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A Quantitative Analysis Of National
Leadership Commitment To Collective
Decision-Making Within The Framework
Of The European Communities, 1959-1972

by

Conrad David Geise, B.A.

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*
A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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in International Affairs

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Ottawa, Ontario

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ABSTRACT

Recent theoretical and empirical literature in the field of international political integration contains many references to the role of national governmental leaders during an integrative process. It has frequently been suggested that a direct causal link exists between a commitment on the part of the national leaderships and a furtherance of the integration scheme. In this paper, an attempt is made to determine what impact certain process mechanisms and environmental factors have on the positions taken by national governmental leaders with regard to political integration.

Using multiple regression analysis on data for the European Communities from 1959 to 1972, three main conclusions were drawn. First, the increasing concentration of trade within the European Communities has led to a high degree of interdependence, which national leaders perceive, necessitates a positive commitment to collective decision-making. Second, national leaders are increasingly using the technical expertise offered by non-governmental community institutions and are thereby either subconsciously or consciously committing themselves to the collective arena. Finally, and equally important, the perceptions that national leaders may have regarding their relative position among the member-states does not appear to be of significance in the development of their position, be it integrative or disintegrative.

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PREFACE

In 1963 France's president, Charles DeGaulle, did what some observers believed could not be accomplished. He impeded, halted, and some have suggested, reversed an integrative process that was moving closer and closer to a federated Western Europe. What factors lead national governmental leaders to commit themselves to, or reject, a furtherance of the integrative process following their initial acceptance?

By analyzing certain process mechanisms and environmental factors which we believe have a direct impact on the stances advocated by the national leaderships of the European Community member-states, we have sought to answer this question. Moreover, we hope this paper, in some small way, contributes to the understanding of conflict resolution through the establishment of collective decision-making systems.

A number of people have contributed to my understanding of the integrative phenomenon and to this manuscript. I am particularly indebted to Professor Michael Dolan for his encouragement and supervisory assistance. I would also like to thank Professors Peyton V. Lyon, Bruce A. McFarlane and George Rich for expanding my awareness of regional integration during the integration seminars held at Carleton University. I also am grateful to Mr. Art Cromer of the University of Louisville Computer Center for his assistance with the mathematical

portion of the text. A note of appreciation is also due Marie Fust for typing the final manuscript. I am also grateful for the different, but no less essential support that I received from my wife and son.

Conrad D. Geise

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The systematic study of the phenomenon termed international political integration is of relatively recent origin.¹ Yet even within this brief time frame, it is clear that the prominent position this particular area of inquiry has achieved in the more inclusive field of international politics derives as much from international events as it does from academic developments. Most obviously, it is the rapid growth in the number and significance of regional organizations peculiar to the post World War II era that stimulated the growing interest on the part of scholars in international organization and regional integration.

This thesis is concerned with the phenomenon of international political integration, and in particular its Western European variant. Basically, it is an effort to examine and then provide satisfactory explanations for some of the important "hows" and "whys" of political integration in the European setting. What we are particularly interested

¹The appearance of Karl Deutsch's Political Community and the North Atlantic Community (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957) and Ernst Haas' The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958) are generally considered the first major works in this field.

in determining are the effects that certain process mechanisms and conditions have had on the behavior of the national leaderships of the member-states with regard to increasing or decreasing their commitment to the collective decision-making arena.

Before proceeding to discuss issues more central to the objectives of this thesis, a few brief remarks on the discipline of international politics and the place of political integration within that discipline seem in order. The reasons for this are twofold. First, it is our firm belief that students of international politics should be fully aware of the reasons behind the compartmentalization that has occurred within their discipline, as well as why such specialized subfields as international political integration have become the focal points of both research and theorizing.

Second, and as a result of this as well as a reminder to both the reader and author, we need to recognize the limitations inherent in such specialization. Scholars who direct their theoretical and research efforts toward explaining political integration, or any particular aspect of this phenomenon, must take care to avoid the mistake of drawing too general conclusions concerning international politics. This simply means that an analysis of Western European political integration should be directed toward specific processes and conditions within the political environment;

and our awareness of this fact will better enable us to determine the necessary boundaries and limitations of our theory and research. For it is manifestly the case that the understanding of political integration alone will not suffice as an explanation of any and all modes of integration.

Students of international politics have traditionally directed their attention toward the "basic units into which the world is divided."² Such a perspective suggests that, while actors in the international political system have changed over the years, being variously city-states, kingdoms, empires and more recently nation-states, the critical element of territoriality has been common to each.³ Territoriality has generally been defined as the physical and corporal capacity of the basic political unit. Throughout history those actors who could offer protection and security to human beings tended to become the basic political units.⁴ If one accepts this interpretation, an analysis of the relations between the basic political units in any given time frame would provide the observer with an accurate picture of the entire international political system.

²See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann (ed.) Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 6. Professor Hoffman suggests that students of international politics ought to be concerned with "the factors and the activities which affect the basic units into which the world is divided."

³Romano Romani, The International Political System, (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 4.

⁴John Hertz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," in Romano Romani (ed.) The International Political System (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 70.

Complementing this concept of territoriality has been a "Realist" notion of power politics. Probably the most well known definition of international politics is offered by Hans J. Morgenthau. "International politics," Professor Morgenthau states, "like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim."⁵ This now classic definition is derived from the relations between states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well as from the philosophical teaching of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz. It is a conception moreover which possesses an even more modern basis in Max Weber's view that political power is always based within a "territory."⁶

From this brief discussion of the traditional arguments one could conclude that: 1) the sole actors in the present international political system are nation-states, whose existence and ability to act in the international environment are dependent on their physical and corporal capacities; and 2) the primary objective of these nation-states is that of controlling other nation-states. But do these two concepts, territoriality and power, truly provide a basis for explaining the totality of political phenomena in

⁵Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) p. 25.

⁶See, Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970) p. 5.

the contemporary international system? Clearly, there are some who doubt it. In particular, the post-1945 era brought forth a new breed of international political theorists. These "Revisionists" viewed the traditional theory as having been based upon an international system that differed greatly from their own. Territoriality in this new age seemed of declining importance if not prospectively obsolete.⁷ Hence the "Revisionists" criticized the traditional view of "states-as-the-sole-actors."⁸ Likewise, struggles for power did not appear to characterize the totality of relations among a large number of the international actors.⁹

Such critical reviews of earlier theoretical efforts, though, prove their utility if, and only if, they provide a basis for further theoretical refinements, or if need be, the total reconstruction of theories. It is significant then, that above and beyond their criticisms of earlier theoretical efforts, these revisionists have also contributed

⁷See, for example, Hertz, "Territorial State," p. 69-81.

⁸See, for example, K. J. Holsti, "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations," in Romani (ed.) The International Political System (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 179-192.

⁹See, Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 3-24.

significantly to the development of a wider variety of conceptual and methodological tools of research. In the process, they have had a tremendous impact on the directions of international political theory.¹⁰

To the extent that these trends have made the study of international politics more "scientific," they have also brought about the establishment of various component "specialized" subfields.¹¹ For example, we might cite the development of such areas of study as transnational relations, international organization, conflict studies, and international political integration.

In each instance, this intellectual "division-of-labor" was brought about by two closely related events. The first and most significant was, as we mentioned earlier, the realization on the part of many political scientists that past theoretical efforts based on single overriding causes (i.e., territoriality and power) failed to provide an adequate explanation of the totality of political phenomena at the international level. Therefore, the

¹⁰For an excellent summary of recent trends, see for example, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Politics and the International System (New York, N.Y.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), p. 71.

¹¹Ibid., p. 72.

development of more complex and specialized theories was viewed as essential for a fuller understanding of international politics. Second, there were the practical problems that the documentary and source materials that one would invariably have to consult in the study of international politics had become so extensive that it had become impossible for individual scholars to successfully carry out methodologically acceptable research work unless specialization in one of the subfields was undertaken.

The consequence of these academic developments has been the construction of what are referred to as "islands-of-theory."¹² By this we mean theories which are concerned with specific types of political phenomena in the international environment. The hope, of course, is that through the linkage of these "islands," we may one day achieve the basic components for a general theory of international politics. But as Professor Pfaltzgraff points out:

How such linking will take place, whether by the enlargement of existing "islands" or new "islands" of theory, or by a major breakthrough toward a macro-theory within which middle-range theories can be linked is an object of debate among political scientists.¹³

If we are to accept the major thrusts of this argument then we must first develop acceptable theories and methods of

¹²Ibid., p. 74.

¹³Ibid., p. 74.

analysis at the subfield level before we can ever hope to link the "islands" into an acceptable general theory of international politics.

Though we will pursue these matters subsequently, it seems obvious that this thesis confronts three basic questions. First, what if any particular contributions can the subfield of political integration make to our understanding of politics? We shall take up this question momentarily. Second, why specialize yet further in an area called Western European integration? And third, why focus specifically on the role of the national leaderships?

Our own reasons for doing so can usefully be explained in both practical and theoretical terms. Practically speaking, Western Europe since the establishment of the European Communities can be interpreted as having evolved into a single political decision-making system, with originally six and at present nine identifiable subsystems.¹⁴ This transfer of the decision-making role in certain policy sectors, from the subsystems to "European institutions" has contributed to a new saliency of "Western European" focused issues and conflicts. As Professors Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold point out:

¹⁴Original subsystems included: Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany. New subsystems include: Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark.

In establishing the three European Communities the participating nation-states committed themselves, it will be recalled, not only to the goal of a customs union and to an eventual economic union and, hence, to refrain from certain kinds of activities that had been traditionally expressions of national autonomy (e.g., raising tariffs, setting quotas on imports, etc.). They also undertook to set up a series of institutions, to which they assigned a variety of tasks, ranging from a simple secretariat to an ultimate decision-maker. They laid the foundations of a distinctly new collective decision-making process, which in the intervening years has grown rapidly in scope and political significance and has progressively enfolded the six governments in a kind of symbolic decision-making relationship. That is to say, these governments are obliged to take more and more decisions together and in association with so-called supra-national institutions, which are intended to represent the presumed common interests of the members of a nascent "Europe".¹⁵

Of course, it should also be noted that events prior to the inauguration of the Communities contributed significantly to the policy sectors that would be initially handled by the new "European" decision-making system.¹⁶ But whatever its historical roots, there is no gainsaying the fact that Western Europe provides one of the best, if not the best available, instances of political integration.

Our primary reason for focusing on the commitment of national leaders to the European Communities is based on the fact that the level of political integration in Western

¹⁵Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 65.

¹⁶For an excellent discussion on the origins of the European Communities, see, Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958).

Europe has been for the most part governed by the actions and strategies of these particular individuals. They have frequently been described as the prime gate-keepers between demands within their constituent systems and the collective decision-making system. Their ability to effect the outcome of the integrative process is based essentially on the fact that they occupy authoritative positions in both the Community (through the Council of Ministers) and national systems. As such, little progress will take place with regard to the furtherance of political integration unless the governmental leaders are willing to act collectively.

In theoretical terms, this shifting of the decision-making role from the nation-states to the collective decision-makers has had its impact upon two dimensions: normative concerns and conflict management. Normatively theorists such as Deutsch, Friedrich, Haas, and Nye, though they possess differing perspectives on the nature of political integration, have seen the future of world peace and economic welfare being favorably affected by the formation of regional organizations or at least increased interdependence between the subsystems within a given region.¹⁷ And indeed these factors are at the center of the four most prominent types

¹⁷For the works in which these points of view are developed, see, Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964), Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), Carl Friedrich, Trends in Federalism and Practice (New York, N.Y.: Frederick Praeger, 1968), Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1971).

of theoretical orientations toward the study of political integration in Western Europe. Though certain differences exist between the neofunctionalist and revised neofunctionalist approaches, essentially both analyze integration by concentrating upon institutions and political elites. The communications approach, on the other hand, studies regional integration by focusing primarily upon transactions in the economic, social and political spheres. The fourth theoretical approach, federalism, focuses on constitutional questions and stresses somewhat more than the neo-functionalists the importance of institutions. All of these schools, however, evidence an abiding concern with the normative consequences of political integration within Western Europe.

Likewise, the theoretical benefits of studying Western European political integration, or international political integration in general, can be delineated as follows. Past theories of international politics have emphasized the importance of "power" and "territoriality". Accompanying this perspective, as was discussed earlier, has been the assumption that these factors were the sole determinants of all international politics. The commitment of national leaders to collective decision-making systems in various parts of the world and in particular the ongoing existence of the European Communities, by means other than coercive efforts, dramatizes the fact that past models and concepts have been overly simplistic and inappropriate for dealing with this

particular phenomena. A focus upon regional integration, or for that matter a particular aspect within its domain, permits "theoretical formulations that interpose a unit of analysis between that of the discreteness of the nation-state and an undifferentiated international system".¹⁸ In other words, the development of integration theories has aided our understanding of conflict and its management, and hence our understanding of politics itself.

To best accomplish the stated purposes of this paper an organization into five chapters seems appropriate. Chapter two has a threefold purpose. First, to explain and define certain concepts that are found frequently in the integration literature; second, to familiarize ourselves with the four major schools of integration thought. This will include an examination of the theoretical as well as the methodological concerns of the various schools. And third, examine and determine the extent to which the various approaches emphasize the commitment and involvement of national leaders to the collective arena. It is our intention in chapter three to point out those factors which we believe have contributed to the positions taken by the national leaderships. In addition, we will go on to spell

¹⁸Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, "The Analysis of Regional Politics: The Integration Versus The Empirical Systems Approach", International Organization (Autumn 1973, Vol. 27 No. 4) p. 467.

out the procedures for operationalizing national actor involvement (our dependent variable) and our independent variables. Chapter four will be a presentation of the relevant data as it applies to these particular variables. And chapter five will provide a survey of the conclusions we may draw from this study of a central aspect of Western European political integration.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW AND APPRAISAL

One of the most difficult intellectual feats to accomplish is to confront an essentially new phenomenon, recognize its novelty, and then go on to describe and explain this novelty without destroying it with blunt and inappropriate analytical instruments.²⁰

A survey of the principle works in the subfield of international political integration reveals the fact that a number of central concepts and terms have come to be used interchangeably. For example, numerous scholars and students employ the terms "international integration" and "international political integration" synonymously, with little effort to distinguish the boundaries, if any, between the two; meanwhile, others speak as if these two concepts refer to distinguishable phenomena and or patterns of behavior. Whatever the case, it would seem that the construction and testing of theories would be aided immeasurably if potentially distinctive patterns of behavior could be clearly differentiated at the conceptual level. So before proceeding to discuss other matters, a few remarks on terminology are warranted.

²⁰Donald Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", Journal Of Common Market Studies, Vol. X, No. 3 (March 1972), p. 269.

Reason dictates that the study of international integration be concerned with describing, explaining and predicting all integrative processes and outcomes within the international system. In other words, international integration encompasses the totality of processes and outcomes in which actors representing different and relatively independent nation-states, through mutual agreement and without reliance on coercive efforts, bring their states together to constitute a new whole. The result of this integrative process has in some cases been described as a community.²¹ To the student of international integration this broad definition means that there exist no boundaries on the areas of investigation, be they economic, political or social.

International political integration, however, is a concept which we think is of more limited applicability. In contrast to the broad areas of investigation associated with the study of international integration, the study of international political integration should be concerned with those integrative processes which are predominantly political in purpose, or in modes of execution, or in result. And since international political integration takes place within the international system, logic thus suggests that one of our major tasks will involve demarcating the political

²¹Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 21.

from those other systems and or patterns of social behavior which reside within the boundaries of the more inclusive international social system. Such a procedure will then enable us to distinguish political integration from the other conceivable forms international integration might assume.

Supposing that we can construct a definition that permits us conceptually (and in due course empirically) to differentiate political from non-political patterns of behavior, we will have taken a major step toward arriving at a precise definition of international political integration. But let us emphasize that so distinguishing phenomena constitutes a problem that more than one social scientist has encountered - often unsuccessfully. And indeed, the difficulties associated with this task can be readily seen in the numerous efforts of students of international integration to devise completely acceptable conceptual frameworks and methods of analysis for their research.

