

**“Debate, Democracy, and the Politics of Panic:
Norman Angell in the Edwardian Crisis”**

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Abstract

“Debate, Democracy, and the Politics of Panic” seeks to recast the historical image of Norman Angell, author of the famous 1910 *pacifist* book The Great Illusion. Norman Angell has traditionally been depicted as a political failure. Recent work by Hugh Peter Gaitskell McNeal has shown that this is largely because historians have a retrospective bias and have not been able to see Angell as his contemporaries would have done. Even McNeal, however, fails to appreciate fully the political significance of Angell’s work. William Scheuerman’s new book Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time provides a theoretical framework through which Norman Angell’s work can be more justly assessed. The present thesis represents an extension and testing of Scheuerman’s logic and centers on the idea that the patterns of public speech which define any society’s public sphere greatly affect that society’s experience of time and by extension its politics. By altering speech patterns in the public sphere Norman Angell had a significant political impact. In a period of acceleration, when the Edwardian public sphere was becoming increasingly confrontational and anti-liberal, Norman Angell fostered a discursive space, *Norman Angellism*, which was characterized by the open-ended give and take of meaningful debate. In so doing Norman Angell affected his contemporaries’ experience of time, slowing things down and creating an environment more conducive to liberal practice. Contrary to George Dangerfield’s claim that England’s liberal state was on the verge of collapse in 1914, the story of Norman Angell shows that there were respected agents of liberal revival at work.

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Introduction

In 1909, a relatively unknown author named Ralph Lane adopted the penname Norman Angell and self-published a political pamphlet entitled “Europe’s Optical Illusion.”¹ Largely because of his own publicity efforts, Angell’s pamphlet became extraordinarily popular and in 1910 it was expanded into a much larger book entitled The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage.² In 2004, I wrote a fourth year research paper that examined some of the work Norman Angell published between 1910 and 1914, and attempted to assess its political significance in terms of recent debates regarding the intellectual’s role in politics and society.³ The most noteworthy change between this work and its predecessor is the absence here of an attempt to formulate a comprehensive definition of the term “intellectual.” Instead I have turned my attention to a “character and circumstance” examination of Angell. This approach means that the thesis is based not only on an assessment of Angell, but also on a particular understanding of the Edwardian period (1900-1914) in which he wrote his famous book. Speed is the central concept in this understanding. This work seeks to shed light on the relationship between shifting experiences of time and the patterns of public speech by suggesting answers to the

¹ Norman Angell, Europe’s Optical Illusion, London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1909

² Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantages, Toronto: McClelland and Goodchild, 1910

³ Ryan Vieira, “Norman Angell as an Intellectual,” Unpublished paper prepared for Professor Y.A. Bennett, 2004. The general theoretical foundation for that paper was based on, Arthur Melzer, et al., eds., The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and Politics, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. In terms of making the research possible for this thesis I must thank Professor Bruce Elliot for consistently encouraging me to apply for a variety of grants and bursaries. I must also thank the staff members at the Ball State, McMaster, and University of Toronto archives for their assistance. I would also like to thank Professor YA Bennett who supervised the writing of this thesis, read all of the drafts, and contributed fantastic ideas. Finally, I must thank Jocelynn Foster for all of her support during this process. Without all of these people it is certain that the present thesis would have remained nothing but a series of scattered ideas in my mind.

questions: to what extent did speed influence politics and political discussion in the Edwardian period and how did Angell fit within that framework as a creator of public discourse?

The central theory which drives this examination grew out of a recent book published by University of Indiana political theorist, William Scheuerman. Professor Scheuerman's book, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, explains recent anti-liberal trends within American politics by grounding them in a broad theoretical and historical framework.⁴ To this end, he employs the concept of social acceleration, a phenomenon which he sees as having three root causes: technology, capitalism, and the inherently competitive modern state system.⁵ Scheuerman argues that this phenomenon potentially disfigures liberal democracy by disabling key aspects of it, such as the separation of powers, which rests on a particular set of temporal assumptions.⁶ According to Scheuerman, increased demands for speed and efficiency tend to benefit the executive, "whose contemporaneous and high-speed temporal contours appear to leave it especially well suited to decision making in a corresponding high-speed social environment."⁷ Scheuerman notes that this sense of acceleration becomes increasingly significant in periods of political crisis, when panic grabs hold of the *demos*, who then insist on change "before it is too late" and are often easily convinced that

⁴ William Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004

⁵ Ibid, pp. 15-23

⁶ Scheuerman sets out the temporal underpinnings of the separation of powers as such: Legislature (forward looking and slow moving), Judiciary (retrospective and slow moving), Executive (contemporaneous and fast-moving). Ibid, pp. 26-70. Also see William Scheuerman, "Liberal Democracy's Time," Unpublished paper presented at University of Michigan Political Theory Colloquium, pp. 5-19. For Scheuerman's earliest expression of this idea see, William Scheuerman, "Liberal Democracy and the Empire of Speed," Polity, (34), 1, September 2001, pp. 41-69

⁷ William Scheuerman, "Liberal Democracy's Time," p. 30

providing the executive with increased powers (think for example of the “Patriot Act” and post 9/11 American society) is the lesser of two evils.

Scheuerman’s book, while in many ways ground breaking, has little to say about the relationship between acceleration and patterns of speech within the public sphere. The logic of his argument, however, is extendable. The central idea which underpins Scheuerman’s work is that speed is a self-perpetuating phenomenon, that it “follows a relatively autonomous developmental logic.”⁸ Scheuerman’s structural examination of the legislature concludes that there is a fundamental misfit between demands for speed and the “necessarily unhurried characteristics of free-wheeling legislation.”⁹ On the basis of this argument, one could build on Scheuerman and suggest that high-speed societies favor not just high-speed institutions, but also high-speed forms of discourse. It should follow that in periods of political crisis, the public sphere should become increasingly confrontational as individuals become less willing to engage in open-ended and free-wheeling political discussion. Increased demands for speed and efficiency also have the potential to disable the public sphere, which Jürgen Habermas has shown to be a central aspect of liberal democracy.¹⁰

By applying, testing, and building upon Scheuerman’s work, this thesis argues that Norman Angell challenged the anti-liberal aspects of his period’s hasty tempo by

⁸ Ibid, p. 19. The idea that acceleration is self-perpetuating is also present in the work of German social theorist Hartmut Rosa. Rosa receives little attention in this thesis for two reasons. First, much of his work is in German and has not been translated into English. Second, though he provides an insightful structural analysis of the effects of acceleration on society, his political analysis is lacking in many ways. For Rosa’s discussion of acceleration as self-perpetuating see Hartmut Rosa, “Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High-Speed Society,” *Constellations*, (10), 3, March 2003, pp. 3-33. For a discussion of the shortcomings within Rosa’s political analysis see, William Scheuerman, “Speed, States, and Social Theory: A Response to Hartmut Rosa,” *Constellations*, (10), 3, March 2003, pp. 42-48.

⁹ Scheuerman, “Liberal Democracy’s Time,” p. 33.

¹⁰ Jürgen Habermas is the major theorist of communication whose work on “communicative reason” and the public sphere has revolutionized academic discourse. Arguably his most important work is: Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.

creating a discursive space, *Norman Angellism*, which promoted and adhered to a “spirit of inquiry.” This is to say that Angell created an intellectual arena devoid of acceleration, where individuals could go to get their thoughts in order, and then return to the public sphere prepared to engage in rational debate. Given the exceptional growth of *Norman Angellism* between 1910 and 1914, this thesis suggests that Angell influenced the patterns of public speech both domestically and internationally, and was instrumental in maintaining liberal democracy in a period when it was increasingly seen as inept. Contrary to George Dangerfield’s famous claim that liberal England was on the verge of collapse in 1914, *Angellism*’s popularity seems to indicate that respected agents of liberal revival were at work.¹¹

For the empiricist this may seem like an interesting argument, but one incapable of proof. There is certainly weight to such a criticism. It is true that on the strength of the evidence, it is impossible to prove the connection between a perception of temporal acceleration and confrontational patterns of speech. Furthermore, it is impossible to demonstrate the precise extent to which Angell influenced perceptions of time by altering patterns of speech. In rebuttal, however, it may be noted that many of the Edwardian period’s major political movements (national efficiency, tariff reform, trade unionism, and women’s suffrage) were largely characterized by both a demand for instant reform and confrontational, sometimes violent, conduct. These signs seem to indicate a connection between acceleration and the closing of the public sphere. One can also point to the fact that before 1914, *Norman Angellism* was one of the most prominent forums for political discussion and that *Angellites* often defined themselves not as holders of an

¹¹ George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, London: Constable, 1936.

ultimate truth, but as intellectual inquirers who welcomed criticism.¹² *Angellism*, it can be argued, seems to have successfully challenged the dominant tone of public political discussion and altered the patterns of public speech. Simply because these issues cannot be examined with scientific exactitude does not mean that they should not be explored. The present thesis is such an exploration.

Chapter 1 examines the work of historians, international relations theorists and others, who have written about Angell. In this chapter, I distinguish between the way in which Angell was considered by his contemporaries (popular and politically significant) and the way in which academics have viewed him since (popular, but politically insignificant). I point to a tradition within the secondary literature, which distinguishes between *Norman Angellism's* tremendous public currency (the frequency of its presence in public political discussion) and its political significance (the extent to which it impacted political practice). I argue that this distinction comes from the knowledge that peace efforts failed in 1914, making it almost second nature to dub *Norman Angellism* politically insignificant. Following Hugh Peter Gaitskell McNeal's recent Ph.D dissertation "Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap: The Emergence of New Liberal Internationalism in Anglo-American Thought, 1897-1914," I argue that we must look beyond this retrospective bias and, for the sake of historical accuracy, at least attempt to see Angell in the same way that his contemporaries did.¹³ To this end, I employ and test

¹² Hence Norman Angell's response to one critic in 1911, "Certainly I shall be delighted to have you indicate the errors which have crept into my book. I am only too well aware that having but very incomplete leisure, many imperfections have been allowed to pass, and I shall be grateful to have some of them indicated." Ball State University Archives and Special Collections (hereafter BSU), Norman Angell Collection, Box 4. Norman Angell to Thomas Carter, 1 November 1911.

¹³ Hugh Peter Gaitskell McNeal, "Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap: The Emergence of New Liberal Internationalism in Anglo-American Thinking, 1897-1914," (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Harvard University, 2000)

Scheuerman's recent theoretical insights, and outline a way to more fully appreciate the political significance of Angell's work as a creator of public discourse.

Chapter 2 examines the environment of anxiety, panic, and acceleration which largely framed the Edwardian age in which Angell wrote The Great Illusion. This chapter opens with a discussion of how aspects of the modern state system worked to create a sense of acceleration. It argues that international economic and military developments, such as the disasters of the Boer War and the growth of both the German economy and navy, signaled a perceived rapid decline in Britain's position as one of the European Great Powers. This decline, and the pace at which it seemed to occur, heightened the Edwardians' awareness of their existence in time and thereby led to a sense of acceleration. Following Scheuerman's argument that acceleration is self-perpetuating, I demonstrate how the perceived rapidity of this decline led to the growth of panicked and xenophobic political movements and how confrontation became the dominant tone of discourse in the Edwardian public sphere. Focusing primarily on "the quest for national efficiency" and Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign, this chapter argues that these movements not only grew out of the period's panic, but also perpetuated it.

National efficiency and tariff reform furthered the acceleration of the Edwardian public sphere. By consistently and publicly proclaiming the failure of Britain's liberal tradition, and by demanding immediate fundamental political reform, but offering no unified or viable alternative, these movements uprooted the Edwardians and inspired a fear of the future. Thus by 1909 the Spectator could comment that the nation was overrun by "panic-mongers."¹⁴ Interestingly, while these movements accelerated the public sphere by stimulating panic, they also brought the British legislature to a halt. The section

¹⁴ Author Unknown, "Panic-Mongers and Security-Mongers," Spectator, 3 July 1909, p. 4

of the polity, which was meant to provide direction for the future became motionless at just the point when the public began to demand forward thinking.¹⁵ The resulting situation was a panicked public, which demanded swift reform, and a sluggish almost inert polity, which provided neither action nor reassurance. By 1910, Edwardian Britain's public sphere and its polity clearly exhibited what Scheuerman has termed a "temporal misfit" and Britain's liberal state had fallen into a condition of crisis. By 1912, Angell was left with the impression that the "outstanding feature" of British democracy was "the failure of parliamentary government as we now know it."¹⁶ In this way, panic led to further panic and the acceleration of the Edwardian public sphere continued.

Chapter 3 examines the growth of *Norman Angellism* and the nature of the discussion which characterized it. Here the arguments of The Great Illusion are examined to illustrate Angell's talent for appealing to major intellectual currents. This gift was not the only cause of the book's success. What made The Great Illusion "the coffee table book of its time," to use the phrase of one historian, was the consistent presence that Angell maintained in the public sphere.¹⁷ This is seen through a consideration of major *Angellite* organizations such as the Garton Foundation, the Cambridge War and Peace Society and the University of Toronto International Polity Club. *Norman Angellism*, it emerges, was unlike traditional political movements in that its focus was on encouraging public discussion more than initiating any specific policy reform; it should be seen more as a discursive space than a political movement.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the legislature as "future-oriented" see, Scheuerman, "Liberal Democracy's Time," pp. 5-15

¹⁶ Norman Angell "The Incompetent Vote," What the Worker Wants, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912, p. 76

¹⁷ McNeal, "Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap," p. 150

I contend that, as a discursive space, *Norman Angellism* was characterized by a distinct temporality. In contrast to the panicked acceleration of the Edwardian public sphere, *Norman Angellism* was rooted in open-ended critical reflection, which is an inherently slow-moving form of discourse. Given its popularity and the character of its discourse, *Norman Angellism* appears to have altered the patterns of public speech thereby affecting the Edwardian experience of time and revitalizing the potential for liberal democratic practice.

The conclusion applies Angell's approach to the challenges posed by social acceleration to liberal democracy in our day. The argument is made that Norman Angell's story represents a particular type of narrative that can inform our understanding of the potential for liberal democratic practice in our contemporary high-speed world. If contemporary intellectuals can follow Angell's lead, and create discursive spaces rooted in critical reflection and free-wheeling public discussion, then these spaces can potentially provide the means whereby the *demos* can escape the hectic tempo of modern life and more adequately consider major political issues. Like subway stops, these spheres of discussion will allow individuals to step outside of incessant movement and see their surroundings more clearly. As such, while speed may disable the potential for a key aspect of good citizenship, the work of individuals like Angell can help revive liberal practice.

In my study of Norman Angell I have made extensive use of the archives at Ball State, McMaster, and Toronto universities. Despite this grounding in primary sources, this thesis does not fit neatly within the disciplinary boundaries of history, let alone the even more specific boundaries of the historical sub-disciplines. Navigating between

history, political theory, and mass communications, this thesis seeks to make sense of a man and a phenomenon that have been insufficiently understood. In so doing it leaves itself open to the criticism of the relevant specialists in these disciplines and sub-disciplines. Nevertheless, as Scheuerman notes, “any serious endeavor to do justice to the fascinating question of the impact of social temporality on liberal democracy necessarily must break free of the neat disciplinary boxes in which scholars typically build their nests.”¹⁸

¹⁸ Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, p. xxi

Chapter One: Angell Remembered

Norman Angell, a journalist, and social and political critic published a 126 page pamphlet entitled “Europe’s Optical Illusion” in 1909. A year later he expanded it into a 371 page book entitled The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage. Angell is best remembered for his argument, that a war between Germany and Britain would be irrational because the rapid means of communication and the extension of credit had made these countries economically interdependent.¹⁹ This book became an international sensation, selling more than two million copies between 1910 and 1913, and was eventually translated into twenty-five languages.²⁰ Moreover, the book inspired the formation of various clubs and societies on an international scale dedicated to discussing and propagating its ideas.²¹ In the four years before the First World War, Angell’s work stimulated public political discussion on an almost unprecedented level and it became nearly inconceivable to speak of international politics without referring to Angell or his book. As an unnamed reviewer in the Pall Mall Magazine claimed in January 1913: “The Great Illusion has taken its place among the few books that have stirred the minds of men and the obscure author of

¹⁹ This thesis will not detail all of the arguments of The Great Illusion as these are available in a great deal of the existing literature. Here I will allude to Angell’s arguments only when necessary and only insofar as they apply to the general argument of the present thesis. For a detailed summary of Angell’s arguments see, Paul David Hines, “Norman Angell Peace Movement, 1911-1915,” (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana, 1964), Chapter 1

²⁰ Howard Weinroth, “Norman Angell and the Great Illusion: An Episode of Pre-1914 Pacifism”, The Historical Journal, 17, No. 3, (1974), 551; Author Unknown, “Norman Angell”, Samuel Britain: Biographical Dictionary of British Economists, July 2003, <http://samuelbrittain.co.uk/text/160_p.html> (31 March 2004)

²¹ It is worth noting that such clubs and societies were not limited to the English-speaking world. Organizations such as Verband für Internationale Verständigung and Student Verein became closely associated with the Norman Angell peace movement. For a discussion of Angell’s connection with German student organizations see Hines, “Norman Angell Peace Movement, 1911-1915,” pp. 105-119; Philip Dale Supina, “The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany.” Journal of Peace Research, 9, No.2, (1972) 161-164

the modest pamphlet has become the leader of a new school of thought.”²² By July 1914, even P.J. Hannan, the secretary of England’s Navy League, which was arguably the institution most antagonistic to the peace movement, looked favorably upon *Angellism*: “I think Mr. Norman Angell’s work has, during the past few years, done an enormous amount to make people, firstly, think more about these great questions and, secondly, to think a great deal more clearly about them than they did before.”²³

The historiography that surrounds Norman Angell is substantial. Contemporary and later commentaries have reflected on Angell’s successes and failures. Immersed within the debate, which Angell’s book set in motion, the contemporary historiography largely believed that Angell was, and would continue to be, politically significant. In contrast, the luxury of hindsight has allowed more recent writers to examine the effects that Angell’s work had on government policy and to reach a much different conclusion. Given Angell’s inability to influence politics in any structural way, confirmed by the events of August 1914, the more recent historiography has, for the most part, distinguished between the public currency of Angell’s ideas (the extent and consistency of their presence in public political discussion) and their political effect (the extent to which they influenced political practice) and, on this basis, has concluded that Angell was politically ineffective. Politics, however, has more than a structural aspect and, as such, both this conclusion and the distinction on which it is based reflect a lack of nuance within the historiography.

²² The William Ready Division of Archives and Special Collections, McMaster University (hereafter WRAC), Norman Angell Collection, Box 5 Clippings File, “The Great Illusion,” Pall Mall Magazine, January 1913.

²³ P.J. Hannan, “Some Dangers of the Movement,” in John Hilton, ed., Report of Certain Discussions at the International Polity Summer School held at Old Jordans Hostel, Beaconsfield July 17 to July 27 1914, London: Harrison and Sons, 1915, p. 48

The most significant problem with the current interpretation of Angell is that it lacks an understanding of the nature and political significance of his important contribution to public speech. Historians have traditionally seen Angell's public currency as politically insignificant, because they know how everything came out in 1914. They suffer from, what might be termed, an "historians bias". This idea is summed up by the renowned English historian A.J.P. Taylor who, in commenting on Edward Grey and the origins of the First World War, wrote: "[w]e interpret past events in the light of what happened later; and it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to see the past as it was at the time."²⁴ In other words, hindsight is not always 20/20 and can pose a serious methodological dilemma for the historian. McNeal's recent doctoral dissertation, "Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap: The Emergence of New Liberal Internationalism in Anglo-American Thought, 1897-1914," has gone a long way to diagnose and correct this problem.²⁵ Urging historians to look beyond their somewhat distorted historical lenses, McNeal argues that prior to the First World War, Norman Angell and The Great Illusion, "appeal[ed] across domestic political divisions to reach the unconverted" and that by 1914 Angell's brand of New Liberal Internationalism had greatly influenced the thinking of the political elite in both Britain and the United

²⁴ A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957, p. 127

²⁵ In this sense McNeal quotes the famous Harvard University historian Bernard Bailyn: "An historian always knows the outcome and consequently there is a built in anachronism because, since one knows how it all came out, one selects material that will show how and why it eventuated as it did... One way to correct or modify this is to stress the contingencies the people at the time had to live with and to enter into the losers' world sympathetically... if you can go back to the confused time when the outcome was unknown... you will have a richer context for understanding what did happen." Bernard Bailyn, "Sometimes an Art, Never a Science, Always a Craft: A Conversation with Bernard Bailyn", William and Mary Quarterly, 51, No. 4, (October 1994), quoted in, McNeal, "Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap," p. 1

States.²⁶ Contrary to much of the recent historiographical work on Angell, McNeal attempts to see Angell as his contemporaries would have done and in so doing ascribes a political significance to Angell's public currency.

McNeal's dissertation is arguably the most sophisticated examination of Angell's work to date. Nevertheless its arguments can be developed further. Though McNeal acknowledges the political significance of Angell's ability to alter the patterns of public speech, his work is primarily concerned with the way in which Angell shifted the focus and not the tone of that speech.²⁷ McNeal treats the issues that were discussed, but not the way in which they were discussed. Furthermore, McNeal's work is firmly grounded within the historical discipline and lacks a multidisciplinary approach. Though McNeal is primarily concerned with how Angell influenced political discussion in the prewar period, his work makes no reference to Jürgen Habermas's ideas regarding the public sphere and the significance of "competing public spheres." McNeal also fails to discuss the accelerated pace of Angell's contemporary environment which has been extensively examined by the cultural historian, Stephen Kern, in his book The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918.²⁸ Thus, while McNeal has made a critical contribution to the Angell historiography, he has also left several questions unanswered.

One central issue that McNeal's work leaves open is Angell's affect on temporality; more precisely, the way in which Angell's work in the public sphere participated in and worked against the period's perceived acceleration. In this sense,

²⁶ Ibid, pp. 203-204

²⁷ "Patterns of public speech" is a phrase I have created to describe to frequency and tone of public political debate within the public sphere. It is meant to account for changes within not only the amount of discussion, or the issues being discussed, but also the climate within which the discussion takes place and the mood which underlies the character of the discussion.

²⁸ Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.

William Scheuerman's recent book Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time provides an excellent starting point for developing a fuller appreciation of the political significance of Angell's public currency. Professor Scheuerman argues that though speed is a necessary and valuable aspect of modernity, it also creates problems for the practice of liberal democracy:

Many traditional notions about liberal democracy rest on assumptions about temporality which become increasingly problematic with the heightened pace of social life. Social speed potentially disables familiar liberal democratic models of political decision making, raising difficult questions for those of us committed to revitalizing liberal democracy in the new century.²⁹

One of Scheuerman's central points is that "high-speed societies privilege high-speed institutions" and that, as such, the executive is often given powers at the expense of the legislature and the judiciary.³⁰ This argument can be extended and reworked to account for the affect that acceleration has on the public sphere. More precisely, following Scheuerman, it seems possible to argue that "high-speed societies privilege high-speed forms of discourse" since the central idea of his argument, that "acceleration is driven by a relatively autonomous developmental logic," has remained intact.³¹ By this logic, one can then conclude that acceleration also has the potential to disable another central aspect of liberal democracy: a meaningful public sphere. Since free-wheeling public discussion is an inherently slow-moving form of discourse, it can potentially be disabled by demands for speed and efficiency. This approach can provide us with interesting insights into Angell's work which, during a period of acceleration, was effective in creating and maintaining a new discursive space that permitted a slow-moving form of discourse.

²⁹ William Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, p. xiv

³⁰ Ibid, p. 45

³¹ Ibid, p. 19

Scheuerman's analysis of social acceleration is particularly applicable to Angell given the atmosphere of political crisis which characterized the Edwardian period. As Scheuerman notes, the significance of acceleration "becomes most obvious during moments of political crisis."³² What Scheuerman does not discuss, however, is the way in which public political discourse becomes increasingly limited during such periods. This is a fact which is demonstrated by politics in Edwardian Britain where the patterns of public speech (the tone, frequency, and quality of discursive acts) became panicked, xenophobic, often anti-liberal and heavily confrontational.³³ In contrast, the discussion which Angell set in motion was free-wheeling, open-ended and inclusive. Following McNeal's call to see Angell as his contemporaries would have done, we can test and build upon Scheuerman's theory. We can examine the temporal and political implications of the dialogue which existed between the form of discourse which characterized *Norman Angellism* and the dominant tone of public debate in the Edwardian public sphere.

Using this framework, *Norman Angellism* can be analyzed not as a political movement, but rather as a discursive space or, to use Habermas's vocabulary, a "competing public sphere."³⁴ Norman Angell had an immediate and significant political impact. Through his consistent presence within the British and international public spheres, he created a new discursive space, which contrasted sharply with the tone

³² Ibid, p. ix

³³ This is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. While the present thesis uses the national efficiency and tariff reform movements as examples one could just as easily use the women's suffrage movement as it was embodied within the militant Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU). For literature on this organization see, Sophia A Van Wingerden, *The Women's Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866-1928*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999; Andrew Rosen, *Rise Up Women! The Militant Campaign of the Women's Social and Political Union, 1903-1914*, London: Routledge, 1974; June Purvis, "Deeds not Words: The Daily Lives of Militant Suffragettes, 1904-1914," in June Purvis, ed., *Votes for Women*, London: Routledge, 2000.

