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THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES IN CONFLICT BETWEEN
SMALL STATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

JANUARY 1967 - DECEMBER 1978

by

© Wadouda Abd-El-Rahman Badran

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

August 1981

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis.

THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES IN CONFLICT BETWEEN SMALL STATES:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Thesis Supervisor

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September 1981

TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

Dr. Abd-El-Rahman Badran

A B S T R A C T

This study is primarily motivated by the need for a greater understanding of the role of third parties who, by the use of their reward power, can induce the resolution of conflict between small states in the international system. Much of the existing literature on third party roles in inter-state conflict borrows heavily from the theoretical literature on labor-management relations and fails to take into account important differences such as the importance of objectives other than conflict resolution by third parties, and the fact that great powers acting as third parties have independent resources of reward and punishment in order to influence the behavior of the protagonists.

The case of the role of the United States in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict between 1967 and 1978 was chosen because it demonstrates an important shift in policy by a major international actor and some reduction in what had otherwise been regarded as an intractable regional conflict. The case was used to test eleven hypotheses about the relationship between third party objectives and behavior, the acceptance of third party mediation by the disputants, and the impact of third party behavior on the level of conflict and cooperation between the protagonists.

Content analysis was used to generate data on the following variables:

- US objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict
- Egyptian-Israeli perceptions of US policy
- US behavior towards Egypt and Israel
- Egyptian-Israeli behavior vis-à-vis one another
- Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation

The principal methods of analysis were analysis of variance and multiple regression.

The study shows that the US behaved predominantly as an ally of Israel during the pre-war period (January 1967 - September 1973) when its decision makers gave priority to conflict management rather than to conflict resolution in its objectives in the peace process. During the post-war period (January 1974 - December 1978), the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary as US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution rather than to conflict management in their objectives in the peace process.

The study questions the importance of the condition of impartiality in gaining acceptance for an intermediary. Egypt accepted US mediation even when the US was perceived as negatively biased.

The study also questions the existing literature where it argues that the reciprocal variable is the only relevant variable in explaining Egyptian and Israeli behavior vis-à-vis one another. Egyptian and Israeli behavior were influenced by US behavior. The results also show that the relevance of the ally and the intermediary models used in testing hypotheses on the impact of third party behavior, on the behavior of a dyad in conflict, differed during the pre-war period as compared with the post-war period. US cooperation towards Israel led to a decrease in Egyptian conflict towards Israel, as was expected, only when the US behaved predominantly as an ally of Israel during the pre-war period. US cooperation towards Israel led to an increase in Egyptian cooperation towards Israel, as was expected, only when the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary during the post-war period. US cooperation towards Egypt led to a decrease in Israeli cooperation towards Egypt, as was expected, only when the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary during the post-war period.

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict between different states is a reality of the international system. This conflict, defined as the simultaneous pursuit of incompatible objectives (Legault *et al.*, 1973:23), may reach its extreme with the outbreak of war that threatens human survival. The aim of peace research is to find means of resolving conflicts before they reach their climax in the form of war.

All states, small as well as great, engage in conflict. A small state, however, usually characterized by a small territory, few resources, uncertain friends and a narrow margin of safety, is rarely able to increase its power sufficiently to affect the outcome of even a regional conflict (Rothstein, 1968:24-25). Consequently, small states usually turn to great powers for economic and political as well as military assistance. Great powers, on the other hand, are usually ready to provide small states with such aid in order to maintain spheres of interest and secure raw materials, or other advantages.

Thus, in order to understand and analyze, and consequently control and preferably resolve, conflict between small states, peace research should not only concentrate on conflict as a dyadic phenomenon but should also include the study of the role

of the great powers involved in conflict between small states. By studying conflict as larger than two parties, research could begin by focusing on the impact of the behavior of a third party on the interaction of a dyadic pair.

The importance of analyzing the role of great powers in small states' conflict lies in the fact that they so often play a vital role in such situations. The capabilities of great powers provide them with the ability to provide small states with positive values or remove or reduce negative ones, i.e. reward power. While the capabilities of great powers also provide them with coercive power, i.e. the ability to punish small states if they do not conform with the attempted influence (French and Raven, 1959:156-157), their willingness to resort to such power might be limited by the leverage which a small state might enjoy vis-à-vis a great power.

Great powers belong to a special category of third parties in dyadic conflicts. More research than that reflected in the current literature on international relations needs to be devoted to this category.¹ This will aid in understanding how a third party with reward power can help in controlling or resolving conflict between small states.

¹Reference to great powers and parties with reward power are used interchangeably in the research.

Some of the contemporary research on third party roles deals with third parties as one category without adequate differentiation between the specific characteristics of the actors which undertake the roles. Another body of research focuses on the role of the great powers in international conflict. This is treated in two types of research:

- A. Foreign policy studies: research here focuses on actions undertaken by the great powers and the internal and external influences that lead to such actions (e.g., Badeau, 1968; Polk, 1975; Quandt, 1977). However, there is only an occasional reference to how the behavior of the great powers affects the behavior of the parties in the conflict.
- B. Quantitative studies on the impact of the behavior of the great powers on the behavior of a dyad in conflict: research here focuses on the systematic interaction between the great powers and the protagonists in conflict (Milstein, 1972; Raymond and Skinner, 1978). However, such research tells us little about the substance of the interaction. Even over a long period of time, it is summarized only in a few figures.

The research undertaken in this study is an attempt to fill the gap in the literature on the role of a third party with reward power in conflicts between small states. It will attempt to answer the following questions:

- Why does a third party with reward power get involved in conflicts between small states?
- How does a third party with reward power behave in a conflict between small states?
- In what ways does the behavior of a third party with reward power affect the behavior of small states in conflict?

The answers to these questions could be provided through a systematic study of:

- a. Third party objectives which function as incentives to intervene in a conflict situation.
- b. The relationship between the objectives of a third party and its behavior, both as an ally and as an intermediary in a conflict situation. The interest in the role of a great power as an ally is due to the concern about great powers providing arms and other assistance to small states in conflict. There is fear that such assistance is a main cause of the intensification of conflict. The study of great powers as intermediaries is essential in understanding one of the mechanisms for the pacific settlement of international disputes. A thorough understanding of the role of an intermediary with reward power is not provided by most of the literature dealing with international conflict. Much of the literature on mediation borrows from the literature on labor-management relations without making appropriate qualifications (Pauk, 1980:3). If peace research is to contribute to explaining and improving international mediation, propositions based upon studies of the special contribution of third parties with reward power have to be developed and tested.
- c. The protagonists' acceptance of third party mediation even when the intermediary is perceived as biased.
- d. The impact of the behavior of a third party, as an ally, and as an intermediary, on the behavior of a dyad in conflict.

These four aspects are systematically studied by examining the case of the US role in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict from January 1967 - December 1978. The United States, as a great power, is an example of a third party with reward power. Egypt and Israel are regarded as small states in accordance

with Azar's (1973) study on small state hostilities.¹ The choice of this case was undertaken due to the threat this conflict has posed to world stability over the past thirty years. The fear that the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Egyptian-Israeli conflict in particular, can trigger crises that could lead to confrontations between great powers has been of great concern in the international peace research movement.

Chapter I will present a review of the theoretical literature on the role of third parties in international conflict. It will highlight contributions which attempt to explain third party objectives, the relationship of objectives to behavior, dyadic acceptance of third party mediation, and ways in which third party behavior affects the behavior of a dyad in conflict.

Chapter II deals with the methodology used to generate the data needed to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature. It will review the sources of the data, offer operational definitions, and discuss the reliability of the data.

¹See his discussion of the characteristics of small states. In this study he analyzed the Arab-Israeli conflict as an example of hostilities between small states.

Chapter III analyses US objectives in the Middle East and its objectives in the peace process in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. It will attempt to identify the shift in US objectives in the peace process as its objectives in the Middle East were threatened by the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.

Chapter IV focuses on US behavior towards Egypt and Israel. It will attempt to identify when the US behaved predominantly as an ally, and when it behaved predominantly as an intermediary. The shift in US behavior will be analyzed in light of the shift in its objectives in the peace process.

Chapter V studies Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation. It questions one of the assumptions in the literature on the importance of impartiality in gaining acceptance for an intermediary.

Chapter VI analyses the impact of US behavior on conflict and cooperation between Egypt and Israel. It tests hypotheses on the impact of the behavior of a third party as an ally on the conflict behavior of the protagonists and the impact of the behavior of a third party as an intermediary on the cooperation between the two protagonists.

CHAPTER I

THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Third parties involve all (other than the dyad) direct or indirect participants in a conflict, regardless of their effect upon its eventual development or outcome (Barringer, 1972:26). In international conflict, third parties can be great powers, middle powers, small powers or international organizations. The literature on third parties generally addresses three questions:

- A. Why a third party intervenes in a conflict and, once it decides to intervene, what role it undertakes (i.e. third party objectives and behavior).
- B. Why do protagonists accept the involvement of a third party in solving the conflict?
- C. In what ways would the behavior of a third party affect the behavior of a dyad in conflict?

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theoretical literature under the above headings, and to emphasize ways in which a third party with reward power differs from other types of third parties. We seek in this review to highlight areas in the theoretical literature that should be clarified by this study.

1.2 THIRD PARTY OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR

This section analyzes third party objectives and behavior. It tackles the concept of regional objectives, and the objectives in the peace process, together with the effect that the threat to regional objectives has on determining the third party's objectives in the peace process. It then highlights the relationship between third party objectives in the peace process and behavior as an ally or as an intermediary. Finally, this section addresses the question why a third party with reward power uses rewards rather than coercion when acting as an intermediary in dyadic conflict.

1.2.1 Third Party Objectives

Foreign policy objectives refer "to the steering mechanisms adopted by governments in their attempt to influence the external environment" (Dolan *et al.*, 1980:421). They can also be described as the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which constitute its external environment (Nuechterlein, 1979:75).

Objectives as an explanatory variable in the foreign policy behavior of nation states have been largely ignored in the recent literature on international relations generally, and the literature on third parties in particular. Most of this last literature does not address the question of third

2

party objectives (Barringer, 1972; Slater and Kirchner, 1973; Milstein, 1972; Raymond and Skinner, 1978). The few works which do mention third party objectives are largely found in the literature that deals with third parties as intermediaries. Frank Edmead (1971:24-25) maintains that in the international arena a third party might be interested in conflict settlement due to a fear of involvement, lack of a desire to supply resources for allies, or a desire to isolate regional disputes from great power conflicts. Oran Young (1972:60) addresses the question of incentives for a third party to intervene in a conflict situation. He suggests that a third party standing to suffer from a war among the protagonists might find it highly desirable to make the solution of a conflict an important objective in order to avoid war.

Most of the literature appears to assume that the resolution of dyadic conflict is the only viable objective for a third party in a conflict situation.¹ By adopting such an assumption, this literature largely ignores the relationship between two categories of third party objectives, namely:

1. Regional Objectives
2. Objectives in the Peace Process

¹Pauk (1980:7-8; 57-58) criticizes the lack of emphasis on third party objectives and criticizes the assumption that third parties are motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns. See his discussion of third party stakes and their implications for the study of international mediation.

1.2.1.1 Regional Objectives

This category refers to third party objectives in the region where the conflict takes place. For example, a third party might want to secure for itself raw materials from the region or might want to protect a set of values in the region because its citizens believe that they are universally good (Nuechterlein, 1979:76). A third party might also want to avoid confrontation with other nation states involved in a particular region.

1.2.1.2 Objectives in the Peace Process

This category refers to a third party's objectives in the settlement of a dyadic conflict. A third party might give priority to either of the following:

- o Conflict management: this refers to a third party's objective of preventing the protagonists' pursuit of incompatible objectives from turning to violence. Conflict management has the advantage of preventing the human suffering that results from war. However, conflict management does not address the basic issues that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.
- o Conflict resolution: this refers to a third party's need to achieve the protagonists' agreement regarding the basic issues and thus terminate the conflict in a self-perpetuating manner (Fisher, 1969). Resolution implies a solution; freely acceptable to all the parties that does not destroy any important values--one parties will not wish to repudiate in the absence of changed circumstances

(Burton, 1969:171). Conflict resolution not only implies the absence of physical violence (Galtung, 1971:190) but also agreement on removing any basic incompatibility in the protagonists' objectives.

Conflict resolution can be accomplished in either of two ways, each having pros and cons:

- through a comprehensive settlement;
- through conflict reduction by reducing areas of incompatibility through step-by-step, partial agreements.

In a comprehensive settlement, priority is given to the solution of all issues involved in the conflict. Each is seen as an integral part of the overall conflict which can only be solved if all related issues are also solved. A comprehensive settlement has the advantage of resolving all the issues that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. But, when all issues are considered simultaneously, the merits of particular issues are lost in one big controversy (Fisher, 1964:91-92).

Conflict reduction, on the other hand, recognizes that everything cannot be done at once, and permits progress in certain areas while other matters are being worked out (Fisher, 1964:91-107). Piecemeal bargains can help cultivate mutual trust between parties in conflict. If a major issue has to be negotiated, it may be necessary first to negotiate some minor items to establish the necessary confidence in each

others' awareness of the long term value of good faith (Schelling, 1963:45). Yet step-by-step could lead to a stalemate if one or both sides refuse to go beyond the limited steps that were taken. Step-by-step is also irremediably ambiguous. Most of the core issues that gave rise to the conflict are left for future considerations (Brzezinski *et al.*, 1975:5).

A third party's advocacy of a comprehensive settlement, or conflict reduction, depends largely on how the foreign policy decision makers evaluate the alternatives which, in their opinion, would most probably resolve the conflict.

1.2.1.3 The Relationship Between Regional Objectives and Objectives in the Peace Process

The relationship between these two categories of third party objectives is outlined in figure 1.1. This figure emphasizes the importance of the *status quo* in a dyadic conflict in understanding the relationship between these two categories. The *status quo* refers to an existing state of affairs in dyadic interaction. If the *status quo* presents a threat to a third party's regional objectives, it will tend to give priority to conflict resolution in its objectives in the peace process. The threat to a third party's regional objectives is determined by its decision makers' perception.

FIGURE 1.1: The Relationship Between a Third Party's Regional Objectives and Its Objectives in the Peace Process

Decision makers do not respond to the objective facts of the situation, but to their image of the situation. It is what they think the world is like, not necessarily what it is really like, that determines their position (Boulding, 1969: 423). The *status quo* can present a threat to a third party's regional objectives if its decision makers believe that the *status quo* has the potential of erupting into violence which could harm its regional objectives. If, on the other hand, a third party's decision makers believe that the *status quo* does not harm its regional objectives, and that the eruption into physical violence can be deterred, it is more likely that the third party will give priority to conflict management. In this case, conflict resolution will not be regarded as an urgent objective for a third party since no harm is perceived to its regional objectives.

1.2.2 Third Party Behavior

Foreign policy behavior is defined as "discrete official action in which governments engage in order to influence the external environment" (Dolan *et al.*, 1980:421). This section deals with the relationship between third party objectives in the peace process and behavior as an ally or intermediary. This will be followed by a discussion of why a third party would prefer the use of rewards, rather than coercion, when it undertakes the role of an intermediary.

1.2.2.1 The Relationship Between Third Party
Objectives and Third Party Behavior

Since objectives may be assumed to be a principal explanatory variable of behavior (Legault *et al.*, 1973:20-21), we expect that a third party's objectives in the peace process would relate to its behavior. In its behavior towards a dyad in conflict, we differentiate between two roles a third party might undertake, that of an ally, or an intermediary.

A third party is referred to as an ally¹ in a conflict situation if it joins in a coalition with one of the parties in conflict against the other. By joining a coalition, a third party helps its partner achieve its objectives, and in frustrating the opponent's objectives. A third party is referred to as an intermediary if it intervenes diplomatically in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing towards its abatement, or termination, and its intervention is accepted by the parties to the conflict (Touval, 1975:52).

¹We use the term ally here in a broader sense than that used in the literature on alliances where an ally refers to a partner in a formal agreement that pledges to cooperate in using its military resources against a specific state or states, and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force in specific circumstances (Osgood, 1968:17).

It is important to note that, while a third party might adopt both roles during a given period, we have to distinguish between continuous and episodic situations (Caplow, 1968:5-7), i.e., whether its behavior as an ally is the dominant type of interaction with a dyad in conflict, and its behavior as an intermediary is only episodic, or vice versa.

The literature on third parties tends to deal separately with these two roles and thus there is little elaboration of the reasons why a third party shifts from the role of an ally to that of an intermediary, and vice versa. The opinion of this writer is that, if a third party prefers conflict management to conflict resolution, it will tend to act predominantly as an ally, cooperating more and conflicting less with the party in the dyad that it believes will preserve the *status quo*, and an absence of physical violence. On the other hand, if a third party prefers conflict resolution to conflict management, it will act predominantly as an intermediary, cooperating with both parties on approximately the same level in order to secure their cooperation vis-à-vis one another. The relationship between third party objectives and third party behavior is outlined in figure 1.2,

FIGURE 1.2: The Relationship Between Third Party Objectives and Third Party Behavior

1.2.2.2 The Preference of Rewards Over Coercion
 in Third Party Behavior as an Intermediary

The important question which arises when addressing the role of an intermediary with reward power is: Why would it resort to rewards rather than coercion in order to secure dyadic cooperation? Reward power depends on a third party's ability to provide positive values and to remove or reduce negative ones. Coercive power, on the other hand, results from a protagonist's expectation that it will be punished by a third party if it does not conform with the attempted influence (French and Raven, 1959:156-157).

We argue that, faced with the increasing awareness of the limitations on the use of coercion as an influence technique, a great power acting as an intermediary might find it more desirable to use rewards to modify or reinforce the behavior of small states in conflict. Three factors might limit a great power's preference for depending on coercion to influence the behavior of small states in conflict:

- Psychological limitations;
- Limitations of unilateral coercion;
- Limitations generated by the leverage that a small state might enjoy vis-à-vis a great power.

Psychological limitations: the literature on psychology indicates that influence attempts often lead to changes other than the intended ones. These changes, called "side effects" or "by-products," occur more frequently in situations in which coercion is used rather than rewards. Coercion generally disrupts or suppresses a wide variety of unrelated behavior in a variety of situations. Rewards, on the other hand, have minimal disruptive or emotional effects (Ferster *et al.*, 1975: 186-188).

Coercion results in decreased attraction and high resistance, while rewards result in increased attraction and low resistance (French and Raven, 1959:165). Efforts, for example, to induce other governments to change their behavior by threatening to deny them rewards might not be effective. Psychologically and politically it is easier for another government to accept rewards for performing an action desired by a third party than for that government to allow itself to be coerced by a threat (Huntington, 1970:171).

Limitations of unilateral coercion: A third party may rely on economic or military sanctions in influencing the behavior of a dyad in conflict. If a third party depends on economic coercion, the effectiveness of such action would be limited by their unilateral application:

Therein lies the difference between economic carrots and economic sticks. Carrots are most effective precisely when they are unilateral; economic sticks, however, must be multilateral if targeted governments are not to evade them merely by finding alternative supplies and markets. Only one kind of stick, however, can be applied unilaterally: force.

(Maynes and Ullman, 1980:8)

In the contemporary international system, the use of force by a great power is limited by changes in its relationship with small states. Small states are not likely to be induced by a great power's military posturing to resume the political or psychological dependence from which most have now liberated themselves. A century ago, a few troops from the metropolitan centers could maintain colonial rule over large areas and inhabitants. Today, while most probably a great power would prevail in a battle against say, Saudi Arabia, the costs would be great and the perceived inconvenience quite high. Furthermore, a lasting legacy of Vietnam is widespread skepticism about the ability of a great power, even when willing to employ a large military intervention, to control the politics of small states (Maynes and Ullman, 1980:8-10).

The leverage of small states: A great power must be cautious in its choice of the issues on which it will use strong political, military or economic pressures towards a small state. Even if it wishes to act it may discover that the force at its disposal is inappropriate to the goals it seeks. The intensive involvement of a great power in a small state might facilitate

attempts by the latter's government to affect decisions undertaken by the great power. This can occur due to the nature of the political system of a great power and/or the small state's perception of the challenges facing the great power. These factors can give a small state a degree of influential access to decision making and decision makers far out of proportion to its size.

To achieve their desired bargaining position, a small state's officials and diplomats might develop close cooperative ties with powerful elements within a great power's political system. This, of course, depends on whether the great power's political system permits the development of such ties. The small state might also count on organized group support within the great power, thus limiting the ability of the great power to use coercion against it.

A small state may also assert their resistance to great power coercion by turning for aid from a rival great power. The use of coercion may be limited by a great power's desire to head off any radical shift in the orientation of the targeted small country (Keohane, 1971:161-182).

The leverage which small states may enjoy vis-à-vis great powers by being able to switch to rival powers or mobilize support within the great powers limits the credibility of coercion to modify or reinforce behavior. Once its credibility is in doubt, coercion will not yield the desired results (Singer, 1969:388).

With the limitations on the use of coercion to support mediatory efforts, a great power might resort to rewards as a means of assuring desired behavior by client governments. As long as they are more than token, such rewards create a network of relations between the donor and the recipient in which frank and confidential communications are possible. They ensure that a great power's view will have a serious hearing and emphasize the importance of the great power as a constant relevant actor in the regional setting (Maynes and Ullman, 1980:7).

1.3 DYADIC ACCEPTANCE OF THIRD PARTY MEDIATION

Even if a third party is willing to undertake the role of intermediary, its mediation may not be accepted by the dyad in conflict.

Acceptability is crucial since, ...it is their acceptability to the parties in conflict which distinguishes mediation from other interventions in conflicts.

(Touval, 1975:57)

This section addresses the condition of impartiality in the acceptance of third party mediation. It also criticizes the discussion of this condition in the literature, and finally elaborates the reasons why the traditionally unfavored party accepts third party mediation even when the intermediary is perceived as biased.

1.3.1 The Condition of Impartiality

According to much of the literature on third parties, an intermediary must be impartial. Impartiality refers to the subjective perception of a party in a conflict that the intermediary is not biased against itself nor in favor of its opponent (Northedge and Donelan, 1971:299; Touval, 1975:55-56). The necessity of maintaining an impartial position has been explained in view of the weight, respect and justice that would be attributed to a solution advocated by an impartial mediator. A perception of bias would bring the status of a third party into some jeopardy (Davies, 1972:85-86; Fisher, 1972:76-77; Northedge and Donelan, 1971:299; Young, 1967b:81-82).

1.3.2 Critique of the Condition of Impartiality

The literature advocating the impartiality of an intermediary in the resolution of international conflict borrows from the literature on labor-management relations. According

to the literature on industrial relations, bias or any action that may lead to suspecting bias would lead to a deadlock.

A mediator...must be in sufficient command of himself not to reveal any partiality if there is any....Once under suspicion, even if he is free of bias, the mediator might as well vanish.

(Manson, 1958:757)

The difference between labour-management relations and international conflict limits the applicability of this attribute in the latter field. In international conflicts, states lack compulsory procedures for resolution by appeal to higher levels.

We argue that even if an intermediary is perceived as biased by the traditionally unfavored party, it might still accept third party mediation. A few recent works on international conflict and mediation find that biased intermediaries can be acceptable. Yaniv (1977:87) indicates that third parties cannot help but be partial. Frei (1976:79) acknowledges that the "usual position of a mediator in between the parties is a situation of asymmetry". Touval (1972) and Amin (1978) suggest that the theory on intermediaries needs to be revised and they cite examples of acceptable biased intermediaries¹ (such as American mediation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia

¹Bias can be favorable as well as negative; in this research it is used to indicate a negative attitude.

over Yemen 1962-1963, and Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan 1965-1966).

According to Touval (1975:60-62) "bias does not negate the role of an intermediary in facilitating communications.

The image each antagonist has of the intermediary, his biases, his motives, and his interests will influence the interpretations of the communications received from the intermediary....In the evaluation of information it is often standard procedure to make allowance for assumed biases of the source of information...But such information can still be useful and may be taken into account when decisions are made.

A biased intermediary can facilitate concessions because of the bargaining power it acquires as a result of joining a coalition with the adversary:

The party which views the intermediary as favoring its antagonist will seek to reverse the relationship and win the intermediary's sympathy, or at least, will attempt to sow discord between the intermediary and its antagonists.

(Touval, 1975:64)

1.3.3 The Acceptance of an Intermediary by the Traditionally Unfavored Party

The question is why would the traditionally unfavored party accept an intermediary even when it is perceived as biased? Another question worth noting is why might the acceptance of the traditionally unfavored party be higher than that of the traditionally favored party? Two reasons can account for such outcomes:

- o Alternatives facing a protagonist
- o Reward power of an intermediary

1.3.3.1 Alternatives Facing a Protagonist

Mediation is one means of conflict resolution. A third party might be accepted as an intermediary even though perceived as biased, because the unfavored party might see that acceptance is far better than rejection due to the limitations of available alternatives (Touval, 1975:63).

The more alternatives a party has the less likely it will prefer to rely on mediation as a means of conflict resolution due to a fear that mediation might reduce the prospects of a favorable outcome. The losses each protagonist would suffer as a result of no agreement depend on the extent of harm it endures as a result of the *status quo* (Hopmann, 1978 :162-163). The higher the losses compared with those of the opponent, the more likely a party will accept mediation even if the intermediary is perceived as biased.

1.3.3.2 Reward Power of an Intermediary

The capabilities of a great power can lead a protagonist to believe that it can solve the conflict. If a protagonist believes that a third party can solve the conflict, it might be willing to accept its mediation even if perceived as biased.

The party in the conflict which has a higher perception of a third party as being capable of solving the conflict will probably be more ready to accept its mediation.

A third party's capability to solve conflicts is to a great extent a function of its ability to induce one of the parties to accept the position of the other or to induce both parties to reach a compromise. A dependency relationship between an intermediary and the traditionally favored party might increase the traditionally unfavored party's willingness to accept its mediation in the belief that such a relationship gives the intermediary bargaining power vis-à-vis the traditionally favored party (Pauk, 1980:49).

Economic or military rewards that a great power can provide may also affect the protagonists' acceptance of its mediation. This influence can result either from actual rewards, or expectation of rewards.

The reward power of an intermediary could induce the traditionally unfavored party to accept compromises offered by the intermediary in order to win the intermediary's sympathies which were not traditionally in its favor. By accepting compromises offered by an intermediary, it would be serving the third party's interest in the pacific settlement of the dispute. In return the traditionally unfavored party would expect to receive economic, political or military rewards.

The traditionally favored party, on the other hand, while it may rely on the third party for military, economic and political support, might not be willing to accept a third party's proposals for compromises out of a fear that the rewards it receives from the third party would be terminated. The traditionally favored party might maintain its freedom of action and still enjoy third party rewards. This is because a client can maintain autonomy of action if he believes that the patron's support will be forthcoming in any case. Such a belief would be plausible due to the patron's objectives which are served by the client, and/or domestic support it enjoys within the third party's political system.

The superpower's capability for restraining the client may be somewhat ambiguous: the low credibility of the superpower's threat to withdraw support may undermine the restraining effect of the essentiality of that support.

(Snyder and Diesing, 1977:30-31)

1.4 THE IMPACT OF THIRD PARTY BEHAVIOR ON THE BEHAVIOR OF A DYAD IN CONFLICT

This section addresses the impact of the behavior of a third party as an ally and as an intermediary on the behavior of a dyad in conflict. It elaborates the reasons why third parties as allies can influence dyadic conflict behavior, and why third parties as intermediaries can influence dyadic cooperative behavior. Finally it questions the adequacy of

the existing literature in understanding the impact of third party behavior as an ally, or as an intermediary, on the behavior of a dyad in conflict.

1.4.1 Third Parties as Allies and Dyadic
Conflict Behavior

Conflict behavior refers to antagonistic actions undertaken by a dyad in pursuit of their incompatible objectives. Its extreme form is physical violence.

A third party is referred to as an ally in a conflict situation if it joins in a coalition with one of the parties against the other. By joining in a coalition a third party helps its partner in achieving its objectives and in frustrating the opponent's objectives.

The role of third parties as allies in the intensification of dyadic conflict is related to their supply of arms and other assistance to their clients. Explanations of the impact of this assistance on conflict behavior are varied. Barringer (1972:121) studied the role of great powers in international conflicts and concluded that:

The more partial, active, and substantial that involvement [of a great power] the greater is the likelihood of escalation....

According to his analysis, great power involvement leads to conflict escalation since they undertake local arms commitments in an effort to establish spheres of influence. Thus, they supply the public support and military equipment that are the fuel of local conflict (Barringer, 1972:112).

Azar (1973:62-66) attributed hostilities between small states partly to arms supply and other economic goods and services provided by great powers to small states, in their competition for influence.

When this military and economic aid flows to areas where conflict of interest and hostile interactions exist, then this aid has a tendency to be used on the battle field or in unsafe skies.

(Azar, 1973:65-66)

Once a great power is involved in a partisan manner in a local conflict, its prestige is affected by the outcome. Shifts in the military balance will prompt it to act to avoid an unfavorable trend or achieve a more favorable one. "Either way, the dominant pressures operate to escalate the level of ongoing hostilities" (Barringer, 1972:115).

A local protagonist may also be encouraged by third party support to escalate the level of hostilities indefinitely on the premise that the great power sponsoring it will eventually help out (Barringer, 1972:115). While the need for such support may act as a restraint on a client in some cases, the client may maintain freedom of action to the extent that it

believes that the great power's support will be automatically available in any case (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:30).

The perception of decision makers, in client states, of the balance of power as influenced by outside arms supply could also lead to an intensification of conflict behavior. Becker (1979:248) suggests that each regional antagonist thinks of itself as being satisfied with a defensive posture when the military balance is favorable but sees aggressive intent in the other side's reaching for additional weapons.

The relationship between arms and other aid supply, and conflict behavior, has been refuted in empirical tests on the role of the superpowers in the Middle East conflict. Milstein (1972) concluded "that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have had but limited influence on the normal Arab-Israeli violence". However, his study covered only the period 1948-1967 and, considering the developments since then, it may need revision.

Raymond and Skinner (1978) have criticized much of the research on the role of the great powers in the Middle East because it focuses on fluctuations within the Arab and Israeli defense budgets. In an attempt to replicate and extend the studies on the impact of great powers on the Middle East conflict, they adopted an event interaction model, using data from Edward E. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) for the period 1948-1973 and from the World Event Interaction

Survey (WEIS) for the period January 1966 - August 1969. They achieved a partial replication of Milstein's findings despite their difference in research design. The evidence they present sustains Milstein's description of an action reaction pattern of violence between Israel and the Arab States, and also agrees with Milstein's conclusion that the US and the USSR have had but limited influence on Arab-Israeli violence. Raymond and Skinner's study is limited to the supportive role of the great powers towards each protagonist. It neither deals with the impact of non-supportive roles nor with the impact of a great power's behavior towards both protagonists on the behavior of each of them.

While the preceeding literature suggests that great power involvement can lead to the intensification of dyadic conflict behavior, we can deduce an opposite hypothesis from the literature on deterrence. Deterrence is a psychological relationship in which one side convinces the other not to attack out of fear of retaliation (Schelling, 1963). According to this literature, a state will not go to war if its decision makers perceive the power of its opponent and its allies to be significantly greater than its power and that of its coalition. Thus, we would expect that if a third party behaves as an ally of one of the parties in conflict, the behavior of the third party would probably have a decreasing

impact on the conflict behavior of the party against whom the alliance is directed out of the latter's fear of retaliation.

1.4.2 Third Parties as Intermediaries and Dyadic Cooperative Behavior

Cooperative behavior of a dyad in conflict refers to the actions that each of the protagonists undertakes to reduce or remove the incompatibility in their objectives.

A third party is referred to as an intermediary if it interferes diplomatically in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing towards its abatement or termination, and its intervention is accepted by the parties to the conflict (Touval, 1975:52).

Third parties acting as intermediaries can affect dyadic cooperative behavior through the various functions that they, as intermediaries, undertake. These functions refer to activities undertaken by an intermediary in order to facilitate achievement of a settlement without imposing an outcome on the protagonists (Young, 1972:55). An intermediary's functions can be grouped under two broad categories:¹

- Facilitating Communication
- Facilitating Concessions

¹This classification is taken from Touval (1975:52).

1.4.2.1 Facilitating Communications

Conflict is usually difficult to regulate, and consequently resolve, partly because the protagonists are normally not in direct communication. The initial step towards conflict resolution necessitates a change in the political situation (Wehr, 1979:35). Scholars differ as to the role of third party communication in conflict resolution.

Some scholars (Burton, 1969; Fisher, 1972; Doob, 1970) focus on the process intended to facilitate the development of a relationship between the protagonists which will enable them to work out their own solution. These scholars regard perception as the major obstacle to conflict resolution (Bartunek *et al.*, 1975:533).

We share, however, the view of other scholars (e.g. Dedring, 1976:119) who see in conflict incompatible objectives the resolution of which requires far more than changed perception. Since protagonists may lack sufficient information about their own situation or that of their opponent, an intermediary may facilitate a settlement by transmitting additional information to one or both protagonists (Ott, 1972: 598; Young, 1972:56-57). While the contemporary world is tied together through mass communication, information transmitted by an intermediary may be regarded as more accurate and reliable. Furthermore, because of the emotions generated by the

conflict, mass media messages, or those passed directly between the protagonists, may be distorted or misperceived (Touval, 1975:53).

1.4.2.2 Facilitating Concessions

High emotions which accompany conflict tend to generate rigidities which inhibit bargaining and hamper movement towards settlement. An intermediary can facilitate the concessions required from one or both sides by providing a face saving lever, presenting proposals, offering guarantees and providing rewards to the protagonists.

Intermediaries assist in what Kerr (1954:237-238) refers to as "graceful retreat" from the maximum-minimum positions set by protagonists. This is so because both sides may become committed to mutually incompatible positions such that a stalemate will occur unless one or both sides compromise (Young, 1972:57-58). Even if one side is prepared to give in, it might hesitate due to a belief that such a concession might lead to a loss of face or bargaining reputation in future situations.¹ An intermediary may help the party giving the concession, for example, by creating the impression that such a concession was due to the pressure of public opinion rather than

¹Podel and Knapp (1969:517-520) find that concessions provided through an intermediary give less of an impression of weakening of a party's position than identical concessions which come directly from the opponent.

to the superior position of the opponent (Young, 1972:58). An intermediary's proposals might lead to substantial concessions because they can relieve the sense of personal weakness that obstructs the making of a concession (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970:239).

If a protagonist is to make a final concession that is not to be interpreted as capitulation, he needs an obvious place to stop. A mediator's suggestion may provide it (Schelling, 1963:71). A proposal may be acceptable simply because it is the mediator's proposal (Davies, 1972:85). Protagonists may be unwilling to initiate proposals for a compromise settlement because such a move might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Thus an intermediary may be able to break the impasse by introducing proposals that the protagonists are unwilling to initiate (Young, 1972:58). An intermediary may also undertake what Young (1967b:53) refers to as "enunciation":

The setting forth of clear-cut statements on the part of an outside party laying out its understanding of the issues involved and suggesting basic principles, procedures, or mechanisms through the use of which a solution might be achieved.

One of the major obstacles to settlement might be the low credibility of any treaty signed between the main parties. Each side might be unwilling to give concession because of a fear of the collapse of the agreement. One principal means of enforcing promises has been the use of outside guarantees.

In order to facilitate concession by the protagonists, an intermediary can undertake the role of a guarantor. This is defined as:

The acceptance by a state of an obligation to protect, by force unless otherwise specified, another and weaker state in its independence, territorial integrity, or other specific attributes.

(Dowty, 1972a:255)

Rewards provided by an intermediary can increase the protagonist's confidence in him and compensate for compromises undertaken by the protagonists. Rewards help protagonists maintain their security, give them reason to persevere in the negotiation, assured of their own strength and continued third party support. Active diplomacy backed by economic and military rewards might be cheaper for an intermediary than the costs it would bear as a result of a possible war due to the failure of efforts at conflict resolution.

When a third party with reward power undertakes the role of an intermediary, and provides rewards to both parties in conflict, the impact of such behavior on the cooperative behavior of a dyad in conflict might differ in the case of the traditionally unfavored party from the case of the traditionally favored party. A protagonist who views a third party as traditionally favoring its opponent will attempt to weaken such a coalition (Touval, 1975:64). In order to show

its conciliatory policies, and win third party sympathies and rewards, the traditionally unfavored party might be willing to cooperate with its opponent even when the intermediary rewards the opponent. Azar and Cohen (1979:170) maintain that:

Cooperation must...be presented either as having some strategic advantage or at least no pragmatic disadvantage for the sender. The decision-maker will often point to the benefit that will accrue from third parties' seeing the sender as conciliatory,....

On the other hand, a protagonist who is traditionally favored by a third party will seek to prevent its relationship with it from deteriorating (Touval, 1975:64). Third party rewards to the opponent might be regarded by the traditionally favored party as a sign of worsening relations between it and the third party. In order to show that it will not be pressured, the traditionally favored party might show its resentment of third party rewards to the traditionally unfavored party by decreasing its cooperation with its opponent.

1.4.3 The Inadequacy of the Existing Literature
in Understanding the Impact of Third Party
Behavior as an Ally and as an Intermediary
on the Behavior of a Dyadic Conflict

Foreign policy behavior among states is largely reciprocal. Although in normal relations the overwhelming immediate determinant of behavior towards another state is the behavior received from that state (Dolan, 1978:29), the behavior of protagonists in an entrenched conflict subject to extra-regional influence is also affected by changes in the relationship between each of them and the third party involved in the conflict situation.

