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THE IMPACT OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS ON
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

By

Kari MacKillop, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Institute of European and Russian Studies

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Ottawa, Ontario
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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Kari MacKillop, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

This thesis will examine the question of how Russian foreign policy was affected by the Kosovo Crisis. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy was pro-Western in nature. It focused on integration into Western economic and political structure. This policy line, however, began to shift in 1993 and by 1996 Russian foreign policy was more independent, less pro-Western. In 1999, during the Kosovo crisis, Russia was adamantly opposed to NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. This was a period of tension between Russia and the West. After the crisis was over, elements of distrust and feelings of insecurity remained. Russian foreign policy documents and statements after the crisis reflect the perceived threat presented by both NATO and the US. Relations between Russia and the West remain stressed, but efforts are being made to rebuild these relations. The Kosovo crisis served to solidify an already existing move away from the West in Russian foreign policy.

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Introduction

The crisis in Kosovo and the bombing campaign by NATO were a source of major disagreement between NATO and Russia. The NATO statement on Kosovo, put out at the Washington Summit in April of 1999, provided a clear statement of the alliance's objectives. NATO claimed to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries in the region and believed that the situation in Kosovo was affecting the stability of the area. The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was violating international law by disrespecting civil and human rights.¹ NATO was well aware that not everyone would agree with their view of the situation, but felt that countries such as Russia and China were offering no solutions, only opposition.² Perhaps this is why they did not wait for UN permission to intervene.

In his speech on the 25 of March, the morning after the bombing began, Russian President Boris Yeltsin branded the bombing campaign "undisguised aggression". He saw it as a violation of the NATO Treaty, the UN Charter, the

¹NATO, "Statement on Kosovo," NATO Review n1 Spring (1999), p. 21.

²Daalder, I.H. & E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," Foreign Policy n116 Fall (1999), p. 135.

NATO-Russian Founding Act and several international laws. The Russian government immediately called off a scheduled visit to the US by Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, recalled the Russian representatives to NATO, suspended the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and postponed all other talks with NATO. In Moscow there were attacks on the US Embassy and German Consulate by demonstrators. Primakov's response to these attacks was that there was nothing wrong with demonstrations as long as they remained lawful.³ Meanwhile, the State Duma had put out a statement saying that it fully supported the actions of the President.⁴

US relations with Russia hit an all-time low for the post-Cold War period.⁵ Yeltsin stated in one of his speeches that Russia would have to rethink its relations with NATO since it had violated the basic principles of international relations.⁶ Russia felt that the bombing had broken the Founding Act, the UN Charter and the NATO

³Paukov, V. & Raskin, A., "US Embassy in Moscow Bombarded-The Weapons Were Eggs and Bottles of Ink," Vremia MN March 26 1999, pp. 1-2. Translated in "NATO strikes Serbia, Russia is Outraged," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press(CDPSP) v51 n12 April 21 1999, pp. 1-6.
⁴Kamyshev, D., "Duma Won't Go to War With NATO-Yet," Kommersant March 30 1999, p. 2. Translated in "Russian Officials, Public Respond to NATO Attacks," The CDPSP v51 n13 April 28 1999, pp. 6-12.
⁵Layne, C., Blunder in the Balkans: The Clinton Administration's Bungled War Against Serbia. (May 20 1999). <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-345es.html>
⁶Kremlin, "Rossiia s etim nikogda ne soglasitsia, zaiavliaet Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Rossiiskaia Gazeta 26 March 1999, p. 2.

Charter. This resulted in a loss of trust; Russia felt that NATO had acted illegally.

Despite severe differences, Russia was not irreconcilably separated from the West. Eventually Russia and NATO were able to cooperate in finding a feasible solution, which was accepted by everyone involved.

Hypothesis

This paper will argue that the events in Kosovo solidified an already existing desire for a Russian foreign policy that was independent from the West. Before the Kosovo crisis began, the move away from a pro-Western policy was already underway. The Kosovo crisis only served to strengthen the desire for an independent policy and solidify the formation of a policy based on multipolarity and Russia's national interests.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy embarked on a pro-Western path. However, in 1993-4 dissatisfaction with this foreign policy was growing and a shift began. The shift was completed when Evgenii Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister in 1996. Primakov's foreign policy was one of a self-reliant Russia, friendly with everyone, but aligned with no one.

Primakov thought that by diversifying Russia's foreign relations to include many different partners it could avoid dependence on anyone (the West in particular) and gain leverage in its relations with both the West and its other partners.⁷ This idea is still visible in Russia's foreign policy today.

The Russian government was strongly opposed to the NATO bombing of Serbia, for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter Two. While Russia had eventually been drawn into the peace process, the feeling that Russia had been overlooked still existed. Despite Russia's veto power in the UN and its supposed great power status, it was unable to stop the bombing. This crisis made it clear that NATO had taken Russia for granted and that Russia found this unacceptable. Russia's actions during this crisis transformed the Primakov Doctrine⁸ into reality. Had NATO taken the time to come to an agreement with Russia before bombing, perhaps the crisis could have been avoided. Instead, this crisis underlined the need for a more independent and stronger Russian foreign policy.

⁷ Pushkov, A., "The Primakov Doctrine and the New European Order," International Affairs v44 n2 (1998), pp. 12-13.

⁸ The Primakov Doctrine is based on the policies of Evgenii Primakov during his time as Russian Foreign Minister. It is based on the idea of gaining leverage in Russia's relations with the West. By interacting with everyone while not becoming too close to anyone, Russia can gain more independence in its foreign policy. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 1.

Shortly after the crisis, tension levels remained high. Russia would not consider Western pleas to stop the campaign in Chechnya. Shortly after the US demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, Yeltsin made a shocking speech in Beijing, reminding the world, and the US in particular, that Russia was still a nuclear power. This strong line continued even after Yeltsin resigned. Putin's national security doctrine also underlined the nuclear strength of Russia and the threats presented by NATO and the US. While these may just be scattered incidents, it is important to determine whether or not they are indications of a stronger Russian foreign policy.

It will be demonstrated that the events of the Kosovo crisis solidified the already existing desire for a more independent (less pro-Western) foreign policy in Russia. This has since been translated into a stronger policy towards the West, which has been represented by the above-mentioned incidents, among other things.

Methodology

The assumptions held by the author in this paper are basically in line with the Realist theory of international relations. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson best laid

out the basic principles of Realism in the book "Politics Among Nations". The first principle is that laws of human nature, which remain fairly stable over time, are at the root of politics. This also means that these laws are applicable to all states.⁹

The second principle is that all relations between states are based on interests, which in turn are defined in terms of power. All statesmen, therefore, think and act according to power interests. All relations are power relations. The interests themselves may change over time, but power issues will always determine these interests.¹⁰

If we apply these principles, then this assessment will assume that all foreign policy action is a part of power relations between states. These states will always act according to their own national interests, however they are perceived.

In order to assess the issues at hand, a comparative methodology will be used. This will be a case study, which will compare Russian foreign policy before, during and after the Kosovo crisis. Before beginning this comparison a working definition of foreign policy is needed as well as an outline of the theoretical and methodological structure.

⁹Morgenthau, H.J. and Thompson, K.W., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1985) pp. 4-11.

¹⁰Ibid.

Foreign policy as defined by Joseph Frankel "consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others".¹¹ This definition assumes that for each action a decision has been made. Frankel explains that decision-making is defined as making up one's mind after considering alternatives. In foreign policy this decision-making power is held solely by the state, with other factors directly or indirectly influencing the process.

In any given situation there are many factors that may influence foreign policy.¹² When a decision-maker is interpreting the situation, national self-interest is the most important factor. Other criteria, such as international peace, security, or welfare of mankind are also used, but only when they do not conflict or interfere with national interest. A person entrusted with decision-making for a state is governed by that state's interests.¹³ Domestic issues, such as public opinion and bureaucratic politics, may have their influence on a government, but ultimately national interest is the vital factor.

The issue of national self-interest is not, however, a clear one. Both inside and outside of a state, this idea

¹¹Frankel, J., The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making. (Oxford University Press: London, 1963) pp. 1-3.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid, pp. 55-56.

can be highly contested. It is commonly interpreted in several different ways.¹⁴ This can be seen in Russia when looking at the different groups, which each advocate a different foreign policy, but all claim to be looking out for the interests of Russia.¹⁵ Various groups within Russian politics advocate different foreign policy alternatives. The debate is centered on just what Russia's national interests are. All of the groups, which will be outlined below, present a different idea of what Russia's national interests are and how to best protect them. Within Russia, not even the idea of national interest is clear-cut.

Now that a sufficient definition of foreign policy has been provided, the methodological structure can be laid out. In his article, "Meaningful Comparison in the Study of Foreign Policy: A Methodological Discussion of Objectives, Techniques, and Research Designs,"¹⁶ McGowan lays out five steps for foreign policy comparison. These are the same steps that will be used here. The first of these is observation. This is the research phase, which

¹⁴Ibid, p. 56.

¹⁵Arbatov, A., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security v18 n2 Fall (1993), pp. 5-43.

¹⁶McGowan, P., "Meaningful Comparison in the Study of Foreign Policy: A Methodological Discussion of Objectives, Techniques, and Research Designs," In (Ed.) Charles Kegley, Gregory Raymond, Robert Rood, Richard Skinner's, International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy. (University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, South Carolina, 1975) p. 69.

provides the foundation for everything that is to follow. McGowan distinguishes between two different types of research. The first of these is library research, which consists of documents, reports, and aggregated data. The second is field study, which consists of interviews and surveys. The research for this comparison is purely library research. It is based on documents, statements, press releases, newspaper reports, as well as secondary sources.

The second step in McGowan's process is classification. This involves placing the policies to be compared into classes. This step must always precede comparison. The different classes of foreign policy must be "natural" groups, as well as being mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.¹⁷

The groups that will be used in this analysis are taken from the different opinions within contemporary Russian society. These groups and the differences between them are outlined in Arbatov's article, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives" .¹⁸ He argues that there are four main groups, which represent the different policy options for Russia now and in the future. The details of the policies

¹⁷Ibid, pp. 69-70.

¹⁸Arbatov, A., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 9-10.

advocated by these different groups will be further explored in Chapter 1.

The first group is the pro-Western group. The main goal of this group is for Russia to join the West. This means that Russia's national interests lie in integration into the West, and that these interests are in fact the same as those of Western states. For this reason, agreement on foreign policy would only be natural, and integration inevitable.

The second group is the moderate liberals. Advocates of this policy are also Westernizers, but they emphasize the importance of a distinctly Russian foreign policy and security priorities. They see Russia's national interest as tied to the West, but not necessarily identical. The idea of partnership with the West suggests that this policy line would be one of constructive engagement. That is, a foreign policy that would foster closer relations for the benefit of both Russia and the West; this would involve partnership between independent states, not integration of these states. Priority is placed on both the West and the CIS.

The third group is the centrist and moderate conservative group. They want improved relations with the West, but not at the expense of Russia's great power status

and regional influence. Close relations with the CIS states, China and Russia's traditional sphere of influence best serve Russia's national interests. This is a policy that seeks maintenance of the international status quo.

The final group is the neo-communist and nationalist position. The ideology is that of Russian Nationalism, which is a combination of Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism and anti-Westernism. They promote Russia's alliance with any anti-Western powers, especially Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Cuba. This idea, evidently calls for conflictual relations with the West. Russia's interests lie in competition and confrontation with the West.

These groups will be used in analyzing and classifying Russian foreign policy since 1991. The groups not only refer to types of Russian foreign policy, but also to political factions within society. In this analysis they will be used with reference to general policy patterns and not to certain leaders or political movements. They are not to be applied in a strict manner, but rather viewed as a spectrum of policy options from pro-Western to anti-Western. As already mentioned, the foundations of these groups will be discussed in Chapter 1.

The next step in McGowan's method is comparison. Once the policies have been classified it is then possible to

compare them. In this case, Russian foreign policy is being compared over time, so several variables will remain constant. Since this paper is looking at Russia during three different time periods many of the domestic factors remain the same, such as political regime, economic situation, and other internal issues.

The fourth step in the process of meaningful comparison is analysis. This involves assessing the results of the comparison. In this case, the degree of change that occurred in Russian foreign policy between the three time periods will be discussed. In this step the cause of the change or continuity will also be assessed. This section will look at the different factors that influence Russian foreign policy and analyze which of these factors played a role in changing or maintaining continuity. In assessing the influences on Russian foreign policy, five factors will be considered. These factors were originally suggested for analyzing Soviet foreign policy, but Aspaturian claims that they are general enough to be applied to foreign policy in general.

The first group of factors includes motivations, purposes and intentions. Motivations are the unseen factors that push a state to follow a policy. The purpose is the goal that an action is supposed to achieve, and the

intentions are a state's readiness to act in a certain way.¹⁹

The second factor is power or capabilities. When a state's capabilities change, new options open up. As relative power and capabilities grow, new priorities develop and old goals tend to disappear.²⁰

The third factor is risk. This factor may be hard to assess because it is based solely on perceptions, judgment and chance. A leader's ability to take risks depends on the flexibility of the decision-making process, command control, image projection, information security and recovery capabilities. When assessing risk, a leader must consider all of these factors.²¹

The fourth factor, which is closely related to risk, is cost-benefit analysis. This is the process through which it is decided whether or not it is worth taking the risk. The appropriate level of benefits versus costs must be found in each situation. This is one factor that can be calculated before a decision is made.²²

¹⁹Aspaturian, V.V., "A Framework for Analyzing Soviet Foreign Policy," In (Ed.) F.J. Fleron, E.P. Hoffmann, and R.F. Laird's Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy: From Lenin to Brezhnev. (Aldine de Gruyter: New York, 1991) p. 156.

²⁰Ibid, p. 167.

²¹Ibid, pp. 170-173.

²²Ibid, pp. 173-174.

The fifth factor is one that is essential to any foreign policy decision: opportunity and threat. Opportunity is any situation in which the outcome will be perceived as favourable. Opportunity provides the final incentive to act or not act. It is usually unexpected, or at least not planned by the state which will benefit.²³ In addition to opportunity, threat must also be considered. This is similar to opportunity, but it is a situation where the perceived outcome will be negative. Threat is not always visible to everyone, as it is based on perception.²⁴ For example, others do not always see the threat against a state's regional influence as a threat.

This leads to the final step in McGowan's method of comparison, which is generalization. In this section the hypothesis that was being tested is either reinforced or disproved, or a new conclusion is formed.²⁵ Also, general conclusions are made about the results and the implications of the study.

²³Ibid, pp. 176-177.

²⁴Kennedy-Pipe, C., Russia and the World 1917-1991. (New York: Arnold, 1998).

²⁵McGowan, P., "Meaningful Comparison," pp.72-73.

Chapter Outline

The chapter breakdown of this study will generally follow the steps outlined above. Chapter One will look at Russian foreign policy (RFP) before the crisis in Kosovo. A historical outline of RFP from 1991 to 1996 will be provided for background purposes. A discussion of the Primakov Doctrine will also be included. Next, policy from 1996 up to the beginning of the Kosovo crisis will be examined. The different factors in the formation of this policy, as outlined above, will be considered. It will then be determined, which policy alternative best characterizes this period of Russian foreign policy.

Chapter Two will examine RFP during the Kosovo crisis. This period of policy will also be compared to the different alternatives outlined by Arbatov. As in Chapter One, the factors behind the policy will be assessed.

Chapter Three will then look at Russian foreign policy at present. Its starting point will be the end of the Kosovo crisis in late 1999 and will examine policy up to the end of December 2000. This will encompass the first year of Putin's rule. Russian foreign policy after the Kosovo crisis, as in the previous chapters, will be

outlined and examined according to the influencing factors and then be characterized.

