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COMMUNALISM AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION: A CASE STUDY
OF SARAWAK, MALAYSIA

by

Christopher Tan, B.A.

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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April, 1977

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submitted by Christopher Tap, in partial fulfilment of the
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ABSTRACT

The separation of Singapore in 1965 exemplified Malaysia's rather tenuous nature. The central government has since been devoting attention to relations with its Bornean states of Sarawak and Sabah.

Sarawak, in particular, has historically exhibited its own plural traits. Moreover, its degree of economic and social development has also differed from that of western Malaysia.

Since 1969 the federal government has adopted an ambitious "nation-building" policy, covering both economic and non-economic areas. As the policy results mainly from the ethnic circumstances in Peninsular Malaysia, its application to other constituent-states remains quite difficult.

This study analyzes relevant aspects in the problem of Malaysian national integration through a case study of Sarawak. The principal contention is that the federal "nation-building" scheme is fundamentally incompatible with the traditional and existing communal characteristics in Sarawak.

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PREFACE

This study represents a culmination of both my long-time personal interest in Malaysia, and the several years of academic work at Carleton. Although my interest in Sarawak was quite intermittent at times in the past, it has since been sustained by a sojourn in the state during the summer of 1970. Ties with Sarawak have now been more consistent, through personal contacts with Sarawakians in Malaysia and former Sarawakians in Canada. Concurrently, my academic training has allowed me to conceptualize some of the knowledge I have on Sarawak.

Examinations by "outsiders" of another country are always difficult endeavours. They can and are, in fact, very often construed as potential "disruptive" forces in the country under study. Moreover, given the physical detachment of the researcher from the country concerned, it may be argued that such studies misrepresent the actual facts and situation. The need of such studies, however, cannot be easily negated. In the case of Sarawak, academic work is still very much in its infancy. Only in the last few years has a handful of comprehensive studies on the state been completed.

At the outset, it must be stressed that I accept the framework of the Malaysian Federation as the appropriate political entity for Sarawak's future growth. Problems between Sarawak and Kuala Lumpur's national policies are, nevertheless, present. But these difficulties, as discussed in the thesis, are seen to be politically solvable. The thesis itself does not gear towards finding possible solutions; possible solutions may be intimated, but they should be regarded more as policy "suggestions" than complete panaceas.

Overall, the completion of this thesis involved, in many ways, the traditional Malay principle of "gotong-royong" (collective help). Several professors at Carleton, and at other universities, contributed greatly towards this study. I am indebted to them for their respective parts in my year-long project:

Elliot L. Tepper, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, for his careful, patient and dedicated supervision of the thesis;

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I especially wish to express my sincerest thanks to Mr. Giok-Po Oey, Southeast Asia Librarian at Cornell University, for allowing and assisting me to use the unique Wason Collection in July 1976.

At Carleton, special thanks to Peggy Atherton, Doris Cole, and the other members of the Interlibrary Loans Department for their laborious task of locating rather obscure titles throughout 1976. Two always-helpful members of the Library staff, Walter Bakalarz and Jean Smyth, also assisted in the completion of this study. I am particularly thankful for their assistance in the reproduction of maps used in the thesis.

This "Preface", as in many others, refers to the typist rather belatedly. But this certainly does not mean to discount the vital role of such assistance. Indeed, I was fortunate to have the expertise of an extremely diligent and skillful typist, Dawn Butt.

Thanks also to the Ontario Provincial Government for awarding me an Ontario Graduate Scholarship (1975-1976), which was the main source of funding for my M.A. studies.

Lastly, I am grateful for the moral support, given throughout the course of this project, by my family (my brother and sister, and my parents). And I wish to dedicate

this study to them, and especially to my parents who celebrated their 25th Wedding Anniversary in December 1976.

Christopher Tan

April 1977

LIST OF MAIN ACRONYMS

BARJASA	Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak
BDC	Borneo Development Corporation
CLC	Communities Liaison Committee
DAP	Democratic Action Party
DO	District Officer
FAMA	Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority
FLDA	Federal Land Development Authority
GRM	Gerakan Party
MARA	Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association
MIC	Malayan Indian Congress
MRP	Minor Rural Project
NEP	New Economic Policy
NF	National Front
OPP	Outline Perspective Plan
PANAS	Party Negara Sarawak
PAP	Peoples Action Party
PESAKA	Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak
PETRONAS	Petroleum Nasional Berhad (National Oil Corporation)
PMIP	Pan Malayan Islamic Party
PPP	People's Progressive Party
RIDA	Rural Industrial Development Authority
SCA	Sarawak Chinese Association

SEDC	Sarawak Economic Development Corporation
SNAP	Sarawak National Party
SUPP	Sarawak United Peoples Party
UMNO	United Malays National Organization

NOTE: North and South Vietnam were formally re-united in July 1976, under communist rule.
 SOURCE: Adapted from Milne, Politics in Malaysia, p.viii.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Most of the newly-independent countries since the end of World War II are attempting to create politically viable "national" entities from congeries of well-established sub-national components. In retrospect, the leviathan task of "national political development" was not first introduced at the demise of colonialism, whose death knell was sounded initially in the mid-1940s. Instead, the idea of "nation-building" can be discerned throughout the histories of earlier "developing" polities both in the western and non-western world. The modern phase of this process, in which the present world is still very much enveloped, was, however, initiated by the French Revolution in the late 18th century. Emanating from that Revolution is the now common notion of a "nation-state" - the predominant framework within which current "national political development" endeavours are being undertaken.

Intrinsic in the conception "nation-state" is the mutual existence of the "nation" and the "state".¹ Embodied within "nation-state" are "state-building" and "nation-building"; in this study, the former denotes territorial integration and the latter representing the establishment of a minimum value consensus requisite for social order.² In the

majority of Third World countries, however, state-building has not been fully completed, while "nation-building" policies are also being formulated and implemented. Thus in marked contrast to the more developed countries, developing polities are attempting to accomplish simultaneously the two tasks of "state-building" and "nation-building". The term "nation-state building" would appear to be more representative of developing polities' quest for progress.

Implicit in the concurrent efforts of nation-state building is the desire for a, more or less, homogeneous political and socio-cultural entity. However, many factors thwart both nation- and state-building efforts. First, widely different traditional regional political ties, common in most large political entities, resist the centralization proclivities entailed in the state-building process. Concomitantly, nation-building efforts confront "resistors" of various types, the chief ones being different ethnic allegiances. The impediments to state-building and nation-building notwithstanding, political leaders in developing countries continue to strive, through several means, for greater degrees of centralized control and overall socio-cultural cohesion.³ Consequently, in the words of Claude Ake, "it is possible for a country to achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity."⁴

Recently, it has been suggested that several main problems confront developing polities in the political development process namely, identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, distribution and integration.⁵ In rather tenuous polities, generally the large and unnatural ones, a premium is certainly placed on integration. Invariably, the quest for national integration comes into conflict with regional interests. Federalism in these countries therefore usually reflects the political goals of the central government. Developing polities, on balance, appear to be based more on centralized federal systems than "loose" or "peripheralized" forms of federalism.⁶ Indeed, the importance of nation-state building accentuates the importance of strong national controls.

Integration at the overall national level thus remains of primary importance to Third World countries. Concurrently, and often neglected, is the political significance of sub-national integrative efforts. Here, integration refers to the maintenance of harmony among various disparate groups divided along such lines as ethnicity and economics.⁷ Being well-established societies these constituents of the new wider national entity obviously continue to manifest indigenous and more traditional societal traits.⁸ In other words, these sub-national components are "old societies in new states", as described by Clifford Geertz.⁹ Thus, national

integration, comprised of the twin processes of state-building and nation-building, often comes in conflict with political integration at the sub-national plane; political integration is regarded here as the process of attaining and maintaining relative harmony among disparate societal groups.¹⁰ At times, it seems that integrative efforts in the national arena even induces disintegrative tendencies at the regional level.

Paradoxical as it may appear, newly-independent countries attempt to create homogeneous entities, both politically and culturally, out of several sub-nations and regions. In many instances extremely unequal relationships exist between the national government and member-states. The central government usually assumes the position of "top-dog", both economically and politically, while the regional units assume "under-dog" positions in those areas.¹¹ Consequently, this upperhand position of national governments allow them to manipulate and contrive nationally-viable entities. Such imbalanced relationships undoubtedly bear much resemblance to the international theory of dependency.¹²

Complimenting the explicit dependency relationship, moreover, are other "integrative" processes. The primary integrative mechanisms originating from the national level include political parties, national economic programmes, and common socio-cultural policies.¹³ In general, there is a sense of urgency among the national governments of Third

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World countries to progress towards a greater degree of national growth. Indeed, the literature on political development has exhibited a perceptible bias towards national development.¹⁴ Although this type of growth is usually insensitive to regional or "particularistic" demands of other types, these countries continue to strive doggedly for such growth; clearly they are "nations in a hurry".¹⁵

This study addresses itself to two problems of political development endemic in the plural Malaysian federation. First, the historical task of procuring and maintaining communal harmony at the regional level, and secondly, the more contemporary challenge of national integration. The problem of attaining national consolidation in Malaysia is examined through a case study of Sarawak, one of the states of East Malaysia.

This is therefore a policy-oriented study in that it follows the "nation-building" policies of the federal government in Malaysia in relation to Sarawak, and the general policy approaches to ethnic pluralism in Sarawak itself. In particular, Sarawak's political integration policies, namely of attaining and maintaining a semblance of harmony among different communal groups, are examined in an historical manner.¹⁶ From these two foci of nation-building and political integration, certain insights may be gained regarding how national integrative schemes affects sub-national communal relations.

The Federation of Malaysia serves as an extremely interesting and also rather complex example of a relatively young nation-state attempting to develop "nationally". It is a "developing" country, and is thus striving to achieve the many ideals associated with a "political religion". Concurrently, Malaysia is engrossed in several developmental problems other than the most salient one of maintaining a degree of cooperation among its communal groups.¹⁷

The Federation, founded in 1963, consists of thirteen extremely disparate member-states: the original eleven states of the Peninsula, the Federation of Malaya, now referred to as either Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia; and the two Bornean areas of Sarawak and Sabah.¹⁸ Singapore, albeit an original member of the Federation, was ousted from the union in 1965.

In creating the Federation of Malaysia, communal relations became more complex for both the wider national Malaysian entity, and, although often overlooked, also for the Federation's constituent units. In fact, Malaysia's major developmental problem continues to be ethnicity. Indeed, Walker Connor has cogently argued that ethnicity is the most crucial, yet most neglected factor in development politics.¹⁹

Peninsular Malaysia historically has been comprised of three principal ethnic groups, the Malays, the Chinese, and Indians. The relative figures for these groups have remained

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rather static in the past half century or so, save for a slight change in the Malay/Chinese balance in favour of the latter. According to the 1970 official census figures Malays formed 53.2 percent, Chinese 35.4 percent, and Indians 10.6 percent of Peninsular Malaysia's total population.²⁰

The Bornean territories, Sarawak and Sabah, evince their own distinctive ethnic characteristics. Needless to say, each of the areas' plural society is complex and quite involved.²¹ Sarawak's population of one million, according to the government census, may be divided along the lines shown in Table 1.

Ostensibly, the presence of various individual plural societies within the Federation, and particularly in Borneo, dictates that traditional approaches to communal conflict maintenance within each area differ accordingly. Moreover, the political development histories of each area govern, to a large extent, the approaches traditionally utilized, and those presently being pursued.²² The areas of Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore, in fact, can be rightly described as equivalent to four separate countries, each with unique "... ethnic distributions, political histories, party systems"²³

Indeed, Peninsular Malaysia experienced a political history quite unlike that of the two eastern Malaysian areas.

TABLE 1

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF SARAWAK, 1960 AND 1970
(POPULATION IN THOUSANDS AND PERCENTAGES)

Year	Ibans	Land Dayaks	Melanaus	Malays	Other "Indigenous"	Chinese	Other
1960 ^a	237,741 32%	57,619 8%	44,661 6%	129,300 17%	37,931 5%	229,154 31%	6,492 1%
1970 ^b	302,984 31%	83,276 9%	53,234 5%	182,709 19%	49,960 5%	294,020 30%	9,735 1%

NOTES: In most official Government Censuses, the "Native" population includes "Malays" (Malays, and Melanaus), and "Dayaks" (Ibans, Land Dayaks, and other "Indigenous"). The Chinese, and "Others" such as Eurasians, are classified as "Non-Natives".

SOURCES: a From Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, Table 1, p.40.

b Figures calculated from data in Leigh, Political Change In Sarawak, pp.1-2; And Government of Malaysia, 1970 Population and Housing Census, p.37.

It existed as the Federation of Malaya until 1963. Independence, or "Merdeka", was achieved in the Peninsula only in 1957. Prior to independence the British governed the area with a "confusing patchwork of legal and administrative structures".²⁴

Both of the Bornean states traversed quite different political routes vis à vis Malaya. Briefly, Sabah was under the rule of the British North Borneo Company throughout the nineteenth century before becoming a full-fledged British colony in 1946.²⁵ In relation to Sabah, Sarawak's history has been far more complicated. Its modern political history can be traced to the establishment of the first "rajahdom" under James Brooke. It remained under Brooke rule until 1946, when Sarawak became a British colony.

In pursuing a conscious policy of laissez-faire in communal relations, the Brookes achieved and maintained harmony among Sarawak's ethnic groups for over a century. Since joining the Malaysian Federation, and, in particular, since 1969 when the federal government in Kuala Lumpur outlined its ambitious "nation-building" plans, Sarawak's ethnic environment has been altered significantly. Although clearly incompatible with Sarawak's human and communal ecology, the federal policies continue to be implemented.

Undeniably, the central government's ardent attempts to achieve "development" in its holistic sense is determined

largely by various domestic and external factors.²⁶ In Malaysia, this process basically entails the search for greater economic equity among its communal groups, and substantial national unity. Thus a crucial, and perhaps intractable, dilemma pervades Malaysian "development"-- on the one hand, the need to establish a "strong" national identity with substantial individual and regional deference to the federal government and its policies and programmes versus the need, on the alternate side, to be sufficiently cognizant of and reasonably accommodative towards the manifold "particularisms" in the plural Federation.²⁷

From the overall Malaysian perspective, modification of Sarawak's society through federal nation-building schemes poses great significance for the already difficult task of "national political development". Thus, in examining the relationship between Malaysian nation-building schemes and communal relations in Sarawak, this study attempts to analyze these questions: (a) Why has the federal government placed such a high priority on nation-building in Malaysia? (b) How has the federal government achieved "centre-ness" in the process of state-building to facilitate nation-building efforts? (c) In what ways have the federal nation-building endeavours influenced communal relations in Sarawak? and (d) On balance, have the Kuala Lumpur nation-building programmes been conducive or inimical to harmonious

communal relations in Sarawak, in other words sub-national political integration?

The overall argument in this preliminary study of Sarawak and Malaysian nation-building is - that due to the inherent societal characteristics of Sarawak the current integrative efforts of the national government are quite successful, in the Sarawakian context at least.²⁸ The federal policy, however, still remains fundamentally incongruous with the communal pattern in Sarawak and is thus creating communal tensions. As such, the nation-building policy of the federal government is creating a potentially dangerous situation for communal relations within the constituent-state, and consequently acting as an incipient impediment to effective Malaysian national integration.²⁹

Notes to Chapter One

1. Essentially, a "nation" is a self-perceived feeling of common identification as manifested in common language, religion and so on. It is a feeling of "we-ness" as opposed to "they" to use Rupert Emerson's terminology. On the other hand, a "state" can be depicted as a political unit comprising a population, territorial demarcation, sovereignty and, most importantly, a monopoly on legitimate physical force (i.e. coercive power) in the given territory. Doubtless, in order to have viable and functional nation-states some degree of interaction between "nation" and "state" remains crucial. The term "nation-state", in fact, suggests such a relationship.

There is a vast collection of studies on these two areas, "nation" and "state". Some of them include: Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953); Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Peter J. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, 20, #4 (July, 1968), 559-592; Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations," International Studies Quarterly, 13, #2 (July, 1969), 149-158; Karl W. Deutsch, "Nationalities and 'Nation-States'," in Politics and Geographic Relationships: Readings in Political Geography, ed. by W. A. D. Jackson (Englewood Cliffs: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1964), 117-119.

2. This distinction between "state-building" and "nation-building" has been developed in Peter Nettl and R. Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies (London: Faber, 1968); Stein Rokkan, et al., Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), and Sheldon Gellar, State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa (Bloomington: International Development Research Center, Indiana University, 1972).

3. For a discussion of the various methods governments in developing countries struggle for survival see W. Howard Wiggins, The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

4. From his A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p.113.
5. Leonard Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.viii.

Integration is specifically mentioned as a chief problem in political development by Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp.65-66.

The problems of achieving legitimacy, identity and integration in a given country are rather self-evident. Participation refers to meaningful roles by the general populace in the overall political process, while penetration implies the degree of governmental presence in the society. Finally, distribution concerns itself with the extent to which power, both economic and political, is present or absent in the polity.

6. The terms "centralized" and "peripheralized" federal systems are developed and discussed in William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1964), pp.5-6.

Other relevant works on federalism include K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968).

7. This is one of the several possible meanings for integration, as posited by Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Political Development and Social Change, ed. by J. S. Finkle and R. W. Gable (2nd ed.; Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), 643-654.

8. It has also been argued that "modernity" actually bases itself on tradition. See Lloyd I. Rudolph and S. I. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

9. See his edition, Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
10. Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," pp.643-645.
11. See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, 8, #2 (1971), 82-117.
12. The principal works concerning the dependency thesis are as follows: André G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); the collection of essays by H. Brewster, N. Girvan, O. Sunkel et al. in the March 1973, volume 22, #1, issue of Social and Economic Studies; and Bonnie Campbell, "Neo-Colonialism, Economic Dependence and Political Change: A Case Study of Cotton and Textile Production in the Ivory Coast, 1960-1970," Review of African Political Economy, #2 (1975).
13. For a comparative analysis of integrative efforts in the Southeast Asian region, refer to John T. McAlister, ed., Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Integration (New York: Random House, 1973).
14. See Rokkan, et al., Citizens, Elections, Parties, pp.47-50; and Gerald S. Maryanov, Conflict and Political Development in Southeast Asia: An Exploration in the International Political Implications of Comparative Theory. Southeast Asia Series #6 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1969).
15. This phrase, "nations in a hurry", has been used to describe African countries in particular. See Arthur Hazlewood, ed., African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Also, the concept of "particularism" is employed here in the same manner as the term coined by Clifford Geertz, "primordial sentiments". Generally, "primordial" attachments encompass a wide range of areas including religion, ethnicity and regionalism. See Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution:

Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States" in Old Societies and New States, ed. by Geertz, pp.105-157.

16. For references on political integration, see above, fn. 7.

17. Basically, a "political religion" asserts that the polity is attempting to achieve some attainable ultimate set of goals. Usually, powerful government (e.g. quasi-absolutist) remains the basic mechanism to achieve such ends. These goals commonly involve general progress, rationality, and even industrialism. See David Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, pp.57-105.

18. The following passage from R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p.1, fn. 1 is useful in distinguishing the many related nomenclatures employed to describe Malaysia and its peoples:

"To prevent confusion, Malaya should be distinguished from Malayan and Malaysian. A Malay is a person of Malay race, distinguished by use of the Malay language and belonging to the Muslim religion. A Malayan is a person who lives in Malaya; who may racially be a Malay, a Chinese, an Indian, a European, or something else. Similarly nowadays, a Malaysian is a person of whatever racial origins, who lives in Malaysia. All these three words - Malay, Malayan and Malaysian - may also be used as adjectives in corresponding senses. Before the formation of Malaysia, Malaysian was sometimes used to include persons racially akin to the Malays, who were Muslims and spoke a similar language, but who originated from a territory other than Malaya, for instance, from Indonesia. But nowadays it would be ambiguous to continue to use "Malaysian" in this sense."

"Semenanjung Malaysia" is the Malay equivalent for Peninsular Malaysia, and is being used quite often in official government publications. Therefore, in this study, "Penisu-

lar Malaysia", "Western Malaysia", "West Malaysia", and "Malaya" will be used interchangeably.

19. See his, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," World Politics, 24, #3. (April, 1972), 319-355.

It is not the intent of this thesis to discuss at any length the respective meanings for "ethnic", "racial", and "communalism". For the purposes of this study, "race" will be given a more general biological orientation (i.e. distinctions in colour pigmentation). "Ethnic" differentiation will be based more on cultural nuances such as language and religion. "Communal" groups are seen as those entities with distinct identities based on broader and more extensive characteristics which would include race, language, religion, particular economic niches, and overall "genres de vie (e.g. the Chinese and Malay communal groups in Malaysia)". In this inquiry, however, "ethnic" and "communal" will be used interchangeably.

20. Ooi Jin-Bee, Peninsular Malaysia (London/New York: Longman Group Company Ltd., 1976), p.130. First published as Land, People and Economy in Malaya in 1963.

21. For comparative purposes, Sabah's population of just under 600,000 can be classified into these groups in 1970: Kadazans (Dusuns) 30%, Muruts 4%, Bajaus 12%, Chinese 22%, Other Indigenous 18%, and Others 14%. Figures from R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam, Malaysia-New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1974), p.5.

Refer also to Appendix A which shows population figures of six specific years in the 1921-1970 period in Peninsular Malaysia.

22. These approaches are discussed in chapters four and five.

23. John A. MacDougall, Shared Burdens: A Study of Communal Discrimination by Political Parties of Malaysia and Singapore (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), p.iii.

The number of constituent-members can be seen as four, instead of fourteen (i.e. counting the individual Malay states), because the constitutional provisions of the Malaysia Agreement (1963) were essentially based on the idea of one Malay component. See Robert O. Tilman, "Malaysia: The Problems of Federation," Western Political Quarterly, #4 (December; 1963), 897-911.

24. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (1st ed.; New York: New York University Press, 1970), p.42.

25. Margaret C. Roff, The Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.26.

26. The term "development" in this study represents all the general processes of political, social, and economic progress. Unless specified to denote one of these particular spheres, "development" will mean the overall collective processes.

27. For a discussion of Pakistan's search for such a "balance" in national integration, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972).

28. Other member-states such as those with a majority of Malays (over 60%) still propose extremely nationalistic (i.e. Malay-oriented) political goals. These states would include Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis. See K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Published for the University of Singapore by the University of Malaya Press, 1965), esp. p.xii.

Also, Sabah has been quite recalcitrant in the national integration process until the "ouster" of the former Chief Minister of the state, Tun Mustapha in late 1975.

29. These more general hypotheses can also be tested in this case study: (a) most national "integrative" policies in most Third World countries tend to be disintegrative in the middle- and long-range perspectives, as such policies usually fail to fully consider regional and local nuances; and (b) the more modernized national government, the

"centre", possesses the upperhand over local areas, and is thus able to realize most of its "integrative" policies.

CHAPTER TWO: FORMATION OF MALAYSIA

Introduction

Chapter two provides a brief historical examination of the formation of Malaysia by discussing the principal reasons for federation; the experiences with regional cooperation prior to 1963, Sarawak's reaction to the Malaysia proposal, and the impact of the separation of Singapore in 1965 on the Federation.

Since this chapter's main purpose is to present an historical overview of the Federation's formative years, more in-depth analysis of federal-state relations is attempted in chapter three.

General Background and Main Reasons for Political Merger

Historically, regional cooperation has not characterized the countries of either South or Southeast Asia. Only somewhat more apocalyptic visions of "Melayu Raya" or the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" have attempted to impress a greater degree of interaction among Southeast Asian countries.¹ The eventual demise of colonial rule, however, resulted in further and less amorphous schemes of regional cooperation.

The end of colonialism signalled the birth of new forms of government. Ostensibly, an overwhelming number of the newly-independent countries adopted the federal species of government, although such a choice was usually prompted by the ex-metropole. Commonwealth countries, in particular, employed the federation schema to a large degree. The list is quite lengthy; Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), Nigeria, Australia, Canada, and India serve as some prime cases. As the "winds of change" eventually swept across Asia new political configurations also transpired. The Federation of Malaysia was a specific example of such a political entity in Southeast Asia.

Some experience with federal schemes had, in fact, been acquired in Malaya prior to the genesis of the Malaysian Federation in September, 1963. Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, with British abetment, became the first federal scheme on the Peninsula as early as 1895 under the title Federated Malay States.² Five other states - Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Johore - were not included in the Federation, and were therefore known as the "Unfederated Malay States".³ There were two other states, Malacca and Singapore, which formed a united administration in 1824, and was known as the Straits Settlement.⁴ Thus, pre-World War II Malaya was divided into three distinct entities, namely the Federated Malay States, the Unfederated Malay States, and the

Straits Settlement.

Though discussed in greater detail in chapter four, it needs to be noted here that government in the above federations was generally indirect. The residential system, in which British officers or "residents" would assume advisory roles in the Malay states, was most prominent in the Federated Malay States. The Malay rulers, or sultans, were, however, not obliged to follow the advice of the residents on areas such as Malay religion and custom.⁵ Indeed, these areas of Malay society were to serve as the basis of the collective body of "special rights" in post-World War II Malaya.

The importance of these Malay "rights" characterized the workings of federations in 19th century Malaya. For instance, the main reason the five states comprising the Unfederated Malay States never joined the Federated States was the fear of losing their power completely to the British. Moreover, the position of Malay "rights" would become highly mooted in a more direct form of colonial administration.⁶ Similar concerns were also evident in post-World War II Malayan federative schemes.

The British proposal for a Malayan Union, discussed further below in chapter four, confronted stubborn Malay opposition. The envisioned Union was to include all the Malaya Peninsula except Singapore, and, more importantly, the

provisions embodied a perceptible movement towards direct rule by the British. Also unlike the prewar system, the position of non-Malays would be greatly improved. In turn, the betterment of non-Malays perforce meant a diminution in the position of Malay rights. Proposed in 1946, the Malayan Union Scheme proved to be quite ephemeral and was replaced by a new plan in 1948.⁷

Within the new 1948 Federation Agreement, Malay rights were not jeopardized in favour of greater non-Malay political roles. Indeed, the 1948 Agreement recognized and instituted the tenets of British colonial indirect rule. Basically, the position of the rulers was upheld by creating the Conference of Rulers, and by having the Paramount Ruler as the Head of State known as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Concomitantly, the other facets of Malay "special rights", such as the predominance of the Islam faith and the Malay language in the Malayan polity, were also present.⁸ Indeed, the "Merdeka" Constitution (Independence Constitution) of 1957 resembled the 1948 Agreement with respect to Malay rights.⁹

Federative schemes in Malaya prior to 1963 were therefore closely aligned to the protection of Malay rights. In expanding the Malayan Federation in 1963, the special Malay position, doubtless, was to be subjected to change as during the 1946-1948 period. Thus, what were the circumstances in

the early 1960s which prompted the formation of the Federation, an entity long opposed by the Malayan Government, and an action certainly to induce political change?

Although some experience with federations was evident on the Malaya peninsula, plans for merger between Singapore and Malaya have been thwarted throughout the postwar period. Between 1955 and 1960 successive Chief Ministers in Singapore, first David Marshall and followed by Lim Yew-hock and Lee Kuan-yew, proposed merger with Malaya.¹⁰ Each of the proposals was unacceptable to the Malayan Government mainly because the inclusion of the predominantly Chinese population of Singapore, approximately 75 percent in the '60s, would upset the delicate equilibrium of communal politics which Malays continued to control in Malaya.¹¹ In fact, possible merger between Malaya and the Borneo areas had also been suggested then but, needless to say, did not materialize until 1963.¹²

In the first months of 1961 the Tunku, Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister of Malaya, changed his mind on the merger issue.¹³ One factor in this was the imminence of the end of the five-year agreement made in 1958 whereby internal security in Singapore was controlled jointly by the governments of Singapore, Malaya and the United Kingdom. Another was that Lee Kuan-yew succeeded in persuading the Tunku that the People's Action Party (PAP), the ruling party in Singapore,

was firmly anti-communist and more reliable than any likely option.¹⁴ Allied to this was the growth of opposition from the extreme left in Singapore and the loss of a by-election which shook public confidence in the ability of the PAP to win the next election.¹⁵ These developments thus increased the disposition of the Malayan leaders to see the advantage, and, indeed, the necessity of a merger which would put defence and internal security in Singapore under the control of a federal government at Kuala Lumpur.

The British Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, in the same period, proposed to the Tunku that it would be advantageous to include the two British Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah with Singapore and Malaya in a federation.¹⁶ The political convenience of this to the Malayan Government was quite clear; its great attraction to the Government was that it would enable the Chinese and left-wing electorate of Singapore to be offset by the inclusion of a considerable number of non-Chinese and non-left wing electorate in the Bornean areas, principally the Ibans of Sarawak and the Kadazans in Sabah as shown in Table 2.

Public discussion emphasized the concern of government leaders with the possibility that Singapore might become the "Cuba of Asia". The Tunku stressed this problem in a

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION BY
ETHNIC GROUPS IN MALAYSIA,
DECEMBER 31, 1964

	<u>Malays^a</u> (%)	<u>Chinese</u> (%)	<u>Indians</u> (%)	<u>Others</u> (%)
Malaya	50.0	36.8	11.1	1.9
Singapore	14.2	74.9	8.2	2.5
Sarawak	66.8	32.0	0.3	0.8
Sabah	67.5	23.0	0.7	8.8
Brunei	70.5	26.0	-	3.4
Total	46.3	42.0	9.3	2.2
Total Minus Borneo	46.1	42.2	9.4	2.2
Total Minus Borneo and Singapore	52.4	35.6	9.6	2.2
Total Minus Singapore	52.5 ^b	35.7	9.6	2.2

NOTES: a "Malays" include "indigenous" tribes
(e.g. Ibans), as well as Malays

b This figure can be broken down:
49.5% - Malays and Muslim tribal people
6.6% - Non-Muslim tribal people

SOURCE: Adapted from Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.),
Tables 12 and 24, pp.294, 429.

speech to his party:

The most important point is that the constitution of Singapore will come to an end and with it two issues will be faced: firstly, whether Singapore becomes independent, and secondly whether Singapore should merge with the Federation of Malaya.

It is impossible to grant independence to Singapore because of the danger of it going communist, and if it goes communist it would with the help of the communist powers try to overrun the whole of Malaya Therefore to prevent this most unhappy and disastrous state of affairs occurring, the only course open to us would be to accept Singapore as a member of the Federation of Malaysia.¹⁷

Private negotiations took place at first between Lee Kuan-yew and the Tunku, and subsequently involved the spokesmen for the Borneo territories.¹⁸ Bargaining continued from July, 1961 until the very eve of the inauguration of the Federation, and resulted in an extremely complicated set of constitutional arrangements in which the different states of the Federation had differing degrees of autonomy. Brunei remained outside the union.¹⁹

Sarawak's Perspective on Federation

Historical attempts at integrating Bornean areas have been present, but were quite unproductive. The initial proposal in April 1953 for union of Sarawak, Brunei and North

Borneo (now Sabah) was seen as an harbinger to the envisaged "South-East Asian Dominion" which would also encompass Malaya and Singapore.²⁰ This proposal for Bornean integration, studied at the "Sarawak-North Borneo-Brunei Conference" met greatest opposition from Brunei.²¹ Ostensibly, it feared an imminent Chinese majority in a larger entity. Brunei also wanted to maintain full control over its oil resources.

Failing to generate sufficient interest in 1953, another scheme for Bornean merger was introduced in 1958.²² Sir Anthony Abell, then Governor of Sarawak, attempted to garner Brunei's interest by advancing the idea of merger within a federation, and not a union. Sir Roland Turnbull, then Governor of North Borneo, delivered a similar proposal on the same day. Briefly, under the proposal, the central government of the envisioned federation would include the Queen's representative, to be called either "Governor-General" or "Government High Commissioner", and a group of advisers drawn from the executive and/or legislative councils of each of the three areas.²³ The constitutional parameters of this tripartite body would include such areas as defence and external affairs, internal security of the whole federation, communications and civil aviation. In the end, however, no favourable response to this proposal was discerned.²⁴

Another futile attempt at Bornean federation occurred in March 1958. Governor of North Borneo, Sir Roland

Turnbull, tried to re-initiate negotiations among the three areas.²⁵ In rejection of this particular and earlier efforts at regional integration, Brunei proceeded with its own political development process. In 1959 the Sultan gave the state a constitution, procured British agreement to create two offices of the Governor of Sarawak and the High Commissioner for Brunei (one person had held both posts until 1959), and stipulated in the new constitution that executive consent was necessary to give effect to any proposal to amalgamate, federate or unite any part of Brunei with any other territory.²⁶ Thus, "... Brunei had chosen to reject British imposed federalism, and to chart its own course towards political independence."²⁷

In retrospect, other disintegrative forces existed in addition to the Brunei factor. The two most prominent ones were (a) the innate antipathy of most Sarawakians for Brunei, due to the latter's long period of tyrannical rule over Sarawak, and (b) a modicum of meaningful interaction among these three territories throughout history. Ultimately, politics in Malaya were to shape the future relationship among these territories, particularly Sarawak and Sabah.

Clearly the role of the Borneo states, Sarawak and Sabah, in the 1963 Malaysian Federation was to offset or to balance out the large Chinese population in Singapore. Several erstwhile schemes for federation in Malaya and

Singapore, as discussed above, were rejected by Kuala Lumpur for fear of an impending upset in the delicate racial balance already existent in Malaya. In incorporating the Bornean areas, Malayan leaders evidently treated the various tribes in Borneo simply as "Malays", although ethnologists emphasize the marked differences between Malays from Malaya, and groups in Borneo.²⁸ However, such a simplistic classification of a very complex situation does allow an "offsetting" effect on the part of Sarawak and Sabah to be apparent.

Largely seen and used as a political expedient by Malayan and British officials, Sarawak and Sabah did not support the federation proposal at first. The "United Front Declaration", drawn up jointly by Ong Kee-hui of the Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP), A. M. Azhari of the Party Raayat in Brunei, and Donald Stephens, leader of Sabah's United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO), rejected the proposal in July 1961.²⁹

James Ongkili has analyzed this reaction of Sarawak and Sabah to the Malaysia proposal very critically. The "conservative attitude", the "conservative feeling", the "exclusivist and xenophobic tendency", and the "inborn characteristics of an inward-looking personality" are seen by him to have been the chief reasons for the tepid reception of the merger plan by Borneo.³⁰

However, in a period when the number of independent states was growing, it was not surprising that leaders in Borneo declined entry into a federation, at the outset at least. Perhaps the goal of self-determination was somewhat "blurred", but such a desire was far from being absent. For a community purported to possess a "retarded political mentality", its rather quick and firm decision can also be construed to have been quite progressive.³¹ Remarks by Donald Stephens epitomized the sentiment of many people in the Bornean territories at that juncture:

... we feel that before we take the plunge, we want to make sure that the plunge will take us forward and not backward. We do believe that the leap can be a great leap forward by us, but to ensure that, there are very many questions which must first be settled.³²

The initial response to the Malaysia proposal, however, did not prove to be irreversible. Within a span of twelve months or so it appears that a volte-face occurred.

Professor Ronald Watts of Queen's University has posited eleven specific factors found to be pertinent in the formation of most new federations. They are as follows:

- (a) desire for political independence, (b) hope of economic advantage, (c) need for administrative efficiency, (d) enhancing of the current conduct of external relations, both diplomatic and military, (e) a community of outlook based on

race, religion, language or culture, (f) geographical factors, (g) influence of history, (h) similarities and differences in colonial and indigenous political and social institution, (i) characteristics of political leadership, (j) existence of successful model of federal union, and (k) influence of the United Kingdom in constitution-making.³³ Most, if not all of these factors were evident during the formation of the Malaysian Federation. Undoubtedly, some were more conducive towards merger than others.

The desire for political independence, firstly, could be discerned in Sarawak at the time. However, much ambivalence transpired over the "Malaysia option" for achieving political independence. This could be seen in the results of two investigatory teams, the Cobbold Commission and the United Nations Mission. In both, approximately thirty-three percent of Sarawak's population opposed entry into the Malaysian scheme, while close to sixty percent approved the scheme conditional on certain provisions such as guarantees on language and religious rights.³⁴

Akin to the desire for political independence was the hope for economic growth within the proposed federation. Clearly, Sarawak's economic progress was quite phlegmatic under both the Brookes and the British administration. Moreover, amelioration of the administrative system would occur. Accordingly, the lead-up to the Federation's genesis has been described as a successful "selling-job".³⁵

Given the somewhat fluid nature of the general Southeast Asian region at the time, the Indo-China situation, and the abortive attempt by Brunei and Indonesia to thwart the formation of the Federation for example, a premium existed for political stability in the Malayan Archipelago and in Borneo.³⁶ As London was fully determined to relinquish most of her overseas territories, the Federation's security umbrella proposal appeared most appealing to Sarawak.

The extent of interaction between Malaya and the Borneo territories prior to the creation of the Malaysian Federation remains difficult to ascertain however. Doubtless, some economic intercourse was present between the two regions throughout history, and particularly between Sarawak and Singapore.³⁷ But ethnic bonds between peoples in the regions are rather slight indeed. Factors such as extremely poor communications between the two areas, with almost non-existent major sea links and only a small airline service, contributed significantly to this situation during and as well as after the British colonial period in Sarawak.

Vibrant interaction among the political elites obviously contributed substantially to the emergence of the Federation. This was greatly assisted by the "good offices" of the British government. Indeed, it seems that the British government, from the outset, perceived the Federation as an honourable "way out" for a receding colonial empire. Some-

what nefarious methods, such as the imprisonment of the more vociferous critics of the scheme in Sarawak, used by the British demonstrated their determination to "pull out" of Southeast Asia. By the end of June 1963, in fact, the British authorities had detained 103 persons alleged to be "hostile" to the Malaysia scheme.³⁸ The three most critical left wing Chinese language newspapers, located in Kuching, Sibu and Miri, were also proscribed.³⁹ A prominent expert on Sarawakian politics asserts that leaders of the SUPP, the predominantly Chinese political party established as the first Sarawak party in 1959 (discussed in greater detail in chapter six): "... certainly believed that the government used the pretext of security as an excuse for obstructing legitimate activities of SUPP merely because SUPP was opposed to the Malaysia Plan."⁴⁰ Ong Kee-hui, then Chairman of the SUPP, has recounted,

The British ensured the victory of the Alliance because they were committed to Malaysia and we opposed it. We lost among the Dyaks because of intimidation by the government and the chiefs - penghulus etc. - who were paid by the government.⁴¹

The somewhat receptive Malayan attitude towards the recommendations of the Report of the Intergovernmental Committee augured well with the Bornean territories. The Malayan and British governments had agreed to appoint the Committee

in November, 1961.⁴² Headed by Lord Landsdowne, the Committee stipulated specific constitutional safeguards for Sarawak and Sabah with respect to native rights, language, religion and the civil service.⁴³

Also, A. M. Azahari's unsuccessful coup in Brunei occurred in late 1962. It initiated Indonesia's policy of "konfrontasi" ("confrontation") to "smash Malaysia". Moreover, there were irritants such as the seizing of Malayan fishing boats by Indonesia in early 1963. The precarious situation was exacerbated by the Philippines' "claim" from the outset.⁴⁴ It, nevertheless, added to the growing complexity of the situation, and, more importantly, directly affected the ultimate decisions of Sarawak and Sabah vis à vis Malaysia.

Apart from joining the Malaysian Federation the other avenues opened to Sarawak and Sabah were (a) the United States of Kalimantan Utara, conceived by A. M. Azahari to encompass Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei under the central control of Brunei; (b) Maphilindo, which represented the envisioned "Malay" supra-state of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia; and (c) a possible communist area.⁴⁵ Due to the circumstances in the region at the time, Sarawak and Sabah were literally "backed up against an immovable wall". In late 1963, resolutions were passed in the legislatures of both areas endorsing the Malaysian proposal. On September 16,

1963 the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, and the two Bornean areas formally became the Federation of Malaysia. The merger was not to remain intact for long, as Singapore would leave in 1965.

The Separation of Singapore, and Sarawak's
Position Within the Federation

Singapore separated, or more rightly, was "ejected" from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965, only some two years following the genesis of the Federation. Many points of friction interacted, and, in the final analysis, it was impossible for Singapore to remain inside Malaysia without violence erupting. The more contentious issues can be categorized into four headings: constitutional, party politics, racial, and personal.⁴⁶ Each group will be dealt with briefly.

First, constitutional points centered mostly on economic and financial issues. Singapore, it must be emphasized, is a free port where customs duties do not apply. These revenues, however, were not seen as sufficient to support Singapore's future growth. The decision was thus made before 1963 to industrialize Singapore, albeit the need to protect some of the new local products by tariffs would be to Singapore's detriment.

