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THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR:
THE CASE OF LABOUR MIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE

Janice Monti Belkaoui

A Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Sociology

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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In 1972, in a Parisian bank where I happened to be cashing some travellers' cheques, I noticed in line ahead of me a dishevelled, vaguely tired looking man, dressed in the traditional North African cachabia. Although he was rather brusquely served, he quietly completed his transaction and left the bank to the accompaniment of steely looks from the patrons and clerks. This image of the foreign worker, alone and barely tolerated, along with other tourist snapshots was filed away in my memory until the advent of this dissertation. It seems fitting to acknowledge the contribution to my thesis of this unknown man alongside those contributors who enjoy a somewhat more exalted social status.

The secondary data on which my analysis is based could not have been assembled without the financial assistance of the Douglas-Coldwell Foundation, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Carleton University. My professors and peers at Carleton have contributed to the completion of this work in countless ways large and small. Professors Monica Boyd, Muri Frumhartz, Bruce McFarlane, John Myles, Iain Prattis, Stephen Richer and Allan Steeves offered verbal and written comments on the proposal in addition to other forms of assistance. A special thanks for editorial and substantive comments is directed to Professor Gertrud Neuwirth. Although she had not served as a formal member of my committee, she has generally acted as my "consigliere sotto voce". Her influence can be traced in this dissertation and in

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ABSTRACT

A review and critique of the literature on the relationship among economic structure, the welfare state and labour migration are used as the basis for an alternative orientation to the prevalent post-industrial approach to labour migration. This alternative approach, "the international system" framework, is applied to the case study of labour migration from the Mediterranean Basin periphery to six countries of the Western European core. The international system approach views the transfer of labour reserves from the periphery to the core as a manifestation of the international division of labour. The core's reliance on foreign labour is related to the expanding nature and cost of welfarism under advanced capitalism. The greater the extension of citizenship rights to the indigenous labour force through the welfare state, the more costly these rights are to capital. One consequence of the spread of welfarism in Western Europe is rising labour costs, coupled with endemic and relative labour scarcity in the "peripheral" or non-monopolistic economic sector. The employment of alternative and cheap labour reserves represents an attempt to reduce labour costs without creating labour unrest among indigenous workers. The employment of foreign labour helps to maintain the rate of profit for the non-monopolistic sector of the economy, in firms and industries which cannot draw upon the means open to monopoly capitalism to maintain an adequate level of surplus. The concentration of foreign labour in these industries serves as a

mechanism of social control, diffusing the potential for class conflict and splitting the working class into a labour aristocracy of domestic workers and an underclass of foreigners exempt from citizenship rights and benefits. This reliance on foreign labour reduces the core's labour costs by placing the burden of social reproduction of labour in the nations of the periphery.

While the requirements of the production process in the advanced capitalist countries of the core have spawned the contemporary pattern of foreign labour importation and utilization, the creation of these labour reserves for the core has been made possible through the peripheralization of the labour supply nations within the international market economy.

Periphery states, like those in the core, must provide conditions of profitable production while also dealing with the tensions caused by economic development. Industrialization and urbanization in the periphery have created a reserve army of labour and increased costs of consumption. The exportation of workers serves to diffuse the tensions generated by development. The actions of the supply and host states, in establishing interstate relations in the form of trade and labour agreements, facilitates the movement of labour to the core. The employment of workers in the core and the influx of foreign currency to the periphery from migrants' remittances and savings tend to further the dependence of the periphery nations on the core, by altering traditional economic and social relations, by causing the proliferation of non-productive investments in the service sector and by creating

preferences for core-manufactured goods, consumption values and lifestyles. Final consideration is given to the alternative to the transfer of labour to the core, i.e., the movement of capital to the periphery, and an assessment of the future prospects for labour migration to Western Europe is presented.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is a trap set by history.
We ... in Europe have been
accustomed to colonizing the
world. Now the foreigners are
coming here to us.

Pierre Messmer,
Prime Minister of France

The foreign worker is like a lemon.
First you squeeze the fruit and
then you throw it away.

Portuguese Worker in France

First-time visitors to Western Europe are often surprised to find that their travelogue images of the continent's old and majestic cities hardly capture the contemporary reality. Many of the expected Parisian street scenes have been replaced by dark casbahs where men in djibellias speak in languages other than French. The sights and sounds in certain quarters of West Berlin resemble more of a Turkish bazaar than an avenue in a German metropole. Most of the major cities in Western Europe host similarly visible foreign contingents. The naive North American tourist soon perceives that Europe, like his own country, is also a land of immigration. Yet many Western Europeans would themselves deny this designation. In their view, these foreigners are only "guests", invited in to work during Europe's postwar boom and soon to return to their homes. Which of these observations correctly describes the contemporary situation?

The nations of Western Europe are just beginning to answer this question.

Most of the countries of Western Europe host sizeable numbers of foreign workers. While the assessments of their exact numerical strength vary widely depending on the source, conservative estimates run to over twelve million. This foreign labour force exceeds in size the native populations of Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and Sweden and approaches that of the Netherlands. Not until the economic recession of the mid-1970s has any serious appraisal been proposed of Europe's laissez-faire migration policies. Indeed, the reliance on foreign labour is somewhat of an entrenched historical and structural feature in Western European economies. The migration of workers from peripheral areas to the industrial centres of Western Europe has its origins in the decline of feudal social relations and in the emergence in the nineteenth century of a reserve labour force, pulled out of rural areas to the urban centres of industrial development. This early period of capitalist development was characterized by uncontrolled intra-European migration. Individual workers moved across national borders in response to purely economic forces, unfettered by political or legal restrictions, and competing directly with native workers on the labour market. The spontaneous nature of this early labour migration changed by the end of the nineteenth century as labour market demands widened. Employers and governments began to recruit foreign labour to satisfy labour demand in certain industries and regions. Migrants no longer acted as

free agents, and their position in the labour market and in the host society as equal to native workers began to alter. This step toward controlled migration gave rise to Western Europe's contemporary pattern of labour migration.

Although labour migration to Europe declined during the interwar period, since 1945 it has taken place on an unprecedented scale. After the second world war, Europe embarked on a program of intensive economic development. This initiative was aggravated, however, by population imbalances and uneven employment effects across the continent. Labour shortages coupled with continued economic growth and rising rates of social mobility for indigenous workers have occurred alongside the expansion of the welfare state. These combined forces encouraged the already established practice of labour importation. Workers from the European South and the Mediterranean Basin were actively recruited to fill labour shortages in the industrialized centres of Western Europe. Consequently, by the 1960s, foreign workers formed an important component of the Western European labour force.

The economic recession of the last decade precipitated a general re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of labour importation by many of the Western European countries. By 1974, all Economic Community labour had been extended the right of intra-Community mobility (free movement) while the entrance of non-Community labour had been severely curtailed. In addition, the major labour-importing countries have suspended all direct foreign labour recruitment. The effect of these measures has been a stabilization rather than a reduction in the size of the foreign

labour force. Although the number of new migrants to Western Europe has declined, massive returns of workers to the sender countries have not materialized. It appears that in this decade Europe's "guests" have settled in for an extended stay.

Sociological analysis of the reliance on foreign labour in Western Europe has been overshadowed by a general preoccupation with the overseas movement of Europeans to the New World. In fact, the recent migratory movements within and to Europe from the Mediterranean Basin are sometimes mistakenly viewed as a reversal of this trend. This assumption is misleading because the two patterns of overseas and intra-European migration coexisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the numbers involved in the intra-continental movement are no less significant. For example, approximately seven of the fifteen million who emigrated from Italy between 1876 and 1920 went to other countries in Europe. France, West Germany and Switzerland have been traditionally dependent on foreign workers in times of labour scarcity. European immigrants to Switzerland, for example, made up nearly fifteen percent of the labour force during the early years of the twentieth century, a proportion that closely approximates the contemporary numerical strength of foreign labour in that country (Karabel, 1979; Rosenblum, 1973). The concentration of large numbers of foreign workers in major urban and industrial centres has become an ubiquitous aspect of the European experience. There are now indications that the pattern of temporary stays is changing, yet the immigration policies of Western Europe have neither accommodated nor encouraged the trend toward permanent settlement. While foreign

workers constitute a pervasive feature of Western European society in this decade, their social status is not as well defined.

The persistence of labour migration and the relative inattention to the Western European phenomenon in contemporary social science literature underscore the need for an understanding of the conditions under which migrant labour flows between host and supply countries are established and maintained. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this need by providing an analytical approach to and an outline of the origins and economic, political and social consequences of labour migration to Western Europe since the end of the second world war.

The following chapter highlights major approaches to the study of labour migration. The post-industrial orientation is discussed primarily in terms of the mechanisms operating in the countries which host immigrant labour. This approach frames the importation of labour in relation to social and technological changes in the post-war era which have altered Western European class and industrial structures. As a result of these changes, the nations of Western Europe have experienced labour scarcity, particularly in dirty and low skill level jobs for which indigenous workers are unavailable. A review of the labour scarcity and related dual economy arguments is offered with some appraisal of their applicability to migration research but the bulk of the discussion is devoted to the need for an alternative approach which shifts the focus beyond social and technological determinants of labour scarcity. An alternative view is advocated which places migration in relation to the international division of labour within a global market

economy, taking into account the forces which operate in labour sending countries of the periphery as well as in the receiving countries of the core. The model outlined in this dissertation does not attempt an explanation of the labour migration phenomenon but offers instead a plausible interpretation of migration within a body of assumptions about the nature of the links among the global economy of capitalism and nation-states. The relevance of the international system approach is outlined in very broad terms and evidence in partial support of the arguments is provided. Although alternative interpretations of the data may be possible, they have not been pursued.

CHAPTER II

Approaches to the Study of Labour Migration

I. The Postindustrial Orientation: Labour Scarcity, "Dirty Jobs" and Migration

Conventional approaches to migration have tended to concentrate on the internal movements of individuals within national boundaries. Most of these attempts to develop a model of migration have produced descriptive methods rather than explanatory theories (see, e.g., the critique of the gravity, transition matrix and cost-benefit models in Böhring, 1978: 10-12). Efforts to develop models appropriate to the study of international labour migration have borrowed heavily from those which map out internal movements and, as a result, have not produced a very fruitful yield. In most treatments, the unit of analysis is the individual migrant and the focus of inquiry revolves around the individual's motivations for becoming a migrant and the social psychological consequences of migration. In these analyses, an individual's reasons for migration are generally tied to the push and pull mechanisms of labour markets in supply and host countries. The social psychological consequences are discussed in terms of the problems of adaptation, acculturation and assimilation which migrants encounter in host societies. These two arenas of analysis, the economic forces of labour supply and demand and the sociological concern with integration, are often combined in cyclical or transitional

models of the migratory process (e.g., Rose, 1969; Böhning, 1972; Richmond and Verma, 1978).

In sociological parlance, such approaches can be subsumed under the "postindustrial society" orientation to social change and development. The postindustrial framework conceptualizes migratory movements as voluntary and rational in nature. Individuals are depicted as more or less active respondents to environmental and situational factors. The decision to migrate is the outcome of their efforts to maximize personal gains and minimize costs. Among the external stimuli to which the potential migrant responds are a number of push and pull forces in sender and receiver nations. Among the primary push factors in the countries of labour supply are overpopulation, famine or other natural disasters, war or political unrest, the trend away from labour-intensive methods in agriculture, and technological development and industrialization in urban centres with resultant unemployment as the supply of labour from rural areas exceeds the demand in the metropole. Also salient are seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the economy and relative differences in wages and opportunities between a migrant's place of origin and intended destination. Pull factors operating in countries which host migrant labour include rapid industrial expansion and to a lesser extent the increased availability of housing, education and other social services. Of particular relevance to international labour migration among these pull factors are the creation of new jobs, the increased demand for skilled labour, and greater educational opportunities and career mobility for

indigenous workers. As a consequence of these trends, vacancies occur in unskilled and less desirable jobs. Employers attempt to alleviate these conditions of labour scarcity through the employment of underutilized social groups, such as ethnic minorities, youth and women, or through the importation of foreign workers.

A. The Labor Scarcity Argument

As the above paragraph illustrates, the postindustrial perspective on international migration has been principally concerned with the problem of labour scarcity in advanced industrial societies. Proponents of the labour scarcity approach focus on the nation state's inability, despite its expanded welfare base, continuing industrial growth and relative affluence, to find indigenous workers willing to do the dirty, menial, and low prestige jobs that cannot be dispensed with even in the midst of advanced industrialism (see, e.g., Kindleberger, 1967; Peach, 1968; Castles and Kosack, 1972; 1973). The labour scarcity literature generally cites two conditions as precipitants of the contemporary market scarcity of unskilled labour:

(1) Technological and economic change has altered the nature and availability of certain types of jobs. Although the "technological revolution" has expanded the number of white collar and skilled blue collar positions, the mechanization of the production process has reduced only marginally the number of menial, unskilled and "dirty" jobs.

(2) Institutional change has dried up many of the traditional sources of indigenous labour for unskilled work.

Broadened educational and occupational aspirations and expanded welfare benefits have enticed traditional sources of unskilled labour, e.g., youths, new immigrants and other unemployed indigenous workers, to stay outside the labour market for prolonged periods, thereby leaving unfilled the vacancies in unskilled and undesirable jobs (Jenkins, 1978: 516-517).

These conditions permit two alternatives to advanced industrial societies. In the first and highly unlikely option, given the workings of contemporary capitalism, economic policy could be directed to the development of a radical alteration of the wage and job structures, resulting in wage levels determined by sociopolitical rather than purely market forces, thereby making "undesirable" jobs less unattractive. In the second option, the Konjunkturpuffer approach recently favoured by Western European industrialists, these jobs are filled by foreign workers, admitted not for purposes of permanent settlement but almost solely for alleviating the supposedly temporary labour shortages (Böhning, 1972: 56-57). At the most general level, the labour scarcity argument maintains that the prevalent mode of adaptation to labour shortages, whether endemic or general, is to draw in unskilled workers from less economically developed regions. Because foreign labour does not compete with indigenous workers for these unskilled and low prestige positions, the importation of foreign manpower, it is argued, is a purely supplemental phenomenon, occurring on a significant scale only in times of full domestic employment, industrial growth and labour scarcity (Jenkins, 1978: 516).

The labour scarcity approach has been important in migration literature for its description of the basic push-pull market mechanism but it falls short as an explanation of the complex social processes involved in the international movement of labour, ignoring the systemic nature and extra-economic characteristics of international migratory patterns. The primary focus on labour shortages in advanced industrial nations can be seen as a response to these countries' migration policy objectives. Researchers who have undertaken migration studies have often been recipients of aid from government agencies and, sometimes, from the private sector. As a consequence, their inquiries have been shaped by these sponsors' manpower policy concerns (Portes, 1978: 469-70). This policy orientation has fostered the widely-held but historically inaccurate argument that the movement of foreign labour into the occupational structure of the advanced industrial nations is a short-term solution to a temporary manpower shortage. The assumption that foreign workers constitute a supplemental and easily dispensable labour force for a nation's "socially undesirable" tasks ignores the contemporary reality, especially as it has unfolded in the world's major labour importing countries on the European continent. Once the practice of admitting foreigners is implemented, the stream of migrant workers into the host nation may become "self-feeding", spreading beyond the "undesirable" jobs to other sectors of the economy and continuing even after the initial labour shortages have been abated (Böhning, 1972: 55-60; Böhning and Maillat, 1974: 49-68; Piore, 1979: 30-31). This is

brought about in conjunction with the societal forces already described which induce indigenous workers out of low-skill level jobs and which make economically tenable for these workers temporary periods of unemployment. Another important factor is the process of "massification" through the adoption of "scientific management" techniques. Through the introduction of these techniques, employers embark upon a deliberate effort to redesign the production process, deskilling jobs in order to employ foreign and other unskilled labour who have never before worked in an industrial setting (Cohen and Jenner, 1968: 41-56; Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 104). The trend toward massification of production takes hold quite apart from the necessity of filling the menial and low-paying jobs deserted by the native labour force. In this manner, as one observer of European conditions states, the very pattern of labour demand is altered and the entire economic sector is affected:

...It is usually in the ... firms in manufacturing industries, which can look further ahead and which can afford to take on a contingent of foreigners on a trial-and-error basis, where foreigners of all grades and levels of literacy are taught in a day or two how to turn a screw or how to operate a lever. Often the production process is already so much subdivided that no further redesigning is required, the car industry being an example. In other cases employers may completely redesign their whole production process to adjust it to the kind of immigrant labor available...the general point here is that, apart from the fact that there are undesirable and badly paid jobs in almost all sectors of the economy, the semi-automatic manufacturing industries of today can easily adopt their mass production processes to the kinds of skills

offered; and, if, say, semi-literate farmers from underdeveloped countries can offer no industrial skills at all, they can still be put into a work place where no more than a repetitive manual movement is required ... (Böhning, 1972: 59-60).

The logic of the labour scarcity argument implies a number of testable hypotheses that, unfortunately, have not been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. As supplemental manpower, foreign workers should be confined to the unskilled menial and low social status occupations shunned by indigenous workers. As unskilled workers entering host nations in times of full employment, foreigners should not be viewed as competition by the native labour force. Since the demand for such unskilled workers has only recently been left unmet by indigenous labour (the social and technological forces which precipitated it having only made themselves felt in the last two decades or so), it should follow that

(1) the wage levels in these occupations have been recently increased as employers attempted either to hold the native labour force to these jobs or to attract new sources of domestic labour to them, and

(2) significant numbers of foreign workers filling these vacancies are also a recent phenomenon and will be largely concentrated in industries opting for employment expansion over the introduction of labour-saving technology.

A decisive test of this line of reasoning would suggest the following set of hypotheses:

(a) the number of foreign workers is positively

associated with levels of aggregate employment in those industrial sectors relying heavily on unskilled workers and in unskilled, low-paying, blue-collar occupations;

(b) the number of foreign workers is positively associated with recent wage hikes in these occupations and industries caused by attempts to hold or attract domestic workers; and

(c) the number of foreign workers is negatively associated with the extent of capital investment and labour-saving technology in the production process of these industries (Jenkins, 1978: 515-521).

A perusal of the available reports on current employment patterns of foreign labour in Western industrial societies indicates at best partial support for the hypothesized directions in these relationships (see, e.g., Almino de Alencar, 1977; Bach, 1978; Baudouin, et. al., 1978; Böhning, 1975; 1978; Castells, 1975; Jenkins, 1977; 1978; Markovits and Karzarinov, 1978; Portes, 1977; 1978; Tapinos, 1974; 1975). Until a thorough catalogue of contemporary migratory patterns and employment practices is assembled by migration researchers, acceptance of the labour scarcity argument and the related assumption that the use of foreign labour is a transitory phenomenon is both empirically unfounded and sociologically misleading.

In the case of Western Europe, several factors must be considered. Rates of natural population increase are now close to zero and unlikely to climb in the future. Nor can one expect a reversal of the trends of expanding welfare benefits, greater career mobility and higher educational aspirations which have had

the overall effect of pushing indigenous workers out of low skill and low prestige jobs. Given this general climate and the continuing deskilling of tasks on the production line, one can counter the labour scarcity argument, as many contemporary migration researchers have done, with evidence that migrant worker flows are not likely to disappear. Indeed, as observers of the trend forecast, these flows may become self-perpetuating, pulling foreign workers from longer distances and distributing them throughout all sectors of economic activity in receiving nations.

B. The Dual Economy Perspective

The focus on labour scarcity provides only a partial understanding of the foreign labour phenomenon. It is also necessary to look at the industries and jobs in host countries to which foreign workers are drawn. Such an examination draws attention to patterns of reliance by certain industries and occupations on this particular form of labour power. Recent empirical work in the related areas of economic dualism and segmented labour markets may provide a base for this aspect of the study of international migration.

The relationship between the utilization of foreign labour and industrial and occupational structures has emerged as a preoccupation of most migration researchers, whether they operate in a conventional postindustrial framework or view the problem from a neo-Marxian or conflict orientation. This literature has evolved at least three perspectives on the relationship between migration and the economic structure. The

first position which draws directly out of neoclassical economic theory ties migratory flows to the push and pull of market forces, specifically to labour shortage in host countries and labour surplus in supply countries. In the second perspective which is most often found in the writings of sociologists, migration satisfies the need to fill the unskilled and undesirable jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. The third position, although related to both of these views and possibly encompassing them, has not been addressed explicitly until very recently. This is the "dual economy" perspective. In this view, migration is necessary to fulfill the peculiar labour requirements of the peripheral sector of the host economy.

In the first position cited above, the push-pull thesis, migration is viewed as an outcome of the tendency for labour demand to overcome labour supply necessitating the development of a supplemental labour pool. In addition to the naive notion that market forces are all determinant, this conception leaves unanswered questions about how foreign migrants, in particular, become the solution to the need for a reserve labour force. Also, because it views the types of jobs in which migrants are concentrated as a consequence of the characteristics of these workers themselves (i.e., their economic motives for migrating and social position in the receiving society), it ignores other determinants of migrant employment patterns inherent in the host country's economic structure. The second approach can be judged a somewhat more sophisticated view of the relationship between migration and economic structure. In general, however,

this "dirty job" argument is still based entirely on the notion of labour scarcity, although, in this case, the shortages are relative and endemic. Migratory flows are tied to Western industrial societies' specific need to fill a set of "undesirable" jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Labour scarcity in this view is an outcome not so much of market forces but of social and technological changes which have altered the structure of the indigenous working class. Although the "dirty jobs" argument enjoys a wide popularity in the literature (see, e.g., Castles and Kosack, 1973; Giner and Salcedo, 1978; Kindleberger, 1967; Peach, 1968; Power and Hardman, 1976); it suffers from the same tunnel vision as the push-pull argument. Because of its overriding concern with the concentration of migrants in dirty and menial jobs, it ignores the organizational structure of those economies which continue to require these jobs and which, in many instances, opt for the employment of foreign workers even where other unskilled but indigenous social groups are available to fill these jobs. This position also refrains from addressing the important deviant case in which foreign migrants are pulled into other jobs, at all skill levels and in all areas of economic activity. The third position on the relationship between migration and host country economies is an application of the "dual economy" perspective. This approach provides a means to relate the employment of foreign migrants and undocumented alien workers as well as indigenous minority groups to the ways in which work and industries are structured in Western industrial economies. This line of

argument is a particular feature of the more sociological and structural rather than the economic and motivational interpretations which focus on behaviour within labour markets:

In providing a non-individualistic alternative ... theories of dual economy provide structural explanations for economic differences between [social] groups. Rather than interpreting group differences in earnings or poverty as due to different rates of individual 'failure' in a competitive market, the theory suggests that such group differences may be the outcome of differential assignments of group members within the sectoral structure of the economic order ... (Beck et. al., 1978; 707).

In investigating the appropriateness of a dual economy approach to the study of international migration, one is struck by the literature's diverse disciplinary and ideological origins and the resultant proliferation of different vocabularies for describing the same economic structure. Included in these discussions are references to 'split economies', 'dual labour markets', and 'labour market segmentation'. Several papers have attempted to alleviate the terminological confusion by outlining the contending perspectives and sketching out the similarities (see, e.g., Beck et. al., 1978; Cain, 1976; Smith, 1976).

1. Dual Economic Sectors and Labour Markets

One variant of the dual economy framework has been implemented with some success in recent empirical analyses of social stratification in the United States and Canada and will serve as an example of the general perspective for the purpose of this discussion. This approach divides the economy of advanced capitalist nations into core and peripheral sectors which display different institutional arrangements and within

which firms and workers respond according to different sets of rules. Economic sectors are thus conceptualized as structural entities, evolved from and organized by the forces of capitalism in modern industrial societies. The sectors can be defined in terms of a set of more or less bipolar characteristics: the core sector is characterized by typically large firms which exhibit high productivity and profits, are capital intensive, display a high incidence of monopolistic market tendencies, are highly unionized and, as a consequence, offer a high level of job stability and high wages to workers. The peripheral sector is characterized by firms which lack the above attributes. Peripheral firms tend to be small, labour intensive with relatively low profits and productivity, operate in highly competitive or seasonal markets, are seldom unionized and, consequently, exhibit job instability and low wages. Because of their small size and precarious competitive position, the peripheral sector firms, unlike monopolistic core industries, are generally not able to take advantage of economies of scale, technological innovation and research and development initiatives to strengthen ~~their~~ productivity and market advantage. This institutional division into a core of large-scale, technologically-and capital-intensive and monopolistic industries and a periphery of small-scale, labour intensive, competitive firms forms the dual economy of Western industrial society (Bluestone et. al., 1973: 28-29; Beck et. al., 1978: 706-709). This usage differs from the dual labour market or labour force segmentation typologies advocated by some contemporary economists (see, e.g.,

Osterman, 1975; Piore, 1975; 1977; 1979). Their focus is not on the structural entities of core and peripheral economic sectors per se, as in the sociological treatments, but on the consequences of core and periphery organizations for jobs and workers. The level of analysis for the economists is a segmented national labour market split into primary and secondary sectors. Jobs in the primary sector are typically highly skilled, offer high wages, good working conditions, employment stability, opportunities for career advanced, and union representation. Jobs in the secondary sector are typically filled by unskilled and non-unionized labour, are poorly paid and unstable, and offer little training or opportunity for career advancement (Piore, 1971; Edwards et. al., 1975). These sectors are characterized in terms of the behaviour of workers and the particular attributes of labour markets (Spilerman, 1977: 551-593). In contrast to the economists' dual labour market typology, the dual economy framework is cast at a more macroscopic level of analysis, viewing the characteristics of primary and secondary labour markets as outcomes rather than as defining criteria of the core and periphery, respectively (Beck et. al., 1978: 706). This structural arrangement of the economy into core and peripheral sectors tends to be associated with the specific worker behaviours and job characteristics associated with the economists' notion of a segmented labour market; primary market conditions as a typical outcome of core sectoral structure and secondary conditions stemming by and large from peripheral sector arrangements (Jenkins, 1978: 516-517).

These descriptions of the core-periphery industrial sectors represent ideal types rather than operational definitions. Although some researchers have attempted to construct empirical indicators of core and periphery for use in quantitative analyses, their dichotimization of industrial sectors has been based only on ratios of concentration. The concepts of core and periphery, as employed here within an historical-comparative methodology, must be viewed as ideal-typical approximations of complex empirical phenomena. They are heuristic tools for purposes of illustration and comparison, based on many observations of concrete reality but neither corresponding nor reducible to any one single empirical observation.

2. The Relationship Between Dual Economies and Migrant Labour

Empirical applications of the dual economy approach indicate that the organization of industrial societies into core and peripheral economic sectors accounts for differences in opportunity structures and income distributions (see, e.g., Beck et. al., 1978; Bibb and Form, 1977; Bluestone et. al., 1973; Hodson, 1977; Stolzenberg, 1975). Variation among different groups in the labour force is related to differential assignment to one or the other of the industrial sectors. Generally speaking, the core sector employs relatively better educated male workers from the middle-class and upwardly-mobile individuals recruited from the working class while the peripheral sector employs a disproportionate number of minorities, teenagers, women, unskilled immigrants, foreign workers, and undocumented aliens (Richmond and Verma, 1978: 9).

The current interest in the dual economy framework hinges

on the realization that, despite the technological expansion, mechanization and automation characteristic of advanced capitalist societies, the number of peripheral sector industries has not declined but instead has grown dramatically in the last twenty-five years (Singelman, 1978). Such an argument is obviously of relevance to the migration tradition's concern with labour scarcity. Although dirty, menial and low-paying jobs have not been mechanized out of existence, the traditional domestic sources of peripheral sector labour have virtually dried up. In essence, advanced industrialism with its technological imperative, mobility ethic and stable occupational structure has created, and must operate with, an inelastic supply of domestic labour. As indigenous workers increasingly shun the periphery's low wages and poor working conditions, firms in this sector are threatened by labour shortages as well as rising labour costs. The high labour costs are intensified by the fact that these competitive, labour-intensive and technologically unsophisticated firms, unlike those in the core sector, are not in a favourable enough market position to pass along to consumers the rising cost of labour nor to invest heavily in labour-saving machinery (O'Connor, 1973: 13-15). Peripheral industries have dealt with their labour crisis through efforts to reduce the proportion of the product allocated to labour as wages. This has typically been accomplished in one of three ways: Some North American and European industries have relocated to areas and countries where cheap labour is plentiful. Other firms have mobilized blocs of unemployed or under-employed indigenous minorities (e.g., Blacks, Hispanics, women and youth are all over-represented in the U.S. peripheral sector). The third and increasingly important way of meeting the demand for

cheap, unskilled labour is through the employment of foreign migrant workers and illegal aliens (Portes, 1978: 473). In general, unskilled foreign labourers, including temporarily-sojourning workers, tend to be clustered in the peripheral sector, among those labour-intensive industries which cannot relocate, in services which cannot be "produced" except on site, or in those specific jobs where domestic labour cannot be hired, for either socially- or demographically-determined reasons (Jenkins, 1978: 519; Portes, 1978: 47).

The disproportionate number of both migrants and indigenous minorities in the periphery is sometimes viewed as the result of deliberate action on the part of employers. This overt exploitation of cheap labour, it is argued, has become a common employment practice for firms in the periphery which are especially prone to cyclical and seasonal fluctuations. Also, such employment practices may, in fact, help to maintain profit margins for these firms in face of increasingly stiff competition by industries from abroad. Foreign manufacturing companies have flooded the North American market, for example, with goods which can be sold for markedly less than the domestic equivalents (Piore, 1975).

3. The Peripheral Sector and the Reserve Army of Labour

An examination of the utilization of foreign workers within the dual economy framework is compatible with the more critical perusals of the migration phenomenon offered by the "structuralist school" of sociologists (i.e., Bach, 1978; Burawoy, 1976; Portes, 1977; 1978; Jenkins, 1978 and others). Rather than viewing migration as an outcome of labour demand and the workings of market forces, the dual economy perspective relates the labour scarcities of

capitalism to the Marxian notion of an industrial reserve army.

As Marx reasoned in the first volume of Capital,

a surplus laboring population is a necessary condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army ... a mass of human material ready for exploitation (1967: 46).

The 'reserve army' concept derives from the argument that a large body of unemployed labour is a necessary condition for maintaining wages at historically and socially determined levels of subsistence. In the classical Marxian view, some of the unemployed will be hired during periods of economic expansion as new markets are opened and industrial growth is encouraged. The existence of large numbers of readily available and idle workers serves to keep wages down during this expansion. If this pool of unemployed is exhausted, the argument continues, competition among capitalists for labour will be intensified and the bargaining position of workers will strengthen. Consequently, the wage level will rise, cutting into profits. Faced by this situation, employers may attempt to ease the rate of investment in order to slow down the expansion effort and/or develop and introduce labour-saving technology into the production process. In the medium- to long-run, these actions in effect serve to renew the numbers of the depleted reserve labour force.

Within this orientation, one can argue that, instead of centering on the personal characteristics of migrants or other peripheral sector workers, researchers can adopt the more relevant focus on the function of peripheral sector employment for the capitalist economy. One advocate of such an approach has provided some empirical evidence that the peripheral economic sector

maintains a reserve labour force for the core sector (Rosenberg, 1977). This argument, it should be noted, rejects the prevalent assumption in dual labour market approaches that the primary or core sectors are characterized by stable employment patterns (see, e.g., Edwards, 1975: 83-108). Applying the "reserve army" argument to migration suggests the hypotheses that, in times of economic growth, indigenous workers in the periphery are pulled into the core sector. Their employment in the core is not permanent, however, and they tend to return to the periphery in times of economic downturn. In the periods of economic expansion when indigenous workers are concentrated in the core sector, the labour supply for the periphery is supplemented by rural migrants, foreign labour and undocumented aliens (Rosenberg, 1977: 228; Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 105). Because of the characteristics of the secondary labour market associated with the periphery, the labour reserve of foreign migrants takes on the role of a transient underclass in many western nations. Set apart by their lack of citizenship rights, absence of industrial skills and, most evidently, their ethnic or racial origins, these workers occupy an inferior social position in almost all host countries, a position maintained by both employers and the indigenous working class. The emergence of this underclass then is intrinsic to developments in the structure of capitalism itself:

... Most of the discussions of the underclass ... have neglected what may be the most basic phenomena serving to differentiate it from the 'mainstream' working class-phenomena located in the economic infrastructure of neo-capitalism, and which, whatever differences might be found between attitudes toward ethnic minorities on the part of the working classes in different countries, might depend upon characteristics

broadly shared by all capitalist societies ... These characteristics can be understood in the context of the emergence of ... the dual labor market ... (E)mployers may be expected to attempt to isolate secondary occupations in such a way as to complement their long-term labor investment with a pool of highly 'disposable' labor, in which a marked degree of labor turnover may be tolerated or even encouraged. The underclass becomes a main repository of this supply of labor for two reasons: since the results of the 'vicious circle of underprivilege' affect this grouping more than any other, its members in any case possess only low levels of education or marketable skills; and the splitting off of secondary occupations is likely to be more acceptable to the working class as a whole if these occupations are in large part the lot of those considered to be ethnically inferior. In many contemporary European societies, the lack of an indigenous ethnic minority leads to a 'transient underclass' (which turns out to be not so transient after all) being imported from the outside (Giddens, 1973: 219-220).

The implications of this line of reasoning are fairly straightforward. The employment pattern of unskilled foreign migrants and minorities, who demand little in the way of benefits, wage hikes or job security, has resulted in a division of the working class, maintained by racism and discriminatory practices. Even those economists who focus on the behaviours of workers and job characteristics in segmented labour markets rather than on the structural arrangements of capitalist economies have observed this split in the organization of the working class. According to one holder of this view, the migration process itself disrupts family life, peer group support systems and stable employment habits, and, as a result, prevents the incorporation of migrant workers into core sector employment. This is further intensified by the

strong tendencies toward remigration (Piore, 1975).

Structuralist variations on this theme suggest that firms in the periphery have deliberately exploited the migrants' lack of job mobility in order to maintain the firms' narrow profit margins in competitive or seasonal markets. High concentrations of migrant labour in peripheral employment represent this sector's attempt to divide the working class into foreign and domestic enclaves and at the same time to undermine the bargaining position of trade unions (Richmond and Verma, 1978: 9-10).

This argument applies equally to the marginally employed minorities in the periphery in the United States and to guest workers in Europe (see, e.g., Castles and Kosack, 1973: 2; Giddens, 1973: 220). The major difference, however, is that "... European capitalists have a luxury not enjoyed by their American counterparts: they can export their labour surplus back to their home countries" (Baron, 1975: 203 quoted in Richmond and Verma, 1978: 10). This difference between North America and Europe is crucial for the purpose of this analysis as it establishes the importance of state economic planning in the management of Europe's migrant labour flows.

This type of argument, however, usually assumes that when these workers are no longer needed, they are simply sent home. As the earlier discussions suggest, this problematic assumption of migrant labour as a short-term phenomenon presents only a partial picture of a very complex reality, and, as the dissertation analyses will show, despite the levelling off of

the post-war boom and increased political pressure to curb immigration and halt illegal alien flows, the phenomenon of a foreign reserve labour force, rotational in membership but permanent as a structure, is an entrenched feature of many western industrial nations.

II. The Applicability of the Dual Economy Typology to the Study of International Migration

Although the dual economy framework at this stage in its development provides little more than an ideal typical representation of the structure of the economy, its relevance to the study of migration lies in its ability to map out the economic functions migrants perform in advanced industrial nations. Despite the existence of differences in the organization of core and peripheral sectors across nations, these institutional arrangements tend to affect the nature of work and the structure of the labour market for migrants in similar ways. The overall functions of the peripheral sector and its secondary labour market as a buffer and a regulator of labour costs remain the same:

The secondary sector constitutes a means of evasion: a sector of the labor market that is not subject to restrictions on layoff and discharge to which the unstable portion of demand can be transferred. The precise institutions through which that transfer occurs vary from one country to another, following the variations in the way in which restrictions on layoff and discharge are imposed. In Italy, the distinction is between small and large enterprises; in France, it depends upon contracting and temporary help services ... Despite the variations in the particular institutions, the institutions that permit escape from job security arrangements closely parallel the distinctions between the

jobs of migrants and the jobs of natives
(Piore, 1979: 39).

The dual economy approach provides a general framework encompassing both the labour scarcity and "dirty jobs" arguments, since most of the jobs to which migrants are drawn in the periphery (a) are by and large rejected by domestic workers and (b) do indeed lie at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. The focus, however, is not on the characteristics of these jobs per se but on the institutional arrangements which led to the structuration of industries into core and peripheral economic sectors. This line of argument should not be taken to imply that all menial and dirty jobs are restricted to the peripheral sector nor does it suggest that migrants or other unskilled labourers have never been employed in core firms. What is intended however is, that to the extent that a dual economic structure can be shown to exist, then it follows that migrants will be disproportionately concentrated in the periphery. And, indeed, because the dual economic perspective does take account of the variability of economic activity, fluctuating labour demand and the problem of reducing the costs of labour rather than merely alleviating labour scarcity, it may very well provide a clue to explaining the conditions under which migrants are found in core industries and primary labour markets. The observation that migrants are generally restricted to unskilled jobs in the periphery and that they are not more widely distributed throughout the economy is related to the fact that the majority of migrants and foreign labour possesses little in the way of credentials necessary for the skilled jobs of the core.

sector. In addition, actions on the part of indigenous labour, through trade unions advocating minimum wage measures or lobbying to restrict immigration, have helped to maintain the boundary between core and periphery employment, restricting the presence of migrants to unskilled and low-paying work. But as we know from the use of foreign doctors and craftsmen in the United States and Canada and from the oil-producing countries' employment of skilled foreign technicians and administrators, where skilled foreign migrants are available and where their employment reflects the variable segment of labor demand, then the utilization of migrants will no longer be confined to the economic periphery.

Theories of economic dualism, especially those which deal primarily with the structure of labour markets, have been almost exclusively North American in application, dealing primarily with institutional barriers to blacks, Hispanics, women and other minorities. As this brief overview suggests, the economic dualism framework has an application beyond the North American context in the study of international migration. In particular, it contributes to the development of a conceptual scheme for the comparative analysis of the occupational and industrial distribution of foreign and indigenous workers across sectors. Although recent empirical investigations of labour force participation of migrants and illegal aliens in the United States have incorporated aspects of the dual economy approach, it has yet to be used for the study of foreign workers in Western Europe. Its application to Europe may shed

some light on the institutionalization of migrant labour patterns and their persistence even in times of economic recession. Although it by no means constitutes an adequate theoretical framework in and of itself, by stressing labour market allocation mechanisms within economic sectors which affect foreign workers within host nations it forms an essential part of an overall framework for the specification of the conditions which sustain migrant labour patterns.

