Abstract

This study examines the practice of Brazil’s humanitarian and development cooperation with Haiti. Brazil is one of several “emerging donors” to have significantly increased their provision of development cooperation over the past decade as part of broader shifts in global political economy, raising questions as to how cooperation functions in terms of these powers’ broader foreign policy objectives. The dissertation situates the question in literature that asks why states are motivated to provide development cooperation, how cooperation impacts recipient states, and expectations for the foreign policy behaviour of emerging countries in general, and for Brazil specifically. The project is based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Brazil and Haiti with 57 individuals and groups in Portuguese, French, and English, as well as Kreyól (with the assistance of an interpreter).

In contrast to the current treatment of the objectives of a state in providing development cooperation, which remains focused on Western powers, I demonstrate empirically how cooperation has supported Brazil as a specifically “post-neoliberal” emerging power (meaning an interventionist state committed to balancing market concerns with other social, political and economic objectives). I argue that Brazilian cooperation has been positively received by Haitian authorities, resulting in clear (albeit short-term) political gains, mainly because of Brazil’s commitment to capacity-building through direct engagement with Haitian officials. However, in approaching aid as a practice, I further conclude that the features of cooperation and the Haitian state’s response are inexplicable without a post-colonial interpretation that situates cooperation in historically constituted political economies by, for instance, recognizing Brazil’s desire to position itself as an alternative to the West and Haiti’s consistent and problematic treatment as “fragile” in its traditional aid relations. I develop the concept of “post-colonial practice” to acknowledge how emergent forms of South-South cooperation occur in and challenge this broader context. This approach forges links between material and ideational contributions in IR, especially from critical political economy and post-colonial work (as well as post-development).
Acknowledgements

This work has truly been a collaborative effort. I would first like to thank my dissertation committee for their continuous support, professional and personal, and for their intellectual guidance, which has enriched the end product in countless ways. Sean Burges has been a source of inspiration for thinking about Brazilian politics and Brazilian foreign policy, even before he was a member of the committee. Chris Brown, thank you in particular for asking tough methodological questions at the start of the process. Cristina Rojas, I am indebted to your influence for the evolution in my theoretical and conceptual understandings of international relations. I am profoundly grateful for the indescribable support of my supervisor, Laura Macdonald, especially when life intervened in unpredictable ways. I especially appreciate your enthusiasm for the project, your respect for my perspective and objectives, and for somehow offering the perfect suggestions at the right moments. I have tremendous respect for you personally, and as a teacher and researcher.

More generally, I would like to express my thanks to the faculty, staff, and students who have all positively contributed to my experience at Carleton, whom are too numerous to thank individually. Thank you to my students for always reminding me why I study Political Science. A special thanks also goes to my mentor and friend Stephen Brown at the University of Ottawa.

I would also like to sincerely thank all of those that contributed to the realization of the fieldwork in Brazil and Haiti. To all of my respondents, I appreciate how generous you were with your time, and for your trust in sharing your insights with me. I also would not have been able to carry out the research so easily or effectively without the support of the BRICS Policy Centre in Rio de Janeiro, Viva Rio in Port-au-Prince, and the Food and Agricultural Organization also in Port-au-Prince.

Thank you to all of my friends and family for supporting me throughout this process. A special thanks goes to Zoe for always reading and discussing my projects with me. To Henry, the newest member of the family, who quite literally kicked me into high gear as I wrote many of these chapters: you are the brightest light. To Graeme: thank you for making it so easy to pursue this, with your unwavering encouragement and constant optimism.

Finally, this project was significantly enabled by the financial support given to me by Carleton University, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and Mitacs.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to Heather.
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Acronyms

ABC – Brazilian development agency / Agencia Brasileira da Cooperação
BNDES - Brazil’s National Economic and Social Development Bank / Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CCI – Interim Cooperation Framework / Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire
CEP – Provisional Electoral Council / Conseil Électoral Provisoire
CGFome – General Coordination of International Actions to Combat Hunger / Coordenação Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
Embrapa – Brazil’s Agricultural Research Corporation / Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária
FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization
GPEDC - Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
IFIs – International Financial Institutions
IMF – International Monetary Fund
Ipea - Institute for Applied Economic Research / Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
IO – International Organization
Fiocruz – Oswaldo Cruz Foundation / Fundação Oswaldo Cruz
MARND – Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development / Ministère de l’agriculture des ressources naturelles et du développement rural
MINUSTAH - The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MSPP – Ministry of Public Health and Population / Ministère de la santé publique et de la population
MRE - Ministry of External Relations (Itamaraty) / Ministério dos Relações Exteriores
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NGO – Non-governmental Organization
NIEO – New International Economic Order
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD - The Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation
PMDB – Brazilian Democratic Movement Party / Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
PNH – Haitian National Police / Police Nationale d’Haïti
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSDB - Brazilian Social Democratic Party / Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PT – Worker’s Party / Partido dos Trabalhadores
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme
SSC – South-South Cooperation
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
WFP – World Food Programme
WTO – World Trade Organization
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Chapter: Introduction

Brazil’s emergence as a global power has a number of implications for global development. While Brazilian South-South Cooperation for development is by no means “new,” since Brazil began providing development assistance in the 1970s, the level of its spending increased significantly under the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) governments beginning in 2003, before declining sharply in the final years of PT rule. In particular, the first decade of the 2000s witnessed a transformation of Brazilian policy towards the South, with development cooperation an important feature of this shift. From 67 projects and isolated activities (described below) that were new or in execution in 2004, Brazilian cooperation peaked at 783 projects in 2011 (ABC, 2012). As measured in one study, between 2005 and 2009 Brazilian South-South Cooperation essentially doubled: from US$158 million to $362 million (Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). Not surprisingly given the slowdown in the Brazilian economy, officials in Itamaraty (another name for Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations - Ministério dos Relações Exteriores, MRE) noted that the cooperation budget was cut during the first two years (2011-2013) of the Dilma Rousseff presidency. In 2013, the number of projects and activities that were new or in execution dropped suddenly to 472, and further declined to 385 in 2014 (ABC, 2012). Revealingly, only 79 of these projects were new in 2013, and only 59 in 2014 (ibid). Nevertheless, the dollar amounts do not adequately represent Brazilian efforts, as I will explain further below, due to the particular institutional set-up of Brazilian cooperation. As well, despite this reduction, under the PT administrations Brazil remained a major contributor to the global development effort, ranking 6th of non-traditional donors providing what the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development) calls “ODA-like” (Official Development Assistance) flows\(^1\) (OECD, 2014).

Outwardly, Brazil has accompanied its global projection with a questioning of global power relations, suggesting the country is committed to addressing global poverty and inequality. As one foreign policy vehicle, its provision of development cooperation forms part of this attempt, with the Brazilian government, based on their own history as a recipient of development aid, viewing aid as one way in which traditional global powers have perpetuated global asymmetries. More significant than the change in volume, then, is whether Brazil has been more effective in achieving global development solutions through its cooperation. Similarly, the record of the PT in power domestically has been described as “neo-developmentalist” or “New Left” (see Leubolt, 2013; 2015) in order to capture how its policies have appealed to large-scale domestic capital and civil society and social movements (Boito & Berringer, 2014). The concept of New Left or post-neoliberal refers to a general proclivity in many South American governments towards greater state involvement in managing the economy and distributing social gains, which are a direct refutation of the prescriptions of neoliberal policy (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Macdonald & Ruckert, 2009; Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). Thus, beyond the notion that the provision of cooperation from an emerging power is based in Brazil’s own history as an aid recipient, I examine how it is also influenced by the donor’s economic model

\(^1\) The OECD estimates that Brazilian financing for development follows China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and India (OECD, 2014). Since South-South Cooperation involves complicated links between cooperation flows and trade and investment activities, what these donors consider to be development assistance may not match the OECD definition of ODA (UNCTAD, 2010). The OECD definition refers to aid as “i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii) each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent” (OECD, 2008, n.p.).
(Feldmann, Lengyel, Malacalza & Ramalho, 2012), broadly understood. In short, the project seeks to embed cooperation in structural determinants that result from Brazil’s position in the global political economy, as well as domestic influences.

Taking the timeframe of the PT in power as the boundary of the study (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government from 2003-2010 and Dilma Rousseff’s from 2011-2015), I consider why Brazil has been perceived as a “softer, friendlier” donor at the same time that South-South Cooperation has been viewed as crucial for the realization of such foreign policy objectives as increased economic ties and greater political influence. I ask: What does Brazilian development and humanitarian cooperation achieve for Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power?

The dissertation shows how cooperation uniquely helps to secure Brazil’s global power ambitions. Brazilian cooperation has been positively received by Haitian authorities, resulting in clear (albeit short-term) political gains, mainly because of Brazil’s commitment to capacity-building through direct engagement with Haitian officials, and because projects respond to socio-economic priorities. In short, these perceptions result from differences in the processes and content of cooperation, which in many ways represent a fuller adherence to a number of global aid effectiveness principles while also realizing key South-South objectives. In approaching aid as a practice, I further conclude that the features of cooperation and the Haitian state’s response are inexplicable without a post-colonial interpretation that, for instance, recognizes Brazil’s desire to position itself as an alternative to the West and Haiti’s consistent and problematic treatment as “fragile” in its traditional aid relations. I develop the concept of “postcolonial practice” to acknowledge how emergent forms of South-South cooperation
occur in this broader context: a racialized political economy. The post-colonial is thus taken as the particular social structure in which cooperation takes place. Its features, which range from the political and economic marginalization of rural Haitians to the primacy both nations place on sovereignty, are determining of the logic of cooperation and its political significance. Secondly, my use of the post-colonial, as I return to below, is as a way to acknowledge and value the vision of cooperation being put forward by Brazil.

Rather than begin from the assumption of various foreign policy motivations in determining cooperation, I instead start from a much more micro-level exploration of the patterns of Brazilian practice, maintaining, as I return to below, that this view ultimately provides a much more complete answer as to how cooperation works as a foreign policy vehicle - and specifically for a post-neoliberal power. While I recognize that such an approach cannot definitively answer the question of motivations, especially as outcomes can be unintended, it helps reveal the logics that cooperation builds and sustains, as these very logics become unified and coherent through action itself. For instance, Brazil’s position around its own prosperity hinging on the reform of the global political economy so as to benefit all developing nations (Burges, 2017; Cervo, 2010; MRE, 1993; Saraiva, 2007) is manifest in its practice of ensuring that its key cooperation partners decide and manage activities.

The main analytical contributions of the project reside in its innovative approach to understanding Brazilian cooperation as a practice. In a number of existing theories, the decision to extend aid is understood in instrumental terms. In his “political theory of foreign aid” for example, Morgenthau (1962) contends that aid, like military politics, is a
weapon in the “political armory of the nation” (p. 309), meaning it should support the broader pursuit of a state’s national interest. More recent IR theorizing has made significant progress in recognizing how the practice of politics is also fundamentally sociological. For constructivists, for example, concepts like the “national interest” are not exogenous to a society but rather a social product (Wendt, 1999). However, variants of constructivism, as represented by scholars like Wendt (1999) and Reus-Smit (1997), are also not sufficient as they do not specify whose values are being constituted, which agents shape beliefs, etc. (Morton, 2005, p. 505). Instead, post-colonial scholarship offers an important foundation for examining how social relations are also marked by race, and how racialized hierarchies operate in post-colonial contexts (see Chowdry & Nair, 2002). While this scholarship is valuable in stressing the content of ideas and the actions that they enable however, there remains an important sense in which they, like much of IR scholarship, are unable to capture the dynamism of the practice of international relations. Colonial and post-colonial representations of developing nations and populations can be portrayed as static portraits making possible certain interventions, and not as crystalized in micro-level practices that work to form these very ideas. For example, many aid analyses focus on how problematic representations sustain ineffective projects (Abrahamsen, 2001; Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1994; Ferguson, 1994, etc.) – not as negotiated and produced through these very projects. In other words, post-colonial works can direct us to what ideas are significant and how they function as part of specific, racialized political economies, but are less helpful in pointing to how they operate. Hence, multifaceted work that draws out how discourse works to fix meanings has rightly been criticized for ultimately rendering ideational structures as overly totalizing – and
difficult to displace\(^2\) (see for example Lie, 2007; Peet & Hartwick, 2015; Simon, 2006). In this dissertation, the emphasis is instead on how Brazilian practice might overturn racist ideas of the Haitian state through cooperation, while cognizant that this occurs only in partial ways.

Practice as a theoretical tool, in contrast, is a way to approach how “practices stabilize social structures and fix ideas and subjectivities in people’s minds”, and how “what states do vs. other states, the moves they make, the signals they give, and the language they speak are constituted by the practices they share” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 20). In response to practice theory’s call for attention to how practices operate in a given context (ibid), the dissertation is premised on the recognition that the outcomes of cooperation are not one-sided but depend on the donor and recipient’s specific contexts, including their history of colonial and post-colonial intervention with other donors. I thus approach aid specifically as a “post-colonial practice”, a concept which I will elaborate in the discussion of contributions below. In general, a practice approach is not only a novel way to understand the phenomenon of South-South Cooperation, but it also provides a persuasive account of aid relationships more generally. Further, I examine the influence of the post-neoliberal state in Brazil on cooperation efforts as “background knowledge” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, following the conceptualization of background in Searle, 1969), shaping how cooperation is designed and managed. In addition to better theorizing the interactions between structures and agents at multiple social levels, the practice-oriented lens also draws similar connections between the material world and ideas. As a result, the

\(^2\) The establishment of a false rigidity between structures and agents certainly occurs to different extents in the work in question. As well, it is important to note that post-development and post-colonial work are not synonymous even if there are prominent overlaps, as argued, for example, by Lie (2007).
largely positive reception of Haitian bureaucrats to Brazilian cooperation that I identify is not based on political and economic factors alone, but has important discursive dimensions insofar as racialized identities are shaped and re-shaped in the context of post-colonial structures. Thus, the re-imagining of Brazilian identity and that of the Haitian state’s – as an active and legitimate state - through cooperation has been a fundamental part of how power dynamics have been re-worked, and why cooperation produces Brazil in a positive light as a distinctly post-neoliberal emerging power. Furthermore, the discursive representations marking Brazilian cooperation have been so successful because they are met with equitable procedural features of cooperation, notably decision-making through consensus. The study shows how ideas concretely play out in terms of how state actors interact, including how decisions are made, but, more importantly, how identities themselves are partly a product of the patterned interaction of development cooperation. Development and humanitarian efforts not only contribute to larger foreign policy goals, but do so in ways that appear uniquely effective given their emphasis on solidarity.

In this introductory Chapter, I present the key questions and objectives that guided the research project, and provide a summary of the argument, before proceeding to preview the dissertation’s analytical framework. Next, I defend the research design. I also introduce the rise of Brazilian South-South Cooperation, outlining the main features of assistance, such as its geographical focus, and explain the distinctive institutional set-up of Brazil’s development and humanitarian cooperation agencies. To conclude, I emphasize the contributions of the research, and preview how the argument will unfold, detailing the chapter plan.
1.1 Questions and Argument

The main objective of the thesis is to comprehend what Brazilian South-South Cooperation for development (SSC as shorthand) does for the Brazilian state. In other words, and with “interest” understood as bound up in a social structure: how does the provision of SSC secure the national interest? I undertake this task by focusing specifically on one important recipient of Brazilian development cooperation, Haiti, which has been an important destination for Brazilian development assistance since Lula arrived in power. Between 2005 and 2009, official figures released by the Brazilian government reveal that Haiti received R$ 29,840,307 in humanitarian assistance, which represents 19% of Brazil’s global contribution (Ipea, 2011). In 2010, Haiti was the top recipient of Brazilian technical cooperation, at US$ 6,655,645, out of a total of 40,485,040 (Ipea, 2014). Also in 2010, Brazil allocated US$ 161.5 million in humanitarian assistance, of which 73.9 was allocated to Haiti in order to cover recovery and reconstruction following the earthquake (Ipea, 2011). More importantly, as I return to below, Haiti has been a meeting point for other major Brazilian foreign policy efforts, especially leadership of the most recent UN Mission, MINUSTAH, which is itself a puzzling decision given Brazil’s history of non-intervention (Diniz, 2007). To understand how Brazilian practice fits into broader global power dynamics, moreover, Haiti is an exceptional case in that its colonial history and post-colonial situation have been indelibly marked by the actions of global powers, including through development efforts, which
means it is well-situated to amplify logics of cooperation that would likely occur elsewhere. In particular, I approach Haiti with the assumption that the donor community has not consistently managed to meet its principles for delivering aid effectively, especially the commitment under the Paris Principles to country ownership - meaning giving the recipient space to define their own development priorities and plans. While such failures are not specific to Haiti, they are particularly egregious, and based in notions of state fragility that have been used and applied without precision.

Based on an analysis of Brazil’s cooperation with Haiti, I ask the following central question: What does Brazilian development and humanitarian cooperation achieve for Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power? Does the case also tell us about why SSC is a valued foreign policy vehicle by other emerging powers given, for example, that these powers have also emerged in a post-colonial context and desire to be alternatives to the North? As part of this overarching question, I also seek to answer the following:

- Using a within country-case comparison, what are the strategies, or “constellations of practices”, that define Brazilian cooperation, and what do they involve (from actors involved to the ideas that inform them)(Best, 2014, p.10)?

- How do Haitians respond to Brazilian cooperation in terms of its adherence to global aid effectiveness principles and defined priorities of SSC? Why? Are there differences in terms of perceptions at the sub-national versus national level (between civil society groups and direct project participants versus bureaucratic partners)?
What are the relationships between development projects and other foreign policy practices (Brazilian and otherwise) – trade and investment linkages, diplomatic initiatives, and military intervention?

The first question aims to provide sufficient details about how cooperation works as a practice at a concrete level so that it is possible to draw broader conclusions as to how Brazilian foreign policy aims are, or are not, supported by cooperation. This means that I start with Brazilian foreign policy aims and priorities, as detailed in Chapter 3. The last two sub-questions follow from my assumptions that development cooperation works relationally as I give priority to power relations, meaning attention is given to how practices always operate in a given context (Adler & Pouliot, 2011). The practice of Brazilian SSC is only intelligible in the broader context of how its efforts intersect with other elements of the Brazilian presence in Haiti, as cooperation does not produce political gains or losses only because of its inherent qualities but also because of how it relates to other efforts. Likewise, Haitians’ responses are shaped by comparisons of Brazilian support with other forms of development cooperation. Again, I will start by providing an overview of historical and current relationships between Haitian elites, society, and foreign actors in Chapter 4 before introducing Brazilian practices. However, the second question also stems from my suspicion that the Brazilian emphasis on creating strong relations with government partners does not necessarily translate into broad national political support, but rather remains restricted to political elites. In Chapter 6, I will also show how cooperation performs an important function in terms of legitimating Brazil’s role in global governance in the eyes of other governments.
I start with an examination of how cooperation concretely operates in order to answer how it has supported, or not, Brazil’s larger foreign policy ambitions (described in Chapter 3). Consistent with practice theory’s efforts to trouble IR theory’s separation of the material and discursive (Best, 2014), I argue that the Haitian government has largely positively evaluated Brazil as a donor because of the particular representations of Brazil and Haiti – how states are portrayed - sustaining Brazil’s practices, including where Haiti is approached as a capable partner rather than simply a “failed state”. Features of Brazilian practice also contrast with the various interventions that the category of Haiti as “failed” or “fragile” have made possible, many of which actually eroded institutional capacity by working outside of state structures. These representations, which are manifested in horizontal practices, deflect some of the contradictions of its projects, such as insufficient attention to the Haitian state’s resource challenges, as well its foreign policy behaviour more broadly, thus ultimately supporting Brazilian ambitions of becoming a post-neoliberal, global power in a particularly unique and effective way.

In the process of constructing this position, I focus on the relationships between the government partners by using process tracing to uncover in detail how decisions are made, what problems are encountered, etc. I maintain that the positive responses from many Haitian bureaucrats to Brazilian cooperation result from its history of colonial and post-colonial intervention from Northern powers, meaning that they perceive Brazil’s cooperation as a fundamental challenge to dominant racialized identities and hierarchies that have viewed the Haitian state as incapable or unwilling to lead its own development efforts, and have neglected (alongside Haitian elites) certain socio-economic priorities,
especially rural agriculture. This former finding has implications for understanding South-South Cooperation in general since other providers of cooperation also rely on similar techniques and ideas about how cooperation should work as a partnership, hence producing similar forms of authority and changed power relations. The purpose of the case study is to discover regularities, which is crucial for processes of theory building (Sartori, 1991). Nevertheless, the Haitian case may also present dynamics that limit its applicability to SSC and even to Brazilian SSC more generally as Brazil has led MINUSTAH (The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) while economic ties between the countries remain minimal, with Brazil, for example, exporting what represents only 0.02% of its total exports to Haiti in 2014 (World Bank, n.d., n.p.).

Before turning to the analytical framework, a few definitional points are in order. First, the dichotomy of traditional versus SSC will be used, where traditional refers to historically prominent aid donors, such as the United States or France, while SSC refers to non-traditional donors, and specifically those espousing South-South principles (mapped out in Chapter 2), which include a rejection of the donor label (Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). Other nations have also become more prominent providers of development cooperation, but there is no consistent categorization of these various actors in the aid literature due to the differences among them. For example, Zimmerman and Smith (2011) make the distinction between emerging donors (that could include EU members), South-South Cooperation (those that reject the donor label), and Arab donors. Manning (2006), in contrast, creates four groups: OECD member countries that are not yet part of the DAC (Development Assistance Committee), new EU members not yet part of the OECD, Middle East and OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) donors, and
finally, “others” (including China and India). The DAC is a body housed within the OECD comprised of 30 members who meet the following criteria:

The existence of appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks that ensure capacity to deliver a development co-operation programme; an accepted measure of effort; and the existence of a system of performance monitoring and evaluation (OECD, 2016).

Members must agree to implement DAC guidelines, provide reporting on their efforts, and engage in peer reviews of their programmes (ibid). Using the category of traditional donors will conflate some important differences among these actors; however, I maintain that its use in concrete situations, such as Haiti, is a useful way to position how Brazilian practice reinforces or presents new challenges to the existing aid regime. I will also demonstrate how the use of this binary, imagined or real, drives Brazilian cooperation.

Similarly, the question as to what to call SSC is fraught. As the reference of the OECD to “ODA-like” flows (OECD, 2014) above highlights, SSC does not necessarily conform to the definition of ODA, such as the requirement that it should be concessional in character (OECD, 2008; see footnote 1). Instead, SSC can involve complicated links between development cooperation and trade and investment activities (UNCTAD, 2010). These interrelations have raised important debates around whether SSC providers are acting in their own self-interest, or in “increasing recognition of the need for investment and trading opportunities in the development process, [which] forces observers to consider carefully the debate over donors interests versus recipient needs” (Rowlands, 2008, p. 10). With these considerations in mind, the dissertation typically uses the term “development cooperation” to capture the diversity of development providers’ practices. While ultimately the exploration of how foreign aid works as a practice reveals and confirms many of the more instrumentalist objectives assumed to be driving Brazilian
foreign policy, it renders the question of “interest” a fluid one that must be historically situated. This terminology is consistent with the OECD-DAC’s efforts to recognize “the evolving development landscape”, which includes partners as diverse as traditional doors, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), civil society organizations, and private sector actors (OECD, 2015). However, I also use the term “donor”, partly as a way to interrogate SSC providers’ own efforts to present their relationships as horizontal and therefore free from power. Instead, just as the Haitian state responds to Brazilian cooperation in the context of its other political and highly asymmetric relations with other external donors and states more generally, Brazil’s decision to offer cooperation places it in a position of a post-neoliberal, still emerging power working to equalize global relations while pursuing its own national objectives.

Finally, as described above, Brazil has been called a “neo-developmentalalist” or “New Left” regime since the election of the PT in 2003. Here the term post-neoliberal is also used to depict these governments. Rather than denoting an abrupt departure, the intention of the “post” prefix is to capture the continuities and discontinuities marking the transition from previous neoliberal governments to the PT regimes (see Macdonald & Ruckert, 2009).

1.2 Analytical Framework

Using an analytical framework developed by Jacqueline Best (2014), I approach South-South Cooperation as a practice. In Best’s (2014) recent book on Governing Failure: Provisional Expertise and the Transformation of Global Development Finance, she puts forward a meso-level approach as a way to capture changes in governance
strategies (visible in the behaviour of multiple organizations), rather than to study either a specific organization alone, or conduct a broader, global analysis. Instead, her analysis links the development of new practices from global development institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to broader changes in governance: a more “provisional” style of governance that is tentative given its preoccupations with failure (Best, 2014). I also seek to “begin in the middle” in order to scale down to uncover how cooperation is actually being done, as well as to scale-up and consider larger trends in development assistance (Best, 2014), particularly the rise of the BRICS. I thus present an application of Best’s (2014) framework in agreement with her that presenting cooperation as a practice reconciles two main issues in IR: first, regarding the structure-agent problem, agency becomes constituted through practice, but can also modify structures (and ultimately practices) over time; and second, that practice is understood as both material and discursive. On the former, it is through the practice of cooperation that Haitian authority is re-configured as they are approached as an active and legitimate authority, which also contributes to positioning the Brazilian state as an alternative global power. Furthermore, these changes were only possible because of the ideational structures in which actions, such as working with state institutions, became logical. In sum, Best’s (2014) methodological proposals for approaching practice provide an ontological opening that has theoretical implications with respect to how structures and their make-up are conceived. Nevertheless, as described above, my interpretation will also depart from Best in anchoring Brazilian practice in specifically post-colonial structures, where the form and meaning of cooperation is set against not only previous
specific limitations of foreign aid, but the more general dismissal of knowledge from non-Western experts.

Before outlining the specific aspects of Best’s (2014) framework adopted here, I will briefly compare the practice approach with two distinct literatures on how foreign policy related to aid is determined. Broadly, the first approaches foreign policy decisions as emanating from political economy factors while the other looks to ideational factors.

In Hudson’s book *Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory* (2007), she explains how the incorporation of domestic variables has been an important source of debate in international relations, with some still preferring to “black-box” the state. Scholars who have attempted to bring in domestic policies have not consistently explained what they mean by this (Fearon, 1998). Similarly, although comparative politics has been more consistently engaged with the linkages between the global political economy and domestic structures, Gourevitch (1978) argues that analysis has usually been procedural, neglecting the politics of negotiations that occur between different groups. For IR realists such as Morgenthau (1962), foreign policy decisions, including the extension of aid, are motivated by the desire to promote the national interest. Interests can be as diverse as keeping a regime in power to gaining access to materials (Pankjah, 2005). Liberal institutionalists instead draw attention to how international regimes essentially change the context within which states make decisions based on self-interest (Keohane, 2005). Furthermore, decisions to participate in regimes, which are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner, 1982, p. 185; Keohane, 2005), are seen as rational, with cooperation also a way of securing national interest.
Looking at aid analyses specifically, scholars (see Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998; Palmer, Wohlander & Morgan, 2002; Tingley, 2010; van der Veen, 2011) have considered the ways in which the domestic political economy shapes policy considerations. As Schraeder et al. (1998) acknowledge, “the notion that self-interest pervades the aid calculation of industrialized states has become axiomatic in the scholarly literature”, but there remains considerable debate as to which interests figure prominently (p. 296), and which states will give and under what conditions (Palmer et al., 2002). From their analysis of four donors – the US, Japan, Sweden, and France, these authors suggest that the purposes of aid are complex and varied, although they point to several commonalities, including the emergence of trade relations as an important determinant of giving (Schraeder et al., 1998). Of course, while changing amounts clearly signify some parallel change in underlying motivations, so too may “constancy in the international political environment…mask important domestic sources of change in economic and strategic interests” (Tingley, 2010, p. 48).

Other scholars (see Mueller, 2010; McCormick, 2008; Whitfield, 2006) have instead focused on the various ways in which aid impacts a recipient’s political economy. Both McCormick (2008), through an overview of China and India’s aid practices in Africa, and Mueller (2010), in an examination of the role of the IMF in Jordan, stress that the impacts of aid practices are highly contextual. Mueller (2010), for example, argues that the IMF has had lasting impacts on class structure in Jordan’s political economy, in particular by influencing the transfer from a largely statist to more liberalized economy. Whitfield (2006) instead draws attention to the institutional impacts of aid. She argues that aid dependency has considerable impacts on domestic politics as donors (who
increasingly represent the interests of private investment capital) become embedded in
the state, both as a significant financial source, and politically in terms of structured
interactions.

Attempts to explain aid practices from the perspective of donors tend to remain at
the unit-level of the state, while explorations of impacts on recipients give more attention
to how aid interacts with the local context. Yet, as one example, the strict separation of
unit-level politics in existing analyses is inherently unable to anticipate how the
international context influences, and is in turn shaped or upheld by, individual donors. I
argue that this separation can miss the crucial ways in which the levels are
interdependent, as well as mediated by the global system. Attention to practices is one
way to effectively integrate domestic and structural determinants of Brazilian foreign
policy behaviour.

The project persuasively demonstrates how Haiti’s experiences with traditional
donors influence its receptiveness to the Brazilian approach, and moreover that Brazil’s
foreign policy has been distinctly shaped by its own colonial history and the presence of a
post-neoliberal government in power. Following Gourevitch (1978), I also ask how
events and outcomes are representative of struggles between different groups. In
Kragelund’s (2014) recent article on emerging donors (or what he refers to as non-
traditional state actors), he explores whether China, India, and Brazil increase Zambia’s
policy space, based on the assumption that simply the availability of other financing can
support alternative policies; however, what seems to require further problematization is
the question of what the BRICS represent (as a whole, if applicable, and individually),
how they fit into a neoliberal global economy, and hence what kinds of alternative
policies are possible. Here I follow Bond and Garcia (2014), who make the compelling argument that the BRICS do not inherently represent a challenge to the status quo, and that the so-called “BRICS from above” (meaning heads of state) can adopt a variety of ideological standpoints, including “anti-imperialist” and “sub-imperialist”. For example, while they may challenge the status quo, such as through the development of new institutions like the New Development Bank (formerly referred to as the BRICS Development Bank), they also act to stabilize the global political economy (Bond & Garcia, 2014). Indeed, while concepts such as SSC and even post-neoliberalism are normatively charged, they are used here with two purposes: the first, to capture continuities with other practices; and, second, to reveal their unique problems and weaknesses – as well as opportunities.

Aid as a practice is furthermore useful in acknowledging the inseparability of material and ideational power. Scholars writing from a post-colonial/post-development perspective have been particularly attuned to ongoing relations of power in development practice. Like all forms of discourse, “development discourse cannot…be treated as an innocent vehicle of neutral knowledge, disconnected from the social relations and structures of power in which it is embedded” (Abrahamsen, 2001, p. 2). Influenced by Foucault’s writings, these scholars see discourse as a practice that constitutes knowledge (Abrahamsen, 2001; Ferguson, 1994). Knowledge and discourse are considered inseparable from power, as power, through discourse, creates a particular “regime of truth…a ‘general politics’ of truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 73). In the case of development, this means that development discourse comes to function as an interpretative grid through which we make sense of the world (Ferguson, 1994). Across its many iterations,
development discourse constitutes the Third World in relation to the First (Abrahamsen, 2001; Ferguson, 1994; Escobar, 1995). The framing of the Third World as in need of development eventually produces an object that is amenable to intervention. Yet while discourse has a way of making certain practices possible, its practices often manage to appear neutral and technocratic (Abrahamsen, 2001; 2003) despite having highly politicized, although often unintended, effects (Ferguson, 1994). Thus, aid can perform a governance function “almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object” (ibid, p. 256). Such works make visible the representations that sustain development interventions, and these insights will be used to situate Brazil in relation to the South and the North. However, as argued above, these portraits can become overly static, and a practice approach is intended instead to capture how ideas function as part of dynamic processes. This vision is more consistent with Mosse’s attention to how “practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of events” (2004, p. 647).

Efforts to construct aid interventions as technical and depoliticized have been particularly noticeable in recent aid practices. From concerns with security (Marriage, 2010), to partnerships (Abrahamsen, 2004; Hayman, 2011), to good governance (Löwenheim, 2008; Carbone, 2010), donors are keen to emphasize their impartiality (Löwenheim, 2008) and the idea that the recipient is in the “driver’s seat” (World Bank President James Wolfensohn in Abrahamsen, 2004). This consensual understanding of power misses how there may not be agreement on what to do between partners, and that the different parties involved have significant power differentials (Hyden, 2008). Efforts
to more deeply involve citizens have also been a feature of New Left regimes, such as conditional cash transfer programs that transform motherhood experiences (Macdonald & Ruckert, 2009), suggesting that inclusivity, partnership, etc., may perform an even more significant function in Southern cooperation. However, this governance function is likely to work in different ways as SSC devotes greater attention to government-government partnerships. I will argue that this practice introduces new tensions around neutrality as assumptions about government partners hide state-society relations from view.

Much of the aid literature reviewed above makes visible the representations that sustain development interventions, and these insights will be used to situate Brazilian cooperation in relation to the South and the North. Nevertheless, even if there are prominent overlaps, as argued, for example, by Lie (2007), post-development and post-colonial work are not synonymous. Post-colonial scholarship specifically reveals the hierarchies between development experts and beneficiaries as racialized and cultural. These hierarchies are intimately related to epistemological questions, where the “coloniality of power” is possible through the violence of knowledge-making that relegates the “Third World” to objects that are either absent altogether, or appear only in “an ‘objectivized’ mode” (Quijano, 2007, p. 173). The significance is two-fold. First, attention is given to development practices specifically as post-colonial endeavours, which are a continuation of civilizational efforts, deeply marking recipients of development projects as those needing to be intervened upon. From the outset, a central consideration was whether it is even possible for countries such as Brazil to ever fully equalize relations of cooperation when they appear to be inherently imbued with power differences between those intervening versus those intervened upon. As I return to in
Chapter 6, practices may be “nested”, in the sense that practices that equalize political relations conflict with the inherent imbalance of donor-recipient relations. Second, in viewing “normative international orders…[as] coextensively orders of action and epistemological orders” (Epstein, 2014, p. 300), the emphasis is also on uncovering different ways of managing and interpreting the development enterprise by historicizing other ideas and identities present in Brazilian and Haitian experiences. In particular, I take seriously the possibility that other ways of doing development are legitimate, asking where Brazilian efforts originate from, and why they produce certain effects. These conceptualizations have obvious implications for where power should be studied, and in particular demand looking beyond and above the nation-state, yet how to achieve this is less clear - hence the need for a practice approach.

A framework attentive to “post-colonial practice” is a way to merge analytical strengths. Conceptually, Best (2014, p. 10) distinguishes between strategies (meso-level), factors (more micro-level), and styles (macro-level) as various elements of the concept of “practice”:

- Strategies refer to “constellations of practices that are linked by their connection to a concrete problem and a way of defining and tackling it”;
- Factors encompass actors (who is doing the governing), techniques (the how), the knowledge and ideas informing strategies, authority (who authorizes practices, and whether they are accepted), and power (what is at stake in a given practice?); and,
• Styles refer to certain similarities across periods, which have effects at a more fundamental level (for example, she argues that all governance strategies are linked to an awareness of the fragility of claims to expert knowledge).

I identify key elements of Brazilian strategy as including the desire to distance itself from traditional donors’ practices and produce mutually beneficial partnerships, and the designing of supposedly more “appropriate” interventions, where Brazil presents its approach as more contextually appropriate given its commonalities with the partner context as well as its developmental successes domestically. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the factors that I identify as making up each of these strategies, or constellations of practices, of Brazilian SSC.

### Table 1  Factors of Strategy 1: Building Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors (by project)</th>
<th>Techniques</th>
<th>Knowledge and Ideas</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Distancing from “traditional donors”</td>
<td>South-South principles</td>
<td>Moral authority as a Southern partner</td>
<td>Extension of state power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Support for the Milk Sector and Improvement of Household Food Security</td>
<td>Concept notes, memorandums of understanding</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MSPP</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development (MARNDR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>School administrations</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Assistance for Increasing Agricultural Production and the Strengthening of Seed Production and Distribution Capacities</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARNDR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmer groups</td>
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</table>
Table 2  Factors of Strategy 2: Designing Appropriate Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors (by project)</th>
<th>Techniques</th>
<th>Knowledge and Ideas</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (MSP)</td>
<td>Stressing appropriate-ness as a partner</td>
<td>Brazilian domestic experiences as useful models</td>
<td>Expert authority based on affinities and successes</td>
<td>Extension of state power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support for the Milk Sector and Improvement of Household Food Security (MSP)</td>
<td>Offer to exchange advice rather than resources</td>
<td>Statist model of development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Assistance for Increasing Agricultural Production and the Strengthening of Seed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Homegrown School Meals Pilot Project in the Petite Rivière de Nippes Municipality in Haiti</td>
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</table>

Breaking down strategies in this way enables the portrayal of a more dynamic relation between structures and agents, in this case the respective states, as techniques such as stressing Brazilian appropriateness ultimately help to enlarge Brazilian authority as a “development expert”. It is furthermore revealing of the interconnections between matter
and ideas, where, for example, the stress on appropriateness relies on background knowledge of post-neoliberal successes. It is expected that the details of these projects and how they function as part of central strategies of cooperation can ultimately provide a number of insights into how cooperation uniquely supports Brazilian ambitions.

1.3 Research Design and Methodology

The choices of cases and research tools were made in order to persuasively answer the overarching question as to what cooperation achieves, and how it may support Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power. Selections of Haiti as the country recipient and the agricultural and health sectors respectively were taken to amplify the potential influence of Brazil’s more interventionist politico-economic model in how it delivers cooperation, and the logics behind its decision to intensify South-South relations. The Haitian case study reflects broader foreign policy objectives as development cooperation is situated alongside other important foreign policy efforts. For example, political relations with Haiti have been a priority of foreign policy, with the decision to lead MINUSTAH attributed to the objective of securing “the Holy Grail of Brazilian diplomacy, permanent membership in the UN Security Council” (Morais and Saad-Filho, 2011, p. 32). Prestige has also been emphasized, with MINUSTAH seen as an important vehicle for Brazil to demonstrate its regional and global ascendance (Bracey, 2011). On a more ideational level, intervention as a way to raise Brazil’s profile means that its identity and nationalism become deeply embedded in efforts (Nieto, 2012). Haiti has also been a partner where Brazil has expressed its suitability as a development partner in cultural terms. Although economic relations did not appear at the outset to be the defining
motivation for the Brazilian-Haitian relationship, the possibility of their importance was not discarded.

Haiti’s development challenges are well-known. Haiti is divided into 10 departments, 140 communes, and 570 communal sectors (Cayemittes, Busangu, Bizimana, Barrère, Sévère, Cayemittes & Charles, 2013). In addition to the 10 departments – West, South, South-West, Grand-Anse, Nippes, North, North-West, North-East, Center, and Artibonite, 6 urban communes in the West are referred to as the “Metropolitan Area” (ibid). In 2014, the population stood at 10.57 million (World Bank, 2015, n.p.). More than half of the population in 2010 was under the age of 21 (PAHO, 2013, n.p.). In 2014, GDP was estimated at US$ 8.713 billion dollars, growing at a rate of 4.2% in 2013, and with 1.7% forecasted for 2015 (World Bank, 2015, n.p.). In 2012, the World Bank estimated that more than half the population was living on less than one US dollar per day, and that 78% were living on less than two (in Cayemittes et al., 2013, p. 2). Haiti is also a highly unequal country, with a Gini coefficient of 0.61 in 2012 (World Bank, 2017). Data from 2013 also found average life expectancy was 63.1 years (World Bank, 2015, n.p.). Unemployment rates have remained stubbornly high: in Port-au-Prince the rate was 49% in 2011; the rate is lower, but still incredibly high, in both other urban (37%) and rural (36%) areas (PAHO, 2013, n.p.). Haiti has a large diaspora abroad, and has been described as the “most remittance-dependent country” (ibid).

Haiti’s development has been significantly affected by recent crises, including, but not limited to, the earthquake that struck in 2010. Prior to the earthquake, 4 hurricanes had also devastated Haiti in 2008, causing 793 deaths, 310 missing, and 548 injuries (PAHO, 2013, n.p.). The earthquake then struck in 2010 at a magnitude of 7.0,
and was followed by at least 59 aftershocks of a magnitude over 4.0 (McIntyre, Hughes, Pauyo, Sullivan, Rogers Jr., Raymonville & Meara, 2011, p. 746). According to the government, over 222,000 people perished in the earthquake, and it left 1.3 million people homeless (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 187). The World Bank estimates that the earthquake caused damage representing 120% of Haiti’s GDP (in Cayemittes et al., 2013, p. 2). Haiti is considered to be particularly vulnerable to earthquakes given its high population density, and that buildings have not been constructed in adherence to anti-seismic norms (Guimier, 2011). Only 9 months after the earthquake, Haiti’s Ministry of Public Health and Population (Le Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population - MSPP) reported that there was an outbreak of cholera in the Central and Artibonite departments, a disease that had not been seen in Haiti for at least the past 100 years (Bliss & Fisher, 2013). Between October of 2010 and August 2013, more than 670,000 people received treatment, and 8,200 deaths were reported (ibid, p. 2). The cholera outbreak was so deadly because of existing deficiencies in Haiti’s water and sanitation systems\(^3\), but also simply because cholera itself incubates in periods ranging from only two hours to five days (Guimier, 2011, p. 185). In what was “described by local journalists as the ‘Haitian 9-11’”, there is now widespread agreement that the disease was introduced by UN Nepalese peacekeepers (Freedman & Lemay-Hebert, 2015, p. 509). In household surveys conducted in 2013, the MSPP found that 4% of total households had had a member injured in the earthquake, while 3% experienced a loss; likewise, 16% of all households saw a member treated for cholera, and 1% died (Cayemittes et al., 2013, p. 343).

\(^3\) For example, The Pan American Health Organization (2013) found that only 10-12% of the population had access to piped water before the earthquake.
More significantly, the extent of Haitian development problems has enabled varied and extensive efforts from the international community to provide support. Haiti thus presents a good context for understanding the impacts of SSC given its historical pattern of colonial and post-colonial relations with other aid providers. In a sense, Haiti can be viewed as a particularly glaring case of the failures of the international aid community. As I describe in Chapters 4 and 5, external actors have played a determining role in Haiti throughout the country’s history, and continued aid dependency means that their impact remains significant. As well, aid interventions have not been able to remedy many socio-economic issues, and have outright harmed development and state capacity in some cases (see for example: Brière, Jobert & Poulin, 2010; Buss with Gardner, 2008; Gros, 2010; Shamsie, 2009; 2011).

Sectorally, these are the two areas, as described in greater detail below, where Brazil has focused its efforts. They thus facilitate the examination of different aspects of exporting its “social technology” or post-neoliberal social programmes. In Haiti, these are areas where demonstrated weaknesses of aid approaches have also been especially prominent, with aid bypassing state structures altogether, or neglecting priorities such as rural agricultural production and universal healthcare. As case studies, Haiti and these sectors thus represent something of a “typical case”, meaning “especially representative of the phenomenon under study” (Gerring, 2007, p. 105). As I return to in the concluding Chapter, the lessons from these cases cannot be expected to fully apply elsewhere. However, I argue that the interactions between Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH and its role as a development provider are not only suggestive of how perceived solidaristic objectives collide with more instrumental ones, which would also be seen in countries
where economic relations were more prominent, but may in fact exaggerate their connections. In Gerring’s (2007) conception, they may ultimately function as “critical” cases given that the Brazilian state leads both efforts, compared to their more cooperative but separate role alongside Brazilian businesses.

Within each sector, two case studies were also chosen in order to investigate the factors, or the components, of broader Brazilian strategies. These projects were chosen randomly from the total universe of known cases (six when field visits were conducted in 2015) since any influence from Brazil’s domestic politico-economic model, and its rationale for extending cooperation to the South in general and to Haiti specifically, should infuse all projects if present. However, because of the limited extent of cooperation overall, the agricultural case studies essentially represent all of those at the implementation stage in 2015 – as I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6, one of these projects had been delayed multiple times but I proceeded with the case in order to understand the reasons for the project not occurring as anticipated. The potential generalizability of the case is further bolstered by the fact that all four of these cases prominently shared the two strategies that defined Brazilian cooperation: efforts to build partnership, and to design more “appropriate” interventions.

Broadly, the chosen research tools support the elaboration of concrete material outcomes, and how partners perceive these results. The discussion relies on evidence that was collected as part of 57 semi-structured interviews conducted in Brazil and Haiti in 2015 in Portuguese, French, English, and Kreyól (the latter with the help of an interpreter - see Annex 1). These interviews were conducted with Haitian government officials, Brazilian government officials from ABC and other ministries involved in cooperation,
Brazilian embassy officials, international organizations (IOs), other bilateral development cooperation providers, think tanks and other research groups, academics, and civil society groups – both Brazilian and Haitian. As part of project site visits, interviews were also conducted with individuals and groups who had participated in Brazilian projects, but these interventions were limited. These interviews were conducted with representatives of farmer associations, and school and hospital administrations with the help of a research assistant who carried out the questioning in Kreyól. Again, these interviews were limited in terms of the number of respondents that I spoke with, but their rigour is also constrained by the fact that the interviews were not conducted by me, and that an international organization facilitated some of the meetings. All respondents were selected using purposive sampling to ensure I could access those most relevant to the research questions (Bryman, 2008). Interviewees were also asked to identify any contacts that they thought would be relevant to the project. The purpose of the interviews was to elicit focused information concerning perceptions of Brazil and Brazilian assistance, and how the distinctive features of project design and delivery are thought to have contributed to development (or not). These perceptions involved measuring cooperation against global standards for aid effectiveness, as well as principles for South-South Cooperation. Upon the request of the Haitians interviewed, it was decided that quotes would remain anonymous in recognition of the sensitivity of the subject, and to facilitate frankness in responses.

All interviews were transcribed, with the exception of some Haitian interviews who requested that interviews not be recorded. The research assistant transcribed the interviews that she facilitated into French. Interview data was coded twice. First, the data
was coded based on expectations from themes that emerged in secondary literature around what cooperation intends to do, and does – both developmentally and in terms of foreign policy goals. Second, the data was re-coded to capture unexpected themes, especially around the symbolic functions of cooperation. In order to best capture the tricky issue of perceptions, participants were asked not only to evaluate Brazilian SSC, but also to directly compare it with other cooperation received. In practice, these comparisons tended to occur continuously, without prompting.

This information was supplemented with empirical data found in government and project documents and secondary information from sources such as news outlets, speeches, and the review of relevant scholarly literature. Beyond providing facts and data, these materials were also examined with a view to uncovering patterns in how cooperation is talked about in order to examine the more discursive aspects of practice. As noted, there are some challenges to accessing empirical data on Brazilian cooperation. However, less formal sharing of project documents was common, and IOs or Haitian counterparts also often supplied information.

All data collected was subject to process tracing. Case studies are considered particularly valuable for theory testing as the researcher can “‘process trace,’ that is, examine the process whereby initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 54). The richness of the case study enables examination of cooperation as a practice by situating dynamic political relations, providing micro-level details about the material techniques and representations sustaining practices, and demonstrating how practices changed and evolved. In particular, process tracing was crucial in helping to establish links between the provision of cooperation and changing
political relationships between the partners, even if, consistent with the concept of practice - but at odds with the intentions of process tracing to establish more linear processes of causation (at least in the formulation of Van Evera, 1997) - structure and agency are co-constituted. For example, interviews with former Brazilian officials and embassy staff in Haiti painted the historically challenging processes of relationship-building that had largely solidified into mutual respect and trust by the time of my arrival in 2015 (in author’s interviews, 2015).

More generally, the methodology used to interpret SSC is historical and discursive. Chapter 4, which introduces the politics of cooperation in Haiti, intentionally takes a long view in order to situate the emergence of alternative forms of development cooperation. For Brazil, its history as a recipient of cooperation is reflected in the knowledge and ideas orienting SSC that I describe in Chapters 5 and 6. More generally, Chapter 2 situates the broad intensification of South-South Cooperation by outlining various criticisms that emerged of the traditional aid regime. The method also has an important discursive element as texts and interviews are considered with a view to how problems and countries are represented. Nevertheless, consistent with the practice approach, the intention is never to separate these representations from how they are formed, or the practices that they continuously make possible.

1.4 Literature Review

Background on Brazilian SSC

In Chapter 4, I provide an extensive review of existing literature on Brazil’s provision of SSC, providing an initial answer to the puzzle of why SSC intensified under
the PT, and also why cooperation has rather ambiguous effects, detailing how it supports Brazil as an emerging, post-neoliberal power. Here I summarize the main features of Brazilian SSC, including its priorities and institutional workings.

As outlined above, Brazil’s emergence as a significant donor has been sudden. The following graph shows this change, documenting new isolated (I return to this concept below) projects and activities per year. In general, Brazilian SSC involves providing scientific and technical cooperation to its partners (Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). SSC is not entirely synonymous with technical cooperation, however. In fact, what the government referred to as cooperation for international development in its public reports covers technical cooperation, but also participation in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian cooperation, and contributions to international organizations (Ipea, 2011; 2014; 2016, which cover 2005-2009, 2010, and 2011-2013 respectively). In the most recent report, across the nine years for which data has been gathered, technical cooperation represented 7%, and humanitarian cooperation 13% of total expenditures, estimated at R$ 7.9 billion (Ipea, 2016, p. 17).

This dissertation is focused on technical and humanitarian cooperation with Haiti for two reasons. First, even where Brazil cooperates with a third partner as in so-called triangular relationships, it was possible to separate out the bilateral relation, meaning that the direct relations between the states can be examined in isolation from other factors. Second, these areas represent the most overlap with how ODA has been defined, hence making any lessons from Brazil’s experiences potentially more widely applicable. Nevertheless, as the sub-question around broader power dynamics intends to probe, these areas are much less defined in practice. Similar to observations that traditional aid
became effectively securitized in the post 9/11 environment in terms of determining where and how aid was delivered (Brown, Grävingholt & Raddatz, 2016), Brazilian peacekeeping efforts intermingled security and cooperation. Indeed, arguably Brazil’s intent was to do so in a more explicit way (Stuenkel, 2013), as I return to in Chapter 4. Methodologically, these considerations and connections come into view once I examine the micro-level details of projects.

In its own words, ABC describes technical cooperation as, “permitting the transfer of knowledge, successful experiences and sophisticated equipment, thereby helping in human resource training and strengthening the receiving country’s institutions” (in BRICS Policy Center, 2013, p. 4; my translation). Engagement can either take the form of “projects” or “isolated activities” (atividades isolados), but projects predominate (ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.); projects can also either be more stand alone versus “groundwork” projects (projetos estruturantes), which are meant to be more long-term and complex (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010). As noted above, technical cooperation has been referred to as Brazil’s “social technology” since support is based on its own development successes, such as the provision of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) (White, 2010, p. 228). Similarly, Muggah (2010, p. 455) notes how, “experiences and skills learned from engaging gang-affected urban slums/favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, were adapted and transferred to the Haitian context”. It is because of this transfer of knowledge and expertise that dollar amounts do not capture the full extent of cooperation. As we will see, the concept that aid is a practice brings this “background knowledge” (Adler & Proul, 2011) to the forefront, simultaneously revealing how the political

[4] The establishment of projects also requires that there already be a general cooperation agreement between the partner countries in place.
outcome of stronger government relations was made possible, but also underlining the significance of post-neoliberal ideas around what a state should do in forming practice.

Graph1: New Isolated Projects and Activities per Year Provided by Brazil (2004-2014)

![Chart showing New Isolated Projects and Activities per Year Provided by Brazil (2004-2014)]

Source: ABC, 2012b

Brazil has certain institutional peculiarities that are important for understanding how cooperation is provided. Brazil will not typically hire consultants, but instead brings in staff from other departments and agencies (the same departments that have accumulated relevant domestic experience) – the salaries would not be counted as part of the cooperation budget as they would remain with the host agency (Burges, 2014). Characteristics of ABC, including using personnel from other departments and ministries, are effects of its legal-institutional environment, which has not yet caught up with the transition from recipient to provider of development assistance (BRICS Policy Center, 2013). ABC is housed within the MRE. As well, CGFome (Coordenação Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome – General Coordination of International Actions to Combat Hunger), the “focal point” for humanitarian assistance, is also located in the
MRE⁵ (Ipea, 2014, p. 76). As in many other countries, ABC’s location within the MRE raises questions around the influence of other objectives on development-related concerns, and Cabral and Weinstock (2010) have argued that it has resulted in a tendency to see quick fixes rather than long-term thinking. There have been proposals for institutional reform, but they remain stalled (ABC representatives and academics in author’s interviews, 2015). Brazil’s cooperation has been described as decentralized since ABC is flexible in adapting high-level decisions to the project context (Rowlands, 2008). The institutional workings of ABC and CGFome are also conditioned by the reliance on inter-agency and departmental cooperation, so that the particular coordination role that these agencies assume effectively varies project to project. Ministries tend to be involved through their International Affairs Units (Assessorias de Relações Internacionais), and these units can lead projects, with ABC providing only an oversight function. In fact, one of these representatives described how their Ministry was increasingly pursuing cooperation without ABC because of the latter’s lack of resources (in author’s interviews, 2015).

Accurate and timely data on the extent of Brazilian SSC is notoriously difficult to come by. As discussed, dollar amounts do not necessarily reflect the effort, and Ipea’s (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - Institute for Applied Economic Research) landmark overviews of “Brazilian Cooperation for International Development”, produced with the support of ABC, MRE, and the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic (SAE/PR - Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos/Presidência da República), were released first in 2011 (covering 2005-2009) and in 2014 (covering 2010

⁵ CGFome was extinguished by the Temer government in 2016 (dos Santos Lima, 2016), as part of a broader shift in the direction of SSC discussed in the concluding Chapter.
only); intentions for it to be an annual exercise (Ipea, 2014) were not realized. In 2016, a report covering the 2011-2013 period was finally made public. On its website, ABC estimates that it contributed a total of R$ 7,099,064 in 2014. In 2014, CGFome estimates that it provided US$ 15 million (CGFome, 2014). As stated, cooperation has been in decline: from a peak of R$ 37,819,613 in 2010, amounts fell to R$27,003,724 in 2011, R$19,812,763 in 2012 and R$13,942,230 in 2013 (ABC). Unfortunately, there has been little scholarly attention to the continuities and differences marking Rousseff’s government; while some have suggested Rousseff played a much more pragmatic role (Burton, 2012; Rothkopf, 2012), such a “maintenance-type” focus seems inevitable given Brazil has already situated itself as taking an active role in global affairs - versus the “groundbreaking” idea of looking beyond the region (ibid, p. 2). This project will therefore also contribute an analysis of foreign policy under Rousseff, including a consideration of how Brazil’s slowdown in growth may have impacted policy. Amounts of cooperation with Haiti are much more precise since they were given through personal correspondences and confirmed in interviews.

Between 2000 and 2014, projects generally targeted agriculture, health, education, and vocational training, but ABC funds an extremely diverse range of initiatives from tourism to sports (ABC) (see Chart 1, which only represents sectoral contributions over 5% of the total). However, ABC does not have set priorities, and relies on recipients to request assistance whereupon they will negotiate potential collaborations (Chandy & Kharas, 2011). For instance, projects in health are based on joint strategic health cooperation plans that have seven priority areas – diseases or themes – that vary according to a country’s needs (Almeida et al. 2010). Brazil does, however, set clear
priority countries in practice (see Table 3 for a breakdown of top recipients) (Inoue & Costa Vaz, 2012), despite their insistence in an access to information request that “ABC does not prioritize countries. Assistance occurs by demand, by the availability of resources and the theme requested by the partner country” (ABC, 2015; my translation). By 2010, 50% of assistance was destined for Africa generally (ODI, 2010) whereas traditionally, recipients of SSC were limited to South America and Portuguese-speaking Africa (Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa - the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries) (CPLP) (Nieto, 2012). However, by 2012, ABC was estimating that it would spend US$40 million in South America, Central America and the Caribbean over the following 3 years, versus $36 million to Africa (ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.). In South and Central America and the Caribbean in 2013, Haiti was the fifth top recipient (shared with Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela) of technical cooperation in terms of numbers of projects with a total of six, following the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Suriname with 16; Bolivia with 15; Honduras with 9; and Colombia with eight (ibid). In 2014, CGFome supported humanitarian actions in the following countries: Benin, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Philippines, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Paraguay, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, and Syria.
### Chart 1: Distribution of Brazilian SSC by Sector 2000-2014 (representing 5% or more)

Source: ABC; my translation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.

### 1.5 Contributions

Before outlining how the dissertation will proceed, this section highlights some of the project’s key findings and contributions. First, the thesis provides empirical evidence

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6 And not including isolated activities.
on Brazilian SSC. Multiple scholars (see Quadir, 2013; Rowlands, 2008; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011) agree that the phenomenon of development assistance from emerging donors has not yet been studied in-depth. As Quadir explains, “while there have been some interesting debates about emerging donors in recent years, not much research has yet been done on how they are affecting the traditional landscape of development assistance programmes” (2013, p. 322). In part, this gap appears to be a result of comparing South-South rhetoric, not actual results, with the practices of traditional donors (i.e. Rowlands, 2008; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011); the difficulty is that little primary research has been attempted on the former, making the implications for development unclear (UNCTAD, 2010). Nevertheless, while such criticisms may hold some weight, at least in regard to initial academic work, there are important exceptions to this claim, and the volume and quality of literature has increased quickly since 2013.

