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**THE MONTREAL CITIZEN'S MOVEMENT:
NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND MUNICIPAL POLITICS
1974-1990**

by

TIMOTHY LLOYD THOMAS, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

January 14, 1994

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**THE MONTREAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT:
NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND MUNICIPAL POLITICS**

submitted by

Timothy L. Thomas, B.A.(Hons.), M.A..

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

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Carleton University
December 16, 1993

ABSTRACT

This thesis constitutes a case study of a successful and relatively new municipal party, the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM). It examines the MCM in light of recent important theoretical contributions by Herbert Kitschelt in *The Logics of Party Formation* (1989). Kitschelt concludes that we are witnessing the appearance of a new form of political party in liberal democracies, the left-libertarian party, which develops internal organizational forms that allow for the co-existence of ideological, "movement" constituencies - motivated by what he calls the logic of constituency representation - and political pragmatists and opportunists - motivated by the logic of electoral competition.

The thesis demonstrates that the MCM is a left-libertarian party by comparing its sociology and policy to that of the Western European ecological parties examined by Kitschelt. The thesis also examines the MCM's history and demonstrates its left-libertarian character by documenting the tension between the two representational logics that was evident within the party between 1974-1990. The thesis focuses on a series of conflicts during this period.

The fact that the MCM is a left-libertarian party accounts for the existence of such tensions within it. The thesis examines both the characteristics of these tensions and their consequences. In the process, the thesis concludes that Kitschelt has indeed found a new form of political representation that is unique not because it defies the developmental patterns for political parties outlined by Roberto Michels and the classical literature, but because of its vigorous and painful attempts to postpone such developments. The case of the MCM suggests that rather than involving themselves in party politics of any form, people seeking libertarian social change should find other means of pursuing their objectives.

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Initially, I thought I might begin my acknowledgements by praising institutions or organizations but upon reflection I realized that this would have been an error. If there is anything that I have learned from my many intellectual endeavours including this thesis, it is that institutions are formed, sustained, and altered by the people within them. As a consequence, rather than thanking Carleton University, I would prefer to thank all of those people be they former professors, fellow graduate students, departmental administrators or administrators connected to the university in other capacities such as graduate studies, financial assistance, or registrar services, for their warm dispositions and personal commitments to professionalism. Cumulatively, they made my time in doctoral studies at Carleton highly enjoyable and intellectually rewarding.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	vi
CHAPTER I: HERBERT KITSCHOLT AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES LITERATURE	1
PART ONE - Kitscholt's Contribution	1
- Kitscholt and Evolutionary Patterns of Left-Libertarian Parties	7
PART TWO - The Canadian Political Parties Literature	12
- Movement to Party	15
- Representational Capacity	19
- Urban Politics	25
CHAPTER II: THE MCM AS A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY	38
- The Historical Origins of the MCM: The Drapeau Years	39
- Founding the MCM	45
- The Programs & Policy Orientation of European Left-Libertarian Parties	49
- The MCM Programs (1974-1986)	52
- Sociological Comparison	57
- Municipal Politics and Canadian Left-Libertarianism	76
CHAPTER III: THE LIFE OF A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY (1974-1981)	100
- The Context	104
- Initial Success and its Aftermath	117
- The Public Transit episode and the 1975 Congress	125
- The Pragmatists	128
- The 1976-78 Years: The Reign of the Ideologues	131
- The Lobbyists	136
- The Electorate	138
CHAPTER IV: THE LIFE OF A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY (1982-1990)	156
- The Context	159
- The MCM After the 1978 Election	166
- Turning the Tide	170
- The Years in Power	184
- Overdale	190
- The Queen's	192
- Matrox	194
- Municipal Democratisation	196
- Dissent Within Caucus	198
- Fears of Oligarchy	200
- The Exodus and its Significance	203
CHAPTER V: INTERPRETING A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY	219
PART ONE - Contemporary Interpretations of the MCM: A Case of Flawed Analysis	221
PART TWO - Modifying Kitscholt	228
- Kitcholt's Contribution & the Case of the MCM	238
APPENDIX A: Methodology	246
APPENDIX B: Charting the Principal Actors by Examining Municipal Candidacies From 1974-90	251
SOURCES CONSULTED	252

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
1	Female Representation in Canadian Federal & Provincial Legislatures & the Montreal Municipal Council	59
2	Number & Percentage of Women Serving on Municipal Councils in Major Canadian Cities, 1989	60
3	Distribution by Sex, of the Candidates of Popular Parties in Montreal & Quebec Municipal Politics	61
4	Age of Party Activists in the German Green Party & the MCM	62
5	The Number of Newly Recruited Candidates versus Those Seeking Re-election with the MCM	64
6	Average Age of New MCM Candidates as Compared to Those Seeking Re-election	65
7	Educational Level of Party Candidates & Activists	66
8	Occupations of Left-Libertarian Militants	69
9	Political Career Experience of Party Activists in West German Greens and MCM	71
10	Principal Characteristics of the Two Types of Local Parties Existing in Quebec	90

CHAPTER ONE

HERBERT KITSCHOLT AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES LITERATURE

PART ONE

Kitscholt's Contribution

When Herbert Kitscholt began to study the German and Belgian Greens he felt that they signalled the emergence of a new style of politics and representation. The "new social movements" that they represented called for the democratization of modern societies and the adoption of more enlightened values, aspiring to something beyond material wealth and military power. Nevertheless, he also cynically anticipated that this new form of representation would offer little in the way of broad new empirical insights into politics in modern democracies. In fact, he originally believed that they would just be part of another brief, issue-oriented cycle in which one of two scenarios would be possible. Either the Green's promising new ideas and political form would soon be partially but inadequately absorbed by their competitors or rival parties, or the exigencies of electoral competition would soon force them to adopt the style and organizational structures of their competitors.¹ The latter scenario would be especially damaging since the Greens had evolved as much out of a distaste for the procedural and operational styles of traditional party structures (including those with "leftist" orientations) as out of claims to alter governmental policy agendas.

As a consequence of his initial cynicism, Kitscholt was confident that the discipline of political science had witnessed similar phenomena before and that it already possessed the necessary tools for predicting the future of the new organizational form embodied in these new parties. Much to his surprise, however, Kitscholt found that he was wrong on both counts. He discovered that the Greens are not an isolated phenomenon, but

part of far-flung cohort of new parties in Western Europe. He also found that the discipline of political science did not yet possess the necessary tools for a proper analysis of this new form of representation.²

The discipline's inadequacy in this regard stems from the fact that most students of political parties have focused on the individual level of political action, on sociological and rational bases of voting decisions, or on the systems level in studying competition and cooperation among parties and the ensuing impacts on public policy. In the process, they have neglected to examine adequately the organizational level of party politics - internal decision making and strategy formation - and inter-organizational networks between state and civil society. Kitschelt proposes four reasons for this lack of scholarly interest: (1) - a widespread and unqualified acceptance of Michels' law of oligarchy, (2) - a belief in the irrelevance of party organization and activism in an age of mass media campaigning, (3) - a disenchantment with the ability of parties to recast procedures of democratic decision-making, and (4) - a belief that elections are the sole standard of democratic politics and have priority over the influence of groups of party activists with regard to party strategy and policy choice.³

Contrary to this emphasis, Kitschelt argues that parties are not nearly as constrained by electoral competition as many scholars have argued. Votes count, but in party politics ideas and activists matter and parties can indeed contribute to political innovation in contemporary democracies. Only with such an understanding, argues Kitschelt, can political scientists truly understand the Green Parties emerging in Europe to represent the political and cultural movements of the postwar generations.

These parties, which he calls left-libertarian, are the only ones capable of uniting enough diverse voices of protest to become contenders

electorally. Only the Greens could successfully unite local, neighbourhood groups with the ecology-minded and activists concerned with causes such as feminism and/or peace. During the 1960s and 1970s, these electoral constituencies had been continually thwarted by existing socialist, liberal, and christian democratic parties. Moreover, joining the ranks of the Maoists and Communists would have meant functioning in the absence of any popular support. Consequentially, left-libertarian parties tended to include the previously unattended constituency of young, educated professionals working in the urban public service sector which is disproportionately female, at least among supporters under thirty-five.⁴

Kitschelt argues that the left-libertarian parties can be considered "left-wing" in their policy orientations because they affirm the principle of equality and reject the primacy of markets and allocation efficiency as the final arbiters of social development and justice. They follow libertarian thinking, however, in rejecting the socialist vision of centralised planning and party organization and call for greater individual autonomy and citizen participation in public affairs. They dislike the post-WWII compact between capital and labour, believing that there has been far too much emphasis placed upon income and economic security. Left-libertarian parties argue that such preoccupations tend to diminish concern for the physical environment and the quality of communal social infrastructures.⁵

Procedurally, these parties trace the centrality of concerns for material economic growth and bureaucracy to the dominance of economic producers in the political process through the organizational efficiency of centralized mass parties and interest groups. Hence, it comes as no surprise to learn that conventional parties are the target of left-libertarian attacks because they remove citizens three steps from the locus of policy formation. According to Kitschelt, left-libertarians

claim that conventional parties force citizens to choose from broad packages of policies over which their votes have no effect. Secondly, they argue that the hierarchical organizational structures of conventional parties stand between citizen preferences and party policies. Finally, left-libertarians observe that conventional governing parties often compromise with each other and interest groups, a process over which voters also have no control.⁶

These new critics of Western European parliamentary parties see parties not simply as transmitters of well defined interests into politics, but as vehicles whose role also includes transforming voters' demands through the deliberations of their own activists, through internal decision making, and through their leadership's choice of alliance strategies. Therefore, according to Kitschelt, it is this "politics of institutional form" that left-libertarians are really concerned about. They feel that while the Keynesian welfare state has muted class conflict, its institutions have given rise to new problems resulting from a crisis of political participation. Partially as a result of the inability of governing institutions to articulate the demands of the left-libertarian constituencies, these constituencies challenge both the *form* and *substance* of policy-making in the Keynesian state.⁷

As a consequence of the fact that they perceive an interdependence between the political form and substance of policy-making, left libertarian parties and their supporters try to enact new models of citizen mobilization that they hope will allow for a more decentralized, participatory society with less emphasis upon economic competition and growth. Because members of this constituency have tended to engage in protest movements and loose alliances of egalitarian organizations with little hierarchy or formalized decision-making procedures, they have built their parties in the same mode.⁸

Kitschelt notes however that most conventional thinking on party organizations sees little hope for the development of new organizational forms and strategies. Weber, Downs, and Duverger were all mesmerized by the role of electoral competition and saw it as the final determinant of party behaviour.⁹ Such analyses argue that it is virtually inevitable that innovative parties will eventually succumb to the logic of electoral competition and will adopt the organizational and strategic patterns of their competitors. According to the logic of the conventional literature concerning political parties, sooner or later all parties gravitate toward an "efficient" model of organization. Innovative forms of party politics are therefore nothing but short-term aberrations.¹⁰

If new forms of representation persist, however, and the left libertarian parties prove to be more than aberrations, Kitschelt claims that political science will then need new methods of analysis for understanding such developments since they clearly contradict and therefore cannot be fully explained by the conventional "functionalist" view of party organization.¹¹ Kitschelt argues that political science must also reconsider the rational actor approach and the many ways that parties defy the logic of electoral competition. He cites instances when political activists leave their imprint despite systemic imperatives, when organizational rules take on a life of their own and become difficult to adjust to the competitive electoral marketplace, or when parties become so dependent or intertwined with certain interests such that they become incapable of acting against these interests despite the fact that the logic of electoral competition would dictate otherwise. All of these circumstances suggest that the logic of party competition is only one possible outcome.¹²

Kitschelt sees the left-libertarian parties as much more significant examples of how parties can avoid the logic of party competition because

these parties do more than contradict such logic in specific instances. They function according to an entirely new logic, that of constituency representation. This logic requires that these new parties build upon patterns of mobilization similar to those employed by their movement constituencies. Kitschelt notes, however, that, ultimately the pursuit of this new form of organization produces results that are not in agreement with either logic and this serves as a source of conflict and change within such parties.¹³

Factionalism tends to increase the more the party supports the democratization of society and it spreads even further when (as is virtually always the case in left-libertarian parties) the party caters to heterogeneous electoral constituencies while electoral thresholds force these constituencies into coalitions under the umbrella of a single party. Kitschelt notes that the great ideological distances between left-libertarian and other parties encourages factionalism because this forces dissatisfied militants within the left-libertarian parties to opt for strategies of internal opposition due to their incapacity to relocate themselves politically.¹⁴ He also makes the obvious connection between the possibility for factionalism within left-libertarian parties and their loose, organizational structures that allow more room for the legitimacy of internal dissent.¹⁵

Such factionalism usually originates amongst the party militants or activists whom Kitschelt subdivides into three main categories: ideologues, lobbyists and pragmatists. Ideologues emphasize a participatory party organization, a broad program, and radical strategy. They draw most of their supporters from the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s. Lobbyists have narrow programmatic concerns and attribute great importance to strategy, but waver between radical and moderate positions and give party organization considerable significance. They represent

militants whose dominant political experience usually has revolved around a specific left-libertarian movement. Among their ranks we usually find a significant number of novice political activists. The final category; the pragmatists, tend to value broad programs and moderate strategies, take an instrumental approach to party organization, and show a fairly balanced distribution of career paths.¹⁶

Kitschelt notes that initially, when left-libertarian parties face strong opposition and there is little opportunity for political success, ideologues represent a large proportion of the militants. At this stage, these ideologues are likely to form coalitions with lobbyists, and struggle with pragmatists. When the parties achieve sufficient electoral support to be competitive, they are forced to choose between a radical strategy of opposition on principle, and a moderate strategy of entering a government coalition and/or alliances to push through policy reforms. It is at this point that ideologues and pragmatists mobilize against each other and vie for the support of the lobbyists. Factionalism thus is born.¹⁷

PART TWO

Kitschelt and Evolutionary Patterns of Left-Libertarian Parties

Kitschelt provides a detailed framework or outline of the specific stages of evolution of left-libertarian parties. Based upon this framework, he then provides suggestions for their successful continued existence. Kitschelt observes that in situations or areas where social movements are highly mobilized but the governing political institutions are unresponsive, left-libertarian parties move closer to the logic of constituency representation. Where such parties are actually able to influence the formation of government, they are pulled more toward a logic

of party competition than where they are in a weak competitive position as opposition parties.¹⁸ Ironically, in left-libertarian strongholds where ecology parties tend to be the most radical, heterogeneous, and decentralized, they are also most likely to receive strong voter support. This, in turn, intensifies the pressure to choose between the logic of party competition and possible electoral success, and the logic of constituency representation and a refusal to compromise party ideals.¹⁹

In the short run, a lack of organization accelerates the adoption of the logic of party competition by left-libertarian parties facing these tensions. The adoption of such logic accelerates the recruitment of pragmatists and the transformation of linkages to external movement organizations. However, these developments lead to what Kitschelt calls a "perverse effect" whereby this new form of interest intermediation and organization that the left-libertarian parties develop, does not result in what founders endorsed or expected. Because of their fluid structures they are initially swayed by the lures of government participation and so move to adopt a moderate strategy of alliance building. In the long run however, this commitment to an electoral strategy requiring executive responsibility, inevitably clashes with the fluid organizational form necessitated by libertarian values and beliefs.²⁰

In their quest for electoral success, modern mass parties develop hierarchical bureaucratic organizations centralized around highly visible leadership personalities who hold both party and electoral office. The actions of every member are subordinated to the leadership so as to present a coherent and unified image to the electorate. Left-libertarian parties on the other hand attract only small numbers of members because their constituencies lack organizational loyalty, they reject formal party affiliation and are driven by varying motivations that do not converge in a single unified ideology. This explains their volatile patterns of

involvement.²¹

Initially, left-libertarian parties recruit executives and nominees for electoral office based upon past involvement in social movements rather than their political stance, organizational loyalty, or ability to express political ideas. Left-libertarian parties rely on informal contacts between party militants and movement organizers yet their open, fluid party structures, combined with internal conflict among ideologues, pragmatists and lobbyists, increases uncertainty among voters with respect to the confidence they place in the parties' external strategies.²²

Therefore, Kitschelt implies that as left-libertarians gain influence and electoral viability, they make the realization that pursuing the logic of constituency representation unleashes a host of perverse effects. These effects result from mistaken assumptions about commitments to left-libertarian style politics as well as from resource constraints that the exercise of influence imposes upon political parties.²³ Such constraints and effects lead to tradeoffs to which party militants respond.

Contrary to the belief that political participation is a superior political good sought for own sake, party militants begin to calculate costs rationally in light of limited resources and alternative preferences. Many militants shy away from assignments with low rates of returns on investment, in terms of yielding little political influence but demanding great time commitments. Militants do not invest enough resources to maintain an interactive process of communication and the party's loose organization promotes the rise to prominence of political entrepreneurs with the most resources and the most intense political preferences. This results in a system of competing cliques and disjointed decision-making which seems perverse to many activists.²⁴

A second source of perverse effects is that militants also

misperceive motivations within the party because they are unaware that activists choose avenues of pursuit according to a scarcity of resources. Since left-libertarian party organizations provide no corrective measures for enhancing the diminished influence of the resource poor or for constraining the augmented influence of the resourceful, the distribution of power in such parties violates the egalitarian, participatory ideals held by many activists. Resource scarcity slows down the process of collective decision-making and constrains participation. As a consequence, informal groups of leaders and activists who can communicate with each other easily, make decisions under time pressures, and place resourceful entrepreneurs in prominent party positions.²⁵

Kitschelt argues that despite appearances otherwise, what occurs is not a "Michels-like" scenario in which left-libertarian entrepreneurs form a cohesive elite or strong oligarchy that pursues courses of action that work to its personal advantage as opposed to that of the party rank and file. Instead, left-libertarian parties witness a competition for influence among weak, fragmented oligarchies whose leaders represent different groups of activists from different levels of the party organization. Nevertheless, in spite of the absence of evidence confirming the existence of a strong oligarchy, party ideologues are driven by the assumptions of the Michels paradigm which reinforces itself as these ideologues encounter perverse effects and try to reduce the positional power and resources of party executives. These ideologues also characterize motives for running for office as being rooted in self-interest rather than the desire to be more politically efficacious and they use this rationale to prevent the emergence of a power center. This ignores the inability of rank-and-file militants to fill the power vacuum due to their limited resources and tends to make power unaccountable by causing it to migrate toward informal elites of entrepreneurs with media

access.²⁶

Such entrepreneurs and more pragmatic activists attempt to counter perverse effects, the party's lack of organization, and the negative effects of conflict from within, by using media linkages to portray a more reassuring image to the electorate. In effect, they modify expectations and behaviour and adopt elements of a logic of party competition. Many municipal councillors and parliamentarians come to accept the routines of institutional politics and party activists make efforts to rationalize the nomination process. Such rationalization entails abandoning the movementist style of recruitment that leads to fragmentation and emphasizing a candidate's political stance and commitment to the party as leading recruitment criteria. This reduces some of the advantage held by conventional mass parties with centralized, professional apparatus and stable leadership but also results in what seems to be a distortion of the party's original principles regarding organizational form.²⁷

Kitschelt concludes that these left-libertarian parties have developed a new form of organization resulting from the struggle between the logic of constituency representation and the logic of party competition. Internally, they struggle to maintain open, loose organizational structures in spite of the ensuing misperceived perverse effects, while externally they attempt to develop an instrumental strategic capacity for coping successfully with political adversaries and for exercising influence over public policy. Furthermore, in contrast to Michels' argument, this developmental process is not driven by autonomous actions of party elites but by the influx of pragmatic rank-and-file activists, the differential mobilization of militants in party conventions, changing linkage patterns between left-libertarian movements and ecology parties, new nomination criteria for the parties' electoral candidates, and other complex internal processes.²⁸

Whether or not this organizational form will prove successful remains to be seen. Kitschelt believes that although, to date, the experience of the left-libertarian party has proven turbulent and its continued existence remains debatable, its politics and constituencies will remain. Left-libertarian parties continue to exist because they adopt techniques that appeal to a select but growing constituency that other mass parties are unable to incorporate. The established mass parties have become victims of their own success by overextending themselves in deploying techniques to maximize votes. In the process their political message has become so diffuse, status-quo oriented, and incapable of responding to new demands, that they can no longer reach well-defined, new left-libertarian constituencies.²⁹

Kitschelt intimates that one of the most powerful indicators that left-libertarian parties will survive is the widespread existence of similar parties in other countries that appeal to the same constituencies. However, his conclusions emphasize the constraints that accompany political power and influence. He warns that the ideologues that naturally gravitate towards such parties must resist continually undermining the efforts of their executives and must adopt "realist" politics that allow for some appreciation of the constraints of power and the impacts of resource scarcity. Only then can this new form of representation truly flourish.³⁰

It is at this point, however, that Kitschelt begins to sound like an apologist and is too forgiving of the actions of the leadership of left-libertarian parties. This is especially true given the fact that these parties are created as much out of a need to correct political processes as policy goals. Kitschelt seems to be trying so hard to avoid acknowledging Michels, that he forgets his own observations regarding the inter-relationship between form and substance in left-libertarian parties.

He forgets that at some point in politics the ends stop justifying the means and that oligarchy can mean ignoring proper procedure no matter what the motives of those who forego them. Consequently, Kitschelt's principal theoretical contribution has not been to find a form of representation that disproves Michels, but to identify a form that evolves to oligarchy but in a far different manner than witnessed in the literature to date.

PART TWO:

The Literature on Canadian Political Parties

The following section will attempt to demonstrate how the assumptions of this body of literature differ from those of Kitschelt. It highlights these differences by dividing the literature into three parts. The section first examines how this literature differs from Kitschelt in its assumption of the incompatibility between social movements and political parties. The second section will examine the inter-related theme of the representational capacity of political parties. If political parties are truly unable to represent the interests of social movements, then the existing literature suggests that they will prove to be inadequate representational organizations for the politics of the future since social movements are growing in number and influence. If, however, a new form of political party capable of addressing the needs of social movements is in the process of being developed (as Kitschelt suggests), then many of the Canadian literature's predictions regarding the future of Canadian political representation become quite tenuous and the theoretical contributions of Herbert Kitschelt become very important.

The third focuses on urban politics and municipal parties. This section demonstrates the widespread nature of the assumption of the incompatibility between political parties and social movements within the

Canadian literature concerning political representation. Since one of the main objectives of the thesis is to establish the MCM as a left-libertarian party in which "movement" constituencies can co-exist with an electoralist mentality, and since the MCM is a municipal party, it then becomes important to discover whether or not there is something unique about municipal politics that allows it to become an area of concentration for left-libertarian analysis.

Perhaps since left-libertarians strongly advocate grassroots control over political administration, they choose not to involve themselves in the huge, bureaucratic structures of national or provincial parties. Perhaps they have not ruled out the political party as an organizational tool, they simply use it at the municipal level where they have a greater sense of political efficacy. Should this be the case, we could expect to find observations of a growing co-existence between "movement" and "party" constituencies within the urban or municipal politics literature and Canadian scholars of political representation with a provincial or national orientation could then be forgiven for their ignorance of left-libertarianism. If, however, there is no mention of this new phenomenon within the municipal literature, then Kitschelt's analysis becomes that much more important since it remains virtually unknown throughout Canadian scholarship.

Movement to Party

Kitschelt's concluding observations clearly distinguish him from the literature concerning Canadian political parties due to his rejection of traditional theoretical propositions, especially those which assert an incompatibility between "movement" and "party" and the inevitable nature of oligarchy within political parties that drives out their "movement" constituencies. This rejection of the traditional literature is rooted in its inability to accept the possibility of a successful co-existence of the logics of constituency representation and party competition within the same party.

Various Canadian academics such as Walter Young, Raymond Hudon and Michael Stein have altered and adapted to fit the Canadian context, these themes first touched upon by scholars such as Duverger and Michels. In his study of the CCF, Walter Young emphasizes the incompatibility between the goals of a "movement" and the goals of a "party". Young argues that "Socialists belong to movements, capitalists support parties."³¹

A movement is "a group venture extending beyond a local community or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in thought, behaviour, and social relationships." A movement seeks fundamental change and may or may not use political means to achieve it; a party seeks power for its leaders through electoral success. Its leaders may or may not then use this power to achieve goals similar in nature to those sought by a movement; and it is customary for party leaders to use their power in such a way as to ensure their continuance in office, even if this means ignoring or perverting their goals. Movements cling to ideals, avoid any shift or dilution of principles. Losing an election shakes a party, for this is the measure of its validity, its criterion of excellence. The validity of a movement, however, is contained in its ideology. Failure to make converts does not alter or diminish the rightness of the cause...³²

Young attributes the presence of both the movement and party mentality to the constant internal struggles that occurred within the

CCF/NDP. Young concludes that the CCF was unsuccessful as a party due to repeated electoral failures but it was successful as a movement in that it was able to coerce the other parties into enacting many of its proposals for reform."

In his analysis of the Social Credit in Quebec, Stein sets forth a developmental framework to help explain the evolution of protest movements into political parties. He argues that sociopolitical movements "evolve through a number of different phases that correspond to changing leadership styles and strategies of action." The first is the mobilization phase dominated by prophets or men of words who are skilled in the task of proselytization. The second is the consolidation phase directed by brilliant propagandists and skilful organizers. The third is the institutionalization phase which is engineered by shrewd political pragmatists who wish to transform the movement into a conventional political party.

The process of evolution from one phase to the next involves internal conflict and factionalism between subgroups of leaders...Once this subgroup abandons the official or major wing of the movement, that wing tends to become more conservative and moderate on questions of ideology and action. It frequently becomes more institutionalized and adopts more conventional platforms and more formal structures of decision-making...As a result the official wing of the movement is transformed into a conventional political party. The breakaway wing...frequently fails to make headway...fragments even further and eventually withers away.³⁴

Raymond Hudon concerns himself primarily with the question of institutionalization and he is more forgiving than these other theorists. For Hudon there is no deliberate attempt to ignore "movement" constituencies once a political party becomes institutionalised. Focusing his analysis on the Parti Québécois, Hudon argues that when it came to power, both capital and labour were suspicious of the PQ. "Consequently, it was hardly able to realize the role that all states must play, that of

guardian of social cohesion."³⁵ In its attempts to perform this function, the PQ made peace with the business community, began to appear like the Quebec Liberal party, and consequently reduced the polarity of Quebec politics. Thus the PQ, which began as an instrument of the socialist and separatist movements in Quebec, soon became a political party like all others and catered to many additional constituencies once it obtained power.

For Hudon this institutionalization of power is not a negative process, but a necessary and inevitable one. The apparent shift in PQ policy could be justified by the greater need of assuring the general cohesion of Quebec society,

In the final analysis, the state and the parties are political entities that contribute to the process of institutionalization of politics - that is, to the reduction of conflict. We must bear in mind that organizations like unions, employers associations and others are also, despite appearances, institutions that participate in the same process.³⁶

All of these Canadian political scientists are dealing with the inevitable decline in a party's emphasis on ideology when faced with electoral success and real power. Either oligarchy and an emphasis on regaining power is inevitable, the party organization becomes an end in itself and replaces all other goals, or, "institutionalization" necessitates that parties deal with the larger task of ensuring societal peace. In any case, goals are either corrupted, transformed, weakened, or ignored.

Sceptical students of party politics make similar assumptions as those made by the Canadian scholars and argue that left-libertarian parties are no different than all other parties. Although they start out with radical, innovative ideas, they will soon totally succumb to the logic of party competition and will adopt electorally-efficient

strategies. Kitschelt responds by pointing out that the strategic wavering of such parties in Western Europe shows they are not following a path of adaptation and accommodation to existing party systems. They are, in fact, breaking new ground by developing different internal and external organizational structures that prevent them from following traditional paths of development for political parties. They accomplish this by creating an external image that appears to follow the logic of party competition while internally their decision-making remains loose, non-hierarchical and non-rational. Instead of being held together through some form of comprehensive rationality, these new parties foster fluid substructures while provocative issues and charismatic personalities maintain their cohesion. The personalities accomplish this task through their influence with the mass media while loose coalitions of the parties' membership are inspired by individual causes rather than comprehensive world views. Internally, the decision-making process adopted by left-libertarian parties prevents them from becoming bureaucratic mass parties.

What is especially unique and important for the study of political science is the fact that this new organizational form contradicts traditional modes of analysis by allowing for the co-existence of political actors motivated by the logic of constituency representation as well as the logic of electoral competition. In other words, movements can now exist within political parties, a scenario long considered impossible by the political science literature concerning political parties, including that generated within the Canadian context.

Indeed, both Young and Stein go to great lengths to elaborate the incompatibility between movement constituencies and political parties. They assume that the logic of constituency representation that dominates political movements simply cannot co-exist with the logic of electoral competition. The assumption is rooted in the belief that movement

constituencies cannot tolerate the ideological flexibility and political opportunism of political parties attempting to gain popular support in the form of votes. This literature argues that parties inevitably become so obsessed by the need for electoral success that, ultimately, they will compromise the ideals that stimulated their creation, those of the movement constituencies.

Because they have accepted the assumptions of the traditional literature concerning political parties, Young and Stein write as if an organizational form with the capacities of the left-libertarian party is impossible. Indeed, their work traces an evolutionary framework for political representation that begins with the political movement and with increased organization and bureaucratization, culminates with the hierarchic and at times, oligarchic organizational form embodied in the political party. Furthermore, unlike Kitschelt, their framework rules out any form of co-existence of both forms of representation. Scholars such as Young and Stein argue that, initially, ideas begin with political movements, but with increased organization and the evolution of political parties out of these movements, the original ideas become altered, bastardized, or corrupted by the organizational needs for electoral success. Young and Stein are not unique in this regard, even within the Canadian context, and most other Canadian scholars make similar assumptions.

Representational Capacity

A possible exception to this belief in the incompatibility of political parties and social movements might be the tradition of Canadian scholarship concerning political parties that begins with Pinard and his

seminal text, *The Rise of a Third Party*. The tradition is continued by Winn and McMenemy in *Political Parties in Canada*, and by Gagnon and Tanguay in *Canadian Parties in Transition*. Common to all of these authors is the belief that the emergence and growth of third parties signals a failure on the part of the two main parties to express the demands or act on the grievances of significant social groups. Third parties have been created to represent groups who have not fallen within the acceptable ideological spectrum of Canada's brokerage parties and traditionally such groups have included movement constituencies arising out of rural populism or labour socialism.³⁷ Consequently, for this group of scholars, the political party in the form of third parties or "parties of protest", remains a viable outlet or unit of representation for movement constituencies.³⁸

Of this group however, only Gagnon and Tanguay consider fully the existence of these parties beyond the moment of their creation when they enter the political system and must deal with the influence of other parties and the prospect of electoral success. Gagnon and Tanguay note that because parties of protest are usually as interested in effecting social change as they are in electoral success, their leaders tend to be reluctant to get involved in electoral politics for fear that political success might dilute the ideological zeal of their movement constituencies. Protest movements have not always remained minor parties in Canada and in such cases, there appears to be a tendency for them to become ossified and increasingly conservative once in office.³⁹

Brodie and Jenson argue that minor parties do not necessarily have to achieve some form of electoral success in order to lose the ideological zeal of their movement constituencies. They argue that the inability of minor or protest parties to redefine politics and the language of politics in Canada is attributable to their inability to challenge the constraints

of the brokerage system. They use the NDP to highlight this argument and they trace this party's origins and how, as it entered the party system, it came to accept the system's constraints. Some analysts even celebrate these constraints which have been reinforced by traditional Canadian perspectives regarding the role of political parties. For example, rather than prioritizing expanded political representation, John Meisel made the following observation of Canadian political parties in the mid-1960s:

In a country lacking a strong national political culture and the institutions fostering it, political parties have a special role to play as agencies of the creation of national symbols, experiences, memories, heroes, and villains, not to mention national favours, benefits and concessions.⁴⁰

The widespread acceptance of the idea that the major function of political parties is to assure social harmony and stability through successful social integration leads to a fear of innovative behaviour and expanded representation. Frank Underhill writes that although ideological flexibility on the part of Canada's political representatives is disliked by its intellectual community, it is very much appreciated by most Canadians who are aware that like most mass democracies, Canada is not a homogenous country and therefore requires leadership that will avoid splitting the country along geographical, cultural or economic lines.⁴¹

Following this logic then, because Canada possesses many dangerous and divisive cleavages, its parties must be all the more willing to ensure social harmony through ideological flexibility and non-divisive political language. In Brodie and Jenson's analysis of the impact of such enthusiasm for brokerage politics, seriously divisive issues remain invisible and confined to the private sector or private life for resolution. From a myriad of social tensions the definition of politics selects those susceptible to "political" solutions and by helping to define the political in such a manner, Canadian political parties

necessarily exclude movement constituencies that attempt to expand the ideological parameters of Canadian politics.²

Whitaker even goes as far as to suggest that increasingly it is the goal of Canada's major parties to become apolitical and to have the goal of improving bureaucracy and technology supercede the importance of ideology within their ranks:

The curious lack of definition of Canadian parties, which has troubled so many observers of our politics, is only reinforced as the evidence concerning their structures is marshalled...The deadening of political controversy, the silence, the greyness which clothed political life at the national level..., were reflections of a Liberal ideal of an apolitical public life...The Liberal party had truly become the government party - an instrument for the depoliticization and bureaucratization of Canadian public life.³

Claude Galipeau links these observations of Whitaker's with those of Brodie and Jenson when he highlights the interrelationship between the desire to obtain stability within policy-making communities and the imposition of bureaucratic and technocratic forms of decision-making. The great Canadian desire for stability can be achieved through legalistic discourse which minimizes any kind of normative or emotional debate. Logic, efficiency and the written rule prevails. Galipeau argues that like the policy-making communities themselves, the party system complements the bureaucratic sublimation of ethical discussion by shunning debates of principle for reasons already outlined by Brodie and Jenson.⁴

Galipeau observes, however, that the recent growth of citizens' groups further challenges the legitimacy of the party system but because they question the liberal-bourgeois consensus over "the good life", they are excluded from contemporary discourse. For these groups to participate in the political system they would have to abandon their societal critique which is of little use to a system guided by the "materialistic ethos" and "discourse" bent on accommodation and brokerage politics. Consequently,

Galipeau argues that certain interests will always be excluded from representation within our legislatures by our party system no matter what the extent of administrative "tinkering".⁴⁵

Galipeau concludes that despite high levels of partisan flexibility in the Canadian party system, new parties similar to the West German Greens have experienced no electoral success. He suggests that this may be attributable to the relative absence of post-materialist values in Canada but there is much evidence to suggest that these values exist in Canada but are expressed outside the party system. Indeed, Duncan Cameron points to the growth of the "popular sector" first identified by Drache and Cameron.⁴⁶ This collection of native peoples, farm groups, social agencies, churches, environmentalists, peace activists, youth and seniors, and women, very much resemble the constituencies that have started left-libertarian parties in Europe. As is the case with the left-libertarians, Cameron observes that this Canadian "popular sector" is engrossed in ideological conflict springing out of its perception of a societal need for much more democratic control over decision-making.⁴⁷

Cameron discusses the breakdown in the post-war consensus that has guided the Western world and how this development has led to expectations of a realignment of the party system. Nevertheless, when he shifts his focus to the Canadian context Cameron notes that "These forces operate outside and, to a lesser extent, inside the party system...It seems more likely, at least to this observer, that the ideological nature of current political struggles will not be translated directly into party realignment. Liberal democracy will continue to diffuse ideological discourse at the level of the party."⁴⁸ Because of their societal role as explained by Galipeau and Brodie and Jenson, Cameron doubts that Canadian parties can ever speak for the concerns of movement constituencies.

Other observers of Canadian political representation tend to agree

with Cameron's conclusion. The authors of *Absent Mandate* argue that the 1940s brought a virtual displacement of policy innovation from the party system to the public service and federal-provincial relations. Then, in the major debates of the 1980s, a royal commission and independently mobilized popular movements became additional engines of innovation remaining outside the party system.⁴⁹ Warren Magnusson believes that this supposed incompatibility between political parties and social movement constituencies will render parties irrelevant to an understanding of the politics of the future.

...the conventional understanding of politics is state-centric, and as such distorts the realities of political life...to understand contemporary Canadian politics, we have to move back from the world of parliaments, parties, and pressure groups, and enter into the world of critical social movements. This is the world in which entrepreneurial initiative, popular mobilization, global networking, and political innovation are most apparent. If my argument is correct, it is also the world in which the critical politics of the twenty-first century will be played out.⁵⁰

In his article, "The Decline of Party in Canada," John Meisel points to the diminishing role of political parties due to the increased dominance of Canadian politics by federal-provincial relations, by the media and image politics, and by interest groups and the bureaucratic state. Meisel observes that these factors as well as the disdain of Parliament, the decline of ministerial responsibility and the inability to live up to election promises, have all served to weaken the credibility and respect accorded political parties by the Canadian public.⁵¹ These developments, when combined with the observations of other Canadian political scientists regarding the representational capacity of the Canadian political party, call into question its future importance as an instrument of political representation.

Urban Politics

Clearly, the literature concerning Canadian political parties excludes the possibility for any form of co-existence within the political parties of two logics: the logic of constituency representation and logic of party or electoral competition. One possible explanation for this fact might be that for reasons of perceived political efficacy, these new social movement constituencies that originate at the local level choose not to get involved in the disconcertingly large, bureaucratic organizational structures of national or provincial parties. While they have not ruled out the party as an organizational tool, they simply use it at the municipal level where they can gain greater control and have a larger impact. Were such a scenario to be useful, however, one would expect there to be mention within the literature examining Canadian municipal parties, of a new and successful co-existence of electoralist and movement constituencies within reinvigorated Canadian municipal parties.

Such literature suggests that this is not the case. Much of the literature concerned with municipal politics in Canada takes no notice of growing "movement" constituencies and tends to focus on variables other than ideology. Indeed Andrew Sancton's definitive work on the politics of *Montreal, Governing the Island of Montreal: Language Differences and Metropolitan Politics*, focuses principally on class differences as the explanatory variable for Montreal politics with a secondary focus upon race, language and religion.⁵² It is only in his work with Warren Magnusson that Sancton begins to notice social movements and even when they are noticed in the municipal literature, their incompatibility with political parties is highlighted.⁵³

With reference to North American urban politics, Harold Chorney

writes that:

In the rare instances where such oppositional movements exist, their orientation has essentially been reformist, even while their rhetoric at times has appeared to offer something more radical. Certainly this is the case, for example, with the Montreal Citizens' Movement. Although it began as a community-based radical decentralized political and social movement, once it was elected to power, sweeping away the remnants of the tired, discredited Drapeau regime in 1986, it became transformed into a fairly conventional reform political party.⁵⁴

Chorney seems to suggest that there is an incompatibility between decentralized political and social movements, and reform political parties at the municipal level. Other municipal politics scholars seem to agree. Marc Raboy writes that the MCM experienced difficulties whenever it debated basic strategy. It had to decide whether to become "primarily an election- and legislative-oriented political party, or was it to emphasize its role as an agent for grass-roots community organizing and mobilization."⁵⁵ Clearly, Raboy leaves no room for the successful integration of the organizational desires of movement constituencies within municipal parties. Similarly, in their study of city politics in Canada, Magnusson and Sancton make the following observations of the MCM:

The underlying problem was a fundamental difference in outlook between those who viewed the MCM as a socialist movement in an urban setting and others who saw it as a political party concerned with winning local elections and hence changing the direction of municipal government.⁵⁶

Chorney, Raboy, and Magnusson and Sancton all demonstrate a definite assumption of the incompatibility between movement and party within the Canadian municipal parties literature. Cameron, and Gagnon and Tanguay demonstrate similar assumptions within the literature concerning Canadian political parties in general, while Galipeau, and Brodie and Jenson, demonstrate more explicitly, the logic for why this is the case. Most importantly, Young, Stein, Whitaker and Hudon conduct case studies of specific parties to trace patterns of development of this incompatibility.

None of the literature concerning Canadian political parties, be it municipal, provincial, or federal in its orientation, allows for the successful co-existence of movement constituencies and their ideological preferences, with the electoralist oriented pragmatists who tend to form conventional political parties.

Herein lies the challenge of Kitschelt's work. He suggests that mutual co-existence of movement politics and party politics is possible within a new organizational form - the left-libertarian party. It is for this reason that Kitschelt might be used to arrive at a better understanding of the MCM, which is just such a party.

PROPOSITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY

An application of Kitschelt's developmental framework for left-libertarian parties to the MCM, would propose the following scenario:

1) If there was substantial left-libertarian sentiment in Montreal at the time of the MCM's creation and the existing partisan institutions were unresponsive to left-libertarian demands, then we should expect a new party (the MCM) initially to experience considerable electoral support.

2) If there was substantial left-libertarian sentiment in Montreal at the time of the MCM's creation, and if the MCM sought to respond to these political forces, then we could expect the MCM to attract a diversity of members out of which the party leadership would be chosen for past involvement in the various movements expressing left-libertarian sentiment.

3) The MCM's organizational base would reflect this diversity and the party would be radicalized, heterogeneous, and decentralized. It would not be able to articulate a coherent strategic perspective for the future.

4) The pressure to resolve this inability would be augmented by the MCM's initial electoral support and potential to hold office. We should then expect to see the MCM begin to recruit more pragmatists and adopt a strategy of moderate alliance building to overcome any ideological impasse and to push through policy reforms. Pragmatists would move to fill the strategic void and hasten the adoption of the logic of party competition for the short term.

5) If the MCM was and is a left-libertarian party, we should then expect its ideologues to become offended by such pragmatism and strategies of alliance building which would seem perverse effects to them. We should then expect the ideologues and pragmatists to mobilize against each other and compete for the support of the lobbyists.

6) Open, fluid party structures, combined with internal conflict among ideologues, pragmatists and lobbyists, increases uncertainty among voters with respect to the confidence they place in the parties' external strategies. As electoral support changes, so too would the MCM's internal organizational composition.

7) This development, combined with resource scarcity, would tie the hands of the party's decision-makers and force them to adopt strategies of crisis management whereby they would forego normal democratic processes, and adopt the most efficient methods of decision-making that usually rely upon political entrepreneurs or those with the most information, ability,

and resources. We could then expect the MCM's high profile party members to be thrust into even greater prominence in an attempt to stem the slide at the polls. As a result, these candidates would combine with the entrepreneurs, to develop a process of decision making that would appear disjointed and elitist.

8) Such apparent elitism would appear to be a perverse effect to ideologues remaining true to the MCM's libertarian roots. Moreover, as the party's strategy becomes more influenced by the logic of electoral competition, these ideologues would develop resistance based on fears of oligarchy which would reinforce themselves as the ideologues tried to reduce the power of the MCM executives.

