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**TOWARDS THE HOLLOW SOCIETY?
GLOBAL ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND
THE (RE)CASUALIZATION OF LABOUR IN CANADA**

by

DAVE BROAD, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

October 11, 1993

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TOWARDS THE HOLLOW SOCIETY:
GLOBAL ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND
THE (RE)CASUALIZATION OF LABOUR IN CANADA

submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation offers an explanation for the increase in part-time work and other forms of casual labour in Canada and other developed capitalist countries in recent years. Using an historical materialist world-systems analysis, the study sets the seeming anomaly of increasing casual labour against a global history of proletarianization. A central argument of the study is that it is not the prevalence of casual labour that should be questioned, so much as the extent of full-time proletarian labour.

Historical evidence reveals that proletarianization of labour under capitalism has been more limited than is often assumed. Capital has always made use of various forms of casual labour throughout the world-economy. The real extent of proletarianization was exaggerated by unqualified acceptance of theories developed by Marx and others regarding the centrality of proletarian labour under capitalism; and by the important political successes of the proletariat itself in organizing into trade unions and political parties in the 19th and 20th Centuries, to demand social rights and better conditions of life and labour.

The importance of the theories of proletarianization and of workers' political successes gave the labour markets of developed countries what might be called a proletarian logic. This logic restricted capital's ability to control labour markets and labour processes. Consequently, capital has shaped and used new

technologies to restructure the international division of labour in recent decades. Included in this restructuring is the drive to weaken organized labour through expansion of the global reserve army of labour and repolarization of labour markets in the centre. An important element of this restructuring is a shift away from capital's dependence on full-time proletarian labour towards more use of casual labour. More generally, there is a move away from the proletarian logic in formal labour markets to a logic of casual labour. This shift is referred to here as the (re)casualization of labour.

This dissertation presents an analysis of the background and current processes of (re)casualization of labour, as well as the effects of (re)casualization on Canadian society in general. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the prospects for progressive social change in Canada.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW:

GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND CASUAL LABOUR

The automation and global restructuring of manufacturing is hollowing out employment overall, is relocating labour-intensive mass production to the Third World and, in North America, is creating a new manufacturing model characterized by flexible manufacturing in large-scale multi-purpose facilities run by fewer, more technically flexible and more highly skilled employees.

- Heather Menzies

Among the singular events that U.S. dailies and broadcasts have considered newsworthy in the last three years is a large number of plant closings in traditional industrial communities, reducing union membership, increasing willingness of organized labor to grant concessions or accept wage cuts from employers, and the revival of sweatshops, homework, and the so-called underground economy. Even more visible has been the attention given to advanced technology as a radical transformer of social life. What links these phenomena, making them distinct features of our times?

- Maria Patricia Fernandez K.

1.1 Introduction and Thesis Statement

Capitalism is full of interesting contradictions. From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution workers fought for shorter working hours. In various countries, labour struggles which brought the 8 or 9 hour day were seen as great triumphs. "Working hours in the developed capitalist nations dropped by almost half from 1850 to 1950, largely as a result of labor's recurrent struggles for shorter

work time" (Moody, 1992: 51).¹ And in many of these nations one in five workers is now classified as part time. Yet, at the same time, official statistics in the United States show an increase in working hours for the average full-time worker over the last couple of decades (Moody, 1992). In Canada, the average work week has dropped to 37 hours. But this average masks the fact that average hours for full-time jobs have remained at 42 hours per week since 1975. Of course, the 42 hour average for all full-timers masks a range of schedules. And the lower general average for all jobs results from the dramatic increase in part-time employment in recent decades.²

The argument of this dissertation is that there is an underlying process of structural transformation which produces these outcomes. They are part of attempts by global capital to renew capital accumulation by reasserting control

¹In most accounts, "labour's struggles" is a term which refers to struggles of the organized labour movement through its trade unions and political parties. In that definition, "labour" is generally assumed to be synonymous with the "working class" or the "proletariat". In the marxian sense, the proletariat is the class made up of those who own no means of production and are forced to sell their labour-power to the bourgeoisie, or capital, for a wage -- hence the common term "wage-labour". Marx and Engels saw the proletariat very much in a political sense. The proletariat existed only in relation to the bourgeoisie. And, according to A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Bottomore, 1983): "For Marx and Engels the working class, engaged in a struggle with the bourgeoisie, was the political force which would accomplish the destruction of capitalism and a transition to socialism - 'the class to which the future belongs' (Marx, Preface to the *Enquete Ouvriere* 1880)." For heuristic purposes, this dissertation begins by defining a hypothetical "proletariat" as full-time wage-labour, employed by capital. Part-time wage-labour is defined as "semi-proletarian" labour (see Note 27 below). "Non-proletarian" labour includes categories such as slaves, peasants, or forms of casual labour which may or may not enter the circuit of capital, depending on the circumstance.

²Statistics Canada, Historical Labour Force Statistics 1992, Catalogue 71-201. Moody (1992: 51) contends that "the increase in overtime, double or multiple job holding, and super-long hours of some professional workers off-set the impact of the 'contingent' [casual] workforce" on working hours. Statistics Canada defines part-time work as paid employment of less than 30 hours per week. This is the definition used in this thesis. See Glossary and Table 7.1 for a more complete definition of part-time work.

over labour markets and labour processes -- control which had been weakened through a history of trade union and labour-party led class struggles, which gave Western workers more power in both the economic and political realms (Abendroth, 1972; Arrighi, 1990; Palmer, 1992).³ To regain control over labour-power, capital has undertaken a number of initiatives, including globalization of production,⁴ technological changes, degradation of labour, (re)casualization of labour,⁵ feminization of labour, informalization of production, and promotion of neo-liberal state policies designed to weaken the labour movement.⁶ One U.S. statesman even referred to the "zapping" of labour (Ackerman, 1982; Harrison & Bluestone, 1988). But these initiatives are usually dressed in more palatable guise. In the workplace we have heard much about "quality of working life"

³I will leave aside for the moment the extent to which these two "realms" can be treated as separate.

We should note, however, that the literature on sociology of work is rife with sometimes confusing interchange of the concepts "work" and "labour". At one level, the two can be interchanged if we are talking about the immediate process of production -- the combination of human labour-power with tools and resources to create some good or service. But labour is also used in a more general sense -- as a noun to refer to a social class, and as an adjective to discuss the labour movement, labour force, labour markets, labour relations, labour power, labour process, et cetera. We get, then, a particular use of the term labour as work, and a general usage referring to the class of workers -- proletarians -- and all of the processes and problems that relate to their actions and interactions. My focus in this thesis is not strictly labour as work, but labour in the more general and inclusive sense. So, in referring to the degradation, feminization, and casualization of labour, I mean to discuss these as processes that are affecting both the world of work, and changes in the labour force(s) in social class terms.

