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GENERATION AND LIFE CYCLE

IN

CANADIAN POLITICS

BY

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Department of Political Science

A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Carleton University

1979

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The undersigned recommend to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies
acceptance of the thesis

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain whether age related differences in political behaviour exist and whether these differences are due to life cycle or to generational effects. If a life cycle effect is present, age differences are due to changes in roles and statuses occurring as part of the process of social aging and to the accumulation of experience with age. The generational model attributes age differences to the impact of historical circumstances on people at a certain malleable period in their life.

A complicating factor in the analysis is the possibility that a spurious relationship between age and political behaviour may exist. Thus it is necessary to control for variables possibly related to both age and the aspects of political behaviour to be examined. Another complicating factor is the impact of period, that is the forces associated with each point in time. To deal with this possibility it is necessary to assume that impact of period is consistent on different age groups.

Four kinds of political behaviour and attitudes are examined: political participation, conservatism, class-voting, and the strength of partisan identification. A variety of age related effects are present. The impact of age on political participation

is due to the life cycle. The level of political participation increases with age until the sixties then shows a slight decline. The examination of the impact of age on conservatism reveals a variety of effects. The life cycle tends to result in an increased impact of social background on behaviour and attitudes rather than an increase in conservatism in an ideological sense. Generational effects are present affecting certain conservative attitudes such as those towards a new Canadian flag causing the old to be more conservative. Neither life cycle nor generational factors have a consistent impact on class voting. With regards to the strength of partisan identification a life cycle effect is present causing increased strength of partisan identification with duration of attachment. Age is related to the strength of partisanship continues to serve as a useful cue for voting.

Overall, life cycle effects have a greater impact than do generational effects. It may be the case that in the Canadian context the volatility of attitudes is such that generational effects are washed away with time.

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Introduction

One of the most fundamental ways in which human beings differ is that they are of various ages. This difference is one to which a good deal of attention is accorded socially, legally and politically. It is commonplace, if not universal to think of members of the same age group as having certain shared characteristics. The young may be stereotyped as impetuous or idealistic while the old may be characterized as rigid, irritable or wise.

These conceptions of age have been embodied in age restrictions on participation in various types of activities since the beginning of civilization, if not before. Primitive societies may initiate individuals into full membership at a specific age and reserve positions of leadership for their eldest members. Plato felt that in the ideal polity only those over 50 would be allowed to rule since by that age desires of the flesh have subsided and these individuals would be capable of more balanced judgement. With, perhaps, similar considerations in mind modern societies have established age limits for social activities such as drinking alcohol and driving a car, as well as for political activities such as voting or holding office.

The importance of studying age differences empirically is that the nature of these differences may help us to predict the evolution of society. Since it is inevitable that the young shall succeed the old, it is important to know whether the values of the young differ systematically from the old, and if they do, to know what the sources of these differences are. If differences between the young and the old are the result of the workings of a life cycle model, and therefore are inherent in the process of aging, then the values of the young will become like those of the old as time passes. At the societal level this model is basically static, for aggregate change is the result only of changing proportions of age groups. But if generations, as represented by cohorts, that is groups of people born in the same time period, maintain their distinctiveness, aggregate change will be the result of the different experiences which have marked different generations. This model is dynamic and marked aggregate change is possible.

Changes in political attitudes can occur which are not related to age either as generation or as life cycle. It may be the case that a period effect exists in which the changes in opinions or behaviour in the population as a whole are reflected more or less equally in all age groups. But even if a period effect is predominant it may be the case that the old

are somewhat less affected than are the young, even though they change in response to the trend in the same direction as the population as a whole.

Also it may be the case that apparent differences between age groups exist that are in fact spurious. Various characteristics that are not inherently related to age such as religion, sex, and class may be related to political attributes or behaviour and be distributed by age in such a way to create an apparent age difference. This possibility is referred to as a compositional effect; that is that different compositions of different age groups will affect attitudes.

An important aspect of political science is the study of political socialization, that is the development of individual orientations toward politics. But while most political socialization research focusses on childhood socialization, it is the political behaviour of adults in which we are most interested. A link between childhood attitudes and adult behaviour is inferred but seldom tested. To do so it is necessary to recognize that political socialization is a process continuing throughout the life cycle. This entails the study of the effects of the life cycle on political orientations. Also, the process of political socialization may change in nature

and in content from one historical period to another. Thus both the study of the life cycle model and of the generational model are necessary continuations of the study of childhood socialization.(1)

But while the implications of age related political differences are far reaching, age has been the subject of comparatively little empirical research. This has been particularly true in the study of Canadian politics.

The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, it will empirically document the nature of age differences in political attitudes and behaviour of the mass public in Canada. That is, it will answer the question what, if any, political differences exist between age groups in this country? The second goal follows from the first. Given that there are age differences, are they inherent in the process of aging or are they due to historical circumstances differentially affecting different generations of people? Which model best explains the effect of age in Canada?

Models of Age: Generational and Life Cycle

In this chapter two models both of which are designed to account for the nature of age differences, the generational and life cycle models, will be examined. (2) The two models conceptualize chronological age as an indicator of two distinct variables, posit different sources of age variation, and in some cases provide conflicting hypotheses about the nature of age differences. The theoretical underpinnings of both models will be laid out and relevant research in the development of the models will be analyzed.

Being of a certain age implies two things. It gives one a position in the flow of history, thus implying that one has been affected in a different way than someone of another age by certain events and processes. Secondly, age is an indicator of position in the life cycle and therefore is an indicator of the degree an individual has been affected by social processes linked to aging itself. The generational model of age focusses on the historical period in which a person was born and the experiences concomitant with being a certain age in a certain era. Thus, for example, from a generational perspective one characteristic of being sixty years old in the 1970's is that one entered the labor force during the

Depression, a time of economic hardship. In the life cycle model the significance of being sixty may be that one is likely to have been in the labor force for a long time, to have grown children, or to be approaching retirement.

Thus the generational model assumes that there is a crucial period in life during which the individual is particularly malleable and that the events and conditions of that era will have a lasting effect on the individual's political attitudes. Karl Mannheim, one of the first to comment at length on the concept of political generation, felt that this crucial period was late adolescence or early adulthood.(3) But cultural factors may cause different crucial periods in different societies. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee suggest that in the United States where youth is relatively apolitical, and where political loyalties are affected by marriage and friendships related to career, political loyalties may not be set until the late twenties.(4) While it is customary to think of political generations being formed as the result of cataclysmic events such as the Great Depression, generations may also be the result of more complex and gradual changes such as the spread of affluence.

The alternative model of aging, the life cycle model, focusses on the roles which society accords to people due to their age, to the effect of the accumulation of experience, or to the psychological effects of biological change. Therefore the sixty year old may be expected to have held the same job for a long period and be more likely to have political attitudes congruent with those prevalent in the work environment.

In the two models, chronological age is used as an indicator of two distinct conceptualizations of age which entail different sources of age differences and dissimilar predictions about the direction of these differences. But researchers have often failed to distinguish between the two models of age when reporting findings about age. Rather, the effect of age may be documented without discussion of its source. Often age seems to be regarded solely as a variable to be controlled for rather than one meriting analysis in its own right. This has been particularly true in the Canadian context where age has rarely been other than a secondary focus of political research.

The following pages will trace the development of political research into age inspired both by the generational and life cycle models. Research on the impact of age on politics has undergone considerable

evolution. The conceptualization of age has been sharpened, the sources of age differences have been dealt with more explicitly, and the quality of data and the time span over which it is available have increased. Among the topics dealt with have been political participation, conservatism, class voting and party identification.

The Generational Model

The word generation has been given a variety of meanings. (5) It can mean ranked descent as it is used to refer to third generation Canadians or it can mean a time period of approximately thirty years. Generations can also refer to an age homogenous group and generation as embodying the Zeitgeist or spirit of the times. This is the meaning when one refers to the "Lost Generation" of the 1920s. The use of generations here combines the later two meanings of the term. Generations will be measured as cohorts, that is groups of people born within a certain time span. But for generation to be a meaningful concept as opposed to a statistical artifact these age homogenous groups must embody essence of an era in a way affecting political attitudes or behaviour. Thus an object of the thesis is to ascertain whether statistical generations have substantive political significance.

Karl Mannheim in the 1920s was one of the first prominent social scientists to discuss in detail the implications of political generations. For Mannheim the concept of generation was important because it implied that individuals of the same age group were to a certain extent unified by having the same position in the flow of history, a position which he saw as analogous to class position. (6) Mannheim stated that "Individuals who belong to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process." (7) He realized that the year of birth of itself was insufficient to create generations; he noted that people born in China and Prussia in the same year could not be considered part of the same generation. (8) Some common political or social experience was implied in the concept of generation. It was felt that those making up generations would continue to act in a distinctive way.

What kind of experience might be expected to have a sufficient impact to create a political generation? A study by Theodore Newcomb in the late 1930's looked at the students of Bennington College in Vermont, a small and experimental liberal women's college. (9) It was found that the effect of the college environment seemed to make the students who had come from conservative upper class families, more liberal. The

original students who had participated in the project. were retested twenty-five years later. They continued to be more liberal in their political attitudes than those of the same age and class who had not been exposed to Bennington. Newcomb and his associates concluded "Neither families from which our Bennington graduates came, nor self-selection within those families appears to account for the continuing liberalism after 25 years of the graduates of 1938, 1939 or 1940. We therefore conclude that the simple fact of four years of experience in the college had a good deal to do with it." (10) Thus in this instance there seems to be a relatively clear generational effect. A liberal environment during a crucial four year period had a liberalizing effect which could be detected 25 years later.

Obviously in the study on Bennington college only a small subsection of the population is being dealt with. Can similar long lasting formative effects on the general population of a certain age be expected? What would the source of these effects be?

Not surprisingly the first country in which there was empirical observation of generational effects was Germany. In Germany there had been a variety of markedly different social periods; war, prosperity, hyperinflation and Depression had followed in rapid

succession.

A German sociologist, Rudolf Heberle, referred to what he termed 'decisive experience' in discussing 'the problem of political generations'. The potentially decisive experiences he refers to are war, revolution and depression. (11) Studies of political generation have continued to focus on such dramatic events as the source of generations. The initial studies on generation in Germany dealt with the effect of the First World War on the rise of the Nazi party. Sigmund Neumann notes that the generation of Germans born between 1890-1900 often had their careers irreparably disrupted by the war. Of these men Neumann

states: "They had lost connection with profession, with family with civil society." (12) The leadership of the Nazi Party came disproportionately from this generation. Similarly Hans Gerth relates the popularity of the Nazi party among former soldiers in the First World War to the military-like command structure of the party. (13)

The remarks of Heberle, Gerth and Neumann on the generational sources of Nazi Party leadership and support are based on aggregate data or on impressionistic observations. With aggregate data it is difficult to ascertain whether differences between age groups are the result of age itself or some other

variable related to age. For example, age differences in Nazi party support might be related to the varying impact of unemployment on age groups rather than on age itself. Since these authors deal with age at one point in time it is difficult to sort out the effect of generation and life cycle. One can infer that World War I had a certain effect on a certain age group but there is always the possibility that this effect was caused by their position in the life cycle. Without data from over a section of the life cycle to enable the researcher to see whether an event has a continuing effect, deciding between a life cycle or a generational interpretation is difficult.

Following the Second World War survey research data with comparable questions and methods of collection covering a progressively longer period of time became available in the United States. Studies of political generations, particularly with regard to electoral behaviour, tended to concentrate on the effect of the Depression. For not only did the Depression have an enormous impact on economic conditions in the United States, it was also the period in which a dramatic political realignment occurred. This realignment creating the Roosevelt coalition in the Democratic Party has had effects extending to the present day.

One of the first studies using survey research data to look at the effect of the Depression on electoral behaviour was that of Angus Campbell, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes reported in The American Voter. Using massed polls taken over a period from 1952 to 1958 comprising about 10,000 respondents, it was found that those people coming into the electorate during the Great Depression were more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than the cohorts preceding and following them. (14) Also, in three polls taken in 1948, 1952 and 1956 the Depression-bred cohort had a higher level of class voting than the electorate as a whole. (15)

David Butler and Donald Stokes report similar findings in Political Change in Britain. The group of people who first voted in 1945, the year of Labour's greatest victory, were, when observed in the 1960's, the most pro-Labour and the most likely to vote along class lines. (16) It is interesting to note that the crucial period forming political behaviour is approximately the same - the period of entrance in the labour force and into the electorate.

While it is customary to think of generations as being formed as the result of great events, generational effects have also been revealed which are more gradual and seem to be the result of long-term

processes which affect the content and nature of political socialization. Paul Abramson documents a generationally based trend toward lower levels of partisan identification in the United States.(17) While Abramson does not suggest the reasons for this trend Walter Dean Burnham has suggested that the trend may be related to the development of a partisan realignment.(18) Another cause of the decline of partisan identification may be related to a general decline of parties as institutions. Frank Sorauf propounds the view that parties in industrial society are declining in importance as other institutions become capable of articulating their interests directly to bureaucracies rather than through political parties.(19) This decline of the importance of parties may be intuitively realized by the public and be reflected in lower levels of partisan identification.

Another work suggesting gradual generationally based change is Ronald Inglehart's "The Silent Revolution in Europe ". Inglehart measured what he called 'acquisitive' and 'post-bourgeois' values by asking people to choose preferred values. The preference for maintaining order and for fighting inflation were considered acquisitive values since maintenance of order implied protection of property. Protecting freedom of speech and giving people more say in the making of important decisions were considered

the post-bourgeois values. The younger cohorts are more likely to hold the post-bourgeois values than are the old. This he attributes to a generational effect: that the young had grown up in an era of prosperity in which acquisitive values were less necessary and in which freedom was no longer a luxury. Those espousing post-bourgeois values were more likely to vote for new left parties or in the case of the Flemish for separatist parties. (20)

Maurice Pinard finds in 1962 that there are higher levels of support in Quebec for the Social Credit party among the young. (21) This seems to be a generational phenomenon, since later generations do not become Social Credit supporters and this group remains distinctive in its level of Social Credit support. (22) Pinard also reports that the young have higher levels of support for separatism. (23) In a later article Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard report much higher levels of support for the separatist Parti Quebecois among the young. (24)

A variety of other findings have been attributed to the existence of political generations. Among these findings in the United States are that those brought up during the First World War, are more 'Jingoistic' (25), that young people are internationalist in their views on foreign policy, (26) and that the children brought up

in the 1930's are collectivist in their orientations. (27) In Canada findings attributed to a generational effect are rare although both Jean Laponce (28) and Mildred Schwartz (29) suggest that there is a generational trend to more nationalistic attitudes.

Both the length of a generation and the nature of the formative experience involved in the creation of a generation vary with the topic examined. In some instances the formation of a generation is due to the impact of events which have very definite time spans such as the Second World War. In this case it would be expected that a generation formed by this event would be distinctive compared to both preceding and following generations. On the other hand, generations may be due to the continuing impact of trends such as secularization. In this instance it would be expected that generations would reflect the trend with the younger being more secular than the older. To a great extent, though, the measurement of generation is determined by the data available. (See Appendix A)

The Life Cycle Model

In the generational model age is an indicator of the time of birth and thus an indicator of unique experiences associated with various historical periods. In contrast, in the life cycle model age is an indicator of processes associated with aging itself. These processes may involve: (30) "(1) differences in social roles and statuses, (2) differences in psychology, temperament that may result directly from physiological aging, (3) greater experience in different role or status situations, (4) greater total experience, (5) reactions to a variety of personal or social events."

With the exception of the effect of personal events the other factors involved in aging can be examined with varying degrees of directness. Aging will be analyzed here as the effect of the life cycle. Changes implied by the term life cycle involve changing social roles, the accumulation of experience and physiological changes. Chronological age in this model serves as a measure of these changes.

The most often cited example of a life cycle effect is the purported relationship between age and conservatism. Conservatism due to age can be viewed as

the result of changing social roles and of physiological changes. New voters may lack responsibilities and wealth and thus tend to be more radical while the accumulation of responsibilities with age may make people more conservative. One particular kind of responsibility affecting young voters is that associated with bringing up young children. According to S.M.Lipset the responsibilities associated with parenthood can make one more appreciative of the role of authority in society.(31) Thus parenthood can make one more conservative, at least in the sense of being more willing to support authority.

One possible perspective on the life cycle is a Freudian one. Freud described the stages of psycho-sexual development as the oral, anal, phallic and genital periods. While this development occurs before the part of the life cycle examined here, Erik Erikson has extended Freudian analysis to include a wider stretch of the life span.(32) The three final stages are of interest here; young adulthood, adulthood, and maturity. Erikson describes young adulthood as a period of conflict in attaining identity which may result in role confusion. In this stage people are susceptible to ideological thinking. Various conditions in modern society, such as the greater possibility of separating sex from reproduction have extended this stage. In this stage people are

susceptible to ideological thinking, often of a Utopian character.(33) Adulthood, for Erikson, implies the development of mature sexuality and the responsibilities of parenthood. The final stage, of maturity implies "emotional integration which permits participation by followership or the responsibility of leadership." (34)

Social psychological theory also suggests that aging at the latter end of the life cycle may result in more conservative attitudes. Raymond Kuhlen suggests that old age is the source of various personal losses.(35) Age brings loss of personal status; roles are lost which cannot be fully replaced. Biological losses which occur may not be as serious of themselves as individuals' perceptions of those losses. Thirdly, with old age an individual's freedom is limited; the individual is locked into career, life style and residence. Frustrated by these limitations old people may feel threatened and react at the individual level by holding tightly to patterns of behaviour and at the societal level by intolerance of dissent and support for authority. Samuel Stouffer's finding in the 1950's reported in Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties that older people in the United States, even when controlling for education, are less willing to tolerate dissent can be interpreted as a conservative reaction to aging.(36)

Evidence on partisan identification, aging and conservatism is weak. John Crittenden reports that old age causes higher levels of Republican identification, and this can be regarded as increasing conservatism with age. But Crittenden's findings have been subjected to criticisms on methodological grounds that will be dealt with below. (37)

Another area in which a life cycle explanation of political behaviour is appropriate is that of political participation. The life cycle entails varying demands on time, interests and resources all of which may affect one's ability to participate in politics. At the beginning of the life cycle people are involved in settling into their life pattern. This is what Norman Nie and Sidney Verba refer to as the 'start-up' phenomenon. (38) The demands involved in starting up tend to lessen the rate of political participation. Similarly knowledge about political issues develops gradually. Thus rates of political participation tend to slowly increase as one ages.

At the other end of the life cycle the 'disengagement' phenomenon occurs. As people retire, and as their friends and relatives die off, they tend to become increasingly isolated and uninvolved. This decline in involvement is reflected in decreasing levels of political participation. (39)

This relationship is documented in the first empirical study of age and political participation, by Herbert Tingsten in 1937. Tingsten, using aggregate data from Switzerland, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, found a curvilinear relationship between age and voting in the case of both sexes. Tingsten discussed the possibility that this relationship was due to the stage of one's career.(40) A much more recent study by Norman Nie and Sidney Verba Participation in America, reveals a life cycle relationship between age and a scale of participation. The strength of the relationship is somewhat reduced when controlled for social status.(41) In Canada, James Curtis and Ronald Lambert obtain similar results using the 1968 National Election Study.(42)

A final life cycle effect is that of growing consistency of attitudes with age. As people get older attitudes may become more consistent as the result of better information and having more time to work out inconsistencies. In Canada, John Courtney and David Smith present some evidence in "Voting in Saskatoon City" which suggests that consistency between federal and provincial vote increases with age.(43) Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee in Voting find that the young are more likely to change their vote intention during the campaign and less likely to cast a vote consistent with their stands on issues.(44) Also with

age the voters' partisanship becomes more consistent with that prevalent in their environment.

One particularly important effect which can be considered an instance of growing consistency with age deals with the level of class voting. Class voting is in a sense a question of the degree of agreement between one's vote and one's environment, at least the work environment. With increasing age, socialization into the work environment becomes more complete. As Paul Abramson explains it:(45)

that young persons are less affected by their social class than older persons are because the young have had less experience in the work force than their elders and have had less time to learn the social and political norms of their class. Moreover, many of the young will have recently crossed class lines through intergenerational social mobility. Both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals may be slow to accept the norms of the class they have entered. A life cycle explanation suggests that as young persons gain more experience in the work force they will become socialized more fully into the norms of their social class. As this socialization occurs, an increasing proportion will learn to support the prevalent party of their class. The net effect of this socialization (and resocialization) will be an increasing relationship

between social class and partisan preference.

Other findings relating to the life cycle suggest that the old are more religious (46), that they are more likely to pick extreme alternatives in evaluating political leaders (47) and they are less likely to favour changes in policy.(48)

Confrontation of the Models

In examining the impact of age in politics there is often considerable ambiguity about whether apparent age differences are the result of generational or life cycle effects. This is particularly true when the analysis is basically cross sectional, that is based on analysis at one point in time.

For example, Campbell et al gave the high level of identification with the Democratic Party and the high level of class voting of people in their forties in the 1950's a generational interpretation; that is that class voting and Democratic identification were the result of the Depression. However, with the data presented a life cycle interpretation of the findings, is also possible. People in their forties may be at

the point in their life cycle at which the work environment is most relevant, yielding a higher level of class voting. It may be the case that this is the time and at which the issue positions of the Democratic party are most appealing. Only by taking data from points in time across a substantial section of the life cycle can a conclusive judgement on the validity of either interpretation be made.

But data taken over a time period is in itself insufficient to make an unambiguous judgement. Take for example, John Crittenden's analysis of age and party identification based on four national samples taken in 1946, 1950, 1954 and 1958. Crittenden found that in each of the four instances the older groups were more likely to identify with the Republicans. Neal Cutler reanalyzes Crittenden's data using cohort analysis. Tracing groups of people born in the same time period over the twelve-year span Cutler finds that the levels of Republicanism decline rather than increase even though that at each point in time the older people are more Republican.(49)

Similarly, Paul Abramson uses cohort analysis to study partisan orientations in Generational Change in American Politics. Abramson traces the level of class voting of the Depression bred cohort from 1948 to 1972 and finds that this cohort continues to vote more

strongly on a class basis than the electorate as a whole. Abramson's research also indicates that there is a generationally based trend to lower levels of partisan identification. (50)

William Klecka in "Political Generations and Political Behavior" looks at the relationship between age and a variety of dependent variables. No clear pattern is found relating several measures of partisanship to age; both generational and life cycle effects are present. Voter turnout showed the usual curvilinear relationship with age resulting from the effects of the life cycle. (51)

Neal Cutler in "Aging and Generations in Politics" examines the relationship between age and beliefs of Americans about foreign policy in the period between 1946 and 1966. In most cases Cutler finds that the generational model better explains the more internationalist attitudes of the young. But Cutler cautions that the choice of a generational over a life cycle explanation is valid only in a certain empirical context and the study of interaction between the two models is necessary. (52)

It must also be borne in mind that apparent age differences may be the result of a compositional fallacy, that is that some other variable is differentially distributed by age creating an apparent

age difference. For example, males and the poor have a higher mortality rate than do females and the rich. In Political Change in Britain David Butler and Donald Stokes show that both these differential/mortality rates tend to make the old appear more conservative in partisanship.(53) In some instances the line between compositional fallacy and age itself is a matter of interpretation. Increases in social status occurring with age can be viewed as inherent in the life cycle or as a variable that happens to be differentially distributed by age. Thus, dealing with the compositional fallacy is both a matter of interpretation of the nature of age and a question of controlling for possible compositional effects such as the sex composition of age groups.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the interface between age and politics in Canada using the two models discussed here. Hypotheses derived from the models will be tested and the relevance of the models will be assessed. Presumably the effects of the life cycle or generation will depend in part on the dependent variable which is being examined. For example, in the case of political participation the bulk of the literature emphasizes the impact of the life cycle while the examination of class voting has focussed primarily on the impact of generational factors. Also the regional or national context may

well have an impact on the nature of age effects. In an area where the Depression had a great effect and where political parties made class based appeals it would be more reasonable to expect high levels of class voting among the Depression generation than in an area where neither of these conditions held. Therefore the examination of age effects necessitates an examination of contextual factors.

Dependent Variables

Age can be and has been related to a multitude of politically relevant variables. Several criteria are used in the choice of the dependent variables to be examined here. The variables to be dealt with are important ones to political scientists and have been examined from a variety of perspectives. These variables can be fundamentally related to processes inherent in the life cycle and/or generational change. Finally, survey data with suitable indicators of these variables must be available. Similarly the historical events and conditions which create generations may result from economic conditions, crises of authority (as one might consider a revolution) or changes in the process of socialization with regard to authority.

Thus, in testing for the effects of life cycle and generation it is natural to look at participation, which involves demands on time and is related to economic status, to look at conservatism, which is intertwined with attitudes towards authority and to look at class voting, which affects the salience of economic issues.

The analysis in this thesis can be divided into two stages. The first stage is descriptive; to find out whether the hypothesized age differences do indeed exist. The second stage is theoretical, the goal being to ascertain whether these differences, if found, can be attributed to life cycle or to generational effects.

The following is a brief discussion of the dependent variables to be dealt with. A more extended discussion of each is presented in the appropriate chapter.

Participation

The nature of political participation underlies discussions of the character of the political system and in particular the degree to which a political system can be considered democratic. Participation encompasses a wide variety of political behaviour. The

most common form of political participation is voting. Other facets of participation are campaign activities such as working for a candidate, donating money to a campaign, wearing a candidate's sticker and trying to convince friends how to vote. Political participation not related to elections includes writing letters to members of parliament and contacting officials. There are also other, less conventional, forms of participation such as protest and violence directed to political ends. Norman Nie and Sidney Verba show in Participation in America that there are different modes of participation and that the kinds of participation within a mode are more strongly related to each other than they are to kinds of participation in other modes.(54) For example, different kinds of electoral participation are more strongly related to each other than they are to contacting officials. It may be the case that different kinds of participation are affected differently by age. For example, harder forms of participation may be more strongly affected by old age than are easier forms.

The life cycle model provides a theoretical basis for predicting age differences in participation. Young people, entering the electorate, tend to be mobile and not well integrated into their community. Opinions and knowledge about politics develop slowly. Both settling in and acquiring knowledge of politics with age lead to

the prediction that participation will increase with age. At the other end of the life cycle other factors are operative which tend to decrease the level of political participation. The most obvious is the decline in health. Also there is the disengagement phenomenon. As friends die and individuals retire they become less involved in society and this diminution of involvement is reflected in lower levels of participation. The combined effect of settling in, the accumulation of knowledge and disengagement is a curvilinear relationship between participation and age. The implications of disengagement theory are dealt with more fully in Chapter 2 on participation.

The variable participation will be operationalized with indicators such as voting rates and various aspects of campaign participation such as working for a candidate. Although the literature suggests that the relationship between age and participation is primarily due to the life cycle the possibility of a generational effect on participation will also be explored.

Conservatism

The most common hypothesis put forward about age and political attitudes is that the old are more conservative. But the concept of conservatism is

diffuse, involving two main dimensions. On one hand conservatism has an ideological dimension involving stands on substantive issues and reflecting a view of human nature and of the nature of society. On the other hand conservatism also embodies resistance to change in personal behaviour and conformity to group norms. Analysis will focus primarily on ideological conservatism.

This ideological conservatism is comprised of attitudes such as authoritarianism and traditionalism, and may be expressed in terms of partisanship. Authoritarianism can be seen in attitudes such as favouring discipline, and harsh measures to punish social deviants. Conservatism also involves acceptance of traditional values such as a belief in religion and acceptance of the appropriateness of long established sources of power.

Ideological conservatism may be expressed in terms of partisanship. What is traditional in large part is defined in terms of the norms of a particular society.

Conservatism and the life cycle involves a variety of phenomena. At the younger end of the electoral life cycle increasing responsibilities may tend to make people more conservative. In particular bringing up children may make parents appreciate the positive aspects of authority. The coming of old age brings

biological losses and losses of roles. These losses can lead to a sense of feeling threatened. In reaction to perceived threats individuals may become more authoritarian, clinging to authoritarian political positions and to more traditional values. This authoritarianism and traditionalism may cause older people to vote for more conservative parties.

The prediction that older people will be more conservative can be derived from a generational model. The generational model would explain greater authoritarianism or adherence to traditional values as the result of being brought up in an era in which those values were more strongly supported. Various observers have credited economic development with creating a generational shift from authoritarian and traditional attitudes to more liberal ones. In times of relative economic scarcity emphasis on order and limitations on self-expression may be seen as necessary. Thus Ronald Inglehart, as noted above, sees the shift from what he calls "acquisitive" to "post-bourgeois" values as being a generational one due to economic development.

Class Voting

Class voting reflects the salience of economic issues in partisan politics or at least the salience of economic issues in the era in which one's partisan preferences were formed. Since both life cycle and historical periods involve economic conditions, predictions derived from both models can be made about class voting. Thinking in generational terms one would expect that the generation most affected by the Depression, that is, those coming onto the labour market for the first time during the Depression would have the highest level of class voting. The economic stress associated with the Depression would increase the salience of economic issues in politics which tend to have a class basis. If political parties during this period made class oriented appeals it would be reasonable to expect that the Depression generation would have voted on a class basis at the time and would continue to do so to a greater extent than the electorate as a whole. This would parallel findings in the United States and to a lesser extent Britain on class voting which have been reported above. In the United States during the Depression the Democratic party did make a class based appeal and thus this generation continues to have a higher level of class voting than the electorate as a whole. A life cycle

explanation of class voting posits that it will increase with the length of time in the work force due to more complete socialization into the work environment. One aspect of this would be socialization into the work environment following social mobility. In the case of class voting the two models provide different descriptive hypotheses about the nature of age differences.

Participation, conservatism and class voting are important variables in the study of politics. They are related to both of the models of age and hypotheses derived from these models can be used to explain differences in these variables.

Partisan Identification

The strength of partisan identification is a variable that may be affected either by generational or by life cycle factors. The nature of these possible effects is related to the conceptualization of the nature of partisan identification. Partisan identification as an enduring attachment to a party can be conceptualized as either a psychological attachment, as is the view of the authors of the American Voter, often inherited from parents, or as a device for information economization. (55)

From the perspective of party identification as psychological attachment periods in which parties are generally held in ill-repute may create generations which have particularly low levels of partisan identification. On the other hand, the presence of other cues for voting in an era may mean that the development of partisan identification as a cue is unnecessary.

From a life cycle perspective the psychological view of party identification suggests that party identification strengthens with duration of attachment. (56) A life cycle perspective posits that partisan identification as a rational tool should grow stronger with continued use providing that it continues to serve as a useful guide in making electoral decisions.

In the Canadian context at the federal level, this creates certain problems. The positions of Canadian political parties, at least the Progressive Conservative party, have varied over time and thus the relationship between strength and age will vary depending on the group examined.

Discussion

While life cycle and generational models may provide contradictory hypotheses they should not be considered as mutually exclusive. In some cases neither effect will be dominant and it seems likely that the life cycle and generational effects will interact.

Neal Cutler cautioned against seeing the models in either-or terms : (57)

We are forced to recognize that the multi-dimensionality of human behavior must be an important component of any explanatory model. In instances where cohort is viewed as the stronger effect we may still expect that there are still some life-stage effects to consider . . . Cohort analysis allows us to unravel these two effects and to determine within a particular empirical context which of the two is relatively more important. The larger task is the mapping of just how generational and maturational experiences dynamically interact to produce complex patterns of human behavior.

Examination of the effects of age on several important political variables and the explanation of these effects in terms of either life cycle or

generational models is an important step towards this goal. By proceeding in this way a more complete understanding of the evolution of political attitudes can be obtained. In examining these effects attention must be paid to the unique aspects of the Canadian political system and in turn to the light that this analysis sheds on that environment.

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Participation and Age

In the broadest sense political participation can encompass all inputs into the political system. Thus included in participation are specific demands made on the political system as well as diffuse and specific supports citizens may give the political system. From this perspective participation may comprise not only acts such as voting but also attitudes of support for specific government actions, general feelings of loyalty or lack of loyalty for the political system as well as acts of violence directed towards political ends. Therefore interest groups, political parties, terrorist cells and bureaucracy may all be involved in political participation.

In another sense the analysis of political participation is related to the issue of representation in a democracy. How individuals are linked to decision makers depends in part on the degree to which they participate and the nature of that participation. The demands voiced for "participatory democracy" or for increased participation of some particular group, such as the poor, are therefore demands for basic changes in the system.

The impact of age on participation can affect the overall levels of participation in a society which in turn may have an impact on political stability. While studies relating overall levels of political participation to political stability have often dealt with the extension of the franchise (1) or the effect of a crisis (2) it may be the case that changes in the level of participation associated with age will have implications for stability.

