The Pacification of Radical Dissent: An Anti-Security Analysis of the Toronto G20 Joint Intelligence Group

By: Nicholas Lamb

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
In
Legal Studies

Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario

Nicholas Lamb ©2012
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:
L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n’y aura aucun contenu manquant.
Abstract

This thesis examines the Toronto G20 security operation as a “pacification project”. By providing an anarchist, “anti-security” analysis of the G20 Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) I argue that this approach holds the promise of understanding security as a productive power that is mobilized to fabricate and reinforce a capitalist social order. I offer evidence that the JIG fulfilled the surveillance function of the G20 pacification project by carrying out a joint forces security (counter) intelligence operation. The JIG consisted of a ‘joint forces operation’ involving an extensive ‘summit intelligence network’ composed of 26 police departments, military and state intelligence units, and over a hundred corporate and government agencies. The JIG also deployed an array of ‘security intelligence’ (SI) and ‘counterintelligence’ (CI) techniques primarily targeting radical activists. Moreover, I demonstrate that the JIG invoked legislation and employed discourses of criminality to enable and rationalize its SI and CI on anti-G20 activists.
Table of Contents of Thesis

Abstract / ii
Acronyms / v

Prologue: To Catch the Jester / 1

Chapter 1: Introduction / 17

Chapter 2: Anarchist Research: Method / 22
  Reflexive mode of analysis / 25
  Anarchist Politics / 28
  Anarchist Criminology / 32

Chapter 3: Pacification: Theory / 41
  Anti-Security / 41
  How “intelligent” is control?: A critical review / 44
  Protest Policing and Surveillance as a ‘Pacification Project’ / 58
  The Conceptual Utility of Pacification / 60
  Studying the G20 Intelligence Operation as a Pacification Project / 66

Chapter 4: An Anti-Security Analysis of the JIG’s Network / 75
  Establishment, headquarters, and function of JIG / 75
  JIG’s Joint Forces Operation / 76
  Liaison Management Team / 78
  JIG’s Command Structure / 84

Chapter 5: An Anti-Security Analysis of the JIG’s Operation / 87
  Security Intelligence / 88
  Security Counterintelligence / 91
  Primary Intelligence Investigative Team / 92
  Analytical Team / 125
  Intelligence Information Management Team / 177

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Implications / 179
## Acronyms found in Thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Analytical Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AW@L</td>
<td>Anti-War at Laurier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDC</td>
<td>Canadian Bomb Data Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCN</td>
<td>Collectif du Chat Noir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFNCIUUs</td>
<td>Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counter-Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICI</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Criminal Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILMT</td>
<td>Corporate Intelligence Liaison Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISO</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAC</td>
<td>la Convergence des Luttes Anti-Capitaliste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COT</td>
<td>Covert Operations Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Correctional Service Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security Establishment Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>Community Relations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILMT</td>
<td>Domestic Intelligence Liaison Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Event Monitoring Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMIOA</td>
<td>Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAT</td>
<td>Independent Asymmetric Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBETs</td>
<td>Integrated Border Enforcement Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIFs</td>
<td>Intake Information Forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IILMT</td>
<td>International Intelligence Liaison Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIMT</td>
<td>Intelligence Information Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Internet Monitoring Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSETs</td>
<td>Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPs</td>
<td>Internationally Protected Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Integrated Security Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITAC</td>
<td>Integrated Threat Assessment Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZ</td>
<td>Interdiction Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIG</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>JIG Operation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMT</td>
<td>Liaison Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Long Range Acoustic Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCMM</td>
<td>Major Case Management Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOB</td>
<td>Main Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICC</td>
<td>Major Incident Command Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTCC</td>
<td>Metro Toronto Convention Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCOB</td>
<td>National Security Criminal Operations Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSESs</td>
<td>National Security Enforcement Sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSIS</td>
<td>National Security Investigations Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSMs</td>
<td>Newest Social Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSTAS</td>
<td>National Security Threat Assessment Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>Ontario Provincial Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGA</td>
<td>People’s Global Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIIT</td>
<td>Primary Intelligence Investigation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Persons of Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POU</td>
<td>Public Order Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Prisoner Processing Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Peel Regional Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWPA</td>
<td>Public Works Protection Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAZ</td>
<td>Restricted Access Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBC</td>
<td>Royal Bank of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Security Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIU</td>
<td>Special Investigation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOs</td>
<td>Security Liaison Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Summit Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOAR</td>
<td>Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCMN</td>
<td>Toronto Community Mobilization Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Toronto Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>Unified Command Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIPs</td>
<td>Very Important Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prologue: To Catch the Jester

During a rainy weekend in late June 2010, thousands of protesters converged in the streets of Toronto and engaged in various tactics of resistance against an elite global governance event known as the G20 Summit. By Saturday afternoon the raucous dissidents had taken over the downtown core of the city, disrupting the business-as-usual routines of the weekend shoppers, retail managers and workaholic financiers. Chanting, “Who’s streets? Our streets!” and other defiant slogans, the thick protest crowd swarmed down several main roads, until it was prevented from marching any further into the “security zone” by contingents of shielded and baton wielding tactical troops of the G20 Integrated Security Unit (ISU). Undeterred, the protesters splintered off into numerous clusters, and began to filter through various intersections and avenues surrounding the massive multi-million dollar security fence that was erected around the Metro Toronto Convention Center (MTCC). Instead of the normal consumerist spectacle, the downtown streets outside the fence were filled with extraordinary array of dissident sights and sounds. For instance, many protesters sang solidarity songs and voiced political ideas with one another, some confronted the militarized riot squads and teased them about their mechanical and clumsy movements, while others sat or laid their bodies down in front of encroaching police lines, vehicles, and obstacles. There were also musicians, clowns, and cheerleaders performing their rebellious street art alongside activist legal observers (copwatchers), street medics, and alternative media teams within the protest crowd. At one point, a smaller militant portion of protesters separated into numerous

---

1 I engaged in a short but stimulating philosophical debate with a protester distributing a Marxist-Leninist newspaper. The conversation became stale however when the topic turned to whether it was the Communists or Anarchists that were the more revolutionary force during the Spanish Civil War...
affinity groups and carried out the ‘black bloc tactic’\(^2\) of snaking past police barricades, spray painting anti-capitalist and anarchist denunciations, and damaging corporate and government property including infamously burning four abandoned police cruisers.\(^3\)

Indeed, while global elites mingled around a fake million dollar lake,\(^4\) outside their heavily fortified confines, thousands of protesters were engaging in a diversity of tactics in response to the G20 and its processes of managing and implementing neoliberal globalization.\(^5\)

Amongst the multitude converging in the streets that weekend was a “Jester”, or at the very least, a tall young man wearing a jester’s hat. Before the G20, neither I nor anyone else even considered me a jester. Indeed, as we will see, it was only through my participation in anti-G20 dissent and subsequent encounter with the G20 pacification project that I acquired a new subjectivity. Just prior to going to Toronto I decided to wear

---

\(^2\) The black bloc has been a consistent presence at anti-globalization protests and manifests when anarchist affinity groups strategically gather and engage in police confrontation, blockades, and targeted property destruction. They wear black clothing and cover their faces with bandannas in order to produce anonymity and militant solidarity during mass protests. Luis Fernandez explains that the tactic has been “[a]dopted by North American anarchists in the late 1990s,” but was “developed in the 1980s in the European autonomous movement to make police surveillance and control more difficult... Since then, the black bloc has been common at anti-globalization protests and is a common police excuse for targeting the movement.” *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 58-59.


\(^5\) Neoliberal globalization can be conceptualized as an ongoing and multidimensional process that is radically reconfiguring nation-states, political economies, and cultures based on hegemonic discourses and processes which prioritize economic growth and the large-scale mobility of capital. According to political economist Stephen Gill, the neoliberal globalization concept “serves to reify a global economic system dominated by large institutional investors and transnational firms that control the bulk of the world’s productive assets, and that are the principal influences in world trade and financial markets.” *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, 2nd Ed, (London: Macmillan-Palgrave, 2008), 130. This multidimensional process encompasses economic, political and socio-cultural domains. For a more comprehensive conceptualization that thoroughly describes these interconnected spheres of globalization see Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 42-50
an orange and black jester’s hat as “a satirical symbol of dissent.” But during the protest my jester hat was used by police in identifying me as a target that needed to be under surveillance and inevitably arrested. In other words, my “G20 experience” included being covertly monitored, detained, and eventually prosecuted for an action I did not commit.

Another “distinctive” part of my costume was my T-Shirt. It had a menacing message that denounced the G20 for what it is- a plutocracy: a governing bureaucracy entrenched in state-corporate capitalism that prioritizes the maintenance and accumulation of power for the wealthy above all other interests. I thought such a slanderous statement was a biting criticism for an institution that publicly legitimates itself by claiming to be a “premier forum of international cooperation on the most important aspects of the international economic and financial agenda.” For me and many others participating in the newest social movements, the G20 like the G8, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Economic Forum, are critically understood as institutions that function to manage and implement neoliberal capitalism which has the effect of intensifying social inequalities, injustices, and oppressions.

---

9 I employ anarchist theorist Richard J.F. Day’s terms the newest social movements and contemporary radical activism in this thesis rather than relying on terms like ‘anti-globalization’, ‘alter-globalization’, or ‘global justice movement’ to describe the complex phenomenon given rise to the anti-G20 protest. Or see his article “From hegemony to Affinity: The political logic of the newest social movements”, Cultural Studies, 18 no. 5 (2004): 716-748 and book Gramsci is Dead, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005)
10 For Day there is no single enemy that the newest social movements are fighting against but rather there are various struggles, “each of which needs to be addressed in its particularity”. The ongoing process of globalizing capital, however, means that all these contemporary struggles tend to occur in a common socio-political context. Day employs the term neoliberal project to describe the “ongoing globalization of capital, as well as the intensification of the societies of control; it also relies upon and perpetuates shifts in the organization of the system of states, through regional agreements such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the construction of superstates such as the European Union.” (Day 2005: 6).
the lead up to the anti-G20 convergence, activist websites like *attack the roots*, exposed the interconnected oppressions stemming from G8/G20 Summits by stating that these 

“[m]eetings are rooted in capitalism, in war, in greed, in patriarchy, in imperialism, in 

racism and in neo-colonialism.”  

These anti-democratic events, with their agenda to produce harmful and disastrous policies, deserved to be protested against and even disrupted like the WTO meeting was in Seattle 1999. Personally, I perceived the G20 Summit as an *elite global governance event* between state and corporate elites who were making major global political-economic decisions that sustained and advanced hegemonic power-knowledge relations and interests at the expense of the majority of the human population. Analytically, I agreed with Luis Fernandez that the G20 and G8 are “globocracies”, composed of the twenty and eight most wealthiest economies in the world, that operate as ‘steering committees’ for late capitalist globalization. The Group of 8 and the Group of 20 Summits are international events in which representatives from the most powerful economies meet to discuss current global economic and security issues. There are two general functions that these global governance institutions carry

importantly notes that neoliberal capitalist societies are divided according to multiple and intersecting lines of social inequality based on gender, race, sexuality, ability, age, and location, and the domination of natural resources and animal life. The neoliberal project entails a “complex web of practices and institutions that have the effect of perpetuating and multiplying various forms of interlocking oppression. These allow ‘populations’ to be divided and managed, and our daily lives to be more intensely immersed in capitalist accumulation and rational-bureaucratic control.” *Day, Gramsci is Dead*, 6.

While editing the thesis (two years after the Toronto G20) I noticed that the website has since been transformed into a blog unrelated to anti-G20 dissent.

Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 50

According to ISU-JIG document F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, *Threat Assessment Reports*] the following international protected persons (a.k.a. global elites) attended the 2010 Toronto G20: African Union Chairman Bingo Wa Muthfirka; Algeria President Abdelaziz Boutefika; Argentina President Cristina Fernandez De Kirchner; Association Of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan; Australia Prime Minister Kevin Rudd; Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva; China President Hu Jin Tao; Columbia President Alvaro Uribe Velez; Ethiopia President Girma Wolde-Giorgis; European Union Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso; European Union Councilor Herman Van Rompuy; France President Nicolas Sarkozy; Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel; Haiti President Rene Preval; International Monetary Fund Managing Director Dominique Straus-Kahn; Italy President Silvio
out: First, they produce a significant agenda setting process for members and non-member governments by imposing action-forcing deadlines, creating imperial initiatives, and inducing nation-states to align their positions on issues that the G8 and G20 Summits highlight. Second, the G8 and G20 elites act as authoritative policy makers managing and implementing global neoliberal governance. Not surprisingly, the professed goals for 2010 Huntsville G8 and Toronto G20 included “strengthening international financial institutions”, “pledging to avoid self-interested economic policies that threaten the global economy”, and “pushing for a commitment to reducing trade barriers”. In short, I critically interpreted these annual meetings of representatives from the richest economies as elite global governance events that perpetuate and steer neoliberal capitalist globalization. Hence, my intentions for going to Toronto were primarily political in that I wanted to converge with thousands of others and participate in a ‘diversity of tactics’ to protest the G20.

Of course I was not the only one to experience this feeling of incitement. According to the website Crimethinc, although radical activists “were already preparing

Berlusconi; Japan Prime Minister Naoto Kan; UK Prime Minister David Cameron; Russia President Dmitry Medvedev; USA President Barack Obama

Fernandez, Policing Dissent, 50

Contrary to conventional thought, neoliberal globalization is not happening spontaneously or organically. Rather it is a concrete political project being implemented by state and corporate elites through various global governance institutions like the G20. Indeed, Day argues that “capitalist globalization…is a result of conscious planning on the part of global financial and governmental elites that meet precisely for this purpose on an increasingly regular basis.” Gramsci is Dead, 8.


During anti-summit mass protests, radical activists tend to adopt a diversity of tactics which is an agreement that no one resistance strategy governs the actions of protesters in the streets. To ensure solidarity between groups during mass demonstrations, participants are asked to respect and not publicly scrutinize others who carryout direct action tactics different from their own. See Fernandez, Policing Dissent, 52. For instance, prior to the Toronto G20 the Toronto Community Mobilization Network released a statement calling for solidarity and respect of a diversity of tactics during the anti-G20 convergence considering “[w]e believe that if we are to truly build a socially just world, it will take many different tactics, much creativity and many different approaches. It is this that allows us to work together even when we disagree.” See “Solidarity and Respect”, Toronto Community Mobilization Network, accessed June 23 2011, http://g20.torontomobilize.org/SolidarityRespect

5
for the G8 in Huntsville the announcement that a major summit would be held in the
downtown core of Canada’s largest city created a stir among anarchists, and generated
significant momentum for counter-summit actions to take place in Toronto.”

Living in Ottawa, I felt compelled to seek out a local group that was organizing and building
awareness of anti-G20 dissent. In particular, I saw this as an opportunity to begin
participating in what Day refers to as “contemporary radical activism”. Fortunately, I
found a radical anti-G20 activist group called Le Collectif du Chat Noir (CCN) through
an Ottawa activist website. The temporary collective was open and accessible to anyone
interested in organizing for anti-summit actions. It was strategically created for anti-G20
organizing and was composed of passionate activists committed to mobilizing resistance
against the Toronto G20 in the Ottawa-Gatineau region. While the other activists in the
collective were much more experienced and effective at mobilizing and spreading
awareness of anti-G20 dissent than me, I did learn about how much effort, trust, and
competence is required in order to organize supporters and plan ‘direct actions’. For

---

19 For Day, contemporary radical activism involves a collective conscious effort at altering, impeding,
disrupting, and constructing alternatives to existing “dominant structures, processes, practices, and
identities”. While not completely dismissing attempts to alter the status quo, radical groups within the
newest social movements (NSMs) are pushing beyond the potentialities and constraints of liberal
progressive reform by attempting to transform the root of the current social order outside of state and
corporate structures. Radical activists desire to not only resist current techniques of domination, but also the
forms/structures/networks that give rise to them. See Day, Gramsci is Dead, 4
20 I found out about the collective from OPIRG-Ottawa/GRIPO-Ottawa, a student activist website:
http://www.opirg-gripo.ca/
21 I employ the term direct action to describe the grassroots activist practice of carrying out political
strategies and tactics to confront, disrupt, and alter the forms of domination and exploitation without
appealing to centralized governmental authority to do so. David Graeber explains that contemporary radical
activists are rejecting “a politics which appeals to governments to modify their behavior, in favour of
physical intervention against state power in a form that itself prefigures and alternative”. “The New
Anarchists”, New Left Review, 13 (2002): 62. Indeed, the practice of direct action has also been recognized
by Day and Fernandez as a strong current in contemporary radical activism. Day argues that direct action
politics are radical because its tactics attempt to intervene, confront, and disrupt state and corporate power
relations in order to “prefigure, or in some cases create, alternatives to the existing order.” Gramsci is
Dead, 19. Fernandez explains that protest direct actions in particular resist reject the mainstream activist
instance, among other assets, mobilizing dissent requires well-informed activists that can effectively spread local awareness about the upcoming mass protest, plan logistics and pre-summit actions, and communicate with other local and out-of-town activist networks. Although I felt comparatively inept, CCN members welcomed me into the activist collective, trusting me with sensitive information, and carrying out various tasks. I was also encouraged to participate in all of the decisions and direct actions that the collective undertook. In doing so I saw how CCN, like many other radical anti-G20 groups, adhered to the hallmarks of the People’s Global Action. PGA refers to a worldwide coordination of radical grassroots campaigns and direct actions in resistance to capitalism while also pursuing social and environmental justice. CCN was part of this transnational activist network by subscribing to its militant, autonomous, anti-capitalist, and anti-authoritarian principles. In other words, the collective shared PGA’s aversion to “hierarchical structures, centralized leadership, and spokespersons representing the compulsion to seek “marching and protest permits, respect protest zones, or negotiate with police before in action.” Some direct actions involve the targeted destruction or vandalism of corporate and state property. During summit protests like the G20, direct actions may also entail “tearing down fences erected to protect meeting areas.” Policing Dissent, 55.

22 In March 2010, Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR) made a public call out for a militant march towards the security fence on Saturday June 26th afternoon after the Labour Union rally. While mainstream and some anti-capitalist groups condemned SOARs proposed concerted attack on the security fence, CCN members including myself voted to support SOAR’s direct action and anyone from our collective who desired to take part.

23 According to Crimethinc’s “Toronto G20: Eyewitness Report”, other radical groups mobilizing for the anti-G20 resistance included Anti-War at Laurier (AW@L), Convergence des Luttes Anticapitalistes (CLAC), No One Is Illegal, Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), and Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR). Alongside this mobilization of radical activism, many non-governmental organizations, labor unions, students, faith-based and public interest groups were also organizing for protests during the Summits. In particular, the “People’s Summit: Building a Movement for a Just World” was organized and attended by groups such as Canadian Federation of Students, Canadian Labour Congress, Council of Canadians, Greenpeace, Oxfam, Rainforest Action Network, Sierra Youth Coalition, Canadian Union of Public Employees Ontario, Make Poverty History, Save the Children, World Vision, Oxfam, The World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, The Assembly of First Nations, World Vision Canada, Climate Action Network, and the Canadian Peace Alliance. See “Who’s who at the summits”, CBC News, June 9, 2010 accessed September 22, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/06/04/f-g8-g20-protesters.html
network.” In doing so, CCN employed an anarchist philosophy of coordination and radical democracy that emphasized autonomy, decentralization, and direct action to confront the capitalist social order. For months, the collective’s committees raised local awareness (through posterling, leafleting, banner drops etc.) planned pre-G20 direct actions, and organized necessary resources (e.g. travel, housing accommodations, and legal support) which, in turn, enabled many Ottawa and Gatineau residents to converge in Toronto and join anti-G20 mass demonstrations come June 25-27th, 2010. Indeed, by joining and participating in CCN, a group supporting a diversity of resistance tactics and committed to network-based, decentralized, and non-hierarchical modes of organizing, I experienced firsthand the potency of contemporary radical activism of the newest social movements against neoliberal capitalist globalization.

Another strong motivation for being in Toronto that weekend was for analytical reasons. My intention was to directly observe and experience the array of policing tactics that I presumed protesters would be subjected to during the mass demonstrations. As a graduate student who was intellectually curious about the social control of dissent in Canada, participating in a mass protest in Toronto seemed like an obvious place to spend a summer weekend. Indeed, following Fernandez’s approach, it was an opportunity to open myself “to the emotions, fears, and frustrations” of activists

24 Ruth Reitan, *Global Activism* (Great Britain: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 188
25 For instance, the collective protested the March ministerial meeting held in Gatineau, and also protested welfare cuts at a Liberal Party office in Ottawa.
26 For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of radical anti-G20 activism that occurred in Toronto starting six months prior to the summit see Mac Scott, “G20 mobilizing in Toronto and community organizing: opportunities created and lessons learned”, *Interface: a journal for and about social movements* 3, no. 1 (2011): 185-189.
experiencing surveillance and social control in real time on the streets during a protest.\textsuperscript{28}

Therefore, in addition to my political objective of partaking in anti-G20 resistance, I also intended to engage in participant-observational research, in which the researcher is directly involved in the social phenomena that they are analyzing.

So after months of engaging in anti-G20 organizing and researching the social control of dissent/protest, I was excited to finally travel to Toronto in order to partake in what I believed was going to be a very strong resistance against the G20. But before doing so I visited my family and explained to them the various reasons I felt compelled to join others protesting the G20. While voicing some concern for my personal safety, my parents were very supportive and wished me luck at my very first mass protest. So on Thursday June 24\textsuperscript{th} I jumped on a bus heading towards Toronto. I arrived in the city in the evening and my good friend from my undergrad days Big-I met me at the downtown terminal. As we made our way towards his place to crash for the night, I could instantly tell that the city had been transformed since I last visited. The first thing I noticed was the sheer number of police officers circulating about on the streets. When we walked past one group of officers, I saw that their uniforms indicated that they were from the Calgary Police Service. Minutes later, I noticed several cops from Sudbury, then detachments from Barrie, Niagara Falls, and Windsor. I assumed that the RCMP and OPP would likely be assisting the Toronto police in carrying out summit security but this was the first indication I had that the G20 ISU was made up of a much more extensive police network

\textsuperscript{28} Fernandez, \textit{Policing Dissent}, 40. See also his chapter “Being there: Thoughts on anarchism and participatory observation” in \textit{Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An introductory anthology of anarchy in the academy} (New York: Routledge, 2009). In particular, Fernandez explains that a participant observational approach can teach “scholars, anarchists, and thinkers...many things, including our own subjectivity and mortality, and the limits of our understanding. And these experiences only come from being there, by placing ourselves within and among the lives of those who suffer, by running risks and, if only momentarily, by placing our privilege into sharp focus” (94).
than I had imagined. As we continued walking through the downtown core observing the diversity of police agencies, I soon realized that the police were watching us too. At one point, a black SUV slowly drove past us and as it did we saw a cop in the back seat pointing a handheld video camera at us. Before retiring at Big-I’s place for the night, we also caught a glimpse of the enormous security fence which stood three metres high and stretched six kilometres around the Convention Centre.  

On Friday June 25th, it was around noon when we made our way to Allan Gardens Park. It was in this convergence space that we expected to join thousands of other anti-G20 protesters preparing for the planned mass march throughout the downtown core.  

Perhaps because I was so excited to finally participate in my first protest, I barely noticed the contingent of police cyclists patrolling the perimeter of the park. But as soon as they stepped onto the grassy landscape, one cop took notice and pedalled quickly towards the two of us. Stopping just beside me, he immediately requested to see the contents of our bags. A little surprised at the blatant attempt to impede access to a public park without having to be searched by an armed agent of the state, we both refused the officer’s command and tried to continue walking into the park. But after only a few steps the cop swiftly manoeuvred himself and his mountain bike in front of us. He again told us to stop and then called for assistance over his radio device that was clamped firmly on the shoulder of his Toronto Police Service uniform. Seconds later, we found ourselves encircled by several police cyclists. Accompanied by his colleagues in blue, the officer

---


30 On their website, the *Toronto Community Mobilization Network* publicized the Friday event: “2:30pm, Allan Gardens (Carlton Street between Jarvis and Sherbourne Street) Free the Streets! March. Block Party.” See “Events” http://g20.torontomobilize.org/
again requested to see the contents of our bags but now added that his demand was made pursuant to the enactment of the “Public Works Protection Act” (PWPA) which supposedly allowed the police to identify and search individuals attempting to enter the park. Shocked that such a law even existed, I asked the bicycle cop to elaborate. He concisely explained that certain areas around the city including the park were designated as a “public work” which gave the police extra law enforcement powers to identify and search citizens. Oblivious to the fact that the PWPA’s jurisdiction only applied to space within the security zone kilometers away, and believing that these armed agents were unlikely to let us enter the park without searching our bags, we reluctantly “consented” to the search by exposing their contents. The cop gazed into my bag and pulled out my jester hat. Noticeably befuddled over the object, he asked me what it was. I simply replied that it was my hat. After a few tense moments of examining it, the officer gave back this pivotal piece of my costume. He then motioned to the both of us that we were now allowed to enter the park. Although the TPS officer searched my friend and I as we were trying to enter a public park by using a law that I had never even heard of before, I was relieved that he let me keep, what now seemed to be, my very menacing hat!

While some confrontations and arrests occurred during Friday’s “Free the Streets!” action, by the evening the mass march fizzled out around University Avenue and Dundas Street.31 We met up with Big-I’s girlfriend KT and the three of us went to Massey Hall and listened to Canadian author Naomi Klein and others speak about the political-economic injustices that were being maintained and perpetuated by the G20/G8 institutions. Afterwards, we headed back to Big-I’s place in order to get good night’s rest.

We believed that Saturday was going to be an even bigger day of action. Little did we know at the time that it was also going to be an intense day of pacification.

On Saturday June 26th, with the intention of participating in a Queens Park rally and then a mass march throughout the downtown streets of Toronto, the three of us left the house around 1pm. But before doing so, I donned my dissident costume. Wearing my jester hat, ski goggles, a Che Guavara bandanna, a black shirt with a logo of middle finger and the words “G20 Plutocracy” painted underneath, and a pair of green landscaping pants, I felt ready to protest. On our way to Queens Park we walked to a pharmacy where KT bought a small bottle of vinegar. I believed vinegar soaked bandanas would provide some protection in case the police got rowdy and deployed tear gas during the demonstration. I became knowledgeable about this defensive measure when I travelled to Toronto and attended a legal observer meeting hosted weeks before by the Movement Defense Committee.\footnote{\textit{\textsuperscript{32}} “G20 Legal Support”, \textit{Movement Defence Committee}, accessed June 2, 2012 \texttt{http://movementdefence.org/}} After KT’s purchase and thus equipped with the necessary ingredients to defend against tear gas, we continued our way towards Queens Park.

We arrived shortly after 1pm. I was very pleased to see that there were already thousands of protesters in the park. After half hour or so of rallying, the large protest crowd gradually filtered out of the park and began marching down University Avenue towards the security fence several kilometers away. The three of us walked together down the streets for well over an hour beside an Animal Liberation affinity group. At one point, I wanted to get a glimpse of how big the march was in front of us so I let Big-I and KT know that I would be back in a few minutes and walked onto the sidewalk in order to
observe the crowd ahead. I was again amazed at how large the protest crowd was. After a couple of minutes of observing this, I attempted to locate and re-join my friends within the massive moving demonstration. But for about fifteen minutes I had trouble finding them. During that time, I observed tactical troops forcefully preventing a section of the march from turning onto an adjoining side street. As I made my way closer to this confrontation, I witnessed riot police swinging and hitting several protesters on the head with their sticks. One protester was struck by a police baton and collapsed in front of me. He began shaking on the ground. Swiftly, another protester and I lifted him up off the ground. To my left the police were continuing to beat and push protesters. Eventually, I bypassed this skirmish, and continued marching on the permitted path with the rest of the crowd. Minutes later, I spotted Big-I and KT several meters ahead and caught up to their section.

At around 3pm the march came to a standstill near the intersection of Queen and Spadina when a massive police line prevented the protesters from marching any further. The three of us hung out near the front of the crowd, unsure whether the march would continue or not. We spent the time surveying our surroundings and chatting with fellow protesters. It was a festive atmosphere. We chanted various slogans like “This is what democracy looks like!” However, I also kept a close eye on the police units assembling several meters away. Behind the front police line dozens of other officers seemed to be mobilizing including a contingent of cops on large horses. Nevertheless, we continued mingling with other protesters and even began playing a rebellious game of ‘protester-protester-cop’. It was around this time that I noticed the police began donning gas masks. We jokingly boasted that our radical version of ‘duck-duck-goose’ must have spooked
the authorities. Nonetheless, we knew this wasn’t a laughing matter and we began pulling out our sandwich bags filled with vinegar soaked bandannas.

While we rummaged for our vinegar-soaked bandannas, two undercover police agents were directly beside us, covertly observing our activities. Detective Constable Marc Beausoleil and Sgt. Shannon Dawson of the Toronto Police Service were dressed as anti-G20 protesters as they photographed us and made observation notes of my friend and me. While collecting intelligence, they were also tasked by their police handlers “to maintain a watchful eye over [Toronto Police] Officer Sean Sutton” who was another undercover cop embedded nearby within the same large crowd of protesters. Sutton’s covert surveillance, however, was far more comprehensive than the other two undercover cops. He had infiltrated the activist legal support team and was posing as a police officer. Instead of fulfilling his role responsibility of recording the rampant civil rights violations made by law enforcement that day, he was providing intelligence and information on the identities, activities and movements of protesters. Operating as a team, the three undercover agents made up one of several “Event Monitoring Units” (EMU) deployed throughout the city that day by the G20 ISU’s Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). The three agents in this particular EMU reported to their supervisors that my friend and I “were making Molotov cocktails” after somehow confusing plastic bags for “small glass juice containers” and the smell of vinegar for “gasoline”!

Oblivious to the surveillance that we were being subjected to, we finished our tear gas defenses and joined a dozen or so other protesters now sitting with their backs toward

---

32 Byrne, “Respondent’s Factum”, 3
33 Byrne, “Respondent’s Factum”, 3
34 Lamb field notes from Officer Sutton’s testimony during R v. Lamb 2011
35 Byrne, “Respondent’s Factum”, 3
the police line. For a while, our stationary bodies acted as an effective obstacle, preventing the tactical troops from further corralling the protest crowd on Spadina Avenue. During these anxious moments, KT and Big-I read out passages from philosopher Cornel West's book *Democracy Matters*.\(^{36}\) Perhaps this was interpreted as offensive left-wing propaganda because within moments the police quickly surrounded our small group and a snatch squad of three or four cops attempted to seize us. I had no intention of being detained so I desperately jumped to my feet and pushed past the police scrum back into the larger crowd of protesters a few metres away. Moments later I realized that my friends were not as lucky. I caught a glimpse of them being quickly escorted away by the police snatch squad somewhere behind the re-formed police line.

While naively hoping to get a phone call from my arrested comrades, I spent the rest of the afternoon joining several protest clusters and observing the tumultuous environment that had befallen downtown Toronto. For a couple of hours I roamed through various streets captivated by extraordinary scenes of anti-G20 resistance and police repression. At around six o’clock, I found myself with a very small group of protesters in front of the security fence fortifying the Convention Centre. I eventually decided to walk southbound down Blue Jay Way in order to join another large protest crowd that I could see gathering at the end of the narrow street. As I walked towards the other protesters, I noticed two police officers in front of me slowly emerging from behind the security fence. Without any verbal warning, they suddenly sprinted directly towards me. I froze. Before I knew it, I was tackled to the ground by the charging cops. While in a strong choke hold, I felt several punches and knee kicks strike the right side of my

stomach. Although my body could not have been any more limp and submissive, Police
Constable Anton Wilson, the officer choking me, repeatedly yelled “stop resisting!!!”
As I was finally lifted to my feet and handcuffed tightly with plastic ties, I thought even
then that PC Wilson’s self-serving declaration not to resist, albeit cosmetic under the
circumstances, had a larger truth to it. While I did not physically resist my overzealous
arresters, I, along with thousands of others,\textsuperscript{37} was resisting that weekend in “Fortress
Toronto”.\textsuperscript{38}

With my hands tightly secured behind my back, I was swiftly taken by PC Wilson
and the other arresting officer behind the security fence. While being escorted I
repeatedly asked why I was being arrested but was not provided an answer. We stopped
near the side of a building and PC Wilson frisked me. The officer pulled out all my
possessions from my pockets including my wallet. I was then asked whether I was indeed
Nicholas Lamb and I confirmed that I was. Again, I asked him why I was arrested. The
cop finally responded, “I was just told to catch the Jester.”

\textsuperscript{37}“Toronto Peaceful beginnings, violent ending as G20 protests grip Toronto”, \textit{The Toronto Star}, June 26,
\textsuperscript{38}Amy Goodman, John Clarke and Sharmeen Khan, “Fortress Toronto: Massive Security
Clampdown for G8/G20 Meetings Most Expensive in Canadian History”, \textit{Democracy Now}. Podcast June
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/6/25/fortress_toronto_massive_security_clampdown_for
Chapter 1: Introduction

Anticipating resistance, the Canadian government, the military, and a network of policing and security agencies organized and carried out a billion dollar security operation in order to protect global power elites and to facilitate the Toronto 2010 G20. Securing the summit entailed both the largest police and intelligence operations in Canadian history.\(^{39}\) Before and during the G20, dissidents were subjected to various social control and surveillance measures including (but not limited to) mass arrests,\(^{40}\) preemptive police raids and detentions,\(^{41}\) the secretive enactment and vigorous enforcement of wartime legislation,\(^{42}\) the ‘kettling’ of hundreds of protesters,\(^{43}\) the infiltration and disruption of activist groups,\(^{44}\) the snatching of protesters within crowds,\(^{45}\) the firing of tear gas\(^{46}\) and rubber bullets,\(^{47}\) covert monitoring of protest activities, and interrogations.

As illustrated in the prologue, I witnessed and experienced some of these policing tactics first-hand during the G20 weekend. However, the substantive focus of this thesis is on the

\(^{40}\) In the days leading up to and over the course of the G20 summit weekend 1,105 people were arrested, making it the largest mass arrest in Canadian history. See Canadian Civil Liberties Association, *G-20 mass arrests by the numbers*. Last modified July 7, 2010, accessed December 12 2011, http://ccla.org/2010/07/07/g-20-mass-arrests-by-the-numbers/
\(^{45}\) Zig Zag, *Fire and Flames*, 17-18
intelligence network and operation of the G20 Integrated Security Unit’s Joint Intelligence Group.

Since the 2010 G20, police and their law enforcement partners have publicly defended and heralded the success of their billion dollar police and intelligence operations. For instance, Toronto Deputy Police Chief Tony Warr accused the public and media for overreacting to the events of the G20 and proclaimed that “police should hold their heads high”.

Internal reviews like the RCMP’s After Action Report also contended that “the security and intelligence operations...had no precedent” since “[n]o host nation has ever conducted two world summits back to back in geographically different locations.” Despite these “challenging conditions”, the G20/G8 Integrated Security Unit and its Joint Intelligence Group “met its Mission Aim and achieved all objectives.” Consequently, the “summit security operations” will have a “lasting legacy...that will benefit major security events in Canada to come.”

The Canadian government has, so far, effectively thwarted the public demands for a ‘public inquiry’ into the planning, training, and implementation of G20 security.

Nevertheless, a number of critical researchers and activists such as “Jester” have employed various methodological and theoretical strategies in order to investigate the G20 event, and, by extension, tear down the ‘blue wall of silence’. For instance, along with other researchers, I requested, collected and shared hundreds of de-classified security documents relating to the G20.

---

49 RCMP, After Action Report, 15
As a result, this thesis provides the beginning of what many of us hope becomes a larger anti-security analysis of the ISU-JIG documents.

The aim of the thesis, therefore, is to carry out a tactical, activist-oriented, and critical discourse of the G20 event as a “pacification project” by contributing to an “anti-security” analysis of the G20 Joint Intelligence Group’s network and operation. To accomplish this, I begin by reviewing the ‘protest policing/surveillance’ literature that describes how policing agencies in the United States and Canada have adapted their strategies and tactics to better manage, monitor, and control anti-globalization protests at elite governance events like G20 Summits. Since the “Battle in Seattle” during the 1999 World Trade Organization meetings, social control scholars generally agree that security operations at these major political summits consists of police deploying a strategic application of both ‘soft’ (consensual) and hard (coercive) array of social control tactics combined with a significant pre-emptive intelligence effort. Most recently, in their inquiry into the development of the multi-modal and intelligence-led character of public order policing, Canadian sociologists Willem de Lint and Alan Hall (2009) have referred to this contemporary strategic approach as “intelligent control”. While their approach can be useful to study the Toronto G20 police and intelligence operations, I argue that ‘intelligent control’ is a problematic concept for critical researchers in solidarity and affinity with the radical activism of the ‘newest social movements’. As an analytical concept, ‘intelligent control’ re-affirms a hegemonic liberal discourse about the policing of mass protests against elite global governance events which, in turn, neutralizes and depoliticises the paramilitary policing and aggressive surveillance of contemporary radical dissent. By analyzing the G20 police and intelligence operations through the ‘intelligent
control’ approach, the researcher is susceptible to re-producing a discourse that rationalizes the suppression of radical anti-G20 dissent that, in effect, legitimates the existing capitalist global order.

In this thesis I argue that the G20/G8 security police operation can be analyzed as a particular ‘pacification project’. The term “pacification” has been re-appropriated and developed by critical policing theorists Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos as part of radical analytic approach called anti-security which seeks to “re-imagine the hegemonic language of security, prioritize material considerations for understanding police power, and unearth existing relationships between domestic-imperial, military-civilian, war-peace, and public-private”. Instead of viewing security as a universal or transcendental virtue, they argue that critical theorists and activists need to understand security as a mode of governing, a political technology and mechanism of domination. The analytical category of pacification has the promise of understanding security as a constitutive and productive power which is mobilized and deployed “for the fabrication of a social order” conducive to the functioning of the global capitalist system. In this thesis I use pacification in order to critically analyze the G20 Joint Intelligence Group. As I explain in my theory chapter, to consider the G20 security operations as encompassing a pacification project, my anti-security analysis must demonstrate that the G20 JIG (my subject of analysis) mobilized strategic power networks composed of public, private and quasi-public agencies, and that it also deployed techniques and discourses that share similarities with those of security intelligence operations that are conducted to suppress perceived state enemies at home and abroad.