The fourth chapter will focus on the comparison of these different time periods and will discuss the differences in influencing factors and the change or continuity between the periods. This analysis will look at how Russian foreign policy has moved along the spectrum of policy choices.

Finally the conclusion will look at the future of Russian relations with the Western world. The original hypothesis, that the Kosovo crisis solidified the movement away from pro-Westernism and strengthened the Primakov Doctrine, will be assessed. Any issues that are unresolved and questions for further study will be discussed.

Chapter 1: From the Collapse to Kosovo

Russian foreign policy has gone through many stages in its development. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a pro-Western policy line was adopted. During this period, several different groups developed among the political elites. They all had different ideas of what Russian foreign policy should be. These groups, as outlined in the previous chapter, included the pro-Westerners, the moderate liberals, the centrists and moderate conservatives, and the neo-communists and nationalists. During the development of Russia's foreign policy, the ideas of these groups have had varying degrees of influence. They represented the different policy options for Russia in the post-Cold War world.

In the period immediately following the dissolution of the USSR, the policy adopted greatly reflected the ideas of the pro-Western group. This is not surprising, as Andrei Kozyrev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, was one of the most prominent supporters of closer ties and cooperation with G7 countries. The main goal during this period was the integration of Russia into the Western economic and political system.

However, when opposition to this policy line began to gain momentum there was a shift in Russian foreign policy. It was actually more like a consensus among the political elites in Russia. The new policy, which emerged between 1993 and 1996, was more assertive in its relations with the West and more pragmatic in its view of Russia's national interests. It was still quite pro-Western, but did not always coincide with Western policies. In this period, Russia began to oppose several policies of NATO and the UN. While this period was not characterized by a clearly defined policy, but rather a culmination of ideas from the different groups, the ideas of the moderate liberals were most visible.

With the appointment of Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister in 1996, the new consensus was developed into a clear policy. This policy line became known as the Primakov Doctrine. It was based on the idea of balance between East and West in Russia's foreign policy. This doctrine was what guided Russian foreign policy from 1996 up to the time the Kosovo crisis began. Some would argue that the ideas contained in the Primakov Doctrine remain influential to this day.

This chapter will look at each of these periods and assess the policies that defined them. It will then look

at the various factors driving the shift in Russian foreign policy.

Policy Groups

Several authors have described the development of different factions in Russia's foreign policy circles. Among these are Alexei Arbatov, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Alexei Pushkov²⁶. All three of these authors outline the policies advocated by each of the competing factions. It is essential to look at the ideas of these groups to understand opposition to and support for the government in its development of relations with the West.

The first group identified by all the authors is the pro-Western group. Arbatov describes this group as believing in economic determinism and universal democratic values, while neglecting the geopolitical and strategic side of international politics. Their main goal was complete economic and political integration with the West. This is the policy that was followed from the time the USSR

²⁶Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 5-43.
 MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European security," Survival v35 n3 Autumn (1993), pp. 3-25.
 Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia: Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," Foreign Policy n93 Winter (1994), pp. 76-91.

collapsed until mid-1992.²⁷ MacFarlane offers a similar description. He points out that the main goal of this policy was for Russia to become a normal democracy. This involved rapid integration into Western institutions such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the development of security and arms control accords with the US.²⁸ Pushkov labels this group "radical democratic". He sees this group as offering the West their allegiance and concessions in return for Russia's integration into the political and economic institutions of the West.²⁹ The similarity among these descriptions is unmistakable: Russia's integration into and cooperation with the states and institution of Europe and the West. These policies were advocated and supported by many politicians such as, President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, cabinet ministers Gennady Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar and Mikhail Poltoranin, and within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Georgy Kunadze and Vitaly Churkin (now Ambassador to Canada).³⁰ These politicians represented the reformers who held power immediately after the disintegration of the USSR.

²⁷Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 9-10.

²⁸MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European security," pp. 8-9.

²⁹Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia," p. 77.

³⁰Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 9-10.

The second group is referred to by several different names. Arbatov describes this idea as "moderate liberal", while Pushkov calls them "moderate democratic". Both explain that this policy is Westernizing, but more pragmatic and realistic than the pro-Western group. They focus on the idea of a distinctly Russian foreign policy based on Russia's geopolitical position and its transitional character. It names the former Soviet states as the priority over the West, but emphasizes the use of the Western model of development. The main idea here is partnership with the West, but not complete subjugation to it. Some of the political actors that advocate this policy are Vladimir Lukin (Ambassador to the US), and Duma deputies Alexander Peskunov and Eugeni Kozhokhin.³¹

Third, according to Arbatov, is the "centrist and moderate conservative" group. This group advocates a reintegration of former Soviet republics based on voluntary agreement. They would like to improve relations with the West as long as it is not at the expense of Russia's regional 'sphere of influence'. Those who advocate this policy also warn against excessive reliance on Western economic aid and political guidance.³² Pushkov refers to

³¹Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 10-11.
Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia," p. 78.

³²Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 12-13.

this group as "statist bureaucratic". He claims that they are pragmatic and mainly represented opposition to Kozyrev's policies of pro-Westernism.³³ MacFarlane sees these ideas and the moderate liberal idea as part of a single group, which he calls the "Eurasian middle ground". He sees this group as promoting balance between East and West without over-emphasizing either.³⁴ Advocates of this policy line included former Vice-President Rutskoi, the Russian Democratic Party, and most of the military's high command.³⁵

The final group discussed by the authors is the neo-communist/nationalist group. MacFarlane defines this group as rejecting the West and the Western model of development. They believe that Russia must abandon the West and turn towards the east and south. They see Western efforts as an attempt to lay the foundation for intervention in Russia's domestic affairs. Therefore, for this group, a Western orientation represents a betrayal of Russian national interests.³⁶ Similarly, Arbatov defines this group as based on Russian nationalism, Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism, and anti-Westernism. The goal of this group is a revival of Russia's empire and its superpower status. It promotes

³³Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia," p. 79-80.

³⁴MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European security," p. 11.

³⁵Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," p. 12.

³⁶MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European security," pp. 10-11.

alliances with rogue states such as Libya, Iraq, North Korea and Cuba.³⁷ Pushkov calls this group the "radical opposition". He defines their ideas in a manner similar to the other authors, but includes the goal of alliance with China and the Arab radicals.³⁸ The main advocates of this policy are the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and its leader Gennadi Zyuganov, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and its leader Vladimir Zhirinovskii.³⁹

These groups provide a comprehensive view of the divisions within the foreign policy discussion in Russia following the collapse of the USSR. These were the options that faced Russia at the time. This description will make it easier to understand the policies chosen and the emergence of widespread opposition to them.

1990-1993

In December of 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist. After a long political battle, which included a coup, Russia had become an independent state, and the Soviet

³⁷Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 13-14.

³⁸Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia," pp. 81-82.

³⁹Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," p. 13.

Union was gone. Boris Yeltsin was the first President of the Russian Federation. However, Russia was still facing many hardships. The political system that had been running the country for the last seventy years had collapsed, and Russia needed to build a new one. It was to be a democratic system that incorporated a Presidential and parliamentary-style government. Russia had elected its President and by the end of 1992 would have elected its first post-Soviet Duma.

In this first year there was a rejection of all that was seen as communist. This also meant an opening of Russia's economy to market forces, and to the international market. Reforms began immediately in a policy called "shock therapy". Russia was quickly transforming its economy into a free-market system. With this transformation came inflation, unemployment, and massive economic hardship. The government had promised the people that the hardship would be severe, but short-lived. Russia was to pass through a period of economic and political instability in order to emerge a liberal-democratic state.

The foreign policy adopted by Russia immediately after independence had its roots in the Gorbachev era. Although the Russian Federation declared independence from the Soviet Union in June of 1991, and appointed its own Foreign

Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, its policy was not new. What would become known as Kozyrev's foreign policy was a continuation of Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. It emphasized the abandonment of militarism and new efforts at cooperation in the international arena.⁴⁰ This was consistent with the popular reaction against the old Soviet doctrine. Russia was rejecting Stalinist militarism and economic isolation, in favour of a peaceful and economically integrated world.⁴¹ The period between Russian independence and 1993 gave birth to a Russian foreign policy focused on peace and friendship between Russia and the West.

This desire for international cooperation could be seen not only in the area of foreign policy strategy, but also in the statements of President Yeltsin. Shortly after independence he announced Russia's commitment to cooperation with the other members of the UN Security Council and increased involvement in UN peacekeeping missions.⁴²

Kozyrev clearly defined this policy in his article published in 1992, "Russia: A Chance for Survival". In

⁴⁰Adomeit, H., "Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality," International Affairs (London) v71 n1 (1995), p. 44.

⁴¹Malcolm, N., "The New Russian Foreign Policy," The World Today v50 n2 February (1994), p. 29.

⁴²MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European security," p. 9.

this article he outlined the main beliefs and values of Russia's foreign policy immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. Kozyrev saw Russia as located in a friendly and positive international environment. It was essential for Russia to cooperate with Western institutions such as the Group of 7 (G7), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Kozyrev claimed that Russia's national interests would best be served in partnership with other democracies, international economic competition, and in learning to play by the rules of the international market. Russia wanted to receive help from Europe and to participate in European institutions for security and cooperation. He claimed that Russia did not want any unnatural military responsibility beyond its borders, and was committed to the goal of ending the arms race and moving forward with disarmament. He also claimed that relations with the former Soviet states would be a friendship between states and people.⁴³ Kozyrev wrote an article for a newspaper in 1992, in which he said:

failure to integrate into the democratic community of states and thus the world economy would amount to a betrayal of the nation and the final slide of Russia down to the category of third rank states.⁴⁴

⁴³Kozyrev, A., "Russia: A Chance for Survival," Foreign Affairs v71 March/April (1992), pp. 8-13.

⁴⁴Adomeit, H., "Russia as a 'Great Power'," p. 44.

There was a sense of urgency in this policy. The underlying idea was that if Russia did not form a partnership with the West, the window of opportunity would slam shut. It is evident that Kozyrev believed that this was the best policy for Russia at the time.

This was the dominant foreign policy line in Russia until mid-1992, when opposition from the Communist Party, the LDPR, and several nationalist groups became quite intense. The opposition accused the government of not looking out for Russia's national interests and simply selling out to the West. Near the end of 1992 foreign policy began to change to accommodate some of the demands of the opposition. In the "Foreign Policy Concept" first published in December of 1992, this change can be seen. In this document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that relations with the West needed to be developed in order for Russia to revive itself, but it also acknowledged the convergence and divergence of interests between the West and Russia. It also recognized the existence of cooperation and conflict between the foreign policies of the West and that of Russia.⁴⁵ It seemed to respond directly to many of the criticisms of the opposition:

⁴⁵MacFarlane, S.N., "Russian Conceptions of Europe," Post-Soviet Affairs v10 n3 (1994), p. 252.

It is fundamentally important to see...the boundaries of any cooperative relationship...the course towards joint action must bring with it an increase in one's status, agreement on this or that question can not be an end in itself or, especially not 'payment' for assistance. Cooperation with anybody must be developed through measures and in such a way, that it addresses the long-term interests of Russia.⁴⁶

This document was adopted in April of 1993 as the new Foreign Policy Concept of Russia. Some of the specific issues contained in the document will be discussed in the next section.

This was a decided shift away from the original pro-Westernism, but it did not reject the idea of partnership with the West. It was focused on making this partnership more equal and balanced. By the time this policy shift began, Russia was no longer facing the question of whether or not to join the West, but rather, what form their partnership would take.⁴⁷

1993-1996

In 1993 in Russia, the transition was still continuing, and hardships were only getting worse. Mass

⁴⁶MID, "Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RF [1993]," In Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoi Rossii (1991-1998): Khrestomatiia v dvukh tomakh; Tom 2-Dokumenty. (Moskovskii Obshchestvenyi Nauchnyi Fond: Moscow, 1999) p. 21.

⁴⁷Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia," p. 76.

inflation and unemployment were only a few of the problems that Russia had to deal with. The Communist Party, and others who were opposed to the President controlled Russia's newly elected Duma. A new constitution had been drawn up, but when the parliament refused to cooperate crisis broke out. Yeltsin's constitution gave the largest share of power to the executive branch, while the parliament had drawn up a resolution that would strip Yeltsin of his power. It turned into a showdown between the White House and the President. Yeltsin dissolved the parliament, but parliament claimed that they had removed him from office. After several days of protest, and even shelling of the White House, the crisis ended and the constitution was eventually ratified in December of 1993. This new constitution called for massive reforms to the political system. This reform process occupied the period from 1993 to 1996. Privatization was underway and the entire Russian political system was being restructured.⁴⁸

By 1993, opposition to Kozyrev's policy had caused a shift in the foreign policy debate in Russia. The opposition had begun with the CPRF and the LDPR, but it soon spread to less radical parties and factions. This increase in opposition started a process of looking into

⁴⁸For more information on these events see: Sakwa, R., Russian Politics and Society: Second Edition. (Routledge: London, 1996).

the question of Russia's character. It developed into the idea that Russia has its own distinct and special role in the world and that they should not be so keen on integration into the West. The discussion of Russian foreign policy had taken on a more nationalistic and self-interested air. The Eurasian middle ground (as MacFarlane calls it) was gaining more ground at the expense of the pro-Western group. The public was also being alienated from the ideas of the reformers. Rapid inflation was making it difficult for people to meet their daily needs, businesses were struggling, output was falling, large-scale unemployment was plaguing Russia and people were becoming more unhappy about the inequities in society. Polling data showed a growing dissatisfaction with the reforms and with the reformers themselves.⁴⁹

Russian foreign policy was becoming more pragmatic. For this reason it had to look at the realities of Russia's situation. Four main things stand out in the analysis of Russia's foreign policy environment. The first is that the USSR was gone and would not be reunited. The second is that Russia was in a state of economic and social crisis with no real end in sight. This made it dependent on the IMF and the World Bank for funds. The third issue was that

⁴⁹MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European security," p. 4-12.

no definite foreign policy elite had emerged. The administrative structures were still in transition. The final element was that the international arena had changed. The world was becoming more multipolar and regional conflicts were on the rise.⁵⁰ All of these factors had to be considered if a new pragmatic foreign policy was to emerge.

In the beginning of 1993 a consensus began to materialize in the foreign policy discussion and a change in policy began to emerge. This new policy was based on a three-pronged approach: Russia as a regional superpower, a world great power, and a nuclear superpower. In April of 1993 the government adopted a new Foreign Policy Concept. It incorporated the change in policy based on this new consensus.⁵¹ The new Concept emphasized economic progress and domestic stabilization over external issues.⁵² It also considered the strengthening of relations with the former Soviet states as a high priority. The Concept listed the formation of new equal and mutually beneficial relations

⁵⁰Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 6-8.

⁵¹Aron, L., "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context," In (Ed.) Mandelbaum, M. The New Russian Foreign Policy. (Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 1998) pp. 24-27.

⁵²MID, "Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RF [1993]," p. 27.

with the CIS states, and stability in the regions surrounding Russia as two of its six priorities.⁵³

The new Foreign Policy Concept also included goals such as: reintegration of the former Soviet space through legitimate means, and opposition to a union of the former Soviet states with those of East-Central Europe against Russia. It also recognized that the use of military means in any sphere would only isolate Russia.⁵⁴ Furthermore, this document declared that Russia was against the use of force by any international actor, and that all international conflicts should be regulated and resolved through the channels and methods of the UN.⁵⁵ This Foreign Policy Concept was a symbol of the consensus that had finally been reached in the discussion of Russia's foreign policy among political elites.⁵⁶

This change in policy was demonstrated very well by Russia's Yugoslav policy. After the fall of the communist regime in Yugoslavia the area erupted into war, mostly based on ethnic rivalry. Initially, Russia had gone along with the policies of sanctions against Serbia and the entrance of troops into Yugoslavia, but by 1993 Russia's

⁵³Ibid, p. 21.

