1

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**TRAVAILS ON THE NEW FRONTIER: THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION,
VIETNAM, AND THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS, 1961-63**

by

Brian David Anthony Mussington, B.A., M.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of Political Science
Carleton University**

March 1994

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

385 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

385, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

**THE AUTHOR HAS GRANTED AN
IRREVOCABLE NON-EXCLUSIVE
LICENCE ALLOWING THE NATIONAL
LIBRARY OF CANADA TO
REPRODUCE, LOAN, DISTRIBUTE OR
SELL COPIES OF HIS/HER THESIS BY
ANY MEANS AND IN ANY FORM OR
FORMAT, MAKING THIS THESIS
AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED
PERSONS.**

**L'AUTEUR A ACCORDE UNE LICENCE
IRREVOCABLE ET NON EXCLUSIVE
PERMETTANT A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
NATIONALE DU CANADA DE
REPRODUIRE, PRETER, DISTRIBUER
OU VENDRE DES COPIES DE SA
THESE DE QUELQUE MANIERE ET
SOUS QUELQUE FORME QUE CE SOIT
POUR METTRE DES EXEMPLAIRES DE
CETTE THESE A LA DISPOSITION DES
PERSONNE INTERESSEES.**

**THE AUTHOR RETAINS OWNERSHIP
OF THE COPYRIGHT IN HIS/HER
THESIS. NEITHER THE THESIS NOR
SUBSTANTIAL EXTRACTS FROM IT
MAY BE PRINTED OR OTHERWISE
REPRODUCED WITHOUT HIS/HER
PERMISSION.**

**L'AUTEUR CONSERVE LA PROPRIETE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR QUI PROTEGE
SA THESE. NI LA THESE NI DES
EXTRAITS SUBSTANTIELS DE CELLE-
CI NE DOIVENT ETRE IMPRIMES OU
AUTREMENT REPRODUITS SANS SON
AUTORISATION.**

ISBN 0-315-38464-3

Name BRIAN DAVID ANTHONY MUSSINGTON

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

International Law and Relations

SUBJECT TERM

0616 U.M.I.

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture 0729
Art History 0377
Cinema 0900
Dance 0378
Fine Arts 0357
Information Science 0723
Journalism 0391
Library Science 0399
Mass Communications 0708
Music 0413
Speech Communication 0459
Theater 0465

EDUCATION

General 0515
Administration 0514
Adult and Continuing 0516
Agricultural 0517
Art 0273
Bilingual and Multicultural 0282
Business 0688
Community College 0275
Curriculum and Instruction 0727
Early Childhood 0518
Elementary 0524
Finance 0277
Guidance and Counseling 0519
Health 0680
Higher 0745
History of 0520
Home Economics 0278
Industrial 0521
Language and Literature 0279
Mathematics 0280
Music 0522
Philosophy of 0998
Physical 0523

Psychology 0525
Reading 0535
Religious 0527
Sciences 0714
Secondary 0533
Social Sciences 0534
Sociology of 0340
Special 0529
Teacher Training 0530
Technology 0710
Tests and Measurements 0288
Vocational 0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language 0679
 General 0289
 Ancient 0290
 Linguistics 0291
 Modern 0401
Literature 0294
 General 0295
 Classical 0297
 Comparative 0298
 Medieval 0316
 Modern 0591
 African 0305
 American 0352
 Asian 0355
 Canadian (English) 0593
 Canadian (French) 0311
 English 0312
 Germanic 0313
 Latin American 0314
 Middle Eastern 0313
 Romance 0314
 Slavic and East European 0314

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy 0422
Religion 0318
 General 0321
 Biblical Studies 0319
 Clergy 0320
 History of 0322
 Philosophy of 0469
Theology 0469

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies 0323
Anthropology 0324
 Archaeology 0326
 Cultural 0327
 Physical 0310
Business Administration 0272
 General 0770
 Accounting 0454
 Banking 0338
 Management 0385
Canadian Studies 0501
Economics 0503
 General 0505
 Agricultural 0508
 Commerce-Business 0509
 Finance 0510
 History 0511
 Labor 0358
 Theory 0366
Folklore 0351
Geography 0578
Gerontology 0578
History 0578
 General 0578

Ancient 0579
Medieval 0581
Modern 0582
Black 0328
African 0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania 0332
Canadian 0334
European 0335
Latin American 0336
Middle Eastern 0337
United States 0337
History of Science 0585
Law 0398
Political Science 0615
 General 0616
 International Law and Relations 0617
 Public Administration 0617
Recreation 0814
Social Work 0452
Sociology 0626
 General 0627
 Criminology and Penology 0938
 Demography 0631
 Ethnic and Racial Studies 0628
 Individual and Family Studies 0629
 Industrial and Labor Relations 0630
 Public and Social Welfare 0700
 Social Structure and Development 0344
 Theory and Methods 0709
Transportation 0999
Urban and Regional Planning 0453
Women's Studies 0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture 0473
 General 0285
 Agronomy 0475
 Animal Culture and Nutrition 0476
 Animal Pathology 0359
 Food Science and Technology 0478
 Forestry and Wildlife 0479
 Plant Culture 0480
 Plant Pathology 0817
 Plant Physiology 0777
 Range Management 0746
 Wood Technology 0306
Biology 0287
 General 0308
 Anatomy 0309
 Biostatistics 0379
 Botany 0329
 Cell 0353
 Ecology 0369
 Entomology 0793
 Genetics 0410
 Limnology 0307
 Microbiology 0317
 Molecular 0416
 Neuroscience 0433
 Oceanography 0821
 Physiology 0778
 Radiation 0472
 Veterinary Science 0786
 Zoology 0760
Biophysics 0425
 General 0996
 Medical 0996

EARTH SCIENCES

Biogeochemistry 0425
Geochemistry 0996

Geodesy 0370
Geology 0372
Geophysics 0373
Hydrology 0388
Mineralogy 0411
Paleobotany 0345
Paleoecology 0426
Paleontology 0418
Paleozoology 0985
Polynology 0427
Physical Geography 0368
Physical Oceanography 0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences 0768
Health Sciences 0566
 General 0300
 Audiology 0992
 Chemotherapy 0567
 Dentistry 0350
 Education 0769
 Hospital Management 0758
 Human Development 0982
 Immunology 0564
 Medicine and Surgery 0347
 Mental Health 0569
 Nursing 0570
 Nutrition 0380
 Obstetrics and Gynecology 0354
 Occupational Health and Therapy 0381
 Ophthalmology 0571
 Pathology 0419
 Pharmacology 0572
 Pharmacy 0382
 Physical Therapy 0573
 Public Health 0574
 Radiology 0575
 Recreation 0575

Speech Pathology 0460
Toxicology 0383
Home Economics 0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences 0485
Chemistry 0749
 General 0486
 Agricultural 0487
 Analytical 0488
 Biochemistry 0738
 Inorganic 0490
 Nuclear 0491
 Organic 0494
 Pharmaceutical 0495
 Physical 0754
 Polymer 0405
 Radiation 0605
Mathematics 0986
Physics 0606
 General 0608
 Acoustics 0748
 Astronomy and Astrophysics 0607
 Atmospheric Science 0798
 Atomic 0759
 Electronics and Electricity 0609
 Elementary Particles and High Energy 0752
 Fluid and Plasma 0756
 Molecular 0611
 Nuclear 0463
 Optics 0346
 Radiation 0984
 Solid State 0984
Statistics 0346
Applied Sciences 0984
Applied Mechanics 0984
Computer Science 0984

Engineering 0537
 General 0538
 Aerospace 0539
 Agricultural 0540
 Automotive 0541
 Biomedical 0542
 Chemical 0543
 Civil 0544
 Electronics and Electrical 0348
 Heat and Thermodynamics 0545
 Hydraulic 0546
 Industrial 0547
 Marine 0794
 Materials Science 0548
 Mechanical 0743
 Metallurgy 0551
 Mining 0552
 Nuclear 0549
 Packaging 0765
 Petroleum 0554
 Sanitary and Municipal 0790
 System Science 0428
Geotechnology 0796
Operations Research 0795
Plastics Technology 0994
Textile Technology 0994

PSYCHOLOGY

General 0621
Behavioral 0384
Clinical 0622
Developmental 0620
Experimental 0623
Industrial 0624
Personality 0625
Physiological 0989
Psychobiology 0349
Psychometrics 0632
Social 0451

The undersigned hereby recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

**TRAVAILS ON THE NEW FRONTIER:
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, VIETNAM,
AND THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS, 1961-63**

submitted by

B. David Mussington, B.A. (Hons.), M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

External Examiner

**Carleton University
March 18, 1994**

Abstract

Travails on the New Frontier: The Kennedy Administration,

Vietnam, and the Governing Consensus, 1961-63

Brian David Anthony Mussington

Department of Political Science
Carleton University

This dissertation examines the development of US Vietnam policy during the Kennedy Administration. The study approaches its subject through a theoretical critique of Political Realism. Realist theory pays insufficient attention to the importance of domestic social forces in the formulation of foreign policy priorities. Because of this shortcoming, traditional approaches to foreign policy incorrectly conceptualize states as unitary, power maximizing actors, with absolute autonomy over domestic society.

This study offers an alternative theoretical framework for understanding foreign policy. Based in the political economy scholarship of Robert Cox, this study argues that state manager preferences in foreign policy are the product of extensive state manager bargaining with powerful social forces in domestic society. State managers are defined as strategists in two causally coincident, but analytically distinct domains. State elites adopt strategies in international relations and domestic politics which seek to minimize the influence of others over policy preferences and state behaviour. In domestic politics, state managers and resource controllers bargain with each other over the allocation of resources for public policy. During this bargaining customary arrangements emerge which govern routine resource access, and set the long-term resource limitations governing state policy. The ideological discourse on foreign policy reflects these arrangements, and defines the array of foreign threats against which domestic resources are arrayed.

US Vietnam policy reflected the power of the governing discourse to mediate perceptions of international relations. The case reveals how information emphasizing the specificity of Vietnamese politics and culture were suppressed under the influence of orthodox views. This led to the imposition of a Cold War interpretation of the communist insurgency, and underwrote the covert escalation and Americanization of the conflict begun during the Kennedy years. Importantly, this study -- utilizing research materials from the Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston -- contradicts John Newman's conclusions in JFK and Vietnam that a reversal of Vietnam policy was planned by President Kennedy shortly before his death. Instead, this study finds a disturbing consistency in Administration views throughout the period. The context of Vietnamese society was lost under the weight of US Cold War policy priorities. In essence, South Vietnam was a convenient theatre, upon which a broader ideological contest was played out.

Acknowledgements

In the long process that produced this dissertation a number of people and organizations have assisted my progress. First, I would like to thank the Department of Political Science, Carleton University for its openness to a diverse and eclectic scholarly community. I found my own movement from political realism to a more informed new institutionalism facilitated by the atmosphere of free and open discussion of my early Ph.D. studies. Above all in the department, I would like to thank Professor John Sigler for his guidance and forbearance in this long enterprise. Secondly, I wish to thank the Department of National Defence, Canada, for its financial support during the dissertation stage of my program. My work at the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at DND also influenced my progress, and showed me the realities of government lying beyond my own theoretical preoccupations.

The research for this dissertation took place in diverse locations: at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts; at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Mass., and at the Department of National Defence in Ottawa. Throughout my varied travels, a small number of people have helped me with their strength of character and relentless support. First, I would like to thank my parents for cultivating the "peculiar" habits of their third child, and for their understanding during my frequent dark moods.

Second, and most importantly, I would like to dedicate this work to Inger Weibust, my friend and future colleague. Her advice and good humour were essential to the completion of this enterprise. My profound thanks and best wishes.

David Mussington.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	1
Acknowledgements.....	2
Introduction.....	6
The Broad Approach.....	10
Sources.....	16
Chapter 1.....	20
A Synthetic Model of State-Society Relations and State Manager Foreign Policy Preferences.....	20
Core Concepts.....	21
Key Processes and Critical Factors.....	27
Consensus Weakness and Breakdown.....	27
The Governing Consensus and Vietnam Policy.....	30
Realism, NeoRealism, and Patterns in International Relations.....	36
Four Themes of Political Realism.....	38
The Assumption of International Anarchy.....	39
The Logic of Help.....	42
Actor Utility Maximization.....	43
The Preeminence of Security Concerns.....	46
Differing Conceptions of the State.....	49
Societal Influences Upon State Behaviour.....	58
Chapter 2	
Social Forces and Foreign Policy: Persistent Patterns of Influence.....	62
Introduction.....	62
Approaches to Foreign Policy: Sources and Biases.....	63
Policy Outcomes and Business Interests.....	70
Business Elites as State Managers.....	80
Policy Criticism and Marginal Politics.....	85

Critiques of US Security Policy.....	85
--------------------------------------	----

Liberal Internationalist Policy Criticism.....	88
--	----

Radical Pluralist Critiques.....	95
----------------------------------	----

The Combined Impact of the Governing Consensus and Critical Discourses.....	103
---	-----

Chapter 3

State Manager Perceptions of Values and Objectives, 1959-61.....	110
---	------------

The Governing Consensus and the Construction of History.....	111
--	-----

Consensus Development and the News Media.....	113
---	-----

The Kennedy Administration and the New Frontier in Foreign Policy.....	115
--	-----

Early Clues: John Kennedy and US Goals in Vietnam.....	117
--	-----

The Domestic Political Environment and Foreign Policy.....	122
--	-----

The Kennedy Administratio and US Vietnam Policy.....	126
--	-----

The Counterinsurgency Program.....	141
------------------------------------	-----

Opinion Management: Engineering Domestic Support for Foreign Policy Initiatives.....	149
---	-----

Continuing Events in Laos.....	153
--------------------------------	-----

The Broader Meaning of the Bay of Pigs Fiasco.....	155
--	-----

Chapter 4

US Vietnam Policy, 1961-63.....	160
--	------------

1961-62: The Early Phase.....	161
-------------------------------	-----

Other Developments: The Evolution of US Vietnam Policy.....	181
---	-----

The Reemergence of the Laotian Issue.....	197
---	-----

Vietnamese Neutralization: The Return of an Old Idea.....	202
---	-----

Uncertainty and the Development of US Policy in Vietnam.....	204
--	-----

US Disillusionment and the Fall of Ngo Dinh Diem.....	212
---	-----

Post Script: August to November 1963 -- Prospects for a Reversal?.....	226
--	-----

The Kennedy Administration and Policy Evolution.....	229
--	-----

Kennedy and Withdrawal Prior to Victory.....	232
--	-----

Chapter 5

The Consensus Rendered Concrete.....	237
The Consensus Revisited.....	237
The Nature of the Consensus.....	238
Interpretations of the Period.....	241
Novel Formulations.....	243
Domestic Political Conditions and the Foreign Policy Consensus.....	262
The Taylor Commission and US Policy.....	266
The Attributes of the Governing Consensus.....	269
The Cold War Consensus as a Policy Environment.....	272
The Governing Consensus as an Interpretive Heuristic.....	278

Chapter 6

Conclusion: State Manager Awareness and the Global Political System.....	284
The Global Political System.....	285
US Vietnam Policy: Trends and Outcomes.....	288
State Manager Awareness and the Perceptual Division of Labour.....	294
Parametric Rationality and Continuous Action In the Global Political Environment.....	298
Policy Persistence and Empirical Information.....	299
The Governing Consensus and External Conditions.....	300
State Managers and Action in the Global Political Environment.....	301
The New Frontier and Vietnam: Consensus as Global Structure.....	302
The Kennedy Administration and Vietnam Policy.....	302
The Functional Utility of the Governing Consensus.....	305
Hegemonic Prerogatives and International Change.....	307
Appendix: The Colegrove Critique and US Policy.....	315
References.....	325

INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL CHANGE AND STATE MANAGER BEHAVIOUR

International theory has long been concerned with patterns and change in international relations. Political realist theorizing has long concentrated upon deliberative, goal-seeking behaviour by nation-states. Policy choices in this literature are defined as both the result of balances of interest, and objective balances of power.¹ Approaches to world politics possess a number of hidden assumptions. These assumptions have great significance for interpretations of international relations, and for theory construction.² This dissertation addresses issues that arise in each of these areas.

Two important insights emerge from a critical analysis of the Political realist literature. First, an investigation of realist assumptions illustrates the presence of ideological

¹Political realism is a complex and varied literature. It can be divided into two related schools. First, classical realism is exemplified by the work of Hans Morgenthau (1977), Martin Wight (1978), and Hedley Bull (1987). These authors emphasize the role of the statesman as a risk-averse, prudential actor in the international system. An extensive literature also exists which purports to find realism's origins in ancient scholarship, most notably, in that of Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*. A more contemporary survey of some of the moral and political issues discussed in realist scholarship is provided by Michael Joseph Smith in his *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (1987).

²Neorealist scholarship claims scientific status, and seeks to construct generalizable propositions from a historical examination of international politics. In pursuit of theoretical rigor, neorealist authors use neoclassical microeconomics, and game-theoretic notions of strategy and rationality. Examples of this literature include: Kenneth Waltz (1979), Robert Keohane (1984), and Stephen Krasner (1978). Robert Gilpin (1981) is one author who self-consciously tries to bridge the classical and neorealist schools, See Keohane (1986), pp. 301-321. Also relevant is a more obliquely game-theoretic tradition, represented by the work of Robert Axelrod (1984), and Kenneth Oye (1986).

influences and context-driven "lessons" drawn from a contingent version of history. Second, analyzing realist assumptions draws attention to less well studied aspects of global politics. Non-traditional focuses of international relations research examine political legitimacy and state-manager empowerment, and offer potentially valuable insights into the behaviour of state managers acting on behalf of nation-states. In turn, these perspectives examine the importance of theoretical and generational factors in international relations. This analysis examines some of these factors, and their significance for foreign policy formation.

This dissertation concentrates on the foreign policy of the Kennedy Administration in Vietnam. Through this focus, it examines critical aspects of the policy setting, out of which emerged US Vietnam policy. A realist analysis of the New Frontier period in US history might focus upon the "objective characteristics" of US preeminence. In contrast, this study concentrates on the self-awareness of state managers of the causal logics and imperatives that guided their actions.

The focus is on the constructed understandings of international change which foster stable and persistent orientations to the international system. In this sense, this study is concerned with discovering how state managers' societal, institutional and ideological positions influence their perceptions of international relations.³ Further, the case developed

³The theoretical embeddedness of state manager understandings of global politics is a key issue in debates in international theory. This dissertation touches on these issues, through an application of a theory that holds that state managers construct appreciations of international phenomena in dialogue with key social forces. External phenomena are thus perceived through socially configured frameworks. The governing consensus in this study is just such a framework. This type of discussion is described as "reflexive" by Mark Neufeld in a paper entitled, "Reflexivity in International Relations Theory". Neufeld offers a far more nuanced and complicated version of social analysis in international politics. The key emphasis is upon

in this dissertation illustrates a theoretical case for the revision of realism. Considerable potential exists for a reconceptualization of realist theory in a manner which pays adequate attention to the importance of internal factors. This case highlights issues peculiar to the United States and South Vietnam in the early 1960s. In this way, the insights gained point to the specificity of emergent factors in determining foreign policy outcomes, and to the persistence of historical lessons, in the face of a complex and contradictory external environment.

The United States was chosen as the subject of this analysis because it allows a focus upon two issues which are frequently under theorized in the literature. First, foreign and defense policy is commonly held to be an elite prerogative. As such, social forces are held to be less important here than they are in areas viewed as less important than national security. National historical legacies are a relatively under-explored in neorealist scholarship.⁴ That

a "rejection of objective standards existing independently of human thought and practice." (p. 56). In turn, Neufeld argues that context is key to determining the definition of knowledge and information. Both of these insights are critical to an analysis which sees the dominant discourse in international relations as essentially contested. See Neufeld (1993).

⁴The literature is, of course, in places quite nuanced on this issue. Barry Posen (1984) discusses the sources of national traditions in military doctrines. Posen's discussion embeds notions of strategic weakness or strength in an ideological/cultural structure of systematic bias. His discussion does, however, argue from the tradition of realist anarchy. Objective strategic "facts" are still argued to select out inappropriate state policies for nation-states. The outcome of warfare is the only conclusive way of determining the consistency of doctrinal bias with systemic imperatives.

Jack Snyder (1984) and Stephen Walt (1987) argue respectively that strategic structure and perceived intentions engender reactive actor behaviour. The responses, of course, vary in appropriateness and efficiency. Nevertheless, realism sees the state system as subject to consistent patterns of challenge and response, reflected variously in balances of power, bandwagoning and risk aversion. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic

school is correspondingly unable to account for a key determinant of transformative political and social change. Second, neorealist scholars frequently fail to consider the uniqueness of the national histories of the great powers. These authors thus correlate the experiences of a small subset of human communities with the experience of all nations states in the history of the international system.⁵

A reflection of this preoccupation with international action by rational, calculating actors is the persistent failure of neorealism to give adequate attention to constraining factors at the domestic level which account for persistent orientations toward international relations. In short, social forces which act at both the domestic societal and transnational levels, are involved in the reproduction of orientations to the international system. Patterns in relations between social forces and state managers are thus an important subject for critical enquiry. The framework developed in this dissertation illuminates critical aspects of this interrelationship, focusing upon: (a) the generation and reproduction of state manager perspectives of international change; (b) the agenda of "objective" national interests said to

Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 12.

⁵The generalizability of state experiences during Robert Gilpin's hegemonic wars (1981) to other periods and state actors goes unquestioned within realist theory. For small states, power maximization may, however, give way to satisficing or risk-acceptant behaviour -- depending upon the particular circumstances facing state managers. Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues for a similar system-determined factor in actor behaviour. Waltz also maintains that states are functionally identical to one another, fulfilling the same military-security related roles relative to the inter-state system. In both scholars' view, national responses are driven by state-system level forces. This dissertation offers a corrective to this overstatement. National traditions are important, and co-determine the responses of state managers to perceived threats.

guide foreign policy; and (c) the notion that policy innovation by the Kennedy Administration on South East Asia was guided by factors external to the institutional and ideological structures of the US government.

THE BROAD APPROACH

This study analyses the consequences of political realism's failure to theorize states as complexes of institutions which are involved in two separate, and analytically distinct, spheres of action. The influence of social forces over state managers in foreign policy is partially counterbalanced by competing state elites in other countries. International outcomes, or more correctly, patterned outcomes in international relations, are formed by constellations of social forces which seek to assert or project values and defend stakes beyond national borders.

From this perspective, any approach that fails to theorize the societal bases of state power is unsatisfactory as an account of the development of foreign policy preferences. A different approach to international politics allows a more appropriate emphasis upon the societal sources of consistency and bias in foreign policy. Rather than focusing upon foreign policy as a rational and efficient response to a complex yet knowable external environment, the conceptual framework developed focuses upon broader perspectives or orientations.⁶

⁶These orientations should not be construed as cognitive maps, or mental constructs, pre-created due to individual education or ideographic factors. Rather, these orientations are inscribed within organizations, the institutions of the state, and in the patterned interaction of state managers with social forces. As such, customary understandings and

These orientations are a product of interacting state managers and social forces, and yield a consistent and self-contained approach to global politics. Foreign policy orientations are thus closely linked to state-society relations and elite legitimacy.⁷

This dissertation uses the comparative politics literature to critique realist assumptions regarding political action. Most pointedly, state manager preferences are examined in the light of societal and institutional influences. Institutional and neo-institutionalist literatures treat policy preferences as a reflection of preexisting biases (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992; Immergut 1992). Further, assumptions of institutional efficiency are eschewed, in favour of a sensitivity to path dependence (Piore and Sabel 1984; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Path dependency in policy formation argues that choices made at one point in time influence the set of options available afterwards. From this basic insight flows the idea that historical influences in institutional development constrain the available behaviours of state managers in policy formation.

legitimated prerogatives can build up over time. Ascendant ideas and social forces must defeat existing structures of power, or take advantage of decaying structures, to further their objectives. For a discussion of the prevalence of institutions in information and value reproduction, see Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992), and Powell and DiMaggio (1991).

⁷This enquiry is also aimed at avoiding the neorealist focus upon objective "facts" which speak for themselves. Instead, I emphasize the existence of structural bias in the construction of dominant state manager perspectives. The contestability of these perspectives in the domestic political setting is key to a more comprehensive understanding of global politics.

The mechanism underlying policy formation is thus historically conditioned. Ideological and bureaucratic factors help to determine the debate on policy alternatives, and the broader discourse on appropriate state behaviour.⁸

State manager preferences are thus formed in the presence of societal influence. Key societal actors thus gain a say in: (a) the resources available to the state; and (b) the policy priorities of state elites. The discourse on appropriate foreign and security instruments is thus an amalgam of state and societal preferences. The conceptual framework developed in this study examines the structure of bargaining between state managers and societal elites, in this case capitalists. From this discussion, the category of social forces is broadened, to include ideological and non-economically driven social forces.

The dialectic of state managers interaction with social forces results in persistent policy preferences and orientations. These orientations structure policy preferences in concrete cases. US Vietnam policy provides a powerful case in point.

Chapter one of this study addresses the nature of state-society relations, and its conditioning effects on the policy preferences of state managers. The chapter argues that a

⁸The broader debate on policy alternatives takes place within a policy network -- or structured interaction of state managers and social forces. This network carries a discourse on the stakes, values and instruments appropriate to action in a contested domain. That domain, international politics, involves the stakes of state managers, and interested societal elites. These elites bargain over the appropriateness of foreign policy interventions to bring about change in international conditions affecting domestic interests. The pattern of societal forces supporting state manager preferences is termed by Robert Cox a historic bloc. This discussion highlights the uniqueness of capitalism to the relationship between key societal elites and state managers. As chapter one argues, the critical aspect of the policy network is the privileged domestic status of capitalists, and the privileged external policy status of state managers. See Cox (1987).

symbiotic relationship exists between state managers and capitalists. In return for a relatively free hand in the domestic economic sphere, state managers receive resources to pursue policy goals both internal and external to a state's national borders. The objectives of state policy are formed in the perpetual bargaining process between state managers and societal elites over domestic and foreign stakes. In the security realm, because of the discourse of international anarchy, state managers enjoy special prerogatives in domestic resource allocation.

Most importantly, state managers articulate a privileged discourse in the national security area. They presumptively define external stakes, appropriate policies, and overall world order goals. In order to accomplish this task, state managers seek to discipline domestic debate on foreign and security policy. In this way, they seek to maintain a stable and supportive domestic political base for their external policies.

Chapter two addresses the societal bases of state manager legitimacy. It emphasizes the relationship between ideas which are ascendent in society, and the longer term persistence of state manager policy preferences. Contention over the institutions and roles controlled by state managers produces a rotation in the individuals who occupy key posts within the state.

As new groups and ideological perspectives arise, they may seek to influence state elites through lobbying or protest campaigns, aimed at undermining the flexibility of state managers in domestic politics. Protest within, and outside, accepted boundaries of debate has differing impact upon state manager behaviour. Such activity receives predictably differing treatment from those state managers involved. The delegitimation of criticism lying outside the acceptable (bounded) discourse on policy priorities is accomplished through the denial of

access to key decision making institutions, the denial of access to "privileged" information, and through the active repression of political movements. At the same time, however, marginal political forces may render themselves irrelevant due to their preoccupation with issues on the periphery of mainstream policy interests.

Each of these themes is visible in the emergence of the New Frontier critique of Eisenhower Administration foreign policy. The Kennedy Administration entered office committed to a much more activist, and offensively-oriented, version of containment. The relationship of this policy line to the coincident strains of liberal criticism in US society goes a long way to explaining the slow emergence of criticism of US escalation in Vietnam.

Chapters three and four document the Vietnam case study through an intensive discussion of Kennedy Administration decision making in South East Asia. Major themes of this discussion outline: the pre-formed nature of Administration policy preferences; the relative unimportance of the substantive nature of the Diem regime -- until its policies began to threaten domestic controversy in the US over covert escalation; and the presence of bias and closure in US decision making at the centre. In particular, the Kennedy inner circle seemed remarkably resistant to information or analyses which placed into question their favored policies, or policy instruments. Further, the manipulation of the external environment was viewed as easy -- and necessary -- because of the special nature of the "best and the brightest" in the Kennedy Administration. This focus found its origins in the exceptionalist rhetoric of the New Frontier, and in the founding myths of the US republic itself. It thereby, was able to prosecute a secret war in Vietnam, and expand the political

commitment to an unsavory regime, in the absence of vigorous public debate over the "objective" stakes involved.

Chapters five and six focus upon the nature of the congealed rhetoric, or governing consensus, which constrained policy debate during the Kennedy years. This discussion argues that the governing consensus played the role of a cognitive and perceptual heuristic, through which international events were interpreted. In addition, this heuristic selected out information that might have undermined the core preferences (counterinsurgency, containment) of the central decision makers. Indeed, the applicability of US grand strategy to what could equally have been seen as an anti-colonial civil war went unquestioned by central decision makers. The reasons for this fact lie in the hermetic nature of the dominant discourse in foreign policy, and in the marginalization of radical critics by state managers.

The separation of the dominant policy discourse from external information is only partial. As stakeholders in society are affected by increasingly inappropriate policies, they critique the policy preferences of state managers, and may over time succeed in changing them. The fact remains, though, that international change is perceived through a heuristic that remains fixed in the short to medium term. This means that state managers are institutionally and ideologically inhibited from rapid responses to international change. Further, it is unlikely that radical change will be anticipated, because such changes are likely to invalidate the presumptions of the paradigm underlying foreign policy. Ad hoc policy responses are thus predictable under conditions of transforming, or diachronic, change. The very unpredictability of such changes, however, means that a crisis in foreign policy may carry the seeds of a broader discourse or paradigm breakdown, in interpretations of

international relations. Such crises are by definition, unlikely to be detected beforehand. Their existence, however, clearly sets profound limits on the ability of state managers to interpret correctly other historical and cultural contexts. World politics, then is much less predictable than neorealist scholarship would argue. Instead, patterned disorder, and uncertainty are critical to understanding the limitations of conceptual approaches to global politics.

SOURCES

This dissertation uses materials on file at the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston, Massachusetts. In addition to documents, tapes associated with the Oral History project of the Kennedy Library were used to construct a picture of the Administration in its principals' own words. Documentary information for this study was derived from scholarly analyses of the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy, and from public documents on the US involvement in Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers were especially important in this regard. Different editions of these documents were used, and their citations are listed below:

- (1) *The Pentagon Papers*, (Senator Gravel Edition), Volumes I and II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

(2) *The Pentagon Papers, (DoD) Edition*, alternate title, "United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67". [12 volumes], Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971).

(3) Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith, *The Pentagon Papers*, as Published by the New York Times. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

In addition, documents released in prior historical publications were also sampled, as sources for policy insights and public opinion information. Two particularly important sources were:

(4) Gareth Porter (ed.). *Vietnam: A History in Documents*. (New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979).

and,

(5) William Conrad Gibbons, *The US Government and Vietnam: Executive and Legislative Relationships, 1945-60; 1961-64; and, January-July 1965*. [3 Volumes] (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986 and 1989).

These sources were in turn buttressed through selective consultation of memoirs written by members of the New Frontier, and other pertinent sources. In consulting these sources, a self-conscious attempt was made to reconstruct a picture of the international setting, as understood by the New Frontiersmen.

The theoretical claims made on behalf of this study are thus proscribed by the attempt to understand global politics in the same manner as the actual decision-maker participants. The case study approach is chosen in order to illuminate the concepts defined in the conceptual model. Chapter one develops the analytical framework from the scholarship of Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly. It emphasizes the precise delimitation of theoretical claims due to the historically specific circumstances of the period.

The conceptual framework argues that decision makers and analysts studying a case, or series of cases, necessarily impose concepts and ordering devices on a varied subject matter. For the purposes of this study, the main criterion has been that of providing a satisfying explanation for the behaviour and events of the period under study. At the same time, however, this dissertation evaluates the degree to which a coherent structuring element existed in the decision making of the Kennedy Administration. The concept of a governing consensus supplies just such a structure, and embeds the state managers of the New Frontier into the domestic and external environments that produced their approach to foreign policy. Analysis of US Vietnam policy during this period allows an evaluation of the mechanisms at work when a great power seeks to manipulate political and social trends in a culturally and historically distant region. The common misperceptions and misapprehensions of political and social phenomena visible in this study illustrate the barriers which inhibit the sensitive awareness by state managers of conditions outside their immediate frame of reference. Similarly, the institutional, strategic structural and ideological dimensions which define state manager roles and prerogatives act to inhibit any real appreciation of the substance of that environment. Rather, state managers gain latitude and legitimacy from a self-serving articulation of a dangerous and disordered setting. In the absence of apprehended crises, state managers systematically misestimate the causal imperatives which derive from their interaction with a dynamic external setting. The fiascoes and disasters which flow from this situation are both tragic and to a degree, unavoidable. These factors have great significance for understandings of stability and change in international relations. The conclusion of this study outlines the implications of this framework for international theory.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is concerned with the persistence of state manager preferences in international relations. Unlike traditional realist analyses, this discussion views the domestic political setting as critical to explaining patterns in international politics, and the responses to those events which form the basis of national foreign policies.⁹ In this direction, this discussion begins with a conceptual analysis of the relationship of state manager foreign policy preferences to the domestic political and social setting. In setting the problem in this way, this study is aimed self-consciously at correcting a limited approach currently dominant in the literature. Realist and neorealist scholarship emphasizes static shifts in material capabilities as key to the evolution of international relations.

⁹Realist discussions focus upon international anarchy, the uncertainty of international outcomes, and upon security problems stemming from ineffectual responses to shifting balances of power. As is noted elsewhere in this chapter, US realist scholarship is more concerned with the imperatives of international anarchy. As Arthur Stein writes:

Because the anarchic environment allows countries to expand without formal restraints, no individual nation's security can ever be ensured except through its own actions. Although states can pursue a variety of objectives, they must at least secure their continued survival. As rational actors, therefore, they focus on the means of providing security. Most fundamentally, they seek to maximize their own power.

This picture of the international realm is the orienting point for this dissertation. As is argued below, such a perspective on global politics overstates the importance of international capability balances, and understates the importance of human agency in international relations. See Stein 1990, p. 5. A fuller examination of the tenets of realism is provided following the presentation of my approach.

While this approach discusses the threats state managers respond to in the security realm, it does not describe the process -- or mechanisms -- through which these threats are perceived. In turn, realist theory does a poor job at accounting for shifts in foreign policy which appear to result from shifts in domestic regimes. These changes make clear the fact that domestic groups and state manager concerns are key to the way foreign policy is formulated. The goals, values and behaviour which underlie state manager behaviour in foreign policy are created in two settings, one domestic, and one international. It is necessary that both of these analytical arenas be addressed if a satisfying explanatory theory of state manager responses to international change is to be constructed.

The discussion below begins by setting out a model of state society relations as a basis for an understanding of persistent foreign policy orientations. This model addresses issues of state manager autonomy from social forces, elite bargaining, and ideological legitimacy. Lastly, the model offers conjectures as to the way that a consensual understanding of international relations is used by state managers in order to discipline -- or delegitimize -- dissenters from government policy. This framework is then applied in subsequent chapters to an interpretation of the policy of the Kennedy Administration in Vietnam for the years 1961-1963.

A SYNTHETIC MODEL OF STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND STATE MANAGER FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES¹⁰

¹⁰The idea of a hegemonic consensus as a proxy for a direct confrontation with international system structures originates in the work of Robert W. Cox. Though most

This model describes the relationship between state managers and societal elites. It also focuses upon the impact of state-society relations on the formation of the foreign policy preferences of state managers. In addressing these issues the model conceptualizes a structure of interpretation through which state managers perceive the world. This structure serves the purpose of simplifying a complex external setting, and provides decision-making guidance in foreign policy. In addition this framework identifies adversaries, allies, and effective means of defending external stakes from assault. A number of core concepts are important to understanding the nature of this inferential structure.

concerned with the international political economy, this work has clear implications for international security studies. Unfortunately, mainstream international theory has been slow to grasp the heuristic power of Cox's insights. For a well-developed example of Cox's approach, see Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces and the Making of History. For a prior statement of Cox's views, see "Production and Hegemony: Towards a Political Economy of World Order," in Harold Jacobson and Duncan Skdjanski (eds), The Emerging International Economic Order: Dynamic Processes, Constraints and Opportunities. Finally, for an integration of the basic insight into a rare dialogue between neorealism and other approaches, see Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 204-254.

Core Concepts

First, this model is concerned with the actions of state managers, and the influence exercised over them by societal elites. State managers are persons occupying key decision making positions within the state. The state is understood as a complex of institutions which makes authoritative decisions for a political community. This framework addresses international politics, therefore the state managers concerned are those who direct the policies of national governments.

State managers enjoy legal and political status as representatives of their political communities. These persons are dependent, however, upon other societal elites for legitimated access to societal resources. In the absence of a command economy, state managers are forced to bargain with societal elites for the resources to carry out their chosen foreign and domestic policies. This bargaining process creates relationships between important societal elites and functionally differentiated agencies within the state apparatus. As such, social forces with interests in foreign policy form relationships with state managers with responsibilities in that area. In return for providing political and economic support for state policy preferences, societal group leaders obtain influence over the very formation of these preferences.

The relationships that state managers form with societal elites are called policy networks. These networks are key to the exercise of influence in policy formation, and also serve as conduits through which the norms and values of security policy writ large are reproduced. On an instrumental basis, policy networks can be used by state managers to mobilize political support for their programs. Even prior to this activity, however, the societal supporters of state managers serve as gatekeepers, influencing the ideas and personnel which reach the highest policymaking positions.¹¹

¹¹More recently, conceptions of comparative politics which focus upon the state have emphasized institutional factors as constraining elements in state and societal group behaviour. This literature is constituted by two types of scholarship. At one level, rational choice theorists, such as Kenneth Shepsle and Douglass North emphasize institutions as efficient organizational responses to historically present phenomena. In turn, these scholars describe the strategic -- or game-theoretic -- environment confronting actors. In discussions of games such as Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, and Deadlock, these scholars attempt to define the conditions under which actors will defect from, or cooperate within, institutionalized agreements. Much of this work is in a field known as positive political economy, but it gains importance here because of its conceptual closeness to the second school in institutional approaches, the so-called "new" or "historical" institutionalism.

This second school is characterized by an attention to interpretive studies of how institutions shape political strategies of both state managers and social forces. Scholars writing in this tradition include Theda Skocpol and Peter Katzenstein. Interpretive scholars have little quarrel with a constraint-based formulation of institutions. Instead, these scholars go further, and discuss the continuous shaping of politics and social force activity, by institutions created at a given point in time. In this way, these scholars place considerable importance upon the way institutions foreclose certain political strategies - in effect **selecting out** actors who favour them -- and empower actors choosing others, or enjoying institutionally supported power advantages. For a discussion of the historical-interpretive institutionalist project, see Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992: 1-32. Earlier scholarship which represents a precursor statement of the institutionalist project can be found in Evans, Reuschmeyer and Skocpol 1985. Positive political economy literature is one area where the other form of institutionalism has found application. For examples of this scholarship, see Alt and Shepsle 1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; and March and Olsen 1989. This dissertation attempts to bridge these two schools through a developed combination of the insights of both. It does, however, belong predominantly in the historical interpretivist school, as it places great emphasis upon in-depth

An important factor that structures relations between state managers and societal elites is the dominance of capitalism as the system for determining the disposition of productive assets. Most specifically, group leaders who represent corporate and business interests enjoy special interests in, and influence over, the behaviour of state elites. This special status derives from a relationship described by Charles Tilly, between capital accumulation and resource acquisition by state managers (Tilly 1990: 16). State managers require a robust economy in order to maximize the resources available for them to pursue external geopolitical interests. At the same time, ensuring regular and non-controversial access to domestic resources requires bargaining between state managers and societal elites. This bargaining takes place in the policy networks described above, and further amplifies the influence of domestic society over the formation of external policy priorities.

A potential conflict of interest arises between state managers and domestic elites due to the differing needs of capitalists and political decision makers. It is clear that different visions of the national interest exist, depending upon one's role or position in the policy network. Similarly, definitions of international conditions are themselves essentially contested formulations. This means that state managers compete with domestic stakeholders in their articulation of the national interest. As such, the debate within the policy network may produce gridlock, as easily as it produces empowerment and legitimation, of initial state manager preferences.

analysis of particular cases, in order to illuminate the way that the strategies of particular political actors were influenced by their understanding of constraints and context.

Societal critiques of state manager preferences are thus involved in the definition of state interests. Criticism from the margins of political life can move to the center of debate when the interests of either state managers or important social forces are at risk. This situation can emerge due to the resource drain of a given policy position, such as a major war or embargo. Similarly, if a business interest is injured by the actions of other states, state managers may become involved in retaliation on behalf of client societal elites. In either case, non-capitalist interests can participate in public discourse on the controversies of the day. A critical issue is: under what circumstances do these views have their maximum impact on the debate within the policy network?¹²

¹²Ellen Immergut describes a similar concept in a discussion of health policymaking in France, Switzerland and Sweden. Immergut is concerned with defining the exact conditions under which institutional rules resolve conflicts between groups through the regulation, or foreclosure, of access to points of decision within an organization. Examples of this factor include the executive veto, through which the executive (in the United States, and elsewhere), can block legislative intervention into existing policies, or protect an executive-led intervention which requires the retention of existing policy measures. (Immergut 1992: 64)

Immergut describes the executives attempts to maximize decision-making autonomy as related to the number of different points in the decision-making process where societal groups, or legislative actors, can intervene to limit executive freedom of action. Terming these points "veto points", Immergut then posits executive autonomy as a contextual phenomenon:

As described, the veto points are not physical entities, but points of strategic uncertainty that arise from the logic of the decision process itself ...Specific institutional mechanisms structure the decision process in a given polity, and by doing so, provide interest groups with different opportunities for influencing political decisions. Depending upon the logic of the decision process, different political strategies are available to interest groups, and different groups are privileged by the political institutions in each country (pp. 66-67).

The policy network in this study is related to Immergut's discussion, in that it defines a second level of institutional constraints over access to state managers, that of the regularized

Answers to this question raise the issue of the nature of political debate within the policy network itself. Because of the special relationship between state managers and capitalists, these actors are critical in determining mainstream political norms, values and acceptable discourse. Policy networks also constrain debate on foreign policy through their gatekeeper function. Some ideas and persons are simply not able to gain access to the critical roles and persons required for the translation of criticism into altered state manager behaviour to take place.

The special importance of national security in the role-orientations of state managers is a key qualitative factor in these policy networks.¹³ As was acknowledged above, political

interaction of core social forces with state agencies. The discourse reproduced during this perpetual dialogue also has constraining characteristics, as is argued below.

¹³This discussion rests on the insights of Robert Cox in his book, Production, Power and World Order. In a theoretical discussion of the linkages between elite prerogatives within the state, modes of social relations which underlie production under capitalism, and behavioural convergences within social groups, Cox writes:

Specific social groups tend to evolve a collective mentality, that is, a typical way of perceiving and interpreting the world that provides orientations to action for members of the group. The term rationalities is used here to designate such coherently worked out patterns of thought, which correspond to practices in a specific social context....Rationalities are the interpretive structures of thought and mental rules for making decisions that are characteristic of specific social groups. Thus the typical mental processes followed by administrators and bureaucrats for reaching decisions of practical consequence differ from those of business entrepreneurs and again from those of elective office holders. [p. 25]

This formulation is close to that of Charles Tilly, who conceptualizes the relationship of elites within civil society to those within the state. The internalization in both elite strata of habitual perceptions and approaches thus derives from their interaction through time, a point upon which much of the early portion of this analysis rests.

realism is the conventional wisdom regarding action in the international system. Under these circumstances, realist notions of safety, security and risk-aversion dominate the interests and values articulated by state managers. Status-quo interests of this type are buttressed by the conservatism of capitalist stakeholders. Because of their control of economic processes in domestic society, these interests are wary of radical redistributive policies at home, and likely to counsel defense of capitalist prerogatives abroad. As Peter Evans remarked, fiscal conservatism at home is complementary to geopolitical activism abroad. Thus, the symbiosis of state managers and capitalist stakeholders produces a rapprochement on limited state involvement in the domestic economy. This also leads to the relatively unfettered control of foreign policy by the executive arm of the state.

The political discourse on the appropriate role of state managers abroad, and on the acceptable inventory of state policies in the international realm is termed the governing consensus. This consensus is a heuristic device, through which state managers and societal elites in the policy network perceive external interests, adversaries and allies.

Key Processes and Critical Factors

The emergence of a governing consensus in foreign policy is fraught with reversals and controversy. Emergent social forces exercise widespread influence in the foreign policy positions of state managers. In addition, these social forces are able to forestall the alteration of existing policy through blocking activities in both legislative and media settings (Immergut 1992: 66). In this way, the broader societal debate on key issues is manipulated

by actors in the policy network to defend domestic and foreign stakes. It is also widely understood that contention over policy issues takes place within acceptable bounds (Immergut 1992: 80). The discourse on societal values in the policy network delegitimizes certain notions and persons from participating in policymaking. In this way the filtering of societal discourse on policy matters protects established centers of power. At the same time, however, this filtering mechanism can only function so long as important actors within the policy network remain fundamentally satisfied with the distribution of influence.

Consensus Weakness and Breakdown

The shifting balance of political and social forces in domestic society means that debate within the bounds of the governing consensus is perpetual. This consensus is thus subject to at least three interpretive criticisms. These diverging views are likely to come from those dissatisfied with current policy. They are also likely to emerge from the margins of political discourse, from those who are normally prevented from exercising influence over the preferences of state managers.

First, stakeholders in foreign policy may view their situation as worsening under the rubric of existing state policies. These actors will likely lobby for changes in government measures so as to better protect their interests. Second, are criticisms from those who feel that the governing consensus is failing to keep up with rapid change in the international system. These social forces may wish to place new issues onto state managers' agendas. As such, they may wish to open the policy network to new participants. Third, however, are a

set of criticisms which take shape during grave crises which place the basic structure of policy networks themselves into question. In this case, the roles, ideological views, and prerogatives of state managers may be undermined. These challenges are most likely to emerge during situations which place the interests of domestic interests in grave danger. Also, economic difficulties at home may alter the balance within the policy network between state managers and capitalists. In this situation, the appropriate role of the state in domestic society may be recast, empowering new social forces and different state managers in the process.¹⁴

It is this last set of critical factors in consensus development that are the focus of this dissertation. Foreign policy, which deals with geopolitical competition, is particularly likely to place into question the key elements of the governing interpretation of international relations. A crisis in foreign policy is likely to catalyze domestic political debates in a manner affecting policy network control over state behaviour.

State managers independence from social forces is therefore circumscribed by domestic interests. This leads to strategic behaviour by state managers to expand their space for agency (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 8; Tilly 1990: 20-28; Skocpol 1985: 17).

Manipulation of the concepts, values and discourse of the policy network is one means

¹⁴The ability of affected social forces to respond to disadvantageous government policies is related to the institutional structure of the state. This issue is addressed in historical institutionalist literature through a discussion of the way that state structure conditions the strategies available to state managers and social forces for influencing policy. Ideas, and policy innovation are thus also subject to conditioning by state structures. In a very real sense, influence by social forces is the projection of their preferences onto state managers, reducing or enhancing their "autonomy" relative to the degree of convergence between the views of both groups. See Weir 1992, for a discussion of these issues.

through which state elites attempt to control societal debates on foreign policy priorities.

Within the state itself, the varying influence of social forces engenders competition among state managers over the policy focus of the state. These clashes of view can clearly activate political controversy in both the policy network and the broader society. In this way, the inter-penetrated state is both an actor in domestic controversies, and an arena for political debate and confrontation.

The governing consensus can thus come under assault from within domestic society, and from within the state. The assaults are themselves key to determining the nature of responses to external challenges.¹⁵ The rhetoric of foreign policy itself becomes an arena for conflict when basic agreement over the identity of adversaries, allies and goals is absent.

¹⁵William Grover comments on the balance of interests between state managers and societal elites within a notional policy network. In Grover's book, The President as Prisoner, he describes the impact of capitalist participation in policy networks:

Domination...does not negate the importance of interclass and intra-class conflict over state policy. But to the extent such conflicts exist, they "do not involve challenges to the rules that create privileges for the upper class and domination by its leadership group. It is, in short, conflict within a shared consensus, a consensus to a significant extent manufactured through class power [my emphasis] [Grover 1989: 79].

The value of Grover's perspective derives from its emphasis upon social and economic conditions as having importance for the options perceived and reacted to by state managers. As well, Grover emphasizes the constraining power of a governing consensus, determining as it does the meaning of key concepts and the invalidity of certain others. A key weakness in Grover's work is its failure to recognize that state managers as a group may represent an elite only partially embedded within a constraining external society. The relationship between state and society is a complex one, with relations of mutual dependence, empowerment and legitimation. Institutional position can bestow important prerogatives in the construction of privileged interests and values. Elites within the state thus exercise independent power in policy innovation.

Under these conditions the consensus is no longer able to fulfill its legitimization and simplification functions. Instead, it may resemble a shop-worn assemblage of cliches regarding common norms and values in international relations.

THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS AND VIETNAM POLICY

In the early 1960s the Cold War dominated official conceptions of foreign policy interests. In this setting the focus of security planning was deterrence of the Soviet Union. In addition to this focus was the broader geopolitical competition between East and West. This contest was a thoroughgoing confrontation between two social systems, value frameworks and notions of the good life. Consistent with the fundamental nature of this competition, the discourse on foreign policy in the United States was dominated by harsh, zero-sum formulations of international relations. The aims of the Soviet bloc were said to be universal. The challenge was thus to contain the Soviet Union, and to prevent it from expanding the number of states under communist control. It was this aim that drove the Kennedy Administration's approach to events in South East Asia (Gaddis 1982; Gaddis 1991: 56).

This study addresses the substance of the governing consensus that existed in the years 1961-63. In particular, this study attempts to account for the consistency of Kennedy Administration policy by outlining the limits of acceptable debate on the US' global role. In essence, this study attempts a reconstruction of the constraints and actors integral to the dominant policy network of the early 1960s. In analysing US Vietnam policy from this

vantage point, this study addresses a number of key questions. These questions are summarized below:

1. What ideological beliefs dominated foreign policy on the eve of the Kennedy Administration taking office?
2. What were the prior foreign policy beliefs of those who came to represent the New Frontier inner circle?
3. How open was the foreign policy discourse of the period to criticism?
4. How did the policy network of the period regulate the formation of US policy toward South East Asia?
5. What mechanisms did the state managers of the Kennedy Administration use to delegitimize criticism of their policy preferences?
6. Which marginal foreign policy views managed to penetrate the governing consensus during the period concerned? Why were these views successfully articulated within the policy network, and others dismissed?
7. How resistant was the governing consensus to refutation by external information?
8. How did interpretations of conditions in Vietnam change under the pressure of evolving events?

These questions structure the case study chapters in this dissertation. The treatment of criticism measures the degree to which the governing consensus, and the underlying political and social network, felt it necessary to respond to questioning of their vision of foreign policy priorities.

The ideological views of the central figures in the new frontier represent the initial biases of state managers with foreign policy responsibilities. The compatibility of these views with the governing consensus is an expected aspect of the gatekeeper role of the policy network. The qualitative state of the policy network is also an issue, however. In particular, it is important to assess the flexibility of the consensus to modification through the assimilation of new information and perspectives.¹⁶ The case study enables this analysis to assess the openness of the policy environment to such contending viewpoints. In turn, the evolution of official views is itself a consequence of diverging institutional positions within the state. The potential for these divisions to be used by external social forces is included within the model. The strength of the consensus, however, may make such divisions entirely theoretical in importance. The mechanisms used by the policy network to delegitimize criticism thus emerge as an issue. The successful delegitimation of criticism suggests the continuing strength of the policy network linking state managers with societal supporters. In turn, the contested nature of state manager foreign policy preferences also triggers enquiry

¹⁶As Margaret Weir notes in a discussion of employment policy as it developed in the Roosevelt New Deal, it is important to account for the degree of fit between policy ideas and the material interests of key stakeholders in society. In this way, it is possible to avoid a stale debate between those who feel ideas are the driving force in history, and those who feel that material interests dominate. Instead, Weir offers a perspective that seeks to account for periods of policy innovation in terms of the "bounded innovation" within a constraining historical trajectory. Weir argues that some ideas can, for temporary -- tactical reasons -- become ascendant, even when the broader trajectory of the policy debate is tending towards the lesser likelihood of such policy ideas prevailing. Thus the temporary needs of state managers, as they bargain with powerful social forces, can force tactical retreats, even though in the long run social forces may be losing the strategic contest with state managers. See Weir 1992: 188-216.

into domestic political activism in opposition to official policy. Each of these issues draws to the centre the domestic sources of an international policy orientation.

The model outlines the factors that influence the changing foreign policy preferences of state managers. This perspective outlines the dynamic interplay of state manager prerogatives and domestic social forces which together form the bases for foreign policy priorities and actions. In focusing on the Cold War, this model addresses the key structuring element in the post-World War II international system. It also addresses two key aspects of the post-war setting: (1) the importance of US hegemonic power to international change; and (2) the impact of the competition with the Soviet Union on the closure of foreign policy debates in the United States.

This study emphasizes the mediated nature of state manager perceptions of international phenomena. The structures which mediate these perspectives are the policy network linking state managers to domestic society, and the governing consensus articulated by state and societal elites which define the stakes of foreign policy. This policy network legitimizes participation in foreign policy debates, punishes departures from "acceptable" perspectives on external interests, and channels debate on government priorities in directions congenial to established centers of power.

A broader theme addressed in this dissertation is the relationship of apprehensions of international change to notions of perception and confrontation with empirical reality. In this direction, this dissertation discusses the governing consensus as a blind, or structural analog, that inhibits action directly in response to emerging events. In launching complex responses to external phenomena, state managers may actually be involved in parametrically rational

behaviour,¹⁷ that is, actions launched with the assumption that the external environment does not respond in anticipation of purposive behaviour.¹⁸

The two-sphere (domestic and international) quality of state manager actions is partially responsible for this phenomenon. It is at least possible, however, to envision a different orientation to external change. Witness Jon Elster's discussion of strategically rational behaviour:

the crucial fact is that human actors not only make their choices on the basis of expectations about the future.... This is the true Leibnizian monad, each individual reflecting the totality from his point of view. The transparency and symmetry of this (parametric) interaction ensures that the fate of the actors is in their own hands, whereas a community of parametrically rational actors will be in the grip of forces that elude them and that perpetually make their plans come to naught (Elster 1984: 19).

Adaptation of state manager policymaking to this approach to foreign policy would face obstacles from the self-serving interpretations of external interests endemic to state manager

¹⁷This complexity is revealed through the model's treatment of the governing consensus' filtering of acceptable views. A secondary phenomenon is the selective entry of critical discourses into the policy network. The exact mechanisms of this differential filtering are addressed in the case study.