9) The result of the party's struggle to cope with perverse effects should then lead to the fragile and tenuous organizational form so unique to left-libertarian parties, whereby the logic of electoral competition would come to dominate the MCM's external strategy while the logic of constituency representation would sustain itself within the party's internal operations. Therefore factionalism and internal dissent would persist within the MCM while a small group of high profile members would continue to perform as visible decision-makers.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MCM AS A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY

This chapter will take up propositions one and two by establishing the MCM as a left-libertarian party. It will do so by focusing upon the party's origins, its membership and its policies over the years. The chapter will begin by demonstrating the prevalence of left-libertarian sentiment in Montreal prior to the creation of the MCM. It will show the unresponsiveness of the Drapeau administration to the movement constituencies possessing such sentiment and how this unresponsiveness led to the creation of the MCM and its subsequent popularity.

The chapter will examine these constituencies in order that they might be compared with those of the left-libertarian parties of Europe. If the MCM was and is truly a left-libertarian party, then the MCM should be made up of similar constituencies and it should possess similar policy orientations as the European left-libertarian parties identified by Kitschelt. Should there be marked similarities in this regard, then the chapter will have succeeded in establishing the MCM as a left-libertarian party.

The chapter will not only attempt to trace similarities in the sociological characteristics of membership, it will also address proposition two by attempting to identify a similarity in the diversity of the constituencies that make up the MCM's membership. Such identification will better explain similarities in the MCM's subsequent organizational and policy development with the European left-libertarian parties.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LIFE OF A LEFT LIBERTARIAN PARTY

Having firmly established the MCM as a left-libertarian party, this chapter will use this categorisation to explain the MCM's development as an instrument of political representation. It will do so by applying Kitschelt's developmental framework of left-libertarian parties to a case study of the MCM. Using French and English newspaper accounts as well as those of academics such as Milner, Roussopoulos, Schecter, Raboy, Magnusson and Sancton, and others, this chapter and the next will piece together a history of the MCM that clearly exhibits a tension and struggle between two logics within the same party: the logic of constituency representation and the logic of electoral competition.

Having demonstrated the diversity of the MCM's membership and organizational base resulting from the logic of constituency representation, this chapter will take up propositions three to six and show the perverse effects of this diversity. The first such perverse effect is an inability to articulate a coherent strategic perspective for the future. Increased electoral support makes this ideological paralysis difficult for the MCM which responds by adopting the logic of electoral competition for the short term and recruiting pragmatists.

The chapter will describe the second perverse effect resulting from such recruitment which comes in the form of internal conflict among ideologues, pragmatists and lobbyists within the MCM. The effect is perverse in that such conflict results in uncertainty among voters with respect to the party's external strategies.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE LIFE OF A LEFT LIBERTARIAN PARTY CONT'D

This fourth chapter will describe how the MCM experiences and attempts to resolve an even more threatening perverse effect resulting from the co-existence of the two logics within the same party. More importantly, the chapter will concur with Kitschelt that this attempted resolution results in a new and unique organizational form of political representation.

This final perverse effect is an outgrowth of the MCM's response to the voter uncertainty of proposition six described in the conclusion of chapter three. Focusing on propositions seven through nine this chapter will describe how the MCM responds to this uncertainty. It will detail the party's adoption of crisis management techniques in order to minimize the perverse effects of the ideological diversity and conflict that results from having the logic of constituency representation exist within a political party. Because of resource scarcity and declining support, the party is forced to forego normal democratic processes and adopt the most efficient methods of decision-making. This entails a reliance upon those with the most information, ability, and resources while the MCM's high profile party members are thrust into even greater prominence in an attempt to stem the slide at the polls.

The chapter will describe how this process appears a perverse effect to the MCM ideologues who perceive this process of decision making as disjointed, elitist and in contradiction with the party's libertarian orientation. The chapter will describe how this leads to accusations of oligarchy that reinforce themselves as the ideologues try to reduce the power of the MCM executives. The chapter will conclude by demonstrating how the MCM's struggle to cope with these most serious perverse effects

leads to a compromise embodied in an organizational form unique to left-libertarian parties.

CHAPTER FIVE INTERPRETING A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY

PART ONE

Having established the MCM as a left-libertarian party and having demonstrated how Kitschelt's analysis captures the internal dynamic of such parties, this chapter will then demonstrate that only Kitschelt's analysis can fully explain the organizational development of left-libertarian parties. It will do so by demonstrating the imprecision of contemporary analyses of the MCM which rely on the assumptions of the classical literature concerning political parties. The chapter will conclude that because such literature assumes an incompatibility between "movement" constituencies (motivated by the logic of constituency representation) and political pragmatists (motivated by the logic of electoral competition), it is inadequate to explain the organizational development of the MCM.

PART TWO

At this point in the thesis, it seems as though the Kitschelt has delivered the perfect method for explaining recent developments in political representation. This section however, will serve to temper this impression by examining recent developments within the MCM and by demonstrating flaws with the logic of some of Kitschelt's arguments. In the process, the chapter will conclude that Kitschelt's principal theoretical contribution has not been to find a new form of representation

that disproves the traditional literature, but that he has found a form that evolves to oligarchy like all others, albeit in a different manner than the literature described until now.

NOTES

1. Herbert Kitschelt, The Logics of Party Formation (London: Cornell University Press, 1989), vii.
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3. Kitschelt, viii.
4. Kitschelt, 2, 276.
5. Kitschelt, 2, 75-97.
6. Kitschelt, 3.
7. Kitschelt, 3, 75-97.
8. Kitschelt, 3.
9. Kitschelt, 3.
10. Kitschelt, 4.
11. Kitschelt, 4.
12. Kitschelt, 4.
13. Kitschelt, 5.
14. Kitschelt, 274, 98-147.
15. Kitschelt, 274.
16. Kitschelt, 115-119.
17. Kitschelt, 282.
18. Kitschelt, 5.
19. Kitschelt, 274.
20. Kitschelt, 274, 201-275.
21. Kitschelt, 277.
22. Kitschelt, 278.
23. Kitschelt, 279.

24. Kitschelt, 279, 225-275.
25. Kitschelt, 279, 168-200.
26. Kitschelt, 280.
27. Kitschelt, 281, 201-225.
28. Kitschelt, 287-288.
29. Kitschelt, 285.
30. Kitschelt, 289.
31. W. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 3.
32. Young, p.4.
33. Young, 3.
34. Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: a political analysis of Social Credit in Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 237-238.
35. Raymond Hudon, "The Parti Québécois in Power," in Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada, 5th ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985), 228.
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41. F.H. Underhill, "Concerning Mr. King," The Canadian Forum (September, 1950), 122.

42. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen: Brokerage Parties and Class Politics," in Gagnon and Tanguay, 28-37.
43. Reginald Whitaker, The Government Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 420.
44. Claude Galipeau, "Political Parties, Interest Groups, and New Social Movements: Towards New Representation," in Gagnon & Tanguay, 415.
45. Galipeau, 404-426.
46. See D. Drache & D. Cameron, The Other Macdonald Report (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1985).
47. Duncan Cameron, "Political Discourse in the Eighties," in Gagnon & Tanguay, 74-80.
48. Cameron, 74-80.
49. Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon Pammett, "On the Political Sidelines," Absent Mandate 2nd ed., (Toronto: Gage Publications, 1990), 11.
50. Warren Magnusson, "Critical Social Movements: De-centring the State," in A.G. Gagnon & J.P. Bickerton, eds., Canadian Politics (Peterborough: Broadview Press, Ltd., 1990), 527.
51. John Meisel, "The Decline of Party in Canada," in Hugh Thorburn ed., Party Politics in Canada, 5th ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985), 78-114.
52. See Andrew Sancton, Governing the Island of Montreal: Language Differences and Metropolitan Politics (Los Angeles: University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985).
53. Warren Magnusson & Andrew Sancton, City Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Ltd., 1983), 75.
54. Harold Chorney, City of Dreams (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990), 192.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE MCM AS A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY

This chapter takes up propositions one and two, establishing that the MCM was a left-libertarian party¹. It does so by focusing upon the party's origins, its policies and its membership over the years. The chapter begins by demonstrating the unresponsiveness of the Drapeau administration to Montreal's movement constituencies and how this unresponsiveness led to the creation of the MCM and its subsequent popularity. These developments echo Kitschelt's first proposition which states that if existing partisan institutions are unresponsive to left-libertarian demands, then we can expect a new party responding to these demands to experience considerable electoral support.

The chapter will also address proposition two which states that such unresponsiveness on the part of existing partisan institutions rallies all of their opponents under one banner and allows for the creation of coalitions encompassing substantial diversity in their membership. The chapter examines the MCM in order to identify a marked diversity in its membership. Such identification will better explain similarities in the MCM's subsequent organizational and policy development with the European left-libertarian parties.

The chapter will then examine these constituencies in order that they might be compared with those of the left-libertarian parties of Europe. If the MCM was and is truly a left-libertarian party, then the MCM should possess a similar policy orientation and it should be made up of similar constituencies as the European left-libertarian parties

¹Throughout the analysis the term "libertarian" is meant to be interpreted in exactly the manner intended by Kitschelt, who, I believe, uses the term with a lower case "l". This meaning is not to be confused with the philosophical tradition of American libertarianism or the political parties that name themselves "libertarian."

identified by Kitschelt. The chapter compares the policy orientations of these constituencies in Europe and in Montreal as well as the sociological characteristics of both groups and demonstrates similarities that effectively establish that the MCM was a left-libertarian party.

The chapter then compares the MCM's development, sociological composition, and ideological orientation with municipal government in other Canadian cities and with other parties in Montreal. This final comparison allows the chapter to conclude that the MCM's left-libertarianism is unique and not part of any trend in municipal politics in Montreal or in Canada.

The Historical Origins of the MCM

The Drapeau Years

Prior to the creation of the MCM, Montreal municipal politics had long been dominated by the distinctive style of former reformer, Jean Drapeau. Drapeau fitted into a relatively closed political urban environment which had not undergone the kind of early reforms and restructuring that a city such as Toronto had experienced. This mayor's major accomplishments included the Metro, Expo 67, the Expos, the Olympic Games, La Floralie, and various grandiose art exhibitions. All of these accomplishments have been considered as part of Drapeau's plan for enhancing Montreal's prestige as a city of world-class importance. Furthermore, many of these monumental spectacles involved projects that necessitated substantial capital investment and employment opportunities, including a metropolitan underground transit system and major roadworks like the Decarie, the Ville Marie and the Metropolitan expressways.¹

Harold Chorney and Andrew Molloy note, however, that with the monuments, the capital works and glory, came notorious cost over-runs, stories of scandal and corruption, and most importantly the Olympic debt and "the misplaced priorities that crippled the civic administration in meeting many of its other more plebian needs."² According to Chorney and Molloy these needs included good quality housing for all income classes; recreational, park, and cultural facilities that were accessible for participation and not just spectatorship; a well maintained system of roads and public transportation that was not starved of operating funds; a sense of neighbourhood that was inviolate against the inroads of some new development project that coveted its land; and a fair property tax system that did not overtax tenants while sparing the wealthiest property owners. Molloy and Chorney conclude, however, that the city's most important need during this period was a more democratic city hall that would allow full opportunities for citizens to participate in the level of government that most directly affected their daily lives. According to these authors, the most important requirement in this regard was a functioning opposition with access to resources that would allow it to be effective at its task.³

The undemocratic nature of Montreal's city hall under the leadership of the Drapeau-Saulnier² administration is carefully detailed by Marcel Adam, who outlines the many difficulties experienced by journalists who attempted to research stories concerning the city's municipal government during the late sixties:

On se rendit compte que les informations les plus élémentaires faisaient défaut et empêchaient de juger adéquatement l'administration municipale ; on découvrit en même temps qu'il était impossible d'obtenir des renseignements sur les

²Montreal municipal administrations are normally identified by the last name of the mayor accompanied by that of the councillor selected by the mayor to serve as president of the administration's executive committee.

questions controversées, comme s'il se fût agi de secrets d'État dont la divulgation aurait enrayé la machine administrative ou mis en cause la sécurité de la collectivité. Plus encore, on fut frappé par l'arrogance de l'administration qui se comportait comme si elle n'avait de comptes à rendre à personne d'autre qu'aux élus.⁴

Adam notes that the arrogance of this particular administration was perceived almost immediately by the city's labour unions' but perhaps the most convincing evidence of the Drapeau-Saulnier administration's tendencies in this regard is the fact that even elements of the city's business community, a group accustomed to having access to municipal decision-makers, found the administration's style offensive and dictatorial:

Mais en 1968 les doléances viennent aussi d'autres personnes, d'autres organismes, qui représentent des intérêts si divers et parfois même divergents, qu'on ne peut les écarter sans examen. Un représentant de la Chambre de commerce de Montréal voit dans l'administration municipale «une forme de dictature» parce que rien n'est fait pour «sensibiliser l'opinion aux affaires municipales» ; pour lui il est clair que le public «devrait être éclairé davantage». Il faut que la situation soit devenue très inquiétante pour que le représentant d'un organisme groupant des représentants d'un secteur d'activité qui privilégie au plus haut point le secret, en vienne à dénoncer ses excès. Un représentant de la Ligue des propriétaires parle aussi dans le même sens et presque dans les mêmes termes que celui de la Chambre de Commerce.⁶

According to Montreal-based political scientist, Henry Milner, the fact that in the late 1960s and early 1970s practically all members of city council were Drapeau's handpicked candidates, ranks him among the most powerful of urban political figures and contributed to his being able to treat Montreal as little more than a site for his own personal schemes of glory. The accuracy of such characterizations of Drapeau is borne out by the actions of the Civic Party which Drapeau created as the vehicle to enact and implement his desires. One example of this fact was the Civic Party's short-lived initial decision to "stall off holding meetings (by law required to meet only four times a year)" in reaction to facing an MCM

team in council. Executive committee member Fernand Desjardins justified this decision by stating to an MCM councillor that it was necessary because "you people talk all the time (in council), make it into propaganda, and get a lot of publicity."⁷ Drapeau and the Civic Party seemed unprepared to deal with even a minimal level of opposition.

Some scholars such as Richard Barrette and Claude Boucher have classified Drapeau as a "boss politique"⁸ in the North American tradition of Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley, but Milner writes that:

Those who would compare him to Richard Daley are mistaken. Daley is boss but also slave in a certain context to the machine he created; Drapeau at his height was slave to no one. A more fitting comparison might therefore be to Robert Moses. It was not until 1974 that Jean Drapeau faced serious opposition and by then this opposition represented a new and potentially different view and understanding of the city and city politics emerging out of the preceding decade.⁹

The extent of Drapeau's personal authority that came to characterize his years in power, would ultimately generate opposition that would manifest itself in diverse forms. Barrette and Boucher write that even the business community tired of Drapeau's fiscal irresponsibility and lust for grandeur and expensive, deficit creating projects:

Pour l'essentiel des mesures législatives qui ont une incidence sur leurs intérêts de classes, la fraction dominante de la bourgeoisie dépend du gouvernement fédéral, mais elle attend du gouvernement municipal des conditions propices à la promotion de ses intérêts. Depuis 1970, il semble en effet que l'administration Drapeau ne porte plus un oreille aussi attentive aux demandes de cette fraction de classe. Elle s'enferme dans ses projets éphémères et réactionnaires (à contre-courant du progrès capitaliste) qui ont nui au développement de l'industrie capitaliste. Pour le capitalisme industriel, il fallait une administration qui couperait court à ces folies des grandeurs et qui mettrait de l'avant pour Montréal des politiques de développement durables.¹⁰

These authors write that it was these sentiments and the disaffection of this constituency that eventually led to the creation of the Municipal Action Group (MAG) in 1978. MAG sought to stabilize the Montreal economy and prevent future economic follies on the municipal level, a goal very

much appreciated by Montreal's politically powerful business community:

C'est dans cette foulée qu'est apparu le Groupe d'Action Municipale en 1978. Se définissant lui-même comme un parti de centre-réformiste, le GAM cherche à prendre le pouvoir afin de relancer une économie stable, ce que l'administration Drapeau n'a pu faire, c'est-à-dire sa révolution tranquille à Montréal...Le Groupe d'Action Municipale, s'appuyant sur une certaine élite locale et une couche de la population "écoeurée" de l'administration Drapeau-Lamarre, défend objectivement les intérêts du grand capital canadien...Pour ces gens, il y avait place à Montréal pour un parti dont les priorités seraient de rendre à la métropole sa vocation de plaque tournante du commerce et des services financiers; de redonner à Montréal les instruments qui permettent le développement économique de la cité, afin de la sortir du "marasme".¹¹

An even more politically significant and powerful opposition came earlier and sustained itself longer than MAG. This opposition arose from a coalition of popular groups guided by a sense of libertarianism which Jacques Godbout and Jean-Pierre Collin claim is often the natural consequence of such lengthy terms of centralized leadership:

le développement des organismes populaires correspond à l'absence d'institutions municipales décentralisées à l'échelon des quartiers et conduit donc à la mise sur pied éventuelle de conseils de quartiers, de structures locales capable de traiter les problèmes territoriaux collectifs et les problèmes de transformation de l'utilisation du sol qui se posent à cette échelle.¹²

This opposition began during the late sixties and early seventies when various left wing nationalist organizations joined together with certain trade unions to form the "front d'action politique" (FRAP). Without nominating a candidate for mayor, FRAP managed to build the basis for an opposition movement at the local level. However, FRAP publicly supported the leftist, ideological goals presented by the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ)'s political manifesto and even though it disapproved of their methods, Drapeau was able to associate FRAP with the terrorist activities of the FLQ in the 1970 election and destroyed its chances of any form of electoral success.

On demandait au FRAP de se situer face au F.L.Q., c'est-à-dire dans l'esprit de beaucoup de gens face à la violence. Le FRAP à cause de ses divisions internes ne présenta pas une position claire. Il se prononça pour les objectifs ultimes visés par le F.L.Q., c'est-à-dire la prise du pouvoir pour les travailleurs, mais précisant qu'il avait choisi, pour sa part, des moyens non violents soit les trois fronts de lutte. Cette position ambiguë fut rapidement reprise par le maire DRAPEAU qui passa à l'offensive...Drapeau utilisa tous les médias disponibles, principalement la radio, pour associer le plus possible le FRAP au F.L.Q....Ces déclarations de M. DRAPEAU eurent d'autant plus de poids que le ministre fédéral Jean Marchand venait de présenter le FRAP comme une "couverture" du F.L.Q....Le jour du vote, les résultats sont les suivants: "Dimanche, 25 octobre: un pourcentage record de Montréalais se rend aux urnes, DRAPEAU est élu à 92% des suffrages, 52 conseillers sur 52 au Parti civique."¹³

Perhaps a lesson had been learned from the manner in which Drapeau had destroyed FRAP, for the subsequent history of opposition to Drapeau displays a marked tendency, even among the most radical elements, to avoid being conclusively tagged with the radical/revolutionary/Marxist label. By 1974, despite the mayor's best efforts, all the forces of opposition (although greatly disorganised) surfaced to confront him and signal the beginning of the end of Jean Drapeau's reign. Civic activists and reformers became imbued by a keen sense of momentous change. "All those who had opposed the regime of Drapeau as authoritarian, anti-democratic and unprogressive had mobilized in the ranks of the opposition parties led by the Montreal Citizens Movement."¹⁴²

Collin and Godbout note that this new entity differed from FRAP in many important ways, not the least of which being its less radical and explicitly socialist stance. Unlike FRAP, which had advocated revolutionary change and had attempted to organize Montreal's less fortunate against the city's commercial and industrial elite, the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM) focused more narrowly on municipal affairs and adopted an orientation that favoured administrative reform rather than all-encompassing societal change:

Le programme du FRAP procédait d'une conception beaucoup plus large que celui du R.C.M.. "Une ville pour nous" se limite à examiner les problèmes strictement municipaux et, comme solution, à proposer certaines réformes administratives...le FRAP,...Marqué par un début d'idéologie socialiste, il (FRAP) vise à regrouper les "salariés" et les gens à "faibles revenus", contre les élites commerçantes et industrielles. Dans le programme R.C.M., on ne fait plus référence aux classes sociales et on s'adresse au "citoyen" de toutes les catégories sociales.¹⁵

The quotation from Collin and Godbout reveals that although these authors felt that the approach of the MCM's was weak and overly timid,¹⁶ they could not deny that it certainly allowed the party to broaden its appeal to virtually every element of Montreal's citizenry. It seemed that even the most radical political groups on the Montreal municipal scene accepted the MCM as the only legitimate vehicle for achieving their political goals.

Founding the MCM

Begun largely by anglophone activists and militants of the FRAP opposition destroyed by Drapeau in 1970, the MCM was formed in May of 1974 from a broad coalition of forces including partisans of the Parti Québécois, members of the Montreal council of the major trade unions, the Quebec wing of the federal New Democratic Party (NDP), independent radicals and a significant number of anglophone intellectuals,¹⁷ all of whom tended to be active in the politics and organization of their communities. Some were concerned for the homeless or urban poor in their areas, some pushed for the implementation of recycling programs or the creation of bicycle paths, some sought to preserve green space and historic buildings located in their communities, while others organized to ensure adequate employment and integration of immigrants and ethnic communities.¹⁸ The vehicles used to accomplish these goals were community groups and associations as well as established pressure groups.

At the time of the MCM's creation, one of the party's most prominent anglophone intellectuals, Henry Milner, observed that the MCM had succeeded in reactivating a considerable group of young people who were part of the university-based radical movement but who upon graduation found, especially as English-speaking Quebecers, few forms in which to express their political principles.¹⁹

Intellectuals Collin and Godbout lamented the MCM's attempt at universal appeal and the ensuing inclusion of anglophone and immigrant groups as well as former members of electorally-oriented political parties such as the Parti Québécois, the NDP and the Mouvement progressiste urbain (MPU). These authors argue that these new members would bring with them the organizational tactics of political parties which would serve only to pervert the goals and ideology of the original movement.²⁰ Such concerns however, were minimized by the many MCM activists who felt that the benefits of such an approach far outweighed its disadvantages. This certainly appeared to be the opinion of Marc Raboy, one of the MCM's founding members,

the significance of the alliance of groups at the origin of the MCM should not be underestimated...It was an alliance between the most progressive elements of very diverse and often conflicting political and social groups, and represented a degree of unity on the left with little precedent...Particularly noteworthy was the MCM's ability to bring together English and French-speaking activists, to an extent no group in Quebec had achieved.²¹

The MCM's approach not only provided a unity on the left, but it also generated excitement and a sense that the party had the potential to become an agent of unprecedented social change.²² Some activists argue that the diversity of the MCM's membership and the ensuing sense of anticipation was part of the party's appeal and was a source of recruitment. Consider the following statement by one MCM militant:

J'avais des intérêts pour la politique locale, mais mes intérêts étaient plus large que ça. Au RCM, c'étaient moins de la partisanerie restreinte. Il y avait dans le RCM des

gens du NPD, du PQ, des écologistes, des anglophones et des francophones, bref, des gens très différents. La possibilité de réunir dans un même ensemble politique des gens qui, autrement, à d'autres niveaux politiques, se battent entre eux, m'attirait énormément.²³

One thing is certain: the unresponsiveness of the Drapeau administration had indeed rallied all of its adversaries and enabled them to form numerous and equally surprising alliances. Milner concurs and just prior to the 1974 election he observed that in just six months the MCM was able to build a remarkable coalition of "non sectarian socialists, socially conscious nationalists, French Canadian and immigrant workers, intellectuals, progressive anglophones disaffected from traditional politicians, and environmentalists."²⁴ Milner observed that during the election of 1974,

The anti-Drapeau vote tended to be higher in districts with sizeable English speaking populations where the NDP had achieved some success; districts with large groups of former immigrants mainly of working class composition, and French Canadian working class areas which have undergone extensive social and physical dislocation due to speculation and development.²⁵

The MCM's heterogeneity assisted the political community in a positive manner by consciously bringing together virtually every municipal activist opposed to Drapeau under the same banner and in the 1974 election, much to its astonishment, the MCM won one-third of the seats in city council.²⁶ Milner's data reveal that approximately 75 percent of the MCM supporters voted for both the party's reform program and for an opposition presence, and 25 percent voted for the MCM as a means of democratising a city hall which had been totally dominated by councillors from Drapeau's Civic Party.²⁷ These figures lend legitimacy to claims that there was a growing perception among the Montreal electorate at the time that their city hall was an unresponsive, even authoritarian

institution requiring an organized political force to scrutinize its exercise of power.

Furthermore, during the 1974 election the MCM received the support of people who had been relatively powerless in the system, including students who were most highly dissatisfied with the civic administration based on its performance regarding pollution control and the management of the Olympic Games, and senior citizens who felt their needs were ignored as well. Clearly city hall was unresponsive to the point where it had mobilized virtually every alienated constituency.²⁸ A 1975 *City Magazine* article observed that "the time had come, it was hoped, to put an end to a regime that has been called at various times dictatorial, secretive, high-handed, and out-of-touch."²⁹

At this point it seems apparent that existing partisan institutions in Montreal were indeed unresponsive and as a consequence, had allowed for a new opposition party to arise and instantaneously experience considerable electoral support in a manner consistent with that predicted by Kitschelt in proposition one. Furthermore, it seems apparent that this unresponsiveness also encouraged unlikely coalitions and a diversity in the membership of the new party similar to that predicted by Kitschelt in proposition two. What remains to be seen however, is whether or not this new and diverse coalition (the MCM) was indeed left-libertarian in nature and not simply the pragmatic result of Montreal's anti-Drapeau forces.

Milner certainly thought so at the time and this is made evident by a passage written in 1974:

The MCM's success may be traced beyond Drapeau's unpopularity and its own organizational strength, to its ability to raise just the kinds of crucial issues that people in cities, not only in Quebec, but elsewhere in North America, are starting to confront - crucial questions having to do with the kind of life that we are to live in our communities and in relation to our fellow citizens. These kinds of questions are universal - they can be asked in any language, and appeal beyond the working class to salaried professionals and the like whose incomes often make them less amenable to class issues focused

on the point of production...But...the MCM...identify the elements that make up the private property industry - and oppose them with a collective/public vision of a city organized in keeping with the needs and direct participation of the mass of the people in their own communities.³⁰

However, the only truly convincing manner in which to establish the MCM as a left-libertarian party and as something more than a pragmatic way in which to oust Drapeau, is to compare first its policy orientation and then its membership with that of the European left-libertarian parties.

The Programs and Policy Orientation of European Left-Libertarian Parties

In his examination of the left-libertarian parties of Western Europe Kitschelt notes that their programs are left-wing, they affirm notions of equality and reject the primacy of markets as arbiters of social development yet they are strongly libertarians in their thought which distinguishes them from traditional European supporters of leftist parties. They reject any vision that incorporates centralist planning and call for a society in which individual autonomy and citizen participation in public affairs have priority.³¹

For comparative purposes we can conclude that with respect to policy, left-libertarians do not have a comprehensive interpretation of modern society which builds on a closed, deductive ideology. Instead they expand on the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity but do not offer a definite vision of the institutions that can implement these values in a libertarian and egalitarian society.

Given this lack of ideological coherence, it is hardly surprising that the programs of left-libertarian parties are indeed disjointed and tend to jump immediately to very detailed arrangements and measures for

specific policy areas (energy, public transit expansion, pollution reduction, labour policy for more democratic participation in the economy by the disadvantaged such as women, youth, ethnic minorities, homosexuals etc.) rather than first establishing well defined principles of institutional choice.³²

European left-libertarians have tended to mobilize around concerns for environmental protection, world peace and nuclear disarmament, women's rights and reproductive freedom, cultural and institutional change through self-help, cooperative enterprises, and an end to urban real-estate speculation.³³ The Flemish ecology party, Agalev, grew out of the Catholic revival movement and rallied around the idea of a lifestyle built on "voluntary simplicity" and a rejection of values associated with industrial and material society such as competition for income, status, and power. Kitschelt notes that the European ecology parties such as Agalev have always had broader goals than ecological ones and they tend to defend the "new poor" including children, the elderly, the sick and infirm, the clients of public social services, and residents of polluted and decaying suburbs. Such parties have attempted to reach these groups and communicate their broader message through the creation of schools, publishing houses, meditation groups, and through environmental protests and groups such as the "Green Bicyclists," a group that introduced Belgium to the bicycle demonstration.³⁴

Kitschelt observes that often the ideological ambiguities of such disjointed party programs lead to substantial disputes among party activists over the priority of different proposals. Such disputes tend to be exacerbated by a deliberate democratic openness that rules out hierarchical solutions to conflicts among political visions and caters to the logic of constituency representation. Thus left-libertarian party programs are continually adjusted to reflect compromises forged among

various factions. This is especially true of the Greens.³⁵

Thus the issues or policy emphasis of the European left-libertarian parties can be summarized in the following manner:

Policy Emphasises of Left-Libertarian Parties

- 1) A concern for environmental protection usually manifesting itself in the form of policies for pollution reduction, energy conservation, public transit expansion and increased bicycle usage by urban commuters.
- 2) A belief in the potential and benefits that can be wrought through cultural and institutional change involving self-help, cooperative enterprises.
- 3) An economic policy emphasis that calls for more democratic participation in the economy by the disadvantaged such as women, youth, ethnic minorities, homosexuals etc.. This emphasis usually manifests itself in labour policies of affirmative action.
- 4) A desire to defend residents of polluted and decaying suburbs as well as the "new poor" (children, the elderly, the sick and infirm) and clients of public social services. This emphasis results in housing policy that attempts to curtail urban real-estate speculation.
- 5) A concern for women's rights and reproductive freedom.
- 6) A strongly articulated desire for world peace usually encompassing policies for nuclear disarmament.

All of these various concerns or desires expressed through the public policy of the European left-libertarian parties will be sought in the language of the MCM's platforms, programs and policy statements over the years. Similarities in this regard would go a long way toward establishing the MCM as a left-libertarian party.

It should be noted that although they have not been exclusively urban in their orientation and it might at first seem difficult to compare these European parties, which operate on a national level, with a municipal party that is strictly urban in its focus, the environmental and self-help policies of the European left-libertarian parties have tended to include greater proportions of urban dwellers since they make up the greatest proportion of commuters, those in need of social services and

housing, and those living with the consequences of industrial pollution. Thus, the European left-libertarian parties and the MCM tend to focus on the same constituencies by virtue of the fact that they deal with the same societal issues.

MCM Program, 1974³⁶

- 1) The MCM endorsed the principle of grassroots democracy including the establishment of neighbourhood councils with considerable decision-making authority. Each neighbourhood would have its own small bureaucracy responsible for local activities related to municipal services.
- 2) The 1974 program advocated the creation of land banks, the support and encouragement of cooperatives, and the creation of district councils to supervise urban development in the districts to prevent speculation and to protect tenants' rights.
- 3) The program also called for a large increase in expenditures on public recreation and parks as well as increased public transportation and the eventual elimination of fares beginning with the elderly.
- 4) An improvement in the collective health of Montrealers was called for in the 1974 program beginning with a reduction in the costs of medication, increased access to hospital services, and the establishment of teams of nurses in neighbourhoods. The MCM would simultaneously enact measures to alleviate the causes of health problems by establishing an inspection system to reduce food, air, water and noise pollution. Severe penalties would be levied against polluters and public food markets would be created.
- 5) The program called for a clarification of the debt and debacle of the Olympic games beginning with the awarding of contracts. It also established that it would prioritize the interests of the botanical gardens over those of the Olympic village.

An examination of the issues of concern and the policy emphasis of the MCM over the years clearly indicates similarities in its policy with that of the European left-libertarian parties. For example, at its founding congress in 1974, the MCM endorsed the principle of grassroots democracy including the establishment of neighbourhood councils with considerable decision-making authority.³⁷ Elected councillors would function as delegates from neighbourhood councils and act as intermediaries between the local citizens and the administrative structure

of the city. Each neighbourhood would have its own small bureaucracy responsible for local activities related to municipal services such as libraries, sanitation, recreation as well as activities related to legal, medical and social services under provincial jurisdiction.³⁸ This policy is certainly consistent with policy tendency number 2 of our summary of left-libertarianism, which outlines a belief in institutional change through self-help and cooperative enterprises.

The 1974 program also emphasized collective aspects of the housing situation in its prescriptions, such as the creation of land banks, the support and encouragement of cooperatives, and the creation of district councils to supervise urban development in the districts.³⁹ Not only is this policy emphasis consistent with policy tendency number 2 of European left-libertarianism, it also corresponds with number 4 which expresses the desire to defend disadvantaged clients of public social services (children, the elderly, the sick) through a variety of techniques such as curtailing urban real estate speculation.

In addition, the program also called for a large increase in expenditures on public recreation and parks as well as increased public transportation and the eventual elimination of fares, beginning with the elderly.⁴⁰ Again this emphasis corresponds with two of those common to European left-libertarianism. Its concern for the elderly clearly corresponds with policy emphasis number 4, and it also echoes the desires for energy conservation and pollution reduction through public transit expansion as expressed by number 1. The fourth portion of the 1974 program also corresponds with left-libertarian environmental concerns as well those relating to the collective well-being of the urban poor. Consequently, the policy emphasis of the MCM's 1974 program includes three of the six policy tendencies common to the European left-libertarian parties lending further legitimacy to claims that the MCM was left-

libertarian at its outset.

An examination of the party's existence beyond 1974 suggests that the MCM grew even more left-libertarian in the four years following its creation. For example, the 1977 report of the Commission des citoyens pour l'avenir de Montréal reflected the views of its most vocal participants - MCM intellectuals and activists. This report, *Centre-Ville: Les gens se prononcent!*,⁴¹ focused on the following issues:

- 1) Downtown planning and preservation in Montreal's central core.
- 2) Libertarian solution to the urban crisis and aspects of local community power. It was felt that a decentralization of the power of decision-making to the community level would help resolve many local problems.
- 3) Reasons for the defence of local social economy in downtown Montreal, resource use in urban development, and the property evaluation system and land speculation.
- 4) The global problem (environmental).
- 5) Youth problems in disadvantaged communities and the needs of working women.

A comparative examination reveals that the Commission's emphasis mirrors almost perfectly, that of the European left-libertarian parties. The MCM's subsequent policy program of 1978 entitled, *Changeons Montréal pour vrai, le programme de gouvernement du Rassemblement des Citoyens de Montréal*, was even more similar in its emphasis and articulated the following:

MCM Program, 1978⁴²

- 1) A desire to improve the quality, cost and availability of housing as well as to implement protections against arbitrary evictions by landlords.
- 2) The need to beautify the city for tourism and to manage better Montreal's green spaces and architecture through legislation preventing indiscriminate demolition and the ensuing creation of abandoned and vacant lots.
- 3) A concern for the city's air quality and the need to minimize noise

pollution through the creation of bicycle lanes for secure cycling as well as through the creation of a free and efficient public transit system that would incorporate taxis.

4) A more equitable system of taxation for residents and small businesses as well as more reasonable rates of payment. The need for suburbanites to pay their equal share of services supplied by the city.

5) More public employment projects with hiring procedures that would avoid discrimination and would benefit organized labour and the greatest number of citizens as opposed to a select few.

6) The establishment of neighbourhood councils with considerable decision-making authority resulting in responsive, organized community services in all quarters that respect the elderly, the handicapped, and clearly enunciated democratic operating procedures. These services would include publicly controlled daycare as well as public food markets.

Upon examination it is evident that the MCM's 1978 program reflects the policy orientations of the European left-libertarian parties even more dramatically than its program of 1974. The first section of the 1978 program certainly reflects the desire to protect the "new poor" through housing policy as stated by policy emphasis number 4 of the left-libertarian parties. Section 3 of the same program concerning environmental protection, is virtually identical to left-libertarian policy emphasis number 1 and even proposes increased bicycle usage as does its European counterpart.

The fifth section of the MCM's 1978 program shares the same concerns for more equitable participation in the labour force on the part of disadvantaged groups as does left-libertarian policy emphasis number 3, while the sixth part of this MCM program corresponds with virtually all of the left-libertarian policy orientations including numbers 2,4, and 5. It reflects a similar desire to improve services to the "new poor" through cooperative enterprises including daycare, which might also be equated with policy emphasis number 5 of the left-libertarian list which expresses a concern for women's rights and reproductive freedom. In sum, the MCM's 1978 program includes all of the policy emphasises of the European left-

libertarian parties except statements expressing a desire for world peace and nuclear disarmament. This would come later, following the election of 1986.

The 1982 program was no less similar and built on the policy orientation of the 1978 program. The only difference was that the 1982 program even more clearly defended disadvantaged groups such as women and new immigrants by proposing the creation of community bureaus designed to address their specific needs.⁴³ The MCM's 1982 program also added to that of 1978 by articulating concerns for improved public safety by upgrading the city's fire fighting equipment and by establishing police foot patrols. The 1982 program's only significant detour from the party's original emphasis was the apparent softening of the party's stance regarding free public transit. Instead, this program merely advocated free transit for seniors outside of "rushhour".⁴⁴

The most significant alteration in the MCM's policy orientation however, came in 1986. During the month of September of that year, about 65 MCM council delegates voted unanimously to put on hold one of the most important and distinguishing planks of its platform - the creation of neighbourhood councils as well as the direct election of mayor.⁴⁵ Clearly, the MCM of 1986 was less libertarian in its orientation than the party had been in previous years. But even this transformation in emphasis, although important for those especially concerned with every element of MCM policy, did not alter the MCM dramatically enough to destroy its correlation with European left-libertarianism.⁴⁶ For example, following the 1986 election the MCM declared Montreal a nuclear-free zone, a decision very consistent with policy emphasis number six of Kitchelt's left-libertarian list, although Dimitrios Roussopolis suggests that this decision must be tempered by the fact Montreal sits in a region which produces over half the military production (mostly for export) in

Canada.⁴⁷

The last published MCM program for the 1990 campaign differed only slightly from that of 1986, in the degree of sophistication of its environmentalism. It more clearly articulated concerns for toxic waste disposal and "sick building" syndrome but the program's overall emphasis, excluding the diminished importance of neighbourhood councils, was remarkably similar to that of 1978 and was therefore very similar still, to the policy emphasis of European left-libertarian parties.⁴⁸

Sociology

As we have seen, there is a marked correspondence between the policy orientations of the European left-libertarian parties and the MCM, especially when platforms and publicised policy positions are compared. Such similarities certainly help to establish the MCM as a left-libertarian party but an equally convincing avenue of inquiry is to examine the sociology of such parties' memberships through a comparison of quantifiable characteristics such as sex, age, education, occupation, and political career experience. If such an examination demonstrates that the MCM appeals to a similar constituency as the left-libertarian parties of Europe, then it will have further reinforced assertions that it is in fact a left-libertarian party.

1) - SEX - Kitschelt argues that within European left-libertarian parties there is a greater proportion of women among their membership than in

traditional parties³. He also argues that these proportions diminish over time and hypothesises that this is a result of the factionalism always experienced by left-libertarian parties. He implies that women become less attracted to these parties due to the increased factionalism such parties experience as they age.⁴

Unfortunately Kitschelt provides no numbers or tables to verify these observations. An examination of the data concerning the MCM in this regard seems to duplicate Kitschelt's observations on one level, but contradict them on another. From its inception in 1974, the MCM elected a woman as its president, Léa Cousineau,⁵⁰ and a document entitled, *MCM 1974-1989, Fifteen years of political activity in Montreal* noted that in November 1974, the MCM officially entered City Hall by electing 18 candidates and for the first time, three women ended up sitting on Montreal's municipal council.⁵¹ In 1984, the MCM formed a new committee to study the integration of women into municipal politics and in December of that year 30 women participated in the first brunch meeting on municipal politics. On February 23, 1986, approximately 300 women took part in a seminar on "Les Montréalaises, une force politique," which they had certainly become.⁵² As an article in *Le Devoir* noted:

C'est pour tenter de contrer cette quasi-absence des femmes sur la scène municipale, en particulier au Conseil de ville, que le Rassemblement des citoyens et citoyennes de Montréal (RCM) organisait, hier, un brunch-colloque sur l'intégration des femmes à la vie politique montréalaise. Le Rassemblement compte environ 6,500 membres dont 43% sont des femmes.⁵³

On November 9, 1986, the MCM came to power with the election of 55 of its 58 candidates. All of its fifteen women candidates were elected, forming 26% of municipal council. Furthermore, a 1990 statistical summary

³It should be noted that although left-libertarian parties are appealing to many women who are interested in politics at the municipal level, they do not attract all women in this category and many also become involved in right-wing municipal parties as well.

of the MCM candidates reveals that during the electoral campaign of that year, three new women candidates had been added to the party's lineup, bringing their total to 38%.⁵⁴ The MCM's sociological history does reveal a well above average percentage of women candidates. Indeed, Table 1 reveals that the percentage of female representation in Montreal's municipal council more than doubles that of the Canadian federal legislature and is more than four times that of Canada's provincial legislatures.

Table 1

Female representation in Canadian federal and provincial legislatures and the Montreal municipal council (in percentages)

	Year	% Women
House of Commons	1984	9.6
Provinces overall	1982	6.2
Montreal municipal council	1986	26.0

Sources: Sylvia Bashevkin, "Political Parties and the Representation of Women," in Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, Canadian Parties in Transition, 1979, Table 19-4; Cahier d'information de la campagne électorale municipale du 4 novembre 1990, (RCM, Montréal, 1990).

Nevertheless, although the MCM has had a higher percentage of women representatives than parties at the federal and provincial levels, Table 2 reveals that its percentage is very average when compared to the municipal councils of other major Canadian cities, and is lower than some, such as Edmonton, which had 53.8% women councillors and a woman mayor in 1989.

Table 2
Number and percentage of women serving on municipal councils in
major Canadian cities, 1989

City	Total number of elected representatives (including mayor)	Year of last election	Number of women councillors	% of women councillors
Edmonton	13	1989	7	53.8
Calgary	14	1989	6	42.8
Saint John's	5	1985	2	40.0
Ottawa	15	1988	5	33.3
Regina	10	1988	3	30.0
Vancouver	10	1988	3	30.0
Quebec City	22	1989	6	27.2
Montreal	60	1986	15	25.0
Toronto	24	1988	6	25.0
Halifax	13	1988	3	23.0
Winnipeg	30	1989	6	20.0
Fredericton	12	1989	2	16.6

Source: Chantal Maillé, Primed for Power: Women in Canadian Politics (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1990), p.14.

Chantal Maillé offers several reasons for women's higher participation in municipal politics compared to that in federal or provincial politics. Not only do the latter require more extensive travel, which is a burden for many women because of family responsibilities, but they also require greater financial resources which is an obstacle for many women who generally have less access to financial networks.⁵⁵ Maillé also suggests that these participation rates might also be explained by the relative attractiveness to women of the kinds of issues dealt with in municipal politics.⁵⁶ Caroline Andrew writes however, that often the sectors of interest to women (education, social services) are not handled at the

municipal level which invariably has to deal with the more mundane concerns involved with maintaining a city's infrastructure (sewage, roads, snow removal, etc.).⁵⁷

Louise Quesnel-Ouellet notes that not only is the MCM's percentage of women representatives average when compared to other municipal councils in major Canadian cities, it is also insignificant when compared to other municipal parties in Montreal. Quesnel-Ouellet shows that Montreal's "electoralist" municipal parties (MAG, PMQ) tend to have slightly lower proportions of women candidates than the "popular" parties (FRAP, RCM/MCM, RPQ)⁵⁸, however these differences are far from substantial (see Table 3).