In attempting to attain this elusive conceptual formula, students of international political integration have generally with little success attempted to develop consensually acceptable definitions and methods of analysis. Numerous efforts have been made to specify what constitutes political integration, to differentiate it from other integrative processes or terminal conditions, to identify what processes and outcomes it involves, and to specify how one would operationalize the numerous variables that constitute indices of "integration".

Professor Donald Puchala, a major contributor to the integration literature, has expressed his estimation of this situation as follows:

More than fifteen years of defining, redefining, modeling and theorizing have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of exactly what it is we are talking about when we refer to "international integration" and exactly what it is we are trying to learn when we study this phenomenon. Part of the problem stems from the fact that different researchers have been looking at different parts, dimensions or manifestations of the phenomenon. Furthermore, different schools of researchers have exalted different parts of the integration "elephant". They have claimed either that their parts were the most important ones, the others being of marginal interest. Added conceptual confusion has followed from the fact that the phenomenon under investigation - international integration and all it involves - has turned out to be more complex than anyone initially suspected. Consequently, uncertainty within schools of researchers currently compounds dissension between the schools.²²

Linked to these conceptual and methodological problems has been the frequent elaboration of the normative preferences of those scholars and students interested in this field of inquiry. As a result we find that international political integration has generally been discussed not only in terms of what is, but also as to what should be ~~trans-~~piring.²³ Such a condition has not only magnified an already prevalent conceptual confusion, but has also created a climate in which those working in the field have seldom combined their theoretical and research efforts. Rather,

²²Puchala, "International Integration", p. 268.

²³Ibid., p. 268.

empirical research has often been carried through merely to buttress previously established normative predispositions. There has, therefore, been less cumulative development toward testable explanations of political integration than would be desired.

These problems notwithstanding, a survey of the literature of international political integration can prove instructive. For instance, such a review should help us clarify what we mean by "political integration", as well as assist us in avoiding the conceptual confusions of earlier research. Likewise, this literature survey should awaken us to the need to keep normative preferences and descriptive propositions clearly separated. As such, all of this will be directed toward providing us with a coherent foundation from which we may begin to explain the role of the national political leaderships within the framework of the West European integrative experience.

The Communications Approach

Communications theorists have sought to explain retrospectively the formation, dissolution or existence of political communities by examining patterns of communications and transactions between two or more nation-states. Of course, to be precise any reference to the communications approach as a theory employs the word "theory" rather loosely. Far more correctly, it is a method of viewing integrative

and disintegrative processes.²⁴ Of particular interest to communications theorists are those processes which lead to the establishment of political communities in which social problems are resolved without reliance on large-scale physical force.²⁵

Since Deutsch and his colleagues are normatively concerned with the problems of peaceful change, their goal, both as a theoretical dependent variable and as policy, is the avoidance of war through voluntary association. The basic set of definitions presented at the beginning of Political Community and the North Atlantic Area reflects these concerns. These definitions state that:

A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people who have become "integrated".

By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a "long time", dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its populations.

By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least one point: that common social problems can be resolved by processes of peaceful change.²⁶

The development of a sense of community is envisioned as a gradual process whereby increased communications and transactions eventually lead to mutual understanding and responsiveness, which then are concerted into a willingness

²⁵Deutsch, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area", p. 5.

²⁶Ibid., p. 5.

to accept peaceful change in relations.²⁷ As such, people must acquire habits which are conducive to integration behavior. Specifically:

...a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and understand each other well beyond the mere exchanges of goods and services... experience and complementarity may...continue to reproduce each other, like the proverbial chicken and the egg, in a syndrom of ethnic learning, that is, a historical process of social learning in which individuals, usually over several generations, learn to become a people.²⁸

As shall be noted later, a fundamental difference of opinion that exists between neo-functionalists and communications theorists pertains to the relevance of certain actors involved in the integrative process. For communication theorists the development of a sense of community is dependent upon a shifting of loyalties and sympathies among all of the "politically relevant strata". Hence they emphasize the numerous historical examples of successful movements toward political amalgamation in which popular participation was a key element.²⁹ In addition, communications theorists also suggest that close ties must exist between the political elites and the populace in each territorial unit.³⁰

²⁷Karl Deutsch, et al, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area", in International Political Communities (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 2.

²⁸Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 91.

²⁹See, for example, Deutsch, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area", p. 31-33.

³⁰Bruce Russell, "Transactions, Community, and International Political Integration", in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XI, No. 3 (March 1973), p. 266.

Yet another feature of the communications approach is the lack of significance that communications theorists give to international or "supranational" institutions in the integrative process. Because communications theorists emphasize patterns of communications, social learning, and the development of "we-feeling", they can conceive of security communities being established with only a limited amount of institutional transformation. It should be noted, furthermore, that because Deutsch's arguments are based on the hypothesis that social assimilation causes political development, international institutional development can not start without the prior existence of social assimilation.

For Deutsch and his colleagues institutions are merely a possible means to "peaceful change" and the avoidance of war. The question of whether and when strong international institutions will aid in the establishment of security-communities is an open one; the need for these institutions is thus not presupposed a priori.³¹

It should be noted, therefore, that communications theorists see the need for institutional development only within the framework of security-communities. The institutions may well become the focal points of decision-making; or on the other hand, they may only play the role of the

³¹Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 96.

weak secretariat; but the establishment of such institutions is interpreted as being essential only as a followup. Institutional development is, as Professor Deutsch suggests, dependent upon prior social integration.

Communications theorists further tell us that economic, political and social communications and transactions within a community will be "more intense, more rewarding, and more enduring than those...for nations not within the community".³² They contend that as the various populations experience the joint rewards of these transactions they will begin to "form images of the group involved in the transactions, and these images will strengthen the bonds between the members."³³

Those advocating a communications approach, therefore, argue that because "intense, enduring and rewarding" patterns of communications are more frequent and important within security-communities than within other communities, one may use measures of economic, political and social transactions as indicators of security-community. Or as Professor Deutsch phrases it: "If we look upon nations and governments as communications systems, impersonal verifiable evidence can be

³²H. Alker and D. Puchala "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area 1928-1963", in J. David Singer (ed.) Quantitative International Politics (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1968), p. 288.

³³Ibid., p. 288.

obtained to check general descriptive or qualitative assertions about...the merger of states."³⁴

Operationally, this simply means that different nation-states, over different periods of time, exchange different quantities of different kinds of transactions. Continuities and deviations in transaction flows reflect movements toward as well as away from international political integration. Therefore, the analysis of transactions "opens the way to observing and recording who deals with whom, how or how much, about what, when."³⁵

The relevance of communications theory to the study of international political integration has been, and is still a subject of much controversy. My criticisms of this approach relate in particular to its apolitical basis and to its use of social and economic transactions as indicators of political integration or disintegration. This apoliticality is clearly evident when one examines the various techniques and approaches suggested by communications theorists.³⁶

³⁴Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government, (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1966), p. 16.

³⁵Donald Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration", in Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (ed.) Regional Integration, Theory and Research, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 129.

³⁶For excellent examples of the use of transaction analysis, see, Donald Puchala, "Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations", International Organization Spring 1970 (Vol. 24 no. 2), p. 183-208.

Assuredly international political integration is concerned with peaceful relations between the participating nation-states. And indeed, this issue appears to be one of the few in which agreement can be found between the various schools of integration thought. Nevertheless, a definition of integration in terms of peaceful change, a sense of community, transactions, and the avoidance of war, encompasses not only the political, but the social and economic realm as well. As such, the definition put forth by Deutsch and his colleagues does not permit us to draw the necessary boundaries if our research is to be concerned primarily with integration as a political phenomena.

As can be readily noted, communications theorists are primarily oriented toward social processes. It may be useful, then, for us to consider the communications theorist's perspective as an essentially sociological one. It is this perspective which has led many critics to conclude that although Deutsch's work is very interesting and suggestive, "it ignores too much that is politically relevant."³⁷ Professor Deutsch and other communications theorists are concerned with the creation of "bonds of community", of "we-ness" and mutual trust. What is being put forward, therefore, is not a theory of an international political community, but

³⁷ Leon Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, No. 4 (June 1967), p. 345.

rather a theory of a social or moral community. The key dependent variable is not political integration, but social assimilation. And indeed, political integration at least at the institutional level is placed well down the developmental line, for it is, after all, seen as dependent upon a previous social integration.³⁸

Along this same line of thought, we further contend that the emphasis of communications theorists or social interaction results in a strong tendency to pass over some of the most basic issues in international political integration. While the communications approach directs the researcher toward questions relating to vertical and horizontal people-to-people interactions and transactions, as well as ones about peoples' attitudes toward one another and attendant perceptions of "we-ness", it fails to consider the decisions made by joint decision-making bodies or supra-national institutions, and the implications these decisions carry for the peoples of the participating nation-states. Again then, this presents a problem for the communications approach since this framework has intentionally downplayed the significance of institutional bodies and/or decisions.

Our second area of concern regarding the communications approach pertains to its use of transactions as the prime indicators of international political integration. As

³⁸ David Easton, A Systems Analysis Of Political Life (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 185.

has been noted earlier, communications theorists have been primarily interested in measuring political integration in two ways. The first is through such measures as the volume of trade, mail, telephone calls, and other forms of tangible commitments between the nation-states involved in the analysis. The second is through the measurement of the opinions of people involved in the integrative process.³⁹ The analysis of transaction flows and the graphing of attitudinal patterns may tell us a great deal about economic interdependence and social assimilation across national borders, but unless they are linked in some manner to the political phenomenon, are inappropriate for the measurement of political integration.⁴⁰

Finally, communications theorists view all types of transactions as equally salient. Welfare-related and foreign policy issues are placed on the same analytical level with recreation issues. Therefore, no attempt seems to be made to "dig into" the content of the transactions.⁴¹

In summary then, our analysis of the theoretical and methodological arguments put forward by communications

³⁹See, for example, Ronald Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration", in Lindberg and Scheingold, Integration, p. 160-191.

⁴⁰Nye, Peace In Parts, p. 33.

⁴¹Ernst Haas, "The Study Of Regional Integration", in Lindberg and Scheingold, Integration, p. 23.

theorists suggest two things. First, it seems that our concern with distinguishing the boundaries between the various types of international integration is a justified one. As Professors Nye, Pentland and Lindberg point out, social community may very well be relevant to political integration, but these are not one and the same phenomenon. Rather, as one delves further into this subject it becomes increasingly clear that international integration is a "multidimensional" phenomenon, in which the different types of integration must be clearly differentiated to provide the basis for a more fruitful analysis.⁴² Second, if we are to speak of international political integration in terms of various nation-states coming together to constitute a whole, we must establish methods of measuring the distinctly political, not just social, bonds which bring and hold these nation-states together.

⁴²See, Joseph Nye, Peace In Parts, p. 21-48. Charles Pentland, "Political Integration: A Multidimensional Perspective", in Lyon, Axline, Hyndman, Molot (ed.) Continental Community? Independence and Integration In North America (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1974), p. 42-66. Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration As A Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", in Lindberg and Scheingold (ed.) Integration, p. 45-127.

The Federalist Approach

What is required is a new political framework...A new dimension of government is needed to carry out those tasks which the individual nation-state can no longer effectively perform on its own...In short, what is needed is a federal Europe: a United States of Europe.⁴³

The sentiments expressed in the above quotation frequent federalist literature. And though such expressions of desire for the attainment of a specific political goal are predominant in federalist theorizing, we must also recognize federalist efforts as an attempt to gain a fuller understanding of the phenomenon we term international political integration.

For our purposes we can divide federalists into two identifiable sub-groups: an ideological/activist group⁴⁴ concerned with developing a strategy, or theory of action, designed to realize an integrated Europe organized along federal lines; and a theorist/observer group⁴⁵ concerned with analyzing the workings of federal politics and the integrative federalizing process. Nevertheless, the two groups do agree on certain things and a number of constant elements

⁴³John Pinder and Roy Pryce, Europe After DeGaulle, (Balt., Md.: Penguin Books Inc., 1969), p. 12-13.

⁴⁴See, for example, R.W.G. Mackay, Towards A United States Of Europe, (London: Hutchinson, 1969).

⁴⁵See, for example, Carl J. Friedrich, "International Federalism In Theory And Practice", in Elmer Plischke (ed.) Systems Of Integrating The International Community (Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1964), p. 117-155.

emerge from their writings. The first of these is a normative concern with the problems of conflict management and individual freedom. In contrast, however, to the communications theorists' version that peace is best achieved through the gradual development of a sociopsychological community (and the feelings of we-ness and duty toward the whole that are associated with it), federalists envision world peace occurring in a situation in which traditionally independent and sovereign nation-states enter into a formal union of nations wherein each, even the smallest member, receives its security and rights from the constitutional arrangements agreed to by the participating nations and from the united power and decisions according to the desires of all the participants.

Federalists, because they are oriented toward a political system which stresses the importance of having all interests represented in the totality,⁴⁶ view the harmonious conciliation of these varied interests as a fundamental objective of the governing institutions.⁴⁷ With this emphasis on a constitutional arrangement and the functions and responsibilities of institutions it is not surprising that we find

⁴⁶Franz L. Neumann, "Federalism and Freedom", in Joseph Fiszman (ed.), The American Political Arena (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown Co., 1966), p. 7-20.

⁴⁷Friedrich, "International Federalism in Theory and Practice", p. 122-123.

many federalists conceiving of international political integration as a condition resulting from a pattern of interest politics, acted out between a central government, the participating national governments and the general public. The attainment of their desired objectives, federalists contend however, requires a particular type of institutional arrangement. That is, a constitutional system characterized by two or more layers of semi-autonomous political authority, in other words, a federally organized political community.⁴⁸

Federalists contend that this specific form of political community, with its basic elements of local autonomy and joint participation, provides certain advantages not found in other communities. The federally integrated political community is therefore looked upon as the most desirable terminal condition of the integration process. One specific advantage federalists see in the federal community is that it is an effective way of solving the problems of diversity while at the same time creating unity.⁴⁹ It is viewed as a way of enabling government to act together in solving joint problems and at the same time protecting the individual differences that exist between the participating nation-states. As Reginald Harrison points out, this is particularly important in the case of Western Europe:

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 120-121.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 121.

In Europe, maintenance of diversity may be regarded as a precondition of any kind of integration, given national and regional idiosyncracies and the high value attached to them. It is, however, not only the existing national entities corresponding to the territorial states which are theoretically protected in a federal union but also regional entities which transcend national boundaries, or regions which are not adequately represented in national parliaments. The mode of election of the Federal Parliament is capable of being adjusted to enhance such diversity.⁵⁰

Another advantage federalists contend is that the federal system enables governing institutions to respond more efficiently to the economic and social demands of highly industrialized societies.⁵¹ In recent years national governments have expanded their role into a wider range of functional responsibilities, fostering the growth of large and powerful technocracies and in the process alienating large segments of the population. These are factors which tend to complicate the problems of national governments and have led to their inability to resolve new problems. Federalists argue that some of these problems could be transferred to an international federal government, thereby relieving the national government of some of its burdens and enabling it to concentrate on the problems particular to its environment. For example, federalists note that since the existing nation-states of Western Europe are too small to meet the necessary

⁵⁰Reginald J. Harrison, Europe In Question (New York, N.Y.: University Press, 1974), p. 55.

⁵¹Pinder and Pryce, Europe After DeGaulle, p. 97.

requirements of scale for modern economic planning and development, this burden could be shifted, becoming the overall responsibility of a European federal government.⁵² Stated simply then, federalism permits a shifting of governmental responsibilities to that area which is perceived by the participating units to possess the highest level of efficiency.

Up to this point our discussion has centered on what federalists regard as a reasonably clear political goal, a federal system of government. Federalist literature, however, particularly that pertaining to Western Europe, has increasingly emphasized the dynamic nature of federalism.

As Professor Friedrich suggests:

...federalism should be seen as the process of federalizing a political community, as the process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or other kind of associations, enter into arrangements for making joint decisions on joint problems.⁵³

It is not difficult to recognize that the flexibility of this definition enables federalism, which originally designated an established institutional arrangement between cooperating nation-states, to become an integrative federalizing process with an initial phase (the international league or confederation) and a terminal condition (the federal

⁵²Ibid., p. 16.