⁴See Glossary for definitions of terms and concepts used throughout the thesis.

⁵British researchers refer to a "casualization of labour" when they talk about recent increases in part-time work, self-employment, industrial homework, et cetera in the formal labour markets of developed capitalist countries (see, e.g., Mitter, 1986; Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987). Since, as noted below and in Chapter II, casual labour and capital's use of it is not new, I would argue that the term casualization needs to be qualified. My particular use of the term "(re)casualization of labour" is discussed on page 5 below.

⁶The combination of these initiatives will be elaborated in the following chapters. See also Frobel et al. (1980), Kolko (1988) and Marchak (1991).

(QWL) and "teamwork" programs (Parker, 1985; Parker & Slaughter, 1988; Wells, 1986; 1987). At the level of government, neo-liberals⁷ preach about getting the nanny state off our backs and promoting various freedoms -- free enterprise, free markets, free trade and, to make the whole package acceptable to a citizenry who has been acclimatized to two centuries of liberal ideology, individual freedom. But, as we will see, in capitalist societies some individuals have more freedom to take advantage of opportunities than others.

My particular concern in this dissertation is to situate what I call the (re)casualization of labour in the context of global restructuring. As is elaborated below and in the next chapter, I use the term "(re)casualization of labour" as a political concept to refer to a shift in the logic of formal labour markets in developed capitalist countries, since roughly 1970. More than a century of working-class struggles through trade unions and labour parties led to improved conditions of labour for the proletariat (full-time, wage-labour), and added a degree of regularity to labour markets in centre states of the world-economy. Labour's struggles gave what might be called a "proletarian logic" to the labour market, resulting in a sort of decasualization of labour. More recently, in attempts to renew accumulation, capital has taken to replacing proletarian labour with casual forms of labour in centre states, to undermine the strength of organ-

⁷I use the term "neo-liberal" here to refer to current political-economic practices based on the notion of free-market capitalism à la Adam Smith's (1776) "invisible hand" of the market. These practices are sometimes referred to as "neo-conservative", given that they have been pushed by Tory governments in Britain, Canada and the United States, but the affinity with classical liberalism makes neo-liberal the more apt term.

ized labour. Most important, however, is not the replacement of proletarian labour with casual labour here or there, but the drive to apply the logic of casual labour to the labour market overall -- to increase competition between workers through what amounts to resuscitation of the reserve army of unemployed and underemployed (see Chapter II). This is what I mean by (re)casualization. I use the prefix "re" here in parentheses to signal both my qualified interpretation of the process of casualization⁸ -- that casual labour *per se* is nothing new, and that capital's use of casual labour is nothing new.

I began the thesis with an interest in part-time work. The debate over part-time work focuses on both the causes and character of this sort of work. Part of its qualification as both a social problem and a sociological issue, in addition to its rapid growth (see Chapter VII), has to do with whether part-time jobs are "good jobs" or "bad jobs". The short answer is that part-time jobs are both. The Globe and Mail sometimes runs advertisements for part-time employment for middle-level professionals, in health care for example, where the working conditions and remuneration are not considered "exploitative", using the (non-marxian) street sense of that term. And certain countries, such as Sweden, because of a history of strong unions and social-democratic politics, provide legislation and cultural conditions that make part-time work more attractive (see Sundstrom, 1987; and Chapter VII).

⁸See also Note 5 above.

Unfortunately, the working conditions of the majority of part-time and other casual workers throughout the world are not attractive. This can be taken as a given for most workers in the Third World. But the non-union, low-wage, insecure labour market status of most part-timers in the First World has earned their work the label of "bad jobs" as well. Both independent Canadian research (e.g., White, 1983) and a major Canadian Government commission investigating part-time work (Labour Canada, 1983) have found part-time workers often saying they feel "exploited". This feeling, given the material conditions upon which it is based (see Chapters VI and VII) is a logical consequence of the socio-economic restructuring which incorporates the (re)casualization of labour.

In government jargon the new labour market conditions result in what is called "the contingent economy" (Belous, 1989), and "contingent" or "non-standard" employment (ECC, 1990; 1991; Krahn, 1992). Webster's New World Dictionary defines "contingent" as "happening by chance; accidental; fortuitous ...; dependent (on or upon something uncertain); conditional". The term might therefore be appropriate, because it signals the precariousness of the forms of work in question, though I think the better term is "casual" labour. The term "non-standard" is derived from the assumption that full-time wage-labour is the standard form of work. The data presented below suggests that this assumption should be questioned, both historically (see Chapters III and IV), and under current conditions.

What interested me most when I started my research was the question of why there has been such an increase in part-time and other so-called contingent

labour in the developed countries in the post-World War II era. I found no satisfactory general explanation. To be sure, there are plenty of starts at an explanation.⁹ The most common see the phenomenon as a reflex of the growth of the service economy and/or the increase in numbers of women entering formal employment. It seemed to me that these factors might constitute elements of an explanation, but there must be more to it than this. After all, the service economy is not strictly a post-World War II phenomenon, and while family responsibilities might make part-time work a preferred option for many women, this is not sufficient reason for employers -- especially private capital -- to increase its use of part-time workers. While individuals may think they choose part-time work for personal reasons (a fallacy of the liberal notion of choice), the part-time option is itself the product of larger economic, political, and social processes (cf. Duffy and Pupo, 1992). The changes affecting labour markets and labour processes have led some authors to bid farewell to the working class (Gorz, 1982), and led others to speak of a "new" proletariat (Mitter, 1986).¹⁰ But I find the picture to be more complex than either of these scenarios allow.

I decided to attempt a general explanation for the increase in part-time work. Having steeped myself in historical materialism and world-systems analysis, I determined that any general explanation must be both historical and global (see Chapter II). As a result, I began to consider the place of the post-World War II

⁹For a survey of these arguments, see Duffy and Pupo (1992).

¹⁰Mitter's "new proletariat" simply broadens the definition of the proletariat to include more than full-time wage-labour. See Note 1 above.

increase in part-time labour against a longer history of expanding full-time labour (proletarianization),¹¹ in the context of a world capitalist system. My study led me to distinguish the forces underlying proletarianization from those supporting part-time and other forms of casual labour. These forms of labour are not new, but they have taken on a contemporary importance. This is, no doubt, partly because they are being counted in official statistics, and because they are being recognized and fought over through labour and gender struggles.

My conclusion is that it is perhaps not the growth of part-time labour, but that of full-time proletarian labour which should be considered more problematic over the five centuries of a capitalist world-system. This conclusion flies in the face of many existing orthodoxies, but is congruent with a world-systems view of what Wallerstein (1983) calls "historical capitalism", and Amin (1989) refers to as "actually existing capitalism". In this light, the post-World War II increase in part-time labour in the formal economy should not be seen as abnormal in the time-space of historical capitalism. My dissertation, then, is not a study of part-time labour *per se*, so much as a study of the historical-global forces producing here casual and there proletarian forms of labour. I argue that this is a dialectical process led by class struggles, which sometimes throw the weight of history to the side of casualization of labour, and sometimes to the side of proletarianization of labour, with neither being a straightforward process.