⁵⁴Sherr, J., "Russia: Geopolitics and Crime," The World Today v51 n2 February (1995), p. 33.

⁵⁵MID, "Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RF [1993]," p. 20.

⁵⁶Malcolm, N., "The New Russian Foreign Policy," p. 31.

stance on the Yugoslav wars changed. Moscow's policy towards the wars in Yugoslavia had shifted from agreement with the West to a more pro-Serbian position.⁵⁷ In the Bosnian crisis of 1993, Russia took on a more independent stance. After a bombing in a Sarajevo marketplace, many of the Western powers called for air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Russia was adamantly opposed to this action. Russia began to call for sanctions against Croatia and to oppose any use of force against the Serbs.⁵⁸ By 1994, Russia's goals in the Yugoslav wars were to prevent punitive measures against the Serbs, maintain relations with the West, and to increase Russia's role in the decision-making process.⁵⁹ Russia was no longer content to follow Western policies if they did not enhance Russia's position. They also were reluctant to allow action against the Serbs, as the opposition would then accuse the government of abandoning a long time ally.⁶⁰

This new policy line can also be seen in a number of announcements made by Kozyrev and Yeltsin. As early as October 1992, Yeltsin began criticizing the Western orientation in Russia's foreign policy. In 1993 Yeltsin began to advocate a leadership position in the security

⁵⁷Adomeit, H., "Russia as a 'Great Power'," p. 46.

⁵⁸MacFarlane, S.N., "Russia, the West and European Security," p. 15.

⁵⁹MacFarlane, S.N., "Russian Conceptions of Europe," p. 255.

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 263.

affairs of the former Soviet Union.⁶¹ He was also quoted in a press release published by ITAR-TASS as saying:

The recent series of visits to South Korea, China, and now India is indicative of the fact that we are moving away from a Western emphasis in Russian foreign policy.⁶²

In October 1993, Yeltsin announced that the inclusion of any Warsaw Pact country in NATO was contrary to Russia's national interests. This was a reversal of his previous statement that the former Warsaw Pact countries had the right to define their own security interests, without the interference of Russia.⁶³ Kozyrev also made statements in 1993 and 1994 that contradicted things he had earlier said. Originally he attributed demands such as, no Western interference in the Baltics, and that sanctions against Serbia be lifted, to the nationalist forces. Then in this period he was making such demands himself. He publicly denounced Western involvement in the Baltics, and demanded that the UN lift its sanctions on Serbia.⁶⁴

The consensus reached in the discussion of Russia's foreign policy did actually translate into a shift in that policy. In the period from 1993 to 1996 Kozyrev acted in

⁶¹Ibid, p. 251.

⁶²Crow, S., "Why has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" International Relations v3 n18 May (1994), p. 1.

⁶³MacFarlane, S.N., "Russian Conceptions of Europe," p. 256.

⁶⁴Adomeit, H., "Russia as a 'Great Power'," p. 45.

accordance with these new ideas. It still did not result in a consolidated foreign policy, but it was a stage of searching for a new relationship with the West. It sought to turn relations with the West into a true partnership, based on equality. This policy was solidified and broadened in 1996 with the replacement of Kozyrev. Evgenii Primakov was appointed Foreign Minister in January 1996. He developed the ideas, which had germinated in the previous period, into what would be known as the Primakov Doctrine.

Primakov Doctrine

Evgenii Primakov is an expert in Middle Eastern affairs. He began working for the newspaper Pravda as deputy-editor of the Asian and African division in 1962. He wrote several articles and books on the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the 1970s he was appointed Deputy-Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and in 1977 became Director of the Institute of Eastern Studies. After completing his Doctorate degree, he became a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1989 he was elected Chairman of the Union Council and,

later that same year, to the Politburo. In 1990 he resigned from the Politburo and was named to Gorbachev's Presidential Council. In 1991 he became the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB. He remained at this post until January of 1996, when he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁵ He has had a long political and academic career focused on issues of foreign policy and international economics.

Russian foreign policy became more sensitive to opposition from the different political groups that were mentioned previously. Primakov took the consensus, which had emerged earlier, and incorporated it into the new Russian foreign policy. It included parts of each group's ideas: it was a middle line between anti-Westernism and pro-Westernism. It identified with the moderate liberal or centrist and moderate conservative ideas of the foreign policy discussion by focusing on good relations with the West, but an independent foreign policy. The main idea was to create an environment in which Russia could focus on its domestic problems and its economic and political development. It was intended to defend Russia's national interests while avoiding confrontation with any state or actor. This policy was based on a realist view of the

⁶⁵For information about Primakov's career see: Mlechin, L., Evgenii Primakov: Istoriia odnoi kar'ery. (Tsentrpoligraf: Moscow, 1999).

world. Primakov promised that it would reflect the great power status of Russia, while pursuing an equal and mutually beneficial relationship with the West. Russia was one of the great powers in the new multipolar world, and its foreign policy should reflect this.⁶⁶

In his article "International Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century: Problems and Prospects,"⁶⁷ Primakov outlined the main facets of his foreign policy. He refuted the assumption that a new dividing line had developed in place of the Iron Curtain. He believed that no such division existed, and that Russia must be involved in European affairs in order to maintain a secure and peaceful environment.⁶⁸ In a passage where he was referring to international security and cooperation, he stated:

this structure will collapse, if a new dividing line is drawn in Europe, or if the model for security is not based on a universal organization such as the OSCE, but say on NATO, even with its 'special relationship' with Russia.⁶⁹

The Russian Foreign Minister delineated four principles that characterize the Primakov Doctrine. The first point involved the issue of NATO enlargement. This

⁶⁶Aron, L., "The Foreign Policy Doctrine," p. 30.

⁶⁷Primakov, E.M., "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia nakanune XXI veka: Problemy, perspektivy," In Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoi Rossii (1991-1998): Khrestomatiia v dvukh tomakh; Tom 1-Issledovaniia. (Moskovskii Obshchestvenyi Nauchnyi Fond: Moscow, 1999) pp. 179-194.

⁶⁸Ibid, p. 180.

⁶⁹Ibid, p. 191.

principle was a combination of the opposition to NATO enlargement seen in the previous policy, and the acceptance of their inability to stop it. Primakov admitted that Russia had no right to veto the entrance of Central and East European states, or anyone else for that matter, into NATO. He wrote, however, that Russia was categorically against the movement of NATO structures and boundaries towards Russian territory. The approach of NATO to Russia greatly complicated the geopolitical position and military plans upon which Russia relied. While these statements may seem contradictory, the main message was that while Russia opposed NATO expansion, it would continue to carry on relations with all the member states.⁷⁰

The second issue involved the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the new world order. Primakov rejected the idea that either side 'won' the Cold War. The leader and follower mentality that had developed since the end of the Cold War gave this illusion, but this was not the case. However, he argued, the world was moving away from this order and drifting towards a multipolar environment of interaction and interdependency.⁷¹

The third issue was also related to interdependency, but in the economic sphere. Primakov acknowledged that the

⁷⁰Ibid, pp. 181-191.

⁷¹Ibid, p. 182.

new economic situation must be incorporated into Russia's foreign policy. The democratization of international economic relations meant that economic measures could no longer be used for achieving selfish political goals. While one state may gain from this, it was not only the punished state that suffered. The amount of regional interdependency meant that economic sanctions, and other methods, harmed that state's trade partners as well. Primakov referred directly to the sanctions against Iraq and Libya, and the Helms-Burton law, which the US adopted to punish any state that traded with Cuba.⁷²

The fourth, and final, foundation of the Primakov Doctrine was a rejection of unilateral action in international conflict. He emphasized the need for cooperation within the international community in solving problems such as conflict resolution, arms control and verification, the humanitarian and legal aspects of security, and the provision of aid and assistance to those countries that are still developing. Similarly, he believed that a European security regime must be inclusive. It must involve all relevant organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO and the Partnership for Peace structures, the EU, the Western European Union

⁷²Ibid, p. 182.

(WEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He assigned the UN the role of keeping international peace and security throughout the world through political and diplomatic means. The OSCE was given a more localized role; Primakov saw it as the universal forum for European security. This was not surprising since it was one of the only European security organizations of which Russia was a member. Primakov, while promoting the idea of collective security through international organizations, also maintained that state sovereignty was still the highest principle in international relations. While collective security was essential, it could never violate the principle of state sovereignty.⁷³

These main principles were the bases for the Primakov Doctrine, which has influenced Russian foreign policy since 1996. This doctrine promotes and advocates the development of relations with the West, but maintains independence in its relations with other regions, specifically China, South Asia, and the Far East. The idea underlying all of Primakov's principles is that Russia should interact with all of the main players in the multipolar world without allying too closely with any one state or bloc.⁷⁴ This idea of balance is intuitively linked to the idea of leverage.

⁷³Ibid, pp. 183, 189-193.

⁷⁴Pushkov, A., "The Primakov Doctrine," p. 12.

Russia will improve its standing in the international arena by creating a type of bidding war among its partners for Russia's attention.⁷⁵ It is important to understand these ideas, as they have been quite influential in the development of Russian foreign policy since 1996.

1996-Kosovo

By 1996, the situation on the domestic front had changed little. After a long campaign, in which the media had been completely dominated by the government, Yeltsin had been re-elected in the second round of voting. While Yeltsin remained in power, his health was extremely poor, and the opposition forces, led by the communists, still controlled the Duma. The transition was not going as smoothly as people had hoped and there were still many problems that needed to be dealt with. Corruption was rampant, organized crime was out of control, privatization was moving very slowly, agricultural reform was not showing results, industrial output continued to decline, the economy was still highly unstable and had not been showing

⁷⁵Blacker, C.D., "Russia and the West," In (Ed.) Mandelbaum, M. The New Russian Foreign Policy. (Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 1998) p. 183.

improvement, prices and unemployment continued to rise, and living standards continued to fall. The war in Chechnya had been brought to a temporary halt and Russian troops were beginning to withdraw, but this war had exposed several problems for Russia. The southern border was very vulnerable to outside threats, the military had proven to be in a decrepit state, and fears of Islamic fundamentalism were on the rise.

The foreign policy consensus that had emerged in 1993 only grew stronger. It was consolidated by the appointment of Evgenii Primakov in January of 1996.⁷⁶ The era of excessive pro-Westernism had definitely ended. Russian foreign policy had moved into the Eurasian middle ground, most closely resembling the moderate liberal point of view. The policies of 1990 to 1993 were not only given up, but were now the target of fierce criticism all across the political spectrum.⁷⁷ The debate no longer included the issue of joining the West. It was now a discussion of whether to follow a realistic and pragmatic relationship

⁷⁶Aron, L., "The Foreign Policy Doctrine," p. 29.

⁷⁷Arbatov, A., "Eurasia Letter: A Russian-US Security Agenda.," Foreign Policy n104 Fall (1996), p. 104.

with all states, or to ally with rogue states in opposition to the West.⁷⁸

This consensus had also become more clearly defined. It was no longer simply a demand for a less pro-Western policy. In 1996 this consensus included the idea that Russia was a great power in the world for several reasons. One reason was its nuclear capabilities. Its geographical location and size also made it a great power. It was a bridge between East and West, Asia and Europe, and a stabilizing force on the Eurasian continent. Russia was a geopolitical force in a multipolar world.⁷⁹

This consensus also extended to the issue of NATO expansion. It was a unifying force amongst the political elite, the bureaucracy, the nationalists and the masses.⁸⁰ All agreed that NATO expansion was against Russia's security and defence interests, and felt that it violated the unwritten agreement that ended the Cold War with the consent of the USSR⁸¹. Almost all of the political leaders in Russia at the time saw NATO expansion as an attempt to

⁷⁸Kanet, R.E. & Birgeron, S.M., "The Domestic-Foreign Policy Linkage in Russian Politics: Nationalist Influences on Russian Foreign Policy," Communist and Post Communist Studies v30 n4 (1997), p. 341.

⁷⁹Sokolov, S.V., "Partnerstva s NATO v svete geopoliticheskogo, formatsionnogo i tsivilizatsionnogo krizisa Rossii," In Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoi Rossii (1991-1998): Khrestomatiia v dvukh tomakh; Tom 1-Issledovaniia. (Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyi Fond: Moscow, 1999) pp. 419-422.

⁸⁰Ibid, pp. 419-422.

⁸¹Arbatov, A., "Eurasia Letter," p. 104.

bring together the anti-Russian countries and to isolate Russia from a European security regime. They also believed that expansion would make Russia militarily vulnerable, something that had not happened since 1941. All the different political groups claimed that Russia had been betrayed. NATO was doing exactly what it had promised not to do, moving in on Russia while Russia was weak.⁸² Everyone agreed, "NATO expansion was the one issue on which Russians were unified".⁸³

Although deeply opposed to it, there was nothing Russia could do to stop NATO expansion. It was forced to build its foreign policy around this major contradiction.⁸⁴ The NATO summit held in Madrid on July 8 to 9, 1997, marked the beginning of a world shaped by the realities of NATO expansion, an increasing role for the US in Eurasia, the deepening and widening of European integration, the Westward drift of the former Soviet Union, and Russia's movement towards NATO, the US, the EU and Europe in general.⁸⁵ Things were changing in the region and Russia had no choice but to face these new realities.

⁸²Black, J.L., Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms. (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.: Lanham, Maryland, 2000) p. 14.

⁸³Ibid p. 39.

⁸⁴Pushkov, A., "The Primakov Doctrine," p. 5.

⁸⁵Ibid, p. 1.

Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on May 27, 1997. This document claimed that both sides wanted to build mutual trust and cooperation between Russia and NATO. It established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which was to provide a mechanism for consultation and coordination of joint action, should the need ever arise. This Act also guaranteed that NATO would not place nuclear weapons, or nuclear storage sites on the territory of new member states.⁸⁶

Once Russia had signed this Act, it had few choices for dealing with NATO expansion. It could fight against the second wave of expansion as it had fought against the first. However, this seems to have had a contradictory effect. The more Russia fought it, the more the Central and East European states wanted it. It could also simply drop its opposition stance and ally itself with the South and East. Another option would be to apply for entrance into NATO, however, such a reversal in policy would only serve to discredit Russia. The final option, and really the only viable option was to simultaneously develop cooperative relations with NATO based on its interests, while paving the road for Russia's entrance into the

⁸⁶NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation. (1997).
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndact-a.htm>.

Euroatlantic security regime.⁸⁷ The last option was, and remains, the only option that would not humiliate or isolate Russia from Europe.

Cooperation with NATO also had its benefits for Russia. The signing of the Founding Act allowed Russia to focus on its internal problems without worrying what was going on around it.⁸⁸ The signing of this document was a step towards building trust between NATO and Russia, and this allowed Russia to turn some of its attention away from the NATO threat.

This ability to focus on internal issues was essential. In the National Security Doctrine published in May of 1997, most of the threats outlined focused on internal issues. It incorporated the nuclear first-use policy as a defensive strategy, but the main idea of the document was to focus on internal issues. It named internal political, economic and social instability as the main threat facing Russia at the time. It further recognized the priority of domestic economic progress over external military issues.⁸⁹

⁸⁷Kortunov, S.V., "K voprosu o postmadridskoi strategii Rossii," In Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoi Rossii (1991-1998): Khrestomatiia v dvukh tomakh; Tom 1-Issledovaniia. (Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyi Fond: Moscow, 1999) pp. 453-456.

⁸⁸Sokolov, S.V., "Partnerstva s NATO," p. 423.

⁸⁹Aron, L., "The Foreign Policy Doctrine," pp. 29-32.