With the formation of Malaysia, the problem became more complex. Malaya also started to industrialize, notably in the area of Petaling Jaya near Kuala Lumpur. Most of the products to be manufactured in Malaya or Singapore were destined for internal consumption, not for export. It was desirable therefore to take advantage of the economies offered by the whole internal market in Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, and not have wasteful competition between factories in Singapore and Malaya which produced almost identical products.. This situation naturally implied that industrial expansion in Singapore and Malaya had to be coordinated. Concurrently, the free port status of Singapore, and of other free ports in Malaysia, Penang and Labuan, could not be ruled out too abruptly, or dislocation and overall economic costs would transpire.

The amount of contribution to the federal government by Singapore was also a focus of dispute. Just prior to the signing of the Malaysia Agreement, it was agreed that Singapore contribute forty percent of all revenues collected to the federal government.⁴⁷ This arrangement was subject to amendments from late December 1964, and every two years thereafter.⁴⁸

In July 1965, the Finance Minister of Malaya, Tan Siew-sin, renewed his earlier demand that Singapore augment its contribution to the central government. Singapore's

Finance Minister retaliated with an offer of thirty percent contribution.⁴⁹ At the time of separation this issue was yet unresolved, although it had been submitted to the World Bank for arbitration.⁵⁰

Another area of conflict was the financing of development projects for the Borneo states. Throughout the negotiations, Malaya had urged Singapore to forward (M)\$50 million to the central government to be used for development in Sarawak and Sabah.⁵¹ The Singapore government, reluctant to become a "Santa Claus" state, preferred to advance the sum as a loan, and not as an outright gift.⁵²

The final agreement provided for a Singapore loan of (M)\$150 million to the federal government for Borneo development. But the loan was never forwarded since Malaya never provided employment on developmental projects for Singaporeans, as agreed to by Lee Kuan-yew and the Tunku.⁵³

Concerning party politics, the Alliance leadership in Malaya had not expected the PAP of Singapore to compete so aggressively in politics within Malaya. It was surprised that something like "full trade in politics" was developing, and interpreted the increase in PAP's activities as a breach of an unspoken agreement.

However tacit the agreement was between Singapore and Malaya, it was assumed by politicians in both areas that

respective party politics would remain essentially unaltered; the alliance pattern was to prevail in Malaya with a somewhat similar dominance by the PAP in Singapore. A series of developments portended changes, nevertheless. The Malayan Alliance Party, the ruling party in the Peninsula, decided to enter the Singapore elections in September 1963 which was won by PAP. A challenge to the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and its role of being the Chinese party in Malaya was posed by PAP's participation in the 1964 Malayan elections which was won by the Alliance. Lastly, there was a growing number of "feuds" between PAP and MCA first of all, and then also between PAP and the UMNO over "political suzerainty" in respective areas and certain political issues, to be discussed below.⁵⁴

Of utmost significance was the salient difference between the respective approaches of the PAP and the Alliance towards politics. The most important issue evolved around the problem of communalism in Malaysia. The former believed in directing attention to the existence of communal problems, analyzing them and stressing the necessity of overcoming them if the Federation were to survive. The ultimate goal was a "Malaysian Malaysia", as opposed to a predominantly "Malay Malaysia."⁵⁵ The latter, while believing that it was necessary to make general pronouncements on the desirability of racial harmony, feared that any extensive open examination

of communal differences would only generate problems.

Personal elements also became involved in Singapore/Malaya relations during the 1963-1965 period. Within both major political groups, the PAP and the UMNO, there existed mutual-distrust and even hatred. Among the UMNO in Malaya, for instance, Lee Kuan-yew was generally alleged to be striving to be the Prime Minister of Malaysia.⁵⁶ This objective, while legally tenable under the terms of federation, was nonetheless a growing worry among Malays in Malaya.

A final variant in the dispute can be added that of the foreign policy approaches. Essentially, the PAP maintained a rather "progressive" stance to international relations vis à vis the Alliance. Lee was intent on bringing Malaysia directly into the so-called Afro-Asian camp.⁵⁷ He argued that, "... for us (Malaysians) life must mean a growing closer identification with the hopes and aspirations and the political attitudes of the growing band of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries."⁵⁸

The presence of other factors, such as the reduction of communist activities at that time, and the fact that the Malaysian Federation was accepted by the international community at large, facilitated the "eviction" of the island-city from the Federation. Originally envisaged to serve as a "New York" for Malaysia, Singapore once again became independent on

August 9, 1965.⁵⁹ Ostensibly, some of the requisites for Singapore's political fusion with Malaya were present, such as geographical propinquity and common defence considerations. However, the fact remains that certain intractable problems prevailed and predominated in the transitory union during 1963 and 1965. Indeed many of the problems in the Singapore/Kuala Lumpur relationship during this period are quite reminiscent of the difficulties in the federal ties with the Bornean states. In other ways, such as Singapore's temerity in the federation, the case of Singapore within Malaysia provides an interesting contrast to the state of Sarawak.

The withdrawal of Singapore naturally caused consternation in both Sarawak and Sabah. The major political parties in both states called for immediate re-examination of the agreement to enter Malaysia. Without Singapore, the political bargaining position of the Bornean states became greatly diminished. The Malayan government, as such, only reaffirmed its original allowances in language and religion. These concessions, to be discussed below, were temporally limited to a ten year period, 1963-1973.⁶⁰

With Singapore's departure from the Federation, Sarawak, and especially the non-Malay communities, lost an ally. Both Sarawak and Singapore possessed a degree of commonality in that a "Malaysian Malaysia", and not a "Malay

Malaysia" was the desirable goal in the Federation. Indeed, multiculturalism serves as the basis of Singapore's "development policy" in the 1970s. For Sarawak multiculturalism serves as a component of its "national ideology", to be discussed below in chapter three. Malaysia by 1965 was not the federation originally envisioned by its architects. Upon entering the Federation, Sarawak was ensured several constitutional safeguards vis à vis the central government. Throughout the past decade or so, however, these provisions have been greatly attenuated. Indeed, Malaysia has been seen as the most centralized federal system in the Commonwealth.⁶¹

Conclusion

Clearly, government prior to World War II in Malaya can be seen more as a "territorial federation", and the Federation of Malaysia more as a "racial federation".⁶² Moreover, the 1963 entity has been characterized by a predominantly Malay elite group at the centre which is in marked contrast to the presence of a relatively disinterested centre in the pre-war years, comprised of the colonial administrators. As a "racial federation", national integration, perforce, confronts more difficulties as communalism assumes primary importance.

Additionally, the political nature of the collection of reasons for merger between Malaya and the Bornean areas ren-

ders national integration quite difficult to achieve. Indeed the tenuous foundation for federation accentuates the importance of national consolidation and development.

In the particular case of Sarawak, the presence of a somewhat amorphous identity and its economic and general backwardness vis à vis Peninsular Malaysia, to be discussed more closely in chapter three, doubtless, contributed to its decision to join the Federation. And this stands in stark contrast to the Singapore case of having a fairly high level of development which allowed for gradual "confrontation" with the central authority. On balance, while the ethnicities of Sarawak and Sabah served as an ethnic balance in the Federation before Singapore's separation, it can be said that Singapore acted as Sarawak's and Sabah's "offsetting" force against the more "mature" Malayan member. Since the exit of Singapore in 1965, Sarawak and Sabah can be seen as unequivocal "underdogs" in the Federation.⁶³ Malaya's historical policy of federalism based on Malay special rights therefore experiences little or no opposition within the Federation minus Singapore. The actual mechanics of Malaysian federalism since the departure of Singapore, the subject of chapter three, have contributed towards the "handicapped" positions of the Bornean states in relation to Malaya.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. "Melayu Raya", or sometimes referred to as "Indonesia Raya", depicts the vast state including all the "indigenous" peoples of Malaysian stock. Although actively propounded in the 1940s by the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), it gained special limelight during the formative years of the Malaysian Federation. Suffice to say that the Philippines attempted to use the attraction of a wider union of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia under the name "Maphilindo" to thwart the creation of Malaysia, in particular the incorporation of the Bornean areas into the Federation. For some ultra Malay nationalists, on the other hand, the somewhat visionary state represented a method of "drowning" the Chinese in a larger "Malay" political unit.

Conceived by the Japanese during World War II, the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" was to encompass all of Asia under Japanese authority. See Means, Malaysian Politics, pp.44-47.

2. N. Ginsbury and C. F. Roberts, Malaya (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp.34-35.
3. Ibid., p.40.
4. Frank H. King, The New Malayan Nation: A Study of Communalism and Nationalism (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p.6.
5. Milne, Politics in Malaysia, p.16.
6. Ginsbury and Roberts, Malaya, pp.36-37.
7. Malay opposition to the Union resulted in the formation of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). See the article by Ishak bin Tadin, "Dato Lnn and Malay Nationalism," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 1 (1960), 56-88.

Also refer to King, New Malayan Nation, p.6.

8. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong holds office for five years and possesses several important powers such as the safeguarding of Malay privileges and the appointment of Prime Ministers. Each Head of State is elected by the Conference of Rulers. See Milne, Politics in Malaysia, pp.130-133.

9. Discussed in greater detail below in chapter four.

10. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.309, fn.3.

11. Ibid., p.294.

12. Union between the Borneo areas and Malaya was discussed on two separate occasions prior to 1957, during the mid-1940s by the Colonial Office in London, and also by the Alliance Party in the early '50s. See Means, Malaysian Politics, p.309, fn. 5. As discussed below in this chapter, there were also specific and more concrete attempts at Bornean integration.

13. It is necessary to briefly explain the several names and titles used in Malaysia. "Dato", which has been changed to "Datuk", is a title conferred by a state of Malaysia, and corresponds roughly to a British knighthood. Its equivalent, when conferred by the Head of State of the Federal Government, is "Tan Sri". A still higher federal title is "Tun". Dato, Tan Sri, and Tun are all non-hereditary.

"Tunku" or "Tengku" is roughly equivalent to prince and is hereditary. Also, the Malay title, "Dato", very common in Sarawak, is hereditary. Persons whose names are prefixed by "Temenggong" or "Penghulu" are part of the native chiefs complex.

14. Nancy M. Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore From Malaysia. Southeast Asia Program Data Paper #73 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1969), pp.6-7.

15. Ibid., p.6.

16. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.293.

The Malayan Prime Minister regarded communist threats as a major reason for the creation of Malaysia. See his article, "Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs, 43 (July, 1965), 659-670.

17. Quoted in Means, Malaysian Politics, p.293.

18. Willard A. Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia: New Factor in World Politics (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1962), esp. pp.15-22.

19. Two main factors impeded the sultanate from joining the Federation. First, the problem concerning the constitutional position of the Brunei sultan within the Federation could not be adequately resolved. Secondly, Brunei was financially self-sufficient since the oil strikes in Seria in 1922, and thus did not regard entry into a larger entity as economically desirable. Refer to ibid., pp.125-151.

For a general account on Brunei, see Donald E. Brown, Socio-Political History of Brunei, A Bornean Malay Sultanate (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1969).

20. B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945-1963: A Study of Federal Problems in a Plural Society (Kuala Lumpur/Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.123.

The proposal for union was suggested by the British government.

21. Ibid.

22. Judith A. Ogston, "Political Development in Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei" (Unpublished B. A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1960), p.83.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp.83-84.

26. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, p.124.
27. Ibid.
28. In particular, see Tom Harrisson, ed., The Peoples of Sarawak (Kuching: Sarawak Museum, 1959). Harrisson unequivocally states in the final chapter, p.134, that Sarawak Malays "... are descendants - often recent descendants - of Melanaus and Land Dayaks, and of many smaller groups which they have either partly ... or wholly ... absorbed since the advent of Islam."
29. James P. Ongkili, The Borneo Response to Malaysia (Singapore: Donald Moore Press Ltd., 1967), p.28.
30. Ibid., pp.40-41, inter alia.
31. Ibid., p.42.
32. Quoted in ibid., p.35.
33. Ronald S. Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1966), p.42.
34. Michael B. Leigh, The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1974), p.46.
35. Sarawak leaders were provided with free passages to Malaya for tours of development projects and the like. The Prime Minister himself, Tunku Abdul Rahman, made numerous visits to both areas in Borneo to garner support. It was generally a "Parker Pen" diplomacy at the lower levels of society. Sarawak and Sabah were also proffered respective sums of (M)\$300 and (M)\$210 million for development should they become Malaysian states.

36. Regarding the Brunei revolt, see below, this chapter. However, the abortive revolt remains quite significant. It initiated Indonesia's policy of "konfrontasi" against Malaysia. Although Indonesia initially acquiesced with the Malaysia proposal it quickly began to thwart the plan after 1961. Numerous reasons accounted for President Sukarno's new policy towards Malaysia: (a) the sustaining of domestic nationalistic fervour originally initiated by Djakarta's campaign in West Irian, (b) the need to fight against the manifestations of the "Old Established Forces" such as colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism which, according to Sukarno, prompted the Malaysia proposal, and (c) the lingering Indonesian aspiration to be leader in the Southeast Asia region.

37. Throughout the Brooke rule, Singapore served as a "window to the world" for Sarawak's economy. Shipments of Sarawakian minerals, pepper and other raw produce were transported to Singapore for overseas trade. Concurrently, Sarawak depended upon Singapore for rice imports, equipment, as well as educational and social facets, especially with Sarawak Chinese.

38. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.46.

39. Ibid.

40. Quoted in ibid.

41. Quoted in ibid., p.47.

Other factors favouring the Malaysia proposal were: (a) the terms of the Cobbold Commission favoured merger; (b) leading Borneo politicians such as Stephen Yong, Ong Kee-hui, and Donald Stephens were excluded from the Commission; (c) the hurried and inefficient United Nations Mission in 1963 also favoured movement towards federation; and (d) the creation of a three-tier electoral system in Sarawak impeded if not blocked completely representation of "grass roots". For details, see Francis L. Starnes, "Malaysia and the North Borneo Territories," Asian Survey, 19 (November, 1963), 519-534.

42. Hamilton F. Armstrong, "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia," Foreign Affairs, 41 (July, 1963), 673-693.

43. The "native" groups in Borneo (see Table 1) were accorded special tracts of land, financial grants and so on. Concerning language, English was to remain the official medium and lingua franca in the public service, but only until 1973. Religious freedom for all groups was also provided. For specifics, see Ongkili, Borneo Response to Malaysia, pp.77-82; and Tilman, "Malaysia: The Problems of Federation."

44. This "claim" was based upon the Arabic wording of a deed between the British North Borneo Company and the Sultan of Sulu which was used by the Philippines' argument that North Borneo was not ceded, but only leased.

The claim was subsequently taken up by the Manila Government from the Kiram Corporation which had initiated the matter with Malaya and Britain. For more detailed accounts, refer to Michael Leifer, The Philippine Claim to Sabah. Monographs on Southeast Asia (Hull: University of Hull, 1968); and Mohamed A. bin Othmani, The Philippines' Claim to Sabah (Singapore/Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970).

45. Within Sarawak there was increasing threats of communist activities and terrorism. The general threat has been poignantly described as the "Danger Within" by the Sarawak Government. See The Danger Within: A History of the Clandestine Communist Organization in Sarawak (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1963).

46. Milne, Politics in Malaysia, p.83.

47. Ibid., p.212.

48. Ibid., p.210.

49. Fletcher, Separation of Singapore, p.16.

50. Ibid., p.18.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p.19.

53. Ibid.
54. Means, Malaysian Politics, chapter 18, inter alia.
55. See Lee Kuan-yew's speech in 1965, "A Malaysian Malaysia" in Southeast Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change, ed. by Roger M. Smith (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp.273-274.
56. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.69.
57. Ibid., pp.67-68. The UMNO was generally more "conservative", and placed more importance on existing links with Britain and the United States (i.e. the "west"). See Milne, Politics in Malaysia, chapter 11.
58. Quoted in ibid., p.68.
59. The Malayan Prime Minister, Abdul Rahman, referred to Singapore as a "New York" in his article, "Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast Asia," p.1.
60. In retrospect, the separation of Singapore was quite anomalous. It has been cogently shown that there was a marked increase in economic and non-economic interaction between Malaya and Singapore with the creation of the Federation. See Robert O. Tilman, "Malaysia and Singapore: The Failure of a Federation," in Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia, ed. by Robert O. Tilman (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp.490-505.
61. Watts, New Federations, p.140.
62. Discussion on these two self-evident types of federations can be found in Mohamad Matasan, "The Nature of Malaysian Federalism" (Unpublished B.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1971), esp. pp.117-124.

63. See Galtung, "Structural Theory of Imperialism," on general ideas of "topdog" - "underdog" relationships as it applies to international politics. These terms have only been used to describe Malaysia's federal-state situation; Galtung does not refer to Malaysia specifically in his study.

CHAPTER THREE:

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN SARAWAK

Introduction

To obtain an overall perspective of the actual mechanisms in Malaysian national integration, it is necessary to examine the ties, both formal and informal, between Sarawak and the federal government. This chapter examines the general area of federalism in Malaysia, and also the specific Sarawak/Kuala Lumpur relationship which encompasses constitutional aspects, Sarawak's dependence on the federal government, and past areas of contention in the relationship.

General Nature of Malaysian Federalism

Some experience with federal schemes had been acquired prior to the genesis of the Malaysian Federation in the Malayan states, as outlined in chapter two.¹ Similarly, Sarawak also had some experience with integrative efforts of the northern Borneo region, although these attempts proved less fruitful than those in Malaya. The eventual formation of the 1963 Federation can be attributed to several key factors: the official support of the ex-metropole government; the presence of external threats; and the existence of gener-

ally cooperative elites amenable to the federative proposal, although Sarawakians had to be "won over".

Throughout Malaysia's and, indeed, Malaya's experience with federalism one particular theme has been most salient.- the so-called centralization motif. Circumstances in Malayan, and Malaysian history, have abetted such a development.. Almost immediately following the postwar period the anti-guerrilla war fought in Malaya necessitated effective central control. Following independence the Emergency became more intensified, making this period, from 1945-1960 the most protracted national crisis in Malaya. Largely resulting from the Emergency, the "centre" assumed greater political influence relative to the member-states. Robert Tilman has asserted that,

all Malayan and Malaysian federations have had central governments that were far stronger than those of the constituent units. Moreover, in each federal system the tendency has been for the centre, over time, to strengthen its position at the expense of the peripheral units.²

The 1969 communal conflagration in Kuala Lumpur also augmented the powers of the federal government. During the conflict complete power was concentrated in the paramilitary council of the National Operations Council (NOC). In its rule, May 15, 1969 to February 20, 1971, "... there were no legal pretences made about sharing ultimate political

authority between the Federal Government and the states."³ Moreover, with the transition to normal life in Malaysia, the Constitution was drastically altered in that some of the "temporary" provisions that granted additional powers to the central government were made a permanent part of the Constitution.⁴ This tendency of centralization, in fact, has been characteristic throughout Malayan history. Professor Tilman elaborates on the constitutional consequences of the "May 13th Incident" or the 1969 riots:

Again the theme was repeated: temporary centralizing powers enunciated to meet an immediate problem became part of the permanent corpus of laws of the Federation once the situation returned to normal. Probably as important, the centralizing habits of politicians and bureaucrats were again reinforced and enlarged by this period of unequivocal centralization.⁵

A greater degree of centralization was certainly needed during the series of political crises in Malaya. And it is quite difficult to refute the recourse to more federal power. Nevertheless, the centralization proclivity tends to neglect diversity within any federal unit. Cynthia Enloe, in fact, contends that "In a multi-ethnic nation political efficacy should be measured not by degrees of centralization but by the appropriateness of any structural formula to ... the given ethnic diversity."⁶ Therefore, the dilemma of Malaysian government and politics remains - the balancing be-

tween national interests and regional nuances.

In Malaysia's "centralized", as opposed to "peripheralized", form of federalism, a pervasive and related motif is evident, namely manipulative federalism.⁷ Here, manipulations of various forms assist in the maintenance and aggrandizement of central authority. In sum, these political machinations can be regarded as vital components in the process of federalism.⁸

Manipulative federalism was present during the formation of the Federation. The winning-over of the Borneo states has been regarded by many analysts as a successful "selling job".⁹ The proffering of several economic schemes, undoubtedly, captured and sustained Bornean interest in the "Greater Malaysia" scheme. Constitutional provisions also formed part of the manipulations; the more sensitive areas of language and education, for example, were left unaltered for a ten year period beginning in 1963.

In the workings of federal-state relations since 1963 manipulations have continued to play an influential role. They may be seen as part of what Carl Friedrich terms the "dynamics" of federalism.¹⁰ Ostensibly, interaction between political parties of the state and federal levels through coalitions obtain a greater and more consistent extent of penetration by the federal government into the constituent

states. Development projects, furthermore, are used to attract and/or reward political support. The allocation of development funds to individual states has constituted a primary facet in manipulative federalism. Gordon Means has observed that, "It is no mere coincidence that when opposition parties have controlled state governments, the Federal Government has been less generous with its funds, arguing that cuts were necessary because of mal-administration and waste by state authorities."¹¹ In conclusion, Professor Means feels that, "The allocation of federal funds has been cleverly employed to secure state compliance with federal policies and to improve the political fortunes of the State Alliance organization (the ruling national party)."¹²

In the final analysis, the centralization theme with the related concept of manipulative federalism is complimented by the growth of coalitional politics throughout Malaysia. The Sarawak Coalition in 1970 was the first to join the National Front (NF), the Front being the new name for the old Alliance Party in Malaya which includes three distinct communal parties. Others since then have also joined the Front, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM) of Penang in February 1972, the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) from Perak in May 1972, and the Partai Islam (PAS) of Kelantan in December 1972.¹³

General Sarawak - Kuala Lumpur Relations

From the more general character of Malaysian federalism, we can now focus on the specific relationship between Sarawak and the central government. The two chief themes, centralization and manipulative federalism, remain pivotal in Sarawak's federal relations.

Although provisions upon entry into the Federation in 1963 safeguarded against drastic and rapid changes in religion, language, "native" rights and so on, these were temporally circumscribed. However, Sarawak nationalistic fervour was somewhat satisfied during the Malaysia debate by these constitutional measures, or manipulations.

The delineation of powers between Sarawak and the Kuala Lumpur government is as follows:

Federal List /

- Defence
- External Affairs
- Internal Affairs
- Civil and Criminal Law
- Federal Citizenship
- Naturalization and Aliens
- State and Federal Elections
- Finance, Trade, Commerce and Industry
- Taxation and Shipping
- Communications
- Federal Works and Power
- Surveys
- Education
- Medicine and Health
- Labour and Social Security
- Welfare of Aborigines
- Censorship and Publications

State List

Land Laws and Licences
 Muslim Law
 Religion and Malay Custom
 Agriculture
 Local Government
 Local Services
 State Works and Water
 State Government

Concurrent List

Social Welfare
 Scholarships
 Protection of Wild Animals
 Town and Country Planning
 Vagrancy
 Drainage and Irrigation
 Rehabilitation of Mining Land 14

Upon entry into the Federation no amendment was to be made on several important areas as alluded to earlier. The areas included citizenship, the constitution, the appointment, renewal and tenure of judges in Sarawak's High Court, the jurisdiction of the state legislature, religion in the state, language in Parliament, special treatment of state "natives", namely the "Dayak" and "Malay" groups, and the allocation of seats for Sarawak in the Federal Parliament.¹⁵ Alterations could be made in these areas if consent of the Governor of Sarawak was present.

Factors other than the constitutional formula, of course, also affect the actual operation of the federation. Although Sarawak has the largest land area in the Federation, its backwardness in relation to other constituents is certainly pronounced. Economically, Sarawak has been behind Peninsular Malaysia for many decades, as the latter is one of the more modernized areas in Southern Asia. Sarawak's political quiescence throughout modern history, moreover, was only beginning to change in the 1950s; by 1957 Malaya had already achieved its rather belated independence from Britain. On balance, the position of Sarawak has been and continues to be of an "underdog" vis à vis the federal government. Evolving from this unequal relationship is the discernible superiority complex of Malaysians vis à vis the Bornean population in general.

This superiority attitude of most Malaysians over eastern Malaysians has contributed to the gradual growth of Sarawak nationalism. The clearest predications of this feeling in Sarawak has been the constitutional crises during the 1960s as well as the issue of nativization of Sarawak's bureaucracy, both to be discussed below. Conversely, Sarawakians of all societal stratas harbour ambivalent attitudes towards Peninsular Malaysia, wavering between a position of deference and one of antagonism. Given the generally diffident character of most Sarawakians, it would seem that the

former posture has been more prevalent, and this particular attitude has perhaps contributed to the general acceptance of the vigorous implementation of Peninsular Malaysia's "development" dictums of Malayism and "native" rights. Facilitated by patronage politics, and "machine" party politics, to be examined in greater detail in chapters six and seven, Sarawakian support of these developmental goals have been generally acquired.

The crucial element in this developmental process remains that nexus between the Sarawak coalition and the National Front based in Peninsular Malaysia. With the Sarawak coalition as an integral member of the Front, it is expected that significant deviances in policies from the federal government do not usually occur. Sarawak's current Chief Minister was, in fact, former Federal Minister of Education before he returned "home" to Sarawak in 1970 to form and head the Sarawak coalition. While as a federal officer, Chief Minister Yakub was the main impetus behind the aggressive Malay education programme.¹⁶ However, the number of Sarawakians at the national level remains minuscule. As of October 1974, three members of Sarawak's Government parties had appointments in the Federal Cabinet: Datuk Ong Kee-hui as Federal Minister of Local Government and Environment, Datuk Amar Haji Abdul Taib bin Mahmud as Federal Minister of Information and Special Functions and of General Planning and

Socio-Economic Research, and Dr. Sulaiman bin Haji Daud with the post of Deputy Minister of Lands and Mines.¹⁷

Intimate relations between federal and state parties develop from other sources as well. Financial support from Malaya to Sarawak's components has been quite frequent. Other forms of support include visitations by federal ministers to Sarawak, especially during important periods such as near elections.¹⁸ Moreover, consistent interaction through conferences and meetings is also maintained between the "national" and regional components of the NF.¹⁹

Coupled with the usage of development programmes, especially at the local levels, to amass and sustain political support, and the employment of legal/constitutional influence by the federal government, the Malaysian Federation becomes more "quasi-federal" than "federal".²⁰ Discreet as they may be, the manifold political manoeuvres are creating a situation in which Sarawak's progress is becoming clearly aligned to that in Peninsular Malaysia. Therefore, national integration is being enhanced through centralization and federal manipulations, the two predominant themes in Malaysian federalism.²¹ However communal differences existent in the plural Federation is relegated to secondary importance. Federalism in both Malaya and Malaysia, in fact, "... has never been designed to reflect ethnic communal differences."²²

Sarawak's Dependence on the Federal Government

The current literature on "dependency" has centered primarily, if not wholly, on inter-state relationships.²³ Here, "dependencia" is applied to an internal or domestic situation, specifically the ties between Sarawak and the federal government. No attempt is, however, made to fully apply this concept to the Malaysian case; it is only used when applicable to Sarawak's federal ties.

Notions of a dependent relationship emerge from Sarawak-Kuala Lumpur relations given the rather marked differences between the two areas. Sarawak, although mainly an agricultural state, still possesses a wide assortment of natural resources, for example timber, pepper and oil.²⁴ In 1975, the respective earnings of crude oil, timber, and pepper were (M)\$1,025.1 million (73.9% of state revenue), (M)\$125.8 million, and (M)\$102 million.²⁵ Concurrently, the more advanced technology and financial capital of Peninsular Malaysia is absolutely necessary to fully exploit these natural resources. The industries existent in eastern and southern Malaya, moreover, require some of Sarawak's products, especially oil. In the general sense, a symbiotic relationship between the two centres of Peninsular Malaysia and of Sarawak is soon created.

Sarawak's dependence on the federal government consists of several forms: developmental, economic, defence and

security, and psychological. Overall, these areas of reliance allow the growth of a close relationship between the two respective centres of Malaya and Sarawak.²⁶

Firstly, in the wide ambit of "development" Sarawak depends upon the federal government mainly as a purveyor of "capital". This "capital" encompasses financial as well as human resources. Federal funds have formed significant percentages in Sarawak's developmental plans since the mid-1960s as well.²⁷ In fact, only with the more recent development of the oil industry can Sarawak contemplate some financial independence from Kuala Lumpur. This possibility of financial autonomy remains quite slim however, given that a sizeable amount of Sarawak's oil revenues accrues to the federal government, to be discussed below.²⁸ Here, a specific dependency relationship can certainly be detected; Sarawak's primary and most important revenue earner is controlled by the federal government, and, thus, this Bornean state's economics are guided by essentially external forces.²⁹ This situation is further compounded by the fact that the federal government is estimated to collect 85 percent of all taxes, duties, licence fees and other revenues collected in the country.³⁰

Sarawak is also dependent on Peninsular Malaysia's expertise. For instance, Sarawak's specialized government personnel are sent to Peninsular Malaysia for training. The

main departments have been Public Works, Health and Welfare, Agriculture, and the Development Office.³¹ Concomitant direct transfers of personnel from Malaya to Sarawak are present as well.³² Positions of importance to national integration have, in fact, been filled by Malaysians. The posts of Director of Radio Malaysia, and Minister of Education in Sarawak serve as prime examples.

This dependency through "development" is, however, most evident at the grass-roots level. Indeed, it is an extension of state-federal dependency to one of reliance by the local levels upon both state and federal assistance. Largely facilitated by the historically weak economic position of local government in Sarawak and by the greater degree of penetration among federal agencies into the state, a sub-state/federal dependency relationship is therefore created.³³

Traditionally, District Officers (DOs) have been the principal focii of local government. They have even been described as the peoples' "mothers and fathers".³⁴ Since joining the Federation two new positions have been created, the State Development Officer (SDO) and the Divisional Development Officer (DDO), to compliment the functions of the DOs. Both of these new posts are directly responsible to the Federal Ministry of Local Government, and the Ministry of National and Rural Development, and, in fact, ultimately to the

national Cabinet. SDOs continue to be recruited directly from Malaya. And DOs are now expected to participate directly in national integration programmes in addition to their traditional responsibility of coordinating local development projects.³⁵

Related to developmental matters are various economic areas in which Sarawak is dependent upon Peninsular Malaysia. First and foremost, trade between the two areas has been growing in importance. Although a scheme was proposed for closer Bornean economic ties in the late 1950s, it was rejected by the parties involved, as discussed above in chapter two. Subsequently a Borneo Free Trade Area between Sarawak and the then North Borneo (now Sabah) was finally agreed upon in January 1962.³⁶ Under the agreement not only the produce of either territory would be able to move freely into the other area, but goods imported from outside the area would also be allowed to move unrestricted, except in the case of liquor, oil, and petrol.

In retrospect, the economics of the Malaysia proposal had remained mostly in the background during the debate on federation. But this was understandable since the merger's main motivating force was political, not economic. During the debate itself, economics as a rationale occupied an ancillary position, and was, in fact, discussed almost exclusively between Singapore and Malaya. In the final

Malaysia Agreement of July 1963 it was ensured that the federal government "... shall progressively establish a Common Market in Malaysia for all goods or products produced, manufactured or assembled in significant quantities in Malaysia."³⁷

Singapore had the most to gain from economic integration, as now it could move from light consumer industries to more basic heavy industries. Malaya, similarly, could collect revenues from tariffs, and in addition profit from a wider market. But the Borneo states seemed to gain no economic benefit at all. In the past their trade with the other Malaysian areas had been conducted with few restrictions. Of their respective total exports, Sarawak had been exporting 60.6 percent and Sabah 63.4 percent to other Malaysian states. Their respective total imports had been 86.1 percent and 54.9 percent for Sarawak and Sabah from other Malaysian states.³⁸ Thus, since their trade had already reached a substantial level, the removal or prevention of trade barriers between member-states was not likely to expand Borneo trade.

The Rueff Mission, a group of economists commissioned by the federal government from the World Bank to study Malaysia's economic policies, recommended in 1963 a greater degree of economic harmonization among the Malaysian states. Specifically, it recommended that industries be allowed to

move freely to the localities where the natural advantages are the greatest; that a single customs tariff be implemented; and finally that the use of devices such as import quotas be discouraged.³⁹

Harmonization of tariffs in Malaysia, however, did not occur at federation. Only in March 1969 was a limited single customs area created, excluding the free ports of Penang and Labuan. Domestically produced commodities, except for a few categories produced in Sarawak and Sabah, were thereby permitted to move duty free within the Federation. The Federal Minister of Finance was also given the authority to levy common customs duties on goods imported to any part of the country, and to extend to Penang and Labuan any regulations considered necessary. In fact, in August 1969 it was ascertained that Penang had lost 90 percent of its free trade status.⁴⁰ Thus, through economic, and particularly trade measures, national economic integration is being enhanced.

The pattern of trade in Sarawak in the past decade or so clearly indicates a strong economic relationship with Peninsular Malaysia. Tables 3 and 4 point this trend out quite well. Of particular note, however, are the precipitous drop of imports from Brunei into Sarawak since 1972 (mostly of oil), and the predominance of Singapore and Japan as Sarawak's main export markets for pepper, timber and palm

TABLE 3

SARAWAK'S IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES, 1965-1974*

Year	Peninsular Malaysia	Brunei	Japan	China	Singapore
1965	14.33	190.50	20.98	36.68	55.78
1966	39.15	215.11	22.09	44.78	58.77
1967	46.76	237.49	24.84	46.05	48.68
1968	59.57	270.35	33.90	41.37	47.53
1969	91.07	259.81	32.70	38.61	44.32
1970	113.34	277.40	46.88	39.40	45.29
1971	119.45	303.92	57.60	32.99	45.89
1972	144.35	76.53	48.43	30.77	42.37
1973	197.32	75.39	58.88	55.81	46.83
1974	218.67	150.41	135.41	121.05	78.10

* Values according to (M)\$ millions.

SOURCE: Adapted from Government of Sarawak, Statistical Handbook of Sarawak 1974 (Kuching: Department of Statistics, 1975), Table 12.2, pp.60-61.

TABLE 4

SARAWAK'S EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES, 1965-1974*

Year	Singapore	Japan	Peninsular Malaysia
1965	212.69	45.46	21.42
1966	197.27	76.99	18.38
1967	192.99	85.93	18.88
1968	205.46	107.18	10.37
1969	235.63	112.64	12.82
1970	221.39	116.14	12.12
1971	242.63	179.16	17.81
1972	264.04	111.20	27.24
1973	376.46	157.49	43.52
1974	525.40	332.72	130.43

*Values according to (M)\$ millions.

SOURCE: Adapted from Government of Sarawak, Statistical Handbook of Sarawak, 1974, Table 12.4, pp.64-65.

oil.⁴¹

The reliance on Peninsular Malaysian's inputs has, in effect, been offset by Sarawak exports to Singapore. These relationships have enabled Sarawak to maintain a favourable balance of trade. Its trade surplus of (M)\$412.5 million in 1974 was the highest ever recorded; it was 75% over the 1973 amount of M\$234.9 million. Of the total export values, 68.8 percent was comprised of petroleum.⁴²

The latest available statistics indicate continuing growth in Sarawak's trade. For 1975, a trade surplus of (M)\$538.6 million was recorded as compared to (M)\$158 million in 1974. Crude oil returns accounted for the largest value of (M) \$1,025.1 million or 73.9% of the total state revenue.⁴³ In fact, Sarawak has maintained a favourable balance of trade for eight consecutive years since 1967.

In terms of other Asian oil-producing countries, Malaysia's production which is concentrated in Sarawak is still quite small. This is shown in Table 5. This limited oil production in Malaysia can be possibly supplemented by natural gas. There are, in fact, plans for a million dollar liquidification plant at Bintulu, Sarawak. Indeed, there are expectations of exportations in gas.⁴⁴ Both Sarawak's desire to expand the fuel industries, and Kuala Lumpur's need for such resources work towards, more or less, mutual dependency relations.

TABLE 5

OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1975

Exporters of Oil	Barrels (Mill. Per Day)	% of Gross Exports
Indonesia	420	61.1
Brunei	93	100.0
China	91	20.1
Malaysia	2	0.4

SOURCE: APB, 5, #9 (February 29, 1976), p.173

Another source of economic dependence on the central government lies in the fact that the Kuala Lumpur government provides a useful channel for foreign assistance. It has recently helped to obtain sizeable amounts of loans and investments for Sarawak: (a) a (M)\$11 million "soft" loan from Abu Dhabi for an oil palm project; (b) an Asian Development Bank loan of (M)\$54 million to the Sarawak Electricity Supply Company; (c) an investment of (M) \$70 million by the Commonwealth Development Corporation in Miri; (d) a World Bank loan of (US) \$1.9 million for the establishment of an educational television system; (e) another (M)\$5 million from the Asian Development Bank for a feasibility study of a deep-water port at Bintulu; and (f) the procurement of a new 130-ton trawler from the United Fisheries of Kuwait.⁴⁵ The possibi-

lity of obtaining future loans from the USSR is also very real, as the Soviet Union has already provided financial assistance in the development of the copper mine at Mamut in Sabah.⁴⁶

Defence and internal security constitute further areas in which Sarawak is dependent upon the federal government. Until the Second World War the defence of the British territories in Southeast Asia rested on the strong conviction that Singapore was an impregnable fortress. This proved to be quite fallacious when Singapore succumbed to Japanese forces in 1942. Consequently, several contingencies were taken. The first was that under the Federation of Malaya Agreement the British Government retained complete control over defence matters. Also, a pan-Malayan defence system was coordinated under the so-called Malayan-Borneo Defence Council, created in 1949.⁴⁷ The Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia was its chairman, with the Council's chief function as one of coordinating defence planning.⁴⁸

With the formation of Malaysia in 1963 Sarawak regarded the Federation as the only tenable alternative for defence. Only Brunei was to remain under the security umbrella of Britain. Within Sarawak the ominous threat of communism made the situation more urgent. In fact, the inability of Sarawak to provide or maintain adequate defence in a somewhat fluid period was a main factor why it could not and still can-

not exist independently.⁴⁹

The importance of the federal government in the security of Sarawak has increased since 1963. Certain factors have also contributed to this growing importance of defence in the area: the continued communist irritant in the Bornean state, the accelerated pace of British retraction from Asia in the 1970s, and the growing significance of oil in the international community.

The Malaysian communist problem lingers on both in Malaya and Sarawak, in spite of Kuala Lumpur's recognition of the Peking regime and internal schisms within the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in Peninsular Malaysia.⁵⁰ In Sarawak, according to the Federal Government White Paper, The Threat of Armed Communism in Sarawak, there are communist activities of "serious proportions".⁵¹ The Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO), formerly the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), has been experiencing success in garnering rural support.⁵²

In recognition of the growing penetration of the SCO, the governments of Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia mounted a major "civil-military" operation, code-named "Ngagau" (Iban for "Total War") in August 1971.⁵³ The operation was launched in the Third Division, and since then a portion of this Division has been designated the Bejang Security Command

(RASCOM).⁵⁴

Although a recent study of the communist factor in Sarawak concluded that insurgency in the state is more a myth than real, an "alert" continues to be maintained.⁵⁵ Individuals in most Third Division towns, for example, are still registered, while curfews throughout most "sensitive" areas are still present. Thus, with this continuance of the "alert", Sarawak's reliance on federal support remains in the areas of security and defence.

Sarawakians, overall, still possess a "backward" predisposition. The phrase "hsan ba lao" in Foochow, literally meaning "backward rural behaviour", characterizes the outlook quite well.⁵⁶ It is this attitude of most Sarawakians that generates further dependence on the national government.