⁵³Carl J. Friedrich, "Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals", Arthur W. MacMahon (ed.) Federalism Mature and Emergent (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 514.

state).⁵⁴ Hence, federalists look upon federalism both as a dynamic process and as a static institutional pattern which serves as the goal of the process.

The focus of our discussion thus far has primarily been directed toward those areas in which federalists are in general agreement. There are, however, areas in which federalists differ greatly. And though as we have indicated, federalists agree on the desirability and arrangement of the terminal condition, it is the differing opinions with regard to the method of attaining the federal state that clearly differentiates the ideological/activist federalists from the theorists.

To begin with, the ideological/activist is fundamentally opposed to the initiation of any incrementalist or functionalist integrative strategy.⁵⁵ It is insufficient, they argue, to establish institutions of international/intergovernmental functional cooperation such as the Council of Ministers of the European Communities whose authority is allocated at the discretion of the participating states, and whose members owe their personal allegiance and status to the individual governments that placed them there. The establishment of such institutional arrangements, according to Professors Pinder and Pryce, not only stifles the first

⁵⁴Friedrich, "International Federalism", p. 127-128.

⁵⁵Mackay, United States Of Europe, p. 54.

principle of federal government - the delimitation of governmental areas of responsibility - but also suggest an effort on the part of national governments to remain as the exclusive arbiters of political authority.⁵⁶

In contrast to the necessity of immediate federal institutional development advocated by the ideological activists, the theorists, although avowing the federal goal, accept what they believe to be a more pragmatic alternative.⁵⁷ That is to say, they are not opposed to the Community Method, or incremental approach, of European integration as it is embodied in the Treaty of Rome. On the contrary, they view intergovernmental cooperative activities as a positive factor which draws attention and support to the goal of European unity.

In terms of analysis, the methods by which federal theorists seek to explain this integrative federalizing process is extensively influenced by the theorists own previous investigations into numerous historical cases of federation. One prime example of this has been the effort to isolate the desires, motives and capacities of units that attempted to form federal states. Federalists argue that by concentrating on those factors that were present in all

⁵⁶Pinder and Pryce, Europe After DeGaulle, p. 29

⁵⁷See, for example, Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community (Balt., Md.: John Hopkins Press, 1966).

known cases of successful federation, while absent from all the unsuccessful ones, the development of a cumulative scheme or check-list of the essential factors of progressing federalization becomes possible.⁵⁸ With the assistance of such a check-list, federalists contend that they are then in a position to provide a satisfactory explanation of the processes which lead from simple interstate cooperative ventures to the establishment of a federal government. In a recent study on the growth and achievement of the European Communities such a list of historical factors of federalization led Friedrich to the conclusion that: "The trends are forward, the prospects are that there will be a great deal of up and down."⁵⁹ His final assessment, moreover, was that the Community was "very much alive and kicking".⁶⁰

In evaluating federalism, both as a reasonably clear political goal and as a framework for analyzing the merger of national politics, there can be no gainsaying the fact that primary importance is placed on institutional building and the resultant institutional relationships. We have found in federalist writing a strong tendency to focus on the relationship between the constituent parts, the nation-

⁵⁸See, Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 36.

⁵⁹Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation (New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969) p. 213

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 312.

states, and the central decision-making body; and on the formal transfer of specific governmental tasks from the national governments to the new international decision-making center.

As a mechanism for explaining and enhancing our understanding of international political integration, however, the federalist approach is a rather dubious path to follow. My reasons for arriving at this conclusion are based principally on: the strong normative bent of federalist writing, its concern with only one particular form of political integration, and the limited explanatory value of federalist check-lists.

Expanding on our first point, federalists have shown themselves to be more interested in normative discourse, than in scientific analysis. This interest is clearly evident, for example, in the quotation found at the beginning of this section. And while all the integration schools evidence an abiding concern with the normative aspects of international political integration, it would seem that in the case of federalism it has kept the authors concerned from the type of analysis which leads to the formation of scientific theory. In short, federalists pay scant attention to the development of a comprehensive scientific theory of federalizing process.⁶¹

⁶¹For an excellent discussion with regard to this particular issue, see, Friedrich von Krosigk, "A Reconsideration of Federalism in the Scope of the Present Discussion on European Integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. IX, No. 3 (March 1971), p. 206.

Our second objection to the federalists' approach is a result of its strict adherence to only one particular form of international political integration. This in turn has led federalists to the point where they become preoccupied with questions concerning the strength of the new central government, the constitutionally based division of powers, and the degree or level of political authority retained by the national governments. In fact, as Professor Donald Puchala points out, numerous federal writers "have tended to equate 'progress' or 'success' in international integration with movement toward central government".⁶² It is this clinging to the use of the federalists' model that has led many critics of federalism to deem it an unproductive approach.

In addition to eliminating questions which in all likelihood are of significance in any analysis of contemporary political integration, the federal theorists' persistence to single out only one terminal condition, federal union, clearly indicates a lack of understanding for the complexities involved in the phenomenon under study. As Professor Haas so correctly points out:

It is sobering to take a glance at some real-life dependent variables. The European Economic Community in 1962 seemed on the point of a breakthrough to a political community defacto because of an attempted expansion in the scope and level of its decision-making capacity; instead it settled down into the uneasy equilibrium state of continuing its established role until 1969. The East African Community moved from healthy exuberance to near-

⁶² Donald Puchala, "International Integration", p. 270.

death in 1960 and 1965 only to revive, phoenixlike, after 1967...The examples could be multiplied. They suggest that the variety of possible outcomes is considerable, that unions may settle down into a stable system without reaching any of the stages we defined earlier in our research. Yet these states still represent higher degrees of "integration" than was true of the member-states at an earlier point in time.⁶³

Our third and final area of concern regarding the federalist approach pertains in general to the methods of research employed by federalists, and, in particular, to the use of checklists which in no way attempt to specify the relationship between the various components on the list, and that between the list as a whole and federal union. Because the factors employed by federalists cover such a wide spectrum of political activity and are in no way linked together, then, to what are they to be considered essential or even explanatory for the formation of a federal union or any other integration terminal condition? More precisely, federalists fail to provide argument as to why their selection of factors are more relevant than some other, and how they are related to the phenomenon under study.⁶⁴

In the final analysis, it is evident that federalist efforts have not resulted in the development of an explanatory integration theory, be it of only one particular form of political integration. And while our critique points to a number of the theoretical and methodological weaknesses of the

⁶³Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", p. 27.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 20.

federalist approach, the review helps us in constructing the foundations necessary for arriving at a coherent explanation of international political integration. For it is now abundantly clear that the emphasis on one ideal terminal condition, based on historical cases of nation-building, omits too much that is relevant for a truly comprehensive study of international political integration.

With these considerations in mind, what seems required is the establishment of a framework that will enable us to take into account numerous possible outcomes. This will not only tend to eliminate the influence of normative preferences that frequently come into play when isolating one terminal condition, but will encourage us to look upon political integration for what it is, a new and unique political phenomenon that takes place in the international system.

The Neo-functionalism and Revised Neo-functionalism Approaches

Neo-functionalism has undoubtedly been and remains the most influential of the major integrationist approaches. This distinction can be attributed in some measure to the similarities that existed between the actual integrative strategies embodied in the treaties establishing the three European Communities and the early neo-functionalism theoretical formulations. Equally important to the influential position attained by neo-functionalism has been the numerous transformations that have occurred within the neo-functionalism school itself. The task of analyzing the neo-functionalism

approach is made more arduous, therefore, by the constant efforts of neo-functionalists to re-examine and revise their earlier theoretical formulations. For our purposes then, it is useful to view the development of neo-functionalist theory as consisting of two phases. The first consists primarily of the early writings of Ernst Haas, Phillipe Schmitter and Leon Lindberg. The second, which we shall label "revised neo-functionalism", consists of the more recent writings of the aforementioned theorists and also the writings of Joseph Nye, Stuart Scheingold, James Caporaso and Mario Barrera.

Normatively, neo-functionalists, like communications theorists and federalists, are primarily concerned with the avoidance and resolution of conflict.⁶⁵ In addition, however, they also place strong emphasis on welfare economics.⁶⁶ Increased economic welfare within the international system is viewed as occurring in a situation of rising functional interdependence and policy coordination. It should be pointed out, however, that in their effort to explain political integration, neo-functionalists have done so in a non-normative way. That is to say, irrespective of their personal opinions concerning its desirability, they have shown a keen desire to explain

⁶⁵Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and Universal Process", in International Political Communities, p. 93. See also, Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 3-18.

⁶⁶See, for example, Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", p. 4.

political integration rather than to concern themselves with recommendations for practical political action.

In any case, the early theoretical formulations of neo-functionalists can best be interpreted as an effort to remedy what were considered the shortcomings of functionalism.⁶⁷ In the first place, neo-functionalists denied the distinctions that functionalists had drawn between politics and technical welfare matters. They argued that functionalism failed to comprehend that in the integrative process all technical problems cannot be resolved solely on the merits of technical experts. As Professors Haas and Schmitter note:

...under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union has best been a continuum. Hence definite political implications can be associated with most movement toward economic integration even when the chief actors themselves do not entertain such notions at the time of adopting their new constitutive charter.⁶⁸

The second major area of disagreement pertained to what has generally been referred to as the "spill-over" process. Neo-functionalists reject the functionalists argument that the integration of highly technical areas automatically spreads or "spills-over" into other levels of activity. Their position is that technical activities are "made technical by

⁶⁷The most notable functional theorist is David Mitrany. See, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

⁶⁸Ernst Haas and Phillippe Schmitter, "Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration", International Political Communities, p. 261.

a prior political decision".⁶⁹ Professor Haas after surveying integrative activities in Western Europe during the 1950's concluded that for spill-over to occur, the functions or tasks performed by international institutions must not only be specific, as Mitrany suggested, but should also be economically important. Furthermore, he added, the functional areas must not be completely non-controversial, for controversy requires the actors to make political decisions with respect to the degree of integration. It is controversy, neo-functionalists suggest, that enables the international institutions to resolve common problems and in so doing expand their own authority.⁷⁰

Neo-functionalism is associated first and foremost with the writings of Ernst Haas. It is he who elaborates the theory most fully, and who formulates it most clearly. Theoretically, Professor Haas is interested in explaining the progress toward a terminal condition he calls political community. Political Community being:

...a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space.⁷¹

⁶⁹Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 23.

⁷⁰Haas and Schmitter, "Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration", p. 262.

⁷¹Haas, Uniting of Europe, p. 5.

The process of attaining this condition among nation-states is referred to as integration. Professor Haas defines it as:

...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.⁷²

These definitions indicate that neo-functionalists clearly view international political integration as a radical transformation of a particular international system. As members of the "Revisionist" school, neo-functionalists completely reject the notion that political communities are monolithic and closed bodies, with national governments as the sole international actors. Their definitions indicate that they conceive of international political integration as a dynamic process, one in which the ever-shifting aims and demands occurring within nations as well as between them are of fundamental importance to the integrative process. However, in contrast to the mass attitudinal and transactional preferences of communications theorists, neo-functionalists place their emphasis on the activities of key groups or political elites and central or "supranational" institutions.⁷³

With these considerations in mind, the original neo-functionalists thesis, as it applies to Western Europe can be

⁷²Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", in International Political Communities, p. 94.

⁷³For an excellent review of the neo-functionalist thesis with regard to elites and institutional development, see, Harrison, Europe in Question, p. 75-94.

delineated as follows. Certain functionally specific sectors or tasks (generally economic), which traditionally fell under the domain of sovereign states, are brought under the control of a joint or supranational decision-making body. The purpose of this body be to resolve disputes that arise between the member-states and in so doing upgrade their common interests. This method of accommodation, which relies heavily on the services of the supranational body, or "institutionalized mediator", maximizes the "spill-over" effect of international decisions.⁷⁴ Spill-over, as has already been mentioned, is the process whereby policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power to an international institution are made real by the expansion of the task itself. Task expansion is therefore reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task.⁷⁵ The tasks that are initially handed over to the international body must be specific, important and controversial, but must not be so controversial as to make the national governments and political elites perceive a loss of control over their vital interests. The character of this decision-making formula, that is, the reliance on an international actor to initiate and implement policies which will upgrade the common interests:

⁷⁴Haas, "International Integration: The European and Universal Experience", p. 96.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 96.

...stimulates interest groups to make themselves heard; it spurs political parties in Strasbourg and Luxembourg to work out common positions; it creates an enormous pressure on high national civil servants to get to know and establish rapport with their opposite numbers; and it sharpens the sensitivities of the legal profession to European norms and political processes in preparation for the inevitable flood of litigation before the Court Of Justice.⁷⁶

As increased benefits are perceived by political elites, pressures are exerted on the national governments to move toward further integration. The international institution is given more authority and functional areas of responsibility, and the political elites respond by shifting their loyalties and expectations to this new center of decision-making. Ultimately, the decisional authority of the international institution, through the gradual politicization of the actors and the spill-over process, expands to include politically sensitive areas where the vital interests reside.

"Because "under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union has best be treated as a continuum",⁷⁷ it is not surprising that in reviewing the neo-functionalists' methods of analysis we find economic as well as political indicators being used in an effort to sketch the integration process. In examining this aspect of neo-functionalism, it seems appropriate that we focus in

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

⁷⁷ Haas and Schmitter, "Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America", p. 261.

particular on the construct developed by Professors Haas and Schmitter for it provides a reasonably accurate portrait of early neo-functionalist analytical efforts.

Haas and Schmitter propose nine variables "which seem to intervene more or less consistently between the act of economic union and the possible end product we label political union".⁷⁸ They then divide the variables into three classifications: 1) those which are in existence prior to the act of union; 2) those existing at the time the union is negotiated and enters into force; and 3) those which manifest themselves during the process which ensues after the union becomes operative.⁷⁹ Along with their operational concerns, these may be presented tabularly as follows:⁸⁰

TABLE I

<u>Time</u>	<u>Variables</u>	<u>Operational Referents</u>
(A) Background Conditions	1) Size/Power	1) Rate of economic growth, industrialization, per capita GNP, exports vs. imports.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 266.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 266.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 277-284.

TABLE I (Cont'd)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Variables</u>	<u>Operational Referents</u>
	2) Rate of transactions	2) Worker's migration, export/import figures, inter-regional transportation, cross-national investment.
	3) Pluralism	3) Associational group activity, labor force diversification, education, press freedom.
	4) Elite complementarity	4) Attitudes toward; expansion of regional commercial activity, external forces, government activities, private enterprise.
(B) Conditions at time of Union	1) Governmental purpose	1) Level of consensus or common purposes of the national governments.
	2) Powers of Union	2) Decisional powers of the collectively established institutions.
(C) Process Conditions	1) Decision-making style	1) Role of regional institutions, activities of national governments centralized vs. diffuse authority.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Variables</u>	<u>Operational Referents</u>
	2) Rate of transactions	2) Interregional vs. external trade, inter-regional communications and associations.
	3) Adaptability of governments	3) Governmental response to collective activities and proposals.

Having specified the variables, Haas and Schmitter set out to apply their scheme to a number of "concrete situations in which economic union led - or was supposed to lead - to political union".⁸¹ They develop scores (high, mixed or low) for each of the nine variables and for the three groups in which the variables were placed. The higher the total judgement score, the greater the likelihood of automatic politicization or spill-over, and thus, the more likely a political union will come into being. Their typology of integration patterns is presented below:⁸²

⁸¹Ibid., p. 262.

⁸²Ibid., p. 278.