¹¹As the term might suggest, "proletarianization" refers to the historical process whereby more and more of the labouring population is transformed into full-time wage-labour. A central argument of this thesis is that the process has been more limited than is generally assumed.

In this thesis I situate part-time work as an instance of capital's standard use of casual labour in the accumulation process. Since the Industrial Revolution in Britain, proletarian labour has come to be expected as the standard form by which capital appropriates labour-power. My argument is that proletarian labour may be seen as the paradigmatic form of labour under the capitalist mode of production (see below). But a journey through the space and time of historical capitalism shows proletarian labour to be by no means exclusive (see Chapters III and VI). As Marx (1867) tells us, capital takes labour as it finds it, with all the peculiarities of nation, race and gender. So, contrary to much current thinking, I will argue that, under actually existing capitalism, part-time labour is not "non-standard" but, given the particular circumstance, fits the norm of capital's appropriation of labour-power in forms most convenient for accumulation and control of labour. This leads to an explanation of the current (re)casualization of labour in terms of an historical rise and fall in capital's appropriation of labour-power in varying forms, given the dialectics of class struggle.

My thesis challenges the common assumptions of both marxian and bourgeois social scientists about the place of proletarian labour and proletarianization of labour in the history of capitalism. The common marxian view is one based on Marx's (1867) theoretical depiction of capitalism in Capital. There capitalism is presented in abstract form, with pure proletarian labour seen as the predominant form of labour under the capitalist mode of production. In this scenario, proletarianization of labour is conceived as an almost natural process --

with proletarian labour coming to replace all other forms of labour.¹² But Amin (1977b), Thompson (1978) and others have criticized many marxians for too much reading Capital, and not enough reading "capitalism". Their point is that the historical reality is much less straightforward than the theoretical assumptions allow -- that capitalism has never existed in pure form.

It must be noted, as well, that bourgeois writers have stumbled at the same point as marxians, viewing labour other than full-time wage-labour as "non-standard" -- to use the term now in vogue in state-sector writing. Why have so many analysts fallen prey to this assumption? I would argue that it is, first, the theoretical importance that has been accorded to the proletariat, not just by Marx and Engels, but by the classical political economists; and, second, the political successes of the proletariat at organizing into trade unions and political parties to further their interests and gain social rights. In the schema of Marx and Engels, the proletariat was to be the agent of destruction of capitalism and creation of socialism.¹³ This is not how history has unfolded to date (Arrighi, 1990), but proletarian organizations have wrought significant changes to the system nonetheless. Proletarian political successes have elevated the role and status of the proletariat to match its status in theory.

Despite its limitations, it must be said that proletarianization has been an immensely important process in that it entails the historical formation of a new

¹²We should note, however, that Marx's overall discussion of actually existing capitalism is quite nuanced.

¹³See Note 1 above.

class of "free" wage-labourers.¹⁴ Proletarianization is also important for its dispossession of non-proletarian labourers from their means of production and reproduction,¹⁵ as through enclosure of peasant lands (see Chapter III). But having said this, we must still remember that there has been an overreading of the proletarianization process that leads to dangerous political conclusions. One is that proletarian labour is always capital's preferred form of labour when, in fact, capital has historically availed itself of the form(s) of labour found to be most politically and economically expedient (Crow and Thorpe, 1988). Another dangerous conclusion is that political organizing against capital(ism) should be based primarily on the proletariat, with other forms of labour playing only a subsidiary role. We should know, by now, the pitfalls of that assumption, which has led to all forms of divide and conquer in capital's struggle against labour (broadly defined).

My thesis, then, is based on a qualified acceptance of Marx and Engels' theorizing on proletarianization, which is sometimes overdrawn for political reasons, but more nuanced in the overall corpus of their work. Braverman (1974: 24) captures this more nuanced sense when he states: "The term 'working class,'

¹⁴Marx always qualified his use of the term "free" to indicate that the proletarian, unlike the peasant or slave, was free of extra-economic coercion. But the proletarian was seen to be unfree in the sense that absence of work implied starvation. Hence Marx sometimes spoke of "wage-slavery".

¹⁵"Reproduction", as used in the marxian schema, refers to the reproduction of the capitalist production process overall (see Bottomore, 1983). In the literature on domestic labour, reproduction refers to the process of supplying the needs of the household unit and, under capitalism, reproducing labour-power through provision of labourers' sustenance and the biological reproduction of the next generation of labourers. As a result of the gender division of labour in society, most of this domestic labour is supplied by women. For the purposes of this thesis, reproduction refers to domestic labour.

properly understood, never precisely delineated a specific body of people, but was rather an expression for an ongoing social process". With that understanding of the process of proletarianization, I make two essential points in my thesis: (1) proletarian labour is the theoretical norm under capitalism, but has not been the historical, global standard because capitalism is never constituted in its purity; and (2) in centre states of the world-system where proletarian labour did become the theoretical standard, since the 1960s we find (re)casualization of labour as part of a global economic restructuring. My dissertation offers an explanation for the process of global restructuring, and for the (re)casualization of labour as an ingredient of that process. Hence, the increase in part-time work is explained not simply as a reflex of the expansion of the service sector, or of women's post-World War II (re)entry into formal wage-labour, but as tied to capital's global restructuring directed at renewal of capital accumulation.

I follow Marx and Engels' understanding that how capitalism works and how important social change occurs is based on a thesis of social polarization. This does not make capitalism unlike other class-based social formations. But capitalism has its own characteristics. Under capitalism social polarization is based on capital's need to exploit labour to make profits and thereby accumulate capital. This leads to social polarization within nation-states. It also leads to a global polarization between imperialist centre and dependent peripheral states. But under 20th Century monopoly capitalism, profit rates have declined because

of class struggles and concomitant technological changes (see Chapter II), and societies at the centre of the world-economy experienced a relative depolarization.

My explanation for the (re)casualization of labour has four components:

- (1) Through class struggles coming out of the Industrial Revolution, proletarian labour had, by the 20th Century, gained rights and higher standards of living from increased wages and welfare state benefits.
- (2) Labour's hard-won rights and benefits gave the proletariat strength as a class, thus impinging upon capital's ability to dictate relations of production and maintain high profits.
- (3) To weaken labour and renew profitability capital has undertaken a program of global restructuring since the 1960s, which is oriented towards altering labour markets and the organization of work, and is producing a repolarization of centre societies.
- (4) One aspect of global restructuring, and an element in social repolarization, is the trend towards weakening full-time proletarian labour and cutting labour costs through substitution of forms of casual labour -- thus what I call the (re)casualization of labour (cf. Menzies, 1989: 203-7).

