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NIETZSCHE'S PERSPECTIVISM

by

HAKAM AL-SHAWI, B.A

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
13 December, 1994
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"NIETZSCHE'S PERSPECTIVISM"

submitted by Hakam Al-Shawi, B.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Chair, Department of Philosophy

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14 December, 1994

ABSTRACT

Much of what has been written about Nietzsche's perspectivism considers the doctrine to be an epistemological and a metaphysical claim about the world. That is, most commentators read Nietzsche's perspectivism as being a form of our traditional understanding of the notion. Such an approach, however, fails to take into consideration both Nietzsche's attack on the 'objective' world and his attack on 'subjectivity'. Once these attacks are considered simultaneously, Nietzsche's perspectivism emerges as an indicator towards a radically different way of thought. This different thought is characterised by an empiricism that remains faithful to the field of experience. Unlike Kant, who places synthesis within a subject, Nietzsche places synthesis within the field of experience as an approximation of being in a realm of pure becoming. Deleuze, though not dealing explicitly with Nietzsche's perspectivism, best captures this different Nietzschean thought. And in this thesis, I rely heavily on his interpretation.

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To Professor Andrew Brook who encouraged me, as an undergraduate, to pursue philosophy, I am eternally grateful. Throughout these years, his help and support have never faltered.

I do not know where I would be had not Professor Béla Egyed introduced me to Nietzsche. For this introduction alone, I cannot thank him enough. But I must thank him also for his continuous support throughout this project, which at times seemed very distant from completion. Most of all, however, I thank him for teaching me how to overcome Nietzsche, if only to return to him!

A special thanks also must go to Sean Saraq, who introduced me to Deleuze, and what it means to be Deleuzian.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my uncle. Though he was distant from me at the final hour, he remains very, very close.

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INTRODUCTION

Though in recent years there has been a tremendous interest in Nietzsche's philosophy, no account of his perspectivism has been able to capture fully his various remarks on the notion. Commentators, for the most part, have rejected the radical nature of the doctrine in favour of a more traditional understanding of perspectivism. Typically, his perspectivism is considered as a doctrine pertaining to our knowledge of reality and what essence there is to be found in such a reality. Little, if any, is said about the subject of such perspectives, about who has such perspectives. And as I will show below, the 'I' that has perspectives is as problematic in Nietzsche's perspectivism as the object of such perspectives.

What I wish to demonstrate in this thesis, is that to capture fully Nietzsche's perspectivism, we must take into account both his remarks against the 'I' and those against the object of such perspectives. And to do so, we must address such key Nietzschean notions as will to power and eternal return. This results in a view of Nietzsche's perspectivism that interprets the notion as an umbrella term for his philosophy; a philosophy that is indicating a different way of thought.

But in being such a radical notion, and an indicator towards a different way of thought, Nietzsche's perspectivism presents a difficulty to the interpreter who, employing traditional tools, wishes to provide some sense of

understanding this different thought. On the one hand, Nietzsche cannot be incorporated into traditional thinking since it is this thinking that he appears to be attacking. Yet, the only tools that are available to think about Nietzsche are traditional. We seem unable to think about a different thought except through our traditional thought. This is a tension that runs through the entire thesis. Whether I am successful in the transition from our traditional thought to Nietzsche's, is for the reader to decide. It is a question of maintaining a delicate balance between explaining Nietzsche to such an extent that we may access him and not forcing him into our traditional thinking.

In chapter one, I begin by introducing our traditional understanding of perspectivism relating it to the Platonic understanding of the notion. Given Nietzsche's various remarks, I suggest that we cannot understand his perspectivism as being traditional. Although the issues raised by some Nietzsche commentators are extremely important, they are not dealing with Nietzsche's perspectivism but with our traditional understanding of the notion. Rather than considering Nietzsche's perspectivism to be some epistemological/metaphysical doctrine, I suggest that we should consider it ontologically as a description of a different way of thinking. And in this regard, the only interpreter who can aid us in such an approach, is Deleuze.

But to anyone who is acquainted with Deleuze, it is clear enough that his interpretation, his philosophy, is as much a mystery as Nietzsche's own philosophy. Thus, there is a need to unfold also his interpretation of Nietzsche.

Chapter two begins by stating that if Nietzsche is offering us an alternative, then his views on the 'object' and the 'subject' must differ from our traditional understanding. Focusing on the 'object' in chapter two, I begin by examining the claim that Nietzsche is committed ultimately to a Kantian view. I argue that this claim neglects to take as problematic Nietzsche's attack on subjectivity. Once this attack is considered, we cannot view Nietzsche within the Kantian framework. To better grasp Nietzsche's attack on the 'object' and the alternative that he is proposing, I suggest a return to Plato.

Through Plato's distinction between being and becoming, and the distinction that he makes within becoming itself, we can isolate a field of experience that helps us to characterise Nietzsche's field of experience. This Nietzschean field of experience, which is the realm of pure becoming, occupies the discussion in the remainder of the chapter. It is a field of forces, will to power and eternal return, operating in a time that differs from our traditional understanding of time as past, present and future.

As we reach the end of chapter two, we have some sense of what Nietzsche's ontology is about. This account, however, still needs to be complemented by an account of Nietzsche's sense of subjectivity. This is the task of chapter three. Given the ontology of chapter two, chapter three explains Nietzsche's attack on our traditional understanding of the 'subject', and explains Nietzsche's sense of subjectivity.

However, I do not begin chapter three by a direct confrontation with Nietzsche. Instead, I begin with Foucault's historical interpretation of the 'I' that describes the birth of the Kantian subject. Though this account is by no means meant to be some doctrine inscribed in stone, it is an interpretation that describes the historical change in the configuration of certain forces. Having presented this historical interpretation, I give a detailed analysis of Kant's notion of subjectivity, and suggest some possible criticisms.

The relevance of Kant's notion of subjectivity is seen once we realise that it is the sense of subjectivity that Nietzsche is attacking. Through a discussion of Kant, Hume and Nietzsche, I attempt to explain Nietzsche's attack on the Kantian notion of subjectivity, and why it is considered by him to be a betrayal of experience. It is at this point that we see how Nietzsche's notion of synthesis is radically

different from Kant's. Consequently, we are able to construct some Nietzschean sense of subjectivity.

Although, ultimately, chapters two and three are a description of Nietzsche's perspectivism, an explicit account of his perspectivism is not given until chapter four. Chapter four integrates the two previous chapters in order to give an explicit account of Nietzsche's perspectivism as an interpretation and an evaluation. Having presented this account, I discuss the problem of interpretation and evaluation, indicating that this is a delicate and a difficult task.

The last section of chapter four is an extremely important section that describes Nietzsche's different thought as being a different kind of empiricism. It is here that we see how far Nietzsche has gone in order to overturn Kantianism. Perhaps, having read this section, the whole thesis should be re-read. However, this is a decision which my readers must make.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCING PERSPECTIVISM

1. INTRODUCING PERSPECTIVISM

Traditionally, to speak in terms of perspectives, is to speak in terms of points of view. This, in turn, suggests both the reality of someone who has the view, and of what is being viewed. If points of view are to be understood as interpretations, then common sense suggests that there is something to be interpreted, and that there is a subject that is interpreting. The interpretations themselves are perspectives upon some 'X' coming from some subjects. Under this widely accepted understanding of perspectivism, perspectives are considered to be interpretations of some 'X' that stands against the interpretation, and is that which is interpreted. With a more sophisticated version of this view, namely relativism, we can claim that the 'X' can never be discovered and that we can arrive only at interpretations, it still remains that there is some 'X' to be interpreted. Moreover, there must be also some 'X' to which the interpretations belong; some subject who interprets. Though this subject might itself be but a collection of such interpretations, it nevertheless must be posited as that which unifies such a collection. In either case, the accepted understanding of perspectivism suggests that some 'X' is presupposed by our interpretations.

Such an understanding of perspectives is not recent. Indeed, perspectivism dates as far back as, at least, 500

B.C., to the time of Xenophanes of Colophon. In the few fragments that survive, Xenophanes is quite explicit about his views regarding the nature of human knowledge. In fragment 34, he states that

[n]o man knows, or ever will know, the truth about the gods and about everything I [Xenophanes] speak of; for even if one chanced to say the complete truth, yet oneself knows it not; but seeming is wrought over all things....¹

And again, in fragment 35, he states: "Let these things be opined as resembling the truth...."² Associated with such a notion of perspectivism, one also can find in Xenophanes a statement of relativism. Consider, for example, fragment 38:

If god had not made yellow honey, men would consider figs far sweeter.³

Also, Plato was clearly aware of perspectivism. Indeed, his whole metaphysics may be considered as a means of overcoming perspectivism, by striving for some stable being. The realm of becoming is for Plato the realm of appearances, of perspectives. What is considered to be the realm of matter, the visible world, is the realm of differing perspectives. In contrast to this is the realm of being which is eternal in its nature and exterior to spaciality and temporality.⁴ The issue for Plato was to reconcile these two realms without jeopardizing the status of being.⁵ And, as we shall see below, it is against this Platonic outlook that Nietzsche appears to be leading us, not simply by rejecting the Platonic understanding of being

in favour of becoming, in favour of perspectives, but, by providing a different sense of being and becoming.

This Platonic outlook on perspectives has developed into our traditional understanding of perspectivism. It is only with Nietzsche that perspectivism becomes radicalized and is pushed to its very limits. By pushing the notion to the extreme of demanding that it not depend on some 'X', whether the 'X' is some subject or some reality independent of perspectives, he gives the notion a unique and different sense, not captured by our traditional understanding of perspectivism. It is, however, not at all clear what Nietzsche is trying to offer, and whether any sense can be given to such a radical form of perspectivism.

Nietzsche appears to propose a unique sense of perspectivism that does not, as does our traditional understanding of the notion, presuppose some 'X' on which our interpretations depend. But in order to posit such a unique form of perspectivism, Nietzsche appears to be offering us an entirely different way of thinking; a way of thought that in the end might be described as his "perspectivism". In a certain sense, we cannot approach Nietzsche's perspectivism without considering it to be a gateway into his philosophy. It is a notion that is not merely an aspect of his philosophy but an umbrella term that quickly moves us into discussing the central tenets of his philosophy such as will to power, eternal return and

subjectivity. Consequently, though this study is about Nietzsche's perspectivism, it is, more crucially, a study of some of the central issues to be found in his philosophy. A critical examination of his perspectivism, and our traditional understanding of the notion, will serve as the framework which will allow us, in turn, to engage the central ideas of his philosophy.

2. NIETZSCHE'S REMARKS

Nietzsche's style and the various remarks that he made during his lifetime, which at times appear contradictory, do not facilitate the emergence of a clear and coherent philosophy, making the commentator's task so much more difficult. Though there are some who would consider such a state of affairs to be a serious short coming, I take it as being indicative of a struggling mind in search of a means to express itself. And such a struggle in thought is exhibited by Nietzsche's various remarks against "the subject" and "the object" presupposed by our traditional understanding of perspectives.

At times, Nietzsche's opponent appears to be subjectivity and consciousness, while at other times he is confronting the very possibility of knowledge, of truth, and of the Kantian thing in itself. Through these various remarks, we are to gain an understanding of his

perspectivism and how it differs from our traditional understanding. Consequently, I shall begin by offering a sample of Nietzsche's various remarks in the hope of offering some sense of what he is trying to say. Subsequent chapters will attempt to develop a systematic interpretation of these remarks, offering a possible position regarding his perspectivism. But by ranging over such a wide array of fundamental issues, these remarks constitute not only an attack on our traditional understanding of perspectivism but seem to be offering an entirely different way of thinking. That is why I stated earlier that Nietzsche's perspectivism is ultimately an umbrella term for his philosophy.

Concentrating initially on his views of "the subject", we find Nietzsche stating:

There exists neither "spirit," nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use. There is no question of "subject and object," but of a particular species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all, regularity of its perceptions (so that it can accumulate experience) -⁶

"Subject," "object," "attribute" - these distinctions are fabricated and are now imposed as a schematism upon all the apparent facts. The fundamental false observation is that I believe it is *I* who do something, suffer something, "have" something, "have" a quality.⁷

These remarks clearly suggest that Nietzsche's interest is to undermine such traditional notions as "subject", "object", "reason", and other such notions which the majority readily accept. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear in which direction Nietzsche is trying to guide us.

His appeal to the 'I' in attempting to undermine the notion of subjectivity makes matters even more difficult. For Nietzsche, "[t]he fundamental false observation is that I believe it is I who do something, suffer something...." But in attempting to undermine the 'I' he refers to it in "I believe..." suggesting that he is either incapable of escaping a reference to the 'I' or that the 'I' of "I believe..." is somehow different from his second reference to the 'I'. Perhaps in this particular case Nietzsche could have avoided such unclarity by simply stating that the fundamental false observation is the belief that it is I who.... However, in other cases, a reference to the 'I' seems inescapable.

Consider, for example, the following remarks where Nietzsche is attempting to undermine subjectivity:

We set up a word at the point at which our ignorance begins, at which we can see no further, e.g., the word "I," the word "do," the word "suffer":- these are perhaps the horizon of our knowledge, but not "truths."⁸

Our subjective compulsion to believe in logic only reveals that, long before logic itself entered our consciousness, we did nothing but introduce its postulates into events: now we discover them in events - we can no longer do otherwise - and imagine that this compulsion guarantees something connected with "truth." It is we who created the "thing," the "identical thing," subject, attribute, activity, object, substance, form, after we had long pursued the process of making identical, coarse and simple. The world seems logical to us because we have made it logical.⁹

Our bad habit of taking a mnemonic, an abbreviative formula, to be an entity, finally as a cause, e.g., to say of lightning "it flashes." Or the little word "I." To make a kind of perspective in seeing the cause of

seeing: that was what happened in the invention of the "subject," the "I"!¹⁰

While attacking the very notion of an 'I' Nietzsche is constantly referring to some such notion. If the 'I' is an invention, then we are quite justified in demanding from Nietzsche an explanation regarding his use of "our" and "we". Who do these terms refer to if not some subject?

It is not difficult to see from the above remarks why it is so simple to dismiss Nietzsche and his views. His remarks concerning subjectivity seem to be self-defeating. Perhaps such a position cannot even be articulated? Perhaps such a way of thought is not possible? But we have so far assumed, as the remarks above suggest, that Nietzsche is simply rejecting subjectivity as an "invention". And our assumption seems justified from what Nietzsche states in the remarks above. However, other remarks made by him suggest a different view on subjectivity.

The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general?¹¹

When one has grasped that the "subject" is not something that creates effects, but only a fiction, much follows.

It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensations. If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then belief also disappears in effective things, in reciprocation, cause and effect between those phenomena that we call things.

There also disappears, of course, the world of effective atoms: the assumption of which always depended on the supposition that one needed subjects.¹²

Though Nietzsche is rejecting the notion of a subject, of an 'I', he appears to be rejecting a particular understanding of subjectivity. But it is far from evident what notion of subjectivity he is rejecting and what notion he is endorsing. Is this reference to the "we" a reference to his different understanding of subjectivity? This is a central question which we must explore in the chapter on subjectivity. For the moment, however, we may perhaps assume that Nietzsche is attacking our traditional understanding of subjectivity, as a fully constituted fixed subject. Against such an understanding, he suggests that "it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects" who somehow interact with each other. But again, it is far from evident what Nietzsche has in mind with his distinction between singularity and multiplicity. Is the "multiplicity of subjects" an aggregate of simple subjects or are we after a completely different conception of multiplicity/singularity, and hence subjectivity?

Not only does Nietzsche attack our traditional understanding of subjectivity but, also, the notion of an object that is somehow distinct from us.

A "thing-in-itself" just as perverse as a "sense-in-itself," a "meaning-in-itself." There are no "facts-in-themselves," for a sense must always be projected into them before there can be "facts."