We argue that most of the existing literature on third parties is inadequate in understanding the impact of third party behavior as an ally and as an intermediary on the behavior of a dyad in conflict. This can be attributed to two reasons:

a) There is a tendency in the literature to study the impact of third party behavior over an extended time period without focusing on the important question of whether there have been major changes in third party interaction with the dyad in conflict. In studying the impact of third party behavior as an ally and as an intermediary we emphasize the necessity of analyzing major shifts in third party behavior. For example, a third party's behavior as an ally might have a significant

impact on dyadic conflict behavior when its behavior as an ally is the predominant type of interaction with a dyad in conflict. However, if its behavior as an ally is not the predominant type of interaction, the impact of such behavior on the behavior of a dyad in conflict might be insignificant.

b) When we speak about the role of a third party as an ally and as an intermediary we are actually addressing the question: How does the third party interact with both protagonists (in a conflict? Thus, if we want to understand the impact of third party behavior as an ally or as an intermediary, our model should incorporate the impact of the behavior of a third party towards both protagonists on the behavior of each of them.

Most of the literature tends to address the impact of the third party's supportive behavior towards one of the protagonists on its behavior towards its opponent.¹ This is outlined in Figure 1.3.

¹Among the exceptions here is the study by Milstein (1972: 157-160). He studied the impact of aid provided by a superpower to the parties in the Middle East conflict on the behavior of each of them. He analyzed ways in which difference in military capability might affect Arab-Israeli violence. The military balance was measured by the difference in military expenditure between Israel and each of the Arab countries and where applicable the amount of military aid received by each party and its opponent.

FIGURE 1.3: The Impact of the Reciprocal Behavior and Third Party Supportive Behavior on the Behavior of a Protagonist in Conflict

This type of model is inadequate in understanding the impact of third party behavior as an ally or as an intermediary. It takes no account of the impact of the behavior of the third party toward both protagonists on the behavior of each of them. When a third party behaves as an ally of one of the parties in conflict it cooperates with one side and conflicts with the other. When it behaves as an intermediary it cooperates with both protagonists in conflict. The suggested models are outlined in figures 1.4 and 1.5.

FIGURE 1.4: The Ally Model

FIGURE 1.5: The Intermediary Model

1.5 HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses will be tested:

- H₁: If a third party prefers conflict management to conflict resolution, it will tend to behave predominantly as an ally, cooperating more and conflicting less with the party in the dyad that it believes will preserve the *status quo*.
- H₂: If a third party prefers conflict resolution to conflict management, it will tend to behave predominantly as an intermediary cooperating with both protagonists at approximately the same level.
- H₃: A third party with reward power may be acceptable as an intermediary by the traditionally unfavored party even though perceived as biased.
- H₄: A third party with reward power may be more acceptable as an intermediary to the traditionally unfavored party than to the traditionally favored party.
- H₅: A nation state's conflict behavior will be affected by the reciprocal behavior it receives from its opponent and by third party behavior as an ally cooperating with one side and conflicting with the other.
- H₆: A nation state's cooperative behavior will be affected by the reciprocal behavior it receives from its opponent and by third party behavior as an intermediary cooperating with both parties in conflict.
- H₇: If a third party behaves as an ally, it will tend to increase the conflict behavior of the party with whom it is allied.
- H₈: If a third party behaves as an ally, it will tend to decrease the conflict behavior of the party against whom the alliance is directed.

- H₉: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to a party in conflict, the recipient will tend to increase its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.
- H₁₀: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to the traditionally favored party, the traditionally unfavored party will tend to increase its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.
- H₁₁: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to the traditionally unfavored party, the traditionally favored party will tend to decrease its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.

CHAPTER II

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter on methodology includes a discussion of the sources of the data used in testing the hypotheses that were presented in Chapter I, the operational definitions and the reliability of the data.

2.2 SOURCES OF THE DATA AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

This study relies primarily on content analysis as a method for generating the necessary data. "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (Berelson, 1952:18). It is used in this study to generate data on:

1. US objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict
2. Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy
3. US behavior towards Egypt and Israel
4. Egyptian-Israeli behavior vis-à-vis one another
5. Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation

The writer coded the data on US objectives and Egyptian-Israeli perceptions. Edward E. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) was used for the data on Egyptian and Israeli behavior towards one another and for US behavior towards the dyad. The writer recoded the descriptive COPDAB file to measure Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation. All data were aggregated quarterly.

2.2.1 US Objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

Objectives are statements which answer the question "who" wants "what," located "where," "when," and "what" they want to do with it (Legault *et al.*, 1974). The interest here is in studying US objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The data base is the public documents available in the Department of State Bulletin during the period January 1967 - April 1979. The documents in the Department of State Bulletin were subjected to systematic content analysis. The unit of analysis used was the theme --a single assertion about some subject (Holsti, 1969:116). Each document was content analysed in terms of two types of objectives: US objectives in the peace process, and US objectives on core issues in the conflict.

2.2.1.1 Type I: US Objectives in the Peace Process

Conflict management: to avoid military hostilities between the dyad in conflict. This category includes objectives dealing with cease-fire, armistice, non-belligerency, balance of power, reduction of tension, exercise of restraint, arms race.

Conflict resolution: this objective contains two sub-categories:

- a. conflict reduction: solve some of the problems in the dyadic conflict through step-by-step tactics.
- b. comprehensive resolution: to secure a comprehensive settlement, normalization of relations, advocate the convening of the Geneva Conference, application of the Johnson five-point plan, resolutions 242 and 338, the Rogers plan (1969), US-USSR (October 1, 1977) statement, Camp David accords 1978, Peace Treaty.

2.2.1.2 Type II: US Objectives Relating to Core Issues

Palestine/Palestinians: objectives related to this issue include:

- acquire homeland/entity
- acquire Palestinian federation with Jordan
- acquire representation of the Palestinians in determining their future
- acquire solution for Palestinian problems
- acquire rights and legitimate concerns of the Palestinians

- acquire justice for the refugees
- deny support for--deal with--meet with--PLO
Palestinian group
- deny state--sovereignty for Palestinians

Egypt (Post June 1967 occupied territory excluded)

objectives related to this issue include:

- protect political independence--territorial
integrity of
- protect security of--peace within
- protect--restore UN forces in Sharm El Sheikh
- protect--restore freedom of navigation in
Aqaba Straits
- acquire--protect freedom of navigation in Suez
Canal

Israel: objectives related to this issue include:

- protect political independence--territorial
integrity of--acquire recognition of
- protect security of--peace within

Arab occupied territory--Post June 1967: objectives
related to this issue include:

TERRITORY

- restore all occupied Arab territory
- restore occupied Arab territories
- restore all Egyptian territory
- restore part of Sinai
- restore West Bank and Gaza
- restore freedom of navigation to Aqaba
- acquire demilitarized zones

JERUSALEM

- deny unilateral action on Jerusalem
- acquire unification of Jerusalem
- protect religious rights of three religions in Jerusalem
- deny pre-1967 status of Jerusalem

SETTLEMENTS

- deny Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territory
- deny Israeli settlements on West Bank
- deny Israeli settlements in Sinai

2.2.2 Egyptian-Israeli Perception of US Policy

Perceptions refer to statements which answer the question "who" believes "what" about "whom" and "when." The interest here is in Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy. The data base is the public documents¹ available in the British Broadcasting Corporation Monitor Part IV on the Middle East and Africa (BBC Part IV) during the period January 1967 - January 1979; these documents were subjected to a systematic content analysis. The theme was the unit of analysis. Each document was content analyzed in terms of three types of perceptions: perception of US policy toward the dyad; perception of US contribution to peace/stability in the Middle East;

¹Also includes broadcasts on the content of public documents.

and perception of US capability to solve the conflict. The data on Egyptian perceptions of US policy towards the dyad was used to construct the bias index for Egypt, and the data on Israeli perceptions of US policy towards the dyad was used to construct the bias index for Israel.

2.2.2.1 Perception of US Policy Towards the Dyad

Positive: policy towards the target is referred to as friendly to, sympathetic to, giving aid to, guaranteeing sovereignty of, partial to, not applying pressure on...

Negative: policy towards the target is referred to as doubtful, lacks sufficient action to, ignoring, deceptive, aggressive, dominating, destructive...

2.2.2.2 Perception of US Contribution to Peace/Stability in the Middle East Conflict

Contributing to peace/stability: policy towards the Middle East conflict is referred to as contributing to avoidance of military confrontation, to conflict reduction or comprehensive settlement.

Not contributing to peace/stability: policy towards the Middle East conflict is referred to as encouraging tensions in the area, not seeking or aiming at any contribution to conflict resolution, adopting general or specific policies that make conflict resolution more difficult.

2.2.2.3 US Capability to Solve the Conflict

Can solve the Middle East conflict, has the capability to put pressure on the opponent.

Cannot solve the Middle East conflict nor put pressure on the opponent.

2.2.2.4 The Bias Index

Bias is defined as a perception of positive policy towards the opponent and negative policy towards oneself. The bias index takes into consideration a protagonist's total perception of a third party's policy towards the dyad. This is calculated for each of the protagonists as follows:

(positive to self minus negative to self) minus
(positive to opponent minus negative to opponent)

A score is calculated for each quarter. A net result with a negative (-) sign would indicate a perception of bias during the quarter, and a net result with a positive (+) sign would indicate a perception of support.

2.2.3 Egyptian, Israeli and US Cooperative and Conflictual Behavior

The data base for the study of Egyptian, Israeli and US conflictual and cooperative behavior is Azar's COPDAB. This is an extensive computer-based library of longitudinal daily international and domestic events/interactions. A COPDAB event record contains "which" source reported "who" did or said "what" to "whom" about what issue area(s) and "when." An event record also contains the evaluation of the coders regarding the type and the scale value of an event.

We only use the COPDAB data on international interactions on:

- Egyptian conflictual and cooperative behavior towards Israel
- Israeli conflictual and cooperative behavior towards Egypt
- US conflictual and cooperative behavior towards Egypt
- US conflictual and cooperative behavior towards Israel

The following presents Azar's COPDAB international scale, the weight assigned to scale points and the steps taken in the computation of the Dimensions of Interactions (DIs).¹ This is

¹The sections dealing with the international scale, weights assigned to scale points and steps taken in the computation of the DIs are from Azar (1980a:24-26, 35-37).

followed by the operational definitions of the reciprocal behavior variable, US behavior as an ally, and US behavior as an intermediary.

2.2.3.1 Azar's COPDAB International Scale

15 Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation and high strategic cost

Use of atomic or nuclear weapons, full scale air, naval, or land battle; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; massive bombing of civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of military installations; chemical or biological warfare.

14 Limited war acts

Intermittent shelling or clashes; sporadic bombing of military and industrial areas; small scale interception or sinking of ships; mining of territorial waters.

13 Small scale military acts

Limited air, sea or border skirmishes; border police acts; annexing territory already occupied; seizing material of target country; imposing blockades; assassinating leaders of target country; material support of subversive activities against target country.

12 Political military hostile actions

Inciting riots and rebellions (train and financially aid rebellions); encouraging guerrilla activities against target country; limited and sporadic terrorist actions; kidnaping or torturing foreign citizens and prisoners of war; giving sanctuary to terrorists; breaking diplomatic relations; attacking diplomats or embassies, expelling military advisors; nationalizing companies without compensation.

11 Diplomatic economic hostile action

Increasing troop mobilization; boycotts; imposing economic sanctions; hindering movement on land, waterways, or air; embargoing goods; refusing mutual trade rights; closing borders and blocking free communication; manipulating trade and currency to cause economic problems; halting aid; granting sanctuary to opposition leaders; mobilizing hostile demonstrations against target country; refusing to support foreign military allies; recalling ambassador for emergency consultation; refusing visas to other nationals or restricting movement in country, expelling or arresting nationals or press; spying on foreign government officials; terminating major agreements.

10 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction

Warning retaliation for acts; making threatening demands and accusations; condemning strongly specific actions or policies; denouncing leaders, system or ideology; postponing heads of state visits; refusing

participation in meetings or summits; levelling strong propaganda attacks; denying support; blocking or vetoing policy or proposals in the UN or other international bodies.

9 Mild verbal expression displaying discord in the interaction

Low key objection to policies or behavior; communicating dissatisfaction through third party; failing to reach an agreement; refusing protest note; denying accusations; objecting to explanation of goals, position, etc.; request change in policy.

8 Neutral or non-significant acts for the international situation

Rhetorical policy statements; non-consequential news items; non-governmental visitors; indifference statements; compensating for nationalized enterprises or private property; no comment statements.

7 Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression--mild verbal support

Meeting of high officials; conferring on problems of mutual interest; visit by lower officials for talks; issuing joint communiques; appointing ambassadors; announce cease-fire; non-governmental exchanges; proposing talks; public non-governmental support of regime; exchanging prisoners of war; ask for support of policy; stating or explaining policy.

6 Official verbal support of goals, values, and regime

Official support of policy; raising legation to embassy; reaffirming friendship; asking for help against third party; apologizing for unfavorable actions or statements; allowing press correspondents entry; thanking for aid; resuming broken diplomatic or other relations.

5 Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic)

Starting diplomatic relations; establishing technological or scientific communication; proposing or offering economic or military aid; recognizing government; opening borders; conducting or enacting friendship agreements; conducting cultural and academic agreements or exchanges.

4 Non-military economic, technological and industrial agreement

Making economic loans, grants, agreeing to economic pacts; giving industrial, cultural, educational assistance; conducting trade agreements and granting most favored nation status; establishing common transportation or communication network; selling industrial technological surplus supplies; providing technical expertise; ceasing economic restrictions; repaying debts; selling non-military goods; giving disaster relief.

3 Military and strategic support

Selling nuclear power plants or materials; providing air, naval, or land facilities for bases; giving military technical or advisory assistance; granting military aid; sharing highly advanced technology; intervening with military support at request of government; concluding military agreements; training military personnel; joint programs and plans to initiate and pursue disarmament.

2 Major strategic alliance (regional or international)

Fighting a war jointly; establishing a joint military command or alliance; conducting joint military manoeuvres; establishing economic common market; joining or organizing international alliances; establishing joint program to raise the global quality of life.

1 Voluntary unification into one nation

Merging voluntarily into one nation-state; forming one nation with one legally binding government.

Events coded on the scale 1 - 7 are defined as cooperative behavior. Events coded on the scale 9 - 15 are defined as conflict behavior.

2.2.3.2 Weights Assigned to Scale Points

COPDAB assigns weights to the scale points outlined above. Eighteen scholars and practitioners of international relations were asked to represent, in numerical terms, the amount of conflict and cooperation represented by each of the scale points in relation to the neutral point 8 which was arbitrarily given an intensity value of one. The weights assigned to the scale points are presented in table 2.1.

TABLE 2.1

WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO COPDAB INTERNATIONAL SCALE

Scale Point	Weighted Value	
15	102	
14	65	
13	50	
12	44	conflict end
11	29	
10	16	
9	6	
8	1	neutral point
7	6	
6	10	
5	14	
4	27	cooperation end
3	31	
2	47	
1	92	

2.2.3.3 Dimensions of Interactions

With data available on both frequency and intensity of behavior of nation A toward B, COPDAB combines these variables into two measures, the Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for cooperation and the Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for conflict. The following steps were taken in the computation of quarterly DIs:

- Multiply quarterly frequency of events of each scale point by weighted value of that point.
- Add the products obtained as follows:
 - to get conflict DIs, add the scores of the conflict part of the scale
 - to get cooperative DIs, add the scores of the cooperative part of the scale.

2.2.3.4 The Reciprocal Behavior Variable

The reciprocal behavior variable is the same behavior received from the opponent (e.g., if Egyptian conflict behavior toward Israel is the dependent variable, then Israeli conflict behavior toward Egypt would be the reciprocal behavior variable).

2.2.3.5 US Behavior as an Ally of Israel

Two variables are used to measure US behavior as an ally of Israel:

1. US cooperative behavior towards Israel; and
2. US conflict behavior towards Egypt.

2.2.3.6 US Behavior as an Intermediary

Two variables are used to measure US behavior as an intermediary in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict:

1. US cooperation towards Israel; and
2. US cooperation towards Egypt.

Since our interest is in the role of an intermediary providing rewards to both protagonists, we do not focus only on diplomatic activity but also on verbal and tangible rewards provided by the third party to both opponents.

2.2.4 Egyptian-Israeli Acceptance of US Mediation

The data base for the study of Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation is Azar's COPDAB descriptive data file. The writer recorded COPDAB's descriptive data on Egyptian and Israeli behavior towards the US according to the following:

Accept mediation: actions which urge, suggest or propose that the US undertake an active role in the peace process or the specific acceptance of proposals presented by the US.

Reject mediation: actions which oppose, refuse or rebuff the involvement of the US in the peace process or the rejection of specific proposals undertaken by the US.

We calculated the percentage of acceptance. This is defined as the ratio of the number of events indicating an actor's acceptance to the total number of events indicating an actor's acceptance and rejection of US mediation.

$$\text{Percentage of acceptance} = \frac{\text{number of acceptance}}{\text{Number of acceptance} + \text{Number of rejection}}$$

For a more detailed description of the coding systems for US objectives and Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy, the reader may refer to the codebooks presented in Appendices I and II. For a detailed description of Azar's CORDAB coding system, the reader may refer to Azar (1980a).

2.3 RELIABILITY

To satisfy the requirements of objectivity in research, repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results (Holsti, 1969:135). This study uses two types of reliability measures:¹ inter-coder reliability and intra-coder reliability.

¹In testing the reliability of the data dealing with US objectives and Egyptian-Israeli perceptions, two experts on content analysis were asked to specify the number of documents in two issues in the Department of State Bulletin (DSB), issue nos. 1593 and 2020 and two issues in the BBC issue nos. 3269 and 3511, which contained references to US objectives and Egyptian and Israeli perception as specified in our codebooks (the Codebook for US objectives in the case of documents in the DSB, and the Codebook for Egyptian-Israeli perceptions in the case of documents in the BBC). The two experts and the writer agreed on the number of documents in each of the specified issues (1 document in DSB issue no. 1593, 3 documents in DSB issue no. 2020, 1 document in BBC issue no. 3269 and 2 documents in BBC issue no. 3511). Two coders (in addition to the writer) were then asked to content analyze four documents from the above issues in accordance with our Codebooks.

- address by Secretary Rogers, "A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View," December 9, 1969.
- Statement by Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Harold Saunders, given before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations, September 28, 1978.
- Nasser's speech in Khartoum, January 1, 1970.
- Interview by Foreign Minister Abba Eban, October 17, 1970.

In testing the reliability of the data on Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation, two coders (in addition to the writer) were asked to specify the number of events (from COPDAB's descriptive file on Egyptian and Israeli behavior towards the US) indicating Egyptian and Israeli acceptance and rejection of US mediation during the period October - December 1973.

For a discussion of the reliability of COPDAB, consult Azar (1980b).

2.3.1 Inter-Coder Reliability Tests

This test measures the agreement of two coders who check the same code for each category coded.¹ The coefficient of reliability is the ratio of coding agreements to the total number of coding decisions (Holsti, 1969:140).

$$C.R. = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$$

M = number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree

N₁ = number of coding decisions by coder 1

N₂ = number of coding decisions by coder 2

The results of the tests between the writer (coder A) and each of the coders (B and C) are presented in Table 2.2. The average coefficient of reliability for the documents dealing with US objectives is .76, for the documents dealing with Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy it is .66 and for the data on Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation it is .90.

¹The tests as undertaken here take into account the reliability of both the abstraction and the coding of each document.

TABLE 2.2
RESULTS OF THE INTER-CODER
RELIABILITY TESTS

	A - B	A - C
Documents dealing with US objectives:		
Rogers' speech	.68	.65
Saunders' statement	.80	.89
Documents dealing with Egyptian-Israeli perceptions:		
Nasser's speech	.58	.62
Eban's interview	.75	.67
Data on Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation:		
Egyptian acceptance	.86	.93
Israeli acceptance	.80	1.0

What constitutes an acceptable level of reliability has not been agreed on. Holsti (1969:142) indicates that the simpler the forms of content analysis, the higher the reliability that can be achieved. This is reflected in the results of our tests; the highest average reliability coefficient is for the data on Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation. The other two average coefficients reported above are reasonably reliable. Burkart (1980:33) and Selim (1979:93) regard an average coefficient of reliability of .64 and .62, respectively, as reasonably reliable.

2.3.2 Intra-Coder Reliability Test

This test is conducted by only one coder who does the coding twice.¹ The writer coded the specified items once and then did it again four months later. The results of the two different codings were calculated according to the coefficient of reliability outlined above. Since the

¹Intra-coder reliability tests were undertaken by Burkart (1980:31-32) and Selim (1979:93-94). They report average coefficients of reliability of .78 and .75 respectively.

coding was undertaken by only one coder, we would expect the coefficient of reliability to be higher than the coefficient in the inter-coder reliability test. In the intra-coder reliability test, individual differences in the interpretation of the coding scheme are minimized (Burkart, 1980:33; Selim, 1979:93).

The results of the tests are presented in Table 2.3. The average coefficient of reliability for the documents dealing with US objectives is .88, for the documents dealing with Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy it is .83 and for the data on Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation it is .97.

2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter identified the sources of the data used in this study, the operational definitions and the reliability of the data. In the following chapters we will use the data in testing the hypotheses that were presented in Chapter I.

TABLE 2.3

RESULTS OF THE INTRA-CODER
RELIABILITY TESTS

Documents dealing with US objectives:	
Rogers' speech	.87
Saunders' statement	.89
Documents dealing with Egyptian-Israeli perceptions of US policy:	
Nasser's speech	.76
Eban's interview	.89
Data on Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of US mediation:	
Egyptian acceptance	.93
Israeli acceptance	1.0

CHAPTER III

US OBJECTIVES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter I emphasized the failure of most of the existing literature on third parties to specify the relationship between a third party's regional objectives and its objectives in the peace process in a conflict situation. It was suggested that if third party decision makers believe that the *status quo* in a dyadic conflict presents a threat to their regional objectives, they will tend to give priority to conflict resolution rather than to conflict management in their objectives in the peace process. It was also suggested that if, on the other hand, a third party's decision makers believe that the *status quo* does not harm their regional objectives, and that the eruption into physical violence can be deterred, it is more likely that these decision makers will give priority to conflict management rather than to conflict resolution in their objectives in the peace process.

This chapter discusses the relationship between US objectives in the Middle East generally and US objectives in the peace process in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. It will first briefly identify US objectives in the Middle East.

This will be followed by a description of Egyptian and Israeli interactions and examine whether or not the *status quo* in these interactions posed a threat to US objectives in the Middle East. Finally, this chapter will discuss US objectives in the peace process in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.

3.2 REGIONAL OBJECTIVES: US OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Regional objectives as defined in Chapter I refer to a third party's objectives in the region where the conflict takes place. According to the literature on American foreign policy and publicly available documents on US foreign policy, the US has the following fundamental objectives in the Middle East:

- Reducing Soviet influence in the area and avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union
- Protecting the security and well-being of Israel
- Secure access to Arab oil¹

¹For a discussion on US objectives in the literature, see Hunter (1971), Pauk (1980), Quandt (1977), Rosecrance (1980) and Tillman (1980).

3.2.1 Reducing Soviet Influence in the Area and Avoiding Confrontation with the Soviet Union

The American view of the Soviet Union, except for the brief period of World War II, has been consistently unfavorable. Before World War II, the Soviet Union was regarded as an unappeasable agent of world revolution. After World War II, American decision makers were concerned with the threat of the spread of communism in other world regions (Tillman, 1980:39). They believed, however, that Soviet expansionist tendencies could be contained by American policy.¹

In the Middle East, the United States sought bases and allies as part of its global defence system against the Soviet Union. Turkey and Greece were drawn into the NATO alliance, Iran was prevented from undertaking a neutralist course and moderate Arab States were supported (Quandt, 1977:5). However, containing Soviet influence in the Middle East proved unattainable by the mid-1950's. Soviet presence in the area increased² due to the increasing reliance of Arab States on the Soviet Union for arms to assist in the

¹For a discussion of the policy of containment see Kennan (1947) and Tucker and Watts (1973).

²For a discussion of USSR influence in the Middle East see Laqueur (1969).

continuing confrontation with Israel. Under these conditions, US decision makers sought to minimize at least the Soviet role since it posed a threat to US objectives in the area. US decision makers believed that they had to keep in mind not only Soviet arms policy but also its stepped up activities in the area and its long term objective of increasing its influence in the area and reducing thereby the influence of the West, and the United States in particular (Sisco, April 23, 1969; DSB, 1561:444).¹

With the increase of Soviet influence in the Middle East, the fear of a confrontation between the two superpowers became a major concern to US decision makers:

The fact that the Middle East is an area of potential conflict between the major powers helps to explain why it is high on the agenda of world trouble spots.

(Sisco, August 19, 1972; DSB, 1735:350)

The large Soviet presence in the area, particularly in Egypt after the 1967 war and during the early 1970's, increased the threat of confrontation between the two superpowers if hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis broke out. Both superpowers had vital political, economic and strategic objectives in the area (Sisco, February 14, 1971; DSB 1654:296). These objectives raised the possibility

¹All citations from the Department of State Bulletin (DSB) will be referred to as follows: Date of Document; DSB, DSB issue number:page.

of nuclear confrontation in case each power intervened on the side of its client. Even if the probability of such a confrontation was low, its consequences were regarded as so dangerous that its prevention became a primary objective (Quandt, 1977:10). This is why the situation in the Middle East was described as being more dangerous than in Vietnam:

The situation in the Mideast is more dangerous, more dangerous because it involves--and this is not the case in Viet-Nam--a collision of the super-powers.

(Nixon, July 1, 1970; DSB, 1622:113)

3.2.2 Protecting the Security and Well-Being of Israel

The concern for Israel's security and well-being has been regarded by US decision makers as a basic commitment of US foreign policy. For example, Secretary of State Rogers (May 6, 1971; DSB, 1666:697) said:

The constancy of America's support for the well-being and security of Israel is an axiom of our relationship.

Despite widespread agreement between US decision makers on the essentiality of the US commitment to Israel, the US does not have a formal alliance with Israel. Nixon (January 4, 1971; DSB, 1648:109) explained this in an interview on American radio and TV. He was asked whether the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for peace

would be better served if the US had an alliance with Israel. He replied:

No I don't believe so, because I think that what we are doing for Israel is so well known to them --and also incidentally it is quite well known to their neighbours--that it provides the balance that is needed....

I do not believe that a formal alliance would be --is either necessary or would be in the interest of peace in the area.

Scholars have attributed the US commitment to Israel to three factors: a moral consideration resulting from the holocaust; American domestic politics, i.e., the influence of the effective Zionist lobby; and American strategic interests.¹

Our policy vis-à-vis Israel remains constant. It has not changed. We believe that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Israel is very important for our national interest.

(Rogers, June 25, 1970; DSB, 1620:26)

According to this explanation, Israel is the only reliable ally of the United States in the area and could provide bases for American military operations in case of need. US prestige would suffer if Soviet arms were allowed to tip the scales against Israel, and American commitment

¹See Quandt (1973), Quandt (1977), and Safran (1978).

throughout the world would be questioned if Israel was defeated by clients of the Soviet Union (Quandt, 1977:12).

3.2.3 Securing Access to Arab Oil

The United States, as a great industrial and military power, is vitally in need of energy resources to ensure its economy and security. Thus securing energy resources is of vital importance to the US. About one fourth of the world's proven and probable oil reserves are in Saudi Arabia (Congressional Research Service, 1977:63; Tillman, 1980:2). Arab oil has been regarded by American decision makers as vital for American security because of its abundance and a fear that America might exhaust its own reserves of petroleum. Eugene Rostow (January 23, 1968; DSB, 1494:218), then State Department Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, explained the US objective to the Senate:

We have serious national interests in the Middle East... Its oil resources are a major factor in the life of the world economy. The power to deny access to the Middle East and its resources would be a matter of grave concern to the United States and its allies in Europe and elsewhere.

In the following section we will consider whether the *status quo* in the Egyptian-Israeli interactions posed a threat to US objectives in the Middle East.

3.3 THE THREAT TO REGIONAL OBJECTIVES:
THE *STATUS QUO* IN THE EGYPTIAN-
ISRAELI INTERACTIONS AND THE THREAT
TO US OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Arab-Israeli conflict, of which the Egyptian-Israeli conflict is part, has been described as a border conflict, a colonial conflict, an ethnic conflict, and a religious conflict. It has also been explained as a product of great power intervention and as a result of the struggles following World War II. It has been attributed to underdevelopment, insecurity, and arrogance. It has also been explained as a campaign for hegemony in the area by one or another international or regional actor.¹ Finally, the conflict has been defined as a protracted social conflict.²

¹These explanations are taken from Azar *et al.* (1978:41-42). See their classification of the literature according to the above explanation.

²See Azar *et al.* (1978:50). They defined a protracted social conflict as:

Hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high...While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination.

3.3.1 The *Status Quo* in Egyptian-Israeli Interactions

In the case of the Egyptian-Israeli interactions the *status quo* refers to the "no war/no peace" situation.¹ Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the Z scores for the quarterly DIs for Egyptian and Israeli conflict and cooperation vis-a-vis one another. The data show that the quarter of the October war (October - December 1973) marked the peak in both conflictual and cooperative behavior. During the pre-war period, Egyptian and Israeli conflict (as indicated by Z scores for the quarterly DIs) was very high, and their cooperation was mostly low. After the war, there was a decline in Egyptian and Israeli conflict and an increase in their cooperation.

3.3.2 The Threat to US Regional Objectives

The threat to a third party's regional objectives depends largely upon its decision makers' perceptions. They do not respond to the objective facts of the situation but to their image of that situation. It is what they believe the world is like, not necessarily what it is really like, that determines their position at any given moment (Boulding, 1969:423).

¹This definition of the *status quo* is customarily used in the relevant literature.

2

FIGURE 3.1: Z Scores for the DIs for Egyptian and Israeli Conflictual Behavior vis-à-vis one another, 1967-1978.

FIGURE 3.2: Z Scores for the DIs for Egyptian and Israeli Cooperative Behavior vis-à-vis one another - January 1967 - December 1978

During the pre-war period, US decision makers believed that the threat of war posed by the conflictual interactions between Egypt and Israel could be deterred. For example, Nixon (July 1, 1970; DSB, 1622:113) explained that:

Once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker than its neighbors, there will be a war. Therefore, it is in U.S. interests to maintain the balance of power... We will do what is necessary to maintain Israel's strength vis-à-vis its neighbors, not because we want Israel to be in a position to wage war... but because that is what will deter its neighbors from attacking it.

US decision makers believed that the *status quo* in Egyptian-Israeli interactions did not harm US objectives in the Middle East. They believed that a strong Israel could fulfill the objective of securing Israeli security and well-being. A strong Israel also served to deter the Russians from further intervention in the Middle East region (Rubin, 1974:100). This argument was particularly strengthened after the Jordan crisis of 1970 when Israel was regarded by US decision makers as an asset in preventing the increase in Soviet influence in the region (Quandt, 1977:106). Kissinger (1979:354, 1290) also believed that the "no war/no peace" situation would work to the advantage of the US. He wanted to frustrate Egypt which he regarded as a radical state hostile to the US. He sought to demonstrate that in the Middle East friendship with the US

was the prerequisite for a change in the "no war/no peace" situation. He believed that this situation would eventually persuade Sadat to deal directly with the US and reduce total dependence on the Soviet Union. Since 1969, Kissinger¹ (1979:368-369) had believed that:

A continuing deadlock was in our interest; it would persuade Egypt to face the reality that Soviet tutelage and a radical foreign policy were obstacles to progress and that only the United States could bring about a settlement; it would demonstrate Soviet impotence and in time might impel a fundamental reconstruction of Arab, and especially of Egyptian foreign policies.

The expulsion of the Soviets by Sadat in 1972 probably reinforced the notion that the US objective of reducing Soviet influence was not threatened by the *status quo*.

US decision makers also did not believe that the *status quo* in Egyptian-Israeli interactions constituted a threat to the US objective of securing access to Arab oil. During the 1950's and 1960's, the predicted oil shortage did not take place. Oil was available at comparatively low prices and American production covered most domestic needs (Quandt, 1977:12). The embargoes of 1956 and 1967 were ineffective and short lived.

¹Note that Kissinger undertook an active role in the formulation of US foreign policy in the Middle East only about the end of 1971 (Kissinger, 1979:348, 1289).

The economic sanctions that have been applied by Arabs in terms of oil exports and by Egypt in the closing of the Suez Canal have had comparatively little effect on the United States. The burdens of these sanctions have fallen in major proportion on the Arabs themselves.

(Rostow, July 12, 1967; DSB, 1469:237)

In 1971, the demand for oil increased, but US production seemed to be leveling off and the oil producing states were becoming more assertive on prices and control of production. This provided an added incentive for new exploration for energy resources, but did not provide a governmental response since there was no perceived urgent threat to the defense or industrial security of the US (Quandt, 1977:13).

While Egypt in this period, January 1967 - September, 1973, was largely a non-exporting oil state, the US objective in securing access to oil confers on the Middle East as a whole considerable importance, and Egypt is a key state in any political settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict (McLaurin *et al.*, 1977:10). But the US government during the pre-1973 war period envisaged no scenario whereby the growing problem of dependency on Arab oil was linked with the lingering grievances over the Egyptian-Israeli impasse (Sigler, 1978:10). It is within this context that we can understand why even the increase in conflictual interactions between Egypt and Israel during the war of attrition, in

1969 and 1970 (see Figures 3.1) was not regarded as a threat to the US objective.

The outbreak of physical violence in the October 1973 War demonstrated the threat that the *status quo* in Egyptian-Israeli interactions really posed to US objectives in the Middle East. The war was a surprise to American decision makers. At his press conference, Kissinger (October 12, 1973; DSB, 1792:534) stated:

We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions during the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities to give us their assessment of what might happen. There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening. Nor was the possibility of hostilities raised in any of the discussions with either of the parties that took place at the United Nations during the last week.

Key US objectives were placed in jeopardy during the war. Confrontation with the Soviet Union became a reality on October 24, 1973, and the flow of oil was interrupted as a result of the Arab embargo.

American concern after the outbreak of hostilities was that the Middle East might become what the Balkans were in Europe before 1914, an area where local rivalries that had their own momentum would draw great powers into a confrontation that they did not necessarily seek, nor even necessarily start (Kissinger, October 12, 1973; DSB, 1792:535).

While Soviet behavior prior to October 12, 1973 was described by Kissinger (October 12, 1973; DSB, 1792:538) as less provocative and less geared to military threat than during the 1967 crisis, events following the cease-fire of October 22, 1973¹ confronted the United States with the reality of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Scali (October 23, 1973; DSB, 1794:601), the US representative to the UN, explained the difficulty of establishing actual cease fire lines and of fixing the position of forces which had been manoeuvring in the desert. US officials, however, knew that it was Israeli forces that were advancing beyond the October 22 cease-fire lines. In an attempt to halt the movement of Israeli forces, Sadat appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States to send forces to oversee the cease-fire. The Soviet Union conveyed to the United States its support for the idea of joint US-USSR forces and threatened to intervene unilaterally to stop Israel's violation of the cease-fire (Quandt, 1977:194-196).

¹The cease-fire of October 22, 1973 was contained in the UN Security Council Resolution 338. See Appendix IV.

The United States did not favor nor approve the sending of a joint US-USSR force into the Middle East since it would compound great power rivalry in the area (Kissinger, October 25, 1973; DSB, 1794:587). The threat of Soviet military presence in the Middle East prompted the American world wide alert of military forces on October 25, 1973. In explaining the alert, Nixon (October 26, 1973; DSB, 1794:581) maintained:

We obtained information which led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force into the Mideast, a military force.

When I received that information, I ordered, shortly after midnight on Thursday morning, an alert for all American forces around the world. This was a precautionary alert. The purpose of that was to indicate to the Soviet Union that we could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Mideast.

The alert had the function of demonstrating the strong belief of the American government that the movement of Soviet forces would be disadvantageous to world peace.¹

¹There are two interpretations as to why the US initiated the alert. One view interprets the alert as an attempt by the US President to distract public attention away from Watergate. The other view minimizes the impact of Watergate. According to this view, Nixon's role in the alert was minimal. The President empowered Kissinger to act on his behalf considerably early in the crisis and did not ratify the military alert until at least three hours after US forces had been informed of the decision. Kissinger advocated the alert since he wanted to save the Egyptian Third Army without appearing as capitulating to Soviet threats. Also, in a crisis situation where time was important, Washington must have considered it safer to err greatly on the side of over-reaction than to falter slightly on the side of inadequacy (Sagan, 1979:172).

To the extent that that message was conveyed, the alert was a success (Schlesinger, October 26, 1973; DSB, 1795:619). The USSR agreed to support the US-sponsored Security Council Resolution 340¹ which excluded the participation of the superpowers from the UN emergency force. In exchange, the US agreed that both Moscow and Washington would send a small number of observers to Egypt (Sagan, 1979:173).

The October War revealed the limitations of détente in minimizing the dangers of local conflict. While American decision makers did acknowledge the role of détente in reducing the dangers of confrontation (Rush, November 13, 1973; DSB, 1797:679), the war made it clear that:

Détente will not stop either country under conditions when it believes its vital interests are involved, and therefore it is important to prevent situations in which either country believes that its vital interests are threatened.
(Kissinger, June 26, 1974; DSB, 1831:204)

The second threat to US objectives resulting from the October War was the cut in the supply of oil to the West, including the United States. US decision makers did not expect the embargo to be effective, as the experience of 1967 had indicated, nor did they foresee the price increase that

¹See Appendix V.

could accompany such an embargo. The October war showed that the embargo could be effective; it further culminated in an unpredicted increase in oil prices and strained relations between the United States and its allies.

The basic cause of the energy crisis was not the Egyptian-Israeli war. The explosive growth of world-wide demand had outrun supply; the war simply made a chronic crisis acute (Kissinger, December 12, 1973; DSB, 1801:780-781). The energy crisis had three dimensions: the shortage of supply, the oil embargo, and the quantum increase in prices. While the oil embargo had the economic effect of reducing the supply of oil, its political dimension was also of concern. It carried with it profound implications for the world community--the manipulation of raw material supplies in order to influence the foreign policies of the importing countries (Kissinger, February 11, 1974; DSB, 1810:202).