Table 3

Distribution by sex, of the candidates of popular parties in Montreal and Quebec municipal politics

	FRAP (1970)		MCM (1978)		MAG (1978)		RPQ (1977)		PMQ (1977)	
Profession	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Men	28	87,5	44	80,0	47	85,5	15	88,2	13	81,2
Women	4	12,5	11	20,0	8	14,5	2	11,8	3	18,8
Total	32	100,0	55	100,0	55	100,0	17	100,0	16	100,0

Source: Louise Quesnel-Ouellet, "Les partis politiques locaux au Québec," in V. Lemieux ed., Personnel et partis politiques au Québec (Montréal: Boréal Express, 1982), Table 11.4, 299.

Consequently, with reference to sex it can be safely concluded that the MCM is very similar to the European left-libertarian parties in its relatively high degree of female representation, but so are virtually all other municipal councils of Canada's major cities and other municipal parties in the city of Montreal. Furthermore, unlike Kitschelt's European examples, the MCM data does not reveal any decrease in the percentage of women representatives. In fact the opposite appears to be the case. Thus, for comparative purposes (between the MCM and the European left-

libertarian parties), the best that can be said in relation to the variable of sex is that the findings are inconclusive.

2) - AGE - Kitschelt argues that European left-libertarians tend to be younger than traditional party membership and he provides data to confirm this assertion. Kitschelt determines that the average age of the West German Greens (1984-1985) was 37. This is the same average age for the MCM members (1974-1986) so there does indeed appear to be statistically significant similarities between the membership of the two groups (See Table 4).

Table 4

Age of party activists in the Greens and MCM (in percentages)

	under 25	25-34	35-44	45-59	60+	Average age
1.MCM candidates (1974)	12%	33%	33%	19%	4%	37.5 100% (N = 52)
2.MCM candidates (1978)	8	47	26	19	0	35.1 100 (N = 53)
3.MCM candidates (1982)	5	46	35	12	2	36.4 100 (N = 57)
4.MCM candidates (1986)	0	21	62	16	2	39.0 100 (N = 58)
5.MCM candidates (1974-86)	6	37	39	17	2	37.0 100 (N = 220)
6.Green's overall (1984-85)	5	48	30	12	5	36.8 100 (N = 207)
7.Green interviewees (1985)	3	47	29	14	7	37.6 100 (N = 86)
8.Green district candidates in Baden-Wurtemberg state election (1984)	6	49	31	9	3	36.0 100 (N = 121)

Sources: For the MCM data see appendix A. For data concerning the West German Greens see H. Kitschelt, The Logics of Party Formation, Table 14.

Indeed, the overall age patterns of the MCM during the 1978-1982 period matches almost perfectly the overall age patterns of the West German Greens, while the age distribution of the MCM candidates during its entire history is very similar to that of the West German activists, although a slightly greater proportion fall within the 35-44 category as opposed to the 25-34 grouping. Thus the average age of the two groups remained virtually identical during the entire period.

An important feature of this statistical comparison as well as all those to follow, is that I have chosen to focus solely upon the West German Green data as opposed to the Agalev and Ecolo (Belgian) data due to the fact that the Belgians are very rural while the West Germans come from an urban environment possessing all of the ingredients common to Montreal and which impact so greatly upon left-libertarianism (universities, social service employment, etc.). Nevertheless the Green interviewees are from the party in general while the MCM data is drawn solely from candidates. Therefore I have included the Baden-Wurttemberg data which is taken from Green election candidates only. I have then merged the West German interviewees with the Baden-Wurttemberg candidates in an attempt to capture the characteristics of both groups that are shared by the MCM sample, thus facilitating comparison.

Continuing on a methodological note, it should also be observed that the MCM data permit a multiple interrupted time series (MITS), an analysis that allows us to test developmental patterns over time. Consequently we are able to go beyond Kitschelt and respond to many observations that he was unable to examine statistically. For example, Kitschelt argues that in centres of left-libertarian activity, ideological and strategic diversity has stimulated conflict that, as was the case with women, has militated against the recruitment of young party members. Apparently such potential membership is apprehensive about joining organizations dominated

by members who are not only fractious but their seniors as well.⁵⁹

An examination of the ages of MCM candidates over time might suggest the possibility that the party has been unable to rejuvenate itself through the recruitment of youth and has aged incrementally (See Table 4). Indeed the average age of the MCM members increased from 35.1 in 1978 to 39.0 in 1986 but Table 5 reveals that in fact the MCM has had little difficulty recruiting new candidates over the twelve year period from 1974 to 1986 and although the number of repeat candidates increases slightly between 1982 and 1986, this increase is slight and the overall number of "repeaters" (18 out of 58 candidates in 1986) appears inadequate to be able to dominate the party to the point where it would be unable to recruit new members.

Table 5

The number of newly recruited candidates versus those seeking re-election with the MCM

	1978	1982	1986
Repeating candidates	13	10	18
New candidates	41	47	40
	<u>N=54</u>	<u>N=57</u>	<u>N=58</u>

Source: See appendix A.

Furthermore, Table 6 reveals that although the repeaters tended to be slightly older than the new candidates during this period, the data do not support the hypothesis that the party's aging is attributable to a lack of turnover in membership and the incremental aging of "repeaters". It appears that in fact the new recruits tend to be slightly older on average, with each election.

Table 6

Average age (in years) of new MCM candidates as compared to those seeking re-election

	1978	1982	1986
Average age of repeating candidates	40.2	38.8	41.8
Average age of new candidates	32.7	35.9	37.8
Average age of all candidates	35.1	36.4	39.0
	N=54	N=57	N=58

Source: See appendix A.

Therefore the most important single finding with respect to the variable of age remains the fact that age distribution within the MCM and the West German Greens is very similar.

3) - EDUCATION - With respect to educational background, Kitschelt found that most left-libertarian activists in the European parties are well educated, having at least some college education if not an advanced university degree. Comparisons with the MCM reveals that this is also true of the MCM whose membership possesses very similar educational attributes to the West German Greens (See Table 7).

Table 7Educational level of party candidates and activists (in percentages)

	University degree	University or college attendance	No university education	
1.MCM candidates (1974)	45%	19%	36%	100% (N=52)
2.MCM candidates (1978)	No	data	available	
3.MCM candidates (1982)	No	data	available	
4.MCM candidates (1986)	64	12	24	100 (N=58)
5.MCM candidates (1974-86)	55	16	30	100 (N=110)
6.Green's overall (1984-85)	64	14	23	100 (N=207)
7.Green interviewees (1985)	62	20	19	100 (N=86)
8.Green district candidates in Baden-Wurttemberg state election (1964)	65	7	27	100 (N=121)

Sources: For MCM data see appendix A. For data concerning the West German Green's see H. Kitschelt, The Logic of Party Formation, Table 15.

This particular similarity between the MCM and Green membership is especially important because of the emphasis Kitschelt places on this variable and its relationship to left-libertarian parties. Kitschelt believes that the educational attributes of left-libertarians impacts significantly upon their parties. Indeed he argues that the educational attributes of left-libertarians contribute to a healthy distrust of their own party as a vehicle of political mobilization.⁶⁰ Because left-libertarian voters are young and very well-educated, they have little party loyalty and are especially likely to think and vote strategically.⁶¹

As well, Kitschelt observes that left-libertarian intellectuals (those who make up the category of membership possessing university degrees in Table 7) place less value upon the social life of the party than do working-class and less educated party activists who enjoy the solidarity and status parties provide. He notes that intellectuals usually have their own networks outside the party, cultivate a libertarian lifestyle, and look outside the party for a sense of community and status.⁶²

Kitschelt feels that this problem is exacerbated in metropolitan centres of left-libertarianism where large, liberal arts oriented universities serve as a constant supplier and training ground for such party activists and supporters.⁶³ Clearly Montreal is just such a centre possessing four universities: McGill, Université de Montréal, Université de Québec à Montréal (UQAM), and Concordia. The latter two are liberal arts oriented, and as Milner has already indicated earlier in the chapter, a relationship existed between these institutions and the MCM that further demonstrates the importance of the statistical variable of education (this is especially true of the anglophone group that Milner described earlier as "the University based radical movement").

4) - **OCCUPATION** - Occupation is another important category for identifying left-libertarian members. In his statistical analysis Kitschelt discovers that the highest percentage of party members and militants indicates employment in the public service sector, primarily education. For the most part, left-libertarian party members and activists in Europe are drawn from the ranks of salaried professionals and business entrepreneurs lending little credence to the notion that left-libertarian parties consist primarily of students and an economically deprived segment of the middle class.⁶⁴ These characteristics also hold true for MCM activists whose occupational distribution resembles that of the West German Greens'

to a greater extent than any other variable. Table 8 demonstrates that the similarities are in fact remarkable, lending further legitimacy to the belief that both parties respond to the same constituencies. The only slight difference that exists occurs within category 5 which can be accounted for by the high rate of union employees among the MCM membership.

Table 8

Occupations of left-libertarian militants (in percentages)

	Green inter- viewees 1985	Baden- Wuerttemberg candidates 1984	Greens overall 1984-85	MCM 1974- 1986	MCM 1974	MCM 1978	MCM 1982	MCM 1986
1.Educational sector, social services, media	31%	45%	38%	38%	40%	31%	40%	39%
2.Student or military	9	7	8	6	2	17	5	0
3.Political officials@	13	*	7	5	4	6	5	5
4.Business/ liberal professions/ entrepreneur	23	26	25	21	17	15	18	33
5.White-collar worker	9	15	12	17	19	17	18	15
6.Blue-collar worker	2	2	2	6	9	6	7	2
7.Unemployed	6	5	6	6	8	7	4	5
8.Retiree, homemaker	6	0	3	2	2	0	4	2
	99% N=86	100% N=121	100% N=207	100% N=222	100% N=53	100% N=54	100% N=57	100% N=58

@. party employees, except parliamentarians or elected officials. It should be noted that there was not funding for opposition party officials in Montreal municipal politics until 1984. Those officials listed prior to this year were from the provincial NDP or the Parti Québécois (PQ).

*. data unavailable

Source: For MCM data see appendix A. For data concerning the West German Greens see Kitschelt, The Logic of Party Formation, (1989), Table 16.

Again Kitschelt notes that there seems to be a connection between this variable of left-libertarian membership and metropolitan areas, which might explain part of the similarity between the two parties in this regard. Kitschelt observes that not only do metropolitan areas contain universities but also a preponderance of service sector employment.⁶¹ Montreal is just such a metropolitan area containing administrative

departments for the governments of Quebec and Canada.

5) - **PREVIOUS POLITICAL ACTIVITY** - Kitschelt concludes from his data that activists coming from New Left or conventional party backgrounds tend to advocate broad programmatic conceptualizations. Narrow programmatic concerns are more typical of party members without previous political involvement or of social movement activists, particularly those from environmental movements who have "drifted" into the parties with the hope of more effectively pursuing their cause.⁶⁶ Forty percent of these European left-libertarian activists or militants take a firm participatory position, while 60 percent favour a more instrumental position.⁶⁷ In both Belgium and West Germany Kitschelt found that among this group, past political experience in organizations striving to gain power promotes a more instrumentalist view of politics even among New Left activists.⁶⁸

Kitschelt reveals that of the left-libertarian activists that he surveyed, many had participated in activities of the New Left, ranging from student associations to more doctrinaire communist splinter parties formed in the late 1960s. A smaller group had been involved in conventional political parties while social movements constituted a third source of left-libertarian party activists in Western Europe⁶⁹ (See Table 9).

Table 9

Political career experience of party activists in West German Greens and MCM (in percentages)

	Political	career	experience		
	New Left (and left-libertarian movements)	Old Left, Social Democratic parties, unions	Business lobbies	No activism before joining left-libertarian party	
MCM candidates (1974)	42%	42%	0%	16%	100% N = 52
MCM candidates (1978)	45	19	0	35	100 N = 52
MCM candidates (1982)	54	21	0	25	100 N = 57
MCM candidates (1986)	55	22	3	20	100 N = 58
MCM candidates (1974-86)	49	26	2	24	100 N = 219
		Conventional party membership			
West German Greens (1984-85)	67	22	0	10	100 N = 86

Source: For MCM data see appendix A. For data concerning the West German Greens see Kitschelt, The Logic of Party Formation, Table 17.

It is apparent from Table 9 that comparison of this type of data becomes more difficult due to prominence of strong, social democratic, socialist or labour parties in Europe that house all of the region's old left and all of its labour constituencies. Such parties are weak or non-existent in most of North America and excluding the NDP and the Parti Québécois, labour in Quebec has tended to reside within large unions that work with a greater degree of political autonomy from the political parties than their European counterparts. As a consequence, where Kitschelt has used the category "Conventional party membership" I have used the category "Old left, social democratic parties (NDP, PQ), labour" to capture the same statistical constituency. Also Kitschelt has not

accounted for militants who are members of pressure groups or business lobbies, a constituency that crops up in the Montreal data.

For all these reasons comparison will be less precise than was the case in previous tables. Nevertheless some useful findings can be gleaned from Table 9. For example, Table 9 reveals that the MCM has been well stocked with both the politically inexperienced as well as those possessing experience in pragmatic organizations striving to gain or influence power such as conventional parties and unions. In fact the MCM has been composed by a higher proportion of these two divergent groups than the West German Greens thus demonstrating an even greater potential for internal conflict and factionalism.

Also, Kitschelt argues that following electoral successes the European left-libertarian parties have begun attracting members who older militants claim often lack a solid political background, who are swept into the party on a general wave of enthusiasm, and who are unable to cope with political business on a daily basis.⁷⁰ The MCM data appear to confirm this idea with greater increases in its politically inexperienced membership following the two periods during which its electoral successes were most acclaimed (1974 and 1986). It also experienced the greatest decrease in such membership following its annihilation at the polls in 1978.

It must also be pointed out that there once again exists a significant statistical relationship between the variable currently being discussed and metropolitan centres. Kitschelt notes that left-libertarian cleavage is most highly mobilized in metropolitan areas. He also notes that in areas where left-libertarian cleavage is highly mobilized, more activists tend to come from the New Left and social movements and therefore possess political experience that makes them viable candidates for office. Clearly Montreal is just such an area and although the

comparisons gleaned from Table 9 are at times tenuous, the table certainly demonstrates the leftist and left-libertarian character of the MCM activists who compare favourably with their European counterparts in this regard.

On a final note regarding Table 9, it is important to observe that the "New Left" category actually grew proportionately over the twelve year period of the MCM's existence captured by the table. This category comprises all MCM candidates involved in groups or organizations concerned with feminism, environmentalism (recycling, preserving green space, promoting the use of the bicycle), architectural preservation, and improving the rights of the urban poor (social housing, youth programs, reduced public transit for seniors). In effect, this category captures the "movement" oriented elements of Montreal's political landscape and because it clearly grew constantly over the course of the MCM's existence, it can therefore be safely concluded that the MCM has always remained a viable option for the city's "movement" constituencies despite the initial fears of the "movement" constituencies associated with FRAP. This observation is confirmed by Pierre Hamel who notes that even when leaders of social movements in Montreal were not always institutionally connected to FRAP or the MCM, they were always influential when it came to these parties' policy and discourse:

Ainsi, non seulement les mouvements urbains ont directement contribué à la mise sur pied des partis politiques d'opposition - en l'occurrence le FRAP et le RCM - , mais un certain nombre d'entre eux ont aussi fourni des appuis concrets à ces partis lors des campagnes électorales, lorsqu'ils ne s'y sont tout simplement pas intégrés, comme ce fut le cas pour quelques comités de citoyens à la fin des années 1960, lors de la création du FRAP. Cette remarque demeure valable en dépit des divergences idéologiques qui ont toujours existé à l'intérieur des mouvements urbains à l'égard de la lutte électorale et de ses limites en termes de retombées positives pour la population. De plus, la participation des mouvements urbains à la lutte politique municipale s'est souvent faite indirectement, dans la mesure où ces mouvements se sont avérés, à maintes occasions, une force d'opposition extra-parlementaire redoutée, faisant

constamment pression sur la classe politique locale, l'obligeant à modifier sa vision de la ville et ses projets politiques.⁷¹

Political analysts such as Collin and Godbout expressed concern that the MCM's greater ideological flexibility than FRAP's would lead the new organization to develop into a pragmatic electoral machine rather than a social movement.⁷² However, such an analysis reflects the assumption of the traditional literature regarding parties and social movements that the two forms of political representation cannot co-exist. Pierre Hamel writes that with the fiscal restraints and declining resources of the state in the 1970s and 1980s, social movements were forced to behave less homogeneously than they had in the 1960s and to adopt more individualistic, more pragmatic, and usually more feasible strategies for accomplishing their objectives. The traditional strategy of maintaining ideological purity by remaining outside political institutions and refusing to enter into bureaucratic structures meant sacrificing opportunity and accomplishing nothing. Increasingly, social movements were forced to adopt the strategies of traditional pressure groups and concentrate their meagre resources on specific accomplishments in order to achieve some of the objectives of the communities that they represented. In effect, this meant working with, and often within the state and political parties to obtain specific policy rewards.⁷³

Hamel's observations are extremely helpful in assessing the relationship between social movement activists and the MCM. The relative importance of these activists during the 1970s is extremely difficult to assess given the fact that most of them chose to remain outside of the MCM structures preferring strategie of moral suasion and to influence the party's discourse. This helps explain the growth of the "social movement" constituency within the MCM from 1974-1986 noted by Table 9. While

initially, activists connected with single issues such as environmentalism or feminism chose to influence the discourse of the MCM while remaining outside its institutional structures, the era of fiscal restraint and increased community hardship forced them to become more involved in the organization itself and this is reflected in Table 9. The number of social movement activists connected to the MCM has not fluctuated to the degree suggested by the Table. What has changed is the political behaviour and strategies of these activists.

This observation is confirmed by Henri Lustiger-Thaler, who notes that even by 1990, when Montreal's social movement constituencies had finally become disenchanted with the MCM, for pragmatic reasons they continued to support the MCM rather than the splinter parties, Ecology Montreal (EM) and the Democratic Coalition (DCM) who vigorously campaigned for their support:

The dynamic operating between community groups and opposition parties, which propelled the MCM to power in 1986, was absent in the 1990 elections. As such, both the DCM and EM found themselves generally unattached to organized community support. This was due to several factors. First and foremost, the MCM and a good proportion of local groups still maintain a tense but operative relationship... Aside from their extra-institutional politics, community groups, as a reactive response to the gradual disinvestment of the state in areas of effective consumption, are becoming more and more service-oriented. They are also assessed by their own constituents based on their ability to deliver the goods. Strapped for resources, these groups openly risk becoming delivery services for distinct social groups targeted by the local state. The coalition-building that did take place in the elections operated in this type of pragmatic context, wherein options were accompanied by a good deal of contingently based internal and external restraints. The party that clearly benefited most from all of this was the MCM.⁷⁴

Lustiger-Thaler's observations suggest that Montreal's social movement constituency shared and continues to share the same sense of strategic pragmatism identified by Kitschelt in its European counterparts. In fact Kitschelt calls these elements, "lobbyists" whose support is solicited by both the "ideologues" and "pragmatists" within left-libertarian parties.⁷⁵

According to Kitschelt, these "lobbyists" or new "social movement" constituencies are more concerned with policy outcomes related to their own specific causes than with ideology, consequently they tend to waver between radical and moderate positions.⁷⁶ Lustiger-Thaler has revealed that the Montreal "lobbyists" or "movement" constituency was no different.

To summarize then, an examination of the sociology of the memberships of the West German Greens and the Montreal Citizen's Movement reveals significant similarities, particularly with respect to the variables of age and occupation. This is not to say that such patterns do not exist between the two groups within the variables of sex, education and career political experience. In fact strong similarities do exist in these categories as well, especially in the instance of education, but the affinity between the two previous categories is simply remarkable. The sociological similarities between the two memberships, when combined with the similarities in policy orientation of the two groups, allows the chapter to build a strong case for the claim that the MCM is in fact the same type of political party as its European left-libertarian counterparts.

Municipal Politics and Canadian Left-Libertarianism

What remains unanswered by the chapter to this point, is whether or not left-libertarianism has become a municipal phenomenon in the Canadian context. As has been demonstrated earlier, data concerning women's participation rates in municipal politics suggests that this may very well be the case. Perhaps Canadian left-libertarians have given up on the non-ideological, electorally driven, brokerage parties that dominate politics on the federal and provincial levels and prefer to focus their efforts on the level of government that Chorney and Molloy argue most directly

affects their daily lives.⁷⁷ Indeed, many of the MCM candidates over the years have had considerable experience in assisting local institutions responsible for the delivery of services in their communities especially the CLSC's (Centre local de services sociaux et communautaires)⁷⁸ and Paul Y. Villeneuve writes that this interest in local institutions was shared by many Montreal intellectuals:

Les intellectuels-meneurs-de-luttes-urbaines, ont assez souvent abouti, au Québec, dans les Centres locaux de services communautaires (CLSC), et dans les Centres régionaux de santé et de services sociaux (CRSSS) qui chapeautent les CLSC et les Centres hospitaliers.⁷⁹

Long-time MCM ideologue and libertarian, Dimitrios Roussopoulos, most explicitly contemplated this possible connection between left-libertarianism and municipal politics when he wrote that: "The force of localism and the direct access of city politics may very well make city hall as an institution the most vulnerable to the people's rage."⁸⁰

Nevertheless, although this connection between left-libertarianism and municipal politics may very well be true of Montreal, an examination of the structure and ideology of Canadian municipal politics in general reveals that despite some sociological similarities, there is little evidence of any such trend, with the possible exceptions being the cities of Winnipeg and Vancouver. For the most part, local government has tended to be regarded by Canadians as simply an administrative tool for the implementation of policy decided by more important levels of government. It has not been perceived as an effective area for any form of policy innovation or even for political change in general.⁸¹

Present-day city governments reflect much of this legacy. The dominating concerns at council meetings are still technical and administrative matters...Thus, most city council sessions lose the opportunity of furnishing a forum for meaningful debate on issue-oriented concerns and rarely reflect cleavages of opinion that exist and the alternatives that might be considered...At present city councils tend to be generally unrepresentative of the diversity of interests and individuals in the communities they serve.⁸²

Dickerson, Drabek, and Woods note, however, that with the new urban problems has come growth in the extent to which many segments of the populace want to be permitted a voice and citizens' groups arose up around a variety of issues. Writing of the 1960s and 1970s, Donald Higgins observes that even though detailed knowledge of occurrences in other cities was often absent: "To the activists as well as to some less impassioned observers, there was a sense of there being an urban reform "movement" - a feeling of shared experiences and objectives."⁸³ Generally, Higgins sees this urban reform or "citizen" movement in Canadian city politics as having three sets of characteristics. First, there were spontaneously formed groups seeking to preserve their neighbourhoods from unwanted intrusions (expressways, high-rise/density development proposals). Included in these citizen groups were also people whose perspectives went beyond their own neighbourhoods and whose leadership tended to be more professional than the more localized and reactive groups. They advocated city-wide policy measures such as the provision of more public housing and day-care facilities, the drafting of municipal development plans, improved public transit, better protection for minorities and tenants, and more effective public participation in municipal decision making.⁸⁴

Second, there were an increasing number of reform politicians winning elections for city councils and transforming the composition of these structures by increasing their percentage of women councillors and by lowering the average age. These reform councillors were seen as having closer ties to citizen groups and possessed operational styles that emphasized consultation, public hearings, and streams of reports and documents to the public. Some were even connected to the NDP or reformist municipal parties, a sharp break with traditional "non-partisan" city politics, and most were seen as leftists or even anarchists.⁸⁵

The third group making up this so called urban reform movement was the alternative press and periodicals such as *This Magazine*, *Our Generation* and *City Magazine*. The simultaneous emergence of all of these actors in metropolitan areas across the country with what seemed like similar messages, accounts for the use of the term "movement" to describe them.⁸⁶ Yet there were other factors that allowed for such terminology. All of these actors seemed to share a concern for process and Higgins notes that:

...perhaps the one factor that has made urban group politics close to being a movement in the late Sixties and the Seventies is a broadening of what is considered "political." "Politics," it seems, is a more respectable word to apply to city government than was the case a decade or so ago.⁸⁷

The most common kinds of policy thrusts championed by progressive urban politicians were public housing, public transit, day care, energy, and "property tax reform to achieve a greater degree of equitable distribution of the tax burden within parameters laid down by the provincial government."⁸⁸ Large segments of the history of city politics in Vancouver and Winnipeg can be seen as a struggle by organized labour to cut down the power of capital's interests relative to city hall and Higgins argues that the experience of the MCM is a more recent example of that same conflict.⁸⁹ He argues that perhaps all these aspects of the progressives' orientation can be encompassed in the broader issue of democratization of the governance of the city,

the matter of the extent to which power can be dispersed and restructured so that groups of citizens in the different areas of the city maintain an effective control of those aspects of their lives over which municipal government can have a bearing...I think that this is the best description of what real progressive urban politics is all about.⁹⁰

Higgins warns however, that despite apparent similarities, city politics is intensely local and becomes increasingly so when "reform"

councillors manage to wield power within and outside city hall. He defines a political movement as something that occurs in many places at more or less the same time and pace; that must involve some uniformity in organizational characteristics, direction, and in strategic decisions; that involves the same kinds of people and issues; and that evolves from similar roots.⁹¹

Given this definition, Higgins concludes that there has not been a reformist movement in the politics of Canada's major cities during the late 1960s and early-to-mid-1970s and to think this way is misleading and harmful to those trying to understand what has happened. He concludes that the localness of progressive urban politics not only between cities but even within them, is noteworthy:

Whether of the elected politician variety, the community group variety, or in terms of the media, progressive urban politics is so far from being uniform in direction, pace of evolution, strategy tactics, kinds of personalities involved, content and so on, that to think of it at all as a movement is misleading and not particularly helpful to those who wish to understand and learn from what has happened.⁹²

Furthermore, Dickerson et al. observe that a system which had been constructed to support neither citizen involvement in general nor the policy process in particular could not respond adequately to this challenge posed during the 1960s and 1970s.⁹³ The ensuing impatience led to the creation of institutions for direct popular participation such as citizen committees which advise the representative councils on policy matters but Dickerson et al. question their long-term survival and usefulness.⁹⁴

Perhaps the best example to substantiate such scepticism is the City of Winnipeg Act of 1972. This act was hailed as the most significant initiative taken to reform municipal institutions and it was designed both to centralize and democratize at the same time. In short, its aim was "to

combine the traditional concerns about fragmentation and lack of comprehensive planning with the newer fashion of trying to make the city more democratic."⁵ There was to be one council, one tax base, and a unified administrative structure while Community Committees were created to counter any effects of over centralization. The Committees were made up of three or four councillors and were to supervise zoning and planning initiatives. Furthermore, to guarantee a sufficient degree of local control by private citizens, each Community Committee area was to have a Resident Advisory Group (RAG) which was to consist of annually elected, Resident Advisors who were to meet regularly with councillors and tender advice on matters of local concern.⁶

What ensued, however, was far from what the Act had envisaged. The inner city of Winnipeg did not fare well by the new arrangement and capital works expenditures and transportation decisions massively favoured the suburbs while most local police and fire stations were closed.⁷ With respect to the attempts to decentralize and democratize local governments, it was found that the resident advisory system was useful but played a minor role in city government and in no way provided an effective counterweight to the centralized administrative system.

Although the resident advisory system had at times provided an arena for local activists to stop local developments perceived as detrimental to their communities, the RAGs were moribund in the suburbs and on larger region-wide issues, the impact of the local decision-making units was far less successful.⁸ Lloyd Axworthy pessimistically concludes that:

In 1977, the Manitoba government substantially altered the Community Committee RAG arrangement by greatly enlarging the population base. Because of the reduction in the size of Council down to twenty-seven, the Community Committees were reduced to six, serving a population base of 100,000 people. Thus, the idea of having small-scale wards, relating to people on a relatively intimate basis, has been eliminated. The notion of RAG's being drawn from local neighbourhood areas has also been eroded, as they now cover a much wider territory. While it is too early to judge, the general expectation is

that this will further diminish the quality of citizen involvement."⁹⁹

Higgins notes that surprisingly few councillors have emerged out of involvement in the RAGs. Instead, progressives in Winnipeg seem to have relied on a strategy that is not only purely electoralist "(once it became clear that the RAGs themselves had so little institutionalized power as to be almost irrelevant), but an electoralist strategy that was basically of the top-down variety."¹⁰⁰ Most indicative of this electoralist orientation in Winnipeg was the role played by Lloyd Axworthy, now a Liberal MP and formerly a cabinet minister. It was generally felt that he was the ideal candidate to run for the mayor's chair and many progressives made their own election plans contingent on whether or not he would run. By the time it became obvious that he was not going to enter the mayoralty race, it was too late for other progressives to put their own election hopes into action. For Higgins this "wait-for-a-saviour-to-drop-down-from-above approach to electoral politics" is a major reason why civic politics in Winnipeg have become so "depressing and boring. Certainly in that city the end of the Seventies saw little of the reform movement left, either electorally or in the form of organized community groups."¹⁰¹

Dickerson et al. assert that because local governments tend to function without the parties or any other devices for building working majorities which can yield coherent policy, municipal politics remains an ineffective area for substantive policy change and is only useful for piecemeal problem solving related to specific issues.¹⁰² Even in Canadian cities that have avoided such patterns and have implemented competitive party structures, municipal politics has tended to be driven by the popularity of certain issues or individuals, as was the case in the Winnipeg context. Furthermore they have often done so at the expense of the libertarian, ideological concerns, and desires for policy innovation

that can be witnessed in the Montreal context. The case of Vancouver best demonstrates this fact.

At first glance, many parallels can be made between the municipal politics of Vancouver and Montreal. When problems of urban growth and its social effects were becoming apparent in Vancouver, two events in 1967 served to facilitate communication between a variety of disaffected groups in the city. The first was the election of Mayor Tom Campbell who came to personify the private profit motive in civic development and an anti-intellectualism and contempt for citizen participation.¹⁰¹ The second was the attempt by Vancouver's Board of Administration and council to proceed with the construction of a proposed freeway which was objected to by an unlikely mix of downtown business and professional people, ratepayers in affluent areas, planners and architects, teachers and UBC academics, and community workers and low-income neighbourhood and youth groups.¹⁰⁴ It must be noted that these constituencies bear remarkable similarity to those which initiated the creation of the MCM.

Organizations were soon formed to represent these constituencies, "The Electors Action Movement" (TEAM) and the "Citizens Council on Civic Development" (CCCD), both of which were motivated by opposition to the freeway and other development projects. As was the case with the MCM, "citizen participation" became the watch-word and was perhaps the most salient positive goal of the new reformers. Paul Tennant writes that TEAM and CCCD were reform groups of the "city beautiful" variety, seeking to change certain policies but remaining conservative in their desire to protect that which made their city a pleasant place to live and raise a family.¹⁰⁵

Later in 1968 however, TEAM was joined in its opposition to the Board of Administration and council by a second new civic party, the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), which was explicitly socialist

and motivated by a Marxist interpretation of society, and which sought not to preserve and protect but to reduce or destroy middle-class control of the city.¹⁰⁶ COPE and its lone city councillor, Harry Rankin, would eventually come to bitterly oppose TEAM, leading analysts such as Higgins to draw parallels with the MCM and its relations with the Municipal Action Group (MAG). Higgins also compares TEAM's experiences to those of the MCM when discussing the fragmentation of progressive forces in Canadian municipalities:

Parallels to this fragmentation or diversity can be seen in the dismemberment of The Electors Action Movement (TEAM) contingent on Vancouver's city council (aldermen Mike Harcourt and Darlene Marzari, for example, left TEAM), and the departure (whether by resignation or ouster remains a matter of some dispute) of councillors Nick Auf der Maur and Bob Keaton from the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM) in 1976.¹⁰⁷

Higgins' analysis, however, focuses on structure and fragmentation rather than ideology. While it is true that both TEAM and the MCM experienced fragmentation, it is important to note which groups chose to oppose their former political allies. The 1976 split in the MCM saw the moderate, electoralist elements leave the party to form MAG while the elements that opposed TEAM were the more radical elements from the left, the very elements that came to dominate the MCM during the comparable period. Furthermore, while the radical left and strongly libertarian constituency in Montreal, largely FRAP supporters, had been absorbed by the MCM and came to dominate it between the years of 1975 and 1978, the same constituency in Vancouver had formed COPE rather than becoming active in TEAM.

Despite these differences however, the years of 1968 to 1972 were exciting ones for TEAM and COPE and were marked by public controversy and the successful defeat of not only the freeway proposal, but many similar development projects. Nevertheless, Tennant observes that:

...the tremendous energy required to organize and maintain the opposition to the developers, to the bureaucracy...could not be carried on indefinitely. Because of their success and their exhaustion the various citizens' groups faded away or, like CCCD, lapsed into routine activities...the politically inclined of the citizen reformers gravitated largely to TEAM to continue the battle directly...It was thus the case that TEAM grew while the citizen's groups declined.¹⁰⁸

Consequently, by the time TEAM finally did achieve power in 1973, citizen reform energy was fading and municipal politics in Vancouver was beginning "a return to normalcy".¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, COPE, which had joined with TEAM to oppose major development projects of the previous administrators, now saw little reason for co-operation and began its previously cited opposition to TEAM.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, the TEAM victory did result in significant transformations in the composition and style of the city's municipal council. Tennant writes that few, if any, other cities with open elections have ever produced a council of such high occupational and social status. All of the eleven had university degrees, eight had pursued post-graduate studies, and four were university professors. The TEAM members of council were on average more than a decade younger than their predecessors and the previous dominance of business interests had been transformed into dominance by those in professions having no business interests.¹¹¹ Again, parallels can be made with the case of the MCM councillors who brought similar educational and professional characteristics to Montreal's city hall.

During its first years in power (1973, 1974), TEAM did work to implement much of the party's policy platform and neighbourhood participation in local area planning was encouraged. The former secrecy of the development process was abolished and for the most part, "the system is undoubtedly much more open than the previous one, but also more subject to delay and personality conflict."¹¹² Most elected members have maintained their party affiliation after elections but party discipline is

not highly developed and "the increasing presence of Independents on council has marked less a weakening of the party system than it has the splintering of TEAM."¹¹³

The number of nominations of candidates from ethnic minorities in all three parties rose sharply and TEAM (like the MCM) nominated and had elected many more women than any other party.¹¹⁴ The secrecy and power of the senior bureaucracy was reduced but Tennant argued that:

In the two remaining areas--those of beliefs about the nature of the city itself and about citizen participation--there has been less change...The city is viewed less as a corporate whole than it was previously, but full recognition of neighbourhoods, as only the ward system would allow, continues as a dubious prospect. Most TEAM council members came to office favouring the partial ward system, but once in office they tended...to see increasing wisdom in the at-large system which brought them to office.¹¹⁵

Tennant concludes that "Vancouver's politics...has been the politics of the middle class. Full participatory democracy remains as illusory in Vancouver as in any other Canadian city."¹¹⁶ In their analysis of Tennant's case study of Vancouver, Dickerson et al. concluded:

Paul Tennant's paper is a careful examination of the sudden rise and apparent decline of public involvement in Vancouver. It raises a question as to the permanency and effectiveness of the new, "participatory" politics as a component of our urban political order.¹¹⁷

Montreal thus appears unique in the orientation and permanence of its left-libertarianism. This fact is admitted even by Higgins who writes:

As well as intractable disputes over questions of long-term objectives, there are equally intractable disputes over basic strategy, and the strategic issue of an electoral versus a grass-roots mass organizing strategy came into sharper focus in debates within the MCM than in any other progressive group I have encountered in city politics. But the issue applies to cities other than just Montreal.¹¹⁸

Yet it is obvious from this quotation that, as was the case with his comparison between TEAM and the MCM, Higgins has not yet fully understood

the uniqueness and strength of the steadfast philosophical adherence to decentralization and libertarian philosophy in Montreal's municipal politics. Local control, so much a part of libertarian philosophy, has been avoided by Canada's cities and even in instances when it has cropped up for brief periods such as in Winnipeg or Vancouver, its existence has been dependent upon individuals and especially upon short-term, piece-meal issues such as opposition to development projects. Once these issues have been resolved, the emphasis on "participatory" politics subsides.

Some might argue that the Toronto experience seems to contradict this pattern due to the lengthy duration of the city's reform process, particularly during the Crombie and Sewell mayoralties (1972-1980) and beyond. Indeed, David Crombie and his supporters were responsible for changes to the process of land-use planning which allowed for greater citizen participation, especially at the neighbourhood level. However, Warren Magnusson reminded students of municipal government that Crombie, Toronto's first reform mayor, was a Progressive Conservative and was a far cry from left-libertarian reformers concerned with issues such as the plight of the urban poor. Magnusson observed that Crombie's tenure as mayor marked a "return to normality" for Torontonians. Normality meant continued development without the disruption and inner city decay so evident in the American experience and which seemed to be threatened by hasty development in the form of expressways (Spadina) and the destruction of many sound, and sometimes historic buildings. Crombie reformers were mostly middle-class urban conservatives keen on preserving the past embodied by the old city.¹¹⁹

Crombie's successor, John Sewell, was well aware of this fact and attempted to reveal the limits of urban conservatism as an approach to the problems of the poor and the ordinary wage-earners.¹²⁰ Sewell waged some

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formidable battles for inner-city minorities and was particularly bold in his demands for police reform. Yet Sewell regarded the extension of community services and facilities as a necessary complement to individual enterprise and not as a negation of it therefore Magnusson concluded that: "...his radicalism was that of a populist and not of a socialist. This set him apart from some of the other militant reformers, who saw their mission in socialist terms."¹²¹

The validity of this latter statement became especially apparent in the years following Sewell's loss of the mayoralty in 1980 to Arthur Eggleton, a Liberal with strong business support. Most of the conservative community groups in middle-class neighbourhoods had fallen away from the reform movement and in the years that followed, reformers identified themselves with the traditional left - and hence with the labour movement and the NDP. Financial and organizational support from the NDP became increasingly important for them as was their identification with the party.¹²² These developments clearly distinguish the reformers of Toronto from those of Montreal whose libertarianism would never allow them to be influenced by an old-style, social democratic party.

In the Montreal context, reformers are concerned with process and are not solely issue driven or controlled by established social democratic parties. Left-libertarianism is much more firmly imbedded in municipal politics and represents the philosophical under-pinnings of a considerable proportion of its municipal candidates. This is made evident by the fact that even in the later years of the MCM's term in power, when its left-libertarian elements felt ignored by the party, this faction had sufficient strength and support to form its own party, the Democratic Coalition, to run against the MCM in Montreal's municipal election of 1990.

The strength of left-libertarianism in Montreal is perhaps

attributable to the preponderance of urban social movements and community groups within the city which Pierre Hamel notes, distinguishes Montreal from anywhere else in the country:

Cette diversité organisationnelle et idéologique s'explique en partie par l'ampleur de ces mouvements dans le contexte montréalais. Plus nombreux, plus forts, plus dynamiques que dans les autres villes du Québec et même du pays, les mouvements urbains montréalais ont réussi à mobiliser des milliers de citoyens autour de problèmes qui affectaient la vie quotidienne ou les conditions de vie de la population des quartiers populaires de la ville.¹²³

Consequently, it can be safely concluded that Montreal's left-libertarianism is not part of a trend common to Canadian municipal politics in general. What remains to be seen however, is whether or not it is part of Montreal municipal politics in general and not just the MCM. As has already been observed, Louise Quesnel-Ouellet notes that with respect to sociological composition, Montreal's "electoralist" municipal parties (GAM, PMQ) tend to have slightly lower proportions of women candidates than the "popular" parties (FRAP, RCM/MCM, RPQ)¹²⁴, but these differences are far from substantial (see Table 3). More indicative of the uniqueness of the MCM's left-libertarianism is the differences in organization, financing, structure, and style between the MCM and Drapeau's Civic Party (See Table 10). Although Quesnel-Ouellet compares the Parti Civique with "popular" parties in general, it is important to note that all "popular" parties other than the MCM, either died, remained very minor fringe parties, or were absorbed by the MCM as was the case with elements of FRAP.

Table 10

Principal characteristics of the two types of local political parties existing in Quebec

	Civic Party	Popular parties
Structure	Centralized	De-centralized
Membership	Selective and limited	Open
Militancy	Non-existent and discouraged	Existing and valued
Parliamentary wing	Blends with membership	Tries to maintain an equilibrium between party militants and itself
Caucus	Plays a central role, identifies itself with the party	But one of many organisms within the party
Party discipline	Very strict	Very strict
Support groups	Professionals, businessmen, manufacturers	Popular groups, unions, cooperatives
Partisan connections	Federal and provincial liberals	Péquistes, social democrats and federal and provincial liberals
Financing	Solicitation without limits	Membership fees, solicitation with limits
Social composition	Concentrated groups of professionals	People of diverse professions
	Little or no women	Some women
Age	Average above 40 years	Average below 40 years

Source: Louise Quesnel-Ouellet, "Les partis politiques locaux au Québec," Tableau 11.5, p.303.

Quesnel-Ouellet's chart of the characteristics of the two types of party on the Montreal municipal scene reveals the MCM's left-libertarian nature as well as the substantial differences in structure, composition and philosophy between it and its principal opposition on the Montreal scene, the Civic Party. Thus, it can be safely concluded that at the time of its outset, the MCM's left-libertarianism was unique not only to

Canadian parties in general including those at the municipal level, but also to Montreal politics as well.

Conclusion

This chapter takes up Kitschelt's propositions one and two and effectively establishes the MCM as a left-libertarian party. It does so by focusing upon the party's origins, its policies and its membership over the years. The chapter first demonstrates the unresponsiveness of the Drapeau administration to Montreal's movement constituencies and how this unresponsiveness first led to FRAP and then the creation of the MCM and its subsequent popularity. It reveals that existing partisan institutions in Montreal were indeed unresponsive and as a consequence, had allowed for a new opposition party to arise and instantaneously experience considerable electoral support in a manner consistent with that predicted by Kitschelt in proposition one.

The chapter also outlines precisely how this unresponsiveness encouraged unlikely coalitions and a diversity in the membership of the new party similar to that predicted by Kitschelt in proposition two. Indeed, it describes how in just six months, the MCM was able to build a remarkable coalition of non-sectarian socialists, socially conscious nationalists, French speaking and immigrant workers, intellectuals, progressive anglophones disaffected from traditional politicians, and environmentalists.

What remained to be demonstrated was whether or not this new and diverse coalition (the MCM) was indeed left-libertarian in nature and not simply the pragmatic result of Montreal's anti-Drapeau forces. The chapter addressed this question by revealing remarkable similarities not only between the policy orientations of the MCM and the European left-

libertarian parties, but also between the sociological characteristics of the memberships of the two groups. In so doing, chapter two effectively established the MCM as a left-libertarian party not only in its pattern of development, but also in its policy and its membership.

The chapter concludes by establishing that this left-libertarianism is unique in the Canadian context and does not represent part of an overall trend in municipal politics, despite some similarities with the Winnipeg and Vancouver examples. It further reveals that this left-libertarianism was also unique to the MCM on the Montreal municipal scene and was not shared by its principal opponent, Drapeau's Civic Party, which resembles more traditional municipal party structures and philosophies.