51 Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos, eds., Anti-Security (Ottawa, ON: Red Quill Books, 2011), 58
In the following chapters, I argue that the principles found in the Canadian military's manual for intelligence operations were employed by the G20 JIG. By detecting similar terms found in the G20 intelligence documents compared to the Canadian Forces' *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, I provide concrete evidence that the JIG fulfilled the surveillance function of the G20 pacification project by implementing a *joint forces security (counter)intelligence operation*. In turn, my anti-security analysis demonstrates that JIG consisted of a ‘joint forces operation’ that mobilized an extensive ‘summit intelligence network’ composed of 26 police departments, several military and state intelligence units, and over a hundred corporate and government agencies. Before and during the G20, the JIG’s operational units deployed an array of ‘security intelligence’ (SI) and ‘counterintelligence’ (CI) surveillance techniques on populations considered hostile to security objectives. In particular, the JIG’s primary target was radical left/anarchist groups and activists. Moreover, the thesis exposes the discourses of criminality and violence that the JIG strategically employed throughout its documents to rationalize its pre-emptive monitoring and infiltration of anti-G20 organizing groups. It will also be shown that national security legislation was tactically invoked by the JIG in order to enable and justify its SI and CI that primarily targeted radical left/anarchist activists planning anti-G20 resistance.
Chapter 2: Anarchist Research: Method

To carry out an anti-security analysis of the G20 Joint Intelligence Group I employ a multi-pronged and reflexive mode of inquiry based on direct experience, grounded in previous research on protest policing/surveillance, and enthused by an anarchist sensibility. It should first be recognized that the amplification of national security policies after September 11, 2001 has made it increasingly difficult and complicated for researchers to gain access and analyze data on state agencies and their practices. Although there has been significant public concern and scrutiny regarding the policing of the G20 Summit, the Canadian government and law enforcement agencies have not openly disclosed internal documentation on the G20/G8 security police operation to the public. Alternative methodological strategies have been necessary to gain access to this information. One key strategy that researchers employ to access and analyze G20 internal documents is to apply (and pay for) requests under the Access to Information Act (ATIA). The ATIA can produce materials that reveal information that would otherwise be hidden from the public. While these de-classified documents are at times heavily redacted and fragmentary, critical researchers have demonstrated that the tactical and continued use of the ATIA can provide valid and illuminating information about the procedures of government, police, and intelligence agencies.

With assistance from Ottawa lawyer Yavar Hameed and researcher Jeff Monaghan, we submitted an ATIA request on July 12, 2010 to several Ontario police departments as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In the submission

---

54 The ATIA requests relating to G20/G8 security cost me $120
we sought “all reports (including drafts), briefing notes, powerpoint presentations, threat assessments, and other related materials...prepared for G8/G20 and G8/G20-related events held in Toronto at the end of June; all joint-agency reports that reference domestic groups or individuals in reference to potential security concerns during the G8/G20 time period; and all email communications that contain any above referenced reports or materials as an attachment(s).” Subsequently, over the course of eight months, we obtained two packages. The first one received consisted of 72 printed PowerPoint slides from the Waterloo Regional Police Service titled “G20 Face to Face - Front Line Officer Training” which was a three-hour session for “all officers assigned to front line duties at the G20.” While this training manual is informative and deserving of analysis, this thesis is primarily concerned with the contents of the second parcel that we received from the RCMP (Lead Agency of G20/G8 ISU-JIG) months later. This package consisted of a CD-ROM simply labeled GA-3951-3-3551/10, which contained 13 PDF documents regarding various intelligence reports produced by the G20/G8 Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). Although heavily redacted throughout, these declassified documents contain substantial information about the various security agencies involved, and the security intelligence and threat assessment analysis prepared and distributed by the JIG’s Analytical Team before and during the G20. I shared these ATIP ISU-JIG documents to the internet based G20 Working Group; a collaboration of journalists, researchers, and activists investigating the G20 event. In doing so, I also gathered ATIA documents that have been retrieved by the research group and several of these have been essential to my analysis. The Group has since provided public access to these materials in an online format and thus the declassified data examined in this thesis can be accessed and downloaded from
It should be noted that many of these materials were released without intelligible titles (e.g. M 3551). In order to clarify and distinguish between the various ISU-JIG documents used in my analysis, I have provided bracketed titles that relate to the content found in the particular document (e.g. M 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports]).

Archival research, however, has a major disadvantage. It is limited to the examination of recorded information and communication only. My attempt to analyze the G20 Joint Intelligence Group is restricted to information from its heavily censored documents. For instance, the possible data that can be reviewed is unlikely to yield an exhaustive list of all the agencies that were involved in the G20 ‘summit intelligence network’ or a complete exposure of the various surveillance techniques that were deployed during the JIG’s operation. Indeed, there are many instances in which information in the documents are noticeably ‘whited out’. Thus, primarily relying on this heavily redacted material is a significant but unavoidable weakness in my inquiry. With that said, I believe that these ATIA documents nonetheless contain substantial information about the JIG’s network and operation.

In order to supplement the censored ISU-JIG documents I also utilize information gleaned from secondary sources such as public government and corporate documents, mainstream and alternative media articles, and activist publications. I also employ information from my own trial R v. Lamb 2011, particularly regarding the undercover tactic that my friend and I experienced during the G20. Finally, as demonstrated in the

---

56 The ATIA documents can be downloaded by following the instructions contained in this link: http://toronto.mediacoop.ca/story/download-g20-papers/9197
prologue and throughout my anti-security analysis below, I also provide participant-observations and reflections emanating from my own G20 experience. Together, this approach helps weave together a critical examination of the JIG’s intelligence network and operation.

**Reflexive mode of inquiry**

Throughout the process of carrying out my research, I have attempted to adopt a reflexive mode of inquiry. According to Fernandez who has done extensive research on the social control and surveillance of anti-globalization protests, “to fully grasp the meaning of control as it works on the minds and bodies of protesters, a researcher requires reflexivity.”\(^{58}\) A reflexive approach is accomplished when the researcher continuously assesses the aspects of their own thoughts, predispositions, behaviours, associations, and emotions in relation to factors of motivation and meaning that will inescapably influence the analysis. Epistemic reflexivity stems from Pierre Bourdieu’s call on sociologists to always conduct their inquiry with a vigilant and conscious attention to the effects of their own position as a researcher. One of the most obvious biases that can “blur the sociological gaze” is the “the social origins and coordinates (class, gender, ethnicity, etc.) of the individual researcher.”\(^{59}\) For this reason it is important that I disclose that I occupy a relatively privileged social position in my everyday life in Canadian society because I am an abled bodied white male from a middle-class background with a sexual demeanor that generally passes as heterosexual. This privileged status has played a major factor in allowing me to accumulate substantial

\(^{58}\) Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 39

social and cultural capital such as attaining post-secondary education. Such an opportunity is less accessible for lower socioeconomic and marginalized groups and individuals, especially those of colour.⁶⁰

Bourdieu's understanding of reflexivity also cautions us against *intellectual bias* which entices the researcher "to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically."⁶¹ He cautions the social researcher to avoid both the positivist tendency of positioning oneself at a distance and treating social phenomenon as an object to decipher because it will hinder the researcher's ability to comprehend social relations and practices. Instead, we need to enter into, and consider ourselves as active agents in the currents of ongoing social interaction. A reflexive sociological approach then is oppositional towards the tendency of positivism which requires that researchers ensure objective distance in order to produce "true" understandings about the particular social phenomenon being studied. The notion of reflexivity problematizes the positivist idea of pure objectivity, arguing that there can never be "a clean and unproblematic separation between the researcher and the researched."⁶² In contrast to positivism then, a reflexive mode of inquiry encourages closeness and interaction with those under study in their own space and time. In other words, to fully grasp a particular social phenomenon, like the police surveillance measures at the G20, sociologists would do well to become an active participant themselves.

⁶⁰ While at times complicated terms and language is unavoidable given this is a graduate thesis that investigates previous academic research and security documents, I have tried to employ an accessible writing style and grammar that can be read and hopefully understood by a diverse audience.
⁶¹ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 39
⁶² Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 39
Instead of employing a stance of distance and objectivity, my analysis seeks to intentionally blur the distinction between protester-dissident and researcher-analyst. Hence, in order to understand the social control and surveillance techniques targeting contemporary radical activism I joined an Ottawa-based anti-G20 organizing group called *Le Collectif du Chat Noir (CCN)* during the months leading up to the G20. As discussed in the prologue, the activist collective/network mobilized local support and resources (e.g. transportation, housing) and organized direct actions for the upcoming anti-G20 protests in Toronto. In doing so, I collaborated with radical activists and became immersed in their anarchist principles, ethics and decision-making activities. During the G20 weekend, I also participated in street marches and civil disobedience, blocked police lines, and observed and experienced pacification tactics including being covertly monitored, arrested (among 1100 other individuals), physically assaulted,^{63} detained, and interrogated. Like other arrested protesters, following the G20 I experienced strict anti-dissent bail conditions and a prosecution that entailed false testimonies from police officers. Fortunately, as will be disclosed below, my lawyer Ryan Clements poked so many holes in the Crown’s ridiculous case that I was eventually acquitted of all charges in May 2011. Placing myself (at times inadvertently) in contentious and dangerous situations allowed me to feel firsthand the powerful emotions produced by the G20 event, which involved alternating sensations of anticipation, stress, anxiety, fear, solidarity, celebration, terror, and anger. Instead of pretending to suppress these feelings to provide

---

^{63} Three hours after my arrest I was thrown in the back of unmarked police van. Subsequently, with my hands still tied behind my back, Constable Douglas Sinclair of the Toronto Police Service punched my face and abdomen multiple times and also twisted my right ear and wrists throughout the course of the fifteen minute ride to the next location behind the security fence. Considering it took fifteen minutes to transport me only 500 meters, during my trial my lawyer Ryan Clements pointed out the discrepancy between this minimal distance traveled and the time I spent in the van, and thus suggested to the court that I was taking for a “joyride” of sorts.
a supposedly "objective" analysis, I embraced these emotions over the course of my research in order to generate an embodied and affective understanding of the G20. In this sense, my 'G20 experience' is treated as an analytic contribution rather than an encumbrance. With this in mind, I sought a reflexive approach throughout the research process providing insights into my emotional sensations and particular firsthand observations.

Anarchist Politics

My sociological gaze has also been influenced and informed by a growing affinity and solidarity with contemporary radical activism, especially the social anarchist philosophical currents steering the newest social movements. While political and media pundits have attacked the newest social movements for not having a central and coherent set of beliefs, social movement scholars who are active participants have recognized the resurgence of anarchism in contemporary radical activism (e.g. Day 2005; Graeber 2002; Gordon 2008; Curran 2009; Hardt and Negri 2004; Juris 2008; Fernandez 2008; Reitan 2007; Starr 2000). For instance, anthropologist and activist David Graeber argues that "[a]narchism is the heart of the [anti-globalization] movement, its soul; the source of most of what's new and hopeful about it", and Uri Gordon goes as far as stating that "the past decade or so has seen the full revival of a global anarchist movement on a scale

---

64 Graeber has discussed that the anti-globalization movement has been criticized for not possessing a coherent central ideology. It has also been attacked for being supposedly opposed to all forms of organization. He argues that both complaints are unwarranted because the movement is about reinventing democracy through new forms of organization and this creation encompasses its ideology. "It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations; networks based on principles of decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus democracy." Graeber, "The New Anarchists", 70. Jeffrey S. Juris puts forward a similar and more comprehensive argument that the formation of horizontal and decentralize activist networks are an emerging anarchist ideal in his book Networking Futures: The Movements against Corporate Globalization (London: Duke University Press Books, 2008)

65 Graeber, "The New Anarchists", 62
and levels of unity and diversity unseen since the 1930s." An effect of my philosophical research and subsequent involvement in anti-G20 dissent is that I too now share with other anarchists in the newest social movements the radical sensibility that seeks deep-seated social transformations including the abolishment of both capitalist exploitation and state domination. As an alternative to the current social order, I support anti-authoritarian, radically democratic, communitarian social organization which I believe has the potential to invigorate idealistic conditions for human and animal existence, and environmental sustainability. Anarchism is best thought of as a disorientation which "openly values fractured, uncertain, and unrealized understandings and practices as the emerging essence of social life." Consequently, it is difficult and even contradictory to strictly define anarchism because of its de-limiting motivations and pluralist notions. Like any long standing belief system, anarchism is complex and debated philosophy. In other words, anarchism means different things for different anarchists. But at its core is its "unflinching opposition to the state and its institutions". Indeed, anarchists in the newest social movements tend to share a rebellious mentality and agency that opposes and problematizes hierarchical, authoritarian, and imperialist (not to mention racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, statist) social relations and conditions.

While recognizing and respecting the variety of anarchist currents in the newest social movements, my own affinity with social anarchism primarily emanated from

69 Curran contends that anarchists in the newest social movements like the anti-globalization movement are "post-ideological" considering they are "inspired by anarchism's various principles and ideas drawing from
reading the works of Noam Chomsky when I was an undergraduate student. In particular, I remember reading his short lecture entitled *Government in the Future*, 70 where he provides a critique of classical liberalism, state capitalism, state socialism, and outlines the radical alternative of libertarian socialism. He relies heavily on the classical works of anarchists such as Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Adolph Fisher, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 71 In doing so, he identifies his anarchism as libertarian socialism which adopts the most radical elements of enlightenment and classical liberal thought. While Chomsky recognizes the abundance of old and new anarchist strands, he is mainly concerned with the classical anarchism formulated by Bakunin and his followers who argued that “every anarchist is a socialist, but every socialist is not necessarily an anarchist”. 72 Meaning, the anarchist shares the socialist’s opposition towards capitalism because both agree it produces class exploitation. But in contrast to many Marxists and radical social democrats, the consistent anarchist will also oppose the organization of society by centralized governmental power. Chomsky argues that the goal of human liberation from exploitation “is not and cannot be reached by a new directing and governing class

---

70 While pursuing my undergrad in sociology at Wilfrid Laurier University, I took a seminar with Professor Peter Eglin in which we thoroughly discussed Noam Chomsky’s works, especially his lecture *Government of the Future* (New York: Open Media Series, 1970).

71 Chomsky’s anarchism is often referred to as “old” or “classical” because he relies on radical enlightenment thinkers. While Day recognizes that classical anarchist theory is valuable for “its insistence that state domination is as great a problem as capitalist exploitation, he nonetheless criticizes old traditions of Marxism and Anarchism for “their commitment to social-scientific rationality and their millenarian faith in the achievement of a society entirely free of domination and exploitation.” Instead, he sees great potential in “postanarchism” which is a variety of anarchism infused with insights from poststructuralist theorists like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and Derrida. Considering I have affinity with elements of both classical and poststructuralist strands of anarchist theory, I take issue with the restrictive label post-anarchist.

72 Chomsky, *Government of the Future*, 24
substituting itself for the bourgeoisie.” The road to emancipation resides in the creation of voluntary, horizontal, radically democratic, and organic communities. Chomsky explains that individuals living under either state socialism or state capitalism are incapable of being free to create and develop their own potentialities to their fullest extent because the authoritarian and oppressive conditions inherent in both state-based modes of social organization. To accomplish a more equitable anarchical society, he advocates an open-ended and “flexible methodology” that consists of “a willingness to change tactics, to consider a variety of strategies, and reluctance to speak with too much certainty or rigidness.” Chomsky summarizes his anarchist vision by stating that it is:

... a kind of voluntary socialism, that is, as libertarian socialist or anarcho-syndicalist or communist anarchist, in the tradition of, say, Bakunin and Kropotkin and others. They had in mind a highly organized form of society, but a society that was organized on the basis of organic units, organic communities. And generally, they meant by that the workplace and the neighborhood, and from those two basic units there could derive through federal arrangements a highly integrated kind of social organization which might be national or even international in scope. And these decisions could be made over a substantial range, but by delegates who are always part of the organic community from which they come, to which they return, and in which, in fact, they live.

Thus, contrary to the mainstream tropes about anarchism being chaotic, violent, and unruly, Chomsky provides an anarchist vision of a complex society that would possess very high levels of social decentralized organization, democratic decision-making, and power accountability. Indeed, his critique of state mechanisms and idealistic vision of stateless society has had a profound influence on my political sensibility in recent years. Combined with my participation in radical anti-G20 activism, I have developed a

73 Chomsky, Government of the Future, 24
74 Noam Chomsky, Chomsky on Anarchism (Oakland: AK Press, 2005), 9
growing affinity with anarchist politics that has inevitably influenced my inquiry into the Toronto G20 Joint Intelligence Group.

Anarchist Criminology

Anarchism is not only re-emerging as a radical contemporary philosophy affecting the newest social movements but it also developing into a critical analytical discourse. Indeed, anarchism is becoming recognized as a growing and influential radical perspective in sociology, socio-legal studies, and criminology.\textsuperscript{76} As a critical criminological approach, anarchism “takes the form of challenging authority within criminal justice institutions” considering as anarchists we “yearn [for] collectivities that treat human beings as essentially [or potentially] altruistic and sociable.”\textsuperscript{77} By “thinking of justice beyond the criminal justice industry, and thinking of the political beyond sovereignty,” an anarchist analytic strives to present a “significant challenge to the theoretical and practical problems associated with conservative and liberal criminology”.\textsuperscript{78} By promoting a critical discourse on criminal justice that is both anti-statist and anti-capitalist, anarchist criminology is strategically oppositional against the technocratic, authoritative, and managerial discourses being disseminated by contemporary conservative and liberal criminologists. The main task of these administrative criminologists, according to Polsky, tends to revolve around theorizing and suggesting “more effective ways to reform lawbreakers and to keep other people


\textsuperscript{77} Pavlich, \textit{Critique and Radical Discourses on Crime}, 126

from becoming lawbreakers”. In other words, their analytical undertaking seems to be concerned with making individuals adjust to crime control procedures and obey legal authorities. Indeed, both conservative and liberal criminology produces administrative discourses that are complicit in eroding human potential for alternative forms of justice outside of state structures and restraining non-hierarchical autonomous social relations. This is especially so “when serving as imperialistic broker of dominant norms and advocating [or justifying] the state’s authoritative criminal justice/legal institutions.” Foucault problematized the discipline of criminology for producing discourses that, in the same way, became integral to the emergence of modern forms of domination and punishment.

While mainstream criminology tends to serve the criminal justice system by examining and opposing those social relations and practices that the state defines as criminal, anarchist criminology “analyzes and opposes the corporate state’s increasing criminalization and control of social and cultural life.” It confronts the constant expansion of legal control and surveillance of populations, and disrupts the ongoing dominant constructions of social issues (i.e. protests) and identities (i.e. black block protesters) as criminal. It accomplishes this by being defiantly against modern state law and also the processes of economic domination and cultural dissemination that maintain and expand it. In doing so, anarchist criminology “works to construct a radical critique of

---

80 Pavlich, *Critique and Radical Discourses on Crime*, 127.
contemporary legal authority” and therefore a “ruthless criticism of everything existing” as part of this authority. Moreover, unlike mainstream perspectives, an anarchist analysis does not promote reformist critiques of the legal and criminal justice systems. Instead, anarchist criminologists like Jeff Ferrell believe that critiquing modern legal institutions and criminal justice procedures demands the “unreasonable” and the “unthinkable”. This is based on the radical and postmodern awareness that contemporary reason and “common sense” contribute to reproducing dominant discourses and apparatuses of authority and power, and thus “it seems in our interest to stop making sense, to imagine the unimaginable.” In response to the understanding that legal discourses and tactics undermine human collectivity and diversity, an anarchist analytic deploys aggressive, disrespectful, and tactical critiques against the law. As Ferrell notes:

Like a tangle of poisonous weeds, the labyrinth of state legality grows in the absence of human community, and once in place, further chokes possibilities for fluid and engaged human interaction. In a social world increasingly fractured by alienated labor and economic inequality, privatized leisure, and the paranoia of the lonely crowd, police calls and civil suits proliferate -- as does the sense that such disjointed, externalized tactics somehow constitute appropriate measures for solving disputes and achieving justice… Ultimately, a reliance on state legality reinforces the power and authority of centralized control systems, disables the potential for human community and human justice outside their bounds, and increasingly reduces human interaction to a stale dichotomy of legality and illegality.

Put differently, an anarchist analytic strives to produce radical discourses which oppose discourses and techniques of legal authority because of the damage they do to the social fabric and potential of human relations. The task of my anarchist sociolegal analysis in this thesis then is to produce a disruptive, radical critique of the G20 Joint Intelligence Group’s “legal” discourses and tactics. Consequently, I argue that the law was employed
by the JIG as a discourse to rationalize its surveillance techniques on radical anti-G20 activist groups.

Regarding anti-G20 resistance, my anarchist sensibility refuses to promote any particular programmatic directive about what protesters should have or shouldn't have done during the anti-G20 convergence. In other words, my analysis does not seek to condemn or place judgmental values on any of the acts of resistance that were carried out. For instance, while I did not engage in targeted property damage during the G20, I do not demonize the direct actions of protesters who carried out the black bloc tactic of outmaneuvering police and smashing various corporate and government property including the infamous burning of several abandoned police cruisers. Instead, my intention is to expose, examine, and de-construct the JIG's discourse and surveillance of anti-G20 protester tactics. As an anarchist researcher, I possess a radical interpretation of what comes to be constituted as a crime under the state legal system in that these individual and/or collective actions carry a degree of political meaning. For this reason, my approach seeks to problematize the boundaries between crime and political resistance. While this exploration neither assumes that all crimes constitute resistance to state authority, it does demand that the researcher devote critical attention to various criminalized forms of agency like the black block tactic, and other deviant practices such as "graffiti writing, 'obscene' art and music performances, pirate radio broadcasts, illegal labor strikes, curfew violations, shoplifting, drug use, street cruising, gangbanging, computer hacking". These are interpreted as avenues to investigate the ways in which criminalized behaviours may be a manifestation of suppressed aspects of human dignity,

---

87 Marin, “Caught in the Act”, 19
88 Ferrell, “Against the Law: Anarchist Criminology”. 35
autonomy, and lived resistance. Hence, I avoid the all too common liberal activist/researcher impulse of criticizing so-called “violent” radical forms of protest.\(^8^9\) Instead, I interpret the black bloc tactic, which damaged corporate and state property during the G20, as a meaningful direct action that entailed strategic coordination and political intentions.\(^9^0\) Thus, my research adheres to the Toronto Community Mobilization Network’s call for a “diversity of tactics” in resisting the G20 Summit.\(^9^1\)

By not advocating for or against any particular resistance tactic, my anarchist method intentionally avoids producing what Foucault refers to as an “imperative discourse” which consists in saying something like “strike against this and do so in this way”.\(^9^2\) Instead, this thesis attempts to provide “tactical pointers” for those who “want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are some constrictions and blockages.”\(^9^3\) In doing so, I hope to contribute towards strategic and tactical debates among radical activist networks while also remaining relevant for broader academic and public audiences.

Furthermore, an anarchist approach employs a fluid, eclectic, and inclusive theoretical framework considering it is in much congruence with other critical

---


\(^9^0\) I agree with Day’s non-hegemonic conception of the black bloc tactic as a non-branded direct action which “has almost become obligatory at major convergences” that attempts “to impede the flows of state and corporate power”. Protesters participating in a bloc, challenge the state’s monopolies on violence and “on invisibility and silence, with its active ignorance of the command not only to behave well, but to be available to be seen behaving well. In refusing to follow the rule of transparency...Bloc subjects represent glaring exceptions within the domesticated and privileged strata of the global North.” See Day, Gramsci is Dead, 29.


\(^9^3\) Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 3.
perspectives that have an “urgent sense of social justice.” For instance, Ferrell suggests that the anarchist analytic shares much with the epistemic uncertainty and situated politics of feminism; with the decentered authority and textual deconstruction of postmodernism; with the political economic analysis of Marxism; and “of course with the broader critique of legal injustice common to all critical criminologies”. This call for diverse inclusivity is in order to prevent the segregation of critical criminology into a closed system of small intellectual silos. Anarchist analytic strives for the progressively pluralist goal of opening space for dialogue and collaboration among various alternative critical perspectives. Indeed, by promoting openness and ongoing critical conversations among various theoretical orientations, anarchist criminology can construct “multifaceted critiques of legal injustice.” Whereas the recognition of multiple alternative criminologies would indeed constitute a crisis of “criminological certainty, a sort of paradigmatic anomie”, for anarchist criminology this variety is “a sign of intellectual life” and enables the opportunity for “tolerance, ambiguity, and uncertainty within an eclectic community of critical criminologists.”

Correspondingly, an anarchist approach attempts to avoid any strict commitment to a master plan or overarching ideological doctrine. In Against Criminology, Stan Cohen suggests that this lack of commitment to any one particular emancipatory vision and/or school of thought constitutes a failure, not of the researcher’s psyche “but of the social world’s refusal to correspond to any one theory.” In other words, anarchist criminology

---

94 Doyle and Moore, Critical Criminology in Canada, 19.
95 Ferrell, “Against the Law: Anarchist Criminology”.
96 Ibid.
97 Ferrell, “Stumbling toward a Critical Criminology”, 73.
consciously avoids constructing rigid theoretical binaries by embracing epistemic fluidness, uncertainty, disorder and even failure when critiquing society. In doing so, the approach can yield aggressive and comprehensive critiques against law and governing authority without employing fixed boundaries or depending upon a single intellectual paradigm. Anarchist method proposes that a decentralized, inclusive and non-authoritarian research community can benefit critical criminology, sociology, and socio-legal studies by discouraging the “tendency to embrace our own intellectual authority, or the exterior authority of the state, as appropriate - or worse, inevitable- frameworks for social order and social change.” As an open-ended approach that borrows and utilizes insights, concepts, and terms from other perspectives, an anarchist analytic intentionally fails (and refuses) to be independent from and succeed over other critical approaches and discourses. Rather than trying to compete for intellectual domination in a particular discipline, an anarchist analysis treats itself as an unfinished project that floats around and “against criminology”. According to Ferrell, this anticipated failure of anarchism to “reach full fruition… [or]…‘win out’ over other perspectives, remains for this very reason an important thread in the larger project of critical criminology”. Thus, I contend that an anarchist approach, with its emphasis on decentralized, fluid, eclectic, and inclusive critical inquiry, provides the epistemic opportunity for the researcher to build and deploy a multi-pronged theoretical framework. While I believe the G20 event could just as well benefit from a poststructuralist feminist or queer examination among

99 Ferrell, “Against the Law: Anarchist Criminology”.
100 Cohen, Against Criminology.
101 Ferrell, “Against the Law: Anarchist Criminology”.

38
others, my particular anarchist analytic largely seeks a ‘tactical alliance’\textsuperscript{102} with Marxist and Foucauldian inspired concepts and terms.

From the broad theoretical orientation of anarchist criminology to the more substantive focus of the G20 Integrated Security Unit and its Joint Intelligence Group, it is useful to consider how extant radical approaches have sought to make sense of police power. In analytic opposition to the very structures which anarchists also seek to overthrow, a collection of radical researchers has begun to consider what doing “Anti-Security” might look like. In their 2011 edited book \textit{Anti-Security}, critical police theorists Neocleous and Rigakos re-appropriate and develop the notion of pacification as part of anti-security project which seeks to “re-imagine the hegemonic language of security, prioritize material considerations for understanding police power.”\textsuperscript{103} In their critique of the hegemonic tendencies of security, they make the convincing theoretical argument that for tactical purposes critical theory really needs to re-appropriate the term ‘pacification’ to help grasp the nature of security politics. Instead of viewing security as a universal or transcendental value, they argue that critical theorists and activists need to understand security, or what passes under the discursive banner of security, as a mode of governing; a political technology; a mechanism of power. The analytical category of pacification has the promise of recognizing security as a fundamental political concept of neoliberal societies and understand it as a constitutive and productive form of power which is mobilized and deployed “for the fabrication of a social order” conducive to the

\textsuperscript{102} I use this term to suggest a potential compatibility between Foucauldian and Marxist concepts. Indeed both Thomas Lemke (2001) and Etienne Balibar (1992) have employed this term to argue that Michel Foucault’s theoretical development went “from a rupture with Marxism as a theory to ‘tactical alliance’, the use of some Marxist concepts or some concepts compatible with Marxism.” See Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique,” Paper presented at \textit{Rethinking Marxism Conference}, University of Amherst (MA), September 21-24, 2000.

\textsuperscript{103} Neocleous and Rigakos, \textit{Anti-Security}, 58
functioning of the global capitalist system.\textsuperscript{104} As stated in the book's declaration of an anti-security political project, security "is a dangerous illusion" because the term has acted as a blockage on analysis and politics. Put simply, security deserves to be problematized in order to be analytically scrutinized. While Neocleous and Rigakos affirm that an anti-security project is born out of their desire to move Marxist "assessments and challenges of security forward,"\textsuperscript{105} I suggest and demonstrate that anarchist researchers/activists could also benefit from the anti-security approach and its analytical concept of pacification.

\textsuperscript{104} Neocleous, "Security as Pacification", in \textit{Anti-Security}, 26
\textsuperscript{105} Neocleous and Rigakos, "Introduction", in \textit{Anti-Security}, 9
Chapter 3: Pacification: Theory

Anti-Security

Security...has come to act as a blockage to politics: the more we succumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation; the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we come to share in the fetish of security, the more we become alienated from one another and the more we become complicit in the exercise of police powers.

- Anti-Security: A Declaration

Intelligence gleaned by the 2010 G8-G20 ISU JIG indicates that groups planning to protest the upcoming Summits are very anti-security, and they intend to use the Summits to challenge police authority and potentially target police.

- G20/G8 ISU-JIG Intelligence Bulletin

The problem of security is that it functions as a dominant, almost impenetrable concept of contemporary hegemonic power relations. As Rigakos theorizes, “[t]o be against security today is to stand against the entire global economic system”. Granted, even from a critical perspective this seems almost unthinkable:

How can anyone be against social security, job security, personal security, or health security? What about children’s security? How could anyone stand against environmental security? Anything in the name of security, therefore, appears as a greater good. Security was already “supreme concept of bourgeoisie society” as early as the 19th century but security after 9/11 has become all but unassailable.

Put differently, the hegemonic concept of security has attached itself to almost all social relations and has come to act as the glue that binds the insecurity of the late capitalist social order. Indeed, Rigakos points out that there are innumerable contemporary social issues being colonized by the illusionary banner of security, changing them into “analytic neologisms such as ‘food security’, ‘supply-chain security’, ‘energy security’ and so

\[106\] Neocleous and Rigakos, Anti-Security, 15
\[107\] George Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, in Anti-Security, ed. Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos (Ottawa, ON: Red Quill Books, 2011), 59

41
on." Consequently, each of these securitized terms in their own way obscures imperialist, exploitive, and alienating objectives of concentrated power and the interests of global power elites. For instance, while "food security" sounds like a noble endeavor," it nonetheless "presupposes a competition of interests", unleashing a "rational governmental discourse that alienates us from the rather basic human compulsion to simply feed the hungry.""110

By its very nature, it should hardly be surprising that a similar rational discourse surrounded the operations of the G20/G8 Integrated Security Unit (ISU), and its Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). The RCMP led G20/G8 ISU publicly described itself as "a joint forces team comprised of security experts collaborating together to ensure the safety of the Heads of State, the community and minimize to the fullest extent possible, the potential impact of police security operations." While this smacks of "balance", reasonable, and even "intelligent" deployment, under the direction of Chief Superintendent Alphonse MacNeil, the ISU consisted of 20,974 security personnel from 26 public police departments (key agencies included Toronto Police Service (TPS), Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Peel Regional Police (PRP)), the Canadian Forces, private security companies, and also the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.111

---

108 Rigakos, "Pacification as a police project", in Anti-Security, 59
109 The term "power elite" was originally developed by sociologist C. Wright Mills' and it refers to a powerful loosely linked network of decision-makers connected by personal and structural ties and political-economic interests. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). However, it is important to recognize that Mill's mid twentieth century thesis regarding the power elite entailed an analysis of American society just after the Second World War. Hence, his inquiry was prior to the emergence of neoliberal globalization. Contemporary critical scholars like sociologist William Robinson, have continued to use Mill's power elite concept but have adapted it appropriately to describe the rise of a transnational elite class that currently exercises significant political decision making power in the global capitalist system. See William Robinson, "Neoliberalism, the global elite, and the Guatemalan transition: A critical macrosocial analysis." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affair, 42 no. 4 (2000): 89-107.
110 Rigakos, "Pacification as a police project", 59-60
(CSIS). With a security budget of approximately $1 billion, it was the most expensive security operation for an international summit to date. The G20 security operation subjected dissident populations to a militarized police presence and a counterintelligence campaign in an attempt to facilitate an institutional process that functions to maintain a global system of exploitation and domination. Rather than allowing citizens to freely organize, debate, and protest the merits and effects of elite global governance events like the G20 Summit, the Canadian state instead mobilized its military, police and intelligence agencies to intervene, manage and suppress these political social relations and practices for the purposes of accomplishing security and imperial objectives.

Considering security has the ability “to latch on to most aspects of human relations,” how can critical researchers and activists study events like the Toronto G20 without succumbing to the hegemonic discourse of security? In part, we need to adopt an analytical and political discourse that is capable of getting over this blockage and thus disrupt the discourses, political rationalities, and police mentalities that legitimate contemporary security projects that have the power/knowledge effects of suppressing contemporary radical activism emanating from the newest social movements. But this hardly seems possible within the confines of contemporary public order policing research which mimics the liberal rhetoric of “balance” and “intelligence” in security. This is perhaps best exemplified in the recent work of de Lint and Hall (2009) and their well-cited analysis of public order policing as “intelligent control.” By analyzing the G20 police and intelligence operations as an ‘intelligence control model’, I believe that critical

---

112 ATIP 4067A [RCMP-Briefing Note To The Minister of Public Safety].8
114 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 60
researchers and activists are susceptible to submitting to and producing a liberal security
discourse that may neutralize and de-politicize the power/knowledge effects of the
Toronto G20 security operation. It is worth taking some time to critically review how this
dominant liberal approach understands protest policing/surveillance before tying in my
anarchist framework to an alternative, radical, anti-security reading of the G20
intelligence network and operation.

How “intelligent” is control?: A critical review

The primary focus for most contemporary researchers studying the policing of
protest has been the type of approach (strategies and tactics) police employ in order to
manage and control mass protests. There seems to be a general consensus that the
turbulent 1960s and 70s saw Western governments increasingly employing aggressive
(“heavy-handed”, “escalated-force”) measures when attempting to manage left-wing
mass demonstrations (e.g. Anti-Vietnam and civil rights movements).  
But some have argued that after the 1970s there was a distinctive shift towards less coercive styles of
protest policing occurring in Western Europe and North America. These researchers
suggest that in the 1980s and 90s police generally tended to employ ‘softer’ tactics which
were oriented towards minimizing the use of force in their management of protests. Often


referred in the literature as the “negotiated management model”\textsuperscript{117} or the “liaison approach”\textsuperscript{118}, this protest policing style relies on communicative rather than coercive intervention, flexible rather than strict law enforcement, and liaising/negotiation with moderate protest event organizers. Some critical scholars, however, dispute the claim that softer tactics supposedly superseded coercive measures throughout 80s and 90s.\textsuperscript{119}

Nevertheless, since the late 1990s researchers have argued that police now tend to employ complex hybrid approaches that also include (overt and covert) intelligence strategies and tactics in their attempts to control and manage mass protests. In particular, they argue that anti-globalization demonstrations which emerged in the mid-1990s has seen police adopt more aggressive, paramilitary measures alongside softer ones in order to manage the mass convergences and protests against elite global governance events. For example, Ericson and Doyle in their case study of the 1997 APEC protests in Vancouver found that the police reneged on a negotiated accord with student protesters as the RCMP made “illegal preventive arrests, censored peaceful expression and assaulted protesters who were already dispersing”.\textsuperscript{120} Based on participant-observations at large protests in the United States from 2001 to 2005, Fernandez argues that police now depend on both “hard-line” and “soft-line social control” tactics in order to manage anti-globalization protests.\textsuperscript{121} King also recognizes that there are indeed two opposing trends emerging simultaneously in Canadian public-order policing. In consort with conciliatory and

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{117} Fernandez, \textit{Policing Dissent}; Ericson and Doyle, “Globalization and the Policing of Protest”.
\bibitem{118} de Lint and Hall, \textit{Intelligent Control}.
\bibitem{120} Ericson and Doyle, “Globalization and the Policing of Protest”, 602
\bibitem{121} Fernandez, \textit{Policing Dissent}, 9
\end{thebibliography}
consultative methods, he argues that there is an increasingly militarized potential for confrontation that police are ready to use if need be.\textsuperscript{122} King reiterates this theory in his analyses on the Canadian policing of mass protests, although he places added emphasis on intelligence gathering, contingency planning, and crowd management.\textsuperscript{123} Regardless of when this mixture of soft and hard-line tactics became the dominant tendency, most scholars studying anti-globalization demonstrations now recognize the multi-modal character of protest policing.

In light of this, de Lint and Hall (2009) try to move beyond both the ‘return to coercion thesis’ and the ‘liaison approach’ by providing a more nuanced concept called ‘intelligent control’. As previously mentioned, it is worth taking some time to understand and critique this work as it stands as an exemplary contemporary treatise for the reasoned and liberal understanding of protest policing/surveillance. In contrast to social control scholars who either suggest there has been a distinctive shift toward consensual policing\textsuperscript{124} or a return to coercive measures,\textsuperscript{125} the authors provide a comprehensive historical analysis of protest policing that accounts for developments of both coercive and consensual tactics. The authors claim that police haven’t abandoned the liaison approach, but they do suggest that police agencies are now employing numerous kinds of policing tactics that incorporate elements of both consent and coercion depending on the groups involved in a particular protest. The strategic use of liaison, intelligence, and aggressive

\textsuperscript{124} della Porta and Reiter, eds., Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies.
\textsuperscript{125} Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms.; Gordon, “The Political Economy of Law and Order Policies”.

46
protest policing tactics is what de Lint and Hall refer to as "intelligent control". In their analysis of the policing of mass protests they recognize the "growth of intelligence-based, paramilitary and community policing applications" and argue that "these trends are complementary developments representing a shift from reactive ad hoc forms of coercion and accommodation to a more strategic integrated approach." The main objective of "intelligent control" then is to exert as much control and predictability as possible during the ambiguous and dynamic instances of mass protests without causing a more radical politics. Police attempt to accomplish this task by modifying the dosage of both soft and hard tactics to control protests corresponding to their (overt and covert) intelligence gathering on protesters. In other words, the police services' selection and use of these 'harder' or 'softer' tactics is dependent upon the collection and examination of information and risk assessments about dissident individuals and populations. Indeed, de Lint and Hall stress the current role that intelligence gathering plays in protest policing operations which entails "action on information drawn as a result of pre-emptive or covert targeting, collection, analysis, and dissemination that then is used to manage conditions of mass public grievance expression." Thus, in concert with liaison and paramilitary practices police are extremely reliant on intelligence-based tactics in their attempt to control anti-globalization protests.