¹⁸The conception used here derives from Jon Elster's important work, Ulysses and the Sirens. Elster defines parametrically rational action in the following manner:

The parametrically rational actor treats his environment as a constant, whereas the strategically rational actor takes account of the fact that the environment is made up of other actors, and that he is a part of their environment, and that they know this, etc. In a community of parametrically rational actors each will believe that he is the only one whose behaviour is variable, and that all the others are parameters for his decision problem. Acting upon these inconsistent beliefs the actors will generate unintended consequences of the kind explored by social scientists from Marx to Keynes. [p. 18]

behaviour. It would also face the obstacle of policy network inertia in the opposite direction, away from clear-eyed views of complexity towards narrow self-interest and zero-sum formulations of conflict.

In Vietnam an oscillation between strategically and parametrically rational behaviour is visible in the evolution of US policy positions. The doctrine of containment inhibited the flexibility of policy discourse necessary for a novel interpretation of the challenge of North Vietnam to enter legitimated debate within the policy network. Similarly, the demonization of the Soviet Union further buttressed the closure of the governing consensus to novel perspectives and new facts pertaining to international relations.

Prevailing understandings of international relations inhibited the emergence of a transcendent and strategically rational perspective on the Cold War. In this way, US Vietnam policy became the implementation of a pre-ordained political construction project, with the critical stakes, values and meanings already pre-identified by the concepts of the governing consensus. As a hegemonic power, the United States enjoyed a historically unique capacity to tailor the behaviour of a subordinate national actor to its broader Cold War purposes. Its material superiority fed the New Frontier's activist commitment to "pay any price, and bear any burden" in pursuit of US foreign policy objectives.

The formation of US foreign policy preferences during this period represents a case study of the way that assessments of international conditions are resistant to change. The resistance of the governing consensus to domestic elite criticism highlights the closed nature of foreign policy evolution in the presence of a robust policy network and ruling ideology.

In the context of a "new world order", the findings of this study illustrate the conceptual and cognitive hurdles facing state managers as they attempt to cope with a rapidly changing international scene. In particular, the weaknesses of realism's focus on the international system as the arbiter of international outcomes highlights the promise of a more nuanced analytical approach that examines domestic political and social forces as the origins of state manager foreign policy preferences.

The findings of this study also illustrate that complexity is inescapable in the prosecution of foreign policy. Discourses are always conditional, and subject to contextual peculiarities. Social forces and political elites possess only privileged access, not privileged wisdom, with respect to shifting international conditions. The next section situates this interpretive approach to international relations against the assumptions of political realism. It then introduces insights from the comparative politics literature that illuminate the complex relationship between state managers and civil society. Lastly, this discussion introduces the political and social origins of the New Frontier approach to foreign policy, which form the substance of chapter two.

REALISM, NEOREALISM, AND PATTERNS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Realist analyses form the core of the conventional wisdom in foreign policy and international politics. Realism claims to describe in objective terms the interest-based behaviour of nation-states in foreign policy. As is argued above, however, the behaviour of others needs to be **perceived** through a framework, or at least **interpreted** through an

analytical lens. From this standpoint, realism -- in its various guises -- constitutes that lense. Realism can thus be judged in terms of the explanatory and interpretive qualities that it brings to a varied subject matter.

Realist analysis argues four key concepts, or themes, which are used to describe processes of international change. These four themes: the assumption of international anarchy; the logic of actor self-help; the assumption of utility maximization and, the preeminence of security issues over other concerns, are argued to provide an exhaustive account of trends in international relations. Realism also argues that the system-level provides constraints, within which national foreign policies take shape (Waltz 1979). As the discussion which opened this chapter made clear, the conceptualization of these constraints in domestic political debates is an inherently ideological exercise. As such, the question of the veracity of the themes themselves can be separated from the way that perspectives on international relations are used by state managers to defend themselves from domestic political influences. Put another way, state managers may find a picture of a dangerous external setting **helpful** in their defense of their decisional prerogatives from domestic critics. The discussion that follows outlines the way that Realism explains these four dominant themes, and draws them together in a broad description of Neorealist theorizing on international politics.

Four Themes of Political Realism¹⁹

Political realism has traditionally described the interstate system as in a state of anarchy. Realists argue that the key actors in international relations are nation-states (Morgenthau 1977). These states are also argued to be functionally identical to one another. This last assumption allows realist scholars to generalize about actor motivations across time and space, thus lending to their theories a universalist quality.

Realist theory argues that the four dominant attributes of the international environment identified above militate against sustained periods of global peace. Realism's central problematique -- accounting for the occurrence and persistence of international conflict -- has predisposed analytical concentration on the international system, giving domestic (internal societal) processes relatively lesser treatment.

This underestimation of the importance of national level political forces is the result of the absence within realism of a rigorous theory of the state. State-society relations as determinants of foreign policy are similarly ill-treated. Realism's single-minded focus on the

¹⁹This critique is directed toward US scholarship on international politics. As is noted elsewhere in the text, classical realism, predominantly articulated by British scholars such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, offered a broader concept of international society. International society, rather than anarchy, clearly denotes an ordered -- though unpredictable -- political setting. For a broader discussion of the differences between British and US IR scholarship built around a debate over differences in international and political theory, see Robert H. Jackson, "Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life," *Millennium*, (Summer 1990), Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 261-270. Jackson's discussion is somewhat unfair to Wight, but it does highlight the differing intellectual agendas of US and British scholars. Wight's discussion of differences in the international realm is criticized because Jackson feels that a single political theory can define action at both the domestic and international levels.

state as a single utility-maximizing actor clouds its view of other influential sources of foreign policy preferences. Social forces in domestic society -- and contention between them and state managers -- can account for much of the debate on foreign policy in modern nation-states. Realism's neglect of this fact seriously weakens it as an explanatory framework for patterns in world politics.

The Assumption of International Anarchy

Political realists discuss anarchy as a situation where no overarching power exists in the international system that orders relations among nation-states.²⁰ Related to this discussion is the idea that the interaction between nation-states is close to, or actually zero-sum in quality. The pursuit of security and advantage by one state is said to necessarily disadvantage its neighbors. The result is a perpetual conflict between states -- where states oppose the drives for hegemony characteristic of the system's most powerful actors.

Realist theory offers at least two explanations for the pursuit of hegemony by great powers, as well as by other nation-states. First, more classically informed scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Martin Wight trace the aggression of states to a "will to power"

²⁰Classical realism discusses a conflictual setting, characterized by a war of all against all. This terminology, borrowed from Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1651 [1909]), captures the mechanism that realism asserts drives international relations - the pursuit of power. Realist scholars' use of this notion is problematic, as the idea fails to come to grips with sustained periods of cooperation between states on non-security issues. For the most famous statement of the classical realist position, see Morgenthau 1977.

inherent in human nature.²¹ The individual characteristics of human beings are thus 'mapped' to the national level -- and state actors are said to take on the aims, goals and aspirations of their 'strong leader'.²²

A second explanation offered by scholars who argue a more explicitly positivist position roots the aggression of states in the systemic conditions that they confront in the international system.²³ Each of these approaches argues that human conflict in the international realm is concerned with the possession and utilization of finite material stakes. In a variation on the discussion of a zero-sum international context, these formulations argue that compromise on security necessarily represents compromise on the most closely held values of state elites (Snidal 1986).

²¹The contrast between this view of international conflict and that of neorealism is discussed at length below. At this point note can be taken, however, that the two perspectives are not necessarily incompatible - but nor is one approach readily reducible to the other.

²²Bruce Bueno de Mesquita defends the strong leader assumption in his book, The War Trap. This text comprises an expected utility theory of decision making that argues for states as utility maximizers agents with respect to foreign policy. See Bueno de Mesquita 1981.

²³These scholars now self-consciously refer to themselves as neorealists. Based on the work of Kenneth Waltz, neorealist international theory purports to place the insights of political realism on a sounder epistemological footing. These formulations use either explicit or implicit neoclassical economic reasoning as a way of describing the mechanisms that produce patterns in international relations. For neorealists, the great powers are oligopolists interacting in a structured manner analogous to an imperfectly competitive market. Kenneth Waltz offered an influential formulation of this position. His model defined a major debate in international theory. For a sample of this debate, see Keohane 1986, and Olson and Groom 1991.

The penalty for cooperation with actors who then fail to reciprocate is held to be potential removal from the international (game) system as an independent actor (Stein 1990).²⁴ Given the overwhelming incentives to defect from cooperative agreements, mutual distrust and disaffection are seen as the normal condition underlying interaction in the international system.

When one attempts to address the behaviour of the international system's most capable actors from this perspective, one sees that arms races, periods of cold war and recurrent crises in interstate relations are predictable outcomes. Coincidentally, the pursuit of advantage by each actor also leads to the undermining of security for other actors. The lack of an overarching power in the global system ensures that a putative hegemon will attempt to structure that environment according to its values and preferences (Gilpin 1981: 210).

This perspective assumes a good deal of divergence between actors on the substance of national values and preferences. More specifically, realism assumes radically different perceptions of national values by state managers. Without conceptualizing the sources of these varying perceptions, realism is unable to adequately explain cooperation and conflict in the interstate system. The fight for hegemony among great powers thus becomes a conflict between different ordering principles within a chaotic, but not anarchic, setting (Stein 1990: 87-88).

²⁴This position is argued in Kenneth Oye 1986. For a discussion of the significant issues involved in interstate relations, see "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies", in Oye 1986, pp. 1-24; and Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, pp. 226-254 in the same volume.

The Logic of Self-Help

Because of international anarchy, realists argue that actors cannot rely upon others to provide for their security. The conflict over values and interests nascent among great powers is said to create a fundamental problem for global political stability. Conflicts between great powers affect others in the international system far more than is reciprocally the case.²⁵ As such, shifts in power among the key actors of the state system are said to cause broader changes in the borders, prerogatives and policies of smaller states.

From the vantage point of smaller states the imperatives of conflicting ordering principles are probably less important than the necessity of safeguarding their corporate integrity from the effects of great power competition.²⁶ Realist theory sees only a limited number of options for smaller states. In short, they can either bandwagon with an ascendant great power, hoping to gain from that state's victory; or, a small state can hope to join other like-minded actors and balance against a potential hegemon. In this way, smaller states may gain influence during the post-hegemonic war period, when the victors are reordering prevailing patterns of interstate relations (Gilpin 1987: 105).

²⁵The extensive use of microeconomic theory by neorealist scholars treats international stability as an essentially systemic attribute - itself the outcome of interacting egoistic state actors through time. For Kenneth Waltz, for example, the superpowers are viewed as oligopolists who assure a stable international environment due to the inherent stability of duopolistic arrangements - buttressed by stable mutual nuclear deterrence. See Waltz 1979.

²⁶During a great power conflict, neutrality may be impermissible, as was argued by John Foster Dulles during his term as US Secretary of State. The nuclear balance of terror, and the resultant relative irrelevance - due to the nuclear revolution - of allies (as in Waltz 1979), presumably modifies this condition during a cold war.

Actor Utility Maximization

This position is most frequently argued by neorealist scholars. Neorealists argue that the decision rules that states follow when perceiving challenges to their values in the international system involve maximizing some notional utility function.²⁷ States are said to use cost-benefit criteria to weigh the merits of particular policy options. States are also said to use cost benefit reasoning as a way of interpreting the actions of others.

²⁷This aspect of the neorealist position is argued strongly by Arthur Stein in his "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic Society", in Stephen Krasner 1983. This argument is extended by Janice Stein in "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict", *International Journal*, 40, 4 (1986), (pp.599-628). Both these authors describe dilemmas of common aversions and common interests which lead to 'inefficient' decision making and outcomes. Efficiency is evaluated according to neoclassical notions - in particular - pareto optimality. This term describes a situation as pareto optimal to the extent that one party cannot gain from a mutual (general) increase in utility without a bargaining partner being made worse off.

The two dilemmas describe situations where, respectively, states share a dislike for a particular outcome without simultaneously favouring another; and, an eventuality where individual national decision making results in sub optimal outcomes for the parties to a dispute. Under the latter conditions, parties share a favored outcome - which could be achieved if cooperation between them were to occur. For the neorealist position, interdependent decision making is the key to sustained international cooperation. At the same time, this injunction to action is not combined with a discussion of how this altered perception is to be sustained within a multifaceted international relationship. Patterns of elite perception and comprehension must be described if this complexity is to be adequately addressed. One should be able to infer the structure of these factors through a theoretical description of the relationship of elite attitudes on the one hand, and the more general quality of mass opinion on the other. A necessary precursor of such an explanation is some theoretical notion of both the state, and state-society relations. Perspectives of the state which adopt a single egoistic utility maximization model are unable to fulfill these requirements.

The underlying presumption of this argument is that the international system does not allow extensive mutuality of gain. One outgrowth of this perspective is the notion of the security dilemma, which holds that actions taken by one actor to increase its security reciprocally reduce the security of its neighbours, thus resulting in a lower aggregate level of security for all.²⁸ Classical realist analyses adopt a slightly different approach. Rather than asserting that cost benefit analyses guide all important decision making in the international sphere, classical realist perspectives counsel an ethic which it is said should guide the behaviour of statesmen. Termed by political realist scholar Hans Morgenthau as prudence, this orientation towards international relations is both elitist and conservative.

Prudential behaviour is extremely risk averse in its interpretation of international conditions. Strictly speaking, this orientation does not counsel cynicism or mistrust on the part of national leaders. Instead, prudential behaviour encourages statesmen not to take expressions of good intentions at face value. Realism argues for an in-depth examination of the interests that are assumed to lie at the base of state behaviour. In essence, classical realism recommends adoption of a thought experiment - during which a statesman is to seek understanding of a potential opponent's strategic position. It is argued that only from that vantage point is it possible to gain an adequate appreciation of the validity of external threats. Policy responses are to be framed against the "model" of interest based behaviour held by the statesman in his or her own mind.

²⁸For a seminal exposition of this view, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", International Journal, 36, Spring 1982, pp. 357-378.

An outgrowth of this approach is the vulnerability of classical realist scholarship to charges of superficiality in its judgements of political intentions and military capabilities. Any approach that sees all behaviour as based in calculations of interest introduces an a priori bias into models of international conflict. A military establishment configured in a particular situation might be perceived as threatening, irrespective of the political content of that state's policies. The question posed most frequently resembles the following: to what purposes could the military capabilities created in state X be put ? In addition, the acquisition of new military capabilities can also be interpreted as revealing aggressive intentions.

Both classical realist and neorealist perspectives share a conservative and risk averse attitude toward the international environment. The utility maximization assumption inherent to neorealist formulations differs from classical realist perspectives in that it is explicitly positivist.²⁹ In the case of classical approaches, the logic of prudence may lead to highly similar interpretations of international conditions.

²⁹A volume that explicitly reveals this aspect of neorealist theory, is the previously cited, Cooperation Under Anarchy. The extensive use of game theory, and of microeconomic reasoning represents a development of a prior theory, most notably that of Kenneth Waltz. The application of these formulations to international politics accomplishes the central objective - that of analytical rigor. At the same time, however, the sacrifice of clear ethical or purposive guidelines (praxis ?) leads to narrow efficiency criteria superseding the largely unexamined normative basis of political action. The liberal core of neo-classical theory correspondingly achieves a degree of hidden ideological preeminence. See Oye 1986, p. 22.

The Preeminence of Security Concerns

Political realism places great importance on the assertion that international politics has its own functional dynamics and behavioural imperatives. A related presumption is also made in these analyses -- that political military security is a precursor to the achievement of other goals. This argument, together with the concepts of international anarchy, the logic of self help, and that of utility maximization, provide support for the view that military capabilities are the basis for sovereign autonomy.

Classical realist scholars place little emphasis upon the theoretical rigor of their more positivist colleagues.³⁰ Nevertheless, classical realism asserts that a different moral setting exists at the international level, where the sovereign (for our purposes -- those acting in the name of the state) must act to defend rights and prerogatives unilaterally due to the absence of a legitimate overarching authority. Classical scholars also pay special attention to military power as the sine qua non of sovereignty in the international system. Their discussion of an international society ascribes a degree of rule-governed status to international relations that belies neorealism's more general pessimism concerning possibilities for cooperation. This formulation derives much of its persuasiveness from a

³⁰In fact, classical realist scholars frequently voiced hostility toward political scientists involved in behavioural science. Hans Morgenthau was quite vocal on this topic, most specifically in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. One scholar, decidedly not a realist, who objects to the scientific rigor of 'self styled' political scientists, is Anatol Rapoport - who in Strategy and Conscience attacks what he sees as the highly negative moral content of positivist approaches. The prudential aspect of classical realism at least makes an explicit moral argument - which is of course itself subject to moral criticism.

poorly theorized link between domestic resource endowments and actualized political military capabilities.³¹ This lacuna in the literature of political realism thus provides a ready target for new perspectives on patterns in the international system. The second part of this chapter addresses these and related issues.

Both variants of political realism have an understanding of global politics that fails to treat processes internal to nation-states seriously as autonomously important in the structuring of systems-level outcomes. Instead, primary importance is placed upon the structured interaction of essentially similar units. Differences of capability are said to expand or contract the material options available to state managers. It is thus argued that differences in behaviour across the international system are the result of differences in resource endowments. Further, the behaviour of hegemons is held to be different in quality from that of other actors due to the superior ability of hegemons to structure the relations of others in the international system.

Political realism thus contains a specific understanding of the functioning of global politics. It emphasizes hierarchy, status and perpetual competition among states. Because these formulations do not disaggregate the state as an object of study, they leave unaddressed linkages between states and their societies that have great importance for state action in the

³¹Robert Gilpin is one realist author who offers a distinctly more sensitive discussion of the relationship between the economic structures of societies and the state's actualized military capabilities. More broadly, Gilpin focuses upon uneven rates of economic growth as sources for differences in political-military potential. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), chapters one and three.

international realm. The creation of material capabilities for the use of state managers in their competition with others necessarily engenders bargaining between social forces and state elites. Similarly, societal groups that control resources gain significant influence over state manager prerogatives, and over the way that state interests are conceptualized in domestic political discourse.

The drives for hegemony launched by state managers in hegemonic states are thus influenced and constrained by political networks that link them with societal elites. These constraints have theoretical importance because they define the underlying societal conditions under which foreign policy is formulated. Further, if the relationship between state managers and leading social forces is inherently political, then the foreign and defence policy orientations adopted by states are correspondingly influenced by shifts in the balance of social forces within domestic society. The realist concentration upon the global systemic imperatives of state action thus critically understates the importance of social forces to the formation of foreign and defense policies. The projection of national power through foreign policy is dependent upon the resources at the disposal of state managers. State managers gain access to societal resources through a variety of means, as conceptualized in the model that began this chapter. Conceptions of the state, and of the way that social forces influence state policies are important to a fuller understanding of state manager policy preferences. The next section offers some insights from the literature of comparative politics on these and related themes.

DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE

Political realism thus argues a fairly consistent position on the nature of the state as an actor in international politics. States are defined as the agency that enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate utilization of violence within a discrete geographic area. Beyond the idea that the state represents an organized facility for violence, the state as an institution is sometimes understood to be under the limited influence of domestic political and social forces. It is evident then, that the necessary compromises that state managers make in their activities within state bureaucracies lead to real opportunities for domestic social forces to influence broad orientations and policy. Plainly, groups of state managers can choose to foster alliances between themselves and stakeholders within society at large. These societal stakeholders also gain important influence over the views and biases of those state elites with whom they deal most closely.

This insight can be extended into a more thoroughgoing discussion of the influence patterns linking state managers with societal groups. The structure and pattern of these relationships may vary across different issue areas, as those agents within society that hold particular views and interests themselves differ. In questions of the material security of the state, realist conceptions of an anarchic external setting provide powerful self-referential arguments which favour the autonomy of state managers from societal forces. In order to obtain access to the resources required to prosecute activities in the external system, state managers must involve themselves in bargaining. In order to maintain domestic political support for their preferred policies. These relationships are addressed in the comparative

politics literature. The next section surveys some examples of this work, and evaluates them in terms of their applicability to the study of international security.

Political realism discusses the state as the basic unit of analysis. In order to assess the relationship, both historical and conceptual, between state managers and their constraining societies it is necessary to explicate a clearer idea of who state managers are - and of how they relate to predominant societal elites. The monopoly of state managers over the legitimated use of violence produces specific roles for those persons occupying military or national security functions. In order to account for differences in civilian and military bureaucratic prerogatives, it is helpful to discuss state managers as being functionally differentiated within state bureaucracies.

The prerogatives, roles and value orientations of these bureaucratic agencies are inscribed within the particular norms of state managers -- as they fulfill the minimum tasks of a structurally defined role. From this perspective, the conception of an international anarchy gains functional utility for state managers charged with defending national security. More specifically, if a shared conception exists that the external environment is dangerous, state managers with responsibilities in this area will be able to claim preferential access to scarce societal resources in pursuit of their espoused goals. For state managers with other responsibilities, national security is frequently discussed as the essential precursor for achieving other goals. In the United States, this view carries considerable political force. The notion of the correct international role for a particular nation-state fulfills the key function of a "gate-keeper", in that those who articulate unacceptable concepts of the status, orientation or responsibilities of their state face a considerable barrier to the achievement or

retention of positions in high office.³² This fact necessarily has a domestic political and social dimension. In their repetitive interaction with societal elites, state managers must show sensitivity to these factors, and are thus vulnerable to influence from outside the state as they attempt to secure regularized and legitimated access to societal resources.³³

This view of an interpenetrated state, with each segment of the state (as functionally differentiated), sensitive to societal stake holders in different issue areas, finds its origins in the work of Charles Tilly. He argues that states perform four basic functions:

³²This approach is at least superficially similar to the work of Richard C. Snyder in the early 1950s. In Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Relations, Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin approach the study of international politics from the vantage-point of attempting to reproduce the understandings of those decision makers involved in a particular historical period. By discussing "internal" factors as influences in foreign policymaking their framework represents a significant advance over more naively realist analyses. Where this dissertation departs from the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin is in its overt recommendation for positivist research methods as a means of "proving" the validity of its theoretical claims. The notion of science argued by these scholars is quite hostile to a more reflexive approach to studying politics. It is also not particularly oriented toward identifying structures of hegemony or discourse that delimit roles. Empirical testing of ideological beliefs by supposedly "value-free" analysts disinterestedly approaching an unchanging subject matter represents an approach epistemologically incompatible with critical and dialectical scholarship. See Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1962.

³³The whole issue of the relative autonomy of the capitalist state was framed initially within Marxist and neo-Marxist literature. Especially important in this regard is the celebrated debate between Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband concerning the autonomy of state managers from the dictates of the capitalist ruling class. See Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet, 1969); and for the Poulantzian rejoinder, see Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973). For a criticism of the functionalism within Poulantzas' book, see David Easton, "The Political System Besieged by the State", Political Theory, vol. 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1981), pp. 303-325.

1. War making: eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have a clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.
2. State Making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories.
3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients.
4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities - war making, state making, and protection (Tilly 1985: 181).³⁴

As state elites carry out these functions, their relations with societal elites take on an increasingly regular and predictable character.

[W]ar Making...led to State Making through the expansion of military organization itself, as a standing army, war industries, supporting bureaucracies, and (rather later) schools grew up within the state apparatus. All of these structures checked potential rivals and opponents. In the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the state apparatus, the managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes. The members of those classes loaned resources, provided technical services, or helped ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, all in return for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies (Tilly 1985: 183).

As a result, the regularized bargaining that developed between state managers and societal elites produced a mutually integrated structure of understandings. The parties to this conceptual bargain, state managers and societal elites, both come to depend upon one another for protection of extant values, non-controversial access to societal resources; and, most

³⁴The most recent development of these ideas is in Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992, (Cambridge: Blackwell 1992).

importantly, the right to allocate those resources in support of purposive action in foreign and security policy.³⁵

In return for a measure of social peace, state managers accept (indeed, have little choice in accepting) the necessary entanglement of domestic social forces in the formation of foreign and domestic policy priorities. State managers must remain sensitive to the external interests of significant domestic social forces in order to maintain a stable and cooperative domestic power base.

The special roles of state managers in defending the national security interests of the state give them powerful professional incentives to pursue autonomy from domestic influences in national security planning. Given the significant resource implications of defence and foreign policy expenditures, there are few grounds to argue for the complete decision making independence of state managers, even in this issue area. It is clear, however, that a perspective on the international system that envisions it as anarchic, is of functional utility to state managers in their perpetual bargaining in domestic society for resources and policy latitude. State managers have an interest in overstating the degree of danger in the international system in order to maximize their policy autonomy and freedom from domestic

³⁵The constraining nature of societal bargains of this type is discussed by Peter Katzenstein in an article concerned with the domestic sources of foreign economic policy. Katzenstein introduces the notion of policy networks to describe the pattern of state society relations which impinges upon state policy making in a particular issue area. Most specifically, Katzenstein asserts that "the governing coalitions of social forces in each of the advanced industrial states find their institutional expression in distinct policy networks which link the public and private sector in the implementation of policy." (Katzenstein 1978: 19).

influences. In this way, they can exercise greater control over domestic political conditions and minimize constraints on their flexibility in foreign policy.³⁶

State manager bargaining with societal elites under these conditions leads to novel institutional and customary forms of decision-making (Ikenberry 1988: 234).³⁷ Different societies enjoy widely varying historical experiences in the international system. Accordingly, the manner in which this experience is reflected in national political and social

³⁶With respect to autonomous state action, the anarchic character of international politics assists the independent behaviour of state managers because of its self confirming articulation of persistent uncertainty in that environment. Stephen D. Krasner finds that state elites in the United States defended a uniform - and distinct - set of goals for an extended period due to this thesis. A state of persistent confrontation with an inherently uncertain external environment helps to foster a more manageable (from the vantage point of interested state managers), policy network domestically. See Krasner 1978.

³⁷In a critical review of the effects of the international system upon domestic regime formation, Peter Gourevitch discusses the substantial and institutional and organizational significance of a nation-state's external environment. In particular, the linkages between international anarchy and the institutional characteristics of state structures are said to be essentially causal. Quoting extensively from Perry Anderson's Lineages of the Absolutist State, Gourevitch argues for the relation of the organizational necessities of modern warfare to the institutional requirements of absolutist rule:

War required more integrated polities, able to elicit loyalty, money and energy from great magnates, middle nobility, merchants, clergymen and peasants. As one state increased its capabilities, that advantage was transmitted through the international system into a requirement for others to develop the same abilities (p. 431).

Note must be taken of how the organizational necessities of warfare are thus elevated to a systems level attribute. Similarly, the significance of warfare to state formation is derivative of a particular mode of production's peculiar crises. See Perry Anderson 1973, and Wallerstein 1974.

institutions also varies widely from country to country. Hegemonic states differ in the ways that their institutions become structured because their relationship to external change is different to that of smaller (less capable) states.

This factor is discussed by Peter Katzenstein and Peter Evans in two different works that address the adaptations of two small states to the international economic environment. Both of these authors pay some attention to the importance of geopolitical factors in constraining the options available to small states. At the same time, however, both authors describe considerable variation in national political structures for states occupying similar international systemic positions.

Peter Katzenstein compares Austria and Switzerland as two states with similar positions in the international division of labour which have quite different patterns of state-society relations. Katzenstein accounts for these differences by arguing that the international system structures domestic political institutions through the foreclosure of options available to state managers. Since both states are argued to be vulnerable to change in the international economy, they cannot adopt orientations to the external system which displace adaptation on to that system. Rather, they are forced to adapt to external change through a more or less constant re-drawing of the boundaries between state and society within their own borders. Similarly, these countries are forced to innovate novel strategies for positioning themselves in the external system in such a way as to minimize vulnerabilities where possible (similar to the minimax strategies discussed by neorealists). As Katzenstein notes:

The strategies they have adopted, the state capacities they have developed, and the ways they have linked the state to other social actors all set the small European democracies apart from larger industrial countries. At the same time, these countries exhibit different patterns of state structure and action among themselves (Katzenstein 1978: 227).

Katzenstein offers a categorization of different policy networks as being "society-centric, or state-centric", depending upon the causal importance of political forces in each realm.

Katzenstein describes Austria as society-centric, because a relatively powerful liberal capitalist ideology makes difficult any intervention by the state into resource allocation decisions within the private economy. Contrarily, Switzerland is described as more state-centric, in that the Swiss state has more actively sought to manipulate political conditions in its own society in specific directions. In particular, the actual absorption of the Social Democratic Party into the state in 1937, is cited as an example of the Swiss state seeking to condition change within its society, in pursuit of a more predictable and quiescent social setting. While there are significant problems with the discussion of two essentially corporatist responses to international vulnerability, the state vs. society-centric perspective offers the benefit of clearly enunciating the variation in societal responses to similar international systemic conditions. One significant problem with this formulation, however, is its relative silence on the issue of timing and ethnographic similarities among states and their neighbours. Without opening a discussion of issues that goes beyond the purview of this analysis, it is clear that the existence of ethnic homogeneity within a society has clear implications for the degree of consensus likely to emerge concerning that society's relationship to change beyond its borders. Similarly, the occurrence of hegemonic wars in

the interstate system can cause the "importance", in geopolitical terms, of particular states to vary across time (and space). Both of these categorizations are necessarily a part of the milieu from which different national responses derive. Interestingly, neither factor is adequately addressed by conventional realist discussions of the international system. These factors both influence the way state managers interpret events in the international environment. The effects of time and space on the assessments of state managers are thus an important part of the analytical framework this group brings to understanding international relations.

Peter Evans shows sensitivity to both of these issues in his approach to state-society relations and shifts in the international division of labour. Evans writes about the close integration (symbiosis) of capitalists and state managers. He argues that this relationship allows state managers to maintain an 'external orientation', so long as basic revenue needs are met.

As Evans argues:

For state officials whose primary orientation is geopolitical, expansion of the state's economic role domestically is likely to have costs both in terms of resources required and in terms of enmeshing the state more in domestic social and political conflicts. As long as domestic economic policy produces the required revenues and as long as its performance provides an adequate base from a 'national security' point of view, minimal intervention goes well with geopolitical preoccupations (Evans 1985: 214).

This discussion resonates with the idea that foreign policy can be the exclusive purview of state elites if they constrain their activism in domestic politics. As such, a system of quid pro quos between state managers and societal elites can support executive autonomy in national

security planning, and meet the needs of capitalists for relatively unfettered control of their assets.

Societal Influences upon State Behaviour

Patterns of mutual dependence exist between the institutional roles occupied by state managers and social forces which control resources and bestow legitimacy within society. The special preoccupations of state managers with national security assist them in arguing for preferential access to scarce resources. The uniqueness of security concerns thus lies within both the subject itself, and in the attitudes of state managers and domestic elites toward that subject. These two phenomena are normally treated separately in the political realist literature. In actuality, however, if social forces are to be taken seriously in the construction of political outcomes at both the international and domestic levels, this treatment must be modified to include state-society relations in models of emergent policy preferences. The conceptual model that began this chapter borrows from Charles Tilly the notion that state managers and societal elites are in continuous dialogue concerning the nature of legitimate political and social action. This dialogue extends to conceptions of political and social action in both the domestic and external spheres. The state is unable to fully organize its society for its own purposes (Tilly 1992: 20). Limitations on both manpower, organizational knowledge and state manager legitimacy all act to constrain state structuring of societal relationships. In turn, the dependence of the state upon society fosters a reciprocal influence relationship, with

key social groupings having an important role in structuring both the formation and content of state policies.

The effectiveness of societal constraints on state manager **perceptions and conceptions** of the politically and socially possible, is the major focus of this study. In foreign policy, the prerogatives of state managers may allow them to dictate, rather than passively accept, conceptualizations of essential security interests. Even here, however, it is reasonable to posit extensive societal influence over the definition of political problems, norms and values. The resource implications of planning for national security, themselves powerful limitations upon the market allocation of capital, foster active political involvement by societal elites.

The key question is thus the following: How do the special prerogatives of state managers in foreign and security policy overlap with the very real opportunities for influence and conceptual bias that accrue to societal elites? Political realism does not approach the problem of understanding international action from this perspective. Instead, realism discusses international relations as the interaction of like units, variously endowed with material capabilities (Stein 1990: 5). The anarchic international setting is said to mandate risk aversion and worst-case planning on the part of state managers. It is also said to punish departures from self-interested behaviour with the extinguishment of sovereign independence (Stein 1990: 6; Downs, Rocke and Siverson 1986: 133).

Contrary to this focus, I argue that the domestic political and social origins of foreign policy are of primary importance. In particular, the political interaction of societal and state elites creates a consensual, value-laden structure of interpretation, according to which

international events are evaluated. The variegated nature of society allows the state a significant ability to shape the public debate on security issues. An important aspect of this ability is the shared perception that the international system is anarchic and dangerous. The recurrence of conflict throughout human history provides apparent confirmation, and retrospective support for this vision.

At any one time it is difficult, if not impossible to fully assess the quality of the relationship between state and society. Analyses that focus upon whether a particular state is 'strong' or 'weak' relative to societal forces frequently fall victim to the fallacy of associating material capabilities with political legitimacy and empowerment. Importantly, it is the routine acceptance of state manager prerogatives by societal elites and masses that establishes the strength of the state as a complex of institutions. As such, the prevailing norms, perspectives and conventional wisdom that define consensual views of the world reflect the acceptable bounds within which state manager behaviour may vary (March and Olsen 1989: 42). Where a society's external or internal interests are perceived (by either social forces or state managers) to be at risk, this prevailing perspective on international conditions provides criteria for assessing success or failure in the achievement of foreign policy goals. These criteria represent domestic political 'potentials', **political conceptions that may be seized upon by groups in society in order to articulate different social or political agendas** which are activated during the push and pull of partisan politics (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 10).

Each of these considerations leads to a greater emphasis upon the particular political understandings of international conditions ascendant in society at any given time. These

perceptions structure interpretations of the possible, and thus influence positions on the legitimacy of state manager behaviour. The relationship of state and society is thus dependent upon the balance of legitimacy, power and interest existing between and among variously contending and cooperating state and societal elites. This perspective of the domestic political environment leads to a novel position on the conditions that structure state-society relations. The approaches evaluated in this chapter counsel a focus upon: (a) the strength of the social forces interested in the issues at stake; (b) the resources at the state's disposal for influencing public opinion; and (c) the type of issue that is the subject of international action.

These considerations point to the contextual dependence of theoretical statements on the relative strength or weakness of state managers. Explicating the link between state manager foreign policy preferences and a dominant discourse on international relations requires an analysis of the dominant foreign policy wisdom of a particular period. This mode of examination also means that findings reached have only limited generalizability across time. Instead, the model identifies emergent factors which have importance during periods of rapid international change.

The next chapter addresses the political environment that formed the New Frontier in US foreign policy. Through a discussion of the social forces involved in the creation of the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy agenda, insights will be offered into the goals that drove US Vietnam policy under President Kennedy. Particular emphasis is placed upon the relationship between oppositionist social forces who opposed a power-politics approach to US foreign policy. The disempowerment of this group, even under a allegedly liberal

president, is key to an understanding of the muted criticism of the critical early decisions of the Kennedy Administration with respect to South East Asia.

CHAPTER 2

SOCIAL FORCES AND FOREIGN POLICY:

PERSISTENT PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE

INTRODUCTION

Establishing the link between social forces and the behaviour of state managers in foreign policymaking requires an extended discussion of the relationship of elites to one another, and of the varying conceptions of international relations abroad in society. In order to address these issues, a focus upon similarities of ideology, social position and articulated perspectives on societal interests is necessary. This discussion analyses the societal bases of the New Frontier. In particular, argumentation in the literature on US foreign policy in the 1960s offers a point of entry into answering these questions. The orientation of the Kennedy Administration toward Vietnam was related to a wider set of elite attitudes and norms abroad among the US' attentive publics. This chapter expands upon this observation by elucidating the ideological and political linkages which underlay the dominant viewpoint regarding the international environment.

In particular, this discussion situates the New Frontier within the societal discourse on US goals and values. As such, it focuses upon rendering clear three critical issues: (a) assessing the degree to which "resource controllers" in US society articulated concrete goals and agendas for action in the global political environment; (b) establishing, where possible,

the linkages between the external activities of corporate actors and the revealed preferences of state managers in decision making on South East Asia; and (c) enunciating a clear inferential link between the attitudes of important societal elites and those of the state managers of the New Frontier.

APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY: SOURCES AND BIASES

A number of authors have written about the interests responsible for the persistent character of US foreign policy. In accounting for the values that bind US society together, it is important to recognize the capitalist nature of the US political economy. This influence upon conceptions of the national interest is an outgrowth of the special needs and prerogatives of capitalists. In turn, it draws strength from capitalists' control over societal surplus, which underwrites the creation of political-military capabilities.

Business interests - more generically termed resource controllers in the last chapter - have long enjoyed significant access to governmental office holders. Over and above the routine placement of former business executives in policymaking positions, the interests of the corporate community enjoy a special privilege in that they are generally seen as functionally necessary for the wider achievement of state goals in a disordered international setting. The nature of this privileging is itself a substantive issue. Richard Barnett focuses upon this, and related themes in his study, Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind US Foreign Policy.

Barnett's analysis discusses the special role of business elites in providing societal

supports for state manager autonomy. In foreign policy, state managers articulate the dominant set of values and causal necessities in the international system for their societies. Business interests in that setting are an important focus of state activity. Due to the serious implications of assaults on the free access of capitalists to markets and investment opportunities, the fate of foreign corporate activities are uppermost in the minds of policymakers. A broader ideological consensus underlies the apparent convergences of interest between state managers and societal elites.

The governing consensus, as is described in chapter one, defines the concepts and causal logics said to obtain in the international setting. For Barnett, one aspect of the domestic ideological consensus is a set of ideas articulated by business elites known as the **business creed** (Barnett 1972: 139). This formulation argues for an identity of interests between capitalists and state managers. In particular, agreement is said to exist upon: (a) the linkages between free movement of capital and US economic and political vitality; and (b) the close relationship between an "appropriate" ordering of the external setting and the fulfillment of US global aspirations. This identity of interests is itself an embedded attribute of a broader elite consensus which aids in managing American society. Barnett defines the business creed in terms that reflect its two-dimensional nature:

Businessmen make two major points in arguing that the expansionist interests of corporations, primarily large corporations, are identical with the national interest. The first concerns the importance of foreign trade. Overseas expansionism is so crucial to the domestic economy, as William Clayton, the world's richest cotton merchant temporarily serving as Assistant Secretary of State, told National Foreign Trade Convention in 1943, that the only alternative to a continuing effort to open up new markets is

"to turn our country into an armed camp, police the seven seas, tighten our belts, and live by the ration books for the next century or so" (Barnet 1972: 139).

The asserted requirement that a harsh authoritarianism be imposed at home in the absence of expansionism abroad, is balanced by the second aspect of the business creed, namely that the "great strength of America [was] her productive capacity and that the maintenance of that strength demand[ed] ever increasing control of critical resources by American corporations" (Barnet 1972: 139).

This view of the international needs of American capitalism thus provides an instrumental rationale for the US state to become active in the international environment in defence of the external interests of its most important societal constituents -- the resource controllers. This interest is anticipated in chapter one. Similarly, however, the existence of understandings and customary interpretations of correct behaviour in defence of stated interests further structures foreign policy formulation. In particular, that structuring is influenced by the prevailing ethos of business as the most highly valued social activity of US society. As Barnet also remarks, "[i]t is curious that the ideology of the free-enterprise system should have taken such a hold in the United States at the very moment that the nation was for all practical purposes abandoning the system in favour of a highly managed, subsidized economy." (Barnet 1972: 140) The persistence of this ethos in the presence of economic and social trends to the contrary, is used by Barnet to argue for the essentially self-affirming and closed nature of the American political agenda.

The values that influenced foreign policy thus draw strength from their links to social forces in US society. In particular, the arguments embedded within the business

creed regarding the nature of human motivations to action - and the contingent definition of freedom -- are important to the underlying strength of the perspective.

According to the business creed, man can be motivated to help society only by being encouraged to help himself. Experiments which seek to inculcate community loyalty and collective responsibility on some basis other than the profit motive are dismissed as hopelessly "romantic" by such sophisticated exponents of the business creed as W.W. Rostow (Barnet 1972: 144).

A second aspect of the business creed argues for the indivisibility of the principle of freedom in human action, with predictable implications for the defence of "freedom-loving" peoples worldwide:

The second tenet of the business creed is that freedom is indivisible. It is often tempting to be cynical about such rhetoric, especially since the "free world," including as it does the Thieu regime in Saigon, the dictatorship in Taipei, and the brutal military juntas in Greece and Brazil, is obviously an honorary association in which freedom is not a requirement of membership. But just as the imperial creed of the national security manager cannot be understood without taking the "rule of law" seriously enough to seek its exact meaning, so we also need to look more closely at the "indivisibility" of freedom....

Nations cannot maintain free enterprise economies except within a system of capitalist states. When nations abandon the capitalist system, particularly when they withdraw from the "free world", such revolutionary acts of defiance are contagious. The further divisibility of freedom is likely to follow. The United States, despite its enormous power, will not be able to maintain its domestic freedom if it is politically and economically isolated from the rest of the world (Barnet 1972: 144).

This last element provides a critically important linkage between the external foreign

policy behaviour of state managers on the one hand, and the predominant value-orientation of capitalists at home, on the other. If the safeguarding of a liberal, open and capitalist global economic system is fundamental to the patterns of accumulation prevalent in the United States, the discussion in the model of state manager defence of social force prerogatives for resource extraction reasons is strengthened considerably.³⁸

Thus, the business creed asserts a symbiotic relationship between domestic and international patterns of economic activity. In turn, it holds that the accumulation patterns of domestic capital -- in terms of the necessary conditions under which profitable business operations can take place -- are themselves dependent on continuing (and expanded) access for US business interests to international investment and market opportunities. The question arises as to the means available for state managers to protect each of these domestic priorities. Self-interest on the part of state managers, given the dependence of the state upon domestic social forces (i.e., the resource controllers) for the maintenance of its access to material and other resources, means that some convergence of national and "corporate" interests is easily anticipated. As the model makes clear, however, domestic capital does not dictate the conditions under which the state acts on its

³⁸The foreign policy implications of this position are starkly visible in the history of foreign interventions launched by the executive branch on the behalf of commercial interests. As Barnett lists them, the overthrow of the Mosadegh regime in Iran in 1953, the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, later covert support for anti-Communist officials in both Vietnam and elsewhere all are indicative of the extent to which US interventions in developing countries can be structured by business priorities.

behalf. Rather, the entire process of action on behalf of unproblematic "national interests" derives its legitimacy from the customary interpretations of appropriate political and social action which themselves are the outgrowth of the dialectical interaction of social forces with the state.

This formulation of state-society relations emphasizes particular aspects of the external (international) environment which are believed to place the material interests of large corporate interests at risk. Prominent among these was, of course, the expansion of a political movement bent on reducing the geographic spread of capitalism, and upon simultaneously removing and nationalizing US investments in newly de-colonized areas of the developing world. In this respect, the Soviet Union and China represented ideologically important factors in the assessments of important social forces in American society -- and thus threats to the societal consensus underlying state-society relations in the United States.

In defence of this domestic complex of values and orientations, the US state acted in ways anticipated in the conceptual framework introduced in the first chapter of this study. The scale of US dependence on foreign investments and trade is an important aspect of assessing the seriousness with which state managers would view these threats. As was argued above, the state managers of the period shared with dominant social groups the belief that economic efficiency and accumulation were primary influences in determining the destiny of US and international society. In terms of the profit potential of the largest US corporations, significant dependence upon the global market is apparent from an description of trends extant between 1950 and 1964:

Between 1950 and 1964, United States commodity exports, including sales of overseas facilities of US corporations, rose nearly 270 per cent, while commodity sales at home increased only 125 per cent. Expectedly, earnings on foreign investments make up a rising portion of after-tax corporate profits -- ten per cent in 1950, and 22 per cent in 1964. In the strategic capital goods sector of the United States economy, military and foreign purchases account[ed] for a surprisingly large share of total output -- between 20 and 50 per cent in twenty-one of twenty-five industries, and over 80 per cent in two industries (O'Connor 1971: 48).

Other indications of the dependence of US capital upon overseas remittances are also available. From the expansion of international banking, to the extensive patterns of US foreign investment in Europe and Asia, capitalism in the United States was becoming more and more integrated into global patterns of economic activity. As such, the interrelationship of state and capitalist interests took on an increasingly expansive meaning. It is evident that the US government viewed it as its role to defend the openness of the international system to liberal trade and investment activities. In turn, the interventionism inherent in this position struck a responsive chord in the desire of the US political elite to secure its special prerogatives as the most materially capable governmental actor in the world (Kimball 1990: 279). As Barnett observed, "businessmen were enthusiastic supporters of interventionist techniques developed by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations" (Barnett 1972: 148). It is, correspondingly, tenable to argue that linkages exist between the predominant values of business elites in the United States and the foreign policy orientation of state managers. The question still exists, however, of the degree to which this convergence of perspective actually produced specific policy

outcomes. This question is potentially unanswerable, due to the difficulty in reconstructing a "paper trail" between the articulated views of business leaders and specific decision making by state managers. At the same time, however, it is possible to extend the prior discussion into a slightly more focused perusal of examples of US policy in areas where corporate interests were prominent.

POLICY OUTCOMES AND BUSINESS INTERESTS

The linkages between business interests and policy proposals are necessarily indirect. Policy formulation is a process involving the institutional legacies and prerogatives of groups of state managers and the articulated self-interests of social forces (Immergut 1992: 66). In the presence of an ideological setting that focuses foreign policy in defence of material interests, defence expenditures and foreign assistance planning will inevitably have a particular character (Viotti & Kauppi 1987: 201-202). Barnett describes the Marshall Plan as a preeminent example of this sort of policy (Barnett 1972: 152). In describing the needs of the US corporate community in the early Cold War period, Barnett quotes the then Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers as follows:

Without new foreign aid, Europe is threatened with starvation and disease; lack of raw materials and equipment impede further recoveries in agricultural and industrial production. Moreover, Europe would be forced into an entirely different character of production and a reorientation of trade. European resources would have to be organized in such a manner that all but the most

essential imports from the Western Hemisphere were dispensed with. This would have a detrimental influence on a number of our important industries which have been accustomed to considerable export to Europe (Barnet 1972: 152).

The situation in Europe at the end of World War II was thus seen as extreme enough that the adoption of autarkic policies in Europe might do serious injury to US economic interests. Interests placed at risk by such events in Europe could not help but be negatively affected by similar occurrences in the developing world.

In the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, US overseas assistance policies had an at least partially economic/strategic rationale. Most importantly, US agricultural assistance policies were overtly directed toward establishing commercially advantageous positions for US farmers. Mandated in the Public Law 480 program, this initiative was designed to "increase the consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes." (Barnet 1972: 153; Magdoff 1969: 135) This program, an important element of agricultural assistance efforts launched by the United States in developing countries -- financed over 29 per cent of its farm exports between 1955 and 1959. As Barnet notes, over 42 per cent of US aid flows fell into the export financing envelope (Barnet 1972: 153).

These factors in US aid policy in the 1950s are, when joined with the basic elements of the business creed enunciated above, indicative of a specific orientation to engagement in the international system. State managers seek to influence patterns of outcomes in the global political environment in directions which favour their domestic

societal political/economic supporters.³⁹ As such, the structure of state-society relations, or more specifically -- the main interests reflected in foreign policy measures -- are representative of particular analyses of external conditions.

For the Kennedy Administration, a similar articulation of US interests in the international system is visible. As John Kennedy stated, "Foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world, and sustains a good many countries which could definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc" (Remarks by President Kennedy before the Economic Club of New York City, December 1962).

As such, the rationales for foreign aid were similar to those offered for other foreign policy measures aimed at stabilizing the global political environment, and preventing the expansion of communist control among developing countries. This convergence of objectives supports the observation that foreign aid decision making in pursuit of external stakes articulated predominantly by state managers also fulfills a subsidiary objective -- that of safeguarding the interests of social forces in the external sphere -- an expectation derived from the conceptual framework.

It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the neat division assumed by political realism between economic and "national security" interests is not particularly

³⁹An additional example of this sort of policy measure is the Hickenlooper amendment, a legal requirement which forbids the President from sending foreign aid to any country that nationalizes US property without paying "adequate" levels of compensation. In this case, adequacy is assessed by the US firms most directly affected (See Barnett, 1972: 155).

useful when it comes to analysis of the links between business attitudes and state manager behaviour. The substance of the links lies instead in the prevailing ideology of societal elites -- that is -- in the business creed. No simple cause and effect relationship between resource controller attitudes (orders) and foreign policy measures (state behaviour) should be expected. In fact, the lack of clear linkages of this type is what allows many critics of radical analyses -- those that identify ideological influences in US foreign policy -- to dismiss such studies of political conditions as unrigorous or biased.

The empirical material presented above seeks to demonstrate the face validity of explanations which tie US foreign policy to the needs of domestic social forces, a point that is emphasized in the model. At the same time, the links between business and government allow for the extension of this perspective on state-society contacts into the context of national security writ large. As Barnett notes, the most significant portion of national security policy concerns the magnitude of defence expenditures (Barnett 1972: 163). As such, the situation at the end of the 1950s is of particular importance, as it relates to the perceived room for manoeuvre felt by the Kennedy Administration due to its belief in Keynesian economic instruments (Gaddis 1982: 204).

As Gaddis notes, after the fiscal conservatism of the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy sought to expand the means available to the United States for the aggressive prosecution of the Cold War. Essential to such a reorientation of policy was an ideological/scientific rationale for an expanded degree of budgetary flexibility. This was supplied by an articulated link between expanded government expenditures (both foreign and domestic) and positive improvements in economic growth. As Paul Samuelson wrote

in a report prepared for the Kennedy transition team. "any stepping up of these (defence and foreign aid) programs that is deemed desirable for its own sake can only help rather than hinder the health of our economy in the period immediately ahead." (Gaddis 1982: 204) The connection between this viewpoint and policy in South East Asia is made more clear by an acknowledgement that the communist threat in South East Asia was specifically identified within the business creed as a direct challenge to the free access of American capital to investment and sales opportunities. As the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars argued in 1970, the linkages between US capitalism and the expansion of the US' military potential were intimate:

An interventionist, anti-Communist foreign policy requires a large military machine. US military spending is currently about \$ 80 billion a year, enough to absorb almost all personal income tax payments (which totalled \$ 90.5 billion in 1969). About half of military spending, or \$ 36.4 billion in fiscal 1969, goes to defense contractors. Like foreign profits, defense contracts are concentrated in the hands of a few large corporations: two-thirds of all Pentagon contracts go the hundred largest contractors. To a great extent these are the same companies that benefit from foreign investment (Kimball 1990: 276).

Economic imperialism is frequently used to explain patterns in US foreign policy.⁴⁰ While the excesses of functionalist explanation which abound in this literature

⁴⁰Magdoff 1969 offers an insightful analysis of the economic underpinnings of US foreign behaviour. Magdoff emphasizes the interaction between state interests and corporate prerogatives in the developing world. As is emphasized in this discussion, the potential for US activity in the interstate system is actually enhanced by the actions of its citizens or corporate actors. As such, simple extensions of the activities of societal stake holders (capitalists) beyond national borders can provide new conduits for exercising control over foreign economies, in addition to the expected "defensive" responses to expropriation of US-controlled assets overseas.

are well known targets of realist criticism, some points can be made on this topic without extending the point too far. First, US policy is, as was argued above, related to the distribution of resources and markets throughout the world. This is necessarily the case because of the dependence of state managers upon aggregated capital controlled by domestic social forces. The requirements of a capitalist economy are a necessary part of the provision of resources to the state. It is inevitable then, that economic interests will enter into the decision making of state managers, whether or not they are lobbied by business elites (Kimball 1990: 295). Stephen Krasner's work in the natural resource sector has amply demonstrated the salience of relatively independent material resource interests articulated by US state managers over an extended period (Krasner 1979).

Similarly, the links between imperialism and war are related to issues which go beyond the relative efficacy of military keynesianism:

In the past, foreign investors have been somewhat wary of the over-all political prospect for the [Southeast Asia] region. I must say, though, that the US actions in Vietnam this year - which have demonstrated that the US will continue to give effective protection to the free nations of the region - have considerably reassured both Asian and Western investors. In fact, I see some reason to hope that the same sort of economic growth may take place in the free economies of Asia that took place in Europe after the Truman doctrine and after NATO provided a protective shield. The same thing also took place in Japan after the US intervention in Korea removed investor doubts (Magdoff 1969: 176).

The linkage is correspondingly close between the geopolitical preferences of state

managers and the self-assessed needs of capitalists. It is important that this point not be underestimated in importance. In essence, the ideological convergence of state managers in their institutional positions and business elites/resource controllers in theirs provided the framework for the expansion of the US state. No countervailing perspective on the needs of American society was permitted to emerge. This study's theoretical model places great emphasis upon the material needs of state managers in foreign policy being assured. As such, the convergence thesis argued here again gives support to the relative license available to state managers in both their articulation and defence of external interests where those actions are perceived, a priori, to privilege the basic outlines of the elite societal bargain supporting state power.

From this perspective, the implementation of the containment doctrine by successive US Administrations always carried within it an inevitable tension between the ideological qualities inherent to the state-society bargain and the privileged discourse on national security articulated by state managers. State managers had a superior ability to call upon the resources of their society, because of the convergence of their view of their international system with the overarching influence of the business creed. This was true, even in the presence of significant domestic societal interests whose material positions would in the long run be undermined by a large expansion in defence expenditures.

From a different perspective, the New Frontier group was able to use the contrasting interests of domestic social forces in order to expand the resources available for national security policy. Both fiscal conservatives and domestic liberals were

interested in the drain of government expenditures on the domestic economy.

Conservatives opposed the government's increasing its share of the overall economy through higher taxes and increasing fiscal expenditures. Correspondingly, domestic liberals wished to use the federal government's fiscal capabilities for domestic social welfare purposes and wealth redistribution. While apparently in conflict, these goals became complementary when the Kennedy Administration adopted an expansive approach to fiscal policy which emphasized Keynesian management of aggregate demand.

Keynesian economic theory promised a way out of a potentially serious financial dilemma. How was the state to expand the resources available for national security programs without provoking domestic conservatives with higher taxes? Keynesianism argued that the necessary increases in national security expenditures would also increase economic growth, and reciprocally the size of societal surplus. In this way, increased government expenditures could constitute a *diminishing* share of national income, whilst still providing increased resources for the pursuit of domestic justice and equity. This, at least, was the promise that the New Frontier used to shield itself from criticism from both its left and right flanks. In doing so, foreign policy elites gained considerable room to manoeuvre regarding the future implications of their seemingly short-term diplomatic strategies.

The significance of the convergence between the business creed and the governing consensus is further evident in the discussions of the period of the strategic importance of South East Asia. The "domino theory" carried within it important defence-industrial and material resource implications, as the following passage authored by Gabriel Kolko

makes clear:

The loss of Indochina, Washington formally articulated in 1952, "would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences...the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progressively follow....It would "render the US position in the US offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental US security interests in the Far east." The "principal world source of natural rubber, tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities" would be lost in Malaya and Indonesia. The rice exports of Burma and Thailand would be taken from Malaya, Ceylon, Japan and India. Eventually, there would be "such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism" (Kimball 1990: 282).