TABLE II

ECONOMIC UNIONS: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES

	EEC	EFTA	OECD	COM- ECON	EAST AFRICAN COMMON MARKET	WEST AFRICAN FEDERA- TION	OAMCE	WEST INDIAN FEDERA- TION	CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET	LAFTA
BACKGROUND CONDITIONS										
1. Size of units	mixed	low	low	low	mixed	low	low	mixed	high	mixed
2. Rate of transaction	high	mixed	mixed	high	low	low	low	low	low	mixed
3. Pluralism	high	high	high	mixed	low	low	low	mixed	mixed	mixed
4. Elite complementarity	high	mixed	mixed	high	mixed	high?	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed
Total Judgment	high	mixed	mixed	mixed+	mixed-	low+	low	mixed	mixed	mixed
CONDITIONS AT TIME OF ECONOMIC UNION										
5. Government purposes	high	low	low	mixed	low	mixed	?	low	mixed	low
6. Powers of union	high	low	low	low	high	low?	low	low	low	low
Total Judgment	high	low	low	low	mixed	mixed?	low+	low	mixed-	low
PROCESS CONDITIONS										
7. Decision-making style	mixed	mixed	low	mixed	mixed	?	?	low	low	mixed
8. Rate of transaction	high	high	mixed	high	low	low	low	low	mixed	mixed
9. Adaptability of governments	high	high	mixed	mixed	low	low	?	low	?	mixed
Total Judgment	high	high	mixed	mixed	low	low	?	low	mixed?	mixed
CHANCES OF AUTOMATIC POLITICIZATION										
	good	fairly good	possible-doubtful	possible-doubtful	doubtful	poor?	?	poor	possible	possible-doubtful

Turning now to revised neo-functionalism, it is apparent that its origins were based on four fundamental considerations. First, there were the critics (including criticism by its authors) who charged that the original neo-functional paradigm overemphasized the spill-over hypothesis which in turn fostered premature conclusions regarding the likelihood of automatic politicization in certain integration movements.⁸³ Second, there was the belief that a number of significant actors and their intentions had been omitted from the model, and therefore, additional actors needed to be included, particularly those falling in the category of "dramatic-political actor".⁸⁴ Third, there was a desire to look into the possibility of alternative integration outcomes.⁸⁵ And fourth, there was the recognition that past analytical techniques had proven inadequate and new methods should be required.⁸⁶

As the diagram on page forty-nine indicates, the total judgement score with regard to the European Economic

⁸³See, for example, Joseph Nye, "Comparing Common Markets", in Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (ed.), Regional Integration, p. 200.

⁸⁴See, for example, Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 122-126.

⁸⁵See, for example, Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", p. 26-32.

⁸⁶See, for example, Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon", p. 47-48.

Community was "high". However, it is now generally agreed upon that the integrative movement has been characterized by fluctuations rather than consistent movement toward political union. The consensus among revised neo-functionalists seems to be that while political implications are indeed associated with more movement toward economic integration, the Haas-Schmitter "economic-political continuum and the oversimplified hypothesis concerning actor intentions left something to be desired. For it is abundantly clear that a variety of conditions and actors can, and do, affect the direction of the integration process. As Roger Hansen points out in a critical review of the spill-over thesis:

First, there was too little recognition of the fact that policy coordination among member-states of the European Community could substitute for greater supranational control. While economic integration does require that many economic policies be coordinated, it does not require formal political or quasi-political institutions to undertake coordination.

Secondly, there was the failure to recognize that in a common market constituted by relatively well-developed economies, a low degree of supranational authority is quite compatible with an acceptable distribution of the benefits of integration.⁸⁷

In a similar vein, Lindberg and Scheingold conclude that spill-over, or the "expansive logic of sector integration" can hardly be viewed as the major compelling feature of the integrative process in Western Europe. Rather, transformations within the European Community political system

⁸⁷Roger Hansen, "European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed?" International Organization, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Spring 1973), p. 231.

were significantly affected by the actions of "dramatic-political actors".⁸⁸ They point in particular to the successful efforts of Chancellor Adenauer to expand the scope of the European Community from coal and steel to atomic energy and a general common market.⁸⁹

This leads us directly to the second point raised by revised neo-functionalists: the overemphasis of technocrats and the lack of attention paid to the wide range of relevant actors and their motivations in the original neo-functionalist model. Professor Nye suggests that the reasoning behind the focus on technocrats was largely due to the fact that it:

...developed at a time when many observers were noting the bureaucratization of politics, the decline of ideology, and the growing popular concern for welfare and when foreign policies were held more closely in the vise of cold-war bipolarity, the national decision-makers in the model were assumed to be economic incrementalists and thus be responsive to the economic logic of integration. It was thought that the technocrat-politicians could bypass the electoral or support politicians and forge links to the ever stronger regional organization until engrenage had proceeded so far that it was too late for anyone to change the pattern.⁹⁰

As such, an examination of revised neo-functionalist models clearly indicates a concern with a myriad of sub-national, national, transnational and supranational actors. In addition, the actors include not only those groups which

⁸⁸Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, p. 241.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁹⁰Nye, "Comparing Common Markets", p. 197-198.

perceive themselves benefitted by integration but also groups opposed to it and neutral groups that may be mobilized for either side.⁹¹ Most revised neo-functionalists agree that the European Community "exists in a setting of potential conflict between different sets of elites with a largely indifferent public looking on."⁹² The major question that arises then is: can political decision-makers ignore the pressures for decisions brought on them by the interested parties or will they be forced into integrative or disintegrative decisions?

As we indicated earlier, neo-functionalists have shown themselves to be essentially concerned with those processes which lead to the establishment of a political community. This terminal condition was defined in specific terms. Revised neo-functionalists, however, on the basis of their conclusions that spill-over was over-emphasized and important actors were omitted from the original neo-functionalist model, have increasingly focused attention on the possibility of alternative outcomes. As Professor Haas points out:

...why the insistence on a single ideal type as the terminal condition? The terminal condition envisaged could very well be more than a pluralistic security community and less than a political community, defined as the successful pluralistic democratic state writ large; in fact, this is likely to be the case. Hence I suggest that we follow the approach of deliberately positing end states that could reflect extensive system transformation

⁹¹Nye, "Comparing Common Markets", p. 197-198.

⁹²Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 81.

leading toward centralization or decentralization or the achievement of a new integrative plateau.⁹³

The fourth area of revised neo-functionalist concern, as we noted, pertains to the inadequacy of early neo-functionalists analytical techniques. In addition to the failure of neo-functionalism to develop an acceptable theory⁹⁴ there has also been a lack of concern for fully operationalizing the various dependent and independent variables employed. As Professor Lindberg notes:

A fully operational definition is one "which actually spell(s) out the procedures used in measurement" and which provides "a detailed set of instructions enabling one to classify...unambiguously". Ideally, in order to permit more than nominal measurement these definitions should be specified as continua rather than as attributes. Just as political integration cannot be adequately described in unidimensional terms, neither can it be adequately described in the dichotomous terms of achieving, or failing to achieve, certain conditions or attributes.⁹⁵

In the wake of their appraisal of neo-functionalist theory-building and empirical research, and based on their desire to construct rather than to merely criticize; revised neo-functionalists have sought to develop an empirically testable system of concepts and postulated outcomes through

⁹⁴That being as Professor Haas points out, one that: describes what happens; identifies the sequence, or stages, and explains why the stages occur, and predicts future outcomes. Haas, "The Study Of Regional Integration", p. 27.

⁹⁵Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", p. 47.

which international political integration can be explained. To this end a vast number of new and revised theories have been put forward. Within these efforts there has been a retention of some important insights that were developed in the original neo-functional thesis. For example, few disagree with Haas's assertion that the economic sphere will create more spill-over into politically sensitive areas than will other functional spheres. Second, most accept the original view that interdependence in functional areas and the inherent linkage of tasks can direct national leaders into unintended supranational commitments.⁹⁶

In addition, an examination of revised neo-functionalism clearly indicates a common theoretical base. In fact, the major components of their theories (i.e., their conceptions of international political integration, the kind of concepts employed in their explanation and their methods of research) appear very similar. Revised neo-functionalists conceptualize international political integration as both a process and end product. In essence they are concerned with the extent to which a group of countries, represented by their national governments, act as a single unit in making domestic and foreign policy decisions. With reference to the end product or terminal condition, Haas, Schmitter, Lindberg, Scheingold and Nye, all agree that a number of possibilities

⁹⁶Hansen, "European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed?" p. 230.

exist. In effect they all are saying we do not know exactly what characteristics the end product may possess, but through our research efforts we have gained some ideas.

For example, Professor Haas states that, "political integration is simply another evaluative term for observing progress along a path of action - leading toward what?"⁹⁷ He then proceeds to put forward three "orienting terminal conditions on which our thoughts and efforts can focus", adding, however, that the three are not exhaustive of possibilities. The three terminal conditions suggested by Haas include: the "regional state", the "regional commune", and the "asymmetrical regional overlay". Summarizing, the regional state resembles the nation-state. It has a centralized hierarchically ordered political authority. A regional commune, on the other hand, is simply a group of units who, because they possess differing functional characteristics, are highly interdependent. And an asymmetrical regional overlap may have a central authority like the regional state, but the participating units also retain authority. Authority is distributed asymmetrically among several centers.⁹⁸

Lindberg and Scheingold, for their part, focus "explicitly on differences in outcome patterns and upon the different consequences each has for system change."⁹⁹ They too posit

⁹⁷Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", p. 30.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 30.

⁹⁹Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 106.

three possible outcomes which are labeled: fulfillment, retraction and extension.¹⁰⁰ Fulfillment refers specifically to those outcomes in which the member-states actively participate in joint decision-making procedures and follow this up with the implementation and enforcement of the decisions that were decided collectively. Retraction is simply the inverse of fulfillment. That is, the situation is such that while a commitment was accepted by the members, they are unable or unwilling to further develop acceptable policies and rules. In addition, those rules and procedures that had previously been established are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. Extension refers to a fundamental change in the function or geographic characteristics of the integrated political system. Lindberg and Scheingold provide examples of extension, which include: the signing of the treaties creating the EEC and EURATOM, referred to as successful system transformations, and, the EDC and the 1973 attempted entry of Britain into the EEC, which are referred to as unsuccessful system transformations.¹⁰¹

We earlier indicated that a major component of the revised neo-functionalist thesis was the active role played by the national political leadership. Furthermore, we noted

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 136-137.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 137

that the response of these political decision-makers to certain forces, or what Nye refers to as "process mechanism", has a direct impact on the direction of the process.¹⁰² With these considerations in mind, Schmitter suggests seven "strategic options" that are open to a given actor in a given context.¹⁰³ These options have also been labeled "action paths"¹⁰⁴ but in more conventional language we might designate them as the processes leading toward integration or disintegration. The various action paths or strategic options are diagrammatically presented by Professor Schmitter:¹⁰⁵

¹⁰²Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 64.

¹⁰³Philippe Schmitter, "A Revised Theory Of Regional Integration", in Lindberg and Scheingold, Regional Integration, p. 242.

¹⁰⁴Haas, "The Study Of Regional Integration", p. 33.

¹⁰⁵Schmitter, "A Revised Theory Of Regional Integration", p. 241.

FIGURE I
LEVEL OF AUTHORITY

Source: Philippe Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," p. 242.

What reasons then account for these alternative paths of action and an arrival at one of the outcomes? Or stated somewhat differently, what are the mechanisms or conditions that exert pressure on decision-makers for integrative or dis-integrative actions? Professor Nye provides us with answers to these questions through the provision of the independent variables frequently employed by the revised neo-functional school. These include: functional linkage of tasks, rising transactions, deliberate linkages and coalition formation, elite socialization, regional group formation, ideological-identitive appeal and the involvement of external actors in the process.¹⁰⁶

As we have already indicated in the opening pages of Chapter II, the main purpose of our inquiry into the major approaches in the field of international political integration was to see whether and to what extent these efforts would provide a starting-point for further elaboration, research and theory-building. From this point of view, the contributions of revised neo-functionalists have significantly advanced our understanding of international political integration.

In the first place, they recognize that an understanding of international political integration cannot be realized simply by focusing on the integrative process. Rather, it is dependent upon a cumulative understanding of both the process

¹⁰⁶For a detailed account of these independent variables, see, Nye, Peace In Parts, p. 64-87.

and end product. The achievement of this objective, therefore, is dependent upon the ability of the theorist to not only explain why and how certain events are transpiring but what the result is.

Secondly, their introduction of political actors that could divert the integration process from its course at any given time brought into question the likelihood of a uni-directional process with a single terminal condition. Suddenly we are confronted with the possibility of a variety of processes which could be occurring simultaneously in various areas of integration activity, and as such, the end product may be highly unanticipated.

By far the most significant contribution has been the recognition that international political integration is not a result of economic processes or conditions alone. It is in fact a reaction to or result of a number of political activities.

A number of weaknesses should be noted, however. Although we will discuss these problems more specifically in Chapter III, the positing of two questions in reference to revised neo-functional theory building and research tends to lend a motivating factor to our own efforts. First, with all the concern that has been shown toward developing operational definitions and methods of measurement, why has there been an almost total disregard for carrying out the testing procedures that can verify or falsify the theoretical formulations? And secondly, since we have seen that revised neo-functionalists frequently speak in terms of the development

of a collective decision-making system or body, do we then categorize such activities as intergovernmental consultation and other forms of inter-state cooperation as similar to international political integration, or is the latter something much more unique? It will be our intention in Chapter III to answer these questions as well as to examine some of the factors which we believe have contributed to the present state of political integration in Western Europe.

National Actor Involvement and Integration Theory

The proceeding review of integration theory seems to indicate that all of the approaches we have discussed, excluding the ideological/activist segment of the federalist school, view the role of national governmental leaders as an essential element of the integrative process. This is particularly evident in the writings of federal theorists, neo-functionalists and revised neo-functionalists who see a direct causal link between the positions advocated and taken by national leaders and the level of political integration among the participating states.¹⁰⁷ Within the framework of these theoretical developments neo-functionalists have argued that previous empirical research indicates that without a commit-

¹⁰⁷See, for example, Philippe Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", p. 232-264. Also, Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon", p. 45-127.

ment by national political leaders to integrative activities, political integration will be halted or decline.¹⁰⁸ And communications theorists, while placing less emphasis on the role of governmental leaders than do the other schools and more on the development of community bonds, do suggest that national leaders are situated in positions in which they can effect the flow of communications between the states and thus influence the level of community development.

In addition to finding similar views among the various schools of integration thought regarding the importance of the national leaderships, our review of this literature has helped us develop some of our own thoughts about the role of these actors. To begin with, national leaders have shown themselves to be primarily concerned with their own particular interests. As such their demands and supports are based on the way in which they perceive their own interests in relation to some given policy or issue, in this case political integration. Certain leaders may see their interests served by further integration. Others may see their interests served by undoing or rolling back the level of integration. While others may see their interests served by a maintenance of the status quo, that is, maintaining the existing level of integration.

¹⁰⁸ See, Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America", p. 329.

Following neo-functionalism, we can further draw a distinction between actors on the basis of their aims. Leaders with dramatic political aims are, as Professor Lindberg points out: "concerned with 'high politics', with national self-assertion, prestige and grandeur, power in the world."¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, other leaders may possess incremental-economic aims whereby they increasingly devote their efforts toward the maximization of their daily welfare concerns and in the process abandon an interest in high politics.¹¹⁰

Add to all of this the fact that fundamental decisions concerning the transfer of decision authority to a collective decision-making arena must be channeled through the political leadership at the sub-system level and we can easily visualize the impact that such actors will have on the terminal condition. Professor Schmitter's diagram of strategic options open to a given actor (presented on page fifty-nine) also provides an apt illustration of the multidirectional possibilities of the integration process.

Whether national decision-makers can ignore the pressures for further integration or whether they will be forced into expanding or retracting the level of authority transferred to the international decision-making bodies will depend in large part upon the strengths (or weaknesses) of the forces and upon the conditions existing in the Communities environment. In sum, then, our model will be directed at explaining

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 123.

the actions and reactions of such decision-makers in response to the multiple forces acting upon them. And in so doing, we will not only be testing the validity of our own model, but will be examining some of the principal hypotheses put forward in previous integration literature.