³⁴ The concept of "competing public spheres" was raised by Habermas in 1989 in response to criticism of his *Structural Transformation* at a conference following its English translation. See, Jurgen Habermas, "Habermas Responds," Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992, pp. 424-430

prevalent in Edwardian public political debate.³⁵ Given the movement's considerable growth between 1910 and 1914, it is possible to argue that it created a "competing public sphere" that altered the patterns of public speech and opened up political discussion on both a national and an international plane. In other words, by affecting the way individuals spoke about political issues Angell necessarily affected political practice. Though it is impossible to empirically measure the exact extent to which this is true, there is enough evidence, when combined with Scheuerman's recent theoretical insights, to strongly suggest that the portrayal of Angell as politically ineffective is seriously flawed.

On 7 July 1905, Angell sold the dying English language Parisian newspaper the Daily Mail, which he had purchased less than a year earlier, to Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord Northcliffe).³⁶ Northcliffe then hired Angell as the paper's general manager. A long

³⁵ The public sphere has been defined by Jurgen Habermas as: "The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor." Jurgen Habermas The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989, p. 27. Beyond Habermas, for a thorough theoretical, historical and sociological account of the concept of the "public sphere" see, Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004; Craig Calhoun ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. It is also worth noting that discussions of the public sphere within British history are not uncommon. In fact, according to Habermas the first manifestation of the public sphere was in Britain. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 57-66. For historical discussions of the public sphere within the British context see, Alexandra Halasz, The Marketplace of Print: Pamphlets and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; David Solkin, Painting for Money: The Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth Century England, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992; Fred Steward and David Wield, "The Family Regualtion and the Public Sphere" Gregor McLennan, ed., State and Society in Contemporary Britain: A Critical Introduction, New York: Polity Press, 1984; David Zarat, Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. A thorough discussion of the confrontational character of public political discussion in Edwardian Britain is given in Chapter 2 of the present thesis.

³⁶ WRAC, (Norman Angell Collection), Box 7, "Associated Newspapers Limited and the Continental Daily Mail Ltd: Agreement" 7 July 1905. Given a general lack of evidence it is somewhat difficult to gauge the degree to which the paper was losing money under Angell. The financial records kept by Angell for the Continental Daily Mail indicate that for the week ending 17 June 1905 the paper lost £536.2.6. WRAC, (Norman Angell Collection), Box 7, "Continental Daily Mail: Statement for the week ending June 17 1905." Alfred Harmsworth lived from 1865 to 1925. Together with his brother Harold he built the Amalgamated Press Company empire whose celebrated early paper Answers was, by 1895, enjoying a weekly circulation that exceeded one million copies. In 1896 Harmsworth launched the prototypical "busy

and close relationship with Northcliffe ensued. Angell was included in Northcliffe's circle and was exposed to some of the most powerful and influential men in British politics. Included in this set were J.L. Garvin, Leo Maxse, Kennedy Jones, and Lord Roberts.³⁷ Through contact with these men, Angell quickly became exposed to some of the ideas dominating British political discussion, particularly as it related to foreign affairs. Here Angell found a widespread, unquestioning attachment to the assumptions that war was either inevitable or economically beneficial: "These things, alike in England and in Germany, are accepted as axioms of the problem [Angell wrote in 1909]. I am not aware that a single authority of note, at least in the world of workaday politics, has ever

man's paper." The Daily Mail's net sales peaked in 1900 at 989, 255. In December 1905 he took the title of Lord Northcliffe. By March 1908 when Harmsworth bought the London Times for £320,000 he had established himself as undoubtedly the most powerful man in Britain's newspaper industry. D. George Boyce, "Harmsworth, Alfred Charles William, Viscount Northcliffe, Journalist and Newspaper Proprietor," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <<http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/view/article/33717?docPos=2>>, accessed 29 April 2006. See also, Paul Ferris, The House of Northcliffe: The Harmsworths of Fleet Street, London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1997; Alfred Patrick Ryan, Lord Northcliffe, London: Collins, 1953; S.J. Taylor, The Great Outsiders: Northcliffe, Rothermere, and the Daily Mail, London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1996.

³⁷ Albert Marrin, Sir Norman Angell, Boston: Twayne, 1979, p. 36. James Louis Garvin lived between 1868 and 1947. From 1904 to 1906 he edited the weekly journal Outlook and beginning in 1908 he edited the Tory paper Observer. During the Edwardian period Garvin was a man of considerable political influence. As John Stubbs writes, "In the decade and a half before the First World War, Garvin's journalism had a remarkable and, on occasion, quite discernible impact on British politics." John Stubbs, "Garvin, James Louis (1868-1947), Journalist and Newspaper Editor," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online. For a more indepth discussion of Garvin and his influence in British politics see A.M. Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, A Study in Great Editorship, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. Leo Maxse lived between 1864 and 1932. In 1893 Maxse became the owner and editor of the Conservative National Review. Maxse was known for his anti-German writing and his skill at reporting scandal and sensation allowed him to gain and retain a wide readership. See John A. Hutcheson, Leopold Maxse and the National Review, 1893-1914: Right-Wing Politics and Journalism in the Edwardian Era, New York: Garland, 1989. William Kennedy Jones lived between 1865 and 1921. He worked for Northcliffe originally as editor of London's Evening News and eventually as editor of the Times. See Dilwyn Porter, "Jones, (William) Kennedy (1865-1921), Newspaper Manager and Editor," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online. Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts lived between 1832 and 1914. Following the disasters of Black Week Roberts succeeded Buller as the commander of the British forces in South Africa. In September 1900 he was appointed commander and chief of the British Army and was given a grant of £100,000. See David James, Lord Roberts, London: Hollis and Carter, 1954.

challenged or disputed them.”³⁸ Later, in his autobiography written in 1951, he commented:

I was quickly to find that these men, many of whom had great influence in politics and journalism, and public life generally, all accepted as truths so self-evident as not to be worthy of discussion certain axiomatic premises which were I soon became convinced, either dangerous half-truths or complete and utter fallacies.³⁹

According to Angell, the idea that war was inevitable or economically viable was blinding contemporary political leaders and drawing Europe towards the brink of war. This situation terrified Angell and in an effort to expose these fallacies, and to avert a future war, he wrote The Great Illusion. As he put it: “...the fears I felt were deep and real and The Great Illusion was born of them.”⁴⁰ This book launched Angell on a course which would place him at the center of international political discussion and earn him widespread recognition.

In The Great Illusion, Angell attacked the widely held assumption that military and economic strength were related.⁴¹ He postulated that the increasing importance of credit,

³⁸ Angell, “Europe’s Optical Illusion,” p. 3

³⁹ Norman Angell, After All: The Autobiography of Norman Angell, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951, p. 138

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 141; An interesting fact which McNeal’s dissertation brings to light is that in the months when Angell was finishing “Europe’s Optical Illusion” he was working in close quarters with George Saunders and William Morton two of the most anti-German of all of the Times’ foreign correspondents. “At the very least, both Saunders and Fullerton provided him with a constant reminder of the anti-German feeling that he attempted to counteract in the book.” McNeal, “Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap,” p. 119

⁴¹ J.D.B. Miller makes clear how widely held this assumption was when he writes, “The first decade of this century was characterized by an unusual degree of bombast and bluster in Britain and Germany, and to a lesser extent the United States. This was typified in Britain by Angell’s employer Northcliffe, in Germany by a variety of patriotic bodies such as those which protested at Angell’s appearance at German universities, and in the United States by President Theodore Roosevelt and General Homer Lea. They emphasized the superiority of the national character and institutions, the special traditions of the armed forces, the importance of colonies, and the danger represented by other countries’ industrial efficiency, military innovation, and access to raw materials. This outlook encouraged a belief in military strength as a measure of national greatness, and a certain pleasure in the prospect of victorious war. Military greatness was readily identified with national riches.” J.D.B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind, New York: St Martin’s Press 1986, p. 26. A similar account can also be found in Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, London: Temple Smith, 1978, pp. 52-72. Also see Michael Howard, “Reflections on the First World War,” Studies in War and Peace, London: Temple Smith, 1970, pp. 99-109

and the subsequent interdependence of modern industrialized nations such as Germany and Britain, made war irrational. He argued that war continued to be waged because the populations of these nations misunderstood the true nature and consequences of modern warfare. In Angell's view, "[t]he difference between the pacifist and the militarist is... an intellectual one; and if we are to bring about that political reformation in Europe that is to liberate us from the militarist burden, the process will have to be intellectual."⁴² In his 1933 Nobel lecture, he reasserted this point:

It is certainly true that just as dictatorships would be impossible without the acquiescence in their establishment of a large part of public opinion, wars would be impossible except for the acquiescence of large sections of the public in the policies out of which they arise.⁴³

Accordingly, Angell argued that if these populations could be engaged in informed public discussion on the nature of modern warfare, they would be less likely to allow their governments to conduct war and wars would seldom occur: "Not until these masked words have been exposed – their masks torn from them – will the Baals of political paganism be shorn of their power."⁴⁴

Angell's emphasis on the economically counterproductive nature of war was neither highly original, nor radical. In fact, Angell was largely following the political and economic philosophies of nineteenth century British liberalism, particularly as expounded by Richard Cobden, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill.⁴⁵ Ideas similar to Angell's had

⁴² Norman Angell, "War as the Failure of Reason," in J.M. Robertson, ed., Essays Towards Peace, London: Watts, 1913, p. 69

⁴³ Norman Angell, "Peace and the Pubic Mind", 19 January 2004, <<http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1933/1933/angell-lecture.html>>, 31 March 2004

⁴⁴ Norman Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags: A Plea for Rationalism in Politics, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903, p. 88

⁴⁵ For a good discussion of the interpretation of war in nineteenth century liberalism see Edmund Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1946. In criticizing Angell, Arnold White wrote in the World in January 1910, "Mr. Angell suffers from the same sort of eye disease as the late Mr. Cobden...." WRAC, (Norman Angell Collection), Box7, Arnold

also been expressed outside of Britain by individuals such as Jacques Novicow and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.⁴⁶ Angell was unique, however, in the extent to which he was able to promote his ideas by appealing to the existing currents of political discussion. As Amos S. Hershey wrote in his review of The Great Illusion for the American Political Science Review:

To those who are more or less familiar with the writings of such veteran European publicists as Bloch, Fried, Lagorette, and Novicow, the leading ideas of this book are not new or original; but... Mr. Angell deserves the credit... of having given them such an attractive dress and such world-wide currency as to ensure attention.⁴⁷

Angell's ability to situate himself within contemporary concerns and anxieties made his book attractive not just to the traditional peace movement, but to anyone involved in public political discussion during this period. As a result The Great Illusion was a tremendous publishing success, not only in Britain but internationally as well. As the historian D.C. Somerville put it, "The man in the street had been much impressed by Norman Angell's The Great Illusion... the most widely read and persuasive of all the handbooks on pacifism."⁴⁸

Following the book's publication in 1910, a variety of clubs, societies and study circles were formed and a new discursive space termed *Norman Angellism* was born. By the end of 1912, there were 40 *Angellite* clubs in Britain alone.⁴⁹ To further promote the discussion of his ideas, Angell also became involved in founding various large NGO's

White, "The New Denationalism," World, 11 January 1910, reproduced in, WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 6, The Work of Norman Angell by his Contemporaries: A Selection of Reviews and Articles Reproduced and Bound up, Issued Privately for Personal Friends and Some Students, p. 11

⁴⁶ Jacques Novicow, War and its Alleged Benefits, trans. Sandi E. Cooper, New York: Garland, 1974.

Sandi E. Cooper ed., Voices of French Pacifism : Comprising La Paix et L'enseignement Pacifiste ; essays by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, New York : Garland Publishing, 1973.

⁴⁷ Amos S. Hershey, "The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage", The American Political Science Review, 5, No. 2, (1911), p. 313.

⁴⁸ D.C. Somerville, quoted in, Angell, After All, p. 149

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 161

such as the Neutrality League (1914) and the Union of Democratic Control (1914). Arguably the most important organization, however, was the Garton Foundation, which was formed in 1912 by Lord Esher, Arthur Balfour, and Richard Garton. With the institutional and financial assistance of this organization, Angell was able to lecture throughout Europe and North America.⁵⁰

The reviews and articles, which appeared in periodicals and newspapers of all political stripes, helped to sustain the discussion which The Great Illusion had initiated.⁵¹ The tone of these reviews ranged from supportive to critical. In Britain, periodicals such as the Quarterly Review and the Nation, and daily newspapers such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Chronicle, generally supported Angell's ideas. These publications saw The Great Illusion as a literary triumph that would reform, revise, and revitalize the pacifist philosophy. Even more optimistically these papers at times assumed that the book would help bring about a paradigm shift in the conduct of international politics. In 1912 the

⁵⁰ A few of the institutions at which Angell lectured include: the Institute of Bankers in London, the International Polity Club at the University of Toronto, the South Place Ethical Society, and various German Universities. Based in London the South Place Ethical Society remains today as one of the oldest free-thought communities in the world. For detailed information on this organization see, "History," South Place Ethical Society, June 2006, <<http://www.ethicalsoc.org.uk/>>, June 2006. It is worth noting that the South Place Ethical Society was in the habit of inviting lectures by some of Britain's most prominent intellectuals. For example, prior to Angell's invitation J.A. Hobson had spoken there. Also, it is worth noting that this society was so intent on hearing from Angell that it promised to bump the Liberal Member of Parliament and famed political author J.M. Robertson, who had also been invited to speak, if Angell should prefer his time slot. WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 1, William Rawlings to Norman Angell, July 26 1911. In February 1913 Angell conducted a two-week lecture tour of German Universities. This thesis will only discuss this only briefly. For a discussion of this tour see; Supina "The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany", pp. 161-164.

⁵¹ According to Norman Angell's "Report for 1912": "Articles and reviews of a lengthy character appeared in the following British publications: the Times, the Spectator, the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, the Daily Mail, the Daily News, the Mourning Leader, the Pall Mall Gazette, the Westminster Gazette, the Edinburgh Review, the Quarterly Review, the Financial Times, the Economic Review, the Journal of the Institute of Bankers of Great Britain, the Economist, the Investors Review, the Evening Standard, the Broad Arrow, the War Office Times, the United Services Gazette, the Nation in Arms, the Army Service Corps Quarterly, the Review of Reviews, the World, the New Age, the Nation, the Bookmaker, the National Review, the London Magazine, the Bystander, the Throne, the Scotsman, the Glasgow Times, the Glasgow Journal." BSU, (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, John Hilton, "Report for 1912". Many of these reviews can be found in clippings files in the Norman Angell holdings both at Ball State and McMaster see, BSU, (Norman Angell Collection), Clippings File Box 62. Also see, WRAC (Norman Angell Collection) Clippings File Box 5.

Quarterly Review referred to Angell's book, which had already been through five editions and had been translated into 10 languages, as "one of the most damaging indictments that have yet appeared of the principles governing the relation of civilized nations to one another."⁵² The Nation stated, "No piece of political thinking has in recent years more stirred the world which controls the movement of politics." In a similar vein the Daily Mail declared that "No book has attracted wider attention or has done more to stimulate thought in the present century than The Great Illusion."⁵³ These sentiments also reached beyond Britain's shores.

In Canada, the Globe and the Star newspapers supported Angell's ideas. In 1912 an unnamed author in the Globe wrote, "Recent paragraphs from Mr. Norman Angell are timely and pertinent."⁵⁴ The article continued by claiming that The Great Illusion was "a book whose influence it seems impossible to exaggerate."⁵⁵ This supportive tone was also evident in the United States. The New York Times Review of Books stated that Angell's book "has compelled thought. It is a book full of real ideas."⁵⁶ Similarly, the review published in Boston's Christian Science Monitor claimed that, "the book is exerting a marvelous influence over the minds of men today."⁵⁷ Other newspapers which reviewed the book favorably included the Boston Herald, Philadelphia's Public Ledger and Chicago's The Evening Post. The St Louis' Globe-Democrat stated, "Not to speak of it flamboyantly, this work is to war and to the spirit of the war god the modern *Mene Mene*,

⁵² Author Unknown, "The New Pacifism," Quarterly Review, 12, (1912), pp. 202, 203

⁵³ WRAC, (Norman Angell Collection), Box 6, "The Great Illusion and Public Opinion".

⁵⁴ (Author Unknown), "Norman Angell and the Emperor", The Globe, 14 September 1912, p. 6a

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Hershey, "The Great Illusion," p. 312; (Author Unknown), "Norman Angell's The Great Illusion and Other Books Showing the Fallacy of War", New York Times Review of Books, 12 March 1911, p. 138

⁵⁷ WRAC, (Norman Angell Collection), Clippings File Box 5, Christian Science Monitor, 16 May 1911.

Tekel Upharsin, the flaming prophetic handwriting on the wall.”⁵⁸ Angell, however, was not without strong critics in Britain, North America, and Germany.

The primary focus of Angell’s critics was his idea that nations could not gain economically in modern war. In May 1911, Ellery Cory Stowell, an American academic, published an article in Annals of American Academy criticizing Angell’s thesis and arguing that the threat of war causes nation states to organize themselves along the most efficient lines which, in turn, leads to economic gain.⁵⁹ Alfred T. Mahan, the famed theorist of sea power, also attacked Angell’s economic thesis.⁶⁰ Mahan, in fact, became arguably Angell’s most vocal critic. As McNeal has observed recently, “No one worked harder to undermine Angell’s views on the origins of war and the nature of international relations than Alfred Thayer Mahan.”⁶¹ In June 1912, Mahan published an article in the North American Review arguing that, contrary to Angell’s thesis, war in the modern

⁵⁸ WRAC, (Norman Angell Collection), “The Great Illusion and Public Opinion”. The phrase cited by the Globe Democrat is taken from chapter 5 of the book of Daniel in the Old Testament. It refers to the Aramaic words inscribed in the wall by God at Belshazzar’s feast. Roughly translated they mean: “It has been counted and counted, weighed and divided.” Daniel interpreted these words to mean that the king’s deeds had been found deficient by God and thus that the kingdom would be divided. Author Unknown, Columbia Encyclopedia, 2005, <<http://www.bartleby.com/65/me/Mene-Men.html>>, March 2006

⁵⁹ Ellery Cory Stowell, “The Great Illusion”, Annales of American Academy, 37, (1911), 766-768. Stowell wrote several books including, Ellery C. Stowell, Consular Cases and Opinions: From the Decisions of the English and American Courts and the Opinions of the Attorneys General, Washington: J Byrne, 1909; Ellery C. Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1915; Ellery C. Stowell, International Cases: Arbitrations and Incidents Illustrative of International Law as Practised by Independent States, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1916; Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, Washington: Byrne, 1921.

⁶⁰ It is important not to underestimate the importance of Alfred Thayer Mahan in military thinking during this period. Since the publication of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Mahan had been considered by many to be the world’s foremost naval strategist. That Mahan considered Angell important enough to publicly discuss says something about the extent of Angell’s influence. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890. For an indepth consideration of Mahan see, Philip A Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. W.D. Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939

⁶¹ McNeal, “Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap,” p. 175

world could be profitable.⁶² Mahan then criticized Angell for being far too concerned with economic self-interest:

A mature consideration of the wars of the past sixty years, and of the occasions also in which war has seemed imminent but has been averted, will show that the motives to war have not often been ‘aggression for the sake of increasing power, and consequently prosperity and financial well-being.’ The impulses, however mistaken they are thought to be by some, or actually may have been, have risen above mere self-interest to feelings and convictions which the argument of The Great Illusion does not so much as touch.⁶³

Mahan considered The Great Illusion to be flawed in both its economic and political logic.

Whether supportive or critical of Angell’s thesis, a common theme ran through the contemporary historiography, namely, that Angell was having an immediate political impact. If this was untrue, Angell would never have received so much attention. Moreover, since Angell’s political effect seemed increasingly evident to his contemporaries, there was only the validity of his views to consider. Even G.G. Coulton, a British scholar of medieval history, who was convinced “of Mr. Angell’s great inaccuracy” and who wrote an entire book (The Main Illusions of Pacifism: A Criticism of Mr. Norman Angell and the Union of Democratic Control) to expose it, acknowledged that “There are Norman Angell Leagues everywhere.”⁶⁴ To Norman Angell’s contemporaries, the political effect and public currency of his ideas were seen as inseparable and his success difficult to deny.

⁶² As evidence, he cited both the German government’s economic growth after the Franco-Prussian war and the economic benefits derived by the British government in the eighteenth century as a result of its sea power. A.T. Mahan, “The Great Illusion”, North American Review, 195, (June 1912), p. 323

⁶³ Ibid, p. 332

⁶⁴ G.G. Coulton, The Main Illusions of Pacifism: A Criticism of Mr. Norman Angell and the Union of Democratic Control, Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1916, pp. vii, 2

Though The Great Illusion sold very well and was the basis of numerous *pacifist* organizations, Angell considered himself to be a failure in political terms. He had set out to avert a future conflict between Germany and Britain and only four years later, on August 4th 1914, Britain entered a war against Germany. As he wrote in his autobiography,

...in drawing any lesson from this experience one should distinguish sharply between the publishing success and the political failure... the book provoked discussion all over Europe and America.... Yet its argument failed to influence policies to any visible extent.⁶⁵

Angell's reflection caused him to fragment the unity of the contemporary historiography by distinguishing between the public currency of his ideas and their political impact. This distinction is important as it is the premise that unites the various strands of the historiography that followed.⁶⁶

There are common themes that emerge from a consideration of the secondary literature dealing with Norman Angell. First, there is a tendency to depict Angell and *Angellism* as elitist insofar as neither the man nor the movement, were able or willing to reach the common man. Paul David Hines wrote that *Angellism's* "appeal was directed to the academic and wealthy classes of society rather than to the entire English population.

⁶⁵ Angell, After All, pp. 149-150

⁶⁶ This distinction is not exclusive to the historiography surrounding Norman Angell but rather it is also prevalent in the historiography surrounding both the prewar and wartime peace movements. For example, Douglas Newton and Keith Robbins both argue that between 1914 -1919 the anti-war movement in Britain was a failure. As Newton writes, "At the outset, the ultimate failure of their campaign is absolutely plain. The Radicals did not succeed in arousing the public, and thus they failed in persuading the wartime British governments." In a similar vein Robbins opines: "The pacifists of the First World War did little to influence the course of the fighting. Only at particular moments did their activities assume fleeting importance." Though it is true that A.J.P. Taylor's classic book The Trouble Makers: Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939 argues that all progress is the result of dissent it also asserts that the dissenters in the early twentieth century had little if any immediate political impact. Douglas Newton, "A Lasting Peace: The British Liberals and the Campaign for a Negotiated Peace with Germany" in Franz Oswald and Maureen Perkins, eds., Europe - Divided or United? Proceedings of the Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for European History, Canberra: Southern Highland Publishers, 2000, p. 215; Keith Robbins, The Abolition of War: The Peace Movement in Britain, 1914-1919, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976, p. 217; A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers, p. 14, 17-18

In general, its program was effective in its presentation to its limited audience. It failed, however, to influence the opinion of the large masses of the English population.”⁶⁷ Hines and others, however, have insufficiently considered Angell’s attachment to classical liberalism and have neglected central *Angellism* institutions and events. There has also been a tendency among historians to neglect or to appreciate insufficiently the atmosphere of political crisis and the period of social acceleration at the time when The Great Illusion appeared. In this respect, historians have shown themselves bound by political history and have focused too much attention on Angell’s inability to effect positive policy change, which was confirmed by the outbreak of war in 1914. The unwillingness of these historians to examine political spaces outside of institutional politics has unfortunately led to a neglect of the political value of Angell’s contribution to both contemporary domestic and international public discussion. The end result is a historiographical tradition that has incorrectly distinguished between Angell’s public currency and his political effect. This failure is problematic.

The first work to make extensive use of the collection of Norman Angell’s private papers housed at Ball State University in Muncie Indiana was Paul David Hines’s 1964 Ed.D dissertation, “Norman Angell Peace Movement, 1911-1915”. Hines’s objective was to explore Angell’s motives for writing The Great Illusion and his techniques for mobilizing public opinion: “In this study, [Hines writes] Norman Angell, his intentions, and the techniques that he utilized to spread the thesis of The Great Illusion in the years before the ‘Great War’ will be examined in detail.”⁶⁸ Hines argues that while Angell’s ideas were rooted in the tradition of British Radicalism, more particularly Cobdenite

⁶⁷ Paul David Hines, “Norman Angell Peace Movement, 1911-1915” (Unpublished Ed.D. Dissertation, Ball State University, 1964).

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. iv

ideology, the methods that he used to promote his ideas represented a window through which historians could grasp the distinctive nature of peace activism in the pre-war period.⁶⁹ Hines contends that elitism in Angell's movement was representative of a largely idealistic, bourgeois centered peace activism.⁷⁰ For this reason, Hines argues, *Norman Angellism* remained an elitist movement, a fad that ultimately failed. By not reaching the masses, Angell was unable to muster enough support to effect policy change: "During the 1911-1915 period, it was difficult to see any permanent effect Norman Angell had on history or the contemporary international political structure."⁷¹ According to Hines, Angell's work had little political effect, rather its value was that it represented a break with the older moralistic style of pacifism and helped set a new rationalist paradigm.