While the logical extension necessary in this formulation is disturbing, the portrayal does not do violence to the beliefs articulated within the business creed, and in fact understates the degree to which US business elites saw the global economy as potentially closed to them if the "free world" was seen to shrink significantly. To amplify a point made in the preceding discussion, particular corporate interests in support of specific foreign policy measures in Vietnam need not be present for the influence of the business creed to be felt. In short, the ideological convergence described in the preceding discussion is powerful enough to structure the anticipation of threats -- in addition to the instrumental responses

themselves.⁴¹

At the global level, the earliest periods of international regime building (evidenced in the creation of the GATT, NATO, the IMF and World Bank, and the related understandings which underpinned the Bretton Woods monetary system), can be interpreted as US-led responses to global disorder. These institutions were designed to create an ordered environment within which second order goals, such as economic growth and peaceful international relations, could be pursued over the longer term. Early US support for the United Nations Organization was perhaps the leading example of this sort of measure, enjoying as it did considerable support among US foreign policy elites. That support did not survive the emergent unmanageability of the UN for US nationally-defined purposes. As such, the shift of focus of the United States toward more unilateral policies can itself be interpreted as a retreat toward institutions of its creation which responded more efficaciously (from the vantage point of US state managers) to the orientation toward international change evidenced within the dominant foreign policy agenda of the United States.⁴²

⁴¹In fact, the preceding discussion of defence contractors as primary beneficiaries of the increase in military spending understates the considerable controversy concerning the importance of this spending to overall economic performance in a society. The linkages are not all one way, though the skewing of economic decision making by a high concentration of society's material resources may lead to the systematic underinvestment in other, "more productive", areas. In terms of technological innovation, it is sometimes argued that the defence budget serves as a surrogate industrial policy in a US ideological context that will not tolerate a more overt social democratic policy initiative.

⁴²A similar point concerning international regimes is made by Joanne Gowa 1983. With particular reference to the international political economy, Gowa finds that the US'

To this point emphasis has been placed upon establishing the validity of the thesis that the resource controller-state manager relationship is itself inscribed in an ideology known as the business creed. In turn, the relationship of the business creed to the governing consensus has been described as the convergence of state manager prerogatives and the requirements of capitalist accumulation. The next section discusses an additional factor that influences the behaviour of state managers as they fulfill their roles in foreign policymaking - the fact that they - as a group - are recruited from the class of professionals who operate large corporations in the private sector.

BUSINESS ELITES AS STATE MANAGERS

The exercise of state power by members of the social group which controls corporate capital is an intriguing variation on the old question of the mechanisms that separate public and private power. It is not always clear where the ends of public policy lie -- and where the private interests of corporate actors emerge. The business creed supplies a crucial simplification device for reconciling these two phenomena - it argues for their functional identity (Barnet 1972: 176).

abandonment of the gold exchangeability in 1971 was tied to the domestic political and economic consequences of such a decision for diminishing state manager (executive branch) autonomy. At a broader level, the Cold War was importantly a setting - within which the United States sought to manage international change. The institutions through which it acted were of changing utility for US purposes as the domestic (US) political environment placed different emphases upon emerging trends in the international setting.

The discussion above situates the business creed as an aspect of the governing consensus that structures the values state managers seek to advance in foreign policy. The similar social origins of business and state elites are indicative of a broader network of influences at large in society. The linkages between business and state elites derive from the peculiar origins of those who have held the highest offices in the state during the routine formulation of national security policy.

As Richard Barnet ably demonstrates, the persistence of the business creed is further exemplified by the shared origins of the principal decisionmakers:

If we look at the men who have held the very top positions, the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of State and Defense, the Secretaries of the three services, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the CIA, we find that out of ninety-one individuals who held these offices during the period between 1940 and 1967, seventy of them were from the ranks of big business or high finance, including eight out of ten Secretaries of Defense, seven out of eight Secretaries of the Air Force, every Secretary of the Navy, eight out of five Directors of the CIA, and three out of five Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (Barnet 1972: 179).

In order to avoid a caricature of the complex relationship between state manager roles and business decision makers, it is necessary to remain focused on the nature of the functions these different groups fulfill. It is not that the business community names those holding the highest positions within the state. The model and ancillary discussion in this chapter have argued for the supremacy of state managers in conceptualizations of the causal processes of the interstate system. Instead, similarities of ideology, and the symbiosis

inherent to the societal positions of capitalists and state managers, lead to extensive interpenetration at the elite level of both groups. Thus, to extend Barnett's insight, the fact that "the Kennedy Administration appointed a few well connected academics but most of the foreign policy posts on the New Frontier were filled by reaching back for the bankers, oil entrepreneurs and managers of high technology industry of the Truman era," is more indicative of the attitudinal convergences inherent to the Cold War (and hence the evolving articulation of the governing consensus and its contingent business creed), than it is of anything else (Barnet 1972: 181).

Further differences exist between the Business Creed formulation and the Governing Consensus concept developed in this study. The two concepts are related because they both refer to the prevailing ideological and political values pursued by elites. For the Governing Consensus, however, a critical difference lies in the institutional environment confronting state managers, where their "two-level" (domestic and international) strategies delimit their roles within the state itself. Similarities of background and socialization are altered by the institutions and prerogatives through which state managers pursue aims in foreign policy. In their conduct of "business" within the state, state managers necessarily depart from the behaviour of private stake holders (in this case, business elites) with a superordinate interest in capital accumulation and the exigencies of commercial markets. State managers confront a different set of imperatives, based in their desire to maintain policy independence in a setting characterized by perpetual resource *dependence* on domestic social forces. This means that similarities of socialization confront *different* decision-making incentives created by

institutional factors. The governing consensus is itself a product of the differing institutional pressures acting on state managers during their prosecution of policy initiatives under these conditions.

The theoretical statement in this dissertation exceeds, to varying degrees, the empirical content of the Vietnam case study. For this case, a condition of pronounced *consensus* existed in foreign policy among state managers and business elites. Because this was the case, the counter-factual issue of assessing divergences between state manager and resource controller (stake holder) positions in foreign policy does not arise. As a result, evidence regarding such an occurrence is, in a sense, not discoverable. Having admitted this, however, it is also the case that the model formulated in this dissertation could be applied to a case where a breakdown in the elite consensus on foreign policy is broadly observed. In other cases, not examined here, where there is dissensus, this theoretical framework would set the stage for finding evidence of conflicts between capitalists and state managers over external stakes. The model would predict considerable dissonance between state managers and business elites due to the diverging impact of the effects of external change on the two groupings. Again, the impact of this potential divergence in exposure to external threat would be mediated through the different institutional mechanisms of the market economy, and the hierarchical complex of state institutions. An example of such a situation might be the 1973 Oil Shock, as it affected respectively the Nixon Administration and the US oil companies. Differences in extant policy would arise almost immediately because of the heightened exposure of business interests to risk associated with an *unchanging* US government policy. Other

specific cases would reveal the particular mechanisms through which dissensus would emerge, but the model would provide a conceptual hint as to the impact of such changes on the coherence of foreign policy.

Extra-governmental links between state managers and business elites are also visible in the lobbying efforts launched by former office holders as they liaise with business elites and congressional figures important to the funding of executive priorities. Advocacy by such groups, and the continuous articulation of contentious - though extremely limited - views by those competing with office holders for positions within the state reconfirmed persistent patterned responses to apprehended external challenges (Baritz 1985: 109). The Gaither Committee which reported to President Eisenhower on the state of the missile balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was itself staffed by experts working for the advanced technology firms and defence contractors likely to benefit from any recommended buildup (Barnet 1972: 181; Gaddis 1982: 184). The dismissal of the committee's recommendations by the President -- an issue which receives greater attention in the next chapter -- failed to prevent the creation of a political issue that would be of considerable importance in the 1960 presidential campaign. The creation of a potent political issue in the domestic arena was thus an outgrowth of the processes through which state managers and resource controllers interact in setting the political limits that govern state policy in the longer term.

In the face of an elite discourse on foreign and security policy, critical views, where they appeared at all, did not enjoy societally significant sponsors. In the governing consensus model, the structural supports stemming from state manager and

resource controller prerogatives are treated as the defining variables in industrial society. As such, contrary views -- containing potentially counterhegemonic critiques of dominant ideological views -- enjoy little access to media or intellectual resources with which to advance an alternate agenda of social values. As such, under conditions of strong elite consensus, marginal critiques are likely to remain marginal -- due to inhibitions on access to political and societal resources important to policy influence.

POLITICAL CRITICISM AND MARGINAL POLITICS

In a social setting defined by state manager relative independence, policy criticism in foreign policy may derive from those who are disadvantaged by existing patterns of economic activity, or because of the salience of international issues to sub-national groups. Both state managers and resource controllers face significant challengers to their decision making latitude if their control is weakened by external policy failure.

The impact of societal criticism of state policy on the governing consensus is itself indicative of the access limits that constrain participation in policy formulation. The governing consensus preempts the discourse on societal values - preventing other political objectives from affecting government policies. The governing consensus becomes both the object of marginal critiques, and the framework for the main-stream discourse on foreign policy. In this way, the consensus is a buffer, or overlay, blocking broader policy debate and 'selecting out' unacceptable ideas.

Critiques of US Security Policy

The political consensus that supported executive freedom of action in Vietnam was an aspect of the policy of Containment. The overlay mentioned above provided a consensus understanding of patterns in international politics. The primary adversary in the global system was identified as communism, and the leading proponents of that social system - the Soviet Union, China and other state socialist countries - were argued to be unalterably hostile. Chapters three and four elucidate the strength of these views among US elites. The articulation of contrary views did not occur within this group. Instead, it arose from others more distant from the centers of policymaking.

An orientation toward active engagement in international affairs was not confined only to the adherents of the governing consensus (DeBenedetti 1990: 13). Critics too desired the positive involvement of US policy in the emergence of developing countries into a stable international order. The governing consensus, and the behaviour of state managers in foreign policy, both relate to the assessed responsibility of the United States for managing international change. An internationalist ethic is visible in both the critics of the then predominant tactical implementation of containment and among those for whom the governing consensus was itself problematic. The major difference appears to have derived from the degree to which the needs of capitalists were seen to coincide (and reinforce) the appropriate role of the United States in global affairs.

Critical commentary aimed at the conflict in Vietnam had not evolved particularly strongly prior to 1963. Instead, any assessment of the climate of dissenting opinion in

foreign policy must focus upon a broader critique that did exist - albeit in rather poor condition -- in the years immediately preceding the beginning of the New Frontier. In a study of peace activism during the Cold War period, Charles DeBenedetti traces the origins of a self-conscious anti-violence critique of foreign policy to a nuanced articulation of liberal internationalism:

These peace advocates had disparate backgrounds and approaches, but in general they represented two wings with deep roots in an historic American peace movement: liberal internationalists and radical pacifists. Divided and disputatious, liberal and pacifist leaders would find themselves at odds in the 1960s, but at the outset they subsumed their differences to their common sense that international conditions were becoming both militarily ever more dangerous and politically more promising (DeBenedetti 1990: 13).

These comments refer explicitly to the peace activism that developed in the period between the death of Josef Stalin in 1953 and the Kennedy inauguration in 1961. This activity took place against the backdrop of an overt shift in US national security policy towards explicit reliance on nuclear deterrence -- in the "new look" policy of the Eisenhower Administration (Gaddis 1982: 127). The emphasis upon nuclear threats as a means to manage international affairs offended both moral sensibilities and an emerging sense that the decolonization occurring in the developing world promised the attainment of a long held American ideal, the transformation of international relations through the persuasive power of the American example (Baritz 1985: 44-45). A key difference emerges at this point between those DeBenedetti terms liberal internationalists and a more radical grouping aimed at far-reaching social change:

Although liberal peace advocates were in some measure moralists, they were mainly reformers. They feared that American democracy was succumbing to a disastrous "apathy or fatalism" that permitted faith in superior nuclear weaponry to become the "real national religion" at the expense of any alternative formulation of national interest or security (DeBenedetti 1990: 18).

At the same time, more radical critics were offering a vision of social change that would impact the very bases of American power -- and its favored policy of overseas intervention:

Radical pacifists opposed all military preparations, defended individual conscientious objection to conscription, and argued for the decentralization and democratization of global power and resources. They believed that Washington and Moscow were both responsible for the Cold War and they called for an immediate halt to the arms race through unilateral and negotiated disarmament. They welcomed popular nonviolent revolutions in the Third World, believing that self-determination and justice was the most reliable way around the superpower conflict (DeBenedetti 1990: 23).

The critiques articulated by both of these groups, and more information is given about them below, found their basis in a dissatisfaction with the relatively stable, conservative and status quo orientation of US foreign policy during the Eisenhower Administration. The slow buildup of nuclear potential -- alongside the continuing conflict of the Cold War -- were felt by these advocates to represent a real danger to human survival. It is no coincidence then, that the major focus during this early period -- again between 1955 and 1961 -- lay in addressing the nuclear question. At this point too, it is clear that the liberal internationalist and more radical groups differed quite profoundly on their prescriptions for addressing what they both viewed as an increasingly

serious situation.

Liberal Internationalist Policy Criticism

This group found its political moorings in the liberal wing of the US Democratic Party. As such, it contained within its members those with access to both capital and policy influence. Among this grouping, one especially influential individual during the period in question was Joseph P. Warburg, a New York Financier. He offered a critique of the 'overly militarized nature' of the Cold War, favouring instead a negotiated settlement of East-West differences, and a focus upon hunger and basic needs as an avenue for integrating developing countries into the world order (DeBenedetti 1990: 13). This non-military emphasis favored as well an expanded role for the United Nations, and included among its adherents persons who had supported the League of Nations during the interwar period.⁴³

World Federalists such as Norman Cousins, atomic scientists such as Eugene Rabinowitch and journalists such as I.F. Stone each can be considered members of this grouping. Respectively, these individuals argued in favour of world government, international control of atomic energy and lastly, for a thoroughgoing reform of civil society (in the United States) in order to redress social inequity and the lack of democratic

⁴³DeBenedetti traces further the origins of peace activism to 19th century discourses on free trade, international law and dispute settlement through arbitration. He further finds this externalized in World War I through the principles of Wilsonian internationalism.

input into US foreign policy. Other representative organizations among the liberal internationalists were the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) founded in 1919, the United Nations Association founded in 1941, the Federation of American Scientists formed from an amalgam of smaller discussion groups in 1946 and the United World Federalists (UWF) formed in 1947 (DeBenedetti 1990: 14).

The UWF in particular, attained considerable mass popularity in the late 1940s, claiming as many as 40,000 members in 1947. Each of these organizations sought, against the backdrop of World War II's aftermath, to achieve an enhanced degree of legalized and regularized behaviour by nation states. The United States' special role in fostering this emergent world system was only superficially appreciated by most of them, however. Instead, the articulated views of these groups can be understood as an externalization of US societal discourses on appropriate state manager behaviour in the international system. A strong presumption is made in the model that state manager appreciations of the international sphere are the dialectically constructed outcome of patterns of state-society interaction. Broad orientations aside, no uniformity or universalization of ideology is defined in this approach. Instead, the broad parameters of the political discourse are outlined -- and by extension -- the margins of the governing/predominant discourse on the external environment are rendered more clear. In the case of liberal internationalists, DeBenedetti observes that they "neither shared a single understanding of the Cold War crisis nor offered a common solution for it. They were simply people of liberal temperament who wanted the United States to lead the nations away from an ongoing competition for armed superiority, to minimize

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

international tensions and organize a consensual world order through negotiations and conciliation." (my emphasis) (DeBenedetti 1990: 15) Agreement existed, then, on the unique role that the United States could play in the creation of a different international setting (Baritz 1985: 101).

The extensive participation in all of these groups of christian movements is of particular note. Christian pacifism was an important organizing principle in the first postwar decade, as it had been in the interwar years.⁴⁴ Publications such as the Christian Century and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, provided fora for the articulation of

⁴⁴Other significant groups included the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) founded in 1917, the National Methodist Conference, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church and individual positions that attained editorial status. In this category lie the views of Norman Cousins in the Saturday Review of Literature and those of Norman Thomas articulated less frequently in The Nation. The Quakers (AFSC) were among the most articulate critics of the prevailing approach to formulating the security policies of the United States. They are placed into the category of liberal nationalists for one significant reason, their overt commitment to non-violent change. Otherwise, they might more appropriately lie in a more radical grouping. An example of this commentary is provided in a statement issued in a pamphlet in 1955:

Man simply cannot make peace and prepare for war at the same time, any more that he can simultaneously support and oppose revolutions....[t]he real choice lies between continuing to deal with international problems on the old basis of military power and attempting to deal with them on the new and revolutionary basis of non-violence [Speaking Truth to Power American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia, 1955: 25,30].

Similar statements were offered by the other groups named above, all of which focused upon the achievement of international change through non-violent means, finessing the existence of structured inequalities - and the ancillary hegemony that such relationships reproduce.

views critical of official policy and allowed for the coalescence of a relatively organized (if limited) critique of the official discourse on security policy. The concentration of this particular style of commentary on the serious consequences of military power in the nuclear age were not the preoccupation of all of those active in the liberal internationalist camp. Instead, the group most closely identifiable with the Democratic Party, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) founded in 1947, approached the Cold War from a decidedly different perspective. This group shared the US Democratic Party leadership's constituency links with organized labour, Roman Catholics and southern white conservatives (DeBenedetti 1990: 18). Among the prominent members of this group were Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith and Adlai Stevenson. In their commitment to the more aggressive use of American power in the world these persons enunciated views which subordinated the attainment of a transformed world order to two subsidiary goals: (1) the successful prosecution of containment aimed at international communism, and (2) a "New Deal" for areas recently under colonial control. (DeBenedetti 1990: 18; Gaddis 1982: 200-201). The latter point obtains a more serious and significant character given the policies implemented by some of these same individuals during the Kennedy Administration. Chapters three and four expand on the place of "middle class revolution" in the Administration's counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. At this point, however, it is sufficient to note that these views displaced substantially -- for these individuals -- the coincident concern with the overarching seriousness of the Cold War. This reality is visible in both the supposedly "pragmatic" support of such liberals for a buildup to close the apparent "bomber gap" enjoyed by the

Soviet Union over the United States, and in the "missile gap" articulated by these same individuals in the aftermath of the Gaither Committee's findings. As DeBenedetti notes, some liberals disagreed with this level of pragmatism and departed from the Democratic Party's mainstream focus upon prosecuting the Cold War at the expense of other goals. In this way, the New Frontier can be partially labelled an offshoot of both an internationalist orientation embedded within the Democratic Party and an extremely limited critique of power politics as practised by the party holding the American presidency.⁴⁵

The relationship between these two dimensions of liberal internationalism in the United States is important for a few reasons. First of all, their closeness is itself a partial explanation for the relative invisibility of peace activism during the earliest period of the New Frontier. The appeal to pragmatism visible in the views of the ADA constituted a bridge to the articulated need for a new approach to foreign policy contained in the argumentation of others within the internationalist community. The apparent shared hostility to older ideological prejudices in foreign policy may have fostered a willingness on the part of some critics to **wait and see** in the face of policies that seemed contrary to their favored approaches but, **that had the virtue of emerging from a group whose partisan affiliation was at least not hostile to higher order priorities**. Secondly, the articulated belief of New Frontier liberals that defence expenditures would themselves

⁴⁵In fact, the Kennedy Administration's first foreign policy pronouncements betrayed an embrace, rather than a rejection, of power political reasoning. As is discussed in the next chapter, President Kennedy was merely more explicit in stating the fundamental goals of US policy in managing the evolving Cold War order.

expand the economic wealth available for **domestic reform** and redistribution may have partially blunted the qualitative critique offered by those not favouring increased spending in these areas because: (a) they would only be necessary in the short term, until a negotiated settlement of Cold War differences could be arranged; and (b) the medium to long term consequences of defence sector investments were argued to expand the economic resources available for redistribution in pursuit of domestic social change. In this way the belief in military keynesianism may have been functional in the New Frontier's "space for agency" in foreign affairs -- with the unfortunate consequence that the rhetoric of political transformation may have allowed the priority of short term pragmatism to override the longer term goals of a reformist project.

Lastly, the attraction of liberals to incrementalist reform and negotiated settlement of the Cold War led to the diffusion of their criticism through their shorter term support for apparently favourable trends toward stabilized East-West relations. The praiseworthy nature of Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal may in this way have split a crucial critique on the internationalization (or abandonment ?) of nuclear power by the appearance of progress towards overcoming a serious short-term policy question. Similarly, the liberal support for Eisenhower's Geneva summit conference in 1955 betrayed an eagerness to applaud any movements towards safety -- defined as they were in this era as progress towards "something approximating a general peace" ("The Dawning Peace", Christian Century, 72, (11 May 1955): 559). As such, reformist liberal critiques of a status quo orientation in foreign policy may have perceived the New Frontier as an at least partial fulfillment of their ideals for pragmatism with principle. At

the same time, however, the acceptance of anti-communist aspects of the post-war orthodoxy itself illustrates the decidedly narrow nature of this critical perspective -- and offers clues to the intensity of the later split between liberal groupings over the nature and instruments of choice in US national security policy. The more radical critique offered by more overtly pacifist groups was importantly a counter to this less thoroughgoing approach. It is to these more radical approaches that we now turn.

Radical Pluralist Critiques

The pluralist term used in this section heading is designed to avoid imputing uniformity to the views of all those articulating a more or less comprehensive critique of the US role in the existing world order. The term radical stems from the fact that, unlike liberal internationalists, this group articulated a quite fundamental critique of the governing discourse on the external environment. As such, the counterhegemonic elements of this perspective are qualitatively different from the instrumental reform proposals extant within the periphery of the governing consensus. While the more pragmatic orientation of the liberal internationalists was oriented toward a modification of foreign policy responses within the existing social and political boundaries, the more radical critical elements in US peace activism sought to articulate a new perspective on the relationship of human emotional and material well-being to political action. As DeBenedetti remarks, this group, while small, did articulate an alternate approach to politics:

The smaller but more cohesive wing of the resurgent peace movement consisted of pacifists, including those who refused to participate in Operation Alert. They were radical in the root sense of the word - fundamental. They rejected war absolutely, refusing on principle to sanction or participate in it. In that sense, their pacifism was rooted in a tradition which stretched back throughout Christian history but was most explicitly represented by the Anabaptist sects and the Society of Friends (Quakers). It was the position of religious nonresistants in the early nineteenth century American peace movement, and it had been partially secularized in twentieth century war resistance and conscientious objection (DeBenedetti 1990: 19).

As such, the historical pedigree of rejectionist activism in the mid-to-late 1950s derives from its relationship to a prior segment of ethical objection to violence in all of its forms. The relationship of non-violent activism to parallel concerns for social justice also reveals itself at this point. In particular, the same groups that were active in arguing for a fundamentally different approach to foreign policy, wished to re-order the **domestic political and social setting** in order to promote equity, fairness and fundamental justice for the historically disadvantaged.⁴⁶

This last perspective was articulated through groups such as the War Resisters League (WRL), formed in 1923 and active internationally in the interwar period and

⁴⁶The involvement of pacifist groups in movements such as the Congress of Racial Equality and FOR in the early days of the US civil rights struggle bears testimony to the domestic reflection of different attitudes to action in the international setting. Quaker and FOR activism in particular, is intimately related to the development of the non-violent orientation of civil rights activism after 1955. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s activities arose from a parallel - and broadly compatible - vision of non-violent protest as a means for transforming both the dominant and the dominated - itself a crucial element in the notion that social interaction allows mutuality of advantage - following the supersession of hegemony.

afterwards. Adherents of this movement (it held few if any formal meetings), placed considerable emphasis on civil disobedience and were extant until the late 1940s. Related movements were the Catholic Worker Movement, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) -- actually founded during World War I -- and the most famous group, the Quakers (DeBenedetti 1990: 22-23). Each of these groups articulated a related (though by no means identical) critique of society -- and of the behaviour of elites on behalf of society. At the same time, these groups shared an orientation toward the achievement of political change through deeply personal commitments to a different and pacifist approach to human relations.

In the 1950s the Quakers and the FOR were the focus of most activist non-violent organizing in the United States. The prestige of the Quakers (the AFSC received the Nobel Prize in 1947 for its relief activities during and immediately following World War II), allowed it to foster a relatively robust critique of a military approach to national security planning. Both the Quakers and the FOR were explicitly internationalist in orientation and emphasized direct action by critical social forces as a means of transforming domestic and international political conditions. Their principled opposition to military preparations of any kind stands in stark contrast to the liberal internationalist emphasis upon incremental reform organized within existing institutions of power. In particular, as DeBenedetti articulates "[t]hey believed that Washington and Moscow were both responsible for the Cold War and they called for an immediate halt to the arms race through unilateral and negotiated disarmament" (DeBenedetti 1990: 23). The fundamental character of this critique is rendered more clear by these groups' celebration

of the potential for non-violent revolution in the developing world, which they saw as representing a model of transformation from which the developed world could learn a great deal.

Differences between liberal internationalists and radical pluralists thus exist along a number of different dimensions. The attraction of many liberals to a containment orientation in foreign policy was itself related to a view that the United States was uniquely empowered to "welcome" recently decolonized areas of the globe into an enlightened international setting. The basic rules of that system were to be governed by the necessities of capitalism and by the rights of "free peoples" to determine their own futures. The importance of combating international communism from this perspective derives from both its overt hostility to non-capitalist organizing principles in the international political economy, and from the political incompatibilities inherent to an essentially **competing** vision of the "good life".

For more radical social forces, this viewpoint was both inherently shortsighted and lacking in its treatment of fundamental issues. It is apparent that for those ethically committed to non-violence in human affairs, **personal attitudinal and value orientations are essential precursors of any larger project aimed at social change.** As such, the opposition to state manager prerogatives in foreign policy attacked the legitimacy of the privileged discourse articulated by state managers in foreign policy. In particular, non-violence as a maxim for action in the international setting stands in rather stark opposition to the prevailing ethos that guides Barnett's "national security managers" in their prosecution of unproblematic agendas of "national interests" -- namely, a belief in

the dangerous and uncertain context of an international anarchy.

In setting out to overturn this basic presumption of action in the international system, radical activism absented itself from the discourse on state manager resource and legal prerogatives that was dominant during the Cold War, and this was especially true in the late 1950s (Baritz 1985: 97-101). Note can also be taken of the relationship between liberal criticism of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy and the vociferous objections of the more radical pacifist social forces. The support of liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and John Kenneth Galbraith for the policy of containment presaged the inability of these same elements to achieve any fundamental transformation of foreign policy once they occupied positions of power. Similarly, the limited nature of their reformist commitment to change in foreign policy is further illustrated by their belief that the United States was unique in its potential for transforming international relations. Indeed, a point of obvious hostility between liberals and radicals was the insinuation that the United States and the Soviet Union were equally responsible for the onset of the Cold War. For Schlesinger and others, it was simply inconceivable that the US could be compared to a totalitarian imperialism that was bent (so it was argued) on limitless global expansion (Fitzgerald 1972: 22).

The criticisms offered by radicals of the US approach to foreign policy were both fundamental and powerful. The question remains, however, as to why they were unable to focus particular attention upon events in South East Asia, and why their approach to a transformed world order -- articulated as it was in the most clearly hegemonic of western nation states -- did not gain more adherents, or place the governing consensus and the

state managers who articulated it, on the political defensive. The answer to this question resides in the peculiar political conditions of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and in the relative salience of different issues on the political agenda defined by the governing consensus.

Most specifically, the peace activists of this period were confronted with a myriad of concerns, each of which grasped the energy and attention of popular opinion. The issue of atmospheric nuclear testing and the vulnerability of these groups to charges that they were either dupes of communist subversion or actually traitors to the United States, crucially delimited the political space within which these groups could manoeuvre. This reality was illustrated in reactions to the activities of groups such as the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), and those of the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA). Both groups faced attack from politicians and columnists who accused them of communist sympathies (DeBenedetti 1990: 36). The events of 1957-59, where the superpowers traded propaganda over unilateral moratoriums on atmospheric testing -- while the United States continued development of what it termed "clean nuclear weapons" -- provided an unstable atmosphere for protestors who sought to advocate a non-violent model for reforming world politics (Gaddis 1982: 192).

The activities of non-violent peace movements in the domestic political sphere were also connected, as was observed earlier, to the US civil rights revolution then gathering momentum. As such, the attention, resources and manpower of these groups were stretched over a number of related issues -- thus reducing the degree to which any new issue could enter the policy agenda in the absence of amelioration of any of the

dominant concerns. This notion -- that the activism of the most radical social movements of the period -- was spread over so many issues that it could not easily adopt an additional issue in the absence of a serious crisis of the governing consensus (i.e., in the absence of its achieving success in one of the other issues) bespeaks a conceptualization of limited issue-space on a broader societal political agenda. As such, the political space within which peace activism developed was constrained by three factors: (1) the continuing strength of the governing consensus, and its contingent interpretation of international relations; (2) the political "taint" that still adhered to the labeling of oppositionist movements as communist -- further illustrating the use by those articulating the governing consensus of this accusation to delegitimize critical discourses; and (3) the very breadth of the non-violent activists' political agenda, which had both domestic and international elements. The fundamental nature of the critique offered by these groups was such that it was difficult for new issues to displace old ones from the broader political agenda -- especially in the light of the seriousness of those issues which were already the focus of attention -- the Cold War and nuclear weapons. The magnetism of the nuclear issue continued to orient the formation of new groups which sought to alter what they saw as the headlong pace of the arms race. In 1961 the World Law Fund (WLF) was formed with the expressed purpose of promoting internationalist ideas; at the same time SANE broadened its focus to address disarmament writ large in addition to the nuclear testing issue (DeBenedetti 1990: 54).

Late in 1962, the magnitude (and quality) of dissent were illustrated by a protest march held in Washington DC by a coalition of university groups. Again, the focus of

attention was nuclear in nature, though the organizations involved also desired an alteration in the character of the Cold War itself. There was, however, little evident sophistication compared to the critique of international violence offered by groups such as the AFSC. As Charles DeBenedetti describes the demonstration:

Well dressed students from fifty-seven colleges in seventeen states lobbied from Capitol Hill to the State Department. They marched to Arlington Cemetery to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and they displayed a fine sense of impartiality by picketing the Soviet embassy. In sharp contrast to later demonstrations, they waved no banners and made few speeches. Thinking of themselves as liberal realists, the young people avoided moralism. They simply addressed the irrationality of civil defense efforts, unchecked atmospheric testing, and uncontrolled arms competition (DeBenedetti 1990: 56).

As DeBenedetti continues, they received attention from few in official Washington, except the White House -- which blamed the Pentagon for recalcitrance on arms control matters.⁴⁷ That these protests were organized by liberals helps confirm the notion that dissatisfaction of some elements of the opinion elite with policy on war/peace issues existed. At the same time, however, the vulnerability of even these articulations of dissent to accusations of communist sympathies (evidenced through the refusal of major religious denominations to offer support for the march), provides counterfactual evidence of the likely reception that any more radical critique of US national security policy would have faced.

⁴⁷McGeorge Bundy asserted this position when discussing the difficulties of arms control verification with the protestors. The Congress maintained a studied silence throughout the entire protest episode.

THE COMBINED IMPACT OF THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS AND CRITICAL DISCOURSES

The collision between articulators of the governing consensus on foreign policy and those offering critical and/or counterhegemonic perspectives, was both complex and thoroughgoing. The answer to the question of why Vietnam failed to displace other concerns from the predominant foreign policy agenda is correspondingly an artifact of this complexity. Most importantly, as noted in the theoretical model that began this dissertation, state managers were able to prevent the entry on to the political agenda of new issues through an overt campaign of delegitimation aimed at those most clearly identified as oppositionist critics.⁴⁸ The closure of the foreign policy debate was itself an outgrowth of the Cold War definition of the main adversary, of the instruments of subversion and corruption most favored by that adversary and lastly, of the assertion of both these factors as self-evident characteristics of the international sphere.

In turn, the state managers of the period were the inheritors of a threat consensus that predated the New Frontier - taking shape as it did in the decade between 1945 and 1955. As was described above, the focus of much activism in that period was upon nuclear disarmament and non-violent protest. In pursuit of transforming international and

⁴⁸As Loren Baritz notes, neither the US political elite, nor the American people at large, ever appreciated the cultural distance separating them from the rural peasantry of Vietnam. The apparent familiarity with Diem assumed partially due to his Roman Catholicism itself masked a parallel incomprehension by US government officials of the relationship of Diem to his own society.

domestic change through non-violent means, more radical groups critically removed themselves from the predominant discourse in what state managers held was an uncertain and disordered setting.

A second issue which caused radical critiques to differ in their effectiveness from those offered by liberal commentators was the fact that they questioned so many of the tenets of the containment policy prosecuted by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. In essence, the radical critics disempowered themselves by equating the international behaviour of the United States with that of the Soviet Union in the domestic political debate. The effects of this outcome were serious and help account for the relatively narrow successes achieved by the peace movement during the period. Most specifically, it appears that FOR, AFSC and related groups' involvement in protest activities prevented them from being more effective on a new issue that was not yet of pronounced domestic salience. While these groups focused upon the achievement of non-violent revolution in developing countries (illustrating their sensitivity to trends in South East Asia and elsewhere), it is not clear that they could have achieved a major impact on the policy agenda by showing **the existence of a crisis in that region that would have catalyzed opposition to official policy back in the United States.**⁴⁹ This

⁴⁹Patterns of congressional oversight further reinforced this factor. As chapters three and four describe, the meager personnel and investigative resources of congressional committees produced highly reactive oversight procedures. As Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones note, this limits Congress' ability to regulate policy formation:

The inability of Congress to oversee policy subsystems continuously leads to a system of "fire-alarm oversight" in which Congress pays attention to an issue only when citizens or groups challenge administrative decision making.

can be contrasted to their pronounced effectiveness on the nuclear test ban issue, where critical scientific and activist opinion was able to show that real effects were occurring in both the domestic food supply (with milk contamination from fallout) and in the increased risk of poor health for children (due to the depositing of Strontium-90 in their bones). State managers were thus forced on to the defensive on this issue partially due to the tangible and negative effects official policy was having on domestic stakeholders, and relatively early on began to prepare the way for a test ban of some type - linked of course to desired progress on other military security questions.⁵⁰

The central division between the liberal critics of US foreign policy during this period and the views offered by radical activists was over the extent to which the United States was necessarily to blame for the effects of its policies. Beyond the question of the degree to which any government is able to control outcomes in the international sphere, the issue arises of the nature of that social environment and of the causal logics that

Delegation except when the alarm is raised is seen as rational -- presumably a response to the limits of serial processing [legislative treatment of policy issues](Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 22)

Thus, traditions of executive primacy in a policy area (in this case foreign policy), receive reinforcement from resource asymmetries within the government. For a broader discussion of these issues, see Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, pp. 165-179.

⁵⁰Even here, some figures in the US Congress suggested that test ban activism was motivated by communist organizing in either the United States or Europe. This accusation was seriously enough considered that Dr. Linus Pauling, the Nobel Prize chemist, was identified as a potential subversive by members of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee. See DeBenedetti, 1990: 52-60.

dominate the occurrence of patterned outcomes. For radical reformers US state managers were similar to their counterparts elsewhere in the international system. In seeking to use force to protect interests in the external sphere, non-violent activists argued that an inequitable system of hegemony was being reproduced -- leading inevitably to the suffering and misery of the poor and disadvantaged.

The radical remedy for this situation varied - according to the degree to which these groups adhered to a particular socialist or theologically-based ideology. For some, the personal rejection of violence as a means for attaining transforming social and political change was seen as catalytic in changing the fundamentals of the existing political and social milieu. Through rejection of the internalized (individual) presumptions that led to the reproduction of negative and power-defined social relationships, some argued that the basic interface between social action on behalf of a society in the external setting **and action defined as legitimate in the domestic and interpersonal spheres** would be broken. Once achieved, this break would allow for the assertion of a new social basis for purposive action based on ethical pacifism and non-violence. In a related vein, this analysis of the source of hegemony and division in international politics was linked to a requisite alteration in patterns of participation in domestic political and social discourse. In particular, the enfranchisement of individual voices in opposition to elite prerogatives - an issue touched upon in the theoretical model - would allow a levelling of the discourse through which the essentially contested nature of the external sphere would be defined.

This perspective on altering US foreign policy prerogatives can be effectively

contrasted with the more reform-minded proposals emanating from the liberal internationalist grouping. In particular, their proposals asserted an essential **agreement** with the containment policies that dominated US approaches to national security during the early postwar years. Where they differed with Eisenhower Administration prescriptions was over the nature of change taking place in the developing world, and in the degree to which the United States could foster change in a specific direction due to its own historical characteristics. The economic and geopolitical aspects of the liberal internationalist position were thus compatible with the governing consensus -- as it developed to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. The next chapter elucidates the links between this position and the New Frontier approach to foreign policy. In essence, the New Frontier represented the triumph of crucial aspects of the liberal internationalist critique in foreign policy.

The contrast between the radical critique of the US approach to the world order and that of the liberal internationalists is particularly evident at this point. It is possible to determine how fundamental the difference between the two critical perspectives was (and remains) by examining the locuses of transformation that each approach defined. For the radicals, the internalized ethical and valuational approaches of individuals were the key. The commitment to individual religious or ideological faith so crucial to activism in the face of frequently repressive action on the part of the state, was of absolute importance if the systemic and persistent hegemony of the predominant discourse was to be overcome. This contrasts directly with the reform minded "within existing institutions" approach to change argued by liberal critics, which held that no fundamental transcendence of

capitalism or state manager approaches to international relations was in order. Instead, this perspective held that expansion of economic activities globally would in and of itself expand the developmental possibilities available to post-colonial states.

In the absence of a sophisticated analysis of hegemony as it functioned in the international sphere, liberals were incapable of perceiving the necessity of changing the most basic elements of the US approach to foreign policy. In fact, the emphasis upon the exceptionalism and indispensability of the United States that lay at the heart of the New Frontier -- and of liberal internationalist rhetoric that was its essential precursor -- was openly hostile to such a view. For liberals, the central reality of conflict in the international sphere was argued to be the Cold War and by extension, the conflict between "freedom" and "totalitarian communism". The Soviet Union's ability to appeal to newly decolonized peoples was seen as an outgrowth of their skills at propaganda and duplicity, not as a logical/rational response in a search for developmental alternatives on the part of emerging nations.

In short, the end points of the activism of the liberal internationalist and non-violent pacifist strains of criticism were dramatically different. Liberals required only instrumental changes which would allow -- so they argued -- for the United States to have determinate influence on patterns of international outcomes. For pacifist activism, however, a much more fundamental -- and correspondingly weaker (in the absence of perceived consensus crisis) articulation of necessary alterations in national security policy was present. They desired the ethical reorientation of individual appreciations of political and social action -- both as a goal itself and as a means for destroying institutions which

defined and reproduced an orientation inimical to the long term prospects of humanity.

Accommodation was thus less available for the radicals than it was for the liberals -- who constituted an opposition party/government in waiting.

CHAPTER 3

STATE MANAGER PERCEPTIONS OF VALUES AND OBJECTIVES, 1959-61

The New Frontier in US foreign policy represented the internalization of the liberal internationalist critique of Eisenhower's South East Asia policy in the institutions of the US state. The membership of the American Friends of Vietnam mentioned in chapter two was a subset of the group that later held leading positions in the Kennedy Administration. The more marginal pacifist line in foreign policy criticism represented by the Quaker American Friends Committee, remained marginal during the entire period under study. The ideological reinforcement that the anti-Communism of the New Frontier received from the consensus articulated by business leaders -- the business creed -- prevented the reemergence of a middle of the road critique of US foreign policy that would have moderated the activism of the new frontier. As chapter two relates, the dissipation of the energies of the more radical critics of US South East Asia policy across a number of different issues, along with the relatively low level of US material commitment, inhibited the emergence of mass opposition to the Kennedy Administration's policies. As such, the Kennedy inner circle found itself relatively unconstrained in the implementation of its policies.

This discussion begins by stating some key themes of the US debate on foreign policy. The narrative then turns to a discussion of the Kennedy Administration's initial approach to South East Asia. Lastly, it describes the attitudes of state managers within the self-defined New Frontier in terms of the concepts developed in the first two chapters.

THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

The presence of a governing consensus, within which policy formulation occurs, is a difficult thing to demonstrate. Beyond the predictable intertemporal shifts in US foreign policy, however, it is possible to detect recurring conceptions that appeared during the postwar era. It is these persistent factors that constitute the framework of the containment consensus.

A consciousness among elites of a particular global role for the United States was, and remains an important aspect of overall US foreign policy.⁵¹ This belief is related to American feelings of exceptionalism, traceable to many of the founding myths of the republic (Huntington 1981: 166-220; Larson 1985: 24-65; Hunt 1987: 32-33). This belief in exceptionalism finds expression in the rhetoric of US presidents, in the actions of the US armed forces around the world, and in the debate on foreign policy among attentive publics at home (Steinbruner 1989: 76-94; Hughes 1978: 153-196; Paterson 1988: 76-94). In addition to this thesis, the postwar US foreign policy consensus was to a significant extent anti-communist in character. An important indicator of political soundness was the degree to which one condemned the 'evil' aspects of communism as a menace to international peace

⁵¹While a variety of roles have been defined as the historical destiny of the United States, these took on a particular character during the postwar era. For John Lewis Gaddis, this role flowed, in the years following World War II, from the necessity of US action to prevent the domination of Europe. Deeper antecedents are of importance here, however; namely, those factors that inhere in the US definition of itself as a society separate and differentiated from all others.

(Paterson 1988: 92). A related theme was that of intervention overseas in defence of American liberal capitalist values. This conception of intervention goes beyond a narrow concern with military activities, such as those launched during the Vietnam war, however.

Rather, intervention refers to the general orientation of US foreign policy toward active engagement in the internal politics of other societies. Put a different way, this concept refers to the active structuring of the external environment according to a limited set of values and interests.

The time period covered by this study involves a phase of the Cold War. As such, the adversarial relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States provides the backdrop, against which the governing consensus developed. The domestic politics of this developmental process saw the rise and fall of particular ideas and formulations - and of the groups and institutions that articulated those views. The push and pull of US politics can thus be understood as a reciprocal relationship between contending institutions, and societal groups under the general rubric of a consensus orientation to international politics. At the same time, however, the institutional prerogatives of state managers provide them with special standing in the articulation of values in national security. There is thus an asymmetrical quality to the policy environment which is a result of the formation of the governing consensus. This asymmetry helps to account for the persistence of foreign policy orientations - and for the corresponding weakness of oppositionist social forces in the absence of perceived crisis. The domestic political conditions which obtained at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 provide considerable evidence of the importance of each of these theoretical concepts.

Consensus Development and the News Media

The news media were, of course, involved in shaping the public's awareness and critical understanding, of events in Vietnam. It is clear from the documentary record, however, that the media had an uncertain relationship with the Administration in its earliest days in office. The Press' relationship with the Kennedy Administration was shaped by its experiences in the Eisenhower years. In the prior period, secrecy and an antagonism with media scrutiny characterized press-Administration relations (Wyatt 1993: 26). In particular, information was released under only the most controlled conditions, with a deliberate attempt by the Eisenhower Administration to foster press dependence upon government sources for foreign policy stories (Wyatt 1993: 68).

The success of this Administration effort produced a critical shortcoming in media expertise on Vietnam later on in the 1960s:

During the 1950s and well into the 1960s, the United States had no independent information-gathering system in Vietnam, and was forced to rely on intelligence and data supplied by a regime that, as the Pentagon Papers put it blandly, "discouraged realism" (Wyatt 1993: 68).

As such, critical reporting on the region was handicapped by a shortfall in subject matter expertise, a weakness that also befell the New Frontier inner circle when it achieved high office. Additional factors weakened the media's ability to counterbalance information control exercised by the Administration. Most importantly, the economics of foreign news reporting meant that there were a relatively small number of foreign correspondents covering the entire world during this era. As Clarence Wyatt puts it:

A 1960 survey of public-relations work in the United States in behalf of foreign governments maintained that "the economics of US news coverage" resulted in "hordes of reporters" following the American President's every move while "the ranks of American journalists covering the rest of the world are remarkably thin." making the press -- and the American people -- vulnerable. "The facts we need to know are often concealed from us or get to us too late. All of a sudden there may be a blow-up in a country with which we have been deeply involved" (Wyatt 1993: 69).

Thus, in structural terms, the media may have been historically incapable of placing their own information sources against those of the Administration where assessments of international events were concerned. The dependent relationship that resulted meant that the Kennedy Administration would find it easier to manipulate press access to vital information, since it (presumably) was more aware of what was vital to prosecution of its anti-insurgent program.

This information dependence was key to the definition of the stakes at risk in Vietnam during 1960 and 1961. First, the Kennedy Administration faced no well-informed, critical media community on its achieving office. The dependence of the Washington press corps on government information gave the New Frontier group the ability to shape the initial facts and assessments of the Kennedy South East Asia policy. Added to this, however, were the close personal relationships that Kennedy had developed with a number of reporters during the 1960 presidential campaign. Among those whom Kennedy formed especially close friendships during this period were: Arthur Krock, a columnist for the New York Times, and also a close confidant of Joseph P. Kennedy, largely responsible for the earlier publication of JFK's undergraduate thesis, as While England Slept; Benjamin Bradlee, assistant manager of Newsweek's Washington DC bureau; Joseph Alsop, a veteran syndicated columnist who had

invited the young JFK to convalesce at his home during his recovery from Addison's Disease; and Charles Bartlett, a long time Kennedy friend from JFK's first campaign for the US House of Representatives in 1946. Bartlett was the Washington correspondent for the Chatanooga Times, and introduced JFK to his wife, Jacqueline Bouvier (Wyatt 1993: 28; Hamilton 1992: 737). These examples are designed to illustrate JFK's positive contacts with some members of the prestige news media. As is noted later, these media outlets were particularly important in the broader information control strategies of the Kennedy Administration. In any event, there was no well developed parallel information network that would have allowed the press to write an in-depth critique of Kennedy Administration policy in South East Asia. Such a structure developed only later in the 1960s, too late too help slow down -- or reverse -- the growing magnitude of the US commitment.

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND THE NEW FRONTIER IN FOREIGN POLICY

The Kennedy Administration felt itself to be the holder of a unique position as defender of liberal and democratic capitalist values around the world. The rhetoric of the era is replete with references to the "new frontier", and to the unique role of the United States. As Thomas Paterson notes, the aura of infinite possibilities was electric:

[Arthur] Schlesinger, Jr. captured the moment this way:
 "Euphoria reigned: we thought for a moment that the world was plastic and the future unlimited" (Paterson 1988: 202).

As Schlesinger continued, "the atmosphere [looked] set for miracles".

At the same time, the leadership style of John F. Kennedy gave concrete support to these views. President Kennedy surrounded himself with advisers similar to himself in both orientation and temperament. These persons, sharing ivy league origins and an activist bias in foreign policy, militated against a simple continuation of the policies of the Eisenhower Administration (Halberstam 1972). At the same time, however, the shared Cold War interpretation of the international situation made it unlikely that any fundamental departures in policy would occur. In any event, the cohesiveness of the Harvard group that entered government with the election of John Kennedy to the Presidency was itself a unique factor in this milieu.

The application of activist instruments to achieve unchanged ends reaffirmed the importance of the central political conflict of the era - that involving the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, the rhetoric of the generational transition symbolized a change that was, perhaps, more apparent than real. As President Kennedy put it:

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

And later, "In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility; I welcome it" (Gibbons 1986b: 3). The implications of this commitment are instrumentally important, as they indicated a much more activist commitment to run

greater risks while implementing containment. As John Lewis Gaddis notes, this was the central departure of the Kennedy Administration's foreign and security policies (Gaddis 1982: 205). With respect to the implementation of containment doctrine, a situation of "maximum danger" would seem to require a maximal response - in terms of both the organization of a society's resources to oppose external aggression and the signalling of resolve and credibility in one's security relations with one's allies. Both of these themes are evident in the evolving policies that the Administration adopted in South East Asia.

Early Clues: John Kennedy and US Goals in Vietnam

In June of 1956, then Senator John F. Kennedy gave the fullest explanation of the his views regarding the US stake in the fate of Vietnam:

(1) First, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the red tide of communism overflowed into Vietnam...

(2) Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However, we may choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengeable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment -- it is playing an important role in the

laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.

(3) Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring -- we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence -- communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest -- then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.

(4) Fourth, and finally, America's stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one -- for it can be measured in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on the brink of war in Indo-China - a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known. The threat of such war is not now altogether removed from the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of President Diem. And the key position of Vietnam in South East Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any outbreak of trouble...

...we should not attempt to buy the friendship of the Vietnamese. Nor can we win their heart by making them dependent upon our handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution -- a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the communists can offer -- far more peaceful, far more democratic and far more locally

controlled. Such a revolution will require much from the United States and much more from Vietnam. We must supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; technicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation taking those first steps toward the complexities of a republican form of government.

We must assist the inspiring growth of Vietnamese democracy and economy, including the complete integration of those refugees who gave up their homes and belongings to seek freedom. We must provide military assistance to rebuild the new Vietnamese army, which every day faces the growing peril of Vietminh armies across the border (Speech given by Senator John F. Kennedy in June 1956 before the American Friends of Vietnam, quoted in Gibbons 1986b: 5-6).

The "American Friends of Vietnam" were a group founded by Leo Cherne in 1956, the organizer of something called the "International Rescue Committee", an organization formed to shelter "self-selected" defectors from communism. Also active in this work was an Austrian anti-communist named Joseph Buttinger, who was introduced to President Diem in Saigon by one Edward Lansdale, who had been impressed previously by a book authored by Buttinger entitled, In the Twilight of Socialism. This organization attempted to argue the issues that were at stake for the US in the fate of the Diem regime. It is important that this group's full significance be recognized. Its membership included both intellectuals and media figures. In each of these categories, the participation of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Max Lerner, are of special note.⁵² At the

⁵²The overlapping membership between this organization and the ADA identified in chapter two illustrates the character of an import element in the liberal internationalist critique of Eisenhower Administration security policy. It also indicates the degree to which

same time, and given the articulated views of then Senator John F. Kennedy this bares special note, one of the principals of the organization was Elliot Newcomb, "a partner in the publicity firm of Newcomb-Oram, which, shortly before the founding of the American Friends of Vietnam, had signed a contract (\$3000 a month plus expenses) to represent the Diem government in the United States (Aronson 1990: 185). The success of the campaign to influence media and official attitudes towards the Diem regime in Washington is, perhaps, best reflected in the degree of openness that the prestige US media and the White House, paid to Diem when he visited the United States. As Aronson describes it, the coverage of Diem in the US media was far from ambivalent:

In 1957, when Diem visited the United States, the New York Times reported (May 9) that "by establishing democratic forms, President Diem had carved a deep niche in official esteem in Washington." As a mark of this esteem, President Eisenhower had sent his personal plane, the Columbine," to Saigon to bring Diem to Washington and met him at the airport. The only other person the President had so honored was King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. The reception for Diem was altogether royal -- an address to a joint session of Congress, an official New York City reception, and a banquet presided over by Time's Henry R. Luce. Many of Diem's speeches were the product of Joseph Buttinger's imaginative mind. The [New York] Times noted, in an editorial headed "Diem on Democracy", a strongly spiritual, rather than political note in Diem's definition of democracy with which "Thomas Jefferson would have no quarrel" (Aronson 1990: 186).

These remarks capture the flavor of the political environment in Washington at the time

the liberals were integrated into the governing consensus' interior workings, rather than existing as a truly marginal critical grouping external to the US political elite.

of the emergence of the New Frontier. The official attitude toward events in South Vietnam was thus a partial product of social forces at home organized for a specific purpose -- molding the image of Ngo Dinh Diem in the United States -- to such an extent that support for his regime would appear inherently compatible with the stakes that US elites had already identified in South East Asia.⁵³

President Kennedy's attitudes on Vietnam were substantially formed prior to his gaining office. His feelings were also shared by many of his closest advisors, as William Gibbons notes:

Kennedy's views of the responsibility of the US toward Vietnam were shared by all but two of his new

⁵³In an ironic turn of fate, while the Eisenhower Administration had increased the amount of financial and humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese government from 1955 onwards, the news media failed to allocate significant additional resources to the story. Diem's image in the US was thus, as was discussed earlier, shaped more and more by a uniform line of reports fed by Administration officials. As Clarence Wyatt notes, "Nor did the story lend itself to relatively simple spot news -- the who, what, when, where, how many -- of war reporting. And if even war reporting strained journalistic resources devoted Vietnam, a story as deep, long-running, and dull as that of nation-building (the major thrust of Eisenhower-era policy) was certainly beyond the reach of mainstream American journalism in the 1950s" (Wyatt 1993: 60). Even within the broader coverage of the Cold War, Vietnam was seen as just one arena in a broader contest -- a view which John Kennedy and other principals in his Administration held. As Joseph Alsop put it:

...if South Vietnam fell, so would Laos and Cambodia. "Laos and Cambodia are the keys to Thailand. Thailand is the key to India and Japan. And the loss of South Asia will surely produce repercussions further afield, in the Middle East, North Africa, and even Europe ("Quemoy-Poland," Washington Post and Times Herald, April 11, 1955, p. 9).

Clearly, such reportage was unlikely to be deeply critical of the broader strategy of the conflict in Vietnam. It was, in fact, broadly in agreement with both the threat consensus articulated by the Administration, and unquestioning of the tactics used to implement policy.

polymaking team....So too were the general lines of US foreign and military policy which characterized at least the first few weeks of the new administration, until the trauma of the failure of the Cuban (Bay of Pigs) invasion in April 1961 resulted in a hardening of attitudes and a reassessment of existing patterns of polymaking, and, to some extent, of policy and operations (Gibbons 1986b: 6).

It is reasonable, then, to argue that state manager preconceptions were important for later US policies. The activist orientation of the New Frontier, joined with a rapidly evolving series of events to give pivotal importance to state manager adaptiveness. This flexibility has two aspects. As was noted in the theoretical discussion, state managers must formulate policy in the face of both international and domestic environments. The next section describes some aspects of the local political setting.

THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

The political environment of the early 1960s was characterized by an apprehension of US strategic weakness. This concern was particularly acute due to the successful Soviet launch of the world's first artificial earth satellites. In addition, in November 1957 the report of the Gaither committee -- appointed to advise President Eisenhower on US defence needs -- recommended a significant increase in defence expenditures (Gaddis 1982: 185). The political importance of this report derived from both the bipartisan endorsement that its conclusions received, and in its specific recommendations for a greater emphasis upon fighting limited wars. The attraction of this report to liberal internationalists was also consonant with the activist, engagement-oriented views of the members of the ADA, and of others due to the counterpoint it provided to the more sedate pace of the Eisenhower years.

President Eisenhower's rejection of the recommendations was based as much in his fiscal conservatism, as it was in the lack of clear limits in the weapons procurement and deployments that would have eventuated under the Gaither committee's scheme. The 'missile gap' issue of the 1960 presidential election was an important outgrowth of this political setting. Kennedy's successful use of this issue was important during his campaign, and presaged an important focus of his first year in office. The endorsement of Gaither recommendations by key military figures, among them Army Generals Mathew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin assured these ideas a great deal of currency later on (Baritz 1985: 97).