The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies "what is that for me?" (for us, for all that lives, etc.)¹³

The "thing-in-itself" nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the "properties," all the "activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defining, communication (to bind together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, activities).¹⁴

And indeed, the notion of an independent object disappears for Nietzsche once the subject disappears. His claim is that once we realize that the subject is a fiction:

At last, the "thing-in-itself" also disappears, because this is fundamentally the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we have grasped that the subject is a fiction. The antithesis "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; with that, however, the concept "appearance" also disappears.¹⁵

These remarks suggest that for Nietzsche there is no independent subject or object. If that is the case, then his perspectivism must be quite different from our traditional understanding of the notion. But it is not enough merely to attack our traditional understanding without offering some sense of the alternative. And in this case, the alternative would have to be an entirely different way of thinking about subjectivity, objectivity and reality as a whole. In essence, it must be an entirely different philosophy.

Two questions confront us at this stage: Is there an alternative to be found in Nietzsche? And if there is such an alternative, can it be articulated? To the first question, I believe that we may tentatively provide a positive answer, as the following remarks suggest:

Perspectivism is only a complex form of specificity. My idea is that every specific body strives to become

master over all space and to extend its force (- its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on - ¹⁶

As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! By doing that one would deduct "relativity!"

Every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance. The "apparent world," therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the world, emanating from a center.

Now there is no other mode of action whatever; and the "world" is only a word for the totality of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of every individual part toward the whole - ¹⁷

But still we are unable to clearly see the nature of this alternative. That Nietzsche labels this alternative as being his unique sense of perspectivism, is clear enough if we consider only the following passage:

Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing *something*, are supposed to be lacking; they always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective "knowing"; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be.¹⁸

But without much further clarification, we are unable to have a clear sense of this alternative. Is it merely a

reformulation of the traditional understanding of perspectivism? If by the end of this project we are unable to articulate such an alternative by providing at least a general framework for it, then we may perhaps conclude that either such a radical alternative is not possible or that though it is possible, it cannot be clearly articulated in its radical form.

3. INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE

There are at least two different approaches to Nietzsche's perspectivism. One approach, as I show below, is to consider the doctrine at an epistemological and a metaphysical level. Under this approach, Nietzsche's perspectivism is considered as an epistemological doctrine that leads to certain metaphysical issues. As an epistemological doctrine, his perspectivism is restricted to the domain of knowledge, and to what we can and cannot know about reality. This, consequently, leads to certain metaphysical issues dealing with the nature of reality as a whole. Ultimately then, under this approach, Nietzsche's perspectivism becomes a certain kind of metaphysics where a subject is attempting to give an overall description of reality. By maintaining a binary opposition between the subject and reality, this approach cannot escape from a metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism,

for such a binary opposition defines metaphysics in general. What makes a particular doctrine metaphysical is a subject's attempt to give a description of reality as a whole, where the subject, hopefully, is incorporated into the description.

The epistemological and metaphysical approach has dominated much of the recent literature on Nietzsche's perspectivism, in the English-speaking world at least. Indeed, ever since Arthur Danto's publication of *Nietzsche As Philosopher* nearly thirty years ago, and the epistemological and metaphysical framework that this work established, commentators have persistently debated the issues raised by him.¹⁹ Danto constructs his framework by beginning with an epistemological reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism. He interprets Nietzsche's perspectivism as a doctrine pertaining to what we can and can not know about the world. For Danto,

[t]he doctrine that there are no facts but only interpretations was termed *Perspectivism*. To be sure, we speak of seeing the same thing from different perspectives, and we might allow that there is no way to see the thing save through a perspective and, finally, that there is no one perspective which is privileged over any other. These would be logical features of the concept of perspective itself. The only difficulty here is in talking about the "same thing" on which these are distinct perspectives. Certainly we cannot say what it is except from one or another perspective, and we cannot speak about it as it is in itself.... We can meaningfully say nothing, then, about whatever it is on which these are perspectives. We cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of the perspective that prevails. Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support,

we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on other people.²⁰

Clearly, for Danto, Nietzsche's perspectivism is an epistemic doctrine that brings into question the relation between our perspectives about reality and reality itself. For Danto, as the quote above suggests, Nietzsche is a sceptic who not only claims that all we can have are perspectives on reality, but we can say nothing about "whatever it is on which these are perspectives." Our concepts and theories are in this sense fictions for they do not describe a certain 'objective' reality, but are our own interpretation of what we believe to be reality. As Danto indicates, for Nietzsche, there is no fact to be appealed to independent of any particular perspective. And given such a state, "we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on other people."

But such an epistemic reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism has not been without challenge, even by commentators who have remained within the confines of an epistemic reading of the doctrine. For example, in a recent article, Brian Leiter, although disagreeing with the Dantoesque interpretation, still argues for an epistemic reading of the notion.²¹ For Leiter, the Dantoesque reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism, which "has attained the status of near-orthodoxy"²², cannot account for Nietzsche's criticisms of other epistemic doctrines, nor can it give any

kind of privilege to Nietzsche's own epistemic position. Under Danto's interpretation, no particular perspective is privileged over any other, for there is no possibility of an appeal to some independent 'fact'. As such, one has no 'objective' basis to criticise or endorse other epistemic positions.

Under Danto's interpretation, the thing as it is in itself is very much like the Kantian thing in itself where nothing about it can be said. When we debate different perspectives, we cannot appeal to the thing as it is in itself as a basis for comparing different perspectives. For Leiter, Nietzsche's perspectivism is much less radical than the Dantoesque interpretation would have us believe. The thing in itself can be appealed to as the basis for comparing different perspectives, even though we might not be able to access this thing without some particular human interest.

Leiter argues that Nietzsche's perspectivism is a device that demonstrates to us the impossibility of disinterested knowledge. By relying on the optical nature of perspectives, Nietzsche, so argues Leiter, is demonstrating to us the impossibility of obtaining knowledge that is completely divorced from any particular 'eye'. That is, our knowledge depends on our interests and needs. This does not imply for Leiter that the object of knowledge cannot be accessed but only that such an object can never be known

without a particular human interest. "That it is human knowledge, however, is not an objection to its being knowledge!"²³ But if this is Leiter's less radical Nietzsche, one wonders how different it is from Danto's interpretation, for even under Leiter, the thing as it is in itself cannot be known without a particular human interest. And such a claim hardly differs from the claim that we can say nothing about the thing as it is in itself.

Given our traditional understanding of perspectivism, and Nietzsche's own remarks which do not provide a clear and an obvious position, it is quite reasonable to assume that Nietzsche's perspectivism should be engaged at an epistemological level, as both Danto and Leiter attempt to do. However, such a position regarding the doctrine leaves aside the whole question of the relation between the subject and its perspectives. From the remarks given in the previous section, it is quite evident that Nietzsche is attacking the subject as much as he is attacking the notion of an independent object. In fact, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, the question of subjectivity cannot be separated from the issues surrounding the object. To demand the abolishment of one, is to demand the abolishment of the other.

As such, epistemological interpretations of Nietzsche's perspectivism neglect a crucial aspect of his notion. By focusing on the relation between perspectives and

reality, the relation between the subject and its perspectives is not taken as problematic. For both Danto and Leiter, for example, the issue is the relation between perspectives and what they are about. Nothing is said about who has such perspectives. Having stated that, we must realize also that by incorporating the subject into the debate, our whole traditional understanding of both the subject and the object is brought into question. And this seems to be precisely Nietzsche's intent in positing his perspectivism.

To explore Nietzsche's views, we must take into consideration both the notions of subjectivity and of objectivity which he so vehemently attacks. And to do so, we must put aside our traditional biases and explore the possibility of a different way of thinking, which such attacks appear to demand. This is not to suggest that the questions raised by an epistemological starting point are completely irrelevant to Nietzsche but that they must be recast and engaged within Nietzsche's own proposed framework. And it is this framework, this Nietzschean way of thinking, that this project will attempt to describe. Indeed, to the whole question of 'reality' and thing in itself, I shall devote an entire chapter. However, the task in that chapter shall not be to discover any Nietzschean views on our ability to access reality but to attempt to give a sense of what this 'reality' is like for Nietzsche,

without our traditional sense of subjectivity and objectivity. As we shall see, unlike an epistemological starting point to Nietzsche's perspectivism which debates the relation of our perspectives to reality, the debate will focus on the sense we must attribute to Nietzsche's will to power.

Following from his epistemological starting point, Danto considers Nietzsche's perspectivism at a metaphysical level as being a claim that attempts to describe the nature of reality. If Nietzsche's perspectivism is a doctrine describing what constitutes reality, then, Danto asks, "[d]oes Perspectivism entail that Perspectivism itself is but a perspective, so that the truth of this doctrine entails that it is false?"²⁴ In other words, the issue which Danto is raising, and which many since him have raised involves the apparent circularity inherent in interpreting Nietzsche's perspectivism as a claim about reality as a whole.²⁵ If perspectivism is a claim about reality, then is it a part of this claim, making the claim itself a perspective, or is it somehow exterior to this claim and thus self-contradictory?

From Danto's initial epistemological reading of the doctrine it is not difficult to see how such a metaphysical issue can arise. Recalling that for Danto, Nietzsche's perspectivism entails that no particular perspective is privileged over any other, and that th' is a claim about

reality, it naturally follows that either this claim is but a perspective or else it is self-refuting. And this is one of the reasons behind Leiter's less radical epistemic reading of Nietzsche. By allowing for some epistemic privilege, Leiter hopes to avoid the metaphysical incoherence that is entailed by Danto's interpretation, though he does not demonstrate this after presenting his epistemic reading of Nietzsche.²⁶ Leiter provides us only with the assertion that we must give up the demand for a description of reality that is divorced from any particular human interest.²⁷ But this does not avoid the circularity mentioned above. We may still ask Leiter whether the claim that objects can be known only through a particular human interest is itself a claim based on a particular human interest, or is somehow exterior to any such interest?

Grimm, however, does engage this metaphysical challenge brought about by the Dantoesque interpretation. Indeed, for Grimm, any metaphysical view is circular, for in being a claim about reality as a whole, it is either a part of this claim or else exterior to it. If it is a part of the claim then it must explain itself as a part of the claim, which is not possible since a claim about reality as a whole has no other ground to explain itself. If it is exterior to the claim, then the claim is clearly not about reality as a whole, for there is at least one claim, namely the claim

itself, that is exterior. In either case, metaphysical views are caught in this web of self-reference.²⁸

Nietzsche's perspectivism and the metaphysical circularity that it presents is not a unique Nietzschean case, according to Grimm. Any metaphysical claim is caught in the same web. What is unique about Nietzsche's case is the manner in which he addresses the issue. For Grimm, Nietzsche presents "a highly original and elegant solution to the chronic circularity of metaphysical argument"²⁹ by making the issue a part of his metaphysical system. As with Danto and Leiter, Grimm's initial starting point is an epistemic reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Indeed, Nietzsche's epistemology is, according to Grimm, that all knowledge is interpretation. And such an epistemic position, so argues Grimm, is embedded in the metaphysical claim that the whole of reality is will to power.

Grimm regards Nietzsche's contribution as being a radically open epistemology that consequently allows him to posit a metaphysics which incorporates the circularity inherent in all metaphysical arguments. The claim that all knowledge is interpretation is not some privileged claim that is exterior to the claim itself but, is considered itself as being an interpretation. Grimm's Nietzsche does not regard himself as having some privileged position to posit such claims but, on the contrary, considers his own claims as being such interpretations. In this sense, argues

Grimm, Nietzsche accepts the circularity of metaphysical arguments by accepting that his own metaphysics is but one such possible interpretation. The whole thrust of Grimm's reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism is to show that for Nietzsche the claim is itself a perspective and that others might hold different perspectives about the nature of reality as a whole.

If Nietzsche's perspectivism is an epistemic doctrine, then the metaphysical issues associated with it naturally arise. Regardless of whether we are to agree with the Danto-esque reading or with some alternative there is a metaphysical issue that must be considered, if we begin with an epistemic interpretation of the doctrine. The claim that all our knowledge is interpretation raises the metaphysical question on the nature of reality as a whole. And given Nietzsche's own remarks about the will to power and the eternal return, the issue of their status naturally arises. Are these notions some interpretation of reality, and if so, why should we accept them given Nietzsche's own epistemic position that all knowledge is interpretation?

Our traditional understanding of perspectives as being someone's views about reality dictates to us the epistemic and metaphysical approach to Nietzsche's perspectivism. The problem, however, is that our traditional understanding of perspectivism cannot account for Nietzsche's attack on both the object and the subject. As we have seen above, the

epistemological/metaphysical approach to his perspectivism deals with what perspectives are about and not with who has such perspectives. I have stated already that an epistemological starting point to Nietzsche's perspectivism does not account for his attack on the subject. Since the metaphysical issue is only a natural continuation from an epistemic starting point, it too does not take into consideration Nietzsche's attack on the subject. Neither Danto, nor Leiter, nor Grimm address the question of who is having such perspectives. Grimm, however, does come close to addressing this question. His reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism is a step away only from taking the subject of knowledge as problematic. Indeed, if Grimm is to be consistent with his reading, then he must question the subject of knowledge. And if he does, then an entirely different Nietzsche emerges.

Since the metaphysical issue is a continuation from an epistemic starting point, we should not be surprised to see that even at the metaphysical level the question of the subject is not raised, for it is not raised at the initial epistemic point. And since the whole question of subjectivity is not addressed by the epistemological/metaphysical approach, it is not dealing with Nietzsche's perspectivism. The issues raised are important for our traditional understanding of perspectivism but they cannot be applied directly to Nietzsche's position. I say directly

because some of the issues raised at the metaphysical level, for example, are relevant though they must be recast in a different framework.

Under the epistemological/metaphysical approach, the will to power and the eternal return are considered as descriptions of reality that must somehow be explained in terms of Nietzsche's own perspectivism. However, once we realize that Nietzsche's perspectivism incorporates an attack on both the subject and the object, then the issue of whether the will to power and eternal return are descriptions of reality is only a part of Nietzsche's perspectivism. The other part is his attack on subjectivity. Thus, we cannot ignore the metaphysical issue raised by the epistemological/metaphysical approach for it contributes to an aspect of his perspectivism, rather than being what his perspectivism is all about.

With our traditional understanding of perspectivism we are forced to think about Nietzsche's perspectivism in an epistemic and a metaphysical manner. Within the tradition, we simply have no sense for a perspective that is not dependent on some subject and object. But such an engagement of Nietzsche's perspectivism would simply not be Nietzsche's. For Nietzsche, it is the tradition that he is attacking, and our traditional commonsensical way of thinking. Thus, to engage Nietzsche we must be prepared to

question our traditional thinking as well as the alternative that Nietzsche is indicating.

A second possible approach to his perspectivism is to consider the doctrine ontologically, not in the traditional sense as a theory of being, for 'being' is itself problematic in Nietzsche, but in the more general sense of a world-view, a sense of thought, a way of life. What such an ontological approach entails is what this project will attempt to indicate, beginning in the next chapter. By adopting such an approach, we do not begin our investigation by committing Nietzsche to the tradition, as the other approach does. We do not begin with the assumption that Nietzsche's perspectivism is an epistemological doctrine leading to a certain kind of metaphysics, but only with the assumption that it is a description of some kind. In other words, what distinguishes this approach from the epistemological/metaphysical approach is that it does not assume from its starting point the existence of a subject that initially attempts to 'know' reality and then describe it as a whole. It is, in this sense, a more general approach to Nietzsche's perspectivism where a binary opposition between a subject and reality is not assumed from the beginning. The only assumption is that Nietzsche is attempting to describe some sense of thought. If this thought turns out to be a description of a subject that is attempting to 'know' reality and consequently describe it as

a whole, then we may conclude that Nietzsche's perspectivism is an epistemological/metaphysical doctrine. But we cannot begin with this assumption unless we wish to impose upon Nietzsche a certain reading from the very start. In a certain sense, then, treating Nietzsche's perspectivism as an ontology implies a neutral starting point that does not commit Nietzsche to the tradition nor to any specific alternative. We are simply beginning with the assumption that Nietzsche is attempting to describe a certain 'space', a 'space' that we must investigate. Only through our investigation can we determine whether or not this 'space' is different from the tradition and whether any sense can be attached to it. Of course, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive and issues tend to overlap. However, they do indicate to us the general attitude taken towards Nietzsche's perspectivism and what it is attempting to be.