In 1974, historian Howard Weinroth published "Norman Angell: An Episode of Pre 1914 Pacifism." This article echoes Hines's argument that *Angellism's* fatal error was its social bias and elitist character:

His 'broad' appeal was largely confined to a business and professional audience or to literary celebrities and the young intelligentsia in the universities. His organizations – the leagues, the debating clubs, the study circles, even the affiliated society for the Right Understanding of International Interests... - were composed essentially by the 'hard-boiled' men of wealth.⁷²

Weinroth argues that by not effectively targeting and engaging with the working class, Angell undercut his essential purpose: that of converting the collective mind to rational self-interest.⁷³ According to Weinroth, one of the reasons that Angell was unable to reach the masses was because his campaign was hampered by the right wing political

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 19

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 118

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 145

⁷² Hines, "Norman Angell Peace Movement," p. 562

⁷³ Ibid, p. 563

affiliations of Esher and Balfour.⁷⁴ Weinroth asserts that because of their attachment to the right Esher and Balfour emphasized caution in the Garton Foundation's activities to avoid offending their political colleagues. In Weinroth's view, this restraint was such that *Angellism* was relegated to a mere academic question and was therefore robbed of its opportunity to effect political change. Hines and Weinroth both depict *Angellism* as an elitist movement that failed politically because it was unable to effect policy change in the political sphere. Neither discussed the political significance of public speech or Angell's contribution to the public sphere.

Following this historiographical tradition, Patrick Gavigan's 1972 doctoral dissertation "Ralph Norman Angell Lane: An Analysis of his Political Career 1914-1931", depicts Angell as an elitist. Gavigan also distinguishes between Angell's public currency and his political effect, concluding that he was a political failure. According to Gavigan, it is misleading to present Norman Angell as a pacifist, or an internationalist, because at the most basic level he was driven by the instincts of a politician: "he eagerly sought a political identity and wanted political power."⁷⁵ Gavigan contends that by 1919, Angell "was cognizant that 'Norman Angellism' was old and tarnished, and, since the public no longer accepted either himself or his tenets, he decided that a public political career might even improve his image."⁷⁶ As a politician, Gavigan point out, Angell was a failure. To this effect Gavigan calls his readers's attention to the fact that Angell lost two of the elections he ran in and even when in office as a Labour M.P. from 1929-1931, Angell was ineffective in promoting his League of Nations agenda within the Commons,

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 558

⁷⁵ Patrick Gavigan, "Ralph Norman Angell Lane: An Analysis of his Political Career, 1914-1931," (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation Ball State University, 1972), p. 2

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 165

and in convincing the government to devote more resources to the League. Gavigan's thesis reinforces the historiographical tradition by separating Angell's public currency from his political effect.

Philip Dale Supina's 1971 doctoral dissertation, "Norman Angell and the Years of Illusion 1908-1914", and his subsequent article, "The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany", concentrates on an earlier period in Angell's life, but reaches a conclusion similar to Gavigan's.⁷⁷ Like most of the secondary literature on Angell, Supina distinguishes between Angell's public currency and his political effect by arguing that although Angell's ideas were widely present in public discussion prior to the First World War, this presence was essentially apolitical, because it failed to effect any visible policy change.⁷⁸ Supina's dissertation provides an excellent narrative of Angell's early life and his peace work after The Great Illusion. He discusses at length Angell's pre-1914 success in promoting his ideas through publishing, international lecture tours, public debates with critics, and the establishment of Norman Angell clubs and societies. Supina demonstrates, better than any other historian, the public debate that Angell's ideas initiated and that Angell himself maintained. Supina, however, reminds his readers that in the long run Angell's movement failed politically:

Angell's fundamental failure involved not his understanding of the futility of war but rather his failure to understand the critical socio-economic changes which were going on within the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The ruling classes of Austria and Russia had no illusions of what war and military defeat might bring but they had still fewer illusions about what the growth of social democracy would inevitably bring if it continued unchecked and unabated. In

⁷⁷ Philip Dale Supina, "Norman Angell and the Years of Illusion, 1908-1914", (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Boston University, 1971). Philip Dale Supina, "The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany," pp. 161-164

⁷⁸ Philip Dale Supina, "Norman Angell and the Years of Illusion, 1908-1914," p.5

dramatic foreign successes they sought to regain what they were everyday losing domestically through the industrial revolution.⁷⁹

Supina argues that Angell could never have achieved his aim of averting war because of the reactionary political attitudes of some of the ruling classes of the Great Powers.

In 1972, Supina published an article that dealt with Angell's 1913 German lecture tour, a subject that clearly had been insufficiently examined. This article followed in the tradition of depicting Angell as an elitist. Though it examines in detail Angell's talks at German universities and his pre-tour publicity campaign it neglects entirely Angell's attempt to reach out to the German working class. This is a striking omission since the primary source material on this lecture tour, which would have been available to Supina, makes clear that Angell made such an attempt.⁸⁰ Moreover, Supina, like others before him, distinguishes between Angell's public currency in Germany and his political effectiveness: "In the long run, [Supina writes] Angell's success in Germany proved fleeting, and his limited influence all but evaporated even before the hot days of July, 1914 vaporized even the strongest pacifist sentiments."⁸¹ In this way, Supina follows the traditional interpretation of Angell by depicting him as elitist and by distinguishing between his public currency and his political effect. The most comprehensive study of Norman Angell to date is Albert Marrin's 1979 book Sir Norman Angell which disappointingly portrays Angell in much the same way.

⁷⁹ Ibid, "Abstract"

⁸⁰ The Garton Foundation "Report for 1912" indicates that part of Angell's pre-tour publicity campaign for Germany involved spending approximately \$2000 on printing an estimated 500,000 small pamphlets which were to be inserted "in magazines and periodicals, especially those going to the working classes..." Given that Angell intended to spend \$17,000 on advertising for his tour this meant that he was spending approximately 12% in an effort to directly target the working class. Supina makes no mention of this. BSU, (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, John Hilton, "Report for 1912".

⁸¹ Supina, "The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany," p. 164

Though most scholars would term Marrin's book a biography, it can also be described as a political and intellectual history, because its primary concerns are the political roots, validity, and legacy of Norman Angell's doctrines. In the manner of many of the other historians, Marrin depicts Angell and *Angellism* as essentially elitist: "Most striking is the elitist rhetoric, due... primarily to Angell himself."⁸² Additionally, Marrin's work perpetuates the historiographical tradition of distinguishing between Angell's public currency and his political effect. Marrin contends that although Angell was incorrect in the details of his argument, he reached a true conclusion, namely, that war in the modern world would be destructive at an unprecedented level. Of Angell he wrote:

[w]rong in detail, he was correct in the grand sense that man had crossed a threshold; that war between superpowers in the industrial era – total, democratized, machine warfare – would be an unspeakable crime from which none could benefit and which would strain the fabric of civilization, exposing it to unforeseen changes and chances.⁸³

Marrin argues that Angell's attempt to save mankind from total war placed a significant emphasis on rational self-interest and entailed an ideal of rationalizing the "collective mind" and further democratizing the exercise of state power. Marrin's book, however, fails to situate Angell within the political atmosphere of crisis which defined Edwardian England. The result is that Marrin is unable to derive any political effect from the very considerable public currency of Angell's ideas, but jumps instead to the conclusion that Angell's value can only be appraised in the long run. Indeed Marrin judges Angell's value as a historical actor by his espousal of the subjugation of politics to reason which helped set a new paradigm in foreign policy dissent. By arguing that Angell's success

⁸² Marrin, *Sir Norman Angell*, p. 124

⁸³ *Ibid*, p. 134

could be judged only in the long term Marrin distinguishes between his political effect and his contemporary public currency.

In his 1986 book, Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind, international relations theorist J.D.B. Miller argues that although Angell proposed ideas that were in some ways faulty, these had a lasting significance:

People who produce ideas about public affairs – especially international affairs – are rarely original in everything they say, and are sometimes inconsistent. These assertions can be made about Norman Angell, as about John Stuart Mill and Edmund Burke. However, each of these men had things to say which were of major importance in their time, and which remain relevant because of the insight they display.⁸⁴

Although Miller places Angell in such illustrious company as Burke and Mill, and acknowledges that he had significant things to say, Miller argues that Angell had little political effect. According to Miller this was largely owing to the fact that Angell's "prescriptions went against the interests of many powerful people to whom war was the right course to pursue if their positions and those of their followers were to be safeguarded."⁸⁵ Miller concludes that Angell's political effect was not an immediate one. Rather Miller, like Marrin, contends that Angell's success can only be gauged in the long term. He argues that Angell became a pioneer in modern international relations theory and that his ideas have found echoes in books and articles by scholars such as Joseph S. Nye, Robert O. Keohayne, A.F.K. Organski, and David Baldwin.⁸⁶ Moreover, Miller, writing in 1986, argues that because of the escalating threat of nuclear warfare Angell's emphasis on political education so as to remove "emotionalism" from international

⁸⁴ Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War, p. ix

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 103

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 88; The influence of Angell on these thinkers can be found in their writings regarding interdependence. For a very clear example of this see, Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence, New York: Longman, 2000, pp. 7-9

politics has contemporary relevance and is more poignant in Miller's contemporary political environment than it had ever been before. By privileging the long-term effects and value of Angell's work, Miller denies it any immediate political value. Accordingly, like other scholars before him, Miller falls into the historiographical tradition of distinguishing between Angell's public currency and his political effect.

Cornelia Navari's article "The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell" is another piece which emphasizes the long term effects over the immediate impact.⁸⁷ Navari begins by reminding her reader, "Norman Angell is a theorist of whom everyone has heard and few take seriously" and that he was the most cited of the "misguided utopians" in E.H. Carr's influential book, The Twenty Years Crisis.⁸⁸ Navari's objective was to correct this misunderstanding of Angell. Navari aims to show the lasting value of Angell's doctrines for modern international relations (IR) theory, by arguing that Norman Angell helped shape modern IR theory, although he is not generally recognized as doing so, by ushering in some of its most important concepts such as international economic interdependence through credit, the removal of "doctrinal hegemony" from the state, and the importance of national well-being.⁸⁹ Navari, however, pays no attention to the immediate political significance of Angell's contribution to public debate.

As this brief discussion of key works has indicated there exists a tradition which distinguishes between Angell's public currency and his political effect. While some historians examine Angell's lasting value, and others look at his inability to effect policy

⁸⁷ Cornelia Navari, "The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell", Review of International Studies, 15 (1989): pp. 341-358

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 341

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 356

change, only McNeal has examined in detail the political value of Angell's contribution to public political debate in Edwardian Britain. Even McNeal's recent work, however, still leaves many questions unanswered. For the most part, it has been assumed that because Angell did not convert the masses, or shift policy to any visible extent that he was politically ineffective. Though the Oxford historian Martin Ceadel has recently begun researching a new biography of Angell, his depiction of Angell in the brief discussion contained in an earlier book Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945 seems to indicate that this tradition will not soon be challenged, however flawed it may be.⁹⁰ For these reasons, the work of Norman Angell deserves to be reconsidered with the benefit of the theoretical insights of Scheuerman and the sophisticated analysis of McNeal. By extending Scheuerman's analysis of social acceleration beyond governmental structure, and applying it to the concept of the public sphere, and by following McNeal's lead of endeavoring to look beyond our retrospective historical bias, it is possible to tackle a previously unconsidered issue: Angell's affect on temporality.

It was not by chance that The Great Illusion was a publishing success. After several publishers rejected his manuscript, Angell produced a shortened version and self-published it as "Europe's Optical Illusion." Then he mounted, at considerable expense to himself, a massive publicity campaign targeting some of Europe's most influential political men. Angell also used his newspaper contacts to secure reviews, such as H.N. Brailsford's favourable two-page assessment in the Nation.⁹¹ Largely because of Angell's efforts "Europe's Optical Illusion" became a sensation and he was approached by London

⁹⁰ Martin Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 177-181

⁹¹ H.N. Brailsford, "The Motive Force of War", Nation, 6, No. 12 (18 December 1909), 490-492

publishers to produce an expanded version. The result of all this attention was the publication of The Great Illusion. Angell, however, did not rest here. Rather, he worked tirelessly to create a public debate and to keep this debate alive through subsequent publications, public lectures, and the establishment of clubs, societies, and study circles. Largely because of this activity, Angell was able to expand the public debate throughout Britain and beyond her shores. For example, within weeks of his two-week lecture tour of German Universities in February 1913, more than 10,000 copies of the German translation of The Great Illusion were sold.⁹² Angell worked tirelessly to keep his ideas at the forefront of both domestic and international spheres of public political debate.

The considerable public political debate that Angell set in motion was open ended and free-wheeling in character. Intellectually Angell was a disciple of Mill's On Liberty: "If there is any one book which explains a man's intellectual life the fact that at twelve I read and was entranced and entered a new world as a result of reading Mill's On Liberty explains most of my subsequent intellectual life."⁹³ Under this influence, Angell was convinced that open public discussion had an inherent political value: "[i]f there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice..."⁹⁴ This attachment to classical liberalism made Angell a public man. The Great Illusion and the publicity work that promoted it were born out of a sense of public duty, a belief that only open and tolerant political discussion could save humankind. Angell was convinced that jingoistic mentalities and the fallacies on which they were based were driving Germany and Britain towards war. Angell relates this in his autobiography:

⁹² It is also worth noting that attendance at the lectures generally ranged from 300-500.

⁹³ Angell, Reminiscences, p. 11

⁹⁴ John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, London: Penguin, 1974, p. 42

More than once the feeling came upon me during the writing of The Great Illusion that I myself was an imbecile to suppose that the flood of human imbecility could ever be stemmed by efforts of reason. But when I stopped writing the book I made the discovery that it was more uncomfortable to stand aside, inert and inactive, while monstrous follies were being proclaimed, than to obey the impulse to say something, do something.⁹⁵

This “impulse” to which Angell referred was the sense of civic responsibility that governed the writing of The Great Illusion and pushed him into the public sphere.

Angell’s ideas fostered the development of a large forum for political discussion, which attained concrete expression in Norman Angell clubs and societies which were rooted in Angell’s classical liberal belief in the political efficacy of the open ended use of public reason. The tendency of historians to treat this arena as politically insignificant is likely the result of their failure to look closely enough at certain *Angellism* institutions and events such as the Garton Foundation and the University of Toronto International Polity Club, the Leeds Norman Angell League’s 1914 conference and the 1914 Summer School at Old Jordans Hostel. Furthermore, the tendency of historians not to situate Angell within the social and political atmosphere of crisis that prevailed in Edwardian Britain has also contributed to the failure to justly appraise his significance. There is no novelty in the view that Edwardian Britain was defined by a sense of emergency. Marrin himself wrote in a review of A.J.A. Morris’s collection of essays, Edwardian Radicalism, 1900-1914: Some Aspects of British Radicalism, that Edwardian society was “strife ridden and beset by controversies ranging over every aspect of domestic and foreign policy.”⁹⁶ Moreover, as early as 1935 George Dangerfield wrote, “[t]he whole mood of

⁹⁵ Angell, After All, pp. 145-146

⁹⁶ Albert Marrin, “Edwardian Radicalism, 1900-1914: Some Aspects of British Radicalism,” American Historical Review, 81, No. 3, p. 594

that prewar England was sudden, somber, and violent...’’⁹⁷ It was no secret to Angell historians that his domestic political context was framed by crisis. The absence of its discussion can only indicate that this context was seen as irrelevant to Angell’s work. Such an assumption, however, is problematic.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, a series of international military, economic, and diplomatic events such as the second South African War and the growth of the German economy produced a sense of relative decline, which under the effects of panic heightened the acceleration of a political environment already sped up by technological advances.⁹⁸ Since accelerated environments tend to favour high-speed forms of discourse, the Edwardian public sphere began to move away from free-wheeling public political discussion and towards confrontational and xenophobic political movements such as national efficiency and tariff reform.⁹⁹ The panicked state of the public sphere was then compounded as Parliament came under increasing pressures to which it was unable to respond. As the public sphere accelerated, and Parliament stagnated, Britain’s liberal state fell into crisis. Though historians of the Edwardian period have consistently

⁹⁷ Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, p. 91

⁹⁸ The most thorough discussion of the temporal affect of late nineteenth and early twentieth century advances in communication and transportation technology is found in, Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. For a discussion within the primary source literature of how technology was speeding up the pace of life during the late Victorian period see, H.G. Wells, “Anticipations of the Reactions of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought,” *Fortnightly Review*, 75: 747-760, 925-938, 1104-1121; 76: 170-188, 355-370, 538-554, 725-738, 911-926, 1063-1082, April - December 1901. Insofar as literature regarding the relationship between domestic and international crises, and the process of acceleration, the best available source is William Scheuerman, *Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time*.

⁹⁹ For a thorough discussion of national efficiency: G.R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914*, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1971 and Searle, *Country before Party: Coalition and the Idea of National Government in Modern Britain, 1885-1987*, London: Longman, 1995, see especially Chapter 4. Also worth examining in terms of national efficiency is H.C.G. Matthew, *The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a post-Gladstonian Elite*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1973 and E.J.T. Brennan, *Education for National Efficiency: The Contributions of Sydney and Beatrice Webb*, London: Athlone, 1987. For a discussion of the tariff reform movement see Alan Sykes, *Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-1913*, New York: Oxford University Press 1979 and R.A. Rempel, *Unionists Divided: Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain, and the Unionist Free Traders*, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972.

emphasized the presence of this crisis environment, none has had the benefit of Scheuerman's recent theoretical insights on the phenomenon of social acceleration which can be used to discern the politically significant relationship between panic, acceleration, and changes within the patterns of public speech. Similarly, none of the historiography surrounding Norman Angell has taken this into account.

The Norman Angell historiography has been largely bound by political history's traditional methodological focus on government and policy. In consequence, historians have consistently and incorrectly assumed that Angell's public currency between 1910 and 1914 was un-political. Though this has become a tradition within the historiography, it is an illusion; one which neglects what a prominent *Angellite* in 1913 described as the movement's "inner history."¹⁰⁰ When both the vastness and open-ended character of *Norman Angellism* are considered within a public sphere defined by acceleration, panic, and confrontation it becomes possible to seriously question this tradition by arguing that Angell had a significant political impact prior to 1914. By consistently working to promote the growth of a public discourse based on a methodology of free-wheeling public political debate, Norman Angell encouraged a public temper that helped calm and slow down the Edwardian public sphere by enhancing the potential for meaningful speech within it. Though unsuccessful in effecting visible policy change Angell altered the patterns of speech which defined the public sphere. This is necessarily a political effect since, as Hannah Arendt has observed in her book *The Human Condition*, "[w]herever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition,

¹⁰⁰ This is to say the history which is "read between the lines of leading articles and deduced from the failures of scare-mongers..." Harold Wright, "Norman Angellism: A Retrospect", *War and Peace: A Norman Angell Monthly*, 1, No. 1, November 1913, p. 6

for speech is what makes man a political being.”¹⁰¹ The work of Norman Angell between 1910 and 1914 helped to create an environment more conducive to liberal democratic practice in a period when liberalism had seemed to become, as Dangerfield observed, “an inconvenient burden.”¹⁰² This interpretation adds to the historiography because it rests on a more developed understanding of the political which brings together Angell’s public currency and his political effect. As such, it ends an inaccuracy which has largely characterized the historiography since the publication of Angell’s autobiography.

This is also an important time to revisit Angell given recent assaults on liberal democracy in the North American context. The process of acceleration which impacted Edwardian Britain leading to widespread and irrational xenophobia was largely the result of political crisis. Such a crisis atmosphere is as present in North America now as it was in Britain during the Edwardian period. Though there have been several popular discussions of acceleration, no academic, other than Scheuerman, has recognized and attempted to deal with the political dilemmas that this phenomenon poses to liberal democratic practice in the current atmosphere of crisis.¹⁰³ Certainly the closing of critical public discourse in our contemporary world, signified by things such as George W. Bush’s “Patriot Act” or Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s attempts to stifle dissent over Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, indicates that now is an ideal time to tackle the difficulties which acceleration poses for liberal practice: “We need to confront the normative and institutional difficulties raised by incessant speed and motion [Scheuerman writes] without succumbing to a misplaced nostalgia for static and impervious forms of

¹⁰¹ Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 3

¹⁰² Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, p. 8

¹⁰³ Janice Stein, The Cult of Efficiency, Toronto: House Anansi Press, 2001. James Gleick, Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything, New York: Pantheon, 1999

social life.”¹⁰⁴ Angell’s experience represents a particular type of narrative that, contrasting the incessant speed of modern life, provides a means by which meaningful public political discussion can occur in a high-speed world without degenerating into confrontation.

The distinctions between public currency and political effect are not as clear-cut as the secondary historiography has maintained to date. To come to a just appreciation, it is necessary to alter the traditional methodology. It is essential that we acknowledge the political significance of political speech as it occurs in public discursive spaces outside of institutional politics. By doing this, we as historians and students of history will be able to better understand Angell, his movement and the political environment in which it emerged. Through this new framework it is possible to argue that Angell’s public currency and his political effect were essentially the same thing. Angell and *Angellism* had an important political effect insofar as they opened up and slowed the pace of the Edwardian public sphere thereby making it more conducive to liberal democratic practice. This interpretation allows us to understand better both Angell and his significance within the immediacy of his surroundings. The present thesis is an attempt to do political history outside of institutional politics and offer an interpretation of *character and circumstance*.

¹⁰⁴ Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, p. 60

Chapter Two: The Acceleration of the Edwardian Public Sphere

In periods of destabilization, when the irrationalism and “emotionalism” of the “collective mind” are stirred by the hastened pace of political life, the relative plurality and openness of a democratic society can easily be forgotten and the complexity of politics replaced by the simplicity of confrontation.¹⁰⁵ The political function of the irrationalism often characteristic of the “collective mind” was one of Angell’s primary interests.¹⁰⁶ Britain’s Edwardian era is a particularly interesting time to examine it.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ An idea similar to this can be found in the concept of a “perpetual motion mania” depicted by Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Such a concept is also found in J.A. Hobson’s *The Psychology of Jingoism* where Hobson argues that the “many complex changes of external environment” characteristic of the modern world create “a nervous wear and tear” making individuals more open to persuasion and creating an atmosphere of jingoism. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Schocken Books, 2004, p. 408; J.A. Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism*, London: G. Richards, 1901, pp. 6-9

¹⁰⁶ The idea that the “collective mind”, as Angell termed it, has an inherent irrationalism is found in Angell’s *Patriotism Under Three Flags*: “The fact that a great number of persons should show collectively less wisdom than the average of the units, is an idea generally scouted as contrary to common-sense. That it is so scouted, notwithstanding its increasing display in politics, that it explains the irrationalism of much political feeling, while it impresses the necessity for greater insistence upon rational control, are all considerations which render its thorough understanding the more imperative.... This collective mind may display qualities morally superior to those of average individuals composing the mass, but it displays a lower degree of rationalism and a more intense emotionalism, good or bad.” Angell, *Patriotism Under Three Flags*, pp. 6-7

¹⁰⁷ The historiography that surrounds the Edwardian period largely depicts it as a period of crisis, confusion, and at times hysteria. The two most classic books in this sense are George Dangerfield’s *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, which argues that Britain’s democratic polity was on the verge of collapse in 1914, and Elie Halevy’s *The Rule of Democracy, 1905-1914*, which claims that Britain was largely defined by domestic anarchy during the Edwardian period. Many historians now argue that the claims made by these books are greatly exaggerated, that Britain’s democracy was not on the verge of crisis in 1910. Nevertheless, the idea that the Edwardian period was one of panic and uncertainty is supported both in the primary and secondary literature. George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, London: Constable and Co., 1935. Elie Halevy, *The Rule of Democracy, 1905-1914*, London: Benn, 1952. For a detailed consideration of the claims made by Dangerfield and Halevy see, David Powell, *The Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901-1914*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996. For considerations of the Edwardian period as uncertain, unstable, and riddled with crisis see, David Brooks *The Age of Upheaval: Edwardian Politics, 1899-1914*, New York: Manchester University Press, 1995; G.R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. For depictions of the political divides within the major political parties see, H.C.G. Matthew, *The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a post-Gladstonian Elite*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1973 and Frans Coetzee, *For Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism in Edwardian England*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. For a discussion of the international anxieties and their impact on British politics, both in terms of institutional politics and public discourse see, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*, London: Ashfield

During this period, economic, military, political, domestic and international developments injected into public debate a sense of uncertainty regarding the position and efficacy of the British state. As other economies, particularly the German one, experienced a period of exponential growth, British anxieties were raised and then heightened by the disasters of the Boer War (1898-1902) and the rapid growth of the German Navy (1898-1912). These economic and military developments created a sense of crisis that heightened the Edwardians' awareness of their existence in time, increased demands for speed and efficiency, and thereby accelerated the pace of the public sphere. As a corollary this limited the potential for nuanced and free-wheeling public political discussion. Confrontational, anti-liberal, and generally xenophobic domestic political movements, such as the national efficiency movement [1901 to 1903], and Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign [1903 to 1906], emerged. They helped to create a sense of impermanence and panic, encouraging a binary "us vs. them" view by publicly questioning the ability of Britain's liberal tradition to maintain a high-degree of international competitiveness. Domestic political movements therefore contributed to the panic that began as a result of international tensions. As the public sphere accelerated, Britain's Parliament came under increasing pressure to which it was unable to respond. In 1910, it became completely stagnant.¹⁰⁸ In consequence, the speed of political movement occurring in civil society became increasingly detached from that which was occurring in polity and Britain's liberal democracy experienced a state of crisis; resembling, as

Press, 1980 and Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls, eds., Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Germany and Britain before 1914, London : Macmillan, 1981. For a similar account in a primary source one could also look to F.W. Hirst, "The Six Panics", The Six Panics and other Essays, London: Methuen, 1913.