To develop my explanation I present evidence which allows for analysis of the historical and current trends underlying the (re)casualization of labour. In Chapter II, I outline the conceptual framework and theoretical arguments on which my analysis is based. In Chapter III, I discuss the general historical trends affecting expansion of proletarian versus casual forms of labour in the classic

British case. In Chapter IV, I present a similar outline of Canadian history. In both cases I compare the common view of a sort of mechanical unfolding of proletarianization to an alternate view that comes from recent feminist and world-systems historical research. This recent research questions the often too simplistic assumptions which overlook the history of capital's complex mixing of proletarian and non-proletarian labour, both for production of commodities and reproduction of labour-power.

In Chapter V, I turn to a discussion of current global economic transformations which are undermining the political power of proletarian labour where it had gained importance, which is mainly in the developed countries, thus paving the way for social repolarization and a (re)casualization of labour. This global restructuring entails what some researchers call a "new international division of labour" (NIDL), which includes important changes in the operations of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the role played by states in the accumulation process.

In Chapter VI, I shift from a discussion focused mainly at the global level to a focus on the national level to show national trends which are contributing to social repolarization and supporting a (re)casualization of labour in Canada. The most important national trends discussed are: (1) the shift from a so-called Fordist to a flexible regime of capital accumulation; (2) the continuing growth of the service economy and movement of the majority of workers from goods production to service employment; and (3) the accelerated (re)entry of women

into the ranks of formal employ in the post-World War II era.¹⁶ These national trends are not exclusive to Canada, but for each country they have particular characteristics coloured by that country's history and mode of insertion into the world-economy.

In Chapter VII, I summarize accounts of current trends in labour markets in centre states of the world-economy, to provide a comparative context for my analysis of the casual labour market in Canada, showing how it has expanded in the post-World War II period, and noting current trends and conditions of labour in the casual labour market. Then, on the basis of evidence concerning the current restructuring presented in Chapters V, VI, and VII, I devote the concluding section of Chapter VII to discussion of the relation of (re)casualization to the continuing degradation of labour (Braverman, 1974). In my final chapter, Chapter VIII, I discuss options for improving the conditions of labour in Canada. I give particular attention to the situation of casual labourers, and to alternatives to the current neo-liberal restructuring which can, for heuristic purposes, be labelled social democratic and socialist, respectively.

1.2 Summary of the Argument

My dissertation might be called "revisionist history". As a work of synthesis, it integrates old and new historical data with data on contemporary labour

¹⁶I place the prefix "re" in parentheses, in referring to women's (re)entry into formal employ after World War II, to stress that many women never left formal employ, and the so-called informal economic activities of women should not be seen as separate from the formal economy (see Chapter III and IV).

market transformations to offer a novel explanation for the (re)casualization of labour. In so doing, I present an alternative view of the historical process of proletarianization. Rather than suggesting that once wage-labour begins it simply spreads through the labour market,¹⁷ I follow certain feminists and world-systems theorists in arguing that there has always been a mix of proletarian and casual labour, but the latter has, along with the so-called informal economy,¹⁸ been missed in the official purview of historians, social scientists, and governments, not to mention trade unions. The reason that casual labour has so often been overlooked, for the last century at least, is because most analyses of labour to date have been so partial, in their historical and/or global extent. And the partialities have related to narrow definitions that have prevented most observers from seeing the whole, even as it continued to be fought over -- in class, national, racial, and gender terms. The whole was hidden by separation of what have come to be called the "formal" and "informal" spheres, or economies. Wage-labour, eventually regulated by the state, and done primarily by males, came to constitute the formal sphere. This was defined as "work", along with directly market-oriented self-employment. Labour that was not directly tied to the capitalist market was not "work". It held lower status, was unregulated, and primarily the

¹⁷See, for example, Howlett and Ramesh's (1992: 175ff) discussion of the expansion of wage-labour in Canada.

¹⁸The "informal economy" can be defined simply to include economic activities that escape the official circuits of capital as sanctioned by the state -- i.e., it includes a wide spectrum of paid, unpaid and illegal activities. This should not lead us to conclude, however, that informal activities are separate from the real circuits of capital, which incorporate such things as domestic labour in reproducing labour-power, and non-market production of goods which can enter the commodity circuit (see below and Broad, 1991).

labour of women and racially oppressed peoples. Where it is part of the circuit of capital, this labour has often been done on a casual basis. Casual labour is at the intersection of the formal and informal economies (Broad, 1991). My theoretical-historical conceptualization of this intersection is further spelled out in Chapter II.

In Chapters III and IV, I trace the history of proletarianization of labour in Britain and Canada. I find some historians arguing that the process took off in Britain at the dawn of the capitalist world-system in the early 1500s. And there is plenty of literature suggesting a steady growth of proletarian labour through periods of enclosure and concomitant urbanization, on to the Industrial Revolution (e.g., Mandel, 1973). I grant that there has been an historical growth of proletarian labour, especially in the capitalist centres. But, as feminist historians and world-systems analysts have shown, the capitalist world has continued to be populated by sizeable casual labour forces, in centre and periphery. I draw on the data of these feminist historians and others to argue that, in both Britain and Canada, casual labour has always played an important role in the accumulation of capital, often in forms of what Marx (1867) called the reserve army of labour (see Chapter II). But this has not always been apparent for three main reasons. First, many researchers, along with general publics in the North, have missed the fact that capitalism is a world-system -- i.e. much of the casual labour has been hidden on the periphery of the system.¹⁹

¹⁹See Amin (1976) on the global reserve army of labour.

Second, while the growth of proletarian labour has been steady, casual labour has come and gone in varying forms in various sectors of economies, and in changing combination with full-time wage labour. Sometimes non-proletarian labour appears to be disappearing as it fades from leading sectors of the economy, but it always seems to reappear in new or declining sectors. We see this, for example, if we follow the trajectory of the textile industry in Britain, then globally (Petras, 1992). The third reason that proletarian labour has been overemphasized in the general history of labour markets and work, is that the separation of formal and informal spheres of the capitalist economy has left certain types of labour hidden from view. Very important here is the non-waged work of women, in both reproduction of labour-power and "informal" production of goods that find their way to the capitalist market.

The domesticization of women that comes out of the Industrial Revolution leaves many women "hidden in the household" (Fox, 1980),²⁰ and obscures the fact that their labours, though informal, are essential for the continuation of the capitalist accumulation process. But the formal relegation of many women to the home also obscured the fact that, for working-class women especially, this was only a partial relegation. I present evidence in Chapters III and IV to argue that even while formally perceived as housewives, many women also took up various sorts of casual labour to help support their families monetarily -- i.e., the double

²⁰"Domesticization of women" refers to the process whereby, as more areas of life are incorporated into the formal capitalist market economy, there is a separation of "public" and "private" spheres which gives men preeminence in the public sphere and leaves women with primary responsibility for the private household, or domestic sphere.

day is not really new. But focus on women's supposed primary role as housewives left their other occupations out of view.