Accordingly, the 'intelligent control' approach in policing mass protests involves a "graduated application of countering applications through real-time information management." For instance, the police still tend to rely on liaison approach to maintain

---

126 de Lint and Hall, Intelligent Control, 6
127 Ibid., 275
128 Ibid.,6
trust with certain moderate labour and protest groups through communication, negotiation, and education. In consort with this consensual strategy, police also employ their paramilitary and intelligence capabilities in order to use precise and/or overwhelming force against large and small protest groups, especially those that are resistant to playing by the rules of the liaison policing strategy (i.e. radical left/anarchist activists). This modulating approach, according to de Lint and Hall, aims to avoid dramatic confrontations and to conceal coercion considering the police now tend to use pre-emptive and aggressive strategies to “identify, isolate, and target those they consider to be significant threats while the remainder are invited to cooperate or partner with the police liaison advice and information service.”129 In sum, ‘intelligent control’ requires the strategic application of (1) a liaison function to negotiate with and accommodate with perceived moderate protest leaders; (2) the heavy use of surveillance to produce actionable intelligence; and (3) paramilitary policing measures to control perceived dangerous elements within protest crowds.

Considering the depth of their analytical model, the G20 security operation is arguably consistent with de Lint and Hall’s hypothesis. However, I argue that the application of this concept in attempt to understand mass protest policing is very problematic for critical researchers who are in solidarity and affinity with the radical activism of the newest social movements. What follows then is a critique of de Lint and Hall’s ‘intelligent control’ concept on the basis that it produces a hegemonic liberal discourse on the policing and surveillance of protests which in turn neutralizes and de-politicizes the suppression of contemporary radical dissent.

129 de Lint and Hall, Intelligent Control, 7
Perhaps it is best to begin with the most obvious instance where de Lint and Hall's analysis implicitly legitimates and de-politicizes protest policing and intelligence operations. For instance, the words “intelligent control” reeks of rationalizing the social control and surveillance of dissent. Whether intended or not, to view policing actions during protests as “intelligent control” carries a legitimating connotation. These words have the dangerous potential of being interpreted as a reasonable and efficient approach to policing anti-globalization protests even though they entail pre-emptive, aggressive, and paramilitary techniques of domination. By employing the terminology ‘intelligent control’ to describe protest policing and intelligence operations, de Lint and Hall engage in symbolic violence: the practice of imposing a category of thought upon dominated individuals and groups (i.e. anti-G20 protesters) who, once they begin observing and evaluating the world in terms of this category may then perceive the existing social order as just, thereby perpetuating hegemonic power/knowledge relations that ultimately serve dominant interests.130 Thus, by referring to the G20 security police operation as employing an ‘intelligent control’ approach, the researcher is susceptible to producing a discursive device that rationalizes the suppression of anti-G20 dissent that, in effect, legitimates the existing capitalist global order.

While the wording of their main concept is the most obvious example, there are many other instances in which de Lint and Hall use language that de-politicizes and legitimates police suppression of contemporary radical dissent. A few instances: While barely mentioning contemporary social injustices and inequalities that protesters are fighting against, the authors consistently sympathize with the “difficult role in managing

130 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 167-168
public order" that police face "with the rise of neoliberalism."\textsuperscript{131} Similarly, they deploy a number of apologetic statements such as "[t]he police don't always get it right"\textsuperscript{132} thus presuming there is an essentially correct way to manage and pacify a protest. While they argue that the 'intelligent control' approach in policing protest is an attempt to "exert as much control and predictability as possible", they avoid any critical consideration that this is conceivably a totalizing objective.\textsuperscript{133} Moreover, de Lint and Hall also project the liberal notion that the only acceptable possibility for dissidents to achieve social change is by playing within the restrictive protest boundaries determined by the state and its policing agencies. For instance, in light of their shaky assumption that "police seek to afford expression based on an understanding that a public order platform is a legitimate vehicle for alternative political messaging", the only question they pose to "labour and social movements is whether they can use those platforms, stage-managed as they are, to achieve meaningful change."\textsuperscript{134} Thus, the authors presume that the only avenue for social change available to dissidents is through state sanctioned political practices and avenues. This discourse overlooks not only the possibility but also the history in which oppressed groups have strategically used grassroots, non-institutionalized and "violent" forms of resistance to achieve positive social change.\textsuperscript{135} The above are just a few examples in which \textit{Intelligent Control} employs a de-politicizing/radicalizing, police-centered and hegemonic language that, in effect, disguises the authoritarian mentalities and tactics involved in the police suppression of contemporary radical dissent.

\textsuperscript{131} de Lint and Hall, \textit{Intelligent Control}, 3
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 7
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 300
De Lint and Hall’s book on contemporary protest policing is also “aimed at understanding developments of public order policing” based on the notion that “public order policing is understood...as the use of police authority and capacity to establish a legitimate equilibrium between governmental and societal, collective and individual rights and interests in a mass or collective demonstration of grievance.”

Understanding protest policing as an attempt by police to achieve the right balance between security of the state and liberty of the citizenry in effect produces a hegemonic liberal discourse regarding protest security operations. According to Neocleous, the idea that state power and police somehow strive for “a balance between security and liberty is essentially a liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism’s key category is not liberty, but security.” He builds on Foucault's earlier insight that liberalism’s historical impulsion for security in the name of liberty produced a political rationality that put in place a whole set of mechanisms for a “society of security”.

Consequently, Neocleous suggests that the myth of establishing a balance between security and liberty in effect “creates an acceptance of all sorts of authoritarian security measures; measures which are then justified on liberal grounds.” Indeed, de Lint and Hall’s liberal discourse on public order policing deemphasizes the duplicitous activities, techniques of domination, and class warfare that are involved in the policing protests of the newest social movements. While they do acknowledge that police at times employ pre-emptive,

---

136 de Lint and Hall, *Intelligent Control*, 14
139 Neocleous, “Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance” ,133
aggressive and paramilitary tactics on “troublesome people and problem populations”, their understanding of public order policing assumes that even these authoritative measures are employed in an attempt by police to “negotiate public order relationships between labour, capital, civil society and governing authorities” for the purposes of establishing a “legitimate equilibrium.” This discourse is problematic for executing a critical analysis of protest policing because it constructs the police as an active, politically neutral institution during protests that only respond forcefully when warranted. Such a conception of police contradicts the more critical discourse that policing has been and still is a productive force in fabricating a capitalist social order grounded on class exploitation and state domination.

Neocleous describes policing as an activity that “has been central to the historically massive operation on the part of the liberal capitalist state to consolidate the social power of capital and the wage form”. Police powers were gradually aimed not just at the preservation of the emerging capitalist order but to its very fabrication. Using the term fabrication to describe police helps us understand its productive and creative force. In other words, when Neocleous argues that police fabricate social order it is a discursive way to conceptualize policing as a pro-active process that shapes social order rather than an institution that reactively responds to disorder. As a productive force in
fabricating capitalist relations, its main target and concern has been the working class and the poor. Neocleous theorizes the following:

Police helped transform these “masterless men” into rational calculating individuals in pursuit of clearly defined economic goals. Its concern for the prosperity of the state meant that it had to encourage wealth production, and thus the productivity of labor, as the foundational activity of modern society. It therefore prioritized productive activity in the material and economic sphere. That is, its mobilizing work was the mobilization of work.\textsuperscript{145}

The historical task of police then was to employ a whole array of discourses and techniques to manage and prevent idleness, resistance, and disruption by the working class in order to facilitate capitalist relations, circulation, and accumulation. Put simply, the police have historically been and continue to be devoted to making the working classes work.

Similarly, in his critical analysis of law enforcement in the United States, Kristian Williams argues that the police are the “natural enemy of the working class” considering the “[c]ontrol of the lower classes has been a function of policing at every point since the institution’s birth, and has served as one of the major determinants of its development.”\textsuperscript{146} He goes on to thoroughly document the historical and contemporary role the police have played in union-busting and strike breaking. Hence, he argues the following:

The role of the police in suppressing organized labor during the period before World War II is well documented and relatively uncontroversial. What is often overlooked, however, is their continuation in this role since that time. The police have undergone a great many changes in the half-century since World War II, but their position in the class structure and their role in the class war have remained very much the same.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} Neocleous, “Theoretical Foundations for a New Police Science”, 29
\textsuperscript{146} Kristian Williams, \textit{Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America}, (Cambridge: South End Press, 2007), 105
\textsuperscript{147} Williams, \textit{Our Enemies in Blue}, 116
In other words, American law enforcement has consistently functioned to discipline and pacify the behaviour of workers for the convenience of American capitalism. Moreover, Williams devotes an entire chapter discussing the history of police infiltration and surveillance of unions, civil rights groups, and left-wing organizations. He provides strong evidence suggesting that police surveillance operations against American dissident groups have focused disproportionately on the political activities of the left. He argues that this stems from an "an ideological bias on the part of the police, especially intelligence sections." 

Likewise, in Canada, police agencies and (since 1984) the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) have a history of targeting the left. In their edited book "Whose National Security?" Kinsman, Buse, and Steedman document how the RCMP covertly "monitored high-school students, gays and lesbians, trade unionists, and left-wing political groups, including Communists, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and the New Democratic Party (NDP), as well as feminists and consumer housewives' associations. They watched public servants, members of the military, university students and professors, peace activists, immigrants, Canada Council grant recipients, Learned Societies meetings, recipients of youth funding initiatives, black community activists, First Nations people and Native Studies programs,

148 The most infamous covert surveillance campaign that primarily targeted the Black Panthers and the American Indian Movement but also the New Left during the 1950s through to the 70s was COINTELPRO (Counter-Intelligence Program). The FBI specialized unit was explicitly developed, in the words of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder." Williams, Our Enemies in Blue, 158. For more information see Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent, (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1990)
149 Williams, Our Enemies in Blue, 162.
150 For a detailed analysis of the RCMP surveillance on Canadian students and professors see: Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002)
plus, of course Quebec sovereignists." They argue that the extensive surveillance of perceived Canadian dissidents not only violated people’s democratic rights but also had a dramatic impact on the socio-political fabric of Canada. The wide scope of surveillance undertaken suggests that surveillance campaigns to protect Canada’s national security “was not only about state regulation, but also included a broader form of social and moral regulation and attempts to define ‘proper Canadian’ subjects.” Through various case studies like the APEC 1997 student-led protests, they illustrate that national security has often served as a code word for the protection of powerful corporate interests. Thus, considering de Lint and Hall’s discourse on the development of Canadian public-order policing tends to de-emphasize the political aspects of intelligence-led policing, how can ‘intelligent control’ as an analytical concept produce a radical analysis of G20 security operation?: I would contend that it simply cannot.

Not surprisingly, therefore, in keeping with the dominant discourse of security de Lint and Hall’s liberal interpretation of protest policing/surveillance avoids analyzing the confrontation between the police and dissident populations as a form of warfare. Instead they tend to construct the conflict in the following manner: “police negotiate the symbolic terrain of the public protest with picketers or demonstrators in order to co-author a production which affords expression that can be absorbed (hopefully) without rebounding on the police themselves.” Neoconservative criminologists have actually been much more forthright about the recent mass demonstrations (i.e. anti-war and anti-globalization) by newest social movements’ since they do employ the war metaphor in

151 Kinsman, et al. eds., Whose National Security? Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of Enemies (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2000), 1
152 Kinsman et al, Whose Nation Security?, 3
153 de Lint and Hall, Intelligent Control, 299
their post-conflict examinations. For instance, in 2001 the RAND Corporation, a U.S. imperial think-tank, published *Networks and Netwars* edited by Arquilla and Ronfeldt. The book is essentially a research project that describes how modern conflicts are and will continue to be waged by non-state networks. Arquilla and Ronfeldt employ and develop the concept of “netwar” to describe the advent of a lower intensity form of warfare being waged by non-state networks against Western governments like the United States. More specifically, they provide the following definition:

To be precise, the term netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a precise central command. Thus, netwar differs from modes of conflict and crime in which the protagonists prefer to develop formal, stand-alone, hierarchical organizations, doctrines, and strategies as in past efforts, for example, to build centralized movements along Leninist lines.

The protagonists engaging in these so-called netwars include transnational terrorist groups, crime organizations, intellectual-property pirates, rural militias, human smugglers and most notably, radical left-wing activists. Indeed, along with terrorist and violent criminal groups their spectrum of netwar “also includes a new generation of revolutionaries, radicals, and activists who are beginning to create information-age ideologies, in which identities and loyalties may shift from the nation state to the transnational level of ‘global civil society.’” The underlying pattern that all these proponents of netwar share is that they employ “network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information age.” In other words, RAND security

---


156 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar”, 6-7
strategists have identified the dominant organizational design of contemporary radical activism of the newest social movements,\(^{157}\) and are analyzing their dissident activities through the lens of netwar.

The most extensive use of the war metaphor to understand NSM's protest strategies and tactics is a chapter by Paul de Armond. He analyzed the 1999 “Battle of Seattle” as a “netwar” between Seattle police and a “rich mix of activists and anarchists”.\(^{158}\) In turn, his security analysis recognizes that the anti-WTO protesters “succeeded in the streets through a combination of strategic surprise and tactical openness” that depended “heavily on information and communications technology, nonhierarchical organization, and tactics that [were] distinctly different from previous forms of civil-society conflicts.” Consequently, he concludes his article by suggesting that “[i]f governmental authorities learned much from their defeat in Seattle, perhaps we should also expect that social netwarriors will learn lessons from their defeats.”\(^{159}\)

Throughout the historical development of policing, security planners and intellectuals have been just as remarkably forthright about the need to pacify populations.\(^{160}\) As early as the 18 century there were calls for “pauper police” to oversee the poor, the need to “civilize” workers and make them “productive” and to distinguish between the “deserving and indigent poor”...all under the veil of a coercive force ready to put down unrest and protect property relations. Indeed, as critical researchers and

\(^{157}\) As previously mentioned contemporary radical activists tend to organize in decentralized, non-hierarchical social networks see Day 2005; Graeber 2002; Gordon 2008; Curran 2009; Juris 2008; Fernandez 2008; Reitan 2007; Starr 2000
\(^{159}\) de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City”, 235
\(^{160}\) Rigakos et. al, General Police System; Neoclesous, Fabrication of Social Order.
activists we must come to recognize this long-standing project, in part, by seeking and employing our own critical conceptual tools that can analyze these conflicts for what they actually are: warfare.

**Protest Police Surveillance as a ‘Pacification Project’**

_Critical theory needs the concept of pacification to make sense of... [security.] And radicals need to understand that in the violent process through which bourgeois order is constituted, security is pacification._

- Mark Neocleous

As the above critical review illustrated, analyzing the G20 policing and intelligence operations as an ‘intelligence control model’ is problematic for those of us who have an affinity for radical activism of the newest social movements. De Lint and Hall’s concept is likely to produce a liberal, police-centered discourse that will neutralize and de-politicize the power/knowledge effects of the 2010 Toronto G20 security. Critical researchers and activists are thus in need of an analytical and political discourse that contains the potential of problematizing and de-stabilizing hegemonic security discourses that have and will continue to attach themselves to the policing and surveillance measures deployed to secure the Toronto G20. Foucault recognized that discourses are “not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it... We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.” Thus, discourses do indeed transmit, produce, and reinforce power but Foucault importantly posited that a discourse also “undermines and exposes it,

---

161 Neocleous, “Security as Pacification”, 53
renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart." Indeed, the political objective of my anti-security analysis is to produce a discourse that is capable of both revealing and disrupting the security discourses involved in the G20 Integrated Security Unit’s police and intelligence operations. The aim of which is to contribute to the current strategic and tactical debates occurring among and within radical activist networks while also remaining applicable for broader academic and public audiences. Correspondingly, the analytical objective of the thesis is to provide critical scholars and activists with a radically charged concept that can “grasp the nature of security politics” and “stand against the securitization of political discourse” surrounding the policing and surveillance of dissent.In order to do so, I accept the invitation suggested by Neocleous and Rigakos that “analysts, activists, and critical thinkers” need to “reassess their place within the security complex and to dare to think the impossible: to stand against security as it manifests itself under the mode of production, to consider what it might mean to be involved in anti-security.” Hence, this thesis is my contribution to an anti-security analysis of the G20/G8 Integrated Security Unit and its operations.

In order to carry out this anti-security analysis on the G20 police and intelligence operations I deploy the concept of pacification that has been re-appropriated and theoretically developed by Neocleous and Rigakos. Similar to Neocleous’ anti-security analyses of the Vietnam War and the ‘Global War on Terror’ and Rigakos’ Thames River and Broken Windows police projects, I analyze the G20 case study through the lens of pacification in order to “(1) problematize the objectives of security; (2) build analytic

162 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge* (London: Penguin books, 1998), 100-1
164 Neocleous and Rigakos, “Introduction”, in *Anti-Security*, 9
connections instead of masking them; (3) displace the ubiquity and reach of security; and anticipate (4) a state of war (including class war) viewing security as an active, unfinished project rife with resistance.”¹⁶⁵ To begin conceptualizing a ‘pacification project’ it is first necessary to explain the conceptual utility of pacification by examining these four characteristics.

The Conceptual Utility of Pacification

First, Rigakos states that “pacification problematizes the objectives of security” because the term presupposes a very negative connotation compared to the ambiguous concept of security which tends to encompass a generally positive set of meanings.¹⁶⁶ As previously mentioned, mobilizing and deploying security operations may seem like a rational objective and necessary aim to accomplish. Since the establishment of security is generally understood as a good thing, this presents a problem for critical analysis that desires to interrogate, expose, and de-naturalize the security techniques, relations and discourses that tend to produce oppressive and exploitive power/knowledge effects. Similarly, the contemporary literature on protest policing/surveillance is currently dominated by liberal approaches such as de Lint and Hall’s ‘intelligent control’ concept which, as I have argued in the previous section, amounts to an apologia for control. While it seems rational that individuals and groups may desire security, even under the guise of intelligent control, do they really want to be pacified? Pacification implies a very negative connotation while eschewing any positive and legitimating associations. Indeed,

¹⁶⁵ Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 61
¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 62
it "presupposes resistance by subjects in ways that speaking of security [and intelligent control] simply does not – making the concept fertile ground for critical engagement." 167

Second, "pacification builds analytic connections instead of masking them." As Rigakos explains, "[o]ne of the problems of speaking about security is how easy it is to continuously divide security almost ad infinitum. The more you can divide and subdivide security the more security can colonize all aspects of human practices and thinking." 168 In contrast, the analytical concept of pacification promises to expose the false binaries surrounding contemporary policing that security discourse has constructed between domestic versus international, soft versus hard tactics, and public versus private. For instance, rather than seeing policing as occurring solely within state borders, pacification presumes a "continuous warfare that is both domestic and international." 169 Security constructs both internal domestic and external foreign enemies. The state’s techniques of colonization of subjects abroad are soon transferred into domestic pacification of dissident populations at home. Indeed, the "new international policing initiatives are but a laboratory for the militarization of domestic security." 170 For example, as I show in my analysis, the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) which projects a debilitating and harmful high pitched sound was deployed during the G20 after this military technology was initially tested and used during recent American military special operations in Iraq and Somalia. Correspondingly, theorists Hardt and Negri recognize that an essential

167 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 62
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid., 63
170 Neocleous and Rigakos, “Anti-Security: A Declaration”, 18
characteristic of contemporary sovereignty, which they conceptualize as Empire,\textsuperscript{171} is that now “military deployment is presented as an internationally sanctioned police action.” They add the following:

...Today military intervention is progressively less a product of decisions that arise out of the old international order or even U.N. structures. More often it is dictated unilaterally by the United States, which charges itself with the primary task and then subsequently asks its allies to set in motion a process of armed containment and/or repression of the current enemy of Empire. These enemies are most often called terrorist, a crude conceptual and terminological reduction that is rooted in a police mentality.\textsuperscript{172}

We therefore need to recognize the current parallel and simultaneous processes of the 'policization of the military' and 'militarization of the police'. Critical geographer Stephen Graham explains that militaries are increasingly being deployed to secure domestic urban territories, just as major police departments such as the NYPD, establish global chains of offices in the major cities of foreign nations. Hence, “'[h]igh intensity

\textsuperscript{171} In their co-authored book \textit{Empire} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), autonomous Marxists Hardt and Negri re-conceptualize the term empire in order to study contemporary processes of global capital and 'societies of control'. Rather than conceiving it as a territorial unit governed by a particular hegemonic political entity like the United States, they conceive a postmodern Empire that is a fluid, hybrid, and globalized power formation comprised of monetary and communication networks that subsumes or destroys any localized, state and/or community-centered system of control. In the contemporary passage to the new world order of Empire, it is theorized that the nation-state is in a process of decline and is being replaced by a new global type of sovereignty. Their "basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what [they] call Empire." (xii) Moreover, this new sovereignty consists of multiple entities (i.e. monarchical, oligarchical, and democratic) united in a crusade for capital accumulation and production. This arrangement of rule began to be constituted during the rise of neoliberal globalization after the Second World War through the establishment of the US Federal Reserve, United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. These global governance institutions, along with the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when force is necessary, guarantee that these new imperial organisms can access and exploit capital markets around the entire world. Consequently, this new type of sovereignty is a total system considering there no longer exists a distinction between inside and outside the capitalist system of accumulation and production. In order to theoretically develop their notion of the emergence of this new world order of Empire, Hardt and Negri draw on poststructuralist concepts of bio-power (Michel Foucault) and 'societies of control' (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari), Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben's ideas of a 'state of exception' and 'just war', and, Karl Marx's political-economic theory of capital.

\textsuperscript{172} Hardt and Negri, \textit{Empire}, 37
policing' and 'low intensity warfare' threaten to merge, challenging historic constraints on the deployment of military force within Western nations."173 Pacification can grasp this process of security projects moving back and forth between the domestic and the international by connecting the continuous warfare against both internal and external enemies of Empire. “Looking at the history of security,” according to Rigakos and Neocleous, “we see that these lineages can be better linked by speaking about pacification projects in the form of peace as warfare, or more precisely, that civil society is always already at war” which “is a long-standing attribute of capitalism.”174

Third, the term pacification “displaces the ubiquity and reach of security.”175 As previously mentioned, security discourse tends to attach itself to basically any category of analysis. In contrast, the term pacification does not contain the same degree of ubiquity as security and thus provides a better conceptual tool for critical inquiry. Rigakos argues that there “is no such thing as food pacification, supply-chain pacification, private pacification, these ideas are nonsensical because pacification resists this type of ubiquity.”176 The employment of pacification requires its practitioners to investigate and answer: who are the targets of pacification? Why are they targets and why are they resisting pacification? What are the political objectives of a particular pacification project? Considering security is more than just an activity it is a goal and a feeling that permeates almost all social relations and commodities, the language of security cannot inquire into the same questions in the same way as pacification can. Whereas, security discourse tends to obscure the real targets, rationalities, and objectives entailed in police

174 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 63  
175 Ibid.  
176 Ibid.
actions, the precise and critical terminology of pacification has greater potential of uncovering these features found in contemporary policing. Hence, Rigakos states that the hegemony of security "casts a deep fog over police projects...A fog through which we may more effectively navigate by understanding pacification."  

Lastly, "Pacification pre-supposes war and resistance", and thus addresses the neocon challenge that I outlined in the previous section. To reiterate, the liberal analyses circumvent analyzing the policing of anti-globalization protests as a form of warfare. This is problematic because state security analysts are employing militarized terms like 'netwar' and 'low intensity warfare' to analyze contemporary protests (e.g. 1999 WTO "Battle in Seattle") and, in turn, strategize effective countering measures and "policy-oriented propositions." In other words, while liberal criminologists like de Lint and Hall produce neutralizing and de-politicizing analyses of contemporary protest policing/surveillance, bourgeois security planners like de Armand, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, in a long tradition dating back to the 18th century, view these conflicts as a particular type of warfare (e.g. netwar) and consequently propose corresponding policies and strategies to government, military and law enforcement agencies in order to combat and counter this perceived asymmetrical, low intensity form of war. As critical researchers and activists we require a radical concept like pacification in order to understand and uncover what intelligent control and security concepts tend to mask; that these contemporary conflicts are in fact battles being waged by the NSMs against the "domestic and global

177 Rigakos, "Pacification as a police project", 63
178 Ibid., 64
179 Through an analysis of netwar case studies presented in the 2001 RAND’s research project, security analysts Arquilla and Ronfeldt proposed several “counternetwar” strategies that Western governments ought to implement. This included the suggestion that “It takes networks to fight networks” Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, 15-16
imperatives of Empire." Pacification addresses this conceptual need because the term is wedded to the presumption that security projects engage in warfare for the purposes of fabricating a social order conducive to global capitalism. In other words, pacification sees that “the entire premise of security is based first and foremost on the security, extension and imposition of property relations...enforcement of a wage-labor system, the expropriation of land, the removal of the opportunity for sustenance, the erasure of communal organization, the imposition of individual competition, the establishment of commodity culture and so forth.” Indeed, pacification presupposes the pacifying of both domestic and international populations for the purpose of rendering them productive subjects of Empire. Thus, the pacification concept recognizes and interrogates the political economy of contemporary policing.

To illustrate this “global interconnectivity of pacification”, Rigakos links two seemingly distinct contemporary conflicts:

Between June 26 and 27, 2010 the Canadian government spent close to 1 billion dollars on security measures for the G20 in Toronto, providing protection for the ceremonial gathering of global state and corporate elites. Mass arrests, illegal detentions, the secret enactment of wartime legislation banning persons from approaching public buildings or parks, and the deployment of over 20,000 police, military and intelligence personnel marked the largest ‘peacetime’ mobilization in Canadian history. A few months later, Egypt erupted into a mass revolt against the tyranny of Mubarak and western nations were slow, indeed reticent, to support the popular uprising. U.S. made tear gas canisters, the same used against protesters in Toronto, were fired into the Egyptian crowds in Tahrir Square. As the battle waged between security forces and the people in the streets, analysts began to describe the cozy relationship between Mubarak and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and revealed that for over two decades, the Egyptian military had been receiving over 1 billion dollars in annual aid to support the regime.

Hence, the strategies, tactics, technologies, and political economy of various pacification projects carry out similar imperial objectives of power. And it is through security discourses and logics that these pacification projects are obfuscated and rationalized.

---

180 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 65 citing Hardt and Negri, Empire.
181 Ibid., 64
182 Ibid., 64-65
Therefore, this thesis makes the theoretical claim that the police and intelligence operations during the Toronto G20 Summit can be critically analyzed as a particular project of pacification.

**Studying the G20 Security Intelligence Operation as a Pacification Project**

Borrowing insights from not only contemporary critical police researchers like Neocleous and Rigakos but also from Foucault's analytic of power, I conceptualize a 'pacification project' here as a type of police mechanism that tends to mobilize strategic power networks and deploys particular techniques, technologies and discourses in an attempt to proactively suppress populations considered hostile, adversarial or risky to the imperial objectives of power within a specified territory. Neocleous turns to the *Oxford English Dictionary* and finds that the term pacification is described as a state or sovereign action that attempts "to put an end to strife or discontent" and "to reduce to peaceful submission" a rebellious population.\(^{183}\) The dictionary cites the Edicts of Pacification of 1563, 1570 and the Edict of Nantes in 1598 as the first instances of the usage of the word 'pacification'. The dates are important, according to Neocleous, because "they are the point of departure for the period in which the insecurity of bourgeois order had to be secured."\(^{184}\) In other words, these initial pacification projects occurred during the initial stages of capitalism. Neocleous reminds us that the social order of capital is an order of social insecurity recognized by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*:

> The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted

---

\(^{183}\) Neocleous, "Security as Pacification", 38

\(^{184}\) Ibid.
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.\textsuperscript{185}

This permanent insecurity of social relations under capitalism gives rise to a \textit{politics of security}, making security into the fundamental concept of a capitalist society. Neocleous argues that “[i]t is through this politics of security that the constant revolutionising of production and uninterrupted disturbance of capitalist order is fabricated, structured and administered.”\textsuperscript{186} In other words, pacification is a process that uses the logic of security in an attempt to order the social relations of power around a capitalist regime of accumulation.

In order to function, the political economy of neoliberal capitalism requires “a pacifying policing system premised upon corrective discipline (i.e., for those already civilized or at least sociable), and, where necessary, repressive sovereignty (i.e., for those considered to be so far beyond redemption as to be literally ‘feckless’ – incapable of assuming responsibility, and so being governed through, the civilizing process)”.\textsuperscript{187}

Security in capitalist societies like Canada therefore entails the disciplining of civilians and the suppression of rebellious populations in order to fabricate a social order that aligns with the interests of capital and state power. Relating to protest policing/surveillance, Matthew DeMichele argues in his comparative historical analysis of the Great Strike of 1877 and the WTO Protests of 1999, that the police “should not be understood as only charged with responding reactively to criminal violations, but rather as serving more important social functions such as protecting dominant economic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{186} Neocleous, “Security as Pacification”, 24
\item \textsuperscript{187} Michael Kempa, “Public Policing, Private Security, Pacifying Populations,” in \textit{Anti-Security}, eds., Neocleous and Rigakos (Ottawa, ON: Red Quill Books, 2011), 95
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
structures.” Indeed, the G20 security police operation’s primary function was not to facilitate a “peaceful protest”, even though it claimed to do so, but rather to implement extensive police and intelligence campaigns that attempted to discipline and pacify resistance towards the G20 Summit, an elite global governance event that operates as a steering committee for neoliberal globalization.

As Rigakos explains, pacification projects consist of *imperial objectives* that try to make populations more “‘productive’ within the international circuit of capital” and fabricate an order that “privileges the global protection of private property.” Indeed, employing the logic that its mission was to “Ensure the Safety and Security of the General Public and Heads of State Attending G8 and G20 Summits In Canada,” I claim that the G20 pacification project’s primary imperial objective was to facilitate a political-economic event that functioned to perpetuate a global system of exploitation and domination.

Pacification may also be understood, in a more Foucauldian sense, as a productive power (a mode of governing or police mechanism) that relies on knowledge of populations in order to strategically deploy corrective discipline (“soft tactics”) alongside suppressive sovereignty (“hard tactics”). In contrast to the repressive notions of power that has dominated political analysis since Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, Foucault radically theorized that it is more analytically useful to investigate power’s productive aspects. He argues that researchers “must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in

189 Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 50
190 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 79
191 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 16
negative terms; it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of object and rituals of truth.¹⁹² Foucault did not put forward a general theory of power. Instead he intended to outline an analytic of power. In his 1977-1978 lectures at the College de France, he suggested to researchers a programme of analyzing the mechanisms that operate in an attempt to secure power:

This analysis involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with what effects, power is applied. If we accept that power is not a substance, fluid or something that derives from a particular source, then this analysis could and would only be at most the beginning of a theory, not a theory of what power is, but simply of power in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have the role or function and theme, even when they are unsuccessful, of securing power. It is a set of procedures, and it is as such, and only as such, that the analysis of mechanisms of power could be understood as the beginnings of something like a theory of power.¹⁹³

Correspondingly, Neocleous argues that rather than seeing security as some sort of universal or transcendental value we need to see it as a political technology of neoliberal capitalist order building. He suggests that the analytical category of pacification can help us make sense of this process:

To see security as a constitutive power or a technique deployed and mobilized in the exercise of power is to read it as a police mechanism: a mechanism for the fabrication of a social order organized around a constant revolutionising of the instruments and relations of production and thus containing the everlasting uncertainty and agitation of all social relations that Marx and Engels define as key to capitalism; a mechanism,...in which the key task is pacification.¹⁹⁴

A pacification project then is a particular type of mode of governing/police mechanism that is deployed for the purpose of fabricating a social order conducive to accomplishing certain imperial objectives.

In order to achieve its imperial objectives, a pacification project deploys a strategic array of techniques and discourses “that are similar with respect to the

¹⁹² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 194
¹⁹³ Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 2
¹⁹⁴ Neocleous, “Security as Pacification”, 26
continuity of pacification of either domestic populations or the exploitation of overseas subjects.” Rigakos’ study of Broken Windows demonstrates this interchangeability of pacification projects from the domestic to the international. Indeed, he argues that the “NYPD’s domestic policing program found a relatively similar operational logic in the midst of an occupational campaign aimed at advancing American imperial interests through pacification.” In other words, international and domestic pacification projects operationally and theoretically overlap in the minds of security thinkers.

Additionally, Rigakos suggests that a key tenet of a pacification project is that it is mobilized and structured by police networks consisting of an elaborate constellation of public, private, and quasi-public agencies. A strategic set of state and corporate “institutions are employed to achieve the same objectives of marshaling the resources of the private sector and the military in order to assist in the extraction of resources, the control of populations, and the overall creation of productive relations.” Indeed, contemporary social theory has recognized the emergence of network forms of social organization. Manuel Castells theorizes that as a historical trend, “dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture.” Regarding the new sovereignty of Empire, Hardt and Negri theorize that apparatuses of rule do not reside in any particular nation-state but are instead exercised and arranged in power networks. Describing the

---

195 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 79
196 Ibid., 77
197 Ibid., 77
emerging shift from Foucault's 'disciplinary society' to Deleuze's 'society of control', they explain that power in (post)modern society is "characterized by an intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices, but in contrast to discipline, this control extends well outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks." In other words, current arrangements of discipline and control are not enclosed in any particular disciplinary or state institution but are instead operative in decentralized and deterritorialized network formations. The role that the nation-state is performing in today's era of neoliberal globalization "is that of distributing powers of governance to, and conferring legitimacy and accountability on, other bodies above and below the state." Hence, Foucault called on researchers investigating power to decenter the state as the object of analysis because "the state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth."

It would be problematic, however, to readily decentralize the state in my analysis on the social control and surveillance of anti-G20 dissent. Fernandez's research on the policing of anti-globalization protests demonstrates that "those responsible for policing protest are a mixture of policing and intelligence agencies firmly associated with the nation-state apparatus but who also articulate missions, activities, and strategies beyond the nation-state." He recognizes the fundamental role that the state plays in funding,

---

199 Hardt and Negri. *Empire*, 23
200 Ericson and Doyle, "Globalization and the policing of protest", 590
202 Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 23
organizing and enabling law enforcement agencies to carry out the social control and surveillance of dissent while also acknowledging that power relations and effects go beyond centralized forms of rule. In other words, when analyzing the policing of protests it is still important to keep the state as a key object under study while maintaining analytical awareness that non-state forces are also (and increasingly) contributing to the social control and surveillance of dissent. Indeed, in the case of the Toronto G20 the Canadian government played a significant role in the G20 security police operation by funding, mobilizing, and distributing police power to state, military, and corporate entities. For instance, the Summit Management Office (SMO), part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), was the federal government agency responsible for the logistical arrangements of the G8/G20 Summits. Based on the historical knowledge that “annual G20 Summits are very high profile gatherings [which] are subject both to extensive lobbying by advocacy groups and to public demonstrations”, the SMO funded and tasked the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to coordinate the G20 police and intelligence operations. In turn, The RCMP established the G8/G20 Integrated Security Unit (ISU) as the “central coordinating body for the G8/G20 Summits security planning, operations and demobilization activities” under the direction of Chief Superintendent Alphonse MacNeil. Importantly, Neocleous and Rigakos’ concept of pacification takes into account state power in police actions/mechanisms while also understanding that these projects also strategically form power networks with military and private forces in order to achieve similar imperial objectives.

203 Toronto Police Service, Toronto Police Service After-Action Review, (June 2011), 5
204 Ibid., 5
How would we therefore understand the G20 intelligence operation as part of a pacification project? This is the primary task of this thesis: to answer this question through an anarchist, anti-security lens. To start, we may say the following: the G20 Joint Intelligence Group mobilized strategic power networks composed of public, private and quasi-public agencies, and that it also deployed techniques and discourses that share similarities with those of intelligence operations that are conducted to monitor and pacify perceived enemy subjects. Indeed, the principles found in the Canadian military’s manual for intelligence operations framed the procedures of the G20 JIG. The Canadian Forces (CF) Joint Intelligence Doctrine is replete with text and terminology similar to that found in the ISU-JIG documents. But what is ultimately convincing of the CF Doctrine’s usage in the guidance of G20 JIG was that its aim was to “provide a national doctrine for the use of intelligence in support of CF operations”.205 As I will demonstrate, the CF was a critical liaison agency within the G20 JIG network.

The CF Doctrine appears to have been a major knowledge source for the G20 JIG by providing it with guidance and principles for carrying out its intelligence operation. The military intelligence manual potentially over-wrote the deployment practices and aims of the JIG, effectively militarizing the entire G20 intelligence gathering operation and, by extension, coding dissidents as enemies of state security forces. Indeed, it stipulates that when the Canadian Forces participate in “any joint or nationally directed operation” the CF Doctrine will take precedence over single-service doctrine.”206 In other words, the CF was required to employ the manual to support the G20 JIG even

---

205 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, May 21, 2003, accessed June 3, 2012, http://api.ning.com/files/5uQkVprCi0YSTiTv6A5DY6UNLFAKtDGv8AdjgCwnlizwkl*9tpOnRv0ExIl1LqN0x*KpUd2gOzo9UDabgSynYjaD4ZT*Ri/CFJointDoctrineBGJ005200FP000JointIntEN21May03.pdf

206 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, i
though the military agency was an integrated partner within a broader policing and intelligence initiative. Although the manual discusses intelligence “in a military context”, the doctrine’s strategies are meant to be flexible depending on the conflict. So as to act “as guidance...as to how intelligence should work and be used, rather than as a set of rules to be slavishly followed in all instances.” Designed to be adaptable to various kinds of CF joint operations, the G20 JIG would likely have employed the military intelligence manual as a valuable knowledge source in order for the JIG to carry out its surveillance function for the G20 Integrated Security Unit. Throughout the analysis, I use the CF Doctrine to clarify and explain particular terms and concepts appropriated in the ISU-JIG documents. For instance, the word ‘intelligence’ was not conceptualized in any of the released documents but if we refer to the CF Doctrine it is very likely that the JIG understood and employed it as “[t]he product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which gives rise to intelligence and as a generic title, to those who carry out the process, which leads to its production.” This also indicates that the military intelligence manual is designed to monitor and pacify either domestic or international adversarial populations in order to accomplish operational security objectives. Thus, by identifying congruent terms found in the ISU-JIG documents compared to the CF Doctrine, I offer concrete evidence that the G20 JIG fulfilled the surveillance function of the G20 pacification project by carrying out a joint forces security (counter)intelligence operation.

207 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, i
208 Ibid., 1-3
Chapter 4: An Anti-Security Analysis of the JIG’s Network

Establishment, headquarters, and function of the JIG

In his critical research on the social control of dissent emanating from the newest social movements, Fernandez has documented that intelligence gathering is a major component of police preparations. Months before a global governance event where there is anticipated resistance, police assemble a “joint intelligence team” in order to “facilitate the flow of overt and covert information within and among agencies”. He has found that these intelligence teams are typically composed of a “network of law enforcement organizations” that include federal, state/provincial, and municipal public police, state intelligence agencies, and (increasingly) private security companies.