Notably, research conducted on ABC (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) cooperation in Haiti by Feldmann, Lengyel, Malacalza and Ramalho (2012) and more recently by Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier (2015) provides an important foundation for confirming and building upon insights specific to Brazilian cooperation through the within-case comparison and across a different time period. In particular, the dissertation extends some of Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier’s (2015) observations around the mixed results of Brazilian cooperation, especially, more positively, the achievement of ownership.

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7 Examples of these exceptions and more recent scholarship include: Brautigam (2009) and Woods (2008), both of whom focus mainly on China; Kragelund (2014); Raposo and Potter (2010); Kiala and Ngwenya (2011); Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier (2015); Feldmann et al., 2012; and, specific to Brazil, Wolford and Nehring (2015), Beghin (2012), Burges (2014), Stolte (2015), and Inoue and Vaz (2012), among others.
There are also several important obstacles towards achieving evidence-based analyses. As explained above regarding Brazil specifically, these donors have not been entirely transparent in providing information on their disbursements, “thereby making it very difficult to obtain comprehensive and reliable data on their aid flow and practices” (ibid, p. 52). The development of a standard set of evaluative criteria has also not yet been achieved, a problem which I return to in-depth in Chapter 7. While outlining the development effects of Brazilian projects is in a sense a secondary purpose of the thesis, these effects still provide a necessary foundation for contrasting what these projects achieve for Brazil, as many of the more objective results make the positive political outcomes even more puzzling.

Consistent with the practice-oriented lens, the approach rests primarily on the reconciliation of ideas and the material world, and of agency and structures, both separations that have continued to trouble IR theory (Best, 2014). Through the Brazilian case for example, I examine how knowledge and ideas – which may be so tacit that they are almost “forgotten” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011) - infuse Brazilian practice in Haiti. As the introduction has so far set out, existing literature has tended to view Brazil’s decision to extend South-South Cooperation as a result of multiple ambitions, and the at times contradictory and ambiguous effects of cooperation can be attributed to these conflicting drivers. While this perspective is useful, approaching aid as a practice ultimately renders this, if not unnecessary, then largely redundant, and furthermore shows how instrumentalist perspectives can be incomplete. First, such approaches can be duplicative: by beginning with how cooperation is actually done, it is possible to establish what it achieves for Brazilian power, ultimately providing answers as to why cooperation is a
useful foreign policy vehicle. This does not fully solve the issue of intentionality, as the Brazilian government may have had other intended goals for SSC, and some of cooperation’s effects may be unintended. What attention to practice does do, however, is persuasively show how policy motivations were also produced by the practice of cooperation as, consistent with Mosse’s (2004) notion, participants struggle to confirm principles such as horizontality or effectiveness. In the absence of a white paper or other policy document setting out the goals of Brazilian SSC, this portrait is even more interesting; these goals were never static, but developed through the provision of cooperation. As well, aspects of cooperation, such as patterns of negotiation, are consistent with a number of objectives of Brazilian policy that have been persuasively argued in the literature, such as a quest for global prestige and recognition as a leader of the South (see Stolte, 2015). However, starting with foreign policy goals, including developmental goals, can also be incomplete: drawing out motivations misses the full extent of what cooperation achieves and why. Furthermore, the way in which Brazilian assumptions about agency have fundamentally overturned racialized notions of the Haitian state as completely lacking in capacity or political will (one of absence), as I argue below, would remain hidden. Similarly, defining characteristics of cooperation, such as the commitment to supporting programs that deliver public goods in a context of resource scarcity, would seem misplaced or illogical when the logics anchoring cooperation – its social meaning - remain hidden. The case thus urges us to foreground how social structures are colonial and post-colonial, which represents one of many necessary steps towards responding to calls to pluralize the discipline of IR broadly (see Acharya, 2014; Blaney & Tickner, 2017).
I therefore develop the concept of “post-colonial practice” to acknowledge how emergent forms of South-South Cooperation occur in a post-colonial context that is marked by a specific racialized political economy. I start from a simple question: Which practices? Where are they located? As outlined in Chapter 4, many of the features of Haitian society and its political economy were inherited from the colonial system, then consolidated, negotiated, and re-worked by Haitian elites with support from international actors, including through the provision of aid. For both Brazil and Haiti, South-South Cooperation is a reaction against “traditional” forms of cooperation that have, in tandem with Haitian elites, neglected the priorities of the Haitian majority while also creating and solidifying more insidious, yet no less damaging representations of (particularly black) Haitians as “absent” – unable to govern themselves. It is thus only when anchoring cooperation in the understandable prominence that both Haitian and Brazilian governments have given to the fulfillment of sovereignty that Brazilian practices and their political significance can fully emerge. Furthermore, the “post” is a way to take seriously and valorize various challenges to this system, as represented by South-South Cooperation. I will chart, for example, how Brazilian support to the rural agricultural sector displaces traditional patterns of aid, which is a potent political symbol given its long-standing place as a site of peasant resistance to state and foreign direction.

Consistent with the intention of the prefix “post-”, the intention is not to imply that this is a fait accompli, but rather to chart how these processes introduce new weaknesses into the design and management of cooperation, and indeed can result in familiar contradictions in the relation between the Southern donor and recipient country.
Furthermore, while the concept of post-neoliberalism has some purchase in explaining the specific form of Brazilian cooperation relative to other forms of aid, more fundamentally South-South Cooperation is premised on the enactment of a different form of global governance, based in alternative forms of knowledge. This knowledge certainly has politico-economic content, such as the promotion of heavier state involvement in direct contradiction to the Washington Consensus, but it also offers deeper challenges. Notably, the turn against notions of state fragility, or the genuine promotion of cooperation based in solidarity, are representative of significant departures from common ways of knowing that permeate the practice of international relations, even if they are only partially realized.

1.6 Conclusion and Chapter Plan

The puzzle of intensified Brazilian cooperation since the arrival of the PT in power has received much interest. On the one hand, the decision has been associated with foreign policy goals of extending Brazilian political and economic power globally. On the other, there have been ideas, aligning with South-South rhetoric more broadly, that Brazil intends to produce a world that is more equitable for developing countries. These dual objectives are not in fact inconsistent with the particular “New Left” politico-economic model that the PT governments adopted domestically, which combined support for large-scale, domestic capital with the extension of citizenship. Not surprisingly, although the evidence of on-the-ground realities has been limited, to date cooperation has also been evaluated as having rather ambivalent outcomes, as I return to in Chapter 3 (see for example Beghin, 2012; BRICS Policy Center, 2013). Through a practice-oriented
approach, I will argue that Brazilian cooperation has been effective in producing Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power because of its strategies of emphasizing partnerships and designing appropriate interventions, which are based on post-neoliberal models that advocate and legitimate state involvement, and broader, post-colonial ideas about Haiti as an “active” rather than “fragile” development partner. The resultant style may sustain Brazil’s weight as a more benevolent power but, somewhat paradoxically, it also leaves Brazil particularly vulnerable to resistance where it does display more instrumental ambitions, and when there is obvious incongruence with its development record in practice. However, as we will see, Brazil, in keeping with Mosse’s (2004) contention that aid efforts work to maintain coherent representations, has struggled to continue to ascribe authority and capacity to the Haitian state despite evidence that its approach contains serious deficiencies in its assumptions around the availability of human and financial resources.

The following Chapter situates the increase in the global provision of SSC, arguing that the emergence and characteristics of this newer form of cooperation are only explicable in the context of criticisms leveled against the traditional aid regime. However, I also seek to provide some initial criticisms of SSC in order to avoid a tendency to present it either as a wholly positive or negative trend. In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to Brazil and Haiti specifically to provide an initial explanation of why Brazil intensified cooperation as a foreign policy vehicle, and outline Haiti’s historical relationship with foreign donors. Specifically, Chapter 4 situates Brazil’s relations with Haiti in the broader context of colonial and post-colonial external interventions that have misrepresented the country and in doing so produced a number of ill-designed interventions that create and
aggravate a racialized political economy. Subsequently, I turn to the case studies in order to develop a full portrait of Brazilian strategies in Haiti. Chapters 5 and 6 are divided according to one characteristic of Brazilian strategy – either partnerships or appropriate interventions – and they explore the factors that have made these strategies possible. In both, I explain how openness to Brazil’s leadership in the Global South relates to its inclusion of Haitian institutions as development actors, and to its extension of models that address socio-economic needs. In Chapter 7, I consider how SSC can be fairly evaluated, discussing Brazil’s strengths and weaknesses, and drawing particular attention to how limitations of the cooperation model seem destined to prevent any longer-term benefits for Brazil of extending cooperation. The purpose of this interpretation is not only to show the interconnections between the qualities and outcomes of cooperation as a way of understanding future effects of cooperation, but also to strengthen the validity of the analytical frame. The Chapter more forcefully demonstrates the utility of attention to social constitution by stressing the need to comprehend cooperation’s features in the historical context – why certain qualities of cooperation are so important to Haitian partners. To conclude, I explore how the findings may be relevant to the other members of the BRICS, especially China, and what the limitations of the study are for understanding Brazilian behaviour abroad.
2 Chapter: South-South Cooperation and the International Development Assistance Regime

As outlined in the introduction, the increase in intensity of South-South Cooperation can be viewed in part as a reaction against the practices of traditional donors, and the characteristics of the current international development assistance regime. In this Chapter, I provide an overview of the main contours of development cooperation globally as a way of historicizing and embedding practices of SSC. The Chapter begins with an overview of how the main principles and strategies of traditional aid have changed over the years, outlining some of the criticisms that have been raised of its effects on development. Analytically, I focus on identifying critiques from both a broad political economy perspective as well as a post-colonial lens. If SSC is an expression of emerging donors’ dissatisfaction with traditional aid, how does this lead to the particular forms SSC takes?

After elaborating some of its shared principles, I argue that the application of these same broad paradigms – critical political economy and post-colonialism – helps to provide insights into some of challenges that this form of cooperation specifically presents for development. I further maintain that these initial analyses are necessary since some of the literature on SSC, especially initially, has tended to be presented in dichotomous terms: either overly celebratory or highly negative. Fortunately, in parallel to the increase in scholarly interest on the topic, more nuanced work that reveals greater complexities in the nature of SSC has been on the increase (including work on Brazil in Haiti; see Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier, 2015; Feldmann et al., 2012; also refer to footnote 8). To conclude, I elaborate an interpretative framework for evaluating Brazilian
cooperation. Beyond the OECD-DAC Principles, I explore how further standards of what
defines “good” cooperation can be distilled from SSC, as well as from the diverse body
of literature on traditional aid practices.

2.1 The International Development Assistance Regime

Since the rise of development assistance post-WWII and what Escobar (1995) has
viewed the very invention of “development”, there has been evidence of a global regime,
albeit one which is in constant flux. Indeed, although there are traceable shifts in
dominant aid thinking – what it should target, under what conditions it is most effective,
etc. - from one era to the next, the notion of what aid is remains ambiguous. As Sogge
(2002) explains, aid can be:

- A financial services industry, promoting exports and loans on easy terms, and
  quietly insuring creditors against bad debts;
- A technical services industry, improving know-how and infrastructure;
- A ‘feel-good’ and image industry that can relieve guilt and subtly pander to the
  satisfactions of parental/paternal authority;
- A political toolshed stocked with carrots and sticks to train and discipline
  clients; and,
- A knowledge and ideology industry, setting policy agendas and shaping norms
  and aspirations” (p. 13).

All of this and more, aid is, in short, a relationship of power, where there is a transfer of
material resources but also a transfer of ideas (Sogge, 2002). The history of development
assistance reflects global contestation over the meaning of development and how it is to
be pursued. The DAC has had hegemonic influence over the international development
assistance regime, including by defining what Official Development Assistance (ODA)
can, and cannot, involve. Nevertheless, the very emergence of SSC can be read as a
counter to ideas around how aid should be provided.
With Truman’s Point Four in his inaugural speech, announcing the United States’ commitment to “making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”, the age of development was effectively launched (Rist, 2002, p. 71). In the decades since, thinking on foreign aid has gone through discernible hegemonic shifts. Rojas (2004, p. 108) argues that aid as a form of government has changed from: the internationalization of aid, including statization where aid helps in governing other states; to multilateralization, where international institutions take on a more prominent role in addressing the social as individualized problems; and, most recently, a new imperialism that depends on the securitization of aid to contain “the hopeless cases’ who could not be expected to progress and who were seen as an obstacle to the progress of others” (referring to Hindess, 2002). While, for instance, aid continued to fund projects and technical assistance between the 1960s to 70s, the focus shifted from assuming aid benefits would “trickle-down” to trying to improve basic needs (Tarp, 2010). The 1980s into the 1990s marked the advent of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), where donors implemented so-called “first generation” conditionalities, making aid available only if various measures signifying a commitment to market orthodoxy were implemented (Hayman, 2011). As Rist (2002) describes, the World Bank’s World Development Report 1994 “is a perfect example of this nineties ‘revolution in attitudes’: it advocates the privatization of infrastructure in the name of efficiency and profitability, whereas everyone had previously agreed that these tasks should be assumed by the State” (p. 222). With the end of the Cold War, aid seemed to have lost some its legitimacy. On one hand, part of aid’s strategic utility for donors was eliminated (Barnes & Brown, 2011). As well, the failure
of SAPs was widely acknowledged, which shook confidence in the donor community’s ability to prescribe the conditions necessary to secure development (Barnes & Browne, 2011; Abrahamsen, 2001).

Ultimately, however, there was actually renewed interest in foreign aid for development (Mavrotas, 2010), demonstrating aid’s remarkable capacity for reinvention. As Mavrotas (2010) explains, donors re-committed to the perceived value of aid with the launching of the Millennium Development Goals, which were eight goals that were to be achieved by the year 2015, complete with specific targets. These goals were eventually replaced by 17 Sustainable Development Goals as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which were conceived of as universal, meaning all countries are expected to progress toward their realization. At the same time, donors have made greater efforts to institutionalize measures that are intended to achieve greater “effectiveness” by improving how they work with country recipients, signaled by the Declaration on Aid Harmonization in 2003, the Paris Declaration in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008 – builds on the Paris Declaration) and more recently the 2011 Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) (Mavrotas, 2010; Sridhar, 2009; OECD, n.d.). For example, donors stressed, in response to criticisms that conditionalities placed on financing make priority-setting processes problematically donor-led, that they would prioritize “ownership” – space for recipients to develop their own national plans and to strengthen national leadership (Sridhar, 2009).

Yet principles for effectiveness exist alongside other norms, such as the governance prescriptions that became central in the 1990s with “second generation

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8 There was renewed interest with the exception of strong anti-aid advocates (such as Easterly, 2006 or Moyo, 2009).
conditionalities” – with financial support provided only if countries met political conditions in addition to economic reforms (Hayman, 2011), rendering ownership at the very least highly confined. Abrahamsen (2001) describes how the reasons for the failure of SAPs were thus refigured in a remarkable sleight of hand: “the reason for the failure of structural adjustment was not the programmes themselves, not imbalances in the global political economy, unfair markets, or adverse domestic conditions, but African governments themselves” (p. 41).

This brief mapping of the history of the provision of assistance provides an opening for understanding the criticisms of aid that have emerged from the South. Indeed, multiple criticisms have been raised by diverse voices in the South, and have produced numerous calls for acting outside of this framework. Although SSC has attracted attention in the past decade because of its intensification, it has a long history. SSC emerged from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was a way for the South to develop a collective identity in order to make demands on the North more effectively (Abrahamsen, 2001; Almeida et al., 2010). The main principles of the NAM included respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, and relations based on equality (Amanor, 2013). NAM also stated that, “‘the participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable’” (quoted in Rist, 2002, p. 82). In Bandung in the 1970s, the Movement produced a Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which included the call for increased aid from the North without strings attached, and the better known call for “trade not aid” (Rist, 2002). In 1978, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was developed, which was the first strategic framework for technical cooperation among developing
countries (UNCTAD, 2010). Despite this shared history, the principles influencing the current form of SSC, as detailed below, occur “in contexts that are quite different from the original conception of North-South unequal relations and Southern solidarity based on self-sufficiency” (Amanor, 2013, p. 23), not the least of which include declining amounts from traditional donors, and economic prosperity among the emerging powers (Quadir, 2013).

At the same time as the changed intensity of SSC represents efforts to move away from the traditional development assistance regime, there have also been efforts to uphold existing standards and structures. These efforts include seeking to draw in these emerging Southern partners to existing regimes, such as by incorporating them into GPEDC, which came into effect in 2012. Moving from “aid effectiveness” to “effective development co-operation”, the objective of the GPEDC is “ensuring all partners involved in development co-ordinate work effectively to ensure maximum impact in eradicating poverty”, which includes adding “inclusive development partnerships” to principles of cooperation (The Global Partnership, 2013). The GPEDC replaces the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, created in 2008 in Accra (where, as described above, principles of aid effectiveness were further consolidated), which, although it eventually came to include many actors, was perceived as “donor-dominated” (Kindornay, 2013, p. 43). The Partnership is intended to meet the goal established at the 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan of “establishing a legitimate and inclusive multi-stakeholder partnership that would better reflect the changing nature of international development and the increasing roles of actors such as the private sector and South-South Cooperation” (ibid). However, whether the GPEDC will be able to meet its
universal mandate is certainly unclear; it faces a number of challenges, including that it remains an *ad hoc* group (Sinclair, 2013). Prior to its first high-level meeting in Mexico in 2014, optimism was in short supply. The GPEDC’s own progress reported noted that,

> Longstanding efforts to change the way development cooperation is delivered are paying off, but much more needs to be done to transform cooperation practices and ensure country ownership of all development efforts, as well as transparency and accountability among development partners (Jones, 2014, n.p.).

Major donors like China, India, and Brazil also remain resistant to such efforts, including because they regard the Partnership as one still dominated by the OECD-DAC (Fues & Klingebiel, 2014)\(^9\).

Academic criticisms have also been raised on a number of issues related to foreign aid, and from various perspectives. As set out in the introduction, conventional analyses of foreign aid, and indeed of foreign policy more generally, are not satisfactory for understanding aid relations. For instance, realism’s insistence upon aid’s use for securing the national interest (see Morgenthau, 1962) problematically dislocates interest from its social context. Interest, as constructivist scholars have alerted us to, is based on collectively held ideas. The constructivist challenge begins to comprehend the ways in which aid has shifted from a more coercive to consensus-generating approach globally, as I will argue post-development scholars have revealed below, yet key analytical gaps remain. As with liberal paradigms (such as Moravcsik, 1997), which see state behaviour as emanating from state-society relations, including through ideational components, there is a tendency to ignore the political and economic relations that influence social aspects.

\(^9\) The OECD-DAC website (2017) lists Brazil’s endorsement of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action as “confirmation pending”.
Hence I turn to the critiques of aid coming from critical political economy and post-development scholars to also analyze SSC.

Working within the political economy tradition, critics of traditional aid draw attention to the ways in which recipient societies are transformed by aid. Recent shifts toward partnership, ownership, good governance, etc. were intended to remedy some of the longstanding limitations of the aid regime, including “lingering issues of paternalism, neocolonialism and economic inequality” (Barnes & Browne, 2011, p. 172) by emphasizing collaboration rather than conditionality (Carbone, 2010). Nevertheless, critics have stressed how a gap between rhetoric and practice remains (ibid; Hayman, 2011). For example, the provision of budget support is still based on the same underlying adherence to liberal democratic norms (Hayman, 2011). Donors may not impose reforms as part of cooperation, but they will refrain from initially selecting a partner that deviates from expected standards (ibid). Sridhar (2009), discussing global health initiatives, notes how vertical financing (where the focus is on specific diseases, services, and interventions) continues despite “near universal consensus that optimal health systems are the key to improving health and that donors must move from vertical towards horizontal financing” (p 1365). He contends that this preference, with such effects as little concern for long-term capacity, results from donors’ focus on ‘quick wins’ (Sridhar, 2011, p. 1370). Donor preferences are also shaped by economic factors. Testing for relationships between trade and aid between 22 donor countries and 187 recipients between 1980 and 2002, Lundsgaarde, Breunig, and Prakash (2010) find strong evidence that bilateral trade influences aid provision, although they acknowledge that it is difficult to determine the
direction of causality. The instrumentalist rationale for these links would be that donors assume they can expand commercial opportunities for their domestic firms (ibid).

Beyond concerns that donors’ political economies influence their development preferences and policies, this literature also explains how development assistance affects recipients’ political economies. The ‘hijacking’ of aid for purposes other than development is thus part of the problem (Sogge, 2002), but so is the deeper contention that development practice entails the reproduction of certain forms of capitalist organization, which only serve to deepen relations of inequality (Weber, 2004). However, critics point to how aid’s interaction with a recipient’s political economy often goes unremarked. Governance is thus approached as technocratic, neglecting the politics of institutions whereby such groups as political parties, government bureaucracy, and the private sector interact (de Haan, 2010). By approaching institutions in recipient governments with a focus on whether they enact the ‘rules of the game’, there is a missed opportunity to see how coalitions might form in support of development (ibid). Hughes and Hutchinson (2012) note how, as one example, technocratic approaches would conceive of opposition to a particular project as temporary rather than structural, or, when seeking to build demand for change, would refuse to take a particular side. In the case of peace-building efforts, this can mean that the donor works with the state, perceiving it as neutral and “often unwittingly” contributing to conflict as it avoids the issue of how state practices marginalize certain groups (Burke, 2012, p. 185). Instead, such critics support a political economy analysis that would entail “reconceptualising politics as a struggle between coalitions, not merely at the margins or over policy questions, but as the central dynamic in social, political and economic life, with the terms of the political settlement
itself always at stake” (Hughes & Hutchinson, 2012, p. 24). Likewise, these social relations must also be understood as transnationalized, involving complex interactions among governments, citizens, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, the Bretton Woods institutions, etc. – and frequent overlaps between these groups (Whitfield, 2006).

Other critiques stem from a post-development approach, and offer a complement to the previous points raised. As explained in the introduction, this approach often see changes in development assistance as part of a particular form of governance, in which recipient nations and citizens are not forced to behave in certain ways, but rather are self-motivated to do so as part of a “will to improve” (Li, 2007). Li’s (2007) use of the concept of “will to improve” thus captures the productive side of power, yet also examines the limits of improvement schemes in terms of not achieving what they set out to do, including as they are met with resistance. As in Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine (1994), moreover, there is a recognition that these interventions will have unplanned effects (Li, 2007). As well, the focus is on how development is spoken about: development discourses are seen as central in the actual production of categories like North and South, so that intervention and other actions serving to rectify problems can even exist at all – that problems can be defined and ultimately acted upon (Abrahamsen, 2001; Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1994). Escobar’s “The Making and Unmaking of the Third World” (1995), for instance, describes development as a historically produced discourse defined by:

The forms of knowledge that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse,
those through which people come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped (p. 10).

According to these perspectives, various forms that development intervention have taken are dependent on representations about what development (and underdevelopment) mean, who the developers versus developed are, and that these representations are widely held.

In broad strokes, a comparison with a political economy analysis of good governance can illustrate the significance of this post-development perspective. In addition to examining the ways in which governance indicators can lead to selectivity in terms of desired recipients (Hayman, 2011; Carbone, 2010), this disciplinary form of power is evident in how recipients may internally constitute themselves next to apparently neutral standards of normalcy (Löwenheim, 2008). Abrahamsen’s (2001) excellent study of the good governance agenda also describes such effects as celebrating forms of democratization that emphasize a role for civil society, even if this involves supporting traditional structures that have been oppressive. Indeed, despite starting with discursive constructions, these thoughts overlap with the previous points raised in that they have similar effects on recipient politics, economies, and societies. For instance, again around governance indicators, the nexus between knowledge and material power is clearly visible; countries are examined and rated according to standards held as legitimate, thus granting aid funds to those who meet them, and neglecting those who do not (Löwenheim, 2008). Ferguson (1994) likewise, in making the distinction between what he calls “academic” and “development” discourse (representations in development agency reports) in Lesotho, notes development agencies’ bewildering statements about its “traditional peasant, subsistence society”, “untouched by modern economic development”, not as a way of revealing them as false, but rather to show how they
become comprehensible in the development industry and to what end (p. 27). Indeed, his argument about unplanned effects traces how these “side effects” did have transformational impacts, expanding state power and strengthening local government machinery (Ferguson, 1994). These types of critiques resonate with the content of both NIEO and recent SSC practices in their stressing of the need to respect the internal affairs of developing nations (Rist, 1997; Woods, 2008). The contrast with political economy is somewhat artificial, however; to return to my earlier comment, the choice to approach aid as a practice stems from the recognition that many insights from a political economy perspective are already subsumed within various post-development approaches.

In the next section, I provide a broader overview of the emergence of SSC as an intended challenge to the traditional development assistance regime. After reviewing some of the main features of this form of assistance, I explore its implications using the same broad analytical frameworks – political economy and post-colonial – described above. The aim is to provide a more nuanced comparison with traditional aid than has been available in the literature.

2.2 South-South Cooperation: Continuity, Hegemonic Change, or Something Else?

The growing intensity of SSC, particularly over the past decade, is one vehicle through which dissatisfaction with traditional aid has become apparent. As observers have suggested (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012), it is worth noting that much of the literature on SSC tends to view the rise of these providers in simplified terms: do they represent “an alternative or ‘another strategy to control African resources and state elites in the guise of a partnership of equals’” (Raposo & Potter, 2010)? An unfortunate
example of the latter is Naím’s (2007) contention that SSC is what he calls “rogue aid”: “a variety of wealthy, nondemocratic regimes have begun to undermine development policy through their own activist aid programs” (p. 96). In contrast, there have also been overly celebratory accounts, especially in analyses that tend to remain at the descriptive level of the principles of SSC. For instance, an article on Brazil’s cooperation in health acknowledges that it is early to evaluate impacts, yet praises the innovative aspects of the approach, including the attempt to integrate human resources development with institutional development, and to break from “unidirectional” models of transferring knowledge (Almeida, de Campos, Buss, Ferreira, & Fonseca, 2010, p. 27). This focus on principles is undoubtedly a symptom of the lack of empirical analyses of SSC, at least initially. Applying the two lenses used to criticize traditional aid above, I will explore how SSC represents neither continuity nor hegemonic change, but instead appears to offer unique opportunities and challenges for recipients.

In 2015, the OECD found that 27 countries providing development cooperation “beyond the DAC” were contributing some US$ 23.5 billion in 2013, which represents more than 13% of the total. China, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) all provided over a billion in 2013 (OECD, 2015). Of the BRICS, China was first, with US$ 3 billion; Russia provided 714 million; India stands at 1.26 billion; and South Africa, 183 million (ibid). The last year they have available for Brazilian funding is 2010, which stood at 500 million. In its official report for the 2011-2013 period, Brazil reports spending US$ 396 million on total funding for development, of which 32 million was destined for technical cooperation (Ipea, 2016). Indeed, this difference is revealing of major problems with the data presented here. The OECD (2015)
notes that, with the exception of Russia, these countries do not report to the DAC, and they have thus used “official sources of these countries…as well as information published by multilateral organizations to arrive at an estimate of flows that may qualify as ODA” (p. 4). In addition to limits on measuring their contributions when there is no agreement as to what qualifies as cooperation, I would also emphasize again that much of Brazil’s contributions are not accounted for in dollar totals because technical assistance relies on expertise from domestic technicians.

While the principles and practices of emerging donors are various, at the same time there has been surprising coherence in messaging\(^\text{10}\). In particular, notions of partnership are stressed in order to distance their relationships with partners (and not recipients) from the hierarchical relationships that are said to characterize traditional aid. As Quadir (2013) describes, there is a “departure from conditionally driven aid to promote ‘horizontal cooperation’ based on the principles of equality, partnership and mutual interest” (p. 324). By stressing their partners’ active role in the process, combined with a focus on capacity-building, Southern donors expect that the country will be in a position to lead future development efforts (Buss, 2011). At the same time, partners such as China or Brazil consider themselves to be part of mutually beneficial relationships; while they provide technical skills and financial co-operation, they are often rewarded commercial benefits in return\(^\text{11}\) (Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). As Brautigam describes for

\(^{10}\) Whether this can continue is unlikely, as economic motivations will mean Southern players will eventually need to recognize that like players are also their competitors. As Burges (2013) notes, Brazil certainly would have recognized the economic opportunities in African markets, especially as European or North American counterparts showed disinterest, but they did not likely anticipate the competitiveness of a rising China.

\(^{11}\) Brazil’s take on this concept is different, as they stress “mutual benefit” in the sense of Brazil also learning from technical exchanges (author’s interviews; see also ABC & BRICS Policy Center, 2013).
the case of China, they propose that cooperation “can be offered in frank exchange, as part of a relationship of mutual benefit” (2009, p. 21). While, as Zimmerman and Smith (2011) note, these donors might attempt to ward off potential criticisms over mutual interest by stressing how “the partner country government’s demand for the project [is] sufficient proof that their activities are well-aligned” (p. 722), these relationships may still be fraught with tensions. Indeed, the concept is premised on the same kinds of assumptions around political neutrality that were critiqued above, which at first glance does not seem to leave Southern donors any better placed to engage with the politics of development cooperation.

Other points of commonality among Southern donors include respect for their partners’ sovereignty and the prominence of an anti-hegemonic rhetoric. On sovereignty, these donors have positioned themselves against tying political conditionalities to their assistance, arguing that they respect the politics of the countries that they are engaged with. This practice has tended to be the focus of criticisms, as the implication is that they are supporting rogue states, hence undermining other external pressure to reform12 (Woods, 2008). While the idea that this is “blind support” likely overstates the case (ibid, p. 1207), there is, again, a legitimate concern that any kind of claim to neutrality misses the fact that the politics of development are inescapable. Refusing to implement political conditionalities is still political, granting tacit support to those in power. These donors also exercise anti-hegemonic rhetoric, including by distancing themselves from DAC donors. In fact, their avoidance of DAC principles, such as by emphasizing the sovereignty of their partners, is based on their claim to be different from Western aid

12 Woods (2008) provides an excellent overview of some of the controversies facing newer donors.
(Kragelund, 2008) – this rhetorical opposition is in spite of obvious commonalities in practice, such as the pursuit of mutual benefit, and in principle – notably, “ownership” (DAC) seems consistent with the focus on equalized relations or partnerships (emerging). In particular, for China the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism has been a “guiding force” in its approach, leading, among other practices, to the rejection of political conditionalities (Raposo & Potter, 2010, p. 182).

There has been less examination of the motivations of recipients in receiving cooperation from the emerging powers. As noted above, there have been arguments that the advent of these donors widens the policy space of their partners (Kragelund, 2014; Woods, 2008). Kragelund (2014), for example, suggests that Zambia has been more vocal than previously in criticizing interference with their development process, and have, as I return to below, generally welcomed the non-interventionist character of what he refers to as non-traditional state actors. Indeed, in general there are strong indications that many governments see cooperation from emerging powers as positive. For instance, “South African President Jacob Zuma in March 2013 cautioned Western companies and institutions that they would lose out to new partners…if they do not shed the old paternalistic ‘colonial’ approach” (Poon, 2013, p. 19). As with President Zuma’s quote that the presence of Southern partners challenges traditional donors to reform, or essentially become extinct (ibid), evidence from multiple states, including Cameroon and Mozambique, indicates governments’ preference (not surprisingly) for the non-conditional model (Nordtveit, 2011; Lagerkvist, 2014). Nevertheless, China’s approach, including the use of non-policy related conditionalities, means that this support can be half-hearted, as I return to below; according to a Cameroonian senior advisor, for
instance: “‘China, on the other hand, is more calculating. China would like to give you something, but they would like something in return’” (Nordtveit, 2011, p. 106). In Latin America, moreover, there has been a general tendency of New Left states to strengthen their ties with other Left regimes. Riggorozzi and Tussie (2012) thus argue that political changes within states have fundamentally altered the character of regional institutions, which, despite their variety, relocate “the focus of regionalism as an extension of domestic rather than global politics” (p. 8). In particular, the differences between Venezuela and Brazil’s approaches to regional political projects have held different levels of attraction; while Chávez’ more statist, mercantilist model generated followers in Nicaragua and Bolivia, Lula’s leadership seemed able to generate a broader appeal (Burges, 2007).

In addition to these areas of overlap characterizing all Southern donors, increasingly the North is involved in SSC, such as through triangular cooperation (Abdenur & Marques da Fonseca, 2013). This arrangement problematizes the idea that emerging donors are separate from traditional aid, as a hegemonic alternative. The OECD surveyed 73 respondents from government and international organizations on 400 triangular programmes or projects in 2015, finding that the most active countries included Japan, Chile, Brazil, Norway, Spain, Guatemala, Germany, South Africa, Mexico, and Colombia (2016). Most of these cooperation projects were in Latin America and the Caribbean (OECD, 2016). The logic behind these arrangements is that they can capitalize on the respective strengths of each partner. Typically, this logic assumes that traditional partners, including DAC donors and also multilateral organizations, have accumulated experiences in aid management and are familiar with norms and standards of aid
effectiveness. Southern partners instead offer their own experiences and shared culture or geography with a recipient (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). These arrangements have a number of significant implications for development, such as aggravating coordination problems that already plague aid relationships. One project in Angola between Japan-Brazil is cited as involving two Angolan counterparts; two Brazilian agencies acting in official capacity; three Brazilian universities; and three Japanese offices (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012).

What are the motivations for and consequences of triangular cooperation? In terms of the Northern participants, these relationships have been read as an attempt to maintain their strategic position (Abdenur, 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). Engaging with Southern partners can thus provide “legitimacy by association for Northern donors, given the contestation of Northern aid” (Abdenur, 2013, p. 1484). As part of their positioning of themselves against DAC donors described above, all Southern donors have, to varying degrees, also sought to establish their “affinity” with other developing countries in order to be perceived as legitimate (Rowlands, 2008, p. 6).

Brazilian cooperation, for instance, is repeatedly described as more relevant to partners’ needs given it is based on lessons learned (see for example White, 2010; Almeida et al., 2010; Nieto, 2012; Burges, 2014). These claims revolve around ideas that Brazil is exporting its own “social technology”, referring to the development successes that it has had domestically as a developing nation (White, 2010). These successes are seen as inherently more appropriate to other developing country contexts. One illustration comes from Kragelund (2014) who writes, “Brazil also acts both as a role model and a development alternative for Zambia: Brazil has been very successful in advancing
economic growth while simultaneously reducing poverty” (p. 153). This logic of appropriateness will be investigated in detail in the following case study Chapters. This jostling to establish legitimacy based on perceived affinities is also a part of triangular cooperation. McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) argue forcefully that these assumptions need to be analyzed with as much rigour as the interests of Northern partners. In all relationships with recipients, there cannot be an assumption in advance that relationships are horizontal (ibid). Aid is a foreign policy tool, meaning that “pivotal states have an interest in promoting a rather essentialist notion of shared identity, experiences and interests, and expertise in particular technologies or social programmes” (ibid, p. 1204). In the case of Brazil, who has been much more of a willing participant in triangular relationships than have other Southern donors (UNCTAD, 2010), Burges’ (2013) explanation of Brazil as a “bridge between old and new” seems apt. Brazil is particularly interested in championing itself as a bridge-builder internationally as a way to advance its interests. The question of how recipients perceive cooperative relationships would help to address some of the potential criticisms of these approaches, but as of yet there have been few examinations (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). Given Brazil’s use of triangular forms of cooperation, the case study Chapters examine in detail the logic behind their use, and the consequences for development as well as partner relations.

SSC can also be explored using the same broad paradigms used to critique traditional aid. There are already numerous indications that SSC resembles traditional aid, and that it is similarly guided by pragmatic economic and political objectives. A few examples include:
• Examining China’s assistance in Africa, for example, Raposo and Potter (2010) find that among the top ten recipients, only four are ranked as having low human development;
• India has concentrated its assistance to its neighbours as an “important facet of its regional hegemony and as representative of its growing global political and commercial ambitions” (Rowlands, 2008, p. 6); and,
• Donors may not extend policy conditionalities, but cooperation has been tied to the purchase of goods and services (Kragelund, 2008; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011).

Such indications lead Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier (2015) to argue, in their comparison of cooperation provided by the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) and ALBA (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas), that all are motivated by securing their national interests as well as solidarity. The puzzle of Brazilian cooperation as laid out in the following Chapter reveals similarly ambiguous outcomes. However, Robledo’s (2015) work on the motivations for non-DAC donors also suggests that their drivers may be unique, including around more instrumental purposes. For instance, while Robledo’s (2015) typology notes the presence of broadly political-diplomatic motivations for donors providing ODA, the maintenance of national sovereignty is a specific objective observable in SSC from Latin American countries. Most South-South discourse would minimize these outcomes by arguing that partners are also receiving benefits.

Undoubtedly, the increase in market opportunities can have desirable effects (Raposo & Potter, 2010). For instance, China’s commitment to offering zero-tariff treatment for products from 39 Least Developed Countries is an important change (Manning, 2006). Still, the terms of these engagements may also be problematic, such as where China has been criticized for importing labour rather than employing local workers (Davies, 2010). More critical accounts are, fortunately, on the increase, with McEwan and Mawdsley (2012), for example, explicitly attempting to apply criticisms of North-South relations to
triangular projects. Most of these accounts tend to pinpoint China’s rise as being negative for development, while stressing that these repercussions are not new, especially in exacerbating dependency on the export of primary products (see Raposo & Potter, 2010; Naím, 2007; Nordtveit, 20011; Hackenesch, 2010). Matunhu (2011) for example describes China as following the lead of the former colonial powers, creating dependent-like relations in which Africa grows the Chinese economy. In identifying the limits of the research project in its application to other emerging donors, I return to Brazil’s comparability with China in the conclusion, arguing that there are substantive differences that leave Brazil as the more development-friendly actor, even if the contrast has been overplayed. These variations in content are coupled with a marked difference in style that helps construct Brazil’s softer, friendlier image. For example, in references to the criticisms around importing labour and non-policy conditions, neither practice is common to the Brazilian approach (Brazilian bureaucrats in author’s interviews, 2015; ABC & BRICS Policy Center, 2013; White, 2010).

However, recognition of continuities with historic aid failures should not blind us to the ways in which SSC might present new opportunities for development. Kragelund (2014) quotes a civil servant as confirming that:

[Non-traditional state actors]…provide loans to the treasury and the treasury then decides how to use the money. There are no Chinese expats here telling the treasury what to do. The Chinese have no project office coordinating the interventions. That is why we like that kind of support so much. It enables us to recognise own priorities (156).

Nevertheless, while this kind of relationship does suggest ownership is being successfully promoted, as referenced earlier it still has an apolitical veneer that should be subject to analysis. If SSC donors build more cooperative relations with their recipient partners, they are still supporting a particular politico-economic regime. The consequences for
recipient societies will thus depend on how representative this government is of different groups’ demands. In contrast to the elite-level demand referenced above, an ethnographic work distinguishes between support at the level of the Mozambican government for Chinese partnerships, and a fearful climate among civil society groups (Lagerkvist, 2014). However, regimes are not static, and the SSC logic would assume that an advantage of working through government partners is the potential for gradual, yet transformative change. The complexities of establishing these relationships are a major focus of the subsequent Chapters on Brazilian-Haitian relations.

Although increasingly the various political and economic dimensions of SSC are acknowledged, there is still a significant gap in our understanding as to how these dimensions come together. How, for instance, do development cooperation and increased investment ties interact? If we can go beyond dichotomized representations of SSC as development-friendly or purely instrumental, the complexities of these relationships can be analyzed in greater depth. Kragelund, in referring to emerging donors, or what he calls non-traditional state actors (NTSAs), argues that “their development experiences point towards a tailored development model that combines purposive state intervention with market-based economic growth and integration into world markets” (2014, p. 158). Kragelund’s (2014) important intervention reminds us that simply pointing to the presence of political and economic drivers in motivating development cooperation says little about the particular development model being promoted, embedded as it is in domestic state-society arrangements. Brazil’s model, while similarly state-directed, prescribes an intensified role for the state not only in the market, but also in rectifying social inequalities (Carmody, 2013). While there may be some congruity between SSC
In addition to political economy analyses of SSC, a more post-colonial lens can also provide a useful departure point. In their principles, SSC appear to take a marked departure from how traditional aid has operated in practice. Concepts of horizontality, non-interference, and the insistence on labeling relations with recipient countries as partnerships are set against the dynamics of traditional relationships – as unequal, highly vertical distributions of power between North and South. Indeed, the emerging donors themselves most often make this contrast. Raposo and Potter (2010) contend for instance that Chinese “rhetoric of anti-hegemonism against the superpowers has been a guiding force in China’s policy formulations towards the developing world and Southern Africa” (p. 182). As discussed above, discourse also seeks an erasure of differences among the South by stressing and constructing affinities. Other aspects of how the relationships forming SSC are spoken about are particular to the emerging donor, and, as we will see when examining Brazilian relationships with Haiti, contingent upon the recipient as well. As one example, Brazil tends to focus on establishing its affinity with other less developed nations by emphasizing its ethnic make-up, especially its African roots (Carmody, 2013).

Observers have noted that cooperation is often favourably received by governments (UNCTD, 2010; Kiala & Ngwenya, 2011). Kiala & Ngwenya (2011) have described Brazil’s relationship with Angola as “shar[ing] a bond that no other BRIC country could emulate. There is an even spread of co-operation over the three tiers of engagement, and a natural appeal at a grassroots level with people-to-people interaction”
These relationships are not free from conflict, however. India, for example, refused to accept tied bilateral aid but now ties much of its own provision (Manning, 2006). Constructions of horizontality are also highly elitist and exclusionary as they can ignore perspectives below and above the state – such as civil society groups or global development organizations. Lagerkvist’s (2014) article on Chinese involvement in Mozambique documents significant concerns over China’s presence, especially around food security, food sovereignty, and customary rights to land access. Thus, one important and perhaps unacknowledged effect of horizontality in principle and practice is the opening up of space for increased government authority and legitimacy on the recipient end (ibid). Lagerkvist (2014) cites an informant as expressing concern that civil society spaces are become more constrained at the same time as the government’s space increases.

As with emerging donors’ own representations of SSC as distinct from traditional aid, analyses of SSC often also seek to understand SSC in comparison to established OECD-DAC norms - whether or not this is done explicitly (see Kragelund, 2008; Hackenesch, 2010; Davies, 2010). This contrast is somewhat inevitable, and even desirable in order to understand what challenges and opportunities arise for development cooperation. Indeed, typical concerns about the characteristics of SSC are framed against DAC standards, including that cooperation is: fragmented; violates governance standards; backtracks on progress towards debt relief (Paulo & Riesen, 2010 in Kim & Lightfoot, 2011). However, the comparison also has its risks. Because these discussions start with OECD-DAC norms as their point of departure, there can be an implicit acceptance that these principles are effective/desirable, and that DAC donors are models of their
successful implementation. As McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) write, the terms of the debate over the significance of SSC “often remained centered around a DAC-non-DAC binary, which is then frequently conflated with a simplistic North-South spatial categorization” (p. 1188).

The repetition of a North-South binary, whether explicit or assumed, has a number of consequences. First, the grouping of actors like China and Brazil under the same label of South-South Cooperation may imply a false sense of coherence, drawing attention to their similarities rather than their important differences; this needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed. Importantly, the contrast, as Kim and Lightfoot (2011) claim, judges them by “what they are not - other than what they actually are” (p. 715). Not only does this tell us little about what practices look like, but it also seems to pre-determine that SSC activities are being negative for development effectiveness – where the meaning of effectiveness is already agreed upon. It also ignores how government partners respond to cooperation. Arguably, the rising prominence of triangular cooperation is also premised on these representations, as it is an attempt to capitalize on the respective cultural authority of emerging donors with the management of traditional donors well versed in aid effectiveness. This type of authority not only places emerging donors in a relatively lower position than traditional donors, it continues to be silent on what the recipient country offers to the partnerships, furthering ideas about the Third World as a place of absence (Abrahamsen, 2001).

This Chapter has so far outlined important shifts in the international development assistance regime in order to situate the incredible increases in SSC seen over the past decade and a half. Further, applying some of the same criticisms that have been applied
to traditional aid over its history has helped to provide initial insights into the potential weaknesses of SSC. Such an application is important as it helps to shift the debate over SSC in more productive directions, not as either continuity with traditional aid or hegemonic change. Rather than existing separate from traditional aid, SSC contains many important overlaps. While the case studies of Brazilian support will provide a much fuller examination of these tensions, it is clear the discursive emphasis on SSC as different from traditional aid has a political rather than descriptive function. Based on this discussion, the final section develops a framework for evaluating Brazilian South-South Cooperation.

2.3 Evaluative Criteria

Any evaluation of Brazilian cooperation must be based on a clear set of criteria. As discussed above, traditional donors have worked to establish a global architecture for aid, which currently includes the Paris Principles of “aid effectiveness”. Given the debates about these norms however, as well as the gap between principles and their actual application, the study does not begin from the assumption that these same criteria represent the “final word” on what cooperation should look like in order to have the best development results. As well, despite recent efforts at the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan to develop a “more inclusive multi-stakeholder governance structure”, emerging donors have been reluctant to participate in the current framework, which makes evaluating Brazil against these criteria automatically imbalanced (Kindornay, 2013, p. 43; Sinclair, 2013). Unfortunately, despite their own claims that they are doing development differently (and better), these new donors have not clearly set
out what norms should instead be adopted, nor have they been consistently evaluating their programs and projects based on alternative conceptions, both actions that would serve to more strongly influence the existing aid regime. Moreover, existing standards risk presenting any practices that fall outside as automatically becoming “bad aid”, thus constructing these donors as “‘illiberal’ and ‘incomplete’” (Kim & Lightfoot, 2011, p. 713-4). Thus, I seek to add additional and revise existing indicators in order to understand the effects of newer donors on development. These indicators are developed through engagement with the literature on emerging donors, but also with the diverse literature on traditional aid practices.

Methodologically speaking, the criteria are applied to the case studies in an interpretative and qualitative manner. In part, this decision reflects the fact that the projects selected for analysis were still in progress. In addition, the lack of transparency around key data is an obstacle to a quantitative comparison of expected and realized outputs. As a result, it is more appropriate to describe qualities and known outcomes of cooperation. However, and more importantly, this approach is consistent with the epistemological underpinnings of practice theory, and the relationship it posits between structures and agents. This evaluation therefore continues to employ process tracing with a more narrow focus on how cooperation fares against such notions as ownership, coherence, and flexibility. The method employed continues to be inductive, interpretative and historical (Pouliot, 2010). When these criteria are applied in Chapter 7 for example, the discussion also returns to the proposed framework, and develops or revises criteria as needed based on the observed practices of Brazil. As well, the intention is to demonstrate where tensions exist among the indicators: for instance, I find that goals of meeting
government priorities while also promoting broader citizen engagement can be at cross-purposes in Haiti. In short, “explaining causality is subordinate to understanding meaning” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 367) as I am comparing more “objective” results and processes with how they have been interpreted. This more focused assessment shows concretely how cooperation leads to positive development outcomes and especially why it is perceived favourably by government partners by, in a sense, removing some of the longer historical view; ultimately, by acknowledging where cooperation has limits and advantages, the Chapter amplifies the necessity of looking to the historically-based logics of cooperation in order to understand its significance. In addition to Chapters 5 and 6 where I stress the political significance of partnerships and demand-driven cooperation for government partners, the discussion of empowerment also recognizes the political symbolism of support in the agricultural and health sectors for Haitian citizens. This exercise further validates the overarching claim that Brazil is perceived as a post-colonial, post-neoliberal emerging power as a result of its strategies of building partnership and designing appropriate intervention.

Table 4 contains an “ideal type” representation of these criteria, and what the provision of cooperation and its outcomes could be expected to look like if the principles were followed. The choices of criteria reflect a combination of DAC principles with a summary of principles articulated by SSC providers. In reality, many of these characteristics are interdependent so that, for instance, projects also have the potential to be of greater relevance if more diverse groups are consulted and involved. The first principles listed reflect established OECD-DAC principles. However, “ownership” has been revised to include citizen participation more directly. The DAC (2015) itself has
recognized that ownership must be broadened, for example explaining that it must “move beyond the executive to include engagement with parliament, political parties, local authorities, the media, academia, social partners and broader civil society” (n.p.). Furthermore, despite their own reluctance to engage with DAC standards, ownership (as well as alignment, which is the application of ownership) in practice resonates with the emerging donors’ emphasis on horizontality and demand-driven processes. However, there are also important tensions, as I return to in Chapters 5 and 7, as Brazil enacts a conception of ownership much closer to the DAC’s original formulation. Similarly, the notion of alignment has been broadened in order to include the South-South focus on capacity-building. Added indicators include: coherence, where other foreign policy tools also explicitly support development; flexibility (or institutional responsiveness); and relevance, such as where the expertise provided is appropriate to the partner’s context. It should be noted that there is even greater convergence between South-South norms and DAC standards when examining the criteria used by the DAC to evaluate cooperation, as opposed to aid effectiveness principles (which I use for the evaluative framework). These criteria include: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability (DAC, n.d.). Finally, specific to Brazil as a post-neoliberal state, I also include addressing inequalities, since the Brazilian government has made efforts to address poverty’s intersection with other forms of inequality. Domestically, for example, there have been efforts to increase women’s representation in parliament, or to shift away from notions of racial democracy to affirmative action, but the success of these measures is contested (Friedman, 2009; Marsiaj, 2012; Htun, 2004). To complicate matters further, these actions may overlap Cardoso’s PSDB and PT administrations, and will need to be
carefully traced. For example, Htun (2004) notes how Cardoso endorsed affirmative action in 2001. Inequalities are also interlinked in important ways, with Friedman (2009) noting for instance how feminist alliances with the PT have in general granted women increased access to the state, while Afro-Brazilian women continue to be marginalized.

Table 4  Evaluative Criteria and Expected Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Inputs/Characteristics</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership*</td>
<td>Partners can exercise leadership over their development policies</td>
<td>Partners have development strategies (such as poverty reduction strategies)</td>
<td>Empowerment of aid recipients so that project outcomes are sustained over the longer-term. Future development processes include multiple stakeholders working together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Processes of consultation are widespread, and include a diverse range of citizens, from government officials to NGOs and research centers, and to potential project participants</td>
<td>Broad buy-in to the project is achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment*</td>
<td>Donors subsequently base their support on partners’ strategies</td>
<td>Use of the partner’s financial management systems</td>
<td>Engagement with existing systems serves to strengthen existing government capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization*</td>
<td>Donors will work together in order to be collectively effective</td>
<td>Use of common arrangements</td>
<td>Less conflict between approaches and the avoidance of overlap. Improved government capacity to manage external actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing for results*</td>
<td>Managing resources and improving decision-making for results</td>
<td>Performance assessment frameworks that are transparent and amenable to monitoring</td>
<td>An approach that continuously improves by looking to previous experiences for lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual accountability*</td>
<td>Donors and partners are accountable for development results</td>
<td>Partners undertake mutual assessment of progress in meeting commitments on aid effectiveness</td>
<td>Develops a culture of shared responsibility for development results – both successes and failures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Other foreign policy tools are designed and implemented with development considerations</td>
<td>An increase in trade relationships or an increase in investment links in pro-poor directions; for example, trade relationships are cultivated in non-traditional areas</td>
<td>Synergies in support of development exist between various forms of South-South cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Brazilian officials on the ground can revise project</td>
<td>There are more feedback loops between</td>
<td>The project is better attuned to the specific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The project not only meets government and citizen priorities, but it also is carried out in a way that is appropriate to the specific context. Technical solutions can be implemented as they are low-cost, can be managed by locals, etc. Project outcomes are not only sustained over the long-term (past the end of the project), but also serve as models for similar problems.

Addressing intersectionality is an explicit focus, such as where improving gender or racial inequality is identified as a central project objective. Increases in equality are visible in such outputs as greater participation in project activities, deeper understanding of gender and racial injustices, etc.

Includes and empowers marginalized groups.
power imbalances of the donor-recipient relationship by enshrining horizontality and non-interference into their norms and actions, these approaches have, perhaps unexpectedly, raised issues surrounding accountability of governments and development that is removed from non-government spheres. I have also suggested that many critical analyses to date of SSC had been either missing or much too harsh, and argued that the same application of analytical frameworks could provide insight into potential pitfalls of this form of cooperation without falling into the tendency to see failures as simply the continued and total breakdown of the development enterprise. In short, such an application would build upon and extend the more recent nuanced academic coverage of SSC (on Brazil, for example, see: Baranyi, Feldmann & Bernier, 2015; Beghin, 2012; Burges, 2014; Feldmann et al., 2012; Stolte, 2015; and Wolford and Nehring, 2015). To conclude, I developed an evaluative framework for Brazilian cooperation by expanding upon the norms promoted by OECD-DAC as representing “aid effectiveness”. In Chapter 7, I return to these criteria in order to assess Brazilian practice in Haiti. In the next Chapter, the discussion turns to Brazil, providing an initial argument that the expanded provision of cooperation globally has been a vehicle through which Brazil has emerged as a post-neoliberal, global power.
3 Chapter: Political Economy of Brazilian South-South Cooperation

In the introduction, I introduced the main features of Brazilian cooperation, including its distinctive institutional set-up, as well as its main sectoral and geographical priorities. The previous Chapter then turned to a more global, historical look at the emergence of SSC in the context of the international development assistance regime, providing an overview of the shared principles that underpin this form of cooperation, and an initial assessment of the challenges it presents for meeting development objectives – some of them unique, with others appearing to repeat long-standing limitations of development practice. In this Chapter, I focus on answering the research puzzle in a preliminary way by reviewing the existing literature on Brazil’s global provision of SSC. Beyond the uncertainty as to the sudden intensification of cooperation as a foreign policy vehicle once the PT came to power, cooperation has also been assessed as having what appear to be rather ambiguous effects. These contradictory outcomes do not automatically point to cooperation as having a clear political function. However, starting from the observation of these outcomes leads me to develop some hypotheses about what SSC achieves in general terms for Brazil.

To begin, I embed Brazilian SSC in a conceptual discussion of the expectations for the behaviour of emerging powers, and of Brazilian specifically. In other words, I look in opposite directions: more structurally, at how emerging powers fit in the broader global political economy, and domestically, at the specific, post-neoliberal politico-economic model that has dominated in Brazil since the election of the Workers’ Party (PT). As part of the latter however, I argue that post-neoliberal characteristics abroad and at home cannot expected to be entirely synonymous since there are specific institutional
factors and constituencies that determine how foreign policy is made in Brazil. Finally, the subsequent discussion of Brazilian SSC applies these insights, arguing that development cooperation appears to function in support of Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power. I elaborate several ways in which this occurs, such as where the extension of development cooperation has occurred alongside intensified political relations, as South-South relations in general are promoted as a vehicle for changing unequal global structures. Nevertheless, in the following Chapters, as I focus on Brazilian cooperation in Haiti, the relative emphases on these ambitions is likely to change, especially given the relatively low significance of economic ties. In the case studies, I also indicate how Brazilian cooperation can be thought of as holding elements of both post-neoliberal and post-colonial practice, even if how this plays out in practice is contradictory and incomplete.

3.1 The Ambiguous Effects of Brazil’s Cooperation Practices

In addition to the overall lack of consistent data surrounding Brazilian SSC, there is a nearly systemic absence of government-led evaluation of the effects and results of practices. As Cabral and Weinstock (2010) argue, “monitoring and evaluation and analytical documentation of experiences continue to be major weaknesses across the board”, although there are increased efforts to address this (p. vi). Notably, a Brazil-Mozambique-South Africa Native Seed Bank Project was evaluated by one of the organizations involved, Articulação SUL (Centro de estudos e articulação da cooperação sul-sul) (Suyuma & Pomeroy, 2014). The evaluation is significant in that it responds to calls both for the implementation of monitoring mechanisms, but also the involvement of
civil society – whose exclusion from SSC has been a major concern of Brazilian civil society organizations, as I develop below (see for example BRICS Policy Center, 2013; Milanyi, Suyuma & Lopes, 2013; Beghin, 2012). It is also worth noting that among many Brazilian officials I spoke with, there appears to be hesitancy towards evaluation as it is associated with traditional donor practices of counting outputs of projects, which were criticized for not truly reflecting whether a project is successful or not. Instead, respondents suggested a focus on processes of cooperation to identify where progress is being made (author’s interviews, 2015). This focus would mean, for example, examining the strength of intensive consultation and dialogue required by the demand-driven nature of projects as an indicator of success (ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.; Brazilian bureaucrats in author’s interviews, 2015). The high and rapidly rising level of demands for Brazilian support (Nieto, 2012; Cabral & Weinstock 2010; author’s interviews, 2015), with the World Bank office in Brasília for instance receiving more than 50 requests between 2008 and 201113 (World Bank and Ipea, 2011), speaks to a broad welcoming of assistance from recipients. Despite this caveat, the lack of accountability mechanisms is a potentially serious disadvantage to cooperation as there is no opportunity to review and adjust practices as a way to augment Brazil’s strengths. Despite projects being largely unique as a result of their demand-driven nature, similar weaknesses were observed in the case studies, as I discuss in the following chapters, which suggests that greater institutional planning would be worthwhile.