NOTES

1. Harold Chorney and Andrew Molloy, "Boss Politics and Quebec Nationalism, Jean Drapeau to Jean Dore: the Pre-modern to the Post-modern," in Alain G. Gagnon ed., Quebec State and Society 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992), 71.
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7. "Reformers vs. Drapeau," City Magazine 1, no.4 (May-June 1975): 5.
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9. Henry Milner, "City Politics - Some Possibilities," Our Generation H6, No.3, (1974): 55.
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12. Jean-Pierre Collin & Jacques Godbout, Les organismes populaires en milieu urbain: contre-pouvoir ou nouvelle pratique professionnelle? (Montréal: Institut national de la recherche scientifique, 1977), 243.
13. Donald McGraw, Le développement des groupes populaires à Montréal (1963-1973) (Montréal: Édition coopératives Albert St-Martin, 1978), 145-146.
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27. Milner, "City Politics - Some Possibilities," 48.

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32. Kitschelt, 93.

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34. Kitschelt, 77.

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45. This development, cited in: Lewis Harris, "MCM puts radical planks of platform on hold," The Gazette (Montreal), September 18, 1986, p.F-12., marked an important symbolic moment in the history of the MCM and although its occurrence did not substantially alter the party's overall policy emphasis, it did have a lasting impact on the party's internal dynamic which will be examined in full detail in a case study of the MCM appearing in subsequent chapters.

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47. Dimitrios Roussopoulos, "Montreal After Drapeau," City Magazine 9, no.1, (Winter 86/87): 34.

48. See, RCM, Plate-forme electorale, Adoptee par le Congres special 7-8 septembre 1990, (Montreal, September 9, 1990).

49. Kitschelt, 120-128.

50. Maillé and Tardy, 165.
51. MCM, 1974-1989, Fifteen years of political activity for Montreal (An anniversary document sponsored and published by MCM local associations, Riviere-des-Prairies and Marc-Aurele-Fortin, 1989), 6.
52. MCM 1974-1989, ..., 6.
53. Renée Rowan, "Les femmes sont absentes de la Ville, juge le RCM," Le Devoir, 24 février 1986, p.2.
54. Cahier d'information de la campagne electorale municipale du 4 novembre 1990 (RCM, Montreal, 1990).
55. Maillé, 14.
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57. Caroline Andrew, "Le pouvoir local: stratégie de pouvoir ou nouvelle impasse pour les femmes?" L'égalité: les moyens pour y arriver, (Québec: Publications du Québec, 1991), 68-69.
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73. Hamel, 110-197.

74. Henri Lustiger-Thaler, "New Social Movement Discourse: The Unsolved Democracy," in William K. Carroll, ed., Organizing Dissent (Published in Canada by Peter Saunders with the assistance of the Department of the Secretary of State, 1992), 188-189.

75. Kitschelt, 282.

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79. Paul Y. Villeneuve, "Changement social et pouvoir municipal à Québec," Cahier de Géographie du Québec 26, No.68, (Sept., 1982): 225.

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81. M.O. Dickerson, S. Drabek, and J.T. Woods, eds., Problems of Change in Urban Government (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1980), 1-2.

82. T.J. Plunkett, "Canadian City Government: A Structure for Policy-Making and Administration," in Dickerson et al., 96.

83. Donald Higgins, "Progressive city politics and the citizen movement: A status report," City Magazine, Annual Review 5, No.1, (1981): 84.

84. Higgins, 84.

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88. Higgins, 92.
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91. Higgins, 86.
92. Higgins, 86.
93. Dickerson et al., 3.
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95. Lloyd Axworthy, "The Best Laid Plans Oft Go Astray: The Case of Winnipeg," in Dickerson et al., 106.
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102. Dickerson et al., 3-4.
103. Paul Tennant, "Vancouver Politics and the Civic Party System," in Dickerson et al., 23.
104. Tennant, 22-23.
105. Tennant, 24-25.
106. Tennant, 25.
107. Higgins, 88.
108. Tennant, 26-27.
109. Tennant, 27.
110. Tennant, 28.

111. Tennant, 27-28.
112. Tennant, 28-29.
113. Tennant, 32-33.
114. Tennant, 34.
115. Tennant, 34. On this point it is necessary to briefly explain the ongoing debate over the ward system in Vancouver which revolves around the fact that this system would in effect allow the neighbourhoods a form of political autonomy with respect to matters of local concern.
116. Tennant, 13.
117. Dickerson et al., 9.
118. Higgins, 89.
119. Warren Magnusson, "Toronto," in Warren Magnusson & Andrew Sancton eds., City Politics in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 115-120.
120. Magnusson, 121.
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122. Magnusson, 126.
123. Hamel, 97.
124. Quesnel-Ouellet, 299.

CHAPTER THREE
THE LIFE OF A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY
1974-1981

Introduction

The preceding chapter has established that the MCM's existence from its origins to the successful municipal election of 1974 fits well with propositions one and two of Kitschelt's developmental framework for left-libertarian parties. The next two chapters will examine the life of the MCM between this election and Montreal's municipal election in 1990. This election is considered the cut-off point for the analysis since it was during this campaign that many of the MCM's libertarian councillors refused to continue the battle between the logic of constituency representation and the logic of electoral competition, the defining feature of left-libertarian parties. Instead, these councillors formed their own splinter parties: the Democratic Coalition and Ecology Montréal, which they believed would be a more effective means of pursuing the logic of constituency representation. The history of the MCM as a left-libertarian party can therefore be divided into two periods: 1974-81 and 1982-1990. Chapter three examines the first period using Kitschelt's propositions three to six, while chapter four uses propositions seven to nine to help analyze the second period.

Consistent with propositions one and two, the Drapeau administration's unresponsiveness to Montreal's left-libertarian sentiment in the early 1970s had indeed resulted in a groundswell of support for the many diverse, rival political elements which rallied themselves under the banner of the newly created party - the MCM. It is important to note that included in these diverse and often conflicting elements were what Kitschelt would term, "ideologues, pragmatists, and lobbyists."¹ The ideologues were those imbued with leftist idealism, the pragmatists were

those motivated by electoral opportunism, while the lobbyists were those fighting for specific causes such as bicycle paths, architectural preservation, low cost housing, reduced public transit for seniors, enhanced green space, affirmative action in municipal hiring, etc.

Kitschelt has observed that the lobbyists or "movement" constituencies within left-libertarian parties have tended to be more concerned with policy rewards for their causes than with ideological consistency and as a consequence, their political stances have fluctuated between radical and moderate positions.² Within their parties these lobbyists could just as easily be associated with pragmatists as they could with ideologues and Henry Milner notes that this was equally true of the Montreal "lobbyists" or "movement" constituency. For example, during the 1976-78 period when the MCM was thoroughly dominated by leftist ideologues, Henry Milner revealed that the strategic orientation of this faction was not shared by the party lobbyists:

There are many districts in Montreal, as elsewhere, where a reformist conception of the basis of the urban question and its solution - one which does not seek to replace the capitalist system - is prevalent among those very groups and individuals presently rooted there and willing to work for change. If these groups indeed constitute an objectively representative expression of the most progressive forces genuinely rooted in those local communities, then any move to "purge" them from the party or its actions contradicts the commitment to the principle of community control.³

As was the case in the left-libertarian parties of Europe, what unified all of these elements within the Montreal context and allowed them to initially co-exist within the MCM, was the belief that through community control over municipal politics, the rigid hierarchy of the existing administration could be broken, policy agendas could be transformed, and all of their needs would be accommodated. Furthermore, the perceived injustice of the unresponsiveness to the legitimate complaints of these Montreal constituencies opposed to Drapeau allowed the new party initially to experience considerable electoral support in the 1974 municipal election.

In propositions three to six however, Kitschelt documents some of the negative repercussions for political parties composed of such diverse elements that have originated in a manner consistent with propositions one and two. Proposition three describes how the diversity within the membership of left-libertarian parties radicalizes their policy orientations but, at the same time, limits their ability to articulate coherent strategic perspectives for the future. Proposition four outlines how party pragmatists move to rectify the party's external image of incoherence by imposing their personalities in attempts to fill the void.

Proposition five explains how these manoeuvres by the party pragmatists usually offend the party's ideological faction and cause the ideologues and pragmatists within the party to mobilize against each other and compete for the support of the party's lobbyists (those concerned with policy rewards for specific issues or concerns). Proposition six describes how this factionalism creates uncertainty among the electorate which loses confidence in the party's external strategies. Electoral losses ensue which result in changes to the party's internal organizational composition.

This chapter will reveal that the developmental pattern of the MCM between the years of 1974-81 corresponds to that outlined by Kitschelt in propositions three to six. In much the same manner described by proposition three, the diversity of the MCM's organizational base did lead to an inability to articulate a coherent strategic perspective. As suggested by proposition four, pressures to resolve this inability did indeed result in initiatives by pragmatists such as Bob Keaton and Nick Auf der Maur to impose their personalities and perspectives on the MCM's external image.

These initiatives of Keaton and Auf der Maur offended many long-time MCM ideologues who reacted in a manner consistent with Kitschelt's fifth proposition. The ideologues resented the efforts of the pragmatists which contradicted many of the party's founding ideals and seemed very much like

the perverse effects that Kitschelt feels often accompany this stage of development. This became especially obvious during the MCM's 1975 congress and the "free public transit for seniors" episode, which resulted in the expulsion or exodus of the Keaton-Auf der Maur group. This group included the MCM's most prominent pragmatists.

From 1976-78, the MCM solidified its strategic perspective by virtually ignoring the logic of electoral competition which had so dominated the concerns of the pragmatists. Unfortunately for the MCM, the uncertainty generated among Montreal voters by the well publicised feuding between the party pragmatists and ideologues, combined with a blatant disregard for electoral tactics, combined to generate the most unsuccessful municipal election in the MCM's short history, that of 1978.

This is precisely the outcome outlined by proposition six and consistent with the pattern suggested by this same proposition; the MCM's decline in electoral support in 1978 did result in transformations to the party's internal organizational composition. The significance of the fact that the party had been beaten by even the Montreal Action Group (MAG), a newly formed party consisting largely of the MCM's excluded pragmatists, was not lost on the MCM members. Nor was the fact that MAG had successfully employed modern electoral tactics to achieve its result. The MCM chose a new leader skilled in the art of media management and it soon changed its internal procedures as well as its external image, thus following the patterns described by Kitschelt's sixth proposition.

The logic of electoral competition was to be accorded much greater importance within the MCM following the 1978 election but it is important to note that although this development alienated many of the MCM ideologues, the same could not be said of its lobbyists or "movement" constituency which Milner, Hamel, and Lustiger-Thaler have shown to have been motivated more by specific policy rewards than ideology. This point is an important one because much of the literature surrounding the MCM's history tends to place the party's leftist ideologues in the same camp as

its lobbyists or "movement" constituency and portrays both as having struggled unsuccessfully against the pragmatists and advocates of the logic of electoral competition. In fact the behaviour of Montreal's "movement" constituency during the MCM's entire history was much more complicated than this and these nuances can only be captured by an analysis incorporating the theoretical contributions Herbert Kitschelt.

The context

Before moving to a detailed discussion of the internal workings of the MCM it is important to understand the environment or historical context in which these organizational developments occurred. The years of 1974-1981 were dynamic ones for the MCM. It was during this period that the party experimented with different organizational tactics that were a by-product of the shifts in dominance of ideological orientation within the MCM. The Quebec electorate at the time seemed very willing to accept experiments and this was best demonstrated by the success of René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in the provincial election of 1976. Clearly, the politics of Quebec have always had a powerful influence at the municipal level, particularly in Montreal. Just as the political destruction of FRAP was a result of the FLQ crisis in 1970 and Drapeau's ability to associate FRAP with the crisis, the election of the Parti Québécois had an equally powerful impact on Montreal's municipal politics.

Some have argued that the political and economic instability created by the Parti Québécois and the fractious federal-provincial relations of the period reinforced Drapeau's grip upon municipal government by making the long-time mayor appear to be the only source of stability and continuity available to any part of the Quebec electorate.⁴ In addition, the economic instability and flight of capital and head offices from Montreal during these years was perceived by many to be a direct result of the provincial election of 1976. Montreal it seemed, was to pay a higher

price than the rest of the province' and this led to the creation of a new municipal party: the Montreal Action Group (MAG), whose expressed purpose was to counteract these negative economic trends and encourage companies to locate their head offices in the city and invest in the Montreal economy.⁶

Needless to say, having a provincial government in power that advocated the separation of the province of Quebec from Canada had repercussions for the province's economic centre and its largest and most important city. Perhaps the most obvious effect was the uncertainty and instability this possibility created in the province's economic domain. Indeed the front pages of all of Quebec's newspapers during this period were dominated by stories of the flight of capital and head offices from the city of Montreal (mostly to Toronto). Writing in 1981, columnist Ann Laughlin described the preceding decade in the following manner:

...Moves are afoot to pull Montreal out of the pits it has slumped into during the past ten years. That slump has seen head offices fleeing the province, financial power draining off to Toronto and other points west, and uncertainty over Parti Québécois policies slamming the lid on investment...business skittishness over the political intentions of the PQ government and its ensuing tax and language policies sent head offices like Sun Life scurrying to Toronto.⁷

As the Laughlin quote indicates, the departure of one head office in particular, that of Sunlife Insurance, came to symbolize what many Quebec sovereigntists have labelled as the "economic terrorism" of Montreal's English-speaking business community. Indeed, Sunlife, which had built and resided in Montreal's most prominent building prior to the construction of Place Ville Marie, made every effort to emphasize the drama of its departure and blame the Parti Québécois (PQ) and Quebec politics in general for what it envisaged would be an ever worsening economic climate for the city of Montreal.⁸ Canadian Pacific Railroad made similar assertions.

It should be noted however, that there is considerable evidence to

suggest that most of the departing head offices during this period used the election of the PQ as an excuse for their departures; they would have left the city anyhow as a result of global economic trends whose impact was being felt long before the election of the PQ. Indeed, Alain Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm attribute much of this head office activity to a larger North American shift of its manufacturing sector from the North-East to more western parts of the continent.⁹

Similarly, a September 1980 article in the *Montreal Gazette* attributed the city's economic malaise to a variety of causes such as the North America-wide shift of population, capital and production to the west, Montreal's heavy concentration of manufacturing jobs in labour-intensive industry such as textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture (those most vulnerable to foreign competitors whose labour costs are often one-tenth of costs in Quebec), the city's insufficient development of the technology necessary for high growth, high-productivity industry, its long-term unemployment levels, the massive debts of its governments at the municipal and provincial level, its inability to attract top outside talent because of the language restrictions of education policies adopted by the provincial government, and the negative attitude of its business community.¹⁰

Clearly, the decline in the Montreal economy was not solely attributable to the exodus of head offices of companies that could not tolerate the direction of Quebec politics at the time. Nevertheless, it is also certain that these developments did nothing to reverse the city's economic decline and although the Sunlife head office's departure was perhaps the most publicized, many others eventually left Montreal such as Canadian Pacific Railroad, Cyanamid, the Royal Bank, CIL, Dupont, Canron, Cadbury, Redpath Sugar, Brooke Bond, British Petroleum, Sifto Salt, Holt Renfrew, etc.

Furthermore, accompanying this flight of head offices and the closure of many factories was a subsequent loss of jobs the effects of

which were also noted by the Montreal dailies. For example, a general economic malaise was noted by the now defunct *Montreal Star*¹¹ and subsequent issues of the paper chronicled Montreal's negative economic image internationally¹² and the attempts of the Drapeau/Lamarre administration to arrest the city's image of decline.¹³ In the fall of 1980, a New York securities trader was quoted as saying that Montreal's days as a major North American city are over:

The city has chosen to become a provincial centre. If you're a Yank or a European, you wouldn't think of putting a head office there after the political problems of the last 10 years. Who needs the hostility?¹⁴

The *Star's* English-language rival at the time, the *Montreal Gazette*, noted that although overall the Quebec economy did not seem to be suffering, this was not true of Montreal which was feeling the effects of the loss of jobs.¹⁵ Subsequent editions of *The Gazette* included pleas by the city's business leaders to "stop the pessimism."¹⁶ It was felt by many that a new attitude could revive the city¹⁷ but Montreal's economic decline was far too serious to be arrested by something as simple as positive thinking and this reality was best demonstrated by the fact that the city's decline was so severe that it had become a national problem of interest to all Canadians. For example a November, 1978 edition of the *Winnipeg Free Press* claimed that Montreal was "a city in decline,"¹⁸ the *Victoria Times* wrote of "the disturbing decline of Montreal,"¹⁹ one columnist for the *Toronto Star* claimed that Montreal was sick "and getting sicker"²⁰ while another noted that Montreal was "quietly dying."²¹ The *Globe & Mail* called Montreal "the city that committed suicide"²² while the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* even went so far as to call Montreal's decline "almost catastrophic."²³

Amidst this turmoil, Montreal's mayor, Jean Drapeau, laboured to keep the city's citizens optimistic by claiming that despite its problems, Montreal had a promising future.²⁴ The *Globe & Mail* was perfectly correct in its assessment that the mayor's approach was hardly surprising given

the fact that Montreal's fight to keep its "vital signs pulsing" was crucial to the economic well-being of the entire province of Quebec.²⁵ With one-third of the province's population and one-half of its 600,000 manufacturing jobs, Montreal accounted for 65 percent of Quebec's production of goods and services.²⁶

Drapeau remained ever vigilant and in the winter of 1981 he appeared to have been blessed with some assistance from the provincial government when it arranged an economic summit in an attempt to come up with an innovative perspective for Montreal's future. Montreal's many assets were to be emphasized including its growing telecommunications, electronic office equipment, and aerospace industries, its guaranteed supply of energy, and its potential as a transport centre if its airports and especially its port could be developed and well managed.²⁷

It was noted however, that many of the people required to help come up with any such futuristic perspective for the city, including federal officials responsible for Montreal's port, airports and its role as a transportation centre, were not invited to the summit. Again it appeared that Montreal was to suffer as a result of the larger Canada-Quebec question and many concluded that the summit "smacked of pre-election public relations" on the part of the provincial government.²⁸ The president of Montreal's Board of Trade at the time, Arthur P. Earle, was somewhat more optimistic and opportunistic in his assessment of the summit:

Sure, it's pre-election and without Ottawa the scope is too narrow. But what this can be is a good forum, a big show to which the province can come with some big announcements about what it will do for Montreal, promises we're going to keep them to.²⁹

Indeed, to this point very few schemes designed to enhance the economic prospects of the city had seemed to work, including Drapeau's 1976 Olympics which had succeeded only in bankrupting and demoralizing the city³⁰ and imposing a debt load to be paid by the city's inhabitants, including the urban poor.³¹ By the spring of 1981 a *Gazette* article

concluded that although the economic health of the city was showing signs of improvement, the city's future remained "cloudy."³²

Such scepticism was augmented by the fact that Montreal's manufacturing sector was dominated by industries that were extremely vulnerable to the international recession of the period. It was for this reason that Montreal was the major Canadian city hardest hit by the recession and had the highest levels of unemployment. Economist Gilles Rheume of the Conference Board of Canada stated that: "When demand falls, industries such as textile, clothing and furniture are hurt" and in 1982, Montreal saw its largest furniture manufacturer, Radisson Furniture Ltd., go bankrupt as did several retail clothing chains including the 66-store Jean Junction chain.³³

Radio Payette, a large, 60-year-old electronic distributor closed its doors and even the city's biggest industry - transportation - had been hit by the recession. Canadian National Railroad, CP Rail. Air Canada, Canadair Ltd., Pratt and Whitney Aircraft of Canada Ltd, and General Motors all experienced layoffs during the year and the entire Montreal experience during the period was perhaps best summarized by a story that appeared in a May, 1982 edition of the Gazette. The story noted that Montreal's hostels were filled with "young vagrants" and that the city possessed more homeless people than at any time since the early 1950s.³⁴

Accompanying the bankruptcies, layoffs, and the exodus of head offices during this period was a simultaneous exodus of a substantial portion of Montreal's population. There were serious concerns about urban sprawl and the exodus of many of the city's residents from the Montreal Urban Community (MUC) to the suburbs or areas further away from the urban centre that had not agreed to have their taxes go towards receiving the collective services of the MUC. These years were also marked by the departure of much of the city's English-speaking community as a result of fears first aroused by the October Crisis of 1970, compounded by the Bourassa government's Bill 22 passed in 1974 (the precursor to Bill 101),

and then solidified by the election of the Parti Québécois. In the weeks following the 1976 Quebec provincial election, many westward bound moving vans made their way along the 401 (otherwise known as the Macdonald-Cartier freeway between Montreal and Toronto) across the Quebec-Ontario border.

Following the 1970 October Crisis and the election of the Parti Québécois Government in 1976, more than 140 corporate head offices left the province. They took with them 14,000 jobs and precipitated the exodus of more than 100,000 mostly English-speaking Montrealers.³⁵

The preceding quotation from *The Globe & Mail* indicates that the exodus was noted by more than the city's local papers and a 1979 edition of the Winnipeg Free Press humorously noted that, "WASPs are a wiltin' on Rue Sherbrooke."³⁶ For many however, the exodus was a serious issue for the city of Montreal in terms of a shrinking tax base and loss of talent and human potential. The Parti Québécois' Bill 101, with its sign law provisions, its limiting of access to English schooling, and its overall hardening of Bill 22, propelled the exodus and ensured that it would not subside during the 1980s. A Gazette article in February of 1982 expressed concern over census figures showing that even accounting for migration to the suburbs, Montreal's population was actually shrinking, unlike those of Toronto or Vancouver which were growing by six and eight percent respectively.³⁷ Another article noted that the flight of head offices and people from Montreal "slows but never stops."³⁸

Statistics such as this prompted Pierre Shooner, head of the Commission d'Initiative et de Développement Économiques de Montréal (CIDEM), to critique Education Minister Camille Laurin's easing of Bill 101 restrictions on English schooling for temporary residents on the grounds that it did not go far enough. For Shooner, less restrictive policy regarding English schooling in Quebec for anglophone Canadians coming from other provinces would help preserve Montreal's drawing power for head offices and other service industries.³⁹

For some however, Montreal's situation was not as gloomy as many were suggesting and initiatives such as those proposed by Shooner were considered unnecessary. In a speech delivered to the Toronto Board of Trade Club, Guy J. Desmarais, president of La Chambre de Commerce du District de Montréal, noted that although the loss of at least 100,000 anglophones in the late seventies had hurt the Montreal economy:

Some of those who left had been very negative about Montreal, and were a major factor in the negative perception of Montreal in other areas of Canada. It is impossible for any community to build with people whose heart is somewhere else. These people no longer live in Montreal, and that alone has resulted in a more positive atmosphere.⁴⁰

In addition, Desmarais noted that the vacuum left by this exodus had opened up opportunities for francophones in the business sector. He observed that never before had there been such a demand for business administration courses and he prophetically stated: "For a large number of francophones, the future lies in business."⁴¹

It is necessary to understand the importance of the language issue for the city of Montreal because, as subsequent chapters will reveal, it would come to directly influence municipal politics in the decade and election campaigns to follow. In 1982, one of Montreal's many municipalities, the Town of Mount Royal (TMR), engaged in its own bizarre struggle with Quebec's language laws by steadfastly refusing to change its English name.⁴² Language was not the only important issue however, and during the same year, the city's many other municipalities had their own difficulties and were on the verge of property tax revolts when, in the spring of that year, 6,000 citizens attended a rally at the Montreal Forum over the issue.⁴³

In 1977, the MCM caused a ruckus over the proposed site for the Namur subway station by insinuating conspiracy and collusion on the part of Montreal Urban Community (MUC) executive committee chairman Lawrence Hanigan and Campeau Corporation, the owners of Blue Bonnets racetrack which apparently stood to benefit from the new location. It was eventually revealed however, that the site had been chosen due to long-

term traffic expectations which had not been factored into the initial discussions involving site selection. In the meantime, the MCM had become so "wrapped up in their suspicions of evil-doing" that they effectively undermined their own credibility in the eyes of the public.⁴⁴

Although the MCM's efforts seemed misguided during the Namur Metro issue one could hardly blame the party for being suspicious of procedure in Montreal municipal government and during the 1974-1982 period it became even more apparent to all concerned with Montreal municipal politics, just how secretive and dictatorial Montreal's City Hall seemed when compared to those of other North American cities. By 1980, no Montreal city council meeting had ever been taped, filmed or photographed. No transcripts were kept, although minutes of council meetings were drawn up and the city did not even tell taxpayers through the newspapers when meetings were to be held. The chamber itself, a regal and intimidating, 100-foot-long structure, was considered by some to be "more suitable for a 17th century session of the House of Lords than a modern municipal council."⁴⁵

In Toronto's city hall, seats for visiting citizens occupy most of the council chamber just a few feet from those of the councillors, while in Montreal the press and spectators are relegated to a small, 40-seat gallery so high in the rafters that they have to strain to comprehend proceedings. Unlike in other cities where agendas were distributed free at the council room door, in Montreal those who showed up during the Drapeau years were given neither an agenda or a floor plan.⁴⁶ Montreal city councillors were expected to stand with the ringing of a bell signifying the arrival of Mayor Drapeau who would then enter the council chamber and begin proceedings with a prayer. The Mayor would then oversee the proceedings and would periodically ring his bell threatening to expel noisemakers from the chamber to wait in the halls.⁴⁷

In both Ottawa and Toronto there were systems of permanent committees (three in Ottawa, four in Toronto), whose tasks were to carry out public business in full view of the citizenry. Instead of leaving the

entire operation of the city in the hands of six people from one party, as was the case in Montreal, these other cities used the committees to distribute the workload with each being responsible for areas of operation such as land use planning, road maintenance and snow clearing, or financial administration. More importantly, almost all of these committee's three or four meetings a week were conducted in public and permitted citizens to speak to the subject at hand while in Montreal citizens were not permitted to speak to their council or to their lone committee, the executive committee. Furthermore, while a Montreal councillor could not question city hall department heads, those in Toronto and Ottawa could do so at length.⁴⁸

The few opposition councillors that there were during these years objected strenuously to the style of City Hall. Michael Fainstat of the MCM expressed serious concerns over the fact that the chairman of the executive committee or a councillor could refuse at any time to answer a citizen's question without explanation. All questions had to be submitted in writing ten days before council meetings at which no time was provided for citizens to hear their answers or ask the questions orally.⁴⁹ Furthermore, all questions were vetted by the mayor before passing them on to the councillor concerned, a practice that Fainstat also objected to:

We're not in Argentina or Brazil. This is Montreal. I don't want the head of the Civic Party approving questions going to me...What revitalization of democracy is there if the mayor controls everything? What citizens' participation is there?...What a farce.⁵⁰

Both Fainstat and Montreal Action Group (MAG) councillor, Nick Auf der Maur pointed out that many other major Canadian and U.S. cities scheduled regular times for citizens to ask questions at council meetings and perhaps Montreal should do the same.⁵¹ Fainstat also objected to the fact that only the seven members of the executive knew what would be discussed by council until 48 hours before meetings, when the official agenda was issued. Fainstat argued that this left insufficient time for

him to be fully prepared for meetings since important items such as broadening police powers were often buried amid those of lesser importance such as routine road repairs.⁵²

Perhaps the most publicized event demonstrating the unique style of the Drapeau administration during these years involved Nick Auf der Maur. On Thursday, June 12, 1980, Auf der Maur learned that because MAG had not included an auditor's certificate when it filed its annual financial statement covering the campaign for the 1978 municipal election, he could face prosecution if he attended a council meeting that Monday evening. Ironically, the meeting was expected to discuss the Malouf commission report which blamed Drapeau for the Olympic cost overruns of 1976 and Auf der Maur had long been considered Drapeau's harshest and most effective critic on the subject.⁵³ In fact Auf der Maur's book, *The Billion Dollar Games* was credited with helping bring about the provincial inquiry in the first place.⁵⁴

Because there were only two opposition councillors on the council (Auf der Maur and Fainstat) as a result of the 1978 election, Auf der Maur's absence meant that it would be difficult to get seconders for opposition motions and only half as many opposition questions could be asked (each opposition councillor was entitled to two questions on the subject).⁵⁵ Auf der Maur did attend the meeting, asked two questions, and was then asked to leave on the grounds that the mayor could be prosecuted under provincial law, Article 90 of Law 44, if he permitted a councillor to sit illegally. Auf der Maur complied and the mayor's critics could not help but conclude that Drapeau had kept the technicality as an "insurance policy" and had "stage-managed" the entire episode to intimidate his critics into not embarrassing the administration over the Malouf report.⁵⁶

Clearly the actions of the Drapeau administration during this period demonstrated "Montreal's uniquely disciplined democracy" but members of the Civic Party argued that this was not "out of step" with the desires of the city's electorate during this period.⁵⁷ As proof of this fact that

they pointed to the 1978 election when voters elected Civic Party councillors to all but two of the 54 council seats and gave Drapeau more than 60 percent of the mayoralty vote. The other mayoral candidates could not even get elected in their own districts and the MCM, which had won 18 seats in 1974 and which was confident of at least reducing Mr. Drapeau's party to a minority government, won only one seat.⁵⁸

If the citizens of Montreal truly desired a modern and more progressive and democratic city hall as MAG and the MCM had claimed, why had they so thoroughly vindicated a man who steadfastly refused to introduce basic democratic procedures at city hall such as the committee system, and who preferred grandiose projects such as Expo '67, the Olympics, and Grand Prix auto racing to better transportation, parks, and housing? Why had they rewarded the man responsible for the city's \$1.3 billion Olympic Games fiasco, soaring property taxes, and some of the poorest municipal services in North America? Part of the explanation for this occurrence lies in the argument that Drapeau was somehow intuitively connected to the hearts and minds of Montrealers and understood their dreams and civic pride. In response to the Malouf Report:

...La Presse editorialist Ivan Guay wrote a virtual apologia for the mayor, saying that if Drapeau was guilty of a crime it was "a crime of passion," based on a gut-level obsession to buttress the self-confidence of his constituents. Guay ventured that the mayor remains the most popular politician in Canada because "the French-Canadian masses recognize themselves in him...Mr. Drapeau can say he spent the money for the people he loves so well. And the more we love, the greater the excess."⁵⁹

But journalist Peter Hadekel cautioned that this explanation alone did not adequately explain what, at first glance, appeared to be bizarre behaviour on the part of the Montreal electorate:

It has been said that Montrealers find fulfilment of their fantasies in Mr. Drapeau's magnificent projects. And there is no doubt about the mayor's ability to pluck the heart-strings of civic pride in his constituents. But why have Montreal voters once again spurned the kind of grass roots, citizen activism that has worked so effectively in city councils across North America?⁶⁰

Hadékel attributed much of the success of Drapeau and his party to the fact that just a few months before the 1978 election, the MCM had been torn by bitter ideological debates between moderate and left-wing elements that led a breakaway faction of moderates to form MAG. As a result, Hadékel argued, the public had been left with the impression that both parties contained "irresponsible radicals who could not get along with each other, let alone try to run a city."⁶¹

Hadékel also attributed Drapeau's success in the 1978 to his remarkable ability simultaneously to portray himself as the defender of the city's two language groups. Perhaps the most famous instance of Drapeau's ability in this regard occurred during the visit of General Charles de Gaulle in 1967 when Drapeau was somehow able to convey to English-speaking Montrealers that he had rebuffed de Gaulle while French-speaking Montrealers were left with the impression that he had not rebuffed the General but instead had used the moment to reaffirm an abandoned New France's ability to survive despite all obstacles. Even General de Gaulle did not regard it as a rebuff for six months later the mayor of Montreal was dining in the Élysée Palace.⁶²

Hadékel argued that this remarkable ability of the Mayor's once again served him well during the time of the 1978 municipal election campaign when it was especially important to stabilize the insecurities of the city's language communities. Indeed the campaign took place during a period of tremendous political uncertainty in Quebec, "with the pro-independence Parti Québécois government trying to sell Quebecers on a vaguely defined policy of sovereignty and economic association with Canada."⁶³ Consequently:

Mr. Drapeau represented a familiar face and the assurance of stability in a city that has been plagued by tensions between the French and English communities. To French-speaking Montrealers in the city's east end he has the image of a moderate Quebec nationalist and to English-speaking residents he is a strong champion of federalism.⁶⁴

As had been the case with FRAP and the October Crisis of 1970,

Canadian politics and economic forces external to Montreal's municipal government, impacted powerfully upon Montreal's urban politics during these years. Hadekel acknowledged this fact and concluded that the forces that had led up to the municipal election of 1978 (political and economic uncertainty over the long-term viability of the Canadian state) as well as the election results themselves, would work to the benefit of Drapeau and would quite possibly lead both MAG and the MCM to dissolve before the next election.⁶⁵

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that this prediction was only true of MAG, somehow the MCM prevailed. To understand more fully this outcome and the 1978 municipal election, it is necessary to go beyond the macro analysis of Hadekel which explains only part of the story, and to return to Kitschelt and examine the internal operations and inner workings of the MCM as an institution capable to a certain degree, of influencing its own fate. Indeed, such an examination reveals that strategic decisions made by activists within the MCM were substantially responsible for the party's poor showing in the 1978 election as well as the more positive result that was to be achieved in 1982.

The initial success and its aftermath

In proposition three, Kitschelt describes how diversity of membership and decentralized structures can thwart the abilities of left-libertarian parties to present coherent strategic perspectives for the future to the voting public. Henry Milner observes that from its founding in 1974, "the goals of the MCM were vaguely socialist and explicitly decentralist. Its program stressed popular participation in decisions, which reflects its own decentralized structure."⁶⁶

Kitschelt has described left-libertarians as those who engage in protest movements or loose alliances of egalitarian organizations with

little hierarchy or formalized decision-making procedures. He claims that such constituencies have built their parties in the same mode.⁶⁷ Speaking of the MCM's libertarian policy emphasis of decentralization Milner writes:

This same principle has been applied to the structure of the party. Efficiency and even coherence have at times been sacrificed to decentralization, since a centralized party structure is not consistent with a conception of "communitarian" socialism which places primacy on the expressed needs of working people rooted in neighbourhood.⁶⁸

The MCM of 1974 fit Kitschelt's description of the structure of left-libertarian parties. It also became clear that the MCM was to endure the developmental difficulties that accompany such an orientation. It had been born with a broad support base which entailed an alliance between political and social groups whose relationship was diverse and conflicting. The MCM's base included activists from every position of the left political spectrum. Henry Milner observes that factions between these groups created inconsistent policy, diverging goals, slow development, and an unorganized, vague, political framework.⁶⁹

The MCM's confusing heterogeneity however, did assist the political community in a positive manner by consciously bringing together both francophone and anglophone activists under the same banner and in the 1974 election, much to its astonishment, the MCM won one-third of the seats in city council. Milner praises this accomplishment⁷⁰ but some MCM ideologues such as Dimitrios Roussopoulos did not share his enthusiasm and responded to this particular perspective of Milner's in the following manner:

It is not surprising therefore that he ascribes "a moment of great celebration by the left in Montreal" when the MCM made electoral gains. What left does he have in mind? The scores of anarchists and Marxists in Montreal who are working in community politics, in the trade unions, in the educational system? His statement is singularly untrue, but it also shows that his position places immense importance on the fact that the bourgeois political order accorded the MCM a part of its mantle of legitimacy.⁷¹

For many theorists, the success of a political party or movement should not be measured only electorally. It is the degree to which its

constituencies control the political agenda and disseminate the movement or party's founding ideals among the population that is the true measure of success.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the MCM's broad appeal was aided by its heterogeneity and concerns for electoral success. Any examination of the ideological development of the MCM during the 1974-1981 period must take into consideration the fact that from its outset the MCM included a strong faction dominated by the logic of electoral competition. Indeed, Chantal Maillé and Évelyne Tardy note that most of the MCM's founding members already had political experience with the Parti Québécois and most of the members holding positions of responsibility had already held similar positions in other political parties before joining the MCM.⁷² Dimitrios Roussopoulos suggests that this past experience in political parties on the part of its membership provided the MCM with its electoralist emphasis and denied it any possibility of even remotely resembling a social movement. Noting a lack of clarification of the role for the neighbourhood councils, Roussopoulos writes:

One reason may be that the political consciousness and commitment of the MCM members is quite low, and that it is a body of people who are primarily attracted to change through electoral work. Not being a mass movement, and not reflecting mass activity, the MCM is in large part the design of its architects who deliberately chose, in putting together the Progressive Urban Movement (a precursor of the MCM), a "broad progressive coalition of P.Q.ers, Communists, NDPers, and trade unionists, etc." One reaps what one sows. Such a coalition will bear bitter fruit, and sharp contradictions.⁷³

Similarly, in their examination of the MCM's origins, Collin and Godbout express dismay at the fact that, unlike FRAP, the new organization did not rely solely upon community organizations and instead included a broad spectrum of political activists interested in the municipal scene including "fragile" new groups of anglophones and immigrants and more importantly, those with past experience in electorally oriented political parties such as the NDP, the PQ, and the MPU.⁷⁴

Like Roussopoulos, Collin and Godbout argue that this aspect of the

MCM's development distinguished the MCM from FRAP and ensured that from its outset, the MCM would have to be deliberately vague and timid in its policy stances to broaden its appeal and to avoid offending crucial elements of the electorate. In short, these authors argue that such an "electoralist" emphasis meant that the MCM would be a political party rather than a social movement like its predecessor.⁷⁵

Au mois de mai 1974, suite à des congrès de quartier tenus en avril, le congrès de fondation du Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal a lieu. Mais alors que le FRAP était surtout un mouvement politique, le R.C.M. se veut, lui, un parti politique, au sens traditionnel...Le R.C.M., pour sa part, se définit comme un parti politique et surtout comme un parti qui s'adresse à toutes les classes de la société. Conséquemment, il tient à se distinguer de tout groupe d'intérêt. Donc, au contraire du FRAP, il tient à garder certaines distances par rapport aux associations populaires en affirmant par ailleurs qu'il a une bonne oreille pour leurs revendications.⁷⁶

"Inspiré du programme du FRAP, [le programme du R.C.M.] n'en garde toutefois que les aspects technocratiques et utopistes. Le programme du FRAP avait une tendance certaine contre le capitalisme et pour le socialisme, même si cela restait confus. Celui du R.C.M. est passablement plus édulcoré et timide, au nom du réalisme, cela va de soi."⁷⁷

With experience in other political parties, this electorally oriented faction of the MCM believed that the organization's early radical goals had to be de-radicalized gradually if the party was to mature into an electoral threat. As early as 1978, MCM intellectual¹ Stephen Schechter observed that:

...despite its participation in a number of extra-parliamentary struggles, the electoralist mentality has always been strong in the party, making itself felt in diverse ways and introducing an additional level of ambiguity and strain.⁷⁸

The inclusion of this faction and its relative strength virtually guaranteed that the MCM was to experience the struggle between two logics common to the left-libertarian parties of Europe.

As the second chapter has demonstrated, however, the MCM's confusing heterogeneity also allowed for the logic of constituency representation

¹The term intellectual applies to any MCM member who has published articles or books concerning the party.

within the party. One of the MCM's founding members has stated:

La fondation du RCM correspondait à toutes sortes de préoccupations locales. On savait n'avoir pas de prise à ce niveau: dossiers qui achoppaient au niveau de la ville, espaces verts, chemins de fer. On avait aussi la préoccupation naissante de prendre les choses en main, d'influencer l'orientation du développement au niveau du quartier.⁷⁹

Consider also the following responses solicited by Maillé and Tardy while interviewing founding members in order to determine their original rationale for joining the MCM:

"Le niveau municipal est très proche de mes préoccupations", nous confiera une autre militante; ou encore "j'avais des amis-es qui étaient intéressés-es par le R.C.M. et qui m'ont amenée à plusieurs réunions...Ce sont les idées de gauche comme la démocratie et la décentralisation qui m'ont attirée", précise-t-elle.⁸⁰

The MCM's leftism and libertarianism was also its unifying force and its program of 1974 projected a series of reforms that emphasized a lack of democracy in the processes and technique employed at City Hall. Citizens were to be given more community control in the form of neighbourhood councils instead of just a form of consultative democracy. The MCM intended to decentralize administration by dispersing decision-making powers throughout the city's neighbourhoods.

Free child care and public transportation were also proposed, but by 1978, all of these radical reforms were either modified or shelved,

Before it was easy enough for the party to state publicly that it would place the accent on mass public participation in all aspects of the decision-making process...but afterwards, the reality was that there were 18 elected councillors, overnight media personalities, with a precise, ready-made role to play within the political process.⁸¹

In these early years it became obvious that many elected councillors were unfamiliar with some program goals, thus creating elements of ideological uncertainty and making them ill-prepared to deal with the pressures of the mass media.⁸²

Candidates had frequently been hastily chosen, some turning out to be unfamiliar with the program and the goals which lay behind it. Also campaign strategy and content laid insufficient stress on the intent behind the proposed reforms.⁸³

The MCM's lack of organization, hierarchical structure, and formalized decision making contributed to the confusion experienced by its candidates, thus reducing their ability to present coherent perspectives for the future. Public utterances of individual discontent and radical posturing replaced serious policy debate within the party. Instead of a renewed attack in 1976 after Drapeau's failed Olympic project, the MCM split apart. The inability to benefit from the difficulties endured by the Civic Party between 1974-1976, magnified its problems.

Kitschelt warns of the difficulties experienced by left-libertarian parties as they gain electoral support and political influence. Proposition four predicts that as the MCM gained such support we could then expect to see an increase in the recruitment of pragmatists who would hasten the adoption of the logic of party competition for the short term and who would urge strategies of alliance building. Indeed, following the 1974 municipal election in Montreal, libertarian intellectual Dimitrios Roussopoulos expressed his fears of exactly such a scenario within the MCM: "Before and after the elections, the majority of the commercial press heaved heavy laurels onto the MCM...Sooner or later more opportunists and careerists will flock to the MCM."⁸⁴

Céline Saint-Pierre writes that although the MCM had been a movement prior to the 1974 election, once it had eighteen municipal councillors sitting in city hall, it became influenced by people whose orientation did not extend beyond the short-term. Rather than concern itself with the long-term mobilization and complete transformation of Montreal city life, the MCM became a political party preoccupied with overturning Drapeau and therefore fearful of expressing radical positions or overly strong statements of socialist objectives.⁸⁵

Proposition five suggests that any such adoption of the logic of electoral competition and the ensuing strategic suggestions would offend and seem to be perverse effects to party ideologues who would respond by initiating an internal struggle within the party. This internal struggle

begins when, in an attempt to thwart the electoralist mentality of the pragmatists, the ideologues compete with the pragmatists to gain the support of the party lobbyists (movement-oriented activists working for specific causes). Consider the following description of the MCM's experience in its first decade:

The MCM's founders and active members had long debated the question of whether the MCM was a "party" or a "movement." Fierce ideological battles were fought at party congresses throughout the '70s around this issue. At one end of the spectrum were the anti-electoralists, who feared that an MCM election victory would inevitably sap the party's principles and result in its "managing the store" for the capitalist system. On the other side were the traditional electoralists, people like Bob Keaton who wanted a strong, structured caucus with a "leader" and a "whip," a caucus that could make its own decisions in response to how it perceived the changing wishes of the electorate. In the middle were movement-oriented pragmatists, who wanted the reforms that electoral victory could achieve, but who sought to preserve the MCM's virtue with a whole series of democratic checks and balances. They also favoured grass-roots action on specific issues, rather than rarefied ideological talk.⁸⁶

Although the terms are different, there can be little doubt that what is being described here is the same process outlined by Kitschelt in proposition five. The struggle within the MCM during this period was the result of the struggle between two logics: the logic of constituency representation held by the anti-electoralists who Kitschelt calls the ideologues, and the logic of electoral competition held by the electoralists who Kitschelt terms the pragmatists. Both groups were vying for the support of the movement-oriented activists who Kitschelt calls lobbyists.