III. Towards an Alternative Framework

The empirical reality of foreign labour utilization has not been adequately dealt with by the prevalent theoretical orientations. What is required is an alternative explanatory and structural model. This counter to the labour scarcity thesis views labour markets not solely in terms of mysteriously ebbing and flowing labour shortages or technologically determined manpower requirements but rather as the crucial mechanism in advanced capitalism of structuring economic and socio-political relationships between classes and between nation-states. In this vein and in the specific context of the American economy's growing reliance on undocumented aliens, Jenkins has documented the faulty core assumptions, inaccuracies and oversights of the conventional labour scarcity model, capping his analysis with the argument that

... the more relevant consideration is the rate of profit of firms, specific industries and national economies that are capitalistically organized ... and the level of organization and conflict between classes (1978: 524).

In addition to the specific weaknesses of the labour scarcity thesis outlined above, the postindustrial interpretation of migration is inherently deficient as a general theory of the phenomenon. It directs insufficient attention to the non-economic mechanisms which influence and are influenced by the push and pull forces. Its narrow view of market forces obscures the independent effects of extra-economic factors which regulate labour supply and demand, specifically the political factors governing international migration and the social relations among foreigners, indigenous workers and employers. The emphasis on a narrow set of independent and dependent variables coupled with an inattention to the broader societal consequences has led to a premature verdict of migrant labour as a short-term and transitory phenomenon. Such a conception overlooks the historical persistence of foreign, albeit "temporarily sojourned" labour, in advanced industrial societies. (Documentation of this trend from the nineteenth century in both North America and Europe can be found in Almino de Alencar, 1977: 20-21; Brody, 1969: 106; Castles and Kosack, 1973: 15-25; Karabel, 1979: 24-25; Kessner, 1977: 28; Rosenblum, 1973: 45-54.) Also minimized in the conventional treatments is the role of foreign labour in stimulating capital accumulation and growth for host countries in general as well as for particular industrial sectors which are heavy users of imported labour (Bach, 1978: 536-558; Jenkins, 1978: 514-535; Nikolinakos, 1975: 5-16; Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 102-111). The emphasis on the utility of foreign labour for host countries and the

subsequent research focus on the processes of adaptation and integration in labour receiving societies has slighted equally important political, social and economic consequences for labour supply countries. Even those rare analyses of migrant workers from the vantage point of their country of origin are seriously flawed by uncritical acceptance of the neoclassical economist's position that the decision to migrate is a rational and voluntary act. Such an interpretation, with its focus on the individual migrant as the unit of analysis and its insensitivity to sociological agents, evokes the ludicrous image of an agricultural day labourer, sitting on a stoop in a Turkish (or Algerian, or Greek) village, juggling with a pocket calculator in order to compute the relative costs and benefits of moving to alternative locations in Western Europe.

The postindustrial orientation's inadequate handling of labour supply country consequences is also revealed in its substitution of policy objectives for rigorous empirical substantiation. For example, this literature often argues that the employment of foreigners provides these workers with crucial industrial skills and capital in the form of wages and savings which they will be able to utilize upon their return from abroad, thereby contributing to the supply country's economic development. In spite of the desirability of this assertion as a policy goal, little evidence has been advanced in support of it and the available data on the amount of migrants' remittances from abroad and the degree of absorption of these funds into supply country economies have been subjected to

conflicting interpretations (see, e.g., Badan-Unat, 1976; Hiemenz and Schatz, 1976; 1977; O.E.C.D., 1975; O.E.C.D., S.O.P.E.M.I. Reports, 1974; 1976; 1977; Paine, 1974; Westlake, 1973; Yannopoulos, 1974).

The postindustrial framework also conceals the class nature of international migration. The impact on host country social structure of an unskilled foreign work force with limited or non-existent citizenship rights is rarely considered nor are the implications of proletarianizing third world migrants only to return them to their home countries, where, typically, opportunities are blocked and political expression is restricted (Castells, 1975: 33-67; Castles and Kosack, 1973: 461-82; Gorz, 1970: 28-31; Nikolinakos, 1975: 6).

In short, by casting the migration of labour largely in terms of market forces, rational objectives and adaptive mechanisms, the postindustrial thesis obscures the multi-dimensional sets of international relationships through which the economic conditions of labour migration are structured. As one recent critic of this approach concludes,

... what is of interest is not how migrants adapt to their environment but how structural, particularly political and legal, constraints make permanent 'integration' impossible... The individual cannot be conceived of as a rational actor maximizing interests under market forces. Instead, the flow of labor is directed by supramarket institutions beyond the control of an individual or even a group of migrants. For these reasons, the analysis of such systems of migrant labor requires a different perspective: one focusing on the nature of external coercive institutions and their mode of organization... (Burawoy, 1976: 1051).

CHAPTER III

AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The preceding review of the literature underlines the absence of a comprehensive structural theory of international migration, despite the proliferation of typologies and various orientations threaded into the empirical analyses of migrant labor. This caustic observation by one of the field's European experts aptly summarizes the state of the art:

The theory of international migration, if it can be said to exist at all, is in a parlous state. Muddled, sometimes deliberately obscure mental models that are accessible only to the introspection of their authors abound. Others are variations of neo-classical economic thinking, which has the advantage of permitting a mathematically precise formalization of the arguments but the disadvantage of being based on such utterly unrealistic assumptions as to be useless, especially when one comes to non-marginal relationships (Böhning, 1978: ii).

The study of international migration awaits the development of a critical theoretical framework. This approach should meet a number of requirements to overcome the pitfalls of its precursors. First of all, it must avoid the idiosyncratic vocabulary and obscure conceptual fields characteristic of much of the contemporary critical tradition in theoretical sociology yet it should be general enough to address the multiple empirical realities of migrant labor patterns as they occur in many Western industrial nations. Crucial to the development of such

a framework is the recognition that international migration is one among several complex phenomena associated with the expansion of an international market economy. The study of migratory flows is therefore best approached through a wider understanding of the global context in which they occur.

I. Elements of the International System Framework

At a general level, an international system framework views social reality in terms of a single world capitalist market in which calculations of maximum profitability are the determinants of levels of production, economic expansion and investment, the division of labour, the transfer of goods, labour and services and the utility of technology. A central tenant of this theoretical position is derived from the observation that geographical areas and nations vary greatly in natural resources, population density and proximity to markets. This variation tends to encourage a concentration of industrial development, productivity and capital investment in "core" regions with the inevitable result of uneven economic growth and the further tendency to neglect or selectively manipulate for purposes of capital accumulation the less well endowed "peripheral" areas (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1967; Wallerstein, 1975). This particular usage of 'core' and 'periphery', common to various strains of neo-Marxist and dependency perspectives, is to be distinguished from the terms of 'core and peripheral economic sectors' introduced earlier in the dual economy discussion. The economic sectors of the dual economy approach typically refer to structures within countries, defined by

industrial organization and firm characteristics, while the core and periphery of the international system signify broad socio-geographical units, each displaying distinctive arrangements of economic activity. In this usage, core and peripheral areas refer only derivatively to the political formations of nation states, and more precisely to institutional patterns of economic and political exchange (Hopkins, 1978: 207-208; Hopkins, 1979: 23-25):

Strong states, in relation to others, develop in core areas; weak states, in relation to others, develop or rather are developed in peripheral areas. Not less important, strong states, in relation both to their internal regions and to other states, develop core processes; weak states (weak in both directions: relative to internal regions and to contending states) develop, or rather have developed for them, peripheral processes. It is important to have in mind that 'peripheral' does not mean marginal in the sense of dispensable: without peripheries, no cores: without both, no capitalist development (Hopkins, 1979: 25).

The recent literature has been somewhat elusive in pinning down the analytical components of this global market system but it is generally characterized by three structural features: an expanding, single market economy, multiple-states and the capital-labour relation: the global economy is a single unit, although it manifests itself in the form of "national economies" related by international trade. The single economy is integrated through the international division of labour, distinguished by a geographically shifting, more advanced and expanding core and a geographically shifting, less advanced and disproportionately expanding periphery. Multiple-states

exist in the sense that individual nations are enlarging their jurisdiction on a world scale while the overall number of states entering into relations of exchange is increasing. As nations expand their arenas of influence and as more of them enter into inter-state relations, they continually attempt to increase their dominance over wider geographical and political spheres. The final element, the capital-labour relation, is the crucial mechanism which both operates and reproduces the process of capital accumulation. The capital-labour relation operates on an ever expanding scale, organizing all of social and political life so that "... formally rational considerations ... come increasingly to govern the courses of action pursued by individuals (households), communities, organizations, and "states" (Hopkins, 1979: 23-24).

On a more concrete level the structural elements of the international system reveal the processes by which the core exercises its control over the periphery. This jurisdiction extends over the periphery's primary and extractive commodities as well as its labour power. The peripheral region is thus used instrumentally by the core. Its resources, in the form of raw materials and labour, become necessary for the maintenance and economic growth of the core (Prattis, 1979). The international market system thus fosters the continuance of this unequal exchange of goods and services, capital and labour, between core and periphery.

A. The Role of Migration Within the International System

The global sweep of this focus provides the appropriate

backdrop for the study of the emergence of a transnational labour reserve within an international division of labour (Galtung, 1971; Nikolinakos, 1975). In the contemporary era, capital accumulation has tended to occur independently of the location of raw materials. These are extracted in one location and transported elsewhere for refining, manufacturing and distribution. The direction of this flow is increasingly from states in peripheral regions to those in the core. The resulting transfer of capital has produced an unequal distribution of wealth, accommodated by the activities of nation-states in both core and periphery and increasingly concentrated in the control of national and multinational firms. This unequal distribution of resources, capital and power, within and across national political boundaries, in conjunction with unequal population distributions, results in the emergence of an international labour market alongside the global capital market (Richmond and Verma, 1979: 25-27). Although political economists disagree sharply on the relative effects and implications of the mobility of capital versus that of labour as a strategy in the accumulation process (see, e.g., the debate between Emmanuel and Bettelheim in Emmanuel, 1972 or the discussion in Barratt-Brown, 1974: 252-55), the international system framework at least acknowledges that both types of movements take place on a wide scale in advanced capitalism and that a more thorough examination of the movement of labour to the core is required.

B. Migration and the State in the International System

The international system perspective directs much needed

attention to the role of state-structures in both core and periphery. Relations of economic and political dependency between core and peripheral regions are created and maintained through the formation, expansion and interaction of nation-states. The nation-state is a necessary political and administrative unit in the operation of the capitalist market. Through the exercise of legal and political mandates, it promotes economic activity and facilitates the conditions of profitable production within and across national borders. The long-term actions by the state on behalf of capital involve the creation and legitimation of certain "institutional proclivities" which include, among others, the establishment and promotion of currencies, efficient internal and international markets, and financial and labour agreements as well as the demand for consumer goods and related lifestyle patterns (Wallerstein, 1975; 367-368). In addition, the state plays an essential role in facilitating the movement of labour from periphery to core. To understand this role in the context of the labour-receiving countries, a discussion of the welfare state within the workings of an international market system are in order.

Demographic imbalances, economic expansion and technological development in the core have resulted in shortages of unskilled labour, especially in the competitive and labour-intensive economic sectors. These conditions of labour scarcity have been exacerbated by the growing strength of trade unions and the extension of social services and welfare benefits to the working class by liberal capitalist governments. As a

consequence of the spread of these welfare state measures, employers have found it exceedingly difficult to attract labour to low paying unskilled work in marginal industries. In short, welfarism has increased both social and economic wages, has effected the upgrading of workers' skill levels and social status through the expansion of educational opportunity, and, at the same time, has created the need for migrant labour reserves. The modern welfare state is thus organized around the management and fulfilment of indigenous workers' demands for social reform and capital's need for cheap labour supplies. The relationship between welfarism, labour migration and capital accumulation is therefore a contradictory one:

Welfare state capitalism apparently forces capital to draw more on foreign labor reserves through its direct effect on rates of exploitation and profit. That is, the welfare state also directly affects labor availability in the core countries ... In general social benefits of all kinds are partial or full alternatives to wage labour for European workers and, to a lesser degree, U.S. and Japanese workers. Moreover, the growth of the social wage is a factor pulling up the average private wage. Generally, welfarism requires that core countries utilize a large part of social labour for education, health care, housing, and so on, not only for unproductive workers but also for productive workers and their families. As social consumption expenditures and social expenses of production increase, the pressure on the state to organize labour migration either directly ... or indirectly also increases. Capital needs new and regulated sources of labour power to protect itself against the core working class and welfare state; the core working class needs the welfare state to protect itself against new sources of labour power and superexploitation (Santa Cruz Collective, 1978; 108).

Within this environment, workers are imported from the periphery and channelled into unskilled jobs vacated by the

upwardly mobile indigenous labour force. The employment of foreign migrants, who are legally, politically and socially segregated from domestic labour and largely cut off from welfarism's benefits and labour union protection, serves in effect to maintain the welfare state's economic and social concessions to indigenous workers. The utilization of foreign workers is both a consequence of welfare state capitalism and a major factor in its continuing survival.

In contrast to the naive utilitarian view of labour scarcity introduced earlier, this approach uncovers a latent social control function of the employment of foreign labour (Jenkins, 1978: 524). Reliance on foreign manpower reserves not only provides a cheap and plentiful supply of labour power but also alters the class structure through the formation of a labour aristocracy of native workers and an underclass of the most exploitable young foreigners who are easily shifted during periods of economic contraction (Castles and Kosack, 1972: 3-21; Castells, 1975: 33-67; Gorz, 1970: 28-31). The process of massification of production, the deskilling of work in advanced capitalism, as it facilitates the employment of an unskilled foreign labour force, also contributes to this change in the organization of the working class (Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 104). Efforts to compartmentalize and deskill production have made previously unemployable or underutilized labour available to capital. This deskilled labour force includes increasing numbers of women, youth, indigenous minorities, undocumented aliens and foreign migrants. Thus, massification opens up

sizeable labour reserves for the core. Foreign labour from peripheral regions, who typically possess no industrial skills or experience, can be easily placed in routinized and repetitive jobs requiring little training or expertise. The concentration of foreigners in competitive, seasonal or labour-intensive industrial sectors further delineates them from the native labour force. This division is perpetuated by native worker's racial animosity, employers' discriminatory practices and the exclusion of migrants from citizenship rights (Becker, 1971; Bonacich, 1972; 1976; Castles and Kosack, 1972).

C. International Migration and the Periphery

The international system framework acknowledges that the spread of welfare state capitalism is not limited in its impact to the labour-receiving societies of the core. Within the international division of labour, social changes in core countries have necessarily related outcomes for nations in the periphery. As labour costs rose in the core, following the introduction of welfare programs by liberal capitalist governments, many industries moved their production processes to the periphery where sources of cheap labour could be induced away from the agricultural sector or from traditional occupations. This trend accompanied the "modernization initiatives" inaugurated by many peripheral states following the close of World War II. The "capitalization of the Third World" attracted international business, opened up markets previously closed to the core and uncovered abundant sources of cheap labour power, all under the banner of "economic development". The movement of

capital to the periphery resulted in a cheapening of the means of agricultural production, the concentration of land-holdings and displacement of the peasantry, the introduction of capital-intensive methods in the agricultural sector and the creation of a rural proletariat (Alba, 1978: 502-513; Nikolinakos, 1975: 5-16). Capitalization in the periphery, at first, created and increased the demand for labour power, but, as the process matured, this demand stabilized and internal migration became an outlet for the newly emergent surplus labour force. As the industrialization efforts expanded in the metropole, the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians migrated to the urban centres in search of work. The employment of this labour supply, in both the traditional and industrial sectors, has been only partial and has not kept pace with the periphery's relatively high population growth nor with demands for consumer goods, improved living conditions and more comprehensive social services, all brought about, ironically, by the introduction of "core processes" in the form of Western manufactured goods, technology and information. In other words, the capitalistic "modernization" of the periphery has created expectations that it cannot meet. The introduction of core processes to the periphery, coupled with these countries' large and relatively young populations, has produced the conditions necessary for the emergence of a reserve army of unemployed and underemployed, perfect candidates for a job with a French construction crew or on a German assembly line. Lack of employment opportunities and a growing dependence on a cash economy and manufactured goods in the periphery, and the

need for unskilled labour by the Western welfare states, transform this reserve army into a migrant labour force for the core.

The processes discussed here represent the mechanisms through which these nation - states enter into relations of unequal exchange with those in the core. International migration is one aspect of the peripheralization of certain non-capitalist, or pre-capitalist, countries within the world market system. Patterns of "modernization" and "economic development" reveal themselves, beneath the level of appearances, as methods by which peripheralization is instigated and carried through:

... Peripheralization involves two processes: penetration and incorporation. Penetration of non-capitalist areas consists of the familiar processes of removing peasants from the land and the 'opening up' of the economy to the world market. Incorporation follows by linking the peripheralized area to areas of core production and is manifest in the complementary exchange of material goods (Bach, 1978: 540).

Incorporation occurs as peripheral nations enter into multiple-state relations; they are inserted into and become dependent upon the international market economy, through colonial ties to core states or through the establishment of "neo-colonial ties", trade agreements and political treaties. Penetration is the outcome of industrialization initiatives and development policies within the peripheral nation and is reflected in gradual changes in its class structure as the number of wage labourers increases and an indigenous capitalist class emerges.

This conception of the peripheralization of the labour

supply countries is related, at a theoretical level, to recent discussions on the "articulation" between the capitalist mode of production and other non-capitalist or pre-capitalist modes (see, e.g., Rey, 1973). Within the international system, the capitalist mode is dominant; however, when useful for capital, other existing modes and relations of production in the peripheral regions are stabilized. In the articulationist view, capital satisfies its various "needs" in exchange with other modes of production and without entirely superseding the relations of exploitation with these modes. At a general level, the terms 'articulation' and 'peripheralization' both refer to transitions taking place within the international division of labour, especially the transformation of agriculture and the creation of proletarians in peripheral areas. The articulationist view, however, stresses the existence of an almost symbiotic relation between capitalism and the pre- or non-capitalist mode as this transition occurs:

... Capitalism can never immediately ... eliminate the preceding modes of production, nor above all the relations of exploitation which characterize these modes of production. On the contrary, during an entire period it must reinforce these relations of exploitation, since it is only this development which permits its own provisioning with goods coming from these modes of production, or with men driven from these modes of production and therefore compelled to sell their labour power to capitalism in order to survive (Rey, 1973; 15-16 quoted and translated by Foster-Carter, 1978: 59).

A specific articulation between the capitalist core and the pre-capitalist periphery results in the formation of an international labour force. This articulation uncovers capitalism's

predilection for labour power which is reproduced within another mode of production in order to reduce labour costs in the capitalist mode (see, e.g., Burawoy, 1976: 1050-1087; Wolpe, 1972: 425-458).

Sets of articulations between countries of the labour-scarce core and labour-surplus periphery reveal the increasingly hierarchical nature of the international division of labour. Recently, intensive capitalization and limited expansion of employment opportunities within certain economic sectors in the Mediterranean Basin countries, which have traditionally been large suppliers of foreign labour, have produced patterns of labour scarcity similar to those which occurred in core-nations. These countries are now alleviating their labour scarcities in agriculture, unskilled occupations and marginal industries through the employment of foreign migrants and "clandestine" workers from even less economically endowed regions of the periphery; central Africa, eastern and southern Asia and elsewhere (Power, 1974: 8-22; Nikolinakos, 1975, 5-16).

The international system framework provides a general level of analysis and conceptual scheme for the study of international migratory flows. International migration, within this context, is viewed as an outcome of the unequal distributions of wealth and power within and between core and periphery. Differential rates of investment, industrialization and population growth within the international economic system have created conditions of economic and political dependence. Thus, the movement of labour from periphery to core flows along the

same channels as those established for the unequal exchange of goods, capital, technology and information. In summary,

... what the migratory mechanism is designed to achieve is not just the balance between the supply and demand of labour but the perpetuation of the dependency relationship between periphery and centre. Basically, the internationalization of labour through the expansion of migration reflects the inherent thrust of capitalism towards expansion and internationalization ... beyond national borders through the international accumulation of capital (Nikolinakos, 1975: 9-10).

II. The Analytical Framework: Migration and the International Division of Labour

A. Objectives and Level of Analysis

Conventional approaches to migration tend to funnel attention to either one of two areas of inquiry. The first area is the investigation of the intra- and international conditions necessary for the establishment of migrant labour patterns. The second focus is the analysis of the consequences of such patterns for both labour-receiving and sending countries. The separation of these areas of analysis has been analytically convenient but theoretically misleading. If labour migration is to be viewed as a structural feature of an increasingly international division of labour, then both aspects, the initial conditions as well as short- and long-term consequences, must be addressed in the countries which send as well as those which receive migrant labourers. Most of the literature tends to focus on the countries of immigration rather than emigration. As a corrective step, this analysis centres on the emergence and persistence of labour migration as a manifestation of an overarching

international economic system. A primary objective has been the development of an analytical framework outlining the historical conditions for and consequences of international labour migration for both sender and receiver nations. Within this general framework, the transfer of labour from peripheral to core areas emerges as a particular variant of class stratification in advanced capitalism. An important focus of inquiry is the role of host and supply states in the management of migratory flows.

The empirical base for the analysis is the Western Europe core and the major labour supply countries of the periphery. The analysis covers the period from the end of World War II through the mid 1970s. The major labour importing countries of the European Community; Belgium, France, West Germany and the Netherlands; and, the non-Community member; Switzerland, will constitute the sample of host countries. Their primary sources for imported labour, the countries of the Mediterranean Basin and the Near East, comprise the supply countries. The major labour supply countries include EC members and associates; Italy¹, Spain, Portugal and Greece; and the non-EC countries; Yugoslavia², Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. A comparison will be drawn with the Scandinavian case of Sweden which is not a Community member and which differs

¹ Italy provides a particularly interesting case since it emerges in this decade as both a sender and receiver of migrant labour.

² Yugoslavia is also a special case to the extent that it is aligned with the Eastern Bloc but maintains considerable trade and labour ties with the capitalist nations of Western Europe.

from the other host countries in that it has followed a somewhat similar pattern of industrialization but until recently has exhibited a distinctive pattern of reliance on foreign labour from neighbouring Scandinavian countries.

B. Data Sources

Three types of numerical data are employed in the dissertation:

(1) Macroeconomic and social indicators for each host and supply country;

(2) Aggregate labour force and population statistics for host and supply countries; and

(3) Aggregate estimates of the number of foreign workers employed in the host countries.

In addition, material has been drawn from treatments of the political, legal and social mechanisms affecting migratory flows and migrant labourers as well as from policy papers issued by government agencies, the EC, the OECD, the ILO and other sources.

The third category above, statistics on the number of foreigners, is the most problematic. The available data sources must be approached with some degree of caution. Each country, whether receiver or sender, and each independent reporting agency, uses a different definition of "foreign worker", little continuity exists in the methodological procedures, and the coding categories and time frames vary considerably from one European country to another. Switzerland, for example, enumerates permanently-domiciled foreign workers in the national census at ten-year intervals but only sporadically estimates the number of

"controlled" workers. Consequently, the irregular time periods for the latter category are incompatible with the former making comparisons almost impossible. Switzerland has generally excluded seasonal and frontier workers in their census figures while West Germany includes them. The annual French census counts only those foreign workers registered at the National Immigration Office, ignoring not only border crossers but also non-active spouses and children who accompany foreign labourers. Figures for Belgium are based entirely on the total of first-time work permits issued each year, a figure which gives no indication at all of the total number of foreigners actually employed. Although the OECD's "Continuous Reporting System on Migration" attempts to deliver comprehensive statistical profiles on a year-to-year basis, they often report data in percentages only, countries are omitted from one year to the next and categories are altered or abandoned from year to year making any comparisons across time difficult. The inauguration of free movement for workers among EC countries and the trend toward special provisions and agreements among Western European countries as well as between European and non-EC affiliated supply countries have emerged as further obstacles to the acquisition of accurate figures on emigration and immigration flows. Finally, the significant number of illegal aliens in Western Europe, those foreigners who enter as "tourists" but stay on clandestinely to work, has never been adequately estimated by national authorities. (Treatments of the methodological problems in the collection of data on foreign

workers can be found in Descloîtres, 1967 and in Martin, 1977.)

As the above discussion illustrates, comparative analysis of the number of foreign workers must be approached with caution. There are a number of structural reasons for this paucity of comparable data sets. Variance in definition across countries is a primary factor. The presence of illegal immigrants is not generally considered in annual estimates and when figures are made public they are often manipulated, i.e., either inflated or deflated, for political purposes. Firms which rely heavily on foreign labour seldom release statistics on their employment so that few records of industrial and occupational distributions of foreigners are available. Finally, the increasingly sensitive political nature of the labour importation issue has resulted in a reluctance on the part of both host and supply states to release comprehensive statistics which are comparable over time. This lack of documentation is often cited as a major deterrent to the analysis of labour migration. The view reflected in this thesis, however, is that this institutional suppression of reliable data points all the more to the need for further inquiries into migration and reveals as well the problematic nature of the relationship between the state and the economy in managing labour importation.

Efforts have been made to compile reliable and current data on the actual number of foreign workers in Europe although missing data for some years and some countries do pose a problem. Indicators include aggregate and relative employment levels by industrial sector, unemployment rates,

productivity rates, skill levels and wage rates, occupational distributions, and documentation of legal-political status. Major sources for these indicators are statistical yearbooks and census reports published by host countries, European Community Eurostat publications and working papers and especially the SOPEMI Reports of the OECD's Continuing Reporting System on Migration. Recent materials have also been extracted from articles and charts in periodicals such as The Economist and Le Monde as well as academic journals and monographs. National government, European Community documents and other sources provide the basis for the analysis of immigration policy.

The available data on the indigenous populations and labour forces of both host and supply countries have a less suspect reputation and serve as relatively sound benchmarks for comparisons with estimates of foreign workers. Fairly comprehensive and comparable figures have been obtained from national census reports, the I.L.O. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, World Bank and U.N. Annual Yearbooks and the OECD Review of Labour Force Statistics. These sources provide the basis for the indicators of labour force participation and employment rates. In addition to these data banks, monographs, periodicals and the popular press have furnished descriptive accounts and anecdotal material and provide documentation of the public responses and debate over the foreign worker issue as well as accounts of the existence of social tensions caused by migration in both sender and receiver nations.

C. Methodological Considerations

The dissertation combines an historical analysis with an investigation of present conditions. It is an exploratory exercise based on case studies and other documentation and owes as much to the techniques of the journalist and archivist as it does to sociological methodology. Any inquiry into social change, including this study of international migration, is grounded in the comparative method (see, e.g., Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1967). The structure of this method is essentially the same used in experimental and statistical designs, adhering to the following general and commonly-held precepts:

- 1) A set of elements, "units of analysis" or "cases" are proposed;
- 2) For the specific research purposes at hand, these cases are assumed to be comparable, i.e., the same set of properties is used to describe each element;
- 3) Each case has a certain quantitative or qualitative value assigned on each property;
- 4) Propositions are constructed, asserting interrelationships between properties.
(Lazarsfeld, 1959: 118).

Thus, the comparative method is related to the conventional logic of social inquiry, derived from procedures of experimental and survey design, although it departs from this conventional framework in certain important respects. First of all, in most analyses employing the comparative method, including this study, the units of analysis, or cases, are countries, rather than individuals. The types of properties predicated to these cases are also broad in scope and include

qualitative and some quantitative measures of economic development, industrial structure, labour scarcity, class structure, employment and immigration levels and the like. Secondly, the logic of conventional social and statistical inquiry, as Lazarsfeld has outlined it, requires that each case be fully comparable; i.e., each case is describable for the research purposes by the same set of properties. This requirement, however, is difficult to meet in most analyses of social change because of the complexity of the cases and the scope of the properties under study. In this study, for example, comparability among cases is based on "instances" where the same or similar processes are apparently in operation but which manifest themselves differently depending on the setting and historical moment (e.g., labour policy in the core versus periphery, or in times of economic expansion versus decline, variations in the composition of class structure and emergence of class conflict from country to country or across time, etc.). This method, then, does not and, indeed, cannot trace precise relationships over time between values of each property for each case, as in conventional hypothesis-testing formats. Its aim is not to determine the plausibility of an explanation, but, instead, to provide plausible interpretive accounts of changes and sequences of events occurring in one place through one period in relation to similar processes occurring in other places. Finally, the method acknowledges the relational nature of sociological inquiry, between the observer and the subject of observation as well as among the subjects of analysis themselves.

In the words of one proponent of this method for world system analysis,

In effect, we use certain conceptual schemas -- interrelated concepts -- to construct the notion of the modern world-system. But then it becomes a construct, a conceptual schema; and the relations among the concepts which we used to gain our new vantage point must then be reworked in the light of the increments to our understanding which our newly acquired angle of vision affords us. For our interest of course lies not in maintaining intact definitional connections among categories just for their own sake, but in comprehending ongoing processes at work at a moment in our active participation in those processes (Hopkins, 1979: 49).

D. Basic Assumptions and Terminology

The term 'international system' refers to a single market, based on capitalist relations of exchange, in which all commodities, including labour, are bought and sold according to formally rational calculations of maximum profitability which determine levels of productivity and capital accumulation. The international system is characterized by the concentration of economic growth, production and investment in core regions and uneven economic development in peripheral regions (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1967; Wallerstein, 1975). Within national societies in both core and periphery, the international system integrates historically specific modes of production. A mode of production refers to the manner in which material surplus is produced and appropriated. Although most societies have been or are presently composed of more than one mode of production, in the contemporary era, the capitalist mode tends to dominate,

subordinating other modes to its requirements of capital accumulation and standards of monetary exchange (Rey, 1973; Mandel, 1976; Foster Carter, 1978; Trimberger, 1979). Phenomena associated with uneven development between core and periphery, including international migration, are outcomes of the articulations among international capitalist exchange relations and specific modes of production within nations:

Hence, a society's particular form of economic development or underdevelopment stems not only from the laws of motion of capitalist accumulation on a world scale, but from a complex interaction of such laws with laws of capitalist exchange and the class struggle generated by the distinct combination of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production (Trimberger, 1979: 130).

International labour migration refers to a particular structure of labour market stratification, created by economic forces of labour supply and demand but maintained and controlled by political and legal mechanisms in both labour receiving and sending countries. The movement of international migrants from supply to host countries can be distinguished from other forms of migration in terms of three criteria:

- (1) The movement typically occurs between two countries which are both inserted in the international market economy of capitalism;
- (2) Migrations tend to originate in peripheral or "developing" countries and move toward the core, or "developed" countries;
- (3) Although many previous migratory movements have been either colonizing initiatives or political or religious in character, the contemporary phenomena are singularly migrations of labourers, "... of individuals.

who move with the sole purpose of selling their work capacity" (Portes, 1978: 472).

An international migrant labour force is composed of individuals who live and work in one place, the host country, but maintain legal residence benchmarks in another, the supply country. This definition implies that the status of international migrant labourers is individually determined; i.e., the individual worker declares that his or her country of normal legal residence is not the same as his or her place of employment (Martin, 1977: 259). However, a distinction must be drawn between this self-determined status and host-country determined status, the latter case being the most salient for purposes of this analysis. A foreign worker for institutional, political and legal as well as personal reasons cannot consider his country of employment a permanent home. The international migrant labourer in the European context is a "guest worker", to use the current and very telling euphemism. The term refers to an individual who is "invited" or otherwise encouraged to migrate to the host country either by the government or an employer for the sole purpose of working, sometimes in a predetermined job, industry or geographical location; his immigration visa does not automatically authorize permanent settlement; and both the terms of his employment and length of stay are decided by the host country. The distinction between self-determined and host-country determined status is necessary for a number of reasons. First of all, as the European Community expanded, regulations governing migration changed. Secondly,

free movement had been extended to all EC nationals by 1974. Finally, in the early 1970s, restrictions were introduced in both EC and non-EC countries which affect the status of non-EC or "third country" migrants from the Near East and North Africa. Consequently, regardless of what a migrant declares to an immigration officer upon entry, it is the host country's designation that determines his or her status. Therefore, an Italian worker in France now enjoys the same benefits and occupational opportunities as an indigenous worker. This was not the case before free movement was extended to EC nationals nor is it presently the case for Italian or other Community workers in non-Community Switzerland, for example. And the status and terms of employment of Turkish, North African or other non-EC workers, whether employed in an EC or a non-EC country, is completely restricted by the host government.

It is misleading to discuss foreign workers in Europe in the same terms employed to describe traditional patterns of migration to North America. The categories of 'landed immigrant', 'permanent resident' or 'resident alien' have limited applicability in the European context for two reasons: first of all, few migrants to the major labour importing countries intend to remain permanently, at least in the initial stages of their employment. In most cases, the foreign worker migrates with the primary intention of selling his or her labour power and returning home with a sizeable portion of saved earnings. The migrant is typically male, unmarried or has left his family behind. An individual certainly does not migrate, as in North American

immigrant mythology, to make a "fresh start in a new land". The expansion of free movement to labour within the European Community has also altered commonly-held notions of citizenship and residency rights and privileges. Secondly, the host countries of Europe have not generally encouraged permanent settlement and, in fact, their immigration policies have made it exceedingly difficult for a foreigner to regularize his status to permanent resident or to acquire citizenship. Overall, in most countries, the first-time entrance of migrants is tied to employment, either through an intended occupation for which indigenous labour is not available or through a specific job offer or contract.

The social position of the migrant in the host country's stratification system is therefore unique in that he is not only a worker but a foreigner and non-citizen as well (Castells, 1975: 57). His opportunities for occupational mobility are formally blocked by visa restrictions. The absence of citizenship rights denies him access to the institutionalized mechanisms for political expression and legal protection available to the national, or indigenous, worker. In particular, the absence of the rights of industrial citizenship especially differentiates the market capacity and bargaining position of the foreign labour force. Even though the migrant may occupy the same economic position as a native worker in relation to the means of production, he fills a markedly inferior position with respect to the social, political and legal institutions and mechanisms which regulate both his economic and non-working activities.

CHAPTER IV

Historical Conditions Facilitating the Emergence of International Migration

I. Core Conditions

National societies within the core are typically referred to as "advanced industrial" or "advanced capitalist". An advanced capitalist society is denoted by a relatively small and declining agricultural sector, a large and increasingly automated industrial sector and an equally large and expanding service sector. These countries tend to have liberal capitalist political structures, committed to full employment and high growth policies (Böhning, 1972: 55). Historically specific patterns of population growth, economic development and working class organization resulted in the emergence of institutionalized welfare and social services which have been extended to the indigenous population. Consequently, the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe tend to experience cyclical labour scarcity, either in absolute or relative terms. Absolute labour scarcity is the result of the total exhaustion of a nation's indigenous labour supply resulting in vacancies at every skill level. In contrast, relative scarcity is the result of the exhaustion of that proportion of the labour supply willing to work in low skill level and manual occupations. Relative labour scarcity is a peculiar feature of Western Europe and occurs in response to several economic and social changes associated with

the emergence of welfare state capitalism:

- (a) demographic changes which affect the age distribution of the labour force;
- (b) rapid industrial expansion and technological innovation;
- (c) expanded demand for skilled workers in the services and manufacturing sectors of the economy;
- (d) the implementation of welfare benefits and expansion of social services which effectively place a floor under wages and which raise expectations and living standards.

Industries and national economies which experience labour scarcities have a number of options open to them: they can increase productivity through the introduction of labour-saving technology; they can relocate the production process to areas of abundant labour supply; or they can introduce new supplies of labour. The last alternative is more likely to occur if the costs of either introducing technology or relocating far outweigh the return to capital. The importation of labour tends to occur if there have been historical precedents for such a practice or if institutional mechanisms exist, such as colonial or economic ties between nations, to facilitate the transfer of manpower from the periphery.

A. Demographic Changes

The consequences of the second world war in Western Europe have been far-reaching. Since 1945, these countries have experienced rapid and intensive social change relative to the

prewar era as well as to the other industrial nations of the world. In addition to internal social transitions, many of the countries in the European core have moved toward political and economic integration. The most obvious indicator of this trend toward core hegemony has been the establishment and, more recently, the expansion of the economic base and political legitimacy of the European Community. The close economic collaboration among the European nations has been accompanied by radical changes in social structure. The second world war itself was instrumental in altering Europe's demographic patterns. The number of war-related deaths has never been accurately tallied. The German war effort displaced millions of Eastern Europeans. Many prisoners of war, forced labourers and refugees did not return to their countries of origin at the close of the war. The displacement of population was aggravated by the political events of the 1950s as new governments were installed and national boundaries redrawn. As political stability returned to the area in the decade following the war, Europe embarked upon one of the longest and most intensive periods of industrial and economic growth in modern history. Postwar Europe represented an economic miracle to the advanced industrial nations of the West. Yet this "miracle" harboured unanticipated consequences for population growth, economic organization and political life, altering the occupational structure and the composition of the labour force and creating conditions which facilitated the importation of massive numbers of foreign workers to the core.

Foremost among the war's demographic consequences was the staggering number of casualties. Casualties were unevenly distributed over the core countries. Sweden suffered virtually none but instead experienced some population gains as refugees from Denmark, Finland and Estonia entered. War losses cut most deeply into the younger working age male population. Although no accurate records exist, the loss of life has been estimated at 7.8 million in Western Europe alone as contrasted to 5.6 million in Eastern Europe and, in the Soviet Union, at least 17 million (Borrie, 1973: 93). The movement of forced labour and refugees during the war and the political reorganizations which followed account for a sizeable proportion of the peculiar population transfers which occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s (Giner and Salcedo, 1978: 97). West Germany, for example, between 1945 and 1961, absorbed over 10 million refugees from Eastern Europe and an additional 3.5 million from the German Democratic Republic (Rist, 1978: 5). The most significant of the demographic trends however is reflected in birth and natural increase rates. As Table 1 indicates, population growth rates in the core countries have stabilized or declined since the war. In contrast, birth rates and life expectancy have increased dramatically in the peripheral nations. Despite a period of increases in the size of northwestern Europe's work force in the immediate postwar period, these nations have never recovered fully from the gaps in the age structure caused by the war. Table 2 gives some indication of these uneven and lasting population effects over the past two decades. Overall, the population of the Western European core has aged. The percentage of the population under 14 years old

Table 1

Average Annual Real Growth Rates in
Population¹ for Core Countries
1950-1973

	1950-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970	1965-1973
Belgium	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4
West Germany	1.0	1.3	0.8	0.6
Netherlands	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.1
Sweden	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
Switzerland	1.3	1.8	1.1	1.0
France	0.9	1.4	0.8	0.8

SOURCE: World Bank. Comparative Economic Data: Selected
Economic Development Indicators. World Tables.
1976. Table 1, pp. 398-399; pp. 14-15.

¹ Population growth rate is based on the sum of annual growth
rates of midyear total population for each country.

Table 2

Age Structure¹ of Core Countries
1960-1970

	Age Structure (%)					
	0-14 years		15-65 years		65 years & over	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Belgium	23.5	23.7	64.5	63.0	12.0	13.3
West Germany	21.7	23.2	67.7	63.6	10.6	13.2
Netherlands	30.7	27.5	60.6	62.4	8.7	10.1
Sweden	22.0	20.8	66.0	65.5	12.0	13.7
Switzerland	23.5	23.5	66.3	65.1	10.2	11.4
France	26.4	24.0	62.0	62.6	11.6	13.4

SOURCE: World Bank. Social Indicators: Population. World
Tables. 1976. Table 2, p. 512; p. 21.