13 Requests for SSC come through multiple channels, including to Brazilian embassies abroad, through presidential visits, from embassy representatives in Brazil, and indirectly through multilateral partners (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010; ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.).
Although the evidence surrounding Brazilian practices is weak, a number of initial assessments can be made. First, in terms of the advantages of Brazilian SSC, the provision of its so-called “social technology” (Inoue & Vaz, 2012), meaning the sharing of experiences learned through the adoption of such social policies as the Food Purchase Programme, has been described as useful and appropriate to the partner’s context. The areas where ABC is most active – agriculture, health, education, etc. – are those where Brazil has accumulated significant capacity domestically (Burges, 2014). Similarly, Brazil is often perceived as having cultural similarities with its partners, especially with former Portuguese colonies (Zibechi, 2012; Kiala & Ngwenya, 2011; World Bank and Ipea, 2011). For instance, a joint report from the World Bank and Ipea writes that Brazilian social policies are especially relevant “in Africa and South America, where cultural, historical, demographic, geological, and socioeconomic links with Brazil are strong” (p. 39). Brazil’s focus on partner demands is also welcomed (Beghin, 2012). As Nieto (2012) argues, “if anything, Brazil’s attention is in high demand nowadays, not resented, and the country is having issues figuring out where to concentrate its diplomatic resources” (p. 166). Brazilian cooperation is also directed at capacity-building, both in terms of human resource development and institutional development in partner countries (Buss, 2011). In health, for example, supporters contend that there is evidence that exchanges of experiences and the sharing of results between partners have helped to develop capacities in Health Ministries and institutions (Almeida et al., 2010; author’s interviews, 2015).

Several challenges have also been identified. The BRICS Policy Center (2013) defines the key challenges facing SSC as: legal-institutional; political; questions around
human rights, and financial. Often these weaknesses are interlinked. For example, the institutional challenge of operating within the MRE can restrict the ABC’s ability to execute cooperation, but it also links to human resource issues, as there is no possibility of a career path specific to ABC (ibid). There is, as a result, a constant turnover of staff, which prevents the safeguarding of institutional memory and learning (civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015). There is also widespread concern that the involvement of diverse ministries and agencies in cooperation is producing a highly fragmented form of cooperation that is potentially incoherent and ineffective (civil society representatives and academics in author’s interviews, 2015; see also BRICS Policy Center, 2013; Burges, 2014). Other criticisms have been much more forceful, including the charge that the relationship between Brazil and other countries in South America is reproducing the classic situation of dependency, and noting resistance to “‘sub-imperial Brazil’” in the region (Charleaux, 2008; Deo, 2012; Flynn, 2007; Sorj & Fausto, 2011 in Beghin, 2012, p. 59; my translation). Such challenges have led the BRICS Policy Center (2013) to recommend that ABC adopt regulatory changes, create a strategic vision document, and engage in dialogue with diverse actors, which would include civil society groups, in order to achieve greater transparency. As mentioned previously, financial resources have been declining significantly and will continue to decline in the current political and economic circumstances facing the country, which affect not only the dynamism of cooperation but also how it is perceived (Costa Vaz, 2017).

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14 In 2017, the Brazilian government did release a strategic foreign policy document in light of its own view that the country does not have “a strategic and coherent foreign policy project” (Presidência da República, 2017, p. 9). The document, however, beyond laying out a frank critique of various axes of Brazilian international efforts – from South-South Cooperation to defence, security and intelligence - ultimately does not define its strategic priorities in any detail.
2014). Finally, there is the potential for tension between this role of the state and its execution of other roles, such as that of a trading partner or investor.

Furthermore, many of these apparent advantages and disadvantages of cooperation are highly ambiguous, especially without detailed contextual accounts. For instance, structural impediments to providing cooperation, such as the lack of a regulatory framework, are perhaps not as serious as they otherwise might be because ABC and international units in each ministry (*Assessorias Internacionais*) can access technicians in relevant ministries and agencies with the required expertise. On a less operational level, discussions around what is effectively “ownership”, or “demand-driven” partnerships, stand out. Because Brazilian SSC is based on demands and is extended without political conditionalities, there is an expectation that this is positive (i.e. Beghin, 2012), presumably since partner countries will have the policy space to implement activities related to their own development priorities. However, it is important to stress that these concepts exist firmly at the level of government-to-government interaction, which raises concerns about the inclusivity of development plans. Indeed, the concept of ownership being invoked does not seem to include “democratic ownership”, which includes concern for “the nature of the support for the partner government’s policies and strategies among the wider population of the partner country, and the

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15 This does, however, introduce other challenges, especially overburdened staff trying to manage their domestic portfolios with these added responsibilities.

16 Ownership is a Paris Principle for Aid Effectiveness agreed to by the DAC, which declares that developing countries “exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions” (OECD 2005/2008, p. 3). On the OECD website, Brazil’s adherence to the principles is listed as “confirmation pending” (2015), and in practice Brazilian officials consistently refer to “South-South principles” and not to the Paris Principles (in author’s interviews, 2015). However, as discussed above, in practice the DAC versus emerging donor dichotomy can collapse, and “ownership” as compared with “partnership”, “horizontality”, etc. are particular areas where intentions seem similar if not the same, which I return to in Chapter 7.
participation of the population in setting policy and monitoring implementation” (Dodd & De Fraia, 2014, p. 1). The opportunities and limitations of this more “exclusive” form of governance will be debated in more detail, especially in Chapter 5. Critiques of this limited form of ownership find the exclusion of broader groups in the partner country troubling, but it is especially grating for civil society actors in Brazil, who stress that they are being marginalized from the export of policies that fundamentally required their support domestically – in pushing for them, and in their implementation (Milani, Suyuma & Lopes, 2013; Lopes, 2013). As one representative of a civil society organization put it, “those innovative social policies are from civil society. And you’re doing that without us. And you’re not doing that properly” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

The conflictual, well-known case of ProSavannah is useful in drawing attention to these tensions. ProSavannah, or “Capacity Improvement Project on Research and Technology Transfer for Development of Agriculture in the Nacala Corridor”, is a trilateral project between Brazil, Japan, and Mozambique to boost agricultural production in the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique (Embrapa, n.d.). The project is modelled on the Brazilian project ProCerrado, which developed technology for tropical agriculture in Brazil’s cerrado (or savannah) region, with a central role played by Brazil’s Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa). There are fears that the modernization of agriculture will generate intense conflicts, including through the displacement of small-scale farmers (Zacarias, 2014, January 1). Civil society organizations from Brazil, Mozambique, and Japan sent a letter to the leaders of the countries involved in May 2013, with the following statements:

• ‘The breadth and grandeur of the ProSavana Programme contrast with the failure of the law and the total absence of a deep, broad, transparent and democratic
public debate, preventing us, (small-scale farmers, families and the population), in this way, from exercising our constitutional right of access to information, consultation, participation and informed consent on a matter of great social, economic and environmental relevance’; and, signatories demanded,

- ‘That the Government of Mozambique see to it that an inclusive and democratic mechanism is set up for the creation of an official broad dialogue with all sectors of Mozambican society, particularly small-scale farmers, rural people, Corridor communities, religious organisations and civil society with the aim of defining their real needs, aspirations and priorities in the national development matrix and agenda’ (UNAC et al. in GRAIN, 2013).

Rather than attempt to summarize the resistance of these groups and individuals, these statements were selected to underline the perceived absence of a more participatory development model, an issue anchored in much broader dynamics in Mozambique.

Any positive outcomes from SSC in terms of giving governments wiggle room to define their own agenda thus depend heavily on several factors, including qualities of democratic governance. It is perhaps not surprising that, with some exceptions, and much contestation between officials on the subject (Brazilian bureaucrats in author’s interviews, 2015), Brazilian-led cooperation has been very reluctant to engage civil society in its activities (Milani, Suyuma & Lopes, 2013; Lopes, 2013). While government-directed cooperation may be a contradiction to SSC’s supposed basis in domestic experiences given that “the programs that are shared with other countries are the results of social battles and the engagement of civil society and social movements” (Milani et al., 2013, p. 38-9), this elitism is not in conflict with the principles of demand-driven assistance and non-interference that together uphold the partner government’s authority. Indeed, below I engage with the debate as to how this approach is consistent with broader foreign policy traditions. Another possibility of this approach is that, in engaging with the national government, democratic processes can be built up over the long-term as capacity improves. In short, the outcomes of Brazilian support remain hazy,
as it offers a number of advantages but also disadvantages for partner countries. To explore the ambiguous effects of its cooperation further, the next section provides a conceptual discussion necessary for analyzing Brazilian cooperation before proceeding to an initial, global analysis of what cooperation accomplishes. This analysis is limited given the lack of empirical evidence.

3.2 Emerging Powers and a Post-neoliberal Brazil

Conceptually, the question of how to explain Brazilian cooperation is still unresolved. The highlights of cooperation’s ambiguous effects for development in fact seems to resonate with a number of theoretical perspectives at first glance. For instance, the realist emphasis on securing the national interest seems consistent with an elite-dominated model, especially Morgenthau’s (1967) contention that policy-making should remain an area for political expertise. Moreover, aid working to secure prestige as an “outward show of modernity and power”, also squares with Brazil’s outward rhetoric of generosity (ibid, p. 6). Conversely, the constructivist turn might instead emphasize the influence of ideas of South-South solidarity in actually achieving a more horizontal form of cooperation. Yet ultimately these paradigms raise more questions than answers. In particular, they seem to explain either the more negative or positive effects of cooperation without accounting for its paradoxes. Instead, in the sections below, I examine the interplay between structural and domestic determinants in defining the form of Brazil’s cooperation – and ultimately, in later Chapters, its effects. This analysis brings in much of the insights raised in the political economy critiques made of both traditional aid and

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17 Much of this section is developed in Pickup (2016).
SSC, but also brings in the post-development/post-development discussion by more seriously engaging with the notion of practice: that is, the inseparability of the material and discursive in how development is spoken about and ultimately acted upon. For Brazilian policy-makers for instance under the PT governments, the idea of securing Brazil’s own national development was seen as possible through the construction and intensification of broad South-South ties.

At the more global or structural level, I find work on emerging powers helpful in elaborating more specific expectations for the behaviour of countries like Brazil. Building on literature on middle powers, Kenkel (2010) argues that Brazil can be understood through the lens of an “emerging power” – a concept that has material and behavioural implications, which include: a preference for multilateralism, regional preponderance, a reliance on diplomacy and mediation, and an ambiguous position regarding world order. Explaining the latter, Kenkel writes, “they are supporters of an overall order that privileges them in relation to their weaker neighbours, yet wish to reform that order where their position in it is unfavourable vis-à-vis the determinant powers” (2010, p. 649). The concept of emerging power has obvious roots in the concept of middle powers, but is theorized as also containing a number of specificities. Jordaan (2003) describes, for example, how emerging powers occupy the semi-periphery of global production while middle powers are located in the core, and favour more fundamental reforms to the global order than do traditional middle powers. Luce (2014), based on the theorizing of Marini (1977), similarly adds that sub-imperialism (subimperialismo) – where a country steps into a new stage of capitalist dependency yet also has some autonomy from this system, such as through the development of a productive national apparatus - helps to explain
emerging powers’ relationships with their neighbours; sub-imperialism is a dialectical process of internationalization-internalization. Politically, regional preponderance tends to be seen as a necessary stepping-stone towards global power, yet the exact relationship is still questioned (Sotero, 2010). For instance, in the case of Brazil, the turn towards Africa is seen in part as a response to increasing resistance from governments and citizens within the region to Brazil’s leadership (see Flemes, 2009; Stolte, 2013).

A consideration of the specific political economy model that currently dominates in Brazil, with its ideational components, also helps to frame its external actions. As Noël and Thérien note, there has been an “intuitively appealing” consensus in the aid literature that countries with welfare states are more generous with their aid (1995, p. 524). They conclude that welfare states do indeed shape foreign aid practices, but that these states must be understood not as isolated or as monolithic but rather as reflections of a society’s concept of justice. Furthermore, Van der Westhizen (2013), in a comparison of Brazil and South Africa, contends that their middle power pursuits follow from their internal class compromises, including the prevalence of social policies. Building on this premise, I want to embed Brazilian SSC in Brazil’s post-neoliberal turn. While retaining elements from the neoliberal era deemed essential for economic stability – including export promotion and fiscal constraint – post-neoliberal governments are also seen as seeking to redefine both the role of the state in the economy (in order to manage the market in equitable ways), and the role of the state in society more generally, particularly with respect to welfare provision (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012). As will become more obvious in the case of Brazil, the contradictions of this model have been subject to much debate, including how continuities in economic policies have restricted the extent to which social
policy can be transformative, or to which different democratic models can be experimented with (in particular, participatory, versus representative). There are also important observations as to how this model has varied across post-neoliberal regimes in Latin America, with most commentators tending to distinguish between the more “radical” countries of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador with countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile (see attempts to categorize in Cameron, 2009; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011). Further, to understand the specific elements of post-neoliberalism in Brazil, and not surprisingly given the length that the PT was in power, it is important to underline the significant shifts in the tenor of PT administrations, including some dramatic changes between both Presidents’ first and second terms.

First, however, I provide a brief overview of the shift to Lula’s first PT administration to better situate domestic and foreign policy changes. As I have argued elsewhere (Calvert & Pickup, 2016), Brazil did not fully implement neoliberal reforms under the administration of Cardoso’s PSDB. For example, the kinds of social policies that Lula’s PT sought to expand were already in place, as I note below. Concerning foreign policy, there are equally a number of areas where the eventual election of the PT would not fully disrupt Cardoso’s approach; again, Cardoso’s implementation of neoliberal reforms was not complete, but Lula’s post-neoliberalism also ultimately continued a number of approaches of his predecessor. In his book on Brazil’s foreign policy, Burges (2017) effectively navigates these subtleties, demonstrating how

18 The literature on these themes is extensive. For instance, some commentators (Dangl, 2014; Gudynas, 2010; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011) have stressed how intensified extractive practices position social programming as compensation; others (Ellner, 2013; Spronk, 2013), especially in Venezuela where more participatory experiments have been attempted, have focused on how these processes can also centralize power.
conditions in Brazil had a direct impact on the ability of both Presidents to innovate, with Cardoso necessarily focused on the domestic economy. Lula, like Cardoso, promoted regional relations but in a more “vocal” way, such as through the championing of Mercosul (the Southern Common Market – O Mercado Comum do Sul) (Mercosur, in Spanish) and the eventual closing off of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (Ramos, 2006; Sotero, 2010, p. 75). Almeida (2004) describes this difference as Mercosul moving from holding primarily economic importance, to social and political. Lula was also influenced by a structuralist vision (Burges, 2017) of achieving “‘democratization of international relations without hegemonies’” (his inaugural speech quoted in Sotero, 2010, p. 74) by encouraging greater South-South ties.

The provision of SSC for development presents a more marked contrast between the PSDB and PT regimes. Brazil’s first official report on the 2005-2009 period (Ipea, 2011) shows that total cooperation – humanitarian assistance, technical cooperation, scholarships, and contributions to international organizations and regional banks – increased almost 50% over the period, to a total of US$ 1.6 billion (to the average values of 2009). Technical assistance, which is the activity most commonly associated with ODA, tripled, exceeding R$ 252.6 million across the period (Ipea, 2011). As the report (2011, p. 34) notes, “three decades ago, when Brazil began to systematize the activities of international cooperation, resource limitations imposed budgetary constraints in terms of the operating modalities that could be adopted”, and further argues that its recent prioritization results from the notion that Brazil “should follow a different path from the traditional donor countries”.
To give a sense of the model adopted by the PT government when it came to power, economic and social policy areas provide a useful opening. The advent of the PT displayed the clearest continuities with the Cardoso government in the economic domain. Especially in his first administration, Lula displayed a similar disposition towards neoliberal economic reforms as had Cardoso. For example, the priority given to the interests of the financial sector meant that even post-Real Plan (Plano Real), where Cardoso managed to successfully temper inflation as financial minister under the Franco administration, inflation control has remained a foremost objective rather than growth or employment (Bin, 2014). At the same time, there were noticeable ruptures in economic policy, many of which have deep roots in earlier Brazilian traditions. For instance, the strengthening of public companies returned as a government priority (de Almeida, 2013). As well, domestic investment policies took on a decidedly post-neoliberal character, such as by targeting high employment areas (Calvert and Pickup, 2015). In general, both the Lula and Dilma administrations took “neo-developmentalist measures” to ensure gains for both large-scale, domestic capital and for workers (Boito and Berringer, 2014). For some, these policies were significant in the growth of Brazil’s internal market and have resulted in clear gains for workers, especially through increases to the minimum wage, which had the most impact on Brazil’s devastating problem of inequality (Carrillo, 2014; Costa, Fritz & Sproll, 2015). However, certain problems apparently inherent to the developmentalist agenda, including an over-dependency on commodity exports, became harder to ignore before the impeachment, since growth began to slow in 2011 (Costa, Fritz & Sproll, 2015; La Botz, 2015). For the previous main beneficiaries of PT policy, moreover, the gains were not equalized; state regulation to encourage flexibility and
create attractive conditions for investment, such as profit-related pay (where workers receive supplements if they increase productivity), have not had the beneficial impacts that workers themselves had envisioned and pushed for (Mello e Silva, 2014). Rather than become a bargaining chip when negotiating, unions have seen their bargaining power decrease substantially as companies offer lower pay increases (ibid). As the massive corruption scheme *Lava Jato* in Brazil has also revealed, this model is prone to corruption as investigations revealed major companies receiving inflated contracts in return for kick-backs to politicians of all parties. In September of 2017, president Michel Temer (of the PMDB – *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* / The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) faced his second charge of corruption.

It is in the realm of social policy where the PT is most celebrated for its achievements. Brazil is “recognized as one of the countries with the most remarkable reductions of income inequalities over the last 15 years” (Leubolt, 2013, p. 70) due to these changes and their complement with employment policies, especially the raise to the minimum wage. Indeed, it has been argued that the success of social policies domestically prompted the “export of social policies” internationally through Brazil’s provision of technical assistance to other countries in the Global South (de Oliveira, 2010, p. 130). While the ruptures between the PSDB and PT are more obvious in this area however, contrary to the popular narrative, conditional cash transfer programs were first introduced by Cardoso - then grouped under the umbrella of the *Bolsa Família* (Family Grant) and considerably expanded under Lula’s government (Leubolt, 2013). By 2013, *Bolsa Família* reached over 13 million families (ibid). A clear limit of this form of assistance has been that, as the “most dynamic sector of social spending”, investments in
other areas have remained low, and before 2004, investments in social services and infrastructure actually declined (ibid, n.p.). Investments in infrastructure eventually increased, including as part of a 2007 Growth Acceleration Program that increased public investment more broadly with a focus on infrastructure (Morais and Saad-Filho, 2011) yet questions still remain about the quality of such attention. The 2013 protests of some 8.5 million people signaled “personal aspirations revolving around public transportation, health care, housing, and employment and also the collective sentiment that the society could do better” (La Botz, 2015, n.p.).

While an overview of economic and social policies however, is useful for understanding the tenor of the post-neoliberal state in Brazil, examining how foreign policy is made reveals that the New Left domestically and abroad will not necessarily be synonymous. The replacement of Cardoso’s PSDB with Lula’s PT brought significant changes to foreign policy. That foreign policy during Lula’s administration was “active and lofty” and closely adhering to PT ideology, Almeida (2004) argues, does not present any “unprecedented revelation for a well-informed observer” (p. 162; my translation). In broad strokes, Almeida (2004) suggests that, in comparison to Cardoso, Lula’s foreign policy involved three important breaks: economically, a defense of national capital; politically, a desire to see Brazil recognized as a global leader; and ideologically, the objective of promoting an alternative to free market globalization. Seabra (2014) also provides a “complement” to such accounts by arguing that defense cooperation has also dramatically increased over the previous decade (p. 78). The rest of this section is based on arguments I develop elsewhere (Pickup, 2016) on how foreign policy behaviour has
been influenced by institutional arrangements and by several key constituencies that are in some ways specific to that realm.

First, the institutional relationship between Foreign Affairs and the government has been significant. The MRE saw an increase in its role during the 1990s as changes such as regional integration and increasingly complex multilateral negotiations demanded skilled diplomacy (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). Itamaraty has historically had a significant degree of autonomy, maintaining its separation from other ministries and agencies (Cason & Power, 2009). A 2001 survey of different members of Brazil’s “foreign policy community” found that there was a strong belief in the idea of its autonomy (de Souza, 2001). For instance, one respondent argued that, “Brazil has a very large bureaucracy and there is little or no democratic oversight…there is no negotiated agenda with society” (ibid, pp. 86-7). Similar to Lula, these diplomats have had a long-standing interest in intensifying Brazil’s presence overseas (Daudelin, 2010). The leadership of Celso Amorim as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003-2011) also involved a push for a specific version of this intensification, as Amorim “endorsed and enhanced” Lula’s vision of focusing more on other developing countries than on the US and Europe (Cardoso, 2013, p. 43). Soares de Lima and Hirst (2006) have also suggested that there is a certain path dependency at work in Itamaraty, where ideas that have once held legitimacy are difficult to dispel. Path dependency would explain the continued resonance of earlier paradigms in Brazil; even the more assertive turn led by Lula has drawn parallels with previous periods, such as the emphasis on South-South ties seen under Geisel (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007), and this resilience would further explain the continuation of aspects of neoliberal policy.
What is striking about the PT’s foreign policy specifically is that it has been subject to domestic debate (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007) as historically, foreign policy-making has been seen as detached from public opinion (Daudelin, 2010). With Lula, however, opposition parties, especially the PSDB and the Liberal Front Party (*Partido da Frente Liberal*) (PFL), were concerned with what they perceived as a lack of effort to maintain relations with traditional countries – mainly the US (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007). In part, the heightened politicization of foreign policy is explained by processes of pluralization, influenced by such changes as Brazil’s return to democracy (Cason & Power 2009). Cason and Power (2009) put forward the argument that, under Cardoso and Lula, policy-making was marked by two trends: “the pluralization of actors and the advent of presidentially led diplomacy” (p. 119; italics in original). Thus, for example, the first trend involved greater civil society participation (Cason & Power 2009). It is necessary to stress how limited this pluralization is, however, given that it is an opening only insofar as Itamaraty was a historically closed-off space, which Belém Lopes (2013) refers to as its “aristocratic republican” tradition. Concerning the Lula administration specifically, both of these trends are also very much related to a specific politicization of foreign policy according to PT beliefs and principles. Again, despite Lula’s continuation of previous macroeconomic policies, there has been the contention that “‘it is in foreign relations and international politics that the Lula government most resembles the discourse of the PT’” (Almeida, 2004 in Cason & Power, 2009, p.162). While the validity of this statement is another issue, it is important to note that foreign policy has been emphatically pushed as a PT agenda. Brazil’s leadership in trade talks provides one illustration. Meeting with the G-20 before the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2003,
Lula sought to address policies that on the whole acted against the interests of the South. In general, discourse around correcting global asymmetries resonates with PT ideology around anti-imperialism and fulfilling rights, such as through poverty reduction (Cason & Power, 2009). Branding actions abroad as the PT’s also helps to explain why foreign policy can no longer claim the autonomy it once held, logically becoming an area of deeper democratic contention.

As well, it is important to understand some of the key constituencies influencing decisions, with the caveat that these will vary by issue-area. De Oliveira (2010) claims that beyond Presidential charisma or an engaged Itamaraty, foreign policy also “reflects the new situation and interests that are well-founded in modern Brazil. The emergence of new elites has led Brazil to stop being a rule-taker” (p. 138). The importance of foreign policy for the PT on an ideological level thus cannot obscure the pragmatic sides of active regional and global engagement, which Lula shared, as reflected in his belief that development of the South was, not only ethically justified, but in Brazil’s best interest (Burges, 2017; Cervo, 2010; Saraiva, 2007). Rather than marginalizing business elites, their influence was extended under PT administrations, especially those representing agricultural interests and exporters (Cason & Power 2009). This influence was clear in a number of appointments made by Lula, including Luiz Fernando Furlan and Roberto Rodrigues to two key ministries, Agriculture, and the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade respectively, who “served as direct communication channels to agricultural interests and exporters” (ibid, p. 128). There are some important exceptions to the dominance of an agribusiness elite. For example, involvement in Mercosul has consistently benefited Brazil’s manufactured goods and services (de Oliveira, 2007). As
well, Brazil’s trade composition to African states involves a heavy emphasis on manufactured goods (Carmody, 2013). However, the stark current imbalance in favour of natural resource exports underlines the importance of these actors, and emphasizes how SSC more broadly for development should be evaluated with a view to environmental sustainability. The broader question is how the balance of interest changes when it is specifically development cooperation being pursued.

Marginalization of the domestic social base of the PT has also been a key determinant of behaviour abroad. Domestically, PT support has been based largely on the urban social movements and unions, with rural demands continuing to be overshadowed by the government, unions, and the urban worker base (de Castro & Motta, 2015). In principle, these union and movement actors should be equally supportive of domestic and foreign behaviour, or perhaps even, if claims that the government’s actions abroad more closely resemble PT values are true, more satisfied with foreign policy. For instance, although de Oliveira (2006) acknowledges that once in power the PT’s counter-hegemony was much more limited than previous local and state experiences would have suggested, he maintains that efforts to “export” social policies abroad, such as to Haiti, are largely positive: “an alternative to occupation and food distribution, Brazil’s actions in Haiti have engaged the best of its social and development policies” (p. 131). Such actions would superficially appear to support the demands of social movements and unions, who generally call for a more interventionist, protectionist state, such as through the extension of social coverage, inclusion to the labour market, and the promotion of participatory governance arrangements.
However, there has been more resistance to Brazil’s activities abroad than these observations would suggest. Considering increased economic activities for example, investments from BNDES have been critiqued for their social and environmental harms by civil society groups and academic observers (Ventura 2013). Development cooperation, moreover, where social participation would seem most likely to be more harmonious with PT beliefs, has, as discussed above, not necessarily involved or gained the support of these actors. As a result, although foreign policy often maintains its relative isolation from society at large (not generating the same concerns with taxpayer accountability seen in many traditional countries), several civil society actors do actively advocate foreign policy positions, including development cooperation, such as Articulação Sul (Centre for the Study and Articulation of South-South Cooperation - Centro de Estudos e Articulação da Cooperação Sul Sul) and ONG FASE (The Federation of Organs for Social and Educational Assistance – Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional). Criticisms have ranged from the demand to be included in efforts, as noted above, to the lack of transparency in terms of available data and missing accountability mechanisms (a good example is from Inesc, 2012, which is an Institute for Socio-economic Studies – Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos). In parallel to dissatisfaction with domestic public policies moreover, some groups have also criticized development cooperation for failing to reconcile the interests of divergent groups, such as where efforts to support agribusiness seem to trump support for small-scale farmers (Inesc, 2012; Lopes, 2013).

To summarize, as a post-neoliberal, emerging power, Brazil has displayed several principal ambitions. That foreign policy during Lula’s administration was “active and
lofty” and closely adhering to PT ideology, Almeida (2004) argues, does not present any “unprecedented revelation for a well-informed observer” (p. 162; my translation). In broad strokes, Almeida (2004) suggests that, in comparison to Cardoso, Lula’s foreign policy involved three important breaks: economically, a defense of national capital; politically, a desire to see Brazil recognized as a global leader; and ideologically, the objective of promoting an alternative to free market globalization. Seabra (2014) also provides a “complement” to such accounts by arguing that defense cooperation has also dramatically increased over the previous decade (p. 78).

However, while there is some utility in separating these themes, it is important to recognize how they fit together as part of a broader structuralist paradigm underpinning the PT’s approach (Burges, 2017). In keeping with an approach to aid as a practice, political economy elements are interwoven with significant representational dimensions, such as seeing other developing countries as offering political and economic opportunities. Brazil’s neo-structuralist vision thus involves “focusing on creating conditions beneficial for domestic actors that might also be attractive to key constituencies in partner countries” (Burges, 2007, pp. 1348-9). In particular, the focus under the Lula regime in achieving this through amplified South-South ties – “the strategy of autonomy through diversification” – has obvious echoes with the proclamation of NIEO (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). Indeed, Brazil’s first official report on cooperation for development references the “historical origins and basic principles” of cooperation as dating back to the 1960s and 70s (Ipea, 2011). In later work, Burges (2017) has emphasized the apparent contradictions of this pursuit, especially when objectives for global reform may not be radical, generating theoretical confusion. Many
of Burges’ (2017) broad insights will be reflected in the micro-level workings of the projects examined in Haiti, and when these cases are placed in the context of Brazil’s broader presence. At the same time, the isolating of one particular foreign policy vehicle will also stress how a broadly structuralist agenda as conceived by Burges (2017) takes on a different form depending on the interaction. In the case of cooperation for development, I will suggest that this relationship is able to dull some of the harder edges of Brazil’s power, mainly as manifested in its participation in MINUSTAH.

3.3 Explaining Brazilian South-South Cooperation

The official position of the Brazilian state is that cooperation is essentially divorced from broader foreign policy objectives. ABC explicitly states that one of its principles is that cooperation has no association with commercial interests or benefits (ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.). Instead, I argue here that Brazil’s position as an emerging power and its changed domestic environment under the PT have been determining factors in the characteristics of its cooperative efforts. This final section argues that SSC has been instrumental in the search for achieving the economic, political, and ideological ambitions laid out above, and details some of mechanisms through which this has been attempted.

Politically, SSC can be understood as occupying a central place in the projection of Brazilian power – both as a symbol of existent power, and as an important tool in the further development of this power. In practice, the two aspects will overlap. One of the first indications of the political functions of cooperation is in the focus of cooperation projects. In Africa, more projects tend to be located in the CPLP community of former
Portuguese colonies or in countries holding more obvious political or economic importance, such as Ghana (Burges, 2014). Haiti, Brazil’s top recipient of cooperation in 2010 (Ipea, 2014), is also the site of Brazilian involvement in MINUSTAH, where Brazil assumed a leadership role in peace-keeping in order to raise its international profile and gain a coveted seat on the UN Security Council\(^\text{19}\) (Nieto, 2012). In fact, although Brazil offered significant humanitarian support, as detailed above, in the wake of the devastating earthquake, Haiti was receiving substantial technical cooperation prior, receiving 19% of the total global contribution between 2005 and 2009 (Ipea, 2011). The number of Lula’s presidential visits to Africa, as well as those of his foreign policy minister, is typically cited as evidence of Brazil’s strategic interest in Africa, but what is also impressive is that Brazil received 47 African heads of state from 27 nations over Lula’s terms (World Bank & Ipea, 2011). Brazil also saw a doubling of the number of its embassies in Africa, and also of the number of African embassies in Brasília (ibid). Although Dilma’s relative disinterest in foreign policy is consistently referred to as an obstacle for strengthened South-South relations\(^\text{20}\) (various Brazilian officials and academics in author’s interviews, 2015), Dilma did visit Africa in her first year in office, specifically Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa (Stolte, 2013; World Bank & Ipea, 2011). As the World Bank and Ipea (2011) aptly note, the idea is that “the new Africa coincides with a global Brazil” (p. 3; italics in original). As well, although Brazil has had a longstanding interest in

\(^{19}\) In the following Chapter, I engage in a fuller discussion on Brazil’s involvement in Haiti.

\(^{20}\) The *Folha de São Paulo* (Campos Mello, 2015, March 22) recently quoted an anonymous government official as saying, “‘the current government has no sensibility for foreign policy, even less for Africa. Before, there hasn’t been money for Africa because it wasn’t a priority. Now, there’s no money for Africa because there’s no money’” (n.p.).
strengthening relations with its South American neighbours, this interest was revitalized under the Lula administration (Almeida, 2007).

Clearly, Brazil has intensified its presence in strategic areas as a way to consolidate its influence, but what kind of influence is it seeking? Stolte (2013) argues that in the case of Brazil, “the pattern of an emerging power coming to Africa for resources, however, does not fit as neatly as it seems at first glance”. She describes how cooperation supports Brazil in the goal of forming coalitions in order to have a voice globally. SSC thus helps project Brazil as an emerging power, but also works to shape its image – a rising power that will act in the interest of the developing world (ibid). For instance, the foreword to Ipea’s (2014) official overview of Brazilian cooperation for development states that, “international solidarity and the promotion of other peoples’ socioeconomic progress are commitments Brazil, as a nation, holds in high regard” (n.p.). Indeed, the motif of partnership manifests in technical cooperation in general, which is held as an act of solidarity, but also in more specific qualities of cooperation, such as non-interference (the refusal of political conditionalities). Deep sensitivity in official discourse to notions of partnership, rather than donors versus recipients (Beghin, 2012; various Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015), is one reflection of Brazil’s efforts to position itself as a power that acts with the South in order to change unequal global power structures. As one high-level official in ABC explained to me, aid implies vertical relations, so we consider ourselves “cooperation partners” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Ideas of solidarity among Southern countries in order to challenge existing structures play out in other foreign policy areas. One example is
Brazilian leadership in WTO negotiations, where Brazil effectively acted as a “de facto spokesperson for the South” (Burges, 2013, p. 584).

Another important and related mechanism through which partnership is achieved is the discursive emphasis on the shared affinities of Brazil with other developing countries. For example, during Lula’s government, Brazil-Africa relations were constructed as a “political, moral and historical obligation” due to Brazil having found success in its social policies that could in turn be useful for other Southern countries, especially Africa where “Brazil shares historical memories with most African countries, having survived decades and even centuries of inequality through colonization, slavery, oppression, and humiliation (World Bank & Ipea, 2011, pp. 39-40). The exact mechanisms through which these ideas of cultural affinity are cultivated are unclear, but it is likely that cultural cooperation plays a role. For instance, Braga (2010) maintains that culture played a central role in improving relations in Haiti, which includes a shared love for soccer; in 2004, “the first act by Brazilian peacekeepers when they arrived in May was to distribute 1,000 soccer balls to Haitian children” (Sullivan, 2004, August 19, n.p.). Furthermore, Brazil is presented as having these shared challenges, but as having overcome them; there is thus an important sense in which cooperation again signifies Brazil’s emergence. Cooperation tends to be concentrated in those areas where Brazil has had successes with its domestic policies; as Burges (2014) explains, assistance focuses “squarely on the transfer of proven administrative and technical approaches to shared developmental problems” (p. 366). As one example, PAA Africa (Purchase from Africans for Africa) (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos África), a program implemented by Brazil in conjunction with the WFP (World Food Programme), FAO
(Food and Agricultural Organization) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID), was “inspired” by Brazil’s Food Purchase Programme, where the government sought to address issues around access to food and viable family farming by purchasing from family farms and subsequently distributing to those in situations of food insecurity (PAA, 2013). The sharing of these successful examples is a way of gaining global recognition, contributing to a project of status-seeking as an emerging power (Stolte, 2015).

What existing discussions of cultural, historical, socio-economic similarities and political recognition seem to allude to, but not yet fully develop, are how identity constructs work as more fundamental mechanisms driving foreign policy. Despite this body of scholarship being extremely varied, post-colonial contributions to IR theory contain some shared challenges, including a call to examine how international relations are underpinned by social relations (see Chowdry and Nair, 2002). Many contributions (see Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Anghie, 2000; Sidaway, 2003) reveal the variety and persistence of hierarchical representations between the West and non-West that sustain “the cultural authority and dominance of the West under colonial rule and in the post-colonial present” (Chowdry & Nair, 2002, p. 15). Liao’s (2013) excellent article on Chinese foreign policy discusses how a change in China’s sense of its identity, especially the relationship between sovereignty and nation following its humiliation with the onset of the Opium Wars, prompted the search for ways to make the nation more cohesive (Liao, 2013). In the case of Brazil, Burges (2005, p. 1134) similarly contends that Lula pursued a “psychologically transformative foreign policy agenda in the global south”, revaluing what it means to be both Brazilian and Southern. In the case of development
cooperation specifically, the sharing of best practices is a way of validating Brazilians’ contributions both in their own eyes, and in their partner countries’ (Burges, 2005). A central challenge for understanding the phenomenon of the rising powers is therefore to consider how they operate in and against this dynamic. How does insistence on Brazil as a culturally similar partner, with a similar history (including colonial experience), shared developmental challenges etc., act as the basis upon which the why and how of cooperation are formed?

These sentiments appear across the emerging powers. In McEwan and Mawdsley’s (2012) words, South-South dimensions are “frequently constructed in depoliticized and essentialist terms, presenting a ‘natural’ congruity between very different southern states” (p. 1187). The provision of technical cooperation from emerging powers offers a powerful support to exercises in nation-building because of the forceful constructions it creates and sustains. What often remains unsaid, but what seems even more significant than the construction of similarities between the Southern partners, is the place of the West. For Brazil, cooperation helps in its self-positioning as having risen in relation to the West. Compared to other foreign policy tools, technical cooperation does this by not simply demarcating a rise in its political and economic weight, but by adding an ideological dimension. Again, if cooperation is about a demonstration of solidarity, then it is about constructing a kind of moral political weight – as Nieto (2012) refers to Brazil, a “benevolent Big Brother/Good Samaritan” (p. 162). Expressing solidarity with a “like” partner is part of the broader process of distancing itself from Western practice, and a particularly effective one given, on the surface at

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21 This, of course, is acknowledged by many scholars, but not necessarily in terms of its ideational dimensions.
least, it is presented as entirely about solidarity to reform the global order. In future Chapters, the consequences of this logic will be demonstrated more thoroughly as I emphasize how the particular politico-economic model of Brazil interacts with the recipient context – including where, in fact, affinities are not what they are presumed to be. Wolford and Nehring’s (2015) article on ProSavannah compares it with the Brazilian experience of ProCerrado – the domestic program to invigorate tropical agriculture which acts as the model - in order to show how the assumptions fall down across the dimensions of land, labour, and capital, is an excellent example of what effects such assumptions can have.

Other political outcomes are also visible. Brazilian officials are aware that in practice a more political logic has interfered with a more technical, developmentalist one. Several Brazilian informants from ministries and agencies involved discussed the antiretroviral factory (ARV) factory in Mozambique, attributing problems in its execution to the fact that it was designed as a result of political backing, essentially bypassing technical consultations (in author’s interviews, 2015). The plant, costing approximately US$ 20 million, first produced a part of the ARV cocktail in 2013 after ten years (Rossi, 2013, November 13). In an interview with Estadão Brasil where the timelines were questioned, Fiocruz (a health-related research institute) representative Lícia de Oliveira, stated, “‘took too long? I look back and I say: nobody has any notion of how hard we worked’” (ibid, n.p; my translation). Effects of strengthened Brazilian ties also include the election of Brazilians to important global roles, such as the head of the FAO and WTO (World Bank & Ipea, 2011; Brazilian officials and academics in author’s interviews, 2015), but multiple informants stressed that these outcomes are indirect
benefits that were not the intent of cooperation (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). At the same time, many participants stressed that they were certain these were outcomes of Brazilian cooperation, even if it is difficult to prove (Brazilian officials and academics in author’s interviews, 2015). As previously mentioned, there has also been positive reception from recipient governments and demand for cooperation continues to be high, resulting in “political repercussions,” since Brazil is guaranteed political recognition (Beghin, 2012, p. 49). This recognition comes not only from developing country partners\(^\text{22}\), but also from various multilateral agencies that continuously solicit Brazilian involvement (Brazilian officials and IO/bilateral aid agency representatives in author’s interviews, 2015). As several scholars have noted (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Burges, 2014), emphases on solidarity also play well nationally, especially with PT supporters.

Economically, technical cooperation has been one facet of a broader foreign policy engagement that has stimulated trade and investment ties with Southern partners. Trade with Africa, for instance, a key region for Brazilian cooperation in all its dimensions (Almeida, 2004), has increased dramatically, from US$ 4 billion in 2000 to $20 billion in 2010 (World Bank & Ipea, 2011). Trade does remain highly concentrated, with exports accounting for over half of the total volume confined to only five countries\(^\text{23}\) (ibid). Importantly, the trade composition has favoured high value-added products,

\(^\text{22}\) It is important to note, however, that potential political recognition for Brazil depends not only on how technical cooperation is perceived, but also on the continued promotion of the Brazilian development model as having achieved successes domestically. Brazilian social policies have been enormously successful in many ways, but they have not been unequivocal, clear for instance in remaining gaps between formal and realized citizenship (such as where not all citizens can access benefits of social programs), thus prompting concerns that Brazil is simply exporting these contradictions abroad (Beghin, 2012).

\(^\text{23}\) These are: South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, and Senegal (World Bank & Ipea, 2011).
although their share did fall in 2012, mainly due to a rise of agricultural exports (Burges, 2013; 2014). Trade has thus not been only commodity-driven, and Brazil seems to pursue a strategy of both resource diversification and supporting value-added economic development (White, 2010). Stolte’s (2013) article on Brazil in Africa argues that Brazil’s main purpose has been increasing its status and not a search for international resources – especially not in the same way that Chinese or Indian engagement has been. In support, she points to some of the political rationales of strengthened ties, but also to other characteristics of economic engagement that indicate it is about more than a simple resource drive; namely, Brazilian officials from the Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior) (MDIC) maintain that their interest in Africa is about access to its growing consumer market, and that Brazil is an energy power in its own right (Stolte, 2013). However, at a country level, as Rossi (2015) shows in the case of Mozambique, resource companies are in practice inextricably linked with other Brazilian businesses: Odebrecht, a major Brazilian construction company, for example, arrived in 2008 in order to work on Vale’s coal mine (ibid). The economic side of Brazil’s relations with Haiti has been minimal, and I return to this exception, including in the conclusion as a way to discuss the limits of the case studies to understanding the overall Brazilian approach and its political outcomes.

Both Lula and Dilma have increased allocations to BNDES to finance Brazilian firms, which benefitted large-scale domestic capital both at home and abroad (Boito & Berringer, 2014). In 2010, BNDES made US$ 100 billion in disbursements, or 7% of Brazil’s GDP (Zibechi, 2012), although Hochstetler (2014) reminds us that these
investments are significantly smaller than they appear given that they occur when Brazilian firms can export goods and services. In South America between 2001 and 2010, support for exported services represented over half of the disbursements (Hochstetler, 2014). BNDES also provides concessional lines of credit through the Ministry of Finance to support Brazilian exports and infrastructure (Montero, 2014). For instance, a credit line of US$ 3.5 billion to Mozambique and Ghana included the involvement of Odebrecht, which is building a processing plant in Ghana for sugarcane (World Bank & Ipea, 2011). While the presence of Brazilian multinationals abroad has increased, so too have there been efforts to increase the participation of small- to medium-sized businesses (ibid). Brazilian companies have been identified as exercising a commitment to capacity-building, including through the use of local labour (Burges, 2014). White (2010) gives an example of Odebrecht’s involvement in Angola, where Angolans are even part of the management structure – the contrast is, again, with China who tends to import labour. Thus, in comparison with others, Brazil is seen as an important contributor to development – a “key partner” for Africa (Burges, 2014, p. 133).

Again, there have also been more critical accounts of investment abroad. While I will return to many of these in future Chapters, and when comparing the Brazilian and Chinese approaches in the conclusion, it is important to stress in a preliminary way some of the controversies that have emerged. In 2014, Brazilian prosecutors notified Odebrecht that it was being investigated for maintaining “slave labour conditions” in its Angolan operations for Biocom (Vieira, 2014). The company Vale has also been particularly dogged by controversies surrounding its operations. Vale, Brazil’s biggest mining company, was voted as the “worst company in the world” in 2012 at the World Economic
Forum for its social and environmental impacts as well as its labour relations - a “prize” established by the Berne Declaration group (Abelvik-Lawson, 2014, p. 795). There has also been resistance to Brazilian leadership within the Latin American region, which comes from other states, such as Venezuela, but also from civil society groups and citizens (Zibechi, 2012; Flemes, 2009).

While much of the outcomes of intensified economic cooperation with its Southern partners are easily identifiable, less so are the mechanisms through which this is achieved and how they relate, especially with regard to the function of technical cooperation. Some analysts, and, as mentioned, the state’s official position, maintain that technical cooperation remains separate from other foreign policy vehicles (see for example Stolte, 2013; World Bank & Ipea, 2011; ABC & BRICS Policy Center, n.d.; multiple informants, especially Brazilian officials, in author’s interviews, 2015). However, the lines are much more blurred, with others drawing attention to the complexity of engagement, which extends to the actors involved (see White, 2010; Burges, 2014; Almeida, 2007). As Burges (2014) explains, “the Brazilian case presents a twist on the established explanations of why ODA is provided…Brazil’s twist is an integration of development assistance provision into larger plans for long-term domestic development and the internationalization of national firms” (p. 356). Viewing cooperation through a structuralist lens (Burges, 2017) makes these controversies appear not as aberrations, but as logical outcomes of Brazil’s intentions. For example, most visits of technical teams include private sector representatives (World Bank & Ipea, 2011). Moreover, the entire notion of a “private sector” is not straightforward when it is subject
to considerable state influence, even without direct ownership24 (Ban, 2014). White (2010) points to agriculture as the area where the drivers – diplomacy, trade, and development - of Brazil-Africa relations most clearly converge. The More Food (Mais Alimentos) program provides one illustration, as it includes a credit line for financing equipment to support family-based agriculture (World Bank & Ipea, 2011), which is bought from Brazilian companies (Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015).

Institutionally, while ABC’s location within the MRE means that it is already subjected to broader foreign policy objectives, there were also indications of moves to bring development even closer to investment following Dilma’s surprise announcement that the two would be promoted in the same agency – not only the same department (Fleck, 2013, July 19). Such an institutional re-organization would further bring into “question so-called ‘disinterested cooperation defended by Brazil as a pillar of partnership with poor countries” (ibid, n.p.; my translation).

Finally, brief mention needs to be made of military strategies, as they also relate to SSC, and take on particular important when examining Brazilian-Haitian relations. Military strategies in general have also included an emphasis on South-South ties. In 2012, Brazil revised its National Defense Policy to prioritize South America and Africa (Seabra, 2014). With Africa, for example, nine general defense cooperation agreements were signed between 2003 and 2013; partners include: Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and South Africa (ibid). Brazil also assumed a central role in building Namibia’s navy (Stolte,

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24 For example, Ban cites a case where a chief executive of Vale was apparently forced out by Rousseff “following his refusal to adjust the company’s objectives to the government’s socio-economic policy” (Financial Times, 11 April 2011 in Ban, 2014, p. 314).
As well, attention was given to backing the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul, ZOPACAS) (Seabra, 2014). The National Defense Strategy also includes peace operations as a priority of international projection (Ipea, 2011). Peace operations are defined in terms much broader than simply peace-keeping, with mandates also including strengthening law enforcement and support for humanitarian assistance (ibid). Brazil’s presence in Haiti, for example, has included a key role for the Brazilian Engineering Company, with troops participating in national road rehabilitation and in building tanks for capturing and storing rainwater (ibid). In total, Brazil has had higher military expenses than Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela combined (Flemes, 2009). Still, as Seabra (2014) notes in seeking to add to the common narrative of foreign policy changes under the PT, the dominant image is of Brazil exerting “soft power” globally.

3.4 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I provided an initial analysis of intensified Brazilian SSC in general, identifying some of its strengths and weaknesses before turning to a more involved discussion of how we can explain the priority given to Southern ties, and the use of development and humanitarian cooperation as a particular vehicle of engagement. To support this discussion, I reviewed conceptual literature on the significance of international stature as an “emerging power” for foreign policy behaviour; outlined the distinctive, post-neoliberal politico-economic model that Brazil adopted with the election of the PT; and, discussed, both in general and also under the PT specifically, how foreign policy is made in Brazil. In this context, the structuralist vision behind Brazil’s strategy
of diversifying key partners by turning to the South underpins its specific offering of intensified development cooperation (Burges, 2017). More generally, I have pointed to the potential for post-colonial scholarship to read the broader significance of the turn to the South, which will animate the case study analysis. These themes will be returned to beginning in Chapter 5, where I explain how projects have helped to produce Brazilian influence by examining specific cases in the agricultural and health sectors in Haiti. First, however, I provide an overview of the Haitian development context, and what kind of role external actors have played in development over the years. This Chapter is premised on the assumption that the effects of cooperation are not one-sided but are part of reciprocal processes. Therefore, any of the ways that cooperation has contributed to Brazil’s emergence as a post-neoliberal power has been produced not simply from the features of its practices, but how these have interacted with the Haitian context. Likewise, I describe Brazil’s broader role in Haiti in order to situate cooperation alongside its other foreign policy presence, which includes minimal economic ties but a strong military component.
4 Chapter: External Influence and Haitian Development

In the previous Chapter, I argued that recognition of how Brazilian SSC has worked globally in support of Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power usefully explains the ambiguous effects of cooperation that have so far been identified. Yet power is always a relation. In any IR theory, there is some recognition of how politics is fundamentally about relations of power, even if the focus often remains on those who are exercising power over others, rather than on those who legitimate, shape, and contest it.

Whether in Dahl’s (1967) classic formulation of A’s influence over B, or feminist theory’s emphasis on how inequality arises because assumptions about feminine characteristics result in these qualities being continually undervalued next to what is “masculine”, power is ultimately about the relations between individuals, groups, and states, and how these actors are hierarchically ordered based on their identities. Brazil’s outreach to Haiti similarly cannot be understood as a one-sided performance. Just as the ways in which its foreign policy traditions and history as an aid recipient shape Brazil’s approach to development cooperation, Brazil does not have complete power to determine how it is perceived or the full effects of its role. The central question becomes: how do reactions and even opposition from partners affect how successfully Brazil is able to project its desired emerging power identity? Where do these reactions originate? In other words, cooperation is embedded in a particular political economy replete with persistent colonial divisions, which means that institutions, culture, politics, and responses of various individuals and organizations all contribute to its reception. In the case of Haiti, considered a “failed” or “fragile” state, it becomes even more significant to theorize Haitian agency in determining the form and outcomes of cooperation, while recognizing
that this is always exercised under certain conditions, including Brazil’s greater economic and political power.

This Chapter therefore complements the previous discussion of Brazil by turning to a specific examination of Haiti. Although the thesis focuses on Brazilian cooperation with Haiti since the election of the PT, this Chapter provides a longer historical view of Haiti’s place in traditional donor aid relations in order to better situate Brazilian cooperation. This longer view helps to establish a comparison with Brazil’s increased presence, and how it displaces, repeats, or modifies previous patterns of external influence. I therefore give an overview of the extent and nature of external involvement since Aristide first came to power in 1990. Charting some of the main events and trends in outside involvement, the Chapter demonstrates how interventions have contributed to shaping Haitian politics, the economy, and society (and vice versa). Many of the specific outcomes of these practices are critiqued, such as traditional donors’ neglect of Haiti’s agricultural sector. While I provide a brief summary of a broad range of Haitian history, and the detrimental effects of Spanish, French, and US occupations, the main focus is on 1990 and beyond in order to facilitate a deeper description as to how these external actors have interacted with domestic individuals and groups. This relational view is consistent with my argument, developed in the second part of the Chapter, that a fundamental re-thinking of sovereignty in Haiti is required, which involves making connections between these external/internal groups.

On a broader level, my intention is to problematize the deeper, colonial representations of Haiti that have defined intervention. I do this as a way of setting up Brazilian strategies, which have, although imperfectly and at times in contradictory ways,
held that the Haitian state is an active and legitimate authority. In particular, I discuss how the label of “failed state” can be both dangerous and void of explanatory power. Following a contribution from Sidaway (2003, pp. 159-160), I approach Haiti as undergoing a “crisis of representation”, where frequent representations of the country as either failed or weak – depictions of sovereignty which Sidaway views as common to the Global South, even if occurring in much more pronounced ways in countries such as Angola and the Congo - can also exist alongside interpretations of the country as possessing “an excess of certain things”. Re-thinking Haiti’s sovereignty in this way captures dynamics that have been minimized, including how external actors have either problematically propped up or ignored internal elites rather than somehow existing separate from them (Baranyi, 2012 is an important exception that I return to below). While my position is that the term fragile can still be used with caution, it does need to be unpacked, with careful attention to what characteristics of Haitian existence its typical formulation has ignored, namely excesses of political and economic power that have stalled or outright prevented development. To conclude, the Chapter discusses Brazil’s presence in Haiti beyond humanitarian and development cooperation, including through leadership of MINUSTAH.

4.1 History of External Involvement

This section presents an overview of the Haitian development context, paying particular attention to how external involvement has intertwined with domestic developments since 1990. Later Chapters, especially Chapter 5, will examine specific interventions in health and agriculture. Because I argue that the overall effects of these
projects are also conditioned by Brazil’s other actions, and by historical and current patterns of donor involvement in the nation, it is necessary to provide an overview of these patterns. Any description of Haiti seems to begin with a comment on its unenviable position as the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. Here I also offer what is at times a grim picture of development in Haiti, but also try to identify, particularly in the sector-specific discussions in the following Chapters, where progress is being made. Throughout the thesis, the emphasis on aid practices as negotiation between partners is also intended to eliminate any tendencies to position Haitian actors as exerting little agency in their day-to-day lives. While these negotiations are more obvious in the case of Brazil, which has made government demand and control the centerpiece of its cooperation efforts, previous aid relations have not gone uncontested or supported by various Haitian actors.

Before such recent shocks as the earthquake in 2010 or the cholera outbreak, Haiti had faced other considerable challenges in terms of its political and economic environment. While I do not aim to give a comprehensive history of these developments, I focus on capturing the extent and nature of external actors’ involvement in more recent times, especially since Aristide first came to power in 1990. I argue that outside actors have been decisive in determining the course of Haitian society in a myriad of ways, but also seek to explain how these key actors, such as the US government, have aligned with domestic actors and priorities. Haitian history seems in brief to be characterized by “recurrent conflicts among elites and between them and the mostly black, poor, rural majority” (Baranyi & Salahub, 2011, p. 53). While many of the consequences of these actions are identified and initially critiqued, the following section will analyze the
involvement of the international community at a more foundational level by connecting interventions to problematic, colonial representations of Haiti.

Developments prior to 1990 have also had profound effects on Haitian development. As Dubois (2012, p. 5) succinctly puts it, “Haiti’s present is the product of its history”. Trouillot (1990, p. 18) similarly stresses how the state is not an independent variable, but rather that “state forms are constantly created, reproduced, maintained and modified…[and] these processes of reproduction and change are intertwined with the historical evolution of the particular society and culture within which the state functions”.

Spanish conquest of the Hispaniola Island was completed in 1509, with headquarters established at Santo Domingo (Dupuy, 1976). With the arrival of the Spanish, mercantile capitalism was introduced in the form of an *encomienda* system, whereby the state assigned natives to individuals who would work as their labourers (ibid). Gradually a new class of creoles emerged. The system also depended on the import of slave labour as Arawaks resisted or died, and, by 1522, two thousand slaves were arriving per year (ibid). Essentially, there were three castes: white colonial inhabitants (*blancs*); free coloureds (*affranchis*); and slaves (Nicholls, 1979). These castes did not map perfectly onto colour divisions and social class divisions, as, for instance, slaves could be mulatto, but they tended to be reinforcing (ibid). By 1697, the eastern third of Hispaniola was ceded to France. Once considered the “Pearl of the Antilles”, Haiti (Saint Domingue) accounted for 40% of France’s total foreign trade in 1789 (Shah, 2009). During French occupation, production intensified so dramatically that Haiti was the most profitable global colony, which in turn led to huge increases in the number of slaves brought from Africa (Dubois, 2012).
As rebellions intensified, the French attempted to ease tensions by abolishing slavery, but there was a disconnect between their rules and the actions of the colonial elite (Dubois, 2012). With Toussaint Louverture in the lead, the rebels ordered the destruction of cities in 1802 (ibid). However, the revolution, which was closely interwoven with events in Europe, eventually gained momentum as Napoleon lost a major battle in 1803, and Haiti’s independence was subsequently proclaimed by General Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1804 (ibid). Many were killed during the rebellion, with approximately 100,000 lives lost between 1802 and 1803 alone (ibid). As the only successful slave uprising that led to the founding of a state, the Haitian revolution was extremely threatening to Western powers, and the great powers reacted with an embargo that isolated the country from the global economy for two decades (Leak, 2013). Haiti’s global isolation was significant for the post-colonial state as Haitian leaders continuously prioritized military spending, which led to the military holding significant control over the state apparatus (Dubois, 2012). Moreover, the rebellion and Haiti’s independence provoked racist political reactions abroad. The Haitian rebellion was considered an affront to the West, “perceived…as absurd and unacceptable” (Seitenfus, 2014, p. 30; my translation). Haiti’s “symbolic power” was that it threatened the white bourgeoisie with the idea that the black, popular classes could attain power (Leak, 2013, p. 395). More than that, the revolution was essentially unthinkable in that it challenged commonplace assumptions found during the Enlightenment that there were degrees of humanity, found among anti- and pro-abolitionists alike25 (Trouillot, 1995).

25 As one example, Trouillot (1995) references the Société des Amis des Noirs, many of whom participated in drafting the Declaration of Rights of Man, who promoted the attainment of rights among mulatto owners.
Despite the fact that it received early independence, Haiti remained stuck in a system of plantation agriculture as leaders, including ex-slaves, saw the attempt to reinvigorate the system as the only economic model possible, especially given their position of global isolation (Shah, 2009; Dubois, 2012). Since the “colony of St. Domingue had been populated with just one goal: to produce crops for export,” the order continued to “haunt” independent Haiti (Dubois, 2012, p. 8). However, there were key differences between the northern kingdom and the southern republic – which emerged after an uprising against Dessalines by leaders who included Alexandre Pétion (the eventual leader of the South) and Henry Christophe (who would lead the North) - with regard to the question of how to manage the economy (Frankema & Masé, 2014; Dubois, 2012). Nevertheless, post-independent leaders continuously remained committed to reinvigorating the plantation system, which had enormous political consequences (Dubois, 2012). On one side, the rules and laws meant to promote plantation agriculture resulted in what Dubois (2012, Chapter 3, p. 13) calls a political structure characterized by the “combination of nominally liberal institutions with thoroughly autocratic governance”. However, and of utmost importance when considering the relevance between agriculture and Haitian agency, rural Haitians also resisted by carving out political and economic systems separate from the state, including the lakou system which involved counter-plantation models practiced by extended family with more egalitarian political elements (Dubois, 2012).