Such internal struggle was clearly undertaken within the MCM between the years of 1974-1976 when the MCM was unable to capitalize on the mishaps of Drapeau's Civic Party. Prior to the 1974 election, the party's heterogeneity had not been a problem. Abe Limonchik, currently an MCM councillor and former party vice-president, noted that: "At first, people came to the MCM from different backgrounds and there was never any debate about what urban socialism was or how it was to be applied to Montreal."⁸⁷ However, faced with the prospect of eventually holding power following the

1974 election, the MCM had no choice but to further clarify its perspective for the future for both itself and the electorate. It was during this process that the MCM began to face the consequences of its heterogeneity and the differences in perspective among its membership regarding goals, strategy, and outlook. Historians Richard Barrette and Claude Boucher note:

Avec un programme sans analyse de classes explicite et sans mesure portant une indication sur l'orientation ouvrière du Parti, après l'élection de 1974, des divisions se sont fait sentir au sein du Parti. Au niveau des stratégies de luttes, certains prônaient l'action parlementaire, tandis que d'autres proposaient la mobilisation populaire. Après un an et demi de pratique, ces contradictions ont incité l'exécutif du Parti (au congrès de 1975) à proposer de se prononcer en faveur d'une analyse socialiste de la question urbaine. Le congrès rejeta l'engagement dans la voie du socialisme. Le débat qui eut lieu "avait révélé l'hétérogénéité politique des militants du RCM composé aussi bien de sociaux-démocrates, de sociaux-démocrates de gauche, de stalinien, de marxistes indépendants, de populistes et d'une large cohorte de jeune qui affichaient des sympathies pour plusieurs aspects du socialisme libertaire, sans compter ces autres membres qui s'avèrent impossibles à classer en fonction des positions politiques traditionnelles."⁸⁸

MCM intellectual, Marc Raboy concurs with this assessment and wrote at the time that: "Once the election was over, the MCM began to experience the tensions of ambiguity inherited from its birth. Was it essentially a political party, or an urban social movement?"⁸⁹ Another MCM intellectual, Henry Milner, observed that the difficulties that such debate aroused made evident the existence of two very different perspectives within the MCM:

The underlying problem was a fundamental difference in outlook between those who viewed the MCM as a socialist movement in an urban setting and others who saw it as a political party concerned with winning local elections and hence changing the direction of municipal government.⁹⁰

Such differences in outlook impacted very strongly upon debates over tactics and strategy within the party. Would the party emphasize parliamentary intervention or extra-parliamentary organization? Would it emphasize leadership and media exposure over adherence to policy and its promotion among "the grassroots?"

At first the conflict manifested itself as one of political style: would the MCM favour parliamentary intervention designed to build essentially, through media exposure, an electoral base for taking power in 1978, or would it use its new-found legitimacy to promote local organizing and mobilizational efforts in the neighbourhoods of Montreal? Would the elected councillors be allowed to assume the "natural" leadership role reserved for them by traditional political values, or would the MCM promote, within its own structures, the kind of democracy it had campaigned for in society outside?⁹¹

The public transit episode and the 1975 congress

These debates would soon come to a head over issues such as the MCM's campaign for free public transport for senior citizens. The MCM had chosen this issue because it would allow for an intervention that would be favourably received by the public while permitting the articulation of the party's broader, anti-capitalist vision. This, in turn, would provide a role for the hundreds of active MCM members. The hunch was correct and the ensuing display of public pressure engendered by the MCM was impressive.

In some districts, MCM activists embarked upon vigorous door to door campaigns geared toward public education. Metro stations were occupied, thousands of people were let in free, and creative acts of civil disobedience were organised such as the "penny campaign" where people were encouraged to pay the new fare of 50 cents or the old fare of 30 cents in pennies in order to fill up the ticket boxes and render them useless.⁹² There was also a massive demonstration of 20,000 persons, mostly students, which ended at City Hall. Cumulatively, all of these measures or attempts to pressure the municipal government led Dimitrios Roussopoulos to conclude that the public transit episode of 1975 "was one of the most wide-spread campaigns of direct action in Montreal's history."⁹³

In fact the campaign was so impressive that the chairman of the Montreal Urban Community quickly announced a compromise proposal: a 40% reduction in public transport rates for senior citizens.⁹⁴ Fearing

misinterpretation on the part of the public, the MCM councillors went along with the proposal despite the fact that the MCM general council had been explicit in its desire for the councillors to accept nothing short of total gratuity of public transport for senior citizens. This decision on the part of the councillors resulted from an electoralist orientation and a preoccupation with public opinion that was not shared by a considerable portion of the MCM membership.⁹⁵ Consequently, the councillors' actions generated some debate as to the extent to which the councillors were supposed to be responsible to the party structures and Roussopoulos expressed the opinions of many party ideologues when he wrote that:

Once elected to city hall, the strictly mandated and revocable delegates of a radical movement have the task of helping in the decentralization of all power back to the people in the neighbourhoods, and to strengthen the new social forms like the neighbourhood councils that will have emerged in the course of social struggle...State authority at the urban level as we know it should be dismantled, as the political economy of the city is being socialised and self-managed by the working people. This then is the essence of the social struggle, the essence of the urban libertarian socialist project...⁹⁶

When such sentiment within the MCM is contrasted with the actions of its elected councillors, it is not surprising that many MCM militants "began to ask themselves if their party was really any different from another..."⁹⁷

Such debate was soon to be resolved at the 1975 party congress which Limonchik pegs as the starting point for the MCM's internal dissent. It was at this congress that "the so-called Left faction, while failing to have a socialist analysis of the city adopted, was strong enough to elect a majority of the new central executive."⁹⁸ Perhaps the most significant addition to this executive was Stephen Schecter, the acknowledged intellectual leader of the socialist tendency, who was elected as party vice-president. Schecter was already well known and disliked by the MCM's moderate faction because of an article he had written⁹⁹ promoting a commitment to "radical socialism" which some City Councillors took to "the bourgeois press and helped orchestrate a press campaign against the

nascent MCM socialist current."¹⁰⁰ Roussopoulos notes that: "The debate had some unbelievably primitive and opportunistic dimensions."¹⁰¹

Councillor Arnold Bennett notes that at the time:

The behaviour of councillors Nick Auf der Maur and Ginette Kéroack in leaking the proposed resolutions to the media and presenting them in the worst possible light resulted in demands by rank-and-file members that the "dissidents" be "disciplined" or "censured" by the party's General Council.¹⁰²

The calls for a vote of censure were continuously ignored but it was clear that the rift within the MCM was widening. Consequently, the addition of Schechter to the new executive could be considered a symbolic victory for the MCM's radical libertarian element and the subsequent tone of the new executive seemed to reflect this fact.

At the congress the new executive carried out a congress resolution to work with districts, helping local people to organize and mobilize their own areas instead of functioning "according to the models of regular political parties, with press conferences and public manifestations."¹⁰³ Limonchik notes that this lack of public presence was misunderstood by some of the MCM's "so-called moderates" who wanted a more traditional style of leadership. This preference on the part of the moderates was attributable to their electoralist orientation which in the past, had led them to object to strong socialist statements by the party, and had led them to fight Schechter and his ideological concerns in the media.¹⁰⁴ In addition:

Parallel conflict developed between the "moderates", who Limonchik said were concentrating entirely on winning the next executive election to the detriment of the party program, and the "radicals" who "wanted to keep building the originality of the program in terms of structure and responsibility."¹⁰⁵

Already we can see evidence of the ever-worsening struggle between the electoralists or pragmatists (moderates) motivated by the logic of party competition, and ideologues (radicals) motivated by the logic of constituency representation. At the 1975 congress "electoralism and the pre-eminence of the parliamentary politics was placed in a

secondary slot" as evidenced by "the continuous defeat during the plenary sessions of resolutions presented by the Cote des Neiges district committee in favour of more hierarchy and centralisation within the MCM."¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless these resolutions had been raised and quite forcefully at that.

Of course it was no accident that these resolutions had come from the committee for the Cote des Neiges area which was also represented on city council by well known leaders of the MCM's moderate faction, Bob Keaton and Nick Auf der Maur. Furthermore, despite the defeat of the resolutions there was little doubt that the moderate, electoralist camp was a force within the MCM and the struggle would continue.

In the month or two preceding the 1975 congress there had been rumours alleging everything from an impending Parti Québécois move to eliminate the "Left" group, to a Communist League (Marxist-Leninist) attempt to take over the MCM.¹⁰⁷ Neither came to fruition but some serious fissures were created at the congress surrounding the issue of whether or not to readmit high profile "moderate" councillors Nick Auf der Maur and Bob Keaton into the party. In compliance with MCM statutes pertaining to dual responsibilities and potential conflicts of political interest, these two councillors had resigned their memberships and maintained their council seats as independents. These actions were necessitated by their decision to form the Democratic Alliance, a new provincial party, and to run in the 1976 provincial election.

The pragmatists

Prior to this episode, councillor Raymond Poulin had been forced to resign because he had been elected president of a local Parti Québécois association. Poulin claimed that this was really an attempt on the part of "radicals," to remove him from the MCM. He argued that these same "radicals" had been running the party since 1975 and the Auf der Maur-

Keaton group made similar assertions when they missed by one vote the 2/3 majority needed to win reintegration.¹⁰⁸

Limonchik argues that this is not an accurate portrayal of events and "people really did want them back - it was a confused vote and they lost on a technicality," but it "became a pretext for a disaffected group to say the MCM had now completely fallen into the hands of the 'Left' faction."¹⁰⁹ Henry Milner writes that "there is no question that both of them would have been easily readmitted had they been willing to admit the fact that party rules and decisions applied to them, just like everyone else."¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, despite the assertions of Limonchik and Milner, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the divisions were ideologically driven and were rooted in more than misunderstanding, misinterpretation and confusion. Limonchik himself admits that the Auf der Maur-Keaton group also walked out because it disagreed with the identification of a proposed housing policy as a socialist policy while councillor Arnold Bennett describes how the moderates fought the analysis by focusing on a quote from Engels in the opening page. Limonchik also notes that Keaton, a social democrat and former NDPer, was uncomfortable with the decision to establish the neighbourhood councils as effective institutions. Perhaps because of his more traditional training in political parties, Keaton preferred to have the caucus take a predominant role.¹¹¹

On the other side were the traditional electoralists, people like Bob Keaton who wanted a strong, structured caucus with a "leader" and a "whip," a caucus that could make its own decisions in response to how it perceived the changing wishes of the electorate... Keaton, a political scientist with an NDP background, would constantly refer to "Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol" in defending an elected representative's right to use his own judgement. He resented the power of the party's General Council, a monthly assembly of district association delegates who officially constituted the "collective leadership" of the MCM between annual party congresses.¹¹²

Auf der Maur's difficulties stemmed from a frustration with the MCM ideologues' preoccupation with maintaining theoretical consistency which

he felt detracted from the party's effectiveness on a practical level.¹¹³ MCM libertarian intellectual Dimitrios Roussopoulos made the following observations of the Auf der Maur camp:

Reflecting the dominant cast of mind in our society, there is an overwhelming anti-intellectual/anti-social theory atmosphere in the MCM. This separation of practice from theory is produced by our educational system. It is a fertile ground for opportunists and careerists.¹¹⁴

Roussopoulos and Auf der Maur's differences in perspective over the relationship of theory to practice in political organizations make evident the growing gap within the MCM between the ideologues and the pragmatists.

Auf der Maur, who had been an MCM councillor during the campaign for free public transit for seniors, expressed exasperation with "a bunch of snarky theoreticians" in the general council who attempted to thwart the proposed reduction in transit fares "on the basis that it was a bourgeois liberal reform and not enough."¹¹⁵ Auf der Maur experienced similar difficulties with the housing committee which took a year to come up with a set of theoretical resolutions that never dealt with questions like land cost, mortgage rates, property taxes, zoning, and the housing programs of other levels of government, but "did manage to talk about the bourgeoisie controlling the levers of power - it ended up characterizing the capitalist system as the cause of the housing crisis."¹¹⁶

Such observations by Auf der Maur, or even those of Raymond Poulin, lend legitimacy to the claim that during the period of 1975-1978, the ideologues were beginning to win the internal battle within the MCM to thwart the electoralist mentality of the pragmatists. It appears as though the ideologues had indeed been offended by attempts (such as those by the MCM councillors during the campaign to change public transit rates for seniors) to initiate a degree of pragmatism within the MCM that they felt would harm the development of internal ideological consistency. A document released as a result of hearings held in the spring of 1977 by the Commission des citoyens pour l'avenir de Montréal demonstrates an awareness of this perceived danger on the part of the ideologues. The

document seemed to confirm fears that the MCM was adopting the organizational tendencies of a political party and was becoming overly responsive to highly-organised, single-issue groups.

This document, entitled, *Centre-Ville: Les gens se prononcent!*, noted that even though the Commission consisted mainly of community groups, libertarian intellectuals, and MCM members, in the process leading to its creation, favoured organized groups and academics and professionals familiar with public hearings and techniques for lobbying governments. Remarking on the process, the document made the following observation:

On est venu à penser que la nature des audiences attire d'abord une fraction de la population, soit les groupes organisés, les professionnels, et les intellectuels (à majorité anglophone) qui sont habitués à oeuvrer au sein de pareils groupes. À l'avenir, on va faire de sorte que les quartiers foncent plus en avant quand il s'agit de participation. La commission se prépare à tenir une série d'assemblées à la fin de l'été et au début de l'automne.¹¹⁷

The 1976-78 years: The reign of the ideologues

Nevertheless, the above quotation makes evident the awareness on the part of the Commission's members that it should and would remove any structural biases against those members of the community who were unfamiliar and uncomfortable with traditional methods of participation with governments. Furthermore, between 1976-1978, the MCM attempted to rid itself of divisiveness and internal inconsistencies by adopting more of a socialist stance within a more firmly-established ideological orientation. This orientation was one that the party president at the time felt distinguished the MCM from all other political parties because of its insistence that all of the crises of contemporary cities evolved out of an inherent bias in the political process in favour of large capital:

Parmi les objectifs qui incitent Léa Cousineau à poursuivre la lutte à l'intérieur du RCM, il y a celui de développer un "parti politique différent des autres". Différent par l'attention qu'il porte à ceux qui n'ont pas encore acquis le

contrôle des moyens de production et par son insistance à souligner la nature économique et politique de toutes les crises que traversent les villes contemporaines, où l'avantage est donné a priori aux détenteurs du grand capital, aux spéculateurs et aux paternalistes de tous crins enclins à réaliser des projets sans consultation des intéressés.¹¹⁸

These sentiments of the party president suggest that the ideology of the far left had certainly come to dominate the MCM and this occurrence was duly noted by Clément Trudel in an article written for *Le Devoir* analyzing the MCM's congress of 1976. However Trudel observed that the "vocabulary of the extreme left" that dominated the congress was not appreciated by all party members, especially the influential Michael Fainstat who felt that this would hurt the party's image:

Michael Fainstat, conseiller RCM de Notre-Dame-de-Grâce,...déplorant qu'il y ait ainsi "polarisation" mais se disant qu'il fallait enrayer toute tendance au "dogmatisme" au parti. M. Fainstat dit craindre l'influence d'un vocabulaire d'extrême gauche utilisé dans certains préambules de résolutions ou de documents "et jamais ces textes ne sont approuvés par un congrès: l'on devrait voir à ne pas imposer à les districts un tel vocabulaire, cela pourrait nuire à notre image et à notre action."¹¹⁹

During this period of the MCM's history it was felt that if ideological clarity was emphasized in the party program then party unity would ensue. In the winter of 1977 a *Le Devoir* editorial commented that:

Traumatisés par leur division spectaculaire de l'hiver dernier et redoutant les retombées d'un tel déchirement dans l'opinion publique, les dirigeants du RCM avaient cette fois tout mis en oeuvre pour éviter de nouvelles ruptures et pour donner l'image de la réconciliation et de l'unité.¹²⁰

Many party moderates considered the ideological orientation designed to rally the membership to be that of the "extreme left." This became especially apparent the following year at the MCM's third annual congress in December of 1977 when the moderate NRG district proposed 40 resolutions to soften the leftist terminology in the party's program. All were soundly defeated.¹²¹

In an article assessing the congress entitled: "La gauche confirme son emprise au RCM," journalist Claude Turcotte noted that the new

president chosen at the gathering, Barbara Lapierre, was an experienced trade-unionist and only two of the eight members selected to the executive, Abe Limonchik and Jean Roy, were from the party's moderate wing.¹²² Furthermore, the party programme and its leftist terminology was to remain intact despite various appeals from the moderates. The congress' participants clearly annunciated a refusal to compromise their "political project" in the interests of "opportunism" and the party's potential electoral success, an attitude which many of the moderates equated with political suicide. Turcotte concluded that:

Toutes les décisions prises au cours des assises de la fin de semaines confirment en effet que le RCM préfère conserver intact son projet politique et refuse systématiquement les compromis à des fins électorales. On verra en septembre prochain quelle sera la réaction des électeurs montréalais. Pour les uns qui ont déjà quitté le RCM et pour d'autres qui y sont encore (reste à savoir s'ils y seront à la prochaine campagne électorale) cette attitude conduit au suicide politique.¹²³

The ideologues had clearly won the struggle within the MCM and a disgruntled Michael Fainstat pleaded with the party to revoke the obligation for its councillors to always remain in accord with the party programme in its entirety.¹²⁴ Recognizing the ever-growing power of the ideologues within the MCM, other party pragmatists and more mainstream members, Bob Keaton, Nick Auf der Maur and executive member, Robert Petrelli had resigned just prior to the congress and formed their own political alternative, the Municipal Action Group (MAG)¹²⁵ which differed substantially from the MCM because it was "the creation of a number of high-profile individuals, not groups."¹²⁶ Furthermore, MAG concentrated on economic issues in an attempt to demonstrate the variety, depth and competence of its members. MAG candidate Serge Joyal favoured the creation of municipal departments to advise and help companies locate and stay in Montreal while Bob Keaton was highly critical of Drapeau for not persuading head offices to stay in Montreal and for not vigorously soliciting investment in Europe in a manner similar to Laval's Mayor

Lucien Palement.¹²⁷ Not surprisingly, Keaton was also highly critical of the MCM and described MAG's objectives in the following manner:

We have social objectives, but social questions cannot be resolved unless the economic situation is settled first. The MCM's economic policies would only depress the city's economy further and its social policies would become impossible to implement. We present moderate and sensible reforms.¹²⁸

MAG also differed substantially from the 1976-1978 variant of the MCM because of its slick marketing and its preoccupation with modern electoral tactics. It was aided in this regard by its considerable connections and resources including: "des services de communicateurs de B.E.D. Publicité, de Ove Design, de l'attaché de presse du chef du Parti libéral du Québec et appuyé par des amis politiques de Joyal (Serge)."¹²⁹

With the departure of its popular but divisive moderates the MCM at first flirted with the idea of building an alliance with MAG during the 1978 municipal election campaign but MAG was not enthralled with the MCM's "heavy reliance" on organizational talent from the PQ's "ultra-militant" Montreal-Centre riding association.¹³⁰ An even greater stumbling block, however, was the huge ideological gap between "the MCM's ideological purists on the left and the prideful pragmatists at the core of MAG." MAG activist Nick Auf der Maur was quoted as saying: "They want to reform the world. We want to reform the city."¹³¹

For the most part, the MCM was enjoying the new found solidarity that accompanied the departure of its outspoken moderates and although at first there had been some attraction to MAG by some MCM dissidents they:

...quickly returned to the fold when it became apparent that MAG would unashamedly emphasize personality over programme, and provided little place for the participation of ordinary people except for election campaign purposes...The pre-campaign preparation within the MCM has been geared, as we have seen, to avoiding the kind of pathological "win-at-all-cost" electoralism that has often minimized the effect of legitimate attempts to participate in the political process.¹³²

Roussopoulos writes of the period that although the socialist left in the MCM was very much "a mixed bag ideologically" and many issues remained

unresolved, "for the moment there is a strong implicit direction towards a kind of libertarian socialism that rejects social democracy on the one hand and Marxism-Leninism on the other."¹³³

Indeed the 1976 congress had adopted a plan to bring together politicized citizens to resist the way capital was transforming their areas.¹³⁴ One out of every three platform points were oriented around long-term social change through the mobilization of active popular support. Many of the MCM ideologues believed that the goal of electoral success could be merged with the logic of constituency representation:

Limonchik said district organization "is the new and legitimate way to get elected...now we're no longer debating which one to concentrate on, but are doing both. Genuine electoral politics that will serve the people must be based on mobilization"...the MCM is "becoming a unique, original political party, with more and more people giving it priority over the formations they come from...the party is beginning to take on an ideological composition of its own, separate from its original founding components."¹³⁵

Sounding very much the left-libertarian, Limonchik concluded that the MCM would soon resolve its factionalism:

The role of the MCM is to create an original solution to an original urban problem. This solution must go beyond socialism to questions like ecology and energy, beyond a situation where the Left refuses to cooperate with environmentalists or alternative energy people saying these are just "liberal issues." The MCM will be able to adapt these questions into its program and eventually come up with a more general framework.¹³⁶

Not everyone shared in Limonchik's enthusiasm and optimism including *Montreal Star* associate editor, Terence Moore, who felt that the MCM's internal squabbles and the party's newly found means of resolving such infighting would prove very costly for the MCM. In a December 15, 1977 editorial, Moore noted that the MCM's unity described by Limonchik:

...has been achieved at the expense of suppressing the moderate wing - the group that believes the party should be open to all currents of progressive opinion in the city...As a result, the party has deliberately cut itself off from all those who believe or could be convinced that getting rid of the Civic Party administration is an important objective in itself. It has limited its clientele to those who want to embark on a vast operation of mobilizing the masses into a network of committees and district councils that will permanently struggle against governments and capitalists.¹³⁷

Moore was highly critical of the intellectual premises guiding the MCM during this period and he suggested that they were ill-suited to the traditional concerns of those who followed municipal politics. According to Moore, most Montrealers were not especially concerned about the evils of capitalism and did not regard municipal elections as a means of rallying the masses and attacking the system:

Most Montrealers do not regard capitalism as the source of their problems. They want a mayor and councillors who will operate municipal services for the benefit of the local public, keep the taxes down, defend municipal autonomy and make the city as prosperous as possible. They don't want lectures on capitalism.¹³⁸

The lobbyists²

Moore believed that the MCM had moved too far away from the broad coalition of interests and citizen's groups (movement constituencies) that had provided it with its original momentum and popularity. As noted previously, Kitschelt argues that the movement constituencies in left-libertarian parties tend to be "lobbyists" or people and groups concerned with their specific causes or issues be they "city beautiful" advocates concerned with architectural preservation, gay rights activists lobbying for municipal legislation regulating the activities of the police, or environmentalists lobbying for recycling programs, cheaper public transit, or more bicycle paths. According to Kitschelt, narrow programmatic concerns are more typical of party members without previous political involvement or of social movement activists, particularly those from environmental movements who have "drifted" into the parties with the hope of more effectively pursuing their cause.¹³⁹

Although the leadership of these constituencies remained politically

²For further clarification of the principal actors within the MCM be they pragmatists, ideologues, or lobbyists, please refer to Appendix B which charts all of these actors by candidacy.

connected with the MCM (See Table 9), Moore felt that during the 1976-1978 period, the MCM had alienated a considerable portion of its following through its preoccupation with all-encompassing ideological consistency at the expense of the often unrelated, specific causes of the city's many diverse groups and organizations. Pierre Hamel noted that many of these groups had already begun behaving in the same manner as their European counterparts by focusing on narrow programmatic concerns related to their specific causes. Like popular groups in other parts of the Western world, Montreal's progressive forces had adapted to the realities forced upon them by the resource scarcity and neo-conservative agenda of the late 1970s and 1980s, and had adopted more pragmatic and individualistic approaches to pursuing their causes or single-issues. They were therefore much less concerned with ideological consistency and the far-reaching, all-encompassing ideological concerns that had driven them in the past. As a consequence, they were also far more likely to be alienated by the ideologues who were guiding the MCM during the 1976-1978 period. Hamel made the following observation of Montreal's "urban movements" or popular groups during this era of Montreal politics:

Les acteurs des mouvements urbains n'interpellent plus les populations des quartiers de Montréal comme s'ils s'adressaient à une communauté homogène comme le faisaient les acteurs des comités de citoyens au cours des années 1960...À la fin des années 1970 et au cours des années 1980, les mouvements urbains se sont diversifiés davantage et ce, tant sur le plan idéologique que sur le plan organisationnel. Tenant compte des changements économiques, politiques et institutionnels, adoptant aussi une approche plus pragmatique, les mouvements urbains se sont préoccupés davantage de leur survie. De ce fait, ils ont été parfois moins critiques à l'endroit des politiques gouvernementales, cherchant à s'y adapter ou à en soutirer le maximum. C'est dans ce contexte aussi que le communautaire est indéniablement apparu sous le couvert d'une valeur refuge pour la gestion du social.¹⁴⁰

The MCM's alienation of the city's lobbyists and groups concerned with social issues was confirmed by Dimitrios Roussopoulos who observed that when a group of bicycle lobbyists called *Citizens on Cycles* called for demonstrations against the Montreal Auto Show during this period, the

MCM did nothing to support the group even though Roussopoulos felt that as had been the case during the public bus transit episode: "There should have been hundreds upon hundreds of MCMers at this demonstration."¹⁴¹

Roussopoulos was highly critical of the MCM's behaviour towards its lobbyists such as *Citizens on Cycles* (a bicycle lobby) or *Save Montreal* (architectural preservationists) and he concluded that an attitudinal change was needed on the part of the MCM to repair any alienation felt by this segment of the party and to prevent an exodus of lobbyists from the MCM's ranks:

Finally a remark on the continued existence of organisations like *Citizens on Cycles* or *Save Montreal*. In spite of the fact that many activists in these and other such organisations are members of the MCM it obviously gives them the impression of a political party in the narrow sense and not also a movement where social action can be organised. The NDP and social democratic parties have the same image...When the MCM undertakes to organise its own mass street actions, and gives active support to the initiatives of other groups, many more of the conscious radicals in the city will work within it, and look to the MCM as perhaps the most important centre of urban social and political action.¹⁴²

More ideological flexibility and greater acknowledgement of the specific concerns of the Montreal community would be needed on the part of the MCM if it was to recapture the political momentum that had sustained it in 1974. Moore prophetically concluded that:

If it is to go anywhere electorally, the MCM must find a way to harness the energies of the zealous leftists who now make up most of its membership and to appeal to the broader segment of progressive opinion that made it a potent opposition force in 1974.¹⁴³

The electorate

Subsequent events such as Montreal's 1978 municipal election suggest that Moore was correct and Limonchik's optimism was indeed misplaced. The 1978 elections were a disaster for the MCM. Not only did its mayoral candidate, Guy Duquette, finish third, but MCM candidates for city council managed a mere 18.5 per cent, themselves running third in most districts

finishing behind even the short-lived MAG party.¹⁴⁴ Only one MCM candidate was elected (Michael Fainstat in Notre-Dame-de-Grace), while Drapeau ran and won on his record.

Proposition six of Kitschelt's developmental framework for left-libertarian parties states that the open, fluid party structures, combined with internal conflict among ideologues, pragmatists and lobbyists predicted by proposition five, increases uncertainty among voters with respect to the confidence they place in the party's external strategies.

The internal struggles of 1975 and early 1976 gave the MCM a reputation of being deeply divided, of being composed of irreconcilable factions; moreover, these assertions were repeated in the election campaign itself by leaders of the Municipal Action Group (MAG), especially by former MCM councillors Bob Keaton and Nick Auf der Maur, and a former MCM executive member, Robert Petrelli.¹⁴⁵

The MCM's organizational battles, the public utterances of individual discontent, and the resignations of well known pragmatists Keaton, Auf der Maur and Petrelli, hurt the MCM publicly during a period of financial uncertainty. Milner writes that "the climate thus created made it very hard to operate effectively, especially to collect funds, adding financial uncertainty to the strain the members experienced."¹⁴⁶

Following the exodus of the Keaton-Auf der Maur group, MCM membership across the city went down to about 800 and five of the original 18 MCM councillors, including all three from Cote des Neiges, sat as independents.¹⁴⁷ It seemed as though the people of Montreal had been provided with little reason to have confidence in the MCM and had no choice but to avoid risking further change by rejecting the stability and authority of the Drapeau machine in the 1978 election.¹⁴⁸

The sad and incredible struggles within the MCM over ideology and strategy have been recounted elsewhere, struggles that resulted in the MCM tearing itself apart and neutralizing itself as a threat to Montreal Mayor Drapeau's regime. Drapeau really had little to fear from the MCM as a progressive political organization over the long run - he did not have to fight it because the MCM proved that it was quite capable of destroying itself from within as an electoral force.¹⁴⁹

It became apparent to many that not only had the party suffered for its ideological factionalism, it had become driven by ideology to the point where it was no longer able to appreciate and accommodate specific desires of the electorate.

While ideological unanimity of purpose had been achieved, the MCM was unable to break out of its habit of looking within itself, rather than outward toward the population, when it came to setting its electoral strategy. For too long the interests of working people in Montreal had been treated ideologically in the MCM, as an objective entity to be marshalled in theoretical arguments and therefore taken for granted rather than as a real composite of the attitudes and feelings of many thousands of ordinary people.¹⁵⁰

Milner writes that the MCM had also failed to adequately appreciate traditional electoral techniques to which the Montreal electorate had become accustomed such as media events involving high profile candidates.

Electoral strategy simply assumed that by engaging in the old practices of 1974...the party could deliver its message. Unfortunately the context had changed,... especially, in the appearance of another opposition force with relatively well-known figures at its head and possessing the resources to run a sophisticated media campaign.¹⁵¹

Kitschelt's proposition six concludes with the assertion that "as electoral support changes, so too would the MCM's internal organizational composition" and nothing could be truer of the MCM's development following the disastrous election of 1978. Jean-Claude Leclerc of *Le Devoir* wrote that for many of the MCM members, the 1978 election was to be the test of the ideological orientation and direction taken by the party during the 1976-78 period:

A cet égard, pour ceux qu'on soupçonne d'électorisme comme pour les autres qui ne jurent que par l'action à la base, la prochaine élection de l'automne sera un test salutaire. Si le RCM a su éviter le pire, il est loin d'avoir retrouvé ce sens de l'initiative qui en avait surpris plus d'un à la dernière élection.¹⁵²

For many, the election result was proof that the logic of electoral competition had been inadequately appreciated by the party and it had been

penalized accordingly. Donald Higgins writes that:

After a series of debates, the 1976 annual congress of the MCM resulted in the movement's deciding that an electoralist/parliamentary strategy was to be secondary to a strategy of grass-roots organizing of groups in the nineteen electoral districts for basically non-electoral purposes. One of the effects of that fateful decision was to quite effectively ostracize the MCM's members of city council. Another pretty clear result of that decision was the disastrous results for MCM candidates in Montreal's 1978 civic election, to the point where Michael Fainstat became the lone MCM councillor. That was just four years after 1974, when eighteen MCM candidates had been elected.¹³

This analysis, first presented by Moore and now reinforced by Higgins, was also shared by a considerable portion of the city's francophone intelligentsia and a 1977 editorial in *Le Devoir* noted that:

En tout état de cause, le Rassemblement est condamné, pour ainsi dire, à poursuivre conjointement son effort "parlementaire" à l'hôtel de ville et ses tentatives d'implantation dans les quartiers. Pour un parti de gauche, ce défi ne va pas sans contradiction, le premier rôle l'incitant à diluer son programme dans les districts relativement à l'aise, le second à concentrer dans les quartiers vraiment "populaires" le gros de ses ressources limitées, aux dépens du reste. En refusant de trancher un dilemme de ce genre, le dernier congrès aura été fidèle à son option politique de laisser les quartiers de Montréal définir leurs choix...Car si la dissidence poussée jusqu'à la démission a toujours sa place en politique, le tiraillement chronique qui a retardé le développement du RCM ne saurait plus, après trois ans, se justifier. Même un parti fort et uni, en effet, aura peine à faire face à la situation qui attend la succession, qu'elle soit, de l'administration actuelle.¹⁴

The socialist, ideological phase of the MCM had been discredited and the period in opposition between 1978-1986 marked the biggest shift in MCM policy; electoral success became the focus and goals began to change. While covering the MCM's annual congress in 1979, journalist André Tardif observed a new attitude among its members: "ils semblent plus déterminées que jamais à mettre un terme du régime du maire Jean Drapeau en 1982," while party president, Abe Limonchik, pronounced that the MCM was in the process of "turning a new leaf": "Nous venons de tourner la page sur la première étape du RCM."¹⁵

This transformation did not go unnoticed by Montreal's "movement"

constituencies or what Louis Roy calls, "des classes populaires."¹⁵⁶ This was especially apparent at "le sommet populaire de Montréal" in 1979 and 1982 where workers in various sectors such as health, social housing, transport, public education, unemployment insurance, human rights, and daycare, gathered with environmentalists, groups concerned with the status of women, and public and private sector unions to discuss "la crise globale du capitalisme...et...pour recomposer l'alliance des forces populaires et, en conséquence, d'en définir les conditions de réalisation."¹⁵⁷

At these gatherings these groups discussed the differences between labour and social movements, between parliamentary action and organizations for the masses, and between reform and revolution.¹⁵⁸ Roy observed that many of the representatives of these groups shared a degree of scepticism regarding the potential success of political participation in municipal politics, and this scepticism was directed at the MCM and its members present at the summit. This scepticism was fostered not only by perceptions of a lack of effectiveness on the part of the MCM at that time, but also by fears similar to those expressed during the FRAP versus MCM debate. Many felt that involvement with unions and in party politics meant adopting bureaucratic, organizational forms chosen by "the state" which contradicted the deliberately de-centralised, libertarian character of the political forces present at the summit.¹⁵⁹

The summit made clear that Montreal's "movement" constituencies were more concerned with organizational form than with ideology and they were aware that parties of the left were just as capable of squashing libertarian sentiment as parties of the right. Roussopoulos has already observed that many social movement constituencies have considered social democratic parties such as the NDP capable of such behaviour¹⁶⁰ and the conclusions reached at the summit reinforced Moore's and Roussopoulos' claims that the MCM's preoccupation with ideology during the 1976-78 period had alienated many of the city's "lobbyists" or "movement

constituencies" prior to the 1978 election.

Indeed, this fact was openly acknowledged at the 1979 congress by party president Abe Limonchik who claimed that one of the principal learning experiences of the 1978 election was just how far removed the MCM had become from the city's communities and community groups. Limonchik argued that the prior to the 1978 election the MCM had suffered from two myths. The first was the belief that in 1974 the Montreal electorate had voted for change when in fact they had simply registered a protest vote, and the second was the belief that the party had established solid political affiliations with the city's communities: "Nous croyons également que nous étions profondément enracinés dans les quartiers, ce que 1978 est venu contredire douloureusement."¹⁶¹ The congress concluded with vows on the part of the party membership to effectively re-establish connections with the communities through structured and effective organization:

Les délégués ont aussi effectué une réorganisation des structures dans le but d'assurer un meilleur contact avec la population, une plus grande efficacité administrative et une présence accrue sur la scène municipale et régionale.¹⁶²

These themes of the 1979 congress were reaffirmed at the 1980 congress where jubilant MCM delegates were able to finally rid their party of the legacy of the 1978 election by once again allying themselves with Montreal's many community groups. Proof of this allegiance was made evident by the substantial attendance and participation of these groups at the congress:

Après son neuvième congrès au cours duquel il tentait une jonction avec les groupes de pression dans les quartiers le Rassemblement des citoyens et citoyennes de Montréal (RCM) estime s'être libéré d'un sentiment de découragement qui le rendait morose depuis sa déconfiture de l'automne 1978. Plus de 250 personnes ont participé enfin de semaine à son congrès parmi lesquelles on comptait une bonne moitié de participants provenant des groupes locaux préoccupés par des problèmes municipaux.¹⁶³

The 1980 congress also made apparent the MCM's acknowledgement of the importance the Montreal electorate placed on the need for administrative

efficiency on the part of its governments and by 1981 its president, Jean Roy, could be heard acknowledging that: "On ne peut séparer la façon dont une ville est administrée et la qualité de vie."¹⁶⁴

The results of the 1978 election as well as the developments at the MCM's annual congresses allowed for an overall disenchantment with the MCM ideologues on the part of the membership and made room for pragmatists to come to prominence within the party. The MCM seemed focused, greater importance was placed on the need for electoral success, and the party's main goal seemed clear: the Civic Party and Jean Drapeau were to be defeated in the next election. *La Presse* editorialist, Jean-Guy Dubuc warned, however, that although the party had unified itself temporarily around this goal, more was required than anti-Drapeau sentiment to sustain the party into the future:

Le RCM avait invité à son congrès 70 organismes d'action sociale ou politique. On peut imaginer tout ce que cela représente d'idéologies diverses, débuts épars et d'objectifs variés. C'est facile de rassembler <<contre>> quelque chose, plus difficile de les unir <<pour>> quelque chose. Tout citoyen de Montréal peut trouver une bonne raison de s'élever contre ses élus; mais il faut plus que cela pour former un programme rationnel.¹⁶⁵

The MCM's new leader, Jean Doré, seemed aware of such observations and although between the years of 1982-1986 he guided the MCM with a more ideologically pragmatic, laissez-faire philosophy and attempted to establish legitimacy in business circles, he was clever enough to realize that libertarianism remained the party's key ideological rallying point. Consequently, while the Civic Party instituted its own reforms during this period, Doré stressed citizen consultation and increased participatory democracy.

The platform called for a more open and democratic city hall and included such in depth reforms as fluoridation of the city's water supply, increasing the number of visible minorities in the city's workforce, more low-cost housing, a master plan for the downtown area, economic development and concerns for the overall quality of life in the city.¹⁶⁶

Conclusion

Chapter three has demonstrated that from its outset in 1974 to the early 1980s, the MCM developed in a manner very much consistent with Kitschelt's propositions three to six. Just as predicted in proposition three, the MCM's heterogeneity and decentralized structure did indeed make for vague, inconsistent policy and the ensuing confusion was augmented by the inexperience of many of the party's newly elected candidates in the 1974 election. The MCM's image was far from being one of coherence and organization and pragmatists such as Bob Keaton and Nick Auf der Maur did indeed move to fill the strategic void in a manner consistent with proposition four. As predicted by proposition five, these moves on the part of the party pragmatists resulted in considerable bitterness on the part of the MCM ideologues, public rancour ensued and high profile pragmatists such as Keaton and Auf der Maur left the party.

The ideologues had temporarily won over the MCM and dominated it to the point where it appeared to have attained a substantial degree of internal stability prior to the 1978 election. However, party lobbyists as well as pragmatists had been alienated and during the election it became apparent that the MCM was to suffer electorally for its insensitivity to the needs of its many single-issue groups, for its image of incoherence and factionalism, and for its deliberate disregard for the logic of electoral competition.

The electorate had little confidence in the party which finished a disappointing third in the election. Furthermore, this disappointing result did indeed contribute to changes within the party's membership and internal organization in a manner consistent with proposition six. The MCM reorganized and recruited more experienced business people and pragmatists into its ranks. High profile pragmatist, Jean Doré, assumed the party leadership and steered the party in a new, more ideologically flexible direction designed to appeal to party lobbyists as well as the

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CHAPTER FOUR
THE LIFE OF A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY CONTINUED
1982-1990

Introduction

Chapter three demonstrated how closely the MCM's development in its early years resembled Kitschelt's propositions three to six. The diversity of the party's membership did in fact hinder its ability to express coherent policy as described by proposition three, pragmatists such as Keaton and Auf der Maur moved to fill the void and take matters into their own hands as predicted by proposition four, this in turn, offended party ideologues in a manner consistent with that anticipated by proposition five, and the ensuing publicized battle between the pragmatists and the ideologues did indeed result in a decline in electoral support in the 1978 election as envisaged by proposition six.

Chapter four will reveal just how closely the MCM's development continued to mirror the developmental process described by Kitschelt in his concluding propositions. These propositions, propositions seven to nine, describe the process whereby left-libertarian parties develop their unique organizational form that results out of the compromise between the logic of constituency representation and the logic of electoral competition. This organizational form adopts the logic of constituency representation to regulate the party's internal operations while the logic of electoral competition dominates its external strategy.

According to Kitschelt's outline, the evolutionary process leading to this new organizational form begins with proposition seven which describes how the party responds first to electoral decline (1978), and then the resource scarcity which the MCM most certainly endured in the

years following the public exodus of many of its pragmatists. Proposition seven describes how techniques of crisis management come to influence left-libertarian parties in just such a position. It outlines how these techniques forgo the normal but cumbersome democratic processes for more efficient methods of decision-making that rely upon small groups of high profile individuals with the greatest resources. The party simply does not have the time or the money to involve all of its membership and adequately resolve its urgent dilemmas. Therefore it does whatever it can to get by in the short-term and high profile members are thrust into even greater prominence in an attempt to stem the slide at the polls.

Proposition eight describes the resistance that these high profile individuals experience from the party ideologues who mistakenly regard them as elites bent on moving the party to oligarchy and away from its libertarian roots. The situation worsens as the ideologues meet resistance to their ensuing attempts to reduce the power of the high profile people. The ideologues' fears of oligarchy are thus reinforced even though what they are really witnessing are the natural by-products of crisis management.

Finally, the situation is resolved when the party ends up with the compromise described by proposition nine whereby internal factionalism and dissent are permitted within the party structure but are masked by the party's external presentation. The party uses the same high profile members skilled at dealing with the media to provide a coherent message to the electorate rather than allowing internal dissent to fracture its external presentations.

This chapter will show that such a scenario describes almost to perfection the period of the MCM's history following the 1978 election. The party experienced resource scarcity, its membership was dropping, the downward cycle common to organizations in decline was evident, and the MCM

responded in a manner consistent with proposition seven. The party adopted an internal strategy that allowed for dissent and factionalism while at the same time it attempted to present an external image that the electorate could trust and which emphasized party unity and coherent policy stances.