Similarly, the intelligence function for the G20 pacification project was conducted through the G20 ISU’s Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) that was composed of a multi-agency network. As an essential component of the Integrated Security Unit, the JIG was “established in December 2008 and became fully operational in early January 2009”; approximately a year and half before the G20 event. The largest intelligence collaboration in Canadian history, according to the RCMP, the G20 JIG infrastructure was developed over the course of 18 months in an empty warehouse in Barrie, Ontario. With its headquarters in Barrie, the JIG was tasked by the ISU with the mandate to “collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate accurate information and intelligence in a timely manner to facilitate the decision-making process in both the planning and

---

209 Fernandez, Policing Dissent, 102
210 Ibid., 107
211 RCMP, After Action Report, 198
212 Ibid., 199
executing phases of securing G8 and G20 Summits."\textsuperscript{213} Indeed, Fernandez has documented that joint intelligence teams collect data and produce knowledge on individuals and populations that police and security analysts perceive to have the potential to disrupt the global governance event that they have been tasked to secure. Throughout the intelligence operation, the team constantly distributes intelligence on perceived threats facing the political venue to other participating police and security agencies.\textsuperscript{214} Indeed, my anti-security analysis will show that the established joint intelligence team for the Toronto G20/G8 carried out a similar intelligence function. But what is perhaps unique and unprecedented about the G20 JIG compared to previous joint intelligence teams was how extensive and militarized its summit intelligence network was.

**JIG’s Joint Forces Operation**

According to the *After-Action Report*, the RCMP described the G20 JIG as a “joint forces operation” made up of numerous police, military, security/intelligence, and private sector agencies.\textsuperscript{215} The CF *Doctrine* provides the following definition and parameters of joint operations:

\begin{quote}
...operations in which the elements of more than one service or environment participate... The Operational level is concerned with the employment of the whole force through the conception, planning and execution of campaigns and major operations. These must contribute directly towards achieving previously defined military-strategic objectives, which are drawn from the overarching political aims of the operation... Joint Force Commanders provide the link between strategic level direction and lower level execution.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

In other words, a joint forces operation entails a multi-agency network that functions throughout all phases of the military/police action in order to achieve the strategic and

\textsuperscript{213} RCMP, *After Action Report*, 32  
\textsuperscript{214} Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 107  
\textsuperscript{215} RCMP, *After Action Report*, 32  
\textsuperscript{216} Canadian Forces, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 5-1
political aims of the mission. In effect, it allows for the network commanders to orchestrate and implement high level strategies into on-the-ground pacification tactics. Indeed, the G20 ISU-JIG partnered four major police forces the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Toronto Police Service (TPS) and Peel Regional Police Service (PRPS) and created “Critical liaison roles…for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian Forces. The JIG also established hundreds of other points of contact with other law enforcement agencies, federal, provincial and municipal government departments and corporate security sections.”217 Critical criminologists Jeff Monaghan and Kevin Walby and journalist Tim Groves have referred to the JIG’s operation as entailing a “multi-agency intelligence network”218 that “employed more than 500 people at its peak.”219 Even the JIG documents repeatedly refer to its multi-agency organization as a “summit intelligence network”.220 According to the RCMP, the summit intelligence network was used to “identify opportunities, gather intelligence and seek input to specific issues and problems” relating to G20 security.221 As we have noted, pacification projects employ “a wide network of public, private and quasi-public institutions” to achieve the same objectives; marshalling the security resources of public, private, and military sectors in

218 This chapter would not be possible if it wasn’t for the trail blazing work of Jeff Monaghan and Kevin Walby, “‘They attacked the city’: Security intelligence, the sociology of protest policing and the anarchist threat at the 2010 Toronto G20 summit, *Current Sociology* (2012): 1-19 http://csi.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/06/21/0011392112448470
220 For example see C 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Weekly Brief on June 18 2010*], 85
221 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 32
order to control particular populations within a specified territory. Indeed, embedded within the G20 ISU, the JIG was a joint forces operation composed of an extensive network of military, public police, intelligence, and private sector agencies.

**Liaison Management Team**

To better understand JIG’s joint forces operation it is necessary to examine how this ‘summit intelligence network’ was mobilized. The creation and maintenance of this extensive network of internal and external contacts was done through the JIG’s Liaison Management Team (LMT). The purpose of the LMT was to “develop, nurture, and maintain appropriate levels of contact between the JIG and its external partners to ensure the JIG is informed and apprised of ALL risks and threats.” The LMT also facilitated the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence among agencies within and external to the JIG. Prior to the G20/G8 Summits, the LMT developed “personnel and procedural relationships with other law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, corporate and private security partners, internationally, nationally, provincially, and locally.” Thus, the LMT carried out a mobilization function for the JIG by building and maintaining its ‘summit intelligence network’. During the G20, the LMT assisted the JIG by streamlining and distributing “live time” intelligence and information to the various agencies and operational components within the network and also to outside contacts. The LMT was directed by the “LMT manager” and was divided into three smaller teams: the Domestic

---

222 Rigakos, “Pacification as a police project”, 79
223 C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 18
224 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 200-201
225 Ibid., 32
Intelligence LMT, the International Intelligence LMT, and the Corporate Intelligence LMT.

**Domestic Intelligence Liaison Management Team**

The Domestic Intelligence LMT (DILMT) built and maintained JIG partnerships between Canadian law enforcement, military, security, intelligence and government agencies. The DILMT facilitated correspondence and collaboration between the four main police agencies in the joint forces operation—the RCMP (Lead Agency), OPP, TPS, and PRPS. It also enabled critical liaison with over a dozen other Canadian police agencies who in turn provided the JIG with investigators and access to their criminal databases. According to the ISU-JIG document *D 509 [ISU-JIG, Liaison Management Team – Domestic – Point of Contact List]*, these included Barrie PS, Belleville PS, CN Police, Durham Regional PS, Gananoque PS, Guelph PS, Halton Regional PS, Hamilton PS, Interpol Ottawa, Kawartha Lakes PS, Kingston PS, London PS, Niagara Parks PS, Niagara Regional PS, North Bay Regional PS, Ottawa PS, Peterborough Lakefield Community PS, Quebec Provincial Police, Rama (First Nations)PS, South Simcoe PS, Thunder Bay PS, Waterloo Regional PS, Windsor PS, and Woodstock PS. The *Domestic Points of Contact List* also reveals that the ISU-JIG coordinated with several security agencies such as Canadian Air Carrier Protection (Air Marshalls), Canadian Bomb Data Centre (CBDC), and Crime Stoppers. Additionally, the document shows that the JIG’s joint forces operation relied on intelligence services from the following

---

226 A 509 [ISU-JIG, Observer Program – JIG Presentation], 3
227 See D 509 [ISU-JIG, Liaison Management Team – Domestic – Point of Contact List]
agencies: Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs),228 Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC),229 Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario (CISO),230 Critical Infrastructure Criminal Intelligence (CICI),231 National Security Criminal Operations Branch (NSCOB), Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Units (CFNCIUs),232 Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs),233 and RCMP National Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs).234 More detail on the role of some of these entities performed for the joint forces operation will be provided in the following chapter when discussing the JIG’s surveillance techniques. The domestic contingent of the LMT also networked with representatives from governmental organizations such as Health Canada, Canada Revenue Agency, Energy Resources Canada, Hydro One, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of National Defence (DND), and Canada Immigration.235 Lastly, through the DILMT, the G20 ISU-JIG was in contact with security personnel from the active Vancouver Olympics Integrated Security Unit.236 In sum, the DILMT was the component of LMT that created and maintained connections with domestic law enforcement, military, security, and intelligence agencies which in turn enabled the flow of intelligence information among these and other entities embedded within the JIG’s summit intelligence network.

228 For background information on IBETs see: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/index-eng.htm
229 For background information on ITAC see: http://www.csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr13-eng.asp
230 For background information on CISO see: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/nsci-ecsn-eng.htm
231 For background information on CICI see: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/nsci-ecsn-eng.htm
232 For background information on CFNCIUs see: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/asu_kingston/cfnici.aspx
233 For background information on INSETs see: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/secur/insets-eisn-eng.htm
234 See D 509 [ISU-JIG, Liaison Management Team – Domestic – Point of Contact List]
235 C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 18
236 D 509 [ISU-JIG, Liaison Management Team – Domestic – Point of Contact List], 10
International Intelligence Liaison Management Team

The international component of the LMT (IILMT) consisted of foreign Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) from many of the nation-states participating in G20 and G8 Summits. The role of the SLOs was to “contribute to the intelligence process by providing information from their respective countries and also to disseminate information to their country’s security officers which will be provided at “live time” briefings.” In other words, these foreign liaison officers of the LMT carried out the double function of providing the JIG with intelligence information while also informing their own government of security knowledge produced by the JIG before and during the G20. Moreover, the IILMT enabled the JIG to establish database sharing relationships with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies from “Australia, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK, US (FBI).” Fernandez and colleagues have documented how intelligence sharing about anti-globalization groups and activists has expanded immensely with the digitization of information and increased interstate agency collaboration and database integration. For instance, an RCMP officer interviewed by Fernandez in 2008 explained how police use covert information from national and international intelligence agencies when preparing for mass demonstrations:

Besides using our intelligence, we also reach out to our international partners. We usually do that through our liaison officers abroad. The RCMP has members working in a variety of countries around the world. And they have developed an effective network of contacts within the countries where they work. We use these contacts. Similarly, the FBI has officers working in Ottawa. We use these officers as points of contact, and use them particularly in the case of the G8 [2003 Ottawa]. We call them and say we are interested in obtaining information on individuals that

---

237 C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 18
238 C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief June 18 2010], 85
239 Fernandez et al., Shutting Down The Streets, 78
might be disruptive and are traveling. They will give us the information they have. We certainly
do use police contacts and agencies from around the world. For the G8 [2003 Ottawa] in
particular, there was a very close working relationship with many of the American agencies. Given
the global situation of the time, it was imperative that we have this close tight working relationship
with other agencies, which would include the FBI, Secret Service, and the usual mix.²⁴⁰

Indeed, through the JIG’s International Intelligence LMT, a similar collaborative
intelligence process was developed in preparation for the 2010 Toronto G20/G8.

**Corporate Intelligence Liaison Management Team**

Undertaking a similar mobilization function as the international and domestic
LMTs, the Corporate Intelligence LMT (CILMT) built and maintained relations with
many corporate and some government entities for the JIG’s summit intelligence network.
According to the JIG *Intelligence Briefs*, the JIG created contacts with 145 different
private sector agencies, “mostly critical infrastructure”.²⁴¹ Groves has also recognized
JIG’s liaison with corporations prior to the G20. For instance, he found that JIG, via the
CILMT, networked with “energy sector stakeholders”.²⁴² Indeed, the ISU-JIG document
*E 509 [LMT Corporate Points of Contact List]* reveals that the Canadian Electricity
Association, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Nuclear Power [Canadian Nuclear
Association], Toronto Hydro, Toronto Water & Sewer, and Union Gas were all listed as
points of contact. Additionally, Groves mentions that several “other corporations that
received intelligence from police included Canada’s major banks, telecom firms, airlines,
downtown property companies and other businesses seen to be vulnerable to the effects

²⁴⁰ Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 106
²⁴¹ C 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Weekly Brief June 18 2010*], 86
²⁴² Groves, “G20 case reveals ‘largest ever’ police spy operation”.
of summit protests."²⁴³ Again many of these entities can be identified when examining
the CILMT list:

**Major Banks:** Bank of Canada, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, CIBC, ING Direct,
HSBC, Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto Dominion Bank

**Communication Firms:** Bell Canada, Canadian Telecom Cyber, Rogers Communications, Telus,
TORIX Toronto Information

**Financial Sector:** Canadian Bankers Association, Financial Sector Working Group, Investment
Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, TMX/TSX Toronto Montreal Exchange, Disaster
Recovery Information Exchange, Symcor

**Hospitality Industry:** Deerhurst Resort, Fairmont Royal York Hotels and Resorts, Greater Toronto
Hotel Association, Hilton Canada, Intercontinental Toronto Centre Hotel, Sheraton Hotels, Metro
Toronto Convention Center, Toronto Airport Hotels, Westin Hotels

**Property Companies:** Brookfield Properties, Oxford Properties Group, Property Management
Bentall Properties, GWL Realty Advisors

**Security Agencies (i.e. Corporate, Airport, and University):** Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority, Canadian Depository Security Ltd, Greater Toronto Airports Authority, Legislative
Security Service, Ryerson University Campus Security, Scotiabank Risk Security & Investigation,
Toronto Port Authority (Island Airport), University of Toronto Campus Security, York University
Campus Security

**Transportation Sector:** Cadillac Fairview, Canadian Couriers & Logistics Association, Canada
Trucking Association, Coach Canada, Go Transit, Hamilton International Airport, Ontario Motor
Coach Owners Association, Ontario Trucking Association, Porter Airlines Inc. Toronto Transit
Commission, Toronto Transportation (Roads Department), TransCanada, Transport Canada,
Penske Truck Leasing, Idealease Truck Leasing, Association Canadian Car Rental Operators,
Union Station, VIA Rail Canada.²⁴⁴

The CILMT also created points of contact with federal and provincial government
services including Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Canada Post, Correctional Service
Canada (CSC), Emergency Management Ontario, Environment Canada Weather
Services, and Toronto Public Health.²⁴⁵ It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive
list of state and corporate agencies considering the LMT's "Points of Contact Lists"
documents (i.e. D509 and E 509) since both contain many noticeable redactions.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the JIG's LMT created and maintained an extensive summit

²⁴³ Groves, “G20 case reveals 'largest ever' police spy operation”.
²⁴⁴ These agencies are listed in alphabetical order throughout the document E 509 [ISU-JIG, LMT
Corporate Points of Contact List]
²⁴⁵ E 509 [ISU-JIG, LMT Corporate Points of Contact List]
intelligence network consisting of well over a hundred points of contacts, and thus
enabled the JIG to carry out a massive joint forces operation.

**JIG’s Command Structure**

The LMT was one of the four teams/components/nodes operating within the JIG’s
commander-led structure. Indeed, not only was the JIG’s personnel and resources derived
from an extensive multi-agency intelligence network but its own command structure
functioned as an intricate hierarchical network. “Due to the classified environment”, the
JIG’s “infrastructure and information flow were extremely complex tasks” according to
the RCMP. In order to provide oversight and structure to the JIG, the “Joint
Management Team” relied upon the principles formulated in the Major Case
Management Model (MCMM). This model is used by the RCMP and other Canadian
law enforcement agencies for the purposes of organizing complex police investigations
and operations. While the JIG documents do not go into any further detail about the
MCMM, I was able to access an online copy of the model through the Ontario Ministry
of Attorney General website. It was designed in 2004 to “provide for a flexible, yet
standardized, response to major case investigations based on the requirements of the
particular case. The circumstances of each major case will dictate the level and extent to
which resources will be assigned to each investigative function.” In applying the
organizational principles of the MCMM, the JIG was led by a “Team Commander”

---

246 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 198
248 Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, *Major Case Management Mode*, October 1,
249 Ibid., 14
supported by four Deputy Commanders. Their role was to "ensure the collection, 
collation, analysis and dissemination of accurate information and intelligence in a timely 
manner to facilitate the decision making in both the planning and execution phases of 
securing the 2010 Summits." In other words, they were the officers in charge of 
making sure that the JIG accomplished its own mandate for the G20 pacification project.
The main JIG Commander was Rod D. McCann, an inspector from the RCMP. When 
examining the ISU-JIG "COMMAND Subchart" (appendix A) which illustrates JIG’s 
chain of command, the JIG Commander is shown positioned at the top of the hierarchical 
structure suggesting that McCann was the principal authority over the entire JIG.251
Operating underneath him were the four Deputy Commanders, two of which were led by 
OPP and Toronto PS inspectors.252 At this level, it is evident that JIG’s command 
structure is not a rigid vertical chain. Instead, it entails horizontal relations between the 
four Deputy Commanders and also between the operational components.253 While 
McCann, the JIG Commander, had the ultimate authority over the entire operation, the 
deputy commanders each managed separate operational teams/components/nodes that 
included the Liaison Management Team (LMT) (discussed above), and the Primary 
Intelligence Investigation Team (PIIT), the Analytical Team (AT), and the Intelligence 
Information Management Team (IIMT) which will be examined in the next chapter. Each 
team had its own dynamic chain of command and operational subcomponents (for LMT 
see appendix B, PIIT see appendix C, AT see appendix D, IIMT see appendix E).254 The

250 C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 15
251 B 509 [ISU-JIG, Subcharts], DOC0037506
252 I could only identify the following two assistant/deputy JIG commanders in the ISU-JIG documents: 
253 B 509 [ISU-JIG, Subcharts], DOC0037506 and DOC037540
254 B 509 [ISU-JIG, Subcharts]
entire JIG command structure is best described as a dynamic, pyramid-shaped network within which the JIG Commander occupied the highest position followed by four Deputy Commanders who managed operational teams that performed specific but interconnected intelligence functions throughout the JIG's joint forces operation.
Chapter 5: An Anti-Security Analysis of the JIG’s Operation

Having taken stock of the JIG’s ‘joint forces operation’, I now turn to mapping the array of surveillance techniques and activities it carried out throughout the G20 pacification project. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to begin by recognizing the analytical obstacle discussed by Fernandez and colleagues regarding the categorization of intelligence practices that occur during the policing of anti-globalization protests. Fernandez has demonstrated that joint intelligence teams typically employ an assemblage of overt and covert techniques of surveillance before and during the mass demonstration in order to gather intelligence on dissident activities and on the populations and individuals who will likely engage in them.255 They tend to gather intelligence by studying past protests, monitoring open source information, and infiltrating activist social networks. More specifically, these surveillance tactics include “direct surveillance, such as observation and visits by officers, recording of automobile plate numbers, raids, questioning, and burglary; electronic surveillance, such as phone taps, audio eavesdropping, tracking of e-mail, and monitoring of internet and other computer activity; use of video, photo, and car tracking devices; undercover surveillance, including by police in disguise, and the use of informants infiltrators and agent provocateurs; and databasing and the sharing of database information.”256 Importantly, Fernandez and colleagues note that overt and covert surveillance are policing tactics which involve more than just the accumulation of police knowledge on protesters; their main objectives are to manage, disrupt, and pacify political resistance. They note, however, that there is an analytical issue in categorizing these surveillance techniques into overt and covert

255 Fernandez, Policing Dissent, 102
256 Fernandez et al. Shutting Down The Streets, 73
methods of observation because most of them (except raids and long-term infiltration since these practices must remain covert in order to be effective) are employed "either way" during the intelligence operation. For instance, they provide the example that "telephone surveillance can be conducted seamlessly, without alerting the surveilled person, or it can be conducted obviously, in order to signal the surveilled person that he is under surveillance (e.g., sounds on the line, disruption of service, purportedly inadvertent playback of tapes on the line)." To supersede this analytical obstacle, perhaps the surveillance measures undertaken during the G20 pacification project can be categorized more effectively by employing the categorical terms that are used by security analysts. Indeed, the terms ‘security intelligence’ and ‘counterintelligence’ found in the CF Doctrine is defined and used in my anti-security analysis for the purposes of better understanding the array of surveillance techniques, activities, and units deployed by the G20 JIG.

Security Intelligence

First, this thesis will demonstrate that the JIG conducted security intelligence (SI) before and during the G20. SI is defined in the CF Doctrine as "intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of organizations or individuals who pose, or may pose, a threat...to the security of the resources, activities, operations, personnel and information of DND and the CF." Distinguished from other "functional disciplines" of intelligence such as "Armed Forces Intelligence", "Biographic Intelligence", and "Scientific and Technical Intelligence", SI is essentially concerned with collecting,

257 Fernandez et al. Shutting Down The Streets, 74
258 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, 2-18
producing, and disseminating intelligence on populations and individuals that are perceived as potential security threats. When examining the ISU-JIG documents it is very evident that the main function of the JIG was to provide the ISU with “a single, consistent and reliable approach to the development and dissemination of intelligence...on any potential threats specific to the G8/G20 Summits.” Indeed, its main task during the G20 pacification project was to carry out SI “by conducting intelligence investigations on possible threats and suspicious activity associated to the 2010 G8-G20 Summits.”

More specifically, JIG aided the G20 pacification project by providing the ISU with “strategic, operational and tactical intelligence”. These are the three levels of security intelligence that are depicted and defined in the CF’s Doctrine. ‘Strategic Intelligence’ refers to intelligence that is required for the creation of policy and plans for the security operation. It is the highest level of intelligence resulting from information collected over “the widest possible area in response to requirements placed by national governments across the complete spectrum of national and international military, diplomatic, political and economic matters”. ‘Operational intelligence’ is the SI needed “for the planning, execution and support” of security measures within a “Theatre of Operations by a Joint Headquarters”. The ‘theater of operations’ for the G20 summit, according to the RCMP’s After-Action Review, “was primarily the Province of Ontario although mobilization involved all provinces and territories of Canada and intelligence

259 Toronto Police Service, Toronto Police Service After-Action Review, 40  
260 H 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Report #3], 344  
261 CSIS-02 [CSIS, Executive Directive-Final], 5-6  
262 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, 2-1  
263 Ibid.
operations were both national and international. In other words, operational intelligence is the level of security intelligence that provides current, up-to-date intelligence products needed for the ongoing implementation of security measures within a particular territory. ‘Tactical Intelligence’ was the third level of SI that the JIG provided. It is intelligence that is gathered and used for “the planning and conduct” of tactical actions and units in order to accomplish security objectives. In particular, this level of SI tracks the possible tactics of the adversary and determines the necessary tactical actions for accomplishing security objectives.

In effect, the JIG produced “intelligence products” (briefings, bulletins, assessments, and reports) in an attempt to “accurately define the threat picture and provide realistic and complete situational awareness for command staff.” More specifically, as will be demonstrated below the security intelligence products were generated by the coordinating efforts of the JIG’s Analytical Team and Primary Intelligence Investigative Team. Corresponding to the JIG’s SI practices, the ISU-JIG documents consistently emphasize the objective of achieving complete ‘situational awareness’. According to the CF Doctrine, a key objective in any SI operation is to achieve complete situational awareness, which the CF manual defines as providing:

A complete understanding of what is happening, and what will happen in a defined Area of Interest. Commanders at all levels require Situational Awareness as one of the key elements of effective Command and Control. Situational Awareness is created in the mind of the Commanders by merging the appropriate Common Operational Picture with additional data and knowledge affecting the employment of the forces under their command.

In other words, the goal of accomplishing complete situational awareness reflects the desire to provide commanders with as much SI as possible when carrying out their

264 RCMP, After Action Report, 64
265 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, 2-1
266 H 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Report #3], 387
267 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, 4-6
mandated activities. In sum, by collecting, producing, and circulating strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence relating to perceived threats towards the G20 global governance event, the JIG provided the ISU with a single source of security intelligence in an attempt to achieve complete situational awareness during the G20 pacification project.

**Security Counterintelligence**

Second, my anti-security analysis will also demonstrate that the JIG’s security intelligence operation also entailed counterintelligence (CI) entities and practices. According to the CF Doctrine, SI is “especially related to CI activity”. Meaning, an SI operation is typically carried out in coordination with counterintelligence practices. Conducted by “specialist CI personnel” (i.e. infiltrators, undercover officers, agent provocateurs and suppressants), these practices also involve collecting security intelligence but are distinguished from SI in that counterintelligence tactics attempt to “counteract the threat to security posed by ...individual(s) engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and/or organized crime.” Hence, CI encompasses a much more proactive and antagonistic approach than SI. Whereas intelligence is specifically aimed at shaping “the visualisation of the adversary, CI is employed to shape how the adversary perceives and visualises friendly [i.e. security forces] capabilities and intentions.” The objective of CI is to produce uncertainty in the mind of adversaries in order to impede and disrupt their decision making capability by misrepresenting and/or denying them information necessary to conduct effective operations. In other words, the

---

268 *Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 2-18
269 Ibid., 1-5
270 Ibid.
primary purpose of CI is the "collection of intelligence required to implement countermeasures designed to degrade an adversary's intelligence and targeting capabilities." In doing so, CI techniques produce security intelligence by gathering covert information on targeted adversaries while also disrupting the capabilities and activities of their targets. In addition to SI then, this chapter will also uncover how the G20 JIG conducted CI tactics before and during the G20 through the deployment of investigative units that primarily targeted anti-G20 radical left/anarchist activists. In order to demonstrate the G20 JIG's SI and CI practices, it is necessary to examine the JIG's investigative (i.e. PIIT), analytical (i.e. AT), and managerial (i.e. IIMT) units.

**Primary Intelligence Investigative Team**

The Primary Intelligence Investigation Team (PIIT) was the operational component that carried out investigative and surveillance functions for the G20 ISU-JIG. According to the RCMP, the PIIT "Investigators conducted intelligence investigations on possible threats and suspicious activity associated to G8 and G20 summits guided by the principles outlined in the PIIT Baseline Document." The *An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Investigative Team* (referred to as the Baseline from this point forward) was completed and shared within the JIG on June 3rd 2009, approximately a year before the Summits. The Baseline, which provided an "investigative foundation for the PIIT," stated that the mandate for the PIIT was "to strategically implement investigative techniques to ensure that law enforcement is cognizant of the evolving nature of ...[G8/G20 security]... threats, the perpetrators, the targets/venues, the timing and the

---

271 Canadian Forces, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 6-6  
272 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 199  
273 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, *An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team*], 14
impact for the public safety and integrity of any/all investigations.” In other words, PIIT operated as the investigative arm of the JIG by targeting populations and individuals that the ISU-JIG perceived as threats towards the G8/G20 Summits. The Baseline emphasized that the PIIT was integral to the overall success of JIG’s operation. For instance, if the JIG did “not acquire the requisite threat-related intelligence” from its PIIT, “all other mandates are placed in jeopardy. This primary importance underscores the critical necessity of discerning the threats to the 2010 G8[G20] Summit[s], the entities which pose that threat, the motivation and intention of these entities, the criminality to be employed in this activity and the public safety issues that may arise as a result.” The main function of the PIIT, however, was the production of security intelligence and counterintelligence predominantly on anti-G20 radical left/ anarchist networks and activists which were labeled “criminal extremists” by the JIG security analysts.

To identify the threat categories to be investigated by the JIG-PIIT, the Baseline employed security intelligence based on “extensive analysis of the criminality surrounding these events [i.e. G8 and G20] in a variety of venues, both in Canada and abroad” done by the JIG’s “subject matter experts”. The PIIT Baseline organized the threats posed to the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits into four separate threat categories: “Terrorism Threats”, “Independent Asymmetric Threats (IAT)”, “Internecine Strife/Conflict”, and most significantly “Public Order Threats”. Notably, the Baseline stipulated that the severity and quantity of these threats would be subject to change in accordance with the PIIT’s SI and CI activities throughout the G20 pacification project.

274 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 275 Ibid.
276 Ibid., 3
277 Ibid., 4
In other words, “the threat picture will constantly evolve based upon information received” from the PIIT investigations.278

Terrorist Threat

Regarding the terrorism threat, a potential terrorist act was considered the most “egregious” threat to the Summits, international protected persons (IPPs) and to Canadian national security more generally. According to the JIG-PIIT analysts, the G8 and G20 venues were considered “viable targets for international or domestic terrorists” primarily because Canada’s role in combating Al Qaida and its allies in Afghanistan, and the fact that the Summits assembled the “world’s major leaders.”279 The terrorist threat was alleged to be aggravated during the time of the Toronto G20 and Huntsville G28 Summits because of the global recession and the public condemnation that was resonating towards the incompetence of political and corporate elites. The Baseline explained that the “global economic malaise has fostered considerable frustration and anger with world leaders and their perceived inability to revert a downturn in the economy.”280 Analysts predicted that this resentment towards global economic inequality would “escalate lawful dissent” and would “legitimize the need for more radical/criminal action” during elite global governance events like the G8 and G20.281 The Baseline notes “that there is no specific intelligence at this time [June 3 2009] indicating that the ...Summit[s] will be targeted by any terrorist entity.”282 Nonetheless, it discloses that the terrorist threat will be constantly evaluated by the PIIT and a variety of national and international

278 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 4
279 Ibid., 5
280 Ibid.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
investigative agencies during the lead up to the June 2010 G8 and G20 events. While Monaghan and Walby are accurate in arguing that the JIG did not conflate activism with terrorism, the security discourse formulated by the JIG-PIIT analysts does however construe the idea that terrorism and dissent are to some extent associated practices. For instance, within the ‘terrorist threat’ category they construct the notion that anti-summit dissent had the potential to lead to extremist acts. In other words, the discourse does not equate dissent with terrorism but it does suggest that the former is susceptible to turn into the latter. Thus, I argue that the JIG-PIIT’s security discourse when discussing “The Terrorist Threat” category in the Baseline document constructed a relation between terrorist and dissident activities.

**Independent Asymmetric Threats (IAT)**

The JIG-PIIT also constructed a threat category called “Independent Asymmetric Threats (IAT)” (a.k.a. Lone Wolf Threat) which has supposedly often “plagued controversial public venues” in the past. According to the Baseline, the IAT “threat typology is comprised of individuals, acting on their own, motivated by very personal reasons, whose actions are likely to include criminal activity and/or initiate a public safety concern”. And “usually comprises the acts of the ‘powerless’ against the ‘powerful’”. In other words, this type of threat refers to individuals, motivated by a personal grievance, acting alone to perpetuate a crime during the Summits. What distinguishes IATs from the other threat categories is that the threat is “posed by persons

---

283 Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 6
284 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 4
285 Ibid., 8
suffering from mental illness.\textsuperscript{286} In effect, individuals falling under the category of IAT are pathologized. Lastly, the JIG-PIIT considered IATs “difficult to foresee” but did not elaborate as to why this was the case.\textsuperscript{287}

**Internecine Strife/Conflict**

The “Internecine Strife/Conflict” was another threat category constructed by the JIG-PIIT analysts. The *Baseline* stated that “[g]iven the multicultural composition” of Canada, “the visits of head-of-state, governmental leaders, from other nation-states, are often perceived to be controversial by some sectors of society. Further, large-scale venues such as the 2010 G8 [and G20] are often viewed by certain ethnic/linguistic groups that hold grievance with the status quo to be advantageous opportunities to illustrate their dissent.”\textsuperscript{288} This perceived threat by the JIG-PIIT stems from Canada’s various ethnic communities which have the potential to engage in dissent against a particular country participating in the G8 and/or G20 Summits. While this dissent “may be entirely lawful”, the *Baseline* goes on to explain that oftentimes “these protests have led to interethnic conflict and public safety challenges. Examples have include [sic] clashes between Greeks and Macedonians, Serbs and Croats, Sikhs and Indians, etc.”\textsuperscript{289} Hence, the JIG-PIIT perceived this threat category as a public safety and security issue that had the potential to arise during the G20/G8 Summits from various ethnic groups and individuals residing in Canada.

**Public Order Threat**

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid., 4
\textsuperscript{287} DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, *An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team*], 8
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid.
The final but deemed the most plausible security threat affecting the G8/G20 global governance events was the public order threat category. According to the PIIT’s Baseline, “as with most venues of this type”, the G8 and G20 “will likely be subject to actions taken by criminal extremists motivated by a variety of radical ideologies, resulting in potentially serious public safety challenges. These ideologies may include variants of anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, nihilism, socialism, and/or communism.”\textsuperscript{290} The JIG-PIIT was claiming that the primary public order threat facing the G8/G20 stemmed from groups and individuals possessing radical left and anti-capitalist philosophies. The document also (incorrectly) stated that “these ideologies may also include notions of racial supremacy and white power and engage in public incitement of hatred.”\textsuperscript{291} Hence, the JIG-PIIT identified adherents’ to extreme right-wing ideas as another public order threat that may potentially affect the facilitation of G8/G20 Summits. “The important commonality” according to the PIIT Baseline, “is that these ideologies...place these individuals and/or organizations at odds with the status quo [emphasis in original] and the current distribution of power in society: this may include a theoretical and practical opposition to authority (i.e. law enforcement and government), the capitalist or mixed market economy, multiculturalism, notions of free trade, and/or the current political systems embodied in most of the participating countries, etc.”\textsuperscript{292} They construct a relation between radical left and extreme right-wing entities by claiming that both have a propensity to engage in unlawful acts of dissent, which is either openly promoted or privately understood among members of the political group. The Baseline warns that radical left and right wing “ideologies or motivations that propel these

\textsuperscript{290} DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 6
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
individuals/organizations incorporate an acceptance of criminal activity and violence to achieve their various goals. Often this acceptance of criminal activity as a means is overtly stated, while at times it is known only internally.”

Although right-wing dissent was identified as a potential threat by the JIG-PIIT analysts, it is clear in the Baseline that radical left activists, particularly anarchists, were constructed as “criminal extremists” and thus the primary public order threat that would likely impact G8/G20 security. The JIG-PIIT analysts produce the essentialist notion that groups and individuals attracted to radical left philosophies are more likely to engage in criminal activities in order to bring about their desired political change. They also construct a dichotomy between what they consider radical dissent from legitimate forms of dissent. The Baseline explains that “Radical, in this sense, merely underscores that the adherents incorporate criminal activity, including violence, to pursue ideological goals. It does not include lawful expressions of dissent as protected in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Indeed, Monaghan and Walby have previously argued that the JIG-PIIT employed discourses of criminality in order to rationalize their targeting of radical left anti-G20 activism. This discourse is especially used to construct anarchists within the newest social movements as illegitimate dissidents by producing the notion that all anarchists possess the disposition to undertake criminal/unlawful activities. For instance, the Baseline states that “[g]iven the high profile of the political philosophy of anarchy within this milieu [i.e. NSMs] it is instructive to note that anarchists pursue a destruction

293 DOC001120 [2010 G8-G20 ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 6
294 Ibid.
295 Monaghan and Walby, “'They attacked the city’”, 6
of law, order and government as a precursor to the imposition of anarchy". In other words, the JIG-PIIT creates the simplistic generalization that any individual or group identifying with anarchist philosophical values and ideas will inevitably carry out illegal and violent actions in order to impose their political beliefs.

Furthermore, the Baseline claimed that anarchist activists and their dissident activities are to blame for the human (both protester and police) violence, property destruction and even the amount of money spent on security during previous global governance events. “As past international summits have illustrated, criminal activists of ... [the anarchist] type have engaged in a variety of direct actions and thereby posed significant challenges. These actions and the law enforcement response have led to death, significant injury, massive property damage, and tremendous public expenditure.” As Monaghan and Walby explain it was this “twinning” of anarchism with criminality that justified the surveillance (SI) and infiltration (CI) techniques that had already begun for security at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, and also amplified the need to continue intelligence efforts in preparation for G8/G20 security. Indeed, the following excerpt from the June 2009 Baseline indicates that the JIG-PITT’s SI and CI activities were well underway while also revealing their mentality towards their targeting of radical left/anarchist activists which they labeled as “criminal extremists”:

The PIIT team has engaged in a significant amount of data-mining, crime analysis and intelligence analysis of the activities of the individuals/organizations that publicly or covertly incorporated criminal activity and/or violence within their modus operandi. The conclusions thus far illustrate a dramatic escalation in criminal activity ostensibly motivated by a politico-ideological stance. Further, a variety of criminal extremists are currently attempting to reorganize their structure with the intention to build a capacity for resistance to venues such as the 2010 G8 Summit and the Winter Olympics. It is precisely this activity — that is currently the most significant priority for the

296 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 6-7
297 Ibid., 7
298 Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 7
PUT. A thorough understanding of these threats and their impact is essential in order to fulfill the mandate of the JIG.299

Indeed, the PIIT Baseline rationalized the JIG-PIITs targeting of radical left/anarchist activists by construing their dissident ideas and activities as criminal and thus justifying PIIT's ongoing surveillance and counterintelligence measures on this perceived public order threat in the lead up to the G8/G20 Summits.

PIIT's SI and CI Practices

The Baseline emphasized the need for the PIIT to undertake both SI and CI investigative activities in order to fulfill the JIG’s intelligence function for the G20 pacification project. “In order for the JIG to fulfill its mandate...the PIIT then must maintain both a proactive and reactive capacity.”300 Meaning, the PIIT’s obligation to the JIG was to conduct aggressive and responsive intelligence gathering in relation to the four threat categories, especially the public order threat of radical left/anarchist activism.

The PIIT also needed to identify the “perpetrators of those threats”.301 To acquire knowledge on G20 threats and its perpetrators, the Baseline stipulated that the PIIT must “take investigative steps/measures...in order to engage in the mandate to detect, deter, prevent, investigate and/or disrupt threats to the 2010 G8[/G20].”302 It’s “Investigated Threshold” was extremely far-reaching considering the PIIT was to “acquire all available intelligence related to known or anticipated threats.”303 Security and threat-related information was to be produced through “a wide variety of investigative techniques,” which included not only SI (e.g. analyzing open source information and reviewing police

299 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 7
300 Ibid., 10
301 Ibid., 11
302 Ibid., 9
303 Ibid., 11
occurrence reports) but also CI through the implementation of "covert techniques such as the recruitment of confidential informants and undercover operations."\textsuperscript{304} By employing SI and CI tactics, it was PIIT’s intention to produce "a comprehensive list of three categories of individuals related to [G20/G8 security] threats."\textsuperscript{305} The categories that the PIIT needed to acquire included suspects, persons of interest (POI), and associates. The Baseline provided the following definitions of each:

- **Suspect:**

  A suspect is a person(s) of interest whom investigators believe to have culpability in the commission of an offence or a conspiracy to commit an offence(s) based on the intelligence or evidence received and processed.

- **Person of Interest:**

  A Person whose background, motivation, relationship to the criminal act/victim, or the opportunity to commit the offence(s), or conspire to commit the offence(s), warrants further investigation, but no evidence currently exists to suggest culpability in the commission of the offence(s), or the conspiracy to commit the offence(s).

- **Associate:**

  An associate is a person(s), who has a relationship with a Person of Interest or a Suspect, and/or appears to be aligned with that individual in terms of motivation and/or organizational affiliation, but there is no information to support further investigation into the activity of that individual.\textsuperscript{306}

The criteria considered for listing individuals into these three categories were primarily based on each subject’s perceived "\textit{polito-ideological motivation and organizational affiliation}" (emphasis in original). The PIIT concentrated on identifying and categorizing particular individuals known to possess certain political ideas (i.e. anarchism, anti-capitalism) that the PIIT presumed would likely lead to unlawful dissent/protest during the G20/G8 Summits. The sources employed in the categorization of suspects, POIs, and associates linked to criminalized forms of dissent came from

\textsuperscript{304} DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, \textit{An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team}], 11
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 12
"police occurrence reports, surveillance reports, source de-debriefing [police interrogation] reports, undercover officer reports/notes and/or other investigative techniques...such as media analysis, [redaction]...public pronouncements, media releases etc." In other words, the PIIT relied on SI and CI investigative techniques in order to categorize individuals based on their relative culpability in engaging in what the Baseline referred to as "criminal activism". Moreover, many anti-G20 activists likely had their names listed in one of these three categories solely based on their perceived membership in any of the anti-G20 mobilizing groups that the JIG-PIIT suspected were pursuing a radical dissident agenda. For instance, the Baseline states that a criterion for determining categorization was "Organizational Affiliation" which "refers to any specific organization/entity to which an individual belongs. This is important due to the stated intent of several organizations." It added that "[c]ertain organizations are more overt about how their dissent would be illustrated including consideration and/or promotion of criminal activity" such as "...anti-capitalist anarchists who would perpetrate criminal acts against governmental or corporate participants."