Post-independent Haiti was tied to foreign powers economically and politically. France demanded a 150 million franc indemnity and trade concessions following independence, which Jean-Pierre Boyer agreed to pay after the North and South were
reunited (Dubois, 2012; Shah, 2009). This indemnity followed a boycott that had already crippled the Haitian export economy (Pierre-Louis, 2011), as well as longstanding, unsuccessful efforts by Haitian leaders to secure international recognition (Nicholls, 1979). The indemnity affected Haiti’s post-colonial political economy in several ways, ranging from its economic significance (especially as the country also accepted a loan from the French in order to pay it), to the reassertion of French influence, and an indirect taxation system that depended upon contributions from the peasantry26 (Dubois, 2012). The peasantry “came to finance the state while having no control over it”, regardless of regime (Trouillot, 1990, p. 59). In addition to marginalizing the peasantry, this system also led to the prominence of urban demands in government decision-making (ibid). As well, Nicholls (1979) describes a general tendency of leaders – who essentially represented one of two colour-based factions of a single class (black or mulatto elites) – to prefer to turn for foreign support rather than compromise internally.

Another defining moment of Haitian history was the US occupation from 1915 to 1934. The US had a number of motives for occupying Haiti. In a highly unstable political context, the US described itself as seeking to restore political order, but their motives were also to prevent German control of the island and to gain control over a coveted port (Dubois, 2012; Frankema & Masé, 2014). Moreover, there were economic motivations at play as the US sought to establish a trusteeship that could produce free markets and free trade (Shah, 2009). Economic, political and racial patterns of earlier foreign interventions persisted. In practice, they were inextricably linked, as, for instance, regaining stability was seen by US officials as ensuring that investment would be possible (Dubois, 2012).

26 It represents, moreover, the authoritarian tendencies of the state as Boyer effectively accepted the indemnity in secret and against the expressed will of a committee that studied it (Dubois, 2012).
The US emphasized plantation agriculture, as well as fiscal responsibility and public works, continuing disposessions that had begun in 1911 in order to facilitate banana production - and had, ironically, formed part of what fuelled the political instability justifying the occupation (Dubois, 2012; Shah, 2009). The occupation was supported by many Haitian elites, including Deputies who ratified a convention officially justifying the marine presence, with, among other conditions, the provision that appointments to state offices be approved by the US (Dubois, 2012). Rebel groups (Cacos) fought the marine invasion on several occasions (ibid). At the height of resistance under Charlemagne Péralte, an estimated 15,000 rebelled (Trouillot, 1990, p. 102). As part of efforts to construct roads, a labour corvée system was enforced that the population fiercely mobilized against given its echoes with slavery (Frankema & Masé, 2014). The US also introduced legal changes regarding foreign ownership of land (which had previously been outlawed27) by disbanding the new legislature which was resisting the change, which resulted in the US coming to control 22% (Dubois, 2012; Steckley & Shamsie, 2015, p. 185). Haiti also came to be even more dependent on the export of coffee (Shah, 2009). Even before the so-called “Second Independence” that occurred with the departure of the marines, President Sténio Vincent effectively “mortgaged away” the possibility of a different politico-economic experiment by, among other decisions, negotiating an agreement on banana exports with the U.S.-based Standard Fruit Company (Dubois, 2012). Thus, the “economic irrationality of the system” was aggravated as peasants were forced to contribute to state coffers and the state was increasingly dependent on one crop (Trouillot, 1990, p. 16).

27 The law represented the primacy placed by Haitians on maintaining their sovereignty (see Dubois, 2012).
Power was further centralized, especially with the creation of a new military and police force, the Gendarmerie, overseen by US marines (Dubois, 2012). This was an army created specifically to fight other Haitians and not foreigners (Trouillot, 1990). Social and cultural divisions continued after the occupation as the government persisted with the US-led crackdown on religious and cultural practices, and as the Dominican Republic massacred Haitians under dictator Rafael Trujillo (Dubois, 2012). The occupation was also premised on racialized, paternalist discourse as black Haitians were denied the possibility of being able to define their path to development given that they were seen as incapable of governing themselves (Dubois, 2012; Shah, 2009). Tropes about Haiti were thus one devastating outcome of the occupation (Dubois, 2012). For a while, the presence of the Americans seemed able to unite Haitians under a “black” identity, yet the mulatto elite was still dominant in the economy (Nicholls, 1979). As well, a new class was emerging, including from non-elite black families whose positioned changed as a result of the technical and professional schools set-up during the occupation (ibid). This class developed noiriste ideas that Duvalier would later exploit28, helped by the Americans’ preference for light-skinned leaders (ibid; Trouillot, 1990). In sum, the occupation “exacerbated the contradictions embedded in the socioeconomic structure, reinforced traditional conflicts, and broadened the dimensions of the crisis by centralizing the system” (Trouillot, 1990, p. 102).

Prior to 1990, external actors again assumed key roles in the Duvalier dictatorships as their support waxed and waned. François Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”, ruled

28 Noirisme refers to a “belief that it is the blacks, in the history of Haiti, who have been the real defenders of national independence, and that it is they who, being the vast majority of the population, should control political power” (Nicholls, 1979, p. 258, footnote 25).
from 1957 to 1971, and was followed by his son Jean-Claude, or “Baby Doc”, until he was overthrown in 1986. The Duvalier state was the culmination of the nation’s evolution, especially the widening gulf between civil society and political society (Trouillot, 1990). Although the army was dismantled, the Duvaliers ruled through terror gangs, the Tonton Macoutes, who comprised over two-thirds of the state budget in the 1960s after they were formalized (Dubois, 2012). In addition to the constant terror and repression wrought by the Duvaliers, one of their legacies was that the military remained the only real functioning institution (ibid). This forms part of what Trouillot (1990, p. 171) refers to as the move from an historically authoritarian state to a totalitarian one, where “the chief of state served as the sole reference point or center”. While the Duvaliers initially promoted the black majority, there was an eventual switch to the minority; significantly, the promotion of various groups was always done opportunistically, hence explaining how the rural situation never improved (Dubois, 2012). The corruption that occurred to secure the personal gains of the Duvalier family was unprecedented (Verner & Egset, 2007). The role of the United States fluctuated throughout the dictatorship. For example, the US heavily supported the regime during the Cold War, raising aid ten-fold (Baranyi & Salahub, 2011; Stanley, 2014). In particular, there was a “formalization” of the alliance between the two countries following the passing of an Anti-Communist Law as well as Nixon’s election (Trouillot, 1990). However, presidential elections held in 1990 were secured as pressure from the United States coincided with popular protest (Dubois, 2012). Activists were also supported by the Carter administration (ibid). Dubois (2012, Chapter 8, p. 37 and 56) argues that François in particular seemed able to “outmaneuver” the US, including by taking
advantage of depictions of Haitian culture: “exoticizing representations of Haiti and Duvalier both justified U.S. support of his regime and buttressed his hold on power, legitimizing it by delegitimizing the idea of Haitian democracy”. The Dominican Republic also played a formative and oscillating role in the political order, ranging from support for insurgents after Trujillo died, to forging an agreement to send money to the Duvalier state from Haitian plantation labourers working in the Dominican (ibid).

Structural Adjustment Programs were first initiated under Duvalier as the government faced pressures from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors to undertake reforms consistent with the Washington Consensus: these include privatization, fiscal restraint, and trade liberalization (Cohen, 2013). Under François Duvalier for example, there was a greater institutionalization of previous moves towards agro-exports as consumption taxes on the peasantry were raised, and as US aid encouraged cash crops (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015). This trend further intensified as a focus on light manufacturing under Jean-Claude Duvalier fuelled urban migration (ibid). Compared to the “political revolution” engineered under François, Jean-Claude “enjoyed saying that he was leading the country through an ‘economic revolution’” (Trouillot, 1990, p. 209). Under Jean-Claude, coffee fell from first to second largest export – a place it had held since independence (Trouillot, 1990). US capital was the largest financial contributor to the assembly industry (ibid). Farmers’ subsistence ability was severely damaged by the encouragement to pursue cash crops, and as taxes on goods – flour, petroleum and sugar made up 25% of government revenue in 1985 – rose (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015). The turn to manufacturing did not result in substantial economic improvement for the poorest, such as in terms of job opportunities (ibid). Ultimately, the
urban-rural gap was reinforced (Trouillot, 1990). The resulting economic crisis was largely the trigger for the regime’s collapse (Jadotte & Pierre, 2008). Indeed, food riots, which arose in response to rising food costs, formed the first protests against Jean-Claude (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015). During this period, countries like the US also began to channel significant aid money to NGOs as they wished to support Haiti but recognized the extent of corruption (Dubois, 2012). This trend represents one factor responsible for the seemingly huge gulf between government elites and the population more broadly, with NGO service delivery effectively “induc[ing] the local population to relieve the Haitian state and its leaders from any political responsibility for the country’s poor services” (Nascentes da Silva, 2015, p. 25).

The election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 at first seemed to mark an end to the turmoil that had followed the ouster of the second Duvalier dictatorship. As Shah (2009, p. 23) explains, however:

While initially the election of the popular leader and Roman Catholic priest Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1990 was greeted with hope and pride by the majority of Haitians, the years following have been characterized by multiple coups, military rule, the continued presence of international peacekeeping forces, and successive attempts to bring about stability through state building.

The election was widely acknowledged by observers and the opposition as free and fair, and Aristide and his Lavalas movement decisively won with almost 70% of the vote (Pastor, 1997; Buss with Gardner, 2008). For his supporters, Aristide “combined a popular appeal to Haiti’s poor and reaching out to the emerging black petite bourgeoisie” (Buss with Gardner, 2008, p. 29). Inspired by liberation theology, Aristide was committed to the rights of the poor and to working with them for liberation from various enemies: Duvalierists/macoutes, the Catholic Church hierarchy, the bourgeoisie, and the
United States (Dupuy, 1997; Hallward, 2011). In the election, the US had supported Marc Bazin, a “centrist” candidate by providing US$ 36 million in assistance (Hallward, 2011, p. 31). Although he was supported in the election by the National Front for Change and Democracy party (Front nationale pour les changements et la démocratie - FNCD), Aristide was also resistant to party structures, and formed the Lavalas movement as a “broad popular front” (Dupuy, 1997, p. 890). As Dupuy (1997) argues, the fact that the movement was not structured as a political organization, and hence lacked accountability measures, meant that power was easily concentrated under Aristide.

Aristide was deposed only nine months later by Raoul Cédras, a Lieutenant-General in the army. Opposition had been quickly fomented (including in earlier unsuccessful coup attempts) in reaction to Aristide’s plans, such as his intention to reduce corruption and institute land reform (Shah, 2009). This opposition came from such sectors as the military, wealthy elites, and foreign business (Kovats-Bernat, 2006). While Dupuy (1997, p. 101) describes Aristide’s program as essentially a “moderate version of social democracy”, his proposed reforms were still very threatening to the status quo and those who had benefitted from the Duvalierist state. Likewise, conservatives in the US had, prior to the coup, already pressured the US not to deliver aid money (ibid). US investors were also concerned with his efforts, especially plans to double the minimum wage and raise taxes on the wealthy (Shah, 2009). Following his ouster, outsiders tried to forge a power-sharing agreement between Aristide and the military government. The US had a so-called “dual strategy” involving denouncing the coup publicly while encouraging, Aristide especially, to make concessions to the junta (Dupuy, 1997, p. 138).

29 Lavalas translates as “avalanche”, “flood”, “the mass of the people”, and “everyone together” (Hallward, 2011, p. xxiv).
The ruling junta maintained power through terror and death squads (Buss with Gardner, 2008), prompting UN sanctions in 1993-4 (von Einsiedel & Malone, 2006). Eventually the UN authorized an US-led multinational force, which secured Aristide’s return a month later: in 1995 this became the UN Military Mission (Rotberg, 1997).

The handling of negotiations for Aristide’s return had a number of political and economic repercussions. Although the Clinton administration gradually became much tougher in their negotiations with the junta, the failure to consider military intervention until 1994 (Dupuy, 1997) did not prevent human rights abuses and even seemed to offer the regime legitimacy. Largely because of sanctions, GDP also fell dramatically, down 31% in the first four years of the 1990s (Rotberg, 1997). These actions pushed Haiti towards becoming effectively a narco-state, producing around 14-20% of the drugs consumed in the US (Nascentes da Silva, 2015). While sanctions can offer a symbolic way of opposing a regime, it must also be considered that they often do more harm to a population as a whole than they do in weakening a regime (Buss with Gardner, 2008).

The Security Council’s authorized multinational force restored Aristide as part of “Operation Restore Democracy” in 1994. The US played a particularly crucial role in Aristide’s return, but made sure that it was conditional on a number of agreements, including that he would support export-processing zones, and that he would not seek the extension of his term for the same duration as he had been deposed (Burron & Silvius, 2013). Indeed, the Operation included an Emergency Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) that was premised on neoliberal principles (Shah, 2009). SAPs, since their earlier incarnations, had focused on the promotion of agro-exports and assembly sector development (Weisbrot, 1997). The EERP included a promise to privatize state-owned
companies (Shah, 2009). Almost immediately, Aristide backtracked on these commitments, which were fiercely opposed by popular civil society organizations (les organisations populaires) (Burron & Silvius, 2013). In particular, his resistance to privatization was met with donor disapproval, especially from the US and the IMF (Buss with Gardner, 2008). For instance, the US withdrew US$ 46 million in balance of payments support in 1995 (Weisbrot, 1997). In all, World Bank (2017) data estimates that Haiti’s official aid received dropped from US$ 722 million in 1995 to $367 million one year later. Aristide had also said that he would preserve the army, but moved to disband it in 1995 (Pastor, 1997). The decision was made without obtaining approval through a constitutional amendment, and without giving any compensation to former members (Nascentes da Silva, 2015), providing an incentive for the ex-military to regroup as militias (von Einsiedel & Malone, 2006). Furthermore, there was no disarmament, and many armed civilians are thought to have formed secret police or paramilitary organizations (Kovats-Bernat, 2006) – including those active in Aristide’s second ouster in 2004. Violence increased in the lead-up to René Préval’s election in 1996 (ibid). With international support, Aristide founded the Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haïti - PNH), and plans were made to increase the number of new recruits to 6,800 and to provide training (Pastor, 1997). The extent of external financing in general consolidated a dependent relationship, especially on the US (Hallward, 2007). More broadly, despite the occupation being necessary to restore democracy, it also undermined democratic institutions by subjecting decisions to foreign control (Dupuy, 1997).

In general, Aristide’s record is highly controversial (Buss with Gardner, 2008). The government made several positive moves, including its attention to reconciliation by
meeting with leaders of all parties, and by assembling a multiparty government (Pastor, 1997). Like many other national leaders however, his role is ambiguous; although he disbanded the army and in turn created a police force, Aristide’s government is criticized for backing “away from deeper reforms such as the vetting of personnel responsible for grave human rights violations or other crimes” (Fortin & Pierre, 2008, 2011 in Baranyi & Salahub, 2011, p. 58). Violence and political assassinations also continued (Pastor, 1997), and it was suggested that Aristide did not do enough to condemn violence perpetrated by his supporters, and even that he seemed to encourage it in his vague remarks (Dupuy, 1997). The lead-up to the 1995 election, as Pastor (1997) argues, provides a good example of the failings of his leadership, while also highlighting the important role of external agents. In the run-up, opposition parties challenged that too many Lavalas supporters were elected to the electoral council (Pastor, 1997). Opposition parties were adamant in demanding reforms, and the US government attempted to push the government to accept these reforms (ibid). Unfortunately, “Aristide and the CEP [Conseil Électoral Provisoire - Provisional Electoral Council] showed no signs of wanting to respond to these requests. The OAS [Organization of American States], the UN, and the US missions then downplayed the defects of the June election and urged the contending parties to move on to the runoffs” (ibid, p. 127). In the run-offs, only 14% of eligible voters participated (Pastor, 1997). In contrast to the 1990 election, international interlocutors had not been helpful in achieving a fair electoral process (ibid). As Buss and Gardner (2008) argue, the wavering of the international community in which elections they accept as fair has eroded the perceived legitimacy of the entire process.
In 1996, power was transferred peacefully to Préval (1996-2001). However, the victory laid only a “shaky foundation” for his administration to govern effectively given that the democratic process itself had been questioned (Pastor, 1997, p. 132), and that only 30% of the population had voted for him (Buss with Gardner, 2008). His election was followed by three UN follow-up missions focused on establishing an effective national police force – a task seen as particularly crucial given Aristide’s decision to remove the military. Haiti became increasingly divided, especially between Duvalierist and Lavalas camps, with the former “more or less correspond[ing] to Western Right and Extreme Right parties which champion the interests of the white and mulatto minority”, and the latter as “Left and Center Left”, aligning with the black majority (Nascentes da Silva, 2015, p. 29). For instance, Préval faced opposition to his chosen Prime Minister, forcing him to rule by decree (Buss with Gardner, 2007). Tensions were also increasing within Lavalas, and Aristide formed a splinter group, Fanmi Lavalas, in 1996 (Kovats-Bernat, 2006, p. 128). Conflicts were in part a result of Préval sticking closely to the neoliberal policies that Aristide had negotiated with the IFIs and bilateral donors prior to his return. In particular, Préval attempted to privatize state-owned companies, and limit government spending (Buss with Gardner, 2007).

Aristide was re-elected in 2000 in the context of escalating violence and political instability. Although Aristide won the elections with 92% of the vote (and turnout around 65%) and Lavalas won decisively at all levels, they were again portrayed as illegitimate by domestic and foreign elites; this time there had been a methodological decision that resulted in converting pluralities to majority wins, and the elections had been boycotted by opposition groups (Hallward, 2007; Jadotte & Pierre, 2008). Upon his re-election, the
UN withdrew its minimal support in the form of the Civilian Support Mission (MICAH) (von Einsiedel & Malone, 2006). The US also justified an aid embargo based on the election outcome (Hallward, 2007). Countries like the US and Canada became more supportive of Aristide’s opposition, including by funneling money to civil society opposition groups (Burron & Silvius, 2013). In general, the privatization of aid to non-state actors jumped in the context of the embargo: USAID, the US development agency, gave on average US$ 68 million annually to NGOs between 2000 and 2003 (Hallward, 2007, p. 82). Similarly, CIDA, Canada’s development agency, reported in 2003 that NGOs were responsible for 80% of services (cited in Brière, Jobert & Poulin, 2010, p. 656).

Opposition to Aristide was led by the Democratic Convergence (Convergence Démocratique - CD), a group that included “members of the old hard-line elite, Duvalierist and ex-military opposition” (Hallward, 2007, p. 96). The Group of 184 acted in parallel to the CD, representing a “very broad coalition of civil society associations and organizations” (Jadotte & Pierre, 2008, p. 94). More critical assessments charge that this group was characterized by external actors as grassroots, but instead represented the amalgamation of all opposition efforts, bringing together elites, business, media, and politicians (Hallward, 2007). Describing this group as “elite civil society”, Burron and Silvius (2013, p. 520) stress a contrast with the Lavalas movement formed by “popular civil society”: “while they are often unable to mobilize for the long term due to the extreme precariousness of the class status of their leaders, they possess intellectuals who can help sustain a coherent structure at the local, regional and national levels”. These groups demanded Aristide’s exile as the only solution to the political impasse as part of
Opération Zéro. Local gangs, who were either politically motivated, or simply taking advantage of the economic opportunity, exacerbated the conflict between Aristide supporters and the opposition (Kovats-Bernat, 2006). This opportunism was intrinsically related to the disbanding of the army as ex-militia sought paying positions (ibid). Despite calling for peace, Aristide was viewed as complicit in the violence (Seitenfus, 2014).

Falling economic indicators also worsened political tensions, as GDP fell from US$ 4 billion in 1999 to only 2.9 in 2003 (Kovats-Bernat, 2006; Hallward, 2007, p. 83). In 2003, the government prepared a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is a detailed plan put forward by the IMF in partnership with the World Bank that is necessary for, among other loans and aid programmes, participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (Shamsie, 2008), but there was difficulty in moving forward with the plan as groups boycotted the process as part of their more general resistance to the government (Buss with Gardner, 2008). Similar to controversy surrounding Aristide’s overall record as President, there are also differing accounts of the conditions under which he was removed from power in 2004, especially regarding whether or not he chose to leave, and how much influence was exerted by the US. Aristide has maintained that he was forcibly removed. His ouster was achieved in complicity with the US government, and the nations of CARICOM (The Caribbean Community) expelled Haiti from the grouping, refusing to recognize the new regime. Venezuela was the only Latin American country to do the same (Pina, 2009; Pilkington, 2011).

The ouster was immediately followed by a UN Multinational Interim Force (MIF) with troops from the US, France, Canada, and Chile. Only 3 months later, MIF was
replaced with the UN Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH’s mandate set forth objectives related to securing and stabilizing the environment; promoting the political process; promoting human rights; and, facilitating humanitarian assistance (UN Resolution 1542 (2004). Initially authorizing a military force of 6,000 troops and 800 police officers, the mission is the first UN peacekeeping initiative to have a majority of troops from Latin American countries (Heine & Thompson, 2011). Following the earthquake, MINUSTAH’s role was expanded to include up to 8,490 troops, 3,711 police, and generally an increase in its responsibilities through the taking on of more state functions (Freedman & Lemay-Hebert, 2015, p. 523). MINUSTAH has been subject to a host of criticisms, including that it was overly repressive of Lavalas’ supporters, and furthermore that “stabilization efforts were not accompanied by efforts to address the political and economic demands of Haiti’s poor majority” (Burron & Silvius, 2013, p. 522). MINUSTAH has also been perceived as problematically supporting President Martelly (2011-), rather than as a neutral force (Nascentes da Silva, 2015). Other criticisms of MINUSTAH that relate more directly to Brazilian leadership are discussed below. It is also important to stress how MINUSTAH itself has changed over the years, with the use of repressive measures in the years immediately after Aristide’s removal eventually easing (Baranyi, 2008).

Aristide’s removal did not provide an immediate remedy to the political turmoil. In fact, the security situation further deteriorated, especially as Aristide’s militarized opponents responded with increasing attacks and criminalization of his supporters. Kovats-Bernat (2006, p. 117) describes how “arson, riot, looting and summary execution have once again formed the lexicon of political conflict on the street”. There are
estimates that 300 to 1,000 supporters were killed in the first few days alone (Hallward, 2007). A “Council of Wise Men”, operating under the auspices of the UN Security Council, which included representatives from the international community, chose an interim Prime Minister, Gerald Latortue (Buss with Gardner, 2008). Latortue’s government was intended to be “technocratic” in the sense of politically neutral, but had no representatives from Lavalas (Hallward, 2007). Insecurity remained prevalent as Haiti faced a combination of militant Aristide supporters, a systematic government-led effort to intimidate these supporters, and “heavy-handed policing” related to the high presence of former military and paramilitaries in the force (Kovats-Bernat, 2006, p. 132). Some scholars (Hallward, 2007; Burron & Silvius, 2007) have accused MINUSTAH of being complicit in police attacks against Lavalas supporters, with Hallward (2007, p. 285) referencing a report from the Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights that argues MINUSTAH “‘provided cover for the police to wage a campaign of terror’”. Undoubtedly, MINUSTAH presented “ambiguous” outcomes for security reform, especially in its early days (Baranyi, 2008, p. 17).

Elections were finally held in 2006 after several postponements, and brought back Préval to a second term. Unsurprisingly, these elections were also marred by accusations of fraud. In particular, the number of null and blank ballots eventually led the CEP, with pressure from the international community, to distribute the blank ballots among all the candidates, leaving Préval as the winner (Buss with Gardner, 2008). Préval is commonly portrayed as representing a more conciliatory figure in Haitian politics. Buss and Gardner (2008, p. 8), for instance, maintain that he practiced the “politics of moderation, trying to build compromise and consensus in the country”. They go on to describe how Préval
made strides in: improving security; maintaining independence from Aristide; and stabilizing the economy (Buss with Gardner, 2008).

The government prioritized state modernization, placing emphasis on state reform, democratic consolidation, and extending state control over the entire country (Brière, Jobert & Poulin, 2010). With support from MINUSTAH forces, security reforms did occur, such as targeted recruitment of women to the PNH, which saw personnel rise to about 8.5% of the total by 2008, or through a vetting program (as police officers were accused of behaviour ranging from corruption to human rights violations) (Fortin & Pierre, 2008; 2011 in Baranyi & Salahub, 2011). The government was not immune from controversy, however, such as concerns that their support of MINUSTAH’s efforts in poorer neighbourhoods amounted to militarizing what is ultimately a socio-economic problem (Hallward, 2007). Various civil society organizations, especially feminist and human rights groups, have pointed to security deficiencies and called for reforms (Fortin & Pierre, 2008; 2011 in Baranyi & Salahub, 2011). Indeed, the progress made on gender equality is a result of a strong women’s movement, supported by actors such as Canada and the UN (ibid). Such evidence leads Baranyi and Salahub (2011) to conclude that policy-practice gaps, while not extreme, are still apparent on core principles of security system reform such as democratic accountability.

The administration’s handling of foreign policy seemed to quite successfully balance objectives of restoring Haitian autonomy without provoking the ire of foreign governments. For instance, Préval sought out relations with the Global North as well as Caribbean and Latin American nations, such as through his receptiveness to Chavez’ proposal to join Petrocaribe and to support Haiti’s social services (Buss with Gardner,
2008). Likewise, he could be rather ambiguous in his relations with the West; Seitenfus (2014) describes one instance where the international community thought that they had secured a “victory” in getting him to change the composition of the CEP; he was simply less than direct in his refusal. Baranyi (2014) also contends, with particular reference to the Canadian state’s efforts in Haiti, that the international community’s role evolved in positive directions following Préval’s election, for example in changing the PNH Reform Plan originally drafted by the UN. These decisions were fundamentally underwritten by the fact that the government presented a more legitimate basis for reforms (ibid).

The interim government and the second Préval administration both faced the daunting challenge of re-building the economy. As part of a 2004-2005 Interim Cooperation Framework (Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire, CCI), donors promised US$ 1.2 billion in aid (Hallward, 2007). A key priority of the transitional government was to improve governance, with a commitment to “rebuild the state while creating and distributing wealth through private investment, mainly in the agriculture and tourism sectors” (Buss with Gardner, 2008, p. 57). The CCI was not helpful in this regard, however. Certain deficiencies, including its lack of mechanisms to oversee projects, meant that donor control remained high, and donors continued to contract out the implementation of many projects to NGOs (Brière, Jobert & Poulin, 2010). The transitional government also backtracked on several promising social initiatives of the previous government, including by cancelling a literacy program, and stopping efforts to promote land reform (Hallward, 2007). Shamsie (2009) describes how export-assembly industry has been portrayed by external actors as central to poverty reduction, examining two of Haiti’s poverty plans: the CCI and the 2007 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
She argues (ibid; 2006) that one of the major limitations of this strategy was that the focus on assembly manufacturing came at the expense of interventions in the rural sector, where poverty is highly concentrated (these discussions are taken up again in the following Chapter). In rural areas, multiple actors, from NGOs to cooperatives, work to compensate for the state’s minimal material presence (MARND, 2011). Peasants are also well-organized, and have articulated calls for “food sovereignty” (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015). Continued commitments to privatization, such as a 2007 agreement with the World Bank to privatize nine firms, also generated fears that the measures would only benefit the rich or foreigners (Buss with Gardner, 2008). Food riots in 2008 – that forced the resignation of Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis - also revealed the inadequacies of a system that has not addressed agricultural reform in a substantive way (PAHO, 2013). As discussed, the economic situation also worsened considerably with the earthquake and other natural disasters.

Shocks like the earthquake aggravated an already existent precarity in Haiti’s development, and have further augmented the uneven power sharing occurring among government actors, external donors and NGOs, and Haitian citizens. Dubois (2012, Epilogue, p. 12) thus calls the difficulties of reconstruction “the aftershocks of a long history of internal conflict and external pressures that has left Haiti’s population vulnerable and exposed”. Concerns about the extent of development and humanitarian assistance have been long-standing, with the country referred to as a “republic of NGOs” or a “project cemetery” (Dubois, 2012; academic quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). A

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30 As Steckley and Shamsie (2015, p. 192) explain, the concept “entails not only access to adequate food, but is also a recognition of the socio-political dimensions of food and food systems, to give people control over what they consume and produce, and to democratize the food system”.
central, paradoxical issue, and one particularly important when understanding the characteristics and outcomes of the Brazilian approach, is that both perceived and real weakness in government capacity have led donors and NGOs to bypass government entities, ultimately further weakening governance, and leading to complaints that projects and programs do not fit with government priorities (Pierre-Louis, 2011). Of course, such broad trends mask divergences among donors, with Canada for instance strengthening state and civil society partners even where funding went to non-state actors (Baranyi, 2013). In particular, the question is whether and how capacity improves when a partner, Brazil in this case, does work directly with its government counterparts. The significance of the earthquake is therefore that it “epitomizes all the symptoms that existed in the country in relation to the way international NGOs operate in the country” (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 198). In March 2010, the international community pledged US$ 10 million for Haitian reconstruction, and established an interim commission (*Commission intérimaire pour la reconstruction d’Haïti*, CIRH), with representatives from government, business, civil society, and donors (Cayemittes et al., 2013, p. 2; Burron & Silvius, 2013). Burron and Silvius (2013, p. 525) argue that an emergency law that gave the commission complete power for 18 months effectively established a “trusteeship”, and Haitian members objected that their voices were excluded (Freedman & Lemay-Hebert, 2015). Dr. Paul Farmer, as UN Deputy Special Envoy, argued that the poor had had very little input in planning processes (in Burron & Silvius, 2013). Local organizations also expressed that the UN had not sufficiently engaged with them in the post-disaster response, and indeed noted that UN cluster meetings were initially conducted in English,

Michel Martelly, of the Repons Paysan (Kreyól) (Réponse Paysanne - Peasant Response) assumed power in 2011 (until 2016). While Préval had managed to forge a more inclusive government, conflicts in the political system flared during the 2010 election. Martelly represented a resurgence of the same groups that had supported the Duvaliers, and was also popular with Western actors (Nascentes da Silva, 2015). The election was once again marred by difficulties. These challenges included that Lavalas was excluded from participation, and, “following the first round, an OAS (Organization of American States) expert mission controversially declared that Martelly had placed second instead of third, in light of serious irregularities and widespread mobilizations by his supporters” (Burron & Silvius, 2013, p. 518). Martelly was especially favoured by the US (ibid). However, the UN and other Western powers pressured Martelly, in conjunction with human rights movements, not to follow through on plans to create a new army, and instead continue with PNH reforms, which runs counter to arguments that aid continued to “securitize” the Haitian environment (Baranyi, 2014). With Martelly, emphasis was placed on an industrialization agenda with the slogan “Haiti is open for business”, and plans for increasing tourism were also put forth (Nascentes da Silva, 2015). Notable initiatives include his move to construct an industrial park in the northeast, which first had to displace farmers and was opposed by civil society organizations (Burron & Silvius, 2013; Shamsie, 2009).

In 2011, the government established a Coordination Framework for Foreign Development Aid (Cadre de Coordination de l’Aide Externe au Développement d’Haïti,
CAED), in recognition that “given the importance of funds injected by international cooperation…the lack of coordination of financial support leads to the fragmentation of the system” (Cayemittes et al., 2013; MSPP, 2012 p. 8; my translation). The framework is thus an important step in reasserting government control over aid monies (Baranyi, Feldmann & Bernier, 2015). The World Bank (2015, n.p.) estimates that Haiti received over a billion dollars in “net official development assistance and official aid received” in 2013. Aid dependency was further entrenched due to a lack of domestic resources. These issues arise when assessing Brazil’s contributions to development in Chapter 7, as the small size of projects seems largely to prevent further dependency on external resources, yet Brazil has supported projects that were not in keeping with existent resource constraints. In a 2013 report, the IMF notes that despite growth, the current account deficit had further deteriorated, and that it was being financed primarily by Venezuela. In 2015, Haitians finally began the process of voting in parliamentary elections that had been postponed since 2011: since January of 2015, Martelly had been ruling by Presidential decree.

This overview provides a glimpse into the decisive impacts that foreign actors have played in Haiti over the years. However, by establishing links between the actions of key foreign governments and global institutions with domestic developments, I also demonstrate how, for example, the escalation of violence leading up to the removal of Aristide in 2004 was dependent on a combination of external and internal factors: growing internal opposition that refused to compromise; US support for opposition groups and increased resistance to the Aristide government; and, the devastation to the economy related to heightened opposition to government plans, including stoppages in
aid. While there are important differences between periods, I have also underlined a number of continuities related to the centralization of political power and the exclusion of opposition, often forcefully; the willingness of foreign powers to pick their preferred political winners; and the inseparable connection between political influence and economic power, including the effects of aid breaks. It is also worth emphasizing that Haitians never gave up on their search for equality or autonomy throughout this daunting history of exclusion (Dubois, 2012). This approach contrasts with tendencies to either present Haitian problems as either primarily endogenously- or exogenously-driven. Both of these tendencies can derive from the simplistic use of “failed state” concepts when labeling Haiti.

4.2 Representations of Haiti, and the Dilemma of “Failed State”

As the previous discussion highlights, problems with the nature and extent of external involvement in Haiti, although exacerbated in times of crisis, such as following the 2010 earthquake, have been prominent throughout Haitian history. Part of the answer for why crises have aggravated the tensions of outside involvement in Haiti is that they have been premised upon and also compounded existent, colonial representations of the country. This section will focus on the role of the label of “failed state” in particular, explaining how this signification of Haiti can be dangerous in terms of the nature of interventions that it makes possible. At the same time, I explore how such representations may also be lacking in their explanatory power. By building on conceptual insights offered by Sidaway (2009), the section demonstrates several characteristics of the Haitian state that are ignored or skewed by this lens. Sketching out these commonalities in how
external actors have tended to view and act upon the state helps to highlight Brazil’s alternative approach of working through government institutions, outlined in the following Chapter. First, however, I give a brief overview of how Haiti is typically portrayed in fragile terms.

Descriptions of Haiti tend to invoke similar images of violence, political instability, incapacity, and poverty. For instance, Brock, Holm, and Stohl (2012, p. 83) write that, “Haiti illustrates how violence is institutionalized by elites fighting for control of the state or clinging to power once they have achieved control. It further illustrates how social or ethnic cleavages can be employed to fuel fear and violence”. Although they also acknowledge that “Haiti is a resilient society whose rural communities in particular have developed coping mechanisms in response to a long history of underdevelopment and political instability”, Verner and Kuttner (2007, p. xiii) similarly add that, “like other fragile states, however, Haiti is also beset by widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, poor governance, and violence”. Buss (with Gardner, 2008, p. 2), who explains that Haiti has been classified as a fragile state in the sense that “the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, especially the poor,” notes how the country has been variously described as a “nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual, or pariah state”. Leak (2013, p. 395) further contends that Haiti has been “imprisoned in the trope of barbarism”, with common constructions such as: “despotism, corruption, coups d’état, voudo, poverty, violence”. The purpose of identifying these messages is not to implicate any particular authors. Rather, it is the coherence in messaging that helps explain policy interventions in Haiti.
As a failed state, where underdevelopment and security are typically linked together, the prescribed fix becomes state-building (Shah, 2009). The concept is intended to express some of the challenges of Haitian politics, including how elite-driven they are (internal and external elites), or where political actors act ambiguously, taking on certain reforms while avoiding others (Leak, 2013; Baranyi & Salahub, 2011). The image constructed of the Haitian state is often a paradoxical one: the state appears simultaneously incapable and unwilling to provide public goods while power remains heavily concentrated. Always, the recommended policy response relates to some form of state-building. Verner and Egset (2007, p. xix) provide a good illustration in their summary of the Haitian state, where the “ability to provide basic public goods has thus been undermined by a history of neglect, political capture and corruption, and compounded by difficult donor partnerships”. The answer, they argue, is to restore core state functions (Verner & Egset, 2007). As Burron and Silvius (2013) acknowledge, the concept has its merits, such as recognition of the need for protection of human rights when the state is unwilling or unable to do so, but it may not be useful for approaching other issues. Technocratic fixes, like building institutions, are not the same as addressing “oligarchic or patrimonial control” (Shamsie, 2008 quoted in Burron & Silvius, 2013, p. 522). My argument is not that the concept has no merit, nor that it misses many of the challenges facing Haiti. In later Chapters, especially Chapter 7, I identify institutional constraints that limit the possibilities for Brazilian cooperation to have positive development outcomes, which are entirely consistent with many of the observations contained in the elaboration and application of this concept. However, other central

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31 Parasram (2017, p. 4) explores how the specific expression of sovereignty as the modern territorial state became the “requirement for existence as a post-colony”.

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features of the state are downplayed. Thus, once understood as applied in a political context, a fuller examination of the representations underpinning the concept reveals its explanatory weaknesses.

Indeed, the adoption of the failed state concept, and in particular its role in driving policy-making, has multiple limitations when applied to contexts like Haiti. These limitations are found both at the conceptual level in terms of the political norms it has rested on, as I return to below, but also in its application to specific cases. Arguably, these issues are impossible to separate as the normative underpinnings either lead to an undue focus on characteristics the Haitian state does hold (such as capacity limits) while missing other elements, such as the links between formal and informal institutions.

Although the concepts of fragile and failed state can be used similarly, they have different lineages (Nay, 2013). Nay (2013, p. 327) argues that the notion of a failed state developed to describe civil conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War environment, whereas fragile tended to be invoked by development agencies specifically (technical or donors) to describe “countries where the legitimacy, authority and capacity of state institutions are dramatically declining, weak or broke”. In 2007, the OECD developed the Fragile State Principles (FSPs – The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations), which included an effort to “translate the principles of aid effectiveness…into contexts of fragility and conflict and help to foster constructive donor engagement where governance is weak and politics volatile” (OECD, 2016, n.p.). Subsequently, in 2009, a “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was developed and endorsed by many of the participants of the GPEDC, which the OECD (ibid) describes as “the main policy framework that sets the standard and principles of
engagement among these countries and organizations”. These initiatives reflect the international community’s concern that the question of making aid more effective needs to account for circumstances where the state is ‘unable to meet (their) population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process’, explicitly drawing connections between development and security (OECD, 2008 cited in Ellison, 2016, p. 467).

Multiple scholars (see Carment, Prest & Yagadeesen, 2010; Hill, Pavignani, Michael, Murru & Beesly, 2014; Nay, 2013), even those who think the fragile state concept still has analytical merit, argue that it has been used without precision, applied to what are very different challenges, such as civil conflict versus poor socio-economic conditions. For example, Carment, Prest and Yagadeesen (2010) note that failed states are only one way in which the more general term fragile state can be broken down; they also add: weak states, collapsed states, difficult partners, difficult environments, and Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS). As Nay (2013, p. 332) charges,

Ironically, this may be one reason that it gained such importance in the international policy discourse: the more extensive, porous and malleable the idea of state fragility, the more it could be appropriated and manipulated by political actors and analysts with conflicting views and policy priorities.

Despite, or because of (following Nay’s (2013) logic), its analytical weaknesses, the label has been used to drive significant and varied interventions into these states. By identifying the roots of failed states, interventions like those to promote democracy sought to build up the state through technocratic fixes, such as by improving the judiciary (Burron & Silvius, 2013). Similarly, when understood as a lack of capacity to deliver public goods, then interventions are premised on the assumption that they can help the state to regain this capacity (Hill et al., 2014). The use of failed state as a catch-all
concept not surprisingly allows for a host of possible interventions, but may also not address their internal tensions, such as where technocratic fixes to issues of capacity may problematically further concentrate what is already a highly skewed distribution of power.

Moreover, the implications of the failed state label can be further understood by examining how it is situated in particular normative and political conditions. The concept is deeply normative, implying what a state ought to be by demonstrating where it falls short of these standards. In other words, “failures to provide these two functions [provision of security and material well-being] are not simply expressions of doing things differently but also evidence of doing them badly” (Brock, Holm, Sorensen & Stohl, 2012, p. 7). Or, as Carment, Prest and Yagadeesen (2010, p. 3) succinctly note, these states are “often considered the negative image of what a state should be”. This Western-centrism, combined with a more general preoccupation with state institutions, risks missing informal structures and the pervasive role of external relationships (Nay, 2013). In their article, “The ‘empty void’ is a crowded space”, Hill et al. (2014, p. 2) describe how health care provision in failed states is actually “increasingly pluralistic, unplanned, privatized, unregulated and globalized”, and not simply missing because of a lack of capacity or willingness to provide. Similarly, Baranyi’s (2012, p. 732) article specifically on Haitian statehood not only provides a carefully drawn empirical portrait of variations in statehood (remarking upon areas where there is less and greater capacity), the analysis more significantly notes how the “challenge is to link the careful documentation of variations in statehood to the rich historical analyses of state (de)formation in Haiti”. The normative foundation of failed or fragile state is also a racialized and colonial one,
naturalizing domination and granting outsiders the power to intervene. Various scholars (Shah, 2009; Seitenfus, 2014) have noted how the relationship between the international community and Haiti has been premised on racialized notions throughout their history, starting with Haiti’s threatening overthrow of slavery, which was unacceptable to the Western order; racist representations of the island can lead to different interventions however, and in Haiti they have taken forms ranging from indifference to direct military occupation (Seitenfus, 2014).

Finally, the politics imbricated in who it is who has the authority to define these states, and to what end, are relevant. Broadly, it is impossible to separate peace operations from the interests that drive outside powers to intervene (Baranyi, 2008). In the post 9/11 context specifically, fragile states became a problem because they were seen as a threat to regional and global stability (Brown, Grävingholt & Raddatz (2015), and this self-interest can compete with other rationales for designing intervention. Some analysts acknowledge that state fragility is explained by both endogenous and exogenous factors, such as state dependency on financing from external donors (see Muggah, 2007 cited in Brière, Jobert & Poulin, p. 655; Seitenfus, 2014; Buss with Gardner, 2008). While this recognition of the roots of fragility does overcome state-centrism, at a practical level interventions do not meaningfully address how the actions of external actors produce instability or prevent development. Outside interests can also interfere with implementation. Muggah and Krause (2006) distinguish between two UN Missions in Haiti – the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH, 1993-1996) and MINUSTAH – and argue that MINUSTAH has been more holistic, including references to human rights and not simply aiming to ensure national security, but argue that this mandate has not been fully
implemented due to various constraints – political, financial, etc. Inattention to the inescapable politics of engaging with fragile states is equally detrimental. For example, Brière, Jobert and Poulin (2010) describe a project undertaken by Quebec, the Canadian government and Haiti to improve capacity, especially among senior levels of government and the civil service (Projet d’appui au renforcement de la gestion publique - Project to support the strengthening of the public service). Although the project tries to rectify the problem of contributing to governance failures by directly engaging with the state, it seems to assume that aligning with the priorities of the transitional government is a neutral choice (Brière, Jobert & Poulin, 2010). Brazil’s commitment to working with government partners, as I will argue, has also remained overly technical in some ways, yet the approach has much potential to contribute to capacity-building in small, incremental ways.

Following Sidaway’s (2003, pp. 159-160) contribution, I approach Haiti as undergoing a “crisis of representation”, where frequent representations of the country as either failed or weak miss how the country also possesses “an excess of certain things”. In particular, rather than a perceived lack of capital, rationality, etc., which are all understood as deficient next to the ideal Western state, Sidaway (2003) examines Angola and Zaire/Congo as exhibiting excesses of these various factors, collapsing the separation between “inside”/ “outside”: colonialism, cold war geopolitics, and extraction of minerals, for example. Haiti, as “the quintessential subaltern: deprived of the right to speak and subject to decisions taken by the elites both inside and outside of the country” (Leak, 2013, p. 394), is thus an excellent case for re-thinking sovereignty as both lack and excess, with actors inside and outside overlapping as much as they exist at odds.
Simply put, my objective is to complete the partial picture of “failure” by drawing out the excesses of power and authority that are also found. My view is thus an extension of Baranyi’s (2012) challenge to consider the historical constitution of Haiti’s state fragility by acknowledging the importance of external actors. Hill et al. (2014) further add that a more adequate analysis of fragility would involve seeing beyond the state as a void, and recognizing how binaries, such as public/private or formal/informal, are inadequate for examining service provision in similar contexts.

4.3 Brazil in Haiti

To conclude, this Chapter briefly provides an overview of the various dimensions of Brazil’s relationship with Haiti, which have been largely defined by its leadership of MINUSTAH. As one of the members of the “Core Group”32, Brazil is considered a key influencer of the Haitian government. Largely, this position is attributable to its leadership of the military component of MINUSTAH. In 2015, MINUSTAH was commanded by General José Luiz Jaborandy Junior, and Brazil contributed 982 troops and 8 police officers – of 2,338 total troops and 2,239 police (MRE, 2015; MINUSTAH, 2015). The agreement to provide military leadership of the mission has been attributed to several factors, not the least of which is considered “the Holy Grail of Brazilian diplomacy, permanent membership in the UN Security Council” (Morais and Saad-Filho, 2011, p. 32). Prestige has also been emphasized, with MINUSTAH seen as an important vehicle for Brazil to demonstrate its regional and global ascendance (Bracey, 2011). In particular, the Brazilian command represents a challenge to the United States’ traditional

32 Other members include Canada, France, Spain, the United States, the EU, and the Organization of American States (OAS).
foothold in the region (Cervo, 2010). The decision also reflects Brazil’s belief in multilateralism and in finding regional solutions (Feldmann et al., 2012), with participation in the Mission an attempt to seal its influence in global forums, but also to influence their principles and actions. For example, Kenkel (2010) describes the importance placed on the peaceful resolution of conflicts by the Brazilians, as well as peace-building over peace enforcement. However, Brazil’s position on peace-keeping, and especially the use of Chapter VII, which authorizes the use of force, also complicates its rationale for participating. As Diniz (2007) argues, Brazil would not participate in the preceding mission (MIF) precisely because it referred to Chapter VII, which contradicts deeply held principles around non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, as well as peacefully settling disputes: the decision to lead the military component is thus only comprehensible once placed alongside its other foreign policy objectives.

The record of Brazilian engagement is certainly controversial. Several successes of the Mission have been noted. Notably, Brazil is said to have succeeded in establishing a permanent presence in some of the more critical areas of Haiti (such as Bel-Air or Cité Soleil), and is also described as having achieved an image of impartiality given its reluctance to use force (Braga, 2010). Brazil’s supposed cultural similarity is also considered to have had positive effects. Some respondents stressed how the Brazilian troops had been able to develop relationships where they operated largely because of a shared interest in futebol and Carnaval, and their approach to community relations (UN representative in author’s interviews, 2015). According to a UN official, even among other Latin American contributors of troops, “Brazilians are the closest to the Haitian population” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). The Brazilian component was also
seen as achieving a balance between being disciplined and forceful when needed, while also being able to act more persuasively to generate good behaviour because of their inroads into communities (Brazilian military official in author’s interviews, 2015). One respondent working for the UN described the fluency of Haitians in Portuguese as an indicator of the substantial presence of Brazil in more unstable areas (in author’s interviews, 2015). Likewise, anecdotally, an NGO respondent related seeing graffiti calling for all varieties of foreign actors to leave Haiti, as well as MINUSTAH, but not Brazil—his suggestion being that the criticism of the mission as a whole is not necessarily being associated with Brazil individually (in author’s interviews, 2015). A Brazilian military official also expressed that the Mission has benefitted Brazil since a special police unit that operates in the favelas (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP) gained experience from troops’ participation in Haiti (in author’s interviews, 2015).

There have also been more critical assessments. First, the comparison with UPP operations in the favelas ignores how they have also drawn sharp criticisms, ranging from corruption of officers to the increases in violence and homicides (Gay, 2014; Rodrigues, 2014). In terms of its relations with other nations, Nieto (2012) notes how Brazilian involvement in the Mission generated resistance from other countries, especially CARICOM (the Caribbean Community), who called for an inquiry into the unconstitutional removal of Aristide. In Brazil, Diniz (2007) describes how the decision to participate involved much more debate than is common with foreign policy decisions. Haitians and external observers have voiced concerns over alleged human rights abuses, and have expressed more general opposition to a military operation given that Haiti was not in civil war (Seitenfus, 2014). Regarding the former, there have been charges (see for
example Podur, 2012) that MINUSTAH was often complicit in the police targeting of Lavalas supporters. A Haitian civil society representative that I interviewed lamented how little had changed, arguing that Brazil’s role repeats problems of classic intervention, and that important cultural aspects shared between the countries have been “used” by the Brazilians to minimize pushback (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Other Haitians and observers have criticized the overall strategy for not sufficiently tackling what are ultimately political challenges in Haiti – the monopolization of power and (often violent) suppression of opponents – and even in being complicit with problematic aspects of governing regimes - such as the transitional government (Podur, 2012) or the Martelly administration’s authoritative tendencies (Nascentes da Silva, 2015). Seitenfus (2014) similarly contends that the focus on security has not sufficiently addressed socio-economic issues.

Some of these issues, such as the tensions between a human-centered framework focused on improving human rights, security, etc. versus a state-centered framework that improves national security through police reform, promoting the rule of law, etc. (Muggah & Krause, 2006), are a challenge of peace-keeping in general, based as it is on the amorphous concept of fragility. However, for Brazil, the potential conflicts with its principles of opposing intervention and prioritizing development issues also mean that it has fallen far short of the radical departure from traditional peace-keeping that it had envisioned. Brazil’s promotion of RwP in particular (Responsibility Whilst Protecting, Brazil’s proposal to replace the Responsibility to Protect agenda), not only was unprecedented as an effort to create global norms (Stuenkel, 2013), it also represented Brazil’s wariness with Chapter VI, attempting to enshrine a focus on prevention so that
the use of force would be a last resort. Given the length of the Mission, it is not surprising that prior to the end of the study in 2015, most Haitians wanted to see the exit of the soldiers (Bachega, 2014). These limitations of MINUSTAH potentially position cooperation as compensation for failing to realize such a multidimensional effort, or, more positively, as the complement to a security-heavy effort.

The economic relationship between the countries is much more marginal, suggesting that economic logic for greater involvement in Haiti remain minimal. In 2000, prior to MINUSTAH’s establishment in 2004, Brazilian exports to Haiti were approximately US $17.2 million, with imports representing $46,000 (UN Comtrade Database, 2017). In 2014, Brazil exported US$ 37,525,010 (representing 0.02% of its overall exports), while it imported $1,266,250 (World Bank, n.d., n.p.). While Diniz (2007, pp. 100-1) acknowledges that superficially the decision to participate in MINUSTAH seems to have no economic basis, he contends that,

There could, however, be indirect economic gains, to the extent that the eventual recognition and acceptance of Brazil’s political leadership in South America would permit or facilitate an effort of political coordination at the continental scale aimed at multilateral trade negotiations.

Thus, it is difficult to conclude that there were no expectations of future gains from exercising leadership, even if there were no immediate ones. Again, the neo-structuralist vision behind PT foreign policy moves often looks to the longer term (Burges, 2017). One Brazilian official confirmed that any economic investment would be a “fringe benefit” (in author’s interviews; my translation). The lack of direct economic gains also applies to participation in the Mission itself. While peacekeepers are awarded a sum from the UN, informants assured me that Brazil pays more for the Mission than it receives (Brazilian military official, UN representative and former advisor to the Haitian
government in author’s interviews, 2015). A Haitian official did note that the presence of the troops led some Haitian importers to buy more from Brazil in order to supply familiar goods to the troops.

An emerging issue for these two states is migration. Haitian migration to Latin American countries has been growing significantly since 2009 (Telesur, 2014). Brazilian officials discussed their permanent visa program, which has offered humanitarian visas since 2011 (embassy staff in author’s interviews, 2015). These officials estimated that there were approximately 60,000 Haitians living in Brazil in 2015 (ibid). These figures would not account for the many more Haitians who have taken undocumented routes into the country. When asked about existing conflicts between Brazil and Haiti, and how they have been resolved, a Haitian government worker noted how the treatment of Haitian migrants is becoming a problem, even if it is not one that is beyond the state (author’s interviews, 2015). Indeed, Brazilian news stories have documented cases of abuse and even killings of Haitians. Citing such examples as the shooting of Haitians outside a church in São Paulo, Gustavo Barreto argues that, “‘the notion that Brazil is a hospitable country, where all strangers and immigrants are welcome, is no more than a myth’” (quoted in Puff, 2015, n.p.).

Another important aspect of Brazil’s relationship with Haiti is through its development and humanitarian cooperation, which I turn to in Chapters 5 and 6. However, it is worth noting here that these areas can often overlap. In particular, Brazilian troops have also been involved in development activities, such as through participation in vaccination programs as part of “Immediate Impact Projects”. Although these types of activities conflict with widely-held ideas about humanitarian cooperation
needing to be as neutral as possible, one Brazilian civil society representative explained (in author’s interviews, 2015), it is the military that often have the equipment and expertise. Several informants expressed how development-type work is seen as a way of “winning hearts and minds” (quoted in ibid; the general sentiment was expressed by a Haitian civil society representative and Haitian official, as well as a Brazilian academic, in author’s interviews, 2015). A Haitian bureaucrat summarized it in this way: “when you are a foreign army, you need to work on your image, and having a cooperation program helps the image of Brazil, and also guarantees the MINUSTAH soldiers are free to do their business without ill-will” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). However, the costs spent on humanitarian and development cooperation do not compare with the money spent on MINUSTAH (Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015).

As I will discuss in the following Chapter, Brazil, in contrast to familiar tropes around Haiti as a failed state, instead constructs the country as an active and legitimate authority through its strategy of working directly with state partners. This fundamental shift in Haitian identity is what enables many of the post-colonial aspects of Brazilian practice, yet it is not a static construction. Instances where Haiti seems to fall short of Brazilian expectations have also led to more pejorative descriptions of the country, as I will return to. Nevertheless, consideration of the broader Brazilian presence in Haiti also begs consideration as to how MINUSTAH circumscribes Brazil’s ability to depart from these norms: Can cooperation depart from more simplistic and problematic descriptions of Haiti if MINUSTAH seems to instead depend on the need for trusteeship? The study does not answer this definitively, but, as I will suggest in the Conclusion, cooperation has
played a role in mitigating any negative effects for Brazil that arise from its involvement in MINUSTAH.

4.4 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have demonstrated how decisive external actors have been in determining the nature of Haitian politics and the economy by looking at events largely since the 1990s. In the area of development cooperation, the historical pattern has too often involved sidelining government priorities and institutional partners. Rather than attempting to answer whether it has been internal or external figures that have exerted the most influence, I instead drew links between developments in Haiti and various groups, whether they are external or internal. This choice stems from my position in the second section regarding the necessity to re-think Haitian sovereignty in ways that can overcome the politically- and normatively-charged ways in which Haiti has been represented and, as a result of these representations, acted upon. By making these connections, I have shown how the roles of governments like the US and donor agencies have had numerous, and too often disastrous, effects on Haitian society. To conclude, I presented a brief overview of Brazil’s broader presence in Haiti. These other aspects of the Brazilian-Haitian relationship are as important as understanding Haiti’s history of outside intervention writ large in explaining the outcomes of Brazilian humanitarian and development cooperation. The remaining puzzle is what Brazil’s strategy of working directly with its government partners instead signifies for development outcomes, and what representations of the country underpin this alternative approach. The next two Chapters will examine cooperation in detail, arguing that agricultural and health projects
have had a number of important political effects. In Chapter 5, I argue that these effects are a product of Brazil’s post-colonial practices, with cooperation’s deliberate emphasis on building closer state-state relations, while also reflecting Haiti’s previous experiences with donors and its post-colonial political economy.

5 Chapter: Building Partnership: Brazilian Efforts to Create more Equitable Relations

As the previous Chapters have outlined, part of what defines SSC, and Brazil’s priorities more specifically, have been efforts to ensure that cooperation is a horizontal relationship in the context of the vertical relations typical of traditional donors, who have
worked outside government institutions or come with pre-determined priorities. As illustrated in the case of Haiti, many experiences with foreign donors have been negative, even serving to deepen dependent relations and intensify poverty, vividly displaying the types of problems that SSC is attempting to overcome. Indeed, in an interview with an official of Brazil’s ABC, the respondent not only expressed his wariness of Brazil being labeled a “donor”, he was hesitant around the word “provide” (prestar):

‘Provide’ is not the best expression because we do not accept the classification of aid providers. We are cooperation partners. When you say that you are providing cooperation, although there is horizontality, there is also a certain inequality. We prefer the expression ‘partner’ (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation).

For Brazil, this principle has a number of roots, some of which are longstanding, and others which relate more specifically to the PT governments, especially insofar as how they are enacted: namely, the emphasis on cultivating Southern partnerships to benefit Brazil’s development while also remedying global imbalances. In providing a global overview of Brazilian SSC based on a review of secondary literature in Chapter 3, I also noted how the PT’s objectives as a post-neoliberal, emerging power have been served by development cooperation, and its position alongside other foreign policy vehicles. The purpose of this Chapter is instead to inductively examine the role of cooperation in foreign policy by beginning from a much more micro-level, using the concept of aid as a practice to investigate the how of cooperation. Given that aid is also approached relationally, however, I locate Brazil’s efforts specifically in Haiti by returning to the conclusions made in Chapter 4 around the role of external donors in preventing and even outright harming national development. By asking what, if anything, Brazil does better –
and what new weaknesses its practices introduce, the Chapter examines what cooperation with Haiti has achieved for Brazil.

