GOVERNING CRIME THROUGH PREVENTION
IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY CANADA

by

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A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the rise to prominence of crime prevention from a position of relative obscurity to a more central focus in Canadian federal government rhetoric between 1974 and 2000. It investigates how the concept of ‘crime prevention’ was articulated and rationalized as an object and an instrument of Canadian federal government intervention in the late twentieth century. By exploring government rhetoric which coalesced around appeals to prevention, this study illuminates some late twentieth century shifts in the expressed desire to prevent crime and victimization.

In an attempt to set the study of crime prevention on a broader canvas of inquiry, this dissertation draws upon the governmentality framework. The governmentality position is substantiated, challenged and extended through textual analyses, discourse analyses and interviews. Late twentieth century Canadian federal government initiatives in the name of crime prevention are better understood in terms of an amalgamation of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social rationalities. As an ambiguous and chameleon-like concept, crime prevention is shaped and reshaped by a complex interplay of evolving rationalities and contingent actualities of politics. The multiplicity, hybridity and partiality among rationalities, actualities and technologies of government are explored.
PERSONAL DEDICATION

To Grant Perry, my partner in life and my soulmate in faith.
You have undoubtedly lived up to the meaning of your name on this journey with me.

COLLECTIVE DEDICATION

To Jordan (my son) and Jason (my foster brother), who are among the many children, who remain the reasons, despite the limitations, that progressive and socially-oriented preventative interventions should be pursued.

In memory of all individuals whose lives have been lost or destroyed as a result of a corrupted version of prevention. May their loss serve as a reminder of the importance of drawing limits of acceptability.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the rise to prominence of crime prevention from a position of relative obscurity to a more central focus within Canadian federal government initiatives between 1974 and 2000. This period was marked by the prolonged emergence of ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention’ which was established in 1994. The dissertation set out to investigate how the concept of ‘crime prevention’ was articulated and rationalized as an object and an instrument of Canadian federal government intervention in the late twentieth century. The most striking features of this historical juncture were a tenaciously optimistic rhetoric replete with sundry rationales and a disparate set of strategic options for preventative pursuits.

The dissertation purports that the rhetoric and rationales upon which prevention is advanced both arise out of, and give rise to, the government setting in which they are constructed. My main argument is that the various forms of government intervention in the name of crime prevention are shaped and re-shaped by an interplay between broader governmental rationalities and contingent actualities. Such a critical analysis on how crime prevention is conceived, rationalized and activated in Canada has, to my knowledge, never been carried out. The characteristics of these complex and evolving arrangements constitute the main focus of this dissertation.
PREVENTION: 'RHETORICALLY' AND 'GOVERNMENTALLY'

Since crime prevention has become a renewed site of government activity in Canada, I contend that investigations should be conducted on federal level initiatives so as to raise questions about the expressed desirability of crime prevention strategies. The central role played by notions of prevention generated by the Canadian federal government makes it possible to see it as a form of regulation in which federal initiatives establish both the priorities and the boundaries of how crime prevention is articulated and rationalized as a strategy aimed at governing crime and victimization.

This study constitutes an analysis of recent government rhetoric and policy initiatives which coalesce around appeals to prevention. By tracing the genesis and the evolution of 'crime prevention' within Canadian federal government activities, this research examines the major trends and characteristics of prevention rhetoric with a view to illuminating some late twentieth century shifts in the expressed desire to prevent. In this light, the dissertation addresses three interrelated areas of inquiry; these include rhetoric, rationales, as well as governmental rationalities.

First, I pursue this study with a view to demonstrating the centrality of 'rhetoric' to this investigation. While one may use the terms 'language' or 'discourse,' I specifically employ the term 'rhetoric' because academic, political and popular discourses of crime prevention are deeply immersed in the business of persuasion, promotion and exhortation. In this sense, rhetoric is regarded as a very particular form of discourse that carries its own distinctive characteristics. Thus, rather than cynically dismissing political rhetoric as an empty vessel, I reconsider its significance in a political setting (Edelman
1977). For as I elaborate, through its persuasive effect, rhetoric does reveal pertinent contents and meanings, and particularly, rationales for government interventions (Edelman 1988).

More specifically, in addition to shedding light on the perceived shift away from reactive criminal justice responses towards allegedly proactive approaches, this dissertation simultaneously demonstrates the significance of government rhetoric in revealing conceptualizations of, and explanations for, shifts in preventative aspirations. This contention not only informs my methodological framework, but it also constitutes the main subject of my analysis, which engages with recent developments in governmentality studies, as well as criminological and sociological scholarship.

The second main issue that is addressed in this investigation involves how the rationales of prevention have evolved over the last twenty-five years. While I explicate its relevance in more detail in chapter three, for the purpose of immediate clarification, I refer to the term ‘rationale’ as the underlying reason, logic or justification that is offered for a particular course of action. In this sense, rationales encompass explications of the alleged necessity of an intervention. In this study, rationales reveal the expressed desirability of government intervention in the name of crime prevention. While my main consideration is with changes in emphasis of crime prevention and their corresponding rationales, I do not tease these out at the expense of identifying relevant continuities (Cohen 1985). I have therefore endeavoured to document both the consistencies and the variations in articulations and rationales of crime prevention over time.
A third and related area of inquiry involves situating the Canadian federal government’s crime prevention initiatives among broader governmental rationalities; these include neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and social welfarism. Since crime prevention is viewed as part of an overall strategy of governance (Crawford 1997; Gilling 1997), this research examines the manner in which the Canadian federal government’s rhetoric on prevention resonates with changes in the broader context of shifting expectations and aspirations of government that are explicated and understood at the level of rationalities (ways of thinking) and technologies (ways of acting) (Garland 1999). The intricacies of this analysis are explicated briefly below, as well as in chapter three.

As I establish in this dissertation, these three areas of inquiry are interrelated. Political rhetoric reveals the expressed rationales underlying government intervention. Together, rhetoric and rationales often resonate with broader rationalities and technologies in some important regards. However, as this dissertation also illustrates, the rhetoric and rationales on prevention at the Canadian federal government level unveil various contingent actualities. Contingent actualities\(^1\) refer to the aleatoric conditions inherent to political and bureaucratic contexts. The presence of these actualities points to a rather complex evolution of, and interplay between rationalities and technologies.

Two of the underlying purposes of this particular analysis are to cast light on the conceptual ambiguity inherent to crime prevention and to challenge the scholarly debates on crime prevention as a contemporary form of regulation. While I explicate them in greater detail in chapters two and three, I address these two matters briefly in their respective order below.
CONCEPTUAL AMBIGUITY

This dissertation examines how the elasticity of the term 'crime prevention' is manifested within government rhetoric. I pursue this inquiry in a constructive and curious spirit. However, it should be noted that prevention is not the objective of my inquiry, but rather the subject of my analysis. This research involves neither an evangelical advocacy, nor a nihilistic evaluation of a particular prevention option. Instead, it documents the usage of the concept in the Canadian federal government setting. The purpose of this component of the study is to cast light on the various ways in which the concept of prevention has been packaged and sold to rationalize emerging and existing federal government interventions over time. While a brief explanation of the relevance of this endeavour is provided immediately below, it is a theme that is carried throughout the remaining chapters.

Prevention, as either a mode, a principle or an aspiration, is an ambiguous concept that carries seemingly implicit rationales for a myriad of interventions. This vagueness is itself a powerful feature that fosters boundless conceptualizations and manifestations of 'preventative' pursuits. The prevention of crime has known many different authors, types and targets. Prevention has often been regarded as the inferred purpose of a number of crime control strategies; for example, the codification of criminal law, the inception of incarceration, as well as the subsequent expansion of disciplinary techniques into the community, have all been variously justified in the name of prevention (Gilling 1997).

Ironically, however, the term has been employed in the late twentieth century to describe a diffuse set of alternative practices that are now considered distinct from, and in
contrast to, the aforementioned traditional reactive criminal justice responses.

Consequently, ‘crime prevention’ remains an ambiguous and vague concept that implies different visions and practices in different theoretical, political, economic, historical and cultural contexts. Despite attempts made to conceptualize the term, little success has been achieved in establishing a definition that is readily accepted by academics, politicians, policy-makers and practitioners (Hastings 1991). In fact, as Koch (1998:22) observes, “even within one particular group, a single definition has not been agreed upon.”

W.B. Gallie\(^2\) (1956:168) attributed this unresolvable ambiguity of a term to what he called “essentially contested concepts,” which consist of the belief that “there is no one clearly definable general use of any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use.” Gallie (1956:169) contended that certain concepts are essentially contested because their employment “inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.” Both the academic literature and the political rhetoric on crime prevention abound with such seemingly perpetual debates about the efficiency of the means and the effectiveness of the ends of preventive interventions. In this light, I contend that the term ‘crime prevention’ may be regarded as an ‘essentially contested concept.’

The elasticity of usage that the term “crime prevention” has acquired has hindered the establishment of a consensus on what it constitutes in its capacities as a means and as an end. Such vagueness has prompted Gilling (1997:xi) to call it a ‘difficult beast to tame’ and as such is somewhat of a contentless rubric. “Crime prevention” now functions largely as a term of convenience for a fairly dispersed array of conceptual,
political and practical positions. The concept itself is extremely powerful with its strength lying in its simplicity and its practicality (Heal 1989:514). However, its alleged simplicity is rather deceptive. As a promotional slogan, prevention is almost impossible to upstage; but it is disconcertingly inadequate as an analytical concept (Gilling 1997).

In light of Gallie’s (1956:168-169) claims that there is no clearly definable or standard use of an essentially contested concept and that no amount of discussion can possibly dispel the ambiguity of the term, I have refrained in this dissertation from any attempt to articulate a more correct use of the concept of crime prevention or to establish more defensible conceptual boundaries. Throughout this research, I have sought neither to delimit nor to reformulate, nor to replace the term ‘crime prevention.’ Rather, the aim has been to demonstrate the variability in the usage of the concept itself.

Furthermore, this dissertation has avoided pre-defining the term and setting an optimum standard for two reasons. First, crime prevention is the subject of this inquiry and not the objective; it is therefore unnecessary to identify a particular use for advocacy purposes. Second, since one of the aims of this research has been to document how the ambiguity of crime prevention and its corresponding rationales have come to be variously articulated in the Canadian federal government setting, the definition has remained open to whatever conception was determined through interviews and through the analysis of government documents.

The appraisal of the term ‘crime prevention’ as an essentially contested concept is central to the main question being addressed in this dissertation, which demonstrates how the Canadian federal government intervention in the name of crime prevention is
articulated and justified. Gallie’s framework sets the stage for a such consideration by emphasizing how ambiguities, complexities and modifications are inherent not only to the concept itself, but also and more importantly, to the corresponding rationales and interventions. Thus, this dissertation draws from, and extends, Gallie’s work by illustrating that rationales and government interventions are also essentially contested.

Although it is a concept that seems to carry its own intrinsic source of legitimacy, crime prevention is nonetheless upheld and heightened by a host of justificatory discourses and an entire body of literature dedicated to establishing its viability. What is of interest here is the variation and ambiguity of the rationales that promote preventative pursuits. Of particular concern are the different political, ideological, policy, public, private or practical positions that are entwined within the rationales of prevention. Hence, exposing the tensions and mutual dependencies between for example, political and scientific arguments, theoretical and practical positions, as well as between public and private claims may prove quite instructive. Other considerations may also be relevant; for example, whether programs in the pursuit of crime prevention are justified in terms of their potential to control crime, or in terms of their social justice value (Gilling 1997:194). The significance of rationales is explicated in chapter three and then illustrated in chapters five through eight.

CRIMINOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PREVENTION

The notion of ‘crime prevention’ has certainly brought many changes in the rhetorical basis of social regulation in late twentieth century Canada. However, as
political rhetoric about crime prevention grows, the danger of superficial thought and 
action also increases; so does the need, therefore, for a more considered and 
comprehensive investigation of this issue, particularly regarding the notion of prevention 
and the rhetoric promoting this allegedly alternative approach.

Since crime prevention was, and remains to a certain extent, an emerging 
alternative to reactive crime control, the overwhelming majority of the literature 
dedicated to advocating its potential has sought to ascertain its effectiveness. In this 
sense, prevention has traditionally been set as the objective of conventional 
criminological study. In its quest for more efficient crime control measures, the literature 
has been constrained to a discourse of administration (Crawford 1997). Through its 
evaluative research, almost every prevention program is read in a positive logic whereby 
‘everything works’ to a greater or lesser extent. While this promotional stance has 
advanced the literature, it has also rendered it a rather inward-looking and self-contained 
endeavour (Gilling 1997).

Even various scholars who have reflected on the emergence of crime prevention 
within other nation-states have engaged at this narrow level of analysis. Examples of 
research on crime prevention in specific countries include, but are not limited to, the 
works of Koch (1998) in England and Wales; Monaghan (1997) in Scotland; Brown and 
Polk (1996) in Australia; the comparative work of Graham and Bennett (1995) in Europe 
and North America, as well as that of Thornton and Endo (1992) on America and Japan; 
Bright (1991) on ‘the British experience;’ King (1991) on both France and Britain; 
Hastings and Melchers (1990) in Canada; as well as Korobeinikov (1985) in the former
U.S.S.R. Despite their comparative value, these studies have tended to be either organizationally oriented or locally-based in their foci, evaluative in their analyses, or advocacy-oriented in their positions.

I further contend that by taking this advocacy approach, many academic observers have not only side stepped or obscured wider arguments, but they have also presented themselves as ideologically and politically entwined with preventative pursuits. The point is that attention to issues of prevention requires more than mere pragmatic theorising. In this light, rather than taking the conventional literature on the effectiveness of prevention as an information base on which to generate further evaluative research, I treat such prevailing scholarship as a phenomenon to be addressed. In so doing, I scrutinize the inherent logic and the major assertions of analyses on prevention. In an effort to frame crime prevention in Canada within a much broader context, I not only cast the technical questions aside, but I also seek to demonstrate the influence of the overabundance of metaphorical depictions that characterize both the literature and the corresponding political rhetoric about prevention.

By contrast, through its central query, this dissertation attempts to foster an exploration that is broader in its scope and more expansive in its analytical depth than those previously undertaken within the conventional literature on crime prevention. In raising questions about scholarship, I am not only assessing a narrowly focused literature, but I am also attempting to bring the study of crime prevention into a more analytically comprehensive account of discourses and practices of regulation. To this end, I am drawing from a set of writings that seeks to enhance the depth and broaden the scope of
criminological and sociological inquiries on crime prevention.

More specifically, I am responding simultaneously to Sutton’s (1994:5) insistence that prevention programs be located within the context of critical social theory; to Chan’s (1994:28) invitation to explore ‘the history and manifestations of the crime prevention concept;’ to Gilling’s (1997:xii) quest to ‘frame crime prevention upon a much broader canvas;’ and to Crawford’s (1997:1) caution against obscuring wider arguments. I further acknowledge others’ advocacy of situating crime prevention within the contexts of emerging technologies (O’Malley 1992, 1996), broader political trends (Pavlich 1999) as well as, current and pre-existing governmental predicaments, social structures and cultural sensibilities (Garland 1996, 1999, 2000).

In addition to responding to these calls for heightened analysis, I not only engage with, and draw from, this distinct scholarship, but I also attempt to extend its cursory consideration of one particular point of contention, that of rationales. Most, if not all, academics acknowledge that the concept of crime prevention has been employed to justify such things as the right to punish (Foucault 1977:93), ‘the practices of the entire criminal justice system’ (Gilling 1997:2), community measures (Pavlich 1999:105) and partnership approaches (Crawford 1997:3). Sutton (1994:5), on the other hand, points to the decline in faith of rationales (e.g. deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation) offered for traditional crime control responses as an explanation for the increased emphasis on crime prevention.

The central concern with such treatments of rationales is that they tend to be accepted at face value. In much academic writing including that mentioned above, the
rationales are mainly alluded to for the purpose of contextualizing the topic. Therefore, while the notion of prevention as a justificatory concept is acknowledged by certain scholars, rarely, if ever, are the nature, characteristics or scope of the discourse of rationales assessed. Thus, where this study differs from others, is in that it undertakes as its primary aim the documentation and analysis of the rhetoric of rationales within a government setting. It does so based on the premise that not only should preventive strategies be situated within broader trends, but the rationales offered for such interventions must also be similarly scrutinized as they too cast light, and likely to a greater extent, on the shifting trajectory of prevention. In this context, consistencies and changes in rationales over time tend to reveal patterns or shifts in priorities, plans and targets of intervention over time.

GOVERNMENTALITY STUDIES AND PREVENTION

In order better to ground my analysis of prevention, I import some insights into the debate from the governmentality perspectives. For, as I elaborate, in diverse ways and to varying degrees, scholars who have recently examined developments in the areas of risk, ‘the social’ and governance offer more trenchant insights for the examination of the relationship among rhetoric, rationales and government intervention. Thus, my analysis is informed by the debates around ‘risk’ (O’Malley 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001; Castel 1991), ‘the social’ (Donzelot 1979a; O’Malley 1999a; Rose 1996a, 2000), as well as government and ‘governing at-a-distance’ (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1993; Garland 1996, 1999, 2000).
While I engage with the governmentality perspective, I also challenge some of its underlying claims. Through my analysis of federally-directed crime prevention initiatives, I reconsider the extent and direction of the alleged shift from social welfarist towards neo-liberal rationalities and technologies of regulation. Furthermore, rather than taking the alleged presence and influence of rationalities for granted as Rose (1996b) does with advanced liberalism, I reflect upon how rationalities both shape, and are shaped by, technologies of regulation. Hence, in this study, rationalities and technologies are thought to evolve relationally. While the next section briefly alludes to the complexities of these engagements and challenges, chapter three and chapters five through nine explicate them in greater detail.

OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

Towards addressing the issues set out in this research, chapter two provides a retrospective analysis of changing social scientific perspectives on prevention and how its opposition to correctionalism facilitated the emergence of alternatives to reactive responses as a dominant form of crime control. By tracing the genesis and evolution of the crime prevention literature through a reflexive lens (Nelken 1994), I confront the problematic aspects of its alternative aspirations, its promotional stance, and its proneness to theoretical myopia. In so doing, I emphasize how prevention-oriented criminology, both in Canada and elsewhere, is captured by a restrictive and narrow discourse of micro-level theorizing and managerial pragmatism with scant regard for the wider context in which the appeal to prevention is negotiated and justified.
In chapter two, I also reflect on how crime prevention’s salience as an end remains seemingly unquestioned. In this light, crime prevention is somewhat of an ‘untouchable’ entity. This chapter therefore examines in greater detail the special place that crime prevention holds within criminology. Finally, particular regard is given to the treatment of ambiguities and justifications within the promotional frame of reference in which the crime prevention literature is set.

In order to transcend the constraining focus of the conventional crime prevention literature, the third chapter introduces an analytical framework that draws from sociological debates that confront the wider contexts and concerns of governing crime, but from which criminological scholarship has remained distant and disconnected. This chapter thus advances a synthesis of governmentality, criminological and sociological analyses. This analytical fusion not only enables the exploration of issues pertinent to the shifting government intervention in the area of crime prevention, but it also, and more importantly, facilitates a more comprehensive and penetrating examination of the reasons for such emerging patterns of continuity and change. This analytical complex therefore merges elements of the governmentality framework, insights from more recently reflexive and contextual inquiries into crime prevention, as well as aspects of Edelman’s⁴ (1964, 1971, 1977, 1988) extended studies of political language.

While this theoretical composite sheds light on the relevance of rationales to government interventions generally, it is also more specifically designed to contribute to conceptual debates within governmentality perspectives. Particular regard is given to the development of such concepts as ‘rationalities’ (Garland 1999), ‘the death of the social’
(Rose 1996a), the emergence and manifestations of the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992; O’Malley 1992) and ‘governing at-a-distance’ (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1993). With differing emphases, these considerations are used to map a pattern of evolving relations and expectations between state and non-state sectors in the realm of crime prevention.

Scholars within the governmentality framework, namely Rose (1996a, 2000) and O’Malley (1992), have argued that ‘social’ forms of governance may be receding in the face of ‘risk’ based technologies. However, this research challenges such a contention by pointing to the potentiality not only of the converse emergence of ‘risk’ and ‘social’ interventions, but also of their co-existence, interdependence and reformulation (Stenson and Watt 1999). The unfolding of this reconsideration, in the Canadian federal policy context, is explored at length in chapters five through nine.

With a view to mobilizing the aforementioned theoretical insights, chapter four outlines the qualitative design employed, the operational concepts engaged and the data set generated in this research. It also explicates the initial exploration enabled through grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987) and it emphasizes the importance of both analytical and instrument triangulation. The chapter further explains the determination of articulations of, and rationales for, preventive intervention through textual analysis. The latter is aided by a synthesis of certain aspects of Edelman’s (1977, 1988) approach to political language as rhetoric and Fairclough’s (1995) approach to discourse analysis. In addition, the nature, extent and value of the semi-structured interviews are presented; and the systematic review of internal indicators that reveal patterns of continuity and change is clarified. In the final section of the chapter, the
details and dilemmas of the research process and ethical considerations are discussed in greater depth.

Chapters five through eight present the empirical data by tracing the evolutionary trajectory of ‘crime prevention’ within Canadian federal government policy initiatives between 1974 and 2000. Given the difficulty of narrating the history of this contingent development in all its complexity, the aim of these chapters is limited to charting the continuities and changes in articulations of prevention, as well as to ascertaining the shifts in rationales and rationalities that underlie it. The sites of ambiguity and the political opportunities afforded by the conceptual vagueness of crime prevention constitute an underlying thread weaving through these chapters. I advance explanations of the emergence of prevention as a more prominent policy initiative by situating it within the evolving government contexts through which it became manifest. In addition, this consideration raises issues about federally directed crime prevention policy under the dialectical influence of emerging and intersecting forms of governing crime.

More specifically, chapters five through eight present how ‘crime prevention’ was articulated and justified within Canadian federal government rhetoric between 1974 and 2000. The chapters are subdivided by the following periodization. Chapter five examines how and why crime prevention took shape primarily within the bounds of the preventive policing program at the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada during the period between 1974 and 1982. Chapter six explores how and why, in the interval of 1983 and mid-1987, crime prevention was extended within the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada through the advent of National Crime Prevention Week and through a greater emphasis on community-based approaches.
Chapter seven assesses how and why crime prevention was re-framed in a transition phase within the Department of Justice Canada between 1987 and mid-1994. Subsequently, chapter eight examines how and why crime prevention was resurrected and reconstituted through the establishment of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention” which was led primarily by the Department of Justice Canada between mid-1994 and the year 2000.6

As these chapters weave through each of these distinct yet interlinked phases, they explore the rhetoric, the articulations and the rationales that have advanced the crime prevention project within the Canadian federal government. As this recent history is being narrated, these chapters provide a descriptive synopsis of the major responsibilities, policy process and procedural accomplishments of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice between 1974 and 2000. Moreover, in addressing the desire to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance,’ these chapters examine the pronouncements of, and rationales for government fragmentation; the corresponding changes relating to accountability and responsibility are also discussed. While the evolution of governmental rationalities is a thread that runs through these chapters, the complexity and multiplicity of rationalities are addressed in greater depth in chapter nine.

Chapter nine hones the analysis by exploring the extent to which the discourses of ‘risk’ and ‘the social’ are entwined in the articulations and rationales of prevention. The focus is further extended by challenging the profundity and direction of the alleged shift from social welfare orientations towards neo-liberal risk-based preventative tendencies. The concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘the social,’ it is argued, should be appraised as much in their
hybrid conditions as in their distinct manifestations. More specifically, this chapter sheds light on the persistent undercurrent of neo-conservatism, the current narratives of neo-liberalism and the thwarted visions of ‘the social’ as they are made manifest in the Canadian federal government’s rhetoric on crime prevention. Additional analysis is dedicated to the multiple reformulations inherent to the intersection among these three governmental rationalities and their corresponding technologies.

By way of conclusion, chapter ten reiterates the manner and dimensions in which prevention is shaped by, and reshapes rationales for government intervention. It also revisits the scholarly and humanitarian objectives towards which this research seeks to make a modest contribution. It further explicates how a more profound consideration of both scholarly and humanitarian interests can serve to illuminate other historical or contemporary circumstances whereby the ‘power to prevent’ prevails as a justificative mode, principle and aspiration. This chapter concludes by way of sketching a research agenda that seeks to project the challenges raised in this inquiry onto the field of human rights violations whereby prevention, more often as an end, is interwoven into extraordinarily repressive conditions.
1. For a better understanding of the concept of contingent actualities, see the section on ‘rationales’ in chapter three and the section on ‘operational concepts’ in chapter four.

2. I acknowledge that W. B. Gallie is not the only scholar who has addressed the notion of ambiguity in greater depth. Zygmunt Bauman (1997:39) has also reflected upon how concepts such as, ‘order’ and ‘freedom’ are laden with ‘incurable ambivalence.’

3. While the means and processes through which crime prevention is achieved are endlessly debated, the goal is more commonly agreed upon and is thereby seemingly uncontested. The positivity associated with prevention as an end is taken for granted.


5. While Stenson and Watt (1999) have argued that, in certain local settings, the ‘social’ is reformulated rather than displaced or replaced, my own proposed emphasis is on the complexity of the co-existence of both risk-based and social welfare oriented articulations and interventions of crime prevention.

6. These dates do not imply that federal level crime prevention initiatives ended in the year 2000. However, this study has not examined the rhetoric or the policies in this regard beyond December, 2000.
CHAPTER 2

PREVENTION AND CRIMINOLOGY

Having outlined the ambiguous nature of the concept of crime prevention in the previous chapter, two related questions require consideration: What are the academic rationales for crime prevention? How is governmental intervention in the name of prevention articulated and addressed within the literature? This chapter explores these questions by tracing the history of prevention as the object of criminological inquiry. This review is inevitably selective, aiming at an elucidation of the key features that form the social scientific rationales\(^1\) for government-based preventative pursuits. Particular attention is accorded to the late twentieth century emergence of a set of alternative writings devoted specifically to advocating crime prevention strategies. By illustrating the major characteristics of this distinct literature, I present some important challenges that should be brought to bear on academic initiatives so as to raise questions about the nature of criminological reasoning in the area of crime prevention.

PREVENTION AND CRIMINOLOGY

The greater emphasis placed on crime prevention within criminological inquiry in the late twentieth century suggests that prevention has moved from a position of relative obscurity to centre-stage in the ‘fight against crime.’ However, such an assertion is somewhat misleading as it fails to consider that prevention has often been regarded as the
implicit object of both criminological and criminal justice endeavours (Gilling 1997:1).

As it has been channeled through the theoretical trajectory since the eighteenth century,
prevention has been variously inferred, derived and sometimes even surmised from
 criminology's preoccupation with both rational choice and causality. Despite
 criminology's interminable search for cause and cure (Gilling 1997), it has failed to
 achieve a widespread agreement on the explanation of crime. By implication, there is
 also no consensus on the most effective way to prevent it. Such uncertainty has prompted
 some, such as Braithwaite (1989a:133), to pessimistically conclude that:

> The present state of criminology is one of abject failure in its own terms. We
cannot say anything convincing to the community about the causes of crime;
we cannot prescribe policies that will work to reduce crime; we cannot in all
honesty say that societies spending more on criminological research get better
criminal justice policies than those that spend little or nothing on criminology.

Such bankruptcy may be attributable to the restrictive and reactionary way in
which criminology has confined itself to administrative concerns and practical
applications. As the knowledge base upon which reform programmes have been guided
and implemented (Cohen 1985:18), criminology is considered by some critics to be too
closely situated within criminal justice institutions (Garland and Sparks 2000; Garland
1992; Foucault 1980). According to Crawford (1997), the result of this narrow focus has
been the relative absence of analysis on control within the context of broader social and
political trends. While a comprehensive critique on the failings of criminology is not
being undertaken here, it is nevertheless instructive to emphasize how the perpetual
failure may actually be perceived as successful. The perennial calls for additional
research, for more effective programs and for firmer theoretical refinement undeniably sustain criminology’s survival and quest for legitimacy as a discipline. What is of interest to this dissertation is not so much the debate over success and failure, but rather how that debate has fostered the perpetual constitution and reconstitution of preventative intervention over time. The nature of the rationales subsumed in the endless process of re-invention and renewal is also significant to understanding both criminology’s and crime prevention’s struggle with legitimacy.

This discussion is undertaken with a view to exposing the parochialism that characterizes the criminological project.2 The overview echoes, in part, Foucault’s (1980) frustration with the “garrulous discourse” and “endless repetitions” typical of most criminological discourse. Foucault’s conception of criminology is particularized in his renowned remarks: “One has the impression that it is of such utility, is needed so urgently and rendered so vital for the working of the system, that it does not even need to seek a theoretical justification for itself, or even simply a coherent framework. It is entirely utilitarian” (Foucault 1980:47-48). This perceived utility and necessity is undoubtedly evident throughout the history of criminological inquiry and is especially manifest in the late twentieth century focus on crime prevention.

However, my account acknowledges that criminology is perhaps more open-ended than Foucault alleged in his dismissive and overgeneralized view. My purpose is neither to defend criminology nor to deny Foucault’s claim about the complex intersection between knowledge and regulation, as the latter constitutes a major contribution of this dissertation. I do nevertheless challenge Foucault’s criticism that criminology ‘is entirely
utilitarian’ and that it necessarily lacks a ‘coherent framework.’

Regarding the allegation of inadequate coherence, one must concede that criminology is certainly eclectic and composed of various and contending perspectives. As Garland (1992:408) points out, “this is a common characteristic of most social sciences today, and may be an incorrigible feature of social inquiry.” Furthermore, any social scientist with even a minimal sense of recent history would acknowledge the existence of counter-discourses that criticize not only the alleged utility and the necessity of criminology, but also the inhumane and smothering consequences of the corresponding criminal justice enterprise. Thus, the literature that I seek to expose as insular must be recognized as only one part, albeit a major reflection, of the discipline of criminology.

While Foucault’s assertion that criminology is entirely utilitarian is credible to a certain extent, it is overly dismissive. Some aspects of criminology’s theorizing may indeed be perceived as having low scientific value (Foucault 1980) as they have tended to serve more political, policy and pragmatic ends. Furthermore, criminology, at least for the most part, represents a discipline that has been dedicated since its inception to justifying its own existence as a legitimate field of inquiry; by implication it has also been devoted to convincing its political and public audiences that crime, however variously defined, is a serious social problem that requires intervention. Notwithstanding this actuality, such an account fails to consider the theoretical transformations that have resulted from the counter-discourses in the late twentieth century that have sought to distance and disconnect themselves from the criminological-criminal justice symbiosis.
PREVENTION’S HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

An examination of the history of prevention within the tradition of criminological theory reveals its existence as both a peripheral and a core concept. Such an account further illustrates the different academic discourses, justifications and recipes for government action that make up the fragmented crime prevention project. This historical contextualization also demonstrates how the character of prevention is shaped by the ever-changing conception of the crime problem which is attributable not only to social scientific reasoning, but also to political pursuits (Gilling 1997:20). Since the eighteenth century, the responsibility for crime control and social regulation has vacillated between state agencies and civil society (Cohen 1985:16-17). Consideration is thus given to how theoretical analyses assign responsibility for crime prevention. This review seeks to uncover patterns of continuity and change in both the articulations and justifications that serve to designate roles and functions within and outside state systems.

While the intention of this review is not to portray a linear sequence of theoretical developments, as that would be misleading, the approaches will nonetheless be presented in the chronological order in which they emerged. It should be noted that in order to situate the contemporary crime prevention literature ideologically and temporally, the building blocks of traditional criminological theorizing must be reviewed; this endeavour is especially pertinent given that many contemporary forms of crime prevention are modern expressions of traditional theories. Although Garland (1992) claims that criminology only emerged as a discipline in the late nineteenth century, it unquestionably has its roots in earlier schools of thought, including classical thought. This section
therefore traces the evolution from classical criminology in the eighteenth century to the labeling perspectives in the mid-twentieth century. The late twentieth century emphasis on crime prevention is examined subsequently.

**Classical Criminology**

The classical school emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century as an alternative to the perceived inefficiencies of the cruel, unusual and arbitrary punishments that had been inconsistently administered by religious authorities during the Middle Ages. In particular, the publication of Cesare Beccaria’s “An Essay on Crimes and Punishments” in 1764 was thought to have had a significant impact as a “comprehensive, coherent treatise on the iniquities of the contemporary European criminal justice systems” (Roshier 1989:5). Concerned with the irrationality and injustice of the control practices of the day, Beccaria sought to curtail the excessiveness of state and religious power in this regard. Thus, through his treatise, he set out to redirect justice practices towards what he perceived to be more humanitarian means and ends.

Although Beccaria presented an alternative to the merciless practices of the Middle Ages period, he remained within an essentially punitive and deterrent paradigm. Within this context, crime consisted simply of an infraction defined by law and was only punishable if it violated the law (Beccaria 1995:10-13). In place of the preventive logic of the barbaric threat of terror, Beccaria proposed a more measured response, relying on the utilitarian calculus to construct a penal sanction where the pain threatened by punishment exceeded the anticipated pleasure of the offence being contemplated.
Classicism's principal preventive strategy was based therefore upon general deterrence and was intended to work mainly at the symbolic level, through the threat rather than the actuality of punishment. However, as Foucault (1977:93) observes, when punishment was inflicted, it was calculated to be of sufficient proportion to prevent repetition of the offence. In this sense, the prevention of crime has, from this era onward, been used as a justification for the right to punish (Foucault 1977:93). Beccaria himself argued that punishments were necessary "to prevent the offender from doing fresh harm to his fellows and to deter others from doing likewise" (Beccaria 1995:31).

In defending the prerogative of the state to punish, Beccaria argued that the intervention was aimed at "defending the repository of the public well-being from the usurpation of individuals" (Beccaria, 1995:10). Although as a reformer Beccaria sought to limit the power of the state and religious authority, he nonetheless espoused a Hobbesian view of centralized government monopoly, and thereby advocated the utility of a more concentrated crime control system. The emergence of capitalist and centralized political power was eventually accompanied by a widespread reliance upon state managed carceral institutions designed to segregate and punish offenders. This brief overview of Beccaria's influence as a reformer within the classical school has demonstrated that the preventative effect of incarceration has been debated since the advent of prisons. It has also revealed an earlier example of the affinity between intellectual thought and government intervention, the former of which seems to have supplied the justificatory defense for the latter.
Neo-Classical Thought

Neo-classical criminology was primarily influenced by the work of Jeremy Bentham whose repulsion with the archaic nature of eighteenth-century British common law led him to propose numerous schemes of rational legal reform. While Bentham’s major preoccupation was the codification of law, the notion of prevention and the role of ‘the state’ were central considerations in his writings and were presented as mutually reinforcing entities. With a view to severing ‘the state’ from any partisan influence, Bentham sought to establish a scientific rationale for any state action which he identified as “the main universal end - the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Bentham 1841:IX.1:170). Bentham outlined his utilitarian maxim which links the actions of individuals, namely the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, with the functions of the state, namely the greatest good for the greatest number (Bentham 1841:II.1:24:18-25).

According to Bentham, the concept of prevention was germane to the appropriate role of ‘the state’ in securing the greatest happiness. Since the security required to ensure greater happiness could not be taken for granted, state action was deemed necessary. Bentham’s “Constitutional Code,” published posthumously in 1841, identified the various ways in which state intervention could serve to maintain security. Bentham’s ideal was deterrent legislation that bore great similarity to its classical antecedents⁵ and which informed his plans, albeit unfulfilled, for the “Panopticon.” Bentham thought that interventions based on both deterrence and reform could have a preventative effect. Despite his emphasis on deterrence, Bentham promoted proactive measures to avert
potential problems. Among the thirteen ministries that he proposed in his code was a Ministry for Preventive Services, whose function was aimed at “the prevention of delinquency and calamity” (Bentham 1841:IX.2:171).

Implied within Bentham’s “Constitutional Code,” particularly in Volume II, is an anticipatory role for government whereby it is not to wait for crime to reveal itself; it should instead foresee its appearance and intervene accordingly. While still employing the classical notion of utilitarianism and the existence of the ‘Homo penalis’ or ‘rational man,’ Bentham claimed that the pull of hedonism was much stronger for some than for others. He thus proposed programs primarily targeted at a pre-delinquent stage, including employment and education “to divert the current of the desires from objects in the pursuit of which men are more apt to be led into the tract of delinquency” (Dinwiddy 1989:91). In later terms, Bentham thus supported tertiary and secondary forms of prevention. This same emphasis on prevention permeated the writings of Bentham’s disciple, Edwin Chadwick. In his “Report on The Sanitary Condition” (1842), Chadwick dedicated an entire chapter (VI) to exposing “evidence of the effects of preventive measures in raising the standard of health and the chances of life” (Chadwick, 1842:276). Through this account, Chadwick explicated the benefits of, and by implication the rationale for, preventive measures designed to avert such potentialities as floods, epidemics, food shortages, work-related accidents and health risks, as well as fires.

In their self-professed humanitarian and liberal pursuits, both Beccaria and Bentham sought to accord dignity, utilitarian efficiency and government involvement to criminal justice practices. By affiliation, the discipline of criminology had taken root in
this pragmatic legal tradition whereby prevention was surmised from, and conflated with, a deterrent logic in its classical form, and was inferred in the neo-classical vision that sought to encompass both reactive and proactive measures. Despite the perceived progress of reforms, there was a growing concern in the latter half of the nineteenth century that the neo-classical control system had failed at the practical level because crime rates continued to rise across Europe (Pasquino 1991:240). This atmosphere of alarm coincided with advances in the empirically-based positive sciences which supplied the grounds for the consideration of a ‘more effective’ alternative.

**Positivism**

Upon the emergence of positivism in the late nineteenth century, centralized state involvement in crime control had become entrenched and irrevocable. The task for the positivist theorists was therefore not so much to convince governments of their responsibility to intercede, as the classical theorists had already reinforced this ‘necessity’ so vehemently. At issue instead was the nature of state intervention, which was about to be changed and intensified immeasurably as new areas of social life were to become colonized by both scientific and political authority.

The theoretical underpinnings of positivist criminology can be found in the dominant human science of the nineteenth century, namely Darwinism. Positivism’s scientific explanation replaced the notion of the rational man - classicism’s “Homo penalis” - with the criminal type - positivism’s “Homo criminalis” (Pasquino 1991:237). Within positivist thought, criminal behaviour was pictured as sickness, not sin, and as
caused rather than chosen. This shift has been attributed to the publication of Cesare Lombroso’s\(^7\) (1876) “L’Uomo delinquente” (The Criminal Man) which established positivism’s causal explanation as rooted in the notion of difference, or more specifically deficient difference.\(^8\) While positivist theorists disagreed over the nature of the cause, they tended to agree that criminals were degenerate and defective. Consequently, positivist criminology’s predominant ‘cure’ involved sentences of ‘preventive’ detention and rehabilitation. In this sense, positivism did not so much replace classicism as add alternatives to its repertoire (Gilling 1997:32). Classicism’s carceral institutions thus became positivism’s sites of experimentation and corrective reconditioning. Pasquino (1991:242) summarizes the project as ‘social hygiene’ and describes it as:

> between the two extremes of residual intimidation for delinquents and neutralization (tending towards physical liquidation) for hardened criminals ... there opens up a vast domain of intervention ... designed to act as a preventive clean-up of the social breeding grounds for crime.

Although it was initially met with considerable scientific scepticism and official mistrust, such a project was reinforced by the interlocking of science and state intervention. According to von Liszt (1899 - cited in Pasquino 1991), the object of the penal sciences was not only to establish a knowledge base upon which criminologists could carry out their practical duties, but it was also to develop a specialized prevention designed to attack the roots of criminality.\(^9\) Since it was around the figure of ‘homo criminalis’ and its allegedly deficient features that positivist criminology constructed its ‘knowledge base,’ the corresponding ‘specialized prevention’ implied corrective treatment, which from that time onward, became the predominant characteristic of the
criminal justice enterprise. Some critics, such as Kittrie (1971), describe the proliferation of treatment programs as the rise of the ‘therapeutic state.’

The treatment variation of the positivist endeavours was commonly viewed as a progressive improvement over the exclusively punitive project of classicism. Since the late nineteenth century, the ‘preventative’ pursuits derived from positivist logic have taken shape through the paternalistic and diagnostic roles of political government. The legal principle of parens patriae (the duty of the state to help those who allegedly cannot help themselves) was repeatedly invoked to justify the subjection of ‘criminals’ and other ‘non-conforming’ individuals to innumerable intrusive ‘preventative’ interventions, including segregated institutionalization and sterilization. Of greater import is the role that positivism played in providing the ‘scientific’ rationale for the repressive biological control efforts of the eugenics movement, including those committed by the Nazis during World War II.

Similarly in the Canadian context, the positivist version of ‘prevention’ became a theme upon which discriminatory agendas were rationalized. Canadian public health officials relied upon American-based ‘evidence’ of the efficacy of ‘asexualization’ to legitimate their pursuits. Dr. F. McKelvey Bell explained that

[prevention is always better than cure. Institutions which will destroy the disease in its infancy are next in order of importance. Degeneracy underlies to a greater or lesser extent all social disease, therefore it must be our first aim to stamp out the degenerate. To do this we must begin at the beginning, i.e., with the control of marriage amongst criminals, degenerates and lunatics, in order that they shall not be able to procreate their kind (Bell 1908:52 cited in McLaren 1990:42).]
To this argument, Dr. Helen MacMurchy, the most prominent Canadian defender of the use of sterilization in the early 1900s, added an economic rationale. As she forecast burdening increases in the costs of institutionalization, she argued that only by sterilization could the prevention of the reproduction of the feeble-minded, the insane and 'chronic criminals' be economically achieved (MacMurchy cited in Atherton 1907:101). In this context, prevention not only took on discriminatory overtones, but it also became entwined in political and economic arguments for more intrusive state and professional interference into the lives of vulnerable populations. Thus in its positivist form, prevention became the site at which scientific evidence and state agendas enmeshed in the pursuit of extreme forms of control.

As a result of damning research and the exposure of numerous violations of human rights standards, the individual rehabilitative and corrective treatment programs of the biological and psychological positivist enterprise had fallen into disrepute. With the perennial call for more research and improvement on the humanitarian and effectiveness fronts, positivism's focus had thus turned to sociological explanations.10

**Functionalism and Anomie**

The functionalist perspective partially distinguished itself from the mainstream criminological enterprise by its emphasis on the positive contributions of crime. This constructive view originated in the late nineteenth-century writings of the French social theorist Émile Durkheim whose work represented the first major sociological analysis of crime. He contended that "[c]rime is ... necessary; it is bound up with the fundamental
conditions of all social life, and by that very fact it is useful ...” (Durkheim 1938:70).
According to this view, without deviance there would be no moral, societal or legal boundaries. The functionalist view that regulation operates through the creation of offences is evident in Durkheim’s (1938:69) claim that “if ...society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such.” This preoccupation with the functionality and normality of crime lead Durkheim to the unique conclusion that crime was a social fact that could not be prevented. He did caution, however, that “[w]hat is normal ... is the existence of criminality, provided that it attains and does not exceed ... a certain level” (Durkheim 1938:66).

For functionalists, limiting the excesses of crime involved socialization and persuasion aimed at both preventing and correcting deviance, for which political institutions were thought to play a central role in both setting and realizing these societal goals (Parsons 1951:51). However, coercion was also available as a last resort within the functionalist view whereby the state could exercise its prerogative to constrain nonconformists, even if by violence (Pfohl 1994:235). Despite the alleged normality of crime, the concern over the excess of disorder clearly underscored the need for, and the legitimacy of coercive state power within functionalist thought.

A subsequent neo-functionalist analysis included Merton’s (1938) adaptation of Durkheim’s concept of anomie, through which he argued that the deviant responses of those socialized into the ends of capitalist individualism were a result of limited access to the legitimate means of attaining the ‘American dream.’ To this problematic, Merton proposed a reformist strategy aimed at expanding greater access to the ‘dream;’ the
implied conservatism of this solution prompted Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) to describe Merton as a ‘cautious rebel.’ The prevention implications of Merton’s proposals constituted a combination of government intervention and individual agency, with greater emphasis having been placed on the latter.

More specifically, he acknowledged the value of increasing legitimate opportunities to those who aspired towards capitalist-oriented goals by calling for an assault on the socially structured obstacles to success. However, Merton conservatively placed greater importance on the need for individuals to reduce their aspirations to a more ‘realistic’ level. Thus, the prevention insinuations of Merton’s model, and of the subsequent modifications to it (see for e.g. Cloward and Ohlin 1960), are commonly criticized for locating the responsibility for crime away from the social structure and onto the individual and delinquent subculture.

**Social Disorganization Perspective**

During the 1920s, the social disorganization perspective emerged through the research of sociologists at the University of Chicago (see for e.g. Park 1936, Shaw and McKay 1942). The theories are thus often referred to as the ‘Chicago school’ approach. By emphasizing social causation, as opposed to rational choice or illness, the Chicago school shifted the focus from individual pathology to group or ecological pathology. By implication, the preventive ideal of this perspective lay in the treatment of society whereby it was thought that disorganized communities could be reorganized through informal social controls. For Shaw and McKay (1942:4), this involved the establishment
of "programs which seek to effect changes in the conditions of life in specific local communities and in whole sections of the city." More specifically such experimental schemes entailed the provision of recreational activities, outreach youth work and resident participation in community development.

While there was no explicit discussion of state responsibility for intervention in this regard, considerable efforts were made on the part of the researchers to solicit the joint efforts of schools, churches, labour unions, industrial and business interests, clubs and other local groups in organizing collectively to combat community problems. Thus, the onus of responsibility was clearly placed within civil society. Despite the approach's shortcomings of generalizability and ecological fallacy, the longevity of the Chicago Area Project bears testimony to the enduring appeal of the idea of social disorganization as a rationale for crime prevention; it also laid the foundation for contemporary versions of community crime prevention initiatives based on multi-agency cooperation. It should be noted, however, that the Chicago school theorists should not necessarily be credited with any significant innovation, as their proposals are similar to the recommendations offered a century earlier by Chadwick (1842:335), who advocated the benefits of public parks and recreational facilities for the general health and welfare of marginalized sectors of the population.

The Learning Perspective

The learning perspective is best known through Edwin Sutherland's (1947) theory of 'differential association' in which he attempted to account for all types of 'criminal'
behaviour including ‘white collar crime.’ In short, this theory purports that criminal behaviour is learned behaviour. Through his sixth principle, Sutherland further explained that the knowledge necessary to commit deviant acts, along with the motives, values and skills, are learned and acquired through personal interactions that take place in deviant groups; such clusters are those in which there is “an excess of definitions favorable to law violation over those favorable to conformity” (Sutherland 1947:6).

According to the learning perspective, deviance may be controlled either by the preventive learning of pro-conventional attitudes and behaviours or by the corrective unlearning of unconventionality. Preventive learning encompasses comprehensive socialization which is supposed to include the entirety of a person’s social experience (Pfohl 1994:315). Given the individualism inherent within this theory, the latter can only be considered a partial explanation and resolution because it reduces deviance to an oversimplified imitative-learning problematic. Furthermore, while the role of ‘the state’ is not explicitly discussed or invoked within this approach, Pfohl (1994:325) contends that recent advances within the learning perspective lend themselves to widespread behavioural manipulation and increases in the power of the state to control ‘deviants’ socially.

Societal Reaction Perspective

The advent of the societal reaction or labeling perspective and the paradigmatic shift associated with it coincided with the growth of scepticism with sociological positivism. This approach purported that the study of deviance can never be fully
detached from the study of social control. Since labeling claimed that deviance was a product of cultural conflict which formal institutions reinforced, then the preventive insinuation was clearly non-intervention. Demands for decriminalization and decarceration thus ensued so as to minimize the alleged detrimental effects of official control agencies. In the context of political-scientific relations, it is important to note that the timing of the academic calls for de-institutionalization closely paralleled the growing fiscal crisis of state government (Scull 1977).

Thus, the principle of ‘pares patriae’ that had dominated the first part of the twentieth century was being reconstituted on academic, political and economic levels. Despite the controversial claims of ‘unintended consequences’ and ‘net-widening’ resulting from this ideological attack and dispersal of control, labeling nonetheless diverted attention away from the offender and beyond the realm of state-directed social control; in so doing, it paved the way for alternative explanations and interventions not confined to criminology or criminal justice. The contemporary crime prevention literature emerged as one of the alternative lines of enquiry amidst the disquiet of conservatives and radicals alike.

Prior to analyzing the late twentieth century literature on prevention, it is useful to reflect on the relation between traditional criminological theorizing and crime prevention thus far. As the previous review demonstrates, theorizing about crime between the late eighteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century has been constructed out of a diverse range of applied interests. While not all theories of crime are necessarily theories of crime prevention, they are often construed as such. Some perspectives even have
objectives beyond that of practical application.

Nevertheless, the majority of conventional theorizing has been interpreted as having an implicit crime prevention objective. It seems that whatever the explanation of crime or the corresponding strategy, a 'preventive' rationalization could be put forth. It should be noted that many of the solutions spawned from this theoretical evolution were similar in their scope; whether they were uniquely punitive or therapeutically corrective, the responses in this approach were most often targeted at the individual level. Whether crime was explained as being a result of sin, choice, pathology or social cause, the response was inflicted upon the individual and often in a very intrusive or destructive manner.

In addition, the preventive practices spawned did not necessarily follow directly from the theories so much as they have been deduced from them within a particular political context. Indeed, the practical implications of the theories are more often politically interpreted than scientifically inferred (Gilling 1997). In this sense, it may even be argued that criminology has had an uneven and peripheral preoccupation with prevention. For most of its existence, the 'special savoir of criminology' (Pasquino 1991:244) has been tied to a deeply entrenched and stubbornly irrevocable neo-classical system of punishment which takes legal definitions of crime as its point of departure. Not even the influence of positivism could replace the classical grip on the criminological and criminal justice enterprise.

Thus, in most instances, the notion of prevention may have been extracted from theories, but more in its capacity as a principle and therefore as a rationale, rather than as
a means. Such a conclusion is a fair one insofar as the majority of the practical interventions derived from neo-classical or positivist thought were reactions either to crime or to symptoms of pre-existing deviant behaviour. While they may have been expected to prevent recidivism, they were still reacting to an initial offense or an allegedly non-conforming behaviour.

Finally, the relationship between criminological theorizing, prevention and 'the state' remains an ambiguous one. Throughout the history of criminology, prevention has been either an implicit part of state intervention or an explicitly favoured one. Since the time of Beccaria and Bentham, criminologists and sociologists of deviance have, in numerous ways and to varying degrees, sought to critique existing state initiatives, influence their policies, or by-pass their interventions. Since the classical school, a role for the state has been implied, and perhaps even expected, in the business of social order and crime control. Thus, all subsequent theories, with the exception of the societal reaction perspective, have variously discerned the prevention theme based on the taken for granted assumption of the existence and perhaps even the necessity of state responsibility for criminal justice policy and practice.

In this context, prevention has been interpreted both as a central principle of the criminal justice project, and as an approach that is distinct and in contrast to it. As mainly an applied discipline, early twentieth century criminology was less concerned with emphasizing the need for state intervention than it was with convincing political authorities to consider other ways of explaining and addressing the problem of crime or deviance. Thus a considerable portion of the criminological enterprise constituted
‘system-fixing’ efforts. It was only after the influence of the societal reaction perspective that serious attention was paid to the viability of crime-reducing measures that lay outside the realm of both ‘the state’ and criminology. This shift took place within the midst of political and intellectual upheaval. By the mid-twentieth century, the adequacy of punitive, correctionalist and community measures as preventative was being called into question. Thus, the highlighting of the constraining aspects of both criminology and criminal justice increased the receptiveness towards alternative ways of conceiving of the crime problem, and by implication, of alternative ways of addressing it.

THE LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE ON CRIME PREVENTION

In light of apparent shifts in Western criminal justice policies and practices since the 1960s, late twentieth century criminological inquiry witnessed the emergence of a literature specifically devoted to advocating and examining crime prevention. However, as political and academic rhetoric about the prevention of crime has grown, the danger of superficial thought has also increased; so does the need, therefore, for critical analysis of the literature promoting this allegedly alternative approach to crime and victimization. This section brings some important challenges to bear on academic initiatives so as to raise questions about the expressed desirability of state interventions in the name of crime prevention. The grounds for caution include, among others, an uncontested promotional literature, a proneness to conceptual ambiguity and theoretical myopia, as well as political nuances.

In this context, by tracing the genesis and the evolution of the crime prevention
literature, this section examines its characteristics and major assertions. First, by highlighting the alternative aspirations of this literature, I demonstrate that it has partially failed to accomplish what it set out to achieve. Second, by tracing the unfolding of the dominant approaches, I emphasize how prevention-oriented criminology, both in Canada and elsewhere, is captured by a restrictive and narrow discourse of micro-level theorizing and managerial pragmatism with scant regard for the wider context in which the appeal to prevention is negotiated and justified. Third, I confront the problematic aspects of the scholarship's promotional stance and the rationales subsumed therein. By examining the Canadian literature in particular, I reveal the nature of academic endeavours consumed with advocating the necessity for state intervention in the name of crime prevention. Finally, this chapter concludes with a reflection on the relationship between the crime prevention scholarship and broader criminological debates.

ALTERNATIVE ASPIRATIONS OF THE CRIME PREVENTION LITERATURE

While the notion of prevention is certainly not a recent one, the emergence of the contemporary crime prevention literature can be traced to a pivotal historical period which fostered the counter ideological attacks on criminological theorizing and which initiated the destructuring impulse in social control practices during the 1960s. This tumultuous moment represented a time when mainstream theory about crime appeared rather limited in its conceptualization and applicability. Even though criminological theorizing has been entwined with state directed regulation since the classical school, the perceived post-World War II rise in crime in many Western societies had damaged the
theories' political utility and had rendered their recycling within criminal justice practices more problematic. According to Gilling (1997:45), "[t]his was either because its practice had failed to deliver the expected reduction in crime, or because the practical implications of the theorizing were in fact highly impractical." Nonetheless, the ideological denunciations, the growing political and scientific dissatisfaction with the correctionalist orientation and the decline in the practical utility of theorizing about crime created a space for new approaches for the study of this phenomenon.

Consequently, there emerged various 'alternative' perspectives. Criminology witnessed the simultaneous advent of the critical perspectives (see for e.g. Taylor, Walton and Young 1973) and revisionist and decarceration literatures (see for e.g. Rothman 1971; Scull 1977; Cohen 1979, 1985; Foucault 1977) towards the left and the renaissance of conservatism (see for e.g. Wilson 1983a,b) on the right. Somewhere in between these extremes, the crime prevention literature developed. While all attempted to move beyond the narrow confines of sociological positivism and the exhausted usefulness of the correctional model, these approaches clearly diverged in their focus of study and in their view of the role of 'the state.' Neo-conservatives continued to advocate formal state intervention and maintained close government relations (Wilson 1983a,b); and while they occasionally promoted the popular informal community control strategies, these were always in association with policing initiatives (Wilson and Kelling 1982). By contrast, the critical perspectives expanded on the counter ideologies to transcend, and to distance themselves from the state and its control practices. Through this somewhat maverick direction, criminology became less concerned with being an applied discipline (Garland and Sparks 2000:197).
The crime prevention literature, on the other hand, seemingly by-passed the state debates and proceeded to develop situational and community focused alternatives. Whereas the critical perspectives were typically retrospective and explicitly detached from control, the crime prevention literature was forward looking and highly immersed in the applied world of crime management. This literature picked up on the lead given by the labeling perspective which helped to divert attention away from the offender as the key explanatory variable; whereas for labeling this shift was mainly theoretical, for the crime prevention literature, it has been mainly practical. It was nonetheless, a practicality that was not initially confined to the repertoire of the traditional reactive criminal justice responses (Gilling 1997); herein lies this literature’s point of departure and apparent mark of innovative discontinuance with criminology and criminal justice.

Indeed, the prevention literature benefitted from the shifting ideologies associated with the historical period in which it emerged. In fact, it was the same pessimistic forces of ‘nothing works’ which conspired to denounce the treatment paradigm that actually served to bolster support for crime prevention (Gilling 1997). Thus, the writings on prevention have enjoyed almost three decades of promotion and documentation of various crime prevention strategies. However, despite the literature’s desire to move beyond existing reactive and formal criminal justice responses, its major accomplishment has been promotional: to document and evaluate various crime prevention strategies. In addition, since this literature bears similarity to both its classical and positivist antecedents, it inevitably became re-entwined with state technologies of regulation with its claims increasingly being subsumed into the main crime control enterprise. The limitations of this endeavour are presented below.
DOMINANT PERSPECTIVES OF THE CRIME PREVENTION LITERATURE

There are indeed contrasting undertakings to describe and deploy features of crime prevention theorising. Several attempts have been made to give tangible expression to the belief that in dealing with crime, prevention is better than cure (Heal 1989:513). These approaches include situational crime prevention which is thought to be accomplished through environmental design, urban planning and target hardening tactics (see for e.g. Brantingham and Brantingham 1981, 1988, 1990; Clarke 1992; Cohen and Felson 1979; Cornish and Clarke 1987; Goldstein 1979; Jacobs 1961; Newman 1973; Jeffery 1971) and community crime prevention through neighbourhood watch type programmes (see for e.g. Rosenbaum 1986, 1987, 1988; Greenberg et al. 1985; Lavrakas 1985; Sampson et al. 1988; Trojanowicz et al. 1975).

More recently developed approaches include crime prevention through social development strategies which imply early intervention in children deemed at-risk of later offending (see for e.g. Farrington 1989, 1994; Hastings 1998; Leblanc 1979, 1983; Leblanc and Fréchette 1989; Normandeau and Hasenpusch 1978; Waller 1990, 1991; Waller and Weiler 1985). Still others have pointed to the strategic value of integration (see for e.g. Braithwaite 1989a; Bottoms 1990; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Rosenbaum 1987, 1988). Without undertaking an in-depth description of their subtleties, the following analysis highlights the basic distinguishing attributes of each perspective. The discussion therefore traces the evolution of the three main orientations presented through the literature, from situational crime prevention, through to community approaches and on crime prevention through social development.
Situational Crime Prevention

‘Situational crime prevention’ is a term that has been used very loosely to refer to theories which advocate crime reduction and whose organizing concept is the spatial and temporal ‘opportunities’ of crime and ‘risks’ of victimization. According to the proponents of this perspective, both ‘space’ and ‘targets’ had been, up until this point, neglected features of criminological theorizing. Situational prevention bears great similarity to neo-classical thinking; in fact, it is considered a contemporary expression of classical theory (Walkate 1996:16) in that it “is based on the assumption that people choose to commit crime and that the decision to offend is influenced by situational factors” (Graham and Bennett 1995:47). The narrow parameters of this problem-oriented approach are best exemplified in Clarke’s (1992:3) contention that situational crime prevention “refers to a preventive approach that relies, not upon improving society or its institutions, but simply upon reducing opportunities for crime.”

The rationale underlying such a premise is attributable to the recognition that post-war improvements in social conditions had been ironically accompanied by rising crime rates and declines in the safety of communities. This claim weakened the case for many sociological explanations of criminality and positivistic-oriented responses. In fact, as Jeffery (1971) argued, many sociological accounts of criminality operated only after the event, and were thereby not genuinely proactive. The impetus also lay in the reality that the repercussions of increasing crime had become a challenge for others besides criminologists and criminal justice officials (Gilling 1997:46).

Such concerns and alleged failures inevitably strengthened the case for situational
advocates to reorient criminology's field of study and to construct alternative ways of
addressing the 'problem' of crime. The literature constructed around the situational
approach thus promoted urban planning and housing design tactics to protect 'defensible
space' (Jacobs 1961; Newman 1973), target hardening schemes through 'environmental
design' (Jeffery 1971; 1977; Brantingham and Brantingham 1981), selective patrols
through 'problem-oriented policing' (Goldstein 1979), opportunity reduction and
lifestyle changes through 'routine activity' theory (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson
1994), and more recently the revival of utilitarianism to manage risk and opportunity
through 'rational choice theory' (Clarke 1992; Cornish and Clarke 1987; Newman et
al. 1997).

Indeed, the advent of situational prevention was considered a momentous change
in theory and practice as it revived an interest in the spatial characteristics of crime; it
thus heralded a period of more pragmatically focused criminological inquiry. However,
its legitimacy was not obtained overnight. On a theoretical level, Clarke and Felson
(1993) claimed that there was no criminological interest in the phenomenon of crime. On
a practical level, Jane Jacobs' pioneering proposals were initially met with considerable
hostility because they relied more on the participation of the public than the criminal
justice system, including the police. In this sense, having been brought forth from outside
mainstream criminology, situational approaches had taken on somewhat of a maverick
standing. They were approaches that no longer took the state and its agencies to be the
primary actors in the business of crime control. In the face of well established
institutional interests, resistance was certainly understandable.
Despite the perceived threats to territorial parameters, however, the advocacy calls were eventually embraced. This recognition was in part accomplished because the situational approach served to engender a sense of hope among policy-makers that something policy-relevant could be found from criminological research to tackle a crime problem that had become increasingly resilient to the criminal justice system. Despite its original attempts to distance itself from traditional state-based interventions, situational crime prevention enjoyed a period of extraordinary success in the political sense as an influence on government programs of crime control in the late 1970s and early 1980s in North America and Britain (Bottoms 1990; O’Malley 1992).

Subsequently, the promotional literature quickly evolved into evaluative research which initially pointed to implementation problems, namely that of displacement. Further research brought to light additional weaknesses; Mawby (1977) and Mayhew (1979) identified that situational approaches fail to consider the social origins of crime. This failure to address the motivations of offending narrowly places the onus of responsibility of situational measures on the potential individual victim (O’Malley 1992:266; Walkate 1991:206). Similarly, Merry (1981:419) concluded that defensible space is not sufficient for crime prevention because “spaces may be defensible but not defended if the social apparatus for effective defense is lacking.” Others have suggested that an inherent limitation in such an approach is a tendency towards architectural determinism (Kinsey et al. 1986). Still others have more recently reiterated that situational strategies react only to symptoms and thereby fail to address enduring social problems of which crime is merely a manifestation (King 1989a; Bottoms 1990).
Indeed the literature has been reflective of the strategies it promotes; however, its original incentive has remained unchallenged. For example, advocates of situational prevention point to rising crime rates as evidence of the failure of criminal justice. However, while this may be a politically persuasive argument, it is hardly an irrefutable fact, especially since the validity of crime rates have been undermined by criminologists for several decades now. Thus, one must question whether crime rates are a neutral measure of efficiency or are constructed to serve as part of the politics of failure.

Furthermore, despite renewed debate on displacement (Clarke 1992; Hesseling 1994), the literature has still failed to resolve this conundrum. Such debates are inevitably endless and seemingly unresolvable and they only reveal micro-level, organizational and technical obstacles.

**Community Crime Prevention**

The advent of ‘community crime prevention’ programs in the early 1980s represented an important point in the development of informal social control as it marked the recognition of the variety of ways in which crime is thought to be prevented. The displacement problems associated with situational approaches served as a rationale for the more socially oriented community strategies; these are known to include ‘Neighbourhood Watch,’ ‘Operation Identification,’ and ‘Block Parent.’ These community solutions also attempted to overcome the situational approaches’ conflicting rationalities of the implementation process. The community focused literature thus maintained an intensely pragmatic emphasis on the importance of ‘inter-agency’
cooperation, ‘partnerships,’ ‘collective action,’ and ‘citizen mobilization,’ etc. In so doing, the literature promoting and evaluating community alternatives inevitably follows a similar trajectory to that of situational prevention.

Initial work attempted to provide empirical support for community programs (Greenberg et al. 1985) so as to marshall scholarly endorsements for the concept of community prevention (Trojanowicz et al. 1975). Community programs were justified through a promotional literature that claimed that high levels of crime were the product of the erosion of informal social control processes and cycles of urban decay (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Greenberg et al. 1985). It should be noted, however, that despite their ‘broken windows’ thesis, Wilson and Kelling (1982) still favoured an emphasis on the police role in order maintenance. Similarly, the concept of Neighbourhood Watch applies the opportunity reduction model which is actually a derivative of situational theorizing, although the former is thought to be achieved through social surveillance and the latter through physical design or natural surveillance. Nonetheless, the basic strategic logic of both approaches remains the same.

While some scholars, such as Rosenbaum (1987) and Greenberg et al., (1985), challenged the theoretical assumptions of community programs and the low quality of evaluation research designs (Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1986:26), they did so mainly through micro-level examinations of implementation obstacles. By exploring the implant hypothesis (Rosenbaum 1987; 1988), the analysis questioned ground level issues such as, citizen participation, fear reduction and the role of the police. The conclusions drawn always pointed to limited success for crime reduction or implementation failure and
called for further research and more efficient program maintenance (Rosenbaum 1987:129). Similar analytical narrowness is reflected in the studies by Sampson et al. (1988) on multi-agency approaches. Without discounting the value of these ‘lessons learned’ type of findings, it is important to note that this literature never seemed to move beyond the examination of unresolvable micro-level issues.

Furthermore, placing the responsibility for crime prevention on the community and expecting that increased community activity would automatically result in less crime (Crawford 1995:105), is not only logically problematic and misleading, but it also blames the community for the problem of crime (Walkate 1991:209). Similar to situational approaches, it also deflects attention away from the social origins of offending. In so doing, the theorizing on community approaches silences relevant etiological insights. In addition, this literature does not consider the broader political, ideological or economic contexts through which community crime prevention programs emerge and the influence that these forces may have on the viability of community level programs. This contention should not be taken as a complete condemnation of the literature on community crime prevention, but rather as a call for social scientists to think more expansively, for example, about the appeals to ‘community’ and ‘crime prevention’ in the context of shifting state and civil society responsibilities (Crawford 1995, 1997).

**Crime Prevention through Social Development**

As the third distinct set of writings on crime prevention, the literature on ‘social development’ emerged around the mid-1980s. It drew inspiration from the critiques of
both situational and community-based approaches as the latter were thought to deflect attention away from the social foundations of offending. In fact, social development programs are premised on the very elements that situational prevention rejects, that is, the biographical causal approaches to understanding offenders. Although it is deemed more proactive than corrective in its orientation, social development research faithfully carries on criminology’s obsessive search for factors that allegedly distinguish the ‘criminal’ from the ‘law abiding.’

In this sense, based on the results of longitudinal research, social development approaches aim to prevent criminality and to curb motivation; its intervention targets are therefore individuals or potential offenders rather than targets of crime as in situational prevention. The literature justifies developmental interventions based on research that identifies ‘risk factors’ which are allegedly linked to criminality (Rutter and Giller 1983; West 1982; Farrington 1994, 1995). Therefore, in an effort to address such problems as economic deprivation, ‘inadequate parenting,’ illiteracy, and nutritional deficiencies, social development adherents advocate early intervention in the areas of health, education, parental support, recreation, social assistance, etc.