¹⁰⁸ This is most strongly displayed in the year 1910 when increasing tensions between the two houses of the British Parliament led to a "constitutional crisis" and there were two national elections. This is thoroughly discussed in, Bruce K. Murray, The People's Budget: Lloyd George and Liberal Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

George Dangerfield asserted, “something that looks very like nervous breakdown.”¹⁰⁹ This “temporal misfit,” a term which Scheuerman uses to discuss the temporal distinctions between polity and civil society, was the political circumstance in which Norman Angell lived when he wrote The Great Illusion and which historians have generally neglected.

In a series of articles entitled “Anticipations” published in the Fortnightly Review at the turn of twentieth century, H.G. Wells commented on the way in which technological advances, particularly in terms of transportation, were irrevocably changing his contemporary social and political environment. In the first article of the series published in April 1901, Wells wrote, “The velocity at which a man and his belongings may pass about the earth is in itself a very trivial matter indeed, but it involves certain other matters not at all trivial, standing, indeed, in an almost fundamental relation to human society.”¹¹⁰ More recently, historians and theorists such as Stephen Kern, Jeremy Rifkin, Hannah Arendt and E.P. Thompson have confirmed Wells’ observations through studies of how technological advances in transportation, communication, and industrial production led to new ways of thinking about time and space in which the perception of time became increasingly “fast moving” and “ever accelerating.”¹¹¹ Though it is now evident that the early twentieth century was a period of consistently escalating acceleration, an examination of how this undercurrent of acceleration could be compounded, through panic caused by domestic and international anxieties, and how this

¹⁰⁹ Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, p. 69

¹¹⁰ H.G. Wells, “Anticipations,” Fortnightly Review, April 1901, No. 75, p. 747

¹¹¹ Jeremy Rifkin refers to the perception of time in the industrial era “as linear, fast-moving, ever accelerating, and a scarce resource.” Jeremy Rifkin, Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History, New York: H. Holt, 1987, p. 60; Stephen Kern The Culture of Time and Space; E.P. Thompson, “Time Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism” Past and Present, 38, (1967), 56-97; Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 205

new panicked acceleration could affect public political discussion, has remained generally absent from the historiography.

The idea that there is a relationship between panic, acceleration, and altered patterns of public speech, however, is not novel. Angell himself made the connection between acceleration and the limiting of openness in public debate as early as 1903, when in accounting for the “impatience of discussion” that defined his public sphere, he gave simultaneity, propinquity, and movement as three root causes.¹¹² Similarly, an acknowledgement of the link between acceleration and the closing of public debate can be found in the speech delivered by Lieutenant B.S. Townroe to an *Angellite* gathering in 1914. Townroe claimed that, “[i]n this hurrying world of ours there is always a danger lest the superficial be taken for the real, the shadow for the substance, misrepresentation for truth.”¹¹³ George Dangerfield observed a connection between acceleration and confrontational public discourse in 1935, when he depicted Edwardian Britain as, “a nation which wanted to revive a sluggish blood by running very fast in any direction...”¹¹⁴ The direct relationship between acceleration and political crisis during this period has, however, remained largely unrecognized and unexplored. Only recently has the very question of the linkage between panic and acceleration been addressed by the political theorist William Scheuerman in his book Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time and he has done so primarily in the context of the accelerated pace of institutional American politics in the post 9/11 era. Moreover, Scheuerman’s book comments solely on the institutional aspects of liberal democracy, concentrating

¹¹² Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, pp. 3, 14

¹¹³ Lieutenant BS Townroe, “Fundamental Points of Agreement between the aims of the Garton Foundation and of the National Service League,” in Hilton ed., Report of Certain Discussions, p. 169

¹¹⁴ Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, p. 8

particularly on the separation of powers, and lacks an examination of the public sphere in its entirety. This is a weakness which Scheuerman admits.¹¹⁵ Building upon and testing Scheuerman's recent theoretical insights, this chapter will examine Edwardian Britain and attempt to show how an environment of emergency accelerated and closed off the public sphere, limiting the potential for meaningful public political discussion. In so doing, it will develop a concept that has remained historiographically embryonic and thus establish the possibility of developing a new understanding of Norman Angell and the relationship between his public currency and political effect.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the tremendous growth of the German and American economies raised British apprehensions over the country's ability to compete as a Great Power in the international arena.¹¹⁶ Although the British economy generally prospered in the late nineteenth century, its gross national product rising from £1.317 billion to £2.084 billion between 1870 and 1900, and its per capita income growing from £29.9 to £42.5 over the same period, the tremendous growth of both the German and American economies conveyed to Britons a sense of relative decline.¹¹⁷ Between 1883 and 1900, Britain's share in world trade fell from 37% to 28.4% and by 1900, Britain had been surpassed in total industrial output by both Germany and the United States.¹¹⁸ "The industrial supremacy of Great Britain ha[d] long been an axiomatic commonplace; and it [was] fast turning into a myth."¹¹⁹ German salesmen were proving

¹¹⁵ Interview with William Scheuerman, Indiana University at Bloomington, 2 February 2006

¹¹⁶ The idea that the competitiveness inherently characteristic of the modern state system can work to further social acceleration has been most thoroughly explored Scheuerman in Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time.

¹¹⁷ Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1885-1905, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 24

¹¹⁸ Peter Cain, "Political Economy in Edwardian England: The Tariff Reform Controversy," The Edwardian Age, London: MacMillan 1979, p 36

¹¹⁹ Ernest Eden Williams, Made in Germany, London: Heinemann, 1896, p. 1

increasingly effective in penetrating traditional British markets, such as China and the Middle East.¹²⁰ Indeed, Britons were becoming increasingly suspicious as the German economy continued to grow.¹²¹ This suspicion was given expression in 1896 by E.E. Williams in his widely read book Made in Germany, which went through six editions in its first year and which argued: “It is but too clear... that on all hands England’s industrial supremacy is tottering to its fall, and this is largely German work.”¹²² In much the same vein, Lord Rosebery told his audience at Epsom:

Year after year our Consuls and our various officials of the Board of Trade have called the attention of the community to the fact that we are no longer, as we once were, undisputed mistress of the world of commerce, but that we are threatened by one very formidable rival, at any rate, who... is encroaching on us as the sea encroaches on weak parts of the coast – I mean Germany.¹²³

Xenophobic anxieties such as this were further popularized in the pages of papers like the Morning Post, Pall Mall Gazette and Daily Mail.¹²⁴ Britain’s loss of industrial supremacy and the air of suspicion that accompanied it, however, did not inflame the “collective mind” to the degree caused by the emerging perception of military decline and the growth of the German navy.

At the outset of the second South African War there was an almost universal sense of confidence among the British public, but this was quickly eroded by a series of military disasters which were reported extensively in the press and which collectively

¹²⁰ Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 61; James Joll, The Origins of the First World War, New York: Longman, 1984, p. 164

¹²¹ Ross J.S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933, pp. 224-272

¹²² Williams, Made in Germany, p. 44.

¹²³ Author Unknown, “Lord Rosebery at Epsom” Times, 25 July 1896, p. 10c

¹²⁴ Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, p. 60

became known as “Black Week.”¹²⁵ Following these disasters, the war assumed the form, as J.L. Garvin wrote in September 1902, of “three years of constant crisis and preoccupation....”¹²⁶ The result was a sense of panic, as Britons attempted to understand their army’s poor showing against what Bernard Shaw had earlier referred to as, “small communities of frontiersmen.”¹²⁷ It was in this sense that, in July 1902, an unnamed author in the Fortnightly Review wrote that in the war England had been tested and had shown itself “corrupted with ease” and displaying “increasing symptoms of slowing down.”¹²⁸ Additionally British conduct in the Transvaal was perceived negatively in the international arena, which only increased what one author in the Times had referred to earlier as, “the isolation of England and her almost universal hatred by other nations.”¹²⁹ Britons were thus becoming increasingly aware of their nation’s potential enemies. As W.T. Stead wrote, “[t]he Empire stripped of its armour, has its hands tied behind its back

¹²⁵ “Black Week” is a term used to describe the mid December 1899 British military defeats at Magersfontein, Colenso, and Stormberg. These defeats were discussed extensively in the press. This is especially true of the Times which had enjoyed an enhanced reputation for its war reportage following the dispatches of W.H. Russell during the Crimean War (1852-1855). For a discussion of the Times coverage of the second South African War see, Jacqueline Beaumont, “The Times at War, 1899-1902,” in Donal Lowry, ed., The South African War Reappraised, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. For Times accounts of the battles of Black Week see, Author Unknown, “Casualties: The Stormberg Reverse,” Times, 8 January 1900, p. 8a; Author Unknown, “The Stormberg Reverse,” Times, 13 January 1900, p. 11e; Author Unknown, “Gatacre’s Repulse at Stormberg,” Times, 18 January 1900, p. 10a; Author Unknown, “The Battle of Colenso,” Times, 17 January 1900, p. 4a; Author Unknown, “The Battle of Colenso,” Times, 26 January 1900, p. 6g; Author Unknown, “After the Battle of Colenso,” Times, 29 January 1900, p. 4a. Also see Kenneth O Morgan, “The Boer War and the Media, 1899-1902,” Twentieth Century British History, 13, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1-16.

¹²⁶ J.L. Garvin, “The Test of Efficiency,” Fortnightly Review, September 1902, p. 412

¹²⁷ Bernard Shaw, Fabianism and the Empire, London: G Richards, 1900, p. 24. For primary source accounts of the panic that followed Black Week as well as other military setbacks in South Africa see, Author Unknown, “Topics of the Day: The Nation and the War,” Spectator, 23 December 1899, pp. 944-945; Author Unknown, “Topics of the Day: The Loyalty of the Cape Dutch,” Spectator, 30 December 1899, pp. 976-977; Author Unknown, “Mr Balfour” Spectator, 13 January 1900, pp. 41-42; Author Unknown, “Conciliation,” Spectator, 20 January 1900, pp. 77-78; Author Unknown, “Topics of the Day: The Government and the War,” Spectator, 3 February 1900, pp. 160-161

¹²⁸ Author Unknown, “England after the War,” Fortnightly Review, 1 July 1902, p. 3

¹²⁹ J.G.K., “To the Editor of the Times,” Times, 11 January 1896, p. 7f

and its bare throat exposed to the keen knife of its bitterest enemies.”¹³⁰ Most prominent among these was Germany which had openly supported the Boers in their war against Britain and whose naval expansion following the first German Naval Law in 1898 had turned it into a significant naval rival.¹³¹ The growth of the German navy became intimately tied to the idea of international animosity between Germany and Britain. From 1898 onwards these two countries became locked in a naval arms race. Journalists such as George Saunders, the Times Berlin correspondent, and the authors of popular literature such as Erskine Childers and William Le Queux, had been raising anxieties over the growth of the German navy in the British public sphere early in the first decade of the twentieth century.¹³² These anxieties were heightened between 1905 and 1908, following the German intervention in Morocco, the introduction of the Dreadnought class ships, the German announcement of an amendment to the Naval Law in November 1907, and the publication of the Kaiser’s 1908 interview in the Daily Telegraph. From 1908 to 1912, the Anglo-German naval arms race came to dominate relations between the two

¹³⁰ W.T. Stead, quoted in Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, p. 242

¹³¹ On 3 January 1896, following Britain’s failed Jameson raid, the Kaiser sent a telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal congratulating him on withstanding the raid. Additionally, as Paul Kennedy notes in The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, by 1900 both the “serious” and “popular” English press were reporting deep rooted Anglophobia in Germany. As Kennedy wrote, “Many Britons learnt of this hostility by reading their daily papers and other magazines.... Saunders, as is well known, conceived it to be his duty to report every manifestation of anti-British feeling, so that the influential readership of the Times would take notice of this new challenge.... [W]ith few exceptions, readers of other British papers were given a similar impression: by April 1900, the Spectator had abandoned its earlier warmth for Germany and was publishing articles with such titles as ‘England’s Real Enemy’; and the Liberal Imperialist Daily Chronicle doubtless made many British breakfast-times uncomfortable by its full descriptions of the Anglophobic cartoons in German dailies and weeklies...” Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 247 The Navy Law provided Alfred von Tirpitz, architect of the German navy, with more than £20 million to develop an extensive fleet which was to consist of 19 battleships, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, and 8 armoured coast-defence ships. See, Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, London: Clarendon Press, 1935, p. 25

¹³² Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp.247-248. See Erskine Childers, Riddle of the Sands, London: Smith, Elder, and Company, 1903. William Le Queux, The Invasion of 1910, London: E. Nash, 1906.

countries.¹³³ The writing of The Great Illusion took place as public worries over the growth of the German navy climaxed.

The velocity at which Britain seemed to be declining, both in military and economic terms, offended what Angell termed “national vanity,” by reminding the public of the nation’s precarious international position. This quickly created a fright and encouraged the growth of irrationalism in public political discussion. As Lord Salisbury noted in 1896 “The collective Briton... is as timorous as a woman; he sees danger everywhere.”¹³⁴ Angell recounted the rapid and tremendous growth of the Anglo-German antagonism in After All: “By the end of 1906, however, I had little time to look around - and the Anglo-German situation seemed suddenly to take on a frightening form. It revealed a monstrous growth of just the kind of irrationalism with which I had dealt in Patriotism Under Three Flags...”¹³⁵ Over the course of less than thirty years Britain had lost a significant degree of its international competitiveness. The perceived rapidity of Britain’s shifting international position furthered the discourse of acceleration which, Angell himself then tied to the growth of irrationalism in the public sphere.

Norman Angell was acutely aware of the accelerated character of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: “One must not ignore the Law of Acceleration [he wrote]. We see more change now in ten years than originally in ten thousand.”¹³⁶ He

¹³³ Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, p. 49

¹³⁴ Lord Salisbury, quoted in Hoffman, p. 224. Tellingly, Angell references this same statement by Salisbury in Patriotism Under Three Flags: “Lord Salisbury, in receiving a large deputation of merchants on one occasion, said that he had always been struck with the enormous difference displayed by Englishmen in a corporate and an individual capacity. They acted, he said, as two different person, adopting as bodies of policies they would never dream of adopting as individuals.” Norman Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, p. 9. Given that Angell knew of the statement it is logical to conclude that he was increasingly aware of the apparent state of panic which defined British public political discussion during this period.

¹³⁵ Angell, After All, p. 135

¹³⁶ Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 199

was also aware of how international and domestic crises during this period were stirring the irrationalism of the “collective mind” and limiting the potential for meaningful public political discussion. As a journalist in both America and Paris, Angell witnessed the way in which the 1895 Venezuelan border dispute, the second South African War, and the Dreyfus Affair had limited the potential for meaningful public spheres in the United States, Britain, and France. According to an article Angell wrote for the English language Parisian newspaper, the Daily Messenger, these events excited nationalistic and jingoistic mentalities wherein “[o]rdinary independence of thought or political action was yelled down as treason.”¹³⁷ Later, commenting on the way in which the second South African War had affected public discourse in Britain, Angell wrote, “[t]here were a dozen good reasons for believing that the conquest of the two Boer republics would not add to the security of Britain’s position in Africa. But to state these reasons in public was as much as a politician’s life was worth...”¹³⁸ Convinced of “the tendency of human judgment in social and political matters to be utterly distorted, warped and twisted...”, Angell wrote his first book which was published in 1903. As he recalled in his autobiography, Patriotism Under Three Flags: A Plea for Rationalism in Politics was, “a first attempt [Angell wrote] to deal with a phenomenon which was to disturb, perplex, and frighten me during the whole of my life, and to run like a red thread through everything I was to write over the next half-century.”¹³⁹ Although the book was reviewed favorably, it was insignificant in terms of sales, selling at best two hundred copies.¹⁴⁰ In Patriotism

¹³⁷ BSU, (Norman Angell Collection), Clippings File Box 62, Norman Angell, Untitled Article, Daily Messenger, n.d.

¹³⁸ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 54, Norman Angell, “Political Writer and Public Mind.”

¹³⁹ Angell, After All, p. 105

¹⁴⁰ McNeal, “Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap,” p. 113. In his review of Patriotism Under Three Flags for the Daily News W.K. Chesterton wrote that it was “an able and interesting book.” Also heavily positive was the review that appeared in the Eastern Daily Press which state that it was “[o]ne of the most

Under Three Flags, Angell depicted his contemporary political environment as irrational and overborne with emotionalism: “National policy [Angell wrote] is more dominated by emotionalism, and is less the result of reflection...”¹⁴¹ According to Angell, events such as the second South African War and the Dreyfus Affair had captured the passions and encouraged a mob mentality that acted in ways that were often contrary to the dictates of reason.¹⁴² In Angell’s view, this was a distinctive characteristic of the Edwardian period:

While it is true that the Victorian era, as much in England as in America, reflects on the whole a contrary spirit – the predominance of a reasoned effort towards well-being, rather than a satisfaction – the recent events analyzed here would show that these forces of rationalism have spent themselves, and that sentiment is once more coming to occupy the first place in public policy.¹⁴³

What Angell was describing was a sense of rising emotionalism which was translating into a sense of panic and emergency. In his view, this sense of panic had captured the public sphere and was limiting the potential for meaningful public debate. “In our day the emotionalism of patriotism has created a state of things by which, just when independence of thought is most needed, the more rational minded are either silenced by sheer noise of patriotic din, or by fear of those penalties which attach to patriotic heresy.”¹⁴⁴ Though this picture of the Edwardian period was shared by contemporaries

notable excursions into the psychology of modern politics...”. Other positive reviews appeared in the Manchester Guardian, the East Anglican Daily Times, the Glasgow Herald, the New Liberal Review, the Saturday Review, the Morning Leader, the Observer, and the Birmingham Post. WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 5, “Some Press Opinions”.

¹⁴¹ Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, p. 13

¹⁴² Angell noted this in Patriotism Under Three Flags: “Few generalizations would seem at first sight to have less justification than these: - That the motives underlying the national behaviour displayed by the peoples respectively concerned in such events as Cleveland’s Venezuelan Message, the Hispano-American War, the Dreyfus Affair, and the South African War, were essentially the same; that in those events considerations of material interest were subordinated to a sentiment which was essentially the same in all, manifested in the same fashion, marked by the same incidents. That national policy was in each case dominated by pride of place and by mastery rather than by the needs of civil well-being, that passions were excited most in defence of a policy which affected material interest little, or not at all, or affected it adversely.” Ibid, p. 17

¹⁴³ Ibid, p. 14

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 85

such as J.A. Hobson, it has never been discussed by historians in direct relation to the political effect of Norman Angell. This is a glaring inadequacy in the historiography since the confrontational and closed character of the Edwardian public sphere accounts for the considerable popularity that *Angellism* enjoyed.

The atmosphere of xenophobic panic that Angell described in Patriotism Under Three Flags was ideal for alarmist ideologies that offered solutions to Britain's apparent decline. One such ideology was national efficiency first expressed by the polemicist and Angell critic, Arnold White. Throughout the second South African War, White had questioned Britain's confidence in a military drawn largely from what he saw as an unfit urban population.¹⁴⁵ As the war entered its second year, White felt that his worries were justified. Capitalizing on the anxieties of the British public, White asked in his 1901 book Efficiency and Empire: "In South Africa we have a lesson. Shall we profit by it sufficiently to reconsider our ways?"¹⁴⁶ Efficiency and Empire was the first thorough exposition of national efficiency.¹⁴⁷

According to White, the war's lesson was that liberalism as a political practice had led to inefficiency in all areas of the British state and that this inefficiency was primarily responsible for Britain's imperial decline. Likening Britain's liberal state to a middle aged man "who eats and drinks to repletion, takes no exercise, and is content to enjoy life while he may", White wrote that it was "...the Anglo-Saxon passion for individualism, patience under adverse circumstances, inherent love of law and order, and

¹⁴⁵ Richard Soloway, "Counting the Degenerates: The Statistics of Race Degeneration in Edwardian England," Journal of Contemporary History, 17, (1982), 140

¹⁴⁶ Arnold White, Efficiency and Empire, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1973, p. xiii

¹⁴⁷ Three useful sources for information on White are: G.R. Searle, "Introduction," in Arnold White, Efficiency and Empire, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1973; G.R. Searle, "White, Arnold, Journalist and Publicist," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online; Author Unknown, "Obituary: Mr. Arnold White," Times, 06 February 1925, p. 14f

continuity of purpose” that had led to Britain’s inefficiency.¹⁴⁸ White concluded that if efficiency was not restored, the British Empire would fall victim to its international competitors: “Either efficiency must be restored to the British administrative system at all costs... or the decline of the British Empire will date from the first decade of the twentieth century.”¹⁴⁹

White’s claim of Britain’s imperial decline aroused a nostalgic sentimentality that attached many Britons to the idea of Empire. Following the conclusion of the war, national efficiency evolved from the cry of alarmists into what appeared to be a legitimate political ideology. It was subsequently adopted and publicly discussed by such distinguished politicians such as Lord Rosebery, and well-known intellectuals such as H.G. Wells and the Webbs. It became a political sensation.¹⁵⁰ On August 16th 1902, while commenting on public opinion surrounding the recent coronation of Edward VII, the Spectator wrote, “At the present time, and perhaps it is the most notable fact of this age, there is a universal outcry for efficiency in all the departments of society, in all the aspects of life.”¹⁵¹ Though national efficiency became more widespread and though it was adopted as the political catch-cry of a distinguished class, it did not lose any of the xenophobic and anti-liberal sentiment it displayed when articulated by White.

¹⁴⁸ White, Efficiency and Empire, p. 28

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 28

¹⁵⁰ The extent to which national efficiency was becoming a sensation is indicated by the fact that it was a title used by various people to justify a vast range of often contrary ends. For example, Lord Roberts used the title of national efficiency to justify and explain the opening of a new indoor rifle range at Clapham Junction Station on 21 October 1909 while in January 1904 Sidney Lee used the title of national efficiency to justify the necessity of increased education in the humanities, particularly in terms of the literary examination of Shakespeare. Author Unknown, “Lord Roberts on National Efficiency,” Times, 22 October 1909, p. 8b. Author Unknown, “Mr Sidney Lee on Books and National Efficiency,” Times, 14 January 1904, p. 10d

¹⁵¹ Author Unknown, “After the Coronation”, Spectator, 16 August 1902, p. 212

National efficiency advocates emphasized that the early twentieth century represented a noticeable break with the past. Sydney Webb commented in 1901, that Britons had become a “new people”:

It is not altogether an idle fancy that associates the change of century with a change of thought. The governing ideas to which we look forward, at the beginning of the twentieth century, will, we may be sure, not be those to which we looked back at the close of the nineteenth.¹⁵²

In the context of this perceived break with tradition, national efficiency advocates consistently declared the inability of Britain’s liberal traditions to work within the accelerated environment of the early twentieth century.¹⁵³ Arguing that, as Wells wrote, “The old party fabrics are no more than dead rotting things,” national efficiency claimed that Britain needed to follow Germany’s example and design government along business lines with more power resting in the hands of the executive or else it would be swallowed up in a new international order.¹⁵⁴ Alarmed with the anti-liberal character of national efficiency Angell wrote:

There has grown up in England recently a party which professes... that [liberal] principles need not be regarded so long as there be ‘efficiency.’ We are told there is no danger in giving the government irresponsible power, if only it be a ‘business government.’ The nation must surely ignore the practical experience of Germany in this respect.¹⁵⁵

United in their condemnation of Britain’s existing political system national efficiency, advocates were heavily divided in their prescriptions for change. While some, like

¹⁵² Sydney Webb, “Fabian Tract No. 108, Twentieth Century Politics: A Policy of National Efficiency.” London: The Fabian Society, 1901, p. 2

¹⁵³ Webb, “Fabian Tract 108”

¹⁵⁴ It is worth noting that Angell owned the book in which Wells made this statement and that the book may be found in the Ball State Norman Angell collection, Mankind in the Making p. 9. Lord Rosebery expressed a sentiment similar to Wells’. In his introduction to Alfred Stead’s 1905 Great Japan: A Study in National Efficiency he wrote: “The fact is that party is an evil... Its operation blights efficiency. It keeps out of employment a great mass of precious ability. It puts into place not the fittest but the most eligible, from the party point of view – that is, very often, the worst.” Quoted in Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, p. 93

¹⁵⁵ Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags p. 64

Haldane and the Webbs, were interested in social and educational reform, a great many others, like Maxse and Hewins, were primarily interested in maintaining Britain's powerful international position. These cleavages revealed national efficiency's ideological shallowness and undermined its ability to do anything other than further the public sphere's preexisting panic. National efficiency was like a piñata; containing various generally unconnected pieces, it was held together only by a thin shell that was sure to crack and break.