To my knowledge, the only interpretation of Nietzsche that offers a systematic ontology, one that also accounts well for his various remarks, is Deleuze's.³⁰ He is the only interpreter of Nietzsche that approaches a thorough and systematic treatment of his perspectivism/philosophy, and is not constrained by traditional thinking. This is why in this project I rely so heavily on his interpretation. However, Deleuze's interpretation and approach to Nietzsche is itself problematic, as subsequent chapters will reveal. Also, though much of Deleuze's interpretation deals with

Nietzsche's perspectivism, Deleuze does not offer us any sustained discussion that explicitly deals with the notion, thus further complicating the task before us.

But by relying so heavily on Deleuze's interpretation, I am not in any way suggesting that somehow Deleuze captures the real Nietzsche. Nietzsche's style, indeed his entire philosophy, does not invite the kind of scholastic interpretation typical of traditional commentaries. There is no real Nietzsche to be discovered from the multiplicity of his works. What can be obtained is a reading, one that is perhaps Nietzschean. Such a state of affairs is very much in the spirit of Nietzsche, and in the spirit of his perspectivism as we shall see below. As such, I shall be offering an interpretation of Nietzsche, a certain reading that hopes to provide a fairly comprehensive framework for his ideas - his perspectivism.

CHAPTER TWO

ONTOLOGY

1. THE QUESTION

We have so far approached Nietzsche but have yet to engage him. The suggestion from the previous chapter is that Nietzsche's perspectivism is ultimately an umbrella term for his philosophy that in turn is an indicator towards a different way of thinking. Traditional interpretations of Nietzsche that have read his perspectivism as an epistemic and a metaphysical doctrine have failed to realize the radical nature of his views by not taking as problematic the question of the subject. To provide an account of Nietzsche's perspectivism, his attacks on both the subject and the object must be taken into consideration.

It is, however, not enough merely to state that Nietzsche is proposing a different way of thinking through his perspectivism. We must defend this claim by demonstrating how Nietzsche's views on perspectivism are different from our traditional understanding of the notion. This implies an engagement of Nietzsche at both the level of the subject and the object to indicate that his views on both of these notions are different from our traditional common sense understanding.

Focusing on the object in this chapter and on the subject in the next, the question before us is whether Nietzsche's attacks are successful. We know that the traditional understanding of perspectivism posits not only a

subject, in the sense of there being an 'I' that has the point of view but, also, an object or a thing. Perspectives are conceived as being about something that is usually independent of the particular perspective. Under such a view, many individuals can have a perspective, a point of view about situation 'X' or thing 'X' or whatever the object may be. But the object itself is viewed as being independent of the different perspectives, in one of two senses. Under the strong sense, the assumption is made that there is some object existing which can be perceived directly. Under the weak sense, the assumption is that although there is some 'X' independent of the perspectives, all that we can arrive at are different perspectives. The strong sense is some form of naïve realism, while the weak sense is some form of Kantianism, where a thing in itself is posited. In either case there must be some 'X' independent of any particular perspective, and is that which allows for the formulation of any perspective.

If Nietzsche's attack on the object and ultimately his perspectivism indicate a different way of thought, then he must be able to free himself from the constraint of an independent 'X' that allows for different perspectives. Anything short of that would maintain him in what is primarily a Kantian view. This is the task before us in this chapter. Are Nietzsche's notions of the will to power and

the eternal return some form of a Kantian thing in itself, and if not, what sense are we to ascribe to them?

2. NIETZSCHE, KANT, AND THE THING IN ITSELF

In a recent article, Stephen Houlgate argues very persuasively that Nietzsche is ultimately committed to a Kantian view of reality.¹ Although Nietzsche desired to free himself from the Kantian view, he was forced nevertheless to remain within its confines to avoid falling into a paradoxical position. As Houlgate comments, the shadow of Kant's thing in itself remains to haunt Nietzsche until the very end. Ultimately, then, if we are to follow Houlgate's reading of Nietzsche, the will to power and eternal return are nothing more than a reformulation of the Kantian thing in itself. This, however, is in need of further explanation.

Kant's epistemological position rests on the famous distinction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves. According to Kant, our knowledge is the product of the mind's ability to receive intuitions and its ability to process such intuitions. Without these two components, we are not able to represent and consequently know any thing.² Since the mind must process what is given to it before any knowledge is possible, we can never maintain that our representations are of things as they are

in themselves. They are "appearances" that may or may not correspond to things in themselves. According to Kant,

[w]hat objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them - a mode which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being.³

What is involved in the formation of our representations, I leave until the next chapter. For the moment, let us examine what Kant understood by the thing in itself. It is wrong to think that what Kant meant by his distinction between appearances and things in themselves is the existence of two worlds; the one which we experience and the one that somehow exists outside our field of experience. Kant's interest in making the distinction is to demonstrate the mind's participation in the production of knowledge. That is, he wished to indicate the impossibility of us knowing any thing as it is in itself, for to know a thing the mind must participate actively in the production of such knowledge. Things as they are in themselves do play a role in our knowledge by the manner in which they affect us, though we can never know whether we have accessed such things as they are in themselves. As such, the notion of a thing in itself is for Kant a limiting notion.⁴ It limits what we can claim about the nature of our knowledge.

According to Houlgate, it is Kant's notion of our contribution to the knowledge of things, and the consequent nature of things as "appearances" of something that appears,

that Nietzsche does not escape. For Kant, there must be a thing in itself that underlies the appearances or else we remain in a circle. As he states:

For appearance can be nothing by itself, outside our mode of representation. Unless, therefore, we are to move constantly in a circle, the word appearance must be recognised as already indicating a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is, indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility.⁵

But, argues Houlgate, this circle is what Nietzsche is asking us to accept. In other words, Nietzsche is attempting to endorse the view that there are appearances only, without anything that allows them to appear. And as Houlgate indicates, such a claim is difficult to accept.

To arrive at some understanding of what Nietzsche is attempting to achieve, Houlgate reads Nietzsche's rejection of the Kantian thing in itself as a claim that we have built our knowledge on appearances to such a degree that a distinction between appearances and things in themselves is no longer possible. That is, Nietzsche's rejection of the object is a claim that we can no longer distinguish the object from the perspectives about it. The two notions become a single notion, whose two components cannot be untangled. For Kant, there is a fundamental difference between appearances and things in themselves. Things in themselves underlie appearances and allow for their appearance. Nietzsche rejects this fundamental difference by

maintaining that the definition of one term includes the other. The very reality of appearances depends upon things in themselves, and the very reality of things in themselves depends upon appearances. With Nietzsche, "[e]ach term is in fact so defined that it includes the other with the result that the line between them blurs into undecidability."⁶ And if this is the case, then Nietzsche's notions of the will to power and the eternal return are merely forms of a Kantian thing in itself that attempt to explain such a single notion.

Under Houlgate's reading, Nietzsche cannot escape the Kantian thing in itself, for no sense can be made of appearances that do not appear from some thing. As such, we must understand Nietzsche's attack on the object, on the thing in itself, as being a claim that the object and the appearances have collapsed into a single notion. Consequently, the will to power and the eternal return are a means to explain this notion. But this, argues Houlgate, is to remain within a Kantian framework and within the Kantian view that we contribute to how things appear to us. Ultimately, Nietzsche's perspectives are Kantian appearances, and his notions of the will to power and the eternal return are the Kantian thing in itself.

Houlgate's argument rests, very reasonably, on the claim that it is not possible to have appearances that do not appear. If we are to make any sense out of Nietzsche's

rejection of the object, then we must view it as a rejection of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, collapsing the two notions into one. However, as with the interpreters mentioned in chapter one, Houlgate does not seem to take as problematic Nietzsche's attack on the subject. Nietzsche's perspectivism simply cannot be taken along Kantian lines, for in Kant it is the subject that allows for the possibility of such appearances. Under Houlgate's reading, there is the assumption that such a Kantian notion of subjectivity is operating also in Nietzsche, which is hardly the case as we shall see in the next chapter.

Had Houlgate realized that Nietzsche, while attacking the Kantian thing in itself, is attacking also the notion of a Kantian subject, he would have regarded Nietzsche as being much more radical than he initially appears to be. Rather than viewing Nietzsche as another Schopenhauer, interpreting will to power and eternal return as a reformulation of Schopenhauer's single will, he would have viewed Schopenhauer as a transitional figure between Kant and Nietzsche. While being able to differentiate between Kant and Schopenhauer, Houlgate is unable to differentiate between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Houlgate does note the difference between Kant and Schopenhauer in that the latter believed it is possible to say something about the thing in itself whereas the former did not.⁷ In Schopenhauer, the

thing in itself becomes a single will. However, Houlgate is unable to note that while both Kant and Schopenhauer maintained that appearances need something to appear from, Nietzsche did not. Both Kant and Schopenhauer remained within the confines of our traditional thinking by believing that it simply does not make sense to talk about appearances that do not appear. But it is precisely this traditional way of thought that Nietzsche seems to be attacking. If we wish to remain within such confines, then we must interpret Nietzsche in a manner that is perhaps similar to Houlgate's. However, such an interpretation would not be *Nietzsche's* perspectivism.

3. PURE BECOMING

Beginning with Kant's epistemology as the point from which Nietzsche's attack on the object is engaged is very reasonable, given Nietzsche's own remarks against Kant and the thing in itself. However, such a starting point restricts our interpretation of Nietzsche to the epistemological field which consequently leads to a neglect of the question of subjectivity, and Nietzsche's attacks of that notion. This is the problem with the interpretations presented in chapter one and with Houlgate's approach. Moreover, such a restriction fails to realise the broad nature of Nietzsche's perspectivism. It does not consider

the doctrine as an umbrella, covering a vast array of issues.

In Kant's case, for example, Nietzsche is not simply attacking the thing in itself but the whole Kantian framework that subjugates being to knowing. For Kant, the nature of being depends upon and is a derivative of knowing. Being is what we can know. It is against such an understanding of being and its links with becoming that Nietzsche's Kant criticism must be seen. Ultimately, Nietzsche's perspectivism is both an attack on the Kantian subjugation of being, and an answer to the Platonic distinction between being and becoming.⁸

We must therefore engage Nietzsche from a neutral starting point which does not commit us at the very start to an epistemological and a metaphysical reading of his views. We must not begin by subjugating being to knowing, as does the epistemological/metaphysical approach. This is why I opt for an ontological reading of Nietzsche along with Deleuze. By such an approach, we are able to engage Nietzsche at a level that does not impose on him a prior commitment to other philosophical views. That is, we can begin with the basic question of what experience is for Nietzsche, and how he construes the relation between being and becoming. Of course, such an approach does not imply that he is immune from the criticisms that the epistemological and

metaphysical approach was liable to, but it does allow for the possibility of constructing a different framework.

Nietzsche's remarks against the subject and the object and his perspectivism are all a means to construct a different framework for experience. They are the tools, together with will to power, forces, and eternal return, that attempt to provide us with a different formulation of the relation between being and becoming. They are a reply to Plato's initial distinction between being and becoming. We must return to Plato to locate the point from which Nietzsche begins to construct his different framework. And it is this framework, this ontology, that explains Nietzsche's attack on the object and the Kantian thing in itself.

Before returning to Plato, however, we need to establish some general sense of what is meant by being and becoming. Being, in general, is the totality of beings, where a being is some 'X' that has some fixed and unchanging aspects. Being, as the totality of such beings, designates some sense of stability, of fixed and unchanging aspects. Becoming, on the other hand, describes a realm where there is no such stability, where there are no fixed points. It is a realm of flux and change characterised by constant movement. Given the long history of these terms, my characterization of being and becoming must only be taken as a general sense of what these terms designate.

Returning to Plato, we note that the main concern for him was not with specific examples of, say, beauty or justice, but with 'what is beauty' or 'what is justice'. By asking 'what is' Plato established an opposition between essence and appearance that led ultimately to an opposition between being and becoming.⁹ His motivation in asking the question 'what is' was to establish being, beyond a realm of apparent becoming. He never questioned the reality of becoming or the realm of appearances. He took this order as a given, and only then asked for the possibility of being. In his desire to explain being, given becoming, he set the two in opposition to each other, in the hope of somehow reconciling them. This separation, however, created a tension between being and becoming, for it provided being with a certain exteriority that had to be simultaneously affirmed with the interiority of being in becoming. As the ground for becoming, being had to have a certain connection to becoming, a certain interiority within becoming. Yet, since being was thought to be excluded from the realm of space and time, it had to occupy simultaneously a certain exteriority to becoming which operated within space and time. Thus, Plato was faced with the simultaneous affirmation of both the exteriority and interiority of being in becoming.¹⁰ This problem, which came to be known as 'the problem of universals', continued well into the present century.

But, within becoming itself, Plato made another distinction between appearances that had a relation to being and those that were very distant from being, and which constituted, to use Deleuzian terms, the realm of "pure becoming"; the realm of the "simulacra".¹¹ He distinguished within becoming as a whole, those copies that had a relation to the Forms and those that had a very distant relation and were copies of the copies. And as Deleuze remarks, this dualism

is not at all the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible, of Idea and matter, or of Ideas and bodies. It is a more profound and secret dualism hidden in sensible and material bodies themselves. It is a subterranean dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action. It is not the distinction between the Model and the copy, but rather between copies and simulacra. Pure becoming, the unlimited, is the matter of the simulacrum insofar as it eludes the action of the Idea and insofar as it contests both model and copy at once. Limited things lie beneath the Ideas; but even beneath things, is there not still this mad element which subsists and occurs on the other side of the order that Ideas impose and things receive?¹²

For Plato, there is a level that is even lower than the level of the copies. It is the level of "simulacra", of shadowy likenesses that seem to elude the action of the Forms.¹³ This is the level of pure becoming, of unlimited flux and movement. Unlike becoming, which is a realm of appearances grounded by being, pure becoming is very distant from any such being. Because of its distance from being, Plato forces pure becoming into the background and treats it as some sort of a perversion; a deviation from what is true.

Consider, for example, the *Phaedrus* and Plato's treatment of the soul that is distant from being.

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato gives a ranking of the different bodies in the realm of becoming that a fallen soul would occupy.¹⁴ The soul that has had the least vision of being, and that fails to resemble being in any way, occupies the lowest body, which is that of a tyrant. And given what Plato says about the tyrant,¹⁵ it is clear that for Plato, this lowest level of becoming, this level of the simulacrum, is an evil level. Of course, in the Middle Ages, this becomes the problem of evil; of trying to explain how such simulacra can emanate from the Good or God.

Plato begins with the assumption that there is a realm of becoming. It is the realm that we experience from day to day; the realm of space and time. But such a realm must presuppose, according to Plato, a realm of being that grounds becoming which, in turn, is the movement from a being to another. For Plato, there can be no becoming without being, and this forced him to postulate being as a realm that is simultaneously exterior to becoming and interior to it. Our experience in the realm of becoming is, according to Plato, only an experience of appearances that are constantly changing. The source of such appearances was Plato's ultimate concern, for in the source, in being only, can there be true knowledge. Thus, it is not this life that should concern us but the realm of being and the Forms.¹⁶

For Nietzsche, this Platonic outlook indicated a devaluation of life in favour of some other. Indeed, this is also Aristotle's critique of Plato. By focusing on the Forms and the realm of being, and by stating that the only possibility for knowledge is to know the Forms, Plato devaluates all that the realm of becoming offers. Nietzsche, in contrast to Plato, sees a certain joy in this life which it is his intention to affirm. We should not devalue this life, according to Nietzsche, in favour of some other but should affirm it and value it beyond any other alternative. This, in essence, is Nietzsche's starting point.

There is a choice to be made between a devaluation of this life in favour of some other and the affirmation of this life. And though the issues associated with either choice are complex, it is at bottom a matter of choice on which world-view we adopt. That it is a choice and a choice that is based on a certain valuation, is a point that Nietzsche cannot deny. Indeed, this is the hallmark of his perspectivism. In any choice that is made, there is always a certain valuation involved, a valuation that is unavoidable. What we might claim as an 'objective' choice is only a choice with a hidden valuation. For example, the Platonic outlook does not itself carry any greater amount of 'objectivity' than Nietzsche's proposed framework, though Plato certainly believed himself to be offering an 'objective' ontology.