Thus a variety of forms of behaviour may be studied under the rubric of political participation. The forms of participation to be dealt with here are directed at the electoral process. The primary form of electoral participation is the act of voting. Interest in politics, while not a form of behaviour itself, is closely linked with participation and will be dealt with here as an aspect of participation. (3) The impact of age on other forms of electoral participation such as donating money to a campaign, working for a candidate or convincing friends how to vote will also be analyzed.

Political philosophers have seen age as one of the fundamental characteristics distinguishing individuals and affecting their suitability as participants. Plato felt that the rulers of the ideal republic should be over fifty years old because by that

period of their lives appetites would have subsided and decisions could be made on a more rational basis.

Aristotle saw conflict between fathers and sons as one of the driving forces behind social changes.

Characterizing approaches to political action Max Weber contrasts the messianic 'ethic of ultimate ends' with the pragmatic 'ethic of responsibility' implying that the young are seen as motivated by 'the ethic of ultimate ends' while the old are seen as motivated by the 'ethic of responsibility' (4).

Age can be seen in terms of the political life cycle or of generational differences. The life cycle refers to the effect of processes inherently related to social or biological aging while generational differences are due to the impact of historical circumstances on individuals.

Age conceptualized as the life cycle may be related to levels of participation in several ways. The stages of the life cycle involve differing demands on time, interest, and other resources, as well as changing levels of experience and knowledge. Comparing the beginning of the electoral life cycle, that is when people are in their late teens and twenties, with the period when they are in their fifties, and sixties, provides a clear contrast. At the beginning of the electoral life cycle people are involved in settling

into their careers and marriages as well as accumulating knowledge and interest about politics. This accumulation of political knowledge and experience combined with the gradual settling into a life pattern is what Sidney Verba and Norman Nie refer to as the "start-up phenomenon" (5). The demands on time involved in settling in, the lack of political experience and the lack of firm ties to the community lead to a low level of participation among the young. With the development of these ties and the accumulation of experience with age, levels of participation tend to increase at least until another phenomenon, that of disengagement, becomes operative.

Social psychologists Elaine Cumming and William Henry develop what is referred to as "disengagement theory". (6) The essential postulate of disengagement theory is that "The expectation of death is universal and decrement of ability probable. Therefore a mutual severing of ties will take place between a person and others in his society." (7) This severing of ties may be initiated by society, by the individual or by both. One consequence of this phenomenon may be a decline in the level of political participation among the elderly. Widowhood and retirement are important aspects of this disengagement. With widowhood not only do people lose an extremely important role, they also lose a social status which makes interaction with third parties

easier. As Irving Rosow puts it "Unmarried adults are normative and statistical deviants" and the "norms of social life are effectively governed by and cater to the married" (8) Dealing with the same theme Riley et al say that with widowhood "the subtle social approval accorded the married state tends to be replaced with pity or indifference" (9) Similarly retirement entails dramatic changes in that aspect of the individual's status derived from occupation. The loss this change entails would be particularly important in a society which places a great deal of value on the instrumental work role.(10)

There has been a great deal of controversy about disengagement theory both on theoretical grounds and with regard to the desirability of the disengagement of the old. A.R. Hochschild criticizes disengagement theory as being unfalsifiable at least in the manner in which it is stated by Cummings and Henry. For example Cummings and Henry describe those old people who are still socially active as not having "successfully" disengaged (11). The assumption remains that disengagement will eventually occur. Another limitation of disengagement theory is what Hochschild describes as the omnibus variable problem (12). Disengagement involves a general loss of social roles. It is possible to become disengaged with respect to some roles while remaining engaged or becoming more

engaged in other roles. For example a study of emeritus professors showed social disengagement occurring without psychological disengagement.(13) Another focus in the criticism of disengagement theory has been on the normative implications of the theory. Cummings and Henry assume not only that disengagement is inevitable but that it is desirable. But Erdman Palmore finds that the elderly who remain socially active are happier than those who disengage.(14) Henry Maas and Joseph Kuypers, in a study of middle class, elderly Californians entitled From Thirty to Seventy, report that disengagement with age occurs only among those people who had poor health.(15) Similarly Margaret Smith and Barbara Gallatin Anderson find that disengagement occurs with age but only when accompanied by poverty, illness, or decrease of energy. (16) Thus while disengagement does occur among the old, the degree to which it is the result of age itself or of particular economic, physical or social changes associated with age is open to question.

The start-up and disengagement phenomena suggest opposing predictions about the effect of age on political participation although the effects act primarily at opposite ends of the life cycle. Start-up for the most part would affect those in their teens and twenties while disengagement acts solely on the old. Therefore it seems likely that the combined effect of

start-up and disengagement will be a curvilinear relationship between age and political participation.

Empirical evidence to support the prediction of a curvilinear relationship between age and participation is documented in one of the first studies of age and participation, that of Herbert Tingsten published in 1937. Tingsten was able to use aggregate data on voting turnout in various subsections of Switzerland, Denmark, the United States and Sweden (17). In these areas the percentage of eligible voters was tabulated by age, as well as, in some cases, by social class and sex. Tingsten obtains remarkably similar findings in these areas and states: (18) "Generally speaking it can be said that voting frequency is lowest in the youngest age groups rising successively and reaching a maximum in the age groups around fifty; with increasing age political interest once again tends to decrease." The pattern is similar if not identical for both sexes as well as for various social classes, although the absolute rates of turnout for men and for people in the upper classes is higher. Tingsten discusses possible explanations for the relationship between age and voting suggested by others. Generally these authors explained changes in levels of participation with age as the result of increased experience or the stage of a person's career. Tingsten finds these explanations to be of little value for him given the

nature of his data and the lack of other indicators related to career other than age itself. Tingsten does suggest that further research might focus on factors such as the different pensioning requirements in various professions. (19) Since Tingsten does suggest a link between the decline in voting among the old to pensions and thus to retirement to a certain degree he anticipated disengagement theory. This theory related general withdrawal from society to a decline in participation.

More recent cross-national studies have also found a curvilinear relationship between age and participation. Norman Nie and Jae-On Kim in 'Participation and the Life Cycle' examine the effect of age in India, Austria, Japan, Nigeria and the United States. In these countries they find a curvilinear relationship between age and various modes of participation. The slope of this relationship, that is, the amount of change in participation per year of age, is less steep for voting than for other measures of participation. They attribute this to the relative ease of the act of voting. Several variables are reported that affect the uncontrolled relationship between age and participation. Controlling for education increases the underparticipation of the more highly educated. In addition, in the United States, India and Nigeria controlling for education does away

with the underparticipation of the very old. In India the United States and Japan those citizens who continue to work participate at a higher level than those who retire. Controlling for length of residence raises the rates of participation of the young. Nonetheless the authors conclude that the young are more genuine underparticipants than the old. (20)

In a study dealing solely with the United States, Participation In America Sidney Verba and Norman Nie develop the concept of the 'start-up' phenomenon. As the young become settled into their job, residence and family their level of participation gradually increases. Participation is seen as a habit which takes the young time to acquire. Also Nie and Verba refer to what they call the 'slow down' of old age a concept fairly similar to disengagement which is related to an old age decline in participation. (21)

Norval Glenn and Michael Grimes examining the United States in 'Aging, Voting, and Political Interest' find the typical curvilinear relationship between age, voting and political interest. Controlling for race, sex and education they found that voter turnout remained constant from middle age to advanced maturity and that political interest continued to increase after 60. Glenn and Grimes formulate what might be referred to as an anti-disengagement.

hypothesis : " An increase in political interest may compensate for a loss of opportunity or inclination to attend to other interests." (22)

While the thrust of research on age and political participation has focussed on the life cycle, it is possible that age related differences may be due to generational effects. Circumstances in a particular historical era may have had lasting effects on the rates of participation of the young, breeding cynicism and apathy about politics or enthusiasm and interest. For example, in Austria, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and Jae-On Kim found that the middle aged had low rates of participation which is contrary to what one would predict from the life cycle model. They attributed this lower rate of participation to a generational effect resulting from political events in Austria in the 1930's. (23)

Similarly Gerald Pomper studying American electoral behaviour finds a generational effect on those college-educated youths who first voted in 1960 :
(24)

In that [1960] contest the candidacies of two young and apparently able nominees increased the activity of college educated youth The initial enthusiasm of the college-educated youth of 1960

continued in later elections.

In Canada research on the relationship between age and political behaviour has been a good deal less detailed and ambitious. Peter Regenstreif in The Diefenbaker Interlude reports a general increase in the level of interest in politics with age using CIPO data. It must be borne in mind that most CIPO data are coded in categories of 21 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, and 50 and over, therefore a possible decline in interest with old age might be obscured. (25) Rick Van Loon using an indicator of participation combining voting, reading about politics, convincing friends on how to vote, belonging to a political party and working in a campaign finds that the young and the very old have lower rates of participation than the middle-aged. (26) A study aimed primarily at exploring the relationship between age and participation in Canada is "Voting, Election Interest and Age : National Interest and Age: National Findings for English and French Canadians" by James E. Curtis and Ronald D. Lambert. (27) Curtis and Lambert explore the relationship between age and voting, election interest and political group affiliation in 1965 and 1968 both with and without controls. Without controls a somewhat irregular curvilinear relationship between age and voting interest is observed. Only among French

Canadian women is the decline in turnout with age very pronounced. When controls are introduced the relationship is diminished and only among French Canadian women is there still a decline in voting or interest with age. Both uncontrolled and controlled relationships reveal that men are likely to increase their frequency of voting with age.(28)

Generation and Life Cycle: Alternative Explanations

While research on the topic of age and political participation has primarily dealt with age as the effect of the life cycle, there have been some findings of generational effects on participation. As noted above Pomper found in the United States a generational effect on college educated voters due to the 1960 election and Nie, Kim and Verba found a generational effect causing lower rates of participation in Austria. Thus the possibility of generational factors affecting participation must be borne in mind. A particular election or period may have caused a lasting increase or decrease in levels of participation in a certain cohort.

At a single point in time it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether an age difference is due to a life cycle or to a period effect as plausible explanations for observed age differences may be derived from both models. Therefore the initial stage in examining age and participation is to take data from as wide a time span as possible. With quasi-longitudinal analysis it is possible to observe whether the change in political participation associated with cohorts which implies a generational effect are important and whether they are as strong as those due to life cycle effects.

Therefore tables reporting the participation rates of age groups and cohorts will be presented. This will allow an assessment of the relative strengths of life cycle and generational effects. A generational effect would be indicated by a strong relationship between cohort and participation while a life cycle effect would be indicated by age group and participation. Table 1 presents the relationship between vote intention and age for four points in time.

Given the fact that the data from the two first points in time are based on quota samples tests of statistical significance are inappropriate for these data sets. Since the hypotheses examined deal with relationships across the whole time period overall

tests of statistical significance are inappropriate and not presented.

Table 1 The Relationship between Participation (vote) and Age over Time

Age	Year of Measurement			
	1945*	1953!	1965	1974
21-29	74	81	81	83
	(-10)	(-4)	(-4)	(-2)
30-39	84	87	83	83
	(0)	(+2)	(-2)	(-2)
40-49	84	85	90	87
	(0)	(0)	(+5)	(+2)
50-59	85	85	88	85
	(+1)	(0)	(+3)	(0)
60-69	90		89	86
	(+6)		(+4)	(+1)
70+	88		87	87
	(+4)		(+2)	(+2)
mean	84	85	85	85
n=	1724	1969	2696	2452

Figures represent the percentage of people who said they had voted or intended to do so. Numbers in brackets represent the percentage simple deviation from the mean for the entire electorate for that point in time. Data for 1945 and 1953 are from CIPO Polls 142

and 228. The 1965 and 1974 data are from national election studies. (29)

*Do you vote in all elections or only in those which interest you? (30)

(Those answering all)

! Percent saying that they intend to vote.

It should be noted that while the questions asked are somewhat different at different points in time the absolute level of response is almost identical. In particular, the wording of the 1945 poll is somewhat different. At the beginning of the electoral life cycle a pattern is evident. An examination of the 1953, 1965 and 1974 polls reveals that in 2 of 3 cases those in their twenties had the lowest rate of voting while in the third instance those in their twenties are tied with those in their thirties for the lowest rate of voting.

At the other end of the life cycle the pattern is less clear cut. In two of the three instances (the 1953 poll has the highest age as 50 and over and therefore is omitted) it declines slightly. In no case is the level of voting lower than that for the electorate as a whole. Thus the drop in voting does occur in some cases but seems to be less sharp than the increase in the level of voting at the beginning of the

life cycle. The possibility of a generational effect will be dealt with below in tables 3 and 4.

Another measure related logically to participation for which there is data over a time span is that of interest in the election or politics. Rick Van Loon finds in his study of political participation using the 1965 National Election Study that political interest is strongly related to electoral participation.(31) However, to a certain extent our ability to examine the impact of age on interest is limited by different wordings and recordings of the questions on interest.(32)

Table 2

Age by Interest in Election or Politics

age	Year of Measurement			
	1945	1953	1965	1974
21-29	82 (-6)	80 (-5)	64 (-5)	56 (-10)
30-39	86 (-2)	87 (+2)	69 (0)	66 (0)
40-49	91 (+3)	86 (+1)	74 (+5)	70 (+4)
50-59	92 (+4)	86 (+1)	71 (+2)	76 (+10)
60-69	93 (+5)		67 (-2)	72 (+6)
70+	87 (-1)		65 (-4)	69 (+3)
mean	88	85	69	66
n=	1702	1794	2674	2550

Percentages are those people interested in the election or in 1965 interested in politics. The numbers in brackets are the simple percentage deviations from the mean.

As in the case of voting there is a marked increase in the level of interest at the beginning of the life cycle. In each case those in their twenties have the lowest level of interest. There is some levelling off among those in their seventies although in only one of three cases is their level of interest lower than the level for the electorate as a whole. In all three cases there is a decline in interest between those in their sixties and those in their seventies. Both voting and level of interest provide evidence supporting the notion of a curvilinear relationship between participation and age, although support for the view that participation increases at the beginning of the life cycle is stronger than that for the position that participation declines at the end of the life cycle.

Although the data in tables 1 and 2 cover a wide time span, in effect the mode of analysis is cross-sectional. That is the analysis proceeds by comparing people of different ages at the same point in time. In order to more accurately assess the effects of age it is necessary to compare the same people across time or at least samples of populations with the same dates of birth. This latter strategy is often referred to as quasi-longitudinal analysis and will be followed here. Rather than following the same people across a time span samples of people with the same

dates of birth will be compared in different polls taken at different points in time. In so doing the cutting points in the 1945, 1965 and 1974 data sets will be arranged to fit the 1953 poll where age is coded in the categories of 21 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49 and 50 and over. This information for voting turnout and for level of interest is presented in tables 3 and 4.

Table 3

Level of Turnout by Cohort

	1945	1953	1965	1974
Date of Birth				
-1903	86	85	88	85
	(+2)	(0)	(+2)	(0)
1904-1913	85	85	89	87
	(+1)	(0)	(+3)	(+2)
1914-1923	75	87	89	85
	(-9)	(+2)	(+4)	(0)
1924-1932		81	85	88
		(-4)	(-1)	(+3)
1933-1944			81	84
			(-5)	(-1)
1945-1956				83
				(-2)
mean	84	85	86	85
	1724	1969	2696	2452

Table 4

Cohorts and Levels of Interest

Date of Birth	1945	1953	1965	1974
-1903.	91	87	65	68
	(+3)	(+1)	(-3)	(+2)
1864-1913	86	87	71	73
	(-2)	(+1)	(+3)	(+7)
1914-1923	82	85	76	75
	(-6)	(-1)	(+8)	(+9)
1924-1932		84	67	70
		(-2)	(+1)	(+4)
1933-1944			66	67
			(-2)	(+1)
1945-1956				56
				(-10)
mean	88	86	68	66
n=	1702	1924	2674	2550

In Table 3 which presents cohort by level of turnout there is no systematic generational pattern. For example following the 1924 to 1932 cohort across the table there is a change in turnout from 4% below the mean to 3% above the mean in 1974. Similarly in Table 4 the level of interest of the 1914 to 1923 cohort rises progressively from 6% below the mean in

1945 to 9% above the mean in 1974. This is a pattern paralleled by the 1924-1933 and the 1933-1944 cohorts. However, a generational explanation is also possible here as there is a decline in the overall level of interest across the four points in time. Therefore it is possible that the higher level of political interest of the older groups is due to a generational effect. That is that they reflect the higher level of political interest characterizing the earlier eras. But given the lack of exactly identical questions at all points in time the results remain ambiguous. Analysis of those who were 'very interested' in politics in 1953 and 1974 reveals that there is increase between the two points in time in the proportion of very interested in the election and that there is no change in the third case.(33) In all three cohorts there is an increase in the proportion interested relative to the mean. Given the absolute as well as the relative increase the evidence tends to support a life cycle interpretation of the effect of age although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous.

Thus while the findings dealing with voting provide clear support for the life cycle model there is some ambiguity with regard to the impact of age on levels of interest in elections. However, a variety of hypotheses can be derived from the life cycle model which can be tested at one point in time and which may

serve to confirm or refute this life cycle interpretation of age differences.

Participation and the Life Cycle

The literature suggests that there will be a gradual increases in the level of participation until people are in their sixties followed by a slight decline in the levels of participation. The first stage in the analysis of the relationship between age and participation is the examination of the zero order relationship in order to see whether this relationship indeed exists. Several different indicators of participation will be used. The second stage in the analysis will be to examine the effect of control variables which may be causing a spurious relationship between age and participation. The third stage is analytical in nature. If the posited relationship between age and participation does exist can it be related to factors thought involved in the political life cycle, that is processes inherent in the "start-up" and disengagement phenomena?

Tables of the uncontrolled relationship between various measures of participation and age are located in Appendix B and the direction of change in levels of participation is summarized in Table 5. This table reveals that for each of the nine measures there is an increase from the first age group (18-29 year olds) to the second age group (30-39 year olds). At the other end of the life cycle a consistent pattern is found; there is a drop from the 60-69 year old category to the 70 and over category in eight of nine instances. The pattern of change in the intermediate age groups is less consistent although there are a majority of cases in which participation increases with age. Appendix C shows similar results using slightly different cutting points for age.

Table 5 shows that the sharpest increases in participation generally occur between the 18-29 category and the 30-39 category. In 6 of the 9 measures of participation the increase between these two categories is higher than the increases between any other categories.

Table 5

Summary of Changes in the Level of Participation

Item	Age Periods				
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69
	to 30-39	to 40-49	to 50-59	to 60-69	to 70+
Interest					
In Election	+12	+2	0	+11	-7
Interest					
In Politics	+7	+8	+2	+5	-6
Read Paper					
About Politics	+10	+8	+3	+3	-7
Discuss					
Politics	+9	+4	-12	+5	-4
Convince					
Friends on Vote	+2	0	+1	+1	-6
Work in					
Community	+11	+7	-7	-9	-2
Attend					
Meetings	+3	+1	+3	-3	0
Contact					
officials	+2	+3	-1	+1	-2
Campaign					

Activity	+3	-2	+2	+1.	-2
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Increases

and Decreases	9+	7+,1-	5+,3-	7+,2-	8-
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Positive sign signifies increased level or participation with age while figures are the percent change in that indicator from one age group to another. The figures at the bottom of the column are the number of indicators which increased (those followed by a plus sign) and the number of indicators that decreased. (those followed by a minus sign) See Appendix B for absolute percentages and numbers.

Another way to assess the sharpness of change in participation rates at different age levels is to observe the slope of the regression line between age and participation within different age limits. The slope of the relationship reveals the degree of change in the level of participation for each unit of change in age. Therefore by comparing the slope of the relationship between age and participation within certain age limits with the slope within other age limits it is possible to compare the effects of the life cycle. In this analysis a scale of participation items is used as an indicator of participation in order to increase reliability and variability.

Comparing the slope of the relationship between participation and age within different age ranges presented in Table 6 shows that the slope is greatest among those under 30 and decreases progressively as the age range is increased. In other words the rate of participation increases most rapidly at the beginning of the electoral life cycle, then there is a slowdown in the rate of increase.

Table 6 Age by Participation within Age Groups
(slope associated with the relationship between age and participation)

	Slope	N=	Sign.
18-29	.027	400	.02
-40	.016	619	.004
-50	.014	850	.00003
-60	.008	1033	.0005
-70	.007	1166	.0005
overall	.004	1252	.01

(The participation scale is made up of items on frequency of vote, discussing politics, trying to convince friends on how to vote and campaign activity. The coefficient of reproducibility of the scale is .9301)

Thomas J. Agnello in an article entitled 'Aging and the Sense of Powerlessness' suggests that the relatively high level of voting of the old may be related to the ease of creating the habit of voting as

opposed to the difficulty of extinguishing it. (34)

Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and Jae-on Kim in

'Participation and the Life Cycle' also relate the relatively slight decline in voting turnout that they found among the old to the ease of the act of voting. (35) Similarly, level of interest in elections is related to participation and requires little effort to perform. Thus the ease of voting and interest may explain the lack of decline with age. They are habits which are fairly easy to develop and become forms of behaviour which resist being extinguished.

This suggests that the effects of age on various aspects of participatory behaviour may be ordered by the effort each form of behaviour requires.

Specifically there should be a greater decline in rates of participation with old age on the difficult forms of behaviour than on the easy forms.

But when the amount of decline in participation rates for interest in election and for the easy forms of behaviour (discussing or reading about politics) is compared to the decline in the difficult forms (contacting people about the election, attending election meetings, or working in the campaign), it is revealed that this is not the case. Since the absolute levels of participation on difficult and easy forms of behaviour vary greatly, comparisons in the amount of

change are difficult. One strategy in dealing with this problem is to change the cutting points of the indicators to make levels of participation more alike. Thus one can compare the percentage who say they participate in a more difficult form of behaviour 'often' or 'sometimes' with those who say they participate in an easier form of behaviour 'often'.

(see Appendix D) Yet even when using this strategy to make forms of participation more comparable there is as great a decline between the 60-69 and the seventy and over category for the easy items as for the difficult items. Similarly, creating scales of difficult and easy aspects of participation reveals no difference in the expected direction.

Testing for Compositional Effects

Before accepting the relationship between age and participation as due to a life cycle effect, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of what is referred to as a compositional fallacy which in essence means that the original relationship may be spurious. The expression compositional fallacy refers to a spurious relationship due to the differential distribution of characteristics not inherently related to aging.

Several variables have been found to be consistently related to participation at various points in time in different political systems. Lester Milbrath summarizes findings on the sources of political participation in the United States. Among the social factors consistently found to be related to political participation are class, occupation, education and sex. (36) In a cross-national context Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's Civic Culture study shows that education affects both attitudes toward democracy and the propensity to participate. (37) Similarly Van Loon's study of participation shows that class, income and education are related to campaign activity.

Given the consistent finding of a relationship between these social factors and levels of political participation the question arises of the extent that these factors may be related to age. The stage in an individual's career and therefore the individual's income may be related to age. The expansion of education has meant that the young have higher levels of formal education than the old. Also death rates among males are higher than those among females. The different age distribution of these variables which are in turn related to political participation may create an apparent life cycle effect which must be controlled for.

First, it is necessary to see to what degree these variables are differentially distributed by age.

Appendix E contains tables of age by sex, education and income. Table 1, Appendix E, reveals the different proportions of people of either sex in each age category. Particularly striking is the difference between the 60 to 69 year old age group and those over 70. While 49% of the 60 to 69 year old group are females, 57% of those over 70 are female. Income also varies with age; there is a sharp decline in the income of those over 60. While 34% of those in their 50's are in the lowest income category 61% of those in their 60's and 78% of those in the over seventy group are in this category. Educational differences by age are even more dramatic. While only 7% of the people in the 18 to 29 category have eight years or less of education the proportion of poorly educated people increases with age until in the over seventy group 56% have fewer than eight years of education.

In order to ascertain more truly the effect of age on participation, it is necessary to control for the possibly confounding influences of the previously mentioned variables. A summarization of these factors of these variables on participation can be found in Table 7. Among these factors is sex. Milbrath reports that "[T]he finding that men are more likely to participate than women is one of the most thoroughly

substantiated in political science".(38) S.M. Lipset finds that in several European countries women have lower rates of voting than men although the differential is narrowing in many instances.(39) In Canada, Van Loon finds lower rates of political interest and campaign activity among women although this relationship disappears among the most highly educated. (40)

Table 7 reveals marked increases in participation within the first three age groups among males. All 9 of the indicators show an increase from the 18-29 category to the 30 to 39 category and from the 30-39 category to the 40-49 category. Following this there is an irregular decline for the rest of the life cycle for males. For females the pattern of increases in participation with age is somewhat less consistent. Nonetheless comparing rates of participation among those in their 60's to those in the 18 to 29 year old category there is an increase in participation on all 9 indicators. Between the 60 to 69 group to the 70 and over group there is a decline on 8 of the 9 indicators. Thus, controlling for sex leaves the curvilinear relationship between age and participation intact.

Table 7

Summary of Changes in Political Participation

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	18-29
	to	to	to	to	to	to
	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+	60-69
Controlling						
Sex						
Females	7+,1-	6+,3-	6+,3-	7+,2-	9-	8+
Males	9+	9+	3+,5-	2+,5-	6-,2+	9+
Education						
Highly educated	8+	7+,1-	2+,6-	7+,1+	5-,1+	6+,2-
Less educated	7+,1-	7+	4+,4-	6+,1-	8-	8+
Income						
High income	8+	6+,2-	3+,3-	6+,2-	5-,1+	9+
Low income	4+,4-	5+,2-	3+,5-	4-,4+	7-,1+	8+,1-

The figures in the table summarize the effect of age on 9 indicators of political participation. The positive figures indicate the number of measures on which there is an increase in the percentage of participants between two age categories while the minus signs indicate a decrease in the proportion of participants between the two age categories. (See Appendices F, G and H for complete figures.)

One of the most consistent findings in political science research has been the association of high levels of education with high levels of participation.

Milbrath reports this in his summary of findings on political participation (41), and Van Loon obtains similar results for Canada using the 1965 National Election Survey. (42) Therefore it is necessary to control for education. Given the higher levels of education of the young and the relationship between education and participation, one would think that the young, being more highly educated, would have a higher than average level of participation. This, of course, is the opposite of what was found in examining the uncontrolled relationship between age and participation.

Education is measured in terms of years of formal education and divided into the categories of ten years and less, and more than ten years. Table 7 shows that in general both the more and less well educated follow the same pattern of changing participation with age although the more highly educated have consistently higher rates of participation. The levels of participation of both groups increase at the beginning of the electoral life cycle and decline at the end of it. At the beginning of the electoral life cycle there is an increased level of participation on all 8 of the indicators, and at the end a pattern of decrease with decline on 5 of the indicators between the 60's and 70 and over category. Similarly, among the less well educated there are 7 instances of increase at the

beginning of the life cycle and only one of decrease. At the end, there is a consistent pattern of decrease with lower rates of participation on all 8 indicators.

Income is another variable related to both age and participation. Table 7 reveals that the pattern of increase at the beginning of the electoral life cycle and decline at the end of it is generally followed but with some differences between the two income groups. The pattern of early increase in participation is more consistent in the higher income category while the decline with old age is more consistent in the lower group. (The possibility that income differences are not truly compositional in nature but are inherently related to the life cycle, as in the decline in income associated with retirement, will be explored later.)

It would seem that sex, education and income have some effect on the uncontrolled relationship but the expected curvilinear pattern remains intact. But a more refined analysis of the relationship between these variables can be provided by a more sophisticated technique such as Pearson Correlation. Pearson correlation can make more thorough use of the data, since all values are used in calculating the results, as opposed to controlling with crosstabulation which requires the choice of a cutting point for the control variable which may be arbitrary. In using

Pearson Correlation it is necessary to cut the relationship into those sections within which a linear pattern is expected since this is a technique which deals solely with the linear proportion of the relationship and over the total life span a curvilinear relationship is expected.

In Appendix I the partial correlation coefficients of age and participation controlling for education, income, sex and self-identified class are presented. To increase the variability and reliability of the measure of participation a scale is created. Because the slope of the relationship, that is, the amount of change in participation associated with change per unit of age, varies, the coefficient of the partial correlation coefficients within different age ranges are presented. The comparison of the zero order correlation coefficients within various age spans with higher order correlation coefficients obtained from controlling for sex, education and class shows that these controls have no consistent effect on the original relationship. Controlling for education in all cases increases the strength of the relationship.

In summation it seems clear that at least with regard to the control variables examined here the relationship is not spurious but is in fact related to age.

Decomposition of the Life Cycle

Theoretical Perspectives

Social aging is not a process which is totally congruent with biological aging, nor is it a process solely determined by the passage of years. Two theoretical perspectives have been suggested for dealing with the effect of life cycle on participation rates. One perspective explains the underparticipation of the young, while the other deals with the decline in participation associated with old age.

Nie and Verba in Participation in America suggest that the increase in participation of the young is related to what they refer to as the 'start-up' phenomenon. (43) This view suggests that the increase in political participation with age will occur more rapidly among those who settle into their place of residence, job and marriage. They found that controlling for length of residence in a particular location decreased the underparticipation of the young. From this perspective one would expect young mobile and unmarried people to have lower rates of political participation than those who are young but married and settled into a residence. Similarly those with

experience in a job should have higher rates of participation than people of comparable age with less work experience.

The second theoretical perspective is that of disengagement theory involving the decline in participation with old age. Because of problems in interpretation of disengagement theory it is necessary to delineate the use to be made of disengagement theory in this context. Firstly, analysis shall be confined to disengagement from roles (eg. the role of marriage or that of political participant) rather than to psychological disengagement. Secondly, disengagement theory will be used here only to make predictions relating the loss of some roles to the loss of other roles. For example, retirement (that is the loss of the work role) would be assumed to be related to a decline in participation. As disengagement is seen as a generalized phenomenon it can be hypothesized that the loss of one role will be related to the loss of other roles.

The Start-Up Phenomenon

A variety of variables are involved in the start-up phenomenon some of which are available in the 1974 data set. The variables available which may be indicators in the start-up are experience on the job and marital status.(44)

Marital status does not seem to have much effect on political participation at the beginning of the life cycle. Appendix J reveals that the increase in participation is more consistent among married males than among the unmarried but there is little difference in the slopes of the relationship or in the absolute levels of participation. Because of the small numbers available in the half sample among the unmarried, in a majority of cases the relationship does not attain statistical significance.

Another variable related to the life cycle is the amount of experience one has at one's job. Older people tend to have been employed at their job for a longer period and thus would be more settled in and have more time to participate in politics. Work experience might be most strongly associated with the start-up effect at the beginning of the electoral life cycle. Therefore these younger voters might be

particularly affected by variation in work experience. Unfortunately the question on work experience was asked only of manual workers and farmers and therefore the the analysis is limited to manual workers.

First, it should be noted that work experience is strongly related to age as the Pearson Correlation between the two variables is .6. Stated in another way, while 74% of those under 29 have less than 5 years work experience only 24% of those from 30 to 39 and 12% of those from 60 to 69 have less than 5 years work experience. Secondly, both experience and age are related to participation among manual workers although the relationship between age and participation among manual workers is less consistent than among the population as a whole.

Looking at the Pearson Correlation of the relationship between age and participation shows that interest in politics, interest in the election, and the item on reading newspapers about the election are significantly related to age. When work experience is controlled for, the strength of the relationship is reduced in two of three cases but all remain significant to the .05 level. In these three cases participation is also related to experience to a statistically significant degree. Experience is also related to the questions on discussing politics,

contacting officials and participating in campaign activity to the .05 level. When age is controlled the relationship remains in existence to a statistically significant degree in three out of four cases. Thus among manual workers there seems to be some effect on participation due to the length of experience at a place of work which while closely related to age is not completely determined by it.

Disengagement Theory

Disengagement theory suggests that as people age the number of roles they have will decline. Roles are socially expected behaviour patterns determined by an individual's status in society. It is hypothesized that with this general decline in roles there will be a decline in the role of political participant.

Among the variables present in the 1974 data set which may indicate a reduction in the number of roles are marital status, retirement and having children.

Before dealing with the social phenomenon associated with the life cycle, a brief look will be taken at a biological aspect of aging, the decline of health. Those who had not voted in 1974 were asked why

they had not done so (Appendix K). The proportion who had not done so because of illness increased steadily with age. While only 5% of those who had not voted in the 18-30 gave illness as their reason, 46% of those in the 61 and over category said that they had not voted for this reason. Curtis and Lambert obtained similar results using the 1968 National Election Study. (45)

Given that work is an important role in society, its loss may be associated with general disengagement and thus with a general decline in participation. While retirement could in itself be seen as a role there are few particular responsibilities associated with it. E.W. Burgess referred to retirement as the 'roleless role' meaning that while retirement is definitely a position in society, but as is not true of other positions there is little agreement about the behaviour that should be associated with being retired'. (46) It would seem to be more realistic to see retirement as the loss of a role rather than a change in role. Therefore it is predicted that retirement will be associated with a more rapid decline in participation with age.