In laying out the national interests of Russia, the National Security Doctrine stated that Russia's national interests were separated into three categories: personal interests, societal interests, and state interests. Personal interests included things such as the protection of rights and freedoms, personal security, an increase in the standard of living, and physical, intellectual and spiritual development. The interests of society were to strengthen democracy, maintain social cohesion, and increased participation in the political system. State interests included protecting the constitutional structure, maintaining the territorial integrity of Russia, maintaining social, political and economic stability, maintaining law and order, and developing international cooperation and peace.⁹⁰ The focus for this document was quite visibly internal threats, not international. Russia needed to work on maintaining stability and security within its borders.

Several other changes were seen after 1996. The policy built on the foundation of the Primakov Doctrine was instrumental in improving relations with India. It also played a role in shifting attention towards the CIS

⁹⁰"Kontsepsiia natsional'noi bezopasnost'i RF [1997]," In Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoi Rossii (1991-1998): Khrestomatia v dvukh tomakh; Tom 2-Dokumenty. (Moskovskii Obshchestvenyi Nauchnyi Fond: Moscow, 1999) p. 72.

states.⁹¹ Russia had been reaffirming relations with Iraq and Iran as well. They had been fighting in the UN to have sanctions lifted against these countries, as well as against Libya. Russia had also taken a more assertive stance in Yugoslavia, often assisting the Serbs and the Greeks, instead of supporting NATO. However, it is important to mention that they did continue to work with the UN and NATO in the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. While relations with the US deteriorated somewhat, this caused a feeling that Europe was the 'good West', and relations with Europe improved.⁹²

So while relations with the West remained relatively stable, contact with old allies was also renewed. Russia-NATO relations had reached a form of peaceful agreement. Russia was not turning away from the West. It was, however, extending itself into the East and South. This is a reflection of the Primakov Doctrine: cooperation with all, dependence on no one. It also reflects the idea of multipolarity, the inevitability of NATO expansion, the desire to improve the Russian economy, and the attempt to form a European security regime.

⁹¹Blacker, C.D., "Russia and the West," p. 184.

⁹²"Russia and the West: Still Most Awkward Partners," The Economist May 9 1999, pp. 21-22.

Influences

The policy adopted by the government immediately after Russian independence failed in several ways. It did not identify Russia's national interests in the post-Cold War world. It focused on the West instead of the former Soviet space, not realizing the importance of relations with its neighbors. It also gave the impression that it was constantly submitting itself to the West (UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, the START II treaty, reduced arms sales to Iran and India, and the unfavourable situation surrounding the Kurile Islands). The final, and perhaps largest, failure was that this pro-Western policy had no real popular base. These failures were fatal for this type of policy line. By the end of 1992 foreign policy had become a major domestic issue. This led to immense criticism of the liberals by the other political groups. The democratic forces became split, confused and discredited because of the hardships and failures created by this pro-Western foreign policy.⁹³

Dissatisfaction with this policy became evident when views towards the US began to change. This change in attitudes was caused by the failures of the pro-Western

⁹³Arbatov, A.G., "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," pp. 17-24.

policy line, the inflated expectations that Russia had about US aid, and the interpretation of US actions in the international arena as pressuring Russia to act against its own political and economic interests.⁹⁴ Russians viewed US foreign policy as that of the victor of the Cold War trying to secure its spoils. They saw NATO expansion, the lifting of arms embargos against Bosnia's Muslim population, and the pushing of Russia out of Europe and the CIS as examples of this US goal.⁹⁵ There was a feeling of betrayal by the US. The expectations of aid were not met, and they seemed to be violating Russia's national interests. The US and Russia had differing views of what partnership meant. The US saw it as Russian compliance with Western policies, while Russia wanted to be consulted on all issues concerning its interest.⁹⁶ All of these things caused a change in attitudes towards the West.

This pro-Western policy was also not viable because the isolation of Russia from the former Soviet republics was not sustainable. The interdependency of the region was demonstrated in several ways. The first issue was that there were twenty-five million Russian speakers living

⁹⁴Pushkov, A.K., "Letters from Eurasia," p. 83.

⁹⁵Migranian, A.M., "Vneshniaia politika rossii: Katastroficheskie itogi trekh let," In Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost' sovremennoi Rossii (1991-1998): Khrestomatia v dvukh tomakh; Tom 1-Issledovaniia. (Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyi Fond: Moscow, 1999) p. 174.

⁹⁶MacFarlane, S.N., "Russian Conceptions of Europe," pp. 261-261.

outside the Russian Federation in neighboring states. Problems with these populations caused migration and other forms of instability both inside and outside of Russia's borders. The second issue was that Russia's own military was scattered across the newly independent states. This was an issue that could be dealt with only through carefully cultivated relations between Russia and its neighbors. The third and final issue was Russia's vulnerability to regional economic trends. Eurasia was a region which was economical interdependent, and Russia could not avoid this.⁹⁷

All of these things, plus a general growth in nationalism⁹⁸, caused the discussion of Russian foreign policy to shift. The influence of the pro-Western ideas began to fade. By 1993 a shift in policy had taken place. This shift was strengthened and consolidated by 1996. The Primakov Doctrine encompassed the new ideas that emerged from the consensus in the Russian foreign policy debate. Policy since 1996 has been based on the principles laid out in the Primakov Doctrine. Russian foreign policy in the period between 1996 and 1999 was a reflection of the

⁹⁷Ibid, pp. 258-260.

⁹⁸Marantz, P., "Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Second Term," Communist and Post Communist Studies v30 n4 (1997), p. 345.

incorporation of opposing ideas. It no longer was based on the ideas of the pro-Western group, but rather more so on the ideas of the moderate liberal group. It was a policy of cooperation with the West and development towards joining Europe, based on a pragmatic assessment of Russia's interests and links to the former Soviet Union.

Chapter 2: The Kosovo Crisis

On March 24, 1999 NATO began a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, which was to last 79 days. Russia's reaction to this campaign was immediate and dramatic. The Russian government strongly opposed any military action in the region, claiming that this matter should be solved only through diplomatic and peaceful means. This was not surprising, considering Russia's search for a more independent policy and historic and emotional ties to Serbia.

This chapter will examine the Russian response to the Kosovo crisis. First, it will look at the historical background to the crisis and Russia's involvement in the region. Second, NATO's declarations and actions will be examined. Third, the reaction and actions of Russia during this time period will be assessed. Finally, some of the underlying factors that may have influenced Russia's foreign policy during this crisis will be discussed.

During the Kosovo Crisis Russian foreign policy could be described as centrist and moderate conservative in orientation. As explained in the previous chapter, this policy line advocated relations with the West, but not at

the expense of Russia's interests in the region. In this time period we can see that Russia clearly considered that Yugoslavia was an area vital to Russian interests, and therefore was willing to risk relations with the West in order to protect those interests. Contrary to the moderate liberal group, which advocated partnership with the West and independent policy, the centrist and moderate conservative group did not advocate partnership. In the Kosovo crisis, Russia's main consideration was its own national interests and not relations with the West.

Background

Kosovo, an autonomous region within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was the center of this whole dispute. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians claim this area as their own. Historically, it was at the heart of Serbian territory, and is considered to be a sacred place for Serbs. It was in this place that Serbia suffered defeat to the Ottoman Turks in 1389. The area then remained under Turkish rule for over 500 years, when in 1912 it was returned to Serbia. During the communist period from 1945 to 1980, Kosovo, at times, enjoyed a type of self-rule within the Yugoslav Federation. The region was given a

great deal of autonomy especially after 1974, until the mid-1980s. However, in 1989 their right to self-rule was revoked and Kosovo lost the autonomy that they had enjoyed under Tito.⁹⁹

After the death of Tito in 1980, there was no single ruler of Yugoslavia. A struggle for power began among the different levels of government (federal versus regional), and different leaders and parties. These leaders often used nationalist rhetoric to gain support for their positions. When the communist regime in Yugoslavia fell, the authority of the central government disintegrated, and political conflicts arose between the federal and regional governments.¹⁰⁰ It was not long until the Balkans erupted into ethnically based conflict and several wars for independence began. Croatia began fighting Yugoslav military forces in Croatia for its independence in mid-1991. The war in Bosnia erupted in early 1992 after the main bridge between Croatia and Bosnia was blown up, and the Bosnian Serbs began a bombing campaign.¹⁰¹

Initially, from 1991 to 1992 Russia's policy in the region was very passive and was in support of Western efforts. In May of 1992 Russia supported sanctions against

⁹⁹Ladika, S., "The Kosovo Crisis," Europe n386 May (1999), p. 25.

¹⁰⁰Woodward, S.L., Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. (The Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C., 1995) p. 15.

¹⁰¹Ibid, p. 18.

Yugoslavia; in September, it agreed to the extension of UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) into Bosnia, and in October it backed the idea of a no-fly zone over Bosnia. However, in late 1993, as in other areas of Russian foreign policy, Russia's position towards Yugoslavia began to change. Although this policy became more independent, Russia still worked within the UN to find a resolution.¹⁰² The previous policy received fierce criticism from all opposition groups, such as accusations that Russia had abandoned a long-time ally and had broken historic ties.¹⁰³

In February 1994, after a bombing in a Sarajevo market place, NATO issued an ultimatum that the Bosnian Serbs must withdraw their forces from around Sarajevo, or else face air strikes. The Serbs were given 10 days to comply. Russia had not been consulted in this decision and sought a way to save face. The Russian representatives quickly proposed that Russian peacekeepers be sent in under UN auspices, if the Serbs agreed to meet NATO's demands. The Serbs agreed and air strikes were averted.¹⁰⁴ Russia had

¹⁰²Bowker, M., "The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community," Europe-Asia Studies v50 n7 (1998), pp. 1245-1257.

¹⁰³Lynch, A. & Lukic, R., "Russian Foreign Policy and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia," International Relations v2 n41 October (1993), p. 29.

¹⁰⁴Cohen, L.J., "Russia and the Balkans: Pan-Slavism, Partnership and Power," International Journal v49 Autumn(1994), p. 837-8.

shown the important role that it could play in the Balkans. Their special relationship with Serbia meant that they were a good choice for a mediator between the different sides.

With the Dayton negotiations in 1995, the ongoing wars in the Balkans were brought to an end. The Dayton Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed in Paris in December 1995 by Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. This agreement laid out the terms for ending the war, and defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state. This agreement drew specific boundaries between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. It also outlined the terms for the entrance of an international peace force to enter the area¹⁰⁵

However, the issue of Kosovo was not even discussed at this peace conference. Up to this point the Kosovo Albanians had been using a non-violent strategy of protest to make their views clear. They pulled out of all representative bodies in the Yugoslav Federation and did not take part in elections. But, when they were ignored at Dayton, they felt that their non-violent strategy had failed and they had not received any international

¹⁰⁵Office of the High Representative(Peace-Implementation Agency in Bosnia-Herzegovina), The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [The Dayton Accord]. (1995). www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-frm.htm

attention. At this point popular support for armed conflict began to grow.¹⁰⁶

In 1997, after years of Serb control over Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began rebelling. There were several incidents of clashes between the KLA and Serbian police and soldiers who patrolled Kosovo and its surrounding areas. Once the fighting began, people started to leave Kosovo in search of safer conditions. Those who did flee Kosovo often reported that Serbia was conducting a war of ethnic cleansing. The Serbs continually and categorically denied all reports of war crimes and ethnic cleansing.¹⁰⁷ It was a matter of Serbia's word against that of the refugees.

Fighting continued between Serb forces and the rebel KLA. Finally, on October 13, 1998, a cease-fire agreement was signed under the threat of NATO air strikes. Under this agreement, Serbia was allowed to keep 20,000 military, paramilitary and police personnel in Kosovo. This cease-fire was to allow both sides to come to the table and work out an agreement. In February 1999 a peace conference was finally held at Rambouillet. The conference continued from February 3 to 23, but at the end both sides refused to

¹⁰⁶Hooper, J., "Kosovo: America's Balkan Problem," Current History v98 April (1999), p. 160.

¹⁰⁷Ladika, S., "The Kosovo Crisis," pp. 25-6.

sign. At one point the Kosovo side was prepared to agree to the terms if the KLA approved the terms. The conference ended without success, and signs of Serbian military build-up around Kosovo could be seen. It became clear that Serbia was preparing for war.¹⁰⁸

It was under these circumstances that NATO issued an ultimatum, which demanded that Milosevic return to the negotiating table and agree to the terms, or NATO would begin air strikes. Milosevic did not return and on March 24, 1999 NATO began bombing Serbia and parts of Kosovo.¹⁰⁹

NATO Bombing

NATO's view on Kosovo had been well established long before the bombing began. In December 1998, NATO had issued a statement that outlined its intentions in the region. It consisted of six main points. The first of these was that the ultimate goal of NATO involvement was an end to violence and a lasting political settlement. Second, NATO believed that both sides were failing to comply with UN resolutions and that the KLA must stop provoking the Serb forces, while Serbia must reduce the number of its forces in Kosovo. The third point was that

¹⁰⁸Hooper, J., "Kosovo," pp. 161-3.

¹⁰⁹"The West Versus Serbia," The Economist March 27 1999, p. 49.

both sides must agree to comply with UN resolutions and to cooperate with international investigators. The fourth point was that dialogue must be maintained between the two sides. NATO claimed to support a political solution that would allow Kosovo greater autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and would protect civil and human rights regardless of ethnicity. Fifth was the demand that the OSCE mission in Kosovo be given full cooperation. The final point was that NATO invited all partners to join them in finding a solution.¹¹⁰

When NATO aircraft began bombing targets near Belgrade and Pristina, the intentions of NATO seemed to change. During the bombing the stated aim was to ensure the protection of the Kosovo Albanians against Serb harassment and persecution and to avert a "humanitarian catastrophe". The US stated that it was obliged to "enforce law and order" and it could not allow opposition or tolerate threats to its national interests.¹¹¹

Javier Solana, the Secretary-General of NATO, stated that he promised to "disrupt" Yugoslavia's war against Kosovo's Albanian population. Solana's statements also suggested that Serbia was being punished for its refusal to

¹¹⁰NATO, "Statement on Kosovo," NATO Review n1 Spring (1999), pp. 21.

¹¹¹Deliagin, M., "America's Real Goals in Yugoslavia," International Affairs v45 n6 (1999), p. 75.

sign an agreement that would allow NATO to police Kosovo.¹¹² NATO's initial stance seemed to be neutral, but once the bombing began, this position changed to anti-Serbian, or pro-Albanian.

While this conflict did spur unity among several NATO members, mainly the US, Britain, France (for a period) and Germany¹¹³, it also sparked a great deal of opposition from Russia, and others. Opponents to the bombing claimed that NATO action in Kosovo was conducted without the consent of the UN Security Council and, therefore, violated international law, the UN Charter and Article 1 of the NATO Charter, which says that NATO should settle all disputes through peaceful means and not through the use or threat of force, or any means "inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".¹¹⁴

¹¹²"The West Versus Serbia," p. 49.

¹¹³"NATO," The Economist April 24, 1999, p. 4. (Extract after p. 54).

¹¹⁴Bissett, J., Notes for Address to Standing Committee Foreign Affairs and International Trade. (February 15 2000).
www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlb.../CommitteeNotice.asp?Language=E&DocumentId=1460.

James Bissett is a former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia. These were the official recorded notes from a speech he delivered to the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade on February 15, 2000, when this committee was discussing the issue of Kosovo.

Russian Response

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia did not come as a surprise to Russia. The Kremlin had not been consulted on the decision to bomb, so they did not know when it would start, but Russia was aware that NATO was preparing for air strikes. As the deadline given in the ultimatum neared, so did then-Prime Minister Primakov's visit to the US. He was scheduled to land in the US on March 24 to discuss Russia's financial position, among other things. Russia was to negotiate conditions for Russia to receive more IMF funds. This meeting was important for Russia financially. However, before the bombing began Primakov had stated that should NATO begin to bomb, he would be forced to call off his visit. This would most certainly mean a loss of IMF funds in the short term.¹¹⁵ The Kosovo crisis could not have come at a worse time for Russia.