¹ Age structure indicates children (0-14 years), working age
population (15-64), and older persons (65 and over) as a
percentage of total midyear population of all ages.

has increased only in West Germany, remaining relatively steady or declining in all other countries of the core. Except for slight gains in the Netherlands and France, the size of the working age population, those between 15 and 65 years old, has declined. The percentage of those over the age of 65, who are by and large out of the work force, has increased in each of the core countries. These changes in population and age structures have placed constraints on Western European labour supply just at the time when economic expansion stepped up labour demand.

B. Economic Expansion

The popular press has often referred to postwar European industrial expansion as the economic miracle of the twentieth century. Between 1950 and 1962, the era commonly known as the immediate postwar period, real national outputs of each Western European country increased by an average of five percent per year in contrast to an annual 3.8 percent average for the United States during the same period (Martin, 1977: 255). An examination of annual growth rates in production from 1950 to 1973 reflects this trend in each of the core countries (see Table 3). Although agricultural production has fluctuated, real growth rates in manufacturing have increased or held fairly constant through the 1960s. Between 1950 and 1965, gross domestic product increased in all core countries except West Germany. Conventionally accepted measures of economic development indicate that by the close of the 1960s the core countries ranked among the world's top fifteen in both energy consumption and percent of labour force in industrial employment (Durand, 1975: 250-251). The relative development level index reported in Table 4 shows

Table 3
Average Annual Real Growth Rates in Production for Core Countries
1950 - 1973

	Belgium	West Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	Switzerland	France
Gross Domestic Product ¹						
1950 - 1960	3.0	7.9	4.5	3.4	4.4	4.4
1960 - 1965	5.2	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.9
1965 - 1970	4.9	4.8	6.0	3.9	3.6	5.8
1965 - 1973	5.0	4.6	5.6	3.1	4.0	5.8
G.D.P. per Capita ²						
1950 - 1960	2.4	6.8	3.5	2.8	3.0	3.5
1960 - 1965	4.5	3.7	3.6	4.4	3.2	4.5
1965 - 1970	4.5	4.0	4.8	3.1	2.4	5.0
1965 - 1973	4.6	4.0	4.4	2.5	3.0	4.9
Gross Production/Agriculture ³						
1950 - 1960	1.3	3.3	2.9	0.1	1.1	3.2
1960 - 1965	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.1	1.2	3.2
1965 - 1970	4.9	3.7	5.3	0.5	2.7	1.6
1965 - 1973	4.0	1.9	4.7	0.8	1.8	1.7
Gross Production/Manufacturing ⁴						
1950 - 1960	4.1	9.9	5.8	3.0	6.0	6.9
1960 - 1965	6.4	5.8	6.2	7.4	5.0	5.5
1965 - 1970	5.8	6.5	7.6	5.0	5.8	7.1
1965 - 1973	5.7	6.0	7.2	4.5	5.3	7.3

Population growth rates are based on the sums of the individual countries' midyear population.

SOURCE: World Bank. Comparative Economic Data: Selected Economic Development Indicators. World Tables. 1976. Table 1, P. 398-399; pp. 14-15.

(cont'd)

- 1 Gross domestic product (G.D.P.) measures the total final output of a country's economy -- that is, all goods produced and services rendered within its territory by residents and non-residents -- without regard to its allocation among domestic and foreign claims. Its value is calculated before deductions are made for depreciation and other capital consumption allowances. Gross domestic product growth rates have been derived from the sum of the individual countries' G.D.P. in constant market prices, after conversion into 1972 U.S. dollars.
- 2 G.D.P. per capita growth rates have been computed from the individual countries' G.D.P. and midyear population.
- 3 Gross production in agriculture growth rates for individual countries are based on agricultural production indexes obtained from the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and reflect both crops and livestock. The indexes were expressed in 1970 U.S. dollars.
- 4 Gross production in manufacturing growth rates were calculated for individual countries from available manufacturing production indexes, expressed in 1970 U.S. dollars.

Table 4

Ranking of Core Countries by Relative Development Level (RDL),
Energy Consumption per Head (Energy), and Percent Share of
Non-Agricultural Sector in Total Employment (Non-agricultural Share)

Country	RDL ¹	Energy ²	% Non-agriculture Share ³
Belgium (1961)	98	4.14	92.6
West Germany (1961)	94	3.63	86.6
Netherlands (1960)	93	2.69	89.3
Sweden (1960)	93	3.49	86.2
Switzerland (1960)	88	1.94	86.7
France (1962)	87	2.60	80.0

SOURCE: J. Durand. The Labor Force in Economic Development,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. Appendix H.
Table H1. pp. 250-251.

¹ The relative development level index is a composite of two economic indicators: energy consumption per head and percent share of non-agricultural sector in total employment. The index was compiled for each country from census data for the year indicated. One hundred countries were included in the sample. The countries are ranked in descending order and the RDL score is derived from the sum of the two indicators. Like all measures of economic development, the RDL index is not without its methodological faults. Although energy consumption and non-agricultural share tend to be highly correlated, in some instances, wide deviations in the level of correspondence can be noted.

² Equivalent of metric tons of coal consumed annually per head.

³ Includes both males and females.

that the core nations differ slightly from one another in their rankings. This indicates that the massive industrialization effort and the economic initiatives which followed the war have had a similar macroscopic impact in all countries of the core within the first decade of the postwar era.

The one event which underlines the coordinated nature of Europe's economic expansion was the ratification of the Treaty of Rome in the mid-1950s. The Treaty, which established the European Economic Community, represented a step toward the economic, social and political integration of Western Europe through its efforts at removing obstacles to the unrestricted movement of goods, capital and labour. The growing importance of the Community has been recognized throughout the world and a new dimension has been introduced into European commentary; that of member and non-member status as an indication of a nation's political and economic position in European affairs. The European Community has grown to a multi-member unit, including all the core countries in this analysis except Switzerland and Sweden, and has in this decade extended associate memberships to the peripheral nations on Europe's southern fringe. Switzerland, although not a member, has entered into trade and labour agreements with the EC which mirror the arrangements enjoyed by Community members. As of 1954 Sweden has been part of a similar economic union with the Scandinavian countries, the Common Nordic Labour Market. For many Europeans, these arrangements constitute in embryonic form the framework for the future integration of Western Europe as a single, sovereign, economic and political

entity. Without a doubt, the European Community in this decade has evolved beyond its original purpose of limited economic association. Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome, for example, which guarantee the free movement of Community and associate nationals to take up employment in any member state, illustrate the expansion of the EC's mandate. Community workers, regardless of national origin within the EC, now receive standardized treatment in each of the member states with respect to wages, taxation and social benefits. The guarantees of free movement and the creation of a "European labour market" are to many observers the most obvious indications of European integration. It must be noted, however, that, while the incorporation of the European worker has indeed been accomplished through the EC, the demand for cheap labour remains. This demand has increasingly been met with manpower from outside the EC (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 44). The economic importance of the European Community, however, cannot be overlooked. The postwar period has witnessed the emergence of an integrated, capitalist European core. The Community represents one means through which core interests have begun to centralize the state management of both economic and non-economic activities; maintaining favourable conditions of investment, sustaining production and supplying manpower while providing easy trade access and generally serving as a political stabilizer (Nikolinakos, 1975: 9).

C. Expansion of the Service and Manufacturing Sectors

Western Europe, over the last fifty years, has undergone a major transformation in economic organization. The two world

wars and the global economic depression which separated them had a profound impact on the European economy. During the 1920s, Western Europe experienced general and unprecedented growth in transformative industries and personal and public services coupled with declines in agriculture and extractive industries. These trends continued until the global depression of the 1930s put a temporary halt to further expansion and investment on the European continent. Between the onset of the depression in 1929 and the first signs of recovery by 1932, the value of international trade had declined by two-thirds and the volume by one-third. As a consequence, the flow of labour from the extractive industries and agriculture to the transformative and service sectors generally subsided (Bagwell and Mingay, 1970: 270; Singelmann, 1978: 63).

The second world war inaugurated an economic recovery across the continent. The war effort itself was responsible for the revitalization of certain segments of the manufacturing sector as these industries geared up to meet the wartime demand for specialized goods and machinery. The demand for transportation and communication workers also increased during the war. The return to a peacetime economy did not precipitate a reversal of the wartime expansion. Instead, the trend intensified. As one observer of postwar Europe reports,

The 1950s and 1960s ... presented a similar situation for all countries ... in that the national economies experienced a remarkable growth rate. As a result, the employment share of agriculture continued to decline at an accelerated pace, and transformative industries, and social and producer services

proved to be the most dynamic sectors during the decade (Singelmann, 1978: 64).

The close of the second world war did indeed usher in a period of massive rebuilding and industrial expansion. Initially, the manufacturing sector was slow to recover but picked up momentum as the necessary investment capital was made available in substantial sums in the mid 1950s. Within one decade, manufacturing output reached an all-time high. The growth in transformative industries was matched by an expansion of the service sector. Service industries were much less affected by the war and the share of employment in the various transportation and communicative services rose steadily and continuously through the postwar era. Table 5 reports economic sector outputs for each of the core countries except Switzerland from the mid-fifties to this decade. The percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in agriculture has declined dramatically since 1955. The share of the GDP in manufacturing rose in Belgium and West Germany, remained fairly constant in the Netherlands but declined in both Sweden and France. No strong trends are evident in the "other industry" category primarily because this combines the GDP in extractive industries, which have generally declined during the post war era, with the GDP in construction and utilities, industries which have displayed remarkable postwar growth. In contrast, the growth of the service sector has been strong, reaching over 50% of the GDP in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden.

The postwar expansion effort is also reflected in employment levels in major industrial divisions. Table 6.

Table 5
Percent of Gross Domestic Product¹ by Economic Sectors² for Core Countries
1955 - 1973

	Belgium	West Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	Switzerland ³	France
Agriculture						
1955	7.9	7.7	11.4	11.1	-	11.2
1960	7.2	5.7	10.5	6.9	-	9.5
1965	6.1	4.3	8.3	5.5	-	7.4
1970	4.4	3.1	6.3	4.0	-	6.2
1973	4.4	3.0	6.3	4.0	-	6.1
Manufacturing						
1955	28.9	41.0	30.6	32.0	-	37.2
1960	29.8	42.2	31.6	27.1	-	36.6
1965	30.3	42.1	30.7	27.4	-	35.5
1970	32.6	42.7	29.8	25.5	-	35.9
1973	32.8	46.0	30.0	24.8	-	34.4
Other Industry						
1955	12.1	12.1	10.5	13.5	-	10.5
1960	11.0	12.3	11.0	11.5	-	11.4
1965	11.5	12.0	11.1	12.3	-	12.7
1970	10.9	11.9	12.0	10.7	-	12.7
1973	11.1	13.7	12.0	10.6	-	13.8
Services						
1955	51.1	39.2	47.4	43.4	-	41.2
1960	51.9	39.8	46.9	54.5	-	42.5
1965	52.0	41.6	49.9	54.8	-	44.4
1970	52.0	42.3	51.9	59.8	-	45.2
1973	51.8	42.8	51.7	60.6	-	45.7

SOURCE: World Bank. Comparative Economic Data: Selected Economic Structure Indicators.
World Tables. 1976. Table 4, pp. 422-423; pp. 5-6; p. 15.

(cont'd)

- 1 Gross domestic product measures the total final output of a country's economy -- that is, all goods produced and services rendered within its territory by residents and non-residents -- without regard to its allocation among domestic and foreign claims. Its value is calculated before deductions are made for depreciation and other capital consumption allowances. The percentage shares were calculated from national accounts in current prices and domestic currencies for individual countries.
- 2 The economic sector classification is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). The sectors comprise the following activities: Agriculture (agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting); Manufacturing (manufacturing, including handicrafts); Other industry (mining, including petroleum and natural gas production, and quarrying, construction, electricity, gas and water); Services (transportation, storage and communication, wholesale and retail trade, banking, insurance and real estate, ownership of dwellings, services, public administration and defense, and other unclassifiable branches).
- 3 Data for Switzerland are not available.

Table 6
Levels of Employment by Industrial Sectors for Core Countries
1956 - 1963
(Index: 1958 = 100)

	West					
	Belgium	Germany	Netherlands ¹	Sweden ¹	Switzerland ¹	France
Manufacturing						
1956	102.0	94.1	103.	102.3	97.4	96.0
1957	104.7	98.1	103.	101.5	102.2	99.0
1958	100.0	100.0	100.	100.0	100.0	100.0
1959	97.9	102.1	102.	100.6	98.8	97.7
1960	101.2	106.7	106.	105.6	105.3	98.7
1961	104.6	110.5	109.	108.7	113.4	99.6
1962	106.9	112.6	111.	108.0	119.5	101.0
1963	108.2	113.6	111.	106.8	121.5	102.9
Mining and Quarrying						
1956	99.9	99.7	101.6	98.0	-	101.3
1957	99.5	102.1	98.4	101.2	-	101.4
1958	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	100.0
1959	89.9	96.7	98.4	92.0	-	98.6
1960	77.0	90.5	93.4	93.9	-	98.4
1961	67.5	87.4	90.2	93.1	-	99.3
1962	61.7	83.4	-	87.3	-	101.2
1963	59.9	79.9	-	79.4	-	105.7
Construction						
1956	106.4	102.2	107.2	-	112.1	99.3
1957	105.7	106.6	105.8	-	114.9	99.9
1958	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0
1959	100.9	113.8	104.8	-	104.6	99.2
1960	101.5	114.8	108.6	-	111.9	99.2
1961	106.0	117.1	112.0	-	123.3	99.6
1962	111.3	121.1	-	-	134.3	100.5
1963	118.6	124.9	-	-	139.6	103.4
Transport, Storage and Communication						
1956	93.9	98.1	107.6	-	-	-
1957	98.2	99.4	99.6	-	-	-
1958	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	-	-
1959	98.0	101.2	100.8	-	-	-
1960	98.9	102.6	101.6	-	-	-
1961	99.5	103.6	103.2	-	-	-
1962	100.6	103.9	-	-	-	-
1963	102.8	104.1	-	-	-	-

SOURCE: International Labor Office, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1964.
Table 8, pp. 159-180.

¹ (-) indicates that data are not available.

provides comparisons of employment levels by economic sectors during the early postwar period. In each of the countries, except France, between 1956 and 1963, the rate of employment increased in manufacturing but declined substantially in the extractive industries. The rebuilding of Europe's roads, industries and cities during the postwar years resulted in an increase in the share of the GDP in construction. By the 1960s, the proportion of the European labour force in construction had climbed to an historical high. Table 6 reveals accelerating increases in construction employment in all core countries except Sweden. The general expansion of the service sector is partly revealed in Table 6 through the large increases in employment in transportation, storage and communications. By 1960, the share of the labour force in agriculture was 20 percent or less in each of the core countries while manufacturing and services accounted for over two-thirds of those employed (Fuchs, 1968: 30). These changes in economic structure occurred alongside a fundamental transformation of European social organization as educational and occupational opportunity expanded. These trends reflect changes in the nature of and demand for Western European labour during an era of extensive social and political restructuring and reform culminating in the emergence of the Western European welfare states.

D. The Welfare State, Class Structure and Labour Demand

A prominent theme in sociological discussions of Western industrialism has been the process of "working class incorporation" through the extension of civil, political and most

recently social welfare rights of citizenship (Bendix, 1964; Lipset, 1964; 1969; Marshall, 1961; 1964). At various stages of labour history, from the era of Roman Empire-building to the Industrial Revolutions of the last and present centuries, the potential for organized action from an increasingly beleaguered working class has threatened the delicate balance of social order. Politicians, religious fraternities and reformist groups have at various times attempted to minimize the possibility of labour unrest through the implementation of social welfare programmes in the guises of food subsidies, transportation, housing, health services, public education, vocational training and general poor relief. As the Western European states gradually assumed a more active role in the management of their economies, they also took charge of and institutionalized the welfare function, becoming, in the contemporary era, prototypical welfare states.

The term 'welfare state' refers to a political system in which the administrative apparatus assumes "cradle-to-grave" responsibility for the protection of the social welfare of its citizens through such measures as medical services, health and unemployment insurance, family allowances, public housing, compulsory education, and old age and disability pensions. Although social insurance was introduced in Germany in the late nineteenth century and in Britain before 1914, a comprehensive programme as well as the term 'welfare state' was first adopted in the United Kingdom by the British Labour Government of 1945-50 with similar schemes soon implemented in other Western European

countries (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977: 673).

The rapid postwar growth experienced by Western Europe initially financed the welfare state apparatus. Social services expenditures rose steadily throughout the postwar period accounting for an increasingly large proportion of the core countries' national budgets (Table 7). These expenditures have effectively raised real income by establishing a floor under wage levels and by providing services to workers and their dependents in cash or kind. With the advent of welfarism, postwar recovery and nearly full employment, Western European class structure has been transformed. A major project of the welfare states has been to provide opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers to move into better paying jobs in the skilled and white collar sectors. Some observers of Western Europe during the postwar period have concluded that its rapid industrial development, especially in the service and transformative sectors, has precipitated higher rates of upward mobility than found in North America (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959; Miller, 1960; Szymanski, 1978). Vocational training, the extension of public education and electronic mass communication have brought with them rising expectations and a resulting unwillingness on the part of the labour force to engage in low-paying and low-prestige work. Yet, even with the technological innovation which accompanied Europe's postwar recovery, it is evident that automation has not been successful in mechanizing these jobs out of existence (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 26-27). Consequently, Western European labour shortages have been mainly

Table 7

Social Security Expenditures as Percentage
of Gross Domestic Product for Core Countries
1957 - 1975¹

	1957	1960	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Belgium	16.3	14.2	16.2	16.4	16.7	17.8	18.3	19.2	22.2
West Germany	20.8	16.1	17.0	17.9	18.2	18.9	19.5	20.8	23.8
Netherlands ²	12.3	-	18.1	19.0	20.1	20.9	21.2	22.4	24.3
Sweden ²	12.9	12.4	17.9	18.8	20.6	-	-	-	-
Switzerland ²	8.7	7.7	10.6	10.6	10.8	-	-	-	-
France	18.9	14.9	-	16.4	16.5	16.6	17.1	17.4	19.5

SOURCES: 1957: H. Aaron. "Social Security: International Comparisons."
In: O. Eckstein. Studies in the Economics of Income Maintenance.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967, p. 46.
1960: P. Cutright. "Income Redistribution: A Cross National
Analysis." Social Forces. December, 1967.
1969-75: Statistical Office of the European Communities. Basic
Statistics of the Community. Social Accounts. 1978. Table 122,
p. 159.

¹ Figures for 1957 and 1960 are not strictly comparable with the 1969-1975 data set.

² (-) indicates that data are not available.

concentrated in those occupations and industrial sectors abandoned by the native work force. Since the end of the war, attempts to alleviate these shortages have been increasingly met by the organized and informal recruitment of foreign workers, first from within Europe and more recently from outside the continent (Guibert, 1966: 553-556; Kindleberger, 1967: 35).

An indication of the transformation of Western Europe's class structure can be seen in the employment distribution of the core countries during the postwar period (Table 8). While unemployment remained fairly stable during the decade between 1960 and 1970, the percentage of the labour force in agriculture declined. Indices of employment reveal some increases in manufacturing among core countries from 1948 to 1960 (Table 9). Increases are reported for West Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands while growth in the other core countries has been also steady. Throughout the core, the proportion of the labour force employed in the services and the transformative sector has widened since 1948 and, between 1948 and 1970, general unemployment levels have dropped (World Bank, 1976: 5-16; 22).

The relationship between welfarism and the capitalist economy is an ambiguous one. The expansion of citizenship rights has been at once beneficial and costly to the core. Conventional sociological thinking on the welfare state (see, e.g., Titmuss, 1968) can be summarized as follows: Welfare spending, which increases the real income of the working class, is regarded as a necessary evil by the capitalist class and therefore requires the intervention of the capitalist state in its administration. Welfare spending raises interest rates by shifting capital from the private to the public sector. As interest rates increase,

Table 8
Employment Distribution for Core Countries
1960 - 1970

	Total Labour Force ¹ (Thousands)		% of Labour Force in Agriculture ²		% of Labour Force in Industry ³		% Unemployed ⁴	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Belgium	3500	3640	7.0	5.0	48.0	42.0	2.8	3.0
West Germany	26800	26500	13.4	8.9	48.0	49.0	0.8	0.7
Netherlands	4200	4800	10.7	6.4	42.0	44.0	1.2	1.1
Sweden	3200	3400	13.8	8.1	45.0	40.0	1.4	1.5
Switzerland ⁵	2500	3000	11.2	7.7	50.0	48.0	-	1.5
France	19700	20600	19.8	15.1	39.0	38.0	2.2	2.2

SOURCES: World Bank. Social Indicators: Employment and Income. World Tables. 1976.
Table 3, p. 516; p. 22; International Labour Office. Yearbook of Labour
Statistics. 1977. Tables 1-2, pp. 9-168.

¹ Labour force indicates economically active persons, including armed forces and unemployed but excluding housewives, students, and other inactive groups.

² Percent of labour force in agriculture indicates agricultural labour force as a percentage of the total labour force. Agricultural activities include farming, forestry, hunting and fishing.

³ Percent of labour force in industry indicates the percentage of the total labour force in mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities.

⁴ Percent of unemployed indicates unemployed as a percentage of total labour force. The unemployed are defined as persons who are able and willing to take a job, who are out of a job on a given day, have remained out of a job, and were seeking work during the enumeration period.

⁵ (-) indicates that data are not available.

2

Table 9

Levels of Employment in Manufacturing for Core Countries¹

1948 - 1960

(Index: 1953 = 100)

	Belgium	West Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	Switzerland	France
1948	-	-	89	103	91	96
1952	-	97	97	103	100	102
1953	100	100	100	100	100	100
1954	100	105	104	101	102	101
1955	102	113	107	104	106	101
1956	105	121	109	104	111	103
1957	106	126	109	103	117	106
1958	100	128	106	101	114	107
1959	98	131	108	101	113	105
1960	101	137	112	106	120	106

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1961. Table 6, p. 54.

¹ These figures are based on the number of salaried employees and wage earners in manufacturing, excluding public utilities, building and other construction.

investment declines and, with it, productivity drops. In this respect, welfare spending can be viewed as a burden on the private sector. Such an argument implies that the adversary relationship between capital and labour is manifested in the public sector through the setting of fiscal and welfare policies and in the labour market through collective bargaining. High rates of welfare spending as well as high wages result in a curtailment of investment. This is only a partial explanation. The relationship between the capitalist economy and the welfare state is not so cut and dried. Just as a minimum wage level is necessary to maintain the physical capacity of the labour force so is a minimum level of social services required to facilitate its social reproduction, to foster cohesion and reduce the potential for conflict. Welfare benefits, particularly in the form of cash subsidies such as food stamps, housing and unemployment allowances and aid for dependent children, can sometimes prevent declines in consumer spending in periods of high unemployment or other economic crises. Thus, welfare expenditures play a counter-cyclical role in stabilizing the economy and do not necessarily constitute a burden. The contemporary function of welfare measures is protective for both capitalists and the working class, in the former case by safeguarding investment and in the latter by maintaining an acceptable standard of living for workers and their families (Hirschhorn, 1979: 153-154).

In the Western European core states, Keynesian economic management of welfare has directly affected labour supply. With the advent of welfarism, traditionally large families have become

superfluous as economic units. Although some countries which experienced severe war casualties and falling birth rates have implemented family allowance benefits to encourage population growth, these measures have in fact reduced the size of the available labour pool, at least in the short run, by keeping females out of the work force (Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 108). Because of the accessibility of social benefits, workers have been able to delay entry into or remain outside the labour market even when jobs are available at desirable skill and wage levels. As the mandate of the welfare states expanded, social benefits have been extended to both productive and unproductive labour. The expansion of social wages in the form of welfare benefits to middle class as well as working class families is an important factor in the increase in the average private wage.

As a result of the expansion of welfare through the extension of citizenship rights, the costs of production as well as of administration of social services have risen steadily since the 1950s. The welfare states of Western Europe attempted to devise a solution which would on one hand alleviate the shortage of labour and on the other curtail the escalating costs of maintaining the welfare infrastructure. The importation of cheap foreign manpower, in the form of a movable reserve army of labour kept socially segregated and economically subordinate to the indigenous labour force through exclusion from citizenship rights, has emerged as a primary means to reduce the economic burden posed by welfarism:

In general, social benefits of all kinds are partial or full alternatives to wage labour for European workers ... As social consumption expenditures and social expenses of production increase, the pressure on the state to organize labour migration either directly (e.g., West Germany, France) or indirectly (e.g., by rigidly enforcing immigration laws in periods of labour surplus and relaxing enforcement when labour power is scarce, as in ... France) also increases. Capital needs new and regulated sources of labour power to protect itself against the core working class and welfare state; the core working class needs the welfare state to protect itself against new sources of labour power and superexploitation (Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 108).

As this argument implies, welfare spending has become a double-edged sword. The greater the extension of citizenship rights through the welfare state, the greater the costs of social reproduction of labour. The core's reliance on a foreign reserve labour force, excluded from the social rights of citizenship, helps to maintain the integration of the indigenous working class while alleviating the economic strain caused by welfare spending.

II. Periphery Conditions

National societies in the periphery are dominated by the capitalist mode of production and various subordinate non-capitalist modes. The specific forms assumed by these peripheral societies are determined by the nature of the non-capitalist modes and the ways in which they have been integrated into the unequal exchange relations of the international system (see Amin, 1976). The maintenance of the non-capitalist mode is required by capitalism to subsidize the low wages paid to labour in the periphery and to generally sustain the rate of return to capital. International migration tends to originate in peripheral

societies with high birth rates and high dependency ratios and which are undergoing relatively rapid industrialization and urbanization. The dominance of the capitalist mode in the periphery corresponds with its transition from agricultural and traditional economic activity. This transition produces a surplus of labour, either in the absolute sense of unemployed individuals or in the relative sense of individuals who are induced into wage labour on a full-time basis because of the unavailability of traditional employment or as a supplement to traditional activities (Amin, 1976; Portes, 1978). Because of the abundant labour supply in peripheral countries, the introduction of industry and "core processes" to these areas is easily implemented. Industrialization in the periphery is accomplished through the specific articulation between capitalism and the non-capitalist, or traditional, mode of production. In other words, a network of informal and traditional economic activities co-exists with industrial employment, keeping wages low but providing for the material needs of workers and their families by keeping down the costs of their consumption (Portes, 1978: 476).

At a general level, these trends contribute to the peripheralization of national societies within the international system. Peripheralization is the outcome of two inter-related processes: incorporation and penetration (Bach, 1978: 536-558). Incorporation occurs as the "developing" countries are inserted into and become dependent upon the international market economy, through colonial or former colonial ties to advanced industrial nations and/or through trade or other forms of economic

dependence. Penetration is the outcome of industrialization initiatives and development policies within these countries and is reflected in their class structures. Patterns of class relations characteristic of the advanced industrial nations are reproduced in the periphery. This is made possible by the mechanism of economic development itself. Development initiatives in these countries are typically modelled after patterns established for the advanced industrial nations. Industrialization is therefore brought about through the application of technologies and capital-intensive methods similar to those developed for alleviating conditions of labour scarcity in highly industrial nations. This pattern of economic development and industrialization brings about the peripheralization of the labour supply country by producing broad economic and social changes in the organization of the labour force as well as in the overall class structure. Industrialization, while increasing aggregate economic growth, also increases income inequality between classes. This situation is aggravated by the "demonstration effect"; the diffusion throughout the population of the reality and benefits of "modern" standards of consumption. The expansion of the manufacturing sector encourages efforts to expand internal markets for consumer goods. Mass communication vehicles, originally introduced as agents of educational and political development, are increasingly used as advertising media, creating new consumer "needs" in all layers of the population including those segments whose economic situation hardly permits the purchase of manufactured commodities (Delacroix, 1977).

Portes, 1978). In summary, peripheralization brings about the following set of conditions:

- a) changes in the economic and population structures in response to (i) the migration of peasants and agricultural workers to urban areas in conjunction with the enlarged demand for industrial labour, and (ii) the expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors with the creation of an internal domestic market for consumer goods;
- b) changes in class structure and labour supply, specifically (i) the emergence of an indigenous bourgeoisie in the periphery metropole along with an industrial proletariat and a semi-proletariat, dividing its activities between industry and traditional or informal economic sectors; and (ii) an oversupply of labour and increased rates of unemployment and underemployment; and
- c) a limited expansion of educational and occupational opportunities and exposure to and general acceptance of modern values and standards of consumption (even though they may be unattainable for a large segment of the population).

Consequently, the development sequence, while beneficial to the nation-state and in the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie, also creates a potentially explosive situation in the form of a reserve army of labour socialized to rising expectations and consumer values. Migration of the unemployed and underemployed to the industrial nations of the core serves as a "social control valve" for the sender country in two ways: It relieves the tensions of overpopulation and rapid industrialization by funneling off the surplus labour force which cannot be absorbed into the economy; and it provides a new source of foreign exchange, through migrants' remittances which are used to bolster the country's fiscal position and further the development process.

A. Economic Expansion, Urbanization and Demographic Change

Although the labour supply countries in this analysis vary in their levels of development (see Table 10), at a macroscopic level they all display a number of conditions common to the peripheralization process. All nine countries may be classified as developing rather than undeveloped as evidenced by the share in nonagricultural employment. The economic, scientific and technological dependency of these countries on the core has been manifested in their levels of foreign debt, balance of payment deficits, income concentration, internal regional imbalances and unemployment and underemployment (Alba, 1978; 503-513; Almino de Alencar, 1977; Bennoune, 1975: 39-56; Nikolinakos, 1975; 5-16; Richmond and Verma, 1978; 3-38; Rist, 1979; 95-108). The "older" countries of emigration, those in southern and eastern Europe, are more highly industrialized and more urbanized than the newer labour suppliers in North Africa and the Near East, indicating the advanced state of their incorporation and penetration into the international system. In fact, within the older sender societies of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia, regional imbalances have developed resulting in the internal colonialization of labour from the rural areas and villages by the industrialized metropole. The relationship between the highly developed Italian north and the Mezzogiorno provides the most familiar example of this (Nikolinakos, 1975: 11). All of the periphery nations report increases from 1960 to 1970 in the proportion of the population living in urban centres (Table 11). These increases correspond to the years of the most

Table 10

Ranking of Periphery Countries by Relative Development Level (RDL),
Energy Consumption per Head (Energy), and
Percent Share of Nonagricultural Sector in Total Employment
(Nonagricultural Share)

	RDL ¹	Energy ²	% Nonagricultural Share ³
Italy (1961)	74	1.22	70.9
Spain (1960)	64	.82	58.7
Portugal (1960)	56	.38	56.8
Yugoslavia (1961)	52	.90	42.8
Greece (1961)	50	.46	45.7
Tunisia (1966)	46	.24	57.4
Algeria (1966)	41	.37	43.3
Turkey (1960)	28	.25	25.1
Morocco (1960)	25	.14	37.9

SOURCE: J. Durand. The Labor Force in Economic Development. N.J.:
Princeton University Press. 1975. Appendix H. Table H1.
pp. 250-251.

¹ The relative development level index is a composite of two economic indicators: energy consumption per head and percent share of non-agricultural sector in total employment. The index was compiled for each country from census data for the year indicated. One hundred countries were included in the sample. The countries are ranked in descending order and the RDL score is derived from the sum of the two indicators. Like all measures of economic development, the RDL index is not without its methodological faults. Although energy consumption and nonagricultural share tend to be highly correlated, in some instances, wide deviations in the level of correspondence can be noted.

² Equivalent of metric tons of coal consumed annually per head.

³ Includes both males and females.

Table 11

Urban Population Growth
for Periphery Countries
1960 - 1970

Country	Urban Population ¹ as Percent of Total Population	
	1960	1970 ²
Italy	48.6	-
Spain	43.0	49.0
Portugal	23.0	37.0
Yugoslavia	28.0	39.0
Greece	43.0	53.0
Tunisia	40.0	44.0
Algeria	31.0	39.0
Turkey	32.0	38.7
Morocco	29.0	35.0

SOURCE: World Bank. Social Indicators:
Population. World Tables. 1976.
Table 2, pp. 510-513.

¹ Urban population indicates the compound annual rate of midyear total urban population for the decades ending in 1960 and 1970. Urban population is defined in terms of inhabitants of cities and towns. Because of differing definitions of urban areas among countries, these rates are not strictly comparable.

² (-) indicates missing data.

intensive development activity. By 1970, approximately half of the populations of the older sender countries of Italy, Spain and Greece had become urban dwellers. The other periphery countries have experienced equally dramatic rises in the urban growth rate.

The countries of the periphery occupy a distinctive niche in the international division of labour. Through the war years and until the sixties, these countries were generally assigned to the production of raw materials and agriculture for export to core transformation sites and markets. Industrialization in the periphery has occurred primarily within the last two decades. The industrializing efforts by and large have not been self-generated by periphery states but have been initiated or at least subsidized by foreign capital from the core, either by former colonial occupiers (as in the case of French involvement in the Maghreb) or by combinations of Western capitalist states or the Communist Bloc who both administered "development aid" programmes in conjunction with foreign policies aimed at maintaining the balance of international power. The industrialization initiatives in the periphery have generally been based on the import substitution model designed to restructure the natural resource- and agricultural-based economy. Small-scale manufacturing, to provide consumer goods for the domestic market, has been gradually introduced and enlarged. The technological processes, the types of products and the marketing and accounting models for the manufacturing sector have been borrowed and transplanted from the industrialized nations of

the core to the periphery.

Industrial production has increased dramatically since 1960, especially in the newly developed transformative sectors (see Table 12). Because of the focus of the developmental model on manufacturing and the creation of consumer markets, the periphery's productive structure has become concentrated and capital intensive. By the close of the last decade, which marks the end of the "first wave" of industrialization and implementation of labour saving technology in agriculture, industrial growth had not been able to keep pace with the growing labour pool, released from traditional agricultural employment and pulled to the metropole in search of industrial work. Nor have the development programmes accomplished their intended objective of transforming the economic structure (Alba, 1978: 504). Even the socialist and centrally-planned states of Yugoslavia and Algeria have opted in favour of capital-intensive, labour-saving developmental policies, leading in both cases to the same conditions characteristic of the other periphery nations -- increasing financial indebtedness, technological dependency on the core and further insertion into the international market economy (Bennoune, 1975:44).

The development process which was itself responsible for the creation of a proletariat within the periphery societies has not been able to absorb this workforce into the economy. Because of unprecedented population growth following the war, the surplus manpower situation in almost every country of the periphery has reached an acute state. All nine countries in the sample are

Table 12

Index of Industrial Production by Sector
for Periphery Countries¹
1960 - 1976
(1970 = 100)

	1960	1963	1968	1969	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 ²
Italy										
General	50	67	90	94	100	104	114	120	108	122
Mining	71 ^a	74	94	98	95	97	100	102	95	99
Manufacturing	50	67	90	94	100	104	114	119	108	120
Food, beverages, tobacco	64	80	87	94	106	108	119	122	115	126
Textiles	91	100	94	100	98	106	115	113	104	123
Chemicals, coal and petroleum products	36	54	93	94	102	111	125	123	106	122
Basic metals	48	57	95	96	98	106	119	132	116	130
Metal products	55	77	85	85	98	99	107	115	105	111
Electricity and gas	52	65	91	95	106	114	122	125	126	141
Spain										
General	34	49	79	91	104	121	140	153	143	152
Mining	97	97	113	116	103	106	98	102	105	107
Manufacturing	32	48	78	91	104	121	141	155	144	153
Food, beverages, tobacco	50	64	88	95	129	134	167	185	170	180
Textiles	59	75	80	93	96	100	101	102	91	87
Chemicals, coal and petroleum products	26	37	73	88	83	112	122	124	127	131
Basic metals	25	42	77	93	109	138	164	197	184	199
Metal products	20	36	67	80	93	112	133	136	131	133
Electricity and gas	33	46	81	92	110	121	135	143	146	160

(cont'd)

	1960	1963	1968	1969	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 ²
Portugal										
General	48	60	88	95	108	122	136	139	132	138
Mining	94	90	105	99	100	102	105	100	92	83
Manufacturing	47	59	88	94	109	123	137	140	132	140
Food, beverages, tobacco	66	72	97	102	113	122	137	147	170	174
Chemicals, coal and petroleum products	50	61	83	90	108	118	130	136	129	145
Basic metals	35	64	81	91	115	148	161	134	104	125
Metal products	31	41	75	90	113	127	135	136	119	126
Electricity	45	60	86	95	109	122	134	146	145	135
Yugoslavia										
General	45	60	83	92	111	119	127	140	147	153
Mining	62	78	88	93	108	110	117	124	130	134
Manufacturing	44	58	82	92	110	119	127	140	149	154
Food, beverages, tobacco	55	66	88	91	110	118	126	136	137	149
Textiles	54	71	91	95	106	116	123	135	141	143
Chemicals, coal and petroleum products	30	44	80	89	118	126	155	181	191	202
Basic metals	53	64	85	92	106	119	132	151	158	160
Metal products	44	55	80	92	108	115	122	139	153	157
Electricity and gas	36	53	79	88	120	134	136	146	134	143
Greece										
General	41	51	81	91	111	127	147	144	151	166
Mining	-	53	73	84	114	118	133	136	133	143
Manufacturing	43	54	81	90	110	127	147	144	150	166
Food, beverages, tobacco	63	75	94	94	106	110	119	116	118	135
Textiles	48	60	79	88	110	127	147	147	174	200
Chemicals, coal and petroleum products	32	42	82	90	108	133	172	171	181	188
Metal products	64	73	81	89	125	138	162	153	143	160
Electricity and gas	29	38	84	96	119	134	150	152	162	181

(cont'd)

	1960	1963	1968	1969	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Tunisia										
General	-	-	94	92	108	116	121	131	134	137
Mining	-	-	101	91	100	101	102	110	114	99
Manufacturing	-	-	93	92	110	120	125	134	134	142
Food and tobacco	-	-	101	81	120	127	135	147	142	139
Textiles	-	-	89	97	98	101	119	121	110	97
Chemicals	-	-	94	91	108	113	118	128	125	134
Electricity and gas	-	-	81	92	112	126	139	158	173	193
Turkey										
General	40	52	88	99	109	120	135	144	158	-
Mining	59	59	86	100	109	109	118	127	136	-
Manufacturing	38	51	88	98	109	120	136	146	158	-
Food, beverages, tobacco	98	81	115	107	127	134	133	144	151	168
Electricity, gas and water	44	50	88	100	112	125	138	150	175	-
Morocco										
General	70	78	90	96	105	115	129	138	134	142
Mining	87	85	94	100	104	123	139	157	114	120
Manufacturing	68	78	90	96	107	112	124	127	135	143
Food, beverages, tobacco	73	81	91	94	109	116	127	133	146	154
Textiles	49	73	89	106	107	112	120	112	116	129
Chemicals and petroleum products	42	66	92	97	104	131	146	159	161	167
Metal products	64	70	88	94	102	104	124	128	135	152
Electricity	49	67	89	94	103	124	139	151	160	171

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1977. Table 48, pp. 155-164.