Appendix L contains a variety of measures of participation by age controlling for retirement. Since there are very few retired respondents in any but the last two categories (60-69 and 70 and over) only the

last two values are given in the cases of the retired. In 8 of the 10 indicators (8 indicators dealing with participation and 2 with interest) the retired people over 70 have lower rates of participation than the unretired people in the over 70 category. While in 8 out of 10 cases the rate of participation increased between the 60-69 group and the 70 and over group for those not retired the level of participation decreased sharply among those who were retired. In the two instances in which the level of participation of those not retired decreased the decline was not nearly as marked as that of the retired. It should be noted that the unretired people in the 70 and over group are disproportionately female.

Thus the phenomenon of retirement seems to be related in some way to changes in participation rates with age but the nature of the relationship is by no means clear cut. While 74% of the 60-69 year old group is not retired 65% of those in the 70 and over category are retired. Thus the apparent increase with age among those who are not retired may be due to a process of selection. The more active people who have higher rates of participation may continue to work while the less active drop out of the labour force. Similarly the marked drop in participation among those who are retired from the 60 to 69 group to the 70 and over group may be due to a change in composition of the

2

group. Those who are retired in their 60's may tend to be those who retired voluntarily being better off in terms of income than those who retired latter because of compulsory retirement. Relatively high incomes and a good deal of spare time may account for the higher levels of participation of the retired people in the 60-69 group compared to those in the same age group who are not retired.

Marked differences are found in income levels between retired and unretired people in the 60-69 and 70 and over age groups. Comparing retired people in their sixties and those seventy and over it, is found that 49% of those in their sixties have a family income of less than \$7,499, while 60% of those over seventy have an income in this category. This would seem to support the view that the drop off in participation among the retired with age is due to differing income levels. But the difference in income levels between unretired people is even greater. While 36% of those in their sixties have family incomes of \$7,499 or less, 53 % in the 70 and over group are in this lower income category. In both age groups the unretired have higher levels of income but the retired in the 60-69 group have higher levels of participation while in the over seventy age group the unretired have higher levels of participation. Thus it seems that participation does decrease with age due to the effects of retirement.

rather than due to the effects of a selection process at least with regard to selection by income.

It may be the case that retirement will affect the sexes in different ways. The work role may be more central for males than for females and therefore its loss through retirement would result in a greater decline in participation among males. The evidence presented in Appendix M which contains indicators of participation by age controlling for both retirement and sex does not support this view. Analysis is constrained by the small number in the sample. There are more instances in which the rate of decline in participation among retired women is greater than that for men than the reverse and the absolute levels of participation among retired males is greater than that of females in the over 70 category. But it should be noted that the proportion of males who retire is greater by far than the proportion of females who do. While 37% of the males in their 60's are retired only 11% of the females are retired and among those who are 70 and over the figures are 92% and 37% respectively. Thus while those females who retire seem to be as strongly affected by it as are the males the fact that a much greater proportion of males retire means that the total effect on males is greater.

The differing proportions of either sex who refer to themselves as retired is related to the differing nature of the roles accorded either sex. To a certain extent the role of housewife seems to become a residual occupational role for females. While 55% of all women in the sample are in this category 75 % of those in their 60's are and 62 % of those in the 70 and over category are. Therefore it may be the case that rather than retiring when they quit their jobs women refer to themselves as housewives. One can regard this phenomenon as an instance of measurement error due to the ambiguity of the term "retired" or it may also indicate a more continuous development of roles over time among women, or at least the availability of an acceptable role after the end of working life.

That the rate of participation declines among those females who do list themselves as retired as quickly or more quickly than among retired males may indicate the importance of the previous work role among those women. The difference between the sexes seems to be due the loss of the work role.

Marital status, like retirement, may be related to disengagement. Those who are married would be more able to withstand the losses associated with age and therefore more able to remain socially involved. Conversely, those who had lost their spouse because

they were divorced, widowed or separated would tend to become disengaged more rapidly. Therefore, a more rapid decline in participation with age among those who are not presently married and a particularly rapid decline for the separated, widowed and divorced is predicted.

In Appendix N, marital status is dichotomized into those who are married and those who are divorced, separated, widowed or single. Firstly, the curve in participation by age is more regular for those who are married compared to those who are not. For the married there is invariably an increase in participation rates over the first two decades of the electoral life cycle. This increase continues throughout the life cycle in some instances and there are more indicators showing an increase in participation from 60-69 to 70 and over than indicators showing a decrease among the married. While the pattern of decrease with age among the unmarried is less consistent than among the married there is a sharp decrease in participation between the last two age categories on all indicators. In every instance the drop in participation is sharper among the unmarried than among the married.

In examining the older section of the life cycle it is only possible to observe the widowed among the unmarried because there are too few old people whose marital status is single, divorced or separated. (47)

Thus in contrasting those who are married and widowed two other indicators available in the full sample will be used : frequency of federal vote and whether the respondent voted in 1974. The data in Appendix O compares the absolute level of participation among the widowed and married in the over seventy category and compares the rate of change in participation from the sixties to the seventy and over category. In 9 of the 11 indicators the level of participation among the married in the over 70 category is higher than among the widowed. In 6 of the 9 cases in which the level of participation was higher among the married the difference was significant to the .05 level while in neither of the two cases in which participation was higher among the widowed was the difference significant to this level.

In observing the slope of the change in participation between the 60-69 and 70 and over group, there is only one case in which there is greater increase in participation among the widowed than among the married, while in 6 cases the rate of participation decreases more rapidly than that of the married.

The proportion of widowed increases with age. While only 6% of the sample as a whole is widowed, 16% of those in their 60's are and 38% of those in the 70 and over group are. While the fact that there are only

relatively small numbers of respondents limits the analysis, it seems that the combination of generally lower rates of participation among the widowed, the increasing percentage of those who are widowed and the sharper rates of decline among the widowed contribute to the decline in participation among the old.

There have been some suggestions that the effect of the loss of a spouse or of being unmarried may be different for males and females. Females are more oriented toward the role of a social mediator while males tend to concentrate on an instrumental role. Margaret Clark and Barbara Gallatin Anderson suggest that this instrumental role may cause difficulties in old age when dependence on others may be necessary for survival. (48) Women are more likely to develop the social skills to adapt to the unmarried status. Also because of differential death rates widowed women are far more numerous in the over 70 category and therefore have more possible people in a similar situation to interact with. Both of these arguments suggest that women will be more capable of coping with the loss of spouse or being single than will men. Comparing married and unmarried males reveals a decline in participation between the last two age groups on all indicators among the unmarried while in 7 out of 9 cases there is an increase in participation among the married. The difference in participation due to

marital status among females is less sharp with 7 out of 9 instances of decline among the unmarried while instances of decline and increase in rates of participation are equally numerous among unmarried females. Marital status better predicts the direction of change in participation rates among males. Thus there is some evidence to support the view that males are more affected by loss of spouse than are females, although because of the size of the subsample the results cannot be considered conclusive.

In the 1965 National Election Study 3 questions are asked of the Quebec section of the sample dealing with levels of social interaction. Respondents are asked whether they have visited other peoples' homes, had others visit their home or had been out with others during the past week. The levels of social interaction as measured by these three indicators decline sharply with age. Among those in the over seventy group those with high social interaction have higher participation rates on all 6 indicators of participation available in this data set; these differences being significant to the .05 level in 3 of 6 cases. Thus lower social interaction which would be associated with general disengagement is related to levels of participation.

(See Appendix P)

In the 1974 data set the only available indicator of social activity is frequency of church attendance. Unlike the social activities indicators referred to in the 1965 data set the frequency of church attendance increases with age from a low of 24% in the 18 to 29 group to 44% among the seventy and over group. Using church attendance as an indicator of social interaction it is predicted that there should be a more drastic decline in participation among those who have low levels of church attendance. This expectation is not fulfilled; in every case there is a more drastic decline in participation among those who attend weekly than among those who attend less frequently. Further research using analysis of variance suggests that the relationship between church attendance and participation among the old may be curvilinear with the highest rates of participation among those with intermediate levels of church attendance.

However, it is debatable whether church attendance is a measure of general social interaction. Unlike the measures of social interaction in the 1965 data set levels of church attendance increase progressively with age. Church attendance may reflect increasing religiosity with age which may in turn reflect the nearness of death. Another possibility is that high levels of church attendance among the old reflect traditional values and thus are due to a generational

effect.

Without being completely of a piece the data provide support for several hypotheses derived from disengagement theory. Retirement, widowhood and declining life space, all of which entail a loss of roles are associated with lower rates of participation.

Summary and Conclusions

Research on the effect of age on political participation has focussed primarily on the impact of the life cycle on political participation. The life cycle involves factors such as demands on time and the accumulation of experience which may effect levels of political participation. Also, at the end of the life cycle ill health and general withdrawal may yield a decline in rates of participation. The combined effects of experience and eventual decline in health have been found to exhibit a curvilinear pattern with participation. Some research has pointed to generational effects on participation and therefore it is necessary to test alternative generational and life cycle explanations of age related effects.

To test these alternative explanations, data from four points in time ranging from 1945 to 1974 which contains measures of the level of interest and vote was analyzed. This analysis revealed that age groups retained their distinctiveness to a greater degree than did cohorts which supported a life cycle explanation of age related differences. Thus the analysis proceeded by examining the life cycle primarily using the 1974 election Study as the data base.

Using several measures of participation the presence of a curvilinear relationship between age and participation was confirmed. No difference was found in this regard between easy and hard items. The effect of age on participation was most marked among those under 30. The rate of increase in participation slowly decreased until after 60 when the absolute level of participation began to decline.

The possibility exists that the apparent age differences were in reality the result of a compositional effect. A compositional effect refers to the possibility that some characteristic is differentially distributed in such a way so as to create an apparent age effect. To test for this the relationship between age and participation was controlled for sex, education and class. Only education had a consistent effect on the original

relationship: when controlling for education the original relationship was strengthened.

Having found that the original relationship between age and participation was not spurious, an attempt to decompose the life cycle, that is to analyze the factors constituting age apart from age itself was made. Two theoretical perspectives provided guidance in this endeavor. For the initial stages of the electoral life cycle the start-up concept suggests that the increase in participation among the young is related to settling into one's job, residence and family. At the end of the life cycle, disengagement theory suggests that the decline in participation among the young will be associated with role losses which events such as retirement and widowhood entail.

The analysis of the start-up phenomenon is hampered by lack of suitable indicators while sample size poses a constraint in the analysis of the disengagement phenomenon. The measure of residential mobility in the data set was inadequate for the purposes of this study. Marital status and having children (asked only of males) had no apparent effect. Experience on the job was asked only of manual workers and farmers. Among manual workers controlling for work experience reduced the relationship between participation and age as was expected.

Among the old, retirement and marital status affected the relationship between age and participation. Participation rates declined more rapidly with age among the retired and the widowed. Males were especially affected by retirement and widowhood.

Thus the effects of the start-up phenomenon only partially accounted for the lower rates of participation of the young. The evidence here supported the contention that participation is a habit which is acquired slowly over a life time. Evidence linking decreased rates of participation with a general disengagement was stronger and more consistent. Those old people who do not disengage in terms of the work role and in terms of marital status maintained high levels of participation. This would suggest that attempts to increase the general social activity of the old will result in increasing their level of participation.

The generally higher level of participation of those in late middle age suggests that their views will eventually be more fully reflected in government policy than groups with lower levels of participation. The focus of the next chapter is to explore the content of these views with regard to their degree of conservatism.

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30) The indicator used in the 1945 poll presents a problem in examining the voting patterns of the young. Respondents were asked whether they voted in all elections or only those which interested them. The fact that many of the younger voters would not have had opportunities to vote previously may have depressed their levels of participation as measured by this indicator. To deal with this possibility the cutting points have been changed to 21-25, 26-29, 30-39 etc. Table 1 Appendix A reveals that there is an increase in vote intention between the 26-29 group and those in the 30-39 group. Using questions asking whether

respondents voted in the previous provincial election, in the 1940 federal election and in the 1942 plebiscite reveals the same pattern of increase between the 26-29 and 30-39 age groups.

31) Van Loon op cit p 395.

32) The questions used to measure interest are:

CIPO 142 (1945)

Are you interested in the Dominion election to be held on June 4 th?

1) yes 2) no 3) other

CIPO 228 (1953)

Are you interested in the coming election?

1) yes 2) no 3) missing

1965

How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics?

1) a good deal 2) some 3) not much

1974

We have found that people sometimes don't pay too much attention to elections. How about yourself? Would you say that you were 1) very interested 2) fairly interested 3) slightly interested 4) not at all interested.

The measure of interest was formed by using the 'yes' responses in 1945 and 1953, combining 'a good deal' and 'some' interest in 1965 and combining 'very', 'fairly' and slightly interested in 1974. The choice of these cutting points is due to the need to make measures comparable across time. However, since the use of these cutting points tends to minimize the variation in the measures other cutting points are used in later analyses.

33) The following table gives the proportions of 'very interested' in the election by age in 1953 and 1974:

	1953	1974
Age.		
21-29	27%	18%
	(-10)	(-11)
30-39	37	30
	(0)	(+1)
40-49	38	32
	(+1)	(+3)
50-59	44	37
	(+7)	(+8)
60-69		40
		(+11)
70+		37
		(+8)
mean	37	29

n= .1688 2550

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44) A variable dealing with the respondents' length of residence in the province is present in the 1974 data set. But the coding of answers as "(1) all of your life (2) most of your life (3) only a year or so" renders the question useless for the purposes of this study.

45) Curtis and Lambert op cit p.304.

46) Robert Atchley Social Forces in Later Life Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing. 1972 p156-157.

47) There are in the 70 and over category only 2 divorced people 4 separated and 16 single while there are 107 married and 79 widowed. This is in the full sample; most of the participation indicators which have been used except the items on interest in politics and interest in the election are available only in half the sample which exacerbates the problem.

48) Clark and Anderson op cit p.253.

Conservatism and Age

Introduction

Perhaps the most common way of categorizing political attitudes is in terms of conservatism or liberalism. But the concept of conservatism can be given several distinct meanings. A most limited view of conservatism sees it as resistance to change either in personal behaviour or in government policy. But conservatism also comprises a view of human nature and the nature of society as well as prescription for government policy.

Conservatives have tended to take a pessimistic view of human nature and of the human condition. There is a tendency to view human nature not as inherently good but as containing elements of evil. Much of what troubles the world is seen as being beyond human control and inherent in the human condition. Thus, neither humanity nor society is seen as perfectable. Rather the best that can be accomplished is to create a society which curbs these tendencies. It is not surprising that, following Burke, conservatives tend to revere tradition. Given the skepticism about the

perfectability of society through rational means, it is natural that conservatives should emphasize the value of long standing traditions. Similarly, emphasis on the restrictive aspects of society follows from the pessimistic view of human nature. Robert Nisbet describes conservatism as a philosophical "anti-enlightenment" occurring simultaneously in several European countries in the wake of the French Revolution. This conservatism emphasized God as the starting point in understanding society, groups as the true seat of human morality, tradition rather than reason as a guide for reform, and a tragic view of history with the recurrence of disasters rather than linear progress.(1)

Thus conservatism has been described as entailing both substantive and behavioural dimensions. The substantive dimension involves specific attitudes towards authority and about the ordering of society while the behavioural dimension deals with willingness to change one's personal behaviour and opinions as well as conformity to group norms. While these different aspects of conservatism are related, they are by no means identical. The relationship between age and various aspects of conservatism will be analyzed.

The relationship between conservatism and age from a life cycle or generational perspective has implications at both the individual and collective levels. While research on mass political socialization has generally focussed on pre-adolescent development the possible increase in conservatism with age is an aspect of adult political socialization. A frequent focus in the study of pre-adolescent political socialization is the subject of attitudes towards authority. As conservatism entails a perspective on authority, the study of conservatism and age is a continuation of pre-adolescent political research. Also the way in which changing roles and the accumulation of experience affect political attitudes may throw light on the way other role changes may affect political attitudes.

A generational approach to the relationship between age and conservatism implies a certain stability of attitudes over time. But the study of generations also touches on the study of trends in public opinion because the demographic replacement of older generations with younger generations is one element making up trends in public opinion.

Similarly, the increased proportion of older people in society may have an important overall impact on attitudes if aging causes conservatism. A more

conservative populace may set the stage for a more rigid or authoritarian state. A citizenry whose attitudes are unlikely to change may lessen the ability of the political system to respond to change. The old are commonly thought to be conservative using various meanings of the term, although the sources of this conservatism are seldom specified. There is some empirical evidence to support this contention. Otto Pollak found that the old were more conservative in that they were less likely to favour changes in either external or foreign policy.(2) Samuel Stouffer found that older people were more conservative in that they were less tolerant of non-conformists and more rigid in their categorizations of other people.(3) In part, this relationship was due to the lower levels of education of the old but the relationship remained when education was controlled. E. Grant Youmans found the old to be more likely to emphasize discipline and respect for authority.(4) But from both the life cycle and generational models of age, possible causes of old age conservatism can be suggested. Conservatism as resistance to personal change or conformity to group norms is clearly a life cycle phenomenon. Both physiological and social changes occurring with age can create an aversion to change in personal behavior. Physiological changes in the brain may cause a decreased ability to deal with new situations. With

age the attitudes of the people with whom an individual interacts become more homogenous which reduces the likelihood of exposure to new political stimuli.

Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, in their study of Elmira, New York, found that as respondents aged their environment became more politically homogenous and their opinions became more internally consistent as well as more likely to reflect the views held in their environment. (5) Robert W. White suggests that with age: "Friendships are pursued when there are congenial similarities of interest and outlook, but people with whom interaction proved difficult are dropped out of the orbit." (6) Increasing homogeneity of the political environment might be one aspect of this phenomenon.

Life cycle factors may also explain the effect of age on substantive aspects of conservatism such as attitudes towards traditions and authority. Responsibilities acquired may tend to make individuals more cautious and less likely to favour challenges to the status quo. S.M. Lissak states with regard to the bringing up of children that "The concern for the welfare of children also have more subtle psychological effects, causing a parent to become aware often for the first time of the positive functions of authority in a society." (7) Thus parenthood can make one more conservative in the sense of being more willing to support authority. Generally increasing

responsibilities and income throughout the life span may increase favourability to a conservative viewpoint in economic matters. Focussing on the end of the life cycle, Raymond Kuhlen suggests that biological losses and loss of freedom may create a perception of threat among the elderly, yielding a decrease in tolerance and strengthened support for authority.(8) The physical and social losses of old age are apt to cause feelings of hostility and increased reliance on accepted ego defences. (9) Thus the process of aging may be associated with increased conservatism, thinking of authoritarianism as an aspect of conservatism.

Conversely, young adulthood can be seen as a stage in life which is particularly conducive to radicalism or at least to non-commitment to a society's accepted values. The increased period of education and greater specialization in careers may create a good deal of instability. Related to this is the lack of definite roles or responsibilities characterizing this period of life. Erik Erikson, in describing the "eight ages of man", characterizes adolescence as a period of identity formation vs. role confusion. The individual at this stage of development is characterized by an ideological view of society. (10) Erikson further notes that in modern society adolescence has developed into a distinct, autonomous and continuing stage in development.(11) In this era, youth has been

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characterized by a marked sympathy for the people of the underdeveloped world and by a radical altruism. Similarly, Kenneth Keniston describes modern "post industrial" society as creating a stage of "post adolescent, pre-adult stage of psychological development", particularly for those between 18 and 26. While these people may have solved adolescent problems such as parental revolt they are still characterized by a degree of disconnection with society. (12)

Generational factors may also be the source of age differences in substantive issues measuring conservatism. The generationally related age differences which come most readily to mind are caused by trends away from conservatism and traditional values. Thus, the conservatism of the old may reflect having come of age in an era characterized by more traditional values. If the old are less likely to change attitudes or behaviour the imprinting of past values may be less subject to change. According to Sidney Pressey and Raymond Kuhlen, "The fact that older people do learn more slowly whether this be attributed to loss of neural plasticity, to strength of established habits which are more difficult to alter ... might be expected in changing times to result in having view points that lay behind those of younger individuals." (13) It may also be the case that the old have a more restricted social life which prevents them

from coming in contact with changing attitudes.

The sources of such trends away from conservatism are varied as are the kinds of attitudes affected. A broad perspective with regard to changing values is provided by the literature on political development in comparative politics. The developmental paradigm of Talcott Parsons envisages society as evolving from collectivity-oriented and ascriptive values to individual-oriented achievement values. (14) Thus if favouring distinctions based on sex, race, or ethnic origin is conservative then the developmental perspective predicts a shift away from conservative values. While Canada has been considered a developed country for some time, development is a continuing process rather than an attribute which a country possesses or does not possess and thus a continuing evolution of Canadian values related to development is indicated.

The conventional perspective on Canadian values, at least among social scientists, has been that Canadians are more conservative than Americans. This view, propounded by S.D. Clark, S.M. Lipset, and Gad Horowitz, among others, sees English Canadian society as more hierarchical and English Canadians as people more willing to evaluate others on ascriptive criteria than are Americans.. But a study done by Craig

Crawford, using samples from comparable American and Canadian towns, suggests that these differences between Americans and Canadians occur predominantly among the older age cohorts. While Canadians 60 and over were more traditional, elitist, conformist and less achievement oriented than Americans of the same age, among those under 30 Canadians were less traditional although they remained more elitist than Americans. (15) Therefore, to the degree that Canadian values are conservative values, Crawford concludes lower levels of conservatism among the young may be evidence of Americanization.

A somewhat different perspective relates changing values to the growth of affluence. In this view growing personal wealth results in a greater sense of personal freedom and a concomitant transition from authoritarian and punitive views to more liberal attitudes. Examining values in different age groups in various Western European countries Ronald Inglehart finds that those brought up in an era of affluence were more likely to have what he referred to as "post-bourgeois" values. These values implied a greater emphasis on freedom and a lower level of respect for authority. (16)

The transition in values can be assessed by changes in legal norms and by changes in public opinion. Laws abolishing capital punishment and restrictions on homosexual behaviour are evidence of a shift to more liberal values, at least on the part of the elite. At the mass level in the United States, James Davies documents the shift in values towards a more tolerant attitude towards communists. (17)

These are possible sources of pure and consistent generational or life cycle effects. A variety of other possibilities are conceivable. For example, Norval Glenn finds that age related differences in conservatism in the United States are related only to the fact that the old are more resistant to the general change to liberalism. The old have become more liberal with age rather than becoming more conservative on a number of questions dealing with racial attitudes but have not become more liberal as quickly as have the young. (18) It is usually thought that the younger cohorts will more completely reflect the spirit of the times than will older groups. Thus in periods in which attitudes are changing rapidly differences between age groups are likely to be marked. But the direction of these differences is not always such that the old are more conservative than the young; sometimes the reverse is true. Younger Cuban workers aged 21-27 were found to be less favourable to the revolution than the

now older revolutionary generation.(19) Similarly, younger whites in the southern United States were found to be less liberal than their slightly older counterparts.(20)

Neither is the decision on whether an observed relationship is due either to generational or to life cycle effects necessarily clear cut. An analysis of conservatism defined as support for the Republican party by John Crittenden attributed the higher levels of conservatism of the old to a life cycle effect.(21) However, a subsequent reanalysis of the same data by Neal Cutler showed the Republicanism of the old to be due to a generational effect. He found that the older voters reflected having grown up in an era of Republican strength.(22)

A variety of factors may affect the magnitude of age differences within a society. Among these are the rapidity of social change in the society and the degree of social interaction between age groups. Rapid change may create large differences in attitudes between age groups while interaction between people of different age groups will tend to lessen these differences. Anticipatory socialization among the young may cause them to change their attitudes, making them more similar to those of the old. Anne Foner suggests that ideal issues are more likely to be the source of an age

gap than are material issues. Material issues tend to divide people along class lines, cutting across age groups, while when ideal issues are involved:

"Self-interested anticipation of improvement at the next stages of their own lives which might otherwise induce young people to postpone struggle is irrelevant when the struggle is for justice or equality for all." (23) Evidence supporting this hypothesis was found by Richard Rose in England. Comparing age and party differences in attitudes, Rose finds that party differences are much more important than age differences on material issues such as Britain's entry into the Common Market and the nationalization of the steel industry while age differences are more important on ideal or life style issues such as abortion and commercial radio: (24).

From this perspective an explanation of the intensity of generational conflict in the United States during the 1960's arises. The 1960's were a period characterized by ideological conflicts about the Viet Nam war and racism which led to a general questioning of the legitimacy of authority. This kind of conflict tended to result in absolute perspectives on society reminiscent of Weber's "ethic of ultimate ends". Conflicts of this kind, unlike divisions on economic issues, tend to pit age groups against each other. Discontinuity between generations was increased by the

rapidity of the change in attitudes in this era. The rapidity of change meant that the formative experiences of succeeding generations were markedly different. The segregation of much of the youthful population in student ghettos combined with the rapidity of change and the nature of the issues involved to create an era of intense generational conflict.

Both generational and life cycle models provide explanations of age differences in conservative attitudes on issues. From the life cycle perspective conservative attitudes are due to an enhanced respect for authority due to the assumption of responsibilities and therefore authority which the life cycle entails. Or, conservatism may be the result of a perception of threat which occurs with old age. Conservatism as resistance to change or conformity has its source in the life cycle. From a generational perspective the conservatism of the old is due to the fact that the old reflect the values of a bygone era. This, of course, will make the old more conservative only if the values of past eras are in some sense more conservative.

In summation, the life cycle model would explain a higher level of conservatism among the old by referring to roles associated with different spans of the life cycle or with the accumulation of experience. The assumption of roles that require the exercise of

authority is thought to increase the individual's support of authority. Conversely, the generational explanation of conservatism among the old is that if history is progressive, moving from conservative to less conservative periods, the old will reflect the conservatism of the past.

Conservatism will be operationalized in a variety of ways. The most obvious indicator of conservatism and the one that is the most readily available is that of partisanship, specifically of support for the Progressive Conservative party or lack of support for the CCF-NDP. Evidence does exist showing that the Canadian public orders political parties a left-right dimension from the NDP to the Progressive Conservatives and this dimension may be analogous to a conservative-liberal dimension. N.H.Chi shows that Progressive Conservative convention delegates are more traditional on a variety of attitudinal items dealing with positions on strikes, social welfare and the British connection.(25) Similarly, David Chandler finds a consistent relationship between attitudes towards the death penalty and partisanship.(26) The other set of indicators to be examined are attitudinal. Various items measuring traditionalism in the Canadian context will be examined. Also conservatism will be measured with regard to attitudes towards deviants. This dimension of conservatism overlaps with the concept of

authoritarianism.

Conservatism as Partisanship

The first dimension of conservatism to be dealt with is that of partisanship. Partisanship has the most direct implications for politics and is the least difficult type of conservatism to measure. Another factor is that there are more comparable questions measuring partisanship than other types of conservatism.

In examining conservatism in this chapter the three most important national parties will be ordered on a conservative-liberal or left-right axis. At the conservative end is the Progressive Conservative party and at the opposite end are the New Democrats with the Liberals occupying the center position. As David Elkins notes, scholars assume this left-right ordering of parties in Canada. Elkins examines this left-right ordering using public perceptions and finds it useful but wanting. A center vs. periphery dimension affects the likelihood that the public will order the parties in the conventional left-right manner. In other words those in the central provinces, Quebec and Ontario,

are more likely to order the parties as N.D.P-Liberal-Progressive Conservative. The possibility of regional variation the nature of conservatism will be examined below.(27) J.A.Laponce also found evidence supporting the ordering of Canadian parties on a left-right continuum in an examination of social science students.(He also examined similar populations in the United States and France). Laponce found that 87% of NDP supporters categorized themselves as on the left compared to only 18% of Progressive Conservative supporters. In all three countries, those on the right tended to believe in the inevitability of war and to be opposed to equality between the sexes and inter-racial marriage.(28)

From our hypothesis relating increasing conservatism with age and our ordering of the three parties on the left-right dimension we predict that support for the Progressive Conservative party will increase with age and that support for the N.D.P. and its predecessor the C.C.F. will decline with age.

The initial stage in the analysis will be cross-sectional in nature focussing on single points in time. Table 1 and Table 2 contain the percentages of people voting Progressive Conservative and N.D.P. at four points widely separated in time. In Table 1 shows the percentages of the electorate in various age groups

which voted Conservative and the percentage deviation of each age group from the mean for the whole electorate. At each point in time there is a higher proportion of the older people voting for the Progressive Conservative Party. In each case the youngest age group has a rate of conservative voting lower than the mean while in three of the four cases the oldest age group has a level of conservative voting higher than the mean. Similarly Table 2 reveals a consistent decline with age in the proportion voting NDP. In all cases the youngest group shows a level of NDP-CCF voting higher than the mean and the oldest group has a lower level of NDP support than the electorate as a whole. Thus using scales cut at either end of our left-right dimension and polls taken at four points in time the evidence tends to support the hypothesis relating age and conservatism.

Table 1(29)

Progressive Conservative Percentage of the Vote

	1945	1955	1965	1974
21-29	24%	20%	28%	29%
	(-6)	(-7)	(-6)	(-3)
30-39	26	29	33	29
	(-3)	(+2)	(-1)	(-3)
40-49	30	27	35	36
	(0)	(0)	(+1)	(+4)
50-59	37	30*	31	35
	(+7)	(+3)	(-3)	((+3)
60-69	38		42	36
	(+8)		(+8)	(+4)
70+	21		45	40
	(-9)		(+11)	(+8)
mean	30	27	34	32

* 50 and over

Table 2

CCF-NDP Percentage of the Vote

	1945	1955	1965	1974
21-29	26%	27%	17%	17%
	(+5)	(+10)	(+2)	(+5)
30-39	22	11	15	15
	(+1)	(-6)	(0)	(+3)
40-49	23	20	15	8
	(+2)	(+3)	(0)	(-4)
50-59	19	13*	16	8
	(-2)	(-4)	(+1)	(-4)
60-69	17		16	11
	(-4)		(+1)	(-1)
70-79	13		6	5
	(-8)		(-7)	(-7)
mean	21	17	15	12
*50 and over				
n=	1338	1410	1565	1871

This cross-sectional analysis provides some evidence that a life cycle effect is present but further examination is necessary. Certainly the data is not consonant with a generational explanation. A general trend toward the New Democratic Party over the

30 year period would be indicated were a generational explanation of these findings to be supported. If such a trend existed it could be argued that successive generations of the young were more pro-NDP due to having attained their party loyalty in a period characterized by greater NDP strength. But such a trend is not present. NDP support has not grown successively over the time span observed. (30) Similarly a general trend away from the Progressive Conservatives in the electorate as a whole could create the effect observed. Then the older generations' conservatism could be explained as a consequence of their reflecting a more conservative era. But gradual trends towards the NDP or away from the Progressive Conservatives which would be consonant with a generational explanation of youthful NDP support and elderly conservatism have not occurred.

In examining this possibility more fully it is necessary to arrange our data in a manner which allows us to observe the aging of various segments of the electorate. The coding of age in the 1955 Gallup poll in categories of 21-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50 and over necessitates a recoding of the 1945 and 1965 data to create comparable categories. In order to be able to follow the same age group over time the 1945 data is coded in categories of 21-29, 30-39, and 40 and over. Thus, it is possible to compare those 40 and over in

1945 with those 50 and over in 1955. Similarly, in the 1965 data age is coded as 21-29, 30-39, 40-49 50-59 and 60 and over. With the data coded in this way it is possible to compare the same age groups over the thirty year time span

Despite the lack of a trend to the CCF-NDP which would provide a generational explanation for the high level by NDP support by the young the possibility of some generational effect on partisanship remains. One should not necessarily expect generational differences to be the result of gradual trends resulting in continuous generational differences. While social science has tended to concentrate on gradual changes thought to be characteristic of stable societies, unique events may play an important part in understanding present day attitudes. The work of Paul Abramson has illustrated the continuing effect of the Great Depression on the level of class voting in the United States.(31) Also major wars which change mobility patterns and the level of partisan support may have a long term effect.(32) Due to this kind of event a cohort may be distinct from both the cohort preceding it and following it. For example it is possible who voters who came into the electorate during the Great Depression or the Second World War may continue to be more pro-NDP than the electorate as a whole. CCF support in the Gallup poll peaked in 1943, and they

became the official opposition in Ontario in 1943, and formed the government of Saskatchewan in 1944.

Therefore, the cohort analysis of the data, that is the following of age groups over time, is necessary not only to further the examination of life cycle effects but also to search for these possible generational effects.

The life cycle hypothesis suggests that as people age they will become less likely to vote CCF-NDP and more likely to vote for the Progressive Conservatives. Tables 3 and 4 present the percentages of each cohort voting for the Progressive Conservatives and for the NDP respectively. By following the cohorts across the tables the effect of age on voting can be traced. In table 3, in 9 of the 12 instances the percentage of voters voting Conservative increases with age along with one instance in which there is no change and two instances of decline in Conservative support. The proportion of those voting NDP-CCF declines with age in 11 out of 12 instances.