It is interesting to note that in Canadian criminological literature, scant attention has been accorded to crime prevention generally, with less emphasis on situational strategies (Brantingham and Brantingham 1988, 1984, 1981; Brantingham 1986; Gabor 1990) and even less on community approaches. While the social development view of crime prevention was not even articulated by criminologists until the mid-1980s, its rise to prominence is clearly reflected in the increase of promotional Canadian literature on

A few notes of caution must be raised regarding this literature. Not only are these writings promotional by advocating a particular prevention strategy, but they are also entrepreneurial as their main impetus seems to be to convince politicians and policy-makers to adopt social development within government programs (see especially for e.g. Waller 1991, 1990; Farrington 1989). They do so by providing seductive economic rationalizations and by pointing to allegedly successful programs in the United States, Sweden, The Netherlands, France, and England and Wales (Waller 1991). What is most problematic about these advocacy oriented writings is that by so narrowly focusing upon translating theory into practice, they remain aloof to the shortcomings and discriminatory potential of the social development approach which have been documented elsewhere (Donzelot 1979a; Ewald 1990; West 1982:131). Not only could this lacuna have serious practical implications, but it is also analytically irresponsible. In this sense, by overlooking potential obstacles or problematic conceptions, the literature does not attempt to resolve them.

While not discounting the humanitarian merits of the social developmental approach, as it is the first late-twentieth century prevention strategy that seeks to address the ‘social foundations’ of offending, I wish to point out that it does so within the diagnostic realm of sociological positivism. While perhaps politically appealing, to
engage with this level of analysis evidently runs the risk of revisiting the perennial shortcomings of the treatment model. Social development is thus viewed by some as a risk-based strategy of normalization in which categories or entire populations may be manipulated (Ewald 1990, 1991). Clearly, these implications merit further analysis. In addition, despite the plethora of ‘outcome’ evaluation studies demonstrating signs of success, there remains little serious attention given to the broader implications of the social development approach for shifting political arrangements and policy formation, and more importantly, for civil society and social relations. Certainly, more in-depth considerations of these contextual matters would broaden criminological understanding in this field.

The intention of this section has not been to suggest a unilinear development of crime prevention theory, where one perspective is replaced by another in a chronological process. Rather, the purpose has been briefly to review important contributions to contemporary crime prevention theorizing and to demonstrate some of the variation therein.

While the rationale of this literature was mainly practical, it was a practicality not confined to traditional criminal justice system responses to crime. However, while this distinction gave it the freedom to be innovative, it seemed that pragmatic ends took precedence over scientific ones. The practical impact of these theories has indeed been considerable as they have contributed to the development of a range of preventive approaches that have focussed not only on the offender, but also on the victim, the environment and the community. They have thus increased the repertoire of official and
unofficial responses to crime.

These theories have also extended the criminological imagination as they have incorporated new explanatory variables, such as time, space and opportunity, and they have moved towards the theoretical and practical integration of individual, community and social explanations of crime and criminality (see for e.g. the work of Braithwaite 1989a; Bottoms 1990; Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990; Hastings 1996, 1998). While greater theoretical holism may be a worthwhile contribution, integration efforts may result in contradictory explanations and approaches, whereby only certain aspects of the integrative perspective may be prioritized for the sake of political expedience. Ultimately, these limitations seem to have been glossed over; however, it is unclear whether these shortcomings are less important than any potential contribution the theories may have made to effective crime control.

An additional shortcoming that requires clarification involves the tenuous link between theory and practice. The literature, through its pragmatic stance, has problematically linked its theories to specific organizational practices; however, it should be noted that while practice may be informed by theory, the translation from the latter to the former occurs within the context of other influences, including social, historical, political, economic and organizational arrangements. Thus, the theories and practices have tended to come in and out of favour over time. The overall effect is a superimposition of one theory-practice coupling upon another, with the result being a mélange which is characteristic of our modern approach to crime (Gilling 1997:43). However, neither in its promotional descriptions, nor in its evaluative analyses does the
literature adequately address this complexity. The fact that this literature has not sufficiently explored the broader political and ideological contexts in which crime prevention strategies emerge and evolve represents a major lacunae and one that renders it theoretically and analytically myopic.

In addition, this literature stemmed from growing opposition to the correctionalist orientation of mainstream criminology and traditional criminal justice. Crime prevention was thus conceived of as an alternative. However, the assumption that crime prevention inevitably leads to alternatives is politically and analytically problematic because it hinders the recognition of any contradictions inherent within a larger project that integrates both existing reactive responses and new proactive approaches. It also ignores the government rationalisations for doing so.

Furthermore, this assumption seems prone to historical amnesia in that it ignores the fact that the push for more proactive measures is the same justification that has prompted the emergence of each new perspective since the birth of criminology through classicism, namely the failure to prevent or control crime effectively. This assumption also overlooks the recursiveness which characterizes the way in which criminological theorizing and criminal justice discourses reproduce themselves.

This is evident in the way in which situational strategies are considered to be contemporary expressions of classical thought (Walkate 1996:16), and the way in which social development approaches engage the diagnostic methodologies of sociological positivism. Similarly, the recent emergence of community programs not only bears similarity to the preventive implications of ecological theories, but it also reflects a return
to the community control practiced prior to the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, despite its alternative vision, the extent to which the prevention literature has shaken its criminological foundations is deeply questionable.

This review also points to a literature that has been fragmented by conflicting ideologies and shortsighted by micro-level evaluations. There certainly have been reflexive analyses, but these have mainly taken the form of program evaluation research (Rosenbaum 1986, 1987), rather than reflections on theorizing. Such evaluations, while somewhat retrospective in nature, have remained inward-looking and self-sustaining endeavours. The majority of the studies, which are primarily American and British in their scope, have focussed largely on implementation difficulties and on improving situational factors at the urban neighbourhood level. While not without merit, these studies have done little to shed light on the political and economic contexts through which crime prevention programmes emerge. In addition to, and related to this glaring lacunae, the crime prevention literature, with its focus on micro-level theorizing, has been stifled by its own theoretical myopia. The subsequent section addresses additional limitations in greater depth.

PROMOTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIME PREVENTION LITERATURE

With an untamable concept as its central objective and with its ambitious alternative aspirations as its core impetus, the crime prevention literature has laboured to acquire both specificity and legitimacy (Gilling 1997). This particular scholarship is a unique academic space where the concept of prevention is held in considerably high
regard as both a means and an end. In this light, this section reflects on some of the characteristics of this distinctive discourse about crime prevention that have emerged in Western societies over the last thirty years.

Although it contains other streams, this literature has taken a clearly promotional direction and has put forth a pragmatic and politically expedient stance. The implication has been that writings on crime prevention have enjoyed almost three decades of development without a significant amount of reflexive scrutiny. The following discussion highlights the advocacy nature of this scholarship and it reveals the rationales that are embedded therein. The manner in which the literature has prescribed state intervention in the name of crime prevention is also illuminated.

Unlike the approach taken in the critical literature on penal control, the defining characteristic of the crime prevention literature was the promotional stance it took as a point of departure. Since the literature, in most instances, was written as an advocacy oriented narrative of reform, it emphasized the desirability of proactive approaches. Perhaps this ‘publicity’ stance (as opposed to an analytical one) is explained by crime prevention’s constant struggle to prove itself against repressive reactive measures. Its relatively marginal place within criminology may have also allowed its advance without in-depth critical examination. However, while reflexive evaluations were put forth to ascertain whether or not, and how it worked, these remained self-exemplifying and self-sustaining endeavours as they were essentially micro-level observations. In addition, the logic of the strategically oriented theories remained that of organizational tactics; thus, crime prevention was largely regarded as a technical matter with its analysis confined to
the implementation difficulties it encountered at the local level (Gilling 1997). Consequently, the conceptualizations within the literature tended to be governed more by strategic considerations rather than contextual analyses.

The promotional nature of the literature is evidenced in the numerous statements of endorsement which are often found in the form of article titles or conclusionary statements. In the competition for the ‘ultimate’ proactive strategy, the most commonly used statement is the compelling recipe of ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.’ Other examples include Schwendinger and Schwendinger’s (1993) call for “giving crime prevention top priority.” The campaign was also powered by additional slogans including “making neighbourhoods safe” (Wilson and Kelling 1989), “safer tomorrows begin today” (MacKillop and Clarke 1989), “fixing broken windows” (Kelling and Coles 1996), as well as, “safer communities” (Canadian Criminal Justice Association 1989). These expressions rely on nostalgic claims and seemingly incontestable goals to rationalize the necessity for intervention.

In its promotional quest to fulfill the desire to attain optimum efficiency and effectiveness, the prevention literature was consumed with highly specified empirical arguments and was thereby captured by a restrictive and narrow discourse of managerial pragmatism with scant regard for the wider context in which the appeal to prevention is negotiated. The literature’s focus on process is exemplified by such slogans as “designing out crime” (Geason and Wilson 1989), “planning crime prevention” (Clifford 1976) and “organizing against crime: redeveloping the neighbourhood” (Sorrentino 1977).
The preoccupation with micro-level implementation is evident in the countless studies that investigate such matters as “multi-agency crime prevention: some barriers to collaboration” (Gilling 1994), “factors related to participation in neighbourhood watch schemes” (Bennett 1989), as well as, “problems of implementing crime prevention: the experience of a demonstration project” (Hope and Murphy 1983). The highly practical focus is also exemplified by scholars’ attempts to offer advice about the value of installing protective devices and alarm systems in reducing crime (Litton 1982). In addition, with an increasing emphasis in recent years on accountability, researchers have also become concerned with evaluating the costs and benefits of investment in prevention strategies. One such example constitutes the investigations conducted by Welsh and Farrington (1999) which they entitled “value for money?”

Following a survey of the literature on crime prevention, it appears that its predominant concern remains that of effectiveness. Numerous articles repeatedly focussed upon matters pertaining to what Gallie (1956) referred to as the ‘optimum.’ Such interests are exemplified in Visher and Weisburd’s (1998) emphasis on “identifying what works: recent trends in crime prevention strategies,” in van Andel’s (1989) research on “crime prevention that works,” as well as in Crawford and Jones’ (1996) “reflections on the transferability of crime prevention initiatives.” Rosenbaum’s (1986) edited collection on “community crime prevention: does it work?” and King’s (1988) claim on “how to make social crime prevention work: the French experience” also serve as a testament to the literature’s obsession with practical success. A related preoccupation has also been in monitoring the results of mass media campaigns in contributing to the
prevention of crime and victimization (Sacco and Silverman 1981; Winkel 1987).

Criminologists writing about crime prevention in the last quarter of the twentieth century were also concerned about the advancement of genuinely proactive measures as distinct from traditional reactive responses. While this stance is evident throughout the literature, Currie (1989:23) best summed up this collectively shared interest when he advocated that

we must place the integrity of the social environment firmly at the top of our political and intellectual agenda ... we cannot concern ourselves only with the downstream consequences of the systematic abuse and neglect of the social environment; we must be bold enough to look unflinchingly at the source.

Furthermore, in a discussion on limiting the contours of prevention, Gassin (1992) holds a similar evangelical position that explicitly excludes all reactive responses and penal sanctions from the modern concept of prevention. He specifically argues that as soon as there is recourse to coercive methods, we step outside the circle of prevention (Gassin 1992:26). Still others, such as Rosenbaum (1986:129), continue to argue that community-based proactive approaches are undoubtedly preferable to the over reliance on law enforcement. Hastings (1996:327), on the other hand, while favouring preventive measures, argued that “... we need to rethink our commitment to law enforcement in the context of a wider and more balanced set of policies and strategies targeted at the needs of victims, communities, and society as a whole. This is the promise of prevention.” This latter position demonstrates that while initially the prevention literature advanced in contrast to traditional criminal justice, it has more recently acknowledged that reactive responses and proactive approaches are sold in a climate of mutual reliance rather than
one of mutually exclusive competition.

What most often accompanies these promotional claims are endless calls for more research. The focus is typically on program evaluations which usually seek to identify the disjuncture between rhetoric and practice, intentions and outcomes or between successes and failures. The overall interest is noted in Hastings’ (1996:326) claim that “we need to know more about what works (and why) in the field of crime prevention.” The emphasis has generally been the pursuit of ‘success stories’ that are conducive to replication.

Similar calls were made two decades earlier by Brantingham and Faust (1976:296) who advocated the need for a stronger commitment to long-term behavioural research and greater attention to the evaluation of demonstration projects. While Farrington (1989:462) also encouraged longitudinal research and social prevention experiments, Normandeau and Hasenpusch (1980) more specifically outlined the necessary methodological components of rigorous comprehensive evaluations for prevention programs. Still others, such as Matthews (1994:101), accentuate the requisite nature of research to the development of effective prevention initiatives.

An additional illustration of research goals is found in Clarke’s (1992) comments. This particular example simultaneously reveals the pragmatic, promotional and micro-level focus that is indicative of the literature on prevention. In seeking to ‘advance our knowledge,’ Clarke (1992:35) explains that

We need to understand the conditions under which particular measures work or do not ... We will need to discover how to harness publicity in enhancing the value of crime prevention initiatives. We will have to learn how best to counter skepticism and indifference. Finally, we will have to become knowledgeable about efficient ways to promote change
and coordinate action. This may be an ambitious agenda and one that seems remote from the traditional preoccupations of criminology, but it has to be followed if the discipline is to make a truly practical contribution to crime control.

The interest in promoting crime prevention and the organizational requirements therein are clearly expressed in this pre-set agenda. It should be noted that while these few examples do not account for the volume of continuous research calls found within the literature, they do nonetheless closely reflect the nature of the majority of articulations in this regard.

Another characteristic feature of the promotional orientation of the crime prevention literature is its position on the role of ‘the state’ in the area of crime prevention. While earlier forms of this scholarship insinuated that prevention lay outside the realm of the state and criminal justice, it has inevitably become implicitly and explicitly entwined with both. In many of the earlier writings on situational prevention, there was an implied assumption that governments, particularly municipal ones, would be involved in crime preventative urban planning schemes; there was a similar expectation that police would assist the public with target hardening measures.

More recently, scholars have sought to influence states’ investment in prevention. For Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1993:425), this task implied that “undoing damage caused by previous administrations and formulating workable alternatives to law-and-order policies requires bold experimentation and planning by civil organizations and federal bureaus...” Their position obviously reflects the general concern for the need to redress past failures in the area of crime control.
A more explicit call to action is evident in Bright’s (1991:84) conclusionary statement that implored politicians to adopt a social approach that "is prepared to invest in research and action and is willing to equip those agencies that are in a position to act with the guidance, encouragement, powers and resources necessary to make an impact. This is the challenge for the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether ... governments are prepared to meet it." In projecting a ten year plan of action designed to reduce the financial and social costs of crime, Pease (1994:692) similarly pressed governments to implement more balanced prevention measures that address private violence, drugs, victimization and recidivism more closely. Such pointed expectations of state involvement on the part of scholars clearly reflect prevention-oriented criminology’s interest in the administrative tasks of the institutional field. Comparable advocations are especially prominent in the Canadian literature.

Canadian-based writings on crime prevention flourished primarily at the turn of the 1990s. Prior to this time, minimal academic attention was devoted to this topic and what research did exist tended to focus upon crime prevention through criminal justice initiatives (Edelman and Rowe 1983; Hiew and Collrin 1983), social intervention among delinquent youth (Hiew and MacDonald 1986), environmental design and community-based policing strategies (Moffatt 1983), as well as, evaluation research (Sacco and Silverman 1981; Normandeau and Hasenpusch 1980). While these aforementioned publications were certainly advocacy-oriented in nature, the greater promotional positions increased in volume and vitality at the end of the 1980s. The burgeoning interest in crime prevention in Canada was exemplified by the publication of two special issues in the

There was certainly no overall collective consensus upon which the special issues were based as situational, community-based and social approaches were presented. What is of particular significance is the advocacy-oriented nature of the ensemble of the writings. Each article seemed to have been written with the objective of influencing the future of crime prevention in Canada. Some papers drew from foreign experiences including France (King 1989b), the United Kingdom (Heal 1989) and the United States (National Crime Prevention Council - U.S.A. 1989) to demonstrate the viability of certain approaches.

The Final Declaration of the Conference on the Reduction of Urban Insecurity (Council of Europe 1989) was also included as a model of what should be adopted in the Canadian context. The emphasis placed therein was on the creation of national coordinating institutions, but with a focus on locally-based and community-oriented strategies. In addition, with a view to endorsing a social development approach and in pointing to a relative absence of corresponding Canadian research, Farrington (1989) firmly recommended an expansion of longitudinal studies, as well as, greater investment in early intervention among at-risk children in this country.

In the same journal issue, the Canadian Criminal Justice Association (1989) presented its views on 'Safer Communities: A Social Strategy for Crime Prevention in Canada.' In response to the self-imposed questions 'what needs to be done in Canada?' and 'who should do it?' the authors outlined 'the state's' role in establishing and enhancing programs in the areas of early childhood intervention, education, social
housing and neighbourhoods, employment, as well as, substance abuse (Canadian Criminal Justice Association 1989:383-386). They then explained that the “federal government is responsible for a broad range of departments, agencies, programs and initiatives affecting crime prevention” (ibid: 387).

More specifically, the authors called upon the Canadian federal government to demonstrate a commitment to crime prevention, to establish a national coordinating agency, to increase its project funding in the area, and to identify crime prevention as a research priority (Ibid:389-390). Additional emphasis was placed upon the partnership cooperation between all levels of government, the police, the voluntary and private sectors, Native Canadians and individual citizens (Ibid:390-398).

The 1990 thematic issue on preventing crime also published a considerable number of advocacy pieces. Certain articles discussed practical concerns regarding the implementation process (Brantingham and Brantingham 1990), displacement problems (Gabor 1990), police-citizen partnerships (Walker and Walker 1990), public opinion and citizen participation (Roberts and Grossman 1990), as well as the benefits and limitations of public information campaigns aimed at preventing family violence (Sacco and Trotman 1990). While these discussions advocated their own particular micro-level focus on prevention, the most explicit calls to action came from Waller’s contribution to the journal.

In his article entitled “With National Leadership Canada Could Turn the Tide on Crime,” Waller (1990:185) unreservedly argued that government leaders needed “to take responsibility for making communities safer from crime.” He also explicitly advocated
that Canada would best be served by a national programme with inter-ministerial
collaboration that is supported by the necessary human and financial resources (Ibid:187-
190). Similar recommendations were echoed by Hastings and Melchers (1990:123) who
cautioned that a greater leadership role was required to guide enthusiastic communities
because without such support, “municipal government involvement in crime prevention
may fade.”

Canadian scholarly publications which appeared after these two special features
continued to emphasize the importance of state involvement in prevention. For example,
in their work on the prevention of criminal violence, Gabor, Welsh and Antonowicz
(1996) expressed concern over Canada’s leadership potential and commitment to the
resources required to develop and sustain the approaches that they deemed necessary to
address this matter. Moreover, Hastings (1996:326-327) reiterated the need for greater
political willingness that is based upon sound knowledge so that prevention could be
endorsed as a priority where energy and resources may be used more effectively.

These scholarly recommendations regarding state involvement in the area of crime
prevention are often accompanied by rationales that serve to demonstrate the alleged
necessity for intervention and reform. The most commonly cited reason for turning
towards proactive approaches is the perceived failure of traditional criminal justice
measures. This rationale has been variously explained throughout the literature. It is
evident in Farrington’s (1989:453) claim that existing methods that rely on rehabilitation,
deterrence and incapacitation are ineffectual and that the history of imprisonment in the
United States is the epitome of this failure. Currie (1989:5) describes this phenomenon as
the loss of credibility in both conservative and minimalist strategies. Similarly, 
Rosenbaum (1988:323) attributes the rise of community crime prevention to an absence 
of effective means for controlling crime.

In addition, the frequently mentioned corollary to this alleged failure is the rise in 
crime rates and the corresponding increase in fear among the public (King 1989b:527). 
This concern is repeated in Hastings’ (1991:85) contention that despite the substantial 
investment in crime control measures, “crime rates stubbornly refuse to fall in any 
significant manner.” Loveday (1994:181) re-echoes this view by pointing out the irony 
that “the rise in crime has occurred against consistently higher spending on law and order 
services ... and it is clear that increased resources for police services or prison places are 
not likely to substantially impinge on the crime rate.” Of additional relevance to this 
realization is the increased recognition in recent years that many of the social factors that 
are deemed related to crime lie outside the purview of law enforcement or correctionalist 

The recognition of the limitations of criminal justice measures is also exemplified 
in the frequently employed quotation by Sir Herbert Morrison who reflexively stated that 
“[f]or the harm done by the offender he is accountable, but for the harm done by wrong 
methods of dealing with crime, when better methods are known, for that all of us are 
responsible.” Authors, such as Waller (1991:1 ) and the Canadian Criminal Justice 
Association (1989:399), have cited these motivational words as a promotional rationale 
for shifting attention towards preventive practices. In this context, one must acknowledge 
that while the preoccupation with the failure of reactive responses has certainly served as
a persuasive justification for increased interest in crime prevention, the perceived success of the latter has also been employed to bolster further support for this approach.

Such strong conviction is also apparent in the coaxing argument that “[c]rime prevention works, ... experience sends a powerful message that ... crime prevention works, both to reduce crime and restore communities’ health” (National Crime Prevention Council - U.S.A. 1989:487). Furthermore, in keeping with the theme of success, Waller (1990:185) also implored the need for Canadian officials to apply the best experiences from other countries so as to increase the likelihood of effectiveness. In addition, the appeal to crime prevention is strengthened by its alleged simplicity and practicality (Heal 1989:514), as well as by its orientation towards inter-agency collaboration and community cohesion.

The attraction to prevention has also been rationalized by the belief in its capacity to address not only crime, but also victimization. Waller (1990) cites injuries to victims as a crucial reason for investing in preventive measures. He specifically contends that it is unsatisfactory to intervene after “innocent persons suffer loss, injury, and emotional trauma at the hands of wrongdoers” (Waller 1990:185). While the harm to victims is perhaps an emotionally compelling reason to intervene, it should be noted however, that within the crime prevention literature, it is cited far less frequently as a rationale than is the ‘failure’ of criminal justice responses in managing the crime rate. In this sense, it appears that the political and fiscal costs associated with failure outweigh the human ones.

While there is nothing inherently problematic with the rationales subsumed in the
promotional stance of the literature, a few notes of caution are worthy of consideration. First, the reasons for state action that are advanced within the literature are seemingly taken at face value; they imply a presumed necessity to intervene. However, since the justificatory statements are taken for granted, they have become enmeshed as part of the objective of the literature rather than its subject of scrutiny. Rationales and slogans are so promotionally advocated and thereby unconditionally accepted, that their significance to the criminological and criminal justice projects is not adequately scrutinized. What they reveal in terms of broader relations between state regulation and civil society are also not adequately understood.

When the prevention literature does debate the rationales for proactive approaches, it is more preoccupied with how an intervention is effective or efficient as opposed to why the intervention has taken place or is being sought. The extent of the debate is located within a concern for pragmatic efficiency rather than, for example, in human terms. Occasionally, researchers are interested in exploring the rationale of a project for evaluation purposes. For example in their evaluation research, Normandeau and Hasenpusch (1980:316) were interested in determining whether or not a program's rationale was ultimately to prevent crime and whether the rationale was effectively implemented. While insightful, such investigations deal with seemingly unresolvable pragmatic issues and thereby tend to gloss over complex questions.

Moreover, within the publicity-oriented scholarship, the concept of crime remains somewhat of an unchallenged truth. Its very existence seems to imply the need for action. Rather than thoroughly problematizing the concept of ‘crime,’ prevention-oriented
scholars seem to have instead developed strategies in response to the political prioritization of the crime problem (see for e.g. Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1993; Waller 1990 ). This undifferentiated treatment of ‘crime’ represents a significant theoretical deficiency in this literature.

Not only have crime prevention scholars been uncritical about definitions of ‘crime’ and constructions of ‘crime prevention,’ but they have also been unreflexive about the political, social, economic and cultural contexts which shape the meanings and manifestations of these terms. The purpose of this recommendation is not to turn prevention theorizing into a form of sociology of knowledge that loses touch with crime and victimization; it is rather to emphasize that if the literature does not reflect on its own existence and constructs, then it will likely offer less insight on the complex manifestations of the prevention of crime.

The foregoing review demonstrates that through its promotional stance and its preoccupation with strategy development and implementation evaluations, the crime prevention literature has seemingly raised pragmatism as an ideology (Nuttall 1989:470). Furthermore, in responding to a perceived absence of sufficient government endorsement, prevention-oriented scholars, and particularly Canadian ones, have taken considerable strides in attempting to entrench crime prevention approaches into the political mainstream. Perhaps one should not be astonished that criminologists behave persuasively or politically because after all, the criminological enterprise has, since its inception, sought to inform government policy and practice. In this sense, criminologists are understandably operating within a context that is defined by instrumental, political
and economic imperatives.

What is disconcerting however, is how this narrowly focussed, atheoretical and pragmatically eclectic debate obscures broader analyses on crime prevention. In this light, the literature’s close entwinement with prevention approaches seems to be taken for granted and deemed both necessary and useful. However, while the literature may be evangelically compelling, it has been less penetrating analytically. In other words, through this quest towards practical effectiveness and political expediency, the discipline has had minimal regard for the wider contexts in which the appeal to prevention is shaped, negotiated and manifested within both academic and political spheres.

**SUMMARY**

Despite its implicit role as a principle and objective throughout the history of criminological inquiry, crime prevention has held a particularly special, almost untouchable, place within late twentieth century criminology. Through its broadsides and homilies toward preventive interventions, the foundational objectives of this literature have seemingly remained sacred and beyond scrutiny. While the means have been endlessly debated, the goal of prevention is rarely, if ever contested and the inherent ambiguity is an accepted and taken-for-granted feature of the literature. That prevention continues to advance almost uncriticised is an indication of the perceived potentialities of this alternative endeavour. This analytical complacency about crime prevention has led to a seemingly unquestioned acceptance of, and contribution to, state involvement in preventive initiatives. In this regard, the extent to which the prevention literature differs
from traditional criminological inquiry is deeply questionable.

While the literature on crime prevention was certainly not part of a radical critique, it was nevertheless severed from the criminological project in its original form. However, it has inevitably become part of the criminological mainstream. In its quest to produce a knowledge that continually seeks to enhance its own capacity for action (Stehr 1994:95), the prevention literature has become part of a 'useful' criminology that supplies strategic advice for crime control (Garland and Sparks, 2000:193) and guides the reform program (Cohen 1985:18). While Carlen (1992:60) has cautioned against attempts to "fashion a theory in the service of politics," Garland (1994:54), in his critique of the larger criminological project, has confirmed that "the central purpose of scientific research was not the construction of explanatory theory but instead the more immediate end of aiding the policy-making process."

Indeed, the literature, and particularly its Canadian component, has sought to become an integral part of state responses to the problems of crime and victimization. However, by seeking to produce research findings that are conducive to immediate or long-term policy, this scholarship has drawn its terms of reference in a highly restrictive and narrow fashion. While this may be perceived as a negative reading of the conventional prevention literature, it is one that is largely justified if the broader understandings of the prominence of prevention are to be taken into consideration.

Clearly, much attention has been devoted to developing explanations for the anticipated outcomes of prevention initiatives. But little corresponding attention has been paid to the wider contexts of their emergence. Most notably, the pragmatic emphasis on
matters of strategy development and implementation evaluations has usurped the attention paid to the political contexts in which crime prevention is negotiated and advanced.

This omission is particularly obvious within Canadian debates. Due to the Canadian prevention literature's close and advocacy-based entwinement with state intervention, scholars have seemingly side-stepped analyses on prevention-oriented policy-making. Canadian academics seem to be more preoccupied with advancing the prevention project in a state setting than they are with actually understanding it. As a result of this problematic attachment, many relevant questions have been overlooked. First, while other researchers have conducted thorough reviews on the nature of state-directed prevention initiatives in England (Gilling 1997; Koch 1998) and France (King 1991), similar Canadian academic inquiries are almost non-existent. Therefore, little is known about federal or national level crime prevention policy-making.

Second and perhaps consequently, efforts to answer the contingent question of 'what works' have seemingly obscured 'why' certain strategies are advanced in particular political contexts and at particular historical moments. In other words, the rationales underlying the changing visions of prevention have not been adequately explored in terms of their significance to broader relations between state regulation and civil society. Third, the literature has not adequately explored broader patterns of continuity and change. This is especially relevant to understanding the shifts in how crime prevention is articulated and rationalized within government initiatives over time.

Given the foregoing limitations, it is doubtful that the crime prevention literature
can provide an appropriate starting point for the study of broader and more penetrating analyses of contemporary forms of regulation. Thus, in attempting to address these lacunae more fully, I contend that criminology, and the crime prevention literature in particular, must become disconnected from the trends to which it has been so closely contributing. To this end, the next chapter outlines a framework that is intended to foster a more expansive and objective analysis of the articulations and rationales underlying the Canadian federal government's intervention in the name of crime prevention.
ENDNOTES

1. While the scientific rationales underlying prevention are the main focus of this chapter, the way in which they lend themselves to political pursuits of legitimacy are also mentioned, albeit briefly. Political rationales are discussed at length in chapters five through eight.

2. It is understood that Criminology is a multi-disciplinary field of inquiry that encompasses such traditions as medical psychology, criminal anthropology, statistical inquiry, social reform and prison discipline.

3. The counter discourses include various strands of critical or radical criminologies, the work of revisionist historians, abolitionists, as well as, feminists.


5. Like Beccaria, Bentham’s ideal solution was deterrent legislation but he explained that demonstrable social harm was a necessary condition for legislatively prescribed sanctions (Bentham 1841:II.VII.6:141).

6. Positivism’s scientific observations were certainly aided by the readily available ‘criminals’ during the period of the great institutional confinements.

7. While Auguste Comte is commonly viewed as the first modern sociologist and while he formed a general methodological background for pathological theorists such as Lombroso, the latter is known more specifically for his contribution to the study of deviance and its control. Two of Lombroso’s students, Raffaele Garafalo and Enrico Ferri are also credited with the advancement of the pathological approach.

8. Positivism’s emphasis on psychological and biological determinism fostered notions of deficient difference which were more often based on cultural and class discrimination.


10. While on-going research and intervention based on psychological and biological theories remains part of correctional treatment programs, they tend to be applied less frequently and less intrusively in their late 20th century form.
11. Emphasis placed in original.

12. Defensible space, a term coined by Oscar Newman (1973), refers to the notion that certain physical or environmental areas (especially residential environments) can be defended or protected from crime or victimization by natural surveillance, urban planning, or housing design.

13. Similar to the concept of defensible space, ‘environmental design,’ according to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981), refers to preventive interventions that might alter crime patterns, such as urban design.

14. Cohen and Felson (1979), the pioneers of ‘routine activity’ theory contend that post-war increases in crime rates have been accompanied by changing patterns of routine activities, which have affected the convergence in time and space of the three necessary conditions for crime, namely a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. The practical preventive implications of routine activity theory aim to create an ‘everyday life’ in which the necessary conditions of crime are kept apart. In addition to target hardening, Felson (1994) points to the need for greater localism with the presence of more guardians.

15. Rational choice theory is a model of practical theorizing which attempts to build a bridge between the variables of the situation (crime) and the disposition (criminality).

16. The notion of ‘architectural determinism’ (Kinsey, Lea and Young 1986) views behaviour in general, and criminal behaviour in particular, as the product of opportunities presented by physical structures.

17. Welsh and Farrington (1999) concluded that although situational prevention strategies can be economically efficient in terms of crime reduction, they pointed to the need for better estimates of costs and benefits and for longer evaluation periods.
CHAPTER 3

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: RHETORIC, RATIONALES AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

The overview in chapter two was intended to draw attention to the ways in which crime prevention is a contested and ambiguous concept, as well as to the way in which the conventional literature has been predominantly concerned with the effective management of crime. The flexible meaning of the term itself and the promotional nature of the corresponding literature have contributed to the advancement of crime prevention strategies in the late twentieth century. However, given the tendency of this literature to adopt a micro-level framework of analysis, less attention has been paid to the manner in which prevention is articulated and developed in the context of shifting political trends. In other words, the crime prevention literature represents a form of criminology that has been primarily interested in inscribing itself within the world of government and in constituting itself as a tool of reform within that setting.

As a result of this pragmatic orientation, the wider contexts from which crime prevention has emerged as a prominent government approach have been overlooked and seemingly taken-for-granted. This realization has been echoed by other scholars such as Braithwaite (2000) who claims that, while criminology may be well established in institutional terms, it has become less relevant to the changes in governance and social relations that characterize our contemporary social world. If criminology is to remain analytically innovative and indeed relevant, its relative silence on the contexts of
emerging forms of regulation must be overcome.

In an effort to move beyond the practical preoccupations of the conventional scholarship and to explore more analytically engaging dimensions of prevention, this chapter establishes a wider vantage point from which to observe the evolution of crime prevention in a government setting. More specifically, it seeks to engender the appraisal of crime prevention in its Canadian federal government form in the late twentieth century. It does so by drawing from a set of debates that is comparatively less entwined with regulatory practices and in which government intervention is the object rather than the objective of analysis. Such an engagement with a literature that is both disconnected from, yet attentive to, government practices is expected to yield a more penetrating assessment of the rhetoric and rationales that underpin government-based prevention policies and programs.

My interest in confronting these wider concerns has been partly informed by the work of Crawford (1997), Gilling (1997), King (1991), Koch (1998) and Sutton (1994) who, in diverging ways and to varying degrees, have specifically examined crime prevention within shifting political and social contexts in other nation-states. Crawford and Gilling both attempted to locate community prevention programmes within shifting political trends in Britain. King examined the political constructions of prevention in which he compared the limiting context of ‘Thatcherism’ in England and the socialist tendencies in France. Similarly, Sutton reviewed the overall project of prevention within the constraints of political and economic pressures in Australia. While Koch’s report on the organization of prevention in Britain was rather descriptive and substantive, it was the
only one to have examined the emergence of a national strategy.

These inquiries undoubtedly represent the first major attempts to set the study of crime prevention upon a broader canvas while simultaneously affirming the importance of doing so. Nevertheless, these studies have primarily focussed upon the nature and implications of prevention policies and practices, rather than on the reasons upon which they are based. Thus, with a view to exploring more fully the rationales of government intervention in the name of prevention, I draw from a set of debates that considers rationales as a more central subject of analysis, but from which conventional criminology, and the crime prevention literature in particular, have thus far remained distant and disconnected.

This set of debates broadly refers to studies on ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1979). However, it should be noted at the outset that while I engage with this analytical framework as a point of departure for carrying out my research, I do so selectively rather than exclusively. I emphasize the relevance of certain features and I draw from additional scholarship for the purpose not only of delimiting my study, but also of overcoming some of the limitations of the governmentality literature. The ensuing discussion highlights the analytical strengths of this framework that are relevant to the study of government generated rhetoric and programs of crime prevention.

The governmentality literature is an influential line of inquiry that flourished subsequent to the publication of Michel Foucault’s (1979) essay ‘On governmentality.’ The Foucauldian studies on ‘the government of others and the government of one’s self’ have initiated extensive scholarly research that scrutinizes governmental rationalities and
practices throughout a diverse range of social, political and economic domains (see Burchell et al. 1991; Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1994; Hunt and Wickham 1994; Barry et al. 1996). These analyses have investigated the emergence, development and complexity of state and non-state governance. They have also drawn attention to the various ways in which the changing forms of governance are impacting on individuals, communities and nation-states (Smandych 1999).

Foucault’s neologism ‘governmentality’ is pertinent to the study of regulation and crime prevention on a number of levels. First, since it regards government as a decentred process, it encourages the examination of diverse measures that are intended to manage individual and collective conduct (Foucault 1979, 1982; Miller and Rose 1990; Gordon 1991; O’Malley et al. 1997). This flexibility is especially relevant to studies on crime prevention because, as a principle and a means, prevention has variously existed both within and outside state institutions. The governmentality framework also facilitates an examination of the relationship that actually links state and non-state forms of governance. This consideration is also useful in shedding light upon the complexity of articulations and manifestations of prevention in their Canadian federal government form, whereby de-centred governance is a predominant feature.

Second, the concept of ‘governmentality’ also enables one to grasp changes in state and non-state techniques designed to govern populations (Foucault 1991a:95; Hunt and Wickham 1994:175). In particular, the governmentality approach has drawn our attention to the emerging changes in governance that are associated with the shifts from social welfarism that emphasized centralized state control towards current neo-liberal
emphases on privatization, decentralization and at-a-distance forms of regulation. In its neo-liberal form, government is seen as responsible for ‘steering’ regulatory activities, whereas the task of ‘rowing’ is delegated to, and assumed by civil society (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). As Bell (1993:395) explains:

Against a back-drop of welfarism, neo-liberal discourses appeal against too much government intervention, poses ‘the market’ as the solution, and befriends the family, suggesting it has been downtrodden by welfarism and needs to become both independent and responsible once more.

In the context of these broader changes in the late twentieth century, it is plausible to suggest that crime prevention is a site through which conceptions of what governance entails, who is governed, as well as how to govern oneself and others are undergoing consequential revisions (Pavlich 1999:104). As I demonstrate later in chapters five through nine, rhetoric and rationales of crime prevention both shape, and are shaped by, changing patterns of governance that are indicative of broader shifts towards neo-liberal rationalities. While I place greater emphasis upon neo-liberalism as an ascendant political rationality, I am nevertheless attentive to the neo-conservative rationalities that are also vigorously present within crime prevention discourses, as well as to the relative persistence of social welfare principles within current social policy.

The third analytical strength of this framework lies in the scope of the concept of ‘governmentality.’ The term refers to the range of governmental rationalities and practices by which populations are rendered both thinkable and measurable for the purposes of government (Foucault 1980, 1991a; Rose and Miller 1992; Miller and Rose 1990). This conception is particularly useful because it implies the intricate link between
technologies of government (ways of acting) and the rationalities (ways of thinking) through which the former are developed and articulated. Here rationalities, or political rationalities in particular, refer to the broad discourses of rule which include for example, classical liberalism, Keynesianism, and neo-liberalism, etc. In the context of crime prevention, considerable analysis has certainly been carried out on the processes and outcomes of programmes; however, little corresponding emphasis has been placed on their relationship to shifts in these broader rationalities. This lacuna can be overcome by an engagement with the governmentality literature because the latter offers an incisive lens through which one can observe and locate prevention as a program of government in relation to the rationalities that generate and shape it. Prior to explicating more precisely how this analysis can be accomplished, a brief comment on the possibility and desirability of a governmentality-criminology dialogue is presented.

Despite Foucault’s (1980) scathing view of criminology as a repressive power/knowledge apparatus, his studies on governmentality do offer a useful framework for analysing changes in how crime is both framed and regulated. In fact, criminological scholars have already demonstrated the ways in which recent reconfigurations and shifting trends in the criminal justice field can be better understood by reference to this approach. For example, O’Malley’s (1992; 1996) analysis of risk, crime prevention and responsibility sheds light on the simultaneous increase in ‘prudentialism’ and the decline of ‘social’ technologies. Similarly, Stenson (1993) examined the redistribution of governmental tasks through community policing technologies. Stenson (1999) later proposed methodological prescriptions that he thought could shed greater light on the
concepts of governmentality and sovereignty in relation to crime control. He more specifically pointed to the importance of examining shifting technologies in light of the oral forms of knowledge (as opposed to only text-based ones) which are inevitably embedded within them.

Garland (1996, 2000) also explores governmental adaptations in light of emerging trends in crime control and cultural sensibilities. Similar to Stenson, Garland (1999) sought to extend the potential of the governmentality framework to the study of crime control by emphasizing the relevance of non-instrumental rationalities in the shaping of regulatory practices. Moreover, Pavlich (1999) explored changes in the objects of governance resulting from emerging neo-liberal rationales around community crime prevention measures in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Hatt (1999) similarly examined sentencing discourse and legislation in relation to discursive practices and governmentality projects. In addition, Feeley and Simon (1992, 1994, Simon and Feeley 1995) emphasize the heightened influence of ‘actuarial justice’ and ‘risk management’ technologies in their perspective on ‘the new penology.’ While to the practically oriented criminologist such studies may be considered indulgent, they have unquestionably extended the scope and enhanced the depth of analyses on crime control and social regulation.

The aforementioned studies exemplify the usefulness of the governmentality literature’s concepts in guiding research and analysis on crime control and criminal justice. Whereas criminology has been primarily, although not exclusively, interested in the efficiency and effectiveness of crime control, the governmentality approach offers a
more penetrating understanding of these programmes by locating them within broader political shifts, as well as through the corresponding forms of reasoning that animate, modify and sustain them. Thus, by drawing upon the insights derived from the studies of crime control highlighted above, as well as from the governmentality literature generally, I isolate the ways in which this framework can enhance our understanding of the contemporary ascendancy of crime prevention.

In the subsequent sections, I define more precisely the analytical themes of rhetoric, rationales and government intervention which form the core subjects of this dissertation research. In so doing, I discuss the relevant strengths and potential limitations of the governmentality approach in interpreting these themes. Furthermore, in an effort to tailor the analysis towards the particular nuances of these terms as they relate more specifically to the rise of crime prevention, I engage with Murray Edelman’s (1988, 1977) work on political rhetoric. For as I argue below, although the governmentality literature’s reference to broad conceptions of ‘language,’ ‘mentalities’ and ‘technologies’ is useful in elucidating shifts in crime control, Edelman’s account engenders a more specific interpretation of the terms ‘rhetoric,’ ‘rationales’ and ‘government intervention.’ Edelman’s framework thus complements the governmentality approach by shedding clearer light on the nature of justifications that are embedded within political language. While the thematic terms are defined separately for the purpose of clarification, their mutual relevance is explicated throughout the discussion below.
This dissertation set out to examine how crime prevention was articulated and justified in its Canadian federal government form in the late twentieth century. The role and nature of the discourse manifest in these articulations and rationales is therefore central to this analysis.¹ By concentrating on how government ‘discourse’ reveals the rationales underlying government intervention in the area of crime prevention, I am investigating the expressed reasons and justifications that animate and propel governance and regulation (Rose 1993:288). By focussing more specifically on the reasons and justifications, I am deliberately engaging with the governmentality framework’s “tendency to view the formation of governmental programmes from the programmers’ perspective” (O’Malley et al.1997:510). The concern here remains on how authorities have contemplated problematizing and solving social problems. In this light, the language that political officials use to articulate such matters becomes an indispensable source of instantiation in that regard.

Language and Governmentality

The Foucauldian governmentality approach is an appropriate framework for the study of political discourse because it is one that has variously “analysed the ‘languages of description’ that have made ... ‘problems’ thinkable and governable” (Rose 2000:322). More specifically, the governmentality school addresses the substance of discourses by
emphasizing not only what is said, but also how it is said (Garland 1999:19); it draws attention to the processes of persuasion and the appeals of political discourse (Miller and Rose 1990:1, 6). Furthermore, by studying the complex interplay among languages of description, rationalities and technologies, the governmentality framework enables one to better observe how rationales and government intervention are shaped through language. It is even plausible to argue that within the governmentality school, language, rationalities and technologies are inextricably linked. Such a contention finds confirmation in Rose’s (1993:289) claim that

[Language, from the perspective of governmentality, is not a matter of meanings, but of the ways in which the world is made intelligible and practicable, and domains are constituted such as ‘the market’, or ‘the family’ which are amenable to interventions by administrators, politicians, authorities and experts ...]

Conceived in this way, language becomes a performatve apparatus for conceptualizing and enunciating governance (Rose and Miller 1992:177). In fact, as Miller and Rose (1990:5-6) suggest,

it is possible to specify and differentiate political rationalities in terms of the relatively systematic discursive matrices within which government is articulated, the particular languages within which objects and objectives are construed, the grammar of analyses and prescriptions, the vocabularies of programmes, the terms in which the legitimacy of government is established. It is out of such linguistic elements that rationalities of government such as welfarism or neo-liberalism ... are elaborated and seek to specify appropriate bases for the organization and mobilization of social life.

The analysis of political language thus allows one to delineate the styles of reasoning or systems of thought that are embedded within it, and from which more
specific rationales for government intervention are derived. While Rose and Miller (1992:177) caution against a view of language as merely contemplative or justificatory, I contend that in the rendering of reality thinkable and in the constituting of domains so that they are tractable to intervention (Rose 1996b:42), political discourse formulates and imparts corresponding rationales. By systematizing problems, solutions and rationales in that regard, discourses in a government context create the justificatory narratives necessary for the establishment of political objectives and agendas for action (Foucault 1980; Stenson and Watt 1999:192).

The governmentality school offers an advantageous approach to the study of language because it views discourse as a significant feature of political government. This perspective also, and more importantly, sheds light on how government is conducted through language (Curtis 1995:578) particularly because the latter serves to formulate the complex interplay between the rationalities and technologies of the former. In this sense, the governmentality approach provides an incisive lens through which one can examine the complexities of the mutual relationship between political discourse and government action. However, while I concur and engage with the governmentality perspective on language as a point of departure, I seek to supplement and enhance its contribution.

The Particularities of Rhetoric

I do so first by examining ‘rhetoric’ as a particular form of discourse that is geared toward purposive ends, and secondly by drawing primarily, but not exclusively, upon Murray Edelman’s (1977; 1988) work on the nature and implications of political
language. I maintain that such a combined analysis further illuminates the peculiarities of the Canadian federal government ‘rhetoric’ on crime prevention.

While this study involves an analysis of the Canadian federal government’s ‘discourse’ on crime prevention, the concept of ‘discourse’ does not adequately reflect the particular nature of the language employed in this regard. While ‘discourse’ certainly reflects the “linguistic and semiotic dimensions” of action (Purvis and Hunt 1993:476), the term does not adequately convey the manner in which language is used as an instrument of persuasion in politics (Paine 1981:1). While I recognize the various theoretical debates and traditions that revolve around ‘discourse’ (see for example, Carrabine 2000, Fairclough 1992, as well as Purvis and Hunt 1993), my modest interest is to cast light on the persuasive intentions and effects of the late twentieth century government-generated discourse that sought to advance crime prevention initiatives.

To this end, I specifically employ the term ‘rhetoric’ because, as I have previously established in chapter two, and as will become clearer in chapters five through eight, both academic and popular discourses of crime prevention are undeniably immersed in the business of persuasion, promotion and exhortation. However, Poovey (1998:33) and Corcoran (1979:xv) have cautioned against the simplistic use of the term rhetoric as meaning ‘persuasive’ and ‘manipulative’ because this interpretation obscures the social function of informing and enlightening that formal or classical rhetoric previously held. More specifically, Corcoran (1979) has contended that the role of contemporary rhetoric, and political rhetoric in particular, has gone beyond its role to persuade opinions and to stimulate thought. He suggests that rhetoric is now also used to control thought, to
conceal and distort information and to divert or suppress public attention (Corcoran 1979:xv).

Nevertheless, Edelman (1977, 1988) and Paine (1981), as well as Corcoran (1979) have sustained the importance of scrutinizing political rhetoric as a tool of persuasion. Thus, despite the negative connotations of deception and illusion that are commonly associated with political rhetoric, I pursue this inquiry with a view to demonstrating the centrality of ‘rhetoric’ to this investigation. Rather than cynically dismissing rhetoric as an empty vessel, I reconsider its significance in a political setting (Edelman 1977; Paine 1981). For as I elaborate, through its persuasive effect, rhetoric does reveal pertinent contents and especially rationales for government interventions (Edelman 1988; 1977). In addition, due to the variable rhetorical uses of the term ‘prevention,’ a focus on its dimensions within the Canadian federal government makes it possible to identify discursive themes, as well as patterns of continuity and change.

I specifically invoke the term ‘rhetoric’ instead of the more neutral concepts of ‘language’ or ‘discourse’ because the former more appropriately reflects the promotional and persuasive tones that characterize both academic and political ‘rhetoric’ on crime prevention. It must be noted that I do not view ‘rhetoric’ and ‘discourse’ as mutually exclusive or opposing terms; rather, I consider ‘rhetoric’ to be a sub category of ‘discourse’ that is employed for particular purposes. According to The Canadian Oxford Dictionary (2001:1236), ‘rhetoric’ denotatively refers to “the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing” and “language designed to persuade or impress (often with an implication of insincerity or exaggeration etc.)” This definition both clarifies and
partially muddles my use of the term. The first part of the definition that makes reference to persuasion conveys the very attribute of the term that I seek to highlight and scrutinize. After all, persuasion is one of the hallmarks of political discourse (Edelman 1988:105) and this feature in itself merits further consideration.

**The Persuasive Features of Rhetoric**

Since crime prevention has been constructed as an emerging alternative in the late twentieth century, its protagonists have been engaged in an obsessive quest to convince government officials, as well as non-state organizations and individuals of its programmatic viability and potential effectiveness. As chapters five through eight illustrate, the exhortation has occurred on two interrelated levels. Efforts to establish prevention’s legitimacy were first aimed at convincing the Canadian federal government to adopt a prevention philosophy and to implement prevention oriented programmes. Subsequent to this espousal, the government engaged in various public campaigns designed to persuade citizens of the benefits of prevention. The ultimate goals were to encourage individuals to participate in community-based prevention programmes and to support them in their own autonomous self-protective measures. In this light, it is fair to suggest that the term ‘rhetoric’ more appropriately captures the essence of the unfolding of these layered persuasion efforts.

The second part of the definition presented above, which purports that rhetoric lacks ‘true meaning,’ partially confounds my usage of the term. The explicit criticism outlined within this definition refers to the negative connotations of deception and
illusion that are commonly associated with popular conceptions of political language (Hall et al. 1978). While this view may be plausible in many significant respects, it does not constitute a central concern of this research for a number of reasons. Of foremost importance is the recognition that rhetoric does reveal consequential information. Such an acknowledgement is particularly crucial within the governmentality approach that accords considerable weight to language in its governmental context.

However, in my attempts to employ the term ‘rhetoric’ within the governmentality perspective, I must proceed with caution because in this particular school of thought, rhetoric is distinguished from discourse. This standpoint is reinforced by Rose’s (1993:289) claim that “political discourse is more than ... rhetoric” because it is the means through which reality is made thinkable and practicable. Given this explicit differentiation, one may surmise that governmentality scholars share the disapproving lay view of ‘rhetoric’ and therefore dismiss it as an empty vessel.

Another reason why the criticism of rhetoric as lacking authentic substance is less relevant to this dissertation lies in the fact that the governmentality perspective itself is not preoccupied with finding ‘meaning’ in language (Rose 1993:289). Nor am I. I do not scrutinize government ‘rhetoric’ on crime prevention in an attempt to uncover disguised meanings, hidden objectives or concealed motives. Instead, I am more inclined to share Garland’s (1999:33) contention that government officials are most often candid in their intentions to minimize both the incidences and the effects of crime and victimization. That is not to say, however that I am not attentive to potential contradictions between programmes that are deployed simultaneously (O’Malley 1999b) and presented as
complementary initiatives within the context of a ‘balanced’ approach.

Nevertheless, what is of greater interest to this dissertation remains the explicit disclosure of rationales through government rhetoric. How this focus is in keeping with the governmentality school’s view on language is summarized in the following explanation. Given that my use of the term ‘rhetoric’ concentrates more on its capacity as an ‘art of persuasion’ than on its tendency to conjure up frustrating images of deceptive camouflages, I think that an analysis of rhetoric within a governmentality framework is a viable and worthwhile endeavour.

Bearing in mind this preference on persuasion and interest in rationales, I present my usage of the concept of ‘rhetoric’ as one that retains the performative characteristics of language as they are identified within the governmentality school. In other words, ‘rhetoric,’ as a distinct form of persuasive language, renders reality thinkable and practicable by relying on influential and activating rationales to achieve its desired effect (Hall et al. 1978). While the governmentality framework is certainly equipped to address the characteristics and implications of ‘rhetoric,’ Edelman’s observations cast additional light on the interdependence of persuasion and rationales within political language.

Some Caveats of Rhetoric and Rationales

Those who are familiar with Edelman’s collection may initially be puzzled by my reliance on his work for two reasons. The first pertains to the fact that his analyses are laden with cynical preoccupations with how governments justify deception, oppression and inequality (Edelman 1977:1), repression (58) failure (54, 62), inaction (57), as well as
persecution (Edelman 1988:106). He also skeptically claims that government rhetoric distorts reality (Edelman 1977:64), masks public interest (138) and serves often as a public relations ploy (155). While not without its merits, such a cynical outlook goes against the grain of the governmentality perspective's neutral gaze on both political language and action. Furthermore, while I share Edelman's concern with such profound social problems, they do not constitute the immediate subject of my analysis.²

The second way in which Edelman's work may seem unrelated to this study is with respect to his focus on the discrepancies between promise and performance. The very title of his 1977 publication, Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail, intimates his interest in this regard. The principal postulate of this book is that governments are more effective with their rhetoric than they are with addressing the social issues (Edelman 1977:103;147). While an analysis of this nature may more completely reveal the complexities and tensions of government intervention, I do not engage in a debate on the gap between rhetoric and practice.

Countless other evaluation studies and references that address this particular concern in the context of crime prevention already exist.³ Besides, I do not explore whether or not government generated prevention rhetoric has been effectively translated into action. My interest is rather in how government action is conceived and justified through rhetoric. In other words, I concentrate on what is evident in the language itself rather than on how or if it is applied in practice. Given that neither political deception nor gaps between intention and outcome constitute the immediate subject of this dissertation, one may question the purpose of drawing upon Edelman's piercing interpretations.
While Edelman’s central concern was on the role of political language in securing the acquiescence of individual citizens, his framework still informs this study on several levels. Edelman’s analysis is most pertinent to this dissertation through its explicit focus upon, and exemplification of, the mutual reinforcement between political rhetoric and justifications for government action. His penetrating observations reinforce the significance of examining how language (especially official political rhetoric) serves to justify, legitimate and rationalize the actions of governments and their officials (Edelman 1977:19, 30, 38, 44, 54, 58). He claims that language does more than describe reality.

He specifically contends that in the context of government, and particularly in the face of persistent social problems, political rhetoric provides and proliferates rationalizations for continued courses of action (Edelman 1988:117). To this end, the incorporation of ‘good reasons’ within political rhetoric is strategically designed to construct both cogency and appeal for government intervention (Edelman 1988:109). In this way, through the use of rationales, language shapes objectives, legitimates expectations and preconstructs the interpretations of policy outcomes (Edelman 1977:78).

In addition, Edelman (1977:96,101) draws attention to the way in which political rhetoric, primed with effectual rationales, not only serves to persuade the public that government policy is addressing social issues, but it also helps to marshal support and activate participation in that regard. Edelman (1977:17) further explains that this support is obtained through deliberate appeal campaigns in which political statements give the impression that public opinion is important. Thus, in their interactive dynamic, rhetoric and rationales may be viewed as performative and catalytic. By extension, rhetoric
placates public anxiety through the use of rationales that strategically reconstruct past failures and provide reassuring expectations for the future (Edelman 1977:147; 1988:104). This interpretation exemplifies one of the ways that government based rhetoric legitimizes preferred policy trajectories (Ibid 1988:104).

Over and above what Edelman has instantiated in terms of how political rhetoric conveys various justifications, I wish briefly to draw attention to other pertinent contributions that I incorporate within my own analysis. These examples also demonstrate the mutual interdependence among rhetoric, rationales and government action. As previously established, within the governmentality school, political discourse is thought to convey governmental concerns with the regulation of the population (Rose 1993). To this end, politicized rhetorics simultaneously signal rejections of past failures and optimistic projections of pending outcomes (Rose and Miller 1990:4).

Such a consideration is echoed in Garland’s (1996:447) recognition that changes in official discourse reveal variations in the nature of justifications over time. He makes specific reference to the distinct emphases within justificatory claims at different historical moments. For example, he explains that whereas governments had previously expressed a rather confident position on correctionalism, their claims have now become “more modest and hesitant” (Garland 1996:447). In this sense, political discourse reveals the limitations of what government can and will provide through its governance of citizens (Rose 2000:327), even if ‘failure’ needs to be ‘reformulated’ to serve emerging justificatory purposes. Thus, by drawing upon these additional understandings of what political discourse reveals, I attempt to examine the nature of temporal variations in
justificatory claims as they apply to the context of evolving emphases on crime prevention.

By way of conclusion to this section, let me briefly clarify what might seem to have been unnecessarily confused by my qualifying explanations. The governmentality perspective undoubtedly offers an advanced framework for analysing political discourse. By elucidating the complex interaction among language, rationalities and technologies, this approach not only sheds light on the substance of discourse, but also exemplifies its performative role within the context of governing. However, given the promotional and persuasive nature of the ‘rhetoric’ constitutive of crime prevention in the late twentieth century and given my explicit and central focus upon rationales, it is necessary that the neutral view of the governmentality school be complemented by a framework that addresses this emphasis in a more seasoned and direct manner. Thus, notwithstanding the distinctions between Edelman’s subject and my own, his penetrating observations bring rhetoric and rationales to the fore of analyses on government intervention. In this light, the subsequent section offers a more precise explication of what is meant by ‘rationales.’

RATIONALES

"Whatever [the] demands, we will tell stories ... to justify and rationalize what we are doing."
(Cohen 1985:89)

What Cohen is referring to in this quotation is that which is often thought to be conveyed through rhetoric; that is, the rationales that justify action either beforehand or afterward. Rationales often encompass explications of the necessity of an intervention
and they also serve to secure an audience's approval and perhaps even its participation (Edelman 1977:17, 96). Although I explain its relevance in more detail below, for the purpose of immediate clarification, I refer to the term 'rationale' as the underlying reason, logic or justification for a particular course of action. It should be noted that despite the subtle distinctions among them, I occasionally refer to 'rationales,' 'reasons,' and 'justifications' interchangeably throughout the text to avoid repetition.

In the subsequent sections, I reiterate the significance of examining rationales on crime prevention. I then explain how the governmentality approach and its reference to 'rationalities' sheds further light on rationales of regulation. Finally, from the insights gained from the governmentality literature, I define more precisely what is meant by the term 'rationale' as it is specifically invoked in this study on prevention.

The Purpose of Studying Rationales

Prior to delimiting the analytical framework, it is worthwhile to clarify the purpose of studying rationales. Justifications or rationales are linked to the basic question of 'why;' in other words, they tend to explain why something has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. Rationales establish an understanding of that which is projected as the reason, purpose or cause of an action. But to what end is it useful to identify and understand the justifications formulated around government intervention? Put simply, why study rationales?

Perhaps if one were interested in extracting policy implications from this dissertation, the immediate response may entail the popular discourse considerations of
public safety or of how and why tax dollars are spent in particulars ways. There may also be a concern around the mistrust of government motives that is fuelled by a perception that governments in power lack altruistic principles. Still others may seek to criticize the excesses or inefficiencies of government with a view to constructing corrective alternatives. The latter preoccupation is certainly in keeping with my broader concern about how the concept of prevention may itself serve as a justification for detrimentally intrusive government actions.

However, the immediate purpose of this dissertation is not to contribute to policy formation and evaluation that has already been endlessly debated in the crime prevention literature. It is concerned neither with a crisis of confidence in government, nor with cynically dismissing the potential of genuinely good intentions. Therefore, with derisive questions and criticisms cast aside, my purpose is rather more modestly and neutrally based. Principally, I seek to establish how the concept of prevention, in all of its ambiguity, is variously shaped, sustained and reformulated by shifting rationales over time. In other words, I attempt to shed light on how rationales help to frame what is meant by crime prevention. While such an examination may be regarded as indulgent because it does not offer any concrete practical alternatives, it should be viewed as an indispensable deconstruction that is at least significant to understandings on a conceptual level.

Furthermore, within the criminological literature, many academics have acknowledged that the concept of crime prevention has been employed to justify, rationalize and legitimate a variety of disciplinary and non-disciplinary techniques
including for example, the right to punish (Foucault 1977:93), 'the practices of the entire criminal justice system' (Gilling 1997:2), community measures (Pavlich 1999:105) and partnership approaches (Crawford 1997:3). Sutton (1994:5) also draws attention to the decline in faith of rationales (e.g. deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation) for traditional crime control responses as an explanation for the increased emphasis on crime prevention. One must also acknowledge that prevention is often not the principal rationale for practices whose outcomes are nevertheless preventative (Gilling 1997:2).

Furthermore, while prevention as a principle serves as a justification for various interventions, less is known about the rationales that legitimate proactive strategies where prevention is constructed as a means. In other words, while the concept of prevention has been employed to justify reactive punitive and corrective measures in the past, less attention has been paid to explaining the reasons for the ascendancy of proactive strategies in the late twentieth century.

Thus, while rationales are alluded to in scholarly debates, often for the purpose of contextualizing the topic, they seem to be accepted at their face value. Therefore, while the notion of prevention as a justificatory concept is acknowledged by certain scholars, rarely, if ever, are the nature, characteristics or scope of the discourse of rationales assessed. Beyond the taken for granted claim that 'nothing [else] works,' little attention has been devoted to scrutinizing the complexity of reasons that underlie prevention's recent rise to prominence and the particular configuration that it has come to acquire.

Thus, what the criminological project has treated as implicit and has even contributed to through its legitimation efforts, I seek to expose as explicit and as a worthy
scholarly subject in its own right. This study therefore undertakes as its primary aim the
documentation and analysis of rationales of prevention as they are articulated within a
government setting. It does so based on the premise that not only should preventive
strategies be situated within broader trends, but the reasons for such interventions must
also be similarly scrutinized as they too shed light, and likely to a greater extent, on the
shifting trajectory of prevention. In the subsequent sections, I refine the concept of
'rationales' by addressing both the strengths and limitations of the governmentality
approach.

The Context of Rationalities

As was previously established, the governmentality framework encourages the
examination of the 'mentalities' or 'rationalities' that render governmental measures both
conceivable and implementable (Rose 1996b). The significance of justifications or
rationales is embedded within the very concepts of the governmentality approach. As
Walters (2000:3) has emphasized, the governmentality literature provides accounts of the
nature and extent to which political reasoning is embedded in government discourse.
Similarly, as Miller and Rose (1990:5-6) have suggested, it is possible to identify
rationalities within political language. The governmentality perspective thus enables one
to scrutinize the governmental logic underlying the recent rise to prominence of crime
prevention.

For example, Rose and Miller (1992:178) consider rationalities to constitute "the
formulation and justification of idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it
and rectifying it.” They also emphasize the moral tone that rationalities carry in their
capacity to justify “the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics” (Rose and Miller
1992:175, 178). Carrabine (2000:317) similarly refers to rationalities as mentalities that
justify what regulation is for. These considerations point to the possibility of scrutinizing
rationales to the extent that they may reveal how social problems are problematized and
are sought to be addressed.

Likewise, Garland refers to ‘rationalities’ as “the ways of thinking and styles of
reasoning that are embodied in a particular set of practices” (Garland 1999:17). He
further explains that if one draws upon the notion of ‘rationalities’ to contemplate crime
control, one may more specifically explore how the governance of crime has been
rationalized and how authorities have understood their role in this regard (Garland
1999:17). The latter consideration is also evident in Rose’s (1996b:41-42) conception of
the ‘problematics of rule,’ which he describes as “the ways in which those who would
exercise rule have posed themselves the questions of the reasons, justifications, means
and ends of rule, and the problems, goals or ambitions that should animate it.”

Gordon (1991) has further emphasized the significance of rationalities to the
practices of government. He conveyed Foucault’s thought that “the very possibility of an
activity or way of governing can be conditional on the availability of a certain notion of
its rationality, which may in turn need, in order to be operable, to be credible to the
governed as well as the governing” (Gordon 1991:48). It is these particular foregoing
formulations and considerations that I seek to develop in relation to how the Canadian
federal government perceives and projects its role in crime prevention and how it justifies
the nature of its intervention in that regard.
Some Limitations of the Emphases on Rationalities

While the strength of the governmentality approach lies in its focus on the ‘nexus’ of mundane practices and broader political rationalities (O’Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997:503), it tends to explicate this link through abstract narratives of change and sometimes without reference to, or with only minimal allusion to specific examples of actual government discourse or programmes. Rose (1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2000), among others, often puts forth abstract generalizations in which he aptly identifies sites that are undergoing revisions in light of broader changes in government, but without adequately substantiating his claims in any concrete form. ¹ Rose and Miller (1992) have been similarly criticized for allowing rationalities to remain ‘free-floating’ and not grounding them in material conditions (Curtis 1995:586).

Since the nexus of rationalities and technologies is not fully instantiated in these generalized debates, it is therefore only partially understood. The risk here with over-generalizations is that the complexities of patterns of continuity and change may be inaccurately or incompletely portrayed when they are not empirically substantiated. Stenson and Watt (1999) have attempted to overcome the limitations of Rose’s (1996a) narrative on ‘the death of the social’ by drawing upon specific examples found within government documents. Their investigations revealed that the unfolding of neo-liberal rationalities does not necessarily involve an even displacement of ‘the social,’ but rather a reformulation of it that is contingent upon other logics, discourses and practices of government (Stenson and Watt 1999:200). Stenson and Watt’s work, along with that of Pavlich (1999), Braithwaite (2000) and Garland (1996), among others, further reinforces
the importance of adequately illustrating the nuances of the interconnection between rationalities and technologies.

An additional limitation of the governmentality school's treatment of rationalities pertains to the way in which governmentality analysis tends to emphasize the knowledge-based rationalities (Garland 1999) that are manifested in textual discourses (Stenson 1999). Indeed, there is considerable merit in examining how government is dependent upon knowledge, and particularly social scientific knowledge, to shed light upon what and who is to be governed (Rose 1993:290; Rose and Miller 1992:182). However, Garland's (1999:34) concern with knowledge-based rationalities is that they tend to conceal "the expressive, emotionally-driven and morally-toned currents" that strongly influence crime control policy.

He thus suggests the need for the governmentality approach to scrutinize what he refers to as the 'non-instrumental rationalities' and symbolic discourses which also shape, alter and compromise government programmes and practices (Garland 1999:34-35). In exemplifying this proposal, he specifically draws our attention to the way in which the emotionally driven currents of public fears about crime inform or sometimes actually displace the knowledge-based economic rationalities that influence the political calculations of punitive policy (Garland 1999:34). Without undermining the significance of governmental rationalities, Garland nevertheless reinforces the importance of the aleatoric nature of the political process that inevitably guides crime control policy, but which the governmentality literature tends to overlook.
'Contingent Actualities'

While Garland’s concept of ‘non-instrumental rationalities’ is helpful in countering the limitations of the governmentality perspective, it tends to create unnecessary and unrealistic dichotomies between so-called ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ rationalities. Thus, in an effort to better capture the impact of aleatoric occurrences within the realms of political rhetoric and policy development, I introduce the concept of ‘contingent actualities.’ It should be noted however, that despite my reformulation of Garland’s notion of ‘non-instrumental rationalities,’ his contributions to governmentality analytics must still be credited as invaluable.