The closest the quest for national efficiency ever came to organizational unity was in November 1902, when Sidney Webb formed a small dining club called the Co-Efficients. This club was founded with twelve members of various political stripes. Each was presumed to be an expert in his field.¹⁵⁶ Webb's club was not simply intended to be a socially eclectic dining group, rather it had a particular political object.¹⁵⁷ Webb believed that the existing political parties did not represent British public opinion, which in his view demanded efficiency above all else.¹⁵⁸ According to Webb, Campbell-Bannerman's Liberals were little more than a party of "Gladstonian Ghosts" and though Salisbury's Conservative Party had been in power since 1895 its success was less an endorsement of Conservatism than it was an indication of contempt for the Liberals.¹⁵⁹ On this basis

¹⁵⁶ The following are the names of some of the founding members, their political affiliations, and their portfolios: Sydney Webb (Fabian Socialist; local government), R.B. Haldane (Liberal Imperialist; law), Edward Grey (Liberal Imperialist; foreign affairs), L.S. Amery (Radical Tory; army), W.A.S. Hewins (Tariff Reformer; economics), Halford Mackinder (Tariff Reformer; geography), Bertrand Russell (Pacifist; philosophy), H.G. Wells (Fabian Socialist; literature), Leo Maxse (Radical Tory; journalism)

¹⁵⁷ The idea that the Co-Efficient club was intended to fill a political purpose is alluded to in a letter sent from Beatrice Webb to Bertrand Russell following the latter's resignation from the club. Webb wrote, "I doubt whether such a discussion society is of much value unless your business in life is mainly political..." Beatrice Webb to Bertrand Russell, May 1903, Box 5.52, Bertrand Russell Fonds, McMaster University Archive

¹⁵⁸ Sidney Webb, "Twentieth Century Politics: A Policy of National Efficiency," London: The Fabian Society, 190, p 7

¹⁵⁹ Sidney Webb "Lord Rosebery's Escape from Houndsditch" *Nineteenth Century and After*, (1), September 1901, p. 373

Webb argued that Britain required a new party with a new philosophy that was relevant and in touch with the demands of the twentieth century; one which could, as he put it, “breathe new life into the dry bones of our public offices.”¹⁶⁰ Webb believed “...that without some new grouping of the electorate, without the inspiration of some new thought, no virile and fecund Opposition, let alone an alternative Government, is conceivable.”¹⁶¹ According to Webb, the creation of this new political party required individuals with diverse political beliefs and backgrounds who could be united in an ideology of national efficiency.¹⁶² Webb intended the Co-Efficient Club, formed one year later, to be the “Brains Trust” or “General Staff” of this new party.

It was not long after the group’s formation, however, before it became obvious that Webb had created little more than a chimera. Though he had intended to revive politics in Britain, he had involved himself in a political discourse built on panic that lacked substance and was inherently fractured. This was reflected in the speed with which cleavages emerged and the club’s political object was abandoned. The staunchly imperialist views of members such as Leo Maxse, Halford Mackinder, and L.S. Amery were in marked contrast to the generally liberal and reformist beliefs of other members, such as Bertrand Russell.¹⁶³ These ideological differences led to noticeable divisions within the Co-Efficient Club and to numerous arguments among its members, making the group politically impracticable: “I very soon found [Bertrand Russell wrote] that I was

¹⁶⁰ Webb “Twentieth Century Politics,” p. 7

¹⁶¹ Webb “Lord Rosebery’s Escape,” p. 374

¹⁶² As Webb put it, “Such a campaign cannot be undertaken by any one man, however, eminent. It involves the close co-operation of a group of men of diverse temperaments and varied talents, imbued with a common faith and a common purpose, and eager to work out, and severally expound, how each department of national life can be raised to its highest possible efficiency.” Webb, “Lord Rosebery’s Escape,” p. 386

¹⁶³ Wells acknowledged such a cleavage in his autobiography where he discussed, “...Maxse, Bellairs, Hewins, Amery, and Mackinder... arguing chiefly against the liberalism of Reeves and Russell and myself...” H.G. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography: Discoveries and Conclusions of a very Ordinary Brain, New York: Macmillan, 1934, p. 653

too much out of sympathy with most of the Co-Efficients to be able to profit by the discussions or contribute usefully to them.”¹⁶⁴ The ideological incompatibility of its membership made the group politically unworkable and, as Amery wrote in his memoirs, “The Co-Efficients, as a brains trust with a definite political object, petered out almost as soon as it began.”¹⁶⁵

As the political prospects of the Co-Efficients came to an end, so too did any hope of a unified national efficiency movement. Effective in criticizing Britain’s liberal state, national efficiency advocates could provide neither a viable nor a unified alternative. National efficiency was, therefore, nothing more than one aspect of a general frustration with liberal democracy’s perceived inability to keep up with an accelerated political atmosphere. Ironically, however, national efficiency also helped to promote this acceleration: by publicly denouncing Britain’s liberal traditions, declaring the decline of the Empire, and by not providing a solution, national efficiency was like the doctor who informs his patient of a terminal illness and offers no further assistance.

As the ideological shallowness of national efficiency became evident, a new movement based largely on panic and marked by a confrontational tone began to capture Britain’s public sphere. In 1903, Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign became Britain’s most controversial political issue.¹⁶⁶ Much like national efficiency, the tariff reform issue struck at the heart of British liberalism. Free trade was a centerpiece of this tradition and though there had previously been some questioning, it was Chamberlain’s campaign which, as Amery recalled in his memoirs, kindled “into instant flame all the

¹⁶⁴ Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, London: Allen, 1969, p. 77

¹⁶⁵ L.S. Amery, *My Political Life*, London: Hutchinson, 1955, p. 224

¹⁶⁶ Chamberlain’s speech to his constituents in Birmingham has been reproduced in, Charles Walter Boyd, ed., *Mr. Chamberlain’s Speeches*, “A Demand for an Inquiry,” London: Constable, 1914, pp. 125-139

embers of doubt and suspicion about the infallibility of free trade, which had been silently smoldering for years.”¹⁶⁷ Chamberlain’s campaign, however, did more. Free trade had been closely tied to the British identity for the better half of a century. Thus Chamberlain’s public campaign for tariff reform challenged Edwardian society to rethink not just its political economy, but its identity as well. While some Britons held close to the free trade “arguments of ‘46”, others, perceiving a need for fresh economic thinking, praised Chamberlain and enthusiastically supported tariff reform. The rhetoric of tariff reformers was heavily based on the panic resulting from Britain’s relative economic decline. Thus Angell wrote: “...international hostility is in reality at the bottom of the Protectionist idea.”¹⁶⁸ Tariff reformers held that free trade had left Britain defenseless in the face of its economic competitors and that it would be decadent and cowardly to continue with this policy. As John Crozier wrote in the Fortnightly Review 1902:

To sit and see our commerce captured by pre-concerted design, and our industries given over to the spoiler like sheep on an open plain, because the ghost of a dead and superannuated political economy has forbidden the erection of defences against the wolves, and because it has decreed that trade will best thrive when it is allowed to wander at its will anywhere and without protection – this indeed would be an inherent cowardice, and he who shall deliver the nation from this Old Economy under which it sits enchanted will, like Cato, deserve if he does not receive, the gratitude of his country.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Amery, My Political Life, p. 236. A prominent example of the “embers of doubt and suspicion” which Amery referred to was the National Fair Trade League formed in 1881. This organization enjoyed moderate success and was supported by many of Salisbury’s Conservatives. Nevertheless, the political catch cry of this organization always played second fiddle to other political issues. Thus, Salisbury silenced the current of tariff reform that was running through his caucus so as to secure the support of Liberal Unionists, conclude the Unionist alliance, and be better equipped to fight Gladstone over Irish Home Rule. For a discussion of this see, Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Reform, p. 84; Sydney Zebel, “Fair Trade: An English Reaction to the Breakdown of the Cobden Treaty System,” Journal of Modern History, 12, No. 2, (June 1940), 173

¹⁶⁸ Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, p. 71

¹⁶⁹ John Crozier, “How to Ruin a Free Trade Nation,” Fortnightly Review, (78), July 1902, p. 35. Crozier’s article is evidence of the fear, panic, and anxiety that was at the root of much of the tariff reform rhetoric. Exhibiting these traits Crozier, making an obvious allusion to Germany’s growth, depicts Britain as being “threatened on all hands by younger rivals.” Additionally this article displays the accelerated temporal mindset that underpinned the movement. Crozier comments that “in the short interval since then, events

Much like national efficiency, the tariff reform movement's focus on Britain's imperial decline and on the decline of its economic competitiveness excited panic and further accelerated the public sphere. Bertrand Russell observed this in a letter he wrote to the French historian of British politics, Elie Halévy:

Have you not observed, over and over again, that excitement leads to follies?... So protectionists here spend almost all their time proving, what is obvious, that we are losing our industrial supremacy. Thus they get people in a fright, ready for any remedy that may be proposed.¹⁷⁰

The fright which Russell was referring to was only compounded by the apparent inability of Parliament to respond.

In the same way that tariff reform divided the public sphere between free traders and tariff reformers, so it divided the Government. From 1903 to 1906, Balfour's Conservative Government was split between Chamberlain's group and those who supported free trade. To heal this cleavage, and facilitate the work of government, Balfour felt compelled to take the middle-ground on the tariff issue. To many, however, this made him appear weak and indecisive. Under the pseudonym "Calchas," J.L. Garvin wrote in the Fortnightly Review: "The commonplace view of the Prime Minister is that he is a weak man."¹⁷¹ Similarly, an unnamed author in the Nation wrote that Balfour had shown himself to be "a reed shaken in the wind" and argued that, "a great trading nation cannot long put up with a Prime Minister who does not know his own mind in the things of commerce and taxation."¹⁷² Between September and October 1903, tariff reform was

have moved so fast... that both the public and the press have been staggered and bewildered." Ibid, pp. 33, 34

¹⁷⁰ WRAC (Bertrand Russell Collection), Box 5.20, Bertrand Russell to Elie Halevy, 2 February 1904

¹⁷¹ J.L. Garvin [Calchas], "Mr. Chamberlain the Protagonist and the Future," Fortnightly Review, November 1903, (80), 745

¹⁷² (Author Unknown), "Pinchbeck Protectionism," Nation, 4 June 1903, pp. 450-451

responsible for three significant ministerial resignations, and by 1905 it was largely responsible for Balfour's own resignation as Prime Minister, which initiated a general election in 1906.

The tariff reform issue thus affected the British parliament and the public sphere in two distinct ways. The rhetoric of tariff reformers raised alarm about the position and efficacy of the British state. It polarized Edwardian society and hastened through confusion and panic the pace of the public sphere. Concomitantly, the politically divisive nature of the tariff reform issue weakened the position and appearance of Balfour's Government. By dividing the Government, the tariff reform issue slowed Parliament and made it appear unresponsive. With Parliament unable to keep up with the public sphere, the distinctions between civil society and polity multiplied. The popular English political magazine, Punch, captured this growing distinction nicely in a cartoon entitled, "History Reverses Itself; or, Papa Joseph taking Master Arthur a Protection Walk" (Appendix).¹⁷³ Here Chamberlain is depicted as a grown man who is hastily walking in the direction of "Protection" while a childlike Balfour, whose hand he is holding, stumbles behind. The caption reads: "Papa Joseph: 'Come along, Master Arthur. Do step out.' Master Arthur: 'That's all very well, but you know I cannot go as fast as you.'"¹⁷⁴ In this cartoon Punch exhibits a clear recognition of the inability of the British Government to keep up with its public sphere. The cartoon indicates a contemporary awareness of the growing "temporal misfit" between polity and civil society.

The 1906 general election, which followed Balfour's resignation, proved a landslide victory for the Liberal Party. The Liberals were given a staggering 400 seats in

¹⁷³ "History Reverses Itself; or, Papa Joseph taking Master Arthur a Protection Walk," Punch, 16 December 1903, p. 425

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

sharp contrast to the Opposition's meager 157.¹⁷⁵ This indicated a widespread frustration with the old government, which had been in power for a decade, and a desire for reform. The new Liberal Government, however, proved just as ineffective as the previous Conservative one: "Campbell-Bannerman's Government, while not without its achievements, had simply not succeeded in becoming that power-house of reform that many... had anticipated after the landslide election victory of 1906."¹⁷⁶ With public support dwindling, the Liberals reevaluated the philosophy on which their party was based.¹⁷⁷ The result was a New Liberalism that was based on an organic conception of the polity and which engaged in a class based politics by appealing to the socio-economic needs of the working class.¹⁷⁸ The new left leaning Liberalism, however, only worsened existing tensions between the Liberal Government and the Conservative House of Lords.¹⁷⁹ By 1910, following the Lords' rejection of Lloyd George's "people's budget," these tensions would literally paralyze Parliament in a "constitutional crisis." The paralysis was furthered when on Friday May 6th 1910 King Edward VII died suddenly.¹⁸⁰ Thus both the institutional and the symbolic representations of British politics had ceased in their motion. By early May 1910, the perceived speed of movement in the public

¹⁷⁵ Coetzee, For Party or Country, p. 71

¹⁷⁶ Murray, The People's Budget 1909/10, p. 51

¹⁷⁷ For an in-depth discussion of the necessity of revision within the Liberal Party by a prolific contemporary author see, L.T. Hobhouse, "The Prospects of Liberalism" Contemporary Review, 93, (March 1908), 349-358

¹⁷⁸ P.F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. These ideas, while they had been previously expressed in the Oxford classes of T.H. Green, were now given voice within the Liberal Party by reformist Liberals such as C.F.G. Masterman.

¹⁷⁹ These tensions had emerged earlier on when in 1906 Campbell-Bannerman began a campaign against the veto power of the Lords.

¹⁸⁰ It is not just the King's death that is important here but the suddenness with which it occurred. His illness had not been publicly announced until the day before his death and had not been pronounced grave until the day of his death. The gravity of feeling that accompanied the King's death was thus amplified by its high degree of suddenness. As the Times reported, "The loss of a ruler so respected and so beloved would have been heavy in any circumstances. The suddenness with which it has fallen upon us makes it overpowering to us all." Author Unknown, "Death of the King," Times, May 7 1910, p. 11c

sphere became entirely distinct from that which was occurring in polity. This significant temporal distinction between polity and public sphere only compounded the panic that had begun with the appearance of Britain's relative decline. Although a conference was called to diffuse the parliamentary deadlock it had little effect and as British society sped along it could only watch as its Parliament fell into crisis.¹⁸¹ Thus on November 19th the Spectator opened: "The political crisis has absorbed the attention of the nation this week."¹⁸²

This was the political atmosphere in which Angell lived when he wrote what would become The Great Illusion. Indeed Angell referred to "Europe's Optical Illusion" as "a political pamphlet written at a time of panic."¹⁸³ Bound by an institutional focus that equates initiating policy change with political impact, the historiography that surrounds Angell has neglected this domestic atmosphere of panic and has, therefore, never provided a complete political analysis of Britain's public sphere and Angell's role within it. As shown in the previous chapter, the tradition has been to argue that, since Angell did not effect any significant policy change, any affect he had on the public sphere was non-political. This logic, however, ignores the central importance of patterns of speech to

¹⁸¹ Frustration with the parliamentary deadlock was also demonstrated by participants in the constitutional conference whose dual role as citizens and politicians made them acutely aware of the growing temporal misfit between polity and public sphere. While the conference was in recess during August 1910 Lloyd George, who had been chosen as one of the Government's delegates, drafted a secret memorandum calling for a national coalition Government. The August memorandum, as it became known, was largely rooted in the rhetoric of national efficiency and closely resembled the ideas expressed earlier in the century by Rosebery, Webb, and the Coefficient Club. It argued that the party system was tearing Britain apart and proposed the formation of a business-like government. By October 20th all members of the conference had been informed of Lloyd George's proposal and throughout the last week of October there were a series of secret and informal discussions regarding it. Though nothing came of these secret talks, the fact that Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Arthur Balfour, and other parliamentarians, were discussing the formation of a national government, indicates the extent to which the efficacy of the party system had been eroded. For a discussion of these secret talks see, Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 176-182 and Searle, For Country or Party, pp. 70-76

¹⁸² Author Unknown, "The Political Situation", Spectator Nov 19 1910 p. 841

¹⁸³ Hilton, A Report of Certain Discussions, p. 393

political practice. Through this neglect, historians have continued to inaccurately depict Angell as politically ineffective. What makes this situation surprising is that evidence exists which demonstrates the political value of Angell's affect on patterns of public speech. All that is in fact necessary for this discernment is knowledge of Angell's own political thinking, to which patterns of public speech were a central concern.

According to Angell, "it is intellectual life which is the essence of human life."¹⁸⁴ As an intellectual disciple of Mill's On Liberty, Angell believed that the true mark of a civilized society was the extent of its tolerance: "To make freedom conditional upon holding right views is to undo the best work of civilization."¹⁸⁵ In Angell's political thinking, open-ended public political debate was key to democratic practice: "There can be no sound democracy without sound individual judgment. . . . That skill cannot possibly be developed save by the habit of free tolerant discussion."¹⁸⁶ By "free and tolerant" Angell was referring to "an adequate sense of responsibility, a sense of the moral obligation to be not partisan, fanatical, emotional but disciplined, [and] intellectually honest."¹⁸⁷ Angell believed that without responsibility and discipline public debate had little political value:

The question is not whether we discuss public policy – we do it in any case endlessly, noisily, raucously, passionately. The question is whether we are to carry on the discussion with some regard to evidence, some sense of responsibility to truth and sound judgment; or with disregard of those things in favor of indulgence in atavistic emotion.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 14, Angell to Harry Lane, n.d.

¹⁸⁵ Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, p. 37. In recounting Mill's influence on him Angell referenced Mill's emphasis on the importance of listening to criticism: "I'd been taught, for instance, that I should never listen to anything that might endanger my faith, but here as a man who said that you could never know whether a thing was true unless you had listened to what had been said against it and that the only way to sift through truth from error was to listen patiently to what could be said against an alleged truth." Angell, Reminiscences, p. 11

¹⁸⁶ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 46, "Power"

¹⁸⁷ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 46, "Public Mind"

¹⁸⁸ Angell, After All, p. 145

If public political discussion was made more reasonable and tolerant, Angell believed, many fundamental political problems could be solved:

If it were part of our recognized moral obligations, and of our social etiquette, to maintain always the temper of reasonableness, toleration of contrary opinion, the attitude of enquiry and the open mind... we should not get into senseless panics which so often in politics lead us into disastrous courses.¹⁸⁹

The endurance of this belief is indicated by the way in which Angell concluded his 1933 Nobel lecture: “Only by intellectual rectitude and in that field shall we be saved. There is no refuge but in truth, in the unconquerable mind of man.”¹⁹⁰ The tendency of individuals to indulge in emotion at the expense of reason in their public political discussion was, for Angell, a fundamental political problem and it was largely bound up with what he termed the “collective mind.”¹⁹¹

According to Angell, the result of one common incident giving a body of persons a “corporate capacity” was the emergence of a collective mind which “reflects, not the average of the units nor even the quality that is common to all, but a distinct, new mentality...”¹⁹² The most noticeable characteristic of this new mentality was a “lower degree of rationalism and a more intense emotionalism...”¹⁹³ To put it simply, Angell’s view was that “men in their collective – their national – capacity are actuated by motives of a distinctly lower type than [sic] those which control their personal conduct.”¹⁹⁴ Thus, in Angell’s view, instances of national crisis, such as the second South African War or

¹⁸⁹ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 47, Norman Angell, “Democracy and the Main Street Mind”. Similarly Angell wrote in Patriotism Under Three Flags, “We may fairly say that as religious feeling has advanced in civilizing influence in proportion as it has been rectified by rationalism, so, advance in political feeling will be marked in like manner.” Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, p. 16

¹⁹⁰ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 46, “Peace and the Public Mind”

¹⁹¹ See earlier discussion in Chapter One, page 1, footnote 2.

¹⁹² Angell, Patriotism Under Three Flags, p. 7

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 7

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 13

the Anglo-German naval arms race, generally resulted in an increase of irrationalism and emotionalism ensuring “the empire of instinct over reason” in the patterns of speech which characterized the public sphere.¹⁹⁵

These statements indicate that Angell was aware of the power that the public sphere held and was intensely interested in the political function of, what he termed, “emotionalism” in the “collective mind.” This interest existed throughout the better part of his life. It was expressed in his life-long correspondence with his brother Harry, it was the primary motivation for his first book Patriotism Under Three Flags: A Plea For Rationalism in Politics (1903), it was the central theme of his 1933 Nobel Prize lecture, and he consistently reflected on it in After All. Angell’s awareness of the anti-liberal political power of panicked and irrational patterns of speech in the public sphere points to a particular dialogue between his environment and himself. The historiographical tendency to ignore the political value of Angell’s contribution to the public sphere ignores this dialogue.

One aspect of this dialogue was Angell’s own understanding of the sense of acceleration prevalent in his environment. Angell believed that the public sphere could be made more rational as a result of due consideration being given to the “laws of Acceleration.” Responding to the criticism that it takes “thousands of years” for humans to fundamentally change Angell argued, “this dogmatism ignores the laws of Acceleration...”, concluding that, given the speed of his contemporary society, the public temper could be made more rational at a much faster pace.¹⁹⁶ Angell’s direct reference to the speed of change which largely characterized his political environment indicates that

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 11

¹⁹⁶ Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 220

he was aware that acceleration was occurring and was cognizant of the fact that it could have a political impact without necessarily directly affecting policy.

Like national efficiency and tariff reform, *Angellism* was intimately tied to the discourse of acceleration. Like these other movements, *Angellism* publicly questioned certain axiomatic beliefs current in the Edwardian period. Unlike these movements, however, *Angellism* never adopted a confrontational or xenophobic character. Angell's intellectual attachment to Mill led to *Angellism's* cosmopolitan character, firmly rooted in the principle that the right to speak has no value without the obligation to listen. In 1911, Angell wrote of himself, "so far from declining to listen to my opponents, they are just the people whom I listen to most carefully."¹⁹⁷ Forty years later he wrote in his autobiography:

In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct.... The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it.¹⁹⁸

Angell's emphasis on discussion, reflection and critical self-examination which are inherently slow moving processes, moved counter to the accelerated and confrontational character of the Edwardian public sphere. As his ideas created a vast forum for public debate, this emphasis increasingly came to define that forum. Indeed it can be argued that the increasing public currency of *Angellism* before 1914 temporally affected the British public sphere.

While the confrontational nature of national efficiency and tariff reform enhanced the panic of the Edwardian period, the free exchange of ideas that characterized

¹⁹⁷ WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 1, Norman Angell to R. Walton, 28 April 1911

¹⁹⁸ Angell, *The Great Illusion*, p. 173

Angellism helped calm the panic and slow the acceleration of the Edwardian public sphere. In other words, by affecting the patterns of speech in the public sphere *Angellism* became involved in an inherently political discourse. Between 1910 and 1914, *Angellism* had a significant political effect in that it helped diffuse the mounting crisis within Britain's liberal democracy by slowing, calming and opening up the public sphere. In an effort to prove this, the next chapter will discuss at length the growth of *Angellism* and the persistence of its dedication to open-ended public debate.

Chapter Three:
Norman Angellism as a New Discursive Space

On the evening of 24 July 1914, the day after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the rationalist and Liberal Member of Parliament, J.M. Robertson addressed an internationally diverse gathering of *Angellites* at the International Polity Summer School held by the Garton Foundation at Old Jordans Hostel in Beaconsfield.¹⁹⁹ Like Angell, Robertson was convinced of the political efficacy of public reason and, in fact, it was Angell's emphasis on rationalism in *The Great Illusion* that initially attracted Robertson to the "New Pacifism."²⁰⁰ Complimenting Angell on his book in April 1911, Robertson wrote, "...I want men's reason captured and your book is doing that to an unprecedented extent."²⁰¹ The subject of Robertson's address to the summer school in July 1914 was "Reasoning."²⁰² Robertson stated that rational and emotional mental activities were intimately related and that with every rational mental activity there was an emotional correlative.²⁰³ With the growth of reason, Robertson claimed, feelings of panic and anxiety could be noticeably limited: "...there is one sense in which feeling may be said to decline with the cultivation of the ratiocinative side of the mind; that is to say, the

¹⁹⁹ Why exactly Angell chose this location is a mystery. It was the burial site of the Quaker pacifist William Penn. Like Angell, J.M. Robertson was a journalist and author before he became a politician. Throughout nineteenth century he was heavily involved in the secularist cause in England and from 1891 to 1893 he was editor of the famous secularist Charles Bradlaugh's paper, the *National Reformer*. Robertson wrote several books on liberalism, rationalism, and contemporary political issues, including: *Home Rule Problems*, *History of Free-thought in the Nineteenth Century*, and *The Meaning of Liberalism*. For a more detailed biographical sketch of Robertson see Odin Dekkers, *J.M. Robertson*, London: Ashgate, 1998.