Several factors have contributed to the development of this "backwardness" among Sarawak's populace. Topography, first of all, has made Sarawak quite sequestered. Moreover, the lack of formal education among the vast majority of Sarawakians creates a general ignorance of "the world outside Borneo". Only those persons in Sarawak's centres, Sibul, Miri, and Kuching for example, are more "in the know". And this is true of most ethnic groups in the state.⁵⁷

Admittedly, the slow but appreciable penetration of the "centre" into rural areas, through developmental agencies and the like, increases contacts between "centre" and "periphery". This compliments the general trait of many "centre" Sarawakians - that of being rather "outward looking", somewhat of "trendy" perspectives. The Ibans, for example, have always been so inclined; the salient example being the "bejalai", a "voyage" taken by every young male to seek fortune, adventure and the like in a period over several years.⁵⁸

The infusion of modern technology into Iban society, moreover, is also indicative of this outward-looking proclivity.⁵⁹ Richard Schwenk, in fact, sees dynamism and pragmatism as the chief Iban characteristics.⁶⁰ The former quality can be seen in the Iban's ability to incorporate symbolic forms of other cultures with theirs, and also to combine modernity with traditional. Such a syncretic quality is most visible in the dress of many Ibans, combining western garb with traditional Iban dress. Pragmatism can be perceived in their adaptation with customs, as in animal augury, and especially in their seemingly undeterred modification of Christianity to accord with fundamental Iban beliefs.⁶¹ The best case of this is the development of the "Bungan cult", a "reformed" and "modernized" species of traditional Iban augury.⁶²

Similarly, the Chinese in Sarawak have always been trying to "extend their horizons". The fact they comprise the majority in most urban centres, 72.6 percent and 76.6 percent of the total population in Kuching and Sibü respectively, demonstrates a clear liking for "where the action is" so to speak.⁶³ Given that the overwhelming majority of Chinese in the urban centres are of business backgrounds the appeal to activity and so on is quite natural. Of course, this characteristic has less applicability among the Chinese in rural areas. However, urban Chinese in most centres of Sarawak endeavour to "look out". Indeed, the travel business in Sarawak has been growing rapidly in the past few years.⁶⁴

As a part of the British Empire during the interregnum 1945 to 1963, Sarawakians had maintained an underlying pride in belonging to a global system. Such an attitude very likely grew from the somewhat romantic Brooke period. Nevertheless, Sarawak nationalism in this period was closely linked to the British Empire; indeed, no other nationalism transcending ethnonationalism existed. In retrospect, such a nationalism appealed to all the various communities. The Chinese benefitted through the economic links with the British imperial order while the Malays and other "native" groups enjoyed political advantages through British colonial rule.

Entry into the Malaysian Federation did not alter this situation greatly. In somewhat simplistic terms, the traditional psychological role of the British Empire has been replaced by Peninsular Malaysia, especially by the federal government. Through the channel of this more "developed" centre, Sarawakians can partake in more portentous activities. One major difference, however, exists between the pre-1963 situation and the present one - that the latter "centre" comprises Malays, and not a relatively disinterested body like the hitherto British administrators.⁶⁵

In the Sarawak-Kuala Lumpur relationship, this re-definition of "centre" has not induced significant changes. The vast gap between Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia in terms of overall progress, a modest approximation of some fifty years, allows the presence of a rather malleable attitude in Sarawak, with an appropriate paternalistic posture in Peninsular Malaysia. Therefore, psychologically, the former is dependent on the latter. But a latent nationalism in Sarawak counters a complete psychological dependence.⁶⁶

Though Sarawak's dependence on Peninsular Malaysia takes several forms, incipient nationalism in Sarawak cannot be overlooked. Indeed, Sarawak nationalism has been quite evident throughout the past decade or so since entering the Federation, surfacing in several specific problem-areas over federal-state relations.

Areas of Dispute in the Past

Four chief issues that concerned Sarawak and the federal government since 1963 were (a) the appointment of a suitable Head of State, (b) the so-called "Ningkan Affair", (c) language and education, and (d) the nativization of Sarawak's civil service.

Firstly, the dispute about the appointment of the Sarawak Head of State, the Governor, became public just at the time Malaysia was being formed. The then ruling party in Sarawak, the Alliance Party, and the Chief Minister wanted Temenggong Jugah, a Dayak, to be Head of State. But the Prime Minister claimed that it had been previously agreed that if the Chief Minister was a Dayak (which Dato Ningkan was), then the Head of State must be a Malay or a Melanau.

An additional complication existed that, to the federal government, the image of Temenggong Jugah was perhaps rather too traditional and inadequately "modernized" to be Head of State.⁶⁷ Compromise was eventually agreed upon where a Malay, Datu Abang Haji-Openg, was made Head of State in Sarawak, while Temenggong Jugah was given a post in the Federal Cabinet with the title "Minister of Sarawak Affairs".⁶⁸

With respect to the "Ningkan Affair" (i.e. Stephen Ningkan), only the highlights will be presented here as the case has been examined in detail elsewhere.⁶⁹ Stephen

Ningkan, at the outset, had been supported by Kuala Lumpur for the Chief Ministership. It soon became apparent that he was unwilling to support federal policies wholeheartedly. The major tension first centred on the Natives Lands Bill in 1965.

Under the proposal, natives, the "Malay" and "Dayak" groups, would gain full title to lands in the interior, but unlike the Malay Reserves Act in Malaya, natives could dispose of their land in any manner, and to any person they wished. The Brooke regime had provided land for every native, although sale of it was prohibited. The Chinese of Sarawak strongly supported the Bill. The natives were not unanimous but most seemed to support it. Opposition emanated from the Malays and the central government. In the end, Ningkan withdrew the Bill sensing its defeat, and thus ended the 1965 predicament.⁷⁰

By 1966 the federal government had decided to replace Ningkan, a Christian Iban. The Prime Minister had attempted to get the Secretary-General of BARJASA, a pro-federal party in Sarawak, to forge an opposition to Ningkan's attempt to create an Iban alliance. Cognizant of BARJASA's intentions Ningkan relieved the Secretary-General of his duties preemptorily.

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A series of events followed. The national Prime Minister first demanded Ningkan's resignation on the basis of a "no-confidence" letter signed by twenty-one Council members in the Sarawak legislature. Concomitantly, BARJASA and other pro-federal parties began to boycott Council Negri (state legislature) sessions. In Kuala Lumpur the Malayan Alliance National Council nominated Tawi Sli as the new Chief Minister of Sarawak, while also pressuring Sarawak's new Governor Openg to dismiss Ningkan in favour of Tawi Sli. The wishes of the Malayan Alliance were carried out, and soon Sarawak's major parties, Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA), defected almost en masse to the new Chief Minister. In retaliation, Ningkan took the Iban party, SNAP, out of the Sarawak Alliance, and brought a legal suit against the Governor for acting illegally in dismissing him from office.⁷¹

The climax came in Kuala Lumpur in September 1966. Under the authorization granted by Article 150 of the Federal Constitution, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declared a state of emergency in Sarawak.⁷² All powers normally vested with the state government were thus transferred to the federal government, and a special session was called in which the Sarawak Constitution was amended to centralize power with the state Governor.⁷³ One month later, October 1966, the Council Negri met under the framework of the amended State Constitution and

"legally" replaced Ningkan with Tawi Sli. This particular case had clearly indicated that "... Sarawak was firmly within the folds of the Malayan Alliance."⁷⁴

There has also been some dispute in the use of Malay in education. In 1964 there was not a single secondary school in which Malay was the medium of instruction, and there was also a shortage of qualified teachers of Malay.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, some members of the federal government believed that, even with such obstacles, education in Malay should be pursued more vigorously, in Sarawak.

Although Malay has been gradually introduced as the medium of instruction throughout primary and secondary levels in Sarawak, as discussed more fully in chapter six, the reluctance and outright rejection by many non-Malay groups continues to exist, albeit neglected by the government. This "silence" on the part of the populace, in fact, reflects the effectiveness of coalitional and machine party politics.⁷⁶

Lastly, the expatriate question in Sarawak. This issue took the rather straightforward form of how rapidly British officers should be replaced by qualified local officers. But in Sarawak, as in Sabah, the supply of qualified human resources was small. Therefore, unless expatriates left very slowly, some of them would be replaced by fully trained Malaysians (i.e. from Peninsular Malaysia), and

not by local people. This Malaysianization process did occur in Sarawak. And it naturally resulted in a "federo-phobia" among Sarawakians, mainly due to fear of the imminent "parachuting" of federal officers into the state under the guise of "secondment".⁷⁷ This fear, in fact, manifested itself in violent forms, particularly in the state capital of Kuching.⁷⁸ Since 1969 the bureaucracy has become a centre of communal competition within Sarawak itself, as numerous measures attempt to augment the number of Malays at the expense of fewer Dayaks and Chinese.

The feeling of most Sarawakians towards federal encroachments in the 1960s has been embodied in what has been termed as Sarawak's "national ideology". William Wu summarizes this more extremist Sarawak viewpoint, which appears to be less in vogue in the 1970s largely because of Sarawak's dependence on the federal government:

Sarawak's 'national ideology' is dedicated to an extreme form of communal regionalism. The ideology is 'nationalistic' in that most Sarawak politicians view the Federation of Malaysia not as a terminal goal of political evolution but as a transitional step leading to its statehood.
(author's emphasis)⁷⁹

The specific components of the "ideology" lingers on in part and in whole. Two of the more salient and vital aspects in this nationalism of the '60s are that,

1. Sarawak must be preserved for Sarawakians.. The fact that Sarawak forms part of Malaysia is a (temporary) political necessity and should not be interpreted as a change of basic posture.
2. Sarawak unity must be based on multi-racial harmony. 80

Since the 1960s the expatriate and language/education questions still remain on the Sarawak political scene, albeit on a lower level of intensity. Generally, the emergence of newer issues, discussed later in chapter seven, has reduced to a degree the political potency of these older problem-areas.

Conclusion

It can be concluded from this chapter that national integration, particularly "state-building", is being facilitated by the workings of "centralized" federalism. In the specific case of Sarawak, the state's dependency on the federal government also enhances national integration. But Malaysia's species of federalism does not attempt to accommodate ethnic or regional diversities within the federation.

The dependency relationship between Sarawak and the federal government has tempered Sarawak's nationalism since the '60s. Membership within the Federation, as such, cannot be construed merely as a "stepping-stone" for Sarawak politi-

cal growth. Indeed, Sarawak's populace apparently continues to aspire to develop through continued participation in the Malaysian Federation, as shown during the formation of the federation discussed in chapter two.

However, as evident in the string of disputes with the federal government, Sarawak federal-state relations are extremely complex and rather delicate. Moreover, the past decade of interaction between Sarawak and Kuala Lumpur has shown that Sarawak's nationalism is quite reactive. For it only manifested with potential and real federal impingements and although the fervour of this feeling has diminished since the 1960s, it continues to survive.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. They included the Federated Malay States comprising Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, from 1895 to 1941; the transitory Malayan Union from 1946 to 1948; the Federation of Malaya from 1948 to 1957; and the 1957 Federation.

2. See his recent study, In Quest of Unity: The Centralization Theme in Malaysian Federal-State Relations. Occasional Paper #39 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), p.62.

3. Ibid., p.63.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. From her, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p.262.

In this quotation Professor Enloe has used "nation" to depict a "state" per the definition in this thesis. Refer to chapter one for relevant discussion of these terms.

7. Regarding the terms, "centralized federalism" and "peripheralized federalism", see Riker, Federalism, pp.5-6. With respect to "manipulative federalism", see fn. 21 of this chapter.

8. On this perception of federalism refer, in particular, to Carl Friedrich, Limited Government (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974), esp. pp.52-63.

9. For details, refer to chapter two regarding the formation of Malaysia.

10. He has stated, "Federalism must be seen as a dynamic process, not merely as a static design. Any particular design or patterns of competencies or jurisdictions is merely a phase, a short-run state of a continuously evolving political entity." From his, "Federalism, National and International: In Theory and Practice," International Political Science Association (Oxford Round Table Meeting), Sept. 19-24, 1963.
11. See his Malaysian Politics (2nd ed., London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1976), p.444.
12. Ibid.
13. Yong Mun Cheong, "The Malaysian Setting," in South-east Asian Affairs 1974, ed. by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), pp.137-161.
14. Malaysian Federal Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: Di-Chetak Di-Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1970), 9th Schedule, articles 74, 77, pp.207-214.
15. Part XIIA, article 161D-161E, pp.173-174.

The categories of "natives" and "non-natives" in Sarawak are further examined in chapter five. Also refer Table 1.
16. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), March 21, 1976, p.10.
17. "General Information on Sarawak," (Kuching: Malaysian Information Service, 1974), p.4.
18. In the first half of 1976 alone, over half a dozen federal figures, mostly ministers, visited Sarawak. Some other officials included the Sultan of Kelantan, and the new Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Vanguard, February 16, 1976 to August 1, 1976, passim.

19. Again in the first half of 1976 party members of the Sarawak Coalition attended NF meetings in Malaya on three or four occasions.

20. K. C. Wheare, in Federal Government, has designated the term "quasi-federal" to denote those federal schemes where the constituent-units are neither coordinate nor autonomous.

21. The formation of the Canadian Confederation followed somewhat similar patterns; manipulations of both economic and political spheres were used extensively in the formative period of the union. See, in particular, Joseph R. Rudolph, Federalism and Nation-Building: India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Nigeria (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), esp. chapter four, where a general discussion of "manipulative federalism" can be found.

22. Gordon P. Means, "Federalism in Malaya and Malaysia," in Fédéralisme et Nations, ed. by Roman Serbyu (Montreal: Les Presses de L'Université du Quebec, 1971), pp. 215-241.

23. Basically, the dependency thesis submits that external ties have created, more or less, a bifurcated society, a "dualistic" society, in the majority of less developed countries. Colonialism and growing international business relations (i.e. multinational enterprises) constitute the two main forms of dependency relationships. Refer to chapter one, fn. 12 for the more important works in this area.

24. Prior to 1972 most of Brunei's oil was refined in and exported from Sarawak. Since then Sarawak is producing more of its own petroleum from oil wells in the Bintulu-Miri inland and offshore region.

Specifically on oil, the first production in Sarawak was made in 1910 at Miri. However, the Miri field has closed since then (in 1972). But Sarawak was able to produce 80,000 barrels per day in 1975 under Sarawak Shell from the five offshore fields at West Lutong, Baram, Baku, Baronia and Tukau. See, Malaysian Digest, 6, #12 (September 6, 1974), p.8.

25. Vanguard, March 20, 1976, p.6.

26. Although the general literature on the dependency thesis is highly regarded for its academic temerity, it still possesses several pitfalls. For a discussion of them see in particular, R. R. Kaufman and H. J. Chernotsky, et al., "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependence," Comparative Politics, 1, #3 (April, 1975), 303-330; and William G. Tyler and J. Peter Wogart, "Economic Dependence and Marginalization," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 15 (February, 1973), 36-45.

27. Parenthetically, there is a growing trend towards less financial dependence upon the federal government, as Sarawak begins to derive more substantial revenues from oil. But, as discussed below, there are certain impediments to appreciable autonomy in finances for Sarawak.

28. Since the inception of the national oil corporation, PETRONAS, all oil, inland and offshore, belongs to the federal government. This is provided in the 1971 Natural Resources Act. As of late, negotiations with all the major oil companies in Malaysia such as Shell and Exxon are attempts to assert greater governmental controls. See New York Times, August 5, 1976, p.86.

29. For a discussion of this aspect of dependency, see Havelock Brewster, "Economic Dependence: A Qualitative Interpretation," Social and Economic Studies, 22, #1 (March, 1973), 90-95.

30. Tan Sri Mohamed S. bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1972), p.135.

31. From a general survey of the Vanguard for the first six months of 1976, roughly twenty-five Sarawakians with the state government went to Peninsular Malaysia for training for a period of up to six weeks.

32. A non-governmental example may be cited here. The senior staff of the newly-opened Holiday Inn Hotel in Kuching only included two Sarawakians out of a total of six persons. The rest had been recruited from Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover, there is a growing lack, and even absence, of competent Sarawakians to handle literary

undertakings. Consequently, Sarawak has been, according to senior Sarawak employees in the government, dependent on foreigners in the past, and more so on the Malaysians since federation.

33. MARA (Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat), for instance, extended its activities to Sarawak in 1966. Basically, it encourages the development of small businesses such as cottage industries and bus companies.

Briefly, there are three main tiers in Sarawak's local governmental system: the lowest, the Municipal Council; then the District Councils; and lastly, the state legislature. Positions in these bodies are acquired through election from the lower levels.

Also, the main problem of local bodies is the lack of adequate funds. It has been estimated that over 80 percent of the necessary monies for local bodies are derived from state and federal sources. There is, moreover, a growing reliance upon Malaysian experts, especially in technical areas. See Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, chapter six; and John Woods, Local Government in Sarawak: An Introduction to the Nature and Working of District Councils in the State (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.8-10.

34. This phrase is used by Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, p.296. For accounts on DOs in Malaya which do relate to the Sarawak situation in many ways, see Milton J. Esman, Administration and Development in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp.93-94 and p.219; and especially Robert O. Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center, 1964), esp. pp.117-120.

35. Indeed, DOs in Sarawak are beginning to resemble the politicized nature of Malaysian DOs, as described by Tilman in Bureaucratic Transition. In contrast to their traditional role of general administrators, DOs in Sarawak are becoming more active participants in governmental campaigns such as "National Language Weeks", "Quran Reading Competitions".

36. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, p.249.

37. Quoted in ibid.
38. Ibid., p.245.
39. Ibid., p.252.
40. John W. Henderson, et al., Area Handbook for Malaysia (Washington D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1970), p.495.
41. Seventy-five percent of Sarawak's pepper exports went to Singapore in 1975, according to the Asia Research Bulletin (ARB), 5, #1 (April 30, 1976), p.195.

On the average, about 50% of total imports into Sarawak up to 1971 comprised of crude oil from Brunei for processing in Sarawak. With the step-up in oil production within Sarawak itself, Brunei's oil imports into the state have diminished, with a concurrent increase of goods from Peninsular Malaysia into Sarawak (e.g. foodstuffs, manufactured goods and some industrial machinery). See Lim Chong-yak, et al., Economic Structure and Organization (Singapore/Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.354.
42. Malaysian Digest, 7, #5 (April 30, 1975), p.7.
43. Vanguard, March 20, 1976, p.6.
44. ARB, 5, #9 (February 29, 1976), p.173.
45. ARB, 5, #10 (March 31, 1976), pp.187-188.
ARB, 5, #9 (February 29, 1976), p.172.
Malaysian Digest, 4, #4 (February 29, 1972), p.7.
FEER, Asia Yearbook 1974, p.219.
ARB, 5, #4 (September 30, 1975), p.128.
ARB, 4, #5 (August 30, 1975), p.130.
46. ARB, 5, #12 (May 31, 1976), p.207.
47. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, p.259.

48. In fact, Francis Carnell points out that the formation of the Federation of Malaya was based largely on defence considerations. See his "Political Implications of Federalism in New States," in Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. by U. K. Hicks, et al. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), p.22.

49. A federal minister, Lim Swee Aun, has argued in favour of Sarawak remaining within the Federation, mostly due to defence considerations. See his speech (available at Cornell's Wason Collection), "Can Sarawak Exist As a Separate Nation?", Full Text of Speech given by the Honourable Minister of Commerce and Industry at the Sarawak Union Club in Kuching, on November 13, 1965, esp. p.5.

50. More specifically, the Chinese in Sarawak can no longer look to the People's Republic of China (PRC) for support in the future, since Peking holds that overseas Chinese, "hua chiaos", must bear allegiance to the country of domicile. (Refer to FEER, June 10, 1974, pp.11-13.) Furthermore, Peking has agreed not to actively encourage communist actions in Malaysia, albeit concrete terms were not formulated.

Regarding the CPM, it has split into two main groups: the "Communist Party of Malaya" (CPM(M-L)), and the "Communist Party of Malaya - Revolutionary Faction" (CPM-(RF)). Both are based in Southern Thailand, the CPM in the Betong District (Yala Province), and the CPM(RF) further north in the Thai province of Surat Thani. See ARB, 5, #12 (May 31, 1976), p.204.

For more general accounts on the PRC in Southeast Asia, see Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Policy, 1949-1970 (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972); and Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).

51. See, Federal Government White Paper, The Threat of Armed Communism in Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1972), p.17.

52. See above, chapter two, fn. 45.

53. Ibid., p.26.
54. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.159.
55. John W. Thomas, "Insurgency in Sarawak: Myth or Real," (Unpublished Student Essay, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1972), esp. p.18.
56. Transliterated into "putonghua" (i.e. Mandarin), it is "hsiang hsia lao".
57. Two particular works indicate this trait: Henry G. Glick, "Political Recruitment in Sarawak: A Case Study of Leadership in a New State," The Journal of Politics, 28 (1966), 81-99; and Michael B. Leigh, The Development of Political Organization and Leadership in Sarawak, East Malaysia (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1971), p.213.
58. "Bejalai", means literally "to walk", and also means "to journey". They "voyages" extend to far and remote corners of Borneo, and even to Malaya and New Guinea.

A recent study of the Ibans in the Sibuan area shows that a sizeable number of young people are currently on "bejalai". Refer to Richard L. Schwenk, The Potential for Rural Development in the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A Preliminary Background Report. Occasional Paper #17 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), p.5.
59. Richard Schwenk, in ibid., p.28, records that of the average Iban of both the Sibuan and Kapit areas, 76.5% had mattresses, 70.0% had pressure lamps, 63.5% had hoes, 61% had mirrors on walls, 56.6% had guns, 55% had beds, 55% had sewing machines, and 48% had radios.
60. See his, "A Macro-Structural Approach to Planning Programs of Developmental Change Using a Case Study of Iban Longhouses" (Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Cornell University, 1971).

61. In 1971 there were roughly 11% Christians among the Ibans. Refer to ibid., p.40.
62. E. White, "Bungan: A New Kayan Belief," Sarawak Museum Journal, 7 (1956), 472-475. See also, Ian Prattis, "The Kayan-Kenyah 'Bungan Cult' in Sarawak," Sarawak Museum Journal, 11, #21-22 (July/Dec., 1963), 64-86.
63. Lee Yong Leng, Population and Settlement in Sarawak (Singapore: Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1970), p.112.
64. Annual world-wide tours are quite common in towns like Sibuan and Kuching which have very active participation.
65. Michael Leifer, in his Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: University British Columbia Press, 1972), provides a good discussion on this subject (especially chapter one).
66. This idea of growth and progress through membership in a larger entity was evident in Canadian history as well. During the so-called "imperialist" years at the turn of the present century, Canadian nationalists wanted political affiliation with Britain (i.e. the British Empire) in order to accelerate Canada's growth. Therefore, Canadian imperialism (i.e. ties with the Empire) was, in reality, Canadian nationalism. Carl Berger's The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); and Frank H. Underhill's The Image of Confederation (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1963), both provide excellent insights into this period of Canadian history.
67. Milne, Politics in Malaysia, p.84.
68. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.387.
69. For summaries of the Ningkan case, see Roff, Politics of Belonging; Means, Malaysian Politics, pp.381-387; Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, pp.94-112; and Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, pp.215-233.

70. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.383.
71. The ruling coalition, the Sarawak Alliance, was formed in 1962, and had five members: PANAS, BARJASA, PESAKA, SNAP and SCA. Also, this series of events is documented most closely in Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, pp.220-222.
72. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.110.
73. Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, p.226.
74. Tilman, Malaysian Federal-State Relations, p.44.

The ostensible reasons for the state of emergency were given in a statement before Parliament by the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, as reprinted in Peter Boyce, ed., Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy (Sydney: Sydney University Press), 1968, pp.20-21;

He attributed the emergency essentially to the presence of "... more than a thousand hard-core members and several thousand supporters and sympathizers of the Communist Party."

Similar constitutional crises, in fact, also occurred in Sabah during 1964. See Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, pp.233-235; and Roff, Politics of Belonging, pp.94-115.

75. Refer to chapter six for more details on these areas.
76. It is interesting to note that Ibans still hold high respect for English vis à vis Malay, and still want their children to be educated in the former language. See James M. Seymour, The Rural School and Rural Development Among the Iban of Sarawak, Malaysia (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1972), p.121.
77. Refer to the article, "Federophobia in Borneo," The Economist, #6136 (April 1961), pp.15-16, cited in William S. C. Wu, Polycommunalism and Nativization: A

Comparative Study of Bureaucratic Transition in Sarawak and Sabah (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1973), p.6.

78. "Federophobia" in Sarawak during the '60s was clearly exemplified by outbreak of violence. It took place in Kuching in 1966, when a large group of Malays (from Kuching) fought with some thirty Malay soldiers from Peninsular Malaysia. See Craig L. Lockard, The Southeast Asian Town in Historical Perspective: A Social History of Kuching, Malaysia, 1820-1970 (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, 1973), p.601.

79. Wu, Polycommunalism and Nativization, p.334.

80. Ibid., p.335.

CHAPTER FOUR:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION
POLICY IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

Introduction

Largely due to Peninsular Malaysia's position of "topdog" in the Federation, a position unquestioned since the separation of Singapore, the course of Sarawak development has been mainly directed by the political, economic and social exigencies of Malayan society. In order to appreciate the national integrative schema in Malaysia since 1969 specifically, it is necessary to trace, in a somewhat panoramic fashion, the growth of communal policy in Peninsular Malaysia. The post-1969 political integration approach and policies in Malaya have, in fact, comprised the basis of "nation-building" within the whole Federation.

This chapter, therefore, briefly describes the ethnic setting in Malaya, and also outlines the Malayan political integration patterns during three particular periods: the colonial years, the period of Alliance Party rule, and the years since the communal riots of 1969.

Communalism in Malayan Society

K. J. Ratnam, in his study of Malayan politics, has asserted: "What is of direct concern here are the divisions which exist between the different communities, and which make the most significant factor in the country's political process;".¹ In Peninsular Malaysia, ethnic groups are easily distinguished from each other: the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians. Persons normally designated as Pakistanis and Ceylonese are classified in Malaysia in the category of Indians. Professor Ratnam, furthermore, demonstrates the ease with which individuals can be identified as Malay, Chinese or Indian:

... communal divisions are not determined by 'racial' differences alone. There is also complete lack of cultural homogeneity, each community having its own religion, language, customs and habits. This naturally constitutes a very serious obstacle to unification; it is the reason why certain 'cultural' matters (particularly language) have come to constitute some of the most difficult political issues of ... Malaya.

Indeed, communalism has been regarded as the "primary threat" to Malayan unity.²

Ostensibly, the major societal structures in Malaya have been communally organized and jibe with J. S. Furnivall's conception of a "plural society". In his influential work, Netherlands India, A Study of Plural Economy, are delineated

five distinct traits of such a society. They include (a) residentially separated communities, (b) economic differentiation by race, (c) uneven distribution of wealth, (d) little intermarriage between such communities, and (e) the existence of one politically dominant community.³ The ethnological and political characteristics of Malaya has and continues to conform to Furnivall's criteria.

Foremost, people identify themselves, and are identified by others according to communal categories. Malays identify themselves by the reinforcing properties of race, religion, language, and by a distinctive genre de vie. Chinese, moreover, maintain a strong racial identity linked to a proud and enduring cultural tradition. The pride of each community in its own institutions and traditions is also more than matched by unflattering and suspicious views of each other. Malays caricature Chinese generally as avaricious and materialistic, morally and generally unscrupulous, ritually (pork-eating) and physically unclean, crude in their manners, and of questionable loyalty to the country, (although the Chinese and not the Malays fought against the Japanese in World War II). On the other hand, Chinese regard Malays as lazy, over-superstitious, backward, and susceptible to subsist on government handouts.⁴ These sets of reflexive stereotypes are generally held by the groups concerned, as documented by Alvin Rabushka.⁵

Doubtless, the principal cleavage is between the Chinese and Malays. This is, in part, due to the vast degree of internal heterogeneity within the "Indian" group. This census category includes members of both Aryan and Dravidian racial stock, such as Punjabi, Bengali, Sinhalese and Tamils. Unlike "Malay", "Indian" is not a common label hung on Indians by each other. In fact, a large portion of them divide themselves very sharply along the same national lines that separate their ancestors or close relatives into Pakistanis, Indians, and Ceylonese on the Indian sub-continent.⁶

The Tamils from the ex-Madras Residency of southern India are so strongly in the majority, 76⁸ percent in Malaya, the common unit of "Indian" is used to subsume the smaller groups as well.⁷ Generally, those under this overall category do see themselves, and are perceived by others, as "casted" in the lower hierarchy of labourers and the like.

With respect to areas of residence, the urban centres have been occupied predominantly by Chinese. The modern sectors of the economy are owned, controlled, and staffed by British firms or by Chinese. In fact, business initiatives throughout the pre-independent period were restricted solely to these two groups. Locally-owned rubber and oil plantations, mines, banks and the like are overwhelmingly Chinese. The latest available figures show the Malay share of ownership in rubber as 0.3 percent, the Indian share as 1.3 percent, the

Chinese as 13.2 percent, and the foreign as 77.7 percent.

In all other forms of agriculture taken as a whole, the Malay share is 3.6 percent, the Chinese 9.2 percent, the Indian 0.2 percent, and the foreign 66.8 percent. In the corporate sector, less than 2 percent is owned by Malays, 22 percent by Chinese, and 61 percent by foreigners.⁸

Also, very few Malays work in Chinese-owned enterprises, which are basically Chinese social systems. Because the Chinese possess superior business skills and experience, most of the land, managerial, professional, clerical, technical and other skilled employees in foreign-owned enterprises have also been Chinese. Traditionally, Malays work primarily in subsistence agriculture and farming and in less skilled urban occupations. It has been estimated that the average per capita income for Chinese is two and a half times that of Malays.⁹ More recent figures indicate that the average household income per month is (M)\$310 for the Indians, (M)\$387 for the Chinese, and only (M)\$179 for the Malays.¹⁰ Thus, there has been some improvement in the Malay situation since the 1960s.

The prevailing communal pluralism is reflected in the educational system. In fact, education reinforces it. Elementary education is provided in four separate systems, all governmentally financed and operated, according to the language of instruction - Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English.

At the secondary level, these are separated into two governmentally-supported streams, Malay and English. But there are a few Chinese language "non-conforming" secondary schools operating without government assistance. Higher education beyond the secondary level has been entirely in English, but portents of change can be easily discerned since the 1969 riots.¹¹

In terms of educational and technological skills, Chinese are far ahead of Malays. In 1967, Malays formed only 2.7 and 14 percent of students in the faculties of engineering and science, and medicine respectively at the University of Malaya. At the College of Technology in Kuala Lumpur, they were less than 10 percent.¹² Since 1969 there has been some degree of improvement in the Malay situation, but the marked imbalance vis-à-vis Chinese enrollment still persists.¹³ Clearly, this inequality reflects the neglect of Malay education during the colonial period, the greater urbanization of the Chinese, and the differential value systems and socialization processes in the two communities.

Political parties are also communally organized. The dominant Malay party is the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Substantial opposition emanates from the Pan-Malay Islamic Party (PMIP) which advocates religious orthodoxy, favours closer associations with Indonesia based largely, but not exclusively, on similar religious identifications,

purports to speak for the deprived Malays, and rejects the Chinese role in Malayan society. There is also a very small Malay Marxist Party, the Parti Rakyat. The leading Chinese party has been the conservative Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) which accepts Malay political hegemony.¹⁴

There are also three parties led by middle-class intellectuals which espouse non-communalism. They are: the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Malayan branch of the PAP in Singapore; the People's Progressive Party (PPP), regionally based in the state of Perak; and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysian (GRM), the ruling government party in Penang. The leadership, cadres and popular support of these three parties are almost entirely non-Malay, predominantly Chinese.¹⁵

In the early 1950s, after a few abortive attempts to organize political parties based strictly along communal lines, a working partnership was established between the MCA and the UMNO. The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) became a partner in 1954.¹⁶ Originally seen as an advantageous electoral device, where decisions on which candidates to run for communal areas were made beforehand, this fairly-well regularized system of interaction among the parties was to form the mechanism within which volatile political issues could be internalized and, in fact, removed from the public ambit. The relative serenity in Malaya's communal politics can be attributed, in large part, to the functioning of the inter-

communal Alliance Party.¹⁷ Indeed, such coalitional forms of government have played major "peace-keeping" roles in centrifugal polities other than Malaya.¹⁸

The Colonial Era, Before 1957

In pre-independent Malaya the approach to ethnicity was relatively uncomplicated. British colonial rule based itself largely upon the concept of "divide and rule". More specifically, the Malay states experienced much autonomy under the system. In the states the principal administrative officer, the British adviser, exercised little control over the Malay ruler generally, and fewer officers were employed in administration. As such, a predominantly Malay administration centred about the royal court. This particular form of administration has been termed the system of indirect rule.¹⁹

This system was initially designed primarily as a means of bringing law and order to the Malay States. The Malay governments remained, and in legal theory sovereignty rested with the Sultans, the traditional Malay leaders, and not with the British Crown. In a number of cases British courts recognized the ultimate sovereignty of each Sultan, restricted only by the terms of the treaties made with the British.

Under such arrangements British policy attempted to follow several basic tenets: the position of the Sultans was safeguarded, as instituted in the treaties; the government was preserved as the distinctly Malay government which antedated any of the treaty arrangements made by the British; the Malays were considered the indigenous people, and the government accepted special responsibility for their welfare and the preservation of their rights as the subjects of the Sultan in each state.

Clearly, the "pro-Malay" policy of the British colonial administration helped to preserve the traditional patterns of Malay society and the peasant-based economy. In retrospect, such a policy contributed greatly to the "handicapped" position of the Malays in the "modern" world of the 1970s.²⁰ Of equal importance, the privileged status of the Malays created an undercurrent of resentment among the other communal groups. Concomitantly, since the Malays possessed the upper hand in the political arena, a species of superiority complex was being engendered among the Malays.

In general, the Chinese evinced much indifference towards political affairs because of several factors.²¹ Engulfed in commerce and business, they simply could not afford much attention to the political orbit except to ensure that it would remain sufficiently stable to continue making profits, although strong emotional ties to China persisted,

usually manifesting in financial support such as during the Chinese Revolution of 1911 in China. The highly organized structure of Chinese society, as demonstrated in the multiplicity of secret societies, facilitated the high extent of self-centredness. Moreover, no channels were opened for the Chinese to effectively penetrate into the political arena, as para-parliamentary institutions were yet to be established, and the government was the exclusive domain of the British and the Malays.

Fetters on language and religion, furthermore, were not present. Indeed, the educational system perpetuated the respective communal identities. Malays were greatly assisted by the establishment of the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar under British administration.²² The "overseas Chinese" ("hua chiao"), or more correctly in the case of Malaya, "Nanyang Chinese" (Chinese of the "South Seas"), expended vast amounts of money in the creation of Chinese schools. The usual pattern was for instruction in the vernacular Chinese dialect up to the secondary school level. At that standard and beyond it Mandarin (or "kuo-yu") became the medium of instruction. Instructors were, in fact, recruited directly from China for several decades until 1949, the year of the Communist revolution in China.

The Indian group also maintained self-autonomy. Mostly employed on plantations, urban trade and shops, they

remained apart from the other groups. Extremely strong ties were also maintained with the Indian sub-continent, similar to the Chinese ties with mainland China.

It thus would seem that as long as the particular communal "domains" remained intact, comparatively cordial relations prevailed. The conscious British policy of divide and rule accorded well with the desire for relative autonomy among each of the communal groups. The designation of the political and economic spheres to the Malays and Chinese, respectively, satisfied both groups. In particular, this social pattern was consonant with the Chinese ordering of society.

The majority of the Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia comprised merchants, businessmen and the like. In traditional Chinese society these economic niches assumed the lowest positions in society, as the literati (i.e. scholars) and government employees possessed higher social prestige and importance.²³ However, in Malayan society the Chinese group did not perceive any modifications to the "ideal" social structure; in that the upper echelons were taken up by the Malays and the British while the Indian group assumed the lowest level of manual workers.²⁴ Therefore, their position in Malayan society was socially legitimized by and accorded with traditional Chinese mores.

In employing violence as an index of communal disharmony, it can be said that pre-World War II Malaya did not experience significant communal problems. Several factors accounted for this: the ubiquitous presence of the British administration, tending to act as a comparatively neutral third force among the disparate groups; the minimal degree of inter-communal interaction; the overall low extent of political mobilization of the three groups; and the comparative contentment of each group with their respective allotted societal positions.

Alterations to the prewar situation transpired with the oncoming of independence in Malaya. As the quest for self-rule grew in importance, a concurrent augmentation in the level of pronounced communal tensions could be detected. Beginning in the mid-1940s, violent racial confrontations lingered throughout the next two decades.²⁵

The issue of central concern to all communal groups revolved around the form of government in an independent Malaya. Mainly in response to the Chinese role in repelling the Japanese, the British proffered the Malayan Union Scheme, whereby greater communal political equity would be instituted, as examined above in chapter two.²⁶

Essentially, the Union Scheme proposed a more equal treatment of the immigrant population, namely the Chinese and the Indians. It also proposed a more unified and centralized government in a union to encompass all the Malay States plus

the former Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca.²⁷ Singapore was, however, to be retained as a Crown Colony for economic and political-security reasons.

With the apparent waning of colonial rule in Malaya, respective communal groups, particularly the Malays, became more politically activated. The Malays became quite apprehensive of the future of their longtime political hegemony. Although to a lesser degree, the Chinese wanted to assure that sufficient political stability and communal freedom were maintained to continue economic activities. The Chinese population was, in general, somewhat politically quiescent, as only its leaders participated actively in political affairs. Nevertheless, the Malay population vehemently opposed the British scheme of a Malay Union - in essence, a blueprint for a more genuine multicultural society.

The Scheme met rigorous and stubborn resistance from the Malays, headed by the newly-created UMNO under Dato Onn. In fact, the creation of the UMNO as well as the MCA and the MIC were due to respective communal concerns over the Scheme. Some initial attempts at inter-communal cooperation were present; the chief example was the Consultative Liason Committee (CLC) conceived by the then Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald. Although some meetings were held, the CLC endured only for a period of one year, roughly from February 1949 to May 1950.²⁸ Through

the channel of the CLC, however, some degree of understanding between the various communal groups was reached on certain issues, and thus introduced some incipient aspects of consociationalism into the Malayan political scene.

Consociational democracy can be briefly described as the attainment of some semblance of compromise or agreement among various groups with religious, linguistic and other cultural or ideological differences, through vibrant elite interaction.²⁹ In this instance of the CLC, the ultimate compromise was the agreement on the formation of a federation, as opposed to a union as originally proposed. Thus, while the traditional authority of the Sultans would remain unchanged, some representation was allotted to non-Malays. Malcolm MacDonald summed up the results well: "... none of the communities received everything it wanted."³⁰

The Emergency (1948-1960) deferred the achievement of self-rule.³¹ In the interim relations among the various groups worsened. The majority of the Chinese were regarded by Malays and British as sympathizers of the Communist actions. Chinese were transferred to the infamous "Resettlement Camps" where Malay mistreatment of Chinese has been documented.³² Also, non-citizens, which included many Chinese, feared outright deportation if accused of insurgent activities.³³

The belated attainment of "Merdeka" (independence) occurred in 1957. For roughly another decade the newly-independent country was to experience relatively harmonious communal ties, largely since the principle of the colonial administration towards Malayan communalism was not abandoned.

The Years of Alliance Party Rule, 1957 to 1969

The government, in this period, pursued the so-called "avoidance" approach to communalism, based mainly on the political mechanism of the Alliance Party.³⁴ The approach followed these chief guidelines. Where possible, public discussion of potentially volatile communal issues was avoided. Political rhetoric, however, purveyed themes of communal harmony and accord, with the pertinent caveats against "bad elements" which might give rise to communal discord. In the words of one analyst of Malaysian politics:

The society was congratulated on the goodwill and the attitude of live and let live that had been achieved The underlying expectation was that over time the spirit of give and take would pervade the thinking and behaviour of responsible members of all communities, a wider set of common national loyalties would emerge, the communities would accommodate, and perhaps ultimately a new-integrated culture would appear.³⁵

The government's posture was thus essentially one of responding to events in the political sphere. As pressures

from their constituencies pushed communally-charged issues through party channels, the Alliance coalition attempted to neutralize them, and to initiate settlement, albeit transitory in certain cases. The Executive Committee of the Alliance Party, also called the Directorate of the Party, continually atomized and internalized conflict-laden political issues. Therefore, some degree of consociationalism was again present in the Malayan polity.³⁶

Ostensibly, government naturally remained rather inert. Little effort was made to anticipate and/or obviate communal problems before they evolved into critical issues. There was little endeavour made to examine these problems beforehand. There was also minimal effort made to create institutions aimed to stimulate meaningful dialogue or to explore accommodative or integrative patterns of development. Clearly, the underlying fear was that any serious public discussion of such issues, even in controlled institutional settings, would be more likely to raise inflammatory passions than to produce solutions or even meaningful habits of discourse. This was shown in the government's refusal to establish a commission of inquiry to examine the cause of communal riots in November 1967. The government held that, "a more positive search for patterns of accommodation and a more diffused and public exploration of communal issues would yield more problems than the system could peacefully handle."³⁷

This "conflict-avoidance" method functioned reasonably well in the decade and a half preceding May 1969. The approach was facilitated by the fact that the volume and intensity of demands was relatively modest. Moreover, the polity had enough uncommitted resources to apply to the resolution of overt conflicts. The charisma of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman also served as a positive symbol of communal reconciliation and conflict avoidance. Similar "father-like" images have also been present in Indonesia (President Sukarno), Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah), India (J. Nehru), and in Republican China (Sun Yat-sen).

