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POLITICAL CULTURE IN A POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETY.

A CASE OF 1994 LITHUANIA

by

ELENA-LINA DANILEVICIUTE

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Sociology & Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

May 10, 1997

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**POLITICAL CULTURE IN A POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETY:
A CASE OF 1994 LITHUANIA.**

submitted by Elena-Lina Danileviciute, B.A.
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for
the degree of Masters of Arts

Chair, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Thesis supervisor

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

May 12, 1997

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to determine the degree to which Lithuanian political culture in 1994 is supportive of stable democratic processes and institutions. The focus is made on cognitive, evaluative, and affective aspects of political attitudes and behavior that were crystallized during the transitional period. Data for this study come from a survey of 1002 Lithuanian citizens, conducted in December, 1994 by the Institute of International Relationships and Political Science with the cooperation of the Service of Applied Surveys & Information.

Overall, political attitudes and related activities of the Lithuanian general public are supportive of the further consolidation of democracy. Despite high levels of political distrust and low levels of subjective political efficacy, norms of democratic participation, high levels of political interest and knowledge, a strong sense of external political efficacy, and emotional attachment toward democratic political actions are paramount in the political culture of Lithuania. An informed, active, and politically efficacious citizenry is more likely to advocate democratic political reforms. These findings are taken as major evidence suggesting that further democratization processes in Lithuania will not be challenged by resistance from Lithuanian political culture.

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Skiriu savo mylimai mamytei, Monikai

Danilevicienei, ir teveliui, Zigmui Danileviciui.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology.

Barrington Moore (1958: 77)

The restoration of Lithuanian independence, voted in March 1990 by the democratically elected Supreme Council, was the first move towards the further disintegration and final collapse of the Soviet Union. Transitional processes in a majority of the successor states of the former USSR resulted in striking political instability and turmoil. Lithuania, however, has a reputation as being the most politically stable among these states, despite a significant decrease in its wealth (Country Report 1993:30). The distinctively stable democratic regime in post-Soviet Lithuania is an appealing object of social inquiry. Indeed, the origins of rapid political metamorphoses, the remarkably high levels of mass political mobilization, its utterly non-violent character, and the sequence of further relatively stable democratic development, makes Lithuania an interesting case study in the exploration and understanding of transitional phenomena among Post-Communist states.

Ethically motivated political engagement of the general public was a crucial generator of political reforms in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics. Memories of national revolts and awareness of cultural, linguistic, religious and socio-economic distinctiveness were Lithuanians' ideological justification for radical political demands. Public opinion held that the national movement in

1989-1990 was merely another step in the continual struggle for a national state that started under Russian imperial rule with the 1883 rebellion and continued with the guerrilla resistance against the Soviet regime in 1945-1952, along with an ever-present dissident movement.

The interwar (1918-1940) independent state of Lithuania was a full member of the League of Nations and had a free market economy, strong currency and armed forces. To Lithuanians it symbolized the final fulfilment of national self-determination. The annexation of the country by Soviet troops in 1940 and mass deportations to Siberia that decreased the Lithuanian population by one third undoubtedly certified the illegitimacy of the Soviet regime for Lithuanians. The feeling of socio-economic "superiority" was also another crucial element building ideological grounds for political and economic sovereignty¹.

It is worthwhile to note that historical memories, cultural and economic distinctiveness, and the offence by the Soviet Union affected public opinion in a way that made Lithuanians consider their country as always having been closer to the democratic West than to the despotic East. Besides, the Communist ideology propagated during the Soviet regime was never espoused and led to commonly expressed inclinations to be identified with an almost mystical Western Europe. These beliefs had an essential impact on the character of

¹ The Baltic states were the most urbanized and industrially developed, higher educated and literate among the rest of the Soviet Union. By the parameters of productivity of labor in industry, agriculture, income growth and production growth these smallest republics overtook other Soviet republics (Lieven 1993).

political behaviour of the general public. In the first stages of independence, Lithuanians demonstrated an extraordinarily strong sense of loyalty, trust, and support for the democratically elected political actors and newly created political institutions.² The tragic events of January 1991 were an apex of political awareness and public commitment that surprised the Western world, Soviet authorities and Lithuanian citizens themselves. Troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry attacked Vilnius television and radio buildings, resulting in the deaths of 14 civilians. In response, nearly 500 000 Lithuanian people (Lietuvos Aidas 1991:14) came to the capital and surrounded the parliament building with the deputies still inside, in non-violent means protecting³ the democratically elected government from military aggression.

Beginning in 1989, strong political awareness, attitudinal consolidation, unified collective actions and striking confidence in political actors⁴ were specific attributes of Lithuanian political behaviour. However, after the recognition of Lithuanian independence among Western countries and the collapse of the USSR, different modes of mass political belief and behaviour appeared. A group-based political motivation transformed to an individually-based motivation of political involvement. Intense political participation was no

² Predispositions of the general public to support decisions of political elites were apparent in the boycott to participate in the referendum in March 1991 on "renewed Union", initiated by the Supreme Soviet. Instead, Lithuanians mobilized around the referenda, organized by the Lithuanian parliament. Eighty five percent of all citizens voted in favour of independence and the rate of participation achieved 94% .

In addition, there were no signs of public disagreement with the decision of the parliament to ignore the economic threats from Moscow that resulted on 8 month embargo on gas supply.

³ No instance of physical offence against Soviet soldiers was reported.

⁴ According to the data of the Survey of Values 1990, 81% of respondents reported trust in the government of the republic (Lietuvos Aidas 1992: 235).

longer the manifestation of national awareness of Lithuanians. Nationalism and anti-communism were no longer the key issues of Lithuanian politics. Reforms continued in economic, cultural and normative domains of social life. Citizens faced the changed system of resource distribution, unemployment, drastic decreases in living standards, 400% annual inflation (Country reports 1993: 37), an 185% increase in crime rates (Knudsen 1996: 96), and both economic and political corruption. Cooperative and collective values were replaced by socially promoted, although culturally absent, values of individual success and competition. Consequently, distressing transitional experiences and the loss of economic security reoriented public opinion away from utopian expectations about the market and democracy toward a more cautious and sceptical outlook. Beginning in 1992, the political behaviour of Lithuanians obtained the forms of moderate political involvement and decreased political interest. Moreover, public disappointment in the outcomes of economic and political reforms resulted in a victory of ex-Communists in the 1993 national elections. Nevertheless, the fact that 80% of the electorate (Country Report 1993: 30) turned out to vote showed that Lithuanians did not share the overwhelming cynicism and apathy apparent elsewhere in the former Communist block, and that the majority of the public wished to influence politics.

Further modes of mass political conduct can be placed in a very controversial interpretative framework. Starting from 1993, public opinion polls continually reported increasing disappointment and distrust over the activities of

both discredited politicians and inefficient state institutions. But there was no organised political protest against the incompetence and corruption of political and economic elites. This is an especially complex phenomenon to explain considering the strength and extent of public political participation demanding the independence of Lithuania. If the awareness of historical background was translated by Lithuanians into the general rejection of Soviet norms and resistance against the Communist indoctrination, they could be expected to hold anti-authoritarian political attitudes and activities. It might be inferred that due to underlying democratic virtues, Lithuanian people prefer political stability and the continuity of economic reforms to intervention through mass protest that would prevent further democratic development. The other reasonable interpretation is that the combination of public dissatisfaction and protest apathy actually demonstrates the uncertainty of political beliefs and preferences, as well as the manifestation of former political socialization and habits of political participation. Finally, the dominance of negative attitudes toward the political system, institutions and political actors, in the case of an emerging democracy, indicates a potential for anti-democratic changes. This interpretation is in accordance with the opinion of recent sovietologists who claim that high levels of mass support for democratic institutions and processes, indicated during the initial phases of *Glasnost* ⁵, indeed was an ephemeral phenomenon (Tismaneanu & Turner

⁵ Surveys of Post-Communist citizens in 1989-1992 detected surprisingly high levels of mass support for competitive elections, significant levels of attachment to many democratic rights and liberties, and high degree of loyalty to reform policies. Therefore, preconditions for the further democratic development and stability, and rapid erosion of communist political culture were enthusiastically concluded (Hahn 1991, 1993; Finifter & Mickiewicz 1992; Gibson & Duch 1992; Reisinger & Hesli 1993).

1995: 5). Mass disillusionment over transformation processes is anticipated to cause the emergence of preferences for stronger leadership and public support for a more authoritarian system if this would generate economic prosperity.

The form of political organisation that will result from the revolutionary events in post-Soviet states has very important political ramifications. The character of democratic transformations in the former USSR is "of enormous significance for the states involved in the transitional processes, for their neighbours and the future of the post-cold war order" (Tismaneanu & Turner 1995: 5). Will Lithuania become a democratic polity or does it have the potential to turn to an authoritarian regime? How can we explain the stable character of political reforms and democratic transformations seen in recent political life in Lithuania? Are we dealing with a peculiar quality of a political system or is it merely a short-term phenomenon?

Since the early 1960's the majority of scholars who have addressed the issues of the democratisation process have ascribed an important role to political culture (Inglehart 1990; Di Palma 1990; Lijphart 1990). Likewise, political culture is believed to be a satisfactory analytical tool for explaining the way Lithuanian society exists politically. To re-formulate the questions within the perspective of political culture, the main problems addressed by the present research are as follow: do Lithuanians possess a pattern of mass political values that is supportive of stable democracy? Is it possible to discuss a culture of democracy and actions of democracy that are congruent with democratic beliefs.

It is agreed that Post-Sovietism incorporates the evolution of the political culture of democratic procedures, norms, institutions, and values, as well as the residues of Communist political culture (Kaplan 1993; Tismaneanu & Turner 1995). Therefore, we may ask, what are the dimensions of mass political attitudes and behaviours that reveal underlying civic values and what are the political preferences, attitudes, and political actions that demonstrate the impact of Soviet political experience?

There is a unique opportunity to elaborate on these questions by analyzing the data of the national survey *Political Culture in Lithuania 1994*, initiated and conducted by the Institute of International Affairs in December 1994. The survey research was designed replicating the conceptual and methodological instrument elaborated by Almond and Verba in the cross-national study *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (1963). This design also enables us to test the applicability of the theoretical model elaborated on by Western scholars and applied in a post-Communist society. Finally, in its attempts to explore the political culture of a post-authoritarian state that demonstrates a stable democratic transition, this study significantly contributes to a more substantial understanding, explanation and, to a certain degree, prediction of the transformation phenomena in the states of the former USSR.

To conclude, the purpose of the study is to explore political preferences, values and behaviours of the general public of Lithuania in 1994.

The theoretical rationale is that political cultural properties of Lithuanian citizens are a determining factor in the stable functioning of democratic institutions and processes. The central object of inquiry is political attitudes and patterns of political conduct that were sustained and crystallized during the transitional period. We hypothesize that Lithuanian political culture has a set of political attitudes and relevant political activities that support the consolidation of democratic governance. It is anticipated that despite high levels of distrust in politics and disappointment at the outcomes of economic reforms, participatory norms, democratic strategies of influencing politics, and support for the democratic regime are paramount within the political beliefs of Lithuanians.

The next chapter of the study presents the theoretical framework of the research. The conceptual scheme of political culture is developed from the updated model of *Civic Culture* (Almond & Verba 1963), and more recent debates on political culture (Kavanagh 1980; Inglehart 1990; Gibson & Dutch 1992; Tismaneaunu & Turner 1995). Particularities of Lithuanian political culture are discussed and a model that incorporates both dominance of civic virtues and memories of former political experience is suggested. The working hypotheses of the study are also presented.

The third chapter describes the survey data, sampling procedure, research methodology, and empirical indicators of the object under investigation. It also discusses statistical procedures used in the analysis of data.

The fourth chapter provides a portrait of various political orientations towards different aspects of a political system, and towards oneself as a political actor. Descriptive analyses of cognitive, affective, and evaluative political orientations are performed in order to define the Lithuanian political culture in 1994 , and to test the working hypotheses of the study.

The fifth chapter examines the factors that affect the variance of Lithuanian political orientations. For this reason a scaling procedure and multiple regression analysis are used.

The prospects of democratic stability in Lithuania are discussed in the final chapter. This issue is approached based on empirical findings of the survey, recent debates on political culture in post-Soviet states, and interviews with Lithuanian politicians.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter deals with the rationale and application of the theoretical framework to the Lithuanian political culture. The stability of democratic institutions and processes is believed to depend on predominant political preferences, values, and behaviours in the political culture. Due to its explanatory power, political culture, therefore, is used to understand the Lithuanian political system. The theoretical model is drawn from the updated version of the classical study of *Civic Culture*, its critics, and debates on political culture. The terminology, dimensions of political culture, its typology, and the importance of prior political experience are taken from the model of *Civic Culture* (Almond & Verba 1963). The emphasis on current political experience as a response to the efficiency of political systems, and expectations for moderate public political involvement are considered in accordance with the later studies on political attitudes and behaviour (Lipman 1977; Kavanagh 1980; Kent 1990). As in previous studies on political attitudes among post-Soviet citizens, the impact of former political experience is also considered (Kaplan 1993; Gibson 1995; Hahn 1995).

1. THE CIVIC CULTURE: ITS IMPORTANCE, CRITIQUES AND APPLICABILITY

In this research, the concept of political culture is drawn from the study of *Civic Culture*, elaborated by Almond and Verba in the 1960s. Political culture is conceptualized as "specifically political orientations - attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system"

(Almond & Verba 1963: 12) that predominate among members of a given society during a given historical period.

As pioneering empirical investigation of the political culture of different nations, *Civic Culture* was very influential in the further inspection of political attitudes and a very efficacious provocateur of theoretical and methodological debates (Brown & Gray 1977: 3). The foremost academic contribution of *Civic Culture* is in an elaborate conceptual scheme that introduced various dimensions of political orientations directed towards different political objects.⁶ Furthermore, students of *Civic Culture* have correlated the primary variables, political orientations and political objects, in order to find particular patterns of covariation among them. In so doing, then, they produced a typology of political cultures. Nevertheless, it must be noted that *Civic Culture* has been quite strongly criticized due to its methodological, interpretative, and conceptual shortcomings. From the methodological point of view, Almond and Verba are accused of biased interpretation of data stemming from ignorance of contextual factors and inaccurate design of the sample.⁷ The next point of criticism is the operationalization of measurement procedures.⁸ Finally, the tendency to describe cultural propensities by at most two dimensions causes some uncertainty regarding the reliability of conclusions and generalizations.

⁶ Since 1960s these insights have been widely used to indicate and measure political cultural propensities of the general public (Franceusco 1984; Kaplan 1993; Gibson 1995).

⁷ As Kavanagh (1980), Conradt (1980), and Sani (1980) point out, failure to control for time of field activities, regional biases, imprecise selection of age groups, under-representation of population with low SES and the smallness of the total sample contribute to ambiguity in the conclusions that are drawn.

⁸ For instance, it is doubtful that with the phenomenon of partisanship decline in both Western and Eastern societies, the types of political partisanship can be inferred from the degree of tolerance for inter-party marriages within the family. The avoidance of Almond and Verba to discuss the fact of incongruence between reported political attitudes and actions, the mixture of participant, subject, and parochial orientations regarding different issues are also crucial targets of criticism.

More importantly, the conceptual framework of *Civic Culture* hardly withstands the test of time. In addition, the ideological biases of the study are transparent. The idealized form of the American and British political systems became a cliché when assessing and predicting mediocre prospects for the stable democracy in Germany, Italy, and Mexico. The citizens of the US and Britain, on the contrary, were presented as possessing predominantly civic values such as high quality of cognition, pride in governmental and political institutions, high levels of active political communication and open political participation, high voting turnouts, and tolerance of political parties. However, a decade later, studies of mass political cognition, competence, and political engagement introduced a dramatically different portrait of the majority of Western citizens - uncertain in their political preferences, and having weak understanding and superficial interest in politics (Nimmo & Bonjean 1972). The latest studies of American political culture show general patterns of serious decline in trust regarding political, economic and social leadership and institutions (Bennet 1994). High levels of confidence and legitimacy, reported by Almond and Verba in the early 1960s, have been replaced by scepticism and decreased support for political institutions (Kavanagh 1980). Within three decades of the development of the notion of political culture, more emphasis has been placed on the determinants of quick shifts in mass political orientations and behaviour rather than on the *status-quo* of political culture. Inglehart (1987) explains attitudinal alterations by the process of modernization and the emergence of a post-modern political culture. He characterizes this political culture in

terms of weakening respect for authorities and declining importance of previous issues of economic, political, and military security. Contrary to the ideas of Almond and Verba, scholars believe that the political orientations of most people are formed mainly by their actual experiences with authorities. Particularities of political culture to a large extent depend on the quality of the performance of political institutions at a particular time (Kavanagh 1980). It is important to note that stated dissatisfaction with the performance of specific government and institutions does not imply the dissatisfaction or neglect of the political system as a whole (Abramowitz 1980). These implications are of particular importance when trying to understand Lithuanian political culture, which has been developing within the context of tremendous economic difficulties.

The reason this study utilizes the ideas of *Civic Culture* is based on the view that the internal constraint and uniformity of political orientations and political objects is a suitable instrument for the elaboration of Lithuanian political culture. The basic principles according to which Almond and Verba develop the typology of political cultures allow one to deal directly with the specification of Lithuanian political culture. The theoretical concern of our study is whether Lithuanian political culture possesses underlying civic values that are supportive for a stable democracy. This issue appears to be particularly relevant to Almond's and Verba's question: what are the conditions for stable democracy when a country's historical experience and political and social structures differ from one another? (Almond & Verba 1963: 10). Finally, to a certain degree we are constrained by Almond's and Verba's interpretation of civic culture

because the survey of *Political Culture in Lithuania 1994* was designed replicating their theoretical and methodological instruments.

The initial argument of *Civic Culture* derives from requirements for citizens to be interested, informed and involved in politics combined with requirements for "a stable democracy": moderate participation, trust, defence of the government, and a strong sense of subjective political efficiency. As demonstrated earlier, in current Western democracies political alienation of citizens is coincident with low levels of political cognition and interest. Therefore, we are fairly cautious in adopting the postulate of highly politically informed, interested and politically committed citizens. However, this study's approach to political participation and interest of ordinary citizens is not as pessimistic as Lipman's view that "to expect ordinary people to become absorbed in the affairs of state would be to demand of them an appetite for political knowledge quite peculiar, if not pathological" (1977: 14). This study, rather, shares Almond and Verba's assessment of the relevance of public attitudes for the establishment of stable democracy. Therefore, it is believed that a reasonable proportion of Lithuanian citizens with the desire and means to influence politics is important for stable democratic development. Furthermore, this study also shares Almond and Verba's assessment of the relevance of historical experience and memories for the particularities of political cultural propensities in a nation's political culture (1963: 10-13).