The annual MCM congresses were attempts by the party to internally manage dissent. All of the party's diverse groups of supporters were incorporated into policy debates at the congresses, but, at the same time, the MCM's high profile leaders did not allow for any such debate to go beyond the congresses and to creep into any part of the party's daily operations. Following the 1978 election, Michael Fainstat and then-newly-selected leader, Jean Doré, intervened and attempted to arrest the MCM's downward slide at the polls. A media strategy was implemented, the logic of electoral competition was emphasized, and any party policy that might in any way be perceived as remotely radical, was either shelved or softened.

This, of course, offended long-time party ideologues such as Marvin Rotrand, Pierre Goyer, Pierre-Yves Melançon, and Sam Boskey who criticized the party's new approach claiming that it blatantly contradicted the party's ideological roots. In the interests of electoral success, however, these councillors agreed to adopt a "wait and see" approach, preferring to allow the MCM a grace period following electoral success with the hope that it would eventually return to its original mandate. The chapter will reveal however that approximately one year after it eventually did obtain power, the MCM's treatment of key issues such as Overdale, the Queen's Hotel demolition, decentralization, and Matrox, convinced these councillors that the logic of constituency representation had not simply been temporarily put aside for short-term electoral interests but was to continue to be ignored.

Rotrand, Goyer, Boskey and Melançon quickly rejected their "wait and see" strategy and became dissident councillors, but, as they attempted to reverse the MCM's orientation, they encountered opposition from the party executive who considered an external image of unity as vital to the MCM's electoral survival. The top-down imposition of this approach by the executive further reinforced the dissident councillors' fears of oligarchy, just as predicted by proposition eight. It is at this stage, however, that the MCM's development takes a dramatic turn away from the developmental pattern envisaged by Kitschelt. The chapter concludes by revealing that instead of accepting their lot and continuing to exist with the compromise of proposition nine, the dissident councillors opted for another strategy. Instead of continuing to tolerate an internal dynamic that involved rancour and debate while the party simultaneously presented an image of unity and coherence to the public, the dissident councillors eventually chose to leave the MCM and form their own splinter parties. This outcome throws some doubt upon Kitschelt's assertion that left-libertarian parties will continue to prevail as healthy organizations because they appeal to constituencies that will either grow or at least remain constant. Kitschelt's conclusion ignores the possibility of an institutional fragmentation of these constituencies leading to a proliferation of smaller, more fragile political parties.

The context

Before analyzing the organizational developments within the MCM itself, it is important to understand the context in which these changes occurred or the macro variables that may have directly or indirectly influenced the MCM during this period. Many of these variables were the same ones that had influenced the organization in the preceding period.

Indeed the economic malaise that had plagued Montreal from 1974-81 continued to have an influence during the 1982-90 period although there were some hopeful signs in 1983 when total construction jumped 34 per cent and retail sales climbed 7 percent, with both trends continuing into 1984. The Port of Montreal accounted for 55 per cent of eastern Canada's container traffic, a record year was forecast for 1984 and Montreal appeared ready to displace Baltimore as the second most important container port on the East Coast.¹ Nevertheless, by 1990 a Montreal Board of Trade survey revealed that of 185 Montreal companies questioned, 49 per cent believed Montreal's growth would be slower than Canada's over the next year while only 9 per cent thought it would be faster. Only 19 per cent said profit margins were rising while 35 per cent said they were falling.²

For the city of Montreal it seemed that the only real differences between the 1982-90 period and the one preceding it was the brief period of economic improvement in the mid 1980s and fact that the policies of the Parti Québécois seemed to receive less of the blame for Montreal's economic woes than they had during the earlier period. Speaking to an audience in the fall of 1983 at the University of Montreal's business school, the École des Hautes Études Commerciales, PQ Finance Minister, Jacques Parizeau expressed what was slowly becoming accepted wisdom when he argued that people who had blamed the PQ policies for the economic decline of Montreal had ignored the fact that the decline dated back to a much earlier period. He agreed that Parti Québécois policies probably had some impact, but insisted that "it was happening before."³ Parizeau claimed that the debate on language of education in Quebec had been exaggerated to the point where it was made to seem as though "the economic recovery of the province hung in the balance."⁴

There is much truth in Parizeau's words and, by this time, most

analysts of the Montreal situation agreed that the westward movement of economic centres of decision caused much of the city's decline and had contributed to the rise of separatism in the late 1960s, a development which accelerated adverse trends.⁵ However many also noted that although the Parti Québécois did not deserve to be blamed for all of Montreal's woes, the party was proving itself incapable of coming to terms with the many proposed solutions for the city's predicament because of its fears that the city would eventually dissociate itself economically and culturally from the rest of the province. By confining Montreal to the role of a regional centre, critics argued that the PQ was denying Montreal the ability to re-establish itself as an international centre in a world that increasingly stressed the interdependence of economies.⁶

During this period, economists and business leaders were proposing many solutions to the Montreal dilemma but all were international in perspective. These included the idea that Montreal take advantage of its geographic location and its assets and expertise in the field of transportation. Others noted that Montreal's quality of life, its pleasant urban environment, and its stimulating intellectual climate could attract the highly mobile professionals and industries of the future.⁷ The city was already very active in establishing itself as the future centre for one such industry - Canada's space industry - and its attempts to achieve this goal certainly resulted in some interesting political alliances.

These were strange years for Canadian politics in general and they were marked by many unlikely political alliances such as Mulroney's merging of Quebec nationalists with Western Canadian spokespeople within the same political party, and the Prime Minister's well known relationship with Quebec Premier, Robert Bourassa. Even the MCM seemed to make unlikely bedfellows and perhaps as a result of the city's overall economic

malaise, it demonstrated a remarkable ability to "cosy up" to developers and the business community despite its origins in community groups and tenants' associations.⁸ It was even discovered that some MCM candidates had built alliances with the federal Progressive Conservatives despite the MCM's leftist origins and the fact that the federal NDP had helped found the party in 1974. There was evidence to suggest that these MCM councillors had been influenced in this regard by Montreal's economic woes and their strong desires to minimize the poverty and hardships experienced by the people of their constituencies. Indeed, it was suggested that these unlikely alliances on the part of the councillors had been fostered with the hope of securing the federal space agency for Montreal. By assisting the electoral aspirations of Tory candidates in Montreal, it was believed that this might result in future policy rewards from the federal government.⁹

This was not illogical behaviour on the part of these MCM councillors given the fact that a committee appointed by the Mulroney government in 1986 to study ways to revive the Montreal economy recommended that a federal space agency be established in the city and that several Crown corporations and federal research laboratories be moved to Montreal from Ottawa.¹⁰ These suggestions as well as the decision to give Canadair Ltd. of Montreal the CF-18 fighter maintenance contract even though Winnipeg's Bristol Aerospace Ltd. was credited with filing the best bid for the work, led many western Canadian leaders to accuse Ottawa of favouring Quebec and especially Montreal over all other regions of the country.¹¹

Ironically the committee studying Montreal, known as the Consultative Committee on the Development of the Montreal Region, concluded in its report that in the past, the Montreal region had not been favoured by the policies of the federal government which had if anything,

worked to the detriment of the region. Laurent Picard, the head of the committee observed that:

For a bilingual and highly sophisticated region of 3 million people, in an exceptionally wealthy country, Montreal has not distinguished itself in either international achievements or quality of effort. All four levels of government have often been fighting against one another at the expense of the region's development.¹²

The report argued that the governments of Quebec and Ottawa have both favoured development of the rest of the province at the expense of Montreal¹³ and in so doing it touched upon another growing concern for those following Montreal municipal politics - the city's relative inability to control key economic or policy decisions that determine its future. Montreal columnist Gretta Chambers observed that:

So many of the decisions on which Montreal's future depends are taken elsewhere, in Quebec City or Ottawa. From its road networks to its cultural infrastructures, it is at the mercy of the government of Quebec. Even its great museums are creatures of far-away bureaucrats.¹⁴

Chambers was especially concerned with the MUC's lack of control over the city's many competing municipalities and the free-for-all that seemed to be developing surrounding the location of the space agency.¹⁵

Despite this apparent powerlessness on the part of Montreal's municipal government and its activists, one event occurred during these years that could certainly serve to minimize the potential for the development of low levels of political efficacy on the part of politically-concerned Montrealers. In June of 1984, mayor Jean Drapeau was forced to hold unprecedented public hearings and eventually back down on plans for a downtown construction project. Proposed by Cadillac Fairview Corp., the developers who built Toronto's Eaton Centre, the project involved a \$150-million concert hall and shopping centre complex to be built on McGill College Avenue in the heart of Montreal. The project was backed by the mayor who presented the plan to the city in

April without warning but with the expectation that construction would begin in August. There had been no public consultation and no economic impact or feasibility studies.¹⁶ The project was also backed by the Parti Québécois Government which had earmarked \$30-million to pay for the concert hall. The provincial government especially liked the fact that the project would create 6,000 jobs in the first two years of its construction and 2000 permanent jobs.¹⁷

Given the project's powerful backing and the assumed powerlessness on the part of Montrealers to control their city's development, one would have expected the project to proceed as planned. This was not the case however and a flurry of press conferences and petitions to redesign or stop the Cadillac Fairview project followed its announcement. Among the protesters were various architectural and historical conservation societies, the MCM and MAG parties, and the media. Not expected among the objectors were the powerful Board of Trade and la Chambre de Commerce, its French-language counterpart.¹⁸

What Cadillac Fairview's planners had failed to take into account was Montrealer's deep attachment to their view of "The Mountain," the 500-acre wooded parkland rising behind the McGill campus which the project would have blocked. Another source of discontent was what many considered the betrayal of an earlier plan, supported by many of Montreal's most prominent architects, to turn McGill College Avenue into a 36-metre-wide, tree-lined Champs Elysee-style boulevard extending three blocks to the McGill University gates.¹⁹ Bowing to public pressure the mayor first revised the project but continued opposition forced him to hold public debates in city hall. Non-governmental hearings were held and presided over by the chairmen of the Board of Trade and la Chambre de Commerce. Eventually the project was scrapped, lending credence to assertions such as the following by a Gazette editorialist that citizen participation in

the development of their city is not always futile:

Think back to 1984, when Jean Drapeau, then mayor, was insisting on letting a private developer build a highly controversial concert hall in the middle of McGill College Ave. Because he refused to allow public consultation, a broadly based coalition of citizens held its own non-governmental hearings on the scheme. That coalition's power lay in its credibility: presiding over the hearings were two unlikely rebels, the chairmen of the Board of Trade and Chambre de Commerce. Result: the mayor withdrew the scheme...It makes no sense to leave everything to government. Passing the buck does not work. The time is ripe for citizens to exert their own pressure.²⁰

Following the Cadillac Fairview-McGill College event one thing was certain: the political style of Jean Drapeau had not changed in any way, much to the good fortune of his opponents. He seemed just as anti-democratic and pro-development as ever and during the years of 1982-90 he demonstrated that he had not lost his love for "the grandiose." Gazette columnist Gretta Chambers once wrote of Montrealers that: "From Drapeau, we have come to expect recurrent big shows"²¹ and in the 1980s, as was the case in the previous decades, Drapeau did not disappoint. By 1988 it was apparent that Montreal had indeed become the "festival capital of Canada."²² Not only did it annually host the International Fireworks Competition, first staged in 1985, its Just For Laughs comedy festival and International Jazz Festival have earned the city international repute. Under Drapeau's orders the old French pavilion at Expo 67 was recycled into a grand summer exhibition hall called the Palais de la Civilisation and in 1984 Ramses II's ancient Egypt graced the site, to the delight of more than 700,000 visitors.²³ In the following year an exhibition displaying the splendours of 7000 years of Chinese history graced the Palais but as Gretta Chambers warned:

By all means let us rejoice in the treasures of China while we can. But grand as this cultural visit may be, it cannot provide the staple and intellectual diet we need for our overall cultural health and welfare.²⁴

Just as Expo 67 and the 1976 Olympics had meant sacrifices on the part of Montrealers during the 1960s and 1970s, so too had Drapeau's projects of the 1980s. Chambers observed that although the great exhibits gave Montreal an image of being a centre for culture and the arts this did not mean indigenous cultural activity was a priority at City hall and in fact less than a third of one percent of the Montreal Urban Community's budget went to supporting the arts, half the sum provided Toronto's artistic community through municipal funding. Chambers observed that in 1986, Quebec had only 140 public libraries to Ontario's 1,000 while studies of space for the performing arts revealed that Montreal was very poorly equipped in this area as well.²⁵

Clearly the Jean Drapeau of the 1980s was not much different than the Jean Drapeau of previous decades but there is considerable evidence to suggest that Montrealers themselves had changed and had outgrown their old mayor during the 1982-90 period. As the 1980s reached their midpoint it was becoming clear that the old Drapeau methods were no longer going to suffice in Montreal politics and at no time was this more evident than during the Cadillac Fairview episode which had visibly shaken the mayor.²⁶ As the 1986 municipal election approached Drapeau tearfully resigned and his Civic Party was trounced by the MCM during the election of that fall. To be sure some of the blame for this electoral result could be attributed to Drapeau's failings but as the following section will indicate, the result was mostly due to the changes that had occurred within the MCM following its disastrous showing in the municipal election of 1978.

The MCM after the 1978 election

According to Kitschelt, the evolution of left-libertarian parties

towards the compromise of proposition nine begins in earnest with proposition seven which describes how the party responds first to electoral decline (1978), and then the resource scarcity which the MCM most certainly endured in the years following the public exodus of many of its pragmatists. Following the devastating election of 1978, the MCM did indeed experience the resource scarcity common to organizations in decline and in April 1979 party activist Henry Milner observed that:

For the moment, apart from campaign debts, the questions concern the immediate future of the party and how best to use its resources over these next four years...Whether it will be able to make use of its human resources effectively in addressing the people of Montreal or whether it will gradually lose them through attrition due to continued internal preoccupations will constitute the next test of the MCM's political maturity and its ability to draw the necessary lesson from its experience.²⁷

Concerns over resource scarcity were already influencing the strategic perspectives of many MCM activists and many had come to appreciate MAG's efficient and effective use of its high profile candidates during its 1978 campaign. The MCM's new leader, Jean Doré, was clearly one of the party members pushed to even greater prominence in the manner described by proposition seven and the style of decision making that accompanied his selection matches that described by the proposition as well.

After the 1978 elections, the new social democratic leadership quietly shelved this idea of a new form of social organization and began talking instead of neighbourhood centers where certain municipal services would be housed, much like local welfare or UIC offices. By 1982, Jean Doré who is mayor of the city today, a former Parti Québécois activist, took over the leadership of the MCM. Systematically the MCM began moving to the political center.²⁸

From the outset, it became quite clear that Jean Doré would not worry himself with ideological concerns, nor would he attempt to maintain consistency with many of the MCM's original goals. A coherent media strategy was developed in an effort to focus criticism on the Civic administration rather than trying to create an alternative public policy

agenda. Part of this media strategy was observed by Jacques Tremblay in his article entitled "La fabrication d'un prince" which appeared in the Spring 1987 edition of *L'Analyste*. Tremblay notes that Doré and the MCM were aided in their electoral efforts by "le secrétariat d'action de la CSN" which was able to have a multitude of press releases published in the media under the guise of what seemed to be a variety of independent and autonomous organizations such as Mouvement 65 ans, le comité inter-centrales de la condition féminine, Mouvement action-chômage, L'office des droits des détenus de la Ligue des droits de l'homme, SOS garderies, le comptoir alimentaire Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, Centre internationale de solidarité ouvrière (CISO) and others.²⁹

In reality, however, all of these organizations and many others were connected either directly or indirectly to the CSN or the MCM, despite the fact that these institutional links were never spelled out by the journalists citing them. As a consequence, even though the media's message had been carefully orchestrated, to the unsuspecting consumer it appeared as though a mass of independent organizations were spontaneously converging on the same political ground. This image lent legitimacy to the political organizations such as the MCM which represented these constituencies.³⁰

All was not "smoke and mirrors," however, and as noted in chapter three, not all of Montreal's community groups and independent organizations were associated with the CSN or were leftist in their orientations. Indeed this "movement" constituency which Kitschelt calls the "lobbyists," encompassed pragmatic, single-issue groups as well as the more broadly-based organizations associated with the CSN. Referring to these groups, Louis Favreau writes that:

At the same time, the popular movements' goal of radically transforming society was considerably toned down in the 1980s. It now seems less important to fight for grand social principles and political ideals than it is to meet more

prosaic - but more realistic - objectives, rooted in the experience of everyday life. Action is no longer defined or planned in terms of a right-left dichotomy; it is more concerned with what will work and what will deliver the goods...They remain progressive in their orientation, but the avant-garde socialist political organization of the 1970s is no longer seen as the path to social transformation. The will to "break the system," as Louis Laberge, President of the FTQ (Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec) put it in 1973, is no longer part of the progressive agenda.³¹

Furthermore, there was some evidence to suggest that the MCM had indeed learned from the 1978 election and under its new president and former FRAP activist, Jean Roy, it appeared to be deliberately loosening its ideological rigidity in order to broaden its appeal to the city's many community groups including the single-issue groups not associated with the left or the CSN. This became readily apparent at a party conference held in October, 1980:

The opposition Montreal Citizens Movement (MCM) has shaken off the depression that followed its disastrous 1978 city election defeat, says its new president. "The MCM is regrouping its forces," Jean Roy, a self-employed translator, said on the weekend after a party conference attended also, for the first time, by representatives of other groups. Party officials estimated attendance at about 110 MCM delegates and 165 observers, many of them representing about 35 local groups not affiliated with the party...Roy said the party is opening itself up to co-operation with other community groups.³²

The MCM had not forgotten the importance of the logic of constituency representation nor had it ignored the importance of internally managing the diversity of opinion within its membership.

It appears that at this point in its development, the MCM was indeed evolving towards the organizational form described by Kitschelt in proposition nine. This organizational form, unique to left-libertarian parties, requires that the logic of electoral competition comes to dominate the party's external strategy while the logic of constituency representation gains influence within the party's internal operations. Doré was clearly a political entrepreneur thrust into media prominence in

order to provide an aura of stability within the MCM that would mask internal ideological inconsistencies and stem any potential slide at the polls.

Turning the tide

Doré was assisted in his quest for electoral success by events and circumstances beyond the control of his own party. One example of this were the actions of Mayor Jean Drapeau and his followers. Donald Higgins, who had been appalled by the fact that the Montreal city council never met during the month he was in the city conducting research in 1980, was also astonished by the undemocratic nature of Montreal's city council at the time:

And there was the incredible spectacle in August of 1980 of the Montreal city council passing a bylaw that completely circumvents the intent of the Quebec provincial government's new Municipal Democratization Act. That act was designed to force city halls to open their doors to some extent - for example, by providing a means whereby citizens can ask questions and get answers. Montreal council's bylaw allows questions to be asked but provides the mayor with the power to refuse to allow answers to be given, and no reasons need be supplied for a refusal to provide answers. Questions have to be submitted ten days in advance, and even questions directed to individual members of city council must first be cleared by the mayor's office.³³

Fortunately for the MCM, it was obvious that the Drapeau administration had not yet learned the lesson of 1974. Its intolerance of political dissent at the municipal level had led to the creation and initial success of the MCM and when this party was at its weakest (1978-1981), the Drapeau administration's continued intolerance (described in the beginning of chapter three) surely helped sustain the MCM by delegitimizing the administration's own authority in the eyes of the electorate and by highlighting the need for a healthy opposition. In an

article written six months before the 1982 municipal election Jean-Guy Dubuc of *La Presse* commented that:

Inutile de revenir sur la nécessité d'offrir aux Montréalais un véritable choix et de constituer un Conseil de ville qui soit vraiment démocratique, Le Parti civique, comme tous les partis qui contrôlent trop facilement le pouvoir, ne peut gouverner démocratiquement s'il n'a pas à affronter une opposition valable.³⁴

It was for this reason that Dubuc felt that efforts to create an alliance between MAG and the MCM were commendable.³⁵

Similarly, two months prior to the 1982 election, MCM candidate Michel Prescott wrote an article in *Le Devoir* that attempted to persuade MAG candidates disenchanted with the MCM (such as Nick Auf der Maur) that an alliance might be a worthwhile endeavour given the fact that although there were ideological differences between the two opposition parties, such an alliance was far preferable to having a Civic Party administration in power for four more years.³⁶ Prescott also warned that although many MAG members preferred an isolationist stance believing that they would eventually become the only party to oppose Drapeau, these members should not ignore the fact that the MCM had proven itself far more capable than MAG at capturing the support of the city's progressive elements through grassroots recruitment efforts at the community level:

D'autre part, si le GAM s'imagine en finir une fois pour toute avec le RCM à l'occasion de ces élections, il se leurre. Il oublie que le RCM a dix fois plus de membres dans ses rangs que le GAM n'en a et qu'il existera toujours à Montréal un courant progressiste qui continuera à s'incarner dans un parti avec l'intention bien arrêtée de faire de Montréal une ville plus humaine et plus près des réels besoins de sa communauté.³⁷

There is considerable evidence to suggest, however, that Prescott was an anomaly within the MCM and in fact most members saw no need to form an alliance with MAG. Alain Duhamel of *Le Devoir* noted that not only did many MCM members dislike MAG's emphasis upon "the cult of the personality"

during election campaigns rather than establishing legitimate connections with community groups, they also saw no need to risk becoming associated with MAG's \$60-\$70,000 of debt resulting from campaign expenses.³⁸ Furthermore, Duhamel concluded that due to the MCM's success at re-establishing itself with the city's community groups (as evidenced by the party's annual congresses), most MCM members honestly believed that the MCM would eventually become the only legitimate competition for the Civic Party:

Le RCM veut se présenter comme la seule alternative crédible au PCM et tentera d'ici son congrès du mois d'avril, au cours duquel il mettra à jour son programme, de rallier à lui toutes les forces progressistes de la ville.³⁹

Much of the MCM membership felt that it was better to try to build a cohesive opposition rather than establish a fragile alliance with a party that was on its way out anyhow. Jean-Guy Dubuc of *La Presse* wrote: "Mais vaut mieux une opposition forte et vraie qu' le pouvoir fragile de ceux qui ont fait semblant de s'entendre."⁴⁰ Dubuc continued by acknowledging that ultimately the proposed MAG-MCM alliance was ideologically infeasible: "On ne saurait que faire d'une administration municipale composée de gens qui affirment des doctrines sociales contraires."⁴¹

The apparent arrogance of the Civic Party had certainly underlined the need for an effective opposition in Montreal's municipal politics and, increasingly, the MCM was becoming the chosen force to oppose Drapeau. Also working in the MCM's favour was the fact that just prior to Montreal's 1982 municipal election, Jean Drapeau suffered a mild stroke leaving him partially paralysed. Perhaps the mayor's weakened physical condition combined with his administration's intolerance of dissent to further weaken the credibility of his claim to the mayoralty. The election results suggested as much and in 1982 the MCM rebounded from its debacle in 1978 by securing 37% of the popular vote. Fifteen councillors were elected under the MCM banner and the MCM mayoral candidate, Jean

Doré, received 35.8% of votes.⁴² The election, in effect, rejuvenated the MCM which was not going to waste its second chance. Doré commented that:

I have been actively involved with the MCM right from its founding in 1974. The 1982 election constituted a real turning point for me...there came a period which I can only describe as digging in. The atmosphere prevailing in the MCM was extraordinary. There was a spirit of camaraderie abroad.⁴³

Contributing to the spirit of optimism that dominated the MCM following the 1982 election was the decline of MAG. Under law the party could only recoup half of its election expenses in districts where it received twenty percent or more of the vote and the election results left MAG with election losses of about \$75,000.⁴⁴ The situation was worsened by the fact that although MAG had tripled its seats by having three of its councillors elected, the MCM had won fifteen making it appear to be the only viable alternative to Mayor Jean Drapeau's Civic Party:

For a party that recently tripled its number of council seats, the Municipal Action Group (MAG) hasn't been showing much enthusiasm about its lot. Since the Montreal election two weeks ago tomorrow, MAG has become the city's forgotten-but-not-gone political party - consigned to bankruptcy by some observers and to simple anonymity by others. It's taken for granted that municipal battles in the next four years will pit Mayor Jean Drapeau's Civic Party on the right against the Montreal Citizens Movement on the left - with not much room for MAG.⁴⁵

Eventually MAG did disband and did not run candidates in the next municipal election in 1986 which Dubuc argued had been the MCM's desired outcome all along:

Il semble évident que le RCM tient à garder ses distances par rapport au GAM, qu'il aimerait bien le voir disparaître d'une façon ou d'une autre, et qu'il se prépare à jouer seul le rôle de groupe d'opposition au Parti civique. Il lui faudra se battre contre bien du monde à la fois.⁴⁶

In the years following the 1982 municipal election it was crucial for the MCM to firmly establish itself not only as the only viable

alternative to the Civic Party, but also as the only party capable of addressing Montreal's future. Immediately following the election, *Le Devoir* editorialist, Jean-Claude Leclerc, observed that the Montreal electorate had sent a clear message that the future of Montreal's municipal politics was "wide open":

Coupée d'une bonne partie de la population, vieillie et aussi dépassée par les événements, l'équipe du Parti civique jouira de quelques années pour renouveler sa direction, son programme et son organisation. Si jamais le Parti civique stagne, comme cela reste possible, l'avenir ne sera pas bloqué pour autant, car la population a fixé un autre rendez-vous au RCM et son leader, Me Jean Doré. Montréal en effet a refusé de confier aveuglément son avenir au parti civique et à son chef, M. Jean Drapeau⁴⁷

Leclerc was careful to note however, that this in no way guaranteed the MCM success in upcoming elections:

Toute une jeunesse, l'électorat des moins de trente-cinq ans, s'est soudainement révélée politiquement active, plus enthousiaste et entreprenante qu'on l'aurait cru en cette période de morosité collective...Mais cette renaissance ne va pas nécessairement mettre le RCM à la tête d'une prochaine administration. L'équipe des quinze conseillers élus dimanche est plus forte, plus expérimentée et surtout plus unie que le groupe des dix-huit élus en 1974 et qui devaient connaître débandade. Mais elle n'a pas encore fait la preuve de son aptitude à assumer éventuellement la relève.⁴⁸

In the years following the 1982 election, the MCM was indeed able to eventually establish itself as the party of the future in Montreal municipal politics and it did this through a progressive image as well as through its ability to portray the Drapeau administration as authoritarian, undemocratic, and out of touch with modern reality. This process began almost immediately following the election when the Mayor's administration refused to move quickly in complying with the MCM's requests for support staff and offices. When the MCM caucus was not meeting in corridors it was enduring inconveniences such as having to conduct meetings for fifteen with a table that could only seat ten. The caucus complained that it was never provided with adequate background

documentation and that it was unable to question a half-dozen of the city's top staff members before the council. Eventually, on January 31, 1983, a couple of months after the election, the MCM caucus engaged in something dangerously close to a filibuster when it slowed up council debates with points of procedure and such measures as insisting on roll-call votes for procedural motions they were sure to lose.⁴⁹

In the spring of that year, the MCM held a party congress at which it was decided that Jean Doré would remain as the party president despite the fact that he had been defeated in his bid for the mayor's chair in the most recent civic election. The congress also selected a majority of women for its executive and prioritized women's issues and economic concerns for the upcoming year.⁵⁰ The 225 delegates and 50 observers called for more day-care centres and women's shelters and agreed to restrictions on displays of pornographic magazines and on signs on nude-dancing bars and erotic cinemas.⁵¹

At the congress, party leaders steered clear of the kind of ideological debate that had torn the party apart during the 1974-78 council term and instead, the congress' participants focused on practical and immediate municipal concerns such as free transit for the elderly, the preservation and creation of green spaces, and bicycle paths:

On parle encore de bicyclettes, d'espaces verts et de vie de quartier dans le nouveau programme du rassemblement des citoyens et des citoyennes de Montréal, mais dans l'ensemble le caractère "granola" du RCM de jadis a presque totalement cédé le pas aux résolutions pratiques et applicables à brève échéance à l'ensemble de la métropole... "C'est bien beau de faire des débats idéologiques et théoriques, mais il faut être impliqués sur le terrain", d'expliquer le président Jean Doré, visiblement satisfait de la tournure des événements.⁵²

The delegates also agreed to push to have Montreal declared a nuclear free zone and it was very much apparent that the MCM was making a sincere attempt to minimize internal divisiveness by incorporating the views of all its diverse membership in its policy orientation.

One of the most important events of the congress was Doré's language statement calling for more city services in English and other languages and less restriction on the use of these languages on some business signs.⁵³ In a somewhat different tone, however, the city's English-language media observed that Doré's statement on language also included assertions that the predominantly French character of Montreal should be preserved and it denounced as "demagogic" any suggestion that provincial language law was responsible for the city's economic woes.⁵⁴

An examination of the French press shows that the MCM's statement on language was considered ambiguous by the city's French-speaking community as well. For example one article that appeared in the November 1983 edition of *Le Devoir* was entitled: "Le RCM: permettre l'affichage bilingue; Yves Beauchemin: l'affichage en français" and it noted that: "Le Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal (RCM) demande de permettre l'utilisation d'autres langues, en plus du français, dans l'affichage commercial."⁵⁵ Another analysis of the same language statement appearing in a 1986 edition of *Le Devoir* was entitled: "Jean Doré s'oppose à l'affichage bilingue dans les rues de Montréal," and it observed that:

...M. Jean Doré considère que la plus grande ville du Québec est française et qu'elle doit le demeurer. Ainsi, dans l'est, la rue Sainte-Catherine, principale artère commerciale, devrait refléter cette réalité linguistique... Sous une administration Doré à Montréal, le bilinguisme aura la vie dure. "Vous ne verriez pas affiches bilingues sur la rue Sainte-Catherine... C'est important que les gens sachent que Montréal est une ville française," soutient M. Doré...⁵⁶

When it was first elaborated, Drapeau of course, could not resist criticising the MCM's statement on language for its apparent contradictions and he argued at the time, that his own Civic Party: "does not say one thing in the west end of the city and something else in the east."⁵⁷ (Most of Montreal's English-speaking community resides in the city's west end). In all fairness to the MCM, however, the statement was

not nearly as contradictory as it was made to appear. In fact a frustrated Jean Doré went to great pains to clarify the MCM policy and in a presentation to Quebec's national assembly he explained that although signs in the city's downtown core and on its principal arteries must remain unilingual French, languages other than French could be permitted in order to reflect the specific cultural makeup of the population of various city quarters. In these particular areas, bilingual signs could be permitted for the following establishments: small businesses specified by the French Language Charter, commercial ventures involving the sale of products particular to a foreign nation or ethnic group, restaurants, and enterprises of a cultural nature such as libraries, cinemas and theatres.⁵⁸

For the most part, the MCM managed to emerge from the language issue relatively unscathed and in the fall of 1983, the party moved to safer ground and continued its long and successful tradition of exposing the undemocratic nature of some of the procedures and processes of city hall. On Monday, September 7, 1983, during a debate over whether to fund a crime-prevention program, all 14 MCM councillors present at a city council meeting walked out to protest refusals by Yvon Lamarre, chairman of the city executive committee, to submit to cross examination and to permit a ten minute recess so that these councillors could discuss the situation among themselves. The MCM councillors were objecting to Montreal City Hall's peculiar tradition whereby Lamarre was expected to respond to questions but also had the ability to insist that a councillor put all questions at once and then refuse to answer follow-up questions.⁵⁹

On May 27, 1984, Jean Doré easily won a byelection in the east-central St. Jean Baptiste district and stunned Civic party workers who had expected a victory or narrow defeat.⁶⁰ Almost immediately, Doré resumed the style of opposition that had preceded him and three days after his

byelection he could be heard complaining about the meagre resources available to his opposition councillors. He pointed out that in Toronto and Vancouver all councillors received a researcher and secretary while in Montreal, there were only two secretaries for 57 councillors, none of whom had even a private telephone line.⁶¹

Perhaps as a result of the MCM's effectiveness at exposing the Drapeau administration as unusual in North America because of its authoritarian measures as well as its lack of public consultation, the administration made its first tentative steps to change this image in August of 1985 when it invited citizens and merchants to deposit briefs or make presentations on a draft zoning amendment for commercial streets. Michael Fainstat of the MCM argued, however, that the move was a "stunt" geared toward the civic elections of the following year:

One of the strong criticisms of the Drapeau era is that his administration is different from every major city in North America. They realize they probably have to make some kind of gesture.⁶²

However, the Civic Party was not the only municipal party guilty of attempting to change its image prior to the 1986 election. In a 1984 article examining the MCM's ten years of existence, Ingrid Peritz observed that although the party was born as a fractious coalition of community groups in the early seventies "more interested in bringing down the capitalist system than seizing power at city hall," a decade later it was "cloaked in maturity, credibility and moderation - a more marketable combination that could pose a threat to the Drapeau regime in the next city election in November, 1986."⁶³ Peritz noted the MCM's new-found pragmatism and its willingness to forge alliances with Montreal's business community:

Today, the MCM is a united party that has moved from marginality to respectability. And its councillors, most of whom eschew dogma, would rather discuss Metro fares than Marx.

Until 1978, the party had no economic policy. Today, it has an elaborate program for growth and investment and the party is actively courting business; in the last few years, it has arranged lunch and office meetings with dozens of prominent members of Montreal's business community...Along the way, the MCM acquired Dore, a 39-year-old bilingual and articulate labor lawyer who describes himself as a "political pragmatist."⁶⁴

Similar observations were made by *Le Devoir's* Alain Duhamel during his coverage of the MCM's preparations for its 1985 congress:

Le développement de la vie démocratique dans la ville reste en tête de liste des priorités des militants, mais, par leur nombre et leur portée, les amendements relatifs à la fiscalité et au développement économique, marquent une évolution dans un parti qui n'a jamais eu une réputation d'ouverture à l'égard des milieux d'affaires et d'industrie.⁶⁵

As the 1986 election approached, the MCM and Jean Doré made substantial efforts to shake their old image and demonstrate their new found openness to the business community. This was especially apparent at a brunch organized by the MCM in early June 1986 which was designed to attract the business community to come to hear the party's program for economic development and to quell any fears on the part of this community that the MCM was opposed to their interests.⁶⁶ Later that month, Jean Doré openly courted Montreal's business community when he conveniently appeared at the annual congress of the *Chambre de Commerce de Montréal* and acknowledged the importance of the business community for the well being of the city and its municipal government:

Selon ce dernier, Montréal a la chance de pouvoir compter sur un milieu d'affaires "très dynamique et qui bouillonne d'idées. Et on peut pas parler de développement de l'ensemble de la ville, que ce soit sur les plans culturels ou environnementaux, si l'activité économique ne crée par la richesse et ne réduit pas le chômage."⁶⁷

Perhaps as a sign of things to come, Peritz observed that for many connected with the MCM, these were not positive developments and some "insiders" feared that the party's new-found pragmatism meant that its

early principles were "in retreat as fast as its members' hairlines."⁶⁸

One such insider:

Marvin Rotrand, 33-year-old MCM councillor for Snowdon who considers himself on the left of the party, laments the MCM's rightward shift and feels the party is "much more middle class than it used to be." Though he's pleased with the party's success, he's concerned that less importance is placed on early, pivotal policies, such as decentralizing city services. Concern for the Cadillac Fairview project is fine, he says, "but there are a lot of poor people in Montreal who never go down to McGill College. They're more concerned about skating rinks in their neighbourhood or enforcement of the housing code."⁶⁹

There can be little doubt that logic of electoral competition had finally come to dominate the MCM's external strategy and this became especially apparent as the 1986 municipal election approached:

Soon after the MCM won power the grassroots membership of the MCM began to notice emperor Doré had no clothes. The warning signs were clear even before the election victory. The platform on which the MCM fought the November 1986 election was not the product of full and frank debate at the grassroots level. It was concocted by Jean Doré and a hand-picked team of "pragmatists" more concerned with image than content.⁷⁰

In an article appearing in *Le Devoir* approximately one month before the election, Jean-François Léonard and Jacques Léveillé observed that this concern with "image politics" on the part of the MCM candidates was also especially apparent in their personal styles and appearance and their acknowledgement of the importance of the camera for electoral politics:

Imaginons l'arrivée de 35 à 40 conseillers du RCM à l'hôtel de ville en 1974 et, par une seule pression du doigt, la même scène douze ans plus tard. Au lieu d'un groupe d'hommes portant la barbe, arborant col roulé et chemise à carreaux, agrémentée de deux macarons plutôt qu'un, nous sommes en présence d'hommes et de femmes plutôt bon chic bon genre, beaucoup plus conscients des effets de leur image sur la pellicule de la photographe ou du caméraman... Cette première image ne dit pas tout. Elle souligne toutefois, une dimension fondamentale du chemin parcouru par le RCM en quête d'une acceptation de son message et de ses politiques par les électeurs montréalais. Le médium et le message ont évolué dans le même sens, soit celui du compromis avec la réalité électorale montréalaise. Le discours est moins carré.⁷¹

In response to the 1950 style scare tactics of Jean Drapeau during the 1986 campaign, Doré confirmed the party's pragmatism and was quoted in a September, 1986 edition of *The Gazette* as saying, "I am not a socialist and never was one, I defy anyone to show how the MCM and its policies can be socialist policies".⁷² This statement could perhaps, have been interpreted in a negative fashion by many MCM members, particularly the ideologues who had dominated the party during the 1976-1978 years. Similarly, members of the MCM's "lobbyists," or those working on behalf of specific causes or for single issues had to be displeased by Doré's comments in the summer of 1986 when he questioned the appropriateness of the party's name: "It would be normal eventually that we change the name," Doré said on a phone-in show on CFCF radio. The name is an anachronism because the party is "not a pressure group," he said.⁷³

At the party convention of 1985 observers noted that the MCM seemed to be changing its policy direction away from some of its traditional policy measures that were the most difficult to implement on a practical level (such as free public transit).⁷⁴ Consider Alain Duhamel's observations of the congress in *Le Devoir*:

Plusieurs amendements constituaient des changements de cap importants aux orientations du parti, définies pour la plupart dans une programme politique préparé en 1978. Ainsi dans le financement du transport en commun, là où il était question de gratuité universelle, le programme parle désormais d'une réduction progressive de la contribution des usagers, jusqu'à 33% des frais d'exploitation, et de nouvelles sources fiscales de financement auprès, entre autres, des bénéficiaires non-usagers...Ainsi dans le débat sur la fiscalité, le conseiller Marvin Rotrand a qualifié "d'opportunistes" certains amendements qui avaient pour effet de nuancer l'engagement du parti envers un système fiscal progressif, par opposition au caractère régressif du régime actuel.⁷⁵

During the summer of 1986, Claude Dupras, Drapeau's replacement as leader of the Civic Party, attacked the MCM's idea of neighbourhood councils, contemptuously referring to them as neighbourhood "soviets".⁷⁶

This clearly had an impact on the Doré-led MCM and "even though every public opinion poll gave a clear advantage to the MCM by a wide margin, the leadership panicked and moved to shelve the idea altogether."⁷

Jean Doré, a consumer-protection lawyer and former attaché to Premier René Lévesque, also entered office on a reform ticket. The MCM promised to end the destruction of neighbourhoods by massive projects, give citizens a voice at city hall, and introduce a measure of social justice on a variety of issues that community groups had mobilised around. By the time this reform ticket was on the verge of victory, much of the original dynamism had been dissipated, as it was invaded by electoral opportunists and its leadership backed away from progressive positions that might cost votes.⁸

During the month of September 1986, about 65 MCM council delegates voted unanimously to put on hold two of the more radical planks of its platform: the first being the creation of neighbourhood councils and the second being the abolition of the direct election of mayor in Montreal. The proposal for the creation of neighbourhood councils was to be submitted to a referendum if the MCM was re-elected for a second term. Doré justified this manoeuvre by articulating a "more gradualist, not to say electoralist, strategy"⁹ claiming that, "You can't do everything at once, you have to do things on a step by step basis".¹⁰ Such statements sounded very familiar to many Quebecers and Gazette columnist Greta Chambers was not the first to draw parallels between the MCM and the Parti Québécois,

Shelving the core of its program worked for the Parti Québécois. Why wouldn't it work for the Montreal Citizen's Movement?...It is developing a PQ-like elasticity of policy...Hence the MCM is postponing indefinitely two of its most controversial proposals...Both the PQ and the MCM were regarded as radical when they started out. Over time, both were forged into mainstream relevance by leaders with a sense of purpose and of the possible.¹¹

For members who favoured ideological consistency over political

opportunism, it was quite clear the direction in which the MCM was headed. Jean François Léonard and Jacques Léveillé observed that "even though all was going their way, the MCM backed down even further from where it had withdrawn already - surely a very ominous sign for the future."⁸² Despite such observations, however, it is important to note that at the party general council where the platform was "softened", only one delegate complained that the decision "smacked of electoral opportunism".⁸³ Even more surprising was the fact that the Parti communiste du Québec (PCQ) and le mouvement socialiste du Québec continued to support the MCM during the 1986 campaign despite the numerous statements and decisions over which they might have taken offence.⁸⁴

This lack of critical response on the part of the MCM membership, the PCQ, and le mouvement socialiste, and even the party lobbyists, may have been caused by the paucity of practical planning that had gone into the more imaginative endeavours such as the local neighbourhood councils. A more plausible explanation however, might be that these institutions, the MCM ideologues and its lobbyists, remembered the election of 1978 and chose not to risk the gains made in 1982. Perhaps they perceived the dominance of the pragmatists and the logic of electoral competition as necessary evils to be endured in the interest of the party and its long-term agenda. This explanation was reinforced by the manner in which the PCQ and le mouvement socialiste qualified their support for the MCM. The PCQ warned of rightward ideological shifts within the MCM⁸⁵ while Bertrand Des Aulniers of le mouvement socialiste advised the party to stick to the goals outlined by the program established at the MCM's outset: "Le Comité régional de Montréal considère qu'il est important et souhaitable que le RCM maintienne et applique son programme initial."⁸⁶

It seemed that the PCQ, le mouvement socialiste, and the more leftist of the MCM ideologues were loyal to the MCM based on ideas of an

earlier era and were biding their time until the MCM attained power when they could more effectively pursue their real agendas. If this was indeed the strategy of the MCM ideologues as well as the PCQ and le mouvement socialiste, then they were partially rewarded by the election of 1986 in which the MCM won 55 seats out of 58, plus the mayoralty.

The years in power

Whatever the reasoning of the ideologues, this quiet acceptance of the logic of electoral competition and its consequences was not to last. It was not until a full seventeen months after it had swept to power in 1986 winning all but three seats, that the MCM began to experience factionalism and rifts amongst its councillors. Kitschelt's proposition eight asserts that as the party's strategy becomes more influenced by the logic of electoral competition, the ideologues develop a resistance based on fears of oligarchy which reinforce themselves as the ideologues try to reduce the power of the party's most dominant, high profile members. The factionalism that was to hit the MCM after it came to power in 1986 was, without any doubt, based on such reasoning and sustained itself in exactly the manner outlined by proposition eight.