1 Excluding Algeria

2 (-) indicates missing data

distinguished by their increasingly young populations and their relatively high dependency ratios (see Tables 13 and 14). The amelioration of medical care and the spread of health and nutrition information through mass media and schools which accompanied the development initiative have extended life expectancy and reduced infant mortality without significantly lowering birth rates. The populations of Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are especially young and, by the end of 1970, over 40 percent of the population in each of these countries were under the age of 15 (Table 13). The segment of the population from which the economically active are drawn, the "15 to 65 year old" category, is large in each of the periphery countries relative to the size of the core labour force although small reductions have been reported between 1960 and 1970 (Table 13). These decreases, however, are matched by slight increases in the dependency ratio (Table 14).

B. Class Structure and Labour Supply

The introduction of capital intensive methods via the import substitution model has effected changes within the periphery's class structure. Political independence from colonial powers and the emergence of a domestically-owned manufacturing sector enabled the formation of an independent indigenous bourgeoisie. Although the industrial structure remains dependent upon core capital and technology, the indigenous capitalist class has been able to downplay its comprador origins and establish itself as an autonomous economic entity. A change at the bottom end of the class structure can also be attributed to the expansion

Table 13

Age Structure¹ of Periphery Countries
1960 - 1970

	0-14 Years		15-65 Years		65 Years and Older	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Italy	24.7	24.3	66.2	64.9	9.1	10.8
Spain	27.0	28.0	65.0	63.0	8.0	9.0
Portugal	29.2	28.5	62.8	61.8	8.0	9.7
Yugoslavia	31.0	28.0	63.0	64.0	6.0	8.0
Greece	26.7	24.9	65.1	64.0	8.2	11.1
Tunisia	42.0	45.0	53.0	51.0	5.0	4.0
Algeria	44.0	47.0	52.0	48.0	4.0	5.0
Turkey	41.3	41.8	55.2	53.9	3.5	4.3
Morocco	44.0	46.0	52.0	49.0	4.0	5.0

SOURCE: World Bank, Social Indicators: Population. World Tables. 1976. Table 2, pp. 510-512.

¹ Age structure indicates children (0-14 years), working age population (15-64 years), and older persons (65 and over) as a percentage of total midyear population of all ages.

Table 14

Dependency Ratios of
Periphery Countries
1960 - 1970

	Dependency Ratio ¹	
	1960 ²	1970
Italy	0.9	1.0
Spain	0.9	1.0
Portugal	1.2	1.2
Yugoslavia	1.0	0.9
Greece	0.9	1.0
Tunisia	1.9	1.8
Algeria	-	2.3
Turkey	1.0	1.1
Morocco	2.0	2.2

SOURCE: World Bank. Social Indicators:
Employment and Income. World
Tables. 1976. Table 3, pp.
514-517; 22.

¹ Dependency ratio indicates the population
under 15 and over 65 years of age divided
by the labour force in the 15-64 year age
group.

² (-) indicates missing data.

of the industrial sector. The opening up of opportunities for industrial employment has weakened the bonds of the traditional and agricultural subsistence economies, mobilizing rural populations toward the metropole or toward other sites of industrial activity. The percentage of the periphery's labour force in agriculture has declined dramatically since 1960 while the size of the industrial work force has generally increased (Table 15). The development initiative has brought about a polarization of the class structure and an exacerbation of income inequality. With the abundant and elastic supply of labour, industrial wages have remained low (Alba, 1978: 504). Since 1970, industrialization has not continued to generate employment for the deruralized masses. Unemployment, and underemployment among the semi-proletariat, is a particular problem for the North African and Near Eastern countries (Bennoune, 1975; Nikolinakos, 1975; Rist, 1978; 1979).

C. Development and the Demonstration Effect

Some analysts suggest that the peripheralization of the labour sending countries is initially accomplished through the demonstration effect - the diffusion among the population of the reality and benefits of modern lifestyles and consumer values from the core (see, e.g., Alba, 1978; Bach, 1978; Delacroix, 1977; Portes, 1978). Indeed, the success of the import substitution model in the periphery has depended upon the transplantation of consumption patterns from the core and the restructuring of the family, education, and polity as well as the economy in terms of core institutional models. Social

Table 15

Labour Force Distribution in the Periphery Countries
1960 - 1970

	Total Labour Force ¹ (thousands)		% of Labour Force ² in Agriculture		% of Labour Force ³ in Industry		Unemployed ⁴	
	1960 ⁵	1970	1960 ⁵	1970	1960	1970	1960 ⁵	1970 ⁵
Italy	20200.0	19800.0	28.0	16.0	40.0	42.0	4.3	3.2
Spain	11600.0	12700.0	41.0	29.0	31.0	38.0	-	2.0
Portugal	3400.0	3000.0	43.0	31.0	29.0	30.0	-	-
Yugoslavia	8300.0	8900.0	57.0	45.0	23.0	27.0	7.0	3.3
Greece	3600.0	3300.0	54.0	40.0	20.0	26.0	6.0	3.0
Tunisia	1400.0	1500.0	69.0	53.0	18.0	19.0	10.0	9.0
Algeria	-	2600.0	-	50.0	12.0	13.0	-	11.0
Turkey	13000.0	14500.0	71.0	67.0	12.0	12.0	2.0	4.0
Morocco	3300.0	4000.0	56.0	50.0	13.0	15.0	9.0	9.0

SOURCE: World Bank. Social Indicators: Employment and Income. World Tables. 1976. Table 3, pp. 514-517; 22.

¹ Total labour force indicates economically active persons, including armed forces and unemployed, but excluding housewives, students and other inactive groups.

² Percent of labour force in agriculture includes all those engaged in farming, forestry, hunting and fishing as a percentage of the total labour force.

³ Percent of labour force in industry includes all those engaged in mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities as a percentage of the total labour force.

⁴ Percent unemployed indicates those persons who are able and willing to take a job, who are out of a job on a given day, have remained out of a job and were seeking work during the enumeration period, as a percentage of the total labour force.

⁵ (-) indicates missing data.

indicators for each of the periphery societies, reported annually by the United Nations, the World Bank, and elsewhere, provide evidence of the demonstration-effect mechanism, in the guises of broadening national media coverage, extension of the franchise, introduction of compulsory schooling, the availability of vocational and managerial training, increasing literacy rates and the adoption of non-traditional forms of dress, lodging, courtship and other aspects of general lifestyle.

This trend toward "modernism" inaugurated by the development initiative has, at the same time, endangered it. The widespread use of the communication media, with their reliance on foreign programming and commercial sponsorship, and the enlargement of educational opportunities have raised the aspirations of vast segments of the periphery's population, even though satisfaction of these newly created "needs" is difficult to fulfill, especially given the nature of the tight labour market and wage structure in the industrial sector:

...Under present circumstances, urbanization, higher education levels, and urban industrial employment have all favoured closer contact and a greater dissemination of modern values and consumer styles originating in the advanced countries. The new consumption demands thus generated compete for their satisfaction with the most essential needs, the satisfaction of which is insufficient in large segments of the population ... In this sense, more than structural modernization, what has been produced is 'modernism' - the illusion that access to advanced consumption styles is within reach. This situation makes development itself difficult (Alba, 1978; 507).

Thus, the developmental model adhered to by the periphery

states has begun to generate severe internal strains. Against the backdrop of the economy's inability to absorb the labour surplus, exacerbated income inequality, large-scale exposure of the population to unattainable consumption standards and increasing urban mobilization, the political sovereignty of the periphery states rests on a precarious foundation. Although countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia have, at various times in the past twenty years, relied on rigid political structures and military repressions in order to forestall and contain social and political dissidence, the internal tensions caused by the rapid transformation of the class structure have not been eased. In light of these conditions, it becomes clear why periphery countries, including those with "centrally-planned" economies, have permitted and indeed encouraged further insertion in the global market system through the emigration of their reserve labour force to the core. In the imagery of the international system perspective, this movement of labour to the Western European core is

...the harvest of international capital and the nation-state system in modern times. Marx's description of the reserve army as the lever of capital accumulation has come true on a world scale (Santa Cruz Collective, 1978: 109).

CHAPTER V

Consequences of the Establishment of International Migration in the Contemporary Era

I. Core Consequences

The economic literature on the importation of foreign workers to Western Europe tends to focus on the costs and benefits of migration in terms of human capital variables (see, e.g., Hiemenz and Schatz, 1976; 1977; Mischon, 1970; Mischon and Needleham, 1966; 1966a; 1968; Salowsky, 1973). The major sociological treatments have been equally selective. One approach restricts itself to the analysis of free movement within the European Community (e.g., Böhning, 1972; Werner, 1973; Schlaim and Yannopoulos, 1976). Other sociological research addresses the problems of assimilation of postwar immigrants in Western European countries (e.g., Rose, 1969). Within this body of literature, the argument can be made that inherent biases have led to either one of two possible ideological emphases: on one hand, the integration of migrants (Rose, 1969; Rist, 1979) and, on the other, to an exclusive focus on conflict and class relations (Castells, 1975; Castles and Kosack, 1973; Gorz, 1970). Little exists in English which specifically addresses the role of the welfare state in perpetuating international migration within the framework of class relations nor do many empirical studies acknowledge the international context in which labour migration occurs.

However, in response to the economic downturn which has affected Europe since 1973, the social science literature acknowledges the pressing need for an assessment of these and other consequences of the continued reliance on labour importation. Although a comprehensive and systematic inventory of these consequences does not yet exist, the theoretical and empirical treatments suggest a number of structural relations which are affected by and affect the importation and employment of foreign workers in the core. The following sections of the analysis investigate the relationship between labour importation and these structural features of advanced industrial society.

Although the nations of the Western European core have not cultivated reputations as countries of immigration, most of them have hosted foreign populations since at least the eighteenth century. The reliance on foreign labour is an entrenched historical feature of European social structure. The movements of workers to industrial sites in the core can be traced back to the decline of feudalism and through to the emergence in the nineteenth century of a rural labour reserve pushing into urban and industrializing centres of development. During this first phase of capitalist development, intra-European labour migration was uncontrolled. Movements of workers across national borders were largely unrestricted by legal or political agents. Migrants travelled relatively short distances to find work, typically moving only as far as a neighbouring country. Because of the absence of regulation, short distances and spontaneous nature of these early flows

along with the emergence of labour intensive industries in competitive markets, native and foreign workers competed as individuals on the job market while industrial firms competed as individuals for their labour power (Almino de Alencar, 1977: 20-21). In these respects, nineteenth century intra-European migration is similar in structure to contemporary internal migratory movements from rural areas (Almino de Alencar, 1977: 21; Tapinos, 1975: 4).

The laissez-faire employment practices were gradually abandoned by the close of the century as the demand for labour enlarged. Employers began to recruit foreign workers directly in their countries of origin and host states stepped in to regulate and manage entry flows. Migrants no longer acted as free agents, at least not to the same extent as in the previous century, and their position in the labour market, as equal in status to indigenous workers, began to alter. The trend toward employer-initiated and state managed recruitment has left its mark on contemporary procedures, setting important structural precedents for the importation of foreign labour in the last half of the twentieth century. Migratory flows during the interwar period have been difficult to trace, primarily because of the social disruption generated by the two wars as well as their peculiar impact on production and labour supply. The economic crises which gripped the West between 1929 and the end of World War II probably had a dampening effect on migratory flows. However, from the end of hostilities in 1945 to at least 1975, the presence of foreign labour has again emerged as a distinctive

structural feature of the economies of the Western European core.

The previous chapter has outlined the economic and social conditions which precipitated the core's reliance on foreign labour. Since the end of World War II, the foreign population in each of the core countries has grown dramatically (Table 16), comprising, by the mid-seventies, over 15 percent of the total population of Switzerland and over 6 percent of the total West German, Belgian and French populations. Table 17 provides 1975 estimates of the numbers of foreigners actually working in each of the core countries by national origin. These data clearly illustrate that the bulk of the foreign migrants have come into the core from the Southern European and Near Eastern periphery. The distribution of nationalities among the core countries reflects patterns of political and economic dependency of the developing nations and former colonial territories of the periphery upon the Western European core. The single largest nationality working in Belgium are Italians. Bilateral agreements with Spain and Morocco explain the relatively large number of these nationals employed in Belgium. France continues to host Europe's largest contingent of Algerians despite Algeria's recent suspension of labour emigration to French destinations. Because of their former colonial ties and continuing economic dependence in the contemporary era, the countries of the Maghreb send more of their workers to France than to any other country of the core. Spanish, Italian and, most recently, Portuguese workers also make up sizeable minorities

Table 16
Total and Foreign Populations¹
for the Core Countries
(Post War Period)

<u>Belgium</u>			
Year	Total Population	Foreign Population	Foreign Population as % of Total
1947	8,388,526	367,619	4.38
1954	8,840,704	379,528	4.29
1961	9,189,714	453,486	4.93
1965	9,499,234	636,749	6.70
1970	9,650,944	696,282	7.21
1973	9,756,590	775,185	7.94
<u>West Germany</u>			
1951	50,241,400	485,763	0.99
1955	52,383,000	484,819	0.92
1961	56,175,000	686,160	1.22
1968	60,184,000	2,318,100	3.96
1970	60,651,000	2,976,500	4.90
1972	61,672,000	3,438,700	5.58
1974	62,054,000	4,127,400	6.65
1975	61,991,500	4,089,000	6.59
<u>Netherlands</u>			
1947	9,715,890	113,871	1.17
1956	10,957,040	106,480	0.98
1960	11,556,008	107,018	0.93
1964	12,212,269	134,792	1.12
1968	12,798,346	181,376	1.43
1973	13,491,020	282,361	2.11
<u>Sweden</u>			
1945	6,673,749	35,111	0.53
1950	7,041,829	123,720	1.76
1954	7,234,664	111,111	1.54
1960	7,497,967	190,621	2.54
1968	7,931,659	320,580	4.04
1970	8,081,229	411,280	5.09
1974	8,176,691	401,158	4.91

(cont'd)

Switzerland

Year	Total Population	Foreign Population	Foreign Population as % of Total
1950	4,714,992	285,446	6.05
1960	5,429,061	569,935	10.50
1965	5,945,500	810,243	13.47
1968	6,147,000	933,142	15.21
1970	6,269,783	982,887	15.68
1974	6,442,800	1,064,526	16.52
1976	6,310,000	958,599	15.19

France

1946	40,125,000	1,743,619	4.35
1954	43,228,000	1,766,100	4.09
1958	45,015,000	1,621,075	3.60
1960	45,904,000	1,633,410	3.56
1965	48,954,000	2,683,490	5.48
1970	51,012,000	3,393,000	6.65
1972	51,921,000	3,775,804	7.21
1974	53,614,441	4,128,312	7.70

SOURCE: H.J. Hoffman-Nowotny. "European Migrations After the Second World War." Paper presented to the Conference on Migration. New Harmony, Indiana. April 14, 1976.

¹ Foreign population is defined as all foreign-born, non-citizens resident in the country, including workers and dependents.

Table 17
Foreign Workers in Core Countries
by Nationality
1975

	Belgium	France ¹	West Germany ²	Netherlands ³	Sweden ⁴	Switzerland ⁵
Algeria	3,000	420,000	2,000		200	
Austria			78,000			21,000
Finland					103,000	
Greece	8,000	5,000	212,000	2,000	8,000	
Italy	85,000	210,000	318,000	10,000	2,500	281,000
Morocco	60,000	165,000	18,000	28,000	500	
Portugal	3,000	430,000	70,000	5,000	1,000	4,000
Spain	30,000	250,000	132,000	18,000	2,000	72,000
Tunisia		90,000	15,000	1,000	200	
Turkey	10,000	35,000	582,000	38,000	4,000	16,000
Yugoslavia	3,000	50,000	436,000	10,000	23,000	24,000
Other	76,000	235,000			60,000	135,000
TOTAL	278,000	1,900,000	2,171,000	216,000	204,000	553,000

SOURCE: OECD. SOPEMI Continuous Reporting System on Migration. 1976: 13-14.

- ¹ Other category for France includes 80,000 nationals from West African countries.
- ² Includes unemployed.
- ³ Other category includes 40,000 nationals from Surinam and the West Indies.
- ⁴ Other category includes 20,000 Danes.
- ⁵ Only permanent and annual workers are counted.

in France. The central location of West Germany and the existence of labour agreements have shaped that country's reliance on Turkish and Yugoslavian workers although Italians and Greeks are also heavily represented in the labour force. Migrants to the Netherlands are divided between former Dutch dependencies overseas (cf. "other" category; Table 17) and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean basin. Just over one-half of the foreign workers in Switzerland are Italians. Apart from a small number of Turkish workers, the majority of foreign manpower admitted to Switzerland has European origins. (This holds true as well among seasonal and frontier workers who have been excluded from the Swiss data in Table 17.) Over 50 percent of the foreign labour in Sweden have entered from Finland and the other Scandinavian countries, under the free movement agreements of the Nordic Common Labour Market. However, since the start of the last decade, the other half of the foreign work force has migrated to Sweden from Southern Europe and the Near East. Table 18 reports OECD estimates of net migration from the early sixties, through the peak years of 1969-1971 to the mid 1970s. The general decline in net migration between the first half of the sixties and 1967 reveals the sensitivity of migratory flows to economic crises. The recession which affected Europe between 1966-68 is indicated by the decrease in the number of incoming migrants to Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and France. The negative flow from West Germany during these years reflects not only changing economic conditions and a tightening of the foreign labour market but

Table 18
Net Migration
to the Core Countries
1961 - 1974
(in thousands)

Country	1961-1966 Annual Average	1967	1969	1971	1974
Belgium	+ 26	+ 18	+ 7	+ 24	+ 78 (1973)
West Germany	+284	-177	+572	+430	+ 46
Netherlands	+ 14	- 13	+ 20	+ 32	+ 15
Sweden	+ 20	+ 10	+ 44	+ 7	+ 11
Switzerland	+ 52	+ 31	+ 24	+ 10	- 65 (1975)
France	+229	+135	+151	+177	+ 64

SOURCE: OECD. SOPEMI Continuous Reporting System on Migration.
Paris. 1975.

also signifies the unsettled political conditions of that period. By 1974, migratory flows had fallen or stabilized in most core countries, again reflecting the adjustment of labour demand to the slowed economy after the 1973 oil crisis. Tighter control over entry and recruitment bans introduced in 1974 by the West German, Dutch, Swiss and French governments are reflected in the figures for that year. The 1975 negative net flow from Switzerland, in particular, demonstrates the sensitivity of the regulated foreign labour force to downturns in the economy. However, this figure may also indicate the expansion of employment opportunities during the same period in Italy, the primary destination of the outmigrants from Switzerland.

Although the economic downturns of 1973-1974 have somewhat curtailed the influx of foreigners to Western Europe evidenced in Table 16, the actual number of foreign workers in the Western European core has not declined as drastically as

some host governments had envisioned. In fact, the magnitude of the reductions in the size of the foreign labour force does not provide convincing support for the prevailing thesis that the push-pull mechanisms operating in the marketplace automatically regulate the demand for foreign workers. In the last decade, the actual number of foreign workers has stabilized at approximately 10 percent of the total Western European labour force and massive returns of workers to their home countries has not taken place despite offers of cash bonuses to returnees by some core governments. This may be, however, more a function of industrial development in some of the labour supply countries. The rate of return through the seventies has been low for Portuguese and Turkish workers but higher for nationals of Italy, Spain and Greece where the labour market situation has improved considerably with respect to the countries of the core (Kandell, 1978: 13). The most prevalent responses by the core to the recent economic crisis have been to suspend further recruitment and to increase fees charged to firms hiring large numbers of foreigners. These measures have resulted in a restructuring rather than a drastic reduction of the foreign labour force: As the European Community enlarges and as free movement of EC workers expands, certain non-Community nationals are now discouraged from entering some core nations. The number of illegal migrants has increased from these non-European areas. The age distribution of the immigrant population in the core is beginning to broaden and to mirror the host countries' age structure. With the trend toward stabilization of the foreign population and the

introduction of family reunification policies, the average sojourn of the foreign worker has lengthened and the proportion of foreign women living and working in the core has risen. In some regions of the core, the foreign work force has begun to move out of employment in the heavy and transformative industries into jobs in the services and tertiary sector (Kayser, 1977: 235).

In summary, Western Europe's postwar migration can be distinguished from the continent's early pattern of labour migration by three developments:

(1) Foreign workers now come from longer distances rather than from bordering countries and, in particular, a large segment originates from outside Europe;

(2) Foreign workers are increasingly employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors, although their occupational levels remain largely unskilled; and

(3) Although the migrants and some of the host states continue to designate the stay abroad as temporary, the reliance on foreign labour power has evolved into an entrenched structural feature of the core economies, and recent trends point toward longer residency and permanent settlement without legal recognition of this fact by the host states.

A. The Relationship Between Labour Importation and Industrial Sector

Advanced industrial societies in the core tend to reproduce the pattern of unequal core-peripheral global relations within their own national economies. These societies are thus characterized by a "dual economy" in the sense of core and peripheral industrial sectors displaying the following set of characteristics:

... the firms in the core economy are noted for high productivity, high profits, intensive utilization of capital, high incidence of monopoly elements, and a high degree of unionization. What follows normally from such characteristics are high wages ... Workers who are able to secure employment in these industries are in most cases assured of relatively high wages and better than average working conditions and fringe benefits ...

Beyond the fringes of the core economy lies a set of industries that lack almost all of the advantages normally found in center firms ... The peripheral industries are noted for their small firm size, labor intensity, low profits, low productivity, intensive product market competition, lack of unionization, and low wages. Unlike core sector industries, the periphery lacks the assets, size and political power to take advantage of economies of scale or to spend large sums on research and development (Bluestone et. al., 1978: 706-707).

Firms in the core sector tend to meet conditions of labour scarcity and the related increase in labour costs through technological innovation which reduces the demand for labour. Because of their advantageous market position, firms in the core are able to transfer to consumers in the form of price increases both the rising labour costs and the cost of improving technology. In contrast, firms in the peripheral sector are typically labour-intensive and not financially-secure enough positions to make heavy investments in technology in order to boost productivity. Because of the competitive or seasonal nature of their markets, these firms are much more sensitive to fluctuations in the business cycle. Their competitive market position does not allow them to pass along to consumers the rising costs of labour. The peripheral firms must instead seek a reduction of the share of their product going to labour

in wages. The employment of foreign migrant labour is one option open to firms in the peripheral sector which are incapable of drawing upon the same production and marketing strategies used by monopoly sector firms for maintaining an adequate level of profit. A steady and easily manipulated supply of foreign workers appears as an attractive solution for maintaining the economic well-being of the peripheral sector.

The importation of foreign workers is only one option among many open to firms attempting to reduce labour costs. Another alternative is to relocate the entire production process to areas where abundant supplies of cheap labour can be mobilized. However, it is sometimes the case that the nature of production or of the commodities manufactured, or the proximity or specialized needs of the consumer market, make the transfer of the production process difficult or impossible. This is typically the situation faced by large agricultural enterprises, some food processing firms, construction, and, especially, the service sector. All of these activities must be performed "on site" in the host country. Therefore, when relocation is not feasible, firms in the periphery may opt for the strategy of locating and employing alternative and readily-available sources of cheap labour, including, in addition to historically disadvantaged minority groups, foreign workers from developing nations, to replace or supplement the existing domestic labour force.

The available data on the industrial sector distribution

of foreign workers, although incomplete and limited in comparability from country to country, do provide some evidence of the clustering of foreigners in industries which satisfy peripheral sector requirements. However, it must be cautioned that the concentration of foreign workers in certain industries is relative rather than absolute and that the available data lend only partial support to the argument of high concentration in industries displaying peripheral sector characteristics. This clustering takes on more significance when considered in relation to the proportion of foreign labour to the total labour force of each core nation. Table 19 provides rough estimates of the share of the foreign work force in the Western European core in 1972. These figures probably underestimate the size of the foreign work force since they exclude part-time, seasonal and illegal workers. However, despite the omissions, these numbers do indicate the relative strength of the foreign presence in the core countries, especially in West Germany, France and Switzerland (where foreign workers make up the highest percentage of any of the core nations). The industrial sector distributions in these three countries suggest high concentrations of foreigners in industries displaying the peripheral sector characteristics described above (see Tables 20-25).

1. West Germany

The reported statistics for West Germany (see Tables 20-22) indicate that, since at least 1969, foreigners have continued to be concentrated in manufacturing and construction and, more recently, have moved into the service sector. The building trades, automotive assembling and hotel and restaurant services, the sectors in which

Table 19
Size of the Foreign Labour Force¹
in the Core Countries
1972

	Total Labour Force (In Millions)	Total Foreign Labour Force (In Thousands)	Foreign Labour Force as % of Total Labour Force
Belgium	3.8	220	5.3
West Germany	25.9	2,317	8.9
Netherlands	4.8	160	3.3
Sweden	3.9	218	5.6
Switzerland	3.1	595	19.4
France	20.7	1,770	8.6

SOURCE: H.A. Halbertsma, "Beyond the Pale." Delta, Autumn, 1973, p. 93.

¹ Foreign labour force includes all active, employed foreign workers with work permits. Unemployed, seasonal and frontier workers have been excluded.

Table 20

Industrial Sector Distribution of Foreign Workers
in West Germany, Switzerland and France.
1968, 1969

Industry	West Germany ¹ (1969)	% Active Switzerland ² (1968)	France ³ (1968)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	1.0	2.6	8.7
Extractive Industries, Energy	3.3	1.3	3.0
Engineering, Electrical Goods, Metal Production	36.9	21.2	16.6
Chemicals	2.8	1.6	2.6
Textiles and Clothing	9.5	10.8	4.1
Other Manufacturing Industries	13.7	12.7	11.7
Building	15.5	25.1	30.0
Commerce, Banking, Insurance	4.9	4.9	8.7
Transport	2.0	0.9	2.2
Public Services, Administration	5.2	13.9	2.4
Private Services	5.2	3.6	9.8
Artistic and Cultural	-	1.4	0.2
TOTAL NUMBER ACTIVE	1,372,059	648,055	1,254,460

SOURCE: S. Castles and G. Kosack. Immigrant Workers² and Class Structure in Western Europe. 1973, pp. 63-71.

- ¹ Active foreign workers with work permits or nationals from EC countries.
- ² Controlled foreign workers on restricted visas. Figures are based on occupational groups rather than industrial sectors.
- ³ Active foreign workers with residence permits.

Table 21
 Industrial Sector Distribution of
 Foreign Workers in West Germany
 by Nationality
 1973

Sector	All Nationalities Except EC	Yugoslavs	Portuguese	Spaniards	Turks
Metalworking, Engineering	30.0	31.9	31.8	33.9	32.1
Textiles, Leather	5.3	3.4	10.8	3.3	7.2
Agriculture, Food	7.8	9.2	6.1	11.5	7.9
Construction	17.1	25.9	11.8	8.8	17.4
Services	7.3	7.6	7.4	6.5	6.2
Other	32.5	22.0	32.1	36.0	29.2

SOURCE: OECD, SOPEMI Continuous Reporting System on Migration. Paris: OECD, 1974.

Table 22

Industrial Sector Distribution
of Foreign Workers in West Germany
1974-1975

	Total N Sept. 1975	%	% Variation 1974-1975 ¹
Agriculture	21,000	1.0	- 4.2
Energy	33,400	1.6	+ 7.0
Processing	1,218,600	59.8	-13.9
Building	228,100	11.2	-16.4
Commerce	114,700	5.6	- 5.3
Transport	74,600	3.7	- 3.8
Services	273,200	13.4	+ 4.6
Other	73,200	3.7	-

SOURCE: OECD. SOPEMI Continuous Reporting System
on Migration. Paris: OECD, 1976.

¹ (-) indicates missing data.

Table 23

Industrial Sector Distribution of Newly-entered Foreign Workers in France¹
1969-1975

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Fishing, Agriculture, Forestry	9.9	11.2	13.9	12.8	11.7	12.7	5.3
Extractive Industries	1.7	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.7	2.6	5.8
Metal Transforming, Mechanical and Electrical Manufacturing	14.7	17.4	12.4	14.9	15.1	12.1	7.8
Glass, Ceramic and Construction Material	2.4	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.6	0.8
Construction and Public Works	40.8	34.4	29.9	27.2	31.8	29.0	14.3
Chemical and Rubber Industry	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.1	1.0
Agricultural and Food Industry	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.3
Textiles, Clothing, Leather, Fur	4.4	3.8	4.7	4.7	4.2	2.8	3.1
Wood and Furniture Manufacturing	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.5	1.1
Other Industries	2.7	2.6	2.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.7
Commerce	5.4	6.7	8.8	10.4	10.8	12.9	24.0
Health and Domestic Services	8.5	10.8	13.4	12.9	9.6	9.0	13.8
Other Tertiary Activities	2.7	3.2	3.9	4.4	4.4	7.2	18.0
TOTALS	167,802	174,243	136,004	98,074	132,055	64,461	25,591

SOURCE: Ministère du Travail. Secrétariat d'état aux Travailleurs Immigrés. Immigration et 7^e Plan. Migrations et Sociétés 1. 1977, p. 86.

¹ Based on figures from the O.N.I. Totals exclude Algerians, seasonal workers and frontier crossers.

Table 24
Industrial Sector Distribution of
French and Foreign Active Populations by Sex and Nationality
1975

	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	Agricultural and Food Industries	Energy Production and Distribution	Intermediate Manufacturing	Equipment Manufacturing	Commodity Manufacturing	Construction, Civil and Agricultural Engineering	Commerce	Transportation Telecommunications	Retail Services	Financial Services, Real Estate, Credit Insurance	Personal and Domestic Services
Total Population	20,943,900	10.1	2.9	1.4	8.3	9.3	7.6	9.1	11.2	6.1	15.0	2.7	16.3
Male	13,268,145	11.1	3.0	2.0	10.4	11.2	6.0	13.6	9.7	7.5	11.7	2.1	11.7
Female	7,675,755	8.3	2.6	0.5	4.5	5.9	10.4	1.4	14.0	3.6	21.0	3.6	24.2
French Population	19,432,660	10.4	2.9	1.5	7.8	9.0	7.5	7.7	11.6	6.4	15.4	2.9	16.9
Male	12,033,490	11.6	3.0	2.0	9.9	11.0	6.0	11.6	10.1	8.0	11.9	3.3	12.6
Female	7,399,170	8.4	2.6	0.1	4.5	5.9	10.2	1.4	14.2	3.7	21.1	3.8	24.1
Foreign Population	1,511,240	5.7	2.2	1.1	14.2	12.6	8.6	26.8	5.9	2.5	11.1	0.7	8.6
Male	1,234,655	6.3	2.0	1.3	15.6	13.6	6.9	32.5	5.4	2.8	9.2	0.5	3.9
Female	276,585	3.1	3.0	0.2	7.8	8.0	16.1	1.6	8.5	1.3	19.4	1.3	29.7
Europe													
Spain	196,250	9.8	2.1	0.3	10.2	9.6	8.6	24.1	6.6	1.8	11.4	0.7	14.8
Male	141,790	12.5	2.0	0.4	12.3	11.4	7.2	32.9	6.7	2.2	9.3	0.5	3.3
Female	54,460	2.8	2.3	0.1	4.8	5.1	12.1	1.0	8.2	1.1	16.7	1.2	44.6
Italy	191,750	6.1	1.8	1.7	16.5	10.2	8.7	29.9	6.9	2.1	10.1	0.7	5.3
Male	154,755	6.4	1.6	2.0	18.1	10.8	5.8	36.6	5.4	2.2	8.6	0.4	2.1
Female	36,995	4.9	2.8	0.2	9.5	7.6	20.6	2.0	13.1	1.4	17.6	1.9	18.4

(cont'd)

	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	Agricultural and Food Industries	Energy, Production and Distribution	Intermediate Manufacturing	Equipment Manufacturing	Commodity Manufacturing	Construction, Civil and Agricultural Engineering	Commerce	Transportation Telecommunications	Retail Services	Financial Services, Real Estate, Credit Insurance	Personal and Domestic Services
Portugal	351,670	3.8	2.6	0.2	13.2	10.3	10.4	34.2	4.0	1.5	9.5	0.5	9.8
Male	248,175	4.2	2.1	0.2	14.6	10.5	7.3	48.0	3.3	1.8	6.0	0.3	1.7
Female	103,495	2.6	4.1	0.1	9.8	9.8	17.7	1.4	5.7	0.9	17.7	1.1	29.1
Poland	21,765	9.5	3.1	4.6	18.4	11.1	11.1	9.6	6.2	1.7	12.2	0.6	11.9
Male	15,215	10.3	3.1	6.4	22.8	13.1	8.8	13.4	5.5	2.1	8.7	0.4	5.4
Female	6,550	7.6	3.2	0.6	8.1	6.6	16.5	0.7	7.9	0.9	20.0	0.9	27.0
Switzerland	11,320	10.1	3.5	0.2	7.1	8.1	7.6	6.9	12.9	3.9	19.8	1.6	18.3
Male	8,685	10.6	4.4	0.2	7.6	9.4	7.7	8.7	13.3	4.3	16.7	1.8	14.3
Female	2,635	4.9	0.6	0.4	5.3	4.0	7.2	1.0	11.4	2.8	30.2	1.1	31.1
Yugoslavia	40,195	2.2	2.3	0.5	15.1	22.7	15.1	16.3	5.0	2.3	12.2	0.4	5.9
Male	28,335	2.5	1.7	0.6	16.3	25.4	10.8	22.6	4.6	2.9	9.2	0.3	2.8
Female	11,860	1.6	3.7	0.3	12.0	16.0	25.1	1.3	6.1	0.8	19.2	0.6	13.4
EC Nationals ¹	59,635	10.0	2.3	2.2	8.8	9.7	7.5	6.6	11.2	3.5	17.8	1.6	18.8
Male	44,475	11.4	2.6	2.8	10.5	11.4	7.5	8.5	11.1	3.8	15.1	1.5	13.8
Female	15,160	6.0	1.4	0.2	3.7	4.9	7.5	8.9	11.7	2.4	25.7	2.1	33.5
Africa													
Algeria	308,575	1.1	2.3	1.3	18.8	14.1	6.5	31.3	5.5	3.8	10.8	0.4	4.1
Male	294,895	1.0	2.3	1.4	19.3	14.4	6.0	32.6	5.2	3.9	10.0	0.4	3.5
Female	13,680	0.8	3.2	0.4	8.4	9.1	17.0	4.2	12.5	2.0	26.0	1.5	14.9
Morocco	145,900	15.8	1.7	3.6	14.2	19.2	5.1	23.3	4.2	2.4	6.9	0.3	3.3
Male	137,620	16.5	1.6	3.8	14.7	19.9	4.7	24.5	3.9	2.5	5.9	0.3	1.7
Female	8,280	3.8	2.5	0.5	6.5	8.3	11.7	2.8	8.4	1.8	23.9	1.2	29.5

(cont'd)

	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	Agricultural and Food Industries	Energy Production and Distribution	Intermediate Manufacturing	Equipment Manufacturing	Commodity Manufacturing	Construction, Civil and Agricultural Engineering	Commerce	Transportation	Retail Services	Financial Services, Real Estate, Credit Insurance	Personal and Domestic Services
Tunisia	67,800	5.0	1.9	0.2	11.4	11.6	8.0	31.9	9.2	3.0	12.4	0.8	4.6
Male	62,745	5.3	1.9	0.2	11.8	11.9	7.1	34.2	8.5	3.0	11.9	0.7	3.5
Female	5,055	0.9	1.9	0.1	6.1	7.0	19.6	2.8	17.3	2.5	19.9	3.6	18.3
Asia													
Turkey	30,530	5.0	2.2	0.3	20.5	16.8	15.4	31.8	3.0	0.9	2.7	0.2	1.2
Male	29,380	5.1	2.0	0.3	20.9	17.1	14.1	32.9	2.9	1.0	2.5	0.2	1.0
Female	1,250	4.0	4.8	0.0	10.8	10.8	44.0	5.2	7.2	0.0	5.6	0.0	7.6
Other Nationals	85,850	1.4	2.1	0.6	9.1	14.6	9.3	5.9	9.0	3.7	22.6	1.7	20.0
Male	68,685	1.5	2.3	0.6	10.5	17.2	8.9	7.2	9.0	4.1	21.1	1.6	16.0
Female	17,175	0.8	1.1	0.2	3.1	4.1	11.1	1.0	9.2	2.5	28.5	2.0	36.4

SOURCE: Ministère du Travail. Les Etrangers au Recensement de 1975. Migrations et Sociétés 2. Tableaux 10, 10 BIS. 1977, pp. 84-87.

1 Excluding Italians.

Table 25
Industrial Sector Distribution of
Swiss and Foreign Workers
1951-1976¹

Sector	1951		1960		1970		1973		1976	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Food, Beverage, Tobacco	6.42	5.50	6.61	4.74	6.95	6.31	7.86	7.08	8.43	7.30
Textiles	12.10	21.92	8.72	15.44	5.78	10.23	5.31	9.31	5.05	9.89
Clothing	9.45	17.08	7.18	16.18	4.53	12.99	4.11	12.03	3.85	12.05
Wood	7.12	4.83	6.26	6.26	5.23	4.59	5.47	4.78	4.89	3.84
Paper	2.80	1.88	2.92	2.04	2.67	2.46	2.66	2.59	2.78	3.84
Graphic Arts	4.48	2.54	5.68	2.66	7.83	3.61	8.42	4.02	8.10	4.11
Leather, Rubber	1.21	1.12	1.00	1.34	2.10	2.61	2.40	2.94	2.16	2.94
Chemicals	4.91	2.55	5.89	2.01	8.17	4.24	7.24	4.49	7.47	5.55
Mining	3.25	5.22	2.90	5.41	2.79	4.32	2.97	4.72	2.81	3.39
Metallurgy	11.56	11.31	11.98	14.37	13.02	14.67	13.71	15.03	13.57	14.64
Machinery	24.82	21.11	28.19	25.52	28.94	26.72	28.54	25.60	30.43	27.21
Watchmaking	10.58	4.37	11.05	2.79	11.72	7.01	11.09	7.28	9.75	6.24
Other Branches	1.23	0.51	1.57	1.17	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.07	0.19	0.10

SOURCE: J.-P. Widmer. Le Rôle de la Main d'oeuvre Etrangère dans l'Evaluation du Marché Suisse de Travail. Neuchâtel: Groupe d'Etudes Economiques. 1977, pp. 126; 246.

¹ (a) Swiss workers; (b) foreign workers.

most foreigners are employed, display peripheral characteristics and are among those industries most sensitive to business cycles (Rist, 1978: 71). Foreign workers in West Germany have begun to move out of heavy transformative industries and into service sector employment. Contrary to popular opinion, this shift to the services does not necessarily imply upward mobility but instead may indicate a downward move of the foreign reserve away from manufacturing into food service, restaurants and hotels where the work is largely unskilled and benefits and opportunities for advancement are relatively scarce.