CHAPTER III

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES REVISITED: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIPS

The proceeding review of the major approaches to the study of international political integration clearly points out the numerous difficulties and complexities that inhere in an examination of this particular political phenomenon. As our survey indicates, these attempts to define international political integration, to explain its uniqueness, and to provide adequate tools for empirical research, have emphasized a variety of features. As a first step in this current research endeavor, a specification of the meaning of political integration in Western Europe is a task which may be accomplished by demarcating political from the other conceivable forms of integration. For our purposes, this will enable us to clearly distinguish what it is we are referring to in discussing the commitment of national leaders to a politically integrated system as opposed to another form of integration. Our efforts to attain this distinction have benefitted greatly from the

systems theoretic approach of Talcott Parsons, William Mitchell and David Easton.¹¹¹

Parsons, for his part, argues that:

...the increasing complexity of systems, insofar as it is not due only to segmentation, involves the development of sub-systems specialized about more specific functions in the operation of the system as a whole, and of the integrative mechanisms which interrelate the functionally differentiate sub-systems.¹¹²

Therefore the task of analyzing social systems can be viewed as a twofold operation. The first task is to differentiate and analyze sub-systems along functional lines (developing islands of theory). And the second is to examine the relationship that exists between the sub-systems (linking the islands). Like most systems oriented theorists, Parsons is concerned primarily with the maintenance and persistence of social systems. He suggests that for such goals to be achieved a social system must perform four functions, each of which is handled by a different sub-system.¹¹³ The four sub-systems include: the economic system, which is concerned with the production of wealth; the social control system, which deals with the integration of the members into society; the sociali-

¹¹¹Professor Lindberg has also suggested the use of systems analysis in the study of political integration. See, Leon Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (June 1967), p. 344-387.

¹¹²Talcott Parsons, Economy and Society: A Study In The Integration of Economic and Social Theory (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 11.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 13-20.

zation system, which handles the maintenance of societal values and norms; and the political system, which is concerned with the mobilization of resources to meet system goals.¹¹⁴

William Mitchell, an advocate of the Parsonian approach to systems analysis, provides us with a somewhat more indepth analysis of the political system. He contends that the political system must perform not one, but four functions. These include:

- 1) The authoritative specification of system goals... regardless of the particular goals found in society, it is imperative that some means be regarded as authoritative for their selection if not for their origination.¹¹⁵
- 2) The authoritative allocation of values and costs. The problem of allocation...consists of two distinct phases: first, deciding the principle rules by which the allocation is to proceed; secondly, allocating the scarce resources, once rules have been established.¹¹⁶
- 3) The authoritative mobilization of resources. Although decisions may be made on societal goals, and the allocation of values and costs thereby decided, the polity cannot be said to be effective until it can implement these decisions by calling upon and acquiring resources. In short, polities require resources to operate, just as do economies...much of the action of government revolves around the processes of acquiring resources and then combining them in new forms so as to carry out goals.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 13-20.

¹¹⁵William Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 127.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 129.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 131.

- 4) The integration of the system. Where social goals are formalized...the political system, through the officials and offices of government, uses both rewards and penalties to coordinate the actions of its people.¹¹⁸

In a somewhat similar vein, David Easton asserts that all political activities "derive their relatedness or systemic ties from the fact that they all more or less influence the way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed for a society."¹¹⁹ Interactions which do not involve the formulation and execution of authoritative decisions for a society must be considered outside the boundaries of the political system. Consequently, students of political life should direct their efforts toward "understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society."¹²⁰

In sum, these three parallel lines of thought help us, at least for analytical purposes, to clearly differentiate the political system from other systems by virtue of its distinctive functional characteristics. And as we indicated earlier, such non-political integrative processes and/or conditions as economic integration and societal integration are essentially irrelevant in the examination of political integration. However, some indicators of these other forms of integration may prove to be relevant in explaining international political integration in which case they should be viewed as certain

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 132.

¹¹⁹David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, Vol. IX, No. 3 (April 1957)p. 383.

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 383.

phenomena or developments within the political system's environment.

Consequently, international political integration can thus be defined as the situation in which originally separate and distinct national units, represented by the officials and offices of the national governments, formulate and implement policies as a single entity, foregoing some of the factual attributes of sovereignty and national autonomy, thereby erecting, overtime, a collective decision-making system.

The attainment of our present task, that is explaining how and why national leaders become committed or opposed to a collective decision-making system, requires that we follow certain procedures. First, we must state precisely what we mean by national leadership commitment. Second, we must specify the particular set of independent variables that most accurately explains our dependent variable. Third, we need to fully operationalize the variables. This necessitates the establishment of techniques used in measuring the variables as well as spelling out how the techniques are to be undertaken. And finally, we must formulate hypotheses that establish clear links between the variables we have selected.

The Dependent Variables

Earlier we stated that the level of political integration in Western Europe was for the most part governed by the positions advocated and taken by the national leaderships. They have frequently been described as the gatekeepers between

demands within their constituent systems and the international decision-making body. Their ability to effect the outcome of the integrative process is based essentially on the fact that they occupy authoritative positions in both the Community (through the Council of Ministers) and national systems. As such, little progress will take place with regard to the furtherance of political integration unless at least one government is willing to act in order to convince the others. Of course, the ideal integrative situation arises when all governments attach their expectations and goals to Community decision-making.

The motivations of national political leaders may differ significantly from those of other actors. National leaders may possess dramatic political aims as well as incremental economic aims. They may have a greater desire for status and prestige in world affairs than the perceived benefits of political integration. As Professor Haas points out with regard to the actions of General DeGaulle in the early 1960's:

DeGaulle had been perfectly willing to use the Common Market and the EEC apparatus in a larger game of welding Europe together under a French political umbrella, to make Europe "truly independent" by dislodging the United States from the continent. The game proved to be a failure: his scheme for a political confederation which would absorb the economic communities was rejected by the other five; his bilateral alliance with Germany brought no results as the government of Ludwig Erhard embraced the American-sponsored Multilateral Nuclear Force and attempted to achieve German security with American rather than French help; his attacks on NATO merely underscored his diplomatic isolation from his five economic partners. Continuation of economic integration thus seemed to make France more dependent on Europe with-

out making Europe fall into line with French foreign policy. A common foreign and defense policy for Europe was DeGaulle's aim. The unwillingness of his partners to concede these items must have made DeGaulle wonder what the further advantages of economic unity might be if they entailed the loss of political sovereignty.¹²²

On the other hand, national leaders who are ideologically and emotionally committed to Community decision-making greatly enhance the chances for an increase in level of political integration. Again referring to Professor Haas:

Integrative decisions based on high politics and basic commitment are undoubtedly more durable than decisions based on converging pragmatic expectations. A process of integration spurred by the vision, the energy and forces of a Bismarck, a Cavour or a Disraeli is clearly more productive of permanence than an indirect process fed by slow fuel of economic expectations. On that type of scale, a Bismarck and a DeGaulle will always be more effective than a Monnet, a Hallstein, or a Erhard.¹²³

Nevertheless, national decision-makers can change their minds or have their minds changed, they can redefine their interests or have their interests shifted, and they can seek new opportunities or be directed toward alternative opportunities. As Professor Lindberg points out with regard to General DeGaulle's political position following his boycott of the Community:

In France the 1965 Presidential elections saw a massive attack by agricultural organizations on General DeGaulle on the grounds that his policies and action were a violation of the European spirit, that they constituted a threat to European integration in general and particularly to the great hopes for the future of French agriculture

¹²²Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America", p. 329.

¹²³Ibid., p. 328.

promised by the common agricultural policy. There is some evidence to indicate that the adverse domestic reaction was one reason for DeGaulle's decision to end his boycott short of the terms he initially demanded and to temper somewhat his frontal attacks on the Commission. As long as farmers represent a significant bloc of voters, even DeGaulle had to take their views into account.¹²⁴

In the final analysis, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the major bonds among the relevant political systems of Western Europe, if a politically integrated Europe, in our sense, is to successfully emerge, will depend greatly on the national leaderships commitment to and involvement in the Community system. Research seems to indicate that as the various national decision-makers interact at the Community level, they become more familiar with the various strands of thought originating in each other's capital as well as from the Communities non-national institutions. Because of this consultation and collaboration, objective perceptions of shared or compatible interests may develop resulting in identificative ties.¹²⁵ That is, national decision-makers may believe that certain important concrete benefits or advantages can be more readily achieved through the Community than through an independent national policy.

In addition, these deliberations may provide a forum in which national decision-makers can discuss the multitude of issues affecting all of them. Do the programs that we have

¹²⁴ Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 161.

¹²⁵ Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon", p. 91.

erected need to be altered? Are there more drawbacks or advantages to future integrative behavior? And while not all such discussions and consultations at the Community level will produce "positive" expressions toward integration, the actions of the national decision-makers in committing themselves to such activities would tend to enhance the chances for future integrative activities.

Operationally then, national actor involvement, our dependent variable, can be defined as the number of man days spent by relevant national government leaders and their subordinates at Community level functions.¹²⁶ For our purposes we have included in our list of functional activities: Council of Ministers meetings, ambassador and ministerial conferences and meetings of intergovernmental committees and working parties. Using the Council of the European Communities: Review of the Council's Work, a yearly Community publication, we were able to calculate the total number of days spent by these national actors in Community activities, and thus develop a yearly dependent variable score.

What conditions and mechanisms, then, explain how and why national political leaders become increasingly involved in Community activities? We have selected five mechanisms which, in our judgement, directly influence the decision that national leaders have to make with regard to committing them-

¹²⁶For another study using a similar approach, see, Nelson Polsby, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives", American Political Science Review (Vol. 62, 1968), p. 144-168.

selves or rejecting increasing involvement. They include: the size and power potential of the participating states, the degree of interdependence, the level of transnational ties and the structural growth of non-national Community institutions.

The selected independent variables are essentially a composite of specific variables previously introduced in various strands of the integration literature. However, in light of our evaluation of this literature, as well as our own "hunches" with regard to the forces that effect the commitment of national decision-makers, and thus political integration, the model we propose is fundamentally revised neo-functionalist in character. In any event, before proceeding to discuss the model in its entirety, let us first examine in some detail each of the independent variables.

Size/Power

One determinant of the response given by national decision-makers, be it integrative or disintegrative, is based on a perception of their own nation's relative strength (size/power) to that of the other participants. There are many ways in which governments - always subject to change, idiosyncrasy, and pressures from within - view their own strengths (or weaknesses) as well as those of other nations.

When the member-states of an integration scheme sit at the bargaining table two elements must normally be present:

there must be both common interests and issues of conflict.¹²⁷ Reason dictates that without common interests there is nothing to negotiate for, and without conflict there is nothing to negotiate about. An important step in any negotiations, as Deutsch points out, is for each participant "to find out on what grounds the other sides can be convinced of the truth of its own views. After one side found out what views or pictures of reality its adversaries hold in their minds, they must try to discover the domain of validity of each such view."¹²⁸

However, the criteria used in judging the validity of each others view, particularly for states that have already in some degree bound themselves together economically, may shift expediently as well as in response to the fixed differences in each actor's perceptions.¹²⁹ As Professor Schmitter points out:

¹²⁷For an excellent discussion on the importance of the relative size and power of states participating in and integration scheme, see, Philippe Schmitter, "Further Notes on Operationalizing Some Variables Related to Regional Integration", International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1969), p. 327-336.

¹²⁸Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), p. 131.

¹²⁹Schmitter, "Variables Related to Regional Integration", p. 320.

...one actor may accuse another of dominating the regional market by the sheer size of its economy; the other may respond, "So what! You are more industrialized" or "But your exports and balance of payments are much better off than mine. I have severe inflationary problems"; to which a third member might retort, "You are both more powerful than I since I have the lowest per capita income"; a fourth voice might add, "I am the one who needs special reassurance. In the long run, I am the most threatened. I have the smallest army."¹³⁰

The above quotation indicates that the validity of one's views may frequently be evaluated in terms of perceptions of their relative power and size potential within the grouping of states. Power and size potential is simply an estimate of the material and human resources available to a nation. As such, it is important that we recognize the probability that the size and power potential of the participating states will be assessed according to different criteria (i.e., military strength, gross national product, population, total area, etc.).

With these considerations in mind, it is our contention that if the rank ordering of all the participating states was the same for all measures used in judging potential size and power, the probability of arriving at mutually satisfying results would be diminished. The inverse being, if the members are heterogeneous in terms of their rankings in the various criteria, they have to evaluate their and the other's relative positions, then there is a greater likelihood that they will attempt to resolve their differences through compromise.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 320.

To better understand this concept, let us imagine that there exists two established integrative arrangements. In each case, as in that of the European Communities, unanimous agreement must exist among the member-states before further integrative steps can be implemented. In the first arrangement, countries A and B are considered to be the dominant members, while countries C, D, E and F are seen as possessing considerably less power and size potential. On the other hand, the second arrangement consists of six member-states in which all perceive that the distribution of power and size potential is roughly equal. All other things being equal, it is our belief that the second integrative arrangement would have a greater tendency to foster compromises among the participating member-states, and thus increase the level of involvement in Community affairs by national leaders.

Why is this so? First, perceived equality affords a greater number of interaction opportunities. The number of possible dyadic relationships in a system of states that perceive themselves to be equal, as opposed to a system in which "core" or "polar" areas exist, is very great and rises in increasing proportion to the number of equal members. With a number of "equal" partners there is a greatly reduced danger of mutually reinforcing antagonism between two states. The individual states will interact with all other members; their cross-cutting loyalties will tend to reduce hostility expressed

toward one particular state or against one particular cause.¹³¹ As such, there will be a greater desire to increase their involvement in the Community in an effort to bring about mutually satisfying results.

Second, if five members of a six member integration arrangement believe that the other member scores highest on all measures of potential size and power, or if four believe two do, it is highly probable that they will also perceive distributional problems. As Professor Nye points out:

Given the tendency of industry to cluster to take advantage of the external economies available from the presence of other industries in more developed parts of a region, there is a danger that (in Gunnar Myrdal's terms) the "spread effects of increased economic activity will be less important to the poorer areas than the 'backwash' effect of the attraction of resources from the poorer to the richer areas."¹³²

As a result, the national leaders will not perceive an equitable distribution of integration benefits and will thus emphasize inequalities - there will be little "give-and-take" and, as such, little commitment to the Community.

We must, therefore, construct an indicator that will provide an accurate accounting of the degree of homogeneity or symmetry of the member-states in the specific context of their relative capacity to control the issues and direction of inter-Community negotiations. We have therefore selected ten

¹³¹Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer; "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), p. 392-396.

¹³²Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 78.

(variable) properties that are generally considered to be indicators used by national governments (in modern industrialized Western Europe) in determining their own as well as other states' power and size potential. They are:

1. Total area.
2. Total population.
3. Total GNP.
4. Per capita GNP.
5. Industry as % of GDP.
6. Balance of payments situation.
7. Rate of economic growth.
8. Reliance on foreign energy sources.
9. Employment as % of total work force.
10. Total military forces.

Most conducive to a situation in which national leaders increase their involvement in Community activities and increasingly rely on the international decision-making body would be when, over time, the rank incongruence of the member-states in relation to the variable properties increases, thereby indicating increasing equality and thus making it more difficult to determine who is winning or losing.

Therefore, the hypothesis accompanying this condition is, of course, that the greater the symmetry in potential size/power or, operationally, the greater the rank incongruence between indicators of potential power, the greater the

likelihood that national leaders will commit themselves to integrative activities.

As Professor Schmitter suggests, an appropriate statistical tool for determining this condition is Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) which measures "the divergence of actual agreement shown in data from maximum possible (perfect) agreement. If the rank ordering of all variables were identical, the integrative arrangement would score a perfect +1. If there is complete divergence (i.e., indicating equality among the members), W would equal 0."¹³³ For example, if after following through the computations necessary in determining the coefficient of concordance we find that it has risen from .28 in 1962 to .48 in 1965, indicating increasing consistency between the ten components, then the likelihood that the member-states would commit themselves to integrative activities would be diminished. If, however, we find the coefficient has declined from .48 in 1965 to .18 in 1970, then the reverse would be true. That is, we would expect an increasing reliance on the Community system and a desire to

¹³³ Schmitter, "Variables Related to Regional Integration", p. 321.

find mutually satisfying results.¹³⁴

Degree of Interdependence

The second variable that must be taken into consideration with regard to national actor strategies is the degree of mutual dependency among the participating states of the integration scheme. Modern industrialized states interact and cooperate primarily for one reason. Because the goals they seek to achieve cannot generally be obtained in isolation, but require compatible efforts on the part of officials and non-governmental groups in different settings.¹³⁵ The largely economic content of the issues and activities, however, does not necessarily suggest that they belong outside the political arena. One of the fundamental lessons we have learned from our review of political integration theories as well as our own observations, is that the politics of power and

¹³⁴See, G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston, Mass.: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971), p. 199-200.