Through his invocation of the term ‘contingencies,’ Curtis (1993) has reinforced the significance of observing the ‘accidental forces’ that shape history and social relations. He further explained contingencies as “forces which are neither entirely random nor the simple product of supra-human structures” (Curtis 1993:52). Based on a combination of Curtis’ interpretation of ‘contingencies’ and Garland’s account of ‘non-instrumental rationalities,’ I invoke the term ‘contingent actualities’ to reflect the complexities evident within the rhetoric and development of government technologies and intervention. It also encompasses the political, bureaucratic and administrative realities that often play a significant catalytic role in determining policy development and implementation (Kernaghan 1971, Kernaghan and Siegel 1995). It further entails the way in which both “inadvertent and contingent discoveries ... are captured, rationalized, and pressed into governmental service” (Walters 2000:11).

The term ‘contingent actualities’ is less restrictive than ‘non-instrumental
rationalities' because the former acknowledges the incoherent and haphazard features of the political, policy and practical spheres without viewing them as completely disconnected from formal governmental rationalities. My use of the term 'contingent actualities' is designed to be more open and evolving so that a more comprehensive understanding of government-generated prevention policies and interventions may be achieved. More specifically, I have sought to demonstrate that political rhetoric and government initiatives in the realm of crime prevention are products of a complex and mutually reinforcing interplay between governmental rationalities and contingent actualities. Illustrations of these relations are presented in chapters five through nine.

**Further Caveats of Abstract Rationalities**

Stenson (1999) also questions the narrow manner in which rationalities are conceived. He contends that the governmentality analysis places greater emphasis on the textual discourses that reveal the mentalities of liberal rule rather than on the oral discourses and social practices through which they are manifested (Stenson 1999:45). This dependency on textual discourses, or in Foucault’s (1972) terms, 'serious statements' conceals the ambiguity of policy formation, as well as the complexity of everyday social practices (Stenson 1999:58-59). Stenson (1999:59) claims that this lacunae can be overcome by extending governmentality analytics so that they enable the examination of the inter-penetration of oral forms of knowledge in social practices.

O’Malley et al. (1997:501-502) echo this limitation of textual analysis in their claim against the governmentality literature’s tendency to render government programmes
as univocal and coherent, as well as to concentrate on politics as ‘mentalities of rule’ rather than as social relations. They therefore emphasize the necessity of rethinking programmes of rule as multi-vocal and decentred, as well as by reconsidering politics as relations of contest (O’Malley et al. 1997:505). Carrabine (2000) also points to the importance of linking the diversity of interactions to broader discourses and rationalities. He specifically cautions that the absence of such dialogues creates partial depictions of how strategies of rule are constituted and maintained (Carrabine 2000:327).

While bearing these limitations and alternatives in mind, I pursue an investigation of the articulation and manifestation of rationalities within the Canadian federal government rhetoric that promotes government action in the name of crime prevention. While an exclusive focus upon rationalities and political representation is critiqued by O’Malley et al. (1997) and Garland (1999, 2000) as being weak and limiting, I contend that in the context of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level, it remains significant and novel. Such a reflexive study has never been undertaken with this particular subject matter in the Canadian context.

Furthermore, by incorporating Garland and Stenson’s queries about the emotive and oral manifestations of rationalities, this study strengthens and extends the governmentality framework by attempting to address the identified limitations and by encompassing broader sources of evidence. Furthermore, this research will serve as a baseline investigation from which extensions of governmentality research on oral discourses, social practices, social relations and contingent actualities may draw comparative material when the examination of crime prevention programme
implementation is subsequently pursued.

In light of the limitations of abstract generalizations, knowledge-based rationalities and textual sources of evidence that have been deemed characteristic of the governmentality school, I invoke the term ‘rationales’ to reflect discourse, and more specifically rhetorical, which is indicative of both governmental rationalities and contingent actualities. While encompassing all of the synonymous connotations of ‘justification,’ ‘logic,’ ‘underlying reasoning,’ the term ‘rationale’ here refers to the identified purpose or reasons for the course of government action. In this sense, ‘rationales’ that are expressed through political discourse reveal that which is thought to shape what governance entails and how it should be deployed (O’Malley 1996a:1; Miller and Rose 1990). However, given the broad and abstract nature of rationalities, there is much to be gained by specifying and targeting them.

This concentration on rationales constitutes one of the means through which the ‘nexus’ between rationalities and technologies may be better understood. For example, since the identification of rationales inevitably points to the use of specific discourses, material objects and contingent actualities, one is able to understand more concretely how ‘rationalities’ are articulated and marketed within political rhetoric designed to promote and legitimate government action. Furthermore, by focussing on ‘rationales,’ one is able to observe more closely and to identify more concretely the compromised and partial ways in which rationalities are manifested in discourse and practice (Garland 1999:31).

In addition, a more concentrated focus upon rationales sheds greater light on the shifts towards neo-liberal styles of government while simultaneously bearing in mind the
alcatoric conditions that influence the translation of rationalities. In other words, rationales constitute the site at which rationalities and contingent actualities or pragmatic constraints both accord and collide at the level of political discourse, the latter of which is usually aimed at explaining both the necessity and the parameters of government action. For example, by isolating rationales in government discourse, one is able to observe how the promotional rhetoric of ‘crime prevention and community safety’ intersects with the language of ‘risk,’ ‘the social,’ ‘government at-a-distance,’ probability, cost control, harm reduction, efficiency and effectiveness (Garland 1999:17).

In this sense, it is plausible to suggest that at the level of discourse, rationalities become performative in the shape of ‘rationales’ that are rendered more readily identifiable through political rhetoric or popular discourse. By extension, such an analysis reveals how crime prevention is shaped and re-shaped in light of changing government aspirations and objectives. It further unveils the use of multiple and contradictory rationales through which crime prevention is ambiguously justified and conveyed in a government setting.

Moreover, by placing greater emphasis on rationales, I am attempting to overcome the limitations of knowledge-based and text-based rationalities as identified by Garland (1999) and Stenson (1999). This study is primarily concerned with elucidating the extent to which rationalities are embedded within government rhetoric on crime prevention. While the corresponding empirical evidence has obviously been drawn from textual and knowledge-based sources, they have been equally supplemented by oral sources (Stenson 1999:58) and expressive and emotionally-driven currents (Garland 1999:34). These
pertinent forms of reasoning were uncovered through interviews with key players involved in the advancement of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level. They were further revealed through the visual images, logos and slogans presented in government publications.

While Garland and Stenson have duly enriched and extended governmentality analysis by their more encompassing methodological prescriptions, I contend that Garland in particular has somewhat hastily overlooked the relevance of government generated discourse to the unfolding of rationalities. More specifically, Garland (1999:17) is dismissive of policy statements and official speeches as sources of evidence of rationalities. However, I maintain, along with Miller and Rose (1990:6), that these constitute one of the primary sites at which rationalities are manifested. In fact, as I demonstrate in chapters five through nine, government policy documents, ministers’ speeches, as well as publications are the very locations through which the ‘thinkable’ is rendered identifiable, understandable and saleable. They are also the sites where the intersection of rationalities and contingent actualities is often played out in a mutually reinforcing manner.

Additional Considerations of Rationales

An additional criticism that merits consideration pertains to O’Malley et al.’s (1997:510) claim that within the governmentality school, there is a tendency to scrutinize the development of government programmes as they are perceived by government authorities themselves. While such a focus may be considered narrow and limiting, it
constitutes the very core of this research study and it is one that can be undertaken in an encompassing and inclusive manner. By examining how crime prevention is articulated and justified from the vantage point of the politicians and policy-makers involved in programme formation, this study traces elements of continuity and change within evolving perceptions of priorities over time.

Moreover, this emphasis on the Canadian government’s own perception of its intervention enables one to explore the manner in which notions of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ become entwined within rationales for either ‘more’ or ‘less’ government. Many governmentality scholars have observed how the perennial registration of failure in meeting government objectives is optimistically constructed as an impetus of innovation and reform (Rose 1996b:53; Rose and Miller 1992:190-1; Miller and Rose 1990; Hunt and Wickham 1994). Bearing this observation in mind, this study uncovers how the justification of failure that is evident in the overgeneralized claim that ‘nothing works’ intersects, either in contradiction or in accordance with, other rationales that are elaborated through government discourse on crime prevention.

As a complementary framework to governmentality considerations of rationalities, Edelman’s (1988; 1977) approach offers additional insight on the value of examining ‘rationales.’ He especially emphasizes how justifications for government action are explicitly constructed through political rhetoric. Given that his analysis on the role of political language in securing public acquiescence is not directly relevant to the immediate subject of this dissertation, I do not present it in its entirety. Instead, I briefly emphasize a few aspects of his observations that are more pertinent to this study. These
highlights are presented in the form of cautionary notes to be taken into consideration within my own analysis.

First, Edelman's (1977:78) conclusions suggest that one should be mindful of the way in which authorities justify their actions by claiming that they rely on specialized knowledge and bureaucratic objectivity. He cautions however, that given the complexity of government actions, these terms must be recognized as ambiguously constructed. In light of this acknowledgement and within the context of crime prevention, I am aware of the extent to which criminological knowledge is embedded within the Canadian federal government's justificatory claims that advance the prevention project. I also note the compromised ways in which knowledge-based claims are put forth in light of the presence of contingent actualities.

Edelman (1977:97) further explicates how the political language employed to justify decisions calls attention to pertinent facts which often includes information on the limitations of the strategic options that are not being pursued. In examining the emergence of 'The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention,' I pay particular heed to the way in which certain measures are explicitly excluded from the discourse promoting the formal strategy. By extension, I especially note the manner in which reactive responses are variously constructed as both in contrast with, and complementary to, proactive strategies.

This latter point echoes Edelman's additional claim that the language that describes and justifies government action is ambiguous. He particularly contends that rationales often take the form of ambiguous abstractions, such as 'national security,'
'public welfare' and 'law and order' (Edelman 1977:65). These vague objectives are often thought to serve in securing state and non-state approval without the constraints of strict outcome measures. In the context of crime prevention, I examine how broadly conceived ambitions of 'community safety,' 'a safer Canada,' and even 'crime prevention' itself, for example, serve to justify government initiatives in this regard.

Throughout his observations, Edelman (1977:101) has also drawn attention to the way in which rationales recur over time. Such an emphasis is especially central to my examination of aspects of continuity and change in both the conceptions and rationales of crime prevention between 1974 and 2000. Not only do I note how rationales have recurred over time, but I am particularly mindful of how certain rationales have been employed and re-employed to justify very distinct forms of crime prevention.

For example, I established in chapters five through eight how some of the same rationales have been used and re-used since the 1970s to justify advancing reactive responses, situational measures, community programs and social development approaches. Thus, through his emphasis on questionable claims, purposive ambiguity and recurring justifications, Edelman's analysis serves to highlight certain relevant features of government-based rationales on crime prevention.

In conclusion to this segment, I maintain that the governmentality approach offers an appropriate analytical base for the study of rationales that justify government activity. The complementary and challenging insights provided by Garland, O'Malley et al., Stenson, as well as Stenson and Watt, strengthen the governmentality school's analytical potential in this regard. Moreover, Edelman's more specific contribution to
understanding the substance of justifications provides additional analytical precision. Since I have established the parameters of the meaning of rhetoric, as well as the significance of rationales to the study of government intervention in the area of crime prevention, I now present a definition and a qualifying explication of the concept of ‘government intervention.’

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

_Studyig “the conduct of government” in “the government of conduct”_
(Hindess 1996:212)

This dissertation investigates how the concept of ‘crime prevention’ is articulated and justified as an object and instrument of government intervention in the late twentieth century. It further purports that the rationales upon which prevention is advanced both shape, and are shaped by, the government setting in which they are constructed. I have already established that rationales reveal government aspirations and proclaim the alleged importance and necessity of intervention. They also serve to delimit the scope of action on the part of governments.

As previously stated, this research does not evaluate the translation of rationalities into technologies of government. Rather, the primary concern of this dissertation remains ‘why’ the Canadian federal government is intervening in the name of prevention in a more concentrated way at this particular historical juncture. Nevertheless, in order to shed greater light upon the rationales, it is imperative to clarify ‘what’ the government is doing and justifying (or at least claiming to do) in the area of crime prevention. I thus
seek to delimit what is meant by ‘government’ and ‘government intervention’ for the purpose of this particular research study.

The notion of ‘government intervention’ as I invoke it, broadly falls under the governmentality term of ‘technologies’ which refer to “the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions” (Rose and Miller 1992:175). However, given that this understanding of ‘technologies’ implies broad systems of social insurance, schooling and penalty, among others (Rose 2000:323), greater specificity is required to reflect the narrower subject matter of this dissertation.

I employ the term ‘government intervention’ to convey the particular nature of federally and nationally directed crime prevention policy and programmes in Canada. For the purpose of clarification, I first decompose the term into its two component parts: ‘government’ and ‘intervention.’ I then discuss how the themes of ‘the social,’ ‘risk,’ and ‘governing at-a-distance’ are interwoven within my application of the term ‘government intervention.’

“Government” - Centrally and De-Centrally Conceived

In Foucauldian analyses, the term ‘government’ is understood in both broad and narrow senses. Foucault broadly defined ‘government’ as ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Gordon 1991:2) which is thought to entail “a more or less methodical and rationally reflected ‘way of doing things,’ or ‘art,’ for acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, correct and modify the ways in which
they conduct themselves” (Burchell 1993:267). Conceived in this way, ‘government’ is thought to operate in numerous spheres including individual self-government, the regulation of interpersonal, institutional and group relations, as well as the exercise of political authority (Gordon 1991:1-3).

More recent emphasis within the governmentality school has been placed on the indirect ‘guidance’ on the manner in which individuals regulate their own comportment (Gordon 1991:2; Hindess 1996:106; Rose 1993:287). This Foucauldian conception of government has influentially drawn attention to the range of authorities and practices of rule that are manifested in micro-settings beyond ‘the state,’ which is itself often considered ‘the’ centralized locus of power in other approaches. This encompassing notion has enabled more penetrating inquiries on the tasks of government within and across a multitude of locales, including among others, the statutory, voluntary and corporate sectors, as well as the micro-level sites of the community, the family and the individual.

By mapping the different spaces opened up for government, the governmentality literature has certainly brought many changing features of government to the fore of analytical inquiry. However, as much as the extended definition of government has encouraged more trenchant observations on the conception and manifestation of power and regulation, it can also be disconcerting. Curtis (1995:580) attributes this frustration to the ‘mushiness’ of the concept of government within the work of Rose and Miller (1992) who are said to variously employ broad, narrow and conventional conceptions of the term. Garland (1999:27) similarly cautioned that to “generalize the idea of
‘governmental’ to refer to all sources and locales that exercise social power inevitably invites confusion.”

Furthermore, despite the arguments within the governmentality school emphasizing the need to examine extra-state forms of governance, it is important to recognize that many contemporary crime prevention programmes originate within central government departments (Stenson 1996; Stenson and Watt 1999:192). Bearing in mind these criticisms against ambiguous and broad conceptions, I employ a more conventional version of ‘government’ while at the same time acknowledging the complementary way in which the Foucauldian usage informs and enhances the conception that I invoke.

Providing a conventional definition of the term ‘the government’ may appear at first glance to be a relatively simple task. After all, it is a term in popular discourse whose meaning is seemingly known, understood, implied and taken-for-granted. It is also a concept that is often accompanied by cynical epithets; its discourse is frequently mistrusted and its intentions are usually doubted (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Furthermore, in its conventional and popular form, ‘the government’ often appears as a fixed, unidimensional and central political authority and is therefore thought to be easily identifiable and definable.

However, while I intend to invoke the term in its rather straightforward conventional form, imparting such a definition has been somewhat challenging in the context of an analysis that draws upon the governmentality framework that cautions against confining interpretations. Trying to be attentive to the complexities that render ‘the government’ and its activities dynamic, multidimensional and de-centred is
somewhat difficult to capture in a definitional statement.

Nonetheless, I refer to ‘government’ as the corpus of legally, politically, fiscally and administratively constituted authorities and agencies of the nation-state. This resembles what Abrams (1988) refers to as a ‘state system.’ Abrams (1988:58) defines a state system as “a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure [sic] centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society.” In this sense, ‘the state’ is not viewed as a coherent actor, but as a multiplex of capacities, agencies and projects that interact, shift and conflict. This interpretation of ‘the state’ allows one more usefully to analyse a department or a series of departments of government (Curtis 1997:10). The specific state to which I make reference in this dissertation is the Canadian federal government. The federal government departments under review here include the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice. In this light, the term ‘government’ is employed as both a noun and an adjective alluding to that which is related to state system activities.

While this interpretation may appear to imply the existence of a centrally-based authority, it does so cautiously and openly so as not to contradict the governmentality view that rejects the state as the only ‘centre’ of power or authority. Still, one must acknowledge that federal government ministries are sites of decision-making, that there exist junctures of policy production and that government generated programmes are identifiable. To a certain degree, these sites and junctures are authoritatively determined by the federal department that oversees their realization.

Nevertheless, one must further recognize that such policies and programmes are
often informed by, and deployed through, interdepartmental and joint management
efforts, federal-provincial-territorial 'collaboration,' as well as municipal, community,
private sector and individual 'cooperation.' In fact, as governmentality scholars have
suggested, the effectiveness of modern forms of government has become dependent upon
the combined interaction between political and non-political authorities (Barry et al.
1993:2), between public and private security (Rose 1996b:37), as well as between state
and non-state practices (Garland 1999:27).

Bearing in mind the fragmentation and elaborate network of state and non-state
agencies that compose the operations of a 'political government' or a 'state system,' this
dissertation seeks to shed light upon how the so-called 'central authority'6 articulates and
justifies the workings of this elaborate network (Stenson and Watt 1999). Therefore, with
a view to better understanding how crime prevention is articulated and justified within its
Canadian federal government context, it is necessary to comprehend the essence of the
government intervention that is shaped to deploy it.

For example, the responsibility for the "National Strategy on Community Safety
and Crime Prevention" is located within the Canadian federal government ministries of
Justice and the Solicitor General. In their directing capacities, these government
departments set the policy agenda for how crime prevention is conceived and
implemented; their staff also determines funding criteria and management practices.
They may thus be considered the 'central authorities' in this regard.

They nevertheless jointly share this task with, and they further depend upon, other
state and non-state agencies to implement their policies and programmes aimed at
addressing crime and victimization. What is of significance to the dissertation is how these ministries, as representative branches of the Canadian federal government, explain and validate the de-centralized or ‘at-a-distance’ way in which federally and nationally directed crime prevention programmes are to be accomplished. In other words, the present study sheds light on how the de-centred constitution of the state is ‘re-centred’ through the policy articulation process.

This focus on the Canadian federal government and two of its ministries involved in crime prevention initiatives may appear to consist of an overly unitary view of the state. While the role of a centralized state may seem much more prominent in my analysis than in most governmentality writings, it is not my intention to overvalue the state in this particular case. Rather, my goal is more complex and long-term. In this dissertation, I emphasize how a more or less centralized authority articulates and rationalizes its plans to intervene ‘at-a-distance’ and to work in ‘collaboration’ with allegedly non-state sectors at the level of rhetoric.

As the concluding chapter indicates in more detail, this dissertation constitutes the first phase of how prevention ‘at-a-distance’ is conceived and justified in the context of government. Once this phase is complete, I plan to examine how the Canadian federal government’s emphasis on governing crime prevention ‘at-a-distance’ is manifested in the implementation phase of ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’

In recognition of the complexity of this initiative, the intention is to explore how ‘at-a-distance’ forms of prevention are carried out through a range of para-state agencies
and non-state organizations, as well as in ‘state-linked’ locations (Smith 2001, 1993). The purpose of the post-doctoral study is to reflect on how ‘at-a-distance’ prevention is experienced by the non-state or para-state sectors. Therefore, this dissertation’s apparent emphasis on a rather centralized state should not be viewed as a contradiction of the governmentality perspectives. Rather, it seeks to study the complexity of the arrangement among centralized state and decentralized non-state sectors in more depth and over the long term. Thus, this dissertation constitutes only the first phase of this longitudinal research endeavour. On a general level, both the immediate and the long-term goals are to reflect upon the relations among the various practices that rely upon the capacities of the state system either directly, indirectly or not at all (Curtis 1997:20; Smith 2001:256).

“Intervention”

While the term ‘intervention’ may appear to be more readily definable because it does not seem to carry quite the same academic ‘baggage’ as the concept of ‘government,’ it still needs to be ‘unpacked’ so that its specific meaning within the context of this dissertation is understood. While I have chosen the term ‘intervention,’ it could easily be substituted by such words as ‘action,’ ‘activity’ or ‘undertaking,’” etc. However, my choice in specifically employing the term ‘intervention’ is purposive because it concurs with the broader Foucauldian conception of ‘government.’ Intervention is defined as “the act or an instance of intervening; interference ... in another’s affairs” (The Canadian Oxford Dictionary 2001:737).

In its verb form, ‘intervene’ signifies “interfere; come between so as to prevent or
modify the result or course of events” (Ibid). In these senses, ‘intervention’ fits well within the governmentality view of ‘government’ as constituting the range of activities that are intended “to shape, guide, manage or regulate the conduct of persons - not only other persons but also oneself” (Rose 1993:287). Indeed, this understanding of ‘government’ implies various forms of intervention in a number of settings. In fact, by comparing these definitions, it is plausible to suggest that the terms ‘intervention’ and ‘government’ may be viewed as synonymous.

However, in an effort to avoid adding a layer of ‘confusion’ and unnecessary ‘mushiness’ to my analysis, let me clarify the implication of this claim. As I stated above, my usage of the terms ‘government’ and ‘governmental’ refers to the existence of a ‘central political government’ and in this particular case, “the Canadian federal government” and its various ministries as they are identified as such. Nevertheless, these government agencies are highly immersed in the business of ‘conducting the conduct’ of individual Canadian citizens.

In the specific case of crime prevention within the Department of Justice Canada and the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada, there exist identifiable measures that are aimed at influencing the individual behaviour of actual and potential victims and offenders; as I demonstrate in chapters five through nine, most of these programmes are designed to encourage autonomous and responsible self-governance on the part of individuals. I seem to be stating the obvious here in the sense that all political governments are more or less interventionist and much of what they ‘do’ inevitably involves guiding and managing individual behaviours, usually with a view to ensuring the
collective well-being. However, the interest for this dissertation is not whether or not governments intervene in the lives of individual citizens, but rather ‘why’ and ‘how’ they attempt to do so.

An additional note of clarification must be raised regarding a potential misinterpretation that may be derived from the connotative meaning of the term ‘intervention.’ Some of the identified synonyms of ‘intervention’ include ‘interference,’ ‘interruption,’ ‘intrusion,’ ‘meddling,’ and ‘obstruction’ (*The Canadian Thesaurus* 2001: 537). Such terms tend to carry rather negative meanings that may suggest the likelihood of detrimental effects on the lives of individual citizens at the hands of ‘the government.’ However, my approach to the study of ‘government intervention’ is more open and is less concerned with conspiracies and devious covers, although I am certainly attentive to the latter. Regardless of the depth of our critical lenses, one must concede that not ‘all’ government intervention is necessarily negatively perceived or received.

A great deal of what governments do provide, at least in many western industrialized democratic nations, both in intention and outcome, may be considered ameliorative. Through infrastructure commitments, health care, public safety provisions and the relative protection of rights and freedoms, numerous governments do attempt to fulfill their ‘pastoral’ undertakings. Thus in the case of crime prevention, I do not to suggest that what the Canadian federal government is proposing to do and is currently accomplishing in this area is inherently negative. Arguably, locally-based crime prevention projects do not necessarily conjure up the same human rights concerns that punitive correctionalist practices sometimes do. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that in its
social development, community-based and situational form, crime prevention may be viewed for the most part as an ameliorative, optimistic and progressive approach.

Thus, by invoking the term ‘intervention,’ I am not deliberately preoccupied at the outset with the task of uncovering concealed objectives and inherently smothering intrusions on the part of government officials. In this sense, I do not assume Nietzsche’s (1969:75) claim that political governments are inherently deceitful and devious. That is not to say however, that I am hiding behind the neutral gaze of the governmentality approach and that my analysis is completely devoid of evaluative comments where they are duly applicable. Such an open analytical regard is in keeping with Rigakos’ (2001:98) claim that the ‘neutral gaze’ of governmentality studies is misleading because governmentality research cannot be value-free. He further contends that this allegedly ‘neutral gaze’ is “an impossible project for criminology” (Rigakos 2001:98), although he does not explain this targeted contention.

Bearing this debate in mind, I do not minimize the significance of the extended reach that emerging forms of prevention-oriented government interventions may have in the micro-settings of individual and communal lives. As scholars, we must remain attentive to the actuality that many government generated preventive measures are largely targeted at socio-economically marginalised groups or individuals and that the nature of these relations reveal a great deal about shifting government priorities. But whether these strategies are perceived as detrimentally intrusive or positive is a matter of endless value-laden debate. My concern is rather to demonstrate how such interventions, in either their proposed or implemented forms, are variously justified as ‘necessary’ at this particular historical moment.
Crime Prevention as “Government Intervention”

Given the aforementioned delimitations and clarifications of the terms ‘government’ and ‘intervention,’ it is now possible to delineate their meaning in their hybrid form. For the purpose of this dissertation, ‘government intervention’ generally refers to the programme activities generated and deployed by a central political government or state system usually with a view to addressing a particular social issue that has been identified as requiring amelioration. In the context of crime prevention, ‘government intervention’ encompasses a diverse range of government directed practices that are designed to circumvent conditions and behaviour that are thought to generate crime and victimization. In this sense, it is plausible to suggest that crime prevention is both a goal and a form of government intervention.

Although this definition may appear to do little to overcome the vagueness associated with other governmentality definitions, its initial broadness is deliberate. Given the ambiguous nature of the concept of crime prevention and given the almost unbounded potential of government intervention, I sought to avoid inaccurately restricting these definitions at the outset. Instead, I have allowed the meaning and implications of the terms ‘government intervention’ and ‘crime prevention’ to be determined and exemplified through their ‘official’ identification in Canadian federal government policy documents and publications. The variation in their perceived significance was also revealed through interviews with key actors involved in the advancement of crime prevention initiatives at the Department of Justice and the Ministry of the Solicitor General. The results of this examination are presented in chapters five through nine.

Although the characteristics of the Canadian federal government’s intervention in the name of crime prevention are illustrated according to how they were revealed in official sources, I have nevertheless framed this exegesis by drawing upon, reconsidering and extending the governmentality constructs of “the social,” “risk,” and governing “at-a-distance.” The purpose of such a guided, yet open approach is to move beyond the tendency within the governmentality literature to generalize patterns and transformations. Such an extension enables a more accurate portrayal of the complexity, unevenness and variation of emerging shifts in the governance of crime.

The narratives of the governmentality framework have characterized recent governmental trends as manifestations of the simultaneous ascendance of neo-liberal configurations of ‘risk’ and the decline of welfarist modes of ‘social’ governance (Rose 1996a; O’Malley 1992; Beck 1992; Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994; Donzelot 1991). This shift has also been associated with de-centered and ‘at-a-distance’ forms of regulation that emphasize preventive governance through the actions of autonomous and responsible individuals (Braithwaite 2000; Rose and Miller 1992; O’Malley 1996b). While this argument is certainly valid and potent in many important respects, it is one that is sometimes broadly and abstractly made without concrete referents.

Through this dissertation, I challenge the governmentality literature’s line of reasoning on two specific interrelated points and I extend it on one other area. The first one questions the extent to which the alleged shift from social welfare forms of
government towards neo-liberal tendencies has been pure and complete. I contend that in the case of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level, one may observe an intersection and overlap of neo-liberal and welfare logics compounded by the persistent undercurrent of neo-conservative claims. Given these uncertainties, the second point of contention challenges the profundity of the decline and displacement of socially-oriented articulations and the rise of risk-based tendencies of preventive intervention. Instead, I draw attention to the potentiality of the hybridized co-existence of risk-based and socially-based practices.

An additional area explored within this research pertains to the desire to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance.’ This consideration amounts more to an exemplification of the governmentality framework than a challenge of it. Nevertheless, particular regard is given to the pronouncements of, and rationales for, government decentralization and fragmentation, as well as to the corresponding changes relating to accountability and responsibility. The specific nuances of these three points of debate are explicated in further detail below.

**Neo-Liberalism Intersected**

The governmentality framework has interpreted major changes in forms of government as involving a shift from social welfare operations premised upon Keynesian virtues of centralized socio-economic management towards a neo-liberal emphasis upon ‘at-a-distance’ forms of individual risk management (Braithwaite 2000:222; Rose 2000:324). Within the Keynesian welfarist rationalities that dominated the political and
economic spheres between the late 1940s and late 1970s, individual responsibility was seen to be conditioned by such social forces as social class, housing and employment supply, as well as the national economy (O’Malley and Palmer 1996:139).

During this period, government intervention was geared more towards the operation of collective social services than towards specific individual actions. The responsibility for such intervention was perceived to be located within the confines of a centralized state that in turn relied upon professional expertise to legitimate its undertakings (Rose 1996b:49). These centrally based strategies of social welfare were perceived by critics to engender problems of state overload and overreach and, by implication, a dependency that thwarted individual freedom and responsibility (Rose 1996b:51; O’Malley 1999b:184; Walters 2000:154).

The climate of critical resistance during the late 1970s thus paved the way for a new formula of government. Governmentality narratives have suggested that the decline in the perceived effectiveness of Keynesian welfare policy has been accompanied by the emergence of neo-liberal political rationalities and technologies (Rose 1996a). The once dominant and centralized ‘social’ forms of government are thought to have given way to a greater emphasis on minimal and decentralized intervention and to a reaffirmation of individual responsibility in managing risks (Rose 2000:337; O’Malley 1999b:184). By implication, universal provisions of social services have been undermined in favour of more narrowly targeted interventions aimed at individuals, families and communities (Stenson and Watt 1999:190; O’Malley 1999b:184). The focus on these revised targets is increasingly sustained by economic forms of reasoning that justify objectives of cost

Rose (1996a:330-331; 2000:333) has argued more specifically that the nationalized and universalized notions of social solidarity have given way to ‘the community’ as a new space for individual and collective regulation. In this sense, local communities have become both the means and a territory of government (Rose 1996a:335). In this context, risk management has allegedly become localized and individualized rather than shared by a broader and inclusive collectivity (O’Malley 1992; Stenson 1993). Instead, government interventions are targeted towards particular ‘communities’ that may be viewed as high risk of criminal and social problems (O’Malley and Palmer 1996; Stenson and Watt 1999).

In the context of crime control, the governmentality approach has also demonstrated how emerging neo-liberal rationalities have given rise to the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992), to prudentialism (O’Malley 1992) or to what Feeley and Simon (1994) refer to as an ‘actuarial logic’ whereby regulation is neither undertaken nor completely controlled by the state. In light of these alleged changes in styles of governance, ‘crime’ has been re-problematized and its control has been reconfigured in many important respects. As high crime rates have become a standardized and accepted feature of daily routines, governments have altered the nature and scope of their responses to crime and victimization (Garland 1996:446).

Since crime is now increasingly perceived as a risk to be calculated and managed (O’Malley 1996b:190), central governments have come to draw from, and inculcate
responsibility upon individual citizens, as well as the private, voluntary and community sectors to partake in the regulation of potential risks. Given these shifts, one may query how particular conceptions and expectations of crime prevention have been recast through emergent neo-liberal rationalities and technologies. While this question is worthy of consideration in its own right and actually forms part of the basis of this research study, it is one that needs to be reposed in light of the broader and more complex context in which central government generated crime prevention initiatives have developed and are sustained.

While a broad and influential shift towards neo-liberal rationalities and technologies is undoubtedly discernable, one must acknowledge, as do many governmentality writers, that governmental programmes are never fully and perfectly realized (Rose 1996a; Rose and Miller 1992; Gordon 1991). While Rose (2000), Donzelot (1991) and Feeley and Simon (1994) insist on the existence of an identifiable coherence associated with an allegedly unilateral shift towards neo-liberal forms of risk-based practices, others such as Garland (1999:31) have pointed to “the compromised, corrupted and partial ways” in which rationalities settle in their practical form. In his earlier study on adaptive strategies, Garland (1996) more specifically reflected upon the fragmentation, volatility, and contradictions associated with broader changes in criminal justice. Others, such as Rigakos and Hadden (2001:61), as well as Hatt (1999) and Gordon (1980), have pointed to the overlapping and integrated ways in which disciplinary (conservatism and neo-conservatism) and risk management approaches (neo-liberalism) exist.
Stenson (1993) has similarly discussed the significance of internally generated complexities of mentalities in the context of community policing; he more specifically claimed that there are no specific rationalities intrinsic to crime control measures (Stenson 1993:381). He also contended that modalities of government should be viewed as fluid and interpenetrating rather than as distinct entities that displace one another (Stenson 1993:386). Furthermore, in their study on local economic development, Stenson and Watt (1999) have not only emphasized the uneven and spatially varied way in which neo-liberal rationalities inhabit local government practices, but they have also highlighted the tensions inherent within the co-existence between neo-liberal discourse and the enduring emphasis upon social rationalities and technologies of government.

Moreover, O’Malley and Palmer (1996) exemplify the tensions inherent in shifts between two broad governmental rationalities. While they place greater emphasis on the distinctions between Keynesian and post-Keynesian policing discourses, they nevertheless briefly discuss the difficulties that the enduring Keynesian feature of police professionalization has placed upon the shift towards post-Keynesian policing that emphasizes police-community partnerships and public responsibility (O’Malley and Palmer 1996:144).

The most explicit and penetrating identification of the overlap between rationalities is evident in O’Malley’s multiple examinations of punishments (1999b), of criminology and criminal justice at the turn of the millennium (2000), as well as of ‘discontinuity, government and risk’ (2001). In an earlier publication, O’Malley (1992) recognized that the effects of rationalities and technologies are contingent upon the
political programs in which they are located and deployed. His more recent work re-
echoes and exemplifies this claim.

While he concedes that the nature of contemporary penal policy can be explained in terms of the emergence of neo-liberal politics, he contends that it is also shaped by the nostalgia of neo-conservatism (O'Malley 1999b:185-189). He asserts that the alliance between neo-conservative and neo-liberal rationalities has increased the diversity of sanctions. He further emphasizes the contradictions resulting from the overlap between rationalities. By way of example, he explains that whereas the projected rhetorical image of the state ‘clamping down on crime’ may be attributed to neo-conservative influences, the simultaneous deployment of policies aimed at devolving responsibility to the community is identified with neo-liberal politics (O'Malley 1999b:190).

He further cautions that the governmentality literature, which emphasizes ‘the death of the social’ and the ascendance of the risk society, has exaggerated the extent to which these transformations have occurred within the criminal justice field (O'Malley 2000). This claim echoes the views of Rigakos and Hadden (2001), as well as Stenson and Watt (1999) who have expressed concern about the over-emphasis on rupture and discontinuity. It should also be noted that in an effort to add credence to the debate, Rigakos (2001:97) reminded the scholarly community that Foucault (1972:173) himself had encouraged the description and analysis of elements of “continuity, return, and repetition” (emphasis in original).

O’Malley (2000:153) more specifically notes that in their tendency toward exaggeration, such accounts have underestimated “the impact of resistance to change; the
instability of programs and their tendencies toward hybridity; and the emergence of other, competing, transformational tendencies.” He subsequently suggested that governmental discourses on risk should be read, “not as fixed, unified and consistent, but as discontinuous, variable and contested” (O’Malley 2001:91). Thus, in contrast to the narratives of the governmentality approach, O’Malley’s view demonstrates the necessity to further consider the complex implications of the amalgamation of both pre-existing and emerging rationalities.

Bearing in mind these challenges, I propose an alternative to the governmentality narrative that projects neo-liberalism as the predominant political rationality of the late twentieth century. I contend that if one is to portray how authorities have reflected upon the reasons and justifications of government intervention (Rose 1993:288), then one must do so as openly and as authentically as possible. Therefore, instead of simply examining the ascendance of crime prevention amidst shifts towards neo-liberal styles of government, I suggest that it may be better understood in the context of the intersection between multiple rationalities that co-exist in their partial and fragmented forms. Rather than viewing neo-liberalism as a complete replacement of welfarist principles, I extend Stenson and Watt’s (1999) contention that certain social welfarist tendencies have been reformulated rather than displaced within government-based regulatory efforts. Similarly, I share O’Malley’s (1999b) view that neo-liberal emphases on prudentialism advance alongside the perennial reinforcement of neo-conservative reactive and punitive measures.

In this light, I explore how crime prevention, in all its ambiguity, is
simultaneously shaped by the complex interplay among persistent welfare rationalities, emergent neo-liberal politics and the recurring recourse to neo-conservative influences. In other words, I demonstrate how crime prevention has been re-cast in the context of a greater emphasis on prudentialism that inevitably relies on both the previously established infrastructure of ‘the social’ and the guarantee of punishment as a last resort. It is here that Garland’s (1999) and Stenson’s (1999) methodological prescriptions to incorporate the ‘non-instrumental’ rationalities and oral sources of information are particularly relevant. The expressive and value-laden discourses that they have emphasized tend to reveal the underlying currents and nostalgic referents that inform the partial shifts from ‘old’ rationalities to the ‘new’ ones; by extension, this consideration should shed greater light on how rationalities are grafted onto one another.

It should also be noted that while Garland (1996) and O’Malley (1999b) are concerned with explicating the extent of the irony, incompatibility and incoherence resulting from the influence of multiple rationalities, my interest is more modestly to demonstrate how the intersections of various rationalities are manifested within the Canadian federal government’s justificatory rhetoric on crime prevention. In other words, I attempt to illustrate how a state rationalizes such uneven arrangements. The next two sections highlight two points of contention that exemplify the complexities associated with the ‘intersected’ rise of neo-liberalism in the context of crime control.

**The Mutuality of ‘The Social’ and ‘Risk’**

As previously stated, governmentality accounts have emphasized the implications
of the shift from social forms of government towards neo-liberal advancements of individualized risk management. The former is associated with welfarist attempts to foster socially-oriented and collectively-based measures aimed at addressing various social ills. It is thought that through its ‘discovery’ (Donzelot 1979), ‘the social’ became an ‘a priori’ of political thought and action (Rose 1996a), as well as a unifying concept of governance (O’Malley 1999a:94) that fostered social solidarity at the level of the nation state (Stenson and Watt 1999:190).

During this era, objects of government were considered ‘social’ problems and ‘social’ pathologies that required social intervention that included various forms of social services, social insurance and social security. However, it has been argued by Baudrillard (1983) and re-echoed, albeit hesitantly, by Rose (1996a) that by the 1970s, the ‘end’ or ‘death’ of the social was imminent and evident.

According to the governmentality line of thought, this decline in social forms of governance is associated with the emergence of neo-liberal rationalities which have advanced the greater emphasis on ‘prudentialism’ (O’Malley 1992, 1996b, 1999a). Due to the perceived greater efficiency of this transition, preventive governance seems to have become more prominent than punitive or disciplinary interventions. According to O’Malley (1996b:199), this shift implies a simultaneous retraction of socialized risk-based techniques and an extension of privatized or individualized ones. More specifically, this alleged fracturing of the social is said to involve the replacement of social forces with entrepreneurialism and the substitution of social services with a reliance on individual practices of prudence and responsibility (O’Malley 1996b, 1999a;
Rose 2000:327). Put simply, neo-liberalism's emphasis on risk management implies that individuals "should be prudent instead of relying on socialized securities" (O'Malley 1996b:196).

Within this post-social vision, Rose (1996b:57) explains how

[p]olitical reason must now justify and organize itself by arguing over the arrangements that are adequate to the existence of persons as, in their essence, creatures of freedom, liberty and autonomy. Within this new regime of the actively responsible self, individuals are to fulfil their national obligations not through their relations of dependency and obligation to one another, but through seeking to fulfil themselves within a variety of micromoral domains or "communities" - families, workplaces, schools, leisure association, neighbourhoods (emphasis in original).

As a technology that places the onus for managing risks on individuals, this neo-liberal form of prudentialism has, by extension, generated changes in sites of criminological inquiry and criminal justice activity. First, both the plight and the role of victims have gained greater prominence through neo-liberal discourses and responsibilization is central to understanding the relatively new emphasis upon victims. Instead of seeking protection from formal enforcement mechanisms, individuals or potential victims are expected to assume responsibility for their own safety through self-education and in partnership with relevant sources of expertise (Rose 2000:327; O'Malley 1996a).

In a second instance, similar changes are said to be occurring with regards to the offender. Given the diminished acknowledgement of social pathologies of crime, the neo-liberal 'offender' is perceived as a rational choice actor now deprived of the privilege of mitigating explanations (Cohen 1985; Pavlich 1999). Offenders are consequently
subjected to increased personal responsibility for their actions and their punishments are
dispensed accordingly (O’Malley 1996a).

This governmentality account of broader and collective notions of risk giving way
to smaller individual risk management (O’Malley 1992, 1996b; Stenson 1993; Rose
2000) undoubtedly has clout. However, while the changes mentioned above are certainly
evident in many important respects, one must acknowledge Stenson and Watt’s
(1999:191) caution that “the shifts are not neatly sequential and older agendas cannot be
wholly displaced.” Furthermore, given the partial and intersected way in which neo-
liberalism has emerged, its predominant features must also be examined in their fractured
manifestations. Even leading ‘risk society’ or governmentality scholars such as Feeley
and Simon (1994) and Rose (2000) recognize that there has not been a complete shift
towards actuarial regulation or risk management.

In this light, I offer a less restricted view on the complexity of the relation
between socially-oriented measures and risk-based technologies. To this end, I explore
the intricacies on three interrelated levels. First, I propose that the presumed shift from an
emphasis on ‘the social’ to the prominence of ‘at-risk’ may not be entirely unidirectional.
Second, I consider the mutuality of social welfare and individualized risk-based forms of
governance. Third, I reiterate Stenson and Watt’s (1999) contention that ‘the social’ has
been reformulated rather than displaced in its neo-liberal context.

In the first instance, I challenge the governmentality framework’s claim that risk-
based measures have emerged subsequent or simultaneous to the decline of social forms
of governance. Short of implying that the converse emergence is discernible, I
nevertheless pay heed to the greater attention attributed to the social explanations and measures that have filtered through Canadian federal crime prevention rhetoric in the last decade of the twentieth century. Indeed, the rise of risk-based measures is evident within the Ministry of the Solicitor General's rhetoric, policies and programs aimed at promoting situational crime prevention in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, as chapters six through eight illustrate in greater detail, an increased emphasis had been placed in the late 1980s within the Ministry of the Solicitor General and in the 1990s within the Department of Justice upon the significance of social conditions in terms of both their link and their 'solution' to crime and victimization. A question related to this potentiality involves asking: If situational prevention had proven so influential as a political strategy in the late 1970s and early 1980s (O'Malley 1992:263), then what was the political attraction of social development in the late 1980s and early 1990s?

Just as the shift from socially-oriented measures towards risk-based prevention strategies has not necessarily been unidirectional, the emergence of risk management may not be unidimensional either. This consideration leads to the second point that proposes the mutuality of social welfare approaches and individualized risk measures. Given the neo-liberal rejection of socially and collectively generated programs, the latter are presumed to be in contrast to risk-based programs. However, I maintain that these allegedly incompatible orientations are not necessarily at odds; I contend that they are linked in two important respects. Principally, instead of narrowly claiming that one form has replaced the other, it is plausible to suggest that they are, at least in some instances, both conceived and deployed simultaneously.
Subsequently and by implication, rather than viewing universal social programs and individual risk management strategies as competing contradictions, they should be recognized in the interrelated and mutually supportive manner in which they are most often deployed. Despite the downscaled government provision of social services, risk-based measures may be premised on the assumption that social welfare support systems can be resurrected as a last resort. Furthermore and more importantly, many prevention strategies imply the need for socially-oriented initiatives. For example, many social development projects aimed at assisting children and youth ‘at risk’ of becoming offenders are premised upon the universal provision of daycare, employment, housing and recreational programming.

Additionally, many risk avoidance measures are contingent upon strong social cohesion and economic stability within a local community. Seen in this way, these presumably distinct measures imply and perpetuate each other in a complementary manner. It may even be argued that social welfare services, albeit narrowing in their scope and retreating in their scale, remain infra-structural to individualized measures. O’Malley (1996b:202) also recognizes that “risk-based techniques may be allied to political programmes of a socialized nature.” The individual responsibility that prudentialism advocates is inevitably conditioned by supportive social circumstances and social technologies that are both formal and informal in nature. The success of neoliberalism’s ‘responsible offender,’ ‘prudent victim’ and ‘enterprising community’ all rely, at least in part, on the infrastructure of social service provisions accorded by a central state (O’Malley 1996b). As Stenson and Watt (1999:197) have reinforced, the
persistent ‘social’ universalism inevitably shapes current neo-liberal discourses and strategies.

The third and final area through which I seek to reconsider the narrative of the governmentality framework refers to the reformulation of ‘the social.’ Stenson and Watt (1999) have argued that in certain local settings, ‘the social’ is reformulated rather than displaced. I extend their analysis by suggesting that especially through its current co-existence with risk-based technologies, ‘the social’ has been reconstituted. As I mentioned above, in the context of crime prevention, we are witnessing a revival of social models of governance. However, although ‘the social’ appears to be a resilient and foundational modality, its existence has been somewhat thwarted in its contemporary neo-liberal form. Stenson and Watt (1999:199-200) maintain that through the enduring tension between the social government logic and the neo-liberal logic, ‘the social’ is often recreated or used selectively to accommodate continued emphases on social solidarity and community cohesion.

Comparatively, O’Malley’s (1999a) diagnosis of the reformulation argument seems to attribute greater weight to the current influence of neo-liberal discourses over social welfare ones. While he acknowledges the late twentieth century alliance between prudentialism and social technologies (O’Malley 1996b:203), he contends that social conditions are now interpreted as ‘risk factors’ (O’Malley 1999a:96-97). The implication of such a thwarted view of social circumstances is that explanatory factors such as an individual’s socio-economic background are now only considered relevant based on their capacity to create risks (O’Malley 1999a:96-97). The resulting drawback, as O’Malley
views it, is that although the problematic social conditions are acknowledged, their particular rectification is not sought; instead, individuals remain responsible for managing the risks produced by the allegedly debilitating social circumstances (O’Malley 1999a:96-97). Simon (1987:78) anticipated O’Malley’s version of the reformulation argument by adding that through the contraction of social welfare benefits, access to them is increasingly based on risk assessment rather than through universal methods of disbursement.

Bearing in mind the aforementioned complexities of the relation between ‘risk’ and ‘social’ logics of governance, it is possible to purport that the neo-liberal shift towards risk management is simultaneously shaped by, and reshapes many enduring elements of ‘the social.’ Whereas in the grand narratives of the governmentality school, conceptions of ‘risk’ and ‘the social’ have been predominantly portrayed as distinct and inconsistent, they may now be seen as mutually constitutive. How this interdependence is manifested within Canadian federally generated crime prevention rhetoric and rationales remains a central concern of this dissertation. Of particular interest is the manner in which conceptions of ‘at risk’ rely upon particular visions of ‘the social’ to engage particular ways of conceiving of crime prevention.

Thus, given that ‘social’ rationalities and technologies exist in the late twentieth century in a contingent and retracted way in relation to their neo-liberal and neo-conservative counterparts, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to the former as ‘neo-social.’ Such a qualification of the concept of the ‘social’ is more reflective of the partiality and variability manifested in the hybrid existence of rationalities and their
corresponding technologies of regulation. While such matters are addressed at length in chapters five through nine, the analytical considerations of how this ‘neo-liberalized’ mutuality is managed within, through and beyond government is presented below.

Governing ‘at-a-distance’

Notwithstanding my conventional use of the term ‘government’ that generally refers to a ‘central political authority’ or ‘state system,’ I remain attentive to the dynamic, multidimensional and de-centered ways in which governmental activities are developed and deployed. As I stated above, my examination of the Canadian federal government’s desire to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance’ is intended to exemplify and extend the governmentality framework’s account of decentralization rather than to reject its core argument at the outset. In the paragraphs that follow, I briefly review the main tenets of the governing ‘at-a-distance’ thesis and I subsequently clarify some peculiarities that are unique to this dissertation.

The concept of ‘at-a-distance’ has been variously employed to map changes both within and between state institutions and extra-state agencies. Rose and Miller’s (1990; 1992) adaptation of Callon and Latour’s (1981) conceptualization of ‘action at-a-distance’ has influentially drawn attention to the actuality that regulation is not exclusively contingent upon formal political intervention. While the coinage was originally employed to characterize liberal forms of government, it continues to bear relevance, and perhaps even to a greater extent, in contemporary neo-liberal mentalities of rule.
From the governmentality perspective, ‘at-a-distance’ generally refers to the notion of a formal political government attempting to maintain a distance between its decisions and the actions of other agencies or individuals (Rose 1996b:53). This view dispels the assumption that governments monopolize social, political and economic practices (O’Malley et al 1997:502). By extension, it implies that not all of society’s ills are to be, should be or can be addressed through government intervention (Rose and Miller 1992:198). In the context of crime control, the state is no longer considered to be the sole guarantor or provider of security (Rose 2000:323; Garland 1996:448).

The current emphasis on ‘at-a-distance’ forms of government is a central feature of neo-liberal discourses that oppose the excess of government intervention (Bell 1993:395) which is held to characterize social welfarism. Under welfarism, social problems were conceived in their collective condition rather than at the individual level; they were therefore thought to require benevolent government intervention (Braithwaite 2000). Within this Keynesian style of governing, the state is perceived to have undertaken more rowing (i.e. delivering services) than steering (i.e. setting societal priorities and making policy decisions) (Braithwaite 2000:223; Osborne and Gaebler 1992:25-35; Rose 2000:324). The perceived result of this greater involvement in ‘rowing’ under social welfarism has been state overreach and overload that has produced an inefficient climate of dependency which has hindered individual autonomy, responsibility and freedom (Rose and Miller 1992:198).

Through the emergence of neo-liberal discourses, these limitations of excessive state intervention have become increasingly apparent, and so much so that states have
come to recognize their own incapacity in terms of ‘rowing.’ This acknowledged inefficacy serves as a justification for the current neo-liberal prescription that advocates ‘steering’ as the ideal role of government (Braithwaite 2000:223; Osborne and Gaebler 1992:30). Herein lies the source of the contemporary rise of ‘at-a-distance’ forms of government. Through this greater emphasis on steering ‘at the centre’ and rowing ‘at-a-distance,’ the preferred role of government has been recast as that of a partner, animator, facilitator and catalyst (Rose 2000:323; Osborne and Gaebler 1992:30). In this capacity and with a view to achieving greater efficiency, government intervention is characterized as minimal and indirect. It seeks to accomplish this goal by acting through an assemblage of networks that are seemingly far distanced from itself.

In this sense, ‘central’ government devolves and decentralizes its previously ascribed functions onto locally based authorities including voluntary and private sector associations. More specifically, it attempts to foster and guide partnerships designed to enable individuals and communities to manage and protect themselves (Pavlich 1999:120). This type of ‘remote control’ government (Pavlich 1999:124) is one that has propelled the alleged shift from a culture of dependency on government rowing to a culture of local activity (Rose 2000:334) and individual entrepreneurialism (O’Malley 1996b:201; Garland 1996:452).

Intrinsic to this shift from government through social agencies to government through individuals (Rose 1993) have been changes in the elements of responsibility and accountability. Garland (1996:452) characterizes these new modes of governing as part of the ‘responsibilization strategy.’ Through its revised neo-liberal ambitions, political
government attempts to 'shed or share' many responsibilities with the voluntary
community, the private sector and with individuals (O’Malley and Palmer 1996:141).
The community and private sectors become extended sites of service provision and
actuarial education. In this arrangement, the relationship between states and individual
citizens is also altered. Where the social welfare client was dependent upon, and
subordinate to, professional experts, the neo-liberal 'prudential' individual is active and
responsible 'in partnership' with public authorities (O’Malley 1996b:203; Rose
2000:334). In this sense, governments seek to act indirectly upon individuals by
capitalizing on their freedom (Rose 1996b:53-54) and by shaping their autonomy through
skills education (O’Malley 1996b:201).

This increased emphasis on individual, community and private sector
responsibility may also be evident in the evolving conceptions of crime prevention in the
late twentieth century. According to Garland (1996:452), state governments seek to
address crime in an indirect manner by activating the participation of non-state agencies.
They does so by undertaking publicity campaigns designed to raise consciousness and
instill a sense of duty on the part of community groups and individuals (Garland
1996:452). Through this form of educational advertising, as well as through various
other means, all individuals, families, corporate organizations and communities are urged
to assume responsibility for their own personal security and to exercise prudence in the
protection of their loved ones, property and employees (Rose 2000:327).

Similar changes have occurred for potential offenders. Since the conception of
'social' causes has been retracted within the current emphasis on 'risk' logics of crime,
the conception of individual responsibility and rational calculation has been renewed
(O’Malley 1996:198). Potential offenders are therefore seen to exercise choice in cost-
benefit terms (O’Malley 1992:264). They are also expected to manage their autonomy
and freedom responsibly in line with governmental objectives of order and civility and
conceptions of good conduct (Rose 2000:323; Rose and Miller 1992:180).

The underlying implication of this approach is that governments can no longer be
solely responsible for managing crime. However, in governing ‘at-a-distance’ and
sharing activities, government is not necessarily seen as diminishing or absolving itself of
responsibility; in addition to maintaining existing functions, it may also be seen as
assuming new coordinating and activating roles in the management of everyday life
(Garland 1996:454).

In light of these alleged changes, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate how the
discourses of prudentialism have permeated the conception of crime prevention at the
Canadian federal government level. It more specifically attempts to shed light on how
these neo-liberal discourses serve as rationales for particular forms of government
intervention in the name of crime prevention. While examining the way in which the
Canadian federal government articulates its intentions on ‘activating’ responsible
individuals, I am also attuned to the tensions and contingencies resulting from the
residual features of social welfarism.

Within neo-liberal visions, the responsible individual is set in contrast to
socialized collective initiatives. However, given the aforementioned proposed mutuality
between social and risk orientations, as well as the intersection of multiple rationalities, I
pay heed to the way in which the Canadian federal government addresses and accounts for the contingent relation between individual actions and other existing and emerging political programmes (O'Malley 1992, 1996). I also draw attention to the complexities of the increased emphasis upon community responsibility and private sector involvement as they are represented in government rhetoric.

As an extension of the shifts in considerations of responsibility, changes in expectations of accountability are also discernable in the realm of crime control. In the move towards action 'at-a-distance,' governments seem to be 'adapting' to crime rather seeking to eliminate it (Garland 1996; Rose 2000). Garland (1996) particularly purports that the adjustment has involved an adaptation to the normality of high crime rates and to the failure of criminal justice agencies. Given the acceptability of crime as a standard part of everyday life, governments have shifted their attention away from the causes of crime and increasingly towards addressing its detrimental effects on victims and on society generally (Garland 1996:447).

In addition, the combination of the heightened emphasis on managerial efficiency, the perceived normality of crime and the acknowledged limitations of the criminal justice system has also resulted by extension in changes in how government interventions are measured. According to Garland (1996:458), greater emphasis is placed on 'outputs' than on 'outcomes.' Thus, the broad goal of crime reduction is no longer the key indicator by which a government's security performance is evaluated. Instead, the output and internal objectives of strategic planning and fiscal accountability (Garland 1996:455;458) seem to serve as adequate measures of both the viability and liability of
government intervention.

Also linked to evolving understandings of accountability is the meaning and utility of successes and failures. Miller and Rose (1990:4) have highlighted "the impetus that "failure" provides for the propagation of new programs of government" that are considered to be improvements over the former policies. In the context of crime control generally, many emerging government activities are justified as necessary in overcoming the limitations of previous interventions which are usually associated with centralized institutional responses. In this 'governmentality' sense, failure is optimistically conceived as a source of innovative reform (O'Malley 1992).

It should be noted, however, that constructions of 'success' are also an important feature in the development of political programmes. In both academic discourse and political rhetoric on crime prevention, domestic and foreign 'success models' also serve, and perhaps to a greater extent than failures, as rationales for the development and extension of government involvement. Given this recognition, I thus examine how conceptions of both success and failure, as well as changes in accountability measures, are embedded within the Canadian federal government's justificatory discourses on crime prevention. Of particular relevance to this study is how discourses of success and failure are included simultaneously within government rhetoric. How these varying conceptions and expectations relating to accountability have evolved over time in their justificatory form are examined at length in chapters five through eight.
The ‘Centrality’ of Government ‘at-a-distance’

Compared to the reliance on punitiveness as a demonstration of authoritative and centralized state control (Garland 1996:460), the contemporary emphasis on prevention seems to lend itself rather well to the aspirations of decentralized governance and inter-agency cooperation. One may even argue that the de-escalating, indirect, and subtle nature of many proactive strategies renders prevention ‘the’ ‘at-a-distance’ rationality and technology ‘par excellence.’ It is in this vein that I attempt to demonstrate how crime prevention is justified and reconstituted through the wider neo-liberal commitment to governing ‘at-a-distance.’ While I follow the ‘at-a-distance’ line of the governmentality narrative rather closely as an analytical framework, I nevertheless seek to highlight a potential source of contention and to offer an alternative perspective in that regard. This discussion should also serve to clarify what may be perceived as a contradiction within the title of the section: “the ‘centrality’ of government ‘at-a-distance.’”

Through the recognition of governance ‘beyond the state,’ one may concede that perhaps government no longer possesses the centrality that was previously attributed to it. However, one must also acknowledge that current changes in patterns of governance do not entail a complete ‘withering away of the state’ either. On the contrary, while government today may be more subtle, the government is not necessarily weaker. It maintains its strength by maximizing its decision-making and direction-setting responsibilities (steering), as well as by minimizing its ‘doing’ (rowing) functions (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).

It is this administrative arrangement that I believe ‘centralizes’ the ‘at-a-distance’
form of governance without undermining political government’s authoritative capacity. Such a contention echoes Stenson and Watt’s (1999:192) claim that despite the actuality of “government operating in non-state agencies, many of the recent key initiatives - for example with respect to crime prevention - originate in central state ministries.” Kernaghan and Siegel (1995:196-197) have also drawn attention to the centralized coordinating authority of state departments.

Kelsey (1993:78-79)\(^9\) similarly argues that through its current emphasis on ‘devolution,’ “the government retains power over essential resource and policy decisions while delegating delivery to the voluntary or private sector.” Pavlich (1999:116) further reinforces this actuality by pointing out that despite the emphasis placed on acting ‘at-a-distance,’ the neo-liberal vision of government inevitably entails centralized control of funding, coordination and strategic planning. He additionally points out the irony inherent within the current stress on ‘partnership’ approaches. He contends that the concept of ‘partnership’ serves as an almost irresistible means through which government exercises directional and administrative control over service providers (Pavlich 1999:114). Acknowledged in this way, ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governance are ineluctably ‘steered,’ regulated and delegated by a ‘central’ government authority that establishes policy visions and controls funding decisions. Edelman (1977:105) refers to this complexity as part of the calculations made by governments to ensure the optimal degree of their own centralized authority.

While this recognition of the ‘centrality’ of governing ‘at-a-distance’ may seem to be stating an obvious feature of state governments, the distinguishing attributes of this
arrangement merit further analytical consideration. Such a reflection is particularly relevant to the context in which crime prevention has emerged as a national strategy in Canada. I maintain that the central role played by federal government-generated notions of crime prevention makes it possible to see it as a form of regulation in which federal initiatives set both the priorities of debate and the boundaries of how crime prevention is conceptualized and rationalized as a strategy aimed at addressing crime and victimization.

In light of this claim, I seek to illustrate how the Canadian federal government articulates and justifies crime prevention through ‘decentralized’ forms of regulation and administration. In so doing, I attempt to demonstrate how a state envisions, authorizes and rationalizes its own intervention ‘at-a-distance.’ Through this endeavor, I scrutinize the complexities of de-centered or ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governing crime and victimization. In this regard, I consider the way in which ‘action at-a-distance’ is simultaneously and variously shaped by the intersection of neo-liberal, neo-social and neo-conservative demands.

Of further analytical import is the incomplete shift from socially-based initiatives towards risk-based practices. In particular, I pay heed to the complex way in which decentralization is conceived and justified in the context of the mutual co-existence of these three orientations. It is anticipated that such a focus will shed light on the potential unevenness of ‘at-a-distance’ governance that struggles amidst the tensions of multiple rationalities operating simultaneously and to varying degrees.
SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to clarify my usage of the concepts of 'rhetoric,' 'rationales,' and 'government intervention' as they are applicable to this dissertation's analytical framework. While attempting to set workable definitional parameters around these terms, I have also tried to capture their complexities not only within their individualized conditions, but also in recognition of their mutual existence. To this end, I have engaged with the governmentality perspective that undoubtedly offers an advanced framework of analysis. By elucidating the complex interaction among language, rationalities and government, the governmentality school brings the intricacies of evolving forms of governance to the fore.

By extension, the approach offers a discerning lens through which to examine contemporary shifts in the forms of governance that are constitutive of crime prevention, as well as in the corresponding discourses and justifications that animate and sustain them. Nevertheless, in an effort to reflect more precisely the nature of the rhetoric, rationales and government action through which crime prevention has emerged, I have complemented the governmentality approach with Edelman's seasoned and direct emphasis on political language and justifications.

In examining the rhetoric, rationales and government intervention constitutive of crime prevention, my purpose is not to critique their shortcomings or to propose more authentic discourses, more worthy justifications or more effective alternative actions. This intention is in keeping with the governmentality approach that attempts to identify and illuminate "the forms of rationality that govern our present rather than simply to
denounce or condemn them” (Barry et al. 1993:260). Thus, with a certain level of judgement in suspension, I illustrate in chapters five through nine how the ambiguity inherent within the concept of crime prevention is addressed within changing emphases of governance.

More specifically, I demonstrate how ‘crime prevention’ has taken shape within the Canadian federal government’s desire to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance’ through an intersected neo-liberal rationality of rule and through the hybridization of social and risk orientations. In other words, I show how crime prevention is conceived and justified in the context of the complexities of contemporary forms of governance. Prior to doing so, however, I present the methodological framework through which this study was accomplished.
ENDNOTES

1. It should be noted that since the methodological framework is presented in chapter four, the purpose of this section is to explicate how language, and more specifically rhetoric, is invoked within this analysis on crime prevention in a governmental setting. Therefore, while a brief consideration of discourse is presented here, the methodological particulars of textual/content analysis are addressed at length in chapter four.

2. Edelman’s emphasis on the detrimental effects of intrusive government action or state inaction may appear to be in stark contrast to my focus on prevention which is often optimistically embraced as a progressive and affirmative measure. Nevertheless, this particular aspect of Edelman’s work becomes relevant to my broader research interest in examining how the concept of prevention serves to justify government action that intentionally leads to serious human rights violations. As the introductory and conclusionary chapters explain, Edelman’s emphases constitute a predominant focus of my post-doctoral research plans.


4. As I demonstrate in chapters five through eight, this acknowledgment that political rhetoric serves to convince the public that their opinion is influential is especially relevant to the manner in which the Canadian federal government has employed similar tactics to ‘encourage’ the participation of Canadian citizens in community oriented and individually based protective measures.

5. In fairness to Rose, this is not to say that his analyses are completely devoid of examples. However, where he does include them, he tends to reference previously undertaken studies.

6. While I present this notion of central authority, I am mindful that the conception of ‘political centres’ is a matter of considerable debate (Curtis 1995:584).

7. While I employ the terms ‘para-state,’ ‘non-state,’ ‘extra-state’ and ‘state-linked’ to demonstrate agencies and organizations that exist ‘beyond’ ‘the state,’ I do not view these concepts or the concept of ‘the state’ as absolute or exclusive. While one may recognize a distinction here, one must nevertheless consider the interrelation between ‘state’ and allegedly ‘extra-state’ agencies.


CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter details the methodology used in this research project. This introduction briefly positions the research in relation to some interesting challenges that have emerged in the past decade in governmentality, sociology and criminology. From this broader academic context, the first section details the research strategy established through this investigation. The second part describes the methods employed in this study. The third section outlines the research process itself and reflects upon the dilemmas and challenges therein. The final part of this chapter presents the original contributions of the study.

The Quest for Grounded Knowledge

As chapters two and three revealed, neither the criminological focus on proactive approaches nor the governmentality perspectives on regulation offer a complete lens through which to observe crime prevention in a penetrating and encompassing manner. As mentioned previously, the criminological literature on prevention tends to engage at a micro level of theorizing. Furthermore, the rationales associated with prevention, in both academic and government settings, tend to be taken at their face value. They are rarely, if ever, scrutinized.

In an effort to overcome the myopic view of prevention and the cursory consideration of its corresponding rationales within criminology, I have relied upon the
analytical contributions of the governmentality perspective to broaden the scope and enhance the depth of inquiry. However, while encompassing and penetrating, the governmentality literature tends to explicate the nexus of rationalities and technologies through rather abstract generalizations of change (O’Malley et al. 1997:503). In an attempt to overcome this limitation, I have incorporated more specific examples of actual government discourse and program initiatives.

In addition, in an effort to broaden the narrow emphasis on knowledge-based rationalities, I have integrated ‘contingent actualities’ into the analysis. As I explained in chapter three, my use of the term ‘contingent actualities’ draws on what Garland (1999:34) has referred to as ‘non-instrumental rationalities.’ Examples of the contingent actualities that are pertinent to this research included, among others, public fear, public opinion, the political image of a ministry, the influence of lobbyists, cabinet ministers’ personas, as well as conferences and consultations. The section below on ‘operational concepts’ explicates actualities in greater detail.

Furthermore, with a view to extending the governmentality analytics beyond textual discourses, I have incorporated other pertinent sources of knowledge into the study. As Stenson (1999:45) has pointed out, looking only at textual references obscures other important dimensions of policy development and program implementation. As a sociologist, I recognize that one may generate a more comprehensive picture of a phenomenon by relying on a multiplicity of data sources.

The oral sources of information that were deemed relevant to this research were obtained through the examination of speeches and interviews. The significance of
speeches has been reinforced by Paine (1981:vi) who claimed that the spoken word is “an instrument of public persuasion in politics.” Paine’s (1981:1) recognition of public speeches as political instruments of persuasion is in keeping with my emphasis in this study on the political rhetoric of crime prevention.

While I acknowledge that ministerial speeches are crafted with particular political agendas underlying them, their discourse may be considered distinct from that of internal textual documents because they reveal the preferences and justifications that are intended to entice a public audience. The rhetoric and rationales that are conveyed to the public may be distinct from those included in policy documents or internal correspondence that are stamped ‘secret’ or ‘confidential.’ In this sense, the rhetoric found in ministerial addresses may be deemed a worthy source of orally-based data.