Over the next two Chapters, I introduce four case studies of Brazilian development and humanitarian cooperation in Haiti’s health and agricultural sectors. I begin this Chapter with a general overview of the case studies, and provide some historical background on health and agricultural projects and programmes in Haiti. My objective in these empirical Chapters is to examine how cooperation has increased Brazilian influence as a post-neoliberal, emerging power by examining how cooperation works on a concrete level, from who is involved, to the ideas promoted, and how power relations shift as a result. Using Best’s framework, the Chapters are divided so that they establish two strategies that define the Brazilian approach: building partnership, and designing appropriate intervention. These strategies involve groups of practices that are based on shared notions of what problem exists, and how actors, in this case Brazilian officials, propose to deal with it (Best, 2014). In both Chapters, I will outline what Brazilians have identified as the problem needing remedy that orient these respective strategies, and how they have subsequently responded, before detailing the factors that have been central to these strategies.

In this Chapter, the focus is on how South-South Cooperation providers, and especially Brazil, came to view the best way of dealing with domestic politics as to foster government partnerships. I argue, revisiting criticisms made of the aid regime in Chapter 2, that this strategy is a direct response to the heavy-handedness of traditional donors in making aid conditional upon the implementation of neoliberal policies. For Brazil, as explained in Chapter 3, this way of defining the problematic and the solution are products
of its own experiences with aid donors, but also relate to its broader foreign policy goals, especially to establishing autonomy. I elaborate the factors – actors, techniques, knowledge and ideas, and relations of authority and power – that have been central to creating and consolidating partnerships as a way of showing how this concretely occurs. For example, I discuss the techniques that have strengthened government working relationships, especially lengthy negotiation processes. I argue ultimately that this strategy has extended Haitian state authority and helped to increase Brazil’s global weight.

5.1 Case Studies

In 2015, Brazil had six projects in Haiti that totaled US$ 40 million (Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015). According to the Brazilian government, the US$ 40 million that was initially allocated to the reconstruction fund for the development of a hydroelectric dam at Artibonite\(^33\) was re-allocated in 2015 to the following areas: $20 million to health, $17 million to professional training, $2 million to agriculture, and $1 million to election support (Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015). In 2010, Brazil had committed R $130 million for recovery and reconstruction costs (Ipea, 2014, p. 72), an “effort without precedent, especially considering it was a developing country” (Seitenfus, 2014, p. 246). From this total universe of cases, four were chosen as case studies. As argued in the introductory Chapter, cases in the health and agricultural sectors are viewed as “typical” of Brazilian SSC (see Gerring, 2007) given that they reflect the

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\(^33\) The building of the hydroelectric dam had been a request from Haitian President Préval to President Lula following the earthquake (Seitenfus, 2014). However, when costs became higher than originally anticipated, the Brazilian government could not proceed with construction (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015).
domestic initiatives undertaken by the PT regimes, which have formed the Brazilian government’s claim that they have appropriate lessons to share based on their domestic successes. As Stolte (2015) contends in her examination of SSC with Africa in agriculture, health and energy moreover, these areas have been the backdrop for Brazil to establish its global profile (such as by launching its candidacy for a post with FAO). The specific cases within these sectors were chosen randomly since all should demonstrate Brazil’s motives for extending cooperation and any cases from these sectors will reflect the domestic model’s influence. Although I had initially approached case selection with a view to assessing concluded projects (where all outcomes would be known), I proceeded with those that had been delayed to understand why they had not occurred as anticipated. Essentially, these were imagined as potential counterfactuals, or a way to “improve… the analysis of mutual relations between variables and the exploration of constitutive relations” (Lupovici, 2009, p. 203). The chosen cases are summarized in Table 5.

As outlined in the introductory Chapter, interview respondents included all project partners (Haitian and Brazilian representatives and IO representatives), in addition to other bilateral aid donors, civil society, and academics. With the exception of the Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, all of the case study projects involved IO partners, which produced interesting dynamics in terms of how the actors related to each other, and their respective responsibilities, as I will return to. In general, while the Brazilians involved worked with their Haitian counterparts, the on-the-ground implementation was overseen by Haitian officials with the representatives of the respective IO, either FAO or the WFP. Interviews were also conducted with direct project participants: hospital administrators (in the case of the Institute); school administrators
(the milk project); and farmer associations (the seed project). These interviews, however, were small in number, totaling six (although the two interviews with farmer associations were in practice similar to focus groups as multiple members were present). Those that involved the school administrators and farmer associations were also limited methodologically given that an IO facilitated access to the field, and that they were conducted through an interpreter, which, respectively, can introduce problems of bias, or lead to interpretative difficulties where nuances were not captured well through the art of translation.

Table 5  Case study projects in the health and agricultural sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Amount of funding</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Brazil-Haiti Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>R$ 123 million</td>
<td>Haiti’s Health Ministry</td>
<td>Offer diverse supports to Haitians with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Support for the Milk Sector and Improvement of Household Food Security</td>
<td>US$ 3,354,486</td>
<td>Haiti’s Health Ministry, WFP</td>
<td>Reduce situation of food vulnerability for school children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Assistance for Increasing Agricultural Production and the Strengthening of Seed Production and Distribution Capacities</td>
<td>US$ 300,000</td>
<td>Haiti’s Ministry for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development FAO</td>
<td>Improve productivity of small-scale farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Homegrown School Meals Pilot Project in the Petite Rivière de</td>
<td>US$ 1,847,388.00</td>
<td>Haiti’s Ministry for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural</td>
<td>Improve productivity of small-scale farmers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the health sector, in 2015 Brazilian assistance was focused on training programs. As part of a tripartite agreement with Haiti and Cuba signed in 2010, Brazil had inaugurated three hospitals in 2014. Connected to one of these hospitals, in Bon Repos, there was also a Brazil-Haiti Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (*L’Institut Haïtien-Brésilien pour les personnes handicapées*) built, where Brazil also assumed a training role of various health professionals (250) to offer services in support of people with disabilities (ABC, n.d.). In total, Brazil invested R $123 million for the construction of the hospitals and Institute (Portal Brasil n.d.). In 2014, however, Brazil also agreed to provide funds for a year to cover ongoing expenses, namely staff salaries (author’s interviews, 2015), which was the focus of interviews and field observations.

In addition, Lèt Agogo (Kreyól) or Support for the Milk Sector and Improvement of Household Food Security (*Appui à la filière lait et amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire des ménage*) was chosen as the second case study. This humanitarian project was completed at the end of December 2014. The project, to which Brazil contributed US$ 3,354,486 million in 2010, has the objective of “reducing social and food vulnerability of Haitian society thanks to the increase in the commercialization of milk and the incomes of milk producers, and the nutritional improvement of beneficiary students of the School Milk Program” (CGFome, 2015, p. 1; my translation). It is the school food program that is the focus of the case study. The Nippes project described below is based on a similar concept, but seeks to expand production beyond milk alone.
The other sector in which I undertook analysis was the agricultural sector. As of 2015, Brazil was undertaking and negotiating several projects in the agricultural sector in Haiti. The two case studies are: Assistance for Increasing Agricultural Production and the Strengthening of Seed Production and Distribution Capacities (Renforcement du système national de production et d’approvisionnement de semences), and the Homegrown School Meals Pilot Project in the Petite Rivière de Nippes Municipality in Haiti (Projet pilote de cantines scolaires dans la région de Petite-Rivière-de-Nippes). The former, which represents a continuation of previous projects dating from 2010, has the objective of “improving the food security of small farmers by way of increasing their productive performance” (CGFome, 2015, p. 2; my translation). With a contribution of US$ 300,000 in 2014, the project aims to increase productivity by providing small-scale farmers with vouchers that they can use to purchase high-quality seeds for crops like maize and beans, and by supporting farmer groups in developing these better-performing varieties (ibid; Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015). The pilot project was experiencing delays in 2015, with respondents suggesting several reasons, including that the conceptual note had gone through many iterations (Brazilian and Haitian officials and IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015). Brazil’s contribution was US$ 1,847,388.00 (CGFome, 2015, p. 1). As a local purchase initiative, the project was designed to support both family farmers and local school children by guaranteeing the purchase of agricultural products for use in school feeding programs (ibid; Brazilian and Haitian officials and IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015). As such, one stated objective is to “increase the agricultural surplus by increasing productivity and reducing losses, and by increasing sales” (CGFome, 2015, p. 1; my translation).
5.2 Histories of Agricultural and Health Intervention in Haiti

Brazilian projects are intelligible only once placed historically, in the broader dynamics of external intervention in Haiti’s health and agricultural sectors. How Haitians have evaluated Brazilian SSC relates directly to the weight that external actors, such as governments like the US and France, and bilateral and global development institutions, have historically held in determining priorities. In the previous Chapter, the discussion emphasized how various actions taken by these actors, which have coincided with decisions taken by Haitian political elites, have in many cases reinforced problematic political institutional dynamics, or stalled socio-economic development. In order to examine general patterns, the discussion by necessity elided some important differences among external governments and aid agencies. Here I again examine broad tendencies, focusing on patterns specifically in the health and agricultural sectors, first providing a brief overview of the challenges Haiti faces with regards to health, before outlining some of the ways in which outside intervention has affected the health system. Crucial impacts of health programs historically have been that privatized systems have displaced the Haitian one, with a myriad of harmful repercussions. In contrast to agriculture, then, where I will highlight the consequences mainly of issues prioritized by donor programs, the criticisms outlined below have more to do with processes – or the way that donors engage with the system. The record of external intervention in the health sector is demonstrative of how assumptions about state fragility have led to bypassing of the system, ultimately undermining capacity. It is also important to reiterate that the cholera
epidemic introduced by Nepalese peacekeepers was devastating to Haiti’s public health, resulting in the deaths of 8,000 people (Seitenfus, 2014, p. 23).

Haiti faces health challenges in a number of areas. The MSPP’s 2012 National Health Policy describes high levels of morbidity resulting from transmittable infections, but also notes that conditions like cardiovascular diseases and diabetes are increasing, suggesting an epidemiological transition. Health problems reflect broader societal inequities, especially between the rich and the poorest (MSPP, 2012). For instance, only 60% of the population is estimated to have access to basic health services (ibid, p. 7). Infant-mortality remains high (the highest in the Americas) (PAHO, 2013, n.p.), and Cayemittes et al. (2013, p. 209) find in their 2013 national survey on mortality, morbidity and service utilization (Enquête Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services, EMMUS-V) that approximately one out of eleven children dies before their 5th birthday.

A key determinant of poor health is malnutrition; a 2008-9 survey found that chronic malnutrition affected between 18 to 32% of the population (PAHO, 2013, n.p.). Maternal mortality has actually been on the increase, from 457 deaths per 1,000 in 1995-6 period to 630 in 2006 (PAHO, 2013, n.p.), and poverty remains an important determinant as to whether women access skilled birth attendants (Babalola, 2013). Women and girls also face high rates of domestic and sexual violence, with over 25% of women and girls indicating in a survey prior to the earthquake that they had suffered physical violence (EMMUS IV cited in Human Rights Watch, 2013 p. 18). As discussed in Chapter 4, disasters such as hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake have also resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, and have further fractured existing inefficiencies in the health system.
The main limitation of how external donors have approached Haiti’s health system is that they have too often worked outside of the public or state system, which has had several distinct ramifications. While the sidelining of the Haitian state has not been specific to the health sector – an estimated 99% of emergency relief post-earthquake bypassed Haitian institutions (Seitenfus, 2014, p. 268) – it is nevertheless an area where this approach has predominated, perhaps due to perceptions that it is a particularly weak institution\textsuperscript{34}. Because the sector is primarily financed by the international community, who tends to use private agencies to implement health programs rather than channeling funds to state bodies, the health system is highly fragmented; this fragmentation is exacerbated by the fact that service delivery is also financed from patient billing (Estupiñán-Day et al., 2011). For instance, prior to the earthquake in 2008, 70% of health services were being provided by non-public institutions (World Bank, 2008, p. 114).

Over the 2005 to 2007 period, foreign resources made up nearly 80% of investment programs in health, with the US, Canada, and the UN acting as key players (World Bank, 2008, p. 124). The government has recognized these tendencies, and has made explicit calls for the transformation of international support. In its 2012 national health policy, the MSPP outlines its objectives, which include exercising leadership, such as through ensuring that external resources are aligned with national priorities. Moreover, the sheer volume of support underlines how influential external contributions can be, either in the case of how provision interacts with existing systems, as I examine here, or in terms of prioritized areas. Between 2006 and 2010, Haiti received more than US$ 99 million in voluntary contributions to the health sector (PAHO, 2013, n.p.). These tendencies were

\textsuperscript{34} Dowel et al. (2011, p. 300) refer to it as the “hemisphere’s weakest public health system”.

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further aggravated as disasters like the earthquake struck. As Mosynski (2011, p. 342) writes, citing a report from a relief agency, “instead of finding themselves working alongside incoming international teams, local NGOs…and health workers were bypassed and sidelined by the wave of international NGOs and clinical teams’’. Human Rights Watch (2013, p. 64) similarly notes how in response to MSPP’s request for donors and NGOs to register and report on their activities, only 14 out of 400 of those who registered actually completed a report.

A central consequence has been the creation of a chaotic field of health services. According to the MSPP (2012, p. 8; my translation), “the lack of coordination of financial support leads to the fragmentation of the system”. In this “crowded space”, the limited coordination that occurs among the many players can result in inadequate service integration (Hill et al., 2014). Following the earthquake, DINEPA (*Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable et de l’Assainissement* – National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation) developed an agreement for NGOs in an effort to coordinate the multitude of efforts (Bliss & Fisher, 2013). Indeed, the more general system of sectoral clusters that developed post-earthquake reflects the “dysfunction” of a system where external actors attempt to hold control in order to assert influence (Guimier, 2011, p. 202; my translation).

The sidelining of Haiti’s public system has created parallel systems that further weaken Haiti’s system. As the MSPP describes it, “many programs in the domain of HIV/AIDS, among others, are conceived of and executed in a manner totally vertical in the concern to show immediate visible results” (MSPP 2012, p. 8; my translation). This approach undermines the authority of ministries like MSPP, and more generally either
sustains, or even can more fully entrench, some of the challenges of the public system. In their post-earthquake and cholera responses, for example, NGOs were focused on enacting immediate solutions in camps by setting up water and sanitation systems; however, since camps are located largely in the west and Port-au-Prince, where infrastructure is already of a better quality, these interventions exacerbated existing fragmentations in coverage and poor overall decentralization (Guimier, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2013). Remarkably, what stands out is how much leadership departments like the MSPP and DINEPA have shown in spite of their challenging environment. For instance, Dowell, Tappero, and Frieden (2011 p. 301) suggest that during the cholera crisis, the MSPP “exerted consistent leadership”, such as by declining donations for rapid malaria tests due to concerns that they would divert resources from a more standard smear test, which directly contradicts the simplistic failed state narrative.

Finally, the consequences of the solidification of parallel systems have been obvious in the area of human resources. In comparison with the World Health Organization’s norm of 25 health professionals for every 10,000 people, Haiti has approximately 5.9 doctors or nurses, and 6.5 professionals (MSPP, 2011, p. 11). Notably, Haiti has been affected by an external brain drain, where it is estimated that 80% of recently graduated doctors migrate (Hill et al., 2011). Internally, moreover, there has also been huge competition with NGOs who can offer better salaries (MSPP, 2011; Guimier, 2011). Prior to the earthquake, donors’ support had gone to the private sector as well as to NGOs (Guimier, 2011). The earthquake, in addition to destroying health facilities, also led to another wave of migration (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The privatization of
funding impacts the quality as well as the numbers of medical staff available. A lack of workforce training has produced under-skilled professionals (Hill et al., 2011).

In the area of agriculture, I argue that interventions have displayed several similarities: general neglect of the agricultural sector; where it has been prioritized, an emphasis on export rather than assuring domestic food security; and incoherence with other interventions. These arguments are heavily influenced by the work of Yasmine Shamsie (2006; 2008; 2009; 2011; 2012) who has worked extensively on these themes.

Haiti’s agricultural sector is a logical site for the attention of various donors. Representing not only the main source of livelihoods for Haitians, it is also overrepresented by the Haitian poor because of its employment significance in rural areas (Shamsie, 2008). Indeed, it is the principal source of revenue in rural areas\(^{35}\), and employs 60% of the active population (MARNDR, 2013, p. 16). In 2011, 88% of rural individuals fell beneath the poverty line, and 77% were in a situation of food insecurity (MARNDR, 2013, p. 15). Despite its majority significance in terms of employment in rural areas, however, the sector has fallen from representing 45% of GDP in the 1970s to only 26% in 2011 (MARNDR, 2011, p. 11). Agriculture suffers from a number of challenges. The state - not only external actors, as argued below - has not consistently prioritized financing to the agricultural sector: state funding declined from the late 1990s into the 2000s, reaching 5.3% of the budget in 2011 (MARNDR, 2013, p. 10). Other challenges are environmental, including the fact that Haiti faces degraded watersheds and soils – partly resulting from the existence of food insecurity which perversely encourages unsustainable practices, and limits important investments such as those in irrigation

\(^{35}\) In Haiti, 57.4% of the population lived in urban areas in 2014 (World Bank, 2016).
Import dependency is also pronounced. The Haitian Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (Ministère de l’agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement rural, MARNDR) (2011, pp. 8, 11) estimates that national production only met 49% of overall food needs in 2009, and this was lower for key staples: in that year, for example, 80% of rice needs were met with imports.

In general, traditional donors have placed minimal importance on agriculture and rural development. In particular, Shamsie (2008) describes how economic development plans in the 1990s were primarily focused on assembly manufacturing, and had little relevance for rural Haiti. McGowan (1997) estimates that less than one percent of aid and loans was directed towards peasant agriculture in 1995/96 (cited in Shamsie, 2008, p. 419). Shamsie (2011) similarly argues that development plans adopted in the 2000s also tended to prioritize urban-based interventions, which she attributes to the “fragile state” discourse and its assumptions about the links between conflict and poverty, whereby it becomes necessary to intervene directly in sites where instability is manifest. While many of these plans shifted focus slightly to the agricultural sector, the relative neglect remained palpable. For example, the 2007 PRSP did not provide any new funding to ensuring food security (ibid).

Indeed, where attention to agricultural development has increased, much of this has problematically remained focused on export-driven models. Steckley and Shamsie (2015, p. 180) refer to this approach as the “food security through trade” model, premised on the idea that development is best realized through open markets. The promotion of such a model, by foreign actors as well as Haitian elites, has a long history, but it was pushed more intensively after the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier (Steckley & Shamsie,
Following Aristide’s second ouster in 2004, Haiti developed a poverty plan, the CCI, which committed to “rebuild the state while creating and distributing wealth through private investment, mainly in the agriculture and tourism sectors” (Buss with Gardner, 2008, p. 57). The 2007 PRSP also identified agriculture as one of four “growth vectors” (Shamsie, 2009, p. 655). Both of these plans, however, are criticized for paying “insufficient attention to the agricultural sector, more specifically the objective of food security” (Shamsie, 2008, p. 421). Although attention to exports may benefit a small group of farmers, such as those able to access agricultural supports and hence with the most potential to be competitive, it does not address food security, which would have much broader repercussions in rural communities (Shamsie, 2008). Post-earthquake, and post-world food crisis, the government’s Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (Plan d’action pour le relèvement et le développement national, PARDN) reiterated the necessity of focusing on agriculture, and was followed by a specific 2010 National Agriculture Investment Plan 2011-2016 (Plan National d’Investissement Agricole) (Shamsie, 2012). As highlighted above, Haiti is food insecure, highly dependent on imports to meet its food demands. The problem of import dependency became especially stark in 2008 in the midst of the world food crisis: the price of imported rice rose by 60%, imported flour by 73%, and local maize by 91% over the course of only 7 months (PAHO, 2013, n.p.). In an explicit call for prioritizing food security, MARNDRT writes in its 2011 Agricultural Development Policy 2010-2025 (Politique du développement agricole, p. 17; my translation) that their overall vision is “to contribute permanently to the satisfaction of the Haitian population’s food needs and to the social and economic development of the country”. It is also significant that, similar
to the health sector, the agricultural assistance that has been on offer has tended to bypass the government (Cohen, 2013).

Another element of external influence on Haiti’s rural development is the impact of other interventions that indirectly affect the agricultural sector. The promotion of neoliberal economic policies – captured by the suite of prescriptions known as the Washington Consensus - has had devastating effects. As MARNDR (2011, p. 14; my translation) states in a clear indictment of these policies, “at a macro level, [neoliberal policy] contributed to the decline of agricultural production, the fall in exports, the explosion of food imports, and the reduction in support of subsistence food”. Neoliberal reforms, which had to be adhered to in order to gain external support of development plans (and even as part of the agreement guaranteeing Aristide’s return), have effectively destroyed the rural sector. In fact, Gros (2010) contends that the IMF and World Bank produced the food crisis by encouraging these reforms, such as the elimination of tariffs, which led to poor economic performance and a hollowing out of state functions. The world food crisis further demonstrated how easily a food insecure population, because of import dependency and limited rural production, could become victim to the volatility of global commodity markets. Relatedly, Cohen (2013) argues that the US, which has been Haiti’s largest trade partner and bilateral donor, displays an “incoherent” food and agricultural policy. He describes how, in the context of cuts to agricultural tariffs, the US continued its policy of providing huge subsidies to US farmers: this practice meant that while the US government provided US $400 million in subsidies in 2010, USAID, the US development agency, was providing only $90 million in agricultural aid to Haiti (Cohen, 2013, p. 601). The Haitian government is cognizant of the links between food insecurity
and import dependency caused by liberalization measures (see MARNDR, 2011). Together, the direct and indirect influences of donors and powerful states account for a huge part of Haiti’s rural devastation.

The discussions of external actors in the context of agricultural and health interventions has largely absolved internal elites. Of course, despite the explicit calls from MARNDR and MSPP to attempt to change the nature of external involvement, other internal actors have supported policy directions as stressed in the previous Chapter. In general, for example, conflicts between the President and Parliament have prevented attempts to build compromise on development plans, such as where Préval turned to ruling by decree when Parliament did not accept his choice for Prime Minister (Buss with Gardner, 2008). For instance, Préval did support privatization measures, as well as efforts to prioritize agricultural exports (Burron & Silvius; 2013; Rotberg, 1997; Shamsie, 2008).

When I discuss the question of empowerment in Chapter 7, I return to these more complicated state-society dynamics as I position Brazilian support for the health and agricultural sectors against the wider, continuous neglect of the sectors by the Haitian and foreign elite. These relationships are not static, nor are they equal, however, especially if the internal actors considered are government decision-makers. Préval’s overlap with many international priorities was not constant, such as where there was tension with the US over the attention given to relations with other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely Venezuela and Cuba (Podur, 2012). Even where priorities may have been shared, examining external-internal links in the context of development assistance specifically demonstrates that Haiti was not considered as a legitimate, sovereign actor as assumptions about state fragility constantly underwrote how projects were managed.
Much too often, they simply worked outside of the government, thus undermining the government’s capacity and legitimacy, although these tendencies varied considerably by specific donors (see Baranyi & Palducel, 2012; Baranyi, 2013 on Canada). Ultimately, the volume of support also places into question the possibility of consensus on development objectives: without sufficient money, Haitians were “likely to agree with almost anything donors proposed, so long as aid flowed” (Buss with Gardner, 2008, p. 114).

5.3 The “Ownership” Problem

This Chapter argues that one of Brazil’s main strategies for development cooperation that has been visible in the Haitian context has been the building of partnerships. First, however, it is important to establish why this strategy was prioritized. My argument here is two-fold. The strategy of building partnerships unfolded in a context of general dissatisfaction with how traditional donors had treated the issue of country “ownership”, but Brazil’s own experiences with development intervention as well as its broader foreign policy currents shaped Brazil’s specific response to this problem.

The problematic of addressing recipient country “ownership” in order to improve development efforts has been widely acknowledged. As discussed in Chapter 2, the focus of the development community on ownership emerged with widespread discontent that policy conditions placed on aid were in part responsible for the failure of SAPs to transform developing countries (Sridhar, 2009). Significantly, the IFIs and aid agencies were also explicit about their role in generating failures, and took various steps to address the erosion of their authority, including the turn to “ownership” (Best, 2014). Ownership,
as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development website explains, refers to the “objective of strengthening partner countries’ ownership of their development strategies and strengthening the ties making governments accountable to their domestic constituents” (2016, n.p.). While initially ownership was largely defined as country governments’ abilities to lead their development plans – such as is envisaged in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, over time the focus was extended to include ownership in the sense of the executive engaging with society more broadly (OECD, 2012). Various steps were taken to foster ownership, including by mandating that PRSPs, which followed SAPs, would be designed by developing countries themselves. These efforts have been criticized on a number of fronts. For some (see Weber, 2004), PRSPs represent little more than SAPs re-packaged, resulting in increased legitimacy for donors without devolving much power. Despite changes in language, the underlying concepts as to what conditions are necessary for development to occur have changed little (Hayman, 2011). Others (see Ruckert, 2010) have argued that they are representative of an “inclusive neoliberalism”, which may advocate continuity with macroeconomic policies but demonstrates more concern with their social impacts through social policy interventions (i.e. conditional cash transfers).

However, more importantly for understanding Brazil’s response to this problematic is the question of why, exactly, ownership was deemed a problem – responses to which have not generated the same degree of consensus. On the one hand, there is disagreement regarding the consequences of vertical donor relations. Arguably, donors like the World Bank have been confined to thinking of this in terms of “aid effectiveness”. Aid effectiveness has promise at a conceptual level for improving aid
outcomes, but to date progress has been limited as donors’ instrumentalist approaches continue to prevent full adherence to stated principles. For example, related to broader efforts to link good governance with aid effectiveness because state performance came to be seen as a potential obstacle to the achievement of results (Carbone, 2010), the donor perspective was that the exercise of better governance could be achieved only through measures that ensured policy ownership (Sobhan, 2002). For others, and this would include recipients themselves, the problem is more one of equity. According to Barnes and Browne (2011), these responses tended to emphasize how conditionalities were paternalistic, coercive, and unjust. Problems include, for example, that recipients were limited in the development policy choices that they could legitimately pursue (UNCTAD, 2010).

Similarly, the proposed solutions have varied. When ownership is defined so as to stress its links with effectiveness, then the solution largely becomes one of capacity-building, where countries are supported in creating an “enabling environment, strong institutions, systems and local expertise to fully own and manage their development processes” (OECD, 2012, p. 30). In other words, the “pursuit of political and economic reforms simultaneously was increasingly seen as essential” (Hayman, 2011, p. 678). In the discussion of shared principles of South-South providers in Chapter 2, I noted how these partners have generally refused to implement policy conditions; this choice is a direct result of their own experiences as former (sometimes current) recipients, and their desire to not interfere in partners’ affairs in similar ways (UNCTAD, 2010). This practice has been one source of debate on whether SSC is undercutting important standards for development cooperation (see for example Manning, 2006).
For Brazil, why have efforts to build partnerships, as I outline below, taken the form that they have? The following discussion of Brazil’s strategy of building partnerships will elaborate how this strategy has unfolded at various levels, from the more micro-level techniques Brazil has employed to broader patterns in establishing Southern ties, but here I introduce several notable rationales for Brazil’s specific response to the ownership problematic. Like other Southern development providers, Brazil’s decision to emphasize a logic of partnership results from earlier donor interferences with its own domestic policy. As one respondent from the Ministry of Defence described, Brazil’s foreign policy attitude of non-interference is a product of powerful countries having interfered with the country (in author’s interviews, 2015). In this way, it is useful to interpret cooperation as a post-colonial practice as it works to disrupt relations of domination in global politics. Again, attention specifically to post-colonial practices is a way to more fully draw out the form cooperation has taken – in this case, the prioritization of partnerships, as well as to explain the political effects that it engenders.

However, Brazil’s approach has also been shaped by broader foreign policy tendencies, as well as foreign policy pursued specifically under PT administrations. These foreign policy currents, as I discussed in Chapter 3, have included the political goal of positioning Brazil as a global leader. Likewise, Brazil has been heavily influenced by principles of defending democracy and sovereignty (Saraiva, 2007). The objective of achieving global influence is a longstanding one. A famous refrain in Brazil – “Brasil é o país do futuro (e sempre será) (Brazil is a country of the future – and always will be) – captures perfectly Brazil’s persistent ambitions to be a global power, but also how these ambitions have been continuously frustrated (Almeida, 2007). What changed with the
The election of the PT, however, was that the achievement of this objective was seen as possible only with efforts to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy (Saraiva, 2007). Significantly, this autonomist project is conceptualized as involving the democratization of international relations, which involves emphasizing South-South ties. In the words of the former Minister of Foreign Relations Celso Amorim, “the national interest and solidarity are not necessarily antagonistic...in many ways, ‘generosity’ is a reflection of a clear vision, that puts long-term interests of the whole nation over immediate gains in this or that sector” (MRE, 2008, n.p.).

5.4 Factors of Partnership

In the previous section, I discussed why the problem of building partnerships came to be viewed as central to fixing development cooperation, and how Brazil also came to see the construction of South-South partnerships as the solution to traditional aid’s weakness of creating highly unequal, vertical donor-recipient relations. And in the previous Chapter I discussed how this perspective resonates with Haitian actors who are legitimately concerned with the development of their country. In this section, I will discuss how Brazil has actually enacted its proposed solution in the context of Haiti by turning to the building blocks that Best (2014) identifies as the key components of such strategies: actors (who is doing the governing); techniques (the how), the knowledge and ideas informing strategies; authority (who authorizes practices, and whether they are accepted), and power (what is at stake in a given practice?). These factors are summarized in the following table. Then, in the final section of this Chapter, I elaborate on what this strategy accomplishes, using the earlier discussion of interventions in Haiti’s
agricultural and health sectors, to explain why the project of building partnerships has been so welcomed by Haitian partners.

Table 6  Factors of Strategy 1: Building Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors (by project)</th>
<th>Techniques</th>
<th>Knowledge and Ideas</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Brazil</td>
<td>• Distancing from “traditional donors”</td>
<td>• Concept notes, memorandums of understanding</td>
<td>• Moral authority as a Southern partner</td>
<td>• Extension of state power</td>
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<td>1. Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<td>• MSPP</td>
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<td>2. Support for the Milk Sector and Improvement of Household Food Security</td>
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<td>• MSPP</td>
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<td>• WFP</td>
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<td>• MARNDER</td>
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<tr>
<td>• School administrations</td>
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<td>3. Assistance for Increasing Agricultural Production and the Strengthening of Seed Production and Distribution Capacities</td>
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<td>• MARNDER</td>
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<tr>
<td>• FAO</td>
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<td>• Farmer groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Homegrown School Meals Pilot Project in the Petite Rivière de Nippes Municipality in Haiti</td>
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<td>• MARNDER</td>
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**Actors**

In examining the actors involved in Brazil’s agricultural- and health-related initiatives, the key consideration is how various groups rationalize their participation as
well as the projects themselves. The relevant actors are multiple. Brazil partners with FAO and MARNDR to implement the seed project. Concerning the pilot project in 2015, Brazil again works with MARNDR, and with the WFP (World Food Programme). In both agricultural projects, local farmer groups are also involved. Most of Brazil’s health cooperation has been related to a tripartite agreement with Cuba and Haiti, but the launching of the Institute specifically is a joint project between Brazil and Haiti, specifically MSPP. The milk project has more diverse agencies involved because of the connections that it attempts to forge between production and supply. As with the agricultural projects, FAO and the WFP have both been involved, but it is the WFP that manages the school feeding aspect. As well, a unit of MARNDR that manages local purchasing represents the Haitian side. School administrators involved in the school feeding program were also considered as relevant actors; although small producer organizations are involved in milk production, they are excluded from the discussion because their role is not directly related to the health component: milk distribution in schools.

The connections between actors involved are an important aspect of these practices. For instance, as the project implementers, the participation of the IOs (FAO and WFP) serves a crucial mediating role. When asked how Haitian participants perceived Brazilian support, several respondents suggested that farmers likely do not know who is the financial backer (IO representative and Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015). Interviews with farmer associations participating in the projects confirmed this, as an interlocutor had to prompt groups to reference Brazilian support. The dynamics of this involvement create distinct relationships: Brazil and the Haitian
governments on one level, and IOs and grassroots participants on the other. For Brazil, this positions the country to benefit politically from the support without having to encounter the actual messiness of development. As one IO respondent noted with frustration, “I think we are serving a purpose for Brazil, I mean buffering all these issues, and just continuing and going on, and being diplomatic, and not giving up, etc., it’s extremely difficult and extremely disappointing” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

While the milk project shares this dynamic with the two agricultural case studies, the Institute for Rehabilitation relies on a much more direct relationship between Brazilian representatives and those actually carrying out the project, such as hospital administrators and doctors. Beyond the physical construction of the Institute beside one of the community hospitals, Brazil also supported the establishment of a training component. As part of this component, Brazil had agreed in 2015 to cover the salaries of community health agents for one year (author’s interviews, 2015). At the end of each period, the Haitian side was responsible for properly accounting for the use of funds before more funds would be released. However, at the time of my arrival, there had been a freeze in funding and the Institute was effectively closed when I first visited in July 2015; it was up-and-running again during my second visit a couple of weeks later in August 2015. The explanations for this break were varied: while some Haitians suggested that the problem was delays on the Brazilian side in releasing the funding, others, including Brazilian officials and several Haitian respondents, argued that Haitian civil servants had not fulfilled the accounting requirements (in author’s interviews, 2015).

This conflict was significant as, regardless of who was responsible for the problem, the lapse did interfere with the working relationships established between the
Brazilian and Haitian partners. For example, one Haitian respondent described the partnership in largely positive terms, explaining how through constant negotiations, the needs of people with disabilities had been recognized, and that all decisions made, such as around the materials or services provided, were taken together (in author’s interviews, 2015). However, he also noted that “in practice, it’s the same story”, arguing that “certain resources are not here [in Haiti]” and that Brazilians should have recognized these limits (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Similarly, a doctor involved in the management of the project, when asked to compare Brazil with other donors, explained that Brazil was “very flexible, a good collaborator. They’re not here to impose, or bring corrections. If there’s a problem, they understand” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Regardless, she described the accounting problem as the Brazilians’, and, openly frustrated, noted that they had gone seven months without payment (author’s interviews, 2015). Even for those respondents who felt that the Brazilian side was at fault for the budgetary lapse then, all still described the partnership positively as responding to needs and as being executed in conjunction. Nevertheless, I will return to this conflict to argue that, rather than representing a breakdown of the partnership constructed between Brazil and Haiti, this incident in fact represents a limitation of Brazil’s partnership model, notably its potential blindness to the realities of the Haitian context.

Understanding the role of actors involves not only identifying who is involved, but also how the actors are in turn constituted by the practice (Best, 2014). In this case, one result is that Brazil’s strong relationship with the relevant ministries re-affirms Haitian sovereignty as the state is positioned as an active participant. In an interview with a representative of an international development organization, the researcher explained to
me how, in a study they conducted in Haiti, officials in Haiti’s Ministry of Health were asked who they would classify as a “model donor”. Their answer: Brazil (in author’s interviews, 2015). And, despite the conflict described above, Brazil was still consistently portrayed by these same respondents as a helpful partner overall. This response to Brazilian cooperation, as I return to when evaluating the Brazilian approach, is only explicable in the context of traditional aid relationships that have too often bypassed state institutions. Haitians’ evaluations, moreover, are related to their perceptions that the content of these projects addresses areas that have been previously neglected. Of course, these interactions are not wholly consistent, and divisions also appear on the Haitian side. In addition to the negative perceptions described above, Haitian civil servants described how projects were approved at a higher level within Haiti, and their technical input was not always fully incorporated (author’s interviews, 2015). One of these respondents suggested, for instance, that more attention needed to be paid to improving farmers’ marketing practices (ibid). Another IO representative suggested that there was a project under negotiation that the government was surprised to learn about, and that they had been struggling “to get something reasonably aligned with government needs” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

Techniques

The projects also rely on certain techniques, or ways of making things happen (Best, 2014). At least one of the techniques employed by Brazil as part of its strategy of constructing partnerships is highly discursive in nature: positioning itself in relation to traditional aid donors. In general, “Brazil portrays itself not as a donor but as a partner,
and then the government always says that both sides benefit, that both learn something. That’s very typical from a horizontal relation, something between peers, between partners” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). The contrast is made implicitly, and sometimes even explicitly, with the hierarchical relations that Brazilians portray as too often characterizing traditional aid. In comparison with a tendency to impose policy conditions, for instance, the Brazilian way is consistently described as “demand-driven” (diverse respondents including Brazilian and Haitian officials, civil society respondents, and IO and bilateral partners in author’s interviews, 2015). For example, one Brazilian described how, “we listen, we bring a lot of ideas, we participate together with the community in the definition of priorities” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). The emphasis was consistently placed on the demands of Haitians, and a willingness to contribute to the betterment of living conditions (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015). As one respondent recalled, summarizing ideas about cooperation as being both demand-driven and of mutual benefit: “I remember how rich the exchanges between technical teams [were], in Haiti for example, exchanges they had with local governments to see their demands, needs. It’s a two-way process: you learn as much as you teach” (former Brazilian bureaucrat quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). This difference is partly explained by proponents as a product of similarities between partners, which I return to in the following Chapter. In practice, the level of demand re-affirms these statements. A representative of one Brazilian ministry’s International Affairs Unit noted that they received several demands per day, and that ABC received dozens (in author’s interviews, 2015). Demands are also channelled through multilateral institutions. Brazilians expressed their inability to keep up with the
level of demand (various Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). Although such techniques are highly discursive, they also interact with concrete practices.

Processes of generating concept notes and memorandums of understanding are also important techniques adopted as part of the Brazilian process. While these are standard tools for development cooperation, the ways in which they are used are notable. As one of the main reasons stated for project delays – which are ubiquitous – the iterative conceptual process was viewed by Brazilians and Haitians alike as necessary for establishing partnerships; passing through multiple revisions, these documents are seen as ensuring that projects are sufficiently “owned” by Haitians, and that partners are in agreement. These specific tools exist in a more general context of open and constant dialogue, facilitated by a specific organizational structure. All projects are managed by regular meetings of a steering committee (Comité de pilotage), with the exact breakdown varying by project. In the case of the Institute, the project was overseen by three committee levels: technical; management; and executive coordination; with each having representatives from the involved parties (author’s interviews, 2015). According to one of these participants, this format allowed much flexibility in the implementation, and “we always tried to bring the most appropriate results together” (doctor quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Unlike traditional donors, he continued, Brazil is characterized by “permanent listening”, and is a constant participant in order to react to problems (ibid).

Brazil has also been reluctant to use monitoring or evaluation tools (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010). Although this absence is not relevant for these specific cases since partnering with an IO guarantees the use of established reporting techniques, the rationale
is nevertheless related to the iterative negotiation process. Brazilians, when asked about the limitations of not having a systematic monitoring and evaluation process, argued that projects must be successful because they are demand-driven (in author’s interviews, 2015). One of these officials further defended the approach, maintaining that, “we can develop or find new evaluation instruments, because our cooperation is interested more in processes than what makes results” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Interestingly, a Brazilian civil society organization otherwise highly critical of inconsistencies in Brazilian practices agreed, relating how they had turned down an international organization’s request to evaluate Brazilian cooperation because the same standards (the OECD-DAC’s aid effectiveness norms) are “not the best reference” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). These material and discursive techniques represent some of the unique ways in which Brazilian cooperation operates.

While I provide an initial evaluation of these projects in Chapter 7, unfortunately formal evaluations of the completed projects were not shared with me; the reason given was that, given respect for a partner’s sovereignty, both sides must agree to disclose. An access to information request in 2015 thus re-affirmed that “projects document are only divulged with the permission of the other involved government”.

Knowledge and ideas

The Brazilian approach is also driven by particular knowledge and ideas. As discussed above, ideas influencing Brazilian practice are also heavily shaped by those
found in South-South narratives more broadly, and by Brazil’s foreign policy principles, including respect for sovereignty. South-South discourse includes such emphases as: creating horizontal partnerships; deriving mutual benefit from these partnerships; and avoiding tying policy conditions to assistance (Quadir, 2013; Woods, 2008; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). As one example, one Brazilian official describes a “cooperation model between equal partners where donor institutions give their way to [instead become] partner institutions in a solidarity cooperation” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Another Brazilian confirmed: “Haiti asked for the cooperation…we are very careful to suggest to them activities…the project is the Haitians’, not ours” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation).

Similar to the discursive emphasis placed on positioning Brazilian cooperation as different from traditional aid, ideas about the significance of SSC typically include references to aid from countries part of the OECD. For example, one Brazilian argued that cooperation is conceived of based on the principle of horizontality: in contrast to the OECD, where relations are vertical and paternalistic, this cooperation occurs between equals (author’s interviews, 2015). Respondents were reluctant to be labeled “donors”, and this resistance was widespread. Cooperation is thus recognized as emerging in a context of dissatisfaction with traditional development cooperation, and, regardless as to whether cooperation is significant in “nominal terms”, it represents a “symbolic politics” (a bilateral donor representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). There was some resistance to whether Brazil achieves horizontality in practice. An emerging critique was that, like traditional donors, Brazil also relies on ready-made models, which I discuss in detail in the following Chapter (civil society representatives
and academics in author’s interviews, 2015). Others suggested that it involved a fundamental mischaracterization of traditional aid, ignoring efforts of other donors to implement principles of aid effectiveness, or that it is desirable to engage in cooperation without setting any restrictions as to the conditions it is delivered under (bilateral donor in author’s interviews, 2015).

Other respondents also discussed how Brazilian practice resonates with Brazil’s foreign policy principles, such as sovereignty and non-interference (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). For Brazil, ideas about emphasizing sovereignty as part of reforming global power relations help to position it as an “alternative country…it’s a strictly political position” (Brazilian civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). The separation of cooperation with economic interests was also repeatedly emphasized, and this was one area where diverse informants suggested Brazil was different from other Southern providers (Haitian and Brazilian officials, academics, and civil society representatives author’s interviews, 2015). According to the Brazilian embassy, “there is always a political interest, but we base very much the implementation of programs on technical knowledge…there are no immediate economic or commercial interests” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Likewise, again with an explicit reference to China, one Brazilian civil society representative described how Brazil’s cooperation is based on an economic model that focuses on income distribution and is attentive to the quality of democracy (in author’s interviews, 2015). Furthermore, he argued, “China looks to the African continent not as a partner, but as a provider of primary resources and products for the Chinese market. Brazil has no interests on the African continent” (quoted in ibid).
**Authority**

All of these practices can be enacted only when they have been authorized (Best, 2014). Where does the Brazilian government gain the authority to act? Moreover, is this authority accepted (ibid)? What Best (2014, p. 33) defines as moral authority – “the claim that a particular practice is correct because it serves the greater good” – is also relevant here. Brazil has presented its emphasis on South-South ties as a moral obligation because of the various shared links Brazil has with its partners, and since Brazil has something to offer given its domestic successes – this latter point is picked up in more detail in the following Chapter. As a demonstration of solidarity, Brazil thus simultaneously constructs its moral weight to intervene, and highlights the immoral practices of traditional donors, and sometimes even that of other Southern providers, who have intervened for other reasons – whether geopolitical, economic, etc. Brazil becomes, as one respondent put it, the “good neighbour” (Brazilian civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Much of this rationale has underpinned many of the comments outlined above, yet at times it was also apparent much more directly. For instance, referring to principles of mutual benefit and solidarity, a respondent noted, “like Lula said, “there isn’t a country so poor that it can’t give and there isn’t a country so rich that it can’t receive’” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). When asked how partners respond to Brazilian cooperation, one Brazilian official said simply that both sides are happy since Brazil is “just trying to help” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). While some did defend cooperation by arguing that countries can have various objectives in decisions to extend cooperation, including
economic ones, most did admit that there was a link between solidarity and political power. Noting the emphasis placed on solidarity, one Brazilian commentator added that “everyone knows that Brazilian cooperation is an instrument to help in the creation of ‘soft power’”, with support creating “positive sympathies”, but maintained this was an indirect benefit (quoted in author’s interviews; my translation). In Haiti specifically, the political links are assumed to relate to Brazil’s desire to project itself as a regional giant (various respondents in author’s interviews, 2015).

*Power*

It is not only authority but also power that permeates these practices. Conceptualizing power as productive, Best (2014, p. 34) describes how practices “enact a particular kind of productive power as they work to configure the world – its objects and actors – in particular ways”. By conceiving of power as productive, the emphasis becomes on how objects are more “plastic and mutable: power is a force that actively constitutes, reshapes, differentiates” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005 cited in Best, 2014, p. 34). Brazilian practices have fundamentally re-configured the Haitian context by including government partners in the carrying out of development activities. Brazilian practice, intentional or not, flips “failed” state representations on their head. Brazil’s strong relationship with relevant ministries re-affirms Haitian sovereignty as the state is positioned as an active participant in leading development efforts. Yet its practices are also based on recognition of this very authority. The ideas around Brazil’s shared similarities with other nations leads to Brazil viewing its partners, whether “fragile” or not, as “like us”. These representations have worked to sustain Brazil’s particular
development authority, for example as IO partners recognized Brazil’s close relationship with the Haitian state (in author’s interviews, 2015), but they also position partner governments on more horizontal terms. And since, as one respondent from the Ministry of Defence succinctly noted, Brazil’s foreign policy attitude of non-interference is a product of “Brazil always having had its autonomous capacity chosen by more powerful countries” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation), Brazil again presumes that upholding sovereignty affords the Haitian state the opportunity to choose its path.

This behaviour contrasts with that of many traditional donors who have channeled aid outside of the state in order to avoid exacerbating, for instance, perceived corruption (Buss with Gardner, 2007). As one civil society representative put it in the context of post-earthquake support: “There’s a sense the government collapsed. Which, I think, in fact, is both untrue and unfair” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Through such features as Brazil’s prioritization of its relations with government actors, and generally leaving implementation to its IO partners; long initial negotiation periods of projects; and the emphasis on ideas of horizontal, non-conditional relationships between government partners, practices of health and agricultural cooperation are about reconfiguring the Haitian sovereign as an active development partner. Brazil’s tacit understanding continues to be upheld even as results seem to conflict with the nature and level of existent capacity that is assumed, a point I return to.

36 Recognition of this shift, however, should not imply that Haitians have not resisted external encroachment of their authority. For instance, a former advisor to the government explained how the Haitian government would not necessarily blatantly resist an outsider’s prescriptions, particularly if advocated by a nation as powerful as the US, but that disagreements can arise more subtly as government actors balk against implementation (author’s interviews, 2015).
In interviews, the power dynamic was illuminated through questions that dealt with conflicts – where they have arisen, how they are resolved, etc. Power has not disappeared through these more equalized relations, but it has been re-worked. When pressed further to comment on the fact that disagreements, even if minor, must arise, Brazilian and Haitian respondents further assured me that they are resolved through negotiation and discussion, and that the prior identification of priorities before projects are started assures a common foundation (in author’s interviews, 2015). As one Haitian participant stated, “the way in which we work permits the avoidance of conflicts. When we are not in agreement…we dialogue in order to arrive at a consensus (we never take votes)” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Similarly, one Brazilian described it in this way: the Brazilian attitude (and many have criticized [us] for this) has been, in terms of international cooperation, that Brazil doesn’t interfere but defers to the self-determinant of governments, of peoples” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

Best’s (2014) analytical framework has illuminated key elements of Brazilian agricultural and health projects in Haiti. By breaking down their actors, techniques, dominant ideas and knowledge, as well as their authority and power, I have begun to reveal how what happens at the micro-scale has much to tell us about why cooperation is pursued. Choices like who to partner with, or what technical documents are used (and in what way), demonstrate what these mean at a more macro-level for power relations. Post-colonial insights have also been employed to go beyond Best’s (2014) conception in order to stress where certain features of practices emerged from, and why strategies of partnership are meaningful, looking to their basis in identities that challenge traditional aid patterns. Moreover, looking to post-colonial practices is a way to consider the
potential of cooperation, where cooperation is viewed as an alternative coming from the South that brings to bear different conceptions of development problematics and international relations. Cultivating partnerships presents certain risks, such as exacerbating any corruption, but it also has the potential to lead to small, yet transformative changes to bureaucratic capacity. In the remaining section, I discuss the outcomes of this strategy in more depth, arguing that these projects are an important vehicle through which Brazil constructs a very particular regional and global image: as an emerging power with a moral authority that derives its power from its interactions with developing country states. As well, I discuss in more detail how Haitian state authority has been extended through these practices.

5.5 Building Partnerships

Brazil’s strategy of building partnerships arose in a context where ownership had been defined as a key problematic for development cooperation more broadly, as well as in Haiti. This problematic was widely agreed upon, yet as I have argued, Brazil adopted a specific approach to addressing it, informed by its experiences as a recipient of aid, as well as its more unique foreign policy objectives. Turning to the case studies, I then examined how this strategy worked at a concrete level. Before discussing in more detail what the implications are for Haiti and Brazil however, I want to stress how this strategy compares at a broad level with the idea of “ownership” that has come to characterize Western approaches to aid in recent years.

In many ways, strategies of promoting ownership and building partnerships seem similar. Both arising from the problematic of hierarchical relationships between donors
and recipients, to varying degrees they have attempted to equalize aid processes so that recipient developing countries also determine their priorities, and hence generate a greater possibility of long-term development transformations. Similarly, in interviews, some did argue that SSC is invoking Paris Principles like the promotion of ownership in stressing partnership, horizontality, and so on, while others were more adamant that they are not the same, even if, as one respondent expressed, Brazil is better at articulating what it is against than what it is for: “why are we defined by exclusion? Non-DAC countries, that’s not enough. It doesn’t say much about what we do, or what we want to do” (Brazilian civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Yet, even without entering into debates as to how well ownership works in practice, the ultimate goals are distinguishable.

Ownership is premised on achieving greater results because governments, as representative of their societies, are engaged in the process. As the discussion of the factors of Brazilian practice have hinted at, the focus of the Brazilian strategy instead does not need to extend beyond government since the goal is more about equalizing international relations; development becomes something of an afterthought as there is a presumption that developing countries who are not being interfered with will act according to the interests of their societies. This does not mean that development considerations become unimportant, or even less important than they are accorded through ownership efforts. Rather, assumptions about how development unfolds are ultimately related to a difference as to where traditional donors versus Southern providers locate the problem of ownership. For the latter, taking away the interference of geopolitically motivated great powers leaves space for already democratic,
developmentally-oriented states to be able to act on their ambitions. In other words, this is entirely consistent with the neo-structuralist vision orientating Brazilian foreign policy (Burges, 2017), but also problematic when it leaves Brazilians in a position where they are unable to anticipate when state actors are not democratic or concerned with development. Ownership, rooted in good governance agendas, is instead based on liberal premises of representation and active civil society, and involves making sure that the right conditions – those that encourage responsible governance - are fostered. One criticism of the good governance agenda helps to illuminate this contrast in more detail. As Abrahamsen (2001) has argued, the Western good governance discourse emphasizes internal factors as central to democratization, which eliminates considerations as to how democracy works in global terms. This contrast will be important when discussing the limitations of the Brazilian approach, a task I return to in Chapter 7, but it is also significant for understanding the more macro-level implications of building partnerships for Haiti and for Brazil, and especially why what are such relatively small initiatives have significant, and even global effects.

For Haiti, partnerships with Brazil extend state authority in ways that resound beyond these specific projects. I begin with the strategy’s effects on Haiti since the political ramifications of partnerships for Brazil simply are not explicable without examining how Haiti generally welcomes Brazilian support. First, bringing the previous discussion together, the Brazilian approach has depended on the establishment of working relationships with the Haitian government, from more technical to decision-making levels. Haitians consistently expressed how their priorities were integrated into development projects, and that input continued over the length of the project as focus was
placed on dialogue and constant communication. As one respondent described it: “the Brazilian approach doesn’t impose anything, it brings the project that the government wanted. And also what addresses the misery of the population” (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015). For example, the Institute was described as a “dream”, an opportunity that had not existed before and that responded to a problem that was particularly acute post-earthquake (Haitian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Several government respondents in one Haitian ministry discussed Brazil’s efforts to dialogue with the government, but debated among themselves as to whether it was better for Brazil to remain flexible, or to adopt a more strategic plan for its support (in author’s interviews, 2015).

Importantly, the stress placed on dialogue was maintained even under difficult conditions. In general, Brazilian officials were willing to persist in forging these relationships despite encountering challenges. In one lengthy interview, an informant described the constant, multiple obstacles thrown-up by Haitian counterparts, and noted how in the end Brazil’s initial proposals around certain project features were eventually supported but only after much time and money was wasted (author’s interviews, 2015). Regardless, his position was that this was a normal outcome of building relationships, which should be understood as a process. “In the beginning we had difficulties”, he concluded, “and now we can’t work without each other” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). This approach contrasts sharply with many Western aid practices that seem dominated by short-term planning and results-based management. Another Brazilian respondent likewise described how negotiations take time but once decisions are made, “they stick” (in author’s interviews, 2015). Similarly, discussing the breakdown of the
dam project and the eventual re-allocation of reconstruction money, the Brazilian official expressed how there had been a certain disappointment that the decision to instead have the Chinese build the dam was not taken transparently – not that it was taken, but that the Haitian government had not alerted them in advance (in author’s interviews, 2015). The Brazilian government’s expectation was thus that partnership should always involve openness, even in more conflictual circumstances.

For society broadly, as the contrast between ownership and building partnerships would lead us to expect, decisions about who to consult are left up to the Haitian government. Multiple respondents thus explained, when asked about the role of either civil society or the private sector in SSC, that it depended on the government to choose who they wanted to participate (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). While Brazilian officials clearly indicated a rationale for the exclusion of private sector actors, where they discussed potential conflicts of interest between profit-making and more altruistic objectives, the explanation for avoiding civil society participation was much more vague: “the Brazilian government is very cautious of integrating civil society into development politics…it reflects on how we also try to provide our cooperation”, one respondent noted (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Nevertheless, concerning the involvement of civil society specifically in the partner country, a Brazilian respondent attributed the choice to Brazil’s prioritization of sovereignty, whereby Brazil cannot make demands on another government (in author’s interviews, 2015). It is interesting to note that in the one truly bilateral project, the Institute for Rehabilitation, although civil society groups did participate in articulating their needs, it was only those projects
involving IO partners where their participation was mandated in the project document (according to IO and Brazilian representatives in author’s interviews, 2015).

The wider significance of this engagement is apparent in the contrast it presents with the interventions of many traditional donors. While this context was raised in the earlier discussion of how health and agricultural supports have bypassed the Haitian state, the contrast was also continuously raised by respondents. For example, numerous respondents described how Brazil’s efforts to closely coordinate with the government were uncommon, and that Brazil was also more successful than others in doing so (Haitian officials, IO representatives and other bilateral partners in author’s interviews, 2015). They similarly emphasized how the importance placed on dialogue led to a flexibility that was equally rare. “Normally”, one respondent argued, “there are external people that prepare [the project] and then leave after. Here everyone stays. Problems that arise are dealt with, and normally it would instead be: look at the project document” (doctor quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation)!

The strategy of building partnerships has had political implications for Haiti. The argument that SSC, regardless of its controversies, is inherently positive in that it provides options for developing countries (see Manning, 2006; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011) holds some weight. Yet it would be a mistake to regard Haiti’s relationship with Brazil as representing only a change in Haiti’s decision-making space because of the existence of competing options, regardless of what the options involve, and disregard how the substantive content differs. Brazil’s approach has not been perfect, but its emphasis on partnership has been widely perceived as creating dialogue that allows space for Haitians to articulate their needs and for projects to adjust to changes over time, both
in terms of these needs and as goals interact with reality. Very concretely, the Haitian government is able to pursue some of its domestic preferences without interference and with active support, and this is a considerable achievement given previous and continuing practices of treating Haitian authority as absent. For Haiti, this translates into recognition as a legitimate source of authority over its territory, and perhaps even one with some power in global relations given it is a friend of Brazil’s. However, as I discuss in the next two Chapters, working directly with the government does not seem likely to translate into longer-term capacity building, as the content of projects has been based on a drastic misjudging of the current situation and needs.

For Brazil, the practice of building partnerships also furthers wider political aims of attaining greater regional and global power, and it does this by presenting the country as a sought-after global power. Cooperation is a way of establishing that Brazil exercises considerable power in the region, and in that respect is similar to its leadership of MINUSTAH. As observers have argued, cooperation is part of broader foreign policy efforts in Haiti which are geared at the objectives of: to attain leadership on the UN Security Council by building its regional and global power; to “flex” its existent power – and also to demonstrate the diminution of US power, a “symbol of their new, not-so-new, assurance of a regional power and regional giant”; and to test principles around peacekeeping (Morais & Saad Filho, 2011; Bracey, 2011; Kenkel, 2010; former advisor to Haitian government quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Unlike MINUSTAH, cooperation is a vehicle for Brazil to exercise a “softer” side of leadership as development contributions mean that you “become an important partner for that country, and you contribute to improving your image in that country” (Brazilian official quoted in
author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Nevertheless, the discursive emphasis on how such political effects are not the purpose of cooperation but rather an unintended outcome also helps Brazil to create “soft power”, especially as an altruistic country. Brazil simply is not instrumentalizing its cooperation in the way that traditional donors have historically. The political value of cooperation is thus that it represents one facet – and the more palatable side - of Brazil’s vision of leading regional integration. Moreover, the praise that is leveled at Brazil in terms of its flexibility and responsiveness helps Brazil to position itself as a global power with moral authority. These partnerships also have tremendous symbolic value. As one respondent sees it: “it’s not the North or the West, it’s our brothers and sisters” (former advisor to the Haitian government quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Again, it is not only what Brazil comes to represent through these partnerships, but also how it is able to distinguish itself from traditional practices.