A senior US official, George M. Bennsky¹ (November 27, 1973; DSB, 1800:771), explained the economic implications of the oil embargo. He estimated that the Arab oil boycott would deprive the United States of between 2.5 and 3 million

¹Director of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs in the State Department.

bbl/d of oil during the winter of 1973-1974, up to 17% of the US estimated winter demand. The possibilities for compensating for the effects of the embargo and cutback from non-Arab sources were virtually nil since these producers were already operating at capacity production levels.

The effects on American allies were even more profound. Bennis (November 29, 1973; DSB, 1800:771-772) estimated that in 1973 Japan imported 40% of its imported oil from Arab sources and that Western Europe, taken as a whole, received 73% of its oil from these sources. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (February 19, 1974; DSB, 1812:280), believed that the dependence of Western Europe on Arab oil influenced the tensions in the American-European relationship during the October War:

What disappointed us, was the failure of the European allies to appreciate the extent of the Soviet threat in the Middle East and their consequent reluctance fully to support our operations during the crisis....

A...significant consideration...was the drastic European dependence on Arab oil supplies....The figures suggest why European governments in varying degrees felt themselves hostage to Arab policies. In short, the European allies simply assessed their national interests in a different way than we did ours.

More important than the embargo were the remarkable price increases that accompanied and followed it. In September 1973, government revenues from the typical barrel of oil at the Persian Gulf was \$1.77. With the proclamation

of the embargo it became \$3.50, and on January 1, 1974, on the Shah's initiative, it rose to \$7.01 (Rustow, 1974: 169-170). Kissinger (February 11, 1974; DSB, 1810:202) estimated the impact of the oil price increases:

The most immediate and critical problem concerns price. Current price levels are simply not sustainable. At these levels, the industrial countries alone will incur a current account deficit of \$36-\$40 billion in 1974. Such large increases in costs would seriously magnify both unemployment and inflation in the importing countries, while the effect on domestic production would be deflationary. Pressures for import quotas will become irresistible; a general decline in world trade will follow inevitably.

Since the oil embargo had made a chronic crisis acute, it was in the US interest to have it lifted and to avoid a situation that might lead to its repetition. Nixon (October 26, 1973; DSB, 1794:583-584) explained the US objective at a Press Conference:

With regard to the oil shortage...one of the major factors which gave enormous urgency to our efforts to settle this particular crisis was the potential of an oil cut off....

What I am simply suggesting is this: that with regard to the fuel shortage potentially in the United States and in the world, it is indispensable at this time that we avoid any further Mideast crisis so that the flow of oil to Europe, to Japan, and to the United States can continue.

The rapid increase in the investable surplus which the Arab producing states came to hold, especially Saudi Arabia, added a new dimension to US objectives in the Middle East. As Harold Saunders (June 12, 1978; DSB, 2017-30), then Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East and South Asian Affairs, explained:

The Middle East figures in our calculations on energy, as well as in our balance-of-payments position and efforts to maintain a stable dollar, in ways that would have been unthinkable 10 years ago.

While Egypt is not one of the major oil producing countries, it was regarded as influential within the Arab world. Saudi Arabia is considered by the US as an effective arbiter of OPEC prices because of its large excess capacity. American decision makers believed that the solution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict would eventually lead to a solution of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict and consequently pacify the Saudis and safeguard US objective in securing access to Arab oil. They expected to be able to secure, if not active Saudi support, at least its passive acquiescence in a peace process focusing on the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict (Tillman, 1980:12, 14).

In view of the threat to US objectives posed by the October war, the US appeared to have had no choice but to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The October war and the oil embargo cost the US, according to the estimates of the National Petroleum Council, between \$30 and \$60 billion in lost gross national product; the next war in the Middle East would cost the US and Western Europe considerably more (Sheehan, 1977:216).

3.4 OBJECTIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS:
US OBJECTIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS
IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Objectives in the peace process as defined earlier, refer to a third party's objectives in the settlement of a dyadic conflict. A third party might give priority either to conflict management or to conflict resolution in its objectives in the peace process. Conflict management refers to the prevention of the protagonists' pursuit of their incompatible objectives from turning into violence. It is operationally defined by statements advocating the avoidance of military confrontation within the dyad. Conflict resolution refers to the need for achieving the protagonists' agreement on the basic issues which terminate the conflict in a self-perpetuating manner (Fisher, 1969). Resolution implies a solution freely acceptable to all parties--one that does not destroy any important values--one that the

parties will not wish to repudiate in the absence of changed circumstances (Burton, 1969:171). Conflict resolution implies not only the absence of physical violence (Galtung, 1971:190) but also an agreement on removing the basic incompatibility in the protagonists' objectives. Conflict resolution is operationally defined by statements advocating conflict reduction and comprehensive settlement. Statements were identified as advocating conflict reduction if they urged the use of step-by-step tactics to solve the conflict. Statements were identified as advocating a comprehensive settlement if they advocated acquiring the solution of all the problems involved in the dyadic conflict, normalization of relations, a peace treaty or the application of a plan/resolution advocating a comprehensive settlement.

Table 3.1 presents the frequency of US objectives in the peace process in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict during the period January 1967 - December 1978. The priority given to conflict management or to conflict resolution is determined by the frequency of articulation of these objectives. Underlying this definition of priority is the assumption that the more relevant an objective to a decision maker, the greater the number of references he will make to that objective.¹

¹Pool (1959:194) and Selim (1979:360) maintain that the more relevant the belief (or any personal characteristics) to a decision maker, the greater the number of references he will make to that belief.

TABLE 3.1

FREQUENCY OF US OBJECTIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS
IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	CONFLICT RESOLUTION		TOTAL
		Conflict Reduction	Comprehensive Settlement	
January-March 1967				
April-June 1967	60		17	77
July-September 1967	20		10	30
October-December 1967	20		10	30
January-March 1968	17		7	24
April-June 1968	13		15	28
July-September 1968	10		2	12
October-December 1968	8		3	11
January-March 1969	5		1	6
April-June 1969	4		3	7
July-September 1969	14		7	21
October-December 1969	8		11	19
January-March 1970	21		5	26
April-June 1970	22		9	31
July-September 1970	13		1	14
October-December 1970	30		11	41
January-March 1971	10		1	11
April-June 1971	14	7	13	34
July-September 1971	5	2		7
October-December 1971	4	7	1	12
January-March 1972	17	6		23
April-June 1972	12	4	5	21
July-September 1972	9	8	4	21
October-December 1972	2	7	1	10
January-March 1973	3	10		13
April-June 1973	30	8	3	41
July-September 1973	6	1	2	9
October-December 1973	59	3	13	75
January-March 1974	1	12		13
April-June 1974	11	8	5	24
July-September 1974	3	2	4	9
October-December 1974	9	11	3	23
January-March 1975	11	14	8	33
April-June 1975	14	1	7	22
July-September 1975	8	8	5	21
October-December 1975	23	3	19	45

.../

TABLE 3.1 (cont'd)

QUARTER	CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	CONFLICT RESOLUTION		TOTAL
		Conflict Reduction	Comprehensive Settlement	
January-March 1976	6	1	6	13
April-June 1976	8		8	16
July-September 1976			5	5
October-December 1976	7		9	16
January-March 1977	5		12	17
April-June 1977	13		23	36
July-September 1977	6		34	40
October-December 1977	15	1	56	72
January-March 1978	16		24	40
April-June 1978	8		13	21
July-September 1978	12		18	30
October-December 1978			12	12
TOTAL	612	124	426	1162

We shall use the data in Table 3.1 to see whether US decision makers gave priority to conflict management during the pre-war period (January 1967 - September 1973), when they did not regard the *status quo* as a threat to their objectives in the Middle East. We also use the data to see whether US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution when they believed that the *status quo* could threaten US objectives in the Middle East (during the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978).

In identifying US priorities, we compared the number of quarters during which US decision makers gave priority to conflict management (or conflict resolution) during the pre- and post-October war periods. Since the comparison of priorities according to quarters does not take into account the extent of differences in priorities accorded to each objective, we also used a second procedure: the difference in the frequency of articulation of US objectives in conflict management and conflict resolution was tested by aggregating separately US objectives in conflict management and conflict resolution during the pre-war period and examining the mean difference between them.¹ The same procedure was used for US objectives

¹Tests of significance in this research are used to help construct a decision rule according to which we can decide if a difference is important or not. The opinion held by the writer is in line with Winch and Campbell's article (1970) titled "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance."

in conflict management and resolution during the post-war period.¹

The data show that during the period January 1967 - December 1978, US decision makers gave priority to conflict management (rather than conflict resolution) in 22 quarters (46%) out of the 48 under study. The data also show that US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution in 24 quarters (50%) of the 48.² Nineteen quarters (86%) out of the 22 during which US decision makers gave priority to conflict management occurred during the pre-war period. In other words, the US gave priority to conflict management in 70% of the quarters during the pre-war period. During the war quarter, US decision makers gave priority to conflict management. Only two quarters (10%) of the 22 during which the US gave priority to conflict management were during the post-war period; the US thus gave priority to conflict management in only 10% of the quarters during the post-war period.

¹The last quarter in 1973 (October - December) was left out because the war took place during it.

²During the first quarter of 1967 (January - March) there were no articulated statements on US objectives in the peace process in the coded documents. During the second quarter of 1976 (April - June) the frequency of articulation on both conflict management and conflict resolution is the same, 8 references in each case.

On the other hand, we find that 7 quarters (29%) of the 24 during which US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution occurred during the pre-war period; US decision makers thus gave priority to conflict resolution in only 26% of the quarters during the pre-war period. Seventeen quarters (71%) of the 24 during which US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution were during the post-war period; US decision makers thus gave priority to conflict resolution in 85% of the quarters during the post-war period.

Table 3.2 presents the mean difference of US objectives on conflict management and conflict resolution during the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973. The results show that US decision makers gave priority to conflict management rather than to conflict resolution during the pre-war period (about 50% more). The mean difference is statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 3.3 presents the mean difference of US objectives on conflict management and conflict resolution during the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978. The results show that US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution rather than to conflict management during the post-war period (about 50 more). The mean difference is statistically significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 3.2

MEAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US OBJECTIVES CONCERNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
DURING THE PRE-WAR PERIOD JANUARY 1967 - SEPTEMBER 1973*

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean Difference	T Value	2-tail Probability
US objectives concerning conflict management	13.96	12.17	6.48	3.22	.003
US objectives concerning conflict resolution	7.48	5.18			

*N = 27

TABLE 3.3

MEAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US OBJECTIVES CONCERNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
DURING THE POST-WAR PERIOD JANUARY 1974 - DECEMBER 1978*

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean Difference	T Value	2-tail Probability
US objectives concerning conflict management	8.80	5.81	-7.80	-3.30	.004
US objectives concerning conflict resolution	16.60	12.02			

*N = 20

3.4.1 The Priority Given to Conflict Management:
US Objectives in the Peace Process During
the Pre-War Period January 1967-September
1973

The priority accorded to conflict management in the pre-war period is mainly attributed to the excessive concern of US decision makers with the maintenance of a cease-fire, limitations on the arms race and the maintenance of the balance of power between the protagonists.¹ Maintaining a cease-fire was an important objective in US foreign policy. Since US decision makers regarded voluntary restraint as insufficient to prevent hostilities, limitations on the arms race and the maintenance of the balance of power were seen as essential for conflict management. US decision makers repeatedly advocated the importance of a cease-fire and undertook the cease-fire initiative of 1970. They repeatedly called for a halt in the arms race in the Middle East and promised the continuation of a balance of power--in Israel's favor. Nixon (February 18, 1970; DSB, 1602:304-305) explained the US objectives in his report to congress:

¹Note here that the peak in the frequency of articulation of US objectives on conflict management, during the pre-war period was during the second quarter of 1967. This is not surprising, given the hostilities phase of the conflict.

This administration has not only pressed efforts to restore observance of the cease-fire....It has also urged an agreement to limit the shipment of arms to the Middle East as a step which could help stabilize the situation in the absence of a settlement. In the meantime, however, I now reaffirm our stated intention to maintain careful watch on the balance of forces and to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.

US decision makers (e.g., Nixon, July 1, 1970; DSB, 1622:113; Sisco, May 7, 1973; DSB, 1772:844) believed that maintaining the balance of power in the region was the essential factor contributing to the absence of war. The absence of war was particularly important in order to safeguard the US objectives of avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union and protecting Israel's security and well-being.

The avoidance of any direct or indirect confrontation with the Soviet Union was very important in US foreign policy. The need for a cease-fire in 1970 was of particular importance in view of the Soviet presence in Egypt, which was described by Secretary Rogers (June 7, 1970; DSB, 1618:790) as "very, very serious matters. And we consider them seriously". Under-Secretary of State Richardson (May 10, 1970; DSB, 1614:686) explained the urgency of the situation¹ in an interview on

¹Note in Table 3.1 the increase in articulated statements on conflict management during the first and second quarters of 1970.

"Issues and Answers":

It is a potentially dangerous situation certainly insofar as there is the risk of actual contact, combat, between Israel and Soviet planes and particularly insofar as there is a possibility of the use of Soviet planes over the Canal area itself. So we do have important reason to try to assure that restraint on both sides is observed.

US decision makers were also concerned with the effect of war on the possibility of direct confrontation between the great powers. Nixon (May 3, 1973; DSB, 1771: 787) advocated refraining from steps that could give rise to the danger of military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The importance of avoiding war was also explained in the context of preserving Israel's security. US decision makers had no intention of jeopardizing Israel's security, even when they decided to hold in abeyance Israel's request for military supplies, as in March 1970. In explaining American concern for Israel's security, Secretary of State Rogers (March 23, 1971; DSB, 1607:477) emphasized:

In making this interim decision on aircraft, we have no intention of jeopardizing the security of Israel. If steps are taken which might upset the current balance...the President will not hesitate to reconsider this matter.

With the continuation after August 1970 of the cease-fire along the Suez Canal, the probability of hostilities appeared lower than at any time since the 1967 war¹ (Quandt, 1977:128).

The likelihood of war in the Middle East in the immediate future has diminished. It is significant that, as uneasy as it is, the cease-fire is being maintained.

(Sisco, October 9, 1972; DSB, 1742:569)

While US decision makers gave priority to conflict management in their objectives in the peace process, Table 3.1 shows that they also articulated some objectives dealing with conflict resolution.² Most of these statements were articulated by State Department officials. This Department had been left in charge of the formulation of US foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly during the period 1969-1971 (Quandt, 1977:77; Kissinger, 1977:8) but its relative importance in policy implementation was impaired by its differences with the White House. Even when the Department did provide a plan for the resolution of the conflict in the Rogers' Plan of 1969, the lack of support from the White House limited its prospects.

¹Note in Table 3.1 the decline in articulated statements on conflict management after 1970 in most quarters. This decline probably reflects the decreased concern with the possibility of hostilities.

²US position on a comprehensive settlement was revealed in the Johnson Plan of 1967 (see DSB, 1463:31-34), UN Security Council Resolution 242 (see Appx. III) and the Rogers' Plan of 1969 (see DSB, 1593:7-11). The US also supported conflict reduction through an interim Canal settlement which called for a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal that would permit the re-opening of the Canal for navigation.

Secretary Rogers (June 25, 1970; DSB, 1620:32-33) acknowledged the limited US backing for the Plan when he was asked at a press conference whether the US continued to believe that the guidelines of the Rogers' Plan would be the ones under which the Jarring negotiations should be conducted. He replied:

Well, not necessarily. We think they are very useful guidelines, but we don't insist that the parties accept them.... We are perfectly prepared, and obviously would have to be, to have the discussions conducted by Ambassador Jarring and he can use any beginning point he would like to.

One of the most useful starting points of a negotiation would be the Security Council Resolution itself.

By the end of 1971, the State Department's role in the formulation of US Middle East policy had declined and Kissinger became its architect (Quandt, 1977:143; Kissinger, 1979:1289). His lack of interest in a resolution of the conflict is reflected, for example, in his description of the US position during the May 1972 Summit Meeting with USSR. Kissinger (1979:1247) reports that he sought the blandest possible Middle East formulation in the communique:

The upshot was a meaningless paragraph that endorsed Security Council Resolution 242 and put the two sides on record as favoring peace in the Middle East. Calling as it did for peaceful settlement and military relaxation in the area it was practically an implicit acceptance of the status quo and was bound to be taken ill not only in Cairo but elsewhere in the Arab World.

3.4.2 The Priority Given to Conflict Resolution:
US Objectives in the Peace Process During the
Post-War Period January 1974 - December 1978

During the October War, Kissinger (October 8, 1973; DSB, 1792:525) acknowledged the limitations of conflict management. In an address before the Third Pacem in Terris Conference, he said:

We meet too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is always precarious and never to be taken for granted. Pacem in Terris remains regrettably elusive. However well we contain this crisis, as we have contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict.

Table 3.1 shows that US decision makers differed during the post-war period as to how conflict resolution should be attained. The Table shows that US decision makers gave priority to conflict reduction rather than a comprehensive settlement during most of the quarters in the period January 1974 - September 1975 and that they gave priority to a comprehensive settlement rather than to conflict reduction during the period October 1975 - December 1978.

After the war, Secretary Kissinger believed that to attempt a comprehensive solution, when an oil embargo was still in force, and Israeli armed forces were confronting the Egyptians along dividing lines that were extremely unstable, would involve a high risk (Kissinger, October 2, 1976; DSB, 1949:545).

Under such conditions, the chances for success of a comprehensive settlement were slight, and the penalties for failure would have been far reaching. Through step-by-step tactics the US could establish a new relationship with Egypt, reduce Soviet influence, and built a new sense of confidence in the parties (Kissinger, October 19, 1976; DSB, 1951:601). This was also the most feasible approach in view of the domestic difficulties that existed in the United States at that time i.e., Watergate (Kissinger, April 13, 1976; DSB, 1923:571).

American decision makers advocated the disengagement of forces which culminated in the Sinai I agreement.¹ Throughout 1974, they supported step-by-step tactics. However, step-by-step tactics were met by a set-back in March 1975.² The failure of step-by-step tactics coincided with other problems in South East Asia with the fall of the Cambodian capital on April 17, to communist forces and the fall of Saigon on April 29, and in the Middle East due to the

¹See Sinai I agreement (Sheehan, 1976:239-240).

²Note the decline in articulated objectives on conflict reduction during the second quarter of 1975 (see Table 3.1)

civil war in Lebanon, and the assassination of King Feisal of Saudi Arabia. Against this disquieting background, Kissinger carried out a reassessment of US policy in the Middle East during the period April - June 1975 (Quandt, 1977: 269).

With the failure of step-by-step tactics, the US had three options:

1. resume the suspended negotiations without making a commitment to go to Geneva;
2. go to Geneva and try to get an overall settlement; or
3. while negotiating for an overall settlement, also have an interim negotiated settlement between Egypt and Israel.

(Ford, April 21, 1975; DSB, 1872:604)

Kissinger's consultations with Arab, Israeli and Soviet leaders did not give him any reason to be optimistic about a new policy. In light of this reality, Ford and Kissinger regarded step-by-step tactics as the only visible alternative (Quandt, 1977:270-271). President Ford (January 23, 1975; DSB, 1860:221) explained this preference in an interview when he said:

We prefer the process that has been successful so far, but if there is no progress, then I think we undoubtedly would be forced to go to Geneva.

I wouldn't be any more optimistic; in fact, I would be less optimistic if the matter was thrown on the doorstep of Geneva.

As Table 3.1 shows, US decision makers renewed their priority for step-by-step tactics during the third quarter of 1975 and the second Sinai agreement was signed in September 1975.¹

While step-by-step tactics have the advantage of cultivating mutual trust between the parties in a conflict (Schelling, 1963:45), this could lead to a stalemate if one or both sides refused to go beyond the limited step that had been taken. Step-by-step tactics are also irremediably ambiguous, most of the core issues which give rise to the conflict are left for future consideration (Brzezinski, *et al.*, 1975:5).

Table 3.1 shows that starting with the last quarter of 1975, conflict reduction declined as a priority alternative in the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Step-by-step tactics had reached their limits because at some point the very tough substantial problems in the conflict had to be tackled.²

¹See text of Sinai II agreement and Annex, as well as the US proposal (DSB, 1892:466-470).

²There has been considerable debate in the literature on the merits and drawbacks of step-by-step tactics: for defence of step-by-step see Avineri (1978) and Hoffman (1975:407-408). For a critique of step-by-step, see Ajami (1976:451-452), Ball (1977), Brzezinski *et al.* (1975), Hoffman (1975:408-410), Sheehan (1976:165-166, 217) and Ullman (1975b:18).

Table 3.1 shows that throughout 1976, US decision makers gave priority to a comprehensive settlement rather than to conflict reduction in the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.¹ Even Kissinger (April 13, 1976; DSB, 1923:571) acknowledged the limitations of step-by-step tactics:

I think it is now generally agreed...that the time for individual steps...is probably over and that we now have to work on a wider canvas.

Articulated objectives on a comprehensive settlement increased starting in January 1977 with the arrival of a new President (see Table 3.1). President Carter (June 24, 1977; DSB, 1988:161) explained the American objective in the peace process in an interview with media representatives when he said:

I think we have also taken a different approach in the Middle East. And it's a matter of judgement. Mr. Kissinger's position was to deal with the Middle Eastern question in a step-by-step, incremental way. Our hope is that we can have an overall settlement ...and that once that settlement is reached, then the step-by-step implementation of the ultimate settlement is the best way to go about it. It's a completely different perspective.

¹Note in Table 3.1 the decline in articulated objectives on a comprehensive settlement during 1976. This can be understood as 1976 was an election year and during such years there is generally less concern with foreign policy issues.

When the Carter administration took office on January 20, 1977, it found that the situation in the Middle East called for a new approach. The step-by-step diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford administrations had defused the immediate tensions produced by the war in 1973. But it had become evident that it would be increasingly difficult to achieve small diplomatic concessions when the ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained obscure. The Arab coalition which had fallen apart after the Sinai II agreement had been resurrected. Saudi Arabia helped improve Egyptian-Syrian relations, Jordan maintained good relations with Syria and the PLO gave the impression of willing to pursue more moderate policies (Quandt, 1977:284) in the face of a united Arab front, it seemed essential for the American administration to address the core issues in the conflict.

The Carter administration was influenced by the Brookings Institution's Report. This report, prepared by a team which included Brzezinski, emphasized the importance of normalization of relations and the resettling of the Palestinians in a Palestinian entity in return for their acceptance of Israel's right to exist, and withdrawal to pre-1967 lines with only such modification as might be mutually accepted in exchange for peace.¹

¹See (Brookings Institution, 1975).

While the Carter administration believed that UN Security Council Resolution 242 provided a basis for negotiations, it was not regarded as sufficient by itself as it dealt only with the Palestinian problem as a refugee problem. The administration thus decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework for an enduring peace, its idea was to use this framework as the basis for the phased negotiations and implementation of specific steps towards peace. To this end, the key elements of the American understanding were:

1. Commitment to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts to normalize relations among the parties.
 2. The establishment of secure borders for Israel which were recognized by all.
 3. A fair solution of the Palestinian problem.
- (Mondale, June 17, 1977; DSB, 1985:43)

These principles were carried out for the most part, in form and not in substance in the Camp David accords.¹ While the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel was agreed upon, withdrawal of Israeli forces were specified only for Sinai. Concerning the Palestinian problem, the

¹See Camp David Accords and accompanying letters (DSB, 2019: 7-11).

Camp David agreements specified local autonomy for the West Bank under continued Israeli occupation. The final status of the West Bank, except for a reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242, was left to future negotiations. The linkage between the two agreements on the Egyptian-Israeli peace and the Palestinian future was very weak (Neumann, 1979:30).

The position outlined in the Camp David Accords should come as no surprise in view of the US position on core issues in the conflict since 1967. A systematic study of US objectives on core issues in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict during the period January 1967 - December 1978 shows that, while US objectives on the political independence territorial integrity and security for Israel were clear, its objectives on the Palestinian problem and the occupied territories were surrounded by ambiguity.

Table 3.4 presents the frequency of articulated statements on US objectives concerning the political independence, territorial integrity and security for Israel. Table 3.4 shows that they tended to increase particularly starting in the second quarter of 1977. In its quest for a comprehensive settlement, the Carter administration was more forthcoming in assuring Israel of continued US commitment.

TABLE 3.4
 FREQUENCY OF US OBJECTIVES
 RELATING TO ISRAEL
 January 1967 - December 1978

Quarter	Independence/ Recognition of	Security of	Total
January-March 1967			
April-June 1967	8	5	13
July-September 1967	13	8	21
October-December 1967	9	12	21
January-March 1968	8	8	16
April-June 1968	14	12	26
July-September 1968	2	4	6
October-December 1968	4	3	7
January-March 1969	1	1	2
April-June 1969	3	5	8
July-September 1969	6	5	11
October-December 1969	7	8	15
January-March 1970	6	8	14
April-June 1970	16	12	28
July-September 1970	4	3	7
October-December 1970	10	9	19
January-March 1971	1	7	8
April-June 1971	13	18	31
July-September 1971		1	1
October-December 1971	3		3
January-March 1972	1	3	4
April-June 1972	5	5	10
July-September 1972	5	4	9
October-December 1972	2	1	3
January-March 1973		2	2
April-June 1973	6	7	13
July-September 1973	3	2	5
October-December 1973	12	17	29
January-March 1974	1		1
April-June 1974	5	13	18
July-September 1974	3	3	6
October-December 1974	4	3	7
January-March 1975	6	3	9
April-June 1975	12	10	22
July-September 1975	10	11	21
October-December 1975	15	15	30

TABLE 3.4 (cont'd)

Quarter	Independence/ Recognition of	Security of	Total
January-March 1976	11	13	24
April-June 1976	12	14	26
July-September 1976	1	1	2
October-December 1976	5	5	10
January-March 1977	5	6	11
April-June 1977	13	26	39
July-September 1977	7	9	16
October-December 1977	12	24	36
January-March 1978	11	20	31
April-June 1978	9	27	36
July-September 1978	11	18	29
October-December 1978		1	1
TOTAL	315	392	707

Table 3.5 presents the frequency of US articulated objectives on the Palestinian problem during the period January 1967 - December 1978. The Palestinian problem is at the heart of the Egyptian-Israel conflict. Egypt regards the acquisition of the right of self-determination for the Palestinians essential, and Israel considers that the acquisition of such rights would be a threat to its security. Most of the US articulated objectives on the Palestinian problem (53%) dealt with justice for the refugees. For example, J. Johnson (December 10, 1969; DSB, 1594:50), Alternate US Representative to the UN, maintained:

There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless.

The problem posed by the refugees...will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration towards hope and justice.

A second objective articulated throughout the period under study was a vague one dealing with the "rights and legitimate concerns of the Palestinians," a concept that was not defined in the coded documents.

TABLE 3 5

FREQUENCY OF US OBJECTIVES RELATING
TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

January 1967 - December 1978

Home land ¹	Federation with Jordan ²	Participation/ Representation ³	Solution ⁴	Rights and Legitimacy Concerns ⁵	Justice For Refugees ⁶	Deny "PLO Group" ⁷	Deny State ⁸	TOTAL ⁹
January-March 1967					9			9
April-June 1967					11			11
July-September 1967					7			7
October-December 1967					7			7
January-March 1968					13			13
April-June 1968					2			2
July-September 1968					7			7
October-December 1968					1			1
January-March 1969					2			2
April-June 1969					5			5
July-September 1969				2	16	1		19
October-December 1969					5			5
January-March 1970					9			9
April-June 1970					1			1
July-September 1970				2	15			17
October-December 1970					13			13
January-March 1971				1				1
April-June 1971								
July-September 1971								
October-December 1971								
January-March 1972					5			5
April-June 1972					4			4
July-September 1972					1			1
October-December 1972								

TABLE 3.5 (cont'd)

	Homeland ¹	Federation with Jordan ²	Participation/ Representation ³	Solution ⁴	Rights and Legitimate Concerns ⁵	Justice For Refugees ⁶	Deny "PLO Group" ⁷	Deny State ⁸	TOTAL
January-March 1973					2	3			5
April-June 1973					1	2			3
July-September 1973						11			11
October-December 1973					1				1
January-March 1974					1				1
April-June 1974					1	4			5
July-September 1974					2	1			3
October-December 1974					3	1			4
January-March 1975					1	2	4		7
April-June 1975					1	6	1		7
July-September 1975				1	2	3	3		9
October-December 1975				5	7	12	18		42
January-March 1976				1	1	4	6		11
April-June 1976				1	1	5	2		9
July-September 1976					1				1
October-December 1976					2	5	1		8
January-March 1977	1			1	4		2		8
April-June 1977	5	1	2	7	1	8	1		25
July-September 1977	1	2	2	2	1	5	10		22
October-December 1977	2	1	7	12	3	9	1	5	40
January-March 1978			8	9	5	9		2	33
April-March 1978	1	1	6	7	3	6		1	25
July-September 1978		1	3	2	2	10		1	19
October-December 1978			6	6	1	1			14
TOTAL	10	6	34	53	49	240	54	9	455

¹Acquire homeland/entity for Palestinians²Acquire Palestinian federation with Jordan³Acquire representation of the Palestinians in determining their future^a⁴Acquire solution for Palestinian problem⁵Acquire rights and legitimate concerns of Palestinians⁶Acquire justice for the refugees⁷Deny support for - deal with - meet with PLO - Palestinian Group⁸Deny state - sovereignty for Palestinians

Two other articulated objectives during the post-war period were denying dealing with the PLO and emphasizing the necessity of solving the Palestinian problem. But here again the content of such a solution was not spelled out. When the Carter administration took office in January 1977, it articulated new objectives on the Palestinian problem. In addition to the previously stated objectives, it advocated a homeland for the Palestinians, a Palestinian entity in federation with Jordan, the necessity of Palestinian participation in determining their future, and publicly opposed the creation of a Palestinian State.

President Carter explained the new American objective at Clinton, Massachusetts on March 16, 1977 (DSB, 1972: 335):

There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many years.

While this was regarded as essential for solving the conflict, ambiguity surrounded its meaning. Carter explained in his news conference (May 12, 1977; DSB, 1980:605):

The exact definition of what that homeland might be, the degree of independence of the Palestinian entity, its relationship with Jordan, or perhaps Syria and others, the geographical boundaries of it, all have to be worked out by the parties involved. But for the Palestinians to have a homeland and for the refugee question to be resolved, is obviously of crucial importance.

American definition of a homeland differed from the Egyptian concept. In an interview (December 28, 1977; DSB, 2010:10), Carter explained:

We do favor a homeland or an entity wherein the Palestinians can live in peace....

President Sadat so far is insisting that the so-called Palestinian entity be an independent nation. My own preference is that they not be an independent nation but be tied in some way with the surrounding countries....

My own personal opinion is that permanent peace can best be maintained if there's not a fairly radical, new independent nation in the heart of the Middle East.

References to a homeland for the Palestinians declined in 1978. Preference was given to the necessity of Palestinian participation in determining their own future, an ambiguous objective which was accepted at Camp David. The ambiguity fostered different interpretations of what participation meant. Egypt regarded it as a precursor to self-determination. Israel and the US were against self-determination. The difference between Israel and the United States, both before and after Camp David, had to do only with the extent of Israeli control over the Palestinian entity, and also the extent of Palestinian participation in determining their future (Tillman, 1980:34-35).

Table 3.6 presents the frequency of US articulated objectives in the occupied Arab territories. Israeli occupation of the Arab territories during the 1967 war added a new dimension to the Egyptian-Israeli conflict; not only were the protagonists in conflict over the Palestinian question but also over the restoration of the territories, something which Israel publicly indicated that it would not concede in its entirety. While American decision makers indicated that withdrawal should take place, they did not publicly advocate total withdrawal from the occupied territories. For example, Secretary Rogers indicated at a press conference (March 16, 1971; DSB, 1658:481):

We have never said that Israel had to withdraw from all territory. Our position has been that it should not acquire territory, except in insubstantial amounts for security purposes.

The definition of what is meant by "insubstantial amounts" was not defined by American decision makers in the coded documents. US policy was based on the ambiguous 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242 which was subject to different interpretations by the actors in the conflict. The exact meaning of "secure borders" was held to be a matter for negotiation and it was believed that it would not be of help to be more precise (Nixon, December 10, 1970; DSB, 1644:771). Carter also demonstrated ambiguity surrounding the meaning of "secure borders," at a press

TABLE 3 6

FREQUENCY OF US OBJECTIVES RELATING
TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
January 1967 - December 1978

	Restore Territories				Deny Settlements			Jerusalem				TOTAL
	General	Part Sinai	All Sinai	W. Bank Gaza	General	Sinai	W. Bank	Deny Unilateral Action	Acquire Unification	Protect Religious Rights	Deny Pre-1967 Status	
January-March 1967	5							2		2		9
April-June 1967	9							5		7		21
July-September 1967	5							1		3		9
October-December 1967	5									3		8
January-March 1968	7							2		6		15
April-June 1968	2									1		3
July-September 1968	3											3
October-December 1968	1											1
January-March 1969	3											3
April-June 1969	5							3	1	3		12
July-September 1969	6		3					3	3	3		18
October-December 1969	2		3					3	3	3		14
January-March 1970	11		1					1	1	1		15
April-June 1970	3											3
July-September 1970	9		2									9
October-December 1970	3		2					2	4	2		23
January-March 1971	13	3						1	1	2	1	33
April-June 1971												
July-September 1971												
October-December 1971												

TABLE 3.6 (cont'd)

	Restore Territories				Deny Settlements			Jerusalem				TOTAL
	General	Part Sinai	All Sinai	W. Bank Gaza	General	Sinai	W. Bank	Deny Unilateral Action	Acquire Unification	Protect Religious Rights	Deny Pre-1967 Status	
January-March 1972		1										1
April-June 1972	5	2										7
July-September 1972	4	1										5
October-December 1972	1	1										2
January-March 1973		3										3
April-June 1973	3	4										7
July-September 1973	2											2
October-December 1973	11											11
January-March 1974												
April-June 1974	4											4
July-September 1974	1											1
October-December 1974	2											2
January-March 1975	2											2
April-June 1975	7											7
July-September 1975	3											3
October-December 1975	12				1			1				12
January-March 1976	4				2							7
April-June 1976	5											5
July-September 1976												
October-December 1976	4				1			1				6
January-March 1977	2											2
April-June 1977	12											12
July-September 1977	7				4		7					18
October-December 1977	10				7			1				18
January-March 1978	16			3	7	1						27
April-June 1978	12			3								15
July-September 1978	12			2				1				16
October-December 1978				1	3							5
TOTAL	233	15	11	9	25	?	8	27	13	37	1	381

conference (March 9, 1977; DSB, 1971:306). He was asked whether it would be appropriate in the Middle East settlement for the Israelis to keep some of the occupied territory they had taken in 1967. He replied:

Now, where that withdrawal might end, I don't know. I would guess it would be some minor adjustments in the 1967 borders. But that still remains to be negotiated.

US decision makers did articulate statements on withdrawal from all Egyptian territory as early as 1969. However, specific references to withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza were made only in 1978 and were in response to Israel's interpretation that UN Security Council Resolution 242 does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But here the US did not advocate total withdrawal but defined it within the context of UN Security Council Resolution 242.

The only clearly articulated objectives regarding the occupied territories related to US opposition to Israeli settlements in occupied territories. However, the coded documents show that objectives on this issue were explicitly articulated only starting in 1976, although it was indicated that the US position on the settlements had been consistent since the subject became an issue in 1968 (Atherton, October 19, 1977; DSB, 2006:828).

Notable by its absence from the Camp David Accords was the specification of the status of Jerusalem. Table 3.6 shows that after the 1967 war the US called for the protection of the religious rights for the three religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, denied unilateral action on Jerusalem and called for the unification of the city. On June 28, 1967, the State Department (DSB, 1664:60) issued a statement on Jerusalem indicating:

The hasty administrative action taken today cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.

US decision makers advocated the unification of Jerusalem and did not favor the return of the city to Arab control. In a statement to the UN Security Council, US representative George Bush (September 25, 1971; DSB, 1687:470) explained:

I want to state clearly that we believe Israel's respect for the holy places has been exemplary. But an Israeli occupation policy made up of unilaterally determined practices cannot help promote a just and lasting peace any more than that cause was served by the status quo in Jerusalem prior to June 1967, which, I want to make clear, we did not like and we do not advocate re-establishing.

During the post-war period, US decision makers probably deliberately avoided articulating objectives on Jerusalem.¹ For example, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Sisco (March 27, 1974; DSB, 1834:296) indicated:

I don't have a very satisfactory answer... about Jerusalem. Most of the time when it's raised, I have to respond that this is one of the reasons why we feel in negotiations, candidly, it probably ought to be the last item on the agenda. There has been no give on Jerusalem, and of course this is a thing which--not only where there's an obvious strong interest on the part of Israel, but all of the Arabs are strongly interested in this situation.

In discussing the obstacles during the negotiations of the Camp David Accords, Carter (November 13, 1978; DSB, 2021:16) explained:

The issue at that time was Jerusalem, which was an almost insurmountable obstacle that we later resolved by not including it at all in the framework.

Given the US position on core issues outlined above, it was highly unlikely that the US would have pushed in the Camp David Accords for a more favorable outcome on the Palestinian Question and the occupied territories.

¹Note in Table 3.6 the decline in the number of articulated objectives on Jerusalem during the post-war period.

3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has developed the relationship between US regional objectives and its objectives in the peace process in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. It questioned the assumption found in most of the existing literature, that a third party will consider conflict resolution as the only viable objective in the settlement of a dyadic conflict. Part of the problem is that this literature does not differentiate between different categories of third party objectives in the peace process. There is no elaboration of the difference between conflict management and conflict resolution as priority alternatives for a third party. However, understanding the priority accorded to conflict management or to conflict resolution is essential in understanding third party behavior towards a dyad in conflict. This point will be further elaborated in the next chapter on US behavior towards the Egyptian-Israeli dyad during the period January 1967 - December 1978.