My conclusion, then, based on materials referenced in Chapters III and IV, is that there has been a strong trend toward proletarianization of labour in Britain and Canada, but this has been overstated to the extent that it was taken as "the norm", while the multitude of forms of what is now euphemistically being labelled "non-standard" or "contingent" work has been overlooked.²¹ So when capital finds it cheaper to rely on non-proletarian and informal labour forces it comes as a surprise to researchers and labourers themselves who have come to narrowly accept full-time proletarian labour as the norm.

In Chapter V, I move on to discuss the current global transformations that are challenging the supposed norm. These challenges result partly from contradictions internal to the proletarianization process itself. Such contradictions are the products of class struggles which have supported maintenance and resuscitation of casual labour upon occasion, and contributed to imperialist expansion historically. As argued in Chapter II, one way that capital has sought to cut production costs historically is through use of casual labour forces. These may be used to supplement proletarian labour or, as we see more recently, to supplant, cheapen, and weaken proletarian labour in the centre states. This is the significance of the so-called new international division of labour (NIDL). The effect of

²¹With its largely resource-based economy, Canada has always had a high percentage of seasonal and other casual workers (see Chapter IV). In many peripheral areas of the country, it is hard to argue that the prevalent casual work patterns are "non-standard".

this global restructuring on workers in centre states is to reduce their strength, thereby forcing them to make concessions on wages and working conditions. In the current lexicon, workers are required to become more "flexible".

I begin Chapter V with a discussion of the structure of the NIDL. It is noted that the NIDL is made possible by technological changes which allow for global communication and transportation systems, and a fragmentation and general deskilling of production processes that allows for global production of goods and services. I then situate Canada, in relation to the United States, as a dependent and subdeveloped, subcentre of the capitalist world-economy. Having done so, I move on to consider the effect that the NIDL has had on labour in the United States and Canada. By putting labour and communities in the centre on a "level playing field" with super-exploited labour in the imperialized countries of the Third World, the NIDL has indeed had the effect of weakening labour and forcing communities to make concessions in order to keep or attract transnational investors. This became obvious in the United States in the 1970s as transnational corporations (TNCs) closed shop and ran away to Third World "free trade zones" -- the phenomenon known as the "runaway shop". This led to a "deindustrialization" of older industrial areas of the U. S. northeast, with high unemployment and urban decay resulting. The strength and numbers of organized labour in the United States were thus eroded, and communities were left competing with each other in "beggar thyself" strategies to attract investors.

For Canadian labour, the impact of global restructuring was not felt so strongly until capital's assault on organized labour after the 1982 recession; the neo-liberal practices of (especially) western Canadian provincial governments during the 1980s; and the signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1988 (Broad, 1988). With the FTA there was an immediate rash of plant shutdowns and jobs carried off to the southern United States and Mexico. Half a million jobs have been lost according to the CLC and other observers. The speed with which the plants were moved and jobs lost should suggest the historical importance of the former tariff and non-tariff protection which had supported Canadian labour and industries. But the federal Tory government argued that the recession which began in 1990 is to blame for job losses, while most business observers lean toward the view that industrial restructuring forces them to make job cuts. Restructuring, it is argued, is required to be "globally competitive". But labour asks, at whose expense?

My analysis of industrial restructuring in Chapter VI follows from Marx's analysis of the increasing organic composition of capital (IOCC). The argument, in short, is that the IOCC, or technological change under capitalism, is not simply the product of a drive to produce more, cheaper, and better, as most bourgeois analysis contends, but to produce more and cheaper so as to maintain or increase rates of profit. Since, according to the labour theory of value, labour produces surplus value that forms the basis for capital's profits, cutting costs means increasing the exploitation of labour (Mandel, 1973). The IOCC is driven, Marx (1867)

argued, by capital's need to push labour to produce more, and cheaper. And this leads, I argue along with Frobel (1982) and others, to the NIDL, as transnational capital's way to more fully utilize the global reserve army of labour.

In this sense, the NIDL must be understood as part of the IOCC which, in the current jargon, is necessitated by capital's need to keep labour "flexible". Thus we hear much from the business press about the need for "flexible production" processes. I begin Chapter VI with a section on the shift from Fordist methods of production to the regime of flexible accumulation, discussing the impact of global restructuring at the national level. My argument is that the NIDL is the global face of flexible production. And this global face is combined with changes in production processes and ways in which labour is organized at the point of production as capital seeks ways to increase production of profits. These changes include an increase in constant capital along with the (re)casualization of labour which, again, fits Marx's (1867) discussion of capital's need for a reserve army of labour (see Chapter II).

Of course, a logical criticism of flexible production, if a prime ingredient is increasing productivity (read profits) through cutting labour costs, is that the process erodes capital's markets (Barnet, 1993). However, we must remember that Marx, among others, has shown that capitalism is not an inherently logical system. Mandel (1973: 51) notes

a pretty contradiction worth stressing, one which Marx already mentioned: each capitalist always likes to see other capitalists increase the wages of their workers, because the wages of those workers are purchasing power for the goods of the capitalist in question. But he cannot allow the wages

of his own workers to increase, for this would obviously reduce his own profit.

In the new era of global competition this contradiction has reasserted itself.

Indeed, neo-liberals should be reminded, as the debates on the capitalist state have shown, that it took the state as a collective capitalist to keep capitalism's contradictions at bay, thus saving individual capitals from themselves and preventing the capitalist system from crumbling. With neo-liberal "downsizing" of the state and freeing up of market forces, what will prevent the competitive laws of the capitalist jungle from reasserting themselves?²²

But capital continues to wield its double-edged flexible weapon against labour, with the global edge of the runaway shop, or threat thereof, and the local edge of labour process and labour market restructuring.²³ Capital's struggle is to reverse the gains of labour. These gains brought about an increase in the strength

²²Indeed, an official of the World Bank, a clearly pro-capitalist institution which, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has spent at least the last decade promoting neo-liberal policies and programs, has issued a call for more state intervention into the economy. Lawrence Summers, bank vice-president and chief economist, said: "If we're going to do better in the next decade I don't think there's any alternative to greater government action" (*The Globe & Mail*, 22/10/92). United Nations development advisor Mahbub ul Haq recently commented: "Somehow the idea emerged in the 1980s that the problem of poverty can be left to the markets, that they can do it all. Today, we know better. Experience has taught us otherwise" (*The Globe and Mail*, 16/09/93). We should note, as well, that capital's historic disregard for environmental destruction reveals lack of a propensity for long-term survival, economic or otherwise.