²⁰⁰ "New Pacifism" was a phrase used at this time to describe the non-religious pacifism. Generally the "New Pacifism" had an economic orientation and was not necessarily concerned with the moral implications of warfare.

²⁰¹ WRAC Norman Angell Collection, Box 1, J.M. Robertson to Norman Angell, 3 April 1911

²⁰² Robertson's address had been reproduced in its entirety in John Hilton ed., *Report of Certain Discussions*, pp. 283-304

²⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 290

tempestuous rush of feeling is no doubt modified and controlled.”²⁰⁴ The degree to which Robertson had in mind the panic characteristic of much the period’s public discourse is unknown. His statement, however, helps to extend Scheuerman’s logic to the public sphere, shedding light on the political significance of Angell’s impact on both domestic and international public discussion.

From 1910 to 1914, in contrast to the dominant tone of public discourse, *Norman Angellism* relied on an approach that remained largely non-partisan, open-ended and attached to Angell’s principle that “The Right of Free Speech is an empty thing unless it is accompanied with a sense of the obligation to listen to the other fellow.”²⁰⁵ *Norman Angellism* carried with it an inherent capacity to calm and slow down Robertson’s “tempestuous rush of feeling.” When this quality is considered alongside *Norman Angellism’s* tremendous domestic and international growth it becomes possible to seriously question the dominant historiographical depiction of Angell as politically insignificant. Indeed, by building on the two pillars of Scheuerman and McNeal’s work one can argue, that as a new discursive space that was defined by a distinct temporality, *Norman Angellism* challenged not only the dominant ideas on war but, perhaps more importantly, the prevailing tone of public political discussion and the Edwardian experience of time. In this way, it increased not only the quantity, but also the quality of participation within the public sphere. By providing the public with pause to think *Angellism* helped slow the perceived speed of movement and restore focus to that which had become blurred by the acceleration accompanying the growing international hostility between Germany and Britain. Since, as Scheuerman has already shown, liberal

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 290

²⁰⁵ BSU Norman Angell Collection, Box 45, “Free Speech”

democracy is potentially disabled by high-speed environments, one can argue that Angell helped create an environment more conducive to liberal democratic practice.

In Patriotism Under Three Flags, Angell had shown that he was acutely aware of the jingoistic environment of the early twentieth century. The Great Illusion was an extension of his earlier work, but with a more specific political focus. Like many of the political movements which grew up in Edwardian Britain, *Norman Angellism* and The Great Illusion were rooted in the anxieties that accompanied Britain's changing international position. Despite critics who claimed that he believed that war was impossible, Angell argued that war was in fact the likely outcome of the panic and the jingoism that accompanied the naval arms race between Germany and Britain:

It is generally admitted [Angell wrote] that the present rivalry in armaments in Europe – notably such as that between England and Germany – cannot go on in its present form indefinitely....There are two current solutions which are offered as a means of egress from this impasse. There is that of the smaller party... who hope to solve the problem by a resort to general disarmament.... And there is that of the larger, which is esteemed the more practical party, who are persuaded that the present state of rivalry and recurrent irritation is bound to culminate in an armed conflict....²⁰⁶

The Great Illusion was meant to stimulate thought, to initiate widespread public political discussion and to avert the prophecy of “the more practical party.” As McNeal wrote of Angell: “For him, the key to international order rested in the public mind, and his primary task was to reach that mind, to convey the significance of international interdependence, to change the climate of opinion, to break up the intellectual basis of the policy which produces armaments in Europe.”²⁰⁷ Angell believed that if he could reach the “collective mind,” expose the economic and philosophical fallacies out of which war emerged, and

²⁰⁶ Angell, The Great Illusion, pp. 3-4

²⁰⁷ McNeal, “Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap,” p. 142

encourage a rational temper of political discussion, he could help avert a future international conflict.

In The Great Illusion, Angell situated himself within the intellectual currents prevalent in the Edwardian public sphere. In the book's first section "The Economics of the Case", he argued against the widely held belief that national well-being and military strength were intimately related. In this way he Angell placed himself in dialogue with a discourse on international relations that was espoused by such prominent thinkers as Alfred T. Mahan, Benjamin Kidd and Frederic Harrison.²⁰⁸ Moreover, Angell did not elevate his argument and his prose to a level that would be impenetrable to "the man in the street." Rather, in Angell's view a refutation of the economic rationale for war needed to be "neither abstruse nor difficult" and required only a "simple exposition of the political facts of Europe as they exist today."²⁰⁹ By increasing the accessibility of his arguments, while at the same time placing himself in dialogue with household intellectual names, Angell raised the potential for his book to take hold of the "collective mind."

The central idea of Angell's economic argument was what he termed, "the financial interdependence of the modern world."²¹⁰ Placing his argument within the period's fascination with technological speed, exhibited by Wells' "Anticipations" and the emergence of Vorticism under Wyndham Lewis, Angell argued that this interdependence was made possible by the vastly increased rapidity of communication characteristic of the early twentieth century:²¹¹

²⁰⁸ Angell also cites several articles that exhibit this assumption from the following newspapers and periodicals: Times (London), National Review, Fortnightly Review, United Service Magazine, Economist and Blackwood's Magazine.

²⁰⁹ Angell, The Great Illusion, pp. 27-28

²¹⁰ Ibid, p. 48

²¹¹ Vorticism was a short lived English art form that began in 1913 when four artists left the Roger Fry led Omega Group and joined Wyndham Lewis in founding the Rebel Art Centre. As an artistic movement

The vital interdependence here indicated, cutting athwart frontiers, is largely the work of the last forty years.... This interdependence is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of modern life which date from yesterday – the rapid post, the instantaneous dissemination of financial aid and commercial information by means of telegraphy, and generally the incredible progress of rapidity in communication which has put the half-dozen chief capitals of Christendom in closer contact financially, and has rendered them more dependent the one upon the other than were the chief cities of Great Britain less than a hundred years ago.²¹²

The crux of Angell’s argument here was the idea of credit. Angell pointed out that rapid means of communication made possible the vast extension of credit on an international scale making the conditions of international politics infinitely more complex than in any previous period.²¹³ Angell argued that in his world it was not in the interest of Germany to attack or invade Britain: “Germany is today in a larger sense than she was ever before our debtor, and... her industrial success is bound up with our financial success.”²¹⁴ If a conflict occurred between these two nations, Angell continued, “[t]he value of the stocks and shares would collapse, and the credit of all those persons and institutions would also be shaken and shattered, and the whole credit system... would collapse like a house of cards.”²¹⁵

Angell’s argument was not isolated economic reasoning. It was intimately tied to a political discourse that had animated the period’s growing internationalism, as well as the philosophy of T.H. Green and the return of the Liberal Party under the rubric of the New

Vorticism borrowed heavily from continental movements such as Futurism and Cubism. The Vorticists by and large drew their inspiration from the fast pace of modern, industrial, urban life. For a more thorough discussion of this movement see: Paul Peppis, Literature, Politics, and the English Avant-Garde: Nation and Empire, 1901-1918, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000; William Wees, Vorticism and the English Avant-Garde, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972; Richard Humphreys, Wyndham Lewis, London: Tate Publishers, 2004.

²¹² Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 50

²¹³ Ibid, p. 271

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 55. There is some evidence in the secondary literature that supports Angell’s claim of interdependence: Sidney Pollard, “The Conflict between the Economic Urge towards Integration and the Political Drive towards Autarky from the 1870s to 1914,” in Sidney Pollard, ed., The Integration of the European Economy Since 1815, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 42-60; Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War p. 62

²¹⁵ Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 58

Liberalism.²¹⁶ More precisely, Angell's argument posited an organic vision of an international polity linked by rapid communication: "A condition of sensibility [Angell wrote] by which the organism as a whole becomes quickly conscious of any damage to a part."²¹⁷ To Angell, credit represented the sensory nerve for this organic international polity: "Now, credit is performing, among other functions, this immense service to the economic and social organism: it is providing it with sensory nerves, by which damage to any part or to any function can be felt, and, thanks to such a feeling, avoided."²¹⁸ The rapidity of communication made this discomfort felt instantaneously around the world. Credit and speed were, in Angell's view, two means by which war could be vastly limited.

The second section of The Great Illusion, "The Human Nature and Morals of the Case", was similarly plugged into the period's predominant intellectual currents. This section was not present in "Europe's Optical Illusion" and was in many ways a response to Angell's critics, who argued that he had previously ignored the emotional or instinctual

²¹⁶ For a discussion of TH Green's political philosophy in terms of its organic vision see I.M. Greengarten, Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal Democratic Thought, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981; John H. Muirhead, Service of the State: Four Lectures on the Political Teaching of T.H. Green, London: Murray, 1908. The early twentieth century was a period of growing internationalism. Cornelia Navari noted in Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century that in the first decade of the twentieth century there were approximately 300 professional associations or cause groups with international ties. One aspect of this growing internationalism was the emergence of an international public sphere wherein the inherent competitiveness of the Westphalian state system was challenged by the cooperation of individuals and organizations from various countries brought together out of common concerns. As F.S. Lyons wrote, "Alongside the Europe of many frontiers there existed an international Europe where the traditional divisions between countries had come to have less and less meaning." Angell's emphasis in the first section of his book on the shrinking of space through communication and interdependence, and in the second section on cooperation was intimately tied to the growing movement towards internationalism. This is certainly demonstrated by the correspondence he received from members of the Esperantist movement. As one Esperantist wrote to Angell, "The theory of the Esperantists is that that [sic] language has exactly the same tendency to link nations as your theory of synchronized bank rates and the network of international finance." Given this similarity it is not surprising that Angell received several letters suggesting an Esperanto translation, WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 1, Hill Rowan to Norman Angell, 10 June 1911. Harrison Hill to Angell Feb 28 1912. Marie Hankel to Harrison Hill n.d.

²¹⁷ Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 157

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 140

motivations for war. The presence of this section in The Great Illusion indicates that Angell saw himself in dialogue with his critics. In other words, this section is a concrete representation of the fact that Angell was a creator of and participant in public discourse, and not an ideologically inflexible man of politics.

Although Angell accepted the premise that humans were naturally prone to irrationality, he argued against the “parrot-like repetition” of arguments that tied human nature to the inevitability of war. Angell believed that humans had enough agency to control and even modify their unruly elements.²¹⁹ Much like his economic argument, Angell sought to develop a line of reasoning that was widely accessible. He argued that the truth of his assertion was ascertainable from some of the most elementary facts of history: “A glance over the common incidents of Europe’s history will show the profound change which has visibly taken place, not only in the minds, but in the hearts of men.... What was once deemed a mere truism would now be viewed with horror and indignation.”²²⁰ In Angell’s view, the problem of war in Europe was largely an intellectual one. He set himself the task of overcoming the continued prevalence of ideologies such as social Darwinism which posited: “that men’s pugnacity... is the outcome of the great natural law of survival, and that a decline of pugnacity marks in any nation a recession and not advance in its struggle for survival.”²²¹ Angell was able to expose the logical flaws in the social Darwinist position by turning their argument upside down. The “real process of war” Angell pointed out, condemned the warlike nations to decay:

²¹⁹ Ibid, p. 202

²²⁰ Ibid, pp. 208-209

²²¹ Ibid, pp. 222-223

What is the real process of war? [Angell wrote] you carefully select from the general population on both sides the healthiest, sturdiest, the physically and mentally soundest, those possessing precisely the virile and manly qualities which you desire to preserve, and having thus selected the elite of the two populations, you exterminate them by battle and disease, and leave the worst of both sides to amalgamate in the process of conquest or defeat – because, in so far as the final amalgamation is concerned, both processes have the same result – and from this amalgam of the worst of both sides you create the new nation or the new society which is carry on the race.²²²

Angell's dismantling of the social Darwinist argument was characteristically constructive. He proceeded to show that it was not through conflict, but rather cooperation that societies advanced.²²³ In this way, Angell argued that interdependence was a natural law of human society as much as it was an economic law of modern international commerce.

Angell's talent for situating his arguments within the contemporary currents of debate, and his ability to make these arguments widely accessible, made his book of immediate interest not just to individuals inside the peace movement, but to anyone involved in public political discussion. Largely for this reason, Angell received support both from the peace movement and those who were traditionally seen as its enemies. It is in this sense that a Quaker pacifist wrote to Angell: "I sincerely wish your book could have been circulated by the hundred thousand, as it would be read, and is read, in quantities where our Quaker (religious) peace arguments are quietly pushed aside as mere theory."²²⁴ While Angell's ability to situate himself within currents of public debate and his capacity for clear writing were necessary conditions for the book's success, they were not in themselves sufficient. Animated by a sense of public duty and devoted to the principle of free-wheeling public political debate, Angell maintained a consistent and

²²² Ibid, p. 236

²²³ Ibid, p. 232

²²⁴ BSU (Norman Angell Collection) Box 1, William Henry Alexander to Norman Angell, 16 July 1911.

untiring presence in the public sphere and created *Norman Angellism* as a new discursive space.

Angell's first efforts at publishing his ideas about interdependence were frustrated by London publishers who, aware of the confrontational and jingoistic state of public political discussion, claimed that, "the public do not care and cannot be persuaded to read books about peace."²²⁵ This prompted Angell to produce a smaller version of his manuscript and to self-publish it as a pamphlet under the title "Europe's Optical Illusion."²²⁶ He strategically targeted an international, educated and politically influential audience which could, he hoped, further the development of his ideas among the masses. As the Freeman's Journal noted in March 1914, "Of course Mr. Angell does not appeal immediately to the masses. Still the masses are bound to feel his influence because he is acting, in the inauguration of his movement, on those minds, and personalities, and influences which in the end create vast volumes of public opinion."²²⁷ Angell explained this strategy to his friend and associate Percy Parker, owner of Public Opinion: "What I am driving at is that the first effort should be not an education of the general public but a direct appeal to those who are educated on the matter and to those who have the means to take it up."²²⁸ For this reason Angell sent copies of his book to between 200 and 300 men concerned with politics and public life in Britain, Germany, and France.²²⁹ In addition,

²²⁵ Angell, After All, p. 146

²²⁶ The fundamental difference between "Europe's Optical Illusion" and The Great Illusion is size. In "Europe's Optical Illusion" the arguments about human nature are significantly smaller. They are expanded in The Great Illusion because of the early criticism Angell received from critics like Alfred Mahan who argued that Angell had placed too much emphasis on economics.

²²⁷ Author Unknown, "The Great Illusion," Freeman's Journal 28 March 1914

²²⁸ WRAC (Norman Angell Collection) Box 1, Norman Angell to Percy Parker 22 October 1910.

²²⁹ Angell, After All, p. 148

Parker was paid £50 by Angell to publish articles in Public Opinion on his ideas and to distribute these volumes among “men of influence.”²³⁰

Angell’s early efforts proved effective. As McNeal has recently observed of Angell, “Within a few weeks, he had managed to distribute copies of his review in Public Opinion to 2000 Members of Parliament and other key figures throughout Britain and Germany.”²³¹ Angell’s pamphlet was quickly becoming a sensation.²³² By May 1910, Angell wrote to Parker that he had received hundreds of letters “from every imaginable sort and condition of person: financiers, politicians, journalists, writers, soldiers, university professors, etc.”²³³ While lunching with Melville Stone, then head of the Associated Press who knew Angell only as Ralph Lane, Stone remarked, “Have you seen a book called Europe’s Optical Illusion? At a diplomatic dinner the other night several

²³⁰ WRAC Norman Angell Collection, Box 1, Norman Angell to Percy Parker 22 October 1910. One account sent by Parker to Angell lists the distribution of 2034 copies of Public Opinion: 175 to English newspapers, 94 to American newspapers, 667 to the British House of Commons, 611 to the House of Lords, and 487 to American Congressmen. WRAC Norman Angell Collection, Box 1, Percy Parker to Norman Angell, 26 January 1911. One month later Parker wrote to Angell that the upcoming Public Opinion would be distributed to 30,000 business men. WRAC Norman Angell Collection, Box 1, Percy Parker to Norman Angell, 2 March 1911. The character of the reviews can be ascertained by the opening lines of Public Opinion on January 27: “When the long balance-sheets of history are finally adjusted in the Courts of the Future, it will probably be found that in the first decade of the twentieth century the book which had the greatest effect on the thought of man and on his ultimate social well-being was called ‘Europe’s Optical Illusion.’” Percy Parker, “An Unchallenged Book: The Book of the Day – A Worthy Candidate for the Nobel Literature and Peace Prizes,” Public Opinion, 27 January 1911, (99), 2570

²³¹ McNeal, “Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap,” p. 131

²³² By early 1910 Angell’s thesis had been publicly endorsed by Count Wolff von Metternich, the German ambassador to London. He had also received a letter supporting his cause and complimenting his book from the Prince Consort of Sweden and according to a letter Angell wrote to F.W. Wile the book “brought within a few weeks a communication from King Edward, the King of Italy and the German Emperor (I am not romancing).” The endorsement of Angell’s thesis by Metternich is recounted in detail in, WRAC (Norman Angell Collection) Box 6, “Norman Angell by his Contemporaries: A Random Collection of Reviews, Criticisms, Comments, Discussions, Letters from Readers, Caricatures, Sketches,” pp. 5-6; Though several of these letters are not contained in either the Ball State or McMaster University collections their existence was discussed by Main Johnson a Canadian *Angellite* in an article he wrote for the Canadian Magazine in March 1914. Main Johnson, “Norman Angell: Apostle of Peace,” Canadian Magazine, Toronto: The Ontario Publishing Co., March 1914, 531; BSU (Norman Angell Collection) Box 27, Norman Angell To F.W. Wile, 3 November 1910

²³³ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 20, Norman Angell to Percy Parker, 18 May 1910.

people talked about it and said it was bound to be something very important.”²³⁴ As Angell observed in his autobiography “In a few months reviews came in scores and hundreds, not only from Britain, the United States, and France; but from Germany also.”²³⁵ Angell’s book had developed such widespread public currency that one reviewer in the Quarterly Review noted, “It is clear that in his [Angell’s] hands the conduct of the war against war, which was one of the salient characteristics of the later years of the nineteenth century and is even more so that of the twentieth, is taking a new form.”²³⁶ In France’s Chamber of Deputies on 14 January 1911, Jean Jaurés quoted from Angell’s pamphlet at length and claimed that on his recent trip to England he had noticed that its thesis was finding expression in both Liberal and Conservative circles.²³⁷ To use the words of the New Statesman “whispers” about Angell’s pamphlet had grown “gradually in strength until they had swelled into something like a roar.”²³⁸ Understandably, it was not long before Angell was being approached by “half the publishers in London” to expand his pamphlet into a book.²³⁹ Angell accepted the offer of the William Heinemann publishing house and “Europe’s Optical Illusion” was expanded into The Great Illusion which appeared late in 1910.

That The Great Illusion was an even larger publishing success than its predecessor was primarily the result of Angell’s consistent presence in both domestic and international public spheres. Throughout September and October 1911, Angell received

²³⁴ Angell, After All, p. 148; Angell, Reminiscences, p. 104

²³⁵ Angell, After All, p. 148

²³⁶ Author Unknown, “The New Pacifism”, The Quarterly Review, 12, (1912), 203

²³⁷ Journal Officiel, 14 January 1911

²³⁸ WRAC (Norman Angell Collection) Clippings File Box 6, Author Unknown, New Statesman

²³⁹ Angell, Reminiscences, p. 105

unexpected support in this endeavor from Northcliffe.²⁴⁰ Originally Northcliffe had, “pooh-poohed the idea that such a thesis could hold water or... affect politics practically.”²⁴¹ By the end of 1910, however, he had become convinced that “in a cheap edition [The Great Illusion] could run into a million.”²⁴² With his knack for knowing what the public wanted, Northcliffe gave Angell space in the Daily Mail to engage the critics of his book and to “push home its thesis.”²⁴³ Late in 1911, the Daily Mail provided Angell with a point of entry into the Edwardian public sphere and the paper’s columns represented the beginnings of *Norman Angellism* as a new discursive space.²⁴⁴

In the public sphere, Angell engaged the panicked “collective mind” in critically rational public debate. Francis Hascam wrote to the editor of the Daily Mail that Angell’s ideas were “filtering down rather rapidly just now through the mass of (so-called) patriotic prejudice...”²⁴⁵ In other words, Angell was breaking through the “emotionalism” which had accelerated the Edwardian public sphere and was encouraging a more rational temper to public discussion. He was effectively reaching out to a rushed citizenry and providing an alternate temporality within which it could form clear and

²⁴⁰ This support was unexpected not simply because of Northcliffe’s well-known xenophobic tendencies but also because the lead writer and editor for the Daily Mail was H.W. Wilson. Wilson was a great supporter of British naval expansion and was known to use the Mail’s columns to promote that agenda. McNeal, “Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap”, pp. 147-148.

²⁴¹ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 27, Angell to F.W. Wile, 3 November 1910.

²⁴² BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, Norman Angell to Kennedy Jones, 1911.

²⁴³ Ibid. Supina’s dissertation hints at the idea that Northcliffe was also in some way funding Angell’s peace work. For evidence of this Supina points to the fact that when Angell left the Daily Mail in 1912 his propaganda expenses instantly increased to three times their previous size. Supina, “Norman Angell and the Years of Illusion.” p. 103

²⁴⁴ For an example of Angell “pushing home” his thesis see Norman Angell, “The Lesson of the Bourse Panics”, Daily Mail (London), 15 September 1911, p. 4c-d. For an example of Angell engaging his critics see Norman Angell, “The Great Illusion and the War: A Reply to my Critics”, Daily Mail (London), 5 October 1911, p. 4d-e. For an example of Angell’s ideas being discussed in editorial columns see Author Unknown, “The Risk to Germany”, Daily Mail (London), 8 September 1911, p. 4b. For an example of Angell being criticized: Author Unknown, “War and the Money Markets: A Real Test for Norman Angell”, Daily Mail (London), 4 October 1911, p. 4f.

²⁴⁵ Francis Hascam, “The Lesson of Bourse Panics: Mr Norman Angell on War”, Daily Mail (London), 15 December 1910, p. 9f

nuanced political opinions. As one reviewer in the Economist noted, “Mr. Angell... has rounded off the whole subject in a way which makes a very strong appeal to the ordinary business man, *who has not much time for politics*, and is apt to assume that wars and preparations for wars are inevitable.”²⁴⁶ Here the Economist’s reviewer gives clear recognition of both the temporal and political implications of Angell’s growing public currency. In essence, the reviewer is arguing that Angell is being successful in pulling “the ordinary business man” (a vague term which could arguably refer to anyone who is involved in commodity exchange) out of his hastened life, where political decision making has become secondary to speed, and into an alternate realm where he can see more clearly the multiple aspects of political issues.

In maintaining a consistent presence within the public sphere after 1911, Angell received invaluable help from Reginald, Viscount Esher.²⁴⁷ Esher was what Angell called the *eminence grise* behind the British throne: he was a good friend of the royal family, who had made it his business to get to know all the political leaders, public men, and writers so that he could advise the King of their qualities.²⁴⁸ Esher, who was one of the first public men to whom Angell mailed copies of “Europe’s Optical Illusion”, was thoroughly impressed with the pamphlet. In January 1910, he wrote a largely supportive and encouraging letter to Angell:

I hate flattery, but I am not flattering when I urge you to push home your main thesis. Your book could be as epoch making as Seeley’s Expansion of England, or

²⁴⁶ Author Unknown, “Reviews of Books: The Illusions of War and the Progress of Peace,” Economist (London), 20 May 1911, p. 1079 (my italics)

²⁴⁷ Lord Esher was a man of tremendous political influence during this period. Not only was he a good friend of King Edward, but he was also the overseer of Queen Victoria’s private papers. In 1902, he served on the Elgin Commission on the South African War. In 1903, he was invited by Arthur Balfour to become War Secretary. In 1905, he became a permanent member on the Committee of Imperial Defence. For a more detailed biography see Peter Fraser, Lord Esher: A Political Biography, London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1973.

²⁴⁸ Angell, Reminiscences, p. 106

Mahan's Sea Power. It is sent forth at the psychological moment and wants to be followed up if you have time and drive.²⁴⁹

Esher's support gave Angell legitimacy and what J.D.B. Miller has termed, "political respectability."²⁵⁰ More importantly, however, it was Esher who was primarily responsible for the formation of the Garton Foundation for Promoting the Study of International Polity.

The Garton Foundation was arguably the most important organization in the spread of Norman Angell's ideas and the creation of *Norman Angellism* as a new discursive space.²⁵¹ Its aim, according to the Memorandum of Association, was "[t]o promote and develop the science of International Polity and economics as indicated in the published writings of Mr. Norman Angell, and for the purpose aforesaid to organize and federate those who may become interested in the said science..."²⁵² In other words, the Garton Foundation hoped to "bring before the mind of the European public the significance of a few simple, ascertainable, tangible facts... and to encourage their discussion."²⁵³ This aim was pursued through various avenues: essay prizes for university students, educational lectures for teachers, the formation of study circles, the formation of societies, single lectures to various societies, courses of lectures, and publications.²⁵⁴

²⁴⁹ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 7, Reginald Esher to Norman Angell, 11 January 1910. This letter greatly impacted Angell who later said it was largely Esher's support of "Europe's Optical Illusion" which was responsible for the pamphlet's expansion into a book. As he wrote to Esher: "I think, in a sense, you are responsible for the book, because if it had not been for your kind encouragement given to the pamphlet on which it is based I am not sure that it would have been written." For his support Angell dedicated his 1914 book The Foundations of International Polity to Esher. BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 7, Norman Angell to Reginald Esher, 30 October 1910.