CHAPTER IV

US BEHAVIOR

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Since objectives are often assumed to be a principal explanatory variable of behavior (Legault *et al.*, 1973:20-21), we expect that a third party's objectives in the peace process would be related to its behavior. In its behavior towards a dyad in conflict, we differentiate between two roles a third party might undertake:

- (1) the role of an ally, and
- (2) the role of an intermediary.

A third party is referred to as an ally in a conflict situation if it joins in a coalition with one of the parties in conflict against the other. By doing this, it helps its partner achieve its objectives and frustrates the opponent. A third party is referred to as an intermediary if it intervenes diplomatically in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing towards the abatement or termination of the conflict, and if its intervention is accepted by the parties to the conflict (Touval, 1975:52). It is important to note here that, while a third party might adopt both roles during a given time period, we have to distinguish between continuous and episodic situations

(Caplow, 1968:5-7), i.e., whether the behavior as an ally is dominant and the behavior as an intermediary is only episodic, or vice-versa.

As indicated in Chapter I, the literature on third parties tends to deal separately with these two roles and, thus there is little elaboration of the reasons why a third party shifts from a predominant role of ally to one of an intermediary, or vice-versa. This chapter will analyse the relationship between US objectives in the peace process and the predominant behavior of the US as an ally and as an intermediary. The chapter will first present a brief description of US behavior towards the Egyptian-Israeli dyad. This will be followed by a test of the following two hypotheses:

- H₁ : If a third party prefers conflict management to conflict resolution, it will tend to behave predominantly as an ally cooperating more and conflicting less with the party in the dyad that it believes will preserve the *status quo*.
- H₂ : If a third party prefers conflict resolution to conflict management, it will tend to behave predominantly as an intermediary cooperating with both protagonists at approximately the same level.

Finally, the chapter will examine why the US, when it undertook the predominant role of an intermediary, largely refrained from a coercive strategy in order to induce Israeli cooperation in resolving the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, despite the increased Israeli dependence on the US for economic and military support.

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF US BEHAVIOR TOWARDS THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DYAD

The following sections will describe US behavior towards the Egyptian-Israeli dyad during the pre-war period, January 1967 - September 1973, the war quarter, October 1973 - December 1973, and the post-war period, January 1974 - December 1978.

In describing US behavior towards the dyad, Azar's COPDAB data on the Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for US conflict and cooperative behavior towards Egypt and Israel will be used. As indicated in Chapter II, the quarterly DIs for cooperation and conflict were calculated according to the following formula:

- multiply the quarterly frequency of events of each scale point on Azar's cooperation and conflict scale by the weighted value of that point.

- add the products obtained as follows:
 - to get conflict DIs, add the scores of the conflict part of the scale
 - to get cooperative DIs, add the scores of the cooperative part of the scale

While we use the DIs for conflict and cooperation in the description, and later in the analysis, of US behavior towards the dyad, we found it necessary also to use Azar's COPDAB descriptive data file for these purposes. Scholars using events data frequently do not acknowledge reading the descriptive files on which the aggregated data were based. They thus run the risk of inferring conclusions which might not adequately reflect the event information that was coded. Azar's COPDAB descriptive data file was used in order to reduce the possibility of such an error and to get a more detailed description of US behavior. The writer also used the descriptive file to aggregate the distribution of US conflictual and cooperative behavior towards Egypt and Israel according to the level of conflict and cooperation as defined by COPDAB.

In describing US behavior towards the dyad, the following sections will deal with:

1. The ratio of US cooperative to conflictual behavior towards Egypt and Israel.
2. The level of US cooperative and conflictual behavior towards Egypt and Israel.
3. The peaks in US cooperative and conflictual behavior towards Egypt and Israel

4.2.1 The Ratio of US Cooperative to Conflictual Behavior Towards Egypt and Israel

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for US cooperation and conflict towards Egypt and Israel respectively. The following sections will describe the ratio of US cooperation to conflict during the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973, the war quarter October 1973 - December 1973, and during the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978.

4.2.1.1 The Ratio of US Cooperation to Conflict Towards Egypt and Israel During the Pre-War Period

(A) Egypt

The aggregated scores for the DIs of US cooperation and for the DIs of US conflict towards Egypt (see Table 4.1) during the pre-war period show that US interaction with Egypt during this period was more conflictual than cooperative. The DIs for US conflict towards Egypt during the pre-war period were 1015 and the DIs for cooperation 871;

TABLE 4.1
 DIMENSIONS OF INTERACTIONS FOR
 US COOPERATIVE AND CONFLICTUAL
 BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT

January 1967 - December 1978

Quarter	DI's Cooperation	DI's Conflict
January-March 1967	18	45
April-June 1967	138	470
July-September 1967	22	83
October-December 1967	100	57
January-March 1968		
April-June 1968		6
July-September 1968	20	
October-December 1968	53	
January-March 1969	6	
April-June 1969	40	
July-September 1969		
October-December 1969		6
January-March 1970		6
April-June 1970	22	6
July-September 1970	22	44
October-December 1970	22	32
January-March 1971	30	16
April-June 1971	66	22
July-September 1971	40	38
October-December 1971	45	28
January-March 1972	12	40
April-June 1972	14	
July-September 1972	49	6
October-December 1972	18	22
January-March 1973	85	
April-June 1973	43	6
July-September 1973	6	82
October-December 1973	136	99
January-March 1974	195	
April-June 1974	325	35
July-September 1974	70	
October-December 1974	166	6

...../

TABLE 4.1 (cont'd)

Quarter	DI's Cooperation	DI's Conflict
January-March 1975	92	12
April-June 1975	83	
July-September 1975	130	
October-December 1975	87	
January-March 1976	217	16
April-June 1976	220	
July-September 1976	84	
October-December 1976		6
January-March 1977	226	
April-June 1977	104	
July-September 1977	178	
October-December 1977	160	22
January-March 1978	219	
April-June 1978	52	34
July-September 1978	121	16
October-December 1978	88	12

source: Azar's COPDAB

US conflict behavior was 1.17 times as great as its cooperation towards Egypt. However, if we look at the ratio of US conflict to cooperation for each quarter during the pre-war period, we find that of the 25 quarters with recorded behavior, 11 had conflict scores higher than cooperation, while 14 showed higher cooperation. The high conflict score, particularly in the second quarter of 1967, gave a high average score for the period as a whole, although the distribution by quarter does show a greater balance.

(B) Israel

Table 4.2 shows that US interaction with Israel during the pre-war period was more cooperative than conflictual. The DIs for US cooperation were 2435 and for conflict 875, thus US cooperation towards Israel was about three times as great as its conflict towards Israel. The data also show that cooperation was higher than conflict in all but two of the 27 quarters during this period.

TABLE 4.2

DIMENSIONS OF INTERACTIONS FOR
US COOPERATIVE AND CONFLICTUAL
BEHAVIOR TOWARD ISRAEL

January 1967 - December 1978

Quarter	DI's Cooperation	DI's Conflict
January-March 1967	12	6
April-June 1967	203	159
July-September 1967	103	84
October-December 1967	41	12
January-March 1968	57	34
April-June 1968	33	22
July-September 1968	98	16
October-December 1968	64	54
January-March 1969	57	48
April-June 1969	34	22
July-September 1969	61	6
October-December 1969	53	18
January-March 1970	111	12
April-June 1970	6	16
July-September 1970	228	16
October-December 1970	111	
January-March 1971	57	12
April-June 1971	71	16
July-September 1971	36	53
October-December 1971	182	36
January-March 1972	121	6
April-June 1972	142	6
July-September 1972	131	29
October-December 1972	57	6
January-March 1973	144	22
April-June 1973	91	79
July-September 1973	131	85
October-December 1973	375	18
January-March 1974	83	
April-June 1974	352	32
July-September 1974	159	
October-December 1974	173	6

TABLE 4.2 (cont'd)

Quarter	DI's Cooperation	DI's Conflict
January-March 1975	131	80
April-June 1975	77	28
July-September 1975	201	6
October-December 1975	41	6
January-March 1976	155	40
April-June 1976	137	41
July-September 1976	107	83
October-December 1976	88	
January-March 1977	136	123
April-June 1977	92	75
July-September 1977	124	227
October-December 1977	195	52
January-March 1978	149	112
April-June 1978	52	62
July-September 1978	239	6
October-December 1978	135	62

Source: Azar's COPDAB

4.2.1.2 The Ratio of US Cooperation to
Conflict Towards Egypt and Israel
During the War Quarter

(A) Egypt

Table 4.1 shows that US interaction with Egypt during the war quarter was more cooperative than conflictual. The DIs for US cooperation during this quarter were 136 and for conflict were 99; thus US cooperation was 1.37 as much as its conflict towards Egypt.

(B) Israel

Table 4.2 shows that US cooperation towards Israel was much higher than its conflict during the period October 1973 - December 1973. The DIs for US cooperation were 375 and for conflict were 18; US cooperation was thus 21 times as great as its conflict towards Israel.

4.2.1.3 The Ratio of US Cooperation to Conflict
Towards Egypt and Israel during the Post-
War Period

(A) Egypt

Table 4.1 shows that during the post-war period, US interaction with Egypt was more cooperative than conflictual. The DIs for US cooperation were 2817 and for conflict 159; US cooperation was thus 18 times as great as its conflict towards Egypt. The data show that cooperation was

higher than conflict in all but one of the 20 quarters during the post-war period.

(B) Israel

Table 4.2 shows that US behavior towards Israel was more cooperative than conflictual during the post-war period. The DIs for US cooperation were 2826 and for conflict 1041; US cooperation was thus about three times as great as its conflict towards Israel. The data also show that cooperation was higher than conflict in all but two of the 20 quarters during the post-war period.

The data on cooperation-conflict ratios show that the United States dramatically changed the pattern of its behavior toward Egypt during the post-war period; from a conflict cooperation ratio of 1.17:1 on the side of conflict to a ratio of 18:1 on the side of cooperation. The war itself greatly heightened US cooperation (21:1) with Israel, but the pattern in the ratio of cooperation to conflict (3:1) during pre- and post-war periods was not much different. Although both countries received almost the same overall cooperation from the United States in the post-war period, US conflict towards Israel was more than

six times as high as with Egypt. We now turn to probe further the nature of this change in the behavior of the United States.

4.2.2 The Level of US Cooperative and Conflictual Behavior Towards Egypt and Israel

The following sections describe the level of US cooperation and conflict towards Egypt and Israel during the pre-war period, the war quarter and the post-war period.

4.2.2.1 The Level of US Cooperation and Conflict Towards Egypt and Israel During the Pre-War Period

(A) The level of US cooperation towards the dyad

Table 4.3 presents the distribution of US cooperative behavior towards Egypt and Israel by level of cooperation on Azar's International Scale for Cooperation and Conflict. The data show that most of the cooperation directed towards Egypt (65%) was on the lowest level of cooperation and there were no events coded on level 3 of the scale (military and strategic support). In the case of US cooperation towards Israel, 48% of the coded events were on the lowest level of the cooperation end of the scale and 15% on level 3.

TABLE 4.3

DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEVEL OF US COOPERATIVE
AND CONFLICTUAL BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT
AND ISRAEL ON AZAR'S INTERNATIONAL SCALE
FOR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

January 1967 - September 1973

Level of Cooperation and Conflict		Egypt	Israel
Level 1 = Voluntary unification into one state	<div>7</div> <p>1 = Voluntary unification into one state 2 = Major strategic alliance (regional or international) 3 = Military and strategic support 4 = Non-military economic technological and industrial agreement 5 = Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic) 6 = Official verbal support of goals, values and regime 7 = Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression of mild verbal support</p>	10%	15%
Level 2 = Major strategic alliance (regional or international)		12%	9%
Level 3 = Military and strategic support		13%	5%
Level 4 = Non-military economic technological and industrial agreement		65%	23%
Level 5 = Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic)			48%
Level 6 = Official verbal support of goals, values and regime			
Level 7 = Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression of mild verbal support			
TOTAL COOPERATION		100%	100%
Level 8 = Neutral			
Level 9 = Mild verbal expression displaying discord in interactions	<p>9 = Mild verbal expression displaying discord in interactions 10 = Strong verbal expression displaying hostility in interactions 11 = Diplomatic economic hostility actions 12 = Political military hostile actions 13 = Small scale military acts 14 = Limited war acts 15 = Extensive war acts</p>	44%	59%
Level 10 = Strong verbal expression displaying hostility in interactions		43%	35%
Level 11 = Diplomatic economic hostility actions		12%	6%
Level 12 = Political military hostile actions		1%	
Level 13 = Small scale military acts			
Level 14 = Limited war acts			
Level 15 = Extensive war acts			
TOTAL CONFLICT		100%	100%

(B) The level of US conflict towards the dyad

Table 4.3 presents the distribution of US conflict towards Egypt and Israel by level of conflict on Azar's International Scale for Cooperation and Conflict. The data show that most of the conflict directed towards both protagonists was on the lowest two levels of the conflict end of the scale, i.e., it involved verbal expressions displaying discord and hostility.

4.2.2.2 The Level of US Cooperation and Conflict
Towards Egypt and Israel During the War
Quarter

(A) The level of US cooperation towards the dyad

Table 4.4 presents the distribution of US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel by level of cooperation on Azar's International Scale for Cooperation and Conflict during the period October 1973 - December 1973. The data show that most of US cooperation towards Egypt during the war quarter (72%) was on the lowest level of cooperation and there were no coded events on level 3 of Azar's scale (military and strategic support). In the case of US cooperation towards Israel, 58% of the coded events were on the lowest level of the cooperation end of the scale, but 15% were on level 3.

TABLE 4.4

DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEVEL OF US COOPERATIVE
AND CONFLICTUAL BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT
AND ISRAEL ON AZAR'S INTERNATIONAL SCALE
FOR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

October 1973 - December 1973

Level of Cooperation and Conflict		Egypt	Israel
Level 1 = Voluntary unification into one state	Level 2 = Major strategic alliance (regional or international) Level 3 = Military and strategic support Level 4 = Non-military economic technological and industrial agreement Level 5 = Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic) Level 6 = Official verbal support of goals, values and regime Level 7 = Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression of mild verbal support	11% 17% 72%	15% 12% 15% 58%
Level 2 = Major strategic alliance (regional or international)			
Level 3 = Military and strategic support			
Level 4 = Non-military economic technological and industrial agreement			
Level 5 = Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic)			
Level 6 = Official verbal support of goals, values and regime			
Level 7 = Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression of mild verbal support			
TOTAL COOPERATION		100%	100%
Level 8 = Neutral			
Level 9 = Mild verbal expression displaying discord in interactions	Level 10 = Strong verbal expression displaying hostility in interactions Level 11 = Diplomatic economic hostility actions Level 12 = Political military hostile actions Level 13 = Small scale military acts Level 14 = Limited war acts Level 15 = Extensive war acts	17% 66% 17%	100%
Level 10 = Strong verbal expression displaying hostility in interactions			
Level 11 = Diplomatic economic hostility actions			
Level 12 = Political military hostile actions			
Level 13 = Small scale military acts			
Level 14 = Limited war acts			
Level 15 = Extensive war acts			
TOTAL CONFLICT		100%	100%

Cooperation End of Azar's Scale

Conflict End of Azar's Scale

(B) The level of US conflict towards the dyad

Table 4.4 presents the distribution of US conflict towards the dyad by level of conflict on Azar's International Scale for Cooperation and Conflict. The data show that most of the conflict directed towards both protagonists was on the lowest two levels of the conflict end of the scale, i.e., it involved verbal expression of discord and hostility.

4.2.2.3 The Level of US Cooperation and Conflict
Towards Egypt and Israel During the Post-
War Period

(A) The level of US cooperation toward the dyad

Table 4.5 presents the distribution of US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel by level of cooperation on Azar's International Scale for Cooperation and Conflict during the post-war period. The level of US cooperation towards Egypt increased during this period as compared with the pre-war period. The distribution of US cooperation during the pre-war period (see Table 4.3) shows that no events were coded on level 3 of Azar's scale (military and strategic support). Table 4.5, on the other hand, shows that 4% of the events during the post-war period were coded on the same level. While most of US cooperation towards Egypt during the pre-war period (see Table 4.3) was on the lowest

TABLE 4.5

DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEVEL OF US COOPERATIVE
AND CONFLICTUAL BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT
AND ISRAEL ON AZAR'S INTERNATIONAL SCALE
FOR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

January 1974 - December 1978

Level of Cooperation and Conflict		Egypt	Israel
Level 1 = Voluntary unification into one state	Level 1 = Voluntary unification into one state Level 2 = Major strategic alliance (regional or international) Level 3 = Military and strategic support Level 4 = Non-military economic technological and industrial agreement Level 5 = Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic) Level 6 = Official verbal support of goals, values and regime Level 7 = Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression of mild verbal support	4%	13%
Level 2 = Major strategic alliance (regional or international)		22%	8%
Level 3 = Military and strategic support		22%	18%
Level 4 = Non-military economic technological and industrial agreement		13%	26%
Level 5 = Cultural and scientific agreement and support (non-strategic)		39%	35%
Level 6 = Official verbal support of goals, values and regime			
Level 7 = Minor official exchanges, talks and policy expression of mild verbal support			
TOTAL COOPERATION		100%	100%
Level 8 = Neutral			
Level 9 = Mild verbal expression displaying discord in interactions	Level 9 = Mild verbal expression displaying discord in interactions Level 10 = Strong verbal expression displaying hostility in interactions Level 11 = Diplomatic economic hostility actions Level 12 = Political military hostile actions Level 13 = Small scale military acts Level 14 = Limited war acts Level 15 = Extensive war acts	69%	62%
Level 10 = Strong verbal expression displaying hostility in interactions		25%	29%
Level 11 = Diplomatic economic hostility actions		6%	9%
Level 12 = Political military hostile actions			
Level 13 = Small scale military acts			
Level 14 = Limited war acts			
Level 15 = Extensive war acts			
TOTAL CONFLICT		100%	100%

level of the cooperation end of Azar's scale (65%), only 39% of the coded events on US cooperation towards Egypt during the post-war period (see Table 4.5) were coded on the same level. In the case of US cooperation towards Israel during the post-war period, a slightly lower percentage (13%) of the coded events were on level 3 than was the case (15%) during the pre-war period. On the other hand, a lower percentage (35%) of events on US cooperation towards Israel was coded on the lowest level of the cooperation end of Azar's scale during the post-war period than during the pre-war period (48%).

(B) The level of US conflict towards Egypt and Israel

Table 4.5 presents the distribution of US conflict towards Egypt and Israel by level of conflict on Azar's International Scale for Cooperation and Conflict during the post-war period. The data show that most of US conflict directed towards both protagonists was still on the lowest two levels of the conflict end of Azar's scale, i.e., it involved verbal expression displaying discord and hostility.

The significant change in US cooperative behavior towards Egypt can also be found by examining the level, or the quality, of the foreign policy output. For the first time, Egypt emerges with high level military and strategic support, although the relative share of this type of cooperation is less than with Israel. Non-military economic support (level 4) has also increased significantly and is higher than in the case of Israel. In point of fact, the relative share of cooperative words is higher with Israel (61%) than with Egypt (52%), but cooperative deeds, although falling short at the highest level, is higher with Egypt (48%) than with Israel (39%). As we have noted, the overall conflict quantity is much higher with Israel than with Egypt, but the actual type of behavior does not differ substantially between the two targets, although the levels of conflict are modestly higher with Israel than with Egypt.

4.2.3 The Peaks in US Cooperative and Conflictual Behavior Towards Egypt and Israel

The following sections will describe the three peaks in US cooperation and conflict towards the dyad during the pre-war and post-war periods, in addition to US behavior towards the dyad during the war quarter. Events used in describing the peaks are taken from Azar's COPDAB descriptive data file.¹

4.2.3.1 The Peaks in US Cooperation and Conflict Towards Egypt and Israel During the Pre-War Period

(A) Peaks in US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel

Figure 4.1 shows that US cooperation towards both Egypt and Israel increased dramatically during the second quarter of 1967. During this quarter, Egypt requested the withdrawal of UN forces from Sharm El-Sheikh and closed the Straits of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and the Six-Day War took place. The relative increase in US cooperation towards Egypt is mainly due to the increased activity aimed at avoiding the escalation of tensions in the Middle East. After the closure of the Aqaba Straits

¹Events used in the description do not in most cases include all events reported in the descriptive file.

FIGURE 4.1: Dimensions of Interactions for US Cooperative Behavior Towards Egypt and Israel - January 1967 - December 1978

in May, Egyptian and US officials conferred and agreed to exchange visits of Vice-Presidents just before the war broke out. The US also offered a Middle East peace plan, and officials of both countries conferred in June. The relative increase in US cooperation towards Egypt is also in part due to US-Egyptian agreement on the Kennedy Round tariff cuts.

Azar's COPDAB reports that the increased cooperation towards Israel during the second quarter in 1967 was mainly due to US support for Israel's right of freedom of navigation in the Aqaba Straits, the US provision of arms and ammunition to Israel in May and June, the US provision of a loan of \$30 million worth of agricultural commodities to Israel, and the general US involvement in efforts to de-escalate the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Figure 4.1 shows that the two other peaks in US cooperation towards Egypt during the pre-war period were during the last quarter of 1967 and the first quarter in 1973. The relative increase in US cooperation towards Egypt during the last quarter of 1967 was partly due to US activity aimed at decreasing the level of tension generated by the 1967 war. The US participated in talks with Egypt in October 1967, advised Israel not to take reprisals against Egypt in October, and sought Egyptian acceptance of Egyptian-Israeli talks in November. The relative increase in the

coded events indicating US cooperation towards Egypt is also partly due to the lifting of US travel ban to Egypt in November, and the agreement with Egypt in December on indirect diplomatic representation in each capital.

COPDAB shows that during the first quarter of 1973, US officials engaged in talks with Egyptian officials in January and February, urged peace on the Egyptian-Israeli front in January, and invited Egypt for Middle East talks in February. During this quarter, the US also sold Egypt \$50 million worth of passenger aircraft.

Figure 4.1 shows that the two other peaks in US cooperation towards Israel were during the third quarter in 1970 and the last quarter in 1971. The relative increase in US cooperation towards Israel during the third quarter in 1970 was mainly due to US activity on the Rogers' Cease-Fire Plan of 1970, US support for Israeli claims about the Egyptian violation of the cease-fire, and actual and promised aid during August and September.

COPDAB shows that the relative increase in US cooperation towards Israel during the last quarter of 1971 was mainly due to three issues: the actual and promised provision of aid to Israel--for example, the US approved a loan of \$500 million to buy F-14 Phantom Jets in November and agreed in December to modernize the Israeli armed forces;

the US was critical of the Soviet provision of arms to the Arabs, and in October the US engaged in discussions on the Middle East situation with Israeli officials.

(B) Peaks in US conflict towards Egypt and Israel

Figure 4.2 shows that the three peaks in US conflict towards the dyad during the period January 1967 - September 1973 took place during the same quarters: the second and third quarters in 1967 and the third quarter in 1973. US conflict towards Egypt during the second quarter of 1967 (see Figure 4.2) represents the highest peak in US conflict towards Egypt during the entire twelve-year period under study: January 1967 - December 1978. The withdrawal of UN forces from Sinai, and the closure of the Aqaba Straits were followed by an increase in US conflict with Egypt. COPDAB, for example, reports that the US opposed the Egyptian request for the withdrawal of UN forces and reacted strongly to Nasser's blockade proclamation, labelling it an act of aggression. With the increased tension in the Middle East, following the closure of the Straits, the State Department first advised US citizens not to visit Egypt, and then the US Government ordered US dependents to leave Egypt. The US also engaged in consultations with other maritime powers and endorsed an international naval force to escort ships through Aqaba. With

FIGURE 4.2: Dimensions of Interactions for US Conflictual Behavior Towards Egypt and Israel - January 1967 - December 1978

the outbreak of war on June 5, the US denied Egyptian accusations that it was participating on the side of Israel. The war prompted a break in US-Egyptian diplomatic relations and the cancellation of a technical aid plan for Egypt.

During the second quarter of 1967, several issues led to an increase in US conflict towards Israel. For example, the US was concerned over the Israeli-Syrian confrontation in April. With the increased tension in the area in the third week of May, the US advised its citizens not to visit Israel and then ordered US dependents to leave Israel. As the tension mounted, the US cautioned Israel on May 28 against any unilateral action in the area. After the war, US conflict towards Israel resulted from differences over the eviction of the refugees from the occupied territories and the annexation of Old Jerusalem. In June, the US warned Israel against the eviction of refugees, and deplored the annexation. The increased conflict was also due to the bombing of the US ship Liberty: in June, the US charged that two Israeli Jet aircraft had flown over Liberty before it was bombed, that the attack on the Liberty was intentional, and that the Liberty's failure to respond was no reason to attack.

Figure 4.2 shows that the second peak in US conflict behavior towards both Egypt and Israel occurred during the third quarter of 1967. The relative increase in US conflict towards Egypt can be understood, to a great extent, if seen within the context of US dissatisfaction over Egyptian behavior during May and June 1967. Examples of US conflict reported in COPDAB include the approval of a ban on Egyptian cotton purchases by the US House Committee on Agriculture and the US accusation that Egypt had deliberately blocked the Suez Canal by sinking ships in the waterway.

The relative increase in US conflict towards Israel during the third quarter of 1967 was mainly due to the continuing differences between the two governments over the annexation of Old Jerusalem and the return of the refugees. The US continued to oppose the annexation and urged the return of the refugees.

Figure 4.2 shows that the third peak in US conflict towards both Egypt and Israel came during the third quarter of 1973. COPDAB reports that during this quarter, the US blamed both Egypt and Israel for the failure to reach a Middle East solution. The conflict with Egypt was also caused by US dismay over the Egyptian claim that the US was blocking peace and by US opposition to Egypt's call for

unilateral Israeli withdrawal and an economic boycott against Israel. US conflict with Israel was also due to the Israeli interception of a Lebanese commercial jetliner. In August, the US protested the Israeli interception, warned Israel that efforts to control terrorism must be legal, supported the UN condemnation of Israel for seizing the commercial aircraft and also the ICAO condemnation of Israel.

4.2.3.2 US Cooperation and Conflict Towards Egypt and Israel During the 1973 War Quarter

(A) US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel

Figure 4.1 shows that US cooperation towards both Egypt and Israel increased during the quarter of the war, October 1973 - December 1973. COPDAB shows that US cooperation towards Egypt during the war (October 6 - October 24) consisted mainly of the repeated US calls for a cease-fire, US support for the Egyptian claim that Israel destroyed temporary Egyptian bridges and US Ambassador Scali's expression of regret for the demonstration against Egypt. After the war, US cooperation mainly involved calls for the relief of the Egyptian Third Army in October 1973 and the meetings between Egyptian and American officials to discuss the disengagement of Egyptian-Israeli forces and peace in the area. Foreign Minister Fahmy, Nixon and

Kissinger met in October 1973. Sadat and Kissinger conferred in November, and Egyptian and US officials met at the Geneva Peace Conference in December. In November, the US also announced that it had reached agreement with Egypt and Israel on the cease-fire. US cooperation with Egypt during this quarter also included the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt and the appointment of Ambassador Eilts as the new US ambassador to Egypt on November 7, 1973.

US cooperation with Israel during the 1973 war quarter (see Figure 4.1) represents the highest peak during the entire twelve-year period under study - January 1967 - December 1978. COPDAB shows that the increased cooperation during this period was mainly due to the supply of arms, to requests for aid to Israel, meetings to discuss arms supplies for Israel, US calls for a cease-fire during the October war, US support for the Israeli position on the violation of the cease-fire and US involvement in the peace process in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. On October 12 the US launched a massive military airlift to Israel.¹

¹There is debate in the literature as to why the supply of arms to Israel only started on October 12. The Kalbs (1974:465-478) maintain that Kissinger was pushing the Pentagon hard to resupply Israel with weapons before that date, but that the Pentagon was stalling. The second interpretation (Golan, 1976:45-50; Luttwak and Laqueur, 1974) refutes Kalbs' explanation. The delay according to this interpretation was deliberate on Kissinger's part. He hoped to achieve Soviet cooperation in order to manage the crisis and thought that a low profile policy would limit the damage to US relations with the Arab oil producing countries.

This was followed by the additional supply of arms, and a request by the President for aid for Israel. The US supplied Israel on October 14 with new jet fighter aircraft to replace war losses. On October 15, it announced a military airlift of major weapons and that it would maintain the arms balance in the Middle East. On October 19, the US announced that it sent 50 airforce personnel to Israel, and President Nixon requested \$2.2 billion in emergency aid for Israel. In November, the US gave Israel \$300 million for purchasing arms and in November and December 1973 assured it of continued US support. US officials also visited Israel in November to evaluate the American arms program. During the war, the US repeatedly called for a cease-fire. In October, after the war, the US agreed to use its influence for Middle East peace, and US and Israeli officials engaged in discussions. In November, the US reached agreement with Egypt and Israel for a cease-fire, and in December the US participated in the Geneva Peace Conference.

(B) US conflict towards Egypt and Israel

Figure 4.2 shows that US conflict increased only towards Egypt during the period October - December 1973, while towards Israel it declined. COPDAB shows that US conflict towards Egypt consisted mostly of rejections of any involvement in policing the cease-fire, accusations that

the USSR was supplying arms to Egypt and denials, on October 11, that the US had taken any jet action in the Middle East.

COPDAB shows that US conflict towards Israel during this period included an appeal to Israel on October 6 to prevent fighting. The US also estimated on October 14 that Israel lost 75-80 planes, and indicated it was unlikely that the US would replace all the losses. In late October, the US insisted that Israel allow Egypt to re-supply the Egyptian Third Army that was trapped in Suez.

4.2.3.3 The Peaks in US Cooperation and Conflict Towards Egypt and Israel during the Post-War Period

(A) Peaks in US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel

Figure 4.1 shows that US cooperation with both Egypt and Israel increased during the second quarter in 1974. With Egypt it represents the highest peak during the entire twelve-year period under study, cooperation with Israel during this quarter represents the highest peak in US cooperation towards Israel during the post-war period. COPDAB shows that the increase in US cooperation with the dyad was mainly due to involvement in the peace process, military aid to Israel, and its economic and technical cooperation with both Egypt and Israel. During April and

May, the US participated in the negotiations on the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement through meetings with Israeli officials and offered suggestions for troop separation. The US also discussed the Middle East situation with Egyptian officials and kept them informed about progress on the Israeli-Syrian disengagement. In June 1974, President Nixon visited both Egypt and Israel. The US also engaged in cultural, economic and technical cooperation with Egypt. For example, in April it agreed to joint operations to clear the Suez Canal and provided Egypt with \$24.7 million in credits for farm commodities. In May, the US formed an economic cooperation committee with Egypt and agreed to improve technical, trade and cultural relations with Egypt. During June, following the visit of President Nixon, the US signed a nuclear technical agreement with Egypt and agreed to begin work on a nuclear power plant. The US also engaged in military, economic, technical and cultural cooperation with Israel. In the military field, for example, it supplied Israel with weapons and engaged in negotiations with Israeli officials for long term rather than yearly military assistance. Examples of US economic and technical cooperation with Israel during this quarter include asking Congress, in April 1974, for \$350 million in foreign aid and offering, in June 1974, to supply Israel with a nuclear research reactor.

In June, the US also signed a cultural exchange agreement with Israel.

Figure 4.1 shows that the two other peaks in US cooperative behavior towards Egypt during the post-war period occurred during the second quarter in 1976 and the first in 1977. The relative increase in US cooperation with Egypt during the second quarter of 1976 was mainly due to meetings between US and Egyptian officials and to US military, economic and technical cooperation. In April, the US sold American aircraft to Egypt, established an international consortium to aid Egypt and agreed to \$2 million technical aid in 1976. In May, the US provided Egypt with \$50 million for agricultural and industrial development, agreed to financial and technical cooperation, and offered a loan of \$99 million for an electric power station. In June, US economic aid packages to Egypt reached \$2 billion.

The third peak was during the first quarter in 1977. The increase in US cooperation during this quarter was mainly due to meetings between US and Egyptian officials and to US economic and technical cooperation with Egypt. On January 19, President Ford invited Sadat to visit the US, and in February, Secretary Vance held talks with Sadat in Egypt. Examples of US economic and technical cooperation with

Egypt include: the supply of food to Egypt following the food riots in Cairo; approval of \$500 million in urgent aid in February; and the agreement to grant Egypt a loan of \$440 million to build three nuclear generators in March. The increase in US cooperation with Egypt also involved the announcement in February that President Carter would approve a \$4.8 million arms sale to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Figure 4.1 shows that the two other peaks in US cooperation with Israel during the post-war period came during the third quarter in 1975 and the third in 1978. COPDAB reports that the increase during the third quarter in 1975 was mainly due to the negotiations of the Sinai II disengagement agreement, the agreement to establish a peace force in the absence of UN forces and the establishment of listening posts in the Sinai buffer zone. The US signed the Sinai agreement on September 1, 1975. During July and August, the US sold military weapons to Israel and in September discussed the sale of F-15 jet aircraft and other arms to Israel, pledged military and economic assistance and offered Pershing missiles.

COPDAB reports that the increase during the third quarter in 1978 was mainly due to the meetings leading to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East at Camp David in

September 1978. In September, the US also appropriated \$1.9 million in economic aid to Israel and helped finance two air bases to be built in the Negev Desert.

(B) Peaks in US conflict towards Egypt and Israel

Figure 4.2 shows that the three peaks in US conflict towards Egypt during the post-war period occurred during the second quarter of 1974, the last in 1977, and the second in 1978. COPDAB shows that during the second quarter of 1974, US conflict involved a critique in April 1974, of Egyptian Government policies by President Nixon and an indication by Secretary Kissinger that the US would not sell arms to Egypt.

Azar's COPDAB reports that in December 1977 the US stated that Sadat's criticisms of the USSR were making the US uneasy. The US also opposed Egyptian support for the creation of a Palestinian State.

COPDAB reports that Carter's plan to sell jets to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia was opposed by US Senators in April 1978 and by the House International Relations Committee in May. US conflict with Egypt during this quarter was also due to Carter's statement in June that the US might be pressing for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, which was not favored by Egypt at the time.

Figure 4.2 shows that the three peaks in US conflict towards Israel during the post-war period were during the first and third quarters in 1977 and the first in 1978. The increase during the first quarter in 1977, as reported in COPDAB, was mainly due to differences between both countries over Israeli arms sales to Chile and Ecuador, the cancellation of the sale of Concussion Bombs to Israel, and differences between both countries over issues in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. In February, the US condemned Israeli oil drilling in Egyptian-occupied territory and warned that this hindered the prospects for peace. In March, the US suggested that the Israeli borders be close to the pre-1967 ones and indicated support for a Palestinian homeland.

US conflict with Israel during the third quarter of 1977 represents the highest peak in US conflict towards Israel during the twelve-year period under study. The increased conflict was mainly due to US opposition to Israeli sales of fighter planes to Peru and Ecuador, and differences between both countries over the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon and issues in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. For example, in July the US expressed its desire for a Palestinian state linked to Jordan, and in September demanded Palestinian representation in any peace talks and favored negotiations with the PLO if they agreed to UN Resolution 242. The US

was also critical of Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territories.

In January 1978, the US endorsed a limited referendum for Palestinians in the occupied territories and requested an Israeli investigation into charges of torture in West Bank prisons. During February, the US repeatedly criticized Israeli settlements in Arab-occupied territories and in March it repeatedly called for an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. The US also released a CIA report on Israel's nuclear capability. This indicated that Israel possessed nuclear weapons as early as 1974.

The description of the peaks in US cooperative and conflictual behavior towards the dyad to some extent lends support to Slater and Kirchner's (1978:30) finding on third party activity in the Middle East. They contend that the dominant issue in drawing third parties into a conflict is armed conflict. The description of the peaks in US behavior suggests that a third party is likely to increase both its conflict and cooperation during crises in the regional conflict. US cooperation with both Egypt and Israel increased during both the second quarter in 1967, when the Six-Day War took place and the last quarter in 1973 when the October War occurred. The US also increased its conflict towards both protagonists during the second quarter in 1967. However,

during the last quarter in 1973, only its conflict with Egypt increased.

4.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US OBJECTIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND ITS PREDOMINANT BEHAVIOR AS AN ALLY AND INTERMEDIARY

Chapter III has shown that US decision makers gave priority to conflict management rather than conflict resolution during the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973, when the *status quo* in Egyptian-Israeli interactions was not regarded as a threat to its objectives in the Middle East. Chapter III has also shown that US decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution rather than to conflict management during the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978, when it was believed that the *status quo* in Egyptian-Israeli interactions did pose a threat to US objectives in the Middle East.

In this section we will test the following two hypotheses:

- H₁: If a third party prefers conflict management to conflict resolution, it will tend to behave predominantly as an ally cooperating more and conflicting less with the party in the dyad that it believes will preserve the *status quo*.

H₂: If a third party prefers conflict resolution to conflict management, it will tend to behave predominantly as an intermediary co-operating with both protagonists at approximately the same level.

US behavior as an ally of Israel is measured by two variables: (1) US cooperative behavior towards Israel, and (2) US conflict behavior towards Egypt. The US role as an intermediary is also measured by two variables: (1) US cooperative behavior towards Israel, and (2) US cooperative behavior towards Egypt. Our interest is in the role of an intermediary providing both verbal and tangible rewards to both protagonists. The Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for cooperation are used in measuring US cooperative behavior and the DIs for conflict are used in measuring US conflict behavior.

In testing whether or not the US behaved predominantly as an ally of Israel during the pre-war period, when it gave priority to conflict management rather than to conflict resolution, we aggregated separately US cooperative behavior towards Egypt and US cooperative behavior towards Israel and examined the mean differences between the cooperation scores. We also aggregated separately US conflict behavior towards Egypt and US conflict behavior towards Israel during the pre-war period and examined the mean difference between the conflict scores.

In testing whether or not the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary during the post-war period when it gave priority to conflict resolution rather than to conflict management, we aggregated separately US cooperative behavior towards Egypt and US cooperative behavior towards Israel and examined the mean difference between these cooperation scores.