²³As one U.S. commentator argues, the use of casual labour "constitutes a local variation of the global shell game perfected by multinationals who move plants across borders. As with the plant-closing strategy, the shift to a contingent work force depresses wages and denies corporate responsibility for fair labor and safety practices. In this new and feudal world order, the company reigns supreme" (Eckhaus, 1992: 5). Perhaps we should add that under feudal traditions the lords, unlike modern TNCs, had some obligations to their serfs.

and cost of labour up to the 1960s, and a concomitant decline in rates of profit.²⁴ As noted, for Canadian labour the global edge of capital's assault comes in the form of first the FTA, and now the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which will incorporate Mexico beyond the maquilas. The level playing field thus created pushes Canadian labour and communities to make concessions or, as the business pundits put it, to be more flexible. This we see with the case of the auto industry, long important to Canadian manufacturing, and now in jeopardy with NAFTA if global competition eventually undermines the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact by draining more jobs out of Canada. NAFTA will also force concessions in collective bargaining, cut jobs and lower labour's power at the point of production to that of workers on the periphery of the global level playing field. The Canadian Auto Workers union (CAW) asserts in a recent (Fall 1992) magazine advertisement that the Canada-U.S. FTA has already eroded the Auto Pact.

For workers, flexibility through concessions is felt in the form of labour process and labour market restructuring at the local level. Workers are asked to give up their "unreasonable" demands and become more "productive" if we are to be globally competitive. We hear this constantly from our neo-liberal governments and the business press. And whole communities are forced to pitch in with more incentives for investors. When we get to work itself, some trade unionists

²⁴For an analysis of how rising labour costs and decreasing profits led to capital's restructuring assault on labour in the United States see Ross and Trachte (1990). For a discussion of labour costs and restructuring in Canada see Drache (1991).

argue that flexible production shifts more of the costs than benefits of productivity growth onto labour. The Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), for example, argue that programs such as "the team concept" and "quality circles" are instituted by management mainly to increase the exploitation of workers by incorporating the workers themselves into workplace decision-making that will increase productivity (see Chapter VI). But, while in some cases the work situation may become a bit more pleasant,²⁵ the monetary benefits go more to capital, which still makes the major decisions about investment. And when the day is done, the IOCC has resulted in fewer jobs, through what are euphemistically called technological redundancies, and thus increased the size of the reserve army of unemployed and underemployed workers. This increased local reserve army then puts more pressure on those still employed to prove their flexibility by making more concessions. The underemployed sector of the reserve army are, of course, the casual labourers. And with flexible production and continued deskilling of many jobs,²⁶ the casual labourers become important in the process known as "flexible manning" of jobs.

The first section of Chapter VI considers mainly the manufacturing side of flexible production, but the process has been applied as well to the service industries. In Section 6.2, I turn to discussions of the rise of the service sector; the impact of its 20th Century expansion on the Canadian labour market; and the

²⁵Though some researchers argue that there is not a wholesale shift away from the old Fordist paradigm of capital-labour relations (Drache, 1991).

²⁶On the combination of flexible production with continued deskilling of work, see Drache (1991).

connection between the growth of the service economy, the shift to flexible accumulation, and the (re)casualization of labour. Section 6.2 begins with a discussion of the forces which brought about the rise of the service sector. These include the growth of the state and of corporate capital, both of which required massive increases in bureaucracies. But the growth of the service sector is also attributable to new means of profit-making, such as production of commercial services, and expansion of advertising and other propaganda required to acculturate citizens to the so-called consumer society (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). My concern is with the impact of the growth of the service sector on work and labour markets.

It is by now common knowledge that the service sector is the largest employer in the advanced capitalist societies. Over 70 percent of Canadian paid employees, for example, work in the service sector. A majority are women who find themselves in low-waged, non-union, dead-end jobs. And the majority of part-time workers are female service sector employees. There are growing numbers of temporary and contract labourers in service work as well (ECC, 1990a). Suffice to say that the service sector hosts a concentrated and still-growing number of casual workers. I discuss how the increasing organic composition of capital and the drive for flexibility applies to the service sector, as the "new" logic of flexible production is applied to service industries as well as goods production. Here we see that the contracting-out, downsizing, de-layering, privatization, et cetera of neo-liberalism does not respect the bounds of goods and service indus-

tries -- state or private sector. There results an erosion of employment security (re)casualization of labour.

But why the concentration of casual labourers in service work? My argument, based on Marx and Engels' conceptualization of class struggles (see Chapter II), is that as the service sector expanded much new employment was created outside the realm of goods production jobs, which had been unionized and had come under state regulation. This new employment appeared coincident with a steady (re)entry of women into the formal labour market over the course of this century. Section 6.3 is devoted to discussion of what some might call a reproletarianization of women in Canada. I provide an outline of the twentieth century proletarianization of women, to account for the way in which this process intersects with the (re)casualization of labour. Most accounts of the proletarianization of women, like most accounts of proletarianization in general, proceed with the assumption that the process is straightforward. Women, who by the end of the Industrial Revolution were being domesticized, are now being proletarianized, so the argument goes. And a cursory glance at the statistics would tend to bear this out. While women constituted only a minority of full-time paid labourers in Canada at the beginning of this century, they now make up 45 percent of the formal labour force. A majority of women are now counted as part of the formal labour force. But, I argue, this general reading of the statistics must be qualified. Just as many labourers during the formative years of capitalist labour markets in Britain and Canada could be counted as proletarian (see Chapters III and IV),

their sometimes tenuous relations to full-time labour must be noted. In these formative years, many labourers did not have a life-long attachment to the capitalist labour market, and the large "informal" body of casual labourers has often not been properly considered in the analysis. Likewise, if many women currently do not have life-time attachments to proletarian labour, or are long-term but casual labourers, perhaps they should be seen as only semi-proletarianized.²⁷ In other words, this new phase of (female) proletarianization must be qualified if we are to avoid certain assumptions of what is normal -- assumptions which have led to the weakening of labour organizations in many Western societies (see below).