The formula for calculating "W" is:

$$W = \frac{\sum (R_i - \bar{R})^2}{k^2(N^3 - N)/12}$$

N = number of countries examined.
 k = number of variable properties.
 R_i = sum of all the ranking columns.
 $\bar{R}$ = mean column total (equal to $\sum R_i/N$).

¹³⁵Richard Cooper, Economics of Interdependence: Policy in the Atlantic (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 148.

status are frequently linked with the politics of wealth and welfare. And while the dramatic political aims of national decision-makers may at various points in time lead to attacks on the activities of the Community institutions, the impetuses to attain desired goals more than not lead to a greater degree of interdependency. In this event, national decision-makers are likely to become more susceptible to events beyond their control. As Richard Cooper points out:

Broadly speaking, increasing interdependence complicates the successful pursuit of national economic objectives in three ways. First, it increases the number and magnitude of the disturbances to which each country's balance of payments is subjected, and this in turn diverts policy attention and instruments of policy to the restoration of external balance. Second, it slows down the process by which national authorities, each acting on its own, are able to reach domestic objectives. Third, the response to greater integration can involve the community of nations in counteracting motions which leave all countries worse off than they need be. These difficulties are in turn complicated by the fact that the objective of greater integration involves international agreements which reduce the number of policy instruments available to national authorities for pursuit of their (economic) objectives.¹³⁶

Within the framework of an integrative arrangement, the need for control leads to an increasing reliance on the established international decision-making body as well as increasing consultations and negotiations between the member-states. These instrumentalities serve to coordinate policies thereby heightening the probability of attaining mutually rewarding goals. As such, the hypothesis accompanying this

¹³⁶ibid., p. 148.

condition is: the more interdependent the member-states become, the more committed and involved the national leaders will become in the Community.

One method of determining the extent to which the member-states of the European Communities are mutually dependent can be achieved by devising a measure of intra-Community exchanges as contrasted with those outside the Community. And while trade data may be but one indicator of mutual dependency or interdependence, others being capital flows, social communications and cultural exchanges to mention a few, in terms of the European Communities it does represent a significant element of both the Communities' history and its functional orientation. The procedure we shall follow then in gauging trade flows will be based on the Michaely concentration index.¹³⁷ This index measures intensity of geographic concentration of transaction behavior and as such becomes an indicator of preference, partnership, interdependence and/or dependence.¹³⁸ After having obtained the coefficients of geographic concentration (in this case concentration of trade

¹³⁷Michael Michaely, Concentration In International Trade (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1962), p. 18-25.

The formula for calculating geographic concentration used here is:

$$G_{jx} = 100 \sqrt{\sum (X_{sj}/X_{.j})^2}$$

where,

X_{sj} = exports of member-state j to other EC members.

$X_{.j}$ = total exports of member-state j .

¹³⁸Donald Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration", p. 132-135.

within the European Communities) for each member-state, we then need to arrive at a single score for each year of the study for the entire Community. Simple averaging could not be used because of the vast differences in the volume of trade by the members. That is to say, Luxembourg's geographic concentration score should not count as much as Germany's when a composite Community score is developed. We, therefore, devised a weighting scheme based on the exports of each member-state to other members, the total volume of intra-Community exports and the geographic concentration score of each member.¹³⁹ By adding each nation's weighted score, a balanced and accurate Community score could be achieved. The range of the index is from "0" to "100". A score of 100 would indicate that all trade by member-states took place within the Community arena.

Transnational Ties

As we earlier indicated, the realignment of interests and the formation of transnational coalitions are vital to an on-going integrative process. A process in which collective and supranational policy formulation, at least in the case of Western Europe, is highly dependent upon the aims and demands

¹³⁹The formula used for weighting each member's geographic concentration score is:

$$WC = X_{sj} / X_{sc} \cdot G_{jx}$$

(The WS for each member was then added and a Community index score obtained.)

where,
 X_{sj} = exports of member-state j to other EC members,
 X_{sc} = total intra-Community exports,
 G_{jx} = geographic concentration score for j.

of certain politically relevant actors within the Community. It is on the basis of this perspective that we place emphasis on the activities of key groups, particularly economic elites. For it is these elites who are the articulators of interests, as distinguished from those who aggregate interests or translate them into policy.¹⁴⁰ As such, it is they who bring legitimacy to the Community system. Transnational ties as used here refers to a measure of consensus existing among the elites of the Community with regard to an acceptance of the Community institutions and practices of the system. It is the extent to which non-governmental elites redirect their activities away from the confines of the nation-state and enter the Community arena.

The formation of transnational coalitions, however, does not necessarily mean that all the participants have identical demands, interests or motivations. Rather, their demands will normally be based on a mutually satisfying compromise. A compromise in which the elites expect to realize their own individual demands to a sufficiently high extent as to induce them to support it. And, of course, this is based on a perception that their goals can more readily be attained through the Community system than through their national government.

¹⁴⁰ Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. xxxiv.

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To secure optimal conditions for such transnational activities (particularly in the economic sector) requires the unification of certain national policies. And as Werner Feld points out, it:

...necessitates that obstacles stemming from divergent fiscal and other laws as well as from disparities in the national policies of the member states be eliminated. Since demands to that effect, although motivated by economic self-interest, require for their satisfaction in most cases action by national authorities or EEC institutions, they seek an "authoritative allocation of values" and thereby become essentially political objectives.¹⁴¹

As such, it would appear highly likely that the spreading of transnational coalitions would increasingly lead to political pressure for the attainment of their objectives. The greater the expansion of these coalitions the greater the chances that legal and policy harmonization will be carried out. Again referring to Feld:

Since effecting this harmonization carries with it the implicit, if not explicit, obligation of the EEC member governments not to make any further unilateral changes in the areas involved, the autonomy of the member states in decisionmaking will tend to be restricted in proportion to the extent harmonization has been carried out.¹⁴²

Because legal and policy harmonization requires a great deal of consultation and negotiations on the part of the member national governments, we would expect to see an increasing amount of involvement in the Community system by these actors.

¹⁴¹Werner Feld, "Political Aspects of Transnational Business Collaboration in the Common Market", International Organization, Vol. 24 No. 2, (Spring 1970) p. 218.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 219.

Therefore, the hypothesis accompanying this situation is: the greater the legitimacy of the Community in the eyes of non-governmental economic elites, the greater the commitment of national decision-makers to collective decision-making and thus increasing their involvement in the Community.

As we have indicated, transnational ties as used here refers to the level of support given by non-governmental elites to the institutions and practices of the Community system. As such, we must develop an indicator that is sensitive to the increases and decreases of support for the system.

Following a procedure previously used in a number of integration studies, we decided that legitimacy, as defined, could best be measured by gauging the growth or decline of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating within the European Community system.¹⁴³ Our justification for doing so is essentially based on the very structure of NGOs in Western Europe, and in particular, on the dominant role played by elites within such bodies. These bureaucratized organizations, in which basic decisions are made by the leadership, sometimes over the opposition and usually over the indifference of the general membership, enable the relevant elites to acquire a manipulative role which, of course, can be used to redirect support and demands into the Community arena.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³Charles W. Kegley and Llewellyn D. Howell, "The Dimensionality of Regional Integration: Construct Validation in the Southeast Asian Context", International Organization, Vol. 29 No. 4, (Autumn 1975), p. 998-1009.

¹⁴⁴Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. xxxiv.

Measured in this case were the number of joint NGO memberships as indicated in the Yearbook of International Organizations published by the Union of International Associations, Brussels, Belgium. The eligibility of the NGOs for the study was based on five criteria. First, the aims of the organizations had to be Community in character, with the intention to cover operations in at least three member countries. Second, members of the organizations had to come from at least three countries. Third, the organizations had to have permanent headquarters and provisions for continuity of operation. Fourth, contributions to the budgets of the organizations had to come from at least three member-countries. And fifth, evidence of current activity had to be available.¹⁴⁵ A score for each year under study was then determined on the basis of the number of NGOs in existence.

One additional comment must be made with regard to the operational procedure we have selected for this variable. There is no question that a point of saturation exists whereby the number of Community NGOs levels off simply because all sectors of activity (i.e., transport, agriculture, administration, agriculture, etc.) are represented to their fullest. Before we selected this procedure, therefore, we had to determine if the European Community had reached this point. If so, the validity of our measurement procedure would be in question.

¹⁴⁵Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations (Vol. 12, Brussels), p. 11.

In our review of the sectors in which Community NGOs are actively involved we found, not surprisingly, that the vast majority were associated with the manufacturing and agricultural industries. And while we found other sectors represented, in our judgement the spectrum of NGO activity within the European Communities does not resemble what we would consider the saturation point. A prime example of this can be found by examining the trade unions sector. In 1972, fourteen years after the establishment of the EEC, only seven Community wide trade union organizations had been established. And these organizations represented only a small percentage of the total work forces organized at the national level.¹⁴⁶ Other sectors where minimal Community growth is evident include: education, press and television, health, and transportation to mention but a few. In summary then, it would appear that a measure of legitimacy based on the growth or decline of Community NGOs would be appropriate, at least for the time period of this particular study.

Structural Growth of Community Institutions

An analysis of the growth, stagnation or decline of those institutions representing the general interest of the entirety, is especially relevant in explaining systematic change in the Communities. As Professor Lindberg suggests:

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 730-732.

We may expect that the longer such structures go on performing important roles as they survive changes in internal leadership and external political climates, as they grow in size and complexity, and as they take on new functions, the more safely one can infer that they will continue to constitute a significant element in the overall regime structure and that their role in that structure has become stable and legitimate.¹⁴⁷

It should be pointed out that in this instance we are referring to the Commission of the European Communities not only as the Commissioners themselves, but also those officials who make up the Commission staff.

In any case, this is not to say that the nature of the Commission's actions, or its degree of independence, are strictly determined by the desires of these administrators or their administrative structure. However, we cannot ignore the Commission's role in the integrative process or the effects its growth and monopoly of technical expertise and information at the Community level may have on the national governments. Its responsibility to be European would in itself seem to demand some degree of legitimate authority which was independent from the member-states. And yet the powers traditionally regarded as vital to governing a modern political entity are absent.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multi-dimensional Phenomenon", p. 83.

¹⁴⁸David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 84

As such, it seems inappropriate to view the growth or decline of the Commission as a measure of collective decision-making among a number of nation-states as some have suggested.¹⁴⁹ Rather, we see the Commission essentially as an administrative arm of the collective decision-makers (i.e., the Council of Ministers) whose primary functions are to enhance the position of the Community system, provide information and expertise on Community affairs and to put forth proposals for further integrative activities. As such, we view the Commission as an institution possessing utilitarian resources which enables it to influence the behavior of the national leaderships. This being the case, it seems far more realistic to view the Commission's growth as an expanding force which acts upon the national decision-makers rather than as the end product itself.

Therefore, it is our contention that as the Commission experiences structural growth and increasingly becomes the most prominent source of Community information it will not only be recognized as an essential component of the system, but will influence the Community positions taken by the national decision-makers. In other words, national leaders, persuaded by their growing reliance on the Commission for technical expertise, will see that their aims can be more efficiently achieved through involvement at the Community

¹⁴⁹Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 49.

rather than solely at the national level. This in turn will lead national decision-makers to face each other in the politics of the Community over their substantive differences of social, political or economic interests rather than over the issue of political integration as such.

For the evaluation of the Commission's structural growth we have selected as our measure the size and growth of the Commission's budget. One problem with this measure, however, as Professor Nye points out:

...is that the budget...of many international organizations reflects other things beside the importance of the organization's output or its internal coherence as an institution. ...the resources of international organizations may grow because of some derivative use, be it the diplomatic designs of a Great Power, or the political awkwardness of firing rather than hiring a duplicate international bureaucrat.¹⁵⁰

To remedy this, we have followed a procedure suggested by Professor Nye and that is to calculate the Commissions' budget as a percentage of the total government budgets of the member-states. As such, our scores were obtained by dividing the budgets of the member-states into the Commission's budget. This was done on a yearly basis for the period of the study (1959-1972). We, therefore, are more concerned with the Commission's growth (or decline) in relation to the member-states rather than an isolated growth pattern.

¹⁵⁰Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 38.

Having described our dependent and independent variables, it is implicit, if not explicit, that the proceeding specification of relationships constitutes an open system of explanation in that no single independent variable is a perfect or even exclusive predictor of the degree of involvement or commitment made by the national leaderships to the Community system.¹⁵¹ That is, our model hypothesizes that the combined effect of changes in our independent variables will, in turn, help predict probable changes in our dependent variable. This is presented diagrammatically on page ninety-five.

As we earlier indicated, the model we propose is essentially revised neo-functionalist in character. With regard to the independent variables, Ernst Haas ~~first~~ suggested that as a pre-condition for a successful integration arrangement the proposed members should possess relatively the same size/power potential. More recently, Phillippe Schmitter has argued, as we do, that during the integrative process the member-states must perceive that their size/power status within the Community is increasingly moving to a point of equality. Interdependence, our second independent variable, can be found in both Communications and Neo-functionalist theorizing. However, Neo-functionalists have been more successful in incorporating it into a politically oriented model. And legitimacy

¹⁵¹ See, Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", p. 246-264.

FIGURE 2

and the structural growth of non-national Community institutions, because Neo-functionalists have always emphasized the importance of elites and institutions, can be found in numerous Neo-functionalist paradigms. And with regard to our dependent variable, national actor involvement, both Federalists (particularly the theorist group) and Neo-functionalists emphasize the direct impact that the national leaderships have on the level of integration within a Community. It will be our intention in Chapter Four, then, to use quantitative research techniques to examine these relationships and thus determine the validity of our model.

Summarizing, our dependent and independent variables, along with their operational concerns, are as follows:

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Source</u>
National Actor Involvement (dependent variable).	Days spent by relevant national leaders at Commu- nity functions.	<u>Council of the Euro- pean Communities:</u> <u>Review of the Coun- cil's Work.</u>
Size/Power (independent variable).	Rank incongruence of "potential" size/power indi- cators. Measured using Kendall's coefficient of concordance.	<u>Basic Statistics of the European Communi- ties</u> and various na- tional statistical yearbooks.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Source</u>
Interdependence (independent variable).	Intensity of geo- graphic concen- tration of trade. Measured using Michaely con- centration index.	Special edition of the <u>Monthly Exter- nal Trade: 1958-1975.</u> Published by the EC.
Legitimacy (independent variable).	Growth or decline of NGOs operat- ing within the European Commu- nities.	<u>Yearbook of Inter- national Organiza- tions.</u>
Structural Growth of Non-national Community Insti- tutions (inde- pendent variable)	Size and growth of Commission budget as per- centage of member states' national budgets.	Statistical Year- books of the member- states and official document of the Euro- pean Communities.

CHAPTER IV

DATA AND ANALYSIS

In Chapter Three we generated hypotheses and established fully operational definitions for our dependent and independent variables. We indicated that it was our belief that certain conditions and process mechanism (i.e., our independent variables) explained how and why national decision-makers increased or decreased their commitment to the European Communities. We further indicated that in explaining the commitment of national political leaders to an integration arrangement we would be examining what has frequently been hypothesized as the single variable possessing a direct causal link with political integration. That is, it has been suggested that if the commitment of national decision-makers toward an integrative scheme increases, it is generally accepted that "positive" integrative steps will follow.

Having presented our model, we can now proceed to measure each variable and thus begin the process of testing how significantly variations and fluctuations in our independent variables affect and explain the action taken by the

national leaderships. As we indicated, the time frame of this study is 1959 through 1972.