4.3.1. US Predominant Behavior as an Ally of
Israel During the Pre-War Period -
January 1967 - September 1973

Table 4.6 presents the mean difference between US cooperative behavior towards Egypt and Israel during the pre-war period. Table 4.6 also presents the mean difference of US conflict behavior towards Egypt and Israel during the same period. The results show that US cooperation towards Israel was 2.80 times as great as its cooperation towards Egypt. The mean difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. The results in Table 4.6 show further that US conflict towards Egypt was 1.16 times as much as its conflict towards Israel. However, the mean difference in this case is not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

TABLE 4.6

MEAN DIFFERENCE OF US COOPERATIVE
AND CONFLICTUAL BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT
AND ISRAEL

January 1967 - September 1973

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean Difference	T Value	2 - Tail Probability
US cooperative behavior toward Egypt	32.26	33.46	-57.93	-5.30	.000
US cooperative behavior toward Israel	90.19	56.77			
US conflict behavior toward Egypt	37.59	89.84	5.19	.40	.691
US conflict behavior toward Israel	32.40	35.18			

N = 27

The results suggest that in its predominant behavior as an ally, a third party might tend to rely more on increasing its cooperation with its client rather than conflict with the opponent in order to strengthen its client's position. US behavior as an ally during the pre-war period deviates from the type of alliance behavior specified in the hypotheses. While the US cooperated with Israel, its behavior towards Egypt consisted mostly of neglect, and both US cooperation and conflict were low.

The literature¹ and publicly available documents also indicate that the predominant US alliance behavior during the pre-war period focused on political and military support to Israel.² Egypt was seen as the challenger to the

¹For a discussion of US foreign policy towards the Middle East, see Campbell (1970), Campbell (1975), Evron (1973), Kissinger (1979), Quandt (1977), Rubin (1974), Safran (1978), and Whetten (1974).

²While the US did undertake the role of an intermediary on some occasions during the pre-war period, its predominant interaction with the dyad was that of an ally of Israel. By 1971, the US had even lost interest in the intermediary role. This is reflected, for example, in Secretary Rogers' press conference in Rome (May 8, 1971; DSB, 1666:701). He said:

Now, when you speak about our acting as mediator, I want to make it clear that we don't intend to act as mediator. We've done what we have done recently with the hope that we could get some momentum going sufficient to help the parties work out an interim agreement, but we are not going to continue to play that active a role.

During the pre-war period, US decision makers tended to prefer UN mediation over US mediation; they supported UN involvement generally and gave support to the Jarring Mission.

status quo. Its two principal objectives, repeated on many occasions during the period, were the restoration of the occupied territories, including the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the acquisition of the rights of self-determination for the Palestinians. (Sigler, 1978:10). It was the party in the dyad that signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971, and the party that continuously received arms from the Soviet Union, a matter of utmost concern to American decision makers. For example, Nixon (January 2, 1972; DSB, 1700:84) said in an interview:

Now, the Soviet Union has been sending in very significant arms shipments to the U.A.R. In view of those shipments, as that continues to escalate, we have had to consider the requests of Israel for planes in order to see that the balance does not shift.

With the absence of any progress towards achieving Egyptian objectives without resort to violence, Egyptian decision makers advocated the military option in many statements. The outbreak of war was exactly what US decision makers had sought to avoid.

Israel, on the other hand, was regarded by American decision makers as essential to maintaining the *status quo* and avoiding war. Israeli military capability was seen as the most important ingredient in deterring violence. American decision makers, after the Six-Day War in 1967, were generally relieved that Israel was able to win the war

without outside interference. The worst possible situation from the American point of view was an imminent Israeli defeat that would pressure them to intervene. Quandt (1973: 271) maintains that the combination of these fears and perceptions led US decision makers to conclude that a strong Israel was in the American interest since it would reduce the need for American involvement in the Middle East during the US involvement in Vietnam. US behavior as an ally of Israel during the pre-war period can also be understood in view of two other developments which threatened the outbreak of major hostilities: the Soviet supply of arms to Egypt, and the Jordan crisis of September 1970.¹

Providing Israel with the aid necessary to maintain the balance of power was regarded as essential by American decision makers since this deterred war. For example, Assistant Secretary of State Sisco (March 20, 1972; DSB, 1713:605-606) indicated:

The arms balance may not be a guarantee of peace. It is not a substitute for negotiations or an end in itself. But it is a deterrent to war, to a war which has the potential for escalation.

¹For a discussion of the Soviet supply of arms to Egypt and the Jordan crisis, see Kissinger (1979:558-631), Kalb and Kalb (1974:186-209), Safran (1978:414-475), and Quandt (1977: 72-127).

Major events following the cease-fire in 1970 seemed to confirm the US decision makers' belief in the balance of power as a means to avoid war. For example, 1971 saw the end of Sadat's year of decision and, although the stalemate had not changed; Egypt did not go to war, nor did it seem about to do so. The expulsion of the Russians in 1972 also showed that US behavior as an ally of Israel served US objectives. Its decision makers believed that their policy of support for Israel caused the Soviets to despair of the Arab ability to alter the stalemate by war without Soviet participation, maximized their fears of such participation, and consequently impelled them to adopt the cautious course which led to a crisis in their relationship with Egypt (Safran, 1978:464-465, 469).

However, the October War in 1973 revealed the failure of deterrence. US behavior as an ally of Israel did not prevent the outbreak of war.

4.3.2 US Predominant Behavior as an Intermediary During the Post-War Period - January 1974 - December 1978

Table 4.7 presents the mean difference of US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel during the post-war period. The results show that US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel was very close, the mean difference is only .45 and not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

TABLE 4.7

MEAN DIFFERENCE OF US COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT AND ISRAEL

January 1974 - December 1978

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean Difference	T Value	2 - Tail Probability
US cooperative behavior toward Egypt	140.85	77.43	-.45	-.01	.976
US cooperative behavior toward Israel	141.30	70.51			

N = 20

The results support our hypothesis that when conflict resolution is the overriding concern of a third party, it will undertake primarily the role of an intermediary. The literature and publicly available documents support the conclusion that the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary during the post-war period.¹ American objectives after the war were first to end hostilities as quickly as possible, and second to end hostilities in such a manner that they would contribute to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more permanent solution (Kissinger, October 12, 1973; DSB, 1792:534). US decision makers acknowledged that the US did not undertake a sufficiently active role during the pre-war period. At a news conference, Kissinger (December 12, 1973; DSB, 1800:756) maintained:

With respect to the oil embargo, I have stated our position at the last press conference, which is that we understand the Arab point of view. The United States prior to October 6 perhaps did not see the situation with the same degree of urgency as some of the Arab countries.

In an address before the Pilgrims of Great Britain, Kissinger (December 12, 1973; DSB, 1801:780) further said:

¹For a discussion of US policy towards the Middle East during the post-war period, see Ball (1977), Ball (1979), Golan (1976), Hoffman (1975), Hoffman (1977), Quandt (1975), Quandt (1977), Safran (1978), Sheehan (1976), Stevens (1977), and Ullman (1975a).

As for the nature of the Middle East conflict, it is fair to state--as many Europeans including your Foreign Secretary have--that the United States did not do all that it might have done before the war to promote a permanent settlement in the Middle East.

Following the war, US decision makers preferred active involvement as an intermediary in order to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, rather than shared US-USSR mediation or even UN mediation. At a press conference, Kissinger (January 22, 1974; DSB, 1807:144) indicated:

With respect to disengagement, it was always understood by the Soviet Union and ourselves that we were in a tactically better position to promote progress on that issue.

It was the desire of both parties that the United States play the intermediary role; the Soviet Union had neither diplomatic relations nor effective contact with Israel (Sisco, January 25, 1974; DSB, 1808:177).

American decision makers were also aware of the limitations of Soviet influence in Egypt. As Alfred Atherton,¹ (June 30, 1976; DSB, 1936:178) said:

The Soviet Union no longer has the same position of major influence it once enjoyed in certain Arab countries. Arab leaders perceive increasingly that while Soviet support may help them make war, only the United States--of the major powers--can produce progress to peace

¹Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asian Affairs.

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US decision makers also preferred an active intermediary role rather than favoring UN mediation as during the pre-war period. During the pre-war period, the UN had been ineffective, as the Jarring Mission had shown, in securing Egyptian-Israeli cooperation. The failure of this showed the limited effectiveness of an intermediary that lacked independent capabilities. Furthermore, the UN was increasingly regarded by the Israelis as anti-Israel; as Secretary Kissinger (October 20, 1975; DSB, 1899:698) indicated:

We have seen a disturbing contrary trend--ideological intolerance, procedural abuses, bloc majorities, one-way sided voting--resulting in a one-way morality that clearly undermines the U.N.'s role as an instrument of conciliation. The resolution naming Zionism as a form of racism is an example; it undermines the U.N.'s necessary and valuable campaign against racial discrimination, and it threatens the U.N.'s capacity as mediator in the Middle East.

The COPDAB descriptive file shows that the US undertook active consultations with both Egypt and Israel in order to resolve the conflict. Shuttle diplomacy resulted in the Sinai I Agreement in January 1974 and the Sinai II Agreement of September 1975. The US undertook active bilateral consultations with the two parties in order to investigate the possibility of convening the Geneva Conference in 1977. It participated in the political and military negotiations between Egypt and Israel after Sadat's visit to

Jerusalem, and it played an active role in the formulating of the Camp David Accords.

Active diplomacy on the part of the United States was backed by military and economic support to Egypt and Israel in order to increase confidence in the United States and facilitate the exchange of concessions by the two adversaries. COPDAB for example, shows that the US provided Egypt with credit for farm commodities in April 1974; \$250 million and economic assistance in January 1975; it reported its intention in September 1977 to sell \$250 million worth of aircrafts to Egypt; and it announced its decision in February 1978 to sell jet aircrafts to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

COPDAB shows that the US also provided Israel with economic and military support. For example, it provided equipment for Israel's military forces in June 1974; it granted Israel \$300 million sales credit in September 1974; it pledged military and economic assistance for Israel with the signing of the Sinai II Agreement on September 1, 1975; and in September 1978, helped finance two airbases to be constructed in the Negev Desert.

The literature (e.g., Golan, 1976; Quandt, 1977; Sheehan, 1976; Safran, 1978; Campbell, 1979) and publicly available documents support the conclusion that the US gave economic and military aid to Egypt and Israel

in order to induce their cooperation towards one another. In undertaking the role of intermediary, the US was bound to be sensitive to Egypt's problems and needs. The American effort to bring about a settlement depended in large part on Sadat's ability to carry it out (Campbell, 1979:620). The US administration had to help Sadat face opposition in Egypt to his cooperation with Israel and isolation in the Arab world (Safran, 1978:562). US decision makers recognized the need to reward Egypt for choosing the US; this would manifest to the world at large, and particularly to the Arab world, that Sadat's friendship with the US would be returned (Sheehan, 1976:206). Egyptian friendship with the US deprived Egypt of the Soviet Union as a source of military supplies.

In explaining the necessity of the sale of military items to Egypt, Alfred Atherton (September 15, 1977; DSB, 2002:651) said:

We firmly believe these sales are in the national interest of the United States.... Given American interest in supporting Egypt's cooperation in our search for a genuine peace in the Middle East, we clearly have a major interest in helping Egypt meet its legitimate defense needs.

American decision makers also believed that military and economic support to Israel were essential in order:

to provide Israel with the assistance needed to maintain its security, giving it resolve to persevere in the negotiations assured of its own strength and of our support.

(Kissinger, July 24, 1974; DSB, 1834:287)

Active diplomacy backed by economic and military support was considered cheaper for the United States than a possible war which could result from the failure of efforts at conflict resolution. For example, the costs involved in the US role in the Sinai II agreement were explained by Secretary Kissinger (September 17, 1975; DSB, 1893:509-510):

There are two considerations with respect to this aid. One, the 1973 war required nearly \$2.5 billion in appropriations for the war alone in addition to the regular appropriation that Israel was getting. In addition, it cost us beyond \$10 billion for the direct costs of the oil embargo, together with the intangible costs of a 5 percent rise in our price index, large unemployment, and so forth. So there is no question that the amounts we are thinking about now would be trifling compared to what a war would cost us.

The use of rewards to induce Israeli cooperation with Egypt has been criticized in the literature. In criticizing the provision of rewards to sign the Sinai II agreement, Ball (1977:458) maintained:

In the light of the hundreds of millions committed to Israel and Egypt for an agreement for Israel to withdraw from two oilfields and parts of two mountain passes, what would be the character and magnitude of the largesse needed to induce agreement on the relinquishment of the balance of Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and to achieve a compromise solution in Jerusalem?

According to Ball (1977:458), the United States cannot afford to try to purchase a total settlement. The US must therefore make it clear that it will use its leverage in the search for peace. Ball (1977:463) praises Eisenhower's decision in 1957 to pressure Israel to withdraw from Arab territories. In describing it he said:

After all, we have acted effectively in the past. President Eisenhower upheld the authority of the United Nations in the Middle East when, ... he was faced with the refusal of the Israeli Government to withdraw from the Sinai territories, in defiance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution of February 16, 1957. His response was prompt and unambiguous. If the Israeli Government did not comply, the United States would not merely suspend governmental assistance but would also eliminate essential tax credits and take other administrative action to restrict private assistance of cash and gifts and bond purchases from American sources.

Since Israel was more dependent on the United States after the 1973 War than ever before, Ball (1977:464) advocated the use of pressure to achieve Israeli concessions.

The national decision Americans must make it quite clear: It is not whether we should try to force an unpalatable peace on the Israeli people, but rather how much longer we should continue to pour assistance into Israel to support policies that impede progress towards peace and thus accentuate the possibility of war, with all the dangers that that holds not only for Israel but for the United States and the other industrialized democracies of Western Europe and Japan. Put another way, how much longer should we go on subsidizing a stalemate that is manifestly untenable for all concerned?

While Ball's argument is desirable from an Arab point of view, and was in fact an important premise in Sadat's calculation of US ability to solve the Middle East conflict, it is not feasible. We share the view of other scholars (e.g. Dowty, 1980; Rosen and Moustafine, 1977) that advocates of an imposed settlement tend to underplay the bargaining situation between a great power and a small state. It is not a one-way street, particularly on matters the small state considers basic to its security (Dowty, 1980:63). Given the limitations on the use of coercion against Israel, the US did not resort, during the period January 1974 - December 1978, to the kind of pressure that would coerce Israel. This was not because the US lacked the capability to exert such pressure, but because US decision makers were reluctant to undertake it. For example, Vice-President Mondale said in a speech (June 17, 1977; DSB, 1985:45):

We do not intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel. If we have differences over military aid--and we may have some--it will be on military grounds or economic grounds but not political grounds. If we have differences over diplomatic strategy--and that could happen--we will work this out on a political level. We will not alter our commitment to Israel's military security.

Another example of reluctance to pressure Israel was given by President Carter (March 9, 1978; DSB, 2013:22) at a press conference:

I don't have any intention to pressure Prime Minister Begin. I don't have any desire to do it and couldn't if I wanted to.

The question now is what were the limitations on the use of coercion that made a reward strategy a more feasible means to induce Israeli cooperation with Egypt, when the US undertook the predominant role of an intermediary during the period January 1974 - December 1978. These will be discussed in the following section.

4.4 THE LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF COERCION BY THIRD PARTIES ACTING AS INTERMEDIARIES: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Table 4.2 shows that US interaction with Israel during the period January 1974 - December 1978 was more cooperative than conflictual. The data presented in Table 4.5 also show that most of US conflict behavior towards Israel

was on the lowest two levels of the conflict and of Azar's cooperation and conflict scale (verbal expressions of discord and hostility).

Given its contribution to Israel's economic and military needs, the US had the capability to exert far more pressure on Israel through withholding economic and military aid in order to induce cooperation vis-a-vis Egypt. While US assistance to Israel was about \$500 million a year after the Six-Day War in June 1967, it was more than \$2.5 billion in economic and military support in 1974. Under the Sinai Agreement of September 1975, the US committed itself to continuing aid of about two billion dollars a year. In the five years following the October War of 1973, the US transferred to Israel more than \$10 billion in official aid, more than half in outright grants. By 1978, one fourth of American economic assistance was going to Israel (Crittender, 1979:1012-1013). The October War also changed fundamentally Israel's security position. It faced new challenges which it could hope to meet only with massive increases in aid from the US. After the October War, Israel depended to a decisive extent on American military aid. During the three years following the Six-Day War, American assistance to Israel averaged about \$40 million a year; this represented only a modest proportion of total Israeli defense expenditure.

In the next three years, however, US assistance averaged about \$400 million or about 28% of Israel's total defence expenditure. In 1974-1975, American assistance averaged \$1.5 billion, 42% of total Israeli defence spending. Furthermore, the US was virtually the only supplier of high technology, sophisticated weapons that after the October War were the mainstay of Israeli strategy (Safran, 1978: 312-316).

While US-Israeli relations after the October War evolved to the point where Israel was more dependent on the US than ever before, Israel felt free to take hardline positions at variance with the US views without fear of anything much worse than verbal admonition from Washington (Ball, 1979:231). Rosen and Moustafine (1977:31) argue that Israeli concessions which go beyond marginal areas and are believed to affect Israeli security, cannot be forced through small punishments.

The US preference for a reward strategy in order to induce Israeli cooperation towards Egypt, and its reluctance to undertake pressure against Israel, except mostly on a low level of verbal criticism, can be understood if one recalls the limitations on the use of coercion outlined in Chapter I. This chapter outlined three sets of limitations on an intermediary's willingness to use coercion: psychological

limitations, limitations on unilateral coercion, and the leverage of small states. While the first and second limitations are of a general nature, the third differs from one small state to the other. In the following we will discuss the leverage of Israel over the US--the special factors in the case of Israel which probably limited US decision makers' willingness to resort to strong coercion in the form of withholding economic and military aid. Three such factors will be discussed in the following sections:

- Israel's nuclear option
- Domestic influences within the US
- US objectives in its relation with Israel

4.4.1 Israel's Nuclear Option

In studying the nuclear policy of small states, Dror (1975:46) concludes that an active nuclear policy may be more advantageous than is often supposed. It provides the small state not only military advantages but also added political leverage in dealing with great powers. Dror's conclusion is of particular relevance in the case of Israel.

Israel's nuclear policy rests on three pillars: the first is a public pledge to build an advanced nuclear capability; the second, an ambiguous promise not to be the first

to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but pledging that if they are introduced by others, they will be matched by Israel. Finally, Israel possess a nuclear establishment with scientific manpower and technological skill to make the first and second pledges credible (Jabber, 1979:73). Israel's nuclear capability probably lends Israel considerable bargaining leverage in its dealing with the US.

In a detailed study, Jabber (1971) concludes that an Israeli nuclear weapons program would not face insurmountable difficulties insofar as technical, human and financial factors are concerned. Furthermore, in the Middle East, where population and industry are concentrated in small areas, a very small number of nuclear bursts could suffice to destroy the enemy. Under these conditions, Israel does not need to develop a reliable missile system in order to possess a credible strike capability against the surrounding Arab countries. In other words, the availability of an assured system with a high degree of penetration capability is not essential for a credible striking power.

Israel's official position on nuclear arms does little to dispel the belief in the inevitable development of its nuclear capability. Statements since May 1964 have maintained that Israel will not be the first to introduce

nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but the meaning of "introduction" has not been satisfactorily clarified (Jabber, 1971:123). To "introduce" could be interpreted that Israel would allow advanced development without final testing and deployment. Israel's possession of fissile material and fabrication devices could stop just short of final assembly of the bomb. While Israeli decision makers emphasize that they would not be the first to introduce atomic weapons in the Middle East, they stress that they would not be the second either. Rosen (1976:26) maintains that Allon repeated a statement to this effect several times when he was Foreign Minister in December 1974. Rosen also quotes President Katzir as saying in December 1974: "Israel possesses the potential to produce atomic weapons and will do so if we need."

The refusal of Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty adds to the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear policy. The refusal to sign tends to be interpreted as evidence of proliferation intentions (Dowty, 1972:143). However, few meaningful conclusions could be drawn about Israel's resort to the nuclear option even if Israel were to sign the NPT, or additional bilateral safeguards were introduced. The NPT leaves the development of nuclear weapons open. Its signatories are inhibited from testing or introducing nuclear weapons, but there is a lack of definition in the treaty

regarding "manufacture" and "nuclear weapons." There are also shortcomings in the NPT with respect to safeguards and signatories can withdraw on three months' notice (Dowty, 1972:147). Furthermore, even if the final agreements regarding the US reactor sales to Egypt and Israel did include additional safeguards, this would inhibit Egypt's capability to produce atomic weapons, but would leave essentially unaffected Israel's capability based on the Dimona reactor¹ (Jabber, 1979:83).

Despite the ambiguity, there is strong belief in part of the literature that Israel has already developed nuclear weapons. For example, Jabber (1979:73-74) maintains that:

The premise that Israel possesses neither ready weapons nor their political equivalent....While probably correct at the outset of the 1970's, can no longer be maintained against the weight of contrary evidence and persuasive inference....

From a political--psychological--deterrent perspective, nuclear weapons in effect have already been introduced into the area by a local party, Israel.

¹The Dimona reactor, established in 1960 in cooperation with France, could produce enough plutonium each year for an atomic bomb (Dowty, 1972:142).

The COPDAB descriptive file also reports that in March 1976, the CIA revealed that Israel had 10-20 nuclear weapons. The descriptive file also shows that during the first quarter in 1978, the US indicated that Israel had atomic weapons as early as 1974.

We accept the consensus (Dowty, 1972; Dror, 1975; Evron, 1974; Hodes, 1968; Jabber, 1971; Jabber, 1974; Jabber, 1979; Rosen, 1976; Rosen and Moustafine, 1977) that Israel's nuclear option, actual or potential, probably limits the US willingness to pressure Israel through withholding aid. If Israel were deprived of American aid, it might find it necessary to rely more heavily on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to achieve self-sufficiency or at least as a last resort deterrent (Rosen and Moustafine, 1977:273). As Jabber (1974:240) explained:

The implied threat by its [Israel's] leaders in their arms negotiations with the United States of going nuclear if their conventional weapons needs are not satisfied has been a complicating factor for US Middle East policy, and is a major incentive for a continued American commitment to maintaining Israel's regional military superiority.

4.4.2 Domestic Influences Within the US

A second factor limiting US decision makers' willingness to use high level coercion against Israel relates to domestic influences within the US. The pro-Israeli lobby has been active in American politics even before the establishment of the State of Israel, and its power increased during the 1960's and 1970's (Tillman, 1980:56). Alarmed by the implications of Eisenhower's pressure against Israel in 1957, American Jewish leaders set out to build one of Washington's most effective lobbies (Ball, 1979:233).

The pro-Israeli organizations in the US have cultivated relationships with the White House, Congress and the media. The State Department has also been the target of pro-Israeli organizations but has generally been less responsive than the elected officials (Quandt, 1973:268-269). Elected officials are more susceptible to pro-Israeli organizations because of the role of these organizations in election campaigns. They help secure votes for the candidates and provide them with campaign contributions. Even after the reform in 1974 of the political fund-raising legislation, American Jews raised considerable sums for election campaigns (Aronson, 1978:93-94).

The pro-Israeli organizations make requests for political economic and military support for Israel and launch protests against policies regarded as pro-Arab or anti-Israel. These organizations are also active in conveying to the Israeli government information on trends within the American administration. Ball (1979:233) indicates that practically no action that could affect Israeli interests can be taken, or even discussed within the administration, without it being known to the Israeli government. As soon as such actions are known to Israel, emissaries are sent to urge members of Congress to make their displeasure known.

The influence of pro-Israeli organizations is strengthened by the widespread disposition among officials and the general public to support Israel. This is not the result of specific pressures by Jewish organizations, but is rather due to American sympathy for the Jewish suffering in the holocaust and also the fact that the Israeli case is well presented in the media (Quandt, 1973:282).

The influence of domestic factors is well summarized by Quandt (1973:274-275):

Domestic factors do seem to enter into consideration by defining boundaries beyond which it seems imprudent to step. This restriction of the scope of possible initiatives has been the most visible effect of domestic factors over the past few years and generally seems more important than the influence of domestic factors in bringing acceptance of favored policies. It is easier to limit the scope of new departures and to inject notes of caution than it is to obtain all that one wants.

An example of how domestic influences limit high level coercion against Israel occurred during the 1975 reassessment period in US foreign policy. This followed the breakdown in March 1975 of negotiations on a second disengagement between Egypt and Israel. The talks deadlocked over Israeli withdrawal from the Mitla and Giddi passes in the Sinai, the oilfields, and the status of the Umm Khisheiba facility. Israel refused to withdraw from the passes unless Egypt agreed to non-belligerency, and insisted on maintaining control over an electronic intelligence station at Umm Khisheiba at the western end of the Giddi Pass. The Israeli position was regarded as inflexible by American decision makers.

On March 21, President Ford sent an urgent message to Prime Minister Rabin to express disappointment that Israel had not moved as far as it might. He warned Rabin that the US would not finance a deadlock that would damage its political interests if Israel were not flexible. He emphasized that the US would reassess its policy in the

Middle East, including its policy towards Israel. This was the severest threat to Israel since Eisenhower had forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1957 (Sheehan, 1976:159). With the breakdown of negotiations, Kissinger and Ford undertook a reassessment of US foreign policy. During this period, Kissinger suggested that Shimon Peres, Allon and Finance Minister Yeboshua Rabenawitz, who were scheduled to visit Washington, stay in Israel until the reassessment was finished. Kissinger also suspended negotiations on new F-15 Fighter Planes for Israel and delayed the delivery of Lance Ground-to-Ground Missiles which had been committed to Israel.¹

¹President Ford's note to Rabin and the actions undertaken against Israel during the reassessment are mentioned in Sheehan (1976:159, 165), Golan (1976:236-243) and Quandt (1977:266). While the COPDAB data does show an increase in US conflict behavior towards Israel during the first and second quarters of 1975 (see Figure 4.2) and the descriptive file does report American dissatisfaction over the breakdown of the negotiations, Ford's message and the specific actions against Israel mentioned above, were not reported in the descriptive file. This absence is probably due to the fact that events data depend on public sources. These were probably not reported in public sources at the time since it might have stimulated domestic opposition within the US. However, despite the absence of these events from COPDAB, this does not alter our conclusion that, given the US contribution to Israel's economic and military needs, the US had the capability to put far more pressure on Israel through withholding economic and military aid in order to induce Israeli's cooperation vis-à-vis Egypt during the period January 1974 - December 1978.

During the reassessment period in April and May 1975, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the vanguard of the Jewish lobby in Washington, undertook an active role in criticizing Kissinger's policies, not only in the Middle East conflict, but also in Cyprus, Turkey and other regions. The lobby urged members of Congress to give greater support to Israel's economic and military needs. Furthermore, Eban, Dayan, and Allon visited the US to dispute Kissinger's version of the March negotiations and to deny the accusation that the negotiations broke off because of Israeli inflexibility.

On May 21, 1975, seventy-six Senators wrote a collective message to the President urging him to endorse Israel's demands for defensible borders and massive economic and military aid (Sheehan, 1976:174-176). In explaining his signature, Senator John Culver was quoted by Tillman (1980: 52) as saying: "The pressure was just too great. I caved."

The message was a clear indication that continued pressure on Israel would be politically counterproductive (Quandt, 1977:270). Ford and Kissinger could no longer withhold aid to Israel.

In answering criticism posed by Edward Sheehan (1976:201) late in 1975, Kissinger replied:

What were the alternatives? The Middle East has a history of decades. Only during the last two years have we produced progress. It's easy to say that what we've done is not enough, but the steps we've taken are the biggest steps so far. They were *the attainable*--given our prevailing domestic situation.

Sheehan (1976:201) interprets Kissinger as meaning by "prevailing domestic situation" the pressure of the Israeli lobby. When Sheehan (1976:202) observed once to one of Kissinger's aides ~~that~~ Israel's American constituency is the greatest constraint upon US policy, the aid replied: "Of course, and the constraint becomes the determinant."

4.4.3 US Objectives in its Relation with Israel

A third factor limiting US willingness to apply high level coercion against Israel by withholding aid relates to US objectives in its relationship with Israel. Chapter III has shown that one of the fundamental US objectives in the Middle East is maintaining the security of Israel; as a reliable ally of the US in the area, it could offer bases for American military operations. US prestige would suffer if Soviet arms were allowed to tip the scales against Israel, and American commitments throughout the world would be further questioned if Israel was defeated by clients of the Soviet Union (Quandt, 1977:12). From an American perspective, withholding aid in order to force

concessions could affect Israel's security. Sanctions cannot be focused to affect only the policy area of the target that the sanctioning state wishes to modify, and withholding aid could weaken Israel to the extent that it might be threatened by an attack from its Arab opponents (Rosen and Moustafine, 1977:26).

Since the US was interested in conflict resolution during the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978, and was willing to provide Israel with guarantees in lieu of defensible borders, US decision makers probably believed that withholding aid might reduce the credibility of US support for Israel and thus increase the value of the territories. In other words, it might make Israel less willing to give concessions. American sanctions, according to this explanation, could enhance feelings of insecurity in Israel and weaken voices of moderation (Rosen and Moustafine, 1977:27).

Withholding aid would also implicitly contradict a third objective of the US with regards to Israel: the desire to maximize Israel's self-sufficiency in order to reduce the need for any direct US involvement during a future war (Rosen and Moustafine, 1977:27). This objective is well explained by Riad Ashkar (1975:9).

In 1973, one of the things that surprised the Israelis was that they were not able to fight at that time without the help of the US. The US realized that the Israelis were on the brink of total defeat if they did not move to help them. Judging from the size of the supplies sent to Israel over the last two years however, I would say that the Israelis had enough weapons and ammunition to allow them to fight for at least three weeks without any help or supplies from the US. I think that the US wanted to arrive at this situation; instead of sending the supplies during the war, it is sending the supplies before the war.

The United States wants to be able to assume a political role which will allow it to claim that its hands are clean and that it is not helping the Israelis against the Arabs. It wants to get around the question of an oil embargo, and thinks that the Arab oil-producing countries will not have an excuse to impose an oil embargo if the United States refrains from sending arms to Israel while the fighting is going on.

4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has emphasized the relationship between the third party's objectives in the peace process and its predominant behavior as an ally or intermediary. It has shown that the US, as a third party, did not undertake the predominant role of an intermediary, except during the post-war period when its decision makers gave priority to conflict resolution rather than conflict management. While conflict management was the overriding concern to US decision makers during the pre-war period, the US behaved predominantly as an ally of Israel. However, US behavior as an ally during

this period deviates from the type of alliance behavior specified in our hypothesis. We expected an ally to cooperate more, and conflict less, with the party in the dyad that it believes will preserve the *status quo* of an absence of physical violence. The test of the hypothesis in this case shows that, while there was a significant difference between US cooperative behavior towards Egypt and Israel, there was no significant difference between US conflict behavior towards both protagonists. US behavior towards Egypt during the pre-war period was mostly neglect in which both US cooperative and conflictual activity towards Egypt was low.

This chapter has also shown that when the US undertook, during the period January 1974 - December 1978, the predominant role of an intermediary, it provided both Egypt and Israel with rewards to induce their cooperation towards one another. Despite Israel's increasing dependence on the US after the 1973 war, the US mostly resorted to verbal coercion against Israel. It did not often depend on withholding aid to force Israeli concessions. This chapter has shown that, besides the psychological limitations and those concerning unilateral coercion, the leverage which a small state possesses might limit the great power's willingness to resort to high levels of coercion against

it. In the case of Israel, this leverage is related to Israel's nuclear option, domestic influences within the US and US strategic objectives in its relations with Israel. These factors probably also limited the credibility of US coercion against Israel and as Singer (1969: 388) indicates, once its credibility is placed in doubt, coercion will not yield the desired results. This point will be further elaborated in discussing Israeli acceptance of US mediation in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF US MEDIATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter questions one of the assumptions in the literature on the importance of impartiality in the acceptance of an intermediary. It will first present an analysis of Egyptian-Israeli perceptions of US policy. This will be followed by examining the following two hypotheses:

- H₃ : A third party with reward power may be acceptable as an intermediary by the traditionally unfavored party even though perceived as biased.
- H₄ : A third party with reward power may be more acceptable as an intermediary to the traditionally unfavored party than to the traditionally favored party.

5.2 EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PERCEPTION OF US POLICY

Decision makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images (Jervis, 1969:240). Thus, the protagonists' perception of third party policy towards them is affected by both the past and present policies of the third party.

Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy were influenced by its policy towards the Middle East since the establishment of Israel as well as during the period under study, January 1967 - December 1978.

The relative importance of US policy towards oneself and one's opponent differed in influencing Egyptian and Israeli perceptions. Touval (1975:64) argues that a protagonist who views a third party as traditionally favoring its opponent will attempt to weaken such a coalition. Thus we would expect Egyptian decision makers to be pre-occupied with US policy towards Israel. We use here the data coded by the writer on Egyptian perceptions of US policy towards the dyad to see the extent of Egyptian concern with US policy toward Israel.

Egyptian concern with US policy towards Israel is reflected in the frequency and distribution of statements discussing US policy towards both Egypt and Israel. During the period January 1967 - December 1978, the coded documents show that Egyptian decision makers articulated 1423 statements dealing with US policy towards the Egyptian-Israeli dyad: 719 (51%) dealt with US policy towards Israel, and 704 (49%) with US policy towards Egypt. Table 5.1 shows the frequency and distribution of Egyptian perceptions of US policy towards the dyad.

TABLE 5.1

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS
OF US POLICY TOWARDS THE DYAD
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	PI ¹	NI ²	PE ³	NE ⁴	TOTAL
January - March 1967	14			6	20
April - June 1967	57			69	126
July - September 1967	10			16	26
October - December 1967	5			2	7
January - March 1968	19			10	29
April - June 1968	10			1	11
July - September 1968	13			9	22
October - December 1968	2			3	5
January - March 1969	25			19	44
April - June 1969	4		2	5	11
July - September 1969	20			12	32
October - December 1969	25	1		23	49
January - March 1970	39			45	84
April - June 1970	70			56	126
July - September 1970	64			41	105
October - December 1970	30			43	73
January - March 1971	19			23	42
April - June 1971	15			8	23
July - September 1971	8			12	20
October - December 1971	18			13	31
January - March 1972	26			36	62
April - June 1972	17			27	44
July - September 1972	43		1	32	76
October - December 1972	14			9	23
January - March 1973	13		1	18	32
April - June 1973	29		2	21	52
July - September 1973	11			7	18
October - December 1973	22		1	10	33
January - March 1974	3		5		8
April - June 1974	10	1	10		21
July - September 1974	2		4		6
October - December 1974			4		4
January - March 1975	5		4	4	13
April - June 1975	6	1	3	1	11
July - September 1975	7		1		8
October - December 1975			8		8
January - March 1976	2		4		6
April - June 1976					
July - September 1976			1	1	2
October - December 1976			2		2

TABLE 5.1 (Cont'd)

QUARTER	P1 ¹	N1 ²	PE ³	NE ⁴	TOTAL
January - March 1977	3	2	5	1	11
April - June 1977	1		8	1	10
July - September 1977	2	1	6	2	11
October - December 1977	8		4	1	13
January - March 1978	9		12	1	22
April - June 1978	6	3	13		22
July - September 1978	1	1	8	1	11
October - December 1978	2		6		8
TOTAL	709 (50%)	10 (1%)	115 (8%)	389 (41%)	1423 (100%)

¹P1 = Perception of positive US policy towards Israel

²N1 = Perception of negative US policy towards Israel

³PE = Perception of positive US policy towards Egypt

⁴NE = Perception of negative US policy towards Egypt

On the other hand, a protagonist who is traditionally favored by a third party will seek to prevent its relations with it from changing for the worse (Touval, 1975:64). Thus we would expect it to be more concerned with the third party's policy towards itself. The relative unimportance of the third party's policy towards the opponent would be reflected in fewer references to the third party's policy towards it.

Israel as the party allied with the US was part of a strong coalition capable of constraining Egyptian behavior. The coded documents on Israeli perceptions show that, during the period January 1967 - December 1978, Israeli decision makers articulated 632 statements dealing with US policy towards the dyad; 32 (5%) dealt with US policy towards Egypt, and 600 (95%) dealt with US policy towards Israel. Table 5.2 shows the frequency and distribution of Israeli perception of US policy towards the dyad during the period January 1967 - December 1978.

5.2.1 Egyptian Perceptions

Chapters III and IV have shown that US objectives in the peace process and its behavior towards the dyad changed during the post-war period as compared with the pre-war period. Now it is important to describe and analyse how and why Egyptian perceptions of US policy towards the dyad changed with the change in US policy.

TABLE 5.2

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS
OF US POLICY TOWARDS THE DYAD
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	PI ¹	NI ²	PE ³	NE ⁴	TOTAL
January - March 1967					
April - June 1967	4				4
July - September 1967					
October - December 1967	1	1			2
January - March 1968					
April - June 1968	5	1			6
July - September 1968	1	1			2
October - December 1968	22	1			23
January - March 1969	7	1			8
April - June 1969	8	14	1		23
July - September 1969	3	2			5
October - December 1969	19	30	3		52
January - March 1970	13	8	2		23
April - June 1970	7	8			15
July - September 1970	25	16			41
October - December 1970	35	3	1	1	40
January - March 1971	19	13	1		33
April - June 1971	12	9			21
July - September 1971	12	7			19
October - December 1971	8	15	1		24
January - March 1972	8	2			10
April - June 1972	5	1			6
July - September 1972	4	1			5
October - December 1972	2				2
January - March 1973	3				3
April - June 1973	1				1
July - September 1973					
October - December 1973	30	9	1		40
January - March 1974	3	1			4
April - June 1974	4	2	1		7
July - September 1974	3	2			5
October - December 1974	2	1			3
January - March 1975	6				6
April - June 1975	11	12			23
July - September 1975	6	2			8
October - December 1975	2		1		3
January - March 1976	5	1	3		9
April - June 1976	5	3			8
July - September 1976	1				1
October - December 1976	9	1			10

TABLE 5.2 (Cont'd)

QUARTER	PI ¹	NI ²	PE ³	NE ⁴	TOTAL
January - March 1977	1	2			3
April - June 1977	4	9	1	2	16
July - September 1977	18	9			27
October - December 1977	13	1	2		16
January - March 1978	16	17	2		35
April - June 1978	4	6	2		12
July - September 1978	10	2			12
October - December 1978	2	7	7		16
TOTAL	379 (60%)	221 (35%)	29 (4.5%)	3 (.5%)	632 (100%)

¹PI = Perception of positive US policy towards Israel

²NI = Perception of negative US policy towards Israel

³PE = Perception of positive US policy towards Egypt

⁴NE = Perception of negative US policy towards Egypt

Table 5.3 presents the results of the bias index for Egypt during the period January 1967 - December 1978. This was calculated as follows:

(positive to self minus negative to self)
minus (positive to opponent minus negative to opponent).