We use the concept of political culture, elaborated in three interconnected directions: 1) *substantive content* 2) *varieties of orientations* and 3) *the relations*

between these components. In terms of *substantive content* three classes of political objects that connect a political system with the psychological ground of politics are presented (Almond & Verba 1963:13-15) as follows:

1. The *system culture*. It is concerned with a political system as a whole and the distribution of attitudes toward the national community, regime, polity and authorities.
2. The *policy culture*. It involves the distribution of preferences and attitudes regarding the *outputs* and *inputs* of politics. The "input" objects are concerned with the institutions of political influence, including interest groups, political parties, and the media of communication. "Output" objects refer to institutions of enforcement of political decisions and policies.
3. The *process culture*. It refers to general values, political beliefs and attitudes towards the self as a political actor and towards other actors in political roles; knowledge of rights, strategies of political influence, and norms of political involvement.

The second conceptual element, used in this study to elaborate Lithuanian political culture, is *varieties of orientations*. Almond and Verba suggested a three-fold model of political orientations (1963: 14-15).

1. *Cognitive orientations* that include the knowledge of a political system, its roles, its inputs and outputs, and performers of these roles.
2. *Affective orientations* that are concerned with feelings of attachment, aversion, or indifference toward different political objects.

3. *Evaluative orientations* that are described as the distribution of negative, indifferent or positive judgements and opinions about a political system, policies, and oneself as a political actor.

The third dimension in the exploration of political culture is *systematic relations* between *substantive content* and *varieties of orientations*. It characterizes the manner in which political structures and political attitudes go together. Here it is concerned with the patterns of causal covariation between the variables and the attribution of these patterns to the different classes of political cultures. According to which objects (system, process, and policy) and how (absence or presence) political orientations are distributed, Almond and Verba specify three ideal modes of political cultures. We present them in the following table:

Table 1: Types of Political Culture

TYPES OF POLITICAL CULTURE	SYSTEM AS A WHOLE	OUTPUT OBJECTS	INPUT OBJECTS	THE SELF AS A POLITICAL ACTOR
PAROCHIAL POLITICAL CULTURE ⁹	-	-	-	-
SUBJECT POLITICAL CULTURE ¹⁰	+	+	-	-
PARTICIPANT POLITICAL CULTURE ¹¹	+	+	+	+

Note: (+) A presence of political orientations; (-) An absence of political orientations

⁹ *Parochial* political culture represents a simple political system. A radical example would be an African tribe where political specialization is minimal and where the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of political orientations are absent in regard to the undeveloped political system. In the case of a modern society, parochial citizens usually demonstrate a certain degree of cognition toward a political system, but they do not manifest either affective or evaluative orientations.

¹⁰ In *subject* political culture a political system does not possess differentiated input structures. Almond and Verba give an example of the authoritarian political system where various orientations towards the political system and output objects are present together with the absence of orientations towards oneself as a political actor and towards input objects. The example of the Soviet Union is particularly applicable here.

¹¹ *Participant* political culture, according to Almond and Verba, is found in a modern political system such as Britain or the United States, where individuals exhibit all types of political orientations towards all classes of political objects.

It is important to note that this three-fold classification of political cultures is useful only as a heuristic device for analytic reflection. In reality, all three dimensions overlap, interact and coexist among themselves. Therefore, for instance, a political system with predominantly *participant* culture necessarily includes within itself both *subject* and *parochial* citizens.

The final aspect we take from the conceptual framework of *Civic Culture* and utilize when exploring Lithuanian political culture is the nature of political beliefs. The character of public political attitudes, whether they are negative, indifferent, or positive towards the political system, essentially affects the stability of political regime. To explore this, we again refer to the terms of Almond and Verba: *allegiance*, *apathy*, and *alienation*. Thus, “*allegiant*” culture occurs when positive cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations are distributed in regard to different classes of political objects. In contrast, “*alienative*” political culture is detected through the dominance of negative feelings and evaluations of different political objects. This reflects incongruence between political culture and political structure. For the purpose of the discussion, the interest of this study is the conceptualization of that type of political culture that is related to democratic stability. Almond and Verba argue that democracy is best supported when society possesses a political culture that is mainly *allegiant* in character and is defined by the mixture of politically attentive and active (*participants*), attentive but only moderately active (*subjects*) and non-attentive (*parochials*) citizens. This mixture is assumed to ensure that the public will engage in political activity around

certain political issues and will restrain political elites without the danger of destructive mass political actions (Almond & Verba 1963: 23). Besides, an essential indicator of *participant* democratic culture is the presence of political orientations towards all classes of political objects. Our major concern is the detection of political orientations directed towards the political *input* and *the self* as a political actor. This indicates the prevalence of *participant versus subject* political attributes in a nation's political culture.

In conclusion, the study of Lithuanian political culture replicates *Civic Culture's* definitions, dimensions of political orientations and political objects, and the modes of the interrelationship between them: *allegiance*, *apathy*, and *alienation*. The rationale of *parochial*, *subject*, and *participant* political cultures, and the theoretical concern about the relationship between the stable democracy and public political values are further utilized. Historical preconditions and memories of political socialization are also expected to influence the attributes of political orientations. In accordance with recent findings, we link political dynamics with prevailing political experiences and patterns of social interaction. Thereby, the findings on the increasingly alienative character of affective and evaluative orientations of the general public towards both political institutions and themselves as political actors are also considered to be constituting elements of democratic political culture.

In order to complete the construction of the theoretical model and to specify Lithuanian political culture in 1994 now we turn to the discussion on the influence of former political habits on the political orientations of Lithuanians. This issue is viewed

in the perspective of current trends in the political culture in Lithuania.

II. LITHUANIAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN 1994: IMPACT OF SOVIET POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO RECENT PATTERNS OF POLITICAL VALUES AND BEHAVIOUR

As mentioned in the introduction of this study, historically and ethnically motivated enmity toward the Soviet regime was an essential determinant of Lithuanian political behaviour in 1989-1992. More importantly, Lithuania was among the most developed and educated republics in the former USSR. Despite legal prohibition, the use of the Western mass media was fairly common among Lithuanians. According to Dahl (1989) and Inglehart (1990) the processes of industrialization, modernization, and access to the foreign media caused the crystallization of liberal values and institutionalization of democracy among post-soviet citizens. In this study, it is anticipated that the tendency of Lithuanians to alienate themselves from the Soviet regime and the institutionalization of democratic values are key factors that accelerated the development of underlying civic values and participant norms. Nonetheless, it is unrealistic to hope for a social miracle and to expect that 4 years of traumatic democratic reforms have completely erased 40 years of political habits.

According to Almond and Verba, centralised authoritarian political structure is indicated through the lack of political orientations towards input structures and the self as a political subject. Indeed, due to the nature of the Soviet political system, there were no independent political and administrative objects that could exert political

influence. The artificial homogeneity of political life was detrimental to public life. In the communist political system, motivated and rational political activism was not necessary. Rather, it was dangerous. Civic activism and political protest were never absent in the political life in Lithuania; however, they deteriorated due to exposure to the totalitarian system. Enabled to be expressed democratically, the forms of civic activity in Lithuania moved to the spheres of art and sport.¹² Furthermore, active political participation in the Communist party was not regarded favourably by Lithuanians¹³. This political habit might significantly influence the negative evaluations or alienative orientations towards political parties that emerged in independent Lithuania. More importantly, it is also anticipated that its expression led to increased public distrust in political and legal institutions.¹⁴

Furthermore, the ignorance of the system and obvious political apathy were even more risky. This leads to the other distinctive phenomenon of the Soviet system - an overwhelming hypocrisy. Acceptance of the political, ideological and economic order had a dual form - public and personal positions. The gap between the personal position and public behaviour was indeed substantial. Privately, one was absolutely ignorant, disrespectful, and deceitful with various authorities, particularly political ones. Publicly, one was forced to demonstrate support and faith in the communist system. This

¹²The extreme popularity of basketball in the 1980s emerged with the new Lithuanian basketball team that for 5 years competed with the team of Russian Socialist Republic for the gold medals in the USSR league. This event had very strong political connotations considering the increase of official reports on "extremist accidents". Usually it was the raising of prohibited national Lithuanian flags.

¹³The candidates for the parliament, for instance, usually were "representative" of workers and collective farmers who were either absent at the meeting that would nominate candidates or those who could not find an excuse. The principle "the smartest avoid any party duties" was internalized at the earliest steps of political socialization that started at age 8.

¹⁴ Piotr Sztompka (1995: 4) and Shlapenko (1989) suggest that "culture of distrust", that derives from Soviet political socialization, is a pervasive phenomenon in all post-Soviet societies

dualism significantly deformed the sense of civic and personal responsibility. In the totalitarian system it was a form of resistance and protest. However, it became a destructive factor in the newly created democratic state. The overwhelming lack of responsibility for the actions of oneself as a citizen and other citizens became a characteristic of both economic and political activities in the country. From this perspective, the previously addressed phenomenon of protest apathy in respect to corruption and incompetence of politicians is a result of political socialization that created political apathy. This Soviet residue is expected to influence the patterns of internal political efficacy surveyed in 1994.

The final important remnant of the Soviet political system derives from the fact that most inhabitants of the Soviet Lithuanian republic enjoyed fairly high standards of living and economic security. In the context of drastic economic shortages, public expectations that the state ensures the welfare of its citizens is not surprising. Therefore, favourable attitudes regarding a state intervention in different domains of social life are also expected to be found.

As we already pointed out, the anomie situation between new social demands and tedious re-adaptation to free-market laws caused the emergence of both economic and normative crises in Lithuanian society. This crisis had significant impact on the political dimension of public life. Levels of political concern and participation, trust and a sense of political efficacy dropped. It is not a surprising finding, considering that economic survival became the most important issue for the vast majority of citizens.¹⁵

¹⁵ In 1992, Lithuanians began to experience high inflation and unstable economy. Household expenditure on food alone rose from 40 % to 67% of the total household's expenditure (Knudsen 1996).

Moreover, new political and economic institutions were created largely from Soviet institutions. Due to inexperience and ingrained Soviet attitudes and behaviours, they performed their functions inefficiently. Earlier we cited the relationship between the particularities of political culture and the efficiency of input and output structures. Therefore, the alienative nature of Lithuanians' political orientations regarding the output structures is an expected reaction.

In conclusion, the residues of Soviet political habits such as the duality of consciousness, distrust in political institutions, low levels of internal political efficacy, and attitudinal in-congruence with new social demands are expected to be reflected in political orientations and behaviours of Lithuanians in 1994. Economic difficulties and the inefficient performance of political and economic institutions are also predicted to be important factors shaping Lithuanian political culture. Nonetheless, the ideological resistance to the Soviet regime, the highly educated population, the processes of modernization and industrialization, and the long-term exposure to the Western media are expected to result in the crystallization of basic democratic values and participant norms.

Finally, the major hypothesis of this study states that among Lithuanian citizens *alienative* evaluative and affective political orientations in regard to political incumbents and interest groups coexist with the qualities of democratic citizens: participatory norms; democratic forms of political influencing; and *allegiance* towards the democratic regime. More detailed working hypotheses of the study are as follows:

- Lithuanian political culture is a *participant* culture. The exposure of various modes (*allegiance, apathy, alienation*) of cognitive, evaluative, and affective political orientations to all classes of political objects is present.
- There are low levels of political interest and participation, and moderate levels of political cognition towards *input* and *output* aspects of the political system and oneself as a political actor.
- Evaluative and affective orientations towards *output* objects have a predominantly *alienative* character.
- Evaluative and affective orientations towards *input* objects also have a predominantly *alienative* character.
- Affective orientations towards the system as a whole have a mainly *allegiant* character.
- *Alienative* orientations towards political institutions are present at the evaluative level but absent at the level of actual or potential political actions.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter deals with the general overview of data, operationalization of measurement instruments, and statistical procedures used to explore political culture in 1994 in Lithuania. The details related to the use of particular statistical procedures, are found in the appendix.

1. DATA

The examination of political culture in Lithuania is based primarily on analysis of data contained in the national survey *Political Culture 1994*. The survey was initiated by the Institute of International Relationships and Political Science and conducted with the cooperation of the Service of Applied Surveys & Information between December 7-16, 1995. In the discussion of final findings, drawn using statistical analysis, material from personal interviews is also included.¹⁶

The respondents to the survey *Political Culture In Lithuania 1994* were 1002 adult citizens of Lithuania. Participation was voluntary, and full anonymity was guaranteed. Lithuania was divided into 15 regions. One hundred forty professional interviewers selected data from 60 survey centers.

The sample design of the study was quota sampling. Using the criteria of gender, education, age, urbanization, and nationality, the proportions of respondents that replicated the target population of Lithuania in 1994 were selected. The technical

¹⁶ Interviews with the major Lithuanian political figures (a former and present premier, leaders of the largest political parties), and political analysts and scientists involved in the examination of politics in Lithuania were conducted by the author of this study in August, 1996.

details of the selection and tables according to which quota criteria were applied are included in the appendix. Quota sampling in the case of this survey has the advantage of being able to insure the inclusion of the proper proportion of various strata of the population. In addition, it is economical and convenient to execute. However, it is essentially a nonprobabilistic method of sampling. Due to this, quota sampling is subject to the particular limitations characteristic of this method. The use of inferential statistics in the case of this sampling is highly questionable since random selection of respondents is minimized. The measurement and control of variability and estimates are limited. Strictly speaking, this sampling procedure allows testing hypotheses and making generalizations only in terms of the sample itself.

II . MEASUREMENT

The survey includes 51 items to measure political cognition, feelings and evaluations towards various aspects of political structure, modes of political involvement, and more general political beliefs such as perceptions of an individual, community, and a state.

The procedures of operationalization and measurement of Lithuanian political culture mainly replicate the methodological instrument of *Civic Culture*. However, the study also refers to current researchers of political culture, thus expanding the methodological instrument of Almond and Verba. For descriptive purposes, we analyse the variations of cognitive, evaluative and affective dimensions of political orientations

toward the following classes of political objects: a) *system as a whole*, b) *input and output effects*, and c) *the self* as a political actor. In order to characterize Lithuanian political culture, we focus on how political orientations are distributed in regard to different political objects. An absence of political orientations towards different political objects indicates *parochial* political properties. The presence of moderately attentive and active citizens exhibit *subject* political virtues. Besides, a *subject* political culture is indicated by the absence of political orientations towards input objects and oneself as a political actor. The presence of all forms (*allegiant, apathetic, alienative*) of political orientations towards all political objects is supposed to indicate *participant* political attitudes. The forms of *allegiant, apathetic* and *alienative* political orientations are indicated by the distribution of positive, negative or neutral responses.

In terms of concrete empirical indicators, the following items are included in the measurement of political culture in Lithuania in 1994:

1 . Cognitive Dimension

The cognitive aspect of political orientations is concerned with the patterns of political interest and involvement, and the quality of political competence. Patterns of political interest and participation are explored through a three-fold set of indicators: 1) subjective evaluation of political interest: *Are you interested in politics?*¹⁷ 2) intensity of discussions about politics: *How often do you discuss politics with your friends?*¹⁸ and 3) concrete involvement in politics: *How do you actively participate in the present political*

¹⁷ Values: 1. 'very interested' 2 'interested' 3 'almost uninterested' 4 'uninterested at all'.

¹⁸ Values: 1 'frequently', 2 'sometimes' 3 'infrequently' 4 'never'.

*life of Lithuania?*¹⁹. Several items are used to indicate the quality of political competence in regard to different objects of the political system. Firstly, political cognition of input objects is gauged through the test of ability to identify the leaders of major political parties: *Write the name of at least one leader of these political parties*²⁰. Awareness of output objects is tested through the ability to identify main political actors and cabinet officers: *Please note which people perform these duties in government and other state institutions?*²¹. In addition to this two-item political knowledge test proposed by Almond and Verba, we refer to the studies of Curtis (1992) and Bennet (1989) and measure political sophistication in a broader sense. The capacity to place Lithuanian political parties in the ideological scale reflects the “conceptual” dimension of political erudition (Bennet 1994). This dimension of political sophistication is tested by the item: *We have listed several political parties that are active in political life of Lithuania. Which of them, do you think, are left-oriented and which of them are right-oriented political parties?*²². The capacity to place oneself in the same ideological scale is also used as an important indicator in the awareness of oneself as a political actor: *In politics one talks about “right” and “left”. How would you evaluate your attitudes in the scale, where 1 means “radical left” and 10 means “radical right”?*²³.

¹⁹ 1. I participate in the organizational activities of a certain political party, movement, union. 2. I participate in the agitation during elections, referenda. 3. I write on the theme of politics in the press, speak on TV, Radio. 4. I participate in mass meetings and activities (demonstrations, meetings, pickets) 5. I sign collective petitions, declarations 6. I am interested in politics: read newspapers, follow TV when there are political discussions 7. I participate in elections. All items have two categories: 1 'yes', 2 'no'.

²⁰ Values: 1. Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party 2. Unity of Lithuanian Liberals 3. Unity of Center 4. Conservators 5. Socialdemocrats 6. National Party 7. Christian Democrats 8. Unity of Lithuanian Poles.

²¹ Values: 1. Prime Minister 2. Minister of Defence 3. Head of Parliament 4. Attorney 5. Minister of Foreign Affairs 6. Minister of Social Defence 7. Head of Supreme Court.

²² The list of the parties: 1. Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party 2. Conservators 3. Socialdemocrats 4. Christian Democrats 5. Unity of Center 6. National Party 7. Unity of Lithuanian Liberals. All parties are evaluated by the scale where -10 means 'radical left' and +10 means 'radical right'.

²³ Values are scaled according to the Lickert scale from 1 to 10.

2. Affective Dimension

The affective dimension of political orientations deals with the different forms of feelings. In particular, it is concerned with the feelings towards a political system such as political pride, political safety, and feelings of support or aversion in regard to various political institutions and politicians. Also, it considers the sense of external political efficacy, strategies of political influencing, and patterns of political affiliation.

The affective dimension in regard to a system as a whole is measured by the items: *Representatives of different countries are proud of different achievements of their countries. What are you proud of in Lithuania?*²⁴ and *What are your feelings during the voting?*²⁵. The sense of political safety is indicated via a previous item of discussions about politics and inclinations to reveal voting preferences, described when analysing the evaluative dimension. The *output* and *input* affects are indicated through preparedness to influence political structure: *Let's imagine that suddenly you and people from your environment have an important problem (reduced salary, building of a polluting factory, prohibition of a newspaper). How would you react to this situation?*²⁶ and *What in your opinion is it necessary to do first in order to solve the problem?*²⁷. The strategies of political influencing are measured by the item: *What means, do you think, are justified in the solving of problems? 1. Public petitions, appeals 2. Demonstrations,*

²⁴ Values: 1. Government 2. Historical Past 3. Economics 4. Architecture 5. Courts 6. Lithuanian People 7. Parliament 8. Nature 9. Religion and values 10. International Position of Lithuania 11. Contribution of Lithuania to art and Science 12. Other 13. Nothing.