By March, 1987, MCM veteran Marvin Rotrand and a half dozen of his colleagues on city council had "pitted" themselves against Mayor Jean Doré and his executive committee. An article by Lewis Harris of *The Gazette* equated the split within the MCM to the Waffle wing of the New Democratic Party. Rotrand joked that maybe the splinter group should be more aptly termed, "pancake" rather than a "waffle" movement because of their "loose-as-a-geese" approach to politics in general.⁸⁷ Waffle or pancake, there is little doubt that this splinter group acted as a more spirited and effective opposition within city council than the opposition itself,⁸⁸

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particularly when it came to issues involving the MCM's founding principles.

The MCM wafflers, many with the party since the beginning, share a passion for public debate and will relentlessly attack the administration on any issue they see as key to the MCM's founding principles. They have voted against the administration, which gets much of its support from newcomers to the party, on issues such as environmental protection, tenants' and consumers' rights and an open administration at city hall.⁸⁹

Harris concludes by characterizing the dissenting faction of the MCM as "the old guard" clashing against "new blood" to prevent the corruption of party principles. This conclusion seems to correspond to Kitschelt's observation that often following electoral successes, the European left-libertarian parties have begun attracting members who enter the party "as a party, not as the representative of definite political concerns" and while these "pragmatic new members may be more attuned to changes in practical activities of the party, they often clash with some of the older militants who have a more ideological or single-issue commitment."⁹⁰ These older militants claim that such newcomers often lack a solid political background, are swept into the party on a general wave of enthusiasm, and are unable to cope with political business on a daily basis. One activist even suggested that his party admit only activists already experienced in protest movements and political involvement.⁹¹

There is evidence to suggest however, that this is an unlikely scenario. Indeed Table 9 of chapter two of this thesis reveals that in fact the number of inexperienced political candidates within the MCM actually diminished from 1978 to 1986. This evidence is reinforced by statements made in 1990 by long-time MCM councillor and social rights activist Arnold Bennett. Bennett expressed confidence in the MCM's new recruits and suggested that the dissident councillors, especially Sam Boskey, had little to fear and lots to like about the party's new

recruits. Commenting on Boskey's view that the MCM was being overwhelmed by pragmatists, Bennett noted:

But what he didn't realise was that a substantial number of delegates had changed their minds after hearing the arguments against giving too much power to the central executive. Despite the departure of all too many veteran activists, new people were emerging who also knew how to think for themselves and who weren't afraid to say no to the party establishment.⁹²

Some might wonder why it took so long for those defending ideological consistency within the party to oppose the blatantly opportunistic and pragmatic actions of Doré and the MCM executive. Indeed, an initial examination of the episode might suggest that the MCM dissidents masqueraded under the banner of ideological purity to hide the fact that they were suffering from the very common human emotions of bitterness and jealousy. Michael Fainstat, the principal spokesperson for the MCM executive suggested at the time that the dissident councillors were motivated partially by self-interest:

I don't think there's much of a comparison to be made with the NDP Waffle. I think what we have is a movement of isolated individuals who are very, very content to see themselves in the media at the slightest opportunity to express their dissidence.⁹³

A July 1988 article in *Le Soleil* outlined the injured feelings of many long-time MCM councillors resulting from the fact that once the party had obtained power, they had not been rewarded for their tolerance of pragmatism and had not received the positions that they believed they merited based on their dedication and their considerable experience and ability. They were particularly upset when outsiders were "parachuted" into lofty positions without having "paid their dues". Such appointments could not be tolerated and their legitimacy could not be accepted by the councillors who had faithfully and competently served the MCM for many years in opposition. This would explain the opposition to the "new blood" described previously,

Mais avec ses 55 élus, 56 avec le maire, ce qui révolte le plus ceux qu'on pourrait aussi bien appeler le groupe des <<orthodoxes>> en raison de leur fidélité à la doctrine du parti, ce sont les doubles mandats confiés à un petit noyau quand des conseillers aux longs états de service sont laissés sans responsabilités sur le carreau, une pratique contraire, selon eux, aux objectifs de démocratisation...Le cas de Benoit Tremblay est peut-être celui qui heurte le plus les <<dissidents>>. <<Sorti tout droit de la machine péquiste..., Benoit Tremblay est arrivé au parti neuf mois avant l'élection>>, racontent, amers, ces vétérans de la scène municipale évincés du pouvoir par des novices fraîchement débarqués.⁹⁴

According to this scenario, the dissenting faction within the MCM were concerned more with their own careers within the MCM than with the party's ideological consistency.

Nevertheless, it would seem that the initial explanation holds more merit. The MCM councillors who would eventually oppose the weakening of theoretical consistency within MCM policy had put aside their initial concerns in the interest of obtaining power. Once it was obtained, however, these concerned councillors then became far more critical of the party's apparent ideological pragmatism. Sam Boskey, one of the most respected of the MCM dissident councillors, explained that once the party began to govern, he allowed it a certain period of grace in order to return to its ideological roots and overcome the logic of electoral competition which he hoped had been used merely as a tool to enable the party to obtain power:

During the last year, all of us in N.D.G. have paid serious attention to the problems in the party, and its relations with an administration with which many of us could not identify. While other local associations have dealt with the issues in various ways, in N.D.G. we agreed that it was important for our members to remain in the party long enough to experience the congress first-hand, in order to judge for themselves what the party has become. The congress is now over. I am not amongst those who believe that the congress resolved our problems...Despite calls by outgoing and incoming presidents for a return to the grassroots, the party has abandoned most activity not directly connected with supporting the administration; evidently most members no longer believe that valid activity in the realm of municipal politics exists anywhere except at city hall.⁹⁵

The best explanation for the behaviour of the MCM's dissenting faction lies in the theories of Kitschelt. Kitschelt notes that often such dissenters remain within left-libertarian parties despite numerous slights to their interests, because the ideological distance between the dissenting faction and the other parties is even greater than that between the factions within the left-libertarian party itself.⁹⁶ This was clearly the case with the MCM "pancakes." Their only other option was to create a new political party. This is an unlikely occurrence within the European context due to the relative size of the left-libertarian constituencies there, but as we shall see later, the strength of "left-libertarianism" within the Montreal electorate allowed for the creation of viable third parties; an option eventually chosen by the MCM dissenters.

Prior to this occurrence, however, the MCM's dissenting faction spent considerable time fighting what seemed like a constantly growing dominance of the party by the logic of electoral competition. To make matters even worse, these dissenting ideologues were very much alone in their battles and Montreal's progressive forces had, for the most part, been appeased by the MCM. Louis Favreau made the following observation of the popular groups leading Montreal's progressive forces during the late 80s and early 90s:

Today's popular groups are not interested in a radical social break under the leadership of a working-class political party. The point is no longer to topple the bourgeois State and smash the capitalist system, but rather to try and rectify the often miserable conditions of existence of an overly-large segment of the population...Poor financing and inadequate credentials are the main problems facing popular groups. As a result, their very existence is in constant jeopardy and, for some groups, lobbying is their last and only resort. Others get together to create so-called "tables de concertation et d'action" (roundtables for coordination and action), and try to get what they can by applying pressure on supportive city councillors.⁹⁷

The city's lobbyists and advocates of single-issue concerns had adapted to the realities established during the 1970s and 1980s and had accepted the

new, more focused, and more pragmatic methods required to accomplish their objectives:

Avec l'arrivée au pouvoir du RCM, les nouvelles classes moyennes bénéficient d'appuis institutionnels et ont opté pour des modes d'intervention plus conformes à leurs intérêts. Mais cette adaption - voire cette redéfinition - des formes de l'action collective du côté des nouvelles classes moyennes n'a pas laissé les classes populaires complètement démunies. Ces dernières se sont également engagées dans un pragmatisme similaire à celui des nouvelles classes moyennes en mettant l'accent sur la défense des droits de groupes sociaux spécifiques: les jeunes, les communautés ethniques, les personnes âgées, les assistés sociaux, etc. Pour tous ces groupes, au cours des dernières années, se sont développés des modes d'intervention centrés sur leurs besoins spécifiques...Il n'est pas surprenant dès alors d'observer une certaine spécialisation de l'action collective alors que les acteurs n'hésitent pas à emprunter des techniques et des stratégies au répertoire des groupes de pression traditionnels.*

Some key issues were to arise, however, that would transform the attitudes of many of the city's lobbyists and social movement activists and rejuvenate the MCM dissenters efforts to organize the left within the party. These issues were Overdale, the Queen's Hotel demolition, Matrox, the public consultation policy, and the right to dissent within the MCM caucus. Concern over these issues was expressed in numerous articles in the Montreal dailies, especially *The Gazette*, which seemed very willing to feature the complaints of the MCM dissident councillors whenever they so desired. Episodes concerning the Queen's, Matrox, Overdale, and the right to dissent within the MCM, all seemed to confirm the fears of the dissident councillors that the MCM was becoming oligarchic at the expense of its "movement" constituencies and was no longer the party that it had claimed to be. Accompanying these incidents was a mixed performance on the part of the MCM with respect to the more general issues of waste recycling, urban planning, and gender and racial equality."

Overdale

The Overdale affair revolved around the issue of tenant's rights versus developers and it, more than any other, symbolized how far the MCM had deviated from its founding "raison d'être." The MCM had always perceived of itself as being an organization for the people, the citizen, rather than big capital, big business, big government, big anything. It was its duty to protect the citizen who did not possess equal institutional resources, from the awesome power of organized capital in municipal politics. This was central to both its leftist and libertarian heritage.

Indeed the political culture of the MCM had congealed during the Milton-Park struggle of the early nineteen-seventies when more than 600 households formed the Milton-Park co-op to fight a plan for their relocation by a developer in exchange for the destruction of their community. In the late 1960s the turn-of-the-century houses of the Milton-Park area had decayed and were filled with low-income tenants. The houses were scheduled to be demolished and replaced by high rises for "the middle-classes on their way back from the suburbs, and for affluent young professionals."¹⁰⁰ With the help of MCM activists such as John Gardiner (dubbed "The Bomber" because of his left-wing views¹⁰¹), the tenants engaged in civil disobedience (occupying the developer's office rather than the threatened homes), and formed Canada's largest co-operative housing project at the time.¹⁰²

Despite the hunger strikes and sit-ins, 250 houses were razed to make way for the first phase of La Cite, an enormous residential and commercial development that opened its towers in 1976. However a city by-law preventing the erection of further high-rises, an uncertain economic climate in Quebec, and the economic woes of the developers combined to put

the project on hold while the remaining Victorian houses were left to deteriorate further while developers examined their options. Residents rallied under the Milton-Park Citizens' Committee, and Heritage Montreal (including Phyllis Lambert, perhaps Montreal's most powerful and best known architectural preservationist), began exploring ways of buying the remaining properties and returning them to residents as cooperatives.¹⁰³

Finally, in 1979 the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation bought the properties for \$5.5 million and sold them for cost plus interest (\$7 million) to the Société d'Amélioration Milton Parc (SAMP), a non-profit group set up by Heritage Montreal. Eventually ownership would be transferred to the individual co-operatives administering the buildings.¹⁰⁴

The Milton-Park issue had become a rallying point for many of the MCM's founding activists and made for some very heady times that would not be forgotten by most of them. This was true even by the late nineteen-eighties when the Overdale situation arose. As a consequence, the dislocation of the tenants of Overdale in favour of a suspect plan by developers to build luxury condos was what Peter Wheeland has termed: "the antithesis of what many activists had fought for over the years."¹⁰⁵ Indeed the Milton-Park struggle of the early seventies had helped define and clarify the MCM's role on the municipal scene and many parallels could be made with the Overdale situation. Both instances involved tenants rejecting proposed relocation schemes in exchange for the destruction of their communities and the Overdale tenants, like those of Milton-Park almost two decades earlier, developed mutual solidarity, a real sense of community and significant outside support.¹⁰⁶

Ironically, it was executive committee member John Gardiner, a former Milton-Park veteran, who was forced to defend the MCM administration during the Overdale saga. Gardiner argued that getting the

developers to build the municipally-owned replacement housing was a major achievement and there was no other way to protect the tenants. He claimed that without such a deal, the landlord could have bypassed the City using the rental board to evict tenants temporarily for major renovations while raising their rents far beyond their ability to pay. Gardiner also insisted that the City repeatedly tried unsuccessfully to buy the Overdale buildings. Still, the sight of the police breaking down barricades and dragging out the resisting Overdale tenants in the Spring of 1988, was, understandably, more than many MCM veteran activists could bear, especially those familiar with the Milton-Park struggle.¹⁰⁷

The Queen's

The demolition of the Queen's Hotel was difficult for MCM veterans as well and as was the case with Overdale, this event reminded them of the unpleasantness of an earlier period. Just as the Milton-Park episode had galvanised the initial leftist and libertarian support for the MCM, the destruction of the Van Horne mansion had done the same for the "city beautiful" elements within the MCM who were concerned with architectural preservation. Many early MCM activists were people living in the downtown area of Montreal who abhorred the Drapeau administration's propensity to think nothing about wiping out large portions of the city's architecture and heritage. These activists deeply resented the destruction of many of Montreal's beautiful old buildings only to replace them with ugly cement projects such as the Décor Decarie shopping mall.

At no time was this resentment more evident than in 1973 when the Drapeau administration permitted the demolition of Montreal's magnificent Van Horne mansion once located on Sherbrooke Street. After that event, however, Montreal's old buildings fared rather well until the MCM's

decision in 1988 to condemn the Queen's Hotel to the same fate. In light of the Queen's demolition, the *Montreal Gazette* published an editorial entitled, "Van Horne, 1988 Style" reminding many Montrealers of Drapeau's fateful decision in 1973.¹⁰⁸ For many MCM activists it seemed that the MCM was once again ignoring its roots and committing the same crucial errors in judgement that had allowed it to replace the old Drapeau administration.

The Queen's was an appealing building constructed in a neo-classic style and it was unusual because it had been built out of red, Scottish sandstone which "provided lively contrast in juxtaposition to the Montreal greystone on buildings such as Windsor Station."¹⁰⁹ Located across the street from the Bonaventure (Grand Trunk) Station and just downhill from Windsor Station (the CPR station that services Montreal's core even today), the Queen's had boomed during Montreal's railroad era. With the closing of the Bonaventure Station, however, its immediate location deteriorated to the point where neither Expo'67 nor the Olympics could reestablish the building as a hotel. Even a brief attempt in 1970 to establish it as a student hostel failed.¹¹⁰

Heritage Montreal asked the provincial government to classify the Queen's in 1985 and 1988 but their efforts were destroyed by reports revealing that there had been clandestine demolition of an inside wing and the building had seriously deteriorated due to neglect of protection from the elements. On June 21, 1988, Montreal City Council approved plans for the construction of a large, two-towered residential and commercial complex that would preserve the two choice facades of the Queen's for its base. Despite protests from some MCM councillors and heritage activists, the developer argued that several of the building's floors had collapsed and any attempts to preserve more of the building would endanger workers' lives.¹¹¹ In a last minute move, however, the administration also

required the developer to preserve the red building stones as well as some of the hotel's "sculptural" elements and in the fall of that year the Queen's Hotel was demolished.¹¹²

Although the Queen's affair was less damaging to the new administration than Overdale, it raised basic questions about preservation, a fundamental MCM policy area. Luther Allen concludes that just as Overdale implied the need for a new housing policy, the Queen's demonstrated the need for selective and effective policies to protect heritage property from years of neglect.¹¹³ The affair also contributed to a disillusionment with the administration on the part of tenants and heritage groups or the "city beautiful" elements of the MCM support base.

Ironically, the person who these groups held accountable for Overdale, the demolition of the Queen's, and for the MCM's "pro-high rise master plan," was none other than John Gardiner, a leading organizer of the Milton-Park co-operative housing project of the late 1970s who had also engaged in civil disobedience in a vain attempt to stop the demolition of Victorian housing on St. Norbert St., one of the city's earliest heritage battles. The irony was not lost on many long-time MCM activists such as Michael Fish who regards Gardiner's apparent transformation as symbolic and proof of an overall malaise within the MCM.¹¹⁴

Matrox

Another affair led to disillusionment on the part of key elements of the MCM support base as well. The Matrox affair of 1988 involved what appeared to be the simultaneous betrayal of the environmentalists and pacifists within the party; two of the MCM's most important "social movement" constituencies representing key segments of the party's policy

orientation. Needless to say, this only reinforced the impression that the MCM was in dire need of efforts to strengthen the logic of constituency representation within its ranks.

The issue arose when Montreal's representatives on the Montreal Urban Community (MUC) Public Planning Commission agreed to let the Matrox company clear twenty hectares¹¹⁵ of protected forest land in the Bois de Liesse park, the last stand of black maple trees on the island. The company required the land so it could expand its parking facilities after it signed a lucrative U.S. military contract (\$300-million) for computer-generated simulations to be used for training.¹¹⁶ A military contract had necessitated the destruction of one of the city's few remaining forests.

In its successful bid to influence the MUC, Matrox had sent a letter detailing time constraints, alleged financial support by the federal and provincial governments, and the number of jobs that would be created. Also included was a subtle suggestion of potential legal responsibility if the company was not granted the land and defaulted on the contract. This seemed to convince the mayor who cited the promise of 400 new jobs when the issue came to the MUC council. The mayor persisted with this argument even though just prior to the vote, Matrox's president revealed that the military contract had not been confirmed and that the contract might eventually be half the figure mentioned, and would create less than 100 jobs. Eight MCM councillors and three suburban mayors opposed the expansion while another eight abstained from the vote.¹¹⁷ Ultimately, the entire event showed just how easily the MCM could be separated from some of its founding ideals and:

For antimilitary and green-space activists alike, the name of a U.S. contractor in Montréal's West Island suburbs became a one-word milestone of the distance the MCM administration had put between itself and the citizen's groups that gave it its foothold.¹¹⁸

Municipal democratisation

The MCM's attempts at municipal democratisation and the development of processes to incorporate the views of its "grassroots" into its policy also seemed to be ineffective despite the fact that this had been virtually the party's "raison d'être" from its outset. In January, 1987, when the MCM named its five public committees: community development; cultural development; planning, housing and public works; economic development, and administration and finance, some councillors welcomed them as an important first step, but expressed concern that their mandate was not far-reaching enough.¹¹⁹

The committees were responsible for conducting open public consultation in their specific policy areas before any major policy recommendation reached the city's powerful executive committee and then city council. Although this was an improvement over the methods of the past, these committees are not nearly as powerful as those of cities such as Toronto where "nothing is presented to city council before a committee - and citizens - get a stab at it first."¹²⁰ In Toronto, every decision that council makes gets public comment first:

But Montreal's committees won't be like that. They were mandated to develop policy - not screen council items. Nothing binds the committees to let citizens speak about issues like routine zoning changes, the bread-and-butter of public committees in other cities.¹²¹

Jean Panet-Raymond writes that the Overdale affair had exposed these MCM standing committees (sometimes called commissions) as mere consultative mechanisms whose recommendations could easily be ignored by the executive committee. These committees are not allowed to deal with any bylaw of a financial nature and get their mandates from the executive as does the Consultation Bureau which is attached to the general

secretariat of the city. Any city department choosing to conduct public hearings must also get prior approval from the executive and the Bureau.¹²²

Executive committee chairman, Michael Fainstat, defended Montreal's committees claiming that they cannot be as extensive as Toronto's because Montreal has a parliamentary system of government in which power is vested in the executive committee (roughly the equivalent of a cabinet) and city council. The executive committee remains responsible for scrutinizing matters before they reach council and Fainstat argued that he was opposed to establishing another level of decision-making: "We're not trying to slow things down."¹²³ But after hearing that Montreal was supposed to catch up with the democratization of other cities of North America, the committees were disappointing for some Montrealers and their councillors.¹²⁴

Perhaps the most promising mechanisms proposed to achieve the objective of municipal democratization were the District Advisory Committees (DACs). The city was divided into nine districts, each with a neighbourhood advisory committee which, unlike the five public committees, was obliged to hold regular public meetings to discuss such matters as local zoning changes before they went to council. It soon became apparent to many however, that the DACs have very limited jurisdiction, they do not have any decision-making authority, and they seem to have their agendas set by the executive committee as well. Any recommendations from these committees are sent directly to the executive committee for study which one councillor stated "is worrisome in terms of what it says about democracy at city hall."¹²⁵ The DACs' composition is limited to local councillors and Panet-Raymond concludes that:

They are not institutions where people can learn how to wield local power, as one would hope for under true municipal decentralisation...There was no overall information strategy for the population or the people working within the

administration.¹²⁶

For many the final straw was the adoption by the MCM in October of 1989 of what appeared to be an impotent public consultation policy. Wheeland writes that the public hearings for the policy took place with little notice in late summer, and hundreds of recommendations to strengthen the policy were ignored by the city executive committee in its final proposal. "After twelve years of saying that Montréal citizens wanted an open and democratic city hall, the MCM now said Montréalers were not ready for a real decentralisation of power."¹²⁷

Dissent within caucus

The fifth issue, dissent within the MCM caucus, was probably the most fundamental and first made itself evident in the month of June, 1987, when some councillors voiced disapproval in caucus over the city's decision to purchase an \$82,000 Fazioli piano. After some councillors leaked the caucus rift to the press, rules were implemented to enforce caucus "confidentiality."¹²⁸ These rules, which effectively silenced some of the MCM's traditionally vocal councillors, were justified by Michael Fainstat, chairman of the executive committee in the following statement: "There are procedures for expressing dissidence. What happens within the caucus belongs within the caucus."¹²⁹

The issue came to a head when the dissident councillors were ostracised for expressing their disagreements on issues such as Matrox and Overdale in caucus. Dissident councillor Marvin Rotrand stated at the time that:

Like several other caucus members, I have felt a growing mood of intolerance in past months. Some of the statements made in caucus recently by executive committee members have shown a complete lack of respect for minority opinion, and for those

holding these ideas. The atmosphere in caucus has grown unacceptable intemperate...¹³⁰

In addition, many of these dissident councillors also felt that caucus confidentiality was being used strategically to stop them from rallying the population or the MCM membership to oppose certain policies:

Public dissent was only allowed after the caucus had reached a decision, and caucus usually only reached these decisions a few hours before city council went into session on Monday evenings. Thus the right to dissent, as Sam Boskey put it, "only exists between 5:00 and 7:00." The "gang of four" (Boskey, Goyer, Melançon, and Rotrand) were frequently targeted by motions of censure. Every media leak fed the climate of paranoia, and was automatically attributed to the dissidents. In one case, at the instigation of caucus president Sharon Leslie, they even condemned an "anonymous councillor" for having divulged a caucus discussion to the media.¹³¹

Jean-Hugues Roy writes that the municipal "parliamentarism" the MCM sought to introduce had unfortunate side effects the most important of which being the rigid belief on the part of many MCM-ers in what can only be called "the party line." This resulted in hostility being generated towards any councillor who disagreed with what caucus had determined to be "the party line." Roy concludes that "ultimately, for many MCM-ers, it seems the party has replaced citizens as their base of allegiance."¹³²

Late in the summer of 1988, these issues, as well as others, gave rise to the Club Jodoin which was initiated by the dissenting faction (Boskey, Goyer, Melançon, and Rotrand) and included councillors Bennett, Sévigny, and Georgoulis. The Club's meetings usually drew anywhere from ten to thirty participants, many of whom were long-standing MCM activists. Initially the Club was limited to people committed to working for change from within the MCM since some of its members were still actively involved in the party as city councillors and local executive members. Nevertheless other Jodoin participants were community activists who had little faith in the left's ability to return the MCM to its ideological roots and it soon became obvious that the "inside-only" strategy was not

going to work. Divisive debate ensued but events were soon to make the debate moot.¹³³

Fears of oligarchy

In November of 1988, long time MCM councillor, Pierre-Yves Melançon who was to later lead the Democratic Coalition, quit the MCM caucus. Melançon's stiffly worded letter of resignation accused the MCM's six-member executive committee of having corrupted the MCM's dream of greater democracy at city hall. According to Melançon, a few people within the MCM have monopolized and centralized power to almost as great an extent as had the Drapeau/Lamarre administration,

Sous l'administration Drapeau, les porte-paroles du RCM ont dénoncé pendant des années l'hyperconcentration du pouvoir dans les mains de certains membres du Comité exécutif. Votre administration l'a étendu à quelques mains de plus: celles des sept membres du Comité exécutif...Avec le changement de gouvernement municipal le 9 novembre 1986, des gains importants s'annonçaient pour la démocratie. Effectivement, des pas ont été faits, entre autres avec la création des Commissions permanentes du Conseil. La politique-cadre en matière de consultation aurait pu être un autre pas en avant.¹³⁴

Melançon's letter clearly encapsulates the fears of oligarchy that result from the apparent elitism and perverse effects of the crisis management described by Kitschelt's proposition seven. This style of organizational management, which is implemented to arrest political turmoil by focusing power in the hands of those most capable of providing the party with the image of stability, is misunderstood by the ideologues who explain its occurrence as the result of the worst possible motives: those of greed and self-interested political gain. Furthermore, these beliefs reinforce themselves as the dissenting faction attempt to counteract the political style that the party has developed.

In the letter it was clear that Melançon felt the MCM was suffering from oligarchic tendencies that were transforming it into a cadre party. He highlighted his frustration over the time it had taken to put reforms in place and attributed this to the MCM's propensity for placing sensitive issues "under study". In the meantime, groups in need of employment equity (women and visible minorities) were losing valuable jobs and time. For Melançon this stalling was attributable to the MCM's oligarchic tendencies and the fact that it had no intentions of ever implementing reforms, particularly those related to the areas of the environment, culture, and sports and entertainment services.¹³⁵

Les lenteurs de votre administration à mettre en place les réformes majeures que les Montréalais et Montréalaises attendent. Une fois le maquillage enlevé, que reste-t-il des réalisations? Le dossier culturel piétine depuis le début: à quand un sommet sur la culture? et le fonds d'investissement?...Et pour les communautés culturelles? C'est la même chose: des paroles. L'égalité des chances dans l'emploi pour les femmes fait l'objet d'une déclaration annuelle. Où sont les gestes concrets?...En matière de sports et loisirs, rien n'a changé non plus. Quand allons-nous tenter de redresser les inégalités entre les diverses régions?...L'environnement est toujours aussi menacé qu'avant: Montréal continue à déverser ses neiges usées dans le fleuve.¹³⁶

Not only do Melançon's comments speak to causes common to all left-libertarians, they also express powerfully the logic of constituency representation and a need for improvement in the representation of minorities and the under-privileged.

A week after the well-publicized Melançon resignation, a full page article appeared in *The Gazette* echoing many of his sentiments. The article, entitled, "Haunted by promises", argued that despite its promise and many promises, the MCM was frequently accused of some of the Drapeau era's failings. The article noted that the city had approved at least a dozen projects for downtown Montreal in the absence of a master plan, something the MCM had been highly critical of when in opposition. It denounced the MCM for not preserving the Queen's Hotel and one member was quoted as saying that although the MCM is a product of community groups,

popular movements and ordinary people, the present administration is working primarily with the business community.¹³⁷ In her analysis of Jean Doré, Sandro Contenta of *The Toronto Star* concurred with *The Gazette* article's sentiments: "The community and social groups that helped him get elected have become his staunchest critics while the developers and businessmen who feared his coming to power now praise him."¹³⁸

The Gazette article concluded with the following quotation from Concordia University professor, Andy Melamed: "The executive committee of the city has too much power, absolutely, I have a feeling that power does corrupt when you have so many councillors at city hall".¹³⁹ Although they have not been recited to perfection, Melamed's words must certainly sound familiar to those familiar with the work of Robert Michels and his assertions of the inevitability of elitism and oligarchy in political organizations. Furthermore, the behaviour of "the pancakes," Melancon's letter, and the words of Melamed all represent expressions of the fears and tendencies described by proposition eight.

The day after the article appeared in *The Gazette*, a conference was held at the Institut pour une politique alternative de Montréal (JPAM). Not surprisingly, the subject of the conference was, "Le RCM au pouvoir - les deux premières années". Composed largely of social activists, academics and dissenting MCM councillors, the conference noted a growing conservatism and centralization of power within the city government,

The Montreal Citizens' Movement administration has abandoned its social democratic roots by cosying up too much with business interests, a conference...was told yesterday. Mayor Jean Doré spends too much time with big businessmen and not enough time with ordinary people," Harold Chorney, an economics professor at Concordia University, told the conference. "Right now, new ideas are almost automatically treated as threats to be defeated," added Stephen Block, a Concordia professor of community and public affairs and MCM member.¹⁴⁰

These are expressions of the need for improved equity in representation within the MCM.

In his paper presented at the IPAM conference, MCM intellectual Stephen Block also suggested that the MCM was taking on all the trappings of a traditional "cadre-type" party including party discipline and rigid, hierarchical control over policy and the behaviour of its members. Those who resisted or acted independently, were dubbed as dissenting traitors working to the detriment of the party. Block was quick to point out that the liberty to engage in such behaviour politically, used to be the "raison d'être" of the MCM:

New ideas within this party are almost automatically treated as threats to be defeated. The bottom line is that this party is not about a pledge of allegiance. It should be about tolerating differences of opinion which is an idea which must be reintroduced into our political culture. At risk is the party platform and the ideas and jobs of those who most truly support it.¹⁴¹

The logic of constituency representation was making itself heard and its representatives were indeed expressing perceptions of oligarchic tendencies within the MCM.

The exodus and its significance

Furthermore, while the MCM administration and party executive had not seemed perturbed by the lone resignation of Melançon, the subsequent resignations of Boskey, Goyer, and Rotrand on December 21, panicked the administration which initially reacted in an oligarchic fashion by deciding to revoke the MCM memberships of the resigning caucus members. However, faced with a rebellion from the Snowdon, Notre Dame de Grâce (NDG), Mont Royal, and Jean Talon associations, the MCM executive backtracked on the expulsions and agreed to discussions with representatives of the dissident councillors and districts. The ensuing discussions did little to resolve the problems outlined by the councillors but as long as these discussions were going on, many disillusioned activists postponed

more drastic actions until hearing a definitive response. Some believed that this meant holding out until a June meeting of the party's general council, while others were waiting until the bi-annual congress in November of that year.¹⁴² The congresses continued to be perceived as the best way to manage internal dissent.

It is at this point in the MCM's development that we could expect to see the unique organizational form described by proposition nine whereby a compromise is worked out between the logic of constituency representation and the logic of electoral competition. This compromise requires that the logic of electoral competition dominate the party's external strategy with key, high profile members handling all the media work while the party's internal structure remains fluid, open and dominated by the logic of constituency representation. According to this scenario, factionalism would continue to exist within the MCM (managed by the party congresses) while a small group of high profile members would continue to perform as visible decision-makers (Doré, Fainstat).

This scenario indeed came to fruition within the MCM and the party muddled along with it for four long, fractious years between 1986-1990, but the compromise explained by proposition nine proved inadequate and did not last. The game of wait-and-see that had so frustrated the Club Jodoin was finally terminated by Rotrand and Goyer who quit the party on the day of the June meeting of the general council due to the adoption of what they perceived as harsh new caucus rules. Melançon officially severed his ties to the party shortly afterwards while Boskey was to wait until shortly after the MCM fall 1989 congress where seemingly oligarchic anti-dissent rules were defeated, but by too slim a margin for Boskey's liking.¹⁴³ Fellow Club Jodoin member, Arnold Bennett regretted Boskey's move and argues compellingly that Boskey had acted too hastily:

In Boskey's view, the results of the congress were unsatisfactory. He had been "saved by a technicality" rather

than being vindicated by an absolute majority. But what he didn't realise was that a substantial number of delegates had changed their minds after hearing the arguments against giving too much power to the central executive. Despite the departure of all too many veteran activists, new people were emerging who also knew how to think for themselves and who weren't afraid to say no to the party establishment.¹⁴⁴

For Bennett at least, the MCM had not yet succumbed entirely to the logic of electoral competition and judging from the new party recruits, it would not do so in the near future. Nonetheless, with the departure of Boskey the exodus was complete.

During the period following the exodus of the dissident councillors from the MCM, Community Action was created to provide Rotrand, in particular, with a local support group that would facilitate his correspondence with other groups interested in forming a new political party. One such group, Green Montreal, had already been created by long-time municipal activist and former MCM ideologue Dimitrios Roussopoulos. Like Community Action, this group had grown out of the ashes of Club Jodoin and it believed that any new municipal party should be inspired by the Green movement sweeping Europe. Ironically, the Green philosophy and emphasis upon community-based organization was virtually identical to that originally used by the MCM. Consequently it comes as no surprise to learn that the Green philosophy appealed to many of the MCM's disenchanted long-time activists.¹⁴⁵ The saga it seems, had come full circle.

The four dissident councillors were almost immediately opposed to forming a "green" party claiming that the Green label was poorly understood by the Montreal population and would discourage groups such as feminists and pacifists from "signing on" with the new party. Although they recognised that modern Green politics embrace much more than environmental issues, the councillors argued that the name and philosophy of the new party should reflect a "rainbow coalition".¹⁴⁶ Given the appeal of the Green parties in Europe to virtually every form of social

movement, this argument on the part of the councillors was clearly a smokescreen. Wheeland concludes that the real source of the problem was the inability of the councillors to work with Roussopoulos and at one point, Rotrand and Roussopoulos were challenging each other to prove who could mobilise more people for a meeting.¹⁴⁷ The end result was that the councillors distanced themselves from the Green initiative which was renamed Ecology Montréal, and formed a new party of their own, the Democratic Coalition. Roy and Weston conclude their edited work with the following observation of the two new "splinter" parties:

The MCM may well win the 1990 election - though partly by default, given the number of parties on the ballot. But the MCM's fall from grace has been so pronounced that it will have little [sic] to celebrate. It is no dynasty, and Doré, at least in this respect, is no Drapeau. While the Democratic Coalition is promulgating the same principles as the first incarnation of the MCM, the Greens are promoting a substantively new philosophy, and in this sense they too resemble the MCM when it was first formed.¹⁴⁸

The important point to remember from all of this is that instead of continuing to refine the unique organizational form described by proposition nine, the dissenting faction of the MCM ultimately split into a multitude of small, opposition parties. Furthermore, despite their individual political successes in the 1990 election, these former Club Jodoin members and MCM dissidents succeeded only in confusing the Montreal electorate by offering no clear, united opposition leaving the MCM as the only viable political option.

The election was interesting, however, in that it served as a virtual launching pad for MCM splinter groups lending substance to the assertion that the MCM has always been a coalition of a variety of political groups only some of whom could be considered as ideologically motivated. Even Nick Auf der Maur, the candidate with the highest profile in the contemporary version of Drapeau's old Civic Party, was once a

member of the MCM. These occurrences also highlight the past existence of the logic of electoral competition as well as the logic of constituency representation within the same party.

Conclusion

The party's new leader, Jean Doré, was one of the party members pushed to even greater prominence in the manner described by proposition seven and the style of decision making that accompanied his selection matches that described by the proposition as well. As the 1986 election date approached Doré and his strategists made no attempt to focus on ideological concerns and the creation of an alternative policy agenda, preferring instead to concentrate on developing a coherent media strategy that focused criticism on the Civic administration. It also appears that at this point in its development, the MCM was evolving towards the organizational form described by Kitschelt in proposition nine. The diversity of opinion within the party was managed at the party's annual congresses while political entrepreneur, Jean Doré, was thrust into media prominence in order to provide an aura of stability within the MCM that would mask internal ideological inconsistencies and stem any potential slide at the polls. This would explain the decision to implement a negative campaign strategy during the election of 1986.

This type of decision-making, however, was not without its consequences and the factionalism that was to hit the MCM after it came to power in 1986 sustained itself in exactly the manner outlined by proposition eight. Episodes such as Overdale, the Queen's Hotel demolition, and Matrox reinforced the need for a resurgence of the logic of constituency representation and by 1988, the dissenting faction within

the MCM was clearly "fed up" with the logic of electoral competition. This became especially apparent with the well-publicized resignation of Melançon whose stiffly worded letter expressed the fears of oligarchy that result from the apparent elitism and perverse effects of the crisis management described by proposition seven. Furthermore, these sentiments were echoed in various articles in Montreal's English-language media as well by statements made by participants at the IPAM conference.

In proposition nine Kitschelt explains that the normal means of resolving this type of impasse within left-libertarian parties is for there to be a compromise whereby the logic of electoral competition comes to dominate the party's external strategy while the logic of constituency representation sustains itself within the party's internal operations. This scenario did indeed come to fruition within the MCM and the party muddled along with it for four long, fractious years between 1986-1990, but the compromise explained by proposition nine proved inadequate and did not last.

Most importantly, this development within the MCM highlighted an inability for the two logics to co-exist within the same party. This demonstrates a potential flaw in Kitschelt's analysis of left-libertarian parties. Perhaps the real significance of the case of the MCM is that it may effectively serve as a precursor for the left-libertarian parties of Western Europe. Kitschelt is confident that the constituencies that support such parties will remain but his analysis is predicated upon the assumption that they will never grow to a size where they might support more than one party. Should they do so, then perhaps faction within left-libertarian parties will choose not to remain within one dispute-ridden party and instead will form their own political alternatives as was the case with the MCM. Furthermore, although the electoral system and differing institutional arrangements are not variables that Kitschelt

considered to be especially relevant to his analysis, it is important to note that in the Montreal example, the fragmentation of a left-libertarian party occurred even in a "first past the post" electoral system where there are more structural disincentives for such fragmentation than in a system of proportional representation.

Perhaps also, the compromise necessitated by proposition nine will prove unsatisfactory to some European left-libertarians as well and they too will chose to risk political oblivion by forming tiny, insignificant parties of their own rather than adopting more "realistic" politics that would entail the sacrifice of some of their most deeply held principles while enduring increasingly less tolerable circumstances (which may very well prove to have also been the case with the MCM).

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145. Wheeland, 194-195.

146. Wheeland, 194-195.

147. Wheeland, 194-195.

148. Weston and Roy, 215.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERPRETING A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTY

Introduction

Chapter four concludes by recounting the ultimate refusal of the MCM ideologues to patiently co-exist with advocates of the logic of party competition. Consequently, the case of the MCM appears to end with a rejection of the final stage of Kitschelt's analysis. It is important to emphasize, however, that events in the MCM case history which appear anomalous to Kitschelt's analysis, only occur when the party attempts to live the compromise explained by Kitschelt's final proposition. Chapters two, three, and most of four reveal that the predictive record of Kitschelt's developmental framework had been fairly congruent up until this point.

Chapter two establishes that the MCM's origins fit well with propositions one and two of Kitschelt's developmental framework for left-libertarian parties. In a manner consistent with proposition one, the Drapeau administration's unresponsiveness to Montreal's left-libertarian sentiment had indeed resulted in a ground-swell of support for the many diverse, rival political elements that rallied themselves under the banner of the newly-created party: the MCM. Furthermore, the perceived injustice of this unresponsiveness to the legitimate complaints of Montreal's many constituencies opposed to Drapeau, allowed the new party initially to experience considerable electoral support in the 1974 municipal election. This occurrence very much corresponds with Kitschelt's second proposition.

Chapter three demonstrated how closely the MCM's development in its early years resembled Kitschelt's propositions three to six. The diversity of the party's membership did in fact hinder its ability to express coherent policy as described by proposition three. Pragmatists such as Keaton and Auf der Maur moved to fill the void and take matters

into their own hands as predicted by proposition four, and this, in turn, offended party ideologues in a manner consistent with that anticipated by proposition five. The ensuing publicized battle between the pragmatists and the ideologues did indeed result in a decline in electoral support in the 1978 election as envisaged by proposition six. Chapter four reveals that, following the 1978 election, the MCM's history corresponds with Kitschelt's propositions seven and eight. The party experienced resource scarcity, its membership declined, the downward cycle common to organizations in decline was evident, and the MCM responded in a manner consistent with proposition seven. Michael Fainstat and then-newly-selected leader, Jean Doré, intervened and attempted to arrest the MCM's downward slide. A media strategy was implemented and the logic of electoral competition was emphasized.

This, of course, offended MCM ideologues such as Marvin Rotrand, Pierre Goyer, Pierre-Yves Melançon, and Sam Boskey but in the interests of electoral success, these councillors adopted a "wait and see" approach, preferring to allow the MCM a grace period following its electoral success with the hope that it would eventually return to its original mandate. Events such as Overdale, the Queen's Hotel demolition, Matrox and others, suggested otherwise and as these councillors attempted to reverse the MCM's orientation, they encountered resistance from the party executive that considered an external image of unity as vital to the MCM's electoral survival. The top-down imposition of this approach by the executive further reinforced the dissident councillors' fears of oligarchy, just as predicted by proposition eight. It is only at this stage, however, that the MCM's development takes a dramatic turn away from the developmental pattern envisaged by Kitschelt.

As a consequence, the similarity between the case of the MCM and Kitschelt's developmental framework permits speculation that Kitschelt's analysis is far more revealing and methodologically profitable than any based upon the traditional literature concerning political representation.

This chapter will address this suggestion by examining many of the existing analyses of the MCM which apply the assumptions of the traditional literature. The chapter will demonstrate that because of these assumptions, the existing analyses of the MCM are flawed and are less precise than an analysis that incorporates the ideas of Herbert Kitschelt. The chapter will conclude, however, by focusing on the incongruence between Kitschelt's final proposition and the case of the MCM, and it will attempt to modify Kitschelt so as to better explain the value of his thought to the study of political parties.

PART ONE

CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MCM

A Case of Flawed Analysis

The value of Kitschelt's analysis becomes obvious when one examines contemporary analyses of the MCM based on assumptions of the incompatibility and inevitable corruption of movements within political parties. These lead their readers astray. Contemporary analyses argue that the MCM is a classic case demonstrating the incompatibility of the goals of movements and parties as well as the incompatibility of ideological consistency and continued electoral success.

These themes were originally discussed by Robert Michels who, as early as 1915, argued that large scale organizations necessarily become oligarchic even if the oligarchy runs contrary to the ideals and intentions of both leaders and led. As organizations become successful they tend to grow and develop bureaucratic structures that militate against internal democracy largely because real democracy involves the direct participation of all organization members in the process of policy making. Once in a position of dominance, the primary goal of the organizational elite is to maintain its power, even if this goal is detrimental to the organization as a whole.¹

Does this theme not appear to apply perfectly to the case of the MCM? Indeed, were Rotrand, Melançon and the dissenting faction not struggling to re-establish the primary goals of the MCM at the expense of Jean Doré and the leadership faction who were corrupting these goals for their own purposes? Did we not hear continued complaints about the corruption of movement and about oligarchical tendencies that increasingly were alienating and ignoring the party rank and file? The media coverage, the conclusions of the IPAM conference and the proliferation of splinter parties for the 1990 election suggest that this was indeed the case.

As we have seen, various Canadian academics such as Walter Young and Michael Stein have altered and adapted to fit the Canadian context, these themes first touched upon by scholars such as Michels and Maurice Duverger. In his study of the CCF, Walter Young emphasizes the incompatibility between the goals of a "movement" and the goals of a "party". Young attributes the presence of both these elements to the constant internal struggles that occurred and continue to occur within the CCF/NDP. Young concludes that the CCF was unsuccessful as a party due to repeated electoral failures but it was successful as a movement in that it was able to coerce power into enacting many of its proposals for reform.²

Direct parallels can and have been made between Young's arguments and the MCM. Were the "pancakes" not fighting to preserve the goals of the movement against the overwhelming forces of "party" being imported into the MCM by its many new members? Were they not playing the same role as that played by the Waffle wing of the NDP? As chapter four demonstrates, *Gazette* analyst, Lewis Harris certainly thought so.