If we consider Plato's rejection of pure becoming, we realise that there is a hidden motivation operating at the heart of his ontology. As Deleuze remarks, Plato's motivation

has to do with selecting among the pretenders, distinguishing good and bad copies or, rather, copies (always well-founded) and simulacra (always engulfed in dissimilarity). It is a question of assuring the triumph of the copies over simulacra, of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, preventing them from climbing to the surface, and "insinuating themselves" everywhere.¹⁷

There is a certain morality operating behind Plato's divisions. At the very heart of his ontology is an axiological dimension that dictates the ranking within the ontology. What is good must be eternal, unchanging and outside the flux of becoming. What is evil, is all that has no relation to the good, it is all that is constantly shifting and changing. As Olkowski remarks, "[e]vil power, false claimant, perversion, essential turning away - each of these terms indicates that the process of division is at the basis of what are for Plato moral determinations."¹⁸ Simulacra, are for Plato a perversion, not because they are a copy of a copy, but because they fail to resemble the Ideas. As far as he was concerned, pure becoming is a perversion of reason and therefore an evil power. Throughout the dialogues his concern is to distinguish the different levels between the Ideas (being) and the lowest level, the level of pure becoming. For example, in the *Phaedrus*, nine such levels are distinguished with the lowest being that of

the tyrant. Pure becoming is the lowest possible level for Plato. "It always eludes the present, causing future and past, more and less, too much and not enough to coincide in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter."¹⁹ It evades the limit, the equal and the same. To defeat it, which is Plato's intention, is "[t]o impose a limit on this becoming, to order it according to the same, to render it similar - and, for that part which remains rebellious, to repress it as deeply as possible, to shut it up in a cavern at the bottom of the Ocean".²⁰

Plato's ultimate motivation was to negate becoming in favour of an eternal and an unchanging realm of being. Such a motivation dictated for him the moral devaluation of all that was distant from becoming, especially the realm of the simulacra. For Nietzsche, such motivation indicated a rejection of this life, this world, in favour of some other. His own starting point is to be this life and this field of experience, and its affirmation without the postulation of some 'higher' reality. Though Plato begins also from this world, he moves quickly to the affirmation of a different reality, devaluing this world of experience. But we should not understand Nietzsche as performing a simple reversal of Platonism "privileging the world of becoming over the world of being".²¹ Nietzsche's starting point is not simply the rejection of Plato's being in favour of his becoming, but the rejection of both in favour of pure becoming. Within the

realm of pure becoming, Nietzsche attempts to answer the question of being.

In contrast to Plato, Nietzsche's initial starting point is the claim that there is only pure becoming. And this claim, as with the Platonic starting point, carries a certain valuation which, in Nietzsche's case, is the affirmation of this world and field of experience. But this world and field of experience is not understood by Nietzsche as the Platonic realm of becoming but as the Platonic realm of pure becoming. As such, from the very beginning Nietzsche faces the problem of accounting for being given this pure becoming. With Plato and his realm of becoming, being is presupposed as the totality of beings resulting in becoming. That is, becoming is a movement from a being to another; a movement which Plato attempts to explain by positing a whole realm as being. In Nietzsche's case, beginning with the affirmation of pure becoming leaves us with an uncertainty about the role of being in such a realm.

The nature of this pure becoming and the possibility of being, within such an outlook, is the clue to Nietzsche's ontology and to his perspectivism. Pure becoming constitutes for Nietzsche the field of experience which is an ontological surface of forces. Life, beings, matter and all that we may call 'reality' is for Nietzsche already a relation of forces. "Every relationship of forces constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological,

social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship."²² Forces, thus, constitute a field of experience in which types are located as certain constellations.

But if Nietzsche's pure becoming is what Plato distinguished as this realm, then we cannot understand the field of forces as an account given to explain 'reality'. If it is such an account, then Nietzsche's forces are merely an attempt to explain the 'real' behind the 'apparent'. Everything that there is must already be a relation of forces. And this, as we shall see in chapter four, must be itself a perspective.

If, however, forces only have a quantity, then we are led to a mechanistic interpretation of forces which allows them to be equalised. That is, an equilibrium state may be achieved by equating some quantity of forces with another quantity. But, given the nature of pure becoming as a field of constant flux, there can be no such equilibrium. For Nietzsche, mechanism "desires nothing but quantities; but force is to be found in quality. Mechanistic theory can therefore only describe processes, not explain them."²³ Mechanistic theory, and indeed any description of forces that considers them only quantitatively, remains abstract and unable to explain the difference in the union of forces. Under a purely quantitative description, there is always the

possibility of equalising or annulling any union of forces. Thus, it is not possible to account for the forces in the union but only the union itself, for there is no means to differentiate between the forces in the union. As such, a purely quantitative description of forces can only describe processes, not explain them. It cannot account for the different forces in the union.

As Deleuze comments, "[f]orces have quantity, but they also have the quality which corresponds to their difference in quantity: the qualities of force are called 'active' and 'reactive'."²⁴ To explain processes, interpretation is required, and this in turn needs to consider the difference between forces in any union. And this difference is the quality of forces. Given that forces have quantity, their quality can only be the difference in this quantity. That is how we can account for the different forces in any union. As such, there are no two forces which are of the same quantity, for then they would not have a quality, and we would not be able to account for their difference in any union. And it is nonsense to speak of a force, for there are only relations of forces; constellations that form a body in the above sense.

The qualities of force are named active and reactive, where active forces are superior and dominant, and reactive forces are inferior and dominated.²⁵ For Nietzsche, the choice is between the affirmation or negation of this world

as pure becoming. This is his basic starting point. Since it is the affirmation of this world that has the greater value for him, those forces which affirm it are named active and are considered the superior forces. Forces which deny this world are the inferior forces, the reactive forces. In any union of forces, both kinds may be found, and what dominates at a particular point will depend upon the will to power in such a body.

Pure becoming and its field of forces describes Nietzsche's field of experience. Within such a field unions of forces constituting different bodies are found. This describes Nietzsche's ontology and the direction of his new thought. But such an ontology still faces two basic questions. First, it must describe how such a union of forces is possible and what guides the relation, and secondly, it must give an account of being in such a realm. Having rejected Plato's distinction between being and becoming in favour of pure becoming, Nietzsche must provide us with some sense of being, explaining its possibility in pure becoming. The answer to the first issue lies in the doctrine of will to power, and the answer to the second in the doctrine of eternal return.

4. WILL TO POWER

Forces enter into a certain relation to constitute a body. What guides this relation is the will to power. As Nietzsche comments:

The victorious concept "force," by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as "will to power,"....²⁶

As "an inner will" operating within the field of pure becoming, the will to power, as Eged comments, must not

be mistaken for some secret inner will pre-existing in each force. For the same reason that there can be no force as such there can be no will to power as such.²⁷

By referring to the will to power as "an inner will", Nietzsche is rejecting the idea that the will to power is simply some external principle regulating the union of forces from outside of pure becoming. If it were purely such a notion, then it would serve as the ground for pure becoming which would go against Nietzsche's initial starting point that there is only a field of pure becoming. Moreover, if the will to power were only a determining notion, then Nietzsche would not be far from making the Platonic distinction between being and becoming. For Plato, becoming is possible through its sharing with being. That is, being is an external principle for becoming. If will to power is such an external principle then it is not far removed from Plato's dichotomy. As being grounds becoming in Plato, so would the will to power ground pure becoming in Nietzsche.

We must, therefore, understand the will to power differently if we are to see Nietzsche as proposing a different way of thinking. If there is only pure becoming then the will to power must be immanent in this field. It must be within pure becoming. And if it is immanent in a field of pure becoming, then not only must it determine the union of forces but must itself also be determined. In other words, if Nietzsche is not to fall into the Platonic distinction between being and becoming, his notion of the will to power must be "plastic".²⁸ As to the nature of this determination, what it is like, I shall consider below.

The will to power does indeed determine the relation of forces but, it is determined also by this relation. It is the synthesis of forces, and as such a synthesis it is "the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic."²⁹ As a differential element, it is the difference in quantity between forces, and thus is also a genetic element peculiar to each force, its quality, that by virtue of which it is what it is. As the genetic element, and as that which determines in the synthesis, the will to power imparts to each force its quality. Forces are brought together by chance, but they are determined by the will to power. In this way, the will to power is capable of affirming chance. In fact, it cannot operate without it. What brings forces within a certain proximity to other forces is the element of chance. But chance cannot of itself

determine such proximate forces. It is the will to power, as the genetic element of the synthesis, that determines such forces. It determines them by imparting to each force a quality, active or reactive, that is itself the difference in quantity between forces.

This difference in quantity between forces, however, is the differential element that conditions the will to power and imparts to it its qualities of affirmation or negation. The will to power is determined by the differential element of forces because this element is a result of chance bringing within a certain proximity certain forces. The differential element that determines the will to power imparts a certain quality to the will to power - affirmation or negation - that we must distinguish from the qualities of forces which are imparted to them by the determining of the will to power. Activity and reactivity are actions of forces that result from a willing - on the part of the will to power - of affirmation or negation.

We must understand the synthesis of forces, which is the will to power, as a simultaneous activity of determining and being determined. And what allows the will to power to be both a genetic and a differential element of forces, is chance. Chance determines the differential element of forces thus allowing them to condition the will to power and to accord it its qualities. But while the will to power is being determined, it determines forces by imparting to each

force a quality, which is the differential element of forces.

We can therefore see how the will to power has this 'double aspect' to it. It determines forces while itself being determined by chance. As Deleuze says, it is

no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines. The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions. It is never superior to the ways that it determines a relation between forces, it is always plastic and changing.³⁰

And with the element of chance, we can now see why the qualities of the will to power are affirmation and negation. As a quality of the will to power, affirmation is the affirmation of chance, and negation is the rejection of this pure becoming. By its affirmation, the will to power affirms chance, overcoming it and turning it into a necessity. But again I must reiterate that affirmation and negation must be distinguished from action and reaction. Affirmation is a desire of the will to power for activity. It is "the power of becoming active" rather than activity itself which belongs to forces. Similarly, negation is a desire of the will to power for reactivity. It is the power of "becoming reactive" rather than reactivity itself which belongs to forces.³¹

But we must still ask how the will to power determines. We know that it is determined by chance through the bringing together of forces but, how does it determine

such forces? In other words, how does the will to power manifest itself? Deleuze's reply is that:

The relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected.³²

In other words, the will to power is a sensibility that manifests itself as that of force. It is an affectivity that is manifested in forces as their quality.³³ The will to power determines the synthesis of forces by imparting to each force a quality, whether active or reactive. And this quality itself is a manifestation of the will to power and its qualities of affirmation and negation. For Nietzsche, "[t]he will to power [is] not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos".³⁴ It is not activity or reactivity but the sensibility of becoming active and becoming reactive. And it is this sensibility that is imparted to forces as their quality.

For Nietzsche, the world is will to power.³⁵ As such, we cannot interpret Nietzsche as proclaiming some sort of a psychological doctrine. He is not claiming there to be some subject, some psychological will that desires more power. Also, we can not interpret the will to power as some grand will desiring more power, since for Nietzsche "there is no will".³⁶ As Deleuze remarks, we must interpret the will to power in a different way. It is power that wills in the will to power. And since the will to power is a sensibility, the

willing of power can only be understood as power's desire to manifest itself. The will to power does not will more power, for it is power that is willing in the will to power. Power does not will power, for it always already has it. Will to power can only mean determining, at each moment, a new constellation of forces, where once again certain forces will dominate while others will be dominated. This is how power manifests itself in the qualities of forces. It wills a certain type of space for itself to operate, a certain union of forces that allows it to express itself.³⁷

But if the will to power is an affectivity and a desire of power to manifest itself in the qualities of forces, then it is a multiplicity and a plurality of different unions of forces. And yet, it appears that Nietzsche intended the notion to be unitary in his reference to the will to power. It is at this point that we begin to see how revolutionary is Nietzsche's will to power. While it is true that he intended it to be a unitary notion, it is also a multiplicity and a plurality. As Deleuze remarks, "[t]he monism of the will to power is inseparable from a pluralist typology."³⁸ When we speak of the will to power as a unitary notion, what is meant is the unity of a multiplicity, of a plurality of forces. At once, the will to power is neither a unity nor a multiplicity but it is both. It is everywhere all the time and yet no where at no time. This, however, is perplexing.

Not only is the will to power a notion that determines and is itself determined but, also, it is both a unity and a multiplicity. But how can we make any sense out of such a notion? It is either an 'X' that determines or an 'X' that is determined. How can it determine if it is not itself determined? Moreover, what sense can we give to a notion that is both a unity and a multiplicity? It would seem that this is the point where we must take leave of logic if we are to understand Nietzsche's different thought. Nietzsche and Deleuze seem to be proposing a way of thinking that is unthinkable. To remedy the situation, I believe that we must take into account the notion of time. To our minds, the will to power seems so perplexing because it defies our chronological sense of time of past, present and future. We tend to think in such a way that what determines has to come before what is determined; and we tend to think that at a point in time there is either a multiplicity or a unity. But for Deleuze, Nietzsche is not presenting his ontology within such an understanding of time.³⁹ As such, we must now explicate time in pure becoming in order to gain a 'deeper' understanding of Nietzsche.

5. TWO SENSES OF TIME

We find it extremely difficult to think of time other than in the traditional way as being a single dimension of

past, present and future. In our thought, we have become so accustomed to thinking about time in such a way, that it seems virtually impossible to construe the notion in some other sense. But, as I have said previously, Nietzsche is proposing a different way of thought, a different way of thinking about this world. As such, we should not be surprised to see that this different thought demands that we should think of time differently. And indeed, this should not come as a surprise at this stage, for in a realm of pure becoming, of constant flux, what sense can be given to our traditional understanding of the present as some fixed point?

To our traditional understanding of time, at least two different readings can be given. Under one such reading, there is no present for it is always absorbed into the past and the future; decomposed into 'what was' and 'what will'. With the other reading, there is only the present into which the past and the future are drawn, functioning as mere limitations on a greater present. Clearly, these two readings of time are complete and must exclude each other, for in each reading the past, present and the future are accounted for. However, we must explicate them further.

With the reading that abolishes the present, time "need not be infinite but only 'infinitely subdivisible'".⁴⁰ Under this reading, each present, however small it may be, is divided into the past and the future

along a straight line that is unlimited in both directions, constantly moving into the past and into the future. It is not an infinite notion of time for "it never comes back upon itself".⁴¹ Such a notion of time characterises pure becoming, constant flux, where every 'is' decomposes into an 'it was' and 'a yet to come'.

With the other reading of time, time is characterised as a limited present absorbing into itself the past and the future. This is an infinite notion of time because it is cyclical, with ever expanding cycles that absorb the past and the future. The past and the future are only the indication of a greater circle, a greater present.

Past, present, and future are not three dimensions of time; only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to the present in time. In other words, whatever is future or past in relation to a certain present (a certain extension or duration) belongs to a more vast present which has a greater extension or duration. There is always a more vast present which absorbs the past and the future. Thus, the relativity of past and future with respect to the present entails a relativity of presents themselves, in relation to each other. God experiences as present that which for me is future or past, since I live inside more limited presents.⁴²

These then are the two readings of time that are critical to understanding Nietzsche. They are definitions of two readings of time that allows us greater access into Nietzsche's different thought. Although they are hardly within the realm of common sense, they are not altogether unintuitive. Under one reading, the present can never be captured, while under the other the present is captured by

an ever increasing expansion of the moment so that it may incorporate the past and the future.

What characterises pure becoming and the realm of the will to power is time where there is no present. This is the only way that the will to power can have the characteristics described above. It can determine as it is determined because it is in constant flux with forces that can not be fixed. There is no moment, no present where we can say that the will to power is determining or that it is being determined. As soon as we attempt to fix a point of determination it has already passed or is yet to come. Similarly, the will to power can be both a unity and a multiplicity for there is no present where it is either a unity or a multiplicity. Again, as soon as we attempt to fix a moment to it, the will to power escapes us. As a synthesis, the will to power is not a synthesis that results in the formation of a being, for nothing fixed can be reached. It is a synthesis where the approach to a being is always transformed into an approach to another being. At once, the will to power is both unity and multiplicity. However, on the question of being, the will to power is not enough to account for being. We must introduce the eternal return.