By way of anecdote, during my police interrogation at Eastern Detention Center, the "field intelligence agents" informed me that I was considered a "person of interest" which was the reason given as to why they wanted to interrogate me. This categorization likely stemmed from the JIG-PIIT’s knowledge that I was active in Collectif du Chat Noir (CCN). One could speculate that the JIG-PIIT categorized me as a POI based on the

---

307 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 13
308 Ibid., 14
CI activity of the undercover officer (Francois Leclerc) who infiltrated CCN prior to the G20. In turn, he likely collected information on individuals participating within the radical activist collective. This would have been especially easy in my case, since I thoughtlessly provided an email address containing my full name to CCN’s email list.

Nevertheless, by carrying out various investigative techniques, the PIIT mission complemented the mandate of the JIG operation. The Baseline continuously expressed the strategic importance of PIIT’s surveillance activities, such as stating that in order “for the JIG to disseminate criminal intelligence regarding the intentions of an individual suspect toward the 2010 G8 [G20],...the PIIT must first have been successful in acquiring information/intelligence in relation to this act via some investigative technique.” Put differently, the PIIT’s SI and CI activities enabled the G20 JIG to produce threat-related security intelligence and information relating to G20 security while simultaneously disrupting the strategies and tactics of perceived G20 adversaries. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, before and during the G20 the JIG-PIIT’s operational units intensely monitored activists and infiltrated anti-G20 organizing groups, especially radical left/anarchist networks.

**PIIT’s Operational Units**

To manage the implementation of SI and CI activities before and during the summits, the PIIT operation was supervised by two “Deputy Commanders” from the OPP and Toronto PS, while an RCMP “Primary Investigator” (Alan Martin Collins) directed the “Deployment Teams” that included 13 investigative “probe teams” and a

---

309 Activist Matthew Morgan-Brown speaks to subMedia about Leclerc’s infiltration of Ottawa activist community prior to G20; http://submedia.tv/stimulator/2011/01/03/riot-2010-part-i/
310 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 10
311 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 76
"Covert Operations Team" (COT). We can see from the PIIT’s operational subchart (appendix C) that the OPP were in charge of three “probe” teams (i.e. 1, 2, 3), the RCMP four (i.e. 4, 5, 6, 7), the Toronto PS four (8,9,10,11), and the Peel Regional PS two (i.e. 12, 13), while the RCMP commanded the COT. The investigative probe teams were further organized into operational subcomponents including a “Surveillance Team”, “Internet Monitoring Unit”, and an “Event Monitoring Team”. Each of these JIG-PIIT teams will now be discussed before proceeding to the COT.

**Surveillance Teams**

Before and during the G20, the JIG-PIIT deployed several surveillance teams at various locations throughout Ontario in order to produce security intelligence (SI) on the location, movement, and quantity of anti-G20 protesters. In his analysis of the ISU-JIG documents, Groves explains that these surveillance teams were positioned in cities outside of Toronto and Huntsville for the purposes of following groups of protesters travelling to anti-G20/G8 demonstrations. Indeed, the JIG’s Operational Plan reveals that surveillance teams “will be pre-staged outside of the Summit Theater of Operations for the purposes of conducting surveillance of various transportation expected to be used by demonstrators to travel to the theaters of operations. They will report on movements, positions and numbers of demonstrators heading into the Summit Theater of Operations.” Weeks before the June 2010 Summits, these surveillance teams provided the JIG with estimates on the quantity of buses and passengers traveling to Toronto and

---

312 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 199  
313 B 509 [ISU-JIG, *Subcharts*], DOC0037547  
315 DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, *Operational Plan*], 3-4
also the approximate amount of protesters that would be participating in anti-G20 demonstrations. For instance, in a June 14, 2010 JIG *Weekly Intelligence Brief* it disclosed that surveillance teams estimated that 35 buses would be transporting approximately 5250 protesters thus putting the “total estimate of known attendees” at 18,680. However, the same *Brief* noted that these numbers did not include “[p]otential numbers of Aboriginal protesters; Total numbers for labour unions, and; Total numbers for Student groups.” This admission indicates that the surveillance teams were also concerned with distinguishing the various sections among the anti-G20 dissident population. During the Toronto G20 weekend (June 25-27th, 2010), these surveillance teams provided the JIG with current SI regarding the arrival and departure of buses transporting protesters. For instance, the JIG’s *Daily Situation Report* on Sunday June 27th reveals that the JIG was informed that “approximately 29 buses arrived in Toronto on 2010-06-26, with approximately 1000 passengers.” And the following day’s *Report* stated that “surveillance confirmed that on 2010-06-27, six buses entered into the province of Québec at 22:54 hours. The buses contained protesters who participated in the G20 summit events in Toronto.” Thus, it is evident that the PIIT’s surveillance teams produced SI on the transportation of anti-G20 protesters for the JIG before and during the G20.

Furthermore, in the lead up to the summits it is likely that the surveillance teams also intensely observed and reported on the activities and locations of targeted anti-G20 activists that were considered suspects or persons of interest by the JIG-PIIT. According

316 ISU-JIG, *Weekly Intelligence Briefs*, 564
317 ISU-JIG, *Daily Situational Reports*, 1354
318 Ibid., 1342
to the JIG Operational Plan, surveillance teams “will assist in conducting surveillance operations as directed by the Primary Investigator. The surveillance supervisors will report to the PIIT MOB [Main Operation Base] OPP Assistant primary.”\(^{319}\) Although the ISU-JIG documents do not reveal any further details regarding the actions of the surveillance teams, the anarchist website *Crimethinc: Ex-Workers Collective* posted an article in November 2010 that detailed how these surveillance teams conducted heavy surveillance on particular anti-G20 activists’ months before the G20. However, the online article has been temporarily pulled from the website because “some of the claims in the text are extremely controversial.”\(^{320}\) At the time of writing, an updated version of the article has yet to be re-posted and I could not find any further information on the practices of the PIIT surveillance teams.

**Internet Monitoring Unit**

Another JIG-PIIT deployment team was the “Internet Monitoring Unit” (IMU). Its function was to produce SI for the JIG by researching and monitoring G20-related information from online open sources. Fernandez explains that open sources that interest the joint intelligence team typically include “statements that activists make in newspapers as well as plans for action calls posted on activist websites.”\(^{321}\) He and his colleagues have also suggested that electronic surveillance is very easy to carry out prior and during a mass demonstration. Security analysts can easily “join listserves and view websites to gather information on events, meetings, and plans. They can [also] automatically trawl

---

\(^{319}\) DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, *Operational Plan*], 3-4


\(^{321}\) Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 105
the internet and intercept satellite-based communications."³²² The JIG-PIIT component that carried out the SI activity electronic surveillance was the IMU. For instance, its objectives, according to an ISU-JIG document, were as follows:

To monitor all open source internet links related to the G8 G20 Summits. To monitor available internet links made available through the use of Summit assets. To assist with the relay of information from Twitter, Facebook and other sources as it relates to live time events during the Summits. To assist the Analytical Team as required.³²³

Before exposing the IMU’s SI activity it is interesting to note that in a Strategic Intelligence Report, JIG analysts expressed the need to monitor internet material for analytical and investigative purposes but also lamented the fact that the internet provides anonymity and also a mobilizing and communicative resource to those who pose a threat to summit security. The Report states the following:

There are copious amounts of material available from open sources that will assist in analysis of events both historical as well as real time. The information available to analysis through open sources is also available to those who would harm or disrupt the security of the 2010 G8 [G20] Summit[s] and, as such, presents a double-edged sword. Instant communication over the internet and cell phone technology is widely available and is commonplace in today’s society. Those who would seek to harm or disrupt have methods at their disposal to efficiently organize and communicate with the potential of complete anonymity. This poses unique challenges for those charged with the responsibility of ensuring the security of the 2010 G8 Summit. There remains much to do from an analytical perspective.³²⁴

So basically, the JIG perceived the internet as both a security and anti-security resource. Online open sources and social networks like Twitter provided security analysts with SI on G20 adversaries and their dissident activities but also gave its adversaries, such as anti-G20 protesters, a relatively anonymous, organizing and communicative technology.

Nonetheless, during the G20 pacification project the PIIT’s IMU provided the JIG with security intelligence from various online sources, including activist and news

³²² Fernandez et al., Shutting Down The Streets, 75
³²³ b2278 [ISU-JIG, Internet Monitoring Unit - Objectives]
³²⁴ 1 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2], 483
websites. While the IMU probably consisted of security analysts from several police
departments, my ISU-JIG document data collection only revealed that Canadian Forces
personnel provided electronic surveillance on anti-G20 demonstrations. More
specifically, this SI activity was done by a CF National Counter Intelligence Unit whose
members “embedded themselves within the Integrated Security Unit” in order to
“collect/report on relevant security intelligence and sustain this position throughout the
duration of the operation.” According to the CF website, its National Counter-
Intelligence Units (CFNCIUUs) are constantly active domestically in providing SI and CI
services in support of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defense
(DND). An ISU-JIG document from the DND, discloses that the “mission” for the
CFNCIU was to “employ a proactive approach to detect, identify, and mitigate the threats
of Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion and Information Operations against
CF/DND operations, personnel, material and infrastructure during the G8/G20
Summits.” While their efforts evidently entailed CI activities, the CFNCIU analysts
were part of the PIIT-IMU as well considering it provided SI regarding anti-G20
demonstration plans that were publicized on open sources prior to the G20. For instance,
the Summary contains SI on various protests occurring throughout the week and weekend
of the G20:

Internet posting of planned days of action for the G8-G20 Summits in Toronto indicate the following
possible activities (Note colour code Legend: Yellow – Little risk of arrest, Orange – Mass Civil

325 DND A-2010-00328 [Canadian Forces, G8-G20 Leader’s Summit Counter Intelligence Summary March
2010], 51
326 Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit
327 DND A-2010-00328 [Canadian Forces, G8-G20 Leader’s Summit Counter Intelligence Summary March
2010], 50
a) 2010-06-21 (Proposed themes for each day Monday to Thursday):
   i. Indigenous Sovereignty and Self-Determination,
   ii. Economic Justice,
   iii. Climate Justice, and
   iv. Migrant Justice and an End to War and Occupation.

b) 2010-06-25 Community Organizations Day of Action [Redaction] followed by Open Space for
   Actions

c) 2010-06-26 Family Friendly March/Rally [Redaction] followed by Open Space for Actions
   [Redaction] and [Redaction]

d) 2010-06-27 Open Space for Actions [Redaction] possible [Redaction].

This protest information was gleaned from the *Toronto Community Mobilization Network*
(TCMN) website which the CFNCIU *Summary* described as a Toronto-based activist
organization “created in order to facilitate protest of 2010 G8-G20 Summits... [whose]... reported objective is to coordinate protesting between special interest activist groups.”

Indeed, by monitoring various open source activist websites, the IMU (via the CFNIUs) determined that there were “a number of groups who will be present in Huntsville and Toronto to protest and disrupt the 2010 Summits.”

Furthermore, the CF *Summary* also reveals that the IMU monitored Canadian news websites. For example, it distributed an entire excerpt of a February 19, 2010 article from the *Globe and Mail* titled “Toronto’s G20: The summit of all fears.” The IMU’s monitoring of news websites was especially evident in the JIG’s *Weekly Intelligence Briefs*. One particular brief stated that “CTV News reported only one out of six mainstream groups said they would be protesting at the G8 in Huntsville”. In light of this SI, the JIG’s assessment was that “[p]rotest activities in Huntsville may be lessened...Increase potential of public disorder incidents at the G20.”

---

328 DND A-2010-00328 [Canadian Forces, G8-G20 Leader’s Summit Counter Intelligence Summary March 2010], 2-3
329 Ibid., 3
330 F 3551 [RCMP, NSTAS Threat Assessment Reports], 214
331 DND A-2010-00328 [Canadian Forces, G8-G20 Leader’s Summit Counter Intelligence Summary March 2010], 38-42
332 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 636
also revealed that the IMU extracted information from a *Globe and Mail* article about a pre-G20 activist conference, and in turn the JIG analysts produced the following SI on anti-G20 mobilization and TCMN’s call for public openness towards a diversity of tactics that will be employed by protesters during G20:

**ANTI-G8-G20 COALITION HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE**

- On 2010-05-20 the Toronto Community Mobilization Network (TCMN) held a press conference.
- Focus was to discuss “issues not tactics”
- Stated that thousands of protesters were expected from all over the world.
- Stated that Canadians should focus on the deeds of the invited dignitaries, not protestors.
- Stated that any “tactics by protestors would pale in comparison to the impact of policies promoted by G20 leaders”.

Lastly, the IMU’s SI activities did not immediately end after the G20 weekend. The ISU-JIG document *ATIP 6445A* reveals that the IMU researched radical activist reactions to the G20 events and in turn extracted several G20 related articles from activist websites. In particular, it contains several articles gleaned from the anarchist news website *A-Infos* and also a text entitled “Moving Forward: Reflections on ‘the Battle of Toronto’” that was posted on *Linchpin*, which is the website of the Ontario anarchist group *Common Cause*. Considering these activist publications were written and posted after June 27th 2010, the IMU clearly continued its internet intelligence gathering following the G20 event. Thus, the JIG-PIIT’s IMU carried out electronic surveillance on online open sources before, during and after the G20, providing the JIG with current SI on the various dissident groups and individuals participating in anti-G20 protests and direct actions.

333 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Weekly Intelligence Briefs*], 742
Event Monitoring Unit Teams

The JIG-PIIT also deployed an Event Monitoring Unit (EMU) composed of undercover officer teams within the anti-G20 demonstrations for the purposes of acquiring current security intelligence and collecting criminal evidence on protesters. According to the RCMP’s *After Action Report*, from June 14th to 27th the JIG-PIIT “deployed EMU teams to monitor crowds and protesters at various demonstrations in Huntsville and Toronto. The primary role of the EMU was to provide ongoing and real time intelligence by closely monitoring any large gatherings with pre-existing potential for criminality.”335 Again, the discourse of criminality is employed, in this instance to rationalize the deployment of undercover officers infiltrating protest crowds and covertly observing and reporting on protester identities and activities. Prior to the G20, the EMU teams were provided with four full days of training by Calgary police. Indeed, the JIG’s *Operational Plan* contains correspondence revealing that Toronto Police Chief William “BLAIR was quite pleased to learn that the Event Monitoring Unit recently received excellent training from Calgary PD with respect to crowd monitoring and infiltration in preparation for the Summits.”336

During EMU operations, officers dressed in plain clothes and worked in teams of at least four. They were strategically positioned in various parts of the demonstrations and their main function was to “gather intelligence or evidence in a strictly ‘observations’ or ‘overhear’ capacity.” 337 More specifically, Monaghan and Walby suggest that listed

335 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 53
336 DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, *Operational Plan*], 8
337 Ibid., 3
groups, suspects, and POIs provided surveillance targets for these covert PIIT squads during the G20.3\textsuperscript{338} When undercover officers observed criminal activity they were trained to specifically “identify suspects and provide guidance and information to Public Order Teams assigned to conduct any follow-up actions.”\textsuperscript{339} The EMU teams transmitted their collected security intelligence “to the EMU managers who immediately updated the EMS JIG Intelligence Situational Board\textsuperscript{340} with real time intelligence and information. Subsequent to collation and analysis, the JIG members (screeners) in the JIG Operation Center (JOC) then transferred relevant event information to the appropriate incident on the EMS ISU Situational Board.”\textsuperscript{341} Consequently, SI collected by the EMU teams was used as evidence in the prosecution of arrested protesters considering “the JIG provided investigators with information required to build criminal cases.”\textsuperscript{342}

My experience not only demonstrates that SI from covert event monitoring was used in prosecuting protesters but also that this intelligence was, at least in my case, susceptible to gross inaccuracies. It also reveals that EMU teams employed the counterintelligence activity of infiltrating protester support groups (e.g. legal observers, street medics, alternative media center, TCMN) in order to gather sensitive information on protester decision-making and conduct close covert surveillance on particular groups and activists during the mass demonstration. For instance, when my friend and I were setting up our tear gas protection consisting of plastic bags containing vinegar soaked bandannas during the June 26\textsuperscript{th} mass demonstration, two undercover police agents were

\textsuperscript{338} Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 8
\textsuperscript{339} DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, Operational Plan], 3
\textsuperscript{340} For a comprehensive sample of excerpts from the Situational Board see Appendix J. I discuss the contents of the board in the section on operational SI below
\textsuperscript{341} RCMP, After Action Report, 53
\textsuperscript{342} ATIP 4067A [RCMP, Briefing Note To The Minister of Public Safety], 7
directly beside us covertly observing our activities. The Toronto police officers, Detective Constable Marc Beausoleil and Sgt. Shannon Dawson, were dressed as anti-G20 protesters as they took pictures and observational notes within protest crowds. While collecting security intelligence on protester movements and activities, they were also tasked by their police handlers “to maintain a watchful eye over [Toronto Police] Officer Sean Sutton” who was another undercover cop embedded nearby within the same large crowd of protesters. Sutton’s covert surveillance, however, was more detailed than the other two undercovers. He had infiltrated the protesters’ legal support team and was posing as a legal observer. Instead of recording the rampant civil rights violations of police, he was providing intelligence and information on the identities, activities and movements of protesters, especially on the more militant affinity groups. Operating as a team, the three undercover agents made the following erroneous observations of my preparation for a tear gas attack. They construed my placing bandannas in vinegar filled plastic bags in the following manner:

Beausoleil saw the Applicant ["Jester"] was holding small glass juice containers while the other male [Big-I] was pouring gasoline into them. The Applicant then inserted cloth into containers and sealed them in such a way that half the cloth was hanging out of the bottle. The bottles were ½ to ¾ full of gasoline. Beausoleil saw the men make three Molotov cocktails. Once they were done, he saw the Applicant place the three Molotovs and a water bottle containing the gasoline that was used to make them into the other male’s backpack. These observations were accompanied by the smell of gasoline. Officer Sutton, the undercover, made similar visual and olfactory observations of the Applicant’s activities.

This SI recorded by an EMU team eventually led to me being arrested and charged with “Weapons Dangerous (C.C. 88.1)”, “Carrying a weapon while attending a public meeting

343 Stephen R. Byrne, Respondent’s Factum in R v. Lamb 2011
344 Lamb field notes from Officer Sutton’s testimony during R v. Lamb 2011
"Carrying concealed weapon (C.C. 89)", "Possession of incendiary material (C.C. 436.1)", and "Common Nuisance (C.C. 180.1)".\(^{346}\)

During the trial, my lawyer Ryan Clements pointed out several discrepancies when these officers took to the stand. First, even though the officers took many photographs of me via a cell phone, they did not take a single picture of the alleged incident of me supposedly concocting Molotovs. Clements also brought to light that the testimonies from the officers did not produce a consistent account regarding the insertion of the cloths into the glass bottles. For example, while Beausoleil alleged that the cloths "were hanging out of the bottle"; Dawson testified that the cloths were directly inserted into the bottle which in theory would make the Molotovs defective. Moreover, during the cross-testimony of Sutton, Clements demonstrated that the officer posing as a legal observer was positioned at least ten meters away from my location within a large crowd, and thus was likely too far from the alleged incident to make an accurate visual and olfactory (smell) assessment. Lastly, the observation that my friend and I possessed a "water bottle containing the gasoline" proved doubtful when the prosecution’s own video surveillance evidence showed me drinking out of the bottle around the time of the incident. Consequently, the observations made by the three event monitors proved to be grossly inaccurate during my trial which ultimately led to my acquittal on all counts.

Interestingly, an RCMP-ISU document containing tactical troop manuals for anti-globalization demonstrations invokes the legal term called "Articulable Cause" which may explain, in part, why the event monitors made such distorted observations about my activities. The term articulable cause, according to the G20 police training

This legal discourse on an ‘articulable cause’ script scenario suggests that police, particularly event monitors, were susceptible to analyzing protester activities predominantly through a criminalized lens. Indeed, according to G20 ISU tactical troop training documents, police were trained to “Treat Event area like a ‘Crime Scene’” in order to “obtain and secure evidence to support charges observed during the course of the crowd management operation.” In sum, the EMU teams provided the JIG with SI which in turn was used by the ISU police investigators to build criminal cases against protesters who were monitored and subsequently arrested during the G20. In order to carry out these functions, the EMU employed the counterintelligence tactic of short-term infiltration of protest crowds and protester support groups. Lastly, as my own case demonstrates, the EMU observations were susceptible to misrepresentations and

347 G 6014 [RCMP, Tactical Troop Manuals For Anti-Globalization Demonstrations], 287
348 Ibid., 287-288
349 Ibid., 287
inaccuracies (and perhaps deliberate fabrication) in part because of their suggestive pre-G20 crowd management training.

**Covert Operations Team**

More long-term and intensive CI activity was undertaken by the JIG-PIIT’s “Covert Operation Team” (COT) which targeted radical and mainstream anti-G20 groups who were organizing leading up to the G20. COT consisted of a “Covert OPS Manager” who supervised a “Team Facilitator” and at least four “undercover operators” (two other COT positions are redacted in the PIIT Operational chart).350 The JIG’s Operational Plan discloses that the PIIT’s COT was mandated to undertake covert surveillance on activist groups for the purposes of exposing criminal intentions and activities associated with anti-G20 dissent: “As part of PIIT, the COT will conduct [redaction] undercover operations to uncover criminality in relation to the 2010 G8-G20 Summits.”351 This indicates that prior to any anti-G20 property damage, the JIG rationalized COT’s preemptive CI activity by presuming that their targets were participating in unlawful forms of dissent. Moreover, the JIG document illustrates that the RCMP was the agency informing the PIIT Primary investigator about covert investigations and that the COT was also composed of undercover officers from provincial and municipal police agencies:

RCMP covert operations reported directly to the [PIIT] Primary Investigator. OPP and other municipal covert operations will report directly to their respective Team Leaders. These reporting lines for covert operations ensure that the application of the undercover technique was followed as per each agency’s individual policies and approval procedures. The Primary Investigator will coordinate and have a clear understanding of all covert operations to avoid overlap and to ensure resources are maximized to their fullest.352

---

350 B 509 [ISU-JIG, Subcharts],DOC0037547
351 DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, Operational Plan],5
352 RCMP, After Action Report, 199
More specifically, the multi-agency COT was composed of several different CI units that were already (and probably still are) conducting domestic operations on perceived threats to national security. As previously suggested, in addition to providing electronic surveillance for the JIG, the Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Units (CFNCIUs) also conducted CI operations. Although heavily redacted, such activities are evident in an ISU-JIG document from the Department of National Defense when it reveals that the Commander of the “CFNCIU: [redaction] – will retain operational command over all CI assets.” And also regarding how “[a]ll CI Investigators will utilize their assigned cell phone as per normal daily ops…”\(353\) The COT also relied on the counterintelligence services from Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) and RCMP National Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs). According to the RCMP website, INSETs and NSESs are strategically based in locations across Canada in order to “collect, share and analyze information and intelligence that concern threats to national security and criminal extremism/ terrorism. INSETs are integrated teams made up of representatives of the RCMP, federal partners [i.e. CSIS] and agencies and provincial and municipal police services, whereas NSESs are solely comprised of RCMP employees.”\(354\) The following excerpt from an ISU-JIG threat assessment document explains the duties and functions of these COT CI units during the G20 pacification project:

\[\text{All INSETs and NSESs have been tasked on a regular basis to report to NSTAS [RCMP Threat Assessment agency discussed below] any threats or adverse information which could impact upon national security issues toward the G8/G 20 summits. Since the 2010 Olympic Games ended in March, all INSETS and NSES’s have been focusing specifically on intelligence-gathering in}\]

\(353\) DND A-2010-00328 [Canadian Forces, G8-G20 Leader’s Summit Counter Intelligence Summary March 2010], 52-53

relation to the 2010 G8/G20 summits in Huntsville and Toronto, and other G8/G20 related events. Many units have responded with intelligence and information regarding planned protests and meetings by a variety of dissident groups and individuals. This information has been subsequently disseminated in both 2010 G8/G20 JIG intelligence briefs as well as in NSTAS Threat Assessments.\(^{355}\)

In other words, the COT and its CI units (i.e. CFNCIUs, INSETs, NSESs) provided JIG with security counterintelligence on anti-G20 activism. As discussed below, alongside carrying out CI tactics, the COT units also collected and provided intelligence to the JIG’s analytical team, whose analysts, in turn, produced and distributed security intelligence briefs and threat assessments on targeted dissident groups and individuals.

The ISU-JIG documents, however, redact all statements disclosing the names of the groups and individuals that were targeted by COT, other than the RCMP’s admission that “undercover operations focused on different target groups and individuals.”\(^{356}\) But critical researchers, journalists and activists have started exposing the extent of COT’s targets and tactics. Monaghan and Walby explain that the covert campaign involved undercover agents infiltrating numerous dissident groups for periods of two years, leading up to the G20 Summit. In particular, police infiltrated anti-G20 activist networks that were “suspected of being anarchists” and “groups associated with indigenous solidarity, environmental reclamations, tenants’ rights, as well as anti-Olympic” collectives.\(^{357}\) According to Groves, activist organizations from Vancouver, Guelph, Kitchener-Waterloo, Toronto and Montreal were subjected to infiltration several months prior to the June 2010 anti-G20 convergence. He notes that the “targets included activists protesting the Olympics, the migrant-justice group No One Is Illegal, Southern Ontario

\(^{355}\) F 3551 [RCMP, \textit{NSTAS Threat Assessment Reports}], 220  
\(^{356}\) RCMP, \textit{After Action Report}, 212  
\(^{357}\) Monaghan and Walby, ‘They attacked the city’, 8
Anarchist Resistance and Greenpeace." The activist groups "Common Cause Ottawa, Mining Justice, the Toronto Community Mobilization Network (TCMN), la Convergence des Luttes Anti-Capitaliste (CLAC)" were also supposedly infiltrated according to one anarchist website. Similarly, activist groups in Ottawa, such as Collectif du Chat Noir (CCN), also experienced infiltration by at least one undercover agent.

While the PIIT-COT also targeted NGOs like Greenpeace, it was primarily radical left/ anarchist groups that were subjected to intense multi-year infiltration campaigns leading up to the G20. In 2008 COT operatives (OPP officers Bindo Showan and Brenda Carey) began carrying out counterintelligence on anarchists organizing in southwestern Ontario including the anti-G20 planning groups Anti-War at Laurier (AW@L) and Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR). COT's undercover operations, deploying upwards of a dozen police infiltrators, later spread to anti-capitalists and anarchists organizing in Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa, and Montreal. According to a Globe and Mail article by Adrian Morrow and Kim Mackrael, undercover operatives infiltrated radical anti-G20 groups by gaining the trust of its members through various persuasive means including displaying an impressive knowledge of radical left-wing history, purchasing beverages for others, having people over to their homes, transporting activists to protest actions and partaking in them, and even getting arrested. While

---

358 Groves, "G20 case reveals 'largest ever' police spy operation".
360 Activist Matthew Morgan-Brown speaks to subMedia about Francois Leclerc's infiltration of Ottawa activist community prior to G20: http://submedia.tv/stimulator/2011/01/03/riot-2010-part-i/

119
seemingly participating in anti-G20 activism, their CI activities attempted to collect criminal intelligence on activists while also trying to disrupt and manipulate their decision-making and awareness capabilities. Indeed, while providing current SI to the JIG, the COT also carried out the CI objective of producing uncertainty in the mind of radical anti-G20 activists in order to impede and disrupt their decision making capability by misrepresenting and/or denying them information necessary to conduct effective operations. For instance, the undercover agents accentuated divisions between anti-G20 activists by telling a particular individual that other activists were insulting them behind their back.\textsuperscript{363} Also, prior to the G20 undercover agent Showan advocated that protesters should commit property damage as a tactic to protest the development of the Hanlon Creek Business Park. In response, OPP spokesperson Sergeant Pierre Chamberland informed the journalists that undercover officers were permitted to “break the law, but only with ‘prior, specific permission from higher-ups’” (i.e. PIIT Primary Investigator, Covert OPS Manager, COT Facilitator). While Officer Carey “remained trusted to the end” of her covert operation, “the male officer eventually aroused suspicion when he turned up at a meeting to which he wasn’t invited and he was kicked out of the organization [i.e. SOAR].”\textsuperscript{364} Indeed, employing an aggressive approach to collecting security intelligence on perceived threats, the COT undercover operatives subjected radical anti-G20 activist groups to various counterintelligence tactics prior to the G20.

The COT undercover operatives also collected evidence of “criminal activism”\textsuperscript{365} on SOAR and AW@L members for the JIG-PIIT which in turn enabled authorities to pre-emptively arrest and charge 21 individuals for “Counselling to Commit Mischief”.

\textsuperscript{363} Morrow and Mackrael. “How police infiltrated groups planning G20 protests”.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{365} DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, \textit{An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team}], 7
Monaghan and Walby explain that most of the defendants were arrested in the early morning hours on the first day of the G20 (June 26, 2010) before any vandalism had even occurred. They also found that the ISU-JIG documents indicate that the JIG-PIIT “was directly involved in the identification of these arrestees”. For instance, in a JIG Daily Situational Report on June 27, 2010 I found the following statement:

13 people arrested resulting from JIG investigation. Numerous charges pending. Several additional arrests pending. The following are the 13 individuals arrested: [all names redacted]

Although the crown would later allege that there were more than fifty other activists who were never indicted, the twenty-one who were charged became known as the G20 main conspiracy group. Groves explains that the Crown built its case against the group by relying on the multi-year covert operations of Showan and Carey. In doing so, the prosecution levied 59 criminal charges in all with more than 70,000 pages of evidence, and months of testimony. According to an article by the Guelph Anarchist Black Cross, “by the time the case reached its preliminary hearing, charges were dropped against three defendants and one defendant received a suspended sentence in a plea resolution negotiated independently. In November [2011], the remaining seventeen came to a plea resolution that saw charges of eleven of the defendants withdrawn and six agreed to pleading guilty and serving varying prison sentences.” During this time, the group released a public statement regarding the political prosecution that they each endured, and explained how they were not surprised at the injustice they were experiencing considering the massive counterintelligence operation that the Canadian state funded. In

---

366 Monaghan and Walby, “'They attacked the city'”, 7
367 L 3551, [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 1359
368 Groves, “G20 case reveals 'largest ever' police spy operation”.
369 For more information about the G20 main conspiracy group and their individual charges and convictions see http://guelphabc.noblogs.org/post/2012/03/18/guelph-abc-camera-news-g20-repression-update-march/
their own words: "[t]he government made a political decision to spend millions of dollars to surveil and infiltrate anarchist, Indigenous solidarity, and migrant justice organizing over several years. After that kind of investment, what sort of justice are we to expect?" I shared a prison cell with some of the male members of the G20 conspiracy group during my detainment at Maplehurst Prison on June 28th 2010. I engaged in a few conversations with some of them and was shocked at the infiltration that they were subjected too. One individual shared his feelings of disbelief and betrayal regarding the revelation that one of his closest friends turned out to be a cop that had been spying on him and his other friends for over a year. Indeed, I saw that these committed activists were still reeling from the effects of the JIG’s infiltration campaign. Similarly, Kalin Stacey, a community organizer, friend and supporter of the G20 conspiracy group commented that "[t]he practice of infiltration and undercover policing of political protest is legally about making a case for conviction, but politically about creating a culture of fear about dissent." Anarchist activist and police scholar Kristian Williams explains that police surveillance has its obvious uses in gathering intelligence and information, but it is also being employed "to harass the target, breed paranoia and feelings of persecution". Likewise, infiltrators and informants supply information for police, but they are also deployed as a CI tactic to disrupt an activist group’s mobilizing and political efforts by "engaging in routine sabotage, provoking rivalries and in-fighting, and

372 Groves, "G20 case reveals 'largest ever' police spy operation",
encouraging activities... that can discredit the organization.” Ultimately then, the JIG-PIIT’s employment of SI and CI tactics on anti-G20 groups and activists was in attempt to both collect intelligence and pacify their organizational and dissident activities.

In the United States, according to Fernandez and colleagues, the newest social movements against neoliberal globalization have “experienced extensive undercover surveillance.” The USA Patriot Act, signed into law in 2001, is the legislation that has enhanced American law enforcement and state intelligence agencies powers of infiltration and surveillance on domestic dissident groups by broadening the definition and scope of terrorism. In effect, the Patriot Act has allowed “the state to infiltrate and survey more groups and larger numbers of people than ever before.” The G20 pacification project’s security (counter) intelligence operation provides clear indication that Canadian law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies are also actively conducting counterintelligence on left-wing dissident populations. The Canadian legislation invoked in the ISU-JIG documents that in turn enabled and rationalized the JIG-PIIT’s tactics included sections 2, 6.1, and 6.2 of the Security Offences Act, section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and sections 2 and 83.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code. One ISU-JIG document in particular, ATIP 4799B [ISU-JIG, Derived Legal Authorities], lists all the federal and provincial legislation that supposedly empowers the ISU and JIG to legally carry out their operations. For instance, the federal CSIS Act provided the legal discourse that enabled the JIG to conduct their SI

373 Williams, Our Enemies In Blue, 153
374 Fernandez et al., Shutting Down The Streets, 76
375 Fernandez, Policing Dissent, 109
376 Some of the ISU-JIG Documents invoking security legislation include: ATIP 4799B [ISU-JIG, Derived Legal Authorities], 78-81; DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 8-9; DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, Operational Plan], 5
and CI activities on left-wing activism under the presumption that they were investigating “threats to the security of Canada” which is defined in section 2 of the Act as:

(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,

(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,

(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and

(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,

But does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).377

As the last sentence of section 2 indicates, the discourse of criminality had to also be employed by the JIG-PIIT in order to “legally” justify their surveillance and infiltration of protest crowds and dissident groups. In other words, by labelling radical left-wing protesters as “criminal extremists” and “criminal activists”378 the JIG-PIIT’s SI and CI tactics can be justified through federal legislation such as section 2 of the CSIS Act.

Indeed, this is another indication that the law was strategically utilized to enable the pacification of radical anti-G20 dissent. More specifically, the use of legal discourse in the JIG documents, in effect, facilitated and rationalized the pre-emptive and disruptive infiltration and surveillance of activist groups and individuals. It is in this critical sense that the G20 pacification project, including its aggressive security (counter) intelligence operation, was “legal”.

377 ATIP 4799B [ISU-JIG, Derived Legal Authorities], 79
378 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 7
Another major operational component of the G20 Joint Intelligence Group was its "Analytical Team" whose main function was to analyze SI and CI collected by the PIIT, and in turn produce and disseminate strategic, operational, and tactical level security intelligence and threat assessments for the ISU and JIG throughout the G20 pacification project. According to ISU-JIG documents, the Analytical Team (AT) was the "driver of the intelligence collection process", and was "responsible for the 'analysis' function of the [JIG] mandate and manufactures the principle commodity of the JIG – high quality strategic and tactical analytical products." In order to do so, the "AT employed a wide variety of specialized software including i2 Analyst Notebook and i2 iBridge as well as specialized equipment such as plotters." In other words, the JIG’s AT analyzed collected security intelligence and information, then through various technologies produced and circulated an array of intelligence products primarily regarding perceived threats towards ISU and JIG security operations. The AT was led by the "AT Manager" S/Sgt. R.G. Penny from the RCMP, who replaced Sgt. John Cuddington when the JIG integrated G20 Summit planning into the ongoing intelligence operation for the G8 in January 2010. Led by the "Analytical Team Manager" the AT had "Lead Analysts providing direction and managing Analytical teams" which consisted "of a number of Analysts and Analytical Researchers." The following are a list of some of these security analysts that can be gleaned from the JIG-AT documents: D/Cst. Richard Brown,

More specifically, the Analytical Team SubChart (Appendix D) shows that the AT command structure was divided into three subcomponents labeled strategic, tactical, and operational, which specified the level of security intelligence that each AT team analyzed. Each had a separate “Team Leader” (i.e. either E. Pinto, C. Galecki, and T. Insinna) from the OPP who separately commanded a team consisting of eight analysts mostly from the RCMP but also from OPP and Toronto PS. Based on the list of analysts identified above, the JIG’s analytical team was staffed by both police officers and civilians. Although the JIG-AT subchart illustrates that it operated through a hierarchical command structure, it should be understood that the AT did not function in isolation within the JIG but instead networked with its other operational components, especially the PIIT. For instance, the PIIT Baseline describes the following integrated mandate that the PIIT and AT collaborated on during the G20/G8 pacification project:

In relation to...potential threats, it is the mandate of the PIIT, and the Analytical Team (AT), to:

a. Pro-actively identify public safety issues related to the 2010 G8 [/G20] and assess/prioritize these threats in relation to the anticipated impact upon public safety.
b. Establish suspects, persons of interest, and associates in relation to these threats according to established criteria...
c. Take investigate steps/measures to remain fully cognizant of the evolving threat(s) in order to engage in the mandate to detect, deter, prevent, investigate and/or disrupt threats to the 2010 G8[G20]...
d. Engage in constant prioritization to ensure action is being taken on the threats that pose the highest threat to public safety.
e. Ensure that criminal information/intelligence received is correctly investigated to ensure the highest degree of reliability/validity and that it is disseminated/shared via the JIG management to/with relevant stakeholders in a timely manner.

384 B 509 [ISU-JIG, SubCharts], DOC0037554
385 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 9

126
Put simply, AT shared with the PIIT the functions of identifying, prioritizing, and informing the ISU-JIG about potential threats, safety issues, and criminal identities relating to the G20/G8 Summits. By analyzing SI and CI from PIIT investigations, the AT produced and disseminated strategic and tactical intelligence reports, weekly and daily operational intelligence briefs/bulletins/reports, and also circulated intelligence updates and threat assessments produced by the RCMP's NSTAS. This section of the chapter will examine the contents of the JIG-AT's various security intelligence products that were distributed throughout the G20 pacification project. In doing so, it will be demonstrated that the AT analysts primarily focused their analytical gaze on the radical left/anarchist public order threat.