The achievement of this influence through cooperation and other foreign policy vehicles has discernible ramifications. While there is some degree to which relationships shift with different political administrations – one respondent argued that Martelly had been slightly wary of Brazil given that it is perceived as so powerful (academic in author’s interviews, 2015), the depth of government relationships was consistently remarked upon. In addition to the comment given to a neutral research body by Haitian ministries that Brazil was a “model donor” (in response to an open question as to who could be best described as a model donor in the Haitian context), others consistently expressed similar sentiments. One IO respondent also suggested, for instance, that part of their rationale for collaborating with Brazil was due to its “strong relationship” with the ministry (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). As part of cooperation projects, Brazilian
officials described how there was a huge amount of dedication from government, which speaks to how positively Brazil is perceived (author’s interviews, 2015). While some respondents expressed doubts that Brazil could influence Haiti as the “good partner”, others argued that the respectful dynamic created leads to a context where Haitians accept criticisms that they would otherwise not (Brazilian officials and IO representatives quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Brazil’s ultimate weight is also determined by the responses it generates from other countries, especially where they are also considered key influencers. For example, the sentiment expressed by IOs and other bilateral partners that Brazil had a close relationship with the Haitian state (in author’s interviews, 2015) reflects a broader recognition of Brazil’s “soft power”. The high level of requests that Brazil receives for cooperation does not only stem from potential bilateral developing country partners, but also are generated by traditional development players. Reasons expressed for undertaking trilateral projects with Brazil included Brazil’s perceived legitimacy with other developing countries (IO representatives and bilateral donors in author’s interviews, 2015). Brazil also forms part of the “Core Group”. Beyond Haiti, others pointed to the election of Brazilians to major global roles, such as FAO, as evidence that Brazil was generating a strong political reputation (Brazilian official and civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015).

Significantly, the achievement of this political power has helped to mitigate and neutralize downsides of the projects, and of Brazil’s broader presence in the country, specifically leadership of MINUSTAH. Haitian respondents were not oblivious to the various instrumental rationales that would encourage Brazil to extend cooperation, but they consistently expressed their belief that solidarity was a significant element.
“Diplomacy, South-South solidarity”, one Haitian argued, “[Brazil] had major challenges itself, but also overcame them, and it’s an emerging economy. It is willing to share with others” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). A Haitian doctor, referring specifically to the Institute for Rehabilitation, gave an example where Brazil’s more instrumental motivations for cooperation – which he also argued were legitimate – simply could not explain its practices. Training, he said, is one case where Brazil “does not only work on the visible side”, but also works in the background to ensure development can occur since, according to him, such capacity-building will position the Institute to have a greater chance of being sustainable over the longer term (ibid). Moreover, the solidarity element seems to generate a greater capacity to overlook the limitations of Brazilian cooperation. Similar to the accounting conflict described above, interviewees that discussed Brazilian willingness to cooperate would also bring up their limitations – and then excuse them. For instance, another Haitian also suggested that the Brazilians needed to account for maintenance costs for the Institute, but then, when asked how relations had changed between Brazil and Haiti, generally described a “good relationship”, with the hope that cooperation would continue, while also acknowledging that Brazilians still face problems of their own (author’s interviews, 2015).

For those who contextualized Brazilian development and humanitarian support in terms of Brazil’s broader involvement in Haiti, especially MINUSTAH, their consideration of the effects of the relationship between the two foreign policy efforts was more mixed. Some expressed the sentiment that cooperation provided a compensatory function for Brazil’s role in MINUSTAH. “When you are a foreign army”, a Haitian explained to me,
You need to work on your image, and having a cooperation programs helps the image of Brazil, and also guarantees the MINUSTAH soldiers are free to do their business without ill-will…[if cooperation continues after MINUSTAH leaves] then I’m mistaken. I am attributing evil motives to a generous, altruistic attitude (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

Some were critical that such positive initiatives received so little financial support while money is available for the Mission (author’s initiatives, 2015). Even for those who thought that Brazil has not been proactive enough in its developmental efforts however, there was still a sentiment expressed that Brazil holds a powerful symbolic relationship with Haiti (ibid). Moreover, these interviewees lamented that cooperation had not been awarded more attention from the government given that it was generating positive results in terms of development (ibid).

5.6 Conclusion

Strategies of building partnerships with their government partners have been a defining feature of Brazilian development and humanitarian cooperation. In this Chapter, I explored how Brazil adopted a very specific understanding of the ownership problematic, which was defined as a significant limitation of traditional aid from all corners. As part of this understanding, Brazil’s eventual extension of development and humanitarian cooperation came to rest on building partnerships as one of its fundamental features. Using case studies of projects in health and agriculture, I discussed the concrete ways in which this strategy unfolds, including the material techniques Brazil promotes, and the dominant ideas found in South-South discourse that it relates to. While Best’s framework has offered considerable explanatory power, her approach remains rooted in experiences and perspectives of the Global North. The analysis in this dissertation has
also reflected post-colonial considerations that give due credit to the influence of
Southern knowledges and the role of common experiences in shaping how cooperation is
practiced and received. A post-colonial framing is a way to understand why respect for
sovereignty is so critical to processes of cooperation, and to appreciate the alternative
practices around ownership put forth by Brazil. While this discussion relied on
elaborating some of the minutiae of projects, the Chapter also argued that these have had
implications for both of the involved partners that extend far beyond these individual
efforts. In particular, Brazil’s acceptance of Haitian authority, particularly given the
constant examples of external actors obstructing the Haitian state in various ways, is
connected to how Brazil is able to project its global weight. Brazil’s heightened power
has an important moral element that cooperation uniquely supports. In order to set the
stage for the discussions of Brazilian strategies, the Chapter also began with an
introduction to the case studies, as well as to histories of agricultural and health-related
development projects in Haiti.

The next Chapter undertakes a similar approach in order to discuss another of
Brazil’s strategies: designing appropriate interventions. While the current Chapter has
provided a portrait of what are essentially the terms of engagement, this strategy is more
about the content of these partnerships. Arguments that Brazil offers a more
“appropriate” form of development intervention represented the next step of Brazil’s
development cooperation. Once partnership became the answer to the ownership
problematic, the next question became: what does greater capacity for a partner
resemble? By defining ideas of appropriate intervention according to Brazilian
experiences, experiences that were assumed to be relevant given perceived similarities
between the countries, Brazil has molded cooperation to build capacity in certain areas, and in very specific ways.

6 Chapter: Designing Appropriate Intervention: Positioning Brazil as a Unique Development Expert
Brazilian SSC has been appealing to Haitian officials insofar as they have deliberately sought to work with their government partners. However, while this strategy has some implications for the content of development projects and initiatives, most of this is indirect and procedural – such as the assumption that cooperation will be demand-driven. The question as to what the implementation of programmes, especially those resembling Brazilian social policies, concretely means for development processes, and how their approach has likewise been perceived, remains. Implicit in this question is another: is the Brazilian approach any more successful in offering effective and appropriate solutions to development problems? Some initial quotations from other bilateral donors and IO partners provide some hints as to how Brazilian models have been evaluated. According to one bilateral representative who frequently works in trilateral arrangements with Brazil: “a lot of times, Brazil has cultural affinity of the same degree of development [with its partners]. At the same time, it has succeeded in overcoming some of the challenges that these countries are trying to overcome. So, that facilitates a lot” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Another IO representative added that, “certain technologies developed in Brazil” are more “appropriate for the region” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Similarly, one IO described how they were “thankful for Brazil’s support to look at [the problem] from a different angle” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). These quotations stress issues of cultural and other affinities, and how the proffered solutions are seen as particularly relevant, as well as backed by a successful record.

As discussed in the previous Chapter, Brazilian SSC arose in a context of widespread discontent with how traditional aid has functioned. In the previous Chapter, I
outlined one limitation – lack of ownership – and how Brazil’s particular understanding of this failing led to its emphasis on building partnerships. In this Chapter, I also identify another criticism that has been leveled at the aid regime: namely, implementing one-size-fits-all policies. Again however, the strategy that Brazil adopted through its own cooperation to remedy the identified problem has been specific. Here I will argue that Brazil’s solution has been one of designing appropriate intervention. This strategy involves attempts to find more contextually-appropriate solutions, which have been modeled on alternatives that it explored as a country domestically as part of its post-neoliberal turn. While proposed projects and programs are ultimately a challenge to neoliberal prescriptions, they also can be read as part of a broader valuation of Southern knowledges around how development is realized. In contrast to the previous Chapter and its focus on processes of cooperation then, this Chapter instead delves into the content of cooperation: how and why it has taken the form it has, and to what end (where there are overlaps with the extension of Haitian authority and Brazilian power as argued in Chapter 5).

The Chapter again breaks down the strategy of designing appropriate interventions according to various factors that are visible in the case study projects. I argue that the defining features of this strategy are the discursive championing of Brazil’s domestic successes and of its parallels with the Haitian context – whether cultural, historical, etc. The strategy has also rested on broad, “post-neoliberal” ideas about the desirability of an interventionist state, and, anchoring these broad notions, more specific policy proposals experimented with in Brazil. Similar to the previous Chapter, I demonstrate how this strategy has worked to cement Brazilian moral authority and global
weight by explaining its implications for other partners. However, rather than focusing on the effects on its more obvious bilateral partner, Haiti, I instead examine traditional development actors in the Haitian context, and how the strategy works to discredit, or at least limit, the contributions of their practices. To begin, I define the problem of universal solutions in international development cooperation before discussing how Brazil’s strategy works, and to what effect.

6.1 The Problem of Universal Solutions

The traditional aid regime has been consistently faulted for its universalist assumptions. These criticisms do, however, take different forms in that they are directed toward development at very different levels. First, what amounts to a “post-development” critique has expressed concerns with the inherent universalism of development, taking issue more with the enterprise writ large than with details of given projects. In Escobar’s (1995) book on development discourse as a regime of truth for instance, he argues that, “development is a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action” (p. 10). For him, this involves treating subjects in the abstract, and intervention is recast as a technical rather than political endeavor as places become areas of either “more” or “less” developed (Escobar, 1995). As Porter (1995) similarly describes, development has been approached as something that is not context-dependent, but rather that its basic requirements applied anywhere. Ferguson’s (1990) critique of the development enterprise in Lesotho argued that although these interventions may fail in terms of what they set out to do, since they are blind to individual circumstances, they nevertheless produce a number of effects. Authors writing in this vein have stressed the
role of the development expert in this process, who, like the problem itself, is constructed as the impartial subject able to diagnose and rectify problems of development using common reference points (see Rojas, 2014; Löwenheim, 2008). Similar to ownership, problems of conceiving of development in this way include that alternative voices are silenced (Crush, 1995), and that political questions are essentially closed off, even as they generate political challenges and resistance that they ultimately cannot contain (Li, 2007).

In all of these ways, development is symptomatic of modern coloniality more broadly, whereby rationality positions knowledge as a relation between an individual and an object, silencing alternative ways of knowing (Quijano, 2007).

Critiques of universalism have also been applied to more specific programmes. SAPs, which were critiqued for not allowing recipient governments sufficient space for defining their own priorities and needs, were similarly described as pushing what were effectively “blueprints”. These orthodox, neoliberal policy prescriptions were those enshrined in the Washington Consensus, such as liberalization and deregulation, and were applied irrespective of context. That is not to say, however, that these policies mimicked the liberal policies undertaken by their promoters; instead, critics pointed to how policies, such as deregulation, would in fact “deprive developing countries of instruments used by rich countries both in the past and currently, to manage their economies” (Culpeper, De Masellis & Emelifeonwu, 2003, p. 8). With the emergence of PRSPs, those who argued that they did not represent a fundamental departure from SAPs suggested that they remained wedded to the Washington Consensus (Weber, 2004). Examples from reforms in Haiti illustrate these tendencies. For instance, discussing export-processing zones (EPZs), which were promoted in Haiti as part of a general push
for export-based trade models, Shamsie notes (2006, p. 38) how they failed to recognize that not only is Haiti the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, but also that “poverty is deeper and more pervasive than in the rest of Latin America”. As a result, a focus on exports did not address the concentration of poverty in rural areas (Shamsie, 2006).

Similar to the ownership problem, explanations for why this was a problem were generally not unified37. On the one hand, the historical record challenged the premise that these policies would translate into development, with critics arguing that the link to development needed to be better investigated; this would include, for example, considering how the quality of trade impacts development, and not expecting changes in volume to simply create growth – or at least growth with a “pro-poor” focus (Culpeper et al., 2003). Beyond the recognition that development was not being realized as theorized, there was a diversity of beliefs as to how it should instead be conceived. For instance, while recognition of the gaps between neoliberal policies and development led many to critique the content of the policies themselves, for others what mattered were the conditions in which policy implementation takes place. Regarding the latter, the good governance agenda thus stressed getting the conditions right for aid to succeed (Carbone, 2010). With reference to Haiti, Buss (with Gardner, 2007) outlines how different bilateral donors acknowledged their failures to recognize the particularities of Haitian governance. A report from Canada’s development agency, for example, describes “‘a society profoundly divided between a traditional culture and an elite, ex-military, and petite-bourgeoisie class, each seeking or clinging to power’” (quoted in Buss with Gardner,

37 More sophisticated variants of dependency theory (see Cardoso & Faletto, 1979) did successfully merge internal and global dynamics in their understanding of dependent development.
2007, p. 86). Other diagnoses in general stressed that developing countries faced special circumstances, and needed the flexibility to determine what policies best suited their environment (Culpeper et al., 2003), therefore establishing an important link to concerns raised around ownership.

For Brazil, the solution was not limited to the conditions of aid delivery. Process was certainly an element, with general resistance from developing countries to universal policy prescriptions for the simple reason that they had erased state authority through the imposition of donor preferences. These countries have also expressed their outrage at the hypocrisy of donors whereby they have been exempt from full adherence to the policies they are advocating; resistance at the WTO to agricultural trade policy is a notable example, with Brazil pushing for liberal policies to be fulfilled - not for differential treatment (Burges, 2007). Nevertheless, and why Brazil’s response to this problematic takes the distinct form that it does alongside other Southern development providers, Brazil’s particular take is also that many of these policies are simply ill-conceived. With the advent of the PT in power, foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter 3, also took a post-neoliberal turn. This turn involves the promotion of state-led economic development, and Brazil’s desire to lead on issues related to resolving poverty and inequality, which are critically related to globalization trends (Montero, 2014; Almeida, 2004). As with domestic policy, the approach can be highly contradictory, and this explains how the WTO example – effectively a push towards further liberalization - exists alongside calls for a more equitable world order.

6.2 Factors of Appropriate Intervention
By elaborating the factors that have been involved in Brazil’s strategy of designing appropriate interventions, this section will demonstrate at a functional level how this strategy has worked, referencing the four case studies introduced in the previous Chapter. I show concretely how Brazil attempted to resolve the problem of universal policy prescriptions. These factors are summarized in the following table.

**Table 7 Factors of Strategy 2: Designing Appropriate Interventions**

<table>
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<th>Actors (by project)</th>
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Actors

Since the case studies used to illustrate both strategies are the same, the actors involved also remain the same. However, before turning to the techniques involved in attempting to design more “appropriate” interventions, I will discuss the relations between these actors insofar as they work to constitute the actors: who they are, how they are positioned to act. While the role of IOs was fundamental to allowing Brazil to remain somewhat isolated from the messiness of development while strengthening its relations with government partners, IOs also remain crucial in helping to construct Brazil’s specific expert authority.

As I will return to below, Brazil has been able to establish its authority as a legitimate development partner by referencing its own successes in alleviating domestic poverty and inequality. As with its strategy of building partnerships, the connections between the actors involved in these projects have been an instrumental part of how this authority is constructed and legitimized. As noted in Chapter 5, demands from bilateral partners for Brazilian support can be channelled through various institutions, including multilateral forums. IOs and other bilateral agencies have also invited Brazil to participate in projects with them. When asked why their development cooperation agency was interested in working with Brazil, IOs and bilateral partners made statements, as the
introduction of the Chapter summarized, around Brazil’s relevance and its expertise from having overcome many issues. As one bilateral actor described the country, Brazil is unique as it is “multi-racial, continental, tropical”, and has made a “huge transition from recipient to partner” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Repeatedly, the reason expressed by other partners for working with Brazil – and inversely, Brazil’s reason for also wanting to cooperate with these other partners – was the range of experiences that the countries possessed, whereby working together “permits the aggregation of different competencies and resources to reach common objectives” (as expressed by an IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Brazilian ministries described receiving demands and interest from IOs and other bilateral partners regularly, and one cited a UN report where 80% of the demands resident coordinators received had asked for their development projects to be supported by developing countries (in author’s interviews, 2015). As I discuss below, the balancing of expertise from developed and developing country partners has a number of consequences for how authority and power relations are established. While these arrangements have certainly helped to sustain the relevancy of more traditional players, for Brazil these interactions also support the achievement of truly global power.

Techniques

The construction of Brazil’s appropriateness by Brazilians, but also by IOs and other development actors, is a technique that has been remarked upon as a general feature of Brazilian practice (see for example Carmody, 2013; Wolford & Nehring, 2015; World Bank & Ipea, 2011). Wolford and Nehring (2015) capture this with the notion of
“parallels”, where similarities, ranging from ecological, to cultural and historical, are used to justify cooperation. In interviews, respondents cited a number of affinities between Brazil and its partner nations: culture, language, shared colonial experience, climatic and socioeconomic conditions, and religious and ethnic diversity (diverse informants in author’s interviews, 2015). Referencing ProSavannah for instance, which tries to replicate the Brazilian experience of ProCerrado in Mozambique, it was not uncommon to hear how the Brazilian cerrado is “exactly equal to the African savannah” (Brazilian research technician quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation), leading to such claims as “it’s more natural that an African country ask for tropical agricultural cooperation from Brazil than Canada” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). These affinities also interact in important ways. Because Brazil shares these traits with other nations, but simultaneously differs from them in that they have been able to overcome many of its own challenges domestically, the country is seen as a singular authority on development cooperation (author’s interviews, 2015). As one interviewee expressed, “it’s easier for Brazil to relate, to understand the dynamic of the other. It makes cooperation between partners possible” (Brazilian civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Indeed, Brazil’s partnership strategy would not be so easily facilitated without the perceived existence of these parallels. Beyond the sheer attractiveness that Brazil possesses since it was able to overcome similar challenges and can therefore offer sound advice, Brazil is seen as someone “like us”. Notions that they have also experienced colonial subjugation – or, in Mignolo’s (2000) formulation, the “colonial difference” - and that they are now providing cooperation out of solidarity paint Brazil as
a helpful friend, serving to equalize relations, and ultimately positioning Brazil to benefit politically from the political capital this generates.

Undoubtedly, the drawing of these similarities can occasionally be an obstacle to development. The Brazilians seemed unprepared for some of the cultural and linguistic obstacles that they would encounter in Haiti. A Brazilian authority, openly frustrated, described work in that country as “the most difficult of my life”, attributing this to a question of culture and language (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Others recognized that development challenges that seemed similar could be very different in the details. Reflecting on his experiences in Mozambique, one Brazilian working in a state-owned research institute recounted the various ways in which they realized the unique challenges of the conditions once they had begun their work, such as where land was of better quality than in Brazil but with a higher concentration of people (in author’s interviews, 2015). His conclusion, also re-iterated by others, was that there was a greater need to study particular circumstances in-depth before beginning new endeavours. However, the technique of underlining parallels has also been instrumental in establishing Brazilian authority, a point I return to. Brazil has also been able to avoid consequences of the incongruence between discourse and action on this point because of the very idea of ‘emergence’, where Brazil is accepted as having been successful but still facing challenges. Similar to how perceived solidaristic motivations help to lessen any limitations of cooperation, notions of being in the process of emergence helped to excuse Brazilian mistakes; the expectation is not thatBrazil will get it right the first time. Brazil is thus described as “an adolescent that hasn’t yet reached adulthood” (Brazilian civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation).
The construction of Brazilian parallels has impacted the material form in which cooperation is delivered. Although humanitarian cooperation usually involves financial resources, the emphasis of technical cooperation on exchanging resources rather than financial transfers is a deliberate one. As one representative of ABC explained, “it’s a principle of our cooperation to not transfer resources (and we don’t have money!). We prefer to transfer capacity” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). In general, these technicians are those who “take on the role in real life, in the same area in Brazil, and have a job, a ‘full-time job’” (ibid). Thus, the reliance on domestic bureaucrats to provide their expertise to global development projects in addition to fulfilling their regular responsibilities is premised on the notion that a cadre of development professionals is unnecessary; having faced, and continuing to face similar challenges under comparable circumstances, these individuals are expected to be able to transfer their expertise to another context. The transfer can take the form of training, or often it is simply oversight of projects that model Brazilian experiences. Of course, this has led to recognized pitfalls, such as those mentioned above where technicians may not possess linguistic fluency. On a more serious level, technicians apply remarkably similar projects to those attempted at home without accounting for variations, with such likely consequences as Haitians’ concern that Brazilians had not fully accounted for the resource challenges faced by the public system (Haitian bureaucrat and medical doctor in author’s interviews, 2015). A Brazilian IO partner, while still acknowledging how useful Brazil’s way-of-thinking has been, also argued that it could be a “two-edged sword”, where Brazil might not consider other valuable strategies (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). The relative balance between technical and humanitarian cooperation is, as
mentioned, unique in the Haitian context. Nevertheless, regardless of who is implementing – whether Brazilian civil servants or IOs alongside Haitian partners - the content of these projects does not stray far from Brazilian experiences.

Knowledge and ideas

The ideas influencing the strategy of designing appropriate interventions have both domestic and more global roots. Domestically, dominant ideas involve notions about what the state can do to promote successful development as learned by Brazil in its recent experiences combating poverty and inequality, many of which resemble what Ferguson (2009, p. 174) describes as appropriating neoliberal “moves” for progressive purposes. Also referred to as its “social technology” (White, 2010), Brazil’s experiences are largely attributable to the advent of the PT government, which was broadly defined by a more interventionist state, and enabled by favourable economic conditions (Burges, 2017; civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015). Ideas forming cooperation practices thus implicate a certain form of development as practiced under PT administrations, and associate the Brazilian model unequivocally with success.

Regarding links with domestic policies, examples abound of where cooperation is modeled on domestic policies, from the anti-retroviral factory supported in Mozambique, which follows from Brazil’s commitment to domestic generic drug production, to agricultural public purchase programs that link agricultural production to guaranteed purchase (various informants, including Brazilian officials and civil society representatives in author’s interviews, 2015). While respondents maintained that they are not replicas, not “copied in another place, since there isn’t another place in the world with
an exact system” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation), again and again the projects implemented seem to have more in common than where they differ. Moreover, projects at least start from the assumption that the Brazilian experience will be relevant, even if they may be eventually modified with time as part of the dialogue process discussed in the last Chapter. For instance, the respondent working for the research institute only noted differences in the quality of land once the project was underway (in author’s interviews, 2015). The case study school feeding pilot, for example, is based on Brazil’s Alimentação Escolar (School Feeding) program, which connects local purchase systems to feeding programs in schools. As one Brazilian quipped, “it’s easy in the sense that the recipe is there” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). The reliance on these ready-made formulas provides some important caveats to the notion of cooperation being demand-driven, although their defenders claim that Brazil is sought out because of its successful programs (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015), a point I return to below. The approach is similarly difficult to reconcile with claims rooted in the principle of horizontality: or how “we also try to know a bit about their policies, their programs to make sure we can take advantage of something that might be useful to the Brazilian reality” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). I found no evidence of Brazilians being inspired by their partners’ efforts (in author’s interviews, 2015).

Beyond the argument that the Brazilian approach may be more relevant, the notion that these policies have been extremely successful is consistently drawn, and instrumental in defining Brazilian practice. Specific projects and programmes undertaken in Brazil are used as models for cooperation abroad as part of an “externalization of” best
practices’” (representative of Brazilian research institute quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). As one academic argued, “they have been successful, they’ve been undeniably successful; more than 44 million people no longer live in abject poverty” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Similarly, a researcher described Brazil as a model for the world in terms of reducing poverty and inequality through its domestic policies (in author’s interviews, 2015). The idea that Brazil’s domestic social policies are exemplary anchors – whether explicitly or not - its proficiency to provide cooperation. As discussed above, the championing of Brazil has come from diverse corners, including from other bilateral partners and from IOs. Importantly, especially for how Brazil has constructed its authority to intervene, Haitians have also spoken about the country’s contribution in similar terms. According to one respondent, Brazil is an important leader on issues of inclusion and disability, so it is well-positioned to share its know-how and experiences with Haitians (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015). Another Haitian official, in the context of the seed project, explained to me how Brazil has two agricultural ministries, one of which works to support family and small-scale agriculture. Because this focus is a part of Brazil’s philosophy, he saw cooperation as also offering this advantage: “if you already have this culture of working with small farmers, then you are open to programs that help [them]” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

Of course, these domestic policies are not as flawless as they have been presented as. More critical reactions, mainly in reference to ProSavannah, described the “contradictions” of exporting Brazilian social policies, especially where extractive models are pushed alongside efforts to protect small-scale farming, and how this dual model also exists at home (civil society respondent quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).
Likewise, referring to health, an academic noted how health is considered a success story, but that this has ignored many of the problems plaguing the system domestically; in practice, “it’s not totally universal; who uses this system?” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation).

That the content of these policies was strongly influenced by Brazilian practice was often unquestioned by respondents, or at the very least in a limited way. In contrast, most often this influence formed part of the reason why they were warmly received (author’s interviews, 2015). The issue of who is involved in cooperation, however, and how this compares with participants in the design and implementation of domestic policy, was a more contentious issue. Referencing the Haitian context specifically, and Brazilian involvement in broad terms (MINUSTAH), one expert argued that there has been a repetition of the domestic approach as the military carries over its dual involvement in development and security abroad. According to him, “in the military mind, these two things [development and security] are extremely intimately related, because the armed forces do development. They’re the ones that built the schools, the telephone lines, the highways, everything in the Amazon” (academic quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). In comparison, Brazilian civil society respondents felt that their role had been rejected, a contrast to the domestic scenario where groups were instrumental in pushing for and implementing public policies (in author’s interviews, 2015). Brazilian civil society representatives were thus critical of their exclusion from cooperation (author’s interviews, 2015). However, it was also acknowledged that the position of ministries on the participation of civil society varies considerably, with the ministry responsible for humanitarian cooperation (CGFome) much more open to involvement than was ABC
(civil society respondent and Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015). In the context of the strategy of constructing partnerships, this stance is not at odds with the broader principle of respecting sovereignty and resultant efforts to approach cooperation as a partnership between governments. Moreover, it is arguable that it is actually more conducive to building Haitian institutions, especially in a historical context where too much aid has been delivered through NGOs.

Ideas informing specific policies represent what Best (2014) would describe as more “practical” forms of knowledge, and also interact with what are more tacit forms - based on certain ontological and epistemological assumptions. While the practices of Brazil and other Southern development partners are more complicated than the wholesale adoption of modernization principles, some of the ontological foundations of modernization theory do appear crucial. In particular, Brazil’s approach rests on assumptions that the state is the main development actor, and that foreigners have a key role to play in injecting capital and technological know-how into developing societies (Rostow, 1971; Marshall, 2015). State interventionism is not necessarily premised on a large state, but on a strong one that is able to extend social participation; social policies are conceived of as where the state incorporates citizens “not as beneficiaries but as subjects of rights” (civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Such ideas obviously counter neoliberal notions of minimizing the state’s role in order to induce development. In particular, Brazil’s post-neoliberal turn places a stress on issues of democracy and participation, and policies are designed to be inclusive, especially of previously marginalized citizens. Participation also extends to the formation of policies:
Programs such as *Bolsa Família*, or the school feeding program, *Lei Maria da Penha* on women’s rights and protection against gender-based violence wouldn’t even exist if it wasn’t through a major emphasis by the government on integrating and participating civil society into the formulation of policies (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

Brazil’s foreign policy strategy is still neo-structuralist in origin (Burges, 2017), but its promotion *through* foreign policy inherently distorts this vision; as will become much clearer in the discussion of sustainability in Chapter 7, there is a tension between a state providing development cooperation and a state providing universal services that makes the resemblance to modernization theory apt. In sum, more tacit and practical ideas that became more prominent with Brazil’s post-neoliberal turn form the foundation for Brazil’s extension of cooperation.

In practice, these ideas shape cooperation, even where they are not fully implemented, as in the case of the tendency to exclude civil society participation. The case studies reflect the more tacit assumptions around development as state-led, and the necessity of targeting the poorest in order to address poverty. Linking school feeding (either in the pilot project or through the distribution of milk) to local purchases places the onus on state interventions to combat hunger and shows a proclivity for supporting small-scale farming by guaranteeing demand. The emphasis on “virtuous cycles” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation) likewise represents Brazil’s preference for deliberately forging links between state supports. The seed project is also based on premises that interventions in areas such as credit and other agricultural inputs will support family farmers by covering the entire production cycle (Brazilian officials and IO representatives in author’s interviews, 2015). Finally, reflecting principles of universality and equality, the project to construct and train
Institute staff was a response to the increase in disabilities post-earthquake, and the realization that the system could not meet the specialized needs of those with handicaps (Haitian officials, medical doctors, and Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015).

**Authority**

Expert authority has traditionally been an important source of legitimacy for development organizations as they are assumed to possess the technical expertise needed to advise and implement development solutions (Best, 2014), and this is no different for the Brazilian case. Returning to the idea of affinities between Brazil and their developing partners, and Brazil as having “emerged”, it is clear for Brazil and for many Haitians (as well as IOs) that Brazil has gained the required expertise to cooperate through its own achievements in alleviating poverty and inequality when faced with similar challenges. As one Brazilian explained, “we understand extreme poverty in a way that maybe Canada doesn’t, in a way that traditional [donors] wouldn’t…because you don’t see it every day since you were born” (civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). It is important to underline how specific this authority is to Brazil; it is an authority that comes from intimately knowing what solutions are most relevant for partners like Haiti, and simply would not be available to most other providers of development cooperation. As one IO explained, this sense of a shared past produces a lot of legitimacy and credibility with developing country partners (in author’s interviews, 2015). He similarly mused, in the context of what this signifies for traditional aid donors: “What does it mean? Can traditional providers change their colonial history” (ibid)? Although analytically it is useful to draw out how the authority of Brazil results from the types of
projects it proposes (Chapter 6), versus the manner in which its technicians work (Chapter 5), in practice they are mutually constitutive of the country as a particular development expert.

This authority appears to be accepted by a number of actors, including IOs who partner with Brazil, and by Brazil’s Haitian counterparts. Representatives of IOs for instance argued that technologies developed in Brazil were more appropriate for the region, and further that they provide an innovative way of thinking about development problems that helps the organization to move away from a more “old-fashioned” approach (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). A bilateral partner similarly echoed that because of Brazilian affinities with its partners, combined with its successes in resolving similar problems, they saw the country as offering public policies well-equipped to tackle development challenges (in author’s interviews, 2015). IO interest in cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 5, is also facilitated by their recognition of the meaningful partnerships constructed between the Haitian and Brazilian governments. Haitian bureaucrats re-iterated this sentiment: Brazil “is closer to us (versus Japan, US, Canada), and [has] similar socioeconomic conditions, we understand each other better. Brazil is a part of the South but because of its emergence has left the South. We understand, and we can benefit” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). The repetition of similar discourse to that used by Brazil itself around its utility as a development partner indicates that Brazil has managed to have its expertise recognized and authorized. Authorization is significant in the context of its country partners, and indeed contributes to the partnership established between the Haitian and
Brazilian governments, but it also has ramifications for the development regime more generally.

Similar to the consolidation of its moral authority, where Brazil’s perceived solidarity becomes central to its ability to gain political advantages from cooperation because of inadequacies associated with other forms of cooperation (especially instrumentalist motives), Brazilian authority is established in relation to that of other actors. As previously discussed, a unique aspect of Brazil’s SSC is its proclivity towards triangular forms, and my contention is that one of the functions of this cooperative vehicle has been that it makes any differences in the expertise of various development experts more prominent. While Brazil’s IO and bilateral partners would discuss Brazil as a provider in terms of its cultural relevance, experience with development solutions, etc., Brazilians expressed the rationales for their partnerships with IOs or other bilateral agencies in very different ways (in author’s interviews, 2015). One standard emphasis was on cooperating with other partners because of their financial resources (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). While quite obviously this role can be interpreted instrumentally, meaning it simply provides Brazil, a country with less resources for cooperation than more developed countries, especially in the last few years, with the ability to continue to offer cooperation, the balance seems much more significant when viewed from Brazil’s principles around the provision of technical cooperation, namely the preference to transfer capacity. In this context, limiting the role of other actors to providing resources reads as a commentary on their usefulness; they are not considered to be in a position to offer valuable expertise. This limited utility is compounded by the fact that the strategy of designing appropriate interventions arises as a response to the failures
of traditional development experts who have problematically relied on universal solutions. Indeed, IOs were also referred to as “rigid” or “strict”, where either they would not adapt projects to shifting circumstances, or their ideas were seen as “conservative” and not “progressive” enough (Brazilian officials quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). I return to the implications of this relation in the next and final section, and conclude here with a discussion of how power relations also shift as a result of this strategy.

*Power*

At the level of these projects, power has been re-configured in ways that again extend the authority of the Haitian state, or at the very least have the potential to. Nevertheless, and while I will also explore how power relations shift more broadly in the next section, the extension of state authority does not function in the same way that it does as a result of Brazilian stress on creating partnerships. Rather, the key to understanding the implications of the emphasis placed on designing appropriate interventions is in how they prioritize capacity-building, which has the potential to strengthen Haitian institutions over the long-term. In a sense, the concern with capacity-building is an intended, long-term outcome of building partnerships. In what is referred to as *cooperação estruturante* (structural cooperation), Brazilians stressed their ultimate goals of strengthening the ability of the Haitian state to execute development. “It’s very complicated in terms of immediate results”, acknowledged a Brazilian representative, “but we see that it’s a medium- to long-term investment to create these competencies and
develop these abilities, and to train and enhance the skills of professionals in each country” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

While this approach certainly contradicts tendencies of traditional aid to bypass the Haitian state, it is not a simple refutation of ideas of state fragility. Instead, there is more of an effort to shift authority within the state bureaucracy to more developmentally-oriented elites and to build up these committed constituencies by empowering them to make decisions and carry out work. For example, a Brazilian commenting on the challenges of working in Haiti argued that development efforts have involved many errors, but stressed that the Haitians have not been exempt: “don’t treat them like kids. It’s a lack of respect…a lot of foreigners committed a lot of errors, but they have also committed political errors” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Using an example of a previous project, another described a long process of battling over project objectives, and readily acknowledged how much money and time was wasted because of the underlying belief in the need to support the government (Brazilian official author’s interviews, 2015). For him, despite all of the frustrations, capacity-building remains the objective: a change in “Haitian mentality” so that they do not simply expect to receive more external money (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Unfortunately, and this issue is raised in more depth in Chapter 7, Brazilians often approached the Haitian state as an apolitical entity, appearing to pay little attention to vested interests (author’s interviews, 2015).

Best’s (2014) approach to understanding practices by breaking them down according to factors has been a useful way to comprehend how the Brazilian strategy of designing appropriate intervention works on a concrete level. Taking the same case study
projects described in the previous Chapter, I have summarized how this strategy has been dependent on certain configurations of actors involved, techniques that stress Brazil’s usefulness as a partner and hence revolve around Brazil’s provision of advice, and ideas about what conditions are conducive for development - as learned through Brazil’s experiments with state-led social policies more actively pursued since the arrival of the PT in power. More broadly, notions of post-colonial practice bring to light the broad appeal of Southern ideas around the necessary conditions for bringing about development, which advocate and legitimate more state involvement, as well as increased supports specifically to health and agriculture. Supports to these areas, especially agriculture, contrast with the relative neglect outlined in Chapter 5. The purpose of the next and final section is to explore the more macro-level effects that arise from this strategy. While I also consider how this strategy impacts the Haitian state, the stress is placed on examining how IO authority and Brazilian power are mutually shaped through the specific expertise that Brazil is understood to be bringing to development cooperation.

6.3 Designing Appropriate Intervention

The strategy of seeking to design more appropriate interventions is not separate from traditional aid practices, but converges with them in interesting and perhaps unexpected ways. First, the strategy has not fully resolved the universalist assumptions it seeks to challenge. Indeed, one criticism is that ideas about what is appropriate and relevant mean cooperation comes to display certain constants, and hence contradict Brazil’s stated emphasis on “demand-driven” cooperation. According to one critic,
Between practice and discourse, Brazil has to arrive without pre-defined priorities, so [Brazil] arrives in a country to start a dialogue with the government and tries to respond to some needs that the government raises, but at the same time it’s interesting to see that the majority of countries where Brazil acts, Brazil does the same programs” (Brazilian academic quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation).

These criticisms have some validity given the obvious parallels between domestic policy and cooperation. As another example, Brazil’s Ministry for Social Development and Combatting Hunger (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome, MDS) has sought to manage the level of demands by holding an information seminar on “Social Policies for Development”, which gives an overview of Brazil’s various programs (described in author’s interviews, 2015). Thus, projects seem to begin from a point where certain characteristics are already predefined. As discussed more below, this reliance on familiar practices can be a problem insofar as the expected affinities with the Haitian, or other partner country context, simply do not hold. However, the criticism that the tendency to enact similar types of programs and projects creates tension with demand-driven, partnership-based approaches also risks being overstated since, according to Haitians involved, projects undertaken still respond to priorities and needs, and are planned and executed in tandem (various officials in author’s interviews, 2015). A different question is what the tendency to rely on blueprints – but ones that are post-neoliberal - signifies for Brazilian power. While I will elaborate upon the unique challenges and opportunities of these models in the next Chapter where I evaluate cooperation, I discuss below the opportunities that the reliance on these models creates for Brazil in terms of recognition as an important development player.

Yet Brazilian SSC’s prioritization of capacity-building is distinct from how it is invoked in discussions of ownership in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda. As
discussed in Chapter 5, ownership arises in the broader context of the good governance agenda so that efforts to build capacity are premised on building a very specific state. As stressed by authors like Hayman (2011), enacting the right political conditions occurs alongside neoliberal economic reforms, and “good” state institutional environments are those that create the “enabling” environments for development to occur (OECD, 2012, p. 30). In contrast, the post-neoliberal emphasis on state-building is about encouraging state intervention to temper the market, as well as increasing the state’s role in promoting social inclusion and democratic participation. Thus, while there can be overlap between social programmes that occur under more “inclusive” neoliberal efforts (see Ruckert, 2010) and post-neoliberal regimes, the latter is more expansive and attempts to approximate more universal social provision. As one Brazilian official cautioned, “Bolsa Família is only possible in [the context of] a universal education and health system...but we have a whole set of social programs”, and these are supported by increases in the minimum wage (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

Before discussing its impacts for Brazil however, the substantive focus of appropriate interventions on capacity-building has a number of implications for Haitian authority beyond these specific interventions. Since capacity-building is inherently long-term, many of these implications remain much more uncertain. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Brazil’s focus on capacity-building occurs in the context of perceived and documented institutional challenges. The Haitian government remains extremely dependent on external sources of funding, and human resource capacity can be weak (various respondents, including Haitian officials, in author’s interviews, 2015). Political will can also be absent. Many of these institutional barriers have been
exacerbated by the earthquake and other crises, as I stressed in the previous discussion of agriculture and health issues. Rightly or wrongly, the perceived fragility of the state has thus led many donors to work in parallel to its institutions. In this context, the Brazilian reliance on working through state channels is expected to generate higher levels of expertise and “buy-in” resulting from consultation and attention to Haitian priorities, that will motivate the state bureaucracy to replicate and scale-up many of these initiatives (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). Brazilians described instances where Ministry staff seemed more committed to achieving development solutions as they were relied upon as active participants in the process (in author’s interviews, 2015). Indeed, one Brazilian worried that the huge dedication shown by government could actually generate new problems should it mean that they are attempting something beyond their ability (author’s interviews, 2015). Indeed, in the next Chapter, I argue that Brazilian support has been based on expectations that are overly naïve in the Haitian environment, and have confused political will with sufficient capacity – especially available resources.

While the effects of its strategic focus on appropriate intervention for Brazil are, and undoubtedly will be, impacted by how the Haitian state is reconfigured, especially over the longer-term, Brazil’s power has shifted as a result of how IOs are indirectly impacted. I argued above that from the perspective of Brazilians, the interest in cooperating with other bilateral partners and IOs has largely been confined to questions of resources, with telling silences on other potential roles of these partners, especially vis-à-vis the question of expertise – the exception is its relations with Cuba\(^\text{38}\), which could

\(^{38}\) Interestingly, partnerships with Cubans were not spoken about in similar, limited terms. Instead, descriptions emphasized how Cuba has a lot of information and experience because of its history with the
signify an interesting North-South dynamic that requires further exploration. Certainly, the respective roles of these players change depending on whether cooperation is predominately technical or humanitarian. In the case of humanitarian assistance, it is typically Brazil who is funding the IO partner to carry out the project. In the case of the seed project, for example, FAO is the implementing partner, and Brazil’s expertise appears to be limited to the design stage. On the surface then, Brazil’s contribution is predominately financial, and hence explains respondents’ comments that they doubted farmers would even be aware that the project was funded by Brazil (IO representative and Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015).

Nevertheless, even in the case of humanitarian projects, the dynamic is different if considered from the perspective of who forms Brazil’s intended audience. In Chapter 5, I contended that Brazil’s cooperative efforts should be seen as prioritizing close relationships with their partners, where anticipated development effects function almost as an afterthought, or at the very least are only important insofar as they impact the political relation. Similarly, here Brazil’s predominately financial role may limit its interactions at a more direct, local level, but its influence is increased where it is instead directed at: government partners. Brazil explains in one of its official reports on development cooperation that “triangular cooperation combines what Brazil has to offer with the capacity of traditional donors, especially through technical and financial contributions, enhancing the comparative advantages of all actors involved” (Ipea, 2014, p. 36). Debates on triangular cooperation have expressed concerns that the relationships are a vehicle for Northern dominance. For example, Abdenur and Marques da Fonseca country, and had a lot to offer the partnership (representative of a Brazilian research institute in author’s interviews, 2015).
(2013, p. 1476) argue that the North is “seeking new points of entry into South-South cooperation to reshape the norms and practices of such cooperation, while also maintaining or gaining access to broader economic, political and security opportunities to which they have been losing access”. While this risk may be present, what is also evident about the Haitian case is how these practices position Brazil even more firmly as a particularly desirable partner for Haiti given the relevant expertise it has on offer. Its “comparative advantage” in the eyes of government partners results from the various affinities described above. For instance, reminiscent of Brazilians’ own descriptions of partnerships, a Haitian official likewise considered how: if “Brazil is closer to Haiti, between the North and South, and if the North is a way of financing and the South is the technical, then why not profit” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation)?

Trilateral relations functions as a visible, blunt reminder of the weaknesses of traditional aid. While these arrangements may assure the North’s continued role, it is as a marginal player. The advent of emerging donors like Brazil capitalizes on discontent with the traditional aid framework and positions their contribution as relevant and novel.

Thus, the significance of the strategy of designing appropriate interventions for Brazil is that it helps to construct Brazil as an alternative global player through the welcoming of Brazil’s development assistance. Brazil’s weight stems not only from its openness to partnerships with other Southern countries, but also that it is assumed to understand the development challenges faced by these partners, and that it has solutions to remedy them. Indeed, Brazilians were not exaggerating when they claimed that, “they (recipient countries) see us in a different form, they adore us” because of a multitude of factors: “a recent history; less conflicts; listening to bureaucrats who are interested” in
our systems (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). These characteristics have resulted in Brazil gaining a lot of “attraction” to other developing countries, as well as “credibility” and “legitimacy” (IO representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). According to a Haitian bureaucrat, a Brazilian initiative was well-placed to address food insecurity; he “hoped that in the future they would increase [the project] to other regions” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Similarly, Brazilians were described as “underst[anding] what we wanted”, and that especially investments made in terms of training personnel would “permit them to be true actors of change in their own space” (medical doctor quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). In interviews of project participants, school administrators identified “the superior quality” of the projects, such as in reference to the availability and the quality of the milk distributed in schools, and consistently expressed their disappointment that projects would not continue: “the only negative aspect”, explained one, “is that the project will not continue” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Indeed, one of the challenges consistently identified around cooperation was that Brazil cannot execute the number of projects that partners would like (diverse respondents, including Haitian and Brazilian officials, and IO representatives in author’s interviews, 2015).

The political capital gained through cooperation also intersected with that personally achieved by President Lula in important ways. The view of Lula as a champion of the fight against poverty and inequality is a specific component of Brazil’s broader image as a helpful development partner. Lula was the one to prioritize post-neoliberal social policies domestically, and to push the same agenda internationally (Brazilian officials author’s interviews, 2015). His was considered a government “that
wanted to have their weight in the world”, and wanted Brazil to be the global power that
did things differently (Brazilian academic quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my
translation). Lula’s objectives of strengthening ties with the South and his reputation as
the champion of these progressive social policies meant that his magnetic appeal worked
in tandem with the content of cooperation to generate a positive reception. In short,
cooperation was intended to develop Lula’s personal prestige as well as Brazil’s (Stolte,
2015). The importance of the presidential figure was not continued under Dilma, who
was widely perceived as having much less interest in foreign policy (various Brazilian
officials in author’s interviews, 2015).

Perceptions of the relationship between Brazil’s development cooperation and its
leadership of MINUSTAH provide some indication as to the broader political outcomes
of cooperation. The image of Brazil in Haiti was extremely dependent on how
MINUSTAH was analyzed. In broad strokes, perspectives that were more positive on
Brazil’s role tended to see peace-keeping and development activities as harmonious,
whereas those who were critical of MINUSTAH, and Brazil’s role therein, described
cooperation as a, unfortunately, limited corrective to the damage inflicted through
military occupation (various Haitian officials and civil society representative in author’s
interviews, 2015). These points were raised in the previous Chapter, but I raise them
again to highlight issues around appropriateness. For example, respondents noted that
Brazil was encouraged to lead the mission in the first place because of perceived
similarities – including cultural and racial, and some also argued that similarities helped
forge better relationships between troops and Haitians (UN official, Brazilian military
official, and Haitian civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015). Critics of
MINUSTAH instead argued that MINUSTAH was “inappropriate since there is not a war”, and wished that more resources could be diverted towards cooperation in lieu, which was seen as important and potentially transformative (Haitian civil society representative quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Regardless of their differences, what is striking about these broad opinions is that, while the question of whether MINUSTAH provides an answer to Haiti’s governance challenges remains deeply contentious, and hence development cooperation may not be sufficient to mitigate wrongdoing, cooperation itself was unanimously perceived positively (author’s interviews, 2015).

6.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has identified another central strategy of Brazil’s cooperation with Haiti: the designing of appropriate interventions. Complementing Chapter 5’s emphasis on how processes of cooperation are carried out, this strategy reveals how and why projects take the form that they do. As in the previous Chapter, I explored how this strategy became central to cooperative efforts, tracing the recognition of the problematic of “one-size-fits-all” policies to Brazil’s perspective that the post-neoliberal experiments it initiated and expanded under PT administrations could be usefully shared abroad. Referring back to the four case studies in the agricultural and health sectors, I discussed how this strategy has unfolded. Again, Best’s (2014) framework was used as a way to separate different factors, from typical techniques to its implications in terms of authority and power, so that the characteristics that define this particular type of cooperation could be drawn out. Beyond Best’s (2014) formulation of practice however, the Chapter is a
testament to the appeal of Southern knowledge in a post-colonial context. Brazilian ideas for reducing poverty did not simply involve post-neoliberal solutions as another policy option, they represented efforts to re-value knowledge from actors beyond traditional development experts. Attention to postcolonial practices is thus partly about recognition of the legitimate development options put forward by the Brazilians. Significantly, the focus on rural agriculture is also a vindication of the historical aspirations of the Haitian peasantry to secure their autonomy against a double process of state and foreign intrusion and neglect – notably through indirect taxation while promoting export-led agriculture or light industry (Dubois, 2012; Trouillot, 1990). To conclude, the Chapter has explained some of the more global implications for Brazilian power afforded by these practices, focusing on how the power of other development actors, rather than that of the Haitian state, has been undermined. In practice, many of the more global implications argued in Chapters 5 and 6 are a product of how these strategies intersect and reinforce each other. Notions of solidarity, for instance, undeniably reinforce the desirability of the Brazilian model.

In the next Chapter, I turn to a more substantive evaluation of the Brazilian approach. I begin with the evaluative criteria laid out in Chapter 2, where I included some additional principles to the OECD-DAC’s aid effectiveness agenda, which are based on literature on SSC. As part of explaining Brazil’s performance relative to this framework, I identify some of the limitations of Brazilian cooperation which relate to its institutional set-up and the domestic political economy. However, in order to also engage with the politics of aid practice in more depth, the Chapter returns to the strategies I have identified as defining Brazilian practice, arguing that the full implications of these
strategies are only intelligible in broader discussions of how both strategies interact with their respective political economies.
Chapter: Evaluating the Brazilian Approach

Brazilian strategies of building partnership and designing appropriate intervention have managed to generate positive reactions from their Haitian partners and other actors in the international development regime. These strategies have obvious implications for the outcomes of development cooperation, especially in terms of ownership and effectiveness, as it is assumed that they respond to the priorities of the Haitian government, and that they offer an alternative model that may be more relevant to challenges in agricultural and health development. This Chapter evaluates the Brazilian approach to SSC in Haiti in order to understand the unique ways in which it has impacted development outcomes, as the focus so far has largely been on perceptions. Strengthened political relations and the appeal of Brazil’s model, do not, of course, necessarily translate to the intended development effects. While I ultimately seek to explain how Brazil’s political status shifted as a result of its strengthened ties with Haiti, and not to focus on providing an evaluation of Brazil’s contributions as a new development player, the latter must also be answered in order to provide a fuller explanation as to why SSC generates goodwill for the Brazilian government – and the possibilities for cooperation continuing to do so. By starting from development outcomes, I amplify how aid is usefully approached as a post-colonial practice. Methodologically, this interpretative analysis works to dis-embed and then re-embed the provision of cooperation in its historical context and social meaning. In other words, I reinforce the possibility that the areas where Brazil has had the most success in meeting effectiveness principles are more highly valued by Haitian partners because of their location in post-colonial political
economies: Haitians’ positive reactions and Brazilians’ adherence to such aid effectiveness principles as ownership and effectiveness are situated in shared colonial experiences. Feelings of solidarity and respect for sovereignty, as well as the broad rejection of universalistic ways of knowing, anchor the practice of cooperation. However, whereas the previous Chapters focus largely on interpretations and receptions from elite partners, this Chapter also spends some time explaining why these projects are also radical in broader, intersectional terms.

As well, the focus on development outcomes helps to reveal the slips and instabilities that occur between the material and ideological aspects of practice, so that representations can shift because of their discrepancies with techniques and results, and vice versa. For example, not only were some Haitian officials cognizant that Brazil’s more appropriate model had failed to anticipate resource limitations, a high-level ABC official, as I recounted in the previous Chapter, described work in Haiti as “the most difficult” of her life, which was attributed to the unexpected and significant differences in culture and language, as well as institutional constraints (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Given data limitations, including the lack of transparency in making evaluations public (and the more general informality in monitoring and evaluation systems, which I describe below), as well as the various stages of the projects under study, this analysis reflects known information as of 2015 only.

To this end, I apply the framework introduced in Chapter 2, which amalgamates standard OECD-DAC principles for aid effectiveness with qualities that have been associated with SSC, to the Brazilian case. My objective is to avoid either a tendency to assume existing standards are appropriate and sufficient, or to support both these
providers’ rhetorical avoidance of the current regime, and their resistance to proposing and adopting other shared principles. I identify several constraints and positive aspects of cooperation, such as the importance placed on dialogue, and, on the negative side, misplaced assumptions that Brazil’s approach, learned from its own recent development experiences, is inherently appropriate to other developing contexts – and, ironically, a tendency to rely on these experiences as new blueprints for cooperation. Many of these features also intersect. For example, while I applaud the efforts of the Brazilians to transfer the responsibility for programs to the Haitian state, it is also apparent that they have underestimated the capacity of the state to provide continuity in activities. In short, my argument is that the Brazilian record for humanitarian and development cooperation is very much a mixed one. This argument is consistent with an earlier comparative study which found that Brazilian cooperation in Haiti, while presenting strengths in terms of its attention to ownership, also lacked accountability mechanisms and displayed a lack of cultural understanding (Baranyi, Fedlmann & Bernier, 2015). However, it is partly this incongruity between development results and the overall positive political reception Brazil has received for these projects that prompts me to ask why cooperation is received more warmly than its characteristics might suggest.

Thus, the bulk of the Chapter is spent revisiting specificities of the Haitian context, including its experiences with other donors, as a way of embedding Brazilian practice. I argue in general terms that cooperation is relational, neither inherently negative nor positive, but rather depends on its interaction with the partner context. Building on Chapters 5 and 6 which dealt with two identified strategies of Brazilian practice, building partnerships and designing appropriate interventions, the Chapter
underlines four areas where the effects of Brazil’s central strategies are most prominent, and where they combine and conflict: Brazilian institutions, Haitian institutions, partnership versus appropriate interventions, and the sustainability of interventions. Following these discussions, the Chapter returns to the central argument that SSC has resulted in political gains for Brazil, helping the country further its status as an emerging, post-neoliberal global power. However, I also stress how these gains appear temporary. Finally, returning to questions of how emerging powers change the cooperation landscape more broadly, I discuss what lessons Brazilian cooperation provides.

7.1 The Paris + Framework Reconsidered

As stated in Chapter 2, international norms for aid effectiveness cannot be readily applied to SSC for fear that they miss important intentions of this form of cooperation, although there is obvious overlap. For example, ownership does display some coherence with the focus of South-South providers on principles such as horizontality and demand-driven cooperation. These convergences are even more apparent when DAC criteria for evaluating cooperation are compared with South-South principles. Nevertheless, as I explored in Chapter 5, the reasons for identifying the need for reforms to aid practices have varied, and so too have the identified solutions. As other SSC researchers so correctly observe, “the divergence lies in that NSC [North-South Cooperation] is often accompanied by policy conditionalities linked to good governance practices, human rights, rule of law reform, and economic liberalization” (Besharati, Moilwa, Khunou & Rios, 2015). Thus, superficial similarities may mask deeper areas of disagreement, while other principles may be missing altogether. The following table summarizes the hybrid
principles I set out initially to evaluate Brazilian cooperation based on the Paris Principles (OECD 2005/2008) and through engagement with the literature on emerging donors.

Table 8  Evaluative Criteria and Expected Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Ownership*</td>
<td>Partners can exercise leadership over their development policies</td>
<td>Partners have development strategies (such as poverty reduction strategies)</td>
<td>Empowerment of aid recipients so that project outcomes are sustained over the longer-term. Future development processes include multiple stakeholders working together.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Processes of consultation are widespread, and include a diverse range of citizens, from government officials to NGOs and research centers, and to potential project participants</td>
<td>Broad buy-in to the project is achieved</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment*</td>
<td>Donors subsequently base their support on partners’ strategies</td>
<td>Use of the partner’s financial management systems</td>
<td>Engagement with existing systems serves to strengthen existing government capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization*</td>
<td>Donors will work together in order to be collectively effective</td>
<td>Use of common arrangements</td>
<td>Less conflict between approaches and the avoidance of overlap. Improved government capacity to manage external actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing for results*</td>
<td>Managing resources and improving decision-making for results</td>
<td>Performance assessment frameworks that are transparent and amenable to monitoring</td>
<td>An approach that continuously improves by looking to previous experiences for lessons</td>
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<td>Mutual accountability*</td>
<td>Donors and partners are accountable for development results</td>
<td>Partners undertake mutual assessment of progress in meeting commitments on aid effectiveness</td>
<td>Develops a culture of shared responsibility for development results – both successes and failures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Other foreign policy tools are designed and implemented with development considerations</td>
<td>An increase in trade relationships or an increase in investment links in pro-poor directions; for example, trade relationships are cultivated in non-traditional areas</td>
<td>Synergies in support of development exist between various forms of South-South cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Brazilian officials on the ground can revise project plans in consultation with the recipient.</td>
<td>There are more feedback loops between policy and practice as project officials (and participants) adjust the</td>
<td>The project is better attuned to the specific context of implementation, demonstrated in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>The project not only meets government and citizen priorities, but it also is carried out in a way that is appropriate to the specific context.</td>
<td>Technical solutions can be implemented as they are low-cost, can be managed by locals, etc.</td>
<td>Project outcomes are not only sustained over the long-term (past the end of the project), but also serve as models for similar problems.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Addressing inequalities</strong></td>
<td>Addressing intersectionality is an explicit focus, such as where improving gender or racial inequality is identified as a central project objective.</td>
<td>Increases in equality are visible in such outputs as greater participation in project activities, deeper understanding of gender and racial injustices, etc.</td>
<td>Includes and empowers marginalized groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender equality</strong></td>
<td>Improving gender equality is a central project objective.</td>
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*Information describing the inputs and outputs is taken from the OECD’s (2005/2008) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.