In his analysis of the Social Credit in Quebec, Stein sets forth a developmental framework to help explain the evolution of protest movements into political parties. He argues that sociopolitical movements "evolve through a number of different phases that correspond to changing leadership styles and strategies of action."³ The first is the mobilization phase dominated by prophets or men of words who are skilled

in the task of proselytization. The second is the consolidation phase directed by brilliant propagandists and skilful organizers. The third is the institutionalization phase which is engineered by shrewd political pragmatists who wish to transform the movement into a conventional political party.⁴

Of all frameworks excluding Kitschelt's, Stein's seems to best fit the case of the MCM. Could it not be argued that the MCM's experiences between the years of 1974-1978 represent the mobilization phase dominated by prophets and ideological concerns, the years of 1978-1986 represent the consolidation phase during which the MCM was dominated by organizers who transformed it into a successful electoral machine at the expense of ideology, while the period since its rise to power in 1986 represents the consolidation phase in which factionalism (the "pancakes" and the Melançon resignation) arose in response to increased institutionalization and the formalization of the structures of decision-making?

The ideas and themes of Michels, Young, and Stein all seem at first, to fit very well with the historical development of the MCM. In an article published in the journal, *Chroniques* in 1976, Céline Saint-Pierre wrote that the successful election of 1974 and the feasibility of future electoral success transformed the goals of the MCM and in the process, transformed it from a movement to a party:

Les origines du RCM font de lui un regroupement de tous les citoyens progressistes, conscients de l'urgence d'intervenir dans la redéfinition des politiques urbaines. La mobilisation autour de la politique municipale a été l'un des premiers soucis du RCM. Une fois, cette mobilisation assurée, il fallait la maintenir sur une base plus solide et se donner des structures minimales pour y arriver. Par ailleurs, l'élection de 18 conseillers municipaux posa le problème du rapport entre le travail parlementaire et l'action militante dans les districts. Le rassemblement devenait un parti municipal... Pour les uns, le travail prioritaire est celui du travail parlementaire, de la mobilisation massive des électeurs sur un programme minimal en vue du renversement le plus vite possible dans le temps du gouvernement Drapeau. Ils préconisent donc des positions modérées, évoquent la peur du socialisme...⁵

Yet Saint-Pierre fails to explain how the members of the MCM first allowed and then tolerated such a dramatic occurrence in such a short period of

time. If they were, for the most part, a "movement," surely much remains to be explained.

Indeed, the successful application of any analysis asserting that the MCM is a corrupted movement is contingent upon three major and very disputable suppositions. First, such an application assumes that the MCM was predominantly an ideologically-based "movement" to begin with and was subsequently transformed into a pragmatic political party. Secondly, such an application has to accept that the "pancakes", Melançon and the people attending the IPAM conference, were legitimate representatives for the original goals of the "movement". And thirdly, such an application assumes that the original goals of the "movement" were altered and ignored during the period that the MCM held power.

If these dissident MCM councillors spoke for the ideological interests of the party, they also spoke for a very small minority and out of 58 councillors at city hall, only a small minority made up the dissident faction (estimates ranged from 4 to 11 depending on the source). Furthermore, despite the fact that the IPAM conference and its negative message received extensive newspaper and television coverage, it consisted of mostly dissident councillors and managed to only half fill a small lecture hall.

Gazette analyst, Lewis Harris, has argued that this small minority was simply defending and attempting to prevent any dilution of the MCM's guiding principles during a time of tremendous membership growth. For this to be the case, however, the MCM would have had to have magically "congealed" ideologically during two very specific years of its existence. Furthermore, such a scenario would necessarily have to ignore the first years of the MCM's existence when the heterogeneity of its membership was its defining feature. Ironically, the two year period between 1976-1978 was the only time during the MCM's entire fourteen years of existence that it ever came close to possessing any kind of ideological consistency.

History does not lend itself very well to Harris' explanation.

Indeed, IPAM contributor, Stephen Schecter has already been quoted as saying that "the electoralist mentality has always been strong in the party, making itself felt in diverse ways" and during the years of 1978-1986 it surely must have been evident to all, that the MCM had adopted a strategy that emphasized the goal of electoral success. This was made evident by the influx of administrators, managers and business people into its ranks⁶, by Jean Doré's denials of the existence of socialism within the party and by the progressive dilution of the party platform. This seemingly contradicts Young's statement that "Socialists belong to movements, capitalists support parties."⁷ Both, it seems, were part of the MCM for an extended period of time.

However, these occurrences are only contradictory if we accept Young's assumption as well as that of the traditional literature that "movement" and "party" constituencies simply cannot tolerate each other let alone co-exist within the same organizational structure. If we adopt Kitschelt's theories and reconsider the MCM as a left-libertarian party, then such occurrences simply demonstrate the ongoing struggles that occur within such parties between the logic of constituency representation and the logic of electoral competition.

Can the MCM truly be considered solely as a "movement"? It is interesting to recall Young's distinction between movements and parties,

A movement is "a group venture extending beyond a local community or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in thought, behaviour, and social relationships." A movement seeks fundamental change and may or may not use political means to achieve it; a party seeks power for its leaders through electoral success. Its leaders may or may not then use this power to achieve goals similar in nature to those sought by a movement; and it is customary for party leaders to use their power in such a way as to ensure their continuance in office, even if this means ignoring or perverting their goals. Movements cling to ideals, avoid any shift or dilution of principles. Losing an election shakes a party, for this is the measure of its validity, its criterion of excellence. The validity of a movement, however, is contained in its ideology. Failure to make converts does not alter or diminish the rightness of the cause...⁸

The MCM's first two years of existence and especially its development during the years of 1978-1986, clearly exclude it from Young's definition

of "movement" and place it firmly in the parameters of "party". Yet as Lustiger-Thaler, Hamel, and the data in Table 9 have shown, the "movement" constituencies remained loyal to the MCM thus contradicting any assertion to the affect that socialists belong only to movements while capitalists belong to parties.

Furthermore, it has to be wondered whether it remains possible to apply the theories of Michels, Young, and Stein to the MCM. All of these writers deal with the invariable decline in a party's emphasis on ideology when faced with real power and electoral success. Either oligarchy or an emphasis on regaining power is inevitable, and the party organization becomes an end in itself and replaces all other goals, or, "institutionalization" necessitates that parties deal with the greater task of ensuring societal peace.⁹ In any case, goals are either corrupted, transformed, weakened, or ignored. Yet in the case of the MCM no such inaction or transformation of values occurred. The emphasis upon electoral success at the expense of all other concerns was solidly present during its beginnings and throughout its subsequent development as was the ideological emphasis.

There are only contradictions if we assume an incompatibility between the logic of electoral competition and the logic of constituency representation. Given such assumptions, the actions of the "pancakes" then become contradictory and hypocritical. If they were truly representatives of movement constituencies and advocates of the logic of constituency representation, how then could they have tolerated the increased dominance of the "electoralist mentality" and all the transformations within the MCM over its history?

Indeed the fairness of equating the MCM dissenters with ideological purity and likening them to the NDP "waffles" must also then be questioned. Given the continual "softening" of policy and given the mayor's pragmatism and denials of socialism, how could the MCM dissenters explain their constant adherence to the party over the course of fourteen

years? Could they continue to carry the banner of "ideological purity" given the fact that at the 1986, party general council where two of the MCM's core platform proposals were dropped, only one delegate complained that the decision "smacked of electoral opportunism."?¹⁰ There were at least four "pancakes".

Perhaps the dissenting faction never perceived the "electoral opportunism" within the MCM? The explanation is unlikely, especially given Léonard and Léveillé's previously cited observation that "even though all was going their way, the MCM backed down even further from where it had withdrawn already - surely a very ominous sign for the future."¹¹ Clearly other explanations are required. Why, for example, did the dissident faction wait until after the MCM's long awaited electoral victory to launch their assault? Indeed, the NDP Waffle waged their battle long before any improvement in the electoral standing of their party. Although there is probably some truth to the argument that because of ideological distance, the MCM dissenters were unable to relocate themselves within existing alternative political organizations, why then, did they not choose sooner to form their own opposition party or parties as had the MCM pragmatists Keaton and Auf der Maur many years earlier when the ideologues dominated the party and the pragmatists represented the party dissenters?

The actions of the "pancake" only become fully understandable if one resorts back to the theories of Kitschelt. It then becomes possible to suggest that the pancake had witnessed the ebbs and flows of the ongoing struggle between the logic of constituency representation and the logic of constituency representation and were simply biding their time. They had had their moments of dominance and although the logic of electoral competition was currently the most influential, it would eventually subside and the logic of constituency representation would once again rise to prominence and its advocates would once again dominate the MCM. It was only with the realization or perception that such a reversal in fortunes

was never going to occur, that the "pancake" gave up and formed its own political alternatives. Such an occurrence is consistent with the behaviour of MCM dissident councillor, Sam Boskey described in chapter four.

PART TWO

Modifying Kitschelt

Kitschelt's analysis is able to account for the development of the MCM better than analyses rooted in the traditional literature, but the case of the MCM demonstrates that even Kitschelt's analysis has its faults. For example, Kitschelt concludes his analysis of left-libertarian parties by having them work out a very precarious compromise arrangement whereby the logic of electoral competition dominates these parties' external strategies while their internal organization is primarily influenced by the logic of constituency representation (See proposition nine).

In the case of the MCM, this compromise did not suffice and many of the ideologues from the movement constituencies who tended to best represent the logic of constituency representation within the party, eventually gave up on the future viability of the organization as a means of achieving their goals or representing their causes. Although they struggled in earnest to successfully co-exist with the pragmatists and the logic of electoral competition, perhaps they came to the realization that ultimately such logic will always come to dominate political parties despite the growing need for organizations to represent the alternative logic. Therefore it seems that the solution or compromise between the two logics described by Kitschelt is a very tenuous one capable of self-destructing at any moment as was the case with the MCM. This thesis has shown that the MCM is or was a left-libertarian party as described by Kitschelt and it suggests that surely many other such parties run the risk

of experiencing similar outcomes.

Kitschelt acknowledges this precariousness and argues that more of a "realist" political perspective is required on the part of ideologues within left-libertarian parties. He recommends that left-libertarian parties:

...maintain an informal, fluid party structure but enhance the authority of political entrepreneurs over crucial decisions and increase their political visibility and responsibility. In practice, the fluid, decentralized ecology parties have already accommodated to a certain personalization of political power. Yet this study has shown that for many militants political entrepreneurs are also the villains, the shadowy figures who bring about the perverse effects that undermine intraparty democracy. What would be needed...then, is less a structural and strategic transformation than a conscious recognition of the importance of political entrepreneurs. The militants would have to subscribe to a new democratic theory to legitimize the factual rather than the idealized difference of ecology parties from their conventional competitors.¹²

Kitschelt seems to be calling for a realization on the part of the ideologues, of the importance the high-profile entrepreneurs play within left-libertarian parties. Indeed, it is often these entrepreneurs who garner these parties enough political success that they are able to create policy when they are in power, and to influence policy if they are recognized as a legitimate opposition.

This has certainly been the case with the MCM. Assessing its years in opposition from 1974-84, Ingrid Peritz observed that the MCM had a powerful influence on both the policy and process of Montreal's municipal government during the ten-year period. With respect to process, Peritz noted that when the MCM first attended council meetings in 1974, citizens and councillors had no forum in which seriously to question the administration on important issues. By 1984 they had obtained a half-hour councillors' question period before each meeting and citizens could address questions in writing. In 1974, only an internal auditor examined city hall's books behind closed doors yet by 1984, procedure called for an independent auditor to submit a public annual report scrutinizing the administration's operations.¹³

When the MCM first elected councillors to city hall, there were only

four meetings a year which were called at the mayor's discretion and which lasted no more than one night each. Ten years later there were a minimum of ten meetings a year the most contentious of which could last as long as two weeks. Peritz also noted that after ten long years of lobbying the MCM had also obtained a budget from the Quebec government for secretarial and research staff for opposition parties. When Drapeau refused them office space in city hall, they rented an office a few blocks away.¹⁴ Finally, with respect to the MCM's impact on municipal policy during the period, Peritz concluded that:

The MCM, along with vocal community groups, can also share credit for improving the face of Montreal over the past decade: housing renovations have replaced rampant demolitions that scarred central city neighborhoods in the 1970s. Beautification programs have transformed nondescript areas into well-lit back lanes and mini-parks. Bicycle paths and pedestrian malls line city streets where cars once dominated.¹⁵

More recently, Jean Doré responded to accusations of political pragmatism by claiming that he had lived up to his promises and his party's ideological tradition during the MCM's first mandate. Doré observed that his administration had enacted a policy that will see 50,000 public housing units built in a decade while only 25,000 such units were built during the last 20 years of Drapeau reign. Doré noted that his administration had steadfastly maintained a ban on the conversion of rental housing into condominiums and had implemented the city's first official plan to prevent the kind of uncontrolled development allowed by Drapeau.¹⁶

Most importantly, argued Doré, the MCM had indeed delivered on promises to make city hall more democratic. While Drapeau used city council as a rubber stamp for his schemes, Doré pointed out that he decentralized power by establishing standing committees. He also set up district advisory committees at which residents discuss local concerns and forward them to council. But perhaps the most democratic reform was the public question period Doré established at the beginning of council

meetings, at which everything from pot holes to taxes can be discussed.¹⁷ Consider the following description of how the question period is currently being used by Montrealers:

A rock musician shows up with his guitar and sings his question; a multiple sclerosis patient in a wheelchair, unable to speak, types his query. There are question-period regulars - cyclists seeking more bike paths and street artists seeking fewer hassles from the police - and mass turnouts for issues like property taxes and flood damage.¹⁸

There is little doubt that question period has certainly transformed the image if not the practice of city hall since the Drapeau era when public involvement was all but non-existent. Seventy-seven year-old retiree, Blanche Gélinas, reinforced this observation when explaining why she had used the question period: "I went because it's democratic now at city hall. Before we couldn't talk, we could only listen."¹⁹ Similarly, Ann Rajan, a translator from Notre Dame de Grâce, made the following comparison between a city hall run by Jean Drapeau and the Doré-styled city hall:

When I used to walk up the street to go into city hall I used to cringe - it was a big, imposing building, and you could almost feel the powers-that-be emanating from it. Now it's real exciting - it's become a real political marketplace. You never know who's going to be there.²⁰

Long time MCM activist and Club Jodoin member, Arnold Bennett, seems to support Kitschelt's conclusion that ideologues within left-libertarian parties must adopt a greater sense of proportion and realize the long-term policy rewards that can be gained by acknowledging and appreciating the role played by political entrepreneurs (such as Jean Doré) within such parties. Bennett enunciated his convictions to this effect in an article he wrote to justify why he remained within the MCM rather than joining his friends and fellow Club Jodoin members. Bennett believes that his friends had acted too quickly and were unrealistic in their expectations for the MCM. He argues persuasively that with time, the organization will right itself and prove to be effective at enacting social reform. In support of

this argument Bennett observes that even the central executive's controversial attempt to disallow the dissident members from remaining within the party was defeated by the MCM membership and "It was more important to ensure that the party remain true to its decentralist roots, even if there were lapses by certain individuals."²¹

Bennett cites many developments within the MCM and its policy which he felt demonstrated that ultimately, the party would prove effective at enacting many of the goals desired by his overly impatient, activist friends. For example, Bennett applauds the creation of the city-owned corporation, SHDM, which was mandated to acquire 12,000 dwellings from the private sector over a ten year period, 2,400 by the end of 1990. These buildings were to then be operated as non-profit housing, and would eventually be turned over to a tenant co-operative or a community-run, non-profit organization. Even before the article was written, the SHDM had managed to acquire fourteen such units on the Anderson Street block of Montreal's Chinatown and Bennett argues that:

Although absolute consensus has not yet been reached, Anderson could turn out to be what Overdale should have been and wasn't - a project that maintains the social and architectural fabric of one of the downtown core's last enclaves of low-rent housing and artistic creation.²²

With respect to the issue of protecting heritage buildings from demolition, Bennett identifies key amendments to the city charter in June, 1988, which permit the City to crack down on landlords who allow residential and commercial buildings to deteriorate. Fines for non-compliance range from \$1,000 to \$20,000 on the first offence and from \$2,000 to \$40,000 on any subsequent infraction. Bennett concludes that had the City possessed this power earlier, it might have been possible to save the Queen's Hotel before it "passed the point of no return."²³

Bennett also notes that a new bylaw allows the City of Montreal discretionary power to refuse to grant commercial conversion permits and each approval has to be submitted to the appropriate district advisory

council (DAC) for public study.²⁴ He vehemently disagrees with the "pancakes'" attacks upon the legitimacy of the DACs and with their attempts to characterize the DACs as nothing more than a "sham and a facade" because they lacked decision-making powers. Bennett argues:

But on this point they were wrong. Though the DACs were a long way from true neighbourhood councils, could only recommend, and were hedged with unacceptable restrictions, they were a formidable consciousness-raising tool. Citizens could do more than merely ask questions or submit petitions at the DAC meetings; they could file *requêtes* that local councillors then had to debate publicly. Community groups quickly learned how to use this request procedure to focus debate on their issues, such as the demand for more public housing in Côte des Neiges. Individuals also used *requêtes* to cut through red tape, and force a quick resolution of problems that otherwise would have been left on the bureaucratic back-burner.²⁵

Thus for Bennett, the long struggle for social change was being won through continued involvement with the MCM and the ability to influence the formation of its policy. Time and patience had allowed for the creation of means to prevent future "Overdales" or "Queen's Hotels" and even the DACs were proving more effective than originally expected. As a consequence, it is Bennett's belief that the dissident councillors or "pancakes" were unrealistic in their demands and had acted too hastily. They should have broadened their perspectives to allow for the realization that in order to win the war, one must lose a few battles along the way.

Similarly, at the IPAM conference, journalist Jean Luc Bastien seemed to concur with Bennett when he made the following observation about the MCM dissidents:

What you'll be hearing today is the difference between the executive and legislative parts of the party - those who have power and those who want it. Today they (dissident wing) will be demanding perfection, but in reality they (MCM executive) have not been that bad.²⁶

Jean Luc Bastien and Bennett seem to concur with Kitschelt that what is required is a broader, more realistic perspective on the part of the MCM dissident ideologues. Indeed, many analysts of the MCM's first mandate concur that although the pace of reform was much slower than many

activists would have liked, the MCM did allow more citizens to be consulted in decision-making at city hall.²⁷

MCM councillor, Sharon Leslie, argues that the attitudes and behaviour of Montreal's citizen's groups and their leaders have contributed to the slow pace of reform on the part of the MCM. Therefore the MCM executive is not solely to blame for the frustration felt by those in the party who advocated the logic of constituency representation. Leslie points out that when the MCM came to power, many citizen's groups assumed that their difficulties had magically ended and assumed that they no longer needed to lobby for their voices to be heard. She argues that in order for the MCM to substantiate their demands to the provincial government, they require continued lobbying efforts from the many groups they are trying to defend. Leslie also notes that the MCM has had to fight a difficult bureaucratic battle:

What has to be remembered is that when we came to power the system had been working the same way for 25 years during which it developed a solid, distinctive attitude and style...People were not used to taking initiative, they had never had to listen to citizens but rather to the administration. When we came to power only a handful of them retired...We are talking about the 12,500 employees of the city, the city workers. This is a huge massive ship and we are a little tug boat trying to turn it around. This is not an easy process and I often find myself getting frustrated when I still run into blocks in services.²⁸

Both Leslie and Michael Fainstat, former Chairman of the MCM Executive Committee argue that the dissident councillors have generated false impressions through the media. Fainstat asserts that the MCM leadership have run an extremely "open" party and as evidence he points to the fact that they have actually decentralized power and decision-making and "have established a vast network of city offices and 12 mini-city councils across Montreal."²⁹ Fainstat notes that "We have a party system in Montreal, based on a parliamentary system. The executive committee is part of that system. But all decisions are made by council."³⁰ Leslie concurs and adds,

We created working committees of caucus essentially linked to city council. They all include a member of the executive committee and there are political working groups. They meet twice a month or sometimes more often depending the number of dossiers. They were created so council could be more involved with the development of policy, they exist, they function, they work and they are a way for the executive committee to test out ideas with us, to solicit our input. I'm responding to their claims that councillors don't have a voice. They have the opportunity if they choose to show up and participate or not.³¹

The conclusion of these partisan sources is that the "pancakes" were able to assist in MCM decision-making should they have so desired, hence, their accusations of oligarchy are unfounded.

By September 1989, the parliamentary wing of the MCM could be heard praising the party's administrative work and it released a document stating: "Nous constituons certainement la meilleure administration que la Ville ait jamais eue."³² Just prior to the 1990 municipal election in Montreal, the president of the Conseil du patronat, Ghislain Dufour, made the following evaluation of the MCM: "Il n'y a pas eu de bavures sur les plans fiscal, économique et financier, ni de grands scandales,"³³ while Nycol Pageau-Goyette, president of la Chambre de commerce du Montréal métropolitain, emphasized the MCM's administrative talents during its first mandate and how the administration had removed the pessimism surrounding municipal government during the Drapeau era:

Au cours des deux premières années, de dire Mme Pageau-Goyette, ils ont fait le ménage et rajeuni la bureaucratie. Cela s'imposait même si des dossiers ont été laissés pour compte. "Ils n'avaient pas d'assises dans la communauté des affaires et il leur a fallu établir leur crédibilité, se rapprocher," ajoute-t-elle. "Leur ouverture nous a surpris. Il n'était pas nécessaire d'envoyer un document de trois pouces d'épais. On pouvait communiquer par téléphone et ils nous écoutaient... Il faut se souvenir, dit-elle, de la fin de l'ère Drapeau, alors que Montréal baignait dans la morosité et le pessimisme. "On sent maintenant un dynamisme et le RCM fait partie du mouvement, même s'il y a peut-être été entraîné par le milieu."³⁴

In addition, when the MCM took power, long-standing disputes with municipal unions were resolved to the satisfaction of all parties for the first time in many years. Administrative reforms were enacted that

reduced the number of middle-management positions and more responsibilities were passed down the chain of command.³⁵ Even the MCM's most disenchanted dissident councillor, Marvin Rotrand, had to admit that the MCM's model of administration was "more enlightened than the previous administration" and although he was not overjoyed with its new master policy on consultation, he had to admit that the MCM had created "another tool of good management."³⁶

In light of these observations as well as those of Arnold Bennett and Jean Luc Bastien, it can logically be suggested that perhaps the most serious threat to the continued existence of left-libertarian parties is the unrealistic idealism of party ideologues. The behaviour of these dissident ideologues was perhaps best explained by Raymond Hudon when he cites Biarez's comment that "organization circulates a commitment whose realization is constantly postponed." Hudon argues that it is for this reason that those who expect the most from political parties, are those who often feel the most betrayed when they obtain power.³⁷

The question remains however, to what extent should these ideologues restrain themselves and abide by the logic of electoral competition? Certainly not to the point where their goals and agendas get postponed indefinitely as was or appeared to be the case with the MCM. Indeed, during the era of the MCM's existence when the party ideologues most feared the possibility of oligarchy, one such ideologue, Stephen Block wrote:

The executive committee would like us to believe that the requirements of everyday practical politics leaves far less latitude for the implementation of many basic MCM policies. Perhaps. But this does not explain all or very much. For these reasons many councillors are facing a dilemma: to resign or remain within the party. Resigning signifies a triumph for the executive committee and its clique of loyal insiders.³⁸

Such sentiments are even more explicitly stated by dissident councillor Pierre Bastien in his letter outlining his reasons for resigning from the MCM:

Soon after the election (1986), I watched many longtime MCM activists leave, and some more recent ones; all of whom, I am sure, still share the same political convictions, but who think that our administration has renounced its principles. I remember having tried to explain to them the constraints of power, and the compromises necessary to exercise it. I was unable to convince many. Now I can say that I no longer find you convincing. For me, power was the means to realise the MCM programme. For you, the MCM was the means to exercise power. You have thrown from your path all that could compromise this power or question the rightness of your quest. Since 1989, and the nearing of the electoral deadline, MCM councillors have had to close ranks behind you, and present an image of solidarity, if they wish to hold on to their seat. This permits you to sit comfortably on your power base. You take advantage of this to clean house, separating not only those who do not roll over on command, but those who are not faithful at all times..."

Clearly Bastien, like Boskey, was aware of the need to be "realistic" and to compromise ideological rigidity in the interests of future policy rewards. But like Boskey and the other dissidents, Bastien's letter expresses the belief that he has been obliged to compromise his beliefs to a far greater extent than his own sense of "realism" allowed.

According to Kitschelt, in the interests of organizational survival, ideologues in left-libertarian parties are expected to absorb, endure, and smother their idealism. But Kitschelt never establishes to what extent they must do so. How should they behave when a left-libertarian party receives positive scores from measurements of public opinion but continues to shy away from enacting some its core policy proposals? Can a tacitly accepted intellectual line be established to demarcate at what point the logic of electoral competition has gone too far? And if so, what should be done to solve dilemma's such as the one experienced by Block, Pierre Bastien, and the MCM ideological wing?

Kitschelt does not specify and in his conclusion he begins to sound like an apologist for the dominance of the logic of electoral competition and calls for perhaps too much restraint on the part of those advocating an alternative logic. Consequently, in his desire to prove the existence of a new form of political party that contradicts traditional analysis, Kitschelt has overextended his own analysis by placing the goal of organizational survival over and above the representational needs of

various important and growing constituencies.

Kitschelt's contribution and the case of the MCM

For scholars concerned with the study of political parties, the case of the MCM at first, seems to confirm Kitschelt's assertion that he has identified a new form of political representation in left-libertarian parties whose uniqueness can be found in the attempts on the part of their members to merge the logic of constituency representation with the logic of electoral competition: a task considered impossible by all previous scholarly examination of political parties in both the Canadian and international contexts. Indeed, the most influential studies of Canadian political representation such as those by Walter Young and Michael Stein assume an incompatibility between the logic of constituency representation that dominates social movements, and the logic of electoral competition present in all political parties. They argue that ideas begin with political movements, but with increased organization and the evolution of political parties out of these movements, the original ideas become altered or corrupted by the organizational need for electoral success.

It is apparent that Young and Stein have been influenced by the work of classical theorist, Robert Michels and his assumption that all political formation begins with ideas but inevitably culminates in oligarchy because of the increased bureaucratization of ideas within political parties and because of the overwhelming need on the part of these organizations to perpetuate themselves. Kitschelt feels that his principal theoretical contribution to the literature concerning political parties and political representation has been to refute Michels and his belief in the inevitability of the dominance of electoral opportunism and then oligarchy within political parties.

The case of the MCM shows, however, that Kitschelt errs in claiming that the co-existence of the logic of electoral competition and the logic

of constituency representation within left-libertarian parties disproves Michels and the traditional literature. Indeed, the MCM case suggests that Kitschelt has been too quick to assume that the ecological parties of Western Europe will continue to be successful at merging the two logics within the same institutional structure. It is very possible that these other left-libertarian parties will self-destruct in a manner similar to the MCM thus reaffirming the assertions of the traditional literature that the two logics cannot co-exist and ultimately, the logic of electoral competition or some form of oligarchy will always come to dominate political parties if they are to sustain themselves beyond the moment of their creation.

Kitschelt has indeed discovered a new form of political representation in the left-libertarian parties but they are not unique for the reasons claimed by their discoverer. Their uniqueness lies not in the incorrect belief that they defy the developmental patterns for political parties outlined by Michels and the classical literature, but rather in their vigorous and painful attempts to postpone such developments. For example, consider the dilemmas experienced by Marvin Rotrand, Pierre Goyer, Pierre-Yves Melançon and especially Sam Boskey, and consider the frustration so evident in their letters of resignation. Consider also the frustration on the part of people such as Michael Fainstat, Sharon Leslie or Arnold Bennett who had to endure the consequences of what they perceived to be misguided behaviour on the part of the dissident councillors within their party. Left-libertarian parties, it would seem, go the way of all parties, but they take longer to do so. This certainly appears to be the lesson of the MCM and only continued identification and examination of other left-libertarian parties will deny or confirm these suspicions.

The case of the MCM is also of importance for libertarians and for students of municipal politics due to the fact that for many people concerned with enacting social change at the grassroots level, municipal

government may at first appear to be a logical venue for pursuing their goals. However, the unsuccessful attempts to affect structural and social change at the local level in other parts of Canada led many libertarian activists to view Montreal as the last remaining opportunity to establish municipal parties as legitimate vehicles for the expression of "grassroots" or community concerns. Indeed, although the Winnipeg and Vancouver experiences had been disappointing, the continued existence of libertarian sentiment in the Montreal context and its embodiment in the MCM made this city's municipal government one of the most likely cites for a libertarian breakthrough in municipal party politics.

The case of the MCM suggests, however, that parties will always become preoccupied with organizational success (re-election) to the detriment of the logic of constituency representation, even in the most unlikely of circumstances. Indeed, Montreal was an area of considerable libertarian sentiment and municipal politics seemed the level of government closest to the people and therefore the one most subject to their control. Yet even in this very promising context, libertarian sentiment and the logic of constituency representation have been so thwarted by the logic of electoral competition that their advocates have experienced considerable if not overwhelming levels of frustration.

The only event to inspire optimism on the part of Montreal's left-libertarian constituency was the period of protest that surrounded a controversial proposal to build a concert hall on McGill College Avenue in downtown Montreal. The project involved a very large expenditure of capital and was favoured by every level of government that was connected with it, yet despite these normally unstoppable forces, the project was thwarted. One *Gazette* editorialist argues that the project was halted not only because it raised the ire of Montreal's influential business community as well as heritage and social groups, but also because these groups chose to ignore the institutionalized processes of interest aggregation and articulation offered by the city's municipal government

and instead, held their own non-governmental hearings on the scheme.⁴⁰

Many social movement theorists suggest that the politics of the next century will reflect the McGill College experience and increasingly, people will direct their activism towards more promising areas of political representation than the political party. Eventually, policy initiatives emanating from the political discourse of localities connected internationally by issue will supersede policy debate within political parties as the principal source of ideas driving political change. One such theorist, Warren Magnusson, argues that politically concerned citizens cannot help but eventually realize the futility of activism imbedded within the institutional confines of governments and political parties. Magnusson observes that the greatest and most significant political changes that he has witnessed in his lifetime involve transformations in societal attitudes regarding the environment and regarding the position of women in society. For Magnusson, these changes have occurred not as a result of the efforts of governments and political parties, but in spite of them. While "the state," its government and political parties are constrained by diplomacy, ideological parameters and "brokerage politics," activists that are not connected with "the state" are not constrained in such a manner and will be increasingly more able to deal with the urgent, and at times overwhelming, problems of our world.⁴¹

What has to be wondered is whether or not Montrealers will make similar observations regarding political change within their own context. The most important incident in the last decade of Montreal politics - the McGill College Avenue incident - suggests that Montrealers, like the much of the rest of the Western world, are learning through experience that political parties, even those closest to the people, are becoming a less important vehicle for political change.

It is possible to conclude, then, that the entire Montreal experience lends further credence to claims that the political party is not the most effective vehicle for enacting social change originating from

the "grassroots" elements of any political community. Its successes have been limited even in the most promising of circumstances. Therefore, rather than involving themselves in party politics of any form, a more feasible plan of action for people seeking libertarian social change would be to attempt to influence political discourse either through direct personal activism, involvement in social movements, or any other methods capable of "de-centring" the state.

NOTES

1. See Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, first published 1915, reprinted 1949), pp.393-425.
2. See W. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
3. Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: a political analysis of Social Credit in Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 237-238.
4. Stein, 237-238.
5. Céline Saint-Pierre, "Le socialisme est difficile au RCM," Chroniques (mars, 1976): 76-77.
6. Jean-François Léonard et Jacques Léveillé, "PCM et RCM: Y a-t-il un socialiste dans la salle," Le Devoir (Montréal), 18 octobre 1986, p.A10.
7. Young, 3.
8. Young, 4.
9. See Raymond Hudon, "The Parti Québécois in Power: Institutionalization, Crisis Management and Decline," in Hugh Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada 5th ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985), 220-234.
10. Lewis Harris, "MCM puts radical planks of platform on hold," The Gazette (Montreal), March 12, 1987, B4.
11. Jean François Léonard and Jacques Léveillé, Montreal After Drapeau, (Montreal: Black Rose Books Ltd., 1986), 27.
12. Herbert Kitschelt, The Logics of Party Formation (London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 299.
13. Ingrid Peritz, "MCM losing radical tinge after 10 years at city hall," The Gazette (Montreal), October 13, 1984, p.B5.
14. Peritz, "MCM losing radical tinge...", p.B5.
15. Peritz, "MCM losing radical tinge...", p.B5.
16. Sandro Contenta, "Shine is off Montreal's reform mayor," The Toronto Star, October 28, 1990, p.B4.

17. Contenta, p.B4.
18. Ingrid Peritz, "Democracy at city hall: it's there for the asking," The Gazette (Montreal), September 25, 1987, p.A3.
19. Peritz, "Democracy at city hall...", p.A3.
20. Peritz, "Democracy at city hall...", p.A3.
21. Arnold Bennett, "Dissent - Why I Stayed in the MCM," in Brendon Weston & Jean-Hugues Roy, eds., Montréal: A Citizen's Guide to City Politics (Montréal: Black Rose Books Ltd., 1990), 178.
22. Bennett, 173.
23. Bennett, 174.
24. Bennett, 175.
25. Bennett, 169.
26. Jean Luc Bastien, reporter for *Le Soleil*, interview by author, tape recording, Institut pour une politique alternative de Montreal, Montreal, 12 November 1988.
27. Weston and Roy, 2.
28. Sharon Leslie, President, MCM Caucus and Councillor for the Loyola District, interview by author, tape recording, City Hall, Montreal, 18 November 1988.
29. Michael Fainstat, quoted in Malcolm McLean, "We will be severe," MTL, (December 1988): 34.
30. Harris, "Poll proves MCM as popular as ever..."
31. Sharon Leslie, President, MCM Caucus and Councillor for the Loyola District, interview by author, Tape recording, City Hall, Montreal, 18 November 1988.
32. Agnes Gruda, "La <<quête du pouvoir>> doit primer le <<travail administratif>> en 90 <<Nous constituons certainement le meilleure administration que la Ville ait jamais eue>>, soutient un document du RCM," La Presse (Montreal), 20 septembre 1989, p.A6.
33. Gilles Gauthier, "Le monde des affaires accorde une note de sept sur dix à l'administration Doré," La Presse (Montréal), 3 novembre 1990, p.G1.

34. Gilles Gauthier, "Le monde des affaires accorde une note de sept sur dix à l'administration Doré," La Presse (Montréal), 3 novembre 1990, p.G1.
35. Bennett, 170.
36. Marvin Rotrand, quoted in "Resignations - MCM Councillors' Letters," in Weston and Roy eds., 158.
37. Raymond Hudon, "The Parti Québécois in Power," in Hugh G. Thorburn ed., Party Politics in Canada, 5th edition, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985), 229.
38. Stephen Block, "The MCM Party Insiders and the Recall Vote," A paper presented at a conference of the Institut pour une politique alternative de Montréal, Montreal, November 1988, p.2.
39. Pierre Bastien, "Resignations: MCM Councillors' Letters" in Weston and Roy eds., 160-161.
40. "No more lip service on reforms," The Gazette (Montreal), January 27, 1993, p.B2.
41. Warren Magnusson, "Critical Social Movements: De-centring the State," in A.G. Gagnon & J.P. Bickerton eds., Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1990), 525-541.

APPENDIX A

All of the MCM statistics and data come from the curriculum vitae of all MCM candidates for each election from 1974-1990. Data concerning MCM membership is haphazard and scarce, there are no delegate surveys that I could find and as far as I know, the analysis of the candidates provided by this thesis is the most comprehensive sociological analysis of the MCM to date. This analysis and its parameters were very much determined by analytic statistical categories supplied by Kitschelt in his study of the European left-libertarian parties since the goal of the thesis is to liken the MCM to such parties. As a consequence, the variables that are measured and compared (sex, age, education, occupation, political experience) can only be those for which Kitschelt has supplied data although the MCM data could be used to make inferences extending beyond the scope of this thesis.

The exception is the variable, sex, for which Kitschelt supplies no data but which he refers to extensively. Therefore I felt it was important to include this variable in my sociological analysis of the MCM although my own data was not conducive to such a task and sex is the only variable for which I did not use the curriculum vitae to generate statistics. Only in 1990 did the MCM start to include photographs of the candidates along with their biographies thus enabling analysts to determine the sex of the candidate. Prior to 1990 this could only be done by guessing the sex of the candidate by the sound of their name; a precarious methodology to say the least and not one that I was about include in this study. Instead, I was able to glean some statistics from a fifteen year party profile published by the MCM itself entitled *MCM, 1974-1989, Fifteen years of political activity for Montreal*. I then compared these statistics with comparable data of Canadian political parties in general to both establish the high percentage of women in the MCM and to circumvent the problem posed by Kitschelt's lack of data in

this regard.

For all the other variables I was able to successfully compare the data supplied by Kitschelt's tables to that supplied by the curriculum vitae for the MCM candidates each year. Rather than considering individual candidates as the statistical focus of this analysis, each year (the sum of all candidates) was considered as its own analytical category in order to show shifts within the MCM membership over time. The logic of this decision was further reinforced by the fact that although each election included individuals who had run as candidates in previous elections, the ages and sociological characteristics of these individuals had changed (often dramatically) within the four year period between each election so that they had to be reconsidered each time to more accurately capture sociological change within the party.

Having established categories of analysis, all the curriculum vitae's were read and any information provided in each curriculum vitae pertaining to age, educational achievement, occupation, and previous political activity was highlighted. Age was the most straight forward and uniformly presented variable in the CV's and I simply checked off each individual MCM candidate for each election year into the appropriate age category corresponding to Kitschelt's data. In this category it is important to note that for the year of 1990 my statistics differ from those officially compiled by the MCM because my numbers unlike those of the MCM, incorporate the last minute withdrawal of candidate Collin Mayrand and his replacement by Germaine Vaillancourt; a women twenty-six years his senior.

I completed the same methodological process for educational achievement and occupation although these categories required considerably more discretion. For example candidates attending trade schools were counted in the category of non-university attendance even though these schools included the term college in their titles. I use a classical definition of university or college education that may have decreased the

MCM figures for university or college attendance. Despite such classification on my part however, the educational data still corresponds significantly with that of Kitschelt. Unfortunately educational characteristics were not considered for the MCM version of their candidate's curriculum vitae in 1978, 1982.

Another difficult area was that of occupation. The challenge here was how to classify the MCM's civil servants and those employed in the para-public sector. These candidates could be placed in a variety of categories. Those employed in the provincial Department of Education or school boards I counted in the "Educational sector, social services, media" category even though they could also be listed in the "white collar employee" category. The same is also true of daycare employees or managers who I also counted in the educational category. Owners of daycares (there were two in the MCM data) were counted in the "Business/liberal professions/entrepreneur" category as were any persons supplying contracted or consulting services to a government department even if the department was involved in the delivery of education or a social service.

Civil servants employed in departments that were not connected with education or the delivery of a social service such as health or welfare were classified as white collar employees. Legal aid lawyers were counted in the "Business/liberal professions/entrepreneur" category even though they might also be considered as involved in the delivery of a social service. I assumed that most would go on to become practising lawyers. Also included in the "white-collar employee" category were the MCM's numerous unions employees who others might include in the category entitled "political functionaries". The latter category includes only those employed by a political party or political representative (ie. federal MP's or provincial MNA's).

Perhaps the most difficult data to categorise was that related to previous political experience. It was clear from the data that the

development of left-libertarianism in the North American includes labour union experience. At least half of the MCM candidates had union experience and many only gravitated into social movements afterwards. Only in 1990 do we begin to see an influx of people with no union experience but who are active in social movements.

Included in the "New Left and left-libertarian movements" category are all candidates involved in groups or organizations concerned with feminism, the environment (including recycling and the promotion of the use of the bicycle, fighting the development of green spaces), the preservation of heritage buildings, improving the rights of the urban poor (improved social housing, tenant's rights, reduced public transit rates for seniors, clubs for drug-free development of youth), and the creation of nuclear free zones (where industries associated with arm's production cannot be built). Included in the category that I call the "Old Left, Social Democratic parties, and unions" are those candidates with no involvement in any of the groups that I have listed as social movements, but who are clearly on the left because of their involvement either in unions or socialist/social democratic parties (ie.NDP, Parti Québécois). The other categories speak for themselves.

It should also be noted that I deliberately chose to refer to journal and newspaper articles to build the case study of the MCM rather than conducting interviews with the principle actors within the party during the period analyzed by the thesis. This might first appear surprising given the fact that most of these people were readily available to me. This decision was based on my preliminary discussions with many of these principle actors in which it became obvious that many of them preferred to give me selective accounts of the events of the period. Many remain politically active and most remain emotionally connected to the party in either a positive or negative manner. Thus, rather than building a case study based on retrospective analyses, I chose to rely on journalistic and academic accounts which, although biased in their own

way, were at least written at the time of the events and consequently did not suffer from revisionism or memory loss.

Appendix B

Charting the principal actors by examining municipal candidacies from 1974-90

	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990
Candidate	Party and ward	Party and ward	Party and ward	Party and ward	Party and ward
Bob Keaton	MCM Côte-des-Neiges	MAG			
Nick Auf der Maur	MCM Côte-des-Neiges	MAG		Civic Party Peter McGill	Montreal Municipal Party Peter McGill
Arnold Bennett	MCM Notre-Dame de Grâce	MCM	MCM Notre-Dame de Grâce	MCM Notre-Dame de Grâce	MCM Notre-Dame de Grâce
Michael Fainstat	MCM Notre-Dame de Grâce	MCM	MCM de la Confédération	MCM de la Confédération	MCM Notre-Dame de Grâce
John Gardiner	MCM St. Louis	MCM St. Louis	MCM Ville-Marie	MCM Ville-Marie	MCM Mile End
Marc Raboy		MCM			
Abe Limonchik			MCM Côte-des-Neiges	MCM Côte-des-Neiges	MCM Côte-des-Neiges
Jean Doré			MCM Mayoral candidate	MCM Mayoral candidate, St-Jean-Baptiste	MCM Mayoral candidate, Plateau Mont-Royal
Sam Boskey			MCM Décarie	MCM Décarie	Democratic Coalition
Pierre-Yves Melançon			MCM Mont-Royal	MCM Mont-Royal	Democratic Coalition Mayoral candidate
Marvin Rotrand			MCM Snowdon	MCM Snowdon	Democratic Coalition
Pierre Bastien				MCM Ahuntsic	Democratic Coalition
Pierre Goyer				MCM Jean Talon	Democratic Coalition
Sharon Leslie				MCM de Loyola	MCM de Loyola
Dimitrios Roussopoulos					Ecology Montréal

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