**Strategic Security Intelligence**

A year before the G20, the JIG's analytical team began producing and disseminating products containing strategic level security intelligence to ISU-JIG Commanders and to selected nodes within the summit intelligence network. Indeed, a document on JIG's implementation discloses that the first two phases of the JIG's operation, the JIG-AT mainly distributed security intelligence that was "highly strategic in nature". As previously described in the section on the three levels of security intelligence (SI) defined in the CF Doctrine, strategic intelligence provides the highest level of SI required for the creation of policy and plans for a joint forces security operation such as the G20 pacification project. These particular JIG-AT intelligence

---

386 The ISU-JIG document C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 21-23 reveals that the JIG's operation was implemented in four distinct phases: (1) "January to June 2009"; (2) "July to December 2009"; (3) "January 2010 to April 2010"; (4) "60 to 0 days...Live Time Operations".

387 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, 2-1
reports can be found in the ATIA ISU-JIG documents \textit{H 3551}, \textit{I 3551}, and \textit{M 3551}. Additionally, CSIS’ Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) produced products containing some strategic level SI for the JIG (i.e. \textit{CSIS-12} and \textit{CSIS-15}) which was subsequently disseminated by the JIG-AT selectively within the ISU-JIG network. By examining these strategic level SI reports, it will be illustrated that the JIG-AT and CSIS security analysts determined from the initial stages of the JIG’s operation that the most probable threat facing G20 security was the public order threat of mass demonstrations emanating from radical left-wing activism.

Between January 2009 and January 2010, there were three central strategic level products that were disseminated by the JIG-AT titled \textit{Strategic Intelligence Reports} \#1 \#2 and \#3. These were distributed to the ISU-JIG commanders and to domestic agencies within the summit intelligence network (i.e. “DISTRIBUTION: Domestic Liaison Group, Internal ISU Distribution, OPP Command Staff, RCMP National and O Division”).\textsuperscript{388} The first report, dated June 5\textsuperscript{th} 2009, was intended to provide broad cursory summary of the perceived threats and risks towards the Summits. Similarly, reports \#2 (dated October 30 2009) and \#3 (dated January 25 2010) gave an “overview of the Analytical Threat Picture as it pertains to the 2010 G8-G20 Summits” but also focused on “the most pertinent and valid intelligence questions identified in previous reports and investigations since the last Strategic Intelligence Report.”\textsuperscript{389} All three reports employed an “All-Threat methodology” in order to “accurately outline” and distinguish between the four main threat categories of public order, terrorism, internecine strife/conflict, and independent...

\textsuperscript{388} H 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Intelligence Report} \#3], 341
\textsuperscript{389} H 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Intelligence Report} \#3], 344
asymmetrical threats (IATs).\textsuperscript{390} Monaghan and Walby’s research has shown that the JIG-AT analysts constructed suspicious identities and exaggerated their threat characteristics. They explain that a “sense of threat is derived from a broad-spectrum intelligence analysis, and these threats are communicated to agencies involved in the protest policing.”\textsuperscript{391} Indeed, by analyzing all types of threats and sorting them into distinct categories, these reports were meant to “accurately define the threat picture and provide realistic and complete situational awareness for [ISU-JIG] command staff.”\textsuperscript{392}

In general, the \textit{Strategic Intel Reports} perceived the G20/G8 Summits as major global political events that have historically attracted both international media attention and domestic resistance from radical left activists. Amplifying the threat from left-wing activism was the fact that the 2010 Summits were going to occur around the same time as two other major political events. For instance, in the initial \textit{Report} the 2010 G20 and G8 Summits were described as “major international forums which will garner global media attention and is traditionally the target of radical activism. This politically charged event coincides with the 2010 Olympics and possibly a North American Leaders Summit, creating a sustained focal point for aggressive protest response from militant groups.”\textsuperscript{393} While the threat that carried the “greatest harm to Canadian interests” was a potential terrorist attack on one or more internationally protected persons, the “most probable threat” was identified as “public disorder and demonstrations possibly involving criminal acts.”\textsuperscript{394} In other words, the threat category that the JIG-AT analysts perceived to pose

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{390} H 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Intelligence Report \#3}, 387
\textsuperscript{391} Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 6
\textsuperscript{392} H 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Intelligence Report \#3}, 387
\textsuperscript{393} 1 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Intelligence Reports \#1 and \#2}, 461
\textsuperscript{394} 1 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Intelligence Reports \#1 and \#2}, 461
\end{flushright}
the highest potential for disrupting the facilitation of these two elite global governance events was the public order threat consisting of unlawful protests and direct actions.

Although the Strategic Intelligence Reports acknowledge a potential public order threat emanating from “Radical Right-Wing Activism”\(^{395}\), it is again clear (despite heavy redaction) that the JIG-AT analysts primarily focused on the perceived public order threat of left-wing activism, particularly from radical left/anarchist groups. The Reports evaluated the perceived public order threat of “Aboriginal Activism” and determined that “[g]iven the increasing intensity expressed by some native solidarity and sovereignty movements, there remains a possibility that more militant First Nations activists and their supporters with extremist views may target the 2010 G8[G20] Summit[s].”\(^{396}\) They were also concerned that “Left Wing groups who take interest in Aboriginal issues will also take issue with the 2010 G8-G20 Summits.”\(^{397}\) Another public order threat that the Reports analyzed was “Environmental Activism” particularly from the Greenpeace NGO considering it “has shown the greatest capacity to organize” compared to other environmental groups.\(^{398}\) While the JIG-AT analysts conceded that Greenpeace “does not have a history of violent protest tactics” they were concerned that the group may “commit highly publicized banner hangings” during the G20.\(^{399}\) Anti-Poverty Activism was also identified as a left-wing public order threat but all information is entirely redacted from the Reports.\(^{400}\) While also heavily redacted, the Reports do reveal that the JIG-AT analysts were principally concerned with domestic radical left/anarchist activism.

\(^{395}\) ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Report #3, 374
\(^{396}\) ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2, 482
\(^{397}\) ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Report #3, 386
\(^{398}\) ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2, 474
\(^{399}\) ibid., 475
\(^{400}\) Under the subheading of Anti-Poverty Activists the information is completely whited out; for example see ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2, 475
considering it was “assessed that persons associated to Left Wing extremism in Ontario will use high profile events such as the 2010 Winter Olympics and the 2010 G8-G20 Summits as staging grounds to further carry their ideological message to the public stage.”\textsuperscript{401} Indeed, Monaghan and Walby’s work has already shown that the JIG \textit{Reports} warned of a high probability of radical left/anarchist groups participating in criminal activities.\textsuperscript{402} For instance, the third \textit{Report} warned that: “The direct targeting of the 2010 G8-G20 Summit sites as a means of disrupting the 2010 G8-G20 Summits and garnering public attention in support of their cause is considered HIGH.”\textsuperscript{403} Moreover, both the second and third \textit{Reports} discussed the political significance of the 2010 year for the Left and the importance of police remaining vigilant of criminal activism. The JIG-AT analysts determined that:

\begin{quote}
2010 has the potential to become a year in which Left Wing extremists [anarchists] will use as a vehicle to disseminate their ideological message. It is important for Law Enforcement to be vigilant of potential criminal activity that could be a result of a convergence between ideologies and individual personalities. It appears at this stage that this convergence is emerging as an extremist crux for the year 2010.\textsuperscript{404}
\end{quote}

Likewise, other strategic level security intelligence disseminated by the JIG-AT contained similar assessments regarding left-wing public order threat. For instance, in a JIG-AT document regarding the assessment on the potential of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) attack, it states that “[s]pecifically, with respect to the 2010 G8-G20 Summits, the primary threat is assessed as emanating from the same single issue (e.g. anti-globalization, environmental or animal rights) extremist groups which have been a feature at such meetings since the World Trade Organization

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item H 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Intelligence Report #3], 386
\item Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 9
\item Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 9 citing H 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Intelligence Report #3], 386
\item H 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Intelligence Report #3], 386; I 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2], 443
\end{thebibliography}
meetings in Seattle, Washington in 1999". Although the assessment acknowledged that previous anti-globalization protests have never had a serious CBRNE incident, the assessment cautioned that the ISU-JIG should not rule out the possibility that anti-G20/G8 protesters may employ these kinds of weapons to further their cause:

...it would be short-sighted to completely disregard the threat from CBRNE at an event of this magnitude. The primary focus of protesting groups has been to call attention to their cause by being as disruptive as possible. It is in the furtherance of this goal that the use of, moreover, the threat of using a CBRNE-type weapons would be most effective.  

While the JIG-AT inevitably assessed a “LOW” probability of a CBRNE attack during the summits, it warned that during “any kind of confrontational situation (unruly mob vs. riot squad), law enforcement officers should be far more concerned about Molotov cocktails and other conventional weapons than radiological dirty bombs.” The ISU-JIG document also contains an “Increased Awareness Bulletin” that explained that the upcoming Summits “could be exploited by the commission of various acts of disruption in support of Anti-Capitalist and Anti-G8 views”. This assessment was based on the “intelligence gleaned by the...ISU JIG” indicating that activist “groups planning to protest the upcoming Summits are very anti-security” and warned that “they intend to use the Summits to challenge police authority and potentially target police.” Arguably, the dissemination of this kind of strategic SI about the potential dangerous actions of protesters towards police affected the perceptions and observations of front-line police officers, particularly EMU agents like Beausoleil, Dawson, and Sutton who were tasked

---

405 M 3551[ISU-JIG, Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1700
406 Not surprisingly, the CBRNE assessment did not take into account the police’s extensive use of irritant gases on protesters.
407 M 3551[ISU-JIG, Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1700
408 Ibid., 1701
409 Ibid., 1899
during the anti-G20 demonstrations to infiltrate crowds and covertly monitor the activities of protesters.

Moreover, CSIS-ITAC reports provided threat overviews to the JIG-AT that contained strategic level SI regarding the trend of left-wing resistance against elite global governance events like the G20 and G8: “Summit opposition tends to consist of an eclectic blend of anarchists and political and social activists, primarily from the left wing ideological spectrum.” The CSIS analysts provided in-depth descriptions regarding how contemporary radical left-wing activist groups hold diverse political opinions but strategically cooperate during mass protests by being respectful of one another’s various resistance practices and collaborate on dissident actions through horizontal and dispersed organizational means. The following demonstrates their analysis of contemporary radical activism:

Their causes are varied and occasionally divergent but there is a general recognition that they have a greater impact by acting in concert at such events while respecting a "diversity of tactics". Cooperation among... groups is generally accomplished in a nonhierarchical, decentralized fashion. It is usually facilitated by a coordinating entity or entities using the Internet and informational sessions to communicate, spread awareness, mobilize and organize. Their most prevalent mode of expression remains demonstrations, civil disobedience, and direct action which may include varying degrees of violence, including a vandalism, rioting and street fighting, demonstrating without a permit, resisting arrest, erecting barricades and attacking police.

Hence, CSIS analysts are familiar with how radical left activist groups cooperate during mass protests, organize through anarchical network-based structures, and use internet and community outreach sessions to mobilize dissent and spread awareness to the broader public. In other words, this excerpt outlines the tendencies in which the newest social movements currently operate. Not surprisingly, the CSIS analysts also attach discourses of violence and criminality when describing contemporary radical activism. Thus, like

\[410\] CSIS-12 [CSIS-ITAC, G8-G20 Summits Threat Overview April 27 2010],3
\[411\] Ibid.
the JIG-AT reports, the CSIS-ITAC assessed that the G8/G20 Summits will attract resistance from various left-wing social and political groups, “including, but not limited to, anti-globalization, anti-war, socialist, anarchist, and environmentalist groups.”\(^{412}\)

The JIG-AT analysts determined that radical left wing protesting was the primary threat to the 2010 G20/G8 Summits by researching previous elite global governance events and determining that past protests involved some unlawful acts of dissent that were perceived to have caused major public order challenges:

Public protesting at this event is not anticipated to be criminal in nature. It is anticipated that overwhelmingly these protests will be designed and staged to illustrate discontent with the status quo. These rights are protected by s. 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, in the past similar events included criminal activity that led to significant public safety issues. It is for this reason that this report includes observations in regard to public protests and is being disseminated.\(^ {413}\)

These Strategic Intel Reports thus rationalized that its primary analytical target was public protest because, historically, similar summit protests have entailed elements of criminality. The CSIS-ITAC assessments also determined that left-wing organized mass demonstrations were very probable based on their analysis of previous elite global governance events: “As demonstrated during similar international events, varying levels of mass protest activity are expected to materialize.”\(^ {414}\) As Fernandez explains, studying past protests has become an important preparation tool for police departments since the 1999 Seattle protests when the police were relatively unaware of the newest social movements’ resistance against neoliberal globalization. Hence, “[s]ubsequent protests in

\(^{412}\) CSIS-15 [CSIS-ITAC, Issue-based extremist overview], 2-3
\(^{413}\) 13551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2], 461
\(^{414}\) CSIS-15 [CSIS-ITAC, Issue-based extremist overview], 2-3
Québec, Washington, DC, and Genoa have built a base of information on tactics, groups, and actions of contemporary radical activism.\textsuperscript{415}

Indeed, the JIG-AT’s initial Strategic Intelligence Report cited examples of major protests that took place both in Canada and internationally since 2001. While the security analysts viewed the previous four G8 Summits in Canada as “relatively peaceful” (e.g. 2002 Kananaskis), protests during other elite global governance events in Canada were perceived as entailing violence. The report provides the following two Canadian examples of violent protests:

In 2001, approximately 30,000 protestors attended the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City. By the end of that Summit, police had used more than 5,000 canisters of tear gas in addition to water cannons and rubber bullets. Over 150 people were arrested after the security fence was breached. The Summit had to be delayed and there were numerous injuries among police officers and protestors. At the 2007 North American Leaders Summit in Montebello, Quebec, violence erupted when approximately 1,000 protesters armed with projectiles including bottles filled with stones clashed with riot equipped Police outside the event.\textsuperscript{416}

The same report, however, acknowledges that G8 and other Summits occurring outside of Canada have experienced a greater amount of violence. It lists and details several previous international G8 and G20 Summits that “have been marred by violent protests” including Genoa (Italy) 2001, Evian (France) 2003, Gleneagles (Scotland, UK) 2005, Heilegendam (Germany) 2007, and London (England) 2009.\textsuperscript{417} The security analysis of previous protests concludes that “[w]hile there has not been a history of violence at G8 Summits in Canada, the potential for it exists and factors critical to ensuring a safe, secure and successful G8/G20 Summits include the availability of adequate security personnel as well as extensive site perimeter restriction.”\textsuperscript{418} Certainly, the G20 ISU

\textsuperscript{415} Fernandez, Policing Dissent, 102-103
\textsuperscript{416} ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2, 465
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., 466
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid.
followed these instructions from the JIG-AT analysts considering it deployed 20,974 security personnell from 26 police departments,419 and also erected a six kilometer security fence around downtown Toronto at a cost of $9.4 million.420

Additionally, there is a strategic SI report found in the ATIA document M 3551 which provided “a survey of the threats observed at the last 11 G8 summits.”421 This included historical analysis describing the evolution of “major mobilizations of the anti-globalization movement” beginning in Cologne (Germany) 1999, Nago (Japan) 2000, Genoa (Italy) 2001, Kananaskis (Canada) 2002, Evian (France) 2003, Sea Island (USA) 2004, Gleneagles (Scotland, UK) 2005, Strelna (Russia) 2006, Heiligendamm (Germany) 2007, Toyako (Japan) 2008, and L’Aquila (Italy) 2009. In particular, their analysis of the G8 in Kananaskis the JIG-AT analysts “assessed that manipulation of the media by activists occurred” because “[s]everal media reports indicated that excessive force was used by police”. They then add that “[c]onstantly assessing the situation and using patience and tolerance of front line officers to avoid unnecessary premature escalation has been noted as an effective tactic.” Interestingly this strategic SI included a footnote citing an article by an anarchist scholar critiquing the anti-globalization movement and its diversity of tactics. For instance in the footnotes the report cites “Keefer, Tom. ‘The Anti-G8 Protest in Calgary: Some Contributions to a Critique of the Anti-Globalization’ June 2nd, 2002”.422 The article which is posted on an anarchist website Common Struggle is “[a]n analysis from an anarcho-communist perspective of the anti-globalization movement in the context of the G8 protest in Calgary with a special focus upon the

419 ATIP 4067A [RCMP, Briefing Note to the Minister of Public Safety], 8
420 Marin, “Caught in the Act”, 25
421 M 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1448
422 Ibid., 1450, 1453
impact of Sept 11th, and contradictions between the movement's reformist and revolutionary tendencies.\textsuperscript{423} Meaning, security analysts, like those in the JIG-AT, draw strategic level security intelligence from the protest analysis produced by radical activists. Hence, it is important for critical researchers and activist scholars to remain cognizant that their published work is susceptible to being monitored and used for security intelligence purposes considering security analysts evidently monitor and trawl the internet and perhaps other sources (e.g. MA theses?) gleaning information about radical dissent.\textsuperscript{424}

Nonetheless, the strategic analysis on the ten year history of G8 Summits concludes with the following assessments:

- Although it is important to be cognizant of issues that have occurred at previous G8 summits they are not necessarily a reflection of what will occur at the 2010 G8[G20]. What should be highlighted is that the majority of direct actions during the G8 venues pre-planning is involved.
- The two G8 summits in North America, Kananaskis (2002) and Georgia (2004) were relatively peaceful. On the contrary, there have been other demonstrations that have turned violent, in particular the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City (2001) and Seattle, Washington (1999).
- It is assessed that the safest and most secure summits have been on North American soil. That said, the willingness of groups to travel in order to stage their cause cannot be ignored.
- The selection of the 2010 G8 in Huntsville has similarities to the 2003 G8 in Evian-les-Bains, France. Therefore, it is assessed that similar infrastructure may be targeted such as bridges, roads and hotels. In addition, large urban centres may be targeted due to the success of securing the Huntsville area. In 2010 these cities will likely include but not limited to Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal.\textsuperscript{425}

In sum, the JIG-AT analysts determined that anti-G20/G8 protesters typically organize and plan demonstrations well in advance of the elite global governance events; protests at previous G8 summits hosted in North America were peaceful but violence has occurred


\textsuperscript{424} In carrying out an anti-security analysis on the G20 JIG, I like to think that I am giving the JIG-AT analysts a little taste of their own medicine.

\textsuperscript{425} M 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports}], 1452-3
at other global governance events; there exists the potential that activist groups outside
the continent will travel to Canada to partake in anti-G20/G8 protests; and that various
types of infrastructure may be targeted by protesters not only in cities hosting the
summits but also in various other locations across the country. Therefore, several months
prior to the G20 and G8 events there were various intelligence products distributed by the
JIG-AT that provided strategic security intelligence which primarily warned the G20/G8
ISU-JIG that the most probable public order threat to the summits would come from left-
wing dissident groups, especially from radical anti-capitalists/ anarchists. These initial
strategic SI analyses likely motivated and rationalized the JIG-PIIT's SI and CI
techniques targeting radical left-wing groups organizing for anti-G20 protests.

**Tactical Security Intelligence**

The JIG-AT also produced and disseminated tactical intelligence reports that
provided security intelligence on the various tactics used by protesters and the different
tactical responses employed by event police during previous anti-globalization protests.
The distribution of tactical SI reports within the JIG network occurred during the third
implementation phase of the JIG operation; January 2010 to April 2010. Indeed, “[t]he
emphasis of the JIG during the period leading up to the 2010 G8 [G20] Summit[s] will
evolve from the gathering, processing, and distribution of intelligence and analytical
reports that are mainly strategic to those mainly tactical in nature.”

As previously
mentioned, tactical intelligence is the level of security intelligence employed in order to
outline the possible tactics of the adversary and determine the necessary tactical actions
for accomplishing security objectives, according to the CF's *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*.

---

426 C 509 [ISU-JIG, *Structure and Implementation*], 22
I was able to locate and analyze two tactical SI reports regarding the September 2009 Pittsburgh G20 and one on the April 2009 London G20. The reports provide an analysis on the implementation and functioning of the particular G20 security operation, while also outlining the tactics that were employed by protesters during the anti-G20 demonstrations. Additionally, the CSIS-ITAC Laser reports contain tactical SI regarding the deployment of the ‘black bloc tactic’ by anti-globalization protesters and thus will be examined and discussed in this section as well. Lastly, it will also be suggested that I and other researchers should attempt to retrieve more tactical SI reports analyzed and distributed by the JIG-AT during the G20/G8 pacification project, particularly two regarding protester tactics. In turn, it will be demonstrated that the tactical SI reports provided the G20/G8 ISU-JIG with security intelligence on how to effectively prepare, organize and implement its pacification project by taking into account the probable strategies and tactics of anti-summit protesters.

**Tactical SI Reports on 2009 Pittsburgh G20**

First, the two tactical SI reports on the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 are *G 3551* and the other is among other reports within *M 3551*. Each provided a separate but similar tactical intelligence analyses of the most recent G20 Summit hosted in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in September 2009. The *G 3551* report was prepared by the JIG-AT member “Cst. Mary Schweier and approved by the AT Acting Manager D/Cst. Richard Brown, and was distributed on October 7th 2009 to ISU-JIG Commanders and JIG-PIIT Managers. In particular, it provided information on the amount of property damage, arrests, attended

---

427 Canadian Forces, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 2-1
428 G 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Tactical Report on Canadians and/or organizations at Pittsburgh G20 Summit*], 332-333
protesters, and deployed law enforcement personnel. For instance, the report’s executive summary disclosed the following:

(UNCLASSIFIED) [Redaction] During the Summit and the week leading into the Summit, an estimated $50,000 in damage was reported to the city. At least a dozen Pittsburgh police cars were vandalized and had nails and screws forced into the tires. A few minor fires were reported and 193 people were arrested. Six thousand police officers were deployed to the G20 and five thousand protesters attended.\textsuperscript{429}

The Pittsburgh G20 tactical report \textit{M 3551} discloses even more information regarding the tactics deployed by the police against anti-G20 protesters. It was prepared by the JIG-AT and distributed to ISU Commanders Alphonse MacNeil and Tim Charlebois and JIG Commanders Rod McCann and Marty Kearns on September 29 2009.\textsuperscript{430} The tactical SI report reveals that event police deployed tear gas, pepper spray, smoke canisters, and rubber bullets to disperse and pacify protest crowds. The tactical SI report also disclosed that for the first time ever the police used sound canons for the purposes of pacifying domestic protesters. For instance, the city of Pittsburgh “purchased four Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) called ‘sound canons’ valued at $200,000 to engage unlawful protesters. This is the first time police have used the LRAD in operations.”\textsuperscript{431} However, the report acknowledges that the LRAD is a military technology and has been used before during American military operations: “It was developed by the military and previously deployed against Somali pirates and Iraqi insurgents.” Meaning, the Pittsburgh G20 witnessed the inaugural deployment of these pacification technologies during a domestic police action. Consequently, anti-G20 protest crowds were subjected to a “high pitched sound that forced demonstrators to cover their ears and withdraw.” The report provided the following assessment made by the Pittsburgh Police bureau chief regarding the

\textsuperscript{429} G 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Tactical Report on Canadians and/or organizations at Pittsburgh G20 Summit}], 334 
\textsuperscript{430} M 3551[ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports}], 1491 
\textsuperscript{431} Ibid., 1493
deployment of the LRADS during the G20: "Other law enforcement agencies will be watching to see how it was used. It served its purpose well" (emphasis in original).\textsuperscript{432} This tactical SI on LRADs conceivably influenced the decision of the Toronto Police to purchase four sound canons a month before the Toronto G20.\textsuperscript{433}

Furthermore, both tactical reports provided a heavily redacted synopsis regarding the various protest issues and actions during the Pittsburgh G20. For instance in the \textit{G 3551} report it stated:

\begin{quote}
During the Pittsburgh G-20, as with all events of this magnitude, especially since the economic crisis is a global issue, anti-G20 gatherings, protests and marches at various locations around Pittsburgh occurred[Heavy redaction]. Protest issues at the G-20 in Pittsburgh ranged from war to global warming to anarchy. Many of the protesters were concerned about the economy and blame G-20 policies in part responsible for the global recession.\textsuperscript{434}
\end{quote}

The other tactical report added the following summary regarding the street fighting that occurred between radical left/anarchist protesters and police during the Pittsburgh G20:

\begin{quote}
Several suspected anarchists were dressed in black, wearing helmets, goggles and face masks... Pepper spray and smoke canisters were used to halt a march to Downtown by anarchists. Some demonstrators regrouped and again faced off with police. One confrontation involved protesters throwing rocks at police and police firing bullets at them.\textsuperscript{435}
\end{quote}

Like the strategic reports, this tactical report also discussed how protesters purportedly complained to the media about the police measures and indicated that this practise is typical during global governance events: "As is the case with most events of this magnitude, protesters complained to media about police using heavy handed tactics, harassment and intimidation tactics."\textsuperscript{436} After noticeable redaction of paragraphs on

\textsuperscript{432} M 3551[ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports}], 1493
\textsuperscript{434} G 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Tactical Report on Canadians and/or organizations at Pittsburgh G20 Summit}], 335
\textsuperscript{435} M 3551[ISU-JIG, \textit{Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports}], 1493-1494
\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., 1494
protester tactics, the tactical report then details an incident during the Pittsburgh G20 where several Greenpeace anti-G20 protesters successfully accomplished an elaborate banner drop tactic before being arrested by police. According to the report, "[t]wo squads of GREENPEACE activists" rappelled down the sides of the Fort Pitt and West End Bridges and unfurled an "80-by-30-foot banner stating 'Danger: Environmental Destruction Ahead'. While initially outmaneuvering the police by "dangling above the Ohio River for several hours", when the eight activists "climbed back up [they were] arrested, along with a ninth member who remained on the bridge to assure police that the activists were peaceful". In outlining this incident during the Pittsburgh G20, the JIG-AT analysts determined that Greenpeace has "demonstrated its ability to organize and mobilize" effective protest tactics during global governance events.

Lastly, the same Pittsburgh G20 tactical SI report provided the following assessment:

It is assessed that each summit presents a unique set of circumstances that must be considered on their own merits. The extent and gravity to which protests occur hinges greatly on fluctuations and global sentiments toward summits over the past decade. The significance of the threat to G8 [/G20] will reflect the global climate month to month in anticipation of the event. Sufficient investment in summit security is a responsible and prudent safeguard against the realities of a successful threat.

In other words, the JIG-AT analysts recognized that summit security involves a continuous and dynamic process of determining the substantial threats that emanate from the evolving international political environment during the lead up of an elite global governance event. Consequently, they suggest that police and intelligence operations for these events deserve to have significant funding in order to prevent against an effective

\footnote{M 3551[ISU-JIG Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1494} \footnote{Ibid., 1497}
security threat. I argue that it is tactical assessments such as this that in part motivated
and rationalized the Canadian state’s billion dollar expenditure on the G20/G8 Summits.

**Tactical SI Report on 2009 London G20**

As previously mentioned, an additional tactical SI report is also found in the ISU-

The analysis was focused on the organization, functioning, and challenges of “OPERATION
GLENOCE”, the multi-agency security (pacification) project established to police
protests at the 2009 G20 in London, England. It discussed how Operation Glencoe
employed a police network in order coordinate summit security among various state
agencies. For instance, the security police operation was “organized by SCOTLAND
YARD as a joint security arrangement bringing together around a dozen police and
government agencies.”

The tactical SI report described that the police network of
Operation Glencoe was structured through “a system designed for multi-agency
operations where each partner takes a command role of one element of the operation.”

They referred to this type of organization as the “Gold, Silver, and Bronze Command
Structure” and then defined what each element entailed:

a. **Gold Commander:** (Strategic) sets the strategic policy and consider next day, next week and
next year issues.

b. **Silver Commander:** (Tactical) manages the tactical deployment of resources at the incident
site, if one exists.

c. **Bronze Commander:** (Operational) delivers the operational plan with the site.

Considering the G20 pacification project employed a similar multi-agency, commander-
led structure, it is likely that this tactical report on Operation Glencoe influenced the

---

439 M 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1435-1446
440 Ibid., 1436
441 Ibid., 1437
organization and structure of the G20 ISU-JIG. Moreover, it also stated that the "operation was one of the largest security events mounted by the METROPOLITAN POLICE Service and was planned in just three months." Then it broke down Operation Glencoe’s security plan by identifying its twelve main objectives including "a. Facilitate lawful protest, b. Provide a safe environment for participants, public and staff, c. Minimise disruption to the life of the residential and business community, d. Minimise disruption to air, rail, vehicular and pedestrian traffic, e. Provide a co-ordinated response to incidents, f. Preserve public order and minimise opportunity to commit crime and take proportionate steps to deal with offenders if crime is committed, g. Protect vulnerable and high profile premises, h. Preserve the dignity of the diplomatic missions and buildings, i. Enforce the Sessional Order of Parliament where appropriate, j. Provide security commensurate to the threat level relating to this series of events, and k. Facilitate the arrival and departure of principals." As we can see below, these security objectives are similar to those of the Toronto G20 ISU found in the document G20 Face-To-Face - Front Line Officer Training. The police training manual states that the “G20 PROJECT MISSION:" is to create & implement an integrated security plan that:

- Ensures safety and security of summit delegations
- Ensures safety and security of public and police
- Provides security equal to the threat level of the event
- Facilitate conditions for peaceful protest.
- Minimizes disruption for residents and businesses.
- Maintains core services.

Thus, I argue that the JIG-AT’s tactical analysis of Operation Glencoe likely assisted the ISU-JIG in determining the appropriate mission objectives for its pacification project.

---

442 M 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1438
443 Waterloo Regional Police Service. "G 20 Face-To-Face - Front Line Officer Training", 32
Additionally, this tactical SI report provides a particular interpretation of the death of Ian Tomlinson who died during the London anti-G20 protests after being struck by a police officer:

On 2009-04-01, Police members of OPERATION GLENCOE responded to the collapse of an individual within the cordoned area of LONDON. First aid was performed however the individual was later pronounced dead after arriving at a hospital. The individual was identified as IAN TOMLINSON, a newspaper stand clerk attempting to return home at the completion of the work day. TOMLINSON had been caught within a police cordon while attempting to leave the area and was initially thought to be a protester...It has been reported that TOMLINSON engaged in an argument with police while attempting to leave the cordon. At the time he was struck by security forces attempting to maintain police lines...TOMLINSON was reported to be intoxicated at the time and had a history of alcohol abuse as well as periods of transience during his adult life.

After viewing the video footage uploaded on You Tube by The Guardian news, however, it is clear that Tomlinson was a victim of police brutality. I believe that the JIG-AT’s discourse regarding this fatal incident during the London G20 is clearly skewed in defence of law enforcement actions. Not only does it falsely claim that Tomlinson confronted police before being assaulted but it also places blame on the victim for his own death by claiming that he was drunk at the time, and had a history of alcoholism and homelessness.

Lastly, while the tactical report acknowledged that there “were no instances of a terrorist attack during the LONDON G20,” it describes the police’s pre-emptive raid of a house occupied by a group of anti-capitalist activists using the accusation that they were going to disrupt the London G20 Summit. After police found weapons, drugs, and “extremist” literature, the activists were arrested for terrorism charges. In particular, it stated the following:

On 2009-03-30, five individuals were arrested under the UK TERRORIST ACT accused of plotting to disrupt the G20 SUMMIT. Police uncovered a cache of imitation and deactivated...

---

444 The following You Tube clip demonstrates that Tomlinson was struck by a masked police officer while walking away from the encroaching police line: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HECMVdl-9SQ
firearms, edged weapons, and improvised explosives fabricated from fireworks. An undetermined number of the arrested were also subject to narcotics charges as a result of the police raid. The imitation firearms seized by police included handguns, long barrelled rifles and an imitation KALASHNIKOV assault rifle. Additionally, extremist literature was seized during the raid, although the exact content remains unknown to the JIG. The individuals arrested appeared to have been anti-capitalist protesters all of whom resided in PLYMOUTH, CORNWALL.\footnote{M 3551 [ISU-JIG Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1443-4}

This tactical SI on this particular “terrorist” incident during the London G20 may have provided the motivation and rational for the ISU-JIG’s pre-emptive raid and arrest of anti-G20 activists just prior to the Toronto G20. As previously mentioned, during the early morning hours of June 26\textsuperscript{th} “G20 police [i.e. ISU] raided two homes in Toronto” and subsequently charged several activists “with conspiracy to commit mischief over $5000.”\footnote{“G20 police raid activists’ homes”, \textit{CBC News}.} Considering Monaghan and Walby have shown that the “JIG was directly involved in the identification of these arrestees”\footnote{Monaghan and Walby, “’They attacked the city’”, 7}, I suggest that the JIG-AT may have also played a role in this particular incident by supplying the ISU with tactical security intelligence that demonstrated the success of a pre-emptive police raid and arrest during the London G20.

\textbf{Black Bloc Tactical SI}

Furthermore, during the third phase of JIG’s ‘joint security (counter) intelligence operation’ several CSIS-ITAC Laser reports were disseminated by the JIG-AT containing substantial tactical SI regarding the potential use of the black bloc tactic by radical left/anarchist groups during the Toronto G20. According to Monaghan and Walby, intelligence-led policing strategically employs various indicators like ‘black bloc’ to determine who they consider being risky and illegitimate protesters within mass
demonstrations crowds.\textsuperscript{448} Indeed, prior to the G20 CSIS-ITAC intelligence documents provided various indicators that criminalized the identities and tactics of radical protesters. One report stated the following:

In the past, some groups have been known to promote violent activity against public and private property, government officials, and law enforcement in an effort to attract attention to their issue. Such groups have provided an outlet for individuals with no particular affiliation to join in and violently broadcast their opinions through black block tactics. There have been several examples over the past decade of issue-based extremists employing black block tactics, such as engaging in violent and destructive behaviour, while protesting international gatherings. Although the worst of these occurrences have erupted in Europe, Canada is not immune to such activity, as demonstrated during the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001.\textsuperscript{449}

Their tactical analysis of the black bloc explained that “extremists” protesters can spontaneously and without warning coalesce into an orchestrated bloc during a mass demonstration. Subsequently, according to the CSIS-ITAC, the black bloc would engage in property damage and violence towards protest security personnel. The affinity groups within a black bloc were considered to be “a proportionally small cadre of extremists, typically a few hundred or less” wearing “similar black or dark clothes” in order to conceal “their features which help them avoid being individually identified.”\textsuperscript{450} More specifically, by analyzing previous anti-globalization protests CSIS-ITAC constructed the following working definition of the black bloc tactic:

A black bloc is a collection of individuals or affinity groups that join in a spontaneous or organized manner at demonstrations or political actions. Anarchist groups are the most inclined to call a black bloc, which in concrete terms means a willingness to break the law, destroy property and/or otherwise engage law enforcement authorities. During demonstrations participants are generally dressed in black and often wear masks or scarves. Members often employ black bloc tactics, which are violent activities ranging from vandalism and theft to throwing projectiles and assaulting police.\textsuperscript{451}

While the CSIS analysts suggested that the concept of the black bloc originated in Europe in the 1980s, they argued that “[b]lack bloc tactics gained particular notoriety in North

\textsuperscript{448} Monaghan and Walby, “‘They attacked the city’”, 9
\textsuperscript{449} CSIS-15 [CSIS-ITAC, Issue-based extremist overview], 2
\textsuperscript{450} CSIS-12 [CSIS-ITAC, G8-G20 Summits Threat Overview April 27 2010], 3
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid.
America in 1999, when protests against the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle turned violent.” They accused the anti-WTO protesters in the black bloc for engaging in “five days of rioting, with outlets of multinational corporations being damaged in targeted attacks. Costs related to vandalism, loss of business, and policing during the riots were estimated at almost US$30 million at the time, and set the tone for security required at subsequent international events.” Thus, I argue that the CSIS analysts used the black bloc threat to legitimize the extravagant security efforts and expenditures required to facilitate elite global governance events since the 1999 Seattle WTO meeting.

Finally, according to an intelligence bulletin, the JIG-AT also produced a tactical intelligence report that listed the various protester tactics that could be carried out during the G20/G8: “Many of the tactics described in the AT report, ‘PROTESTER TACTICS’ may be used during the upcoming G8-G20 Summits. It should be noted, however, that this report does not supply an exhaustive list, but a general overview of commonly used tactics.” As far as I know, the ATIA requests relating to the G20 JIG’s operation have yet to yield this AT tactical intelligence report. Additionally, several JIG-AT intelligence products describing protester tactics cite a document titled “Militant Anti-globalization Tactics” written by CSIS in 2002. After an extensive internet search, however, I could not retrieve this tactical SI report. Nevertheless, it is evident that especially during the third phase of the JIG operation that the JIG-AT prepared and distributed tactical

452 CSIS-12 [CSIS-ITAC, G8-G20 Summits Threat Overview April 27 2010], 3
453 K 3551 [ISU-JIG, Intelligence Bulletins], 843
454 See footnote 18 in M 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports], 1703
455 It may be worthwhile to carry out further ATIA requests pertaining to Toronto G20 tactical reports in order to find more information regarding the JIG-AT’s tactical intelligence analyses.
intelligence reports to the ISU-JIG commanders that provided security intelligence outlining the various tactics employed by protesters and the different tactical responses deployed by security forces during previous anti-summit protests.

**Operational Security Intelligence**

Leading up to and during the G20 Summit, the JIG-AT produced and disseminated operational intelligence products consisting of weekly intelligence briefs, periodic bulletins, NSTAS and ITAC Laser updates, and (eventually) daily situational reports containing security intelligence (SI) and threat assessments on the four main threat categories mentioned above. A security (counter)intelligence operation according to the CF Doctrine requires operational intelligence which is the level of SI that provides current, up-to-date intelligence products needed for the ongoing planning, execution and support of security measures within a the theater of operations.\(^{456}\) Indeed, the JIG-AT prepared and distributed a variety of operational level SI products during the G20/G8 in order for the ISU and JIG to conduct proactive operations against perceived security threats. From at least March 22, 2010 through to June 14, 2010, the JIG-AT produced and disseminated the "JIG Weekly Brief" for the purpose of updating and highlighting "various local, national and international issues of concern relating to the security of the G8/G 20 events."\(^{457}\) During this time, the JIG-AT also created and distributed "Intelligence Bulletins" which are all found in the JIG document *K 3551 [ISU-JIG Intelligence Bulletins]*. On June 15\(^{th}\), the JIG-AT started replacing the weekly briefs with

---

\(^{456}\) Canadian Forces, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 2-1

\(^{457}\) F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, *Threat Assessment Reports*], 221
"Daily Situational Reports". From the 15th to the end of the Summits on the 27th, these reports were distributed in the morning to the ISU-JIG commanders and selectively throughout the summit intelligence network. The daily situational reports contained SI on “protest activity from both the Huntsville area [G8 location] and downtown Toronto [G20 location] as well as issues surrounding the summit threat environment.” Both the weekly and daily intelligence products were prepared by the JIG analytical team members and were reviewed by either the JIG Commander R.D. McCann or JIG Deputy Commander Pat Morris.