Observations of Brazilian cooperation developed through the fieldwork, as well as several notable developments since the fieldwork was conducted, have prompted some revision of these criteria. First, in terms of SSC broadly, there has been movement towards a firmer establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems. A Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) held their first technical workshop in 2015 to discuss what an appropriate monitoring and accountability framework was for SSC. Recognizing that these systems remain weak due to a number of major challenges, from the lack of a conceptual framework to missing statistical information, they nonetheless develop an initial framework for evaluation, setting out the following criteria: ownership; horizontality and solidarity; capacity development; transparency, accountability and information management; inclusive partnerships, citizens’ protection and empowerment; efficient partnerships; and SSC in the global arena (such as if cooperation contributes to coalition building) (Besharati et. al., 2015). They also make a number of contributions surrounding how evaluations should take place, recommending participatory methods to
affirm SSC principles, and similarly suggesting that more ethnographic methods may best measure principles such as joint ownership or horizontality (ibid). However, their framework is also meant to be multi-level, and certain categories are better suited to analysis of cooperation at broader levels; for example, transparency, accountability and information management have some relevance for cooperation in Haiti, especially in terms of transparency to local populations (ibid), but it is overall more relevant for global issues such as whether Brazilians have evaluation systems that enable learning. I will include transparency as part of a broader conception of ownership, as detailed below.

Developments related to Brazilian SSC specifically are also of note. In 2013, the Brazilian government published a “Manual on the Management of South-South Technical Cooperation” (Manual de Gestão da Cooperação Técnica Sul-Sul), which includes regulations around evaluation, such as when they will happen (and when they are required), and what they should be examining. A 2016 report for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on “Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms for South-South and Triangular Development Cooperation: Lessons from Brazil for the 2030 Agenda” argues that monitoring and evaluation practices among Brazilian agencies remain heterogeneous, with little apparent use of the Manual, especially with regards to evaluation. However, they also found that practices happen informally, often in monitoring committees, suggesting that, “although not formally elaborated as an evaluation framework, projects are objects of constant participatory reflection among partners” (UNDP, 2016, p. 16). For the first time, an external evaluation was made publicly available in 2015 that put into practice the Manual’s evaluation framework (Plan Políticas Públicas & Articulação Sul).
These developments in Brazil also prompt some refining of how to evaluate Brazil’s cooperation with Haiti. In its Manual, ABC establishes a framework for evaluation based on: performance; efficacy; efficiency; sustainability; operational and management aspects; and lessons learned (2013). Furthermore, stressing the active participation of project partners, they describe the purpose of evaluations as to consider the “direct and indirect perception of beneficiaries” (ABC, 2013, p. 110; my translation).

In the external evaluation, the two organizations responsible considered the results and objectives that were obtained based on the project document, planning and management processes that influenced the attainment of results, and SSC principles (Plan Políticas Públicas & Articulação Sul, 2016). In short, the evaluation employs the same criteria outlined in the ABC Manual, while adding an analysis of SSC principles, defined as horizontality, ownership of technology, and mutual benefits (ibid). The Manual employs Results-Based Management (RBM) (UNDP, 2016). RBM arose as a response to the perceived failures of aid programmes to answer what outcomes – as opposed to inputs, activities, or outputs - their interventions were generating, and hence if they were tackling the initial problem; the inclusion of RBM was often made contingent on debt relief initiatives or national poverty reduction strategies (DFATD; Kusek & Rist, 2004). This inclusion is surprising given RBM’s association with neoliberal aid approaches, and this fact has not gone unnoticed. For instance, the authors of the UNDP (2016) report suggest it is incongruous with capacity-building, which is a notable emphasis of Brazilian cooperation. Capacity-building is conceptualized as occurring at four interrelated and interdependent levels: individual; organizational; inter-institutional, and contextual (ABC, 2013). Similarly, ABC recognizes that technical cooperation has three dimensions
– in the short-, medium-, and long-term – and that the success of projects may only be
registered long after their end, when it is clear whether an organization has adopted and
maintained practices without Brazilian involvement (ibid).

Table 9 presents the revised evaluative criteria. First, using the language of the
Brazilian Manual, sustainability is presented as a separate principle. While this term has
some overlap with alignment, there is sufficient conceptual distinction to warrant a
separate category rather than the extension of the former; in particular, while alignment is
presented as a way for donors to support existing institutions with the desire of indirectly
strengthening them, the Brazilian strategy of capacity-building is much more direct and
explicit. As the authors of the UNDP report (2016, p. 17) note, their research found that
capacity-building was “highly emphasized by some interviewees as the main component
of Brazilian cooperation”. Sustainability is thus described as “assess[ing] whether the
benefits generated by the project will be sustained after the end of the project and if it
will have long term effects” (Plan Políticas Públicas & Articulação Sul, 2016, p. 20).
Recognition that cooperation from countries such as Brazil does “not reflect a concerted,
well-planned strategy” (Feldmann et al., 2012, p. 49) needs to be tempered by the fact
that Brazil lacks an overarching strategy (hence the previous demand for a strategic
vision document, such as a white paper; see BPC, 2013). Nevertheless, there are two
caveats to this fact, which together justify the inclusion of sustainability as an evaluative
criterion. First, the focus of technical cooperation on sustainability issues at the project
level has indeed been a key concern of Brazilian cooperation, captured in the notion of
“structural” (cooperação estruturante) projects or programs, “characterized by actions
that may develop individual and institutional capacities with sustainable results in the
benefitted countries, as opposed to specific projects, whose impacts are more limited” (Ipea, 2011, p. 34). Furthermore, at a broader level, a strategy does not need to be formally outlined in order to exert influence. In the case of cooperation, the practice of cooperation has solidified key emphases and directions over time, including the focus on capacity-building. For instance, a short strategic document released by ABC in 2016 (n.p.; my translation), albeit beyond the timeframe of the study, describes one overarching principle as “focus on the development of institutional and productive human capacities, as the basis for the achievement of qualitative, measurable and durable advances”. Under “means” (through which cooperation is achieved), the document further concludes, technical cooperation has the ultimate objective of the “consolidation of partner countries as autonomous nations, from actions that drive structural changes that enable cumulative gains in human capital, institutional strengthening and productive capacity” (ibid).

While the external evaluation also considers SSC principles separately, my contention is that, for the sake of simplicity, two of the three (horizontality and ownership of technology) function better when considered as the preconditions for the attainment of other principles. In other words, these principles concern the how. Taking horizontality for example, which the external report defines as “related to shared management and the establishment of equal power relations” (ibid), the fulfillment of ownership depends on horizontal practices. However, the third, the concept of mutual benefits (ibid), which refers to the Brazilian belief in also benefitting from partnerships as a way to equalize relations, is not sufficiently addressed by the framework and I consider it separately. Notions of flexibility and relevance developed in my initial framework are subsumed
within the concept of “efficiency” as laid out in the Brazilian Manual, whereby attention is paid to the way in which various resources (from financial to human) are employed to carry out the project. Finally, addressing inequalities, with an emphasis on gender relations, is renamed empowerment in order to be consistent with the language put forward by NeST Africa (2015). One other minor change to expected outcomes is included in bold. These revised criteria are even closer to DAC criteria for evaluating cooperation (OECD, n.d.), demonstrating particular convergence with the principles of effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. For example, the OECD’s (n.d.) emphasis on efficiency devotes similar attention to issues of cost-effectiveness.

Table 9 Revised Evaluative Criteria and Expected Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes

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<td>Processes of consultation are widespread, and include a diverse range of citizens, from government officials to NGOs and research centers, and to potential project participants</td>
<td>Broad buy-in to the project is achieved</td>
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<td>Synergies in support of development exist between various forms of South-South cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency**, ***</td>
<td>All resources are managed as effectively as possible in order to attain project results</td>
<td>There is flexibility and limited bureaucracy as the project is regularly monitored and adjusted Technical solutions can be implemented as they are low-cost, time efficient, can be managed by locals, complement existing initiatives, etc. Activities are carried out as anticipated</td>
<td>The project is better attuned to the specific context of implementation, demonstrated in improvements in various socioeconomic indicators and as confirmed by beneficiaries Project outcomes are not only sustained over the long-term (past the end of the project), but also serve as models for similar problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment**</td>
<td>Addressing intersectionality is an explicit focus, such as where improving gender or racial inequality is identified as a central project objective</td>
<td>Increases in equality are visible in such outputs as greater participation in project activities, deeper understanding of gender and racial injustices, etc.</td>
<td>Includes and empowers marginalized groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Sustainability**

- Capacity development and learning exchange to generate self-reliance
- Projects are compatible with sectoral priorities, existing programmes, etc.
  - Participation is valued at every step in order to ensure its appropriation (especially in management), and other mechanisms are put in place to facilitate change from individual capacity to broader interinstitutional or social level
  - While external factors cannot be controlled, such as political will, this context is monitored and projects are adjusted as needed
- Benefits of the project are sustained over the long-term as aspects of the project are absorbed and adapted

### Mutual benefit**, ***

- Both partners gain from cooperation
- Knowledge exchange is a two-way process, with Brazilian technicians learning from their counterparts
- There is evidence of take-up in projects or activities implemented in Brazil
- Ideas of cooperation as a horizontal relationship hold purchase

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*Information describing the inputs and outputs is taken from the OECD’s (2005/2008) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.
**Likewise, these categories and expectations are heavily influenced by ABC (2013) and Plan Políticas Públicas and Articulação Sul (2016).
***NeST Africa (2015).

### 7.2 Evaluation of Cooperation According to the Paris + Framework

In this section, I present a brief overview of where these principles were enacted, or not, in Brazil’s cooperation with Haiti. However, because the case studies examined were at different stages of implementation (ranging from the school milk project which had closed at the end of 2014 to the negotiation of the school feeding pilot project), many of the outputs and outcomes are still unknown. The purpose of making any general conclusions in this respect is to identify trends in cooperation practices, and especially to
uncover why cooperation is regarded well by Haitian counterparts. Furthermore, the framework is conducive to this exercise since it establishes criteria for effective cooperation writ large, rather than characteristics at the project level. Following this overview, I take a more extensive look at aspects of cooperation that relate to the Brazilian strategies of building partnerships and designing appropriate interventions in order to draw out the distinct challenges and innovations of cooperation built around these notions. In particular, I reflect on sustainability, ownership, and efficiency, drawing attention to their interdependencies.

**Ownership**

The commitment to ownership that the Brazilians have demonstrated is exceptional, especially in the Haitian context. As Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier (2015, p. 169) conclude in an earlier examination of Brazilian cooperation, their “concern with national ownership and local agency is paramount and characterizes most of its [Brazil’s] cooperation initiatives in Haiti”. From the outset of cooperation, the sentiment among Haitians was that Brazilians were responding to their priorities (diverse officials in author’s interviews, 2015). However, ownership did not end with the initial decision as to what projects to enter into. Instead, projects were managed as iterative processes, where mechanisms such as the regular committee meetings rework details and reaffirm buy-in. Key mandates of the Brazilian approach, including that the numbers of Brazilian bureaucrats be matched in committee meetings by their partners (ABC, 2013), therefore had obvious payoff in terms of enabling ownership. Haitian bureaucrats consistently emphasized their overall satisfaction with these projects and with their involvement in
their management (in author’s interviews, 2015). Nevertheless, because this satisfaction is relative, it should not be concluded that Brazil has somehow equalized the partnership. For example, one bureaucrat affirmed that, although consensus decision-making was practiced throughout, his Ministry was not as “important” as the other partners involved given money tends to equal power (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015).

Furthermore, the principled commitment to ownership is limited to an understanding of it as a state-state relation. Since Brazil’s understanding of ownership, as with other providers of SSC, is rooted in its own experiences as a recipient of foreign aid, privileging notions of non-conditionality and respect for sovereignty, Brazil sees broader involvement as a question for its partner government and adopts a “hands-off” approach. This carries risks, which I will develop in my discussion of how internal sustainability and ownership combine below. When the state in question is an inclusive one, then these problems are absent, and processes of consultation will occur as anticipated. Concerning the case studies, there was evidence of buy-in from affected groups. Groups and actors benefitting from the projects consistently expressed their approval, noting how initiatives responded to development problems (farmer associations, school administrators and hospital administrators in author’s interviews, 2015). In the words of one farmer, the project offered high-quality seeds, and “improvements for farmers in terms of knowledge and income” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Overall, the approach to ownership demonstrated by Brazil in these projects is distinct and welcome, but it is highly contingent on its partner state having the will and capacity to engage society more broadly.
Alignment

Similarly, the Brazilian approach appears to have prioritized alignment with Haitian systems, although how that worked in terms of financial management systems was only discussed with reference to the Institute. Unlike criticisms of much of traditional aid’s tendency to bypass state institutions and create parallel structures in Haiti, the preference for demand-driven cooperation was put into practice by subsequently aligning with government institutions. For example, the Haitian bureaucrat mentioned above who described the lesser position of the Ministry was not particularly concerned with the lack of input his division had had in designing the project, and nevertheless explained that their division was responsible for technical aspects of implementation, from inventories to workshops (author’s interviews, 2015). Because of the very nature of sustainability, as I return to below, how these engagements affect capacity beyond the individuals and institutions directly involved is something that is only visible over the long-term.

The strategy of aligning with Haitian systems did produce several challenges. In the case of the Institute, the accounting problem produced a conflict between the project partners. From one perspective, the lapse occurred as a result of the Haitian side not properly accounting for spending, which in turn meant that the Brazilians eventually did not release more funds until the problems were settled (Brazilian officials and medical doctors in author’s interviews, 2015). This situation underlines how engagement may not be enough to strengthen institutions when it approaches them in their current state, but rather may require more concerted effort to build capacity in the first place. Indeed, alignment in this sense can put unnecessary stress on existing institutions if they are not
able to perform according to expectations; in this case, the eventual lapse in funding hurt progress that had been made in building human resource capacity through the project’s training component, as those who had been trained had to seek employment elsewhere (medical doctors and Haitian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). Again, many of these problems are relevant insofar as they touch on project sustainability.

Harmonization

Harmonization is difficult to assess in the Brazilian context. Undoubtedly, there did not appear to be much effort to harmonize efforts with other providers of development cooperation. In some ways, what could be called Brazil’s “anti-systemic” inclination, where cooperation is broadly seen as an alternative to traditional aid, means that consulting with other donors working in the country is not a priority. Harmonization could, in theory, also introduce tensions with ownership where other donors are not responding to Haitian demands. One IO representative was critical of Brazil’s inattention to collaboration with other development funders (in author’s interviews, 2015). However, several caveats apply. First, this is a strategic stance more than it reflects actual practice. Brazil’s partnerships with FAO and the WFP are examples of how SSC does not exist as a separate modality from traditional or North-South Cooperation, but rather overlaps and competes with other forms of cooperation. Furthermore, the rationales for these triangular relationships were described as benefitting from complementarities between the different approaches, as I described in Chapter 6, which is effectively harmonization at a micro-level. For instance, while Brazil was viewed as offering an innovative approach to school feeding and a strong relationship with the Ministry, its IO partner brought many years of
experience (IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015). On an individual basis, these arrangements have the potential to allow for improved government capacity to manage external actors since they combine efforts. Finally, I was not privy to collective decision-making that would have happened at more political level, such as through Brazil’s participation in the Core Group, where collaboration may have occurred more frequently.

*Managing for results*

Brazilian cooperation makes important strides in managing for results through its monitoring practices, yet its evaluation efforts remain unsatisfactory. As stated above, the UNDP (2016) report on Brazil’s use of monitoring and evaluation practices contends that monitoring often occurs informally. The projects that I examined support this observation. In particular, the highly participatory nature of initiatives, and the flexible attitude that marks Brazilian efforts mean that projects are well-positioned to realize problems early and make any necessary corrections. The committee structures and insistence on open dialogue are central to these processes of adaptation. As one Haitian member of a committee explained it, the Brazilian approach is characterized by “flexibility, different from other forms…and also implicates all parties at the same level, where they participate and react to problems” (medical doctor in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). This approach, however, has not always translated into the most efficient management of resources, especially where it results in lost time, or where political rationales have impeded necessary technical changes - an issue I will return to in more detail.
Evaluation, in contrast, remains marginal. In part, this failure relates to transparency, as Brazil’s commitment to its partners’ sovereignty means that it will not release any project documents, including evaluations; this position was stated to me in interviews and in an access to information request (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015; 2015). While this stance is coherent with Brazil’s approach to partnership and horizontality, it nevertheless presents a serious drawback. Frameworks may be transparent to direct project partners in the government, but they are not available to broader stakeholders, including potential beneficiaries. Unless there is an effort to apply lessons learned to future efforts, Brazilian engagement will continue to suffer from similar challenges. Indeed, the external evaluation of the Cotton-4 project (Plan Políticas Públicas & Articulação Sul, 2016), undertaken in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, contains some striking parallels with the projects that I observed in Haiti – for example insufficient adaptation of technical models to local realities - which is a worrying indication that evaluations are not feeding into future management plans. Furthermore, Brazil’s evaluation frameworks may simply not be adequately designed for its emphasis on structural cooperation, as they may not facilitate the establishment of causality between efforts and institutional change in partner contexts (UNDP, 2016); instead, more ethnographic and qualitative tools may be required (NeST Africa, 2015), especially when applied longitudinally.

Mutual accountability

Progress towards achieving mutual accountability hinges to a great extent on monitoring and evaluation practices. As a result, the achievement of mutual
accountability mirrors the patterns observed above. On the one hand, the attention being paid to monitoring, albeit informally, and especially in its participatory format, ensures that both partners are responsible for assessing progress and making any necessary corrections. That said, the situation is not an entirely equitable one. Several comments from Brazilian officials were striking in their association of project difficulties, such as delays, with the Haitian side. For instance, one senior official described the history of Brazilian technical cooperation with Haiti, noting how the earthquake had devastated efforts, especially because their efforts to date had involved large infrastructural projects (in author’s interviews, 2015). Such criticisms are understandable, yet the official further argued that as a result of other insufficiencies on the Haitian side, including accounting problems and instability in terms of project partners (turnover), that they would be increasingly turning to other forms of cooperation, such as more ad hoc (pontuais) projects (instead of structural, or capacity-building) and trilateral arrangements (ibid). Similarly, another interviewee explained how significant delays in a project’s execution were a result of Haitian officials being difficult to work with, and having other objectives in mind (former Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015). However, the Brazilian side has a responsibility to adequately design and adjust projects so that they are appropriate to the resources that are available to them. Furthermore, these anecdotes have potentially troubling implications for the Brazilians’ long-term commitment to ensuring ownership and sustainability in Haiti.

On the other hand, the inattention to evaluation risks placing most of the responsibility for development results on Haiti. Eventual failures, or the breakdown of results over the long-term become a product of the Haitian state’s instability, either
because of a lack of political will, or because of insufficient resources. However, any such outcomes should also be interpreted as a failure of the Brazilian model to properly account for the partner context. Without proper evaluation furthermore, Brazil is not accountable to its partners or to its citizens (as the ultimate funders) for any weaknesses in its cooperation.

Coherence

Brazilian SSC does not demonstrate coherence with its other foreign policy engagements with Haiti. As outlined in Chapter 4, economic forms of cooperation with Haiti have remained marginal. In contrast, MINUSTAH represents Brazil’s other main form of engagement with the country internally, while externally, although not a “true” example of foreign policy, the migration of Haitians to Brazil has nevertheless presented an issue for coherence. Regarding the former, the intention of the Brazilian state was to design a form of intervention that would take development into account; the focus on peace-building rather than peace-keeping reflects Brazil’s desire to be the cornerstone of state-building processes (Nieto, 2012), and its belief that peace could not be achieved without attention to socio-economic issues, which is consistent with so-called “third-generation peacekeeping operations” (Feldmann et al., 2012, p. 48). MINUSTAH’s immediate impact projects are one example of how the mission attempted to realize its development objectives. However, the operation, as previously noted, has been criticized for failing to enact the conceptual challenge it had hoped for, and is ultimately seen as closely resembling Western-led peace-keeping efforts (see Seitenfus, 2014). As well, I argued in earlier Chapters that Haitian respondents typically perceived MINUSTAH
negatively, and viewed development and humanitarian initiatives as potential compensation for military involvement, which were underfunded relative to MINUSTAH (Haitian official and civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015). These tensions have likely amplified since 2015 as public opinion became even more resolutely against the Mission (Bachega, 2014).

On migration, the official welcoming of migrants as part of the humanitarian visa allowances are coherent with Brazilian expressions of solidarity. The Brazilian newspaper O Globo reported in 2016 that the number of Haitians entering Brazil illegally through Acre had declined by 96% as a result of the extension of the visa (Fulgêncio), which is of great significance for the individuals and families prevented from having to take the precarious journey. In practice however, issues of poor treatment disrupt this narrative, even if they largely occur privately, and not as a direct result of state policy or inaction (as reported in news, for example Puff, 2015).

Efficiency

Returning to development and humanitarian efforts specifically, the Brazilians have taken some notable steps in improving project efficiency. Positive changes to socioeconomic indicators and perceptions that projects address needed areas speak to an effective management. For example, the project aimed at strengthening agricultural production by targeting seed quality and distribution provided farmers with technical support related to growing seeds, storing them, and packaging them for sale. According to one Haitian bureaucrat, the initiative resulted in improved costs for farmers who can spend less on seeds than they have in the past because they can expect more of the plants to survive (in author’s interviews, 2015). Farmer groups confirmed that the project had
led to improvements in terms of knowledge and revenue (in author’s interviews, 2015). While the Nippes pilot project was not yet implemented, the Haitian responsible, referring to the guaranteed school purchase element, argued it was a “very good initiative” due to the situation of food insecurity in Haiti (in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). The project aims to incorporate 23 schools, 3,500 students, and 1,500 farmers (Brazilian and Haitian officials and IO representatives in author’s interviews, 2015).

The reception to the health projects was similarly enthusiastic. School administrators interviewed concerning the milk project were unhappy that the project was over, describing it in positive terms: milk of a high quality, locally sourced, and regularly distributed; they also attributed the program to lowering the rate of student absences (in author’s interviews, 2015). In a personal communication describing humanitarian efforts as of June 2015 (I was told in an interview that an evaluation was done but it was not shared with me), 84,751 students between the ages of 6 and 12 had received milk. An original project document shared with me does not indicate the number of students expected to receive milk but does outline the expectation that 24,079 students are expected to have improved attendance. Finally, the completion of the Institute was also well-received, described variously as: “modern”; accessible (since services are free); and high-quality care that responds to multiple dimensions of needs (due to the different types of medical professionals available, from physiotherapists to psychologists) (Haitian bureaucrats, medical professionals, and civil society respondents in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). The Institute was expected to provide care to approximately 4,000 people per month (ABC, 2012a). The training aspect was further praised in general terms
(medical doctors in author’s interviews, 2015). The Institute was, however, also subject to problems because of the accounting disagreement and resultant loss of staff mentioned previously, which also led to a temporary shut-down of the Institute. I discuss this challenge at greater length in the context of sustainability below.

In particular, flexibility in execution and the types of solutions being implemented carry a number of benefits. Attention to flexibility is related to Brazil’s focus on constant participation, and was praised by Haitian counterparts. Described for instance as “different from other forms [of cooperation], problems that arise are resolved” instead of having to rigidly adhere to the original project objectives (Haitian medical doctor quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). The types of solutions implemented are also seen as appropriate to the Haitian context. As explained in Chapter 6, the gains from the seed project, for instance, were attributed to Brazil’s specific model, which, according to a Haitian government partner, focuses on small farmers as a “continuation of their own philosophy” and therefore resonates with Haiti’s rural agricultural situation (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Significantly, a number of initiatives were also linked to activities that were already underway. The milk project, as one example, is one part of longstanding efforts to improve milk production that have been led by the Haitian organization Veterimed (Brazilian and Haitian officials in author’s interviews, 2015; Schaaf, 2008). In theory, technical solutions are also expected to be of low cost since they are offered by Brazilians with the requisite expertise.

Many of these outcomes have limitations, however, and the overall picture is mixed. For example, while Brazilian cooperation makes the most gains in achieving flexibility in its implementation, the corollary is that the approach is not time-efficient. A
Brazilian respondent argued that while they were successful in creating a government partnership, they lost both time and money as a result (in author’s interviews, 2015). The provision of technical expertise from Brazilians may be low-cost, but it can negatively affect project progress as there is constant turnover in the partners involved. In the cases I examined, this was a complaint the Brazilians had about their Haitian counterparts, and not the reverse (in author’s interviews, 2015), but it was raised in the public evaluation (Plan Políticas Públicas & Articulação Sul, 2016). A more glaring concern is that the models are simply not well-attuned to Haitian circumstances over the long-term. This problem of suitability can arise in terms of either institutional factors or how the development problem is understood; here I discuss the latter, returning to the issue of institutional coherence when discussing sustainability. In interviews, projects were consistently described as meeting Haitian demands, yet there were also worrying signals that how they were being conceptualized was not fully aligned with the problems they were intended to ameliorate. For instance, in the case of the seed project, farmers sell the higher-quality seeds they produce as a result of the production support using 50-kilo bags. Traditionally, Haitians buy smaller packages that are approximately 5 pounds (using a measure called a marmite) (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015). The difference may seem small, but marketing in the standard package would make it much likelier that farmers purchase the seeds in the absence of a market organized by FAO – where farmers are given vouchers to purchase the seeds (ibid). When discussing the Institute, a Haitian official noted that although the public availability of medical services is a significant step in meeting the needs of Haitians with disabilities, without access to free medicine patients are unlikely to follow-up with their treatment (in author’s
interviews, 2015). To conclude, efficiency is one area where humanitarian and
development efforts have realized considerable progress in the short-term, yet even the
positive aspects can have their downsides, and, more significantly, initiatives may not be
sufficiently adapted to the partner context that they can continue to have favourable
outcomes over the longer term.

*Empowerment*

Brazilian cooperation has made mixed strides in addressing empowerment. While
meeting the needs of certain marginalized groups, there is no obvious attempt to address
inequalities in an intersectional way. However, a longer view of Haiti’s political economy
reveals how disruptive the content of these projects is when considering race.

More positively, all of the initiatives seek betterment of the lives of the poorest
and other marginalized groups, specifically those with disabilities, and have progressed in
their attainment of these objectives. The focus on rural development, as noted, has been a
long-neglected area of traditional aid, and the Haitian government has consistently laid
out priorities in official plans, such as the promotion of rural agriculture, to address these
challenges. Although the Institute is an unprecedented achievement in meeting the needs
of people living with disabilities, one respondent noted that it does serve only the greater
Port-au-Prince area (medical doctor in author’s interviews, 2015), reflecting broader
rural-urban divides in terms of available services.

In contrast, there was no explicit focus on addressing inequalities in intersectional
terms. Neither gender nor race was once discussed as a concern of cooperation (author’s
interviews, 2015). Although there were rare instances where women held prominent
positions that made them targeted respondents, almost all of the interviews in Haiti were conducted were with men, including the school administrators and farmers.

Nevertheless, situating practices within the broader post-colonial political economy of Haiti reveals a sharp focus on racial inequalities. Any public investments, such as in education and health, received marginal attention from post-colonial regimes. Positive moves, such as “The Code Henry” under Christophe that required plantation owners to provide health care, still existed in the context of the unequal plantation system, and it is difficult to say if it was enforced (Dubois, 2012). Arguing that the reason many foreign observers misunderstood some of the support for Duvalier, for instance, Nicholls (1979, p. 247) explains how,

The government has never seen its duties as including a responsibility for the welfare of its individual subjects in general…the fact his [Duvalier’s] government did almost nothing to improve the lot of the average Haitian was irrelevant to his claims to legitimacy.

Not only was the commitment under Jean-Claude extremely low, state expenditures also came to be increasingly concentrated in Port-au-Prince (20% of the population received 80% of expenses) (Trouillot, 1990, p. 183). In addition to the weight represented by aid money, health needs have been financed privately by users fees, which the poorest cannot afford (Arnousse & Yves-Antoine, 2008). A recent report from the MSPP on national health between 2013-2014 noted that the state funded only 6% of their expenses, representing 8% of the GDP (MSPP, 2017). Thus, even where projects do not sufficiently overcome rural-urban polarization (as in the case of the Institute), the stepping up of state involvement in health care provision for the black majority is a radical move in a historical sense. Furthermore, the significance of projects that respond to rural agricultural needs is difficult to overstate once placed in its post-colonial context. Beyond
neglect from foreign and domestic elites, for many rural Haitians, efforts to practice "counter-plantation" systems have been a constant that represent not only an alternative economic practice, but also a space to exert political agency outside the reach of the state (Dubois, 2012). Moreover, given that “the counter-plantation system as it was practiced in Haiti registered only [for elites] as an absence, or an obstacle to progress” (ibid, Chapter 7, p. 26), the recognition of its importance by Brazilian and Haitian authorities is hugely significant in political terms.

Empowerment, however, is more than addressing the needs of marginalized groups. Closely related to notions of inclusive partnership, NeST (2015, p. 41) posits that empowerment also occurs with the “inclusion of marginalized population groups in the planning and implementation of the SSC initiative”. As discussed, Brazil’s policies around non-conditionality and non-interference have meant that it generally does not specify how the partner country should engage society more broadly, with the exception of trilateral arrangements with IOs that often mandate these provisions. As a result, where empowerment occurs, it has been a result of the Haitian state’s initiative. In the case of agricultural producers involved in the seed project, farmers participating generally expressed their satisfaction (in author’s interviews, 2015); however, they also commented that the program needed to offer other supports: such as offering irrigation projects, grain storage, mills, and tool banks (ibid). The criticism suggests, and by no means definitively given the methodological limitations in speaking to these participants, that farmers have been trained but not necessarily consulted as to what their ultimate goals are.

Empowerment is, in short, uncertain. Furthermore, the absence of women farmers potentially indicates that supports for their inclusion were also absent. Further research,
including interviews with Haitians who have used services in the Institute - beyond the medical doctors and other administrators responsible for its management - would give a better indication as to whether they felt that the trained staff were sensitive and qualified to address their needs. Similarly, because the field visits to examine the seed and milk projects were conducted with the help of FAO, its presence may have softened any discontent that was expressed to me. Regardless, the fact that broader notions of empowerment are left to the state’s prerogative is undoubtedly a limit of Brazilian cooperation.

Sustainability

Sustainability is a crucial measure of whether Brazilian cooperation has been successful due to the significance placed on its achievement through strategies of building partnership and designing appropriate interventions. I argue that capacity-building has been an emphasis of cooperation, and leads to immediate gains in terms of more individualized capacity. It has not, however, appeared to position Haitian partners to undergo broader institutional change, and the long-term benefits remain uncertain.

Attention to capacity-building is an obvious priority of the Brazilians involved, and it is put into practice through their participatory approach, as well as the focus on learning exchange. As a result, projects have been aligned with government priorities and with existing institutions. While participatory mechanisms ensure that capacity development can occur on an individual level however, it is not clear that mechanisms were also put in place to ensure change is transferred to the broader institutional or social level; in the words of ABC, projects did not seem able to “prepare the direct beneficiaries
to adapt the shared experiences and knowledge to their own reality and to continue to effectively apply the developed capacities…after the withdrawal of cooperation” (2013, p. 72). Taking the example of the milk project, addressing food insecurity through the provision of free food is a fairly universal, common sense approach. Particular challenges are found in the details. How, for instance, does the project work in the absence of an external donor? Thus, while assumptions about the relevance of Brazilian models may lead to inefficiency should they misinterpret or ignore contextual details, as seen above, they can also impact sustainability when the details relate to institutional characteristics, such as funding availability. It was also not apparent that the capacities of existing institutions were accurately estimated. This is most conspicuous in terms of the Institute, which faced considerable setbacks – the loss of trained staff - because the ability of the Haitian side to provide accounting according to the expectations of the Brazilians was overestimated. According to Haitians involved who did blame their side for the mistake, the problem resulted from the permanence of a different mindset, regular absences, etc. (medical doctors in author’s interviews, 2015).

Whether benefits will be sustained is also only answerable in the longer-term. Nevertheless, an apparent inability to read the Haitian context, coupled with a lack of mechanisms to promote broader institutional change, would suggest these outcomes are unlikely. Moreover, it is extremely significant that Brazilians themselves expressed their move away from structural projects because of the perceived difficulties working in the Haitian context (officials in author’s interviews, 2015).
Mutual benefit

The principle of mutual benefit did not appear to have been realized, nor did it seem to be a priority of Brazilian efforts. As benefits for Haitians have already been discussed, I only treat the question of whether the Brazilian side also gained from cooperation. The idea of mutual benefit emphasizes knowledge exchange as a two-way process so that Brazilian technicians would also adapt programs and policies according to innovations they observe. I found no evidence that this take-up had taken place. Indeed, in interviews there was not a single Brazilian respondent who could describe any influence of partner practices on their own actions – even when prompted directly (in author’s interviews, 2015). These interviews included Brazilians who had participated in projects in countries other than Haiti, indicating that this was not specific to the Haitian case (ibid). The failure to enact this principle is a signal of other potential limitations. First, it problematizes the notion that cooperation is a horizontal relationship. Parallel to the swing towards projects that are ameliorative without working towards structural change, this unidirectional flow may also indicate that Brazilian practice is reinforcing troubling representations of the Haitian state as absent. Moreover, the absence of mutual benefit as understood in this way could suggest a general rigidity of the Brazilians involved to following their own models. Thus, building on the analysis of some of the negative aspects of efficiency noted above, a lack of openness to Haitian actions might also translate into a similar failure to adjust interventions to best practices already underway in-country. An example from the milk project demonstrates this risk. The project, which builds upon existing efforts in Haiti led by Haitians, was described to me as having gone through a particularly lengthy negotiation period by a Brazilian involved
(in author’s interviews, 2015). For this respondent, the time was viewed as necessary for building the relationship, and especially as a way to create trust between the partners (ibid), both of which are positive indications of Brazil’s commitment to ownership. Yet the tone of the discussion also conveyed that the lengthy process was ultimately to get Haitians on board with Brazil’s ideas as to how the project should unfold; in his words, the lost years and lost money were a “high price for something we realized at the beginning” (in author’s interviews, 2015). The efforts of Brazilians to truly partner with their Haitian counterparts are remarkable, but they do not erase all issues of inequity in these power-laden relationships.

In this section, I have provided an extensive evaluation of the case study projects according to the adapted framework, which accommodates principles of South-South Cooperation with long-standing notions of what makes aid effective. The analysis is not based on full information, especially in light of the refusal to share project evaluations, and can only identify trends. Regardless, the defining benefits and weaknesses of cooperation are clear. Brazilian cooperation is notable for its efforts to ensure ownership, alignment and efficiency, although the emphasis placed on strengthening state-state relations has its downfalls in addressing issues of more inclusive ownership and sustainability. The pursuit of harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability remains weak. There is little demonstration of coherence with other foreign policy efforts. Likewise, the active consideration of mutual benefit was missing. Finally, steps have been taken to realize empowerment and sustainability in the short-term but their long-term effects are less certain.
In the next section, I discuss the implications of this analysis in terms of Brazil’s focus of practices on building partnership and designing appropriate interventions. As a result, I return to notions of ownership, sustainability, and efficiency as a way to outline weaknesses and contingencies in Brazil’s approach, especially where these principles are considered together.

7.3 Brazilian and Haitian Institutions

First, the politics of Brazilian and Haitian institutions impact the sustainability of projects and the model itself. Brazil’s institutional workings can harm cooperation due to resource-related and more political questions. The Brazilian government is cognizant that technical cooperation is dependent on internal and external factors to guarantee project sustainability: whereas external factors would refer to those mainly under the Haitian government’s control, internal factors include issues such as whether the Brazilian government guarantees effective participation, and whether it is prepared to adapt its experiences (ABC, 2013).

Because Brazil lacks a legal framework to directly transfer financial resources to partner countries, and furthermore because its provision of technical cooperation is premised on providing expertise and not resources, the model has a number of challenges that distinguish it from traditional cooperation. For one, development projects that rely on the provision of technical expertise depend on human resources for their success. However, the continuity and engagement of personnel is challenging when these same technicians have full-time jobs in Brazil. While turnover of Brazilian partners was not raised by Haitians in relation to these projects, it is a finding of the Cotton-4 project,
prompting the evaluators’ suggestion to develop incentives for Brazilians to participate in addition to their home duties (Plan Políticas Públicas & Articulação Sul, 2016). It was also a weakness acknowledged by many Brazilians themselves (in author’s interview, 2015). In Haiti, the Brazilian staff involved were praised for being present and involved, with one respondent noting, for example, that they were in constant communication despite the technicians not residing there (medical doctor in author’s interviews, 2015). While there was not as stark of a divide between men and women in terms of who participated in cooperation on the Brazilian end, most of the staff were men, suggesting that the necessity of travel could be at odds with familial responsibilities, which are often primarily assumed by women. Nevertheless, this positive development, and how it lays the groundwork for ensuring sustainability and ownership, should be viewed as a result of the commitment of individuals involved and not necessarily as a result of the system, which does not incentivize or otherwise guarantee participation. In the case of the humanitarian projects examined, Brazil has to transfer its financial contributions through UN agencies. As mentioned, referring to these arrangements in general, some Brazilians felt constrained in how projects were designed or carried out (in author’s interviews, 2015). One respondent thus described dialogue with IOs as “very fragile” (Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Again, while there were no specific examples from the case studies, the sentiment was that these arrangements could limit the progressive character of Brazilian interventions. There was also a sense that the financial support was very minimal and would not generate large-scale impacts (IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015).
Given the model’s emphasis on partnership, changes in government directly impact the relation. As one Brazilian official quipped: “SSC is a horizontal conversation. And when partners change, everything changes” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Even a shift of administrations of the same party – from Lula to Dilma – was perceived as having had tremendous impacts on the impact of Brazil in Haiti (various respondents, including Brazilian officials and academics in author’s interviews, 2015)\(^\text{39}\).

This is an issue that is in no way particular to Brazil, yet the reliance on technicians from Brazil’s own ministries means that foreign policy is directly touched by domestic changes, not simply similarly affected because of ideological and strategic changes that change domestic and foreign policy directions. Following Dilma’s impeachment in 2016, one analyst thus commented that, “technical cooperation has counted on the participation of government organs that have been completely altered or extinguished by the existing government” (Fingermann, 2016; my translation).

For the most part, interviewees could speak to the more technical aspects of projects, and only indirectly to the high-level decision-making processes that resulted in cooperation in the first place. In this sense, the state-state form of ownership is still a multi-dimensional relationship, involving bureaucrats at different levels as well as Ministers and other political actors. The politics of cooperation underlie what projects get undertaken, and how they are designed and implemented. Decisions for primarily political reasons have happened, with examples given to me of projects that were announced by Lula and the executing agencies had to figure out how they would design and implement the initiative (various officials speaking beyond Haiti in author’s

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\(^{39}\) As one Brazilian official quipped angrily, “Dilma knows nothing about foreign policy” (in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation).
The Institute was the result of a direct request to Brazil by President Préval (Haitian and Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). Importantly, political questions also impact where the Brazilian government remains silent. According to one technician, they refused to broach an issue because they knew it would be politically sensitive, despite identifying it as a necessary step towards achieving the project’s objectives (Brazilian official in author’s interviews, 2015). Broadly, there is a sense, as one respondent put it, of “want[ing] to be sure the Haitian government leads the way, whether or not [it] leads anywhere” (former advisor to the Haitian government quoted in author’s interviews, 2015).

However, somewhat paradoxically, decision-making may not only exclude important technical considerations however, but, as I argue above, but Brazilian politics can produce a risk of biasing initiatives towards Brazil’s domestic development model given these are the backdrop to its reputation as a useful global partner (see Stolte, 2015). For the most part this dynamic would play out subtly, as in the failure of the seed project to account for marketing specifics. Yet an IO respondent also described a project that appeared “pre-cooked” as it had not come from a “country expression of interest”, and had resulted in long negotiations in order to get it “reasonably aligned with government needs” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). While the stress on partnership may mean that projects are not designed or carried out efficiently, it may also impact sustainability where the constraints of Haitian institutions are disregarded.

Returning to the humanitarian model’s basis in working with IOs, furthermore, the difficulty is that there can be a certain “path dependency” at work as projects tend to conform to previous initiatives that have been undertaken. The process for approving the
seed project was described to me as FAO wanting a program on seed supply and milk production, with the eventual project “basically a continuation of FAO’s promotion of GPAS” (Group producteurs artisanes de semences – Group of Artisan Seed Producers) (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015). This continuation is not inherently negative, but, combined with the politics of cooperation occurring at such a high level, there is a possibility that more technical considerations are ignored as political preferences and longstanding practices prevent innovation and adaptation. In this way, (political) ownership and external influence can undermine efficiency, as projects do not fully meet local demands, and can eventually impact sustainability.

Without viewing Haiti as an unproblematic case of a “failed” or “fragile” state, the state does present specific challenges in terms of the resources that are available and political leadership. The Brazilian approach demonstrates a certain naivety in assuming that the Haitian state is consistently developmentally oriented, and free from other political or economic motivations. A number of respondents shared stories of those in the bureaucracy who would impede progress by effectively strong-arming the other partners (Brazilian official and IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015). While these instances may be rare, and may also arise over genuinely contested issues and not for the purpose of benefitting from state resources, Brazil cannot approach the state as a neutral entity, nor assume that it shares the same concern with poverty reduction championed by the PT administrations. One example was given to me of Brazil having declined a request from Haiti for a cable car because it was “beyond what they found appropriate”, but, more generally, respondents described a hesitancy of Brazil to intervene in sensitive areas (former advisor to Haitian government quoted in author’s interviews and bilateral aid
The question of whether partnerships are inclusive is also relevant here. As previously discussed, Brazil’s stance towards civil society and broader involvement is that it will defer to its partner state. In terms of Brazil’s general presence in the country, this led to criticisms that Brazil was acting “in complicity” with President Martelly (Haitian civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015).

Both Haiti and Brazil may also not adequately account for the government’s capacity in terms of resources, which is an issue that is particularly important when considering how more humanitarian efforts can be sustained over the longer-term. A failure to understand existing institutions’ capacities was glaring. Describing the Institute and the hospitals that were built by the Brazilian government, for instance, one Brazilian respondent noted that they had not anticipated that the Haitian state would not be able to step in with the day-to-day costs, and had ultimately decided to repeat some of the training, as well as to provide funding for maintenance costs for three years (in author’s interviews, 2015). Humanitarian projects, in turn, face the general problem of the state not being able to absorb the initiatives once projects finish. In the case of the seed project, one issue is that the state will not be able to guarantee purchase as FAO has done with its seed fairs (and cannot, as I return to below), which FAO has tried to circumvent by doing projects back-to-back (IO representative in author’s interviews, 2015). Likewise, the pilot project for Nippes was already anticipated as being unsustainable because of political will and budget questions, with an IO partner commenting that “Brazil’s approach is valid…but in reality, I’m doubtful it works in a fragile state” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). The strategy of prioritizing partnerships between governments has a number of positive benefits, yet inattention to questions of resources and the
politics of cooperation have either directly limited the ability of projects to meet their objectives, or clearly have limitations in their ability to continue to do so.

7.4 Partnership and the Appropriateness of Interventions

The interplay between principles of ownership and efficiency also produces important questions as to how strategies of prioritizing partnership are circumscribed by reliance on post-neoliberal blueprints. The rhetoric of demand-driven support defines how Brazilians speak about cooperation. As one official explained, “we teach what we have done, but we don’t say what they have to do” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Brazilians also raise doubts concerning applicability to their own situations (various officials in author’s interviews, 2015). Nevertheless, as I argued above, the nature of interventions tends to look remarkably like what has been done domestically in Brazil, which was also remarked upon by several interview respondents (academics and civil society representatives in author’s interviews, 2015); on the surface, these models may have some relevancy, especially as issues such as rural productivity or malnutrition are universal, yet their details can present a mismatch with important aspects of the Haitian context, as with the measurement used to market seeds, or the guaranteed purchase aspect of cyclical interventions found in the seed and milk projects. This discordance raises concerns about the extent to which Brazil truly is characterized by, as one Haitian put it, “permanent listening” (medical doctor quoted in author’s interviews, 2015). Moreover, the tension underlines the fact that SSC simply cannot escape the inherent inequities of cooperation. Despite all of Brazil’s intentions to create horizontal partnerships, the nature of sharing its “model” experiences creates a dynamic of Haiti
needing to learn from Brazil. The difficulty that Brazilians had in articulating what they had concretely learned from partnerships (in author’s interviews, 2015) suggests that they remain in a “teacher” mindset. Given that donors’ influence is so pervasive in Haiti, the minimal financial weight of Brazil may help to consolidate its image as a softer, more benevolent power, yet the dynamic of student/teacher is also inherently imbalanced. As well, it may be minimal, but any financial amount places the “donor” in the privileged position. One Haitian respondent thus described how the Ministry was on board with Brazil and the partner IO, but that the Ministry was a relatively less important player: “he who pays the piper calls the tune” (“celui qui donne, ordonne”) (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Strengthened partnerships may be an important outcome of Brazilian cooperation, but the persistence of experts means that it cannot be a partnership of equals.

7.5  The Sustainability of Appropriate Interventions

Finally, while the push to implement Brazilian experiences may impede attainment of partnership, it also has effects on sustainability. Assumptions about the relevancy of Brazilian models have prevented sustainable improvements in addressing the identified problems, and at worst may actually destroy existing capacity. Above I pointed out how the seed project assumed some common features that were not present in Haiti, such as marketing practices, which can limit the extent to which the project actually responds to demands; when thinking about project sustainability moreover, central assumptions of the cyclical model, whereby improvements to productivity link to guaranteed purchase and eventual widespread distribution, simply do not hold. As one
bureaucrat explained to me, in Haiti the farmer associations do not have legal status so
they cannot sell to the state or enter into binding contracts (in author’s interviews, 2015). Thus, the model cannot be sustained in the absence of external support. As already noted, the sustainability of these guaranteed purchase models is also not assured when the government is unlikely to have the resources necessary to step in as the guarantor. The Institute and the state’s inability to take on the everyday costs presents a similar issue. These features are not simply details of projects that can be adjusted to better conform to reality but represent major, defining aspects of project design that effectively ensure the projects cannot continue. Although Brazil’s own similar programs can be criticized for alleviating poverty only through persistent intervention – and hence not promoting structural change, the difference between variable external charity and social investment as a right of citizenship is a considerable one.

The application of Brazilian models may also harm the existing capacities of Haitian institutions. As I argued above, the accounting requirements for the Institute were not met by those responsible, which resulted in project delays, and ultimately a loss of the capacity that had been built up through the training component (Haitian and Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). A Brazilian I spoke with stressed their fear that the positive relations they had built up actually meant Haitians were committing themselves beyond what was available to them (in author’s interviews, 2015). In short, the cases I examined demonstrate how Brazil’s approach has been appropriate as a model for donor intervention, but it does not function well as proposed domestic policy.

7.6 Repercussions for Brazil
Given these various flaws in the cooperation model, I return briefly to the question of how cooperation supports Brazilian ambition to be a post-neoliberal, global power. In this and the final section, I will discuss what, if any, lessons for global development cooperation the Brazilian experience in Haiti provides. In previous Chapters, I have argued that the practice of cooperation has helped Brazil to achieve global power status. However, the discussion above presents a number of clear limitations on how cooperation has been pursued, suggesting there is a tension between what cooperation has actually achieved, and how it has been perceived. I will outline a number of rationales for this gap, before emphasizing my contention that this achievement of increased global stature has very much been a temporary one.

First, despite the problems that have been analyzed in this Chapter, the Brazilian model has performed very well in a number of areas, namely ownership (in a limited sense), alignment, efficiency, and sustainability (again, in a limited sense, to more individual levels). The Brazilians’ concern for what I have referred to as building partnership and designing appropriate interventions have resulted in technical and humanitarian cooperation that: defers to government priorities, aligns with existing systems, meets the needs of marginalized communities, and builds capacity of the institutions and individuals involved in the projects. These strategies are defined by their commitment to involving government partners for the purpose of meeting their objectives and strengthening institutions, and of offering support that is flexible and well-adapted to development challenges because it stems from lessons learned in Brazil. On a simple level then, cooperation excels in these areas because they have been those prioritized by Brazilian officials based on its conception of the development problematic. One
contribution of the post-colonial frame is thus the ability to take Brazilian practices seriously by understanding their origins. Moreover, reading post-colonial practices demonstrates how evaluations of SSC are set against traditional aid that has been deficient in terms of ownership and its inappropriate interventions vis-à-vis actual country needs. Aid is, in short, intelligible as a post-colonial practice in that it has worked – incompletely, and while introducing new tensions - to overturn the vertical delivery of universal models – followed by traditional development players. Inversely, cooperation has exhibited deficiencies in those areas that have not aligned well with principles, or have conflicted with other ambitions. For example, evaluation has remained marginal or hidden both because assumptions around partnership are based on the logic that meeting development needs is a product of alignment with government priorities, and hesitancy to interfere with sovereignty. Likewise, empowerment cannot be guaranteed (at least not inherently) through cooperation because ownership is defined in such limited terms.

Not only do these features cohere with Brazil’s stated principles of SSC, they are striking in the Haitian context where assumptions about state fragility have led to the bypassing of the state and its institutions. To summarize the arguments raised previously, the successes and failings of Brazilian cooperation are legible only in the historical context of Haiti’s relationships with traditional donors broadly, and in the particular areas of health and agriculture. The implementation of ownership is amplified by the fact that most aid to Haiti is still delivered beyond the state. Partnership involves responding to government priorities, such as the long-expressed desire for interventions targeting problems of rural development, rather than continuing to focus on donor preferences for export-led agricultural models. As well, alignment, as in the building of the Institute as a
public institution, runs counter to the trend of privatizing health services. These efforts build the capacity of individuals and groups involved in the projects, even if concerns remain as to their longevity past project end dates. It is primarily this contextualization that helps to explain why cooperation has been positively received despite having some significant failings.

Brazil may also be excused from some criticism because of the softer, symbolic qualities of the relationship. Even the humanitarian projects (which do involve the provision of financial resources) undoubtedly remain small in scale – such as the contribution of only US $300,000 in 2014 to the seed project. Yet if projects serve primarily to strengthen government-government ties, as I have argued, then the lack of funds may actually help to support this objective. Given that donors’ influence is so pervasive in Haiti, and that in areas like agriculture the priorities of external assistance have had so many deleterious effects, then the minimal financial weight of Brazil may contribute to its image as a more benevolent power. In a reference to health projects where Brazil was perceived as having insufficient resources, another bilateral donor thus commented that perhaps Brazil’s weight is “symbolic” (quoted in author’s interviews, 2015; my translation). Again, ideas about South-South solidarity and partnership are part of how Brazil can establish its moral authority. As an emerging power, there was also recognition that Brazil’s support had limitations because it still faced problems domestically (Haitian official in author’s interviews, 2015).

The symbolic aspects of this post-colonial relationship also extend to Haiti. The foreign policy behaviour of emerging powers exists in this context, but so too do the responses from partner nations like Haiti. Brazil’s entrance as a potential cooperation
partner provides a material diversification of cooperation since they offer different types of projects, respond to neglected priorities, etc., yet it also challenges the authority of the West on an ideational level, and how that authority has historically viewed and acted in states like Haiti. Especially because Haiti is usually viewed through the “fragile state” lens, efforts on behalf of the Brazilians to execute development activities in partnership re-make Haiti’s identity from a subordinate state in the global system to a government recognized as having legitimacy and autonomy. Thus, material and ideational factors must be reconciled, and how it is only through the productive nature of language that subjects are defined and practices are legitimated (Hansen, 2006). As Mawdsley (2010) has argued, the attention to horizontal relationships enables more respectful relations, even if these relations do not fully resolve questions of equity, and indeed can introduce new tensions.

Moreover, the analysis of empowerment also uncovers the social meaning of cooperation in terms of traditional relations between the Haitian state and society. Stepping inwards from a more global racialized political economy to the post-colonial context within Haiti reveals how, whether or not it is intentional, projects that support public healthcare and rural production are extremely disruptive when placed historically. Post-neoliberal models do not only represent a confirmation of Haitian sovereignty writ large, they represent a refutation of what Trouillot (1990) refers to as the polarization between political and civil society in post-colonial Haiti.

Attention in short must be given to identities as relational, whereby Brazil’s engagement with Haiti shifts how it sees itself and how it is viewed by others. For instance, while the Haitian government may gain more power domestically because of
Brazil’s respect for its authority, Brazil’s drive to global power is contingent upon the support of developing countries like Haiti. The support is therefore premised on a radical notion – in current discourse – of the Haitian government as an active development agent. Moreover, the strategy of appropriate interventions invokes similarities between nations so that signs of “underdeveloped” are embedded with more positive signs (a partner like “us”), thus potentially signifying more positive identity constructions – such as underdeveloped but motivated to overcome various obstacles. These representations are in stark contrast to the notions of absence that permeate development discourse and practice, both in general, and when Haiti is spoken about.

Finally, we should not expect that the positive political outcomes Brazil has gained will be long-lasting. I want to highlight several features of the Haitian and Brazilian environments that have the potential to erode the political gains that have been made. On the one hand, the minimal concept of ownership being practiced by Brazil can lead to challenges from several sides, especially if the quality of governance deteriorates. First, there is the potential for Brazil to face increased resistance from Haitian citizens and civil society groups if it continues to be perceived as acting in collusion with the government. Second, since Brazil gains legitimacy as an emerging power based on its reception from Haiti and other, existing powers, it must be very careful that the perception of the international community is not that it is undermining standards of good governance (a criticism typically leveled at China). Lastly, and this problem was just beginning to emerge as indicated in the interviews, there is a risk of backlash from state institutions who do not feel that Brazil is adequately accounting for key characteristics of the context, such as resource gaps. In a sense, and I return to this in the conclusion, Haiti
presents a “critical” case in that it dramatically underlines what risks cooperation as a form of political engagement can produce. Relatedly, the longer Brazil provides cooperation, the more it will be expected to have overcome some of the mistakes that are more understandable coming from a “newer” provider. Political developments in Brazil also have immediate repercussions on its foreign policy behaviour. As Burges and Daudelin (2014, p. 20) aptly describe it, Lula offered something of a “Golden Age of Presidential Diplomacy”, and Brazil generated expectations that it could not live up to during the Dilma administrations. As discussed, the inability to meet rising expectations was compounded by the fact that the transition to Dilma’s governments was largely perceived as signifying a disinterest in foreign policy, not simply the result of a different environment (Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015; Burges, 2014; Costa Vaz, 2014). The impeachment of Dilma in 2016, and the subsequent Temer government of the PMDB also underline how contingent this approach is. While I return to outcomes for cooperation specifically in the Conclusion, Temer has not only been seen by the international community as an illegitimate leader, but also is criticized by domestic observers as returning to a mindset of the neoliberal era – where, for example, the focus is on building ties with traditional powers - that will reinforce Brazilian dependency in the global political economy (Grupo de Reflexão sobre Relações Internacionais, 2017). It is, in short, doubtful that cooperation can generate meaningful political change for Brazil over the long-term.

7.7 Lessons for Development Cooperation
In this last section, I contend that Brazilian cooperation offers a number of distinct lessons for providers of development cooperation. On one level, this examination of Brazilian cooperation with Haiti seems to repeat the “same old story” of development cooperation, where providers fail to realize their own stated principles as broader foreign policy ambitions collide with development aims. While one of Brazil’s main strategies has been to design appropriate interventions for example, it has a tendency to fall back on universalistic assumptions in promoting policies that resemble its own domestic policies. These assumptions are no less problematic simply because they come from another developing country. Indeed, I have argued that the project case studies present major drawbacks in thinking that the state can take on functions that the Brazilian state could.

Nevertheless, it is useful to draw out some of the more nuanced lessons that Brazil’s model of cooperation provides. I will focus on lessons learned in the areas of ownership, efficiency and sustainability respectively because of their centrality to the strategies of building partnerships and designing appropriate interventions. The discussion will be brief given that it reiterates many of the findings explained earlier.

On ownership, the Brazilians’ commitment to engaging with their partner state is novel, and stands out relative to the ways in which many donors have engaged with Haiti over the years. However, the concept of ownership remains highly constricted. Given the priority the Brazilian state places on principles of sovereignty and non-interference, it is unlikely that Brazil will mandate more inclusive practices, such as consultation with stakeholders. Instead, Brazil should, in extreme cases, have criteria for considering whether it will partner with a state in the first place. This is not to suggest some variant of the good governance agenda, where Brazil would condition its support on governance as
defined by liberal democratic norms (Hayman, 2011). Yet the neo-structuralist/post-neoliberal approach to development, where the state is the primary driver of progress, is also problematic insofar as it assumes the state will re-distribute gains. What the Brazilian example does in short is raise a crucial discussion as to what happens once Paris Principles are actually enacted: what does ownership achieve in terms of development outcomes? The study is certainly encouraging insofar as projects were widely seen as needed and relatively successful from Haitian elites and participants alike (in author’s interviews, 2015).