When the bombing began Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, and Boris Yeltsin issued statements. Ivanov stated that despite what NATO does, Russia would continue to negotiate with Yugoslavia. He claimed that Yugoslavia must take responsibility for its action and sign the treaty worked out at Rambouillet. Ivanov also stated

¹¹⁵Iusin, M., "Moskva stanovitsia zalozhnitsei Miloshevicha," Izvestiia March 24 1999, p. 1.

that bombing would only lead to civilian victims, refugees and an escalation of violence. NATO military action had no moral, political, or legal justification.¹¹⁶ Ivanov's statement shows that Russia was very much against the bombing, but still felt that some agreement could be reached through political means.

Yeltsin's statement was much harsher. He called the NATO bombing nothing but "undisguised aggression". Only the UN Security Council had the right to decide which measures will be used in ensuring international peace and security, and they had made no such decision. Yeltsin pointed out that both the UN Charter and the Russia-NATO Founding Act had been broken. He promised that Russia would not stand by and allow NATO to enter the twenty-first century as an international gendarme. He believed that the UN must meet and discuss this issue and to put an immediate end to the bombing. He also outlined what steps he had taken in response to NATO's military action.

The first step was to call off Primakov's visit to the US. This involved the turn-around of Primakov's plane somewhere over the Atlantic. Second, was to demand an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to end NATO military action in Kosovo. Third, he recalled the Russian

¹¹⁶ITAR-TASS, "V Evrope-novyi agressor," Rossiiskaia Gazeta March 25 1999 p. 1.

representatives to NATO, suspended the Partnership for Peace and the development of any new cooperative initiatives.

Yeltsin claimed that the sooner NATO stopped bombing the sooner the international community could find a peaceful solution to the problem. He announced that Russia was prepared to work with the Contact Group and all of its members in order to achieve this. He also suggested that Russia had the right to use whatever measures it deemed adequate to ensure its own, and Europe's, security.¹¹⁷

This statement shows the intensity with which Russia was opposed to military action in this situation. Calling off Primakov's visit and opposing NATO meant that it was almost certain that they would not receive any IMF funds in the near future. It also called into question the future of Russia-NATO relations. But for the present, it seemed clear that Russia would not use military means to oppose NATO. Yeltsin, after a meeting with Ivanov, announced that extreme measures would not be used in response to NATO military action, because Russia refused to sink to the level of the Americans and instead chose the moral high

¹¹⁷Kremlin, "Rossiia s etim nikogda ne soglasitsia, zaiavliaet Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Rossiiskaia Gazeta March 26 1999, p. 2.

road.¹¹⁸ While this statement may be rather insulting to the US and NATO, it does make it clear that Russia was not prepared to use military force. It also makes it clear that Russia was willing to sacrifice relations with the West, or at least with NATO, in favour of protecting its interests in the area. Freezing relations with NATO only demonstrated this point further.

Within a few days Russia had sent its representatives to Yugoslavia to try to find a diplomatic solution. The first delegation consisted of Prime Minister Primakov, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of Defence. On March 31, from Belgrade, Primakov announced that the President (Yeltsin) had sent them to find a peaceful solution through diplomatic means.¹¹⁹ There was another group of Russian politicians who went to Yugoslavia, but they were not sent through official channels, or even with the consent of the government.¹²⁰ Their actions cannot be considered a part of Russia's foreign policy, and therefore will not be discussed here.

¹¹⁸Ulianov, N., "Protest Rossiian narastaet," Nezavisimaia Gazeta March 26 1999, p. 1.

¹¹⁹Lebedev, A., "Belgradskaia missiia Primakova," Izvestiia March 31 1999, p. 1.

¹²⁰On March 30, 1999, Egor Gaidar, Boris Nemtsov and Boris Fedorov (all Duma Deputies from the political movement Pravoie Delo) went to Yugoslavia and met with the leaders of the opposition there. This visit received a negative response from Moscow. For more information see: Shevchenko, M., "Rossiia pytaetsia polozhit' konets voine na Balkanakh," Nezavisimaia Gazeta March 31 1999, p. 6.

While earlier statements had implied that Russia would not use military force, a statement made by Yeltsin on April 10, was not so clear on this position. He claimed that this crisis would not turn into armed conflict unless the Americans dragged them into it. Russia believed that the US wanted to make Yugoslavia its protectorate, and Russia could simply not allow this. Yeltsin considered that NATO must understand that Russia's exit to the Mediterranean Sea was next door and that Russia simply could not give up Yugoslavia.¹²¹ While this statement left unclear just what measures Russia was willing to use, it did make it clear that Russia would never agree to NATO military action in Yugoslavia. This was yet another example of the fact that Russia was clearly willing to sacrifice its relations with NATO to protect its interests in Yugoslavia.

Finally on April 13, some progress was made towards a solution to the crisis. The German representatives in the Contact Group¹²² had put forth a plan. It would entail a peacekeeping force under the UN flag and not NATO. This idea would allow Milosevic to save face and would end the

¹²¹Gornostaev, D., "Karibskii krizis mozhet povtorit'sia na Balkanakh," Nezavisimaia Gazeta April 10 1999, p. 1.

¹²²The contact group was made up of the Foreign Ministers of the G8 countries. They were to meet in order to find a resolution to the Kosovo crisis.

bombing.¹²³ A few days later, Victor Chernomyrdin was appointed the special representative of the Russian President for the regulation of the conflict in Yugoslavia.¹²⁴ The next day, Chernomyrdin announced his support of the German plan. The Russians were concerned that no agreement would be found while the bombs were dropping. The German plan called for a cease-fire for 24 hours, during which Milosevic would begin to withdraw his troops from Kosovo and allow the entrance of some international troops. If this did not happen then the bombing would resume. This plan was appealing because it would be carried out through a UN resolution.¹²⁵ The Russians liked this plan, as did others. They set to work on reaching an agreement on a UN resolution.

Meanwhile, NATO was planning its Washington Summit, which would celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of NATO. Russia refused to attend this summit because of the war in Yugoslavia. Yeltsin claimed that he had no choice but to freeze all relations with NATO.¹²⁶ Hopes of reconciliation, although the peace process was under way,

¹²³Iusin, M., "Kosovo: Zapad skloniaetsia k kompromissu," Izvestiia April 13 1999, p. 1.

¹²⁴Marsov, V. & Ulianov, N., "Chernomyrdin zaimetsia Iugoslavskim Krizisom," Nezavisimaia Gazeta April 15 1999, p. 1.

¹²⁵Gornostaev, D., "Nuzhen li Chernomyrdin na Balkanakh," Nezavisimaia Gazeta April 16 1999, p. 1.

¹²⁶Abarinov, V., "NATO otkazyvaetsia ot oboronitel'noi kontseptsii," Izvestiia April 23 1999, p. 1.

were not high. However, despite Russia's refusal to participate in the NATO summit, the West realized the value of Russia's participation in a resolution. The US announced that it would like Russia to participate because the Russian representatives had a very constructive role to play.¹²⁷

The next breakthrough in the peace process would not come until May 7, 1999, when the Foreign Ministers of the G8 countries met in Bonn, Germany to discuss the situation in Kosovo. There were several different issues being discussed at this meeting, and proposals made by all sides. The Russians still insisted that a cease-fire should be called until a peaceful resolution could be found, reiterating their position that a solution would only be found through peaceful means and not through force. The US had stated its interest in having Chernomyrdin act as a channel of communication between NATO and Yugoslavia. NATO refused to call a cease-fire, but did agree to include Russian troops in the peacekeeping force, which would enter Yugoslavia once the bombing finished.¹²⁸

At this meeting the Contact Group also agreed on seven conditions that must be met before the bombing would stop.

¹²⁷Sokolov, V., "Chernomyrdina v Briussele i Vashingtone ne zhdut," Nezavisimaia Gazeta April 27 1999, p. 1.

¹²⁸Mikheev, V., "Sem' plus odin eshche ne vosem'," Izvestiia May 7 1999, p. 1.

The first of these was an end to all violence and repression in Kosovo. Second, military, paramilitary and police personnel must be completely withdrawn from Kosovo. Third, an international peacekeeping force, approved by the UN Security Council, must be allowed to enter the region to guarantee common goals. Fourth, an intermediate administration for Kosovo must be founded, which will be assigned, by the UN, to provide for normal living conditions in Kosovo for all residents. Fifth, all refugees must be allowed to freely and safely return to their homes. Sixth, a political process with the aim of agreement on the Rambouillet Treaty and the disarmament of the KLA must be initiated. Finally, economic stabilization and development of the region must be accounted for.¹²⁹ The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of all the G8 countries agreed upon these seven conditions. This was what Milosevic had to agree to in order for the bombing campaign to end.

It was not until almost a month later that Serbia finally met these conditions. On June 3, the Serbian parliament voted to accept the terms of the peace plan.¹³⁰ Once the plan was accepted and the withdrawal of troops

¹²⁹Gornostaev, D., "Neuzheli-Proryv?" Nezavisimaia Gazeta May 7 1999, p. 1 & 3.

¹³⁰Gornostaev, D. & Korotchenko, I., "Belgrad soglasilsia s mirnym planom," Nezavisimaia Gazeta June 4 1999, p. 1.

began, Solana ordered an end to the bombing. On June 10, 1999 the bombing of Yugoslavia ended.¹³¹

Although the bombing was over, there were still issues of contention between Russia and NATO. It had been agreed that Russia would make up part of the peacekeeping forces, but how this would be run had not yet been worked out. It had been agreed that the mission would be carried out under the UN flag. The Russian side announced that both Russia and NATO would command their own forces, but coordination still needed to be worked out.¹³² NATO, on the other hand, was still insisting that control of the mission must remain in NATO hands, but that Russian participation was being considered.¹³³

The day after the bombs stopped NATO troops began entering Kosovo;¹³⁴ Russian troops would come later. However, before NATO could get all their troops into the region, Russia pulled yet another surprise. Russian forces, with the help of the Serb forces, made their way from Bosnia, across Kosovo to take control of the Pristina airport. This was apparently an attempt to gain some

¹³¹Kosyrev, D., "Vchera zakonchilas' voina," Nezavisimaia Gazeta June 11 1999, p. 1.

¹³²Gornostaev, D., "Emissary vse zhe vyleteli v Belgrad," Nezavisimaia Gazeta June 3 1999, p. 1.

¹³³Gornostaev, D. & Korotchenko, I., "Belgrad soglasilsia," p. 1.

¹³⁴Danilov, D., Moshes, A. & Bordachev, T., Kosovskii Krizis: Novyie Evropeiskie realii. (Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Institut Evropy: Moscow, 1999) p. 61.

leverage in the negotiations between NATO and Russia as to Russian participation in the peacekeeping plan. On June 19 Russia and the US met in Helsinki to discuss the role Moscow would play in the resolution of the crisis. However, since the Russians already controlled the airport in Pristina, they had some degree of leverage in these negotiations.¹³⁵

Eventually the negotiations were completed and Russian peacekeepers began to enter Kosovo on July 6.¹³⁶ The crisis had ended and the peacekeeping forces were in place. Russia had been able to reach an agreement with NATO. Russian troops became a de facto part of the international peacekeeping force in Kosovo.¹³⁷

The Kosovo crisis represented a period of uncertainty for Russian foreign policy. Russia needed to find a path that would make it clear that Russia was fundamentally opposed to the NATO bombing, but keep avenues open for joint action with the West. Although Russian relations with NATO were frozen through the entire crisis, and for a long period after, they did continue to do business with

¹³⁵Gornostaev, D. & Sokolov, V., "Dogovorennosti po Kosovo vse net," Nezavisimaia Gazeta June 19 1999, pp. 1 & 6.

¹³⁶Georgiev, V., "Nachat Vvod Nashikh Voisk v Kosovo," Nezavisimaia Gazeta July 7 1999, p. 1.

¹³⁷Danilov, D., Moshes, A. & Bordachev, T., Kosovskii Krizis, p. 66.

the international credit organizations, and to maintain political ties with the EU and with several Western states on a bilateral and multilateral level, even though those states were members of NATO.¹³⁸ Russia did not cut its political or economic ties with Europe, or with the international community, only with NATO. So despite fundamental disagreement on the issue at hand, Russia did not alienate itself from the West. Initially, Russia did seem to do just this, but through the course of the crisis, Russia was brought into the peace process and became a part of the solution.¹³⁹

While relations did continue with several Western institutions and states, relations with the West in general had hit an all-time low for the Post-Cold War period. Russian policy during this period was focused on protecting its interests in the region, despite the effect this would have on relations with NATO and the West. For this reason, this policy can only be classified as centrist and moderate conservative. It put Russia's interests before relations with the West.

¹³⁸Ibid, pp. 29-30.

¹³⁹Pond, E., "Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe," The Washington Quarterly v22 n4 (1999), p. 79.

Influences

There were several factors that influenced Russia's foreign policy during the Kosovo crisis. Many of them were tied to events that had occurred previous to the war and some were related to the war itself. These motivations came from both domestic and international factors.

The first of these motivations is loosely referred to as pan-Slavism. Pan-Slavism developed in the nineteenth century as Russia was fighting for influence over the areas previously controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Russia was seen as a pillar of support in the development of an independent identity for Slavic people in what would become Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁰ This led to the idea of friendship and a bond among Slavic people that transferred into the political realm. This is the historic idea of friendship between Russia and Serbia (among others) because they are both Slavic nations. While this theory does not have much scientific backing, the effects of it cannot be underestimated. While ideas of Serb-Russian solidarity are hard to prove historically, they do have emotional value. During the Kosovo crisis this idea of a Slavic brotherhood had deep emotional roots in both Belgrade and Moscow as it

¹⁴⁰Petkovic, R., "Russia's Role in the Yugoslav Crisis," Review of International Affairs v45 (1994), pp. 1-2.

had in the previous Yugoslav wars.¹⁴¹ This may not have been based on pan-Slavism as much as on common interests; however, the idea of pan-Slavism was expressed in public opinion as protecting a historic ally.

Russia and Serbia also had common interests that fuelled Russian foreign policy in this period. The idea of Slavic solidarity was popular, but so was the idea of opposing the West, and asserting Russian and Serbian independence from the West.¹⁴² Public opinion in Russia turned sharply against the US during the crisis.¹⁴³ It is reasonable to assume that if public opinion had turned against the West, then there would be remembrances of the "historic" bonds between Serbia and Russia. This would also be an excellent opportunity for Russia to show that it is in fact independent from the West in its foreign policy.

In the first Yugoslav wars Russia had not taken such an independent stance, and Yeltsin had faced much criticism for these policies. His domestic opponents, led by the CPRF and LDPR had argued that he made too many concessions to the West, that Russia had abandoned a long-term ally, and that Yeltsin was naive for not realizing that Yugoslavia was simply a dress rehearsal for NATO

¹⁴¹Lynch, A. & Lukic, R., "Russian Foreign Policy," p. 25.

¹⁴²Ibid, p. 25.