Table 3

Progressive Conservative Percentage of Vote by Cohort

year of birth	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1905	33	30	43	40
	(+3)	(+3)	(+9)	(+8)
1906-1915	26	27	31	36
	(-4)	(0)	(-3)	(+4)
1916-1925	24	29	35	35
	(-6)	(+2)	(+1)	(+3)
1926-1935		20	33	36
		(-7)	(-1)	(+4)
1936-1944			28	29
			(-6)	(-3)
				29
				(-3)
mean	30	27	34	32

Table 4

CCF-NDP Percentage of The Vote By Cohort

year of birth	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1905	20 (-1)	13 (-4)	12 (-3)	5 (-7)
1906-1915	22 (+1)	20 (+3)	16 (+1)	11 (-1)
1916-1925	26 (+5)	11 (-6)	15 (0)	8 (-4)
		27 (+10)	15 (0)	8 (-4)
1936-1944			17 (+2)	15 (+3)
				17 (+5)
mean	21	17	15	12
n=	1338	1410	1565	1871

It is possible that the decline in percentage of CCF-NDP voters with age is due not to the effects of aging but to a period effect. That is, an effect which appears to be due to the aging of cohorts may in fact be the response of a particular group of people to a

general trend affecting the whole population. To take the generational possibility into account the effect of age on the simple deviations of NDP vote in each cohort from the general level of NDP support in the electorate as a whole for that point in time can be traced. In so doing it is revealed that there are still 8 instances of decrease in NDP vote relative to the mean compared with 4 instances of increase. Controlling in a like matter for a period effect on Progressive Conservative support shows eight instances of increase and only three of decrease with one case in which there is no change. Clearly aging has markedly different effects on the rates of Conservative and NDP support.

To test for generational effects it is instructive to examine the effect of age on those who were 21-29 and those who were 30 to 39 in 1945, that is those people born between 1916-1924 and between 1906-1915 respectively. These cohorts are those which one would expect to be the most affected by the Depression and the wartime surge in CCF popularity. The CCF was founded in 1932 as a direct result of the Depression. It scored its first major successes during the Second World War, forming the government of Saskatchewan in 1944 and becoming the official opposition in Ontario in 1943. In both the United States and Britain the Depression and World War have had lasting effects on electoral behavior causing disproportionately high levels

of Democratic support in the Depression generation and disproportionately high levels of Labour support in the War generation. But the level of support for the CCF of those 21 to 29 in 1945 changes from 26% to 11% to 15% to 8% in 1945, 1955, 1965 and 1974 respectively. Similarly, in the cohort of those who were 30 to 39 in 1945 CCF-NDP support declines from 22% to 20% to 16% to 11% in 1945, 1955, 1965 and 1974 respectively. In order to contend with a period effect, the levels of CCF-NDP support compared to the mean are examined. In the 1906-1915 group there are three instances in which their level of support for the CCF-NDP is above the mean while for the 1916-1925 group there is only 1 instance in which the level of support for the CCF-NDP is above the mean.

Another way of confirming the relationship between partisanship and age is by using an alternate measure of our dependent variable, partisanship. One alternate measure of our dependent variable which is available in the 1965 and 1974 data sets is that of party identification. (33) Levels of Progressive Conservative and NDP party identification are presented in tables 5 and 6 respectively. Again, at each point in time the Progressive Conservatives have a lower level of support among the young while the CCF-NDP has a higher level of support among the young. Tracing the level of NDP partisan identification in each case there is a decline

in the level of NDP identification as the cohort ages. The decline in CCF-NDP remains when the deviation from the mean for that point in time is examined. The situation with regard to Progressive Conservative partisanship is somewhat different. While within each data set the older people have higher levels of party identification there is a decline in the absolute level of conservative support with age between the two points. However, examination of the simple deviations from the mean reveals an increase in conservatism relative to the mean in all cases.

Table 5

<u>Progressive Conservative Identification by Age</u>						
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
	30	33	36	35	42	47
1965	(-6)	(-3)	(0)	(-1)	(+6)	(+11)
	22	26	32	30	32	40
1974	(-6)	(-2)	(+4)	(+2)	(+4)	(+12)

Table 6

NDP Identification by Age

	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
	17	15	13	14	13	4
1965	(+3)	(+1)	(-1)	(00)	(-1)	(-10)
	17	14	9	8	10	3
1974	(5)	(+2)	(-3)	(-4)	(-2)	(-09)
n= (1974) 1970						
n= (1965) 1524						

Thus, the evidence supports our contention that the process of aging is itself related to increased conservatism both when conservatism is measured as support for the Progressive Conservative Party and when it is measured as lack of support for the NDP. But several factors could conceivably modify this relationship or reveal it to be spurious. In examining this relationship it is necessary to control for a variety of possible effects, to verify that the observed effect is indeed due to the life cycle. Among these possible effects are those specifying the relationship as occurring only under certain conditions. Another type of factor which may create an apparent effect due to aging is sometimes referred to as a compositional fallacy. In other words, another variable, related to both age and conservatism, may be distributed in such a way as to create a spurious effect. Thus, the apparent relationship would disappear with the use of a

control variable. Varying proportions of males and females within age groups combined with different levels of party support could create such an effect. A final possibility to be examined is that other variables may be found which are inherently related to the process of aging. For example, changes in roles such as implied by marriage or parenthood can be considered an inherent part of the life cycle and might be related to political attitudes. While the nature of the data available makes the direct analysis of processes inherently related to the life cycle difficult, assessment of specification or compositional effects is possible. Among the individual attributes that are related to age are sex and education. Since the death rate among males is higher than among females, females predominate among the older age groups. Thus the examination of the relationship between age and partisanship controlling for sex is necessary to deal with a possible compositional fallacy. Also role differences between sexes may result in different kinds of political life cycles. Similarly education may be involved both in a compositional fallacy and as a factor which affects the nature of the life cycle. There is some evidence to suggest that the more educated progress through the life cycle more slowly than the uneducated. Variables related to partisanship in the Canadian context must

also be considered. Religion is one such important variable.

Analysis will proceed by examining the relationship between age and partisanship controlling for education, sex and religion. The primary object of these controls will be to test for compositional fallacies. Given the nature of the data available analysis of role changes inherent in the life cycle cannot be directly dealt with.

One possible instance of a compositional fallacy could be due to the effect of education. Levels of education have increased steadily over time. For example, in the 1974 data set the mean level of education for those over 60 is 8 years while for those under 29 it was 12 years. Education is a characteristic which is essentially determined by the time one is 25 years old. One's level of education may influence one's attitudes on a variety of political and social issues. Groups of different education may undergo a different characteristic life cycle; thus, the relevance of age may be different for different education groups.

Dividing the 1955, 1965, and 1974 samples by education (the 1945 poll has no measure of education) into those having only elementary school education and those having some high school education, in table 7,

shows that among the more highly educated there are seven occasions of increase in Progressive Conservative support with age and only two of decrease. The pattern of decrease with age in NDP support is maintained among both the more and less educated. (Tables 7 and 8) But among the less educated , contrary to expectations there are slightly more instances of decline in than of increase in Conservative support.

Table 7
 Progressive Conservative Percentage
 of Vote
 Controlling for Education

		1955	1965	1974
Less Highly Educated (elementary only)				
Year of Birth				
-1905		25 (0)	38 (+6)	35 (+3)
1906-1915		24 (-1)	20 (-12)	36 (+4)
1916-1925		34 (+9)	37 (+5)	31 (-1)
1926-1935		18 (-7)	30 (-2)	30 (-2)
1936-1944			34 (+2)	29 (-3)
1945-1956				27 (-5)
	mean	25	32	32
	N=	566	663	465

More Highly Educated
(some high school or more)

	1955	1965	1974
Year of Birth			
-1905	35	47	46
	(+6)	(+14)	(+13)
1906-1915	28	37	36
	(-1)	(+4)	(+3)
1916-1925	26	32	37
	(-3)	(-1)	(+4)
1926-1935	26	31	38
	(-3)	(-2)	(+5)
1936-1944		26	29
		(-7)	(-4)
1945-1956			29
			(-4)
mean	29	33	33
n=	760	1389	1398

Table 8

CCF-NDP Percentage of the Vote

Controlling for Education

Less Highly Educated

	1955	1965	1974
-1905	18	15	8
	(+2)	(+1)	(0)
1906-1915	23	17	6
	(+7)	(+3)	(-2)
1916-1925	4	14	6
	(-12)	(0)	(-2)
1926-1935	19	15	12
	(+3)	(+1)	(+4)
1936-1944		7	11
		(-7)	(+3)
1945-1956			10
			(+2)
mean	16	14	8
N=	566	663	465

More Highly Educated

	1955	1965	1974
-1905	9	9	4
	(-6)	(-8)	(-9)
1906-1915	18	17	16
	(+3)	(0)	(+3)
1916-1925	15	18	9
	(0)	(+1)	(-4)
1926-1935	15	18	7
	(0)	(+1)	(-6)
1936-1944		18	16
		(+1)	(+3)
1945-1956			17
			(+4)
mean	15	17	13
n=	760	1389	1398

Another possible instance of a compositional fallacy would be the effect of differing proportions of either sex in various age groups. Were females more conservative in their vote than males, as they are in certain European countries such as France and Italy, as well as having longer life spans, then increasing conservatism with age could be the result of demographic trends rather than of aging itself. Conceivably, because of differing occupational roles

and differing family roles the process of aging may be different for males and females and thus the political implications of aging may vary with sex.

Initially it is useful to observe the relative levels of support for the Progressive Conservatives and the New Democratic Party between the sexes. There are only slight differences in party support for the Progressive Conservatives between the sexes. Lack of variation in support for the Progressive Conservatives would tend to eliminate the possibility that age differences in conservative support have their source in a compositional fallacy due to sex. But the possibility remains that age may have a different effect on conservatives in one sex. Given the relative youthfulness both of males and NDP supporters a compositional explanation of age differences in NDP support remains viable.

Looking at table 9, which displays conservative proportions of the male vote, and tracing the voters over the time span reveals that there are 8 instances of increase in conservatism with age and only 3 instances of decrease. The comparable figures for the CCF-NDP among males presented in table 11, are 10 cases of decrease and only two of increased support with age. The examination of the deviations from the mean in tables 9 and 11 shows increases in Progressive

Conservative support with age, outnumbering decreases 7 to 5, and NDP support decreasing with age 9 times and increasing only 3 times.

Table 9

Progressive Conservative Proportion of Male Vote

	1945	1955	1965	1974
Year of Birth				
-1905	34 (+2)	27 (0)	43 (+9)	32 (-2)
1906-1915	25 (-7)	28 (+1)	34 (0)	35 (+1)
1916-1925	14 (-18)	30 (+3)	30 (-4)	39 (+5)
1926-1935		17 (-10)	32 (-2)	38 (+4)
1936-1944			33 (-1)	27 (-7)
1945-1956				32 (-2)
mean	32	27	34	34
n=	892	731	766	890

Table 10

Progressive Conservative Proportion of Female Vote

	1955	1965	1974
1-1905	34	43	46
	(+8)	(+9)	(+14)
1906-1915	25	27	36
	(-1)	(-7)	(+4)
1916-1925	27	40	32
	(+1)	(+6)	(0)
1926-1935	17	33	33
	(-9)	(-1)	(+1)
1936-1944		24	29
		(-10)	(-3)
1944-1956			26
			(-6)
n=	630	799	981
mean	26	34	32

Women are undersampled to such a degree in the 1945 survey that analysis is based only on the latter 3 points in time. As table 10 reveals females have increasing rates of conservative support in 7 out of nine cases and table 12 shows a decrease in CCF-NDP support in all cases. Comparing the simple deviations from the mean there are 6 instances of increase in Progressive Conservative support with age compared to

two in which conservative support decreases. There are five occasions in which CCF-NDP support decreases and three in which it increases. Thus controlling for sex causes little difference in the initial relationship between age and conservatism.

Table 11

CCF-NDP Proportion of the Male Vote

	1945	1955	1965	1974
Year of Birth				
-1905	20 (-2)	11 (-4)	12 (-5)	11 (-3)
1906-1915	22 (0)	18 (+3)	17 (0)	13 (-1)
1916-1925	34 (+12)	24 (+9)	21 (+3)	10 (-4)
1926-1935		27 (+6)	18 (+1)	11 (-3)
1936-1944			16 (-1)	19 (+5)
1945-1956				18 (+4)
mean	22	15	17	14

Table 12

CCF-NDP Proportion of the Female Vote

	1955	1965	1974
Year of Birth			
-1905	15	12	1
	(-1)	(-1)	(-8)
1906-1915	23	15	8
	(+7)	(-2)	(-1)
1916-1925	11	10	7
	(-5)	(-7)	(-2)
1926-1935	14	12	6
	(-2)	(-1)	(-5)
1936-1944		17	12
		(+4)	(+3)
1945-1956			15
			(+6)
mean	16	13	9

Another possible demographic characteristic which may be related to the relationship between vote and age is religion. As William Irvine notes, religion has remained an important cleavage in Canada at the federal level in spite of the lack of primarily religious issues. (34) Catholics have voted disproportionately Liberal while the Protestant vote has been disproportionately Progressive Conservative. Higher proportions of Protestants in the older cohorts could

create the observed relationship between age and conservatism. It should be noted that the proportion of Roman Catholics decreases with age as shown in Appendix A. Also, given the varying levels of party support within each religion a specification effect could exist. That is, the relationship between age and conservatism could exist only within one religion or differ between religions.

Tables 13 and 14 present the proportion of Catholics and Protestants voting for the Conservatives. Among Protestants those in their twenties and thirties invariably have lower levels of support for the Conservatives than does the general population of Protestants. Following the cohorts across time reveals 8 instances of increased Protestant support for the Conservatives compared to four cases of decline. Following the simple deviations from the mean shows 9 instances of increased Conservative support among Protestants and only 3 of decreased conservative support.

But the relationship of age and partisanship among Catholics as shown in Table 14 is different than that among Protestants. There are as many instances in which the old are below the mean level of conservatism and the young are above the mean level of conservatism as the reverse. Following the cohorts of Catholic

voters across time reveals 6 instances in which the level of conservatism increases, 5 in which it decreases, and one in which there is no change. Comparing the simple deviations from the mean level of Catholic support over time shows that there are as many instances of decreased support for the Conservatives with age as the reverse.

Table 13

Protestant Vote for Progressive Conservatives

	1945	1954	1965	1974
-1905	39	45	56	51
	(+2)	(+5)	(+9)	(+8)
1906-1915	34	52	43	44
	(+4)	(+12)	(-4)	(+1)
1916-1925	31	29	50	46
	(-6)	(-11)	(+3)	(+3)
1926-1935		26	44	50
		(-14)	(-3)	(+7)
1936-1944			39	36
			(-8)	(-7)
1945-1956				38
				(-5)
mean	37	40	47	43
	924	774	750	1040

Table 14

Roman Catholic Vote for Progressive Conservatives

	1945	1954	1965	1974
-1905	17%	18%	24%	14%
	(+2)	(-1)	(+4)	(-3)
1906-1915	12	18	16	18
	(-3)	(-1)	(-4)	(+1)
1916-1925	13	20	19	19
	(-2)	(+1)	(-1)	(+1)
1926-1935		20	20	18
		(+1)	(0)	(-4)
1936-1944			20	13
			(0)	(-4)
1945-1956				16
				(-1)
mean	15	19	20	17
n=	380	557	665	702

(The 1954 data is from CIPO poll 238)

Looking at Table 15 containing the Protestant vote for the CCF-NDP shows that in all cases the proportion voting for the CCF-NDP among those in their twenties is as high or higher than the mean level of CCF-NDP support for that point in time. Following the cohorts across the time span reveals eight instances of decrease in CCF-NDP support compared to three of increase and one instance in which there is no change. Examination of the deviations from the mean level of

CCF-NDP support reveals seven instances of decrease in support and five instances of increase in CCF-NDP support.

Among Catholics the level of support of the youngest cohort for the CCF-NDP is invariably higher than the mean for the electorate for that point in time. Instances of decreased levels of CCF-NDP support in cohorts over time outnumber increases eight to three while decreases in simple deviations from the mean outnumber increases seven to three. Thus the decline in NDP support with age occurs within both religions.

Table 15
Protestant Vote for the CCF-NDP

	1945	1954	1965	1974
Year of Birth				
-1905	23%	10%	15%	7%
	(-1)	(-4)	(-2)	(-6)
1906-1915	28	14	21	13
	(+4)	(0)	(+4)	(0)
1916-1925	27	15	15	13
	(+3)	(+1)	(-2)	(+4)
1926-1935		27	16	17
		(+13)	(-1)	(+2)
1936-1944			17	15
			(0)	(+2)
1945-1956				17
				(+4)
mean	24	14	17	13
	924	774	750	1040

Table 16
Catholic Vote for the CCF-NDP

	1945	1954	1965	1974
Year of Birth				
-1905	15	6	3	2
	(+1)	(-2)	(-8)	(-8)
1906-1915	9	2	8	5
	(-5)	(-2)	(-3)	(-5)
1916-1925	21	3	13	3
	(+7)	(-1)	(+2)	(-7)
1926-1935		9	12	5
		(+5)	(+1)	(-5)
1936-1944			16	16
			(+5)	(+6)
1945-1956				16
				(+6)
mean	14	4	11	10
n=	380	557	665	702

Thus while the relationship between CCF-NDP support and age is similar among Catholics and Protestants the relationship between age and Progressive Conservative support holds only among

Protestants. These findings suggest that while the relationship between age and conservatism measured as partisanship is not due to a compositional fallacy it is an effect which holds primarily among Protestants. This suggests a further investigation of the relationship between age, religion and partisanship.

Given the length of the association between Catholics and the Liberal party in Canada at the federal level it would be interesting to examine the effect of age on voting for the Liberals among Catholics. This data is presented in Table 17. At each point in time younger Catholics are less Liberal than are older Catholics. There are eight instances of increase in Catholic support for the Liberals compared to four of decrease. The simple deviations from the mean show nine instances of increase and three of decrease. Thus as aging yielded increased Republicanism in Republican Elmira, among Protestants in Canada it is associated with support for the Progressive Conservatives and among Catholics with increased Liberalism.

A simple equation of age with increased conservatism does not account for these findings. What kind of general explanation can be offered? One explanation of the findings is suggested by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee in Voting, a study of

the formation of partisanship in Elmira, New York. They find that with age one's political environment tends to become more homogenous. For example, an aspect of this growth in homogeneity is that the congruence between an individual's partisanship and that of close friends increases. The authors hypothesize that over time an individual's views become more consistent with the views predominant in his environment. In Republican Elmira, this factor was held responsible for the greater Republicanism of the old. (35) Given the Liberal character of partisanship among Catholics in Canada this provides an explanation for the lack of increase in Progressive Conservative support among Catholics. If Catholics lived in communities that tend to be Liberal and have social contact disproportionately with other Catholics increased congruence of their political views with those predominant in their environment suggests that with age Catholics should become more Liberal in their partisanship. Conversely, for Protestants homogeneity of the environment with age would create increased support for the Conservatives. The data available here provides only an indirect test of this kind of hypothesis. Information on the partisanship of one's friends and associates would be necessary to deal more fully with this hypothesis. If it is the case that an individual's associations become more homogenous with

age partisanship may also be reinforced at the individual level. Thus it might be expected that with age intensity of party identification will increase. This hypothesis will be dealt with in Chapter 5.

Table 17

Roman Catholic Vote for Liberals

	1945	1954	1965	1974
Year of Birth				
-1905	68 (-3)	77 (0)	73 (+4)	84 (+10)
1906-1915	79 (+8)	80 (+3)	76 (+7)	77 (+3)
1916-1925	66 (-5)	77 (0)	68 (-1)	78 (+4)
1926-1935		72 (-5)	69 (0)	77 (+3)
1936-1944			64 (-5)	71 (-3)
1945-1956				67 (-7)
mean	71	77	69	74
n	380	557	665	702

Another way of assessing the impact of age on the relationship between religion and vote, is to measure the degree to which religion predicts vote within each cohort. Table 18 presents the relationship between

religion and vote coded in various ways in 1945, 1954, 1965 and 1974. Vote has been coded as conservative vs. other, conservative vs. Liberal, and Liberal vs. other. Religion has been coded as Catholics vs. All others and Catholics vs. Protestants. Looking at results (ie. measures of vote by religion for the whole electorate at each point in time) shows that there is no overall decline in the strength of the relationship. (36) Indeed, with all six combinations of measures there is a sharp increase in the strength of religious voting from 1954 to 1965 while the relationship retains its strength between 1965 and 1974. This increase in the strength of the association between religion and vote suggests that, if anything, the present era is one in which religion is more important. If this were the case, the youngest cohort would presumably be most affected and have a higher association between religion and vote than the electorate as a whole.

7

Table 18

Vote By Religion

(taus of the relationship between religion and vote)

	1954	1965	1974
PC/LIB(a)			
RC/Pr (d)	.17	.34	.23
N=	1206	1561	1547
RC/Oth(e)	.16	.63	.28
N=	1253	1725	1657
PC/Oth(b)			
RC/Pr	.10	.27	.29
N=	1497	1836	1736
RC/Oth	.10	.24	.27
N=	1562	2053	1878
LIB/Oth(c)			
RC/Pr	.22	.33	.26
N=	1492	1836	1736
RC/Oth	.21	.31	.23
	1562	2053	1878

(a) Progressive Conservatives and Liberals only

(b) Progressive Conservative voters compared to all others

(c) Liberal voters compared to all others

(d) Roman Catholics compared to Protestants

(e) Roman Catholics compared to all other religions

Such is not the case. With every measure and at every point in time the youngest cohort shows a weaker association between religion and vote than the electorate as a whole and a lower level than those in their forties. Table 19 juxtaposes the taus of the relationship between religion and vote at three points in time. There are 10 instances of increase in the strength of the relationship with age and just two of decrease. The increase in strength seems to be particularly noticeable in the first two decades of the electoral life span, that is between the twenties and the forties. Examining the effect of age on the deviations from the strength of the relationship in the electorate as a whole (that is the figures in brackets) shows ten instances in which the the strength of the relationship increases and two in which it decreases. The 2 later points have a higher overall relationship between religion and vote. Therefore if a generational effect were present it would be expected that the older cohorts would have a lower strength of vote by religion reflecting the strength of the relationship in that period. Thus both quasi-longitudinal analysis and the nature of the general trend in the strength of the relationship suggest that the age effect present is due to a life cycle effect. The passage of time may well increase one's socialization into a religious subculture.

Table 19
Vote by Religion within Cohorts!
(taus)

	1945	1954	1965	1974
Year of Birth				
-1905	.12 (.0)	.23 (.02)	.41 (.09)	.37 (.07)
n=	1450	442	407	148
1906-1915	.20 (.08)	.38 (.17)	.39 (.07)	.31 (.01)
n=	600	353	332	222
1916-1925	.03 (-.09)	.16 (-.05)	.28 (-.04)	.34 (.04)
n=	354	420	457	274
1926-1935		.05 (-.16)	.26 (-.06)	.36 (.06)
n=		343	475	351
1936-1944			.18 (-.14)	.23 (-.07)
n=			381	317
1945-1956				.21 (-.09)
n=				473
mean	.12	.21	.32	.30

! Religion coded as Catholics and others; Vote coded as Liberals and others.

Accordingly partisanship and age are related in a variety of conditions although not always in the manner expected. Controlling for sex and the level of education has little effect on the original relationship. However, subdividing the population by religion into Catholics and Protestants reveals a distinctive pattern. While for Protestants age is related to increased support for the Progressive Conservative Party, among Roman Catholics it is related to augmented Liberal support. Thus it would seem that a life cycle effect is present strengthening attachment to the party associated with a particular religious group.(37) The analysis does not suggest that age yields conservatism in an ideological sense. Rather what exists is a reinforcement of group loyalties with age.

In spite of the predominance of this life cycle effect some indications of generational effects do exist. For example, the two youngest groups (ie. those from 18 to 29 and from 30 to 39 in 1974) seem to be particularly pro-NDP and particularly weak in their support of the Progressive Conservatives. (Tables 1 and 2) This pattern persists among Roman Catholics. (Table 16) Only future analysis will reveal whether

this group will retain its distinctiveness and become a generation in the fullest sense of the word. The predominance of a life cycle effect in the data observed does not preclude the creation of a generation in the future.

Conservatism in Attitudes

In dealing with conservatism in attitudes it is necessary to set criteria by which an attitude can be considered an aspect of conservatism. Herbert McCloskey in an article entitled "Conservatism and Personality" relates basic personality dispositions to a variety of attitudes, precepts and policy positions which he considers conservative. McCloskey puts forward the view that there is a fundamental coherence in conservative philosophy and opinions from the writings of Edmond Burke to certain present day views expressed by the general public. This conservative ideology encompasses a view of the nature of mankind, of the value of traditional social norms and of the role of authority in society. Conservatism implies a pessimistic view of human nature; people are seen as being dominated by appetite and as being essentially flawed. An emphasis on authority and the value of

traditional social norms follows from this conception of human nature as essentially flawed.(38) In relating conservatism to personality McCloskey finds that conservatives are characterized by isolation, insecurity and feelings of inferiority.(39) Therefore older people who feel threatened by losses in status would be more likely to hold conservative values than younger people.

The discussion of conservatism in attitudes requires a consideration of the issue of authoritarianism. The classic work The Authoritarian Personality by Theodore Adorno et al. attempted to put forth an all encompassing view of authoritarianism.(40) Authoritarianism was seen as having its source in ego defense mechanisms and as a complex phenomenon involving several interlocking characteristics. Among these characteristics were conventionalism, a willingness to punish those who violate conventional norms, an emphasis on power and toughness and a generalized hostility to humanity.(41)

There are some similarities between the authoritarianism and the conservatism described by McCloskey and the philosophical conservatism described by Nisbet. In both authoritarianism and conservatism there is a pessimistic view of humanity and an emphasis on conventional values. However, authoritarianism as

conceptualized by Adorno et al. was seen as a syndrome involving several interlocking symptoms some of which have no direct political impact. For example, the authoritarian individual was thought to be superstitious. Clearly, the analysis of public opinion polls with one or two items dealing with intolerance etc. cannot be seen as a validation of the authoritarian construct. Rather what can be dealt with here are certain items which may be a manifestation of authoritarianism and may also reflect the pessimistic view of humanity and emphasis on order described as a part of conservatism.

Thus the remainder of the chapter is an attempt to find indicators of conservatism and to test for the effect of age on conservatism. Age effects will be assessed as to their source in the life cycle or generational models of age.

Various problems are present in attempting to assess the impact of age on all or any of these varieties of conservatism. In measuring the impact of age it is extremely helpful to have data from across a time span. Thus it is necessary in the Canadian context to use Gallup polls. This presents certain limitations. The number of similarly worded questions is limited and the manner in which age is coded presents problems. (See Appendix D for the wordings of

the questions used)

A variety of indicators will be used to assess conservatism both in McCloskey's sense and as support for values which can be considered traditional in the Canadian context. General support for order is measured by questions on favourability to free speech, compulsory military service for 18 year olds and attitudes towards strikes and trade unions in general. Questions on corporal punishment for school children, favouring the death penalty for convicted murderers and harsh treatment for criminals in general are used to assess the punitive aspect of conservatism. The belief in the natural inequality of man is measured by attitudes towards racial inter-marriage, and views on the lowering of the voting age. Support for the monarchy and for the Union Jack are considered as indicators of support for traditional values.

In evaluating the effects of age on political attitudes it is necessary to assess the direction of trends in political values. For example it is commonly assumed that attitudes are becoming more liberal. This could be related to age in various ways. There could be a purely period effect; all age groups might respond to the general trend equally. But previous findings suggest that the old will respond less completely to a trend than will the young. This kind

of effect would tend to create marked differences in attitudes between age groups particularly with regard to values which are changing rapidly. If increased inflexibility with age was complete a pure generational model would be in effect. Only the young would change their beliefs but having passed a certain critical age would retain their beliefs for the rest of their lives. Were this the case age groups would reflect the attitudes of past historical eras like sedimentary rock mirroring the geological development of previous epochs. If the values of those eras were more conservative the old will reflect this conservatism. Life cycle effects yielding conservatism with age may combine with generational effects to increase the attitudinal gap between young and old. Changes in attitudes due solely to the life cycle will have relatively marginal effects on general trends as change could then be due to the fluctuating age composition of the population.

The army is by nature a force supporting civil order and military service has been thought of as building character and respect for discipline. Thus, support for compulsory military service can be considered a measure of conservatism. A question of whether military service should be required was asked with identical wordings at points in time approximately 20 years apart (1955, 1974) and the results are

presented in table 20. In this instance there is a predominantly generation effect with some slight evidence of an life cycle effect. There is a slight decrease in overall support for military service which declines from 56% to 48% (or to 50% if we include only those in the 22 and over category in the 1974 poll) But following the 1955 population 19 years later reveals a slight increase in support for military service. Comparing those in their twenties in 1955 to those in their forties in 1974 there is an increase from 49% to 52%. Similarly support from those in their thirties in 1955 increases from 60 to 62% and from those in their forties in 1955 increases from 57% to 68%. All told, those in the forty and over category in 1974 have a 60% approval rate of military service compared to the 56% support rate of the 1955 sample. While the old become slightly more conservative the sharp decline in conservatism among those coming into the electorate yields a net trend to less conservative attitudes. Thirty-eight percent of those between 22 and 39 supported military service in 1974 compared to about 55% in 1955. In this instance the change in beliefs about the value of military service of those coming into the electorate between the two points in time is largely responsible for creating an age difference.

Table 20

Support for Compulsory Military Service

	1955	1974
Year of Birth		
-1915	57%	68%
	(+1)	(+20)
1916-1925	60	62
	(+4)	(+14)
1926-1935	49	52
	(-7)	(+4)
1936-1944		46
		(-2)
1945-1952		29
		(-19)
1953-1956		12
		(-36)
mean	56	48
n=	1829	951

(1955 and 1974 data are from CIPO Polls 241 and 366 respectively)

Intolerance for minorities, particularly those challenging the established order such as communists, can be considered an aspect of conservatism. Therefore the question of whether 'communists should be outlawed'

which is available in Gallup polls can be used as a measure of conservatism. There are two similarly worded questions on outlawing communists from 1954 and 1968 which are presented in table 21. Because of differing cut-off points in the coding of age only rough approximations of effects can be made. In all age groups there is a decline in support for outlawing communists but the decline is much more marked among the young. Thus there is a period effect somewhat modified by the lower degree of change among the older cohorts. As in the case of military service the rapidity of change creates a difference between age groups. The degree of age difference is far more marked in the 1968 than the 1954 sample.

Table 21

Support for Outlawing Communists

	1954		1968
Age			
21-29	71 (-3)	21-29	56 (-4)
30-39	73 (-1)	30-39	57 (-3)
40-49	73 (-1)	40-49	56 (-4)
50+	77 (+3)	50-59	62 (+2)
		60-69	67 (+7)
		70+	74 (+14)
mean	74		60
n=	1741		2498

(The 1954 and 1968 data are from CIPO Poll 238 and the 1968 National Election study respectively)

Punitiveness can also be considered an aspect of conservatism. For the punitive individual not only is authority to be upheld but those disobeying it are to be punished harshly. One measure of punitiveness available is approval of corporal punishment for school children. Data sets with questions on corporal punishment are available from 1949, 1959, 1965 and 1974.

Figures for the four points in time show a fairly steady level of support for corporal punishment between 1949 and 1965 followed by a decline in support for corporal punishment between 1965 and 1974. In all cases the old are more favourable to corporal punishment than are the young but in the first case the difference is slight. Following samples of populations with the same date of birth in table 22 shows that between 1949 and 1959 there are increases with age in all three cases in support for corporal punishment. The increases from the twenties to thirties and from the thirties to the forties are much greater than those in the over forty group. From 1965 to 1974 there are slight increases in the first two age groups (ie. those under 40 in 1965) but decreases in the two older groups. Comparing those 30 and over in the 1974 poll to the whole 1965 sample there is a slight decline in approval of corporal punishment from 54% to 53%. Taking this evidence into account suggests a rather 'impure' explanation of the effect of age. Both life cycle and generational factors seem to be at work. There is some shift in attitude to a more authoritarian position due to aging from the 20's to the 40's. But also a slow generational trend away from corporal punishment speeds up from 1965 to 1974 causing an overall decline in approval for corporal punishment.

Table 22

Approval of Corporal Punishment in 1949, 1959

	1949	1959
Year of Birth		
-1909	56 (+3)	59 (+3)
1910-1919	49 (-4)	56 (0)
1920-1929	50 (-3)	60 (+4)
1930-1938		48 (-8)
mean	53	56
n=	1801	615

(The tables are arranged in this manner so that the age periods are comparable at both points in time.)