²⁵ Values: 1. I feel that I do an important job 2. I do it with sarcasm 3. It seems meaningless 4. I vote because it is my duty 5. Feelings depend on the situation 6. I do not feel anything 7. Other.

²⁶ Values: 1. I would organize a group in order to solve this problem 2. I would participate in the activities of such a group if I were invited 3. I would financially support the activities of such a group 4. I would sign the petitions and appeals of this group 5. I would do nothing 6. Other 9. Don't know.

²⁷ 1. Appeal to Government 2. Appeal to political parties 3. Appeal to deputies 4. Appeal to court 5. Appeal to press, TV, or radio 6. To organize protest actions 7. Other 8 Don't know.

*pickets 3. Strikes 4. Use of personal influence 5. Bribing important people 6. Blackmailing 7. Damaging private property 8. Violence*²⁸. The patterns of political affiliation are measured by the items: *If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party you would vote for?*²⁹ *For which party did you vote in the Parliamentary elections in 1992?*³⁰

3 . *Evaluative Dimension*

The evaluative dimension of political orientations deals with the assessment of effectiveness of input and output institutions, and with the content and quality of norms of internal political efficacy. This dimension is particularly highly interrelated with the affective dimension of political beliefs. The set of following items: *Do you think that the Government of Lithuania frequently makes correct political decisions?*³¹, also, *Do you think that Lithuania is governed by a powerful minority or that welfare of all citizens is considered? Do you think that your town is governed by a powerful minority or that welfare of all citizens is considered?*³² represents an assessment of trust in and competence of political actors. The evaluative dimension towards the self as a political actor is indicated through the item: *How much, do you think, policy of a country depends on the will of people like you?*³³.

²⁸ This item is scaled by the Thurstone scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is 'always justified' and 10 'never justified'.

²⁹ Values: 1. Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party 2. Unity of Lithuanian Liberals 3. Unity of Center 4. Conservators 5. Socialdemocrats 6. National Party 7. Christian Democrats 8. Democrats. 9. For no one 10. I do not know.

³⁰ Values: 1. Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party 2. Unity of Lithuanian Liberals 3. Unity of Center 4. Conservators 5. Socialdemocrats 6. National Party 7. Christian Democrats 8. Democrats. 9. Unity of Poles 10. Other. 11. I did not vote.

³¹ After the recoding values 1 'almost never' 2 'only sometimes' 3 'frequently' 4 'almost always'.

³² Values: 1 'In favor of all citizens' 2 'According to the interest of a powerful minority' 3 'I do not know'.

³³ The values are scaled from 1 "not at all" to 10 "very much".

4 . General Political Attitudes

The descriptive analysis of the Lithuanian political culture is undertaken according to the distribution of listed variables. In the explanatory analysis of political culture demographic variables (gender, age, education, occupation, nationality, and urbanization district) and general political attitudes are additionally used. Authoritarian and individualistic values are indicated through the items: 1) *Do you think the political authority should solve these problems and questions* ³⁴, 2) *Which of the sentences better represents your opinion? A. I think that freedom of personality is more important than equality. Everyone should have the opportunity to live free and to develop independently; B. If it is necessary to choose between freedom and equality, I think that equality is more important* ³⁵. Also, the perception of national movement is measured through the item: *Renewal was an important event in the life of Lithuania. Which aim do you think can be considered as the most important?*³⁶.

5 . Analysis

Various statistical procedures are applied in accordance with the objectives of the study. In order to define the Lithuanian political culture and to test the working hypotheses of the study, a basic descriptive analysis is performed. To explain the political culture of Lithuanians, scaling procedures, and multiple regression analysis

³⁴ The categories are: 1. To control means of mass media 2. To ensure material welfare of people 3. To control the maintenance of moral standards 4. To regulate the labour relations 5. To save Lithuanian economy from Foreign competition. The categories are scaled by three dimension scale: 1'It should regulate' 2'It should partly regulate', and 3 'It should not regulate'.

³⁵ Values are 1'Agree more with A' 2'Agree more with B' 3'Agree with no one of them' 9'Do not know'.

³⁶ Consolidation of democracy 2. Renewal of independence 3. Creation of a just society 4. Increasing of economic wealth; 5. Safeguarding of Human rights and freedom.

with dummy variables are used . These operations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER FOUR: COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE AND EVALUATIVE PATTERNS OF LITHUANIAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN 1994

This chapter portrays political orientations of the Lithuanian general public in 1994. Descriptive analyses of cognitive, affective, and evaluative political orientations towards all classes of political objects are performed in order to test the working hypotheses of the study, and to identify the type of Lithuanian political culture. The cognitive dimension is explored by the following set of variables: political concern, participation, political information tests, and ideological cognition of oneself. In terms of the affective political orientation we deal with the variables such as political pride, political communication, external and internal political efficacy, and strategies of political influencing. When examining the evaluative political dimension, the patterns of political trust are considered. The extent to which these political orientations are found towards different political objects is assumed to determine the dominance of *parochial*, *subject*, or *participant* political culture. Democratic political culture is assumed to be represented by the mixture of political *subjects*, *participants* and *parochials* who constitute the smallest segment of the general public. In the Lithuanian political culture predominantly, *allegiant* orientations towards the political regime are anticipated to be found.

I . COGNITIVE DIMENSION: OBJECTS, QUALITY, INTENSITY OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND PATTERNS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

An informed citizenry, able to appreciate its own interests and make intelligent political judgments, is essential to democracy. Almond and Verba suggest that "democratic competence is closely related to having valid information about political issues and processes, and to the ability to use information in the analysis of issues and the devising of influence strategies" (1963: 95). Due to the shift from public to individual levels of political motivation and the prevalence of other than political concerns Lithuanians in 1994 are anticipated to exhibit low levels of political interest and participation, and moderate forms of political knowledge. To test the hypothesis, the objects of political cognition, intensity, and quality of cognitive competence are studied.

1 . Cognition of the Political System: Trends of Political Interest and Participation

Cognition of the political system is believed to reveal the extent of participant orientations in the country. It is not a sufficient, yet, necessary component of the democratic culture. This aspect of the cognitive orientation is indicated *via* subjective attentiveness to political matters, the extent of communication about political matters, and patterns of political activism.

- **Attentiveness to politics**

As expected, political matters in 1994 are evidently a secondary concern in Lithuania. More than three quarters of respondents regard the decrease in living standards to be among the most important issues³⁷. Similarly, 76% are concerned about crime, while 37% of respondents see unemployment to be one of the top problems in the country. The question of officials' corruption is noted by 28% of respondents. Meanwhile, a political issue such as discord among politicians is chosen by just 16% of respondents. Nevertheless, exactly half of respondents regard themselves as still being very interested or interested in politics. A considerable percentage of respondents (40%) say they are not particularly interested in politics. However, only 10 % of respondents report total disinterest in politics (see Chart 1).

Chart 1: Political Interest

³⁷ Respondents could note three highly important issues. When presenting the results, the sum of choices is used.

Subjective evaluation of political interest, however, is a fairly superficial indicator of how much the general public is concerned about politics. A better indicator of public political concern is the extent to which people discuss politics daily.

• ***Extent of discussions about politics***

This aspect of political concern is indicated by asking people how frequently they discuss politics with the people closest to them. Results show that a bit more than one quarter of respondents discuss political matters infrequently. The frequency of political *parochials* is similar to the variable of political interest: eight percent of surveyed Lithuanians do not discuss politics. A surprisingly large segment of respondents (63%) report that politics are frequently or very frequently discussed with their family members and friends.

Chart 2: An Extent of Political Communication

- **Forms of political involvement**

The most effective measure of cognitive political orientations towards the political system is the levels of political involvement. It describes in which way and how intensively citizens are actually politically active. Figures in Table 2 display an unexpectedly high degree of all forms of political engagement among the Lithuanian general public in 1994. The most frequent pattern is a formal mode of conventional political involvement - three quarters of respondents participate or participated in elections. The next pattern is the passive form of political engagement - 68% report following politics on TV and radio. The relatively high percentages of active *participants*, those who sign petitions (28%) and participate in mass meetings (15%), are again unexpected given the presumption of diminished political attentiveness. The most intensive forms of public political participation, writing in the press on matters of politics and participating in organizational activities of a certain party or movement, are the least frequent.

Table 2: Forms of Political Participation in 1994

How actively do you participate in the present political life of Lithuania?	Yes	No
A4.1 I participate in the organizational services of a certain movement, party, union	4%	96%
A4.2 I participate in campaigns, public relations, propaganda	12%	88%
A4.3 I write on the above subjects in the press, speak on TV, radio	1%	99%
A4.4 I participate in mass meetings and activities	15%	85%
A4.5 I sign collective petitions, resolutions	28%	72%
A4.6 I am interested in politics, read press, follow TV when there are political discussions	68%	32%
A4.7 I participate in elections	75%	25%

As a matter of fact, the patterns of political interest and participation of Lithuanians in 1994 appear to resemble the patterns of political involvement seen in Britain and the United States in the early 1960s³⁸. It is important to note, however, the discrepancy between the lower scores of self-reported political interest and yet high rates of actual political involvement. This implies that although the majority of Lithuanian citizens are actively exposed to politics they are also likely to express personal alienation from this domain of social life.

To summarize empirical results, in terms of political concern Lithuanians display predominantly *participant* cognitive orientations. The hypothesized low levels of political involvement in 1994 are not supported. In terms of political participation, Lithuanians demonstrate predominantly *subject* political orientations. The modes of political interest, however, are not the most substantial determinant of the cognitive map of a nation's political culture. Measuring political sophistication gives a better description of the cognitive political orientation.

2. Cognition of Input and Output Affects of the Political System: Political Information Tests

The quality of cognitive exposure towards administrative and political objects is a good indicator of how *subject* and *participant* political orientations are distributed. A tendency to be informed only about political incumbents is assumed to demonstrate the

³⁸ See *Civic Culture* p.35-40.

dominance of *subject* political cognition. Knowledge about both political officials and leaders of political interest groups is supposed to manifest *participant* political orientations. Therefore, respondents were asked to name the major officials of governmental institutions and the main leaders of various political parties. In addition to this political information test the conceptual dimension of political sophistication was measured by asking respondents to place political parties on an ideological continuum.

• *Political information tests*

Contrary to the hypothesized moderate forms of political awareness, empirical results reveal high levels of political sophistication in the Lithuanian public. Table 3 suggests that the exposure of Lithuanians to output objects, or their ability to identify government officials, is impressive. Only 8%³⁹ of respondents are unable to name at least one government official; meanwhile, 60 % demonstrate a very high level of political knowledge (Table 3).

Table 3: Political Information Test of Input and Output Objects

	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	LEADERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
NAMED NO ONE	8%	20%
NAMED 1 TO 3	32%	50%
NAMED 4 AND MORE	60%	30%

However, the cognitive affect towards input structures is not so impressive: 20% of respondents are incapable of naming any leader of a political party. Only 30% of

³⁹ Compare to 28% of Americans or 23% of British reported in *Civic Culture*.

them correctly name more than 4 political party leaders. Nevertheless, the latter percentage is still much higher than, for instance, the rates found among the US citizenry⁴⁰. Moreover, the additional measure, the test of conceptual political knowledge, does not support the idea of fragile cognition towards political interest groups. Despite a short history of a multi-party political system, the plurality of Lithuanian respondents were able correctly to scale political parties according to their political affiliation⁴¹.

Table 4: A Test of Conceptual Political Knowledge

LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES	LEVELS OF CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE		
	CORRECT	WRONG	MISSING
LDLP	68%	14%	18%
SOCIAL DEMOCRATS	52%	32%	27%
CONSERVATIVES	62%	13%	23%
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS	67%	6%	27%
UNITY OF LIBERALS	51%	17%	32%
CENTRISTS	56%	16%	29%
NATIONAL UNITY	51%	19%	30%

Obviously, the scaling patterns reflect the size and political influence of political parties. For instance, the majority of respondents correctly define the governing Democratic Labor Party, and the second largest political fraction in parliament - a coalition of Conservatives and Christian-Democrats. The parties that are smaller and less politically influential such as Unity of Liberals or National Unity are more likely to be omitted or misinterpreted.

⁴⁰ Bennet (1995) suggests that about 40% of American respondents in 1980s were not able to identify the leaders of major political parties.

⁴¹ According to the same study of Bennet, in 1994 42% of American respondents could not place a governing party on the ideology scale.

Although Lithuanians tend to be better informed about political *output*, in general unexpectedly high levels of political knowledge about both *input* and *output* objects are found. The hypothesized moderate levels of political sophistication among the Lithuanian general public in 1994, therefore, are not supported by data.

- ***Ideological cognition of the self***

The last indicator for exploring the character of political culture in terms of political cognition is the ideological awareness of the general public. The majority of Lithuanian respondents can easily define their political affiliation: 77 % of them place themselves in the ideological scale. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the self-ascribed ideological position of Lithuanians is congruent with their voting preferences. At this point, however, our primary concern is an ideological map of the Lithuanian public that portrays the distribution of political preferences in 1994. According to Chart 3, the plurality of Lithuanian people locate themselves in the middle of the ideological continuum. In addition, there is a tendency towards right-wing political affiliation.

Chart 3: A Map of Political Affiliation in 1994

The particularities of Lithuanian ideological preferences and the relationship with other political orientations will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. It is important to note the inclination of the general public to place itself in the very middle of the ideological scale. This to a certain degree might indicate a tendency to alienate from political input objects.

To conclude, capability to place oneself in the ideological continuum is congruent with the previous findings on high levels of political cognition among the Lithuanian public. Empirical findings, therefore, do not support the initial hypothesis that Lithuanians in 1994 have moderate levels of political cognition towards input and output aspects of the political system.

II . AFFECTIVE AND EVALUATIVE DIMENSIONS: FEELINGS AND JUDGEMENTS ABOUT POLITICAL OBJECTS AND PROCESSES

Mass political beliefs and judgements, whether they are *allegiant*, *apathetic* or *alienative* towards the political system, are thought to have a fundamental influence on the stability and legitimacy of a political regime. The sense of internal and external political efficacy, acknowledged strategies of political influencing, patterns of political communication, and political trust are assumed to shape the patterns of political behaviour and explicate a nation's political culture (Curtis & Stronach 1992). This section, therefore, deals with generalized attitudes, feelings and judgments of Lithuanians towards the political system as a whole, its administrative agencies, political interest groups, and themselves as political actors.

The working hypothesis states that due to both the ineffective performance of political institutions and the impact of Soviet political socialization, Lithuanians tend to alienate themselves from *input* and *output* elements of the political system. Nevertheless, due to the underlying virtues of democratic partisanship, *alienative* political orientations towards governmental agencies and interest groups are anticipated to coexist with *allegiant* orientations towards the democratic political regime. It is also anticipated that Lithuanians demonstrate *alienative* political orientations at the evaluative level but not at the level of potential protest actions.

1 .System Affect: Patterns of National Pride; the Sense of Political Safety; Feelings during Voting and Voting Behaviour; Civic Competence; and Patterns of Political Influence.

- **National pride**

As noted earlier, patriotic feelings of the Lithuanian general public were the crucial generator of profound participatory norms in the early 1990s. However, in 1994 Lithuanians do not tend to extend their national pride to the domain of politics. They rather take pride in abstractions such as an honorable historical past (59%), the beauty of the Lithuanian countryside (chosen as the second object of pride by 60% of respondents), architecture (28%), and the Lithuanian people (23%). Political and institutional forms of a state such as government, parliament, and courts are chosen as the objects of pride only by 7% of respondents; another 7% feel proud of the international position of the country. The evidence of mass political alienation from the political system is apparent. When the general public demonstrates negative responses to newly emerged democratic institutions, the likelihood of democratic stability is highly questionable. Certainly, political and economic anomie in Lithuania and the disillusionment with the competence and effectiveness of political incumbents are important determinants of very low system affect in terms of political pride. Furthermore, the ingrained Soviet habits of alienation from institutional forms of politics also have a significant effect on the patterns of political pride. For the concern of this study, it is important to determine whether Lithuanians possess *alienative* or *allegiant*

political orientations towards the political regime. The exploration of other dimensions that illustrate the political system affect, therefore, is necessary.

• ***The sense of political safety***

The next indicator of how citizens feel about the political regime is the sense of safety in face-to face political interaction, and the willingness to reveal political preferences. In the survey of *Political Culture in Lithuania 1994*, these aspects are gauged via two items: exposure to political communication, and inclination to report former and future electoral choices.

Concerning political communication, Table 5 suggests that Lithuanian respondents demonstrate a convincing sense of safety: only 8% of respondents do not discuss politics with friends or family members, while 63% feel comfortable and do it very frequently or frequently. Less than one third of respondents (29%) report political matters to be an infrequent topic of discussion. A general tendency to reveal former and future voting preferences further indicates a high degree of political security in 1994 Lithuania. Descriptive statistics show a very small percentage of those who do not report their former electoral choice. Even fewer (2%) people do not reveal their future voting choice⁴².

Table 5: Preparedness to Report Political Choices

	For which party did you vote in the elections to the Parliament in 1992?	If parliamentary elections were tomorrow, what party would you vote for?
Used a particular party	76%	55%
Did not vote	19%	-
Will vote for no one	-	22%

⁴² The possibility of a sampling error must be also considered.

One might argue that the category “*Do not know*” containing 22% of respondents to a certain extent includes politically cautious citizens. However, given the intensity of political discussions and willingness to disclose former voting decisions, this group of respondents is more likely to have a vague notion of future political choice than a sense of political jeopardy. This suggests that Lithuanians demonstrate an affective *allegiance* towards the political system that is inconsistent with the previous findings on modes of political pride. This inconsistency is important in understanding the Lithuanian political culture. It indicates the anticipated coexistence of *allegiant* affections towards the political regime and *alienative* orientations towards its *output* and *input* aspects. Feelings and judgments of citizens when voting are additional indicators of the political system affect.

- ***Feelings during voting and patterns of voting behaviour***

Participation in elections is an essential act of democracy. According to the empirical evidence, the majority of Lithuanian respondents demonstrate emotional attachment to this political act. Fifty- seven percent of the surveyed individuals exhibit *participant* virtues and feel that by voting they do a very important job or perform the duty of a citizen (see Chart 4). Twenty eight percent are not explicit about their feelings toward elections, constituting the segment of political *subjects*. Alienative or “antagonistic” participants who consider the voting action to be meaningless or feel

ironic about voting constitute 15%.