Similarly, interviews are an important source of oral information because they tend to reveal the ‘unpublished’ or ‘unofficial’ influences that have been brought to bear on a particular government initiative. In this sense, interviews uncover the rationales of government intervention that are not openly shared with public audiences. More specifically, the interviewees shed light on the way in which rationales are sometimes constructed haphazardly as a result of politicians’ and policy makers’ preferences or in the face of unpredicted occurrences or crises. In this context, interviews are a valuable site at which ‘contingent actualities’ are discovered.

As this brief overview demonstrates, my attempts to extend and to strengthen the governmentality framework have had meaningful methodological consequences. A more integrated analytical frame of reference has encompassed broader sources of evidence.
These alternative sources of data and areas of inquiry complement the governmentality perspective's emphasis on rationalities. In particular, they allow a researcher to be attentive to some of the aleatoric conditions that also shape government decisions and intervention, but from which some of the governmentality writers seemed to be disconnected. Thus, the advantages of integrated analytical and methodological contributions lie in their capacity to locate prevention within more complex contexts and to examine the rationales which systematically, and perhaps also serendipitously, maintain and reproduce this government generated intervention. Furthermore, this unique focus enabled me to highlight not only points of discontinuity and rupture, but also points of convergence, repetition and continuity in ways the more abstract, generalized focus of much of the governmentality literature does not.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Methodological Context

This research is accomplished through a diachronic analysis. Diachronic analyses examine the development of phenomena over time (Hatt and Caputo 1996:415-416). This study situates crime prevention diachronically so as to account for the shifts in preventive rationalities over time in Canada. More specifically, it examines elements of both continuity and change in the articulation and justification of crime prevention between 1974 and 2000 at the federal government level. Such a thorough appraisal undoubtedly broadens the scope and enhances the depth of investigation into crime prevention which is most commonly evaluated synchronically.
Focus and Objectives

Exploring the magnitude of the alleged shifts from reactive responses to the myriad of proactive approaches at the federal level in Canada involves investigating how the emphases and rationales of crime prevention have changed over time. This project does so by engaging critically with some of the trajectories - past and present - which have emerged out of federally directed, national level crime prevention policy initiatives in Canada. Three main and interrelated objectives structure this project. The first objective seeks to uncover the combinations of rhetoric and rationales through which crime prevention is advanced in the Canadian federal government arena.

The second objective involves determining the extent of the shift in federally directed crime prevention initiatives. The emphasis of inquiry is placed on the broader neo-liberal, neo-conservative and social rationalities that inform preventative pursuits. The indicators of continuity and change in this regard are outlined below in the section on design. As stated above, this phase implies observing the recent shift towards prevention through a diachronic lens.

The third objective seeks to develop a framework that grounds crime prevention, in the Canadian context, theoretically. The impetus is to move beyond the limitations of the micro-level theorizing characteristic of the crime prevention literature. This objective is intended as the final phase of analysis and is accomplished through grounded theory and reflexivity. This theoretical endeavour offers insights on the relations among rhetoric formation, political rationales and the appeal of crime prevention.
Research Questions

This research undertakes as its primary aim the documentation and analysis of the rhetoric and rationales which coalesce around appeals to prevention. The purpose is to illuminate some late twentieth century trends in the desire to prevent. This project is based on qualitative research undertaken at the Canadian federal government level in Ottawa. The focus of the research revolves around the following six areas of inquiry:

1. How is crime prevention justified as an object of government intervention?
2. How are the rationales articulated in a government setting?
3. What is the political appeal of prevention at this particular historical juncture?
4. Why do appeals to prevention in criminal justice policy appear to be on the increase?
5. How have rationales of prevention evolved at the federal level between 1974 & 2000?
6. How is the elasticity of the term ‘crime prevention’ evident in government rhetoric?

Agendas

This project has a number of theoretical and political agendas. It seeks to transcend boundaries of the literature on governmentality by assuming a different point of entry. The governmentality perspective does not afford significant legitimacy to those rationales that are not formally aligned with broader rationalities. However, my study centers upon both formal rationalities and contingent actualities. It attempts to create a theoretical and methodological space with a view to making sense of these missing sources of inquiry and to establish their interrelatedness. The analytical approach, which considers the interplay between formal rationalities and contingent actualities, endeavours to add a new dimension to the understanding of governmentality.
At the same time, I am attempting to extend the conceptual tools of criminology by opening up new ways of understanding crime prevention. Focusing on the various rationales underlying the prevention of crime allows us to explore their significance and contingencies in a government setting. Among other things, as an emerging alternative, crime prevention occupies a space on the margins of crime control. It also constitutes various approaches that are constantly evolving and overlapping. Therefore, this complex space where rhetoric, rationales and policy variations meet forms an important area of inquiry.

Assumptions

Three assumptions underlie this research project. First, it assumes that different and competing rationalities informing crime prevention exist; second, it accepts that crime prevention is an ambiguous concept whose visions and practices vary depending upon the political, social, economic and cultural contexts in which it emerges; third, it presumes that crime prevention is historically and discursively constructed and always relative to other forms of regulation and control, which themselves change.

Operational Concepts

Prior to engaging in the analytical discussions in chapters five through nine, several important concepts require clarification. Together, the terms below are derived from the areas of criminology, political language and governmentality. The first set pertains to definitions of criminological terms in the realm of crime prevention. The
second section clarifies the concept of rhetoric and its significance to this study. Finally, the third set refers to concepts derived from the governmentality literature.

Whereas ‘proactive approaches’ are considered pre-emptive interventions capable of reducing the risk or probability of crime and victimization, ‘reactive responses’ are activated after a ‘crime’ has occurred. The latter take the form of official criminal justice responses (e.g. policing, sanctions) and/or informal control mechanisms (e.g. interpersonal, family or community social sanctions). However, not only are these contested concepts in their own right as distinct practices, but their co-existence and mutual dependence are also matters of considerable debate.

This study acknowledges the elasticity of usage that the term crime prevention has acquired; it further recognizes (in keeping with grounded theory) that different conceptions of prevention were revealed in various documents and interviews through the grounded theory approach. Nonetheless, ‘crime prevention’ provisionally implies an actual shift away from formal reactive responses to crime and towards proactive actions aimed at significantly reducing the risk of victimization and ‘criminal’ or ‘deviant’ tendencies.

According to the authors of various typologies (e.g. Brantingham and Faust 1976, Van Dijk and de Waard 1991, Hastings 1996, 1993a), ‘crime prevention’ is sub-divided into three categories or levels of intervention; these include tertiary, secondary and primary. ‘Tertiary prevention’ involves intervention into the lives of actual offenders whereby treatment or punishment is imposed to prevent further re-offending (Brantingham and Faust, 1976: 290). Since it is aimed at specific deterrence and the
prevention of recidivism, tertiary prevention merely comprises the principal mission of existing reactive criminal justice responses rooted in neo-classical models of human nature and control.

'Secondary prevention,' on the other hand, involves the early identification of 'potential' offenders whereby social development intervention is designed to reduce the 'risk' of future anti-social or criminal behaviour (Brantingham and Faust, 1976:293); secondary prevention thus absorbs within its purview such activities as, education and vocational training, as well as, social, recreational and health development. The great majority of interventions labelled 'crime prevention' tend to fit within this secondary category.

'Primary prevention,' which is posited by Brantingham and Faust (1976:292) as the optimal goal, vaguely refers to activities which focus on those conditions of the social or physical environment that provide opportunities for criminal behaviour. Hastings (1996:324) explains that the focus at this level is "on the broad economic, political, and ideological factors associated with the rate of crime in our society." Although the primary level is set as "the ideal objective" (Brantingham and Faust 1976:292), the corresponding policy interventions are not clearly defined and they appear to be constrained by political imperatives.

While chapter three outlined the contextual complexities of the terms 'rhetoric' and 'rationales' in more detail, since they are so central to this dissertation, they merit a brief clarification here. As chapter three indicated, the term 'rhetoric' captures more precisely the way in which the Canadian federal government 'discourse' conveys the
expressed desirability of government intervention in the name of prevention. 'Rhetoric' is understood as language employed to persuade or please, often through the use of rationales. Such a clarification is pertinent to this study, which illuminates the significance of state rhetoric in revealing the rationales and rationalities underlying intervention in the area of crime prevention (Edelman 1977; Miller and Rose 1990).

The term 'rationales' is invoked here to reflect those discourses which are indicative of both governmental rationalities and contingent actualities. While encompassing the synonymous connotations of 'justifications' and 'underlying reasoning,' by extension, the term 'rationale' refers to the identified purpose or reasons for the course of government action. In this sense, 'rationales' reveal that which is thought to shape what governance entails and why it should be deployed (O'Malley 1996a:1). It should also be noted that while good intentions and admirable political agendas may be conveyed through rationales, one cannot lose sight of the complexity and contradictions inherent to the use of rationales within a political government setting.

The term 'rationalities' must now be clarified. For our purposes, Garland's (1999) breakdown of the concept is instructive and appropriate. Garland (1999:17) refers to 'governmental rationalities' as "the ways of thinking and styles of reasoning that are embodied in a particular set of practices." Similarly, Rose and Miller (1992:178) consider rationalities to constitute "the formulation and justification of idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it." Garland (1999:17) further explains that if one draws upon the notion of 'rationalities' to contemplate crime control, one may more specifically explore how the governance of crime has been
rationalized and how authorities have understood their role in this regard.

Garland contends, however, that governmentality analysis tends to emphasize knowledge-based rationalities at the expense of non-instrumental ones. While Garland does not define the term ‘non-instrumental rationalities’ concisely, his explanation demonstrates that the term encompasses “the expressive, emotionally-driven and morally-toned currents” that play a significant role in shaping crime control policy. In an effort more openly to reflect the complexities that shape government policy and intervention, I have substituted for Garland’s term that of ‘contingent actualities.’

To this broad definition, I add such constitutive elements as public fear, public opinion, political image, the persuasive influences of individual and community-based lobbyists, as well as international level pressures, a minister’s persona and serendipitous bureaucratic changes. This list does not represent the contingent actualities in their entirety; however, it does provide a sense of the complex influences that determine the nature of government intervention. These political and administrative realities often play a significant catalytic role in determining policy development and implementation.

It should also be noted that although the distinction between knowledge-based or abstract rationalities and contingent actualities is made here, I fully acknowledge that they often operate simultaneously in the political government realm. In other words, rather than viewing either abstract rationalities or contingent actualities as being in competition with one another for their influence over government intervention, they should be recognized as constantly interweaving with each other. This complex interplay between governmental rationalities and contingent actualities is illustrated in greater detail in
chapters five through nine.

The last set of terms that requires specification pertains to the various rationalities emphasized through governmentality perspectives. These include, neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and 'the social.' For the purpose of this dissertation on crime prevention, neo-conservatism refers generally to 'right-wing' law and order agendas. A neo-conservative crime control agenda generally consists of increases in law enforcement practices, as well as harsher and more punitive sentencing measures (Hatt et al. 1994:65). While conservatism is associated with punitive and repressive measures, the neo-conservative variant, which is said to have emerged in the 1980s in England, the United States and Canada, tends to acknowledge the influence of mitigating circumstances. In the context of crime prevention, neo-conservative measures tend to be reactive, tertiary and deterrence-oriented rather than proactive and pre-emptive.

Purvis and Hunt (1999:470) refer to neo-liberal rule "as a new alliance between the state, autonomous experts, and self-governing individuals." In the context of crime control and social regulation, neo-liberalism emphasizes cost-effectiveness, as well as 'at-a-distance' forms of regulation based on prudentialism and responsibilization; these techniques may include among others, individualized and community-based risk management practices. In the context of crime prevention, neo-liberal measures would constitute secondary level prevention activities which tend to be situational ones aimed at addressing the plight of potentially 'at-risk' offenders and victims.

While many governmentality writers refer to 'the social,' few, if any, have adequately defined it. Without providing a precise definition, O'Malley (1999a:94)
summed up social rule in the following statement:

Social services, social insurances, social security, and the social wage were variously constituted by governments to deal with social problems, social forces, social injustices, and social pathologies through various forms of social intervention, social work, social science, and social engineering. The social appeared as a unified and unifying (usually national) space of rule.

While this quotation does not constitute an actual definition of the term ‘the social,’ it does provide a sense of what it encompasses. For Rose (1996a:333), “[t]he social was an order of collective being and collective responsibilities and obligations.” Governing ‘from the point of view of the social’ was therefore seen as an attempt to foster social solidarity at a national level (Rose 1996a:333; Stenson and Watt 1999:190). In the context of crime prevention, ‘the social’ may be aligned with primary level forms of universally provided interventions aimed at addressing broader political, social, cultural and economic inequalities and injustices.

Within the governmentality framework, ‘post-social’ refers loosely to ‘the death of the social’ (Rose 1996a) or ‘the end of the social’ (Baudrillard 1983). However, I contend that the term ‘neo-social’ more accurately portrays the changes in political rationalities and technologies post-1980. I contend, along with Stenson and Watt (1999), that rather than being wholly displaced by neo-liberal tendencies, ‘the social’ has been reformulated. Thus, the qualification ‘neo-social’ reflects the partiality and variability manifested in the co-existence of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and ‘social’ rationalities and their corresponding programmes. Chapters three and five through nine explicate and illustrate the complexity of this term in greater detail.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

It became evident early on through preliminary searches that in order to capture the complexity of the subject matter, a complex analysis could only be accomplished by examining crime prevention policy at three levels. First, in order to locate crime prevention governmentally, the academic and political contexts needed to be sketched. Second, the policy development site itself had to be explored in order to determine elements of change and continuity. Third, the project had to operate at the substantive level of both text and actors in order to shed light on how prevention is articulated and justified by government officials.

Furthermore, in an effort to strengthen the study design, this research included both analytical and instrument triangulation. Analytical triangulation involved the integration of governmentality perspectives and criminological preoccupations through a diachronic lens. It further encompassed a more refined understanding of government discourse through Edelman’s (1977, 1988) trenchant insights on political rhetoric. In addition, Fairclough’s (1995:76) recognition of the overlapping and competing vocabularies that correspond to different domains and institutions is particularly relevant to this research on political discourse.

In addition, the scope of the project required the triangulation of qualitative methodologies. The instruments included the content analysis of Canadian federal government texts, in-depth semi-structured interviews, as well as participant observation. Multiple methods allowed for a comprehensive examination and an analysis that integrated product\(^1\) and process\(^2\), as well as rationalities and contingent actualities.
Primarily motivated by a desire to render 'rationalities' comprehensible in their political government form, the triangulation approach that allowed multiple analytical frameworks and multiple research techniques to intersect was particularly fruitful. Triangulation helped to strengthen the study's validity, provide in-depth detail and to facilitate broader understandings of the subject matter (Berg 1998:6). The use of multiple methods facilitated not only the validation of articulations and rationales, but also the refinement and extension of concepts, as well as the integration of different perspectives (Berg 1998:6), all of which enhanced insights on crime prevention. Of particular significance is the way in which the resulting data enabled me to move from the general to the specific. In other words, it allowed me to substantiate and delineate rationalities in their concrete form.

**Design**

This research is an exploratory study of how crime prevention is justified at the Canadian federal government level. It also assesses elements of continuity and change in the articulation and rationales of prevention over time between 1974 and 2000. This was accomplished through a qualitative examination of the rationales, objectives, and policy initiatives that constitute federal government policy and programme initiatives. In an effort to move beyond the myopic nature of crime prevention theorizing, as well as the limiting abstractness of governmentality perspectives, the methodology employed for this study engaged grounded theory.

Grounded theory, as defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967:1) is “the discovery of
theory from data - systematically obtained and analysed in social research.” Although this study relied on a diachronic approach and on governmentality perspectives as guiding frameworks, it was not established by a strict hypothesis, and nor did it rely upon existing typologies to categorize the information gathered through content analysis. Themes, patterns and nuances were determined inductively through the course of the research.

**Content Analysis of Government Texts and Ministerial Speeches**

In its focus on rhetoric and rationales, this study explored how crime prevention was justified from the vantage point of politicians and policy-makers. This was accomplished by a content analysis of government texts, ministerial speeches and interviews. This variety of sources is pertinent to a study on rhetoric because rhetoric is not only an oral practice, but it has also been extended to written communication (Poovey 1998:39). While I address texts immediately below, I deal with the interviews in the next section.

Texts here refer to the variety of government documents that include both internal policy documents and official publications. These texts were important transmitters of rationales or legitimating discourses of crime prevention. The content analysis sought to highlight those aspects of rhetoric that explicitly revealed the Canadian federal government’s rationales for their intervention in the name of crime prevention. Texts were examined for sites of rationales that conveyed the desire for reform and the quest for effectiveness and innovation. Although they were found throughout different locations within texts and speeches, rationales were often situated in statements of purpose, lists of
goals and objectives. They were also conveyed through slogans and images.

In addition, the content analysis of the federal government documents and speeches enabled a closer examination that determined how crime prevention is articulated and justified. The analysis captured the subtle meanings, assumptions and interests that are embedded in the official texts. While analytical categories were inductively developed from themes, patterns and concepts which appear in the texts, the content analysis nevertheless examined indicators of continuity and change. The internal indicators that were systematically explored in the data included:

a) variations, shifts and similarities in the rationales of prevention over time;

b) variations, shifts and similarities in the articulations of prevention over time;

c) variations, shifts and similarities in the models of prevention over time;

d) variations, shifts and similarities in the scope of intervention over time;

These indicators were selected for their capacity to shed light on both the formal rationalities and the contingent actualities underlying Canadian federal government crime prevention initiatives. It is understood that this analysis did not capture all the nuances that permeated the official publications. However, it did aid in uncovering patterns of continuity and change, as well as, consistencies, ambiguities and contradictions.

In addition to the internal indicators of rationales, this study was also attentive to the broader contextual influences that shaped the nature of federally-generated preventative pursuits. These external indicators of continuity and change included the impact of changes in government and the impact of organizational restructuring within
and among government departments. Changes in legislation, policy and in criminal justice expenditures were also monitored in a secondary manner. The purpose of this analysis was to assess the extent to which neo-conservative tendencies toward ‘cops, courts, and corrections’ are entwined within the allegedly dominant neo-liberal emphases on prudentialism.

As the central research method, the content analysis of texts and speeches proved to be an appropriate and invaluable source of data. This research technique allowed me systematically to summarize data that covered such a lengthy time frame. It also enabled me to organize the data, primarily ‘rationales,’ thematically and to identify patterns over time.

**Interviews**

In addition to numerous informal consultations with various government officials since 1994, a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews was undertaken with fourteen (14) individuals who were involved with Canadian federal government level crime prevention initiatives between 1974 and 1999. The details of the interviewees and the interview process are outlined below in the sections on sampling and data collection.

The interviews were intended to provide retrospective insights, contextual analysis and supplementary validation for the documentary analysis. Throughout the interview process, I seized the opportunity to check and clarify what I was observing in the government documents and in ministerial speeches. More specifically, the purpose of the interviews was to garner insight into the varying dynamics influencing the articulation
and justification of crime prevention policy initiatives. In particular, since interviewees supplied ‘insider’ information that was not published in official publications, they provided the contextual evidence that often constituted contingent actualities. As mentioned previously, contingent actualities are recognized as influential in shaping government decision making, policy development and intervention. In this sense, the interviews were secondary methods designed to provide context and analytic insight. In other words, these were more substantiating than exclusively substantive sources.

**Participant Observation**

In addition to the two main research instruments (content analysis and interviews), one opportunity for participant observation arose through the course of the data collection phase. Following an interview with one of the informants from the Department of Justice, I received an invitation to attend a Workshop entitled “Towards Our Vision For Change.” It was hosted by the National Crime Prevention Council on June 17, 1997.

This occasion for participant observation enabled me to observe pertinent interactions that were not realizable through the other methodological approaches (i.e. textual analysis and interviews). More specifically, it allowed “direct experiential and observational access to the insiders’ world of meaning” (Jorgensen 1989:15). As an outsider, who had only worked peripherally with federal government policy in other sections within the Department of Justice, I lacked a true sense of government decision making and policy initiatives that pertained directly to crime prevention.

Therefore, this workshop provided an opportunity to meet a variety of different
players involved with federal government prevention activities. They included members of the National Crime Prevention Council and its secretariat, academics, representatives from non-governmental organizations from across the country, as well as officials from various federal government departments including, Justice, Solicitor General, Health, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, National Defence and Human Resources Development. More importantly, this close encounter with key players involved with federal and national level preventative pursuits allowed me to be attentive to the nature of rationales that circulate through professional relations in both formal and informal ways.

RESEARCH PROCESS

Sampling

The first phase of research generated a data set through a content analysis of all available federal level internal policy documents and correspondence, as well as official publications on crime prevention initiatives from the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada and the Department of Justice Canada between 1974 and 2000. The data from internal policy documents were derived from such items as memoranda to cabinet, briefing notes to the minister, internal correspondence, summaries of meetings and policy papers. Many of these documents were obtained through the Access to Information Act.

Official publications included material that was produced for public consumption or that was at least available to the public. These items included promotional pamphlets, information handbooks, 'how-to' manuals, bulletins, as well as research reports, user reports, evaluation reports, conference reports, consultation reports and committee
reports. Excluded from this list are research documents or user reports that, although funded and published by the government departments, explicitly indicated that “the views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada [or the Department of Justice Canada].”

Since this study sought to uncover government based rationales, such documents were deemed indirectly relevant. While they may have served as contextual material, quotations were not drawn from them. This same exception applies to the publications of the National Crime Prevention Council; the latter was considered an advisory board to the federal government. While the significance of its contribution to informing government rationales is noted, its texts were not directly cited. However, the publications produced through the National Crime Prevention Centre were included as principal data.

Furthermore, the data set included an investigation of the bureaucratic dynamics, committees and conferences that have advanced federal level initiatives and the ‘national strategy’ in particular. The purpose of this endeavour was to capture the complexity of rationales and their corresponding shifts in emphasis over time.

The second type of data was generated through in-depth semi-structured interviews. The fourteen individuals had worked in differing ways and to varying degrees on Canadian federal government level crime prevention initiatives between 1974 and 1999. The interviewees were intentionally selected to ensure that all sectors, time periods, as well as degrees of responsibility and involvement were represented in the sample.

Thus, respondents included a range of former and current policy-makers, analysts,
deputy-ministers, academics, researchers and practitioners. Due to availability, only three individuals who had worked with the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada in the 1970s and 1980s were interviewed. While one of these respondents was retired at the time of the interview, the other two were working as academics in university settings in the Ottawa area. Another person who worked with the same ministry in the 1990s was also interviewed.

The remainder were involved with crime prevention after 1987 with the Department of Justice Canada. They included individuals who had worked in the areas of policy development, project management and evaluation. Some had been seconded to the Department of Justice from other government locations, including the Ministry of Health and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Other interviewees with the Department of Justice had worked in various capacities; these included the former National Crime Prevention Council Secretariat, the current National Crime Prevention Centre and its Steering Committee, the ongoing Federal-Provincial-Territorial Working Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention, as well as the ongoing Inter-Departmental Working Group on Crime Prevention. The majority of these Department of Justice officials had been directly involved with the establishment and implementation of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.”

The ‘extra-state’ sectors were represented in two ways. First, the two former members of the National Crime Prevention Council were from external organizations. One was from the academic sphere, while the other represented an active grassroots, community-based group. Furthermore, two other Department of Justice employees had
also been involved extensively at different periods in crime prevention at the municipal level, either through previous employment or volunteer commitments. Interviews with these ‘extra-state’ individuals offered unique insights on how crime prevention was framed through a national agenda and deemed a federal government responsibility.

**Data Collection**

In an effort to strengthen the strategies for collecting the data, I interwove data collection and analysis from the outset. This practice served to systematize the data, to identify and correct blind spots, as well as to organize and deepen the analysis. Furthermore, the interview process and the textual analysis were accomplished in a mutually informing manner; this exercise also served to overcome researcher bias.

Initially, two pilot interviews were conducted by using a broad, open-ended interview schedule. The interviews were tape recorded and extensive notes were taken during and after each interview. The interviews were transcribed and preliminary analysis was undertaken. Two Department of Justice Canada officials were interviewed. One interviewee was a former policy analyst with the Department of Justice whose involvement with crime prevention during the 1980s was in the areas of research and policy development; this person’s position and the historical period of her involvement offered unique insights into the justificatory efforts required to advance crime prevention as a federal government priority. The second person selected for the pilot interviews was a researcher who was involved in the evaluation of the national strategy; this person offered insights into developments, obstacles and constraints in the late 1990s.
These interviewees were purposively selected for the pilot interviews because they offered both historical and contemporary insights into the development and activities of the national strategy. Their responses and feedback also influenced the reformulation of existing questions and the addition of new ones. For example, both respondents reinforced the importance of questioning the origins, quality and methodologies of the research upon which the national strategy was based. In addition, their responses confirmed the significance of my intention to probe deeper into the inter-organizational arrangements of the Department of Justice, the involvement of other federal departments, the federal-provincial-municipal governmental structure, the role of key actors, political party agendas, as well as into the political utility underlying the co-existence of reactive and proactive measures. The interview questions were therefore modified accordingly.

The interviewees' responses also shed light on the identification and organization of concepts, themes and indicators. For example, the interviews explored variations and shifts (and their political rationales) in the prioritization of the problems and target groups of crime and victimization, as well as in the advancement of models of prevention. In this sense, the pilot interviews served not only to modify the interview questions, but also to sharpen the content analysis of internal policy documents and official publications.

Other aims motivated these pilot interviews. First, they shed light on how people responded to open-ended questions; this allowed me to gauge which questions would elicit more comprehensive responses. Second, they served to identify any ambiguous questions, or those which revealed my biases. Third, they revealed potential blind spots within the interview questions and within the content analysis.
All fourteen interviews, including the two pilot ones, were conducted between February 8, 1999 and December 2, 1999 in the Ottawa area. While the majority of interviews were completed in the spring of 1999, this time period was extended due to the accessibility of certain respondents. The interviews lasted between one half hour and two hours depending on the intensity of involvement of the interviewee or their availability. At the beginning of each interview, consent was established and permission to use a tape recorder was granted. Once consent was obtained, a pseudonym was determined in consultation with, and agreed upon by both the researcher and the interviewee. This step was carried out in the interest of ensuring confidentiality and anonymity. The list of interviewees’ pseudonyms can be found in Appendix A; the consent form is presented in Appendix B.

The semi-structured in-depth interviews used open-ended questions to solicit information on the context of the shifting trajectory of crime prevention within federal government policy initiatives. They also explored the rationales put forth in this regard. The interview questionnaire, included in Appendix C, served as a guide. During the interviews, I drew from this set of questions. Given that each interviewee’s relation to federally directed crime prevention initiatives differed with respect to the length of time involved, the intensity of their responsibility or participation, and their role, other questions relevant to their experience were formulated and asked accordingly.

All interviews were recorded and then fully transcribed. Although the exercise of transcribing the interviews in their entirety was time consuming, it proved invaluable. It provided a complete text of the interviews that served as a check against my selective
memory and against the content of official documents. Aware that in transcription, non-verbal communication is lost or not always remembered, I attempted during the interview process to document these interactions. Careful transcription and note-taking also allowed me to capture both what was said and how it was said. I also noted the hesitations, emphatic tones and laughter in the interviewees' speech. These characteristics are significant because they reveal details about some of the uncertainties, priorities and human relations that are linked to government intentions and interventions.

Analysis

Analysis of the interview data began after transcription, while the analysis of the text-based data began as materials were carefully gathered over a three-year period. In keeping with the grounded theory approach, analysis of the collected data was treated as an ongoing process throughout the research. While analysis of the data obtained through both the textual analysis and the interviews was guided by insights from governmentality perspectives, it was accomplished through three types of coding: open, axial and selective.

As the initial stage, open coding permitted a wider analysis through unrestricted coding (Strauss 1987:28; Berg 1995:186). Open coding involved analysing the data minutely through consistent sets of questions and comparisons, so as to name, group and categorize phenomena and concepts, albeit tentatively (Strauss 1987:28-32; Berg 1995:186-187). The reading and rereading of texts and transcripts was unavoidably shaped by the conceptual interests to which I was attuned. For example, distinctions between
proactive and reactive approaches, as well as between neo-liberal, neo-conservative and ‘social’ rationalities were identified. Furthermore, in an effort to overcome bias, the content of the interviews was compared with the content of other interviews, and with that of official documents. Categories were inductively developed from themes and concepts which appeared meaningful to respondents.

Subsequently, axial coding, which consists of the intense analysis around categories, was undertaken to establish relationships between categories and subcategories in terms of conditions, contexts, strategies and consequences (Strauss 1987:27-28, 32). This stage involved a constant interplay between proposing and checking. As themes and patterns emerged, they were identified and reread in an increasingly focused manner to check the accuracy of the themes. As I started to develop analytic frameworks, the transcripts and the government texts were reviewed again. It was through this phase of analysis that the commonalities, continuities, overlap, as well as contradictions among rationales and approaches were discovered.

Finally, selective coding was employed to scan the data systematically, as well as previous codes and categories so as to validate and explicate the relationships (Strauss 1987:33). This final phase served to deepen my understanding of the similarities, differences and complexities of the various rationales and priorities that advanced crime prevention initiatives over the twenty-five year period which was examined through this study. My analysis of the data at this stage was also sharpened by my constant relating back to the governmentality literature. This final phase of verification also helped to enhance the reliability of the coding scheme and to minimize researcher bias. In
considering how the analysis was undertaken, I recognized the implications of interpretation. I constantly questioned whether or not I was being true to the data. I made no attempt to impose meaning in textual statements and interviewees' comments, nor to selectively disregard them either. In this sense, I continually and cautiously monitored my selection and interpretation exercises.

While there is nothing particularly innovative about my approach to analysis, it did enable me to address some of the limitations of the governmentality framework. The triangulation of methods, research rigour and grounded theory allowed me to substantiate and modify governmentality claims with pertinent empirical evidence. This endeavour has confirmed the importance of empirical accounts within sociology. While post-modernists have cautioned against the ability to make, and the desirability of making knowledge claims (Bauman 1997, 1987), the research process requires some acceptance of the potential of representing societal activity. In the context of governmentality studies, this (my) analytical approach cautions against abandoning rigorous sociological inquiry in favour of 'free-floating' generalizations. Instead, I contend that new methodological spaces can be opened up within governmentality frameworks with a view to facilitating a more encompassing, yet specified perspective.

It should also be noted that with such an inductive method, there is no claim that the analysis is objective. To deny researcher bias is unrealistic and naive. This study is inevitably shaped by my interpretation, as well as by my strengths and weaknesses as a researcher. While my analysis was guided by the tensions within the governmentality approach, it remains a product of what I discovered and what I failed to discover.
Through the very process of discovery and interpretation, I continually re-evaluated and re-established my project. The end result in 2002 is undoubtedly very different from my proposal of 1999. In order to make sense of the data, I decided to abandon some concepts and themes, embrace others and periodically rethink my own integrative theoretical framework.

ETHICAL ISSUES

As this study dealt with human subjects through the interview process, it was required to conform to the “Policies and Procedures for Ethical Conduct of Research by Academic Staff” as outlined by Graduate Studies at Carleton University. A brief proposal, a letter of consent and the questionnaire (see Appendices B and C) were reviewed and approved by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology’s Ethics Review Committee. A number of procedures, which followed the recommended practices, were established.

First, participation in the research was voluntary and on the basis of informed consent. Second, all reasonable measures were taken to ensure anonymity and confidentiality; the steps included:

a) altering the names and other identifying information in the written transcripts of the interviews;
b) keeping all identifying information separate from the research data;
c) ensuring that no identifying information is included in the dissertation or published materials. Only a pseudonym with generic identifiers is included in the dissertation text (see Appendix A for the list of interviewees’ pseudonyms).
Third, for safekeeping, all data were stored in a private office on the condition that the tapes are destroyed once the dissertation is complete. In addition, the letter of consent (see Appendix B) outlined to interviewees their rights and recourse, as well as, the expectations regarding their participation in the research study. The interviewees were asked to read and sign the letter of consent and were given a copy for their records.

**Dilemmas of the Research Process**

In any human subject research, there are always complex ethical issues to address. While this project was characterized by open and honest discussion of the research goals and procedures with interviewees, there are always some areas of the research agenda that are not fully revealed (Lofland and Lofland 1984:24). For example, the extent of analysis is unlikely to be shared at the onset of data collection. This problem is particularly an issue in grounded studies because the researcher does not necessarily have a clear direction of the depth and scope of analysis at the outset.

The corresponding concern is whether or not truly informed consent is obtainable. Despite a researcher's best efforts to clarify the research objectives and process, interviewees cannot be fully aware of the implications of consent. More specifically, interviewees cannot truly understand the implications of how their words are to be used and analyzed. Arguably, neither can the researcher know exactly how words are to be transformed into data because unpredictable changes occur and inevitable compromises are made through the course of research. Changes in emphasis may occur at the data collection stage or at the analysis phase, or both. In this sense, truly informed consent is
difficult to ensure and attain in an evolving research process.

I came across this problem at the interview stage. Despite my best efforts to ensure informants that I was not evaluating either the process or the outcome of their work, some still perceived my research to be an evaluation study. This confusion became evident in some settings where interviewees defended their government department and their policies even when the questions did not ask for this information. While some interviewees proudly promoted their work, other seemingly disgruntled employees saw the interview as an opportunity to vent their frustrations on both policy and labour issues, again even when the questions did not seek these details.

Furthermore, I encountered another form of uncertainty during the later stages of my analysis. As my research evolved through grounded theory and engaged with a different analytical framework after the interviews had been completed, I wondered how interviewees would react to the change. Once my analytical framework had been re-established, I invited an employee at the Department of Justice to read my chapters on theory, methodology and discussion. In part, the purpose of this review was to ensure validity. This individual had not been interviewed; however, he had provided a great deal of insight and resources for the research project. He also had more advanced academic training and could therefore respond to the interweaving between theoretical frameworks and government policy.

His initial reaction to the chapters was “this is not what people at Justice think you’re doing.” While I had not in any way ‘manipulated’ the interviewees’ words, I ended up focusing on certain questions and responses more than others. I had essentially
zeroed in on responses that revealed information on rationales. The research had simply taken a more concentrated direction from the original questions and interview schedule. These unexpected developments demonstrate how researchers must always remain conscious of the complexities of consent.

Additional dilemmas and problems were also encountered during the course of this research. First, while the analytical and methodological frameworks engaged in this study were appropriate given the research objectives, the potential outcome of the investigation was contingent upon other factors. For example, the strengths and weaknesses of the researcher may enhance or hinder both process and outcome. Although the findings are presented as accurate, they are nevertheless constrained by the context of a researcher’s personal and academic worlds.

Second, another influential determinant was the restrictions placed by the ethics committee on the nature of pseudonyms. For the sake of anonymity and confidentiality, pseudonyms had to be established. However, not being able to use someone’s official title within the dissertation text partially constrains any data that may have been generated from their interview. An interviewee’s actual position is significant to the research because what an informant reveals is directly related to their knowledge of, and involvement in, the issue. The level of knowledge and the degree of involvement are directly related to a person’s official position.

Not being able to identify someone’s actual title may limit the impact of their statements. For example, several interviewees proposed the use of the pseudonym of ‘policy analyst.’ However, this commonly used generic ‘alias’ obscured the fact that
these interviewees held quite different positions. Some were researchers, evaluators, program managers, while others held senior portfolios. Yet, while some interviewees were comfortable using their actual title, the expectations of the ethics committee prohibited this direct use. However, a senior official may offer different insights than a newly recruited project manager; yet the pseudonym of ‘policy analyst’ obscures the actual source of the statement and may actually limit the impact of the latter.

Notwithstanding the limitations, the pseudonyms proved invaluable on a different front. Despite my efforts to ensure anonymity and confidentiality, these were difficult to secure completely. During some interviews, I discovered that certain interviewees, who were close colleagues, had communicated amongst themselves about their participation in this study. On a few occasions, I refused politely to answer the question “who else did you interview?” or to comment on statements such as: “I don’t know who else you have talked to.” Even though I never revealed names or positions, the conversations among various interviewees compromised my efforts. In this sense, the use of pseudonyms was crucial because it was the only mechanism that ensured anonymity in the printed version of the dissertation.

An additional obstacle involved the combination of complexity and time constraints. Obviously with research that entails multiple levels of interaction, methodology and analysis, not all issues can be resolved. Certainly research that involves both textual analysis and in-depth interviews is too complex to allow for simple conclusions. Furthermore, time constraints have an obvious bearing on the scope and depth of research and analysis. For example, I had intended to investigate the nature and
influence of academic research on crime prevention in greater detail. However, a lack of both time and space forced me to revise this objective and the extent to which it was to be undertaken. The same constraint occurred with my intention to investigate how ‘governing at-a-distance’ was conceptualized and justified in the realm of crime prevention. However, the depth at which I explored this form of regulation was moderated. A more detailed analysis will certainly be developed in a post-doctoral study.

SUMMARY

This chapter allowed me to reiterate my position in relation to key debates in the literatures of governmentality and criminology. I also explicated the corresponding methodological consequences for the extension and refinement of these broader perspectives. I demonstrated how my methodological approach holds the promise of establishing new ways of engaging governmentality perspectives. The incorporation of contingent actualities into the study of broader rationalities was made possible through grounded analysis, the latter of which illuminated both the complexity and benefits of theoretical and methodological triangulation. Furthermore, the inductive method did not abandon the theoretical framework. Rather, it enhanced and extended it. In this sense, innovative analytical developments were coupled with appropriate methodological frameworks that operated in a mutually reinforcing manner.
ENDNOTES

1. Product here refers to official publications and internal policy documents.

2. Process here refers to what was captured through participant observation and interviews.

3. The role of official publications in conveying rhetoric and persuasive rationales is important to this study that is attempting to demonstrate how government intervention is articulated, justified and accomplished. This interest falls under what Fairclough (1995:207) refers to as ‘commodification.’ Commodification is the process whereby language is produced, marketed and distributed as ‘commodities’ to ‘clients’ or ‘consumers’ (ibid). Official publications, especially pamphlets and ‘how-to’ manuals produced by both the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada and the Department of Justice Canada, were produced to ensure acquiescence and to activate participation (Edelman 1977) among a varied group of consumers and clients; these included individual Canadians, police organizations and community groups.
CHAPTER 5


This chapter presents how 'crime prevention' was articulated and justified within Canadian federal government rhetoric between 1974 and 1982. Chapters six, seven and eight conduct the same examination, but for the periods covering 1983 to mid-1987, mid-1987 to mid-1994 and from mid-1994 to 2000, respectively. The reason for this periodization is explained below.

Between the mid 1970s and the turn of the millennium, the federal government of Canada undertook several policy initiatives in the area of crime prevention. This period is subdivided into four distinct phases: 1974 to 1982; 1983 to mid-1987; mid-1987 to mid-1994; and mid-1994 to 2000. During the period between 1974 and 1982, crime prevention took shape primarily within the bounds of the preventive policing program at the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada. In the interval of 1983 and mid-1987, crime prevention was extended within the Ministry of Solicitor General Canada through the advent of National Crime Prevention Week and through a greater emphasis on community based approaches.

Between 1987 and mid-1994, crime prevention was re-framed in a transition phase within the Department of Justice Canada. Subsequently, between mid-1994 and the year 2000, crime prevention was resurrected and reconstituted through the establishment of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention”

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which was led primarily by the Department of Justice Canada. As these chapters weave through each of these distinct yet interlinked phases, they explore the rhetoric, the articulations, and the rationales that have advanced the crime prevention project within the Canadian federal government.

There are two related questions that comprise this task. The first asks "how has crime prevention been conceptualized in a government setting?" and the second questions "why has crime prevention been prioritized at this particular historical juncture?" Answering these questions inevitably requires an examination of the political appeal of prevention. Given the complexity of such an endeavour, various threads are interwoven throughout the four discussion chapters. The threads consist of diverse, yet interrelated themes, claims, contexts, undertakings and parameters. They are explicated in the subsequent paragraphs.

First, the chapters explore the nature of the Canadian federal government’s rhetoric that has promoted and proclaimed the greater emphasis on crime prevention in the late twentieth century. Rhetoric is viewed in this study as the site at which articulations and justifications are made known; thus, it is imperative that political rhetoric’s distinctively persuasive features be exposed as relevant in contextualizing and appreciating the significance of the rationales that underlie federally-generated preventative interventions. In this sense, I am mindful of the way in which the enthusiastic, persuasive and optimistic language that advances the crime prevention project actually influences our understanding of it.

Second, the chapters present how the concept is employed in a government
context by examining how ‘crime prevention’ is articulated through political rhetoric. While I have been interested in how the concept has been delineated, I have nevertheless been attentive to the extent to which the term has remained ambiguous, diffuse and ill-defined. In this sense, I demonstrate how the ‘essentially contested’ nature of the concept of prevention is manifested in its Canadian federal government form. The purpose of this emphasis is to overcome the previously mentioned limitations of the criminological literature whereby crime prevention is a seemingly implied concept whose ambiguity is uncontested and whose rationales are readily accepted.

Third, the main contribution of these chapters is the presentation of the rationales that have advanced and sustained crime prevention within Canadian federal policy initiatives. The purpose of this emphasis on rationales is to move beyond the aforementioned preoccupation within the academic literature on anticipated outcomes of prevention initiatives. By extension, I have sought to expose the rationales that have been previously taken-for-granted, estimated and assumed. To this end, I assess which rationales have remained constant and prominent or have withered away and/or have partially recurred.

Fourth, the thread running through these chapters involves the examination of the elements of continuity and change in the articulations and rationales that have advanced crime prevention within the Canadian federal government during the late twentieth century. I maintain that this period marks a unique phase in the conceptual history of crime prevention because changes have occurred on two levels. The indicators of these two levels of continuity and change may be observed in two ways.
The initial focus examines the evolution of crime prevention from its capacity as a rationale or a principle (end) to a distinct strategic orientation (means). I contend that in the discernable shift from a ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992a,b) in the late twentieth century, prevention has been differentially conceived, justified and deployed. Whereas in the so-called disciplinary era¹, the concept of prevention was employed to justify reactive and punitive measures, within the risk society, it has been used as a rationale for allegedly proactive and risk-oriented measures. In this context, crime prevention has been presented as an alternative to, and a marked departure from, the alleged ineffectiveness and narrow confines of traditional reactive criminal justice intervention.

Ironically, crime prevention had been previously used to justify reactive measures. In this light, I explore how crime prevention is variously articulated and justified through these shifting trends. Despite the appearance of a coherent shift, I am nevertheless mindful of the partial and incomplete ways in which this trend is unfolding. In other words, in the amalgamation of neo-liberal, neo-conservative and neo-social rationalities and technologies that characterizes late twentieth century regulation, prevention is engaged as both an end and a means.

The subsequent focus demonstrates how prevention, as a strategic option, has additionally been maneuvered through three sub-phases of development. The Canadian federal government’s prevention priorities have shifted from situational approaches in the 1970s to community-based strategies in the 1980s, both under the Solicitor General’s direction, and then shifted again primarily to social development interventions in the
1990s under the charge of the Department of Justice. Although differing in their process or means, common to each of these phases has been a desire to shift the balance of responsibility for the control or reduction of crime away from the formal criminal justice system. It should be noted however, that these phases have not been as distinct as this evolution implies; each approach has encroached upon the other, all the while struggling alongside neo-conservative reactive responses. The purpose in observing the evolution of these sub-phases is to reveal the commonalities, distinctions, ambiguities, complexities and partialities in the articulation and justification of crime prevention over time.

Fifth, as the recent history of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level is narrated, these chapters provide a descriptive synopsis of the major responsibilities, policy process and procedural accomplishments of the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada and the Department of Justice Canada in the area of crime prevention between 1974 and 2000. While it is difficult, and beyond the scope of this dissertation, to narrate the history of this initiative in all its complexity, order and disorder, I nevertheless integrate the relevant political and policy developments throughout these chapters. In so doing, I shed light on the individual and collective protagonists that have advanced and shaped the articulations of, and rationales for, crime prevention on both national and federal² terrains.

Finally, in order to grasp more fully the rationales as they are revealed through government speeches, policy documents, and publications, I situate them within their broader rationalities (ie. neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and neo-social welfarism). It should be noted however, that while the nature and significance of the rationales and
government interventions in the name of crime prevention run through chapters five through eight, the complexity and multiplicity of rationalities and governmental technologies are addressed in greater depth in chapters eight and nine. The complexity is more evident during the time frames covered in these latter two chapters.

It should also be noted that while the evolution implied in these above mentioned shifts is readily known and identifiable, the rationales underpinning the changing visions of prevention, or even the continuities therein, have not been adequately explored or documented through academic enquiries. The reasons for this lacuna remain uncertain. The discoveries made through this research project have been illuminating. And the data collection was by no means an insurmountable task. The undertaking certainly did not involve a pain-staking search for obscurities. The rationales were rather explicit and copious in ministerial speeches and official publications. The rationales identified through this research reveal government-generated images of governance through crime prevention, the desires and purposes of governance through crime prevention, as well as the nature, extent and targets of governance through crime prevention.

While the story of crime prevention at the federal level is recounted through an emphasis on its rationales, it is not one that has a clear beginning, middle and end. Nor is it one that is exclusively shaped by formal or abstract rationalities. On its policy journey from the 1970s onward, crime prevention was coaxed into life by various strands of influence from both internal and external sources. As it was propelled forward by both fashionable and sustaining rationales, it eventually acquired commitment, authority and expertise. However, as a former Research Officer with the Ministry of the Solicitor
General between 1975 and 1984 defensively cautioned about government-based policy and programme development, "... it's actually quite messy and ... there's a lot of serendipity ... there was a lot of idiosyncrasy and accidents, and very much influenced by who was at a certain place at a certain time rather than being so tightly systematically planned."

Additionally, in its late twentieth century form, crime prevention has tended to meander through an array of departments, sections, committees and programs. As will become evident in this chapter, the formation of the crime prevention initiative coalesced with other policy, program and research strands within the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice. As the former Research Officer further insisted, "what happens is with a government ministry, something comes from one source, but as it goes through like a pipe ... as it goes through a different neighbourhood, it takes on the characteristics and you have different purposes" being brought to bear on it. Bearing in mind this interweaving of abstract rationalities and contingent actualities over time, we now turn to the genesis of this history in the mid-1970s.

1974-1982: THE UNSETTLED ORIGINS OF A GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE

The emergence of crime prevention as an allegedly distinct set of initiatives within the Canadian federal government occurred in the mid 1970s within the Ministry of the Solicitor General. In 1974, preliminary preparation began in the areas of policy, research and programs through the establishment of the Causes and Prevention Research Section. Then in 1975, the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the University of
Toronto's Centre of Criminology jointly sponsored a 'Crime Prevention Workshop.'

The purpose of the meeting was to develop a foundation for research and to coordinate efforts between government, academics and practitioners.

When the Assistant Deputy Minister of Research and Development, Mr. Ben Hofley, spoke at the opening address, he not only set the tone for that particular symposium, but he also identified the rationale that was to underpin the federal government's crime prevention agenda for the next quarter century. He stated that

We have ... turned away from the model of crime as a problem or pathology in the offender and have come to view crime more as a phenomenon involving a complex interaction between the community and the individual ... efforts to root out and cure the problem of the offender, and thereby cure crime, have fallen far short of expectations and some are even saying these efforts are a failure (Communications Group 1975:12-13).

This statement reveals two significant and interrelated features of the federal government's emphasis on crime prevention. First, through its reference to the changing focus on the offender, this pronouncement confirms the shift in regulation that was occurring at the time. The greater emphasis on the community signifies the move away from punitive and reactive responses towards more proactive and risk-oriented approaches.

The second part of this claim introduces the failure of existing control measures as one of the main rationales underlying the alleged shift in regulation. This acknowledgement is in keeping with the overarching claim of 'nothing works' that called into question the contributions of existing punitive and rehabilitative interventions at the time. Despite the controversial debates around this disparaging contention, it is
nevertheless against this decline of confidence in traditional criminal justice responses that the emergence of crime prevention is at least partially understood. As the subsequent pages demonstrate, this emphasis on the limitations of existing programs serves as an explicit, recurrent and predominant justification for each emerging variation of prevention policy in the latter quarter of the twentieth century.

Furthermore, in the same speech, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Research and Development reinforced that “crime prevention is everybody’s business” (Communications Group 1975:13). This promotional slogan is reflective of the neo-liberalized rhetoric on responsibility that was to dominate the federally directed crime prevention discourse over the next twenty-five years. The emerging shift in state and extra-state relations in the area of regulation is implied within this brief catch phrase. While it captures the seemingly optimistic theme of inter-agency collaboration, this persuasive pronouncement obscures the complexity of the changes that were to be played out in the shared responsibilities among the Canadian federal government, provincial jurisdictions, community-based and private sector organizations, as well as individual citizens.

It must also be noted that not only does this neo-liberal theme recur profusely in various formulations within government rhetoric, but it also generates additional rationales that attempt to ensure its saleability and viability as it is constantly reshaped in light of neo-conservative and neo-social contingencies. This actuality is explicated and exemplified in this chapter, as well as in subsequent chapters.

Following the workshop in 1975, as well as the 5th United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime\textsuperscript{6} which took place in the same year, the shift towards neo-liberal emphases on community, partnership and responsibility was concretized through a number of policy developments within the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Foremost among the initiating programs was the ‘Peace and Security’ Package of 1976 which aimed simultaneously to abolish capital punishment and to convey public assurance of personal safety.

The advent of this umbrella initiative is thought to have opened up a space for crime prevention within the federal government arena. As a former Research Officer with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1975 and 1984 explained, “capital punishment, I think is a crucial issue to understand in terms of what happened later in crime prevention.” A Senior Official,\textsuperscript{7} who worked with the same ministry between 1973 and 1998, also confirmed that the abolition of the death penalty served to increase the stock of crime prevention; he claimed that it “promoted yet another surge toward working with the community.” In the face of considerable public opposition to the abolition of capital punishment, it was politically imperative to manifest visible concern about criminal violence and the protection of the public (Rock 1986:127).

The former Research Officer (1975-1984) insisted that the Solicitor General’s character and inclinations had an influential effect on the changes taking place at the time. He interpreted that Minister “Warren Allmand, who had sort of a long reputation for someone who’s involved in social justice,” was ideally suited to oversee the abolition of capital punishment, as well as the advent of less disciplinary measures. In fact, Minister Allmand’s own views were openly declared to the press; he claimed that he opposed capital punishment to such an extent that he would resign rather than sign an execution
order (Toronto Star 1975). The Senior Official (1973-1998) agreed that the biases of the Minister were crucial in shaping the agenda; he held the view that “Warren Allmand was a great advocate of prevention.” These acknowledgements of a minister’s influential role, the aforementioned conferences, as well as the expressed crisis over public image are important examples of the contingent actualities that also propel policy directions in a government setting.

The former Research Officer (1975 and 1984) later clarified the internally generated rationales that had motivated ministerial staff to provide an alternative to the outgoing death penalty as a means of crime control; he specifically related that the overall sense at the time was that you can’t appear to be just doing something to remove some penalty. You have to be doing something to make the citizenry, the public safer. So that term “Peace and Security” package came out; we have to do a series of things that are going to make a safer society, that are going to help the police to be more effective, that are going to help the police and citizenry work together more closely; that are going to deal with victims.

Thus, in a classic case of an idea borne out of necessity, officials began to organize initiatives under the priority setting umbrella of ‘peace and security,’ of which crime prevention constituted only a component. In lieu of the repressive conservatism reflected through the threat of capital punishment, neo-conservative ‘alternatives’ emerged in the form of minimum sentences for first and second degree murder, as well as gun control and dangerous offender legislation (Research Officer 1975-1984). Crime prevention projects, along with other neo-liberal options such as victim-oriented initiatives and diversion programs, began to take shape alongside the continued reliance upon reactive responses (Research Officer 1975-1984).
THE RATIONALES FOR THE ALTERNATIVE OF ‘PREVENTIVE’ POLICING

In 1976, ‘crime prevention’ officially came to life through the “Preventive Policing Program.” As the first major federal crime prevention initiative, this project represented the federal government’s concrete move into crime prevention beyond the previous emphasis on research within the Causes and Prevention Research Section. This program, which was situated within the Consultation Centre of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, was designed “to help improve police management and skills in crime prevention and to stimulate interest in crime prevention programs” (Picard 1986:1). The rationales underlying the establishment of this program were explicitly articulated in several Consultation Centre Strategic Plan documents.

One of the first rationales identified claimed that the program was developed in response to an alleged public demand. It was stated that the “Ministry has recognized a desire expressed on the part of the general public for an increased assurance of protection from the effects of crime” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1977/78:40). In these formative years of the initiative, officials were preoccupied with “increasing, standardizing and accessing the federal government resources available to municipal police departments for mobilizing crime prevention programs” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1977/78:40).

In addition to marshaling the resources and activating the programs, awareness and ‘conversion’ also seemed to have been among the related goals that justified the advent, as well as the maintenance of the prevention theme within the policing domain. One of the Ministry’s objectives for the ‘Preventive Policing Program’ was to “encourage
and assist the police community to place greater emphasis on preventive policing and a
community oriented delivery of police services” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of
Canada 1978/79: 15). The need for education campaigns is certainly understandable
given that prevention was not only being ‘inserted’ within a traditionally reactive field,
but it was also being introduced to a public that had relied on police responses for their
protection since the nineteenth century. The purpose of the federal Ministry of the
Solicitor General’s emphasis on awareness for both the police and the general public was
explicitly reinforced in the following aim:

To ensure that the local police community in Canada has been made aware
of crime prevention programs and various policing concepts such as team
policing so that there will be a significantly increased emphasis in the area
of experimentation and development of such programs in Canadian police

Furthermore, the concern over the problem of ‘crime’ and the interest in
overcoming the limitations of traditional responses resurfaced as an explicit rationale that
underpinned the preventive policing program. It was articulated as follows: “Greater
emphasis on preventive policing will have a positive long-term effect on criminal activity
while experimentation with community oriented policing methods will provide an
alternative to the traditional delivery of police services” (Ministry of the Solicitor General

With the exception of the aforementioned rationales that were found within
ministry documents, surprisingly little was said about crime prevention within ministers’
speeches during the late 1970s. This lack of promotional emphasis within ministerial
addresses is in stark contrast to what was evident in the early 1980s and especially in the mid-1990s. When asked about this peculiarity and the need to justify government activity, a Senior Official who had worked with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1973 and 1998 explained that “from the 70s into the 80s, where the police were largely involved, there wasn’t a great need for argument because the police departments tended to evolve into that kind of thing, into preventive policing then into ... working more closely with the community.”

As this interviewee explained, it seems that as long as crime prevention existed within the traditional mechanisms of a policing framework, despite a certain amount of initial resistance on the part of the police officers, it was rather easily contained and managed. The integration of situational crime prevention efforts within police services extended rather than replaced police-oriented initiatives at that time. Given this actuality, it is possible to surmise that justificatory rhetoric was not as imperative in the 1970s as it was in later years.

As we will observe later, the 1980s and 1990s engendered a new era for crime prevention that extended well beyond criminal justice agencies and more into social and community spaces. Given the need then for increased promotion and persuasion, these two decades were accompanied by the use of innumerable slogans and justificatory statements in speeches and publications that highlighted the ‘need’ for more proactive approaches. In this context, it is possible to see that when crime prevention began to take on a significantly different form, the necessity of more influential rationales was greater given that acceptance, participation and fiscal support had to be secured on different levels and in new spaces.
THE APPEAL OF “WORKING TOGETHER TO PREVENT CRIME”

In 1978, the Ministry of the Solicitor General introduced a crime prevention theme and logo: “Working Together to Prevent Crime.” In an effort to disseminate this theme, the Ministry prepared crime prevention kits containing brochures, pamphlets, posters, buttons and bumper stickers, as well as camera ready art work. This collection consisted largely of technologically-oriented paraphernalia directed at encouraging individualized efforts of opportunity reduction. These kits were distributed throughout police departments across Canada in preparation for Police Week in May 1978.

The promotional materials included such topics as, “Tips to stop shoplifting,” “Woman Alone,” “Nuisance Problems,” “Home Security,” “Protection for Senior Citizens,” “Motorcycle theft prevention,” “Auto theft prevention,” “Operation Identification,” and “Operation Provident.” This publicity material promoting target hardening measures constituted some of the early versions of technologies of ‘at-a-distance’ crime prevention. They involved government-generated advice that sought to empower and responsibilities individuals to assume the tasks of their own protection. In this ‘at-a-distance’ form of target hardening, individuals are ‘guided’ and ‘encouraged’ by police services to engage in practices that render themselves and their property less likely to become targets of crime. The subsequent sections also highlight some of the rationales presented implicitly through images and logos, as well as explicitly in the text of pamphlets and other promotional material.

As we examine the nature of the rationales, we must bear in mind the context in which they were produced and disseminated. As confirmed by a Senior Official with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1973 and 1998, “the bulk of the prevention was
target hardening through the policing community” in the 1970s. A Research Official with the Consultation Centre at the Ministry of the Solicitor General in the mid-1980s also corroborated that “police-based crime prevention was the priority” at that particular time. These strong ties to police services in the late 1970s inevitably shaped the nature of the crime prevention strategies that were prioritized.

Target hardening measures, as reflected in Figure 5.1, both complemented and extended the police’s role in the protection of the public. Through this neo-liberal approach however, the police’s role was to educate people on how to protect themselves. Target hardening is a form of situational crime prevention\(^\text{i}\) which involves risk-based measures that are designed to reduce the opportunity of property offences and personal harms. As outlined in Figure 5.1, programs such as Operation Identification and Home Security fall under this category. These involved very concrete measures coupled with the backing of hardware resources that were gaining considerable momentum in safety rhetoric and practices at that time.

The emphasis on hardware is reflected in the image of the house secured by the padlock; the latter reinforces the fortress mentality that dominated risk management measures in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As identified in Figure 5.1, the motivational ‘action-oriented’ commands of “Lock It and Pocket the Key” and “Mark all your valuables. Contact your police and join Operation Identification” demonstrate the way in which neo-liberal government efforts to responsibilize individuals and to activate their participation were packaged and disseminated in the late 1970s within the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s “Media Promotion Manual.” This example also shows the explicitly persuasive messages that are often found in political rhetoric.
Figure 5.1
Images of Advertising for Target Hardening Measures
THE MUTUALITY OF NEO-LIBERAL AND NEO-CONSERVATIVE THEMES

The link between the neo-liberal orientation and the neo-conservative institution of policing is reflected in the image presented in Figure 5.2. The logo which shows a family grouping and a police officer with the message "Working Together to Prevent Crime" is supposed to epitomize the community policing approach that the Ministry of the Solicitor General fostered in the late 1970s and into the early 1980s. The assumption is that individual citizens, families and communities are in partnership with the police. It is interesting to note that while the slogan implies action, the image of the individuals conveys passivity. More specifically, the people have eyes and ears which allow them to receive information; however they do not have mouths that would allow them to express their thoughts, needs and desires. In this sense, the people are depicted as passive consumers of the knowledge that is disseminated by the federal government rather than as autonomous producers of thought and action. In other words, this image strategically implies that individuals are to act according to the information that is provided to them.

It should also be noted that the presence and role of the police is reinforced by 'the shield' that forms the backdrop of the image. The background location of the police shield may also give the impression that it's role is one of a 'backstop.' In other words, it may serve to assure the public that the police remain central figures in the prevention and management of crime; at the very least, the police would be considered a last resort. Furthermore, the 'shield' may also serve as a concrete illustration of the extension of the police into the everyday lives of the citizenry whereby the police become state directed agents of risk management. Nevertheless, this image is the first in a long and evolving
series that attempt to convey visually the emerging partnership among the police, the community and citizens.

It is interesting to note here that the theme of 'Working Together to Prevent Crime,' which is depicted in Figure 5.2, places an emphasis on governing through solidarity. According to Rose (1996a), the emphasis on social solidarity is indicative of governing through 'the social.' Yet, the means through which the theme is carried out places emphasis on individualized risk-management efforts that are consistent with neo-liberal tendencies, but which are also reinforced by the neo-conservative presence of police. Thus, while the emphasis on working in partnership may be a form of governing through solidarity, it is one that is highly individualized and localized at the community level rather than at the national level (Stenson and Watt 1999:190).
Figure 5.2
Logo of "Working Together to Prevent Crime"
THE RATIONALES UNDERLYING CRIME PREVENTION ‘AT-A-DISTANCE’

The titles of the aforementioned pamphlets reflect the emerging neo-liberal emphasis on how individuals or groups are to prevent potential risks of crime and victimization. Three of the eight pamphlets are presented in Figure 5.3. Prior to examining the specific rationales, it must be noted that the justifications presented in the pamphlets, although prepared by the Ministry of the Solicitor General, do not justify the federal government’s involvement in these activities. Rather, the rationales represented the federal government’s interpretation of the reasons that individual citizens and community groups should engage in the risk-based crime prevention measures. Thus, one must bear in mind the agenda of ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘at-a-distance’ governing that is embedded within the justificatory statements and ‘how-to’ suggestions presented in the promotional pamphlets, the latter of which were being distributed and utilized by the neo-conservative oriented police services.

The rationales expressed in the various pamphlets conveyed numerous concerns, all of which attempted to appeal to individuals’ senses of fear, urgency or vulnerability. Both the pamphlets on “Nuisance Problems” and “Protection for Senior Citizens,” emphasized people’s vulnerability to crime, as well as the after-effects of being a victim. The brochure on “Nuisance Problems” explicitly noted the rationale for intervention at the outset; it stated that “[w]hile nuisance problems may not seem as serious as many other crimes, they can be dangerous and psychologically traumatic.” In addition, the pamphlet entitled, “Protection for Senior Citizens” explained that “[c]riminals often regard older persons as easy targets for many kinds of crimes. Every elderly person
should be aware of these crimes and how to prevent them." Clearly these rationales were strategically designed to elicit concern among the readers and to prompt them to act on their own behalf.
Figure 5.3
Samples of Pamphlets from the 1978 Working Together to Prevent Crime Campaign
The pamphlet on "Auto theft prevention" gave the following reason as an impetus for citizens to become more proactive: "Auto theft is a serious crime that affects the whole community. Higher insurance rates, property damage, injuries and loss of life from accidents are the results." This claim emphasized the detrimental consequences of crime as significant reasons to intervene. When such losses are defined in more personal terms, they appeal to people's sense of fear and thus serve to mobilize individuals. This focus on the costs of crime in financial, personal, environmental and community terms is in keeping with the increased recognition of the harm to victims that was occurring in the late 1970s. While the acknowledgement of these multiple costs and consequences is the first to appear in print during this era, it is one that became a recurrent rationale throughout the remainder of the late twentieth century. A similar concern over the financial effects of crime was exemplified in the brochure on "Tips to stop shoplifting." The rationale written at the outset stated that "[e]veryone pays for shoplifting - businessmen suffer lower profits and consumers ultimately pay higher prices."

Moreover, the pamphlet entitled, "Motorcycle Theft Prevention" offered a slightly different, but not unrelated, reason to intervene. It claimed that "motorcycle theft is a serious crime which has become more prevalent." This statement emphasized not only the gravity of the offence, but it also highlighted an alleged increase in the frequency of the so-called crime. Such claims are likely to instill fear in individuals. By extension, this emotionally-based rationale that conjures up fear of crime may potentially compel people to engage in crime prevention activities that are allegedly developed for their own benefit.
Furthermore, it should be noted that common to all of these pamphlets’ messages is a concern for the victims or potential victims of crimes. This marks a significant shift from the previous emphasis on the offender under more punitive regimes. The inclusion of these ‘compelling’ rationales in these pamphlets targeted at potential victims further reinforces how the onus of responsibility in public safety matters was increasingly being placed on the potential victim at this particular historical juncture. In other words, the rationales, together with the ‘how to’ tips within the brochures, are a testament to the then emerging neo-liberal emphasis on the calculation of risks in the management of crime and victimization in its ‘at-a-distance’ form.

This emerging neo-liberal version of crime prevention in the late 1970s is further reflected in the definition that was circulated within promotional material at the time. It should be noted that this is the only definition of crime prevention that surfaced in publications by the Ministry of the Solicitor General during the late 1970s. The definition read as follows: “Crime Prevention is the ‘anticipation, the recognition and the appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to reduce or remove that risk’” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1979:1). It was subsequently stated that “this definition relates to and emphasizes crime prevention activities centred on the awareness and responsibilities assumed by the police and the citizen “Working Together” to prevent crime” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1979:1).

The emphasis on ‘risk’ in the definition, as well as the accentuation of responsibility and collaboration in the explication of the former are part of the same neo-liberal orientation. However, I found the alleged relation between the definition and the
popular slogan rather presumptuous and exaggerated. While the definition is rather vague and may be open to interpretation, it does not allude to partnerships and nor does it indicate who is responsible for ‘anticipating,’ ‘recognizing,’ and ‘appraising,’ crime risks. Nevertheless, such an assumption is indeed reflective of the rising emphasis on the collaborative efforts\textsuperscript{12} that were becoming more prominent features of risk management strategies at the onset of the 1980s.

**A NEW MINISTER AND A NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION**

Between 1979 and 1980, the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s programs in the area of crime prevention remained primarily within the purview of the policing service. Thus in its late 1970s form, crime prevention was shaped by a mutual engagement between neo-conservative and neo-liberal visions. However, the early 1980s were marked by an increased interest in the expansion of the crime prevention agenda beyond the confines of police-based schemes. The changes were reflected in the political rhetoric that began to emphasize the importance of the community, the relevance of social measures, and the plight of victims. Three significant actualities influenced this shift almost simultaneously. They included the participation of the Ministry of the Solicitor General in the Sixth United Nations’ Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, the agenda and character of the incoming Minister, as well as the development of the Ministry’s ‘national plan of action.’

As subsequent chapters reveal, Canada’s federal crime prevention agenda in the late twentieth century has been shaped and invigorated by numerous international
conferences. While the international fora became more influential in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they also served as compelling forces in the earlier part of the 1980s. In reference to the Sixth United Nations’ Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which was held in Venezuela in 1980, the Ministry’s Annual Report for 1980-1981 identified crime prevention as among the top six general areas for future priority attention (Ministry of the Solicitor General 1981a: 2). Thus, through its membership in the United Nations, Canada held an international obligation to comply with, and to implement the advances that were being promoted at the international level.

The second consequential occurrence was the appointment of an allegedly well-intentioned and progressively-minded Solicitor General, Robert Kaplan. Two interviewees repeatedly reinforced the impact that the Minister had on crime prevention at the time. A Senior Official with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1973 and 1998 described Minister Kaplan as “a great advocate of prevention.” When asked whether or not crime prevention was a priority for the ministry at the time, this Senior Official later responded that “crime prevention was certainly a priority for Minister Robert Kaplan.” Such a response indicates the perceived role that a politician or minister may have in shaping the agenda of an entire ministry.