6. ETERNAL RETURN

We have already defined the nature of pure becoming in terms of forces and the will to power, and we have seen how the will to power is the synthesis of forces. But, in fact, our account of synthesis is not complete without the eternal return. We have so far elucidated a field of difference in terms of a plurality of forces, thus giving some meaning to the notion of pure becoming. But difference by itself is not enough. Repetition is required in order to provide us with a sense of being *within* becoming. And it is the eternal return, as an ontological notion, that provides this repetition.

The will to power is the synthesis of forces. It is both the genetic and differential element of force. It operates in pure becoming, in time without a present, as a manifestation of difference. But this notion of synthesis is not itself complete without the eternal return which explains how in this synthesis a being is approached. There must be some 'principle' for this synthesis that accounts for the reproduction of diversity. As it stands, the synthesis we have unfolded can not explain how forces can reproduce differences within pure becoming.⁴³ It is the eternal return which guaranties the reproduction of diversity within pure becoming. And the reproduction of diversity which is explained by the eternal return, must not

be understood as the reproduction of the same. It is not the reproduction of identity or the identical that is explained by the eternal return. In fact, given that the eternal return explains an aspect of pure becoming which is itself in a time with no present, no such identity is possible.

Without the present, the eternal return can not be the return of the same. Such a notion of return, of identity, has to be within the cyclical reading of time which can only understand the eternal return as the return of the same. Moreover, had Nietzsche been advocating a return of the same, he would only have been repeating what the Stoics had said already, and thus there would be nothing new in his doctrine, which hardly explains how it is "6,000 feet beyond man and time".⁴⁴

We must understand the eternal return not as the return of a being but returning itself as it approaches a being. As Deleuze states:

It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes. It is not some one thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity.⁴⁵

It is returning itself, as a folding or a series of foldings within the flux of pure becoming that explains the eternal return. Through such recurrence, forces within the synthesis of the will to power fold back on themselves allowing for the reproduction of diversity. But a being is never reproduced for it is never produced initially. There is no

notion of identity in Nietzsche. His will to power is not a synthesis resulting in a being; it is a synthesis that approaches a being only to be dissolved, and to approach another. What allows for the reproduction of such a diversity in the field of pure becoming is the returning of forces.

Before our discussion of the eternal return we were explaining the nature of the world only as pure becoming. We could not account for any sense of a being in such a realm for it was in constant flux without any 'principle' that allows for a sense of a being. With the eternal return we can see how a being can be approached in such a field of flux. But it is only an approach, an approximation that never reaches a fixed being. As Nietzsche says:

That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being.⁴⁶

And it must only be an approximation for the world is pure becoming without any notion of identity. Being is approximated in a world of becoming through the notion of returning, which is the repetition of difference itself.

We must, however, be careful not to fall into the Platonic trap that situates being outside of becoming. With such an exteriority, difference (becoming) cannot provide a total support of being for being is exterior to becoming and is itself driven by a final aspect, the Good. As such, Plato's becoming cannot realise a thing within itself, and must seek some other in order to establish such a nature.

Plato's conception of becoming is not that of a pure becoming, but of a becoming that has an end and an origin in the Good, and an intermediate end in being. Therefore, it cannot provide a total support of being, for its difference relies on being, which itself has a certain exteriority.⁴⁷

The very form of the question changes in Nietzsche from the Platonic 'what' to 'who' - asking 'which one is it' rather than 'what is'. And by 'which one', Nietzsche is not searching for some essential being that is removed from pure becoming but for a constellation of forces, a certain type, a certain will to power within pure becoming. In this way, essence is not set in opposition to a thing (being is not opposed to becoming), but "is determined by the forces with affinity for the thing and by the will with affinity for these forces."⁴⁸ Such an approach, however, poses a problem for Nietzsche, since language, by its very nature, postulates a dichotomy between being and becoming. In everyday language, it is always a question of a doer and a deed, of a being and a becoming, and this is the very language which must be used to express Nietzsche's thought. This is perhaps why at times Nietzsche appears contradictory or unclear, about what he is stating. Ideally, to express being within the realm of pure becoming, verbs only should be used, thus not allowing for a distinction between a doer and a deed.

With the eternal return, then, our account of the synthesis introduced with the will to power is complete, for an account of being is given within pure becoming. Pure becoming is a surface of time without a present in which everything is a synthesis of will to power, thus establishing this surface as a plurality of forces, of differences. Being is approximated in such a field through the notion of returning, which completes the synthesis by accounting for the reproduction of diversity. The eternal return establishes the moment within pure becoming as "the being of that which becomes."⁴⁹

Also, with the eternal return we gain a better understanding of pure becoming itself. Since pure becoming operates within a reading of time that has no present and is not infinite but unlimited in both directions, pure becoming must be unlimited and unbounded and yet finite. It is unlimited since every point on its surface constitutes the centre of a flux with no state and no present. It is finite because only through the folding of forces, through returning, can being be approximated. As both unbounded and finite pure becoming could not have started nor can it have an end.

But we can speak also of the being of pure becoming as a single totality. Here, it is the *experience* of the eternal return that provides us with such a notion of being. For such an experience to be possible, we must think of the

eternal return as operating in the sense of time where there is only a present, and it is a present of the entire past and the future in a single moment. I do not believe that such an experience is explicable. It must be experienced in order for it to be grasped. But we may claim that such an experience must be an overwhelming moment, a point of such high intensity that one is lost in a field where there is only a present of the entire past and future. It can not be an experience of an increasing present where the circle is gradually expanding, for that would not account for the being of pure becoming in its totality. It must be an experience that synthesises the whole past and future in a single moment.

CHAPTER THREE

SUBJECTIVITY

1. THE QUESTION ONCE AGAIN

I have suggested so far that interpretations of Nietzsche's perspectivism which did not take seriously his attack on subjectivity fail to present an account of it. To account for Nietzsche's perspectivism, both his attacks on the object and the subject must be considered. Once this is realised, a much more radical Nietzsche emerges; a Nietzsche who is indicating the possibility of a different way of thinking. In the previous chapter, I have attempted to present the framework for this different thought by focusing on Nietzsche's attack on the object and the relation of being to becoming. But the ontology presented there is not complete. It must be still complemented by an explanation of Nietzsche's attack on subjectivity. In other words, we must show how from the Deleuze-Nietzsche ontology follows also Nietzsche's attack on subjectivity. This is the focus of this chapter.

From chapter one, we know that Nietzsche's attack on the subject is an attack directed at a particular understanding of subjectivity: subjectivity as a fully constituted fixed entity. It is this sense of subjectivity that Nietzsche wishes to undermine in favour of his own, different, sense. And, given the ontology presented in the previous chapter, this is hardly surprising. In a realm of pure becoming, no fixed thing can be established, though it

may be approached. The case does not differ for the notion of subjectivity. There is simply no room in such a realm for a sense of subjectivity that construes the 'I' as some permanent, fixed being. If subjectivity is to remain within the realm of pure becoming, Nietzsche must offer us a different sense for the notion. The question, however, is whether Nietzsche's different sense is really different from the sense that he is attacking.

Before presenting Nietzsche's account, however, we need to examine the sense of subjectivity that he is attacking. In this way, we will be able to see whether Nietzsche can free himself from such a sense of subjectivity. If he is unable to escape from what is fundamentally a Kantian notion of subjectivity, then his entire attempt for a different way of thinking would be doomed. His ontology must be able to articulate some sense of subjectivity if it is to be complete.

2. THE BIRTH OF THE 'I'

Nietzsche's attack on the subject is an attack on our modern, Kantian, sense of subjectivity. Although such an understanding of a representing subject stems from Descartes, it is with Kant that it achieves its clearest formulation. With Descartes, there still remained a theological component, namely God, that completed his views

on the representing subject. Only with Kant is God removed from the sphere of rational thought and treated entirely as a matter of faith. Thus, the subject of rational thought under the Kantian philosophy is divorced from any theological components. And it is with such a Kantian representing subject that contemporary thought has the greatest affiliation. Indeed, Kant articulated, and developed, the notion of subjectivity in such a way that contemporary thought still revolves around the issues that he indicated. The emergence of our contemporary Kantian notion of subjectivity is thus recent. Although representation itself was not born with Kant, it is with him that it took a certain position in thought with respect to its relation to the subject. Prior to the Kantian critique, representation had a curious, interesting role that Kant reformulated to his own needs.

In what Foucault terms the Classical Age, which occupied most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, representation was situated in a certain conception of the world, of being, that viewed the individual as a part of being, without questioning the mode by which the individual was aware of being.¹ For this period, the individual and the world are creations of God, and a person's role is to understand the ordering of this creation, of being. The world is God's world, and has to it a certain ordering which an individual can come to know.

Knowledge in the Classical Age meant the realisation of order within being. And this order was to be verified with certainty according to the strict tabulation of identities and differences, beginning with resemblances. The nature of this knowledge was, therefore, representational for it re-presented the order of being to the individual.

Consciousness, however, did not have as one of its functions the power to represent, but was regarded as itself being the realm of representations. An individual, as a being created by God, had the special ability to represent, and therefore to know the world. The question demanding the grounds for the ability to represent could not arise in the Classical Age, for consciousness itself was regarded as being simply the realm of representations that re-presented the world of God, and posited themselves as such representatives. Thus, the representing subject was not itself questioned, nor could it have been questioned. It was considered as an object similar to the collection of other objects created by God. The individual was only one such object within the collection.

What allowed for the link between representations and being, what enabled human nature and nature to intersect, was language. As Dreyfus and Rabinow comment:

... nature and human nature [were] linked together. Human nature [had] a special role in relation to nature that turn[ed] on the human activity of knowing.... They [were] linked together by the power of discourse. Representation and being c[ame] together in discourse, that is, language insofar as it represents.²

But, as Foucault remarks, language as it was conceived of during the Classical Age must not be placed at a great distance from thought; for, discourse in that Age was merely "representation itself represented by verbal signs."³

According to Foucault,

[t]he language of the Classical [A]ge [was] much closer to the thought it [was] charged with expressing than is generally supposed; but it [was] not parallel to it; it [was] caught in the grid of thought, woven into the very fabric it [was] unrolling. It [was] not an exterior effect of thought, but thought itself.⁴

We might say with Deleuze that the Classical Age "is the world of infinite representation" where "the forces within man enter into a relation with those forces that raise things to infinity", creating the God-form.⁵ By speaking in terms of the forces within man, Deleuze does not presuppose a Man-form, but only the existence of "places, points of industry, a region of the existent."⁶ In the Classical Age, such places, such forces, enter into a relation with other forces that are construed as a limitation that can be raised to infinity - to the infinitely perfect. Thus, according to Deleuze,

the compound created from the confrontation between the forces within man, on the one hand, and the forces that raise to infinity, on the other, is not a Man-form but the God-form.⁷

The Man-form only appears as a result of a mutation, a rupture in thought that allows the forces in man to enter into a relation with forces that are finite.

This rupture in thought marks for Foucault the rise of the Modern Age, which starts around the beginning of the nineteenth century. At this time, to use Deleuze's words, "the forces within man enter into a relation with new forces from the outside, which are forces of finitude."⁸ Then, in a second stage, the realisation of finitude from the outside folds inwards creating the Man-form. Whereas the Classical Age is characterised by a confrontation with forces that raise to infinity, the unfold, the Modern Age, is characterised by a confrontation with forces of finitude, the fold, creating the Man-form.⁹

According to Foucault, a certain mutation in thought occurs around the time of the Kantian philosophy.¹⁰ Man, as the measure of all things, the 'I', is born, and replaces the God of the Classical Age who posited and guaranteed representations. As Dreyfus and Rabinow comment:

Man, who was once himself a being among others, now is a subject among objects. But Man is not only a subject among objects, he soon realizes that what he is seeking to understand is not only the objects of the world but himself. Man becomes the subject and object of his own understanding.¹¹

Thus, language is no longer a transparent link with nature, allowing for a human intersection with the world, but is regarded as itself being in a certain sense problematic.

Accompanying this mutation in thought, a secondary mutation occurs. Man, realising his finitude, places himself in God's seat. Rather than undertaking an analysis of representations, he embarks upon an analytic, asking for the

conditions in man that make representations possible. The question becomes: Given this finitude, how are representations possible?

Dreyfus and Rabinow capture this secondary mutation by commenting that man, having realised his finitude, does not view it as an imposition on him, "due to his intermediate place in the great table of beings, but as somehow decreed or imposed" by him.¹² "Thus in a startling inversion man claims total knowledge by virtue of his limitations."¹³

Modern thought, therefore, gives birth to the representing subject, the 'I', as a subject of knowledge. Man, having realised his finitude, undertakes the project of demonstrating how this finitude serves as the ground for all knowledge. And it is Kant who undertakes this project, and against whom Nietzsche responds. We must, therefore, explicate Kant at least far enough to allow us to see against whom Nietzsche is responding.

3. THE CULTIVATION OF THE 'I'

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant begins by accepting that our experience of the world involves the formulation of different representations.¹⁴ And this is evident in the Transcendental Deduction, in which he seeks to discover the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, by way of representations. As he states at A97:

...we must first of all consider, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution, the subjective sources which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience.

If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected.

But this also reveals to us a further assumption. A subject of experience is to be the point where this experience is realised, and that which makes such an experience possible. And this is hardly surprising. As Brook comments:

There can be no awareness of something that is not *someone's*. Every representation of something represents it to *someone*. Every intention is intended by *someone*. Every action is the action of *some agent*. Everything meant by an utterance is meant by *someone*. That is why we must postulate a subject.¹⁵

Indeed, even Nietzsche appears to be committed to the postulation of such a subject, as I suggest in chapter one. It appears to be virtually impossible to avoid such a reference without falling into some sort of an absurdity. But this is a point that we must eventually explore. For now, we must continue with Kant.

Given that we do have experience, Kant distinguishes between the passive and the active elements of our experience. Intuitions, the passive element, are blind without the categories and the different features of the subject. Similarly, our a priori subjective abilities are useless without intuitions.

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.¹⁶

Intuitions, then, are the raw material for the mind. They come in two kinds. Pure intuitions are a priori and are space and time. Empirical intuitions are 'given' to the mind and when processed yield objects of representation. Here 'given' cannot mean 'caused' since causality is one of the categories of relation. It only suggests that some input is somehow given to the mind. Also, by 'objects of representation' Kant does not mean "objects capable of existing outside our power of representation."¹⁷ The objects represented are intentional objects.¹⁸ If we desire to discuss an object as existing independently of our mind, then we can only refer to such an object "as something in general = x" since we cannot know anything about such an object.¹⁹

Every empirical intuition contains a manifold which must undergo a threefold synthesis in order for a representation to arise. Beginning with a synthesis of apprehension, the manifold has to be placed in a time sequence where each single 'time slice' will eventually appear as an element of an object. Thus, even though the represented object will appear as a unitary object, its different elements, as given by the manifold of the intuition, have to be placed in a time sequence because each 'time slice' will contain a part of the manifold that will give the mind an 'impression' of the object's element, and the mind cannot receive simultaneous impressions from any

one intuition. Thus, as far as Kant is concerned, "in order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold...it [the manifold] must first be run through, and held together. This act I [Kant] name the synthesis of apprehension."²⁰

Not only must a mind engage in a synthesis of apprehension, but it must also have the capacity for a synthesis of reproduction. In order for an intentional object to be represented as unified at the end of this threefold synthesis, the apprehended manifold parts must be reproduced in an associative manner, according to some rule. The fact that a reproduction, of the different manifold parts of one intuition, is needed is quite evident. Since for any one intuition, its manifold is apprehended across time, the different parts of the manifold have to be brought together at a time if a single, unified object is to be represented at a time. However, this reproduction is not done through memory, or to be more precise, through any memory that the subject is aware of.²¹ It is an unconscious act of the mind, where the subject is unable to 'recognise' anything in the process. In fact, the subject at this stage has no representations.