Table 23

Approval of Corporal Punishment in 1965, 1974

	1965	1974
Year of Birth		
-1915	64	58
	(+10)	(+10)
1916-1925	59	58
	(+5)	(+10)
1926-1935	45	50
	(-9)	(+2)
1936-1944	45	46
	(-9)	(-2)
1945-1956		36
		(-12)
mean	54	48
N=	672	957

(The 1949, 1959, 1965, and 1974 data are from CIPO Polls 191, 274, 313 and 374 respectively)

In a sense the ultimate dimension of punitiveness is support for capital punishment. Questions on the death penalty with similar wordings are available from 1955, 1966 and 1975. Between 1955 and 1966 there is only a slight difference in support for the death penalty and no consistent pattern of increase in support with age. But between 1966 and 1974 there is a large increase in all age groups in support for the

death penalty for convicted murderers. A period effect is clearly paramount. If anything, the older age groups show greater change yielding a stronger relationship between increased age and support for capital punishment.

Table 24

Support for the Death Penalty by Cohort

	1955	1966	1974
-1905	61		78
	(+5)		(+3)
1906-1915	49	59*	81
	(-7)	(0)	(+6)
1916-1925	58	60	77
	(+2)	(+1)	(+2)
1926-1935	63	60	79
	(+7)	(+1)	(+4)
1936-1945		55	75
		(-4)	(0)
1946-1957			70
			(-5)
mean	56	59	75
n=	1722	591	973

*born before 1915

(The 1955, 1966, and 1974 data are from CIPQ Polls

245, 317, 374 respectively)

Support for traditional values is an integral part of conservatism. In Canada among traditional values are, at least among the English speaking, an attachment for the British connection. Items dealing with the status of a new flag and a new national anthem as well as those dealing with the status of the monarchy tap this dimension of conservatism. The issue of the new flag is particularly interesting given the adoption of the new flag in 1965. The results of identical questions asked in 1953 and 1963 on the desirability of a new flag are presented in table 25. In this time period support for a new flag increases by 7%. This increase is due predominantly to a gradual generational trend involving the replacement of less pro-new flag older people with more pro-new flag younger people. The results of the 1975 poll on approval of the maple leaf flag ten years after its adoption show a very different picture. A period effect, far greater in magnitude than the previous generational effect exists among all cohorts for approval of the new flag. But age differences remain, with old people showing markedly lower levels of approval.

Table 25

Approval of a New Flag 1953, 1963, 1975

Year of Birth	1953	1963	1975
-1903	39		-1905 73
	(-6)		(-16)
1904-1913	40	41*	1906-1915 77
	(-5)	(-11)	(-12)
1914-1923	51	52	1916-1925 83
	(+6)	(0)	(-6)
1924-1933	54	57	1926-1935 85
	(+9)	(+5)	(-4)
1934-1943		62	1936-1945 92
		(+10)	(+3)
			1946-1957 95
			(+6)
mean	45	52	89
n=	1622	2276	913

*born before 1913

(The data for 1953, 1963 and 1975 are from CIP0 Polls 227T, 302, and 380 respectively)

According to McCloskey belief in the natural inequality of man is a basic component of ideological conservatism. A possible corollary of this belief would be the acceptance of discrimination based on racial, religious or other ascriptive grounds. A

variety of indicators available for assessing attitudes on racial and religious exclusion are presented by age in Appendix B. In every instance the old are more likely to favour exclusion than are the young. Two similar measures available from 1958 and 1968 dealing with opposition to intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants are presented in table 26. A period effect is evident. Marked change toward the more liberal position occurs in all cohorts. This transition is most marked among the young; the older groups are in both instances less liberal.

Table 26

Disapproval of Intermarriage between
Catholics and Protestants

	1958	1968
Year of Birth		
-1908	64 (+12)	
1909-1918	44 (-8)	41* (-11)
1919-1928	39 (-13)	49 (+16)
1929-1938	50 (-2)	27 (-4)
1939-1947		22 (-9)
mean	52	31
	472	660

*born before 1918

(The data is from CIPPO Polls 270 and 328)

Another set of attitudes which may serve as an indicator of conservatism are views on unions and particularly on strikes. Strikes are in a sense an example of social disorder and thus the conservative individual may be more likely to be hostile to trade unions. Also involved in attitudes towards unions are views on inequality. Unions may be regarded as a force

for equality particularly among the middle class.

Several different items are available from points in time approximately ten years apart which are presented in Appendix C which measure attitudes towards unions. These items deal with the question of whether laws regulating unions are too strict, whether union leaders are trouble makers, whether labour unions are wisely led and whether the respondents favour the right to strike. While there is some evidence of increase in anti-union feeling with age it is weak.

An obvious factor which may affect the relationship between age and attitude is membership in a union by the respondent or a family member. The results of controlling for family union membership are presented in table 27. The results in a majority of cases are weak. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that in dealing with the right to strike and the wisdom of labour leadership the relationship between age and attitude towards unions is reversed among those with a member of the family in a union. This suggests an increased gap with age between unionists and non-unionists and leads to a slightly different mode of analysis which is presented in table 28. Therefore the analysis proceeds to examine the effect of union membership on attitudes towards union within age groups. Looking at the relationship between union

membership and attitude toward unions reveals that it is weak among those in their twenties. From the twenties to the thirties the strength of the relationship invariably increases. The strength of the relationship usually attains its highest level among respondents in their thirties and forties. Following cohorts across decades on similar questions there is an invariable increase in the strength of the relationship with age. Thus, as in the case of the effect of religion on partisanship there is an instance of degree of socialization into an environment.

Table 27

Relationship between Age and Union Items

Controlled for Union Membership

Right to Strike

	1962	1972
uncontrolled	.08	.04
n=	650	566
unionists	-.05	-.05
n=	157	187
non-unionists	.10	.05
n=	493	379

Union Laws Too Strict

1961 1970

uncontrolled	.04	.01
n=	(505)	585
unionists	-.09	-.03
n=	(138)	188
non-unionists	.07	.00
	(367)	397

Union Leaders Trouble Makers

	1954	1964
uncontrolled	.02	.07
n=	1369	519
unionists	-.05	-.02
n=	363	133
non-unionists	.06	.11
n=	993	380

Labour Wisely Led

	1954	1966
uncontrolled	.04	.13
n=	1383	529
unionists	-.10	-.09
n=	386	150
non-unionists	+.06	.19
	984	379

Table 28

Relationship between Union Membership and

Attitudes towards Unions by Age

(taus)

Right to Strike by Union Membership

	1962	1972
Year of Birth		
-1912	.14	
n=	178	
1913-1922	.13	.11
n=	156	176
1923-1932	.14	.20
n=	171	110
1933-1942	.04	.07
n=	145	115
1943-1954		.01
		165

Union Laws too Strict

	1961	1970
-1911	.12	
n=	135	
1912-1921	.25	.13
	128	200
1922-1931	.10	.22
n=	153	122
1932-1941	.10	.26
	89	126

1942-1952 .08

127

Union Leaders Trouble Makers by Union Membership

	1954	1964
-1904	.07	
n=	293	
1905-1914	.20	.18
n=	263	176
1915-1924	.10	.35
n=	385	112
1925-1934	.06	.06
n=	315	132
1935-1943		.08
n=		99

Labour Wisely Led by Union Membership

	1954	1966
-1904	.24	
n=	369	
1905-1914	.17	.15
n=	289	175
1915-1924	.13	.32
n=	398	111
1925-1934	.07	.21
n=	314	133
1935-1945		-.05
		109

(The data in Tables 27 and 28 for

1954, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1972 are from CIPO Polls 235, 291, 299, 309, 320, 342, and 352 respectively.)

Summary and Conclusions

Increased age has been thought to be related to increased conservatism from both life cycle and generational perspectives. Responsibilities acquired during the life cycle may enhance an individual's appreciation of authority and desire to preserve the social order. Perception of personal threat can yield an authoritarian reaction causing increased intolerance of deviants. A generational model attributes the conservatism of the old to their reflecting the more conservative values of a bygone era.

However, an examination of all effects on conservatism including period, generation and life cycle shows that generational and life cycle effects creating conservatism are not the only nor the predominant effects. In fact age acts more often as a reinforcer of attitudes than as a source of ideological conservatism.

3

The analysis of the relationship between age and conservatism deals first with conservatism as partisanship. Support for the Progressive Conservative party is considered indicative of conservatism while support for the CCF-NDP is used as an indicator of the absence of conservatism. While the life cycle hypothesis posits increased conservatism with age a generational hypothesis predicts high levels of CCF-NDP support among the Depression and World War II generations. These periods saw the birth and blossoming of the CCF.

The initial analysis indicates that there is no consistent evidence that either the Depression or War generations are more pro-CCF. While initially the voters do seem to become more Conservative with age, the use of religion as a control reveals that the relationship is different among Catholics and Protestants. While among Protestants voters do tend to increase their support for the Progressive Conservative party with age, among Roman Catholics aging is related to higher levels of support for the Liberals. CCF-NDP strength declined with age among both Protestants and Catholics. These findings indicate that what is occurring is not increased conservatism in an ideological sense but rather a stronger attachment to the partisan forms of a religious group with age. What is revealed is the impact of experience.

Similarly, attitudes towards unions show a reinforcement effect with age. While it had originally been hypothesized that age would yield anti-union attitudes, what is revealed is that the differences in attitudes towards unions among unionists and non-unionists increase with age. Non-unionists become somewhat more anti-union while unionists become somewhat more pro-union. Thus both with regard to attitudes towards unions and partisanship a reinforcement effect is predominant.

Analysis of the relationship between age and other aspects of conservatism necessitates the use of a variety of questions available on Gallup polls. These questions deal with what can be termed the authoritarian and traditional aspects of conservatism.

Results are varied. In some cases there is a fairly strong relationship between age and conservatism in the direction predicted while in others there is not. In no instance are the young more conservative than the old. The relationship between age and conservatism varies over time. Rapidly changing attitudes may create a situation in which age and attitude are strongly related as the old usually respond to change less completely than the young. But such is not always the case. Between 1966 and 1974 the attitudes of the old to the death penalty changed a bit

more rapidly than those of the young, albeit in a conservative direction.

Questions on compulsory military service, military training and on support for corporal punishment show a gradual aging effect; support for the more authoritarian position increased with age.

Generational effects were also present in the relationship. A generational effect away from support for the Union Jack or Red Ensign was also found.

Attitudes towards unions revealed a different pattern.

Rather than becoming more conservative with age, with time people became more fully integrated into the working subculture of which they are a part. The relative lack of flexibility of the old, that is their lower level of responsiveness to the general trend, is evident on the issues of intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants where the old follow the trend towards approval of intermarriage more slowly than do the young and with regards to the flag issue where acceptance of the new flag lags behind that of the young.

The pattern of the impact of age on attitude is complex. There are different kinds of age effects affecting different indicators of conservatism. In many cases the effects are not pure but rather life cycle, generational and period effects occur

simultaneously. In some instances the mix of effects changes over time. Between 1949 and 1959 there is a life cycle effect in the relationship between age and the approval of corporal punishment while between 1965 and 1974 a generational effect becomes paramount. A more dramatic instance of the changing effect of age with time is the case of the flag. While before the adoption of the flag a gradual generational trend away from support for the Union Jack or the Red Ensign existed, after adoption of the maple leaf flag a rapid trend towards approval was modified only slightly by its lesser effect on the elderly. Thus overt political events affect the nature of the relationship between age and attitudes.

The relationship between age as life cycle or as generation and political attitudes is inevitably linked to the nature of trends in those attitudes. In times of rapid change, or perhaps one might say with regard to attitudes that are changing rapidly, the greater stability of the old may yield sharp age differences as shown in dealing with military service and outlawing communism. The general level of change, that is the period effect, far exceeds the strength of effects due to age. It must be noted that with one exception (attitude toward military service) the attitudes of those in the oldest group change in the same direction as the population as a whole.

Overall the posited conservatism/age hypothesis has a relatively minor impact on the attitudes and behaviour observed. The reinforcement effect of age on vote or on attitudes towards unions is more consistent than age as a force making people more conservative. Both life cycle and generational effects do have some impact on some issues. However this impact is both time and issue specific. In the Canadian context it seems that the old are in most cases affected by the same trends that affect society as a whole.

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1974 figures are from the 1965 and 1974 National
Election Studies respectively.

30) While the data presented show a sharp decline in CCF-NDP support from 1945 to 1974 from 21% to 12 % aggregate levels of CCF-NDP support in elections have changed from 15.6% to 11.3% to 10.7% to 17.9% to 15.4% in the elections of 1945, 1953, 1957, 1965 and 1974 respectively. See Colin Campbell Canadian Political Facts Toronto: Metheun. 1977. pp. 87-90.

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33) The question used to assess party identification in 1965 is "Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as . . ." while in 1974 the question was "Thinking of federal politics do you usually think of yourself as Liberal . . ." Chapter 5 deals with the impact of age on the intensity of party identification.

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Class-voting and Age

Class has been seen as a fundamental cleavage in society, particularly from a Marxist perspective, but also from a more general social scientific perspective. For Marx, industrialization would result in the sharpening of the class division and the diminishing of the importance of ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages, resulting ultimately in the division of society into two hostile camps, the owners of the means of production and the workers.(1)

The electoral implications of changing cleavages due to historical development, are put forth by S.M.Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Examining European development Lipset and Rokkan delineate two cleavages resulting from the national revolution and two from the industrial revolution. The resolution of the problem of national integration results in conflicts between church and state and between dominant populations and ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. The industrial revolution results firstly in conflicts between landed interests and industrialists and secondly between workers and tenants versus landowners and industrialists.(2) Presumably, this second kind of class cleavage should characterize the electoral

competition of a developed industrial society.

From this perspective Canada is something of an anomaly. While it is an industrialized country levels of class voting, at least at the federal level remain low. Robert Alford in Party and Society, a study of class-voting in Canada, Britain, Australia and the United States, characterizes Canada as the country with the lowest level of class-voting. This Alford attributes to Canada's lack of national identity which allows the development of strong attachments to religious, ethnic and linguistic groups.(3) In terms of Lipset and Rokkan's model one might say that Canada is a country still in the throes of its national revolution.

But a variety of considerations preclude a description of Canada as a country having 'pure non-class politics' which is the subtitle of Alford's chapter on Canada. The stratification of society by wealth has, if anything, become sharper. For example, the proportion of income earned by the highest 20% of income earners increased from 40% to 47% from 1950 to 1970.(4) N.H.Chi puts forward the view that the 'self-perpetuating myth of non-class politics is disfunctional for the Canadian political system resulting in the threat of disintegration along regional lines.(5) In his analysis of class voting Chi

reanalyzes Alford's data and also performs analyses of his own using union membership as an indicator of class. Chi further contends that class polarization is increasing in Canada.(6) At the provincial level in some provinces the class cleavage has become one of the fundamental cleavages for electoral politics. John Wilson categorizes Canadian provinces as having traditional, transitional or developed political systems. In the developed provinces such as Saskatchewan class is the main electoral cleavage.(7) Jane Jenson obtains results generally congruent with Wilson's view. British Columbia and Saskatchewan are the only provinces in which the class cleavage is a statistically significant predictor of the vote.(8)

But geographical divisions are not the only ones which may affect the importance of the class cleavage for electoral politics. Different age groups may have differing degrees of class polarization. Age differences in class polarization may have sources either in generational or life cycle phenomena. Those who first come onto the labour market in an era of high unemployment and economic hardship may be more affected by economic issues, and class may play a more important role in their voting. Analysis of the effects of the Great Depression has been the main focus of interest in dealing with generational effects on class-voting.

Paul Abramson, examining American electoral behaviour

using polls taken between 1948 and 1972, finds that the Depression cohort continues to have a higher level of class voting than the electorate as a whole.(9) In Britain, David Butler and Donald Stokes find that the cohort that first voted in 1945, the year of the Labour landslide, had higher levels of class voting than the electorate as a whole (10).

But generational factors are not the only possible explanations of differences in class voting. It is possible that age differences are the result of a more complete socialization into a class culture or due to the responsibilities acquired during the life cycle. With a more complete socialization into the work environment, people may be more likely to vote for a party disproportionately favoured in that environment, resulting in an increase in class voting with age. Also, individuals may have undergone social mobility in the course of their lives and thus their vote may not initially reflect their current social status but with time may change to do so.(11)

Were a generational explanation indicated particular cohorts would be distinctive with regard to their level of class voting compared to the electorate as a whole. Conversely, a life cycle explanation would be supported by data showing an increase in class voting with age at least to a certain point in the life

span.

Before examining the data it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the concept of class voting in the Canadian context. Presumably, class voting refers to the degree to which the lower class votes for leftwing parties and the middle class votes for right wing parties. But the designation of parties as left or right in Canada is by no means unambiguous. Robert Alford in his analysis of class voting in Canada categorized the CCF and the Liberals as parties of the left and the Progressive Conservatives as the party of the right.(12) J.A.Laponce using samples of Canadian social science students found that while 87% of NDP supporters categorized themselves as on the left 45% of Liberal supporters did so compared to only 18% of Progressive Conservative supporters.(13) But in some respects the appeal of the Progressive Conservatives when led by John Diefenbaker was populist in nature and in a sense more left wing than the appeal of the Liberals. On the other hand it has been noted that the appeal of the NDP has been Fabian in nature emphasizing an appeal to moderation rather than to a class against class conflict.

Nonetheless it is possible to make too much of the non-class character of Canadian parties. Financially, the NDP is tied to the trade unions while the bulk of

Progressive Conservative and Liberal support comes from business. N.H. Chi analyzing data from the 1965 National Election Study finds that supporters of the NDP, Liberal, and Progressive Conservatives can be categorized by the class nature of their support, with the NDP obtaining a disproportionately large part of their support from the working class and the Progressive Conservatives obtaining a disproportionately small portion of their support from the working class. (14)

An important factor in dealing with the nature of class voting in Canada is the different types of appeal made by various political parties in parts of the country which reflect the different nature of the class structure. Consideration of this point is essential in examining the nature of CCF-NDP support across Canada. As the CCF and its successor the NDP are defined as the left pole of the partisan continuum it is necessary to assess the degree to which the party's appeal is to that group thought of as the left's natural constituency, the working class.

While the Regina Manifesto, the declaration of principles produced at the founding of the CCF called for the abolition of capitalism, which might be thought to be an appeal oriented toward the working class, the CCF's initial successes were scored in Saskatchewan, a

predominantly rural province. As S.M.Lipset shows, within the province CCF support was concentrated in rural areas with small town people identifying with the merchant class and voting for the Liberals or the Conservatives.(15) Among farmers the CCF first obtained the support of the wealthier farmers who were predominantly of Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian origin. By 1944 and the election of the CCF government, CCF support in rural areas had increased disproportionately among poorer farmers so that there was no longer any systematic difference in support by wealth.(16) In the larger urban areas the CCF did gain the support of the working class. Paralleling the pattern of growth in support among farmers CCF support in the working class was initially strongest among skilled workers predominantly of Anglo-Saxon origin.(17) In the province as a whole CCF support was predominantly a rural phenomenon.

In his classic work Democracy in Alberta C.B.MacPherson documents the political impact of the ambivalent class position of prairie farmers. While farmers feel themselves to be independent, in fact the terms of trade are generally tilted against them and they are unable to dispose of the labour of others, the prime source of wealth in a capitalist economy. MacPherson analyzes the class position of the farmers as being petit bourgeois in nature giving rise to a

false consciousness of their position in society and an uneven oscillation between radicalism and conservatism. (18)

While on the prairies CCF support was predominantly a rural phenomenon, in British Columbia and Ontario CCF support followed a more conventional pattern for a socialist party. With regard to British Columbia, both Walter Young and Martin Robin relate the intensity of class conflict in that province to the economic insecurity inherent in a resource based economy. (19) This, combined with what Robin refers to as a 'robber baron' ethos on the part of the middle class has engendered a militant and politically active labour movement strongly committed to the CCF. In contrast to the situation on the prairies the diversified and geographically fragmented farming areas have not been radicalized but rather had formed the backbone of Social Credit support in a province where Social Credit was a conservative force. (20) Similarly in Ontario, while the party system has not been polarized to the degree that it has in British Columbia CCF support has been strongest among industrial workers.

The situation of the party in Quebec is distinct from that found in any of the provinces west of the Ottawa river. The traditional distaste of the Catholic

church for socialism created a formidable barrier. The CCF also suffered from the presence in its ranks of some anti-French English speaking Canadians as well as from its reputation as a party favouring policies requiring the centralization of power at the federal level. Lacking strong support in the Quebec trade union movement the CCF tended to be a party whose leadership and support was limited to a small number of English speaking intellectuals.(21) Apart from a pocket of support in Cape Breton island CCF-NDP support in Atlantic Canada was limited.

Another perspective relating regionalism to the level of class voting deals with region as a component of a definition of marginality. N.H. Chi posits that class voting does exist among the non-marginal (ie. modal) groups. Marginality is defined in terms of region and religion. Members of minority religions within a region are defined as marginal. Chi's evidence supports his hypothesis. French-Catholics in Quebec and English Protestants in other provinces have the highest levels of class voting. (except in the maritimes where neither the modal nor the marginal group has a significant level of class voting.) Chi also shows that those trade union members who have a higher level of interest in politics are more likely to vote for the NDP. (22)

What these findings suggest is not that the concept of class-voting should be dismissed as inapplicable to Canada but rather that the regional component of party support should be taken into account. Thus the most fruitful approach in examining the relationship between class voting and age may be to concentrate on urban areas and particularly to deal with Ontario and British Columbia.

Another consideration in dealing with the relationship between age and class voting deals with the way in which class is conceptualized. The notion of class has been a mainstay of social theory but approaches to class have differed and indicators of class will vary. Discussions of class habitually begin with the theories of Karl Marx. Marx saw industrial capitalism as a social order characterized by a uniquely complete dichotomization of society into two hostile classes: the owners of the means of production and the workers. However Marx believed that certain groups might exist which would complicate this dichotomous class structure. One such group is the lumpenproletariat. This group is made up of people unable to adjust to the conventional class structure such as criminals. Such people would be a small minority which in any case would be unlikely to show up in conventional survey research. Another more important complication is the existence of marginal

classes of people who are the vestiges of a previous economic order. Farmers in the Canadian context would fit into this category. A further complication is the existence of groups such as managers who are directly dependent on the owning class and identify with it.(23)

The owners of the means of production themselves are such a small proportion of society that direct use of a Marxist indicator of social class is rare. However revisions of Marxism starting in the nineteenth century focussed on the role of a more numerous group the emergent middle class. As Richard Hamilton says of views of this class of white collar workers:(24)

[T]hey were thought to be economically better off than manual workers. They certainly had more stable employment. The higher incomes, the greater job security and also to some extent, the greater contact with the employer, contributed to the development of a different style of life, which in turn, allowed the development of a different consciousness.

In a sense this class can be viewed as a complication of the class structure due to a group being dependent on the owning class and identifying with it.

Max Weber's concept of class is based on the idea of life chances. That is, in a market situation class is determined by an individual's chances of obtaining income or property. Unlike status groups for Weber classes are categories not communities. Unlike classes, status groups are usually communities with conventions, rituals and appropriate life styles. Membership in a status group may be related to class but the relationship is not complete. Status groups will resist the entrance of individuals into the group solely on the basis of wealth. Also status groups may attempt to limit the scope of the market and thus its ability to determine life chances. (25)

Given the different conceptualizations of class it is not surprising that it has been measured in a variety of ways. Some of the methods involve the observations of other individuals on how people live (ie. life style) or others' rankings of class position and thus are inapplicable for use as indicators in the secondary analysis of surveys. (26) Other methods involve self-ranking or reports on how individuals earn their living, that is their occupation.

Self-identified class is to a certain extent a measure of class consciousness. The difficulty with self-identified class is that the respondent may only have a vague notion of the meaning of class. Thus there may be large deviations between reports of

self-identified class and reports of objective measures of class. Occupation may also have shortcomings as a measure since a wide variety of occupational circumstances may be encompassed in a single occupational category such as proprietors. Nonetheless occupation is a category that does reflect social reality to a greater degree than do other measures.(27)

To a certain degree the white collar-manual distinction of Marxists combines the Weberian notion of life chances with some overtones of status. White collar workers may have higher income, more security and less onerous conditions of work but they also have a status and a life style setting them off from manual workers. Given the applicability of the white collar/manual distinction from both these perspectives it will be the primary indicator of class used.

In examining a generational explanation of the effect of age on class voting attention shall be focussed on those born between 1906 and 1915 and those born between 1916 and 1925. These cohorts will be termed the Depression and War Generations respectively. The straightened economic circumstances of the Depression have in other national contexts been shown to have increased the level of class voting in this cohort.(28) The War years in Canada saw a shift to the left in party support which would be indicative of the

increased politicization of the class cleavage which in turn would be particularly evident in the cohort most affected by the war. Thus economic circumstances suggest that these generations may be those having high levels of class voting. But also in the Depression and War periods, the left wing party, the CCF, made the kind of appeal that emphasized class issues and would tend to increase class voting. During the Depression the party called for the abolition of the capitalist system and for the lessening of economic inequality. During the Second World War and during the election campaign of 1945 this appeal was somewhat toned down. But the CCF campaign often harkened back to the Depression and predicted that another economic downturn would follow the war. CCF appeals were frequently directed at "farmers and workers" as opposed to the population as a whole. (29) Thus both the Depression and War generations came into the electorate in eras in which the CCF appeal was class oriented and would have resulted in high levels of class voting. In fact CCF gains in 1945 in Ontario in particular were predominantly in industrial ridings.

While the coding of the data necessitates arbitrary cutoff points in the definition of our generations the Depression and War were of sufficient duration and magnitude to have an impact on even broad age categories.

Table 1 contains statistics of the strength of relationship between class and vote at various points in time within age groups. Class is measured as occupation and occupation has been subdivided into manual and non-manual categories. Because of the ambiguous class position of farmers, they are initially excluded from the analysis. Vote is divided into those who voted for the CCF-NDP and those who voted for other parties.

Examination of the level of class voting of the Depression and War cohorts reveals no evidence that these cohorts have distinctively higher levels of class voting. In both cases there are as many cases in which these cohorts are below the mean in their level of class voting as in which they are above the mean.

Table 1
Class (occupation) By Vote
(Tau)

	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1875	.14 (+.-.034)			
n=	33			
1876-1885	.16 (-.01)			
n=	121			
1886-1895	.20 (+.03)		.22 (+.16)	
n=	201		31	
1896-1905	.21 (+.04)	.18 (+.08)	.12 (+.06)	-
n=	242	280	79	6
1906-1915	.13 (-.04)	.11 (+.02)	.20 (+.14)	.00 (-.04)
n=	253	272	201	72
1916-1925	.21 (+.04)	.08 (-.02)	.02 (-.04)	-.06 (-.10)
n=	137	317	308	164
1926-1935		.02 (-.08)	.06 (.00)	.12 (+.08)
n=		218	323	238
1936-1945			-.03 (-.09)	.02 (-.02)

n=		258		210
1946-1956				.02
				(-.02)
n=				296
mean	.17	.10	.06	.04
n=	985	1086	1211	981

The evidence for a life cycle interpretation of the data is mixed. Following the cohorts across time reveals as many instances of decrease in the level of class voting as instances of increase. But it should be noted that the mean level of class voting drops steadily across the time span. In order to take this factor into account it is possible to examine the deviations from the mean level of class voting for the electorate as a whole at each point in time. In this way it is found that there are 7 instances of increase in the level of class voting compared to the mean and four instances of decrease.

But because there is a continuing decline in the level of class voting over the four points in time a generational interpretation of the data is also possible. Older cohorts could reflect the higher level of class voting of those eras. Since there are as many decreases in the absolute level of class voting as there are increases a generational explanation of the findings cannot be excluded.

Another prediction which can be derived from the life cycle model of the relationship between class voting and age pertains to the degree of congruence between objective and subjective measures of class. If individuals are more completely socialized into the working environment with age as the life cycle model suggests their self-perceptions of their class standing should be more in accord with their objective class position. The data presented in Appendices A and B present the relationship between self-identified class and objective measures of class with age groups in 1965 and 1974. There is generally an increase in congruence between subjective and objective measures of class between the first and third decades of the electoral life cycle. (ie. between the 18-29 and 40-49 age groups) but thereafter the relationship between self-identified class and other measures of class tends to decrease. It might be thought that the decline in association between the two types of indicators was due to the increasing proportion of retired people with age. But the seventy and over group which is made up predominantly of retired people has generally a higher level of congruence than the samples as a whole. Thus this aspect of the data does not support the life cycle model.

A further examination of the relationship between age and class voting requires an analysis of the relationship between age and class voting under the particular regional, religious and ethnic circumstances in which class voting should be strongest. As noted above class voting would be strongest on a regional basis in Ontario and British Columbia. Also, one would expect that class voting would be greater in urban areas than in rural areas. With regard to ethnic and religious factors class voting should be strongest among non-marginal groups such as English protestants.

Initially the relationship between class and vote will be examined in non-rural areas. In larger centers it is more likely that working class people can become organized and thus vote on a class basis. Table 2 presents the relationship between class, measured as occupation, and vote dichotomized into NDP and others within various cohorts in non-rural areas. Examining the Depression and War generations reveals no evidence of higher levels of class voting. The Depression generation is below the mean level of class voting twice and the War generation is below the mean on three occasions.

Following cohorts across time shows that there are five instances of increase in the level of class voting, five of decrease and one in which there is no

change. Clearly the consistency in the increase in the level of class voting with age is not that great.

Table 2

Class voting in Non-rural Areas

	(occupation)			
	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1875	.14			
	(-.03)			
n=	33			
1876-1885	.15			
	(-.02)			
n=	120			
1886-1895	.20		.25	
	(+.03)		(+.19)	
n=	201		26	
1896-1905	.21	.21	.09	
	(+.04)	(+.07)	(+.03)	
n=	242	248	58	5
1906-1915	.12	.14	.19	-.01
	(-.05)	(0)	(.13)	(-.06)
n=	251	234	157	58
1916-1925	.20	.09	.03	-.09
	(+.03)	(-.05)	(-.03)	(-.16)
n=	136	274	243	130
1926-1935		.07	.09	.27
		(-.07)	(-.04)	(+.20)
n=		176	246	191

1936-1945			.07	.07
			(+.01)	(0)
			194	167
1946-1956				.07
				(0)
n=				234
mean	.17	.14	.06	.07
n=	981	931	938	787

As noted above N.H. Chi finds that class voting exists most strongly in Canada among those people who are not culturally marginal. Thus it should be the case that the level of class voting should be highest among English Protestants outside Québec. A clear relationship between age and voting might exist only among English Protestants rather than among the population as a whole.

Table 3 contains measures of the relationship between class and vote among English speaking Protestants outside the province of Quebec. In Chi's terminology this group would be in the modal category and thus have higher levels of class voting. Examination of the data reveals some evidence in support of the life cycle view of class voting. There are seven instances of increase in class voting with age compared to three instances of decrease. Comparing the change in deviations from the mean over time

reveals eight instances of increase and four of decrease. From a generational perspective it is evident that the Depression and War generations are distinct. While the Depression generation has a consistently high level of class voting, the War generation has a consistently low level of class voting.

Table 3
Class by Vote
Among English Protestants
Outside of Quebec

	(occupation)			
	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1875	.03			
	(-.16)			
n=	14			
1876-1885	.14			
	(-.05)			
n=	63			
1886-1895	.21		.32	
	(+.02)		(.13)	
n=	99		15	
1896-1905	.26	.09	.31	
	(+.07)	(+.02)	(+.12)	
n=	115	144	46	4
1906-1915	.20	.19	.35	.24
	(.01)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)

n=	114	123	105	32
1916-1925	.13	.04	.12	-.15
	(-.06)	(-.03)	(-.07)	(-.23)
n=	55	144	143	74
1926-1935		-.05	.18	.29
		(-.12)	(-.01)	(.21)
n=		98	66	97
1936-1945			.08	.12
			(-.11)	(.04)
n=			98	86
1946-1956				.02
				(-.06)
				118
mean	.19	.07	.19	.08
n=	460	508	580	409

One factor affecting the nature of class voting in Canada is region. The appeal of the NDP in the prairie provinces would be different from that in an industrialized province such as Ontario or in British Columbia with its tradition of class conflict. Thus it is necessary to control for province. Table 4 presents the relationship between class and vote in Ontario. The data lend little support to either the life cycle or generational models of the effect of age. There are as many instances of decrease in the level of class voting with age as of increase. Neither the Depression nor the War generation is distinct with respect to its

level of class voting. Both the Depression and the War generations are above the mean on three of four occasions. While among English Protestants outside Quebec as a whole the Depression generation had higher levels of class voting than the War generation there were no systematic differences among Ontarians.