2. France

French data on sector distributions (Tables 20, 23 and 24) reveal a pattern of foreign employment similar to the West German case. However, because of the relatively slow rate of French postwar economic recovery, agriculture has remained labour-intensive for a longer period in France than in other areas of Western Europe. Consequently, France has relied more heavily on foreign labour in this sector than have the other core countries. Table 24 indicates that, among first-time migrants, the proportion in agriculture, manufacturing and construction has declined since 1969 while those employed in commercial, health and other services have increased. Policy changes introduced in 1972 and 1973, designed to match recruitment with this pattern of economic restructuring, have been less than successful (see Section 'C' on the relationship between labour importation and the state). Although the heavy users of foreign labour in the past decade, construction and metalworking firms in particular, no longer rely on immigrants to the extent they had in the previous years

of market expansion, peripheral industries in the domestic, personal and health services and smaller firms have turned to the foreign reserve to satisfy their labour needs. Because the bureaucratic apparatus of the Office National d'Immigration had not anticipated these sectoral shifts, the government-run recruitment system was slow in attracting foreign workers to these sectors. As a consequence, employers have continued to hire illegal, "unregularized" workers, despite the threat of punitive government actions intended to cut off the flow of these clandestine migrants (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 138). The available data therefore underestimate the extent of the movement into the peripheral sector. Table 24 provides a detailed comparison of French and foreign employment in 1975 in each of the industrial sectors by sex and nationality. Overall, foreigners have been overrepresented in the sensitive building trades and manufacturing firms. It is also noteworthy that female immigrants are overrepresented in comparison to French women in these same sectors as well as in the domestic and personal services. Some observers, noting the shift by native French workers to service employment (see Table 24), have argued that the reliance on foreigners in unskilled jobs in manufacturing and construction as well as the services has enabled the French labour force to move relatively quickly into white collar employment in the tertiary sector without the intermediate and evolutionary stopover in secondary industries (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 142).

3. Switzerland

Swiss data (Tables 20 and 25) also reveal a clustering of

foreigners in clothing, textiles, construction, some areas of manufacturing and the services. However, the peculiar situation of nearly absolute labour scarcity and rapid upward mobility for Swiss nationals has resulted in a wider sectoral distribution of foreigners than found in the other core countries. In the last decade, in comparison to native workers, foreigners have been overrepresented in those industries displaying peripheral characteristics: the building trades, textiles and clothing, metal working and other small manufacturing industries (Böhning and Maillat, 1974: 152). Other peculiarities have affected the employment patterns of foreigners and Swiss citizens. At least in the Swiss case, the charge that foreigners are relegated to the least socially desirable jobs is a partial fallacy. Street cleaning, for instance, because of public employment policies reflecting the cultural value of civic and community pride, is largely performed by Swiss nationals (Böhning and Maillat, 1974: 162). The historical reliance on foreign workers and their gradual spread to most industrial sectors is interpreted by one analyst as evidence of the "self-feeding process" of migration - the pattern through which migrants move out of low-paying and low productivity sectors into jobs at every level of the industrial sector (Böhning, 1972: 47). However, before assigning too much weight to the momentum generated by this process, it must be noted that the great majority of Swiss firms, regardless of industrial type, are distinguished by peripheral sector characteristics: they tend to be small-scale, labour-intensive and family-owned (see Maillat in Böhning and Maillat, 1974: 127-87). The presence of an unskilled and easily moveable labour

reserve is imperative for the economic well-being of such enterprises.

4. Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden

The statistics on the sectoral employment of foreigners in Belgium and Holland are not as recent as those available for the other core countries (Tables 26-27). In general, in both countries, foreign workers have been concentrated in those industries most sensitive to business cycles -- construction, small-scale manufacturing, metal working and textiles -- as well as the service sector. It appears that these trends have continued through the seventies. SOPEMI data for 1973 report that in Holland the largest number of work permits has been issued for jobs in metal-working, followed by food service and textiles (OECD, 1974).

Swedish figures on industrial sectors also reveal the clustering of foreign workers in manufacturing and services but do not reflect the other core countries' pattern of foreign employment in construction (Table 28). The data show only slight variations among the sectoral distributions of Finns and non-Scandinavian workers, suggesting that Nordic Common Market workers and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean migrants perform the same labour functions. An observer of the Swedish situation has found that most foreign workers, regardless of national origin, are concentrated in small-scale enterprises characterized by peripheral sector attributes (Majava, 1979: 174).

Table 26

Industrial Sector Distribution
of Foreign Workers in Belgium
1958-1961¹

Sector	1958	1959	1960	1961
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries	0.9	1.4	0.9	0.7
Mining, Quarrying	32.8	6.7	4.6	9.0
Manufacturing	23.2	42.3	48.4	50.9
Building	6.6	4.5	3.9	5.1
Transport, Communications	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2
Commerce	6.9	9.9	8.3	7.5
Hotels, Personal Services	11.8	4.5	3.5	2.7
Services	16.2	29.1	28.8	22.4
Others	0.1	0.1	-	-
TOTAL	18,907	8,555	9,446	11,841

SOURCE: OECD. Adaptation of Rural and Foreign Workers to Industries.
Paris: OECD, 1965.

¹ Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 27
Industrial Sector Distribution
of Foreign Workers in the Netherlands
1959-1962¹

Sector	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Pottery, Glass	3.7	2.5	3.4	2.7	2.7
Building	4.7	5.5	5.3	5.5	5.8
Chemicals	3.4	3.1	3.1	2.1	2.1
Wood, Cork	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9
Leather, Rubber	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.3	3.2
Mining	16.0	12.6	8.3	8.0	7.0
Metallurgy	18.5	17.9	19.5	24.4	28.4
Textiles	9.6	9.6	9.8	10.9	10.6
Food	6.7	8.0	9.2	3.8	3.4
Agriculture	1.1	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.7
Commerce	7.8	8.7	8.0	9.0	8.3
Transport	7.3	7.7	7.8	9.2	9.1
Domestic Service	4.6	4.2	3.9	4.0	3.5
Others	13.3	15.2	16.7	15.7	13.7
TOTAL	31,934	27,952	31,727	26,500	31,299

SOURCE: OECD. Adaptation of Rural and Foreign Workers to Industries.
Paris: OECD, 1965.

¹ Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 28
 Industrial Sector Distribution
 of Foreign Workers in Sweden
 by Nationality
 1970

Sector	All Nationalities	Finns	Greeks	Yugoslavs	Turks
Agriculture	2.7	3.4	0.1	0.1	0.2
Mining	0.6	0.8	-	0.2	-
Manufacturing	58.8	64.1	72.2	78.0	64.6
Construction	5.5	5.7	1.5	1.8	0.5
Hotel and Catering	10.3	7.4	7.9	7.8	17.3
Other Services	20.9	17.2	10.1	10.7	14.1

SOURCE: OECD. SOPEMI Continuous Reporting System on Migration Paris,
 1974.

B. The Relationship Between Industrial Sectors and Class Relations

The concentration of foreign workers in unskilled jobs in the peripheral industries is a form of social control over the entire working class, foreign and domestic, unskilled and skilled labour alike. This view places the phenomenon of international migration in relation to capitalist production as a whole. The employment of foreign workers in menial jobs and in the peripheral sector serves as a social control mechanism by providing a substitute for capital investment in labour-saving technology as well as by creating a division in the organization of the host country's working class. Economies in advanced capitalism are subject to conflicting and potentially disruptive interests between labour and capital which must be regulated to maintain an adequate level of profit. The employment of foreign workers in the low-paying and unstable jobs of the peripheral sector is one means of institutionally regulating the level of class conflict and serves as a buffer against the formation of collective interests on the part of the working class as a whole.

1. Skill Levels of Foreign Workers

The occupational distribution of the foreign labour force indicates the institutional separation of the migrants from native workers by virtue of the former's low skill level and concentration in manual jobs. Although it is generally known that the foreign labour force in each of the core countries is largely unskilled, data on socio-economic status and skill levels have been reported only for the three largest users of imported

labour -- West Germany, France and Switzerland (Tables 29-36). These figures, it must be cautioned, have not been consecutively reported during the postwar period nor are the tables comparable by skill level or by worker category, due to differences in each country's system of industrial coding and immigration classification. Taken together, however, these data tend to confirm the underclass status occupied by the foreign labour force.

West German statistics for the years 1961, 1968 and 1972 (Tables 29-31) indicate that foreigners have been clustered in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations and were more likely to be classified as wage- rather than salary-earners than native workers. The breakdown of foreign workers in West Germany by nationality provided by Table 29 reveals their negligible impact in non-manual jobs. Excluding the relatively high number of Yugoslavs in skilled manual occupations, over three-fourths of the Mediterranean Basin migrants performed semi- and unskilled work.

French figures, reporting the socio-economic status of the foreign labour force between 1967 and 1975, also document a similar clustering and over-representation of immigrants at the lower end of the occupational ladder (Tables 29, and 33-35). When the distribution is broken down by the country of origin (Tables 29 and 35), non-EC migrants, especially North Africans, have lower skill levels than either French citizens or other Community nationals. Foreign women are also over-represented with respect to native females not only in unskilled manual work but in service sector jobs as well (Table 35). The slight

Table 29

Occupational Distribution of Foreign Workers
in France, West Germany and Switzerland

SES	I. France (1967)					
	Spain	Italy	Poland	Portugal	Algeria	Tunisia
Engineers/Managers	.5	.8	.8	.1	-	.4
Supervisors/Technicians	1.5	3.0	2.0	.2	.1	.4
Non-manual Workers	3.9	3.7	3.8	.9	1.2	2.9
Skilled Manual	31.5	41.1	24.5	28.8	11.5	14.9
Semi-skilled Manual	36.5	35.4	42.3	35.1	38.0	46.0
Unskilled Manual	26.4	16.0	26.6	34.9	49.2	35.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SES	II. West Germany ¹ (1968)					
	Italy	Greece	Spain	Turkey	Portugal	Others
Non-Manual	-	-	-	-	-	35
Skilled Manual	13	7	15	16	12	55
Semi-skilled Manual	37	53	44	38	43	27
Unskilled Manual	48	37	38	43	43	14
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SES	III. Switzerland (1960)		
	Foreign Workers	Swiss Employees	
Non-manual	15.0	52.0	
Skilled Manual	25.0	18.5	
Semi-skilled Manual	31.0	22.5	
Unskilled Manual	23.0	7.0	
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	

SOURCES: S. Castles and G. Kosack. Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe. London: Oxford University Press. 1973; pp. 80-83.

¹ Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding; Figures include males only.

Table 30

Occupational Distribution of
Foreign and West German Workers
1961-1968¹

	Males						Females					
	Total		German		Foreign		Total		German		Foreign	
	1961	1968	1961	1968	1961	1968	1961	1968	1961	1968	1961	1968
Wage Earners	63.4	60.0	62.8	58.0	86.8	90.0	49.2	43.0	49.0	41.0	69.6	86.0
Apprentices	6.5	6.0	6.6	6.0	2.7	2.0	7.7	7.0	7.8	7.0	5.4	5.0
Salary Earners	22.0	26.0	22.3	27.0	10.5	8.0	40.9	48.0	41.1	49.0	24.9	12.0
Civil Servants	8.0	9.0	8.3	9.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	3.0	2.2	3.0	0.0	0.0

SOURCE: W.R. Böhning. The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Table 4-2, p. 61.

¹ Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 31

Occupational Distribution of
Foreign Workers in West Germany
1972

Foremen and Supervisors	1
Skilled Workers	15
Semi-skilled Workers	41
Unskilled Workers	31
TOTAL Manual Workers	88
Clerical Staff	11
Trainees and Apprentices	1

SOURCES: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Repräsentativuntersuchung, 1972); OECD. The OECD and International Migration. Paris, 1975. p. 47.

Table 32
Occupational Distribution of
Newly-Entered Foreign Workers in France¹
1969-1975

Skill Level	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Unskilled	40.1	42.3	41.9	34.5	35.0	34.4	23.5
Semiskilled	28.8	31.1	30.6	34.8	36.5	34.1	38.2
Skilled and Clerical	29.7	25.0	25.5	28.3	26.4	26.7	24.5
Administrative Technician/Managerial	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.1	4.8	13.8
TOTALS	167,802	174,243	136,004	98,074	132,055	64,461	25,591

SOURCE: Ministère du Travail. Secrétariat d'état aux Travailleurs Immigrés. Immigration et 7^e Plan. Migrations et Sociétés 1. 1979, p. 92.

¹ Based on figures from the O.N.I. Totals exclude Alerigans, seasonal workers and frontier crossers.

Table 33
Occupational Distribution of
Foreign Active Population in France
1967, 1971, 1973¹

	1967 (July)	1971 (July)	1973 (October)
Unskilled	31.9	36.7	18.8
Semiskilled	36.6	40.1	42.6
Skilled	25.2	26.8	30.5
Clerical	3.4	3.6	5.1
Administrative/ Technician	1.7	1.7	1.7
Managerial	1.2	1.1	1.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Ministère du Travail. Secrétariat d'état aux Travailleurs Immigrés. Immigration et 7^e Plan. Migrations et Sociétés 1. 1977, p. 85.

¹ Based on Ministry of Labour Surveys. Total N is given only for 1973 (i.e. 1,440,000) and includes only wage earners in the industrial and commercial sectors.

Table 34

Occupational Distribution of
French and Foreign Active Populations¹
1973

	% Total Workers	% Foreign Workers
Unskilled	8.5	18.8
Semiskilled	25.2	42.6
Skilled	25.6	30.5
Clerical	22.8	5.1
Administrative/ Technician	10.3	1.7
Managerial/ Professional	7.6	1.3
N	12,700,000	1,440,000

SOURCE: Ministère du Travail. Secrétariat d'état aux
Travailleurs Immigrés. Immigration et 7^e Plan.
Migrations et Sociétés 1. 1977, p. 20.

¹ Based on the October 1973 Ministry of Labour Survey.
Totals include only wage earners in the industrial
and commercial sectors.

Table 35

Occupational Distribution of
French and Foreign Active Populations by Sex and Nationality
1975

	Total	Farm Operator	Farm Worker	Proprietor	Professionals/Upper Management	Middle Management	Clerk	Foremen, Skilled Workers, Apprentices	Semiskilled, Unskilled Workers	Miners, Sailors, Fishermen	Service Personnel	Artists/Clergy, Armed Forces Personnel, Police
Total Population	21,774,860	7.3	1.6	7.5	6.4	12.1	16.9	15.5	20.1	4.9	5.4	2.3
Male	13,642,675	8.0	2.4	8.3	8.2	11.1	10.2	22.8	23.1	0.8	2.0	3.1
Female	8,132,185	7.0	0.5	7.0	4.1	15.4	30.2	5.3	17.3	0.1	11.9	1.2
French Citizens	20,190,520	8.1	1.5	8.2	7.0	13.5	18.6	5.7	18.8	0.5	5.6	2.5
Male	12,356,645	8.7	2.2	8.9	8.8	12.0	10.7	22.4	20.2	0.8	2.0	3.3
Female	7,833,875	7.2	0.5	7.2	4.3	15.8	30.8	5.2	16.4	0.1	11.3	1.2
Foreigners	1,584,340	1.0	4.4	3.1	2.4	2.6	5.4	22.9	49.0	1.0	6.9	1.3
Male	1,286,030	1.0	5.0	3.5	2.5	2.4	3.8	26.5	51.2	1.2	2.0	0.9
Female	298,310	0.9	1.7	1.7	2.0	3.6	12.4	7.6	39.5	0.1	27.8	2.7
Europe												
Spain	203,990	1.2	8.3	3.4	1.0	2.1	5.6	27.2	34.8	0.3	14.7	1.4
Male	146,400	1.6	10.7	4.2	1.1	2.3	3.8	35.4	36.9	0.4	2.9	0.7
Female	57,590	0.4	2.1	1.3	0.5	1.7	10.5	6.5	29.4	0.1	44.4	3.1
Italy	199,235	3.1	2.8	7.2	1.4	3.1	6.8	33.6	34.0	1.6	5.2	1.2
Male	159,490	3.1	3.1	8.2	1.6	3.2	3.6	39.4	32.9	2.0	2.2	0.7
Female	39,745	2.9	1.5	3.0	0.7	2.8	19.6	10.3	38.4	0.0	17.3	3.5

(cont'd)

	Total	Farm Operator	Farm Worker	Proprietor	Professionals/Upper Management	Middle Management	Clerk	Foremen, Skilled Workers, Apprentices	Semiskilled, Unskilled Workers	Miners, Sailors, Fishermen	Service Personnel	Artists/Clergy, Armed Forces Personnel, Police
Portugal	360,730	0.1	3.2	0.7	0.2	0.6	3.3	26.0	55.4	0.2	10.2	0.1
Male	252,680	0.1	3.6	0.9	0.2	0.6	2.2	34.3	56.4	0.3	1.3	0.1
Female	108,050	0.1	2.2	0.3	0.2	0.6	5.9	6.5	53.1	0.1	30.8	0.2
Poland	22,875	2.8	6.1	3.5	3.2	4.4	5.3	19.7	3.8	3.9	9.5	3.6
Male	15,845	2.7	7.1	3.9	3.6	4.3	4.6	24.7	38.4	5.6	2.7	2.4
Female	7,030	3.1	3.8	2.6	2.4	4.6	6.9	8.3	37.2	0.1	24.7	6.3
Switzerland	11,630	8.0	1.7	11.1	15.7	12.4	9.8	10.5	12.1	0.1	4.9	13.7
Male	8,865	9.2	2.1	13.0	18.6	10.4	7.1	13.0	13.1	0.1	2.5	10.9
Female	2,765	4.2	0.5	5.4	6.5	18.6	18.3	2.5	8.9	0.0	12.5	22.6
Yugoslavia	42,160	0.2	2.1	2.1	1.3	2.3	4.1	29.5	50.1	0.4	7.0	0.9
Male	29,430	0.2	2.4	2.4	1.5	1.5	3.2	35.8	48.3	0.5	2.2	1.0
Female	12,730	0.3	1.3	1.3	0.9	1.9	6.4	15.7	54.2	0.0	18.5	0.5
EC Nationals ¹	62,125	6.5	3.1	7.2	19.3	12.2	11.3	12.1	14.3	1.5	5.0	7.5
Male	45,835	7.1	4.3	8.0	21.7	10.3	6.7	15.3	15.9	2.0	2.5	6.4
Female	16,290	4.7	0.5	5.1	12.6	17.6	24.3	2.9	9.9	0.1	11.8	10.5
Africa												
Algeria	331,090	0.1	0.8	0.6	0.3	1.0	5.0	19.2	67.2	1.1	2.6	0.1
Male	313,710	0.1	0.8	2.6	0.3	0.9	3.9	19.7	68.6	1.2	1.8	0.1
Female	17,380	0.1	0.4	2.8	0.5	3.2	2.51	9.6	42.6	0.1	15.5	0.1

(cont'd)

	Total	Farm Operator	Farm Worker	Proprietor	Professionals/Upper Management	Middle Management	Clerk	Foremen, Skilled Workers, Apprentices	Semiskilled, Unskilled Workers	Miners, Sailors, Fishermen	Service Personnel	Artists/Clergy, Armed Forces Personnel, Police
Morocco	152,255	0.1	15.1	1.7	0.8	1.1	3.3	15.0	56.1	3.5	3.1	0.2
Male	142,680	0.1	16.0	1.6	0.8	0.9	2.7	15.6	57.1	3.7	1.3	0.2
Female	9,575	0.0	3.0	1.9	1.1	2.9	12.9	6.9	41.4	0.1	29.6	0.2
Tunisia	72,980	0.1	4.4	3.8	1.8	3.3	7.2	23.7	51.9	0.1	3.5	0.2
Male	67,040	0.1	4.8	3.8	1.9	3.1	5.5	24.7	53.5	0.2	2.2	0.2
Female	5,940	0.0	0.6	2.9	0.9	4.7	25.9	12.5	33.8	0.0	18.3	0.4
Asia												
Turkey	31,205	0.1	4.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.3	19.5	70.7	0.3	0.5	0.2
Male	29,820	0.1	5.0	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.1	19.3	71.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
Female	1,385	0.0	3.3	2.5	2.5	2.9	4.7	22.0	55.6	0.0	4.7	1.8
Other Nationals	94,065	0.4	0.8	4.3	14.9	10.0	11.1	11.9	32.3	0.3	7.6	6.4
Male	74,235	0.4	1.0	4.6	15.8	9.0	8.7	13.2	37.2	0.4	4.2	5.5
Female	19,830	0.4	0.4	3.2	11.6	13.6	20.3	6.7	13.9	0.1	20.2	9.6

SOURCE: Ministère du Travail. Les Etrangers au Recensement de 1975. Migrations et Sociétés 2, Tableaux 9, 9 BIS. 1977, pp. 80-83.

1. Excluding Italians.

Table 36

Occupational Distribution of
Foreign Workers in Switzerland by
Type of Initial Residence Permit
1959-1968

	1959	1960	1964	1966	1968
% Skilled and Semiskilled:					
Seasonal Workers	54.5	51.0	44.6	47.3	43.9
Non-Seasonal Workers	73.4	64.2	56.9	61.4	63.0
Frontier Workers	72.2	71.6	73.7	72.8	74.0
TOTAL	64.2	59.2	52.4	56.3	55.8
TOTAL N	175,832	202,338	238,410	192,545	192,969
% Unskilled:					
Seasonal Workers	45.5	49.0	55.4	52.7	56.4
Non-Seasonal Workers	26.6	35.8	43.1	38.6	37.0
Frontier Workers	27.8	28.4	26.9	27.2	26.0
TOTAL	35.8	40.8	47.6	43.7	44.2
TOTAL N	97,994	139,527	216,929	153,882	152,902

SOURCE: OECD. The Effects of the Employment of Foreign Workers. Paris.
1973, p. 151.

decline in the proportion of foreign workers in low skill levels between 1969 and 1975 in France (Tables 32 and 33) is most likely attributable to the implementation of stringent entry and recruitment requirements, which have tied work permits to specific occupational shortages, than to any significantly measurable upward mobility among immigrants. Reports based on other data sources have suggested that these government-released figures may be overestimating the changes in the skill levels of foreign workers. Moulrier and Tapinos (1979: 140) report that in 1973 approximately 90 percent of the foreign work force engaged in some form of manual labour compared to 60 percent of the French workers. Also, official statistics, especially data collected by the O.N.I., generally excluded estimates of the large "clandestine" foreign labour force who are overwhelmingly concentrated in unskilled manual and service jobs. The French data also imply the existence of an occupational hierarchy among foreign workers themselves. The relative low skill level of the Maghrebians workers has already been described. In addition, workers from EC countries, with their guarantees of free movement and social benefit parity, are more likely to hold skilled manual or white collar jobs than other migrants. However, because of the recent expansion of job opportunities in Southern Europe, the supply of skilled EC labour for French firms has begun to evaporate. A French consular official, formerly engaged in worker recruitment, stated in a recent interview that, for at least the past three years, it has been virtually impossible to recruit skilled workers from

Italy, the traditional source of trained manpower for the French labour market. Increasingly, employers must satisfy their labour demand by bringing in workers from farther afield and by offering vocational training to upgrade the skill levels of the existing foreign reserves. Official government policies, trade union positions and public opinion have not been supportive of either of these options.

The available Swiss data on socioeconomic status cover the years of 1959 to 1968 (Tables 29 and 36). These figures leave no doubt that the foreign work force has been over-represented relative to Swiss labour in manual occupations. Seasonal workers in particular, who are the most regulated and controlled segment of the contract labour force, have been heavily concentrated in unskilled jobs relative to annual (i.e., non-seasonal) and frontier workers (Table 36).

The Swedish labour market, while similar to the other countries in the degree to which foreigners are found in manual work, has undergone since 1965 a structural change which distinguishes it from the rest of the Western European core. Between that year and 1970, the Swedish labour force increased by 176,000 individuals, three-quarters of which came from the addition of foreign workers primarily in manual occupations. However, between 1970 and 1974, 90 percent of the 124,000 unit increase in the size of the labour force was brought about by internal changes, in particular by a growing proportion of Swedish women entering the job market (OECD, 1976: 35). According to SOPEMI observers, it appears that Swedish industries have begun

to substitute women for foreign workers. Historically, the functions of women and immigrants in the labour market, as unskilled and inexpensive labour reserves, have often been similar and employers have tended to opt for one group over the other based on relative costs of their mobilization. Sweden, in face of the increasing costs of extending social benefits to Nordic Common Market workers and of importing other foreign workers from longer distances, has decided to integrate its postwar generation of females into the labour force.

2. Foreign Workers and Trade Unions

As the preceding discussion suggests, a very real gulf exists between the foreign and native worker. The fact that the two groups are increasingly separated by industrial sectors and skill levels results not only in a loss of contact among all members of the working class but also in the emergence of conflicting images of their respective social positions. The social and economic gap between foreign and domestic workers is maintained by the former's political vulnerability as non-citizens. Their alien status excludes them from the rights of citizenship extended to native workers. In some host countries, foreign workers have been restricted from political activity and full participation in the labour movement. In other host nations, where trade union policy is officially open to foreign membership, the domestic rank and file have not encouraged the recruitment or assimilation of migrants into the union fold. Several forces have served as barriers between foreigners and native labour. These include Western Europe's traditional

hostility to foreigners, differences in linguistic and cultural backgrounds, differences in qualifications, industrial experiences and motivations as well as the increasingly segregated workplace situations. Finally, the foreign labour force's weak legal and political status has also hindered involvement in organized labour activities (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 118-127). These structural barriers between the two groups have manifested themselves in ambiguous union policies on migration and in an increasing climate of hostility.

Established industrial work forces, with strong welfare and social support systems, have tended to be antagonistic towards the influx of large groups of workers from other areas. The fear of competition from the foreign labour force has been historically widespread (Patterson, 1968: 240). Organized labour has traditionally advocated limiting the number of foreigners. The classic trade union stance has been based on the assumption that large numbers of foreign migrants will depress average wage levels, provide strikebreakers for management and generally allow owners to reap extra profits (Rist, 1978: 124). Some Western European trade unionists have argued that, because foreign workers lack an industrial tradition and come from areas in which labour and political associations are repressed, they are inherently antagonistic to trade unions and their presence in the country in large numbers may serve to weaken working class organization as a whole. This position gives rise to the charge that foreigners, by accepting low wages and poor working conditions, undermine the advancements made by the national labour

movement.

Within this context, Western European trade unions display a great reluctance to involve themselves in migrant organization for fear of losing their constituencies among the indigenous labour force (Castles and Kosack, 1976: 116-179; Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1968). Apart from the case of France, trade unions of the core are generally stronger in overall membership than those in North America (Table 37). While each of the core

Table 37

Union Membership¹
Western European Core and U.S.
1974

Country	Union Members as % of Total Labour Force
Sweden	80
Belgium	71
Netherlands	41
West Germany	38
United States	30
France	23

SOURCE: E. Kassalow. "Conflict and Cooperation in Europe's Industrial Relations." Industrial Relations, May, 1974: 158.

¹ Union members as a percent of non-agricultural wage and salary workers.

countries has experienced increases in absolute membership levels, recent research indicates a general reduction in the extent of organization. In particular, Swiss, Swedish and West German unions have undergone declines in membership density, i.e., the proportion of the work force who are union members (Roberts, 1973:

45-56). In view of this situation and in light of the current campaign to organize white collar workers, trade union leaders have treaded lightly on the issue of migration in order to hold on to and attract indigenous members. The Western European unions are caught between the policy contradiction of nationalism versus internationalism. To maintain the national identity of their membership is to tolerate the exploitation of a non-unionized foreign labour force. Yet this strategy may also operate to weaken the unions because the employment of cheap foreign labour undermines negotiation for better wages and benefits. The way out of this dilemma for most unions of the core has been to oppose open immigration and foreign labour recruitment but to attempt to organize the migrants once they are in the country's work force. Even this strategy is not without defects:

... If the unions oppose migration initially ... they may find that the immigrants do not trust them and are unwilling to join. Where this happens, the unions have the worst of both worlds. Not strong enough to prevent immigration, their attempts to do so only serve to alienate the new workers from them. The result is the weakening of the unions and the deepening of the split in the working class. Thus there is a potential contradiction between trade union policies toward immigration on the one hand and policies toward immigrant workers once they are in the country on the other (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 28).

- This contradiction can be traced in the relationship between trade unions and migrants throughout the postwar period. The unions in each country of the core have tried to strike a balance between protecting their own bargaining positions and

incorporating the new work force into the membership rank and file. By and large, such efforts have been less than successful in breaking down the social, economic and political walls between foreign and native workers.

a. West Germany

The West German trade unions, having accepted the principle of labour importation as a means for alleviating war losses, have been successful only in their efforts at making German workers tolerate the foreign presence as a necessary factor in the recovery and expansion of the economy. In this respect, the trade unions have projected a reformist position; they tend to support efforts to expand the existing economic structure but hardly act as revolutionary agents to transform the basic modes of production (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 129-30; Rist, 1978: 126).

The German trade unions in the early years of the post war migratory influx lobbied for the inclusion of equal pay for equal work provisions in the federal agreements with supply countries. This action arose out of widespread concern that the presence of a large foreign labour reserve would depress wage levels. After this achievement, the unions did nothing overt to oppose immigration and throughout the sixties made sporadic attempts on behalf of the foreign work force. For example, the German labour federations were behind efforts to make employer-provided housing for single migrants one of the provisions in bilateral treaties with labour supply countries. They have also been involved in the assimilation of foreign workers, in the

form of vocational training, German language courses and native-language newspapers. Since the last decade, the German unions have encouraged the nomination of immigrant representatives to union councils (Rist, 1978: 127).

The unions' attempts to organize foreign workers may have resulted in the awakening of class consciousness among the migrants but it is difficult to tell from the available membership statistics. Survey data do report that union membership is higher than the national average among Turkish workers (Kudat and Ozkan, 1976: 65). This same research indicates that the longer a foreign worker resides in West Germany, the more likely he or she will be a union member. Another student of the West German situation argues that only one in every four foreigners is a union member (Rist, 1978: 128-129). Several factors underline the low level of participation: the types of work and the industrial sectors in which foreigners tend to be clustered are not active targets of union organization efforts. This is especially the case in the public services, food and agriculture. Union affiliation does not translate into the same levels of job security and legal protection for foreign workers as it does for German workers. Trade unions have not effected changes in entry permit or deportation regulations. Foreigners as non-citizens are still legally restricted by the state regardless of the extent of protective measures contained in union-management contracts. The Alien Act of the federal government restricts the type of political activity open to foreigners to behaviour that is not detrimental to the best

interests and welfare of the Federal Republic. The meaning of this stipulation is up to the individual interpretations of public officials. Foreigners who attempt to organize their fellow workers or who form unions on their own may be judged in violation of this legal code and face imprisonment and/or deportation. In addition, the Alien Act prohibits demonstrations against heads of state (including the foreign workers' home country officials), public criticism of the host as well as the home country, agitation within industry (variously interpreted to mean foreign workers' participation in legal as well as illegal strikes), and the distribution of literature on heavily travelled streets or in university areas (Rist, 1978: 144).

Not surprisingly, given this climate, the trade unions have been less than successful in their efforts to recruit migrants. Hostility toward foreigners has been high even among active trade unionists. A survey of German Ford Motor Works' employees conducted in the early sixties reported that a larger percentage of union members than unorganized workers felt that the large foreign labour force was disadvantageous to native workers (Institut für Angewandte Sozialwissenschaft, in Castles and Kosack, 1973: 131). Foreign workers, for their part, have been reluctant to join the unions. A study of Italian workers in West Germany, for example, reveals that

... the disinterest in union activity ... is almost always justified by the interviewed with a lack of faith regarding possible help to be received through the German associations. The workers have had occasion to see that the unions are more interested in augmenting their membership figures than in the actual needs of their members (Churches Committee on Migrant Workers, 1966:68).

In West Germany, foreigners have found only minimal assistance and forced marginality within the unions. This situation has resulted in efforts by some foreign workers to direct their labour organizing initiatives toward the sender countries. The Association of Turkish Workers for example attempts to organize workers as well as to promote industrial employment in Turkey. The association is supported by the Federal Republic as well as the trade unions whose rank and file are not challenged by the foreign workers' activism directed toward the home country.

b. France

The relationship between the French trade unions and foreign workers is more complex than the German situation because the labour movement in France has been a traditionally active agent in French politics. In the early post-war period, the French unions generally accepted immigration as a necessary evil. From 1947 through the sixties, immigration gradually acquired its reputation as a threat to the solidarity of the indigenous working class. Even the Confédération Générale du Travail, the association most closely aligned with the French Communist Party, expressed its formal disapproval of the government's immigration policy in a resolution adopted by its 1965 Labour Congress:

... this massive entry of [foreign labour], which suffers all sorts of discrimination with regard to wages, social benefits, living conditions, and trade union rights, is intended to 'loosen the labour market' in other words to organize unemployment and to permit the bosses to more easily resist the demands of the working class (In Castles and Kosack, 1973: 134).

The three major French trade unions have held fairly steady in their opposition to the recruitment of foreign workers, viewing the migrants as an industrial reserve ~~army~~ deliberately employed to undermine the economic position of French workers. Since the sixties, ~~however~~, the unions, and the C.G.T. in particular, have resigned themselves to the inevitability of some foreign presence in the French labour force, and most of the labour federations have moved toward acceptance of the most recent C.G.T. position. This leftist posture, which views the reliance on foreign workers as an outcome of neo-colonialism and uneven development, has finally rejected

... the notion that France only temporarily needs manpower or that accepting Third World Migrants can be some form of development aid. Rather the present system of labour exchange is one means by which the capitalist managers attempt to overcome a major contradiction in the system (Freeman, 1979: 230).

Thus, the primary thrust of French union policy has not been directed at easing entry restrictions but at achieving equal rights for those workers already in the country. This position has emerged as the conventional union compromise on the immigration issue. Trade unions have maintained that equal pay is necessary to avoid a fall in wage levels for all workers. The French unions have also been careful to avert the stirring up of latent animosity toward foreigners by downplaying the special needs of their foreign worker constituencies. As a consequence of this policy, real grievances and the differences that do exist between foreign and native worker status have tended to be

ignored (Freeman, 1979: 233-237).

Prior to 1964, French trade unions did little on behalf of foreign workers out of fear of jeopardizing the native membership. By that time, however, the sheer numerical strength of the foreign labour force could no longer be ignored and unions inaugurated campaigns for equal social rights. Also in the sixties, foreign workers were "discovered" by the parties of the left. By the middle of the decade, Communist leader Georges Marchais castigated his supporters for overlooking the importance of foreign workers to French class struggle (Freeman, 1979: 90-91).

Through the end of the sixties and into the seventies, the unions and the left began to consider the foreign presence as a factor in the French political arena. Leftist groups began to pressure the central government for better social conditions in the immigrant-occupied slum areas, and bands of "Gauchistes" and "Maoïstes" staged a series of commando-style raids on government immigration bureaus. During the early seventies, protestors occupied the offices of an influential national executive association, the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) and turned the subsequent official inquiry of their action into a political forum on the migrant problem, soliciting testimony from Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Genêt and others. Some migrants responded to the worsening social and economic conditions, independently of trade union support, by staging sit-downs and hunger-strikes.

The restrictive immigration policy outlined in the Marcellin and Fontanet circulaires of 1972 set off a great

deal of protest from the politicized unions and the left. The unions began to provide partial support for the foreign workers' previously unauthorized hunger strikes and work stoppages. The situation grew more heated and more complex, however, when the Algerian government, responding to the 1973 wave of violence by French nationals against North African workers, suspended all labour emigration to France. The unions' response to the racial incidents of 1973 was not overwhelmingly supportive of the immigrants' position. Both the C.G.T. and the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (C.F.D.T.) could only caution restraint in reply to the general strike proposed by the Amicale des Algériens en Europe and other migrant groups. Indeed, the C.G.T. was notably unsympathetic, warning, in a Le Monde report, that

... immigrant workers, manipulated by sectarian elements (groupusculaires), will only indulge in actions which may harm their true interests (quoted in Freeman, 1979: 237).

The alignment of the parties of the left with the French trade unions has not produced a more open policy toward immigrant labour. The track record of both the Socialist Party (P.S.) and the Communist Party (P.C.F.) is not very impressive. Because of the complexities of the immigration issue, the parties of the left have been unable to formulate a coherent policy for inclusion in their platforms. The P.C.F. in particular has been unable to agree upon any strategy beyond a call for solidarity among all workers and a repudiation of the "Trotskyites" who have attempted to organize foreigners into unions outside the C.G.T. and P.C.F.

In general, the approach of both the trade unions and the left has been to confine

... their activity to rhetorical attacks on government policy, protestations of solidarity with migrants and condemnations of racism. The reasons for this should by now be clear -- migrants pose difficult problems and they do not necessarily or easily fit into traditional categories of analysis. Furthermore, they have lacked the essential political privileges that would have allowed them to be recruited and organized by parties for electoral or agitational purposes. Besides, many migrants are apolitical or petit bourgeois in their orientation. Given the essential electoral strategy of the PS-PCF coalition, a strong defense of the rights of immigrants might have reduced its support among the working class. All of these factors have led the established parties to tread lightly in this area and forfeit the immigration issue to the revolutionary left and counterrevolutionary right (Freeman, 1979: 245).

Although all the major trade federations in France are now advocating the integration of foreign workers, the reception of migrants in unions and by their political party'sponsors has not greatly improved. During the last general election, in which the centrist candidate Giscard d'Estaing won by a narrow edge, the Union of the Left coalition campaigned on a socialist reform platform that only addressed the foreign worker issue in passing. In fact, the United Left candidate Mitterand, while publicly supportive of equal rights for foreign workers, was quietly backing broad proposals to limit the size of the foreign work force through accelerated automation and the restructuring of manual wage scales (Freeman, 1979: 96). The French unions have had to make some concessions in the seventies, however, especially as migration flows have stabilized and strict controls

have been implemented. The three major unions now agree on these basic points:

- (1) All are in favour of family reunification;
- (2) All support vocational training and better working conditions; and
- (3) All advocate continuing state control of immigration through agencies in which unions are represented (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 135).

c. Switzerland

The largest trade union in Switzerland is the Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund (S.G.B.). Its immigration policies generally dictate those practiced by the smaller trade federations. Swiss unions, like their West German counterparts, can be classified as moderate and reformist, working more often with management than against it. Swiss workers have experienced the slowest rate of wage increases in Western Europe and strikes are extremely rare. Because of their accommodative labour relations policies, the heavy concentration of foreigners in the labour force poses special problems for the Swiss unions. Not surprisingly, all the Swiss trade federations strongly oppose the continued entry of foreign workers. In doing so, the unions have attracted some rather strange bedfellows who also oppose further reliance on foreign labour. These include right-wing groups like the Zurich Democratic Party and the National Movement Against Foreign Domination of People and Homeland, whose major plank, the fear of Überfremdung or "over-foreignization", expresses the concern that large numbers of foreigners will erode the Swiss "national character". Although the S.G.B. has not {

officially supported Zurich Democrat James Schwarzenbach's initiatives to expel the foreign population, it has proposed alternative measures for countering Überfremdung (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 147-148).