In the period of independent Malaya, harmonious communal relations depended on several factors. The Alliance had to continually perform with utmost political precision and efficiency. The demands of the respective groups had to be of manageable proportions and substance. Moreover, the government had to serve the role of a para-third force in the Malaysian polity, striving to be comparatively disinterested in communal politics. This approach was, perforce, abandoned after the 1969 conflagration between the Malays and Chinese.

The "May 13th Incident" of 1969 necessitated a volte-face in the government's approach to communalism. The need to act on the copious complaints from the Malays regarding their continuing economic inferiority to the Chinese was evident.³⁸ A contributing factor to the "Incident" was the

waning of Malay support for the Alliance Party. Compounded by the growing appeal of the PMIP and the DAP, the power base of the Alliance was being undermined.³⁹ Specifically, the Alliance won clear majority in only seven of eleven assemblies. GRM won Penang, PMIP kept control of its historical stronghold of Kelantan; and Alliance majorities were lost in Perak and Selangor with Sarawak as an expected loss. With a very real possibility of an Alliance "ouster", Malays over-reacted to premature victory rallies on the part of opposition parties.⁴⁰ In fact, it marked a firm resentment of any changes to the existing political situation, namely Malay political monopolization.⁴¹

The Period Since the Communal Riots of 1969

In stark contrast to the pre-1969 years, the Alliance Party embarked on a policy of active government participation in communal affairs beginning in the new decade of the 1970s. The government was to rid itself of the past role of a relatively inactive "third force" in Malayan and Malaysian politics. This new approach was based on these basic tenets: that the government must direct the future growth of a "national identity"; that the Malays require deliberate and conscious assistance from the government due to their inferior economic position vis à vis the Chinese; and that failure to accomplish these above goals would result in an inevitable weakening of Alliance Party power. According to

Tan Sri Ghazalie Shafie, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969, "... We can no longer afford to drift along on an ad hoc basis sweeping inconvenient questions under the carpet in a (sic) euphoria of hope and fake optimism."⁴²

Subsumed under the new government policy were several distinct items. First, the government's integrity had to be re-established after the riots of 1969. This was done by instituting new governmental bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Agency.⁴³ Secondly, and more importantly, the Constitution was depoliticized; this action, in reality, meant an entrenchment of politicized articles in the Constitution. The justification for rendering certain provisions unalterable was that: "... if these entrenched provisions are in anyway eroded, or weakened, the entire constitutional structure is endangered, and with it, the existence of the nation-itself."⁴⁴ Those provisions rendered unalterable were:

1. Article 71 which provides for Federal guarantee of the Constitution of each state and the rights and prerogatives of the Malay rules;
2. Article 152 which provides for the Malay language to be the National Language and ultimately to be the sole official language;
3. Article 153 which provides for the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the Head of State) to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other commu-

nities in accordance with the provisions of that article;

4. Article 157 which provides inter alia that any amendment to the provisions relating to the Malay Rulers (Articles 39, 70 and 71) and the special position of the Malays (Article 153) shall not be passed without the Conference of Ruler's consent.⁴⁵

To prevent these constitutional provisions from being weakened, two types of government measures were required. It is, first of all, an offence for any person to "utter, print, or publish words" or do any act which questions any matter, right, status' position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected in the entrenched provisions of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, it is illegal to engender such a tendency as to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between the various communal groups.⁴⁶

In the quest for national consolidation, the "National Ideology", the "Rukunegara", was proclaimed in August, 1970. It presented five fundamental principles, as founded on the "basic precepts of Malaysian society." These tenets are dedicated to:

- achieving a greater unity of all her peoples;
- maintaining a democratic way of life;
- creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared;
- ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions;

building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology.⁴⁷

The five distinct principles outlined by the government were as follows:

Belief in God (Keperchayaan kepada Tuhan)
 Loyalty to King and Country (Kesetiaan kepada Raja dan Negara)
 Upholding the Constitution (Keluhoran Perlembagaan)
 Rule of Law (Kedaulatan Undang 2)
 Good Behaviour and Morality (Kesopanan dan Kesusilaan)⁴⁸

The newly-created Department of National Unity contributed quickly to the overall new "development" policy.

Two basic aims existed in the so-called "two prongs" of the New Economic Policy (NEP) formulated by the Department: (a) the eradication of poverty among all Malaysians, and (b) the restructuring of society so that the present identification of race with economic functions would eventually be eliminated.⁴⁹

This New Economic Policy has been incorporated into the Second Malaysia Plan, spanning the years 1971 to 1975.⁵⁰

The first objective is to be pursued through the promotion of general economic growth in the economy; the second by expanding Malay special privileges and by formulating new projects especially designed to raise the economic position of the Malays. The Malays form the country's main

group of "bumiputras", literally meaning "sons or princes of the soil."⁵¹ The Second Malaysia Plan accords much attention to the rural sector of the economy, as one million new acres of land are to be opened for settlement, primarily for Malays who will acquire small rubber holdings.⁵² Rural areas are also provided improved services and new economic opportunities in the form of decentralized industrial development and the promotion of small industries.⁵³

The government also proposed to establish many new industries and, after they become viable, to transfer them to Malay ownership and management. Special financing and technical assistance are being made available to Malay enterprise from a variety of government agencies which have been set up especially to aid Malays.⁵⁴ In the schools, new emphasis is being placed on scientific and managerial training for Malay students. To encourage the Malays to develop an achievement-oriented ethic, and to value science and technology, the government has resorted to religion. Several Islamic conferences have been sponsored by the government to promote "Islamic modernism", and to demonstrate the compatibility between Islam and the achievement ethic required for modern society. For example, the theme for the 1971 International Quran Reading Competition at Kuala Lumpur was: "Islam and Education in the Field of Science and Technology".⁵⁵

The goals of the government have been incorporated under the so-called Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) 1970-1990, conceived with the primary objectives of providing national unity and creation of a modern socio-economic environment.⁵⁶ The OPP subsumes two national economic plans, the Second Malaysia Plan (1970-1975), and the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1981).⁵⁷

In order to "uplift" the Malays their levels of income require significant increases. Toward that end, three particular problem-areas are being tackled: employment, ownership, and income distribution. First, at the employment sector, the primary concern has been directed towards increasing the number of Malay workers with an objective of 40 percent of the work force. The second part of the employment problem is seen at the managerial level and not at the worker level. In 1970, Malays constituted only 7 percent of the manufacturing sector's management as compared to 68 percent Chinese, 4 percent Indian, and 18 percent foreign.⁵⁸ Therefore the problem remains quite clear - Malays continue to be employed in the public relations and technical areas, and not in the managerial positions.

With respect to ownership, the goals for 1990 are for Malays to own 30 percent of all commercial and industrial activities in the economy. The target percentages for other Malaysians and foreigners are 40 percent and 30 percent, re-

spectively. Since 1969 Malay investment has been aided by the government-supported agencies which supply capital, insure investment, train management and encourage savings. For example, the National Trading Corporation (PERNAS) purchases businesses, operates in joint venture activities, and develops new industries which are "held in trust" until sufficient Malay private capital is available to take over the firms. Wholesale operations have been purchased in order to aid Malay businessmen; Bank Bumiputra helps Malays in financing; and MARA, the "Council for Trust for Indigenous People", encourages savings.⁵⁹

In the final analysis, both of the foregoing programmes are intended to improve the Malay income level, since it is alleged that Malay income imbalance is due to their high concentration in rural areas marked by high underemployment and low investment in higher income commercial and industrial sectors. Therefore, by augmenting Malay participation and ownership in the modern sector it will be possible to correct the income inequity associated with area and skill mal-distribution. This can be done without injuring other communities, according to the government, because of the expected high growth factor. The government has projected sectoral growth rates of 12.3 percent in manufacturing, 5.4 percent in agriculture, 4.9 percent in commerce, and 6.5 percent in construction.⁶⁰ Malaysian development is therefore

founded on continuing economic growth. Concomitantly, government interference is needed to ameliorate the Malay economic plight; thus the need for Malay "special rights".⁶¹

Significant governmental initiatives under the NEP are naturally causing Malay-Chinese antagonisms. Generally, Chinese perceive threats to their traditional "domain" of economics given the many government economic measures. In reaction to these government actions there appears to be more interaction and cooperation among Chinese in Malaya.⁶² Moreover, development based on the NEP is, in fact, creating perceptible economic schisms within the Malay community itself.⁶³ In the long term, these Malay divisions may prove to be salutary to ethnic relations as the main societal cleavage between Chinese and Malay will become less "reinforcing". Indeed, an incipient class dichotomy or cleavage based on groups of "haves" and "have-nots" may even transpire.⁶⁴

Non-economic areas also constitute a vital part of the post-1969 development strategy in Malaysia's national plans. The Second Malaysia Plan, in particular, is quite explicit about the introduction of "Bahasa Malaysia", a "modernized" brand of Malay, into the entire educational system.⁶⁵ To stimulate growth of a "national" culture, the "national" language is to be applied in "graduated" steps. The ultimate goal is to have all primary and secondary schools as well as university courses taught in "Bahasa Malaysia".⁶⁶

The new education policy specifically provided for the eventual replacement of "national-type" schools, which have used languages other than Malay, by "national" schools which would use only Malay. It is hoped by the national government that by 1984 Malay would have completely replaced English as the language of instruction at all levels of education.⁶⁷ This new education policy is, in fact, regarded as "... probably the most important post - May 13 (1969) policy departure. It represented a sharp break with the past and one bound to have profound ... consequences."⁶⁸

As such, decommunalization of the overall Malayan and, in fact, Malaysian society formed an integral component of the Alliance Party's (or National Front since 1970) strategy for "national" growth. Special provisions within the framework of the legal system, however, required constitutional amendments, and these, in turn, needed a two-third majority in the national Parliament. When the emergency had to be declared in May 1969, the Alliance had won 66 seats in Peninsular Malaysia and 10 in Sabah.⁶⁹ There remained one uncompleted contest in Malacca, 6 in Sabah and the full contingent of 24 in Sarawak. It was, of course, possible that some opposition members might be amenable to conversion, but too much activity along such lines would, undoubtedly, have suggested corruptive measures. Therefore, the drive for two-thirds, 96 out of 144 seats, required control of at least

twenty of the remaining thirty-one seats.⁷⁰

The results of the 1970 elections in Sabah, as expected, were altogether favourable, as the Alliance captured all six seats. Sarawak was somewhat of a disappointment to the Alliance, for it managed to win less than one-third of the seats.⁷¹ Therefore, a coalition was deemed necessary to run the state. After short but intense negotiations, the SUPP accepted a junior partnership with the Alliance in Sarawak, and, thus, provided the Alliance Party in Sarawak with a majority in the State Assembly.⁷² It was also agreed to support the Alliance in the Federal Parliament. This political marriage between the Alliance and the SUPP signified the genesis of a new phase in Sarawak's political growth. The new pattern of growth in Sarawak was to be based on the newly-adopted strategy for "development" in Peninsular Malaysia.

Conclusion

The extensive aggregation of "nation-building" programmes in Malaysia since 1969 has resulted from the designation of economics as the primary cause of the "May 13th Incident". The current pseudo savior-faire approach of the Malayan government is in direct contrast to the "avoidance" approach in the pre-1969 years.⁷³ This approach, coupled with the several facets of the "National Ideology", strives

to provide a nostrum for Malayan and Malaysian problems of "development".

Adopting the political integration approach of Peninsular Malaysia's society as an overall national integrative scheme certainly seems ambitious. Indeed, it indicates a degree of inflexibility within the national government to adopt such a schema in view of the vast heterogeneity within the Federation.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. Ratnam, Political Process in Malaya, p.5.
2. Ibid., p.1; Kernial S. Sandhu, "Communalism: The Primary Threat to Malayan Unity," Asian Survey, 2, #6 (August, 1962), 30-41.
3. J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, A Study of Plural Economy (New York: New York University Press, 1939), esp. pp.24-30.
4. See discussion in Esman, Development in Malaysia, pp.17-21.
5. Alvin Rabushka, "Racial Stereotypes in Malaya," Asian Survey, 2 (1971), 709-218.

There are three categories of stereotypes: "auto-stereotype", which denotes the self-perceived image; "hetero-stereotype", representing the images of persons held by those outside the group concerned; and "reflexive", which depicts the mutual images commonly held by both groups (i.e. of each other). Thus, respective examples of the above types are Chinese of Chinese, Malays of Chinese, and Malays of Chinese and Chinese of Malays. The pioneering work of stereotyping is Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1965, First Published 1949).

6. MacDougall, Communal Discrimination, p.v.
7. Ibid., pp.2-4.
8. Pran Chopra, "Malaysia's Strategy for Survival," Pacific Affairs, 47, #4 (Winter, 1974-75), 437-454.

For an historical examination on this aspect of Malayan society, consult J. J. Puthuchear, Ownership and Control In The Malayan Economy (Singapore: Donald Moore for Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1960). Also, the main

foreign countries involved in Malaysia's economy are Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.

9. T. H. Silcock, "Approximate Racial Division of National Income," in Political Economy of Independent Malaya, ed. by T. H. Silcock and E. K. Fisk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp.276-281.

10. Figures cited in Chopra, "Malaysia's Strategy," p.444. See also, Charles Hirschman, Ethnic Stratification in West Malaysia (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, 1972), esp. pp.196-218.

11. This area is discussed in greater detail in chapter six with respect to Sarawak. Suffice to say here that generally since 1969 the Malay language is being adopted in various spheres of society, the most conspicuous one being in education.

12. Refer to Milton J. Esman, "Malaysia: Communal Coexistence and Mutual Deterrence," in Racial Tensions and National Identity, ed. by Ernest D. Campbell (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), pp.227-243.

13. In the 1969-1970 academic session at the University of Malaya, only 79 Malays were in science, as compared to 228 non-Malays. The Malay ratio in engineering and first year medicine was even lower. Also, in the Faculty of Economics and Administration, there were three non-Malays for every two Malays. See "Towards National Harmony," (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1971), Table 1, p.12, cited in R. S. Milne, "The Politics of Malaysia's New Economic Policy," Pacific Affairs, 49, #2 (Summer, 1976), 235-262.

14. For an historical account of the MCA, see Margaret Roff, "The Malayan Chinese Association, 1948-65," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 6 (1965), 40-53.

15. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.153.

16. Ibid.

17. K. J. Ratnam, in Political Process in Malaya, p.159, posits four distinct groups of political parties in Malaya: "Inter-communal" (e.g. Alliance), "Malay-Communal" (e.g. PMIP), "Non-Malay Communal" (e.g. PPP), and "Ideological" (e.g. the Socialist Front of 1957, comprised of the more "progressive" parties, such as the GRM and PPP).

It is important to note that the Alliance Party is an inter-communal party and not a non-communal party, as described by Geertz, "Integrative Revolution," p.114.

For an excellent discussion on party politics in general, and non-communal parties specifically in western Malaysia, see R. K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971).

18. The "Grand Coalition" between the Socialists and the People's Party in the Second Austrian Republic is another prime case of this type of accommodative mechanism. Eric Nordlinger has, in fact, posited further methods, in addition to coalitional politics, utilized to secure some degree of ethnic and/or ideological accord: the proportionality principle (i.e. "proporz"), "purposive depoliticization" on the part of the government, and mutual veto, compromise, and concessions. See his Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press for the Centre for International Affairs, 1971), esp. pp.21-32.

For a discussion of Nordlinger's study, see Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict," Public Policy, 21 (Winter, 1973), 49-78.

19. Means, Malaysian Politics, pp.42-43.

20. A concise discussion of the factors involved in the economic "backwardness" of Malays is provided by David Lim, Economic Growth and Development in West Malaysia, 1947-1970 (Kuala Lumpur/Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973); esp. chapter four, section D. Also see the articles in Part 7, "Human Factors in Economic Development", in Readings on Malaysian Economic Development, ed. by David Lim (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975).

21. Although Sinitic contacts, and early settlement are recorded as early as the fifth century, significant immigration to Malaya did not begin until the commencement of British rule at the turn of the century. See, R. O. Winstedt, The Malays, A Cultural History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1950), p.11.

22. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p.84.

Although British etiquette played an important component of the education provided at the College, traditional modes of life were left untampered. In fact, British educational policy upheld such societal facets. Yael Levy summarizes the influence of the British education system this way:

"The spirit of this educational system was close to some aspects of the traditional culture; it promoted the traditional concept of hierarchy and associated high social status with cultural superiority."

See her Malaysia and Ceylon: A Study of Two Developing Centres. Studies in Comparative Modernization Series, Volume 2, #90-009 (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1974), p.20.

Also refer to R. Wilkinson, Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), esp. chapter 9.

23. For a review of traditional Chinese society, see two articles, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "High Ch'ing: 1683-1839," and Ernest P. Young, "Nationalism, Reform, and Republican Revolution: China in the Early Twentieth Century," in Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, ed. by James B. Crowley (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1970).

24. Wang Gungwu, "Traditional Leadership in a New Nation: The Chinese in Malaya and Singapore," in Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia, ed. by S. T. Alisjahbana, et al. (Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Society of Orientalists, 1965), pp.172-185.

25. There were serious clashes between Chinese and Malays in 1945, 1948, 1950, 1960, 1964 and 1967. Each of these was, of course, not the magnitude and intensity of the 1969 riots. See Felix V. Gagliano, Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath. Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series #13 (Athens: Ohio University, Centre for International Affairs, 1971), esp. pp.8-10. Also see Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1973).

26. The Chinese, understandably, comprised the majority of the Japanese resistance force in Malaya, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), as Imperial Japan had carried out discriminatory acts against the Chinese population.

On the Malayan Union Scheme, see particularly James de Vere Allen, The Malayan Union (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

27. Means, Malaysian Politics, p.52.

28. Karl von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p.97.

29. Kenneth D. McRae's edition, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies. The Carleton Library #79 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), provides the best available collection of works dealing with consociationalism. A comprehensive summary of the existing literature is provided by Professor McRae in Part One of the book.

Other works on the area include: Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); and Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 477-505.

30. Quoted in von Vorys, Stability in Malaysia, p.80.

31. It is generally held that the Communist activities were a direct result of the orders from the International Communist Conference held in Calcutta in 1948. See King, New Malayan Nation, p.1.

32. See Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) pp.104-105.

33. For further details, refer to Means, Malaysian Politics, esp. chapter 9.

34. Esman, Development in Malaysia, p.258.

35. Ibid., p.10.

36. Regarding consociationalism, see earlier discussion in this chapter.

37. Esman, Development in Malaysia, p.258.

38. Gagliano, Communal Violence, pp.14-23.

39. For a summary of the policy proposals of these parties, see Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), pp.393-395.

40. In fact, it has been suggested that Malays instigated the riots, in bringing into Kuala Lumpur Malay supporters to rally behind the waning Alliance Party. See Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), p.397; and John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London: John Murray, 1969). See Appendix B for the results of the 1969 election.

41. Gagliano, Communal Violence, pp.25-35, inter alia.

42. Quoted in R. S. Milne, "'National Ideology' and Nation-Building in Malaysia," Asian Survey, 10, #7 (July, 1970), 563-573.

For a detailed discussion of the events immediately before and after the 1969 riots, see Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), chapter 21.

43. Milne, "National Ideology", p.391.

44. Government of Malaysia, Rukunegara (English Translation) (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia, n.d.), p.6.

45. Cited in Milne, "National Ideology", p.391.

For greater detail on these constitutional aspects, refer to Malaysian Federal Constitution, pp.70-71 and pp.156-157. Regarding the position of Head of State, see above, chapter two.

46. Milne, "National Ideology", p.391.

47. Government of Malaysia, Rukunegara, p.6. The term "Rukun" is the religious term for the "five pillars of Islam" which define the fundamental obligations of a Muslim. Therefore, "While Rukunegara can be translated as 'basic principles of the nation', it also has a distinctly Islamic ideological connotation." See Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), p.414, fn. 39.

48. Government of Malaysia, Rukunegara, p.6.

49. Gordon P. Means, "'Special Rights' as a strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia," Comparative Politics, 5 (1972-1973), 29-63.

50. Ibid., p.60.

A critical analysis of the Second Malaysia Plan is provided by Syed H. Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975: A Critique. Occasional Paper #15 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972). His main contentions are that the Plan (a) misuses statistics to render the Plan quite unrealistic, and (b) defies the normal developmental process of entrepreneurship by engendering the growth of a class of capitalists (i.e. Malays) through deliberate governmental actions.

51. The term "bumiputra" is sometimes referred to as "bumiputera"; the former will be used in this study. Officially, it incorporates Malays, and "indigenous" native groups such as Ibans and Melanans in Sarawak, and Kadazans in Sabah. It, however, excludes the so-called "immigrant" groups, the Chinese and Indians. The term becomes very ambiguous when applied to Sarawak's communities. For instance, are Sarawak Malays "sons of the soil" or are the various Dayak tribes, such as the Ibans, more authentic Bornean "bumiputras". Chapter six delves into this area more closely.
52. Means, "'Special Rights'," p.60.
53. Chapter six examines some of these programmes in Sarawak.
54. Some of them include the services of the Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA), the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA), and the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA). See Milne, "New Economic Policy," pp.343-250; and Frank H. Golay, et al., Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, under the auspices of the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1969), pp.341-390, inter alia.
55. Means, "'Special Rights'," p.60, fn. 68.
56. ARB, 5, #8 (January 31, 1976), p.104.
57. Ibid.
58. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in Malaysia," Asian Survey, 15, #3 (March, 1975), 258-266.
59. See Harcharan S. Khera, Problems and Prospects of the Malaysian Economy (Petaling Jaya: Central News Agency, 1972), esp. chapters 11 and 12, for a summary of these organizations.
60. von der Mehden, "Industrial Policy," p.266. Also

see Sevinc Carlsson, Malaysia: Search for National Unity and Economic Growth. The Washington Papers, 3, #25 (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1975), esp. pp. 38-42.

61. For a discussion of the "special rights" approach, as opposed to a more universalistic and achievement-oriented strategy, see Means, "'Special Rights'".

62. Under the sponsorship of the MCA new economic relations are being forged within the Chinese community, as well as between the Chinese and the government. See Milne, "New Economic Policy," p.252.

63. This conclusion on the NEP has been reached by both Professors Milne and Means. Refer to Milne, "New Economic Policy," pp.258-261; and Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), pp.449-451.

64. Such a division (i.e. based on economics) has, in fact, been present throughout Sarawak's history. The effects of the NEP on this particular trait of Sarawak society is examined in chapter six. Suffice to say that the most salient impact of the NEP on Sarawak is that this historical economic dichotomy is being transformed into one based more on reinforcing communal differences, similar to Malaya's two-group model. In Sarawak, it is not being founded on the fairly straightforward Malay/Chinese division, but on the "bumiputra"/"non-bumiputra" model within the NEP.

65. Government of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1973).

Earlier reports had examined the main issues involved in education: the Fenn-Wu, the Razak, and the Talib. The Fenn-Wu, published in 1951, adopted the view that it would be a mistake to try to force the Chinese to be educated through any other medium than Chinese, and that Chinese culture should be preserved but modified to suit Malayan conditions. It emphasized that what was desired was a direction of education through all the different language media towards a common sense of belonging to Malaya, and that this should be done in terms of the different Malayan cultures. See T. H. Silcock and A. Aziz, "Nationalism in Malaya," in Asian Nationalism and the West, ed. by W. H. Holland (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), pp.299-345.

The essential features of the "Razak Plan", named after the Chairman of the Committee on Education, Abdul Razak, were as follows: the separate language-medium school systems were to remain, with Malay and English as compulsory subjects in all schools. All schools had to conform to this education policy to be eligible for government grants-in-aid. See Means, Malaysian Politics, p.202.

These points of the Razak Plan were approved by the Talib Committee, established in 1959. The Talib Report, furthermore, advocated severe limiting of hours of Chinese instruction. Refer to Margaret Roff, "The Politics of Language in Malaya," Asian Survey, 7, #5 (May, 1967), 316-329.

66. Government of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review, p.5.

It needs to be emphasized that "Bahasa Malaysia" represents only one form of the Malay language. The colloquial form, which is most common in rural areas, is referred to as "bazaar" Malay. There are also various local variations or regional "dialects" such as "Sarawak Malay".

67. Jerome R. Bass, Malaysian Politics, 1968-1970: Crises and Response (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1973), p.436.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., pp.400-412.

70. Refer to figures in Appendix B.

71. von Vorys, Stability in Malaysia, p.116.

72. Ibid.

73. The term "savoir-faire" usually denotes tactful action based on "worldwide" or "bountiful" knowledge. It can thus be argued that Malaysian nation-building since 1969 cannot be seen as based on a savior-faire approach since it is (untactfully) exacerbating communal ties, particularly in Sarawak (to be discussed below).

Consequently, the term is used here to represent the salient change from laissez-faire to a position where the federal government purports to know the panacea for ethnic problems in Malaysia.

CHAPTER FIVE:
COMMUNAL RELATIONS IN SARAWAK BEFORE
JOINING MALAYSIA, 1841-1963

Introduction

In order to show Sarawak's distinctiveness, indeed uniqueness, vis-à-vis Peninsular Malaysia's society, this chapter outlines the chief ethnological characteristics of Sarawak society, and the development of communal policy beginning with the Brooke rule to the late 1960s. As in Malaya, "The most characteristic feature of the society of Sarawak ... is its pluralism The pluralism of the society constitutes the main challenge developers have to face."¹

Sarawak's Ethnic Environment

Transplanting the Malayan political integration approach to its constituent-states unavoidably creates complications in the latter. With the high degree of heterogeneity in the Malaysian Federation, federal directives, perforce, need to accord with local circumstances. The common reference to Quebec - "il n'est pas comme les autres" - is fully germane to the specific federal government/Sarawak relationship.

The peoples of Sarawak have long called forth the most extraordinary, romantic, affectionate and enduring eulogies from Europeans who have sojourned or worked extensively among them. More cautious visitors have argued, for example, that: "... a majority of Rajah Brooke's subjects may, and under the present judicious system will, eventually acquire a position more elevated in the scale of humanity, but can never be civilized in the European sense of the expression"² Less transitory observers have, however, been more fascinated with the variety of their life styles and adaptations to an extremely difficult physical environment.³ Somewhere between the dismissive and more serious viewpoints one might place these comments:

Borneo lies across the equator. It is a land where men are simple men, women are unsophisticated women, monkeys are uninhibited monkeys, orchids are blooming orchids, and all manner of natural creatures are their own unspoiled selves.⁴

Such an idyllic caricature would certainly need revision in order to describe present-day Sarawak.

Regardless of the vision of Sarawak held by certain writers, the ethnic makeup in this Bornean area has remained quite complex. Tom Harrisson has warned against arbitrarily regarding specific groups as "indigenous" and others as "arriviste", pointing to archaeological evidence that Chinese were active in Sarawak more than a thousand years ago, and to

genealogical evidence that Ibans entered Sarawak from southern Borneo.⁵ Indeed, Tim Babcock has recently shown that Sarawak evinces its own "indigenous ethnicity" which defies the rather facile ethnological categorizations by occidental scholars.⁶

The usual simplistic descriptive dichotomies of Sarawak's population are cast in terms of indigenes/immigrants and natives/Chinese. Within the 69 percent of the population deemed to be indigenous there are numerous sub-groups.⁷ The categories used in the most current census were Malays, Melanau, Sea Dayak (i.e. Iban), Land Dayak, and others, the last with eight sub-heads of its own.⁸ Also, one of the more important population differentials has been between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The single largest community in Sarawak, comprising 31 percent of the total population, are the Sea Dayaks or the Ibans (see Figure 1 for ethnic distribution of Sarawak's population).⁹ The terms are interchangeable, but the former is somewhat misleading, for although they use boats they are now essentially up-river people ("ulu"). Whereas they have customarily identified themselves by the names of the rivers along which they dwelt, growing political consciousness has given them a sense of common identity and unity. As "pirates", headhunters and slash-and-burn cultivators addicted to frequent migration, they were the legendary "wild men of Borneo".

FIGURE 1

Earlier ethnographers thought that Ibans belonged to the "Malay race", and to have originated from the Malay Peninsula or Sumatra. However, this theory has now fallen into disrepute as the oral history of the Ibans themselves traces their origins to the Kapuas River valley in what is now Kalimantan (Indonesia Borneo).¹⁰

The other tribal peoples of Sarawak are less numerous than the Ibans. Chief among them are the so-called Land Dayaks. They have generally been denigrated as "less energetic" than the Ibans. Such a comparison reminds one of the usual distinctions made between the Chinese and the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia, as well as in Sarawak. This perception of the Land Dayaks may have resulted from the reluctance of most of these peoples to adopt more "modern" ideas such as sedentary agriculture, or making use of educational opportunities offered by the government.¹¹

The Land Dayaks, some of the earliest inhabitants of the state, possess a close relationship with tribes of south Borneo (Kalimantan). They share similar customs with many of these southern groups. Great numbers of the Land Dayak group still live over the border in Indonesian territory, and though groups in both territories belong to various branches of one stock, they have now drifted apart with different customs and dialects. Culturally, they are therefore considerably less homogeneous than the Ibans. Presently in the

First Division of Sarawak, they are broadly divided into five main groups based on dialectal differences.

Under the census heading "other Indigenous" are Besaya, Kedayan, Kayan, Kenyah, Kelebit and Punan. Collectively, they constitute little more than 5 percent of the total population of Sarawak.¹² They are each linguistically and culturally distinct and distinctive. Dutch and Indonesian ethnographers have referred to them quite often as simply "Dyaks". However, more contemporary British counterparts have been more astute observers, and always maintain the particularity of these groups.

The Malay and Melanaus of Sarawak are predominantly coastal peoples and overwhelmingly Muslim. The question has sometimes been raised as to whether the census distinction between the two groups is in fact recognized by the people themselves. But certainly there are salient differences of language and custom between them. The Melanaus have traditionally lived in villages along the coast of the Third, Fourth and the new Sixth Administrative Divisions, and have been ~~fishermen~~ and sago growers; sago is a root plant often used as a flour substitute. From linguistic and other evidence it would seem that the Melanaus are related ethnically to up-river tribes and possibly to the Land Dayaks, and their conversion to Islam was, doubtless, achieved under the rule of the Brunei Sultanate in the early nineteenth century. In

1970, 75 percent of the Melanaus were Muslims, while 22 percent were still pagans, and only 5 percent as Christians.¹³ Since the establishment of Malaysia, to be "Malay" has been politically advantageous, and many Melanau leaders have chosen to adopt this identity. Tun Abdul Rahman Yakub, the present Chief Minister of Sarawak, is a prime example of a Melanau "turned Malay". This process of entering the Malay fold is termed as "Masok Melayu".¹⁴

All Malays in Sarawak, comprising approximately 18 percent of the total population in the state, are Muslims.¹⁵ The use of the term "Malay" in Sarawak is, however, misleading in that it suggests that such peoples are related to the peoples of the Peninsula or come from there. For a long time theories involving physical migration were popular but it is now thought more likely that in fact the "Malays" of Sarawak originated from the conversion of indigenous non-Muslim tribal peoples to Islam.¹⁶

Generally, the term "Malay" is defined more in terms of culture than racial or political attributes. Constitutionally, being "Malay" denotes one who habitually speaks the Malay language, professes the Muslim religion, and conforms to Malay customs.¹⁷ "Masok Islam" represents the process of "entering the Muslim fold", while "Masok Melayu" depicts "entering the Malay community". The former, perforce, precedes the latter. Given this apparent "flexibility" in that

"Malay" is measured in cultural terms, "movement" into this group is therefore possible. Indeed, Arabs and Pakistanis on Peninsular Malaysia are usually regarded as Malays, since they have completed the process of "Masok Melayu".¹⁸ Undoubtedly, this measure of "flexibility" reflects the desire to expand the "Malay" group, which is largely dictated by politics; more specifically, by the Malay desire for political supremacy.

The Malays are, in fact, a mixed stock and probably the least "native" of the "indigenous" groups in Sarawak. There are elements of Melanau, Iban and Land Dayak blood in the Sarawak Malay.¹⁹ Tom Harrission is of the opinion that the "... Malays have no long pedigree as such, no strong racial entity, but a great deal of diversity of origin, from other groups, often attained recently."²⁰ The paradox, according to Lee Yong Leng, is that "... although the Malays are everywhere recognized as a distinct racial group, in Sarawak they have no common origin as such. Many became Malays in comparatively recent times as a result of proselytization."²¹

The heterogeneous Malay group is, however, bound together by the common tie of Islam. The determining characteristic of the Malays is therefore one of religion. There is also a tendency to regard converts to Islam as Malays, as discussed above. The Melanaus have been the prime case of such converts. In fact, some analysts have said that the

Melanaus have been dominated by the Malays to such an extent that there is danger of their being fully absorbed by the Malays. J. L. Noakes has argued that an awakening of racial consciousness among the Melanaus has been reducing the number of Muslim converts.²² With the large degree of politicization of ethnicity; as embodied in "bumiputraism", this Melanau ethnonationalism may indeed be waning.²³ However, it would be, according to Noakes,

a mistake not to recognize the individuality of the Melanaus as a cultural group; among the people it is freely recognized; languages, customs, physical characteristics and occupation place these people in a loose but definite group of their own.²⁴

While Chinese links with Borneo in general, and Sarawak specifically, may very well go back over a thousand years ago, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that Chinese began to settle in considerable numbers. Chinese settlement in the First Division around Kuching was mainly by movement of Hakka peoples northwards from the then Dutch Kalimantan. They were apparently attracted by trading and mining possibilities around the gold mines of Bau.²⁵ The other concentration of Chinese was in the Sibu area of the Third Division. This community owes its origins to an arrangement made in 1900 between Rajah Charles Brooke and Wong Nai-siong to bring Foochow farming families to cultivate the Rejang River valley.²⁶ From these relatively

recent beginnings, the Chinese community of Sarawak has grown to 30 percent of the total Sarawak population and has been able to control the bulk of commerce and trade, and to engage in commercial agriculture.²⁷

In the 1970s, the tripartite division of Sarawak's population stands in marked contrast to the predominance of a Malay versus non-Malay (i.e. Chinese) dichotomy in Peninsular Malaysia. It has produced in Sarawak a situation in which each group has found it necessary to manoeuvre to gain the support of elements outside its own community. The population of one million in Sarawak can, therefore, be somewhat arbitrarily divided into three principal groups. The individual communities and their respective percentages of Sarawak's total population are: Iban 31.0%, Chinese 30.1%, Malay 18.7%, Land Dayak 8.5%, Melanau 5.4%, and other minor groups such as Kedayan and Indians 1.1%.²⁸

It is important to note that the relative balance between these groups has remained approximately the same throughout this present century. Both the 1947 and the 1960 censuses, in particular, reveal that "Malays", "Dayaks", and the "non-natives" have constituted about 20, 40, and 30 percent of the population, respectively.²⁹

Ostensibly, J. S. Furnivall's conception of a "plural society" seems to apply to Sarawak.³⁰ The different communities have been and are still residentially separated.³¹

Ibans are domiciled in the "ulu" regions (up-river) of the Second and Third Divisions. The Land Dayaks, meanwhile, are almost solely within the small First Division. The smaller groups of the Medayau, the Bisayu and the Kelabits are found in the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Divisions. Notwithstanding the dialectal and economic differences within the Chinese community, they are mostly located near or in urban centres.³²

Occupational differences accord with ethnic diversity as well. Both the non-Muslims and Malayo-Muslim peoples are predominantly agriculturally-based. For instance, the Ibans have traditionally been swidden agriculturalists (i.e. slash-and-burn agriculture), while Land Dayaks have been based on sago production, concentrated in the First Division. The latter, Land Dayaks' activity, is largely of a non-sedentary nature as well. Indeed, less than six percent of agricultural land in Sarawak is under sedentary cultivation.³³ But, overall, 82 percent of Sarawak's economically active population is involved in agriculture which accounts for over half of Sarawak's total export income, excluding petroleum.³⁴

The Chinese in Sarawak, as is the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia, dominate in commerce and trade. This, however, does not mean that the majority of the Chinese has been in such fields. Instead, only about 20 to 30 percent of the community has been involved in commercial areas, while the remaining portion has stayed in agricultural activities, main-

ly growing cash crops as opposed to padi cultivation.³⁵

Doubtless, this economic structure of the Sarawak Chinese, particularly in terms of the high percentage of Sarawak Chinese in agricultural activities, is unique vis à vis other "Nanyang Chinese" settlements. And this phenomenon has resulted largely from the Brooke policy of encouraging immigration of farmers from southern China, examined more closely in the next section.

Chinese, however, continue to dominate commercial activities in Sarawak. The lumber industry in the Third Division, for example, is mostly, if not wholly, owned by Chinese. Other groups are involved in these operations only at the lower levels of administrative clerks, watchmen, guides and so on. Ibans fill many of these lower positions, particularly those on "bejalai".³⁶

Economic power, however, has not jibed with political power. As in colonial Malaya, both the Brookes and the British administration favoured the Sarawak Malays and Dayaks at the neglect of the Chinese. On balance, Sarawak has evinced characteristics of a plural society.

Parenthetically, certain sectors of Sarawak society, particularly the urban centres, have also demonstrated, more or less, non-plural characteristics. Physical segregation along communal lines has existed and continue to persist in Sarawak. But interaction among the various communities, both

formally and informally, were frequent and meaningful. The apparent obstacle of physical separation was usually offset by inter-communal harmony fostered by common allegiance to the Brookes, and then to the British government. And the vital element in both periods was that the British institutions were basically perceived as comparatively "neutral" by the communal groups. This was the manifestation of a "minimal-consensus" polity.

Sarawak society was, furthermore, essentially an aggregation of many sequestered settlements. This trait naturally contributed to the emergence of regional identifications, based more on geographical factors than strictly ethnic ones. Ibans, for instance, have historically been demarcated along geographical lines; those of the Rejang River Delta region "versus" Ibans of the Kapit River (upriver) area, for example. Moreover, divisional identities exist among respective groups. Thus, there are Ibans from the Third Division, as opposed to those of the Fourth or Second Divisions. The situation, therefore, arises where different communal groups of a particular physically-distinct settlement area possess far greater degrees of cooperation than among the respective ethnic communities on a divisional- or state-wide basis.³⁷ Sarawak's society, in sum, may thus be seen as quasi-plural in a communal sense, as its main traditional cleavages have not been completely reinforcing in view of various intra-communal divisions.

These ethnic characteristics of Sarawak society have usually been translated into political terms. Within each respective communal group there exists, in most cases, two chief opposing parties. Each community has, more or less, a "modern" party with a concomitant "conservative" counterpart. Usually, the geographical factor influences the support for these two species of parties. Communalism in Sarawak, thus, has not been politicized nor polarized to the extent in Malaya where two distinct "camps" of Malay and Chinese prevail. Instead, Sarawak party politics, to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, has reflected the somewhat less than plural nature of the society.

Communal Relations During the Brooke Rule, 1841-1946

The history of modern Sarawak began with the arrival of James Brooke at Kuching, the present state capital, in 1841. For the next century or so the Brooke family ruled Sarawak. Overall, the Brooke rule was then characterized as

a kind of mild despotism, the only government suitable to Asiatics, who look to their chief as the sole repository (sic) of supreme power. The influence of old Rajah still pervades the whole system, and native and European work together in perfect harmony.³⁸

All three Brookes - James, Charles and Vyner - in fact adhered to the somewhat celebrated policy of "benevolent despotism"

during their respective periods of rule.