The final synthesis is that of recognition in a concept. The "manifold of the representation would never...form a whole, [if it were merely reproduced] since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it"²² (my insertion). The apprehended and reproduced

manifold must undergo a synthesis of recognition, which is an act that renders the manifold united. Consciousness is here taken to mean awareness, or more precisely, a state of awareness and is not an act.²³ The act of recognition gives rise to an awareness of the manifold; an awareness that imparts unity to the manifold and recognition in a concept. The fact that an object appears to us as unified is due to awareness imparting unity to the manifold of the object. The nature of awareness is such that it imparts a unity to whatever the subject is aware of, and this is tantamount to recognition in a concept. This is what Kant calls the "unity of consciousness" at A105. It is "what combines the manifold...into one representation."²⁴ The "unity of apperception" introduced at A105 is the unity of the act whereby a concept is applied to the unified manifold. Both the "unity of consciousness" and the "unity of apperception" are simultaneously applied to the manifold and thus, as stated above, imparting unity to the manifold is tantamount to recognition in a concept. Their difference lies in their relation to the manifold. Consciousness is directly related to the manifold, whereas apperception is related to applying a concept to the manifold.

At this stage of the analysis, all we have are single objects of representation. But as far as Kant is concerned, our experience usually involves the representation of many objects simultaneously. Thus, he now considers how it is

possible for us to have such an experience. Moreover, Kant states that there must "be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general...."²⁵ Thus, the empirical synthesis and apperception introduced above require a transcendental condition. And "[t]his original and transcendental condition is no other than *transcendental apperception*."²⁶

This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws.²⁷

Since our experience does not normally involve individual objects but a whole group of objects simultaneously existing together, there is required an act which allows us to have such an experience. This act is transcendental apperception. It is transcendental because it is required for the possibility of experience. Thus, apperception has two aspects to it; an empirical aspect that involves individual objects, and a transcendental aspect that allows for the simultaneous experience of a whole group of objects.

It is at this point that Kant must postulate a transcendental subject, an 'I', that is single and unified, and capable of ensuring that all of experience belongs to this one 'I'. It is not at all clear, from A107 and A108, whether transcendental apperception is this 'I' or whether it is a form of self-awareness.²⁸ What is clear, however,

is that transcendental apperception must be closely linked to a postulated 'I' if it is not itself the 'I'. In these sections, Kant is quite clear about making a distinction between the empirical aspect of the self and the transcendental.

Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named *inner sense*, or *empirical apperception*. What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data. To render such a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible.²⁹

That Kant is here postulating a transcendental 'I' is further shown by his reference to "the identity of the self" at A108.

Thus, for the possibility of experience, a transcendental subject is necessary. And this is all that we need to establish here. What this subject is like, whether anything about it can be known, is another issue. But it is clear, at least from the Second Paralogism, that for Kant

...we designate the subject of inherence only transcendentially, without noting in it any quality whatsoever - in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise.³⁰

Of course, we are still able to become aware of the subject empirically by introspecting our inner states, but this provides us with no knowledge regarding the 'I' as subject of experience.

4. CRITIQUE

Given Kant's account, as it is stated above, it seems that there remain, at least, three issues which need to be addressed.³¹ First, there appears to remain in Kant a miraculous harmony between the terms of the synthesis. Although we are told how each part of the synthesis operates, no account is given of the harmony between each part. For some reason, Kant expects us to follow him in believing that there is such a harmony, without him offering us any explanation for it. Perhaps, transcendental apperception is supposed to be that which allows for such a harmony. However, transcendental apperception is an act of unification. If it is to account for the harmony between the terms of the synthesis, then Kant must offer us an account that would explain how such an act can account for the harmony.

Secondly, Kant does not offer us a truly genetic principle for the synthesis; a principle that does not require any other principle to determine it. Although, at A106, we are told that transcendental apperception is "original", we have no reason to follow Kant in accepting a transcendental condition as being itself unconditioned. For a truly genetic principle, it must be a principle of internal determination. That is, it must be immanent within

the field of experience without being logically situated as a condition for the possibility of experience.

Thirdly, there is a more general objection brought against Kant regarding his distinction between the empirical and the transcendental aspects of subjectivity. As Foucault notes, "a strange empirico - transcendental doublet"³² is created when man "is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible."³³ For Kant, the transcendental aspect of subjectivity is what allows for the possibility of knowledge and yet, it is through our empirical awareness of subjectivity that this a priori condition is derived. As such, not only is the Kantian subject that which is necessary for the possibility of knowledge, but it is itself an object of knowledge from which this a priori requirement is obtained. On the one hand, the subject is an empirical and finite object existing among other objects, and yet this same finite subject is the necessary condition for the possibility of all knowledge. If knowledge is possible only through the transcendental aspect of subjectivity, then how can we know this a priori condition through an *empirical* awareness of subjectivity? There appears to be some contradiction operating in the claim that through empirical knowledge we arrive at the a priori condition for the possibility of all knowledge. It would seem that, at least, one piece of knowledge is

possible without the a priori condition for knowledge - namely, knowledge of the a priori condition itself.

5. NIETZSCHE AND SUBJECTIVITY

We know that for Hume the basic distinction was between impressions and ideas. Experience provided us with impressions out of which we generated ideas or representations. For him, all our knowledge was ultimately derived from experience, from the impressions that we receive. We do not find in Hume any Kantian categories that modify the given, nor any notion of a principle of unification similar to Kant's transcendental apperception. Indeed, for Hume, there is no subject similar to the Kantian transcendental 'I' that is required for experience to be possible. Looking inside himself, Hume could not find any simple 'I' to be labelled as such. As he tells us:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade,.... I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him.¹⁴

Unlike Kant and his network model of experience, a network of categories and transcendental apperception, Hume did not believe in the mind's participation in the production of knowledge. It is Kant who corrects Hume by insisting upon the production involved in knowledge.

However, Kant was wrong in insisting that such a production must be the result of an a priori network of categories and transcendental apperception. By placing the tools of production at such a distance from the field of experience, Kant further removes us from this field, imposing a whole framework upon the manifold before the possibility of representations. For Kant, representations are not simply given to the mind but must first be generated by a synthesis before the mind is capable of being aware of any such representations. Thus, the mind has certain a priori abilities that allow for the possibility of knowledge. A part of these abilities is the mind's power to unify both individually represented objects and objects given in one experience. It is this unity of representations that is ultimately the 'I' that Hume was searching for through introspection.

If there is a victory of Kant over Hume, then it is at the cost of removing us further from the field of experience. Again, I repeat, Kant was right to insist upon the production involved with experience, but wrong in placing the tools of production in an a priori synthesising subject. By placing the tools of production in such a subject, Kant further subjugates being to knowing.

For Nietzsche, there is an alternative route to be taken from Hume, a route that Kant should have taken with his notion of synthesis. It is a route that gives a priority

to the field of experience over knowledge and thought. In Kant, Nietzsche saw a betrayal of Hume's empiricism rather than a solution to Hume's problem of causality, as Kant claimed to be providing.³⁵ For Nietzsche, Kant's reply to Hume is a further attack on empiricism and an increased denial of the field of experience. By making it impossible to experience the given without some a priori synthesising subject, Kant further subjugates the field of experience to a knowing subject. However, Kant was right to insist upon the notion of production. But this production need not be at a great distance from the field of experience. Through forces, will to power and eternal return, Nietzsche makes production immanent within the field of experience. In this way, he combines the fallibilism of Hume's empiricism with the notion of production. He removes synthesis out of the Kantian subject and places it within the field of experience.

Nietzsche's ontology, as I have presented it in the previous chapter, is at the same time empiricist and pluralist. And, as Deleuze says, his "philosophy cannot be understood without taking his essential pluralism into account."³⁶ But, as we shall see again in chapter four, his empiricism is not a return to Hume's psychological model where the field of experience is given. It is not an empiricism that seeks to give an account of how the sensible

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becomes intelligible. Such an empiricism continues to subjugate the field of experience to a knowing subject.

For Nietzsche, the field of experience is itself prior to any notion of subjectivity. As pure becoming it is not made subordinate to knowing or to thought. It is not some established realm that is given to some subject. It is a field of forces, will to power and eternal return, where these notions are immanent in the field as experience itself. They are immanent in the field without attempting to abstract any generalisations from the field. In this way, Nietzsche's empiricism is a concern for the specificity of the empirical. The empirical is not given to some 'X', but is that which is experience itself as forces, will to power and eternal return.

Although Nietzsche is closer to Hume than to Kant, his proximity to Hume is soon transformed into a difference from Hume once Nietzsche's different empiricism is taken into consideration. This different notion of the empirical that concerns itself with the very specificity of the empirical, rests on a critique of representation that we must take into consideration. However, before presenting Nietzsche's criticism of representation, we must see what such models of experience entail.

Any model of experience, whether Kantian or otherwise, that describes experience in terms of representations, must out of necessity be a model that postulates a realm that is

distinct from the field of experience itself. In other words, in being a representationalist model of experience, a realm for representations must be posited. Representations are after all a re-presentation of something, and as such there is a distinction made between the representations and what they are about. Whether the representations must belong to someone is debatable. For Hume, there is no someone apart from the particular representations. The mind is just a collection of such representations. For Kant, on the other hand, the representations must belong to someone because it is this someone that initially allows for the production of representations.

Nietzsche saw in all such models of representation a certain falsification of the field of experience. Such a falsification stems not from the inability to accurately represent, but from the establishment of a realm of experience - namely, the realm of representations - that does not necessarily change with any changes in the objects of such representations. The realm of pure becoming, the field of experience itself, is for Nietzsche a field in constant flux. Representations, once formed, provide a realm that is distinct from the field of experience, thereby falsifying the nature of pure becoming as a field in constant flux. If the field of experience is in constant flux, then any representation of this field is bound to falsify it; as the representation is formed, the object has changed. As we saw

earlier, pure becoming operates in a time where there is no notion of a present but only a past and a future.

Representations, by being representations, attempt to ascribe a present to a field in which the present always escapes. They try to subjugate this field to knowing. This is why representationalist accounts of experience are a falsification of the field of experience.

Nietzsche wants to present an account of experience, an empiricism, that does not subjugate experience to a knowing subject. His different sense of subjectivity, then, must be a non-representationalist account of the notion that remains immanent in the field of experience. With neither Hume nor Kant is such an account possible, for they both rely on representations. Hume indicated the problem of subjectivity by in effect asking the question "how is the subject constituted in the given?"³⁷ It is this question that Nietzsche answers by formulating a sense of subjectivity immanent within the field of experience. Kant, on the other hand, does not reply to Hume by answering this question. For him, the question is "given that we do have experience of representations, what must the subject be like for such experience to be possible?"

So far, we have a sense of the field in which Nietzsche's account of subjectivity is situated. We know, from above, that Nietzsche, unlike Kant, does not begin by asking for the conditions in a subject that would allow

experience but, rather, by asking for the possibility of subjectivity in a field of experience. For Nietzsche the issue is how subjectivity is to be realised immanently in the field of experience. How is subjectivity to be constituted within a realm of forces? But we know also that a body is a constellation of forces and is therefore a multiplicity and a plurality of different forces.

Nietzsche's sense of subjectivity considers the subject as a constellation of forces, as a type, a body, within the surface of pure becoming. For Nietzsche, we must understand subjectivity for what it really is: a union of forces forming a body. As he says 'Of the Despisers of the Body':

But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body.

The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman.

Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call 'spirit', is also an instrument of your body, a little instrument and toy of your great intelligence.

You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'.³⁸

And, as Deleuze comments, in such a body,

[a]ctive and reactive are precisely the original qualities which express the relation of force with force. Because forces which enter into relation do not have quantity without each of them having, at the same time, the quality corresponding to their difference in quantity as such.³⁹

But in being the "original" qualities, active and reactive are not original in the Kantian sense. They are not

equivalent to transcendental apperception, which is for Kant an original condition.⁴⁰ With Kant, experience is simply not possible without transcendental apperception. It is an a priori condition that allows for experience, and is thus labelled by him as an original condition. As that which allows us to access the field of experience, transcendental apperception is not given in this field but determines it. Active and reactive, on the other hand, as original qualities of forces are immanent within the field of experience. They are original qualities in so far as they are the genetic element of the will to power as it conditions forces, imparting a quality to each force. Active and reactive, as original qualities, are the immanent condition of the relation of force with force; which is itself a differential in quantity.

The fundamental difference between Kant and Nietzsche rests with the notion of synthesis. For Kant, the field of experience cannot be experienced without a synthesising subject. A synthesis must be performed by a unifying subject before experience is possible. It is a synthesis resulting in a fixed representation/s present to the mind at a moment in time. With Nietzsche, no such Kantian synthesis is even possible, for the present can never be captured. As such, Nietzsche's notion of synthesis is not a synthesis resulting in a fixed and permanent being. Indeed, a being can never be obtained in the field of experience for it is in constant

flux. It is a synthesis that approaches a being without ever establishing any such being as a fixed entity. Moreover, the very notion of synthesis is for Nietzsche a plastic notion in that it is not simply what determines experience but is itself simultaneously determined by the field of experience. In other words, for Nietzsche, will to power and eternal return are not some absolute a priori conditions for the possibility of experience. They determine experience *while* they themselves are determined. They are immanent within the field of pure becoming. In this way Nietzsche responds to the Kantian synthesis. By making synthesis immanent within the field of experience he found a truly genetic 'principle' that imparts to each force its quality, while through eternal return he found "the reproduction of diversity at the heart of synthesis".⁴¹

But if the will to power is such a 'principle' of synthesis, then is not Nietzsche open to the objection that this is but another sense of the Kantian subject? In other words, is the will to power not just a whole collection of homunculi replacing the Kantian homunculus? After all, as Dennett comments, "wherever a theory relies on a formulation bearing the logical marks of intentionality, there a little man is concealed."⁴² And the will to power certainly does bear the marks of intentionality.

For a homunculus to be present in a theory that bears "the logical marks of intentionality", experience itself

must be construed as belonging to some 'X', which in this case would be a homunculus. In other words, for a homunculus to be present an experience about something must belong to some 'X'. A homunculus is that to which an experience belongs. Certainly, if will to power is a determining notion only, it can not escape being a "little man" or even the one unifying Kantian subject. As a determining notion only, it would not be immanent within the field of experience but be that which allows for experience. As such, the experience would belong to some 'X'. But will to power is both a determining and a determined notion immanent within experience. As a determining element it is the genetic element of forces, imparting to each force its quality, which simultaneously determines the will to power as the differential element between forces. Thus, in no way is will to power at a distance from the field of forces, having the features of some kind of a homunculus. Experience belongs to will to power as much as will to power belongs to experience. Unlike both Kant and Hume, experience for Nietzsche is not some given, but is will to power and eternal return.

The sense of subjectivity that Nietzsche wishes to establish is a sense that does not remove subjectivity from the field of experience. In this way, subjectivity is an active notion, affirming the field of pure becoming. Consciousness, understood as simple awareness of the type we

associate with animals, is but a development, a feature of some unions of force, that is a reaction to the field of experience. For Nietzsche, consciousness introduces a dichotomy between the field of experience and that which is conscious. It subjugates the field of experience to thought. To be conscious, to be aware of 'X', requires some 'Y' that is not itself 'X' and is that which is aware of 'X'. If we understand this 'X' as the field of experience, then 'Y' must in some sense be at a distance from 'X', reacting to 'X'. And by being a reaction to 'X', 'Y' begins to consider 'X' from its own limited distance, rather than by dissolving itself into 'X', into the field of experience.

This is why for Nietzsche, consciousness is essentially reactive. It creates a distance, or gives the illusion of a distance, a separation, between that which it is aware of and itself. A dog, for example, that is aware of the wall has a sense of distance, of separation between itself and the wall. As such, consciousness is a separation from the field of pure becoming, providing the illusion of beings. Rather than affirming pure becoming, consciousness affirms beings and their distance from itself. That is why it is a characteristic associated with reactive forces. It introduces a sense of subjectivity that is not immanent within the field of experience, thus allowing for the negation of pure becoming.