Let us examine first, then, the size and power potential of the European Communities member-states. In Chapter Three we indicated that national decision-makers would be more likely to become involved in the collective arena if the ranking of the states, in terms of the various criteria each might use in evaluating their own as well as that of the other members, became increasingly incongruent. Our results for the period 1959 through 1972, calculated by using Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W), are presented on page one-hundred. It should be recalled that the range of " W " is from "0" to "+1". The closer the score to "0" the greater the degree of rank incongruence between our ten "size/power" indicators.¹⁵²

As Figure 3 demonstrates, there exists a fairly high degree of rank incongruence, the scores ranging from a high of .36 to a low of .16. And while our data indicate that Luxembourg and Belgium are frequently at the lower end of the spectrum among the Six, West Germany and France are frequently at the top throughout the entire period, the data also shows grounds for which each member can visualize the power of the

¹⁵²Data sources for size/power indicators included: Basic Statistics of the Community (Vol. 2-14) published yearly by the European Communities; various volumes of the statistical yearbooks of the member-states, including, Annuaire Statistique De Luxembourg, Annuaire Statistique De La Belgique, Statistisches Jahrbuch Fur Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Statistical Yearbook of the Netherlands, Annuario Statistico Italiano and Annuaire Statistique De Francias.

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FIGURE 3

RANK INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN INDICATORS OF SIZE/POWER POTENTIAL
(KENDALL'S COEFFICIENT OF CONCORDANCE)

others or claim a degree of status for itself. In addition, figure two also indicates that the coefficient scores have fluctuated considerably. In fact, out of the thirteen time frames five coefficient scores rose, seven dropped and one remained the same. The difference between the coefficient scores for 1959 (.25) and 1972 (.16) was .09.

The second independent variable discussed in Chapter Three pertained to the degree of interdependence that existed among the Communities member-states. We hypothesized that the more mutually dependent the member-states became, or operationally, the greater the concentration of trade between member-states, the more favorably national leaders would look upon political integration and thus involve themselves increasingly in Community affairs.

As is indicated in Table 3 and Figure 4, the European integration movement does "benefit" from an increasing concentration of intra-Community trade as opposed to total trade. For example, in 1959 the Michaely index figure for the Communities' member-states was 33.84. By 1972 this figure had increased to 52.16. In fact, as our graph (Figure 4) aptly illustrates, the trend of intra-Community trade concentration is most definitely on the increase. And in absolute terms, while the total amount of trade by the member-states has increased approximately sixfold, from 49,416 million Eurodollars in 1959 to 275,483 million Eurodollars in 1972, intra-Community trade has increased nine times, from 16,259 million Eurodollars in 1959 to 134,857 million Eurodollars in 1972 (see

TABLE 3

INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE CONCENTRATION USING MICHAELY INDEX

	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Bel./Lux.</u>	<u>Yearly Index Score</u>
1959	27.1	27.8	27.3	44.1	46.2	33.84
1960	29.7	29.5	29.5	45.9	50.5	34.51
1961	33.5	31.7	30.1	47.6	53.2	38.54
1962	36.8	33.1	34.8	49.2	56.8	38.20
1963	38.2	37.3	35.4	55.3	60.7	45.42
1964	38.8	36.4	37.8	55.6	62.5	44.63
1965	40.9	35.1	40.1	55.7	61.8	43.43
1966	42.2	36.3	40.6	55.5	62.8	45.79
1967	41.3	36.8	38.7	54.9	62.9	43.72
1968	43.0	37.5	40.0	57.4	64.3	46.90
1969	47.8	39.8	42.4	60.1	67.5	50.12
1970	48.8	40.1	42.9	61.9	68.4	50.96
1971	49.1	40.0	44.6	63.8	68.6	50.91
1972	49.9	39.9	45.1	65.0	68.3	52.16

Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities,
Monthly External Trade Bulletin (special edition 1958-75).

FIGURE 4

INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE CONCENTRATION

MICHAELY INDEX
SCORE

75.0

70.0

65.0

60.0

55.0

50.0

45.0

40.0

35.0

30.0

25.0

20.0

15.0

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities,
Monthly External Trade Bulletin (special edition
1958-1975).

FIGURE 5

INTRA-EC TRADE VS. EXTRA-EC TRADE BY THE MEMBER STATES

(MIO EUR.)

Figure 5). Taken together, the data clearly indicate that the member-states of the European Communities have become increasingly dependent upon one another. On the basis of this, coupled with "favorable" movement in our other variables, we would expect to see an increasing number of national leaders involved in the Community system.

The third independent variable discussed in Chapter Three pertained to the transnational ties within the Community. We indicated that it was our belief that after the initial Commitment by the national governments to establish an economic union or community, elites, and particularly economic elites, would seek to form transnational coalitions and would support Community activities in an effort to take advantage of the expanded marketing and production area. We furthermore concluded that such events would bring increasing legitimacy to the Community system and would force national leaders to expand their original commitments in an effort to satisfy the legal and policy harmonization demands of their constituencies.

As indicated earlier, the measure we decided to employ in determining transnational ties within the Community is based on the growth or decline of non-governmental organizations operating within the European Communities whose activities are directly affected by Community affairs. As is indicated in Table 4 and Figure 6, non-governmental organizations have increased substantially since 1958. And while much of this growth occurred from 1958-1964, it is important to note that

TABLE 4

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER (OUR PERFORMANCE SCORE)</u>	<u>YEARLY % GROWTH</u>	<u>TOTAL % GROWTH</u>
1958	69	-	-
1959	125	81.159	81.159
1960	165	32.000	113.159
1961	192	16.363	129.522
1962	210	9.375	138.897
1963	228	8.571	147.468
1964	238	4.385	151.853
1965	247	3.781	155.634
1966	251	1.619	157.253
1967	255	1.593	158.846
1968	259	1.568	160.414
1969	262	1.158	161.572
1970	266	1.526	163.098
1971	269	1.127	164.225
1972	272	1.115	165.340

Source: Yearbook Of International Organizations

FIGURE 6

TOTAL % GROWTH OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EC

(% GROWTH)

SOURCE: Yearbook of International Organizations

in the time-frame of our study there was only one year in which a decline occurred. According to our hypothesis then, we would expect to see an increasing degree of national government involvement in the Community arena.

The fourth and final independent variable discussed in Chapter Three was the structural growth of non-nationally oriented Community institutions. We hypothesized that as the Commission of the European Communities increasingly experienced structural growth, as it became the center of Community information and technical expertise, national leaders would increasingly commit themselves to the collective arena. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that national leaders, persuaded by their growing reliance on the Commission for technical assistance, would see that their objectives could be more readily achieved through increased involvement at the Community level rather than solely relying on national decision-making.

As stated earlier, the measure used in determining the structural growth of the Commission is the Commission's annual budget as a percentage of the total annual budgets of the member-states. Table 5 clearly indicates that the purse strings are held by the national governments. Nevertheless, the Commission's budget as a percentage of the national budgets rose from .170% in 1959 to its high point of 3.049 in 1970. In 1971 and again in 1972 the percentage declined slightly. Finally, it should be pointed out that the reason for the sharp increase in the Commission's budget in 1968 was due in great part to the increase in funds directed to the administration of the Common Agricultural policy.

TABLE 5

COMPARING COMMISSION EXPENDITURES TO THOSE OF THE MEMBER-
STATE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

(Fig. In U.S. Dollars)

	Total National Government Expenditures	EEC Commission ECSC High Authority, Euratom Commission, EC Commission	Commission And High Authority Expenditures As A % Of Member States Expenditures
1959	35,833,744,744	64,146,146	.179%
1960	39,652,809,542	71,741,938	.181%
1961	44,180,846,471	79,344,459	.170%
1962	49,531,978,512	97,558,865	.197%
1963	55,174,030,613	94,825,164	.172%
1964	57,859,506,266	112,757,530	.195%
1965	67,009,484,545	226,330,669	.338%
1966	73,172,254,228	435,865,720	.593%
1967	77,546,767,901	690,216,049	.890%
1968	87,286,035,707	2,157,460,029	2.471%
1969	94,544,701,372	2,680,624,188	2.835%
1970	105,440,485,003	3,231,543,928	3.049%
1971	130,281,954,827	3,877,389,487	2.976%
1972	154,543,642,743	4,409,893,489	2.853%

Source: Various official Community documents and Statistical Yearbooks of the United States.

Our final measure is that of the dependent variable, national leader involvement. On the assumption that national political officials, to become committed to and involved in collective decision-making and thus political integration, would have to physically increase their involvement in such activities, we operationally defined our dependent variable as the total number of days spent by relevant national government officials at Community level functions. These included: Council of Ministers meetings, ambassadorial and ministerial conferences, and intergovernmental committees and working parties. Our yearly dependent variable performance score was, therefore, the sum of these activities.

As is indicated in Table 6 and Figure 7, there has been a considerable increase in the total sum of activities by national officials at the Community level. The Table also shows that this is due in great measure to increasing amounts of time spent by national actors in intergovernmental committees and working sessions, and not so much by increasing Council of Minister meetings or ministerial conferences. However, the ever increasing days spent by national officials in committees and working parties does indicate that the national leaderships are increasingly committed to resolving differences and arriving at joint policies within the framework of the Community system.

TABLE 6
NUMBER OF DAYS SPENT BY NATIONAL ACTORS IN
COMMUNITY LEVEL ACTIVITY

Year	Council Of Ministers	Min. and Amb. Conferences	Committee and Working Parties	Total Performance Score
1959	21	71	325	417
1960	44	97	505	646
1961	46	108	655	809
1962	80	128	783	991
1963	63½	146½	744½	954.5
1964	102½	229½	1002½	1334.5
1965	35½	105½	760½	901
1966	70½	112½	952½	1135.5
1967	75½	134	1233	1442.5
1968	61	132	1253	1446
1969	69	129	1412½	1610.5
1970	81	154	1403	1638
1971	75½	127½	1439	1642
1972	73	159	2135	2367

Source: Council of the European Communities: Review of the Council's Work:

FIGURE 7

NUMBER OF DAYS SPENT BY NATIONAL ACTORS IN
COMMUNITY LEVEL ACTIVITYNO. OF
DAYS

2400
2300
2200
2100
2000
1900
1800
1700
1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

(YEAR)

SOURCE: Council of the European Communities: Review of the
Councils Work.

Having generated these data, the next step in our research endeavor is to fit equations thereby enabling us to determine if statistically significant relationships do in fact exist between our dependent and independent variables. For this purpose multiple regression, which is a "general statistical technique through which one can analyse the relationship between a dependent or criterion variable and a set of independent or predictor variables"¹⁵³, seemed most appropriate.

Since the most important piece of information we wanted to acquire was how effectively fluctuations or rates of change in the aforementioned independent variables explained the level of involvement of national governmental leaders in Community affairs, our analysis had to focus on three fundamental areas. First we had to determine if, in reality, all of the independent variables discussed were of importance in explaining our dependent variable. Could it be that only two or three of the variables were significant? Second, because we have hypothesized that certain conditions or mechanisms had to occur prior to an increase in the commitment of national leaders to European integration, we had to determine if this was actually the case. To answer this second question then, we examined our data in three ways. The first way was to lag our dependent variable (i.e., dependent variable follows independent variables; dependent variable, 1959, with index variables, 1958).

¹⁵³Norman H. Nie, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1975), p. 321.

Second, we had our independent and dependent variables occurring at the same time. And third, we led our dependent variable (i.e., dependent variable precedes independent variables; dependent variable, 1958, with index variables, 1959). The third question we wanted to answer was does a significant relationship exist between our independent and dependent variables because of fluctuations in their levels or because of the rates to which they change. To answer this question our equations were run in both levels and logs.

Some of the techniques that are used in evaluating multiple regressions and a summary of our findings are presented below:

Standardized B or Beta weight: Permits a direct standard comparison of how much effect each independent variable has on the dependent variable. "The Beta weights...indicate how much change in the dependent variable is produced by a standardized change in one of the independent variables when the others are controlled."¹⁵⁴

Beta weight = partial b coefficient $\frac{\text{Standard deviation of the independent variable}}{\text{Standard deviation of the dependent variable}}$

Durbin-Watson Statistic: One technique of checking for the presence of autocorrelation when the method of least squares is applied to data. A Durbin-Watson table enables the researcher to determine if positive or negative serial

¹⁵⁴G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods, p. 196.

correlation exists, or if in fact, the variables are independent.

F-Ratio Test Statistic: Provides a statistical test to evaluate the significance of the regression equation. This is done by comparing the calculated F-ratio statistic with the appropriate percentage point of the F distribution with regression (numerator) and error (denominator) degrees of freedom, using a tabulation of the F distribution (given in statistics texts).

t-Statistic: Provides a statistical test to determine the statistical significance of the independent variables to the regression equation. For our purposes we used a one-tailed test at the 10% significance level.

R²: Provides an indication of the proportion of variation explained by the variables included in the regression equation. For example, let us assume that the R² for one of our equations equals .782, this indicates that 78 percent of the variation in our dependent variable is explained by our independent variables operating jointly:

A total of eighteen multiple regression equations were used in this analysis. Of those, nine were computed with the data presented in levels, and nine with the data logged. Because the equations with the logged data added the most significance to our particular analysis, we will focus primarily on those equations.

Summary Of Equation Results With Data In Log Form

The results of the first three equations computed with logged data are presented below.

Equation #1

Ordinary Least Squares (unlagged)

Multiple Regression 5 Variables 13 Observations

t-statistic = 1.397* $R^2 = .9009$

F-statistic (4,8) = 20.4558*** Durbin-Watson = 2.378

National Leadership Commitment =

+ .1048 (Size/Power) + .1169 (Interdependence) +
 .6587 (Transnational Ties) + .1987 (Structural Growth)¹⁵⁵

t-statistics of independent variables:

Size/Power = .8397 Structural Growth = 1.084

Interdependence = 1.094 Transnational Ties = 2.267

The R^2 in equation #1 indicates that 90% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables operating jointly. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic provided evidence of negative serial

¹⁵⁵Regression coefficients have been standardized (Beta weights).

correlation which brought into question the results of this equation. Furthermore, the only statistically significant independent variable to the regression equation (as indicated by the t-statistic) was transnational ties.

In addition to these results, scattergrams, which graphically illustrate the relationship between two variables, were also generated. As is shown in figures 8,9, and 10, there appears to be a strongly positive linear relationship between national leadership commitment and interdependence, national leadership commitment and transnational ties, and national leadership commitment and Community institution structural growth. On the other hand, Figure 10 illustrates that there does not appear to exist any relationship between national leadership commitment and size/power.

Based on the presence of serial correlation, the results of this equation were considered inconclusive and thus unacceptable.

Equation #2

Ordinary Least Squares (lagged)

Multiple Regression 5 Variables 13 Observations

t-statistic = 1.397*

$R^2 = .8807$

F-statistic (4,8) = 22.8239*** Durbin-Watson = 2.268

National Leadership Commitment =

+ .0859 (Size/Power) + .2024 (Interdependence) +

.5645 (Transnational Ties) + .3153 (Structural Growth)

FIGURE 8

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT (HORIZONTAL)

VS.

VARIABLE: INTERDEPENDENCE (VERTICAL)

(LOGGED)

FIGURE 9

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT (HORIZONTAL)

VS.

VARIABLE: TRANSNATIONAL TIES (VERTICAL)

(LOGGED)

FIGURE 10

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT (HORIZONTAL)

VS.

VARIABLE: COMMUNITY INSTITUTION (VERTICAL)

(LOGGED)

FIGURE 11

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT (HORIZONTAL)

VS.

VARIABLE: SIZE/POWER (VERTICAL)

(LOGGED)

t-statistics of independent variables:

Size/Power = .6384 Structural Growth = 1.921

Interdependence = .6394 Transnational Ties = 1.088

As we have indicated, equation #2 was computed with our dependent variable lagged (i.e., dependent variable follows independent variables; dependent variable, 1960, with index variables, 1959). As was the case in equation #1, the R^2 in this equation is relatively high ($R^2 = .8807$, indicating that 88 percent of the variation in national leadership commitment was explained by the independent variables). In addition, and other things being equal, the standardized regression coefficients (B's) indicate that one standard deviation unit change of transnational ties would introduce the greatest change in national leadership commitment followed by structural growth, interdependence and size/power. Again, however, the results of one of our equations was brought into doubt by evidence of negative serial correlation (Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.268). On the basis of this finding the results of this equation were deemed unacceptable.