Chart 4: Feelings During Voting

Patterns of voting behavior are also considered to be a substantial measurement of system affect. The magnitude of those who participate in elections shows that Lithuanian citizens acknowledge the importance of this political action - 76% of respondents did participate in national elections in 1992. However, recently only 56% can explicitly report their political choice in future elections, while 22% don't know which party they will vote for. This finding indicates an increase in political *parochialism* among the Lithuanian public in 1994. Nevertheless, a vital majority of surveyed Lithuanians do intend to participate in 1996 elections. It is important to note that a fairly large proportion of them are not inclined to give their vote for any political party: 22% of participants express apparent alienation from the objects of political input (see Chart 5).

Chart 5: Patterns of Voting Behaviour

To conclude, a strong sense of political safety and high levels of emotional involvement in voting action challenge the reliability of the earlier finding on alienative orientations towards the political system. To the contrary, the hypothesized allegiance towards the political system is supported. This judgment is also supported by the indication of high voting turnouts. Furthermore, the detection of alienative tendencies towards political parties provides further evidence that positive orientations to the political regime are likely to coexist with negative orientations towards its input objects. The final set of items such as the sense of civic competence external efficacy, and strategies of political influencing further explore the political system effect.

- ***The sense of civic competence***

The ideal model of democratic society corresponds to a society in which citizens to a certain degree participate in political decisions, believe they ought and think they can participate, and know what strategies of political influencing are available (Almond and Verba 1989). In defining a nation's political culture, therefore, it is crucial to know the ordinary citizens' conception of what role in politics they ought and can play. For this reason, surveyed individuals were asked how they would act in a hypothetical politically stressed situation. Empirical results demonstrate that the majority of Lithuanians are likely to feel competent to do something in the case of unjust government decisions. The segment of "political gladiators" who would organize a protest group is not large (9%). However, a considerable percentage of respondents demonstrate orientations of active *participants*: 29% of them would participate in the activities of a protest group if invited. There are a significant number of still politically attentive though less politically active *subjects*: nearly half of the surveyed Lithuanians would support the activities of the protest group by signing its petitions and appeals. Few Lithuanians would donate money to the activities of such a group. The fact that merely 3% of respondents would fund the activities of the protest group reflects an absence of the economic well-being that would generate politically motivated financial commitment. Presumably, with better economic conditions donations to a political protest group would be more frequent. Alternatively, the data might also be interpreted as a symptom of the altered sense of political commitment. In contrast to the political

commitment shown in the 1990s, Lithuanians in 1994 are no longer willing to suffer financially for political reasons.⁴³ Finally, the proportion of political *parochials* who would not become involved or are not sure about their actions constitutes one tenth of the respondents sampled (see Chart 6).

Chart 6: Perception of Political Actions in a Case of Politically Stressed Situation

To conclude, in terms of external political efficacy, the Lithuanian public in 1994 demonstrates obvious participatory norms. Moreover, the vast majority of respondents also show the sense of political cooperation for effective political action that is considered to be an important attribute of democratic citizenry. Therefore, open political communication, emotional attachment during voting, voting turnouts, and modes of civic efficacy support the hypothesized public *allegiance* towards the political regime in Lithuania.

In addition to the perceived ability to influence an unjust political situation,

⁴³ It is different from the facts of political commitments in 1990-91 presented in the chapter 1.

another crucial aspect of civic efficacy, are the strategies citizens think are most efficient in solving a political problem. It is indicated by the public perception of the different channels through which political influence can be exerted. This issue also closely relates to the notion of the role input and output objects play in intervening between citizens and politics. Given the anticipated alienation from administrative political structures, Lithuanians show an unexpectedly high predisposition to consider the appeal to *input* and *output* structures. Twenty-eight percent of surveyed individuals think that it is the best to appeal to the government, while 10% of them believe that the appeal should be to parliamentary deputies. This finding generates a two-fold question that we intend to answer in the following chapter. Do these tendencies underlie support of present political *outputs*, or are they the outcome of the previous political habits that support state intervention in solving social problems? Meanwhile, a significantly smaller fraction (15%) of Lithuanians think that political protest is the most efficient way to exert political influence, and 7% do not know what it is the best to do in this situation. Unexpectedly, the highest political exposure is detected in regard to one of the *input* objects. This is suggested by the fact that 29% of respondents consider the appeal to the press and TV to be the most efficient way to influence politics. In contrast, the other dimension of political *input* is ranked the lowest: help of political parties is sought by only 3% of respondents. The minimal consideration of parties as the agents of political problem resolution is not unique to Lithuanian political orientations. As pointed out by Almond and Verba, relatively few citizens of Western democracies count on the help of

political parties. Similar findings are also demonstrated in later studies (Curtis & Stronach 1992). More importantly, a very strong consideration of the mass media appears as a unique trait of Lithuanian political attitudes.⁴⁴ Firstly, this fact is explainable by the role played by the mass media from the early 1990s. This institution performed the crucial role in mobilizing the population and informing about revolutionary events. In 1994 it effectively criticized and discredited illegal activities of political and economic elites. On the other hand, as a social institution, the media does not carry the responsibility for the generation or legitimization of political and economic laws. Therefore, it can be much more positively ranked compared to governmental institutions to which the responsibility for the difficulties in a state is attributed. For this study, it is important that the presence of affective political orientations not only to *output* but also *input* is found. It indicates the predominance of *participant* political attributes as opposed to the predominance of *subject* ones.

Aspirations to act in the face of an unjust political situation do not necessarily mean that citizens would do so. Nevertheless, it is more likely that citizens who are inclined to act would actually make an effort to exert political influence. The manner of exerting political influence, therefore, is an additional description of a nation's political culture.

- ***Patterns of political influencing***

⁴⁴ This evidence is congruent with other empirical findings. According to *Political Barometer 1994*, mass media had the highest score in the hierarchy of the most trustworthy political and social institutions (Lietuvos Rytas 1994).

When analyzing the modes of political influence we focus on the extent to which individuals approve conventional *versus* nonconventional forms of political involvement. According to Table 6, the majority of Lithuanians prefer legal forms of political involvement: 84% of them approve public appeals and petitions. Seventy-three percent of respondents approve stronger forms of political protest such as demonstrations. The more drastic the political actions, the less support they are likely to get from the general public in 1994. Fewer of the surveyed Lithuanians are willing to be involved in extralegal political actions. This is suggested by the fact that 61% of them justify strikes as a strategy to influence politics, while only 8% of them justify blackmailing and threatening. Only a few respondents (5%-6%) approve violent methods to exercise political influence.

Table 6: Means of Political Influencing

What means do you think are justified in the solving of this problem?					
	strongly justified	justified	somewhat justified	unjustified	strongly unjustified
Public Appeals	45%	18%	21%	9%	9%
Demonstrations, pickets	32%	21%	20%	13%	15%
Strikes	22%	14%	21%	16%	23%
Mobbing	13%	11%	17%	13%	47%
Bullying	5%	6%	6%	6%	75%
Blackmail, threatening	2%	2%	4%	4%	88%
Damage of property	2%	2%	2%	3%	92%
Terrorist actions	1%	1%	2%	2%	94%

According to Almond and Verba the tendency to approve protest participation is essentially determined by *alienative* evaluations towards the political system and its institutions. In 1994 Lithuania the plurality of citizens are not likely to use non-

conventional strategies when pursuing their political demands. Considering earlier findings on the supportive character of the political regime, predominantly positive evaluative orientations towards the political system can be concluded. The tendency towards non-violent forms of political influence also supports the assumed existence of underlying democratic values. In this study it is believed that these values generate public support for particularly democratic strategies of political participation. Unquestionably, low interest in political protest is caused by a variety of factors: the support for the political regime is only one of them. This issue will be discussed further in the following chapters. Yet, it is commonly believed that the likelihood of protest approval is significantly related to the distribution of *alienative* political orientations to both *input* and *output* institutions (Kavanagh 1980; Abramovitz 1980). Nonetheless, the analysis of *output* affect demonstrates that it is not the case for Lithuanian political culture in 1994.

2. Output Affect: Subjective Political Competence, Trust in Honesty and Competence of Political Actors

The relationship between the citizenry and the political system is further indicated by the nature of internal political efficacy, and political trust.

• A sense of subjective political competence

Although the majority of Lithuanians are confident in their ability to influence a politically unjust situation, they demonstrate very low levels of internal political efficacy.

A striking minority of them believe that "people like myself" have an important influence on the way politics of the country are run. The mean of the responses, that vary in the continuum from 1 "Not at all" to 10 "Very much", is only 3.54. According to Chart 7, 67% of responses are distributed among the three lowest categories of the scale, meanwhile only 11% of respondents see themselves as influential in the policy making of the country.

Chart 7: Internal Political Efficacy

A similarly low evaluation of internal efficacy is a common phenomenon in recent Western democracies (Kavanagh 1989: 151)⁴⁵. Nevertheless, in the case of this study, the inconsistency between potential political influencing and self-perceived political efficacy is interpreted as a crucial indicator of how Lithuanians evaluate the

⁴⁵ It is argued that the item of self-scored political efficacy measures a person's self-confidence rather than ones attitudes to the political system.

responsiveness of output institutions. Obviously *alienative* political evaluations of political *outputs* are indicated. Moreover, we also believe that low levels of subjective political efficacy are an outcome of Soviet political habits that increased *personal* alienation from any institutionalized form of politics.

- ***Trust in the honesty and competence of politicians***

Distrust in the competence of the government is another element that indicates strong *alienation* from administrative aspects of Lithuanian politics. When asked about the competence of their government, only 16% of Lithuanian respondents believe that the Lithuanian government “almost always” or “frequently” arrives at correct political decisions.⁴⁶ Most Lithuanians are likely to believe in the poor performance of their government, while respondents who are completely cynical about the conduct of government are the minority.

Chart 8: Trust in the Competence of the Government

⁴⁶ This ratio, for instance, is half the one in Great Britain and one third the one in Germany (Kavanagh 1980; Conradt 1980).

These results support the initial hypothesis about predominantly low levels of public political trust in the government of the country. Moreover, negative evaluations of the country's leadership are also drawn from the notion of how much public interest is considered. A majority of Lithuanian respondents believe that the state is governed by interests of the political elite, while only a small minority believes in the honesty of politicians. As suggested in Chart 9, when asked about the trustworthiness of local officials, Lithuanians tend to be more unsure by whose interest their town is governed. Nevertheless, they are slightly more optimistic about the honesty of municipal as opposed to state officials.

Chart 9: Beliefs in the Honesty of Politicians.

To conclude, the pessimistic estimation of internal political efficacy, the high

levels of distrust in political actors, and the obvious cynical view to the honesty of politicians provide the evidence supporting the hypothesis that evaluations of and affections toward political incumbents are predominantly *alienative*. This also supports the hypothesis on the parallelism of *allegiance* towards the political regime and *alienation* to its output elements.

III . SUMMARY

According to descriptive statistics, the Lithuanian political culture in 1994 approximates the model of a participant democracy. Lithuanian citizens exhibit *cognitive*, *affective* and *evaluative* political orientations towards all classes of political objects. In accordance with theoretical requirements for the civic culture we found a mixture of *participant*, *subject*, and *parochial* political attitudes in 1994 Lithuania. The percentage of political *parochials* is insignificant. In terms of the *cognitive* political dimension, a predominance of political *participants* is found. Regarding *affective* and *evaluative* dimensions, predominantly *subject* and *participant* political attributes are detected. Political *allegiance* is confirmed when dealing with affections to and evaluations of the political regime and the mass media. Predominantly *alienative* political culture is found in terms of evaluative and affective political orientations towards the administrative agencies and political parties.

More explicitly, in keeping with the *Civic Culture* requirements for a stable democracy, there is no intensive mass political engagement. Lithuanian people are more likely to be formally involved in politics by following politics and participating in

elections. Nonetheless, there are many *participants* who are involved in signing petitions and attending mass meetings. The majority of Lithuanian respondents exhibit an impressive quality of political sophistication in regard to both political officials and leaders of political parties. They also easily place themselves on the ideological continuum. Therefore, we do not find evidence to support the anticipated low levels of political involvement and moderate levels of political cognition among the Lithuanian general public in 1994.

Lithuanians also demonstrate a strong sense of external political efficacy and are optimistic about their ability to change an unjust governmental decision. Theoretically it indicates an activist view of the self in relation to the governing process, and positive affect towards the political regime. The majority of surveyed individuals also demonstrate a very strong feeling of political security. Similarly, a vital plurality of Lithuanians are likely to acknowledge the importance of democratic elections and express considerable emotional attachment towards voting. Based on these findings, the hypothesized *allegiant* nature of affective and evaluative orientations towards the political regime is supported. Moreover, in 1994, Lithuanian respondents demonstrate predominantly conventional forms of political influencing and a low tendency toward protest activities. This is the final descriptive evidence we use when arguing that there is public political *allegiance* towards the political regime in Lithuania.

This is not the case with Lithuanians' feelings and evaluations in regard to *input* and especially *output* objects of the political system. Despite intensive exposure to

politics and high levels of internal political efficacy, Lithuanians tend to demonstrate *alienation* from politics. Very few of them spontaneously refer to political and governmental institutions as objects of national pride. Besides that, rates of self-identified political interest are lower than actual political involvement and a considerable segment of citizens are not willing to vote for any political party. A low sense of internal political efficacy relates to the low expectation of serious consideration from government agencies. The economic and political reality in Lithuania evidently gives rise to a tendency to mistrust the authorities. Lithuanians are very sceptical about the activities of governing structures and have very little faith in the honesty of governing people. Therefore, the hypothesis about the *alienative* character of affective and evaluative orientations to political *outputs* is supported.

The anticipated negative orientations towards the objects of political *input* are only partially supported. Although Lithuanians in 1994 tend to be alienated from political parties, they attribute an important intervening role to the institution of mass media. Furthermore, in spite of the negative evaluation of *output* objects, Lithuanians seriously consider them in political problem solving. Contradictions like this can not be explained by descriptive statistics alone. The next chapter, therefore, is designed to explore underlying dimensions of political attitudes, to uncover patterns of covariation among cognitive, evaluative and affective aspects, and to detect the factors that significantly differentiate political orientations.

CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL CULTURE IN LITHUANIA IN 1994

In the previous chapter we presented the distribution of *participant*, *subject* and *parochial* political orientations of the Lithuanian general public by focusing on *allegiant versus alienative* character of political attitudes towards the democratic regime. In this chapter we further explore the extent to which the Lithuanian political culture is supportive for the democratic political system by focusing on the factors associated with cognitive, affective and evaluative political orientations of Lithuanians in 1994. First, we combine multiple indicators in scales and examine their reliability. The scaling procedure thus models a set of continuous dependent variables that represent distinctive political orientations. Second, multiple regression analysis with dummy variables is conducted to explain the variance of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations. The results are interpreted both from the theoretical perspective of *Civic Culture* and contemporary studies of political attitudes of post-Soviet citizens.

1. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RATIONALE OF THE EXPLANATORY RESEARCH

1. Theoretical Rationale

As revealed by the descriptive analyses, the Lithuanian public in 1994 demonstrates a democratically *participant* political culture. It is both principally *allegiant* towards the democratic political regime and at the same time predominantly *alienative*

in respect to its *output* and *input* aspects. To understand Lithuanian political culture, it is important to examine what factors determine the distinctive characteristics of political attitudes and behaviours and how various political dimensions covary among themselves. Moreover, to predict the likelihood of democratic stability in this post - Soviet state, it is essential to research what set of political attitudes is likely to be found among the citizens who perceive themselves as capable of influencing and participating in politics. Are these citizens actually involved in politics? Are they likely to be loyal towards the newly emerged democratic system? To address these issues the theoretical rationale of *Civic Culture* is further followed. More recent empirical findings on the patterns of cognitive, affective, and evaluative political orientations are also incorporated when interpreting empirical findings.

To begin with, the nature of the coexistence of various political orientations and the overlap between their predictors must be discussed. As noted by the majority of scholars, cognitive, affective and evaluative classes of political orientations mutually reinforce themselves, and cannot be understood in isolation (Junn 1991; Leighley 1991; Bennet 1994). Almond and Verba argue that democratic *participants* who possess higher levels of political cognition are assumed to exhibit a more intensive sense of capacity to influence politics, to score higher on the scale of subjective efficacy, to be more emotionally attached to the democratic regime, and to be more socially and politically trustworthy (1963:139). Due to this theoretically assumed overlap the remaining dimensions are treated as independent variables of the

explanatory model, when explaining the variance of a separate political orientation.

In addition, the majority of authors suggest that non-political attributes such as interpersonal trust and patterns of political socialization are important supplementary factors in explaining the patterns of internal and external political efficacy and political trust, as well as willingness to be involved in cooperative actions to influence politics (Almond & Verba 1963; Inglehart 1987; Reisinger & Miller 1994). Unfortunately, the survey *Political Culture in Lithuania 1994* does not allow the examination of the effect of political socialization. Therefore, we are limited to the use of the variable of interpersonal trust, as a presumably important non-political attribute that influences patterns of political orientations.

Finally, in the sufficient description of a nation's political culture the effect of demographic variables such as education, gender, religion, age, place of residence, nationality, and occupation must be considered (Almond & Verba 1963; Neuman 1986; Luskin 1990; Bennet 1994). Almond and Verba found that two demographic variables - education and gender, cross-nationally demonstrated the strongest correlation with all classes of political attitudes (1963). Recent studies on political attitudes and behaviours of Western and post-Soviet citizens also stress the importance of socio-economic status and ethnicity in the variation of political orientations (Gibson 1992; Reisinger, Miller, Hesli & Maher 1994; Hahn 1995). Our primary concern, nevertheless, is the general modes in which particular factors differentiate cognitive, affective and evaluative political orientations of Lithuanians in 1994.

2 . Empirical Rationale

Students of *Civic Culture* examined the relation between distinctive predictors and every separate component of cognitive, affective, or evaluative dimension of political orientations using descriptive statistics. In this study, more advanced statistical techniques such as a scaling procedure and multiple regression analysis are employed, and the effects of various factors on a multiple political dimension are analyzed.

• *Scaling procedure*

Scaling of the items that were designed to measure three-dimensional political orientations allows one to construct three clusters of continuous variables that represent cognitive, affective, and evaluative dimensions. Every cluster is further used as a dependent variable in multiple regression analysis. The reliability of the scales is also tested.⁴⁷

As the magnitude of the reliability coefficient ($\alpha=.7192$) demonstrates, the resultant scale of political cognition is acceptable.⁴⁸ The items of political motivation (political interest and discussions about politics), political sophistication (test of input and output, and conceptual knowledge), and political activism are added in order to represent the continuum of political cognition. A decrease of values in the scale refers to the increase of *parochial* cognitive orientations, while an increase is associated with the strengthening of *participant* cognitive norms. Likewise, a very high Alpha coefficient

⁴⁷ See appendix p.111-115.