A score was calculated for each quarter. A net result with a negative (-) sign would indicate a perception of bias¹ during the quarter, and a net result with a positive (+) sign would indicate a perception of support.

Table 5.3 shows that during the period January 1967 - December 1978, the US was perceived as biased in 32 quarters out of the 48 quarters under study (67%). However, 27 out of the 32 quarters in which the US was perceived as biased were during the pre-war period, i.e. the US was perceived as 100% biased during the period January 1967 - September 1973. During the war, the US was perceived as biased. During the post-war period, the US was perceived as biased in only four quarters out of 20 quarters during this period (January 1974 - December 1978), i.e. the US was perceived as biased in 20% of the quarters during the post war period.² Thus, only

¹Bias can be favorable as well as negative; in this research it is used to indicate a negative attitude.

²There was no reference to Egyptian perceptions of US policy towards the dyad in one of the quarters during the post-war period. In one of the quarters during the post-war period, the result of the calculation of the bias index was zero.

TABLE 5.3
RESULTS OF THE BIAS INDEX FOR EGYPT
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	Perception of Support	Perception of Bias
January - March 1967		-20
April - June 1967		-126
July - September 1967		-26
October - December 1967		-7
January - March 1968		-29
April - June 1968		-11
July - September 1968		-22
October - December 1968		-5
January - March 1969		-44
April - June 1969		-7
July - September 1969		-32
October - December 1969		-47
January - March 1970		-84
April - June 1970		-126
July - September 1970		-105
October - December 1970		-73
January - March 1971		-42
April - June 1971		-23
July - September 1971		-20
October - December 1971		-31
January - March 1972		-62
April - June 1972		-44
July - September 1972		-74
October - December 1972		-23
January - March 1973		-30
April - June 1973		-48
July - September 1973		-18
October - December 1973		-31
January - March 1974	+2	
April - June 1974	+1	
July - September 1974	+2	
October - December 1974	+4	
January - March 1975		- 5
April - June 1975		- 3
July - September 1975		- 6
October - December 1975	+8	

TABLE 5.3 (Cont'd)

QUARTER	Perception of Support	Perception of Bias
January - March 1976	+2	
April - June 1976		
July - September 1976	x*	x*
October - December 1976	+2	
January - March 1977	+3	
April - June 1977	+6	
July - September 1977	+3	
October - December 1977		-5
January - March 1978	+2	
April - June 1978	+10	
July - September 1978	+7	
October - December 1978	+4	

*An x refers to the fact that the result of the calculation of the bias index was zero.

13% of the quarters indicating bias during the whole period (32 quarters) were during the post-war period and 84% of the quarters indicating bias were prior to the war.

The question is why was the US perceived as 100% biased during the pre-war period, January 1967 - September 1973? and why did this decrease during the post-war period, January 1974 - December 1978?¹

5.2.1.1 Egyptian Perceptions During the Pre-War Period - January 1967 - September 1973

Egyptian perceptions during this period were influenced by US policy during the 1950's and early 1960's, as well as by its policy during the period under study, January 1967 - September 1973. The memory of US policy during the earlier years may well have influenced the Egyptian perceptions of US policy as being biased against Egypt. During that period, US policy had frequently clashed with Egyptian objectives. For example, the US had backed the Baghdad Pact; refused to meet Egyptian demands for arms in 1955; withdrew aid from the High Dam Project in 1956; initiated the Eisenhower

¹The war quarter October - December 1973 will be dealt with separately.

Doctrine in 1957; intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1958; and suspended aid to Egypt in 1965. The US had also frequently supported Arab conservative regimes and Israel.

These actions reinforced the image of the US as an imperialist power seeking the destruction of Egypt's progressive regime. Egyptian decision makers believed that, since progressive Arab regimes posed a threat to US imperialist interests in the region, it was natural for the US to try to contain them. The regional agents for implementing US objectives were Arab conservatives and Israel. The arming of Arab reactionaries was regarded as being aimed primarily against the revolution of the Arab masses and at checking the progressive Arab tide (UAR Government, April 22, 1967; BBC, 2448:4).¹

However, after the 1967 war, Israel was regarded as the only agent implementing the US plan for liquidating progressive Arab regimes² (Sadat, March 19, 1970; BBC, 3335:2).

¹All citations from the British Broadcasting Corporation Monitor Part IV (BBC) will be referred to as follows: Date of Document; BBC, BBC issue number:page. Unless otherwise specified, the page refers to section A of the BBC.

²According to the coded documents, the use of Arab conservatives was not mentioned after the 1967 war. After the 1967 war intra-Arab rivalries were played down. Nasser no longer possessed the capability nor the motivation to pursue a revolutionary policy in the Arab world. Domestic problems, preoccupation with Israel and economic dependence on other Arab countries relegated Egypt's revolutionary ambitions in the Arab world to a secondary position within the overall policy priorities (Dawisha, 1976:53).

The negative Egyptian image of the US was reinforced by US policy during the pre-October 1973 war period.¹ The tendency to fit incoming information into existing images increases the more confident the actor is of the validity of his image. An actor regards his image as valid if it appears to be supported by a large amount of data (Jervis, 1976:195). During the pre-October 1973 period, US policy presented Egyptian decision makers with numerous examples to reinforce their image. The reinforcement of the negative Egyptian image of US policy can be understood in light of US support to Israel, its reluctance to undertake the role of an intermediary and the ambiguity of its policy.²

¹US objectives and behavior are discussed in chapters III and IV.

²Note here that the peaks in Egyptian perceptions of US as biased (as indicated by the results of the bias index presented in Table 5.3) were during the second quarter in 1967 and during the second and third quarters in 1970. During the second quarter of 1967, the US supported Israel's right to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and did not undertake an active role to prevent the Israeli attack of June 1967. Nasser (July 23, 1967; BBC, 2525:3) attributed the 1967 defeat partly to US behavior prior to the June war:

We were the victims of a diplomatic trick, a political deception in which we had not imagined a major Power would involve itself. This political trick was played by the United States. It was represented in the US President's speech, his appeals, his requests that we co-operate with the UN Secretary-General, and his offer to send the Vice-President to discuss with us ways to save the entire world from this crisis.

The US was reluctant to undertake the role of an intermediary following the rejection of the Rogers plan of 1969. While it did interfere as an intermediary and presented the cease-fire plan of August 1970, it backed Israel's accusations of the

The increase in US support for Israel after the 1967 war, through the supply of arms and backing at the UN, was an important element influencing the extensive focus on US support for Israel and its negative impact on the Arab cause. The US refusal to make any statement stipulating the need for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the position they occupied before June 5, 1967 was sufficient proof for Nasser that the United States supported Israel and colluded with it in its occupation (Nasser, July 23, 1968; BBC 2830:10). The consistent US supply of arms to Israel was believed to have encouraged its continued aggression against the Arabs and its disregard of the UN Security Council resolutions (Riyad, November 24, 1968; BBC, 2935:1). In a meeting with military commanders, Sadat (December 31, 1970; BBC, 3572:1) explained the overt manoeuvres by Israel and the US to weaken the issue and to enable Israel to usurp Arab territory. He considered the continuation of US military and material support for Israel equivalent to its participation in the occupation of the Arab territories (Sadat, May 27, 1971; BBC, 3695:3). Sadat (July 24, 1972; BBC 4050:9) believed that the main aim of such behavior was to demoralize the Arab domestic front

Egyptian violation of the cease-fire and provided Israel with arms in August and September 1970.

in general and that of Egypt in particular, since it was regarded as the main center of steadfastness.

US policies were not sufficiently motivated to undertake an active policy in order to solve the Middle East conflict. Sadat (April 24, 1972; BBC, 3973:3) explained the US role in a meeting with the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) information group. He told them that he had broken off every contact with the United States because it had gone back on everything it had promised since Rogers' visit and the messages, verbal and written, which he had exchanged with President Nixon. He described the backing of the US as "shameful" and said it had become evident that the United States was carrying out an operation of "prevarication and deception."

Nasser and Sadat insisted on utilizing all possible instruments, including the political and diplomatic, to eliminate the effects of aggression¹ (Dawisha, 1976:53). If a peace involving the return of the occupied territories was a major objective in Egyptian foreign policy, we would expect Egypt to develop further its negative image of a superpower

¹Although Nasser had his doubts about the success such instruments could achieve (Heikal, 1975:54).

believed capable of resolving the Middle East conflict but not contributing towards its resolution. Both Nasser and Sadat believed that the US could solve the Middle East conflict. For example, in a speech at a rally in Khartoum, Nasser (May 28, 1970; BBC, 3391:14) emphasized:

If the USA seeks peace it must order Israel to withdraw because that is within the power of the USA, whose orders Israel accepts because Israel lives at US expense.

US policy was perceived by Egyptian decision makers during both the Nasser and Sadat governments prior to October 1973 as responsible for the state of war in the Middle East and obstructing peace. Table 5.4 shows that only 2% of Egyptian decision makers' statements on the US contribution to peace during the pre-war period perceived the US as contributing to peace while 98% saw it as not contributing. Actions not contributing to peace included the US applying pressure at the UN, sending arms to Israel and giving it political support.

Jervis (1976:195) contends that a corollary to his hypothesis that decision makers tend to fit incoming information to their existing images is that this tendency is greater the more ambiguous the information received by the actor. The ambiguity of US policy on the occupied territories probably contributed to the reinforcement of the negative Egyptian image of the US. For example, in an interview with

TABLE 5.4

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS OF
US CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE
January 1967 - September 1973

QUARTER	Contributes to Peace	Does not Contribute to Peace	TOTAL
January - March 1967			
April - June 1967		1	1
July - September 1967			
October - December 1967			
January - March 1968			
April - June 1968			
July - September 1968			
October - December 1968			
January - March 1969		1	1
April - June 1969			
July - September 1969			
October - December 1969		1	1
January - March 1970		2	2
April - June 1970		1	1
July - September 1970		12	12
October - December 1970		8	8
January - March 1971		2	2
April - June 1971		1	1
July - September 1971		2	2
October - December 1971		2	2
January - March 1972		9	9
April - June 1972		1	1
July - September 1972	2	7	9
October - December 1972		4	4
January - March 1973		1	1
April - June 1973		21	21
July - September 1973		13	13
TOTAL	2(2%)	89(98%)	91(100%)

Newsweek, Sadat (April 2, 1973; BBC, 4261:6) expressed dissatisfaction with the ambiguity of the US position on the occupied territories:

To this day there has been no paper defining the position over the entire problem in a decisive manner. Rogers said US commitment to Israel did not extend to the occupation of our territory, but this had never been transformed into an official policy. All we see are inadequacies.

Under such conditions, where Egyptian decision makers believed that the US supported Israeli aggression against the Arabs, that it was not contributing to peace and that it deliberately undertook an ambiguous policy, even the occasional goodwill gesture by the US and non-imperialist act, was usually lost in the overall image of mistrust and suspicion. When decision makers believe that another state is an enemy, the perception of hostility is usually more central than other aspects of the image and is used to explain much of the other's behavior. Decision makers tend to think that nations regarded as enemies make proposals that work against their interest and aid their enemies (Jervis, 1976:117-120, 299).

Occasional US cooperative behavior aimed at solving the Middle East conflict was perceived as being only responsive to Israel's needs. For example, the 13-point US plan presented to the Soviet Union in 1969 was perceived by Nasser (July 23, 1969; BBC 3134:14) as reflecting the Israeli point of view.

The US 13-point plan is a replica of the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's statement. The Americans arranged Eban's statement in 13 points and submitted it to the Soviet Union as the view regarding a solution of the question.

The Rogers' plan of December 1969 was also perceived by Nasser (February 15, 1970; BBC, 3307:1) as being unbalanced and completely pro-Israel. In evaluating the motives behind the Rogers' initiative of 1970, Sadat (July 24, 1972; BBC, 4050:5) said:

In June 1970, Rogers submitted the so-called Rogers initiative. Why did he do this? The war of attrition was in progress then. Israel was suffering from the war of attrition....In the summer of 1970, Israel rushed to the United States and Rogers submitted his plan.

5.2.1.2 Egyptian Perceptions During the War Quarter - October - December 1973

During the War October 6 - October 24, 1973 US policy was still perceived as positive to Israel and negative to Egypt (see Table 5.5). Egyptian perceptions during the war can be understood in view of the concern over the extensive US supply of arms and aid to Israel. This concern was reflected in a statement by Ahmed Anis (October 12, 1973; BBC, 4424:1-2), the official spokesman for the Egyptian government. He referred to reports that the US was sending arms to Israel; according to him, these reports showed a

TABLE 5.5

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPT PERCEPTION
OF US POLICY TOWARDS THE DYAD
During the War October 6 - October 24 and after
the War October 25 - December 31, 1973

TIME	PI ¹	NI ²	PE ³	NE ⁴	TOTAL
October 6 - October 24 1973	15			8	23
October 25 - December 31 1973	7		1	2	10
TOTAL	22(67%)		1(3%)	10(30%)	33(100%)
¹ PI	Perception of <u>positive</u> US policy towards Israel				
² NI	Perception of <u>negative</u> US policy towards Israel				
³ PE	Perception of <u>positive</u> US policy towards Egypt				
⁴ NE	Perception of <u>negative</u> US policy towards Egypt				

clear provocation of the Arab Nation's feelings at the critical stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which the United States bore the responsibility for backing the Israeli aggressors, politically, economically, and militarily.

During the remainder of the last quarter in 1973, October 25 - December 31, 1973, Egyptian perception of US policy as negative towards Egypt declined (see Table 5.5.) The most important factor probably contributing to this decline was the perceived positive US contribution to peace (Table 5.6 presents the frequency and distribution of Egyptian perceptions of US contribution to peace during and after the October war). At a press conference of the ASU, Sadat (October 31, 1973; BBC, 4439:11) said:

I can also say that the United States despite its intervention after the 11th day and its supply [of weapons] to Israel of what the American army had not yet used, that up to this moment, the US attitude in regard to working for peace is a constructive one.

5.2.1.3 Egyptian Perception During the Post-War Period January 1974 - December 1978

The period following the October war, January 1974 - December 1978, was subject to changes in Egyptian decision makers' perceptions of US policy towards the dyad; Egyptian perception of US bias against itself (as indicated by the results of the bias index presented in Table 5.3) declined.

TABLE 5.6
 FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPT PERCEPTIONS
 OF US AS CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE
 During the War October 6 - October 24 and after
 the War October 25 - December 31, 1973

TIME	Contributes to Peace	Does not Contribute to Peace	TOTAL
October 6 - October 24, 1973		3	3
October 25 - December 31 1973	1	0	1
TOTAL	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	4 (100%)

While US policy during the pre-war period had reinforced the Egyptians' negative image of the US, its policy after the October war led to a different image. The priority given by the US to conflict resolution, and its predominant behavior as an intermediary, which Sadat had sought since 1971, appear to have had a dramatic impact on Egyptian perceptions.¹ Greater changes in decision makers' attitudes towards others result when discrepant information arrives in a large batch than when it is considered bit by bit; in such a situation, contradictions between it and the prevailing view will be relatively more obvious (Jervis, 1976:308).

Acceptance of a new image produces alterations of perceptions and interpretations on both the conscious and unconscious levels (Jervis, 1976:166). Egyptian decision makers perceived the US as contributing to peace and also as contributing to Egypt's economic prosperity. The negative perceptions of US policy declined, and so did the perceived linkage between US support for Israel and its hostility to Egypt.

¹Note that the quarters in which US policy was perceived as biased against Egypt (as indicated by the results of the bias index in Table 5.3) were during the first, second and third quarters of 1975 and the last quarter in 1977. In 1975 Egypt was dissatisfied by the American statements on the possibility of the use of force against the oil producing states. In the last quarter in 1977, Egypt was not satisfied by US mediatory efforts.

The US was perceived as contributing to peace during the period January 1974 - December 1978, in 94% of the Egyptian statements on the US contribution to peace and only 6% as not contributing to peace (see Table 5.7).

Egyptian decision makers changed their perception of the linkage between US support to Israel and its hostility to Egypt according to a mechanism similar to what Jervis (1976:295) refers to as the "mechanism of differentiation" in attitudinal change. This involves separation of an individual's personal qualities from judgement of the policies he is implementing or the views he is advocating.

US support for Israel was explained as a fact that had to be lived with. Egypt had to deal with the US as it existed (Sadat, August 13, 1975; BBC, 4982:10). US support for Israel was never doubted by Egyptian decision makers.

Whoever ignores the fact that the United States guarantees Israel's security...is burying his head in the sand (Sadat, May 1, 1974; BBC, 4590:7)

In his speech at the conference on "Egypt until the Year 2000," Sadat (January 2, 1975; BBC, 4795:2) said:

The attitude of the USA was during our all-out confrontation with it 100 per cent partial to Israel; now I am not saying at all that the US attitude to Israel has changed, in the sense that it has abandoned its support for Israel. No, far from it...It should never occur to anyone that the USA would one day be on our side against Israel or that she would abandon Israel.

TABLE 5.7

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS OF
US CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE
January 1974 - December 1978

QUARTER	Contributes to Peace	Does not Contribute to Peace	TOTAL
January - March 1974	3	1	4
April - June 1974	5		5
July - September 1974			
October - December 1974	2		2
January - March 1975	13	1	14
April - June 1975	2		2
July - September 1975	7	1	8
October - December 1975	1		1
January - March 1976	3	1	4
April - June 1976			
July - September 1976			
October - December 1976	3		3
January - March 1977	3	1	4
April - June 1977	5		5
July - September 1977	8		8
October - December 1977	20		20
January - March 1978	18	4	22
April - June 1978	10		10
July - September 1978	14		14
October - December 1978	19		19
TOTAL	136(94%)	9(6%)	145(100%)

Yet, such support was not evaluated as linked to a negative policy to Egypt. US policy towards Egypt was mostly perceived as positive. Eighty-nine percent of the statements on US policy towards Egypt during this period perceived the US as adopting a positive policy towards Egypt while only 11% of the statements perceived the US as adopting a negative policy towards Egypt. Sadat (February 28, 1974; BBC, 4540:1) considered that the US had a new attitude based on goodwill. This he believed paved the way for the restoration of relations between the two countries. The US was perceived as contributing significantly to the strengthening of the Egyptian economy (Fahmi, January 11, 1977; BBC, 5411:7). Sadat (February 17, 1977; BBC, 5443:2) expressed his gratitude for the US help in the difficult time through which the economy was passing.

The change in US policy towards Egypt was perceived to be a result of three main factors: oil, success of the Arabs in the October war and a reaction to Egyptian foreign policy. Oil was considered a particularly significant factor underlying the change in US policy.

The United States simply discovered that its absolute bias for Israel and its utter disdain for the Arabs were unfounded....

The USA also discovered that oil, that primary strategic commodity, could be a weapon available to the Arabs....The United States had no alternative but to change its stand. In other words, it is we who changed US policy.

(Sadat, May 1, 1974; BBC, 4590:6)

The US move to contact the Arabs and be more responsive to them was perceived to be a reaction to the Arab performance in the October war. Sadat (September 4, 1975; BBC, 5000:10) emphasized in his speech at the Joint People's Assembly - ASU meeting, that the US had discovered that the Arabs would not be defeated in a few hours. US policy was also perceived to have changed as a reaction to Egyptian moves. In the same speech, he maintained that:

Some people tried to interpret my words as meaning that I was getting closer to the United States or rushing into the embrace of the United States. No, this is not so....It is a form of applying pressure on the United States to make it face up to its responsibilities. To a great extent we have succeeded and we have seen the United States make all that effort since the end of hostilities....

5.2.2 Israeli Perceptions

This section describes and analyses how and why Israeli perceptions of US policy towards the dyad changed with the change in US policy.

Table 5.8 presents the results of the bias index for Israel during the period January 1967 - December 1978. The results show that the US was perceived as biased in ten quarters out of the 48 quarters under study (21%): four out of the ten (i.e. 40%) were during the pre-war period. Thus, the US was perceived as biased in 15% of the quarters during

TABLE 5.8

RESULTS OF THE BIAS INDEX FOR ISRAEL
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	Perception of Support	Perception of Bias
January - March 1967		
April - June 1967	+4	
July - September 1967		
October - December 1967	x*	x*
January - March 1968		
April - June 1968	+4	
July - September 1968	x*	x*
October - December 1968	+21	
January - March 1969	+6	
April - June 1969		-7
July - September 1969	+1	
October - December 1969		-14
January - March 1970	+3	
April - June 1970		-1
July - September 1970	+9	
October - December 1970	+32	
January - March 1971	+5	
April - June 1971	+3	
July - September 1971	+5	
October - December 1971		-8
January - March 1972	+6	
April - June 1972	+4	
July - September 1972	+3	
October - December 1972	+2	
January - March 1973	+3	
April - June 1973	+1	
July - September 1973		
October - December 1973	+20	
January - March 1974	+2	
April - June 1974	+1	
July - September 1974	+1	
October - December 1974	+1	
January - March 1975	+6	
April - June 1975		-1
July - September 1975	+4	
October - December 1975	+1	

.../

TABLE 5.8 (Cont'd)

QUARTER	Perception of Support	Perception of Bias
January - March 1976	+1	
April - June 1976	+2	
July - September 1976	+1	
October - December 1976	+8	
January - March 1977		-1
April - June 1977		-4
July - September 1977	+9	
October - December 1977	+10	
January - March 1978		-3
April - June 1978		-4
July - September 1978	+8	
October - December 1978		-12

*An x refers to the fact that the result of the calculation of the bias index was zero.

the pre-war period and as supportive in 63%.¹ During the war quarter, US policy was perceived as supportive. During the post-war period, the perception of bias, as indicated by the bias index, increased. Israeli decision makers perceived the US as biased in six quarters out of the 20 during the post-war period; i.e. the US was thus perceived as biased in 30% of the quarters during this period and as supportive in 70%. Thus, 60% of the quarters indicating bias during the whole time period (10 quarters) were during the post-war period, and 40% during the pre-war period.

The question is: Why was the US mostly perceived as supportive during the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973? Why was it considered biased in some quarters during this period? and why was it considered more biased during the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978.²

5.2.2.1 Israeli Perceptions During the Pre-War Period January 1967 - September 1973

Israeli perceptions of US policy were probably influenced by US policy since the establishment of the State of Israel, as well as by its policy during the period under

¹There were no articulated statements on Israeli perception of US policy towards the dyad in the coded documents in four of the quarters during the pre-war period. In two of the quarters during the pre-war period, the result of calculation of the bias index was zero.

²The war quarter will be dealt with separately.

study. The US was Israel's ally since its establishment as a State. As Prime Minister Meir (October 2, 1970; BBC, 3499:8) pointed out:

I do not remember, since the establishment of the State of Israel and even before that, one American President who was hostile to the State of Israel.

Israeli perceptions of US policy as mostly supportive were reinforced by US policy during this period. The US supported Israel at the UN. It supplied Israel with economic and military aid,¹ and supported the Israeli condition of no withdrawal without peace.

The US support for Israel at the UN and its other aid were highly regarded by Israeli decision makers. Foreign Minister Eban (May 24, 1970; BBC, 3388:12) believed that the US attributed seriousness and importance to the preservation of Israel's security balance and that it was determined that the balance should not be upset. He had no doubt that, when necessary, the US would maintain Israel's strength in relation to its neighbors (Eban, July 13, 1970; BBC, 3430:6). The US was perceived as Israel's best friend. In an interview on Israeli radio, Eban (October 30, 1971; BBC, 3828:3) acknowledged that:

¹The peaks in Israeli perceptions of US as supportive (as indicated in Table 5.8) were during the last quarter of 1968 and the last quarter in 1970. Johnson announced in October 1968 that Israel would be allowed to purchase Phantoms. In the last quarter of 1970, the US supplied Israel with military aid.

The United States is the best friend Israel has ever had. It is the country which is helping us to insure our defence capability, maintain our economic position and the basic principle of our policy of no withdrawal without peace and no peace except through agreement.

Despite Israel's dependence on the United States, its decision makers did not perceive US policy as applying pressure against Israel even during periods where US - Israeli relations were tense as after the Rogers plan in 1969.

Prime Minister Meir (December 13, 1969; BBC, 3256:8) indicated:

The truth is that there have not been any pressures from the United States....

Meir (October 2, 1970; BBC, 3499:7) explained her conception of dependence on the United States in an interview:

There was the first Rogers plan and we said no, and there were the second Rogers plan and the third Rogers plan, and we said no. There were the four-Power talks, and we said: We do not accept them. And there were the two-Power talks, and we said: We do not accept them. I do not see that the United States has obliged us to accept any thing against our will.

Absorption Minister Natan Peled (January 2, 1971; BBC, 3574:1) was quoted by Israeli radio as saying:

Before our return to the Jarring talks the USA responded to most of the essential demands connected with Israel's military and political security. Washington did not coerce us into returning to the Jarring talks, but left it to the Israeli Government to decide.

Foreign Minister Eban (March 2, 1972; BBC, 3931:3) indicated that Israel had not been asked to make any political concessions whatsoever in return for the arms it required from the U.S.

Israeli decision makers believed that US support to Israel served US interests:

The USA reached the conclusion that the policy of strengthening Israel in the arms balance was not a product of sympathy for Israel... US security is based on a deterrent deployment, on the credibility of its deterrent force in the world.... Abandonment of Israel's security would thus mean a complete breakdown of the credibility of the US deterrent power in the world.... I am more inclined to believe the USA will act in the long term on the basis of considerations of its own interests rather than pure considerations of sympathy (Eban, April 17, 1971; BBC, 3662:11).

While Israeli decision makers had a favorable image of US policy, such a favorable image did not delude them into ignoring negative policies when they were perceived as related to Israel's security. The perception of fear makes decision makers sensitive to perceived threats to their security that other observers might regard as unimportant (Jervis, 1976:373).

Israeli decision makers had their doubts about the extent of support the US would continue to lend Israel. This was explained in view of other US interests in the Arab world, its interest in seeking an accommodation with the Soviet Union, and its comparative capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

At a meeting with students at the Haifa Technion, Israeli Defence Minister Dayan (November 9, 1967; BBC, 2618:5) pointed out that the US was continuing its search for allies among the Arabs and that its policy would not always be one of ties with Israel alone. Although Prime Minister Meir (August 27, 1970; BBC, 3463:7) perceived US policy as agreeing with the Israeli position of no withdrawal without peace, she believed that there might be a time when the US believed peace had arrived and the Israelis did not. While the United States wanted a settlement in the Middle East, it also wanted to achieve full understanding with the USSR, and the Israelis had to be wary of this state of affairs (Dayan, February 11, 1972; BBC, 3914:3). US capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was also subjected to doubt by Defence Minister Dayan (May 10, 1970; BBC, 3376:5):

There are two super-Powers in the world,.... The Soviet Union is very ambitious now and is pursuing a policy of expansion in the Middle EastI do not, however, want the next period from an international point of view, to be such that, in international matters, the USA will be what they themselves call a paper tiger without teeth. That is to say, I do not want the world and the Middle East--and us in it--to remain open to Soviet ambitions...

Perceptions of US policy as negative towards Israel also related to specific US actions which Israel believed might affect its security, i.e., US involvement in the peace process and the delay or refusal to extend aid to Israel.¹ Table 5.9 shows the frequency and distribution of Israeli perception of US contribution to peace. During the period January 1967 - September 1973, the US was perceived as contributing to peace² in 59% of the total statements on US contribution to peace and 41% as not contributing to peace.

The negative perception of the active intermediary role of an extra regional power was probably influenced by Israel's success in the June 1967 war. Following the war, Israeli decision makers preferred greater autonomy from outside. They feared superpower deals which could lead to a settlement different from their own formula of secure borders (Aronson, 1978:82-83, 95), especially since the US during the Nixon administration sought accommodation with the USSR. Nixon and Kissinger were intrigued by the possibility of a new relationship with the Soviet Union that would

¹Note that the peak in Israeli perception of US as biased (as indicated in Table 5.8) was during the last quarter in 1969. This was a period where the US undertook an active intermediary role and presented the Rogers plan of 1969.

²Israeli perceptions of US policy as contributing to peace were attributed to its role in counter balancing Soviet influence by its support for Israel; maintaining the balance of power was seen as a deterrent to renewed hostility.

TABLE 5.9

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF
US CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE
January 1967 - September 1973

QUARTER	Contributes to Peace	Does not Contribute to Peace	TOTAL
January - March 1967			
April - June 1967			
July - September 1967			
October - December 1967			
January - March 1968			
April - June 1968	1		1
July - September 1968			
October - December 1968	4		4
January - March 1969	1	1	2
April - June 1969		2	2
July - September 1969	2	2	4
October - December 1969	2	4	6
January - March 1970			
April - June 1970		1	1
July - September 1970	1		1
October - December 1970			
January - March 1971	1		1
April - June 1971			
July - September 1971			
October - December 1971	1	2	3
January - March 1972	1		1
April - June 1972			
July - September 1972			
October - December 1972	1		1
January - March 1973	2		2
April - June 1973			
July - September 1973			
TOTAL	17(59%)	12(41%)	29(100%)

help ensure global stability and minimize the risks of confrontation (Quandt, 1977:76-77). The Israelis were highly critical of the Four Power talks and Two Power talks due to their perceived threat to Israeli security. In an interview, Eban (January 3, 1970; BBC, 3271:3) said:

There was the publication of...the documents presented by the United States to the Four-Power consultations. Well, everybody, I think understood that the object of these proposals was not to meet Israel's interests but rather to pacify the Arabs or to win over the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Meir (December 29, 1969; BBC, 3266:6) considered the US proposals, in the Four-Power talks on the borders and the return of the refugees, harmful to the security of Israel and a danger to its very existence.

The reluctance to supply arms to Israel was also negatively perceived since it would, from the Israeli point of view, upset the military balance in the Middle East. For example, in commenting on the American decision to hold in abeyance Israel's request for military supplies in March 1970, Foreign Minister Eban (March 23, 1970; BBC, 3338:3) maintained:

The failure of the United States to respond at this stage has led to disappointment and concern in Israel. Israel's vital needs for its self-defence have not been satisfied in today's statement of the US government. There is therefore a danger that the inflexibility of the Arab States--particularly Egypt, which disregards the cease-fire--will increase.... A deterrent policy should ensure

that an expected aggressor is convinced that there will be no halt in the growing strength of the target.

5.2.2.2 Israeli Perceptions During the War Quarter - October - December 1973

The war quarter represented one of the peaks in perceiving US policy as supportive to Israel. The dramatic increase in US aid to Israel during the war was seen as important in winning the war. In reply to a question in the Knesset, Dayan (October 30, 1973; BBC, 4439:1) explained that without arms it was impossible to free prisoners. There was only one country which was prepared to supply Israel with equipment. This was the US; whoever suggests conducting such a war by a rift with the United States is actually suggesting that Israel should not win the war.

During the war period October 6-24, US policy was perceived as positive to Israel in all the coded statements (see Table 5.10). During the remainder of the war quarter October 25 - December 31, 1973, US policy was perceived as positive to Israel in 63% of the statements on US policy towards the dyad, and as negative in 33%. The increase in the negative perceptions can be understood in the light of the increased US involvement in the peace process.

TABLE 5.10

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS
OF US POLICY TOWARDS THE DYAD
During the War October 6 - October 24 and after
the War October 25 - December 31, 1973

TIME	PI ¹	NI ²	PE ³	NE ⁴	TOTAL
October 6 - October 24, 1973	13				13
October 25 - December 31, 1973	17	9	1		27
TOTAL	30 (75%)	9 (23%)	1 (2%)		40 (100%)

¹PI = Perception of positive US policy towards Israel

²NI = Perception of negative US policy towards Israel

³PE = Perception of positive US policy towards Egypt

⁴NE = Perception of negative US policy towards Egypt

5.2.2.3 Israeli Perceptions During the Post-War Period - January 1974 - December 1978

The period following the October war was subject to change in Israeli decision makers' perceptions of US policy towards the dyad. The US was still perceived as supportive,¹ but the perception of bias increased.

The increased involvement of the US in the peace process, its explicit opposition to the settlements issue and the supply of arms to Egypt and Saudi Arabia were among the main issues that raised Israeli decision makers' concern over US policy.²

¹Perceptions of US policy as supportive to Israel were attributed to US supply of arms and aid to Israel (Rabin, June 15, 1976; BBC, 5236:1; Weizman, September 7, 1977; BBC, 5610:3). The questioning of US supply of arms and aid was described as unfounded. Rabin, for example, (December 2, 1976; BBC, 5381:3) maintained that:

The day is not far off when the F-15 will be flown by IAF pilots. Israel is assured of having the F-16 in the eighties. And the United States, if it promises something at the Presidential level, stands by its pledges. It is only the speculative interpretation of a number of Israeli journalists which makes them question it.

²Note here that five out of the six quarters in which the US was perceived as biased during the post-war period (as indicated by the results in Table 5.8) were during the Carter administration. In its efforts to secure a comprehensive settlement, the Carter administration was more forthcoming in specifying its position on the settlements issue, and increased support to Egypt.

Table 5.11 shows that the US was perceived as contributing to peace in 88% of the total statements on US contribution to peace during the post-war period and 12% as not contributing to peace. While the US was generally perceived as contributing to peace, Israeli decision makers were wary of US pressures during the negotiations to achieve an agreement acceptable to the Arabs. In evaluating Israeli-American tensions in April 1975, Foreign Minister Allon (April 13, 1975; BBC, 4878:1) told an Israeli radio correspondent that such tensions stemmed:

partly from a subjective American disappointment following the suspension of the talks with Egypt, and partly, perhaps, from the desire to exert influence upon us to adopt a different position from the one we had adopted before the suspension of the talks.

American policy on the settlement issue was negatively evaluated by Israeli leaders. For example, Begin (July 27, 1977; BBC, 5575:2) expressed disappointment about US position on the settlements:

The Secretary of State...said yesterday that the settlements are against international law....

I want, in the name of the Israeli Government, to express deep regret about the deep disappointment with the announcement....On the matter of settlement there are differences of opinion between the US Government and Israel's Government.

TABLE 5.11

FREQUENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF
US CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE
January 1974 - December 1978

QUARTER	Contributes to Peace	Does not Contribute to Peace	TOTAL
January - March 1974	4		4
April - June 1974	1		1
July - September 1974	2		2
October - December 1974	1		1
January - March 1975	8		8
April - June 1975			
July - September 1975	4		4
October - December 1975		1	1
January - March 1976	1	2	3
April - June 1976	2		2
July - September 1976			
October - December 1976	1	1	2
January - March 1977	1		1
April - June 1977	5	2	7
July - September 1977	8		8
October - December 1977	9	1	10
January - March 1978	5		5
April - June 1978	2	2	4
July - September 1978	14		14
October - December 1978	3	1	4
TOTAL	71(88%)	10(12%)	81(100%)

The supply of arms to Egypt and Saudi Arabia was also negatively perceived. Begin (May 16, 1978; BBC, 5816:13) described the decision taken by the US Senate endorsing the administration's arms deal with Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia, as a serious decision, the gravity of which should not be under-rated. Since over the previous two and a half years the State of Israel received an absolute unconditional commitment, he regretted that a condition had been attached in the course of time.

5.3

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF US MEDIATION

Most of the literature on mediation contends that an intermediary must be impartial in order to be accepted by the protagonists in conflict (e.g., Davies, 1972:85-86; Fisher, 1972:76-77; Young, 1967:81-82). A few recent works in international conflict and mediation find that biased intermediaries can be accepted by the traditionally unfavored party (Amin, 1978; Pauk, 1980; Touval, 1972). We now examine the following 2 hypotheses:

- H₃: A third party with reward power may be acceptable as an intermediary by the traditionally unfavored party even though perceived as biased.
- H₄: A third party with reward power may be more acceptable as an intermediary to the traditionally unfavored party than to the traditionally favored party.

The US is an example of a third party with reward power. Egypt is the party traditionally unfavored by the US and Israel is the one traditionally favored. The perception of bias is indicated by a net score with a negative (-) sign in each quarter as calculated according to the bias index. Acceptance of US mediation is indicated by actions which urge, suggest or propose that the US undertake an active role in the peace process, or the acceptance of specific proposals presented by the US. Rejection of US mediation is indicated by actions which oppose, refuse or rebuff the involvement of the US in the peace process, or the rejection of specific proposals undertaken by the US. We then calculated the percentage of acceptance which is defined as the ratio of the number of events indicating an actor's acceptance to the total number of events indicating an actor's acceptance and rejection of US mediation. Table 5.12 presents the frequency of Egyptian acceptance and rejection of US mediation and Table 5.13 presents the frequency of Israeli acceptance and rejection of US mediation.