¹⁴³Dobriansky, P.J., "Russian Foreign Policy: Promise or Peril?" The Washington Quarterly v23 n1 (2000), p. 135.

intervention into Russia.¹⁴⁴ This opposition to policies in the first Yugoslav crisis was tied to the shift in Russian foreign policy discussed earlier. Yeltsin could only assume that a policy, which placed Russia on the side of NATO and not Serbia, would mean more opposition. Public opinion seemed to support this idea. This policy was meant to avoid giving the communists and other opposition groups, fuel for their fight against the government, and to maintain some degree of balance in Russian foreign policy.¹⁴⁵

However, these were not the only things that influenced Russian policy in Yugoslavia. Underlying these trends was the knowledge that NATO was expanding, regardless of Moscow's opinion. The process was already well under way before the crisis started, and was completed during the crisis at the Washington Summit. On March 12, only 12 days before the beginning of the bombing, NATO had received documents signed by the Presidents of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic that outlined their entrance into NATO. This meant that what Russia had been fighting against for so long, was officially going forward, soon.

Russia's response to this announcement was not surprising. Ivanov released a statement saying that this

¹⁴⁴Petkovic, R., "Russia's Role," p. 3.

¹⁴⁵Aristarkhov, S., "Vybor Primakova," Izvestiia March 25 1999, p. 1.

was definitely a step in the wrong direction. Europe should be searching for a common security regime, not one that protects only certain states, but that includes all of Europe.¹⁴⁶ NATO expansion, now that it had been realized, only served to heighten Russia's sense of exclusion from Europe. When NATO began bombing Yugoslavia, a non-member country, this distrust grew. The two issues are so interrelated that it is difficult to discuss one without the other.¹⁴⁷ The fact that NATO had so recently expanded and was already involved in a war, which Russia saw as illegal, spurred issues of distrust. This only increased the sense that NATO was not concerned about Russian interests, many even saw the situation in Kosovo as analogous to Russia.¹⁴⁸ They feared that if NATO would intervene in Yugoslavia, then what was to stop NATO from intervening in Russia, more specifically, in Chechnya.

There were many issues underlying Russia's foreign policy in Kosovo, but most of all this policy was based on a resentment of NATO's influence in the world.¹⁴⁹ Russia found itself facing once again a bloc that was, or that it

¹⁴⁶Charodeev, G., "Vengriia, Pol'sha i Chekhiia Uzhe v NATO," Izvestiia March 12 1999, p. 1.

¹⁴⁷Lukin, A., "NATO i Rossiia Posle Kosovo," Nezavisimaia Gazeta June 9 1999, p. 8.

¹⁴⁸Lynch, A. & Lukic, R., "Russian Foreign Policy," p. 26.

¹⁴⁹"Russia. It disagrees About Kosovo. Ah, Yes," The Economist March 27 1999, p. 50.

perceived to be, hostile to Russia's interests and security.

The escalation of the conflict in Kosovo was seemingly inevitable. Once peace talks broke down, NATO saw the threat of force as their only option for dealing with Milosevic. Once the bombs began to fall, Russia had no other option but to oppose NATO.

Russia had been advocating a peaceful resolution based on diplomacy for a long time. It could not change its policy now. Russia's vital interests were at stake. Yugoslavia is a region that was historically within Russia's area of interest. They could not allow NATO to control the area. Russia initially seemed to cut itself off from the West, but in reality, they had left the path open for joint action and cooperation. While relations with NATO remained frozen, Russia did work with the Contact Group to find a solution to the crisis.

Several things motivated Russian foreign policy in Yugoslavia. Public opinion and NATO expansion were two of the most important. The government simply could not afford to give the opposition more ammunition. In this way, we can see how this policy is simply an extension of Russian foreign policy as it developed since 1996. Russia refused

to bow to Western pressure, and maintained its independent view throughout the crisis, but did not cut off all relations with the West, eventually becoming a part of the solution.

NATO relations were cut off and relations with the US were cold. Russia had put its interests in the region before relations with the West. Russia refused to let its weakness show. This suggests that Russia was more concerned about its interests in Yugoslavia, and saving face, than relations with the West. This is why this policy has been classified as centrist and moderate conservative. Policy up to this point had been about finding a degree of independence, but also emphasized partnership with the West. This moderate liberal stance is similar to the centrist and moderate conservative stance in that it emphasizes independence. However, it is different in how it sees relations with the West. The former sees relations as a partnership, while the latter does not. It calls for good relations with the West, but no better than with other states. During the Kosovo crisis Russia was willing to risk relations with the West, therefore the idea of partnership had vanished.

Chapter 3: Post-Kosovo Foreign Policy

The Kosovo crisis had a lasting impact on Russian foreign policy. Relations between NATO and Russia did not resume once the crisis was over. It took nearly a year before they were reestablished. In the period immediately following the crisis things seemed not to improve. When the war in Chechnya flared up again, relations with the West only got worse. It was not until after Yeltsin's resignation that relations began to slowly improve.

This chapter will discuss the nature of Russian foreign policy from the end of the Kosovo crisis to December 2000. First, relations with the West during Yeltsin's last few months will be assessed. Then, Putin's first year in office, first as an incumbent and later as the elected President, will be examined. This chapter will determine what type of foreign policy Russia was following after the Kosovo crisis, and what factors may have influenced this policy. It will also briefly mention issues that were ongoing at the end of 2000.

Russian foreign policy today is one of partnership with Europe, and developing closer ties with other regions of the world, including strategic partnerships with China,

and the CIS states. Relations with NATO have been revived, but the trust is gone and suspicions of NATO's desire to intervene in Chechnya remain. Cooperation with Europe is clearly a manifestation of the moderate liberal policy that had developed before the Kosovo crisis, but the problems with the US and the distrust of NATO had developed during and after the Kosovo crisis. The idea of partnership no longer includes the entire West, but instead focuses on Europe.

Yeltsin's Last Days

Russian foreign policy in the second half of 1999 was concerned with redefining Russia-NATO relations and Russia's relations with the West as a whole. On October 12, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov made a statement about this very issue. He acknowledged that, like it or not, NATO was a reality in Europe and in the world. This was the reason why Russia had signed the Founding Act in 1997. According to Ivanov, it may be that NATO was a leftover from the Cold War, but the fact remained that all states have the right to join any kind of alliance they see fit. Conflicts arise when these alliances threaten the security of another state. NATO broke that Russia-NATO Founding

Act, but Russia must maintain relations with Europe and most nations of Western Europe are members of NATO. Relations with NATO are being rebuilt, but it will be slow because a fundamental trust has been broken.¹⁵⁰ This statement seems to reflect a desire to move past the events of the Kosovo crisis, and rebuild relations with NATO. However, other indicators suggest that this may not be so easy.

The Kosovo crisis was not the only issue of concern between NATO and Russia. During the crisis, at the NATO Washington Summit on April 23-24, two things occurred that had an impact on NATO-Russian relations. The first was that NATO's first wave of expansion had been completed. The second factor was that NATO had approved a new Strategic Concept. This concept was not radically different from the 1991 concept, but several parts had been developed. It stated that conflict prevention and crisis management were among the essential elements of NATO's responsibilities. It also confirmed that NATO was still open to further expansion, and any European democracy may

¹⁵⁰Gornostaiev, D., "Igor' Ivanov: Otstavka Prezidenta destabiliziruet situatsiiu v mire," Nezavisimaia Gazeta October 12 1999, p. 6.

be considered for entry.¹⁵¹ This only confirmed that NATO's role in the European security environment was growing.

In late 1999, Russia was also dealing with a rash of terrorist activity in Moscow. In September, terrorist bombs had killed more than 300 people. They had been placed in a shopping mall, three different apartment buildings, and military housing for officers and their families. The Kremlin declared that Chechen rebels, who were fighting the Russian Army in Dagestan at the time, planted these bombs.¹⁵² These bombings had created an atmosphere of fear in Moscow, and the government reacted. Prime Minister Putin had promised to put a stop to this, by destroying terrorist bases in Chechnya.¹⁵³ The Russian government began to focus much of its efforts on fighting a war against terrorism.

In October of 1999, new drafts of the Foreign Policy Concept and the National Security Doctrine were released; and they were later approved in early 2000. In both documents the US and NATO are singled out as the main sources of growing military and political threats. The

¹⁵¹Cragg, A., "A New Strategic Concept for a New Era," NATO Review v47 n2 (1999), pp. 19-22.

¹⁵²"Terrorism in Russia," The Connection (an internet news source) September 21 1999. www.theconnection.org/archive/1999/09/0921a.shtml.

¹⁵³Martin, S., "Separatists Deny Blame for 300 Bomb Deaths," The Irish Times September 15 1999. www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/1999/0915/wor2.htm.

National Security Doctrine points to US domination over international politics, and the use of force in the resolution of conflicts as threats to the development of a multipolar system.¹⁵⁴ The Foreign Policy Concept points to the development of this multipolar world as Russia's highest priority in the international arena.¹⁵⁵ The National Security Doctrine also provides for the use of nuclear weapons in war. It included a nuclear first use policy, which previously had been rejected in Russian policy. It stated that Russia could use nuclear weapons if under attack, even if they were only facing conventional weapons under extreme circumstances.¹⁵⁶

The National Security Doctrine further identifies several threats facing Russia. These threats, in the order they appear in the document, are: the failure of states and alliances to recognize the existing mechanisms of international security, especially the UN and the OSCE; the weakening of Russia's political, economic and military stance in the world; the strengthening of military alliances, and NATO's eastward expansion; the possibility of foreign military bases and powerful military contingents

¹⁵⁴MID, Kontseptsia natsional'noi bezopasnost'i RF. (2000)
www.ln.mid.ru/website/ns-O.../a54f9caa5e6875e432569fb00487a6?OpenDocument.htm

¹⁵⁵MID, Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RF. (2000)
www.mid.ru/mid/vpcons.htm

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*

being placed on Russia's borders; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their technology; the development and escalation of conflict around Russia's borders, or the borders of any CIS state; and finally, claims on Russian territory.¹⁵⁷ This doctrine further states that:

Threats to the national security of the Russian Federation...exist as a result of other states trying to prevent the strengthening of Russia as a center of power in a multipolar world, to interfere in the realization of Russia's national interests, and to weaken Russia's position in Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵⁸

Many of these threats can be linked directly to both the Kosovo crisis and NATO expansion. NATO expansion is referred to directly as one of the main threats facing Russia, and the threat of military bases near Russia's borders refers to NATO's placement of forces on the territory of its new members. The threat presented by states and alliances refusing to recognize the role of the UN and OSCE can be linked to the Kosovo crisis. During this crisis Russia repeatedly claimed that NATO was acting without UN consent. This combined with the naming outright of NATO and the US as threats show that Russian relations with NATO and the US were not what they once were. The level of distrust and disagreement had grown.

¹⁵⁷MID, Kontseptsia natsional'noi bezopasnost'i RF.

¹⁵⁸Ibid.

The Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation has been demanding its independence from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After an unsuccessful campaign by the Russians to put an end to rebel action, a cease-fire was signed between Russia and Chechnya in 1996. However, in late 1999, after months of fighting in Dagestan between the Russian Army and Chechen rebel forces, and the bombings in Moscow, the Russian government decided to take action. When war broke out again between Russia and Chechnya, things only got worse between Russia and the West. The Russian government had issued a warning that a bombing campaign would begin in Groznii. Yeltsin warned the citizens of Groznii that they had better evacuate the city before December 11. Shortly after, Clinton made a statement condemning this warning. On December 8, 1999, Clinton announced "Russia will pay a high price for Chechnya". Clinton claimed that Russia's threat to the citizens of Groznii only served to destabilize the region and to lower Russia's standing in the international community. He further stated that the US supported the fight against terrorism, but that Russia's methods in Chechnya were counterproductive. The European Union took an even harsher stance. The Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that if Russia did not stop its use of force in

Chechnya, the EU would stop trade and negotiations on all new agreements, and would prevent Russia from getting any IMF funding.¹⁵⁹

These statements were all made during Yeltsin's visit to Beijing. During the course of these meetings Russia and China had agreed on several issues, including the need to foster multipolarity in the international arena. From Beijing, Yeltsin responded to the statement made by Bill Clinton. He suggested that Clinton must have forgot that Russia is a nuclear power when he took it upon himself to try to pressure Russia. He also claimed that it is not and will never be the case that Bill Clinton alone could dictate to the world how to live.¹⁶⁰ This response, while quite drastic and a little alarming, shows that Russia was concerned over US interference in Russia's internal affairs. The fact that Yeltsin responded only to Clinton's statements and not to those of the EU shows that Russia was not so willing to push relations with the EU as they were with the US.

According to Dobriansky, despite a breakdown in relations between Russia and NATO, and the US in particular, Russia is not out to over turn the present

¹⁵⁹Iusin, M., "Golos Ameriki," Izvestiia December 8 1999, p. 1.

¹⁶⁰Gornostaev, D., "El'tsin napomnil Klintonu i miru: Rossiia ostaetsia iadernoi derzhavoi," Nezavisimaia Gazeta December 10 1999, p. 1.

status quo. Russia has adopted the term of major power for itself, has emphasized the need to advance Russia's economic interests, and has stressed the importance of the Near Abroad. Russian diplomats are also relentlessly advocating the use of diplomatic means in solving international conflicts. All of these things suggest that Russia is searching for its role in the present system, rather than trying to overturn it.¹⁶¹

During Yeltsin's last six months as President, Russia-NATO relations had not recovered. There had still been no consultations between the two, and would not be until March 2000. However, it also seemed clear that despite problems with NATO and the US, Russia was not looking to overturn the status quo. Russia seemed to be searching for an independent role within the existing international system.

Putin

On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin stepped down as President of the Russian Federation and handed power over to Vladimir Putin. Putin was later elected President in March 2000. This section will examine Putin's first year in power. During this time Putin did not make drastic

¹⁶¹Dobriansky, P.J., "Russian Foreign Policy," p. 141.

changes to foreign policy. Relations with the West did improve, but relations with China and the Near Abroad were also maintained. Putin did not abandon the basic premises of the Primakov Doctrine. The most notable part of Putin's policy has been the added emphasis on Europe. Russia has been working towards a multipolar world by fostering relations with Europe, Central Asia and China.¹⁶² This has meant less emphasis on relations with the US, in favour of relations with Europe.

Vladimir Putin graduated from the Department of Law at Leningrad State University. Immediately following university he began working for the state security agency, the KGB. He was stationed in East Germany from 1985 to 1990. In 1991 he began working for the Mayor of Saint Petersburg, as the chairman of the Committee for External Relations. From 1996 to 1998 he worked for the Presidential Administration in various positions. In 1998, he was appointed director of the Federal Security Service, (FSB), which was one of the successors to the KGB. In August of 1999, he was appointed Prime Minister in one of Yeltsin's many cabinet shuffles.¹⁶³ As Prime Minister and President, Putin consistently claimed to support the reform

¹⁶²Leahy, A., "Putin's Russia," International Journal v55 n4 (2000), p. 644.

¹⁶³"Biografiia," Vladimir Putin: Kandidat na post Prezidenta RF. (1999). www.putin2000.ru/01/

process and the development of democracy in Russia. He had spoken about a revival of moral values in Russia, and the rejuvenation of the economy as main priorities. He also had appealed to the patriotic tendencies in Russian society by voicing his desire to restore respect and power to Russia. His statements reflected a commitment to the development of law and order, and a strong state.¹⁶⁴

The fundamental basis of Russian foreign policy during Putin's first year was the development of a multipolar world based on a dynamic geopolitical balance.¹⁶⁵ Ivanov's statement on January 20, 2000, only confirmed this. He claimed that there is no alternative to multipolarity: it was the only way to protect the interests of each individual state in an era of globalization; it would provide security for all states and international peace. This system should be based on the sharing of information and culture, arms reductions, and the UN. Ivanov announced that Russia wanted to work together with the EU in developing a cooperative system and for integration. This is why Russia supported the OSCE and the Council of Europe. As for relations with NATO, Ivanov did not rule them out, but said that cooperation may be possible only if NATO

¹⁶⁴Leahy, A., "Putin's Russia," pp. 634-637.