⁴⁸ It is agreed that the value of Alpha Coefficient, equal or higher than .800, represents a very high reliability (Carmines & Zeller 1985:11).

(0.8327) suggests that the scaling of measures of the evaluative dimension is highly reliable.⁴⁹ This scale is made by summing the categories of political trust and confidence in the honesty of national and local public officials. Higher values on the scale indicate more *allegiant* political evaluations, while lower values are associated with the increase of *alienative* evaluative orientations.

The efforts to scale the affective dimension of political orientations are less satisfactory. Since various items measure the conceptually different affects towards distinctive classes of political objects, the inclusion of all items in one scale is not meaningful. For this reason, a two-fold scale of the affective political orientation is produced. The first aspect reflects ideological preferences or political affiliation of Lithuanians. As the Alpha coefficient (.8327) shows, scaling the items of self-reported political affiliation and former and future electoral choices is solidly reliable. Higher values in the continuum *AFFECTIVE I* are associated with stronger pro-right ideological affiliation.

However, other essential measures of the affective political orientation such as political pride, the sense of political safety, and patterns of exerting political influence are categorical variables and could not be included in the scaling procedure. When creating the scale of political efficacy, ordinal variables such as a measure of emotional attachment during voting, a sense of civic efficacy, preferred actions in political problem solving, and internal political efficacy are included in the scaling procedure. The

⁴⁹ Certainly high Alpha coefficients in the case of cognitive and evaluative dimensions are caused by the fact that almost all items, included in the original measurement, were acceptable for the scaling procedure. All of them were either Lickert type interval variables or easily transformable into interval variables.

smaller the value of the scaled variable *AFFECTIVE II*, the more fragile or more *parochial* the sense of civic and political efficacy, emotional attachment towards voting and inclinations to influence politics in a politically stressed situation are likely to be found. However, the fact that these particular variables are not suitable for the adequate scaling procedure is reflected by a low reliability coefficient (0.333). The magnitude of the Alpha coefficient forces us to consider the reliability of the results drawn employing this dimension in the further analysis.

In sum, the following continuous variables: *COGNITIVE*, *AFFECTIVE I: Ideological Preferences*, *AFFECTIVE II: Political Efficacy*, and *EVALUATIVE* were created employing the scaling procedure. These variables are identified with cognitive, affective, and evaluative dimensions of political orientations and are utilized as dependent variables in the following stage of the explanatory analysis of political orientations in 1994 Lithuania.

II . DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS OF COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND EVALUATIVE DIMENSIONS

1 . Regression Analyses and Results

To explain the variance of distinctive political orientations, multiple regression analysis of distinctive political orientations as dependent variables with all suggested predictors as independent variables is conducted. All models pass diagnostic tests.⁵⁰

In four regression models, gender, nationality, and occupation are treated as dichotomous (gender⁵¹, nationality⁵²) and polythomous (occupation)⁵³ variables.

⁵⁰ See the appendix p. 117-130.

⁵¹ A category 1 'male', a reference category 0 'female'.

COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE I: Ideological Preferences, AFFECTIVE II: Political Efficacy, EVALUATIVE, religiosity⁵⁴ and age are set as continuous variables. Meanwhile, education, city size, and interpersonal trust are treated as interval variables.

Table 7 shows the results of multiple regression analysis.

Table 7: Regression Analysis

PREDICTORS	DEPENDENT VARIABLES							
	Cognition		Ideological affiliation		Political Efficacy		Evaluation	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Cognition	-	-	.10**	.17**	.12**	.25**	.00**	.00**
Ideological affiliation	.34**	.20**	-	-	.12*	.15*	-.26*	-.36*
Political Efficacy	.53**	.23**	.16**	.15**	-	-	.06	.06
Evaluation	.01	.00	-.36*	-.27*	.06	.06	-	-
Interpersonal Trust	.18	.04	-.05	-.02	.04	.02	.26*	.12*
Religiosity	-.12	-.05	.44**	.32**	.03	.04	.03	.03
Age	.04**	.21**	.01	.07	-.00	-.02	.00	.04
Education	.59**	.22**	.01	.01	-.06	-.06	.01	.01
D Gender	.40	-	.61*	-	.04	-	.19	-
D Nationality	1.06**	-	1.14**	-	.65*	-	-.01	-
D Occupation: State	.98	-	-.29	-	.28	-	-.05	-
D Occupation: Rural	.55	-	1.09	-	.03	-	-.25	-
D Occupation: Welfare	.45	-	.05	-	.10	-	.17	-
Urbanization	.03	.01	.36*	.20*	.09	.08	-.08	-.06
Adjusted R ²	.23*		.37*		.16*		.11*	

Note: * Regression coefficient is significant at .05 ; ** Regression coefficient is significant at .01.

b - unstandardized regression coefficient; Beta - standardized regression coefficient

D - Dummy variable

⁵² A dummy variable *Nationality* has 2 categories: 1 'Dummy Lithuanian' and a reference category 0 'Other nationalities'.

⁵³ After recoding, the polythomous variable *Occupation* has 3 categories: Dummy Occupation 1: State Employees; Dummy Occupation 2: 'Rural workers; Dummy Occupation 3: People on Welfare; and the reference category 'Private Enterprise Employees'.

⁵⁴ A continuous variable *Religiosity* is constructed summing two interval variables. The first indicates the frequency of Church attendance. The second indicates subjective evaluation of the strength of religiosity.

- **Cognitive dimension**

The cognitive dimension of political orientations is regressed on affective and evaluative dimensions of political orientations, interpersonal trust, and socio-demographic factors. The value of the adjusted R^2 shows that this regression model accounts for 23% of variance of the cognitive index.⁵⁵

Among continuous variables, the sense of political efficacy appears to have the strongest positive effect on the variance of political cognition.⁵⁶ In accordance with the theoretical rationale of *Civic Culture*, individuals with a stronger sense of political and subjective efficacy and higher emotional attachment towards the political regime are likely to be more politically motivated, more politically knowledgeable, and to demonstrate stronger participant orientations. This finding is a very important argument when further discussing the prospects of the democratic stability in Lithuania.

The second strongest predictor of the variance of political cognition is the variable of education.⁵⁷ Education strengthens political interest and sophistication, causing more intense political participation. Similarly, the factor of age significantly differentiates the patterns of political cognition.⁵⁸ Older respondents are likely to be more concerned with, competent and involved in politics than their younger counterparts. Strangely enough, a variable of ideological preferences appears to have

⁵⁵ See appendix, p 112-113.

⁵⁶ One standard deviation increase in the scale of political competence increases political cognition index by .2259 standard deviations, controlling for other independent variables.

⁵⁷ One standard deviation increase in education is followed by .2228 standard deviation increase in the index of political cognition, the influence of other independent variables entered into the regression model keeping constant.

⁵⁸ One standard deviation increase in age is followed by .2093 standard deviation increase in the cognitive dimension of political orientations, when controlling for affective and evaluative orientations, and the set of demographic variables.

a statistically significant effect, when accounting for the cognitive index in Lithuania.⁵⁹ Those who identify themselves with pro-right political orientations are more likely to demonstrate the virtues of *participant* citizens.

Among the set of dummy variables, only nationality is found to be a statistically significant factor, controlling for the effect of the other independent variables. There is a statistically significant difference in the means of the political cognition scale between different categories of nationality: the mean of the political cognition index among Lithuanian respondents is 1.0625 higher than the mean of non-Lithuanians.⁶⁰ This indicates that representatives of national minorities are likely to be less politically motivated, have lower political knowledge and demonstrate greater political apathy or *parochial* political orientations compared to their Lithuanian counterparts.

To conclude, the factors of ideological preferences, political efficacy, evaluation of trustworthiness and honesty of politicians, age, education, and nationality have statistically significant effects when accounting for the index of political cognition. The sense of political efficacy and education appear to be the most important predictors among the continuous variables, included in this regression model.⁶¹ In general, a respondent who scores high on the scale of political cognition would be expected to be an educated older Lithuanian, either female or male, who believes in one's capacities to influence politics and affiliates herself/himself with pro-right political orientations.

⁵⁹ One standard deviation increase of right - wing preferences in the ideological continuum increases political cognition by .2034 standard deviation, the influence of other political orientations, education, age, nationality, and urbanization keeping constant.

⁶⁰ The interpretation of dummy variables, entered into the regression equation, is different. Since the interpretation of Betas is useless, the values of b coefficients and T tests are considered.

⁶¹ The comparison of increment to R^2 associated with different independent variables is not a suitable procedure due to the considerable differences in the values of Tolerance (min. Tolerance is .5003, max. Tolerance .9562).

- **Affective dimension**

Two aspects of the affective dimension, ideological preferences and a sense of political efficacy, are regressed on cognitive and evaluative dimensions of political attitudes, a variable of interpersonal trust and socio-demographic factors. It is worthwhile to note that these explanatory models disclose important aspects of the way Lithuanian political attitudes covary.

a) ideological preferences

The regression model of ideological preferences accounts for 37% of variance of the dependent variable.⁶²

When understanding the factors that differentiate the ideological preferences of the Lithuanian general public, the religiosity scale firstly must be considered.⁶³ Those who demonstrate more intense church attendance and score higher on the scale of religious feelings are much more likely to affiliate themselves with pro-right political orientations. Among continuous predictors, a variable of the next importance is the cognitive dimension of political orientations.⁶⁴ Due to the earlier finding that the increase in political affiliation index increases the index of political cognition, the mutuality of this relationship must now be confirmed. More politically motivated and active as well as more politically informed individuals are likely to vote for pro-right

⁶² See the appendix, p. 130-31.

⁶³ One standard deviation increase in the scale of strength of religiosity is followed by .3227 standard deviation increase in pro-rightist ideological preferences, the influence of political cognition, confidence, age, education, gender, nationality, occupation, and urbanization keeping constant.

⁶⁴ One standard deviation increase in the index of political cognition is followed by .1732 standard deviation increase in the scale of ideological propensities, when the effect of other independent variables is controlled.

political parties and place themselves on the right side of the ideological continuum. The next important predictor of ideological affiliation among the Lithuanian populace is the evaluative dimension. The direction of the relationship should be noted: one standard deviation increase in the scale of confidence of political leadership is followed by .2662 standard deviation drop in the ideological continuum, controlling the effect of the other independent variables. To put it more explicitly, pro-right oriented respondents tend much more than their left-oriented counterparts to distrust the competence and honesty of political leadership of Lithuania. The urbanization level also significantly differentiates ideological preferences of respondents: respondents from larger cities are more likely to affiliate with and to vote for pro-right political parties.⁶⁵

As the values of the T significance test show, two dummy variables entered into the regression equation have statistically significant effects on the variance of ideological preferences, keeping constant the rest of the independent variables. The variable of ethnicity influences not only the cognitive but also the affective dimension of political orientations. The mean of the ideological preferences index among Lithuanian respondents is .1855 higher than the mean associated with respondents of national minorities. In other words, ethnically non-Lithuanian respondents are more likely to affiliate themselves with pro-left political orientations and to vote for pro-left political parties.

⁶⁵ With one standard deviation increase in the urbanization level there is .1982 standard deviation increase towards pro-right direction.

Furthermore, the mean of ideological preferences is also statistically different between males and females, when the effect of other independent variables is kept constant. Male respondents demonstrate .1315 higher average in the scale of ideological affiliation. This suggests the tendency of Lithuanian men to support pro-right rather than pro-left political parties.

To conclude, when accounting for the variance of ideological orientations among the Lithuanian public, the variables of political cognition, political trust, a sense of political efficacy, religious feelings, and factors of gender, nationality, and urbanization are confirmed to have statistically significant effects. In general, when portraying “average” representatives of pro-right and pro-left political preferences in 1994, an attachment to right-wing parties is most likely to be demonstrated by a religious Lithuanian male, who is an inhabitant of a larger town or city. Besides, he is likely to score higher on the index of political cognition and be confident in his capacities to influence politics. However, he is also likely to assess critically the competence and trustworthiness of the current political leadership. A representative supporter of pro-left political ideas and parties is most likely to be found among ethnically non-Lithuanian females who live in a less urbanized area and tend to demonstrate *parochial* cognitive and affective political orientations.

b) political efficacy

The second aspect of the affective political orientation, political efficacy, is

regressed on cognitive and evaluative indexes, variables of ideological affiliation, interpersonal trust, and socio-demographic attributes. As noted previously, the building of this dependent variable by scaling procedure had a low reliability. This disadvantage, therefore, may cause a low percentage of explained variance (16%). The model contains just a few items that affect the dependent variable. Therefore, it must be taken into account that this explanatory model is not the most adequate one when understanding and explaining the sense of political efficacy among the Lithuanian public.

According to Betas, when the impact of ideological preferences, political and interpersonal trust, and demographic variables is controlled, the cognitive dimension has the greatest effect on the scale of political efficacy.⁶⁶ Higher levels of political interest, sophistication, and involvement among Lithuanians are likely to fortify their sense of internal and external political efficacy. The second most important independent variable, that elucidates the variance of Lithuanians' political efficacy, is the index of ideological preferences. Intensification of pro-right ideological preferences is likely to strengthen the sense of political efficacy.⁶⁷

Finally, when considering the effect of demographic variables, the variable of nationality appears to differentiate the variance of one more political orientation.⁶⁸ More explicitly, representatives of ethnic minorities are likely to see themselves as less

⁶⁶ One standard deviation increase in the scale of political cognition increases the sense of political efficacy by .2543 standard deviations, keeping constant the effect of other independent variables.

⁶⁷ One standard deviation increase in the scale of ideological continuum is followed by .1509 standard deviation increase in the sense of political efficacy, when the impact of political cognition, political and interpersonal trust, and demographic variables is controlled.

⁶⁸ The mean of political efficacy index among ethnic Lithuanians is .6455 higher compared to representatives of national minorities, when the effect of other independent variables is kept constant.

politically important. They also tend to be more passive in the case of a politically stressed situation and do not feel as great an emotional attachment during voting.

To conclude, among 13 variables included in the explanatory model of political efficacy, political cognition, ideological affiliation, and nationality differentiate the variation of the dependent variable. Generally speaking, an ethnic Lithuanian, either female or male, who demonstrates high levels of political cognition and prefers pro-right political parties is likely to have a stronger sense of subjective political importance, perceive himself/herself to be competent at influencing politics and feel a stronger emotional attachment when voting.

- ***Evaluative dimension***

The regression model of the last political orientation, evaluative dimension, accounts for 11% of variance of the dependent variable. Although the proportion of the explained variance is statistically significant, yet it is pretty small and the number of statistically significant predictors is minimal. Since production of the dependent variable by scaling was reliable, the utility of the employed explanatory model, when trying to understand the variance of political evaluations, is limited. Only two continuous variables appear to have a statistically significant effect in accounting for the variance of the evaluative dimension, when the effect of the remaining independent variables is controlled. The variable of ideological affiliation has a strong negative effect on the evaluation of the country's leadership.⁶⁹ More explicitly, the increase in the ideological

⁶⁹ One standard deviation increase in the index of ideological affiliation is followed by .2629 standard deviation decrease in the scale of political evaluations, controlling for the other independent variables.

continuum towards the pro-right direction is associated with a less favorable assessment of the competence and honesty of political leadership at both state and local levels. The second statistically important predictor of the evaluative political orientation is a variable of interpersonal trust.⁷⁰ One standard deviation increase in belief that it is possible to trust most people increases the sense of political trust by .1043 of a standard deviation.

To conclude, this regression model shows that politically trustworthy Lithuanian respondents are more likely to exhibit left-oriented political orientations and to score higher in the scale of interpersonal trust.

• Summary

Multiple regression equations suggest that the primary factors in explaining the political orientations of Lithuanians are the manner distinctive political dimensions covary and overlap among themselves. The most intriguing finding is that the index of political affiliation appears to have a cogent effect on all classes of political orientations. Meanwhile, the scale of political cognition significantly differentiates both aspects of the affective political orientation. The evaluative dimension is an important predictor of the variance in political affiliation. Furthermore, in Lithuanian political culture the variables of education, gender, age and occupation are minor predictors of political orientations, controlling for the effects of other independent variables. Among

⁷⁰ This variable is statistically significant predictor at .0500 significance level. At the significance level .0100 it no more would be considered to be statistically significant predictor.

demographic attributes, surprisingly enough, only the variable of ethnicity consistently affects the variance of political orientations.

Having determined what factors influence the variance of Lithuanian political attitudes, the next step is to understand why these factors are important determinants of the Lithuanian political culture.

2 . INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS

To begin with, the effect of political affiliation deserves primary attention. It is a particularly interesting phenomenon, given the previously detected tendency of Lithuanians to alienate from *input* aspects of the political system. As noted previously, respondents with higher pro-right scores on the ideological continuum are likely to exhibit greater political concern, sophistication and participation, have a stronger sense of internal and external political efficacy, and be more critical when evaluating competence and honesty of political incumbents. To use the jargon of *Civic Culture*, those with pro-right political orientations are likely to be *alienative participants* in regard to political *output* objects, although they are *allegiant participants* in respect to the political regime. When discussing the democratic virtues of Lithuanian political culture from the *Civic Culture* perspective, this is a puzzling finding. When supporters of distinctive ideological orientations vary extensively in their political conduct and do not share common structural orientations, the presence of *fragmented* as opposed to *consensual* political culture is suggested (Almond & Verba 1963). Fragmentation and

polarization of political attitudes are very likely to lead to political instability in a society (Almond & Verba 1963; Kavanagh 1980). Furthermore, politically conscious and influential citizens who negatively evaluate the political infrastructure, also negatively contribute to the democratic stability in a state. Nevertheless, when our interpretative framework is enriched by more recent studies, the prospects of democratic stability in Lithuania do not seem to be so fragile. Take the example of Canadian society, it is agreed that weaker identification with the governing party is coincident with lower perception of system responsiveness and higher political distrust (Lambert 1986). Because the ex-communist party was a main political force in 1994 Lithuania, people who do not identify themselves with the left-oriented governing party score lower in the index of political trust. Hence, the manner in which Lithuanian ideological preferences correlate with evaluative and affective orientations resembles that in a modern democratic society.