Table 4
Class Voting in Ontario

	(occupation)			
	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1875	.07			
	(-.15)			
n=	17			
1876-1885	.26			
	(+.04)			
n=	49			
1886-1895	.10		.39	
	(-.12)		(.22)	
n=	49		13	
1896-1905	.26	.13	.05	-
	(.04)	(.04)	(-.12)	
n=	97	98	25	3
1906-1915	.25	-.02	.35	.37
	(.03)	(-.11)	(.18)	(.27)
n=	95	92	81	26
1916-1925	.29	.24	.18	-.06
	(.07)	(.15)	(.01)	(-.16)

n=	54	123	116	52
1926-1935		-.02	.18	.31
		(-.11)	(.11)	(.21)
		78	131	84
1936-1945			.05	-.15
			(-.12)	(-.25)
n=			108	79
1946-1956				.12
				(.02)
n=				88
mean	.22	.09	.17	.10
n=	396	390	477	332

The fact that there is a different pattern of results in class voting by generation in Ontario than among English speaking Protestants as a whole suggests that there may be regional factors affecting the relative impact of generational experiences. The deprivation caused by the Depression was most severe in the prairie provinces. Thus class voting may be highest among the Depression generation in those provinces than elsewhere.

To deal with this question it is necessary to measure class in a somewhat different manner. Thus far the analysis has measured class as occupation excluding farmers. Clearly such a strategy is not viable in analyzing class voting on the prairies. Farmers

constitute a large proportion of the sample in that region and more importantly are a group towards which the CCF explicitly directed its appeal. Rather than using occupation as an indicator of class, wealth or income will be used as an indicator of class. The second strategy to be followed is that of comparing support among farmers and others.

Given the particular appeal of the CCF-NDP to farmers it might be expected that CCF strength would be especially strong among farmers and that this strength would be particularly evident in the Depression generation. Table 5 presents the relationship between occupation, this time coded as farmers and others and vote in the prairie provinces. But in fact farmers are only very slightly stronger in their support of the CCF-NDP than are those in other occupations. The Depression generation is above the mean in the level of class voting measured in this way on three of four occasions but differences are slight.

Table 5

Farmers/others by vote

Prairie Provinces

	1945	1955	1965	1974
-1875	.06			
n=	13			
1876-1885	-.12			
n=	55			
1886-1895	.01		-	
n=	73			
1896-1905	-.08	.07	-.04	-
n=	75	81	15	21
1906-1915	.14	-.30	.03	.06
n=	63	55	34	41
1916-1925	-.13	-.25	-.05	.-
n=	49	54	66	43
1926-1935		-.14	-.11	.08
n=		48	66	48
1936-1945			.35	.03
			32	42
1946-1956				.16
n=				77
mean	.03	.01	.02	.05
n=	328	238	270	273

In attempting to ascertain the relationship between class voting and age the pattern of class voting within cohorts was examined over a thirty year

time span using a variety of indicators of class. Also, the relationship has been examined in a variety of regional contexts and among culturally modal populations. In no case does a clear and consistent pattern emerge. A generational or life cycle effect cannot be completely discounted. For example larger samples would permit a more complete examination of the relationship at a provincial level. The impact of the Depression in Saskatchewan, the province in which the CCF was most successful, could be examined. Similarly the general unavailability of data on voting at the provincial level prohibits the analysis of age effects on class voting at that level. Given the greater importance of issues such as social welfare at the provincial level, analysis of class voting and age at this level might be instructive.(30) Nonetheless the picture which emerges is one in which age has little consistent effect.

With regard to possible generational effects on class voting it is necessary to examine what Phillip Converse refers to as side evidence (31), which is cross-sectional in nature, and suggests whether a generational or a life cycle effect is present. One such piece of evidence from the 1954 data set is a question on the likelihood of the Depression reoccurring. It would seem likely that those who were most affected by the Depression would be the most

sensitive to the possibility of its reoccurrence. However, the data reveal that those born between 1905 and 1914 who form the Depression generation were the least likely to think that there would be another Depression. Another measure relating to class consciousness from the 1974 data deals with perception of the inevitability of class conflict. Rather than finding that the Depression generation sees conflict as inevitable it is found that the perception of the inevitability of class conflict drops with age.

Presumably the effect of class on vote would imply a certain degree of class consciousness. The life cycle hypothesis posits that the passage of time will result in a more complete socialization of the individual into the environment and thus greater congruence between attitudes and social background. The examination of conservatism showed an increased congruence between religion and vote with age. Similarly attitudes towards unions became more congruent with union membership as individuals aged. While membership in a union is not identical to being working class, unions are a working class organization and the CCF-NDP has been closely identified with unions. Indeed the data show that union membership is more strongly related to CCF-NDP vote than are other measures of class.

In dealing with the relationship between attitudes towards unions, union membership and vote a variety of questions will be examined, assessing favourability towards unions. The questions to be used deal with whether union leaders are trouble makers, whether laws regulating unions are too strict and whether the right to strike should be maintained. Unfortunately due to the small number of NDP supporters reported in several of these polls analysis will primarily be directed at the question of whether labour leaders are trouble makers.

With increasing age it would be expected that there would be a greater congruence between attitude toward union and voting for the NDP. Table 6 presents the relationship between attitude (whether union leaders are trouble makers) and vote within age groups at two points in time. This relationship is strengthened by age. Examining the relationship cross-sectionally, that is comparing older people and younger people at the same point in time, shows a stronger association between attitude and vote among the older groups. Similarly following cohorts between the two points in time reveals an increase in the effect of attitudes on vote with age.

Table 6

Attitude toward Union by Vote by Age(1)

(Tau B)

	1954	1966
-1904	.31	
n=	284	
1905-1914	.16	.20
n=	200	101
1915-1924	.01	.17
n=	317	84
1925-1934	.00	.15
n=	232	89
1935-1944		.02
n=		87
mean	.10	.13
n=		361

(1) Some people say that there are too many trouble makers and agitators among union leaders. Others say that this talk is only anti-labor propaganda. What are your views on this?

Another test of the relationship between attitude toward union and vote is the question of whether laws regulating unions are strict enough. Here a response

that the laws are not strict enough is considered anti-union. Given the low proportion of NDP supporters in the 1961 poll it was decided to take the relationship between attitude and vote for the electorate as a whole in 1961 and compare it with the relationship among those over thirty in the 1970 poll. An increase in the strength of relationship between attitude and vote is revealed in table 7.

Table 7

	1961	1970
-1940.	.09	.24
n=	361	297
1941-1949.		.06
n=		101

1961 At the present time, do you think the laws regulating labor unions are too strict of not strict enough? (CIPO 291)

1970 Do you think that the laws regulating labor unions are too strict or not strict enough? (CIPO 342)

It has been shown that age increases the relationship between union membership and attitudes towards unions. Among union members attitudes towards unions are in a sense measures of class consciousness. Thus, if aging increases socialization into the class environment class consciousness should increase and

should be related to an increased vote for the NDP. Constraint between attitudes should increase implying a stronger relationship between attitude and vote with age among unionists. The data presented in table 8 reveal that there is a steady increase with age in the strength of the relationship between attitude and vote among union members. Table 9 also reveals an increase in the relationship between vote and attitude with age among unionists although only one point of comparison is available. This would suggest that the combined impact of attitude and background on vote should be strengthened with age.

Table 8
 Attitude toward Union
 (Too many trouble makers)
 by Vote (NDP/oth)
 by Age
 (unionists)
 (Tau B)

	1954	1966
-1904	.68	
n=	58	
1905-1914	.21	.37
n=	45	21
1915-1924	.10	.34

n=	87	32
1925-1934	.16	.28
n=	86	17
1935-		.30

Table 9

Attitude Toward Union
(union laws too strict)
(unionists)

	1961	1970
-1940	.22	.30
n=	97	90
1941-1949		.02
n=		41

To assess the combined impact of attitudes and union membership on vote a multiple correlation (Pearson's R) derived from a multiple regression analysis is used. (All variables have been dichotomized) The multiple correlation of the two variables dealing with attitudes towards unions and union membership on vote within various cohorts is presented in Table 10. At both points in time the strength of the relationship between these three independent variables and vote is greater within the older cohorts. In two of the three cases the strength of the relationship increases over time.

Table 10
The Effect of Attitudes
Towards Unions and Union Membership
On Vote
(Multiple Correlation Coefficients)

	1954	1966
-1904	.38	
n=	230	
1905-1914	.25	.28
n=	175	89
1915-1924	.23	.16
n=	265	68
1925-1934	.18	.23
n=	196	76
1935-		.05
n=		66
mean	.20	.17
n=	868	299

Summary and Conclusions

Analyzing the relationship between class voting and age requires the specification of the mechanisms acting on class voting from both life cycle and generational perspectives and necessitates a discussion of the nature of class voting in the Canadian context.

A generational model of the effect of class voting suggests that a particular cohort affected by an era in which class voting was high will remain higher in its level of class voting. In Canada, and especially in Ontario and British Columbia where the CCF's appeal tended to be class oriented it is posited that the cohorts coming of age during the Depression and the Second World War would have higher levels of class voting.

The life cycle model suggests that as people age, socialization into the environment becomes more complete and therefore that class voting will increase with age.

The existence of class voting in Canada has been subject to a good deal of debate. The nature of the appeal of the CCF on the prairies was, initially at least, an appeal to farmers and was particularly successful among the better off farmers. In Ontario and BC the appeal of the CCF was a more conventional class appeal directed to the industrial working class. Thus the impact of age on class would be expected to be most marked in areas where class voting is the highest. Also, those groups which are culturally modal such as English speaking Protestants outside Quebec are expected to have higher levels of class voting and thus the impact of age on class voting should be more

readily ascertainable.

Any way class is measured and within any population examined there is no clearcut relationship between class voting and age. Similarly, examination of age distinctions in CCF-NDP support among farmers and non-farmers in the prairies does not reveal any pattern.

There is some evidence that attitudes towards unions become better predictors of vote with age. In this regard it is interesting to note that union membership is a better predictor of CCF-NDP vote than other measures of class.

In some instances the nature of the data limits the exploration of the relationship between class voting and age. For example, it would be interesting to analyze the political behaviour of the Depression generation in Saskatchewan but the size of the sample within the province renders this impossible.

The lack of results in the data examined suggest not that class voting is non-existent but rather that the mechanisms posited in the models of aging are inoperative or weak in the Canadian context. The life cycle model suggests that continuing socialization into a working class environment yields increased attachment to the party associated with that class. But in Canada

NDP support is a minority position even within the working class. Thus increased attachment to the NDP due to socialization may not occur. Perhaps because of this, there is a greater amount of switching in and out of the NDP than there is of the Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives, and a lower proportion of NDP identifiers have never changed their party identification than have supporters of other parties. Since generational effects depend on the persistence of party attachments over time perhaps the weakness of the generational effects that have been found is not that surprising. Thus if the oft referred to volatility of Canadian electoral behaviour is real, possible generational effects may be washed away. The weakness of a class voting in the society as a whole suggests that any class effect would be minor.

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Party Identification and Age

An important thrust in the study of electoral politics has been analysis of the distinction between short- and long-term forces affecting the voting decision. While electoral results can be seen as the outcome of decisions taken at one point in time, it is obvious that there is a good deal of continuity in a party's sources of support over time. For example, in Canada the Liberal party has continued as the dominant party in the province of Quebec over most of this century. Observing such continuing patterns political scientists have attempted not only to analyze the effect of particular issues or candidates on single elections but also to assess the impact of long-term forces on the voting decision. At the individual level, one of the most fruitful concepts used to obtain an understanding of these long-term forces is that of party identification. The existence of high levels of party identification in a political system can serve to strengthen the electoral stability of the political system. If a large proportion of the electorate has an enduring attachment to a party the electorate will be less susceptible to the appeals of demagogues and the rise of flash parties will be prevented.

In the United States, in particular, party identification has become a useful (if not the predominant) concept in the study of voting behaviour. Inspired in part by the work of V.O. Key who refers to the "standing decision" of the American electorate to support one party or another, the importance of party identification has been expounded most fully by Angus Campbell, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes of the University of Michigan. Party identification is the cornerstone of their analysis in The American Voter and other works. Party identification is seen as the fundamental mechanism by which voters order their political universe and an important determinant of their involvement in politics. Its impact on vote and positions on issues is analyzed. Even though the period observed in the American Voter, the nineteen fifties, showed dramatic variation in the level of party support (for example when comparing the Republican Presidential victory in 1956 with the Democratic congressional victory in 1958), party identification remains the prime determinant of the vote. (1) Similarly, party identification is strongly related to positions on domestic issues and attitudes towards the candidate in both the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. The electorate's stand on foreign policy was also affected by partisan identification although not to the degree as were other

issues.(2)

Partisanship is seen as a psychological attachment fundamental to a voter's political identity. In a more recent summary of the "Michigan View" of the authors of the American Voter Warren Miller compares partisan attachment to religious attachment. Like a communicant observing religious ritual without necessarily understanding, "a citizen who identifies with a political party comes to know habitually if not instinctively what to do on election day." (3) In large part, party identification is the result of childhood socialization, as the degree of congruence between the respondents' identification and that of their parents was high. But factors such as personal and social changes as well as generational factors had an effect on party identification.

Party identification has traditionally had two elements: direction and intensity. Direction in the United States is either Republican or Democratic and intensity ranges from independent to strong Republican or Democrat. In the American two-party system both direction and intensity can be ordered on one dimension from strong Republican to strong Democrat. While classical democratic theory had posited that the independent voter would be the best informed and the most concerned with politics, in fact the level of

interest in politics is higher among identifiers and higher yet among strong identifiers.(4)

But the findings reported in The American Voter are bound both by time and place. More recent studies of party identification in the United States using data from the 1960's and 1970's have altered the original picture of the nature of party identification obtained from the analysis of data gathered in the 1950's.

Norman H. .Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik for example show that in the seventies fewer Americans have a partisan identification, that partisan identification is less likely to be passed on to children and that partisan identification is a less accurate predictor of the vote.(5)

Out of the analysis of party identification the strategy of normal vote analysis was developed. The normal vote "is simply the vote that would have been cast if partisan identification were the only political factor relevant to partisan vote choice." (6) In an early discussion of the concept Converse hypothesizes that responsiveness to short term forces would vary inversely with the strength of party identification and that short-term forces will be less effective in changing the direction of the vote of strong identifiers than of others. Analysis proceeds by examination of the deviations from the normal vote

model caused by short term forces. Knowing the overall level of partisan identification in the electorate, a prediction can be made about the division of the vote when short-term electoral forces are of various strengths.(7)

Given the success of the use of party identification in the American context and the predominance of American based electoral studies within the discipline, it is not surprising that attempts were made to use the concept in other national contexts. But before examining the use of party identification in other political systems and particularly in Canada it is worthwhile to note several factors in the United States which facilitate the use of party identification. To be a useful concept, party identification must be distinct from the vote itself. This implies that changes in vote must not necessarily entail changes in party identification. Were party identification identical to the vote examination of the deviations from it would be impossible. Since the American institutional framework requires voters to cast votes for different offices and at different levels of government simultaneously, a strict identity between vote and partisan identification becomes more difficult. Also, primary elections in most instances require voters to declare themselves as either Democrats or Republicans, thus encouraging people to

think of themselves in party terms. Finally, the two-party system in the United States simplifies the use of partisan identification yielding a single continuum combining intensity and direction of party identification..

Considering these factors it is not surprising that the utility of party identification has varied from one political system to another. The degree of usefulness of the concept is related to the proportion of the population having a party identification and to whether party identification is distinct from the vote itself. In Britain, David Butler and Donald Stokes report that 90% of the electorate is willing to categorize itself in terms of party identification.(8) But in comparing the United States and Britain they note the institutional factors which affect the meaning of party identification in the two countries:(9)

On polling day the British electors vote only for a single office at a single level of government. The American has to cope with a vast collection of partisan candidates seeking a variety of offices at federal, state and local levels: it is small wonder that he becomes conscious of a generalized belief about his ties to party, although some of his individual choices are not tied to it.

Partly because of this, they find that party identification is far less stable in Britain than in the United States. While in the United States 30 per cent of those who changed their vote changed their identification, in Britain 61 per cent did so.(10) Similarly in Norway, a country with a unitary parliamentary system, Angus Campbell and Henry Valen find comparable levels of identification to the United States(11) and a greater relationship between partisanship and vote than in the United States.(12)

While studies of partisan identification in Norway and Britain show high levels of partisan identification, in France, Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux find much lower levels of party identification than in the United States. In the United States 75% of the population has a party identification; in France only about 45% of the electorate has a similar identification.(13) Converse and Dupeux's explanation of the low level of partisan identification among the French focusses on the nature of socialization in the family. Because the French are less aware than are Americans of the partisanship of their fathers, the inheritance of party identification is low. David Cameron and Laura Summers present a critique of this explanation of the low levels of partisanship (14). They contend that the undersampling of lower class voters in Converse and Dupeux's study would omit

Communist voters who would be more likely to identify with their party. They also note that the lower levels of education of the French would account for most of the difference in levels of partisanship between the United States and France. Also, they make the case that partisanship is not equivalent between the two countries. In France personalities such as de Gaulle serve as a non-partisan mode of mobilizing the electorate. But although the strength of the Gaullist party cannot be attributed to family socialization, Cameron and Summers argue that in retrospect the party has proved to be a durable phenomenon.

In the Netherlands Jacques Thomassen finds the concept of the direction of partisan identification of limited, if any, utility. Using data from a panel study he finds that party identification is less stable than the vote and is not causally prior to the vote. Thomassen posits that the difference between vote and partisan identification can be explained in terms of measurement unreliability. (15)

The discussion of the relationship between the strength of party identification and age entails a consideration of the different conceptualizations of party identification, since the study of party identification in comparative perspective has entailed some redefinition of the concept. This redefinition of

party identification reflects not only differences at the individual level but also differences in the party systems and histories of particular countries.

A study of party identification in Germany in 1969 by Max Kaase suggests that party identification is merely another element in an individual's belief system(16). Similarly in the Netherlands, Thommassen reported that his findings can be explained in terms of measurement reliability, that is that vote and party identification are both indicators of the same thing. Using this conception of party identification there is no reason to hypothesize that age will yield higher levels of party identification.

The American Voter conceptualization of party identification is that of a psychological attachment often inherited from parents. The authors hypothesize that this psychological attachment becomes stronger with the length of time it has been held. Examining those who have changed party identification at some point in time reveals that the longer the duration since the change, the greater the intensity of party identification. Thus to the extent that age serves as a surrogate indicator of the duration of identification, the old will be more intense in their identification. However, it is also posited that the ability to absorb new identification slows with

age. (17)

Another view of party identification is put forth by Arthur Goldberg who views it as a rational guide to party preference. Goldberg makes the point that this conception of party identification is not necessarily incompatible with the psychological conception of partisanship and that "affectively conditioned party identification learned in childhood might prove a rationally sound guide when examined in adulthood" (18). Goldberg posits that if an individual shares the norms of the group these norms will produce effective rationality with regard to group goals. Education is seen as a factor increasing rationality by reducing the costs of information. Goldberg finds that the predictions derived from the rational model of party identification are confirmed although the strength of the association is not that strong. (19)

Hypotheses about the relationship between age either as an indicator of the life cycle or of generation depend on the conceptualization of party identification. If party identification is solely an indicator of short-term liking for a party or just an alternate indicator of vote, there is no particular reason for age differences in the strength of party identification to exist from either a generational or a life cycle perspective.

On the other hand, if party identification is an enduring psychological attachment, hypotheses relating age and party identification can be derived from both models of age. The life cycle model suggests that this psychological attachment is strengthened over time. The authors of the American Voter relate duration since change in party identification to its strength. A generational perspective suggests that changes in the process of socialization into partisan attachment will cause different levels of attachment to parties among different age groups. In relating a psychological view of strength of partisanship and its relationship with age, authors such as Norval Glenn and Paul Abramson contend that it is due to a generational effect. They take the position that the lower levels of partisanship among the young are due to changes in the nature of the political socialization of the young. As Abramson puts it, "This analysis strongly suggests that the relatively weak party identifications among the young result from fundamental differences between their socialization and that of their elders." (20)

If party identification is viewed as having a rational basis as a means of economizing on the effort spent on voting, plausible hypotheses relating age to the strength of party identification can also be suggested. Presumably, if party identification continues to serve as a useful aide in making the

voting decision, the voter will be willing to rely on it increasingly with time. M. Kent Jennings' finding of increased attachment to parties among older voters in the Netherlands suggests a life cycle explanation:

"The more often the voter reaffirms his conviction by supporting the party at the polls, and the more accustomed his perceptual and coding devices become to handling information about the parties in a standard fashion, the more entrenched becomes his attachment to party." (21) A generational perspective suggests that those whose party identification was formed in a period in which party identification was a useful cue will be more likely to continue to identify strongly with that party.

W. Phillips Shively, using a functional model of party identification in which party identification is analyzed as a means of lessening information costs, examines the strengthening of party identification over the life cycle. (22) Shively contends that there is an increase in partisanship with age but that this increase is related to the need to reduce information costs. Less educated people for whom information costs are higher have greater increases in party identification with age than do the more highly educated. Partisan identification serves as an alternative to education as a means of lessening information costs. (23)

Party identification as a psychological identification and as a rational cueing device are not necessarily mutually incompatible. Elements of both views may be present at the same time. The socialization process may create a party identification which is in fact a rational guide to voting behaviour. On the other hand a party identification which originated as the rational means of lessening information costs, if maintained over a long period of time, may be difficult to change even when it no longer serves its original purpose.

The nature of party identification in particular countries is determined in large part by the characteristics of the political system and particularly of the party system in that country. One dimension of this is institutional. In the United States with elections for various offices occurring simultaneously it is easier to think of party identification as distinct from the vote. But, historical circumstances and the clarity with which parties differentiate themselves on issues also have an impact on the development of party identification. W. Phillips Shively examines predictions about electoral behaviour derived from what he refers to as "the party identification theory of electoral stability" to explain political instability in the Weimar Republic(24). This theory predicts that groups with

weak party identification such as the young will provide a disproportionate amount of support for new parties. But the analysis based on aggregate data does not support the predictions of the theory. This Shively hypothesizes is because party identification did not develop in Weimar. In general he posits that:(25)

If the social or economic conflicts in which a voter is involved are sufficiently clear; and the position of parties or groups of parties with regard to these conflicts is sufficiently clear; then there is no need for the voter to develop lasting ties to any party per se, and he will not do so.

Presumably, had voters been asked during the Weimar era whether they identified with a party some would have responded affirmatively. But this identification would not have been distinct from the vote and would only have indicated a liking for a political party at that point in time.

Shively's hypothesis relating the nature of the political system to the presence of party identification is clearly one in which party identification is conceptualized as a means of information economization. To state his hypothesis in

a slightly different manner: if other cues are available partisanship is not necessary. In Weimar political parties were characterized by sharp differences in policy and differences in the sources of support. In such a situation a party identification distinct from vote would be unnecessary.

Historical circumstances in different political systems will also help determine the likelihood that party identification as a psychological identification will develop. Dramatic discontinuities in the functioning of the party system occurring with defeat in war or the suspension of democracy will affect the process of development of party identification.

Converse and Dupeux attributed the low level of party identification in France compared to that of the United States to a breakdown in political socialization within the French family. In a later article entitled "Of Time and Partisan Stability" Converse attempts to predict the levels of party identification in five countries: United States, Britain, Italy, Germany and Mexico, using individual level characteristics as modified by national circumstances. (26) Two primary processes are involved, a learning process and a transmission process. Two secondary processes are also involved, a resistance phenomenon implying declining ability to learn with age and a forgetting process involving the decay in identification with age. It is

assumed that learning occurs with continuing experience in the party system. The five countries involved consist of two stable democracies, the United States and Britain, two countries in which democracy had been at some point in time disrupted, Italy and Germany, and one new democracy. The disruption of democracy in countries such as Italy and Germany is incorporated in the model as a factor reducing the voters' years of eligibility to vote and causing decay of previous party identification. Party identification is both learned and inherited from the father. The strength of inheritance from the father depends on the strength of the father's partisan identification which in turn is due to the father's length of eligibility. In this manner historical circumstances are incorporated into the model. Converse obtains accurate predictions of the aggregate level of party identification in the countries examined.

Thus it can be seen that macro-level characteristics can affect the development of party identification whether it is conceptualized as psychological attachment or as a tool for information economizing. But the nature of party identification as well as its intensity may vary not only between political systems but also within them. Shively examines the partisanship of those leaning towards either the Democratic or the Republican party. For

these people it seems that partisanship is not distinct from the vote but rather tends to change with a change in vote.(27) The analysis of generational changes in the intensity of partisanship in the United States and of generational changes in the ability of partisanship to predict vote suggests that a change in the type of partisanship may be present. Given these considerations what suggestions can be derived about the nature of party identification in Canada?

In Canada the usefulness of the concept of party identification has been the subject of a good deal of debate. On one hand the position has been taken that Canadian electoral behaviour is so volatile that the examination of party identification is futile. John Meisel contends that the concept of party identification may be inapplicable in Canada as "party identification seems to be as volatile in Canada as the vote itself." (28) Were this the case party identification would be solely an indicator of liking for party.

Jon Pammett, in a study of the partisan orientations of school children in Kingston, finds that only half as many grade four children have a party orientation as Greenstein had found in New Haven. Pammett hypothesizes that politics may be less salient for Canadians than for citizens of other countries.(29)

Childhood socialization into partisan identification would suggest that party identification is a psychological attachment. Pammett's finding indicates that there are some Canadians for whom psychological attachment exists but that they are a smaller proportion of the population than in the United States.

Paul M. Sniderman, H.D. Forbes and Ian Melzer deal with the question of party identification in Canada and the corollary question of the degree of electoral volatility in Canada in an article entitled "Party Loyalty and Electoral Volatility". They attack what they refer to as the "textbook theory of Canadian politics" which contends that support for parties in Canada is highly volatile because Canadians lack strong party loyalties which do not exist because of the similarity of positions taken by parties. They find the levels of party identification in Canada to be slightly lower than those in the United States or Britain but much higher than those in France. While party identification is a strong predictor of vote, it is not identical to the vote itself as there is a certain deviation from identification in vote. They also note that the generally high level of inheritance of party identification from parents suggests that party identification is an enduring phenomenon. They conclude that "party identification is a useful concept in the analysis of the vote in Canada." (30)

While the distinction between party identification as a device for information economization and as a psychological attachment is not discussed, it seems clear that the emphasis on factors such as inheritance of identification⁷ from parents suggests that it is viewed as a psychological identification.

Jane Jenson examines the usefulness of the concept of party identification in Canada particularly with regard to the changes which occurred in the Diefenbaker era. Diefenbaker's leadership of the Progressive Conservative party resulted in changes in party positions with regard to social welfare and the regional distribution of the benefits of government as well as a reinforcement of the party's attachment to the British connection. These changes in party policy caused a switch away from conservative party identification among those in the central provinces, among those of non-British origin, and among the French speaking. This willingness to change identification in response to changing party positions indicates that at least to a certain degree party identification is a rational device for economizing on information. She notes that in such an era characterized by "mobile and manouevering" parties the concept of party identification may be a weak predictor of the vote and require some reformulation. (31)

The controversy about the utility of the concept of party identification has implications for a variety of broader issues in the study of Canadian politics. Clearly the stability of the party system will affect the ability of the citizenry to develop an enduring attachment. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that if a party maintains its support among certain groups over a long period of time the mechanism of family political socialization will be able to develop, creating a psychological attachment to parties. Conversely, an electorate without strong allegiances to political parties may in turn limit the role political parties are able to play.. The ability of party leadership to influence the electorate's views on issues will be limited too if loyalties to parties are weak. Thus trends increasing or decreasing the strength of party identification may be associated with the general development of, and importance of the party system.

In the United States there exists an extensive but conflicting literature on the relationship between party identification and age. The initial work dealing with the relationship between the strength of party identification and age is the The American Voter. Using cross-sectional data the authors make the life cycle argument that party identification becomes stronger with age due to the greater length that the attachment has been held.(32)

Paul Abramson and Norval Glenn in later analyses using quasi-longitudinal data from 1952 on contend that the relationship between age and strength of partisanship is due to a generational effect. They take the position that the lower level of partisanship among the young is due to changes in the nature of the political socialization of the young. (33)

Phillip Converse puts forward a rejoinder to the generational view in a book length work entitled Cohort Analyzing Party Identification. The essence of Converse's position is that consideration of the relationship between age and the strength of party identification must take into account varying historical circumstances rather than treating the entire post 1952 period as a unified whole. He divides the time span into a "steady state" period which extends to 1964 and the period after 1964. (34) Converse argues that the impact of the Viet Nam war and a high level of racial conflict, particularly in 1965, resulted in a feeling of betrayal yielding an uncertainty about national leadership that transcended party lines. (35) In the steady state period the overall strength of party identification in the population as a whole remains constant. In this period the old have higher levels of party identification due to a life cycle effect increasing partisanship with age. After 1964 there is a dramatic decrease in the overall levels

of party identification in the population. This Converse shows is due in part to a generational effect with the new voters having much lower levels of party identification but also due to a period effect with the strength of party identification declining among all age groups.

Generational hypotheses about the relationship between age and the strength of party identification relate historical circumstances to the development of party identification. If in some period groups are closely tied to particular parties party identification will be unnecessary as a device for economizing on information. Increasing levels of education among younger cohorts would also tend to lessen the need for party identification. Were this the case it can be hypothesized that the young will have lower levels of party identification.

While the focus here is not primarily on the examination of the nature of party identification, the conceptualization of party identification determines in part the circumstances under which age will have an effect on strength of identification and in turn findings on the relationship between age and strength of identification will have implications for the conceptualization of party identification. Jenson's analysis of party identification as a rational

allegiance responding to changes in party positions suggests that it may be necessary to divide the Canadian electorate into groups with regard to how they might have been affected by the changes in Conservative party position during the Diefenbaker era. Those whose party identification changed during the Diefenbaker era would start having the strength of their party identification reinforced at that point in time. In other words an individual who changed his party identification in 1960 might have maintained that identification until 1974 and thus have accumulated 14 years eligibility and might have the same level of intensity of identification as someone who had been in the electorate for 14 years would have had controlling for the lower rate of absorption of new loyalties with age. Given these considerations, the examination of party identification in Canada requires examination of particular circumstances or various sub-groups in the population. For lower class people of British origin living in peripheral provinces, Diefenbaker's leadership of the Conservative party should not have caused a switching away from Conservative party identification. But for other groups this era may have caused changes in party identification and thus the strengthening of party identification posited to occur with duration of attachment would have to recommence.

D

The data base available for the direct analysis of age and party identification in Canada (as opposed to recall data) is only nine years, from 1965 to 1974. Using Converse's terminology, can we categorize this period as a steady state era or a period of dramatic change? Clearly the period of greatest change in Canadian federal politics since the Second World War was the Diefenbaker epoch. As Jane Jenson shows, his leadership of the Progressive Conservative party caused a loss of Conservative identifiers among those of non-British descent, among Francophones and among voters in the central provinces due to changes in emphasis in party policy. (36) It would seem unlikely that the leadership of Robert Stanfield resulted in similar switches in party support. Thus while the 1965-1974 period has seen marked fluctuations in party support it may be a relatively calm period compared to the decade preceding it.

The data presented in Appendix A tend to support this contention. The proportion of strong, fairly strong and weak identifiers at the federal level as well as non-identifiers is presented at three points in time: 1965, 1968 and 1974. The percentage of the electorate at each level of identification is remarkably constant with some overall increase in the proportion of identifiers. While this apparent consistency may conceal numerous individual changes it

suggests that the kind of phenomena operative in the United States are not present in Canada. At least in this period there is no massive turning away from identification with political parties due to a loss of confidence in political leadership in Canada.

It is instructive to comment on the implications of the trend towards higher levels of party identification for the relationship between age and strength of partisanship. A trend towards stronger party identification suggests that if a generational effect is present the young brought up in an era of strengthening partisanship should have stronger attachments to party than the old. This growth in the strength of party identification occurs almost solely among those who are very strong in their identification.

- The first step in the analysis will be to examine the levels of strong partisan identification within age groups at three points in time. Given the debate about the weakness of partisan identification in Canada, at least when compared to the United States, it may be the case that those claiming only moderate or weak attachment to parties are similar to those who are 'leaners' in the American context. For these people partisan identification would merely be a transitory emotional tie. Therefore, analysis will concentrate on

the development of strong identification which would be more likely to be the kind of enduring attachment affected by age.

Table 1 contains proportions of strong identifiers at the federal level arranged by cohort. Because the points in time at which the measurements are taken are not equally far apart the widths of the cohorts must be arranged accordingly. Thus the data arranged at two points in time (1965 and 1974) with cohorts of equal widths is also presented in Appendix B. In 11 of 12 instances in Table 1 there is an increase in the strength of identification with party as a cohort ages. The data in Appendix B reveal a similar pattern. A trend towards higher levels of identification over the period examined is evident. Thus to correct for this trend the pattern of deviations from the mean is also examined. The results remain essentially the same with nine instances of increase compared to three of decrease. This result holds in the presentation of data made in appendix B.