Equation #3

Ordinary Least Squares (led)

Multiple Regression 5 Variables 13 Observations

t-statistic - 1.397* $R^2 = .9226$

F-statistic (4,8) = 23.8239*** Durbin-Watson = 2.6519

National Leadership Commitment =

$$+ .08755 (\text{Size/Power}) + .1468 (\text{Interdependence}) + \\ .1507 (\text{Structural Growth}) + .1101 (\text{Transnational Ties})$$

t-statistics of independent variables:

Size/Power = .6552	Structural Growth = .4611
Interdependence = .4169	Transnational Ties = 2.5372

In Equation #3 the R^2 (.9226) was higher than in the previous two, thereby suggesting a rejection of our hypotheses since our dependent variable led our independent variables in this equation. The standardized regression coefficients indicated that structural growth produced the greatest change in national leadership commitment followed by interdependence, transnational ties and size/power respectively. On the other hand, only transnational ties had an acceptable t-statistic, indicating that it was the only variable of statistical significance to the regression equation. And, as was the case in Equations #1 and #2, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated the presence of negative serial correlation. Again, this threw into question the significance of our equation and we rejected the results.

In arriving at the results for these equations we also generated a correlation matrix to determine if a multicollinearity problem existed. By multicollinearity we are referring to a situation in which two or more independent variables in a regression equation are highly correlated. This

situation makes the Beta weights unreliable and thus makes it difficult to distinguish the separate effects of these variables on the dependent variable.

As is indicated in the correlation matrix below, interdependence and transnational ties are highly correlated (.9231). This evidence of multicollinearity necessitated the removal of one of these variables from the regression analysis. Because interdependence appeared to be more highly correlated with national leadership commitment (the dependent variable) than did transnational ties, we decided to repeat the first three logged equations with the exception of eliminating transnational ties.

<u>Correlation Matrix</u>					
National Leadership Commitment (1)	1.000				
Size/Power (2)	0.0859	1.0000			
Interdependence (3)	0.8936	0.0143	1.000		
Transnational Ties (4)	0.8361	0.1214	0.9231	1.0000	
Structural Growth (5)	0.7513	0.0968	0.7917	0.6597	1.0000
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

The results for Equations #4, #5 and #6 were similar to those of our first three equations in that serial correlation was in evidence. Therefore, in a further attempt to attain satisfactory results, the Cochrane-Orcutt Iterative Technique (a form of pseudo-generalized least squares) was employed on Equations #7, #8 and #9 in an effort to adjust for the presence

of serial correlation. The results of these equations are presented below.

Equation #7

Pseudo-Generalized Least Squares (Unlagged)

Multiple Regression 4 Variables 13 Observations

t-statistic = 1,383* R² = .9125

F-statistic (3,9) = 31.2973*** Durbin-Watson = 2.2079

National Leadership Commitment =

$$+ .1483 \text{ (Size/Power)} + .6901 \text{ (Interdependence)}$$

+ .1756 (Structural Growth)

t-statistics for independent variables:

Size/Power = .1417 Interdependence = 4.2413

Structural Growth = 1.2079

In Equation #7 the R^2 of .9125 indicated that the three independent variables used in this equation explained a relatively high percentage of the variance in our dependent variable. And interdependence, alone, accounted for a majority of this (as indicated by the Beta weights). Again, however, the Durbin-Watson statistic provided evidence of serial correlation, thereby bringing into question the equation results. Because of the presence of serial correlation we regarded our results as unacceptable.

Equation #8

Pseudo-Generalized Least Squares (Lagged)

Multiple Regression 4 Variables 13 Observations

t-statistic = 1.383

 $R^2 = .8759$

F-statistic (3,9) = 18.7848** Durbin-Watson = 2.0350

National Leadership Commitment =

+ .1394 (Size/Power) + .3750 (Interdependence)

+ .3451 (Structural Growth)

t-statistics for independent variables:

Size/Power = .3003

Interdependence = 2.2257

Structural Growth = 2.3573

In contrast to the previous equations, the Durbin-Watson statistic for this equation indicated that the independent variables are truly independent (i.e., there is no presence of positive or negative serial correlation). The R^2 indicated that 88 percent of the variance in national leadership commitment was explained by our three variables acting jointly. The standardized Betas suggested that most of this variance was due to the level of interdependence among the member-states and the structural growth of non-national community institutions. Furthermore, these two variables possessed acceptable t-statistics, whereas the size/power t-statistic fell below the significance level.

Repeating a procedure utilized earlier, we generated scattergrams to provide a visual reference of our results. In

contrast to the previously introduced scattergrams, these were generated with our dependent variable lagged. Figures 12, 13, and 14 graphically reaffirm the results of our equation.

Figures 12 and 13 indicate a strongly positive linear relationship between national leadership commitment and interdependence, and national leadership commitment and structural growth. In contrast, size/power again shows no sign of a relationship with national leadership commitment.

Equation #9

Pseudo-Generalized Least Squares (1ed)

Multiple Regression . 4 Variables 13 Observations

t-statistic = 1.383*

Durbin-Watson=2.9824

F-statistic (3,9) = 18.4639

National Leadership Commitment =

+ .0765 (Size/Power) + .7927 (Interdependence)

+ .65977 (Structural Growth)

t-statistics of independent variables:

Size/Power = .5168

Interdependence = 6.9143

Structural Growth = .1651

As was the case in all of the regression equations excluding #8, the Durbin-Watson statistic (2.9824) indicated serial correlation. Based on this finding, we regarded the results of this equation as unacceptable.

FIGURE 12

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT-LAGGED (HORIZONTAL)

VS.

VARIABLE: INTERDEPENDENCE (VERTICAL)

(LOGGED)

FIGURE 13

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT-LAGGED (HORIZONTAL)
 VS.
 VARIABLE: COMMUNITY INSTITUTION (VERTICAL)
 (LOGGED)

FIGURE 14

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT-LAGGED (HORIZONTAL)
VS.
VARIABLE: SIZE/POWER (VERTICAL)
(LOGGED)

As we indicated at the outset of this particular section, we were essentially interested in determining the degree of linear dependence of national leadership commitment on the four independent variables (size/power, interdependence, structural growth of Community institutions and transnational ties). Out of the eighteen multiple regression equations used in this study, only one provided statistically satisfactory results. As we have noted, the other regression equations evidenced an unacceptable level of serial correlation and were thus deemed unacceptable. Based on the results of these equations, what conclusions can we develop?

To begin with, our results from Equation #8 support the earlier stated hypothesis relating to the impact of interdependence and structural growth on national leadership commitment. The significance of these two variables in explaining our dependent variable is supported not only by the Beta weights for these variables, but in that this particular equation had the dependent variable lagged. In addition, the t-statistics and scattergrams added further support to our size/power and interdependence hypotheses.

Second, due to the multicollinearity problem we were unable to determine if transnational ties were statistically significant in explaining national leadership commitment. In all likelihood this situation is a result of the linkage that has traditionally existed between increased trade between two or more nation-states (our measure of interdependence) and the establishment of non-governmental relationships among the trading partners. And, as we have indicated in Figure 15, transnational

FIGURE 15

PLOT OF VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT-LAGGED (HORIZONTAL)

VS.

VARIABLE: TRANSNATIONAL TIES (VERTICAL)

(LOGGED)

ties do appear to be highly correlated with our lagged dependent variable.

Finally, the perceptions that national leaders possess of their relative strength vis-a-vis the other Community member-states do not appear to influence the positions taken or advocated by these individuals with regard to a commitment to collective decision-making. This in itself may be an indication that the national leaders, through earlier Community participation, are gradually becoming more Community oriented. Or we might state this another way. If perceptions of size and power do not appear to significantly influence the positions taken by the national leaderships, are we not moving closer to a situation in which, regardless of their size and power, nation-states can collectively resolve disputes and develop mutually rewarding policies.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There have always been those who have considered the development of a politically integrated Western Europe as an impossible, and even absurd, undertaking. They have argued that the governmental leaderships of the European Communities member-states, like all national leaders, are jealous of their national sovereignty and are willing to cede only that amount of authority (power) which they perceive as beneficial to their own national interests. The proponents of this view do concede that the community system has, to some degree, been successful in less sensitive areas such as welfare policy, but the lack of any meaningful progress in those areas which touch upon the nerves of national sovereignty, they argue, substantiates their point of view. In sum, they contend that the construction of a collective decision-making system in Western Europe, where common problems of both high and low politics are discussed and unified programs developed, will not take place primarily because the national leaders do not desire a loss of national sovereignty and all it encompasses.

Before proceeding with our own interpretations of the events surrounding the European Communities from 1959 through

1972 and assessing the contributions we hope to have made to the study of political integration, it is necessary to underscore in closing several points about the nature of our study and the topic under investigation.

First, no empirical study can be better than the data on which it is based, and the limitations of the data at our disposal, even with the assistance of European Community personnel, certainly limited the depth to which we would have hoped to have gone. For example, we had initially intended to generate a composite score for national actor involvement (our dependent variable) based on both the number of days spent by national governmental officials in Community level functions and the issues that arose in these meetings. Such a development would have, in all probability, enabled us to determine if only "low" political issues were discussed or if "high" politics had in some way filtered in. In addition, the selection of the ten variable properties used in evaluating the relative size and power potential of the member-states provides another example. These variable components were selected on the basis of our interpretation of how national leaders perceive their nations as well as their counterparts' strengths and weaknesses. A more appropriate, but exceedingly difficult, avenue would have been to conduct interviews with high ranking national officials, and then establish weights for each category based on the degree or level of importance given by each nation's

representative. This procedure would have undoubtedly facilitated the evaluation of a nation's perception of their position in relation to the other member-states.

Furthermore, our omission of certain variables that have frequently been discussed in the integration literature certainly limits the all encompassing and definitive results one might hope to achieve. The impact of external forces, the role of the supranational leadership, bilateral agreements between member-states are but a few of the numerous areas in which integrationists have sought to resolve their unique puzzle. It is sufficient, at this point, to say that the selection of the independent variables used in this particular analysis was based on: a fairly comprehensive review of the integration literature, a basic understanding of the political climate in Western Europe during the time-frame of this study; and our own belief that the variables existed autonomously and were of primary significance in explaining the behavior patterns of national governmental leaders as they relate to the integrative phenomenon.

Finally, we must resist the temptation of generalizing the findings of this particular study and concluding that national leadership commitment to the European Communities is directly linked to an increasing level of political integration among the member-states, and therefore, an increasing concentration of trade and structural growth of non-governmental Community institutions are prerequisites for political integration. The direct linkage of our dependent variable and

political integration, as indicated earlier, has yet to be proven. What we have shown is that certain variables appear to have an influence on the degree to which the national leaderships become involved in European decision-making as opposed to strictly national decision-making. On the other hand, because of the dual roles that national leaders are required to play as members of the community system, there can be no question that they are strategically situated, more so than any other group of actors, to influence (either positively or negatively) the direction of the integrative process.

With these warnings and thoughts in mind, we have reached the conclusion that if the member-states of the European Communities continue increasing their level of economic dependence and furthering the expansion of institutional growth (trends our study indicate prevailed during the 60's) they will increasingly find themselves committed to resolving conflicts and initiating proposals for future action within the framework of a collective decision-making system.

APPENDIX

The tables provided in this Appendix relate to the rank ordering of the member-states of the European Communities according to those factors we considered relevant in measuring size/power potential. Kendall's "W" for the particular year and measures in question is located at the bottom of each table.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Rank,
Ordering
1959

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	4	5	6
Per Capita GNP	2	6	3	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	5	1	6	4	2
Balance of Payments Situation	6	2	1	4	3	4
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	5	1	2	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	2	1	5	4	3	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .25

Rank
Ordering
1960

APPENDIX

TABLE 2

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	4	5	6
Per Capita GNP	2	6	3	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	2	5	6	4	1
Balance of Payments Situation	2	4	1	3	5	5
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	5	1	2	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	3	1	4	5	2	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	2	6	3	5	4	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .25

APPENDIX

TABLE 3

Rank
Ordering
1961

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	3	6	2	5	4	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	5	2	6	4	1
Balance of Payments Situation	1	3	2	5	4	5
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	5	1	2	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	1	2	5	4	3	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .31

APPENDIX

TABLE 4

Rank
Ordering
1962

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	3	6	2	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	5	1	6	4	2
Balance of Payments Situation	1	2	6	4	3	4
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	2	5	1	3	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	3	2	5	4	1	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .24

APPENDIX

TABLE 5

Rank
Ordering
1963

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	2	6	3	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	4	2	6	5	1
Balance of Payments Situation	1	6	2	4	3	4
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	2	5	1	4	3	6
Rate of Economic Growth	4	6	5	3	1	2
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .27

APPENDIX

TABLE 6

Rank
Ordering
1964

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	2	6	3	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	4	2	6	5	1
Balance of Payments Situation	5	1	2	3	6	3
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	2	5	1	3	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	1	5	2	4	3	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .30

APPENDIX

TABLE 7

Rank
Ordering
1965

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	2	6	3	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	4	1	5	6	2
Balance of Payments Situation	2	1	6	3	5	3
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	2	5	1	3	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	2	1	4	3	4	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .26

APPENDIX

TABLE 8

Rank
Ordering
1966

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	2	6	3	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	4	2	6	5	1
Balance of Payments Situation	2	1	3	4	6	4
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	2	5	1	3	4	6
Rate of Economic Growth	3	1	6	4	2	5
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	6	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .25

APPENDIX

TABLE 9

Rank
Ordering
1967

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	1	6	3	4	5	2
Industry As % Of GDP	3	6	2	5	4	1
Balance of Payments Situation	3	2	1	4	6	4
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	2	5	1	4	3	6
Rate of Economic Growth	4	2	1	5	1	3
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	2	6	2	5	4	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .36

APPENDIX

Rank
Ordering
1968

TABLE 10

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	1	6	3	4	5	2
Industry As % Of GDP	3	6	2	5	4	1
Balance of Payments Situation	6	2	1	4	3	4
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	5	1	4	2	6
Rate of Economic Growth	3	6	1	5	4	2
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	5	4	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .31

APPENDIX

Rank
Ordering
1969

TABLE 11

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	1	6	3	4	5	2
Industry As % Of GDP	3	6	2	4	5	1
Balance of Payments Situation	6	1	2	3	5	3
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	5	1	4	2	6
Rate of Economic Growth	4	5	3	2	1	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .20

APPENDIX

TABLE 12

Rank
Ordering
1970

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	3	6	2	4	5	1
Industry As % Of GDP	3	6	2	4	5	1
Balance of Payments Situation	5	2	1	3	6	3
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	4	2	4	1	6
Rate of Economic Growth	1	5	4	3	2	6
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	5	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .27

APPENDIX

TABLE 13

Rank
Ordering
1971

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	3	6	1	4	5	2
Industry As % Of GDP	3	6	2	4	5	1
Balance of Payments Situation	5	1	2	3	6	3
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	4	2	5	1	6
Rate of Economic Growth	2	6	4	3	5	1
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	5	6	2	4	3	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .20

APPENDIX

TABLE 14

Rank
Ordering
1972

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>	<u>Luxem- bourg</u>
Total Area	1	2	3	5	4	6
Total GNP	2	3	1	5	4	6
Per Capita GNP	3	6	1	4	5	2
Industry As % Of GDP	2	4	1	5	6	3
Balance of Payments Situation	6	1	5	3	2	3
Reliance On Foreign Energy Sources (Inverted)	3	4	2	5	1	6
Rate of Economic Growth	4	2	5	3	6	1
Unemployment As % Of Total Work Force (Inverted)	4	6	2	3	5	1
Total Military Force	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population	3	2	1	5	4	6

W = .16

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