More importantly for the investigation of this study, the variable of ideological preferences is positively associated with the index of political cognition. One possible explanation is fairly simple: this is a position-opposition phenomenon. With the change of the governing political party, stronger political mobilization among the supporters of an opposition party would be expected. There is another possible explanation worth considering. The phenomenon of stronger *participant* orientations among pro-right identifiers may reflect underlying attributes of public political attitudes and behaviour in Lithuania. Pursuing this argument, the origins of right *versus* left ideological affiliation

must firstly be considered. As noted by political analysts, an essential determinant of the public ideological map in Lithuania is the way citizens assess the Communist political regime (Degutis 1996:24). Instead of being attitudinally attached to a particular ideological doctrine and party, Lithuanians are more likely to emphasize their positive or negative assessment of the Communist political regime, when defining their political affiliation. Moreover, those who support right-wing political parties not only tend to be estranged from the Communist regime, they are also likely to advocate economic reforms and democratic transformations in the country (Alisauskiene 1996). In the case of this study, the relationship of political orientations with general social attitudes is not the major concern. However, values of the correlation matrix show that Lithuanians who score higher on the index of ideological affiliation are likely to prefer individual freedom as opposed to social equality.⁷¹ In addition, respondents with pro-right political orientations are more likely to be against any kind of state censorship, to disagree that a state needs to take care of their welfare and to think that the main function of a state is to guarantee the interests of an individual. This finding further supports the argument that there is a particular set of underlying political attitudes among identifiers with pro-right political orientations. Empirical evidence that the variable of religiosity determines the variance of political affiliation is supplementary in our argumentation. In understanding this effect better, the historical perspective is helpful. In the inter-war republic of Lithuania, the Catholic church was active in politics and evidently supported right-wing political parties. Moreover, the dissident movement against the Soviet regime

⁷¹ Pearson coefficients is equal .0974 and important at the significance level .035

was basically co-ordinated by active members of the Catholic community. Finally, the Catholic Church played an essential role when mobilizing the Lithuanian public around the national movement in the 1990s. Consequently, contemporary political transformations in the state were organized mainly by those with anti-Communist attitudes. In understanding Lithuanian political culture it is important to note that for a particular segment, national ideas and concern about the future of an independent state might still serve both as an important ideological foundation and a basic motivation for stronger political interest and involvement. Therefore, the patterns of more intense political activism among the individuals with pro-right ideological orientations, detected in 1994, are not an ephemeral phenomenon. This, in turn, explains why then the index of political cognition is affected by modes of political affiliation.

Therefore, in terms of the cognitive dimension, more politically motivated, more knowledgeable, and more active Lithuanian respondents tend to exhibit right-oriented electoral choices and a stronger feeling of political efficacy. We just discussed what factors cause the fairly specific effect of ideological preferences on the variance of political cognition. The relationship between political cognition and the sense of political efficacy, however, is not unique to the Lithuanian political culture. It conforms with the findings of most research on this topic. The sense of political efficacy is presumed to be a vital attribute when trying to understand the nature of democratic political orientations. Ideally, a democratic citizen is supposed to be a self-confident

active citizen who follows and discusses politics, is politically sophisticated, satisfied with the role of participant, and is also favourably disposed towards the performance of the political system and generally positive toward it. It is significant for this study that cognitive and affective dimensions of Lithuanian political attitudes appear to covary according to classical presumptions of a democracy. Lithuanian respondents who score high in the indexes of internal and external political efficacy and are emotionally attached to the political regime score significantly higher in the scale of political cognition. In addition, when considering the relationship with more general political values, both cognitive and affective dimensions have a direct correlation with the notion of strategies of political influencing. The correlation matrix shows that more politically cognitive and efficacious Lithuanian citizens are more likely to acknowledge democratic strategies to influence politics such as public petitions and appeals, as well as demonstrations and pickets.⁷² Furthermore, the scales of political cognition and evaluation also directly correlate with the attitudes associated with a liberal democratic system. Lithuanians with higher levels of political cognition and efficacy are more likely to think that *"the freedom of personality is more important than equality. Everyone should have the opportunity to live freely and to develop independently"*.⁷³ These findings suggest that a set of democratic values and norms is likely to be found among the politically informed, active and efficacious segment of the general public. This

⁷² The direct correlation between the justification of public petitions and the index of political cognition is equal .1624 and significant at the .000 significance level. The correlation of the same political strategy with the index of political efficacy is significant at the same level of significance and equal .1205. Similarly, the justification of demonstrations and pickets directly correlates with the index of political cognition: Pearson correlation coefficient =.1237 when P=. 000. The latter political strategy significantly correlates (.1782) with the index of political efficacy at P=.000.

⁷³ Pearson coefficients are important the significance levels of .005 and equal .1042 when correlated with the scale of political cognition and .1658 in the case of political efficacy.

evidence certainly increases an optimistic view to the likelihood of democratic stability in Lithuania.

Nevertheless, it is also worthwhile to note the relationship of cognitive and affective political orientations with the notion of the state's role. According to the rationale of *Civic Culture*, the tendency of citizens to be affected by *output* structures and at the same time to alienate from *input* structures is a symptom of a *subjective* as opposed to *participant* political culture. In 1994, neither cognitive nor affective dimensions differentiate the dominant tendency of the Lithuanian public to be in favour of the intervening role of a state.⁷⁴ While generally critical of the performance of political incumbents, at the same time the majority of Lithuanian respondents demonstrate a great degree of dependence on the *output* structures. Certainly, this is a rather superficial empirical argument; however, to a certain extent it reflects the vestiges of former political socialization in more general social and political attitudes. The reappearance of former political habits in the currents trends of Lithuanian political culture is discussed in the final chapter. At this point, the essential finding of the study is the fact that in 1994 cognitive and affective dimensions of Lithuanian political habits covary according to the theoretically presumed patterns. However, when considering the range of the evaluative dimension, Lithuanian political attitudes are mainly inconsistent with the conceptual presumptions of *Civic Culture*.

Almond and Verba argue that individuals with higher levels of political cognition are supposed to feel more confidence in the competence and honesty of their country's

⁷⁴ According to the frequency distribution, 56% of responds agree that 'A state must to ensure that everybody is economically provided', meanwhile 43% agree that 'A state needs to guarantee the interests of an individual.'

leadership. To the contrary, we find that overwhelming public distrust in politicians and public officeholders is equally evident among strata with different modes of political interest, sophistication, and participation. Similarly, the variable of political evaluation is rather equally distributed among respondents with various levels of political efficacy. Can this finding be considered as an essential obstacle to the prospects for democratic stability in Lithuania? In speculating on the implications of the finding, it is worthwhile to begin with the reference to contemporary studies. As a matter of fact, the variable of political trust either is not considered to be an essential predictor of both political cognition and efficacy, or the negative relationship between political trust and political efficacy is noted (Martin & Stronach 1992; Bennet 1994). Furthermore, given the extent of corruption among political elites and the inefficiency of political institutions in 1994, to expect Lithuanian people to trust the honesty and competence of their political leadership is to search for the presence of an unrealistically idealistic citizenry. Nevertheless, when explaining the variance of political trust, the effect of more trustworthy social attitudes is found to be particularly important. In congruence with the presumptions of *Civic Culture* "general social trust is likely to be translated into politically relevant trust" (Almond & Verba 1963: 228).

After the overview of covariance of cognitive, affective and evaluative political orientations, the next logical step in understanding the nation's culture is the interpretation of the effect of demographic variables. In this analysis, ethnicity appears to be the best explanatory variable for all classes of political attitudes. Representatives

of ethnic minorities are likely to be less politically motivated, to possess lower levels of political knowledge, and to be more passive politically. They also tend to score lower in the indexes of internal and external political efficacy as well as to demonstrate pro-left political orientations. These results are consistent with the earlier findings on higher levels of political apathy among national minorities in the Baltic states (Tureikyte 1992; Kaplan 1995) and limited involvement of leaders of ethnic communities in the political life of Lithuania.⁷⁵ They lack opportunity to identify with the politically influential group, therefore, leading to reduced motivation to be interested and involved in politics. However, in explaining the modes of political orientations among the representatives of ethnic minorities, the historical aspect again shall be considered. In Lithuania, the biggest ethnic minority is comprised⁷⁶ mainly of families of former Soviet militarists or the Russian speaking populace, who moved to Lithuania after the second world war. Until the declaration of independence, the vast majority of them did not have a need to learn the Lithuanian language, spoken by 82% of the population,⁷⁷ and enjoyed considerable economic benefits, provided by the state. Not surprisingly, therefore, pro-left political orientations, or, as a matter of fact, stronger attachment to the Communist political and economic system are more characteristic of people who benefited from it. Besides, the patterns of political socialization among Lithuanians and Russians were certainly different. Due to the different historical background and longer exposure to the Soviet ideology, the representatives of ethnic minorities were not as alienated from or

⁷⁵ With the exception of Lithuanian Poles whose ethnically based party has seats in the Parliament.

⁷⁶ In 1994, ethnically Russian citizens constituted 11% of the population.

⁷⁷ According the qualitative survey "National Minorities in Lithuania 1994", 65% of surveyed representatives (mainly older than 45 years) of the Russian community could not efficiently communicate in Lithuanian (Zilinskiene 1995).

resistant to the Communist regime as Lithuanians were. Finally, the national movement and its political and economic outcomes could significantly increase the sense of cultural and linguistic alienation and *parochial* attitudes about the system that caused so many stressful social demands.⁷⁸

In the case of this research study, the other demographic variables such as education, age, and urbanization have an important effect only on the variance of political cognition. In accordance with both *Civic Culture* rationale and contemporary studies, more educated respondents score higher in the index of political cognition. More highly educated individuals obtain what Pierre Bourdieu calls “a symbolic capitalism” that allows them to learn participatory norms, and to articulate and express political opinions. Besides, an increase in education results in higher social status, leading to stronger integration into society and a greater willingness to be involved in political decision making. As noted, the variable of education does not differentiate the remaining dimensions of political orientations. This suggests that in 1994 educated Lithuanians tend to share with their uneducated counterparts a common affective *allegiance* towards the political system. In addition, both educated and uneducated segments of the public share evaluative *alienation* from the *output* structures. This indicates that both the *alienative* and *allegiant* character of political orientations are not a matter of political *parochialism*. On the contrary, the public dissatisfaction with the performance of political elites is an essential attribute of Lithuanian political orientations in 1994.

⁷⁸ For instance, knowledge of the Lithuanian language has become a mandatory requirement when searching for any kind of job.

The other variable that has a special pattern of variance is age. In contrast to *Civic Culture* findings, this variable in Lithuanian political culture is positively related to the index of political cognition. We think that this fact is caused by the fact that older Lithuanians have had a unique political experience. The oldest of them kept and transmitted political memories from inter-war independent Lithuania and experienced dramatic social upheavals, caused by changing of political regimes. The realization of the possibly brutal importance of politics in daily life might cause older respondents to develop ongoing concern about political events. Equally important, the older population of Lithuania is the most economically vulnerable segment. Their welfare is highly dependent on state politics. This factor may increase older Lithuanians' motivation to be politically informed and to influence political decision making.

The next unexpected finding from the exploration of the effect of demographic variables is the evidence that gender does not affect modes of political cognition and efficacy. The tendency for female respondents to demonstrate lower levels of political interest, knowledge and involvement is a very stable finding in the majority of studies. Besides, there is no evidence of a gender gap in the variance of political efficacy, contrary to numerous findings (Almond & Verba 1963; Luskin 1990; Bennet 1994; Hanh 1995). It is not the case even when the direct correlation between gender and both political cognition and efficacy are considered. One possible explanation of why gender is not an influential correlate of political dimensions can be the fact that politics in 1994 was still an important concern among all strata of the population. The other explanation

would derive from the traditionally different status of women in Baltic countries, where the tradition of females' exclusion from public life does not have as strong roots as, for instance, in Slavic cultures. Nevertheless, when concluding about the minor effect of gender in explaining Lithuanian political culture, the correlation of this demographic factor with the scale of political affiliation has to be noted. Females are less likely to favour pro-right electoral choices. In explaining why the difference exists, it is worth referring to the study of Carnaghan and Bahry. They suggest that East European women are more concerned with social welfare issues and support greater government control over the economy, leading to their tendency to favour pro-left political choices (1990: 381).

Finally, in research findings shared by other students of political culture in the former communist countries, socio-economic status is confirmed to have a significant positive effect on patterns of political interest, participation, and sense of political efficacy (Gibson & Duch 1992; Reisinger & Miller 1994; Hahn 1995). Unfortunately, in this research the scale of socio-economic status could not be developed because of the distorted income variable.⁷⁹ Therefore, the independent effects of education and occupation were considered. While education appears to be an important explanatory variable in the scale of political cognition, the impact of occupational status on distinctive dimensions of political culture is not clearly evident when controlling for the other independent variables. This finding is difficult to explain. However, it is consistent with the study of Reisinger, Miller and Hesli who found in the case of Lithuania "the

⁷⁹ A socio-economic scale is usually composed of variables of education, occupation, and income (Hahn 1995).

common acceptance of democratic values across its social classes" (1994).

III . SUMMARY

When considering the results of multiple regression models from the perspective of democratic political culture, we confirm that Lithuanian political culture has a set of political attitudes and patterns of political behaviour that basically supports the consolidation of democracy. First, the relationship between cognitive and affective political orientations shows that political attitudes and behaviours of the Lithuanian populace are favourable to the support of a democratic political culture. More explicitly, norms of democratic strategies of political influencing and *allegiance* towards the political system are found among the politically active and efficacious segment of the Lithuanian general public. Furthermore, high levels of political distrust among Lithuanian citizens do not reflect a lack of support for democracy. They are equally distributed among different social strata and reflect the realistic assessment of inefficient performance of political institutions and untrustworthy economic and political elites.

Most importantly, results suggest that the underlying structure of political beliefs is rooted in the sense of national identity as well as former political experience. Despite the 45 year absence of a multi-party political system, the sense of political affiliation among Lithuanians is not fairly diffused or uncrystallized. As a matter of fact, Lithuanian political culture seems to be fragmented based on the strength of the attitudinal

attachment to the former political regime. This causes different modes of political motivation, knowledge and involvement among Lithuanian citizens. Again, it is important to note that those who favour transformations are likely to belong to a politically concerned, active, and efficacious segment of the Lithuanian public.

In terms of demographic variables, the differentiating effect of ethnicity is striking. It is also determined by the manner of underlying ideological beliefs. While there is no evidence of a gender and occupational gap in Lithuanian political attitudes, the factors of education and age appear to be important in the variance of political concern, knowledge and political engagement of the general public of Lithuania in 1994.

CHAPTER SIX: PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRATIC STABILITY IN LITHUANIA

This study dealt with the political cultural properties of citizens in Lithuania, one of the most politically stable ex-Soviet states. Three interrelated questions were addressed. Firstly, is the political stability in 1994 Lithuania caused by political orientations that support democratic consolidation, or by the uncertainty of political beliefs and ingrained habits of political apathy? Thereby, what political attitudes and patterns of political conduct were sustained and crystallized during the democratic transformations in Lithuania? Finally, does this set of political attitudes and relevant activities among Lithuanians approximate a democratic political culture?

To begin with, we should consider the complexity of these questions from both conceptual and empirical points of view. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism, the political culture of Central and Eastern European countries is undergoing continuous transformations. As Schoplin (1993: 13) suggests:

Various value systems were on offer, some derived from the pre-communist past, some conditioned by the anticipatory socialization of Communism, and some structured by expectations of 'entering Europe'. Elements taken from all three broad possibilities were combined in a variety of ways to produce an uneasy and complex situation, in which no one political culture could be described as dominant.

Not only social scientists feel puzzled when defining the political culture of a post-Soviet state. Almost all leading politicians and political analysts of Lithuania, interviewed in the summer of 1996, made statements to the effect that either "there is no political culture *per se*"⁸⁰ or "...yet, there are very fragile basis of the democratic

⁸⁰ From the interview with Lauras Bielinis, a political analyst and a main editor of the almanac *Politologija*.

political culture.”⁸¹ Lithuanian political elite’s negative image of the Lithuanian electorate is challenged by the findings of our survey through data analysis. We detect recognizable and definable patterns of political attitudes and behaviours. Although the limited generalization of results due to the sampling method must be considered, this research suggests that Lithuanian political culture in 1994 basically approximates the classical model of civic culture.

Almond and Verba pointed out that “Where norms of participation, perceived ability to participate, and actual participation are high, effective democracy is more likely to flourish” (1963:135). Following this rationale, the evidence drawn from the survey *Political Culture in Lithuania 1994* leads to a fairly optimistic conclusion about the presence of civic values and the prospects of democratic stability. Indeed, the survey reveals a large proportion of politically knowledgeable individuals with strong political motivation across different occupational, age and gender segments. Since the degree and character of mass political involvement are important indicators of political stability, it is essential to note that in 1994 Lithuania intense political interest coexists with the prevalence of formal and conventional modes of political participation. How can we explain the absence of cognitive apathy in 1994 Lithuania? According to Rasa Alisauskiene, the director of the Gallup affiliate in Lithuania, high levels of political concern among Lithuanians result from anxiety about and dissatisfaction with ongoing political processes, and from traditionally present political interest. We also suggest that much broader opportunities to access political information in a newly democratic

⁸¹ From the interview with Vytautas Vagnorius, an ex-prime minister of Lithuania for 1991-94, and a prime minister from 1997.

system contribute to high levels of political motivation. For the concern of our study it is important to note that Lithuania, like other Western industrialized and urbanized societies, has a high proportion of its populace with the desire and means to influence political life in one way or another.

Effective democracy is more likely to survive in a country where citizens consider their political regime to be democratic. Our argument that Lithuanian citizens consider their political regime to be democratic is drawn from various variables: high levels of external political efficacy, emotional attachment to the act of voting, and a convincing sense of political security. Closer analysis reveals that politically motivated, informed and active individuals are likely to feel efficacious influencing politics, and, most importantly, to express *allegiance* towards the political regime. It is also essential to note that the majority of Lithuanian respondents are not likely to support non-conventional forms of political influencing that would increase the likelihood of global changes. In accordance with the most optimistic interviewee Algirdas Karosas⁸², we argue that 40 years' experience with the Soviet system did not eliminate the development of democratic values and norms. Thus, we confirm suggestions of Inglehart (1990) that the processes of urbanization and industrialization that took place during the Soviet regime, high educational levels and a long-term exposure to Western mass media contributed to the crystallization of democratic values among the general public of Lithuania. Consistent with the earlier findings on the sources and implications for democracy among Lithuanian citizens (Reisinger, Miller & Hesli 1994; Knudsen

⁸² A head of the governing LDLP fraction in the 1996 Parliament.

1996), we confirm that political orientations of surveyed Lithuanian citizens are supportive of further democratic consolidation.