Table 1
Strength of Party Identification
At the Federal Level

Date of Birth	1965	1968	1974 (37)
-1895	35.3 (13.0)	42.7 (19.4)	
1896-1905	30.6 (8.3)	31.9 (8.6)	43.3 (16.8)
1906-1915	26.2 (3.9)	26.0 (2.7)	33.8 (7.3)
1916-1925	21.9 (-.4)	23.5 (+.2)	32.0 (5.5)
1926-1935	17.4 (-4.9)	22.6 (-.7)	24.2 (-2.3)
1936-1944	15.3 (-7.0)	15.7 (-7.4)	24.9 (-1.6)
1945-1947		15.1 (-7.2)	21.7 (-4.8)
1948-1956			18.2 (-8.3)
mean	22.3	23.3	26.5
Tau c=	.14*	.14*	.16*
n=	2097	2767	2437

(An Asterisk indicates significance at the .05 level)

period over which that identification continues to be an information economizing device. Among French Canadians for whom Progressive Conservative party identification became a less rational tool the strengthening of identification with age was less marked.

Table 5
Relationship between Age and Intensity Of Partisanship
Of Progressive Conservative Identifiers.
Within Various Sub Groups

	(1965)
	(Tau C)
All Identifiers	
Peripheral British	.29*
n=	349
French Canadians	.12
n=	63
Unchanged Identification	
Peripheral British	.29*
n=	234
French Canadians	.21
n=	39

Another test of the relationship between age and strength of identification would be at the provincial level. The relationship between age and strength of identification at the provincial level in Ontario, for

strength of partisanship is due to the fact that the duration of the partisanship of the old will be longer. But among those who have changed their partisanship age will not necessarily be related to duration of partisanship and therefore age should not be related to the strength of party identification.

Thus it would be expected that the relationship between age and strength of party identification would be stronger among those who had never been closer to another party. Table 2 contains statistics of the level of association between age and strength of party identification at three points in time among the population as a whole, among those who had never changed their identification, and among those who had changed their identification. In each instance as expected the relationship is stronger among the consistent identifiers. There is a statistically significant relationship between age and strength of identification in all instances. This tends to support the view that duration of identification creates strength of identification. This was the case with levels of identification among the electorate as a whole a cohort analysis of levels of strong identification among those who have never changed their identification reveals an increase in the proportion of strong identifiers with age between 1965 and 1974. This data is presented in Appendix C.

Table 2

Relationship between Age
And
Strength of Identification
By
Constancy of Attachment
(Tau C)

	1965	1968	1974
All Identifiers	.14*	.14*	.19*
n=	2097	2767	2034
Constant			
Identifiers	.20*	.21*	.22*
n=	1008	1433	1321
Once Closer			
To Other Party	.14*	.12*	.12*
n=	616	797	674

It would also be expected that among those who had changed their party affiliation the length of time since that change would be related to the strength of partisan identification. Table 3 presents the association between strength of partisan identification and length of time since change. In all instances those for whom the period is longer have stronger identification. In 1965 and 1968 this relationship is stronger than the relationship between age and strength.

of partisanship among changers at that point in time. Again this finding tends to confirm the view that strength of partisan identification is related to duration of attachment and is thus a life cycle effect. While it might be the case that some generational phenomenon was responsible for creating an apparent relationship between strength and partisan identification in the period before 1965, it would seem unlikely that a generational effect could create the observed relationship between strength of identification and time since change in identification.

Table 3

Relationship between Strength of Identification

And

Time Since Change in Identification

(Tau C)

	1965	1968	1974
	.17*	.16*	.08*
n=	558	677	608

Another factor which is an inherent part of the relationship between strength of party identification and age is the direction of the identification, that is the party identified with. Among identifiers with the two main parties the relationship between age and strength of identification is stronger among those who say that they have never felt closer to another party.

While age is related to strength of identification among NDP supporters, the relationship is weaker than that among the two main parties and in two of three instances the relationship is stronger among all NDP supporters than among the constant identifiers. Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix D contain the proportions of those identifying with the three parties who have never been closer to another party in 1965, 1968 and 1974 respectively. In each case a lower proportion of NDP supporters have never felt closer to another than did identifiers of the Liberal or Progressive Conservative party. This may reflect a fluidity in NDP support which would account for the lower level of the relationship between age and party identification among NDP party supporters.

Table 4
Relationship Between Strength
Of Partisanship and Age
(Tau C)

All Identifiers

	1965	1968	1974
Liberals	.15*	.15*	.21*
n=	768	1254	1177
Progressive Conservatives	.23*	.24*	.15*

n=	539	641	555
New Democrats	.19	.07-	.20*
n=	206	266	227

Among those who have never been closer to
Another Party

Liberals	.23*	.18*	.24*
----------	------	------	------

n=	508	796	795
----	-----	-----	-----

Progressive

Conservatives	.21*	.28*	.20*
---------------	------	------	------

n=	348	445	354
----	-----	-----	-----

New Democrats	.15	.11	.18
---------------	-----	-----	-----

n=	88	129	126
----	----	-----	-----

All Parties

Overall	.14*	.13*	.14*
---------	------	------	------

n=	2097	2767	2034
----	------	------	------

Constants	.20*	.20*	.22
-----------	------	------	-----

n=	1008	1433	1321
----	------	------	------

The level of association between intensity of partisan identification and partisanship within parties should also be related to the social and ethnic characteristics of the voters. The Diefenbaker era resulted in a loosening of ties between the Progressive Conservative party and some groups but the reaffirmation of ties between the party and other groups. Among lower class voters of British origin

living in peripheral provinces Progressive Conservative identification should have been strengthened or undisturbed. Thus it would be expected that the relationship between age and the intensity of partisan identification would be strongest amongst those who were members of groups to which the Progressive Conservatives had reaffirmed their ties and weakest among groups with which the Progressive Conservatives had weakened their ties. In a group with which ties had been strengthened age would be a better indicator of time during which the tie had existed undisturbed. Table 5 reports the strength of the relationship between intensity of partisan identification and age among all Progressive Conservative party identifiers, among unchanged Progressive Conservative party identifiers, among voters of British origin in peripheral provinces and among French Canadians in 1965. In 1965 the effect of Diefenbaker on the electorate was still fresh. These are groups in which the relationship between age and strength of partisanship should be strong and weak respectively. As expected, the relationship between strength of attachment and age is stronger in the polar pro-Conservative groups whether identification among constants or among all voters is considered. This would seem to indicate that the relationship between age and strength of party identification is due to the

period over which that identification continues to be an information economizing device. Among French Canadians for whom Progressive Conservative party identification became a less rational tool the strengthening of identification with age was less marked.

Table 5
Relationship between Age and Intensity Of Partisanship
Of Progressive Conservative Identifiers.
Within Various Sub Groups

	(1965)
	(Tau C)
All Identifiers	
Peripheral British	.29*
n=	349
French Canadians	.12
n=	63
Unchanged Identification	
Peripheral British	.29*
n=	234
French Canadians	.21
n=	39

Another test of the relationship between age and strength of identification would be at the provincial level. The relationship between age and strength of identification at the provincial level in Ontario, for

example, would be much less affected by changes in identification caused by Diefenbaker's policies than would the relationship at the federal level. The continuing strength of the Progressive Conservative party in Ontario and the continuity of leadership within that party suggests that the relationship between age and strength of identification among Ontario Conservative identifiers should be particularly strong. Without dramatic changes in party position, partisan identification remains a useful cue for voting and thus should be intensified with time and continued use. Table 6 presents the strength of the relationship between intensity of identification and age among all identifiers in Ontario and among partisans of each of the three main parties. While the relationship is invariably in the direction expected, it is much stronger among Progressive Conservative identifiers and only among them is it statistically significant. This indicates that it is not age itself so much as duration over which partisanship has proved a useful guide to voting that causes intensification of identification.

Table 6

Relationship Between Age and Intensity
Of Identification in Ontario

	1965	1974
All Identifiers	.17*	.12
n=	486	547
Progressive Conservatives	.26*	.23*
n=	204	214
Liberals	.15	.05
n=	205	252
NDP	.08	.14
n=	71	79

In spite of the difference in party systems at the federal and provincial levels the proportion of cross-level identifiers, that is those identifying with the same party at both levels, does increase with age as shown in Appendix E. But, as would be expected given the frequent lack of congruence between federal and provincial parties, the relationship is weaker than the relationship at a single level.

Thus far the approach taken to party identification has been based on the view that party identification is, at least in part, a device for information economizing which, if it continues to be

useful over time will strengthen. The finding that party identification tends to be stronger among those who have never changed their identification and among groups towards which party positions have been consistently favourable over a period of time tends to support this view of the nature of party identification. Other predictions can be made about party identification which have relevance to the relationship between age and the strength of party identification. Arthur Goldberg, in dealing with party identification as a rational tool, showed that education could be seen as an alternative to party identification as a source of information about politics. Therefore more highly educated people would have less need for party identification. The data in both 1965 and 1974 support this hypothesis, with poorly educated people having a stronger identification with a political party. (see Appendix F) But as W. Phillips Shively illustrates the strength of party identification may also be related to the individual's motivation to become involved in politics. After all, the citizen who has no desire to vote needs neither information about politics nor party identification as a guide. This suggests that those who are more interested in politics will be more likely to identify with a party particularly if they are poorly educated. As the data in Appendix F reveal, both in 1965 and in

1974 those with high levels of interest in politics and low education are more likely to identify strongly with a party.

The fact that education and interest in politics are related to strength of identification may have implications for the relationship between age and strength of identification. Since levels of participation increase with age, due to factors associated with the life cycle, it would be expected that there is a higher proportion of old people who are interested in politics. But also, the level of education decreases with age due to generational factors affecting the availability of education. Therefore it might be expected that the proportion of those with high interest and low education will increase with age.

Therefore, it would be expected that controlling for education and interest in politics would decrease the relationship between age and intensity of party identification. Using partial correlation to control for education and interest it is possible to compare the strength of controlled and uncontrolled relationships. As predicted, the data in Table 7 show a decrease in the strength of the relationship between age and intensity when controlling for interest in politics and level of education although the

relationship remains significant. As noted above, the increase in partisanship is affected by the party system; where particular parties have been consistent in their positions vis-a-vis particular groups, partisanship is more likely to develop with age. Thus the question arises of the impact of education and interest in politics within particular groups. The examination of the age/intensity relationship among federal Progressive Conservative identifiers in peripheral provinces and among Ontario Progressive Conservatives at the provincial level, groups of voters who have shown greater increases in identification with age, shows that the initial pattern is preserved in most cases. That is, even when controlling for education and interest in politics the relationship within these groups remains stronger than within the electorate as a whole. In general, the pattern of decrease in the age/intensity relationship when controlling for education and interest in politics is also maintained. Thus, it seems that the relationship between age and strength is responsive both to information resources at the individual level, as measured by education to interest in politics, as well as to the behaviour of political parties in terms of the continuity of support and the positions taken.

Table 7
 The Relationship Between Strength
 Of Identification and Age
 Controlling for Education, Interest in Politics
 (Pearson Correlation)

	1965	1974
uncontrolled	.15*	.15*
controlling for:		
education	.13*	.12*
Interest in politics	.14*	.13*
education and		
interest in politics	.11*	.08*
n=	1553	2024

Among Progressive Conservative Identifiers
 Of British Origin
 Living in Peripheral Provinces

uncontrolled	.24*	.14*
Controlling for:		
education	.20*	.12*
interest in politics	.25*	.12*
education,		
interest in politics	.19*	.09*
n=	172	207

Among Progressive Conservative Identifiers

In Ontario

(Provincial Identification)

Uncontrolled	.23*	.23*
Controlling for:		
Education	.25*	.22*
Interest in politics	.24*	.19*
Education, interest in politics	.24*	.17*
n=	202	213

Clearly, while the results support the aging-party attachment hypothesis the direct examination of the effect of age on strength of partisanship has been limited by the short time span available. Therefore it is necessary to observe the primary behavioural consequence of party identification: constancy of vote. In the data sets to be used, measures of present vote or vote intention as well as the previous vote are available, therefore constancy will be measured as voting for the same party in two elections. Logically, those who identify strongly with a party would be less likely to change their vote from one election to another. Thus, if the old identify more strongly with political parties than do the young they should show greater constancy in their vote. More generally, greater constancy of the old would be predicted from the hypothesis that the old are more reluctant to

4

change their behaviour. Using constancy of vote as an indicator of strength of party identification permits observation of a much wider time span from 1945 to 1974.

The relationship between age and constancy of the vote at four points in time is presented in Table 8. At three of the four points the old have significantly greater constancy of the vote than have the young. Not surprisingly, constancy of the vote is strongly related to strength of party identification in 1965 and 1974, the surveys in which these measures are available. The proportions of people changing their vote varies dramatically over time. In 1945 with the emergence of the CCF and the Bloc Populaire only 69% of those voting at both points in time voted for the same party, while in 1955, nearing the end of the quiescent St. Laurent era, 89% of the voters were constant. As with the data using party identification as an indicator, the fact that constancy is greater among the older age groups is congruent with the view that strength of partisanship increases with age. However, little can be said about the overall trends in levels of party identification from the evidence presented on constancy. The proportion of the electorate voting for the same party as it did in the previous election is determined in large part by the impact of short-term forces on the vote. A particularly attractive or unattractive

leader, an important issue, or a particularly well or poorly executed campaign may have an impact on the level of constancy of the vote. Therefore it would be more reasonable to explain the much higher level of constancy in 1955 as compared to 1945 as due to the nature of short-term forces at each point in time rather than as resulting from a dramatic increase in the level of party identification.

It is interesting to observe those in their twenties in 1955 and compare this group to those in their thirties in 1965. While in 1955 those in their twenties have high levels of constancy it is this group that has the most pronounced decline in partisanship between 1955 and 1965. But while it would be expected that this group might have high levels of constancy reflecting the quiescence of the era it would not have high levels of party identification due to its youth. Thus it would be particularly affected by the impact of Diefenbaker on the pattern of party support and show a dramatic decline in the level of constancy.

While the proportion of strong identifiers increased between 1965 and 1974 there is a slight decline in the proportion of constants between the two points in time. Given the availability of measures of party identification in 1965 and 1974, the question arises of the relationship between constancy and

strength of party identification within age groups. Between the two points there is an increase in the relationship between constancy and the strength of party identification. At both points in time, although particularly in 1974, the association is stronger in the older age groups. (see Appendix G) The increase of the impact of party identification on vote with age is congruent with the pattern of increasing strength of identification with age. If identification with a party over time proves useful, it seems reasonable to expect not only that an increasing proportion of the electorate will claim strong identification with a party but also that they will be more willing to use it as a guide to their voting behaviour.

Table 8
Proportion of Constant Voters
By Age

	1945	1955	1965	1974
21-29	61.6	91.0	79.1	72.0
N=	106	199	196	347
30-39	61.1	91.3	81.0	76.1
N=	330	355	353	345
40-49	65.3	85.9	84.1	79.9
N=	349	305	359	354
50-59	77.4	88.2	84.4	83.9
N=	281	368	237	274
60-69	81.7		85.5	81.7
N=	175		172	218
70+	70.8		91.7	86.9
N=	48		133	160
mean	69.0	89	83.6	79.1
N=	1288	1226	1450	1658

The concept of party identification implying a general attachment to party goes beyond consistency of vote. In order to get at this concept it is possible to examine congruence of vote and positions on issues in the 1945 and 1974 data sets as well as in another Gallup Poll not previously referred to which was taken in 1953. In the 1945 and 1953 polls respondents were asked which party could best handle various issues on 4

and 3 questions respectively as well as their present and past vote. The proportion of respondents voting for the same party on both occasions and naming it as the best party on all issues are presented in table 9. For the 1974 data set the procedure is similar although only one issue is used- the one the respondent defines as most important. (Those not voting in either election are excluded as well as those not taking a position on an issue) Using this more generalized measure of attachment to party than just consistency of vote shows that in 1945 and 1974 this measure is related to age.

Table 9

Constancy (votes, issues)

(1945, 1953, 1974)

	1945	1953	1974
21-29	75.7	66.4%	61.4%
n=	72	134	228
30-39	69.2	69.0	70.1
n=	241	281	204
40-49	74.3	73.4	71.7
n=	257	274	244
50-59	81.9	72.2	77.6
n=	218	277	174
60-69	84.3		71.3
n=	141		129
70+	81.3		79.3

n=	32	87	
mean	76.6	70.8	70.7
n=	960	966	1066
Tau c	.11	.05	.11

It is interesting to note that, in 1974 the levels of constancy (issues, votes) are affected in the same way as is party identification by high interest in politics combined with lack of information resources. The highest proportion of constants is among the group with high interest in politics and low education while the lowest proportion is among those with low interest and high education. (Appendix H) In the 1953 poll while a measure of interest in politics is available no measure of education is present. Alternative measures of availability of information which are present are occupation and wealth. Within each occupational or wealth category the more highly interested have higher levels of consistency. The impact of interest is highest and attains statistical significance among farmers and the poor groups which would have lower levels of information resources. Thus at both points in time there is some evidence that this measure of consistency combining vote and issue orientation acts in a manner similar to party identification.

Summary and Conclusions

Party identification was first developed as a research tool in the United States in the 1950's and was seen as an enduring psychological attachment to a political party. Research on the concept over time and in a variety of national contexts has shown that the original formulation of party identification was in some cases not useful or required reworking. In some instances, it was found party identification was merely an indicator of a transitory liking for a political party while in other cases party identification was a tool for information economization in the making of the voting decision.

The nature of the conceptualization of party identification determines in part the nature of the hypotheses that can be derived about the relationship between age and the intensity of party identification. If party identification is solely an indicator of liking for a party, there is little likelihood that it will be affected by age either as generation or as life cycle. On the other hand, party identification as psychological attachment may be strengthened with age and is likely to show the continuing imprint of historical circumstances. Similarly, party identification as a rational device for information

economization may become stronger after it is relied on over a period of time. The hypothesis relating age to strength of identification from a life cycle perspective is that strength of attachment will increase with the duration that the attachment is held and therefore the old will identify more strongly with political parties. A generational hypothesis suggests that the intensity of party identification will be affected by historical circumstances. In particular, there may be lower levels of identification among the younger cohorts due to alternative sources of information about politics such as television.

But observation of the aggregate levels of party identification over three points in time 1965, 1968 and 1974 reveals that there is a slight increase in the level of partisan identification. At each point in time the old have stronger party identification than do the young. This is the opposite of what would be predicted from the trend in the overall levels of party identification

But while this evidence supports a life cycle view, given the shortness of the time span observed it is necessary to examine the relationship between age and strength of identification in other ways. It is posited that intensity of identification will be related to duration of attachment; therefore for those

who have changed the direction of their identification, strength should be related to the length of time since change. The data supports this view since, among those who have changed the direction of identification at some point in time, strength is related to the period since change in identification.

Hypotheses can be derived from the model of party identification as a rational device that have relevance to the relationship between age and intensity. One set of such hypotheses deals with the impact of changes in the party system on the age/intensity relationship. Groups towards which a party has maintained a constant appeal should develop a stronger attachment to that party than do groups among which the appeal of the party has varied in strength. Thus the age/intensity relationship should be stronger among Progressive Conservatives of British origin living in peripheral provinces than among Francophone Progressive Conservative identifiers. The evidence supports the hypothesis. Similarly, in Ontario where the Progressive Conservative party has shown greater continuity of leadership the relationship is stronger among Progressive Conservative identifiers than among the identifiers of other parties or among the Canadian electorate as a whole in Ontario or federally.

Another prediction which can be derived from the conceptualization of party identification as a rational tool which has implications for the relationship between age and strength of identification relates identification to other information resources and to the motivation to participate. As the rational model would predict the proportion of strong identifiers is highest among those with low information resources and high motivation. Since the old have higher motivation to participate and lower information resources at least as measured by education these factors might play a part in the age/intensity relationship. Controlling for interest and education does reduce the relationship between age and interest although it remains significant. The impact of the variables related to the party system remains.

In order to expand the time span over which the relationship can be examined, constancy of vote, which should be related to strength of identification, is examined over the period from 1945 to 1974. In order to create a measure more similar to party identification than constancy of the vote, constancy of the vote is combined with orientation to towards parties on particular issues. There is an increase in constancy when measured in this way, with age.

Thus the evidence supports the view that strength of attachment is related to duration of attachment. Thus as duration is related to the life cycle it can be said that the strength and age relationship can be considered a life cycle phenomenon. However, the relationship is also affected by historical circumstances such as changes in party positions and thus, in a sense has a generational aspect. Similarly, the relationship is affected by the lower levels of education of the old which is clearly a generational factor.

The analysis of the impact of the changes in party positions on the age/intensity relationship and the impact of motivation and information resources tends to support the view that party identification is at least in part a rational phenomenon responsive to changing circumstances and that the intensity with which it is held is related to the time period over which it has been a useful guide.

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partisan identification differ in the manner in which
federal and provincial identification is assessed. In
1965 and 1968 respondents are first asked: "Generally
speaking do you think of yourself as

Conservative, Liberal . . .". They are subsequently
asked: "When you say you are (name of chosen party)

are you thinking of national politics, politics here in this province or both?" In the 1974 National Election Study there are separate questions assessing federal and provincial identification. Respondents are first asked: "Thinking of federal politics do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal". Then, in another part of the questionnaire respondents are asked a similar question on provincial identification.

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis has been to deal with the impact of age on various forms of political behaviour.. The analysis has sought to examine whether particular age differences were due to generational or life cycle effects. Where possible, the factors inherent in these age changes have been analyzed.

The concept of generation deals with the impact of historical circumstances on particular age groups. A generational explanation is predicated on the view that there is a certain formative period in life. According to the generational model the opinions or patterns of behaviour accepted in this period are in a sense imprinted on the individual for life. Thus in a generational explanation of age related differences these differences reflect the individual's place in the flow of history. Most typically great events such as wars, revolutions, Depressions, are thought of as the source of generational differences. However, it is also possible that gradual changes such as those caused by secularization or economic development can cause distinct generations. Whether generations are due to dramatic historical events or to more gradual changes, age from a generational perspective reflects the impact

of historical circumstances.

A life cycle explanation seeks to analyze age related differences as the result of changes inherent in the process of social aging. Greater experience in particular roles may result in a more complete congruence between social background and behaviour with age. Thus changes in roles such as occur with marriage or retirement may have an impact on political behaviour and may be the source of age differences in political behaviour. Particularly interesting in this regard is the hypothesized impact of the start-up and disengagement phenomena on political participation.

The start-up hypothesis suggests that at the beginning of the electoral life cycle individuals will be preoccupied with establishing themselves in careers, marriages, and residences. Because of this, their rates of political participation will be low. But as people settle into careers, families and residences in their twenties there will be an increase in the level of political participation. Disengagement theory deals with the severing of ties by the elderly and also has implications for the levels of political participation. Disengagement theory posits that the old will generally decrease their level of social interaction. This general disengagement will be reflected in the decline of the role of political participant. Another life cycle phenomenon to be examined is the accumulation of

experience and the effect of duration of holding attachments on the strength of attachment.

The impact of age on several dependent variables was analyzed. The initial dependent variable dealt with was political participation. While political participation can refer to a wide variety of activities including political violence, attention in this case was focussed on electoral participation. Research on the impact of age on campaign participation has generally emphasized the impact of life cycle factors such as the start-up phenomenon, disengagement and the gradual accumulation of experience. It has been generally found that the relationship between age and participation is a curvilinear one with an increase in participation until the fifties or sixties followed by a decline thereafter. Although the bulk of the literature suggests that the impact of age on participation was due to the life cycle, account was also taken of the possibility of a generational effect. To do so, the level of voting and the level of interest in politics was examined in the period from 1945 to 1974. There is no distinct generation with regard to these two measures but there is a general increase in participation with age. Having confirmed the general view of the impact of age on the level of participation, analysis proceeded by an examination of data from the 1974 National Election Study.

Examination of the effect of age on political participation using several questions on campaign activity as indicators reveals an increase in the level of participation with age up to and including the sixties followed by a decline in participation. The rate of increase in participation is greatest for those under thirty and gradually the rate of increase levels off. The nature of the indicator of participation used, that is whether it is an 'easy' or 'hard' item, has no discernable effect on the pattern of changes with age. The next stage in the analysis was to control for factors possibly causing a spurious relationship between the life cycle and political participation. The only control variable which had a consistent effect was education. When education was used as a control the relationship between age and participation increased.

The final stage in dealing with the impact of the life cycle on participation was to ascertain whether the changes in roles associated with the start-up and disengagement phenomenon have an effect. The analysis was hampered by lack of suitable indicators of roles. In dealing with the start-up phenomenon only the length of work experience has an effect; controlling for experience reduces the relationship between age and participation as expected. Unfortunately the value of this finding was limited by the fact that the question

on length of work experience was only available among manual workers.

The analysis of disengagement reveals that the decline in political participation with age is less rapid among those who remain married and in the work force. Thus there is evidence linking changes in roles that are associated with the life cycle with changes in participation. However the increase in the rate of participation with age occurs even without changes in roles indicating that increases in participation may be due to a gradual learning of the political role.

Probably the most frequently suggested hypothesis relating age to political behaviour is that the old are more conservative than are the young. From a life cycle perspective this conservatism is due to the attainment of positions of authority within society or to perception of threats resulting in a desire to cling more tightly to established values. The generational model posits that if history is progressive, changing from more to less conservative eras, the old will be conservative due to their relecting the values of past periods.

In testing the impact of these models two main types of conservatism are examined. The first is partisanship, that is support for the Progressive Conservative Party or lack of support for the NDP. The

second operationalization of conservatism uses questions on a variety of attitudinal items dealing with traditionalism and support for authority.

While initially it seemed that conservatism as partisanship was related to the life cycle, further analysis revealed that the pattern was affected by religious affiliation. Among Protestants age was associated with greater support for the Progressive Conservative Party but among Catholics support for the Liberals increased with age. What occurred was an increase in the effect of social background on partisanship with age. Similarly, in dealing with attitudes towards unions, it was found that rather than an increase in hostility towards unions with age, there was an increased impact of social background on attitudes. Unionists tended to become more pro-union with age while non-unionists became more anti-union with age. Other attitudes used as indicators of conservatism showed the old to be more conservative than the young due both to generational and to life cycle effects. However, age differences in attitudes were not substantial particularly when compared to changes associated with period effects. In most cases the attitudes of the old changed in the same direction as the population as a whole. What seems most significant is the increased congruence between attitude and social background that occurs with age.

rather than an ideological conservatizing effect.

Class voting reflects the polarization of society on class lines and the appeals political parties make on the basis of these cleavages. Hypotheses about the impact of age on class voting can be derived from both generational and life cycle models. The generational model focusses on the impact of the Great Depression and the Second World War. In an era of economic deprivation class voting may increase if parties orient their appeals to class based issues. In areas such as Ontario and British Columbia the CCF did make a strong class oriented appeal during the Depression. In the prairies the CCF made another sort of class based appeal, particularly to farmers. During the Second World War the CCF had its greatest successes while still using a class based appeal, so it can also be hypothesized that the War generation will show high levels of class voting. From a life cycle perspective a hypothesis is suggested by the findings dealing with conservatism: that with age there will be an increasing congruence between social background and political behaviour therefor class voting will increase with the passing of the life cycle.

The findings provide only slight support for either model. There is some indication that the Depression Generation has a higher level of class

voting but results are inconsistent. Depression Generation farmers on the prairies are more pro-CCF-NDP than is the War Generation but the result attains statistical significance on only one occasion. The data lend little support to the life cycle hypothesis as there is little evidence of increased class voting with age although in some instances it is found that the combined impact of attitude towards unions and union membership on vote increases with age. It must be concluded that the overall weakness of class voting in the Canadian context means that age effects can be easily washed out. In other instances such as examining age effects on farmers on the prairies, sample size hinders analysis.

Party identification as an enduring attachment has been conceptualized both as a fundamental psychological identification and as a rational tool for economizing on information in the making of the voting decision. Previous research suggests that the latter view may be more applicable in the Canadian context. A life cycle perspective on the strength of party identification suggests that the longer party identification has been used as a tool the more strongly it will be relied upon and the more intensely it will be held. In the American context extensive evidence has been gathered to show that there has been an overall decline in the strength of party identification and that the younger

generation has lower levels of party identification. A similar generational hypothesis can be suggested for Canada although no strong evidence exists to show that parties have in fact declined as objects of loyalty. Given the shortness of the time span available, from 1965 to 1974, it is necessary to rely on recall data and other forms of side evidence. Firstly, though, it is necessary to note that at each point in time (1965, 1968, 1974) the old have stronger identification than the young. Also there is a slight increase in the overall level of partisan identification in the period observed. This increase in the overall level of partisan identification is the opposite of what would be predicted were there a generational trend explaining the lower level of party identification of the young. Examination of recall data shows that among those who have at some point changed their party identification the strength of identification is related to time since change. Since the life cycle view of the relationship suggests that it is not age as such that causes increased strength of party identification but rather the duration of the attachment, the recall data supports the life cycle hypothesis.

Several predictions can be derived from the view of party identification as a rational allegiance which have relevance for the relationship between age and strength of identification. The relationship should be

strongest among those groups towards which a party has maintained a consistent appeal. The Progressive Conservative Party has maintained a consistent appeal towards groups such as people of British origins in peripheral provinces while towards French Canadians its appeal has varied. Therefore it can be predicted that the relationship between age and strength of party identification will be stronger among Progressive Conservatives in the former group than in the latter group. The data supports the prediction as the strength of the relationship between party identification and age is stronger among those groups towards which the Progressive Conservative party has made a constant appeal. This supports the view that the relationship between age and strength of identification is related to the length of time that the attachment has been held if the party has maintained a constant appeal. This is a life cycle effect in the sense that the length of time the attachment can be held is limited by one's age. It is also affected by historical circumstances such as a party changing its positions on issues and therefore changing its appeal to a particular group. Under these circumstances time in a sense starts being counted; duration of attachment must be accumulated anew.

The central theme of the thesis has been the contrast between the impact of generational and life cycle explanations on four areas of political behaviour. In general, life cycle factors have been found to be of greater importance than have generational factors. In accord with the bulk of the literature on the topic, political participation is found to be affected by the life cycle without any discernable generational effect. The impact of age on conservatism varies with indicators examined. The most consistent effects are those reinforcing the impact of social background on vote and attitudes towards unions. Some attitudes used as indicators of conservatism were influenced by generational factors.

Research done in other nations suggests that generational factors have had an important impact on class voting. In particular it has been found that the Depression and War generations have higher levels of class voting than the electorate as a whole. But the data analyzed here reveal only slight evidence of generational impact on voting. It may be the case that the relatively low level of class voting in Canada render the persistence of a generational effect on class voting unlikely.

With regard to party identification it is found that the strength of attachment is related to the duration of the attachment if the appeal of parties is consistent. However it is a life cycle effect with a generational dimension in the sense that historical factors changing party attachments weaken the age/strength relationship.

Overall the most notable effect is the impact of experience accumulated with age on behaviour. Political participation increases and the strength of partisanship and social background is reinforced.

The lack of conclusive support of generational hypotheses suggests that the volatility of Canadian political behaviour may make persistence of a generational impact difficult.

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Appendix for Chapter 1

Appendix A

Data and Methodology

Looking at a period of time presents constraints in the availability of data which are not present in a cross-sectional study. There are several criteria for judging the worth of data for cohort analysis. Among these are the time period spanned by the polls available, the number of polls that can be obtained with the desired information, the similarity of question wordings and comparability of sampling methods and procedures. (1) The Carleton University Data Archives has Canadian Institute of Public Opinion polls from 1945 to the present as well as the 1965, 1968 and 1974 National Election Studies. While one would ideally want data spanning the individuals entire life span, the 1945-1974 span is adequate. Federal vote or federal vote intention is universally available on the C.I.P.O. data. An estimation of wealth is available as well as a measure of occupation. Various measures of participation in the C.I.P.O. data can be employed. Among these are non-voting, interest in elections and knowledge of political figures which can be closely related to participation. Conservatism apart from

party support can be examined using various questions. Some deal with support for traditional values such as religion, while others tap the authoritarian dimension of conservatism. The respondent's stand on abolition of the death penalty can be considered a measure of authoritarianism. While questions are not always strictly comparable, the importance of having exactly the same questions is diminished by focussing on the analysis of sub-groups rather than on the study of trends. The National Election Studies have a wider variety of data available particularly in the case of the 1974 study. The three studies have party identification age coded by year and questions on a variety of issues. The 1974 study have party identification, age coded by year and questions a variety of issues. The 1974 study has questions available on factors such as age of children which may help illuminate the nature of the life cycle. The coding of age is obviously very since cohorts are groups of people categorized by their period of birth. In general, the measurement of the length of the age groups examined has been guided by convenience. For example in Abramson's work age is measured in decades.