Self-consciousness as an awareness of an 'I' that is itself conscious, is an even greater form of reactivity than consciousness. Its invention by the Modern Age gave rise to a sense of subjectivity that was much further removed from the field of experience than the subjectivity of ordinary consciousness. The 'I' created a clear dichotomy between the subject and object of experience, thus removing subjectivity from the field of experience and then asking how is experience possible. This is why self-consciousness is a much more extreme form of reactivity, and a state where reactive forces attain domination. Subjectivity, under self-consciousness, involves a total divorce from the field of experience and a positing of an 'I' that is outside of this field.

Subjectivity for Nietzsche is then not itself a reactive notion. What is reactive is the sense that consciousness imparts upon the field of experience which, at an extreme form, is self-consciousness. The distinction in Nietzsche is therefore between the conscious and the unconscious. But we must be careful not to confuse this distinction with the mental/physical distinction. The unconscious is a totally impersonal realm that is constituted by all constellations of force. Consciousness is immanent within this field, and is characterised by the operation of reactive forces. Within the field of forces there are types, and some such types are conscious. Thus,

there is no fundamental distinction between the mental and the physical, nor between the unconscious and the non-conscious. Both of these distinctions are to be seen as collapsed into a single realm of forces that exhibits consciousness as a type.

But so far, we have not seen how a Nietzschean notion of subjectivity, how such a type, is comprised on the surface of forces. We know that it is not some essential subject that remains unchanged. There cannot be an essential self that traverses the field of experience. Subjectivity in Nietzsche's active sense can only be understood as a type, which is itself fragmented and loosely comprised of a collection of 'singularities' or constellations of force.

Within pure becoming there are only constellations of force which are pre-individual 'singularities'.⁴³ They are relations of force to force governed by the will to power. A sense of subjectivity is constituted when a certain number of these 'singularities' are grouped together in a certain way, in a certain relation.⁴⁴ And within such a formulation of 'singularities', consciousness is exhibited by the reactive forces as a relation to an exteriority.

Subjectivity, then, as a body, is a constellation of forces. But this constellation is itself a collection of 'singularities', of other constellations that are predominantly unconscious. We can characterise subjectivity as being a field of intensities, where each intensity is

itself the differential element of forces.⁴⁵ For what is the differential element of forces? It is their quality - active and reactive - and is thus an intensity. Intensity is the quality of forces, and subjectivity is but a field of intensities.

We cannot say that the notion of subjectivity, of individuality, is completely abolished in Nietzsche. But the way in which subjectivity is articulated is radically different from the conscious/self-conscious sense of subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari capture this Nietzschean sense of subjectivity when they comment that

[t]here is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name *haecceity* for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject.⁴⁶

CHAPTER FOUR

PERSPECTIVISM

1. THE LAST QUESTION

We have been leading up to a direct confrontation with Nietzsche's perspectivism. In chapter one, we saw how the epistemological/metaphysical approach to his perspectivism relies on a traditional understanding of perspectivism which is not Nietzsche's. And in chapters two and three we saw why the traditional understanding is not Nietzsche's. Since Nietzsche does not present us with a traditional notion of subjectivity, of 'reality', or of objectivity, his perspectivism cannot be any of our traditional understandings of the notion.

But we have not yet presented an explicit account of Nietzsche's perspectivism. We have not given a positive formulation to what Nietzsche means by perspectivism. The task before us now is to articulate his unique sense of perspectivism, given the ontology and the unique sense of subjectivity presented above. As we shall see, both Nietzsche's ontology and his unique sense of subjectivity are what ultimately shape his perspectivism. This is why I consider his perspectivism to be a general term for his philosophy. To describe it is to unfold the key issues in Nietzsche's philosophy.

2. SENSE, VALUE, HIERARCHY: INTRODUCING PERSPECTIVISM

We have seen how a body, whether biological, physical, social, or political, is constituted by a constellation of forces-in-will to power. And we have seen also how the quality of forces is either active or reactive, and how the qualities of the will to power, as the synthesis of forces, are affirmation and negation. But such an account is still incomplete, for we have not yet explicitly located Nietzsche's pluralism, and how a body may have a plurality of senses associated with it. We have given an account of the field of forces, and have described this surface in chapter two, but we have not explicitly acknowledged how Nietzsche's pluralism operates on this surface, and how a body constituted on such a surface does have a plurality of senses.

A body is a multiplicity, a plurality of forces that dominate and are dominated. And it is these very forces, in their multiplicity, that provide a plurality of senses to a body. There is no fixed essence to a body, no fixed identity that remains unchanged but only a plurality of forces, of senses that are the result of different formations within the constellation of forces constituting a body. We have said above that a body is a constellation of forces synthesised by the will to power. But this 'very constellation of forces is itself a constellation of senses,

of different senses that define a phenomenon. And a phenomenon may have as many different senses as the forces that define it.¹

The will to power determines the synthesis of forces, of senses, thus constituting a particular sense of a phenomenon depending on the forces that are dominating and those that are dominated. But the will to power is itself determined by the synthesis. As we saw above, the will to power determines while itself being determined. Its determination imparts to it its qualities of affirmation and negation which, as we saw, are the affirmation of chance and the negation of pure becoming. But to affirm or to negate chance is to evaluate chance in one way or the other. Thus, the qualities of the will to power are certain valuations. The will to power then determines a sense while itself is determined by value.

But we cannot understand value without the notion of hierarchy, for value is hierarchy. And hierarchy is the ordering of forces that constitute a phenomenon or a body. A body is a constellation of forces; of forces that are active and reactive. A body has as many senses as there are forces capable of influencing it. As such, there is always a multiplicity of senses to a body. But such a constellation of forces is itself a certain hierarchy of forces; a certain ranking of active and reactive forces. Sometimes it is the reactive forces that are ranked higher, while at other times

it is the active forces. And it is this hierarchy of forces itself that is a certain valuation. Value is the hierarchy of forces in a phenomenon.

As such, there is no sense without value. The will to power determines a sense while it is, itself, determined by a certain valuation, a certain hierarchy of forces. This valuation, this hierarchy of forces, is what gives the will to power its qualities of affirmation and negation, of becoming active or becoming reactive. We must recall here the distinction between the qualities of force and those of the will to power. Forces are said to be active or reactive because they are what can, while the will to power is said to be either a *becoming* active or a *becoming* reactive because it is what wills. The hierarchy of forces determines whether the will to power is a becoming active or a becoming reactive, whether it has the quality of affirmation or of negation, and this determination is what is called valuation.²

A phenomenon is, therefore, a complex. It has a plurality of senses and the possibility of different valuations. And this is why interpretation is far from being a simple activity. As we shall see below, sense, value and the will to power (both as that which determines and that which is determined) raise the question of interpretation and of determining the value or the various values of any phenomenon. And this is one of Nietzsche's greatest

contributions to philosophy. He explicitly acknowledged the hidden valuation that is present in any supposedly 'objective' account. Moreover, he made it a critical part of his pluralism by incorporating it into his ontology.

We have introduced sense, value and hierarchy but have not fully unfolded the intricate relationship between these terms and their relation to the will to power. To do so, we must explicitly relate these notions to Nietzsche's perspectivism, and explain how the will to power is a perspective. In other words, we must explain how a phenomenon is a perspective, a multiplicity of perspectives depending on the interpretation.

Any phenomenon is a constellation of forces, of senses, that is determined by the will to power. And the will to power itself, its quality, is determined by the hierarchy of forces constituting the phenomenon. As the synthesis of forces, will to power determines while it is determined. It determines forces by imparting to each force its quality, while it is itself determined by the hierarchy of such forces. But we know, also, that the synthesis is not a synthesis resulting in a fixed being. It does not operate in a time that has a present. As such, the synthesis is itself in constant flux, varying in as many different ways as there are forces capable of defining any given phenomenon.

The nature of any such phenomenon depends on the interpretation of the phenomenon which is a perspective. Since there are always a plurality of senses to any phenomenon, and the possibility of different valuations (for in a realm of flux there are different possibilities of synthesis), there are numerous perspectives to any phenomenon depending on the interpretation. This is not to suggest that there is some essence to a phenomenon that is interpreted, which is the traditional view of perspectivism, but that interpretation is what constitutes a phenomenon with a particular sense and valuation. What a phenomenon is, depends on the interpretation of the will to power and the forces that are taking hold of the phenomenon at the time. But since the will to power and forces are in constant flux, there is never a moment that captures the being of the phenomenon. Any particular interpretation is already a particular perspective. This is what Nietzsche means when he claims that, "'[e]ssence,' the 'essential nature,' is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity."³

It is always a question of interpretation, of arriving at a particular perspective, at a particular sense and valuation. A perspective is therefore the result of a double activity. It is the result of a particular sense and of a particular valuation, resulting from an interpretation. This is why there is no fixed identity, no constant essential

nature. What a phenomenon is depends upon the interpretation.

3. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION

A perspective is an interpretation. It is an interpretation and a valuation of a constellation of forces, of types, situated on a surface of forces, of pure becoming. Since there are only constellations of forces in pure becoming, it is the will to power that interprets and evaluates. What interprets, what has the perspective, is another constellation of forces, other perspectives and valuations. "One may not ask: 'who then interprets?' for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, exists (but not as a 'being' but as a process, a becoming) as an affect."⁴ Thus perspectives can not be escaped. It is always a matter of forming perspectives on other perspectives through perspectives.

How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without "sense," does not become "nonsense"; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in *interpretation* - that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is a hopeless curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there *might* be⁵

Perspectives, then, are what interpret or, what amounts to the same thing, "[t]he will to power interprets".⁶ That is, it seeks to discover the sense and value of any phenomenon. And this is the problem of interpretation and evaluation; the problem of discovering in any phenomenon the state of its forces (which are active, and which are reactive), and the condition of the will to power constituting the phenomenon.⁷ Not only is interpretation the discovery of the sense of any phenomenon, of the state of its forces but, also, it is the discovery of the hierarchy of such forces, and hence the value of any phenomenon.

This is why interpretation and evaluation are far from being simple activities. They require a careful discovery of both the qualities of the forces in any phenomenon and their hierarchy. Not only is a perspective a sense of a phenomenon; it is also a certain valuation. That is why the quality of the will to power constituting any phenomenon must also be discovered. But the issues involved are even more complex, for perspectives are not essences and are therefore susceptible to change depending upon the variation in forces. We must not forget that we are dealing with a field of pure becoming where all forces are related in a flux which has neither a beginning nor an end. Consequently, a variation in the will to power that interprets and a variation in the will to power that is being interpreted

will generate a different perspective; a different sense and value.

But we must not understand such a variation in perspectives and interpretations as entailing that all perspectives have equal value. Indeed, given Nietzsche's ontology, this is not possible. Within the ontology itself there is an immanent 'principle' of evaluation that places a greater value on those perspectives that affirm rather than deny pure becoming. And this immanent 'principle', this internal principle, is will to power. A greater value is placed on perspectives that affirm because they are exhibiting an affirmative will to power, which is an affirmation of chance, an overcoming that dominates chance. That is why we must be careful in deciding whether the will to power in any phenomenon is affirmative or negative. From such an interpretation a perspective is obtained, and the nature of such a perspective determines how we value it. Nietzsche did not object to the positing of values, but demanded that we enquire for the quality of the will to power exhibiting such values. For him, the question is what quality of will to power is exhibiting a particular value.

4. PERSPECTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVITY

We have seen how perspectives operate at an ontological level and how this operation relates to sense,

value and interpretation. But we have not explicitly accounted for the relationship between perspectivism and subjectivity, and we have not yet explained how Nietzsche's notion of perspectivism is asubjective. Thus, we must return to the discussion of subjectivity found in the previous chapter in order to see how that discussion relates to what has been presented subsequently.

From the previous chapter, we know that at the pre-individual level, at the level of pure becoming, there are only constellations of forces determined by the will to power as it is itself determined. Such constellations, such singularities, such intensities, form in a loose and fragmented way some kind of a subjectivity. But such a subjectivity is never some essence, some identity. As we saw with our discussion of forces and will to power, in the flux of pure becoming no such identity can occur. And this is confirmed by the very nature of Nietzsche's perspectivism, which as we saw, maintains a thorough pluralism.

But if this is the nature of subjectivity, and if perspectivism is as it has been described above, then perspectives must surely be pre-subjective, must, in fact, themselves constitute subjectivity. Subjectivity is constituted by a plurality of intensities, of constellation of forces which are nothing other than constellations of will to power as perspectives. The singularities, the intensities that constitute subjectivity are perspectives

with a particular sense and a particular valuation. As such, subjectivity in the Nietzschean sense is a loosely defined notion signifying a collection of perspectives. And it is a loosely defined notion because the singularities that constitute any such subjectivity are themselves perspectives that may change depending upon the sense, value and the will to power involved in interpreting such perspectives.

In its relation to subjectivity, we must understand Nietzsche's perspectivism as that which forms some sense of subjectivity as a plurality of intensities; of different senses and values. We must not regard it as "a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject."⁸ But, given the nature of Nietzsche's subject (subject-N) and the nature of the object as described in chapter two (object-N), could we not still say that a subject-N has a Nietzschean perspective of an object-N? Indeed we can make such a statement. However, if we consider what such a statement implies, we quickly discover that all we are saying is that a perspective has an interpretation of another perspective. And this would be very much in line with Nietzsche's perspectivism. It is an interpretation of an interpretation, and not a description of what is not already an interpretation. As Foucault remarks:

Interpretation can never be brought to an end, simply because there is nothing to interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, because at bottom everything is already interpretation. Each sign is in

itself not the thing that presents itself to interpretation, but the interpretation of other signs.⁹

5. PERSPECTIVISM, ONTOLOGY, EMPIRICISM

The originality and specificity of Nietzsche's perspectivism, which is his ontology, indicates to us the possibility of a different way of thinking. It directs us towards the possibility of remaining faithful to the field of experience in all of its richness. This different thought rests on an empiricism that does not seek to give an account of how the sensible becomes intelligible. It does not describe how a subject can experience the sensible, nor does it describe the necessary conditions for such a subject to have such an experience. It is not an empiricism that begins with a distinction between a subject and the field of experience, asking how such experience is possible. It is an empiricism that begins with "the concrete richness of the sensible"¹⁰ and remains faithful to this field.

Such an empiricism, which is developed in the later works of Deleuze, forms the basic building block of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Nietzsche's perspectives occupy the field of experience without attempting to abstract from it generalisations that are in turn applied to the field. They remain specific to a particular interpretation without establishing any such interpretation as some fixed essence continuing through the field of becoming. The interplay of

forces, which characterise his perspectives, is never brought to a resting point, and is, as such, never abstracted from the field of experience.

What allows for the thought of such an empiricism, is a distinction between "real difference and conceptual difference".¹¹ Conceptual difference, as a difference between concepts, can not capture the difference between each actualization of the sensible, for a concept captures different actualizations of the sensible as belonging to the same concept. In Kantian terms, this means that given different manifolds over a period of time, a concept would determine them as being the same object every time. It does not, and indeed can not, distinguish between the difference in each given manifold. As such, a difference between concepts differs from a real difference of the sensible. The sensible itself, that is the field of experience itself, is different from moment to moment.

It is this real difference in the sensible that Nietzsche's perspectivism captures. Perspectives are the difference in the fluctuations of the will to power and forces. Unlike the Kantian framework that imposes an a priori structure on the sensible, perspectives capture the sensible within its field without imposing any a priori structures on it. In a sense, Nietzsche's perspectivism overturns Kantianism by a return to the Kantian manifold. It is not a question of a subject determining a given manifold

but of realising some sense of subjectivity within a given manifold. The manifold is not adapted to the subject, the subject is adapted to the manifold.

But although Nietzsche's perspectivism is an ontology based upon a non-conceptual empiricism that captures the real difference of the sensible, it is "a transcendental empiricism"¹² where "transcendental" is understood as a "necessary condition" and not as a foundation for knowledge; and where "empiricism" is understood in the above sense as a search for real difference. Nietzsche's empiricism is not a return to some pre-Kantian notion of the empirical, but a return to the empirical that does not subjugate the field to knowledge, as does the Kantian synthesis. As transcendentals, forces, will to power and eternal return are tools for communicating through the empirical without subjugating it. They are tools to experience this field as a field of real difference. They are not some absolute a priori structures imposed by a synthesising subject, but tools which provide access to the field of experience, determining it while they are determined.