At the same time, it must be noted that the optimistic outlook for the democratic stability in Lithuania is challenged by the findings of low levels of political pride, both interpersonal and political distrust, and *alienative* feelings regarding political authorities. To refer to Almond and Verba, a successful shift to a democratic participant political culture involves the acceptance of norms of democratic participation, civic obligation, the development of the sense of internal efficacy, and diffusion of positive orientations towards a democratic infrastructure (1963: 27). While findings of the survey indicate acceptance of norms of democratic participation, there is no empirical support for the other requirements. Lithuanian respondents show overwhelmingly low levels of both subjective political efficacy and *allegiance* towards the infrastructure of the political system. Predictions of future democratic stability in Lithuania, therefore, are highly dependent on the optimism of those interpreting the results. Habermass (1996), for instance, defines the period of overwhelming withdrawal of public support and disillusionment with the competence of political institutions as 'a legitimization crisis' that might essentially jeopardize the future democratic transformations in post-communist countries. Alternatively, Gibson & Dutch (1992), Reisinger & Miller (1994), and Hahn (1995) argue that dissatisfaction with the performance of the specific government and institutions does not imply lack of faith in the larger idea of democracy. In this study we support the second position, thus implying that the negative character of evaluative and affective orientations towards output and input objects is expected

given the tremendous economic difficulties in 1994 Lithuania. Furthermore, to put it in the expressive words of Egidijus Bickauskas⁸³ "...The political stability in Lithuania is caused by various factors - national mentality, negativism regarding any radical actions...However, it is mainly caused by the misapprehended tolerance of Lithuanian citizens regarding activities of democratically elected, however, too frequently incompetent and self-seeking politicians. Replace Lithuanian citizens by their French counterparts, and in two days only ruins of the Parliament building in Vilnius would be left". Besides, historically determined public hostility towards the Soviet regime also essentially contributed to the fact that in 1994 *alienative* political attitudes are present at the evaluative level but absent at the level of potential political protest. This is a vital factor in understanding the phenomenon of political stability in Lithuania.

Almond and Verba stated that political attitudes are largely a product of political socialization. Although detected low levels of internal political efficacy are primarily related to how the responsiveness of political institutions is assessed, they also show the way current attributes of Lithuanian political culture are affected by patterns of former political socialization. Habits to alienate from institutional forms of politics are thought to contribute to low patterns of political trust in 1994. Similarly, low levels of internal political efficacy are influenced by former political traits such as a reduced sense of personal responsibility. Moreover, we also detect an evidence of controversial political consciousness and indoctrinated perceptions of economic and political systems. Despite the overwhelming distrust of politicians, in a politically stressed

⁸³ From the author's interviews with the leader of the Center Party.

situation Lithuanians are likely to think that the most efficient way of problem resolution is to appeal to political *output* structures. Likewise, despite the differences in political cognition, affection and evaluation, an impressive proportion of Lithuanians support the intervening role of the state. Apparently, the impact of the past political socialization and political experience was lessened during the period of national sentiments and political mobilization of the masses. The emergence of a new and complicated social and economic reality, however, led to the reappearance of former perceptions of and expectations about political institutions and organizations.

A key finding of this study relates to the relationship of political affiliation with the remaining dimensions of political attitudes. According to the opinion of all interviewed experts in Lithuanian politics, the Lithuanian electorate arrives at its decisions based "on the attractiveness of political figures"⁸⁴ as opposed to the rational evaluation of different political programs. In contrast to these observations, we detect recognisable patterns of political affiliation. Subjective evaluation of political affiliation is congruent with the voting conduct. Particularly pro-right as opposed to pro-left political orientations differentiate the manifestation of political motivation, knowledge and involvement, political trust and civic efficacy. Pro-right oriented individuals are also more likely to support democratic virtues and stability. In general, we believe that this indicates more general and more stable attitudes that are derived from the former political experience and unique history. This study, therefore, challenges the studies of Gibson (1992), Reisinger, Miller & Hesli (1994) who found that in 1992 neither

⁸⁴ Mindaugas Degutis, a director of the Service of Applied Surveys & Information.

nationalism nor former political experience determined political attitudes of post-Soviet citizens. Apparently, in 1994 anti-Communist ideas and patriotism still appear to be important components of political attitudes, especially among the older respondents.

Nevertheless, an important concern is how long the Lithuanian public will retain its faith in democracy if the economy and crime in Lithuania worsen? Almond and Verba feared that when the myth of democracy comes into serious conflict with the realities of politics, the results are overwhelming cynicism and political apathy. These characteristics found in the majority of post-Soviet states. However, when asked about the main aim of the national movement in 1990, 78% of Lithuanians surveyed in 1994 thought that it was the renewal of an independent democratic state, while only 6% expected the reforms to increase their economic welfare. In 1996 the interviewed Lithuanian prime minister feared that a charismatic leader might be able to mobilize the Lithuanian public around actions that would disturb democratic stability. However, three months later in national elections Lithuanians demonstrated overwhelming ignorance of political leaders and voted only for political parties (Lietuvos Rytas 1996: 273). In addition, the general public of Lithuania has had several tests of its commitment to ongoing reforms. Neither the 1994 referendum on increasing presidential political power nor the 1996 referendum on the offer to use 50% of the state's budget to compensate financial losses incurred through privatization and a bank crisis were supported by the Lithuanian public. Certainly, in Lithuanian political culture there is a cleavage between those who advocate radical transformations and those who are nostalgic in respect to the economic stability, provided by the former political regime. Certainly, the future of democracy will highly depend on its successful

institutionalization as well as on the behaviour of political elites. However, according to the results of this study, the stability of a democratic regime in Lithuania is not likely to be challenged by public resistance and hostility.

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Appendix

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Citizens of different countries are proud of different achievements of their countries. Please indicate what you are proud of in Lithuania? Mark no more than three questions.

1. Government	9. Religion and values
2. Historical past	10. International position of Lithuania
3. Economics	11. Contribution of Lithuania to art and science
4. Architecture	12.
5. Courts	Other.....
6. Lithuanian people	13. Nothing
7. Parliament	
8. Nature	

2. Renewal was an important event in the life of Lithuania. Which aim, do you think, can be considered as the most important?

1. Consolidation of democracy	5. Safeguarding of human rights and freedom
2. Renewal of independence	6. Other
3. Creation of a just society	
4. Increase of economic wealth	

3. In general, are you interested in politics ?

1. Very interested	3. Not very interested
2. Interested	4. Totally uninterested

4. How do you actively participate in the present political life of Lithuania ?

	YES	NO
1 I participate in the organizational activities of a certain, political party, union, or movement	1	2
2 I participate in the campaigns during elections, referenda.	1	2
3 I write about politics in the press, speak on TV, radio.	1	104
4 I participate in mass meetings and activities (demonstrations, meetings, pickets)	1	2
5 I sign collective petitions, appeals, declarations.	1	2
6 I am interested in politics: read press, follow TV when there are political discussions.	1	2
7 I participate in elections.	1	2
8 Other	1	2

5. Please note Which people perform these duties in government and other state institutions? (Write the name, if you don't know - leave the space empty)

Appendix

1. Prime Minister	-	
2. Minister of Defense	-	
3. Head of Parliament	-	
4. Attorney	-	
5. Minister of Foreign Affairs	-	
6. Minister of Social Defense	-	
7. Head of Supreme Court	-	

6. Please, write the name of at least one leader of these political parties:

1. LDLP party	
2. Unity of Lithuanian Liberals	
3. Unity of Centre	
4. Conservators	
5. Socialdemocrats	
6. National Party	
10 Christian democrats	
5	
8. Unity of Lithuanian Poles	

7. Do you think political authorities should address these questions and problems?

	Yes, it should	Partly should	No, it is not its responsibility	Do not know
1. To control mass media.	1	2	3	9
2. To ensure material welfare.	1	2	3	9
3. To maintain public morality	1	2	3	9
4. To regulate labour relations	1	2	3	9
5. To protect the Lithuanian economy from foreign competition	1	2	3	9

8. In politics one talks about "right" and "left". How would you evaluate your political attitudes in this scale, where 1 means "radical right" and 2 means 'radical left'.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
"Left"									"Right"

99. Do not know

10. Which of these sentences better represents your opinion?

Appendix

- A** I think that the freedom of personality is more important than equality. Everyone should have the opportunity to live freely and to develop independently.
- B** If it is necessary to choose between the freedom and equality, I think that equality is more important. It means that everyone's material needs are met and there are big social differences that often do not depend on a man himself.

1. Agree more with A
2. Agree more with B
3. Agree with neither of them
9. Don't know

11. Imagine that suddenly you and your neighbours or colleagues were faced a big problem (reduced salary, polluted factory, prohibition of certain newspapers) How would you react to this situation ?

1. I would organize a group in order to solve the problem.
2. I would participate in the activities of such a group if I were invited.
3. I would financially support the activities of such a group.
4. I would sign the petitions and appeals of this group.
5. I would do nothing.
6. Other.
9. Do not know.

12. What, in your opinion, should be done first in order to solve the problem ?

1. Appeal to Government.	5. Appeal to press, TV or radio
2. Appeal to political parties	6. Organize protest actions
3. Appeal to deputies of Parliament	7. Other.
4. Appeal to Court	8. Don't know.

13. What means, do you think, are justified in solving such problems?

Public petitions, appeal

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Always justified									Never justified

Demonstrations, pickets

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Always justified									Never justified

Strikes

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Always justified									Never justified

Use of personal influence

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Always justified									Never justified

Appendix

Bribing important people

1	2		3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10
Always justified									Never justified		

Blackmailing

1	2		3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10
Always justified									Never justified		

Damaging private property

1	2		3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10
Always justified									Never justified		

Violence

1	2		3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10
Always justified									Never justified		

14. Which concerns, according to your understanding, are most important in Lithuania?

1. Decreasing living standards 2. Pollution of environment 3. Weakening of moral norms of society 4. Relations with foreign countries 5. Increasing influence of Western culture 6. Crime 7. Lack of investment in production	8. Corruption of officials 9. Discord among various political forces 10. International conflicts 11. Inflation 12. Violation of Human Rights 13. Unemployment 14. Other

15. Does the Government of Lithuania frequently arrives at right decisions ?

1. Almost always. 2. Most of the time. 3. Only sometimes.	4. Almost never. 5. Don't know

16. Do you think that our country is guided according to the interest of some influential groups or in favor of all citizens ?

- 1. In favor of all citizens
- 2. According to the interests of some groups.
- 3. Don't know.

22. How much do you think the policy of a country depends on the will of people like you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Not at all									Very much	

23. What are you feelings during elections?

Appendix

1. I feel I do an important job.
2. I do it with sarcasm.
3. It seems meaningless
4. I vote because it is my duty.

5. Feelings depend on the situation.
6. I do not feel anything.
7. Other

24. If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party you would vote for?

1. Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP).
2. Unity of Lithuanian Liberals.
3. Unity of Center.
4. Conservators.
5. Socialdemocrats.

6. National Party.
7. Christian Democrats.
8. Democrats.
9. For no one of them.
10. Don't know

25. For which party did you vote in the Parliamentary elections in 1992 ?

1. LDLP.
2. Coalition of Sajudis.
3. National Unity.
4. Unity of Center.
5. Democrats.
6. Party of Christian Democrats.

7. Socialdemocrats.
8. Unity of Liberals.
9. Unity of Polish.
10. Other.
11. I did not vote

26. Below are listed several political parties that are active in the political life of Lithuania. Which of them, you think, are left-oriented and which of them are right-oriented political parties? Please, mark your answers in a scale where -10 means radical left and +10 means radical right.

LDLP

Conservators

Socialdemocrats

Christian democrats

Unity of Center

National Unity

Unity of Liberals

28. Please indicate which of these sentences better represents your opinion?

1

2

3

4

5

Appendix

	Completely agree with the left one	Agree more with the left one	Difficult to say	Agree more with the right one	Completely agree with the right one
1	People need to take care of their own welfare			A state must to ensure that everybody is provided for	
	1	2	3	4	5
2	A state first needs to express interests of society			A state first needs to guarantee the interests of an individual	
	1	2	3	4	5
3	By no means those who think differently may be restricted			Sometimes a society is in a position when censure is necessary	
	1	2	3	4	5
4	When there are changes in my life I enjoy new possibilities			When there are changes in my life I worry about possible difficulties	
	1	2	3	4	5

36. How often do you discuss politics with your friends?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Infrequently
4. Never.

37. Do do you think, it is possible to trust most people, or it is necessary to be cautious?

1. One can trust most people.
2. One should be cautious with most people

39. How would you define yourself:

1. Deeply religious	3. Hesitating
2. Religious	4. Do not know

43. Your age:

44. Gender:

1. Male	2. Female

45. Education:

Appendix

1. Primary
2. General secondary
3. Secondary (PTM)

4. Special secondary
5. University , some university.

46. Nationality:

1. Lithuanian	2. Russian	3. Polish	4. Other

47. Your main occupation:

1. I work	4. I study
2. I am retired	5. I am unemployed
3. I study	

48. What are your middle income per month?

1. Under 100 lt.	2. 101-200 lt.	3. 201-300 lt.	4. 301-400 lt.
5. 401-600 lt	6. 601-800 lt.	7. 801-1000 lt.	8. 1001-1500 lt
8. Over 1500 e			

49. What are the main sources of your income?

- | | Main source of
income | Supplemental source of
income |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. A job in non-profit enterprise | 1 | 1 |
| 2. A job in state enterprise | 2 | 2 |
| 3. Business in private enterprise | 3 | 3 |
| 4. Hired job in private enterprise | 4 | 4 |
| 5. Interest from savings, dividends | 5 | 5 |
| 6. Hired job in agriculture | 6 | 6 |
| 7. Private farm | 7 | 7 |
| 8. Social payments (pension, stipend) | 8 | 8 |
| 9. Help of spouse, parents, children | 9 | 9 |
| 10. Other. | 9 | 9 |

50. The size of your community :

1. Vilnius	2. 200-500 000	3. 100-200 000	
4. 50-100 000	5. 10-50 000	6. 2-10 000	7. Under 2000

APPENDIX B: SAMPLE

Lithuania was divided into 15 regions. Proportions of respondents in every different region were selected according to the following table:

Table 8. Sample

AGE	MALE	FEMALE
16-19	X1	Y1
20-29	X2	Y2
30-39	X3	Y3
40-49	X4	Y4
50-59	X5	Y5
60 +	X6	Y6
With high education	X7	Y7
Lithuanians Z1		
Russians Z2		
Polish Z3		

A separate table, following the same principle, was created for an every separate district according to its demographic characteristics. The percentage of respondents, interviewed in each of 15 regions, represented the proportion the inhabitants the district constitutes in terms of entire population.

APPENDIX C: SCALING

The items that constitute every single scale are presented in Table

Table 9: *Scaling of Cognitive, Affective, and Evaluative Dimensions*

SCALES	ALPHA RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS	ITEMS INCLUDED
COGNITIVE	0.7192	Political Interest ⁸⁵ Discussions About Politics Test of Political Input Knowledge ⁸⁶ Test of Political Output Knowledge Test of Conceptual Knowledge Index of Political Activism ⁸⁷
AFFECTIVE I: Ideological Preferences	0.8327	Subjective Esteem of Ideological Preferences ⁸⁸ Former Voting Preferences ⁸⁹ Future Voting Preferences
AFFECTIVE II: Political Efficacy	0.3449	Subjective Political Efficacy ⁹⁰ Citizen Efficacy 1 ⁹¹

⁸⁵ Recoded, the item *Political Interest* has 4 categories that vary from 1 'Not interested at all' to 4 'Very much interested'. Similarly, recoded, the item *Discussions About Politics* has 4 categories that vary from 1 'Do not discuss at all' to 4 'Discuss very frequently'.

⁸⁶ First, by the procedure *COUNT* the index of Knowledge of Political Party Leaders was created (0 represented those who named no one and 7 represented those who identified all required political leaders). By recoding the variable *Test of Political Input Knowledge* is computed. It has 4 categories 1 'Poor Political Knowledge', 2 'Moderate Political Knowledge', 3 'Good Political Knowledge', and 4 'Very Good Political Knowledge'. The variable *Test of Political Output Knowledge* is build according to the same principle as the item *Test of Political Input Knowledge* and has the same 4 categories. *Test of Conceptual Political Knowledge* is created according to the same principle as the previous two items and also has 4 categories that vary from very poor to very good knowledge of parties' ideological affiliation. However, several additional modifying procedures needed to be employed to construct the primary index of *Conceptual Knowledge* where the minimal value 0 referred to an absence of conceptual knowledge and the maximum value 7 reflected the capacity to locate all 7 political parties on the ideological scale. For details see the appendix p. 111.

⁸⁷ By a procedure *COMPUTE IF*, the original index of *Political Activism* with 11 categories of extent of political involvement was completed. In the next step, the eleven category variable was transformed to a six category item: 1 'Apolitical', 2 'Competent non-participants' 3 'Incompetent participants' 4 'Participants' 5 'Active participants' 6 'Political gladiators'.

⁸⁸ A continuum where 1 refers to 'Radical left' and 10 to 'Radical right' was recoded to a 5 category interval item: 1 'Radical left', 2 'Left', 3 'Centrist' 4 'Right' 5 'Radical right'.

⁸⁹ The categorical item presented a list of political parties was transformed to an ordinal variable *Former Voting Preferences*: 1 'Left' 2 'Centrist' 3 'Right'. By the same principle a variable *Future Voting Preferences* was developed.

⁹⁰ Recoding a continuum variable of internal political efficacy, a 5 category interval variable of *Subjective Political Efficacy* was computed. The values in regard to how much the policy of the country depends "on the will of people like" vary from 1 'Not at all' to 5 'Very much'.

⁹¹ After recoding, these categories describe hypothesized actions in a politically stressed situation: 1'Do nothing'; 2'Sign petitions or help financially'; 3'Participate in a protest group'; 4'Organize a protest group'. The variable of *Citizen Efficacy 2* is recoded according to same direction: 1'Do nothing' 2' Apply to input or output structures' 3'Protest'.