Serendipity has occurred throughout the histories of many different countries. And in the case of Sarawak it was by historical chance that James Brooke visited the northern areas of Borneo. Hoping to equal and even to surpass the exploits of Stamford Raffles, the founder of Singapore and famous British explorer throughout the rest of Asia, James had originally wanted to establish an intimate British diplomatic relationship with China.³⁹ While in Sarawak he was accorded, in 1841 by the Malay overlords, the title of "Rajah" ("ruler"), and given the whole territory for his role in the suppression of an uprising by Land Dayaks and Chinese in the Kuching area. The territory was then much smaller than present-day Sarawak, and was, in fact, under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Brunei.⁴⁰ Gradually Sarawak's territory expanded during Brooke rule, mostly through military efforts against the Brunei government.⁴¹

Of paramount importance to the Brookes was political stability in Sarawak. This desire was not so much generated by economic reasons as by personal motives. . . The territory, to the Rajahs, served as a personal tropical paradise. The paraphernalia of British civilization would eventually be transplanted in Sarawak, but direct control by the London government was to be minimal. However, the Rajahs themselves did aspire to maintain Britain's supremacy in the re-

gion, and also saw the need for British protection. In 1888 Sarawak became a British protectorate.⁴²

Upon assuming power the personal inclinations of the Brookes began to manifest. It has been observed that "... (James) had an instinctive understanding of the Malay mind."⁴³ Quite obviously, he found favour in their close relationship to the land, and also in their somewhat serene dispositions. In attempting to preserve the pastoral existence of the Malays and Dayaks, a series of laws was enacted in 1841. There were three particular segments. They were: the preservation of the "written law of Sarawak" ("ondongondong"); the preservation of Dayak life; and, quite interestingly, "... to ensure the good of the country, all men whether Chinese, Malays or Dyaks are permitted to enjoy their gains."⁴⁴ Clearly, the last point recognized the need for communal freedom. It was largely intended, however, for the continuance of economic growth, and was not directed towards genuine communal equality.

The separation of the society into three distinct groups can be easily discerned. The Dayaks, quite oddly enough, were seen to need protection, presumably from the growing commercialism of the Chinese. This policy appears quite anomalous, in hindsight, since the Dayaks have maintained relatively close and amicable relations, political and economic, with the Chinese throughout Sarawak's history.⁴⁵

The Malays, on the other hand, attained privileged positions as administrators in the Brookes' civil service. And this particular formula of ethnic segmentation was not to be abandoned in the ensuing years.

Although somewhat clear ethnic distinctions, as discussed above, were maintained by the Brookes, no instability transpired. Several factors deterred such an occurrence. The whole population, firstly, was not politically mobilized nor activated. In fact, they were not politically conscious. The more contentious issues harbouring ethnic connotations therefore remained de-politicized.

Secondly, these communities generally existed quite independently of each other. The Chinese remained somewhat isolated at the gold mines near Bau for many years. Only during the early twentieth century did more Chinese concentrate in and around urban centres, such as at the Rejang River settlement near Sibu. With the Dayaks, subsistence agricultural activities assumed much importance. The Malays were the only group that had regular contact with governmental activities. Contacts which were present among other groups, such as Chinese and Ibans, were also present and were conducive to communal harmony as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Most importantly, the Brookes not only allowed, but encouraged autonomy among the individual communal groups.

All of the three Brookes used Ibans for the military, trusted the Malays as government officials, and depended on Chinese economic enterprise.⁴⁶ Rationalism had dictated that a policy of communal autonomy be followed. Testimony to the success of this political integration approach was the fact that no communal disturbances occurred in the period. The only possible instances of open communal conflict were the so-called Chinese rebellion of 1857, and the Asun rebellion (1929-1940). But these "rebellions" have been seen more as the results of reasons other than communalism. Moreover, the ill-feelings caused by these incidents proved to be quite ephemeral in nature.⁴⁷

Due to the dispersed nature of the settlements the political system was therefore extremely decentralized. To carry out their responsibilities the Rajahs appointed residents and district officers (DOs) to each of the divisions, usually headquartered at an out-station (e.g. Kapit, Miri).⁴⁸ Rajah James' instructions to new officers illustrated the benevolent quality of his rule:

Proper deference should be showed to the chiefs; and in any case of difficulty it is well to ask the advice and opinion of the headman. It satisfies them and strengthens you. You are not obliged in all cases to follow their advice, but the fact of asking is a compliment to them and gives them an interest in what is being done by the government.⁴⁹

Below the permanent officers was the "hinge" upon which the government relied upon for support. Every Malay and Melanau village had its chief, "tua kampong", who was elected by the people, and if approved by the Rajah, which was usually the case, was given a commission on the taxes to be collected. The Ibans, Kayahs and other peoples were also under distinct chiefs, "penghulus" or sometimes "orang kayas". The penghulu usually had more than one village under his jurisdiction and more overall power than a tua kampong.

Government under the Brookes was perhaps most "indirect" in reference to the Chinese. The "kang chew" or "Kapitan China" had a relatively free hand in functioning as a broker for the community, and was often given gambling, pawn and opium concessions by the government. Government measures concerning the Chinese were limited almost exclusively to the control of secret societies and the separation of the Chinese into geographically exclusive areas. The latter was accomplished by restricting the areas of land available for Chinese settlement, and this was most evident in the farming areas around the Rejang River.⁵⁰ Although the government tried to separate the communities as much as possible, mainly through the control of settlement patterns, significant communal interaction still occurred which has been discussed earlier.

Governmental accommodation of the different communal groups could further be seen in the judicial process. The Supreme Court, according to Stephen Runciman, was administered by the Rajah "... partly according to the custom of the people involved, partly according to the codified Indian law and partly according to his own common sense."⁵¹ Malay civil cases were heard by the Datu's Court, a traditional court, and in 1911 a Chinese Civil Court was formally established.⁵²

In education, the Brookes maintained and even encouraged vernacular schools based on the respective mediums of Malay, Iban, and the various Chinese dialects. Government grants to both English-medium schools, and vernacular-medium schools were present.⁵³ Granted complete laissez-faire was not present, as English was used at Kuching schools run by the government and missionaries mainly of the Catholic and Methodist Churches. But no effort was made by the government to undermine the continuing existence of these schools. In fact, the so-called "Blue Report" of 1935, completed by a senior officer in the Brooke government, Mr. Le Gros Clark, stressed the general importance of ethnicity by advocating less emphasis on English-medium instruction, and more on rural vernacular training.⁵⁴ Indeed, the vernacular systems were actually maintained until the middle of the British administration period.

Sarawak's relative isolation from the "rest of the world" facilitated the maintenance of congenial communal ties. This degree of detachment also allowed for the instituting of the personal rule by the Brookes. The one distinct trait of the three Rajahs was their adversity towards rapid progress.⁵⁵ This proclivity was the basis of the "Brooke ideology", although it was not a fully explicit and conceptualized set of ideas.⁵⁶ Yet it imbued the entire "development" efforts during Brooke rule. The ideology was "... founded on the fundamental assumption that change, particularly far-reaching or rapid change, was usually harmful (to society)."⁵⁷ As late as the 1940s, Vyner Brooke rejected, unequivocally, the possibility of rapid industrialism in Sarawak.⁵⁸ Doubtless, the Brooke family wanted to keep Sarawak as their own "Devonshire Manor", an English "Shangri-La" in Southeast Asia.

Economic advancement was, however, not totally absent in Sarawak during Brooke rule. Indeed, by the standards of a rather "backward" Bornean territory during the early twentieth century, the extent of progress was quite impressive, particularly under Charles' rule (1868-1917). According to Robert Pringle, "... the impact of the Brookes must be measured not against the records of other states far better endowed with immediately exploitable resources, both human and natural, but in relation to the political and social

fabric of Sarawak itself on the eve of Brooke rule."⁵⁹

The indications of economic growth during Brooke rule are quite numerous. Some of them include the following: the early development of the coal and rubber industries; the construction of a railroad which began in 1917; the completion of the Brooke Dockyard in Kuching in 1907; the introduction of public utilities such as street lighting and a limited telephone service in and around 1900; and the establishment of a cigar factory.⁶⁰ Other innovations by the Brookes - the control of Iban migration, the encouragement of Chinese immigration, and the introduction of missionaries for instance - rendered the Brooke period rather "revolutionary". However, growth was regulated along the precepts of the Brooke "ideology" as the Brookes were extremely sensitive to the many ramifications, particularly the negative ones, of rapid growth.

Quite perceptible in Brooke rule was its disregard for the Chinese community. James once asserted that Sarawak belongs to the "... Malays, Sea Dyaks, Land Dyaks, Kayans, Milanos, Muruts, Kadayans, Bisayahs and other tribes"⁶¹ The Brookes, as with the British administration in colonial Malaya, assumed that the Chinese were only transients. The high extent of isolationism of the Chinese simply reinforced this government attitude. However, it can be argued that the Chinese posed as potential competitors to the wielders of

power in both areas. Even at this juncture, the Chinese controlled the economic spheres. And their presence in Sarawak also did not prove to be of a transitory nature. In 1970, close to 80 percent of Sarawak's Chinese population are local born.⁶² Finally, at the close of Brooke rule, recognition, albeit indirectly, of the Sarawak Chinese community could be discerned. The pertinent clauses of ~~Viceroy Brooke's~~ "Cardinal Principles" of 1941 were:

- (a) Our subjects of whatever race or creed shall be freely and impartially admitted to offices in Our Service, the duties of which they might be qualified by their education, ability and integrity duly to discharge.
- (b) ... the general policy of Our Predecessors and Ourselves whereby the various races of the State have been enabled to live in happiness and harmony together shall be adhered to by Our successors
- (c) Freedom of expression both in speech and writing shall be permitted and encouraged and that everyone shall be entitled to worship as he pleases.⁶³

The global conflagration of World War II bore great significance to Asia generally. Most importantly, it had demonstrated that Asians were by no means inferior or even ancillary to the occidental colonialists. Inevitably, nationalistic fervour increased with a concurrent abatement in colonialism. The conclusion of the War did not, however, signify the beginning of Sarawak self-rule.

The Colonial Years, 1946 - 1963

Cession of Sarawak to the British government occurred in 1946. Abdication of the Brookes had resulted from the fact that Rajah Vyner deemed postwar reconstruction of the economy too leviathan a task to be undertaken by the Brooke family. In fact, cession of Sarawak had been contemplated earlier in history by the Brookes mainly because of economic factors.⁶⁴

Concomitantly, an euphoric atmosphere of self-determination, ubiquitous in the international community, militated against the survival of "benevolent despotism". The commitment of the Labour Government in Britain to end Brooke rule provided the needed impetus to begin a new period in Sarawak's history.⁶⁵

With the Malays in Malaya successfully thwarting the British plan of Malayan Union, Sarawak Malays were gaining aplomb in Borneo.⁶⁶ But the latter group were less successful than Peninsula counterparts in its endeavour. During the late 1940s, a proliferation of basically nationalistic organizations had been formed to oppose cession. Some seventeen associations declared their support for independence under the Rajah, the most important of which was the Malay National Union and its affiliates, the Pergerakan Pemuda Sarawak (Sarawak Youth Movement). The only Malay organization supporting cession was the Young Malay Association.⁶⁷

The new government, the British colonial administration, wanted loyalty to the British crown at the outset of its rule. Consequently, a circular was passed throughout the civil service which was to be signed by all government employees expressing loyalty to Britain. A total of 338, of whom 335 were Malays, in higher government positions refused to comply and resigned.⁶⁸ For more than two years thereafter, feelings and frustrations simmered throughout the Malay community. Recriminations were rife, directed more against those Malays who had benefitted from cession than against the colonial authorities themselves. The heir-apparent to the Rajahdom, Anthony Brooke, was prohibited from re-entering Sarawak under a provision of the Undesirable Persons Ordinance.⁶⁹

The Chinese community tended to benefit from the withdrawal of the privileged status hitherto accorded to the Malays, as did the Dayaks. The situation was one of frustration, perhaps desperation, for there appeared to be no legitimate means of restoring Brooke rule. By 1949, a Sibubased clandestine organization, the Thirteen Essential Ingredients, was created by the Pergerakan Pemuda Melayu. They were committed to get "liberation" restored as soon as possible, and also to the assassination of the Sarawak Governor.⁷⁰

Two external developments helped to consolidate the position of the colonial government. First, the rapid rise

in commodity prices, as a direct result of the Korean War, greatly increased the general level of prosperity throughout Sarawak. Second, there was a general decline in the security of the Western position throughout Asia as evidenced in the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, and the fighting in Indo-China. In view of the international ambience, Anthony Brooke, the heir-apparent ("Rajah Muda"), resolved to cease his activities against cession and urged all Sarawakians to do likewise in 1951.⁷¹ From that time onward, the organizations working against cession lay quiescent, never to regain effective popular support.⁷²

Sir Charles Arden Clarke, the then Governor of Sarawak, described the ethnic situation in 1947 in this fashion:

In Sarawak, we are dealing with a plural society, that is, a society comprising a variety of elements which differ in race, language, custom, religion and culture and which live side by side, yet without mingling in one political unit.⁷³

He concluded by asserting that,

Our objective is to weld these elements into a body of Sarawak citizens capable of managing in cooperation with each other their own and their country's affairs.⁷⁴

Analogous to the Brooke rule, the British favoured the Malays and Dayaks. A distinction was also made between

the "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" peoples. The former were defined as "... those persons who recognize no allegiance to any foreign territory, who regard Sarawak as their homeland, who believe themselves to be part of the territory, and who are now regarded as natives by their followers."⁷⁵ This set of criteria was certainly intended to "ostracize" the Chinese from Sarawak society.

Additionally, the government discriminated against the Chinese in the administration of the Land Code. Land was simply protected for the "natives" from the Chinese, and even Iban encroachments through their practice of swidden agriculture. The British were also prone to reject those educated in Chinese from the civil service. They, however, gave preferential treatment to Malays and other "natives" irrespective of language capabilities.⁷⁶

Outside these discriminatory policies, actual communal relations remained comparatively serene. Two significant disturbances did occur in the period, both in Kuching. But both were limited to labour problems. However, two problem areas - education and gun control - did tend to blemish the British rule in Sarawak.

Education, firstly, has always been a matter of pivotal concern for the whole Chinese community. Chinese settlers, wherever they have located themselves in Southeast Asia, have invariably established their own schools which in

due course became the focal points of each community. Before the war, the Chinese community in Kuching ran the schools on a dialect group basis. Thus, the Hokkien school was meant to serve the Hokkien community, and Foochow school for the Foochows and so on. Shortly after the war, a single board was created to encourage all Chinese secondary schools in Kuching, and the various associations to lend their school properties to the board.

No Chinese schools were included among the responsibilities of the Education Department until 1946. After the war, young militants began to challenge the conservatives' control of the Chinese schools. Upon completion of an official study on financing education and conditions of service in the teaching profession, the government published a White Paper and a new Grant Code regulation to take effect from 1956.⁷⁷

These recommendations, though hardly radical, represented the first substantial attempt by the government to assist and redirect the system of Chinese education in Sarawak. In a special report, the government noted the reliance of Chinese schools upon donations, some in the form of a levy on merchants, and suggested a "bargain" with the government offering sizeable financial assistance in return for a measure of government control of the curriculum.

Amid opposition from the Chinese, in the form of strikes and hartels in the towns of Miri, Sarikei, Sibuan and

Kuching, the government introduced a measure of conformity in salary scale, organization and also in some text books. In 1962, government assistance rested on the condition that schools must accept a ten year conversion programme. This meant that gradual adoption of the English medium for instruction in all subjects at the secondary level. In 1960, 37 percent of the Chinese were literate in English with a concurrent drop in the percentage of "kuo-yu" (Mandarin) education.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, most Chinese accepted English in consideration of its international utility. Moreover, vernacular schools were permitted to operate, albeit without government assistance. This policy tended to placate most Chinese and Ibans.

Another matter which received some negative reaction from most groups occurred in early 1963. Due to the increase of communist activity, the government ordered the suppression of all guns and ammunition of non-natives.⁷⁹ It, therefore, ignored the some sixty thousand native fire-arms, but collected the only eight thousand four hundred from non-natives.⁸⁰ Pungent remarks were liberally volleyed at the government by various Chinese newspapers such as the See Hua Daily News in Sibü. As with the education issue, the fire-arms question also quickly subsided. In fact, overall ethnic relations were quite harmonious during the British administration, similar to the Brooke period. What, then, were the

main reasons for the pacific nature of communal relations in Sarawak at this time?

First, an essentially laissez-faire approach to pluralism continued throughout the early years of British rule. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Kuching, for instance, was allowed to levy a tax on its own on all incoming and outgoing Chinese cargo in order to obtain sufficient funds for its schools.⁸¹ Only a small degree of control, moreover, was present through the office of the DO.

Decentralization remained the cornerstone of British administration. The years 1948 and 1949 witnessed significant administrative developments. They were mainly intended to ameliorate the links between the central authorities and the local groups. The programme was composed of two basic segments, the introduction of a limited number of selected Sarawak citizens into the higher echelons of the government, and the creation of five local authorities which assumed responsibility for primary education.⁸²

As intimated in the "Note" of the first British Governor in Sarawak, Sir Charles Arden Clarke, the main emphasis of the British administration was placed on local government as a means of political integration. These initial five local organizations were located at Bau, Simanggang, Betong, Sibuan, and Bintulu.⁸³ The principal trait of these early authorities was their distinct communally-based

activities. Not until 1948 was an ethnically-mixed authority being formed in Limbang.⁸⁴

It is interesting to note that during the formation of these local government bodies, intra-ethnic disputes were quite prevalent. In Mukah, there were problems based on religious differences within the Melanau group itself. Those who had been converted to Roman Catholicism clashed with those Melanaus of the Islamic faith. Also, Malays of different regions refused to cooperate at Kalaka in the Second Division.⁸⁵ Therefore, these instances point out the somewhat non-plural nature of Sarawak society, discussed more fully above.

Informal interaction, moreover, worked towards greater cooperation among the ethnic groups. This interaction took several forms. Development of timber mills, for instance, required the employment of natives as guides and the like. They were, and are still, almost all owned and operated by Chinese. The propinquity of some Chinese settlements to Iban settlements (e.g. longhouses) also enhanced interaction through economic and social contacts. Inter-marriage between Dayaks and Chinese timber barons in most cases were, and are still, quite common in towns like Sibu.⁸⁶ Again, an essentially non-plural trait has enhanced relatively harmonious communal relations.

More formal ties between the ethnic groups also resulted from party politics. As political parties are discussed more closely in chapter six, only the "highlights" as they relate to the British period are examined here. Although the Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS), comprised mostly of Malays and Ibans, was formed as a negative reaction to the predominantly Chinese SUPP, leaders in both parties interacted quite regularly. Subsequent parties like the Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA), with mostly Iban and Land Dayak members, had quite congenial relations with people in the SUPP, and of course, with the Sarawak National Party (SNAP), another Dayak party. Even the SUPP aspired to be a multicultural party during its infancy; but its overwhelming number of Chinese members rendered such an aim impossible. However, the venerable goal of racial cooperation was clearly existent.

By acting as the crucial neutral third force in the Sarawakian political ambit, the British furthered ethnic accord. Like the Brookes, the British consciously set out to nurture and to sustain some measure of communal harmony in the colony. Dayaks, Malays and Chinese, moreover, tended to accept the presence of a relatively disinterested group at the apex of the political structure. It seems that as long as the colonial administration performed the needed calculations in "racial arithmetic", peace and order would prevail.⁸⁷ Although certain calculations favoured the non-Chinese, overall, they were comparatively neutral.

Due to the century of paternalistic rule most, if not all of the population accepted Sarawak's colonial status; Sarawak was dependent on the British government and the British Empire as discussed in chapter three. The population certainly hoped for eventual independence, but were not impatient. In retrospect, it was a correct posture in the mid-20th century, as Sarawak did not possess the political nor the economic requisites for self-rule. There was a paucity of capable leaders; while the vast majority of the population was politically apathetic. Economically, Sarawak was "underdeveloped", if not "undeveloped", save for some timber and pepper production. London, however, worked diligently towards gradual Sarawak self-rule beginning in the early 1950s. The establishment of a local government system, and the holding of local elections in 1951 and 1957 attested to the British sincerity and determination in achieving its goal.

On balance, the period between 1946 and 1963 witnessed continued peaceful coexistence among Sarawak's three major communal groups. Communal politics were activated only when particular groups envisaged impingements into the rights perceived to be solely their own. Such was the case during the cession debate and the education issue. But, by no means were the economic inequalities between the non-Chinese and Chinese narrowed. On the other hand, it must be stressed that vast economic gaps are prevalent within the Sarawak society itself.

Conclusion

Sarawak's modern history, since the inception of Brooke rule, has been characterized by relative communal harmony among its three main groups, the Ibans, the Chinese, and the Malays. Several principal factors have contributed towards such a development: the perceptible "non-plural" characteristics of Sarawak society; the essentially laissez-faire approach of the Brooke and British governments toward Sarawak pluralism; and the basically non-discriminatory policies of these two governments.

In relation to Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak's ethnological makeup and experience with communal relations is certainly quite different and distinct. One commonality exists between the two areas however - both areas' experiences with the laissez-faire approach to communalism proved to be quite successful and effective, the individual policies notwithstanding. In fact, laissez-faire, with basically non-discriminatory policies, was even effective in maintaining relative communal harmony when appreciable modernization was taking place in Sarawak.

However, since the 1969 riots in Malaya, the Federation's growth has been based on generally pro-Malay policies, and a *savoir-faire* approach, both of which are subsumed under the Rukunegara. This strategy is the basis to combat communal discord within Peninsular Malaysia itself, and to promote

"national" growth. The post-1969 "nation-building" strategy of Kuala Lumpur was therefore departed from the more traditional approaches of communal conflict management by abandoning "avoidance politics". With a more active approach and a congeries of extremely sensitive development policies, the principal dilemma of unnatural political entities becomes even more important - the accommodation of regional differences with the national growth strategy.

Notes to Chapter Five

1. Sarawak Government and the University of Wageningen (Holland), Regional Planning Study of the First Division, Sarawak (8 vol.; n.p., 1969), vol. 2, p.20.
2. F. Boyle, Adventures Among the Dyaks of Borneo (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1865), p.320.
3. Ibid.
4. Malcolm MacDonald, Borneo People (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p.11.
5. Harrisson, Peoples of Sarawak, p.6.
6. "Indigenous ethnicity", unlike racial identity, is not held to be immutable, and is indeed characterized by impermanence according to Tim Babcock. Moreover, he asserts, "If we are to have an accurate understanding of traditional Borneo, we must form a picture of populations continually 'becoming' something else (e.g. through intermarriage), a picture with very few solid lines demarcating ethnic boundaries." See his, "Indigenous Ethnicity in Sarawak", Sarawak Museum Journal, 12, #43 (January/December, 1974), 191-202.
7. Roff, Politics of Belonging, p.26.
8. Ibid. Also refer to chapter one.
9. Ibid., p.27.
10. Benedict Sandin, The Sea Dayaks of Borneo Before White Rajah Rule (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp.2-4.
11. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.92.
12. Roff, Politics of Belonging, p.28.

13. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.70.
14. "Masok Melayu" ("masok" literally means "to enter") is discussed below in greater detail. See Richard Allen, Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect (New York: Oxford University press, 1968), esp. p.121.
15. Roff, Politics of Belonging, p.28.
16. This idea is presented in Tom Harrisson's The Malays of Southwest Sarawak Before Malaysia (London: MacMillan, 1970), esp. pp.154-159.

The possibility of actual migration from other parts of the Southeast Asian region, and especially Malaya and Sumatra, cannot be totally disregarded. The presence of land bridges in antiquarian Southeast Asia seems to have facilitated possible movements of people. Some of the Sarawak Malays do, in fact, trace their origins back to Malaya and Sumatra to as early as the fifteenth century. Relevant discussions can be found in several works, notably Charles Hose and William McDougall, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo (2 vols.; London: MacMillan, 1927); and Henry L. Roth, The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo (2 vols.; London: Truslove and Hanson, 1896).
17. MacDougall, Communal Discrimination, p.6.
18. Ibid.
19. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.54.
20. Tom Harrisson, "The Malays of South-West Sarawak before Malaysia," Sarawak Museum Journal, 11 (July-December, 1964), p.349.
21. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.55.
22. J. L. Noakes, Sarawak and Brunei: A Report on the 1947 Population Census (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1950), p.30, cited in Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.55.

23. Refer to chapter four for earlier discussion on this term, "bumiputra".
24. Noakes, Population Census, p.30.
25. Robert Payne, The White Rajahs of Sarawak (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1960), p.20.
26. Michael B. Leigh, The Chinese Community of Sarawak: A Study of Communal Relations (Singapore: Malaysia Printers Ltd., 1963) p.35.

See also, James R. Hipkins, "The History of the Chinese in Borneo," Sarawak Museum Journal, 19, #38-39 (July - December, 1971), 109-153.
27. Leigh, Chinese Community, p.30.
28. Refer to Table 1 in chapter one.
- 29.. As indicated in Table 1, the two "native" groups are (a) the "Malay" group (Malays, Melanau and Kedayans), and (b) the "Dayak" group (Ibans, Land Dayaks, and other "indigenous" groups). The "non-natives" include the Chinese, Indians and Europeans. This classification system is used in Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, pp.1-2.
30. The five attributes of a "plural society", as described in chapter four of this thesis, were (a) residentially separated communities, (b) economic differentiation by race, (c) uneven distribution of wealth, (d) little intermarriage between the communities, and (e) the existence of one politically dominant community.
31. In the early 1970s, however, there have been the creation of "settlement villages" such as Sibintek near Sibuan where both Dayaks and Chinese live in the same area. These "villages" will be discussed in greater detail below in chapter six.
32. Chinese are now trying to move into the rural areas, beginning in the 1970s. Doubtless, this situation creates problems with the Ibans who are swidden agricultur-

lists, as well as with other "natives" who possess legal claim to vast tracts of land (i.e. "Native Land Reserves"). See Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, pp.201-207.

33. James C. Jackson, Sarawak: A Geographical Survey of a Developing State (London: University of London Press, 1968), p.73.

34. Ibid.

35. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.113.

36. To reiterate, "bejalai" is an important Iban tradition which demands that all young Iban males undertake "a journey" for material gains and economic wealth. See earlier discussion in chapter three. ♣

37. The same can be said of Chinese in Sarawak. It has been noted that over a dozen different dialectal groups, usually reinforced by economic differences, exist within this community. See Ju-k'ang T'ien, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure. Monographs on Social Anthropology #12 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1953).

38. Quoted in Jon M. Reinhardt, "Administrative Policy and Practice in Sarawak: Continuity and Change under The Brookes," Journal of Asian Studies, 27, #4 (August, 1970), 851-862.

39. Payne, White Rajahs, p.5.

Indeed, James Brooke's vessel to Sarawak, called the "Royalist", also bore the name "second Raffles". See Ogston, "Sarawak, North Borneo," p.21.

40. See, in particular, Nicholas Tarling, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei (Kuala Lumpur/Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971).

41. On Brunei itself, refer to Brown, Brunei.

42. S. Baring-Gould, and C. A. Bamfylde, A History of Sarawak Under its Two Rajahs, 1839-1908 (London: Henry Sotheran and Co., 1909), p.351.

See also, L. R. Wright, "Sarawak's Relations With Britain, 1850-1870," Sarawak Museum Journal, 11, #23-24 (December, 1964), 628-648.

43. Payne, White Rajahs, p.47.

44. Ibid., p.55.

"Dayak" is also spelt "Dyak"; the latter used particularly in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

45. This was especially true of the Chinese-Dayak relationship in the First Division. See Robert Pringle, Rajah and Rebels, The Ibans of Sarawak Under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp.178-208.

46. The military role of the Ibans was exemplified by their role in the Chinese rebellion of 1857, discussed below. For an analysis of the Iban factor during Brooke rule, see Ulla Wagner, Colonialism and Iban Warfare (Stockholm OBE - Tryck Stklm., 1972).

47. This "rebellion" resulted from the imposition of higher taxes on Chinese gold by the Brooke government, according to Leigh, Chinese Community, p.32. More recently, two other theories have been suggested. First, that it was a result of the rising of tensions between Chinese and English in Sarawak because the Viceroy of Canton had offered a reward for the head of every Englishman slain, a decree emerging from the war between Britain and China. Secondly, it has been suggested that the problem was basically the result of a violation of faith arising from Rajah's granting of protection to a Chinese adulterer from Bau who was to be executed according to Chinese customary law. Regarding these latter two theories, see Craig A. Lockard, "Chinese Immigration Into Sarawak, 1868-1917," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1967), pp.12-13.

The Asun rebellion was caused by poor economic conditions during the global depression period. Asun was the name of the Iban leader who led the "rebellion" against the

economically better-off Chinese in Sarawak. The "rebellion" of Asun is discussed further in chapter seven. See Robert Pringle, "Asun's Rebellion: The Political Growing Pains of a Tribal Society in Brooke Sarawak, 1929-1940," Sarawak Museum Journal, 16 (July, 1968), 346-376.

48. Arthur B. Ward's career with the Brooke administration, as chronicled in his autobiography, is perhaps typical of most European civil servants in Sarawak during the period. Refer A. B. Ward, Rajah's Servant. Southeast Asia Program Data Paper #61 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1966).

According to Ward (p.33), the men in Brookes' administration were personally chosen by the Rajah. Special attributes included personal devotion of each prospective employee to Rajah and his rule in Sarawak. No exact figures on the number of actual employees are present. Usual estimates for the late 19th century, during Charles' rule, are at about fifty to sixty Europeans in Sarawak. A more modest one places it at twenty or so. See, Otto C. Doering III, "Government in Sarawak Under Charles Brooke," Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 39, #210 (December, 1966), 95-107.

The duties of the resident corresponded to those of the DO. Basically, both positions were involved in administrative-financial matters. See Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, p.261.

Regarding the creation of administrative divisions in Sarawak, they were established according to the time sequence in which the Brooke government assumed control of each area: in 1873 the areas of the first three divisions; then in 1880 the territories of the new Fourth and Fifth Divisions. On April 2, 1970 the erstwhile Kapit District became the new Seventh Division, while the Binatang and Sarikei Districts became the Sixth Division, as shown in Figure 1.

49. Quoted in Reinhardt, "Administrative Policy," p.853.

50. The development of Sarawak's land policy is examined in detail in A. F. Porter, Land Administration in Sarawak (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1967), esp. chapter 3.

51. Stephen Runciman, The White Rajahs (Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1960), pp.203-204.

52. Ibid.
53. James M. Seymour, "Education in Sarawak Under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1967), p.99.
54. Ibid., p.83.
55. According to a British Foreign Office Report in 1899, the policy of the Brookes was as follows:

"... the ruler of the country regards his position as a trust held by him for the benefit of the inhabitants ... progress is necessarily slow, since sudden jumps from the methods of the past to the up-to-dateism of modern ideas, though advantageous to the pocket, and on paper attractive, are not always conducive to the happiness of the people when peremptorily translated."

Quoted in Baring-Gould, and Bampfylde, History of Sarawak, p.417.
56. Robert M. Pringle, "The Brookes of Sarawak: Reformers in Spite of Themselves," Sarawak Museum Journal, 19, #38-39 (July-December, 1971), 54-77.
57. Ibid., p.72.
58. Payne, White Rajahs, p.232.
59. See his article, "Brookes of Sarawak," p.54.
60. See A. H. Moy-Thomas, "Economic Development Under the Second Rajah (1870-1917)," Sarawak Museum Journal, 10, #17-18 (July-December, 1961), 50-58.
61. Payne, White Rajahs, p.264 cites this quotation.

62. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.109. • The remaining portion comprises of those born on mainland China. The number of Chinese in Sarawak who have immigrated from other parts of Southeast Asia (e.g. Malaya) remains insignificant.
63. Cited in Hugh Hickling, Sarawak and Its Government (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1954), p.158.
64. L. W. Jones, The Population of Borneo, A Study of the Peoples of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei (London: The Athlone Press, 1966), p.7.
65. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.10.
66. As discussed in chapters two and three, inter.alia, the Malayan Union Scheme attempted to establish a more centralized governmental structure, with a concurrent granting of political rights to non-Malays such as citizenship privileges.
67. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.14.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Concealed among a group of Sibu school children lined up to honour the Governor's first visit, two members of the group, Thirteen Essential Ingredients, fatally stabbed Duncan Stewart, the second British Governor in Sarawak. This event galvanized strong opposition against the anti-cessionists, and terminated effective political influence of such organizations against the colonial regime.
71. Payne, White Rajahs, p.36.
72. However, Anthony Brooke, the heir-apparent, reportedly stated in a 1960 interview in London, England, that he was quite willing to continue Brooke rule in Sarawak as long as the Sarawak populace desired it. Knowledge of interview gained from private sources.

73. Quoted in Ian Morrison, "Local Self-Government in Sarawak," Pacific Affairs, 22, #2 (June, 1949), 178-185.

This description of Sarawak society was not entirely correct. The main fault was its neglect of the appreciable degree of communal interaction in Sarawak, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

74. Ibid., p.178.

75. Leigh, Chinese Community, p.35.

76. Ibid., pp.35-36. The term "natives", as it applies in Sarawak, has been discussed earlier in this chapter.

77. Ibid., pp.41-43, inter alia.

The new Grant Code regulations were first outlined in the Woodhead Report, see E. W. Woodhead, The Financing of Education and Conditions of Service in the Teaching Profession in Sarawak (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1955).

78. Leigh, Chinese Community, p.41.

79. Ibid., p.36.

80. Ibid.

81. Morrison, "Local Self-Government," p.180.

82. Ibid., p.183.

83. Woods, Local Government in Sarawak, p.8.

84. Ibid., p.9.

85. Morrison, "Local Self-Government," p.183.

86. Statistics on intermarriage do not exist. But references to this phenomenon in Sarawak is made in several studies: Lockard, "Chinese Immigration," p.128; Lockard, History of Kuching, p.614, 628; and Vinson H. Sutlive, From Longhouse to Pasar: Urbanization in Sarawak, East Malaysia (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1972), p.132.

87. "Racial arithmetic", or "racial balancing", refers basically to any decision, whether socio-cultural or political, which must be made in light of racial implications. The appointment of Temenggong Jugah, as discussed in chapter three, serves as one example. The term, "racial arithmetic", is used by Professor Milne in Politics in Malaysia, p.4.

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CHAPTER SIX:

MALAYSIAN "NATION-BUILDING" IN SARAWAK

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the several "nation-building" programmes being implemented in Sarawak since 1969: language and education, economic measures, and party politics. The pre-1969 situation in each of the above areas is first discussed, under separate heading, to provide some background and comparison to the more current policies. Then, the specific Malaysian programmes are analyzed relative to communal relations in Sarawak, and the ways in which this distinctive Malaysian "nation-building" approach has influenced Sarawak's society. Specifically, has Malaysian "nation-building" been inimical or conducive to communal harmony in Sarawak?

Language and Education Policies

PRIOR TO 1969: The two most obvious cultural aspects of nation-building consist of language and education. Language has always been a sensitive subject in Sarawak. The British introduction of English as the medium of instruction in the early 1960s, albeit opposed initially, did not lead to an enduring

stigma among the various communities; Ibans, Chinese and Malays all accepted English with equanimity. This acceptance was, doubtless, conditioned by the language and education policy of the Brookes.¹ The ensuing statement by the long-time leader of the Ibans, Stephen Ningkan, epitomizes the general attitude of most Sarawakians towards language in the 1960s, and still in the 1970s:

We have chosen English as our medium of instruction not because the former colonial government insisted upon it, but because of the Native Peoples of Sarawak. Its adoption has been regarded as essential if we are to make rapid educational progress to catch up with our neighbours and to fit ourselves for life in the modern world²

Sarawak's Governor in 1960 posited similar ideas in his speech before the Council Negri (state legislature).

Now it is apparent that multiracial schools can only function satisfactorily if there is a common medium of instruction In the circumstances of Sarawak today, English is undoubtedly the most acceptable language for educational purposes. It has been employed for many years as a medium in a number of aided Secondary Schools (i.e. government-assisted) where its use has enabled pupils of different races to study together. It has immediate advantages in obtaining employment for school-leavers and even greater advantages in the field of further education as it has made it possible for Sarawak students to enter universities and training colleges in increasing numbers. Many more such trained persons are required and it has clearly become a matter for concern to parents that the exclusive use of other media fails to provide opportunities

outside the limited occupations open to the products of communal education.³

Under the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia (1963), language assumed a vital component of those areas "safeguarded" for Sarawak. Emanating directly from the negotiations of the Inter-Governmental Consultative Committee, among Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories, it was agreed that language in Sarawak remain unaltered for a period of ten years beginning in 1963. But this was not stipulated in the Constitution of the Federation. Nonetheless, the language proposal was part of a gamut of special "protections" for Sarawak society: protection of indigenous modes of life, religious guarantees, emigration controls and so on. These provisions could be changed only with a two-thirds majority in Sarawak's Council Negri.⁴

Specifically on language in Sarawak, the arrangement by which Malay was to become the sole official language of Malaya by 1967 was unacceptable to Sarawak. Ostensibly, the time for a changeover to Malay from English would then have been too short. Accordingly, a postponement of ten years was provided for, until 1973, just as a decade had previously been allowed, from 1957-1967, before English could cease to be an official language in Malaya. The representatives from Sarawak were, therefore, permitted to use English in the Federal Parliament until 1973, and could also use it in the courts of the two states and on appeals from them during

the period. It was also allowed to be used until that time in the two Legislative Assemblies or for other official purposes.⁵ In retrospect, these constitutional concessions to Sarawak and Sabah can be regarded as "... an artificial contrivance designed to serve federally the self-interests of the several political units which contemplated it (i.e. federation)"⁶

The education issue is naturally closely linked to the language issue. The Bornean delegates who met at the Inter-Governmental Consultative Committee were united in their opposition to Malay becoming a medium of instruction for their educational systems. It was agreed by the delegates who formed that Committee, which determined the constitutional basis for Malaysia, to insert in their report article 17, which read in part:

Although education will be a federal subject the present policy and system of administration of education in North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak should be undisturbed and remain under the control of the Government of the State until that Government otherwise agrees. In particular: - (1) the present policy in the Borneo States regarding the use of English should continue⁷

No such clause has been incorporated into the Malaysian Constitution. However, the depth of Bornean feeling could only be ignored at a great risk. Due to Sarawakian sensitivity, the mere promotion of the Malaysian education

policy, with its greater role for Malay-medium instruction, becomes an irritant to harmonious relations between the central government and Sarawak.

Prior to the Malaysian Federation, vernacular languages were used in the respective school systems of the various communal groups, and English served as the medium of instruction in government schools. As discussed in chapter five, the Woodhead Report recommended a greater degree of government control in education through the "grant-in-aid" system. But the English medium was generally accepted along with vernacular schools.⁸ In fact, there has been five quite distinct educational streams: state-run, under local governments, administered by church and missionaries, Chinese committees' schools, and the private schools. Throughout Brooke rule, the non-government streams were encouraged and even financially assisted by the government. At the genesis of Malaysia, about 80 percent of all pupils in Sarawak were still in government and/or government-aided Schools.⁹

DURING THE 1970s: The language and education policy in the Second Malaysia Plan is a direct outgrowth of a series of earlier governmental studies: the Fenn-Wu, the Razak and the Talib.¹⁰ The Second Malaysia Plan is explicit about the introduction of "Bahasa Malaysia" into the whole educational system. The use of this "national language" has been introduced in "graduated", but deliberate steps.¹¹ The year 1970

was actually the initial occasion in which Malay was used as the medium of instruction; it was in an Aided Transition Class in Kuching. Now, Malay classes have been established in about seventy-five percent of the secondary schools and in about one-quarter of the primary schools.¹² The ultimate aim is to have all schools - primary, secondary and university - use Bahasa Malaysia to enhance national integration.