Before and during the G20/G8 the JIG-AT also sent out updates from intelligence hubs of CSIS-ITAC and RCMP’s National Security Threat Assessment Section (NSTAS). The NSTAS is a continuously active RCMP intelligence centre which provided the JIG-AT with “Threat Assessment Updates regarding the G8 summit in Huntsville, Ontario on 2010-06-25/26 and the G20 summit in Toronto, Ontario on 2010-06-26/27. In conjunction with the G8/G20 Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) and other government departments, NSTAS gathered information in the preparation of Threat Assessment Updates.” Indeed, the weekly briefs and daily reports contained a threat and risk level assessment “derived from NSTAS”. According to a daily report, the ISU-JIG used the NSTAS “Threat Level Legend” which is depicted in Appendix H. The threat level was defined in the weekly briefs as “[a]n evaluation of a threat to a person(s), location or event based on available information and intelligence, combined

458 I 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 563
459 F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports], 275
460 Ibid., 273
461 D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief June 21 2010], 178
462 L 3551 [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 1267
with an overall analysis of the threat environment.” Whereas, the risk level was described as the level representing “the impact the threat may have” and “identifies and evaluates the severity and probability of potential impact...based on observable risk of a given situation (social, political and otherwise) in the physical environment combined with threat intelligence.”\footnote{D 3551 [ISU-JIG, \textit{Weekly Brief June 21 2010}], 178} According to the CF \textit{Joint Intelligence Doctrine}, these assessments are considered “threat and risk products” and the creation of which is an essential activity during a security (counter) intelligence operation “where there are multiple threat sources and it is difficult to define adversary courses of action.” The CF \textit{Doctrine} simply defines a threat “as a person or thing likely to cause harm” and a risk as “the chance and nature of the harm likely to be suffered as a result of a threat.”\footnote{Canadian Forces, \textit{Joint Intelligence Doctrine}, 3-8} Similarly, CSIS' ITAC released several “LASER Reports” and other intelligence products that provided “both classified and unclassified updates to government, industry and international partners.”\footnote{CSIS-02 [CSIS, \textit{Executive Directive-Final}], 15} As previously discussed, several of these products contained strategic level SI and were disseminated by the JIG-AT beginning in April 2010. However, some of these and other CSIS-ITAC reports, especially those produced weekly during May and June 2010, consisted of operational security intelligence updates. ITAC, the Intelligence Threat Assessment Center, is an operational component of CSIS that continuously functions to “produce comprehensive threat assessments... [which] evaluate both the probability and potential consequences of threats.”\footnote{Canadian Security Intelligence Service. “Backgrounder No. 13 - The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)”. Last modified Feb 21 2012, accessed June 12 2012, \url{http://www.csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr13-eng.asp}} In sum, the NSTAS and ITAC are national security intelligence hubs that provided security
intelligence updates for the G20 JIG which in turn was distributed to the ISU-JIG commanders and selectively throughout the summit intelligence network by the JIG’s analytical team along with its own weekly briefs, periodic bulletins and daily situational reports.

During the weeks leading up to the G20/G8, the weekly briefs included an update on the various agencies that were internal and external to the JIG’s “summit intelligence network” discussed earlier in the chapter. The figures shown in Appendix F are featured in almost every weekly brief without any variation. The weekly briefs also consistently provided June 2010 environmental forecasts for both the Muskoka and Toronto regions (see Appendix G). Likewise, the daily situational reports provided 24 hour weather forecasts for both “theater of operations”. For instance, in the June 21st daily report projected that weather in Toronto that day would be “Mainly Sunny. High of 26 degrees. Cloudy periods and 17 degrees overnight.” The weekly briefs, periodic bulletins, and daily situational reports also consisted of updating the ISU-JIG personnel about the most current security intelligence on the four threat categories of terrorism, internecine strife/conflict, independent asymmetric threats, and, most substantially, the public order (i.e. radical left wing/anarchist activism, issue specific extremism/activism, and aboriginal activism). I discuss these in sequence below.

**Terrorist Threat Operational SI**

Unless redacted there was minimal operational security intelligence that was produced and disseminated by the JIG-AT before and during the summits on the terrorist
threat. Terrorism posed a low level threat and risk to G20/G8 security. The weekly briefs continuously disclosed that none of the PIIT-COT counterintelligence units were finding any indication that either the G20/G8 events or the international protected persons attending them were at risk of a terrorist attack. For instance, although "[a]ll counterterrorism units have been focusing on intelligence gathering for the Summits since the 2010 Olympic Games"[,] "[n]one of these units possess any information to suggest any specific threats to national security with regard to the Summits." 469 In light of this, the JIG-AT analysts determined that "[n]o identified terrorist threats to G8-G20 Summits." 470 And "[n]o specific threats have been identified by the Summit Intelligence Network that would impact a Head of State or delegation while in attendance at the Summits." 471 Indeed, while the JIG-PIIT was actively investigating the terrorist threat category, the JIG-AT weekly briefs repeatedly stated that there was no perceivable terrorist threat toward the global governance events or to its attendees. Likewise, none of the daily situational reports contain operational SI on the terrorist threat category. Although there was no indication that specific terrorist threats existed, the threat assessment tables at the end of the weekly briefs consistently projected a “Low” level threat and risk to G20/G8 security rather than the even lower “no known threat” level (see terrorist threat column in Appendix I). 472 According to the NSTAS threat level legend (Appendix H), the “low” level threat indicates that “[i]ntelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having either the capability or the intent to

469 C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 18 2010], 103; D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 21 2010], 135
470 D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 21 2010], 168
471 C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 18 2010], 104
472 For example see C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 18 2010], 114; D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 21 2010], 178
perform an act of violence” and low risk means “[d]irect or unintentional harm to the Protect Person(s) is possible.”473 Meaning, the weekly briefs disclosed that the JIG’s counter-terrorism units did not gather any SI on the terrorist threat category, however, the JIG-AT analysts did not rule out the possibility of terrorism during the G20/G8 events considering it projected low level threat and risk assessments.

Perhaps a reason for this was based on information from NSTAS updates which consistently disclosed that “Canada and several of the attending countries were specifically mentioned by Osama bin Laden as being among the designated targets for terrorist action because of their role in Afghanistan after 2001-09-11.”474 In particular, NSTAS analysts stated that “Al Qaeda inspired homegrown terrorist groups such as the ‘Toronto 18’” are especially “likely to at least consider including the 2010 G-8 and G20 summits or less protected nearby facilities among their target choices.”475 Also, NSTAS updates consistently disclosed that the global power elites attending the Summits could be possible targets of terrorism because of previous attempts and threats made by Al Qaeda towards them. For instance, NSTAS warned that “one of the most prominent threats impacting the security of all VIPs is the threat by Al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist groups” because they have “targeted or threatened to target most of the member countries of the Western world at one time or another including the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Japan - all countries attending the G8/G 20 summit events.”476 Hence, “with the leaders of most of the world’s most powerful nations gathering in one primary location over a three-day period, such events pose an attractive

473 F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports], 229
474 Ibid., 214
475 Ibid., 225
476 Ibid., 287
opportunity to those with the terrorist mindset.\textsuperscript{477} Therefore, although the JIG-PIIT did not provide any security intelligence regarding the terrorist threat category, the JIG-AT did not rule out the possibility of a terrorist attack because NSTAS updates constantly assessed that the G20 and G8 venues and the global elites attending them could be seen as attractive targets by terrorist groups and like-minded individuals.

**IAT and Internecine strife/conflict Threat Operational SI**

Similarly, there was little amount of operational SI disclosed by the JIG-AT regarding both the internecine/strife threat and independent asymmetric threat (IAT) categories. The weekly briefs and periodic bulletins disclosed minimal quantity of SI regarding these two threat categories and thus projected a low threat and risk level assessments on each. Unfortunately for my analysis, the slight amount of SI that it did provide was redacted in the weekly briefs. But one NSTAS update does state that “the actions of “Lone Wolf” individuals motivated by any number of personal goals…cannot be discounted.”\textsuperscript{478} Interestingly, another update discloses the security concern regarding the possibility of an IAT acquiring falsified accreditation and thus gaining access into the summit security zones:

Obtaining accreditation through forgery or theft has been the goal of many groups and/or individuals wishing to breach security at major events such as the G8/G 20. As reported in the NSTAS threat assessment dated 2010/06/24, individuals have received accreditation from G8/G 20 summit venues and have subsequently been deemed unsuitable candidates for security clearance. Additionally there are persons and groups who will attempt to falsify accreditation. [Sentence redacted] Some attempts have been successful. During the opening ceremony of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, a mentally ill man with a homemade security pass was able to get within meters of US VP Joe BIDEN. As police held back thousands of protesters outside BC Place, the man slipped past several layers of security using his falsified identification.\textsuperscript{479}

\textsuperscript{477} F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports], 226
\textsuperscript{478} Ibid., 225
\textsuperscript{479} Ibid., 297
In other words, based on a breach of security incident at the Vancouver Winter Olympics months before, the NSTAS analysts believed a similar event could potentially occur during the G20/G8 Summits. This disclosure also reveals that just prior to the G20 and G8 an unspecified amount of people had their security clearances revoked after the ISU-JIG determined that they posed a security risk. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that there was a substantial amount of operational SI on either of these categories, considering IAT received a low level threat and risk assessment in all of the weekly intelligence briefs, and internecine strife/conflict was not even given a threat/risk assessment (see Appendix I). Likewise, the daily situational reports contained little information on either of these two threat categories.

**Public Order Threat Operational SI**

In contrast, the JIG-AT analysts produced and distributed a significant amount of operational level SI on the public order threat category and, accordingly, initially gave it a medium level threat and risk assessment prior to the June 25-27th 2010 weekend and then subsequently a high level assessment during the G20 Summit. Although they evaluated the possible public order threat from radical right-wing activists and even major league baseball fans (e.g. “BLUE JAYS GAMES MOVED TO PHILADELPHIA DURING G20... Relocated due to Summit security concerns... ASSESSMENT: There is no indication that disappointed baseball fans intend to protest the summit events.”), these JIG-AT documents primarily entailed SI on the public order threat of left wing anti-G20 activism. Indeed, the analysts' main “security concerns” emanated from Ontario left-

---

480 For example notice the whiteout block underneath the IAT heading on page 102 of C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 18 2010] 
481 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 735
wing anti-G20 groups who were currently organizing and planning for both “large-scale demonstrations...during the summits” and “smaller protests...prior to the summits targeting government agencies, politicians and corporate officials and offices throughout the country.”  They were also concerned about the left-wing anti-G20 activism occurring not only outside the province but also in the United States and United Kingdom: “CONCERNS...Various protest groups from Canada, US, UK, as well as other countries from around the world, have called to mobilize and travel to Ontario to be part of the protests environment.” In other words, the JIG-AT analysts primarily warned about the public order threat subcategory of left-wing anti-G20 activism which they perceived to be occurring not only in Ontario but also throughout Canada and abroad.

Additionally, NSTAS updates were detailing security concerns regarding the current planning and organizing by left-wing activists of mass protests to be carried during the G20/G8 events and also smaller demonstrations to be held across Canada during the lead up to the summits. In light of this, NSTAS analysts suggested the possibility that threat and risk assessments will be elevated as the elite global governance events approach. For instance, a NSTAS update on May 25 provided the following statement:

Several social issues which may generate security concerns for each of the summits still exist. These concerns include large-scale demonstrations. Planning is well underway by some dissenting groups for demonstrations and protests to be held during the 2010 G8/G 20 summits. As well, it is expected that prior to these events, smaller protests will be organized by various groups and individuals targeting government agencies, politicians and corporate officials and offices throughout the country. Therefore, the risk and threat levels may be elevated or adjusted during

---

482 C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 18 2010], 112; D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief June 21 2010], 144
483 Ibid.
The period of time leading up to and during the events, depending on IPP and VIP visits and security concerns existing at the time.⁴⁸⁴

The above scenario actually played out during the week of the summits. Prior to June 21 the NSTAS updates and the AT’s weekly briefs provided the threat assessment that the left-wing public order threat posed a “MEDIUM” level threat towards the G20/G8 security.⁴⁸⁵ In the briefs the Medium threat level meant that “[i]ntelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having the capability and the intent to commit an act of serious violence… [However]… There is no intelligence indicating that an attack is forthcoming.”⁴⁸⁶ Whereas, from June 21-27 the daily situational reports elevated the G20 security threat/risk level to “HIGH” based on the left-wing public order threat (see Appendix I).⁴⁸⁷ A June 27 report stated that the “overall threat level for the G20 Summit is currently HIGH” based on the SI that “[m]ore direct actions are being displayed and continue to be planned.”⁴⁸⁸ The high level threat indicated that “[i]ntelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having the capability and the intent to commit an act of serious violence… Intelligence indicates that an attack may be forthcoming.”⁴⁸⁹ Thus, just like the NSTAS analysts predicted, the risk and threat levels were heightened leading up to the G20 event.

The weekly briefs and periodic bulletins consistently disclosed SI regarding the ongoing activities of left wing activism leading up to the G20/G8, especially on the actions of radical left/anarchist groups. The intelligence products updated the ISU-JIG

⁴⁸⁴ F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports], 214
⁴⁸⁵ L 3551 [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 1265, 1251, 1262
⁴⁸⁶ A 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 9 2010], 53
⁴⁸⁷ D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 21 2010], 146
⁴⁸⁸ ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 59
⁴⁸⁹ D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 21 2010], 178
on dissidents organizing and participating in direct actions during the weeks prior to the Toronto G20. For instance, they produced SI on how the JIG-PIIT was carrying out surveillance on Le Collectif du Chat Noir (CCN), the Ottawa-based activist collective I was taking part in during the lead up to the G20. In particular, the JIG produced operational SI on our March 29-30 protest at the G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting that occurred in the nearby city of Gatineau, PQ. The weekly briefs disclosed that “[p]ersons reported to be planning direct actions at the G7 Foreign Ministers meeting in Gatineau are being monitored by the PIIT. Further information will be reported as needed.”490 Consequently, the JIG-AT analysts recommended that “the PIIT monitor persons identified in Ottawa region for any further plans for disruption of the G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Gatineau, QC.”491 Hence, along with others in CCN, I may have been one such person monitored by the JIG-PIIT stemming from my participation in planning a protest against a ministerial meeting occurring in Ottawa-Gatineau region a few weeks prior to the G20.

Similarly, the weekly briefs contained operational level SI on left-wing activist groups in Nova Scotia who planned and participated in protest actions against the “Halifax G8 Development Minister Meeting” that occurred in late April 2010. Prior to the protest in Halifax, a weekly brief disseminated on April 13, 2010 acknowledged that demonstrations were to be held on April 25th and provided the assessment that “[t]he

490 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 630
491 Ibid., 632
potential exists that Halifax protesters will also attend G20 Summit." After the protest action, a May 20th intelligence bulletin produced the following:

The G8 Meeting that recently took place in Halifax in 2010-04 saw a turnout of 200-300 individuals who protested peacefully over the course of three days, with the exception of one incident, where a protester from a labour group was arrested for assaulting a police officer. Protester tactics used included carrying signs and placards, wearing costumes, shouting slogans, and generally making a lot of noise. There were approximately 30 individuals who appeared to be Anarchist supporters, as they were dressed in black, wearing black masks, and carrying black flags, protesting without incident. G8-G20 ISU JIG investigators were present, conducting surveillance and collecting intelligence. Several of the masked protesters were observed taking photographs during the protests, of people and vehicles.

In other words, the bulletin disclosed that the JIG-PIIT deployed an event monitor unit that observed and gathered SI during the protest. As a result, the ISU-JIG was informed about the duration of the action, the number of protesters, including those suspected of being anarchists, the protest tactics employed, and the suspicious activity of several protesters photographing their surroundings. Based on this operational SI, the JIG-AT analysts made the prediction that “[i]t is possible that the social and environmental groups that protested in Halifax in 2010-04 will also appear at the G8 and/or G20 Summits in 2010-06.” And added that “[i]ntelligence collected by the attending G8-G20 ISU JIG investigators will be utilized to identify possible participants who will most likely come, and what capability they might have to disrupt public order.” Thus, the JIG-PIIT’s surveillance of the direct action against the G8 Development Meeting in Halifax roughly two months before the Toronto G20, provided the JIG-AT with a list of potential anti-G20 protesters and their perceived capability of resisting the G20 Summit.

492 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 494
493 K 3551 [ISU-JIG, Intelligence Bulletins], 843
494 Ibid.

160
The weekly briefs and periodic bulletins contain similar operational level SI and information on pre-G20 demonstrations including the “Montreal May Day protest”, “Harmonized Sales Tax Protest”, and the “Vancouver Rally against the G8 University Summit.” The JIG-AT analysts were also consistently assessing the radical left-wing protests against the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. For example,

The Ontario Left Wing extremists traveling to the Olympics are expected to participate in anti-Olympic protests during the games. It is likely some of these persons will be involved in banner drops at or near games venue locations. It is suspected that some of these persons also may engage in criminal direct actions. The exact nature of these actions is unknown at this time.

The above excerpt also reveals that similar to their discourse on radical anti-G20 dissent, the JIG-AT de-legitimated radical anti-Olympic activists by referring to them as “extremists” and pre-emptively criminalizing their dissident activities.

Furthermore, the weekly briefs and periodic bulletins consisted of a substantial amount of operational level SI on the various G20 related direct actions involving property damage. For instance, one brief disclosed that anarchists in Durham, Ontario set fire to an equipment shed owned by CN Rail Line causing “[e]xtensive damage estimated at $450,000”. The JIG-AT assessment was that “[a]narchists continue to use the disruption of railways in an attempt to gain attention towards their cause” and suggested that “as the Summit dates approach” it is necessary for police to continue their “vigilance around railways.” Another weekly brief revealed that several banks in downtown Toronto were being “vandalized with anti-G20 slogans” and their assessment was that

---

495 J 3551 [JSU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 506
496 Ibid., 509
497 Ibid., 509
498 Ibid., 604
499 Ibid., 542
"[s]imilar acts leading up to and occurring during the G8-G20 Summits is probable."500 Likewise, NSTAS updates disclosed that "several provinces have reported instances of minor damage, broken windows and graffiti to various corporate properties, after which responsibility has been claimed by local activists or groups making references to the upcoming summits."501 It then provided the assessment that "[s]uch activities and incidents can be expected to continue during the time leading up to and during the G8/G20 summits."502 Thus, the NSTAS analysts anticipated that these kinds of direct actions involving targeted property vandalism were likely going to continue before and during the June 2010 elite global governance events.

The incident that garnered the most SI in the weekly briefs, bulletins, and NSTAS threat assessments was the so-called anarchist firebombing of an RBC bank in Ottawa during the early morning hours of May 18, 2010. The controversial direct action resulted in no human casualties or injuries but caused approximately $300,000 in property damage.503 According to a bulletin disseminated two days later, "a Royal Bank Branch in the Glebe area of Ottawa was firebombed... [And]...[s]hortly after the bombing a group called FFFC – Ottawa posted a video and transcript claiming responsibility..."504 Indeed, soon after the direct action, a video was uploaded on an Ottawa independent media website.505 It included a manifesto explaining that the group’s targeting of RBC stemmed from the bank’s sponsorship of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games and for its continued financing of Alberta’s massive Tar Sands project which has caused “the second

500 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 603
501 F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports], 220
502 Ibid.
503 Ibid., 225
504 K 3551 [ISU-JIG, Intelligence Bulletins], 798
fastest rate of deforestation on the planet”. The video transcript also made it known that the group intended to be present at the June G20/G8 Summits: “On June 25-27 2010, the G8/G20 ‘leaders’ and bankers are meeting in Huntsville and Toronto to make decisions that will further their policies of exploitation of people and the environment. We will be there.”

While the statements made in the video never disclosed the FFFC’s political affiliations, the ISU-JIG documents and the mainstream media consistently referred to the group as being anarchists. One bulletin reasoned that “the points made in the communiqué are that of an anti-government, anti-capitalist group and [thus] parallel closely to that of anarchist ideals.” Regardless, the JIG-AT assessed that the FFFC’s pre-G20 RBC firebombing indicated that it illustrated “the propensity and capability for violence” and predicted that “similar acts occurring during the G8-G20 Summits are probable.”

The analysts also warned that the RBC and other banks in Toronto’s financial district would be a “favorite target for anarchists” protesting at the G20 Summits.

Months before the RBC firebombing, however, the JIG-AT had already determined that radical left-wing protesters would target financial institutions and banks near the MTCC during the G20 Summit because of their corporate financing of the Tar Sands and their culpability in the economic recession. For instance, a weekly brief disseminated on February 11th 2010 disclosed that “[a]t this time, it is assessed that the

506 The video can also be accessed on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5RiRuo5R38
508 K 3551 [ISU-JIG, Intelligence Bulletins], 798
509 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 741
510 K 3551 [ISU-JIG, Intelligence Bulletins], 798
financial district of Toronto could be targeted by Left Wing extremists due to the geographical proximity of the area to the extent location at or near the TORONTO CONVENTION CENTRE. Additionally, ROYAL BANK OF CANADA and SCOTIABANK have been targeted by Left Wing extremists in Ontario and BC due to their participation in the 2010 Olympics sponsorship, perceived funding of the Alberta tar sands and current financial recession.”511 Indeed, the JIG-AT was already producing and disseminating SI regarding the likelihood of extensive property damage to financial entities well before the RBC firebombing incident. Arguably then, the JIG-AT would have produced similar assessments about radical left-wing dissent whether or not the RBC firebombing occurred. After the FFFC’s direct action, however, the incident was used in the weekly briefs and bulletins to further rationalize the JIG’s PIIT and AT’s ongoing activities targeting left-wing activism.

The JIG-AT’s weekly briefs and periodic bulletins also contained operational level SI on the likely strategies and tactics that will be employed by protesters during anti-G20 mass demonstrations. One JIG-AT bulletin discloses the following:

Protesters have been known to change or modify tactics based on the location of an event, and experience gained from past protests. The G8-G20 Summits ISU JIG investigators and analysts are responsible for collecting and analyzing information relating to upcoming protests and planned tactics. This information will be relayed, as necessary, to the front-line officers managing crowd control during the Summits.512

In other words, considering protesters are constantly adapting their tactics, the JIG tasked its PIIT and AT components to acquire and examine SI on the planning of specific resistance activities. In turn, the JIG intended to communicate this analyzed operational SI to the street-level tactical troops in order to control and pacify anti-G20 protesters.

511 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 631
512 K 3551 [ISU-JIG, Intelligence Bulletins], 843
Hence, many of the weekly briefs entailed SI regarding the announced strategies and tactics of protesters. For example, one weekly brief consisted of security intelligence on a May 20th 2010 anti-G20 activist press conference:

**ANTI-G8-G20 COALITION HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE**

- On 2010-05-20 the Toronto Community Mobilization Network (TCMN) held a press conference.
- Focus was to discuss "issues not tactics"
- Stated that thousands of protesters were expected from all over the world.
- Stated that Canadians should focus on the deeds of the invited dignitaries, not protestors.
- Stated that any tactics by protestors would pale in comparison to the impact of policies promoted by G20 leaders.\(^{513}\)

The JIG-AT analysts then provided the assessment that "[t]he press conference may have been held to gain public support and to help mobilize any negative public opinion resulting from the RBC bombing."\(^{514}\) Another weekly brief discloses the JIG-AT’s security concern regarding the announcement by anti-G20 activists that they would not adhere to a police negotiated and designated free speech zone:

**ACTIVISTS STATE THEY WILL NOT BE LIMITED TO DESIGNATED SPEECH AREAS**

- Activists stated that they will continue to demonstrate at various locations throughout the city.
- Stated designated speech area “undemocratic and authoritarian”.
- Protestors are planning events all over the city.\(^{515}\)

In light of this declaration made by anti-G20 activists, the JIG-AT analysts assessed that the “[p]otential exists for escalating activism throughout the downtown core.”\(^{516}\)

In addition to the JIG-AT’s focus on acquiring SI on protest strategies, the analysts were also concerned about protesters employing defensive tactics against pacification technologies and tactics. Several weekly briefs disclose the JIG-AT’s concern that the distribution of ear plugs by the Council of Canadians during anti-G20

---

\(^{513}\) J 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Weekly Intelligence Briefs*], 742

\(^{514}\) Ibid.

\(^{515}\) Ibid., 635

\(^{516}\) Ibid.
demonstrations would provide an effective countermeasure to the LRADs that were to be used by the ISU for crowd control:

THE COUNCIL OF CANADIANS TO DISTRIBUTE EAR PLUGS

- Police have purchased four long range acoustic devices (LRAD)
- Primarily to be used as a "communication tool" at G20 doubles as loud speaker.
- The Council of Canadians states that the LRAD are "abusive"
- The Council of Canadians will be distributing ear plugs until the end of the Summit.

ASSESSMENT

- The use of LRAD at G20 Pittsburgh assessed to be an effective crowd control tool and may have limited the amount of damage incurred
- Similar results are probable at the G20 in Toronto.
- Earplugs can make for an effective countermeasure to LRADs, as this non-lethal weapon can produce permanent ear damage.
- It is unknown what strength of ear plugs are being distributed, but one that will protect up to 32 decibels is what the LRAD corporation suggests in order to be effective.517

Indeed, this security concern over the distribution of ear plugs to protesters in order to prevent ear damage demonstrates the JIG-AT’s zealousness in analyzing all types of protester tactics and countermeasures that could be employed during anti-G20 mass demonstrations.

Operational SI during Live Time Operations

During the weekend of the Toronto G20 (June 25-27th, 2010), the JIG analytical team collected and analyzed current security intelligence from the PIIT’s surveillance units (IMU, EMU, COT), and prepared and distributed operational level SI to ISU-JIG Commanders and selected nodes within the JIG network. According to its documents, this time period was considered the “Live Time Operations” phase of the JIG’s implementation.518 During this phase the JIG-AT carried out “pro-active delivery of

517 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 605, 610
518 C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 22
intelligence to Tactical Commanders and the 2010 [G20/]G8 Summit-ISU Command." 519

As previously mentioned, beginning June 15th the JIG-AT replaced the Weekly Briefs with Daily Situational Reports/Bulletins that were published every morning up to June 27th, the final day of the Toronto G20. 520 These daily intelligence products contained up-to-date SI primarily on the various protest actions occurring near the G8 and G20 theaters of operations. Indeed, an NSTAS threat assessment on June 22nd explained this transition by stating that the JIG-AT “has commenced daily situation reports outlining protest activity from both the Huntsville area and downtown Toronto as well as issues surrounding the summit threat environment.” 521 It also warned that left-wing “protest and anarchist groups have begun to assemble in Huntsville and Toronto, Ontario with the intent to disrupt the G8 and G20 summits” by engaging in “direct action tactics” which “may result in violence and may also impact the movements of summit participants.” 522

The JIG-AT produced a similar threat assessment in their Daily Situation Reports just prior to the G20 weekend. For instance, one report disclosed that “[i]nformation available to the JIG states that the peaceful nature is expected to change upon the arrival of Anarchists from Ottawa and Quebec” and “the potential for public order issues will increase significantly as of the afternoon of 2010-06-25 until 2010-06-27.” 523 Indeed, during its ‘live time operations’ the JIG, through its investigative (PIIT) and analytical (AT) components, continued and even intensified its deployment of SI and CI techniques on anti-G20 dissent, especially on those perceived to be radical left/anarchist protesters. I demonstrate this in chronological order below.

519 C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation], 22-23
520 J 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Intelligence Briefs], 563
521 F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports], 275
522 Ibid., 288
523 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 39
On Friday June 25th, the Daily Situation Report contained information on the anticipated protest activities occurring in downtown Toronto. Compared to Saturday and Sunday reports, though, the Friday report had relatively minimal amount of operational SI. The only public order threat information that was not redacted was regarding a feminist picnic that was expected to occur around noon in Allan Gardens Park: “On 2010-06-25 the “G20 FEMINIST PICNIC AND POLITICS is scheduled for 12:30hrs.”524 The Saturday June 26th Report, however, provided the following summary of the Friday anti-G20 protest: “On 2010-06-25 at 1400 hrs, a demonstration started at ALLAN Gardens. The protesters took to the streets, marching west along nearby Carlton Street, across Younge Street and then south on University Avenue.”525 It then disclosed that “[s]ome of these protesters returned to ALLAN GARDENS for the planned TENT CITY event”…where a “few hundred people set up a couple dozen tents where they said they will camp for the weekend.”526 The JIG-AT analysts produced operational SI about how the tent city being erected in a public park may become a significant public order threat because more out-of-town radical left/ anarchist protesters were expected to arrive in the city for Saturday’s mass demonstration: “Tent city is on-going and has the potential to escalate into violence once participants from Montreal and other areas arrive with reinforcements. Events being organized by SOAR have the increased potential for violence and public order issues.”527 Thus, the JIG-AT produced the notion that the tent city action was susceptible to turning violent once radical left/ anarchist individuals and groups increased their presence in the ‘theater of operations’ of Toronto.

524 L 3551 [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 1374
525 Ibid., 1382
526 Ibid.
527 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 33
Sometime during the morning of Saturday June 26th, 2010, a *Daily Intelligence Bulletin* was published and distributed to ISU-JIG Commanders and selectively within the JIG network warning that major public order issues, emanating from protesters, were expected to ensue throughout the day. In particular, it stated that “actions by protest groups planned for during the summit meetings have the potential for public order issues to prevail.” The bulletin provided risk assessments on four protest actions that were expected to occur on Saturday. The JIG-AT analysts determined their assessments by using the risk levels projected by activist organizers of the protests. “The ascribed risk levels in this document are based on the anticipated risk by the coordinators of the various events, in conjunction with G8-G 20 ISU JIG analysis.” More specifically, the JIG-AT determined its risk levels by the amount of legal observers that were expected to be present at each protest action. In other words, they considered that “[t]he number of legal observers scheduled to attend is a good indicator of the amount of illegal activity that is expected to occur.” Meaning, they construed a positive correlation between the number of scheduled legal observers and the degree of anticipated criminality. For example, a high amount of legal observers indicated that there would be a strong likelihood for illegal forms of protest. This also shows another instance in which the JIG-AT relied on SI collected from the JIG-PIIT’s counterintelligence techniques targeting the anti-G20 activist legal defence group. As previously mentioned, Toronto police officer Sean Sutton was one of potentially several undercover agents who had infiltrated the legal support team and provided SI on protest activities including, perhaps, the amount of legal/police observers scheduled to attend the various protest actions.

---

528 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, *Daily Situational Reports*], 31  
529 Ibid.  
530 Ibid.
The first event that the bulletin listed for “2010-06-26” was the “People First. We Deserve Better” march occurring between “13:00hrs -16:00hrs”.\textsuperscript{531} It disclosed that the protest action was “organized by Oxfam, Greenpeace and the Canadian Labour Congress” and that it was considered “Family friendly.” The JIG-AT analysts assessed a “low-medium” risk level based on their knowledge that only “14 legal observers [were] scheduled”. They also considered the possibility that mainstream and radical factions may clash during the protest: “Potential for altercations with other protest and/or anarchist groups exist.”\textsuperscript{532}

Next, the bulletin provided information on the “Get off the Fence” radical action that would target the security fence after affinity groups splinter from the NGO and labour organized mass demonstration. It specified that the anarchist group SOAR had organized “a militant march that will break off from the People First march when it circles back to the ‘free speech zone’.” Subsequently, “[t]he Get off the Fence contingent will...head directly to confront the security apparatus.” The JIG-AT analysts assessed a “High” risk level because “30 legal observers [were] scheduled” to attend the protest action at the security fence. After simply stating “[c]riminal acts, public order concern”, the bulletin provided the following prediction:

Tactics: attempt to breach security zone. Members of the Black Bloc, not wearing traditional Black Bloc clothing, will infiltrate and engage in "ugly protest" and attack the fence. Expected confrontations, violence towards police, property damage, potential arsons, and use of projectiles, grappling hooks and bolt cutters.\textsuperscript{533}

\textsuperscript{531} ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 31
\textsuperscript{532} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{533} Ibid.
In other words, the JIG-AT analysts anticipated that militant protesters will somehow subvert the lawful protest and influence protesters to participate in violence against the police and also attempt to tear down the security fence.

The bulletin then listed the "Saturday Night Fever" event planned by "SOAR and radical ‘queer’ groups" that was expected to begin at "22:45" hours and lasting "all night" long. It described the radical action "as a conceptualized ‘Roaming Dance Party’, ‘Radical Street Party’ and ‘Take Back the Streets’". With "18 legal observers scheduled", the JIG-AT analysts assessed that this action entailed a "High" risk level. A few sentences are then noticeably redacted before estimating that "[approximately 1000 protesters are expected to attend]" and claiming that they will "likely...be under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol." The prediction, made by the JIG-AT analysts, that protesters will probably be intoxicated, amplified the notion that this late night protest action was a major public order issue that needed to be monitored and pacified.

Lastly, the Saturday morning bulletin provided operational SI on "Jail Rally/Court Support" that was anticipated to occur relating to the early morning police raids and arrests of key anti-G20 activists discussed previously. It stated the following:

Significant arrests have been made on the morning of 2010-06-26. This will have immediate ramifications and require a law enforcement response. A subsequent jail rally in support of the arrestees can be expected at the Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC), located at 629 Eastern Avenue. [Redaction] court solidarity protests will occur at 2201 Finch West when first appearances are made. Although they did not provide a risk level assessment, the security analysts claimed that the possible tactics during jail/court solidarity protests may include the “use of fireworks

---

534 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 32
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
and spray paint." In sum, the intelligence bulletin that was published and distributed sometime in the morning of June 26th discloses that the JIG was aware that protesters would begin assembling in Queens Park around one in the afternoon, before participating in a family friendly march organized by mainstream organizations. When the mass protest circled back to Queens Park, they expected that a significant amount of protesters would break away from the permitted path and engage in a militant march towards the security zone in an attempt to attack and tear down the fence. During the evening, the JIG-AT analysts also anticipated and warned the ISU-JIG about an anti-G20 street party planned by anarchist and radical "queer" groups. Finally, stemming from the ISU's targeted and pre-emptive arrests of key activists, they expected that throughout the weekend there would likely be jail rallies at the Eastern Detention Center and solidarity protests at the Jane and Finch courthouse.

During the Saturday afternoon, the JIG-AT prepared and distributed a *Daily Situational Report* that consisted of operational SI on the ongoing protest activities occurring in Toronto. The report provided an update on the "Summit Threat Environment" and contained "[information current as of: 2010-06-26, 14:00 hrs]." While a significant portion of the report is redacted, it did contain SI on the anti-G20 and migrant justice group *No One is Illegal*. The following excerpt reveals that the activists were definitely under surveillance by the JIG, perhaps through a police infiltrator or informant:

NO ONE IS ILLEGAL (NOII) converged at College St. and University Avenue in Toronto at 12:30 HRS for their protest march. Their membership was instructed to bring bandannas soaked in

---

537 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, *Daily Situational Reports*], 32
538 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, *Daily Situational Reports*], 35
lemon juice, earplugs and other protest equipment. It is likely that this protest will be confrontational and continue into the late afternoon. JIG continues to monitor.  

It is also demonstrates that the JIG-AT analysts perceived the protesters’ defensive materials as an indicator that the protest action will be hostile. The report also contains current operational SI on the “large-scale protest [that] commenced at Queen’s Park.” The JIG identified the various groups that had assembled in the park including Greenpeace, Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL), Oxfam, Sikh Activist Network, United Front of Sikhs, the Canadian Labour Congress, Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), Vietnam Reform Party, and “the Ogaden and Oromo community groups”.  

A later report disclosed that the JIG not only identified but attempted to monitor the more radical anti-G20 groups who were also present in Queen’s Park such as No One Is Illegal (NOII), Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR), Toronto Mobilization Network (TCMN), Anti-War @ Laurier (AW@L), la Convergence des Luttes Anti-Capitaliste (CLAC), Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), “Palestinian protesters”, Rainforest Action Network Toronto (RANT), Collectif du Chat Noir (CCN), G420 (marijuana activist group) “and many other groups.” Just after one o’clock, the Saturday afternoon report estimated that “6000 protesters” were rallying in the park. After providing this information, it again disclosed that the “JIG continues to monitor.” Hence, the JIG likely deployed several event monitoring units (EMUs) within the park in order to provide the JIG-AT with current operational SI. Moreover, the report gave an update on the “Get off the Fence” event that was scheduled to occur sometime during the “People First” march. In particular, it stated that “[p]articipants met at Queen’s Park with

---

539 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 37
540 Ibid., 36, 51
541 Ibid., 242
542 Ibid., 36

173
Again, we see that the JIG-AT analysts distinguished and constructed a dichotomy between perceived radical protesters and "legitimate" protesters. Considering "[o]pen source information encourages people ‘to confront the security apparatus that will have occupied our city’", the report reiterated the prediction that the "Get off the Fence" protest "has great potential to be violent". Again, it stipulated that the "JIG continues to monitor." 

Interestingly, the ISU-JIG document ATIP 6445C, not only consists of several Daily Situational Reports, it also provides the "G8-G20 INTEL (Situational Board)." It entails a chronology of live time operational SI that occurred between two in the afternoon to ten in the evening on Saturday June 26th. I constructed a table found in Appendix J that provides a comprehensive (but not an exhaustive) sample of the situation board. The live time reporting of SI reveals how the JIG carried out operational SI and CI during the anti-G20 mass protest. Examining the board we can see that there were at least six PIIT-EMUs and several PIIT-COTs (teams “A”, “IAT”, and “Y”), that were conducting counterintelligence at various locations during the protest. The primary surveillance target was clearly the black block and radical protesters. The JIG’s surveillance teams continuously reported on their activities and movements (e.g. "portion of Black Bloc at University & College are in the process of changing clothes"). In-depth observations like "Black Bloc is discussing lighting a police car on fire" and "[p]lan is to reintegrate with crowd and to later engage with further Black Bloc Tactics", suggests that there were likely undercover police officers embedded within the black bloc, perhaps

543 ATIP 6445C [JIG - Daily Situational Reports], 36
544 ATIP 6445C [JIG - Daily Situational Reports], 36
545 ATIP 6445C [JIG - Daily Situational Reports], 118-124
dressed as black bloc protesters. The EMUs also attempted to identify specific protesters (e.g. "One male in the crowd identified as a member of OCAP") and video record the identities of block bloc members (e.g. "1707hrs EMU1 in Queens park attempting video of people changing clothes"). Moreover, it is evident that the EMUs had accessed protesters' online social media (i.e. twitter) feeds, and were following and reporting on the various comments being posted: "EMU4 reports black bloc broken up and are now twittering to try and reform." Indeed, the Situational Board depicts the current, up-to-the minute surveillance and correspondence of the JIG during the Saturday mass protest.