Hypothesis 3 was supported by the data on Egyptian perception and acceptance; Egypt accepted US mediation even when the US was perceived as biased. According to the results of the bias index presented in Table 5.3, the US was perceived as biased in 32 quarters during the period January 1967 - December 1978. The data on Egyptian acceptance of

TABLE 5.12

FREQUENCY OF EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF US MEDIATION
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	Accept	Reject	QUARTER	Accept	Reject
January - March 1967			January - March 1973	2	3
April - June 1967	2	6	April - June 1973		
July - September 1967			July - September 1973		1
October - December 1967	1		October - December 1973	8	
January - March 1968			January - March 1974	1	
April - June 1968			April - June 1974	3	
July - September 1968			July - September 1974	1	
October - December 1968		1	October - December 1974		
January - March 1969		2	January - March 1975	1	
April - June 1969			April - June 1975	3	
July - September 1969		1	July - September 1975	2	
October - December 1969			October - December 1975		
January - March 1970	1		January - March 1976		
April - June 1970			April - June 1976		
July - September 1970	1	1	July - September 1976		
October - December 1970		2	October - December 1976	1	
January - March 1971	4		January - March 1977	2	
April - June 1971		1	April - June 1977	1	
July - September 1971	3	1	July - September 1977	1	1
October - December 1971	1	1	October - December 1977	3	
January - March 1972	1	4	January - March 1978	1	
April - June 1972		1	April - June 1978	1	
July - September 1972		2	July - September 1978	5	
October - December 1972		1	October - December 1978	1	
TOTAL				51	29

TABLE 5.13

FREQUENCY OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF US MEDIATION
January 1967 - December 1978

QUARTER	Accept	Reject	QUARTER	Accept	Reject
January - March 1967			January - March 1973	1	1
April - June 1967	3	1	April - June 1973		
July - September 1967			July - September 1973		
October - December 1967			October - December 1973	2	
January - March 1968			January - March 1974		
April - June 1968			April - June 1974	1	
July - September 1968		1	July - September 1974		
October - December 1968			October - December 1974	1	
January - March 1969		3	January - March 1975		
April - June 1969		2	April - June 1975		
July - September 1969			July - September 1975	4	
October - December 1969		1	October - December 1975		1
January - March 1970			January - March 1976	1	1
April - June 1970			April - June 1976	1	1
July - September 1970	4	2	July - September 1976		
October - December 1970		1	October - December 1976		
January - March 1971		3	January - March 1977		1
April - June 1971	2	2	April - June 1977	1	2
July - September 1971	1	1	July - September 1977	2	4
October - December 1971	1	3	October - December 1977	5	1
January - March 1972	3	1	January - March 1978	2	3
April - June 1972			April - June 1978		
July - September 1972			July - September 1978	7	1
October - December 1972	2	1	October - December 1978	2	4
TOTAL			TOTAL		
			46		
			41		

US mediation show that Egypt accepted US mediation in 14 (44%) of the 32 quarters during which the US was perceived as biased.

Hypothesis 4 was not supported by the data on Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation. While the percentage of acceptance for Egypt (64%) during the period January 1967 - December 1978 was higher than the percentage of acceptance for Israel (53%), the Z for the difference in their percentage of acceptance was not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

In the following sections we will analyze Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation within the context of their available alternatives and the reward power of the intermediary.

5.3.1 Egyptian Acceptance

An intermediary may be accepted by the traditionally unfavored party even if it is perceived as biased because the traditionally unfavored party might see acceptance as better than rejection because of the limitations of available alternatives and also the intermediary's reward power (Touval, 1975:61-63; Pauk, 1980:9-12, 45-51).

5.3.1.1 The Alternatives

The June 1967 war was the most devastating military defeat in Egyptian modern history. It resulted in the Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza strip along with other Arab territories in the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Jerusalem. This was unacceptable to both Egypt and the other Arabs.

Egyptian decision makers during both Nasser and Sadat leaderships sought all available alternatives to regain the occupied territories. They restored the armed forces, and enlisted Arab capabilities, and support, UN mediation, Soviet aid and support and US mediation to solve the Middle East conflict.

By 1970 Egyptian acceptance of US mediation increased.¹ The decision makers realized during the period 1967-1970 the marked limitations of the other options.

Israeli military superiority, and the ineffectiveness of the war of attrition, rendered the military option inoperable. Because of the 1967 defeat, the resulting humiliation and the importance of maintaining Arab solidarity, Egypt could not enter into bilateral negotiations with Israel.

¹The data on acceptance (presented in Table 5.12) show that after the period 1968-1969, where there were no coded events indicating acceptance, Egyptian acceptance began to increase.

Egypt sought Arab support after the war. At the Khartoum Conference of 29 August 1967, it received £100 million a year from the other Arab countries. While this sum was enormous, the expense of rebuilding the Egyptian forces was also substantial. The building of the airfields, and bunkers for the new Soviet planes alone cost Egypt £100 million before the end of 1967. Thus, the amount of aid promised at Khartoum was spent within less than six months on a single project (Heikal, 1975:53, 268). This probably showed the limitation of such aid alone, in helping reconstruct the Egyptian armed forces. Nasser also sought to maintain an "eastern" front of Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian resistance. However, this was rendered inoperative due to the dissension between Hussein and the Palestinians, and Jordan and Syria. In 1968 an Iraqi coup, by a right wing faction of the Baath party, further intensified the dissension and fragmentation within the eastern front. This meant that Egypt had to depend on its own front. It initiated the war of attrition but, as the threat of Israeli counter-offensive increased, Nasser tried to revitalize the eastern front. When this failed, he sought, in December 1969, the convocation of an Arab summit meeting to enlist Arab money and participation in the battle (Dawisha, 1976:55-57). The failure of the Rabat Conference

in January 1970 further indicated that dependence on the Arab World could not by itself solve the Middle East conflict.

Nasser also sought peaceful settlement of the conflict through the United Nations. He accepted resolution 242, despite its general ambiguity about restoring the occupied Arab territories. He also cooperated with the Jarring mission, which failed to accomplish any significant progress from 1968 until its end in February 1971. This demonstrated to the Egyptian decision makers the limitation of an intermediary with no independent capability, and thus weakened the relevance of the UN in the restoration of the occupied territories.

The Soviet Union was Egypt's main supporter in the aftermath of the 1967 war, it participated in the reconstruction of the Egyptian military forces and lent support at the UN. But Soviet support in the field of military supplies was the cause of Egyptian-Soviet tension due to increasing Egyptian demands and the reluctance of the Soviets to respond. The tension had mounted by early 1970. During a meeting in Moscow in January 1970, Heikal (1975: 86-87) quoted Nasser as telling the Soviet leadership:

As far as my position goes I have made the necessary calculations. Let me be quite frank with you. If we do not get what I am asking for, everybody will assume that the only solution is in the hands of the Americans....As far as I can see, you are not prepared to help us in the same way that America helps Israel. This means that there is only one course open to me: I shall go back to Egypt and I shall tell the people the truth. I shall tell them that the time has come for me to step down and hand over to a pro-American President. If I cannot save them, somebody else will have to do it. That is my final word.

While this crisis in Egyptian-Soviet relations was resolved, the repeated reluctance of the Soviets on military supply rendered this option by itself insufficient in restoring the occupied territories.

It is against this background that Egyptian decision makers accepted US mediation, even though perceived as biased, during the pre-war period (the percentage of acceptance for Egypt during this period was 36%). Egypt accepted the US cease-fire proposal in 1970 and renewed it in 1971. Egypt repeatedly asked for coordinated great power involvement to solve the Middle East conflict, sought US involvement in the interim canal settlement in 1971 and requested the US to apply pressure on Israel to evacuate the occupied territories.

By 1972-1973, Sadat was frustrated by the lack of US response to his repeated requests for more energetic involvement and Egyptian acceptance of US mediation

(as indicated in Table 3.12) declined.¹ In an interview for Newsweek, Sadat (April 2, 1973; BBC, 4261:8) was asked about European advice to him that nothing would be done unless Egypt did something to show that it cared for its case. He replied:

They are, ...right. All have slept on the Middle East crisis but they will soon wake up to the fact that the Americans have left us no other course than this.

Sadat's decision to launch the 1973 war should not be interpreted as contradicting Touval's hypothesis on acceptance of a biased intermediary. Sadat opted for a limited war backed by the oil weapon in order to stimulate US interest in pressuring Israel to return the occupied territory² (Pauk, 1980:47).

During the post-war period, January 1974 - December 1978, Egyptian acceptance of US mediation increased (the percentage of acceptance was 96%). US mediation was still regarded by the Egyptian leadership as their best alternative in solving the Middle East conflict. The experience of 1967-1970, and Sadat's own personal beliefs on the US role, rendered it the best choice, especially after the war when it was mostly perceived as adopting a positive policy towards Egypt.

¹Egyptian acceptance as indicated by the data on acceptance dropped from 10 events indicating acceptance during 1970-1971 to 3 events indicating acceptance during Jan. 1972 to Sept. 1973.

²Note that the frequency of Egyptian acceptance during the war quarter, as indicated by the data on acceptance presented in Table 5.12 was the highest in any single quarter during the entire time period.

5.3.1.2 Reward Power of the Intermediary

A second explanation which might account for the acceptance of an intermediary even when perceived as biased is the reward power possessed by an intermediary. The traditionally unfavored party may accept third party mediation if it believes that the third party is capable of solving the conflict. Pauk (1980:49) maintains that the dependence relationship between an intermediary and the traditionally favored party increases the traditionally unfavored party's incentive to accept third party mediation. The traditionally unfavored party might believe that this dependency gives the intermediary bargaining power vis-à-vis the favored party.

Both Nasser and Sadat believed that the US could put pressure on Israel because of Israel's dependence on the US for economic, political and military support. Table 5.14 presents the frequency and distribution of Egyptian decision makers' perceptions of US capability to solve the conflict. The data reveal that when the effectiveness of the dependence relationship is questioned by the traditionally unfavored party, there is a possibility that its acceptance of third party mediation will decline.¹

¹During the period January 1972 - September 1973, there was only one reference to US capability to solve the conflict and 3 references to US inability to solve the conflict due to its reluctance to put pressure on Israel. Egyptian acceptance of US mediation declined during the same time period. In an address, Sadat (March 26, 1973; BBC, 4256:6) explained that "the USA cannot exert pressure on Israel."

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Sadat reached the conclusion that limited war was the only way to stimulate US involvement in the peace process and revitalize the possibility of using the dependence relationship between Israel and the US to Egypt's advantage. The war would threaten US interests in the area and consequently force it to adopt a sterner position in its bargaining with Israel.

An intermediary may be accepted by the traditionally unfavored party even if perceived as biased because of its ability to provide the unfavored party with economic or military assistance. The capability to provide such rewards might induce the unfavored party to accept compromises to win the intermediary's sympathies which were not traditionally in its favor. By accepting compromises offered by the intermediary, it would be serving the intermediary's interests in the pacific settlement of the dispute. In return, the traditionally unfavored party would expect to receive economic and military rewards. Sadat believed that the US was not only capable of restoring the occupied territories, but was also capable of playing an instrumental role in solving Egypt's economic problems.

5.3.2 Israeli Acceptance

Israeli acceptance of US mediation can be understood within the context of its available alternatives, its evaluation of US capability to solve the conflict and its expectation of the continuity of US economic and military assistance.

5.3.2.1 The Alternatives

The June 1967 war was a great military victory for Israel resulting in the occupation of vast Arab territories. The devastating defeat of the Arab armies probably led Israeli decision makers to believe that the Arabs would need many years to reconstruct their armed forces. They felt secure from an attack for a long time and viewed their own strength in the Middle East as equal to if not more important than that of the great powers (Aronson, 1978:82). The "no war / no peace" situation was not regarded as harmful to Israeli interests. As a result, its bargaining advantages were high. Unless the negotiations resulted in an asymmetrical outcome in its favor, Israel was not ready to change the situation.¹

¹For a detailed discussion of asymmetrical bargaining power see Hopmann (1978) and Snyder and Diezing (1977:256-262).

The best way to solve the Middle East conflict, from Israel's point of view, was through direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis. Since this was not possible during the pre-war period, because of the declared Arab position of "no negotiation," mediation was to be kept at a minimum until the Arabs accepted their position.

After 1967, Israel accepted the US cease-fire plan in 1970, asked for advice on the reopening of the Canal in April 1971, joined US sponsored talks in return for F-4s in October 1971, accepted the US proposal to begin talks with Egypt on Suez in February 1972, and declared itself in favor of US mediation (as opposed to UN mediation) during 1972 and 1973. Against this behavior indicating willingness to accept mediation at a minimum level within the context of an overall settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, Israel rejected all attempts at mediation involving a comprehensive settlement. It rejected the Two-Power and Four-Power talks and the Rogers plan of 1969, and also the partial US plan for withdrawal of 25 miles from Suez in 1971.

The basis on which "the status quo syndrome" was based was shattered by the 1973 war. Israel could no longer rely on its own military capability to maintain the state of "no war/no peace" (Aronson, 1978:136, 169-170). Incrementalism was regarded as the best alternative to maintain maximum

security requirements while pacifying Arab and American interests. Israel still retained its bargaining advantage resulting from the occupation of the Arab territories, it could thus obstruct any change which was considered against its security interests.

Since direct negotiations were not a foreseeable option right after the war, an intermediary's role was essential. Available intermediaries were the UN, the USSR in collaboration with the US, and the US alone.

The UN was distrusted by the Israelis because of the third world majority favoring the Arab point of view. Soviet-American collaboration, while accepted in the Geneva Conference, was not seen as the best alternative due to the fear of increased pressure on Israel if the US and USSR reached an accommodation not necessarily in Israel's interests. Unilateral mediation by the US was the preferred alternative since it would be undertaken by a friendly state and Israel would be directly involved in the process of conflict resolution. It is for such considerations that the percentage of acceptance of US mediation by Israel increased from 43% during the pre-war period to 60% during the post-war period.

5.3.2.2 Reward Power of the Intermediary

The Israeli belief in the limitations on the US capability to solve the conflict is reflected in the low frequency of this theme in the coded documents. Table 5.15 shows that there were only six references to US capability to solve the conflict during the entire twelve year period.

While Israel depended on US military, economic and political support, it probably was not willing to give in to the US proposals for the solution of the Middle East conflict out of fear that the rewards it received from the US would be terminated. Israel could maintain its freedom of action and still enjoy US rewards. A client can maintain autonomy of action if he believes that the patron's support will be forthcoming in any case. Such a belief might be plausible because of the patron's interests which are served by the client and/or due to domestic interests within the patron's political system. Snyder and Diesing (1977:30-31) maintain that:

The superpower's capability for restraining the client may be somewhat ambiguous: the low credibility of the superpower's threat to withdraw support may undermine the restraining effect of the essentiality of that support.

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QUARTER	Can Solve	Cannot Solve	QUARTER	Can Solve	Cannot Solve	TOTAL
January - March 1967			January - March 1973			
April - June 1967			April - June 1973			
July - September 1967			July - September 1973			
October - December 1967			October - December 1973			
January - March 1968	1		January - March 1974			
April - June 1968			April - June 1974			
July - September 1968			July - September 1974			
October - December 1968			October - December 1974			
January - March 1969			January - March 1975			
April - June 1969			April - June 1975			
July - September 1969			July - September 1975	1		
October - December 1969			October - December 1975			
January - March 1970	1		January - March 1976			
April - June 1970			April - June 1976			
July - September 1970			July - September 1976			
October - December 1970			October - December 1976			
January - March 1971			January - March 1977			
April - June 1971			April - June 1977			
July - September 1971			July - September 1977			
October - December 1971	1		October - December 1977	1		
January - March 1972			January - March 1978			
April - June 1972			April - June 1978			
July - September 1972			July - September 1978			
October - December 1972	1		October - December 1978			
TOTAL			TOTAL	6 (86%)	1 (14%)	7 (100%)

Since Israel perceived US support as serving US interests, and since Israeli leaders could count to a considerable extent on domestic influences within the US, the Israelis might well have believed that rejecting US involvement in the peace process would not result in the disruption of US rewards.

5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter presented a description and an analysis of Egyptian and Israeli perceptions and acceptance of US mediation. The chapter questioned the condition of impartiality as discussed in most of the literature on international mediation. Hypothesis 3 on the traditionally unfavored party's acceptance of third party mediation even though the intermediary is perceived as biased was supported by the data on Egyptian perceptions and its acceptance of US mediation. Egyptian acceptance was explained in view of its available alternatives, its perception of US capability to solve the conflict and its expectations of receiving rewards from the US.

According to hypothesis 4, we expected that a third party with reward power would be more acceptable as an intermediary to the traditionally unfavored party than to the traditionally favored party. This hypothesis was not supported

by the data on Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation. While the percentage of acceptance for Egypt was higher than that of Israel, the Z for the difference in their percentage of acceptance was not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

CHAPTER VI

THE IMPACT OF US BEHAVIOR ON EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BEHAVIOR

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters discussed the objectives of the US as a third party in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, its behavior as an ally and as an intermediary, and the acceptance of its mediation by Egypt and Israel. Now it is important to analyze the impact of US behavior as an ally on Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the impact of US behavior as an intermediary on Egyptian-Israeli cooperation. This is done through testing two groups of hypotheses. The first group deals with the impact of the reciprocal variable and third party behavior on the behavior of the dyad in conflict. The second group of hypotheses deals with the expected direction of the impact of third party behavior as an ally and as an intermediary on the protagonists' behavior. The chapter elaborates on the method used in testing the hypotheses. This will be followed by a analysis of the results of the tests.

6.2 DISCUSSION OF THE HYPOTHESES

6.2.1 Hypotheses on the Impact of the Reciprocal Behavior Variable and the Impact of Third Party Behavior

Foreign policy behavior among states is largely reciprocal. While in normal relationships the overwhelming immediate determinant of behavior towards another state is the behavior received from that state (Dolan, 1978:29), the behavior of protagonists in an entrenched conflict subject to extraregional influence is also affected by changes in the relationship between each of them and the third party involved in the conflict situation. In the Egyptian-Israeli context this means that the behavior of each of the protagonists towards one another is affected by changes in the US behavior towards both of them as well as by the behavior each receives from the other. The impact of the US here is not that every action that occurs between the US and Egypt and between the US and Israel results in Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel or vice-versa, but rather that aggregated changes in the US-Egyptian relationship and the US-Israeli relationship affect Egyptian-Israeli behavior towards one another.

Although there is increasing consensus among politicians and scholars that the superpowers influence the behavior of the Arabs and the Israelis, empirical studies on dyadic interaction in the Middle East have not supported such a consensus. The behavior of the protagonists in the Middle East was found to be largely reciprocal. The contrast between the impressionistic accounts and empirical studies necessitates a further extension of the models used in these tests. The scope of this study is limited only to the impact of the US as a third party on the interaction of the Egyptian-Israeli dyad during the period January 1967 - December 1978.

The following two hypotheses will be tested:

- H₅: A nation state's conflict behavior will be affected by the reciprocal behavior it receives from its opponent and by third party behavior as an ally cooperating with one side and conflicting with the other.
- H₆: A nation state's cooperative behavior will be affected by the reciprocal behavior it receives from its opponent and by third party behavior as an intermediary cooperating with both parties in conflict.

6.2.2 Hypotheses on the Direction of the Impact of Third Party Behavior as an Ally and as an Intermediary on the Protagonists' Behavior

The second group of hypotheses is concerned with the suggested direction of the impact of third party behavior as an ally and as an intermediary on the behavior of a dyad in conflict. The review of the literature in Chapter I has shown that a third party acting as an ally can influence dyadic conflict behavior since it provides its client with arms and other assistance. Two hypotheses on the direction of such influence can be derived from this literature:

- H₇: If a third party behaves as an ally, it will tend to increase the conflict behavior of the party with whom it is allied.
- H₈: If a third party behaves as an ally, it will tend to decrease the conflict behavior of the party against whom the alliance is directed.

The review of the literature has also shown that third party behavior as an intermediary can influence dyadic cooperative behavior. Such influence was attributed to the functions undertaken by the intermediary, i.e. facilitating communication and facilitating concession. Chapter I has also emphasized that an intermediary's capabilities are an important element in determining his success in carrying out these functions. Such capabilities provide him with reward

power vis-à-vis the protagonists. Rewards can be verbal (i.e., support for a protagonist's position) or tangible (i.e., providing economic or military aid). Rewards provided to one of the parties in conflict can function as incentives for it to cooperate with its opponent. Rewards provided to the opponent may function as pressures on it to cooperate. Three hypotheses on the direction of the impact of third party behavior as an intermediary providing rewards to a dyad in conflict will be tested:

- H₉ : If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to a party in conflict, the recipient will tend to increase its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.
- H₁₀: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to the traditionally favored party, the traditionally unfavored party will tend to increase its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.
- H₁₁: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to the traditionally unfavored party, the traditionally favored party will tend to decrease its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.

6.3 METHODOLOGY

In this section we deal with the models used in testing the hypotheses, the time periods during which the hypotheses will be tested, the operational definitions and the problems encountered in using multiple regression in testing the hypotheses.

6.3.1 The Models

Two models are used in this study: the ally model and the intermediary model.

6.3.1.1 The Ally Model

In the case of Egyptian conflict behavior towards Israel, the ally model is used to test hypotheses 5 and 8. In the case of Israeli conflict towards Egypt the ally model is used to test hypotheses 5 and 7.

Figure 6.1 depicts the ally model for Egyptian conflict towards Israel. It shows that Egyptian conflict towards Israel is a function of Israeli conflict towards Egypt, US cooperation towards Israel and US conflict towards Egypt.

FIGURE 6.1: The Ally Model in the Case of Egyptian Conflict Behavior Towards Israel

Figure 6.2 depicts the ally model for Israeli conflict towards Egypt. It shows that Israeli conflict towards Egypt is a function of Egyptian conflict towards Israel, US cooperation towards Israel and US conflict towards Egypt.

FIGURE 6.2: The Ally Model in the Case of Israeli Conflict Behavior Towards Egypt

6.3.1.2 The Intermediary Model

In the case of Egyptian cooperation towards Israel, the intermediary model is used to test hypotheses 6, 9 and 10. In the case of Israeli cooperation towards Egypt, the intermediary model is used to test hypotheses 6, 9 and 11.

Figure 6.3 depicts the intermediary model for Egyptian cooperation towards Israel. It shows that Egyptian cooperation towards Israel is a function of Israeli cooperation towards Egypt, US cooperation towards Israel and US cooperation towards Egypt.

FIGURE 6.3: The Intermediary Model / In the Case of Egyptian Cooperative Behavior Towards Israel

Figure 6.4 depicts the intermediary model for Israeli cooperation towards Egypt. It shows that Israeli cooperation towards Egypt is a function of Egyptian cooperation towards Israel, US cooperation towards Israel and US cooperation towards Egypt.

FIGURE 6.4: The Intermediary Model in the Case of Israeli Cooperative Behavior Towards Egypt

6.3.2 The Time Periods

Chapter I points out that one of the reasons for the inadequacy of the existing literature in understanding the impact of the behavior of a third party as an ally and as an intermediary is its lack of emphasis on the need to identify when and why shifts in third party behavior occurred. This is why in this study we undertook a detailed analysis of US behavior during the period January 1967 - December 1978. The analysis in Chapter IV reveals that US behavior was subject to a major change after the October War of 1973. It showed that during the period January 1967 - September 1973, the US behaved predominantly as an ally of Israel. After the War, during the period January 1974 - December 1978, US behavior changed to be predominantly that of an intermediary providing rewards to both protagonists. Since there was a major change in US behavior during the post-war period as compared with the pre-war period, the ally model and the intermediary model will be used in both periods to see if the shift in US behavior had any impact on the dyad's behavior. The two periods are:

January 1967 - September 1973

January 1974 - December 1978¹

¹The last quarter in 1973 (October - December 1973) was left out because it was the quarter during which the War took place.

6.3.3 Operational Definitions

6.3.3.1 The Dependent Variables

The operational indicators for the dependent variables are Egyptian conflict behavior towards Israel, Israeli conflict behavior towards Egypt, Egyptian cooperative behavior towards Israel and Israeli cooperative behavior towards Egypt, as defined in Azar's COPDAB. The Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for conflict are used in measuring each actor's conflict and the Dimensions of Interactions (DIs) for cooperation are used in measuring each actor's cooperation.¹

6.3.3.2 The Independent Variables

The reciprocal variable is the same behavior received from the opponent (e.g., if Egyptian conflict is the dependent variable, then Israeli conflict would be the reciprocal variable).

The second set of independent variables is the role of the US as an ally of Israel. US behavior as an ally of Israel is measured by two variables, one is US cooperation towards Israel and the other is US conflict towards Egypt.

¹For a detailed discussion of how the DIs for conflict and cooperation are derived see Chapter II.

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The third set of independent variables is the role of the US as an intermediary in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. US behavior as an intermediary is also measured by two variables, one is US cooperation towards Israel and the other is US cooperation towards Egypt. Since our interest is in the role of an intermediary providing rewards to both protagonists, we do not focus only on diplomatic activity but also on verbal and tangible rewards provided by the intermediary to both opponents.

All the independent variables are defined in accordance with Azar's COPDAB definitions. The DIs for cooperation are used in measuring each actor's cooperation and the DIs for conflict are used in measuring each actor's conflict.

6.3.4 Multiple Regression

The relationship between the dependent and independent variables is examined using multiple regression: a statistical technique that determines the combined effect of a number of independent variables upon a dependent variable. The b coefficient is used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in an independent variable.¹

¹Ordinary least squares with correction for autocorrelation were used. The equations were not treated as a system. The serial correlation between each dependent variable at times t and $t-1$ during the pre-war period was moderate ranging between .43 and .52. During the post-war period the correlation was lower ranging between .14 and .41. The assumption, although not tested, is that the residuals across equations are uncorrelated.

Before regression can be meaningfully employed, we need to examine:

- the outliers
- lagging
- the problem of multicollinearity
- the problem of autocorrelation

6.3.4.1 The Outliers

One of the problems that might be encountered in regression analysis is the presence of outliers, i.e., extreme data points in a set of observations. Extreme data points might affect the conclusion inferred from regression analysis. When there are extreme data points, the conclusions drawn could be greatly affected by one or two extreme observations (Chatterjee and Price, 1977:19). A few outliers were found in our data. The extreme data points were lowered to about the level of the mean + two standard deviations, but the rank order of the data was kept intact.¹

6.3.4.2 Lagging

A three-month (quarterly) lag was introduced to the reciprocal variable since one of the assumptions of regression analysis is that the specified relationship is recursive (i.e., there is a one-way causation). The lagging of the

¹For the data and the lowered outliers see Appendix VI.

reciprocal variable would also decrease the possibility that the method for data collection would inflate the impact of the reciprocal variable (Dolan, 1978:47).¹

There is no theoretical reason for introducing lags to the US variables; however, on empirical grounds we wanted to see whether the introduction of lags improved the explanatory power of our ally and intermediary models. The explanatory power of our ally model improved in most cases when a one quarter lag was introduced to the US variables, i.e., US cooperation towards Israel and US conflict towards Egypt.²

¹Newspapers and chronologies at times use a reporting format which makes it difficult to identify the initiator of an action. Events data codebooks (COPDAB included) call for double coding of events such as agreements and clashes when it becomes difficult to identify who initiated the event (Sigler, cited in Azar *et al.*, 1974:47).

²The R^2 provides us with the proportion of total variability in the dependent variable as explained by the independent variables in our ally model. In the case of Egyptian conflict behavior towards Israel, the R^2 increased from .30 to .36 when the US variables were lagged during the pre-war period. The R^2 also increased from .14 to .21 when the US variables were lagged during the post-war period. In the case of Israeli conflict behavior towards Egypt during the pre-war period, the R^2 increased from .21 to .34 when the US variables were lagged. However, during the post-war period, the R^2 in the case of the lagged and non-lagged US variables was very low, .08 in both cases.

The explanatory power of our intermediary model decreased when a one quarter lag was introduced to the US variables, i.e., US cooperation towards Israel and US cooperation towards Egypt.¹ Consequently, we decided to use a one quarter lag for the US variables in the ally model and no lag for the US variables in the intermediary model.

6.3.4.3 The Problem of Multicollinearity

One of the assumptions of multiple regression is that none of the explanatory variables is perfectly correlated with another. When this assumption is violated we speak of multicollinearity. With perfect multicollinearity, it becomes impossible to estimate the unique effect of individual variables in multiple regression. On the other hand, when all the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with each other, we speak about an absence of multicollinearity. The cases in between are described by various degrees of multicollinearity. In most cases, multicollinearity is a question of degree and not of kind (Kmenta, 1971:380).

¹In the case of Egyptian cooperation towards Israel, the R^2 decreased from .17 to .11 when lags were introduced to the US variables during the pre-war period. The R^2 also decreased from .29 to .18 when lags were introduced during the post-war period. In the case of Israeli cooperation towards Egypt, the R^2 decreased from .47 to .41 when lags were introduced to the US variables during the pre-war period. The R^2 also decreased from .48 to .42 when lags were introduced during the post-war period.

One way of detecting multicollinearity is the inspection of the simple correlations among the independent variables. Inspecting the intercorrelations¹ between our independent variables we found that most of them were lower than .20. The highest intercorrelations, using the ally model, were between US cooperation towards Israel and US conflict towards Egypt, .32 during the pre-war period and .41 during the post-war period. The highest intercorrelations, using the intermediary model, were mostly between the US variables, i.e., US cooperation towards Israel and US cooperation towards Egypt, .24 during the pre-war period and .60 during the post-war period. Such intercorrelations are within the tolerable limits accepted by some scholars.²

¹For the correlation matrices see Appendix VII.

²Given that in most cases some multicollinearity exists, the question becomes: At what degree does it become harmful? This question has not been agreed upon by researchers. Some scholars (e.g., McCormick, 1975:31), maintain that while the extent of tolerable multicollinearity has not been agreed upon, the standard rule of thumb is a correlation of between .6 and .7 or higher between the independent variables. However, McCormick maintains that there is an upper level to such intercorrelation. Forbes and Tufte (1968:1262-1263) and Tufte (1969: 653-654) are critical of two studies in comparative politics which report .95 and .89 correlations between two sets of independent variables.

6.3.4.4 The Problem of Autocorrelation

Another important assumption of regression analysis is the mutual independence in the observations of the independent variables, i.e., the error terms are uncorrelated. When this assumption is violated, we speak about the existence of autocorrelation in our data. Correlation in the error terms suggests that there is additional explanatory information in the data that has not been exploited in the model studied. Autocorrelation is usually associated with regression in time series. If autocorrelation is observed in the data, then the confidence intervals and various tests of significance used would no longer be strictly valid (Chatterjee and Price, 1977:123-124).

Autocorrelation can be detected by computing the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic.¹ When the multiple

¹The Durbin-Watson statistic, d , is the basis of a very popular test of autocorrelation in regression analysis. Durbin and Watson computed a table of critical values for 95% confidence levels to test the null hypothesis that the error terms are serially independent against the alternative that the null hypothesis is false. Corresponding to a given sample size and the number of parameters estimated, there are two critical values, the lower critical value d_L and the upper critical value d_u .

1. $d < d_L$ reject H_0
2. $d > d_u$ do not reject H_0
3. $d_L < d < d_u$ the test is inconclusive.

regression procedure was first applied to our data, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated the presence of autocorrelation in one of our eight regression runs. Therefore, the equations were refitted taking autocorrelation into account.¹

6.4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Both the ally and the intermediary models are used to explain Egyptian and Israeli behavior during two distinct time periods:

- A. January 1967 - September 1973.
- B. January 1974 - December 1978.

The results of the ally model are presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. Those of the intermediary model are depicted in Tables 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8. The results in each table will show the following:

- a. Whether or not the reciprocal variable had an impact on the dependent variable.
- b. Whether or not the US had an impact on the dependent variable.
- c. If the US had an impact on the dependent variable, was such an impact in the expected direction?

¹Autocorrelation was corrected for using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. The type of autocorrelation most prevalent in these equations was second order.

6.4.1 The Ally Model

The dependent variables that will be explained using this model are Egyptian conflict towards Israel and Israeli conflict towards Egypt during the pre- and post- October 1973 War periods.

6.4.1.1 Egyptian Conflict Towards Israel

The independent variables used in explaining Egyptian conflict towards Israel are Israeli conflict towards Egypt and US behavior as an ally of Israel (cooperating with Israel and conflicting with Egypt).

A. During the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973

In testing hypothesis 5 in the first group of hypotheses dealing with the impact of the reciprocal variable and third party behavior as an ally, the results in Table 6.1 lend partial support to this hypothesis. They show that Egyptian conflict towards Israel (the dependent variable) was affected by Israeli conflict towards Egypt (the reciprocal variable). The b coefficient for Israeli conflict behavior towards Egypt is .35 and is statistically significant. The dependent variable was also influenced by US cooperation towards Israel, the b coefficient is -3.52 and is statistically significant. However, the b coefficient for US conflict towards Egypt is -.21 and is not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

TABLE 6.1

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF ISRAELI
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON EGYPTIAN CONFLICT
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS ISRAEL
January 1967 - September 1973

	a	ICFE	USCPI	USCFE	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ECONFISR	744.11	.35* (.08)	-3.52** (1.64)	-.21 (3.37)	.40	-.34

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variables. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original R^2 . RH02 = the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ECONFISR = Egypt conflict towards Israel

ICFE = Israeli conflict towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

USCPI = US cooperation towards Israel
lagged one quarter

USCFE = US conflict towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

N = 26

*significant at .01 level

**significant at .05 level

In testing hypothesis 8 in the second group of hypotheses dealing with the suggested direction of the impact of third party behavior as an ally, we find that the results also lend partial support to this hypothesis. Egyptian conflict towards Israel decreased as US cooperation towards its client (Israel) increased. The b coefficient for US cooperation towards Israel is negative (-3.52) and is statistically significant. While the impact of US conflict towards Egypt was in the same direction (b coefficient of -.21) it was not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

B. During the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978

Table 6.2 presents the results of the regression estimates using the ally model to explain Egyptian conflict towards Israel during the period January 1974 to December 1978. The results show that hypothesis 5 is only partially supported. Egyptian conflict behavior towards Israel was affected only by US conflict towards Egypt. The b coefficient for US conflict towards Egypt is 1.93 and is statistically significant. Egyptian conflict towards Israel was not influenced by Israeli conflict towards Egypt, nor by US cooperation towards Israel. The b coefficient for Israeli conflict towards Egypt is .09 and the b coefficient for US cooperation towards Israel is .04. Both coefficients are not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

TABLE 6.2

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF ISRAELI
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON EGYPTIAN CONFLICT
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS ISRAEL
January 1974 - December 1978

	a	ICFE	USCPI	USCFE	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ECONFISR	75.72	.09 (.24)	.04 (.18)	1.93** (1.06)	.18	.15

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original $\bar{R}^2$. RH02 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ECONFISR = Egyptian conflict towards Israel

ICFE = Israeli conflict towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

USCPI = US cooperation towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

USCFE = US conflict towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

N = 19

**significant at .05 level

Hypothesis 8 was not supported during the period January 1974 - December 1978. Egyptian conflict did not decrease as a result of US behavior as an ally of Israel. The b coefficient for US conflict towards Egypt is positive and the b coefficient for US cooperation towards Israel is insignificant. This result suggests that hypothesis 8 is partially supported only when the predominant interaction of a third party with a dyad in conflict is that of an ally, as was the case during the pre-war period.

6.4.1.2 Israeli Conflict Towards Egypt

The independent variables used in explaining Israeli conflict towards Egypt are Egyptian conflict towards Israel and US behavior as an ally of Israel (cooperating with Israel and conflicting with Egypt).

A. During the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973

The results in Table 6.3 lend partial support to hypothesis 5 in the first group of hypotheses dealing with the impact of the reciprocal behavior and third party behavior as an ally. Israeli conflict towards Egypt (the dependent variable) was affected by Egyptian conflict towards Israel (the reciprocal variable). The b coefficient is 1.50 and is statistically significant. The dependent variable was

TABLE 6.3

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF EGYPTIAN
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON ISRAELI CONFLICT
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT

January 1967 - September 1973

	a	ECFI	USCPI	USCFE	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ICONFEGT	386.68	1.50* (.20)	-6.15** (2.6)	-4.41 (4.25)	.73	-.54

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original $\bar{R}^2$. RH02 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original value.

ICONFEGT = Israeli conflict towards Egypt
ECFI = Egyptian conflict towards Israel
lagged one quarter
USCPI = US cooperation towards Israel
lagged one quarter
USCFE = US conflict towards Egypt
lagged one quarter
N = 26

*significant at .01 level

**significant at .05 level

also influenced by US cooperation towards Israel. The b coefficient is -6.15 and is statistically significant. However, the b coefficient for US conflict towards Egypt is -4.41, and is not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

In testing hypothesis 7 in the second group of hypotheses, dealing with the suggested direction of the impact of third party behavior as an ally, we find that the results do not support our hypothesis. Israeli conflict towards Egypt did not increase as a result of US behavior as an ally of Israel. The b coefficients for US cooperation towards Israel and for US conflict towards Egypt are negative.

B. During the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978

Table 6.4 presents the results of the regression estimates using the ally model to explain Israeli conflict towards Egypt during the period January 1974 - December 1978. The results show that none of the tested hypotheses is supported. The total variability in Israeli conflict, as explained by the independent variables, is trivial ($\bar{R}^2$ is .00). The b coefficient for Egyptian conflict towards Israel is -.13, for US cooperation towards Israel it is -.05 and for US conflict towards Egypt it is -.11, and none of the coefficients is statistically significant at an acceptable level. The prime determinants of Israeli conflict towards Egypt during the post-war period were not accounted for by our model. This result suggests that a third party's behavior as

TABLE 6.4

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF EGYPTIAN
CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON ISRAELI
CONFLICT BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT
January 1974 - December 1978

	a	ECFI	USCPI	USCFE	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ICONFEGT	103.10	-.13 (.22)	-.05 (.15)	-.11 (.98)	.00	.22

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original R^2 . RH02 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ICONFEGT = Israeli conflict towards Egypt
ECFI = Egyptian conflict towards Israel
lagged one quarter
USCPI = US cooperation towards Israel
lagged one quarter
USCFE = US conflict towards Egypt
lagged one quarter
N = 19

an ally influences the conflict of the traditionally favored party only when the predominant interaction of a third party with a dyad in conflict is that of an ally of the traditionally favored party, as was the case during the pre-war period.

6.4.2 The Intermediary Model

The dependent variables that will be explained using this model are Egyptian cooperation towards Israel and Israeli cooperation towards Egypt during the pre- and post-October War periods.