The Research Officer who had worked with the ministry between 1975 and 1984 also insisted on several occasions in the interview setting that Minister Kaplan had a significant influence in both shaping and advancing the crime prevention project at the federal level. In describing the early 1980s, the interviewee explained that “this is where crime prevention gets hot. Kaplan. Robert Kaplan comes in.” He continued:
Kaplan comes in ... he has this image of being a friendly sort of face, and he comes in, into this ministry and he's dealing with escapes from prison, riots, scandals, crises, you know, it's bad news ... so he wants ... good news ... He saw crime prevention for example as an issue that would bring about good and also it would be something that he could get involved in. That it was like looking for a win-win [situation]. [He had a] very optimistic ... positive view.

Amidst the negativity that had characterized the Ministry of the Solicitor General's image in dealing with reactive institutionalized responses to crime, both the Minister and crime prevention emerged at the time as catalysts for change. In this particular case, crime prevention was becoming the fashionable product and Minister Kaplan seemed to be suited as the ideal salesman. As subsequent sections demonstrate, this convenient arrangement is evident in the rhetoric that Minister Kaplan employed to advocate the crime prevention agenda. In this sense, crime prevention provided the allegedly more sensitive and benevolent Minister with a legitimating rationale to ameliorate some degrading aspects of criminal justice.

It should be noted however, that against the cynicism typically associated with political rhetoric, the former Research Officer (1975-1984) cautioned that "when you had someone like Kaplan for example, underneath it there was a wanting to do good." This view is in keeping with Garland's (1999:33) recognition that [at least some] government officials are candid in their intentions to minimize both the incidences and the effects of crime and victimization.

Under the charismatic leadership of Robert Kaplan, the Ministry of the Solicitor General sought to establish a national agenda. The document produced around this theme was entitled: "Crime Prevention: A National Plan of Action." A review of this official
paper revealed some significant rationales for the increased emphasis on crime
prevention, as well as for federal government involvement in this regard. In discussing
the future mandate of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, this document noted that:

... the Ministry cannot rest at its current level of activity. There are
pressures from all sectors - governmental and public - and the current
social and economic climate demands intensified and extensive crime
prevention initiatives. Indeed, it is the Minister’s corporate responsibility
to lead the way and stimulate others to seize their responsibilities
(Ministry of the Solicitor General 1981b:5).

The persuasiveness of this text-based political rhetoric is found in the use of rationales
that encompass political, social and economic pressures. The promises of performance
that are commonly found in rhetoric are also evident in the emphasis on the Minister’s
responsibility to lead and to stimulate (Paine 1981:121).

In addition, the document specifically made reference to the importance of the
federal government’s involvement in the promotion of cooperation among federal,
provincial, private sector agencies and citizens’ groups (Ministry of the Solicitor General
1981b:6). In so doing, the federal government had “to be responsive to provincial
community and jurisdiction” (ibid:6). Part of the intention was to give added impetus to
the existing actions of other sectors by consolidating and enhancing the various pre-
existing efforts (ibid:3). The Ministry of the Solicitor General viewed such a leadership
role as being consistent with its “obligation to work toward reducing the flow into the
criminal justice system by exploring cost-efficient alternatives” (ibid:2); it was
specifically concerned with the “reduction of the penitentiary population” (ibid:3).

Among the other reasons for intervention, the document cited a substantial
quantity of research\textsuperscript{13} on the limited effectiveness and escalating costs of the reactive responses to crime (ibid:2). In sum, this official policy paper constituted an internally produced document that included both internally generated and externally-based rationales that served as a significant impetus in moving the crime prevention agenda forward at the federal government level.

We have just recognized the United Nations’ Congress, the character of the Minister, and the ‘national plan of action’ as three significant contingent actualities that influenced the advancement of crime prevention within the Ministry of the Solicitor General in the early 1980s. We will now reflect upon the combination of governmental rationalities and contingent actualities that was explicitly noted in both oral and written political discourse.

\textbf{INTERSECTIONS OF RATIONALITIES AND CONTINGENT ACTUALITIES}

The concern over the image of the Ministry of the Solicitor General that was first introduced to this dissertation by two interviewees was confirmed in a speech by the Minister himself. He specifically stated that “I am confident that my ministry is moving forward in a number of key areas and that we are finally being seen more as an active ministry than a reactive ministry” (Kaplan 1981:1). This quotation serves as another example of how politicians fashion words as instruments of persuasion (Paine 1981:113). More specifically, the optimism conveyed and the claims of performance and effectiveness in this statement reflect a deliberate attempt to convince the audience that something is being done.
Furthermore, in the context of public relations and concern over political optics, it is interesting to note how this statement equates ‘moving forward’ with proactive intervention and thereby implies that ‘reactive’ approaches are less progressive. In the same speech, the Minister later claimed that “Canadians also live in a society besieged by the fear of crime” (Kaplan 1981:5). As ensuing chapters confirm, this expressed concern over citizens’ fear of crime constitutes a recurring rationale in both oral and written political rhetoric. Again, the mention of ‘fear’ is a strategic demonstration of concern for citizens on the part of the government which was desperately seeking to change its image and to secure acquiescence for an emerging alternative strategy.

In addition to public image and fear, fiscal restraints, as well as the limitations of both government jurisdiction and police responses also became significant parts of the neo-liberal rationales embedded within the political rhetoric on crime prevention in the early 1980s. Where economic impediments and government limitations were concerned, the Minister cautioned that “these are times when the resources of government are severely limited. Perhaps more importantly, these are times when it is becoming increasingly obvious that government alone could not accomplish the task ahead even if we did have the resources” (Kaplan 1981:14-15). This statement reflects two rationales that are often presented as mutually related. Together, they serve as powerful reasons for seeking both financial and community-based alternatives to deliver crime prevention approaches.

In the same speech, Minister Kaplan added another increasingly popular rationale to his list of reasons for looking towards prevention as a serious option. He stated that
For many years, the police have accepted a steadily growing sphere of responsibility for prevention and control of crime, with a corresponding relinquishing of responsibility on the part of the public. By over-estimating their capacity even to control crime, the police inflated public expectations and urged acceptance of the view that they simply needed more resources to wage their battle. Despite massive increases in police personnel and equipment, the magnitude and seriousness of our crime problem has continued (Kaplan 1981:10).

This assertion presents previous reactive and police-based interventions as having a limited capacity to address the problem of crime. By extension, it also suggests that the trend that saw police services expand in the previous decade was about to decline in its magnitude and scope. The corollary to this decline that this quotation makes explicit is that the ‘responsibility on the part of the public’ that was thought to have been previously ‘relinquished’ was about to be reinstated and reinvigorated. The neo-liberal overtones about government and police limitations, as well as citizen responsibility that are embedded in this statement mark the onset of a long list of similar rationales that characterized the government-based reasons for crime prevention in the 1980s and 1990s.

The following year, similar justifications resurfaced within internal documents and the minister’s speeches. In a briefing note written for a Meeting with the Solicitor General on February 10, 1982, several reasons for the emphasis on crime prevention were revealed. The briefing note, which was obtained through the Access to Information Act, was entitled: “Crime Prevention: Strategies for the Ministry of the Solicitor General.” One of the main sections of the briefing note was explicitly entitled: “Why Crime Prevention?” The responses written for the purpose of informing the ministers included the following:14
a) limited effectiveness and high costs of reactive approaches to crime control;
b) limited resources;
c) effectiveness of preventive measures which focus on specific crimes and situational factors, e.g. robbery, break & enter, vandalism;
d) public pressure and support for crime prevention initiatives, e.g. The Canadian Pharmaceutical Association; The Canadian Window & Door Manufacturers’ Association;
e) associate this Ministry with a positive endeavour, one that reinforces its leadership in criminal justice, through the stimulation, facilitation, coordination of crime prevention initiatives.

To have discovered such an explicit list of reasons was indeed a fortunate happenstance for a researcher who was searching expressly for answers to the question of ‘why is crime prevention being emphasized at this particular time?’ This roster of reasons represents a summary of the rationales that were scattered and repeated throughout other documents and speeches. The first three reasons, and especially the second and third ones, are in keeping with neo-liberal preoccupations with cost-efficiency and program effectiveness. The two subsequent reasons undoubtedly complement the former. As contingent actualities, the last two reasons are seemingly influential ones because they are linked to the highly political interests of public image and government-citizen relations. These various examples demonstrate the co-existence of rationalities and actualities as they are expressed in the form of rationales within government discourse.

It should be noted that while the government seems to be concerned with the
alleged 'failure' of former approaches (reason # 1), it is equally impressed by the
'success' of emerging proactive approaches (reason # 3). In other words, the government
does not seem to dwell on either failures or successes; instead it seems to highlight their
mutual significance in the shift towards crime prevention. This occurrence in the
Canadian context confirms Miller and Rose's (1990:4) observation that "failure provides
for the propagation of new programs of government." Furthermore, it is evident that out
of concern for public image, the Canadian federal government never acknowledges
'failure' without presenting an alternative. In this sense, both 'success' and 'failure' are
incorporated strategically within political discourse with a view to ensuring innovation.

It is interesting to note that much of what had been explained to the minister in the
internal briefing note reappeared several months later in his speeches. On one occasion,
he emphasized the actuality of limited resources:

We are all working within the same basic constraints. We all know that
policy makers cannot simply throw money at social problems in the hope
that there will be payoffs. For the policy maker, fiscal restraint has meant
a narrowing and sharpening of focus. Now the policy maker must ask,
more carefully than before, how can I make things better without added
costs ... (Kaplan 1982a:2-3)?

As indicated in this quotation, the official 'flagging' of the economic limitations
was mentioned in conjunction with the limited capacity of government to deal with
'social problems.' Such an allusion in this minister's use of orally-based rhetoric was
seemingly intended to appease those within and outside the Ministry of the Solicitor
General who were resisting the shift away from reactive police-based measures towards
proactive community-based initiatives.15 Thus, the minister cautiously sought to balance
the various pressures that were both supportive of, and resistant to, crime prevention.

In the same speech, Minister Kaplan also emphasized the effectiveness of the preventative measures that had been developing under the Ministry of the Solicitor General. He claimed that

[w]ith the co-operation of the police across the country we have been quite successful in introducing proactive crime prevention programs and in changing the attitudes of police themselves toward preventive activity. We have as an integral part of this, systematically involved local community organizations and private citizens in our efforts to encourage everyone to take responsibility for reducing crime (Kaplan 1982a:9).

As is common with the persuasive overtones of political rhetoric, such a statement is seemingly attempting to generate support by building on the momentum of what has been interpreted as successful interventions. As will become evident through ensuing chapters, this rhetorical tactic is repeated on numerous occasions throughout ministerial addresses, and especially during the 1990s campaign that ushered in the ‘national strategy.’ The emphasis on ‘success’ stories was a crucial one for Canada because it tended to lag behind many other Western industrialized nations which were already channeling crime prevention efforts through a national coordinating body. Canada also lacked the expansive repertoire of research studies from which American and European countries benefitted for the purpose of bolstering their own awareness and program campaigns. Therefore, when Canadian-based success stories did appear, they were mentioned opportunistically in political rhetoric.

In a later speech, Minister Kaplan presented, yet again, the costliness and limited effectiveness of the reactive measures as a worthy reason for shifting towards crime
prevention efforts. He emphasized that the criminal justice system

has reached a level of maturity beyond which more money and manpower
cannot substantially effect change ... What can work is crime prevention -
down to earth, practical means by which the efforts of many segments of
the community can be combined with those of the police to forge a more
effective, less-costly method of crime control (Kaplan 1982b:1).

While this statement conveys the neo-liberal features of cost-effectiveness and
inter-agency cooperation, it also clearly indicates that the neo-conservative mechanisms
of policing were not going to be wholly displaced by the emerging emphasis on proactive
approaches. This emphasis on the partnership role of the police and the undercurrent of
conservatism is addressed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Finally, in the midst of both the existing and pending changes, the Minister
carefully sought to set Canadians’ minds at ease by confirming that the problem of crime
remained a priority for the federal government. He specifically declared: “I can assure
you that the Government of Canada is very much concerned about crime” (Kaplan
1982b:3). Such an assertion obviously attempted to affirm a positive image and a
leadership role on the part of the government. But the statement was almost imperative
anyway, especially at a time when the proposed changes were likely perceived as being
‘soft on crime’ and as increasingly shifting part of the responsibility for crime prevention
and public safety onto communities and citizens that continued to rely on the government
and the police for both programming and protection.

This section has reinforced the presence and influence of contingent actualities in
a government setting. Rather than viewing contingent actualities as obstacles to the
translation of abstract rationalities into technologies, this discussion has shown that they
are better understood as constitutive elements of government that interweave with, and
are sometimes indicative of rationalities. More importantly, this overview of contingent
actualities illustrates that rationalities are not systematically transformed into
governmental technologies. Rather, government initiatives are carried out in complex
and sometimes ad hoc ways.

1974-1982 IN REVIEW

The late 1970s and early 1980s represent a unique period in the conceptual history
of crime prevention. It is during this brief period that the meaning of ‘crime prevention’
shifted from a principle of reactive responses to a distinct proactive strategy. While
prevention was often thought to be the implicit purpose of crime control strategies, it was
not until the mid 1970s in Canada that systematically planned crime prevention activities
were given serious consideration. In other words, in the alleged shift from a punitive
society to a risk society, crime prevention evolved from a rationale for control practices to
a program of regulation itself. In this sense, crime prevention was reclassified as an
alternative to a reactive criminal justice system that it had once served to justify.

One must acknowledge however, that this shift from a passive goal to an active
strategy was by no means absolute; as ensuing chapters demonstrate, prevention remains
a rationale for the neo-conservative reactive measures which were considered to be an
integral part of a ‘balanced’ approach to crime prevention in the 1990s. Nevertheless,
despite the partiality of this shift from the late 1970s onward, changes were undoubtedly
visible. One of the most notable features of this transition period is the apparent necessity and significance of rationales in both political and public spheres.

The old cliche question: "Do the ends justify the means?"\textsuperscript{16} may seem relevant here, at least at first glance. However, it may also be argued that it does not seem appropriate in this case because in its late twentieth century form, crime prevention has become both the ends and the means. In most instances, the strategies used to achieve crime prevention are also labeled as such, and the anticipated goals that prevention approaches are thought to accomplish also carry the same title. In this period where crime prevention was emphasized as both a strategy and a goal, the question above may appear altogether irrelevant and unnecessary. However, given the litany of rationales that have accompanied the greater emphasis on prevention, one may be prompted to question the need for legitimation and justification. It is too soon to answer this question at this point in the presentation of findings as the response would remain speculative at best. We will thus return to it after all of the rationales up until the year 2000 are presented and discussed.

For now, the rationales that were put forth between 1974 and 1982 are of interest to this discussion. The above review of the persuasive prevention rhetoric that emerged in the mid-1970s indicated a shift in crime control practices that were aimed initially at dealing with problems of organizational maintenance, limited effectiveness, fiscal restraint, legitimacy and a tarnished image resulting from negative publicity. In the face of such adversity, the Ministry of the Solicitor General searched for sources of innovation and in effect new markets of regulation. These preoccupations opened up a space for
neo-liberal versions of crime control of which crime prevention seemed to be constructed as the ideal type. This changing emphasis was certainly evident in both documents and speeches and according to the rationales that were conveyed through the persuasive political rhetoric, the appeal of neo-liberal preventive strategies lay in the belief that it offered a great deal more promise than the policies that preceded it.

While many of the rationales used to justify the shift towards prevention reflect neo-liberal visions of individualized or locally-based risk management interventions, they were nevertheless intersected by, or took the form of, contingent actualities. As this chapter has demonstrated, the contingent actualities are numerous. It is therefore plausible to purport that rationalities do not operate in isolation or as a top-down force as some governmentality writers, such as Rose (1996a,b) imply. Rather, they operate in concert with contingent actualities in such a way that they often mutually reflect each other. It may also be argued that some actualities, such as political image prior to election periods, may hold more clout in the political decision making arena than the formal rationalities that are thought to translate into technologies. In other words, the catalytic potential of contingent actualities can never be underestimated.

Furthermore, while this chapter demonstrated that neo-liberal rationalities were clearly intersected by contingent actualities, it also presented the seemingly shadowed presence of neo-conservatism. While only one explicit reason for the maintenance of reactive measures was found in documents and speeches on the topic of crime prevention, this apparent omission should not obscure the permanency of conservative mechanisms during this era. Crime control at this time was firmly entrenched. It was the shift away
from this right-wing trend that required legitimation and justification. Therefore, there was less need to justify conservative interventions at this point because despite the emerging neo-liberal discourse and trend, crime prevention remained firmly embedded within the conservative confines of policing during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Nevertheless, there are three main observations to retain at this juncture. First, the rationales that surfaced in the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated the initial and partial emergence of neo-liberal emphases of risk management, cost-effectiveness and inter-agency cooperation. Second, many of the neo-liberal oriented rationales and the contingent actualities were employed in most instances to heighten awareness and to stimulate community participation in a neo-liberal direction. The persuasive overtones of the political rhetoric used in both speech and text serve as a testament to the Canadian federal government’s efforts to promote crime prevention initiatives. Third, the neo-liberal rationales tended to compete against the permanency of neo-conservative technologies. As we will observe in the next chapter, neo-liberal tendencies took a stronger hold within the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s crime prevention agenda in the period between 1983 and mid-1987.
1. Disciplinary era refers to the historical period between the early 19th Century until approximately the mid-20th Century and is characterized by centralized state power and the practices of imprisonment as a means of crime control. As much as a shift from the disciplinary era with an emphasis on ‘deviance-control-order’ to the ‘risk society’ with its emphasis on ‘knowledge-risk-security’ is evident, one must recognize the partiality inherent within this transition.

2. The distinction between national and federal is made here because the federal government departments have been responsible for programming at the community levels, but they had not established a national strategy until 1994. The National Crime Prevention Week, established in 1983, was a national awareness campaign; however, it did not fund actual programs. The point here is that what is accomplished at the federal level in terms of crime prevention is not always national in its reach.

3. Although I did find myself on one occasion in the archives located in the sub-basement of the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s parking garage in search of publications dating back to the 1970s.

4. This workshop in Toronto took place in 1975 between May 21 and 22.

5. Mr. Hofley was speaking on behalf of the Solicitor General, Mr. Warren Allmand.

6. This United Nations Congress was identified as an important catalyst by a Senior Official who had worked with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1973 and 1998.

7. This Senior Official also identified the controversial ‘Quebec Crisis’ as having prompted a need to develop a more positive image of government-based control.

8. The same wording was in the 1978/79 version of the same document on p.15. However, no evidence was provided to support this claim of public demand.

9. While the ‘what to do’ suggestions were plentiful, there were no rationales provided in the pamphlet “Woman Alone,” the latter of which was targeted towards women’s personal security. I cannot begin to speculate on the reasons for this omission and no interviewee could explain it. A contextual note must nevertheless be made in this regard. It was not until 1983 that legislation pertaining to physical violence and sexual assault against women was re-enacted to actually discourage and sanction these forms of victimization rather than to
enable them. For a more complete analysis of these changes, see Maria Los (1994) "The Struggle to Redefine Rape in the Early 1980s" in Julian V. Roberts and Renate M. Mohr (eds.). *Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change*. Toronto: The University of Toronto Press. 20-56.

10. Operation Identification refers to a program that involved the marking of home valuables; Operation Provident involved the marking of business valuables.

11. See chapter three for additional clarification on situational measures.

12. As opposed to individualized ones.

13. The context of the research cited in the National Plan of Action in 1981 must be noted. At this time there was an expanding body of research on crime prevention that originated in the United Kingdom (including that of Oscar Newman, Rutter and Giller and the British Home Office), as well as in the United States. The latter's repertoire included the Kansas City Police Experiment and the Detroit Policing Experiment which demonstrated that preventative methods had reduced crime rates and thereby the size of police forces; it also included Farrington and Wolfgang's longitudinal studies which emphasized the importance of early social and economic investment as a worthy method of crime prevention.

14. This list was extracted directly from the Briefing Note. Pages were not numbered.

15. See chapter 6 for more insight on the nature of this resistance.

16. Or even its corollary, as odd as it appears: "Do the means justify the ends?" The latter may seem more appropriate in the context where prevention serves as a justifications for human rights violations.

17. I am not intending to slip levels of analysis here by comparing rationalities with technologies. However, this claim does reflect an undeniable reality. Neo-liberal rationales were bumping up against the entrenched neo-conservative technologies of crime control. Rationales were needed to justify emerging trends that required convincing both within and outside government departments.
CHAPTER 6

NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION CAMPAIGNS AND LOCAL SAFETY CONCERNS: 1983-1987

The period between 1983 and mid-1987 was marked by the advent of “National Crime Prevention Week,” by a greater emphasis on community safety, as well as by calls for increased responsibility on the part of individuals and extra-state agencies in the advancement of preventative initiatives. In the following pages, I document the rationales that were employed effectively through political rhetoric to advance these mainly neo-liberal features of the crime prevention agenda at the Canadian federal government level during the mid-1980s. In so doing, I not only demonstrate the predominance of neo-liberal rationales at this time, but I also pay heed to the recalcitrant presence of conservative orientations. I further reveal the rationales that convey social welfare interests which began to surface in official rhetoric towards the end of this phase. The persuasive effect of political rhetoric, as well as the intersection and influence of contingent actualities are also discussed.

During the inaugural announcement of Canada’s first ‘National Crime Prevention Week’ in 1983, the Solicitor General reiterated the significance that the positive image of crime prevention brought to his Ministry. In his introduction, he stated that “[i]t’s a particular pleasure for me because unlike most of my work it’s an opportunity to talk about “good news” --what Canadians are doing and can do even more effectively through better co-operation to prevent crime” (Kaplan 1983b:1). This quotation reveals how the
interest in ‘good news’ is equated with the neo-liberal desirability of citizen involvement in crime prevention activities. The national week itself became the means through which the federal government sought to encourage Canadians to participate in community-based crime prevention measures.

It should be noted however, that while the ‘National Crime Prevention Week’ became a major annual event for the Ministry of the Solicitor General for over a decade after its inception, it had been proposed in a rather haphazard way. As the Former Research Officer, who had worked with the Ministry between 1975 and 1984, explained:

... we’re sitting around just like in a group you know, what should we do, and I said, just out of the blue, what about national crime prevention week and they said ya, what about national crime prevention week. ... The idea of it came from me and they said ya this is the kind of thing that would be you know great for this guy Kaplan ... But how to get this going, this is ... for me one of the most intriguing experiences that I had in government and it was how within that room it came along. And then the national crime prevention week just gets going like you know this idea catches hold. I thought of it as kind of a funny thing, I said it almost in a joking sort of way.

This insider’s interpretation reveals two relevant points about rationales in a government setting. First, it seems that the suitability of the Minister’s persona to the national initiative was an important consideration in utilizing this type of campaign. It is interesting to note here that when interviewees commented about the catalytic role of Ministers, they only mentioned the influence of the Liberal ones. Despite the shift to a Conservative government in 1984, not one interviewee commented about the influence of Ministers during the Conservative era between 1984 and 1993. Even when asked about how changes in government affected crime prevention initiatives, instead of commenting
on the effects of political shifts, many interviewees responded that differences were
discernable “when a Minister changed.” Given these responses, it appears that the role of
Ministers, and particularly Liberal ones, was perceived to be significant in shaping crime
prevention policies.

A second point about rationales is revealed in the quotation presented above. It is
intriguing to note that what became one of the primary vehicles through which the
Canadian federal government sought to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance,’ had been
originally conceived serendipitously rather than having been systematically planned. The
way in which this interviewee’s suggestion was made in jest and then taken seriously and
transformed into a national project is worthy of note. This actuality exemplifies that
governmental technologies, either proposed or actual, are not simply extracted from, or
indicative of, abstract rationalities. Rather, they are grounded in complex and sometimes
uncertain political and administrative relations that play such a determining role in their
actualization.

Nevertheless, despite the serendipitous origins of the national campaign week, the
rationales that were constructed around it afterward certainly appeared more deliberate in
their design. The rationales were purposefully devised to demonstrate persuasively the
alleged necessity of the shift towards proactive measures and the desirability of delivering
crime prevention at the community level. The significance of the financial and human
costs of crime, the advantages of individual and local responsibility in the management of
risk, as well as the importance of awareness campaigns became the foreground
considerations that were evident in the persuasive political rhetoric at this time.
ORCHESTRATING AWARENESS

Awareness was among the main reasons explicitly cited for initiating the national week. The promotion was targeted towards internal staff, police personnel, as well as the general public. The campaign messages most often sought to secure acquiescence and to generate involvement. The Minister responsible for bringing about the initiative openly explained: “I see National Crime Prevention Week as an excellent means of increasing awareness” (Kaplan 1983c: 4). The corresponding enthusiasm was conveyed in the following ‘convincing’ words: “I can already say that it is a success; my office has received an impressive number of requests for information, as well as words of congratulation and encouragement” (Kaplan 1983c:4).

This claim to achievement reflects how a government activated awareness campaign in this neo-liberal era tended to be measured more by the volume of information requests than by the effectiveness of crime reduction. It is also a testament to the perceived role that the federal government had assumed vis-à-vis crime prevention at this time. In light of the failures attributed to the previous reactive and correctionalist side of crime control, the measures of success linked to the emerging proactive strategies were seemingly revised; the expectations of achievement appeared to have been reduced. Similar efforts to ‘moderate’ measures of success and to temper aspirations of government interventions are also evident in the later 1990s within the rhetoric promoting the implementation of ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’

The awareness efforts were not limited to promotional rhetoric in ministerial
speeches. A considerable number of pamphlets and manuals, including "The Good Neighbours Crime Prevention Handbook," had been produced to persuade Canadians to become involved in preventative efforts. The second Minister of the Solicitor General to have been involved in promoting the national initiative emphasized that "[t]hese materials are designed to stimulate interest and to promote participation in National Crime Prevention Week and in crime prevention generally" (MacKay 1984:3).

In the same speech, Minister Elmer MacKay further confirmed that the rationale underlying the awareness campaign was not only to activate the public, but also to render it more responsible for its own safeguarding. He specifically stated that

"[t]he purpose in having a national week focussing on the prevention of crime is to bring to public attention the responsibility we all share to take action to protect our families, communities and businesses from crime. We can all participate in finding new ways to encourage respect for the well-being of others and to reduce the conditions that lead to criminal attitudes and violent outbursts in the street or in the home (MacKay 1984:1)."

These efforts to impose obligations on the public are in keeping with the greater emphasis on the so-called 'victim' at this time. Both the civil rights campaign and the women's movements had undoubtedly led to the increased recognition of the plight of 'victims.' Certainly part of the attraction of prevention was that it offered the prospect of helping the potential victim. However, the Canadian federal government's response to this acknowledgement within the context of crime prevention was not so much to guarantee formal protection, but rather to render all citizens more responsible in their capacity as potential victims. As the later section on 'Rationalizing and Re-directing Responsibility' demonstrates, the awareness campaigns were clearly aimed at attributing
a status of ‘victims at-risk’ to the general public.

While the emphasis on public ‘responsibility’ was explicitly evident within the persuasive political rhetoric on crime prevention, it was never negatively ‘enforced’ or forcefully imposed. The federal government’s tactic in this regard was rather to motivate and to encourage participation. The positivity associated with the crime prevention campaign was articulated by John Evans, the Director General of Research and Statistics in the Ministry of the Solicitor General in 1983. He presented the following rationale:

First we have to create awareness, interest and understanding of crime prevention ... Only then are people motivated to change their attitudes and eventually make a commitment. The community is the missing link in crime prevention efforts. But people need encouragement and support. They need good information that shows what has worked and how to develop and maintain good programmes [sic] (Communications Group 1983:24).3

The link between the awareness campaign and the emphasis on responsibility and participation was confirmed more formally in the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s 1985 Planning Guide. It stated that the purpose of ‘National Crime Prevention Week’ was “to increase public awareness and understanding of what community crime prevention is all about” and “[t]o encourage more people to become actively involved in the growing trend of community participation in crime prevention” (Ministry of the Solicitor General 1985b: 1).

This quotation also highlights a shift that had occurred in the mid-1980s. While in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s, the promotion of participation was typically targeted towards individualized risk management strategies, it was becoming evident in the mid-1980s that participation was being directed towards ‘community-based’
measures. The message of safer streets seemed to be more persuasive when it was supplemented by the promotional rhetoric of community; in this sense, collective citizen involvement tended to offer a more palatable element to proactive measures.

While for Rose (1996a:331), this emphasis on ‘community’ signalled the death of the collectivist and universalistic character of the social (Stenson and Watt 1999:189), one must nevertheless acknowledge the sense of solidarity and partnership that is implied within the notion of community during the mid-1980s. While social solidarity may be localized and targeted at this time, it still relies upon a partnership that is conceived, encouraged and funded by a national government.

This promotion of targeted participation at the community level was further reinforced during the 1986 National Crime Prevention Week by the promotional rhetoric of Minister Kelleher. He claimed that

[The Week is intended to focus Canadians’ attention on the benefits of community crime prevention, and during the week, activities across the country will encourage the growing trend to community participation in crime prevention programs ... I urge all Canadians to become partners in preventing crime November 2-8, and all year round (Kelleher 1986:30).]

The presentation of community participation in this instance as a ‘growing trend’ was strategically used as promotional rhetoric in the sense that it gives the public the impression that by joining these ‘community’ efforts, they will be participating in a currently fashionable activity. Furthermore, by presenting all ‘Canadians’ as potential ‘partners’ in crime prevention efforts, the federal government was also creating an enticing scenario for individual citizens and associations. It may thus be argued that the
idea of a becoming a ‘partner’ in a ‘trend’ was used here as a worthwhile reason for citizens to become involved in proactive measures. This example illustrates that, in its awareness efforts and through its strategic use of political rhetoric, the federal government attempts to persuade its audience on two levels. First, the federal government explicitly articulated its rationales for its role in launching an awareness campaign; and second, it also openly ‘suggested’ its interpretation of the reasons that individual citizens and locally-based organizations should become involved. This instance demonstrates the complexity of the persuasive potential of political rhetoric, especially when a government is attempting to secure both acceptance of, and participation in, a particular initiative.

In addition, towards the end of this community-oriented phase between 1983 and 1987, “success” was also employed as a rhetorical tool of promotion and publicity. Whereas, in the late 1970s, one of the main rationales underlying the shift towards prevention was the alleged ‘failure’ of previous control responses, in the mid-1980s, the ‘success’ of emerging practices was presented as part of the reason for intervention and participation. In 1987, Solicitor General James Kelleher articulated this enthusiastic reliance on the perceived success of the national campaign. He stated that “[s]ince National Crime Prevention Week and the awards program began four years ago, community crime prevention programs have spread to all corners of the country, and everyone is reaping the benefits of safer, more secure communities.” The emphasis here on the expansion of, and participation in, prevention programs through awareness tactics is a seemingly powerful way to encourage further involvement. The familiarity with the
alleged success of awareness campaigns is thought to be an incentive in itself.

The awareness campaigns were propelled by rather emotive and expressive visual images as the pictures presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, from the Ministry of the Solicitor General's "1985 Planning Guide" for the National Crime Prevention Week, show. Figure 6.1 was the official image for the 1985 National Crime Prevention Week. The "Partners in Preventing Crime" is a similar logo to the 1978 one on "Working Together To Prevent Crime." While both convey the idea of partnership, the 1985 version was launched with a more interactive image and a more invigorating sub-title than the 1978 image, which was seen in chapter 5 in Figure 5.2. The 1985 image of several individuals walking together conveys a sense of community; it particularly imparts the ideal goal of individuals interacting in a cohesive and peaceful manner. Furthermore, the depiction within the circle of a police officer shaking hands with individuals, seemingly children, portrays the action of partnership. Such a positive and pleasant portrayal of police-citizen relations is seemingly intended to ensure confidence in the potential of a collaborative effort.

Various other features of this image must also be highlighted. For example, within the same circle, the backdrop of both urban and rural scenes gives the impression that the federal government is attempting to be encompassing in its scope by addressing the concerns of individuals in various geographical areas. This sense of collectivity is further conveyed by the inclusion of the silhouette images of families, couples, children, the elderly and adult individuals. Furthermore, the image of the police officer walking amongst them also reinforces the notion of integration and solidarity. It should be noted however, that despite the attempts to be inclusive, there is no representation of racial
diversity among the silhouette images. What remains evident though is the appearance of a group of well dressed, middle class people. Thus, one might surmise that despite the intentions of inclusion and interaction, the image portrays a rather select and exclusive group of individuals that are to be protected through the crime prevention partnership.

Moreover, the slogan on the poster in Figure 6.1 is also a powerful statement obviously designed to marshall support and to activate participation. It reads as follows: “Crime Prevention We’ve got everything to gain!” This motto is optimistic and forward looking. The positivity associated with the slogan reinforces the persuasive effect that this form of rhetoric is intended to have. The enthusiastic emphasis on the potential gain is strategically employed to encourage participation. In its entirety, the poster conveys the idea that participation and partnership will ensure a safe and pleasant environment where people can interact, work, play and live in harmony as individuals and families. In this sense, both rhetoric and visual images work together to impart the viability and desirability of crime prevention.
Figure 6.1
National Crime Prevention Week
1985 Campaign Logo

CRIME PREVENTION

We've got everything to gain!

Partners in Preventing Crime

NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION WEEK • NOV. 3-9, 1985
Similarly, Figure 6.2 presents an ideal and pleasant scene. What could be more ‘crime-free’ than children playing safely and happily while ‘sharing and caring’? The underlying message here is that ‘sharing and caring’ is related to crime prevention. What remains unclear, however, is whether ‘sharing and caring’ constitutes a form of crime prevention or if crime prevention practices lead to the possibility of a favourable and safe environment in which children can play. It is probable that the image is intended to express both the solution and the goal simultaneously. Whatever the logic, the point here is that this image is an expressive one that persuasively appeals to one’s emotive sense of harmony and protection, especially where children are concerned. Furthermore, it must be noted that this picture is a colouring sheet for children; in this light, it represents an effort to convey to children, at their level, the importance of positive social interaction.

While both Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are intended to responsibilize individuals and communities in a neo-liberal manner, they are accomplished through the use of rationales that are conveyed strategically and persuasively through expressive slogans and emotionally-driven visual images. Given the complexity of these figures, it is plausible to assert that they provide another example of the way in which rationalities are not only packaged and sold to the public, but also how they are enhanced by other contingent actualities.
Figure 6.2
National Crime Prevention Week
Colouring Picture for Children
MINIMIZING THE COSTS OF CRIME AND
MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PREVENTION

Since the neo-liberal principle of cost-reduction underlies the crime prevention
trajectory of the late twentieth century, it is understandable that this sustaining rationale
was vigorously and frequently reiterated throughout numerous ministerial speeches and
government texts between 1983 and mid-1987. Different emphases were placed on
various costs associated with crime, victimization and the criminal justice system; these
included primarily financial, human and social losses. Two other rationales intertwined
with this emphasis on costs; the first was the continued recognition of the limitations of
existing criminal justice responses; the second involved the emerging, yet fervent claims
regarding the effectiveness of proactive approaches.

The intermingling of these rationales was confirmed by an interviewee who stated
that

all the concerns about the effectiveness of the justice system, how that,
viewing crime as a social problem that has to be dealt with, wanting to find
the effective ways of dealing with the problem and the argument came to be
made very early that you would rather prevent something from happening
than reacting and fixing it; it was very costly, that kind of language was
being used quite a bit ... so it was effectiveness and costs, bang for the buck
(Former Research Officer with the Ministry of the Solicitor General of
Canada between 1975 and 1984).

In addition to demonstrating the combination of various rationales, this Former
Research Officer further noted the influence that a prominent protagonist had in fostering
the recognition and adoption of the cost-reduction rationale. Irvin Waller, who was both
a researcher and an advocate of crime prevention and victim-oriented programmes, had
lobbied fervently for an increased integration of proactive measures on both federal and national levels. In his promotional efforts in favour of preventative measures, Waller attempted to draw the federal government's attention to the impact of crime on society and the limitations of traditional crime control methods. The Former Research Officer stated that

Waller introduced ... this ... one of the selling things for crime prevention; there was a big cost to criminal justice issue that emerged ... and so this prevention is being sold as something that costs less and citizens can be involved in doing, it doesn't involve paid functionaries (Former Research Officer with the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1975-1984).

Waller's role as a well-known advocate, who had worked both within and outside the civil service, is significant in understanding how the rationales that propelled the shift towards crime prevention forward were not necessarily internally generated through the federal government. Furthermore, while Waller's emphasis on cost-reduction may have been fashionably neo-liberal, his influence points to the actuality that the eventual adoption and use of rationales within government discourse are sometimes the result of an amalgamation of internal contingencies and external pressures.

Whatever the origins of the rationales pertaining to costs and limitations, they certainly abounded within the political rhetoric on prevention during the early and mid-1980s. The following examples demonstrate how rationales are an integral part of the persuasive armoury of political rhetoric. In 1983, the Ministry of the Solicitor General published and distributed "The Good Neighbours Crime Prevention Handbook." This 'how-to' manual cited numerous reasons for engaging in preventative approaches. Prior
to discussing the cost-efficiency rationales presented within this document, a consideration of the image on its front cover provides an important illustration of how goals and rationales are conveyed pictorially.

Similar to the two figures above, Figure 6.3 imparts another ideal scenario in which white middle class individuals, presumably neighbours, are able to conduct their lives in a safe and orderly manner. The desired goal of neighbourhood orderliness is portrayed in the image as a worthy reason for engaging in crime prevention practices. Furthermore, the concept of 'good neighbours' seems to imply that being neighbourly may translate into a reduction in crime. This example sheds further light on our understanding of how both image (the pleasant picture on the front cover) and text (the concept of 'good neighbours') also convey the reasons for intervening and participating in crime prevention activities. In this sense, rationales are presented in the shape of desired goals that are made known through pictures and slogans. The images are almost presented in an 'if, then' scenario. For example, 'if' one desires the peace, cohesion, order and white middle class norms presented in the image, 'then' it is in one's own best interest to participate or become involved in the activities that the picture is representing.
Figure 6.3
Image on the Front Cover of
The Good Neighbours Crime Prevention Handbook
The handbook first makes reference to the alleged increase in criminal justice expenditures. The rationale was explicitly articulated as follows: "Because of the rising costs of providing police protection, it makes sense for everyone to help prevent crime" (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1983: 1). This plea for 'help' appears to be a commonly used theme that is employed to bolster the persuasive effect of the Canadian federal government's rhetoric on prevention.

The justification of increased costs is later linked in the same document to the perceived ineffectiveness of existing measures. This combination of reasons was expressed in the following words:

... crime has grown faster than the police forces we've established to "look after" it. Recent evidence even suggests that no matter how much money is poured into increasing police patrols and investigation, crime rates will not decrease proportionately as a result (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1983:2).

While this handbook did not indicate the source of the evidence that it used to justify proactive measures, the claim nevertheless drew public attention simultaneously to the alleged increase in crime rates and the limited capacity of the police to manage this growth. This document further reinforced the politically persuasive argument of rising crime rates. While it acknowledged a decline in the rate of violent crimes between 1970 and 1980, the text specifically noted that "[p]roperty crimes - break and enter, vandalism, motor-vehicle theft - which make up nearly 50 percent of total crime, have indeed been increasing" (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1983:3).

In addition, this 'how-to' manual later articulated the concern about the costs of
crime by appealing to a sense of nationalism. The text emphasized that “[c]rime is a national issue that places a social and economic burden on everyone” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1983:3). This statement, along with the previous ones that I highlighted from the handbook, strategically presented the burden of the various costs and the limitations of existing measures as affecting ‘everyone.’ By appealing to a collective sense of concern, this rhetoric used rationales not only to justify the necessity of seeking proactive alternatives, but also to insinuate the importance of public participation in that regard. This example represents another instance where political rhetoric is intended strategically to be persuasive in conveying both the significance of a government intervention and the need for participation in the initiatives.

Furthermore, the emphasis on the costs of crime and the limitations of existing control measures within text-based rhetoric was often re-echoed orally in the form of ministerial speeches. For example, Minister Kaplan (1983:1) claimed that

Surveys have indicated that crime is one of the social issues that Canadians are most concerned about and quite rightly so. Crime affects the quality of life in many ways – not only directly through financial loss and personal injury but also by destroying the vitality of our neighbourhoods and by disrupting our peace of mind.

While the origin of the surveys was not identified in the speech, reference to such research findings nevertheless lends clout to the claim that they are making. Moreover, the mention of the economic and human costs of crime undoubtedly appeals to the emotionally driven concerns that impact on citizens at both individual and collective levels.
The way in which emotional pleas are sometimes framed as rationales is also evident in Minister James Kelleher’s remarks in 1987. Claiming that property crime was a serious problem, Kelleher (1987:2) argued that “it affects the most those who are vulnerable in our society, the elderly and those without the social and financial resources to compensate for their losses.” He further contended that “... much sexual assault and domestic violence remains hidden and women, children and the elderly are too often left to cope, on their own, with the consequences of these crimes” (Kelleher 1987:2). Not only do these quotations reflect how the costs and consequences of crime are articulated as rationales, but they also demonstrate how the desired effect of the rationales may be heightened when emotionally taxing concerns, such as the plight of more vulnerable populations, are embedded within them. In making this claim, I am not questioning the sincerity of the rationales; I am merely illustrating Garland’s (1999), as well as Stenson and Watt’s (1999) contention that not all rationalities originate in systematic knowledge; rather, as this example shows, many are located within, or complemented by, emotionally-driven currents.

Moreover, the limited capacity of traditional responses of crime control was also acknowledged in oral discourses. Consider the following:

We do have a good criminal justice system in Canada and it is an effective one. However, we know that conventional approaches to policing and corrections have advanced about as far as they can go and we do know that building more jails, expanding the courts and hiring more police officers will not make it any more effective. We therefore need to add a new dimension to our system which directly involves the public acting out of a sense of community (Kaplan 1983d:4).
Kaplan’s initial contention that the Canadian criminal justice system is ‘good’ and ‘effective’ may appear to contradict his subsequent claim about the need to look beyond reactive approaches. However, this statement in its entirety reflects the combination of neo-conservative and neo-liberal rationalities that simultaneously reinforced the crime prevention agenda in the mid-1980s. The first sentence explicitly conveys the permanence of the punitive and reactive responses associated with neo-conservatism. It further implies the intentions on the part of the federal government to maintain this form of crime control despite the known limitations. The remainder of the quotation however, reflects the emerging neo-liberal emphasis on community-based citizen activism that was being invoked to compensate for the limitations of neo-conservative measures.

This aforementioned preoccupation with costs and limitations was reiterated in a more optimistic way in the following statement by Minister Kaplan: “Community crime prevention is becoming an increasingly effective and inexpensive part of our repertoire of crime control techniques” (Kaplan 1983a:3). In addition to being a concisely articulated utilitarian sentence, this particular pronouncement is distinct from other claims in that it draws attention to the positive promises of prevention rather than to the negativity linked with past failures. This instance is in keeping with Paine’s (1981:121) view that political rhetoric is replete with sundry promises of future action. This latter part of the statement also points to an important reality; it reminds the audience that neo-liberal forms of community crime prevention constitute only a part of a larger repertoire of crime control techniques, which are predominantly neo-conservative in origin.

Four years later in 1987, a similar emphasis was placed on the limitations of
traditional control practices in a speech made by the Solicitor General at the time. At the National Workshop on Crime Prevention through Social Development, which was held in Hull, Québec, Minister James Kelleher reinforced that "... we must all recognize that, while existing strategies of crime prevention, crime control and corrections may have contained crime, they have not reduced it" (Kelleher 1987:2). This same rationale had been used twelve years earlier in a ministerial speech at the national workshop in 1975. It was invoked then to promote target hardening measures. In the early 1980s, it was called upon numerous times to rationalize the inception of community-oriented approaches.

In 1987 however, the 'failure' of the criminal justice system was reiterated as a rationale neither in a neo-conservative context nor in an exclusively neo-liberal vein. Rather, it was raised in a climate where socially-oriented approaches were being recognized within federal government circles as a worthy component of preventative pursuits. This brief overview demonstrates how one particular rationale forms an undercurrent and in so doing, serves to justify a variety of state-generated interventions and citizen-based activities. As chapters seven and eight demonstrate, this same justification also resurfaces frequently in the last decade of the twentieth century.

This brief overview demonstrated how the costs of crime and the limitations of criminal justice were framed as reasons for the shift towards preventative initiatives. While many text-based and orally-based statements reflected the emerging neo-liberal preoccupations in this regard, others illustrated how the latter are intersected by neo-conservative and emotionally-driven currents. In addition, while some of these rationales were invoked to explain the reasons underlying the involvement of the federal
government, others were called upon to promote citizen participation in prevention activities. The next section explores more closely how the notion of responsibility is presented as a significant reason for both state and extra-state interventions in the name of crime prevention.

RATIONALIZING AND RE-DIRECTING RESPONSIBILITY

In this section, I introduce the rationales that explicitly pertained to both government and public responsibility in the area of crime prevention between 1983 and 1987. As will become evident, some text-based and orally-based discourses reveal the rationales that the Canadian federal government presented as pertinent to its own intervention in this area. By contrast, other publications and speeches point to the reasons that the federal government had put forth to justify public involvement; these reasons were most often explicitly included in promotional rhetoric that was designed to instill a sense of responsibility on the part of citizens and community groups. While the nature of the Canadian federal government’s attempts to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance’ is not presented in great detail, some of the rationales and the persuasive rhetoric put forth to advance this neo-liberal version of governance and responsibility are discussed here.

The majority of the reasons that were put forth to explicate the necessity of federal government involvement were documented in internal ministerial texts. One such rationale surfaced in a Briefing Note to the Solicitor General on June 14, 1984. The note suggested that one of the reasons for increasing support for crime prevention on the part
of the government was "[t]o respond to increasing public concern and fear of crime and to develop more cost-effective means of controlling and reducing crime." Although this rationale was documented for internal use within the Ministry of the Solicitor General, it is clear from its content that the federal government's decision to govern in a more proactive way was influenced by both external and emotive factors.

A more elaborate briefing note presented to the Solicitor General of Canada in June 1985 listed numerous reasons that supported the increased involvement on the part of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada. This briefing note entitled "Crime Prevention Initiative," enumerated the following rationales:

1.1 The purpose of the Ministry Secretariat Crime Prevention Initiative is to reduce crime and the social and economic costs of crime in Canadian society.

1.2 The Ministry's reasons for involvement in crime prevention include:

i) the reduction of crime requires shared responsibility and coordinated action among all orders of government and sectors of Canadian society;

ii) the Ministry's ability to develop national perspectives and information upon which to base national policies;

iii) the Ministry's ability to coordinate the dissemination of information to ensure that what is learned through research and experience is made available for modification and application nationally and internationally;

iv) the need to control rising rates of incarceration and criminal justice expenditures; - Ministry responsibility for policing, corrections and national security constitute 90% of federal government spending and 30% of total criminal justice expenditures in Canada;

v) the Ministry Secretariat's ability to support crime prevention program development, dissemination of information and collaboration through -research, demonstration and evaluation - to support development of innovative crime prevention policies and programs
consultation and information - to support planning, coordination and implementation of crime prevention strategies and programs
promotion and recognition - to encourage involvement in crime prevention by individuals and organizations (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1985c:1-2).

This list of reasons and purposes reflects a combination of several interrelated rationales. The neo-liberal preoccupation with crime reduction and the minimization of costs is clearly presented at the outset in article 1.1. In addition, the first reason outlined in section 1.2 also identifies the prominent neo-liberal element of 'responsibility.' However, the remainder of the reasons listed pertain to the Ministry's ability to undertake and to coordinate crime prevention programs at the federal level and on a national basis.

This list certainly seems to be promoting the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada's willingness and ability to undertake crime prevention initiatives. However, it also illustrates how the neo-liberal emphases of responsibility and cost-efficiency are contingent upon a government department's capacity to support, facilitate and implement such objectives. It should be noted that amidst the fanfare linked to the neo-liberal underscoring of governing 'at-a-distance' in the early and mid-1980s, this list represents one of the few instances where the federal government actually acknowledges the reasons for its own role in the area of crime prevention. The next sections present the Canadian government's numerous attempts to convey the reasons why the extra-state sector should participate in proactive approaches.

In contrast to the relatively few examples of the federal government's introspectively generated rationales, the rationales designed to 'responsibilize' the public
certainly abounded, particularly in oral discourses. One of the first occasions where
government officials revealed their intentions with respect to citizen obligation occurred
during the inaugural announcement for National Crime Prevention Week in 1983. Sheila
Arthurs, the Planning and Liaison Coordinator of the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s
Programs Branch at the time, explained that

> We want to start erasing the image of crime prevention as dangerous work
or someone else’s job. We want to encourage people to take responsibility,
but not lose faith in society’s institutions - there’s a fine line between citizen
responsibility and a vigilante attitude (Communications Group 1983:19).

While this pronouncement introduced the neo-liberal element of responsibility, it
did so cautiously by reinforcing the continued importance of existing formal institutions,
presumably those of neo-conservative lineage; in this case, the latter would constitute the
role of the police. Nevertheless, despite this apparent effort not to dismiss the role of
existing reactive mechanisms in their entirety, government officials were far from reticent
in their quest to instill a sense of responsibility on the part of the public.

Some even claimed that the public itself sought this increased level of obligation.
The Minister himself asserted that “[t]he people I have met with - who have asked to
meet me - are ready to take on more responsibility for the prevention of crime and the
amelioration of suffering - if they are shown the way” (Kaplan 1983e:4). While it is
impossible to verify the authenticity of this claim, one must nevertheless acknowledge
that it instantiates the strategic use of a rather cogent rationale. This alleged desire on the
part of the public to assume greater responsibility further affirms the federal
government’s role as a guide that is ‘to show’ the alleged duty-seekers ‘the way.’
should also be noted that this statement represents a rather strategic instance whereby ‘politics’ is personalized in an effort to render the rhetoric more persuasive and credible (Paine 1981:121-122).

In addition to individual accountability, greater importance was placed on increasing collective responsibility. This emphasis was justified on one occasion based on experience that had been gained within the Ministry of the Solicitor General itself. As Kaplan (1983f:1) explained:

National Crime Prevention Week developed from an interest in my Ministry to review our crime prevention efforts. During this review, we became aware of the extent to which we had neglected, and been neglected by, those outside of the criminal justice system. We became aware of the extent to which we, within the criminal justice system, had been given and had taken the majority of the responsibility for crime prevention. This is especially the case as far as the police are concerned. They, most of all, have been the main initiators and stimulators of crime prevention in Canada. It became evident ... that we needed to invite and indeed urge others to join with us in the prevention of crime; to participate in improving the quality of Canadian life.

This contention demonstrates how rationales sometimes emerge out of lessons learned from internally organized reassessments and that they are not necessarily strictly plotted; or at least the source of this rationale was conveyed in this particular way at the level of rhetoric. A similar rationale that justified the shift in the responsibility of prevention into public spaces resurfaced a year later in a written briefing note. It stated that

[While the RCMP and other police services across the country have carried responsibility for planning and organizing crime prevention strategies and programs, experimentation has shown that the success of these programs requires that the “community” share responsibility with the police (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1984: 1).]
Furthermore, the Canadian federal government's efforts to encourage the public to assume greater responsibility in the prevention of crime were not limited to structured lists in internal documents or polished ministerial speeches. Some of the most compelling neo-liberal rationales were embedded within various alluring slogans and catch-phrases which were often found in publications destined for public consumption. Consider the following expressions:

- "So be good to yourself - get involved!"  
  (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1985d:3)

- "Crime prevention is everyone's business"  
  (Communications Group, 1985:10)

- "Crime Prevention is ... Good Neighbours"  
  (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1985d)

- "Crime affects us all, and it is costly. Help make your home, community, school and workplace a safer place to be by joining the partnership ..."  
  (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1985b:1)

Common to each of these slogans is an implied or explicit neo-liberal expectation of active participation. While they are similar in their promotion of responsibility, they differ slightly in their emphasis on it. The first slogan, "So be good to yourself - get involved!," encourages participation by appealing to a sense of responsibility to the self. The second, "Crime prevention is everyone’s business," justifies engagement by invoking a sense of accountability on a collective or societal level.

The third slogan, "Crime Prevention is ... Good Neighbours," equates the success of proactive measures with effective community cohesion and implores responsibility
towards those with whom one is in close proximity. The fourth slogan emotively appeals for citizen involvement by reminding its audience of the costs and consequences of crime. It subsequently itemizes one's responsibility to specific spatial locations. As these four examples demonstrate, government generated rhetoric has sought to instill a sense of responsibility for prevention on both individual and collective levels. These slogans do so by appealing to individuals' emotional ties or to their sense of moral responsibility. In this sense, slogans must be considered a consequential part of the repertoire of Canadian federal government's rhetoric on crime prevention.

Whatever the specific nature of the responsibility that is implied, it seems that accountability is thought to be manifested through active participation. Moreover, according to the wording of the foregoing slogans, it appears that this public involvement is deemed to be secured more effectively by government awareness campaigns that are fortified by explicit rhetorics and reminders of responsibility in this regard. In this sense, appeals to responsibility become an integral component in the relation between government dispensed 'advice' on prevention and the public's involvement in it.

This brief overview of the strategic use of the notion of responsibility within the promotional rhetoric on crime prevention points to a recognition of a joint responsibility between state and extra-state sectors. While very few internal documents explicated the self-professed reasons for government involvement in crime prevention, there existed a greater number of rationales aimed at rendering the public more responsible for, and active in, prevention programs. The majority of these rationales reflected neo-liberal principles of government efforts designed to activate preventative initiatives through a
host of responsible individuals and agencies within civil society.

The foregoing discussion of the centrality of rationales of responsibility within government rhetoric has revealed a strong neo-liberal influence on prevention projects at the Ministry of the Solicitor General during the mid-1980s. The next section, however, brings to light the rationales aimed at advancing the social welfare oriented proactive measures that were emerging at the same time.

"THE SOCIAL" IN THE SHADOWS

While many governmentality writers have contended that 'the social' was being challenged and displaced during the 1980s (O'Malley 1999a), I suggest that it is precisely at this time that 'the social' was 're-discovered' in the context of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level. While the complexity that characterized this advancement is discussed in greater detail in chapters eight and nine, the following paragraphs present the rationales that propelled the 'social' versions of crime prevention forward within the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Prior to doing so, a note of clarification on what constitutes 'the social' is required.

According to governmentality writers, governing 'from the point of view of the social' was seen as an attempt to foster social solidarity and collective responsibilities at a national level (Rose 1996a:333; Stenson and Watt 1999:190). However, as Rose (1996a:330-331; 2000:333) has argued, the nationalized and universalized notions of social solidarity have given way to 'the community' as a new space for individual and collective regulation. According to Rose (1996a), this greater emphasis on governing
crime and its prevention through ‘community’ constitutes a major characteristic of the post-social era. As previous paragraphs have demonstrated, this shift towards community-based interventions is evident in many important respects in the case of federally-directed crime prevention initiatives in Canada during the early to mid-1980s.

However, other research data have pointed to the emergence of ‘social’ considerations, at least at the level of political rhetoric. There seems to have been an emerging recognition at this time among politicians and policy-makers of the influence of broader socio-economic conditions on crime and victimization. The major government players were beginning to acknowledge the need for intervention at a broader ‘social’ level. Thus, despite the salience of community-based crime prevention initiatives during the early to mid-1980s, a parallel rhetoric on ‘social’ interventions was also surfacing simultaneously. One must nevertheless bear in mind that what is discussed below is an understanding of ‘the social’ as it was conveyed through interviews and in federal government documents. In the following paragraphs and in subsequent chapters, the complex and ambivalent way in which the prefix ‘social’ is utilized both at the level of Canadian government rhetoric and in governmentality writings will become apparent.

Evidence of ‘social’ forms of governing surfaced within Canadian federal government discourse on crime prevention in the mid-1980s. This emergence was manifested through a number of speeches and events that took place primarily between 1985 and 1987 within the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Nevertheless, the first signs of the receptiveness to social explanations and social solutions were evident in the following words of Minister Elmer MacKay during the 1984 National Crime Prevention
Week:

Studies of the personal histories of inmates in federal penitentiaries show that persistent and violent offenders often began their criminal careers at a very young age. The cost in human and economic terms of these wasted lives is very great and requires a concerted effort to strengthen the social, economic and personal conditions in which we all live. It is in this sense that we understand crime prevention as contributing to the quality of life of all Canadians. Clearly there is a need to involve individuals and groups who have not previously been involved in crime prevention (MacKay 1984:2).

Despite the predominance of social welfare government regimes until the late twentieth century in many western democratic nations, the integration of ‘the social’ into discourses of crime prevention was rather novel and transformative for this proposed form of regulation at the Canadian federal government level. While in the minister’s statement the multiple costs of crime remain a prime rationale, they are invoked here to draw attention to social conditions and social solutions rather than to situational ones (O’Malley 1999a:94; 2000:161). Furthermore, while the plea for the involvement of extra-state sectors in prevention initiatives appears to constitute a neo-liberal responsibilization ploy, it is nevertheless one that implies the contributions of social work and social service spheres rather than the exclusive reliance on individualized or privatized risk management tactics (O’Malley 1999a:94; 2000:161).

Another indication of the Canadian federal government’s embracing of ‘social’ orientations was found in changes in emphasis of the problems that were to be addressed through preventative approaches. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the focus of preventative efforts was largely on property offences such as, break and enter, theft, and shoplifting; these offences were thought to be prevented through target hardening and
opportunity reduction measures. However, in the mid-1980s there was evidence of an increased recognition of social welfare concerns. For example, as noted in a memorandum from the Director of the Research Division in July 1986, there was a heightened acknowledgment of socio-economic factors, such as unemployment, neighbourhood degeneration and family instability; these conditions were considered to be contributors to crime problems (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1986b:17; O’Malley 2000:161).

While the reconstitution of crime prevention as a form of social engineering was being officially acknowledged both in internally-based oral communications and in written texts, this shift did not appear to originate from within the Ministry of the Solicitor General. According to a Research Official with the Consultation Centre at the Ministry in the mid-1980s, “the pressure came from outside.” Many of the rationales for social welfare oriented crime prevention initiatives originated from extra-state agencies, such as the Canadian Council on Social Development, as well as individual advocates, namely Irvin Waller and Richard Weiler.⁶

In addition, the momentum had been built from conferences in Canada, as well as from the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1985). The adoption of resolutions dealing with crime prevention and victims further reinforced the recognition of broader and more progressive alternatives (Ministry of the Solicitor General 1986c:5). In this sense, many of the rationales were generated as contingent actualities through consultation processes on international, national and local levels.⁷
An example of a recommendation born out of a national consultation meeting is found in the following: there was “agreement that more resources should be allocated to crime prevention through social development ... focus on target hardening and opportunity reduction should be reduced” (Picard 1985:41). This endorsement of social-oriented approaches was presented at a “Crime Prevention Initiative Planning Workshop” that was sponsored by the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada’s Programs Branch in November 1985. The workshop had drawn upon the expertise of delegates from both state and extra-state sectors for the purpose of debating the future of crime prevention in Canada. The fact that the delegates had recommended a broader welfare-oriented level of intervention in an allegedly saturated neo-liberal era indicates a fragmented acceptance of individualized and privatized crime prevention measures.

Additionally, the emergence of social considerations in crime prevention rhetoric was exemplified in a speech by Solicitor General James Kelleher at the 1987 National Workshop on Crime Prevention through Social Development. He acknowledged that “... a law enforcement approach alone will never solve the problem because it leaves untouched the social, economic and cultural influences that produce criminal behaviour” (Kelleher 1987:5). The limitations of law enforcement certainly do not constitute a new rationale for the reorientation towards crime prevention. However, the way in which they are employed in this statement to demonstrate the failure to address social and economic influences of crime is definitely unprecedented. This example also illustrates the way in which political rhetoric resonates with emerging changes within both state and extra-state spheres.
Moreover, this emphasis on social factors was reinforced in the same speech by the mention of David Farrington's research findings that pointed to the imperativeness of early identification and early social intervention into the lives of children at-risk (Kelleher 1987:7). Farrington's study, as well as Richard Tremblay's longitudinal research work out of the University of Montreal were subsequently cited in the April issue of Liaison that same year (Communications Group 1987:18-19). The reliance on these research findings undoubtedly lent credence to the rationales put forth by government officials and extra-state advocates in their expressed interest to re-orient the prevention trajectory in a more social direction that allegedly encompassed universal provisions of daycare, employment programs and other comprehensive interventions aimed at addressing broader political, social, cultural and economic inequalities and injustices (O'Malley 1999a:94).

RESISTANCE TO "THE SOCIAL"

While an obvious momentum was building towards 'social' forms of preventative governance in the mid-1980s, it was an impulse that had been met with resistance. Although crime prevention through social development was thought by some to offer a great deal more promise than the punitive and risk-based policies that had preceded it, it was an alternative vision that was greeted with a great deal of scepticism, particularly from within the Ministry of the Solicitor General itself.

A Research Official with the Consultation Centre who had worked within the Ministry in the mid-1980s claimed that “it was pretty hard to argue against. It was like
arguing against motherhood really.” Yet, another interviewee remembered a different scenario. According to a Former Research Officer who had worked within the Ministry between 1975 and 1984, socially-oriented crime prevention was initially resisted in the late 1970s and early 1980s; he claimed that other colleagues “were much more sceptical towards that softer approach to crime prevention ... there was sort of this disdainful attitude towards this stuff ... throwing dollars at social problems was one of the disparaging phrases ... being used.” He further noted that

... there’s some concern with not being so expansive in their outreach and being more tied into operations, saying you’ve gone way beyond your role, some people were saying ... the idea was that the police are the front door of the justice system and we have gone out that front door ... and crime prevention was really, and victims too, were the vehicles by which they went out that front door. And moved beyond preventive policing to everything under the sun.

This interviewee’s comments suggest that while ‘the social’ may have been discovered within crime prevention spheres in the late twentieth century, it was received within rather hesitant and restrictive parameters.

Additional indirect resistance to a full-fledged social crime prevention project came in the form of a statement in a memorandum at the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada in 1986. The message explicitly advocated the maintenance of conservative forms of control as viable and effective crime prevention approaches. The memorandum specifically explained that

... the Ministry views corrections as a form of crime prevention, not solely through removal of the offender from society, but in the provision of programs to change prisoners’ attitudes and opportunities to reintegrate successfully into that society, thus preventing crimes these prisoners might otherwise commit (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1986b:ii).
The belief that the containment and rehabilitation of prisoners during their period of incarceration is an effective form of crime prevention reverts to the punitive rationality whereby prevention was viewed as an end and imprisonment was thought to be the means through which the end was to be achieved. The inclusion of this advocacy position on corrections further reinforces the permanence of conservative and reactive versions of prevention. By extension, it illustrates how ‘proactive’ preventative efforts may be moderated amidst continued pleas for punishment. It also reveals how crime prevention remains a site at which various rationalities and technologies vie for space in government discourse and practice.

The promotional rhetoric marking the emergence of ‘the social’ during the mid-1980s reveals a great deal about rationales and prevention within a government setting. First, this review demonstrated how the combination of formal rationalities and contingent actualities may simultaneously advance and impede policy options. Both the optimism and the resistance to social welfare oriented prevention measures illustrate the lack of coherence among rationales that are put forth even within one government department. Given the initial resistance to social approaches, it appeared that the rationales put forth in ministerial speeches were directed as much towards internal officials and agencies as they were aimed externally at a public audience. In this sense, the political rhetoric employed to promote this alternative vision was targeted at multiple audiences.

Second, with respect to crime prevention in the mid-1980s, the emergence of the social meant an apparent expansion; the aim was to encompass social explanations and
social solutions in the crime prevention equation. However, this alleged enhancement was located within an entrenched conservative institutional framework that was still adapting to a relatively nascent neo-liberal risk management project. While the political parameters inhibiting a social welfarist version of crime prevention were obvious, a myriad of rhetorics and rationales of ‘the social’ nevertheless became integral components of the campaign that led to a national crime prevention policy in the 1990s. In other words, social visions constituted the main impetus upon which crime prevention was to be set on a national stage. The nature of this transition is explicated in chapters seven, eight and nine.

1983 - 1987 IN REVIEW

This temporal phase was characterized by a continued accentuation of the neo-liberal individualized risk management approaches that had developed in the late 1970s. While in the phase between 1974 and 1982, we observed an intersection between conservative and neo-liberal rationales, in the period between 1983 and 1987, this continued overlap partially evolved through an emersion of social welfare considerations.

The review of the rationales in this chapter indicates that the federal government’s reasons for promoting a neo-liberal prevention project at this time primarily encompassed the need to stimulate interest, to promote awareness of proactive approaches and to activate the participation of a ‘responsible’ public. Compared to the late 1970s however, greater emphasis was placed on the significance of collective responsibility rather than simply on individualized prudence. The reasons for this persuasive promotion were
based on the newly discovered effectiveness of community participation at minimal financial cost. Given this contention, it is not surprising that the 'convincing' rhetoric of cost-reduction and the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system resurfaced during the mid-1980s in the form of compelling rationales that further sustained the propensity towards proactive approaches at the federal government level.

Such rationales were simultaneously advanced within the rhetoric by various contingent actualities. Some of these included the desire for the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Minister himself to concentrate on 'good news' projects. The neo-liberal rationales were further reinforced by the alleged success of existing awareness campaigns and community-based efforts, as well as by the influential advocacy efforts of prominent crime prevention proponents both from inside and outside the Ministry of the Solicitor General. The Ministry's self-identified ability and willingness to coordinate and deliver preventative measures were equally significant; this rationale seemed to demonstrate a need on the part of this traditionally reactive government ministry to secure its role in the proactive trend.

The greater emphasis on community responsibility and its corresponding efforts became a significant part of neo-liberal rhetoric on prevention during this era. The optimistic discourse that was utilized especially during National Crime Prevention Week campaigns carried forth multiple preferences and hopes. The impression conveyed in many of the documents and speeches, and which was indicative of much of the rhetoric on crime prevention, was that community participation and partnerships could reduce crime and the fear of the latter, and it could by extension increase community safety. In
this sense, the faith in crime prevention was enhanced by the promotion of potential results and heightened expectations. This optimism was so convincingly conveyed in the prevention rhetoric that it was seemingly accepted as fact.