To stimulate growth of the "national language", Bahasa Malaysia has been promoted actively throughout the state. The genesis of the Sarawak Coalition in 1970, comprising Party Bumiputra, the PESAKA and the SUPP, has precluded any significant opposition, and thus facilitates the "pushing" of Bahasa Malaysia. Bahasa Malaysia was easily instituted as the official language of Sarawak in 1973. Specific measures have been taken to promote the use of Malay such as by the so-called "National Language Weeks" which were first introduced in 1960 in Malaya. The use of Malay has also been encouraged in the mass media.¹³

The promotion of Malay in the educational system has been facilitated by several factors. First, since January, 1973 the state government controls all primary schools which had been under the direct management of local civic governments, known as Local Authorities.¹⁴ The stated purpose of this action was "... to accelerate the development of primary education in the rural areas, professionally and administratively."¹⁵

In 1970 only approximately thirty percent of the primary school leavers continued their education, thus leaving seventy percent out of school.¹⁶ This fact, apparently, accounted for new legislation in 1971 providing free education at the secondary level in government and aided schools.¹⁷ Concurrently, Bahasa Malaysia was introduced as the medium of instruction in forty classes in thirty-five primary schools.¹⁸

Thirdly, attempts have been made to standardize or "nationalize" the educational curriculum in Sarawak. In March 1976, the Malaysian Educational Act of 1971 was extended to Sarawak "... for speedy integration of the state's educational system with the national system to help further strengthen the roots of national unity."¹⁹ Specific measures in this particular integrative process included the introduction of a new spelling system for Bahasa Malaysia for the whole Federation; the presence of common school uniforms; and the standardization of syllabuses.²⁰

The stated national policy is to have Malay as the sole medium of instruction in all schools up to the pre-university level by 1982. Concomitantly, the examinations for the Lower Certificate of Education (LCE), equivalent to Canada's Grade 12, and the Higher School Certificate (HSC), analogous to Canada's Grade 13, would be abolished by 1978 and 1982 respectively. In both cases, Malay equivalents would replace these English examinations.²¹

The potential for communal conflict over education and language remains very real in Sarawak; a recent problem in Peninsular Malaysia portends such a development. The difficulty evolved around the 1973 results of the Malaysian Certificate of Education (MCE). Out of a total of 27,784 non-Malay candidates who sat for examination only 9,314 passed, as most did not meet the requirements of the Malay language paper (a pass compulsory in order to qualify for full certificate).²² The then Minister of Education, Datuk Hussein Onn refused to accord provisional passes to those candidates who failed because of the failure grade in the Malay language paper, although allowing those students to repeat the year. Failure of the MCE meant non-Malay students could not enter pre-university classes.²³ The gravity of this 1973 situation could be seen in the pervasive fear of another "May 13th Incident".²⁴

The language aspect of education is continually exacerbated by government quotas favouring Malays. It is estimated that a four to one bias in favour of Malays is used for entrance screening in universities at present. Overall, the implications of ethnic sponsorship in Malaysian education are quite profound vis à vis communal relations. The Peninsular Malaysia case is instructive for Sarawak. A study of the consequences of Malay sponsorship in education, where education becomes a means of attaining similar economic goals

among all ethnic groups, concludes:

... the Malaysian government's attempts to provide a more equitable redistribution of social and economic benefits by manipulation of the educational system has continued to exacerbate ethnic sensitivities in the Malaysian political arena - with both Malays and non-Malays developing the belief that the educational system is serving as an instrument for sponsoring the interests of the rival groups.²⁵

Manning Nash, in his study of aspirations and values of Malay and Chinese students in Pasir Mas, Kelantan, also arrived at a similar conclusion to that of the study by Yoshimitsu Takei, et al. - that the schools in Malaysia may be sharpening ethnic conflict since the young are taught to compete for similar commodities.²⁶

The initial shortage of Malay-speaking teachers in Sarawak is now being circumvented by the teaching of Malay at the three teachers colleges in the state, Lintang Teachers' College in Kuching, Sarawak Teachers' College in Sibu, and the Rejang Teachers' College at Binatang. All three institutions began teaching in the national language in 1967, while all teachers of senior secondary classes were sent to Peninsular Malaysia's Teachers College for training. "National Language Weeks" constitute a regular event at these colleges as well. In 1967 a fully-equipped language laboratory was completed at the Lintang College. There are also exchange

programmes for teachers and students between Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak.²⁷

At the secondary school level, the percentage of government schools in Sarawak is still not high in relation to non-government, and non-aided schools. According to 1973 figures, there were fifty-eight government and government aided schools as compared to fifty-one which were privately run.²⁸ This relative parity between the number of schools in each system can be detected throughout the past decade.²⁹ It will need a further period of time before Malay can be fully introduced into the Sarawak educational system. But since federation, the penetration of Peninsular Malaysia's government into both Sarawak's language and education spheres is clearly evident. Based principally on the "Malay" nation, this national integration policy is having profound effects on non-Malay communities, as most Ibans and Chinese have traditionally been adamant in safeguarding their respective languages and even in the retention of English as the state's lingua franca.

Conversely, the population of Sarawak has traditionally been amenable to using Malay when the need was present. Although many Chinese, for example, were not fluent in Malay prior to Malaysia, little resentment towards trying to converse in it existed. This feeling was especially true in the "pasars" (i.e. "bazaars") like Sibuan and Kuching. In fact, a

high level of communal interaction was and is still characteristic of most urban centres in Sarawak. This communal interaction has been documented for two Sarawak towns, Kuching and Sibu.³⁰

In hindsight, it appears that the willingness to employ each other's languages existed before active "Malay" schemes were seriously initiated in Sarawak. Clearly, the presence of English as the accepted lingua franca reduced hostilities over language. In this sense, English served as a relatively neutral element. Among Ibans a reluctant cooperative attitude is slowly growing; but they still hold high regard for English.³¹ The Chinese, on the other hand, are more recalcitrant than the Ibans. Language, understandably constitutes the very foundation of the community. Granted various dialects persist, but Mandarin ("kuo-yu") serves as a unifying force. The principal reasoning among many Chinese, in a dispassionate form, is that Malay restricts the educational opportunities of students aspiring for higher education, abroad for example, and that Chinese, and in fact all non-Malays in Sarawak, are "way behind" in Malay with extremely poor chances of fully grasping the language.³²

The "pushing" of Malay by the government throughout Sarawak society, and particularly in the educational system, is regarded by most Malays as a basic political right. To them, mostly Peninsular Malays, the proper establishment of

Malay as the ubiquitous medium of instruction, and the commercial and governmental medium is an integral component of the overall Malaysian developmental process to terminate the inequities between Malays and Chinese. Once Malay becomes the commercial language in the Federation, in particular, Malays will have an upperhand vis à vis Chinese. But it will take some time for Malay to fully penetrate this sector of society. Trying to establish Malay as the lingua franca throughout the Federation thus forms a basic part of the envisioned "Masyarakat Adil" (A Just Society).³³

The consequences of such a rigorous policy cannot be fully predicted. It is useful to bear in mind, however, that centrifugal, if not disruptive, effects can very well transpire as this homogenization process is accelerated in the future. These problems of language were, interestingly enough, not present in earlier European "developing" countries, nor in colonial administrations as in Malaya.³⁴ But they now comprise vital parts in the nation-building process of developing politics. In Malaysia, and particularly in Sarawak, the ominous threat of conflict over language remains very real. R. B. Le Page's description of language problems in Malaya during the 1960s is also applicable to the current situation in Sarawak: "... if the present Government were to be replaced by one dominated by more extremist Malay opinion, the danger would exist that an attempt to be more ruthless in

imposing the national language, without freedom of choice in the schools, would lead to serious inter-racial strife."³⁵

Economic Development

POST-WORLD WAR II POLICIES: Economic growth has historically been of a slow and cautious character in Sarawak. Due to the attitudes of the Brookes economic growth in prewar Sarawak was circumscribed, although some economic development was present.³⁶ Similarly, under the British administration Sarawak experienced limited economic growth as the government's main focii were postwar reconstruction and initial infrastructural development. Partially to fulfill the Sarawakian anticipation of economic growth within the Federation, and also partly to galvanize popular support for the national government, the Malaysian federal government has been extremely active in Sarawak's economic progress. Unlike policies of earlier governments in Sarawak, the Kuala Lumpur government has attempted to relate economic planning directly to communalism. These policies also attempt to inculcate a sense of "national" feeling in the polity; indeed, the economic programmes under the NEP were specifically formulated to attain some degree of national unity.

Striving for economic growth usually tends to facilitate the emergence of more amicable ethnic ties, since the entire society is supposedly united in the quest of a, more or

less, common goal.³⁷ Since 1969, Malaysian economic growth has been patterned along the guidelines of the NEP. Its "two prongs" are the eradication of poverty, and the de-ethnization of economic wealth, as discussed in chapter four. The NEP is part of a broader plan to ameliorate the poor economic conditions of the Malays, namely the "Outline Perspective Plan" (1970-1990) or OPP.³⁸ The emphasis on bumiputeraism appears to be resulting in an emergence of communal suspicions, particularly in the state of Sarawak.

Postwar development planning actually began in 1947 with the so-called "Development Programme" for Sarawak covering the period 1951 to 1957.³⁹ In 1951, a Development Board was created to plan, organize and oversee economic development in Sarawak.⁴⁰ Overall, it was difficult to distinguish between development and rehabilitation in this plan. The aims and objectives of the first Plan in Sarawak were a varied mixture.⁴¹ For the 1955-1960 period, the total expenditure for development was roughly (M)\$99.4 million; 68.3% for economic schemes, 24.7% for social services, and 7.0% went for miscellaneous items.⁴² Over half of the overall total development expenditure went to communications.⁴³

The figures for the next Sarawak Plan (1959-1963) reflected priorities similar to those of the first Plan (Table 6).

TABLE 6

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE UNDER THE
1959-1963 SARAWAK PLAN

Areas	Original Plan		Actual (Estimated)	
	(\$ Mill.)	(%)	(\$ Mill.)	(%)
Agriculture	31.5	27.4	27.8	17.4
Transport	40.0	34.8	58.2	36.3
Public Works	1.3	1.1	13.3	8.3
Communications	2.5	2.2	5.3	3.3
Utilities	11.7	10.2	11.9	7.4
Industry	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3
General	4.2	3.6	11.2	7.0
Social Services	23.6	20.5	32.1	20.0

SOURCE: Government of Sarawak, Sarawak Development Progress, 1964-1967 (Kuching: Government Press Office, 1967), p.6.

The Sarawak Plan for the period 1964-1968 pursued a somewhat different focus than the earlier plans - it concentrated more on the agricultural sector of the economy. Cognizant that eighty percent of Sarawak's active workers were involved in agriculture, the Plan aimed to provide "... adequate infrastructure for the development of the rural agricultural economy." In short, the "... Government's commitment towards agriculture (was) a massive one"⁴⁴

Apart from the usual schemes to improve transporta-

tion, public utilities and the like, the concept of land settlement schemes was introduced to Sarawak.⁴⁵ Seven schemes were established at Tribok (First Division), Melugu and Skrang (Second Division), Meradong, Sibintek and Lambir (Third Division), and Lubai Tengah (Fifth Division). They were all geared towards rubber and oil palm production.⁴⁶ Overall, eighty-one percent of government expenditure went to economic matters, fourteen percent to social, and four for administration.⁴⁷ The specific allocations are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7
SARAWAK'S DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURE, 1964-1968

Areas	\$Mill.	%
Agriculture	108.6	31.7
Transport	110.6	32.2
Public Works	20.0	5.8
Communications	6.6	1.9
Utilities	19.0	5.6
Industry	0.8	0.2
General	27.8	8.1
Social Services	49.6	14.5

SOURCE: Government of Sarawak, Development Plan, 1964-1968, p.34.

This 1964-1968 Sarawak Plan was eventually incorporated with the First Malaysia Plan, 1965-1970. Under the

Malaysia Plan, the government called for an investment of (M)\$380 million, as proffered in the negotiations during the formation of the federation. The additional (M)\$37 million were allocated into these areas: (M)\$15 million for agriculture; (M)\$12 million to communications; (M)\$5 million to public works; (M)\$3 million to social services; and (M)\$2 million for industry.⁴⁸

The 1964-1968 Sarawak Plan was succeeded by the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) which allocated (M) \$392.2 million to Sarawak.⁴⁹ In Sarawak, as in the Peninsula, the Plan is based on the NEP; its aims are principally "... providing communications to link up the various isolated rural areas and at reducing the economic gap not only between the various races but between the rural and urban populations."⁵⁰ Naturally, the tenets of NEP - of eradication of poverty, regardless of race, and the economic uplifting of Malays - assume overriding importance in the state's pattern of economic growth.⁵¹ The introduction and implementation of such national economic policies has been assisted by Sarawak's position of "underdog" within Malaysia's federal system.

Both the national and state governments are therefore trying to meet the somewhat ambitious objective of reducing poverty in the rural areas by endeavouring to industrialize Sarawak. This economic approach was recommended by a study undertaken by the University of Wageningen of Holland.⁵²

Through nascent agro-industrialism, the state's growing unemployment situation can be abated as well as overcoming poverty through new employment. This incipient step towards industrialism can be seen in a number of programmes to be discussed below.

INITIATIVES UNDER THE SECOND MALAYSIA PLAN: Infrastructural growth has been quite evident in this Bornean state since the late 1960s. Three important roads have been completed since 1970, the Kuching - Simanggang, the Miri - Bintulu, the Kuching - Sibul, and Kuching - Serian. Except for an uncompleted section near Bintulu, these individual projects form the trans-Sarawak highway.⁵³ Moreover, construction of access roads to twelve proposed micro-wave stations, for the improvement of telecommunications, has been started.⁵⁴ Renovation of airports has been carried out at the main airfields. A new aerodrome was also opened in Miri in 1968. Port facilities have also been expanded and improved at Kuching, Sibul and Sarikei.⁵⁵

Additionally, the past five years have witnessed the implementation of a considerable number of water projects. In both Kuching and Sibul, for example, a major programme of expansion has taken place to cope with the ever increasing consumption of water. Projects in town development have also occurred throughout the state. The so-called Bintulu Tri-

angle Project is an attempt to develop the area around Bintulu according to the plans of the British Commonwealth Development Corporation.⁵⁶ Natural gas and oil fields near Bintulu have obviously generated increased interest in the area. Sarawak's oil production, which comprises most of Malaysia's current output, is primarily from the Miri-Bintulu area.⁵⁷

The recent publication by the Chief Minister's Office in Sarawak, Guide for Investment in Sarawak, attests to the government's firm aim of industrializing the state.⁵⁸ The principal tenet is import substitution of products such as radios, transistors, small machinery and the like. Industrial estates have now been built at Sarieki, Sibul and Kuching (see Figure 2). The government provides fiscal and other investment incentives which vary from exemptions of import duty on machinery and equipment to "tax holidays" for a period of up to five years for industries accorded "pioneer status", to be discussed in detail below. The promotional efforts by the Sarawak Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) have been supplemented by a federal body, the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Corporation (MIDF).⁵⁹

Industrial estates in Sarawak can be classified into two categories: those developed by the private sector, and those initiated by the state government. Four industrial estates, Pending in Kuching, Upper Lanang in Sibul, Piasau in

SOURCE: Adapted from Malaysia (FIDA), Malaysia: Your Profit Centre in Asia (n.p., 1975), back endpaper.

Miri, and one in Binatang, are administered by the state.⁶⁰ Two further industrial estates are proposed by the state government. They include sites at Limbang and at Semariang. The former is to have a total area of twenty-four acres, while the latter over one-hundred acres.⁶¹

Apart from initiatives by the Kuching government, the Borneo Development Corporation (BDC), a non-government body, has opened three sites - Sungai Antu (Sibu), Tanah Puteh (Kuching), and the Sarikei site. All three areas cater to general light industries. A ten acre site is also proposed for the Pending area in Kuching by the BDC. The other non-governmental estate is the Bintawa complex (Kuching) under the management of the Malaysian Industrial Development Corporation.⁶²

Regarding fiscal and other incentives, the Malaysian federal government has enacted a number of attractive investment incentives under the Investment Act (1968), and the subsequent Investment Incentives (Amendment) Act 1971. Both strive to promote industrialization. The types of incentives available under these legislative measures are quite varied. The Investment Incentives Act (1968) has these specific incentives: pioneer status, investment tax credit, and export incentives. Similarly, the Investment Incentives (Amendment) Act 1971 also has three specific programmes: labour utilization relief, increased capital allowances, and

special incentives for the electronics industry.⁶³

Briefly, pioneer status incentives are restricted to three categories. They include (a) companies intending to produce goods not already manufactured on a commercial scale suitable to the economic requirements of the state (i.e. import substitution enterprises); (b) enterprises deemed necessary to the "public interest"; and (c) companies intending to manufacture products wholly for export.⁶⁴

Companies given pioneer status incentives are allowed an initial tax relief period of two years starting on production day. In this two year period, no obligatory minimum investment level is required of these companies. Moreover, all industries established in Sarawak qualifying for pioneer status would automatically be entitled to an extra year of tax relief, since Sarawak has been designated a "Development Area" by the federal government. In addition, an extension of a further year of tax relief is granted to a dozen or so "priority products or industries". These include food products, animal feedstuff, wood products, toys, products from padi bushes and straw, rubber products, chemicals, hardware, and electrical appliances.⁶⁵ The extension also applies if the required percentage of "Malaysian content" is present which means if the particular industry incorporates at least fifty percent by value of Malaysian raw materials and/or parts or components manufactured in Malaysia.⁶⁶

Companies not accorded pioneer status may benefit from the Investment Tax Credit. The amount of tax credit accorded usually will not be less than twenty-five percent of the total capital expenditure incurred by the project. Again, since Sarawak is a "Development Area" all industries established in the state automatically qualify for an additional credit of five percent of the expenditures.⁶⁷

The exportation of goods is encouraged by three specific incentives. First, there is the export allowance which basically allows deductions from income tax of certain percentages of expenses used in producing Malaysian goods. Secondly, promotional activities, overseas advertising expenses for example, can be reduced for expenses. Lastly, resident companies are entitled to an accelerated depreciation allowance.⁶⁸

The Labour Utilization Relief Incentives provides for exemption of income tax in the same manner as for pioneer companies, except that in this case the granting of such exemption is based upon the number of full time employees engaged in the project instead of on the amount of capital expenditure incurred. Also, in order to encourage existing factories to modernize their production techniques and to encourage the establishment of modernized factories, the government also has "increased capital allowances" incentives. They can be granted to projects which are deemed desirable in

the "national interest", but which cannot be granted tax exemption under the other schemes.⁶⁹

Collectively, these above programmes of land settlement, industrialization and so on attempt to overcome the growing problem of unemployment in Sarawak. In comparison to Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak's and Sabah's unemployment situation has been somewhat better as indicated in Table 8. Indeed, there has been a labour shortage in Sabah. In Sarawak, roughly 3 percent of the labour force was unemployed in 1970.⁷⁰

Unemployment in Sarawak is, undoubtedly, exacerbated by the phenomenon of underemployment where persons, involuntarily, are working part-time and/or do not use their skills to the maximum on their jobs. This is especially common in Sarawak given the high prevalence of family-type operations in urban areas, particularly among the Chinese, and also in the non-sedentary agricultural activities among the Ibans for instance. However, unemployment in Sarawak, as in Malaya, is basically a youth phenomenon, largely due to the fact that 42 percent of Sarawak's population is under 15 years of age.⁷¹

In terms of actual financial allocation under the Second Malaysia Plan industrial development is still of lower priority to agriculture. In fact, the traditional

TABLE 8
LABOUR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN MALAYSIA, 1965-1975*

	1965	1970 (Estimated)	Increase 1966-70	Average Annual Growth Rate (%)	1975 (Target)	Increase 1971-75	Average Annual Growth Rate (%)
MALAYSIA							
Labour Force	3,246	3,768	522	3.0	4,413	645	3.2
Employment	3,048	3,493	445	2.8	4,089	596	3.2
Unemployment	198	275	77	6.8	324	49	3.3
Unemployment (As % of Labour Force)	6.1	7.3	-	-	7.3	-	-
WEST MALAYSIA							
Labour Force	2,730	3,150	420	2.9	3,690	540	3.2
Employment	2,550	2,900	350	2.6	3,395	495	3.2
Unemployment	180	250	70	6.8	295	45	3.3
Unemployment (As % of Labour Force)	6.5	8.0	-	-	8.0	-	-
EAST MALAYSIA							
Labour Force	516	618	102	3.7	723	105	3.2
Employment	498	593	95	3.5	694	101	3.2
Unemployment	18	25	7	6.8	429	4	3.0
Unemployment (As % of Labour Force)	3.5	4.0	-	-	4.0	-	-

* Figures in Thousands, except percentages.

SOURCE: Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Table 7.2, p.102.

governmental emphasis on the agricultural and transportation sectors continues to be evident. This is characteristic of Peninsular Malaysia as well, and the apparent stress on industrialization can perhaps be interpreted as political rhetoric.

Some progress has also occurred in agriculture within Sarawak. Presently, some 70 percent of the active labour force in the state is engaged in agriculture.⁷² Rubber was the prime agricultural export until 1966. It received continued attention until 1972 when there was a change in policy in interest of agricultural diversification. However, it is still the crop with the largest acreage. Replanting schemes on rubber estates have been formulated where high-yielding rubber trees are cultivated.⁷³

Numerous other schemes have also attempted to improve agriculture. Some of them include: Assistance to Padi Planters, Pepper Subsidy Programme, and the Coconut Planting Scheme. These commercial schemes have been concentrated mainly in the First Division, particularly in the more productive divisional "Development" areas.⁷⁴ Programmes in the Third and Fourth Divisions are largely land settlement schemes based on subsistence, non-commercial, production.⁷⁵

An extensive research programme has also been present. Research areas range from livestock to palm oil. The Timber Research and Technical Training Centre, in particular,

exemplifies the pervasiveness of the overall developmental process. This centre and other similar ones provide basic training in modern techniques with the primary object of improving the yield of a particular given crop.⁷⁶

THE NEP AND SARAWAK COMMUNALISM: Overall, national unity serves as the federal government's goal of economic development in Malaysia, according to the Second Malaysia Plan. The Plan begins with this paragraph:

National unity is the over-riding objective of the country. A stage has been reached in the nation's economic and social development where greater emphasis must be placed on social integration and more equitable distribution of income and opportunities for national unity and progress The Second Malaysia Plan, ..., is designed to facilitate the achievement of the national objective.⁷⁷

National unity's intimate relationship with economic development clearly stems directly from the causes attributed to the May 13th Incident of 1969 by the federal government. As discussed in chapter four, the national leaders regarded the crisis as a direct result of the allegedly gross and persistent economic inequities between Chinese and Malays. Concomitantly, eradication of poverty, as the first "prong" of the NEP, would supposedly neutralize the potency of communal tensions in the future. The more specific second "prong", of uplifting the economic levels of Malays vis à vis

Chinese, similarly focussed on communalism.

In the process of pursuing an economic policy of "uplifting" a particular sector of society, the "bumiputras", the society is clearly bifurcated into two hostile camps. Earlier chapters have examined the connotations implied in the term "bumiputra" which are dictated mostly by politics. For example, the term, on Peninsular Malaysia applies strictly to Malays. With the formation of the Federation "bumiputras" now include other non-Malay groups, especially in the Bornean areas including Melanaus and Ibans in Sarawak, and Kadazans in Sabah. Thus, the meaning of "bumiputra" is not wholly governed by religion nor by cultural traits. In this sense, bumiputraism may be seen as somewhat flexible, changing accordingly with political vicissitudes. This apparent degree of elasticity, however, has not been evident in Sarawak's development process since the late 1960s.

The "bumiputra-ization" of Sarawak society is most salient in economics. In many ways this particular approach to economic amelioration conflicts directly with the aims of national unity and communal harmony. "Bumiputras" in Sarawak encompass basically "non-immigrant" groups, namely Malays, Ibans, Land Dayaks, and the miscellany of other "native" groups. In brief, Sarawak's "bumiputras" are the non-Chinese groups. Parenthetically, the specific application of bumiputraism remains rather ambiguous. Malays, at times, accrue

much more benefits from the policy of bumiputraism than the more genuine "sons of the soil" in the state, the Ibans.⁷⁸

A general trend in the Sarawakian society is, however, perceptible - bumiputraism serves as the principal touchstone in "development".

The most salient characteristic of Malayan growth has been its "special" form of "nationalism". In the Malaysian case, it is not pan-Malaysianism against some external threat such as foreign businesses, but based more on bumiputraism. Rightly or wrongly, developmental efforts become directed by excessive bumiputraism in hopes of "breeding" or "incubating" Malay capitalists.⁷⁹ The case of the FLDA (Federal Land Development Authority) is enlightening. Gayl D. Ness' studies of the Authority in Peninsular Malaysia have shown that Malay favouritism pervades the workings of this body, as was originally intended when it was created. The percentages of total settlers for 1957 were 86 percent Malay and 11 percent Chinese.⁸⁰

The Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), created in 1950, has been more exclusive in the programmes. As its title suggests, RIDA's purpose is to attempt to stimulate growth in the rural areas by provision of physical improvements, and changing the structure of the rural economy through provision of rural credit and marketing assistance. It is with RIDA that Malay nationalism is most perceptible.

Ness describes the body as the "... embodiment of a pro-Malay and anti-Chinese sentiment"⁸¹

Overall, the Sarawak situation is beginning to resemble that which exists in Peninsular Malaysia. The general tenor of the non-bumiputra population is both of disgust and distrust with the NEP. Businesses, for example, are now required 49 percent ownership by bumiputras.⁸² Other, egregious discriminatory, or "compensatory discrimination" according to some Malays, can be easily discerned. Timber, historically the economic mainstay of many Chinese in Sarawak, has come under stringent controls of the state government through a licencing system. It is commonly alleged by Chinese timber companies that the clear majority of timber concessions are accorded to Malays, even at the exclusion of other "bumiputras" such as the Ibans. These suspicions intensify when Chinese-owned and operated timber mills have to abandon operations, temporarily usually, due to (a) depletion of trees in allotted "reserves", and (b) communist activities in such "reserves". Several sawmills in the Sungei Merah area of Sibul have closed in early 1976 due to these very reasons.⁸³

Another recent government stipulation regarding timber operations is that only "fully-integrated" timber operations are eligible for application to forest reserves. Here, "fully-integrated" implies the presence of exploitative, pro-

cessing and marketing facilities.⁸⁴ Doubtless, this expansive rider precludes many smaller scale sawmills from applying. It would seem that only the state itself could possibly possess such extensive operational facets.

Another important characteristic of development planning in Peninsular Malaysia, and increasingly in Sarawak, is the high degree of rationalism. As with bumiputraism, rationalism tends to worsen communal relations. This rationalism is reflected in the highly sophisticated organization of development planning. Centred around the National Development Committee of the National Operations Room (NOR) in Kuala Lumpur, a total of 114 "development" bodies span the Federation. In turn, there are "development committees" at the regional, state, district, and village levels. It is, in general, a very decentralized developmental effort.⁸⁵

The manifold developmental schemes, the most notable being the FLDA, are founded on the essentially Weberian ideal of rational planning. The FLDA is particularly relevant to Sarawak development, as the state is overwhelmingly agricultural in character. Indeed, the Authority has organized several new settlements throughout Sarawak, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Most significant in these schemes under FLDA is that they involve various communal groups in Sarawak. Quite simply, Ibans, Malays and Chinese, as the main groups, inter-

act continually through physical proximity. The main reasons for such settlement schemes are to provide land for the Chinese who have been barred access to certain tracts of land, and to regulate the practice of swidden agriculture by making the Ibans practice more sedentary forms of agriculture on these settlements.⁸⁶ Implicit in these schemes is the search for communal cooperation and eventual harmony by having Sarawak's various ethnic groups live closely together.

Ironically, these very schemes which attempt to de-segmentize the society harbour the greatest potential for communal divisiveness in the future. It seems that communities which are supposed to interact regularly through physical propinquity are not so inclined generally. In fact, greater consciousness of certain ethnicities increases with the psychological displacements experienced in these settlement schemes. It would seem that government-induced ethnic interaction through these schemes is somewhat of a "forced" nature, and cannot be expected to have the salutary effects of interaction through one's own volition, as during the Brooke era. A recent study of the human impact of the various FLDA schemes, in fact, concluded that Malays exhibit a marked "involuting" tendency mainly as a reaction to the over-rationalistic approach of the Authority.⁸⁷

The existence of rural poverty in Sarawak cannot be easily denied. But to attain "unity", the federal government

proposes not only to assist the rural areas, but also to focus on "bumiputras" in particular: A large majority of the Minor Rural Projects (MRPs) have also been used to attain political support. The actual total sums of these projects have been increasing steadily in the past few years.⁸⁸

Though they constitute an important part in patronage politics, as discussed below, these MRPs heighten communal suspicions.

A perplexing situation characterizes the Sarawak case - that rural poverty, and indeed general economic impoverishment, is ethnically blind within the state. Affluent Chinese comprise roughly thirty percent of this community within Sarawak; the rest of the Chinese continue to be involved in meagre agricultural livelihoods.⁸⁹ Therefore, Sarawak's society differs markedly from that in Peninsular Malaysia where economic lines clearly run along ethnic divisions.⁹⁰

Poverty and its eradication is perhaps pivotal in Malaysian and Sarawakian development. As Sarawak has been classified a "Development Area", the task of surmounting poverty remains crucial. In Peninsular Malaysia, poverty is allied to rural development as agriculture still accounts for some 60 percent of total employment. In Sarawak, 70 to 80 percent of the labour force, of all ethnic groups, are still in agriculture. Thus, rural development assumes parti-

cular importance in Sarawak's general development, and specifically political integration.

Significant rates of growth, however, do not imply genuine progress, as the "poor can get poorer and the rich get richer".⁹¹ On the other hand, there is little empirical basis for the view that higher rates of growth inevitably generate greater inequality.⁹² In the overall analysis, it would seem that it depends on government policy whether growth is to denote greater equality or not.

In the case of Malaysia a relatively high GNP (gross national product) continues to coexist with a sizeable proportion of the population "below the poverty line". It is estimated, in a recent study, that the 1969 GNP per capita in Malaysia was (US)\$323. But 11.0 percent and 15.5 percent of the population were below (US)\$50 and (US)\$75, respectively.⁹³ The same study also ascertained that Malaysia, along with twenty-one other countries, had "high inequality", as opposed to those with "moderate" and "low" inequality levels. The specific statistics were: the lowest 40 percent shared only 11.6 percent of the total Malaysian GNP, while the middle 40 percent and the top 20 percent shared 32.4 percent and 56.0 percent respectively.⁹⁴ Admittedly, Malaysia's overall GNP of (US)\$323 is quite high in relation to other Asian countries, but it is becoming a principal example of growth insensitive to equality, as evidenced in the growing discontent

among rural Malays.⁹⁵

The available 1973 data on Sarawak does not allow for an accurate determination of the actual relationship between growth and equality. The highest growth rate ever experienced by Sarawak was in 1973 when the GNP increased by 14.1 percent from (M)\$940 million (approximately (US)\$313 million) in 1970 to (M)\$1,286 million in 1973. Concurrently, per capita income increased from (M)\$963 to (M)\$1,213.⁹⁶ Doubtless, such increases depend on continuing economic prosperity, and at face value these statistics cannot indicate the actual number of persons "getting better" and ~~or~~ "getting worse".

A central problem in Malaysia's apparent efforts to reduce rural poverty remains unaltered - that no definitive income distribution mechanism exists in the economic system.⁹⁷ This problem is exacerbated by the highly discriminating development policies of the federal government. Bumiputeraism does not accord with the socio-economic conditions in Sarawak, mainly because of Sarawak's trait of pan-ethnic impoverishment. Overall, Sarawak's ethnic relations are strained, and genuine development becomes more remote.

Party Politics

SARAWAK'S TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF COMMUNAL (POLITICS: Party politics in Sarawak had a late beginning. Only during the cession

and Malaysia debates did, more or less, genuine political parties emerge. Prior to the debate over cession of Sarawak to the British, political activity was minuscule among the Chinese, restricted to Malay youths, and comparatively unknown to the Ibans and Dayaks in general. Among the three main communal groups, the Malays evinced the greatest degree of political consciousness prior to the period in and around the formation of Malaysia.⁹⁸

Politics of some significant magnitude began in Sarawak with the creation of political parties. Since the late 1950s, there have been several parties within Sarawak, some of which have been alluded to earlier in this study. They include: SURP (Sarawak United People's Party), PANAS (Party Negara Sarawak), SCA (Sarawak Chinese Association), PESAKA (Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak), BARJASA (Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak, and SNAP (Sarawak National Party).⁹⁹

Two alliances have been formed in the postwar period in Sarawak politics. The Sarawak Alliance, first of all, lasted from November 1962 to April 1963, and consisted of PANAS, PESAKA, SNAP and SCA. Formed in July 1970, the Sarawak Coalition continues to be the government party in the state. It comprises the SUPP, PESAKA, and the Party Bumiputra. Party Bumiputra itself was formed in November, 1966 when BARJASA and PANAS merged to form one united Islamic party.¹⁰⁰

The stimuli for creating political parties in Sarawak varied greatly. SUPP, the first political party, was an outgrowth of pressure groups which had resisted government policy in the spheres of education and trade licencing. The SUPP also voiced some desire for a degree of self-determination. The second party to be formed, PANAS, was involved less with grievances and more with protecting the interests of other communities. Both of these two parties had received official government (i.e. British) support. The last four parties were formed after it had become clear that the state was shortly to gain independence within the Federation of Malaysia.

When the formation of Malaysia was proposed in May 1961, only two parties were in existence, the SUPP and PANAS. Up to that time the only elections held in the state had been local ones of District Councils.¹⁰¹ SUPP was first opposed to Malaysia, preferring that Sarawak should become independent by itself. PANAS, after a brief period of hesitation, came out in support of Malaysia. Through somewhat nefarious government actions, as discussed in chapter two, the opposition to Malaysia mounted by the SUPP was overcome. These first two parties were followed rapidly by four others: SNAP, largely Iban formed in April 1961; BARJASA, mainly Malay in December 1961; PESAKA, mostly Iban in August 1962; and the SCA, primarily Chinese in July 1962.¹⁰²

The duplication of parties among the Chinese, the Malays, and the Ibans may be accounted for by separate reasons in each case. The SCA owed its origin to the apparent radical stand of the SUPP and the belief it was communist-infiltrated, which repelled some right-wing and moderate Chinese. The PANAS leaders were drawn largely from the Malays who had been most in favour of the cession of Sarawak to the British Crown by the Brooke family. This issue had deeply divided the Malays some fifteen years previously, and BARJASA, the newer Malay party, was led by persons who were closely identified with the anti-cession faction. The difference between the PESAKA and SNAP parties was largely geographical; the former was based mainly in the Third Division, while the latter's strength was concentrated in the Second Division.¹⁰³

Despite the multi-ethnic origins of several parties, the SUPP and PESAKA in particular, the basic ethnic component of each party was discernible in the politics of the 1960s. The ethnic breakdown was as follows:

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Predominant Ethnic Component</u>
SUPP (Sarawak United People's Party)	Chinese
SCA (Sarawak Chinese Association)	Chinese
PANAS (Parti Negara Sarawak)	Malay
BARJASA (Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak)	Malay
SNAP (Sarawak National Party)	Iban
PESAKA (Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak)	Iban

Prior to the formation of the Malaysian Federation and the Malaysianization of Sarawakian politics, party politics in Sarawak centred initially on inter-communal problems and later on intra-communal difficulties. Throughout the history of Sarawak party politics, the parties have aspired to be multicultural, trying to operate with broad mass support. The SUPP, for instance, before being regarded as essentially an organization for communistic activities, attempted to be a multicultural party. In fact, as of January 1963, SUPP's membership, although predominantly Chinese (44 percent), was composed of 32 percent Iban, and 14 percent Land Dayaks and other smaller groups including Malays.¹⁰⁴ SNAP in the 1970s still emphatically states: "... SNAP is a multicultural party."¹⁰⁵

On the more informal plane, personal contacts among the members of the major parties were frequent and sincere. Temenggong Jugah of the PESAKA, for example, had cordial relations with many members of the SUPP in the Third Division. Likewise, SUPP people had relatively harmonious ties with members of SNAP.¹⁰⁶ During the 1960s, it seems that political affiliations did not completely impede certain forms of communal contact.

More importantly, the inter-communal divisions maintained a somewhat stable equilibrium in Sarawak. When the SUPP, for instance, had placed itself against the British

administration, the SCA was created to follow the more conservative stance. Thus, each major community had two parties, each organization with perceptible degrees of political differences. For every major ethnic group before 1970 one party could legitimately claim official support, namely PANAS, PESAKA and SCA. The other three, BARJASA, SNAP and SUPP, sought to usurp power from the influential leadership, as represented by the former three parties. Michael Leigh summarizes the situation aptly:

The very cleavages that militated against communal unity created a multiplicity of disagreements which have in fact promoted conflict resolution through a process of flexible realignments. Rather than making racial blocks more rigid, as occurred elsewhere in Malaysia, this political division within racial communities provided a ready basis for compromise, forcing the factions to seek allies outside their community in the quest for political power. 107

THE MALAYSIANIZATION PROCESS: The central problem in Sarawak party politics in the 1970s appears to be the alliance system *per se*. The apparent search for a unity based upon race and religion, successfully being achieved at present by the Party Bumiputra for the Islamic community, has set in motion a process that will lead to a sharpening of the cleavages between the ethnic groups. The merger between PESAKA (Iban) with Party Bumiputra (Malay) in May 1973 to form the Party Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu Sarawak, more commonly referred to as

Bersatu, signifies the growing "bumiputra-ization" and consequent bifurcation of Sarawak politics and society.¹⁰⁸ In the past it was the divisions within each ethnic group that had facilitated ready compromise and the maintenance of pan-ethnic coalitions, both within and outside the government.

Formerly in Sarawak the only group that was inadequately represented within the government was the Chinese. But they were best equipped to utilize economic power to redress their lack of political representation, in most cases anyway. And now it is the Dayaks (e.g. Ibans) who suffer inadequate political representation, and there is even more reason for them to seek unity for political purposes. The Dayaks have few economic resources that are immediately realizable, and thus most depend upon their numbers for political clout.

Politics in Sarawak is thus on the verge of conforming to the pattern in Peninsular Malaysia, as each ethnic group becomes identified with a communal party, and the lines of cleavage deepen. Ultimately, much will depend on the degree to which SNAP can maintain the cohesiveness as the principal nationalist party of Sarawak. In short, "... Sarawak is now part of Malaysia and Sarawak politics have become Malaysian politics."¹⁰⁹

"Consociational democracy", as outlined in chapter four, depicts the condition where a high frequency of interac-

tion and accommodation among political elites produces relative stability in segmented societies.¹¹⁰ The party process in Sarawak since 1963 can be described as a brand of such a "democracy". In this Bornean state elitist interaction has occurred mainly within party alliances; during the 1960s the Sarawak Alliance, and since 1970 the Sarawak Coalition. A large drawback of these alliances, however, has been their exclusion of certain important political parties. The Alliance precluded the Chinese represented by the SUPP. In the 1970s, the Iban party, SNAP, is not a member of the Coalition. The ostensible reason for precluding SNAP was the fear that too strong of a Dayak opposition, comprised of SNAP and PESAKA, might develop within the Coalition itself. William Riker's "size principle" regarding political coalitions in general is also germane.¹¹¹

Sarawak's political parties can also be seen as "political machines".¹¹² As "machines" the functioning of coalitional politics is enhanced. Concurrently, the political power of the government cannot be easily nor effectively challenged, and in the case of Sarawak the implementation of Malaysian "nation-building" programmes is greatly facilitated by the Sarawak Coalition machine. Basically, two aspects of "political machines" have been delineated by James Scott. First of all, they do not possess a definite set of political ideas. This, as such, enables them to bargain quite freely

with other groups. The joining of the SUPP with the Party Bumiputra illustrates this lacking of political principles.

The maintenance of political power, secondly, serves as the overriding objective of such "machines".¹¹³ With this crucial need for adequate resources to procure and maintain power, it is therefore usually the government party that is the dominant "machine". There exists a surfeit of methods of retaining power, such as through the dissemination of political gifts. Patronage also plays an important, and sometimes determining, role in Sarawak politics. Financial assistance to the Party Bumiputra from Peninsular Malaysia, the NF (National Front) members in particular, has helped to assure its financial superiority over the other parties.¹¹⁴

Although actual financial and other ties between state and federal parties have not been studied, it is instructive to see that the Sarawak Alliance was dependent on the Alliance in Malaya during the 1960s. According to Professor Milne, "They depend(ed) on the Alliance in Malaya not just for advice on campaigning and for money. Some owed their origins to groundwork by the Malayan Alliance."¹¹⁵

The weak political scruples of the parties, unavoidably, result in the alienation of certain portions within the ethnic community it purports to represent. Many Chinese, for example, tend to regard the SUPP in Sarawak and the MCA in Malaya, as traitorous to the Chinese cause.¹¹⁶ Similarly,

some Malays perceive their parties in likewise fashion. Consequently, political parties in Sarawak fail to fully articulate the interests of the various communities. Failing to be channelled through the pertinent political process, these politically disregarded interests may prove to be detrimental to the state's, and the Federation's future.