The Sunday June 27th Daily Situational Report, provided a summary of the previous day's "Get off the Fence" protest. It primarily focused on the extensive property damage caused by anarchists. For instance, it stated the following:

Anarchists using BLACK BLOC tactics were present wearing black clothing, red bandanas, and some wearing gas masks. At 13:29hrs the crowd reached between 5000 to 10000 protestors. At 13:51hrs, BLACK BLOC members moved toward the security fence. During the march, police cars were damaged and set on fire, media vehicles were damaged, mailboxes were damaged and windows were smashed at banks and other businesses. The hospitals in the downtown core were locked down and no one was allowed in or out.

The report also discussed that around four in the afternoon the black bloc protesters discarded and substituted their black clothes for either common clothing or pink t-shirts:

"At 16:03 hrs, BLACK BLOC members removed their black clothing and blended into the crowd. Some...changed into pink t-shirts in support of the PINK BLOC." While acknowledging that "[n]umerous arrests were made", it disclosed that "[c]ells of protesters continued to clash with police as they moved to various locations." Lastly, the report estimated that around midnight "100 to 200 protestors marched toward the

546 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 118-124
547 Ibid., 57
PRISONER PROCESSING CENTRE (PPC) at 629 Easter Avenue, Toronto to merge with the group that was already gathered for the "Jail Solidarity Dance Party". 548

Another intelligence product that the JIG-AT produced and distributed on Sunday June 27th was the “G8-G20 Steering Committee Brief”. The brief also recapped the previous day’s events. In particular, it disclosed that the protests “started at QUEEN’s PARK” and “[a]narchists using Black Bloc tactics broke off from the route as expected.” 549 The brief also discussed the various strategies, tactics, and equipment employed by the black bloc during the protest. It stated the following:

Various tactics were used during the march by anarchists using BLACK BLOC tactics. Members used red and black flags on sticks to signal activity locations, used the sticks from signs, and doused themselves in baby oil to be slippery when touched. Some of the members wore goggles and used golf balls, heavy objects and hammers to cause property damage. 550

Lastly, it summarized some of property damaged that occurred during the protest: “At least 4 police cars were vandalized/damaged. At least six police cars set on fire...Unknown number of windows smashed at businesses and banks...Media vehicles and other cars were vandalized/damaged....Overturned mailboxes.” 551 In sum, the JIG-AT’s reports and briefs consisted of information primarily on the identities, strategies, tactics, equipment, and movements of radical left/anarchist protesters during the JIG’s “live time operations” phase.

548 ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports], 57
549 Ibid., 242
550 Ibid., 57
551 Ibid., 247
The final operational component of the JIG was its Intelligence Information Management Team (IIMT). Compared to the other JIG teams, however, the ISU-JIG documents do not disclose much information regarding the JIG-IIMT operations during the G20 pacification project. I could only find two documents (i.e., RCMP’s *After Action Report* and C 509 [ISU-JIG, *Structure and Implementation]*) that discussed anything substantial about this component of the JIG. Nevertheless, based on the (very banal) information provided, the IIMT’s primary functions were to sustain the JIG’s electronic database while also directing, organizing, and circulating the flow of communication, intelligence and information between the ISU-JIG’s operational components and Tactical Commanders. According to the RCMP, “the mandate of the IIMT was to manage and coordinate the information obtained by the JIG and ensure the dissemination of all JIG intelligence in a timely fashion.”

More specifically, the JIG-IIMT was comprised of three distinct subcomponents: Intake and Classification, Intelex and Evidence and Reporting Team. The “Intake and Classification Team” reviewed “incoming information for appropriate action with recommendation to the Intelligence Information Manager” and also determined the “level of protection and classification” that was “applied to information.” It also identified relevant information and brought it to the attention of ISU-JIG investigators and security analysts for review and action by completing “Intake Information Forms (IIFs)” and assigning them for review by the JIG Primary investigator and analytical team manager. The “Intelex Team” uploaded and exported data from the JIG’s restricted intelligence...

---

552 RCMP, *After Action Report*, 199
553 C 509 [ISU-JIG, *Structure and Implementation*], 19
database. It also “coordinated all requests for non-restricted intelligence database and other publicly available database searches on behalf of the PIIT and AT.”\textsuperscript{554} Lastly, throughout the G20 pacification project the IIMT’s “Evidence and Reporting Team” managed the technical functioning of the dataset which included “scanning all hardcopy documents, linking of information...to each task, analyzing the information and retrieving information.”\textsuperscript{555} It was also accountable for the quality assurance and auditing of the dataset information to guarantee compliance and consistency with format and arrangements. Indeed, the IIMT’s subcomponents performed various technocratic tasks of sustaining the JIG’s databases, and dealing with coordinating, extracting, and exporting information to various personnel and operational components within the ISU-JIG during the pacification project.

\textsuperscript{554} RCMP, \textit{After Action Report}, 200
\textsuperscript{555} RCMP, \textit{After Action Report}, 200
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Through the lens of pacification, this thesis has demonstrated that the G20 Integrated Security Unit’s Joint Intelligence Group mobilized strategic power networks composed of public, private and quasi-public agencies, and deployed techniques and discourses in an attempt to proactively suppress dissident populations considered adversarial to the imperial objectives of neoliberal capitalist globalization. By identifying congruent terms found in the G20 intelligence documents compared to that of the Canadian Forces’ Joint Intelligence Doctrine, I provided concrete evidence that the JIG fulfilled the surveillance function of the G20 pacification project by implementing a joint forces security (counter)intelligence operation that primarily targeted radical left/anarchist activism. Moreover, this thesis has argued that the G20 JIG strategically invoked national security legislation and employed discourses of violence and criminality in order to enable and rationalize its security intelligence and counterintelligence on various anti-G20 organizing groups and activists.

To summarize, my anti-security analysis revealed that as an essential component of the Integrated Security Unit, the JIG was established approximately a year and half before the G20 event and was tasked with the mandate to “collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate accurate information and intelligence in a timely manner” in order “to facilitate the decision-making process in both the planning and executing phases of securing G8 and G20 Summits.”\footnote{RCMP, After Action Report, 32} To carry out the largest intelligence collaboration in Canadian history, the G20 JIG carried out a ‘joint forces operation’. Through its Domestic, International, and Corporate Liaison Management Teams, the JIG strategically
mobilized an extensive ‘summit intelligence network’ composed of 26 police departments, several military and state intelligence units, and over a hundred corporate and government agencies. In particular, it assisted in enabling the collaboration between the four main ISU police forces of the RCMP, OPP, Toronto Police Service and Peel Regional Police Service, and also facilitated critical liaison roles for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian Forces. Additionally, the JIG-LMT established hundreds of other points of contact with other law enforcement agencies, federal, provincial and municipal government departments and corporations. Indeed, through its LMTs, the JIG created and maintained an extensive summit intelligence network and thus enabled the ISU to carry out a massive joint forces operation.

The thesis also examined the JIG’s command structure and argued that it functioned as a dynamic, pyramid-shaped network. By employing principles derived from the Major Case Management Model (MCMM), the JIG was led by Commander Rod D. McCann, and was supported by four Deputy Commanders. While the JIG Commander had the ultimate authority over the entire operation, the deputy commanders each managed four operational teams (LMT, PIIT, AT, and IIMT). Hence, the JIG command structure was composed of hierarchical relations within its operational components while also entailing horizontal relations between the four Deputy Commanders and between the operational components that performed specific but interconnected intelligence functions throughout the JIG’s joint forces operation.
Before and during the G20, the JIG’s operational units deployed an array of ‘security intelligence’ (SI) and ‘counterintelligence’ (CI) surveillance techniques on populations considered hostile towards security objectives. The terms SI and CI are found in the CF Doctrine and were defined and used in my anti-security analysis in order to better understand the various surveillance practices, activities, and units deployed by the JIG. Considering the JIG’s main task during the G20 pacification project was to carry out “intelligence investigations on possible threats and suspicious activity associated to the 2010 G8-G20 Summits”;\(^{557}\) it was argued that this is type of intelligence is what the CF Doctrine refers to as security intelligence. The objective of SI is to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence on populations and individuals that are perceived as potential security threats. SI consists of three interconnected levels of intelligence; strategic, tactical, and operational. The ATIA documents revealed that the JIG, aided the ISU, by providing it with “strategic, operational and tactical intelligence” throughout the G20 pacification project.\(^{558}\) According to the CF Doctrine, ‘Strategic Intelligence’ refers to intelligence that is required for the creation of policy and plans for the security operation. The ‘tactical’ level of SI tracks the possible tactics of perceived adversaries and, correspondingly, determines the necessary tactical actions for accomplishing security objectives. Lastly, operational intelligence is the level that provides current, up-to-date SI needed for the ongoing implementation of security measures within a “theater of operations” (territory under pacification). Thus, I have argued that by collecting, producing, and circulating these three levels of SI relating to perceived threats towards the G20/G8 global governance events, the JIG provided the ISU with a single source of

---

\(^{557}\) H 3551 [ISU-JIG, Strategic Intelligence Report #3], 344
\(^{558}\) CSIS-02 [CSIS, Executive Directive-Final], 5-6
intelligence in an attempt to achieve complete situational awareness during the G20 pacification project.

My anti-security analysis also illustrated that the JIG’s intelligence operation entailed counterintelligence (CI) entities and activities. The CF Doctrine disclosed that an SI operation is typically carried out in coordination with counterintelligence practices. CI also involves collecting security intelligence but is distinguished from SI in that its tactics attempt to “counteract the threat to security posed by ... individual(s) engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and/or organized crime.” In other words, CI encompasses a much more proactive and antagonistic approach than SI because its objective is to produce uncertainty in the mind of targeted adversaries in order to impede and disrupt their decision making capability by misrepresenting, misdirecting and/or denying them information necessary to conduct effective operations. Thus, CI operatives and units produce security intelligence by gathering covert information on targeted adversaries while also disrupting the capabilities and activities of their targets. Considering, that SI and CI were interchangeably employed before and during the G20 pacification project I used the somewhat awkward label of security (counter) intelligence to describe the JIG’s investigative and analytical intelligence practices.

With SI and CI defined, the thesis then examined the JIG’s investigative operational component; the Primary Intelligence Investigation Team (PIIT). The main function of the PIIT was the implementation of SI and CI on populations and individuals that the ISU-JIG perceived as threats towards the G8/G20 Summits. According to its Investigative Baseline, The PIIT organized the threats posed to the 2010 G8 and G20

---

559 Canadian Forces, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, 1-5
Summits into four separate threat categories: Terrorism Threats, Independent Asymmetric Threats (IAT), Internecine Strife/Conflict, and most significantly Public Order Threats. While a potential terrorist act was considered the most “egregious” threat to the Summits, this analysis demonstrated that the PIIT predominantly targeted anti-G20 radical left/ anarchist networks and activists under the public order threat category. Indeed, the JIG-PIIT analysts themselves claimed that the primary public order threat facing the G8/G20 stemmed from groups and individuals possessing radical left and anti-capitalist philosophies. They argued that subjects attracted to radical left philosophies were likely to engage in criminal activities during the G20/G8 in order to bring about their desired political change. They also constructed a dichotomy between what they considered criminal activists from legitimate protesters. This discourse was especially used to construct anarchists within the newest social movements as illegitimate dissidents by producing the notion that all anarchists possess the disposition to undertake criminal/unlawful activities. I argued that the JIG-PITT analysts rationalized the targeting of radical left/anarchist activists by construing their political ideas and activities as criminal and violent. My analyst also demonstrated that the PIITs “Investigated Threshold” was extremely far-reaching considering the PIIT was to “acquire all available intelligence related to known or anticipated threats.” Security and threat-related information was produced through not only SI (e.g. analyzing open source information and reviewing police occurrence reports) but also CI through the implementation of covert techniques such as the recruitment of confidential informants and undercover operations. By employing SI and CI tactics prior to the G20, it was the PIIT’s intention to

560 DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team], 11
produce a list of three threat-categories of individuals; suspects, persons of interest (POI), and associates. The criteria considered for listing people into these three categories were primarily based on the target’s perceived *politico-ideological motivation* and *organizational affiliation*. The PIIT concentrated on identifying and categorizing particular individuals and groups known to possess certain political ideas (i.e. anarchism, anti-capitalism) which the PIIT presumed would likely lead to unlawful dissent/protest during the G20/G8.

My analysis also examined the PIIT’s operational structure. To carry out the implementation of SI and CI activities before and during the summits, the PIIT operation was supervised by two “Deputy Commanders”, while a “Primary Investigator” directed the “Deployment Teams” that included 13 investigative “probe teams” and a “Covert Operations Team” (COT). It was shown that the investigative probe teams were further organized into operational SI and CI units including a “Surveillance Team”, “Internet Monitoring Unit”, and an “Event Monitoring Team”. Just prior and during the G20, the JIG-PIIT deployed several surveillance teams at various locations throughout Ontario for the purposes of producing intelligence on the location, movement, and mobilization of anti-G20 protesters. For instance, weeks before the June 2010 Summits these surveillance teams provided the JIG with estimates on the quantity of buses and passengers traveling to Toronto and also the approximate amount of protesters that would be participating in anti-G20 protests. Moreover, the Internet Monitoring Unit produced SI for the JIG by monitoring anti-G20-related information from online open sources including activist and mainstream news websites. I have shown that the IMU carried out electronic surveillance before, during and after the G20, thus providing the JIG with current SI on the various
dissident groups communicating about anti-G20 protests and direct actions. The JIG-PIIT also deployed an Event Monitoring Unit composed of undercover officer teams within the anti-G20 demonstrations for the purposes of acquiring real time security intelligence and collecting criminal evidence on protesters. EMU agents were dressed in plain clothes and worked in teams of at least four. They were strategically positioned in various locations during the demonstrations and their main function was to “gather intelligence or evidence in a strictly ‘observations’ or ‘overhear’ capacity.” I used my own G20 experience not only to demonstrate that SI from EMU teams were used in prosecuting protesters but also that their observations were susceptible to gross inaccuracies. It also revealed that the EMU teams employed the CI activity of infiltrating protester support working groups (e.g. legal observers, street medics, alternative media center, and TCMN) in order to gather sensitive information on protester decision-making while also conducting close covert surveillance on particular groups and activists during anti-G20 protests.

This thesis also illustrated that through its “Covert Operation Team” (COT), the JIG-PITT carried out long-term and intensive CI activity months prior to the G20 on radical and mainstream groups organizing anti-G20 dissent. The PIIT’s COT was mandated to undertake covert surveillance on activist groups for the purposes of exposing criminal intentions and activities associated with anti-G20 organizing. The multi-agency COT was composed of several different CI units including Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Units (CFNCIUs), Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) and RCMP National Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs). Consequently, these CI units provided the JIG with SI on anti-G20 activism which in turn was used by
JIG’s analytical team to produce and distribute intelligence briefs and threat assessments on dissident groups and individuals.

While the PIIT-COT targeted mainstream groups like Greenpeace, it was primarily radical left/anarchist groups that were subjected to intense multi-year infiltration campaigns prior to the G20. Undercover operatives like OPP officers Bindo Showan and Brenda Carey infiltrated radical anti-G20 groups. They gained the trust of targeted activists through various means including displaying an impressive knowledge of radical politics, purchasing beverages for others, hosting parties at their homes, transporting activists to direct actions and partaking in them, and even getting arrested. The COT undercover operatives collected evidence of “criminal activism” on SOAR and AW@L members for the JIG-PIIT which in turn enabled authorities to pre-emptively arrest and charge 21 individuals for “Counselling to Commit Mischief”. I demonstrated that the PIIT’s SI and CI activities enabled the G20 JIG to produce threat-related security intelligence and information relating to G20 security while simultaneously disrupting anti-G20 activism.

In order to enable and rationalize the JIG-PITT’s counterintelligence tactics, I have argued that Canadian legislation (i.e. the Security Offences Act, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and sections 2 and 83.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code) was tactically invoked in the JIG documents. For instance, the federal CSIS Act provided the legal discourse that enabled JIG to conduct their CI activities on left-wing activism under the presumption that they were investigating “threats to the security of Canada” defined in section 2 of the Act. However, in order to do so, the JIG also had to employ a discourse of criminality. By labelling radical left-wing protesters as “criminal
extremists” and “criminal activists”, the JIG-PIIT produced the notion that its tactics were justified under section 2 of the CSIS Act. Thus, I contend that judicial and criminal discourses were employed in the ISU-JIG documents that, in effect, facilitated and rationalized the pre-emptive and aggressive surveillance techniques targeting anti-G20 activist groups and individuals.

My anti-security analysis then focused on the JIG’s “Analytical Team” by examining the cache of intelligence products that it produced and distributed to the ISU-JIG commanders and selectively throughout the summit intelligence network leading up to and during the G20/G8 Summits. The primary function of the JIG-AT was to analyze the SI and CI collected by the PIIT, and in turn it created and disseminated strategic, operational, and tactical level security intelligence reports and threat assessments for the ISU and JIG throughout the G20 pacification project. Indeed, the AT and PIIT components of the JIG collaborated on identifying, prioritizing, and informing the ISU-JIG regarding potential threats, security issues, and criminalized identities relating to the G20/G8 Summits. By analyzing SI and CI from PIIT investigations, the AT produced and disseminated strategic and tactical intelligence reports, weekly and daily operational intelligence briefs/bulletins/reports while also circulating intelligence updates and threat assessments produced by the RCMP’s NSTAS and CSIS’ ITAC.

The strategic SI reports, which were distributed during the initial phases of the JIG’s implementation, employed an “All-Threat methodology” in order to accurately outline and distinguish between the four main threat categories of public order, terrorism, internecine strife/conflict, and IATs. By analyzing all types of threats and sorting them into distinct categories, these reports were meant to precisely define the threat picture and
provide situational awareness for the ISU-JIG command staff. Consequently, the JIG-AT analysts identified that the most probable threat towards the G20/G8 security was the public order threat of mass demonstrations emanating from radical left-wing activism. The Reports also discussed the political significance of the 2010 year for the Canadian radical left and warned about the importance of police remaining vigilant toward criminal forms of activism. Similarly, CSIS-ITAC Laser reports provided in-depth descriptions regarding how radical left groups cooperate during mass anti-globalization protests, organize through anarchical network-based structures, and rely on the internet and information sessions to mobilize dissent and spread awareness to the broader public.

This thesis also examined several of the JIG-AT’s tactical SI reports distributed during the third phase (January 2010 to April 2010) of the JIG’s operation. These products outlined the various tactics carried out by protesters and the different tactical responses used by security forces during previous anti-globalization protests. In particular, this tactical SI provided the ISU-JIG with security intelligence on how to effectively prepare, organize and implement its pacification project by taking into account the potential strategies and tactics of protesters. I suggested that these reports may have influenced the Toronto G20 ISU’s various preparatory decisions including: the purchase of several sound canons (LRADs); the demand for huge government expenditures on summit security; to organize a multi-agency and commander-led police network; to determine mission objectives; and to conduct pre-emptive police raids on radical activists' homes.

Leading up to and during the G20 Summit the JIG-AT produced and distributed operational intelligence products consisting of weekly intelligence briefs, periodic
bulletins, NSTAS and ITAC Laser updates, and (eventually) daily situational reports containing SI and threat assessments on the four threat categories. Although the JIG-PIIT was actively investigating the threat category, the JIG-AT weekly briefs repeatedly disclosed that there was no perceivable terrorist threat toward the global governance event or to its attendees. However, the JIG-AT did not rule out the possibility of a terrorist attack because I argued that NSTAS updates consistently assessed that the G20 and G8 events and the global elites attending them could be seen by terrorists as attractive targets. The internecine/strife threat and independent asymmetric threat (IAT) categories had little amount of operational SI in the weekly briefs, periodic bulletins, and daily reports. In contrast, the JIG-AT analysts produced and distributed substantial operational SI on the public order threat category and, accordingly, initially gave it a medium level threat and risk assessment prior to the G20 weekend but then elevated the assessments to high during the G20 proceedings. It was demonstrated that the JIG-AT analysts' foremost security concerns stemmed from Ontario left-wing anti-G20 groups who were currently organizing and planning for both large-scale demonstrations during the summits and numerous smaller protests prior to the June events targeting government buildings, politician offices and corporate storefronts throughout the country. The JIG-AT was also concerned about the left-wing anti-G20 activism that was currently mobilizing not only outside the province but also in the United States and United Kingdom.

The weekly briefs and periodic bulletins provided operational level SI on various pre-G20 demonstrations and direct actions occurring across the country. The incident action that garnered the most SI in the weekly briefs, bulletins, and NSTAS threat
assessments was the so-called anarchist firebombing of an RBC bank in Ottawa during the early morning hours of May 18, 2010. I argued that the JIG-AT would have likely produced similar assessments about radical left-wing dissent regardless of the RBC firebombing since months before the JIG-AT had already determined that protesters would target the RBC and other banks near the MTCC for its financing of the Tar Sands and their culpability in the economic recession.

During its ‘live time operations’, the JIG, through its PIIT and AT components, continued and even intensified its deployment of SI and CI tactics on anti-G20 dissent, especially on radical left/anarchist protesters. Intelligence bulletins provided operational SI on the G20 weekend protest actions. The JIG-AT analysts determined their risk assessments for each by using the risk levels projected by activist organizers of the protests. More specifically, they came up with risk levels based on the amount of legal observers that were expected to be present at each protest action. Hence, they construed a positive correlation between the number of scheduled legal observers and the degree of anticipated criminality. Moreover, during the mass rally in Queens Park on Saturday June 26th the JIG identified the various mainstream and radical groups that had assembled in the park. In light of this, I have suggested that the JIG likely deployed several Event Monitoring Unit teams within the park in order to provide the JIG-AT with current operational SI. By examining the Situational Board which discloses the current, up-to-the minute surveillance and correspondence of the JIG during the Saturday mass protest, it is clear that the primary surveillance target was the black block and other radical protesters considering the JIG-PIIT teams continuously reported on their activities and movements. The EMU teams also attempted to identify specific protesters and had accessed and were
reporting on the protesters’ online social media feeds. Indeed, similar to the JIG-AT’s strategic and tactical reports, it was demonstrated that the operational SI products primarily consisted of information on the identities, strategies, tactics, equipment, and movements of radical left/anarchist protesters during the JIG’s “live time operations” phase.

Lastly, my anti-security analysis attempted to examine the JIG’s Intelligence Information Management Team. However, the ISU-JIG documents provided minimal information about this operational component. Nonetheless, I determined that the IIMT’s major functions were to sustain an electronic database while also directing, organizing, and circulating the circulation of communication, intelligence and information between the ISU-JIG’s operational teams and Tactical Commanders. The JIG-IIMT was comprised of three distinct subcomponents that included Intake and Classification, Intelex, and Evidence and Reporting Teams. The Intake and Classification Team reviewed incoming information for appropriate action with endorsement to the IIMT Manager and also assessed the level of protection and classification that was applied to different sets of information. It also identified relevant data and brought it to the attention of ISU-JIG investigators and security analysts for review. The Intelex Team uploaded and transferred information from the JIG’s restricted security intelligence database. Lastly, the Evidence and Reporting Team managed the technical functioning of the dataset and was accountable for the dataset in order to guarantee uniformity with format and provisions. Thus, during the pacification project the IIMT’s subcomponents carried out various technocratic actions to sustain the JIG’s incoming and outgoing information,
and managing data distribution to personnel and operational components within the ISU-JIG.

In order to carry out my analysis of the G20 JIG network and operation, I employed an anarchist, anti-security approach which examined the G20 security operation as a particular “pacification project”. In my method chapter I reflected on my affinity with anarchist politics and how I share with other anarchists in the newest social movements the rebellious mentality and agency that opposes and problematizes hierarchical, authoritarian, and imperialist social relations and conditions. In turn, I explained that anarchism is also developing into a critical analytical discourse that is both anti-statist and anti-capitalist, and is strategically oppositional against the technocratic, authoritative, and managerial discourses being disseminated by contemporary conservative and liberal criminologists. Considering, anarchist criminology employs a fluid, eclectic, and inclusive theoretical framework, I explained that my particular anarchist analytic largely seeks a ‘tactical alliance’ with Marxist and Foucauldian inspired concepts and terms. Correspondingly, I suggested that anarchist researchers/activists could benefit from an anti-security stance that attempts to expose, problematize, and disrupt the hegemonic tendencies of the concept of security.

Similar to the hegemonic concept of security, I criticized de Lint and Hall’s concept of intelligent control that is currently influencing the protest policing/surveillance literature. I contended that their analytical framework is problematic for critical researchers in solidarity and affinity with the radical activism of the ‘newest social movements’. In particular, I argued that ‘intelligent control’ re-affirms a hegemonic liberal discourse about the policing of mass protests against elite global governance
events which, in turn, neutralizes and de-politicises the paramilitary policing and aggressive surveillance of contemporary radical dissent.

In contrast, Neocleous and Rigakos' re-appropriation of the term 'pacification' seeks to problematize the objectives of security projects, build analytic connections instead of masking them, disrupt the ubiquity and reach of security, and pre-supposes war and resistance. Hence, I made the theoretical claim that the police and intelligence operations during the Toronto G20 Summit can be critically analyzed as a particular project of pacification. By borrowing insights from Neocleous and Rigakos but also from Foucault's analytic of power, I conceptualized a 'pacification project' as a type of police mechanism that tends to mobilize strategic power networks and deploys particular techniques, technologies and discourses in an attempt to proactively suppress populations considered hostile, adversarial or risky to the imperial objectives of power within a specified territory. In doing, the pacification concept helped me focus and understand the type of structure and practices of the G20 JIG. Considering a key theoretical tenet of a pacification project is that it is organized in police networks consisting of an elaborate constellation of public, private, and quasi-public agencies, this enabled me to identify and examine the various state and non-state agencies that were mobilized by the G20 JIG. The radical concept also assisted my analysis of the JIG by recognizing that these kinds of policing projects tend to deploy a strategic array of techniques and discourses that are similar with respect to the continuity of pacification of either domestic or international populations. In other words, international and domestic pacification projects operationally and theoretically overlap in the minds of security thinkers. Based on this notion, I sought out, found, and examined a military security
intelligence manual. Consequently, I determined that the Canadian Forces’ *Joint Intelligence Doctrine* likely framed the procedures of the G20 JIG because it was replete with text and terminology similar to that found in the ISU-JIG documents. Indeed, by identifying congruent terms found in the ISU-JIG documents compared to the *CF Doctrine*, I was able to offer concrete evidence that the JIG fulfilled the surveillance function of the G20 pacification project by carrying out a ‘joint forces operation’ involving an extensive ‘summit intelligence network’ that deployed an array of ‘security intelligence’ (SI) and ‘counterintelligence’ (CI) techniques primarily targeting the perceived adversarial population of radical left/anarchist activists. Therefore, I argue that a major theoretical implication of my thesis is that researchers and activists can benefit from the anti-security approach that critically analyzes protest policing/surveillance operations as particular pacification projects. Indeed, in the future I intend to continue my anarchist anti-security analysis of the ISU-JIG documents by focusing on the ISU’s paramilitary police operation that was mobilized and deployed during the G20 pacification project.
Bibliography


“G20 Conspiracy Case: The Inside Story”, Anarchist News, November 24, 2011,


Monaghan, Jeff and Kevin Walby, “‘They attacked the city’: Security intelligence, the sociology of protest policing and the anarchist threat at the 2010 Toronto G20 summit”. Current Sociology (2012): 1-19. http://csi.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/06/21/0011392112448470


ISU-JIG Documents:

The following ATIA documents can be downloaded by following the instructions contained in the following link: http://toronto.mediacoop.ca/story/download-g20-papers/9197

A 509 [ISU-JIG, Observer Program – JIG Presentation]
A 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 9 2010]
ATIP 4067A [RCMP, Briefing Note to the Minister of Public Safety]
ATIP 4799B [ISU-JIG, Derived Legal Authorities]
ATIP 6445A [ISU-JIG, Post-G20 Monitoring of Activist Websites]
ATIP 6445C [ISU-JIG, Daily Situational Reports]
B 509 [ISU-JIG, Subcharts]
b2278 [ISU-JIG, Internet Monitoring Unit - Objectives]
C 509 [ISU-JIG, Structure and Implementation]
C 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief on June 18 2010]
CSIS-02 [CSIS, Executive Directive-Final]
CSIS-12 [CSIS-ITAC, G8-G20 Summits Threat Overview April 27 2010]
CSIS-15 [CSIS-ITAC, Issue-based extremist overview]
D 509 [ISU-JIG, Liaison Management Team – Domestic – Point of Contact List]
D 3551 [ISU-JIG, Weekly Brief June 21 2010]
DND A-2010-00328 [Canadian Forces, G8-G20 Leader’s Summit Counter Intelligence Summary March 2010]
DOC001120 [ISU-JIG, An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Team]
DOC0029907 [ISU-JIG, Operational Plan]
E 509 [ISU-JIG, LMT Corporate Points of Contact List]
F 3551 [RCMP-NSTAS, Threat Assessment Reports]
G 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Tactical Report on Canadians and/or organizations at Pittsburgh G20 Summit*]

G 6014 [RCMP, *Tactical Troop Manuals For Anti-Globalization Demonstrations*]

H 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Strategic Intelligence Report #3*]

I 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Strategic Intelligence Reports #1 and #2*]

J 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Weekly Intelligence Briefs*]

K 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Intelligence Bulletins*]

L 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Daily Situational Reports*]

M 3551 [ISU-JIG, *Strategic Tactical and Operational Intelligence Reports*]


Waterloo Regional Police Service. *G20 Face-To-Face - Front Line Officer Training*. 

205
Appendix A - Command Structure Subchart

INTELLIGENCE GROUP COMMANDER

Adjud NCO

Adjud Assistant

JIG Deputy Commander
Support

JIG Deputy Commander
Operations OPP

Joint Management Team

JIG Deputy Commander
Operations TPS

JIG Deputy Commander
Strategic

PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE TEAM (PIT)
Manager

Lawmail Administrator Team Manager

Analytical Team Manager

Administrative Assistant

Support NCO OPP

Primary Intelligence Investigative Team (PIT)
Appendix B – Liaison Management Team Subchart
Appendix C – Primary Intelligence Investigation Team SubChart
Appendix F - Summit Intelligence Network

INTERNAL

- GTA Police
  Investigators (OPP, RCMP, TPS, PRP, DRPS, YRPS)
- CBSA
  Monitoring all Canadian entry points nationally and internationally
- ITAC
  The other Four Eyes' threat centres (JTAC, NTAC, NCTC and CTAC)
- CSIS
  National units and international intelligence service relationships
- NSCOB
  Counter terrorism units across Canada
- RCMP
  International law enforcement relationships including Europol
- Interpol
  The other Four Eyes alliance
- CSEC
  J2, NCIU, SOFCOM
- DICC
  Law enforcement DBs (CSIS, TPS, RCMP, OPP, PRP, YRPS, DRPS,
  Guelph RPS, Kitchener Waterloo RPS, London PS, CN Police, TC, CISO)
  Hamilton RPS, Ottawa RPS, Kingston PS,
- IICC
  Australia, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico,
  Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK, US (FBI)

EXTERNAL

- LMT
  Other Government Departments and Private Sector Group
  145 different agencies, mostly critical infrastructure
  (Daily Meeting in Toronto)

- YOU!!!
## Appendix G - Environmental Forecasts

### JUNE SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Light:</th>
<th>0455-0458</th>
<th>Sunrise:</th>
<th>0532-0535</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunset:</td>
<td>2106-2107</td>
<td>Last Light:</td>
<td>2144-2148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon: Phase:</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>% of Illum:</td>
<td>90-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Temperature: High:</td>
<td>22-25°C</td>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>11-13°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Rainfall:</td>
<td>84mm (for the month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Direction:</td>
<td>W-SWLY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Speed/Gusts:</td>
<td>10-20 Kts Gusts 21-32 Kts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-30 Km/h Gusts 40-60 Km/h</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Toronto Environmental Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Light:</th>
<th>0502-0506</th>
<th>Sunrise:</th>
<th>0538-0542</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunset:</td>
<td>2103</td>
<td>Last Light:</td>
<td>2139-2138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon: Phase:</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>% of Illum:</td>
<td>90-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Temperature: High:</td>
<td>23-27°C</td>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>11-15°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Rainfall:</td>
<td>74mm (for the month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Direction:</td>
<td>W-NWLY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Speed/Gusts:</td>
<td>5-10 Kts Gusts 21-33 Kts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-30 Km/h Gusts 40-65 Km/h</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H - Threat Level Legend

**THREAT LEVEL LEGEND:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMMINENT</td>
<td>Intelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having the capability and the intent to commit an act of serious violence against a specific target in the immediate future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Intelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having the capability and the intent to commit an act of serious violence. Intelligence indicates that an attack may be forthcoming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Intelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having the capability and the intent to commit an act of serious violence. There is no intelligence indicating that an attack is forthcoming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Intelligence has identified an individual or group within Canada or abroad which is assessed as having either the capability or the intent to perform an act of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO KNOWN THREAT</td>
<td>There is no available information intelligence indicating a threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix I - Threat and Risk Level Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREAT</th>
<th>G8</th>
<th>G20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC ORDER</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZED CRIME</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYBER THREAT / ESPIONAGE</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENT ASYMMETRIC THREAT</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC HEALTH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:32</td>
<td>IAT: College and Bay 150 to 200 smashing windows to CIBC. Now west of Bay on college running. Significant damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:41</td>
<td>MICC: black block taking off black t-shirts and putting on pink t-shirts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:42</td>
<td>1640hrs EMU5 reports that uniform police have cleared Queens park, the crowds are at College and University, smashing signs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:54</td>
<td>1653hrs EMU2 has identified male who smashed police vehicle on Queens and was using the radio. They are currently at College and University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:01</td>
<td>1659hrs EMU5 large crowd north on University towards Queens Park, another POU team has arrived in area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:08</td>
<td>1707hrs EMU1 in Queens park attempting video of people changing clothes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:11</td>
<td>1710hrs EMU6 at Queens park. Protesters at the front of Queens park are saying they are moving north and have gas masks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:12</td>
<td>[Source redacted] Portion of Black Bloc at University &amp; College are in the process of changing clothes. Plan is to reintegrate with crowd and to later engage with further Black Bloc Tactics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:28</td>
<td>1824hrs EMU Teams 1 and 3 are staged in the area of Queen and Spadina. EMU3 reports the police vehicle is still on fire. There are approx. 1000 people in the immediate area. Approx 5 to 10 maels [sic] dressed in pink shirts are now north on Spadina from Queen walking on the east side of the road. EMU3 will maintain surveillance of subjects as far as possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:46</td>
<td>From UCC [Unified Command Center] board: On June 26, 2010 at 1940h Supt. Stubbings advised that TPS have been undertaking arrests at Queen's Park. Approx. 1000 demonstrators are at this location. 5 sections of TPS PSU on scene.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:47</td>
<td>EMU Team 3 reports 8-10 Sikhs congregating at a green “P” parking lot at Queen at Augusta. [Source redacted] Believes they will be causing havoc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:19</td>
<td>2118hrs PIIT Team A Sherbourne and Queen will provide intel when available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:49</td>
<td>2148hrs EMU1 reports group 60 to 70 south on Yonge [sic] at shooter heading to the fence. Female in crowd confirmed they are going to the fence as they walked by.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:56</td>
<td>2155hrs EMU1 reports the group is through Adelaide. One male in the crowd identified as a member of OCAP [Ontario Coalition Against Poverty].</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:05</td>
<td>2203 EMU1 is on Esplanade south of front between Young and Bay, some in the crowd have masks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:09</td>
<td>From UCC Board: at 22:00 hours [Source redacted] informed Supt. BUZZA (TACC- Operations Commander) that a group of about 60 protesters who were Southbound on Yonge Street through Adelaide Street. Group was chanting “TO THE FENCE” One member of group was positively identified as a member of the Black Bloc but it is not wearing any Black Bloc gear/clothing....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:32</td>
<td>IAT: College and Bay 150 to 200 smashing windows to CIBC. &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; now west of Bay on college running. Significant damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:41</td>
<td>MICC: black block taking off black t-shirts and putting [sic] on Pink t-shirts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:42</td>
<td>1640hrs EMU5 reports that uniform police have cleared Queens park the crowds are at College and University smashing signs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:54</td>
<td>1653hrs EMU2 has identified male who smashed police vehicle on Queens and was using the radio They are currently at College and University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:01</td>
<td>1659hrs EMU5 large crowd north on University towards Queens Park another POU team has arrived in area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:08</td>
<td>1707hrs EMU1 in Queens park attempting video of people changing clothes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:11</td>
<td>1710hrs EMU6 at Queens park. Protesters at the front of Queens park are saying they are moving north and have gas masks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:12</td>
<td>[source redacted] portion of Black Bloc at University &amp; College are in the process of changing clothes. Plan is to reintegrate with crowd and to later engage with further Black Bloc Tactics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:28</td>
<td>EMU Teams 1 and 3 are staged in the area of Queen and Spadina. EMU3 reports the police vehicle is still on fire. There are approx. 1000 people in the immediate area. Approx 5 to 10 maels [sic] dressed in pink shirts are now north on Spadina from Queen walking on the east side of the road. EMU3 will maintain surveillance of subjects as far as possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:46</td>
<td>From UCC [Unified Command Center] board: On June 26, 2010 at 1940h Supt. Stubbings advised that TPS have been undertaking arrests at Queen’s Park. Approx. 1000 demonstrators are at this location. 5 sections of TPS PSU on scene.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:47</td>
<td>EMU Team 3 reports 8-10 Sikhs congregating at a green “P” parking lot at Queen at Augusta. [source redacted] Believes they will be causing havoc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:19</td>
<td>2118hrs PiIT Team A Sherbourne and Queen will provide intell when available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:49</td>
<td>2148hrs EMU1 reports group 60 to 70 south on younge [sic] at shooter heading to the fence. Female in crowd confirmed they are going to the fence as they walked by.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:56</td>
<td>2155hrs EMU1 reports the group is through Adelaide. One male in the crowd identified as a member of OCAP [Ontario Coalition Against Poverty].</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:05</td>
<td>2203 EMU1 is on Esplanade south of front between Young and Bay, some in the crowd have masks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:09</td>
<td>From UCC Board: at 22:00 hours [source redacted] informed Supt. BUZZA (TACC- Operations Commander) that a group of about 60 protesters who were Southbound on Yonge Street through Adelaide Street. Group was chanting “TO THE FENCE” One member of group was positively identified as a member of the Black Bloc but it is not wearing any Black Bloc gear/clothing....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>