In being immanent within the field of experience, Nietzsche's transcendentals become the field of experience. They determine it while they are determined. But this does not imply that they are some ultimate constituents, or some ultimate principle. They are not an essence of the sensible, for there is no such essence. At once, they are the sensible

and an interpretation. And, perhaps this is the point of 'insanity' in Nietzsche's perspectivism. It is at once the realm of experience and a perspective on this realm. It posits itself as the sensible while allowing for the possibility of other ontologies to be posited. It posits itself as the center while simultaneously claiming that every point in the field is a center. As Debra Bergoffen explains, Nietzsche's perspectivism

is not grounded in the claim that this is the true perspective but in the affirmation that decentered perspectivism is less repressive than the absolute perspective of the center.¹³

And I would add that each point is itself a center.

But if Nietzsche's perspectivism is such a radically different notion, a notion that appears to have no resemblance to our traditional understanding of perspectivism, why call it perspectivism? Why not label it by some other word that signifies its radical nature? To our traditional understanding, perspectivism indicates a certain flux, a certain lack of an essence. It is a notion that implies relativity with no fixed point. We regard it as being a point of view belonging to some subject, and not as an objective statement. By its optical root, we consider it to be specific to a particular eye and unable to generalise. But it is precisely this specificity that Nietzsche wants to draw upon and radicalise. He wants to maintain that this specificity is all that there is. For Nietzsche, it is

always a matter of a certain interpretation and valuation. We can not go beyond that without creating fictions.

This implies that perspectives are better than fictions. That is, they are what really is. But if this is the case, then perspectives seem to be another kind of essence! While we can say that they are another kind of 'essence', they are such only if we understand 'essence' in a radically different way. Perspectives are an 'essence' not in the sense of something fixed and permanent to be opposed to what is changing, but in the sense of describing pure becoming as a constant flux, and the approximation of being within such a flux.

CONCLUSION

Kant begins his section on the distinction between phenomena and noumena in the following way:

We have now not merely explored the territory of pure understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth - enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.¹

At this stage of his analysis, Kant has given an account of the application of concepts to the manifold of experience. The understanding, through the application of concepts to the given manifold, provides us with knowledge about the world. But this is an island, according to Kant, that is surrounded "by a wide and stormy ocean". It is the "ocean" of reason, as we see later in his analysis, against which we must guard ourselves because of its deceptive powers. According to Kant, reason, as it pertains to our knowledge of the world, must have only a 'regulative' employment, 'regulating' the understanding and its concepts.² If we venture away from the 'regulative' use of reason, and take its powers to be 'constitutive' of the world, then we fall into illusion, into the "ocean" that surrounds our island. This has been the fate of the dogmatic metaphysics which Kant characterises.³ It took reason to be 'constitutive' of

the world, describing a realm that is completely divorced from the field of experience.

This "ocean", however, seems to be the field of pure becoming that Nietzsche wants us to affirm. In this sense, Nietzsche overturns Kantianism by asking us to dive into the "ocean". But it is not the "ocean" of reason for Nietzsche but of thought. Kant's island is, for Nietzsche, itself an island of reason, of reactive forces that desire to establish this fixed sense of being in an "ocean" of pure becoming. To remain faithful to the field of experience, and to avoid falling into any type of dogmatic metaphysics, we must affirm the field of experience itself without attempting to construct an island within its flux.

Although Kant believed that his island and the 'regulative' use of reason overcome dogmatic metaphysics, in the end, he cannot avoid falling into the trap of dogmatic metaphysics. What dogmatic metaphysics postulated as the truth about the world, is transformed in Kant into 'regulative' ideas. And this transformation is only a different sense of what is 'constitutive'. Consider, for example, the idea of God in its 'regulative' use. Kant states: "I shall not only be entitled, but shall also be constrained, to realise this idea, that is, to posit for it a real object."⁴ But if the 'regulative' use of reason guides and constrains the understanding in a certain way, then is it not by such an operation constituting the field

of experience in a certain indirect way? That is, it constitutes the manifold through the understanding.

Can we not, however, accuse Nietzsche of the same slide into dogmatic metaphysics? Are his notions of forces, will to power and eternal return very different from Kant's concepts and 'regulative' ideas? Indeed they are. For Nietzsche, synthesis is not a feature of some subject that is given a manifold, but a description of the field of experience itself. Forces, will to power and eternal return are not 'principles' that a subject imposes upon the field of experience, but are the field of experience. Moreover, they are not at a distance from the field of experience, which is the case with Kant's concepts and 'regulative' ideas. For Kant, the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason are not given in experience, but determine the given of experience. With Nietzsche, on the other hand, forces, will to power and eternal return are determined by the field of experience as they determine it. Moreover, they are the field of experience which is in constant flux.

What Kant characterises as an "ocean" becomes in Nietzsche the field of pure becoming, describing the possibility of different thought. Ultimately, however, Nietzsche's perspectivism is not a philosophy of thought but of experience, where thought itself collapses into experience. The affirmation of his perspectivism demands a new way of thinking that is a dive into the field of

experience, into a Dionysian realm of pure becoming. Only in such a way can pure becoming and the being of this becoming be affirmed. Attempting to capture such an affirmation through *rational* thought, as is the case with this project, can lead to an approximation only. Ultimately, language is an extremely poor substitute for active affirmation. As Nietzsche remarks:

It is the stillest words which bring the storm. Thoughts that come on doves' feet guide the world.⁵

At a more concrete level, this Nietzschean way of thinking injects into our traditional understanding of ethics, politics, subjectivity and epistemology, a certain fluidity that goes against the sense of permanence we associate with these notions. On the ethical front, Nietzsche's perspectivism indicates the impossibility of establishing any fixed notion of value that somehow transcends the flux of the world. Although values may be posited, it is always a question of 'who' is positing such values, where 'who' refers to the will to power of such a constellation.

On the political side, Nietzsche's perspectivism describes a politics of forces creating a certain space for their operation. It is not a politics of attaining more power, for power is that which wills in the will to power. What it wills is a certain space, a certain configuration of forces that allows it to operate. The space itself is never

fixed and isolated from other forces but is dynamic, constantly rearranging and reconfiguring itself.

With subjectivity, we have seen already how fragile is Nietzsche's sense of the notion. There is no fixed 'I', no permanent subject that traverses the field of experience. Such a sense of subjectivity is the result of reactive forces dominating. To overcome such forces, pure becoming must be affirmed, which results in a sense of subjectivity that we can characterise as a loose configuration of intensities, always changing, never establishing a being.

Finally, on the 'epistemological' front, we must not understand Nietzsche's perspectivism as being an attack on 'knowledge', but as an attack on a particular understanding of 'knowledge'. Nietzsche was not against 'knowledge', but against the idea of establishing some foundation for 'knowledge'. With Kant, for example, such a foundation rests in the subject, subjugating the field of experience to what we can know about it. For Nietzsche, there is no such foundation, nor is there a sense of subjectivity that can subjugate the field of experience without betraying its flux. If we wish to speak about 'knowledge' then we must speak of Nietzsche's perspectivism as 'knowledge'.⁶

Ultimately, however, even if we do not embrace fully Nietzsche's different thought, its influence on our traditional thought is inescapable. As Reinhard Hoppner stated in a recent speech:

Nietzsche's influence led to the fact that other questions are asked by society. That questioning is more radical and, as a result, thinking is different. What more positive thing can one say of a thinker, even if one may have many questions about his thinking?⁷

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING PERSPECTIVISM

1. Fragment 34 as found in G.S.Kirk, J.E.Raven and M.Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd. edition (New York: C.U.P., 1983) 179. References to Xenophanes' fragments are to be found in this text on page 179.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Plato, *Republic*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, tran. by Paul Shorey, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press, 1961; reprint, with corrections, 1963) VI, 502c-511e.

5. This is the issue in the *Parmenides*, especially sections 130e-131e. See Plato, *Parmenides*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, tran. by F.M. Cornford, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press, 1961; reprint, with corrections, 1963).

6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, tran. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967) section 480. Henceforth, I will refer to this work as WP followed by section number.

7. WP, 549.

8. WP, 482.

9. WP, 521.

10. WP, 548.

11. WP, 490.

12. WP, 552.

13. WP, 556.

14. WP, 558.

15. WP, 552.
16. WP, 636.
17. WP, 567.
18. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, tran. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967) third essay, section 12.
19. Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche As Philosopher* (New York: Macmillan, 1965) 68-99.
20. Danto, 77.
21. Brian Leiter, 'Perspectivism in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*' in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, ed. by Richard Schacht (L.A.: University of California Press, 1994) 334-357. Other commentators which adopt an epistemological approach to Nietzsche's perspectivism include Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (Boston: Routledge, 1983), Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1985) 42-73; Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (New York: C.U.P., 1990) 127-158.
22. Leiter, 334.
23. Leiter, 350.
24. Danto, 80.
25. For example, see Ruediger Herman Grimm, 'Circularity and Self-Reference in Nietzsche', *Metaphilosophy*, Vol.10, Nos.3 and 4, July/October 1979, 289-305. Also, see Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker* (New York: C.U.P., 1994) 18-19.
26. Leiter, 334.
27. Leiter, 350.
28. Grimm, 289-292.
29. Grimm, 290.
30. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, tran. by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983). Henceforth, I will refer to this work as NP followed by page number.

CHAPTER TWO: ONTOLOGY

1. Stephen Houlgate, "Kant, Nietzsche and the 'Thing In Itself'", *Nietzsche-Studien*, Vol. 22, 1993, 115-157.

2. A50/B74-A51/B75. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Kant are from *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tran. by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1933). References to A and B indicate references to passages in the first and second editions, respectively.

3. A42/B59.

4. A256.

5. A251-A252.

6. Houlgate, 142.

7. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, tran. by E.F.J. Payne in two volumes (New York: Dover, 1969).

8. Although much of Western Philosophy since Kant is epistemology and the subjugation of being to knowing, this subjugation goes back to Plato. It is against such a subjugation that the Nietzsche-Deleuze ontology must be understood. Deleuze's Nietzsche insists upon the priority of 'being' over knowing, and indeed over thought.

9. NP, 76.

10. See, for example, Plato's *Parmenides*, 130e-131e.

11. For Plato. see *Republic*, 509d-511e; and *Sophist*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, tran. by F.M. Cornford, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press, 1961; reprint, with corrections, 1963) 236b. For Deleuze, see *The Logic of Sense*, tran. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas (London: Athlone Press, 1990) 1-3. Henceforth, I will refer to this work as LS followed by page number.

12. LS, 2.

13. See Plato, *Philebus*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, tran. by R. Hackforth, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press, 1961; reprint, with corrections, 1963) 23c-25a; and *Parmenides*, 154-155.

14. Plato, *Phaedrus*, in R. Hackforth's, *Plato's Phaedrus* (New York: C.U.P., 1952) 248a-e.

15. *Republic*, Book IX.

16. Plato's reasons for postulating a realm of being are given in the *Letters*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, tran. by L.A. Post, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press, 1961; reprint, with corrections, 1963) letter VII. He believed that the moral degeneration of his period was caused by the relativism of the Sophists who based their epistemology on the world of becoming. The solution, according to Plato, was the development of a new epistemology and metaphysics that resulted in the study of stable 'objects' so that whoever studied them came to the same conclusion. Hence, his realm of being.

17. LS, 257.

18. Dorothea Olkowski, 'Monstrous Reflection: Sade and Masoch - Rewriting the History of Reason' in *Crisis in Continental Philosophy*, ed. by A.B. Dallery and C.E. Scott with P. Holley Roberts (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990) 190.

19. LS, 2.

20. LS, 258-9.

21. Robert John Ackermann, *Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) 118.

22. NP, 40.

23. WP, 660.

24. NP, 42.

25. NP, 40.

26. WP, 619.

27. Béla Egyed, 'Tracking Nihilism: Heidegger to Nietzsche to Derrida', in *Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism*, ed. by Tom Darby, Béla Egyed and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton U. Press, 1989) 6.

28. NP, 53.

29. NP, 50.

30. Ibid.

31. NP, 54.

32. NP, 62.

33. The affiliation here is with Spinoza and his notions of substance, attributes and affections.

34. WP, 635.

35. F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, tran. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966) sec. 186.

36. WP, 46.

37. NP, 85.

38. NP, 85-6.

39. LS, 58-65.

40. LS, 61.

41. LS, 62.

42. LS, 162.

43. NP, 50.

44. F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, tran. by R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1979) 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra'.

45. NP, 48.

46. WP, 617.

47. See Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze; An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1993) 6.

48. NP, 75-7.

49. NP, 48.

CHAPTER THREE: SUBJECTIVITY

1. On the nature of representation in the Classical Age, I am referring to Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1970) Ch. 3. I rely also on Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1983) Ch. 2, and on Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault's archaeology of scientific reason* (New York: C.U.P., 1989) Ch. 4.

2. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 20.

3. Foucault, 81.

4. Foucault, 78.

5. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, tran. and ed. by Seán Hand (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1988) 125. Henceforth, I will refer to this work as F followed by page number.

6. F, 124.

7. F, 125.

8. F, 126.

9. F, 129.

10. Foucault, Ch. 9.

11. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 28.

12. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 29.

13. Ibid.

14. A97.

15. Andrew Brook, *Kant and the Mind* (New York: C.U.P., 1994) 26.

16. A51/B75.

17. A104.
18. See, for example, Brook, 26.
19. A104.
20. A99.
21. See Brook, 127-8.
22. A103.
23. See Brook, 128-30.
24. A103.
25. A106.
26. A106-7.
27. A108.
28. See Brook, 144-51.
29. A107.
30. A355.
31. For the first two issues that follow, see NP, 51-2.
32. Foucault, 318.
33. Ibid.
34. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd. edition, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: O.U.P., 1978) 252.
35. Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come forth as a Science*, in *Kant: Selections*, ed. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1988) 156-233. Kant's reference to Hume and the claim that he is solving Hume's problem is to be found in the introduction of the work.
36. NP, 4.
37. Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, tran. by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1991) 87. Though Deleuze is here indicating how Hume singled out this "empirical problem", I believe that it is also a Nietzschean problem.

38. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, tran. by R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1969) part one.

39. NP, 40.

40. A106.

41. NP, 52.

42. Daniel Dennett, *Brainstorms* (Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books, 1978) 12.

43. LS, 109.

44. Ibid.

45. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, tran. by Paul Patton (London: Athlone Press, 1994) 222.

46. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, tran. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1987) 261.

CHAPTER FOUR: PERSPECTIVISM

1. NP, 4.
2. On sense, value and hierarchy, see NP, 3-8.
3. WP, 556.
4. Ibid.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tran. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974) section 374.
6. WP, 643.
7. See NP, 53 and 67.
8. Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, tran. by Tom Conley (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1993) 20.
9. M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', tran. by Alan D. Schrift in *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy*, ed. by Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) 64.
10. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, tran. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1987) 54.
11. For this distinction, I rely on Bruce Baugh, 'Deleuze and Empiricism', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 1993, 15-31. Here, Baugh's reference is to Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). Unless a specific reference is made, the ideas expressed in this section of my work rely on both Baugh's article and on Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*.
12. Baugh, 15.

13. Debra B. Bergoffen, 'Nietzsche's Madman: Perspectivism without Nihilism', *Nietzsche as Postmodernist*, ed. by Clayton Koelb (New York: The State University of New York Press, 1990) 57.

CONCLUSION

1. B294-B295.
2. See the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic beginning at A642/B670.
3. See the preface to the first or second edition.
4. A677/B705.
5. Zarathustra, 'The Stillest Hour'.
6. This has been done already in the philosophy of science, particularly in the work of Feyerabend. For example, see Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: New Left Books, 1975).
7. This is an extract from the speech given by Reinhard Hoppner, the Premier of Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, at the memorial ceremony held on 15, October, 1994, in memory of Nietzsche. See, 'God may be dead but Nietzsche's making a comeback', in the *Globe and Mail*, 14 November, 1994.

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