The modest emergence of social orientations during the latter part of this 1983-1987 phase indicated that the governance of crime was becoming problematized in yet another way partly in reaction to the greater emphasis on social cohesion, longitudinal research studies and external pressure from social welfare advocates. While the governmentality authors have claimed that individual exercises of prudence and responsibility were replacing social services during this era, and while this is evident to a certain extent in the late 1970s and early 1980s in crime prevention at the federal level, 'the social' emerged in the mid-1980s as a potentially viable space through which to explain and address crime. Therefore, rather than observing the death or decline of the social at this time, we may actually observe its discovery and penetration onto the terrain of crime prevention, and especially at the level of rhetoric.

As mentioned above, the cost-reduction argument and the inadequacy of law enforcement and criminal justice responses which had been previously employed to justify neo-liberal approaches, were re-invoked at this later stage to advance more social versions of crime prevention. However, as the above overview briefly demonstrated, the promotion of 'the social' within the Canadian federal government rhetoric of crime prevention at this time was inevitably entwined with trenchant conservative and emerging neo-conservative claims of the value of policing and corrections in the context of prevention. It is further intersected by the ascending neo-liberal assertions of the
importance of both individual and collective responsibility within the crime prevention trajectory. This occurrence is perhaps more appropriately described as ‘neo-social’ prevention rather than exclusively ‘social.’ The complexity of ‘neo-social’ versions of prevention are discussed in further detail in the two subsequent chapters.

THE DEPARTMENTAL RE-LOCATION OF CRIME PREVENTION

Prior to moving into the next chapter and the next phase of the crime prevention trajectory at the federal government level, an important bureaucratic modification must be noted. Notwithstanding the momentum that crime prevention was enjoying in certain circles both inside and outside the Ministry of the Solicitor General during the mid-1980s, it was uprooted from its bureaucratic dwelling and transferred, along with other policy initiatives, to the Department of Justice midway through 1987. The transfer was a result of the Nielsen Task Force under the Conservative leadership that sought to revamp and streamline federal departments. This re-assignment was confirmed in the following official announcement:

Under an agreement between Justice Minister Ray Hnatyshyn and Solicitor General James Kelleher, Justice will be responsible for overall leadership for the policy areas of young offenders, victims of crime, crime prevention, women and natives in the criminal justice system, and international criminal justice (Government of Canada 1987:1).

As a result of this departmental re-location, crime prevention was now having to survive and to be reconstituted among difficult labour disputes and organizational changes. Many employees of the Ministry of the Solicitor General had feared that this transfer would significantly alter and possibly halt the ‘neo-social’ direction that crime
prevention was just starting to take on. This concern was expressed by the former Research Official who had worked in the Consultation Centre at the Ministry of the Solicitor General during the mid-1980s. This interviewee explained that “SolGen would be sort of kindred spirits to the idea of social development; the folks who worked there weren’t lawyers I mean they weren’t looking at it through the lens of legalism and it was seen as you know that’s do-gooder stuff, that’s social work stuff, not real justice stuff.”

As noted in this quotation, the concern was over the potential loss of the social welfare emphasis; many crime prevention advocates had worried that the legal focus of the Department of Justice would not be receptive to the ‘do gooder’ or ‘social work stuff’ that crime prevention had started to encompass in the mid to late 1980s. The next chapter reveals how the departmental re-location of crime prevention did affect its momentum and direction.
ENDNOTES

1. See chapters seven and eight for greater detail on the national strategy.

2. The contents of the handbook are discussed below.

3. The error in the last word was in the original text.


5. This list is extracted directly from pages 1 and 2 of this briefing note. It should also be noted that the reasons listed under this briefing note were also found in a Draft Strategic Plan dated May 1985 and entitled: The Crime Prevention Initiative (Solicitor General of Canada). It was located within Secretariat File # 1142-P5 / Volume 1: Under article 2 on page 2). It was also found in the 1986/1987 Draft Strategic Plan Crime Prevention Initiative which was dated February 20, 1986 on page 1.

6. The late Richard Weiler worked with the Canadian Council on Social Development. He and Waller had worked together on research and policy papers. Their lobbying efforts attempted to direct the federal government’s attention towards social development as a viable and desirable crime prevention endeavour. Weiler was well known in both governmental and non-governmental circles as a children’s safety advocate.

7. See Stephen Krasner (1983) on the role of international norms, organizations and ideas on policy formation.

8. David Farrington conducted a twenty-five year study on boys in London. His work supports the early identification of children who are likely to behave in antisocial ways; it suggests strategies to limit the development of delinquency. A similar Canadian study was conducted by Naomi Rae Grant at McMaster Hospital in Hamilton.

9. Richard Tremblay’s research conducted out of the University of Montreal emphasized early intervention programmes aimed at adolescent girls for the purpose of avoiding teenage pregnancy.

10. Here, prevention through corrections was thought to be accomplished by incapacitation (p.13), rehabilitation (p.14), therapy programs for families of parolees to address ‘risk’ factors (p.15), and programs for sexual offenders (p.16).
CHAPTER 7

THE RISE OF CRIME PREVENTION

This chapter presents the rationales that propelled ‘crime prevention’ forward within its new location at the Department of Justice Canada between 1987 and mid-1994. Particular regard is given to the justifications that were put forth toward the establishment of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention” which occurred in 1994. These years were characterized as a transitional phase whereby crime prevention was settling into its new bureaucratic dwelling under the Conservative leadership. This period was also marked by significant rhetoric and activity aimed at the development of a national council and strategy on crime prevention.

In addition, by illuminating the intersection among various rationalities, this chapter illustrates how Canadian federally-directed crime prevention initiatives are a site at which the forecasts about the ascendance of neo-liberalism within the governmentality literature can be reassessed (O’Malley 2000). More specifically, this chapter demonstrates how neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social tendencies are presented in government rhetoric as mutually reinforcing, rather than as distinct and contrasting orientations. This is accomplished by drawing attention to the combination of formal rationalities and contingent actualities that have advanced crime prevention on both federal and national terrains.

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Between April 1987 and June 1994, crime prevention was promoted through a variegated combination of persuasive rationales and strategic options as it was channelled through a series of consultations, committees and conferences. In addition to raising the profile of prevention within its new domain at the federal Department of Justice, these exchanges also seemed to maintain the momentum of the social development approach that had been building previously at the Ministry of the Solicitor General. However, it should be noted that, in its early years at the Department of Justice, prevention was frequently conceived in legal terms.

The initial legal emphasis was expressed in the following excerpt from a speech by the then Minister of Justice Doug Lewis (1989:6):

In terms of legislation, the Department has in many respects taken a pro-active approach in order to ensure that the goals of the justice system are better met. For example, the Criminal Code was recently amended in order to provide greater protection to children and young people from abusive or exploitative sexual acts ... There are other Department of Justice initiatives in the crime prevention area. We have moved ... to implement victims of crime legislation, impaired driving laws, firearms control, amendments to the Young Offenders Act, changes with respect to homicide law, and arson and sentencing reform.

In the same speech, Minister Lewis (1989:8) further confirmed that "legislation is obviously an integral part of the federal government’s effort to prevent crime." This ministerial address demonstrates how legislation was presented in political rhetoric as an important preventative measure. It further reinforced the permanence of neo-conservative versions of prevention. This legalistic orientation, while not surprising, was nevertheless
perceived by some as an obstacle to a more social and proactive project. This frustration was expressed by a Policy Analyst who had worked with the Department of Justice in the late 1980s and early 1990s. She explained that:

In the 80s, it was really hard to convince people about the benefit of crime prevention because you were convincing the bureaucracy of Justice which are lawyers which aren’t trained to think in a social manner. So it took a lot of effort from the international U.N. work and the U.S. to prove to them that if we were going along the same way then we were missing the boat ... we had a strong evaluation from the U.S. and showed that crime prevention through social development worked.

This interviewee’s interpretation indicates that despite the explicit links made to neo-conservative orientations, other influences ensured that the scope of prevention remained more encompassing, and particularly open to social modes of regulation. One such pressure came from the very Ministry that had once housed prevention policies. It should be noted here that although the major responsibility for crime prevention had been transferred to the Department of Justice, the Ministry of the Solicitor General maintained the coordinating responsibilities for the National Crime Prevention Week.

The now ‘marginal’ voices from the Ministry of the Solicitor General continued to echo the importance of social welfare measures. One example of this emphasis was found in a speech by Solicitor General Pierre Blais in 1989 during the National Crime Prevention Week Awards Ceremony. In addition to re-iterating the need to lessen the social and financial costs of crime, Minister Blais (1989:4) explained that “[t]he investment in youth ... is key in crime prevention efforts. We must ensure that the needs of our youth are met - from recreational and leisure activities to long-term opportunities
for education and employment.” This statement, especially the emphasis on education and employment, reflects the partially ‘social’ scope that crime prevention was thought to entail, at least according to other government sectors. This quotation represents another example of the way in which political rhetoric includes personalized issues, such as ‘needs,’ in order to enhance its persuasive effect (Paine 1981:121).

Other influences were also coming to bear on crime prevention and the majority of them were from outside the federal government. In fact, many international and locally-based individuals and organizations were advocating greater federal government involvement in crime prevention through social development at this time. This actuality was confirmed by the Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice who stated that “it [crime prevention through social development] originated ... in the international conferences that occurred in the '80s and was led by the municipal level and internationally.” In light of this occurrence, the next few pages demonstrate the nature of the external influences that shaped the national and federal crime prevention agendas in the 1990s.

**RATIONALES FROM THE GROUND UP: PRESSURE FROM LOCAL SITES**

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, due in part to the lack of national coordination, academics and practitioners directed the federal government’s attention towards crime prevention as a crucial component of a national strategy for ensuring safer communities in Canada. As the Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice confirmed in an interview in 1999, “it was the municipalities that were much more active, who saw the benefits of crime prevention earlier than the senior governments.” A Policy Analyst, who
had worked with the Department of Justice in the late 1980s and early 1990s, explained
more specifically that

There [were] key players outside the federal government pushing for it; key mayors at the local level saying it’s not working; we have the mayor of Montreal saying that it’s not working and that we have to do it differently, he’s listened to. The big city mayor coming into force. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities coming on board; those are political pressures that sort of reshaped the strategies of Justice and how they saw their role in crime prevention.

This respondent’s comments reveal not only that the perceived failure of existing responses was a concern, but that the preoccupation was brought forth by individuals and groups with considerable leverage outside the federal government.

Other interviewees¹ also mentioned the advocacy role of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities; still others highlighted the pressures exerted by the Canadian Council on Social Development and the Canadian Criminal Justice Association. These community-based organizations were not only advocating the social development approach, but they were also seeking greater responsibility on the part of the federal government. As a former Secretariat Staff Member to the National Crime Prevention Council worded it, “some people would like to say the feds were going to do it no matter what; I think there was a lot of significant lobbying ... those were grassroots people saying it’s time for the feds to help pay.”

This external spurring was officially acknowledged in a Department of Justice document. The internally distributed paper entitled: “Public Environmental Analysis - Crime Prevention,” was intended to provide the Minister and senior ministerial officials
with an understanding of the need for investing more systematically in prevention. One of the main reasons cited for greater federal government involvement was the advocacy on the part of “professional and interest groups” (Department of Justice Canada 1990b:13). In reference to this locally-based pressure in the early 1990s, an Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice conceded in 1999 that “it was essential to have the new money provided by the [federal] government to demonstrate leadership in this area and to kickstart meaningful crime prevention programs.”

In addition to the aforementioned community-based groups, specific individuals had been identified as having had a strong influence on mobilizing greater federal government engagement in crime prevention, and particularly in the social development version of it. These included the late Richard Weiler, a consultant with the Canadian Council on Social Development and a dedicated community activist; Irvin Waller, an applied criminologist and a vigorous proponent of prevention; as well as Ross Hastings, a criminologist whose expertise lies in the areas of community policing and prevention.

The most prominent of these three external lobbyists was undoubtedly Irvin Waller. He was identified by various interviewees from both the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice, as well as by those with extra-state affiliations. Allegedly, his advocacy efforts spanned two decades and he placed particular emphasis on social development measures. As a former Secretariat Staff Member to the National Crime Prevention Council noted, social development “was very significant in the work that Irvin Waller was doing to promote crime prevention long before the feds got involved; he was really promoting federal involvement.” Waller’s influence was not only
recognized by interviewees, but it was also officially noted in a policy document. In a briefing note on crime prevention circulated among senior departmental officials, including the Minister of Justice, Waller was characterized as having urged the Canadian Prime Minister to establish a national council on crime prevention and to address crime through a social development approach (Department of Justice Canada 1990b:6).

The inclusion of Waller’s role in an official document is significant on two levels. First, it demonstrates that the federal government itself acknowledges the external pressures that sought to shape the trajectory of its policies and programmes. Second, it shows how Waller’s advocacy efforts were identified as part of the Canadian federal government’s own reasons for pursuing crime prevention through social development in a more consistent way and on a broader level. One of Waller’s most significant contributions remains the way in which he drew the Canadian government’s attention to advances that had been occurring in other countries and on an international level. The international lineage of Canada’s federal prevention policy is presented briefly below.

**RATIONALES FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES**

In addition to the ‘pressure’ generated by community-based organizations and activists, international activities also came to bear on federally-directed crime prevention initiatives. Many international events served as the impetus for greater engagement in crime prevention on the part of the Canadian federal government. In fact, several international occurrences were cited as consequential reasons for the increased interest within the Department of Justice. The international influence had an impact on the
Canadian scene in three interrelated ways; first, it drew attention to Canada’s performance in the area of criminal justice; second, it prompted interest and stimulated action; and third, it demonstrated pertinent advances in foreign locations.

The first area has to do with ‘optical impressions’ in a global setting. As a Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre revealed, “internationally we don’t look very good in terms of the number of people we’ve got in adult correctional facilities.” This point was formally raised by Irvin Waller who had produced a research document for the Department of Justice Canada, entitled, *Current Trends in European Crime Prevention: Implications for Canada*. As a reason to adopt foreign prevention programmes, Waller (1989:31) argued that Sweden’s and particularly The Netherlands’ incarceration rates were markedly lower than those of Canada, and especially, the United States. This concern with the inadequacy of punitive responses became, yet again, a compelling rationale for looking beyond reactive measures.

The second impact was seemingly more significant than the first. The European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention that was held in 1989 in Montreal appeared to have been a vital catalyst for Canada. As a former Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice in the late 1980s and early 1990s explained:

I think the ‘89 conference in Montreal ... was the first time we saw two very different strategies meeting face to face and recognizing that crime prevention through social development was the way to go. It was the U.S. facing the European factors and at that conference, the Canadian involvement was minimal, but what the Canadians learned was incredible and I think it gave the impetus for all the other changes that came after that.

The influence of this meeting was explicitly identified in an official policy
document that was circulated among senior officials within the Department of Justice. The text specifically stated that "[f]ollowing the October, 1989 European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention, several letters to the Minister have called for the establishment of a national crime prevention council" (Department of Justice Canada 1990b: 8). Apparently, the international conference instilled a sense of urgency for Canada to take on crime prevention as a national priority, or at least it was articulated as such in an internal policy paper.

A similar statement was made in a Memorandum and Briefing Note on Crime Prevention to the Minister of Justice by the Director General of the Policy Section. In reference to the 8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, which took place in Havana, Cuba (1990) and the European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention in Montreal, Canada (1989), the memorandum noted that

[The major outcome of all these activities has clearly been the development, by non-governmental organizations and local governments, of strategies for crime prevention. This has increased the pressure on the federal government to articulate its crime prevention policy and establish funding schemes for local actions (Department of Justice Canada 1990a:7).

The inclusion of this admission in an internal policy document is significant because it reveals how the federal government negotiates pressure from the outside. It further demonstrates how external and international influences were incorporated into government discourse as explicit rationales for intervention. In this sense, government officials seem to have 'internalized' the language of critique and then represented it in the
form of reasons for their own proposed initiatives.

The third international influence pertains to developments in other countries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, crime prevention, and national councils on crime prevention in particular, had gained currency internationally. However, Canada lacked a standard of its own. Thus, following the synergy of international conferences, including the Paris Conference on Urban Safety, Drugs and Crime Prevention in 1991, Canada became somewhat of a political chameleon by following international trends. The Canadian federal government thus began to consider the national council experiences from France, England, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United States (Waller 1989). This actuality was iterated by a Policy Analyst who has worked with the Department of Justice since 1990. She stated that “internationally it was amazing that the focus placed on crime prevention by other countries ... really contributed to raising its profile.”

In addition to increasing the momentum towards preventative approaches and promoting the importance of a national governing body, the international exchanges also reinforced the potential of social development measures. A Policy Analyst, who has worked with the Department of Justice since 1990, explained that international experiences were crucial in demonstrating that “social programmes, or community development processes were important.” Furthermore, “The Agenda for Safer Cities” declaration of the 1989 conference in Montreal explicitly recommended the adoption and implementation of crime prevention through social development.

A specific foreign experience that was repeatedly identified in official government documents was the early intervention program known as the Perry Preschool Project,
which originated in Michigan in the United States (House of Commons Canada 1993:17). A cost-benefit analysis of this project had demonstrated that for every one dollar invested in the early intervention program, five dollars would be saved by a decreased demand for public services. The cost-effective potential attributed to this project became a significant rationale for the adoption of socially-based and universally deployed approaches among various federal government spheres, including those of Justice, Solicitor General and Health. It also appeared in numerous internal policy documents and externally distributed publications both before and after the advent of the national strategy.² As a Current Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre emphatically noted, “it was a very compelling, a very compelling argument” [repetition in original].

The impact of advances in foreign contexts and at the international level were undoubtedly consequential for the development of federal crime prevention initiatives.³ The role of internationally-based progress is crucial to include in a discussion on rationales because it served as a timely and potent contingent actuality that shaped the Canadian prevention project. The depth of the impact was corroborated by a Former Policy Analyst who stated that “the whole strategy, yeah, was from out of country for sure. We haven’t developed much by ourselves.” Another current Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice maintained that “the fact that it is a priority in other countries ... has spurred Canada on.” The early 1990s were very much characterized by consolidated efforts to integrate internationally-generated developments into a ‘made in Canada’ approach. The next section highlights the nature of the ‘Canadian-based’ reasons that were engendered at this time.
RATIONALES FROM WITHIN: FEDERAL APPROPRIATION

As the two previous sections have demonstrated, many of the catalytic rationales invoked to advance crime prevention initiatives in the early 1990s originated outside the Department of Justice and the Ministry of the Solicitor General. This actuality comes as no surprise given that this transitional phase between 1987 and mid-1994 was a period of intense lobbying from externally-based groups and individuals. Eventually, socially-oriented crime prevention alternatives struck a responsive political chord. The tenaciously optimistic messages that crime could be prevented were finally reaching receptive political minds; in this sense, the elements of a seemingly consequential shift in crime policy were coming together during this period.

In the face of both international and local pressures, the Department of Justice Canada began systematically to prepare a broader policy on prevention. The rationales put forth in this regard were found in a Briefing Note on Crime Prevention to the Minister of Justice by the Director General of the Policy Directorate. The main reasons were summed up in a sentence that read: “[g]radually increasing crime rates, the cost of traditional criminal justice strategies and growing concern by the public about crime dictates increased effort to develop new strategies in combatting crime” (Department of Justice Canada 1990a:13).

The reference to the crime rate and the associated costs point to the perceived inadequacy of the reactive component of the criminal justice system. It also serves as an example of how the federal government has itself assumed a discourse of critique by acknowledging its own incapacity. This articulation supports Miller and Rose’s (1990:4)
contention that "the impetus of 'failure' provides for the propagation of new programs of government." While this notion of 'failure' had been re-echoed in ministerial speeches and internal documents since the late 1970s within the Ministry of the Solicitor General, its allegedly increasing scale and implications seemed to carry greater weight in the early 1990s. While the 'new programs of government' were still seven years away from implementation at this point, a great deal of preparatory work was initiated during this period.

An indication of the interest and seriousness that the federal government had accorded to crime prevention at this time is to be found in its efforts to set up three consultation initiatives between November 1992 and October 1993. These included the "Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General," the "National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention," and "The Ad Hoc Advisory Committee for a National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention." All three of these events consisted of formally organized consultative meetings in which state and extra-state sectors exchanged ideas on the need for preventative alternatives, the related priorities, as well as the required plans of action.

In each case, a report on the proceedings of these meetings was produced. These reports were known in their respective order as Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward A National Strategy (February 1993), The Proceedings of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention (August 1993) and Community Safety through Crime Prevention (October 1993). These documents typically consisted of a list of reasons for proactive preferences and a series of recommendations on how to implement
the proposed policy and program options.

In a speech announcing the launch of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention, the then Minister of Justice, Kim Campbell (1992:2), identified some of the reasons for these consultations. She stated that

[...]his initiative responds to the growing concern of Canadians about their safety and the safety of their families. Women and other vulnerable groups are fearful on the streets and in their homes. There is a growing fear of young persons committing serious violent crimes ...

This expressed concern for the safety of Canadians, for the associated fear and for the perceived threats created by so-called ‘criminal’ activities forms part of the emotively driven currents that Garland (1999:34) considered significant in shaping policy directions. This statement also represents another instance where political rhetoric’s persuasive potential is enhanced by the personalization of allegedly public issues (Paine 1981:121). Since the concern for victimization has surfaced on numerous occasions since the late 1970s, it appears to be a recurrent rationale, but one that seems to have reached more receptive minds in the early 1990s. The consultation processes that took place between 1992 and 1993 are an indication of how the rationales advocated by international and community groups on behalf of victims and potential victims of crime were becoming incorporated into government rhetoric with a rather expressive and conscientious tone.

Furthermore, the internationally-generated and locally-advocated emphasis on ‘social’ orientations was also surfacing in the ministerial rhetoric that was employed to advance the ‘Canadian’ prevention project at this time. This consideration of ‘social’ alternatives was found in the same speech by the Minister of Justice through which she
announced the 'national symposium.' She declared that

[i]mproving safety and preventing crime is extremely complex. It requires a broad social response. The justice system must work together with other systems such as health, education, social and employment systems. Our legislative and judicial frameworks are not sufficient by themselves to ensure safety, neither should they be considered as substitutes to the obligation to address at the root some of the ills that affect our society today (Campbell 1992:1).

The perceived limitations of the justice system are mentioned yet again in orally-based rhetoric in the form of a rationale that justifies broader alternatives. However, in this case, the criminal justice frameworks were not projected as being completely displaced; rather they were seen to operate as part of a broader social program that encompasses cultural, economic and health policies. As conveyed in this ministerial statement, this multi-pronged approach is optimistically envisioned as a significant step forward in federal government efforts to address crime and victimization. Such a vision was carried through all three of the consultation processes between 1992 and 1993.

'THE HORNER REPORT'

According to twelve out of the fourteen interviewees, the most influential of these reports was Crime Prevention In Canada: Toward A National Strategy: The Twelfth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General. While the latter constitutes its official title, the document became informally, yet famously known as "The Horner Report;" it was named after the Chair of the committee, Dr. Robert Horner who was a Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament. It should be noted that,
despite some interviewees' view that Liberal governments were "the supporters of prevention as opposed to the Conservative government," both the Standing Committee's consultation process and the Horner Report were produced while the Progressive Conservative party was in government. The report itself was seen to have had a significant impact.

A former Secretariat Staff Member of the National Crime Prevention Council enthusiastically exclaimed in an interview that "Horner was huge for setting the tone for crime prevention." In addition, a former secondee to the Department of Justice in the mid to late 1990s described the Horner Report as a "defining moment." Similarly, the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council explained that "the Horner committee was really the transition point where everybody sort of put it [crime prevention] on the agenda." Another Department of Justice Official on secondment testified that the Horner Report "really got the ball rolling; it started government commitment to the issue, attention to the issue." It may be argued that this report was held in such high regard that it itself became part of the reasons underlying the proposed government intervention. It should be noted that when asked 'why' the federal government was embracing crime prevention at this particular time, several interviewees emphatically commented on the influence of "The Horner Report."

The fact that this formal consultation occurred and that it produced a favourable report seemed to have served as a justifying motivation for both state and extra-state sectors. In this sense, the Horner Report may be considered one of the key contingent actualities that advanced the crime prevention project in the early 1990s. Despite the
status of this document as a contingent actuality, various formal rationalities circulated throughout it. Notwithstanding its own popular role as an impetus for government action, the Horner Report did put forth specific rationales that secured not only the acceptance of proactive approaches as viable alternatives, but also the increased involvement of the federal government in this regard. Prior to listing these rationales, it should be noted how they were included in this report.

The members of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General claimed that they began their national study on crime prevention because they recognized “the inherent inadequacy of the criminal justice system as a response by society to crime and the fear it inspires” and because they sought to respond “to public appeals for preventive action” (House of Commons Canada 1993:1). To this end, the committee heard oral presentations by, and received written submissions from over one hundred witnesses between November 1992 and February 1993. The witnesses included “crime prevention practitioners, academics, crime victims, government officials, community groups, volunteers and law enforcement agencies” (House of Commons Canada 1993:1).

The Horner Report consisted mainly of a selective summary of recommendations that were put forth by the various witnesses. It also documented numerous reasons for leaning towards the greater use of preventative approaches. The reliance upon the rationales that were provided by the witnesses is yet another example of how the reasons articulated in government texts originated in outside spheres. It should be noted however, that these particular rationales were put forth in a consultation process that had been formally organized by federal government officials. As a co-writer of the Horner Report
explained in interview, many witnesses were proposed by Dr. Irvin Waller; they were then invited to present recommendations before the Standing Committee. Based on this actuality, it is plausible to contend that while the rationales presented by the witnesses may have come from external voices, they nevertheless surfaced in a climate that was generated by the federal government. They were thus purposively selected.

Based on the evidence provided by the witnesses, the report acknowledged numerous reasons for turning towards proactive approaches as viable strategic options. One of the first rationales listed was an increase in crime rates based on reports from Statistics Canada and the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. Particular reference was made to an alleged 65% increase in violent crime between 1981 and 1991 (House of Commons Canada 1993:5). The Horner Report also drew attention to the significance of the financial, physical and psychological costs associated with crime and victimization (House of Commons Canada 1993:6). Finally, the fear of crime and victimization was also presented as an important rationale because of the way it restricts individuals' autonomy (House of Commons Canada 1993:7). These reasons seemed to be influential in shaping government policy and programmes because they tended to appeal to both politicians and the public on an emotional level, the latter of which often serves as a powerful impetus for action.

Various rationalities were also embedded within the text of the Horner Report. Their complex interrelation was evident in a number of rationales and recommendations. One example involved the way in which the report acknowledged "that traditional criminal justice responses, while necessary, are insufficient deterrents to acts that threaten
public safety and security” (House of Commons Canada 1993:1). This justificatory statement is an important one to note because while it identifies the limitations of neo-conservative responses, it still reinforces their alleged indispensability.

In addition to recognizing the limited deterrent effect of conventional control models, the report also notes that the latter “[fail] to address the underlying factors associated with crime and criminality” (House of Commons Canada 1993:1). The factors associated with crime were identified primarily as social welfare ones with a greater emphasis being placed on poverty, relative disadvantage, inadequate housing, unemployment and inequality (House of Commons Canada 1993:9-13). It should be noted however, that these conditions are discussed in their capacity as determinants of risk that are thought to lead to crime and victimization (House of Commons Canada 1993:9-15). This revelation provides another example of the way in which neo-liberal emphases on risk and ‘social’ welfare conditions are conceived in a complementary manner (O’Malley 2000; Stenson and Watt 1999).

The perceived mutual reinforcement among neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social rationalities and programmes was also explicitly promoted in the Horner Report. It recommended an integrated approach that included law enforcement, community-based policing, social development and the reduction of criminal opportunities (House of Commons Canada 1993:15-22, 33-34).

This ‘balanced’ approach reflects the continued reliance upon the dominant neo-conservative tendencies involving police-based interventions. Although the limitations of traditional law enforcement and criminal justice practices were identified at the outset of
the report as a main rationale for alternative proactive approaches, their continued use was promoted in four out of the eleven recommendations. While Recommendation 1 advocated the continued use of policing practices in a general way, Recommendations 9 and 11 more specifically suggested the possibilities of increasing the police’s powers of arrest in cases of violent offenders and parolees (House of Commons Canada 1993:34-35).

With respect to sentencing, recommendation 10 promoted amendments to the Criminal Code that would enable more severe penalties in cases of harassment (House of Commons Canada 1993:35). The recommendations of neo-conservative oriented measures appear to contradict the main rationale that was identified in the report for turning towards crime prevention. However, despite the acknowledged limitations of reactive responses, they are nevertheless conceived as part of an integrated approach. It is in this complex and seemingly contradictory arrangement that various rationalities and programmes are presented as mutually fulfilling rather than as exclusionary and displacing.

This mutuality of proposed approaches is further demonstrated by the emphasis within the first recommendation on “reduction of criminal opportunities,” the latter of which constitutes a neo-liberal version of risk management. Opportunity-reduction measures entail individual or collective efforts that are designed to protect people and communities from becoming victims of property crime (House of Commons Canada 1993:15). It should also be noted that many of these risk-based activities are thought to require the cooperation of local police services (ibid).
The neo-social penchant is evident in this balanced approach by the inclusion of ‘social development’ measures. The ‘neo-social’ stipulation is appropriate here because the term ‘social’ is invoked in this document in its link to background factors that place children and youth at-risk of crime or victimization (House of Commons Canada 1993:16-17). In this sense, social welfare strategies are conceived here in a very goal-directed and limited way. First, they are purposively envisioned because they are thought to be mobilized in the early years of children’s lives to ensure the maximization of their preventative potential. Second, they are conceptualised in a circumscribed (as opposed to universal) way by their dual ability to either generate or prevent risk factors. These constrained versions of social welfare demonstrate how the latter is conceived in varying alliances with other rationalities and discourses of government (Stenson and Watt 1999:200).

This brief overview of the content of the Horner Report demonstrates the complex way in which rationalities take shape in their state-centred form, even at the proposal stage. It appears that on the part of state and extra-state officials there was an intended intersection among a multiplicity of logics and discourses of regulation. Furthermore, the high regard accorded to this report and its perceived catalytic role in building momentum toward greater federal level involvement in prevention is indicative of the pivotal pertinence of contingent actualities in shaping federal government generated rhetoric and programmes.
POST-HORNER MINISTERIAL PREOCCUPATIONS

Following the publication of the ‘Horner Report’ in February 1993, the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention took place in March of that same year. At the opening of the symposium, the Minister of Justice revealed some of the reasons that prevention was being considered as a viable option at this time. Concerned Canadians, as well as a limited and costly criminal justice system were among the major preoccupations mentioned. He specifically expressed concern over the growing financial expenditures of formal control mechanisms in the following statement:

Our national system of justice currently costs Canadians 8 billion dollars in direct expenditures ... No matter how you look at them, these figures are astronomical. Therefore, the real question is: How can we spend these 8 billion dollars better and smarter (Blais 1993a:3)?

This interest in cost-effectiveness is a reiteration of similar statements made by various ministers at both the Department of Justice and the Ministry of the Solicitor General dating back to the late 1970s. In this sense, it is a recurring rationale, but one that seems to have held greater weight in the early 1990s. A similar observation can be made with respect to the limitations of formal control mechanisms. The inadequacy has been identified in numerous speeches and official publications since the late 1970s and it is cited yet again by the Minister of Justice in his explanation of the changing nature of the Canadian federal government’s crime control measures. He specifically stated that

... the criminal justice system is only one of the tools in preventing crime. Stricter laws and longer prison terms may be appropriate in some cases. Often, they are not. In addition to being very costly, they tend to focus on the symptoms of what has already gone wrong, rather than preventing harm by eliminating the causes (Blais 1993a:2)
This acknowledgement of the existing criminal justice measures as being primarily reactive is an interesting one because it contradicts a comment that Minister Blais made in a later speech in May wherein he stated that: “we all know that despite enlightened measures to prevent crime, the law does have a proper place in crime prevention and in responding to crime” (Blais 1993b:5). While in some instances, the limitations of the criminal justice system are presented as rationales that demonstrate the necessity of proactive approaches, in other cases, these neo-conservative responses are presented as part of a proactive agenda. Whereas government officials portray this double presence of neo-conservative rationalities and programmes as a ‘balanced’ project, critical researchers may perceive this presentation as contradictory. Still, a critic of political language may interpret this confusion as an inherent feature of political rhetoric (Edelman 1977). Whatever one’s inclination may be, this multiple consideration of the significance of reactive and punitive measures and their corresponding rationales reflect the complex tensions that surface in government rhetoric and policy proposals.

The complexity inherent in the various invocations of rationalities and their corresponding technologies is further evident in Blais’ words in the same speech from which the latter quotation was found. In this case, Blais presented the reasons for considering social prevention options. He stated that “… unless we attack the social and economic conditions that lead to crime, we will be caught in a spiral of crime, repression, more crime and more repression … as Parliamentarians we will not serve the interests of Canadians through quick-fix calls to get tough on crime” (Blais 1993b:4).

While this quotation demonstrates how the perceived inadequacies of one
programme of government became the rationale for embracing another initiative, it further reinforces the tensions and distinctions among various political rationalities and technologies as they are embedded within political rhetoric and rationales.

'THE RED BOOK'

Similar complexity was evident in another allegedly influential text. Six interviewees identified the “Red Book” as an influential document. The official title of the first “Red Book” is *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada*. It was the federal Liberal party’s official platform text for the 1993 election. Through this text, the Liberal Party of Canada launched its “Safe Homes, Safe Streets” agenda which advocated a balanced approach under the slogan: “Protection and Prevention” (The Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 85). The subtitle read: “Fighting crime and violence requires tough measures and social reforms” (Ibid). Although the slogan mentioned ‘prevention’ and the subtitle referred to ‘social reforms,’ the proposed agenda was rather ‘tough’ and legislatively focussed. It read as follows:

A Liberal government will introduce a broad range of crime and justice initiatives to reverse Canada’s growing crime and violence rate. We will take a tough line on violence against women and children, with stricter penalties and concrete measures to protect them from abusers. A Liberal government will strengthen gun control laws. We will reform the Young Offenders Act to offer real rehabilitation while cracking down on serious and repeat young criminals. And we will take aim at violent pornography and the exploitation of children (The Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 85).

In addition to being an instance of a promise of future performances, this statement provides yet another example of the way in which stricter legislation and
tougher penalties are considered integral parts of preventative measures. The persuasive power of the rhetoric in this instance was enhanced by the reference to ‘serious and repeat young criminals’ and ‘violent pornography and the exploitation of children.’ Given that these so-called crime problems tend to instill fear and outrage, they are strategically situated in this rhetoric to convince the book’s audience of the perceived need for increased punitiveness.

The persuasive power derived from the inclusion of issues that inevitably instill fear is worthy of further consideration and contextualizing. It is interesting to note that the Red Book’s promulgation of an atmosphere of fear in this instance was timely. The Liberal Party was in opposition at that time and was thus eager to draw the public’s attention to its capacity and willingness to address allegedly serious crime problems. This reactionary political role on the part of both governments and opposition parties is significant in understanding the relation between political rhetoric, public panic and government intervention (Hall et al. 1978).

While the Liberal Party conveyed a firm stance on the use of legislation, it nevertheless made mention of socio-economic factors, albeit in an opportune way to criticize its political opponents. The document later acknowledged that

[for crime to be prevented, it is necessary to respond to the underlying social causes of criminal behaviour. The most characteristic social background for criminals is poverty. Conservative government decisions to cut social programs were made without acknowledging the effects these cuts could have on crime rates. Access to health care, housing, jobs, and training is essential if crime is to be prevented (The Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 85).

While no specific program proposals followed this acknowledgement, it is
nevertheless an indication that a ‘balanced’ crime prevention approach was being supported politically. While the “Redbook” is not an official Government of Canada or Department of Justice Canada publication, its contents are presented here because it was considered by many interviewees as a consequential catalyst in the inception of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.”

PREVENTION ‘AT-A-DISTANCE’

A rather ‘classic’ articulation of crime prevention ‘at-a-distance’ was presented in two statements by the Minister of Justice in 1989. First, he claimed that “[w]hile all levels of government, whether national, provincial or local, generally share responsibility for the administration of justice, crime is largely an urban problem and that means that municipal governments, agencies and organizations are ideally suited for assuming a major leadership role in crime prevention” (Lewis 1989:3). This contention reflects the explicit intention on the part of the federal government to distance itself from the leadership and implementation tasks in the realm of crime prevention.

He then stated that “[n]ot every crime prevention program requires government intervention, although most appear to require some measure of government funding” (Lewis 1989:4-5). This quotation reflects the perceived and professed nature of the Canadian federal government’s capacity as a funder of crime prevention programming. This role was to characterize the relationship between the federal government and the community sector over the next ten years.

The rhetoric of ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governing crime gained momentum in the
early 1990s alongside, and arguably through, the intersected rhetorics of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social modes of regulation. The more focused emphasis on preventing crime at-a-distance emerged in a rather peculiar way. While pressures from the international and local communities since the mid-1980s had pushed the Canadian federal government to take on greater responsibility in the area of crime prevention, it assumed this leadership role on its own terms.

While lobbying efforts persuaded the federal government to demonstrate political and financial leadership, the government itself conveniently assumed the discourse of self-critique. More specifically, when government officials, usually ministers, discussed the government’s role, they often prefaced their statements by acknowledging their own incapacities and limitations. Thus, the rhetoric advancing ‘at-a-distance’ forms of preventing crime operated through a tension between an allegedly desired federal leadership role and a limited potential for doing so. This tension was evident in the following statement by Kim Campbell, Minister of Justice:

The federal government wants to show leadership and help develop opportunities and tools to address these issues. However, all stakeholders must accept responsibility for finding and implementing solutions. We must work together in order to improve safety and preserve the excellent quality of life of Canadians (Campbell1992:4).

This pronouncement reveals the federal government’s constrained willingness to commit fully to this alternative approach. This intention was carefully worded at the level of political rhetoric in such a way that the safety of Canadians was presented as being contingent upon a partnership approach and a mutual responsibility shared among
the federal government and extra-state sectors. The rationale put forth for this envisioned approach was based on the perceived limitation of exclusive and fragmented efforts. This rationale was worded in the following way: "The reality is that none of us working alone can make major progress in reducing crime and making our communities and homes safer" (Blais 1993a:1).

In addition, the simultaneous claim to leadership and cautious acceptance of that role was further explicated by Pierre Blais, the Minister of Justice at the time. He explained that

[t]he federal government will lead where it has responsibility, and provide support where it can. But the main answers come from the community. That means local initiatives with support from government. This is not a question of the federal government shirking its responsibilities. It is a recognition of what the federal government is and is not good at doing (Blais 1993a:9).

This explicit and cautious reassurance that the federal government is not "shirking its responsibilities" seems to have been strategically employed at the level of rhetoric as a means to neutralize the subsequent claim about the federal government’s abilities, willingness and limitations. In this sense, the government’s limitations became a rationale for increasing the devolution of programs in the context of crime prevention.

The emphasis on "prevention at-a-distance" was later justified by an appeal to the plight of vulnerable populations. It was articulated in the following way:

This partnership is the basis for the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention ... It is imperative that the voices of women, aboriginal people, ethnocultural and racial minorities, the police, victims’ groups, persons with disabilities and corrections officers all be heard. We must continue to reach out for society and its citizens to play a more active and constructive role in crime prevention (Blais 1993c:3).
The notion of partnership is presented here under the guise of consultations with vulnerable groups. The relevance of their voices is linked to the government’s efforts to ‘reach out’ not so much on the basis of welfarist benevolence, but rather with a view to solicit their participation. This statement further demonstrates yet another example of the manner in which the plight of the marginalized is sought to be addressed in a rather ‘neo-liberalized’ social way that is contingent upon the active involvement of the individuals and groups themselves. In this sense, ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governing seem to sit rather strategically at the intersection of neo-liberal, neo-social and neo-conservative rationalities and their corresponding programmes.

1987-1994 IN REVIEW

Between April 1987 and July 1994, the Canadian federal government was enticed by a powerful crusade for proactive approaches through which it considered the costs of crime and embraced initiatives that employed both the ‘social’ and ‘community’ tags for greater political effect. In addition, as the overview demonstrates, crime prevention benefited from the rise of official crime rates and the alleged inability of traditional criminal justice agencies to control crime; both of these ‘problems’ constituted the main rationales through which proactive approaches came to be viewed as worthy alternatives.

While the federal government’s limitations were becoming increasingly apparent and were being openly acknowledged in official rhetoric in the form of rationales, the corresponding rhetoric also conveyed a more optimistic view of preventative measures. The concept of ‘crime prevention’ conveyed through the rhetoric of federal departments
and especially within the Ministry of Justice primarily by way of evangelical pronouncements of cost-effectiveness and multi-agency cooperation. Various rhetorical evocations that responded to concerns of fiscal crisis and legitimacy sought to establish the worth and desirability of more proactive pursuits.

Furthermore, another source of innovation revealed itself in a rather unexpected bureaucratic way. The original concerns of the legalistic focus within the Department of Justice, while still evident, did not seem to stagnate the momentum that had been building towards a national strategy on crime prevention and community safety. In fact, as a Former Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice in the late 1980s and early 1990s indicated, the transfer of crime prevention to the Department of Justice had a rather ‘balanced’ and beneficial effect. She specifically stated that

... to put it into the Justice Department I think it slowed down the process that was growing but at the same time, it gave it the high level minister that it might require because between Solicitor General and Justice, the Minister of Justice is a foot higher, to put it that way.

In its new location within the Department of Justice, prevention became somewhat disconnected from the strong link with policing and correctional services that it had under the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, the higher profile of the Department of Justice and its more expansive policy directions allowed prevention to be shaped by broader concerns around gender and cultural inequality, as well as the early development and protection of children, all which arguably constitute social welfare interests.

As noted earlier, many of the rationales originated outside the federal government
domain and had circulated through international conferences and national consultation processes. The impact of these external influences was explicitly acknowledged in January 1994 in a Department of Justice text that documented the nature of the pending National Crime Prevention Council. It stated that “[a] number of international and national events have provided a focus for a community safety and crime prevention strategy for Canada. The Department of Justice has made a commitment to develop a national strategy ...” (Department of Justice Canada 1994:i).

The same document revealed a similar, yet somewhat peculiar ‘rationale.’ The text read as follows: “[t]he recent focus on crime prevention and community safety issues has increased interest in establishing a national crime prevention council” (Department of Justice Canada 1994:1). It appears here that the ‘recent focus’ on prevention elsewhere served as an important impetus for increased attention to the issue. It is certainly not an odd rationale to be found within a government setting that is constantly shaped by external lobbying efforts.

It is nevertheless a justification that must be added to the list of contingent actualities. While not at odds with a broader list that takes note of fiscal restraint and the failure of existing measures, ‘recent focus’ just seems to fit under the category of contingent actualities in a rather vague way. It should be noted however, that this ambiguous claim of ‘recent focus’ may actually serve as a broader umbrella under which a variety of rationales may fall.

Nevertheless, whatever the specificity or generality of rationales may be, it is evident that through the various international conferences and national consultation
processes between mid-1987 and mid-1994, the elements of a broader approach to crime and victimization came together. While prevention may have been shaped by legal interests earlier on within the Department of Justice, the aforementioned conferences and reports opened up spaces for more encompassing alternatives. Both government documents and ministerial speeches revealed the plans for a ‘balanced’ approach between traditional reactive responses and emerging proactive approaches. Furthermore, the persuasive and optimistic rhetoric conveyed a seemingly unquestionable desirability of the mutual interdependence among various rationalities and programmes. The intersection of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social was presented as innovative. In this sense, the hybridization of rationalities and technologies may be seen as enabling government innovation (O’Malley 2000).

The innovation and the momentum associated with this emerging intersection is attributable, at least in part, to the rise of ‘social’ modes of prevention. While neo-liberal and neo-conservative discourses and programmes had intertwined in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the addition of the much celebrated ‘social’ conditions and ‘social’ solutions further enhanced and complicated the dynamic. As previously argued, rationalities may be represented in government settings through a reference to rationales. As the examples of rationales noted above reveal, rationalities were variously emphasized throughout internal policy documents, official publications and speeches. There existed ongoing tensions among neo-liberal logics which emphasized individualized risk management and ‘at-a-distance’ tactics, neo-conservative logics that maintained existing criminal justice traditions, along with ‘social’ logics that emphasized broad-based social
service provisions and early intervention.

While the existence of these multiple rationalities may be perceived by some as a tension or a contradiction, it is one that is managed by a persuasive and optimistic government rhetoric that projects a mutually reinforcing alliance among all three of them. In this sense, it is plausible to contend that in their intersection, all three evolve simultaneously rather than separately or in a mutually exclusive manner. Regarding 'the social' in particular, while it may be celebrated as a tool of innovation that enhanced the crime prevention project beyond neo-liberal and neo-conservative tendencies, it is one that exists in a rather 'submerged' (Stenson and Watt 1999:196) manner in its alliance with both of its counterparts. The way in which 'the social' was articulated and rationalized in federally generated crime prevention initiatives during the late twentieth century clearly conveys a reformulated version of it. The next two chapters address this development, as well as the complex intertwining of formal rationalities and contingent actualities that were brought to bear on the advancement of crime prevention between mid-1994 and 2000.
ENDNOTES

1. These other interviewees included a Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice between 1990 and 1999 and a Secretariat Staff Member with the National Crime Prevention Council between 1994 and 1997.

2. Reference to the Perry Pre-school project was made particularly in the publications produced by the National Crime Prevention Council between 1994-1997.

3. Not only did international events serve as a rationale for greater emphasis on crime prevention, but Canadian conceptual debates on crime prevention are also located amongst these international debates and initiatives. Therefore, Canada’s conceptualizations have been influenced by notions of prevention which originated beyond its national borders.

4. This note on the crime rate is qualified by the following statement: \textit{[i]The safety of Canadians and their enjoyment of healthy physical, social and economic environments are threatened by criminal activities ... In the 1980's, two million Criminal Code offences have been recorded each year, double the 1970's rate. The number of violent crimes reported to police has increased approximately 20% since the early 1980s} (Department of Justice Canada 1990a:1).

5. The implementation phase of the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention did not begin until 1998, although preparatory work was done in 1997.

6. The only two interviewees who did not make mention of the Horner Report did not do so because they had worked with the Ministry of the Solicitor General up until the mid-1980s and were therefore not familiar with the developments in the 1990s. Neither respondent was working with the federal government at the time of the interviews.

7. ‘Concerned Canadians’ is understood by the following explanation: \textit{“A 1990 poll revealed that 78 per cent of Canadians felt crime was an important issue in our communities”} (Blais 1993a:1).

8. These six interviewees include a Current Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre, a Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, an Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of Justice, a Seconded Policy Analyst to the National Crime Prevention Centre, a Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice and a Department of Justice Official.
CHAPTER 8

THE PROMOTIONAL RATIONALES UNDERLYING
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY ON
COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CRIME PREVENTION: 1994-2000

What had been conceived in 1981 through the Ministry of the Solicitor General's 'National Plan of Action'1 and then reiterated in countless conferences, consultations and committees since that time, finally came to fruition in 1994. On July 5, 1994, the Government of Canada announced “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.” It took over thirteen years to establish and it ended up being located within a different ministry2 than its original founder. Nevertheless, 1994 marked the year in which several influences had come together and resulted in crime prevention being given considerably greater weight in the Canadian federal government's crime control agenda.

The establishment of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention” demonstrates how the federal government had been enticed by very powerful external and internal crusades for greater national coordination. The “Horner Report”(1993) had recommended that the federal government play a strong leadership role; the “Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on a Canadian Strategy for Community Safety and Crime Prevention” had reiterated this recommendation in its report, “Community Safety through Crime Prevention”(1993). Furthermore, the Liberal Party of Canada had also ‘proposed’ the establishment of a national strategy and a national council as part of
their "Safe Homes / Safe Streets" agenda in its platform document, "Creating Opportunities" (1993).

The purpose of the initiative was articulated by the federal Solicitor General, Herb Gray, on the day that the 'National Strategy' was announced. He claimed that "[w]e need a national crime prevention effort to help Canadians protect themselves from victimization and therefore improve their personal and family security" (Government of Canada 1994:2). The neo-liberal emphasis on individual responsibility and 'at-a-distance' forms of governing crime and its prevention are explicit within this statement. A greater accent on partnership and cost-effectiveness was iterated by the Minister of Justice, Allan Rock. He stated that

[t]his is the first time a comprehensive national strategy has been put together to encompass the contributions of all citizens, groups and governments in achieving the common goal of safer communities. Although the funding is modest, the commitment of all levels of government to work together to make a difference will ensure that existing funds and resources will be used to improve crime prevention practices (Government of Canada 1994: 2).

These optimistic statements by the two ministers set out some of the elements that were considered important in the creation of safer communities for Canadians. Clearly, the federal government was encouraged to consider the costs of crime control; it was also enticed by the tags of community safety and inter-agency and inter-governmental collaboration.

What is less evident here is the variety and complexity of rationales that were brought to bear on this initiative. Also absent from these quotations is an understanding
of the way in which the intersection of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social rationalities and technologies became more intensely featured between 1994 and 2000. This chapter therefore documents the combination of governmental rationalities and contingent actualities that were put forth to promote, elaborate and sustain the aims of national crime prevention initiatives. In so doing, it demonstrates the recursiveness of various rationales in the rhetoric on prevention since the 1970s. While this chapter presents how the features of neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and the 'neo-social' are expressed through the articulations and rationales of crime prevention, chapter nine addresses the complex interplay of these rationalities in greater detail.

PHASE I OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY

Prior to discussing the rationales underlying the National Strategy, the nature of the latter requires explication. Phase I of "The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention" took place between 1994 and 1997. This stage involved the work of the National Crime Prevention Council which was established in 1994. This National Council was an advisory body that had been set up to provide advice to the ministers and the federal government on short-term and long-term strategic directions for Canada in the area of community safety and crime prevention.

The National Council produced a number of documents that proposed various strategic and target priorities; these included crime prevention through social development and a focus on children, youth, women and Aboriginal peoples. The documents prepared by the National Crime Prevention Council, while instructive, were
not scrutinized or treated as 'official government discourse' because they were not constituted as such. 3 Although the National Council was funded by the federal government, it was considered to be an 'arms length' advisory body that was comprised of twenty-five extra-state community practitioners and academics.

It was clear from the outset that the National Crime Prevention Council’s documents did not necessarily express the views of the federal government; in fact in some instances, they challenged existing government practices on both federal and provincial terrains. It was also itself an unwieldy council with representation from welfarist-oriented groups, neo-liberal moderates, as well as conservative extremists; the latter often advocated repressive measures. As the two members of the National Crime Prevention Council who served as informants for this study conveyed, the decisions that they made and the proposals that they put forth were more often based on compromise rather than on consensus. 4

It must be noted however, that despite its arm’s length role and its internal tensions, the contributions of the National Crime Prevention Council were considered invaluable in various federal government spheres. Its reports and recommendations were later incorporated into the implementation phase of the National Strategy which began in 1998. Evidence of the impact of the National Council was found in a backgrounder sheet produced by the National Crime Prevention Centre. It stated that

[p]romoting crime prevention through social development, the former Council focused on children and youth and developed models for dealing with the early prevention of criminal behaviour. These models showed that children need adequate care throughout their early lives, and this extends to what happens before they are born. Above all else, children need good
parenting. At the same time, there is a need to eliminate, to the extent possible, known risk factors in children's lives, such as abuse, poverty, and drug and alcohol abuse. We know that children grow up to be good citizens when they have had the benefit of developing in a nurturing family and community environment (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998:2).

This quotation indicates that the dominant theme of social development within the National Crime Prevention Council's reports had permeated the federal government's thinking about the causes of, and responses to, crime in Canada. While chapter nine explores the convoluted emphasis on 'social' issues and solutions in greater detail, for the moment it is sufficient to acknowledge that the work of the national council provided the seal of legitimacy for the social direction that crime prevention initiatives were to take, albeit in a partial way.

In numerous ways and to varying degrees, the National Crime Prevention Council generated enthusiasm, optimism and commitment around crime prevention, and particularly the social development version of it. Much of the impetus for the growth of crime prevention at the federal government level can be attributed to the promotional activities of the council, particularly through the dissemination of its committee reports. In this sense, crime prevention came to greater 'political' life under the National Crime Prevention Council.

This occurrence was confirmed by several interviewees. A former secondee to the Department of Justice identified the national council as a 'defining moment.' Similarly, a senior official with the Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada between 1973 and 1998 saw it as a 'catalyst' for government action in the area of prevention. In addition, as a
former secretariat staff member to the National Crime Prevention Council worded it: "the National Council obviously drew a lot of attention." In this sense, the National Council must be considered a significant contingent actuality that influenced the federal government's desire to intervene in the name of prevention.

Prior to discussing Phase II of the National Strategy, it is instructive to examine the rationalizing principles embedded within the logo of the National Crime Prevention Council (1994) that is illustrated in Figure 8.1. The intended meaning of the logo was explained in the pamphlet in which it first appeared in 1994. It stated: "Our logo reflects a sense of community, with adults and children standing together and helping each other. The "people" can also be interpreted as trees beside the houses growing upward, reaching for the light - a new positive force" (National Crime Prevention Council 1994).

This is the first logo that I came across since the mid-1970s that actually explicitly articulated the intended meaning of the image. The figure portrays both order (or stability) through the homes and activity through the people. Furthermore, it presents an ideal situation by emphasizing the positive aspects of community collaboration. The upward stance of the adults and children is both optimistic and forward-looking. These positive features are clearly intended to appeal to the viewer on an emotional level. In so doing, the image indirectly rationalizes an 'at-a-distance' form of governing by appealing to individuals' emotive sense of community in a very animated and anticipatory manner. In this sense, the figure conveys various rationales which may be considered as part of the persuasive arsenal of political rhetoric on prevention.
Figure 8.1
Original Logo of the National Crime Prevention Council
PHASE II OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY

On June 2, 1998, the Canadian federal government announced Phase II of ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’ It was created not only based on the recommendations made by the National Crime Prevention Council, but also in fulfilment of a promise outlined in the Liberal government’s second ‘Red Book’ that was officially entitled Securing Our Future (1997). Phase II essentially constitutes the implementation phase of the National Strategy. For the first time in Canadian history, there existed a federally directed strategy that was designed to provide a framework for coordinating crime prevention activities at the national level.

To this end, the National Crime Prevention Centre was established in 1998. Its function was to move the central government strategy on prevention forward into the provinces and local communities. It was made up of prominent individuals from a range of federal government departments. It was intended as a policy making forum for the development, promotion, coordination and funding of crime prevention programs across Canada. The centre was considered by many as a major accomplishment on the part of the federal government in the area of crime prevention. For example, according to the Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of Justice, “one indication of the importance which the Department gives to crime prevention is that that area was hived off and constituted as a centre with its own ADM [Assistant Deputy Minister].”

As outlined by the National Crime Prevention Centre (1998:2) itself, “... Phase II of the National Strategy aims to increase individual and community safety by equipping Canadians with the knowledge, skills and resources they need to advance crime
prevention efforts in their communities.” The vision of ‘at-a-distance’ prevention through responsible and knowledgeable individuals is discussed below.

This new phase was announced with a $32 million annual budget over a five year commitment, $2 million of which was to be allocated to private sector initiatives that were established later in 1999. According to some interviewees, this budget for crime prevention paled in comparison to the $9.9 billion that is spent on police, courts and corrections. As the Former Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice contended, “its peanuts, ... it’s a good start but ... it’s seed money.” Likewise, a Former Member of the National Crime Prevention Council complained that “it’s not enough.”

On the other hand, for other interviewees, it was thought to be a significant contribution. As a Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General stated: “... to be given $30 million to play with, to shift that balance will really be a fundamental shift in everyone’s thinking.” This same interviewee later elaborated that

$32 million isn’t a lot of money depending on who you talk to but ... to put it into crime prevention through social development is kind of a courageous thing for a government because it’s not a five year thing. I mean everything in government is done on a five year span, and so to be spending a good chunk of money in a very splashy way that isn’t going to show marked reductions in crime in five years is a fairly courageous thing for a government and they have to have the sensibility I think to even let it go ahead.

Without making unsustainable assumptions about the intentions of policy-makers, it is nevertheless interesting to draw attention to the comment on ‘spending a good chunk of money in a very splashy way.’ This statement suggests that the optics of crime prevention initiatives are an important consideration in government decision-making and
spending. Furthermore, while an evaluation of prevention programs is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is plausible to contend that $32 million annually, which is perceived as a ‘good chunk of money,’ is vastly inadequate for the task that it is allegedly dedicated to addressing.

The Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of Justice echoed the Policy Analyst’s interpretation. He too thought that the allocation of new money towards crime prevention demonstrated “commitment” on the part of the government particularly “in an atmosphere of deficit reduction.” An assessment of the fiscal value of prevention initiatives is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the tensions that surface regarding the ‘balance’ between reactive responses and proactive approaches are indicative of some of the contradictions that arise within government-generated crime control rhetoric and practice.

The Components of Phase II of The National Strategy

In a pamphlet entitled: “Safer Communities: Everybody’s Responsibility,” the Government of Canada outlined the main components of the National Strategy. While promoting a social development approach, the pamphlet indicated that “[t]he Government of Canada believes that action must take place at the community level” (Government of Canada 2000). The rationale underlying this pronouncement was articulated in the following: “It is the people who live, work and play in a community who understand their area’s resources, problems, unique needs and capacities” (Government of Canada 2000). This example demonstrates how ‘at-a-distance’ forms of prevention are rationalized by
strategically ‘inflating’ the importance of a community’s capacity for knowledge and action. This statement also illustrates the inclusion of personal and community concerns into political rhetoric that tends to render the latter more convincing.

The pamphlet then went on to list the principal priority groups of the National Strategy. They were identified as follows: Children and Youth, Aboriginal People and Women’s Personal Security (Government of Canada 2000). It is interesting to note that these were the same priorities emphasized by the National Crime Prevention Council. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these target groups within the National Strategy reflects, at least in part, a sensitivity to the socio-economic plight of more marginal and vulnerable populations.

In addition to a Communications, Promotion and Public Education facet, as well as the National Crime Prevention Centre, the National Strategy’s major component is the “Safer Communities Initiative.” It “is designed to assist Canadians in undertaking crime prevention activities in their communities” (Government of Canada 2000). This initiative is comprised of four funding units. They are listed as follows:

The Community Mobilization Program helps communities develop approaches to crime prevention and undertake activities that deal with the root causes of crime. The Community Mobilization Program aims:
- to increase the development of community-based partnerships;
- to increase public awareness of and support for crime prevention; and
- to increase the capacity of diverse communities to deal with crime and victimization.

The principle objective of the Crime Prevention Investment Fund is to identify and evaluate social development approaches to crime prevention. The main goal of the Fund is to establish reliable information on what works and what is promising in reducing the risk factors associated with crime and victimization.
The Crime Prevention Partnership Program supports the involvement of organizations that can contribute to community crime prevention through the development of information, tools and resources. The results, applicable across Canada, are intended to facilitate community participation in all phases of crime prevention.

The Business Action Program on Crime Prevention involves national and provincial/territorial business and professional associations that will strengthen Canada’s approach to crime prevention. The extensive networks of national business and professional associations can help communities prevent crime, share information and encourage community mobilization.

While the nature of rationales, rationalities and programmes expressed through the National Strategy are discussed in subsequent sections, three brief points related to this list are worthy of mention here. The first is that this pamphlet enthusiastically promotes the social development approach. Nowhere is the actual emphasis on neo-conservative-oriented reactive and repressive responses mentioned within this pamphlet. Second, the Business Action Program is a strategic opportunity for the federal government to capitalize on the private sector’s alleged willingness to support financially different crime prevention activities of a situational or risk-oriented nature. Third, the Government of Canada clearly conveyed its intentions to carry out the above mentioned social development and private sector programs in an ‘at-a-distance’ manner at the community level.

Prior to elaborating upon the text-based reasons underlying the National Strategy, I discuss the rhetoric and rationales expressed through some of the visual images produced by the National Crime Prevention Centre in its promotion of the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention. They are presented in figures 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.
Figure 8.2
The Logo of the National Crime Prevention Centre
The image in Figure 8.2 evokes a variety of sentiments. First, the backdrop of the maple leaf is seemingly intended to appeal to a sense of Canadian pride. As the subsequent section on recursive rationales demonstrates, this visual ‘play’ on Canadian nostalgia is in keeping with similar appeals that are made at the level of political rhetoric through ministerial speeches and official publications. Secondly, the two different coloured hands are presumably intended to reflect the multi-cultural composition of the Canadian population. Thirdly and more importantly, the two hands that are ostensibly embracing an individual are emblematic of the benevolent intervention implied within the social development approach that is promoted through the National Strategy. This figure conjures up notions of protection and nurturing. The idea of ‘help’ is conveyed here in a very positive way. In so doing, it is likely to influence individuals’ emotional or sympathetic tendencies towards children or other potentially ‘unsafe’ groups of people.

It is also illustrative to note that while the image in Figure 8.2 conveys a sense of protection, it seems to be geared more towards human care and nurturing. This fostering image in the late 1990s is certainly in stark contrast to the pictures of locks and bars that were used to promote target hardening and opportunity reduction measures in the late 1970s (see Figures 5.1 and 5.3 in chapter five). At that time, crime prevention was more often equated with the fortress mentality that sought to ‘protect’ physical structures (ie. houses, business offices or public buildings) or property (cars, motorcycles, or other high priced portable items). While the fortress mentality was still evident toward the end of the twentieth century, this comparison does demonstrate the changes in priority targets and processes over time.
These changes in emphasis are also evident in the pamphlet presented in Figure 8.3. This brochure is entitled: “Safer Communities: Everybody’s Responsibility.” The title itself assumes that the goal of safer communities may be accomplished through a collaborative effort. It further implies the neo-liberal emphasis on community and individual responsibility. It should also be noted that the pictures on the pamphlet represent the three priority groups of the National Strategy. They included children (top right), Aboriginal peoples (bottom left) and women (bottom right).
Figure 8.3
Year 2000 Pamphlet of the
National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention

Safer Communities:
Everybody's Responsibility
Each image on the pamphlet portrays an important facet of the National Strategy. For example, the image of the hand shake in the top left corner reflects the benevolence and support that is thought to underlie the social development approach promoted through the National Strategy. In addition, the picture of the two children walking hand in hand in a park depicts the ideal conditions of public safety, especially for vulnerable populations. Furthermore, the images of the woman with the bicycle and the Aboriginal men with the canoe also convey the ideal environment for people to enjoy life, public spaces and natural settings with reasonable confidence in the safety around them. The portrayals of recreational activities are also indicative of the encompassing range of initiatives that fall under the umbrella of crime prevention through social development.

Similar optimism and positive goals are also displayed in the image that forms the backdrop of the Prevention Newsletter that is published by the National Crime Prevention Centre since 1999. The image (Government of Canada 2000b) is presented below in Figure 8.4.
Figure 8.4
Image from the Prevention Newsletter
This picturesque background image of a two-parent/two-child nuclear family standing by a body of water with a sunset portrays an ideal setting. Here, the ‘perfect’ two-parent/two-child family is cherishing a moment in nature in a rather peaceful way. The implication is that ‘prevention’ inevitably enables this type of orderly enjoyment. Again, it is a pleasant picture that conveys the desirability of preventative intervention. It is plausible to suggest here that these images constitute indirect political rhetoric in a visual form that add to the potential for persuasion.

An additional space where positive imaging was strategically employed was in the National Crime Prevention Centre’s 1998 Video entitled: “Building Safer Communities: It’s Time To Act.” Among numerous other images, the video included depictions of youth waving to a police officer in car, a mother feeding her baby, a youth centre with youth playing in a pool, the Canadian and Quebec flags flying together, children in a daycare, people jogging, a child on a slide in winter, two Native Canadians building a canoe, people walking freely and happily on a sidewalk, youth playing street hockey, a high school graduation, a mother and tot walking, as well as, a YMCA facility. Together, these various images conveyed the goals of peace, order, happiness and ‘good government.’ It should also be noted that the optimism associated with these images and with the potential of prevention was reinforced by the narrator of the video who stated that “the problems are complex but the solutions can be found” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998b).

It is also interesting to note the unquestioned positivity emphasized in these images and in those previously displayed. The pictures associated with crime prevention
that have been used as promotional material at the federal government level in Canada are in stark contrast to those images used by international development organizations. The latter explicitly display the desperate plight of their target population.

Instead, the crime prevention paraphernalia, presented above, displayed the ideal objectives of intervention, solidarity and participation. In other words, rather than focussing on the suffering inherent to the physical, emotional, psychological and financial costs of crime, the emotive images used to promote crime prevention tend to be more forward-looking and optimistic. The goals are presented rather than the problems. It may even be argued that the positive goals presented through the images serve as motivating rationales for engaging in preventative pursuits.

Now that we have examined some of the principles of prevention that were conveyed visually, we turn to a discussion on the rationales that propelled prevention forward through speeches and texts in the last years of the twentieth century.

THE RECURSIVENESS OF RATIONALES

The rationales that surfaced in speeches and publications in the late 1990s bear great resemblance to the ones that had been iterated in both the 1970s and 1980s. According to Edelman (1977), this observation is rather characteristic of government rhetoric. Rationalizations recur because the kinds of anxieties that official actions allegedly address recur (Edelman 1977:98). As the subsequent discussion demonstrates, in the case of crime and its prevention or control, the related costs and failures have remained significant concerns over the years.
It may also be argued that this repetition of rationales, and particularly neo-liberal ones, has ended up as a cumulative consolidation in the latter years of the twentieth century. In other words, many of the reasons have been put forth simultaneously and often in a mutually reinforcing way; as I demonstrate below, this actuality is more evident in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, despite the links among the rationales, I thought that it was instructive to divide them thematically into three categories: (a) fiscal preoccupations, (b) the failures of the criminal justice system, and (c) alternative successes. It should also be noted that, in keeping with the governmentality approach, this section presents how the Government of Canada’s crime prevention agenda in the late 1990s was thought and rationalized into being from the officials’ perspective (Miller and Rose 1990; O’Malley et al. 1997).

**Fiscal Preoccupations**

The rhetoric of prevention at the federal government level since the 1970s has undoubtedly been dominated by fiscal concerns. The recurrence of economic rationales was confirmed in interview by the Senior Official who had worked with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1973 and 1998. He explained that the cost-benefit argument has “always been an argument that’s used ... the whole idea of prevention is how much we can afford in terms of criminal justice.” Several other respondents, including the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council and a Secondee to the Department of Justice, further maintained that the increased emphasis on crime prevention in the 1990s was “fiscally driven” and “clearly connected to ... the need to
come up with more effective ways of spending money."

The preoccupation with expenditure restraint was officially documented in the 1994-95 Estimates (Department of Justice 1994:23).\textsuperscript{10} It was also noted again in the 1997-98 Estimates; the section entitled "Message from the Minister of Justice" specifically stated that "[c]oncern over the growing costs of the justice system will continue to drive the Department's efforts to identify cost-effective responses to justice issues and to reduce the demands on the criminal justice system, in particular, without compromising personal safety and security" (Department of Justice 1997:4).