6.4.2.1 Egyptian Cooperation Towards Israel

The independent variables used in explaining Egyptian cooperation towards Israel are Israeli cooperation towards Egypt and US behavior as an intermediary (cooperating with Israel and cooperating with Egypt).

A. During the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973

Table 6.5 presents the results of the regression estimates using the intermediary model to explain Egyptian cooperation towards Israel during the period January 1967 - September 1973. None of the tested hypotheses is supported. The total variability in Egyptian cooperation towards Israel as explained by the independent variables is trivial

TABLE 6.5

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF ISRAELI
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON EGYPTIAN COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS ISRAEL

January 1967 - September 1973

	a	ICPE	USCOOPIS	USCOOPEG	$\bar{R}^2$	RHO2
ECOOPISR	20.28	-.17 (.16)	-.002 (.05)	-.02 (.08)	.00	-.34

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original R^2 . RHO2 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ECOOPISR = Egyptian cooperation towards Israel

ICPE = Israeli cooperation towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

USCOOPIS = US cooperation towards Israel

USCOOPEG = US cooperation towards Egypt

N = 26

(the R^2 is .00). The b coefficient for Israeli cooperation towards Egypt is $-.17$, for US cooperation towards Israel it is $-.002$ and for US cooperation towards Egypt it is $-.02$ and none of the b coefficients is statistically significant at an acceptable level.

B. During the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978

The results in Table 6.6 lend partial support to hypothesis 6 in the first group of hypotheses dealing with the impact of the reciprocal variable and third party behavior as an intermediary. The results show that Egyptian cooperation was affected by US cooperation towards Israel. The b coefficient is $.45$ and is statistically significant. Egyptian cooperation towards Israel was not influenced by Israeli cooperation towards Egypt nor by US cooperation towards Egypt. The b coefficient in the first case is $-.17$ and in the latter case it is $.06$, and both are not statistically significant at an acceptable level.

In testing hypothesis 9 in the second group of hypotheses dealing with the suggested direction of the impact of third party behavior as an intermediary, we find that the results do not support this hypothesis. Egyptian cooperation towards Israel did not increase as a result of the intermediary's cooperation towards Egypt.

TABLE 6.6

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF ISRAELI
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON EGYPTIAN COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS ISRAEL
January 1974 - December 1978

	a	ICPE	USCOOPIS	USCOOPEG	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ECOOPISR	6.59	-.17 (.13)	.45* (.11)	-.06 (.07)	.71	-.35

NOTES: *b* coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the *b* coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original $\bar{R}^2$. RH02 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ECOOPIS = Egyptian cooperation towards Israel

ICPE = Israel cooperation towards Egypt
lagged one quarter

USCOOPIS = US cooperation towards Israel

USCOOPEG = US cooperation towards Egypt

N = 19

*significant at .01 level

The results in Table 6.6 support hypothesis 10. US cooperation towards Israel (the traditionally favored party) significantly accounted for an increase in Egyptian cooperation towards Israel (the b coefficient is .45). This result suggests that when a third party's behavior changes from being predominantly an ally of one party to being predominantly that of an intermediary, cooperating with both protagonists, the traditionally unfavored party might be influenced by the pressures generated from the third party's cooperative behavior towards the traditionally favored party. This might be attributed to the desire of the traditionally unfavored party to sustain the third party's behavior as an intermediary. Since cooperation in dyadic interaction might be desired by the third party in order to secure its regional objectives, the traditionally unfavored party might resort to cooperation with its opponent even under pressure in order to please the third party and thus secure for itself future rewards.

6.4.2.2 Israeli Cooperation Towards Egypt

The independent variables used in explaining Israeli cooperation towards Egypt are Egyptian cooperation towards Israel and US behavior as an intermediary (cooperating with Israel and cooperating with Egypt).

A. During the pre-war period January 1967 - September 1973

In testing hypothesis 6 in the first group of hypotheses dealing with the impact of the reciprocal variable and third party behavior as an intermediary, the results in Table 6.7 lend support to this hypothesis. Israeli cooperation towards Egypt was influenced by the three specified independent variables. The b coefficient for Egyptian cooperation towards Israel is .77, for US cooperation towards Israel it is .13 and for US cooperation towards Egypt it is .17. The b coefficients for the three independent variables are statistically significant.

Hypothesis 9 is also supported by the results. Israel increased its cooperation towards Egypt as US cooperation towards it increased; the b coefficient is .13.

Hypothesis 11 is not supported. Israeli cooperation towards Egypt did not decrease as a result of US cooperation towards Egypt. The b coefficient for US cooperation towards Egypt is positive.

B. During the post-war period January 1974 - December 1978

Table 6.8 presents the results of the regression estimates using the intermediary model to explain Israeli cooperation towards Egypt during the period January 1974 - December 1978. Hypothesis 6 is supported. Israeli cooperation towards Egypt was influenced by the three specified independent variables.

TABLE 6.7

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF EGYPTIAN
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON ISRAELI COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT

January 1967 - September 1973

	a	ECPI	USCOOPIS	USCOOPEG	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ICOOPEGT	-1.3	.77* (.18)	.13** (.06)	.17*** (.12)	.50	.32

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented in parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original R^2 . RH02 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ICOOPEGT	Israeli cooperation towards Egypt
ECPI	Egyptian cooperation towards Israel lagged one quarter
USCOOPIS	US cooperation towards Israel
USCOOPEG	US cooperation towards Egypt
N	26

*significant at .01 level
**significant at .05 level
***significant at .10 level

TABLE 6.8

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF EGYPTIAN
BEHAVIOR AND US BEHAVIOR ON ISRAELI COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS EGYPT
January 1974 - December 1978

	a	ECPI	USCOOPIS	USCOOPEG	$\bar{R}^2$	RH02
ICOOPEGT	-6.82	.75* (.18)	.45** (.18)	-.30** (.15)	.54	.19

NOTES: b coefficients are used to indicate the change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. The standard errors of the b coefficients are presented between parentheses. $\bar{R}^2$ is R^2 adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom. $\bar{R}^2$ after correcting for autocorrelation has a slightly different meaning than the original R^2 . RH02 is the second order estimate of serial correlation and is used to adjust the original values.

ICOOPEGT = Israeli cooperation towards Egypt

ECPI = Egyptian cooperation towards Israel
lagged one quarter

USCOOPIS = US cooperation towards Israel

USCOOPEG = US cooperation towards Egypt

N = 19

*significant at .01 level

**significant at .05 level

The b coefficient for Egyptian cooperation towards Israel is .75, for US cooperation towards Israel it is .45 and for US cooperation towards Egypt it is -.30. The b coefficients for the three independent variables are statistically significant.

Hypothesis 9 is also supported by the results. Israel increased its cooperation towards Egypt as US cooperation towards it increased (b coefficient is .45).

Hypothesis 11 is also supported by the results. Israel decreased its cooperation towards Egypt as US cooperation towards Egypt (the traditionally unfavored party) increased; the b coefficient is -.30. This result suggests that hypothesis 11 is supported only when the predominant interaction of a third party with a dyad in conflict is that of an intermediary as was the case during the post-war period. During the pre-war period, Israel (the traditionally favored party) was willing to respond positively to US cooperation towards the traditionally unfavored party (Egypt), when the third party's behavior as an intermediary was only episodic. During the post-war period, when the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary, Israeli cooperation towards Egypt decreased as US cooperation towards Egypt increased. This might be attributed to the resentment of the traditionally favored party to the increased pressures resulting from

the change in the third party's behavior towards the traditionally unfavored party.

6.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This Chapter used an ally model and an intermediary model to test hypotheses on the impact of the reciprocal behavior variable and US behavior on Egyptian and Israeli behavior vis-à-vis one another. In using regression analysis to test these hypotheses, an attempt was made to correct for the problems of the outliers and autocorrelation and a broad interpretation of the tolerable level of multicollinearity was adopted.

The results of the tests undertaken in this Chapter are summarized in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. The results show that the intermediary model had a better fit to the data than the ally model. More of our hypotheses on the direction of the impact of third party behavior were supported using the intermediary model than the ally model.

The results corroborate the argument that the relevance of the ally and the intermediary models used in testing our hypotheses differed during the pre-war as compared with the post-war period. US cooperation towards Israel led to a decrease in Egyptian conflict towards Israel, as was expected, only when

TABLE 6.9

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE TESTS USING THE ALLY MODEL
FOR EGYPT AND ISRAEL DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1967 -
SEPTEMBER 1973 AND THE PERIOD JANUARY 1974 - DECEMBER 1978

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLES		
	RECIPROCAL VARIABLE	US COOPERATION TO ISRAEL	US CONFLICT TO EGYPT
Egyptian conflict towards Israel January 1967 - September 1973	had an impact	had an impact in the expected direction	did not have an impact
Egyptian conflict towards Israel January 1974 - December 1978	did not have an impact	did not have an impact	had an impact but not in the expected direction
Israeli conflict towards Egypt January 1967 - September 1973	had an impact	had an impact but not in the expected direction	did not have an impact
Israeli conflict towards Egypt January 1974 - December 1978	did not have an impact	did not have an impact	did not have an impact

TABLE 6.10

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE TESTS USING THE INTERMEDIARY
MODEL FOR EGYPT AND ISRAEL DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1967
- SEPTEMBER 1973 AND THE PERIOD JANUARY 1974 - DECEMBER 1978

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLES		
	RECIPROCAL VARIABLE	US COOPERATION TO ISRAEL	US COOPERATION TO EGYPT
Egyptian cooperation towards Israel January 1967 - September 1973	did not have an impact	did not have an impact	did not have an impact
Egyptian cooperation towards Israel January 1974 - December 1978	did not have an impact	had an impact in the expec- ted direction	did not have an impact
Israeli cooperation towards Egypt January 1967 - September 1973	had an impact	had an impact in the expec- ted direction	had an impact but not in the expected direction
Israeli cooperation towards Egypt January 1974 - December 1978	had an impact	had an impact in the expec- ted direction	had an impact in the expec- ted direction

the US behaved predominantly as an ally of Israel. US cooperation towards Israel led to an increase in Egyptian cooperation towards Israel, as was expected, only when the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary. US cooperation towards Egypt led to a decrease in Israeli cooperation towards Egypt, as expected, only when the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary.

The results also question the existing literature where it argues that the reciprocal variable is the only relevant variable in explaining Egyptian and Israeli behavior vis-à-vis one another. The results summarized in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show that Egyptian conflict towards Israel was not only affected by the reciprocal variable but was also significantly affected by US cooperation towards Israel during the pre-war period. During the post-war period, Egyptian conflict towards Israel was affected only by US conflict towards Egypt. Egyptian cooperation towards Israel during the post-war period was influenced only by US cooperation towards Israel. In the case of Israeli conflict towards Egypt, Israeli behavior was not only influenced by the reciprocal variable but also by US cooperation towards Israel during the pre-war period. Israeli cooperation towards Egypt during both time periods was not only influenced by the reciprocal variable, but also by US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel.

In view of these results, a third party with reward power should not refrain from attempting to solve a dyadic conflict on the grounds that the reciprocal variable is the only one that can affect the behavior of a nation in conflict. If the third party wants to resolve a conflict, it should behave predominantly as an intermediary in its interaction with a dyad in conflict.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to contribute to a better understanding of the role of third parties with reward power in conflict between small states. The case of the US role in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict was selected in large part because this conflict has threatened world stability over the past thirty years. The fear that the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Egyptian-Israeli conflict in particular, could trigger a crisis leading to a major military confrontation between the superpowers has been a great concern to foreign policy decision makers and peace researchers.

The review of the literature revealed several gaps which hinder understanding of third party roles in international conflict. Most of the existing works on third parties ignore the importance of the objectives of the third parties in the conflict, the influence which these have on the behavior of third parties, and also the difference between third parties in international conflict and labor-management disputes. In labor-management mediation, the principal objective of the third party is the resolution of the conflict, and the third party rarely has any independent resources of its own to reward or punish the disputants as a means of influencing the outcome.

Most of the literature on third parties in international conflict assumes that conflict resolution is the only viable objective in the settlement of any conflict, and therefore fails to stress the importance of the third party's actual objectives in the regional conflict. Consequently, the literature fails to explore the relationship between third party objectives in the peace process and its behavior as an ally and as an intermediary. A third party is referred to as an ally in a conflict situation if it joins in a coalition with one of the parties in conflict against the other. A third party is referred to as an intermediary if it intervenes diplomatically in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing towards its abatement, or termination, and its intervention is accepted by the parties to the conflict (Touval, 1975:52).

If an intermediary possesses reward power, as might be the case in international conflict, it gains considerable advantage in undertaking the role. It may be acceptable as an intermediary by the traditionally unfavored party even when it is perceived as negatively biased because of its ability to solve the conflict and/or to provide material inducement for cooperation.

Furthermore, while the theoretical literature emphasizes that third parties can influence the behavior of protagonists in conflict, some of the empirical studies have minimized the likelihood of any such impact. The contrast between theory and empirical findings necessitated a further extension of the models used in the relevant tests. Since our interest was in the role of third parties, both as allies and as intermediaries, we found most of the literature unhelpful in understanding the impact of these roles. Two reasons were advanced for this:

- a) There has been a tendency to study the impact of a third party over an extended period of time without focusing on the important question of whether there have been major changes in its interaction with the dyad in conflict. In studying the impact of third party behavior as an ally and as an intermediary, we emphasized the necessity of analyzing shifts in its behavior. For example, a third party acting as an ally might have a significant impact on a dyadic conflict when this is predominant in its interaction with the protagonists. However, if its behavior as an ally is secondary, its impact might be insignificant.

b) Much of the literature focuses on the impact of a third party's support for one of the protagonists on its behavior towards its opponent. Such a focus ignores the impact of the behavior of the third party towards both protagonists on the behavior of each of them.

The US role in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict during the period January 1967 - December 1978 was examined in order to test hypotheses developed from the literature. An ally and an intermediary model were developed to assist in testing hypotheses on the impact of the US on Egyptian-Israeli behavior. The reader is cautioned that these models capture only part of the US behavior during the period examined. US conflict towards Israel is not examined in the ally model and the emphasis is only on US cooperation towards Egypt and Israel when examining US behavior as an intermediary.

Since the US behaved both as an ally and as an intermediary during the period examined, we have differentiated between the US predominant behavior as an ally of Israel and its predominant behavior as an intermediary. We then tested our hypotheses on the impact of third party behavior on the behavior of a dyad in conflict during two time periods:

January 1967 - September 1973; January 1974 - December 1978.

Eleven hypotheses were tested in this study.

H₁: If a third party prefers conflict management to conflict resolution, it will tend to behave predominantly as an ally cooperating more and conflicting less with the party in the dyad that it believes will preserve the *status quo*.

This hypothesis was partially supported by US behavior towards Egypt and Israel during the pre-war period January 1967-September 1973; US decision makers did not believe that the *status quo* in the conflict posed a threat to its objective in the Middle East. Consequently, they gave priority to conflict management over conflict resolution. With this over-riding interest, deterrence was believed essential to prevent the outbreak of war. However, US behavior as an ally deviated from the type of behavior specified in the above hypothesis. It was expected that an ally would cooperate more and conflict less with the party in the dyad that it believed would preserve the *status quo* (the "no war/no peace" situation in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict). The test revealed a significant difference between US cooperation with Egypt and with Israel but no significant difference in US conflict towards the two protagonists. US behavior towards Egypt during the period consisted mostly of neglect, both its cooperation and conflict were low.

H₂: If a third party prefers conflict resolution to conflict management, it will tend to behave predominantly as an intermediary, cooperating with both protagonists at approximately the same level.

This hypothesis was supported by US behavior towards Egypt and Israel during the post-war period. During the October war, key US objectives in the Middle East were placed in jeopardy; the possibility of confrontation with the USSR became a reality, and the flow of oil was interrupted by the Arab embargo. The US decision makers thus came to believe that the "no war/no peace" situation (the *status quo*) posed a

threat to US objectives in the Middle East. Because of this perception, conflict resolution was given priority over conflict management in the objectives related to the peace process, and the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary, cooperating with Egypt and Israel at approximately the same level.

- H₃: A third party with reward power may be acceptable as an intermediary by the traditionally unfavored party even though perceived as biased.

The data on Egyptian perception of US policy and its acceptance of US mediation support this hypothesis. It accepted US mediation even though the US was perceived as negatively biased.

- H₄: A third party with reward power may be more acceptable as an intermediary to the traditionally unfavored party than to the traditionally favored party.

This hypothesis was not supported by the data on Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of US mediation. The difference between the percentages of acceptance for Egypt and Israel was statistically insignificant.

- H₅: A nation state's conflict behavior will be affected by the reciprocal behavior it receives from its opponent and by third party behavior as an ally cooperating with one side and conflicting with the other.

In the case of Egyptian conflict towards Israel, this hypothesis was partially supported during both the pre- and post-war periods. During the first, Egyptian conflict was influenced by Israeli conflict towards Egypt and by US cooperation with Israel. During the post-war period, Egyptian conflict was only affected by US conflict towards Egypt.

In the case of Israeli conflict towards Egypt, this hypothesis was partially supported, but only during the pre-war period when Israeli conflict was affected by both Egyptian conflict towards Israel and by US cooperation towards Israel.

H₆: A nation state's cooperative behavior will be affected by the reciprocal behavior it receives from its opponent and by third party behavior as an intermediary cooperating with both parties in conflict.

In the case of Egyptian cooperation with Israel, this hypothesis was partially supported, but only during the post-war period when Egyptian cooperation was affected by US cooperation with Israel.

In the case of Israeli cooperation with Egypt, the hypothesis was supported during both pre- and post-war periods; Israeli cooperation was affected by all three independent variables: (1) reciprocal behavior of opponent;

(2) third party cooperation with itself; and (3) third party cooperation with its opponent.

H₇: If a third party behaves as an ally, it will tend to increase the conflict behavior of the party with whom it is allied.

This hypothesis was not supported in the case of Israeli conflict towards Egypt. Its conflict during both the pre- and post-war periods did not increase as a result of US behavior as an ally.

H₈: If a third party behaves as an ally, it will tend to decrease the conflict behavior of the party against whom the alliance is directed.

This was partially supported, but only in the case of Egyptian conflict towards Israel during the pre-war period. During this period, Egyptian conflict decreased as US cooperation with its client (Israel) increased.

H₉: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to a party in conflict, the recipient will tend to increase its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.

This hypothesis was supported only in the case of Israeli cooperation towards Egypt during the pre- and post-war periods. Israel's cooperation with Egypt increased as US cooperation towards it increased.

- H₁₀: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to the traditionally favored party, the traditionally unfavored party will tend to increase its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.

Egyptian cooperation towards Israel supported this hypothesis, but only during the post-war period; Egyptian cooperation then increased as US cooperation towards Israel increased:

- H₁₁: If a third party behaves as an intermediary providing rewards to the traditionally unfavored party, the traditionally favored party will tend to decrease its cooperative behavior towards its opponent.

This hypothesis was supported only in case of Israeli cooperation towards Egypt during the post-war period. This decreased as US cooperation towards Egypt increased.

The hypotheses tested in this research were only tested in one case during a particular time period. These hypotheses need to be tested in other cases. However this study has pointed to areas in the theoretical literature that need further investigation. In analyzing the role of third parties in the management of conflict it has shown that while alliance behavior might decrease the conflict behavior of the protagonists, it is not a sufficient condition to prevent war with the increase in frustration of the traditionally unfavored party.

In analyzing the role of third parties in the resolution of conflict, this research has shown that while the third party did induce cooperation between the protagonists when it undertook the predominant role of an intermediary, the tests undertaken point to elements of instability in the system of

cooperation that have not been sufficiently developed in the theoretical literature. The traditionally favored party decreased its cooperation with its opponent as the third party cooperation with the opponent increased and the traditionally unfavored party increased its cooperation with the opponent only with increased third party cooperation towards the opponent. This study, however, has not analyzed the conditions under which the system of cooperation under such circumstances might break down; this is a question for future research.

A second question for future research relates to the protagonists' objectives and the extent to which changes in their objectives might facilitate an intermediary's role. We have not systematically analyzed here the protagonists' objectives nor the larger regional context within which this specific conflict has long been enmeshed.

The results of the regression estimates used in testing hypotheses 5 through 11 suggest two further considerations for future research on the impact of third party behavior on the behavior of protagonists in conflict.

a) Analysis needs to be devoted to the content of third party behavior before such tests are undertaken. This research has shown that the relevance of the ally and the intermediary models used in testing our hypotheses differed from the pre-war period (when the US behaved predominantly as an ally) as compared with the post-war period (when the US behaved predominantly as an intermediary).

b) A third party's behavior towards both protagonists should be taken into account when studying the impact of its behavior on the behavior of each of the protagonists towards the other. This research has shown that Egyptian behavior was influenced in most cases only by US behavior towards Israel. The research has also shown that Israeli behavior was not only influenced by US behavior towards Israel but also by US behavior towards Egypt.

APPENDIX I

CODEBOOK: US OBJECTIVES IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The purpose of this codebook is to provide instructions to identify and to code material about US objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Objectives are statements which answer the question "who" wants "what" located "where" "when" and "what" they want to do with it. These statements will be used to present a systematic analysis of the change in US objectives over time.

A third party's objectives in a conflict situation are related to four types of functions: protection, restoration, acquisition, and denial:

- (1) A third party may seek to protect, preserve or maintain a position or resource which is of importance to it. It may protect only that which one of the dyad already possesses or that which already exists (e.g., an existing pattern of relationship).
- (2) A third party may seek to restore an object which one of the parties possessed in the past but does not possess in the present. Restore may apply only to what one of the parties really did own in the past.
- (3) A third party may seek to acquire a position, or a pattern of dyadic relationship, which does not exist in a conflict situation now nor in the past.
- (4) A third party may seek to deny or deprive one of the parties in conflict of a position or an advantage which it seeks to achieve.¹

¹Legault *et al.* (1974) use these functions in relation to the objectives of the parties in conflict.

The task is to determine whether the documents studied contain material relevant to US objectives towards the peace process and core issues in the conflict (i.e., relating to the Palestinians, Egypt, Israel and the occupied territories).

SOURCE

The source for identifying relevant statements is the Department of State Bulletin, which contains an official weekly (starting 1978 monthly) record of US foreign policy. The source includes complete texts and extracts of speeches, interviews, press conferences...

IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

The theme is the coding unit. Read the source material and determine the number of themes. The following rules provide guidelines:

ACTOR

Identify only statements made by decision makers in the executive branch of government. Statements made by members of congress will not be included.

OBJECTIVES

1. Each objective must be explicitly articulated. Vague objectives, e.g., peace, should not be identified.

2. Do not identify a decision maker's description of his own past objectives. The interest is only in present objectives.

3. Each time an objective is stated it should be identified. One sentence may incorporate several objectives.

4. Certain key words will provide a guideline in identifying objectives. The kinds of words are the following (although the list is by no means exhaustive):

must	want	incumbent upon
ought	plan	have to
should	important to	desire to

5. If then phrases should not be identified as objectives.

6. Internal objectives should not be included (Legault *et al.*, 1974).

7.* Reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict is interpreted as reference to the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Do not code US explicit reference to the Israeli-Syrian conflict. Do not code US explicit reference to the Jordan-Israeli conflict except when the US objectives relating to core issues deal with the West Bank or Jerusalem.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS

<u>Column</u>	<u>Item</u>
1 - 2	<u>Source year:</u> 67 - 79
3 - 4	<u>Source month:</u> 1 - 12
5 - 6	<u>Source day:</u> 1 - 31
7 - 9	<u>Page:</u> (use page number)
10	<u>Column:</u> (1) a (2) b (3) c
11 - 12	<u>Year - Statement:</u> 67 - 78
13 - 14	<u>Month - Statement:</u> 1 - 12
15 - 16	<u>Day - Statement:</u> (use date the document was made public)
17 - 20	<u>Statement number</u>
21	<u>Type of Document:</u> (1) Speech/statement (2) Press conference/interview (3) Letter/message (4) Joint communique/statement (9) Other
22	<u>Actor:</u> (1) President (2) Vice-President (3) White House staff/spokesman (4) Foreign Minister (5) Defense Minister (6) Other ministers (7) Spokesman - military defence bureaucracy (8) Spokesman - foreign affairs bureaucracy (9) Government unspecified

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

ColumnItem

23

Audience:

- (1) Domestic - general
- (2) US organization - Jewish
- (3) Congress/congress members
- (4) UN and its agencies
- (5) Foreign politician or diplomat
- (6) Foreign audience - general
- (9) Other

24 - 25

Type I - US Objectives in the Peace Process:

This type refers to US objectives in the settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Only specific statements can give us a clear representation of US objectives. Vague statements such as "peace," "just settlement" do not give us a clear representation of US objectives in the peace process. In order to be consistent, and to minimize judgement, code only explicitly stated objectives according to the following:

- (11) Conflict management: This category involves statements which prefer protecting/acquiring the absence of military confrontation between the dyad. This category involves statements dealing with cease-fire, armistice, non-belligerency, balance of power, reduction of tension, exercise of restraint and arms race.
- (12) Conflict reduction: This category involves statements which advocate a step-by-step approach to solve the conflict and acquire implementation of the partial agreements that were undertaken, e.g., 6-point disengagement plan, Sinai I and Sinai II.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

<u>Column</u>	<u>Item</u>
24 - 25	<p>If a comprehensive settlement is mentioned in a document as an ultimate goal to be achieved in the future, but a step-by-step approach is advocated as the best alternative in the same document, code only (12) since it represents the priority of present US objectives on how the peace process should be governed.</p> <p>(13) <u>Comprehensive resolution</u>: This category includes statements seeking to acquire a comprehensive settlement, overall settlement, normalization of relations, peace treaty and acquiring the application of comprehensive settlement plans/resolutions, e.g., Johnson 5-point plan 1967, Resolution 242, Rogers' Plan 1969, Resolution 338, US-USSR Joint Statement of October 1, 1977, Camp David Accords of 1978, and also statements advocating the convening of the Geneva Conference. In case of reference to a particular plan/resolution as the priority in US current objectives, code this category (13) and also code the content of the plan/resolution on the related objectives specified in this codebook, e.g., acquire justice for the refugees, restore Arab territories...</p>

Type II - Core Issues in the Conflict:Palestine/Palestinians

- (21) acquire homeland/entity
- (22) acquire Palestinian federation with Jordan
- (23) acquire representation of the Palestinians in determining their future
- (24) acquire solution of Palestinian problem
- (25) acquire rights and legitimate concerns of the Palestinians
- (26) acquire justice for the refugees/restore civilian settlement in occupied territories

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

<u>Column</u>	<u>Item</u>
24 - 25	<u>Palestine/Palestinians (cont'd):</u> (27) deny dealing with Palestinian group/PLO/support for PLO/ recognition of PLO (28) deny Palestinian State/sovereignty for Palestinians <u>Egypt - Post-June 1967</u> <u>(occupied territory excluded)</u> (31) protect political independence and territorial integrity (32) protect security of/peace within ¹ (33) protect/restore UN forces in Sharm El Sheikh (34) protect/restore freedom of navigation in Aqaba Straits (35) protect/acquire freedom of navigation in Suez <u>Israel</u> (41) protect political independence and territorial integrity/acquire recog- nition of (42) protect security of/peace within <u>Arab Occupied Territory - Post-June 1967</u> (51) restore all occupied Arab territories (52) restore occupied Arab territories, but there is no specification that refer- ence is to all occupied Arab territories. Code under this category unless there is an explicit reference to all Arab territories (53) restore all Egyptian territory (54) restore part of Sinai (55) restore West Bank/Gaza but no refer- ence to all

¹Categories (31) and (32) were included since some statements indicated that the US is seeking the political independence, territorial integrity and security of all nations in the area. These objectives were coded once in relation to Egypt and a second time in relation to Israel.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

<u>Colum</u>	<u>Item</u>
24 - 25	<u>Arab occupied territory (cont'd)</u>
	(56) restore freedom of navigation in Aqaba
	(57) acquire demilitarized zones
	(58) deny unilateral action on Jerusalem
	(59) acquire unification of Jerusalem
	(60) protect religious rights of three religions in Jerusalem
	(61) deny return of pre-June 1967 status of Jerusalem
	(62) deny settlements in occupied terri- tories - general
	(63) deny settlements on West Bank
	(64) deny settlements in Sinai

APPENDIX II

CODEBOOK: EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICY

The purpose of this codebook is to provide instructions to identify and code materials about Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy. Perceptions refer to statements which answer the question "who" believes "what" about "whom" and "when."

The task is to determine whether the documents studied contain material relevant to the cognitive and/or affective dimensions of US policy as outlined by Egyptian and Israeli decision makers. The cognitive dimension of one's view contains those attributes seen as objective characteristics independent of one's own subjective judgement about them, e.g., Sadat says: "The US is giving phantoms to Israel." The affective component includes evaluation, liking or disliking for a particular policy. Example, Sadat says: "US policy is harming the Egyptian cause." We seek to identify and to code Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of US policy towards the dyad and other actors, its contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East conflict and its capability to solve the Middle East conflict.

SOURCE

The source for identifying relevant statements is the British Broadcasting Corporation Monitor, Part IV, on the Middle East and Africa. Section A of this daily publication contains broadcasts of speeches, statements, interviews, and press conferences by decision makers. However, be sure to check Sections D and E since sometimes they contain broadcasts on special events that took place and are related to the Middle East: e.g., Sadat's speech at the Algiers Non-alignment Conference.

IDENTIFYING INSTRUCTIONS

The theme is the coding unit. Read the source material and determine the number of themes. The following rules provide guidelines.

Actors

We are only interested in statements made by decision makers in the executive branch of government. Statements made by members of the legislatures or non-government groups will not be included.

Target of Perceived Policy

1. If there is a change in target of perceived policy, we have a new theme. Exception to this is when the reference is to Arabs, Arab progressives, and Egypt: e.g., Sadat says:

"US wants to destroy the Arabs and Egypt." We have only one theme since Egypt is part of the Arab world to which he is referring. If, however, the reference was to Arab reactionaries and Egypt, then we would have two themes since Egypt is not regarded by its decision makers as part of Arab reactionaries.

2. If reference is to one target, do not infer its perceived impact on another. If Sadat says: "US is aiding Israel," we have here only one theme. Do not infer that this implies a perception of a negative policy towards the Arabs. If, on the other hand, Sadat says: "US aid to Israel makes it a partner in the aggression against the Arabs," then we have two themes: US aids Israel and US adopts an aggressive policy towards the Arabs.

3. If an Egyptian decision maker refers to the target of perceived policy as "us," interpret this as Egypt unless he is speaking to an audience in another Arab country or outlining a position at an Arab meeting whether bilateral or multilateral, and there is no reference that he is speaking about Egypt alone. In this case, "us" would be interpreted as Arab.

Perceived Policy

1. We are interested here in US government policy, reference to US media or US domestic groups will not be included.
2. Reference to the policy of Western countries will be interpreted as reference to US policy.
3. Reference to imperialism by Egyptian decision makers are to be interpreted as reference to US.
4. Do not identify as separate statements the explanation of a particular theme. For example, if a statement says: "US supports Israel by giving it aid and backing at the UN," here we have only one theme. However, the repetition of a theme should be identified every time it is stated. If Sadat says in a speech: "US supports Israel" five times, there are five themes. We are interested in the frequency of reference to a particular theme provided they are not used as a detailed explanation of one particular theme.
5. If there is a change in perceived policy, we have a new theme.
6. Do not include reference to US policy before January 1967. We are only interested in the period January 1967 - December 1978. Reference to past US policy (after 1967) is included unless it is indicated that this policy has changed. Here we would only be interested in the reference

to the changed aspect: e.g., if Nasser said in 1969: "US policy has been completely hostile to the Arabs in 1967," we have one theme on US hostility towards the Arabs. If Sadat said in 1974: "US policy was completely hostile to the Arabs in 1967, but is now friendly," we have one theme on US friendliness to the Arabs.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS

<u>Column</u>	<u>Item</u>
1 - 4	<u>Source - issue number</u> (use actual number)
5	<u>Section number</u> (1) A (2) D (3) E
6 - 7	<u>Page number</u> (use actual page number)
8 - 9	<u>Paragraph number</u> (number paragraphs on each page separately. Title of documents and broadcasts should not be counted as paragraphs. First paragraph is identified as number one even if not indented. In case of interviews, both questions and answers are counted as separate paragraphs).

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

<u>Column</u>	<u>Item</u>
10 - 11	<u>Year of statement:</u> 67 - 78
12 - 13	<u>Month of statement:</u> 1 - 12
14 - 15	<u>Day of statement:</u> Code day identified by the BBC for the broadcast of the speech interview
16 - 19	<u>Statement number</u>
20	<u>Data set number:</u> (1) Egypt (2) Israel
21	<u>Type of Document:</u> (1) Speech/statement (2) Press conference/interview (3) Message/letter (4) Joint communique/statement (9) Others
22	<u>Audience:</u> (1) Domestic audience - general (2) Legislative (3) UN and its agencies (4) Foreign politicians or diplomats (5) Foreign audience - general (6) Armed Forces (9) Others
23	<u>Actor:</u> (1) Head of State (2) Head of Government (3) Foreign Minister (4) Defence Minister (5) Other Cabinet minister (6) Spokesman from military defense bureaucracy (7) Spokesman from foreign affairs bureaucracy (8) Government unspecified

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

<u>Column</u>	<u>Item</u>
24	<u>Target of perceived policy:</u> ¹ (1) Egypt (2) Israel (3) Palestine/Palestinian (4) Arab reactionaries (5) Arab progressives (6) Arabs (7) PLO (8) Middle East conflict
25 - 26	<u>US Policy towards the dyad and other relevant actors</u> (11) <u>Positive:</u> Code here statements which indicate that the US policy is supportive of, friendly to, sympathetic with, allied with, giving aid to, partial to, guaranteeing sovereignty of, not applying pressure on... (12) <u>Negative:</u> Code here statements which indicate that the US policy lacks sufficient action, to doubtful, ignoring, deceptive, applying pressure, dominating, aggressive, destructive...

¹In the analyses, Egypt, Arabs and Arab progressives are aggregated to represent perceptions of US policy towards Egypt.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd)

ColumnItem

25 - 26

US contribution to peace/stability in
the Middle East conflict(21) US contributes to peace/stability:

Code here statements which indicate that US policy is contributing to the avoidance of military, confrontation, to conflict reduction or to comprehensive settlement.

(22) US not contributing to peace/stability:

Code here statements which indicate that US policy is encouraging tensions in the area, not seeking or aiming at any contribution to conflict resolution, adopting general or specific policies that make conflict resolution more difficult.

US capability to solve the Middle East
conflict(31) Can solve:

Code here statements which indicate that the US can solve the conflict/has capability to put pressure on the opponent.

(32) Cannot solve:

Code here statements which indicate that the US cannot solve the conflict nor put pressure on opponent.

APPENDIX III

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242¹

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concerns with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
 - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
 - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. *Affirms further* the necessity
 - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
 - (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
 - (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

¹November 22, 1967.

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

APPENDIX IV

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338¹

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

¹October 22, 1973.

APPENDIX V

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 340¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338(1973) and 339(1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338(1973) and 339(1973);

5. *Requests* all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338(1973) and 339(1973).

¹October 25, 1973.

APPENDIX VI
(A) TRANSFORMATION OF THE OUTLIERS
January 1967 - September 1973

QUARTER	VARIABLE	ORIGINAL VALUE	TRANSFORMED VALUE
April-June 1967	Israel conflict toward Egypt	3440	3148
	US cooperation toward Egypt	138	98
	US conflict toward Egypt	470	90
	US conflict toward Israel	159	103
July-September 1967	Israel cooperation toward Egypt	92	86
October-December 1967	US cooperation toward Egypt	100	97
January-March 1970	Israel conflict toward Egypt	3313	3147
April-June 1970	Israel conflict toward Egypt	3455	3149
July-September 1970	US cooperation toward Israel	228	204
October-December 1970	Egypt cooperation toward Israel	68	61
January-March 1971	Egypt cooperation toward Israel	94	62
	Israel cooperation toward Egypt	132	87

APPENDIX VI (cont'd)

(B) TRANSFORMATION OF THE OUTLIERS

January 1974 - December 1978

QUARTER	VARIABLE	ORIGINAL VALUE	TRANSFORMED VALUE
January-March 1974	Egypt conflict toward Israel	387	200
	Israel conflict toward Egypt	628	160
April-June 1974	US cooperation toward Egypt	325	296
	US conflict toward Egypt	35	31
	US cooperation toward Israel	352	282
July-September 1977	US conflict toward Israel	227	164
January-March 1978	Israel cooperation toward Egypt	160	156
April-June 1978	US conflict toward Egypt	34	30
July-September 1978	Egypt cooperation toward Israel	169	153
	Israel cooperation toward Egypt	165	157

APPENDIX VII

WAR

(B) CORRELATION MATRIX - January 1974 - December 1978

[illegible]

APPENDIX VII (cont'd)
CORRELATION MATRICES (A) & (B)*

EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES

- 1 Egypt cooperative behavior towards Israel
- 2 Egypt conflict behavior toward Israel
- 3 Israel cooperative behavior toward Egypt
- 4 Israel conflict behavior toward Egypt
- 5 US cooperative behavior toward Egypt
- 6 US conflict behavior toward Egypt
- 7 US cooperative behavior toward Israel
- 8 US conflict behavior toward Israel
- 9 Egypt cooperative behavior toward Israel
lagged one quarter
- 10 Egypt conflict behavior toward Israel
lagged one quarter
- 11 Israel cooperative behavior toward Egypt
lagged one quarter
- 12 Israel conflict behavior toward Egypt
lagged one quarter
- 13 US conflict behavior toward Egypt
lagged one quarter
- 14 US conflict behavior toward Israel
lagged one quarter
- 15 US cooperative behavior toward Egypt
lagged one quarter
- 16 US cooperative behavior toward Israel
lagged one quarter

*(A) - January 1967 - September 1973

(B) - January 1974 - December 1978

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