The goals of US policy espoused by President Kennedy were also shared by the most senior cabinet level officials. Witness the remarks of Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State:

When the Kennedy Administration took office, the SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) was a part of the law of the land. How we respond under the SEATO Treaty was strongly linked in our minds with the judgements that would be made in other capitals as to how and whether we would react under other security treaties such as the Rio Pact and NATO (Gibbons 1986b: 7).

The important point in this passage is the explicit linkage cited by an important decision maker between US policy in peripheral areas and the credibility of American power guarantees elsewhere. This theme recurs throughout the period under study.

In 1960, a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy existed. As a consequence, containment was not seen as a problematic policy. In the case of Vietnam, US assistance was seen as the application of a broad principle, even though there was some uneasiness over the nature of the Diem regime in Saigon.

During the previous decade, congressional opinion had been the target of influence attempts led by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Early on the complex issue of separating support for French policy in Indochina from the continuation of colonial rule in the area necessitated a nuanced diplomacy that left itself open to inevitable contradictions. Official evaluations of US interests in supporting a nationalist government under Ngo Dinh Diem ran headlong into the anti-communism of French

policy in opposition to the Vietminh. As US Senator Mike Mansfield of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee remarked:

If Diem fails, the alternative is a government composed of his present opponents, no combination of which is likely to base itself strongly in the populace. Such a government would be indefinitely dependent on support of the French and could survive only so long as the latter are able to obtain Viet Minh acquiescence in its survival (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, vol. XIII, p. 2056).

This central contradiction, which attached US support to a colonial power seeking to maintain its dominant position was to plague American officials stances on the issue throughout the latter part of the decade. Eventually unambiguous support for Diem by the United States removed, though not without some debate within the Administration (interestingly with Secretary of Defense MacNamara arguing against US involvement in South East Asia), any doubt concerning the direction in which American policy would tilt (Gibbons 1986a: 284). The positions of the Secretary of State and the President assured that the broad outlines of American policy in South East Asia were effectively decided for two decades.

Early media portrayals of Diem derived much of their character from the enthusiasm of the US government, formed against the backdrop of the Sects Crisis in 1955.⁵⁴ The New York Times praised Diem as a man of "unimpeachable integrity," while

⁵⁴The Sects Crisis consisted of the newly appointed Premier Diem confronting, and defeating in sequence both Buddhist and secular political groups, each of which enjoyed significant popular followings. In April of 1955, Diem finally succeeded in defeating the Binh Xuyen, an organized crime syndicate with a considerable private army, and the last significant group opposing Diem's policies. US support followed, as Diem was seen as

US News took a much more neutral tone, apparently not choosing to expend the resources necessary to put a correspondent in Saigon full time. Time Magazine's John Mecklin described Diem as a man "who is hindered with the terrible but challenging task of leading the 10.5 million people of South Vietnam from the brink of Communism into their long-sought state of sovereign independence."⁵⁵

Newsweek adopted a slightly more critical tone, acknowledging a number of shortcomings in Diem's character, and acknowledging that "Diem has no real backing, no political machine of his own..." Showing considerably more prescience than its competitors, the magazine opined that "How to replace Diem was the problem."⁵⁶

The balance of coverage of Diem for the ensuing four years was rather praiseworthy of Diem, as was noted earlier. Other than a series of articles by Albert Colegrove of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, outlining a scandal over the distribution of funds in the US' aid program to South Vietnam, no significant negative press affected Diem until 1961 (see Appendix for a discussion of the Colegrove episode).⁵⁷

proving himself "tough enough" to fight a prolonged insurgency.

⁵⁵"Tremors from Washington", Time Magazine, May 1, 1955, p. 34.

⁵⁶"Decline--and Fall?" Newsweek, May 2, 1955, p. 34.

⁵⁷The Colegrove hearings represent one of the few departures from the orthodox relationship between press and administration perspectives on foreign policy in the 1950s. The hearings gain importance because of the manner that superficial critiques of containment policies were controlled and dismissed by both branches of government. The incident also provides an interesting example of the marginalization of criticism under a strong governing discourse, something this dissertation seeks to emphasize.

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND US VIETNAM POLICY

Elected in 1960, President John F. Kennedy asserted a more energetic perspective on US foreign relations. As was argued above, the substance of Administration foreign policy developed within a preexisting containment framework. The instruments of policy were less conservatively used, though even this divergence should not be overstated -- since the early forays into insurgency operations -- most particularly the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion -- were formulated under the old rules.⁵⁸

The position adopted by the Kennedy Administration toward Vietnam was readily predictable from the historic commitment of the President to the viability of a non-communist regime in the South. As Kennedy made clear when he was in the US Senate, he viewed the fate of Vietnam as bound up with the coherence of the US global vision of itself. The nuances and variations of American policy in Southeast Asia were, however, frequently more comprised of spirited rhetoric than they were of substantive understanding of the actions necessary for the achievement of a particular goal.

The approach of the Kennedy Administration to foreign policy revealed an impatience with what was perceived as the defensive character of Eisenhower-era

⁵⁸There is considerable conjecture as to the significance of the Bay of Pigs fiasco on subsequent US policy in Vietnam. It is sometimes argued that the American failure in Cuba led to a more stringent and uncompromising stance in support of the Diem regime in South Vietnam. See Noam Chomsky (1992).

diplomacy.⁵⁹ Instead, the new Administration sought to substitute a more activist grand strategy, one meant to engage the emerging societies of the developing world in a historic contest between East and West.

Vietnam thus fulfilled a crucial function for the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy. It represented both a suitable arena for prosecuting the conflict with what was then seen as the Sino-Soviet bloc and a setting where American national values could be seen to triumph over those of the rival superpower. Containment was thus stretched in the direction of a tactically more expansive anti-Communist campaign, involving the active pursuit of the hearts and minds of "subject" peoples.

The detail of Kennedy Administration strategy is a case study in the ability of a tactical re-orientation of policy to have profound implications for available policy choices in the future. The new Administration adopted a broad perspective meant to stabilize events in the whole of South East Asia, while at the same time aiming at making an effective stand in South Vietnam. This approach was importantly the result of a calculation that other positions in the region -- most specifically that in Laos -- were not

⁵⁹Stylistic differences aside, the incoming Kennedy Administration objected to what it saw as the laxness with which President Eisenhower was perceived to be promoting US interests abroad. In particular, Kennedy and his followers objected to "soft sentimentalism" that they felt had come to dominate official policies and views. As Thomas Paterson observed, "They [the Kennedy supporters] charged, with remarkable exaggeration, that Eisenhower was unwilling to enter the new battleground of the Cold War, the Third World - that he was consigning it to Communism without a fight". [Paterson 1988: 198] The entire 1960 presidential campaign became a referendum between those who viewed the stabilized prosecution of the Cold War as an end in itself, and those who saw the conflict as a national call to arms. At least, this is the way that the Kennedy campaign approached the contest for the US' highest political office.

defensible over the longer term (Gibbons 1986b: 9-11).

This discussion of US motives for neutralizing Laos contrasts with that of one of the participants, Roger Hilsman. In his memoir, To Move a Nation, Hilsman gives the following rationale for the US' strategy of Laotian neutralization:

...the "political" argument, to sum up, was that for the United States the strategic objective was to **deny** the Mekong Lowlands and the north-south road to the Communists, not to have it **for** ourselves. The least costly way of achieving this goal seemed to be a "political" solution achieved by "political" means -- a neutral Laos through a government of national union. If the Communists compelled the United States to use force, it should be used for this same goal, to restore the cease fire line and put negotiations back on track. And if the Communists did not accept a neutral Laos and a government of national union as the way out, we would be holding the lowlands, denying them to the Communist side (Hilsman 1967: 149).

This highly positional perspective on neutralization is not contrary to the broader strategic approach argued by this study. Rather, by not formally linking the fate of Laos and Vietnam in this passage, Hilsman is arguing for the separation of the two areas in the minds of New Frontier decisionmakers, something that is not supported by the historical record described to this point.

Hilsman's discussion does focus upon two approaches to Laotian policy, one favouring military means, and the other more limited and "politically" oriented. This approach, however, is defined as lying in the context of a broader political strategy of limiting the expansion of Communist control in South East Asia - one which Hilsman felt could be a century long competition (Hilsman 1967: 150). Indeed, Hilsman argued for the strategic importance of the territory of Laos - lying as it did astride major river and land communications routes into Vietnam (Hilsman 1967: 94-95). This focus upon the

intrinsic value of Laos, versus its tactical utility in a broader contest contrasts with the opinions expressed by members of the New Frontier's inner group mentioned above. The President's own thinking on this issue is perhaps best revealed by his caution in inserting US troops into the area without a significant degree of multilateral support. At the same time, however, Hilsman's discussion of Laos' geostrategic position in South East Asia may have been important to those who anticipated a future **fight** involving US forces on the ground. As Hilsman concludes regarding the neutralization:

To those who felt a showdown between Communist China and the United States was inevitable and believed that it was to the advantage of the United States that the showdown came sooner rather than later, any such tacit agreement to put the question of Laos to one side for a time seemed dangerous. And there is, of course a respectable argument for this position. But to those who saw the long-run interest of the United States best served by an accommodation between Communist China and the United States and the goal in South East Asia as limited to denying the area to Communism rather than making it an American ally, a postponement seemed better than the obvious alternatives -- a large-scale military intervention or surrendering it to the Communists. To those who sought this more limited goal, in other words, Laos was a victory -- of sorts (Hilsman 1967: 154).

The activism of the Kennedy Administration fostered an uneasy balance between these two goals -- the prevention of Communist expansion and a delaying action, where Laos' ultimate fate would be decided only in the medium to long-term (Khong 1992: 82). President Kennedy himself may have felt it necessary to balance these goals -- fearing as he did criticism at home for being soft on Communism. It is certainly the case that the President indicated considerable unease with **unequivocal** commitments to particular countries in the area - something that the case of South Vietnam was to show in great detail. In turn, the recommendations for overt military intervention which emanated from

the Pentagon -- which emphasized as they would in the future a **categorical commitment** -- were roundly rejected by President Kennedy whenever they arose (Hilsman 1967: 143). In short, notions of timing and the likely future evolution of the region as a whole allowed the neutralization of Laos to satisfy people with apparently varying positions on US intervention.

US responsibilities under the SEATO treaty obligated it to come to the assistance of the region's states if they came under what was apprehended to be communist pressure - from an external source. Earlier, President Eisenhower had considered an overt military intervention when Laos appeared on the verge of collapse under the pressure of the communist insurgency:

This [the weakness in Laos] was disturbing news. Possibly we had another Lebanon on our hands. While we needed more information - such as indisputable proof of North Vietnamese or Red Chinese intervention - before taking overt action, I was resolved that we could not simply stand by. I thought we might be approaching the time when we should make active use of the Seventh Fleet, including landing parties (Eisenhower 1965: 71?).

This threat appeared in December of 1960, and thus left the incoming Kennedy Administration with a serious policy dilemma. An indication of Kennedy's unease with this particular situation is a comment made during the presidential transition: "whatever happens in Laos, an American invasion, a communist victory or whatever", he hoped that it would occur "before we take over and get blamed for it" (Gibbons 1986b: 9).

Early communications between President Kennedy and the new Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, were also concerned with this crisis. In particular, Mansfield

was concerned that Laos be neutralized, largely because he was of the opinion that US military involvement in the region could not be minimized -- due to SEATO obligations -
- without such an occurrence.

This opinion was shared by key Administration figures. In particular, Secretary of State Dean Rusk held the view that Laos should not be portrayed as a "strongly pro-Western Ally", in order to dampen the disappointment should events in that country go awry. In early discussions between the Executive Branch and the Congress relating to South East Asia, however, Laotian events dominated. Vietnam was not even on the agenda of meetings held in February of 1961 (Gibbons 1986b: 11). Helping Laos transition into a "stable and independent" position was the espoused aim of US policy. Soviet proposals for an international conference on the issue were opposed by the Administration - since they were viewed as having the potential to "inflame the situation", apparently meaning that until the position on the ground changed significantly, US policy could not allow an institutionalized peace process to give equal standing to communist and non-communist elements in the country.

The particular interest of President Kennedy in the Laotian situation derived from a number of factors. First of all, as we have seen, it represented a foreign policy challenge that was bequeathed to Kennedy by the Eisenhower Administration. In turn, the seriousness of the events, with insurgent gains -- particularly in the latter part of 1960 -- militated against this situation leaving the summit of the policy agenda in the short term. Secondly, the President was interested in solidifying his image with respect to the Soviet Union, and it is at least arguable that he sought to minimize early occurrences that

might appear to show weakness.⁶⁰

The actions of a particular individual, then Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, were also of importance. Lansdale had previously been active in Vietnam as a CIA operative in 1954-56.⁶¹ He authored a report on the Laotian situation

⁶⁰As John Lewis Gaddis notes in Strategies of Containment, the communist threat was not the immediate reason why Laotian events preoccupied the presidential mind. Rather, Kennedy was concerned with the appearance of weakness that might flow from such an apparent strategic reversal:

Both men [Kennedy and Johnson] agreed that Eisenhower and Dulles had overextended the United States; the problem was that these commitments, once made, could not be abandoned without appearing to call into question more vital obligations elsewhere.

And, as President Kennedy stated at the time, "[w]e cannot and will not accept any visible humiliation over Laos." [Gaddis 1982: 212] This linkage of a particular commitment to reputational considerations recurred throughout the Kennedy Administration, and to an extent paralyzed the activist orientation of the leading figures; or, at least, prevented that activism from straying too far beyond the containment consensus that underlay the Eisenhower Administration's global strategy.

⁶¹Lansdale's knowledge of Vietnam dated from an earlier tour in the Saigon Military Mission in June 1954. This mission was a covert organization of 12 US soldiers and intelligence operatives that specialized in "dirty tricks". [Karnow 1983: 22] This unit was designed to infiltrate the Vietminh forces, and promote disenchantment between them and their purportedly Chinese controllers. The Central Intelligence Agency supported Lansdale's emphasis upon psychological warfare and winning the "hearts and minds" of the people because of his apparent earlier success in the OSS during World War II, where he was involved in the successful suppression of the Hukbalahap communist insurgency in the Philippines.

During this period, Lansdale brought some of his Filipino operatives with him to assist in the expansion of operations. These units were infiltrated into North Vietnam at this time using US Navy vessels, and hid weapons in Hanoi itself, in preparation for sabotage attacks in that city. In addition, Lansdale was involved - though the exact degree of his involvement is controversial - in promoting the large refugee flows from North Vietnam to the South. As

that came to the attention of the President some time in January of 1961. Lansdale spent 10 days in Vietnam from January 2-12, holding meetings with President Diem, other prominent South Vietnamese leaders, and key opposition figures. Lansdale also had

became clear later, these refugees were to provide a significantly large anti-Communist constituency for Diem and his supporters later on. Interestingly, many of those fleeing were Roman Catholic, as was Diem. One could conjecture as to the social and religious "distance" that this factor may have introduced into Diem's relations with an overwhelmingly confucian society with important Buddhist elements.

Lansdale's activities extended further into actually advising Diem on domestic political strategy. In particular, he assisted Diem in countering a coup organized by General Nguyen Van Hinh. Lansdale apparently organized a kidnapping of Hinh's most important lieutenant shortly before the planned coup. In addition, Lansdale bribed several members of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, two opposition political groups, in order to sway them in Diem's direction during the period of maximum pressure. Apparently these activities involved the expenditure by Lansdale of over US \$ 3 million of CIA funds. These activities place Lansdale's advice to the White House concerning Vietnam policy in 1961 in a different, though not altogether negative light. Lansdale's activities - and their apparent success - would likely convince those ignorant of social and political realities in Vietnam of the in-depth nature of his knowledge. Importantly, in the absence of alternative expertise in the National Security Council (NSC) or at the State Department, Lansdale's credentials must have seemed overwhelmingly impressive.

Colonel Lansdale was, however, apparently capable of significant naivete when confronting the realities of Vietnamese society. As Stable Karnow noted, Lansdale held a quite incredibly simplistic notion of how to fight communism:

Just remember this...Communist guerrillas hide among the people. If you win the people over to your side, the Communist guerrillas will have no place to hide. With no place to hide, you can find them. Then, as military men, fix them....finish them [Karnow: 221].

Such was the analysis of one whom President Kennedy considered an expert of Vietnam, and on counterinsurgency operations. This level of generality - or unconsciousness of cultural and societal subtlety - provides a disturbing precursor of future US policy in the country and in the region.

extensive contacts with members of the US Mission in Saigon.

His report recommended a significant alteration in US policy in this area. More specifically, Lansdale argued that "[t]he free Vietnamese, and their government, probably will be able to do no more than postpone eventual defeat - unless they find a Vietnamese way of mobilizing their total resources and then utilizing them with spirit." Lansdale continued by recommending that the US consider Vietnam a "combat area of the Cold War, as an area requiring emergency treatment" (Gibbons 1986b: 12).

Lansdale's recommendations gain importance because of the degree to which they envisioned a much more politically and socially involved strategy on the part of the United States. Lansdale asserted that persons with cultural sensitivity and ideological commitment could assist the Vietnamese to win a contest that was essentially concerned with the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. The purposes of US policy for Lansdale are revealed in his prescription for political strategy in Saigon:

In addition to a new Ambassador....[Lansdale] suggested that a similar person be sent to Vietnam for "political operations whose primary job would be to work with the 'oppositionists' with the goal of establishing a responsible opposition party by which to promote a "two party system which can afford to be surfaced, end much of the present clandestine political structures, and give sound encouragement to the development of new political leaders" (Gibbons 1986b: 12).

The implantation of a US-style democratic political process was to be fostered through a much more thoroughgoing level of involvement by the US Government in the routine push and pull of domestic politics in Vietnam. In particular, Lansdale felt that Diem was being unfairly criticized by the US political leadership, and that American influence

would likely increase if a different approach to him was adopted.

Lansdale's recommendations are also important for other reasons. First of all, they apparently had the ear of President Kennedy during the very earliest days of his Administration. It is also important to recognize the congruence of Lansdale's recommendations and the rhetoric of the new frontier. The favored strategy of Lansdale, counterinsurgency initiatives led by American specialists, were also those of President Kennedy and his advisors. As Thomas Paterson observed, the dual strategy of "modernization" and "counterinsurgency" envisioned the transformation of Vietnamese political processes in a manner competitive with the revolutionary claims of the communists:

The governing notion was that evolutionary economic development would insure non-communist political stability. The Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps sought to fulfill this concept....Washington thus sought...to induce what [Arthur] Schlesinger, Jr. called "middle class revolution". Land reform, industrialization, tax reform, and public health and sanitation programs had to be undertaken, Schlesinger informed the President, or "new Castros will infallibly rise across the continent" (Paterson 1988: 206).

This passage resonates with the orientation enunciated in the 1956 Kennedy speech to the American Friends of Vietnam, which sought to engage the developing world in a contest for a development scenario different -- and more acceptable from a US perspective -- to that proposed by the communist insurgents.

A second consideration is that of the degree to which contrary views were voiced in the White House during the initial phase of the Kennedy Administration. Keeping in mind the essential congruence between Lansdale's views and President Kennedy's political rhetoric, it is particularly troubling that those persons advising the President did not challenge the details -- or the activist tone -- of the approach to South East Asia. We have already taken note of the homogeneity of view within the Kennedy White House concerning foreign policy. This is, of course, to be expected. A President seeks to appoint those who share congenial views regarding politics and national interests. Identity of views can be more problematic, however, where such a consensus precludes dissent by those close to the President.⁶²

That this was the case, is evident from a number of different instances. Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy's UN Ambassador is reported to have said "[t]hey've got the damndest bunch of boy commandos you ever saw. " (Paterson 1988: 203) In additional support for the purported immaturity of Kennedy's advisers, former Presidential Aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. acknowledged that "the besetting sin of the New Frontier...was the addiction of activism." The vulnerability of President Kennedy to accusations of weakness of will is legendary. As one anecdote has it, upon the occasion of a reception given by the White House for some Texas book publishers, one of the guests voiced the

⁶²President Kennedy's dismissal of George Ball's views regarding Vietnam provides a case in point. When Ball predicted that Vietnam might one day require up to three hundred thousand US troops, Kennedy is reported to have said, "Well, George, you're supposed to be one of the smartest guys in town, but you're crazier than hell. That will never happen" [Karnow 1983: 249].

view that "Many Texans in the Southwest think that you are riding [your daughter] Caroline's tricycle, instead of being a man on horseback." (Paterson 1988: 202) It is reported that Kennedy's response was to invite "friendly" members of the press to craft an alternate suggestion of a more vigorous and activist statesman.

We must recognize some variation in influence among Kennedy's advisers. In particular, General Lansdale's position subsequent to his report's impact provides a case in point. He was assigned as an assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara. In his own words, Lansdale doubted the degree to which he was able to communicate the complexity of the Vietnamese situation to his superior:

I said, "Always keep in mind about Vietnam, that the struggle goes far beyond the material things of life. It takes something else. Let's at least learn that lesson." Somehow I found him [MacNamara] very hard to talk to. Watching his face as I talked, I got the feeling that he didn't understand me (Gibbons 1986b: 13).

The contradiction between these views and those enumerated earlier suggests an incongruity between an ideological commitment to anti-communism by an individual who possessed some knowledge of the Vietnamese cultural context (Lansdale), and a state manager who possessed an inordinate degree of confidence in systematic scientific analysis of a foreign cultural setting (MacNamara). This insight gains further support if one considers the degree of expertise present within the US Government relating to South East Asia immediately prior to a major escalation in the quality of the US commitment. As Barry Rubin writes, the State Department had very few area specialists on staff during the escalatory stage of US diplomatic involvement in the late 1950s (Rubin 1987: 137).

Since the Defense Department and the NSC held the leading positions in policymaking with respect to South East Asia, perhaps this was a less costly weakness than it might have been.

This lack of a counterpoint within State to the activism of the White House constituted a key weakness within the US foreign policy system. This was as much an outgrowth of the earlier McCarthy era assault on the US foreign service officer cadre, as it was a proximate result of the low esteem that President Kennedy had for the State Department.⁶³

The lack of a knowledgeable institutional actor in the formulation of US Vietnam policy, other than components of the military and intelligence communities, thus acted as a significant impediment to an effective criticism of White House perspectives on the region. In spite of the Kennedy Administration's contempt for State Department insights, they illustrated no similar self-consciousness with respect to their own lack of familiarity with the region's varying cultures and history (Baritz 1985: 276-277). The adoption of a counterinsurgency orientation was the key to what the Administration viewed as an aggressive and revolutionary campaign to both engage a developing country in the wider

⁶³As Rubin observed, the activists of the New Frontier had profound contempt for the State Department suppression of specialist knowledge - not that the Administration showed itself aware of its own ignorance. As Rubin observes, "the New Frontier people were contemptuous of situations like that of the Japanese language expert never assigned to Japan, or the routine promotion of those blocking or ineptly carrying out decisions." [p. 106] Given the dismissal by the White House of State Department knowledge, and the weak position of the Secretary of State Dean Rusk as an outsider relative to the President's inner circle, crucial checks on central foreign policy formulations and initiatives went unarticulated - at least in a manner likely to significantly affect policy.

contest between the 'free world' and international communism, and to transform the arena of conflict in Vietnam -- negating the very sources of insurgency support. The inevitable misapprehensions which flowed from a superficial familiarity with South East Asia's conflicts and cultures led to a series of decisions that were to critically structure US policy for the entire Vietnam war period.

The adoption of counterinsurgency thinking was more than a merely instrumental adaptation to different local conditions in South East Asia. The New Frontier articulated a notion of political and social transformation based in the notions of modernization and middle class revolution. The next section expands upon the programmatic details of this initiative, but it is important to appreciate the parallel influences of societal criticism upon the policy actually implemented.

Most specifically, the preceding discussion of liberal internationalist views of the failures of the Eisenhower Administration was articulated by persons who later held decision making positions in the Kennedy Administration. To recapitulate the approach of this group, they felt it important for the United States to focus upon two goals: (1) effectively implement the containment of international communism; and (2) the launching of a plan to politically and socially modernize developing societies so as to remove "points of opportunity" for communist aggression. The power of the United States to manipulate outcomes in the international system at this level of abstraction was assumed, rather than demonstrated through any rigorous analysis of regional factors.

The confidence of the New Frontiersmen in their own abilities has been commented upon above. Their hubris is, however, less surprising than the degree to

which they were able to impose their will on an at times stubborn set of bureaucracies -- as the discussion of the first counterinsurgency plan below indicates. Loren Baritz finds similarities between the attitudes that supported US feelings of empowerment in foreign policy and what he terms the "American Myth of Technology". Baritz discerns the primacy of technique over substance in the US approach to policymaking (Baritz 1985: 96-97). The adoption of technical rational solutions to ameliorate complex social "problems" allows state managers to assert scientific rigor in their policy recommendations. The conclusion of this study anticipates Baritz's emphasis upon technical rational responses to complexity by describing the effects of state manager suppression of contextual nuance behind a simplified framework of inference. It can be noted here, however, that the Administration may have underestimated the necessary balance between substantive issues and procedural details. The frustration of US officials in the operation of the CIP program under Eisenhower was to be repeated when the Kennedy leadership tried to dictate requirements and policies to Diem under more harsh (i.e., the insurgency was perceived as more serious) conditions. This frustration is connected directly with the cognitive simplification function served by the governing consensus and constitutes a key reason for the repetitive failure of the Administration to understand the inevitable foreclosure of future options inherent in any contemporary policy choice. The next section describes the first counterinsurgency program launched by the Kennedy Administration and defines the expectations which guided its design.

THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM

US Ambassador to Saigon Elbridge Durbrow introduced a counterinsurgency plan to assist the South Vietnamese government in January of 1961. This program envisioned enhanced support for the South Vietnamese army's counterinsurgency efforts -- in particular -- the plan proposed an increase in the size of the armed forces of 20,000 from 150,000 to 170,000 (Gelb and Betts 1979: 69). Durbrow was uneasy about closely linking the increase in forces to the counterinsurgency effort. The US ambassador favoured a more intense use of the existing forces in pursuit of victory against the communists. Durbrow's concerns appear to have been concentrated upon the way that US influence could produce specific policy shifts by Diem. The plan was designed in Washington, and hence the ambassador was primarily concerned with ensuring the compliance of the South Vietnamese government with the new approach. As he stated at the time, "[c]onsideration should...be given to what actions we are prepared to take to encourage, or if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential elements of the plan."

As was evident in the views of Edward Lansdale mentioned earlier, there were indications of the US' willingness to demand adherence to measures meant to advance the anti-communist cause. At the same time, the plan envisaged by Durbrow would have represented an unprecedented expansion in the US political investment in Vietnam. In particular, the US was to underwrite the 20,000 man increase in the size of the Vietnamese armed forces. As well, the mandating of specific political measures -- as recommended by Lansdale -- presaged the likelihood of Diem's replacement if he failed

to meet US requirements. Interestingly, it was believed that, if the measures included in the plan were adopted, that "the war would be over in eighteen months" (Schlesinger 1964: 541).

White House deliberations regarding this plan focused upon the relationship between the means, the expansion of South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and the ends, the defeat of the insurgents. A parallel goal was the deterrence of communist Chinese and North Vietnamese intervention in the conflict. General Lansdale was a key advocate of the use of US advisors in order to advance the emergence of a stable democratic political system in South Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk voiced the frustration of many in the State Department when he mentioned that US policy was faced with "pressing Diem to do things he did not wish to do and the need to convey to him American support." (Gibbons 1986b: 15)

Lansdale's support for Diem is an interesting counterpoint to the opinions held within the professional echelons of the State Department. The General's views apparently held greater sway with the President than did the arguments for complexity and contradiction that emerged from Secretary Rusk. In this case, Rusk's position as an outsider relative to Kennedy's inner circle, and the parallel marginalization of the State Department in Vietnam decision-making, are both implicated in the particular policy choice that eventuated. Kennedy approved the [Durbrow] plan without comment, having previously asked whether infiltration was among the methods considered by the CIA for

combating the communist threat in the Laos-Vietnam region.⁶⁴

One aspect of Lansdale's recommendations that Kennedy ignored was that the US should make something of a stand in Laos, on the premise that a speedy solution (neutralization) in Laos would provide insufficient time for the US to structure its political and military position in South Vietnam. Kennedy was not convinced by Lansdale's arguments concerning the impact of a US overt presence upon South Vietnamese morale. As the President observed at the time, "...how do we change morale; how do we get operations going in the North; how do we get moving ?" (Gibbons 1986b: 15)

The new emphasis upon counterinsurgency was transmitted from the White House through a sequence of National Security Action Memoranda. From February 3 through March 9, 1961, the White House issued a number of directives to the Pentagon based upon Lansdale's analysis. In particular, Secretary of Defense MacNamara was directed to report upon the mechanics and feasibility of conducting guerilla operations in North Vietnam (NSAM 2). In addition, Kennedy had a version of Lansdale's analysis published in the open press -- actually in the *Saturday Evening Post*, on May 20, 1961, presumably in an attempt to communicate something of the background information that he felt most pertinent to developments in South East Asia.

⁶⁴In fact, CIA Director Allan Dulles was to respond that four teams of 8 men were active in this vein. Operations had begun in some areas of the South, but had not extended into North Vietnam or Laos. For details of these and other plans to use covert methods, see Karnow 1983.

Under NSAM 28, dated March 9 1961, the President urged a report, again from Secretary MacNamara, on the ongoing efforts to generate a guerilla campaign against the communist insurgency emanating from North Vietnam. This flurry of activity bracketed a period during which the President was apparently seeking to place US policy on a different footing in the region. Kennedy appears to have assumed that a clear show of US resolve, alongside an increase in the tempo of offensive actions in the theatre at risk (South East Asia), would show positive results in relatively short order.

During the same period, however, initiative by the Soviet Union reinforced the Kennedy resolve to compete in all areas. On January 6, 1961 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech in which he announced that "wars of national liberation", more generally, anti-colonial struggles and guerilla wars in developing countries, would receive ceaseless support from international communism.

By all accounts, this event had a significant effect on President Kennedy and his advisers. Indeed, Kennedy apparently quoted frequently from Khrushchev's speech at cabinet meetings, ostensibly hoping to elicit reactions from his inner circle (Gibbons 1986b: 16). As is evident from the foregoing discussion, however, all that this nascent challenge constituted was a **reinforcement** for trends and tendencies in threat assessment and policy that already existed.

The predilection of the Kennedy Administration to interpret the speech as a direct challenge to the US' global position was already firmly demonstrated in the manner and tone of the governing approach to foreign policy. The personal interest that the President took in crafting the more arcane details of national policy during this period are

illustrative of the degree to which Kennedy personalized a perceptibly geopolitical challenge.

In addition to personally editing the Green Beret's (US Special Forces) special operations training manuals, the President also read at length studies of the implementation of counterinsurgency operations. He also took it upon himself to recommend additional military technical innovations -- in weaponry and logistics -- that might make US forces more effective in the area. The Green Berets became a favorite institution for the President during this period, and the term "counterinsurgency" came to have a certain 'cachet' among the inner circle (Gibbons 1986b: 16; Karnow 1983: 248).

A special counterinsurgency task force was formed, with a number of notable participants. Formed in March of 1961, the task force was headed by Richard Bissell, a Deputy Director of the CIA. In January of 1962, this group changed its name to the Special Group (CI), and was chaired by presidential adviser General Maxwell D. Taylor. In addition to these two members, the participants were: "the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development and the Director of the US Information Agency" (Gibbons 1986b: 17).

As adjuncts to these individuals, W.W. Rostow, a professor from MIT, became McGeorge Bundy's (the National Security Advisor) assistant, and Roger Hilsman, the Head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, became instrumental in innovating in counterinsurgency planning. Finally, historical figures of importance in

the late 1960s also backed this shift in policy. Henry Kissinger for one, became convinced as early as 1955 that wars "in the periphery" were likely to figure prominently in the prosecution of the Cold War (Gibbons 1986b: 17; Gaddis 1982: 198; Melanson 1983: 122-123). The limits of conventional and nuclear weaponry in application against insurgent threats were also key factors in support of this consensus. Doubts were voiced about the likelihood of success of the measures being taken, but this was mostly an instrumental critique of methods, not of the underlying goals of policy.

The change in attitudes during 1961 did not, of course, remove the problem of Laos from the Administration's foreign policy agenda. Early on, Kennedy had established a task force on Laos, staffed by the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, J. Graham Parsons, his deputy John Steeves and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze. Secretary of State Dean Rusk prepared a draft plan for the neutralization of Laos for delivery to the President late in February 1961. Debate surrounding the plan focused upon the degree to which the settlement in Laos represented a reversal or an advance for the communists. Interestingly, a small US military deployment into Thailand was proposed as a signal of US seriousness. President Kennedy approved the plan, except for the army contingent envisioned by its drafters. This pattern was to recur in Kennedy's decision making on the region. In no case was the President willing to contemplate -- at least through an explicit decision -- the establishment of a combat capability unable to overwhelm the adversary of the moment.

Discussions on this issue frequently mentioned the possibility of action under SEATO plan 5, a plan that envisioned the deployment of US, Australian, New Zealand

and British forces along the Mekong River, in an attempt to present a defensible line to Communist aggression infiltrating through Cambodia and Laos. The forces envisioned for this exercise were much larger than the token elements mentioned within the counterinsurgency program (initially US contributions under this plan were to total approximately 13,000, many of whom would be service personnel, not a part of the military advisor contingent). In particular, it was anticipated that SEATO plan 5 would involve the deployment of 129,000 US combat troops as a part of the combined contingent of over 200,000 men. A figure as close to the President as McGeorge Bundy wrote in favour of just such a radical shift in policy as early as October 1961:

For what one man's feel is worth, mine -- based on very close touch with Indochina in the 1954 war and civil war afterwards till Diem took hold -- is that it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Vietcong....An early and hard-hitting operation has a good chance (70 per cent would be my guess) of arresting things and giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up. Even if we follow up hard, on the lines the JCS are working out after yesterday's meeting, however, chances are not much better that we will in fact be able to clean up the situation. It all depends on Diem's effectiveness, which is very problematical (sic). The 30 per cent chance is that we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I would myself favour going in (The Pentagon Papers, chapter 4, pp. 12A, 13).

This awareness of danger contrasts rather starkly with the prevailing ethos of the counterinsurgency program, which emphasized the relative ease of molding Vietnamese society for US ends. The application of unconventional military power -- through counterinsurgency efforts -- was apparently meant to forestall indefinitely the application

of large scale military force.

In March of 1961 President Kennedy authorized the movement of significant US naval forces into the region proximate to Laos. Included in these forces were: three aircraft carriers, long range troop and cargo transport aircraft, and a token force of 150 soldiers dispatched to Udorn, Thailand (Gibbons 1986b: 21). Alongside this initiative came the inevitable covert operations launched under the auspices of flights by the US Air Force of planes borrowed from the Philippine Air Force. These aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over Laos through March and April of that year. The US sought to avoid clear involvement in operations in the region, wishing to maintain "flexibility" at the very time when the shift in policy in Washington was solidifying US resolve to stand and fight -- though not in Laos.

The military moves begun in an effort to stabilize the diplomatic environment prior to a neutralization of Laos also involved discussions with the US' allies within SEATO. Congressional support was forthcoming for just this sort of initiative, as a letter from Senator J. William Fulbright to the President on March 24 1961 illustrates:

[...the extent]....to which you might be willing to go in defending Laos could possibly be influenced by the stability in Vietnam. It would be embarrassing to say the least, to have Vietnam collapse just as we are extended in Laos (Gibbons 1986b: 22).

In this vein, the US sought to achieve multilateral support for its campaign in South East Asia. The diplomatic content of this initiative reveals US frustration with what they saw as a less than forthcoming attitude on the part of the British, in supporting what were described as avowedly "Western" aims. The conditional nature of US unilateral

behaviour is intimated, however, by statements by Kennedy shortly before the fateful Bay of Pigs invasion. As reported at the time by British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, "...unless the British decide to join the US in such an effort....he (President Kennedy) was not sure he could get his people to accept unilateral action" (Gibbons 1986b: 22).

Opinion Management: Engineering Domestic Support for Foreign Policy Initiatives

An interesting example of the way that the Kennedy Administration sought to deal with domestic opposition to its Vietnam policy is provided by William Gibbons in a discussion of a draft "Contingency Information Program" tabled in the White House in July of 1961. This plan envisioned a two-level communications plan, aimed first at swaying official opinion in congress - and second - toward utilizing congressional figures to influence popular attitudes on the question.

The particular themes that were emphasized by this plan were: (1) the 'domino' theory of communist aggression; (2) a clear linkage of communist aggression in South East Asia to US security interests; (3) the linkages between communist propaganda in Berlin and elsewhere to 'probing actions' in the region; and a message not for public consumption - but linked rhetorically to the "bear any burden" theme of the President's inaugural address; (4) "A change in operational philosophy....instead of haggling with Diem over who should finance what proportion of the effort, **we should regard this as a wartime situation in which the sky's the limit.**" [my emphasis] (Gibbons 1986b:

57-58).

Any government is necessarily concerned with communicating its message and policies to the wider public. For the purposes of this study, the methodologies and overall structure of the influence attempt are the important issue.

First, the program envisioned the use of "perspective" pieces in the prestige press (i.e., the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and influential broadcast outlets, such as CBS News), in order to prepare the ground for later "expert" commentaries emanating from Administration officials. Especially important in this regard were to be the expositions of Maxwell Taylor and Edward Lansdale. In turn, key columnists in the prestige press were to be used as avenues, through which issues the Administration sought to introduce would enter the public debate. Parallel to this process were to be informal liaison meetings with congressional leaders.⁶⁵

The coincidence of the journalistic "perspectives" and congressional consultations was meant to allow for the possibility of measuring the success of the Administration's communications efforts through opinion polling. At this point in the campaign a number of tactical modifications were also envisioned. In particular, if public sentiment was not developing in the desired direction, a withdrawal of the substantive policy initiative was foreseen. In turn, however, if public attitudes were seen as accepting of an increased US role in the region, backgrounders by Administration figures would also be utilized to

⁶⁵As was discussed earlier, Administration contacts in key media outlets were well suited to achieving this goal. The tensions in the media's own conception of its role in a Cold War conflict also fed this potential for manipulation.

escalate the identification of high Administration officials with the newly espoused policy goals. In turn, congressional leaders would be asked to go on record as supporting the executive-led initiative in Vietnam. The final stages of the campaign were discussed in terms of generating requests by Asian allies (i.e., Thailand, South Vietnam) for US assistance in their efforts against communist insurgents. Presidential "fire-side chats" to the American public were envisioned as the final means of solidifying national support for the initial deployments of US troops.

This plan reflects an emphasis upon incremental messages to different segments of the Executive, the Congress, and the US public, about the evolving threat facing the country. The management of elite media and public debate was key to the political process out of which a viable policy emerged. In particular, the allowance of a fall-back position within the overall influence effort illustrates the interaction between public attitudes and allowable shifts in government policy. Significantly, however, this appeal to mass opinion -- the fire-side chat to the nation -- takes place at the conclusion of the influence effort.

It appears that the Administration felt it necessary to develop elite opinion first, as an essential precursor to the acquiescence of the mass public.⁶⁶ Administration

⁶⁶Not that the Administration necessarily had anything to worry about from the Media. As was observed above, the media's dependence upon government information effectively prevented them from pro-actively developing more critical lines of reporting. In turn, the media also basically **agreed** with the threat perception articulated by the New Frontier. As such, they were hardly likely to oppose its measures vociferously. As Noam Chomsky notes in Manufacturing Consent, no significant critical reporting of the US's policies in South Vietnam appeared until after 1965:

prerogatives in foreign and defence policy, buttressed by congressional deference to the executive in these same issue areas, placed key levers in the hands of one segment of the state, to the (potential) disadvantage of other theses concerning available policy options. In any case, as we have seen elsewhere in this study, the Kennedy Administration never seriously considered a negotiated solution to the communist insurgency in Vietnam. Rather, the neutralization of Laos prepared the way for a more "effective" stand to be taken in an adjacent country, where, the Administration felt, the people were more willing to fight.

US frustration with the difficulty of implementing so elaborate a plan for influencing political events is commented upon by Michael Hunt in his Ideology and US Foreign Policy. While referring to US attempts to control international events, his remarks resound with applicability to the US domestic scene:

The American tendency to see the world as simple and pliable has been reinforced by geopolitics, with its conception of the globe as a chessboard, neatly demarcated and easily controlled by anyone with enough strong pieces and the proper strategy. But the world, complex and slow to change, has resisted our (sic) efforts to impose our will and enforce our rules. We have known the bewilderment of the chess master who discovers that in fact no square is like another, that pawns often disturbingly assume a life of their own, and that few contests are neatly two-sided (Hunt 1987: 176).

It is a highly significant fact that neither then, nor before, was there any detectable questioning of the righteousness of the American cause in Vietnam, or of the necessity to proceed to full-scale "Intervention". By that time, of course, only the questions of tactics and costs remained open, and further discussion in the mainstream media was largely limited to these narrow issues (Chomsky and Herman 1988: 172).

A public relations campaign designed to transform US public opinion into allowing a slow and inexorable escalation in US involvement in Vietnam was to an extent a waste of effort, given the underlying logic of the Administration's policy -- which was to involve the prestige of the US in the region -- leaving to a future President of the United States the decision as to whether the stake had become large enough that the US ought to willingly fight to defend it. At the same time, the relatively low salience of Vietnam to the American public made this sort of plan almost too sophisticated, as the interest and attention of those likely to oppose expanded US involvement were otherwise occupied - as the discussion in chapter two made clear.

CONTINUING EVENTS IN LAOS

Khrushchev's acquiescence in the US proposal for a peace conference on the Laotian situation made British support for military intervention academic, but the incident provides an interesting counterpoint to the bravado of the new frontier. The Bay of Pigs invasion marked a crucial transition point in the Kennedy Administration's self awareness in foreign policy. The abortive invasion produced a perceptible hardening of the US attitude toward what it perceived as communist "probing" actions in the periphery. Apparently concerned with an unmet challenge from an expansionist adversary, the Kennedy Administration interpreted the Bay of Pigs as placing at risk the United States' reputation and credibility in the prosecution of containment.

President Kennedy came to view the campaign in South East Asia as allowing the vindication of American power and prestige. Tactical decision making in the White House aimed at allowing a stand to be taken in Vietnam, which was interpreted as more suitable than Laos, hence its neutralization. Similarly, the challenge posed by Khrushchev's support for insurgencies in the Third World, and the emphasis placed by the Kennedy Administration upon credibility-based foreign policy considerations led to a reaffirmation of resolve -- even in the face of the apparent failure of some of the favoured unconventional modes of warfare.

In the rhetoric of the Kennedy years, "communist offensives" and "monolithic communism" were the favorite targets of activist foreign policy practitioners. The contrary strains within the New Frontier - on the one hand - containment and war-like; and, on the other, expansive yet anti-colonialist, both fell victim to the measures used to implement policy. The activities of Edward Lansdale, and the policy prescriptions produced by Maxwell Taylor and Roger Hilsman, each required a deepening involvement in South Vietnamese social and political realities. The failure of US policy makers to achieve the requisite level of knowledge and cultural sensitivity prior to the escalation of American involvement led to some of the misapprehensions already described. In turn, however, it reveals the power and persistence of those pictures, formulations and biases that state managers brought to the problems of US foreign policy.

Thomas Paterson summarizes the apparent lessons that this period bestowed on Kennedy's "containment generation":

...toughness against communism works; a nation must negotiate from strength; precautions must be taken to avoid compromises or sell-outs in negotiations; communism [was] monolithic; communism was a cancer feeding on poverty and economic dislocation (Paterson 1988: 195).

The list continues, but for our purposes the important point is the fact that specific rhetorical and political influence lay behind each of the accusations, observations and phenomena summarized in these statements. Political competitiveness at home was thus significantly related to the behaviour of state managers in their planning of foreign policy. As the 1960 election campaign illustrated, the essential similarity of the overall foreign policy positions of candidates Richard Nixon and John Kennedy was a reaffirmation of the postwar US foreign policy consensus.⁶⁷ The international system, for this viewpoint, was defined by a central cleavage -- that represented by the Cold War.

The discussion to this point has sought to illustrate some of the factors important to the Cold War policy environment within the Kennedy Administration in 1961. The balance of this narrative extends to the period during which both Ngo Dinh Diem and President Kennedy were both assassinated. The discussion then converges toward the continuity thesis derived initially, arguing that the emergence of underlying trends in international outcomes, sometimes but by no means mostly, under the pressure of

⁶⁷It is interesting to conjecture as to the effects of the narrow electoral victory of John F. Kennedy on his self-perceived policy flexibility while in office. It is at least credible to argue that the narrow victory helped to delegitimize any **potentially novel** policy innovations that JFK may have planned, though there is little evidence that this is the case. Instead, the Administration was likely placed on the defensive, as its perceived weakness was seen as a place where the Republicans might tend to attack in both the Congress, and in the 1964 presidential election. For a theoretical discussion of legitimacy deficits and electoral weakness, see the discussion of veto points in chapter two, and Immergut 1992: 65-66.

deliberate US policy prescriptions - indicates the contradictions in US policy which were themselves the result of the imperfect meshing of the ideological structure of explanation within the containment consensus - and the dynamism of the global political situation.

The Broader Meaning of the Bay of Pigs Fiasco

The failure at the Bay of Pigs had one other significant effect, it solidified in the mind of the President a distrust of the advice he received from both the intelligence agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Theodore Sorensen observed:

He [President Kennedy] relied more on his White House staff and his own common sense; and he asked the Attorney General and me to attend all NSC meetings. He began asking questions he had not asked before about military operations in Laos. He requested each member of the Chiefs of Staff to give him in writing his detailed views on where our intervention would lead, who would join us, how we would react to a massive Red Chinese response and where it would all end. Their answers, considered in an NSC meeting on May 1, looked very different from the operations envisioned; and the closer he looked, the less justifiable and definable those answers became. "Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did," he would say to me in September..., "otherwise we'd be in Laos by now - and that would be a hundred times worse" (Sorenson 1966: 72c).

Rather than having a sobering effect on the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy, it is likely that this failure reinforced the activist dynamic already dominant among the inner circle. Support is provided for this interpretation by the now de-classified transcripts of the confidential investigation into the Bay of Pigs invasion. The principals on the

investigative panel, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke (then Chief of Naval Operations), and Allan Dulles delivered a number of recommendations to the President. Their orientation towards the tactics and methods used in the Bay of Pigs speak powerfully for themselves:

We are of the opinion that the preparations and execution of paramilitary operations such as Zapata (the Bay of Pigs Operation) are a form of cold war action in which the country must be prepared to engage. If it does so, it must engage in it with the maximum chance of success....[With respect to the broader question of US cold war operations, the group concluded that there was need for]...a changed attitude on the part of the government and of the people toward the emergency which confronts us. The first requirement of such a change is to recognize that we are in a life and death struggle which we may be losing, and will lose unless we change our ways and marshall our resources with an intensity associated in the past only with times of war. To effect this change, we must give immediate consideration to taking such measures as the announcement of a limited national emergency, the review of any treaties or international agreements, which restrain the full use of our resources in the cold war, and the determination to seek the respect of our neighbours, without the criteria being international popularity, and a policy of taking into account the proportioning of foreign aid to the attitude shown us by our neighbours (Operation Zapata 1981: 43).

It is readily apparent that these persons - each important in the shaping of US Vietnam policy, drew a sharp lesson from the Cuban debacle. That lesson was that the war against the communist enemy was not subject to normal legal and moral restraints -- even the weak constraints operative in the international setting. In addition, the potential suspension of oversight procedures that inhibited executive freedom of action - was also anticipated by this group (Wyatt 1993: 50). The erosion of domestic democratic

principles under the pressure of an external threat was thus a key element of the policy debate in the upper echelon of the Kennedy Administration. At the same time, it is clear that this notion of total conflict held a clear resonance with the "pay any price, bear any burden" rhetoric of Kennedy's inaugural address. It is apparent then, that the activism of the Kennedy years was positively related to an unfortunate concentration of executive power. Under conditions of legislative acquiescence in foreign policy, such a habitual resort to policy prescriptions that risked the historic relations among the different branches of government -- and the norms of political criticism -- left the foundation for what later became known as the imperial presidency (Huntington 1981; Steinbruner 1989; Barnett 1972; Paterson 1988; Grover 1989; Melanson 1983; Schandler 1977).

From this vantage point, the remaining policy initiatives taken by the Administration with respect to South East Asia followed -- not according to some overarching logic -- but consistent with a given tactical implementation of containment. That interpretation saw the threat from the communist world as increasing in seriousness. In language reminiscent of NSC-68, those closest to the President appeared willing to engage North Vietnam in a conflict of an ever widening scope. The rationale behind this expansion was the unprecedented nature of the competition with the Soviet Union, and the anticipated implications of a communist victory in South Vietnam.

The implementation of US policy in South Vietnam was rather schizophrenic. US support for the Diem regime was increasingly seen as conflicting with the broader goal of opposing the progress of the communist insurgents. The Administration narrowed its own options toward an instrumental support for Diem, so long as his survival aided the

prosecution of the Cold War. In many ways the progress of the insurgency set the pace for US disgruntlement with Diem himself (Hunt 1987: 176-177).

The balance of the Kennedy Administration's term in office saw a variation in actions within the foreign policy consensus discussed in this chapter. As a particular implementation of the containment doctrine, Kennedy's policies were rendered unique by their activist tone, and by a peculiar implementation of a quite polar Cold War perspective on East-West relations.

This chapter began the analysis of the foreign policy perceptions of the Kennedy Administration. The next chapter relates the historical development of the biases identified as present in 1961, to the conceptual framework presented in the first two chapters. In particular, by counterpoising the theoretically anticipated relationship of state and society which produced the observed policy agenda of the Administration to 1963, it is possible to examine state manager understandings of the international environment, and the impact they had upon the evolving US Vietnam policy.

CHAPTER 4

US VIETNAM POLICY, 1961-63

The Kennedy Administration's approach to Vietnam illustrates the complex nature of policymaking within the state. Public opinion and organized social forces gained only intermittent access to the policy debate at the centre of the Administration. As was argued earlier, elites were able -- to a remarkable degree -- articulate foreign policy without fear of popular consternation. The policy environment at the end of the Kennedy Administration confronted a specific problem, the penetration of communist insurgents into Vietnam, and the broader challenge of vigorously prosecuting the Cold War. Foreign policy during this period can thus be assessed in the light of the Cold War concept of global politics outlined in preceding chapters. This chapter describes the US policy developed to combat the communist insurgents in South East Asia between 1961 and 1963. In particular this discussion focuses upon the Kennedy Administration's single minded approach to implementing containment. At the same time, the instrumental utility of the Diem regime to the achievement of American goals is discussed against the very real limitations that became apparent to Diem's willingness to follow US orders in the governance of his society. The replacement of Diem at the end of the period is similarly discussed as it relates to the continuous reaffirmation of US higher order goals in fighting the Cold War.

1961-62: THE EARLY PHASE

In early October 1961, General Maxwell D. Taylor led an investigative commission to Saigon and other parts of South Vietnam. This commission was charged with analyzing, on the ground, the seriousness of the communist insurgency, the strength of the Diem regime, and the implications of both factors for the protection of US security interests throughout South East Asia. Following a stay in Vietnam of approximately 2 weeks, during which they consulted US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) personnel, the US embassy's senior analysts and the principals of the Diem regime, the commission returned to Washington with a coherent - though none too rigorous - appreciation of the dilemmas confronting American policy.

As Maxwell Taylor remarked later, the commission was struck by the poor morale of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) side:

...[i]t was no exaggeration to say that the entire country was suffering from a collapse of national morale - an obvious fact which made a strong impression on the members of our mission. In subsequent weeks...the thought was always with us that we needed something visible which could be done quickly to offset the oppressive feeling of hopelessness which seemed to permeate all ranks of Vietnamese society (Taylor 1972: 228).

Taylor construed a particular message from this situation, as he makes clear in a passage from the same source:

From all quarters in Southeast Asia the message on Vietnam is the same: vigorous American action is needed to buy time for Vietnam to mobilize and organize its real

assets; but the time for such a turn around has nearly run out. And if Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to hold Southeast Asia. What will be lost is not merely a crucial piece of real estate, but the faith that the US has the will and the capacity to deal with the Communist offensive in that area (Taylor 1972: 228-230).

The Taylor commission's recommendations were contained in a 25 page report portions of which remain classified. One appendix to that report, however, is a memorandum written by Edward Lansdale. As was noted earlier, Lansdale had long recommended an increase in the involvement of US specialists in the planning of the campaign against the insurgents. Lansdale's discussion in the memorandum was a variation on this earlier theme:

It will take Americans who are willing to stake all on the outcome, who know their tasks, and who can act with great understanding in collaboration with the Vietnamese...I believe that one year of devoted duty by such Americans...would spark a complete psychological change in Vietnam's situation, give the Vietnamese the hope of winning and take the initiative away from the communists....[w]ithout this spark the Vietnamese were going to lose their country. [With such direct American help he thought that]...much of the present Vietnamese bickering and hesitancy would disappear as a new sense of direction is given them (Gibbons 1986b: 74).

The recommended scale of US involvement was acknowledged to present very real challenges to the US constitutional system. In particular, the question of the legal position of US forces in South East Asia in the absence of a declaration of war, was addressed by Lansdale. Again, from the same memorandum:

The US needs to declare a 'sub-limited' war on the communists in Vietnam and then to wage it successfully. Since such an action is not envisioned by our Constitution, a way of so doing must be found which is consistent with our heritage. The most natural declaration would be a proclamation by the President, which would state US objectives and clearly outline the principles of human liberty involved. The US Congress would vote support of these objectives and principles. Implementing action would then be carried out by Executive Order (Gibbons 1986b: 74).

As a harbinger of the eventual Gulf of Tonkin resolution, this passage is stark and powerful.⁶⁸ Other aspects of the Taylor recommendations are of particular importance.

⁶⁸The threat to US political and legal norms posed by foreign policy measures in Vietnam was viewed by some as a decisional variable that helped distinguish purported 'realists' from 'idealists'. Clearly, for some observers the checks and balances on executive power peculiar to the US constitutional tradition, had begun to outlive their usefulness. An example of this perspective is available from an unlikely source, Senator J. William Fulbright, later a severe critic of US involvement in Vietnam. Here is a sample of Senator Fulbright's views:

...for the existing requirements of American foreign policy we have hobbled the President by too niggardly a grant of power...The overriding problem of inadequate Presidential authority in foreign affairs derives from the checks and balances of congressional authority in foreign relations. [Fulbright questioned]...whether in the face of the harsh realities of the 1960s we can successfully execute a long range program for the taming or containing, to today's aggressive and revolutionary forces by continuing to leave vast and vital decision making powers in the hands of a decentralized, independent minded and largely parochial minded body of legislators. [An article by J. William Fulbright, on "American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century under an 18th Century Constitution", cited in Gibbons, 1986b: 127]

In the face of the history of abuses of executive authority in two decades following, perhaps Fulbright's opinions on this topic underwent some change. In any case, it is clear

The political status of the Diem regime, and of Diem himself, was addressed in the report.