This professed desire to balance financial costs with safety concerns was by no means a modest rationale underlying the federal government's prevention pilgrimage since the 1970s. Rather, it has remained a sustaining reason and one that has been marketed extensively in speeches and publications. As one Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre acknowledged of crime prevention: "I think in part the selling of it had to do with the whole ... cost effectiveness argument ... the 90s selling point was ... this is the way to potentially save money and promote safer communities ... it was very compelling."

The most common reference made by Ministers or in documents in the late 1990s pertained to the $10 billion price tag attached to criminal justice expenditures on an annual basis. This figure was often augmented to an estimated $46 billion\textsuperscript{11} as the extended costs related to personal and physical suffering were factored into the equation (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998c). This estimated figure encompassed the contributions of the health, social services, education and employment sectors. It
represented an effort on the part of the federal government to quantify the ripple effects of crime in dollar terms, seemingly for promotional and rationalizing purposes. The irony underlying the government's own acknowledgement of the expenses related to "cops, courts and corrections" is that it has not reduced its expenditures on reactive measures; it has simply added $32 million towards prevention. This actuality reinforces the way in which political rhetoric often conceals action and/or inaction elsewhere (Edelman 1977).

Nevertheless, the rationale put forth in support of the $32 million was explicated in the following way by the Minister of Justice in 1997:

It is estimated that the cost of detaining a young offender for a year in closed custody can add up to approximately $100,000. If prevention programs can result in 320 fewer young people in custody every year, we will save $32 million a year, and our crime prevention investment will have paid for itself in dollars and cents, let alone human pain and lost potential (McLellran 1997: 5 - emphasis in original).

This projected cost-benefit calculation clearly demonstrates the fiscal preoccupations associated with government involvement in prevention initiatives. This rationale appears compelling because it is presented as a seemingly irrefutable long term investment. It is interesting to note that in this particular quotation, the economic costs are highlighted first, while the 'human' ones appear to be secondary. In other words, the economic rationale seems to be supplemented here by the human reasons which become a 'value-added' bonus in the investment scheme. This observation indicates not only the extent to which the prevention campaign was 'fiscally-driven,' but also the strategic use of rhetoric in that regard.

The neo-liberal emphasis on cost-effectiveness found further expression in a
'story' that became an allegedly compelling impetus for preventative pursuits. It was entitled: "Jack’s Troubled Career." It appeared in numerous National Crime Prevention Centre documents in the late 1990s, including its own separate publication, and it was circulated widely among politicians, policy makers and practitioners. It was also included in the second issue of the "Prevention" newsletter (2000:10) with the following subtitle: "The costs to society of a young person in trouble."

It hypothetically enumerated the financial costs that are incurred by the end of an adolescent’s troubled life. It estimated that by the age of 17, Jack’s childhood and adolescent difficulties would cost ‘society’ a total of $511,500.00. These expenditures included Jack’s involvement with child welfare services, group home care, special education, police contacts and investigations, court sessions, psychological and psychiatric assessments, open and closed custody, as well as probation (Government of Canada 2000:10).

While the story of "Jack’s Troubled Career" became the expression of prevention’s economic rationale par excellence and a useful tool of political rhetoric, one interviewee cautioned about its validity and expressed frustration with its utility. The Senior Official with the Ministry of the Solicitor General (1973-1998), claimed that Jack’s Troubled Career ...[pause] you can’t support that; it’s much more of an estimate than it is good research. But if people took a look at that and saw the costs associated with that. You would think they would respond. But you know, they don’t. They allow it to happen.

While the estimates were based on a mix of published figures, some of the sources that were drawn upon were less definitive than others. This actuality was acknowledged
by the story’s promoters (Government of Canada 2000:11). Nevertheless, while the
fictional story presented a compelling argument for investing in prevention, this
respondent’s comment reminds us of the continued and substantial investment in reactive
approaches ($46 billion per annum) over proactive ones ($32 million per annum). While
this dissertation has not set out to expose the gap between justificatory rhetoric and
practice, it is worth noting here that as compelling as the slogans and stories promoted via
political rhetoric might be, their message is not necessarily reflected at the policy or
program levels.

Whatever the gaps, it is evident from this brief overview that there seems to be a
strong faith in the cost-effectiveness potential of prevention and this confidence became a
seemingly powerful rationale, at least at the level of government rhetoric. Prevention was
further propelled by reasons such as, “it is the fiscally prudent thing to do” (Assistant
Deputy Minister - Department of Justice)\(^\text{12}\) and “[i]t is also good social policy and smart
economic policy” (Government of Canada 1999:3).\(^\text{13}\) In light of these promotional
comments and their capacity to serve as compelling rationales, it is possible to see how
prevention has become somewhat of an icon of economic imperatives in governmental
terms (Garland 1999). We now turn to some of the other rationales that are inextricably
linked to this predominant preoccupation with fiscal restraint.

The Limitations of the Reactive Criminal Justice System

The Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council attributed the
favourable consideration of preventative alternatives in the 1990s to “the increasing
recognition of the cost ineffectiveness of a reactive approach” because “it was too expensive for what it was accomplishing.” The Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of Justice similarly stated that “the traditional approach of more cops, courts and corrections is very costly and has not proven to be very effective ... we need to look at other options.” While the inclusion of both of these statements may appear to be redundant, that is exactly the point that I have sought to make through their presentation.¹⁴

As previous chapters have demonstrated, the alleged failure of the criminal justice system has been reiterated as a rationale in numerous speeches and government documents since the mid 1970s. This phenomenon has been variously explained by different scholars. While Garland (1996) refers to this predicament more neutrally as ‘recurring ambivalence’ towards criminal justice, Edelman (1977) offers a more cynical interpretation.

Edelman (1977:97) has pointed to the way in which political language that attempts to justify decisions often calls attention to the limitations of a different option from the one taken. He has further contended that the cumulation of justifications allows governments to construct a particular narrative about the past so as to legitimate their proposed plans for the future (Edelman 1988). Edelman (1977:79) has additionally cautioned against the way in which these optimistic narratives of reform obscure the government’s actual pursuit of policies that are known to be ineffective. This observation is quite pertinent to the case of crime prevention whereby both the idealism and optimism inherent within the rhetoric that promotes proactive pursuits obscure the Government of Canada’s continued investment in neo-conservative reactive responses. Yet, while the
latter have been frequently dismissed as limited in their impact and costly in their maintenance, they are currently promoted, and persuasively so, as part of the prevention project through the National Strategy.

Miller and Rose (1990) have presented a similar claim regarding the utility of ‘failure’ as a rationale for ‘new’ government intervention. While their version is seemingly more impartial than Edelman’s, it is still illustrative. More specifically, Miller and Rose (1990:4) have argued that “the impetus of ‘failure’ provides for the propagation of new programs of government.” They attribute this actuality to the way in which governments constantly reform themselves in light of failures and evaluations (Miller and Rose 1990). While Rose and Miller consider ‘failure’ to be an occasion for reflection within government spheres, I seek to emphasize the repetitiveness of the use of failure as a rationale for reform. The operative word here is ‘constantly.’ This rationale of the limited effectiveness of the criminal justice system has been repeatedly recycled throughout the late twentieth century to justify both neo-liberal visions of risk management (1970s and 1980s), and socially-oriented versions of prevention (1980s and 1990s), as well as a combination thereof.

The extended mileage that this allegedly compelling reason has enjoyed for over a quarter of a century has undoubtedly been enhanced by its link to the predominant preoccupation of the costs of reactive measures. In other words, while the ‘failure’ itself is seemingly important, the ‘cost’ of the failure is also considered to be equally, if not more significant in its capacity to rationalize alternative plans. Nevertheless, despite the mutually reinforcing link between ‘cost’ and ‘failure,’ the limited capacity of the criminal
justice system has still been utilized as a notable rationale on its own. This was evident in an explicit enunciation of ‘why’ the federal government decided to invest in preventative programs. Consider the following statement that was included in a pamphlet produced by the National Crime Prevention Centre:

In Canada, we have traditionally responded to crime with reactive measures - the apprehension, sentencing, incarceration and rehabilitation of offenders. This approach, while important, is not sufficient to prevent crime. That is why the Government of Canada launched the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention (Government of Canada 2000 - my emphasis).

Furthermore, while the high rate of incarceration in Canada compared to other Western industrialized nations\textsuperscript{16} has been cited as a reason for investing in prevention, its counterpart, the crime rate, has also been presented as a significant stimulant for supplementary action. Its significance, however, has been ‘strategically’ constructed. Consider the following twist:

Canada’s crime rate fell for the seventh consecutive year in 1998. The 4% drop resulted in the lowest police-reported crime rate since 1979. Since peaking in 1991, the national crime rate has declined 22%. However, it is still 87% higher than it was 30 years ago (Government of Canada n.d.(b):1).

While I do not contest the validity of this statement on statistics,\textsuperscript{17} I do nevertheless question the federal government’s deliberate efforts to maintain the rationale of high crime rates as a worthy reason for their fledgling attempts to engage in prevention on a grander scale. What is of further interest here is its explicit acknowledgment of the decline in the rate. While the candour of the first three sentences of this quotation should be credited, the twist presented in the last statement requires consideration. The authors’
efforts to reach back in time to find the lowest comparative figure obscures the possibility that other relevant factors, beyond criminal justice interventions, may have contributed to the more recent reduction. The figure of 87% is used here rather strategically to reinforce the ‘urgent’ desirability of prevention alternatives. This figure also reminds readers of the inability of criminal justice measures to control crime adequately over time.

This brief section has demonstrated the way in which the limitations of the reactive criminal justice system have been used repeatedly at the level of rhetoric as a compelling rationale underlying the federal government’s increasing reliance on prevention alternatives in the late 1990s. Some may contend that this notion of ‘failure’ has been strategically exploited not only to acquire support for prevention, but also to mask the continued investment in reactive responses. Whatever the interpretation may be, there is no doubt that the limitations of criminal justice measures have become one of the most predominant of the recurring rationales that have promoted crime prevention in late twentieth century Canada at the federal government level. While the emphasis on ‘failure’ has undoubtedly been significant, the increasing appeal of ‘success’ models has also served to bolster support for crime prevention in the latter half of the 1990s.

The Promise of Alternative Successes

Miller and Rose’s (1990:4) contention that “the “failure” of one policy or set of policies is always linked to attempts to devise or propose programs that would work better” was certainly evident in the aforementioned rationales employed to advance the prevention agenda at the federal government level in Canada. However, Miller and
Rose’s concentration on ‘failure’ tends to obscure the extent to which the flipside of failure, which is arguably success or potential success, also constitutes an important impetus for reform. One must recognize that the success of previous or existing programs has also become an influential rationale for change and innovation, particularly in the realm of proactive approaches. The emphasis on the evaluation of prevention programs in both academic and practical spheres has certainly fostered a climate of optimism and by extension, it has generated a persuasive rhetoric of success in this regard.

This enthusiastic faith in prevention was conveyed in a statement made by the Solicitor General of Canada at the official launch of the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention on June 2, 1998. He reiterated the well known and well used adage when he claimed that “[t]he key to public safety is preventing crime. An ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure” (Scott 1998:1 - emphasis in original). The perceived potential of prevention is presented here at the level of political rhetoric in the form of an irresistible reason for government intervention. It is interesting to note that it is a rationale that was actually appropriated by government officials; it had been used, but not coined, by Waller (1989) almost a decade earlier to draw the federal government’s attention to the issue. In this sense, just as government officials had previously assumed the discourse of self-critique by their recognition of the limitations of their reactive measures, so too have they adopted the optimistic rhetoric of positivity.

An additional emphasis on successes was found in a booklet dedicated to promoting crime prevention through social development (CPSD). The document
explained that

Some of the best known CPSD programs involve early intervention with children at risk and their parents. Programs such as the Perry Pre-School Project in Michigan, the Hawaii Healthy Start Project, and a new generation of “Headstart” programs in Canada (such as Moncton Headstart and Aboriginal Headstart) create supportive environments for children who are a potential risk of later life criminality. These programs demonstrate the ways in which supportive strategies can significantly improve children’s development, educational achievement and social adjustment, and reduce the likelihood of later involvement in crime (Government of Canada n.d.(a):2).

This passage demonstrates how government officials began to incorporate the ideas promoted by both Waller (1989) and the National Crime Prevention Council (1994-1997). It also shows how foreign success models, as well as Canadian made best practices are enthusiastically promoted as worthy endeavours. Despite the potential contradictions and gaps within this political rhetoric, the inclusion of allegedly effective programs illustrates that government generated rhetoric on crime prevention incorporates examples of both success and failure as part of its justificatory and persuasive character.

This brief overview of the three interrelated rationales was presented from the perspective of some of the officials who helped to shape the discourse and policies around prevention at the federal government level in Canada in the late 1990s. Based on this summary, it is possible to see how this rhetoric of prevention had turned at that time around the allocation of fiscal resources or the lack thereof, around concerns with the ineffectiveness of reactive approaches, as well as around the potential of successful alternatives. In many ways, prevention has advanced through administrative rationales and in relation to the practices of bureaucracy. The next section addresses how
prevention has also been re-constituted through more emotive and sometimes serendipitous influences.

CONTINGENT ACTUALITIES

As Hindess (1997:266) has so appropriately pointed out, ‘government’ is not necessarily conducted solely according to its own autonomous and coherent rationality. In addition, if we are to better grasp the reasons for government intervention, we must pay heed to the multiple rationales that are taken up in the political realm; we must further recognize how the presence of various rationales is indicative of a political process that is shaped by conflicting interests both within and without government agencies (Garland 1999:34).

We must also acknowledge the complex internal dynamics that influence government decisions and actions. For example, in discussing the role of external influences, the Assistant Deputy Minister at the Department of Justice explained that “between that and the decision making by government there is a considerable amount of time and energy spent on translating ideas that may be generated by an external body into something which government can act on.” While the translation process of ‘ideal’ alternatives into ‘viable’ strategies may be highly ‘politicized’ and ‘bureaucratized,’ it is one that illustrates how rationales are neither solely formally generated nor exclusively arbitrarily conceived. Rather, they are contingent upon a complex array of influences that are often interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

In light of these claims, this section attempts to move beyond the predominantly
neo-liberal rationales emphasized above. It specifically demonstrates how prevention rhetoric and policy are a product not only of shifting rationalities, but also of aleatoric and contingent political circumstances (Curtis 1993; Garland 1999; Walters 2000). It focusses particularly on the influential role of actors, the political opportunities afforded by prevention, as well as the emotively-based concerns of crime that were expressed both for, and by Canadians.

Candid and Committed Politicians

As in previous years, crime prevention in the late 1990s was shaped and advanced through the aspirations of various protagonists. The influence of the National Crime Prevention Council, the Horner Report, the speeches from the throne, as well as the Liberal ‘Redbooks,’ were considered significant catalysts in moving crime prevention forward on the federal agenda (Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada). Various ministers and deputy ministers were also identified by interviewees as having ‘championed’ the cause of prevention. Ministers Alan Rock (Justice), Herb Gray (Solicitor General) and Andy Scott (Solicitor General), as well as Deputy Ministers John Tait (Justice) and George Thompson (Justice) were considered by several interviewees to be the politicians the most influential and committed to the federal level prevention project. In fact, these ‘broad thinking’ officials were regarded by one interviewee as ‘blessings’ for both the departments involved and the crime prevention initiatives themselves (Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice).

This same respondent went on to illustrate the personal commitment of Deputy
Minister of Justice George Thompson who had worked in this position between 1994 and 1998. She specifically stated that “the deputy minister played a very big role; the deputy minister at the time had a very keen interest in crime prevention ... which gave it ... a lot of profile ... the personal interest of the deputy minister made a difference in affecting things” (Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice).

While I was not able to obtain a complete sense of how this alleged personal dedication was actually translated into action, it is plausible to claim, based on the responses of several interviewees, that crime prevention initiatives, and the National Strategy in particular, were propelled forward by candidly concerned political officials. That is not to say that they were merrily and naively detached from the constraints of fiscal crises and questions of ineffectiveness. Rather, the combination of their presence and the matters that they dealt with seemed to have determined the nature of the proposed prevention plans.

As I mentioned briefly in chapter seven, it is interesting to note here that only Liberal Ministers of Justice and Solicitor Generals were identified by interviewees as having played a prominent role in advancing the federal level crime prevention initiative. This finding not only pertains to the latter half of the 1990s, but also to the entire period between 1974 and 2000. Not one interviewee identified a Conservative Solicitor General or Minister of Justice as having been a catalyst in spurring the prevention project. Yet as I noted in the previous chapter, it was the Conservative government that established the infamous Horner Report, which itself was seen to have had a significant impact in setting crime prevention on both national and federal agendas.
It is difficult to speculate why responses tended to favour the Liberals’ contribution. Unfortunately however, I did not seize the opportunity during interviews to clarify these claims. Nevertheless, two interviewees’ responses are worthy of mention here. While the former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council noted that the $32 million annual investment made by the Liberal government in the late 1990s was “more than anybody has ever done before,” he also recalled the effect of the Horner Report under the Conservative leadership. Furthermore, the former Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice added that she did not notice a difference between Conservative and Liberal support of prevention between the late 1980s and the 1990s; she claimed that “the evolution was growing automatically because it was coming from an apolitical movement ... because it came from outside the federal bodies.” While these two interviewees’ responses are more judgmental than conclusive, they do nevertheless cast some light on the ambivalent link between prevention and political support.

**Crime Prevention as Political Opportunism**

The optimism and positivity associated with prevention and its persuasive rhetoric may be appropriately considered part of the expressive and morally-toned currents that Garland (1999:34) has identified as consequential in shaping crime control policy. By extension, the political opportunities afforded by the enthusiasm may very well be regarded as a significant part of the reasons that prevention has been so readily embraced in recent years.

Several interviewees, including the Former Chair of the National Crime
Prevention Council, a Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre and the Senior Official with the Ministry of the Solicitor General, designated prevention as a ‘good news’ issue that fostered a positive approach to governing crime. It should be noted here that in the early 1980s, Solicitor General Robert Kaplan also viewed prevention as a good news opportunity in the face of various penal crises. This observation illustrates how contingent actualities also recur at various political moments.

In addition, some of these respondents openly revealed the political utility of prevention in more detail. In response to the question: “What sustains the federal government’s interest in crime prevention?,” a Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre offered the following explanation:

I think a part of it is political opportunism ... positive federal visibility; that they have an opportunity to go into their ridings where projects have been supported and issue press releases and make announcements ... with their constituents ... it’s good news when there’s not a lot of good news out there.

The Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council provided a similar account but with a particular twist on government accountability. He stated that “at a hidden level, it is one of the few opportunities governments have to have good news stories around crime and to be seen to do something positive for communities without taking accountability for the impact of the spending.”

It is evident through these two interpretations that not only has crime prevention become a site where the positive side of justice initiatives are enthusiastically featured and not only has it become a space where the interests of communities and constituents are placated, but it is also a venue for the federal government to render itself more visible
without actually being fully responsible for interventions. The specifics of the ‘at-a-distance’ forms of prevention are beyond the scope of this dissertation; however, their rationales are discussed in a subsequent section in more detail.

Nevertheless, it is sufficient for the moment to contend that the ‘good news’ image conveyed through crime prevention potentially camouflages the extent to which the Canadian federal government has strategically set itself up merely to provide guidance and seed funds for proactive measures. Individuals and communities are themselves expected to be more accountable through their own exercises of prudence and through their ability to maintain programs and to adapt to evaluation criteria and alternative funding sources.

In any case, this brief consideration demonstrates how the perceived political advantages of crime prevention may be viewed as a powerful reason underlying the Government of Canada’s interest and intervention in proactive measures. It further illustrates that one can never underestimate the influence that emotive currents, both positive and negative, can wield on government generated activities.

“Concerned Canadians”

An additional contingent actuality that surfaced on numerous occasions in both speeches and documents pertained to the plight of the Canadian people vis-à-vis crime and its prevention. This emotively-based rationale took the form of two different, yet related types of concerns. First, it encompassed the concern for the well-being of Canadians as professed by government officials; secondly, it involved the alleged
concerns held by Canadians over crime as interpreted by government officials. I address these in turn.

First, the concern for Canadians on the part of the government was made explicit in an explanation of the lessons learned from “Jack’s Troubled Career.” This story seems to have received a considerable amount of ‘endorsement’ mileage. At the end of the article in the “Prevention” newsletter, a section entitled “The Moral of the Story” explained that

Jack’s career as a repeat young offender illustrates some of the common features of how children and young people pass through the child welfare and young offender systems. Not only are these services expensive to provide, but the offences themselves result in a cost to society in terms of the physical costs, personal injuries, and psychological harm experienced by victims. Jack has a painful early life, and his offences cause pain to others. The cost of such pain is enormous and not easily calculated in dollar terms, which would require placing a figure on a lost life, or lost employment and lost enjoyment of life by victims and families ... In addition, the costs of crime have to be calculated over time, because pain and suffering are not necessarily short-term in their effects (Government of Canada 2000:10-11).

This quotation reveals the concern that the Government of Canada claims to have had at the turn of the millennium over the suffering endured by many young offenders in their early years of life, as well as over the pain that victims and their families struggle through over the long-term. Despite the aforementioned preoccupation with fiscal expenditures, it is evident here that human costs do matter, at least at the level of official rhetoric and especially where socially-oriented interventions are being promoted.

The second level of ‘concerned Canadians’ pertains to their fears, worries, and expectations. It should be noted however, that the examples of Canadians’ concerns that
are provided below are presented from the federal government’s perspective. This research did not undertake a consultation with Canadians themselves. This section, therefore, only illustrates the way in which the federal government’s interpretations of Canadians’ concerns has been used as a rationale to advance the National Strategy.

The first example illustrates the nostalgic national appeal that is drawn upon by a government official to rationalize the shift towards prevention. According to the former Minister of Justice,

Canadians are determined to preserve the peaceful, orderly and safe communities that reflect our society’s values. One of Canada’s defining characteristics is our deep sense of order and civility. Yet in a society that abhors crime and violence, there is increasing concern for the safe and peaceful communities we feel are being threatened by crime, and particularly by violent crime (Rock 1994: 2).

This statement may be critiqued by some as being presumptuous because it generalizes the term “Canadians” in a collective way without providing evidence of this claim. Nevertheless, national pride is emotively linked here to peace and safety. This appeal to “Canadianism” is intended to serve here as a compelling reason for preventative action. This quotation further illustrates the federal government’s attempts to render its rhetoric more persuasive by personalizing the messages conveyed through it.

Related to this ‘nationalized’ concern over safety is the issue of fear. The federal government’s awareness of public fear was acknowledged in a document produced by the National Crime Prevention Centre. It stated that “[t]he drop in reported crime rates in the 1990s gives the sense that criminal behaviour is declining, yet the fear of crime is still very prevalent among Canadians” (Government of Canada n.d.(b):2). Although this
claim is not substantiated here, it is important to note how 'fear' is invoked in this case as a concern on the part of the Government of Canada.

While details about what is understood as fear are not provided here, the fact that the federal government acknowledges the emotional paralysis and the physical constraints related to fear of crime conveys a sense of shared worry between a government and its citizens. Furthermore, its inclusion in a text with a subtitle of "The National Strategy in Action," suggests that fear is considered to be worthy grounds for intervention.

It should also be noted how this preoccupation with individualized fear is thought to have extended repercussions. Consider the following: "When Canadians feel unsafe in their homes and streets, communities suffer both economically and socially." (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999b). This statement reveals the way in which lack of safety is perceived to have a negative impact on community cohesion and prosperity. In this particular case, the multiple effects of fear are emotively expressed at the level of rhetoric as part of the motivating reason for action.

An additional demonstration of concern on the part of the federal government was evident in the following excerpt from a speech by a former Minister of Justice:

... when I became Justice Minister, I decided a top priority would be to address why Canadians were losing confidence in important parts of our justice system. I have identified three priority areas: crime prevention, youth justice and the concerns of victims, where I hope concentrated work can help alleviate some of Canadians' concerns about our system of justice (McLellan 1998a:2).

Canadians' alleged lack of confidence in the justice system is explicitly identified in this quotation as the reason for the prioritization of crime prevention as a government
initiative. More specifically, crime prevention is conceived here as part of the solution to the said problem. It is important to note here the recurrence of this particular rationale. The declining confidence on the part of Canadians in the justice system was one of the founding reasons for the advent of prevention programs at the federal government level in the mid 1970s. Bearing this actuality in mind, it appears as though the problem underlying this rationale has persisted for over a quarter of a century. While it is beyond the scope of this study to determine why this problem has not been rectified, it is at least instructive to note the repetitiveness of rationales over time.

By way of conclusion to this section on contingent actualities, three points must be reinforced here. First, emotionally driven currents undoubtedly supply the federal government with compelling rationales for action. Second, despite the political opportunism afforded by crime prevention, candid concerns for both individuals and communities do form important parts of the reasons underlying the federal government’s prevention strategy. It is important to note here that the rationales mentioned above constitute an important part of the persuasive arsenal of political rhetoric on crime prevention. Third, crime prevention is shaped as much by contingent actualities as it is by formal rationalities; it is also plausible to suggest that these multiple levels of influence often advance the prevention project simultaneously and in a mutually reinforcing manner.
PREVENTION AT-A-DISTANCE

This section examines the articulations and rationales underlying the Canadian federal government’s desire to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance.’ More specifically, it illustrates how the Government of Canada itself conceives prevention as a form of regulation within and among government departments and extra-state agencies. The purpose of this endeavour is to demonstrate how discourses of ‘at-a-distance’ governing have permeated state-generated prevention rhetoric and initiatives in the late 1990s. In doing so, this section draws attention to the complexities inherent to the increased emphasis upon community responsibility and private sector involvement as they are represented in promotional government rhetoric.

‘The Government’ of Canada: Its Intentions for Intervention

The Government of Canada’s crime prevention initiatives from the mid 1970s onward have been characterized by neo-liberal emphases of governing ‘at-a-distance.’ The late 1990s in particular saw a marked increase in government rhetoric and activities that were placing greater weight on the value of decentralized forms of regulation and administration in the realm of crime prevention. The examples presented below for the purpose of illustrating this occurrence are direct reflections of the federal government’s own perspective on the matter. The aim of these selected examples is to demonstrate how the Canadian federal government itself articulates and rationalizes its own attempts to maintain a distance between its decisions and the actions of other agencies and individuals (Rose 1996b:53).
As Rose (2000:323) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992:30) have pointed out, in the 'at-a-distance' arrangement, the preferred role of state has been recast as that of a partner, animator, facilitator and catalyst. In this capacity, and with a view to achieving greater efficiency, government intervention is characterized as minimal and indirect. Accordingly, it seeks to act through an assemblage of networks that are seemingly far removed from itself. This evolving adaptation was explicitly articulated in a document that officially announced the aims of 'The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention' (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998:2). The text specifically stated that

> [t]he objectives of the National Strategy are:
> -to promote the integrated action of key governmental and non-governmental partners to reduce crime and victimization;
> -to assist communities in developing and implementing community-based solutions to problems that contribute to crime and victimization, particularly as they affect children, youth, women and Aboriginal people; and
> -to increase public awareness of and support for effective approaches to crime prevention.

It is evident from this passage that the 'at-a-distance' scheme of the National Strategy was established at the outset. In fact, it was promoted through a rather optimistic rhetoric that attempted to communicate the benevolent character of this arrangement, which is seemingly intended to leave individuals and communities better off than they were before.

The decentralized nature of the National Strategy was also conveyed orally in a speech by the Minister of Justice\(^*\) in 1998. She explained that

> [t]he role of the Department of Justice in this next phase of the strategy will
be to help communities share information on best practices, to help federal
government departments to work in a coordinated fashion, and to build
partnerships between governments, NGOs, and the private sector. However,
at the end of the day, the success of this program must depend on our ability
to mobilize the commitment, ideas, expertise and contribution of Canadians
at the grassroots level. If we succeed in that task, our strategy will have an
impact on confidence in our justice system -- both for those who are directly
involved in this prevention work and for all Canadians who benefit from our
crime prevention strategy (McLellan 1998b:4). 21

This quotation reflects the way in which the federal Department of Justice, as the
lead state agency for the National Strategy, intended to ‘steer’ prevention initiatives rather
than to deliver the actual services (Braithwaite 2000:223; Osborne and Gaebler 1992:25-
35; Rose 2000:324). The intentions to ‘share,’ ‘help,’ ‘build,’ and ‘mobilize’ reflect the
state’s own perception of itself as a facilitator and a catalyst for ‘grassroots level’
activities. It should also be noted that at the level of rhetoric, these softer terms, as
opposed to ‘control’ for example, are useful in garnering support for, and to activate
participation in, a process that is allegedly less repressive and more accessible and
affirmative (Edelman 1977).

What is less certain here, however, is the reason put forth for this decentralized
endeavour. The Minister identified “confidence in our justice system,” and not crime
reduction, as the purpose of this form of implementation. While it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation to evaluate the worthiness of the rationales put forth, it is disconcerting to
think that the Canadian federal government would mount a multi-million dollar campaign
simply to build Canadians’ confidence in an already limited resource. In fairness, other
rationales, such as fear of crime, have been noted elsewhere. But it is important to
mention that the confidence of Canadians in the criminal justice system seems to have been a preoccupation with former Minister McLellan because she repeated it in several other speeches during her term.

Nevertheless, this shift in the federal government’s perceived function may be due in part to the Government of Canada’s recognition of its own incapacity to ‘row’ or to deliver services efficiently and effectively. This acknowledged inefficacy may certainly serve as a rationale for the current neo-liberal prescription that advocates ‘steering’ (instead of ‘rowing’) as the ideal role of the state (Braithwaite 2000:223; Osborne and Gaebler 1992:30). In the Canadian context, an example of how state officials acknowledge their own limitations was provided by a respondent in an interview setting. She confirmed that the purpose of the National Strategy was “to provide some tools for communities. But also to really underscore, and maybe that’s even the biggest change, is that not one level of government, not one sector can really put prevention in place; it really needs that multi-disciplinary, multi-level kind of response” (Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice).

She later added emphatically that “[i]t would be harmful to try to do it alone; we need provinces to work with us; the responses, the solutions are part of provincial systems, are part of municipal responsibilities” (Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice). This latter quotation reveals how the bureaucratic relationship among the federal, provincial and municipal governments constitutes a delivery system that creates an ‘at-a-distance’ strategy in and of itself; it is at least in part removed from the federal level.
Another actuality must also be noted here. It pertains to the "centrality" inherent within state generated prevention initiatives. Despite the claims among governmentality writers that regulation is not exclusively contingent upon formal and central state intervention, one must nevertheless recognize the 'centralized' way in which prevention has become envisioned and deployed. As Stenson and Watt (1999:192) have noted, despite the desire to govern preventively 'at-a-distance,' many policy initiatives originate within central state ministries. These ministries 'steer' the projects by setting the priorities of debate, by establishing policy visions and by controlling funding decisions (Pavlich 1999:114).

This centralized 'control' is evident in the case of crime prevention on two levels. First, the only so-called prevention site through which the Government of Canada governs directly is in the area of federal corrections; these are managed directly by the federal departments of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services Canada. Despite the reactive nature of these criminal justice measures, they are still considered to be important parts of the balanced approach to crime prevention. It must be pointed out here that it is these reactive and repressive measures, and not the proactive and social ones, that the federal government has maintained under its direct supervision and management.

The second area where 'centralized' control is evident pertains to the leadership role that was taken on by the Canadian federal government and by the Ministries of Justice and the Solicitor General in particular. It was further sustained by the establishment of the federally funded umbrella organization known as the National Crime Prevention Centre that was tasked to manage "The National Strategy on Community
Safety and Crime Prevention." In some ways, these developments point to an authoritative moment on the part of the Canadian federal government that took command of the initiative, but sought to devolve the delivery of crime prevention onto the community and the private sector.

Nevertheless, for some advocates of more proactive orientations, crime prevention is a responsibility of the state-system. In fact, in certain contexts it is deemed a necessity due to the limited potential of the volunteer and private sectors to address the more complex problems of crime and victimization. The Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council explained that crime prevention is the state’s responsibility because crime prevention will not produce the kind of bottom lines that will make it attractive for the private sector to go into high needs communities. Okay, I mean Pete & Marwick can handle CIBC and the Royal Bank of Canada, but they’re not going to handle the ghettos in Montreal or Toronto. And volunteerism is not a viable response in high needs, low resource communities. Those people don’t have the skills and are too afraid to get involved anyway, and they certainly don’t have the resources. So by default, the only source of resources and expertise is governments. If they don’t do it, nobody else can or will.

This example points to a more complex dynamic among the Canadian federal government and the private and community sectors. On the one hand, individuals, communities and the private sector are becoming more involved and responsibilized in preventive measures (O’Malley and Palmer 1996:141). On the other hand, there seems to be a continued need and desire for state-generated knowledge and resources, the latter of which most often takes the form of economic support. This tension between centralized and decentralized state authority renders the notions of responsibility and accountability
within the ‘at-a-distance’ forms of prevention more complex. While attempting to render individuals, communities and the private sector more responsible and active, the National Strategy inevitably creates a dependent relationship among these non-state groups and the federal government, especially where funding is concerned.

In this sense, the revised neo-liberal ambitions associated with the Canadian federal government’s crime prevention initiatives have emerged in rather partial and convoluted ways. Despite its intention to govern ‘at-a-distance’ and to share activities, the Government of Canada is not necessarily diminishing or absolving itself of all responsibility. Rather, in addition to maintaining existing functions, it is also assuming a new coordinating and funding role in the management of individuals, the private sector and communities (Garland 1996:454).

The Government of Canada and [In]Dependent Local Communities

Despite the foreseeable dependence mentioned above, there is no doubt that the Government of Canada has sought to ‘responsibilize’ communities through the National Strategy. In fact, according to the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council, part of the federal government’s intention was “to re-educate people to lower expectations and crime prevention became one of the places where communities were supposed to take responsibility for services that had been centrally provided previously.”

As this quotation reveals, part of the purpose of the federal government’s efforts was to lower Canadians’ expectations of, and dependency upon, all levels of government and the criminal justice system as absolute guarantors of protection and security (Rose
2000:323; Garland 1996:448). As indicated by the Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice, the corollary of this effort was “to empower communities to adopt a crime prevention through social development approach to dealing with the problems in their areas.” This statement reveals part of the reason for a decentralized prevention strategy. It further uncovers the federal government’s intention to localize the problem of crime, as well as to responsibilize and habitilize communities, yet all through an allegedly ‘social’ orientation.

Some of these goals were explicitly and officially announced at the launch of the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention in 1998. The ‘Backgrounder’ document included the following description:

The Community Mobilization Program aims:
- to increase the development of broad, community-based partnerships focused on dealing with local crime prevention issues;
- to increase public awareness of and support for crime prevention; and
- to increase the capacity of diverse communities to deal with crime and victimization. (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998:3).

This excerpt reveals the federal government’s own view of itself as a mobilizer, coordinator, educator, and enabler of community-oriented prevention programs. The seemingly benevolent intentions on the part of the federal government were further reinforced in the following explication: “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention is designed to help Canadians create safer communities, by supporting community-based crime prevention efforts, enhancing communities’ knowledge and experience with respect to crime prevention and fostering partnerships and collaboration” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998:1 - my emphasis).
The actions implied within the terms ‘supporting,’ ‘enhancing’ and ‘fostering’ reflect the indirect nature of the federal government’s plans through the National Strategy. While these verbs convey the federal government’s benevolent intentions to ‘assist,’ they also impart a sense of detachment from the actual programs themselves. In other words, the federal government’s intervention in this case is conceived as less ‘active’ in and of itself, and more as a promoter and enabler of action among others, especially communities. Nevertheless, at the level of rhetoric, these verbs persuasively impart a more favourable view of the Canadian federal government as a nurturer rather than as a controller. This positive image is an important one in the context of the federal government’s own efforts to provide a ‘balanced’ approach to crime and victimization.

In addition, the community tag attached to crime prevention was enthusiastically and emphatically promoted in the rhetoric that sought to advance the National Strategy. For example, Minister McLellan had proclaimed that “[c]ommunity-based and community-driven projects are the future of crime prevention in Canada. We will therefore be flexible as we work to complement local efforts - and we want the help of those who are deeply involved with their communities to make sure that these projects run effectively” (McLellan 1998a:5-6).

This quotation identifies the community not only as the site of prevention, but also as the actual propeller of prevention. In this sense, the community is expected to act both as a leader and as a recipient simultaneously. It should also be noted that this Minister’s statement draws attention to the complex way in which ‘at-a-distance’ governance is envisioned through the National Strategy. While there is certainly emphasis on
community-based action, the federal government does not see itself as completely
detached from the ground level. Rather, by seeking “to complement local efforts,” the
federal government presents itself as a collaborator and partner in these initiatives.

This ‘self-inclusion’ in the partnership effort on the part of the federal government
was also evident in a statement made by the former Solicitor General, Andy Scott, at the
launch of the National Strategy in 1998. He stated that

[s]trong partnerships, which include governments, police, community
organizations, business, families and individuals are the key to crime
prevention. Communities must engage all these partners to take
action to prevent crime. When people do not act, problems are allowed
to grow. The results show up in our prisons and the costs are staggering

The Solicitor General’s words certainly corroborate Pavlich’s (1999:120) claim
that governments are increasingly attempting to foster partnerships designed to enable
individuals and communities to manage and protect themselves. While the federal
government is presented here as part of a collaborative alliance, there was certainly an
onus placed on communities to take advantage of the partnerships and to activate
themselves accordingly. The use of the term ‘must’ in this emphatic rhetoric is indicative
of the persuasive effect that was intended through this statement.

Furthermore, one of the rationales underlying federal government generated
prevention programs and their ‘at-a-distance’ format was also presented in the latter
portion of this statement. More specifically, the Minister strategically mentioned that if
action was not taken, then detrimental consequences would likely develop at the level of
prisons, and by extension, at the level of society, especially in terms of costs. This
example demonstrates how ‘costs’ have surfaced yet again as a worthy reason for engaging in proactive orientations.

The Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council also confirmed the link between the greater emphasis on ‘community’ and economic imperatives. He explained that

in response to the fiscal crisis, governments have reached out for basically community based volunteer resources and have couched that in a rhetoric of community and responsibility; there’s a lot more emphasis on individual responsibility than individual rights in that debate. But it’s a very undisciplined and sloppy debate. Now for an academic that’s very frustrating. For an elected official and to some extent a bureaucrat, that’s the very attraction of the terminology because you can avoid accountability.

Here, the ‘fiscal crisis’ is interpreted as a significant reason underlying the Canadian federal government’s efforts to ‘responsibilize’ communities. This account also exemplifies what Garland (1996:452) has coined as the ‘responsibilization strategy.’ The latter refers to the changes in both responsibility and accountability that are said to have occurred with recent shifts in the realm of crime control. As this respondent’s comments indicate, and as Garland’s coinage implies, these changes are resulting to a certain extent in more responsible non-state sectors and less accountable state agencies. While this statement alleges significant distinctions between these two sectors, I do acknowledge that they are entwined in a rather mutually reinforcing relation rather than in a mutually exclusive one.

As this brief consideration of the emphasis on community has demonstrated, the community tag has been effectively attached to the Canadian federal government’s
prevention initiatives. However, regardless of the tendency within the rhetoric to promote greater community involvement, there are undeniable complexities in the 'at-a-distance' form of governing that render local 'communities' both independent of, and dependent upon, federal government intervention.

One must also recognize that despite the greater emphasis on 'communities' in the rhetoric on prevention at the federal level in Canada in the late 1990s, the federal government has sought to 'share' many responsibilities not only with 'voluntary' communities, but also with the private sector. In light of this actuality, the next section presents pertinent examples of the rhetoric and rationales that were put forth in the advancement of the private sector initiative within "The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention."

The Federal Government in "Partnership" with the Private Sector

As previous sections have demonstrated, through its revised neo-liberal ambitions, the 'centralized' federal government in Canada has increasingly sought to address crime in an indirect manner by activating the participation of extra-state agencies (Garland 1996:452). In addition to individuals and communities, the private sector has more recently been considered a valuable and viable extra-state agency in the effort to address crime and victimization. As a Department of Justice Official explained, "[p]hase I was strictly oriented to the social development approach; this one is a little broader because it is encouraging investment in the private sector and the private sector clearly is probably a little more oriented toward target hardening."
This explanation reveals how the inclusion of the private sector has facilitated the re-emphasis on target hardening. Target hardening is a form of situational crime prevention that is predominantly neo-liberal in nature. It requires that property owners be responsible for the protection of themselves and their belongings. Thus, the inclusion of the private sector within the ‘National Strategy’ is encouraging and enabling a return to individualized prevention measures.

This development was manifested in the establishment of two components that were added to the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention in 1999. They were announced as the ‘Business Action Program’ and the ‘Business Alliance on Crime Prevention.’ The purpose of this late addition to the National Strategy was identified as follows: “It seeks to engage the private sector as an active partner, leader and resource on crime prevention in Canadian communities” (Department of Justice 1999:1-2). Furthermore, according to the former Minister of Justice, Anne McLellan, “this initiative supports the involvement of Canadian businesses in the important task of preventing crime ... It brings together their unique skills, expertise and creativity to the Government of Canada’s efforts to foster stronger and safer communities” (Department of Justice 1999:1).

These statements clearly reveal an emphasis on partnership and collaboration. More importantly, they reveal the federal government’s explicit intention to ‘engage’ extra-state resources as leaders in the crime prevention agenda. The quotation further indicates that while the ‘benefactor’ remains local communities, the Government of Canada maintains a certain level of ownership over the initiatives. Through this
arrangement, the business sector is brought into the federal government’s own efforts to ensure community safety. While this observation may seem trivial, it nevertheless demonstrates the federal government’s explicit aim to ‘steer’ the prevention agenda while the private and voluntary sectors are ‘commissioned’ to ‘row’ prevention vessels forward.

It should also be noted that this statement represents another attempt to personalize political rhetoric to render it more persuasive and effective (Paine 1981:121). Here, the Minister is complimenting the business sector for “their unique skills, expertise and creativity.” Such a tactic in this rhetoric on prevention ‘at-a-distance’ not only conveys promises of performance among all sectors, but it expresses it in a rather forward-looking way. In this case, positivity and optimism are powerful instruments of rhetoric.

Moreover, the private sector initiative sought not only to responsibilize businesses and communities at a collective level, but also to activate the participation of Canadians at an individual level. This ‘at-a-distance’ feature of the private sector initiative was reinforced in the following explanation:

Through a variety of activities, the initiative will raise **public awareness** about auto theft and **set out the steps available to Canadians by which they can protect themselves from this crime**. It will also seek to foster new responses and solutions to the problem, as well as encourage community-based efforts to support those **individuals most at risk**, particularly youth, of stealing vehicles (Department of Justice 1999:1 - my emphasis).

This quotation demonstrates the extended reach of the private sector initiative, which is presented here as the vessel through which individualized prudence is to be accomplished. In addition to engaging potential victims, this component of the National
Strategy also attempts to minimize individuals’ likelihood of becoming involved in crime. This responsibilization is thought to be accomplished through a complex collaboration among the federal government, the private sector and local communities. Whatever the degree of state intervention that may be envisioned here, the ultimate aim is clearly to render more responsible those individuals who are potentially at greater risk of becoming either a victim or an offender.

Now that we have a better, albeit brief, understanding of the aims and nature of the private sector component of the National Strategy, a thumbnail consideration of the rationales put forth in favour of this initiative is worthy of illustration. Of foremost interest is the way in which many previously used rationales resurfaced in the rhetoric that promoted the private sector initiatives. Many of the same reasons that had been advanced in support of the social development theme had also been used to rationalize the ‘business’ oriented programs. These included distinguished Canadian pride in safe communities, the $46 billion annual extended cost of crime, as well as fear of crime (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999:1). Many of these concerns were iterated in the following statement: “When Canadians feel unsafe in their homes and streets, communities suffer both economically and socially. A study by Peat Marwick revealed that people begin to avoid city centres because of fear of crime” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999:1). This explanation reinforces the way in which fear of crime is thought to be entwined with individual suffering and community decay, both of which are considered worthy reasons to engage in crime prevention activities.

In addition to the general concern of fear, there seemed to have been a distinct
preoccupation with auto theft in the late 1990s. While vehicle theft was an issue for the
Ministry of the Solicitor General's crime prevention unit in the late 1970s, it seemed to
have resurfaced as a significant problem in the late 1990s for the Department of Justice.
This concern, that served as a seemingly important rationale underlying the private sector
initiative, was expressed in the following statement by the former Minister of Justice,
Anne McLellan:

Auto theft is a crime that affects all Canadians, and it is a crime that has
grown in recent years ... It requires a concerted response, and together with
the Insurance Council of Canada, we are taking an important first step in
making Canadians aware of the scope of the auto theft problem and what
they can do to prevent it (Department of Justice 1999:1).

Not only does this promotional statement emphasize the problem of auto theft, but
it also reminds both the private and public sectors of their role in the prevention of this
identified problem. In this case, fear and concern (for all Canadians) are useful features
of political rhetoric because they impart a personal connection to the issue. This tactic is
thought to assist in securing acquiescence and participation (Paine 1981; Edelman 1977).

Statistics were also introduced to reinforce the alleged gravity of the situation and
thereby to enhance the rationalizing potential of the claim. For example, it was
mentioned that "[i]n 1998 alone, a total of 165,799 vehicles were stolen, which represents
an increase of 66 percent from 1987" (Department of Justice 1999:1). A comparative
time span of ten years was strategically used here to buttress the clout of the claim.
Nevertheless, the 'alarm' expressed through these statistics is undoubtedly intended to
serve as an important impetus for action. This example illustrates a rather effective use of
political rhetoric because it portrays the urgency of the matter in a rather dramatic way.

Other reasons for engaging the private sector in the National Strategy were alluded to in both oral and text-based communications. The first example was found in a speech by the Minister of Justice in 1997. She claimed that “[e]xperience in other countries demonstrates that the private sector is willing to invest in measures that reduce the opportunity to commit such crimes as car thefts and break and enters” (McLellan 1997:5).

Here, the alleged ‘willingness’ of the private sector is seemingly presented as an acceptable rationale for incorporating their services within a state-directed prevention strategy. This example also reveals the Canadian federal government’s continued reliance upon ‘successful’ experiences beyond its borders, which themselves seem to serve as worthy reasons for intervention. Two additional rationales were also expressed in a written ‘backgrounder’ that was disseminated at the launch of the National Strategy’s ‘Business Action Program’ in 1999. The document noted that

[t]here is a need for information resources, tools and supports that bolster community involvement in crime prevention. As a partner with a very pragmatic interest in helping communities thrive economically and socially, business is well positioned to make major inroads in providing these tools and supports (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999b).

The first reason constitutes the ‘need’ for resources to activate community participation. This reason reveals how the federal government’s intention to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance’ is highly contingent upon the support of the private sector. The second and related rationale pertains to the perceived capacity of the business sector to carry out the desired tasks. The belief that ‘business is well positioned’ seems to be
presented here as a reason for its participation in and of itself. It is also another effective use of rhetoric that maximizes its persuasive potential by sharing compliments and conveying optimism.

There is nevertheless, a particular twist to this arrangement. Implied within this statement above is a three-way collaboration among the federal government, the private sector and the local communities; however, the involvement of the communities is thought to be achieved here through the support of the business sphere. In this particular case, the Canadian federal government seems to be distancing itself even further from the local community by having the private sector supplement its pre-established efforts through the provision of tools.

**The Complex Challenges of Prevention “at-a-distance”**

The above discussion demonstrates a deliberate effort on the part of the Government of Canada to govern preventively ‘at-a-distance.’ Over the short time span in which the ‘National Strategy’ evolved in the late 1990s, the federal government sought to incorporate the contributions of local communities, individual citizens and the private sector. It seems that all three of these entities are expected to reinforce one another’s involvement while working under the umbrella of the federal government’s ‘National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’ While the ‘at-a-distance’ and collaborative nature of this arrangement is explicitly and enthusiastically conveyed within political rhetoric, there are certainly some complex challenges that may hinder the potential effectiveness and efficiency of its implementation.
The desire to manage the prevention agenda ‘at-a-distance’ was expressed through the term ‘horizontality.’ This intention was officially acknowledged and explicated in a policy document on crime prevention aimed at children ages 0 to 12. It stated that “[t]o facilitate a horizontal approach to crime prevention, it is necessary to develop linkages with other players who have key roles in addressing issues related to crime prevention...” (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000:9).

While the nature of this collaborative arrangement is explained in the previous section, the associated obstacles must be clarified. This consideration is by no means intended to raise all the relevant cautionary flags that pertain to this endeavour. Such a task is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, a brief discussion from the perspective of the interviewees is presented below.

Two interviewees openly expressed frustration with the allegedly horizontal nature of the National Strategy. As the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council stated, “the buzzword is horizontality but the administrative reality is still vertical.” The Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General also explained that “... we're all struggling with horizontality. How do you achieve perfectly horizontal policy making in a structure and a corporate culture that has been set up in silos?” These challenges pertain to the intended collaboration among federal government departments, different levels of government, as well as several extra-state sectors. Some of the main obstacles identified by interviewees were problems with ‘turf wars,’ competition for funding and a lack of communication.

A second area that presents a challenge to prevention ‘at-a-distance’ pertains to
the ability of the associated players to actually carry out their allocated task. In the 'at-a-distance' formula, the community has been 'assigned' considerable responsibility in addressing locally-based crime and victimization. While one may critically characterize this refocusing of the delivery of prevention services onto local communities as the individualization of social problems (Hastings 1998), a related deception is also worthy of mention. It pertains to the capacity of communities to actually accomplish this task. As the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council cautioned, "I think we've oversold the idea that communities can solve their own problems ... the idea that communities (A) know their own problems and (B) can solve their own problems ... it may have set up the strategy for failure when communities can't deliver what we've told them they should be able to do."

A final area that may be perceived as an obstacle for 'at-a-distance' forms of crime prevention is linked to the continued and immediate presence of the police. One must first re-iterate that the criminal justice orientation has not diminished. Second and relatedly, despite the emphasis on social and community approaches, police services are still linked as the vehicle through which many prevention programs are implemented. This arrangement not only allows police, as state funded and state directed agencies, to shape individual and community responsibility initiatives, but it also enables them to control the direction of prevention programs and likely so through a target hardening and / or law and order agenda. Thus, due to the state directed and centralized authoritative nature of police services, their continued and prominent presence in the realm of prevention inevitably limits the flexibility and perhaps even the range of 'at-a-distance'
As this overview of the Government of Canada’s desire to prevent crime ‘at-a-distance’ reveals, this endeavour has undoubtedly attempted to respond to worthy concerns; these have been presented in the form of the following rationales: fiscal crises, fear of crime, Canadian pride and increasing crime rates. Furthermore, the intentions to responsibilize individuals, local communities and the private sector through this initiative have been both explicitly and enthusiastically conveyed. However, despite the efforts to render the prevention agenda more efficient and effective, the intended goals of partnerships, collaboration and responsibilization have become rather complex.

In being both centrally and de-centrally conceived and achieved, the ‘at-a-distance’ forms of prevention have complicated, and been complicated by, the relations among the state and the extra-state sectors. It has also created some uncertainties with respect to potential outcomes, especially at the organizational and community levels. Nevertheless, whatever the obstacles to this approach may be, the Government of Canada seems determined to manage the prevention of crime and victimization ‘at-a-relatively clear-distance’ from itself.

1994-2000 IN REVIEW

While the reasons underlying the establishment of the ‘National Strategy’ had been well promoted and documented between 1987 and 1994, similar and additional rationales continued to be openly expressed through speeches and official publications between 1994 and 2000. The roster of rationales summarized in this chapter reflects a variety of different concerns. The fiscal preoccupations and the failure of the reactive
criminal justice system remain the dominant and most frequently mentioned reasons that have advanced the emphases on proactive approaches during this particular time period and throughout the latter quarter of the twentieth century.

While neo-liberal versions of prevention were advanced mainly by the rationale of cost-effectiveness, neo-social quests were promoted as the alternative to dealing with the complex array of social and economic factors associated with crime, but from which the criminal justice system is thought to be detached. Moreover, the controversial and seemingly contradictory inclusion of neo-conservative measures was sustained by a continued faith in the importance of legislation, police responsibility and capability, as well as by the protection potential of correctional facilities and programming.

The ‘at-a-distance’ form of governing crime and victimization that was promoted through the ‘National Strategy’ was rationalized by a number of interrelated concerns and interests. ‘At-a-distance’ prevention measures were sought in response to fiscal pressures and in recognition of the limited capacity of the federal government. They were also intended to capitalize on the pre-existing or newly imposed responsibility on the part of individuals, families, communities and private sector organizations. This extension of state generated prevention initiatives was justified by a belief that the solutions to the problem of crime lie in the community and that the private sector is both willing and capable of assisting in the areas of leadership and financial support. This emphasis on extra-state sectors, especially at the local community level, appears to be in contrast to the acknowledgments of broad based social welfare interventions which were also viewed as worthy crime prevention measures in the mid to late 1990s. The resulting tensions and
contradictions are addressed in the next chapter.

Other rationales that formed part of the National Strategy’s objectives included the desire to reduce the social and physical costs of crime and to protect more vulnerable populations, which were identified as the following priority groups: children and youth at-risk, women and Aboriginal peoples. In addition, concern over the fear of victimization and higher crime rates continued to serve as important motivators of preventative intervention. Furthermore, visual images of community safety, crime-free spaces, as well as protective and nurturing environments also expressed the desirability of preventative pursuits.

Other contingent actualities that served to advance prevention initiatives at the federal level included the influential role of committed and candid politicians, the positive political opportunities afforded by proactive approaches, as well as the optimistic promotion of alternative successes. It should also be noted that various publications, including the Horner Report, the Liberal Redbooks and the documents published by the National Crime Prevention Council also served to legitimate the balanced approach of the ‘National Strategy.’

Through their inclusion in political rhetoric, the various rationales mentioned above were invoked not only to promote the acceptance of prevention as a viable option, but also to encourage participation and partnership. It is plausible to suggest here that the persuasive potential of the Canadian federal government’s rhetoric on prevention was bolstered by the strategic use of rationales that conveyed the need for, and the promise of, state and extra-state intervention. It is also interesting to note that the rationales put forth
legitimated both innovation and continuity. For example, many of the same reasons used to rationalize the emerging risk-based and socially oriented components of the ‘National Strategy’ were also drawn upon to justify the continued reliance on reactive criminal justice responses. In this sense, elements of both continuity (i.e. existing measures) and change (i.e. alternatives) were sustained through similar rationales.

In conclusion, this overview has attempted to demonstrate that Canadian federal government generated crime prevention initiatives are shaped by a variety of rationales. While some are indicative of broader governmental rationalities, others are characteristic of political or bureaucratic contingencies or interests. In other words, the evidence provided here, and throughout the previous three chapters, illustrates that the translation of articulated governmental rationalities into their programmatic form is complicated by a host of different political and practical considerations and constraints. Whether or not they are perceived to be reciprocally reinforcing or mutually contradictory, these influences are significant in shaping technologies.
ENDNOTES

1. For more details on the national plan of action, see the section on the phase between 1974 and 1983.

2. The Ministry of Justice Canada is the federal level bureaucracy responsible for “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.” However, the Ministry of the Solicitor General is considered to be an official joint partner and has contributed significantly in terms of seconded employees, research and programs.

3. O’Malley (2000) cites an important passage from one of the National Crime Prevention Council’s documents that demonstrates the mutual link between risk factors and social conditions. While indicative of the intersections of rationalities and technologies in the late twentieth century, the quotation that he cites cannot be considered official discourse of the Canadian federal government because the National Crime Prevention Council was an ‘arms-length’ advisory body.

4. The debates among council members were characterized by numerous interpretations and expectations of crime prevention. Council meetings may be described in Hicks’ reinterpretation of the words of Voltaire: “Divided by interests, and united in crime [prevention]” (Hicks 1998:344). Hicks added the word ‘prevention’ to Voltaire’s original quotation: “Divisés d’intérêts, et pour le crime unis” (Mérope 1754).

5. The amount of $9.9 billion spent on reactive measures was provided by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics and it was mentioned in numerous National Crime Prevention Council documents, the Horner Report and by several interviewees.

6. The constraints of communities’ capacities are discussed below in the section on ‘at-a-distance.’

7. The Communications, Promotion, and Public Education Program includes the National Crime Prevention Centre’s Web site and Resource Centre. It was “created to increase public awareness as well as to assistant Canadians who need information on crime prevention solutions for communities” (Government of Canada 2000). The National Crime Prevention Centre is located within the Department of Justice and is responsible for the implementation of the National Strategy (Government of Canada 2000).

8. The following indented list is a direct extract from the pamphlet: Safer Communities: Everybody’s Responsibility (Government of Canada 2000).
9. The image in Figure 8.4 was scanned from Issue #2 - Summer 2000 of the Prevention Newsletter.

10. In the early 1990s, the Department of Justice ceased the publication of their annual report. Currently, the “Estimates” is a document that highlights the past accomplishments and proposed policy plans. It is published annually.

11. In a section entitled “By the Numbers” with a subtitle of “The Costs of This, That and the Other Things,” the Prevention newsletter listed the following figures as relevant rationales for investing in crime prevention:

- Amount of money invested each year in Phase II of the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention: **$32 million**
- Average annual cost of keeping an offender in a federal institution (1995-96): **$50,375**
- Estimated annual cost of detaining a young offender (1995-96): **$100,000**
- Estimated total annual costs associated with crime and the criminal justice system in Canada (1996): **$46 billion**
- Operating costs of 411 Canadian shelters for abused women (1997-98): **$170 million**
- Amount that the theft of motor vehicles and their parts cost the insurance industry in Canada in 1996: **$600 million**
- Estimated costs due to fraudulent insurance claims in Canada in 1994: **$1.3 billion**
- Spending on justice services in Canada in 1994-95: **$10 billion**
  - on criminal prosecutions: **$258 million**,  
  - on youth corrections: **$526 million**,  
  - on legal aid: **$646 million**,  
  - on courts: **$835 million**,  
  - on adult corrections: **$1.9 billion**,  
  - and on police services: **$5.8 billion**. (Prevention 1999:5 - emphasis in original)

12. For a better understanding, here is the complete response by the Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of Justice in response to the question, “What sustains the federal government’s interest in crime prevention or the Department of Justice’s interest?”: “The belief that it will be more effective over time in reducing criminality; beyond that ... **it is the fiscally prudent thing to do because it will ultimately reduce prison populations and the federal government’s, the taxpayers’ costs**. The first point goes to the protection of the public that it does have the benefit of reducing criminality but of course it enhances the primary objectives that we have with the criminal justice system.”
13. For a better understanding of the context of this quotation, here is the full statement that was included. In explaining why crime prevention through social development would be featured more prominently in the “Prevention” newsletter, the editors explained that “Intervening early to prevent crime, and helping people and their communities become more resilient to the factors that can trigger and influence criminal behaviour, is simply good justice policy. *It is also good social policy and smart economic policy*” (Government of Canada 1999:3).

14. Numerous other respondents provided similar statements that revealed the reasons that crime prevention was being considered as a viable option. The former secondee to the Department of Justice (1994-1998) explained the following:

> “I think the pressures that were coming to bear on the government in terms of corrections, in terms of Aboriginal people, in terms of parole, in terms of policing, the cost of policing; I think really make the government aware, become more aware of the fact that crime prevention is definitely needed.”

15. The manner in which failure tends to be presented optimistically as a source of reform and innovation by government officials is presented in the next section on alternative successes.

16. Here is an additional rationale that emphasized the desire to reduce the incarceration rate: “Canada has a high rate of incarceration compared with other Western industrialized countries. Using social development initiatives, the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention works to reduce the incarceration rate by reducing the number of people who come into contact with the judicial system” (Government of Canada n.d.(c):4).

17. I do question the extent to which crime statistics accurately portray the prevalence of certain types of offences and forms of victimization that are not systematically reported by the public or seriously dealt with by the police.

18. The former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council also added the following points: “... it's a good news story; people love going into communities and giving them money and communities love receiving it.” He later cautioned that “they’re attempting to please as many people as fast as they can. They’re handing out as much money to as many groups. And again, you have to remember for a politician, leadership is difficult because it’s a lot nicer to give 10 groups a thousand bucks each than it is to give one group ten thousand bucks and have nine groups really pissed off at you. You know in a one person one vote world, that’s a politically dangerous thing to do.”
19. Garland (1999:33) cautions that although authorities’ expressions of concern can be taken at their face value, their analyses may not always be correct.

20. The Solicitor General articulated similar ideas about the ‘at-a-distance’ nature of the National Strategy. He stated that “people have to take a good look at their community, analyze its problems, and help shape effective, long-term solutions. Canadians are prepared to do that. But they need support. Governments must provide support; it must be part of the partnership. But governments cannot dictate the terms. We can provide resources. But people know how those resources can be most effectively deployed in their own communities. We can provide opportunities to disseminate ideas and information. But people must shape those ideas, and share them. That is what the National Strategy is all about” (Scott 1998:2-3).

21. In this quotation by former Minister McLellan, the words in bold are my emphasis while the underlined word was in the original text. The acronym ‘NGO’ refers to ‘non-governmental organization.’

22. The role of community as being both a leader and a recipient surfaced in conversation with Jane Dickson-Gilmore.

23. The onus placed on communities in this statement is evident in the sentence that is highlighted in bold (my own emphasis).

24. Minister McLellan added two rationales to this list linked to community mobilization strategies when she explained the following: “The key to reducing Canadians’ fear of crime and to increasing the confidence of Canadians in their justice system is to encourage community mobilization in the fight against crime. This grassroots-led initiative is all about giving Canadians the tools they need to prevent crime in their neighbourhoods” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1998d:1). My emphasis highlights the two rationales identified: (a) fear of crime and (b) confidence in the justice system.

25. The former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council further clarified the implications of the ‘fiscal crisis’ for community-oriented and at-a-distance prevention programs. He explained that it was “… in part a recognition that it just wasn’t politically on to come up with a suggestion for billions of new dollars in central programming in the fiscal context of the provinces and the federal government at that time. So community was the default choice, not the theoretically obvious choice.”

26. When launched on April 12, 1999, the ‘Business Action Program’ was allocated an annual budget of $2 million to “enable the Government of Canada to partner
with the business community to prevent crime” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999:1). The Business Action Program was designed to “provide grants to private-sector-funded initiatives that have the potential to reduce crime and improve community safety.” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999:1).

27. When launched on April 12, 1999, the ‘Business Alliance on Crime Prevention’ was composed of the Insurance Council of Canada, the Canadian Automobile Dealers Association, the Retail Council of Canada and the Canadian Bankers Association. It was established to “promote business-government-voluntary sector partnerships related to crime prevention and identify specific strategies to encourage broader involvement in the issue” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999:2). It was tasked with the responsibility of “recommending Business Action Program projects for the approval of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada and the Solicitor General of Canada” (National Crime Prevention Centre 1999:2).

28. This emphasis on responsibility was reinforced in another statement made by the then Minister of Justice, Anne McLellan. She stated that “together with the Insurance Council of Canada, we are taking an important first step in making Canadians aware of the scope of the auto theft problem and what they can do to prevent it” (Department of Justice 1999:1).
CHAPTER 9


In chapters five through eight, I traced the emergence of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social rationalities and the interplay among them as they were expressed in the Canadian federal government’s rhetoric on crime prevention since the mid-1970s. As I mentioned earlier, at no time is this intersection more explicit than in the late 1990s. In this chapter, I illustrate various instantiations of this co-existence in the context of the Government of Canada’s crime prevention initiatives. I first present examples of each rationality separately; then I demonstrate the complex interplay among all three as they are articulated and rationalized in the ‘balanced’ approach to community safety and crime prevention.

THE PERSISTENT UNDERCURRENT OF NEO-CONSERVATISM

The sub-title of this section could easily be substituted with the following: “the persistent rhetoric and practice of repression.” I suggest this possibility because the reactive measures inherent to the late twentieth century neo-conservative fold tend to encompass images of strict law and order politics and harsh punitiveness (Hatt et al. 1994:65). The recursiveness of both the rationalities and the technologies of neo-conservatism have characterized the federal level prevention initiatives since the 1970s.
While neo-conservatism may be considered a ‘residual rationality’ of its conservative antecedent, there is something more particular about this underlying rationality that renders it more complex.

First, the arbitrariness facilitated by the term prevention is further complicated by proactive approaches’ inevitable bond to reactive responses. For example, there appears to exist an historical amnesia among Canadian federal government officials that existing practices, to which prevention is considered an alternative, were themselves once considered preventative; this conveniently enables the government to re-invent the wheel periodically. In this context, prevention becomes a major political opportunity to justify traditional conservative-based criminal justice practices. In fact in this particular case, both reactive responses and proactive approaches draw upon, and benefit from, the same promotional rhetoric on prevention.

This actuality favours a related deception. While it has almost become a truism among Canadian politicians, policy-makers and practitioners that the future is prevention (Hastings 1993:1), this optimistic view fails to recognize the government’s continued and substantial investment in order maintenance and punitive measures. In fact, as Laycock and Heal (1989:322) observe, “the notion that crime and its prevention is the responsibility of the police and the criminal justice system is entrenched; it is hardly going to be turned round overnight.” Specific examples of this phenomenon in the Canadian context are presented below.

Secondly and relatedly, despite the rationales that advocated the need for more proactive alternatives to reactive repression, the latter is still viewed as a valued part of
the crime prevention initiative. More specifically, the perceived failure and the related costs of the conservative oriented criminal justice system constitute the main rationales that have been repeated in the prevention rhetoric since the mid-1970s. Yet, neo-conservative measures have been explicitly considered part of the balanced approach to crime prevention. According to Edelman (1977:150), this phenomenon is not unusual because some forms of state action persist indefinitely despite their ineffectiveness. What is more troublesome for Edelman (1977:79) is the way in which governments continue to justify the pursuit of policies that are known to be ineffective. The examples below demonstrate how neo-conservative measures have been rationalized in the late 1990s.

Before presenting the rationales, I provide two instances where crime prevention is equated with reactive responses. The first one was mentioned by a Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice Canada. She claimed that “there is a recognition of prevention that sometimes the law enforcement and corrections are required and ... could be of themselves viewed as prevention of recidivism.” Conceived in this way, prevention is not considered an alternative to control; rather both control and prevention are regarded as mutually reinforcing.

The second example demonstrates the way in which crime prevention is equated with legislation. It was expressed by the former Minister of Justice, Allan Rock on the occasion of his appearance before the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. He claimed the following: “...there are many other crime prevention and community safety measures ... These include changes to our pornography, extradition and prostitution laws and further sentencing reforms” (Department of Justice Canada 1994:9). This
example is one of many whereby Ministers still persuasively remind their audiences of the allegedly permanent role of the criminal justice system.