Appendix

		Citizen Efficacy 2 Feelings during Voting ⁹²
EVALUATIVE	0.8232	Trust in the Competence of the Government Confidence in the Honesty of Incumbents: State Confidence in the Honesty of Incumbents: Local

The input of the scaling procedures is presented bellow:

```
compute pactiv=activ.
recode pactiv (1=1) (2,3,4=2) (5,6=3) (7=4) (8,9=5) (10,11=6).
variable labels pactiv 'Scale of polit activism 2'.
recode pactiv (1=1) (3=2) (2=3) (4=4) (5=5) (6=6).
value labels pactiv 1'apolitic' 2'nonattentive participants' 3'attentive nonparticipants'
4'participants' 5'active participants' 6'gladiators'.
compute cinput=input.
recode cinput (0,1=1) (2,3=2) (4,5=3) (6,7=4).
compute coutput=output.
recode coutput (0,1=1) (2,3=2) (4,5=3) (6,7=4).
compute cconcept=ext26.
recode cconcept (0,1=1) (2,3=2) (4,5=3) (6,7=4).
compute idea8=c8.
recode idea8 (1,2,3=1) (4,5,6=2) (7,8,9,10=3).
compute pstress=c11.
recode pstress (5=1) (4,3=2) (2=3) (1=4).
compute solve=c12.
recode solve (4=1) (1,2=2) (3=3).
compute feel=c23.
recode feel (1,2=1) (3,4=2) (5,6=3).
compute honest=c16.
recode honest (3=1) (2=2) (1=3).
compute subj=a22.
recode subj (1,2,3=1) (4,5,6=2) (7,8,9,10=3).
```

```
reliability variables= a3 c36 cinput coutput pactiv cconcept /statistics=descriptives corr scale
/summary=all.
```

R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L L)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	A3	2.4077	.7594	830.3
2.	C36	2.7028	.8518	830.3
3.	CINPUT	1.6027	.4896	830.3
4.	COUTPUT	2.5921	.9563	830.3
5.	PACTIV	3.4783	1.4451	830.3
6.	CCONCEPT	2.7850	1.1932	830.3

Correlation Matrix

	A3	C36	CINPUT	COUTPUT	PACTIV	CCONCEPT
A3	1.0000					
C36	.5396	1.0000				
CINPUT	.2859	.2405	1.0000			
COUTPUT	.3832	.3464	.5139	1.0000		
PACTIV	.4938	.4278	.2648	.3193	1.0000	
CCONCEPT	.2174	.1513	.4067	.3703	.2281	1.0000

N of Cases = 830.3

Statistics for	Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of
Scale	15.5687	14.8370	3.8519	Variables
				6

⁹² After recoding, the variable of *Feelings during Voting* has 3 categories: 1'Meaningless and Irony'; 2'Nothing or it depends'; 3'A duty, important job'.

Appendix

Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	2.5948	1.6027	3.4783	1.8756	2.1703	.3695
Item Variances	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	.9908	.2397	2.0882	1.8484	8.7102	.4367
Inter-item Covariances	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	.2964	.1003	.5418	.4415	5.4014	.0197
Inter-item Correlations	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	.3459	.1513	.5396	.3883	3.5672	.0131

Item-total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
A3	13.1610	11.3188	.5757	.4021	.6572
C36	12.8659	11.2904	.4928	.3419	.6722
CINPUT	13.9660	12.8567	.4957	.3271	.6953
COUTPUT	12.9766	10.5998	.5336	.3643	.6568
PACTIV	12.0904	8.5747	.4932	.3019	.6878
CONCEPT	12.7837	10.6523	.3606	.2098	.7167

Reliability Coefficients 6 items
Alpha = .7192 Standardized item alpha = .7604
-- compute cognit= a3 + c36 + cinput + coutput + pactiv + cconcept.

reliability variables= idea8 ca24 ca25/statistics=descriptives corr scale /summary=all.

R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L L)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	IDEA8	2.2524	.7299	471.8
2.	CA24	1.9989	.9376	471.8
3.	CA25	1.9883	.9738	471.8

Correlation Matrix

	IDEA8	CA24	CA25
IDEA8	1.0000		
CA24	.5759	1.0000	
CA25	.5521	.7516	1.0000

N of Cases = 471.8

Statistics for		Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables	
Scale		6.2397	5.3057	2.3034	3	
Item Means	Mean		Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min
		2.0799	1.9883	2.2524	.2641	1.1328
Item Variances	Mean		Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min
		.7967	.5328	.9484	.4156	1.7801
Inter-item Covariances	Mean		Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min
		.4909	.3924	.6862	.2938	1.7488
Inter-item Correlations	Mean		Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min
		.6265	.5521	.7516	.1995	1.3614

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
IDEA8	3.9872	3.1999	.6024	.3643	.8578
CA24	4.2407	2.2659	.7655	.6021	.6927
CA25	4.2514	2.2000	.7468	.5861	.7165

Reliability Coefficients 3 items

Alpha = .9327 Standardized item alpha = .9342
-- compute affvote= idea8 + ca24 + ca25.

Appendix

```
reliability variables=      subj  feel  solve  pstress  /statistics=descriptives  corr  scale=
/summary=all.
```

R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L L)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	SUBJ	1.4808	.7400	933.5
2.	FEEL	2.4230	.7341	933.5
3.	SOLVE	2.0928	.4649	933.5
4.	PSTRESS	2.3034	.8342	933.5

Correlation Matrix

	SUBJ	FEEL	SOLVE	PSTRESS
SUBJ	1.0000			
FEEL	.1891	1.0000		
SOLVE	.0922	.0608	1.0000	
PSTRESS	.1620	.0464	.1678	1.0000

N of Cases = 933.5

Statistics for	Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables			
Scale	8.3000	2.6959	1.6419	4			
Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance	
	1.0750	1.4808	2.4230	.9423	1.6363	.1756	
Item Variances	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance	
	.4996	.2162	.6959	.4797	3.2190	.0409	
Inter-item Covariances	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance	
	.0581	.0207	.1027	.0820	4.9545	.0012	
Inter-item Correlations	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance	
	.1197	.0464	.1891	.1428	4.0806	.0034	

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item- Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
SUBJ	6.8192	1.6793	.2446	.0625	.2040
FEEL	5.8769	1.8533	.1520	.0378	.3186
SOLVE	6.2072	2.2447	.1687	.0342	.3089
PSTRESS	5.9966	1.6131	.1826	.0499	.2987

Reliability Coefficients 4 items
Alpha = .3449 Standardized item alpha = .3523

```
-- compute afffeel= subj + fell + solve + pstress.
```

```
-----
compute honest2=a16.
recode honest2 (2=1) (3,9=2) (1=3).
-- reliability variables= ca15 honest honest2 /statistics=descriptives corr scale=
/summary=all.
```

R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L L)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	CA15	2.0070	.6266	921.6
2.	HONEST	1.3456	.6721	921.6
3.	HONEST2	1.3456	.6721	921.6

Correlation Matrix

	CA15	HONEST	HONEST2
CA15	1.0000		
HONEST	.3746	1.0000	
HONEST2	.3746	1.0000	1.0000

* * * Warning * * * Determinant of matrix is zero
Statistics based on inverse matrix for scale ALL
are meaningless and printed as .

Appendix

N of Cases =		921.6					
Statistics for		Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables		
Scale		4.6981	2.8309	1.6825	3		
Item Means		Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
		1.5660	1.3456	2.0070	.6614	1.4916	.1458
Item Variances		Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
		.4321	.3927	.4518	.0591	1.1505	.0012
Inter-item Covariances		Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
		.2558	.1578	.4518	.2940	2.8631	.0230
Inter-item Correlations		Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
		.5831	.3746	1.0000	.6254	2.6692	.1043

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
CA15	2.6911	1.8070	.3746	.	1.0000
HONEST	3.3526	1.1600	.8420	.	.5441
HONEST1	3.3526	1.1600	.8420	.	.5441

Reliability Coefficients 3 items

Alpha = .8132 Standardized item alpha = .8075

-- compute evaluat= ca15 + honest + honest1.

APPENDIX D: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

I. Checking for the Assumptions of Regression Analysis

The following assumptions of regression analysis are tested: linearity of relationship, assumptions related to error terms, and multicollinearity problems.

A) *Assumption of the linear relationship*

For an adequate regression model, the change in the dependent variable Y , associated with one unit increase in the X_i is constant regardless different levels of X . The violation of this assumption is tested using graphic techniques such as scatterplots of regression residuals, and scatterplots of regression residuals with continuous independent variables. Patterns of a tolerably linear relationship are observed in the graphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. This suggests random distribution of residuals around the zero line .

Figure 1: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 1.*

Appendix

Figure 2: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.*

Figure 3: *Regression Assumption: Linearity3.*

Appendix

Figure 4: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity4.*

The plotting independent variables with regression residuals are more visually understandable and easier interpretable (graphs 5-10). The random distribution of residuals around the zero line confirms that a serious problem of curvilinear relationship is not found among four regression models.

Figure 5: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity*

2.1

Figure 6: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.2.*

Appendix

Figure 7: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.3.*

Appendix

Figure 8: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.4.*

Figure 9: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.5.*

Figure 10: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.6.*

Figure 11: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.7.*

Figure 12: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity2.8.*

Figure 13: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity2.9.*

Figure 14: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.10.*

Figure 15: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity 2.11.*

Appendix

Figure 16: *Regression Assumptions: Linearity* 2.12.

B) *Checking for residuals*

The assumptions related to error terms imply that residuals are normally distributed.

1. The graphs 17-21 suggest that residuals in all four regression models have an acceptable normal distribution.

Figure 17: *Regression Assumptions: Normality of residuals* 1.1

Appendix

Figure 18: *Regression Assumptions: Normality of residuals 1.2*

Figure 19: *Regression Assumptions: Normality of residuals 1.3*

Appendix

Figure 20: *Regression Assumptions: Normality of residuals1.4*

2. Already presented graphs of independent variables against regression residuals do not manifest the problem of serious heteroscedasticity. It suggests that the variance of residuals is constant for all levels of X_i .

B) Checking for multicollinearity problem

This assumption implies that all independent variables, included in the regression model, can not be highly interrelated among themselves. Results of the regression analyses indicate that the problem of multicollinearity in the context of all regression models is not a serious issue. The values of Tolerance, associated with different independent variables, are not close to zero, and values of $\sqrt{VIF}$ do not exceed 2.

```
-- REGRESSION /MISSING PAIRWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA TOL -- /CRITERIA=PIN(.05)
POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT cognit /METHOD=ENTER affvote afffeel evaluat a37 relig1 a43 a45
isex dlit dstate
-- display dispersion cplace.
```

*** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ***

Pairwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. COGNIT

Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Appendix

```

AFFVOTE AFFFEEL EVALUAT A37      RELIG1  A43      A45      DSEX      DLIT      DSTATE
DRURAL  DPENSION CPLACE

```

```

Variables Entered on Step Number  1..  CPLACE
                                   2..  DPENSION
                                   3..  A37      Trust in people
                                   4..  AFFFEEL
                                   5..  EVALUAT
                                   6..  DSEX      dummy sex
                                   7..  A43      Age
                                   8..  DLIT
                                   9..  A45      Education
                                   10.. RELIG1
                                   11.. DSTATE
                                   12.. AFFVOTE
                                   13.. DRURAL

```

Multiple R	.50722	Analysis of Variance			
R Square	.25727		DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Adjusted R Square	.23083	Regression	13	1443.65612	111.05047
Standard Error	3.37819	Residual	365	4167.71288	11.41214
		F =	9.73091	Signif F =	.0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	Tolerance	VIF	T	Sig T
AFFVOTE	.340062	.093139	.203355	.655608	1.525	3.651	.0003
AFFFEEL	.530138	.112343	.225980	.886833	1.128	4.719	.0000
EVALUAT	.010586	.111631	.004624	.855371	1.169	.095	.9245
A37	.179328	.124254	.036879	.956211	1.046	.800	.4244
RELIG1	-.119170	.119334	-.052415	.738260	1.355	-.999	.3186
A43	.044465	.101056	.209273	.822448	1.216	4.208	.0000
A45	.586445	.132099	.222830	.807244	1.239	4.439	.0000
DSEX	.402608	.370165	.052084	.886891	1.128	1.088	.2775
DLIT	1.062493	.503136	.103414	.848043	1.179	2.112	.0354
DSTATE	.986328	.514463	.114338	.571812	1.749	1.917	.0560
DRURAL	.547255	.654428	.051379	.538747	1.856	.836	.4036
DPENSION	.452196	.516350	.055833	.500354	1.999	.876	.3917
CPLACE	.027602	.160432	.009080	.730243	1.369	.172	.8635
(Constant)	4.355942	1.422948				3.061	.0024

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

```

-- REGRESSION /MISSING PAIRWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT affvote /METHOD=ENTER cognit afffeel evaluat a37 relig1 a43 a45 dsex dlit
dstate drural dpension cplace.

```

* * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * *

```

Pairwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. AFFVOTE
Block Number 1. Method: Enter
COGNIT AFFFEEL EVALUAT A37      RELIG1  A43      A45      DSEX      DLIT      DSTATE
DRURAL  DPENSION CPLACE

```

```

Variables Entered on Step Number  1..  CPLACE
                                   2..  DPENSION
                                   3..  A37      Trust in people
                                   4..  AFFFEEL
                                   5..  EVALUAT
                                   6..  DSEX      dummy sex
                                   7..  A43      Age
                                   8..  DLIT
                                   9..  A45      Education
                                   10.. RELIG1
                                   11.. COGNIT
                                   12.. DSTATE
                                   13.. DRURAL

```

Multiple R	.60620	Analysis of Variance			
R Square	.36748		DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Adjusted R Square	.34496	Regression	13		787.39139
Standard Error	58.71141				

Appendix

Standard Error 1.86425 Residual 365 1269.22133 3.47541
F = 16.32105 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	Tolerance	VIF	T	Sig T
COGNIT	.103561	.028364	.173181	.769838	1.299	3.651	.0003
AFFFEEL	.160237	.063306	.114221	.850530	1.176	2.531	.0118
EVALUAT	-.364474	.058578	-.266229	.946023	1.057	-6.222	.0000
A37	-.054125	.123830	-.018614	.955039	1.047	-.437	.6623
RELIG1	.438721	.061819	.322678	.837786	1.194	7.097	.0000
A43	.008383	.005954	.065978	.788664	1.268	1.408	.1600
A45	.008173	.074839	.005193	.765936	1.306	.109	.9131
DSEX	.607822	.202118	.131491	.905919	1.104	3.007	.0028
DLIT	1.139438	.272908	.185459	.877804	1.139	4.175	.0000
DSTATE	-.288301	.284932	-.055888	.567701	1.761	-1.012	.3123
DRURAL	.088760	.361461	.013935	.537806	1.859	.246	.8062
DPENSION	.053218	.285232	.010988	.499353	2.003	.187	.8521
CPLACE	.360232	.086508	.198157	.764854	1.307	4.164	.0000
(Constant)	.276456	.795131				.348	.7283

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

REGRESSION/MISSING PAIRWISE/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA TOL/CRITERIA=PIN(.15)
POUT(.10)/NOORIGIN/DEPENDENT afffeel/METHOD=ENTER cognit affvote evaluat a37 relig1 a43 a45 dsex
dlit dstate drural dpension cplace.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Pairwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. AFFFEEL

Block Number 1. Method: Enter

COGNIT AFFVOTE EVALUAT A37 RELIG1 A43 A45 DSEX DLIT DSTATE
DRURAL DPENSION CPLACE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 1.. CPLACE
2.. DPENSION
3.. A37 Trust in people
4.. COGNIT
5.. EVALUAT
6.. DSEX dummy sex
7.. DLIT
8.. RELIG1
9.. A43 Age
10.. A45 Education
11.. DSTATE
12.. AFFVOTE
13.. DRURAL

Multiple R	.40513	Analysis of Variance	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
R Square	.16413	Regression	13	167.35049	12.87311
Adjusted R Square	.13438	Residual	365	852.24956	2.33365
Standard Error	1.52763	F =	5.51630	Signif F =	.0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	Tolerance	VIF	T	Sig T
COGNIT	.108407	.022973	.254318	.788014	1.269	4.719	.0000
AFFVOTE	.107595	.042508	.150942	.643616	1.554	2.531	.0118
EVALUAT	.060103	.050383	.061589	.858683	1.165	1.193	.2337
A37	.047948	.101467	.023133	.955123	1.047	.473	.6368
RELIG1	.038112	.054000	.039324	.737254	1.356	.706	.4808
A43	-.001671	.004892	-.018446	.784657	1.274	-.342	.7329
A45	-.064231	.061234	-.057255	.768218	1.302	-1.049	.2949
DSEX	.047379	.167643	.014379	.884220	1.131	.283	.7776
DLIT	.645486	.226399	.147388	.856461	1.168	2.851	.0046
DSTATE	.288138	.233324	.078359	.568478	1.759	1.235	.2177
DRURAL	.036935	.296212	.008135	.537740	1.860	.126	.9009
DPENSION	.103346	.233678	.029935	.499573	2.002	.442	.6586
CPLACE	.047557	.070371	.075294	.733817	1.363	1.348	.1795
(Constant)	4.704863	.603371				7.798	.0000

Appendix

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

REGRESSION /MISSING PAIRWISE/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA TOL /CRITERIA=PIN<.15 /
 RONT<.10 /NOORIGIN/DEPENDENT evaluat/METHOD=ENTER cognit affvote afffeel a37 relig1 a43 a45 dsex
 dlit dstate drural dpension cplace.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Pairwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. EVALUAT

Block Number 1. Method: Enter

COGNIT AFFVOTE AFFFEEL A37 RELIG1 A43 A45 DSEX DLIT DSTATE
 DRURAL DPENSION CPLACE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 1.. CPLACE
 2.. DPENSION
 3.. A37 Trust in people
 4.. AFFFEEL
 5.. DSEX dummy sex
 6.. A43 Age
 7.. DLIT
 8.. A45 Education
 9.. RELIG1
 10.. COGNIT
 11.. DSTATE
 12.. AFFVOTE
 13.. DRURAL

Multiple R	.38033	Analysis of Variance			
R Square	.14465		DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Adjusted R Square	.11420	Regression	13	154.86719	11.91286
Standard Error	1.58353	Residual	365	915.76467	2.50757

F = 4.75076 Signif F = .0000

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	Tolerance	VIF	T	Sig T
COGNIT	.002326	.024529	.005325	.742745	1.346	.095	.9245
AFFVOTE	-.262974	.042265	-.360018	.699571	1.429	-6.222	.0000
AFFFEEL	.064583	.054138	.063025	.839124	1.192	1.193	.2337
A37	.261050	.104321	.122905	.970906	1.030	2.502	.0128
RELIG1	.031885	.055990	.032106	.736904	1.357	.569	.5694
A43	.003516	.005068	.037982	.785441	1.273	.694	.4883
A45	.010632	.063568	.009249	.765970	1.306	.167	.8673
DSEX	.191648	.173507	.056759	.886980	1.127	1.105	.2701
DLIT	-.005925	.237282	-.001320	.837814	1.194	-.025	.9801
DSTATE	-.052008	.242351	-.013802	.566185	1.766	-.215	.8302
DRURAL	-.254176	.306770	-.054632	.538728	1.856	-.829	.4079
DPENSION	.179428	.242112	.050719	.500057	2.000	.741	.4591
CPLACE	-.081370	.075085	-.061277	.732532	1.365	-1.084	.2790
(Constant)	5.119251	.620127				8.255	.0000

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.