As William Jorden, one of the members of the task force observed at the time:

If the new US program resulting from the Taylor mission's recommendations did not produce the necessary improvement in the Vietnamese government, however...the US would then have to consider backing changes that would reduce sharply the role of the President (Diem) and would alter his status to that of figurehead and symbol (Gibbons 1986b: 75).

US involvement in the reform of the GVN thus proceeded to a much greater extent than the "like-minded souls" campaign envisaged by Lansdale. The restructuring of South Vietnam was to proceed along lines designed in the White House, with the necessary participation of the Vietnamese government. Containment as a policy required the acquiescence of the South Vietnamese in the details of strategy for the prosecution of the war. In this way the vision of conflict prevalent in Washington remained dominant over any local peculiarities in the communists' real aims. As was true at other moments, the assumption of special prerogatives by the United States in defining the "best or good" world order overpowered the cultural and political concerns unique to South East Asia.

The flavor of the discussions in the White House is effectively captured by a memorandum authored by Frank Childs, a University of Michigan professor who had previously served in an advisory capacity in South Vietnam: "[Diem]...can only postpone defeat...he cannot win...Projecting the present trend...South Vietnam will surely fall to the

from the discussion thus far that similar opinions - to the extent that deference to presidential authority in foreign affairs was even an issue - were prevalent among the Senator's colleagues.

Vietcong in 12-18 months". As Child continued, this fact held stark implications for the future of the Diem Regime:

There are intelligent and able men in Vietnam who could provide the effective leadership and even capture the imagination of the population. A military coup - or an assassin's bullet - are the only means by which this leadership will ever be exercised (Gibbons 1986b: 76).

The circulation of this memorandum within the NSC in October 1961, provides an early indicator of anti-Diem sentiment within Kennedy inner circle. Diem's cumulative failure to implement policies favoured by the United States led decision makers in Washington to doubt his political reliability. In a manner familiar from other instances of realpolitik, it is evident that the importance of a particular ally to US interests in the area derived not from the particular regime in power, but from the ability to deny supposedly scarce resources and populations to an enemy. South Vietnam became just another US power instrument, to be modified and maintained as needed.

Another member of the Taylor commission, W.W. Rostow voiced similar views of the situation in South Vietnam. His prescription is all the more important as he was one of the intellectual creators of the counterinsurgency approach to fighting limited wars. The broader implications of the US approach to anti-Communism held that the escalation of communist activity in South Vietnam represented concrete evidence of the Khrushchev strategy announced earlier in the year:

It is my judgement and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev's "wars of liberation" which are really

para-wars of guerilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerilla aggression in North Vietnam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbours to the south (Pentagon Papers, Vol.2 1971: 96).

This perspective is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the sharp resonance these lines have with later US policy in the region. A clear linkage is made between the Communist insurgency in Vietnam and the broader Soviet strategy emphasizing wars of national liberation. As such, these views were a restatement of the long-held opinions of the Kennedy inner-circle regarding Vietnam. The prior decision to make a stand in Vietnam following the neutralization of Laos can thus be understood as a tactical retrenchment, inherently consistent with and reinforcing of, existing policy prescriptions.

Early November of 1961 saw discussion of the Taylor recommendations within the NSC. Some criticism was voiced that the recommendations contained in the report were too incrementalist, predicated as they were on the deployment of 6 to 8 thousand US military personnel (army and/or marines), ostensibly offered as assistance in a flood relief program. These forces were to be armed, and authorized to defend themselves if attacked. This commitment of US troops was described as a signal to both the insurgents and the North Vietnamese of the seriousness of US resolve on the one hand, and as

rendering possible the "filling out" of an embryonic command structure in the future, on the other.

Some participants, significantly McGeorge Bundy and Robert MacNamara, criticized this approach as likely to send only "muddy" signals to the communists. Rather, these two individuals argued for a **categorical** commitment to the defence of South Vietnam at the earliest possible time. Under the MacNamara-Bundy approach, the small force recommended by Taylor would be increased, alongside a formal declaration by the President of the United States that the US would not allow the defeat of the South by communist forces. The other Taylor recommendations were to be implemented as originally designed (Gibbons 1986b: 79).

Differences among the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House on the Taylor recommendations centered on the questions of the size of the military forces to be sent, and upon the efficacy of pressure on Diem to force reforms in his government as a precursor to enhanced US support. The Pentagon recommended adoption of the report's recommendations, though with an increased ground force commitment. The White House and the State Department placed more emphasis upon pressuring Diem to reform his governmental structure, by including some of the democratic opposition forces in a National Emergency Council.

During this same period, however, unease with the magnitude of the growing US commitment to the South was voiced at the centre. Witness the remarks of Robert Johnson on October 31, 1961:

If we do not intend to be forced out of South East Asia altogether, there is real doubt whether, once we committed forces, we could withdraw them until reasonable security had been restored in Vietnam....In making a decision on the Taylor proposal we need to face and to decide in principle the question of whether we are prepared, if necessary to step up very considerably our military commitment in Vietnam. If we commit 6 - 8,000 troops and then pull them out when the going got rough we will be finished in Vietnam and probably in all of South East Asia (Notes from a meeting with McGeorge Bundy on October 31, 1961; in Gibbons 1986b: 80).

It is evident here that Johnson, an NSC staff member during this period, felt that the differences between a categorical commitment and the political implications of even a (numerically) minimal deployment in South Vietnam were far from clear. In Johnson's case, this position did not derive from any principled objection to US forces in the region. Indeed, he had earlier recommended the insertion of US forces into Laos (Gibbons 1986b: 80). Rather, the concern lay with the future willingness of the Kennedy Administration to follow through on an incrementally constructed commitment. The US policy of containment did not represent a barrier to this sort of policy follow-through. Instead, it can be viewed as setting highly permissive political boundaries for such an initiative.

A second group existed, however, that had previous bureaucratic responsibility for Vietnam policy within the broad NSC structure, the Vietnam Task Force. This group had been established by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 20, 1961. It was designed to evaluate and produce recommendations regarding short and medium term policy for countering "communist domination in Vietnam". The membership of this

task force is important, if for no other reason than the fame that befell many of its members later on in the decade:

This new group was...headed by Deputy Secretary of Defence Roswell Gilpatric, with [Edward] Lansdale as operations officer. Other members included, W.W. Rostow, Paul Nitze (then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), General H. Bonisteel II from the JCS, U. Alexis Johnson (Deputy Under Secretary of State), and Desmond Fitzgerald, (then Chief of the Far East Division of the CIA) (Gibbons 1986b: 35).

This group produced a separate proposal, subtly different from the Taylor recommendations. Rather than 6 to 8 thousand military personnel, the Vietnam Task Force recommendations envisaged the deployment of approximately 1500 US troops in a developmental assistance role. More specifically, though armed, they were to assist the South Vietnamese government in implementing flood relief projects. Additional troop commitments were to be contingent on Diem's implementation of governmental structural reforms and the potential expansion of the entire affair into a SEATO operation (Gibbons 1986b: 80). This plan did not place in question the fundamental premise of the commitment of US forces to the defence of South Vietnam. Timing seems to have been the major difference between two formulations. Maximizing the efficacy of US pressure upon Diem was also a key concern.

A third plan did exist, however, and was put forward by the following individuals: Averell Harriman, Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith and Abram Chayes - then

Legal Advisor to the State Department.⁶⁹ The plan envisioned the neutralization of South Vietnam, along the same lines as Laos. In the interim, a renewed line of pressure upon Diem for internal reform was recommended, alongside the appointment of a new strong ambassador to further impress the point. Some names were suggested for the post, among these were: George C. McGhee, David E. Lilienthal and Averell Harriman himself (Gibbons 1986b: 82).

While of apparent interest to the President, this initiative failed for lack of strong support in the State Department, as well as due to the lack of powerful advocates elsewhere in the US Government. Witness the description by one of this group's members concerning the departmental support (or the lack thereof), for this proposal:

...it didn't fly partly because we didn't have enough people for it. Bowles was at that time on his way out. He was not a powerful figure. I think Harlan Cleveland (Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs) was identified with it, also. We had all the non-power in the Department, and so it just never flew. We talked to the Secretary about it, but it was simply regarded as not within the realm of possibility (Congressional Research Service interview with Abrams Chayes, October 13, 1978; cited in Gibbons, 1986b: 83).

The near complete absence of congressional involvement in this entire deliberation is clearly evident. The task forces struck within the NSC, and the Taylor Commission itself, were

⁶⁹Chester Bowles was removed from a position of influence in the Administration shortly afterward, in what Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts termed "the Thanksgiving Day Massacre" which saw a reorganization of the State Department in response to Kennedy's dissatisfaction with its effectiveness. See Gelb and Betts: 74-75.

entirely executive branch activities. It is not the case, however, that key congressional figures were entirely unaware of evolving US policy towards Vietnam. In particular, Senator Mike Mansfield sent a long memorandum to President Kennedy on November 2, 1961 urging him to avoid the introduction of US forces into the country (The Kennedy Library, NSF Country File, Vietnam, "The Vietnamese and South East Asia Situation").

Mansfield's chief concerns seem to have revolved around the dangers of escalation into a war with the Peoples' Republic of China, the lack of strong allies on the US side, and the dubious nature of the South Vietnamese willingness and ability to fight. He added that any force sent to the area should be militarily significant and able to "provide that bare minimum of effectiveness which would permit a solution of the guerilla problem in South Vietnam or prevent further encroachment southward -- assuming of course that the Chinese Communists, let alone the Russians, do not become involved (Gibbons 1986b: 85).

In quality, these concerns do not differ from those voiced within the Administration. In turn, they significantly do not place into question the fundamental necessity of countering a communist probe into South East Asia.⁷⁰ At the same time, however, Mansfield reiterated

⁷⁰Interestingly, with reference to the Administration decisions of late November, one senior senator, Stuart Symington, (D/MO), voiced not only awareness but also approval of the evolving policy. As the new Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Symington's unelicited support gains additional significance. In a hand written note dated October 21, 1961 following his visit to South Vietnam Symington wrote: "It seems to me we ought to try and hold this place. Otherwise this part of the world is sure to go down the drain....If you so decide, it will be my privilege to support your position to the best of my ability." Symington extended his support to a more thoroughgoing statement of threat perception that anticipated NSAM 111: "Whether it be Saigon or Berlin, or some other place...I do not think that this nation can afford to bend further...." And further, [with respect to Vietnam]...we are losing...which would then result in the loss of Laos and Cambodia...both already far gone, as well as

the importance of economic and political pressure upon the Diem regime to reform itself. For the Kennedy Administration, this represented a perspective that had not been in the ascendancy since prior to April 19, 1961 -- the date of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

By November of 1961, the interagency process was coming to a head, and a draft memorandum authored within the Pentagon, was circulated. This memorandum both supported and extended the Taylor commission's recommendations. The categorical commitment that MacNamara had argued for earlier was fleshed out into a broader agenda of options:

The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the US shall: (a) Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism, and (b) Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions.

Following this paragraph, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff set down a number of conclusions that they had reached concerning the seriousness of the challenge posed by the Communist insurgency, and the necessary actions that the US should adopt to counter the threat:

The Fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.

Thailand and Burma." [The Kennedy Library, POF Country File, Vietnam General. Cited in Gibbons, 1986b: 101] This early statement of the domino theory is clearly consistent with the rhetoric of the position Kennedy adopted 4 years prior to the beginning of his presidency.

The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of US forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgement that the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight.

The introduction of a US force of the magnitude of an initial 8000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.

The memorandum went on to argue for the insertion in the medium term of 206,000 (6 divisions) of US troops in order to secure the country from any potential intimidation from China or North Vietnam (Pentagon Papers, vol. 2, 1971: 108-109).

While acknowledging the seriousness of this sort of decision, the paper concluded with three statements which set the military analysis of the situation clearly into focus:

(a) We do not believe major units of US forces should be introduced in South Vietnam unless we are willing to make an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum.

(b) We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the US to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions.

(c) If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward its fulfillment.

The early date of this recommendation (the document is dated November 8, 1961), belies the continuation of debate elsewhere within the Administration concerning the wisdom of a formal declaration in support of South Vietnam. The State Department and the White House continued to debate the merits of a secular expansion in the US commitment to the GVN, apparently still convinced that a small deployment of forces could be kept limited.⁷¹

The State Department in particular, was quite divided on this question, with Ngo Dinh Diem himself seen as a major problem. Both George Ball, then new Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, were dubious concerning the commitment of US prestige to a regime they saw as unwilling to reform itself.

Ball in particular, reports that he discussed the Taylor recommendations with the President on a number of occasions. Witness the description of one conversation:

I told Kennedy at that time that if we went down that road we would have 300,000 men in the jungles and paddies in five years' time and that it was an impossible terrain, both politically and militarily, and that the last thing in the world we ought to do is get involved in this. But he said, "Well George, I always thought you were one of the brighter guys in town, but I think you're crazier than hell. It isn't going to happen" (Gibbons 1986b: 88).

⁷¹John Newman offers a different interpretation of the debate surrounding the expansion of the US commitment in Vietnam. Rather than placing emphasis upon the threat perception in Washington, Newman argues that the reports forwarded to President Kennedy were intentionally falsified by members of the US MAAG in Saigon. Newman's thesis is examined elsewhere in this chapter at length, but it bears on the details of this story because of its divergence from the documentary record. See John Newman, *JFK and Vietnam*, pp. 105-111.

Interestingly, on November 8, 1961 a special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that the North Vietnamese would counter man-for-man any US escalation of the conflict, and that they would not be particularly vulnerable to threats to bomb them into submission. This estimate continued by conjecturing as to the escalatory implications of a strong response by the Soviet Union and China to US actions in the region (Pentagon Papers, vol. 2, 1971: 107). The failure of the Kennedy inner circle to act according to this recommendation is not in itself evidence that they were impervious to other analyses of the situation in South East Asia. It does indicate, however, the importance of prior decisions vis a vis that region and the degree to which the fundamental commitment was no longer the subject of intense debate at the highest political levels.

On November 8, 1961 the DoD-JCS memorandum was forwarded to the President. On the same day a meeting within the State Department reached some conclusions regarding a near-term US commitment to the survival of the Diem regime. Apparently, the Secretary of State decided to support all of the Taylor recommendations - except for the deployment of US forces to South Vietnam. President Kennedy asked MacNamara and Rusk to attempt to reconcile their approaches to the subject and combine them into an advisory memorandum.

On November 11, 1961 a joint paper was forwarded to the President. The Pentagon's earlier recommendation for the clear and near-term deployment of large scale US forces to South East Asia was removed. In contradistinction, however, Kennedy's

instructions regarding the reconciliation paper - namely that Rusk and MacNamara should attempt to reconcile Taylor's recommendation with the DeD-JCS draft of November 8, probably indicates a decision at that point in favour of an overt US military role in the defence of South Vietnam. This conclusion gains further support from the statement regarding South Vietnam's importance contained in the reconciliation document:

The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism. The basic means of accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of South Vietnam in a position to win the war against the guerrillas. We must insist that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the same time we must recognize that it will probably not be possible for the GVN to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam continues unchecked and the guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in the neighboring territory.

We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circumstances, it may be necessary for the United States to strike at the source of the aggression in North Vietnam (Pentagon Papers 1971, vol. 2: 110-116).

The memorandum went on to differentiate two types of defence forces: (1)

Category A Units - of modest size required for the direct support of the South Vietnamese military effort, such as communications assistance, helicopter and other forms of airlift, reconnaissance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence units; and, (2)

Category B Forces -- "larger units with actual or potential direct military missions...[which] pose a more serious problem in that they are much more significant

from the point of view of domestic and international political factors and greatly increase the probabilities of Communist bloc escalation." (Pentagon Papers 1971, vol. 2: 110-116)

Category B forces were seen as especially significant, because they would not be needed if GVN forces were reasonably successful, but they also would be unable to accomplish their mission in the face of an apathetic population (Gibbons 1986b: 90).

Discussions between the President, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense MacNamara were held on November 14. At this meeting, the significance of a near-term deployment decision to the ongoing negotiations regarding the neutralization of Laos was broached by the President. The decision that followed to delay the announcement of the MAAG contingent in Saigon was apparently a tactical measure, meant to more clearly de-link the two occurrences - thus stabilization was the goal in Laos, in preparation for the more serious push in Vietnam. There is little in the documentary record to support the interpretation that some new objections were introduced into high level debate at this point. Instead, this episode adds support to the conclusion reached above, namely that a clear decision to escalate militarily emanates from Kennedy's acceptance of the essential thrust of the November 8, 1961 DoD-JCS memorandum.⁷²

⁷²In response to a querying memorandum, McGeorge Bundy set out his opinions regarding the Taylor commission recommendations, and the MacNamara-Rusk paper of November 11. The paper argued that the US should be willing to make the decision immediately, so that when and if the time came, US combat forces would be used to defend South Vietnam. One division was envisaged as sufficient at the outset. The willingness to do this should also be communicated to Diem, and through diplomatic channels at the same time to the North Vietnamese government. Bundy argued that militarily significant should be the only rationale for the deployment of military forces. Signalling, and/or displays meant to enhance

This interpretation of early decision making regarding Vietnam is challenged by Yuen Foong Khong in his important study: Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Khong argues that Kennedy's refusal to endorse the Pentagon's favoured options indicates a tilt toward the State Department line.

Khong's views are related to his thesis that the Kennedy Administration was influenced by powerful historical analogies in its policies in Vietnam (Khong 1992: 82-83). In addition, Khong asserts that the neutralization of Laos cannot be made consistent with a containment explanation for US foreign policy, narrowly defined. This thesis relies on a particularly narrow view of US Laotian policy. As was argued earlier, if a "tactical" appreciation is adopted for US decisions, the neutralization decision does not represent that much of a puzzle.

Khong's narrative, however, places great emphasis upon the individual policy prescriptions of the Kennedy inner circle. This position is appropriate -- but must be balanced (and subordinated) to a broader concept of an ideological environment which defined the choice and presentation of analogies within the New Frontier itself. When approached from this perspective, Khong's discussion of analogic reasoning in foreign policy constitutes a subset of state manager-specific behavioural injunctions. In this case, historical policy prescriptions about deterring aggression cite instances such as the communist insurgencies such as those in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines as the

US credibility should be eschewed as reasons for the insertion of inferior numbers of US military assets. Militarily meaningful deployments were the only kind that Bundy felt ought to be considered. (Full text of memorandum, Gibbons, 1986b: 95-96)

sources of relevant examples (Khong 1992: 88). Khong argues that these examples are indicative of those used by policy makers to support their favoured initiatives. While this may be true, it begs the question of the criteria according to which these analogies were chosen -- and the degree to which ideology provided the selection mechanism for them.

Most specifically, embeddedness of analogic reasoning within a broader ideological context means that containment itself outlines the set of acceptable historical examples. As a speech by President Kennedy illustrates, counter-insurgency thinking was intimately related to the broader historical and ideological project of the New Frontier:

Korea has not been the only battle ground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba, and Cyprus and almost continuously in the Indo-China Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another kind of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of by aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires in those situations where we must counter it...a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training (Robinson 1968: 813).

Khong's analysis is thus a subset of a broader characterization of US policy argued in this study. By failing to extend his analysis into the dynamic, disabling aspects of containment **as a policy environment**, Khong misses the constraining qualities acting on the choices of analogies available to decision makers. As the developments in the Laotian situation made clear, tactical decisions were more often than not subordinated to the political needs of the President.

On November 14, President Kennedy sent a query to Rusk and MacNamara regarding the political implications of repudiating the Geneva accords. The more interesting segment, however, is a second portion of the same paper that refers to the details of counter-guerilla operations. Consistent with his earlier fascination with counterinsurgency thinking, Kennedy reflects a preoccupation with the implementation of the military option in his memorandum. This is most evident in a sentence concerning weapons and training of special force units:

I think there should be a group specially trained for guerilla warfare. I understand that the guns that have been used have been too heavy. Would carbines be better ? Wonder if someone could make sure we are moving ahead to improve this (Gibbons 1986b: 93-94).

A meeting of the NSC on November 15, finalized this particular decision making assistance, with a discussion of the domestic political significance of the new commitment to South Vietnam. In turn, the necessity of cultivating some international support to counter domestic critics (both Democratic and Republican) was also cited during the deliberations.

The meeting eventuated in the issuance on November 22, 1961 of NSAM 111. The contents of this memorandum reveal: (1) no explicit mention of the specific roles to be played by US forces; (2) expectations of explicit reform measures that the Diem regime would undertake, given the new scale of the US political commitment; (3) acceptance of the deployment of Category A military forces. In addition, the plan ordered Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting (US Ambassador in Saigon) to communicate to Diem

the fact that the plans in NSAM 111 envisaged a much closer level of cooperation between US and GVN officials. As the telegram related US views, "We would expect to share in the decision making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affected the security situation." (Pentagon Papers (DoD edition), book 11, 1971: 410-418)

US actions under the new plan were thus made explicitly conditional on the "cooperative attitude" of the Diem government. The reforms that the United States government anticipated were themselves a part of a wider strategy to increase domestic and international support for US efforts in the region. To the extent that Diem failed to implement the prescribed policies, he was thus a concrete barrier to the US' grand design. As such, at this time, US involvement in the then hypothetical replacement of Diem -- when and if it became necessary -- was clearly envisioned. In fact, overt discussion of this possibility was taking place Kennedy Administration inner circle as early as October of 1961.

US policy at this stage was oriented towards a subtle Americanization of the conflict in Vietnam. As the discussion preceding argued, the decision process at work during this period took place within a fairly hermetic containment-centered political context. Those policy prescriptions that diverged from this view - be they those of George Ball, or the abortive recommendation for the neutralization of South Vietnam along lines similar to Laos, were never real alternatives in the eyes of those most intimately involved in Vietnam policy making. On the contrary, the Taylor recommendations, and their evolution in the hands of the interagency reconciliation

process, served to reinforce the broad approach already evident during the first months of the Kennedy Presidency.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS: THE EVOLUTION OF US VIETNAM POLICY

The domestic political cover for the repudiation of the Geneva accords, was provided by the release on December 8, 1961 of a State Department White Paper authored by William Jorden entitled, "A Threat To Peace: North Vietnam's Efforts to Conquer South Vietnam". This two volume work argued that North Vietnam was directing the insurgency in the South, contrary to the Geneva accords. In addition, it held that the North's goal was to communize the South at its earliest opportunity, and that for this reason, South Vietnam had the right to ask the United States for assistance under its inherent rights of self-defence stipulated under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The US abrogation of the Geneva accords was thus justified in terms of a prior violation by the North, creating a situation where the US no longer felt bound by its obligations under that document.

In the ensuing period, the expansion in US troop strength in South Vietnam accelerated, with fully 1700 additional personnel attached to the MAAG by February 1962. More covert measures were the major focus of early initiatives under the revised US assistance programs, however. In particular, counterinsurgency efforts were now to

receive a significant push in order to achieve the espoused target of controlling the growth of the rebel forces (said to number 16000 in December 1961) present in the South.

The CIA station chief in Saigon, William Colby, was in charge of coordinating these activities. His earliest efforts revolved around the organization of "Civilian Irregular Defense Groups" (CIDGs), popular civilian (non-regular force) units that would be aimed at gaining the confidence of civil populations. US special forces personnel were to work with these units, in an effort to identify potential insurgents and insurgent targets for eventual "eradication" operations by regular GVN forces.

Concentrated at the village level, this plan borrowed from the apparently successful application of counterinsurgency methods undertaken by the British in Malaya. Indeed, an advisory mission including veterans of that campaign was invited to Saigon by Diem in early 1961, a move indicative of the degree to which he was successfully sold on the program by his American sponsors (Gelb and Betts 1979: 82-83). This program, which became known by a more infamous name "the Strategic Hamlets" plan, was discussed in the following manner by a specialist in counterinsurgency thinking:

The underlying concept of the [strategic hamlet] program was an abrupt break with the actual strategy of the GVN as well as with the proposals of the MAAG. Instead of emphasizing elimination of armed bands of the VC by military means, the program attempted to go directly to the heart of the insurgency's strength, its ability to gain the willing or unwilling support of the rural population, which it was then able to organize to provide intelligence, food, money, and recruits for armed units. As was repeated endlessly in public explanations of the plan, the purpose was to dry up the sea of friendly peasantry in which swam the VC "fish" (Blaufart 1977: 104).

The contradiction in this program, that the activities of the regular forces of the GVN would doctrinally clash with the new focus of the counterinsurgency program sponsored by the United States, was to be finessed by the expertise of the US MAAG. The "visibility" of this alteration in the prosecution of the war to the rural peasantry was of course, a problem. In any case, given the optimistic projections of relatively rapid victory over the insurgents, it is apparent that these difficulties were seen as more tactical and limited in scope than subsequently became clear. A continuous characteristic of the decisions made during this period is the purely instrumental rationale lying behind each of them. The communist threat was seen as unambiguous, the necessity of countering its probes was seen as self-evident, and the utility of American power for these purposes was seen to be obvious. The strategic hamlets program is a particularly clear example of the extent to which the technical rational approach of US Vietnam policy viewed the manipulation of political conditions in the region as a mechanistic process, one enabling those possessing superior knowledge and comprehension to shape political and social conditions in a particular direction. The strategic hamlets program had opponents among the uniformed military services in the United States due to its non-traditional approach to military combat. It also, however, had powerful proponents on the civilian side and prominent among these was Roger Hilsman, then Director of Intelligence for the State Department. Hilsman, alongside Walt Rostow, had been an early partisan of counterinsurgency methods. Early in 1962, Hilsman argued vigorously in favour of counterinsurgency doctrine at the prompting of President Kennedy, by then a convinced supporter of these views.

Hilsman paid a visit to Vietnam during this period and returned highly critical of traditional GVN methods of fighting the insurgents. At Kennedy's request he authored a paper entitled, "A Strategic Concept for Vietnam", which espoused the counterinsurgency doctrine as a means of defeating the communists. These ideas, similar to those argued by Sir Robert Thompson, an important originator of counterinsurgency thinking for the British in Malaya, were apparently - and predictably - well received by the President.⁷³ The recommendations in this paper echoed the views of Lansdale, Rostow and Hilsman already stated. Based around Strategic Hamlets, or defended villages as they were sometimes termed, the defence of the South was to be designed around winning the hearts and minds of the rural population. The unquantifiable nature of this particular goal ran headlong into the more systematic, apparently scientific, methodologies favoured by civilian specialists in Washington as tools for evaluating success or failure. Secretary MacNamara was apparently less than critical of these arguments.⁷⁴

⁷³Thompson was invited by Diem to Saigon during this period to discuss counterinsurgency methods in Vietnam. His personal familiarity with Diem was taken by Hilsman as proof of the willingness of Diem to make a good faith effort to adopt new policies.

⁷⁴Edward Lansdale reports that when he tried to emphasize "human factors" in counterinsurgency operations, MacNamara's typical response was frustration and curtness. As he stated during an interview with the Congressional Research Service, "he [MacNamara] asked me to please not bother him anymore. He used to say, Thank you, I've got something else to do now". (Quoted in Gibbons 1986b: 107) Interview date: November 19, 1982.

The involvement of US military advisors in actual combat was a potentially troublesome aspect of the new policy. As such involvement was explicitly illegal during this period, political cover was necessary -- using the familiar rationale of the necessities of national security. In order to achieve this goal, the Administration sought to manage the news media's coverage of the war against the insurgents, through a number of formal and informal methods. For this section it is important to return to the new relationship that was to exist between the US government, the MAAG and the US Embassy in Saigon in particular, and the Diem regime. This is the case because the methods used by the Kennedy Administration to control domestic opinion -- as affected by US-based media -- were importantly centered inside Vietnam itself.

The close consultation between these agencies was designed by the White House to give the US an appreciable degree of control over the security related policies of the GVN. As a consequence, it is possible to extend this insight by positing an interest on the part of the Kennedy Administration, in moderating the domestic (US) political salience of their activities in South East Asia. As the major conduit through which public and legislative groupings received information concerning events in the region, the media (both print and electronic), were thus targets of manipulation, directed at influencing the both the quality and quantity of press coverage of the ongoing conflict.

As early as November 1961, directives were sent from Washington, DC to the embassy in Saigon stipulating that the embassy staff (including MAAG personnel), "...not give other than routine cooperation to correspondents on coverage [of] certain military activities in Vietnam. No comment at all [was to be offered] on classified activities"

PM-1 3 1/2"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

(Kennedy Library, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Washington to Saigon 698, November 28, 1961).

Independent and aggressive reporting on Vietnam during this period constituted a threat to the maintenance of close executive branch control of the whole Vietnam program. As such, a policy evolved which sought to intimidate reporters, and to reduce both the quantity (and quality) of coverage by US media outlets. Reporters from UPI, Newsweek, and the New York Times (perhaps the most famous case later on being David Halberstam), all confronted a less cooperative environment within which they had to cover the details of the Diem regime's response to the insurgency.

A cable from Washington to the Saigon Embassy in February 1962 communicates the perspective of the Administration on this point. When discussing the relationship of the media to US objectives in the region, the telegram put the official case this way:

[I]n the absence of rigid censorship, US interests [will] best be protected through [a] policy of maximum feasible cooperation, guidance and appeal to good faith of correspondents...[but that in order to avoid negative domestic and international commentary on policy]...Correspondents should not be taken on missions whose nature [was] such that undesirable dispatches would be highly probable...it [is] not, repeat not in our interest...to have stories indicating that Americans are leading and directing combat missions against the Viet Cong (The Kennedy Library, NSF Country File, Vietnam, General, Cable 1006).

In May of 1963, an investigation by the House of Representatives Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee concluded that, "[t]he restrictive US press policy in Vietnam...unquestionably contributed

to the lack of information about conditions in Vietnam which created an international crisis. Instead of hiding the facts from the American public, the State Department should have done everything possible to expose the true situation in full view (Gibbons 1986b: 111).

Expulsion orders applied to particularly critical journalists by the Diem regime were frequently protested by the international press corps in Saigon. Critical coverage was regularly the subject of attack by Diem and his closest advisors. US official knowledge, and acquiescence in the face of these moves by Diem is intimated by the very close relationship that developed during the first half of 1962 between that regime and the Vietnam policy controllers in Washington. It is difficult not to conclude that these state managers (US) shared the same goals as their GVN colleagues, at least in this regard.⁷⁵ It is now known that US advisors were involved in combat missions during this period. Indeed, the end of January 1962 saw the initiation of the FARM GATE series of US air combat missions, flown in support of GVN anti-insurgent sweeps in the Vietnamese interior. The continuation of official denials of these developments increasingly ran headlong into the editorial commentary emerging in the prestige American media. In the

⁷⁵In the immediate aftermath of the NSAM 111's promulgation, a cycle of expulsions began in South Vietnam. Among the reporters who came under pressure were: James Robinson, NBC's South East Asia correspondent, Homer Bigart and David Halberstam of the New York Times, Neil Sheehan of United Press International, and Malcolm W. Browne of the Associated Press. Of these individuals, James Robinson was expelled from Saigon by the Diem regime, attempts were made to expel Bigart, and a French reporter, Francois Sully of Newsweek, was expelled in December 1961. The intimidation factor at this point may be conjectured to have increased. Such was the apparent intention, as the debate on US advisors' roles continued into 1962.

New York Times for example, editors wrote that "the Administration should not attempt to conceal the facts about American military involvement in Vietnam, and the possibility of an eventual major conflict".⁷⁶ The ostensible objective of the series of Administration denials, namely avoidance of any admission that the United States was violating the Geneva accords, increasingly disappeared under a more thoroughgoing determination to preserve presidential freedom of action in Vietnam.

The question of whether the US Congress and the American public were actually being consulted or informed regarding developments in South East Asia is a complex one. The discussion above emphasized the essential agreement between Congressional leaders and the policy centers of the Administration regarding the significance of a perceived loss to the Soviets in the region. Similarly, the strength of the governing consensus among political elites was such that, in the absence of some fundamental crisis that appeared to place core national values at risk, there was unlikely to be any sustained challenge on the minutiae of Administration policy. The engagement of powerful domestic stakeholders in the Vietnam policy was simply too small for them to mount any serious rejectionist opposition to the New Frontier's foreign policy preferences.

At the same time, institutional prerogatives, and the deference that was indicative of the congressional-presidential relationship in national security policy, favoured the Kennedy Administration's maximal room for manoeuvre in Vietnam, and throughout the

⁷⁶New York Times, February 14, 1962.

South East Asian region. Comments made by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield help illustrate the nature of this now unfamiliar congressional deference to the executive:

...it borders on the irresponsible to suggest that Congress had not been well informed on this situation for many years....It is the President's responsibility to act, it is ours to advise as we are able in our individual and collective wisdom, and, to the extent that it is constitutionally required, to consent (Gibbons 1986b: 109).

The Administration response to continuing negative coverage of its Vietnam policies in the New York Times is instructive in terms of the theoretical expectations derived from the model described in chapters one and two. In particular, the gate keeper functions of the media, regarding the level and quality of public discourse are important to the maintenance of state manager authority and legitimacy of action. In foreign policy terms this is less so, due to the peculiar prerogatives of the state in this area. Nevertheless, the broader principle -- that the states acts to maintain and advance their control over the broad agenda of political priorities and values in society -- falls out from the model as a particularly important behavioural tendency, that inheres in both state managers' institutional prerogatives -- and in the way that institutional responses to external assault manifest themselves.

Senior Administration officials, most notably Averell Harriman, contacted James Reston at the New York Times, and sought to have him file a corrective statement in order to rectify "facts that had not been included" in his original stories. In turn, more or less direct appeals were made to his, and other reporter's patriotism, "...pointing out that

there were conflicting publicity pressures which had to be balanced - not only American opinion, but international opinion, including ICC (the International Control Commission for Indochina, established by the Geneva Accords) and Co-Chairmen (the USSR and Britain, co-chairmen in Geneva and on a continuing basis thereafter). South Vietnam and communist bloc -- balancing them was not easy, particularly as the American correspondents despatches plus photographs of recent helicopter flights had made the situation look like a US war, rather than a Vietnamese conflict which we were assisting" (Gibbons 1986b:110).

The relationship between state managers and members of the media was thus quite tense. This tension was, however, carefully circumscribed by the mutual dependence of the two groups. In particular, the media were clearly dependent upon the US government for information and access to news-worthy areas. At the same time, however, the administration relied upon the media as the primary vehicle for communicating its assessments and prescriptions for action in foreign and security policy. It is important conceptually, however, to discuss whether this complementarity of interest -- the necessary and ubiquitous mutual dependence of media and government -- did not lead to a "self-censoring" overlay on reporting of the realities in South Vietnam. This sort of case is argued by James Aronson in his The Press and the Cold War, where he asserts that the press offered a basically minimalist critique of Kennedy Administration policy in Vietnam - emphasizing a difference over tactics, rather than substance. Aronson identifies a systematic process through which the Administration was able to regulate the coverage of events in South East Asia by US media representatives. Signified in Cable

1006 mentioned earlier in this chapter, an apparently permissive attitude towards critical reporting was in reality a carefully formulated program aimed at preventing the reality of US activities in the anti-insurgent war coming to light.

The media's role as both conduit and refractor of popular political phenomena itself creates pressures and conflicts between journalists and state managers. In the case of the US Vietnam policy, controversies developed around the issue of press coverage of President Diem. Consistent with the close management of information characteristic of the Administration, Kennedy-era state managers sought to exercise influence over foreign correspondents in South Vietnam. Maintaining a stable and non-controversial portrayal of US activities in the theatre of conflict among the US public was the primary goal. In this regard, US diplomatic and military personnel were under special instructions to tailor both the information and contacts that they established with foreign reporters in order to support US policy goals.

Elements of the political environment in South Vietnam were, of course beyond the immediate control of state managers in Washington, DC. Ngo Dinh Diem's policies elicited highly critical commentaries from the foreign press corps. As was noted above, Diem's response to these stories involved the selective expulsions of journalists, and appeals to US and Administration officials to instill "responsible behaviour" in their nationals.

The responses reflected in the media's coverage of the US role were, while critical, decidedly limited in scope. The reasons for this are readily apparent, if one takes note of the comments of one of the more aggressive journalists present in Saigon during

this period, David Halberstam. In describing the relationship between the press corps and the US Mission, Halberstam notes: "While we were sympathetic to the aims of the US government, we had to be critical of the representatives of our government who created a policy of optimism about the war that simply was not justified. There was no choice for us. We had our duty to our newspapers, the public that reads them, and that was to tell the truth (Aronson 1990: 195). The first sentence of this discussion is indicative of the sentiments of the period 1961-62. At that point in time, the distrust that was to characterize Press-Administration relations on this and other topics, was not predominant on a day to day basis. At the same time, US officials voiced a high degree of mistrust of the "maturity" of journalists active in Vietnam reporting. As John Mecklin, a journalist on leave in government service stationed at the US Mission in Saigon remarked, the coverage by the US press reflected "irresponsible, sensationalized, astigmatic reporting", on a regular basis. These comments, included in a memorandum sent to the State Department from Saigon in February of 1963, reflected the degree of frustration and anger felt by some officials in the Saigon embassy -- most specifically by General Paul D. Harkins (then Commander of US forces in South Vietnam), and Ambassador Nolting -- both of which placed pressure on Mecklin to be more hard-hitting in his comments on press coverage of the war against the insurgents.

Complaints regarding particular stories deriving from the foreign press in Vietnam came directly from the Diem regime. An example of this is available from a case in the fall of 1962 involving Francois Sully, a reporter for Newsweek Magazine. On August 22, an article by Sully entitled "Vietnam: The Unpleasant Truth", was published in

Newsweek. The article argued that US military advisors in South Vietnam were inept in their training of GVN troops in counterinsurgency and other military tactics. In turn, the story asserted that the war was a "losing proposition" in the long term. In the aftermath of the story's publication, the Diem regime voiced official outrage at the tone and content of Sully's reporting. On September 3, Sully was expelled from South Vietnam. For our purposes, however, the treatment that Sully received in the time between the initial reporting of the story and his expulsion by the GVN is important as an exemplar of the manner in which official (US) interests in managing coverage of the war through the manipulation of patriotic and other symbols was refracted in the essentially shared political understanding of US goals in Vietnam evident in the Saigon press corps. As James Aronson describes, the "gauntlet" that Sully ran -- with his ostensible colleagues -- indicates the narrowness of acceptable reportage in the South Vietnamese capital:

The Sully affair provoked some equally painful agonizing among the newsmen. "A dozen of them argued until 3 A.M. in a room at the Hotel Caravelle. They were torn between those who wanted to fight back with a strongly worded protest, and those who feared that they too might be expelled if the protest angered the palace. There were numerous epithets, (e.g., "coward"). The dispute reached a McCarthyesque moment when Sully was formally required to say whether he was (1) a French spy, or (2) a Communist. He replied no to both questions." (John Mecklin, from Mission in Torment, cited in Aronson 1990: 196)

The many and varied pressures of reporting under the harshest of conditions thus made themselves felt in the reciprocal fear and admiration felt for a member of the journalistic community who had been singled out for punishment for the substance of his

reporting. More direct attempts were made by the Administration in Washington to influence those individuals who were sent to Saigon to report on US activities. In particular, David Halberstam reports an incident where President Kennedy, while at dinner with New York Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, pressured Sulzberger regarding the suitability of Halberstam for the harsh reporting conditions in Saigon. Kennedy apparently went so far as to ask whether Sulzberger had considered "transferring me [Halberstam] to another area." (David Halberstam, cited in Aronson 1990: 204). The response from the New York Times, a strong defence of its independence of action, does not remove the fact that the President felt it legitimate to overtly counsel the removal of particular individuals who were problematic in their coverage of US policy. As a component of the political environment which overlay US Vietnam policy, this factor adds another element to the new frontier's information control strategy.

The issue of whether a journalistic "herd instinct" was at work in coverage of events in Vietnam bares closely on the nature of the coverage that eventuated from the Saigon-based press corps. Certainly, the Administration held that reporting from the region was biased by a level of "groupthink" that prevented journalists from seeing the "big picture". This view was also shared by the US editors of many of the most prominent Saigon reporters, as they sometimes rewrote stories filed by Vietnam correspondents in New York and Washington, without advanced notice. On at least one occasion, these actions caused the resignation of reporters in protest - most prominently perhaps, in the instance of Charles Mohr of Time Magazine in September of 1963. On an

earlier occasion, Stanley Karnow, Mohr's predecessor as Time Magazine's South East Asia bureau chief, had resigned for the same reasons.

The many intersecting pressures upon reporters operating in Saigon between 1961 and 1963 offer a unique picture of the generators of information, who then saw their "product" again refracted and reflected within the domestic political and social setting of the United States. At the same time, the relationship between the Administration and the most prestigious media outlets is both complementary and complex. The ideological convergence evident in the similar criticism voiced by both administration officials and media owners, structured the openness of media outlets to critical reporting. As such, this convergent consensus constrained the information that was available to the US attentive and mass publics. Fissures in media unanimity were eventually to render Kennedy Administration policy more vulnerable to domestic criticism, but this was due to factors unique to the personal and reporting dynamics present in Saigon. Importantly, reporters who had daily contact with the realities of South Vietnam -- and US policy there -- were relatively slow to voice anything more than instrumental critiques of US policy. Their production of an instrumentally different picture of the social and political setting in South East Asia was, however, such that it engendered outrage and retaliatory actions on the part of Administration officials in both Washington and Saigon.

The effectiveness of Administration attempts at manipulating the media was decidedly mixed, though apparently they did succeed in having individual items removed from major network news programs in the 1960s. Averell Harriman's assertion that the Vietnamese conflict was starting to look like a US war due to misreporting by US media

outlets, is indicative of the flawed practises of state managers who attempted to manipulate the news. What is most important at this point, however, is the degree to which institutional and political factors fostered a continuation of executive policy autonomy with respect to Vietnam. At no point during the first two-thirds of the Kennedy Administration's revised Vietnam program was a sustained critical debate able to even marginally challenge the broad thrust of policy. In turn, events were to develop that removed this nascent Vietnam escalation from a prominent position on the US political agenda. The trends set in place during the 1961-62 period were thus able to avoid direct confrontation with opposing social forces (as evidenced within the state), with a contrary issue agenda. The inertia that the dominant policy was able to gain was in large measure responsible for this situation and for the implications that flowed from it.

THE REEMERGENCE OF THE LAOTIAN ISSUE

It is a topic of conjecture whether the partial unravelling of the Laotian settlement was due to the communist insurgents', or others perception of an impending escalation of the US role in the region. Whatever the case, in March of 1962, the negotiations to achieve Laotian neutralization began to look less and less certain. The main stumbling block appeared to be the US-supported government of General Nosavan Phoumi's change in attitude with respect to the formation of a coalition government subsequent to a final settlement.

In turn, Phoumi's forces came into conflict with communist insurgents along the Laotian border with China, thus threatening to escalate conflict to involve the Peoples' Republic just at the moment when the country seemed about to achieve a measure of peace. US irritation with Phoumi was such that in January of that year it implemented a temporary aid cut off in an attempt to change his behaviour.⁷⁷ The outbreak of conflict near the Chinese border, however, appeared to some in Washington as an attempt by the communists to make gains at the expense of a US-supported government that was most interested in an early settlement.

American policy thus adopted a perspective more reminiscent of the earlier (1950s) approach to South East Asia, and reconsidered the direct insertion of US combat troops in order to prevent Phoumi's defeat. Fear that the communist forces were trying to present the United States with a situation resembling that of Dien Bien Phu helped reinforce this alteration in official Washington's attitude toward Laos. Key congressional leaders, most prominent among them being Mike Mansfield, were brought into the White House in the latter part of February for consultations on the possible necessity of US action in the crisis. Mansfield's comments are instructive as an indicator of congressional feeling regarding the likelihood of such measures:

⁷⁷The activities of agencies of the US government in support of Phoumi's position in Washington offer a significant rejoinder to perspectives that would argue for a uniform articulation of foreign policy from the source - Washington, DC - to the target - Laos. The eventual outcome, however, is probably as clear a demonstration as ever that presidential (US) preferences in foreign policy can be crucial in adding coherence to particular initiatives.

[If the Administration was going to use US forces]...they had better tell the whole truth to the American people, realize that this would be worse than Korea, would cost a great deal more and very likely bring us into conflict with the communist Chinese. I said that I thought it was the worst possible move we could make....I think that the congressional leadership were in full accord with my views, and I have an idea that the President was too although he didn't say anything (Gibbons 1986b: 113).

Earlier concerns that the Laotians were unwilling to fight for themselves were likely behind this uneasiness. At the same time, however, none of the congressional leaders present apparently extended their enquiries into a broader investigation of developments in the country directly adjacent to Laos -- Vietnam. The remarkable degree of separation of the two issues in the minds of decision makers illustrates the degree to which Vietnam had yet to become a major focus of attention for congressional leaders. The Administration, even when faced with the necessity of inserting US forces in a neighboring area, succeeded in limiting the pressure upon it to increase public discussion of Vietnam to any significant degree. The extension of consultations to congressional leaders during this crisis (the meetings also included Senator Hubert Humphrey - the new Democratic Whip in the Senate, Senator J. William Fulbright, House Democrats Carl Albert, Carl Vinson, Thomas Morgan, Leslie Arends and others), probably served to effectively blunt any suspicions that the White House was concealing any of its activities in other areas. Certainly, the earlier public defence by Senator Mansfield of Administration consultation with Congress regarding events in Vietnam was only strengthened by these activities.

The perspective on events in Laos dominant in Washington was also critically affected by other developments in the region. In particular, the Thai government was concerned that communist progress in Laos would place them under significant pressure in the short to medium term. They sought specific guarantees from the US that they would receive direct assistance should an attack ensue following the Laotian settlement. Within the SEATO framework, coalition decision-making between the signatory governments would remove automaticity from the response process generated by any aggression against a particular regional state. Most specifically, as a treaty organization, the US relationship with Thailand was not a bilateral alliance *per se*.

The Administration, however, sought to achieve a significant degree of influence with the Thais as a means of buttressing the US position in the region. As such, the State Department went to some lengths to recast the US position, vis a vis Thai defence. On a visit to Washington in February 1962, the Thai foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, received a commitment that "the US considered Thailand's independence and integrity vital to the national interests of the United States, and would honor its pledge to defend Thailand under the SEATO Treaty even if no other SEATO nations were willing to act (Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1962).

This reinterpretation of US obligations toward Thailand caused some controversy on Capitol hill, and required explanation to key Senate figures, who accused the White House of preventing the Senate from fulfilling its obligations to oversee foreign treaty commitments of the United States. The Administration response to these concerns is

important for what it reveals concerning the new frontiersmen's attitude toward legislative participation in foreign policy:

The legal opinion is that there is no need to consult with this committee (Senate Foreign Relations) ...The communique...would merely be stating publicly the interpretation of the treaty as presented to the committee by [Allen] Dulles, and as explained previously to the Thais (Gibbons 1986b: 115; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Session, unpublished transcript, February 27, 1962. The speaker is Averell Harriman).

The bending of the relationship between the treaty ratification prerogatives of the US Senate and the Administration's ability to place on the record its own stipulative understandings of treaty-specific commitments, went unchallenged by the congressional leadership. Consistent with the already noted habitual deference to the executive in foreign policy, thus allowed the Administration to construct novel "alliance-like" bilateral obligations, through reinterpretations of existing security arrangements. It was within this framework that the extension of US involvement in South East Asia developed. It is apparent, then, that the New Frontier was able to construct new foreign obligations for the United States with the acquiescence of other sections of the US political system. The existence of a coherent foreign policy model within the New Frontier created by existing constitutional and historical prerogatives, added to the empowerment of the executive branch itself.

Between February and May 1962 no coalition government was established in Laos. US concern with the possible unravelling of its entire South East Asian position

caused - again - major US officials to contemplate the deployment of US forces. In particular, Roger Hilsman and Averell Harriman recommended this course of action. On May 10, President Kennedy authorized the deployment of a naval task force from the Seventh Fleet towards the Gulf of Siam. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposing the insertion of a small demonstration force, favouring instead a "militarily meaningful" deployment.

On May 11, Kennedy received the endorsement of former President Dwight Eisenhower for military action to safeguard US interests in Laos. Feeling that this announcement provided sufficient domestic political cover, Kennedy agreed to the sending of 5000 US troops to Thailand for eventual deployment along the Mekong River. More forceful measures were also under consideration, as became clear later. The following day saw a Thai request for US assistance under SEATO procedures. Congressional leaders were informed at that moment of the actions that the President had decided upon previously. Even at this point, Secretary of State Rusk discussed these actions as consistent with, but not actually an implementation of, US obligations under the SEATO pact. As such, the requirements for the Administration to report its actions to Congress were further minimized, as Kennedy's powers as commander-in-chief provided the ostensible framework for the measures implemented.

In the case of Laos, a division within the Administration was visible between those who favoured fairly significant near-term escalation of US commitments to high level force deployments, and others who were more attached to the deterrent quality of more limited force insertions, and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency methods and

tactics. The personalities need not be repeated here, as they reflect divisions highlighted during the earlier discussion of the potential neutralization of South Vietnam. The successful conclusion of the Laotian negotiations in July of 1962 forestalled the implementation of combat plans that would have mandated joint action by Thai and US forces in the invasion and seizure of a Laotian province. The willingness of the US to contemplate such action indicates an awareness that escalation might be necessary in order to achieve US aims. The relatively uncritical acceptance of these policies by congressional leaders in this case thus provides a "miniature replica model" of the sequence of events that was to see large scale US deployments in South Vietnam.

VIETNAMESE NEUTRALIZATION: THE RETURN OF AN OLD IDEA

During the same period that the Laotian solution appeared to be unravelling, the original Galbraith-Harriman proposal for the neutralization of South Vietnam reemerged within the Kennedy inner circle. The precise reasons for the reappearance of this proposal owe much to the doubts of some of the senior Kennedy advisors (MacNamara, McGeorge Bundy and others) concerning the long run tenability of a close working relationship with the Diem regime in Saigon. In addition, however, such moves were met with sympathy by the President, thus indicating some degree of uneasiness with the accelerating process of commitment that the US seemed embarked upon in South East Asia.

In any case, the decision was made to launch "feelers" toward the North Vietnamese concerning the issue. During a visit to Washington, DC in April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith, then US Ambassador to India, broached the subject of Vietnamese neutralization to Averell Harriman. Following a meeting with the President, approval was obtained to open a channel to North Vietnam regarding the proposal. This move was exceedingly unpopular with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were concerned that such an initiative would render nonsensical US policy, with respect to both Laos and the Diem regime.

Indeed, it appears accurate to note the incongruity between this move and the commitment to armed engagement on the side of the GVN late in 1961. In any case, this potential reversal in policy was short-lived, as a meeting between Averell Harriman and North Vietnamese delegates on the sidelines of the Geneva conference amply demonstrates. As William Gibbons describes it, "Harriman, accompanied by his deputy, William Sullivan, went to the Hotel Suite of the Burmese delegation to the Conference, where they met with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Ung Van Khiem, and one of his aides. The meeting was fruitless, Sullivan said later. 'We got absolutely nowhere. We hit a stone wall'" (Gibbons 1986b: 121).

The coincident US irritation with Nosavan Phoumi's obstructionism in Laos and the dubious utility of that solution, left a confusing atmosphere within which the Kennedy Administration broached the duplication of a plan already problematic in one area to the Vietnamese setting. One is left wondering what the perceptions of the North Vietnamese must have been when they saw the main sponsor of an obstructionist leader in Laos,

seeking to offer a duplicate framework for agreement in a theatre where they (North Vietnam) felt they could prevail.

Such an initiative is perhaps, more indicative of Kennedy's unwillingness to accept that the foreclosure of options at one point in time and space, had concrete implications in related areas of interest, than it is of any genuine doubts he had concerning its general strategy in the region. Decision making in the aftermath of the Laotian solution certainly did not return to a less militarized approach to the region. An exactly opposite description of events is more accurate.

UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF US POLICY IN VIETNAM

The failure of the Vietnam neutralization initiative removed the last clear obstacle before the full implementation of a highly interventionist US Vietnam policy. Objections to that initiative stemming from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other senior Administration officials appeared vindicated, and in any case, positive reports from South Vietnam argued against changing a policy that appeared to be succeeding.

Administration officials publicly defended the successes of the Vietnam program, even though in private they were voicing objections. George Ball was a particularly vociferous opponent of policy internally. His public pronouncements on the issue speak for themselves:

If the Vietnamese people were to lose the struggle to maintain a free and independent nation, it would be a loss of tragic significance to the security of Free World interest in the whole of Asia and the South Pacific.

And more than that, if the United States were to neglect its solemn commitments to the Vietnamese people, the consequences would not be limited even to those areas - they would be worldwide. For the Free World's security cannot be given away piecemeal; it is not divisible. When the going gets rough we cannot observe those commitments that are easy or near at hand and disregard the others.

What we do or fail to do in Vietnam will be felt both by our antagonists and our friends. Any United States retreat in one area of struggle inevitably encourages Communist adventures in another. How we act in Vietnam will have its impact on Communist actions in Europe, in Africa our unwillingness to meet our commitments in one tension area will simply encourage the Communists to bestir trouble in another (Gibbons 1986b: 122).

This speech, made before the Detroit Economic Club on April 30, 1962 illustrates the full flights of New Frontier rhetoric. It also indicates the degree to which the private doubts of state managers concerning the overall evolution of US policy in South East Asia, were suppressed before public audiences. Rather, a containment-centric, anti-communist tone dominated the public discourse on events in South East Asia. Indeed, the argument for explicit linkages between events in that region and putative communist "probes" elsewhere in the world, was belied by the Kennedy Administration's own refusal to apply the same logic to its own decision making with respect to Laos and South Vietnam.

Beyond this inconsistency, however, one is made more conscious than ever of the limitations on acceptable viewpoints imposed by the governing articulation of political reality within the State itself. In an environment where the limits of political discourse

have been defined by particular decisions reached at the centre (most specifically indicated by NSAM 111), the dangers of attempting to force other issues on to the policy agenda are even more significant. It is interesting, for example, that the main mover of the Vietnam neutralization initiative was John Kenneth Galbraith. While safely ensconced in New Delhi, his position on a day to day basis owed considerably less to the political dynamics of Washington power than it did to a longer term personal relationship with the President. Even given these circumstances, it is likely that the failure of that initiative had concrete effect, with respect to Galbraith's influence with the Secretary of State, who had opposed the idea from the beginning.

The favourable reports from the MACV (the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam -- the successor to the MAAG created in February of 1962 under a four star General, General Paul Harkins) -- in Saigon of progress in fighting the insurgent forces caused the Administration to begin planning for the medium term reduction and eventual withdrawal of US forces from South East Asia. These positive pronouncements were predicated on the implementation of the recommended reform actions on the part of the Diem government. In particular, the Administration was receiving reports that Diem was increasingly successful in generating popular support for his regime.

The rationale for these favourable pronouncements is rather unclear, due to the much more equivocal comments authored by many officials close to the centre of decision. In particular, in June of 1962, Hilsman reported that "on balance (the Vietcong)...continue[d] to erode government authority in the countryside (Gibbons 1986b: 124). Hilsman went on to argue that, while the government had made some

progress along the lines of increasing its legitimacy with the Vietnamese masses, "there had been no major breakthrough in identifying the people with struggle against the Viet Cong."