(2) In Nie, Verba and Petrocik's study age is divided into four year periods. (3) As American Presidential elections are held quadrennially, each new election means the arrival of a new cohort which of course, may

or may not be a new generation. Another approach is taken by William R. Klecka. Klecka criticises the 'a priori' approach to the definition of political generations and uses an empirical approach. Using two techniques, one based on the maximization of the sum of squares the other on a technique developed by Klecka which entails the calculation of what are referred to as deviation proportions Klecka empirically defines generations by using the points in time at which significant changes in attitudes occur. (4) However, Klecka finds that his empirically defined generations work only slightly better than the 'a priori' generations. (5) In any case measuring age in equal categories simplifies the comparison of generational and life cycle effects. The C.I.P.O. polls taken after 1952 have age coded in the categories of 21-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50 years of age and over. Because of this it is necessary when using the polls to have generations or stages in the life cycle in terms of decades and to concentrate on points in time ten years apart. The crucial problem in the study of age is the problem of indeterminateness. (6) With data from one point in time it is not, strictly speaking, possible to distinguish whether an age difference is due to a life cycle or to a generational effect. It is, of course, possible to use recall data to help determine which effects are operative. This is one of the strategies

to be followed in dealing with the strength of partisan identification. The other more general procedure is cohort analysis the comparison of people with the same dates of birth at different points in time. However, in so doing, a third effect is added a period effect, pertaining to the impact of forces at that point in time on the observed attitudes or behaviour. Thus, the problem is underidentified and certain simplifying assumptions are necessary. Phillip Converse, suggests two possible ways of dealing with the problem. One solution is the use of 'side evidence' that is evidence from outside the cohort analysis which suggests which effect may be operative allowing the researcher to discount certain other effects. The other possible simplifying assumption is that of parsimony. Converse also notes that period and generational effects are closely associated and tend to blur.(7) A variety of methodological approaches will be taken. The first and simplest approach is to examine the cross-sectional patterns in the relationship between age and attitude. Subsequently, it is possible to arrange the data in such a way that cohorts can be followed over a time period. Having done this it is possible to observe attitudes over time. This can be done both by observing the absolute changes in an attitude and by observing changes in attitude relative to the electorate as a whole. Clearly, concurrence in results

between the approaches is important. Given the nature of the Gallup Poll data which is based in part on quota samples and since there is uncertainty about the manner in which the older poll data was gathered tests of statistical significance are inappropriate. Thus, in analyses completely based on polls and in the quasi-longitudinal analyses which rely in part on the polls, tests of significance are not reported. Rather, attention is placed on the analysis of trends within subsections of the data.

1) John Crittenden "Aging and Party Affiliation" Public Opinion Quarterly v. 26. 1962 p. 659.

2) Abramson op cit p. 58.

3) Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik The Changing American Voter Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1976. p. 79.

4) William R. Klecka "Political Generations and Political Behavior" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1971 p. 40.

5) Ibid pp. 124-125.

6) See K.O. Mason, W.M. Mason, H.H. Winsborough and

W.K.Poole "Some Methodological Issues in Cohort
Analysis of Archival Data" American Sociological Review
1973. v. 38. (April) pp 242-258

7) Phillip Converse The Dynamics of Party Support
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Appendices for Chapter 2

(all appendices apart from A and R use data from the 1974 National Election Study)

Appendix A: Various Measures of Turnout 1945

	A	B	C	D
21-25	71%	29%	42%	29%
26-29	79	68	71	68
30-39	84	72	76	72
40-49	83	74	86	74
50-59	85	77	85	77
60-69	89	75	87	75
70+	88	70	72	70

A Do you vote in all elections or only in those which interest you?

B Do you remember for certain whether you voted in the 1940 Dominion Elections ?

C Did you vote in the last provincial election held in this province?

D Do you remember for certain whether you voted in the plebiscite election in 1942 ?

Appendix B : Participation Items By Age

Item	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Interest						
in Election	18%	30%	32%	32%	43%	36%
n=	374	214	240	187	140	99
Interest in						
Politics	6	13	17	19	24	18

n=	371	214	240	187	140	100	.00
Read Paper							
Re Election	30	40	48	51	54	47	
n=	373	214	238	187	140	100	.00
Discuss							
Politics	25	32	36	24	29	25	
n=	373	214	239	186	140	100	.00
Convince							
Friends on Vote	8	10	10	11	12	6	
n=	373	214	240	187	140	100	.13
Work in							
Community*	15	26	33	26	17	15	
n=	373	213	239	187	140	99	.00
Attend Meeting							
Election	3	6	7	10	7	7	
	373	214	240	187	139	100	.12
Contact							
Officials	1	3	6	5	6	4	
n=	373	214	239	187	140	100	.00
Campaign							
Activity	2	5	3	5	6	4	
n=	373	214	239	187	140	100	.50
Turnout							
1974	84	83	91	83	88	88	
n=	328	209	237	187	139	98	.10

* sometimes, often

Percentages are those who state that they participate in campaign activity often. The item on turnout reports the percentages who voted in 1974. The items on interest in election, interest in politics and voting are available in the whole sample n=2445. The other items are available only in a half sample.

Appendix C: Participation Items by Age

Different Cutoff Points for Age

	Items								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
18-21	14	4	26	25	7	1	3	0	1
22-25	19	5	32	29	8	3	2	2	3
26-29	20	18	33	22	7	3	4	0	3
30-33	29	10	37	38	14	8	3	1	4
34-39	30	11	42	28	7	10	7	4	5
40-49	32	17	48	36	10	10	7	6	3
50-59	37	18	51	24	11	8	10	5	5
60-65	38	20	54	30	9	11	6	6	5
66-69	43	28	53	25	22	3	11	7	8
70+	38	22	47	25	6	4	10	4	4
sign.	.00	.00	.00	.001	.07	.001	.54	.006	.21

A Interest in Election

B Interest in Politics

C Read Paper about the Election

D Discuss Politics

E Convince Friends on How to Vote

F Work in Community on Election

G Attend Election Meeting

H Contact Election Officials

I Campaign Activity

N=

	Whole sample	Half Sample
18-21	276	135
22-25	259	130
26-29	212	108
30-33	179	78
34-39	268	136
40-49	478	238
50-59	382	187
60-65	202	104
66-69	89	36
70+	306	100

Appendix D

Proportion Participating in Various Political Activities (often sometimes)

	A	B	C	D
18-21	6	6	17	17
22-25	11	12	16	16
26-29	10	10	13	19
30-33	19	6	27	14
34-39	19	11	26	17
40-49	21	14	33	25

50-59	21	14	26	24
60-65	21	13	17	23
66-69	22	16	20	33
70+	16	11	28	22

A Contacting Officials

B Campaign Activity

C Work in Community

D Attend Election Meeting

Appendix E

Table 1 Age by Sex

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
men	47%	46%	45%	46%	51%	43%
women	53	54	55	54	49	57

Table 2 Age by Education

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Years of Education						
0-8	7%	11%	33%	34%	48%	56%
9-12	53	59	48	48	41	36

13+	39	26	19	17	10	8	
n=	747	447	479	382	291	207	2553

Table 3 Age by Income

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
low	20	17	21	34	61	78
medium	46	46	40	33	25	14
high	34	37	39	32	14	8
n=	732	441	463	369	286	201

Appendix F Participation Controlling for Sex

females

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+	sign.
Interest in	16	25	26	35	43	40	
Election		+9	+1	+9	+8	-3	.00
Interest in	3	7	10	13	24	20	
Politics		+4	+3	+3	+11	-4	.00
Whole sample							
N=	353	207	216	176	149	89	
Read Paper	27	31	42	48	51	42	
Re Election		+4	+11	+6	+3	-9	.00
Discuss	26	25	28	21	31	28	
Politics		-1	+3	-7	+10	-3	.10
Convince	6	6	4	10	6	4	
Friends on Vote		0	-2	+6	-4	-2	.70
Work in		10	11	2	9	4	

Community		+8	+1	-9	+7	-5	.01
Attend Meeting	3	5	4	8	6	4	
		+2	-1	+4	-2	-2	.53
Contact	1	3	5	3	5	2	
officials		+2	+2	-2	+2	-3	.01
Campaign	4	5	2	5	8	4	
Activity		+1	-3	+3	+3	-4	.55
Half Sample							
N=	200	114	125	106	65	50	

Males

Interest in	.20	35	38	39	36	34	
Election		+15	+3	+1	-3	-2	.00
Interest in	9	15	25	25	22	25	
Politics		+6	+10	0	-3	+3	.00
Whole sample							
N=	353	207	216	176	149	89	
Read Paper	34	51	54	54	56	52	
Re Election		+17	+3	0	+2	-4	.01
Discuss	24	39	45	28	28	22	
politics		+14	+6	-17	0	-6	.00
Convince Friends	10	14	17	11	17	8	
on Vote		+4	+3	-6	+6	-9	.02
Work in	3	8	10	16	8	4	
Community		+5	+2	+6	-8	-4	.00
Attend Meeting	3	6	10	11	8	10	

In Campaign		+3	+4	+1	-3	+2	.42
Contact	1	4	8	7	7	6	
Officials		+3	+4	-1	0	-1	.00
Campaign	0	4	5	5	4	4	
Activity		+4	+1	0	-1	0	.52
Half Sample							
N=	173	100	113	81	75	50	

Appendix G

Participation By Age Controlling for Education

Item	Level of Educ.	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+ Sign
Interest	low	15	24	24	27	32	.32 .00
In Election	High	19	34	40	50	59	.53 .00
Interest	Low	4	10	12	17	19	.17 .00
In Politics	High	6	11	21	21	33	.37 .00
Read Paper	Low	12	25	34	41	42	.41 .00
Re Election	High	35	52	64	67	84	.68 .00
Discuss	Low	8	26	31	17	26	.23 .00
Politics	High	30	36	41	34	42	.31 .17
Work in	Low	20	38	39	35	37	.28 .06
Community	High	30	42	54	44	29	.45 .00

Attend	Low	14	21	39	35	36	34 .00
Meetings	High	34	35	40	35	43	36 .80
Contact	Low	14	26	32	35	23	22 .02
Officials	High	21	46	45	32	47	32 .00
Campaign	Low	10	7	13	19	19	18 .09
Activity	High	17	24	25	22	24	14 .32

Low education is 0-10 years

High education is 11 or more years.

Number in the Whole sample

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Low education	163	197	250	223	208	156
High education	581	250	228	113	83	74

N in half sample

Low education	83	95	124	113	102	74
High education	290	119	112	73	38	22

Summary of Changes

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	18-29
	to	to	to	to	to	to
	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+	60-69
Highly educated 8+	7+, 1-	2+, 6-	7+, 1+	5-, 1+	6+, 2-	
Less educated	7+, 1-	7+	4+, 4-	6+, 1-	8-	8+

Appendix H

Changes in Participation by Age by Income

Item	Income	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+ sign
Interest	Low	48	51	60	68	70	67 .00
In Election	High	62	74	77	82	80	80 .00
Interest	Low	41	42	56	63	63	62 .00
In Politics	High	50	60	68	70	76	63 .00
Read Papers	Low	63	60	60	59	71	67 .45
Re Election	High	67	76	79	80	92	56 .00
Discuss	Low	59	53	65	44	53	51 .12
Politics	High	70	78	75	64	84	50 .02
Work in	Low	28	33	44	40	37	31 .15
Community	High	27	43	46	36	32	44 .00
Attend	Low	26	23	46	33	39	34 .02
Meetings	High	31	33	37	37	39	38 .79
Contact	Low	21	27	33	29	25	26 .42
Officials	High	18	42	38	38	45	19 .00
Campaign	Low	17	8	22	21	19	17 .27
Activity	High	13	21	14	19	21	19 .30

Income is divided into categories of up to \$9,999 and over \$10,000. Participation indicators are coded with often, sometimes and seldom collapsed into one category.

Numbers

Whole sample

18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+

low income	278	152	160	167	207	170
high income	454	288	303	202	79	30
Half sample						
low income	136	73	81	82	100	82
high income	230	137	145	97	38	16

Summary of Changes

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	18-29
	to	to	to	to	to	to
	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+	60-69
high income	8+	6+, 2-	3+, 3-	6+, 2-	5-, 1+	9+
low income	4+, 4-	5+, 2-	3+, 5-	4-, 4+	7-, 1	8+, 1-

Appendix I

Pearson Correlations of Participation by Age with Controls Within Various Age Groups

Age Less Than or Equal to:

Controls

	30	40	50	60	70
uncontrolled	.12	.13	.15	.13	.12
Education	.13	.16	.19	.17	.17
Self-identified					
Class	.10	.12	.15	.13	.12
Income	.11	.12	.15	.14	.15
Sex	.12	.13	.15	.13	.15

education

self-id class .11 .15 .18 .16 .15

education

income .12 .15 .18 .17 .17

education

sex .13 .16 .19 .17 .17

class

income .10 .11 .15 .14 .14

income

sex .11 .12 .15 .13 .15

education

class, income .11 .14 .18 .16 .16

education, class

sex .11 .15 .18 .16 .15

education,

income, sex .12 .15 .18 .17 .17

all controls .11 .11 .15 .14 .16

Appendix J

Participation by Age by Sex by Marital Status

Females

Item	Status	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Interest	M.	18	26	26	39	44	30 .00
In Election	unm.	12	15	28	23	42	47 .00
Interest In	M.	4	7	9	13	25	9 .00
Politics	unm.	2	12	13	11	22	28 .00
Read Paper	m.	25	34	39	48	52	52 .12
Re Politics	unm.	30	13	57	48	48	34 .02

Discuss	m.	24	23	26	21	33	38 .14
Politics	unm.	27	38	35	17	26	20 .14
Convince	m.	6	5	4	9	5	3 .64
Friends	unm.	6	13	4	11	9	5 .33
Work in	m.	18	22	28	21	24	33 .33
Community*	unm.	11	19	35	17	9	11 .02
Contact	m.	19	12	20	12	23	10 .05
Officials*	unm.	6	25	13	22	9	7 .04
Campaign	m.	11	11	16	16	19	24 .42
Activity*	unm.	15	10	17	13	9	0 .38
Attend	m.	17	14	24	18	24	28 .70
Meeting*	unm.	21	19	30	26	22	10 .36

Males

Interest	m.	19	36	39	36	36	41 .01
In Election	unm.	21	32	30	38	38	15 .16
Interest	m.	9	15	26	23	20	30 .00
In Politics	unm.	8	12	13	38	33	12 .00
Read Paper	m.	36	49	56	56	55	59 .27
Re Election	unm.	32	67	40	40	63	33 .20
Discuss	m.	25	38	46	29	28	24 .01
Politics	unm.	25	44	33	20	23	17 .88
Convince	m.	13	13	18	11	13	11 .03
Friends	unm.	9	11	6	10	50	0 .02
Work in	m.	8	30	39	35	13	40 .00
Community*	unm.	23	22	27	10	50	25 .21

Contact	m.	6	25	21	31	24	32 .03
Officials*	unm.	11	11	33	31	25	0 .36
Campaign	m.	4	8	11	14	10	16 .36
Activity*	unm.	6	11	13	10	25	0 .08
Attend	m.	11	18	23	25	24	27 .42
Meeting*	unm.	19	22	37	50	50	25 .28

*sometimes, often

Sample size

Females

Whole sample

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
married	239	213	223	159	101	46
unmarried	155	26	39	47	41	71

Half sample

Married	119	98	102	83	42	21
Unmarried	81	16	23	23	23	29

Males

Whole sample

Married	153	179	193	155	128	68
Unmarried	200	25	23	21	21	26

Half Sample

Married	80	90	98	71	67	37
Unmarried	93	9	15	10	8	12

Appendix K

Reason for not Voting 1974 by Age

	18-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61+
Don't Know	9%	4%	2%	11%	2%
Out of Town	14	16	15	20	18
Sick	5	8	14	13	46
Vacation	16	21	25	18	3
Forgot	2	0	5	0	0
Busy	13	8	5	7	6
Couldn't					
Decide	6	4	5	7	6
Not interested	16	10	7	9	9
Religion	0	1	2	0	0
Did not want to	3	5	2	4	0
Felt own party					
would win	3	3	3	0	0
Would make no					
Difference	9	8	3	3	3
Never vote	0	4	3	0	1
Out on Business	5	4	3	0	1
Not enumerated	2	1	3	0	3
Refuse	0	3	0	0	0
Can't remember	1	1	0	2	0
N=	200	80	59	56	68

Appendix L

Participation by Age by Employment status (retired or unretired)

Item	Status	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Int.	unr.	19	29	33	37	37	47 .00
Election	ret.					41	31 .01
Int in	unr.	6	13	17	18	21	20 .00
Pol.	ret.					30	16 .09
Read Paper	unr.	30	40	48	51	51	54 .00
Re Politics	ret.					59	43 .11
Discuss	unr.	25	32	36	24	31	37 .00
Politics	ret.					24	18 .37
Convince	unr.	8	9	10	10	9	6 .34
Friends	ret.					22	6 .38
Attend	unr.	3	6	7	9	5	6 .11
Meeting	ret.					14	9 .92
Contact	unr.	1	3	6	5	4	6 .00
Officials	ret.					11	3 .00

(There are 1140 unretired people in the half sample, 37 people in the half sample who are retired and in their sixties and 65 who are retired and in their seventies. In the whole sample there are 66 retired people in their sixties and 125 in their seventies.)

Appendix M

Participation by Retirement by Sex

Among the retired

Item	sex	60-69	70+
			Sign.
Interest	m	42	33 .38

In Election	f	50	28	.20
Interest	m	24	22	.98
In politics	f	25	16	.67
Read Paper*	m	89	71	.16
Re Politics	f	90	45	.23
Discuss*	m	62	53	.67
Politics	f	82	25	.01
Convince	m	31	7	.01
Friends	f	0	5	.76
Work in	m	8	2	.62
Community	f	18	0	.13
Attend	m	15	7	.44
Meeting	f	9	5	.75
Contact	m	12	4	.52
Officials	f	10	0	.76
Campaign	m	12	7	.27
Activity	f	9	0	.76

*often, sometimes

(There are 55 retired males in the whole sample in their sixties and 82 in their seventies compared to 16 females who are retired and in their sixties and 43 in their seventies. In the whole sample there are 26 males in their 60's 45 in their seventies and 11 and 20 in these categories in the half sample.)

Appendix N

Participation by Age by Marital Status

Item	Status	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Interest	married	19	30	32	39	39	39 .00
In Election	unm.	17	24	36	28	40	38 .00
Interest	m.	6	10	17	18	22	21 .00
In Politics	unm.	6	12	13	19	26	24 .00
Read Paper	m.	30	41	48	52	54	57 .00
Re Election	unm.	31	32	50	45	52	34 .01
Discuss	m.	25	30	36	25	30	29 .04
Politics	unm.	26	40	34	18	26	20 .08
Work in	m.	3	8	10	9	7	7 .00
Community	unm.	2	12	13	3	13	7 .05
Convince	m.	9	9	11	11	10	9 .27
Friends	unm.	7	12	5	9	19	2 .02
Attend*	m.	14	16	23	21	24	28 .11
Meetings	unm.	20	20	33	33	28	14 .16
Contact*	m.	9	18	20	21	24	24 .01
Officials	unm.	9	20	21	24	13	5 .00
Campaign*	m.	8	10	14	15	14	19 .43
Activity	unm.	10	8	16	12	13	0 .00

*often, sometimes

Number in sample

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Whole sample						
Married	391	393	417	314	229	107
Unmarried	353	51	61	68	62	98

Half sample

Married	199	188	200	154	109	58
Unmarried	174	25	38	33	31	41

Appendix O

Participation by Age by Marital Status (widowed, married)

Item	Status	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Interest	Married	20	30	31	35	41	38
In Election	Widowed					41	41 .52
Interest in	M.	8	12	16	19	22	19
Politics	W.					19	28 .59
Read Paper	M.	30	41	47	52	54	57
Re Politics	W.					47	38 .66
Discuss	M.	25	30	36	25	30	29
Politics	W.					33	21 .42
Working in	M.	3	8	10	9	7	7
Community	W.					7	0 .04
Attend	M.	3	5	6	8	6	10
Meeting	W.					0	3 .87
Campaign	M.	5	4	3	5	5	7
Activity	W.					7	0 .73
Contact	M.	1	2	6	5	5	7
Officials	W.					7	0 .20
Convince	M.	17	21	33	22	26	32
Friends	W.					33	13 .40

Appendix P

Social Contact By Age (from 1965 National Election Study)

Percent having the follow type of social contact (Quebec only)

	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+ n
Others Visited R's						
Home in the Past Week	75	72	74	69	60	61 639
Sign.						.13
R has been out with						
Others in past week	63	43	55	39	31	.14 639
sign.						.00
R has visited Other's						
Home in Past Week	77	59	62	47	47	41 640
sign.						.00
n=	142	152	133	97	72	44
R Member of						
Voluntary Association	27	29	45	41	46	61 1120
sign.						.00
(Total sample)						
	223	300	284	179	80	54

Appendices for Chapter 3

Appendix A Religion by Age

V477	AGE	by V452			
RELIGION		V452			
Count	Row #	CATH.	PROT.	Row	Total
		1.I	2.I		
V477	1.	354	297	651	
18-29		54.4	45.6	28.9	
	2.	194	201	396	
30-39		49.1	50.9	17.6	
	3.	210	218	428	
40-49		49.0	51.0	19.0	
	4.	138	198	336	
50-59		41.1	58.9	14.9	
	5.	94	162	256	
60-69		36.6	63.4	11.4	
	6.	71	112	183	
70 AND OVER		38.7	61.3	8.1	
Column		1061	1189	2250	
Total		47.2	52.8	100.0	
Number of missing observations = 195					

Appendix B

Measures of Racial Attitudes by Age

	1954(a)	1958(b)	1968(c)	1968(d)	1968(e)	1975(f)
21-29	9%	30%	22%	21%	45%	21%
n=			137	126	135	291
30-39	6%	44	27	31	56	27
n=			154	135	154	215
40-49	10	39	29	29	63	25

n=			147	129	138	157
50+	14	64	41	49	68	29
n=			222	202	226	157
60+						33
n=						131
70+						41
n=						69
mean	10	52	31	45	60	41
n=			660	592	653	1046

(a) favouring racial exclusion from places of entertainment (CIPO 237)

(b) disapproval of trend to greater intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants (CIPO 270)

(c) disapproval of marriage between a Catholic and a Protestant (CIPO 328)

(d) disapproval of marriage between Jews and Gentiles (CIPO 328)

(e) disapproval of marriage between whites and others (CIPO 328)

(f) favouring the exclusion of immigrants on the basis of national origin (CIPO 377)

Appendix C

Attitudes Towards Unions By Age

Table 1 Approval of the Right to Strike

	1962	1972
1912	61	
1913-1922	74	69
1923-1932	71	70
1933-1942	72	66
1943-1950		73

1951-1954		78
mean	69	70
n=	650	556

Table 2 Regulation of Unions Not Strict Enough

	1961	1970
-1911	56	
1912-1921	45	66
1922-1931	52	51
1932-1941	47	63
1942-1949		64
mean	50	62
n=	505	585

Table 3 Those Feeling that Union Leaders are Trouble Makers

	1954	1964
-1904	63	
1905-1914	53	64
1915-1924	58	65
1925-1934	58	62
1935-1943		58
mean	58	63
n=	1369	519

Table 4 Those Feeling that Labour Wisely Led

	1954	1966
-1904	33	
1905-1914	41	47
1915-1924	46	57
1925-1934	41	52
1935-1944		54
mean	39	52
n=	1383	529

Appendix D

(The following are the questions used to measure conservative attitudes)

Compulsory Military Service CIPQ Poll 241 (1955)

Would you favour or oppose requiring every able bodied young man in this country, when he reaches the age of 18 to spend one year and then join the reserves or the militia as its called?

CIPQ Poll 366 (1974)

(identical to the question asked in Poll 241)

Outlawing Communists

Poll 238 (1954)

Would you favour or oppose a law to outlaw any group or political party which advocates communism?

1968 National Election Study "Communists should be outlawed."

1) Agree strongly 2) Agree mildly 3) Agree mildly 4) Disagree strongly 5) No opinion

Corporal Punishment

CIPO Poll 191 (1949)

Do you agree with teachers being allowed to inflict corporal punishment?

CIPO Poll 274 (1959)

Some teachers say that they should be allowed to punish students in grade schools by paddling them. Do you think they should be allowed to do this or not?

CIPO Poll 313

Do you think school officials should ever have the right to give pupils a licking?

CIPO Poll 374 (1975)

Do you agree or disagree with teachers being allowed to inflict corporal punishment?

Death Penalty

CIPO Poll 245 (1955)

Which of the following comes closest to the way you feel about dealing with convicted murderers:

- 1) life imprisonment but no death penalty
- 2) death penalty for men but not for women
- 3) continue giving both men and women the death penalty

CIPO Poll 317 (1966)

If a national referendum (a public vote) were held today on the question of capital punishment - that is executing someone for murder- would you vote for retaining the death penalty in Canada or abolishing it?

CIPO Poll 374 (1975)

Do you favour or oppose capital punishment for the killing of any innocent person?

Flag

CIPO Poll 227T (1953)

Which of these things do you think Canada should do about its flag - design a new national flag of its own or use the Canadian Red Ensign or the Union Jack?

CIPO 270 (1958)

Do you approve or disapprove of Canada having a national flag entirely different from that of any other country?

CIPO 302 (1963)

(identical to Poll 227)

CIPO 380 (1975)

Canada has now had its own Maple Leaf flag for just over ten years. On the whole would you say 1) you approve 2) or disapprove.

Intermarriage

CIPO Poll 270 (1958)

Reports show that there is an increase in the rate of intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants? Do you approve of this or not?

CIPO Poll 328 (1968)

(Do you agree or disagree with a Marriage between:)

Catholics and Protestants

Attitudes towards unions

CIPO 299 (1962)

Do you think that workers should or should not, have the right to strike?

CIPO 352 (1972) (Identical to Poll 299)

CIPO 291 (1961)

Do you think the laws regulating labour unions are too strict or not strict enough?

CIPO 342 (1970)

At the present time do you think that the laws regulating labour unions are too strict or not strict enough?

CIPO Poll 205 (1954)

Some people say that there are too many trouble makers and agitators among union leaders. Others say that this talk is nly ant-union propaganda. What are your views on this?

CIPO Poll 309 (1964)

(Identical to Poll 235)

CIPO Poll 235 (1954) Do you think that generally speaking, labour is being wisely led by its leaders?

CIPO Poll 320 (1966)

(Identical to poll 235)

Appendices for Chapter 4

Appendix A

The Relationship Between Self Identified Class and Measures of Objective Class

(1965)

Self Identified Class By

	Income	Education	Union Membership
Age			
18-29	.26	.33	.21
n=	478	492	492
30-39	.36	.42	.27
n=	621	634	634
40-49	.42	.36	.24
n=	552	570	570
50-59	.27	.36	.24
n=	399	410	410
60-69	.30	.44	.12
n=	266	280	280
70+	.37	.38	.06
n=	194	207	207
mean	.31	.37	.21
n=	2529	2614	2614

Appendix B

The Relationship Between
Self Identified Class and
Measures of Objective Class
(1974)

Self Identified Class By

	Income	Education	Union Membership
Age			
18-29	.20	.25	.04
n=	673	630	675
30-39	.26	.35	.09
n=	413	416	414
40-49	.37	.37	.13
n=	429	434	435
50-59	.22	.13	.06
n=	324	332	330
60-69	.17	.40	.06
n=	255	260	257
70+	.10	.32	.17
n=	163	166	164
mean	.24	.30	.07
n=	2264	2294	2283

Appendix A
 Appendices for Chapter 5
 Strength of Federal Party Identification
 In 1965, 1968 and 1974

	1965	1968	1974
Strength of Identification			
very strong	22.1%	23.3%	26.5%
fairly strong	38.7	41.9	39.6
not very strong	13.7	13.6	13.4
no identification	25.5	21.1	20.6
n=	2706*	2767	2437*

* weighted

Those with only provincial identification are included with the non-identifiers

Appendix B
 Proportion of Strong Identifiers
 At the Federal Level (1965, 1974)

	1965	1974
-1895	34.4 (12.3)	
1896-1905	28.6 (6.5)	43.3 (16.8)
1906-1915	25.6 (3.5)	33.8 (7.3)
1916-1925	21.8	32.0

	(-.3)	(5.5)
1926-1935	18.1	24.2
	(4.0)	(-2.3)
1936-1945	15.4	24.9
	(-6.7)	(19.0)
mean	22.1	26.5
n=	2097	2437

Appendix C

Proportions of Strong Identifiers Within Age Groups Among those Who Never Changed Identification

	1965	1974
-1895	50	
	(+18)	
1896-1905	40	55
	(+8)	(+16)
1906-1915	39	48
	(+7)	(+9)
1916-1925	33	50
	(+1)	(+11)
1926-1935	25	35
	(-7)	(-4)
1936-1945	21	40
	(-11)	(+1)
1946-1956		27

(-8)

mean 32 39

n= 1008 1321

Appendix D

Table 1

(1965)

V223 XR'S PAST PARTY ID by V221 R'S PARTY IDENTIFICATION

V221 Partisanship

	Count	I							
	Col	%	I	P.C.	Lib.	N.D.P.		Row	Total
			I		1.I	2.I	3.I		
V223			I		I	I	I		
	1.		I	180	I	245	I	113	I
CHANGED			I	33.0	I	31.7	I	54.6	I
			I		I	I	I		
	2.		I	365	I	529	I	94	I
CONSTANT			I	67.0	I	68.3	I	45.4	I
			I		I	I	I		
	Column			545		774		207	
	Total			35.7		50.7		13.6	

Chi-Square Significance = -0.0000

Number of missing observations = 591

TABLE 2 Whether ever close to other party.

BY Partisanship

Partisanship

	Count	I	Col %	I	Lib.	P.C.	NDP	Row	Total
		I		I	1.I	2.I	3.I		
V137		I		I	I	I	I		
	1.	I	426	I	187	I	132	I	745
Changed		I	34.0	I	29.2	I	49.6	I	34.5
		I		I	I	I	I		
	2.	I	828	I	454	I	134	I	1416
Constant		I	66.0	I	70.8	I	50.4	I	65.5
		I		I	I	I	I		

Number of missing observations = 606

Partisanship

	Count	Col 1	Col 2	Col 3	Col 4	Row Total
		Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.		
		1.I	2.I	3.I		
V134						
	1.	361	193	96		650
Changed		31.0	34.7	43.0		33.5
	2.	802	363	127		1292
		69.0	65.3	57.0		66.3
Constant						
	Column	1163	556	223		1942
	Total	59.9	28.6	11.5		100.0

Number of missing observations = 620

Proportions Strongly Identifying

With the Same Parties Federally and Provincially

Age	
18-29	12.9%
30-39	19.8
40-49	17.8
50-59	26.8
60-69	23.6
70+	33.0
mean	20.0
Tau c=	.13*
sign.=	.00
n=	2220

Appendix F
Proportion of Strong Identifiers
By
Education, Interest In Politics

	1965	1974
Education		
1-10 years	22.7	22.0
n=	1267	1206
11 plus	16.1	33.2
n=	850	1346
Interest in Politics		
High	32.8	43.3
n=	538	353
Low	24.7	18.7
n=	1569	2209
High interest, Low education	40.8	50.3
n=	238	161
High education	26.7	37.2
n=	300	191
Low interest, low education	20.9	30.5
n=	1015	1045
High education	14.5	19.5
n=	544	1155

Appendix G

Constancy of Vote

By Party Identification

(Tau C)

	1965	1974
21-29	.03	.15*
n=	196	347
30-39	.08	.18*
n=	353	305
40-49	.15*	.18*
n=	359	354
50-59	.10	.19*
n=	237	274
60-69	.14	.20*
n=	172	218
70+	.24*	.27*
n=	133	160
mean	.12*	.20*
n=	1460	1664

Appendix H

The Impact of Information Resources and Interest
 On Constancy Towards Party

Level of Interest
 In Politics

1953

N=

Tau B

55

OF/DE

Occupation

Professional,

managerial

High

76.38

Low

69.8

230

.07

Blue Collar

High

74.0

Low

70.1

551

.04

Farmers

High

78.4

Low

58.7

183

.20*

Wealth

Higher

High

74.7

Low

69.1

643

.06

Lower

High

78.0

Low

65.0

317

.13*

1974

Education

Higher

High

74.1

Low

66.1

613

.07

Lower

High

84.3

Low

73.0

453

.10*

Percentages are the proportions of the electorate within each group consistent in vote and stand on issues towards party.

END

04 · 03 · 80

FIN