This neo-conservative emphasis was justified on two separate occasions by the Solicitor General, Andy Scott. During a speech in 1997 where he was explaining that public safety is a priority for the federal government, he claimed that “Canadians told us that they wanted the Government to get tough on violent, high-risk offenders. And we have made solid gains over the last four years” (Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada 1997). In this particular instance, the Minister is drawing upon the alleged expectations of Canadians to justify more repressive measures. This personalization of social problems and the potential solutions further reinforces both the persuasive and the camouflaging effect of the rhetoric being employed here.

He similarly contended a year later that “[i]ncarceration is an important part of our justice system. Violent criminals have to be kept off our streets. Enforcement of the law is crucial” (Scott 1998:1 - emphasis in original). This appeal to safety on the street is conveniently employed here to rationalize the continued use of law enforcement and incarceration measures. This quotation further indicates the permanence of repressive measures. In doing so, it demonstrates the mere partial shift of prevention as a principle (end) to a strategic option (means). In other words, despite conceivable changes over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the notion of prevention is still used to justify neo-conservative interventions.

The entrenchment of neo-conservatism was also explicated by a Former Secretariat Staff Member with the National Crime Prevention Council. He claimed that
“I think we’re still reacting more than we’re being proactive. This [crime prevention] is kind of a shining spot, but it’s not across the board federally ... if you compare it to the entire department, I think it’s just a small area.” This statement reveals how proactive approaches remained fairly fledgling initiatives compared to their reactive counterparts.

It should be noted that the Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of Justice confirmed this occurrence when he stated that “the Department’s operations, it’s main business line is providing legal services to government; so for 80% of my colleagues in the department, the crime prevention initiative is largely irrelevant.” This bureaucratic actuality points to the rather legal and conservative orientations of the Department of Justice, which is responsible for the administration of ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’ It further shows how crime prevention remains enmeshed with neo-conservative pursuits.

In addition, the perceived permanency of reactive control measures was expressed by a Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre. She stated that “I would be very surprised if we would ever see an equitable allocation of resources for crime control and crime prevention; that would be wonderful; but unlikely that will ever happen ... these are institutions that don’t move” (emphasis in original). In addition, the way in which neo-conservative measures take precedence over neo-liberal or neo-social crime prevention is also manifested in financial terms. The $10 billion annual allocation towards ‘cops, courts and corrections’ versus the $32 million per year allocation towards the National Strategy is quite indicative of the reliance upon reactive punitive measures. In other words, despite the apparent ground swell of support for preventive pursuits, the
related funding remains modest compared to the continued investment in reactive responses. In this light, one must question whether ‘prevention’ is indeed being supported as a full alternative to reactive measures or if the prevention rhetoric is merely serving as a smokescreen for the enduring and expanding elements of the reactive criminal justice system.

Moreover, the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council further explained that “[t]he biggest single obstacle is trying to do new kinds of work in the frameworks of old institutions.” While many governmentality writers have emphasized the discontinuity inherent within changes in regulation in the late twentieth century, this statement, along with the ones that preceded it, reinforce important elements of continuity that render the prevention project more complex and comprehensive.

Given what these interviewees have confirmed, there is no doubt that crime prevention, and especially the neo-liberal and neo-social versions of it, struggled to establish a secure foothold within a government department that has long been neo-conservative in its direction. Nevertheless, despite the undercurrent of neo-conservatism, both neo-liberal and neo-social emphases have undeniably shaped the crime prevention agenda in the late 1990s.

THE NARRATIVES OF NEO-LIBERALISM

The neo-liberal features of the federal level crime prevention initiatives in the late 1990s were manifested in preoccupations with cost-effectiveness, ‘at-a-distance’ forms of implementation, responsibilization strategies, promotions of prudence, as well as
individuals, families and communities ‘at-risk.’ While the first four preoccupations have been addressed throughout the discussion chapters, less attention has been paid to the focus on ‘at-risk.’ Therefore, this section briefly illustrates how the notion of ‘at-risk’ is incorporated within the Canadian federal government’s rhetoric on crime prevention in the late 1990s.

Beyond the emphasis on ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governing, the concept of ‘at-risk’ may be considered neo-liberalism’s second predominant feature par excellence. It has been made manifest in the National Strategy through various terms such as ‘youth at-risk,’ (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000b:ii) ‘children at-risk’ and ‘at-risk families’ (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000a:4-9). There has also been a recognition of children, youth and families living in conditions of ‘multiple risks’ (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000a:8).

Furthermore, there is certainly an ‘at-a-distance’ form to the federal government’s intentions to address risk-based prevention. This was evident in a document that was promoting the National Strategy. It indicated that “[t]he Strategy takes an early-intervention, social development approach to helping Canadians and communities deal with the risk factors that lead to crime and victimization” (Government of Canada n.d.b:2). Here, the responsibility of dealing with ‘risks’ is delegated to Canadians while the role of ‘helping’ is arrogated to the federal government through its capacity as the coordinator of the National Strategy.

The rationale underlying this effort to address risk factors related to crime was found in a National Crime Prevention Centre document that promoted prevention
programs among children aged 0 to 12. The document included a reference from a well-known Canadian researcher and promoter of social development projects. Dr. Richard Tremblay was quoted as having claimed that

[p]reventive interventions over the first three years of life for at-risk families clearly reduce the prevalence and the seriousness of behaviour problems. It appears clear that money invested in well-planned early prevention efforts with at-risk families will give greater payoffs than money invested in later preventive efforts with the same at-risk families (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000a:4).

The opinion of an academic researcher is strategically employed here to further legitimize the emphasis on risk factors and the desire to intervene at an early stage. The concept of ‘at-risk’ is also linked to the positive prospects of a long-term investment. By extension, the optimism conveyed through this claim attempts to render the problem of ‘at-risk’ a surmountable one.

What is less certain throughout all of this neo-liberal emphasis on ‘at-risk’ is the meaning of the term ‘at-risk’ itself. Most interviewees were puzzled by the question: “How does the National Strategy define ‘at-risk’?” Most hesitated to respond initially. Many admitted that there was confusion and uncertainty around the concept. Several others realized, upon hearing the question, that an actual definition did not exist. Therefore, just as no definition¹ of ‘at-risk’ was offered in government documents, none of the interviewees could provide a concise definition either.

One interviewee did nevertheless offer a somewhat muddled explanation. A Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General explained that she had received a phone call from a colleague at HRDC (Human Resources Development Canada) who
had asked her what the Ministry of the Solicitor General's definition of 'youth at-risk' was. She offered this account of her reaction to the phone call:

... she asked if we had a definition and I said well no. There's nothing that sort of, a public definition. I said but we know what we mean, you know when I say youth at-risk, there's a pretty common ... so I can write that down for you, and I sort of wrote it down and floated it around a couple of people and they said ya that's what it is. And that's sort of what we're calling a working definition. And I think, but we do throw 'at-risk' around a lot. You know, youth at-risk, children at-risk, the communities at-risk. What's a community at-risk? It's difficult. It's sort of, when you bring it down to an individual, okay, but then a community at-risk then you go back to all of those factors and in determining the community, we all know one when we see one. I don't know.

The uncertainty and irregularity conveyed here is both puzzling and disconcerting. It is puzzling because 'at-risk' is a term that frequently surfaces in federal government documents pertaining to the National Strategy. Yet, no attempt seems to have been made to ensure that it is clearly understood by either its disseminators or its recipients. Furthermore, individuals, families and communities are being labelled 'at-risk,' but without an adequate explanation of what that might entail. The qualifying comment, "we all know one when we see one," while articulated rhetorically, is nevertheless indicative of both the confusion and the 'risk' of marginalization² inherent within the ill-defined term 'at-risk.'³

While the concept of 'at-risk' was not adequately defined, the National Strategy's documents do offer examples of what is meant by 'risk factors.' They were evident in the following:

There is also growing recognition that the presence of multiple risk factors produces the greatest levels of risk. Interventions that address multiple risk
factors are therefore most desirable. Strategies that address underlying societal factors such as poverty and unemployment, abuse and neglect, inadequate schooling and housing - as well as strategies that address more immediate individual, family and community risk factors - need to be linked to crime prevention policy (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000b:ii).

The risk factors identified here were explicitly considered ‘societal’ factors; they were also deemed crucial to crime prevention policy. These conditions of poverty, unemployment, as well as inadequate schooling and housing are characteristic of social welfare concerns. It is here that the mutual link between preoccupations of ‘risk’ and considerations of ‘the social’ are expressed. The complexity and implications of this relation are explicated in further detail below. In the meantime, it is imperative to qualify the constraints placed on these so-called societal factors in the very same document.

Despite the ‘social’ dimensions of the risk factors that were identified, the viability of addressing them seemed to be an important consideration. The text revealed that

From the perspective of the Strategy, which emphasizes a crime prevention through social development approach, the primary task is to identify the changeable risk factors associated with crime and victimization and support the development and implementation of crime prevention solutions that involve individuals, families and community (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000b:ii - my emphasis).

The federal government’s concern with feasibility was expressed in the word ‘changeable’. The problems of poverty, unemployment and inadequate housing identified above are obviously not readily ‘fixable’ under the current capitalist climate. As every ‘good sociologist’ knows, the solutions to these issues would require significant
restructuring. By focussing on so-called ‘changeable’ risk factors, the federal government has conveniently, but not surprisingly, distanced itself from broad scale socio-economic changes. While not explained in the text, ‘changeable,’ within the social development vein, and through the ‘at-a-distance’ format, translates into efforts that equip individuals, families and communities with the necessary resources so that they may better adapt to their socio-economic deprivation. In this sense, risk factors remain localized and individualized. Thus, despite the allusion to ‘social’ level issues, ‘risk’ factors maintain their ‘neo-liberal’ tone at the levels of both rhetoric and intended practice.

It is evident that neo-liberal themes had a strong influence on the Canadian federal government’s crime prevention initiatives in the late 1990s. Responsibilization strategies certainly abounded within the rhetoric on prevention. However, it would be misleading to conclude that it is the only theme that was informing crime prevention at that time. The complexity of the ‘social’ influence is discussed below.

THWARTED VISIONS OF ‘THE SOCIAL’

Just as the neo-liberal emphasis of ‘at-risk’ is somewhat constrained and uncertain, so too are the ‘social’ versions of prevention within the National Strategy. They are both abbreviated and imprecise. This section discusses this claim by addressing three interrelated areas. First, I present how social welfare rationalities are partially embedded within the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention; secondly, I demonstrate how ‘the social’ is reformulated through the National Strategy; third, I illustrate the frustration among National Strategy officials with the purposive use
of social welfare tactics.

At the outset, it is plausible to contend that “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention” gave expression to social welfare rationalities between 1994 and 2000. The initiative itself represents an attempt at national level coordination and solidarity building among politicians, police, practitioners and the public (Stenson and Watt 1999:196). In addition, the social development focus does resemble, at least in part, interventions of the welfare era. There is no doubt that attempts were made to link crime prevention policies not only to social structural contexts, but also to general social support services for Canadian citizens. These links are especially evident at the level of rhetoric and explanation. As previous chapters and sections have shown, even Ministers have referred to various social ills and nationalized social services.

An additional example was found in a plea by Allan Rock who was Minister of Justice in 1994. He stated that “[c]rime prevention must take into account the deep causes of crime: poverty, sexual exploitation of children, family dysfunction, racial inequality and inefficient or underfunded social services” (Rock 1994:3). While sexual exploitation and family dysfunction may be symptomatic of broader social conditions, the recognition of poverty, inequality and inadequate social services is at least indicative of the federal government’s attempts to take into account broader social contexts.

Another indication of the federal government’s acknowledgement of structural circumstances was found in a section of a booklet on the safety of ‘women and girls.’ The section was entitled: “The Societal Context of Women’s Personal Security.” In it, reference was made to “institutions that facilitate and sustain unequal power relations
between men and women and render women and girls “acceptable targets” for crime, particularly crimes related to violence and abuse” (National Crime Prevention Centre 2000c:3). This attempt to link gender inequalities to gender-based crimes shows that the federal government is at least attentive to the systematic nature of various social, economic and cultural deprivations.

Moreover, a brief review of the projects funded between 1998 and 2000 through the Crime Prevention Investment Fund component of the National Strategy confirmed that a significant number of programs did indeed address social welfarist type concerns. The conditions identified as having been dealt with through the funded projects included, among others, inadequate, unsafe and high density housing, poverty, high unemployment and lack of access to employment related training, lack of access to affordable child care, unstable or low income family conditions, marginalized urban populations and homelessness (National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention 2000).

This list is indicative of the way in which crime came to be problematized, and its prevention came to be formulated, from a social point of view. However, while this list may appear both ‘social’ and comprehensive, it is one that was self-identified by federal government officials. The extent to which these conditions and the gender-based inequalities are ‘systematically’ addressed in their programmatic form is uncertain and beyond the scope of this dissertation. For our immediate purposes, a few comments in this regard are worthy of consideration.

It must first be noted how social conditions are now interpreted as risk factors. O’Malley (1999a:96-97) attributes this actuality to the late twentieth century alliance
between prudentialism and social rationalities and technologies. The problem with such a thwarted view of social circumstances is that explanatory factors such as an individual’s socio-economic background are now only considered relevant based on their capacity to create risks (O’Malley 1999a:96-97). This actuality was confirmed by the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council who explained that “there’s a mix ... But that said, it’s clearly the developmental, not the social variant of it.”

The projects reviewed in the “The Crime Prevention Investment Fund” between 1998 and 2000 further corroborated O’Malley’s claim. Despite the acknowledgement of broader social ills, the predominant focus was on ‘at-risk’ children through selected social development measures. Thus, it is clear that the National Strategy is neither advocating nor implementing a ‘social welfarist’ initiative on a broad or universal scale. Rather, it is conceived and deployed in smaller pockets at the community and individual levels. Thus, while the social point of view may have been invoked at the level of rhetoric, its ambitions have been revised and its scope has been reduced at the level of practice.

While certain documents revealed the limited considerations of social orientations, the interviewees were more forthcoming with critical comments. Several respondents pointed to the way in which socio-economic conditions are only partially dealt with through the National Strategy. One of the most potent accounts was offered by a Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre. She explained that

we’re seeing that people are less willing, as our governments to maintain a social safety that ... we had and grew accustomed to in the 60s and 70s in this country and if in some respects if you can argue that you are putting resources into services that are going to promote community safety and security for Canadians I think that that resonates better with the public than
that you’re ... giving dollars to poor parents to take care of their kids; so in some respects your social entitlement is now bound up in the fact that we’re preventing ... you from becoming a little criminal ... services have been cut so drastically across the country, ... I feel like a social welfare agency sometimes, you know, people phoning and saying ... well your criteria are too stringent; we really need the money; we have such a good program and it’s not being funded anymore (emphasis in original).

This quotation demonstrates how social considerations are attached to crime prevention in a very purposive way. Rather than being universally deployed, they are targeted towards individuals deemed ‘at-risk’ of becoming ‘offenders.’ The paraphrased plea of potential clients further reinforces the lack of systematic and adequate investment in social security and service provisions.

A similar limitation was pointed out by the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council. He contended that there was a need to recognize the limits of localism as a response to inequalities. That if the problem is the international economy, don’t go into some little backwards community in Nova Scotia and expect them to compensate for the loss of the fishery or the forestry ... if you don’t do this, whatever other good things you do are going to have a limited investment bang.

Again, there is an acknowledgement here within the National Strategy of a need to address broader socio-economic conditions. However, selected and targeted ‘social’ interventions, whether planned in the name of crime prevention or not, are bound to have limited impacts on long-standing societal exigencies. This point was further reinforced by a Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre. She admitted that “... you realize too that the level of the economic deprivation is so phenomenal and so there would have to be a number of changes occurring in a number of different levels so I guess that’s
why I'm not terribly sanguine ... because I think that those kinds of inequalities, or disadvantages or risk factors are going to be with us.” While this admission may appear somewhat defeatist, it serves as a poignant reminder of the limited potential of targeted interventions that attempt to redress broader social inequities.

These interviewees’ comments demonstrate that although ‘the social’ is invoked in the context of crime prevention in the late twentieth century, it exists there in a more constrained way; it is used selectively and purposively. It is also, in my estimation, compromised through its co-existence with neo-conservative themes and with neo-liberal emphases. It is further retracted and partialized by fiscal constraints and political contingencies. While Stenson and Watt (1999: 196) refer to this condition as ‘the submerged social,’ I offer another, albeit similar, variant.

In their contingent capacity under the guise of crime prevention, I contend that ‘social’ orientations should be more appropriately termed or referred to as ‘neo-social’ rationalities and technologies (rather than purely ‘social’ ones). Such a qualification of the concept of the ‘social’ is more reflective of the partiality and variability manifested in the co-existence of multiple rationalities and their corresponding technologies. It should also be noted that a ‘post-social’ qualification is not as relevant here because, while neo-liberal tendencies seem to dominate the crime prevention initiatives at the Canadian federal government level, social orientations have not been dismissed in their entirety. In fact, as I mentioned previously, existing government generated and sustained ‘social’ provisions remain infra-structural to neo-liberal approaches and neo-conservative responses.

While these few examples have briefly demonstrated how ‘the social’ has been
reformulated in late twentieth century crime prevention policy (Stenson and Watt 1999), they have not conveyed the sentiments of frustration felt by many federal government officials in this regard. The intricacies that were shared are certainly worthy of consideration.

While some interviewees claimed that social ills were being readily addressed through the social development focus of the National Strategy, others adamantly criticized the lack of social welfare provisions in relation to crime prevention policy. The examples below reflect the level of frustration with the limitations of allegedly ‘social’ interventions. They are included here because they reveal how government officials, and their associated colleagues, recognize the limitations of their own initiatives.

The first example points to the constraints placed on socially-oriented crime prevention within the context of the Department of Justice. A Former Secretariat Staff Member to the National Crime Prevention Council complained in the following way:

... but government attention attached to a ministry and not right across the board; ... and so for instance tax policy and health prevention still aren’t tied closely to crime or social development; tax policies still don’t support families or tax breaks to corporations to have day cares, stuff like that. Bigger picture stuff.

Clearly, one federal government department could only have a limited capacity for mounting a social welfare type initiative. What is further troubling is the actual departments selected for undertaking a social development strategy. While the Ministry of the Solicitor General was considered a key part of the National Strategy, the Department of Justice remains the leader and coordinator of the initiative. In their
conjoined capacities, the main business of these two departments involves the enactment of legislation, the enforcement of ‘the law’ and the administration of punishment. At the very least, these two departments were not equipped to undertake social development work; nor do their mandates readily facilitate such an undertaking.

It should also be noted that despite the existence of an Interdepartmental Working Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention, several interviewees involved with the National Strategy admitted that this group rarely met. Since the interdepartmental collaboration was not occurring at the desired or necessary level, very little was accomplished in terms of broad-based crime prevention initiatives. Given these departmental constraints, the aforementioned incorporation of neo-conservative reactive and repressive measures within the National Strategy should come as no surprise. In this sense, ‘social’ level orientations may be viewed as constrained by the very bureaucratic institutions in which they were set to be accomplished.

Another important consideration was revealed in an interview setting. After referring to the National Crime Prevention Centre as a ‘bank,’ the latter interviewee further contested that

>[the point is Justice is giving out money right now; they’re not doing social development; they’re giving out money to maybe make it happen to some degree but I mean giving $50,000 to a project to make sure that the community knows how to secure themselves against crime or ensure that a rec program for kids is as limited as it can get; think of what it would cost to really do social development; totally resourcing the way we do business in a different way; we’re not doing that; sorry, we’re just not! (Former Secretariat Staff to the National Crime Prevention Council - emphatic tone in original).]
This contention reinforces, yet again, the limited way in which social development is deployed through government generated programs. It is not only targeted and selected, but it also seems to be dealing with symptoms of social conditions rather than with the social conditions themselves. Community-based projects and recreation programs cannot possibly address, to any significant degree, the conditions that lead to socio-economic deprivation within neighbourhoods or among individuals.

Another interviewee expressed concern about the disparity in the financial allocations between reactive responses and more socially-oriented proactive approaches. He questioned:

... how much has been spent on nutrition programs; I'd like to know how much is being spent on literacy programs; I'd like to know how much is being spent on parenting skills; I'd like to know what's being spent on early childhood care, pre-natal care for women; I'd like to know what's being spent on that and I'd like to know what's being spent on bars and grills and chains and grates! (Former Secondee to the Department of Justice).

This respondent’s rhetorical question serves as a reminder of the considerable difference between federal government investments in crime prevention and crime control. The $9.9 billion spent on “bars and grills and chains and grates” versus the $32 million invested in proactive measures is an indication of the permanence and priority accorded to neo-conservative measures. In this sense, although they are promoted as mutually reinforcing in political rhetoric, reactive responses and proactive approaches seemed to be adversarial counterparts, at least in economic terms.

Two other interviewees pointed to the constrained way in which ‘social’ services are conceived and implemented through the National Strategy. A Former Member of the
National Crime Prevention Council from the extra-state sector protested that "we focussed on [children aged] 0 to 6 and did we make any promise about the national child care cause? No! That to me is a bit of a lightning rod issue" (emphatic tone in original). The Former Secretariat Staff Member to the National Crime Prevention Council raised a similar objection when she claimed that "... we're not implementing a grand scheme that changes the way services to families are delivered ... we're a bank now" (emphatic tone in original).

These two final examples illustrate how broader social welfare interventions, while occasionally envisioned as part of the crime prevention equation, are more often retracted. Although universal child care and employment programs have been alluded to by Ministers in their speeches, and implored by numerous advocates, they are not fully represented at the level of policy development and program implementation.

Thus, visions of 'the social' exist in a rather curtailed way within the context of federal government-directed crime prevention initiatives. In some instances, it has been reformulated as a developmental or risk-based intervention, rather than as an entirely 'social' development project. It has also been constrained within the confines of 'justice' oriented institutions and it has been abbreviated by fiscal priorities. The only site at which it remains somewhat consistent is at the level of rhetoric; even there, however, it often vies for space among neo-liberal and neo-conservative interests. This latter point is taken up in the section below.
THE INTERSECTION OF RATIONALITIES IN A ‘BALANCED’ APPROACH

As former chapters have shown, crime prevention sits at the intersection of a number of discourses of regulation and rationalities of government, including neo-conservative, neo-liberal and ‘neo-social’ ones. I contend that this combination was particularly evident in the period following the establishment of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention,” namely between 1994 and 2000. These multiple rationalities found expression especially in the ‘balanced’ approach advocated and advanced through the National Strategy. The articulations and rationales of this agglomerated scheme are presented and discussed below.

The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, it attempts to reinforce that the concept of prevention remains ‘open’ in character (Gallie 1956). As a result, the expectations attributed to it are shaped and reshaped by an eclectic arrangement of sustaining and evolving rationales, methods, goals, as well as political and practical contingencies.

Second, the ensuing discussion seeks to demonstrate that crime prevention, in its late twentieth century form, is a site through which one can challenge the governmentality framework’s claim on the death of ‘the social’ and the ascendance of neo-liberal emphases on risk management. Rather than viewing neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and ‘the social’ as distinct and contrasting entities that displace one another, I share Stenson’s (1993:386) contention that they often interpenetrate one another in a mutually reinforcing way.

Some governmentality writers have examined this interpenetration. Certain
authors, such as O’Malley (1999b), Gordon (1980) and Rose (2000), have discussed the alliance between neo-conservative (‘clamping down on crime’) and neo-liberal (emphases on risk and responsibility) rationalities. Still other writers and critics, such as Stenson and Watt (1999), have illustrated the interconnectedness between neo-liberal and social mentalities. However, few if any have explored the combination of all three rationalities together. While O’Malley (2000) alludes to the tendency towards ‘hybridity,’ he does not adequately corroborate his claims with concrete examples of political discourse or government policy. In this light, this section presents how this intersection is articulated and rationalized through government rhetoric.

The ‘balanced’ approach that is evident through various components of “The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention” had been advocated by the ‘Horner Report’ and the National Crime Prevention Council. As one Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada explained, there seemed to be a ‘consensus’ around the emphasis on a ‘balanced’ approach between proactive and reactive measures. She related the following: “I think that there’s really an understanding that we need a balanced approach ... that prevention is not going to eradicate everything at the other end, but there needs to be a balanced approach.”

A Policy Analyst with the National Crime Prevention Centre asserted more tenaciously that

... the strategy is about ... a balance; it’s looking at criminal justice and taking a balanced approach. While there will always be a need, ... even in the Horner Report, that was right up front, page one, ... there will always be a need for ... the more traditional enforcement and courts and correctional types of responses but at the same time ... if you can keep people out of the
system in the first place then this makes far more sense from a community safety perspective, as well as from a cost perspective.

The term ‘balance’ is employed rather effectively here to secure acquiescence for what may otherwise be perceived as a contradictory strategy (Edelman 1977:152). It is certainly a potent use of political rhetoric because it obscures the actuality of compromises and contradictions. Certainly some academic critics view a combined approach of proactivity, prudentialism and punitiveness as contradictory (O’Malley 1999b; Garland 2000, 1996). However, in government rhetoric it is promoted as “complementary” (Policy Analyst with the Ministry of the Solicitor General). While there is no doubt that these distinct technologies compete for political space and government funds, a Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice defensively held that “we’re not seeing them as in opposition to one another.”

The Rationales Underlying the ‘Balanced’ Approach

Prior to presenting specific examples of how this ‘complementary’ approach is articulated, it is instructive to consider some of the rationales that were employed to advance this ‘balanced’ strategy. In 1997, the then Solicitor General Andy Scott claimed that

Recent opinion surveys show that Canadians want a balanced approach from governments to deal with the root causes of crime and to emphasize community crime prevention programs, while continuing to stay tough on violent crime ... The results speak directly to Canadian values and suggest how we may further reform Canada’s criminal justice system. But they also speak to the need to involve Canadians closely in the development of safe and effective solutions (Solicitor General of Canada 1997 - my emphasis).
While the validity of the claim in the first sentence of this quotation may be questionable for some, it does nevertheless illustrate the way in which government officials attempt to draw Canadians' alleged desires into their own efforts to legitimize a potentially controversial initiative. Again, this effort to personalize the issue of crime and the corresponding solutions is a strategic use of political rhetoric.

In addition, a rather pragmatic reason was also offered as an explanation for the 'complementary' or 'balanced' approach. The Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council clarified that "... a lot of good social development stuff in high needs communities can’t happen until you’ve got a minimum level of security that would allow people to become actively involved and good enforcement and good situational stuff is one of the keys to that."

As conceived by someone closely involved with the National Strategy, this explanation reveals the 'need' for mutual support between neo-conservative ("law enforcement"), neo-liberal ("situational stuff" which involves risk management) and neo-social ("social development") programs. In fairness, this rationale does make sense at a practical level. Nevertheless, the circular logic implied within this proposed approach makes it difficult to ascertain which of these interventions should be initiated first.

**Selected Articulations of the ‘Balanced’ Approach**

The most illustrative articulation of the ‘balanced’ approach was presented by the Honourable Allan Rock who was the Minister of Justice in 1995. He stated that:

...crime prevention is too important to be left to the lawyers, or the justice
ministers, or even the judges. Making streets safer has as much to do with literacy as it does with the law; with the strength of families as with the length of sentences; and with early intervention as with mandatory supervision. If crime prevention is going to be effective, it has to be based on the linkages between law enforcement and social agencies, between the educational system and families, and between community workers and health care professionals. Successful crime prevention means communities taking responsibility for themselves. Instead of wringing their hands, people should be invited to roll up their sleeves and work to do something about the problem. Crime prevention means recognizing connections between the crime rate and the employment rate, between how a child behaves at school and whether that kid has had a hot meal that day. In the final analysis, crime prevention has as much to do with Paul Martin in Finance, John Manley in Industry, and Lloyd Axworthy in Human Resources Development, as it does with Allan Rock at the Department of Justice.

This quotation exemplifies how crime prevention is a unique site at which several rationalities and technologies, while distinct, are conjoined in a federal government initiative. Wrapped up in this emphatic rhetoric on a mixed approach is an emphasis on all three rationalities and their corresponding technologies: neo-conservatism (e.g. law enforcement and sentencing), neo-liberalism (e.g. individual, family and community responsibility) and neo-social considerations (e.g. the enhancement of broader social policies and services in the areas of education, health care, socio-economic support and employment).

A similar promotional statement was made two years later in the “Estimates” which is an official annual publication through the Department of Justice. It promised that

... the Department will also introduce a small number of highly-targeted measures to deal with violent, high-risk offenders balanced by a strong emphasis on crime prevention and increased use of cost-effective, non-carceral alternatives for low-risk, non-violent offenders. Implementation
of the government’s Firearms Control Program will also continue. Recognizing that complex social policy problems cannot be solved by the justice system alone, the Department is working in partnership with other systems to develop effective, enduring responses to crime and violence and build a safe society. The health care, educational, social welfare and economic systems have an important role to play, as do other levels of government, non-governmental organizations, communities, families and individuals (Department of Justice Canada 1997:8-9).

The careful crafting of political rhetoric is evident in this statement. While seemingly repetitive in relation to the former ministerial statement, this quotation distinguishes between proactive and reactive measures in a rather unique way. While this ‘announcement’ certainly conveys the combination of risk-based, punitive and social welfare oriented measures, it emphasizes some more specifically than others. Notice how the proposed reactive initiatives are specified, targeted and even named (e.g. Firearms Control Program). The broader social policy issues, on the other hand, are alluded to in a rather vague way. They are even referred to as somewhat detached from the Department of Justice and viewed as the responsibility of ‘other systems.’ Thus, despite the allegedly ‘balanced’ approach expressed through this citation, the neo-conservative components seem to be more specific and systematic than the ‘social’ ones.

Multiple Reformulations

As the previous section has established, the ‘National Strategy’ promoted a ‘balanced’ approach which combined the use of the police and the criminal justice system (neo-conservatism), the responsibility of individuals, families and communities (neo-liberalism), as well as, the enhancement of broader social policies and services (‘the
Stenson and Watt (1999) have shown that as a result of the mutual relation between ‘risk-based’ and ‘socially-oriented’ approaches, ‘the social’ has been reformulated rather than displaced. I have also demonstrated how ‘the social’ has been revised through the intersection of not only neo-liberalism and ‘social welfarism,’ but also neo-conservatism. Furthermore, I have extended Stenson and Watt’s idea of reformulation by suggesting that all three rationalities have been altered to a certain degree through their mutual intersection.

Since a previous section has already illustrated how ‘the social’ has been retracted through its late twentieth century inclusion into government generated crime prevention initiatives, I briefly propose how neo-conservative and neo-liberal features have been altered as a result of their inclusion into the same arrangement.

I suggest that neo-conservative tendencies have been reconstituted on two levels. First, this is evident where police and other criminal justice officials are now expected to encourage and coordinate individual and community responsibilization programs. Furthermore, as previously shown excerpts from ministerial speeches have conveyed, the police are also now expected to ‘police’ in a ‘social’ way by being mindful of the social origins and consequences of problems such as runaway children, homeless youth and drug abuse (Kelleher 1987:5). In this way, the police may act as one of many referral agencies for social services. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that neo-conservatism is somewhat expanded through its alliance with neo-liberal and social rationalities and technologies.
Similarly, neo-liberal pursuits of prudentialism advance alongside, and sometimes through, the perennial reinforcement of reactive policing and punitive measures. Many community-oriented and individualized crime prevention programs are activated and coordinated through police services. Moreover, despite the obvious neo-liberal emphases on risk and responsibility, the national strategy's promotion of crime prevention through social development allegedly attempts to address the probability of risks of both crime and victimization through broader social support systems. In other words, neo-liberalism's 'responsible offender,' 'prudent victim' and 'enterprising community' all rely at least in part on the infrastructure of social service provisions accorded by the federal, provincial and municipal governments (O'Malley 2001, 2000). In this sense, neo-liberal emphases on risk are both retracted by neo-conservative measures and enhanced by socially-oriented projects.

Likewise, 'the social' has been reformulated through the grafting of these three rationalities and their corresponding technologies onto one another. I have already discussed above how 'the social' has been 'diluted' by the continued prioritization and substantial investment in neo-conservative control practices, as well as by the increased promotion of neo-liberal risk management exercises. Nevertheless, I have an additional concern to raise in this regard.

Despite the optimism associated with the partnership approach within the National Strategy, I contend that such an 'at-a-distance' feature may actually further compromise the 'social' pursuits of the strategy. While governing 'at-a-distance' tends to be considered a feature of neo-liberalism, the social versions of crime prevention are also
thought to be achieved through it. For example, many of the social factors associated with crime and victimization are thought to be addressed at the community level through either neighbourhood or individualized programming (Rose 1996a). Universal provisions, while alluded to, do not constitute a key component of the National Strategy. In this sense, the potential outcome of ‘social’ prevention may be hindered.

As I mentioned above, in their constrained and contingent capacity at the intersection of neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governing, ‘social’ orientations should be more appropriately referred to as ‘neo-social’ rationalities and technologies. Such a qualification of the concept of the ‘social’ is more reflective of the partiality and variability manifested in the co-existence of multiple rationalities and their corresponding technologies. More specifically, ‘the social’ has been rendered more accountable, efficient and subjected to neo-liberal expectations (Dean 1999:193). Through such a contention, I maintain that there is a residual presence of ‘the social’ in late twentieth century forms of regulation, albeit under revised ambitions.

Based on this brief overview and these selected examples, it becomes apparent how in the ‘balanced’ approach of crime prevention at the Canadian federal level, there are compromises made among the three rationalities to the extent that none of them are translated in their entirety through the crime prevention project. Certainly some, such as Cohen (1985), may consider this ‘balanced’ approach to be nothing more than a ‘blurring of boundaries’ at the level of rationalities, technologies and along bureaucratic lines. Others such as O’Malley (2000:164) interpret this tendency toward hybridity as an advantageous tool of government innovation.
While I agree with both Cohen and O’Malley in these regards, I raise additional conceptual considerations. Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to link late twentieth century crime prevention initiatives in Canada to three seemingly distinct, yet intersecting rationalities: neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and social welfarism. However, due to the ambiguous nature of both prevention and these rationalities, I have found it increasingly frustrating to compartmentalize prevention into these allegedly distinct categories. My analysis of the multiplicity, hybridity and partiality of these rationalities and their relation to contingent actualities goes some way towards reflecting the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of distinguishing among the categorizations.

Of particular relevance here is the way in which these rationalities, and especially the prefix ‘social’ (Valverde 1997, Wagner 2000, Walters 2000) are variously employed within, and among, different academic, political and public spheres. While I am not suggesting that the categories of neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and ‘the social’ are completely unhelpful, I do contend that their multiple usage occasionally invites confusion. I do not claim to have clarified this confusion through this dissertation. Rather, I have reflected upon the way in which Canadian federal crime prevention initiatives in the late twentieth century are a site at which the complexity and ambiguity of rationalities is apparent.

SUMMARY

This reflection has illustrated that crime prevention sits somewhat ‘strenuously,’ yet also seemingly ‘comfortably’ at the intersection of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and
neo-social rationalities. On the one hand, the variations of prevention have competed for space on the national agenda; on the other, they have been promoted simultaneously through ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’ In some ways, this ambiguous concept has become a chameleon of rationalities and their corresponding technologies.

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate some of the complexities inherent to the intersection mentioned above. Part of this undertaking has involved both a challenge against, and an extension of, some of the claims of the governmentality literature. There is no doubt that consequential shifts are visible. However, as O’Malley (2000) has pointed out, and as the evidence presented in this dissertation confirms, the governmentality framework’s contentions are contestable. More specifically, while pronouncements on the ‘death of the social’ and the rise of ‘risk society’ are evident through recognisable changes, this closer and substantiated examination of crime prevention has indicated that the extent of the alleged shifts has been exaggerated (O’Malley 2000:160).

The findings of this research corroborate O’Malley’s (2000:153) claim that there has been an underestimation of the resistance to change, the instability of programs and the emergence of transformational tendencies. In the case of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the resistance to change is evident in the recursiveness of neo-conservative discourses and practices; the instability of programs is apparent in the re-emergence and then retracted variations of ‘the social;’ the transformational tendencies are manifested in the
predominance of neo-liberal emphases of risk management exercises and 'at-a-distance' delivery mechanisms.

In this light, rather than being exclusive manifestations of particular rationalities, the late twentieth century crime prevention initiatives examined in this research have been shaped more by residual rationalities that have intersected with emerging ones. While there have certainly been compromises, tensions and reformulations of rationalities and technologies, none of them have been wholly displaced as earlier governmentality writers had purported or implied.

Thus, given the way in which the rationalities and technologies have become interwoven and interdependent, or at least promoted as such, it is plausible to conclude that the governmentality assessments and predictions of transformations and ruptures have been partially inaccurate. Nevertheless, I maintain that the governmentality literature was certainly a valuable analytical resource for my research project. In this light, the challenges brought against it in this dissertation were meant to extend rather than to dismiss the governmentality framework in its entirety.
ENDNOTES

1. Some effort is made to distinguish between being ‘at-risk’ of victimization and being ‘at-risk’ of offending. However, this distinction is often muddled because National Strategy officials often consider those individuals who are ‘at-risk’ of one to be also ‘at-risk’ of the other.

2. The ‘at-risk’ populations (i.e. impoverished children, youth and women) are at further ‘risk’ of being targeted and labelled through this allegedly benevolent social development strategy. This concern was confirmed by the Former Chair of the National Crime Prevention Council who acknowledged that

   the minute you get into a logic of risk and into a logic of prevention you abdicate the notion of innocent until proven guilty in favour of the notion of potentially guilty until proven innocent. And then that justifies all sorts of interventions; those interventions are much more likely to be applied against the vulnerable by the powerful than vice versa.

3. In fairness, this Policy Analyst from the Ministry of the Solicitor General did offer a more detailed understanding of the various definitions of ‘youth at-risk.’ She explained that

   ... we all have them and they’re all different. When HRDC talks about a youth at-risk, they are at-risk of unemployment. Health talks about children and youth at-risk, they’re a number of the health, you know STDs and HIV, and drug addiction and ... then when we talk about youth at-risk, it’s crime and victimization; so we’re all, we all recognize that a lot of those people are the same people.

   While this explanation is in part intended to clarify what is meant by ‘youth at-risk,’ it still points to the variability of the term.

4. While this is written partially in jest, one must recognize the complexity associated with this challenge. Many of the policy makers involved with the National Strategy that I interviewed were also very much aware of the limitations of their interventions.

5. Crime prevention through social development is a complex approach that does acknowledge the broader social factors that influence instances of ‘criminality’ and victimization. However, in practice, it is more often the developmental aspect of it that is implemented. This component tends to focus more narrowly on the ‘at-risk’ factors and it attempts to assist individuals in minimizing them. It clearly focuses on helping individuals to better adapt to stifling socio-economic conditions rather than attempting to eradicate or improve the conditions themselves. It is very individualistically oriented.
6. What is said here about the complexity of categories on rationalities and the prefix 'the social' can also be said about distinctions between the notions of 'state' and 'non/extra/para-state.' Such distinctions imply that these sectors exist exclusively. However, as this dissertation's emphasis on 'at-a-distance' prevention has demonstrated, these conceptual divisions are not necessarily accurate or helpful because these two allegedly distinct sectors actually interact to such an extent that their boundaries are often indistinguishable. There was further confusion about the use of the terms 'state' and 'government' in this governmentality analysis on Canadian federal government initiatives. In academic analyses, and especially within the governmentality framework, there is an alleged necessity to distinguish between 'state' and 'government.' However, in popular discourse, the terms government and non-governmental are used to describe what governmentality writers refer to as 'state' and 'non/para/extra-state.' This occasionally led to confusion when interviewees were using the terms 'government' and especially 'non-governmental' to describe the various agencies involved advancing the crime prevention initiatives.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to understand, in one particular case, how a ‘government’ articulates and rationalizes its desire to act, to what extent, on what level and to what end. This study has differed from the majority of research on crime prevention because the latter tends to measure methods and results rather than intentions and rationales. My study exclusively and explicitly focussed on political rationales and governmental rationalities. The underlying impetus of such an endeavour was to extend analyses and to expand inquiries on crime prevention through broader and more in-depth considerations.

In this concluding chapter, I reiterate the main contributions and the most important implications of my research and I consider some objections that might be raised against it. I first highlight how criminology, sociology and governmentality frameworks have shaped the analyses in this study. I then provide an overview of the rationales and rationalities underlying federally directed crime prevention initiatives between 1974 and 2000. Finally, I discuss some future directions that may evolve from this dissertation.

CRIMINOLOGY, GOVERNMENTALITY AND SOCIOLOGY

This research sought to move beyond the platitudinous and recursive comments on the ineffectiveness of intervention that so commonly characterize the academic literature on crime prevention. One of the shortcomings of this criminological literature
is its failure to take stock of broader analytical developments elsewhere. As a means of
remedying this situation, I chose to reflect on developments in other fields and on my
own thinking about crime prevention. The goal was to bring the study of crime
prevention into a more theoretically comprehensive, yet grounded, account of rationalities
of regulation.

To this end, the governmentality literature became a valuable analytical resource
for my dissertation. I have attempted to demonstrate how the governmentality framework
has enabled me to bring the intricacies of evolving rationalities around crime prevention
to the fore. Compared to the conventional criminological literature on proactive
approaches, the governmentality framework has opened up different analytical angles
through which to observe contemporary rhetoric on preventative initiatives.

Nevertheless, a development that emerged during the course of the data collection
and the analysis must be explicated here. As I previously mentioned, I began this
dissertation with the intention of moving beyond a micro-level crime prevention literature
that was seemingly too grounded in pragmatic preoccupations. While the engagement
with the governmentality framework helped in overcoming this limitation, it was an
endeavour that was in some ways wanting. At issue was the governmentality
framework’s proneness to abstract generalizations of change, its overemphasis on
knowledge-based rationalities and its dependency on textual discourses.

In this sense, governmentality perspectives seemed to be somewhat detached from
the intricacies of political discourses and state interventions. The empirical data, upon
which this study drew, presented some interesting challenges against claims within the
governmentality literature. This dissertation thus became a journey towards finding a middle ground that was engaging at a conceptual level, yet attentive to contingent actualities as they were presented in their Canadian federal government form.

In an attempt to address this concern and to make sense of the evidence that my research yielded, I have strengthened the governmentality framework’s analytical potential in the realm of crime prevention by incorporating the challenging insights of Garland (1999), O’Malley (2001, 2000, 1999a, 1999b), Stenson (1999, 1993), as well as Stenson and Watt (1999). Their contributions enabled me to integrate some pertinent sociological tools. More specifically, in addition to incorporating varied sources of data, I also paid heed to the contingent actualities of politics and government that influence the relational interplay between governmental rationalities and technologies. Furthermore, my specific focus on rationales also provided additional analytical precision.

By substantiating the governmentality position on the rise and fall of various rationalities within complex and contingent shifts in late twentieth century Canadian federal crime prevention initiatives, I have demonstrated that crime prevention is a site at which the forecasts of the governmentality literature may be reconsidered. My focus is distinct and novel insofar as it has enabled me to highlight not only points of discontinuity and rupture, but also points of convergence, repetition and continuity in ways that the more abstract, generalized focus of much governmentality literature does not.

Another distinct feature of this study is its emphasis on state formulations of crime prevention. Although I have acknowledged that many contemporary crime
prevention programs originate within central government departments (Stenson 1996; Stenson and Watt 1999), my intention was certainly not to undermine the governmentality perspective’s emphasis on de-centred regulation. Rather, my goal was to demonstrate how a state, the Canadian federal government in this particular case, articulates governance through prevention, especially in its at-a-distance form. The long-term plans of this distinct contribution are explicated below in the section on future directions under the sub-heading of prevention “at-a-distance.”

1974-2000 IN REVIEW

There is no doubt that broader changes in regulation in the late twentieth century were echoed in the changing character of the discourses and practices of prevention. However, with more recent optimistic emphases on reforms and innovations, continuities have often gone unnoticed. In fact, within governmentality circles, there seems to have been more of a presumption of change than of continuity. However, as the discussions in chapters five through nine have demonstrated, recent trends in crime control and social regulation have displayed both continuities and changes.

In the particular case of crime prevention, this dialectic between continuity and change takes on a unique meaning. It was summed up by Gilling (1997:8) who stated that “[c]rime prevention ... is a constant with a changing character.” In other words, the goal of preventing crime has remained the same over time; but the methods employed to achieve it have allegedly changed. Gilling’s contention was confirmed by the observations of an authoritative interviewee. The Senior Official who had worked with the Ministry of the Solicitor General between 1973 and 1998 claimed that “where we
have to get to hasn’t changed and I don’t think it will ever change. How we get there is a different kind of thing.”

Although I have not concentrated as much on changes in technologies or methods, I have placed greater emphasis on similarities and differences among the rationales and rationalities over time. Thus, the next two sections highlight what has changed and what has remained the same at the level of both rationales and rationalities. In so doing, I draw attention to the way in which rhetoric and rationales have advanced innovation and sustained tradition simultaneously.

**Rationales**

As chapters five through nine have shown, prevention was propelled forward on both federal and national terrains by a promotional rhetoric replete with sundry rationales that proclaimed the desirability of state and extra-state intervention in this regard. This study of rationales was not intended as a ‘truth-seeking’ or ‘fact-finding’ mission. This restriction was in part because officially articulated or published ‘rationales’ do not necessarily reflect decisions that are made in ministerial meetings or throughout the policy development process. Instead, I have concentrated on how rationales have been strategically employed to secure support of, and participation in, Canadian federal government generated crime prevention initiatives.

The rationales underlying the federal level prevention agenda between 1974 and 2000 were put forth via a tenaciously optimistic rhetoric. In many ways, the push for crime prevention was written as a promotional narrative of reform and benevolence.
Prevention was drawn onto the federal level and national agenda by political attractions and pragmatic inducements. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, crime prevention became a word synonymous with political opportunity, fiscal prudence, alternative viability and pragmatic efficiency.

The continuities and changes in rationales that I have noted are indeed illustrative. There is certainly a recursiveness which characterizes the way in which rationales are reproduced in the context of crime prevention at the Canadian federal government level. While prevention has been justified by various reasons between 1974 and 2000, some rationales have remained constant throughout this time period. These included, among others, the failure of the criminal justice system, the financial costs of reactive responses, political opportunism, as well as the physical, social and psychological harm resulting from crime and victimization.

What is clear to us now in the twenty-first century with the benefit of hindsight is that these rationales have variously legitimated neo-conservative, neo-liberal and ‘neo-social’ versions of prevention. In this sense, it is possible to see that throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, the same rationales had often promoted emergent policies and sustained existing programs simultaneously. Both reactive and proactive measures had been curiously advocated in this arrangement. Thus, the quest for alternative approaches has been moderated here.

It should also be noted that in addition to reflecting a variety of concerns, rationales not only promoted the acceptance of prevention as a viable option, but they also conveyed the alleged need for the Canadian federal government to intervene in, and
the public to participate in, crime prevention activities. It is also clear in this instance that prevention derives its appeal from a wider rhetoric on the desired limits of government intervention. Federal level crime prevention initiatives have engendered both direct and indirect government action. Thus, while rationales have expressed a desire for greater state involvement, they have simultaneously imparted the expectations of governing 'at-a-distance.'

Based on this brief review of rationales, it is possible to contend that a small cluster of rationales has consistently served to advance both proactive and reactive, as well as state and extra-state interventions in the name of crime prevention. This actuality points to the complexity inherent within both crime prevention and government-based initiatives. The next section further reinforces the intertwining of broader rationalities that also inform government generated preventative pursuits.

**Governmental Rationalities**

The evolution of Canadian federal level crime prevention initiatives between 1974 and 2000 has presented an opportunity to examine 'the death of the social' and the 'risk society' theses. Contrary to the governmentality line, this research has found that, while representing some aspects of a neo-liberal orientation, the crime prevention policies and programs of this historical juncture are better understood in terms of an amalgamation of various rationalities that are presented as mutually reinforcing rather than as contradictory or displacing.

More specifically, this study has reflected on crime prevention at the intersection
of neo-conservative, neo-liberal and neo-social rationalities. This examination has revealed how crime prevention, as an ambiguous and chameleon-like concept, is shaped and reshaped by multiple rationalities over time. Consequently, the story of crime prevention is one of compromise, accommodation and ambiguity.

In questioning the unidirectional shift in rationalities and technologies in favour of neo-liberalism, this analysis found that crime prevention has remained in complicity with neo-conservative mechanisms of discipline and reactivity. It also seems wedded, at least in part, to social welfarist orientations. This finding is by no means implying that crime prevention has been unaffected by the emergence of neo-liberal emphases on risk management and ‘at-a-distance’ forms of governing crime; this development is not only discernable, it is also undeniable.

Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this research on crime prevention at the federal government level during this two and a half decade period points to more complex conditions. The open declarations in both speeches and publications suggest that the governmentality writers were ‘presumptuous’ to view recent changes in regulation as points of rupture and replacement. Instead, these research findings require us to consider the multiplicity, variability and partiality among rationalities and technologies of government, the tendency towards hybridity, as well as the interdependent mutuality in both conceptions and practices of regulation.

It is against this multiplex backdrop that elements of both continuity and change in crime prevention can be observed. As ambiguous and frustrating as this complexity may be for some observers and practitioners, it is an actuality that calls us to pay closer attention to the diversity and unevenness of conceptualizations, rationales, rationalities
and forms of crime prevention on both academic and practical levels. Abstract and theoretical considerations must bear these complexities in mind; practitioners should also be cognisant of the diverse and uneven conceptualizations and consequences that shape and re-shape their terrain.

An additional note on rationales and rationalities must be made here. The rationales presented in chapters five through nine were indicative of broader rationalities of neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and neo-social orientations. However, they also revealed some of the political, bureaucratic and circumstantial reasons for the greater emphasis on prevention at the federal government level. Based on these findings, it is possible to recognize how government prevention programmes do not just spring out of dominant rationalities. Rather they are shaped by an interplay between formal rationalities of government and ‘messy actualities’ of politics, policy and practice.

The undeniable presence of contingent actualities illustrates how rationalities are not necessarily forces that determine technologies in a unidirectional manner. One must recognize that rationalities and technologies may actually be, or become, disconnected as a result of the influence of ‘messy’ actualities. As this study has illustrated, despite the assumed relation between rationalities and technologies, contingent actualities also shape and re-shape the nature and scope of government programs.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The conclusions drawn about prevention through this dissertation are not merely a matter of more, different or better data. Rather, they signal fundamental issues about the potentialities of prevention and the rationalities of government. My interest in the
rationales of prevention has been three-fold: scholarly, substantive and humanitarian. In
the subsequent sections, I present my future intentions for all three of these areas. The
first one challenges academics to think more openly about criminology and
governmentality frameworks. The second one seeks to substantiate the governmentality
claims of 'at-a-distance' forms of governing crime. Finally, the third one raises concerns
about the boundless possibilities of prevention in the context of human rights violations.
The primary purpose of these three proposed research studies is to promote a broader
understanding of the subject of prevention than has previously been sought or developed.

Criminology, Governmentality and Sociology Reconsidered

To the degree that we are witnessing discernable shifts, still far from complete and
bound to remain partial in certain important respects, there have emerged a series of
theoretical, political and practical tensions, disparities and lacunae. Given these evolving
considerations, one must question whether or not the frameworks of criminology and
governmentality are adequate for explanations of the changing realities of crime
prevention, criminal justice and social regulation (Garland and Sparks 2000; Garland
1999).

If these two separate models are to maintain their traditional focus and scope, then
the answer to this question is likely negative. More specifically, if criminology remains
an evaluation enterprise dominated by applied concerns and law and order politics, then it
will be less able to come to terms with the modifications that characterize twenty-first
century crime control. Similarly, if governmentality's forecasts remain abstract,
exaggerated and ungrounded, they too will be less relevant to attempts at understanding the varying implications of trends in social regulation.

Clearly, there is much to both rethink and ‘unthink’ with these two frameworks. Thus, the challenge for both criminology and governmentality is to continue an open dialogue with each other so as to advance analyses of crime control and social regulation in more capacious directions. The purpose would be to initiate a sensitizing perspective that demonstrates the possibility and desirability to think about questions of crime prevention and other forms of regulation in a more comprehensive manner. At the very least, this dialogue should address the complexities and contradictions of trends in regulation without adopting exclusive vocabularies of either abstractness or concreteness. Rather, criminology and governmentality perspectives should continue to engage in mutually transcending analyses.

This dialogue may also benefit from the integration of sociological tools of analysis. The gap between criminology and governmentality that was flagged in this study may be somewhat lessened by sociological considerations. This is not to suggest that sociology must come to the rescue of these partial frameworks. The uniqueness, partiality and specificity of these studies are indeed their strengths. Nevertheless, as this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate, criminological and governmentality enquiries into prevention may be enhanced by sociological accounts of the social relations and institutional dynamics of continuity and change that shape this form of regulation (Marshall 1998:628-630).

While the distinct enquiries of sociology, criminology and governmentality
studies may seem incompatible in certain important respects, they need not be regarded as mutually exclusive (Garland 1999:37). Rather, if the purpose of the enquiry is to shed light on both the implementation and implications of preventative technologies, then sociological analyses will undoubtedly be indispensable. Thus, rather than maintaining unnecessary and constrictive disciplinary boundaries, I invite criminological, sociological and governmentality writers to develop integration efforts that may lead to mutually beneficial extensions of their respective lines of enquiry.

**Prevention “at-a-distance”**

One of the ways in which this aforementioned duality of governmentality and criminology may manifest itself is in the area of governing crime ‘at-a-distance.’ This dissertation has demonstrated that crime prevention is a form of regulation in which federal initiatives set the boundaries of how it is articulated and rationalized as a strategy aimed at addressing crime and victimization. Nevertheless, while the present study may be faulted for having a state-centric view of prevention, the intention was not to present a distorted picture of this form of social regulation. Rather, the purpose of the dissertation was to examine how the Canadian federal government articulated its activities in the area of crime prevention, including its ‘at-a-distance’ components.

Now that the articulations and rationales of prevention ‘at-a-distance’ at the level of rhetoric have been made known through this initial phase of research, the ‘at-a-distance’ nature of federally directed prevention initiatives remains an important area of future inquiry. In other words, while the present study analysed how prevention was
formulated at the levels of rationalities and political rhetoric, the proposed research on ‘at-a-distance’ governance seeks in some ways to explore prevention technologies ‘from the ground up.’ The purpose of this endeavour is two-fold. First, as Walters (2000:4) has pointed out, given that problematizations of social issues “do not just happen inside policy-makers’ and other experts’ heads,” there is a need to “understand governmental thought” as a “practical activity.” This is thought to be made possible through the examination of the various corresponding technologies. The second purpose is to study the complex interactive, and sometimes disconnected, dynamic between rationalities and technologies that is often shaped and re-shaped by contingent actualities of practice.

Furthermore, given that little is known about the relationship among federal, provincial and local levels of governing in the prevention of crime in Canada, an extension of this dissertation should explore how the emphasis on governing ‘at-a-distance’ is manifested in the implementation phase of ‘The National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.’ Beyond examining how ‘at-a-distance’ prevention is articulated and rationalized, it would be instructive to explore how it is carried out through a range of state, extra-state and state-linked agencies through National Strategy initiatives. Rather than viewing the National Crime Prevention Centre as the ‘absolute’ central state coordinating agency, and the National Strategy as the ‘master’ strategy in this regard, the purpose of the proposed study is to explore the interactive dynamics of decision-making, resources and program implementation among state, para-state and non-state bodies.

There is also a need to investigate more closely the views of those administering
and experiencing the different kinds of community-based programs through the National Strategy. Such a study would produce a ‘local’ knowledge which would shed light on how ‘at-a-distance’ governance is experienced by practitioners and lived by clients (Valverde 1997:54). This proposed research could also shed light on how broader governmental rationalities are implemented and corrupted in practice, often with unforeseen consequences (Garland 1999:31). This localized research would undoubtedly lend itself to comparative studies across Canadian provinces, municipalities and local communities.

**When Prevention is Punitive**

Beyond the scholarly and substantive areas mentioned above, my major interests in crime prevention are humanitarian; I am concerned with the boundless possibilities of prevention. The notion of prevention is certainly accompanied by many ethics and virtues including salvation, benevolence, progressiveness and creativity (Billis 1981:377). It also appears that because it is often set as the ideal and desirable form of social control, the word ‘prevention’ is both rich in symbolic power and allegedly lacking in negative connotations (Gilling 1997). However, given the range of forms, targets and principles of prevention across the international stage, one must be wary of how repressive tendencies may occur and recur through the notion of prevention.

In this light, I seek to project the questions and challenges raised in this research on rationales and government intervention onto the terrain of human rights violations where prevention has been appropriated to serve extremely repressive ends. It is my hope
that by better understanding instances where the concept of prevention is manipulated, we
may improve our ability to challenge and overcome circumstances that impede human
potential.

In raising these issues, I am responding to both Cohen’s (1993) and South’s
(1997) pleas that criminology revitalize itself by including human rights and global issues
as part of its core content. Since human rights violations constitute the most extreme
forms of victimization, then they should be central areas of inquiry within criminology.

Furthermore, in highlighting concerns around the ‘power to prevent,’ I seek to
emphasize that prevention is not merely a slippery or ambiguous term; given that it is also
sometimes misguided and exploited, the concept may very well be considered a
misnomer in certain detrimental conditions. More specifically, I am taking into account
Gallie’s (1956:198) cautionary note that when a concept is endlessly contestable, “it is
well worth asking where the limit of its acceptability should be drawn.”

Since this study is not an evaluative one, I have sought neither to establish more
defensible conceptual boundaries of crime prevention, nor to advocate any preferences
among the neo-conservative, neo-liberal or neo-social versions of it. However, when
prevention is used to justify such intrusive interventions as torture, sterilization, genocide,
forced abortions, executions, segregation, rape and female genital mutilation, among
others, then world citizens are well within their right to challenge perceptions of
‘acceptability.’

In attempting to address the insidious potential of prevention, I am suggesting that
there are pressing practical reasons why we should confront ‘rationales’ and
‘justifications’ in both state and extra-state contexts. To evade or dismiss rationales as merely ‘rhetoric’ would result in a blatant disregard for the human suffering entailed in the aforementioned interventions. In this light, it is my hope that the analytical framework established through this research that exposes the significance of both state-generated and extra-state-based rationales will enable myself and others to pursue questions that will broaden the parameters of criminological, sociological and governmentality inquiry.

SUMMARY

This dissertation has demonstrated that the analytical frameworks of governmentality, political language, sociology and criminology go some way towards an understanding of the complex phenomenon of crime prevention, at least in its Canadian federal government form. By conjoining these analytical frameworks and by addressing some of their shortcomings, this study has transcended the partiality of each perspective. As a result, it has broadened the scope and depth of inquiry into crime prevention.

There is certainly no implied finality in this concluding chapter. Rather, the contentions and challenges presented within this work should serve as a base upon which social science scholars can extend, on either broader or narrower levels, analyses of social regulation and social justice.
ENDNOTES

1. I credit this notion of 'messy actualities' to insights provided by Bruce Curtis.

2. These three interests should not be divorced from one another. It is my hope that subsequent scholarship will take up these concerns in their mutual form.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewee I  Department of Justice Official
1994-1999

Interviewee II  Former Policy Analyst with the Department of Justice
1988-1994

Interviewee III  Policy Analyst at the National Crime Prevention Centre
1998-1999
Senior Research Officer and Writer - “The Horner Report”
1992-1993

Interviewee IV  Former Secretariat Staff - National Crime Prevention Council
1994-1998

Interviewee V  Former Secondee to the Department of Justice
1994-1998

Interviewee VI  Assistant Deputy Minister - Department of Justice Canada
1992-1999

Interviewee VII  Former Member - National Crime Prevention Council
1994-1997

Interviewee VIII  Policy Analyst - Department of Justice
1990-1999

Interviewee IX  Policy Analyst - Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada
1996-1999

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Interviewee X  National Crime Prevention Secretariat Staff 1994-1998

Interviewee XI Seconded Policy Analyst - National Crime Prevention Centre
                  1996-1999

Interviewee XII Former Research Officer - Ministry of the Solicitor General
                  1975-1984

Interviewee XIII Former Chair - National Crime Prevention Council
                  1994-1997

Interviewee XIV Official - Consultation Centre - Ministry of the Solicitor General
                  1985-1987
APPENDIX B

LETTER OF CONSENT

In partial fulfilment of the PhD degree requirements in Sociology at Carleton University, I am currently gathering information on the development and evolution of federal crime prevention policy initiatives in Canada. While my broader project explores shifts in the discourse of prevention, as well as preventive rationalities in terms of control and regulation, I am also interested in the broader political, social and economic contexts through which the shifts in focus on crime prevention have occurred between 1970 and 1999. This study further examines the relation between rhetoric and policy, as well as, any strengths and/or limitations (including compromises) of federal prevention policies and projects. This consultative interview will therefore explore your thoughts and professional experience regarding the development and the implications of these initiatives.

Your voluntary participation in this project requires one interview at a place of your choice for an estimated 1.5 hours. Follow-up questions or interviews may be requested for clarification. You are free to stop or withdraw from the interview at any time, for whatever reason. Equally, you are under no obligation to answer questions that may cause you discomfort.

Concerning privacy and confidentiality, the following precautions will be taken.

- I will personally transcribe each tape-recorded interview.

- For safekeeping, all data will be stored in a private office.

- I will erase each interview tape after the dissertation is written.

- I will eliminate identifying information from the transcripts of the interview, from the dissertation and from any lectures, research, articles or books not yet written or published. A pseudonym with a generic identifier will be used; the pseudonym will be determined in consultation with, and agreed upon by both the researcher and the interviewee.

This letter of consent outlines the nature of my research and my responsibilities as a researcher; it also clarifies your rights and recourse as a respondent. Should you have questions regarding the research or the interviews (content or process), I (Christine Gervais) may be reached by phone at 831-9158 or by e-mail at cgervais@ccs.carleton.ca. Additional concerns may be addressed to:
John Shepherd  
Chair, Department of Sociology and Anthropology  
Carleton University  
520-2600 x 2585  
john_shepherd@carleton.ca

Maeve McMahon  
Department of Law  
Carleton University  
520-2600 x 8095  
mcmahon@ecs.carleton.ca

Upon completion of my PhD, copies of the written dissertation will be available for your review in the library at Carleton University and at the National Library of Canada.

Your time, consideration and valuable input are greatly appreciated.

Christine Gervais  
PhD Candidate in Sociology  
Carleton University  
Date

INFORMED CONSENT

Informed by the details outlined above, I understand the purpose of the research, the researcher's role and my rights as an interviewee. Therefore, I, ___________________, consent to participate in this interview. I do so on the understanding that the information collected will be used for research purposes only.

Signature  
Date
APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Depending on the interviewees' involvement, I drew from the following set of questions:

INTRODUCTION

• How do you describe your role in the advancement of the national strategy? (When were you involved? For how long? In what capacity?)

HISTORY

• How has crime prevention evolved within federal government initiatives since the mid 1970s?

• What did crime prevention look like at the federal level in the 1970s? In the 1980s? In the 1990s?

• Which departments were responsible for crime prevention in the 1970s? In the 1980s? In the 1990s?

• Why did a change in the responsibility for crime prevention occur?

• How has this departmental change affected the focus of crime prevention?

• Beyond the Department of Justice and Solicitor General, what role did other government departments play in crime prevention and community safety projects at the national level?

• What is the process by which crime prevention was placed on the national agenda? (Why crime prevention? Why now?)

• What have been the key moments responsible for the greater emphasis on prevention at the national level?

• What have been the political influences on the advancement of crime prevention as a priority at the federal government level?

• What have been the economic influences on the advancement of crime prevention as a priority at the federal level?
• How have Canada's crime prevention initiatives been influenced by advancements in other countries?

• How have the rationales used to advance crime prevention at the federal level changed over time?

• Have there been any obstacles to the development of the federal level policies and programmes on crime prevention? If so, what? If no, why not?

• Within the competing demands for policy evident during the various consultation meetings (1992-93), how were alternative or oppositional voices represented?

• What has been the appeal of prevention for the federal government? Has it been longstanding? How has the appeal evolved over time or has it remained the same?

• How has the flexibility of the term prevention been used/manipulated?

• What terms are representative of the discourse of crime prevention?

**RESEARCH**

• What research served to justify the establishment of the national strategy and the social development approach it is promoting?

• What are the origins of this research?

• How has this research been used to advance crime prevention policy?

• What / who determined the scope and emphasis of the research?

• What role did researchers play in determining the scope and emphasis of the research?

**CURRENT NATIONAL STRATEGY**

• Is prevention a priority for the federal government with respect to crime control?

• What is the current nature of national crime prevention initiatives?

• Why is crime prevention taking the shape it is taking?

• What or who determines which strategies are prioritized through the national strategy?

• While there are many different forms of crime prevention, what strategy (type of crime prevention) is being advanced through the national strategy?
• What influenced the construction of this particular type of crime prevention being advanced?

• What sustains the federal government’s interest in crime prevention generally and in this particular type of crime prevention?

• How the national strategy define ‘crime?’

• How does the national strategy define ‘crime prevention’? What levels and targets are being advanced?

• How does the national strategy define ‘at risk?’ How is it measured?

• How are the policies developed through the national strategy considered proactive?

• What is considered the national strategy’s measure of success?

• Has the policy making process in the Department of Justice enabled the national strategy? If so, how?

• Has the policy making process in the Department of Justice inhibited the national strategy? If so, how?

• There are conflicting viewpoints on the benefit of crime prevention (short-term and long-term) for society. How is the national strategy intended to impact Canadian society?

CANADA’S GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

• What is the relationship between local communities, provinces and the national strategy?

• How might Canada’s federal-provincial-municipal governmental structure enable the strategy’s activities?

• How might Canada’s federal-provincial-municipal governmental structure inhibit the strategy’s activities?

• What steps are being taken to address this unique division of responsibilities?
ASSESSING CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

- Crime prevention is often thought to represent a shift in the delivery of criminal justice practices. Does the National Strategy represent a major change in criminal justice overall? Why? Why not?

- Does the national strategy represent a major change in policy reform at the federal level/national level? If yes, why? / If no, why not? / Or if mixed, how?


- What are the strategy’s goals for the year 2000? for 2010? for 2020?

- Are there any contradictions or ambiguities within the national strategy? If so, what? If no, why not?

- Is it a unified set of policies? If so, why? If no, why not?

- Are there any contradictions or ambiguities between the national crime prevention strategy and with what the federal government is doing in criminal justice overall (Department of Justice, Solicitor General of Canada, Correctional Services of Canada)? If yes, what are they? If no, why not?

CONCLUSION

- Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about national crime prevention initiatives in Canada?

- Do you have any questions regarding this research study?
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