Hilsman's report concluded with cautious optimism concerning the prospects for eventual victory if, that is, the Diem regime continued to implement policies consistent with its ongoing strategy. Robert MacNamara took this last section of the report as a rationale to begin planning the medium term withdrawal of US forces from the region. In particular, he envisaged a reduction of troop strength from "an expected peak of 12000 in 1963-64 to 1500 (consisting only of MACV headquarters staff) and US military assistance funds from \$ 180 million to \$ 40.8 million (by fiscal year 1968)" (Pentagon Papers 1971, vol. 2, 1971: 161).

These paper plans were further buttressed by a Honolulu meeting that brought together Secretary MacNamara with military officials from the MACV, who reported that their best estimate was that they were a single year away from reducing the Vietcong to military insignificance. MacNamara illustrated more prudence than his uniformed subordinates in the aftermath of the conference. He settled upon a three year estimate for the period within which US forces would be required in South Vietnam. He did not, however, voice any doubts concerning the certainty of eventual victory.

At the same conference, MacNamara consulted with his advisors in Saigon, with respect to longer term strategy in South East Asia. Out of this meeting flowed a number of decisions. First of all, MacNamara ordered the formulation of the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) which was reported to his office at the end of 1962

(Gibbons 1986b: 130). During the intervening period, Vietnam as an issue had been superseded in the attention of central decision makers by both Berlin and Cuba.

The Cuban missile crisis, carrying with it the very real possibility of nuclear war between the superpowers, necessarily dominated the decision makers of the Kennedy Administration from late September 1962 to its conclusion over one month later. For our purposes, the actions of the Congress are particularly important, because they constitute an additional grant of authority to the President in foreign policy.

The Cuban resolution, passed by both Houses of Congress on September 26, 1962 stated that the President was empowered to "prevent by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States" (Gibbons 1986b: 129).

This resolution, which contained no time limit, pre-authorized whatever actions President Kennedy might have contemplated relating to Cuba. It also allowed the Administration carte blanche in both the articulation and implementation of actions to counteract perceived threats to the security interests of the US. It, in conjunction with the already documented pattern of deference, represents an important extension of executive power -- in a manner which places into question the 18th century constitutional principles referred to with such scorn by Senator Fulbright. This resolution was approved by the Congress almost without debate. Further, the designated committees passed on the resolution without comment, a departure from prior procedures. The only opposition to

the resolution came from legislators who felt that it did not go far enough in establishing the President's right and duty to use all means necessary to defend US interests wherever and whenever they were placed at risk. Finally, because it was a joint resolution of Both Houses of Congress, and required the President's signature to go into force, the resolution carried the force of law. This particular factor is important, since it compares interestingly to a similar resolution passed by the Congress with reference to Berlin which, as a "sense of Congress" measure, was merely the enunciation of legislative opinion - not a mandatory call for action (Gibbons 1986b: 129).

The combined significance of these two episodes to the Kennedy Administration has been the subject of much scholarly comment ever since the events of 1962. For the purposes of this study, however, the incidents of that period are less important than the residual effect they may have had on state manager behaviour during the time under analysis. It is apparent from the responses of state managers within the NSC that the aftermath of Cuba was a period for profound pessimism concerning the prospects for a rapid solution to the conflict in South East Asia.

In particular, Roger Hilsman at the State Department voiced some of the unease with the developing Vietnamese situation:

Elimination, even significant reduction, of the Communist insurgency will almost certainly require several years. The sharp increase of the US presence in South Vietnam and the events of recent months in Laos apparently have not weakened Communist resolve to take over South Vietnam....[t]hey probably continue to look primarily to the long run in South Vietnam and to remain confident of eventual victory (Gibbons 1986b: 131).

In addition, though optimistic on the tactical details of the counterinsurgency program (especially with regards to the strategic hamlets program), Hilsman remarked that the integration of the regular GVN force methods with these other measures was haphazard at best. The paper concluded with a prescient notation regarding the increasing unpopularity of the Diem regime. It went on to conjecture as to the necessary moves that the US would have to undertake, should a coup attempt against Diem appear likely to succeed.

Coincidentally, US Senator Mike Mansfield toured South Vietnam during the same period, and returned quite discouraged, with respect to the chances for success in the area. Apparently in search of reports uninfluenced by official US or South Vietnamese perspectives, Mansfield sought out US reporters' commentaries on the progress of the counterinsurgency program. From these almost uniformly negative appraisals, Mansfield concluded that serious shortcomings existed in US strategy in Vietnam and called for a thorough evaluation of future relations with the Diem government.

So negative was Mansfield's confidential report to the President that, on his return to the United States, he was called for a meeting with President Kennedy. Mansfield's report focused significant attention upon the resistance of Ngo Dinh Diem to accept US reform proposals. He was portrayed -- not without some real evidence -- as a barrier to the successful restructuring of the South Vietnamese state and as such, to the successful execution of the anti-insurgent effort directed against the communists.

The President was sufficiently disturbed by Mansfield's appraisal to call for another in a series of on-the-spot assessments by his own most trusted advisors. Kennedy ordered Roger Hilsman and Michael Forrestal, a member of the NSC staff, to travel to Vietnam and

report back on the viability of the US effort. While quite positive toward the progress of the overall strategy, Hilsman and Forrestal were most direct in mentioning disturbing elements in the evolving situation:

...it's ominous that in the face of greatly increased government pressure and US support the Viet Cong can still field 23,000 regular forces and 100,000 militia, supported by unknown thousands of sympathizers....the conclusion seems inescapable that the Viet Cong could continue the war effort at the present level, or perhaps increase it, even if the infiltration routes were completely closed (Gibbons 1986b: 134).

The report went on to express doubt about the US' own reports concerning the number of communists killed, as opposed to the inevitable sacrifice of civilian lives in the ongoing conflict. In reporting this last reality, the report focused upon the correctness of the "basic strategic concept" of the strategic hamlets program, but criticized quite severely its application by the GVN. In particular, Diem was criticized for not proceeding with previously promised reforms in a prompt manner.

A confidential "Eyes Only" report to the President was annexed to the Hilsman-Forrestal document. This paper recommended the replacement of Ambassador Nolting in Saigon and questioned the degree to which Diem himself was "useful" to the effective pursuit of US aims in the region (The Kennedy Library, NSF Country File. Report declassified in 1982).

This last section of the report to the President presaged an increasing irritation within the Administration with the perceived obstructionism of the Saigon government. A series of events occurred that further reinforced Washington's doubts concerning the existing

leadership in South Vietnam. The next section describes these developments and concludes with an outline of their significance for US policy in the region.

US DISILLUSIONMENT AND THE FALL OF NGO DINH DIEM

From the beginning of 1963, US policymakers felt themselves confronted by the increasing obstructionism of Ngo Dinh Diem. In addition, the actions of Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were seen as further exacerbating the failure of the GVN to achieve sustained increases in its popular legitimacy. The remarks of Frank Childs noted earlier regarding the likelihood of success in Vietnam with Diem in control effectively symbolize the mood in Washington DC as 1963 wore on.

The Forrestal-Hilsman report specifically designated Diem as an obstacle to the achievement of US aims in the region. This position was still opposed, however, by officials present on the ground in Saigon, among others, John H. Richardson - CIA Station Chief in Saigon, General Edward Lansdale, Ambassador Nolting and William Colby - Chief of the Far East Division in the CIA Directorate of Plans. In addition, Secretary MacNamara and the Chairman of the JCS Maxwell Taylor also opposed what they saw as precipitate action against an allied head of government. The support of these individuals further indicates the relative contestability of the instrumental aspect of the containment policy - in contradistinction to the core features of the overall approach to international relations. In particular, controversies within the policy framework overpowered those between different approaches, something readily conceptualized within the model. In this case, the hard-core of

the governing consensus remained robust and tailored the strategic discourse within which policy toward the insurgents developed.

In Congress, overt positions in favour of Diem (i.e., that of Senator Mansfield), turned into frustration with his apparent refusal to yield to American wishes in his prosecution of the war. A future opponent of US policy in the region, Senator Fulbright, himself voiced no strong opposition to the replacement of Diem by someone else. This tacit approval even extended to covert US efforts to topple his government. In addition, Fulbright was apparently in receipt of a memorandum by John Newhouse, then a staffer for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that argued that US policy was hostage to the inflexibility of the Diem regime, and that new possibilities would only exist upon his removal.

The inconclusive military situation and the decline of congressional support for Diem were themselves the harbinger of a decision to shift support from Diem in the spring of 1963. From May until August of that year, a developing crisis in Vietnam involving the forcible suppression of Buddhist monasteries further highlighted the authoritarian and repressive side of Diem's domestic policies. It also made it impossible for the Kennedy Administration to pretend any longer that the conflict with the insurgents could be prosecuted successfully while Diem remained in control in Saigon.

Initially, only private warnings were given to Diem that if his repression of Buddhist worshippers continued, the US would have to publicly dissociate itself from his actions. At the same time, however, the domestic political setting in the United States ceased to be a fixed and supportive feature in the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy. It is during this period that the first large-scale civil protest against US policy in Vietnam occurred.⁷⁸ In

particular, one early protest action was organized by a group of New York Clergymen, called the Ministers Vietnam Committee. In June of 1963, this group placed a full page advertisement in the New York Times calling upon the President to respond to a four point list of concerns:

1. Our country's military aid to those who denied him [the Buddhist monk] religious freedom.
2. The immoral spraying of parts of South Vietnam with crop destroying chemicals and the herding of many of the people into concentration camps called "strategic hamlets".
3. The loss of American lives and billions of dollars to bolster a regime universally regarded as unjust, undemocratic and unstable.
4. The fiction that this is "fighting for freedom".

The strong public response to this notice (apparently 18000 people sent funds in support of the advertisement, allowing for a duplicate to be placed into the same newspaper on September 15), was also apparent in a 15000 name petition forwarded to the President on August 15, signed by clergymen throughout the United States. This, in conjunction with a number of very critical editorials in newspapers such as the New York Times, provided indications of the activation of public concern and opposition to US support for Diem and his continuance in power.

⁷⁸Buddhist uprisings were beginning to spread throughout South Vietnam during this period. It is apparent that Diem interpreted these calls for freedom of worship as direct challenges to his regime. In any case, the self-immolation of Buddhist monks was carried back to the United States by broadcast news coverage, and apparently helped engender significant shifts in public opinion vis a vis US policy, and the nature of the Diem regime.

The first significant public demonstrations against US involvement in Vietnam also appeared during this period, led by US Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas, Robert Jones, the executive secretary of the Unitarian Universalist Washington office, and Dr. Donald Szantho Harrington, pastor of the Community Church of New York (Gibbons 1986b: 144-145). These activities, as was noted in chapter two, were themselves representative of a breakdown of the pronounced "space for agency" that existed for the Kennedy group after the relative stasis of the Eisenhower years. The potential for flexible and activist involvement in a prescriptive foreign policy agenda existed because of the generational shift in US foreign policy encapsulated in the New Frontier, and due to the displacement achieved by the Administration of liberal criticism of its actions. Many of the most articulate liberal internationalists were implicated in its policies. They allowed the New Frontier breathing room to try new approaches. The commitment of John Kennedy to an expansion in the conventional attributes of national power - particularly the slow Americanization of the anti-insurgent war in South East Asia -- was visible to some groups external to the US state -- even though its salience to the mass public was still quite low. Importantly, however, the core supporters of the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy outlook were still participants in its formulation.

It is correspondingly predictable that the criticism that did emerge came from those on the margins of the radical pacifist grouping identified in chapter two. The involvement of the US Socialist Party in these protests is thus consistent with the expectations of the model. The very marginalization of the critics confirms the robustness of the governing consensus in the face of domestic dissent.

Prior to these protest activities diplomatic traffic between Washington DC and the Saigon embassy was already filled with strategizing concerning the available replacements for Diem. In particular, Diem's Vice President, Nguyen Ngoc Thu, was viewed as an acceptable prospect. Further to this end, Hilsman (by then promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East) authored a telegram to the mission suggesting that implementing the plan should involve direct communications with Nguyen Ngoc Thu, and perhaps even with Diem himself (Gibbons 1986b: 145). In the events that followed, Thu did occupy the civilian position of the Presidency at one point, giving added importance to the US communications with the embassy and the MACV during this period. Parallel with these moves, US decision makers in Washington also continued to suggest that the Saigon embassy pressure Diem to adopt democratic reforms that would help blunt popular opposition to his rule. In particular, they argued that Diem should

"accept the Buddhist crisis as [a] blessing in disguise and...use agreement reached as a stepping stone to concessions to other groups (before they demand them). The whole operation would be keyed to building up popular support for the regime prior to August parliamentary elections and importantly, also to making sure that paper undertakings to Buddhists are carried out in full measure."⁷⁹

The Saigon embassy responded to this last communication with thinly disguised amusement and disgust, dismissing the plan as naive in the face of the realities of politics in Vietnam. Further, the embassy voiced the opinion that "if Diem was in a mood to freeze up,

⁷⁹NSF Country File, Vietnam, Washington to Saigon 1219, June 14, 1963.

rather than move forward, his days are numbered." The suggestion was also added that the channel to Nguyen Ngoc Thu be utilized.

In Washington DC the impact of these events upon domestic opinion was a major concern. The continuing repression of the bonze (Buddhist monks) protests was having concrete effect, in terms of alienating public support for the Presidency's policy. As some of his key advisors remarked in July 1963,

"We all believe one more bonze burning will cause domestic US reaction which will require strong public statement despite the danger that this might precipitate a coup in Saigon. Demarche to Diem to insisting on removal of Nhu (his brother, and the instigator of repressive actions against the Buddhists) and wife to post outside SVN before such statement becomes necessary under consideration."

Estimates in the White House were that a coup attempt, or attempts at one, were to be expected over the ensuing four month period. The question then shifted to the effect that these events might have on the continuing war against the communists. Opinion differed on this subject, with predictions alternating between chaos and civil war on the one hand, and a minimal or non-existent effect, on the other. CIA and MACV communications with Vietnamese armed forces' generals were ongoing at this point and had as a secondary motive the detection of any coup plans. These officials were also queried by some of their Vietnamese counterparts as to the US' attitude, in case a change in government should take place.

The prior communications between the Saigon Embassy and Washington, DC illustrate the preeminent US concern at this point, the maintenance of a viable military

program in opposition to the communist insurgents. Ambassador Nolting, however, continued to oppose precipitate action by the US, as he envisioned the collapse of Vietnam into "feuding factions and [that] the Americans would have to withdraw.." (Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, 1971: 728-729) Nolting also continued to believe that the war against the insurgents was going well, and that the Buddhist unrest was not affecting it significantly. He testified before an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to this effect early in July of 1963.

The ensuing month saw a thoroughgoing crisis in the US perception of Diem's compatibility with its goals. In quick succession, on July 10 1963 a SNIE was released that predicted continuing delaying actions by Diem, in opposition to the recommended actions of the Administration, and that the unrest threatened to explode into a wider crisis of governance for the regime. In turn, it was predicted that "a better than even chance" existed that a coup or assassination attempt would occur in the short, not the medium, term (Pentagon Papers 1971, vol. 2: 729-733).

On August 12, Nolting cabled Washington reporting that Diem had promised to proceed with reform measures, and that he would be conciliatory to the Buddhists, in response to world opinion and US concerns. On August 21, the security forces of the GVN stormed Buddhist pagodas in several cities. In fact, these attacks were launched by the police and security force units loyal to Nhu. It is unclear whether Diem had any knowledge of the assaults, in either their planning or execution.

In response to these events, US policy moved into high gear, with Averell Harriman and Michael Forrestal drafting a statement that denounced the assault on the pagodas, and

formally dissociated the US from Diem's policies regarding the Buddhist protests. More ominously, US MACV personnel, and possibly CIA operatives in Saigon, began discussions with dissident army officers concerning the possibility of a coup.⁸⁰

On August 24, 1963 the US sent a telegram to Henry Cabot Lodge, the new US Ambassador in Saigon, giving instructions concerning the US attitude towards Diem's regime in the light of its continuing suppression of Buddhist religious freedoms:

[The] US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with best military and political personalities available. If, in spite of all you[r] efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.

In instructions to General Harkins, the telegram was even more direct:

We must at the same time tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of Nhus from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism (Johnson Library, Declassified and Sanitized documents from Unprocessed Files, Washington to Saigon 243, August 24, 1963).

⁸⁰The Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Declassified and Sanitized Documents from Unprocessed Files, Contacts with Vietnamese Generals, 23 August through 23 October 1963.

This telegram marked the most formal opening of US policy to the eventual overthrow of the Diem regime. In turn, it goes further than prior policy in extending US support for Vietnam to the maintenance of order within the society, separate and apart from the war against the communists. As such, the effective Americanization of the war in Vietnam accelerated rapidly following the decision to remove Diem.

Discussions in Washington in the ensuing days appeared to retreat somewhat from the decisive and direct tone of the August 24 telegram. In particular, however, it is apparent that the telegram itself was the result of a drafting process involving all of the following to varying degrees: Roger Hilsman, Roswell Gilpatric, Dean Rusk, Maxwell Taylor, and Richard Helms standing in for John McCone. No members of Congress were consulted during the entire episode.

Some of the principals named above expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of the exercise and President Kennedy himself viewed the telegram as a major mistake. He apparently felt that he had been misled regarding the trajectory of events at a particular moment, and that some of his advisors had exceeded the latitude he was willing to give them. In any case, the dye was cast, and no corrective cable was ever sent. Lodge replied in due course, agreeing in general with the message, but questioning the wisdom of presenting Diem with ultimatums at that point in time. In turn, the State Department postponed direct talks concerning these issues with Diem, choosing instead to allow the rest of the telegram's agenda of action to proceed forward.

From these events until the actual coup on November 2, US policy vacillated between an unwillingness to accept the policies of Nhu and Diem and a desire to avoid actual

participation in the coup to overthrow them. The ensuing period saw the retrenchment by South Vietnamese generals from a coup plan in early September and then a revised coup plan implemented successfully at the end of October. The continuing unease of President Kennedy with this particular policy choice is amply illustrated by an "eyes only" telegram that he sent to Ambassador Lodge in Saigon late in August 1963:

I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support.

Until the very moment of the go signal for the opposition by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, bear full responsibility for this operation and its consequences. It is for this reason that I count on you for a continuing assessment of the prospects of success and most particularly desire your candid warning if the current course begins to go sour. When we go, we must go to win, but it will be better to change our minds than fail. And if our national interest should require a change of mind, we must not be afraid of it (The Kennedy Library, NSF Presidential Meetings File, CAP 63465. Declassified in 1980).

Hesitation in the implementation of the coup plans left the US for a time completely without effective contacts with the Government of South Vietnam. Channels between the US embassy in Saigon and the Diem regime were so strained as to be unusable. In particular, Henry Cabot Lodge's intense personal dislike for Diem made any opening of backchannels of communication between the two countries quite unlikely.

In the intervening period, the Administration used its allies in the US Senate to increase pressure upon Diem to give way. A threatened aid cut-off by the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee was utilized by the President as a lever to alter Diem's attitude towards acting in accordance with US wishes. Debate also continued within the White House and among Kennedy's chief advisors concerning the necessity of the removal of Diem to the achievement of its aims. At no point during this period does it appear that serious consideration was being given to the withdrawal of tacit US support for a military overthrow of the Diem regime. As such, the August 24 cable, and the supporting communications of subsequent days, can be taken as the effective end of US support for the Diem regime. The interregnum that followed only extended the agony of decision for two extra months.

US policy during this entire period evidenced a rather remarkable singleness of purpose. While on the one hand disturbed by the human cost of supporting a repressive regime in Saigon, the Kennedy Administration remained focused upon assessing most actions of the Diem regime according to a single criterion, their effect upon the prosecution of the war against the communists. It is equally evident that the congressional involvement in Vietnam decision making was effectively of a "me-too" variety, coming as it did typically in the aftermath of NSC deliberations, and in at least one case constituting a catalytic element in policy debates proceeding within the White House itself. At no time did the legislative branch significantly constrain the extension of US links with South Vietnam, and thus, with the fate of the Diem regime.

Finally, on those occasions when the Congress sought to articulate a national goal or value, it was invariably in support of an expansion of Presidential power and policy flexibility. Legislative actions that served to constrain executive license in foreign policy were either not entertained, or never succeeded in overcoming the general aura of deference

and respect for Presidential primacy in foreign affairs. The debate within the White House, and within those bureaucratic agencies that contributed to its decision-making on South East Asia, oscillated between those who favoured smaller military commitments to the GVN, and those who felt that an "all or nothing" choice needed to be made rapidly, lest the threat to US prestige in the region grow to overwhelm the objective political importance of that area.

The events of this period illustrate the structuring of Administration perceptions of possibilities and dilemmas in Vietnam by the preexisting set of biases held by Kennedy and his inner circle. At the same time, the logic of events - as interpreted in the light of the governing consensus - was visible as a generator of policy initiatives. The manipulation of conditions in South East Asia was seen as within the competence of the United States. At the same time, instrumental considerations in the region were subordinated to an assumed set of linkages between the policies of a client - the Diem regime - and relative success in the war against the insurgents. The inability of the United States to force Diem to implement a favoured set of reforms was assumed to inhibit the war against international communism. South Vietnam was only unique to the extent that it constituted the latest challenge by the Soviet Union to the 'free world's' commitment to fight communist expansion. This argument lay at the core of Kennedy Administration policy throughout the period in question, and provides a case study of the strength of constructed apprehensions of constraint and opportunity in the implementation of a comprehensive program in foreign policy.

The nature of the prescriptions inherent to a comprehensive policy initiative, and the degree to which the Administration proceeded in the absence of the consideration of alternative policies, provides important insights into the responses of state managers to

problems and challenges. The next chapter renders more concrete these tendencies in relation to the governing consensus framework developed in chapters one and two. The subsequent discussion outlines the significance of persistent bias to flexibility in foreign policy.

POST-SCRIPT: AUGUST TO NOVEMBER 1963 -- PROSPECTS FOR A REVERSAL?

Recent scholarship has attempted to reopen the issue of whether President Kennedy was considering a tactical or strategic withdrawal from Vietnam immediately prior to his assassination. Depending upon one's view of the New Frontier Vietnam policy, it is possible to come to different conclusions regarding a reversal through a last-minute change of heart by the central decision maker. The theory developed in this dissertation is designed to come to grips with a broad social and political agenda in foreign policy. The goals of state managers are discussed against the backdrop of social forces and ideological factors, which together influence policy formulation.

Analysis of controversial historical events inevitably carries with it a measure of "rewriting" of history. As this study has argued, events do not speak for themselves, interpreters are influenced by their backgrounds. In turn, however, the ideological influence on policy analysis continues to evolve. Thus in 1992, John Newman's book JEK and Vietnam, catalyzed a decade long reappraisal of the meaning of Vietnam to US foreign policy. It also reopened the issue of whether the escalation of the Vietnam commitment was the responsibility of John Kennedy, or Lyndon B. Johnson.

Newman's book focuses upon the entire Kennedy Administration, but for our purposes, his analysis of the period August through November of 1963 is of particular importance. Prior to this period, Newman's discussion is broadly sympathetic to that offered in this study, with a critique offered of the militarization of US policy (Newman 1992: 148);

of the bureaucracy misleading the chief executive (Newman 1992: 347); and, a notation that Kennedy himself was less than certain regarding future prospects for victory (Newman 1992: 366-370).

Newman's discussion also highlights a possible divergence of positions between Kennedy and his closest advisors. This issue is key to the New Frontier perspective offered in this study, because it contradicts the thesis of basic agreement that motivates the case study in chapters three and four. Evidence gathered from the sources consulted there seems to contradict Newman's position in at least three areas. The major areas of disagreement with John Newman's interpretation of Kennedy Vietnam policy are the following: (a) Newman's insistence that Kennedy's inner circle of advisors were systematically misleading him regarding progress in Vietnam; (b) the notion that a "guileful" Kennedy concealed his policy preferences from his closest advisors throughout the period under study; and (c) the idea that Kennedy considered withdrawal, prior to victory, in South Vietnam.

Each of these points raises the issue of whether a single person (even the President of the United States) is able to "pick and choose" among policy options, with apparently little regard for the consequences of prior choices. In the language of the conceptual framework developed in this study, it is clear that parametrically rational behaviour in international relations carries with it the assumption that the external environment is not a dynamic element in the decision process. Under this assumption, the compliance of President Diem with US wishes would not be a particularly troublesome factor in the progress of US policy. Instead, a more systemic, capability distribution-specific explanation would hold that the power balance between the United States and its adversaries would determine the ultimate

outcome. In this case, the voluntarism of the Newman position would be submerged beneath a more general basic force model (Keohane 1984).

In the institutional interpretivist formulation offered in this study, state managers' individual variations in opinion are less important than the general conceptual environment and tenor of opinion existing over an extended period of time. As such, it is clear that the explanation Newman offers confronts the documentary record with an individualist critique (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992: 5) Newman does not offer an explicit theoretical defense or grounding for his study, but it is clearly concerned with the limitations acting on a central decision maker translating his/her preferences into policy. Notions of path dependence in policy, which hold that choices in the future are contingent upon foregone opportunities of the past, must be used to assess the decisions of the Kennedy Administration. Similarly, shifts in policy must be assessed against strategic directions in policy development, rather than in terms of tactical shifts in emphasis within a consistent line.

The Kennedy Administration and Policy Evolution

The Kennedy Administration sought to stabilize the Diem regime in Vietnam. This was designed to increase the effectiveness of the fight against the communists. As was argued in chapter four, this campaign was inhibited by the unwillingness of the Diem regime to adopt internal reform measures to increase its domestic support. Newman discusses this difficulty in terms of the reports that were sent back to Washington by the US MAAG in Saigon. As he discusses them:

In mid-February 1962, before most of the new American advisors had arrived and certainly long before the new Kennedy program had any chance to affect the tide of battle, US military reporting on the war became suddenly optimistic. That was not the case, however, for the US intelligence community, which published an NIE on February 21, right after [the] third SECDEF conference. The estimate concluded that communist control was advancing in South Vietnam and would continue to do so. The NIE sharply contradicted the optimistic picture advanced by Harkins at the conference, which suggests that his cheerful outlook on the war was prompted not by new information from the battlefield, but by a political decision from Washington (Newman 1992: 194).

Newman alleges that General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had previously complained to General Harkins, the head of the MACV, concerning the tone and content of his combat reporting. Apparently, Newman feels that the politics of Vietnam policy in Washington were altering the intelligence reaching the President (Newman 1992: 192). It will be noted, however, that the initial decisions on Vietnam took place in the light of Pentagon recommendations for a steep escalation. As chapter three remarked, the Pentagon achieved a basic victory over the Department of State in setting the bounds of

Vietnam policy. In fact, escalation, through the increased use of covert methods, was taking place during this period. That this coincides with a sequence of negative NIEs authored by the intelligence community argues against the systematic alteration of reports from the combat theatre.

Newman's discussion of Lemnitzer's "molding" of combat reporting from the MACV is but one instance of a more disturbing conspiracy that Newman finds existed within the US Government. Most specifically, Newman alleges that Kennedy's closest advisors misled and disobeyed him in the prosecution of Vietnam policy. Not only were these individuals said to be systematically altering information reaching Kennedy, but they are also described as binding his choices, through duplicitous behaviour behind his back. Witness Newman's discussion of the plot to overthrow Diem:

Hilsman, with Harriman's support, then drafted the single most controversial cable of the Vietnam War. Known as the "Saturday Night Special" or simply the "August 24 cable," it mired Kennedy in a plot to overthrow Diem and created an irreversible division in the administration (Newman 1992: 346).

The discussion of this cable in chapter four shows that it was the product of well established flexibility in Vietnam policy. If the actual wording of the cable did not have Kennedy's approval, its broad attitude towards the increasingly problematic Diem regime certainly did. The public repudiation of Diem's repression of the Buddhist protests that immediately preceded the coup plot is unmentioned by Newman, as is the unfavourable congressional commentary that was increasing the domestic controversy surrounding Vietnam policy. By ignoring these facts Newman understates the political pressures on the Administration to act against Diem, and overstates the independence of Kennedy's central advisors.

Newman also alleges that Kennedy misled his own chief advisors, while using them to provide domestic political cover for a domestic withdrawal. In this case, Newman is arguing that Kennedy *knew that he was being misled, and thereby misled his duplicitous subordinates* (Newman 1992: 386).⁸¹ This remarkable thesis is developed through an extended discussion of the deception of Maxwell Taylor, subsequently promoted to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in falsifying the information about the military situation in Vietnam reaching the President. As Noam Chomsky writes, this part of the alleged plot stretches credulity:

Thus JFK thought that [Maxwell] Taylor was "the one general...who shared his own views and that he could, therefore, trust to carry out his bidding." Shamelessly deceived, JFK therefore placed him in charge of the Special Group on counterinsurgency, promoted him to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and relied on him until the end, though Taylor was undermining him at every turn; Taylor became "the second most powerful person in the White House," Newman observes, making no attempt to resolve the paradox. From the beginning, the "record leaves the reader with the unforgettable image of a President pitted against his own advisors and the bureaucracy that served under him." (Chomsky 1993: 128)

Chomsky argues that Kennedy was instead fully "in synch" with the slow covert escalation of the conflict, something this study verifies. At no point was Kennedy in vocal opposition to the increased use of covert methods or show those he felt responsible for the insurgency

⁸¹Newman even alleges that Kennedy had to conceal his consideration of withdrawal from the JCS because he feared Republican criticism from the right in the 1964 presidential election. While a reasonable supposition, it is at least arguable that Kennedy essentially *agreed* with the hardline Republican anti-communists. Hence, his protecting himself had more to do with his doing what he initially preferred to do, rather than with his unwillingness to appear weak in the face of domestic critics. As well, domestic criticism -- both in the media and in the Congress -- were simply not well developed enough at this point to cause the Kennedy Administration much of a problem. See chapter three on this point.

(variously, Khrushchev, Mao, or Ho Chi Minh), that they would pay a price for their actions. Indeed, the record is full of examples where Kennedy criticized the slow development of counterinsurgency options -- including those involving infiltration into North Vietnam.

The Kennedy Administration's Vietnam policy developed without the overt involvement of the Vice President, saving one trip to Saigon, where Johnson's report was written for him by Kennedy's advisors in the NSC prior to his arrival (see chapter three of this dissertation). Newman, however, argues that a concrete backchannel involving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the MACV existed, and that this was critical to the "reversal" in policy that occurred following the assassination (Newman 1992: 15-18). In fact, on closer reading, this backchannel refers to discussions within the NSC over *the neutralization of Laos in 1961!* There is simply nothing in the documentary record to support a vigorous role for Lyndon Johnson in the Vietnam decisions of the Kennedy Administration, something Newman himself concedes elsewhere in his book (Newman 1992: 67). This confused and selective use of documents only muddies the waters on Kennedy's true policy preferences. Instead, an examination of the decisions and debate within the Administration is more likely to discern these facts.

Kennedy and Withdrawal Prior to Victory

The strength of Kennedy's commitment to fighting communism is clear. Newman's thesis requires that this vision be conditioned by a broader awareness of the subjectivity of the Cold War, and of a broader commonality of humankind -- something some analysts

maintain was evident in his American University speech.⁸² This speech was written in order to outline what was described as a new approach to peace with the Soviet Union. As Michael Beschloss remarks, it is likely that Kennedy felt strong enough to deliver such an initiative only in the light of facing Khrushchev down over the missiles in Cuba (Beschloss 1991: 576). The speech called for a reexamination of attitudes toward the Soviet Union, and towards the inevitability of armed conflict with the communist bloc.

The power of this address stemmed from its lyrical qualities, but also from the stark divergence it represented from the Administration's prior rhetoric (Beschloss 1991: 599). Indeed, during the same period, new initiatives were being launched to disrupt Castro's rule in Cuba, and the covert war in Vietnam was being escalated (see chapter 4). As such, this address, while politically useful in the context of discussions regarding the partial test ban, falls in stark contrast to the coincident policies being carried out under the direction of the Kennedy brothers.⁸³

⁸²The nature of this speech, and the sources of its high flown rhetoric will be addressed below.

⁸³Thomas Paterson notes the intensity of their antipathy to Castro's regime:

In mid-June (1963) the NSC approved a new sabotage program. The CIA quickly cranked up new dirty tricks and revitalized its assassination option by making contact with a traitorous Cuban official, Rolando Cubela Secades. Code-named AM/LASH, he plotted with the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. In Florida, American officials intercepted and arrested saboteurs heading for Cuba, but seldom prosecuted and usually released them. Alpha 66 and Commando L raiders hit oil facilities, sugar mills, and industrial plants. (Paterson 1989: 153)

What are we to make of the continuation of these attacks, even after an alleged "change of heart" on the part of Kennedy after the Cuban missile crisis? Stronger anti-Cuba remarks

Beschloss' discussion of the American University speech captures the most satisfying explanation for this superficial change of view:

The American University speech, though deeply felt, was as much the product of political calculation as any address Kennedy ever gave. It was designed to build public support for the test ban treaty he hoped to achieve, to mollify Khrushchev after the misunderstanding over inspections, and overcome any Soviet skepticism that he was willing to jeopardize his domestic position in order to push a controversial agreement through the Senate.

The speech may also have been intended to offer the chairman a shining inducement for an American-Soviet entente. In early June (1963), Chinese officials were about to descend on Moscow in hopes of resolving their Soviet quarrel at the expense of the United States (Beschloss 1991: 600).

Rather than accepting the voluntaristic argument offered by Newman, Beschloss offers a sophisticated (though less kind) description of the address' origins. This treatment is much more consistent with the analysis offered in this dissertation, and thus is a more credible discussion of Kennedy's views at that time.

Chapters two and three of this dissertation use Kennedy's own words to outline the strength of the containment consensus. This is buttressed by anecdotal evidence of the

followed, including a speech on the 18th of November 1963 where Kennedy spoke of "Castro's small band of conspirators," and called for "anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt" (p. 154). It is possible that these remarks were made merely assuage those in the US who still adhered to the strongly anti-communist line of the early Kennedy Administration. Joined with continuing policies in South East Asia, however, it seems more likely that tactical retrenchments aside, Kennedy remained committed to prosecuting the Cold War in an aggressive manner.

impact of Khrushchev's "wars of national liberation" on the intensity of the New Frontier policy prescriptions.⁸⁴

John Newman's argument rests most fundamentally on his reading of a single memorandum, NSAM 263, and its Johnson Administration incarnation, NSAM 273. This document discussed a plan for the contingent withdrawal of US military advisors from Vietnam under a two-year timetable (Chomsky 1992: 138). The first drafts of this document date from early October 1963, hence Newman's belief that they represented the President's sentiments at the time of his assassination (Newman 1992: 236). NSAM 263 implemented the plan for contingent withdrawal of 1000 military advisors reached after the MacNamara-Taylor plan was completed in October 1962. It depended upon assessments of the success of planned combat initiatives in the South, and thus was predicated *on victory*. Newman acknowledges this point in his narrative, but then ignores it in his subsequent discourse on the rewriting of the memorandum in the Johnson Administration, even though presumably, it was rewritten by its original authors.⁸⁵ The rewritten version is argued to represent a wholesale reversal of Kennedy Administration policy, something that is belied by the text of the document itself.⁸⁶ The absence of documentary evidence supporting this position is

⁸⁴Conversation with Professor John Sigler, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa Canada, April 1991.

⁸⁵As is frequently observed, Johnson retained many of Kennedy's senior advisors for an extended period. It is certainly true, then, that the NSAM memoranda -- rewritten barely one month after their initial release -- involved the same persons (and preferences).

⁸⁶In fact, both memoranda -- NSAM 263 and NSAM 273 -- are argued from the vantage point of the contingent withdrawal plan for 1000 US troops. Where they differ is in the failure of NSAM to *restate* the withdrawal decision. This may signify either the acceptance,

doubly damning because Newman relies almost entirely on *post hoc* appraisals by former participants, whose earlier (pre-Tet Offensive) commentaries differed significantly from these later remarks.⁸⁷ This is linked to Newman's dismissal of the Pentagon Papers account of the period as a "grandiose cover story", with its "subtle anti-Kennedy Slant" (Chomsky 1993: 141).

There is little in Newman's thesis to contradict the considerable ideological and political power of the mainstream foreign policy consensus in Vietnam Policy. Containment was unquestioned, at least, at the centre. And, it seems wholly unreasonable to assign Newman's interpretation any more weight than the others considered in this analysis. Kennedy Administration decisions were not simply the result of a single person's whims. Neither, however, were they under the control of a single individual either. In a large organization, inertia and policy heuristics dominate the implementation -- if not the formulation -- of policy prescriptions. Newman's thesis requires that this explanation for Kennedy's decisions be placed aside, in favour of a complex conspiracy involving malfeasance by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the members of the MACV contingent in Saigon. Further, Newman argues for the "double-duplicity" of the President in misleading those who would simultaneously mislead him. This is simply too complex and convoluted a discussion of the Vietnam decisions to be credible. It is also wholly at variance

or the reversal, of the original withdrawal. Read together with the rest of the documentation surrounding this issue, however, it seems to place most of the emphasis upon the assessment of the war that was to be released in 1964, as was originally envisioned by NSAM 263.

⁸⁷In fact, it is interesting that all of Newman's sources for this particularly thesis derive from *after* the Tet Offensive.

with the evidence of the period's own documents, and with the pre-Tet Offensive (when the war came to be in remarkably ill-repute throughout the United States) comments of the central figures.

The next chapter addresses the persistence of Kennedy Administration policies as a result of the working out of a policy formation heuristic. The governing consensus was the framework for that heuristic, and it -- rather than a complex conspiracy -- was responsible for the decisions which expanded the US commitment in South Vietnam.

CHAPTER 5

THE CONSENSUS RENDERED CONCRETE

This chapter draws together the case study's insights with the initial conceptual model. Most specifically, this chapter assesses the foreign policy of the Kennedy Administration in Vietnam, and that policy's relation to the governing consensus. The historical material introduced in previous chapters makes it clear that no simple interaction occurred between Kennedy Administration decision makers and a dynamic external political setting. Rather, this interaction was a mediated one, with institutional and ideological influences important in determining the policy choices that occurred.

THE CONSENSUS REVISITED

The conceptual framework argued that a consistent interpretation of the international context dominated foreign policy-making during the Kennedy Administration. In turn, this consensus was posited to have genuine constraining power, as it provided criteria for assessing policy initiatives, and filtered the public debate of policies by state managers and opinion leaders. The institutional supports for this consensus were also argued to be products of the institutional-legal order of US society.

The pattern of state-society relations that supports state institutions was then related to the development of symbiotic social linkages between state and non-state elites. These

relationships possess ideological qualities, as stable and sustained interaction through time gives way to customary understandings, and legitimated prerogatives. The notion of an ideological structure, having social and institutional supports that enjoy effective sanctioning power against ideological or behavioural deviation is not a new one. Nor, however, is it one to be underestimated, in its heuristic power for explaining the translation of international system structure into concrete political conditions at the domestic level.

THE NATURE OF THE CONSENSUS

The initial views of President John F. Kennedy remain the most powerful indicator of the predilections brought to the Presidency in 1961. Kennedy saw the United States as pivotal to the further development of South East Asia, and to the fight against international communism.

The Kennedy inaugural address similarly resonates with the anti-communist declarations so characteristic of the new frontier. These statements were not, however, merely rhetorical flourishes meant for domestic political consumption. Rather, they represent important statements -- or indicators -- of the values and goals that were to guide the Kennedy implementation of the containment doctrine. In particular, the counterpoint of these statements to the ensuing decisions taken within the NSC structure, and the tangible escalation of the US political commitment to South Vietnam that eventuated during the post-Taylor commission period in 1962, both indicate the importance of these political positions.

As the initial model postulated, certain core attributes characterized the consensus perspective dominating foreign policy during this period. In particular, as elucidated in chapter one, these key aspects were held to be: the self-conscious awareness of US hegemonic prerogatives and capabilities in the aftermath of the Second World War; and secondly, the clear presence of the only potential competitor to US global supremacy, the Soviet Union.

The case study indicates the importance of both of these features to the self-definition of the Kennedy Administration. The New Frontier state managers defined themselves - through their rhetoric - as differing both generationally, and historically from prior elites. In particular, the view that the Cold War placed "freedom in maximum danger" allowed state managers to manipulate the symbolic power of values that were expected to drive global political change.

The early observations by presidential aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. that the political environment seemed infinitely malleable, and that they (the New Frontiersmen) were specifically empowered -- indeed required -- to take advantage of such opportunities as appeared -- further bespeaks the self-conscious awareness of significant space for agency.⁸⁸

⁸⁸The material basis for this assumption is accounted for in the work of John Lewis Gaddis. In Strategies of Containment, Gaddis takes note of the influence of Keynesian argumentation regarding the resource limits, within which state managers would necessarily have to operate. The ascendancy of Keynesian economic prescriptions helps account for the empowerment of the Kennedy Administration relative to a fiscally more conservative domestic society. In any case, the fiscal conservatism of the Eisenhower Administration was seen (by the new frontiersmen) as key to the relative lack of vigor evident in its foreign policy. It was not a pattern of behaviour that recommended itself to an unabashedly activist administration. See Gaddis (1982), chapter 7, "Kennedy, Johnson and Flexible Response."

This policy space fostered innovation in foreign policy. It was also predicated on the maintenance of a political base at home that would support policy autonomy on the part of the executive.

The selection of counterinsurgency methods can be interpreted as the implementation of this broader interventionist approach. Concrete linkages exist between instrumental political actions and a broader foreign policy strategy. Intellectual justification for these connections was provided by theories of political societal modernization. The involvement of W. W. Rostow for example in the early planning of counterinsurgency operations, indicates the peculiar intellectual bases of the prevailing policies of the era. The attachment of other central decision makers of the period to purportedly scientific notions of political and economic transformation -- most importantly that of Robert S. MacNamara -- further assisted the implementation of a systematic approach. The inevitable imperfection, or gap, separating policy prescriptions, conceptual formulations, and "scientific" analyses of social phenomena in Vietnam from empirical conditions, was itself a consequence of initial biases.

John Kennedy entered office with a four point agenda for Vietnam policy. These values were: (1) the prevention of a 'red' tide of Communism from sweeping South East Asia; (2) preservation of South Vietnam as a demonstration project of democracy in the region; (3) enhancement of US prestige as the 'god-parent' of effective reform in Asia; and (4) to effectively minimize the strategic necessity of further US conventional force deployments in the region, or importantly, the occurrence of armed conflict.

These goals represent a fairly robust and logically consistent design outlining the value of South Vietnam to the United States, and by implication, the degree to which US

prestige was necessarily linked with outcomes in the area. Other interpretations have been offered for the consistencies and departures in Kennedy Administration foreign policy. The next section counterpoises some of these discussions with the formulation offered in this study. Two factors influence the nature of the comments discussed here. First, most of them discuss Vietnam as a broadly applicable case study in the implementation of containment. In this vein, the authors seek to draw lessons with respect to bureaucratic, political or psychological forces that led to the patterns of decision making that eventuated during the period. Second, the narratives offered by most scholars do not focus upon the Kennedy Administration's peculiar self-image, as contained in both its rhetoric and personalities. As such, these elements are fairly under-represented in the resultant explanations offered for the Vietnam failure.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PERIOD

Different organizing devices have been used to understand the Kennedy Administration's Vietnam policy. On the one hand, much of the scholarly material is authored by participants in the Administration's decision making. As such, it takes advantage of insider knowledge and post-hoc rationalizations for policies that may have become clouded in the light of subsequent events. Similarly, the tragic foreshortening of the Kennedy Administration casts a shadow over much of the discussion by these individuals. It is not so much that Kennedy Administration officials have sought to "re-write history" in order to render John F. Kennedy's legacy more robust; rather, it is evident in their writings that

different interpretations of the man, and of his Administration, derive partially from emotional and other identifications with the Kennedy legacy.⁸⁹ The separation of that legacy from the substantive material of the period is a reality of the historiography of the era. As such, it is clear that one must examine the materials prepared by former policy makers with a skeptical and yet understanding eye.

A second segment of the literature constitutes either an overt critique of the Kennedy Administration's approach to foreign policy, or a rather instrumental evaluation of the use of American power during the early 1960s. This literature, frequently written by academic political scientists, is more concerned with analysis of the preoccupations of the Kennedy Administration in foreign policy, and with the measures used during the new frontier to advance US global interests. This dissertation clearly belongs in the latter category, and yet seeks to bridge the inevitable gap that separates the recollections of the once powerful, and the analytical purposes of the more academically removed scholar. This section thus constitutes a counterposition of different discussions of the period 1961-63, from the vantage point of US foreign policy towards Vietnam and South East Asia. In essence, it seeks to situate the interpretation of the period derived from the conceptual framework, in relation to other discussions of the same events.

⁸⁹This situation is commented upon at length by Thomas G. Paterson in his Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). In addition, limitations on access to still-classified documentation makes certain questions vulnerable only to conjecture, with no final answers visible to scholarly enquiry; see pp. 191-194.

Novel Formulations

The conceptual framework which guides this study treats the Cold War, and policy maker responses to that conflict as reflected in the doctrine of containment, as an inferential structure, through which events were interpreted. This focus leads to a description of the policy environment as simultaneously constraining and empowering, as state managers seek to advance their peculiar approaches to manipulating outcomes in the external arena.

The ideological and strategic cultural factors embedded in the notion of the governing consensus are visible in the post-hoc discussions of the period authored by participants in the new frontier. In a text which reflects the complexity of the policy environment in Washington at the time, Robert Komer reflects a complex - yet tragically limited - appreciation of the challenges posed to US decision making by the alien social and political context of South Vietnam:

We may have looked on Vietnam too much as an exercise in containing global Communist expansionism, but much evidence exists of realistic analysis and high level grasp of the nature of the problem we confronted in Vietnam itself. After all, we had plenty of time to learn -- including some twenty years between 1945 and 1965. As far back as the French days, many were pointing out the essentially political nature of what began as an anti-colonial struggle, became a revolutionary war, and evolved into more of an outright invasion of South Vietnam as the revolution failed (Komer 1986: 3).

Komer was an official in the Johnson Administration, responsible for supervision of civil operations and revolutionary development support for the US military forces, Vietnam (MACV). His acknowledgement that the conflict in South East Asia changed over time reflected a more sophisticated view of the war than was prevalent among other commentators during the period. At the same time, his text Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict, reflects an inordinate concern with the inefficiencies in the actual prosecution of the war caused by US institutional shortcomings. Witness his comments on the scale of the resources at the disposal of US policymakers in Vietnam, "Surely it wasn't for lack of resources - in money, machines, and men. Even allowing for many miscalculations, the disparity in strength and resources between the contending sides would have suggested a different outcome, as indeed it did to successive US administrations." (Komer 1986: 9) The essential puzzle for Komer appears to be one of why the US power advantages could not be translated into victory in the theatre. Among the reasons Komer identifies as responsible for the eventual US defeat were: (1) the weakness of the Saigon Regime; (2) the incremental nature of the US approach; and, (3) institutional constraints in both the US government and within the Diem regime, that prevented creative adaptations of policy to changing conditions (Komer 1986: 14-16). Komer's discussion continues with an involved description of how the US policy aimed at countering the insurgents became overly militarized -- and of how the poorly developed counterinsurgency strategy for prosecuting the war in Vietnam led to underestimation of the quality and determination of the adversary. Nowhere in his narrative is the basic US assumption placed into question -- that the South Vietnam conflict represented an overt instance of Khrushchev's wars of national liberation in the periphery -

and that this factor overrode in salience the unique anti-colonialist and socio-cultural elements of the South East Asian context. The critique offered by Komer cannot be dismissed easily as an unsophisticated listing of the shortcomings of US bureaucratic and military decision making relating to Vietnam. There is visible within his narrative a rigorous interpretation of the uniqueness of the South Vietnamese situation. Witness his discussion of this particular issue:

The chief actors...Vietnamese and American - were hardly unaware of the atypical nature of the conflict, the fact that it was not just another conventional limited war. John Kennedy with "counterinsurgency", Lyndon Johnson with his "other war" , Robert MacNamara in his trip reports, and many others sought broader focus. [Averell] Harriman, Forrestal and Hilsman in the early Sixties argued for a more rounded politico-military approach. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr the doubters feared that 'the more elaborate the military establishment....the more it would be overwhelmed by brass, channels, and paperwork, the more it would rely on conventional tactics, and the more it would compromise the Vietnamese nationalism of Diem's cause.'
(Komer 1986: 4)

While these comments were directed toward the Johnson Administration, they also apply to the prosecution of the anti-insurgent campaign between 1961 and 1963. Similarly, however, there is no questioning of the fundamentals of the US stake in the region. It is seemingly self-evident to Komer that "the anti-communist, Soviet inspired probe" explanation for the character of the war against the communist insurgents, was unproblematic and obvious. At the same time, the differences between the "normal limited conventional war" interpretation of conflict in South East Asia, and the fundamentals of the US approach to the region, should

not be overstated. As was evident in the case study, for the upper reaches of the Kennedy Administration no dichotomy existed between an overt military commitment to South Vietnam, and the incremental extension of support for "democracy" through financial and small-scale military support. As Komer notes at one point in his analysis, "[p]olitically we failed to give due weight to the revolutionary dynamics of the situation, the popular appeal of the Vietcong, the feebleness of the Diem regime, or the depth of factionalism among traditional South Vietnamese elites." (Komer 1986: 5) In essence, in failing to understand fundamentally the contextual uniqueness of power relations in South Vietnamese society, the US strategy was hamstrung from the beginning.

For Komer, the flaws in US policy derive from institutional problems, rather than from an incorrect interpretation of the area's politics. Contrary to his interpretation, this study anticipates the ubiquitous dismissal of contextual complexity by US state managers. The policy environment was characterized by an overweening confidence in the logic and predictability of international events. In turn, resource scarcities were seen as a problem only to the extent that they inhibited the clarity of the US' policies to its adversaries. In short, if the US showed itself as willing to "pay any price and bear any burden", an adversary less well endowed materially would retreat under the weight of US superiority. Limitations of strategic concepts -- that is -- of the strategy that would defeat the insurgents in short order -- would merely add to the expense involved in the overwhelming the enemy. Other than a critique over tactics, Komer has little to offer in explanation for the increasing incoherence of US goals in the region.

Komer's insightful but limited discussion of US policy in Vietnam can be counterpoised to the more grandiose -- and differently problematic -- discussion of Kennedy Administration policy offered by Richard J. Barnet in his Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind US Foreign Policy. Barnet's discussion -- as was evident in chapter two -- is an interpretation of Vietnam that is both radical and comprehensive. Rather than focusing upon technical issues in the US' prosecution of the conflict, Barnet focuses upon what he sees as the real origins of US aims in the region. In particular, the United States is viewed as being intent upon maintaining its position as the world's preeminent power. This goal is described as the fundamental US national interest. All other focuses of policy are viewed as instrumental and subordinate to the achievement of broader ends. The articulation of the national security interests of the United States is a function Barnet reserves for his **national security managers**, a group responsible for, "...filtering the information that reaches the President, and...interpreting the outside world for him." (Barnet 1972: 76) The similarity of this notion to the perceptual division of labour discussed elsewhere in this study is revealing. In essence, functional differentiation within the state -- the same factor that creates sites for social forces to influence the articulated goals of state managers -- is argued by Barnet to reflect patterns of information and interpretation flow around the central decision maker, the President.

For Barnet, the state managers of the new frontier were a special cohort within a broader category of national security managers. Indeed, their unique characteristics bear more than a striking resemblance to the idea that the decision-makers of the new frontier

were the "best and the brightest". Witness his description of the prevailing ethic among the Kennedy Administration's senior foreign policy officials:

The cult of excellence reached its zenith with Kennedy. Observing him as he was about to launch his campaign for the presidency in 1960, Theodore H. White noted, "In the personal Kennedy lexicon, no phrase is more damning than 'He's a very common man' or 'That's a very ordinary type' " The arrogance so characteristic of the Kennedy advisers, a quality that made it so easy for them to dismiss unwelcome advice by dismissing those who proffered it, was the pride of the men who viewed themselves as the chosen (Barnet 1972: 70).

The implications of these views, hardly foreign to policy elites in the United States, was a dismissive attitude toward popular opinion, and the limitations customary and constitutional structures placed upon executive freedom of action. The pattern of deference revealed in the case study is thus important in an understanding of the Kennedy Administration's approach to foreign policy. Not only did the tradition of executive autonomy in foreign policy suit the predilections of the Kennedy Administration, but it also presented them with an opportunity to structure the domestic and international environments in ways that were uniquely understandable to them, consistent with their self-proclaimed superiority in intellectual and political expertise. Barnet's analysis approaches caricature at this point, but is instructive in that it focuses upon the peculiarities of state manager world view that may empower them -- in the presence of institutional opportunities for agency -- to implement novel departures in foreign policy.

In order to explain US policy towards Vietnam, Barnet focuses upon the inertia of modern governmental bureaucracies. This factor -- together with a focus upon the pursuit of

abstract principles as means for defining the national interest -- ensures the separation of policy design and implementation, from the complex influences of political and social processes in the target society.

The implications of such a perspective for action in Vietnam flow from the self-understanding of the interests and values articulated by state managers. As Barnett explains, US state managers arrogated unto themselves the articulation of the values that were common to mankind -- and thus, assumed that they alone were capable of overriding the particularisms of "narrow nationalisms" in pursuit of unproblematic goals. The similarity of this notion to that of hegemonic power in the international system is a major focus of the conclusion of this dissertation. As then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk characterized the point, "the United States is criticized not for sacrificing our national interests to international interests but for endeavoring to **impose the international interest upon other nations**" [my emphasis] (Magdoff 1969: 41).

Barnett describes US policy toward Vietnam as designed to suppress threats to its ordering of the international environment. This is especially true for conflicts in the developing world. The Cold War from this vantage point may have represented a "genuine" conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (alongside their erstwhile allies), but such a view is argued to seriously understate the imperial ambitions and behaviour of US state managers.

Barnett's discussion extends further into a description of the domestic social environment (and the attitudes of business elites) that state managers must deal with in order to safeguard the autonomy that they hold in national security policy. This discussion was

elucidated in chapter two and need not be repeated here. The necessarily symbiotic relationship between business leaders and state managers stands out in Barnet's analysis as the critical bargain that underpins state (and private business) prerogatives in a capitalist political economy (Barnet 1972: 146-147). Interpretations of economic, social and political subjects are overwhelmingly capitalist in character, and counsel the use of American power to sustain a stable international environment for business activities. Bearing in mind the potential divergence of views between state managers and capitalists, however, it must be emphasized that considerable departures from routine agreement between the two groups are to be expected. US external political aims continued, however, to be defended in terms of their compatibility with a complex notion of the national interest. These interest would, of necessity, be formulated in the process identified earlier involving important social forces and state managers. The linkage between state manager interests and the views of business elites in the United States was essentially ideological. For the Kennedy Administration, it was fundamental that capitalist organizing principles be allowed to flourish in the periphery, where they were under assault by hostile forces.