Despite their opposition to further immigration, the Swiss unions, like others in the core countries, have attempted to organize the foreign labour force. These efforts have met with limited success. Although foreign workers comprise 1/4 to 1/3 of the total labour force, their level of union membership has never been higher than 10 to 15 percent (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 149). Predictably, foreign workers are not generally predisposed to joining Swiss unions. Their reluctance is buttressed by the fact that so few foreigners have attained union leadership status even in areas and industrial sectors with extremely high immigrant concentrations. Animosity between foreigners and Swiss nationals, intensified by Überfremdung ideology and recurrent expulsion referendums, has also served to keep foreigners out. According to a student of the Swiss labour movement,

... in the eyes of a foreigner, the trade union is not a militant organization which he can trust, but rather a Swiss workers' guild which collaborates with the employers (Gessler, 1968: 17-18).

d. Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden

The trade union stance toward migrants in each of these three core countries generally mirrors the paradoxical strategy employed by West Germany, France and Switzerland. The unions in each of the countries have opposed further recruitment while

making half-hearted efforts to organize those foreigners already established in the host labour force. Trade federations in Belgium see the flow of unskilled migrants as a primary factor keeping wages down in the services and other sectors where foreigners are heavily concentrated. Belgium, in the 1970s, has had the highest unemployment rate of the Benelux countries and the unions have been vocal in linking this to the continuing reliance on foreign labour. The 1976 ban on recruitment adopted by the Brussels government was largely initiated by the national trade union movement (Beyer, 1979: 112). Foreign workers in Belgium tend to shy away from trade union activity and politics. One reason is related to the migrants legal status. The Ministry of Justice has complete power to order deportations. Workers from the more politically repressive sender countries are insecure about their status and fear that Belgian officials openly cooperate with agents from sender governments. A Moroccan trade union activist in Belgium charges that because of these liaisons workers get deported for minor reasons. Political activity may result in being singled out as agitators to Moroccan agents. Once sent home, these workers are liable to arrest and imprisonment (Power and Hardman, 1978: 21).

Unions in the Netherlands have made some efforts to accommodate the interests of foreigners but are not particularly active in organizing migrants. The protectivist stance adopted by the Dutch trade unions has led to various plans, never actually realized, to implement a rotational system of immigrant labour. In addition, the unions have been behind several proposals which offer lump sums in cash and pension repayments to workers who

leave. Development programmes designed to provide vocational training to workers in their home countries have been opposed by Dutch trade unionists as a drain on the taxpayer and as a form of discrimination in reverse (Beyer, 1979: 115). Although foreign workers have been officially welcomed into the powerful Swedish labour movement, non-Nordic workers do not enjoy equal benefits with native workers. Specifically, dismissal and lay-off protection extended to Swedish and other Scandinavian union members is not available to other foreign nationals (Majava, 1979: 174).

The above observations on the relationship between foreign workers and trade unions in each of the core countries fuel the argument that the nature of the union movement under welfarism has changed. The expansion of union representation to indigenous white collar workers, civil servants and professionals has altered the role of unions. They no longer can be counted on to articulate traditional working class interests but emerge instead as a kind of junior partner with management. The position of foreign workers in such organizations has been aptly summarized by an observer of the European labour movement:

Trade unions are deeply rooted in their nationalistic way of thinking which is evident in their attitude toward foreign workers. It is here that the contradiction between the internationalization of the labour force and the mode of production on the one hand and the national character of the trade unions on the other becomes often acute. For while the trade unions claim to represent the interest of their foreign members, in reality they are obliged to represent the interest of the native workers ... they have accepted the discrimination system against foreign workers. In the present stage

they limit themselves to declarations of protest, but actually are not doing anything to protect foreigners against the repressive measures of the government. If one reads between the lines of certain statements they have made about the necessity of limiting the number of foreign workers and of taking measures to better the infrastructure of guest workers, one can detect the same attitude that is prevalent among the working class, namely, that foreigners should go back home as they are not needed any longer (Nikolinakes, 1979a: 15).

3. Foreign Workers and Labour Disputes

The case studies presented by Castles and Kosack (1973: 153-175) of industrial disputes involving foreign workers uncover two similarities in the conflict patterns among workers, management and unions. First of all, a recurrent pattern of similar labour grievances by foreign workers and similar repressive responses by management and authorities hold in each core country. Secondly, foreigners who have gone on strike, with or without official trade union backing, tend to receive little support from indigenous workers. Consequently, the most successful of these strike actions have occurred in firms where foreigners form the majority of the labour force. On the other hand, where indigenous workers have fought for better wages and conditions, foreign workers tend to show solidarity and generally refuse management's attempts to use them as strikebreakers. Unions typically will support foreign workers' grievances when they coincide with those of immediate concern to the native labour force. In many circumstances, union leadership is reluctant to support "foreign workers' issues" and in some cases has dismissed militant activity by foreign labour as outside the realm of the union mandate, branding the disputes as simple

instances of racial hostility.

a. Belgium

The 1970 strike by 23,000 coal miners in Limbourg illustrates the typical response of trade unions and civil authorities to foreign grievances. Sixty percent of the strikers were workers from Southern Europe and the Near East. These workers were particularly affected by poor living and working conditions and were especially vulnerable to the disease of silicosis. Victims of the disease were offered inadequate diagnosis, treatment and compensation. Because the strike occurred in a declining, marginal industry within the peripheral sector and because it was generally viewed as a "foreigners' strike", the trade unions refused organizing assistance and strike pay to the workers involved. Nor did the unions protest when coke produced by these mines was replaced by imports during the strike. Since the grievances of foreigners were inconsequential to the Belgian political parties and the press, police intervention against strikers was tolerated. After a month, the strike was broken and workers returned to the mines on management's terms. The organizers of the unofficial strike were dismissed and tried in civil court. (A full account and documentation can be found in Castles and Kosack, 1973: 166-167.)

b. West Germany

Labour disputes involving foreigners in West Germany also provide evidence of their political and legal vulnerability. A 1967 strike at a biscuit factory in Barsinghausen followed the dismissal of fifteen Spanish women who had staged a work stoppage

to protest the transfer of three immigrant women to lower-paying work. These layoffs precipitated an unofficial strike involving most of the several hundred Spanish female workers. Because the strikers were not unionized labour, the union refused to intervene and antagonism from native employees ran high against the foreign women. The strike was quickly resolved in management's favour when 300 women were fired and expelled from company housing (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: 158).

German management has tended to play on the hostility of natives toward foreign workers to break strikes in which the two groups have acted in solidarity. During a 1967 rubber industry strike in Hessen, management publicly blamed the poor working conditions on the foreign labour pool. These charges came after unsuccessful attempts by management and civil authorities to use Turkish workers from the company-run barracks as strikebreakers. Management statements mailed to employees contained references to "gates blocked by drunken foreigners" and to "members of an alien Mediterranean horde". This theme was taken up by the popular press. Despite these tactics and because native labour was the major force in instigating the strike, the workers remained united, finally winning a modest pay raise in the settlement (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: 164).

Despite the willingness of foreigners to strike on behalf of native workers' grievances, the domestic labour force has seldom reciprocated for issues that directly bear on the foreigners' situation. This characterized a 1969 strike at a car headlamp factory in Lippstadt, West Germany. Approximately

1700 workers, mostly Italian and Spanish nationals, staged a spontaneous and unofficial strike to protest the differential treatment of foreign workers. Their actions were fueled by a number of grievances: most of the workers had signed contracts in their home countries which tied them to lower wage rates than received by German nationals in the same jobs. Foreign women received even lower wages for similar work. Also, workers who travelled to their home countries over the Christmas period were docked in their regular paycheques and in their holiday bonuses for every day of work missed. After a factory fire of undetermined origin during the strike and following episodes of violence between foremen and strikers, management, with the tacit approval of the union, called in the federal riot police who curbed the disturbance with dogs and para-military vehicles. Although the union involved, I.G. Metall, has a militant reputation, its local officials were unsympathetic to the foreign workers' demands. The strike was broken within three days, and, although some concessions on holiday pay were won, the major issue of wage differentials was not resolved (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: 160).

c. Switzerland

Industrial disputes involving immigrants in Switzerland, where the labour movement is weak and where strikes are rare, pose delicate problems to both management and trade unions, especially in view of the numerical strength of the foreign labour force. An illustration is provided by the 1972 strike against the Murer building firm by 200 Spanish workers on

seasonal permits. The workers had been recruited in Spain by the Geneva firm but when they arrived they were paid less than promised. They were also provided with inadequate housing in abandoned cold storage sheds, air raid shelters and wooden storage huts far from the work site. In addition, Murer began hiring out some of the workers to other employers, a not uncommon practice among peripheral sector firms in Switzerland and Germany. Firms which cannot hire foreign labour in adequate numbers because of the government's tight control over recruitment often arrange to employ another company's foreign labour surplus, paying a higher wage rate than initially contracted by the workers. The difference in wage does not go to the workers, however, but is pocketed by the subcontracting company. The strike was immediately perceived as a "foreigners' grievance". Although the Swiss trade union harshly condemned the strike as a violation of the industrial peace and the government threatened the striking workers with deportation, the Spanish workers quickly won broad support among a large number of the foreign workers in the Geneva area. Employers saw the threat on the horizon of a general strike across Switzerland. After an unprecedented march of solidarity in Geneva by 4,000 foreign workers of all nationalities, Murer agreed to negotiate, made several concessions and work was resumed without any dismissals or deportations (see the account in Castles and Kosack, 1973: 162).

d. France

The French political climate of the late sixties and early seventies has placed the foreign labour force in a

particularly vulnerable position between management and the leftist-dominated union movement. Cases have been reported in which immigrants were mobilized as strikebreakers in actions called by the C.G.T. and the C.F.D.T. The 1967 strike at the Cellophane chemical plant in Lyon is such a case. Despite collusive efforts by the patronat and the Portuguese Consul to engage Portuguese workers as strikebreakers, the foreign workers largely supported the domestic labour force's demands. After the strike was settled, three Portuguese nationals who had organized the foreign workers to resist management were dismissed for illegally occupying trade union posts (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: 165).

The events of May 1968 which rallied French workers against the state also affected the foreign labour force. The May crisis illustrated not only the transcendent class consciousness of the immigrants but also the distinct disadvantage of their legal and political status as a guest labour reserve. Especially active in 1978 were immigrants from the French Overseas Departments. As full French citizens, these workers could participate without fear of deportation while protesting the social and economic inequality they shared with other foreign workers. In general, the trade unions made an effort to welcome foreign workers into the general strikes and the support of the foreign work force was a crucial factor in the success of the May movement. Governments from the more reactionary sender countries expressed concern over the effect of such participation on the latent political

consciousness of their nationals. The Portuguese government sent buses to the radical stronghold of Saint Denis during the May strikes to bring workers home. Many Portuguese, especially those from rural areas, traditionally anti-left and anti-union, were unsympathetic to the French workers. The Portuguese government exploited their political naiveté by persuading them to leave France. In general, however, many foreigners marched alongside French workers, although no data officially record the extent of their participation. The more militant groups joined with foreign workers into an Action Committee to improve the legal and social conditions experienced by immigrants and special attention was directed to the health problems suffered by foreigners in substandard housing and work environments (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: 163-165; Freeman, 1979: 216-259). After the short-lived euphoria of May and June 1968, the cooperation between the French labour movement and immigrants returned to its previous level of marginality. The legal and economic separation between French and foreign labour soon regained its political saliency. The 1969 strikes at the SOLLAC steelworks serve as evidence of the continuing split within the working class. When predominantly French-staffed departments at SOLLAC staged wildcat strikes without union backing, immediate concessions were made by management. But, when largely immigrant-dominated departments staged a similar sit-down strike, their demands were ignored. Management threatened the foreign workers with deportation and called in police to break the picket line. These measures were successful in bringing the strike to an immediate

halt without resolving the grievances which precipitated it (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: 163). In the last decade, however, French management has grown more cautious in dealing with the increasingly politicized foreign labour force. A 1973 strike at the large Renault plant outside Paris, which began as a spontaneous protest over equal pay for equal work by a few hundred Algerian assembly line workers, soon gained the support of 12,000 semi-skilled workers, over three-quarters of whom were immigrants. Although the strike ended in only a partial victory for the workers, it did succeed in driving home to the French patronat the degree of organization and solidarity among the foreign work force (Bennoune, 1975: 52-53).

These illustrations of labour disputes involving migrants suggest that while their interests on the shop floor tend to converge with the unionized domestic work force, they have been managed to appear at odds with indigenous workers' grievances. This separation is maintained by the migrants' status as non-citizens. By the same token one can reason that in countries where the foreign population more closely resembles the domestic population, in terms of the political, legal and social rights of citizenship, the less marked are their differences over labour issues. It is therefore in the shared interests of management and their allies in the Western European trade unions that the host states maintain the legal and political vulnerability of foreign workers.

4. Race and Class

The presence of foreign workers in unskilled and socially undesirable jobs has created an ideological gap in addition to

the economic one between them and the domestic labour force. One indicator of this gap is the level of racial hostility and discrimination directed toward foreigners. Discrimination is an outcome of, created and maintained by, the polarization of immigrant and minority workers in peripheral sectors and low-skill employment (Bonacich, 1972; 1976; Edwards, et. al., 1975). It is within the environment of a dual economic structure, bolstered by discriminatory practices and race relations, that the present foreign labour system has thrived. The reserve of easily controlled, socially-, legally- and politically outcast workers provides a cheap alternative source of labour for employers and increases, or at least heightens awareness of, competition between foreign and native workers (Becker, 1971; Burawoy, 1976; Wolpe, 1972).

Although Western Europe has generally prided itself on its tolerance and the absence of racial problems of the sort that plagues the United States, the records of the core countries are not without blemish. Their large and increasingly ethnically-diverse populations remain unassimilated and easy targets of racial rhetoric and overt hostility. In some instances, host government policy has fostered xenophobia. In other cases, racism has emerged out of a real fear of economic displacement and competition by the domestic working class.

Even in countries where the foreign population is relatively small, incidents have occurred. Shops in some Belgian communities for example refused to sell bottled gas to North Africans during the 1973 oil crisis, on the grounds that the

shortage was their fault as Arabs. Belgian police in recent years have reportedly abused foreigners, especially Moroccans. A particularly dramatic case was reported in 1975 in Møllenback. Foreigners demonstrated after an unprovoked beating by city police of a Moroccan worker in his home. In the Netherlands, competition over housing has precipitated riots between Turkish and Dutch nationals (Power and Hardman, 1978).

Italians have been the victims of discriminatory campaigns in Switzerland since at least the turn of the century and Swiss society continues to be characterized by its xenophobic stance toward foreigners. Swiss attitudes toward foreign workers have been widely discussed in academic research as well as the popular media. A recent Italian film, Bread and Chocolate, which deals with the dilemma of the "Southern" worker in Switzerland, has been acclaimed in Europe and North America for its sensitive treatment of the problem. The current restrictive Swiss policy toward foreigners must be situated historically. According to at least one observation, their formal position of neutrality which followed the war has been accompanied by a general societal condition of smugness (see Hoffmann-Nowotny and Killias, 1979: 193-206). A philosophy of "small is beautiful" has been fortified by Switzerland's post-war economic security and international reputation as a financial centre. These changes, along with the evolution of Swiss class structure have led to the present inhospitable climate toward foreigners (Hoffmann-Nowotny

and Killias, 1979: 200). Since 1900, the Swiss have voted in five referendums on the issue of Überfremdung (over-foreignization) and expulsion of foreigners. All have been defeated, including the last of these efforts in 1974, the Schwarzenbacher Initiative, named after James Schwarzenbach, Chairman of the National Action party. Even with the controls of the mid-seventies, which effectively bar all non-Europeans from entry to Switzerland, the issue remains a sensitive one.

Within the context of the changing French economic climate and in view of its former status as colonizer of North Africa, social relations between North African workers and French nationals have never been easy and since the last decade have taken a turn for the worst. A series of articles in the prestigious newspaper Le Monde in 1970 on the spread of racism in France were greeted by a wave of angry letters to the editor. In this correspondence, writers singled out North Africans, in particular as the "niggers of France". Letters warned of "the invasion of France by races of inferior men ..." and of "unassimilable multitudes which constitute a mortal peril for France ..." (Le Monde, 1970). By 1972, the mass appeal and politically reactionary publication Minute regularly published anti-foreigner, and especially anti-Algerian, material. A racist campaign against "the brown threat", Maghrebian workers, was launched in 1973 by the neo-Fascist group, Ordre Nouveau (Bennoune, 1975: 53-54). Although racism has been a feature of French society, it never became a national issue before the seventies and, even then, it was not heavily exploited by

political parties of either the left or right. Racial tensions came to a head in 1973 after a Marseillais bus driver was killed by an Algerian who later was found to be mentally ill. Throughout that summer, racial violence flared in urban areas where foreigners, particularly Algerians, were concentrated. Most of the available accounts report incidents instigated by French nationals. In a three week period in August and September, eleven North Africans were killed in incidents all across France. The violence was particularly heated in the south of France, and at least one regional newspaper fueled the flames with racist editorials:

... we have had enough of Algerian thieves, Algerian thugs, Algerian braggarts, Algerian troublemakers, Algerian syphilitics, Algerian rapists, Algerian pimps, Algerian lunatics, Algerian killers (Le Meridional, August, 1973 in Bennoune, 1975: 53-54).

Incidents continued through the winter. On December 14, 1973, a bomb exploded in the Algerian Consulate in Marseille, in an office where workers waited for the processing of identification cards. Four people were killed and 100 wounded (Bennoune, 1975: 54). Algeria responded by suspending labor emigration to France. Although the then French President Pompidou, preoccupied with energy needs and the economy and fearing international repercussions, hoped to downplay the violence, others in the government did not, seeking to use the situation to their own political advantage. Minister of the Interior Marcellin, for example, co-author of the controversial immigration Circulaire, embarked on a personal campaign to expel any and all foreigners who disrupted

the civil order. His office used the situation as an excuse to quietly disband the leadership cadre of the radical immigrant groups (Freeman, 1979: 109). French policy on race and immigration has always been to proceed with as little public commentary as possible in order to reduce the influence of the national press and political parties. However, after the events of 1973, public sentiments were too agitated to be ignored. Many in the government felt that strong measures were necessary to prove to the public that efforts were being made to quell the racial disorders. It was in this context that presidential candidate Giscard d'Estaing made race an issue for the first time in the 1974 election campaign. His victory translated into a policy mandate to halt further recruitment and substitute short-term rotational schemes of foreign labour importation for the present "open" system (Freeman, 1979: 110).

Sweden with its widely-held reputation of Scandinavian tolerance and openness has not been immune to racial tensions, especially within the last two years of economic recession. At least five right-wing groups have sprung into existence, usually incorporating the words "Viking" or "Nordic" in their titles and calling for the repatriation of the foreign population. A neo-Nazi party in Olofstom in March, 1979 plastered walls with posters demanding the maintenance of Swedish racial purity and calling for the expulsion of the "blackhaired ones"; i.e., workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece (The Guardian, 1979; 9). Resentment against other Scandinavians, Finns in particular, is also on the rise. Swedish public sentiment toward Finns is

reminiscent of nineteenth century British jibes at the Irish worker. A leading Stockholm businessman queried on the subject of Finnish immigration replied without hesitation, "... they get drunk, have too many children and are only here to sponge off our social security" (The Guardian, 1979: 9). More serious, however, has been an outbreak of physical violence against a group of Assyrians, a Christian sect from the Middle East. Although legislation to counter racial discrimination does exist, authorities have been reluctant to use it. Foreigners charge that prejudicial attitudes are common among police and civil authorities (The Guardian, 1979: 9).

C. The Relationship Between the State and Economy in Managing Labour Importation

International migrant labour patterns exist within the general framework of class relations. The labour importing nations of the core are class societies. It is this basic capital-labour relation which provides the core state with the authority and explicit mandate to create and promote the conditions necessary for capital accumulation, on one hand, and to meet working class demands for welfarism, on the other. In essence, the very decision-making power and legitimacy of the core state stems from and is ultimately dependent upon the accumulation process and the continuation of the conditions of profitable production. Legitimation is a necessary component of the exercise and effectiveness of state authority:

... if (and only as long as) the capitalist state manages, through a variety of institutional mechanisms, to convey the image of an organization of power that pursues common and general interests of society as a whole, allows equal access to

power and is responsive to justified demands, the state can function in its specific relation to accumulation. This is equivalent to saying that the state can only function as a capitalist state by appealing to symbols and sources of support that conceal its nature as a capitalist state; the existence of a capitalist state presupposes the systematic denial of its nature as a capitalist state ... (Offe, 1975: 127).

The analysis of the emergence and persistence of international immigration to the core must be placed within this body of assumptions on the nature of legitimation and accumulation in the capitalist state.

1. Core State Policies

The formulation and revision of labour and immigration policies in response to economic cycles provide the primary mechanisms for the efficient management of the importation and employment of foreigners. Labour and immigration regulations insure the political and legal powerlessness of foreign workers while protecting and making concessions to domestic workers. The state's action in reproducing the legal and social vulnerability of foreign workers funnels off the potential for class conflict by splintering the entire working class. The state must regulate immigration and promote profitable production by stabilizing labour conditions. In times of economic downturns, when domestic unemployment rises, large numbers of foreign workers in sensitive industries are viewed as a threat to the productivity and political stability of the domestic labour force. It is precisely at such times that the state intervenes by introducing restrictive immigration policies or by reformulating the existing permissive policies (see, e.g., Bach, 1978:

536-558). Such actions appear to be the result of interest-group political expression, especially when assessed from the vantage point of the predominant "pluralist" theories of the state and society. However, the short-term effect of these policies illustrates that their primary function is to diffuse political dissent, remove the basis for organized class action, and substitute in its place issues of political representation. According to this line of reasoning, the basic aim of immigration and labour policies, in periods of both economic growth and decline, is (1) to regularize labour supply to provide the conditions of profitable production and (2) to stabilize the working class through the funneling off of potentially divisive issues by placing them into the arena of public policy debate by various interest groups. The immigration and "foreigner" policies in the Western European core operate according to these precepts. Despite the economic downturn of the seventies, immigrant workers continue to form the backbone of the core countries' labour force yet their policies are increasingly formulated with the objectives of regulating flows and restricting entry. It is possible that the real impact of these policies is on the level of appearances, directed at the ideological temperament of the domestic working class:

Although all the evidence would suggest that immigration in Europe is growing, developing, even sustaining and feeding on itself; although Europeans are becoming more entrenched in work habits that are increasingly removed from the kind of jobs immigrants do; although history tells us this is the way things often have been, there is developing a strong counter-current -- man's prejudice to man. It is being said in the bar, on the street corner, in the clubs and parliaments of Europe -- the immigrant must go (Power and Hardman, 1978: 14).

The following discussion outlines the specific manifestations of the immigration policies, as they have evolved and been modified, in each of the countries of the core.

a. Belgium

Belgium's coal and steel industry has relied on Italian and Polish migrants since the nineteenth century. Until the end of the first world war, their flow was unrestricted and unmonitored. Following World War II, as Polish migration dried up and as labour shortages began to appear, firms and the government coordinated active labour recruitment initiatives in the Mediterranean Basin. Since then, Belgian labour and migration policy has evolved in response to the exigencies of Common Market membership and labour market demands. The entrance of migrants has been increasingly tied to economic conditions. By 1967, the entrance of migrants was restricted to those granted valid work permits. Three categories of work permits serve to stratify the foreign labour force in status and skill hierarchies. Class A permits, available on request and allowing unrestricted movement and job mobility, can be obtained only by nationals of the European Community. Class B permits restrict the applicant to one employer within a single industry for a specified period of time, usually one to three years. Class C permits, which do not normally tie the worker to a specific employer, are valid for specially designated and usually highly skilled occupations and professions for which Belgian nationals are in short supply. The entrance of non-EC nationals from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia is usually accomplished through Class B

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permits. These are the countries with which Belgium has entered into bilateral agreements to protect labour flows (Beyer, 1979: 109-112).

The introduction of free movement for EC migrants and the coinciding rise in the influx of non-EC workers has led to tighter surveillance over the entrance of workers from outside the Community. Since 1967, entrance has been monitored by the Office National de l'Emploi. Workers seeking jobs in Belgium are screened through ONE consular offices in the sender countries. The ONE works with Belgian firms to publicize openings and it carefully screens applicants before issuing work permits. Medical exams and inquiries into migrants' backgrounds are prerequisites for obtaining a valid visa. Official Belgian policy permits the issuance of a visa only if no native Belgian is willing and qualified for the position. However, the wording of this stipulation makes it easily circumvented by firms whose first preference is to employ cheap, unskilled and easily managed foreigners. With the economic difficulties and rising level of domestic unemployment of the seventies, immigration control has been tightened yet the demand for foreign labour in certain sectors of the economy remains. As a result, illegal immigration has increased. Despite a 1974 amnesty extended to those already working in Belgium as well as provisions to regularize their legal status, many of the illegally-sojourned foreigners, fearing deportation, have refused to come forward.

Belgian policy, for the last five years, has reflected the dilemma of most core countries in the seventies. Although

public opinion is increasingly unfavourable to the reliance on foreign workers, their necessity to the peripheral industrial sector cannot be ignored. In response to these uneasy conditions, Belgium in 1976 introduced legislation banning further non-EC recruitment, but, at the same time, reduced the eligibility period for permanent work permits for foreigners resident in the country from ten years to six. And special agreements lower this eligibility to four years for nationals from Greece, Malta, Morocco and Turkey. This legislation also allows for full employment mobility after five years and full equality in the workplace to spouses and parents of Belgian citizens (Beyer, 1979: 112). Thus, Belgium has relinquished its status as an importer of labour and has become, de-facto, a country of immigration. It remains to be seen however if these new immigrants will be acculturated into Belgian society or if their continuing separation in the work place will serve as the basis for their exclusion from full participation in other spheres of social life.

b. The Netherlands

A pattern similar to Belgian policy development can be traced in the Netherlands. Up until the economic expansion of the late fifties and sixties, Holland was a country of emigration rather than immigration. Then, the post war recovery created labour shortages which were partially filled by Spaniards and Italians. By the middle sixties, the Netherlands met some of its demand for labour with migrants from the former Dutch dependency of Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles. These

workers enjoyed the same legal status as Dutch nationals but, in reality, were socially and economically segregated. Figures on their participation are not reported with much regularity, and although these Dutch subjects are not registered as aliens they function in similar ways on the labour market. Also, in recent years, the number of border crossers who come in daily to work has risen although data documenting these flows are not available. Because of the Dutch political structure which offered native workers extensive social services, the trade unions have evolved into accommodative and moderate organizations, generally siding with the state on matters of labour policy. Labour and immigration legislation therefore tends to be protectionist and reflects union concerns and public opinion. As a result, the Netherlands have kept the number of foreign workers low by maintaining a policy of rotation and by discouraging permanent settlement (Beyer, 1979: 117).

Throughout the 1960s, Dutch policy has favoured the entrance of unmarried males for temporary stays, usually not to exceed three years. This position has received the support of the major trade federations. The economic slowdown of the mid-seventies has precipitated even greater restrictions over entry. Apart from EC workers who are permitted free movement, applicants for work permits are screened at consulates and recruitment agencies in the sender countries. Bilateral labour agreements are maintained with Greece, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Work permits for these nationals, keyed not only to specific job offers but also to housing availability,

are granted only if Dutch workers are unavailable for the positions. Because of the tight housing market in Holland, accommodation must be secured before entry through the Aliens Registration Office. Housing permits are usually issued for a limited sojourn tied to the type of work permit granted. Non-EC nationals are the primary recipients of restricted visas. Since 1974, permits are centrally issued and controlled through the Ministries of Economic and Social Affairs (Beyer, 1979: 117-120).

In light of these restrictive entrance policies and because the reliance of foreign workers by peripheral sector industries has not abated, it is not surprising that illegal immigration has become a problem. A 1972 estimate has projected that at least 15 percent of the foreign work force in Holland is illegal. The response of the Dutch government has been similar to the Belgian course of action. Since the illegals had become a necessary component in the labour force, the government offered an amnesty in 1974 but it also imposed a total restriction on further recruitment. The current economic climate which affects the domestic labour force primarily in high unemployment and inflation rates has produced even more stringent "foreigner" policy proposals. The Second Chamber of Parliament recently gave its approval to a bill which would limit any future immigration to purely rotational and temporary flows. This legislation proposes the issuance of two-year maximum stay work permits, tied to specific jobs within restricted geographical regions. A ceiling on the overall number of permits has also been proposed.

The new legislation has yet to pass the First Chamber before becoming law. It has been widely discussed and since 1975 been vigorously opposed by immigrant and civic action organizations (Beyer, 1979: 118). Other indications of the increasingly restrictive environment have appeared in the last five years.

The new restrictions on foreign recruitment and mobility are so stringent that they have prevented Holland from signing the ILO convention on equality of treatment for labour. The status of firms that employ over twenty foreigners is constantly reviewed by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The employment of illegals (i.e., workers who have entered the Netherlands without first obtaining work and housing permits) is now considered an economic offense. Employers caught in this practice are subject to fines and/or imprisonment. In addition to these restrictions, measures are being discussed and implemented to induce foreign workers to return to their home countries. The Remploi programme, for example, has been established to aid in the reintegration of returnees (OECD, 1976: 39). It must be remembered, however, that, despite such initiatives, foreign workers have not exited in the expected numbers. The bulk of the foreign work force remains in Holland for the simple reason that it is a necessary component of the peripheral sector labour market.

c. West Germany

The evolution of migrant labour policy in West Germany cannot be understood without reference to the historical forces which have shaped German economy and society since the second world war. During the war years, when a sizeable proportion

of productive-age German males were away at the front, the Reich relied on a forced labour force of over seven million foreign "guests", who were carefully controlled and segregated from German civilians. The public posture toward these Southern and Eastern European workers was derived from National Socialist ideology: although their labour power was necessary to the Fatherland, the workers themselves were perceived as a threat to German racial purity. German women who associated with Polish workers were subject to public humiliation and risked being sent to labour camps. Migrants so accused were frequently executed on the spot. Official propaganda emphasized the racial inferiority of these nationals. Immediately following the war and into the economic recovery period, this carefully instilled attitude was set on edge by the number of refugees who originated from Prussia, Sudetenland and other territories and by the foreign workers who came from even farther afield to fill the postwar labour shortages. Observers of the contemporary era stress that, because of the ideological climate, Germany has not developed an immigration policy but a "foreigner" policy (Höffmann-Nowotny, 1976:12).

With the expanded demand for labour, the government entered into bilateral treaties with supplier nations. The first of these agreements in 1955 with Italy opened up the foreign labour market in construction and agriculture. The success of this agreement encouraged the recruitment of Italian workers in the other expanding industrial sectors, so that by 1959 only ten percent of the Italian workers in Germany were employed

in agriculture. In 1960, similar arrangements were negotiated with Greece and Spain, and, by the end of the decade, with Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia (Rist, 1978: 61).

Although EC nationals can easily obtain a five year residency permit and enjoy equal mobility with native workers, non-Community workers, in West Germany as in all the core countries, are severely restricted. Until 1973, the entrance of non-EC nationals was tied to work permits specifying job and length of stay. After the recruitment ban of 1973, some nationals from outside the EC have been granted work permits in cases where employers have certified that no German nationals were available or qualified. The official objectives of the 1973 recruitment suspension, inaugurated with public fanfare, have been to curb unemployment and to make space in the labour market for young adults, Germans as well as the offspring of those foreigners who entered the country before December 1974. Under closer scrutiny, however, this new legislation actually discriminates against a segment of the foreign population. The December 1974 cutoff date is of crucial importance in assessing the status of foreign workers in Germany. Under the new rules, if an alien arrived in Germany after this date, unless German-born, he or she is ineligible for a work permit. Young dependents who have joined their immigrant parents working in Germany after December 1974 have no legal status. Their options are to leave, remain unemployed or work illegally. With either of the last two options, these first generation immigrants are subject to deportation. A

few reports of such deportations of foreign dependents have made their way into the popular press; however, no official statistics have been released. The loophole in the new immigration law also affects the employment prospects of the spouses of established workers. If they joined their husbands or wives after 1974, they cannot acquire working papers. The policy thereby restricts the immigrant family's opportunity for additional income and works against permanent settlement (Rist, 1979: 75-77).

Foreign workers also face inter-regional mobility restrictions in addition to job restrictions. Since the majority of the foreign population has not been granted permanent residency privileges, workers must periodically renew their temporary permits at police stations. A list of "over-burdened" cities is now stamped into aliens' passports. When the foreign population exceeds six percent of the municipal total, a city may apply for federal designation as an "overburdened settlement area". The designation cuts off the further immigration of foreigners to that city. When the foreign population surpasses 12 percent, the city, on its own, is permitted to restrict further foreign residence. The settlement ban has been enacted in 45 cities, since 1977, including the major centres of Cologne, Frankfurt, Hanover, Munich and West Berlin where unemployment and anti-foreigner sentiment have reached a post-war high. Exempted from the settlement ban are EC nationals, spouses of German citizens and those workers who have been established in Germany for five continuous years. Because these exceptions account for only half of West Germany's

immigrants, these regulations are directed primarily at the new, non-Community workers who are publicly perceived as the least assimilable and least desirable element of the foreign population. Foreigners are also restricted to areas within municipalities. As of 1979, three areas of Berlin have been closed to the further movement of foreign workers and their families (Rist, 1979: 79-80).

The West German policies have been formulated to assuage public opinion of German nationals. They have not evolved out of any coordinated government and economic action to restructure labour demand. The peripheral sector in particular still displays a predilection for cheap labour reserves. Thus, the new policies and the recruitment ban have resulted in an increase in the size of the illegal work force. The number of illegals prior to the 1973 legislation was miniscule since the possibility of regularizing one's status once employed was easily accomplished. By 1975, however, between 200,000 and 300,000 foreigners were in the work force illegally. The practice continues despite a 1975 law imposing penalties on individuals and firms found guilty of recruiting, transporting and hiring illegal aliens (Rist, 1979: 78).

The recruitment ban has not resulted in the anticipated drastic reduction in the size of the foreign labour force. Although there has been a reported 16 percent reduction in the number of foreign workers employed in West Germany between 1973 and 1975, this figure does not mean that the workers involved have returned home. Many workers, especially women and those

employed in particularly sensitive peripheral industries, remain in Germany but have withdrawn from the labour force or have been laid off (OECD, 1976). These workers now constitute a labour reserve. And although European Community workers especially Italians and Spaniards have tended to leave in response to enlarged employment opportunity in their home countries; Turkish and North African workers have remained (Rist, 1979: 65).

These trends run somewhat counter to the government's official stance toward labour immigration as a means of providing developing nations with a skilled labour force upon the migrants' return. In fact, the West German government has publicly supported the repatriation of migrants only since 1973 when domestic unemployment and antagonism toward foreigners peaked. Despite proposals put forward by opposition parties, the current German government, unlike its French counterpart, has resisted the awarding of cash bonuses or the repayment of pension contributions to foreign workers who voluntarily leave. The closest thing to a move facilitating repatriation began in 1975 when West Germany began negotiations with Turkey and other labour suppliers to provide them with investment capital for industrial development and employment expansion. Despite the officially announced objective to reduce the foreign labour force to 1.5 million and apart from verbal pronouncements aimed at the appeasement of the opposition and the public, no really effective incentives to promote return migration have been introduced (Rist, 1979: 84). Indeed, the government has deliberately cultivated this policy approach.

A senior bureaucrat recently boasted that "... anyone in the business knows that talk of repatriation was merely a political move to reassure public opinion" (quoted in Power in Hardman, 1978: 14).

d) France

France has been a country of immigration since at least the nineteenth century. By 1908 the French government had begun to regulate migratory flows and had entered into labour agreements with the major suppliers, Italy and Poland. World War I precipitated the first of chronic labour shortages and by 1930 France ranked second after the United States in immigration volume. Migrants in the interwar period originated mainly in Southern and Central Europe and included a fair number of Russian emigrés. Most of these workers were concentrated in construction, mining, textiles and the newer chemical and metalworking industries. Recruitment was accomplished without government interference directly by the industries. The Société Générale d'Immigration, an arm of the mining and metallurgy industry was especially active in labour recruitment during this period (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 127-128). Since the second world war, the French state has become more active in the management of recruitment. Since then, it has made attempts to control the regional distribution of workers and to channel labour into the agricultural sector. The flow of immigration and the need for more stringent policy surveillance increased dramatically in the mid-1950s. Between 1956 and 1966, a three-fold increase in immigration registration was reported. The early postwar period is characterized by its ease of control over entry. The majority of the

immigrants came from other EC nations or from former dependencies or colonies. During these years, foreigners found it easier to enter France with a tourist visa and then regularize their status from within than to register prior to entry with the official regulatory agency, the Office National d'Immigration. This practice of "immigration from within" was widespread in the sixties and, by 1968, only one out of four vacancies for foreign labour was filled through the government channels of the ONI (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 131-132; 135). Measures introduced in 1964 to tighten up entrance controls had little real impact since the demand for labour was so wide. Although first time applicants were granted one-year permits, valid for a specific job within a defined region, the permit was easily renewed after the first year for a further three-year extension. Following this renewal, work permits could be extended for ten years without geographical restrictions (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 132).

The political events of May and June 1968 as they affected the foreign labour force left their mark on subsequent immigration and labour policies. The most immediate outcome of the protests was to bring foreign workers into French political life, an area from which they had been barred by virtue of their exclusion from citizenship rights. As the earlier discussion has suggested, foreign workers did appear among the striking demonstrators, taking the opportunity to express their solidarity with the left and with the working class as a whole. Government reaction to the foreigners' foray into the

domestic political affairs of France was quick and angry.

Le Monde reported that by June 15, 1968, 147 foreign activists in the May strikes had been physically removed to "the frontier of their choice". Leftist critics of the government have charged that those expelled were singled out by the government because of their opposition to the regime and their unauthorized activism on issues of migrant welfare. On a more general level, however, the major impact of the "Days of May" has been to underscore the importance of foreign labour in French class structure. For the first time, the attention of the French public was directed toward the gap between controlled and spontaneous, "unregularized" immigration (Freeman, 1979: 84-86). The time had come for a reassessment of the government's laissez-faire entrance policies and the effectiveness of the ONI. Since 1968, the influx of Algerians in particular has become an issue of extreme sensitivity. Under a 1969 agreement, France and Algeria agreed to regulate the flow of immigrants to 35,000 annually and renegotiated later to 25,000. Despite these measures, it has been next to impossible to tally the total number of Algerian entries and the considerable clandestine immigration from North Africa has not been estimated. During the early seventies, many Algerians entered France on tourist visas which in effect allowed them nine months to find a job and regularize their status. The ONI was never able to keep an accurate count (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 135). By 1973, the flows were curtailed, however, when racial campaigns against North African nationals led Algeria to suspend out-migration to

France.