²⁵⁰ Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War, p. 6

²⁵¹ The Garton Foundation extended Angell's activities to such a degree that he was forced to leave the Daily Mail in the spring of 1912 and pursue his peace work full-time.

²⁵² WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 7, "Memorandum of Association," Garton Foundation Members Agreement, Clause 3, Article 1.

²⁵³ Norman Angell, "The International Polity Movement," The Foundations of International Polity, p. 218

²⁵⁴ BSU (Norman Angell Collection) Box 29, John Hilton, "Report" 28 August 1913.

One of the most important publications which the Garton Foundation sponsored was the monthly periodical, War and Peace: A Norman Angell Monthly. Norman Angell wrote an article in every number of this periodical before August 1914. In this way, War and Peace resembled the Daily Mail, in that it provided Angell with another point of access to the Edwardian public sphere. This journal, however, did not act simply as means to secure the promotion of *Norman Angellism*, but rather to secure critical reflection and debate of Angell's ideas. As the lead writer put it in the inaugural number:

To impress the significance of just those facts which are the most relevant and essential in this problem, to do what we can to keep them before public attention and to encourage their discussion, is our work.²⁵⁵

For this reason War and Peace aimed to remain “strictly non-partisan” and published pieces both by Angell's supporters and his critics.²⁵⁶ The resulting effect was such that War and Peace began to appear less like a tool of propaganda and more like a sphere of critical discussion based on an open-ended, mutual give and take. This aspect of the discussion which framed *Norman Angellism* would become characteristic of Angell's activities with the Garton Foundation prior to the First World War.

While associated with the Garton Foundation, Angell spoke at various, often prestigious, institutions.²⁵⁷ These lectures put Angell in direct dialogue with some of the

²⁵⁵ Author Unknown, “About Ourselves”, War and Peace, 1, No. 1, October 1913, p. 1

²⁵⁶ Supporters: Bertrand Russell, “Why Nations Love War”, War and Peace, 2, No. 14, November 1914, p. pp.20-21; H.N. Brailsford, “On Preventing Wars”, War and Peace, 2, No. 17, February 1914, pp. 71-72; J.A. Hobson, “The Limitations of Nationalism”, War and Peace, 1, No. 6, March 1914, p. 155; E.D. Morel, “Foreign Policy and the People”, War and Peace, 1, No. 3, February 1914, p. 129; Ramsay MacDonald, “The War and After”, War and Peace, 2, No. 13, October 1914, p. 5; For an additional list of contributors see Angell, After All, p. 169. Critics: Frederic Harrison, “Mischievous and Immoral”, War and Peace, 1, No. 3, December 1913, p. 65. A. Rifleman, “The Fallacy of Norman Angellism”, War and Peace, 1, No. 4, January 1914, p. 103. A. Rifleman, “The Fallacy of Norman Angellism: Further Instances”, War and Peace, 1, No. 5, February 1914, p. 167

²⁵⁷ A few British organizations that Angell spoke at under the auspices of the Garton Foundation included: The British Chamber of Commerce (Paris), The Chatham Club (London), The South Place Institute (London), The Pioneer Club (London), The Midland Institute (Birmingham), The National Liberal Club (London), The Glasgow Liberal Club, The Leeds Chamber of Commerce, the Liberal Colonial Club, and

most important individuals in British public life, which only strengthened his claim to political legitimacy. Throughout 1912, Angell lectured extensively in Britain and though some lectures did not draw as large a crowd as was anticipated, most of the lectures were a stunning success. The extensive lecture schedule that Angell kept up during 1912 was a strategic move by the Garton Foundation. By placing Angell in dialogue with a variety of organizations, the Garton Foundation sought to disassociate *Norman Angellism* from traditional pacifist political affiliations. In this way, the Foundation marketed itself as an open-ended and educative, rather than partisan, political movement. Thus in 1914, Angell could write that “the educative policy of the Garton Foundation is one which can equally be supported and approved by the soldier, the Navy League man, the Universal Service man, or the naval economist and the Quaker.”²⁵⁸ By keeping *Angellism* non-partisan, it was hoped that the Foundation would be able to avoid political attacks from Unionists and the growing radical right. Writing to Balfour in October 1912, Esher commented: “I want something which will induce Unionists to see that this is no peace propaganda in the ordinary sense; that it has no connection with the Radical Party; that all we want is to have the theory discussed; that we don’t even claim that it is true.”²⁵⁹

Arguably the two most important lectures Angell delivered during 1912 were at the Institute of Bankers in London and the Cambridge Union. In January, Angell spoke to the Institute of Bankers in London on the subject of “The Influence of Credit on International

the United Service Institution. Hilton, “Report for 1912”; Author Unknown, “Overseas Dominions: Mr. Norman Angell on their Impregnability,” *Times* (London), 1 November 1913, p. 5g; Author Unknown, “Mr. Norman Angell and the Use of Armies,” *Times* (London), 9 October 1913, p. 5g

²⁵⁸ Angell, “The International Polity Movement,” p. 211

²⁵⁹ Reginald Esher to Arthur Balfour, 12 October 1912, Oliver Viscount Esher, ed., *The Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher*, London: Ivor, Nicholson and Watson, 1938, vol.3, pp. 111-112

Relations.”²⁶⁰ Catering to his audience, Angell distinguished his ideas from the conspiratorial theory of the socialist, who concentrates on “the alleged direct interference of eminent financiers, or groups of financiers, with the negotiations between European Governments.”²⁶¹ Angell claimed that there already existed “a vast deal of nonsense” on that subject and instead he decided to concentrate on “the unnoticed impersonal forces which the ordinary weekday, humdrum work of banking has called into existence; the cumulative outcome of those numberless everyday operations that take place almost completely outside the control of Governments or financiers.”²⁶² More precisely Angell argued, as he had in The Great Illusion, that the extension of credit on an international scale had led to an organic international polity which, because of technological developments that increased rapidity in communication, instantaneously sensed discomfort in any of its parts.²⁶³ Angell’s lecture was enthusiastically received by the Institute. As the Times reported:

The President, in moving a vote of thanks, which was very heartily received, said the economic waste of war was now far and away the most prominent factor for consideration, not only for Governments and bankers, but for the merchants, the traders, the common people of this and every other country (cheers) owing to the great development of interdependence of one country upon another. What they wanted to see was Mr. Norman Angell’s ideas permeating every community.²⁶⁴

The interest and enthusiasm which the Institute of Bankers displayed on this occasion is indicative of the high-level of public currency which Angell’s ideas enjoyed during this

²⁶⁰ The paper which Angell read to this organization was been reproduced in Angell’s 1914 book The Foundations of International Polity, see, Norman Angell, “The Influence of Credit on International Relations,” The Foundations of International Polity, pp. 81-139

²⁶¹ Ibid. p. 82

²⁶² Ibid. p. 87

²⁶³ Angell makes extensive biological references in this lecture. For these see, Ibid. pp. 87-89, 108, 116. The argument Angell develops in this lecture is largely repetitive of The Great Illusion. It is, however, not surprising that an individual who lectured so extensively would often repeat himself. The argument of Angell’s lecture is best summed up from pp. 123-125.

²⁶⁴ Author Unknown, “Banking and International Relations,” Times, 18 January 1912, p. 6e

period. Moreover, given that Angell's argument was about international interdependence, the enthusiasm with which it was received indicates that Angell was becoming successful in encouraging his listeners to think beyond narrow minded xenophobia. This achievement was repeated in Angell's performance at the 1912 Cambridge Union Debate.²⁶⁵

Early in 1912, Angell was invited to debate Robert Yerburgh, then president of England's Navy League, at the Cambridge Union on the topic of the relationship between strong sustained trade and naval supremacy.²⁶⁶ Angell's task was not easy. As he was to recall in the early 1930s, "[t]his was at a time when the country was at a pitch of a navy building panic" and as the Canadian *Angellite* Main Johnson noted, numbered among those who attended was a "whole raft of admirals [who] had come to the University to lend colour and dignity to the proceedings and to give moral support to their speaker."²⁶⁷ Angell, however, was successful in overcoming these obstacles and by the close of the evening he had won the debate by one of the largest houses that ever voted at the union (285 to 255).

²⁶⁵ The Cambridge Union is one the oldest and largest organizations at Cambridge University. It was established in 1815 for the purpose of providing a platform for free-speech. The first half of the twentieth century, the period during which Angell spoke, is listed by the societies website as a period of particular strength. "Cambridge Union Society History," <http://www.cambridge-union.org/index.php?c=history&dbno=1> [accessed 02, 01, 2006]

²⁶⁶ Notes on this debate have been reproduced in *The Foundations of International Polity*. See Norman Angell, "Two Keels to One not Enough," *The Foundations of International Polity*, pp. 163-193. Initially Angell had been invited to oppose the following motion: "That the safety of the British Empire and its trade depends on an unquestioned British naval superiority maintained upon the basis of two keels to one of capital ships against the next strongest European Power, and the full necessary complement of smaller craft." Angell, however, refused stating that he would only oppose the motion if its opening was changed to read: "That the safety of the British Empire and its trade can only be secured by an unquestioned..." This indicates that Angell had a particular attention to detail when it came to his work in public political discussion.

²⁶⁷ Norman Angell, "Partners in Peace," C. Ernest Fayle, ed., *Harold Wright: A Memoir*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1934, p. 61; Main Johnson, "Norman Angell: Apostle of Peace," p. 533

To his audience, Angell presented an argument that forced them to think beyond the “us versus them” polarity: “we shall make no progress until we place ourselves in the position of the other man.”²⁶⁸ This meant that “our policy must be determined by our rival’s... [and] our rival’s policy is determined by ours.”²⁶⁹ It followed, therefore, that stockpiling armaments was an irrational policy that only led to expensive arms races. A more efficacious means of securing national defence, Angell believed, would be through a policy of “general enlightenment of the public opinion in both countries as to the real nature of the supposed conflict between them.”²⁷⁰ Although the triumph at the Union attracted the attention of important faculty members, such as John Maynard Keynes, the most significant result, however, was the formation of the Cambridge War and Peace Society, under the presidency of the future journalist Harold Wright.²⁷¹

The Cambridge Society was the first of the numerous *Angellite* organizations that spread to several major educational institutions in Britain. It represents one of the first steps in the expansion of *Norman Angellism* from the pages of The Great Illusion to a widespread forum for public debate. Within a year, this organization had 180 members and had sponsored meetings addressed by a number of well-known public men including, Alfred Noyes, Lord Brassey, and Sir Thomas Barclay. To further encourage the growth of the Cambridge Society, the Garton Foundation instituted an essay contest, awarding 25

²⁶⁸ Angell, “Two Keels to One not Enough,” p. 168

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 167

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 177

²⁷¹ John Maynard Keynes was a famous Cambridge economist who moved in both academic and political circles. From 1906-1908 he worked for the India Office and later was appointed lecturer in economics at Cambridge University. In 1912 he became the editor of the Economic Journal and in 1913 he served on the Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency. See, Robert Jacob Alexander Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: A Biography, London: MacMillan, 1983. Sadly this biography makes only fleeting references to Angell. Following the formation of the society Angell invited many of its early members to be his guests during a week long summer outing in an effort to get in touch with the type of young Englishman likely to get involved in public life. The result of this was that at least two of the guests decided to pursue international work rather than parliamentary politics. One of these was Wright. Hilton, “Report for 1912,” pp. 8-9

guineas for the best paper dealing with international polity read by a society member.²⁷²

The ultimate purpose of the Cambridge Society was, as Angell later commented, “to provoke the rational discussion among the general public of those ultimate questions.”²⁷³

It would serve as a model for various study groups set up across Europe and North America by Angell and the Garton Foundation.

Angell’s intention was that the clubs and societies that grew out of his work with the Garton Foundation should facilitate free-wheeling political discussion. In the letter which he wrote to the Manchester University War and Peace Society upon its founding, Angell urged that “Such a club should include men of as diverse opinions as possible – quite as much those interested in the machinery of warfare, as those interested mainly in the bearing of these matters on social progress.”²⁷⁴ Angell believed that such an ideologically diverse membership would only increase the quality of debate which occurred within the Society:

If the circle includes a certain number generally hostile to pacific conceptions, so much the better. They will, by their points of interrogation act as a stimulus to the investigation of the rest, while on their side they will certainly benefit by a better understanding of factors, which even from the purely military point of view can no longer be neglected.²⁷⁵

From the outset then, Angell’s expressed intent was to foster meaningful public political discussion. Within the discursive space of *Norman Angellism*, he would later tell one of his students, “...you are not following a man, but you are following or developing an

²⁷² Hilton, “Report for 1912”

²⁷³ Angell, “Partners in Peace,” p. 64

²⁷⁴ BSU (Norman Angell Collecton), JX1963A52, Norman Angell, “An Open Letter to the Manchester University War and Peace Society”

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

idea.”²⁷⁶ As the number of clubs and societies grew this attachment to intellectual inquiry and open-ended public debate strengthened.

This aspect of *Angellism* is reflected in the report of a conference held by the Leeds Norman Angell League under “the auspices of the Garton Foundation” on 17 April 1914. The report shows that there was an overwhelming emphasis on conducting the *Angellism* campaign with, what one speaker termed, “a spirit of inquiry.”²⁷⁷ In his lecture, John Hilton, a prominent Garton organizer, underlined that its attachment to promoting free-wheeling discussion made *Angellism* quite unlike many of the political movements current in the Edwardian public sphere. Hilton’s point was reemphasized in Harold Wright’s talk, where *Angellism* was defined as “truth seeking” rather than “diplomacy.”²⁷⁸ This indicated that there was harmony on this issue among the important speakers at the conference. The idea that *Angellism* should be conducted along the lines of a “spirit of inquiry” was again clearly made in B. Langdon Davies’ lecture, “Dangers to be Avoided:”

The dangers to avoid in the conduct of a movement such as ours are many. I propose to run briefly through a few which have occurred to me. Pentulance, the attitude of impatience towards those who are obsessed with the old views, is most disadvantageous. So also is pedantry, the irritating way of seeming to regard ourselves as alone possessing the true doctrines and the dangerous habit of asserting dogmatically as facts many things which are really only tendencies.²⁷⁹

The 17 April 1914 conference held by the Leeds Norman Angell League is demonstrative of way which *Norman Angellism* sought to fashion a new discursive space. Its supporters’ belief in and adherence to an approach based on the principle of free-wheeling public

²⁷⁶ Hilton, *Report of Certain Discussions*, p. 78

²⁷⁷ For emphasis on a spirit of enquiry see the speeches of John Hilton, Harold Wright, and BN Langdon Davies. BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, “Leeds Norman Angell League Conference,”

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*

²⁷⁹ B. Langdon Davies, “Dangers to be Avoided,” in “Leeds Norman Angell League Conference”.

debate contrasted sharply with the more confrontational tone of public discussion prevalent in the Edwardian public sphere.

Angell's publicity work with the Garton Foundation encouraged the foundation of Norman Angell clubs and societies. By the end of 1912, there were, Angell estimated, between 30 and 40 *Angellite* clubs/societies based on the Cambridge model and located in every major commercial and educational center in Britain, many of which enjoyed large memberships.²⁸⁰ The significance of this estimate is enhanced when one considers the individuals who were involved in these organizations: C.P. Scott, Bertrand Russell, J.A. Hobson, Erskine Childers, Noel Buxton, and Lady Kate Courtney to name only a few. As early as 2 December 1912, while lecturing at Cambridge, Esher noted that *Norman Angellism* had worked its way into the collective consciousness of Edwardian Britain's political elite:

I have had the opportunity of listening to very confidential inquiries into, and discussions of, the economic effects upon our trade, commerce and finance on the outbreak of a European war in which we ourselves might be engaged. This inquiry extended over many months, and many of the wealthiest and most influential men of business from the cities of the United Kingdom were called to give evidence before those whose duty it was to conclude the report.

I am sure that very few, if any, of those eminent witnesses had read his book, but by some mysterious process the virus of Norman Angell was working in their minds, for one after the other, these magnates of commerce and of finance, corroborated by their fears and anticipations, the doctrine of The Great Illusion.²⁸¹

The tremendous domestic growth of *Angellism* has traditionally been described as unpolitical given its ostensible inability to effect policy change.²⁸² Only McNeal's recent

²⁸⁰ BSU, Norman Angell Collection, Box 29, "Norman Angell to Rowntree Trust". Supina has argued that the figure was 40 in his article on Norman Angell's German campaign. Supina, "The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany," p. 161. According to War and Peace, by November 1913 the R.U.I.I (London) had 150 members, the Manchester University War and Peace Society had 114 members, the Cambridge University War and Peace Society had 180 members, and the Manchester Norman Angell League held open-air lectures at which the average attendance was 350.

²⁸¹ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, "Viscount Esher's Speech at Cambridge University"

²⁸² See historiographical descriptions in chapter 1 of the present thesis.

work has attempted to understand Angell within the immediacy of his surroundings without the distorted lenses of hindsight. Even McNeal's understanding of *Angellism's* political effect, however, does not fully appreciate its vital contribution to the patterns of public speech which characterized Edwardian Britain's public sphere. Not only did Angell contribute to the volume of public political discussion, but the forum for debate which he created and rooted in a methodology based on free-wheeling public political discussion also contributed to the value and meaningfulness of public discourse. Like national efficiency and tariff reform, *Angellism* helped manipulate the patterns of speech, which characterized the Edwardian public sphere. In contrast to these movements, however, *Angellism* did not contribute to the panic and acceleration which largely defined public political discussion in Edwardian Britain, but rather reacted against it. Arguably *Angellism's* wide-spread public currency and its adherence to free-wheeling public political debate helped calm and slow the Edwardian public sphere. Given Scheuerman's recent demonstration that liberal democracy rests on temporal underpinnings and is potentially disabled by increased demands for speed it becomes possible to argue that *Norman Angellism's* manipulation of speech patterns helped reinforce liberalism in a period when it was increasingly being viewed as, to use Dangerfield's words, "an inconvenient burden."²⁸³

Angell's affect on patterns of speech did not simply have a domestic political significance. In pushing the borders of *Norman Angellism* beyond national boundaries Angell extended his open-ended form of discourse to an international level. By challenging the competitive and exclusionary modern state system, *Norman Angellism* hit the period's panic and acceleration at its root. With the urging of Balfour and Esher and

²⁸³ Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, p. 8

the financial assistance of the Rowntree Trust, the Carnegie Endowment, and the World Peace Foundation, Angell began to concentrate on developing an international wing for his movement.²⁸⁴ It was Angell's hope that as a result "the outstanding feature" of *Norman Angellism* would become "...the general interchange of ideas at a later period with similar circles established abroad."²⁸⁵ To this end, Angell devoted much of 1913 to making extensive lecture tours in the United States and Germany. In both countries, his appearances were generally met with enthusiasm.²⁸⁶ The international growth of Angell's ideas during this period is not difficult to measure. Within only one week of Angell's German tour more than 10,000 copies of Die Falsche Rechnung were sold and by August 1914 The Great Illusion had sold more copies in Germany than in any other European country save England.²⁸⁷ By June 1913, The Great Illusion had sold 21,000 copies in

²⁸⁴ Angell solicited the help of these outside organizations as a financial necessity. The funds of the Garton Foundation were insufficient to pursue an international publicity campaign. While Garton donated £500 in 1912 Norman Angell's expenses for that year amounted to £1125.12. Given that Angell had left his job with Northcliffe to pursue his peace work full-time finances were becoming increasingly strained. BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, "Norman Angell Statement of Expenses 1912". As Angell wrote in his report to the Rowntree Trust: "The grant of these funds to me by the Rowntree Trust has enabled me to give a much wider scope to my activities than would have been possible had I been dependent solely upon the help furnished by the Garton Foundation." BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, Norman Angell, "Report by Norman Angell of Expenditure of Funds Granted by the Rowntree Trust."

²⁸⁵ Angell, "An Open Letter to the Manchester University War and Peace Society."

²⁸⁶ There was considerable interest in Angell's work in both of these countries before the tour. "I had a long talk a couple of days since with one of the Kaiser's personal friends, who told me how much he (the Kaiser) had been interested in and discussed the book." BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 7, Norman Angell to Reginald Esher, 30 October 1910. The Garton Report for 1912 also indicates that several German papers, such as the Deutsche Revue, the Berliner Tageblatt, and the Vossische-Leitung, had requested articles dealing with Germany's specific position in The Great Illusion. It is also worth noting that prior to his lecture tour of German Universities Angell was invited to Berlin to meet with the heads of the Social Democratic Party. BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Hilton, "Report for 1912." Much of the German interest in The Great Illusion was the result of Angell's early propaganda efforts. By December 1910 Angell had sent copies of the German translation of his book to "every member of the Reichstag and to about a hundred selected [German] professors." BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 27, Angell to F.W. Wile, 3 November 1910.

²⁸⁷ Marrin comments that 10,000 copies were sold "within weeks", Marrin, Sir Norman Angell, p. 131. George Nasmyth's report of the lecture arguably the most important piece of primary source literature regarding the German tour indicates that 10,000 copies were sold "within a week after the beginning after the beginning of Norman Angell's meetings." It is also worth noting, as Nasmyth does, that 10,000 copies represented the entirety of the first edition which means that, had there been more available, more would have sold. Reporting on the concrete results of the German tour Nasmyth's report commented that nearly

France, and 15,000 copies in Italy.²⁸⁸ Angell's February 1914 North American lecture tour consisted of a punishing schedule of 120 lectures in 90 days but resulted in, as Marrin noted, "a triumph with enthusiastic audiences everywhere."²⁸⁹ In all likelihood this is why Edwin Mead, head of the American based World Peace Foundation, began his lecture at Old Jordans: "I wish to pay tribute to the very vital influence which he is carrying into the United States. There is no finer contribution upon this great question as it affects our own people in recent times than Mr. Angell's."²⁹⁰ Certainly it is not hard to see that by 1914 "the virus of Norman Angell," to use Esher's vocabulary, had spread beyond Britain and had infected enthusiastic hosts across Europe and North America.

Most historians, however, have failed to recognize the political significance of *Norman Angellism's* international wing. Throughout his international campaign, Angell brought together politically interested people from various nationalities and encouraged open ended discourse. By doing so he worked to defy the inherently exclusivist and competitive nature of the modern state system, which Scheuerman has acknowledged as a central cause of acceleration. For example, Angell's conference at Le Touquet in France from September 19th to September 22nd 1913 attracted authors, bankers, politicians and

40,000 copies of a 15 page pamphlet "containing the essentials of The Great Illusion" had been distributed and between 2000 and 3000 had heard the direct arguments of Norman Angell as expressed in the seven lectures. Nasmyth concludes his report: "The most important results of the tour cannot be measured in such statistics, however, but lies in the awakened interest of those who have been won to the study of the problems, or have been already converted and are spreading the ideas further. Of these Dr. John Mez, a student of Political Economy at Friedburg, and Friedrich Depken of Bremen may be cited as examples. Each of these students have already published a whole series of articles in various newspapers and magazines on the arguments of The Great Illusion, and the groups of students who are at work on the problems in the various universities represent the beginning of what will prove in time to be a revolution of the public opinion in Germany." BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, George Nasmyth, "Norman Angell's Lecture Tour of the German Universities, February 1-14 1913: General Report of George Nasmyth."

²⁸⁸ Supina "Norman Angell and the Years of Illusion," p. 132

²⁸⁹ Marrin notes that one of the legacies of this tour was the establishment of International Polity Club at various universities throughout the United States. By 1915 the Federation of International Polity Clubs had 42 affiliated groups. Marrin, Sir Norman Angell, pp. 131-132

²⁹⁰ Hilton, Report of Certain Discussions, p. 209

teachers from France, England, Germany and the United States.²⁹¹ Angell's ability to bring together politically interested individuals from various countries for the purpose of political discussion was politically significant, not only because it represents *Angellism's* growth beyond domestic borders, but also because it indicates Angell's participation in a growing international public sphere, the cosmopolitanism and inclusiveness of which challenged the source of much of the period's acceleration.

The character of the political discourse that defined the international expression of *Angellism* can be grasped through an examination of two expressions of *Angellism* which have received insufficient attention: the International Polity Summer School held at Old Jordans Hostel, Beaconsfield, and the University of Toronto International Polity Club. Both demonstrate that in its international expansion, *Angellism* lost none of the inclusiveness and open ended character, which had largely defined it in its domestic British context.