For Barnet, this assault is integral to the expansionist nature of US power. Barnet's formulation is very close to that of the conceptual framework defined in chapter one. Where it differs, however, is in its understanding of hegemony, in its objectification of the perspectives offered by state managers, and in the qualitative importance of systematic error derived from bureaucratic decision-making processes. Barnet's discussion traces the decision making pathologies of Vietnam to the processes of bureaucratic inertia and elite hubris endemic to state manager autonomy in foreign policy, and to the peculiar dynamics of US

society as reflected alternately in the peculiarities of the new frontier -- and in the longer term ideology of US exceptionalism.

The model developed in this study is not hostile to Barnett's interpretation. Indeed, there is a considerable closeness in both interpretations of foreign policy. The differences which do exist flow from the varying problematiqués that guide the analyses. While Barnett was interested in accounting for what he saw as the political and moral excesses of the US foreign policy establishment, this study is focused upon a different political and social phenomenon, namely the construction of state manager awareness of a disordered international setting. The degree to which that setting is disordered, is thus less important, than the degree to which a particular awareness of the international environment structured action and the apprehended appropriateness of action in that environment.

For this study, the choices of action by state managers in the external system do not flow -- as they do for Barnett -- from any necessary compatibility of interests between business elites and state managers. Instead, the formulation developed in this study describes the governing consensus as a constraining heuristic framework. The values and biases of state managers are mutually constituted by state manager action in both the international and domestic settings. Bureaucratic inertia is thus a single, but not necessarily primary, factor in the social processes which create and reproduce a foreign policy orientation. At the same time, the institutional and social qualities of the state as a complex of institutions necessarily lead to experiential and political differences of opinion on policy positions. Barnett's analysis is silent on the importance of this factor. As such, his strong assumption of complementarity

between state manager interests and those of a wider group of societal elites is too weak to account for the sources of new frontier activism.

The Komer and Barnett critiques operate at different political and analytical levels. Komer is clearly interested in improving bureaucratic analytical and decision-making performance. At the same time, the basic parameters of his discussion, namely the articulated political and strategic objectives of the United States during this period, are viewed as appropriate. Barnett's discussion attempts to reach beyond a description of the relationship between imperfect analytical and substantive performance, towards a highly critical viewpoint on the moral and political outputs which necessarily inhere in a bureaucratic decision-making environment where the preeminent emphasis resides in abstract principles. Where Komer emphasizes amelioration of errors and shortfalls in knowledge, Barnett attacks the fundamentals of US action in the international system. The hegemonic prerogatives of US policy -- especially as articulated during the new frontier -- are argued by Barnett to represent a concrete extension of many decades of imperial assumptions and hubris on the part of his "national security managers". From the perspective of the model introduced in chapter one, Barnett's formulation places rather too much emphasis upon bureaucratic inertia as a source of pathological policy. As the discussion above indicates, the twin (external-international and domestic-societal) environments which confront state managers as they seek to preserve policymaking flexibility, produce habitual response patterns within state institutions. The complexity of this interaction is increased further due to the accretion of decision making routines and "lessons of history", as time passes. This complexity is

underestimated by both Barnet and Komer. Indeed, in the latter, the issue receives no attention at all.

One interesting variation on the Komer explanation is that offered by Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts in their text The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Gelb and Betts argue that the Kennedy Administration was in full control of its policy -- in both the implementation and formulation stages. More importantly, the authors argue that Kennedy was aware of the longer term implications of his decisions -- but failed to recognize the inevitable foreclosure of options which inhered in any policy choice that sought to implement containment in South East Asia.

The authors identify what they consider an inevitable tension between long term containment goals and the instrumental necessities of prosecuting the war against the insurgents. In particular, the prior necessity of governmental reform by Diem in the broader anti-insurgent program is viewed by the authors as a fundamental barrier to US leverage over the GVN:

The supreme irony was that the leverage was designed to increase the political vitality and viability of the government so that it would be more effective in mobilizing the country against the Communists, but the government could not implement many of the reforms without cutting its own throat. American officials wanted Diem to consolidate his Byzantine military command structures and intelligence networks, eliminate administrative overlapping, and delegate more authority to subordinates. But in doing this Diem would be giving his political rivals the tools to make a coup against him (Gelb and Betts 1979: 84).

At the same time, the Kennedy Administration was inclined toward making a stand in South Vietnam. Indeed, as was argued in the case study, Kennedy felt that he could not absorb a loss in South Vietnam, lest it communicate a lack of resolve to the Soviet Union.

The tension between the military elements of the counterinsurgency program and the perceived necessity of political reform in the GVN took place well within the framework of US goals in the region. In particular, Gelb and Betts find no fundamental questioning of the application of containment to South East Asia. In addition, the authors assert that "[f]or the overwhelming majority of policymakers the perceived costs of defeat in Vietnam would remain prohibitive well into the 1960s." (Gelb and Betts 1979: 79) This judgement was shared across departments, even among the supposed "doves" in the State Department, who had differed over methods, but not over the strategic fundamentals.

The continuing domestic weakness of the Diem regime eventually led to its abandonment by the Kennedy Administration. Gelb and Betts feel that an option for withdrawal existed in the face of the continuing resistance by Diem to US calls for reform. The fact that this choice was not adopted by the Kennedy Administration is, perhaps, due to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy in November of 1963. This conclusion is, however, subject to the inevitable recapitulations of history commented upon in the first part of this discussion.

The explanation gains support from the advocacy of preemptive withdrawal by Robert Kennedy during the latter part of 1963. As Gelb and Betts note, the option was taken seriously enough that Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State, felt it necessary to counter it at a meeting of Administration principals with the following views: "The Administration hewed

to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs." (Gelb and Betts 1979: 93)

In contradistinction to the above possibility, the authors find no evidence of a radical reconsideration by President Kennedy of his options in South East Asia. Instead, they find that Kennedy's misgivings were confined to diminishing support for the Diem regime. In short, Diem was the central problem, not US goals in the region. Certainly, the shortcomings of the war against the insurgents were not blamed on the failure of counterinsurgency operations. Instead, impediments to the strategy's implementation - be they the Diem regime or other forces - were to be removed so that presidential policy flexibility was maintained. The foreclosure of options that inheres in any policy choice was not fully considered by the Kennedy Administration. Rather, Secretary of State Rusk's concern for the persistent application of US power and control, was the central focus of presidential attention.

The strength of the containment commitment is a consistent theme in each of the authors' analyses of US goals. The persistence of this interpretation of events owes much to the coincidence in time of the South East Asia crises with events in Berlin (the recurrent Berlin crises), the assertion by the Soviet Union that it would support anti-colonial struggles in the developing world, and finally to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Thomas Paterson addresses the particular reasons that the Kennedy Administration was unable to transcend its anti-communist vision in his text, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan. In a formulation similar to the one used in this dissertation, Paterson emphasizes the unique characteristics of the "containment generation":

Kennedy's "containment generation" imbibed several lessons from the postwar years of the Soviet-American confrontation: toughness against Communism works; precautions must be taken to avoid compromises or sell-outs in negotiations; Communism was monolithic; Communism was a cancer feeding on poverty and economic dislocation on a global scale; revolutions and civil wars were usually Communist-inspired or exploited by Communists; and a powerful United States, almost alone, had the duty to protect a threatened world (Paterson 1988: 195).

The Kennedy Administration's commitment to political and economic modernization as a response to communist "wars of national liberation" was integral to US counterinsurgency strategy. The claims and goals of the United States in global politics -- where the ubiquity of communist challenges was seen to be self-evident -- were themselves revolutionary; revolutionary in that they sought to preemptively structure the international environment, in opposition to communism.

The perceived lessons of the first postwar decade received additional reinforcement from those of World War II. As Paterson relates, John Kennedy's senior thesis at Harvard, published in 1940 as Why England Slept, enunciated the complement to the containment vision:

Its theme was direct: The English revealed weakness before the Nazi threat and should have employed force. For Kennedy's generation, the Munich agreement became the Munich "syndrome" or lesson, a vivid example of the costs of softness. In his televised address to the nation on October 22, 1962, in the terrible throes of the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy summoned that historical legacy for a rationale: "The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive

conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war" (Paterson 1988: 197).

As such, a second element is introduced into the anti-communism of the Kennedy approach to foreign policy, most specifically the explicit avoidance of prior historical errors. At the same time as it chose a unidimensional approach to foreign policy, with the external challenge posed by communism argued to be unique in history, the Kennedy Administration adopted lessons from history deriving from a different spatio-temporal context (Khong 1992: 87). The closeness of this formulation to the parametrically rational behaviour anticipated in the conceptual framework is manifest. Paterson's analysis does not adopt this language to describe US foreign policy. His discussion is, however, broadly consistent with it. Paterson comments upon the strength of the cold war assumptions among the Kennedy Administration's principals. It also highlights the parallel presence of articulated lessons drawn from world war II, further illustrating the persistence of a historical legacy that was assumed to be unproblematic among the new frontiersmen.

Paterson defines 2 periods as pivotal to the "lessons of history" drawn by the Kennedy state managers: (1) the postwar decade between 1946 and 1956; and, (2) the lessons drawn from the "failures of nerve" evidenced immediately prior to World War II on the part of the western democracies. In addition, the activist reflex of the new frontier found utility in the new concepts of political and economic modernization articulated by scholars such as W.W. Rostow.

One author who attributes considerably more strength to the "lessons of history" thesis as applied to the formulators of US containment policy during the Kennedy era, is

Ernest May. In his text, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Abuse of History in American Foreign Policy, May argues that "Given the assumptions generally shared by Americans in the 1960s, it seems probable that any collection of men or women would have decided as did members of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations" (May 1973: 83). One need not accept wholly May's notion that the human decision makers were, in effect, simply "carriers" of the cold war consensus, in order to appreciate the strength of the ideological and political-institutional forces biasing decision making in the direction of an instrumental application of containment in South East Asia. As May continued, however, almost everyone [by the early 1970s] regard[ed] those decisions as mistaken. Many [found] them incredible." (May 1973: 84) This last remark emphasizes the time-bound nature of particular perceptions of interests and options. In particular, the outcomes that were seen to have flowed from a specific sequence of outcomes and decisions in the past are understood to have formed specific historical trajectories for state managers. This view is, however, purely retrospective in quality, and tends to form only in response to quite serious (fundamental ?) crises in the governing consensus' empirical referents. In essence, the Vietnam debacle is the scale of events necessary to create a crisis for the dominant interpretation guiding foreign policy. The lessons of history have persistence and robustness across time -- which are reflected in both the behaviour of decision makers acting in the presence of pronounced uncertainty, and in the post hoc analyses of academic critics (Melanson 1983: 218).

Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Kennedy State Department, and later Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, offered an in depth explanation of US Vietnam policy in his book To Move a Nation: The Politics of

Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. As was noted earlier, Hilsman was an early advocate and planner of counterinsurgency strategy as applied to South Vietnam. As is described in chapter three, he authored at least two reports which were central to decisions on the tactics necessary to advance two complementary goals: (1) increased US leverage over Diem; and (2) increasing the effectiveness of the "hearts and minds" campaign integral to counter-insurgency efforts.

Hilsman resigned from the State Department in March of 1964. His ostensible reason for leaving, the over-militarization of US policy in the conflict, is interesting for what it emphasizes, as much as for what it leaves unstated. In particular, Hilsman was a consistent advocate of the selective use of military force in support of counterinsurgency efforts. As such, his position in the State Department emphasized the primacy of political goals over military considerations. The differences between Hilsman's recommendations while in office, and his commentaries following his resignation are instructive, as they illustrate both the narrowness of the debate within the counterinsurgency advocates of the new frontier, and the trend-lines which led to an instrumental convergence of recommendations (among both the "hawks" and "doves") toward a larger US ground force commitment (Gelb and Betts 1979: 278; Gaddis 1982: 246).

In one of the memoranda tabled upon his resignation, Hilsman stated the following opinion: "the way to fight a guerrilla is to adopt the tactics of a guerilla" (Hilsman 1967: 535-536). The differences of political objectives between the adversaries was, apparently, not such as to make the methods adopted unsuited to the goals in question. This instrumental understanding of methods as separated from goals is visible elsewhere in his text. As he

continued, "significant [covert] action against North Vietnam that is taken before we have demonstrated success in our counterinsurgency program will be interpreted by the Communists as an act of desperation, and will, therefore, not be effective in persuading the North Vietnamese to cease and desist. What is worse, I think that premature action will so alarm our friends and allies and a significant segment of domestic opinion that the pressures for neutralization will become formidable" (Hilsman 1967: 536). The timing of this memorandum, in March of 1964, following the coup and assassination against President Diem, is indicative of Hilsman's resistance to the notion that political conditions in the South had become markedly less manageable. Similarly, his arguments concerning signalling to the North Vietnamese are significantly belied by his prior confidence that the overthrow of Diem would not fatally weaken the coherence of US policy in the region. Indeed, in a second parting memorandum, Hilsman asserted that counterinsurgency planning would strengthen the ability of the US to escalate the conflict along conventional lines, if such should be felt necessary in the future (Hilsman 1967: 536).

Hilsman's earlier involvement in the coup to remove Diem is, perhaps, as clear an indicator as any other factor, of the attitude towards political change held by him during his time in office. In To Move a Nation, Hilsman does not back away from a pronounced confidence in the counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. Rather, his remarks are a much narrower discussion of the instrumental and policy-specific considerations which led to events in the region spiralling out of US control. Most specifically, Hilsman emphasizes what he saw as the premature militarization of the conflict by US officials. Recommending an incremental "ink-blot" strategy, which would see the slow extension of regime control over

the interior through the strategic hamlet's program and covert operations extended into North Vietnam, Hilsman had significantly not abandoned his confidence in these methods.

President Johnson's mistrust of his advice, and his connections to the Kennedy Administration, were predominantly responsible for his speedy departure from the State Department (Karnow 1983: 340-341).

It is evident from the discussion above that Hilsman was significantly involved in the design of the counterinsurgency elements of US policy. For him, it appears that conventional military and geopolitical strategies superseded a more nuanced and promising escalation control approach, based in counterinsurgency doctrine. In implementing the Kennedy approach to Vietnam policy, Hilsman's views indicate the tendency identified in the model -- namely -- that South Vietnam was viewed only as an instrument for prosecution of the Cold War. Similarly, Richard Barnett's observations on the decision making inertia that generates "bureaucratic homicide", are peculiarly appropriate in the case of Hilsman. The process that led to the precipitous telegram promising US support for the overthrow of Diem is similarly a case in point. As the discussion in chapter four made clear, this decision was the logical end point of a sequence of decisions deriving from the earliest months of the Kennedy Administration. Hilsman's discussion of a split between a more militarily inclined group in the Administration, and those more inclined toward a politically "nuanced" strategy, is overstated -- in that the incremental expansion of forces enunciated in Hilsman's favoured strategy, led to a greater level of dependence by South Vietnam on the US, as the combat successes of the ARVN failed to increase. Similarly, US leverage against Diem was itself a diminishing asset, as its use was constrained by its effects on the war against the insurgents,

and on the repeated "called bluffs" that Diem and Nhu were able to place at the doorstep of US policymakers.

Each of these perspectives offers something different to an assessment of the early US involvement in Vietnam. For the most part, these analyses focused upon instrumental factors -- at the policy implementation level -- without placing into question the essential goals of policy. The one approach that did go into greater depth, that of Richard Barnet, is crucially limited by the narrowness of its focus. By emphasizing the imperial expansion stemming from unique factors in US society, and from the peculiar relationship of that society in economic terms to the world system, Barnet failed to account for the crucially janus-faced, and interactive elements at both the domestic societal and international levels that structured the roles and behaviour that both constrained and empowered state managers.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSENSUS

The political environment of the late 1950s, in particular the Gaither committee's analysis of international conditions, was fraught with apprehensions of strategic weakness, and deteriorating international conditions. The substance of the Gaither recommendations aside (and it is not the argument of this study that the vulnerabilities identified by that committee were of particular urgency in 1961), the Kennedy Administration felt itself to be involved in a long-term and escalating political conflict with the Soviet Union.

This conclusion is supported by the rhetoric of the Administration's principals prior to their holding office, and by the decisions taken during its earliest days in Washington, DC. In particular, decision makers as important as Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin had endorsed the Gaither perspective on national security. Further, the incoming Administration had inherited two crises that resembled the picture of global threats discussed by its most hawkish members -- the neutralization of Laos, and the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

The Laotian situation presented the Administration with an early challenge to its inaugural rhetoric. In spite of their uneasiness with a situation left unresolved by the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy group did not shrink from the challenge. The first portion of the Kennedy Administration was thus preoccupied with the development of political conditions in Laos, and with the necessity of sending unambiguous signals to the 'real' controllers of the communist insurgents active in that theatre, variously argued to lie in Beijing, Moscow and Hanoi.

Congressional discussion of the Laotian issue indicated basic agreement on the necessity of foiling an attempt by Communist forces to forestall neutralization along lines envisioned by pro-Western elements in that country. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield in particular, viewed developments in that area as important for the US global position.

Mansfield held that Laos was not worth a substantial investment of US prestige and resources. This perspective was also argued by key Administration officials. Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued that it would not be politically wise to describe Laos as a "strongly pro-Western ally", as this would not only be at variance with the truth, but would place the

US in a difficult position, obligating it to come to the defence of a people seen as unwilling to defend themselves.

This viewpoint bears further scrutiny. Rather than placing into question the viability of the US strategic position in the region, the Laotian situation helps make more clear its substantive orientation. US goals in South East Asia were predicated on a relatively 'clear-eyed' view of who would fight, how hard they would fight, and the degree to which they would comply with American strategic prescriptions. As such, the importance of Laos stems from both its unsuitability for US manipulation, and for the baseline conditions that it indicates for the commitment of US prestige and military forces.

Vietnam was relatively unimportant to US policy makers in the initial period. As such, it is not the case that day to day perspectives were framed within a free-wheeling, critical debate at the highest levels. Instead, new information entering the central decision making structures at the NSC and within the Pentagon were conditioned by instrumental considerations, mostly linked to the operation of the US MAAG in Saigon, and to the details of economic and political assistance to the GVN.

Within this setting, subordinate officials significantly influenced the development of conditions in South East Asia for official Washington. The importance of particular individuals thus gained a status out of all proportion to the considered intellectual content of their recommendations. It was into this environment that General Edward Lansdale came to have a particular resonance with those of the Administration's principals.

An indication of this rather peculiar reality is the significant presidential attention paid to a report on the Laotian situation authored by Lansdale in January 1961. Lansdale's

two-week stay in Saigon during this period takes on additional importance for the future of US Vietnam policy because this same report was utilized at the highest levels to support an alteration in US policy toward South East Asia. This alteration was fundamentally a shift of emphasis, favouring neutralization of Laos, and the design of a significant geostrategic position in South Vietnam, from which the US role in the entire region could be strengthened.

The then near-term deployment of US military assets near to Laos was thus a move destined to (temporarily) stabilize a segment of a region, in preparation for a considered and deliberately laid out scenario for reinforcing the future exercise of US influence on more fertile ground. The ineffectiveness of SEATO (from the point of view of tactical responses by the United States) merely constituted an additional force influencing state managers in their choice of policy instruments. It is, of course, the case that the United States sought multilateral support for its policies in the region, in the Laotian case going so far as to assert to then British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan the positive value of a UK commitment to support its SEATO obligations in the near term as an essential buttress for US goals in the region (in light of potential opposition on the domestic and international levels).

The Bay of Pigs fiasco appears to have solidified, rather than undermined, the Kennedy Administration's activism. Indeed, failure there seems to have reinforced -- in the minds of the Administration -- the importance of other theaters in the global competition. This linkage thesis -- explicit in the Eisenhower implementation of the Containment doctrine -- thus saw a further concrete incarnation in a crisis in the periphery. Vietnam became a terrain upon which the US would engage the Soviet Union in a putative "war of national

liberation". In an ironic twist of the January 1961 national liberation speech by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Kennedy adopted a parallel notion of the strategic competition. The theatre of conflict thus formulated -- in political terms -- was characterized by a particularly stark removal of contextual complexity. This allowed US state managers to overstate the degree of instrumental control exercised from outside over Ho Chi Minh, and to similarly overestimate the degree to which the US could itself define outcomes in the Vietnam conflict.

THE TAYLOR COMMISSION AND US POLICY

The recommendations of Maxwell Taylor's investigative commission provided advanced indications of the emerging Kennedy Administration policy. The commission's analysis of the situation also set the parameters of debate, with the key differences lying in the pace and quality of escalation that would allow for effective control over the insurgency, the importance of a demonstration-level US military plan for the defence of the South, and the degree to which Diem represented a viable long term partner for the United States.

Taylor's recommendations argued for the importance of South Vietnam as an area where US prestige and credibility were already implicated. Further, he acknowledged difficulties in the implementation of plans up to that point, but envisioned the exercise of leverage over Diem, with an expanded US military and economic commitment being gained in return for domestic (GVN) political and social reforms. These plans were designed to enhance the legitimacy of the domestic Diem government. Further, consistent with

Lansdale's observations attached to the Taylor report, political reform was designed to inculcate democratic values within opposition elites, providing potential alternatives to the Diem regime during a future period of transition.

US involvement was to see specialist participation in the implementation of counterinsurgency operations, in the reform of government operations with a view to reducing malfeasance and corruption, and in any other decisions that tangibly affected the war against the insurgents. The intellectual underpinnings of this US initiative, as was argued above, are indicated by the participation in its deliberations of W.W. Rostow, a political science professor from MIT, and later an important advisor to McGeorge Bundy.⁹⁰ Rostow framed the US policy in South East Asia as a response to Khrushchev's wars of national liberation. This was, in turn, linked with US credibility in South East Asia -- and related lastly -- to US global stature -- and its own self-definition as the leader of the 'free world'.

The Taylor recommendations were, as was described earlier, not implemented as originally written. Their basic thrust, however, was to guide the first wholly Kennedy Administration-derived program in opposition to the insurgency in South Vietnam. During the design of the final plan the Secretary of Defense and the JCS argued for steep and rapid escalation in order to stabilize the region militarily. In opposition to this perspective, the

⁹⁰For an example of the scholarship that provided the intellectual underpinnings of the new frontier's notions of political and economic modernization, see W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, a non-Communist Manifesto New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

White House NSC structure and the State Department favoured a more graduated and credibility-enhancing program. In both proposals, however, further US support was to be contingent upon Diem's actions with regard to governmental reform. His long term reliability was also the subject of debate, though no near term decisions were made to seek a replacement leader for the GVN.

An interesting proposal for the neutralization of South Vietnam was entertained, and then dismissed due to the lack of senior staff member support in the State Department. As was argued in chapter three, it is possible to trace a decision process beginning in early November 1961 that appears to mandate the escalation of US involvement in the region, and the choice of a mostly military focus for this escalation.

The tone of debate in the White House and the State Department on South Vietnam is further indicated by the discussion of the problem that Ngo Dinh Diem himself represented. His alleged duplicity, or at least that of his closest advisors (especially his brother Nhu), was seen as a significant obstacle to the successful execution of American plans. As such, it was within the broad US approach to that country that consideration was given to seeking replacements for Diem, or at least, to manipulating political conditions in the South with a view to maximizing his compliance with US desires.

The subsequent decision to deploy military advisors attached to the MAAG in Saigon was a reflection of these contrasting influences. Also important was a temporary delay in its implementation, in order to produce a tactical de-linkage between Vietnamese developments and events then occurring in Laos. The promulgation of NSAM 111 represents a

fundamentally important point of decision in US Vietnam policy. It represented a fundamental commitment to defining the fate of South East Asia, but of a special kind.

The commitment to South Vietnam is more correctly defined as a statement of the Kennedy Administration's adherence to Containment. If one adopts this perspective on subsequent events, the instrumental character of US moves in relation to both the ongoing conflict with the insurgents and with reference to the Diem regime, becomes apparent.

The relationship of these decisions to new frontier conceptions of global politics was thus a complex one, and not completely removed from the interplay of events and expectations. At the same time, however, state manager expectations are not readily reducible to any particular factual circumstances that placed into doubt the general orientation of official policy. The shifts and trends visible were within a defined strategy. That strategy is the subject of the next section.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS

From the case study materials, this section describes the structure of the governing consensus. This section discusses the values, goals and biases that were reflected in the decision making of the Kennedy Administration. It also focuses upon the options that were not chosen, whether or not wholly coherent and detailed rationales were visible in the documentary record.⁹¹

It is apparent from the rhetoric of the early days of the Kennedy Administration that state managers saw themselves as a unique grouping. This perspective is itself congruent with traditional perspectives on US exceptionalism, and the unique prerogatives and behavioural necessities that flow from that position. US leadership of the 'free world' was conceptualized by the Kennedy state managers in a way that reinforced key aspects of the American approach to global politics.⁹²

⁹¹For a discussion that situates a conception of orthodoxy in postwar US foreign policy in American international relations scholarship, see Richard A. Melanson, Writing History and Making Policy (1983).

⁹²The American approach to foreign and defence policy - or more precisely - to national security policy - is argued to adhere to a relatively coherent strategic culture. The incarnation of this culture is aptly demonstrated by John Lewis Gaddis' Strategies of Containment. As well, that discussion captures an additional significant factor within the governing consensus - the necessity of deterrence to the exercise of escalation control during conflicts in the periphery. This particular factor was subsumed, within the discussion, inside the containment goals of the Cold War foreign policy consensus. The argument of the model, that this strategic culture has domestic social and political sources, is not a new one. A scholar with whom this author differs on most theoretical issues, D) Gray, also argues for the importance of national historical and cultural experiences to national styles of national security planning. The strength of this insight, in the wider discussion of state manager

The political environment into which these decision makers entered was, however, structured by other factors that generated predictable policy responses. The most obvious attribute of the dominant attitudes of the period was anti-Communism. The case study reveals the long term salience of this issue for the Kennedy Administration. In particular, the early debates in the Congress on US policy in South East Asia during the Eisenhower Administration were fully preoccupied with the Cold War. In turn, President Kennedy was self-consciously anti-communist, and espoused a universalist doctrine that sought to engage developing countries as partners in a conflict against the Soviet Union.

During this era, this aspect of the governing consensus received additional reinforcement; perhaps most importantly, from the January 1961 speech by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, where he enunciated his long term support for "wars of national liberation". The state managers of the new frontier were enthusiastic participants in this historic contest. Further, they evaluated their own chances of success as being reasonably good. The enthusiasm and sense of limitless possibilities noted in chapter three resonates with the new frontier's view that it was unique in history, in that it had a coherent understanding of

perspectives on the nature of the external environment, is crucial to a coherent understanding of the nature of behavioural injunctions said to derive from international system structure. As is argued elsewhere in this study, domestic conceptualizations of these behavioural injunctions necessarily differ as they are filtered through different cultural and historical experiential lenses. As such, and as will be argued in the concluding chapter, international relations is crucially influenced by the inevitable dissonance that arises between different groups of state managers as their internal societal location, and geostrategic placement, differs.

evolving global conditions, and commanded the resources and power necessary to determine patterns of outcomes.

This consciousness of resource and knowledge empowerment provided the essential intellectual and political support for an interventionist foreign policy. As such, the Kennedy Administration's approach to South East Asia drew strength from the peculiar attributes of the political and ideological setting of the US at the end of the 1950s.

Perceptual factors linked with this systemic status caused the *issue* of strategic weakness to reinforce the notion of exceptionalism embedded within the governing consensus. In particular, this attribute received substantial support from the sequence of Berlin crises prior to the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, and from the transitional crises of the early 1960s, namely the Laotian situation and the continuing insurgency in South Vietnam. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also of great significance in this area.

The consensus went beyond a relatively widespread agreement upon ideas and threat analyses. Instead, it received much more concrete actualization through the peculiar institutional characteristics of the relationship between the US Presidency and the Congress. In particular, the presence of habitual and robust patterns of deference in foreign policymaking prevented the injection of critical domestic political factors into the decision making process that defined US goals and prerogatives, even had the salience of the issues been such that it generated action by social forces in opposition to existing policy (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). As the discussion in chapter two indicates, the fragmentation of foreign policy criticism in the period was not pronounced. Those differences that had existed became muted when some critics gained access to positions of

power (as became true of liberal internationalists). In the case of South East Asia, the Executive was able to define almost alone, both the aims and tactics that guided US policy for a number of years.

This habitual deference had one additional consequence, it left unaltered a pattern of informational closure that was to have stark implications later in the 1960s, when the Vietnam war became exceedingly controversial. In particular, the executive informed the congressional leadership on only an ad hoc basis of the details of US policy in South East Asia. As the case indicates, significant commitments of US power and prestige were made in secret, as the residual offshoots of inter-agency discussions and decision making processes.

Congressional-executive relations had another significant attribute, their peculiar character formed a barrier against critical discussion of national security values and perspectives. If the congressional leadership enjoyed only ad hoc access to information on foreign policy activities orchestrated by the Administration, the wider public was wholly reliant upon media channels for information and critical commentary regarding events external to the United States. In addition, in the absence of unambiguous resource commitments to the GVN, US activities in the region had little domestic (US) political salience. As such, neither congressional attention, nor public outrage, were significant impediments upon executive freedom of action during the period under study.

THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS AS A POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Each of the factors mentioned above leads to a conclusion that the Containment consensus that guided US foreign policy in the early 1960s can be treated as a constraining environment. The constraints were such that state manager behaviour conformed to a relatively small set of actions; and in turn, that individuals with policy responsibilities reacted in predictable ways to events in South East Asia. It is similarly possible to conceptualize this policy environment as a proxy for international structure, to the degree that it represents a contingent interpretation of international relations. In particular, since state managers acted habitually as if their expectations and interpretations of the external environment were accurate, these views necessarily constituted the actual substance of the international system, for state managers occupying their systemic and societal positions.⁹³

From this point logically flows a number of consequences for a discussion of the importance of the international environment to the behaviour of state managers. First, these officials viewed the containment doctrine as an absolute political necessity. As such, US state managers viewed it as imperative that the United States adopt a leadership role among

⁹³Policy controversies are differences of conceptualization, with respect to the external environment. As well, it is possible to reintroduce political controversy into differences in foreign policy. It is not just that people have different views concerning the favoured goals of the state, or that differences over the national interest exist. Both of these insights can be accepted, but also extended, into a more thoroughgoing analysis of the implications for social action in the international sphere, where state managers -- enjoying a significant legitimated opportunity to utilize violence in the pursuit of a particular agenda of values -- systematically mis-assess the behavioural necessities of international action. Conflict resolution efforts in the global political environment can thus be viewed as essentially attempts at the reconciliation of different structured perceptions of the international system. The interaction of different conceptualizations in the international realm is the focus of the concluding chapter.

the countries of the 'free world' This view does not differentiate the new frontiersmen from others in American society during the same period. Rather, a shared threat perception necessarily translated into similar conceptions of policy necessities. The contingent expectations of the actions of others in the international system were themselves based upon a dominant interpretation that was unquestioned, with respect to those social forces at the domestic level that influenced foreign policy.

The division of the globe into communism and the 'free world' exemplified the dominant viewpoint of the period. Similarly, the uniqueness of the role assigned to the United States in this conceptualization harked back to a traditional American awareness of an exceptional historical destiny. The coincidence of this factor with a material condition under which American economic political and military weight exceeded that of any other state, provided a powerful empirical referent for a pre-existing element of US societal discourse.

Consistent with the expectations of the theoretical model, the foreign policy prerogatives of the executive were further reinforced by the apprehension of extreme danger in the external environment. This fact, along with the availability of Keynesian economic instruments, muted domestic criticism of state manager preferences in foreign policy. In this way, the picture of international relations articulated by the governing consensus provided ancillary rationales for secretive decision making, executive independence and instrumental compromise.

The structure of the United States government gave concrete assistance to this tendency, as it provided the conduit, for the executive's exercise of its prerogatives in foreign policy. The habituated deference of the legislative to the executive branch in foreign policy

was a significant characteristic of the way state managers were able to implement policy without reference to domestic critics. The escalation of the US involvement in Vietnam evidenced within the case study is importantly a narrative of the activation of **latent** prerogatives in the face of a strong foreign policy consensus.

The absence of significant societal opposition to the increased US commitment to the Diem regime logically flows from another aspect of the model. In this sense, the governing consensus acts to legitimate access to information on key issues. In turn, the substance of national security issues is seen to lie fully within the competence of executive branch state managers. Consultations between Administration officials and legislative leaders took place on a perfunctory basis. The lack of mandatory structural consultation between the two branches on matters of foreign policy prevented the development of major stake-holders on these issues within the legislative branch.⁹⁴ Similarly, other issues in related theaters (i.e., the Berlin crises, and to an extent the Laotian issue), distracted congressional attention long enough to prevent the emergence of competing issues on to the public agenda.

The ability of social forces to penetrate an institutional complex where information is closely held, agendas of priorities are remarkably robust, and access to central decision makers is constrained at best, is quite slight. This factor is further exacerbated if one takes into account the fact that liberal critics of US foreign policy were now in charge of that

⁹⁴The US tradition of Presidential leadership in foreign and defence policy goes back to the founding years of the republic. During the Cold War, the militarization of foreign and security policy **methods** reinforced this factor, as it allowed Presidents to carry out their security policy under the rubric of functions relating to the presidential role as Commander-In-Chief.

policy's implementation. In short, moderate critics of US foreign behaviour were in power, leaving the articulation of more radical views to those on the very margins of the US political mainstream.

The news media provides a conduit through which information reaches the mass public. This transmission belt was similarly a major target of manipulation by state managers with national security responsibilities. The manipulation of media coverage on the ground in South Vietnam, alongside the specific instructions forwarded to the US Mission in Saigon, both illustrate the prevailing desire by state managers to control the reporting out of an ongoing theatre of conflict.

The methods used by state managers to control information are also influenced by the character of consensual knowledge. The ideological element of this social phenomenon makes itself felt through the denial of legitimacy to certain questions and considerations. This factor can be overt, or merely latent, underneath an apparently unproblematic threat consensus. Elite consensus, especially where it is reinforced by peculiar institutional factors, acts as a powerful check on the articulation of truly critical ideas, or interpretations.

Similarly, such a consensus acts as a filter on the information required for the execution of 'normal' behaviour within a defined institutional structure. As such, the reality of congressional and public inattention to foreign policy was itself a critical attribute of the division of labour in conceptualization and reaction to external phenomena.⁹⁵

⁹⁵The conceptualization of a perceptual division of labour with respect to the international sphere follows from the discussion of institutional and strategic cultural supports for the governing consensus. In particular, any special prerogatives that state managers enjoy with respect to articulating societal interests deriving from the international setting, necessarily

With respect to information control finally, state managers have at their disposal the ability to bestow and withdraw access to closely held empirical material, a powerful lever when interacting with members of the print and electronic media. It is clear that the Kennedy Administration utilized access limitations and favoritism in its relations with the Press Corps (both in Washington DC and Saigon). The extent to which it succeeded in controlling the public articulation of elite opinion on issues that it viewed as important, is itself a controversial subject.

In the case of US relations with the Diem regime, it is evident that reporters came under some pressure to respect the national security interests of the United States (as articulated by the state managers of the new frontier) in their reportage back in the USA.⁹⁶

translate into habitual patterns of deference and importantly, inattention. The accretion of professionalization and expertise within bureaucratic component of the state thus translates into regularized compartmentalization of foreign policy tasks, and similarly into the construction of groups of experts - for whom the articulation of state interests defines their societal and political status.

⁹⁶Throughout the history of the Cold War, an uneasy tension existed between the legitimate articulation of critical journalistic insights and the espoused needs of governments for control over dissident (seditious ?) activities. As such, in the United States journalists have always enjoyed an uneasy relationship with state managers. James Aronson enunciates the degree to which journalistic norms and behaviour have been penetrated (and frequently compromised), in the face of the pressures of national security thinking. See The Press and the Cold War (Revised and Expanded Edition) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1950). Aronson's chapters on the Vietnam debacle (chapters 13-15), indicate the often troubling compromise of Journalistic ethics and state policy. More importantly, however, this discussion also illustrates the degree to which the media are more than mere articulators of 'objective' information, and actually exercise an important gate-keeper role on the articulation of critical perspectives on official policy. Chapter 11 of this text includes a particularly troubling discussion of the role of the New York Times in suppressing early reporting on the preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, (pp. 153-169).

Similarly, in close liaison with the Diem regime, the US embassy in Saigon cannot escape responsibility for cycles of expulsion suffered by the foreign press contingent at different points in time. The particular history of the relationship between the media and the Kennedy Administration is controversial. From the case study material, it is evident that the Administration used both 'carrots and sticks' in order to influence the quality and quantity of reporting on issues of primary interest.

THE GOVERNING CONSENSUS AS AN INTERPRETIVE HEURISTIC

As the dominant structure of interpretation and inference, the governing consensus constitutes an analog for determinate international structures. This is the case because the governing consensus helps define for state managers: (a) the behaviour to be expected from other state managers acting on behalf of societies in the global political environment, and (b) the contingent expectations likely to be held by state managers acting on behalf of other societies. In turn, the governing consensus' constraining powers influence the agenda of policy options considered by state managers in the execution of their roles. This influence is thus constituted through the evolution and persistence of different decision making procedures, through the patterns of information control evident in the relationship of state managers to the media, and through the substantive decisions made by state managers in the face of partially understood international change.

The early period of the Vietnam conflict saw peculiar factors evident in each of these areas. First, the collapse of decision making concerning Vietnam to the NSC and the

Pentagon was itself indicative of differences of expertise, perceived "tough mindedness" and tactical differences over the choice of policy (economic, military assistance, or diplomatic) instruments. Second, the Kennedy Administration's attitude toward the media reveals a perceived necessity to manage the public debate on US interests in South East Asia. This fact, alongside circumstantial evidence that links US policy makers to selective expulsions of particularly recalcitrant reporters in the region, provides some clues as to the increasingly fine-grained informational control that the Administration sought to exercise.

Lastly, decisions made by state managers during this period reveal the degree to which initial views were only reinforced by the course of events in South Vietnam. The fate of the Vietnam neutralization proposal is readily understandable if one approaches it from the perspective of prior decisions involving Laos. In particular, once the Laotian solution seemed in process, the decision to make a stand in a geographically close theatre was also made. As such, this linkage of aims was a differentiating decision between tactical implementation strategies of the containment policy.

The US strategic position in the region was defined as dependent upon preventing the wholesale defeat of pro-Western governments. As Vietnam was chosen as a place to stand and fight, it soon became the preeminent area where the US stake in the region lay. As such, the global conflict with what was interpreted as a single Communist adversary, was prosecuted along lines where Vietnam itself was only important to the wider US agenda to the extent that its nature detracted from the effort against the insurgents.

As such, the problems of Diem only became politically salient for the Kennedy Administration when they appeared to present dilemmas for the United States in the face of

shifting domestic and international opinion. At this point, the trajectory of decision shifted within the relatively narrow avenue of further assisting the achievement of an unchanged agenda of American goals - the isolation and destruction of the communist insurgency. Once the decision was made that Diem would not be instrumentally useful in achieving this task, his regime became expendable, and state managers began to explore options for Diem's removal or neutralization within the Government of South Vietnam.

The interplay of executive prerogatives with an ideological interpretation which held that the external environment was particularly threatening, allowed for the successful blunting of critical opinion on Vietnam for almost the entire period under study. Indeed, it was only at the end of the case study period that the first significant public protest occurred -- coincidentally -- because of problems that state managers in Washington had already identified - in the policies carried out by Diem. At this point the lack of comprehensive and reliable control of the media is evidenced by the advent of television pictures of the suppression of Buddhist protests by South Vietnamese security forces, and the coincident emergence of protest activity in the United States.

The strength of the governing consensus produces routine decision making on the assumption of a relatively unchanging external setting. In this sense, for the governing notion of reality, the international system is confronted in a parametrically rational manner. To reiterate the discussion in chapter one, this view holds that the long term implementation of systematic plans in the external system does not elicit an adaptive response from that setting in the short run. As well, the manipulability of the external system is also held to be relatively invariant. As such, the social forces that underlie legitimate state actions in foreign

policy are assumed to be in relative stasis in the short run. By extension, the special prerogatives of state managers in foreign policy are held to be exceedingly robust in the face of domestic challenge. One other way that this viewpoint may be stated is that national security -- the security of the political community as defined by state managers -- represents the basis of other social values; and, receives deferential treatment as a consequence.

The functional aspect of this notion of the international environment for state manager autonomy is manifest. First, the manipulability of outcomes in a parametrically rational manner allows for the development of expert knowledge, further solidifying the social position of state managers vis a vis other societal elites, on a defined subject matter. Similarly, the role of the governing consensus in filtering information and perspectives on the external environment also focuses attention upon the social and institutional supports that allow the consensus to reproduce itself through time. As peak decision makers within the state, state managers operate within an institutional complex which itself has extensive consensus-driven elements. The significance of the consensus to the operation of foreign policy within the US government should not be underestimated. To be succinct, it provides the values according to which policy is designed, and the instruments through which those goals are generically pursued. In this vein, one of the outgrowths of the privileged articulation of national security values and necessities within the state is a pattern of secret decision-making and the notion that time and political constraints delimit who is, and is not, to be consulted and trusted with the minutiae of policy. This idea accounts for the relative exclusion and inclusion of various sites within the state in the decision making process on Vietnam. The relative unimportance of State Department prescriptions, relative to the

4 of/de 4

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

formulations deriving from the NSC and the Pentagon, reflects this theoretical concept. In the case study and within the conceptual framework, this function of the governing consensus is treated as detracting from a direct confrontation with external change. More directly, the consensus allows for the functional simplification of a highly complex external setting, thus allowing state managers to deal with a manageable agenda of problems. The inevitable consequence of this simplification, however, is an inability to achieve a thoroughly contextual understanding of particular social and political phenomena.

To set the most fundamental theme of this dissertation into sharp relief, unmediated comprehension of the international system by state managers is inherently infeasible. Rather, it is necessarily the case that such a confrontation with external reality represents a refracted perspective, influenced and conditioned by the prevailing dogma on the lessons of history, by the peculiar biases and loyalties of those occupying elite manager roles within the state, and finally, reflective of a particular historical conjuncture - and its geostrategic characteristics. In turn, of course, this fact means that any *description* of a constraining consensus itself has only limited validity -- applying only to defined historical and social conditions. While the notion of the consensus is readily transferrable as an analytical tool, the *structure* of a particular framework necessarily derives from particular cases.

The case study indicates the persistence and robustness of institutionalized views of international relations. Second, the analysis indicates that descriptions of the external environment were themselves reflective of prior historical views held by state managers. The degree to which the received wisdom of this group was confounded by external events is controversial. What is not controversial, however, is that prior views critically structured the

actual decisions made during the initial escalation of the US commitment to Vietnam. The implications of these domestic interpretations of the external environment are both clear and radical. International structure from this vantage point is the domestic articulation by state managers of an authoritative interpretation of external reality. The domestic sources and institutional supports that foster the reproduction of a persistent consensus are thus essential causal mechanisms accounting for political perceptions of international change. The next chapter expands upon the implications of this conception of global politics for neorealist scholarship. In turn, it draws the narrative to a close by rendering concrete the insights which flow from the Vietnam case study, and relating them to the problem of interpreting hegemonic behaviour in an ephemeral global context.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: STATE MANAGER AWARENESS AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

The complexities of action in the global political environment are brought sharply into focus by concentrating on the way state managers respond to international change. In concrete cases, this focus offers insights into the development of policies, and into their relationship to biases and expectations in assessments of others' actions. In turn, these expectations translate into contingent interpretations of the causal processes inherent to the state system. It is the nature of state manager interpretations of these processes that is the subject of this last chapter. In conjunction with a more explicit statement of the lessons of the Vietnam case study, this chapter addresses three theoretical concerns introduced in chapter five. These issues are respectively: (1) state manager awareness, and the existence of a conceptualized perceptual division of labour with respect to the inter-state system; (2) parametric rationality and continuous (historical) action within the global political environment; and (3) the nature of the relationship between hegemonic prerogatives and processes of global political change.

THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The global political system can be defined as the complex inter-relationship of self-regarding institutional and political structures. This interaction is not unidimensional, with metaphorical 'billiard balls' colliding with one another. Rather, the global setting is configured by material, societal and ideological forces, each of which are influential in the construction of political outcomes. This insight is fully consistent with the broad literature on international interdependence, with the complex interdependence scholarship of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, and with their relatively sophisticated historical-diplomatic discussions of interstate relations.

An important difference is present, however, in the essentialist, or reductionist, qualities of those theories. These models quite routinely trace patterns in international politics to capability concentrations, hegemonic status prevalent within related issue areas, and static vulnerabilities extant due to resource or economic interdependencies. This study has argued for the parallel importance of the constructed understandings of notions of material or geopolitical forces. The relative robustness of state manager conceptions of political necessity, in the face of an external environment that systematically challenges ingrained perceptions of social and political phenomena, further amplifies the point. The variability of political and social forces produces responses by state managers which, in principle, derive from imperfect or incomplete knowledge. A further consequence of this situation is the departure of state manager perceptions of structure from any separate - 'objectified' environment; that is, one which is invariant in the face of social and political

activity. As was stated in the last chapter, the contextual specificity of assessments of international structure means that analyses which focus on domestic social forces in international outcomes are of necessarily limited generalizability. Instead of the particular structure and processes of the governing consensus being generic, the important point is the idea that a conceptual framework that defines external (read international) political stakes, departs from an 'objective' representation of empirical circumstances.

This alternative formulation of global politics emphasizes the clash of cultures and values, as well as from the inevitable asymmetries that characterize differences of wealth, geopolitical position and military capability. In fact, rather than tracing these differences to material factors, this exposition gives primacy to the conceptions held by human participants in state decision making. The social forces that give rise to these dominant conceptions are thus the chief topic of concern.

The case study examined the process through which state manager awareness of the international environment was filtered in a particular instance. This process takes place within an interpretive framework. This framework is both intensely ideological, and institutionally reinforced through the distribution of power within the state, and between the state and leading groups in society.

It is apparent from the exposition in earlier chapters that no simple conception of a confrontation between an agenda of foreign interests and a malleable external environment, can be sustained as an adequate picture of politics at the global level. State managers adopt perspectives or approaches to external change which are extremely resistant to challenge from new information. This resistance has two dimensions, and derives importantly from the

janus-faced role of state managers in foreign policy. These role-based constraints on state manager behaviour derive from a socially constructed ideological and bureaucratic constraint network that conditions the articulation of views that differ fundamentally from accepted norms and perspectives.

In turn, this constraint network must itself come to terms with a dynamic external environment comprised of similarly configured actors. In this vein, state manager freedom of action is further constrained by the actions of officials acting on behalf of other societies. Relationships of dependence or subordination, as well as those of hegemony, represent relations where political options themselves are collectively constructed understandings of the possible.

The mutually constitutive nature of political decisions, and their underlying formulation of means-ends relationships, further adds to the complexity of patterns in international politics. It is this fact that renders particular interpretations inherently ambiguous. As the development of US policy in Vietnam between 1961 and 1963 indicates, prevailing interpretations are extremely robust in the face of contradictory information.

US VIETNAM POLICY: TRENDS AND OUTCOMES

The Kennedy Administration's initial foreign policy orientation was highly activist. At the same time, the deployment of US political instruments in the external environment was reflective of a defined interpretation and contingent decisional calculus. That calculus has been described in prior chapters. Within the general rubric of containment, policy instruments were chosen which allowed the executive to implement choices in a timely manner, with ostensibly effective communications of resolve, credibility and information elements in foreign policy.

The links between the choice of policy instruments on the one hand, and the information concerns of involved state managers on the other, are crucial to an understanding of the complex interface between the state and the global political environment. From the discussion in the first chapter, it is predictable that realist analyses of the threat environment in South East Asia would concentrate on a small set of political-military factors. A neorealist critique would emphasize the unitary or strong-leader characteristics of national decision-making for the actors involved. Secondly, this school might offer a discussion emphasizing a minimax decision rule, giving prominence to risk aversion on the part of the involved state managers. Lastly, the constrained options available to non-hegemony in the active theatre would also be a focus, with a related discussion of balancing or bandwagoning behaviour by involved state elites.

Realist interpretations of US policy in Vietnam might argue that a stand in that area would communicate information to potential adversaries regarding US staying power, prestige, and energy in the prosecution of its global political aims. At the same time, these analyses might also offer critique of the tactics used in implementing US grand strategy.

An assessment of relative resolve, and of the independent valuation by each power of its own stakes in the region might round out the assessments conducted from this analytical perspective. The case study in chapters three and four discussed the decision making of the Kennedy Administration, and evaluated the degree to which new information was assimilated to pre-existing political concepts. These perspectives were explained in terms of their compatibility with, and relationship to, a governing ideological and social consensus on the rules of global politics.

The Kennedy Administration operated within a particular understanding of global politics. The Administration was under little, if any, active pressure from either the domestic societal or external environments to alter the fundamentals of its foreign policy. In applying the containment doctrine inherited from their predecessors, the new frontier state managers extended the logic of a world divided along Cold War lines into their policies towards South East Asia. A number of factors inhered within this approach. First, demonstrations of force were used to establish the credibility of US commitments in the region. Discussions within the Administration clustered importantly around the degree of confidence in US signals, and the effectiveness of American power.

The debate on this issue was itself constrained by agreement on the role of the United States in prosecuting a conflict with international communism. As was argued earlier, this

role carries with it contingent expectations and evaluations of relative prestige, status and capability. These contingent factors structured the choice of policy instruments in concrete decision making instances. In South Vietnam, US policy was designed to regulate, and if possible nullify, the effectiveness of the communist insurgency. In turn, South East Asia represented but one theatre of a global contest against the Soviet Union. As such, its importance to US policy had at least two dimensions. First, the conflict in the region allowed a test of US approaches for opposing revolutionary forces fighting Khrushchev's wars of national liberation. Second, the successful shaping of outcomes in the region was to act as reinforcement in the broader global contest. Measures taken toward prevailing in one area were instrumentally related to success in the broader contest. The relationship between these two levels of conflict was described, for the Kennedy Administration, by the picture of the global political environment constituting the Cold War.

Within the policy environment, actions were taken that were aimed at influencing the behaviour of the communist insurgents, and that of their assumed sponsor, the Soviet Union. The instrumental responses of these actors to US initiatives were thus interpreted as unambiguously linked to the information content of US signaling. This interpretation was also two dimensional, with the communists perceived as amenable to deterrent threats, and to engagement through the use of counterinsurgency techniques.

Ensuring the clarity of this communication was a significant focus of US attention. As such, the instruments at the disposal of the United States in this conflict were crucial to decisions on US policy options.

In turn, the external environment's relationship to the decision-makers of the new frontier was assumed to be unidirectional. That is, the environment was interpreted to be changeable only along the two dimensions identified above, namely, within the behavioural possibilities defined by a Cold War perspective on power relations, and required by the implementation of the containment policy. This evaluation of the international conditions was thus only sensitive to dynamism from that source along particular dimensions. It is in this sense that the relationship of the new frontiers state managers to the international system resembles the parametrically rational perspective discussed by Jon Elster in his important text, Ulysses and the Sirens.

The diminished flexibility evidenced by this approach to foreign policy defined the tactical implementation of the first Kennedy anti-insurgent program. Particularly apparent was the closure of policy options relatively early during the Administration's tenure. In turn, this closure was only reinforced by other aspects of world events that were themselves interpreted according to the Cold War description of political reality. The Bay of Pigs debacle, the recurrent Berlin Crises, transitional difficulties in the neutralization of Laos and finally, the Cuban Missile Crisis, each provided confirming empirical referents for the state manager's perceptions.

US policy still had to deal with Diem's intransigence on political reforms. This factor had dual significance for US objectives in the region. That relationship itself had two dimensions. First, the necessity of domestic political and economic reforms in solidifying the legitimacy of the Diem government among the South Vietnamese population was manifest. In particular, this factor represented the implementation of a Kennedy policy prescription

originally enunciated in 1956 in Washington DC. The 'revolutionary' potential of middle class reform, through W.W. Rostow's favoured processes of political modernization, was to be utilized as a counter to the perceived worldwide trend toward communism.

Second, reform efforts in South Vietnam also had a domestic US audience. The Kennedy Administration thus attempted, with varying success, to influence both the informational and editorial coverage of US media operating in the region. As is discussed in chapter three, this information management strategy was designed to influence the debate in the United States on these issues, and to retain the normal prerogatives of foreign policy flexibility for the Kennedy Administration.

State manager manipulation (or control) of their relations with important societal groups are critically dependent upon information control. In turn, state managers are peculiarly preoccupied with maintaining their preeminence in articulating the dominant discourse in foreign policy. As such, a critical linkage exists between events in an instrumentally important area of foreign policy, and politics back in the United States. It is in this regard that the failure of the Diem regime to live up to its guarantee to the US Administration must be considered.

From the case study, it is indicated that a positive relationship exists between the pace and tone of Kennedy Administration activity in opposition to the Diem regime's suppression of Buddhist protests, and the degree to which Diem's activities presented political problems back in the United States. Within the public information strategy elucidated in chapter three, a concern existed that the Administration retain a tactical retrenchment option in the public portrayal of US stakes in South Vietnam.

In particular, this information strategy envisaged the necessity of establishing a disconnect between the goals of US policy and the behaviour of the Diem regime. In turn, the nature of the US military and political commitment to that country, and of the assets that would be invested in a US role in South East Asia, were always viewed in terms of their relationship to US public opinion. It is difficult to assess the strength of this relationship from the documentary record, but it appears reasonable to assert that the broad strategy of the new frontier desired the suppression of analyses that would place into question the importance of the US stake in South Vietnam. Further, keeping that country off the 'mainstream' political agenda was a real goal. Again, to the degree that the policies of the Diem regime rendered the achievement of this narrow goal more difficult, the instrumental utility of that grouping to the broader US strategy was placed into question. As events developed, this shortcoming of Diem's governance was to be of particular significance toward the middle of 1963.

The most important aspect of this situation was thus the degree to which the different aspects of the US domestic and foreign political settings were manipulated to maintain a foreign policy orientation that was consistent with preexisting biases. Beyond a mere elucidation of cognitive closure and image maintenance, this discussion argues that the new frontier notion of global political structure was the substantive source of the policy inflexibility evidenced throughout the period. This is especially apparent in the case described above, where the domestic political needs of the Administration may have been causal in accelerating decisional closure around the fate of Diem. In turn, this controversy was treated as important only to the extent that it detracted from the US ability to fight the

war with the communists. As such, the linkage between the consensus interpretation of international relations and the instrumental decision making of the Kennedy Administration in South Vietnam, is a close one -- with the instrumental 'necessities' of the Cold War seen as mandating particular actions, and removing others from the realm of the acceptable.

STATE MANAGER AWARENESS AND THE PERCEPTUAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

Integral to the relationship between the governing consensus, strategic cultural factors and the structure of state institutions, is the notion that legitimated commentary on the external environment is a regulated phenomenon. In particular, the special prerogatives of state managers in national security affairs allows them to exercise a strong degree of informational and critical analytical control over the debate on foreign policy priorities.