In response to the French public's heightened concern over the presence of foreign workers, following the events of May 1968 and 1973, the ONI finally acted to contain the practice of immigration through regularization. However, loopholes in the legislation have remained which effectively exempt from entrance restriction household workers, skilled workers in designated occupations and Portuguese (who have been entering France in unprecedented numbers in response to the political and economic upheavals they faced at home). Although more employers rely on the recruitment services of the ONI since the 1972 restrictions, the demand for clandestine labour has not been eliminated. To get around the federal restrictions, some firms, especially in construction, have reclassified positions upward into the exempted skilled categories in order to regularize illegal labourers who will work at low wage levels (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 136). The 1972 measures, known as the Marcellin and Fontanet Circulaires after the Ministers of Labour and the Interior, are similar to immigration policies in the other core countries, linking work visas to residency permits and suspending further recruitment. The French measures place jurisdiction over permits in the hands of the Prefecture of Police, highlighting the state's authority over immigration. In theory, under the Circulaires, vacancies may be filled by foreign workers only if no native French can be found for the positions. In practice, little control over placement is exercised. The new Circulaires which tie work permits to housing have tended to

exacerbate the established foreign workers' housing and job uncertainties. Apart from first time migrants who must be housed by employers, the 1972 measures place the burden of locating accommodations on the workers themselves. Out of fear of losing their regularized status, migrants will hold on to expensive, but approved, housing and exploitative jobs. In this fashion, the policies discourage both occupational and geographical mobility, and discourage family reunification since the supply of approved housing is limited. In fact, the rigidity of the Circulaires has not decreased the reliance on foreign labour but has produced a shift toward temporary rotational and contract labour systems by some firms (Freeman, 1979: 93).

Also illustrative of the new inhospitable climate toward foreign labour is the increase in deportations. Within the last decade, France has expelled an average of 3600 foreigners each year for violations of the immigration laws. A number of those expelled have been victims of the 1972 regularization and naturalization edicts. For the most part, the deportees have been residents in France for most of their adult lives. Detained by the police for minor offenses, they have no legal recourse because of their status as non-citizens. In some reported cases, those who were "repatriated" have lived in France since childhood and have been educated in French schools. But because their parents had not been regularized or naturalized, they were sent to a "home" country that is socially and culturally alien (Power and Hardman, 1978: 18).

After the 1974 presidential election in France, all

immigration outside the EC was suspended. The plan was first announced as a temporary measure but has been extended in view of the unpromising economic horizon. The recent policy measures resemble the strategies advocated by the other core countries; they temper the suspension of recruitment with quiet efforts to stabilize the established and continually necessary foreign labour force. In this respect the French policy has extended fuller union representation to workers and expanded social service coverage. The immigration policy of France, perhaps more than any other core country in the seventies, has been orchestrated with an eye to public opinion. The recent changes have been widely publicized through the French press and TV and commentary has been extensive. The government has especially stressed the integrative aspects of the current immigration policy, symbolized by President Giscard d'Estaing's visits to the homes of foreign workers in cities like Marseilles where foreign concentrations and racial tensions are high (Freeman, 1979: 97-98). An example of this orchestrated strategy is the wide national media coverage given to the President's "impromptu" breakfast invitation to a group of stunned Algerian streetcleaners outside the Elysée Palace. In constantly bringing the foreign worker situation to the public forum and in defining it as a "social problem" within the realm of public discourse, the latest French government hopes to contain the explosive racial and political climate in which the entire French working class is emersed. So far, the government's strategy has not been challenged.

e. Switzerland

Aside from Liechtenstein and Luxembourg, Switzerland hosts a higher percentage of foreign residents than any other country in Western Europe. Although the government does not officially consider Switzerland a country of immigration, since the last decade public pressure over immigration issues has led to a more restricted foreign labour policy. The current Swiss situation of dependence on foreign workers is an historical irony. In the 18th century, an overpopulated Switzerland imposed forced military emigration to reduce internal population imbalances. Until the 20th century, Switzerland's low degree of economic attractiveness resulted in negligible immigration flows. Only with the postwar economic recovery has immigration reached its record levels.

The restrictive nature of Swiss labour policy can be traced at least to 1936. From the time of these early regulations, work permits have always been granted in relation to a region's economic and "cultural" needs, the percentage of foreigners already employed and labour market conditions. Three types of permits are issued. The first two types, annual permits and seasonal and frontier-crosser permits, are the most prevalent kinds of visas obtained by foreign workers. The third status, resident alien, is the most difficult to obtain and in addition to a character investigation requires ten years of consecutive residency in Switzerland and is only awarded at the discretion of the canton. Swiss isolationism which followed the war has affected its foreign policy; both the rate of reception of

foreign workers and the number of naturalizations are strictly controlled. Regulation tightening since the war has also spawned careful scrutiny over foreign workers in and out of the workplace by cantonal employment bureaus and the Fremdenpolizei (Hoffman-Nowotny and Killias, 1979: 193-199).

In a move to reconcile industrial needs with growing public resentment, Swiss policy in the sixties embarked on a program of de-stabilization. Firms were authorized to replace only workers who left. By the economic slowdown of the mid seventies, sensitivity over the foreign presence had grown to such proportions that new restrictions also curtailed foreign ownership of businesses and real estate. Since 1968, the number of annual permits has been frozen. Until the mid seventies, workers were restricted to a designated job, occupation and canton for a five-year period. Current regulations restrict workers to jobs for one year and reduce the limitations on occupational and geographic mobility to three years. Unlike the other countries of the core who are resigned to accommodating and stabilizing their resident foreign populations, Switzerland does not encourage family reunification or permanent settlement. The government has favoured rotational systems of employment, replacing foreign workers with new ones after a temporary stay instead of gradually extending costly social, legal and political benefits to workers and their dependents over a lifetime. In the past, these rotational schemes have taken on an exploitive character when officials interpreted the Christmas vacations taken by seasonal workers as terminations of employment, requiring

re-application for work permits (Böhning, 1972: 46).

Although the sensitivity over Überfremdung has characterized Swiss society since at least before the war, the recent climate of public opinion toward foreigners has been a major factor in the new policies of the mid seventies which virtually close off Switzerland to non-European workers. Periodically since the sixties Swiss nationalist groups have sponsored referendums, within cantons and federally, to reduce the size of the foreign labour force by expelling large numbers of workers. Although the level of voter participation has varied in these ballots and, to date, all proposals have been defeated, the margin of victory is narrow. The most recent initiative indicated that nearly 40 percent of the Swiss referendum voters favour deportation or other extreme measures to decrease the nation's dependence on foreigners (Hoffman-Nowotny and Killias, 1979: 202-206). It must be stressed, however, that regardless of the ebb and flow of public attitudes, the Swiss economy with its high proportion of small-scale industries is much more dependent on foreign workers than any other country of the core. Domestic reserves of unskilled workers to fill vacancies occupied by aliens are not available. Since the advent of the stricter controls, employers have moved toward a rotational system to fill their labour needs, relying more heavily on daily and frontier workers and contract labour. Swiss labour policy in the next few years, in order to manage the ideological climate in which the fear of Überfremdung remains high, will almost certainly continue to tolerate the foreign labour force while

discouraging both permanent settlement and the recruitment of the "new foreign workers" from North Africa and the Near East.

f. Sweden

The development of Swedish policy, in sharp contrast to the increasing restriction of Swiss measures, provides an illustration of the strategies open to host states with integrative immigration plans. In 1954, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway joined to form the Nordic Common Labour Market, which guaranteed labour mobility for Scandinavian workers. As of 1958, a passport union was established among these countries and Nordic citizens enjoy equality of treatment and social services. Although Iceland does not enjoy official member status, work permits are not necessary for Icelandic nationals in Sweden or Denmark and are granted to them as a matter of course in Norway and Finland. The recruitment of Finnish labour to Sweden, the most sizeable of the immigrant groups, is under the control of agencies maintained by a separate Swedish-Finnish labour agreement (Majava, 1979: 164-172).

Substantial numbers of foreign workers did not appear in Sweden until the postwar economic recovery. In 1945, foreigners accounted for only one-half of one percent of the total population. By the last decade, this figure rose to five percent. In the seventies, Nordic nationals accounted for close to half of the foreign population but it appears that their numerical strength is waning. EC nationals and other Southern workers form a significant proportion of the Swedish foreign labour force. In the last five years, the Swedish government has had to assess

the economy's reliance on foreign labour, especially in light of the steadily growing number of non-Nordic workers in the labour force. In an effort to hold down the costs of the social service infrastructure, which primarily benefits Nordic Common Market nationals, the Swedish state has, since 1975, restricted the recruitment of non-Nordic workers. This new policy links labour needs to the management of immigrant affairs. Workers from outside Scandinavia must arrange both employment and housing before entering Sweden. The current Swedish measures, operating on the assumption that these workers and their families will not settle permanently, provide educational and cultural programs in the workers' native languages. Although first-year migrants are restricted to a specified job, after that period, renewed permits are valid for all occupations. Dependents may join workers after the first year at which time permanent residence status may be claimed. In contrast to the relative ease of assimilation of foreign labourers, aliens who desire self-employment are severely restricted. State policy maintains this position to contain workers in industrial sectors where labour is in short supply. Although Sweden maintains labour agreements with the non-Nordic suppliers of Yugoslavia and Turkey, very little collective recruitment from these areas is practiced. A long standing labour arrangement with Italy was suspended in 1976 as Italians increasingly find more attractive employment opportunities at home or within the EC (Majava, 1979: 172-173).

In contrast to the high unemployment of the core countries in the seventies, Sweden's rapid economic growth has spawned

continuing labour shortages. But because of a heightened perception by Swedes of competition between national and foreign workers, the demand for labour is tempered with a reluctance to increase the number of non-Scandinavians in the work force. Consequently, firms who have applied for permission to recruit Southern Europeans have been rejected. Employers have fallen back on more expensive Danish reserves and are making attempts to move Swedish females into unskilled and service sector work. A current of negative public opinion toward Finnish immigrants has also manifested itself. This sentiment underscores support of Swedish government initiatives to provide investment capital for industrial and employment expansion in Finland (OECD, 1974: 6).

The analysis of immigration and labour policies in each of the countries of the core reveals the seemingly contradictory relationships among government, economy and public opinion. Host states face an increasingly unresolvable dilemma as they weigh the costs of maintaining their national populations against the costs of reliance on foreign labour. At the most general level, core immigration policy, as it has developed through the last decade, reflects the state's attempt to coordinate labour conditions, as part of its mandate to provide a healthy climate for capital, while promoting and securing its own political legitimacy, through the encouragement of public commentary and input on immigration issues. Remarks made by a student of the West German case but equally applicable to the other countries of the Western European core, summarize the nature of the policy function:

The economic necessity of the guestworkers is obvious, given current production and labour arrangements; but the simultaneous rejection of

any political, cultural and social integration of these same workers and their families creates a situation of inherent tension. It is a condition experienced in many other countries as well, where a host society finds itself in absolute need of the services and labour of migrants, but chooses not to grant recognition or acceptance. There is thus a continual need for the host country to provide sufficient incentives for the laborers to stay, but not to the extent that such incentives would threaten the political, social or economic well-being of the national population. The current situation ... is but another manifestation of a centre country forced into a continual series of improvisations when confronted with a sizeable periphery population in its midst" (Rist, 74).

2. Savings in the Cost of Social Reproduction

The preceding discussion should make clear that the nations of the core, whether they adopt policies toward assimilating migrants or in favour of rotational systems, cannot do without foreign labour. The core's continuing reliance on foreign labour is related to the state's mandate to provide the most advantageous conditions for profitable production. A national labour force must be maintained and renewed, i.e., workers must receive at least minimal subsistence and vacancies must be filled. Contemporary international labour migration is characterized by the structural separation of the processes of renewal and maintenance (Burawoy, 1976). The reliance on foreign workers represents for the host country a saving in the overall cost of social reproduction of the labour force. The temporary nature of the migratory flow, the disproportionate number of single and male migrants, and the continual replacement of older migrants by younger, more productive ones, place the burden of reproduction of labour, in both the sociological and literal sense, in the supply rather than the host country. Migrant labour saves the

host country the cost of rearing, supporting and educating the worker during the unproductive years of childhood and adolescence. Because of the worker's legal status as a non-citizen and because of the relatively short-term residency and "work life" in the host country (approximately four years on the average), the migrant does not claim or does not take advantage of benefits such as pensions, unemployment compensation, disability funds, etc., even if taxed for such services through payroll deductions. Also, since workers are usually males who are either single or whose families are left behind, the host country saves the cost of family maintenance. Another host country saving lies in the fact that, because of discriminatory practices and employer policy, foreigners tend to occupy substandard housing or live in firm-run barracks or pensions. Foreign labour constitutes a cheap and productive alternative to the welfare state's own domestic labour force with its extensive and costly social service support system. Reliance on foreign labour represents a considerable saving to the countries of the core. Specific examples of these savings are provided in the following sections.

a. Indicators of Foreign Worker Productivity

Immigrant workers in the Western European core are predominantly male and tend to be younger than the national population, with the majority of migrants between 15 and 44 years old, the most productive labouring years of life (see Tables 38-39). Females are underrepresented in the foreign labour forces of the core. The number of females among foreign immigrants has generally been low, usually less than one-third of the foreign labour force in each of the core countries, with the exception of Sweden. The

Table 38

Proportion of Male Foreign Population
in the 25 to 44 Age Group
in Selected Core Countries
1969

Countries	% Males in the following groups	
	25 - 44	Total Migrants
Belgium	71.3	61.2
West Germany ¹	69.1	63.2
Netherlands	67.8	60.6
France ¹	85.6	81.6

SOURCE: UN Demographic Year Book: 1970. New York, 1971. Table 25.

¹ For 1968.

Table 39

Age Distribution of Foreign Population
in Selected Core Countries
1968, 1969

Countries	Total (in 000s)					
		Under 14	15 - 24	25 - 44	45 - 64	65 and over
Belgium	(55)	27.1	23.0	33.4	7.2	2.7
West Germany ¹	(686)	12.2	29.4	46.0	8.8	3.2
Netherlands	(67)	20.8	23.8	46.2	7.4	1.4
France ¹	(93)	0.0	34.4	59.2	5.4 ²	0.8 ³

SOURCE: UN Demographic Year Book 1970. New York, 1971. Table 25.

¹ For 1968.

² Only 45 to 54.

³ 55 and over.

sex ratio of foreigners to Swedes is fairly balanced due to the equal benefits extended to Scandinavian workers and their families. In fact, among the Finns in Sweden, there are more females than males (OECD, 1974: 20). Mediterranean migrants to Sweden, however, are more likely to be male (Majava, 1979: 168).

Because the foreign populations are predominantly young males, their rates of economic activity are high relative to the national labour force. The concept of 'superexploitation' is relevant here to the understanding of the saving foreigners represent to the core states (Jenkins, 1978: 528). Superexploitation is based on the premise that all workers are exploited in the Marxian sense that the wages they receive are less than the economic value of their labour power. Foreign workers, following this argument, are superexploited to the extent that stable differentials exist in the rates of exploitation between migrants and domestic workers. At this point, it should be noted in passing that the debate over the empirical content and measurement of exploitation has not been resolved nor will it likely be in this discussion. Since the quantities of labour power and surplus value have not been objectively measured and, in fact, are increasingly obscured by market transactions, it is at least equally difficult to attempt to construct an indicator of superexploitation. However, a rather crude and relative measure of it is possible: a group is superexploited if it performs the same type of job but receives consistently lower wages than another group; or if one group is consistently more productive than the other. In this specific sense, the superexploitation of foreign workers provides the economic basis for the artificial boundary between them and the indigenous

"labour aristocracy", who are protected from such excesses by minimum wage laws, unionization and other protective measures accorded to them by the welfare state. The French census of 1968 reported that 47 percent of the immigrant population were economically active compared to 40 percent of the total population. The most recently arrived groups, Moroccans, Portuguese and Yugoslavs, have the highest rates while the older immigrants tend to resemble the native population. German figures for 1970 on economic activity also report very high rates for foreigners, especially Turks and Yugoslavs, the most recent immigrants who are less likely to be accompanied by dependents. Lower activity rates characterize the more established populations from Italy, Greece and Spain, which include increasingly high numbers of spouses and children. Available data from Swiss sources also confirm these trends. In Switzerland, even those older categories of migrants with the lowest activity rates had rates higher than those reported for the total population (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 58-60).

Foreign workers are more likely to work longer hours and more overtime than natives. French data indicate that the sectors in which foreigners are concentrated, especially metal fabricating, construction and services, are characterized by longer average work weeks than other industries (France, Ministère du Travail, 1977: 111). In 1972, foreign males in West Germany worked an average of 210 hours per month, in contrast to less than 200 hours for German males. Foreign females averaged 199 hours to 185 for German women (Blitz, 1977: 486).

Despite some attempts by the trade unions in core countries to ensure wage parity, some evidence indicates that the average

wage level is lower for foreigners than for native workers (Castells, 1975: 33-67). Because migrants sign contracts locking them into jobs and wage rates prior to immigrating, they are often hired by recruiters at below current levels. The stipulations of their work permit and visa hold them to a specified job and wage rate. Some host states have made this a condition of foreign employment. In France, for example, foreign workers from outside the European Community by law receive less than domestic workers in the same occupational categories for the first six months of their employment. The official justification for this practice is that foreigners, because of their initial unfamiliarity with industrial employment, are likely to be less efficient in the first months of a job. Despite the government's claims that wage parity between the two groups is soon achieved, recent research shows pay differentials of 10 to 20 percent between foreign and French workers in the same job and qualification levels (Freeman, 1979; 190). Although regulations providing for wage parity are a prominent part of many of the core nations' labour and immigration policies, these rulings apply only to those workers who have been legally registered and possess the appropriate visas. The large illegal labour pool which constitutes a significant proportion of the immigration to the core in the last decade is exempted from such protection and thus more open to superexploitation.

An examination of unemployment also provides an indicator of the flexibility of foreign workers as a labour reserve. Because these workers are concentrated in sensitive peripheral industries and are easily moved, they tend to exhibit slightly higher unemployment rates than native workers. However, because they are

less cushioned from economic downturns than native workers who enjoy full social services protection, the foreign workers tend to remain unemployed for shorter periods, taking jobs that native workers shun or leaving the host country altogether. There is also some evidence that, despite the legal and economic vulnerability of foreign workers and because of some peripheral firms' predilection for the cheaper foreign reserves, their overall unemployment rate in the long run is lower than that for nationals (Castells, 1975: 33-67; Rist, 1979: 63-72). The recent experience in the core countries bears out these trends. The Netherlands, which has had moderate increases in unemployment in the seventies, reports a slightly higher rate for foreign workers than Dutch nationals. The newer, less protected migrants from North Africa and Turkey suffer from higher unemployment than Yugoslavs or Southern Europeans (OECD, 1976: 35). Data on the rate of foreign unemployment in Switzerland are not abundant. However, given the specificity of Swiss labour policy which ties the entrance of migrants to specific jobs and employers, it is unlikely that foreign unemployment is high. If a foreign worker is laid off, he or she must leave the country. Until the 1970s unemployment benefits have not been available to non-European nationals in Switzerland (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 92-93). SOPEMI estimates for 1976 show that less than one-quarter of the total unemployed were foreigners (OECD, 1976: 33). French evidence indicates that despite the economic vulnerability of foreign workers the proportion among the unemployed seeking work is not as high as the proportion they represent among all wage earners in France. Although foreign workers lose their jobs more frequently than indigenous workers, they stay out of work

for shorter periods. In 1973, the number of foreigners among the total unemployed in France was 15 percent. By 1976, this figure dropped to 12.3 percent (Entzinger, 1978: 4). Three-quarters of the unemployed foreigners in France in 1975 were newer migrants from the Southern Mediterranean. Although the unemployment rate for the 25-40 age category was slightly higher for foreigners than French workers, the proportion of unemployed between the most productive ages of 18 to 24 was lower for foreigners (OECD, 1976: 30-31). Although foreign workers in West Germany are eligible for some unemployment benefits, the ban on further recruitment and the rotational nature of the foreign labour pool have kept foreign unemployment comparable with German national rates over the long term (Rist, 1979: 71). The kinds of jobs typically held by migrants in the peripheral sector, streetcleaning, garbage collecting and road building, are not generally the first jobs to be hit by a recession so foreign unemployment in 1973-74 has not been unusually high. Some observers also claim that because German unemployment assistance to foreigners is inadequate, workers who have been laid off tend to leave the country (Castles and Kosack, 1979: 92; Rist, 1979: 71). Thus, West Germany has been able to export unemployment when it no longer needed imported labour. The Swedish case stands in contrast to the other core countries. Because of a rigorous full employment policy and continuing economic growth, Sweden, until very recently, has been able to maintain its unemployment rate at approximately one percent. Of those registered as unemployed in 1975, only 4.3 percent were foreigners (OECD, 1976: 35).

b. Obstacles to Permanent Settlement: The Cost of Full Citizenship

The average stay of the foreign worker abroad has been

under five years but, since the general recruitment suspension of 1973 and the related difficulties in re-entering and renewing work permits, foreign workers are extending the length of stay in the host countries. In 1972, 57 percent of the foreigners in West Germany had lived there less than three years (Blitz, 1977: 485). By 1976, one-third of the non EC labour force in Germany had been there for eight years or longer (Rist, 1979: 79). The proportion of foreigners who have resided in Switzerland for over five years has increased from eleven percent in 1955 to 46 percent in 1971 (OECD, 1973: 145). However, the majority of foreign workers in the countries of the core, single males or married men without their families, recruited on one-to-three year permits, do leave after the expiration of their visas. These workers are not reimbursed by the host states for the mandatory deductions from their wages for social security, pensions and health insurance they will never claim (Beyer, 1979: 120; Majava, 1979: 163).

i. Family Immigration

Despite the lengthening of the average stay abroad, core states have adopted ambiguous stances toward family reunification and permanent settlement. The extent of family immigration for three of the core nations is indicated by Tables 40 and 41. All the core countries reflect the trends found in these data.

Family immigration has increased since 1973 and the number of spouses and dependent children resident in the host countries is higher for the older immigrant groups. This reunification of family members has taken place in spite of rather than because of

Table 40
Family Ratios¹ for Foreign Workers
in Three Core Countries
1973-1977

	1973	1975	1977
West Germany ²	33.3	41.2	48.2
France ³	-	53.8	-
Netherlands ⁴	31.1	38.8	45.2

SOURCE: H. Entzinger. "Return Migration from West European to Mediterranean Countries. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1978. Table 19, p. 28.

¹ The proportion of dependent spouses and children plus those without work per residence to the total number of foreign population.

² Includes nationals from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

³ Includes nationals from (2) plus Morocco and Tunisia.

⁴ Includes nationals from Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.

the new immigration rules adopted by the core countries since the mid seventies. In Belgium for example, despite a government offer to reimburse up to 50 percent of dependents' travel costs, recent changes in the immigration and employment act make it difficult for family members who arrive in Belgium after 1976 to secure work permits. The lack of employment opportunities for dependents discourages family immigration (Beyer, 1979: 113). In the Netherlands, similar loopholes in the immigration law serve to deter family reunification. Workers are authorized to bring in family members after one year of residency, provided that suitable accommodations can be found. Since Holland suffers a severe housing shortage with approved housing for immigrants at

Table 41
Family Ratios¹ for Foreign Workers
in Three Core Countries by Country of Origin
1975

Country of Origin	Host Country		
	West Germany ²	France ²	Netherlands ²
Italy	51.4	57.0	50.5
Spain	49.7	59.0	37.7
Portugal	42.4	52.5	41.1
Yugoslavia	38.6	40.0	24.6
Greece	49.8	-	47.2
Algeria	-	53.4	-
Tunisia	-	47.8	-
Morocco	-	41.4	26.7
Turkey	49.5	-	54.2

SOURCE: H. Entzinger. "Return Migration from West European to Mediterranean Countries. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1978. Table 20, p. 29.

¹ The proportion of the dependent spouses and children plus those without work per residence to the total number of foreign population.

² (-) indicates insignificant numbers.

a premium, this stipulation effectively dissuades family movement to the Netherlands. The official French position has been to encourage the migration of families. At the same time, however, France has seen a decline in the number of EC migrants and an increase in male workers from the Maghreb and Yugoslavia. Since the 1968 and 1974 changes in the immigration laws in both France and Switzerland have been directed at reducing the flow of these non-EC workers, efforts to promote family reunification among these groups have been precluded (Moulier and Tapinos, 1979: 136). The West German case provides the best illustration of the

contradiction between official policy on family immigration and its implementation. Since the mid seventies, the government has promoted family reunification. However, family members who join workers in Germany are subject to the municipal settlement bans. If a foreign worker wants to bring his wife and children to Germany but lives in a city which has been declared an "overburdened settlement area", he must move to another. But, if he has been in Germany for less than three years, he may not be permitted to change jobs so a move to another city becomes impossible. If the worker lives in a city with an internal restriction of further foreign residents, he must move out of the area of high foreign concentration before his family is permitted to join him thereby relinquishing the support system of ethnic and cultural continuity the immigrant neighbourhood could provide to the new arrivals. The 1975 regulations which provide family allowance benefits to foreign workers also work against family immigration. The legislation draws a distinction between children residing in West Germany and those outside. A lower tax rate on these benefits is allotted to foreign workers whose children resided in Germany prior to 1975. This rate is not available to workers who brought in their children after this date. The welfare and tax structures thereby encourage workers to keep family members in the home country (Rist, 1978: 82-88). Thus any family immigration that occurs does so in spite of the federal government.

ii. Naturalization

The low level of naturalizations in the core countries

indicates not only the segregation of foreign workers from political and civil affairs but also reflects deliberate state policy to restrict the expansion of full citizenship rights to the immigrant labour reserve. In Belgium, citizenship may be granted after ten years of continuous residency, but the final approval is contingent upon a cash payment, police screening, consent of both Houses of Parliament and the signature of the King (Power and Hardman, 1978: 20). After six years of residency, a foreigner may apply for the status of "Belgian subject", but this designation guarantees only partial citizenship rights and does not entitle the recipient to a Belgian passport. Because of the necessity to maintain the power balance between the indigenous Flemish and Walloon linguistic groups, the Belgian government has not encouraged the naturalization of foreigners, who on the whole adopt French as their second language. Between 1963 and 1972, there have been only 12,000 full naturalizations in Belgium (Beyer, 1979: 113). In the Netherlands, as well, similar procedures have kept the number of naturalizations low, never more than a few thousand annually (Beyer, 1979: 120). West German naturalization policy is also, predictably, restrictive. A foreigner has no legal claim to citizenship unless married to a German national. However, other foreigners may be granted naturalization if they are found to be free of criminal records, can adequately maintain their families and satisfy a ten-year minimum residency requirement. The ten-year rule is a necessary but not sufficient condition for citizenship. The official German position is adamant on the

maintenance of a lengthy residency period:

The Federal government is of the opinion that there is no necessity of providing special regulations for foreign workers with regard to the laws of naturalization. Naturalization presupposes a process of assimilation and therefore demands a time of residence which cannot be too short (quoted in Rist, 1978: 76).

Switzerland in its naturalization policies also tries to balance the interests of its regional and linguistic constituencies. The naturalization of foreigners is a sensitive issue among Swiss nationals. Since citizenship requirements are set by the local Gemeinde and the cantons, public attitudes against the large foreign population have been easily translated into restrictive regulations. The latest Überfremdung initiative has proposed a 4,000 annual ceiling on naturalizations and Swiss officials do not encourage foreigners to apply, despite the official federal position in favour of the assimilation of the established foreign labour force and their families. The citizenship act of 1952, which provides guidelines but is not binding for the cantons, sets 12 years required residency as the minimum for naturalization in addition to proof of "cultural assimilation": Cantons usually stipulate a thorough police investigation of applicants' background, a cash payment and denominational and/or linguistic requirements. These restrictions make full citizenship exceedingly difficult for foreign workers and their families and the actual annual number remains low (Hoffmann-Nowotny and Killias, 1979: 206). In contrast to the other core countries, Sweden's continuing postwar labour

needs and slow population growth are reflected in a relatively liberal naturalization policy. As of May 1975, a foreigner may apply for permanent residence status after one year of residency. After three years of residency, foreigners may vote in municipal and regional elections. Nordic nationals may obtain full citizenship after two years in Sweden; other nationals are eligible after five years of continuous residency. Nearly 50 percent of those nationalized are Finns. Until citizenship is attained, foreigners are ineligible for public service jobs and are restricted from business and real estate ownership (OECD, 1976: 38; Majava, 1979: 178).

iii. Housing

The kinds of accommodations in which migrants are housed present another example of the way in which core states keep down the cost of maintaining the foreign labour force. Both publicly-provided lodging and the private housing market operate to restrict foreigners to the cheapest available accommodations.

Three general kinds of housing have been available to foreign workers in the core. (1) Housing provided by employers without government assistance is usually subject to some sort of code of minimum standards. (2) Hostels for single workers usually provided by firms with some government backing and public, government-built housing often lodge both foreign and indigenous workers. (3) Lastly, the private housing market, which includes shanties and bidonvilles, provides housing for legal as well as clandestine workers.

(a) Housing Provided by Employers

The quality of this type of housing ranges widely from country to country. In most of the core countries, firms who employ certain categories of foreigners must provide housing for first-time migrants. These accommodations are often provided in barracks, converted warehouses and abandoned industrial buildings. If they are leased by the firm from private owners, a common practice, the type and standard of accommodation vary considerably, despite the existing of federal and municipal housing codes. The West German minimum standard regulations, for example, suggest the kind of environment in which most new migrants are forced to spend their non-working hours. Workers are provided with a straw mattress, wool covers, a pillow and bed linens, for which a fee is deducted from their pay. The provisions specify that

... bed linens shall be changed at least monthly. The straw mat must be replaced ... at least every three months ... Hot water is supplied only if the work carried out by tenants is classified as dirty (West Germany, Unterkunftsdorf, 1964).

The fact that such minimum standards exist suggests the general state of the employer-run accommodations. Many observers of these barrack-like dormitories have been struck by their inadequacies. Visitors to lodgings supplied by German and Swiss firms in the 1970s reported the following conditions:

... Dormitories are usually shared by at least four men, more often six or eight, often sleeping in double decker bunks. Furniture generally includes little more than a table, a few upright wooden chairs, and wardrobes. Heating and cooking is

most commonly done by means of coal stoves, and the communal washing facilities are often primitive and sometimes outdoors ... It should be remembered that immigrants spend nearly all their non-working hours in these surroundings, for they usually lack the money or are too tired to go out in the evenings or weekends (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 249).

In West Germany, the company housing, or Heime, is usually located quite near the work site. This proximity has led to the illegal practice of "hot bedding", in which barrack managers allow different workers to use the same bed as they change work shifts (Rist, 1978: 152). A U.N. report on the make-shift accommodations provided to workers by the French building industry has documented how substandard housing conditions are directly related to the powerlessness of foreigners' legal and political status:

"The building sector is one of the rare sectors which has evolved complete networks of organization, from the recruitment of the workers in Africa to their work and their housing on building sites, sites which have all the aspects of real camps and where the laws are openly flouted: ... food and transport provided by the firm which charges excessively for its poor quality services; housing in huts, limitations of visits to certain hours, ... the prohibition of women; suppression of all rights of trade unions and political expression ... these practices are in force in the Oise at Armentières, in the Seine-Maritime at Elbeuf and the Lyons region ... In Seine et Marne, at Mesnil Amelot, when the airport of Roissy-en-France was being built, men were sleeping in huts on folding beds smaller than themselves and with no room to stand up. From their pay of 900 to 1000 Francs per month, 120 Francs is deducted when there are eight men to a room and 190 Francs when there are two men to a room" (In Power and Hardman, 1978: 17).

Swiss employers defend the general housing standards with the argument that, since they are providing a service (for which

they deduct rents from workers' pay), they have a "right" to house foreign labour in ways they judge to be the most efficient. When firms lease housing from private owners, even minimum standards are impossible to enforce. One Bern manager, in justifying this practice, remarked "...we are not responsible for ... conditions. That's the way the dirty swine like to live" (quoted in Castles and Kosack, 1973: 250).

(b) Public Housing and Single Worker Housing

In the tight postwar housing market of Western Europe, where public housing is available, preference is usually given to indigenous over foreign workers and their families. Because of the scarcity of adequate lodging for families and because of entrance regulations which tie family immigration to the securing of suitable housing, many workers find it easier to leave their dependents in the home country. Therefore, hostels for single workers are the most prevalent type of accommodation in this category. Such hostels in France have been partially funded by deductions from the family allowances of workers whose children and spouses remain in the home country. Thus, even though the host country has extended partial social services to the worker, it has in effect also taxed a proportion of the benefit income to pay for the worker's maintenance. The rest of the funding for these hostels has come from recruitment fees collected from employers either directly or through the ONI. In Switzerland, which has no federally-run system of public housing, hostels are operated by church organizations or private migrant welfare agencies. In West Germany, the hostels have been federally

financed on the condition that they be suitably constructed for conversion into one-family flats. This stipulation derives from an official stance toward the phasing out of foreign labour at which time this housing will be made available to German families or "assimilated" immigrant families. In all the core countries, the restrictions governing tenants of the hostels are severe. Entry is usually forbidden to non-tenants, including visiting relatives, and proprietors retain the right to search the premises with access to workers' personal possessions (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 255-261).

(c) The Private Housing Market

If foreign workers change jobs or are joined by their dependents, or if the living conditions in specially provided lodgings are no longer bearable, the alternative is the private housing market, where foreigners must compete with nationals over one of Western Europe's scarcest resources -- adequate housing. Conditions in the private sector are sometimes worse than the firm-run barracks. Rents are typically high for sub-standard accommodations and discrimination, especially against the Southern immigrants, is not uncommon throughout the core.

Although Holland has advocated family reunification for the established foreign labour force, the policy is inoperable because of the severe housing shortage. The recent Dutch policy, which ties family immigration to the availability of approved housing, contains a real "Catch 22". Workers may bring in dependents if suitable housing is secured. However, in the major industrial centres where the shortage is the most severe,

workers can apply for neither an immigrant housing permit nor public housing unless their families are already in the country. Although the Netherlands has been able to assimilate and house Indonesian refugees throughout the fifties, similar efforts have not been made on behalf of the Southern Europeans, North Africans and West Indians who comprise the bulk of the foreign population in this decade. Because of the housing situation, foreign workers have begun to concentrate in boarding houses in the least residentially desirable sections of Dutch cities. As these areas began to decline and as the more affluent Dutch residents moved away, buildings have been bought up cheaply by less than responsible entrepreneurs who then spend as little money as possible to convert them into multiple unit dwellings. In 1972, a mob of Dutch nationals, angry over competition for housing with foreigners, set fire to several of these boarding houses, in an old section of Rotterdam where Turkish workers had begun to concentrate (Power and Hardman, 1978: 22; 28). Belgium, after the Netherlands, is the most densely populated of the core countries. Although land is at a premium and suburban expansion is physically impossible, the housing policy is laissez-faire. Low income groups, whether foreign or Belgian, compete for affordable housing on the private market. Foreigners as well as poor working class Belgians are clustered in the older and cheaper areas of the cities (Power and Hardman, 1978: 21).

In West Germany, as well, the private housing to which foreigners are attracted is in older and less desirable locations,

in areas vacated by the upwardly mobile German population. Since less than ten percent of the foreigners in West Germany are housed in public housing, the migrants are especially subject to rent gouging. It has been estimated that foreigners in the private housing market pay between 38 to 79 percent more than German nationals for small one-bedroom apartments. These conditions are further aggravated by a general housing shortage. Flexibility of housing choice, regardless of income level, is limited for German nationals as well as foreigners. In West Berlin, in particular, the situation is acute since it is physically impossible to channel urban growth to suburbs as other cities have done. As a consequence, Germans tend to display high residential stability. This situation also deters geographical and occupational mobility, as Germans, aware of the general housing shortage, tend to shy away from career moves which would take them to another locale. In order to restrict further overcrowding, recent immigration measures have ruled that foreign workers must find certified housing before they can be joined by their families. This restriction, on the one hand, has discouraged family immigration and, on the other, encouraged overcrowding as some workers arranged to transport their dependents into West Germany illegally to unapproved and overcrowded living conditions. One implication of the tight housing market in West Germany is that it has served to curb large-scale segregation. Immobility has also meant that areas where foreigners reside are also heavily German (Rist, 1978: 149-158). Although the shortage has hindered the development of

the foreign ghettos and bidonvilles found in France, discrimination against non-EC nationals in Germany is on the rise. Newspaper advertisements for furnished rooms often run warnings that Gastarbeiter unerwünscht ("guest workers are not wanted") or nur für Deutsche ("for Germans only"). In Switzerland, this kind of housing discrimination is quite open. Notices for rooms often include the caveat Keine Italianer ("no Italians") which is usually intended to exclude all foreigners. In Sweden, despite the extensive welfare structure which provides housing assistance to those foreigners who have the linguistic and social skills to seek them out, some ethnic ghettoization has occurred in the newer housing developments especially among non-Scandinavian migrants (Majava, 1979: 175).

Foreign workers in France face the worst living and housing conditions of the countries of the core. Immigrants, and especially clandestine workers, who are unable to find adequate housing within their incomes, are concentrated in ghetto-like areas around industrial sites. Shantytowns of make-shift tin and cardboard shelters began appearing in or near French cities by the end of the fifties. These bidonvilles, from 'bidon', the French name for the gas cans which are flattened out to provide the major building material, are largely occupied by Arab and African workers. The alleys of some of these bidonvilles, although just a few kilometres from the Champs Elysée, are more reminiscent of a village bazaar or souk than a Parisian street. These concentrations of foreigners have become one of the most controversial points of the government's immigration

programme. The situation was largely tolerated until the early seventies when a tragic but dramatic event caught the attention of the popular press forcing the government to take action. On a sub-freezing January night in 1970, in a bidonville outside Paris, five African workers died of asphyxiation from the poisonous fumes of a charcoal fire they had built to warm their unheated room. The accident occurred in a five-room building which these workers shared with 45 other foreigners. The rooms were rented to them by a landlord whose negligence had resulted in the cut off of electricity and utilities. The public clamour surrounding the incident pressured a much needed government investigation of living conditions among foreign workers and speeded through measures authorizing federal purchase of land in the bidonville areas (Freeman, 1979: 91-92). However, despite some bulldozing of the worst of the shantytowns, the bidonvilles and the landlords who prey on the vulnerable foreign work force have not been eliminated.

As this overview suggests, despite public pronouncements and policy, the core countries have not been prepared for a massive influx of foreign dependents or the extension of full citizenship rights to foreigners. Other researchers have noted the lack of educational and vocational opportunities for immigrant children and the general absence of the necessary social infrastructure for the assimilation of migrants (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Rose, 1969; Rist, 1978). Indeed such measures would irrevocably alter the distinguishing feature of the foreign population -- its low cost of maintenance relative to native

citizens. The more social welfare extended to foreign workers and their dependents in the form of increasing citizenship rights, the more closely they resemble the native population and function like them in the labour market. The extension of equal housing opportunities and welfare benefits to migrants alters their status as a cheap labour reserve for peripheral sector industry. Since most of the core nations actively resist the label of "country of immigration", displaying great reluctance to incorporate the foreign population into the welfare state, it is not surprising that the ideological and political climate of Western Europe remains inhospitable to permanent settlement.