However, in relation to other polities, whether "developed" or still "developing", Sarawak experiences an extremely high degree of voter participation. In the 1970 election approximately 75 percent of the eligible voters turned out. A comparable percentage was present for the 1974 election as well.¹¹⁷ Given these figures, it may seem that a sizeable proportion of the population supports the government and its policies. Politics based on "political machines", however, usually generate good turnouts and favourable results for the incumbent party or parties. This is especially true of Sarawak where large numbers of the "clients" are poor.¹¹⁸

In the case of Sarawak, it has been pointed out that new large-scale government expenditures do alter traditional patron-client ties. Professor Milne elaborates on some instances of patronage politics in Sarawak:

Requests from particular communities were more likely to be granted if support was strong there for the government party. Payments were made not only in money or in the form of development projects but also in the shape of exempting elector-clients from the operation of the law. In Sarawak, Ibans who felled trees illegally were

treated with minimal rigor, and many local councils entirely failed to press for payments of local rates in case electors might be alienated.¹¹⁹

The communal character of the patron appears to be changing as well. Prior to active Malaysianization of Sarawak, traditional local leaders assumed the role of patrons, with the Chinese being the most predominant given their economic power. In the 1970s, the federal government is becoming the chief patron.¹²⁰ In these patronage relations, the central government attempts to amass support through fulfilling Sarawak population's anticipation of economic advancement. This situation does not necessarily mean the displacement of the traditional leaders. Indeed, they (e.g., DOs, penghulus), act as the essential links between the federal government and Sarawak's populace.¹²¹ National integration is therefore enhanced through the functioning of, more or less, traditional patron-client ties which transcend communal lines. It has been observed that,

the influence of patron-client ties ... are much less clear (in Sarawak). There were certainly many examples of 'friendship' between Natives and Chinese individuals who had patron-client ties. This often took the form of referring to the other person as "father" or "uncle", and occasionally to an enactment of the ceremony of bloodbrotherhood. In some cases patron-client activities undoubtedly broke down ethnic inhibitions which previously existed.¹²²

The election process also favours the government. Gerrymandering has occurred in several elections. Another method has been the holding of elections in a rather protracted fashion, in which the "safer" seats are contested first. With a series of impressive victories for the government party, voters in other districts are apt to also lend support to the government. They do so since they sense political futility in opposing an obvious winner. Furthermore, by becoming a supporter of the winning side, they would not be exempted from the benefits usually accruable from the government. Somewhat unorthodox tactics, in the sense of the democratic process, have also assisted in prolonging the serenity in Sarawakian politics. Detentions of the more outspoken opposition members have taken place on numerous occasions under the guise of subversive and/or communistic activities.¹²³

Conclusion

In an attempt to further national integration in Malaysia, the state government of Sarawak has adopted federal policies in quite a wholesale fashion. The federal government's initiatives in language and education, economic growth, and party politics are of particular importance to Sarawak society.

From this chapter's examination of these specific elements, it can be seen that in conforming to Peninsular

Malaysia's pattern of growth - of Malay language, and of "bumiputraized" economics and politics - Sarawak society is therefore becoming increasingly divided into two main "communal" groups; a situation in contrast to pre-1963 Sarawak, as discussed in chapter five.¹²⁴ The traditional pattern of cross-cutting cleavages had maintain communal harmony in Sarawak prior to Malaysia. The copious cross-cutting cleavages in party politics, or through patron-client, ties prevented the emergence of an intensified bipolar plural society.¹²⁵

Sarawak's historical approach to communalism, moreover, is in stark contrast to the present strategy of active social mobilization of the population along the dictates of bumiputraism. As shown in chapter five, the Brookes pursued a conscious policy of laissez-faire with minimal governmental interventions in the society. Needless to say, circumstances in the 1970s render a Brooke-type policy approach unrealistic. The influence of "political religion" assumes prominent importance in the development process of Malaysia.¹²⁶ More pressing is the need to achieve national consolidation in a rather fluid Asian region.

In the cause of national integration, the specific federal policies in language and education, economics, and party politics are attempting to make Sarawak society conform to that in Peninsular Malaysia. Doubtless, communal strains are being created in such politically-sensitive social and eco-

nomie areas. Although these strains have not yet been fully defined in political terms nor manifested in anomie forms since 1969, the atmosphere in Sarawak can be seen as one increasingly imbued with tension. As these communal suspicions and tensions increase in number and intensity, national integration will ultimately suffer.

Notes to Chapter Six

1. During the Brooke period, as described in chapter five, a laissez-faire approach was evident in non-economic matters in general. The approach was somewhat "regulated" in the sense that English was used as the medium of instruction in schools close to the capital of Kuching. Although vernacular schools were encouraged by the Brookes, some adjustments were made by all the communities in shifting to English. English, in fact, could be termed as the lingua franca of Brooke Sarawak. See, in particular, Seymour, "Education in Sarawak," esp. pp.95-98.
2. Quoted in Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.93.
In 1960, of the 11,500 literate Ibans, three-quarters were literate in English, less than 50 percent in Iban, and less than one-quarter in Malay. Figures from Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.92.
3. Quoted in R. H. K. Wong, "Education and Problems of Nationhood," in Malaysia: A Survey, ed. by Wang Gungwu (New York: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), pp.119-209.
4. Refer to chapter two for further details.
5. After 1967, Malaysians who had been English-educated must use Malay in Parliament. Representatives from the Borneo territories, however, continued to use English.
6. Rudolph, Federalism and Nation-Building, p.297.
7. Quoted in Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.92.
8. Regarding the Woodhead Report, see chapter five.
9. Sarawak Education Department, Annual Summary for 1964 (Kuching: Government Printer, 1964), p.3.

Overall, the literacy rate is still quite low in

Sarawak. It is estimated that over 50 percent of Peninsular Malaysians are illiterate; while 75 percent of Bornean Malaysians are illiterate. In Sarawak, literacy among the non-Malay "indigenous" peoples averaged well below 15 percent. Chinese in Sarawak, however, account for 60 percent of the literate persons in the state. See Henderson et al., Area Handbook, p.180; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Chinese Minority Aspirations and Problems in Sarawak," Pacific Affairs, 39, #1-2 (Spring/Summer, 1966), 64-82.

10. As outlined in chapter four, all three reports generally agreed that while the national system of education was to be acceptable for the populace as a whole, there was every intention of making Malay as the national language and the sole medium of instruction.

11. Government of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, p.24.

12. Sarawak Department of Education, Annual Report for 1973 (Kuching: Government Press Office, 1974), p.10.

13. The Vanguard, published in Kuching, has one page of daily news in Malay. Radio (Sarawak) Malaysia and T.V. Malaysia have introduced the use of Malay, with only a few hours accorded to the other languages. Educational television shows are transmitted directly from Kuala Lumpur via Sabah to Sarawak since television was first introduced into Sarawak in fall 1975. These educational programmes are mostly, if not all, in Malay, and are Peninsular Malaysia-oriented.

14. These "Local Authorities", as the name suggests, were local government bodies with their respective "local treasuries". The responsibility of primary education was formally allocated to these Authorities in 1959. See Woods, Local Government in Sarawak, esp. chapter two.

15. Sarawak Department of Education, Annual Report for 1973, pp.1-15, passim.

16. Sarawak Department of Education, Annual Report for 1971 (Kuching: Government Press, 1972), p.4.

17. Ibid., p.8.
18. Ibid., p.2.
19. Vanguard, March 24, 1976, p.7.
20. Sarawak Department of Education, Annual Report for 1973, pp.1-15, passim.
21. Yong Mun Cheong, "Malaysia in 1973: The Search for a New Political and Economic Order," in Trends in Malaysia II: Proceedings and Background Paper, ed. by Yong Mun Cheong (Singapore: Singapore University Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p.10.
22. Ibid., p.19.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p.9.
25. Yoshimitsu Takei, et al., Educational Sponsorship by Ethnicity: A Preliminary Analysis of the West Malaysian Experience. Southeast Asia Series #28 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Affairs, 1973), p.37.
26. Manning Nash, Peasant Citizens: Politics, Religion, and Modernization. Southeast Asia Series #31 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Affairs, 1974).
27. In 1972, 90 teachers were recruited for training in Peninsular Malaysia. Moreover, students at both primary and secondary levels have been financed by the federal and state governments to study in West Malaysia. Recently, the study programme for students has been expanded to allow students from Malaya to study in Sarawak. See Vanguard, March 31, 1976, p.8.

28. Sarawak Department of Education, Annual Report 1973, p.10. There were approximately 29,000 and 13,000 students in the government/government aided schools, and the privately-run schools respectively. Figures calculated from Government of Sarawak, Statistical Handbook of Sarawak 1974, Table 17.6, p.102.

There was, however, a greater difference in the number of primary schools. In 1973, there were 863 primary schools that were under the government or under its assistance, while there were only 9 privately-run schools. Moreover, about 94,000 primary school students were enrolled in the former system, as compared to only 597 in the latter one. Figures computed from Government of Sarawak, Statistical Handbook of Sarawak 1974, Table 17.3, p.99, and Table 17.4, p.100.

29. In fact, there was an average of fifty secondary schools per year in each of these two systems during the period 1965-1972. Data computed from Government of Sarawak, Statistical Handbook of Sarawak 1974, Table 17.5, p.101.

30. Offsprings of Chinese/Dayak parents are known as "Perakans". They are usually fluent in both Iban and a Chinese dialect, as well as English. See Lockard, History of Kuching; and Sutlive, Urbanization in Sarawak.

31. In a detailed study of the Iban village, Pernerani in the First Division, a somewhat apprehensive attitude over the abandonment of the English medium in education was found among most villagers. These villagers, nevertheless, do acquiesce in the introduction of Malay. Refer to Seymour, Rural Development Among the Iban, esp. pp.109-122.

32. These were the main arguments given by a Chinese physician in Sarawak, through private correspondence. The importance of English as enunciated by this Sarawakian, jibes closely with the views of the British colonial administration, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

33. This slogan was first used in the Royal Address to the Federal Parliament in 1971. See Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), p.416, fn. 73.

34. J. Das Gupta explains that European countries were more concerned with the problems associated with standardization of one identific and functionally efficient language for the whole community than with conflict resolution among multiple languages. See his article, "Language Diversity and National Development," in Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. by Joshua A. Fishman, et al. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp.17-26.

35. R. B. Le Page, The National Language Question: Linguistic Problems of Newly Independent States (London: Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, 1964), p.76.

36. As discussed in chapter five, the Brookes possessed an innate antipathy for rapid, unrestricted economic growth lest it would disturb, and eventually destroy the indigenous genre de vie. However, some limited forms of growth was encouraged.

37. Greater national cohesiveness appears to evolve when a country aspires to accomplish several national tasks such as economic growth. This is a proposition certainly implicit, if not explicit, in the general body of "nation-building" literature. See, for example, David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. chapter seven; Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (3 vols.; New York: Pantheon, 1968), p.328; and Wriggins, Political Survival, esp. chapter ten.

38. Refer to chapter four regarding the development of the OPP.

39. Government of Sarawak, Development Plan of Sarawak, 1955-1960 (Kuching: Government Press Office, 1961), p.4.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., pp.9-10.

42. Ibid., p.41.

43. Ibid.
44. Government of Sarawak, Development Plan, 1964-1968 (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1968), p.34.
45. Government of Sarawak, Sarawak Development Progress, 1964-1967, p.18.

Land settlement schemes were by no means novel to other parts of Southeast Asia, including Malaya. But in Sarawak, this was the first instance of such programmes. For an account of land settlement schemes during the Emergency period in Malaya, see Maynard W. Dow, Nation-Building in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Pruett Press, Inc., 1966).

46. Government of Sarawak, Sarawak Development Progress, 1964-1967, p.18. See p.210 on these schemes' ethnic makeup.
47. Government of Sarawak, Development Plan, 1964-1968, p.59.
48. The exact financial breakdown was direct federal expenditure (M)\$178,549,754; federal grants (M)\$114,783,767; federal loan (M)\$16,300,000; and state funds (M)\$33,437,820. These figures were determined from general data in James Osborn, Area, Development Policy and the Middle City in Malaysia. Department of Geography Research Paper #153 (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1974), pp.82-85, Table 6.
49. Sarawak Government, Sarawak Maju Sejak Merdeka (Petaling: Kum Printers, 1974), p.5.
50. Ibid.
51. See chapter four, section on Rukunegara politics (i.e. post-1969 period in Peninsular Malaysia). "Economic uplifting" involves, for example, the improvement of social amenities among rural Malays, and greater Malay ownership of urban businesses.
52. Sarawak and University of Wageningen, Study of the First Division, inter alia.

53. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa, Canada, an independent body created in 1970 by the Canadian federal government, has been involved in a comprehensive study of the socio-cultural impact of this state-wide highway. Only preliminary reports have been completed as of the summer 1976.

54. Government of Sarawak, 785 Days: Progress Under Sarawak Coalition Government (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1972), p.41.

55. Ibid., p.28.

56. Sarawak Government, Sarawak Maju, p.50.

In August 1971, the federal and state governments acquired the services of Hoff and Overgaard Consultants of Denmark, and Huntings Technical Services, Ltd. (London) to complete a study on regional planning in the Miri/Bintulu area. The study, entitled the "Miri Bintulu Regional Planning Study, Fourth Division", aimed to examine "... overall development of the ... area with particular attention to identification of land resources for agricultural and forestry development" The study was completed in mid-1974. For a summary of the study, see Sarawak Land and Survey Department, Annual Report for 1974 (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1974), p.9.

For a recent discussion on regional planning in general, see Antoni R. Kuklinski, ed., Regional Development and Planning: International Perspectives (Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Company, 1975), esp. part 3.

57. Sarawak's oil industry has been discussed in detail in chapter three.

58. Government of Sarawak (State Planning Unit), Guide For Investment in Sarawak, Malaysia (Kuching: Government Press Office, 1974).

59. The Sarawak Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) was created in March, 1972 with four major responsibilities: direct investment in specific industrial projects either on its own or on joint ventures with private corpora-

ations or individuals; promotion of industrial development; provision of facilities to enhance the growth of industrial activities; and the provision of loans for agriculture, industry and other economic activities. See Government of Sarawak, Promoting Commerce and Industry. Meaningful Development Series (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1974).

60. Government of Sarawak, Guide For Investment, p.32.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., pp.36-38.
63. Ibid., p.38.
64. Ibid. Also see Carlson, Malaysia, pp.42-47.
65. Government of Malaysia, Federal Industrial Development Authority, Malaysia: Your Profit Centre, p.12.
66. The 1976 Budget. Speech by the Hon'ble. the Chief Minister Datuk Patinggi (Dr.) Haji Abdul Rahman Ya'kub, introducing the Supply (1976) Bill in the Council Negri on 23 March 1976, p.12.
67. Government of Malaysia, Federal Industrial Development Authority, Malaysia: Your Profit Centre, p.16.
68. The 1976 Budget. Speech by the Hon'ble. the Chief Minister, p.12.
69. Khera, Malaysian Economy, p.46.
70. The Malaysian Migration Fund Board, in fact, continues to send workers from other parts of the Federation to Sabah. In 1970, a total of 1,917 workers migrated to Sabah, as compared to 733 in 1969. The state is still short of skilled and unskilled labour despite the Board's efforts. See, Khera, Malaysian Economy, p.116.

The figure on Sarawak unemployment has been calculated from data in Government of Sarawak, Statistical Handbook of Sarawak 1974, Table 2.6, p.14. The Handbook for 1974 does not provide more recent statistics on labour in Sarawak.

71. It must be emphasized that Sarawak is overwhelmingly an agricultural state; about 70 to 80 percent of the labour force was in agricultural activities in 1974. Most of the youths leaving the traditional primary economic areas are attempting to find employment in the urban centres.

The National Youth Development Corps, a federally-sponsored programme, is attempting to train youths in basic skills and locate suitable employment for those unemployed. Refer to Khera, Malaysian Economy, p.116.

72. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.43.

73. The policy of diversification came in vogue especially during the 1960s. See T. R. McHale, "Problems of Industrial Development in Malaysia," in You Poh Seng, ed., Economic Problems of Malaysia (Singapore: Adult Education Board, 1965), pp.40-48.

Manifestations of this policy are traced and discussed in Allen D. Hinton, "Rural Development in West Malaysia, 1956-1970" (Unpublished B.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1973).

Concerning the growth of rubber production in Sarawak, refer to Moy-Thomas, "Economic Development,"; and Y. L. Lee, "The Development of Resources in British Borneo and Its Impact on Settlement," Sarawak Museum Journal, 10 (July-December, 1962), 563-558.

74. Government of Sarawak, Agricultural Progress. Meaningful Development Series (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1974), p.3.

75. Ibid.

76. Government of Sarawak, Sarawak Maju, pp.60-61.

77. Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, p.3.

In a speech on 12 July, 1971 by Prime Minister Razak, he stated: "I wish to stress, as is clearly stated in the Plan (Second Malaysia Plan), that the over-riding objective is to achieve national unity." Quoted in Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, p.7.

78. This feeling of dissatisfaction was gleaned through private correspondence with Ibans in Sarawak.

79. These terms are used in Alatas, Critique, p.8.

On the highly politicized nature of Malaysian development, especially in Malaya, see Marvin Rogers, "The Politicization of Malay Villagers: National Integration or Disintegration," Comparative Politics, 8, #1 (January, 1975), 205-225.

80. Gayl D. Ness, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia: A Study of Complex Organizations in Stimulating Economic Development in New States (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p.172. Also see his "Modernization and Control of the Bureaucracy in Malaysia," Asian Survey, 5, #9 (September, 1965), 467-473.

81. Ibid., p.195.

82. In using the example of the multinational corporation or multinational enterprise, it would appear that ownership of such international businesses by national governments as with Malay ownership of private businesses remains rather of symbolic value. Control remains the crucial element in both cases.

83. Information gathered through private correspondence with ~~persons~~ in Sarawak.

84. Informed by Sarawakians in Canada. Unfortunately, no actual size of such plants could be estimated from the available information.

85. For further details, see James P. Ongkili, Modernization in East Malaysia, 1960-1970 (Kuala Lumpur/Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.30-36, and p.87.

See also, Christopher T. C. Ho, "Development Administration in West Malaysia" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1971), esp. chapter three.

86. Lee, Settlement in Sarawak, p.191.

87. This "involuting" proclivity need not necessarily be circumscribed to Malays. The Ibans, for example, are also experiencing drastic changes in adapting from shifting agricultural practices to more sedentary forms of production. For a discussion on the reaction of Malays to FLDA programmes, see Keith R. Emrich, A Behavioral Approach to Rural Development: The Malaysian Case (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973).

88. The increase can be seen in these figures:
(M)\$865,288 in 1964; (M)\$1,435,482 in 1965;
(M)\$1,976,168 in 1966; and (M)\$1,376,630 for 1967. From Sarawak Government, Development Plan of Sarawak, 1955-1960, pp.71-75.

89. This rough estimate is derived from various figures on involvement in urban trade and commerce given by private sources in Sarawak.

90. In Sarawak, poverty does not run along ethnic lines; economic impoverishment is a pan-ethnic phenomenon. Indeed, the division of Sarawak society into groups of "haves" and "have nots" is the only tenable "bi-furcating process" that accords with societal traits in the state. As noted in the study by the University of Wageningen, Study of the First Division, vol. 5, p.6:

"one has to take into account the distinction between haves and have-nots; notably among the Chinese, but present in all ethnic groups. There is a growing awareness of these disparities within and across ethnic lines."

On the distinctions between Sarawak's and Malaya's communal characteristics in terms of models, see Esman, "Communal Conflict,"; and Levy, Malaysia and Ceylon.

91. There are two particularly good sources on this area: Hollis Chenery, et al., Redistribution With Growth (London: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1974); and Myrdal, Asian Drama, esp. vol. one, chapter 12.

92. M. S. Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem," in Chenery, et al., Redistribution With Growth, pp. 3-27.

93. Ibid., p. 12.

94. Ibid., p. 8.

According to 1958 figures, 65 percent was in the lower income level, 30 percent in the medium range, and 5 percent in the high income bracket. Therefore, there has been some improvement in the Malaysian income equity situation since then. Figures for 1958 gleaned from Lim, et al., Economic Structure, pp. 231-233, inter alia.

95. This growing discontent among Malays, mostly in northern Peninsular Malaysia, is, according to Rogers in "Politicization of Malay Villagers,":

"... caused more by frustrated aspirations than by actual impoverishment. Their religion admonishes them not to be covetous and to accept what Allah provides, but the problems of earning a living and the visibility of consumer goods arouse dissatisfaction."

In relation to other Asian countries, Malaysia's GNP per capita is quite high. The respective 1969 GNP per capita for Burma, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, the Philippines, and Taiwan was, in American dollars, 72, 95, 100, 173, 233, and 317. From Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality," p. 12.

96. In American dollars, (M) \$963 and (M) \$1,213 are about \$321, and \$1,213, respectively. Figures from Malaysian Digest, January 15, 1974, p. 3.

97. This problem is best analyzed in Mohamed Nor bin Abdul Ghani, Poverty and Its Eradication: A Compa-

relative Study of Malaysia, Mexico and the United States (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1975), esp. chapter five.

98. Refer to chapters four and five in this thesis.

99. See Michael B. Leigh, "Party Formation in Sarawak," Indonesia, 9 (April, 1970), 189-224; and Leigh, Chinese Community, chapter 10.

100. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.144.

101. R. S. Milne, "Political Parties in Sarawak and Sabah," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 6, #2 (September, 1965), 104-117.

102. Ibid., pp.106-111, passim.

103. C. Paul Bradley, "Communal Politics in Malaysian Borneo," Western Political Quarterly, 21, #1 (March, 1968), 123-140.

104. Leigh, "Party Formation in Sarawak," p.200.

105. Sarawak Digest, #2 (1974), p.12.

106. From conversations with former SUPP party members who were active in the political affairs of Sarawak during the 1960s. Also see Kroef, "Chinese Minority Aspirations."

107. Leigh, "Party Formation in Sarawak," p.224.

108. Apparently, PESAKA's reasons for joining remain very unclear, since it has historically been the political mainstay of Dayak identity in Sarawak. See Yong, "Malaysian Setting."

109. Robert O. Tilman, "The Sarawak Political Scene," Pacific Affairs, 37 (1964-1965), 440-449.

110. Refer to general discussion on consociationalism in chapter four. Qualifications are also needed when discussing Malaysia. First, autonomy of the respective groups, or "segments", do not exist. This can be seen in the significant "incursions" into the Chinese and Iban communities. Also, these groups are not totally united in their respective set of convictions, nor are they culturally similar. Secondly, every issue of political contention in Malaysia generally evolves around communalism. Segmented societies in Europe, on the other hand, have been more concerned with specific issue-areas, mainly religious and linguistic. It is not usually the case of European countries that issues have so many ramifications.

Undoubtedly, the nature of so-called "developing countries" is a significant factor. In Malaysia especially, politics is governed by the "constant pie theory" where every group, and in fact every individual, is out to procure as much as possible of an acknowledged limited amount of "goods". This situation, as such, evolves into a case of a zero-sum game.

111. Basically, he suggests that alliances tend to limit their size according to the size of the "political cake". The rationale is that the smaller the size of the successful coalition, the greater the "payoff" to each member of the winning group. See his Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Charles Adrian Press, 1962), esp. p.47.

112. James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," American Political Science Review, #4 (December, 1969), 1143-1145.

113. For an insightful analysis of the role of power and politics in Third World countries, see Wriggins, Political Survival, esp. Part III, pp.89-221.

114. The NF is comprised of several parties. The NF was formerly the Alliance Party before expanding itself to incorporate other state-based parties. Refer to above, chapters three and four.

115. Milne, "Political Parties," p.113.

116. In fact, many Chinese Sarawakians possess more antipathy for so-called "dirty" Chinese in both Sarawak

and Malaya than for persons of other ethnic groups.

117. Leigh, Political Change in Sarawak, p.96.

118. In essence, a "patron-client" relationship is an unequal dyadic exchange relationship where the patron is the holder of economic and political power, and the client is the party in need of assistance. The patron also needs help, however, mostly in the form of political support; thus the exchange relationship.

According to James Scott,

"The patron-client relationship - an exchange relationship between roles - may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a large instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron), uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services to the patron."

From his "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American Political Science Review, #1 (1972), 91-113.

119. R. S. Milne, "Patrons, Clients and Ethnicity: The Case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia," Asian Survey, 13, #10 (October, 1973), 891-908.

120. It has been said that "Many simple people (in the Bornean states) believed that it would be cake for ten every day after Malaysia." Quoted in Milne and Ratnam, Sarawak and Sabah, p.352. This attitude among Borneo's populace reflects the need for active federal participation at the local levels, such as through MRPs (Minor Rural Projects), discussed earlier in this chapter.

121. This is particularly true of DOs since they have a close working relationship with the federal government. See earlier discussion in chapter three.

122. Milne, "Patrons, Clients and Ethnicity," p.902.

123. James Wong and Ling Beng Siew, two prominent public figures in Sarawak, were recently "ostracized" from active politics. The state government had found them to be detrimental to "state security". James Wong was, and is still, a leading figure in SNAP. Ling Beng Siew, a longtime timber tycoon, has been active in the SCA since its inception. The former was imprisoned for a two-year period, while the latter had a brief sojourn in Singapore. Since then, both have returned to active life in the state, beginning around 1976.

On the general area of political manoeuvres in Peninsular Malaysia, which are becoming of more applicability to Sarawak politics, see Alvin Rabushka, "The Manipulation of Ethnic Politics in Malaya," Polity, 2, #3 (Spring 1970), 356-356.

124. Refer, in particular, to Esman, "Communal Coexistence," regarding Peninsular Malaysia's communal pattern.

125. See earlier discussions on cleavage patterns in chapters four and five.

126. "Political religion" is generally defined in chapter one.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Introduction

In trying to consolidate the principal ideas presented throughout this thesis, the concluding chapter endeavours to provide (a) an examination of the implications of Malaysian "nation-building" policies on Sarawak communal relations; (b) an appreciation of the chief factors contributing towards continued political stability in Sarawak; (c) an account of the existing and likely future areas of contention in Sarawak federal-state relations; and (d) a brief inquiry of the discernible trends in the complex process of Malaysian "development".

Implications of Malaysian "Nation-Building" on Sarawak Political Integration

It is difficult to fully assess national integrative schemes in any given country. Only when integration has actually failed can attempts at evaluation be seriously made. Indeed, "building a nation-state is a slow and complicated affair"¹ Therefore, as large and rather unnatural political configurations continue to exist and function, only their apparent weaknesses can be pinpointed. Here, those drawbacks in the Malaysian case are related directly to commu-

nalism in Sarawak.

The fruition of Kuala Lumpur's longtime political integration policy came immediately after the May 13th Incident of 1969.² Couched in the principles of the Rukunegara and the NEP, Malaysian national integration policy evinced a clear Malay bias in the economic, and socio-cultural spheres. Implicit was the notion that substantial political and cultural homogeneity based on Malayanism was needed in the Federation for successful national integration. Also underlying this policy was the idea that Peninsular Malaysia's political characteristics were to dictate the future direction of the Federation.

Within Sarawak, communalism has traversed its own particular course, one quite different from that experienced in Peninsular Malaysia. Largely due to the different communal composition in Sarawak, and also to the historic inter-communal ties, Sarawak society cannot be totally receptive to the "nation-building" schema emanating from the federal government. On balance, it would appear that the greatest threat to Malaysian national integration, from the perspective of this Sarawak case study, lies in the very policies that attempt to promote integration. In other words, the federal government's attempts to "Malaysianize" Sarawak presents the single most lethal danger to national integration.

Certain specific integrative factors have helped to sustain the Federation since the waning of an embryonic Malaysian nationalism during the "save Malaysia" campaign in late 1963. Politicians in Malaysia, both at the federal and state levels, have resorted to the two prime integrative institutions of the political party and the bureaucracy.³ First, although political parties evolved rather slowly in Sarawak, they have, within the span of just a decade and a half (1960-1976), entered the national political ambit through coalitional politics. Sarawak's only historical antecedent to the present governing Sarawak Coalition was the Sarawak Alliance in the 1960s. Since 1970, the Sarawak Coalition is a member of the NF (National Front); and through such an intimate relationship of a pan-national party framework, national integration is enhanced.

Numerous studies, moreover, have pointed to the vast potential of the Malaysian bureaucracy as a positive integrative factor.⁴ Incoherent integrative aspects can indeed be discerned in Sarawak due to the bureaucracy. The early "parachutage" of federal civil servants, which continues today, allowed growth of closer federal-state ties in Sarawak. The paucity of suitably qualified Sarawakians to fill vacancies left by departing expatriates facilitated the inflow into Sarawak of Peninsular Malaysians. Currently in the period of active Sarawak and Malaysian development, a premium is placed

on an efficient and effective bureaucracy. Perceptible in Sarawak is a gradual fusion of state and federal efforts in the development process; the task of development, in fact, justifies it, and Sarawak's dependence on the federal government warrants it.⁵ Thus, Dwight Waldo's conception of an "administrative state" can be applied to Sarawak, and more so as developmental endeavours proliferate in the future.⁶

The foundations for federation, as discussed in chapter two, were quite tenuous; therefore, the importance and urgency of national integration in Malaysia. Only through the combination of several events was merger eventually realized. Since then, the Malaysian Federation, in addition to institutional integration, has been sustained by the related motifs of centralized and manipulative federalism.⁶ In the case of Sarawak, dependence on the federal government has contributed towards "state-building" (i.e. the growth of "state-ness").⁷ Doubtless, Sarawak's three chief areas of dependence - economic, defence, and psychological - continue to shape its relations with the federal government during the 1970s.

Malaysia's "nation-building" policy encompasses several ambitious programmes - the NEP, Malaynization of the educational system, and gradual Islamization of the Federation. The most significant implication of these programmes on Sarawak society needs to be emphasized - that of modifying an historically stable pluralist cleavage structure to a potentially

unstable one of reinforcing cleavages. The bifurcating element of the NEP into groups of "bumiputras" and "non-bumiputras" has been the main impetus for such change.

The basic-two-group approach of the NEP conflicts with the social characteristics of Sarawak. Unlike Malayan society, Sarawak's lower economic groups span across all communal groups including the Chinese. However, bumiputraism serves as the touchstone of development in Malaysia. Although the term "bumiputra" originates from Peninsular Malaysia, it is having federation-wide usage. In Sarawak, "bumiputra" becomes rather ambiguous, as discussed in chapters four and five. Nonetheless, the official government meaning for "bumiputra" in Sarawak is quite uncomplicated; it incorporates, in essence, non-Chinese groups in the state such as Ibans, Melanaus, and Land Dayaks. Socio-cultural facets, language and education for example, also constitute integral roles in bumiputraism. In brief, bumiputraism is a manifestation of Malayism, as personified in the "pushing" of the Malay language.

Modernization, as documented by several academics, usually increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict.⁸ This was also seen in the above discussion on language and education in chapter six. In pursuing the essentially discriminatory development policy of bumiputraism in Sarawak, ethnic tensions will most likely be increased. Moreover, the most crucial

aspect of poverty and overall development continues to be absent in Malaysia - an effective mechanism of income distribution. Continuing growth, whether or not based on bumiputeraism, will only perpetuate existing poverty in the Federation. Economic equality, thus, cannot be guaranteed by favouritism towards the development of particular ethnic groups through ownership and entrepreneurship assistance. Such "slanted" policies may indeed impede economic growth, as it appears that entrepreneurship cannot be promoted merely through government policy.⁹ In the case of Sarawak, bumiputeraism and its many manifestations may, in fact, degenerate into ethnic hostilities, prompted by government - sanctioned "inequities" in the development process. Overall, it would seem that "development" in Sarawak is inimical to harmonious communal relations. In large part, it is caused by the federal "nation-building" policy which is incongruous to Sarawak society.

This growing degree of ethnic antagonism in Sarawak is compounded by the absence of a relatively disinterested party. Prior to Malaysia, both the British administration and the Brookes strove to act the role of a comparatively neutral "third force" among the disparate communities. The overall laissez-faire approach to communalism complimented the roles of the Brooke and British governments. Within Malaysia, and particularly since 1969, Sarawak society has not

possessed such a third force. The state government, as well as the federal government, have become active participants in the political process. The importance of a relatively neutral third force is now heightened by the pseudo *savoir-faire* approach of the Sarawak government. The activation of Sarawak society by the government, moreover, increases the level of communal competition, and accentuates the importance of a societal "broker". Presently, only the bureaucracy in Sarawak possesses the potential to fulfill such an "off-setting" capacity.¹⁰

In reaction to Malaysian "nation-building", the various communal groups in Sarawak become more "ethnicized" to meet the various dictates of the bifurcation tendency in the "nation-building" policies.¹¹ As most "indigenous" or "native" groups in Sarawak are classified under the politically-conceived category "bumiputras", those "non-native" groups excluded from the "bumiputra" category naturally become more defensive. They thus become more ethnocentric in safeguarding their respective communities. Those designated as "bumiputras", on the other hand, become more conscious of their "bumiputra" traits. But the "non-bumiputras" conspicuously draw back into their own ethnic communities, partly as a protectionist action, and also due to a concurrent alienation from the politics in Sarawak. Certain groups officially classified as "bumiputras" continue to uphold their individual

ethnic distinctiveness. The historical strength of Iban-ness among both up-river and the more urbanized Ibans is still quite strong. In future, however, political exigencies may necessitate a self-imposed bumiputraization process among these non-Malay native groups such as the Ibans.

Sarawak's current highly ethnicized society is also generally quite mobilized. In other words, the society is greatly "activated" in the process of state and national progress. This somewhat intense "development syndrome" permeates the entire Sarawakian society which has been initiated and sustained by political means.¹² The argument that unfulfilled "rising expectations" may result in "revolutions" applies to Sarawak. Indeed, Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe suggest that modernization tends to heighten communal relations.¹³ The most recent instance of violence, on a widespread scale, in Sarawak was in fact caused by poor economic conditions. The Asun "rebellion", prompted by economic ills, evolved into an anti-Chinese campaign led by up-river Ibans. Similar factors also contributed to the 1857 Chinese revolt. But the very legitimacy of the state government, and, more importantly, Sarawak's contentment within the Federation, depends on the success or failure of economic advancement and its concomitants of general social progress.¹⁴

This apparent commitment to development is further complicated by the human factor involved. Although often neglected, rationalistic development programmes usually fail to

fully appreciate the consequences of such efforts on individuals. Sarawak especially presents a difficult situation. Its largest community, the Ibans, has traditionally been based on non-sedentary livelihoods while the Chinese, Sarawak's most important economic group, possess extremely strong attachments to land and property. With resettlement schemes and the like, physical migrations and, thus, uprooting of individual and collective lives have to occur. For the Ibans, such a process sometimes destroys their overall genre de vie.¹⁵ For the Chinese, the effect is less devastating but still profound. Thus, there are many "pernicious effects" in the Sarawak developmental process similar to most "modernizing" areas, as suggested by George Appell.¹⁶ These "effects", in disturbing traditional livelihoods, increase the potential for communal conflict.

Clearly, each communal group in Sarawak possesses its own set of cultural traits. These characteristics obviously pose an obstacle to overall national integration. But it needs to be stressed that they also comprise the very foundation of each individual within each particular group. Psychological security is by far the most important function of primordial ties for the individual.¹⁷ Ethnicities in Sarawak will not likely disappear with the presence of modernization. And communal relations will ultimately determine the success or failure of Malaysian national integration

schemes in Sarawak.

It is perhaps the cost of all national integration policies based on homogeneity that ethnic tensions will increase. Additionally, it may eventually thwart the very objective of integration.¹⁸ Therefore, alternatives to integration based on homogeneity of large and unnatural political entities are needed. A primary concern would be to accord more consideration to the societal "givens" of a particular society, namely the existing ethnic communities, regional identities and so on. Overall, Stanley Bedlington rightly asserts that "... ethnicity needs to be recognized not as a threat but as a legitimate human condition."¹⁹

Reasons For Communal Stability in Sarawak

Malaysia's "nation-building" policy contrasts markedly with the traditional political integration approaches in Sarawak. To reiterate, Sarawak witnessed up to 1969 a long history of "laissez-faire" rule, partially regulated in the sense that a minimal degree of direct governmental intervention was existent. In the period of Brooke rule (1841-1946), Sarawak experienced comparatively harmonious communal relations, save for the Chinese revolt in 1857 and the Asun "rebellion" in the 1930s. As discussed above, both were not wholly communal incidents, but instigated by other economic and political factors.²⁰

A principle of Brooke rule was the autonomy of each communal group. Basically, the British colonial policy of divide and rule through an indirect rule system was followed. The main features of a plural society were present; nonetheless, several characteristics of a non-plural society were also existent in Sarawak such as regular interaction among the communal groups. Consciously, the Brookes minimized the influence of external factors as they were deemed disruptive, and adverse to harmonious communal relations. Thus, the core of Brooke rule rested on the belief that the essentially plural society in Sarawak was to be maintained; therefore, a clear acceptance of Sarawak's societal "givens". To the Brookes, maintenance of pluralism was, somewhat ironically, the most feasible solution to communalism. This basic political integration policy was abetted by having the government act as a relatively neutral third force in the society.

Contrariwise, the Malaysian integration policy, which also serves as the political integration approach in Sarawak, is founded on active and conscious mobilization of the various ethnic groups. This approach stands in direct contrast to Brookes' policy.²¹ The absence of communal violence, and in fact, the growing presence of communal cooperation in Sarawak during Brooke rule attest to the appropriateness and effectiveness of "laissez-faire". Since active implementation of Malaysian "nation-building" communal relations in Sarawak have been strained, but continue to be com-

paratively "quiet".

The relatively recent political concept of consociationalism helps to explain the situation in Sarawak. Consociational democracy, according to Arend Lipjhart, depicts, basically, the condition where a high frequency of interaction and accommodation among the political elites of individual groups produces comparative stability in a plural or segmented society. The party process in Sarawak since 1963 can be seen as a type of this "democracy".²²

The constant interaction among the elites in party politics has maintained both a large degree of communal harmony within Sarawak, and has also enhanced integration at the national level. In particular, the operation of "machine politics", through "patron-client" relationships, has also promoted communal accord. It is through patronage politics that a semblance of vertical integration - of Sarawak's populace and the elites - can be achieved. This can indeed be regarded as a form of the "trickling down" effect in development politics.²³

Although early growth in the extent of "ethnicization" is principally caused by the nation-building schemes, some traits of Sarawak society still persist. The many divisions within the Sarawak Chinese community still prevail and is, thus, an example of a second chief reason for comparative communal accord. Namely, it is the non-plural attributes of

Sarawak that assist the political integration effort. Ibans, furthermore, continue to be divided along geographical lines, the predominant distinction being those of the "ulu" (up-river) areas, and those from areas closer to urban centres.²⁴ These vestiges of the pluralist model of communalism, with its distinctive cross-cutting pattern of cleavages, continue to engender some degree of ethnic accord. But the survival of such intra-communal schisms is highly mooted in face of the growing "bifurcation" process and its concomitant "ethnification" trend in Sarawakian society.

A feeling of political futility also pervades the Sarawakian populace. For all groups, there exists the idea that the "centre" - both state and federal - is too powerful, and even too remote, to induce any significant change. In part, this is influenced by the attitude of deference to government held by Chinese, Malays, and Ibans. Regarding the Chinese, the Hartzian notion of "transplantations", which basically describes the movement of ideas and concepts from the "old" world (e.g. Europe) to the "new" world (e.g. North America), is germane. Traditional society in China was highly stratified with an expected deferential populace. Such facets of Chinese political culture were naturally "transplanted", in part or in whole, to "Nanyang areas" ("South Seas"). Both the Malays and Ibans also possess attitudes conducive to deference to the rulers.²⁵

Allied to the ubiquitous deferential posture in Sarawak society, there is a high premium accorded to political stability. The advancement of contentious issues, which usually entail communal matters, according to some Sarawakians, should be kept to a minimum. The old adage "don't rock the boat" describes this attitude quite well.²⁶ In Sarawak the populace feels that some semblance of political stability is vitally important for achieving development. Indeed, such stability is essential for continued growth in the Malaysian economy. And, in reality, popular contentment rests largely on undeterred economic growth with some appreciation of income equity. In 1976, both Malaysia and Sarawak, in particular, continue to experience favourable balance of payments.²⁷

The paucity of feasible options for Sarawak heightens the importance of communal cooperation, lest internal instability would precipitate greater degrees of federal controls and interference. Basically, the options opened to Sarawak in the future are few in number. Many pessimistic Sarawakians maintain that the "future" of non-Malay groups was foreclosed in 1963 when they once again became "colonial" subjects under the Federation of Malaysia. Many persons, as such, have tried and succeeded in "escaping" the imminent "Malay Sarawak". Immigration to the more developed countries like Australia, the United States and Canada by many affluent Sarawakians has been a principal means of

"escape" in recent years.²⁸

Recourses such as armed rebellion would probably be unrealistic. The most important factor is that the military, both the federal and the state, has been overwhelmingly Malay.²⁹ However, an armed struggle between Dayaks and the government forces would prove to be quite protracted, since the former has always been "masters" of the Bornean jungles. Some form of regional integration between Sarawak and Sabah would not be salutary to non-Malay groups in Sarawak, as Sabah is firmly committed to the policies of the federal government. Moreover, communism does not appear to be a tenable option. The constant vigilance over this phenomenon by the governments of Kuala Lumpur, Sarawak, and Indonesia has greatly retarded its potency in Borneo. The surrender in May, 1974 of numerous "CTs" ("communist terrorists") in Sarawak abated the strength of communism in the state, for the time being at least. The possibility of merger with Brunei, and Sabah remains unlikely. The many reasons behind the failures of earlier attempts to integrate these areas of northern Borneo in the 1950s still persist today. In fact, relations between Sarawak and Brunei have been rather strained in the past few years.³⁰ There is also the Indonesian factor. Future expansionist endeavours by Indonesia, as during the formation of Malaysia, cannot be ruled out as a possibility. Although up-river tribes in

Sarawak do interact quite regularly with Indonesian groups in Kalimantan, as discussed in chapter five, most Sarawakians would strongly oppose incorporation into Indonesia. In relation to Malaysia, Indonesia is seen by Sarawakians as economically poor, and less receptive towards minority groups like the Chinese. Indeed, the present "bumiputra" groups in the state would probably not enjoy the privileges they now have within the Federation, if Sarawak were under Indonesia.³¹

Given the lingering nationalistic fervour in Sarawak since joining Malaysia, it would seem that independence cannot be completely ruled out as a possible option. However, the continuing dependency relationship with the federal government attenuates the Sarawakian drive for nationalism (i.e. regional nationalism). Other factors, such as the fluidity of the Southeast Asian region, accentuates the need for Sarawak to belong to a larger unit. In the final analysis, the quest for more political clout in Sarawak vis à vis the federal government is quite difficult, as discussed in chapter three.