More specifically, state manager roles, as established, allow their occupants to articulate the governing consensus as a privileged concept of empirical phenomena. This consequence of the relationship of the governing consensus to the external environment thus takes the form of a division of labour with respect to articulated rules and processes operative in the global political setting. This idea is articulated elsewhere in this dissertation. At this point, however, its heuristic power can be extended by reconceptualizing this tendency as an essentially contested one. In particular, since state manager awareness of, and responsiveness to, the external environment is critically conditioned by an underlying array of social forces, it is legitimate to assert that the prerogative of articulating the governing consensus is itself

subject to all of the dynamics identified as pertaining to the interpretation of external phenomena.

The effect of external events on the societal stake holders is critical to the maintenance of state manager autonomy in foreign policy. This factor is readily visible in the case study, and further reveals itself in the strength with which the state managers of the new frontier sought to exercise control over their decisions' communication to the American public. From this vantage point, the maxim 'information is power', attains quite stark significance. The exercise of informational closure by the Kennedy Administration acted as a reinforcement for existing patterns of disclosure, which were overwhelmingly structured by the perceived necessities of executive action.

The contested nature of state manager perceptions thus leads to the conception of the external environment as a phenomenon which -- to an extent -- defies intersubjective agreement. While a superficial consensus upon concepts and adversarial relations may appear evident, further analysis reveals essential nuances of logic and interpretations of the empirical, that lead to varying conclusions concerning the causal logics of global politics. These differences are essentially political, as they take shape against the backdrop of controversies between societal and state elites over the appropriate priorities of public policy.

If one discusses relations between groups of state managers, as they launch actions in the global political sphere on behalf of their societies, one is left with additional complexity. First, the strategic cultural and institutional factors identified above vary markedly throughout the global political environment. As such, interactions between groups of state managers who do not necessarily share expectations and conceptualizations of the global

political environment, will necessarily be difficult, and prone to confusion and misinterpretation.

Second, if one recalls the earlier conceptual linkage between geopolitical position and the assumed prerogatives of state managers, it is apparent that the behaviour of states may importantly differ -- even if the "international systemic imperatives" argued by political realists, are taken at face value. For this framework, geopolitical constraints are viewed as one among many influences -- and not necessarily the most important ones -- in the shaping of political outcomes. These outcomes are, of course, interpreted through the consensual lenses that necessarily mediate state manager awareness of international phenomena. The confrontation of these consensual lenses -- in the global environment -- can be conceptualized as a process related though not reducible to, the material balance of forces (capability) discussed by political realism. It is apparent from the case study that balances of power need not be determinate of political outcomes. Indeed, the material balance was relatively stable during the entire period in question. State managers in each of the countries involved, the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and perhaps, among the insurgents, had varying perceptions of behavioural imperatives. Decision making in each of the concerned capitals derived importantly from 'domestic' political considerations, and was relatively impervious to global political phenomena -- as broadly understood in this dissertation.

The consensus among the new frontiersmen provided the crucial interpretive framework, through which the implications of those domestic (internal to South Vietnam) events for the broader global political contest, were conceived. The multiple layers of this conceptual framework importantly resemble the assumptions that Jon Elster describes as

inherent to parametrically rational action in the social sphere. In this case, the term 'social sphere' refers to the global political setting. Perceived imperatives within that environment are discussed as constrained according to the two dimensions discussed in the last section; namely, (1) according to the uni-dimensional notion of the enemy as implacable and vulnerable to only a closely defined series of signals - deterrent actions and militarily superior force; and (2) the contingent relationship between action in this particular theatre of conflict and the wider conflict on the "global" level. The next section addresses the implications of a parametrically rational conception of foreign policy for international relations.

PARAMETRIC RATIONALITY AND CONTINUOUS ACTION IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SETTING

Jon Elster's notion of parametrically rational action holds that the external environment remains invariant in the face of purposive action by social agents. This approach to political interaction thus logically leads to a number of theoretical tendencies when used to interpret global political concerns. In sequence, a number of important factors must be considered. First, the question arises of the degree to which state manager conceptions of the external environment are **actually cut off from empirical refutation**, and thus vulnerable to a parametric characterization. Second, the impact of a theorized interaction between the governing consensus and empirical phenomena upon policy outcomes must be assessed in the light of the former concern with informational and heuristic closure within state decision making bureaucracies. Lastly, an assessment of the interaction between different state managers -- as they approach one another through differentially permeable conceptual mechanisms -- addresses the question of the characteristics of the global political setting, and of the material qualities of its causal processes.

Policy Persistence and Empirical Information

The resistance of policy processes to influence by empirical phenomena arises from both the problematic nature of all interpretations of external events but also from the substantive nature of the contact between the governing consensus and empirical phenomena. As a conditioned interaction, this occurrence involves the complex filtering of empirical information according to a structure of prior expectations, interpretive biases and analytical heuristics.

At the same time, however, it is not the argument of this study that there is no substantive contact between a disconfirming empirical setting and conceptual structures of interpretation. Rather than reconciliation within the governing consensus taking place through the application of correspondence rules, which reconcile "objective experience" with a separate frame of reference, perception is influenced by the existence of shared analogies to events in the past (Yuen Fong 1991; Redman 1991: 19). Hence, international system structure is inferred from the perceived fit between observed phenomena and the dominant ideological perspective. This process is quite clearly autistic, in the absence of contestability of the inference heuristic in two areas: (1) the determination of participation in the interpretive enterprise itself; and (2) the articulation of competing analogies by critics of existing policy.

As is made clear in chapter two, institutional structures can act to delegitimize participation -- or at least, disable participation -- in policy formulation. If policy development is looked upon as a process where shared analogies are reconciled and

assimilated, then a closed discourse on state priorities can result in a policy process entirely unresponsive to external change. Policy responses are thus largely autistic -- at least while the salience of the dominant analogies remains beyond question.

The Governing Consensus and External Conditions

As an historical artifact of social and political processes at both the global and domestic societal levels, the consensus is itself integrally constituted by sustained interaction with both confirming and disconfirming empirical phenomena. Temporal interaction between a robust consensus and the external environment departs from a symmetrical dialogue in that in principle there is no clear separation between dominant structures of interpretation and empirical phenomena.

The discussion of state manager action in the global political environment consequently devolves into a conceptualization of the manner in which the prevailing interpretation manages information concerning external events. In turn, the mechanisms through which this management takes place are conditioned by the very pattern of social forces discussed under the previous heading. More specifically still, the interaction between state managers and social forces, is the process through which conceptual and informational management takes place.

State Managers and Action in the Global Political Environment

The complexity of interaction between state managers in the global political environment defies simple conceptions of uni-dimensional conflicts over material stakes. Instead, global political conflict can be understood as a clash between contradictory interpretive structures, articulated by different groups of state managers, fostered through historical interaction with other such structures through time, and conditioned by both changing material conditions, geopolitical factors, and the peculiar societal contexts of the particular countries in question. While less parsimonious than political realist conceptions of capability-derived international structures, this formulation offers the attraction of integrating political and social forces from both the domestic and global level.

Parametrically rational responses to global political conditions are thus influenced by domestic constraint networks, themselves providing the essential supports for the predominant interpretation of external phenomena. As such, decision making under these conditions does not take place in response to game-theoretic imperatives -- but -- instead is an outgrowth of political and social processes which are themselves antecedent to international outcomes. Further, the nature of decision making is only partially a closed phenomenon governed by a fixed analytical heuristic. Decision maker appreciations of events are affected by external phenomena, but only in ways -- or through mechanisms -- structured and defined by the array of social forces within which state power is embedded.

THE NEW FRONTIER AND VIETNAM: CONSENSUS AS GLOBAL STRUCTURE

It is possible at this point to draw together the varied strands of the conceptual framework in explanation of US decision making on Vietnam between 1961 and 1963. In this section, the nature of the Kennedy Administration articulation of the global system will be stated explicitly, and evaluated in terms of its implications for the decisions taken in Vietnam. That decision making will itself be identified in terms of the partially hermetic and resistant -- and parametrically constrained -- dimensions that governed both the choice and implementation of policy in South Vietnam. This section will close with a discussion of the picture of the global system that emerges from this conceptual approach.

The Kennedy Administration and Vietnam Policy

Chapter four described the character of the governing consensus, and its relation to the implementation of military containment in Vietnam. To reiterate these goals, as enunciated by President Kennedy before he entered the Oval Office, US foreign policy sought to: (a) prevent communist expansion throughout South East Asia; (b) preserve South Vietnam as a demonstration project of democracy in the region; (c) enhance US prestige as the 'god-parent' of reform in Asia; and, (d) effectively minimize the strategic necessity of further US conventional force deployments in the region.

The relationship of these goals to one another is not immediately clear, but can be discerned through a discussion of the trajectory of decisions followed by American state

managers between 1961 and 1963. First, it is evident from the case analysis that the prevention of further communist expansion in the region remained the preeminent object of US policy. Without reiterating the detail already enunciated in preceding chapters, it is clear that goal (d), that is -- the lessened necessity of expansion in ground forces in support of US goals -- did not survive the instrumental considerations that governed US approaches during 1961 and 1962. Similarly goals (b) and (c) were decidedly less than central to the overall framework of US aims in the region. In particular, the behaviour of the Diem regime that detracted from democratic and pluralistic American values was viewed as problematic only to the extent that it detracted from South Vietnamese and US domestic opinion's acquiescence in the prosecution of the war against the communist insurgents. No great moral outrage is evidenced within the Administration in response to the suppression by Diem of Buddhist religious freedoms. Instead, the public portrayal of Buddhist monks immolating themselves in response to Diem's policies caused political problems, both in the United States and in other Allied capitals. Only when this became apparent did the state managers of the new frontier seek to minimize the damage ostensibly 'caused' by Diem's policies, through an informal search for a replacement.

The first two dimensions discussed earlier are germane at this point. First of all, dimension one - the appropriateness of deterrent and military capability considerations is indicated by the relative importance of goal (a), the disappearance of goal (d) and the only instrumental application of action aimed in the direction of goals (b) and (c).

Dimension two -- the relationship between actions in South East Asia and the broader political contest with the Soviet Union -- is illustrated through the sequence of decisions that

saw the tactical delaying of announcements regarding the enhanced US commitment toward the Government of South Vietnam while the Laotian neutralization was in progress. In turn, the discussions at the centre linked US credibility in a theatre whose inhabitants were perceived to be prepared to fight -- South Vietnam -- to perceived Soviet probes elsewhere in the world, examples of which were provided by the closeness in time of these events to the Berlin crises of 1959-60, Khrushchev's enunciation of support for wars of national liberation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Action that can be interpreted as detracting from the two conceptualized dimensions of parametrically constrained action -- alternatives that envisioned the neutralization of South Vietnam along Laotian lines -- failed to receive significant support at the centre, and were pursued as a policy option in an ad hoc, personalistic manner by individual Administration officials -- with little or no support within the state as a whole. As was noted earlier, a major articulator of this position, John Kenneth Galbraith, was at that time US Ambassador to India. His inability to engage the President in personal lobbying involving this initiative was partially responsible for its failure. At the same time, however, as other advocates of the position emphasized, it had little or no support among the inner circle of new frontiersmen - and certainly none from within the office of the Secretary of State.

As such, the New Frontier setting approximated the hermetic and resistant, partially parametric environment described in the conceptual framework developed throughout this study. Further, material factors in this case, be they realist- described capability balances between the two sides, or the political relations linking the respective superpowers to their regional clients, were not subject to a great deal of change. In addition, US assumptions

regarding the levels of instrumental control exercised by their perceived adversaries in the Vietnam conflict, remained unexamined. As such, the manipulability and long term regulation of political conditions in South East Asia (and most specifically, in South Vietnam), remained subject to contextual factors peculiar to the region, and to the social forces underlying foreign policy in the United States.

The Functional Utility of the Governing Consensus

The governing consensus is a product of state manager interaction with both domestic societal and international social factors through time. In turn, the consensus has positive utility for state managers in managing the inevitable tensions deriving from the overlap between stakeholders and competing social forces at both the domestic and global levels. The governing consensus thus performs at least two functions. On the one hand, it provides a guide to a complex external setting composed of material factors and groups of state managers embedded within other societal frames of reference. As well, this dominant interpretation is itself a useful simplification of the external environment, allowing the application of analytical perspectives and techniques which promise to foster the manipulability of political outcomes across time and space.

As is argued elsewhere in this study, the articulation of the governing consensus by state managers is an essentially contested phenomenon. Key social forces become active in particular political controversies, to the degree that they perceive themselves as stake holders in foreign policy outcomes. As such, the prerogatives of state managers are under continual

pressure, and the apprehension of that pressure is an important influence upon state manager behaviour. Each of these theoretical concerns is evident within the Kennedy Administration policies with respect to Vietnam. The preservation of executive prerogatives was an essential subtext within the detail of the dominant approach to both Vietnam and Congressional consultations on the region.

At the same time, the containment consensus shared by both legislative and executive branch officials provided important cues and criteria, according to which events in the external setting, be they Diem's implementation of the counterinsurgency program, or the failure of domestic reforms in South Vietnam to galvanize popular support for the Diem regime, were assessed and categorized. US policy thus proceeded according to a remarkably robust grand design.

The singularly instrumental importance of South Vietnam is all the more evident if one considers the remarkable degree of at least logical coherence in the development of policy throughout the period under study. The United States' unique material capabilities, and its leaders' ideological fervor, were fundamental to a systematic attempt to restructure both the South Vietnamese government and society. The main goal in South East Asia was the preparation of a politically stabilized arena, within which the US could fight and win a battle in the Cold War.

The scale of this conflict, and the prerogatives which the United States necessarily arrogated to itself in the global system as a consequence, both raise the question of the significance of hegemony to processes underlying international change. This issue forms the concluding segment of this chapter, and of the dissertation itself.

HEGEMONIC PREROGATIVES AND INTERNATIONAL CHANGE

The uniqueness of the United States in the global system calls into question the relationship between conceptualizations of its state managers, and those of other state elites elsewhere in the world. In describing parametrically rational action in the global realm, the conceptual framework has focused upon a single case, and sought to utilize an inferential framework in order to reveal important factors about world politics. This approach allows for an integration of domestic political processes with those more routinely ascribed to be operative at some 'other' -- and definitionally separate -- global level.

This assumed dichotomy between levels is crucial to the claims of parsimony made for political realism. The consequence of this separation of political spheres, however, is the objectification of the external environment, removing the critically **interactive** nature of purposive state manager action in foreign policy from the purview of the analyst.

An emphasis upon the conceptual structures through which state managers interpret external change avoids this division of a basically singular political setting. In addition, it allows for the discussion of a frequently hidden aspect of power relations in global politics, the ability of hegemonic power to impose a contingent perspective of international reality upon an 'external environment' composed of purposive, though differentially empowered, actors.

The manner in which this imposition is achieved is similar to that argued by Robert Cox in his Production, Power and World Order. The broad political and social implications of differing placement in a capitalist international division of labour; the degree to which

social forces in the core of the capitalist world economy are able to influence state policies in support of their own self-defined interests; and, the degree to which state managers -- acting in an environment frequently argued to be anarchic -- are able to combat societal influences and carve out a residual space for agency in foreign policy, each bear directly upon the relationship between hegemonic actors and others.

The pattern of social forces that supports a particular institutional-legal order, and a contingent state complex of institutions (termed by Cox a historic bloc), is thus implicated in the broad orientation adopted by state managers to the global system. As such, the Kennedy Administration's own conception of an exceptional historic moment, drew essential support from a material and political balance of social forces at home. For the purposes of this study, a reflection of that setting has been detected in the rhetoric of the new frontier, in the patterns of interaction between the US Presidency and the United States Congress, and in the considered decision making of the Administration's inner circle.

That reflection has been conceptualized as the basis of the governing consensus that regulates state manager orientations toward global politics. The clash of these frameworks is more typically known as international relations. The existence of hegemony in the global political environment, with some institutional-legal orders, and their ancillary state complexes, more effectively able to galvanize material resources to influence the perceived interests and options of others, is effectively conceptualized in this model. The focus upon US decision making in Vietnam allows an empirical demonstration of the applicability of a different perspective on the global political environment. Similarly, the instrumental behaviour of state managers in this case illustrates the degree to which US policy was

unaffected by the conceptions of others. The hermetic nature of the governing consensus during the new frontier period falls in stark contrast to other theoretical perspectives which argue for the salience of learning processes -- with political leaders gaining experience and expertise as they fulfill their state manager roles.

In contradistinction to this position, this model seeks to interpret the changing awareness of state managers with respect to qualitative change in their external environments. The governing consensus is both a blind and a necessary simplifying framework for conceptualizing a complex global system. In a *specific* instance where a coherent, logically consistent strategy existed for tailoring a segment of the external environment in a particular manner, the consensus understanding of that environment was invariant, with respect to information deriving from it. In short, the dominant awareness, within which the strategic goals of containment and deterrence were key attributes, displayed persistence. This persistence is visible both within the documentary record of the decision making of the Kennedy Administration on Vietnam, but also through the striking similarity between the rhetoric of the new frontier and the prior views of John F. Kennedy and his advisors, framed against the US postwar policy of containment.

The persistence of a particular perspective on international affairs is a subject commented upon at length in the critical literature on international relations. The first chapter of this study addressed some of the shortcomings of political realism. In particular, it addressed the untheorized hard core of the realist approach, from a vantage point that emphasized the mediated nature of state manager comprehension of the external setting. Their awareness of causal processes in the global political environment was conceptualized

as an embedded one, conditioned and constrained by institutional, historical, material and strategic cultural factors.

These factors clearly have empowering elements as well. Depending upon the structure of the historic bloc, it is tenable to argue that state managers in one national locale may enjoy more efficacious access to societal resources than might be true in a different part of the global system. In the presence of overwhelming resource endowments, however, even a highly constraining pattern of social forces may not prevent state managers from exploiting material asymmetries across the global system to their (the political community on behalf of which state managers claim to act) advantage -- or at least the advantage of influential social forces within their own society. Indeed, it is consistent with the initial framework to argue that certain societal elites may gain from the foreign policy activities of state managers, thus acting as empowering agents for the state due to their status as stake holders in the external setting.

With respect to the construction of regularized cooperative arrangements at the global political level, it is possible to conceptualize these frameworks as accidental - or deliberately designed convergences of interest, on the part of groups of state managers, but also on the part of social forces which are themselves stake holders, with respect to particular phenomena in the global environment. As such, the perceptual division of labour mentioned elsewhere in this study has a parallel influence over the way the many arrangements stabilizing the convergent expectations of state managers develop. These arrangements, more conventionally described as internationally institutionalized behaviour or decision making processes (regimes), are thus more than merely convergent expectations concerning norms,

principles and decision making procedures in a particular issue area. Rather, regimes are themselves convergent factors within conceptually separate consensual networks. These networks are the predominant inferential structures that mediate for state managers the empirical conditions obtaining in the global system. From this perspective, therefore, international regimes represent epiphenomena, crucially vulnerable to the ascendant orientations prevalent in particular societies across time and space.

A corollary of this construction of regime arrangements in the global system, is their relative sensitivity to the political conditions present in their most significant sponsors. In particular, those state managers who adopt a coherent approach to issues in the external setting - (i.e., those who launch initiatives in foreign policy) - are reciprocally vulnerable to the effect of those policies on domestic social forces which are stake holders in the external setting. This theme was discussed in chapters one and two at length. As a potential force within the global political setting, the mechanisms through which societal stake holders influence state managers lies at what political realists would term the 'domestic' level. The importance of this line of reasoning warrants the overall orientation of this study, that the 'domestic' political level is pivotal for any comprehensive understanding of dynamic processes within a disordered political environment. The disorder of the global setting thus derives from a number of different sources, beyond the realist fixation upon the absence of a sovereign authority able to constrain the actions of states.

The variation of resource endowments across the global system is thus crucially implicated in the disordered nature of global interactions. The relationship of resource asymmetries to relative status within the global environment is quite complex. While the

realist emphasis upon capability distributions and international anarchy offers parsimonious conceptualizations of global political processes, these formulations unfortunately overstate significantly the identity of the actors in the global system, undertheorize the nature of hegemonic control in the global system, and are relatively weak in the way they explain international change.

This framework holds that change in the global political setting occurs due to the effect of external environmental factors upon domestic societal stake holders. In turn, state managers, those who enjoy preferential access to societal resources partially on the basis of the unique characteristics argued to pertain in the global setting, act to minimize threats to their positions within two analytically separable but causally coincident domains, normally termed domestic society and the international system. The balancing of social forces within two spheres is itself a dynamic process -- differing in varying cultural contexts -- and crucially implicated in the ability of state managers to sustain persistent strategies within the global political environment.

Within the case study, it is evident that the United States, a superpower, was able to avoid the resource implications of an activist, resource-intensive political strategy in South East Asia (for a time). The state managers of the new frontier were able to achieve this effect through: (a) the presumption that the United States was able to structure long term outcomes in the region, as a result of its status as the leader of the 'free world'; (b) the strength of the domestic consensus around the focal points of containment of Soviet power, and deterrence through the application of military power on a selective basis; (c) the peculiar institutional relationship existing between the Congress and the Executive Branch that gave to the state

managers of the new frontier extensive latitude in binding the US governmental structure to stakes in the external setting (the survival of the Diem regime ?); and, (d) the single-minded focus of the central decision makers upon action in pursuit of interests they saw as in "a period of maximum danger".

The emphasis upon human agency that this framework enunciates, represents a response to the untheorized content of neorealist scholarship. As such, the strong leader assumption so crucial to realist political argumentation is reconceptualized as an embedded social and political factor, conditioned and influenced by patterns of social forces within different societies.

In the case of US Vietnam policy, a region of the globe became the arena within which a consensus-derived strategy (militarized containment and roll-back of a communist insurgency), was prosecuted. The development of that policy is illustrative of a relatively hermetic inferential interpretation of the region, one according to which empirical information was assimilated and reoriented. The need of the state managers of the new frontier to expand their preeminence in foreign affairs, both at home and abroad, drove the policy. These needs also governed the choice of policy instruments utilized in South Vietnam. The quality of political change engendered by these policies was both constrained and ephemeral. On the one hand, political conditions in South East Asia were manipulated in accordance with the needs of US grand strategy. At the same time, domestic reforms in South Vietnam were hostage to the narrow misunderstandings of culture and context endemic to the new frontier.

In essence, the necessities of policy -- US policy -- defined the minima of the political and social setting within which contingent goals were perceived. In this sense, the implementation of measures in defence against a threat defined within the governing consensus, crucially differentiates itself from theoretical actions directed against **unambiguous** material threats within the external setting. As was argued elsewhere in this study, there are no unmediated perceptions or communications of threat within the global political setting; such an assertion simply is not tenable within a conceptually sophisticated analysis of global politics. In the analysis of political outcomes in the global system, it is apparent that conceptual frameworks are the essential 'objects' of study. Clashes and differences among these inferential structures can be evaluated as a means of assessing political stability in regions, in bilateral relationships and throughout the global political system. In this way, social and political change throughout the world can be understood according to its essential human sources; and, the global political setting rendered more vulnerable to analysis and remediation.

APPENDIX: THE COLEGROVE CRITIQUE AND US POLICY

The factors that influence policy formation are political, and economic, and international and domestic. As the discussion in chapters one and two indicates, domestic political factors are pivotal determinants of both the substance and the broad orientation of foreign policy.

The conceptual framework leads us to expect significant domestic influence forces in foreign policy innovation. That influence, however, is limited in scope -- and constrained by the other competing issues present on both the dominant and critical policy agendas. As chapters two and three argued, opposition political and social forces were preoccupied with other issues and only intermittently offered critiques of state manager behaviour in Vietnam policy. The political debate on South East Asia was limited to debates within the governing consensus concerning the efficiency policy instruments. The next section relates an example of this line of criticism, involving a journalist and US assistance programs in South Vietnam. The case indicates the constraints on information gathering which questioned the prevailing orthodoxy on containment.

The Colegrove hearings of 1959 placed Vietnam closer to the centre of the foreign policy agenda than had been previously the case. Albert Colegrove, a newspaper reporter, authored a series of articles between July 21-26, 1959. These articles were extremely critical of the administration of US assistance in South Vietnam. The specific critique offered by Colegrove is important, and is discussed in more detail below. For the purposes of this study, however, primary emphasis is placed upon the response to the charges by both the Administration and the Congress.

Albert Colegrove was concerned with a programme called the Commodity Import Program (CIP). He also wrote about financial assistance to the South Vietnamese government on a broader basis. In outline, this program utilized cash grants to the Vietnamese government, which were then used to purchase goods (capital and otherwise) which were sold to Vietnamese importers. The income from these activities was itself to be used to maintain a "counterpart fund", that would be disbursed by both countries for budgetary purposes (Gibbons 1986a: 315).

Colegrove's critique centered upon apparent corruption within the Vietnamese government in the disbursement phase of the CIP. In particular, Colegrove held that neglect by the Administration in Washington was causal in the malfeasance taking hold within the program. In Colegrove's words:

Following a reckless, foolish, made-in-Washington policy of non-interference, we've forked over bundles of American cash to the fledgling, inexperienced Vietnam Government, and then looked piously at the ceiling while the money melted away. Thanks to our hands off attitude, we've done little to guide Vietnam toward the day when she can support herself. This country has a terrible financial problem. Our solution has been to put her on the dole. She may be there for 10 years, 25 years - or forever (Albert Colegrove, from articles in the Scripps-Howard newspapers published between July 21-26, 1959. Cited in Gibbons, 1986a: 322).

Colegrove went further, and asserted that US officials on the scene were actively prevented by their superiors from voicing criticism of the program. As one US official was quoted as saying, "If you start criticizing the status quo, even mildly, you're gently

warned your boss may consider you a troublemaker, and might so state when he writes up your next efficiency report. this could foul up your career permanently".

The Colegrove critique went into some detail concerning the administration of aid to South Vietnam. Most importantly, however, Colegrove asserted that US assistance created negative incentives for Vietnamese officials to reform their own government.

This meant that their dependence on the US was likely to increase:

Who wants to climb on the soapbox when he's permitted a 2 hour mid-day siesta, is chauffeured to and from work in a Government car - and gets up to \$ 319 a month in so-called hardship pay for his dauntless willingness to ensure the tensions and vicissitudes of a city that's properly known as the Paris of the Orient ? (Gibbons 1986a: 323)

While these remarks refer to the activities of American officials in Saigon, the implication is clear. The programs meant to assist the Vietnamese develop a successful and self-reliant society contained parallel elements - which might militate against the implementation of these policies.

These charges elicited a vocal and pointed response from both Houses of Congress and the Administration. The pace and intensity of state actions are illustrative of the delegitimation of opposition views theorized in chapters one and two. This example also further reinforces the notion that the peace activists of the period, even had they chosen to voice criticism of policy in South Vietnam, would have faced a vocal and harsh response from the chief articulators of the governing consensus - the state managers of the executive and legislative branches.

Key sub-committees of both Houses of Congress launched hearings into Colegrove's accusations. These hearings, held in both open and executive session, illustrate the power of media coverage to alter the domestic context of the foreign policy agenda. The limitations on that impact are similarly instructive as to the strength of the governing consensus.

Congressional oversight of administration programs in foreign assistance suffered from a number of weaknesses. The lack of sufficient staff resources limited severely the ability of congressional committees to oversee closely the administration of legislated foreign assistance programs.⁹⁷ In turn, a large degree of latitude was enjoyed by the executive in foreign policy. Agreement on the basic outlines of policy -- Containment -- removed a whole set of questions from the political agenda. It also placed the onus upon the Congress to allow the Administration to take those actions necessary to maintain the peace -- on a both covert and overt basis. Such, at least, were the perceived necessities of foreign policy in 1959.

The Colegrove hearings began in July of 1959. A similar set of investigative actions were under way at the same time by the Senate Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations. This committee held hearings in Saigon and cooperated with, while deferring in competence to, the full Foreign Relations Committee. The House Foreign Affairs

⁹⁷This fact created a pattern of congressional oversight known as "fire alarm oversight". In this situation, public opinion and interest group activity were catalysts for legislative investigations. See McCubbins and Schwartz 1984.

Committee was less activist in its investigation, and according to William Gibbons, did not "conduct a very critical examination of the allegations" (Gibbons 1986a: 325).

The US Senate was thus the major agent in this episode. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee during this period was chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright, later an important critic of US policy during the Vietnam war. Fulbright's early uncertainty as to how to proceed on the Colegrove accusations illustrates the significance of executive prerogatives in foreign policy. For the committee, and for Fulbright in particular, there was a desire to insulate the wider US policy towards Vietnam from any negative impact that might derive from revelations during a congressional investigation. In this vein, the Foreign Relations Committee chief of staff of the time Carl Marcy recommended that "it would concentrate on larger foreign policy matters, leaving to [the] Government Operations [committee] and the Comptroller General (GAO) this administrative detail" (Gibbons 1986a: 324).

The significance of "administrative detail" to the actual achievement of policy aims was seen as problematic, but only because of possible spillover effects from domestic controversy. This further illustrates the cognizance of participants in the policy process that domestically driven issues could impact the latitude that foreign policy makers enjoy. In any event, Senator Fulbright chose to launch a full set of hearings into the accusations. The relative inactivity of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in this regard probably militated in favour of a Senate investigation - because of fear that media criticism would ensue if the Colegrove charges went unanswered.

Substantive issues also entered into the decision to hold full committee hearings. US Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield seems to have concluded that there were real problems with the foreign aid program to South Vietnam. He was not alone in this awareness, as prior congressional opinion illustrated.⁹⁸ At any event, the investigation was divided into two phases, the first of which took place in July Washington, DC. The second set of hearings, launched by the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, were to be held in Vietnam.

During the first round of hearings Colegrove was denounced repeatedly by witnesses who accused his series of "serving the communist cause". Elbridge Durbrow, then US Ambassador in Saigon flew back to Washington in order to take part in the hearings. His testimony criticized the coverage as harmful to US security:

The series of articles have not only given a most erroneous picture of our efforts there, but, what in my estimation is worse, they have done an inestimable amount of harm to American prestige in southeast Asia and to the prestige of Vietnam....only Communist imperialists would benefit from this series (Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, July 27, August 3, 11, 14, 1959, 86th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1959. p. 34).

⁹⁸In both 1957 and 1958, key Senate figures drew the attention of the Administration to the distributional tilt of US assistance to the Diem regime in the direction of military rather than economic and political support. Interestingly, then Senator John F. Kennedy was one of the principals involved in these communications. As William Gibbons notes, "[I]n September 1958, [Senator] Fulbright and seven others (Green, John Sparkman (D/Ala.), Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Kennedy and Langer) sent a letter ' President Eisenhower requesting greater emphasis on economic as opposed to military aid.'" (Gibbons, 1986a: 322). It was into this setting that the Colegrove revelations gained significance.

The tone of the responses in the Congress did not depart radically from Durbrow's remarks. Accusations of "communist propaganda" and "yellow journalism" predominated in responses before the investigating committees (Gibbons 1986a: 326). In spite of these comments, the report of the Subcommittee on the Colegrove accusations turned out to be a rather constructive and reasonable document -- though it was also quite limited in its recommendations. The report criticized the emphasis upon military assistance to the South Vietnamese government. It also praised the apparent successes of the Diem regime in implementing a political and social reform program that was likely to "achieve economic self-sufficiency".

Interestingly, the report concluded that the military assistance package was more effective than the economic program. The CIP was criticized for the exchange rate that was provided between the US dollar and the South Vietnamese currency. It was said to be too low. The Vietnamese budget was said, however, to be wholly too dependent upon disbursements from the CIP and other assistance programs for its fiscal stability. In the report's words, "The continued derivation of a large part of the Vietnamese revenues directly or indirectly from grants of aid constitutes a form of dependence on outside rather than indigenous sources which, in the long run, is in the interest neither of the Vietnamese nor this Nation" (Gibbons 1986a: 326). In addition, Mansfield confirmed a number of Colegrove's accusations - including those that focused upon the laxity of budget controls and program administration. In its recommendations the subcommittee report included increased language and cultural sensitivity training for State Department operatives, apparently meant to increase the effectiveness of US assistance.

A general orientation against arms length allocations of aid to recipient states was recommended. Perhaps it was thought that the exposure of foreign policy to domestic-style bureaucratic and managerial controls would render unnecessary further encroachments into executive prerogatives by the Congress. The committee's findings did not set in progress a more thoroughgoing investigation into the shortcomings of US policy. Rather, as William Gibbons notes, they may have distracted attention from what may have been truly necessary -- a thorough reevaluation of policy fundamentals.

Where Gibbons' narrative falls short is in its apparent expectation that the discovery of malfeasance on the part of both Vietnamese and US officials would inevitably foreclose, or replace, the likelihood of a congressionally driven critique of the Containment vision. Instead, other factors militated against an effective critique deriving from within the US government. Consistent with the conceptual framework, more radical critiques of extant policy were unlikely to receive a fair hearing. The treatment that the Colegrove articles received was not a departure from the normal treatment of such views.

In addition, the relatively small-scale of congressional staffs during this period crucially colored the type of investigation that was launched by the committees concerned. Large scale investigative units were unknown to the legislative branch at this point. It is clear that the holding of hearings, and the sending of a single investigator, to Saigon stretched the resource of even the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to its limits.

In this sense, the crucial prerogatives of the executive -- in terms of personnel, depth of coverage of issues, and the overriding broad agreement on overall objectives --

constrained the emergence of contrary perspectives from within the state. Criticism from outside of official was vulnerable to similar barriers, in addition to the traditional distrust of accusations perceived to derive from the political left.

In this example, a problem in the international environment, a foreign assistance program in Vietnam, was the subject of domestic political controversy. Congressional unease with the controllability of outcomes in South East Asia was muted during this early period due to the prevailing consensus on the necessity of US involvement in containing perceived communist aggression. At the same time, however, a relatively high profile external portrayal of events deriving from the print media was able to engender a spirited response within the legislative branch of the state.

The resulting hearings reveal another aspect of the state's response to policy criticism. The Colegrove critique was confined to shortcomings in the implementation of the Commodity Import Program. The wider implications of that critique, that US assistance was eroding the incentives for the Diem regime to proceed with genuine reform, should have led to a more thoroughgoing investigation of American involvement. The Mansfield Sub-committee's report in this case did corroborate many of Colgrove's accusations, and a related commentary did posit the feasibility that the military assistance portion of the program could be wound down over the medium term, once the economic self-reliance was achieved (Gibbons 1986a: 326). The crucial contradiction -- that the budgetary dependence of the South Vietnamese government upon disbursements from the CIP and other programs was increasing -- was not missed by the subcommittee report. It was merely reported, and its wider implications ignored.

What is one to conclude from this example ? Were the times merely inopportune for a reorientation in policy ? Were the factors pointed out in the articles so trivial as to be undeserving of a response ? Or, was the trajectory of events in South East Asia so much in flux that the ramifications of South Vietnamese dependence were still uncertain ?

The Administration response to Colegrove clearly illustrates the perceived illegitimacy of arguing a position that was seen as aiding communist expansion. As Elbridge Durbrow remarked, the Administration was unwilling to consider criticism that even implied that the bases of US policy in South East Asia might need rethinking. The mild nature of the Colegrove critique, focused upon the implementation of policy, rather than upon its ends. At the same time, however, the more radical critique that could have derived from the Colegrove explication did not appear.

The danger of communist expansion was uppermost in the minds of even the most critical congressional leaders. Similarly, the Administration was simply unwilling to consider what it viewed as congressional interference in the foreign policy prerogatives of the executive.⁹⁹ As such, both institutional and political/ideological constraints helped to

⁹⁹A series of events close in time to those under study were those taking place in the Middle East in 1957. Both Houses of Congress approved a joint resolution on the Middle East by a 20-8 vote in the joint committee. The debate surrounding this resolution proceeded for some days, with the discussions focusing on the exact limits of the president's right to involve US forces in conflict without prior or coincident congressional approval. Key congressional leaders, most prominent among them Senator Mike Mansfield, argued for a relatively unfettered right for the president's use of the armed forces - where in his judgement the security interests of the US were at risk. In approving the resolution as finally drafted, the Congress was solidifying the prior rejection of legislative limitations upon the president's prerogatives in this regard. Interestingly, many of these limits resemble the War Powers' Act passed over a presidential veto over a decade later. In particular, this resolution remained mute on the issue of congressional authorization of presidential actions. Instead, it "strongly

prevent a departure in policy ensuing from a minimalist critique of the US stance toward South East Asia.

support[ed] the policy announced by the president of using armed force if necessary..." [Gibbons, 1986a: 348] Historically, the refusal of the Congress to confront the president led to a sequence of controversies and misunderstandings in the next decade - especially when one considers the exact status of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - whose historical antecedents include the Middle East Resolution and a number of others.

REFERENCES

- Allison, Graham T., Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1985. Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War New York: W.W. Norton.
- Allyn, Bruce J., James G. Blight and David A. Welch. 1989. "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis", International Security 14, 3. pp. 136-162.
- Ambrose, Stephen. 1985. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 [Fourth Edition, Revised] New York: Penguin Books.
- Argyris, Chris and Donald Schon. 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Aronson, James. 1990. [Revised and Expanded Edition] The Press and the Cold War New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Art, Robert and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.). 1983. The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
- Ashley, Richard K. 1981. "Political Realism and Human Interests." International Studies Quarterly 25. pp. 204-236.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation New York: Basic Books.
- Baritz, Loren. 1985. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did New York: Morrow.
- Barnet, Richard. 1981. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade New York: Touchstone.
- Barnet, Richard. 1972. The Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind US Foreign Policy New York: Penguin Books.
- Barnet, Richard. 1968. Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World New York: World.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1993. Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post Marxist Madison Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Benjamin, Roger and Raymond Duvall. 1985. "The Capitalist State In Context." in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds.) The Democratic State Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of America. pp. 19-57.

Bernstein, Richard J. 1985. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Beschloss, Michael R. 1991. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-63, New York: Edward Burlingame.

Blaufarb, Douglas. 1977. The Counterinsurgency Era New York: The Free Press.

Blechman, Barry and Stephen Kaplan. 1978. Force Without War Washington, DC: Brookings.

Booth, Ken. 1979. Strategy and EthnoCentrism London: Croom Helm

Borawski, John [ed.]. 1986. Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence Building Measures for Crisis Stability Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Brams, Stephen J. 1985. Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory To Superpower Conflict New Haven and London: Yale University.

Brodie, Bernard. 1984. "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-21.

Brown, Seyom. 1987. The Causes and Prevention of War New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bryant, Christopher G.A. and David Jary. 1991. Giddens' Theory of Structuration: A Critical Appreciation London and New York: Routledge.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics London: Macmillan.

Buzan, Barry. 1984. "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case." International Organization 38, 4. pp. 597-624.

Caporaso, James A. 1988. "Introduction to a Special Issue On the State In Comparative and International Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 21, 1. (April), pp. 3-12.

Charlton, Michael and Anthony Moncrieff. 1989. Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam New York: Hill and Wang.

Chomsky, Noam. 1993. Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and US Political Culture Boston, MA: South End Press.

Chomsky, Noam. 1979. After the Cataclysm: Post War IndoChina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology Montreal: Black Rose.

Chomsky, Noam. 1970. At War with Asia New York: Pantheon.

Cleveland, Harlan M. 1966. The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Policy New York: Harper.

Cottam, Martha L. 1986. Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Cox, Robert W. 1987. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History New York: Columbia University Press.

Cox, Robert W. 1989. "Middlepowermanship. Japan and Future World Order," International Journal vol. XLIV, no. 4, pp. 823-862.

DeBenedetti, Charles with Charles Chatfield. 1990. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.

Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1962

Downs, George and David Rocke. 1987. "Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control." World Politics 39, 3, pp. 297-325.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Randolph W. Siverson. 1986. "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Kenneth Oye (ed), Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 118-146.

Easton, David. 1981. "The Political System Besieged By the State," Political Theory 9, 3, pp. 303-325.

Eisenhower, Dwight. 1965. Waging Peace, 1956-61 Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Elster, Jon. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order New York: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, Jon. 1984. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality London: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, Peter, Dietrich Reuschmeyer and Theda Skocpol. 1985. Bringing the State Back In London and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fagen, Richard R. 1986. "The Logics of Hegemony: The United States as a Superpower in Central America," in Jan F. Triska (ed.) Dominant Powers and Subordinate States, pp. 218-238.

Fann, K.T. and Donald Hodges (eds.). 1971. Readings in US Imperialism Boston: Porter Sargent.

Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach "The State As An Obstacle to International Theory." Unpublished Manuscript. Prepared for the XIII International Congress of the International Political Science Association. Paris, France, July 16, 1985.

Fitzgerald, Frances. 1972. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans In Vietnam Boston: Little, Brown.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54. Vol. XIII. 1956. Washington DC: USGPO

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1987. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War New York: Oxford University Press.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security 12, 1. pp. 3-21.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1972. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War New York and London: Columbia University Press.

Garthoff, Raymond L. 1985. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan Washington, DC.: Brookings.

Garrett, Stephen A. 1978. Ideals and Reality: An Analysis of the debate over Vietnam. Washington, DC.: University Press of America.

Gelb, Leslie H. and Richard K. Betts. 1979. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked Washington, DC.: Brookings.

George, Alexander L. 1980. " Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in Ole Holsti et al., (eds.) Change In The International System Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, pp. 233-262.

George, Alexander L. and Timothy McKeown. 1985. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." in Advances in Information Processing Vol. 2, Greenwich, Connecticut.: JAI Press.

George, Alexander L. et al. 1982. Managing the US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (Eds.). 1988. US-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures and Lessons New York: Oxford University Press.

Gibbons, William Conrad. 1989. The US Government and the Vietnam War: Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part III January-July 1965 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Gibbons, William Conrad. 1986a. The US Government and the Vietnam War: Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part I 1945-60, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Gibbons, William Conrad. 1986b. The US Government and the Vietnam War: Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II 1961-64, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." International Organization 32, 4, pp. 881-911.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The International System and Regime Formation: A Critical Review of Anderson and Wallerstein." Comparative Politics

Gowa, Joanne. 1983. Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Gowa, Joanne. 1986 "Anarchy, Egoism and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization 40, 1. pp. 137-186.

Gray, Colin. 1986. Nuclear Strategy and National Style Boston: Hamilton Press.

Grover, William F. 1989. The President as Prisoner: A Structural Critique of the Carter and Reagan Years Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.

Grunberg, Isabelle. 1990. "Exploring the 'myth' of Hegemonic Stability." International Organization 44, 4. pp. 431-477.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1988. "War, Revolution and the Growth of the Coercive State." Comparative Political Studies 21, 1. pp. 45-65.

Haas, Ernst. 1980. "Why collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes." World Politics 32.

Halberstam, David. 1964. The Making of a Quagmire: American and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era (Revised Edition) New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Halberstam, David. 1972. The Best and the Brightest New York: Random House.

Hatcher, Patrick Lloyd. 1990. The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. 1988. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon.

Hershberg, James G. 1990. "Before 'The Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba ?" Diplomatic History 14, 2. pp. 163-198.

Hilsman, Roger. 1967. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Kennedy Administration Garden City, NY.: Doubleday.

Hoffman, Mark. 1991. "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," Millennium, 20, 2, pp. 169-185.

Hoffmann, Stanley. 1986. Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory of International Relations Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Hoffmann, Stanley. 1980. Primacy or World Order New York: McGraw-Hill.

Holsti, Ole R., Randolph Siverson and Alexander George (eds.). 1980. Change in the International System Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Hughes, Barry. 1978. The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.

Hunt, Michael H. 1987. Ideology and US Foreign Policy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1987. "Coping with the Lippman Gap." Foreign Affairs 66, 3. pp. 453-477.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press.

Ikenberry, G. John. 1988. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Ikenberry, G. John, David Lake and Michael Mastunduno (eds), 1986. The State and American Foreign Economic Policy Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Ikenberry, G. John. 1986. "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to US Foreign Economic Policy," in Ikenberry, Lake and Mastunduno (eds), The State and American Foreign Economic Policy pp. 219-243.

Ikenberry, G. John. 1986. "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment." World Politics 39, pp. 53-77.

International Journal: Managing Conflict 1985. Vol. XI, No. 4. CIIA. Toronto.

Jacobsen, Carl G. (ed.). 1987. The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies and Mind Sets. London: SIPRI and Oxford University Press.

Jamgotch, Nish (ed.) Sectors of Mutual Benefit in US-Soviet Relations Duke University Press.

Janis, Irving. 1972. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Jervis, Robert. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Politics Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Karnow, Stanley. 1983. Vietnam: A History New York: Viking Press.

Katzenstein, Peter (ed.). 1978. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Keohane, Robert and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1987. "Power and Interdependence Revisited." International Organization 41, 4.

Keohane, Robert. (ed.) 1986. NeoRealism and Its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations." International Organization 40, 1. pp. 1-27.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kerry, Richard J. 1990. The Star-Spangled Mirror: America's Image of Itself and the World Savage, Md.: Rowman.

Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kimball, Jeffrey P. 1990. To Reason Why: The Debate about the Causes of US Involvement in the Vietnam War Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Komer, Robert. 1986. Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1979. Defending the National Interest Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 21, 1. pp. 66-94.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1984. "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics." Comparative Politics 16, 2. pp. 223-246.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. International Regimes Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State." International Organization 40, 4. pp. 753-775.

Kuchan, Charles A. 1988. "Nato and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behaviour." International Organization 42, 2. pp. 317-346.

Kuper, Adam and Jessica Kuper. 1985. The Social Science Encyclopedia London and New York: Routledge.

Lafeber, Walter (eds.) 1985. America in Vietnam: A Documentary History London and New York: W.W. Norton.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1985. "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty." International Organization 41, 1. pp. 27-48.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1985. Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Lauren, Paul G. 1979. Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy New York: The Free Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned, Janice Gross Stein and David S. Cohen. 1988. "Afghanistan as Inkblot: Assessing Cognitive and Motivational Explanations of Foreign Policy." Unpublished Manuscript. February.

Lebow, Richard Ned and Ariel Levite. 1988. "Preventing Accidental War in the Middle East." Unpublished Manuscript. February.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1987. Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Lipson, Charles. 1984. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs." World Politics 37. pp. 1-23.

Luttwak, Edward N. 1987. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press.

Magdoff, Harry. 1969. The Age of Imperialism New York: Monthly Review Press.

Mandelbaum, Michael. 1988. The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries New York: Cambridge University Press.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: The Free Press.

Matthews, Robert O., Arthur G. Rubinoff and Janice Gross Stein. 1983. International Conflict and Conflict Management Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall.

Melanson, Richard A. 1983. Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam and Revisionism. Volume VI Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.

Miliband, Ralph. 1971. The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power London and Melbourne: Quartet.

Millet, Allan R., Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman. 1986. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." International Security 11, 1. pp. 37-71.

Mills, Walter. 1965. War and Revolution Today, with Special Reference to Vietnam Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Montague, Kayne. 1983. The Kennedy Crises, the Press, the Presidency and Foreign Policy Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1977. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th Edition, Revised) New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1946. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mottola, Kari (ed.). 1986. Ten Years After Helsinki: The Making of the European Security Regime Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Murray, Douglas J. and Paul Viotti. 1978. The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study

Neufeld, Mark. 1993. "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory," Millennium 22, 1. pp. 53-76.

Neustadt, Richard and Ernest May. 1986. Thinking In Time New York: Free Press.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1981. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. 1988. "NeoRealism and NeoLiberalism." World Politics XL, 2.

Nye, Joseph and Sean M. Lynn Jones. 1988. "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field." International Security 12, 4. pp. 5-27.

Nye, Joseph S. 1988. "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes." Manuscript. January.

O'Connor, James. 1971. "The Meaning of Economic Imperialism," in K.T. Fann and David Hodges (eds.) Readings in US Imperialism Boston: Porter Sargent.

Operation Zapata: The "Ultra-Sensitive" Report and the Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs 1981. Frederick, Md.: University Press of America.

Olson, William C. and A.J.R. Groom. 1991. International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation, London: Harper Collins.

Oye, Kenneth (ed.). 1986. Cooperation Under Anarchy Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Panitch, Leo (ed.). 1977. The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Paterson, Thomas G. (ed.) 1989. Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-63 New York: Oxford University Press.

- Paterson, Thomas G. 1988. Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pilat, Joseph F., Robert E. Pendley and Charles K. Ebinger. 1985. Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.
- Porter, Gareth. 1979. Vietnam: A History in Documents New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises.
- Powell, Charles A., James W. Dyson and Helen E. Purkitt. 1987. "Opening the 'Black Box': Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision-Making." in Charles F. Herman, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James Rosenau (eds.) New Directions In the Study of Foreign Policy Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.) 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago; University of Chicago Press.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World New York: Basic Books.
- Rosenau, James N. 1985. "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics." International Organization 39, 4. pp. 849-894.
- Rosenau, James N. 1988. "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics." Comparative Political Studies 21, 1. pp. 13-44.
- Rourke, John. 1983. Congress and the Presidency in US Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Interaction and Influence Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.
- Rubin, Barry. 1985. Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over US Foreign Policy New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rupert, Mark Edward. 1990. "Producing Hegemony: State/Society Relations and the Politics of Productivity in the United States." International Studies Quarterly 34, 4. pp. 427-456.
- Russett, Bruce (ed.). 1988. "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead." International Organization 39, 2. pp. 207-231.
- Schandler, Herbert Y. 1977. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1966. Arms and Influence New York: Yale University Press.

- Schelling, Thomas. 1960. Strategy of Conflict New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. 1964. A Thousand Days Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Shawcross, William. 1972. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Pocket Books.
- Sheehan, Neil and Hedrick Smith. 1971. The Pentagon Papers, as Published by the New York Times. New York: Quadrangle Books.
- Sherr, Alan B. 1988. The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Simon, Herbert. 1981. "The Architecture of Complexity>" in H. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (2nd Ed.) Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. pp. 193-229.
- Sjolander, Claire Turenne and Wayne S. Cox (Eds.). 1994. Beyond the Third Debate: New Directions in the Study of International Relations Theory Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In, pp. 3-37.
- Skocpol, Theda. (ed.) 1984. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Michael Joseph. 1986. Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Smith, Roger K. 1988. "The Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory." International Organization 41, 2. pp. 137-186.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1986. "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," in Kenneth Oye, (ed.) Cooperation Under Anarchy. pp. 25-57.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." International Organization 39, 4. pp. 579-614.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes." American Political Science Review (79).

Snyder, Glenn and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 1991. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 1984. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 1982. "Perception of the Security Dilemma in 1914." Manuscript. November 1982.

Snyder, Richard C., H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. 1962. Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Relations New York: Free Press.

Sorenson, Theodore C. 1966. Kennedy New York: Bantam Books.

Sperber, Irwin. 1990. Fashions in Science: Opinion Leaders and Collective Behaviour in the Social Sciences Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Stein, Arthur. 1990. Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Stein, Arthur. 1980. The Nation at War Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stein, Janice (ed.). 1989. Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Steinbruner, John D. 1989. Restructuring American Foreign Policy Washington, DC.

Steinmo, Sven., Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds) 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis New York: Cambridge University Press.

Strange, Susan. 1987. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." International Organization 41, 4.

Talbott, Strobe. 1989. The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace New York: Vintage Books.

Taylor, Maxwell. 1972. Swords into Ploughshares New York: W.W. Norton.

Tetreault, Mary Ann. 1988. "Regimes and World Orders." Alternatives XIII. pp. 5-26.

The Pentagon Papers. (DoD) Edition. alternate title. "United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67." 1971. [12 volumes]. Washington DC: USGPO.

The Pentagon Papers. (Senator Gravel Edition) 1971. Vols. 1 and 2. Boston: Beacon Press.

Thompson, E.P. 1982. Beyond the Cold War: A New Approach to the Arms Race and Nuclear Annihilation New York: Pantheon Books.

Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992 Cambridge, MA.: Blackwell.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and StateMaking as Organized Crime." in Peter Evans et al., (eds.) Bringing the State Back In, pp. 169-191.

Tilly, Charles. 1985b. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Triska, Jan F. (ed.). 1986. Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Vasquez, John A. 1985. "Domestic Contention on Critical Foreign Policy Issues: The Case of the United States." International Organization 39, 4. pp. 643-666.

Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism New York: Macmillan.

Walker, R.B.J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory New York; Cambridge University Press.

Walker, R.B.J. 1989. "History and Structure in International Relations," Millennium, 18, 2, pp. 163-181.

Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Weir, Margaret. 1992. "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation," in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (eds) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, pp. 188-216.

Wight, Martin 1978. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (eds) Power Politics New York: Holmes and Meier.

Wyatt, Clarence R. 1993. Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War New York: W.W. Norton.

Young, Oran. 1986. "International Regimes: Toward A New Theory of Institutions." World Politics 39, 1. pp. 104-122.

Meeting Notes File, Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Austin, Texas.

Material from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, January 30, 1961, John F. Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 193.

Durbrow to Rusk, April 12, 1961, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 193.

"A Program of Action," Durbrow to Rusk, March 11, 1961, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 193.

Rusk to Nolting, October 2, 1961, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 194.

Anspacher to USIA, October 27, 1961, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 194.

Takashi Oka to Joseph G. Harrison, November 2, 1961, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 194.

Felt to Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 29, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 196.

Ball to Rusk, March 26, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 196.

Sylvester to CINCSTRIKE et al., March 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 196.

Harriman to Nolting, April 4, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 196.

L.D. Battle to M. Bundy, April 18, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 202.

Ball to Nolting, March 23, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 196.

Nolting to Rusk, November 16, 1961, National Security File, box 195.

Nolting to Rusk, November 13, 1961, National Security File, box 195.

Sylvester to M. Bundy, April 7, 1962, President's Office File, box 128A.

Rusk to Nolting, November 24, 1961, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 195.

Tregaskis to Salinger, January 4, 1963, Kennedy Papers, White House Central File, box 74.

Felt to Sylvester, November 26, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Joint Chiefs to Kennedy, January 3, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Harkins to Dodge, January 3, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Report of Visit by Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 20-31, 1963 (no clear date), Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Felt to Rusk, January 11, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Felt to Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, boxes 198-99.

Memorandum of Conversation, White House Meetings, August 26, 1963, Roger Hilsman Papers, box 4.

Ball to (Charge d'affaires) Truehart, July 7, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, boxes 198-99.

Memorandum for the Record, March 19, 1962, Roger Hilsman Papers, box 3.

Mecklin to Nolting, November 27, 1962, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 200.

Kennedy to Harkins and Nolting, May 3, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Bail to Nolting, May 21, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 197.

Bail to Lodge, August 21, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, boxes 198-199.

Trueheart to Rusk, August 21, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, boxes 198-99.

Lodge to Rusk, October 5, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 200.

NSF Country File, Vietnam, General, Cable 1006

Lodge to Rusk, October 11, 1963, Kennedy Papers, National Security File, box 200.

NSF Country File, Vietnam, "The Vietnamese and South East Asia Situation".

NSF Country File, Vietnam, Washington to Saigon 698, November 28, 1961

NSF Country File, Vietnam, Washington to Saigon 1219, June 14, 1963

NSF Presidential Meetings File, CAP 63465.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Session, unpublished transcript, February 27, 1962.

"The Dawning Peace", Christian Century, 72, (11 May 1955).

END

2 6 - 0 5 - 9 5

FIN