Perhaps it is because women are only semi-proletarianized that we have the persistent cultural perception, denounced by feminists, that women's employment is secondary to men's because women are not primary supporters of families. This perception has allowed employers to hire women into service sector jobs without union status, and therefore at low wages, with little security. This occurred with "new" jobs, as well as older service sector jobs which were actively "feminized". We see this, for example, in the case of clerical work in Canada (Lowe, 1987). All of this has allowed capital to avoid or replace higher-waged,

²⁷Bernstein (1988: 36-7) refers to two uses of the term "semi-proletarianization": "The first can be illustrated [with respect] to debt bondage, which refers to a relationship whereby someone is forced to pay off their debts by providing goods or labour service to their creditor.... [In] the second form of semi-proletarianization ... periodic wage labour is combined with other economic activity (and especially subsistence agriculture) to provide a means of livelihood and household reproduction." We can, then, refer to the existence of semi-proletarian labour where producers mix wage-labour with other economic activities -- i.e., they do not engage exclusively in full-time wage-labour.

unionized male labour. I grant that there is also creation of high-salaried positions in services as a result of the giant corporations' problems of trying to absorb their excessive economic surpluses (Baran and Sweezy, 1966), but these are not the majority of jobs in the service sector. As recent studies show (e.g., Sassen, 1988; Ross and Trachte, 1990), in the words of the now-defunct Economic Council of Canada (ECC, 1990), there are more "bad jobs" than "good jobs" created in services. And with the growth of service employment, the logic of the service sector labour market has spread to goods production, so that an increasing number of manufacturing production jobs have lost their high-wage union status, as globalization, degradation, feminization, informalization, and (re)casualization have affected these jobs as well. Most obvious are the cases of textiles and electronics (Nash and Fernandez, 1983).

In Chapter VII, I move on to discuss the recent growth of various types of casual labour in Canada. To provide a comparative context, I start the chapter with a brief summary on (re)casualization of labour in Britain and other industrialized countries. Then, beginning with the case of part-time work, I provide an account of the casual labour market in Canada. It is noted that there is a steady growth of part-time work in post-World War II Canada -- over two decades of economic boom and two decades of global crisis. It is argued, then, against subjectivist views, that part-time work is not a choice for most. Duffy and Pupo (1992), for example, note that women, as the majority of part-time workers, have their "choices" structured by labour markets and family responsibilities. It is also

argued that even if women do choose to work part time, capital need not employ them part time. In other words, more than women's individual needs or culturally-induced restrictions are required to push capital to hire part-timers.

To further my argument that the increase in part-time labour is structural, I examine the growth of other types of casual labour in Canada. It is noted that the growth of these other forms of casual labour parallel the increase in part-time labour, and that the generalized (re)casualization of labour is tied to an economic restructuring process that fits the parameters of flexible production, as outlined in Chapter VI. The move toward more part-time, short-term, temporary, contract, and home labour gives rise to a flexible labour market which suits the demands of corporations, whose eyes are on the short term, and for whom the new global competitiveness necessitates "the throw-away worker".²⁸ With large corporations increasingly contracting-out much of their production and doing less and less "in-house", the mainstream business press has begun to speak of "the hollow company". With the (re)casualization of labour and the shipping of so many jobs out of Canada, we must beware of "the hollow society". Those whose narrow fixation on proletarian labour at the centre of the world-system caused them to dismiss the importance of Marx's reserve army of labour spoke too soon.

While many trade unions initially (perhaps justly) offered blanket opposition to part-time work as a corporate strategy of union-busting, some are now seeing the need to incorporate part-timers and other casuals to maintain labour's

²⁸Indeed, the trend is so pronounced that Herman (1992) has had to add a new term to his "Doublespeak Dictionary": "A 'LOW OVERHEAD.' A temporary worker."

strength against capital. And some analysts are arguing the need for means other than collective bargaining to improve standards of labour and life (e.g., Fudge, 1991). Simplistic notions of who should be counted as workers must be avoided if labour is to regain strength in the current struggle against capital's neo-liberal onslaught. Proletarian/casual, formal/informal, male/female, racial and national bounds must be turned into bonds if the working class is to defeat what the labour movement calls "the corporate agenda". Perhaps organized labour should look back to the examples of those who struggled in solidarity with the unemployed during the last great depression of the 1930s if there is to be an effective struggle against the corporate agenda during the current crisis.

My concluding chapter provides a discussion of the problems and possibilities for casual work and casual workers, including a discussion of policy and political options for labour. Examples are offered to argue that casual labour need not be degraded labour. The essential political conclusion that I stress is the need for the labour movement to organize and unite the working class using a more inclusive definition of "labour". As long as the labour movement operates according to restricted definitions of who is or is not a worker, or according to assumptions that some workers have lower status because of their ethnicity, race, gender or casual attachment to the formal labour market, then the working class will remain fragmented and unable to contest the hegemony of capital in the workplace or society at large, not to mention mount a struggle for a more egalitarian society and just world order.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUALIZATION:

THE HISTORICAL MATERIAL OF CLASS STRUGGLE

It is a human tendency to represent as perpetual what is only frequent, or as constant what is really casual.

- Samuel Johnson

What is surprising is not that there has been so much proletarianization, but that there has been so little. Four hundred years at least into the existence of a historical social system, the amount of fully proletarianized labour in the capitalist world-economy today cannot be said to total even fifty per cent.

- Immanuel Wallerstein

2.1 The Problem

Social researchers have noted a rapid growth of part-time and other forms of casual labour in Western capitalist economies. In recent years the rate of increase in part-time work in these countries' formal economies has outstripped the rate of growth of full-time work which, in some cases, is negative (see Section 7.1). As summarized in Chapter I, this dissertation offers an explanation for the post-World War II increase in part-time work in Canada. It focuses on the structural transformations which have dramatically altered the topography of the Canadian labour market: (1) transnationalization of capitalist production; (2) changes in production processes; (3) the rise of the service sector and the

welfare state; (4) the (re)entry of increasing numbers of women into the formal labour market; and (5) the (re)casualization of labour.²⁹ Some British³⁰ sociologists (Mitter, 1986; Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987) argue that increasing part-time labour is one aspect of a more general casualization of labour in the developed capitalist countries. Other types of casual work which are also on the rise are temporary and contract work, industrial homework, and self-employment (see, e.g., Beechey, 1987; Johnson, 1982; Kolko, 1988; Mackenzie, 1986). The growth of these forms of casual labour run concurrent to an expansion of the "informal economy" in the developed countries (Portes et al., 1989; Broad, 1991).

According to Mitter (1986), there is a global context for the contemporary casualization of labour -- the "new international division of labour" (NIDL), an outcome of increasing mobility of capital on a world scale (cf. Frobel et al., 1980; Frobel, 1984).³¹ I agree with Mitter's global perspective, and argue that a thorough explanation for the contemporary increase in certain types of casual labour can be done only by drawing links to the restructuring of the world-economy. But

²⁹Fernandez (1985: 207) sets out "seven characteristics of contemporary production". She divides these heuristically into two "levels of analysis": "First, I will examine those traits which are fundamental activators in the movement of capital on a global scale (internationalization, mobility, and technological development). Afterward I will focus on those that may be regarded as corollaries or related effects (centralization and geographical dispersion of production, fragmentation and deskilling of labour processes, pseudoregression, and formalization)".

³⁰There is rather lax practice in such literature in using the appellations "British" (Britain) and "English" (England) interchangeably. For consistency, I will use the term (Great) Britain where possible.