The International Polity Summer School held at Old Jordans Hostel took place over the course of 10 days between July 17 and July 27 1914 and was considered by Angell to be one of the most successful *Angellism* events in the prewar period.²⁹² The Old Jordans Summer School is one of the best concrete examples of how Angell's movement participated in an international discursive space. Much like the Le Toquet conference, this event was made up of prominent guests and speakers from various locations and

²⁹¹ Some prominent guests included: Sir John Barlow (MP from Frome, Somerset), H. Bell (of Lloyd's Bank), Jacques Dumas (editor of *La Paix Par Le Droit*), Professor Guerard (of Houston University), Sir Robert A Hadfield (President of the Iron and Steel Institute), Tighe Hopkins (Author and Journalist), E.D. Morel (Author and Journalist), J. Prudhommeaux (Secretary, European Carnegie Endowment), Sir Herbert Raphael (MP for South Derbyshire), Arnold Rowntree (MP for York), Professor Sieper (Munich University). Hines, *Norman Angell Peace Movement*, Appendix A. Angell emphasizes the success of this conference both in his autobiography and in the *Reminiscences*, see Angell, *After All*, p. 172., Angell, *Reminiscences*, pp. 115-116

²⁹² Angell, *After All* p. 172

ideological backgrounds.²⁹³ Nevertheless, the discussions which took place at the event were largely characterized by an open-ended give and take. As one author in War and Peace noted: “The salient feature about this conference is the marked absence of extremists and faddists of all kinds.”²⁹⁴ Almost forty years later, Angell wrote that the conference never approached “the intolerance, fanaticism, vindictiveness, that seem to have marked a great number of the Communist dominated gatherings this last twenty-five years.”²⁹⁵ On the contrary, much like *Angellism* in its domestic British context, this event was designed to permit critical reflection and was animated by what War and Peace termed, an “insatiable appetite for discussion.”²⁹⁶

The morning session of the school was devoted to the idea of gaining a better understanding of *Norman Angellism* by first criticizing it. One of the students would be asked to provide a concise statement outlining the central ideas of *Norman Angellism* and then the rest of the class would be asked to question and criticize the statement.²⁹⁷ This attachment to critical inquiry was represented in the statements of the students when they were asked “what is Norman Angellism?” Leonard Behrens of the Manchester Norman Angell League stated: “We set out to discuss it as an intellectual question, and we believe

²⁹³ Included in this group were: P.J Hannan (President, Navy League, England), Manley O. Huson (Professor of Law, Harvard University, U.S.A.), B.S. Townroe (National Service League, England), Charles Wright (Lloyds Bank, England), James Wilson (Clergyman, New Zealand), Fred Blythe (Columbia University, U.S.A), Woodhull Hay (France), B.H. Knollenberg (Graduate student, Harvard University, U.S.A), Dr. John Mez (Professor, Munich University)

²⁹⁴ G.W.N., “The International Polity Summer School: Some Impressions”, War and Peace, 1, No. 10, August 1914, p. 313

²⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 173

²⁹⁶ G.W.N., “The International Polity Summer School”, p. 314

²⁹⁷ Norman Angell outlined the process thus: “Here is the method of the morning session. Whoever is conducting the session will ask one of the students either to state our case in general or to state a particular part of that case – the conductor of the session will then criticize the statement; or a question will be asked of one student, and others will be asked to criticize the reply, after which the director of the class will criticize the whole process.” Hilton, Report of Certain Discussions, p. 1

we have there the solution to the whole problem.”²⁹⁸ Similarly John Mez of Munich University stated that it “is a method of considering the basic assumptions about war and peace” which aims “at exposing the wrong thinking we are led into by adhering to old misconceptions.”²⁹⁹

The afternoon session of the summer school was devoted to lectures by distinguished speakers. They were often Angell critics whose arguments, according to Angell, needed to be seriously and critically considered. In this sense Angell referred to them as “corpses to be dissected.”³⁰⁰ Following the lectures, students were asked to summarize and critically examine the speaker’s central ideas. The lecturer would then be given the opportunity to respond. In this way, the afternoon session of the school was defined by a mutual give and take between interlocutors. The spirit of inquiry which defined this event was also evident in the Canadian wing of *Angellism* which was centered around the University of Toronto International Polity Club.

In the Kardova Tea Room on 23 October 1913, the University of Toronto International Polity Club was formed. Within one year this organization had 250 formal members, it attracted several high profile speakers, it held meetings with attendance figures over 300, and it caused Angell to refer to Toronto as “the intellectual centre of the Dominion.”³⁰¹ By 11 April 1914, the Star reported the club to be “...thoroughly alive.”³⁰²

²⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 3

²⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 4

³⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 30

³⁰¹ For membership figures see, Author Unknown, “Polity Club Serves Noteworthy Ends,” Star (Toronto), 11 April 1914, p. 10c; Speakers to the club in its first year included, John Lewis (editor of the Toronto Star), G.E. Jackson (Cambridge Lecturer in Economics), J.A. Macdonald (editor of the Toronto Globe), Sir John Willison (Canadian correspondent to the London Times), Alfred Noyes (English poet), and N.W. Rowell (leader of Ontario’s provincial Liberal Party). BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 29, “Memo for Norman Angell,” 15 February 1914. The club’s first meeting filled the newly built YMCA’s auditorium achieving an attendance of 300. Author Unknown, “New University Club Hears Able Addresses,” Globe (Toronto), 5 December 1913. According to the Star extra tables had to be brought in to accommodate the

Despite its success this organization has received no historiographical attention. This is problematic not simply because of the organization's popularity, nor the fact that it was the only Canadian *Angellite* organization, but because the University of Toronto Club was a model of the inclusiveness and the open-ended give and take that characterized the discursive space which Angell had created.

In the way of the clubs and societies in Britain, the University of Toronto International Polity Club firmly adhered to an approach that was inclusive in nature and defined by "a spirit of inquiry." The formal objects of the Club were:

[T]o encourage the study of international relations; to discuss problems relating to armed aggression; to consider means of settling international disputes without war; to stimulate a sympathetic appreciation of the character, problems and intellectual currents of other nations; and to cooperate for the furthering of these aims with similar organizations in other universities.³⁰³

The Club was not a peace organization per se, but rather was aimed at anyone interested in international issues.³⁰⁴ According to its manifesto, the Club was based "first and foremost, on individual breadth of view" and was the product of no "clique, nor of any single college."³⁰⁵ This point was reiterated by the organization's second president, C.R. Young, who in 1915 defined the Club as "...an association of eager enquirers, of searchers after truth..."³⁰⁶ The hope of the Club was that "by its broad and open-minded interest in every phase of internationalism..." it could "form student opinion and send forth from the University men and women trained to think clearly and without

inaugural meeting, Author Unknown, "Varsity People are Fond of Polity Club: Big Crowd, with Many Ladies, Hear Speakers at International Dinner," *Star* (Toronto), 5 December 1913. University of Toronto Archives and Records Management (hereafter UTARMS), Office of the Registrar, A1973-0051/239

³⁰² "Polity Club Serves Noteworthy Ends".

³⁰³ UTARMS, Office of the Registrar, A1973-0051/239, "International Polity Club Report for 1915"

³⁰⁴ "There is assuredly nothing in these objects that commits the Club, as a club, to the advocacy of either peace or war. On the contrary there is much that will appeal to all students of World problems."

"International Polity Club Report for 1915".

³⁰⁵ UTARMS, Office of the Registrar, A1973-0051/239, "International Polity Club Report for 1914".

³⁰⁶ "International Polity Club Report for 1915".

prejudice.”³⁰⁷ Clearly the University of Toronto Club was more of a discursive space than a policy focused political movement.

In membership, the Club was highly diverse. In terms of gender, fully half of the 300 who attended the inaugural meeting were female, nearly half of its 250 members in 1914 were female undergraduates and from 1915-1916, women made up more than half of its executive. Additionally, membership in the club was not just limited to students, but open to the general public and the club actively encouraged membership from people of different cultures and political points of view.³⁰⁸ According to its manifesto the single requirement for membership was, “sincerity of conviction or honesty of doubt.”³⁰⁹ As Gilbert Jackson, Vice President of the Club, told a Toronto Star reporter, “[w]e exist for the purpose of thought and discussion.... We think that the subject of war and peace is one that interests most people, and we try to study it from all points of view, getting opinions of men of all types of mind.... We number among our members Imperialists, Liberals, and Conservatives, Socialists and Individualists.”³¹⁰ In light of this it is hard to deny that as a discursive space the Club was inclusive and open-ended.

The University of Toronto Club was also involved in the international coming together that defined other expressions of *Angellism* such as the Old Jordans Summer School and the Le Touquet conference. Late in 1913, the Toronto Club elected three members to represent it at the annual Convention of the American Association of

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ A shining example of the cosmopolitan nature of the club is the fact that on 8 December 1914 it held a “cosmopolitan night” where representatives of various cultures could express, “in speech or in music, the infinite variety of the peoples of the earth as well as something of their common possessions.” UTARMS, Office of the Registrar, A1973-0051/239, Author Unknown, “Cosmopolitan Night,” Star, 8 December 1914.

³⁰⁹ “International Polity Club Report for 1914”.

³¹⁰ UTARMS, Office of the Registrar, A1973-0051/239, “Polity Club Serves Noteworthy Ends,” Star (Toronto)

Cosmopolitan Clubs at Iowa City. The Toronto Club was the sole Canadian organization present at the conference, where twenty-one other nationalities were represented.³¹¹ The Toronto representatives were fairly active at the conference, so much so, that they caught the eye of George Nasmyth who later agreed to come to their club and lecture. By 1915, the promotion of a cosmopolitan world-view became an essential aim of the Club. As the 1915 report read: “A field of activity in which the Club hopes to achieve much is the promotion of cosmopolitanism among students.”³¹² For this reason in 1915 the Club started to hold cosmopolitan nights where large numbers of foreign students were brought together to discuss their national cultures.³¹³

Given its diversity, its attachment to critical reflection and discussion, and the apparent absence of confrontation, it seems evident that as a discursive space the University of Toronto International Polity Club was defined by an unhurried temporality. That is to say that the time which individuals experienced with the Club was distinctly slower than that which they would have experienced within the Edwardian public sphere. When seen in this light, the University of Toronto International Polity Club appears to lend further support to the idea that Norman Angellism participated in creating areas where individuals were given the time necessary to more adequately fulfill their civic duty and form thought-out political opinions.

The rapid growth of *Norman Angellism* in an international context only strengthened the movements footing in its domestic context. With the institutional help of the Garton

³¹¹ There are conflicting numbers as to how many nationalities were represented at this conference. While the International Polity Club’s 1914 report lists the number as twenty-one, the Toronto *Star* gives the vague figure of “over twenty” and the University of Toronto newspaper, *Varsity*, lists the number of 22. UTARMS, Office of the Registrar, A1973-0051/239, *Varsity*, 9 January 1913; *Star* 31 December 1913.

³¹² “International Polity Club Report for 1915”.

³¹³ The first of these nights was held in December 1915. It is not clear whether another was held before the Club dissolved in 1916.

Foundation, the financial aid of the Carnegie Endowment, and the support of dedicated converts, *Norman Angellism* was consistently growing both domestically and internationally:

Angell's influence appeared to be everywhere: in deliberations of the British Committee of Imperial Defense whose members suddenly found themselves confronted with papers on economic finance and interdependence; in major political speeches; in the discussions of bankers, financiers and economists on the likely impact of a major European war on the international credit system; at public and private meetings of military experts; in the debates of peace activists; In the years immediately before the outbreak of the First World War, few works dominated discussion of international relations... more than The Great Illusion.³¹⁴

While there is recognition here that Angell was in many ways successful, "transform[ing] the intellectual environment within which the Anglo-American elite discussed international relations," there is a failure to appreciate the affect that Angell's public currency had on temporality; on the way in which *Norman Angellism* represented a space outside of the hectic tempo of political life where individuals were provided with a pause to reflect.³¹⁵

The view of Angell as politically ineffective stems from the fact that historians have not examined his work within the context of the accelerated temporal contours of his political environment. Such a context, however, is key to an understanding of Angell. Commenting on the events of July and August 1914, he attributed his inability to affect policy to "the paralyzing rapidity" with which events developed.³¹⁶ He wrote, "Our failure to produce a greater effect must be attributed mainly to the speed with which the situation developed."³¹⁷ Scheuerman's recent work, when extended to account for public discourse, enables us to see Angell in this context. It allows us to follow McNeal beyond

³¹⁴ McNeal, "Making War Expensive and Peace Cheap," p. 149.

³¹⁵ Ibid, p. 150.

³¹⁶ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 66, Norman Angell, "Report," n.d.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

our retrospective bias and to construct an image of Angell that more fully appreciates the political significance of his public currency.

Though *Norman Angellism* has traditionally been seen as a political movement it can arguably be more accurately described as a new discursive space or, to use Habermas's vocabulary, a competing public sphere. Unlike traditional political movements, which have a clearly defined policy objective, *Norman Angellism* was concerned primarily with raising discussion and awareness. Largely for this reason it was able to maintain an adherence to critical reason and "a spirit of inquiry" in an accelerated environment. By fostering open-ended discussion, *Norman Angellism* stood in marked contrast to the prevailing speedy and confrontational tone. *Norman Angellism* as a discursive space was a haven on an international scale to which individuals could escape the hastened pace of political life and consider, reflect on, and criticize existing political dogma and doctrines. Though it is impossible to measure scientifically the exact extent of Angell's influence on the patterns of public speech it seems likely that, given the public currency of *Norman Angellism* between 1910 and 1914, his affect was significant.

Conclusion

Speed poses several problems for the practice of liberal democracy. Scheuerman's recent book has probed many of these, but has said little regarding the ways in which acceleration affects the public sphere and political discussion. Speed tends to place a premium on the importance of clear minded decision making, but citizens are not provided with the required time to think through political issues. It seems important in 2006 to explore this aspect of the phenomenon. An examination of the Edwardian period has indicated how this sense of acceleration can lead to panic, an "us versus them" mindset, and confrontational rather than meaningful public discourse. It can, in other words, lead to the closing of the public sphere and the growth of anti-liberal political forces. Political acceleration is as present today as it was in the Edwardian period. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks placed America's national territory under attack for the first time since the War of 1812. Using the world's fastest mode of transportation "a group of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations" instantly changed the American polity from a confident superpower to, what President George W. Bush has described as, "a country awakened to danger."³¹⁸ In other words, these attacks brought to the contemporary "collective mind" of America a new sense of immediacy, by publicly demonstrating the nation's vulnerability. In consequence, a perceived necessity for rapid political action arose and a series of laws were passed which gave additional powers to the executive branch of the state; powers which in many ways violate civil liberties and

³¹⁸ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," 20 September 2001. The idea of danger has since become an integral part of the discourse through which the war on terror is constructed, described, and legitimized. For a discussion of this see, Richard Jackson, "Writing Threat and Danger," Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 92-120

human rights.³¹⁹ The events of 9/11 arguably increased both the perceived and actual speed of political movement, creating an anti-liberal political environment.

In terms of the American public sphere, these attacks have given birth to a condition strikingly similar to the one that Angell described as “emotionalism” in Patriotism Under Three Flags. A sense of panic and anxiety has allowed confrontation and narrow “us versus them” thinking to become the dominant tone of public political debate. Using the words with which President George W. Bush began the “war on terror” it is possible to sum up much of American public political debate: “Either you are with us or your are with the terrorists.”³²⁰ As University of Chicago professor, Lauren Berlant, has recently observed, “at present the political sphere of the United States is saturated by the deployment of emotion to convert the nation from the liveness of politics to the time of moral clarities that actively trump nuancing dissenting counternarratives.”³²¹ In this way, what several commentators have termed, “the new McCarthyism” has emerged.³²² Certainly, this is supported by the difficulties that several academics and public figures have faced as a result of their objection to American foreign policy.

In many ways the contemporary American political scene resembles what Angell observed in the Edwardian period: the rapid change in status of the world’s strongest nation, the growth of “emotionalism,” the emergence of confrontation as the dominant tone of public debate, and the strengthening of anti-liberal political trends. In this light, it

³¹⁹ Elaine Hagopian, Civil Rights in Peril: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, London: Pluto Press, 2004.

³²⁰ Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”

³²¹ Lauren Berlant, “The Epistemology of State Emotion,” Austin Sarat, ed., Dissent in Dangerous Times, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2005, p. 73

³²² Sandra Sliberstein, “The New McCarthyism,” War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11, New York: Routledge, pp. 127-146; David Cole, “The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,” Sarat, Dissent in Dangerous Times, pp. 111-145. EJ Dionne, “The New McCarthyism” Washington Post, 28 June 2005, p. A15. It is also worth noting that a Google search turns up 89,900 results for the search term: “New McCarthyism”

becomes important to follow McNeal's call not simply because it is an interesting intellectual exercise, but because in some ways we have become much like Angell's contemporaries. This is not the narrow claim of the historicist.³²³ I am not claiming that there are scientifically discernable historical patterns, nor am I asserting the common, yet inaccurate, phrase: "history repeats itself." I am, however, asserting that there are similarities between different historical periods and that one can derive general lessons from the past. Given the clear temporal similarity between the Edwardian and contemporary American public spheres, it seems that our reexamination of Angell can be used to inform the efforts of those who wish to revitalize liberal democratic practice in America in the new century.

It is important to assert that the temporal challenges that open-ended discursive spaces pose to acceleration are as integral to liberal democratic practice now as they were in the Edwardian age. This said it is perhaps appropriate to follow Angell's example and engage in an exercise of self-criticism in the hope that through such an exercise we may gain a better understanding of the politically significant relationship between acceleration and changes within the patterns of public speech. To this end I will attempt to examine one of the most obvious temporal and political problems with which open-ended discursive spaces are faced, namely, the "temporal misfit" where the dominant and alternative temporalities become too distinct and the rate at which political issues evolve in the public sphere become too fast for the alternative discursive spaces to keep up.

³²³ I use the term "historicist" in the same way that Karl Popper uses it in The Open Society and its Enemies. Here Popper defines the historicist as one who believes in historical inevitability and who claims to have discovered scientific patterns in history which allow for the prediction of the future. Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 2-3

The first rebuttal to this criticism seems to be the ever increasing rate of exchange which defines contemporary modes of communication. In the brief consideration which Scheuerman gives to public discourse he argues that there is potential for free-wheeling deliberative exchange to keep pace with the accelerated temporal character of modern society. Through the use of the Internet, NGOs are given an infrastructure through which they can express their views to a wider audience than ever before. As Scheuerman notes, however, this new technology can act as a buttressing force for liberal democratic practice only so long as it is kept from becoming “an overwhelming commercial device.”³²⁴ To this end he suggests public subsidies for websites, strict rules of disclosure for news sites, and an applied updated version of the fairness doctrine.³²⁵ “Since cyberspace now functions as a public site such as sidewalks and parks once did, [Scheuerman writes] perhaps it needs to be similarly regulated so as to provide meaningful communicative access for interested participants.”³²⁶ In Scheuerman’s view, there is certainly the potential for maintaining meaningful discursive spaces within America’s heightening environment of acceleration.

Angell was similarly optimistic regarding the potential for liberal democracy to function within a high-speed environment. His analysis of “the Laws of Acceleration” argued that within the speedy pace of the modern world it was possible for human beings to adapt and function rationally within changing temporal situations.³²⁷ In this sense he posited an optimism over the emergence of broadcast media similar to that which Scheuerman posits over the advent of the Internet:

³²⁴ Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, p. 204

³²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 204

³²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 204

³²⁷ Angell, The Great Illusion, p. 220

The immense superiority of Broadcasting over the popular press as we have known it in the past is this: newspapers are compelled by the economic condition of their existence to compete in pandering to prejudice and onesidedness.... Broadcasting, at least as we know it in England, is much more favorably situated for developing the saner second thought for exercising impartiality; the responsibility which we associate with a judiciary.³²⁸

Sadly the clear consolidation of the mass media into a handful of conglomerates (such as AOL Time Warner, Viacom, General Electric and News Corporation) has led to the largely controlled and biased dissemination of information, greatly negating the hope which Angell expressed almost a century ago.³²⁹ Hence Mark Dowie, in his introduction to John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton's Toxic Sludge, noted that there are now significantly more public relations people controlling the news than there are reporters writing it.³³⁰ Perhaps then the story of broadcasting should add weight to Scheuerman's suggestions regarding the regulation of cyberspace. Even if the Internet was to develop as a meaningful public space, however, there is still a major theoretical problem which Scheuerman did not sufficiently consider.

Though it is true that modern society has created, what Scheuerman describes as, "opportunities for eliminating historically contingent forms of unnecessary or excess

³²⁸ BSU (Norman Angell Collection), Box 45, "Free Speech"

³²⁹ This idea is best elaborated by the "propaganda model" created by Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman in their celebrated book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Through their propaganda model Chomsky and Herman argue that the contemporary mass media represents a tool through which the economic elite are able to justify existing social and economic relations. According to Chomsky and Herman's model all news must pass through five "news filters" which cleanse media content and limit any significant potential for political dissent. These filters are: "(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and 'experts' funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) 'flak' as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) 'anticommunism' as a national religion and control mechanism." These filters appear so natural, Chomsky and Herman note, that even the journalists who function within them often become convinced of the illusion that they are reporting objectively. See Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books, 2002, pp. 1-35

³³⁰ Mark Dowie, "Introduction," in John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Public Relations Industry, Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1995, p. 2. This source is also cited by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman in the updated introduction for the 2002 edition of Manufacturing Consent. See, Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. xvii

slowness in political deliberation,” it is also true that the pace of critical public discourse can only logically be sped up to a degree.³³¹ Even though the Internet increases the speed with which information can be disseminated, it cannot increase the speed of the reflection and the thought processes that are the foundation of clear political opinions and which, to be meaningful, must move at an inherently slow pace. This is particularly true when we are referring to times of political panic, such as the Edwardian period and contemporary America, where public discourse has become largely confrontational and the acceleration of the public sphere has consequently become a self-perpetuating loop (where panic breeds confrontation and confrontation breeds further panic). In sum, there is no reason to believe that competing public spheres would remain meaningful even if they were made to move significantly faster. In this way, reliance on the increased potential for speed in critical discussion leads us to what is largely a dead end.

Perhaps the most important lesson that Angell’s history gives us is that the work of intellectuals, or creators of discursive space, is not politically autonomous, but is in fact part of a larger political process. Arguably one reason why Angell has been seen as politically insignificant is because historians and other scholars have been trying to see *Norman Angellism* as if it were autonomous and thus they have paid too much attention to Angell’s inability to achieve peace. Such an interpretation lacks an understanding of *Norman Angellism* as part of the temporal dialectics (the acceleration and deceleration) of liberal democracy. In this light the “temporal misfit” criticism becomes moot because the emphasis is no longer on effecting immediate institutional political reform, but rather on maintaining a temporal challenge to speed.

³³¹ Scheuerman, *Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time*, p. 201

In looking at Angell as a part of a temporal and political process, contemporary intellectuals embedded within the accelerated contours of contemporary America should derive a sense of purpose. In creating competing public spheres they are members of a critical community that compensates for the scarcity of time. Though the rapid speed of contemporary society may leave them in the dust, their particular political aims unrealized, it is essential that they gain the understanding that they are an essential aspect of liberal democratic practice. As Columbia University professor Charles Forcey wrote to Angell in 1959:

[The intellectual] has to somehow attain to the moral and intellectual balance that allows him to know that his words will have only the faintest impact while at the same time feeling that his speculations and criticisms are an overwhelmingly important social activity. The intellectual has to realize that ideas, or culture in the anthropologist's sense, change only devastatingly slowly, but that his own contributions are a fractional additive to that great process.³³²

It is important that intellectuals recognize their "fractional additive." That is to say, it is important to be cognizant of the political significance of those individuals who manipulate public speech patterns by creating new discursive spaces with alternative temporalities.

It is within the slower pace of open-ended discursive spaces that others gain deeper political understanding and are given a sense of meaning. It was in this spirit that Leonard Behrens, a Manchester *Angellite*, wrote to Angell on Christmas Day 1962:

The world owes you much, but at the moment I am thinking more of my personal debt to you. It would be more than fifty years since Langdon-Davies came hunting in Manchester and to my eternal gratitude picked me out to take a humble share in your work. That work was a pleasure and an inspiration, and as the years - and the wars - passed on, it led me into ways that I traveled with satisfaction and put upon my shoulders burdens which it was an honour to bear. Thank you, dear N.A., for

³³² WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 1, Charles Forcey to Norman Angell, 1959.

all the work you gave me to do and for the inspiration which generated the motive power to push on with it.³³³

As Behrens' letter demonstrates the alternative slower temporality of open-ended discursive space is, like acceleration, a self-perpetuating process. By creating an alternative to the speedy pace of the Edwardian public sphere Angell created a means by which individuals like Behrens could form clear political opinions and then later carry on with the work of creating further critical public discourse. Temporality in politics is a large process and like Janus it has two faces. So long as individuals like Angell are willing to take on the burden of maintaining alternative open-ended discursive spaces this process will not end.

³³³ WRAC (Norman Angell Collection), Box 2, Leonard Behrens to Norman Angell, 25 December 1962. Also see, Chapter Three, page 86, footnote 272.

Appendix



*Linley Sambrook 1903
with some changes 1845.*

HISTORY REVERSES ITSELF ;

OR, PAPA JOSEPH TAKING MASTER ARTHUR A PROTECTION WALK.

PAPA JOSEPH. "COME ALONG, MASTER ARTHUR. DO STEP OUT!"

MASTER ARTHUR. "THAT'S ALL VERY WELL, BUT YOU KNOW I CANNOT GO AS FAST AS YOU DO."

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