II. Periphery Consequences

Very little attention in the literature has been directed to the impact of labour migration in the supply countries. Following the same general line of argument developed for host countries, one may safely assume that labour exportation will have specific consequences for the periphery countries' class structure and social relations and will be a major concern to the state-apparatus, affecting internal economic and labour as well as foreign policies. And, finally, because the exportation of labour from the periphery to the core flows along the same structural channels used for the exchange of commodities, capital, technology and information in the extended capitalist system, the exportation of labour is an essential element in the peripheralization of the supply country within the international system.

A. The Relationship Between Labour Migration and Class Structure

International migratory movements are an important aspect of the increasing world division of labour. Demographic as well as socio-economic factors in the supply country have contributed to this particular form of economic dependence between core and periphery. The massive departure of a country's most productive and young adult males alters the very fabric of social life. Marriages are postponed, child-bearing and family life are disrupted, and traditional social relations are weakened as women and older members of families take on the household management roles typically assigned to the young males (Kosack, 1976: 367-379). All family dependents must adjust to an economic reliance on remittances sent home by migrants abroad.

Empirical treatments on the impact of emigration from the peripheral countries reveal contradictory effects on class and social structure (e.g., Bennoune, 1975; Kosack, 1976; Badan-Unat, 1976). This is primarily because of a lack of attention to theoretical considerations and an emphasis on benefits versus costs and functions versus dysfunctions. However, both the costs and benefits of emigration can be better understood when cast in terms of class relations in an international system. The exportation of labour tends to alleviate conditions of labour oversupply, capital scarcity and problems associated with controlling the labour force. The migration of young and productive males reduces the inevitable strains caused by growing inequalities inherent in the development process and buffers against the possible political unrest by a reserve army of labour.

Table 42 suggests the nature of the relationship between emigration and the structure of the peripheral countries' economies. This table represents an attempt to estimate the size of the labour force of out-migrants in relation to the total labour force of the peripheral nations. Although the data are not strictly comparable, the results approximate estimates of the OECD observers and other researchers. The out-migrants employed in the core represent significant proportions of their home countries' economically active populations. Algeria and Portugal, especially, have exported substantial numbers of their active populations to the core. Since the seventies, however, this outlet for the periphery nations' surplus labour has closed. As the core experienced higher unemployment and lower growth rates, labour recruitment has been suspended, emigration flows have fallen and some out-migrants have returned to their home countries. Although the OECD Continuous Reporting System on Migration periodically monitors the return flows, accurate figures are not generally made available by the core or periphery nations. Table 43 is based on annual estimates of emigration flows (out-migration) to core destinations. These data show a marked reduction through the first half of the seventies in the number of workers who have left the periphery. Table 44, which estimates in- and out-migration for six of the periphery countries reveals the extent to which workers have returned. It is this rotational aspect of international migration, the process by which imported workers are exported back to the periphery, that has the most direct impact on class structure:

Table 42

Migrants Employed in Core Countries as a Percentage
of the Economically Active Population
of the Periphery Countries
1975

Migrants' Country of Origin	Total Number Employed in the Core ¹	Economically Active Population ² of Country of Origin	Workers in Core as % of the Economically Active Population
Algeria	425,200	2,564,663	16.5
Greece	235,000	3,234,996	7.2
Italy	906,500	19,615,000	4.6
Morocco	270,500	3,980,518	6.7
Portugal	513,000	3,395,865	15.1
Spain	504,000	13,388,000	3.7
Tunisia	106,200	1,729,060	6.1
Turkey	685,000	16,349,380	4.1
Yugoslavia	556,000	8,889,816	6.2

¹ Calculated from Table 17.

² 1975 figures; Source: I.L.O. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1977, Table 1, pp. 9-52.

Table 43

Emigration Flows of Workers¹ from
Periphery Countries to Core Destinations
1961-1975

(Migration in Thousands)

Country	Annual Average 1961-67 ²	1968 ²	1969 ²	1970 ²	1971 ²	1972 ²	1973 ²	1974 ²	1975 ²
Italy	+ 71	+130	+ 57	+ 69	+167	+141	+123	+112	+ 88
Spain	+133	+ 53	+ 39	+ 16	-	-	+ 96	+ 51	+ 21
Portugal	+ 61	+ 49	+110	+143	+119	+ 94	+ 97	+ 44	+ 22
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	+125	+ 81	+ 57	+100	+ 20	+ 15
Greece	+ 37	-	+ 67	+ 68	+ 43	+ 29	+ 15	+ 11	+ 10
Tunisia	+ 12	+ 3	+ 7	+ 13	+ 14	+ 10	+ 12	+ 9	-
Algeria ³	-	-	-	-	-	+ 22	-	-	-
Turkey	+203	+ 43	+104	+129	+ 88	+ 85	+137	+ 20	+ 4
Morocco	-	-	-	-	-	+ 35	+ 30	+ 31	+ 10

SOURCE: OECD. SOPEMI Continuous Reporting System on Migration. Paris, 1975; 1976.

¹ Emigrating Workers only; Data exclude family members not in the work force.

² (-) indicates missing data.

³ Algeria suspended labour emigration in September 1973.

Table 44.

Total In- and Out-Migration
of Selected Periphery Country Workers¹
1973-1976

	1973			1974			1975			1976		
	In	Out	Balance	In	Out	Balance	In	Out	Balance	In	Out	Balance
Algeria	-	20,000	-20,000	1,250	-	+ 1,250	4,500	-	+ 4,500	30,000	-	+30,000
Greece	22,285	27,525	- 5,240	24,476	24,448	+	28	34,214	+13,884	32,067	20,374	+11,693
Italy	125,168	123,302	+ 1,866	116,708	112,020	+ 4,688	122,774	92,666	+30,108	108,410	89,987	+18,423
Morocco	7,130	34,829	-27,699	6,287	30,408	-24,121	7,359	11,523	- 4,164	?	13,355	?
*Spain	73,900	100,900	-27,000	88,000	53,200	+34,800	110,200	20,600	+89,600	?	12,100	?
Yugoslavia	12,285	73,435	-61,150	13,376	9,979	+ 3,397	19,556	7,679	+11,877	33,254	5,945	+27,309

SOURCE: H. Entzinger. Return Migration from West European to Mediterranean Countries. Geneva: International Labour Office. Table 22, p. 53.

¹ From and to Western Europe and other overseas countries.

What chances does a return migrant have to get a job, to invest his savings, to use his skills and experience, to give his children a good education, and to live more comfortably? To what extent do the home countries grant special facilities to them or take account of them in their policies for social and economic development? (Entzinger, 1978: 52).

Answers to these questions are just beginning to emerge. These answers point to the link between international migration and the further penetration and incorporation of the periphery into the international economy. Returning workers from the core bring with them more than their savings and experiences in the industrialized core. They are also the active bearers of the core ideology of consumerism and individualism. Very little of the returnees' energies and even less of their savings have made their way into productive investments. In addition to the acquisition of homes, land and conspicuous imported manufactured goods, many migrants have used their savings to set up small retail shops or businesses in the tertiary sector. Returnees are likely to be the proprietors of grocery stores or restaurants, or driving their own taxis (OECD, 1975a; Power and Hardman, 1978; Rist, 1979). Turkish evidence reports a high failure rate for such initiatives because of the crowded competitive market, the periphery population's low level of purchasing power and the returnees' general lack of managerial expertise (Entzinger, 1978: 61).

One of the most persistent myths surrounding international migration is that industrial employment in the core provides returnees with crucial skills needed for the economic development of their home countries. In reality, a gross imbalance exists

between the kinds of work migrants perform in the core and the types of jobs created by economic development in the periphery. The work experience in the core has proletarianized migrants, creating for the periphery nations an unskilled and unabsorbable labour reserve. Since migrants are concentrated in low skill level jobs, where decision-making and initiative are rarely required, they generally are not exposed to the particular kinds of industrial qualifications and administrative skills needed for the development of their home countries. The contemporary Algerian situation provides an illustration. Algeria, unlike the other countries of the periphery, is in a position to absorb some of the expatriate labour force into its expanding economy. Its oil reserves and industrial growth have opened up new employment opportunities for skilled workers, technicians and administrative personnel. These unfilled jobs are in chemicals, hydrocarbons and textiles. Two out of every three Algerians employed in Europe, however, are in unskilled work in the building and construction trades. Their experience abroad hardly translates into the types of jobs in which labour is needed at home (Trébous, 1970). Such disparities between periphery needs and migrants' skill levels and work experience are common. Workers are not sent to the core for training to assume roles of industrial leadership upon their return. They go primarily to sell their labour power. These migrants in the succinct words of one observer, "do not go abroad to learn but to earn" (Entzinger, 1978: 33).

Employment opportunities for returnees vary from country

to country. Algeria, as we have seen, tends to welcome the re-emigration of the skilled fraction of the expatriate labour force. Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Turkey, dependent upon remittances and plagued by regional imbalances and unemployment, do not encourage return migration. The largest proportion of Turkey's emigrants have come from the more developed and urbanized Western part of the country. The departure of these migrants to the core, many of whom were skilled, has precipitated further rural-urban migration to the Western region, depressing the development prospects of the central and Eastern provinces. These rural areas have suffered from migration in yet another way. Because of a reluctance to abandon inefficient and labour-intensive farming methods, the investment of migrants' remittances in agriculture has served to bolster the peripheralization process. These investments, directed toward land speculation rather than in machinery to improve productivity, have caused inflation in the rural areas. Current land prices have reached unrealistic levels, especially affecting those who have stayed at home. In this way, the process of international migration, through migrants' remittances, affects income distribution and class structure, further exacerbating the uneven development between Turkey's eastern and central regions and its industrializing West (Entzinger, 1978: 59-61). In countries where the economic situation has improved, notably Greece, Italy and Spain, return migration has increased. However, as in the case of Turkey, the class structures of these countries have been altered through the interaction of migration and uneven regional

development. One unanticipated outcome of the combined effects of limited regional industrial development, rural-urban migration and the continuing attractiveness of employment abroad for these countries has been their emergence as both exporters and, in the seventies, as importers of labour. While Spanish workers journeyed to France and West Germany, North Africans found employment in Spain's small-scale industries and harbours. A small number of Filipinos, Egyptians, and Ethiopians in Italy have found work in the domestic and personal service sectors. Africans and Arabs are engaged in shipbuilding, fishing and agriculture, in competition with Italian workers, in Naples, Bari and Sicily. In Greece, between 1974 and 1975, at least 20,000 foreigners, mostly from Pakistan, found employment as unskilled workers in sensitive industries. Much of this new migration to Spain, Italy and Greece is illegal and racial tensions between "new periphery" and "old periphery" workers have already erupted (Atlas World Press Review, 1978: 48; Power and Hardman, 1978; Martin, 1977).

Return migration to Yugoslavia (approximately 200,000 between 1974 and 1976) has boosted that country's unemployment rate. Unlike the other periphery countries, economic restructuring in Yugoslavia has created a surplus of qualified and skilled labour. These skilled workers have been the most likely to emigrate and stay abroad while unskilled workers have been likely to return. These returnees tend to settle in the less developed southern regions where they originated and where unemployment is high (Entzinger, 1978: 63).

The periphery countries' reliance on remittances sent by migrants is another indication of their incorporation into and penetration by the international market system. These monies are not generally channelled into capital investments but are used to purchase durable consumer goods, usually furniture, cars or electrical appliances. Since many of these manufactured goods must be imported from industrialized countries, a significant proportion of these remittances flows right back to the core nations. Increasing dependence on remittance income makes little sense -- for individuals or for nation-states:

Mechanically adding remittances to the trade deficit makes even less sense than mechanically subtracting emigrants from the unemployed, quite apart from the possibly inflationary repercussions of such an inflow of disposable income. On the individual level, remittances are used in the first instance to cater for daily needs or to pay off old debts. A continuing inflow subsequently goes on consumer goods, sometimes of quite a fancy kind and often of foreign origin. None of this expenditure is more than marginally productive. Moreover, when the migrant extends his stay abroad and possibly sends for his family the remittances begin to dry up.

In macroeconomic terms, the foreign currency tends to be used, wherever there is no strict control of imports, to pay for imports of foreign consumer goods by the non-migrant population and by recipients of remittances. Thus, there is an increasing familiarization with foreign consumer goods brought about by the publicity surrounding migration and by emigrants themselves. It leads in effect to a widespread disdain for domestic products and a higher value placed on foreign goods. And it leaves little if any room for domestic productive investment (Böhning, 1973).

The increase in the supply of money, especially in the form of foreign currency in those periphery nations where the exchange

rate is particularly sensitive, induces inflation and is especially felt by those nationals who have not had the opportunity to migrate or who are not immediate relatives of those who have. This situation increases the level of social inequality and produces even greater pressures to migrate. A 1976 report estimates that, even though West Germany has curtailed labour recruitment, between 500,000 and 2,000,000 Turks have applied for work permits to go there (The Economist, 1977: 63). This push to emigrate poses a serious problem in the coming decade as the core countries act to cut off incoming flows of labour.

Tables 45 through 49 reveal the effect of remittances on five of the periphery countries' balance of payments. In all countries, remittances substantially alter the size of the payments balances, lessening the impact of the generally negative balance of goods and services. The Portuguese data (Table 45) reveal that the growing proportion of remittances in transfers through the seventies has resulted in a positive balance of payments. A recent OECD survey has established that 24 percent of the remittances to Portugal are spent on dependents' education, 32 percent are spent on appliances and other conspicuous consumer goods, and 38 percent on purchases of land and housing. These purchases illustrate the demonstration effect in operation; they insure the further dependency of the national economy on international migration:

Table 45
Effect of Remittances on Balance of Payments
Portugal
1960-1973
(Millions in U.S. Dollars)

	Balances of Goods and Services (a)	Official Transfers (b)	Private Transfers (c)	(of which) Emigrants' Remittances (d)	Balance of Current Payments (a) + (b) + (c)
1960	-125	-	80	48	- 45
1961	-273	-	75	45	-198
1962	-116	-	85	51	- 31
1963	-135	-	109	65	- 26
1964	-138	-	138	70	-
1965	-145	-	151	99	6
1966	-148	-	199	136	51
1967	-104	-	269	200	165
1968	-236	-	314	208	78
1969	-214	-	416	266	202
1970	-390	-	507	324	117
1971	-492	-	664	456	172
1972	-414	-	872	596	458
1973	-564	-	1,111	740	547

SOURCE: OECD. The OECD and International Migration. Paris. 1975. p. 26.

Table 46

Effect of Remittances on Balance of Payments
Spain
1960-1973
(Millions in U.S. Dollars)

	Balance of Goods and Services (a)	Official Transfers (b)	Private Transfers (c)	(of which) Emigrants' Remittances (d)	Balance of Current Payments (a) + (b) + (c)
1960	302	33	58	55	393
1961	60	46	116	116	222
1962	-171	12	209	146	50
1963	-445	6	251	195	-188
1964	-289	4	316	237	31
1965	-845	2	358	298	485
1966	-983	2	416	346	-568
1967	-906	5	445	320	-456
1968	-690	-1	448	319	-243
1969	-926	-18	550	400	-394
1970	-580	-	659	467	79
1971	88	-5	772	548	855
1972	-225	-9	875	599	571
1973	-856	-7	1,421	913	558

SOURCE: OECD. The OECD and International Migration. Paris, 1975. p. 26.

Table 47
 Effect of Remittances on Balance of Payments
 Yugoslavia
 1969-1972
 (Millions in U.S. Dollars)

	Trade Balance	Net Services and Transfers	(of which) Emigrants' Remittances	Balance of Current Payments
1969	- 660	560	210	-110
1970	-1.190	860	440	-340
1971	-1.140	1.110	650	-320
1972	- 990	1.128	790	300

SOURCE: OECD. The OECD and International Migration. Paris.
 1975. p. 27.

Table 48
Effect of Remittances on Balance of Payments
Greece
1960-1973
(Millions in U.S. Dollars)

	Balance of Goods and Services (a)	Official Transfers (b)	Private Transfers (c)	(of which) Emigrants' Remittances (d)	Balance of Current Payments (a) + (b) + (c)
1960	- 188	37	90	idem	- 61
1961	- 199	38	98	idem	- 62
1962	- 294	75	139	idem	- 81
1963	- 261	43	168	idem	- 50
1964	- 396	18	177	idem	- 201
1965	- 492	16	207	idem	- 269
1966	- 475	5	235	idem	- 235
1967	- 425	6	232	idem	- 187
1968	- 499	2	238	239	- 259
1969	- 636	2	276	277	- 358
1970	- 763	2	341	343	- 420
1971	- 833	1	454	458	- 375
1972	- 949	1	568	567	- 380
1973	-1,919	-	732	735	-1,187

SOURCE: OECD. The OECD and International Migration. Paris, 1975. p. 26.

Table 49
 Effect of Remittances on Balance of Payments
 Turkey
 1969-1973
 (Millions in U.S. Dollars)

	Trade Balance	Net Services and Transfers	(of which) Emigrants' Remittances	Balance of Current Payments
1969	-129	10	141	-143
1970	-260	91	273	-107
1971	-372	272	471	- 9
1972	-522	538	740	72
1973	-572	1.108	1.183	611

SOURCE: OECD. The OECD and International Migration. Paris.
 1975. p. 27.

Possession of a house is regarded as the best investment one can possibly make. But while it is an obvious sign of fortune before the eyes of the whole village, it is also paradoxically enough a window display of 'French comfort' and serves as an advertisement for an even greater exodus ... This vulgarizing of architecture is perhaps the most revealing sign of the contradiction maintained by emigration ... these clumsy imitations of a civilisation of which the emigrants have only retained the external signs of prosperity show that the Portuguese always want village approval for their distant success: but the upsetting of cultural traditions will perhaps be responsible for breaking up the rural community and will thus increasingly jeopardize the chances of permanent return (OECD observer in Power and Hardman, 1978: 33).

The Spanish and Yugoslavian situations (Tables 46 and 47) mirror the Portuguese case. Remittances have increasingly comprised an important proportion of net transfers and, by the mid 1970s, have helped to offset negative trade balances, resulting in positive balances of payments for both countries. The Greek case (Table 48) is more complicated. Although remittances have increased, so have the trade and balance of payment deficits. One student of Greek migration suggests that the demonstration effect, through the familiarization of Greeks with Western manufactured goods, has created a situation in which the increasing volume of remittances covered a decreasing proportion of the trade deficit (Nikolinakos, 1971: 782-799). This situation is aggravated by the tendency of migrants to shy away from investment opportunities in Greece's expanding industrial sector, preferring instead to use their savings to purchase land or consumer goods or to set up a small business in the already crowded tertiary sector. These

investments in small scale enterprises have a high failure rate because they operate against the general direction taken by the contemporary Greek economy (Entzinger, 1978: 57). Turkey also is dependent on remittances to balance its growing trade deficit (Table 49). It has been estimated that, without this money, Turkey's payments deficit would have grown by another third by 1976 (The Economist, 1977:63). Since the mid seventies, however, the volume of remittances sent to Turkey has declined and the negative trade balance has widened. This is primarily because the increased flow of capital, as in Greece, has been translated into new consumer habits and a demand for Western-made goods (Entzinger, 1978: 59-60). The decline in remittances is also related to two other factors: the size of the Turkish labour force in the core has been steadily reduced since 1974; and limited opportunity, unemployment and family reunification in the core countries have kept money that is normally transferred to Turkey in Western Europe.

B. The Relationship Between the State and the Economy in Managing Labour Migration

The theoretical discussion on the role of the state in managing labour migration in core countries provides insights for understanding the conditions in labour supply countries. Supply countries are typically "developing" and peripheralized nations, dependent upon and inserted into the world economy. The interests of capital in the host country are generally congruent with those in the labour importing countries. The periphery nation-state has a vested interest in maintaining emigration flows to the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe. The supply state

must promote the conditions for accumulation in order to attract and increase core investment in the periphery. At the same time, it must manage the potential conflict created by the "development initiative" in the form of a large reserve of unemployed and underemployed labourers with rising expectations and consumer values. It is in this respect that the "modernization effort" represents a conundrum for capital, by providing conditions of profitable production on one hand while sowing the seeds of class conflict on the other. On one level, these tensions are alleviated by the coexistence of traditional economic activities with the expansion of wage labour in industrial settings. However, as the capitalist mode of production takes hold, emigration to the core nations emerges as a way to deal with the overabundance of labour. The supply state then seeks political agreements with host countries to regularize the movement of workers across international frontiers. Most of the periphery countries have entered into bilateral labour agreements with the core. The agreement between Greece and West Germany is prototypical of these treaties. The treaty established a West German Commission in Greece to provide nationals with information on vacancies and to match suitable applicants with job openings. Although a great deal of this coordination of labour flows by the two governments has been discontinued since the labour recruitment suspension, the Greek Ministry of Labour continues to maintain 22 offices in major West German urban centres (Lianos, 1979: 214-215). The Greek-West Germany procedures resemble most of the other bilateral labour arrangements between periphery and core. Most

periphery nations man labour offices or special consular units in major core cities to facilitate the processing of entrances and returns of their nationals.

The evolution of Algerian migration policy provides an illustration of the state's legitimation function, as it responds to the changing nature of the core's demand for labour and its own ability to absorb the costs of migration. In the first of socialist Algeria's Three Year Plans, out-migration was officially considered an instrument of development and a means to relieve internal tensions caused by economic restructuring, land reform and industrialization. However, as Algerian workers in France met with increasing racial hostility and as Algeria's economic fortunes in the seventies and its need for skilled labour grew, this policy was modified. The 1976 National Charter states that Algerian workers no longer need to migrate. The new policy is especially concerned with the counter-revolutionary and culturally-eroding effects of migration (Entzinger, 1978: 55). Yugoslavian policy has followed a similar path. While migration has been officially encouraged in the sixties, since 1972 the government has taken a more cautious attitude as pressures to migrate begin to conflict with central planning objectives (Bačić, 1979: 259-269).

Since the general curtailment of labour recruitment by Western Europe, the revised policies of the periphery nations reflect efforts to ease the re-entry of returning migrants. These measures however operate more to bolster the periphery states' political and fiscal legitimacy within the world market

system then to provide for the economic and social reabsorption of the returnees. From the mid-seventies, the periphery nations have entered into development plans with the core. These plans have been initiated ostensibly to provide vocational training for migrants wishing to return to their home countries. In reality, they represent a means for the core countries to decrease the size of their foreign labour force and for the periphery to acquire new sources of investment capital. The REMPLD programme between the Netherlands on one side and Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia on the other, is a case in point. REMPLD, Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and the Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development, was launched in 1974 to promote the return migration of skilled workers. In the last five years, the Netherlands has made 15 million guilders available to these countries through REMPLD. Rather than using these funds to expand employment opportunities, the periphery countries have generally favoured the establishment of large industrial complexes which tend to be capital rather than labour intensive and which often have required additional investment credits. In addition, the recipient countries have placed some of the REMPLD monies into other investments in order to maximize returns. Where industrial (and employment) expansion has occurred through the REMPLD programme, the Netherlands has provided only partial investment credit and has not underwritten any part of the maintenance costs of such initiatives (Entzinger, 1978: 43). France has inaugurated similar development programmes with Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Senegal and Mali. One

aspect of these programmes, under the jurisdiction of the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE), is to provide vocational training and apprenticeships in France for migrants desiring to return to their home countries. In its five years of operation, this training has been actually made available to only 700 workers from all six countries (Entzinger, 1978: 44). Yugoslavian agreements with West Germany and the Netherlands for the vocational training of returnees have involved only 200 to 300 recipients and a similar Greek-West German plan has affected only 300 returnees in its five years of operation (OECD, 1976: 47).

Algeria maintains a special consular official at its Paris embassy to assist in finding employment in Algeria for workers wishing to leave France. In the early seventies, several Algerian companies sought to recruit skilled Algerians working in France but encountered great difficulty inducing these workers to return. Moreover, a large number of those recruited were dissatisfied with the working and living conditions in Algeria and quickly returned to France. Most of the Algerian efforts have been directed at encouraging return migration among the twenty percent of the expatriate labour force that is skilled. However, even the jointly administered development programmes aimed at training the unskilled expatriate labour force for industrial employment in Algeria have not been successful. One notable failure involved a joint effort between the Berliet lorry factory in Lyon and an Algerian counterpart, the state-run SONACOME plant. Algerians recruited for the training course at Lyon refused to return to Algeria after completion of their

training. Other French companies have since been unwilling to enter into similar ventures. (Entzinger, 1978: 65-66).

Turkish programmes for the reabsorption of returnees have been overshadowed, as in the other countries of the periphery, by plans which favour large-scale capital-intensive industrialization over employment creation. In 1971, Turkey signed a bilateral treaty with West Germany to provide returnees with vocational and managerial training. The impact of this treaty, known as the Ankara Agreement, has been minimal. Of the 200,000 Turks who returned from West Germany between 1971 and 1975, only fifty participated in the training courses. Other training recipients decided to stay in West Germany (Entzinger, 1978: 35). Independent efforts by Turkish workers to turn their own savings into profitable investments have resulted in the establishment in Turkey of several industrial plants in which the shareholders are Turkish workers. The Turkish government, however, has not been supportive of these initiatives. The State Industry and Workers Investment Bank has sought to divert migrants' investments in these worker-controlled companies to its own large-scale industries (Entzinger, 1978: 38).

The periphery states also attempt to facilitate the absorption of foreign exchange, derived from migrants' remittances. This is accomplished through permissive monetary regulations, "enabling" legislation, or "blind eye" policies on the part of customs officials, on the transfer, conversion, and incorporation of foreign exchange and imported goods into supply countries' economies. Algerian nationals working in France, for

example, have been granted by their government special import and tax exemptions. Although Algeria has a housing shortage as well as a nationalized housing policy, the regulations restricting property ownership are not binding for return migrants. Because of a state-condoned effort to promote the investment of migrants' savings, returnees are allowed to purchase private accommodations and scarce building land (Entzinger, 1978: 56). Turkish workers abroad have been somewhat reluctant to send money home because of the high interest it can earn in European banks in contrast to Turkey's growing inflation. New Turkish banking regulations, to induce the flow of remittances, allow these workers to deposit foreign currency directly in Turkish banks, in special foreign currency accounts which earn a 7 percent rate of interest (comparable to German bank rates). An agreement between the Turkish Central Bank and the West German Dresdner Bank enables Turkish workers to deposit money through the German bank to be credited directly to foreign currency accounts in Turkey (Kudat, 1979: 254). Turkish migrants also benefit from import allowances and tax exemptions as do Yugoslavian and Portuguese workers (Entzinger, 1978: 59-60). A 1975 Portuguese measure established a system of foreign exchange deposit accounts similar to the Turkish procedures (OECD, 1976: 50). Throughout the periphery, these kinds of special monetary privileges, tax exemptions and priority in housing for migrants and their families have caused resentment among those who have stayed at home (The Economist, 1977: 63).

The nations of the periphery are caught by the force of

the migratory cycle. Dependent on remittances to balance their trade deficits, they have facilitated the absorption of foreign currency while at the same time furthering their dependency on imported goods and Western models of consumption. This situation has created tensions among those nationals who have stayed at home. Within the current economic climate and despite the core's attempts to regulate incoming flows, the pressures to migrate have risen rather than eased. Although some of the nations of the periphery are now in a position to absorb the skilled segment of the expatriated labour forces, their economies cannot withstand a massive return of unskilled labour. Nor can the economies of the core afford to relinquish entirely this captive labour reserve of cheap alien workers. The recent proliferation of core-periphery treaties to promote the return of migrants has not opened up jobs for returnees but rather has enabled the transfer of investment capital to ease the fiscal position of the periphery states in the world economy. In any case, given the contemporary conditions, it appears increasingly unlikely that foreign workers already in the core will return to the periphery. Yet the core nations remain opposed to all but marginal integration of these workers into their welfare apparatus. As temporary stays turn into permanent settlement, the periphery loses its most productive and enterprising workers. Moreover, the fate of these workers and their families in the core is unclear. Deprived of equal rights of citizenship and isolated in social and occupational ghettos, they form a new European underclass. One wonders especially about the children of these workers. The second

generation of foreigners, already lost to the countries of their parents, face an uncertain future in the European core.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis, in its overview of the causes and consequences of international migration, has uncovered several differences, from country to country, in labour supply and demand, in rates of economic growth and decline and in periphery and core state adaptations to the international labour market. In particular, it must be stressed that the concentration of foreign workers in certain industries in the core nations is relative rather than absolute and the available data lend only partial support to the argument of peripheral industrial concentration. In countries of the core for which data are available, there appears to be relatively wide dispersion of foreign workers in many industries although there is evident concentration in construction and certain manufacturing industries and services as well as in the lower occupational skill levels. Given the nature of the existing data and until more sensitive indicators and comparable data sets are made available, the conclusions can only be cautiously and tentatively drawn. However, at a general level of analysis, a common pattern of migration within the international system has emerged. The following discussion draws out these broad historical forces and the social, political and economic responses to international migration. This summary provides the elements of an analytical framework for the study of the transfer and use of labour reserves from the periphery to the core as a manifestation of the international division of labour. This framework is partly derived from the nature of welfarism in advanced capitalism. Regardless of independent labour

market effects which push and pull migrants to and from the core to periphery, the key to understanding the core's reliance on foreign rather than indigenous ethnic or other minority-status workers is related to the spread and cost of welfare in the form of the social and political rights of citizenship. The greater the extension of citizenship rights to labour through the welfare state, the more costly these rights have been to capital. As a specific consequence of the spread of welfarism in Western Europe, the peripheral economic sector tends to experience rising labour costs and labour scarcity. One attempt to reduce labour costs is through the employment of alternative and cheap sources of labour. Hence, the importation of foreign labour helps to maintain the rate of profit for the non-monopolistic sector of the economy, in firms and industries which cannot draw upon the means open to monopoly capitalism for maintaining an adequate level of surplus. The concentration of foreign labour in these industries serves as a mechanism of social control by diffusing the potential for organized class conflict. The working class is split into a labour aristocracy of domestic workers, placated by the spread of welfarism, and an underclass of foreigners, without recourse to the legal, political or social benefits enjoyed by full citizens. The reliance on foreign workers tends to reduce labour costs by placing the burden of the cost of social reproduction of labour in the nations of labour supply in the periphery. These basic generalizations, drawn from the Western European experience of the postwar period, suggest a set of specific tendencies of foreign labour importation and utilization in the core which characterize much of the contemporary situation:

1. The level of economic growth and proportion of the national product spent on social welfare tend to be positively associated with the aggregate number of foreign workers employed in the host country.

2. The level of employment of foreign workers tends to be positively associated with the degree of relative labour scarcity in the peripheral industrial sector of each host country.
3. The level of employment of foreign workers tends to be higher in those firms and services with production processes which must be performed "on site" or which cannot easily relocate to areas of abundant and cheap labour supplies.
4. The wage rate tends to be lower and the productivity rate higher for foreign workers than for indigenous workers in the same occupation.
5. The level of participation in trade unions and the degree of claims to social services tends to be lower for foreign workers than for indigenous workers.
6. The level of employment of foreign workers in an industrial sector tends to be negatively associated with the level of industrial conflict in that sector, as evidenced by the number of strikes and work stoppages.
7. If industrial conflicts do occur and if they are centered around issues particularly sensitive to foreign workers, then the less likely is the participation and support of indigenous workers.
8. The political vulnerability of foreign workers tends to be negatively associated with the quantity and quality of citizenship rights accorded to them by the host state. The more rights accorded to foreign workers,
the more they tend to resemble the indigenous labour force,
the less racial hostility and discrimination directed toward them, and
the less useful they become as a buffer against the indigenous work force's labour demands.
9. In periods of relative economic growth and low domestic unemployment, immigration and labour policies tend to facilitate the entrance and employment of foreign workers. In periods of relative economic slowdowns and high domestic unemployment, these policies tend to restrict the continued entrance of foreign workers but not the continued employment of those foreign workers already in the host country.
10. The greater the economic slowdown, the greater the policy response to the presence of foreign

workers, and the greater the public debate on immigration among interest groups and political parties in national forums and media.

11. The extent of savings to the host country of the cost of social reproduction of foreign labour is positively associated with the proportion of single workers without dependents to married workers with dependents and negatively associated with the length of employment in the host country, the age of the foreign work force, and the number of welfare benefits accorded to them.

Thus, the contemporary pattern of international migration stems from the requirements of the production process in the advanced capitalist countries of the core. But this represents only half of the international migration equation. The core's predilection for foreign over domestic labour reserves has been made possible through the peripheralization of the labour supply nations in the international system. International migration tends to originate in the nations of the periphery. Peripheral states must promote profitable production conditions while also dealing with the tensions caused by the emergence of a reserve army of labour and the rising costs of consumption during the process of incorporation into the capitalist world market. In this respect, the exportation of labour is an outcome of the articulation between capitalism and the traditional modes of production within the peripheral country. The actions of the supply state, in establishing interstate relations in the form of trade agreements and political treaties to facilitate the movement of labour to the core, serve to diffuse the tensions of capitalist development. The employment of workers in the core and the influx of foreign currency to

the periphery from their remittances and savings tend to hasten the peripheralization of these nations by altering traditional economic and social relations, by augmenting expenditures and investment in the service and manufacturing sectors and by creating a preference for core goods, consumption values and lifestyles. These generalizations suggest the following set of tendencies for the periphery:

1. The degree of permissiveness of the supply country's policy toward emigration is positively associated with its extent of urbanization, industrialization, regional imbalance and the level of unemployment and underemployment.
2. The higher the emigration rate, the more likely remittances and savings are used for non-productive investments, in housing or consumer goods, or channelled into small enterprises in the service sector.
3. The higher the emigration, the greater the supply country's dependence on remittances to balance the payments deficit and the greater the proportion of the balance of payments in the form of migrants' remittances.
4. The level of emigration is positively associated with the degree of permissiveness of legislation on the transfer of foreign currency and the ease of its absorption in the supply country's economy.

This treatment of international labour migration would not be complete without some comment on the question of labour importation versus capital exportation within the international division of labour. This issue may provide the key for understanding the future prospects of labour migration to the core. One proposal for the equitable solution to the double-edged sword of international migration advocates the movement of

capital to the areas of labour supply rather than the movement of their labour to the core. A number of reasons, related to core-periphery dependency and the current international economic crisis, explains why this transfer has not taken place on a wider scale. In these years of rising energy costs, global economic slowdown and unemployment, most of the Western European core nations have been reluctant to inaugurate new capital out-flows. Moreover, as we have seen, this kind of

- large scale capital investment in the developing countries tends to disturb rural-urban balances, creating even more labour reserves as more workers than the economy can absorb leave rural and traditional employment for industrial work in the metropole. These effects of capital investment in the periphery also exacerbate latent political and social tensions especially in those countries where the government has achieved only a precarious public backing for its own legitimacy. Within this contemporary climate, capitalist interests in the core do not generally regard the labour supply countries as good investment bets, hence the reluctance of the core states to finance and expand development programmes for employment creation in the periphery. The major labour supply countries of the Mediterranean Basin have become too politically volatile and their labour is too costly relative to the other farther reaches of the periphery to attract capital investment on a larger scale. This argument has been offered as an official defense of labour importation in a recent statement by a high ranking West German policymaker:

Our suppliers of labour do not correspond with where we want to invest our capital. German capital wants to go where there is political stability and low wages. This means South Africa, East Asia -- and we would if we could, Eastern Europe. It does not mean Italy and Turkey from where most of our migrants come (Immigration Analyst, West Germany, in Power and Hardman, 1978: 35).

Moreover, foreign labour in the core is now beginning to concentrate in jobs in the service sector and in other industries which must be performed on site in the host country. Short of a revolutionary economic restructuring which would redistribute the labour force to pull indigenous workers back into these jobs, the core must at least maintain its foreign labour force for the time being. However, a massive influx of foreigners, as Europe witnessed in the late sixties and early seventies, can no longer be absorbed into the core economies. Thus, the contemporary situation juxtaposes increasingly rigid government restrictions against industry's continuing reliance on foreign labour. The Dutch Employers Association is constantly battling these regulations as are most industrialists in the other core countries. Large firms in France and West Germany have used political manoeuvres to secure exemptions from the recruitment suspension. Illegal immigration to the core has reached unprecedented numbers. Employers in Switzerland, France and West Germany, while maintaining the recruitment ban on annual workers, have all increased their reliance on seasonal workers and frontier crossers, moving this labour into industry from agriculture where it had previously been directed.

Labour migration has always existed and will continue to exist. Indeed, Western Europe's economic health and standard of living have been made possible by the contribution of foreign labour. In some senses, these workers constitute a form of development aid from the nations of the periphery to the core. The size and conditions of future transfers of labour, however, are open to speculation. It is likely that future patterns of labour migration will vary in response to the exigencies of the international market. The current situation in the Western European core, characterized by declining growth rates, higher than normal domestic unemployment and rising tensions between native and foreign populations, will serve to keep down migration in the short run. It is also highly probable that the core states will continue, as far as they are able, to resist efforts to incorporate the foreign labour force into the welfare apparatus, at least until the next generation. Return migration to the periphery is not likely to increase beyond current rates because of these countries' inability to absorb the return of large numbers of unskilled workers as well as these workers' growing reluctance to leave permanent jobs in the core as the possibilities for re-entry at a later time grow dim. In the long run, however, it is quite possible that international migration to the core will regain its old momentum. By the next decade Western Europe may improve its economic growth prospects. This situation, coupled with continuing low population growth and high social mobility, will lead once again to the exhaustion of the

available domestic labour supply, necessitating the recruitment of foreigners. The creation of peripheralized countries will also continue, through the insertion of still other nations into the international market system, resulting in the now familiar patterns of unabsorbable labour reserves and heightened social tension. Out-migration will again be viewed as a solution. These new migrants will most likely come from new and more distant areas of the periphery, beyond the Mediterranean Basin, from Southern Asia and tropical Africa. Indicators of this process are already evident. Small communities of Asian and African nationals have appeared within the perimeter of the core. Current labour-sending countries are also playing reluctant hosts to such migrants. In view of this new stock of foreign labour, and in order to protect the status of its indigenous work force and minimize the sources of labour conflict, it is likely that the core states will organize labour recruitment even more stringently than in this decade, enforcing an unprecedented level of control over entry, internal movement and occupational assignment.

This discussion has been by necessity executed at a level of extreme generality. The analysis has focused on the macroscopic forces and outcomes of the international division of labour over the more immediate social and personal effects of labour migration. Yet it is at this human level that the real costs of labour migration lie. The workers of the periphery have been brought to the core like interchangeable and replaceable parts. For every part that broke down,

another, in what has seemed until recently like an endless supply, has been brought in as a replacement. But foreign workers are not merely cogs in the machine of capitalist economy. Indeed, without their contribution, the machine would cease to exist. The countries of the core are only now beginning to ask themselves how big a price they are willing to pay for these workers. They have not yet realized that this decision may not be theirs to make.

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