¹⁶⁵Tsentr Evraziiskikh Geopoliticheskikh Initsiativ, Nash put': Strategicheskie perspektivy razvitiia Rossii v XXI veke. ("ARKTOGEYA-Tsentr": Moscow, 1999). P. 95.

considered Russia's national interests and international concerns. He ends by stating that the CIS would continue to be an area of high priority for Russia. Relations with these states should be based on mutual benefit and friendship.¹⁶⁶ This statement clearly suggests that Russia's areas of interest lay in Europe and the CIS, and that relations with NATO could be rebuilt if trust could be reestablished.

The beginning of improved relations with NATO can be seen in early 2000. On February 16 a meeting was held between Putin, Ivanov, and NATO representatives. At this meeting it was agreed that Russia and NATO must work to put the recent conflict behind them and rebuild relations, based on the premises of the Founding Act.¹⁶⁷ Both sides had agreed that they needed to reestablish the trust that was lost during the Kosovo crisis. NATO once again had to convince Russia that it did not present a threat to Russian sovereignty and interests.

The first step towards this goal was achieved on March 15, 2000, almost one year after the beginning of the

¹⁶⁶Ivanov, I., "Russia and Today's World-Moscow's Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the 21st Century," Nezavisimaia Gazeta January 20 2000, p. 9. Translated in "Ivanov on Russian Foreign Policy for 21st Century," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press v52 n3 February 16 2000 pp. 9-10

¹⁶⁷Sokolov, V., "Kreml' i NATO pomirilis'," Nezavisimaia Gazeta February 17 2000, p. 1.

bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. This was the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, since Yeltsin had frozen relations.¹⁶⁸ This marked the first step in reopening the channels of communication between Russia and NATO.

Putin took a very active role in this first year of his presidency. By May 2000 he had already visited all of the leaders of the CIS states and was preparing for meetings with the US and European leaders. He had also adopted the Foreign Policy Concept and National Security Doctrine that had been drafted under Yeltsin. As discussed earlier, these documents laid out the perceived threats facing Russia. They also focused on the concept of developing a multipolar world and an international arena in which Russia was a European state and a Eurasian great power, dedicated to regional and global security.¹⁶⁹

Putin continued a foreign policy based on the ideas of the Primakov Doctrine. He was attempting to strengthen ties to Europe, China and the Near Abroad. He had placed emphasis on forging new ties with India and Iran, and was increasing arms sales activities. He was also attempting

¹⁶⁸Gornostaev, D., "Rossiia i NATO snova sovietuiutsia," Nezavisimaia Gazeta March 16 2000, p. 1.

¹⁶⁹Medvedev, R., "Vladimir Putin. Novye aktsenty vneshnei politiki Rossii," Rossiisskaia Gazeta August 8 2000, pp. 3 & 7.

to get NATO-Russian relations on a more stable ground. However, there was an issue of contention that threatened to harm relations between Russia and the US: Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM). This issue had been on going for some time now, but the debate really only heated up in 2000.

The United States wanted to develop and deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. This would be an anti-missile system, which would protect the largest cities in the US. It would consist of space and ground-based sensors to provide early-warning, ground-based radar to identify and track missiles, ground-based interceptors to destroy enemy warheads, and a battle command, control and communications system.¹⁷⁰ The initial deployment is set to take place in 2005, although at the time of writing this had not yet been approved. This initial deployment would include ground-based rocket interceptors capable of protecting all 50 states.¹⁷¹

The US had become committed to the deployment of this system. In March 1999, a congressional bill gave the initial go ahead, but when it was signed into law in July 1999, it confirmed the US's commitment to NMD. According

¹⁷⁰London Telegraph, Russia Ready to Defy Missile Defence Plan. (2001). www.smh.com.au/news/0012/06/world/world7.html.

¹⁷¹Ferguson, C.D. & Pike, J.E., National Missile Defence: Developing Disaster. (2000). www.acronym.org.uk/44nmd.htm.

to this law the President was now authorized to move forward with the project.¹⁷² While Bill Clinton signed this into law, George W. Bush had also expressed his commitment to the development of NMD in order to protect the US from rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea,¹⁷³ as well as from accidental launch from Russia.¹⁷⁴

While the idea of this system was disturbing to Russia because of its implications for Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)¹⁷⁵ and the strategic arms balance, the larger issue was that the deployment of the NMD breaks the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limits the development of an anti-ballistic missile system. Under this treaty the US system would be limited to its already existing launch pads in Grand Forks, North Dakota and nationwide protection is prohibited.¹⁷⁶ The US would like to negotiate changes to the treaty, while Russia refused the idea of modifications.

¹⁷²"National Missile Defence-An Attempt at World Domination by US Imperialism," Lalkar (a communist newsletter published in the UK). (2001). www.lalkar.demon.co.uk/issues/contents/sep2000/missiles.htm

¹⁷³London Telegraph, Russia Ready to Defy Missile Defence Plan.

¹⁷⁴Ferguson, C.D. & Pike, J.E., National Missile Defence: Developing Disaster. (2000). www.acronym.org.uk/44nmd.htm.

¹⁷⁵MAD is a concept that is integral to the arms control environment. Each side has enough weapons to assure the destruction of the other side. Weapons above and beyond this level can then be eliminated. As long as both sides are able to effectively wipe out the other side, arms reductions can proceed. If there is not Mutually Assured Destruction, then there is imbalance and one side will see itself as insecure. If there is MAD then both sides can feel secure in knowing that they can destroy the other. Currently there is MAD between the US and Russia, but NMD would provide protection for the continental US, and therefore, the US would have an advantage over Russia.

¹⁷⁶London Telegraph, Russia Ready to Defy Missile Defence Plan.

Russia saw the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic arms reduction between the US and Russia. Breaking this treaty would undermine the trust behind the arms reductions.¹⁷⁷ While there were legal means for the US to terminate the treaty, it would really be in everyone's best interest if an agreement on the issue was found.¹⁷⁸ However, an agreement may not be so easily reached.

Russia had threatened to tear up all other arms agreements if the US goes ahead with the development and implementation of NMD. Regardless of their official opposition to the NMD, it is quite evident that Russia feels threatened by US deployment of any ABM system. Many analysts, such as Ferguson and Pike,¹⁷⁹ have argued that if the US does break the ABM Treaty, Russia will feel extremely threatened and will begin to develop new arms, in turn spurring an arms race similar to the days of the Cold War.¹⁸⁰ While this may seem a bit extreme, it was understandable seeing that the Russians feared that the ultimate goal of NMD was to put Russia at a disadvantage in

¹⁷⁷Ferguson, C.D. & Pike, J.E., National Missile Defence: Developing Disaster.

¹⁷⁸MacDonald, G.E.C., NORAD and National Missile Defence: A Perspective of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. (2001).
www.journal.dnd.ca/voll/no2_e/policy_e/poll_e.html.

¹⁷⁹Ferguson, C.D. & Pike, J.E., National Missile Defence: Developing Disaster.

¹⁸⁰National Missile Defence-An Attempt at World Domination by US Imperialism.

the arms arena.¹⁸¹ Russia blatantly distrusted the US and feared that they were trying to gain a strategic advantage.

Russia was not the only state that opposed the development of NMD. With the exception of Britain, almost all the EU states had expressed concern over the US deployment of an ABM system.¹⁸² Europe was afraid of the effects that US NMD might have on European security. Many felt that once the US was protected it may cause rogue states to aim their missiles at Europe because of its close ties to the US and the number of American forces stationed in Europe. All of the European states were also concerned about the issue of the ABM Treaty. They felt that breaking this treaty would set a bad precedent and start a new arms race. China and Canada had also expressed concern over this issue.¹⁸³ Many of the European states that opposed the NMD have expressed interest in the plan presented by Putin. He suggested that instead of the US NMD, a common European missile defence be established. This idea found support in Europe.¹⁸⁴

By the end of 2000, no resolution had yet been found to this disagreement. In fact, this discussion was still

¹⁸¹London Telegraph, Russia Ready to Defy Missile Defence Plan.

¹⁸²National Missile Defence-An Attempt at World Domination by US Imperialism.

¹⁸³NMD-A Threat to European Security. (2001). www.european-defence.co.uk/article10.html.

¹⁸⁴Medvedev, R., "Vladimir Putin," p. 3.

on going at the time of writing. This issue will be one which may be fundamental in rebuilding, or destroying, trust between the US and Russia. It is impossible to say what the result of this dispute will be, but it will have its impact on US-Russian relations.

Influences

Russian foreign policy during Putin's first year was not drastically different from what came before it. It was based on the principles of the Primakov Doctrine, and because of this was very focused on the development of a multipolar world. It also concentrated on relations with Europe and the Near Abroad. Relations with NATO and the US were much colder than they were previous to the Kosovo conflict. While the situation with NATO seemed to be improving, or at least discussion was under way, relations with the US had hit yet another roadblock. This next section will look at some of the forces driving foreign policy from July 1999 to December 2000. While the economic collapse in 1998, and disagreement with the IMF over aid had some influence, overwhelming evidence seems to suggest that the main motivators for policy had been NATO expansion and the Kosovo crisis.

In Ivanov's speech on January 20, 2000, he addressed this issue. He claimed that "the events in Yugoslavia raised numerous questions" about NATO's willingness to take Russia's concerns into consideration and about their desire to comply with the agreements made in the Founding Act. Ivanov went on to say that NATO was "a reality in the European arena, and ignoring that fact would be shortsighted at best".¹⁸⁵ This expressed the conflicting ideas behind Russian foreign policy. After the Kosovo crisis there was a great deal of mistrust built up between NATO and Russia, but Russia had to deal with NATO because NATO was not going away.

When being interviewed about the draft of the Foreign Policy Concept and the National Security Doctrine, Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev admitted that the Kosovo crisis had led to many revisions in the threat assessment contained in the National Security Doctrine. Kosovo also confirmed many of the fears that Russia had over NATO expansion. The fact that NATO had recently expanded and was already bombing a non-NATO country close to Russia was seen as increasing the threat of NATO intervention in Russia's internal affairs. Military analysts in Russia argued that NATO action in Kosovo was a template for NATO

¹⁸⁵Ivanov, I., "Russia and Today's World," p. 9.

action against Russia's vital interests. Russian perceptions were that NATO wanted to take unilateral action in the Balkans and in the Caucasus.¹⁸⁶ This shows that this mistrust of NATO, caused by events in Kosovo, had a direct impact on the formation of Russian foreign policy.

With the war in Kosovo coming on the heels of NATO expansion, the level of distrust remained high. After NATO used military force in Kosovo it was no longer reasonable for Russia to believe that NATO was a "purely defensive alliance dedicated to peace and upholding the principles of the United Nations".¹⁸⁷ Yet this was exactly what NATO was asking Russia to believe. All the trust and cooperation that had been built and confirmed by the Founding Act was destroyed by the Kosovo conflict.¹⁸⁸

When the Kosovo crisis was over there was a great deal of resentment and mistrust left behind. Russia was no longer in contact with NATO, and the fundamental agreement they had built was in ruins. In the second half of 1999, Russian foreign policy had as its main goal the development of a multipolar world. It sought to do this by developing relations with China and the Near Abroad. Relations with

¹⁸⁶Blank, S.J., Threats to Russian Security. Pp. 3-5.

¹⁸⁷Bissett, J., Notes for Address to Standing Committee Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

¹⁸⁸"NATO," pp. 1-18 (Extract after p. 54).

NATO and the US remained poor. Russia had no contact with NATO until February 2000, and exchanges with the US could only be seen as conflictual. However, in 2000 things began to warm up. Putin stressed relations with Europe, and Russia acknowledged that NATO was in fact a reality in European affairs, and must be dealt with. So relations were reestablished with NATO and they were trying to find a way back to the agreement they had previously found.

Relations with the US were not so quickly repaired. A new conflict quickly arose in Russia-US relations. The disagreement over the NMD has prevented Russia and the US from really fostering relations after the war in Kosovo. However, this has not seemed to hamper Russian foreign policy. The main initiative in Putin's first year was to increase relations with Europe and to maintain a good relationship with the CIS states and China.

While it is uncertain where Russia's foreign policy will lead it, it is clear that this policy will be directed towards Europe and the development of a multipolar international system. They have committed themselves to this, and hope to remain a great power within this system. The fact that partnership with Europe was considered a priority shows the moderate liberal strain in Russian foreign policy. However, the National Security Doctrine

and the Foreign Policy Concept clearly pointed to the US and NATO as threats. Partnership was not considered an option with them. This, combined with the focus on the CIS and China, shows that remnants of the centrist and moderate conservative policy line have been left behind from the Kosovo crisis. Russian foreign policy today is a combination of these two policies.

Chapter 4: Comparison and Analysis

In the introduction, four main policy groups were outlined to classify Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Each time period has been classified in the previous chapters. This chapter focuses on a comparison of these policies. It will then examine the five factors that influenced Russian foreign policy and see how they changed.

Russian foreign policy in the period from 1991 to 1993 was pro-Western in nature. This was defined by Kozyrev's initial policy of economic and political integration with the West. Russia declared its commitment to institutions such as the UN, which were focused on creating cooperation and international peace. Kozyrev also actively pursued cooperation with the G7, the EU, the OECD, and several international financial institutions. During this period Russia's national interests were seen as intrinsically linked to those of the West. They included things like partnership with other democratic states, international economic competition, and involvement in the international market. Russia was also very interested in ending the arms race and moving forward with disarmament. There was even a

sense that failure to integrate into the West would be catastrophic for Russia, a missed opportunity. This policy of pro-Westernism shone through in almost all of Russia's international actions. In the beginning of the Yugoslav wars, Russia agreed to sanctions and international peacekeeping forces in regions that were once considered to be its own sphere of influence. Relations with the US and Europe were given the highest priority. However, this policy quickly reached its end.

In late 1992 and early 1993 popular opinion and political opposition rose against this policy. The period between 1993 and 1996 was a time of searching for a way to balance Russia's relations with the West, to form a real equal partnership. This newly developing policy was to be more pragmatic in its outlook, and protect the traditional interests of Russia and its newly developed interests. It was to be based on the idea of Russia as a regional superpower, a world great power, and a nuclear superpower. The Foreign Policy Concept adopted in April 1993 focused on economic progress and domestic stabilization. It saw the threats to Russia coming from within. Russia's relations with Yugoslavia also began to change. Russia supported a more pro-Serbian line by trying to get sanctions lifted and by opposing military action. Relations with South Korea,

China, and India were also strengthened. All of these changing ideas were solidified into a single policy formulated by Primakov.

Policy from 1996 to 1999 was largely based on the ideas of Evgenii Primakov. This policy sought to create an equal and mutually beneficial relationship with the West. Russia and the West would be true equal partners. The Primakov Doctrine rejected the idea that the Cold War had winners and losers, and embraced the idea that the world was in a stage of developing multipolarity. It also condemned the use of economic measures for political gain, that is sanctions, and rejected unilateral action in the case of international conflict. It advocated cooperation, but not at the expense of state sovereignty, which is the backbone of international relations.

Policy from 1996 to 1999 clearly reflected these ideas, which represent a moderate liberal stance, that is, partnership with the West based on independence and equality. This can be seen in the policies towards NATO. Russia was categorically against the expansion of NATO. However, Russia's opposition to the West on this issue did not harm relations during this period. In fact, Russia still moved forward with the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, which brought the two into a

cooperative relationship. This clearly demonstrates the idea of independent foreign policy, but partnership with the West. They cooperated, but did not agree on all issues. The National Security Doctrine adopted in 1997 focused once again on internal issues instead of external threats. Russia saw its interests in developing an environment in which they could focus on domestic stability. This period is reflective of the moderate liberal policy line: partnership with the West, but an independent foreign policy.