A more likely scenario would be the development of specific mechanisms for engaging with states on governance issues. Central to this would be recognition of where states simply lack resources, and where politics remains elite-driven, with problems such as political capture, since analytical precision in itself has been a challenge (Nay, 2013). For example, if the sustainability of the Institute is primarily a question of resources for quotidian costs, then the Brazilians should be potentially scaling back the infrastructure or services in advance, assessing what the state could afford, etc. Moreover, necessary attention to the roots of failed states that also examines external factors and informal institutions (ibid) should lead to Brazil advocating to other international providers for cooperation that truly engages with state institutions. These evaluations are obviously fraught with challenges, but the alternative, of acting neutral in the face of political consequences, also has repercussions. The answer is also certainly not, as a comment from a Brazilian official worryingly implies (in author’s interviews, 2015), to abandon this practice because it has been difficult.
Concerning efficiency, problems identified include timing and the wasting of other resources, and misunderstanding the full dimension of project needs. On the Brazilian side, timing issues could be improved by the use of incentives (as suggested by Plan Políticas Públicas and Articulação Sul in their 2016 evaluation) or institutional changes that would result in a development cadre (as recommended by the BRICS Policy Center, 2013; Cabral & Weinstock, 2010, etc.). In their relations with partners, Brazilians furthermore need to enable more technocratic forms of decision-making that would prevent the kinds of setbacks and roadblocks that are generated from the political move of ensuring Haitians are exercising ownership, and engage when necessary rather than remaining non-confrontational. The issue of sufficiently adapting Brazilian models also requires re-thinking. Brazil is not wrong in advocating for its domestic policy experiences to be implemented in other developing nations because of similarities, especially when there has existed high demand, but these have been assumed more than proven. In fact, Wolford and Nehring (2015) have demonstrated key differences in terms of land, labour, and money between Mozambique and Brazil, where cooperation has also been justified on the assumption of “parallels”. Brazil appears to be lacking a comprehensive environmental scan, in a broad sense, that determines where its models will work, and where they need modification. Again, this exercise is fundamentally a political one, and participatory evaluation methods in particular should be prioritized. The broader lesson for development cooperation is an obvious one, and long-standing: universal models, of any kind, are ill-advised.

Finally, greater attention to sustainability issues in project management could have a number of positive effects. My arguments around ways to establish conditions for
sustainability are also contingent upon recognition of cooperation as a political practice. More generally, comprehensive environmental scans need to anticipate the challenges and characteristics of the context better so that projects are designed to align with characteristics such as resources availability, cultural norms, and strengths and weaknesses of public systems (and their tensions with private systems). As one example, the social policies implemented in Brazil were accomplished in a situation of economic growth that Haiti has not experienced. An implication for Brazil and other providers may be to work in fewer countries so that they can invest in the research needed to understand the political, social, and economic environments. Lastly, Brazil’s cooperation with Haiti underlines how there is still a lack of understanding around how, exactly, it is possible to move from more individual to broader institutional changes. One step in this regard may be to re-conceptualize how institutional change is borne, moving away from linear assumptions. At the very least, the process should involve recognition of the political externalities that interfere with project realization.

7.8 Conclusion

This Chapter has considered how Brazilian cooperation has fared in meeting development and humanitarian goals in Haiti. After revisiting the initial evaluative criteria laid out in Chapter 2, the bulk of the Chapter was spent analyzing the delivery of cooperation according to each factor. The discussion highlighted several strengths of cooperation, particularly in the areas of ownership, alignment and efficiency, while also summarizing serious drawbacks in terms of managing for results, coherence with other foreign policy efforts, and achieving mutual benefit. Given that Brazilian cooperation, I
argue, has been defined by two central strategies of building partnerships and designing appropriate interventions, I examined several related principles in more detail, namely ownership, alignment and efficiency, and how they intersect. This exercise helped me to demonstrate how the successful aspects of cooperation have been highly contingent, and can conflict with each other, including where post-neoliberal models are in tension with existing institutional capacities. Finally, I put forward several rationales for why political gains have been generated by Brazil, and how they should also be expected to be short-lived. The argument in this Chapter thus presents an important addition to the findings in Chapters 5 and 6, where I emphasize the perceptions of Haitians to the projects undertaken, by showing how the overall record of cooperation is mixed when assessed against various principles for delivering cooperation. The discussion here is thus helpful in understanding the positive reception, and how principles like ownership are pursued in a post-colonial context, which includes existing donor relations in Haiti that have privileged the universalistic knowledge of traditional development experts. Significantly, the application of empowerment also enables a more nuanced interpretation of the content of projects, one that is more consistent with the post-colonial analysis of internal-external dynamics in Haiti argued in Chapter 4. While the focus of the argument is on how cooperation supports Brazilian political ambitions through active engagement of the Haitian government, Brazilian contributions to the agricultural and health sectors overcome a long history of neglect and align with peasant resistance. The discussion is also revealing, however, in that cooperation presents a number of faults that seem liable to prevent long-term success. To conclude, I offered several of the distinct lessons that
can be learned from this form of cooperation, and argued for a number of measures to be taken in order to improve Brazilian efforts.

In the next and final Chapter, I return to a more macro-level discussion of what cooperation has done for Brazil. I will situate Brazil in the global political economy, and how its position relates to the other BRICS, and to traditional donors. I conclude that development and humanitarian cooperation have been central to the establishment of Brazilian leadership in the Global South, ultimately helping to produce wider global recognition, and hence the realization of its main foreign policy ambitions. Coming back to methodological choices outlined in the introduction, the Chapter also seeks to establish where findings may apply to other emerging donors, and also to the practices of Brazil more broadly.
8 Chapter: Conclusion

As Best (2014) explains it, her approach is intended to capture governance that occurs at a mid- or meso-level, locating a change in what she argues is a more provisional style of governance to multiple agencies. In this study, while I have similarly attempted to approach Brazilian development cooperation as embodying a style of aid governance, much of the analysis has revolved around the micro- to mid-levels. Beyond Best (2014), my explicit objective has also been to treat alternatives from the South as post-colonial practices, engaging with their content and significance once the influence of the colonial encounter is taken into account. Asking how cooperation has supported Brazil as a post-neoliberal, emerging power, I have shown how Brazil has gained politically from the ways in which its cooperation differs in form and content from traditional cooperation, influenced by its experience as a recipient of aid, and its domestic experimentations with post-neoliberalism. Similarly, Haitian responses occur in a context where traditional aid implicitly exists as the referent point for how officials and beneficiaries respond to Brazilian initiative. In Chapters 5 and 6 for example, taking the health and agricultural sectors as representative of broader cooperation efforts, I argued that Brazilian practiced is summarized by the strategies of building partnership and designing appropriate interventions. These strategies have resulted in a number of benefits for Brazil, from the recognition of its development expertise by traditional actors in the international cooperation community, to Haitian sentiments that their programmes have targeted much-needed areas, and that Brazilians have demonstrated an unprecedented effort to build capacity and engage with government institutions. Nevertheless, as I have shown in the previous Chapter through an application of a “Paris + framework” for evaluating
cooperation, it is difficult to sustain these benefits over the long-term given that they demonstrate significant weaknesses in other areas, most notably planning for sustainability. The remaining question centers around how applicable these conclusions are for other scenarios: Brazil’s global provision of assistance, but also, in what is more consistent with Best’s (2014) intentions, where they may offer lessons appropriate to understanding the phenomenon of the emerging powers more generally.

In this final Chapter, I seek to draw out some of the more macro-level implications of my contention that cooperation has helped Brazil to achieve global recognition. In particular, I examine how cooperation has positioned Brazil in the global political economy, in relation to both traditional donors and to the other BRICS. I reiterate the conclusions that were made in the previous Chapter, namely that while cooperation helped Brazil to secure its desired ambition of influence on the global level, it has done so in a highly circumscribed way. Due to the existing limitations and unique characteristics of Brazil’s model, and its highly symbolic appeal, the gains are only certain in the short-term. Moreover, both the nature of weaknesses and positive attributes depend on the context in which they interact such that, for instance, Brazil’s attention to building partnerships is appealing because of the tendencies of traditional donors to avoid the Haitian state.

In this Chapter I also return to methodological choices outlined in the introduction to specify the contributions of the research. In particular, I consider whether the insights generated from examining SSC as a practice also open up space for understanding the phenomenon more broadly, and in particular whether any conclusions apply to the BRICS more broadly. On the latter, I argue that although they share many of the same
principles, the practices appear to have important differences, even if they are sometimes (especially in the case of China versus Brazil, which is my focus) exaggerated. On Brazilian practice, I draw on evidence from secondary literature and interviews, as many of the Brazilians referred to cases other than Haiti, in order to draw out what is likely specific to the Haitian context, and where more general lessons can be inferred. In terms of Brazilian-Haitian relations, I focus on the unique characteristic of their bond, and the political circumstances, while also noting the lack of economic presence.

I will first summarize the conclusions of the thesis before situating Brazil in the global political economy more broadly. In the final two sections, I conclude by comparing Brazil to other BRICS providers, and consider the potential applicability of the Haitian case to other instances of SSC.

8.1 Re-worked Identities and Appropriate Partners: Brazilian Gains from Cooperation

I have argued that attention to Brazilian cooperation with Haiti as a practice reveals how cooperation supports Brazil in its quest for global power status. By employing but also expanding Best’s (2014) framework, I broke down how cooperation works in concrete terms by distinguishing its different dimensions, from the actors involved to the dominant ideas that are employed. In particular, I demonstrate how two primary strategies, building partnerships and designing appropriate interventions, have underpinned Brazil’s approach to development and humanitarian cooperation with Haiti. Haitian officials have positively responded to Brazilian efforts because of their prioritization of working relationships, and the models they have put forward based on their own experiences. These alternative practices are a product of common experiences
with power imbalances in the global political economy, including in their racial
dimensions. Brazil is recognized, however, not only as a global player, but as a
specifically post-neoliberal one, whereby its approach explicitly stands apart from
traditional aid practices, such as through conferring a main role in development to the
state. Significantly, Brazil’s authority is also established by traditional aid actors working
in Haiti, whether through their recognition of Brazil’s successful and innovative ideas, or
their acknowledgement of the close relation established between government partners.

A central contribution of the thesis is in viewing aid as a practice, which
recognizes the importance of ideas and their relation to concrete actions in a dynamic
manner. For practice theory, as formulated by Best (2014) and others, the analysis of aid
as a specifically post-colonial practice is intended to help push the approach, which is
still incipient, in directions that fully recognize the plurality of IR. To date, many
applications have remained focused on the practice of politics by traditional powers or in
traditional areas. For instance, Adler and Pouliot (2011) reference how practices of
nuclear deterrence and arms control came to form a social structure that regulated the
superpowers’ behaviour without attributing any role to other powers, even if they do
acknowledge disagreement within the respective nations. Indeed, although the emphasis
on the subjects who actively construct changing practices is a welcome theorization into
the co-constitutive nature of agents and structures, there is still a sense in which these

40 For example, Adler and Pouliot (2011) develop the concept with reference to deterrence and arms control
between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, and cooperative security between NATO and
Russia in a post-Cold War climate. Best’s framework (2014) is developed through engagement with the
hegemonic providers of development finance, the IMF and World Bank, and their more “provisional”
approach to governance. Cooper and Pouliot (2015) is a potential exception as they study G20 practices and
how they reproduce and undermine oligarchic tendencies in global governance. However, their analysis
remains focused on global hierarchies in political and economic terms. For example, while they reference
normative challenges among members, such as discussions around capital controls, there is no
consideration of how the arrangement reacts to or reconfirms colonial hierarchies.

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appear to be familiar actors of global politics. Arguably, of course, practice theory is more an ontological starting point than a coherent paradigm. In fact, Adler and Pouliot acknowledge in their 2011 edited volume that, “an IR practice-oriented theoretical approach comprises a fairly vast array of analytical frameworks that privilege practice as the key entry point to the stuff of world politics” (p. 5). Nevertheless, whether or not this silencing of non-traditional actors and subjects is inherent to the approach, Southern nations have been positioned as marginal players in international relations. According to Barkawi and Laffey (2006, p. 244), not only do representational practices in academia have social consequences as they fail to explain complex power relations, but there are also political implications as histories of active agents, and their integral relations with the North, effectively disappear from view.

This work instead intends to contribute to a broader challenge faced by IR, which is to fully incorporate the diversity of how global politics is practiced, which includes alternative forms of cooperation from the South. Simply put, one of my uses of the post-colonial is to take Brazilian cooperation as a serious challenge to OECD norms, whose opportunities and limits can be understood once the logics – or how officials defined the problems of aid – are examined. Again, however, “alternative” is not automatically associated with “good” or “better”, and the analysis works to bring out the challenges and opportunities for global development in a nuanced way. This framework thus relies on post-colonial scholarship to explain the content and violence of ideas, and how it is that the authority of the West has marginalized and silenced alternative voices in the colonial past and post-colonial present, with Western actors holding the power to intervene in and manage non-Western peoples. In development, representations have too often been
racialized so that the developing world has consistently been positioned as a passive recipient of the Global North’s charity. Brazil has worked to supersede this, even if in an incomplete and contradictory manner. However, practice, rather than post-colonialism, represents a more complete approach as it reconciles ideational structures with patterned actions in a much more fluid way: it is not simply that constant, almost timeless representations are what enable interventions in states such as Haiti, but rather that international practices such as cooperation are always in the process of creating norms. The push for appropriate interventions, for instance, is a product of Brazil’s resistance to neoliberal and colonial blueprints and its own experimentation with post-neoliberal forms of social intervention, which are subsequently put into practice through the offer of exchange rather than resources, and projects modeled on Brazilian experiences.

Approaching aid as a practice furthermore sheds light on changes that occur to social relations as well as to “material” reality. While the projects examined make such gains as improvements in farmers’ productivity, decreases in food insecurity in schools, and access to medical services for people with disabilities, more invisible transformations are also present. In particular, Brazil’s prioritization of working with the state is underpinned by the assumption that its partner individuals and organizations are legitimate authorities, contradicting the “failed” or “fragile” state narrative. Changes to Brazil’s global image occur in part because of these identity shifts, as well as what it means for traditional donors that SSC is seen as a more desirable option.

Furthermore, any gains for Brazil are only legible once placed in the Haitian context. In short, the impacts of development cooperation are best understood in relational terms. My second use of the post-colonial is thus to examine how aid is set
against the Haitian post-colonial context. For Brazil’s cooperation, this means historicizing cooperation in Haiti. The prioritization of relationships with government partners is welcomed for the very reason that the Haitian government has critiqued the failure of many traditional donors to work with the state, and called for support that engages with, rather than circumvents, institutions in needed areas. Of course, Haitian elites have also solidified polarization within the country across post-colonial regimes by consistently neglecting public supports (see Dubois, 2012; Trouillot, 1990), and increasing state involvement in health and agriculture is therefore a quite radical move in terms of intersectional inequalities. Weaknesses of the cooperation model, likewise, are a product of their interaction with features of the Haitian state and Haitian society. In another context, the guaranteed purchase model that underpins many of Brazil’s initiatives might not be at odds with the resources available, especially if a humanitarian crisis occurred separate from a political crisis. Approaching cooperation in relational terms would be an important addition to analyses of all aid donors, not only Brazil.

I have also argued that Brazilian SSC is highly contingent on a number of factors functioning as predicted, which points to how any benefits for Brazil may be short-term. On a political level, the relation’s emphasis on building partnerships means that it is also susceptible to governance changes, whether a change in Brazil’s administration, or in the quality of the partner’s governance. The post-Lula era has not been able to keep up with the expectations that were generated. Moreover, Brazil’s ideational appeal is unlikely to last with time if it becomes increasingly dissonant with its concrete actions. There was an increasing sense in interviews that Brazil should be learning lessons from its mistakes, and that being a “newer” provider was not sufficient reason to be ignorant of the
particular circumstances it faces (Haitian officials and even Brazilian officials, especially those critical of the Dilma government’s inattention to foreign policy, in author’s interviews, 2015). The features of specific cooperation initiatives also work against lasting success in the sense of the sustainable transformations that are envisioned in structural projects. While given the size and scope of Brazilian cooperation, these transformations could only occur at a micro-level, and indeed require many internal improvements that are beyond their control, the lack of attention to internal features of the Haitian public systems militates against this possibility. The Brazilian model has simply not demonstrated a capacity to work within the constraints of Haitian institutions. The reliance on Brazil’s experiences is built on faulty assumptions that they are easily applied in other situations because of various shared affinities. The drive to establish improved political relations, moreover, manifests in an apolitical stance that can have a number of detrimental consequences, from limiting empowerment, to lost time and money as obstacles are ignored. These findings point to the particular limitations that cooperation from an emerging power can have given SSC’s emphasis on horizontality and mutual exchange. Cooperation has helped to position Brazil as a post-neoliberal, global power, but it does not appear to do so in a sustainable way.

If the research holds lessons for why states give cooperation then, the implication is that the political usage of cooperation remains risky. While it may be accompanied by genuine solidarity in the Brazilian case, cooperation may still generate negative political effects over time. Thus, development and humanitarian efforts can contribute to larger foreign policy goals, and indeed may do so in ways that are uniquely effective – such as of low cost – but solidarity discourse needs to be accompanied by positive development
outcomes, and sustained commitments. Where political calculations interfere with
accurate estimations of development problems or institutional capacities, or conflict
aversion leads to a hesitancy to make changes addressing development concerns, etc.,
cooperation may ultimately be viewed by partners as little more than an instrumental
vehicle for political motives. Despite all of the unique challenges Brazil’s cooperation
presents, this was a lesson Brazil stood to learn from traditional providers that it has been
so critical of. Of course, the risk depends on the perception of the partners involved. It
would be a mistake, in other words, to assume that Brazil’s partners do not also hold
mixed motives. For Haitian partners, especially political decision-makers, the relationship
may also be more significant politically than it is in terms of how development problems
are addressed. Again, a concept of a disarticulated state, and differences between
decision-makers and technical bureaucrats, can explain the finer nuances of why
Brazilian cooperation is welcomed.

8.2 Brazil in the Existing Global Aid Architecture

From these conclusions, I turn here to the implications of Brazilian cooperation at
the global level, asking how it coheres with the global aid architecture, and, in the
following section, the practices of the other BRICS. Throughout the thesis, I have argued
that Brazil needs to position itself against the ideas and practices of traditional donors in
order to present itself as a valuable cooperation provider. However, perhaps counter-
intuitively, Brazil also needs these actors to be a legitimate, alternative global power.

Brazil and other emerging powers have rhetorically distanced themselves from the
practices of traditional donors. As I explored in Chapter 2, SSC providers emerged as part
of a broader dissatisfaction with traditional aid, stressing principles such as horizontality, mutual benefit, and non-conditionality. Espousing non-interference and self-help for instance, Japan and China have both relied on the provision of loans to African partners rather than grants, and have also concentrated on supporting economic infrastructure and services (Raposo & Potter, 2010). In Kragelund’s (2014, p. 156) article on non-traditional state actors in Zambia, he notes how they have often been viewed positively, with one civil servant commenting how,

There are no Chinese expats here telling the treasury what to do. The Chinese have no project office coordinating the interventions. That is why we like that kind of support so much. It enables us to recognise our own priorities.

Much of the existing literature on SSC thus attempts to evaluate whether it forms an effective challenge to the Western approach as embodied in the OECD-DAC principles for aid effectiveness.

For the most part, the duality of traditional/emerging was manifest in Brazilian practice. As I argued previously, Brazil described itself in these terms, and respondents confirmed that Brazil was indeed different, often explicitly making comparisons with traditional aid. The emphasis of Brazil as a partner in development, rather than a donor or even provider, captures Brazilian efforts to make this distinction. In particular, the claim that Brazil extends SSC as part of a demonstration of solidarity, and not for either political or economic gains, embeds Brazil’s authority, and especially its moral authority, to engage. However, this contrast was not simply promoted by the Brazilians, but was something affirmed by various actors, from other bilateral donors and IOs, to Haitian counterparts. For example, the stress on establishing close relations with the Haitian government was widely praised by traditional players (IOs and other bilateral donors in
author’s interviews, 2015). Likewise, representatives of IOs and other bilateral partners saw Brazil’s post-neoliberal models as effective solutions to development problems, based on the presence of commonalities between nations (ibid). These models are not only seen as attractive; Brazil also gains legitimacy as a country to have made important steps in reducing poverty and inequality because of their social programs (ibid). Thus, Brazil was able to establish itself “as a global reference point for pro-poor growth and development, and assumed the role of a leading power of the South” (Stolte, 2015, p. 152). While Brazilian efforts are by no means free of tensions, characteristics of their cooperation do present an alternative option, and one that is welcomed by their partners.

Since identities are constituted relationally, Brazil defines itself against what it is not – a “traditional donor”. In short, Brazil needs other donors to construct itself as a benign global power, and does not exist outside of the traditional aid system. Whether as a provider of more relevant assistance, or as another developing country acting in solidarity rather than for its own benefit, Brazil depends upon the discredited system to legitimize its own efforts. Indeed, as I have argued, Brazil’s success in enacting some of these principles stems from a general dissatisfaction with traditional aid, namely a reliance on conditional, neoliberal blueprints, and the broader silencing of alternative perspectives. Brazil’s successes do not result primarily from characteristics of its cooperation being inherently positive in their own right, but instead are situated vis-à-vis the perceived failings of the aid regime in Haiti, from bypassing the state to create private systems, to the implementation of solutions that do not address government priorities. Brazil has constructed its principles in this context, and worked to realize them through such practices as its deferral to government priorities, and the transplant of its domestic
social policy experiments. Indeed, in explaining the origins of Brazil’s strategies of
building partnership and designing appropriate intervention, I have shown how the
problematic of delivering aid effectively has been concretely defined in the context of
Brazilian experiences with foreign aid so that, for instance, social programs with a more
interventionist state are seen as an important correction to neoliberal models orienting the
good governance agenda.

The traditional/emerging power binary does not have to be wholly consistent in
order to function well, moreover. Unquestionably a blatant disregard of its own SSC
principles would lead to criticisms that Brazil does not present a sufficient alternative to
other providers; nevertheless tensions can exist as the promotion of an idea of difference
performs two functions: both to minimize variety among traditional donors, and to
dismiss where Brazil falls short of meeting its standards. In the case of the Institute, an
accounting problem effectively resulted in a temporary shut-down. This represents an
extreme example of how an inadequate assessment of Haitian capacity interferes with the
promotion of capacity-building through alignment with partner institutions. Yet despite
the detrimental effects of this situation, Brazil appeared relatively unscathed, with
respondents still evaluating cooperation in glowing terms (various Haitian officials in
author’s interviews, 2015). The incident suggests that the particular moral authority
Brazil has constructed through setting itself apart from traditional practice in discourse
and in action has helped minimize weaknesses. These processes are dynamic, however.
In addition to my comment that there was increasingly a sentiment among some Haitian
bureaucrats that Brazil was not accounting for resource gaps, and that Brazil is expected
to learn lessons from its initial mistakes (in author’s interviews, 2015), there is also a
temporal aspect to disconnects between how Brazil presents itself as a provider, and what it is actually doing: the symbolic representation of Brazil as an alternative is contradicted and diminished as weaknesses arise, but not immediately. As I argued previously, it is also important to understand how Brazilian practice re-makes Haitian identity as well as produces material changes in development circumstances. Thus, it is useful to think of Brazil’s position as a development provider in more macro-terms as interdependent with the existing aid system.

This symbiotic relation is no more visible than in trilateral arrangements. In existing literature on trilateral or triangular donor efforts, discussions have emphasized how they serve as a vehicle for assuring the North’s continued role in development efforts (Abdenur & Marques da Fonseca, 2013). While this argument is certainly valid, I have also argued that the Brazilian experience in Haiti shows how they function as a very visible reminder of the weaknesses of traditional aid. By combining respective advantages, usually financial with relevant technical advice, the arrangements serve to confirm Brazilian identity as alternative and superior to the traditional aid system. Not only do they represent the North-South binary that Brazil’s justification for cooperation is based on in a tangible way, they also signify the North’s recognition of Brazilian cooperation as valuable, whether for the strong relations they have forged with their country partners, or because of the novel models they have put forward. Stolte (2015, p. 148) makes a similar argument with reference to Africa when she writes that the mechanism “has been an important step toward the international acknowledgement of Brazil’s global role”. In these more explicit vehicles, but also more generally, responses to Brazil as an emerging donor have depended on the insertion of Brazil against the
traditional aid regime. Yet Brazil needs traditional aid, and traditional aid donors, to justify the validity of its cooperation in concept and in practice.

8.3 Brazil and the BRICS

Brazilian cooperation also occurs in a global context where other emerging countries have intensified their provision of development cooperation. Similar to traditional donors, Brazil’s support is evaluated against this larger phenomenon. Before discussing any findings from the Brazilian case that apply to SSC more generally, here I chart important similarities and differences between various providers, focusing on China.

As outlined previously, many of the “emerged” providers share distinct principles that orientate their offering of SSC. There is no consensus in existing literature on how newer donors should be categorized (see Manning, 2006; Rowlands, 2008; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). However, SSC as one grouping of such actors, contains, at least in rhetoric, emphases on creating partnership, achieving “mutual benefit”, and avoiding conditionalities (see Kragelund, 2008; Quadir, 2013; Woods, 2008; Zimmerman & Smith, 2011); SSC does not conform to aid as defined by the OECD-DAC, including because of their reliance on concessional funding in addition to grants. These objectives are shaped by the criticisms that these partners hold in regards to traditional aid, as borne from their own experiences. Nevertheless, it has not yet been empirically demonstrated that these emerging donors have been able to reconcile the problems of traditional aid that they critique, or that their concrete activities are in harmony with their stated goals. For instance, Hackenesch’s (2010, n.p.) examination of Chinese and Brazilian
engagement in Angola argues that “Brazil and China do not create new challenges for development but old problems become more obvious”. In the Brazilian case, several principles, such as empowerment and sustainability, have not been fully realized, and indeed exist in tensions with other priorities, such as their push for limited ownership. Yet although “old” problems of development may surface in a broad sense, it is in the details of cooperation that more subtle, unique challenges for development arise. Brazil’s push for the implementation of post-neoliberal development models presents a long-standing problem in its fundamental misreading of state capacity over the long-term, but its refusal to create new systems parallel to the state can create minimal capacity improvements. My contention is that SSC cannot be read as either continuity or hegemonic change with the traditional aid regime.

It should be noted that, among emerging donors, Brazil and China are often presented at extremes, with Brazil as the friendlier provider and China as offering assistance in its barely disguised pursuit of economic profit. On a broad level, the principles guiding Chinese cooperation resonate with those of Brazil. For China, however, there is less reticence in expecting the relations to afford mutual benefits, although motivations have evolved with time (Nordtveit, 2011). Indeed, while any benefits for Brazil beyond learning exchange are strongly denied, especially any economic benefits (various Brazilian officials in author’s interviews, 2015), the expectation for China is of more immediate commercial benefits (Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). China also tends to provide loans over grants (Raposo & Potter, 2010). Another defining aspect of cooperation is the import of labour (Brautigam, 2008), which again contrasts with the Brazilians who are against conditionality in any form, political or
economic. Like Brazil, China’s support is modeled on its own development experiences: “they believe in investment, trade, and technology as levels for development, and they are applying these same tools in their African engagement, not out of altruism but because of what they learned at home” (Brautigam, 2008, p. 311). These principles tend to produce an ambiguous form of cooperation.

Many of these features explain why China tends to be the most fiercely criticized emerging donor by academics and civil society organizations. Raposo and Potter’s (2010) comparison of Chinese and Japanese cooperation find that among China’s top ten recipients, only four were ranked as having low human development, suggesting poverty reduction may not be the foremost concern (ibid). Indeed, typically the country is presented as acting mainly to secure resources. Such a motivation is explained as the reason why “rogue aid providers” are non-democratic, extending cooperation to states regardless of their regime type (Naím, 2007). Chinese SSC is also demand-driven, yet resource ambitions complicate this dynamic in practice. As Nordtveit (2011, p. 106) finds in a study of Chinese assistance to Cameroon, quoting a senior advisor to the Prime Minister,

‘Norway let us steer towards the areas of intervention that we felt were appropriate and needed in Cameroon. France would never have let us steer the process…China, on the other hand, is more calculating. China would like to give you something, but they would like something in return’.

Yet, as with Brazilian cooperation, cooperation has promising features. More positively, China has cancelled loans, opened exports to zero-tariff treatment, and emphasized infrastructural development (Raposo & Potter, 2010). Similarly, multi-year commitments mean that funding is more predictable (UNCTAD, 2010). More generally, there is a sense that the significant weight of China provides an alternative actor to partner with, opening
up governments’ policy space (Lagerkvist, 2014). Specifically, China has much more money than Brazil, and could potentially have a much greater impact. How, then, do the practices of China compare with the Brazilian record?

8.4 Lessons for South-South Cooperation

Rather than conflate emerging donors, I consider any implications of the conclusions surrounding Brazilian cooperation in Haiti for China specifically. The comparison is also general, and not specific to the countries’ engagements in Haiti. These contentions are necessarily tentative given that the comparison depends on existing literature, rather than primary research conducted within the same parameters. While both countries share a symbolic appeal and have prioritized state ownership, the softer form of Brazilian cooperation contradicts the more naked pursuit of economic ambitions, and results in substantive differences in the nature of interventions.

On a significant ideational level, China and Brazil share a symbolic appeal that is a product of their post-colonial status. Similar to Brazil, China puts forward an anti-hegemonic purpose as guiding its interventions in the Global South (Raposo & Potter, 2010). For instance, “China believes that its disinterested aid and higher emphasis on infrastructure development…responds better to African needs than the Western donor’s emphasis on human development, law, and institutional reform” (ibid, p. 195).

Commentators on SSC have tended to discuss the presence of emerging donors as

41 Chinese support to Haiti remains more moderate than in other places. For example, while Brazil was ranked 15th of donors who committed funding to Haiti in 2010 according to Relief Web, China was in 19th place (cited in the Guardian, n.d.). Following Hurricane Matthew, China has signed two agreements: one related to the construction of a national electrical network (including a wind and solar park estimated at US$ 1.2 million), and agricultural support worth US$ 800 million (MCPE, 2014).
consequently widening developing country policy space, even if they remain uncertain as
to how this space has concretely been altered, and if it has been altered for the better
(Kragelund, 2014; Woods, 2008). Their presence alone thus inherently offers an
alternative to traditional aid. In addition, the ability to create this binary of
SSC/traditional aid is aided by the symbolic appeal that China projects in extending
describes its principles as sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity, and common
development. As Davies (2010, p. 13) argues, the Chinese focus on securing resources
has also existed alongside efforts to project soft power: “the Chinese government’s
brazen corporatist approach to engaging Africa is being actively downplayed through
political rhetoric that appeals to a political solidarity that China has with Africa as well as
the ramping up of aid to African states”. While the wider resonance in society of this
strategy is questionable, as I return to in the discussion of ownership, there is no doubt
that it has been appealing to elites (Kiala & Ngwenya, 2011; Lagerkvist, 2014).

Nevertheless, the symbolic appeal of China is simply not as compelling as
compared with Brazil. There is a hesitancy of the BRICS to match their rhetorical
commitments with concrete action, which I suggest is not only representative of Brazil’s
structural power ambition – where global reforms are pursued to help in securing national
development (Burges, 2017) – but also of important disagreements as to what an ideal
system of global governance would be. China’s focus on gaining its own policy
autonomy through these arrangements has translated into a pragmatic economic approach
(Brautigam, 2009; Rowlands, 2008) that chips away at its ideational appeal in a way that
Brazil has not yet experienced. While theorization on identity-making through foreign
policy has recognized the slips between how identities are spoken about and actual practices, which are always destabilizing of how coherently identities can be projected (Hansen, 2006), tensions are much more glaring in the Chinese case given how it is much more blatantly a would-be hegemon. Although China’s reliance on the acquisition of primary commodities can be overstated (Brautigam, 2008), Brazil has pursued a strategy of both resource diversification and supporting value-added economic development (White, 2010). Similar to the Brazilian case studies, moreover, there is an important time dimension whereby these tensions and slippages between rhetoric and reality become increasingly problematic, especially as partners come to expect more from their not-so-new partners. These practices relate to domestic experiences, including historical relations with external powers. For example, China’s focus on coordinating special economic zones with host governments is a direct product of its development experience (Davies, 2010). Thus, China and Brazil may pursue different goals based on their different, learned understandings of what development challenges are, and how development should be pursued.

What differentiates these countries is also a matter of style. The prioritization of ownership is an area where Brazil and China superficially adopt a similar approach, but display marked differences in their method. On the level of government-government interaction, both countries have stressed their approach as demand-driven. However, China’s realization of this principle has been criticized for conflicting with its broader goals of ensuring its own development, whereas the case studies examined in Haiti were consistently welcomed as responding to government priorities (various Haitian officials in author’s interviews, 2015). While, especially when compared with traditional aid, the
frankness with which China announces its goal of mutual benefit certainly has an appeal, and indeed reveals the hypocrisy in criticisms from traditional powers who pursued these goals more insidiously, there is nevertheless a sense in which the strategy also comes off as grating. In other words, Brazil and China may both see cooperation as a vehicle for realizing national development goals, yet it is undoubtedly the case that Brazil does so in a subtler way that can make its more solidaristic motivations appear primary. Burges’ (2017) characterizations of Brazilian foreign policy more generally as playing something of a long game are apt here. Brazilians interviewed were unanimous in their contention that any other benefits of cooperation – again, especially in the economic realm - would be indirect and peripheral (in author’s interviews, 2015). The emphasis on tactics such as generating consensus (Burges, 2017), combined with cultural affinities, results in a more quintessentially diplomatic approach that country governments respond well to. Style, of course, also intersects with what are substantive differences. China’s One-China Policy (Kragelund, 2008) and extensive use of non-policy conditions also provide important caveats to the notion that it prioritizes partner demands (UNCTAD, 2010).

Regardless of these variations, efforts to ensure ownership in a limited sense (government approval) may result in similar tendencies to deepen state authority. In his analysis of Chinese involvement in Mozambique, Lagerkvist (2014) finds that civil society spaces have become more constrained, while there is simultaneously a sense of Chinese support having further entrenched state authority. For both China and Brazil, this approach carries the risk that they will be accused, from various corners, of supporting authoritarian regimes and eroding human rights. Criticism of China from scholars and other donors has tended to revolve around such issues, with concerns that China is
eroding governance standards (as summarized by Woods, 2008). Defenders have noted that such criticisms may overlook the fact that DAC donors have not been particularly successful at improving governance through conditionality (Zimmermann & Smith 2011), but the concern is still valid. That said, however, the nature of governance challenges that these donors pose is distinct. On a less extreme level, the consolidation of government structures, rooted as they are in assumptions that the partner government is responsible for managing relations with non-state groups, can come at the expense of certain groups, generating beliefs that the external power is propping up an unpopular government (for example, a Haitian civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015 on Brazil supporting Martelly). The flip side is that these relations have the potential to generate more sustainable changes to individuals and institutions. It is also likely that they have been less hands-off behind-the-scenes. Both have approached countries in private and rely heavily on dialogue, with China for instance meeting with opposition politicians in Zimbabwe and even reversing an arms shipment (Woods, 2008). In short, Brazil and China’s approach in this respect are much more similar than presented in the typical narrative (see Economist, 2012).

Ownership in a more inclusive sense reveals more striking differences. In a comparison of Angola’s relations with each of the BRIC countries, Kiala and Ngwenya (2011, p. 18) conclude that while China’s relation is primarily elite-driven, “Brazil and Angola share a bond that no other BRIC country could emulate. There is…a natural appeal at a grassroots level with people-to-people interaction”. They attribute this bond largely to the cultural similarities between the nations (ibid). In contrast, Lagerkvist (2014) describes how despite Afrobarometer surveys showing support for China’s
presence, ethnographic studies have tended to find a fearful climate; for instance, his study revealed deep concerns over the acquisition of land, including contestation as to what was defined as “idle” in official figures (ibid). While Brazil has arguably been overly celebratory of its similarities with partner nations, and problematically relied on the assumption of parallels when defining interventions, the aspect of cultural proximity is nevertheless an important factor in creating mutual trust and respect. Nevertheless, Brazil is not immune from criticisms even if it has been more muted, with some respondents noting the compensatory nature of cooperation in the context of MINUSTAH’s presence (Haitian official and civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015). Similarly, civil society actors in Mozambique, including the National Association of Small Farmers (UNAC), who Lagerkvist (2014) found to be wary of the Chinese presence, have similarly opposed Brazilian intervention, especially the ProSavannah project (UNAC in Grain, 2013). Brazil and China both promote an elite-based form of cooperation that can be further examined in the Chinese case. Yet, undoubtedly more striking differences will emerge in the details, especially as China, like Brazil, forms its practices based on its particular conception of how to pursue national development as gleaned from its own experiences.

8.5 The Relevance of the Haitian Case

The Haitian case should also be considered in terms of its applicability for understanding Brazilian cooperation more generally. In particular, how would more prominent economic interests change the dynamics observed? How do political circumstances, especially MINUSTAH and the concentration of political power (in terms
of domestic and external elites) define the specific outcomes of cooperation in the Haitian case?

The Haitian case presents several features that seem to delimit its generalizability at first glance. Cooperation exists in the unique context of command of a military operation, MINUSTAH, but an economic presence is largely absent. The absence of economic factors is certainly atypical. Trade with Africa for instance, a key region for Brazilian cooperation in all its dimensions (Almeida, 2004), has increased dramatically, from US$ 4 billion in 2000 to $20 billion in 2010 (World Bank & Ipea, 2011). Trade does remain highly concentrated, with exports accounting for over half of the total volume confined to only 5 countries\textsuperscript{42} (ibid). More importantly, Brazil’s presence involves increased investment. Zibechi describes how in the 2008 to 2009 period, Brazilian investments to developed countries dropped (by 47% to North America and 18% to Europe), increasing by 36% to Asia, 126% to Africa and 15% to Latin America. Since 2007, moreover, the firm Ernst & Young estimates that Brazil’s FDI to Africa increased by 10.7% (Costas, 2013). For example, Angola defined Brazil as one of its four strategic development partners in 2010 despite Brazil not being in the top four of its trade partners; investment, in contrast, holds an important presence in-country, such as with Odebrecht forming the Bioenergy Company of Angola (Biocom) with Sonangol and Damer, with plans to invest US$ 358 million in sugar plantations (Kiala & Ngwenya, 2011). In Latin America, BNDES has played a central role in the expansion and growth of “multilatinas”, who carried out approximately 40% of their foreign operations within

\textsuperscript{42} These are: South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, and Senegal (World Bank & Ipea, 2011).
the region between 2005 and 2013 (ECLAC, 2013). As a result, the case study appears to stray from a “typical” case.

Despite these patterns however, I argue that there is an important sense in which the presence of stronger economic relations has not impacted perceptions of Brazil more broadly, and of SSC specifically, suggesting that the case study still carries general lessons. Brazil has certainly not been immune to criticisms. The company Vale has been particularly dogged by controversies surrounding its operations. The company was voted as the “worst company in the world” in 2012 at the World Economic Forum for its social and environmental impacts as well as its labour relations - a “prize” established by the Berne Declaration group (Abelvik-Lawson, 2014, p. 795). Among the affected countries is Mozambique, where Vale extracts coal from the fields in Tete province at the Moatize mine. In a report, Kabemba and Nhancale (2012) detail problems associated with Vale’s operations, such as that it lacks in transparency and accountability, and that it has implemented an unfair resettlement programme. Vale’s own reports have contradicted these claims (ibid). There is also a notable difference between regions, as criticisms in Latin American have tended to emerge more forcefully from civil society groups (Inesc, 2012; Zibechi, 2014). Such critiques would suggest that the provision of Brazilian cooperation to partner countries would be tarnished by these concerns, especially since the extension of investment abroad has been a deliberate aspect of foreign policy designed to encourage national development, with state support offered in the form of subsidized credit or preferential contract (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011).

However, the Brazilian state has managed to dodge most of these critiques. There are several reasons as to why. These rationales also underline the comparison made with
China above. First, in a similar vein as Chinese support, the Brazilian provision of development cooperation is an elite-driven process, meaning that partner governments may not reflect critiques raised at more grassroots levels - hence not dampening Brazilian appeal. As well, in what presents a contrast with China, there are substantive differences in style and substance that mark Brazil’s presence. As discussed above, since the pursuit of Brazilian foreign policy seeks to position Brazil to meeting national development goals over the long-term (Burges, 2017), the element of self-interested pursuit may not be so glaring. Thus, while Haitian respondents were keenly aware that cooperation was extended for purposes other than solidarity, the latter motive was also quite clearly seen as genuine (in author’s interviews, 2015); in the case of China, development cooperation can appear much more solidly as compensation for the benefits gained by the country. Substantively as well, Burges (2017) provides a compelling explanation of Brazil’s relationship with domestic companies as having struck a delicate balance: while the state has been close enough to influence the direction of company’s investments, it has also maintained an enviable distance that shields it from the full extent of blowback. Whether this continues in the face of the extent of the corruption scheme Lava Jato remains to be seen. And despite the serious allegations made against Brazilian companies, there are also concrete ways in which their practices have taken development into consideration. Notably, various authors have discussed how Brazilian companies tend to employ local labour, demonstrating a commitment to capacity-building (Burges, 2014; World Bank & Ipea, 2011). Finally, the issue of perceived cultural similarity forges connections with Brazil beyond the government (see Zibechi, 2012; Kiala & Ngwenya, 2011; World Bank and Ipea, 2011). More rigorous comparisons of Brazilian projects, including in Latin
America and the Caribbean versus Africa, would significantly contribute to an understanding of how different combinations of SSC, in a broad sense, impact the partner context, yet the assumption should not be that the presence of stronger economic ties would automatically diminish Brazil’s softer image.

It is instead MINUSTAH that poses a more serious problem in terms of the study’s applicability to other instances of Brazilian cooperation. The Haitian case may be unique not because of the absence of trade and investment ties, which still allow Brazil to project itself as a benevolent power, but because MINUSTAH appears to be a simple reflection of the projection of hard power. However, again two considerations are central to understanding why this projection is softened in practice. On MINUSTAH alone, as explained in Chapter 4, criticisms of the mission have not necessarily implicated Brazil. Brazil’s participation in MINUSTAH was intended to reflect its unique conceptualization of peace-keeping, with attention to peace-building over enforcement, including a prioritization of socio-economic development (Kenkel, 2010). Although reviews of Brazilian involvement have been mixed (see Braga, 2010; Haitian civil society representative and UN representative in author’s interviews, 2015; Nieto, 2012; Seitenfus, 2014), it is striking that, similar to the economic relations described above, Brazil’s image has not been heavily affected by its role. Indeed, despite criticisms that the mission did not successfully employ Brazil’s concept of peace-keeping, certain efforts, such as its attention to development - however insufficient - have combined with its cultural appeal to minimize these limits (UN representative, Brazilian military officer, and academic in author’s interviews, 2015).
Furthermore, Brazil has, surprisingly, managed to separate MINUSTAH from the offering of development and humanitarian cooperation. Most Haitians saw cooperation as demonstrating Brazilian solidarity, while only two raised cooperation as reparations for its role in MINUSTAH (officials and civil society representative in author’s interviews, 2015). Key features of how Brazil approaches cooperation, including negotiating and consensus-building, help to achieve this image. In other words, the provision of cooperation dampens critiques of MINUSTAH, rather than MINUSTAH contributing to negative perceptions of Brazil’s development and humanitarian activities. Yet criticisms of leadership of MINUSTAH do exist, leaving Haiti as a more challenging example of how cooperation interacts with other foreign policy vehicles, and similar patterns may arise in countries such as Angola and Mozambique where concerns about investment relations have emerged most prominently. MINUSTAH’s as an example of the exercise of hard power thus approximates Haiti as a more of a “crucial” case than a “typical”. According to Gerring (2007, p. 105), a “crucial” case is where a case is representative of “the most difficult scenario for a given proposition”. The crucial test becomes: can Brazil successfully project itself as a global power seeking reform of the global political economy under conditions where it has assumed the role of an occupying force?

Moreover, while the label of “failed” or “fragile” state should not be straightforwardly applied to Haiti, Haiti’s context does offer a unique situation for examining what cooperation’s effects are, including for Brazil’s foreign policy ambitions. Following Sidaway’s (2003) important contribution, I have approached Haiti as a country characterized by a concentration of political power, both domestic and foreign, at elite levels. Moreover, the existence of critical gaps in resources and capacity in some areas,
which reinforce power dynamics, combine to create a distinct environment in which to offer cooperation. Shortages of resources, for example, reinforce dependencies on external actors who provide funding, which cement their authority in identifying development problems and determining solutions. Again, the sense of the case as a “crucial” one is apt.

In sum, the conclusions take their specific form because of how cooperation interacts with both Brazilian foreign policy more generally, and because of features of the Haitian environment. While aid’s effects are relational, dependent on how they cohere with the recipient’s current and historical political economy and post-colonial relations, an initial comparison of Brazil’s cooperation with Haiti with patterns observed in the behaviour of China, and with its own practices in other developing nations reveals a number of interesting tendencies that should be explored. Brazil and China do remain distinct in their approach to development, but the opposition that comes through in popular discourse is overstated. Both countries display a preference for building government relations that can have a number of consequences. For Brazil, Haiti is a unique context to examine the effects of cooperation not so much because of the marginal economic side to its presence, but instead because its participation in MINUSTAH represents an example, although by no means straightforward, of the exercise of hard power.

8.6 Future Research

While these attempts to draw out the generalizability of the Brazilian case suggest parallels to other instances of Brazilian cooperation and to support provided by China, as
well as underline central differences, it is not the purpose of a case study to provide conclusions in this respect. Instead, the case offers a number of hypotheses and insights that could guide further research. In particular, undertaking case studies at a similar level of analysis in contexts where Brazilian cooperation for development occurs alongside significant economic relations would confirm or refute my proposal that they have not impacted the perceptions of partner governments around development cooperation in a significant way. Such analyses would need to account for variation in the regime in power. Should a government be more critical of Brazil in its various capacities, why is this so? What are the relations between key civil society groups who have mobilized against Brazilian cooperation, and the partner government? Differences in regimes would also enable confirmations about risks surrounding Brazil’s promotion of partnerships, and the possibility of marked differences in how governments negotiate and adapt Brazil’s post-neoliberal models.

The study also raises questions that would contribute to a better understanding of how the intensification of SSC has impacted the global aid regime. Although Brazil engages in trilateral arrangements more than other emerging donors, Brazil’s apparent use of these forms in Haiti to be able to focus its efforts on building political relations and avoid the messiness of on-the-ground development work raises a question: What purpose do these vehicles serve for emerging donors? And for traditional donors? The tendency in existing literature has been to assume that they function as a way for traditional donors to maintain their foothold (see Abdenur & Marques da Fonseca, 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012), but it is likely that emerging donors have also entered the partnerships for strategic reasons. Other potential lines of inquiry include disaggregating between
Chinese and Brazilian practices, and perceptions of them, at grassroots versus government levels in order to more fairly chart their similarities and differences. Concerning emerging donors more broadly, academics and civil society groups can continue to develop appropriate standards for measuring the distinct contributions of SSC. Finally, comparative work that discusses particular SSC providers against traditional aid donors would counteract the tendency, including in this work, to present either group as homogenous. Indeed, a central question guiding this research must be: What do SSC providers gain from the construction of implicit and explicit dichotomies with traditional aid?

More generally, approaching aid as a practice presents promising lines of research for aid analyses irrespective of the type of donor. First, the Brazilian case reveals the significant ways in which ideas specific to the Brazilian experience with aid, and its foreign policy ambitions shape the minutiae of cooperation on a micro-level. Beyond influencing the form of cooperation moreover, ideational aspects of Brazilian practice are crucial insofar as they construct and define identities – of Brazil, and also the partner nation. These manifestations suggest that research into understanding the motivations and outcomes of aid is incomplete without attention to issues such as identity constructions, and beliefs about what aid should do. Nilima Gulrajani and Liam Swiss’ (2017) report on why countries become donors is a valuable step in this regard. The authors examine why emerging donors have arisen, arguing that the state’s desire to be perceived differently, as advanced and influential, is an important element to their rise, drawing on sociological theories of norm diffusion. A next step is to address the reciprocal nature of identity construction – what the provision of cooperation from emerging countries means for
traditional donors, and for their developing country partners. Arguably, the nature of practice also eliminates the need to discuss motivations, as the focus becomes on what aid does.

Finally, at the time of writing, Dilma’s PT administration had been impeached in 2016, and a centre-right government led by Temer had taken charge in the interim. While the full effect of the PT’s fall is unknown, several points can be made as to the future of cooperation in a post-PT world. As emphasized before, the political nature of Brazil’s approach in building partnership means that it is highly sensitive to changes in either government. Thus, not only is cooperation politically beneficial in the short-term because of issues such as inadequate plans to ensure sustainability, the transfer of power in Brazil also underlines how cooperation can abruptly end – at least in its current form. Temer’s desire to implement an austerity plan to amend the constitution (A Proposta de Emenda Constitucional - PEC), decried by a UN observer as one of the worst the world has seen (quoted in Watts, 2016), raises doubts that many resources will be available for cooperation over the long-term. Recent research (Papi & Medeiros, 2017, p. 15) confirms there was a gradual decline in projects, decreasing from 66 in 2015 to 52 in 2016, and to 46 in 2017, based on information obtained from ABC. Moreover, it is very likely that the characteristics and priorities of cooperation change if the effort is sustained, including in directions that maximize the exchange of investments and technology (Dos Santos Lima, 2016). Fingermann (2016) notes how changes to domestic institutions will almost inevitably impact directly on projects and programs abroad given their basis in domestic programming, and the in-kind contributions of technical advisors. The government’s decision in 2016 to eliminate CGFome and to redistribute its functions to other units
within Itamaraty is a clear sign of a shift away from previous social policies (Papi & Medeiros, 2017). However, this shift does not mean that the provision of cooperation can be reduced to a historical case. In contrast, cooperation is likely to have a number of lasting legacies for the Brazilian state. In particular, it is likely that the future absence or further diminution of cooperation creates more negative repercussions for Brazil than if they have never offered support. The expectations generated by Lula, and to a lesser extent Dilma, seem destined to be disappointed, with unfortunate consequences for Brazil’s global power ambitions.
Appendices

Appendix A Interview Respondents

Academic, Rio de Janeiro, February 23, 2015
Academic, Rio de Janeiro, February 9, 2015
Academic, Santa Maria (conducted via skype), April 22, 2015
Bilateral donor representative, Department for International Development, Rio de Janeiro, February 26, 2015
Bilateral donor representative, German Development Agency, Brasília, March 6, 2015
Brazilian ambassador, Rio de Janeiro, February 26, 2015
Brazilian ambassador, Port-au-Prince, July 16, 2015
Brazilian chamber of commerce representative, Câmara de Comércio, Indústria e Agropecuária Brasil-Moçambique (CCIABM – Brazil-Mozambique Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture), Belo Horizonte (conducted via skype), January 29, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Articulação Sul, Rio de Janeiro, February 27, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Consea – National Council for Food and Nutritional Security), Rio de Janeiro, February 27, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Oxfam, Brasília, March 5, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Institut de Estudos Socioeconômicos (Inesc – Institute for Socioeconomic Studies), Brasília, March 31, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Instituto Igarapé, Rodonia (conducted via skype), Feb. 10, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Instituto Lula, São Paulo, March 24, 2015
Brazilian civil society representative, Via Campesina – Haiti, Port-au-Prince (conducted via email), received July 22, 2015
Brazilian military officer, Rio de Janeiro, March 16, 2015
Brazilian official, ABC, Berna (conducted via skype), March 19, 2015
Brazilian official, ABC, Brasília, March 9, 2015
Brazilian official, ABC, Brasília, March 9, 2015
Brazilian official, ABC, Brasília, March 9, 2015
Brazilian official, ABC, Washington (conducted via skype), March 17, 2015
Brazilian official, CGFome, Brasília, March 5, 2015
Brazilian official, Ministério da Defesa (MD - Ministry of Defence), Brasília, April 1, 2015
Brazilian official, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrárias (MDA – Ministry of Agrarian Development), Brasília, March 5, 2015
Brazilian official, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Agrário (MDS - Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger), Brasília, March 6, 2015
Brazilian official, Ministério da Saúde (MS – Ministry of Health), Brasília (conducted via email), received Sept. 2, 2015
Brazilian official, Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da Republica (Secretary-General of the President of the Republic), Brasília, April 1, 2015
Brazilian representative of state-run research institute, Embrapa, Brasília, March 30, 2015
Brazilian representative of state-run research institute, Fiocruz, Rio de Janeiro, March 3, 2015
Brazilian representative of state-run research institute, Fiocruz, Rio de Janeiro, February 25, 2015
Brazilian representative of state-run research institute, Fiocruz, Rio de Janeiro (conducted via email), received February 23, 2015
Brazilian representative of state-run research institute, Ipea, Rio de Janeiro, March 11, 2015
Civil society representative, Development International, Rio de Janeiro, February 6, 2015
Civil society representative, Oxfam, Washington (conducted via skype), July 8, 2015
Farmer association, Association agricole pour le développement (Agricultural Association for Development), Verrette (Artibonite department), August 4, 2015
Farmer association, Mouvement agricole pour le développement (Agricultural Movement for Development), Verrette (Artibonite department), August 4, 2015
Former advisor to Haitian government, Paris (conducted via skype), July 24, 2015
Former Brazilian embassy official in Haiti, Mexico City (conducted via skype), June 30, 2015
Former IO representative in Haiti, Porto Alegre (conducted via skype), July 22, 2015
Haitian civil society representative, Plateforme Haïtienne de plaidoyer pour un développement alternatif (PAPDA – Haitian Advocacy Platform for Alternative Development), Port-au-Prince, July 30, 2015
Haitian civil society representative, Le réseau associatif national pour l’intégration des personnes handicapées (National Association Network for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities), Port-au-Prince, August 12, 2015
Haitian medical doctors, Port-au-Prince, July 20, 2015
Haitian official, Bureau du secrétaire d’état a l’intégration des personnes handicapées (BSEIPH – Office of the Secretary of State for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities), Port-au-Prince, July 10, 2015
Haitian official, BSEIPH, Port-au-Prince, July 17, 2015
Haitian official, MARNDR, Port-au-Prince, July 27, 2015
Haitian official, MARNDR, Port-au-Prince, July 23, 2015
Haitian official, Ministère de la planification et de la coopération externe (MPCE – Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation), Port-au-Prince, July 28, 2015
Hospital administrator, Port-au-Prince, July 29, 2015
IO representative, FAO, Port-au-Prince, July 13, 2015
IO representative, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, July 18, 2015
IO representative, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Brasilia (conducted via email), received June 30, 2015
IO representative, WFP, Port-au-Prince, July 14, 2015
School administrator, Verrette (Artibonite department), August 4, 2015
School administrator, Verrette (Artibonite department), August 4, 2015
School administrator, Verrette (Artibonite department), August 4, 2015
Appendix B Sample Questionnaire (Government official)

- Depuis combien du temps travaillez-vous ici? Quelles sont vos responsabilités principales?

- Pouvez-vous m’indiquer les étapes de la conception d’un projet (concernant la coopération technique et aussi humanitaire), de sa conception à sa mise en œuvre, puis de sa mise en œuvre à l’évaluation des résultats ? (Qui est impliqué, quels documents ou rapports sont d’habitude rédigés?)
  - En quoi consistent les relations actuelles entre le gouvernement Haïtien et les instituts du Brésil dans ce processus? Et dans quelle mesure le gouvernement travaille-t-il comme les autres partenaires – par exemple la société civile ou le secteur privé?

- Quels projets sont en cours maintenant en Haïti?
  - Comment ont-ils développés avec le temps? Qui a pris les décisions ? Et généralement, comment les décisions sont-elles prises?

- En quoi l’émergence de la coopération brésilienne est-elle une réaction contre les pratiques traditionnelles ?

- Pourquoi est-ce que le concept du partenariat est si important pour les efforts brésiliens ?

- Quel type de partenaire représente réellement le Brésil en comparaison aux autres partenaires/donateurs?
  - Dans le cadre des expériences citées, quelles sont, selon vous, les opportunités principales? Et quels sont les défis principaux?
  - Pourriez-vous mentionner des exemples?
• Comment percevez-vous la coopération brésilienne? Et quelle est votre impression de la façon dont les participants perçoivent les projets?

• Quel type de projet voulez-vous voir mis en œuvre? Quelles sont les priorités qui contribueraient (ou qui pourraient contribuer) au développement du gouvernement?

• Quels sont les objectifs principaux du Brésil visant à augmenter leur coopération? Par exemple, considérez-vous que les relations politiques ou économiques se sont améliorées entre le Brésil et Haïti?

• Si un conflit se présente entre les différentes personnes participant aux projets – par exemple, entre le Brésil et vous – comment sont-ils d’habitude résolus ? Pouvez-vous discuter tous les cas où un conflit s’est avéré, et comment ils ont été résolus?

• Voudriez-vous ajouter quelque chose que nous n’avons pas encore discuté?

• Pour terminer, pourriez-vous suggérer des personnes à Haïti que je pourrais contacter?
Appendix C  Sample Questionnaire (Civil society representative)

- Desde quando você trabalha aqui? Quais são suas responsabilidades principais?
- Como você acha que a avança cooperação brasileira é uma reação das práticas tradicionais?
- Por que o conceito da parceria é importante por os esforços brasileiros?
- Que tipo de parceiro é o Brasil em comparação aos outros doadores/parceiros na realidade?
  - Em suas pesquisa, quais são as principais oportunidades e os principais desafios (exemplos)?
  - Como acha que os parceiros os recebem?
- Como você descreveria a importância das políticas sociais (política publica) no Brasil moldando as qualidades da cooperação?
  - Poderia citar alguns exemplos?
- Nos processos da cooperação, quando o setor privado e a sociedade civil são envolvidos? Como os grupos interagem num caso típico?
- Quais são os objetivos principais do Brasil no aumento da cooperação brasileira? Por exemplo, acha que a cooperação tem vantagens politicas?
- Se fosse um conflito entre atores diferentes envolvidos nestes projetos - por exemplo, entre o Brasil e o Haiti - como os são resolvidos? Puder discutir alguns casos onde estiveram conflitos, e como os foram resolvidos?
- Gostaria de adicionar alguma coisa que não tenhamos discutido?
- Finalmente, há alguns contatos que sugeriria?
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