Generally, politics in Sarawak have been rather subdued. To counteract subversive activities, usually in the form of communism, the political ambit is somewhat "muffled". Various operations, in fact para-political purges, have controlled the direction of Sarawak politics. These operations date back to the British administration when

it assisted the Federation's genesis through coercive actions. More recent predications include "Operation Judas", during 1973, in which some twenty-five prominent public figures were arrested including the outspoken SNAP member, James Wong.³² Other more subtle tactics have been evident as well; the best example of "nudges" by the government is the use of licence controls (e.g. timber concessions) to incorporate useful figures into the government as to preempt possible opposition. The induction of Dr. Wong Soon Kai, presently Sarawak's Minister for Agriculture and Community Development, into politics, according to most Sarawak Political observers, was accomplished through discreet, yet firm, coercion.³³ In addition, defamation of more prominent figures has also been employed as another "coercive" tactic. These extra-parliamentary political manoeuvres are somewhat indicative of the general un-democratic trend in Sarawak and in Malaysia as a whole; they are, in fact, symptomatic of a moribund democracy.³⁴

Present and Future Problem-Areas in Sarawak

Federal-State Relations

Certain new issues have developed in Sarawak's relationship with Kuala Lumpur. These add to the several problems already existent in this relationship, as examined in chapter three. The growing favourable economic situation in-

Sarawak is resulting in more political aplomb. Specifically, the central position of oil in Malaysia's overall economy is of much importance. And, ironically, it is oil that is an emerging issue of contention between Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak. In a recent speech by Sarawak's Chief Minister, he stated unequivocally that:

... oil is not only the State's biggest export earner but it is also the most important source of revenue to the State Government and it is therefore that this State Government (i.e. Sarawak) should be involved directly or indirectly in the development of the oil industry in the state.³⁵

However, the federal oil corporation, PETRONAS, established in October 1974, controls and plans the "... orderly development of the petroleum and related industries in Malaysia."³⁶ In fact, by 1975 PETRONAS had signed agreements with all state governments, except Sabah and Selangor, under which the corporation will pay them five percent each of the revenue derived from the production of crude oil from their respective states in return for vesting in the corporation the entire ownership and exclusive rights of exploring and exploiting petroleum. Sarawak's petroleum agreement with PETRONAS was concluded on 26 March, 1975.³⁷

As long as Sarawak's overall economic picture looks favourable, pressures to alter existing arrangements with PETRONAS will be minimal. Shades of "Mustaphaism", of com-

plete state control of oil revenues in Sabah under the then Chief Minister Mustapha, may arise in Sarawak during poorer economic periods. Insufficient finances for developmental endeavours, for instance, may prompt an offensive by the Sarawak government against the central government for greater control of its own resource revenues. Indeed, the Chief Minister has recently asked the federal government to examine the actual role of PETRONAS in economic development.³⁸

Sarawak's government may very well "oppose" the federal government with respect to the progress or, in fact, tardiness of development efforts in the state. Since Sarawak has been designated a "Development Area" by the federal government, the anticipation of economic modernization in the state remains quite high. However, in the complex process of development, insufficient appropriation or misdirected funds from the federal purse may create local tensions. The growing demand for rapid economic growth by the poorer northeastern Malayan states, such as Kelantan, may indeed decrease the amount of future federal development funds in Sarawak. Already in 1970, the vast difference in the amount of development projects between Peninsular Malaysia and Bornean Malaysia is evident.³⁹

The "infiltration" of federal developmental bodies into Sarawak, the FLDA, RIDA, and MARA to mention a few, has been met with acquiescence among Sarawakians so far. Incom-

patible priorities in development planning between the state and the Kuala Lumpur government may manifest in the poor operation of these above organizations. In such an event, general public opposition to these federal bodies will most likely result in Sarawak.

On the more general plane, the whole gamut of "nation-building" programmes, as discussed in chapter six, may very well meet future criticism or staunch opposition from Sarawak's government. With the achievement of more economic progress, political confidence usually augments. In face of a federal government insensitive to state views, such as Sarawak's, greater political activism may transpire in the latter during the coming years.

For Sarawak specifically, the question of religion will probably dominate the political scene in the middle-range perspective. Similar to the language and the education debates, religion will prove to be a protracted and complex issue. As indicated in earlier discussions on religion in chapters three and five, only the Malays and Melanau are Muslims. Chinese adhere to various faiths, the main ones being Buddhism and Christianity. Ibans are mostly pagans, with a sizeable proportion of 11 percent as Christians.

The possibility of Sarawak striving for more constitutional powers in the future cannot be completely negated. Although poorly defined in legal terms, the two Bornean states

were guaranteed "special concessions" during the Malaysia negotiations. Since 1973 these rights have terminated; Malay is the official language, Malay is the main medium of instruction in education, the state's civil service officially favours Malays, and Islam is becoming de facto the official religion in Sarawak.⁴⁰

Future negotiations may centre on a better defined and more meaningful constitutional formula for Sarawak. This development remains a slight possibility, nonetheless, given the persistent centralization theme in Malaysian federalism, and also Sarawak's general dependence on the central government. It seems that Malaysia will most likely continue to be the most centralized federation in the Commonwealth.⁴¹ However, two factors, the physical distance between Sarawak and West Malaysia, and the continuing search for Bornean autonomy, will also influence the future direction of the Federation.

The physical separation of Peninsular Malaysia from the Bornean states, some 640 kilometres of ocean, conjures up images of the still-born West Indies Federation, and Pakistan before its breakup in 1971.⁴² Unqualified generalizations, however, are impossible to be formulated, as the future of Sarawak's dependent relationship with Peninsular Malaysia bears important weight on the future course of federalism in Malaysia. On the other hand, the fact that Sarawak has the

vast majority of the Federation's oil does minimize, to a certain extent this dependent relationship. Indeed, oil is, and will probably continue to be, Sarawak's principal political leverage vis à vis the federal government.

The other variable - the quest for autonomy - is more crucial for the Federation's future. The federal government in the 1970s has apparently become quite impervious to the fact that both Sarawak and Sabah were extremely reluctant entrants into Malaysia. Both areas, moreover, have traversed quite different paths of development between themselves and in relation to Peninsular Malaysia. Robert Tilman has emphatically stated that:

It seems likely that the leaders of Peninsular Malaysia have never thoroughly grasped, understood, or appreciated the spirit ("self-reliant and independent"), just as they have been unable to accept the real differences, at least perceived if not real, between the peoples of East and West Malaysia. 43

In sum, Professor Tilman correctly concludes,

The Federal Government seems to have forgotten, or perhaps it never accepted, that the peoples of Borneo entered into the Malaysia scheme with certain reservations and conditions, and that in almost every case these were related to a desire to express their political, social, and economic goals within the familiar idioms of their own lives. 44

Neglect or deliberate oversight on the part of the federal government has not stifled the persistent nationalist fervour within the Borneo states. In fact, the oversight may have sustained such a sentiment - a feeling not always discernible at first observation, but which has been and continues to be part of Bornean and Sarawakian politics.

"The hard evidence on the public record is lacking," Professor Tilman explains, but,

... this spirit of independence and autonomy is still very much alive in Sabah and Sarawak. Again in my personal view, by depriving the peoples of East Malaysia of the opportunity of giving expression to their own uniqueness the Federal Government may have charted a collision course with Sabah and Sarawak. If so, there will be some difficult times ahead for the Federation of Malaysia, as the federation exists today. 45

Trends in Malaysian "Development"

The "development" process, which is used here to include both economic and non-economic spheres, is extremely complex and often follows a tortuous path. Malaysian society is complicated, and is built upon a collection of interrelated spheres namely, economic, socio-cultural, and political. Malaysia's conspicuous plural characteristic, in fact, revolves around these several spheres. For in a highly segmented society like Malaysia, "... it is a rule of public life that any issue, however innocuous on the surface, may erupt in perverse

communal forms."⁴⁶

Since 1969, the federal government has instituted a vigorous and holistic programme based on drastic structural changes in Malaysian society. These alterations mainly include the surmounting of poverty, and the eradication of communally-identifiable wealth. The development process, overall, entails a wholesale de-segregation and de-segmentation of society to create, if not fabricate, a new society based on economic equality, and national unity.

Aligned to this process of massive economic changes are numerous socio-cultural policies. First, and foremost, is the advancement of "Malayism", in trying to create a "Malay Malaysia", as opposed to a "Malaysian Malaysia".⁴⁷ Through the historical monopoly of political power, some of these policies emanating from the Malay community have enjoyed rather undeterred success. However, these policies are still regarded as too "weak" by the ultra-Malays centred in north-eastern Malaya. With an augmentation in the force and numbers of governmental incursions into the acknowledged Chinese economic domain, the usually-held theory of "mutual deterrence" as the paradigm of Malaysian political stability holds less applicability.⁴⁸ The idea of "balanced pluralism", where individual communal groups monopolize respective societal spheres (e.g. Malay domination of politics), is thus being disturbed in Malaysia.⁴⁹ Professor Means' often over-

looked observation, therefore, continues to characterize Malaysian society: "Implied, but unstated, in this strategy (i.e. "balanced pluralism") was the assumption that when the Malays obtained a more equitable share of the country's economy, they would be more willing to accept a greater participation of non-Malays in the political system."⁵⁰ In other words, "Will the non-Malays acquire a more equitable share of political power and benefits from the political system as the Malays acquire a more equitable share of economic power and benefits from the economic system?"⁵¹

Overall, Malaysian "development" has become more dogmatic. Directed by the prescribed tenets of the "National Ideology", which subsumes the NEP, the path of growth has become perceptibly and increasingly "guided". Admittedly, flexibility is not completely precluded from such an approach; but Malaysia's traditional posture of pragmatism certainly assumes an ancillary position. Thus, political, economic, and social progress is beginning to become tainted with rigorous principles as personified in the Rukunegara.⁵²

This particular point of view does prescribe more to a linear perception of Malaysian politics than to a more cyclical one where a return to pragmatism will occur. A cyclical pattern seems quite remote given the consistent growth of Malayism throughout Malaysia's history. Moreover, certain recent developments render such a pattern difficult to achieve

as well: the appointment of several extremist Malays to the new federal Cabinet, including Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamed, the author of the controversial book The Malay Dilemma; the monopoly of political power by the NF (National Front), which won 90 percent of the national seats in the 1974 election; and the pervasive view among persons in the higher echelons of the public service that democracy has limited application in Malaysian society.⁵³

This growing dogmatism at the national level, which is being infused into local levels, may indeed activate Sarawak nationalism. With the change of Sarawak's diffused pattern of communal cleavages to one of cleavage specificity, political problems become "neon-signed". The success or failure of these "highlighted" areas, in fact, determines the very legitimacy of the federal and state governments in power, and, in turn, the future viability of the Federation itself.

However, perfection, or even near perfection, does not prevail in the 150 or so polities in the present international community. Canada, for instance, faces possible disintegration with the election to power of the separatist Parti Québécois in Quebec late in 1976. The Americans are still plagued by a plethora of unresolved problems connected with ethnicity. Places like the Jura, Northern Ireland, Eritrea, and the Basques continue to be confronted with simi-

lar difficulties. In the so-called "developing" countries, however, the leaders are attempting to quickly accomplish, in simultaneous fashion, a miscellany of difficult tasks. These countries are being guided by "political religions".⁵⁴

Malaysia's quite laudable record of peace and stability has only been marred by the 1969 riots. However, as the number of better-educated non-Malays in the Federation increases, it becomes increasingly imperative that adequate accommodation of non-government views be present.⁵⁵ It would certainly enhance the legitimacy of the government, and, in turn, would augment the extent of stability in the country. In the mid-1970s, there exists an ubiquitous and eerie "political silence" among many of the more educated persons throughout the Federation. This political reticence among the well-educated, which defies complete analysis by politicians, could hold malicious consequences for the country's future; it relates to the overall pattern of "development" in Malaysia. Greater attention could be accorded by the governments, both at the federal and state levels, to the main problems in the political development process other than the building of a national identity and national integration, namely participation which is related to legitimacy and distribution.⁵⁶

Very briefly, in using criteria for "political development" as delineated by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, Malaysia, as a whole, is not politically "developed". They

posit three particular attributes of a more "developed" polity: universalism as opposed to particularism; achievement-oriented rather than ascriptive behaviour; and the presence of a large degree of rationalism.⁵⁷

In Malaysia, ascriptive tendencies can be seen in the favoured position of Malays in the constitution. Only Malays can become the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the Head of State). Certain governmental bodies, such as the Conference of Rulers, safeguard the special privileges of Malays.⁵⁸ The list of special privileges include the following: Malay as the national language; Islam as the official religion; economic stipulations under the NEP; and the constitutional provisions mentioned above. Needless to say, particularism still imbues the Malaysian polity. The degree of rational behavior, however, cannot be easily assessed. To the Malays, rationalism dictates that the present pattern of politics and "development" be pursued. Alternatively, it can be argued that since Malaysian has committed itself fully to "development" rational behaviour should minimize the potency of both ascriptive and particularistic tendencies.

An intrinsic component of "political development", although implicit in the study by Almond and Coleman, is political stability which determines the survival of any given polity. Indeed, it can be seen as the most crucial aspect in development politics.⁵⁹ Sarawak, in particular, has

experienced appreciable stability since the dawn of Brooke rule. Political stability in the 1970s may be undermined, however, by the actual "development" process in Malaysia. The present governments in Kuching and Kuala Lumpur have failed to consider the fact that during the process of modernization, psychological traumas precipitate, with a surfeit of change. It is perhaps in these periods of social insecurity that the function of the familiar becomes ever more important. Ethnicities serve as one of these crucial familiarities for the ordinary citizen.⁶⁰ A prescription for the problem of political integration, thus, cannot simply be the gradual obliteration and eventual suppression of distinct communal groups. Such a quixotic approach to political integration fails to nurture and maintain inter-ethnic understanding and cooperation.

The egregious paradox in Malaysia's development process, since the late 1960s, has been that both the governments of Kuala Lumpur and Kuching are being directed by "primordial sentiments" - sentiments which "development" aims to overcome and eradicate.⁶¹ In particular, the current "savoir-faire" approach to communalism in Sarawak conflicts with the policy recommendation of the 1969 study by the University of Wageningen. The study recommended that

A radical and too emphatic strategy might in itself already involve discriminating tendencies or might be considered discriminating in the present plural context

In view of the political structure of Malaysia and Sarawak, it is highly unlikely that a radical attempt towards harmonization would be politically as well as administratively practicable.⁶²

Political integration and, in fact, national integration may be best achieved by according greater recognition to the regional nuances, and to the various ethnic communities. Cythnia Enloe, in presenting a more "progressive" approach to political development, has focussed specifically on the development and growth of ethnic groups within nation-states. Unequivocally, she asserts that, "if modernity tends to alienation of the individual and to centralized injustice in the name of rational planning, then perhaps modernization is antithetical to genuine development."⁶³

Hopefully, policy-makers in Kuala Lumpur and Sarawak will become more cognizant of the fundamental, and the more crucial facets of political integration and national integration. Only then will they begin to direct themselves to the real concerns of political development in particular, and development in general.

Notes to Chapter Seven

1. Indeed, Joseph Strayer further maintains that "... most of the political entities created in the past fifty years are never going to complete this process." See his "The Historical Experience in Europe," in Nation-Building, ed. by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (Chicago: Atherton Press, 1963), pp.17-26.

2. "Political integration", as discussed in chapter one, refers to the maintenance of some semblance of unity among disparate and district communal groups. "National integration" entails the twin processes of "nation-building" and "state-building". "Nation-building" is concerned more with socio-cultural aspects such as values, while "state-building" is more involved with the actual inter-governmental ties among the constituent member-states (e.g. centralization proclivities of federalism).

3. General discussions on integration can be found in Lim, "Problems of National Integration"; and McAlister, (ed.), Politics of National Integration.

4. Galy Ness' suggestion that development in Sarawak, during the 1960s, placed higher priority on efficiency and performance than politics accentuates the importance of Sarawak's bureaucratic sector. See his article, "Bureaucracy in Malaysia."

Regarding the potential positive role of Malaysia's bureaucracy in integrative problems, see Esman, Development in Malaysia; and Wu, Polycommunalism and Nativization.

5. As indicated in chapter one, no attempt is made to provide a full definition of the term "development" in this study. Here, it is used to denote overall progressive change encompassing matters as greater income equality, individual contentment and the like.

6. The origin of the term, "administrative state" is Dwight Waldo's, The Administrative State (New York: Ronald Press, 1948). Milton Esman provides a terse summary of this "state" in Development in Malaysia (p.62):

"The 'administrative state' as an ideal type is one in which the state is the dominant institution, guiding and controlling more than it responds to societal pressures, and administrative (bureaucratic) institutions, personnel, values, and styles are more important than political and participative organs in determining the behaviour of the state and thus the course of public affairs."

7. Greater detail on "state-building" and related theoretical areas can be found in chapter one.
8. These studies are discussed below in this chapter.
9. In the European countries, entrepreneurs evolved from rather unregulated growth, and not through rigorous governmental guidance. For a comprehensive discussion on this area, refer to Peter Kilby, "Hunting the Heffalump," in Entrepreneurship and Economic Development, ed. by Peter Kilby (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp.1-40.
10. See Esman, Development in Malaysia, esp. chapter 8.
11. No attempt is made to provide a comprehensive definition of "ethnicization" here. It is used only to denote the process whereby communal groups, due to certain stimuli become more aware of their individual community, either becoming more defensive or more ethnocentric in the process. Examples of "ethnicization" among the "bumiputras" include the greater incidence of entering the "Malay fold" through "Masok Melayu" by groups such as the Melanaus. Also, there have been several new associations based on bumiputraism. These bumiputra clubs include sports, hawkers, and cultural spheres.

Conversely, the historically heterogeneous Chinese community is becoming more cohesive and defensive in face of bumiputraism. The Henghua (Dialect) Association in Sibul, for example, has just recently allowed, for the first time, membership of non-Henghua persons (e.g. Foochows). For a discussion of the ubiquity and importance of ethnic associations in Peninsular Malaysia, which resembles the Sarawak case in many ways, see Stephen A. Douglas and Paul Pedersen, Blood,

Believer, and Brother: The Development of Voluntary Associations in Malaysia. Southeast Asia Programme Series #29 (Athens: Ohio Center for International Studies, 1973).

12. The phrase "development syndrome" is used by Lucian Pye in Aspects of Political Development, pp.47-58, passim.

13. See their article, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review, #4 (December, 1970), 1112-1130.

Similar ideas on the relationship between modernization and communal stability can be found in Alvin Rabushka, Race and Politics in Urban Malaya (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), esp. pp.91-103; Rabushka and Shepsle, Plural Societies, esp. pp.71-87; Conner, "Nation-Building," and Esman, "Communal Conflict."

Two studies have, however, raised some doubts about this direct relationship between modernization and worsening communal relations: D. G. Morrisson, and H. M. Stevenson, "Cultural Pluralism, Modernization and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis of Sources of Instability in African Nations," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5 (1972); and W. Hang, "Social and Cultural Pluralism As a Concept in Social System Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, 73 (1967).

14. See chapter five for more details on these two "rebellions".

The idea that legitimacy depends greatly on the government to realize economic advancement is presented by Seymour M. Lipset in Political Man (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p.83.

15. This is not to suggest that all settlement schemes adopt sedentary types of agriculture. Indeed, certain traditional Iban agricultural activities still exist in the government-sponsored schemes. However, the "disturbing" factor in these schemes cannot be easily denied; "disturbance" of individual psychological contentment for instance.

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963 A

16. See Professor Appell's article, "The Pernicious Effects of Development," Fields Within Fields, #4 (Winter 1975), 31-41. The opening paragraph in the article presents several important ideas in this area:

"Every act of development involves, of necessity, an act of destruction. This destruction - social, ecological, or both - is seldom accounted for in development projects, despite the fact that it may entail costs that far outweigh the benefits arising from the development. And I use the term development here to cover all those activities usually incorporated under such terms as economic, education, and agricultural planning and development."

17. Regarding the term "primordial sentiments", refer to chapter one. Also, it has been shown that ethnicities continue to persist even in face of rapid modernization as in the United States. See Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (2nd ed.; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).

18. Nancy Snider argues that minimal "integrative" endeavours by the Malaysian government may indeed enhance communal relations. See her article, "Is National Integration Necessary? The Malaysian Case," Journal of International Affairs, 27, #1 (1973), 80-90.

19. Stanley S. Bedlington, The Singapore Malay Community: The Politics of State Integration (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1974), p.4.

20. See chapter five.

21. Without the presence of properly-established institutions, such a mobilization process may prove detrimental to the political development process. See especially, Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, (April, 1965), 386-430.

22. The general literature on consociationalism was introduced in chapter four. The two most important

works are Lijphart, Politics of Accommodation; and McRae; (ed.), Consociational Democracy.

23. Basically, the "trickling down" idea is used by economists to depict the "spread effects", to use Gunnar Myrdal's term, of economic growth usually initiated at the "centre" of society. See Gunnar Myrdal, "International Trade and International Inequality," in Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by Gerald M. Meier (2nd ed.; Oxford: University Press, 1970), pp.479-484.

24. Ibans of the Rejang River area have traditionally been more progressive given their propinquity to Sibü. Therefore, these particular groups have always been somewhat detached from the more "backward" Iban communities in the up-river regions.

25. The idea of "transformations" between "old" and "new" societies is presented in Louis Hartz, et al., The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia (1st ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), esp. chapter one.

In fact, the younger generation of Chinese in South-east Asia, as a whole, possesses a far more optimistic perception of the future. In part, this outlook is due to the reduction of "Chinese-ness" among the younger people. See David W. Chang, "Current Status of Chinese Minorities in South-east Asia," Asian Survey, 13, #6 (June, 1973), 587-603.

26. The "don't rock the boat" posture is characteristic of consociationalism. In the case of Sarawak, this attitude is prompted by several factors: economic factors within the urban Chinese, developmental ones on the part of the impoverished, and political motives among the political elites. The term, "rocking the boat", has been used by Professor Means, Malaysian Politics, p.404.

27. Overall, Malaysia had a surplus of (M)\$171 million in 1975. See ARB, 5, #2 (May 31, 1976), p.208. As discussed in chapter six, Sarawak has experienced an overall favourable balance of trade for eight consecutive years since 1968. Also see Carlson, Malaysia, pp.48-50.

28. Immigration figures are extremely difficult to obtain. This comment on the extent of immigration from Sarawak is based on the presence of numerous Sarawakians in Canada, and also on the fact that more Sarawakians are now attempting to leave the state (usually for places outside Southeast Asia).

29. This predominant Malay presence is most noticeable in the army where all ground force is reserved for Malays. Other army units and the entire navy and air force generally conform to the specified racial proportions of 40 percent Malay, 40 percent Chinese, and 20 percent Indian and others. See Henderson, et al., Area Handbook, p.558. Also refer to Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-1973. Occasional Paper #35 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975).

30. Brunei has recently been making claims on the Limbang area in the Fifth Division of Sarawak. See FEER, September 27, 1974, p.14.

31. These general attitudes of Sarawakians towards Indonesia have been noted in personal correspondence with persons in Sarawak, and in conversations with Sarawakians in Canada. For a general discussion on the position of the Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, see Chang, "Chinese Minorities."

32. FEER, December 13, 1973, p.14.

33. Conversations with Sarawakians in Canada.

34. Most academics saw the "May 13th Incident" as the beginning of the demise of Malaysian democracy. See, in particular, Slimming, Death of a Democracy; Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur/Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971); and Means, "Malaysia".

35. The 1976 Budget. Speech by the Hon'able. Chief Minister of Sarawak, p.7.

36. ARB, 5, -#2 (May 31, 1976), p.205.

37. ARB, 4, #11 (April 30, 1975), p.70.

38. "Text of the Speech Given by the Chief Minister During the Debate on the Third Malaysia Plan, 26 July, 1976," in Vanguard, July 28, 1976, p.7.

39. In the speech given by Sarawak's Chief Minister, in ibid., he criticized the federal government on the fact that the final sum allocated to the state under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1981) was 25 percent less than Sarawak's original request. The Chief Minister was also critical of the continuing lack of "proper information" in Kuala Lumpur on Sarawak such as statistical data.

In general, it can be estimated that in 1970 there were four times as many major development projects in Peninsular Malaysia than in Sarawak. Approximation determined from data given in Osborn, Development Policy, pp.94-95.

40. Islam can be construed as the de facto state religion, since the Chief Minister has adopted Islam; there are a surfeit of "Quran Reading Contests" throughout the public service held on a regular basis; and more public funds have been allocated for the construction of mosques than for any other faiths. Moslems, however, comprise only 28.9 percent of the combined population of Sarawak and Sabah. Indeed, only about 47 percent of the total Malaysian population are Muslims. See Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia," Comparative Politics, 1, #2 (January, 1969), 264-284.

41. Watts, New Federations, p.140.

42. For a general discussion on this area, see Frank N. Trager, "The Federation of Malaysia: An Intermediate Failure?" in Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism, ed. by Thomas M. Franck (New York: New York University Press, 1968), pp.125-166.

The analogy of Pakistan, of course, needs to be qualified. Clearly, in the case of Pakistan the distance separating West and East Pakistan was exacerbated by the fact that another country (India) divided the state.

In the Malaysian case, James Ongkili has suggested that national integration be enhanced by establishing new

travel arrangements between Peninsular Malaysia and the Bornean states (e.g. free airplane passages). See his, "National Integration in Malaysia," in Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ed.), Southeast Asian Affairs 1974, pp.161-172.

43. Tilman, Malaysian Federal-State Relations, p.69.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

The basic problem may lie in the fact that federalism in Malaysia has been regarded by the Kuala Lumpur government, from the outset of federation in 1963, to be more of a "racial federation" based on "centralized federalism", as opposed to "peripheralized federalism." See earlier discussions on the formation of the Federation, and federalism in chapters two and three.

46. Esman, Development in Malaysia, p.261.

47. As discussed above in chapter two, the phrase "Malaysian Malaysia" was coined by Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew during the Malaysia debates. It depicts, basically, a country with more political rights for the non-Malays which would be in contrast to a "Malay Malaysia."

48. Esman, "Communal Coexistence".

49. In fact, four classes of "regime objectives" have been posited by Professor Esman: "institutionalized dominance", "induced assimilation", "syncretic integration", and also "balanced pluralism". See his "Management of Communal Conflict", and "Communal Conflict in Southeast Asia".

50. Means, "Malaysia," p.189.

51. Means, Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.), pp.452-453.

52. A good discussion of the relationship between the degree of governmental controls in economics, and economic growth in two Southeast Asian countries is provided by Roger A. Freeman, Socialism and Private Enterprise in Equatorial Asia: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia. Hoover Institution Series #20 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

53. Of a total of 154 seats, the NF won 135. See C. Pillay, The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia. Occasional Paper #25 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974).

Regarding the higher civil servants in Malaysia, James Scott has observed that most of them would accede to authoritarian rule if the political situation warranted it, as during times of political crises. See his Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

54. A "political religion" has been discussed earlier in this study. Suffice to say here that it believes that the polity can achieve some attainable ultimate ideal (e.g. progress, industrialism).

55. In fact, Paul Pedersen regards students in Malaysia as one of the most important factors in determining the future stability of the Federation. Refer to his "Possibilities for Violence in Malaysia," Current History, 61, #364 (December, 1971), 339-344.

56. With respect to the problems in the political development process, see Binder, et al., Sequences in Political Development; and Pye, Aspects of Political Development, as discussed above in chapter one.

57. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), esp. pp.20-35.

58. Ironically, the Department of National Unity at the federal level has been quite discriminatory in its policies as well. It was, in fact, created to assist bumiputras. See Malaysian Digest, September 5, 1974, p.4.

59. Refer to Almond and Coleman, Politics of the Developing Areas, inter alia.

Also, according to Michael Leifer, Dilemmas of Statehood, p.2:

"Political viability depends on stability and order, and common consciousness has a greater chance of crystallizing if people become used to living within a common framework of government. This is still the immediate task in Southeast Asia, even among countries which have enjoyed more than two decades of independence."

See too regarding this general focus on political stability: Mark Kesselmen, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," World Politics, 26, #1 (October, 1973), 138-154; and Donal C. O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of the Democratic Ideal: American Political Science, 1960-1970," Journal of Development Studies (April, 1972), 351-378.

60. As discussed earlier in this chapter, ethnicities do not necessarily disappear with the presence of modernization, as shown in Glazer and Moynihan, Melting Pot (2nd ed.). Indeed, there is a growing awareness of the need to accord more recognition to the "legitimacy" of ethnicities in plural societies. See, in particular, Andrew M. Greeley, Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), esp. chapters 1, 13, and 14; and David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc., 1975), esp. chapters 1 and 9.

61. There is a growing body of fascinating literature on the negative aspects of modernization which relate directly, in a theoretical fashion, to the Malaysian development process and communalism. See Peter L. Berger, et al., The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1973); Peter Morris, Loss and Change (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); Peter L. Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1974); and E. J. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered (London: Blond and Briggs, Ltd., 1973).

62. The study, furthermore, cautions that,

"Fundamentally, the attainment of national unity is a long term process that has to be attained step by step. If programmes or measures for the promotion of national unity are over-emphasized, they may lead to reverse effects."

Both quotations from, Sarawak Government and the University of Wageningen, Study of the First Division, vol. 5, p.38.

63. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict, p.274.

POSTSCRIPT:

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS, JANUARY-AUGUST 1976

The first eight months of 1976 were extremely eventful for Malaysia. Three main important developments occurred in this period: the death of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Razak and the appointment of Datuk Hussein Onn as the new Malaysian leader; the promulgation of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1981; and the entry of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) into the Sarawak Coalition in August. The appointment of Datuk Onn portends the greatest chances of change, while some change can also develop from the incorporation of SNAP into the government party. The Third Malaysia Plan does not appear to be an extremely important source of future change in terms of Sarawak communalism.

Datuk Onn's appointment as Prime Minister on January 13, 1976 came upon the death of Tun Abdul Razak. The general posture of Onn seems to be significantly more moderate than his predecessor. It must be remembered that non-Malays distrusted Razak for his adamant role in advancing Malay in the education system.¹ Onn, the son of Dato Onn bin Ja'afar founder of the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO), has been gaining some favour among the non-Malays by his strong stand in the so-called "Harun Affair", and by

his tendency to regard general development without specific references to ethnicity.²

The moderating stance of Onn is offset, however, by the presence of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad as the new Deputy Prime Minister, while also serving as Minister of Education. Another purported Malay extremist, Tengku Razaleigh, holds two important portfolios at the national level, chairman of PETRONAS, and Finance Minister. With the retirement in 1974 of Tan Siew Sin, leader of the MCA (Malayan Chinese Association), the non-Malays, and especially the Chinese, lack an effective spokesman in the Malaysian political arena in 1976.

The Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1981) is part of the overall OPP ("Outline Perspective Plan, 1970-1990). Similar to Malaysia's earlier plans, a substantial part of the funds under the Third Malaysia Plan is allocated to the economic amelioration of "bumiputras"; (M)\$315 million is designated for MARA, and (M)\$200 million to the Bumiputra Investment Fund. The latter amount represents an 85 percent increase from the Second Malaysia Plan allocation.³

The specific allocations of the total expenditure of (M)\$2.4 billion are presented in the following table, with respect to economic growth.⁴ The total budget allocated under the new plan for economic development is (M)\$12,665 million, 68.3 percent of the total expenditure.⁵

EXPENDITURE IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE
THIRD MALAYSIA PLAN (1976-1981)

Economic Development	Total Allocation of (M) \$12,665 Million
Economic Areas	% of \$12,665 Million
Agriculture	25.5
Commerce and Industry	9.5
Transport	15.2
Communications	6.4
Utilities	11.5

SOURCE: Figures compiled from information in
Vanguard, July 10, 1976, p.1.

Sarawak received (M) \$1,657 million, or 8.7 percent of the total expenditure. Five other states were accorded a larger sum than Sarawak: Pahang, \$2,054 million (11.1 percent); Johore, \$1,831.7 million (9.9 percent); Perak, \$1,791.8 million (9.7 percent); the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, \$1,490 million (8 percent); and Selangor, \$1,413 million (7.6 percent).⁶

It appears that the Third Malaysia Plan does not deviate from the NEP (New Economic Policy), as attention continues to be focussed on "bumiputraism", and allied areas. Sarawak, in particular, expected a larger amount from the new Plan than the actual sum allocated; this may prove significant to future

Sarawak federal-state relations.

Also in the first half of 1976 SNAP, an Iban party, surprisingly joined the Sarawak Coalition, and also became a constituent-member of the NF (National Front). Early indications of this development were recorded early in March, surmising that SNAP would support the Coalition during the debate of the Sarawak Constitution (Amendment) Bill.⁷ A two-thirds majority was needed to pass the Bill, and at that juncture both SNAP and the Party Bumiputra, or Bersatu, each had eighteen seats; the SUPP (Sarawak United Peoples Party) had twelve seats.⁸

On March 25, the Council Negri (state legislature) unanimously passed the Bill with only one absention.⁹ Therefore, SNAP joined ranks with the government party, a decision which had been agreed to prior March 25, on March 23. The ostensible reasons for SNAP's decision, according to its Secretary-General Encik Leo Moggie, were that a stable coalition government, including all parties, would enhance Sarawak's stability and security, and that SNAP could be of "greater service" to the populace within the government coalition such as influencing the nature of the Third Malaysia Plan.¹⁰ SNAP was, accordingly, given a total of five high ranking posts: one as deputy Chief Minister, two assistant ministers; one political secretary, and one federal minister.¹¹

The main implications of SNAP's actions are (a) that as absence of governmental opposition in Sarawak facilitates the "Malaysianization" of Sarawak society, although a minor deterrent role can be actualized by SNAP within the Coalition; (b) the greater dissatisfaction and disillusionment of Ibans especially with party politics, since SNAP's strong showing in the 1974 election had laid the basis for an imminent "confrontation" with the government; and (c) the temporary institutionalization of "machine politics" and their concomitants which will necessarily contribute to greater "ethnicization" generally in Sarawak.¹²

Overall, these three developments in Malaysia and Sarawak, in particular, do not seem to be potential sources of drastic change; the most significant being the appointment of Datuk Onn, the most "expected" being the substance of the Third Malaysia Plan, and the actions of SNAP as the most surprising and most important for Sarawakians.

Notes to Postscript

1. Onn was, in fact, manoeuvred out of the federal Education portfolio in the 1960s, and was replaced by Yakub, the current Chief Minister of Sarawak.. The main reason for Onn's "ouster" was that he had been too "soft" in promoting Malay in the educational system.

2. Suffice to say that Harun, the Chief Minister of Selangor and a leading UMNO member, was expelled from the UMNO and legally charged for corruption involving monies upward to (M)\$9 million. See FEER, March 20, 1976, pp.11-12.

It has been asserted that the action by Onn in the Harun matter constituted an "era in the making". Onn is noted for his "... deep-seated dislike of corruption and love for the law," as evidenced in this "affair". Quotations from FEER, April 9, 1976, pp.14-16, inter alia.

3. Vanguard, July 19, 1976, p.6.

4. Vanguard, July 10, 1976, p.1

5. Ibid. . About 20 percent of the economic expenditure goes to administration, social services and the like.

6. Ibid.

7. Vanguard, March 20, 1976, p.1.

The Bill was to restrict the number of assistant minister appointments in the state government to nine. See Vanguard, March 20, 1976, pp.1-2, inter alia.

8. Vanguard, March 19, 1976, p.1.

9. James Wong, SNAP member for Limbang, was the only politician to abstain on the vote. See Vanguard, March 20, 1976, p.1.

10. Vanguard, March 23, 1976, p.1.

11. Ibid.

12. Sabah's political situation was also in a state of flux in this period during 1976: Dato Fuad Stephens led his new party, BERJAYA, to victory over Tun Mustapha early in the year and became the new Chief Minister on April 16, 1976; on June 7 the new Chief Minister and a group of ministers and his son were killed in a plane crash near Kota Kinabalu, just fifty-two days after becoming Chief Minister; Datuk Harris Salleh, formerly Deputy Chief Minister, there-fore became Chief Minister, and also led the government party, BERJAYA, into the membership of the NF on June 22; and the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA) withdrew from the Sabah Alliance on June 14, just about one week before BERJAYA and Sarawak's SNAP were officially accepted into the NF. Refer to Vanguard, February 15 to August 1, 1976, inter alia.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF MALAYA (EXCLUDING SINGAPORE)
IN PERCENTAGES, 1921-1970

Year	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others
1921	54.0%	29.4%	15.1%	1.5%
1931	49.2%	33.9%	15.1%	1.3%
1947	49.8%	38.4%	10.8%	1.8%
1957	49.8%	37.2%	11.3%	1.8%
1960	50.0%	37.0%	11.2%	1.8%
1964	50.1%	36.8%	11.2%	1.9%
1970	53.2%	35.4%	10.6%	0.8%

SOURCE: Means, Malaysian Politics, Table 1, p.12;
and Government of Malaysia, 1970 Population
and Housing Census, Table 6, p.27.

APPENDIX B

COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF PARTY SUPPORT IN THE
1969 MALAYAN ELECTION

Party	Malay Votes		Non-Malay Votes		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
UMNO	501,779	41.4	201,080	23.0	702,859	33.7
MCA	138,016	11.4	143,800	16.4	281,816	13.5
MIC	16,964	1.4	8,879	1.0	25,843	1.2
<u>ALLIANCE</u>	656,759	54.2	353,758	40.4	1,010,518	48.4
PMIP	486,950	40.2	8,685	1.0	495,635	23.8
DAP	24,389	2.0	262,217	30.0	286,606	13.7
GRM	22,840	1.9	156,127	17.8	178,967	8.6
PPP	5,785	0.5	74,971	8.6	80,756	3.9
PR	8,659	0.7	17,126	2.0	25,785	1.2
UMCO	-	-	1,808	0.2	1,808	0.1
INDEPENDENTS	6,496	0.5	613	-	7,109	0.3
<u>OPPOSITION</u>	555,119	45.8	521,547	59.6	1,076,666	51.6
TOTAL	1,211,878	100.0	875,306	100.0	2,087,184	100.0

SOURCE: K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, "The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, #2 (Summer 1970), p.220.

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It would be pedantic to cite all the works consulted in the course of this thesis' research. Thus, only the more important, and more relevant ones are listed below.

Overall, the references are broadly categorized into "Primary Sources", and "Secondary Sources". The former comprises these sections: "Government Publications", "Dissertations/Theses", "Non-Government Periodicals", "Newspapers", and "Speeches".

The latter category is, similarly, divided into five areas: "General (Theory, Asian Development etc.)"; "Malaysia (Peninsular Malaysia and Eastern Malaysia)"; "Peninsular Malaysia"; "Eastern Malaysia (Both Sarawak and Sabah)"; and "Sarawak". Each of these five areas is further subsumed under the headings, "Books", and "Articles".

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