Policy during the Kosovo crisis was more identifiable with the centrist and moderate conservative line than with the moderate liberal one. Russia was willing to allow relations with the West to deteriorate in order to defend what it saw as its national interests. Russia harshly condemned NATO action in Yugoslavia and openly opposed it. They even went as far as to freeze all relations with NATO, and call off Primakov's much-awaited visit to the US. This was all because NATO had taken unilateral action in the Balkans, an area considered to be in Russia's area of interest. Eventually Russia was brought into the decision making process, but remained adamant that NATO had broken the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the UN Charter and even NATO's own Charter. Russia insisted on having its

peacekeepers in Yugoslavia, but refused to allow them to be commanded by NATO. Russia wanted to have control over its own forces.

While Russia did continue to do business with Western states and institutions during the crisis, it clearly put its self-interest in the region ahead of relations with the West. Russia had abandoned the idea of partnership in favour of protecting its interests in its traditional sphere of influence, but it did not give up on relations all together.

In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis it was unclear what impact the crisis would have on Russia-Western relations. The Foreign Policy Concept and the National Security Doctrine developed late in 1999 point to many external threats that were clearly linked to NATO expansion and the Kosovo crisis. The previous documents had focused on domestic issues that might present threats. These documents clearly focused on external issues and the threat of unilateral intervention into Russia, or its areas of interest. The rapport that had been built up over the years between NATO and Russia was gone.

When the war in Chechnya broke out again, things only got worse. When criticized by the US for its actions, Russia responded by reminding the US that Russia remained a

nuclear power. The current issue of the US NMD has also caused a lot of stress in US-Russian relations. Russia has threatened to tear up all arms agreements if the US moves forward with it. Russia is unwilling to allow the US to have a strategic advantage over it.

In relations with the US and NATO, Russian policy is clearly following a centrist and moderate conservative line. It is focusing on protecting itself, regardless of the impact on relations with NATO or the US. Russia has recently restarted relations with NATO and expressed its interest in rebuilding the channels of communication and the Founding Act. This is an attempt to stabilize relations, rather than to form a partnership.

Relations with Europe, on the other hand, reflect a more moderate liberal policy line. As seen in the previous chapter, foreign policy during Putin's first year emphasized Russia's interest in the formation of a cooperative system for European peace and security, and Russia's part in this system. Russia's relations with Europe are stabilizing, while relations with the US are deteriorating. Russian foreign policy in general is focused on fostering partnerships with the CIS states, China, and Europe, and maintaining some degree of stability in relations with the US.

In the introduction, five different influencing factors were described. These were: motivations, purposes and intentions; power and capability; risk; cost-benefit; and opportunity and threat. This next section will look at how these factors changed over time, and how their relative importance changed.

The first category is motivations, purposes and intention. Beginning in 1992, foreign policy became an issue in domestic politics. This meant that public opinion and political opposition all had their own views of what Russian foreign policy should be. This is why opposition and opinion became a large motivating factor in Russian foreign policy. This is especially evident in 1993 to 1996, when rising public and political opposition to the pro-Western policies caused the government to change its foreign policy orientation. Realist theory, as mentioned earlier, focuses on national interests as a determinant of how a state acts. However, before 1996, and the development of the Primakov Doctrine, it was not clear what Russia's national interests were. Public opinion and political opposition played a role in determining what Russia's national interests would be, these interests then began guiding Russian foreign policy. Until 1996, the

government had been pursuing a policy that was unsustainable because it did not consider many of the issues vital to Russia's regional stability, such as the Near Abroad or Russians living there. This combined with a general growth in nationalism, led the government to reassess its foreign policy concerns, and ultimately to a shift in policy towards a more pragmatic approach. Public opinion and opposition groups were able to make such an impact because the previous policy had not been based on any consensus.

After 1996, political opposition continued to be a motivating factor, but not to the same degree. A consensus had been formed on issues of foreign policy. This consensus was embodied in the Primakov Doctrine. After 1996, the foreign policy elite knew that as long as they adhered to these ideas, then the opposition would not be too immense. Leaders were concerned with not giving their opponents more ammunition. After the shift in Russian foreign policy in 1996, public opinion and political opposition did not play a direct role in influencing policy. It is possible that the popularity of the campaign in Chechnya may have influenced Yeltsin's reaction to Western criticism of the war, but the degree to which this influenced his decisions is unclear. During Putin's first

year the role of public opinion and political opposition has been even more diminished because of the popularity he enjoyed and the support of the Duma. Initially, public opinion and political opposition was a large motivating factor in Russian foreign policy, but this influence faded as the government grew stronger.

Public opinion and political opposition may have been driving Russia towards a less pro-Western policy, but there were also factors that were motivating Russia to remain on a Westernizing path. The promise of international aid and IMF funds was a large motivating factor. Russia was more likely to receive the money it so desperately needed, if it pursued a foreign policy that was cooperative with the West. Russia needed this money to continue its domestic reform. This issue will also be discussed in the cost-benefit section.

Intentions and purposes in Russian foreign policy have remained constant since 1996. The main goal of Russian foreign policy since 1996 has been to establish some form of independent relationship with the West. Russia has tried to establish stability in its surrounding region so that it could focus on internal issues such as political stability and economic development. Russia's primary goal in the post-Cold War period has been to find and develop

its role in the new international system. Since 1996, Russia has seen its role as that of an international great power and the dominant regional power. Its goal is to develop an environment in which Russia is a center of power in a multipolar world.

The next issue is that of power and capabilities. While these factors had changed dramatically from the times of the Soviet Union, since 1991 change has been very gradual. Russia's ability to influence events in the international arena, and its economic and resource capabilities have not radically changed. Since this is a comparison between different time period in one states policy it is reasonable to assume that this factor would not dramatically change in the short to medium term. However, the slow decay of Russia's military has changed its capability to defend itself. The war in Chechnya demonstrated this very clearly. The lack of funds and supplies had led to a steady decline in the ability of the Russian army to act, either in a defensive or offensive manner. This steady decline in conventional forces caused Russia to begin to rely on its nuclear arsenal.

The next factor to be discussed is risk. From 1991 to the present day, Russia has not had to consider the risk of military confrontation with the West. The risks facing

Russia in the post-Cold War period have been of a different nature. The Kosovo crisis presented several risks for Russia. The first of these was that it had the potential to set a precedent. If NATO was allowed to intervene in Kosovo, this could provide legitimacy for NATO intervention elsewhere. If this were the case then Russia could eventually face NATO intervention in Chechnya, or in other internal matters. Conversely, if NATO had not been allowed to intervene in Kosovo, then no such precedent would be set. NATO would have no justification for interfering in Russia's internal affairs.

Russia also faced the risk of setting a bad example by not acting. If Russia did not oppose the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, then it would open a virtual Pandora's box. Russian rhetoric had been consistently opposed to Western intervention in Russia's traditional 'sphere of influence' since 1996. Had they not opposed NATO action in Kosovo, it could be interpreted that they would also not oppose Western involvement in other areas near Russia, such as the Baltics and the CIS states. This could lead Western actors to believe that Russia would not seriously object to a larger role for the West in these areas, and possibly the further expansion of NATO. Closely related to this is the risk of losing influence in these areas. If Russia does

nothing to support a state that was once in its sphere of influence, then it may lose legitimacy in these areas. If all the previous statements about forming strategic partnerships and mutually beneficial relationships are believed to be mere rhetoric, then these states might be inclined to turn towards the West for partnership instead. By not acting in Kosovo, Russia could have risked losing influence in areas that are considered to be vital to Russia's national interests.

The cost-benefit balance has also changed over time. The shift in policy in 1993 was partly caused by the understanding that the costs of a pro-Western policy were increasing. The benefits of this policy were large amounts of Western aid, while the costs were following or agreement on international issues. However, as internal opposition to this policy grew, so did the cost. Continuing this pro-Western line would have been political suicide for Yeltsin and Kozyrev.

After 1996 the cost-benefit balance had changed. The cost of sacrificing Russia's interests clearly outweighed the benefits. Russia had to follow a more independent policy, at the expense of relations with the West. During the Kosovo crisis, the cost of compliance with the West would have been a loss of influence in Yugoslavia. As

discussed earlier, the failure to support Yugoslavia could ultimately lead to a loss of influence in Russia's areas of interest. This cost was unacceptable to Russia, so it was forced to find a policy that demonstrated its opposition, but left room for joint action with the West. Similarly, the development of a US NMD would mean the loss of MAD and a strategic arms balance between Russia and the US. Taking into account the reduction in Russia's military capacity, this is a large price to pay; and once again, Russia has deemed this an unacceptable cost and is opposed to it. For each foreign policy decision made one can examine the cost-benefit analysis. Since the foreign policy shift in 1993 the cost of compliance with the West has steadily increased.

The final factor that influenced Russian foreign policy was opportunity and threat. As was seen in the previous chapters, from 1991 to 1999 Russia did not see the West as threatening. The Foreign Policy Concept and National Security Doctrine for this period clearly pointed to internal instability and economic underdevelopment as the main threats facing Russia. These documents focused on priorities such as development of the domestic economy and political infrastructure. However, the 2000 documents point to several external threats connected to the West.

These documents outline several threats from external sources, and mostly related to military matters. The National Security Doctrine points to NATO expansion, action by states or blocs without the consent of the UN, the placement of large military units or bases near Russia's borders, and the escalation of conflicts near or on Russia's borders. The Foreign Policy Concept also points to growing US domination in international affairs as a threat to Russia's role in the international arena. The Concept also places priority on counteracting this trend, and forging strategic partnerships with the CIS states and China.

Most of the threats are related to Russia's military weakness, the increasing global influence of the US, the expansion of NATO, and NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia. Taking this into consideration it then becomes clear why Russia is fundamentally opposed to the development of US NMD. The implementation of this system in the US, according to Russia, would only put Russia at a further disadvantage to the US.

The issue of opportunity is also important. Since 1996 Russia has been dedicated to developing an independent foreign policy. The crisis in Kosovo was an excellent

opportunity for Russia to demonstrate this new independence.

In the policy shift in 1993, the most important factor seemed to be motivations such as internal opposition to pro-Western policies. However, from 1996 to the present the most important factor in explaining changes in Russian foreign policy has been the change in perceived threats. While the cost-benefit analysis has also played a large role, the fact that Russia now sees the US and NATO as threats has deeply impacted present-day policies. This change in threat assessment, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, was linked directly to the expansion of NATO and the Kosovo crisis.

Conclusions

The crisis in Kosovo solidified an already existing move away from the West in Russian foreign policy. Ever since 1993, Russia had been rejecting the idea of a pro-Western foreign policy. With the adoption of the Primakov Doctrine, Russia's foreign policy became more independent from the West. The issue of NATO expansion had consistently caused mistrust between NATO and Russia, and the Kosovo crisis confirmed many of the fears that Russia had about expansion. Relations with the US and NATO have not significantly improved since the end of the crisis. Despite problems, Russia's relations with Europe have been improving faster than relations with NATO and the US. The Kosovo crisis emphasized Russia's suspicions of NATO and the US and the necessity for Russia to focus on regional stability and influence. The Kosovo crisis strengthened the idea that Russia must find a way of protecting its traditional interests. Cooperation with Europe is seen as contributing to this goal, while cooperation with NATO and the US does not.

The future of Russian foreign policy is most likely on the same path. Russia has recently devoted efforts to the

development of a system for peace and cooperation in Europe, such as their constant advocating of the OSCE as a pillar in European security, and efforts to find an agreement on a European missile defence system as an alternative to the US NMD, and will most likely continue in this direction. Russia's proximity to Europe and its political and economic influence over neighboring states suggest that Russia's interest lies in creating a stable partnership. Relations with NATO have also been improving recently, but it is uncertain how far this will go. The Kosovo crisis was a major breach of trust between NATO and Russia, and it remains to be seen if this can be overcome.

Relations with the US are also tense. It is likely that Russia will continue to oppose the development of NMD, and if it goes forward, then it is anyone's guess what Russia's reaction will be. Many experts suggest that it will spur a new arms race, but Russia has no desire for this. It does not have the money or resources for a new arms race. However, Russia does feel threatened by the deployment of NMD, so its reaction will probably be aggressive. Russia has also recently been reforming the armed forces and Ministry of Defence. It will be cutting staff and restructuring in order to modernize Russia's military. This ultimately is hoped to free up enough money

to upgrade Russia's arsenal and to properly train its troops.¹⁸⁹ Russia is likely to want to develop new weapons in response to NMD, and these defence reforms might make this possible. Russia will also most likely continue to advocate the development of a European Missile Defence system.

It is undoubtedly the case that Russia will continue to focus its attention on the Near Abroad, as Russia has come to realize the importance of this area for its own national security. It will also most likely continue to develop a strategic partnership with China, especially if relations with the US continue to worsen. Relations with India and other traditional allies will also continue to be important. The merging of the two largest arms agencies into one state-controlled company, Rosoboronexport, will likely result in increased arms sales. New contracts have already been signed with China and India for the sale of navy weapons.¹⁹⁰ It seems clear that Russia will pursue its interests through the formation of close relations with several different partners. These things all support the formation of multipolarity in the international arena.

¹⁸⁹Komarov, A., "Russia to Undertake Deep Force Cuts," Aviation Week and Space Technology v153 n21 November (2000), p. 31.

¹⁹⁰Komarov, A., "Russia Merges Arms Agencies," Aviation Week and Space Technology v153 n20 November (2000), p. 35.

There were several issues that were only briefly mentioned that could be explored further. As is evident from much of the discussion surrounding the current war in Chechnya, this war has been a source of disagreement between Russia and the West. Several authors, such as Boris Fedorov¹⁹¹ and Ekaterina Stepanova,¹⁹² discuss the links between Russia's action in Chechnya and NATO action in Kosovo, but a thorough study has yet to be done. The fact that both are struggles between the federal government and rebel forces, raises questions about why NATO saw it as legitimate to enter Kosovo, but is opposed to Russian forces fighting in Chechnya. The reverse is also interesting: Russia was adamantly opposed to the use of force in Kosovo, but seems to have no problem with using force in the Chechen situation. The concerns expressed by the CPRF and other opposition forces, that Kosovo was a dress rehearsal for NATO intervention into Russian affairs, could also be further explored.

The timing of the most recent Chechen war also raises many questions. It is possible that fears of Western intervention in Chechnya may have been driving the Russian desire to bring a quick end to the war. Further research

¹⁹¹Fedorov, B., Pytaias' poniat' Rossiю. (Limbus Press: St. Petersburg, 2000).

¹⁹²Stepanova, E., "Kosovo and Chechnya: Illogical Parallels," Security Dialogue v31 n1 (2000), pp. 135-141.

could possibly determine what, if any, were the direct links between the Kosovo crisis and the war in Chechnya.

Another issue is that of the NMD. This goes much deeper than simply the development of a new defensive system. It concerns the subject of trust and international treaties. If the strategic arms balance between Russia and the US is upset, Russia will undoubtedly feel insecure. This could lead to Russia developing new arms, or further developing its strategic arsenal. Rising feelings of insecurity will also most likely lead to a strengthening of the strategic partnership between Russia and China, as well as Russia and the CIS. Further study on the subject could be done to determine the long-term effects of this on Russia-US relations and on international security in general.

Another issue that was only briefly discussed is the impact of the change in leadership in Russia. Will Putin's foreign policy end up being any different than Yeltsin's? Will it ultimately lead to confrontation or cooperation? There have been many suspicions that Putin is not as dedicated to democracy as he claims to be. What impact might this have on Russia's relations with the rest of the world?

Only a small part of Russia's foreign policy has been examined here. There were still several ongoing issues at the time of writing. As these issues develop it will become more evident what impact they will have on Russia's relations with the West. Ultimately, it is still undetermined what role Russia will play in European affairs, and in the international community.

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