³¹The most complete discussion of the NIDL is Frobel et al. (1980). There has been great debate over both the concept and the phenomenon. Useful contributions can be found in Cameron and Houle (1985), R. Cohen (1987), Dixon and Jonas (1979; 1982), Nash and Fernandez (1983), Petras (1981), Sanderson (1985), Scott and Storper (1986), Southall (1988), Contemporary Marxism (now Social Justice), Review, and "The Political Economy of the World-System Annuals".

I will add the historical dimension of the longue duree (Braudel, 1977), to argue that what we witness is not so much the casualization of labour per se, as the (re)casualization of labour, which is primarily political in nature (see Chapter I). Historical vision reveals that the forms of casual labour being discussed are not so new. Those who compare Sassen's (1982) analysis of the contemporary casual labour market in New York City with Stedman Jones' (1984) account of London in the late 1800s will see the similarities. The work, products and technology may not be the same, but the structural organization of the labour markets show marked parallels. In some cases the reader may experience a sense of deja vu, as with the case of the textile industry.

In the early part of the Industrial Revolution we find a combining of factory production with putting-out of work to small workshops and domestic producers (Marx, 1867; Thompson, 1968). As the labour struggles and social reforms of the nineteenth century proceeded, much of this "sweated" work -- especially female and child labour -- came under state regulation. We might say that this labour was decasualized (see Chapter I). But now, with what some call the "return of the runaway shop" and the "peripheralization of the centre" (see below), we find a (re)casualization of this work in cities such as New York and Toronto (Sassen, 1982; 1988; Petras, 1992; Leach, 1993; Yalnizyan, 1993). But at the end of the nineteenth century as well, even after extensive labour organizing and social reforms, we still find a good deal of casual labour in textiles and a number of other trades in London, due to seasonal fluctuations in demand and

other market factors (Stedman Jones, 1984). Stedman Jones (1984: 329) notes that by the 1890s "the casual-labour problem came to be associated much more closely with the problem of the declining industries", but he shows this to have been an ideological misrepresentation of the problem, that smacks of what Ryan (1976) calls "blaming the victim".

These historical comparisons and analysis of historical processes (see below and Chapters III and IV) provide the bases for my explanations of both the (re)casualization of labour and the restructuring of the international division of labour (IDL). Using the method of historical materialism, I account for both phenomena primarily as outcomes of class struggles. My dissertation is an application of historical materialist world-systems analysis to the problem of (re)casualization of labour in Canada.³²

I begin with three basic assumptions:

(a) Capitalism has developed through an "external-internal dialectic" which links national social transformations to international divisions of labour -- i.e., capitalism is a world-system (Braudel, 1977; Frank, 1979; Wallerstein, 1979).

³²World-systems analysis is an outgrowth of dependency theory, and has been formalized in sociology by Wallerstein (1974; 1979). There are two strains of world-systems theorists --liberals and neo-marxists. For both, the modern world-system is based on an underlying capitalist world-economy, but with politically independent nation-states ranked hierarchically according to their mode of incorporation into the world-economy. Most developed are centre, or core states, followed by semi-peripheries and peripheries. (These categories apply as well to regional hierarchies within states.) Interstate relations are typified by domination and exploitation. For neo-marxists, these nation-state relations are based on and cross-cut by class relations of exploitation. I have presented a discussion of debates surrounding world-systems analysis elsewhere (Broad, 1981). On doing world-systems analysis, see Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982), Shannon (1989) and So (1990).

(b) The cyclical rhythms and secular trends of the capitalist world-system are primarily products of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 1848; Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982).

(c) The new international division of labour, as well, is primarily a product of such struggles -- a result, in the main, of capital's global quest for cheaper, more controllable labour-power to counter stagnation tendencies and renew accumulation by rolling back gains won by labour over this century (Frobel et al., 1980). The (re)casualization of labour, then, is posed as a process coming out of the struggles which led to capital's quest for cheaper, more controllable labour-power.

The most salient questions to be addressed are:

- (1) What are the historical origins of full-time proletarian labour?
- (2) What has been the spacio-temporal extent (limit) of the full-time proletariat?
- (3) What is the balance of global versus national factors contributing to (re)casualization of labour?
- (4) What factors in the post-World War II era have pushed and pulled increasing numbers of women into the wage-labour force in the centre?
- (5) How have the increasing organic composition of capital and labour's gains over the last century prompted capital's drive for a (re)casualized labour market?
- (6) Are the present increase in part-time labour and the (re)casualization of labour in Canada: (i) temporary phenomena; (ii) a return to the "norm" of historical capital-labour relations; or (iii) something altogether "new"?

The historical articulation of proletarian versus casual labour under capitalism is here posed as the central problem for investigation. My argument, again, is that there is an historical trend toward proletarianization of labour under capitalism, but as a process, never an absolute outcome. Capital has always relied upon "unfree" labour for production of some commodities and for reproduction of labour-power.

2.2 Buddy, Can You Spare a Paradigm?

In the 1892 introduction to his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels uses

the term 'historical materialism,' to designate that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another (Engels, 1892: 386-7).

Historical materialism is an approach to the study of society developed by Engels and Marx. It draws on Hegelian dialectics in assuming a correspondence between "ideal" and "material" conditions of life, but inverts the idealism of Hegel to argue that it is the material conditions of life which provide the basis for ideal conditions, not the reverse. This position is worked out by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, and its main points succinctly adumbrated by Marx in his "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.³³

³³In his "Preface", Marx (1859: 182) states: "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of

Central to the historical materialist approach is the necessity for a dialectical and holistic methodology. According to Engels (1878: 26) there are two "modes of thought" -- "dialectics" and "metaphysics". "To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, fixed, rigid, objects of investigation given once and for all. He thinks in absolutely unmediated antitheses." Engels contends that the metaphysical mode of thought "invariably bumps into a limit sooner or later, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions, because in the presence of their existence it forgets their coming into being and passing away; because in their state of rest it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees" (Engels, 1878: 26). This passage serves to distinguish the methods of dialectical and non-dialectical thought. The latter, including not just metaphysics but positivism and empiricism, might be referred to, pace Engels, as the "linear" mode of thought. The dialectical mode of thought considers things in their historical totality -- it sees the forest, not just the trees (cf. Sweezy, 1981).

these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." Marx and Engels' use of some terms has been contested - especially "base" and "superstructure" and "forces" and "relations" of production -- and they have been accused of "economic determinism" and "class reductionism". But I believe their work, and the wording of the preceding quote, show a more nuanced (dialectical) reading of social processes than certain critics allow (cf. Sayer, 1983; Shaw, 1983).

Unlike the linear mode of thought, using dialectics

we find that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to the individual case as such; but as soon as we consider the individual case in its connection with the universe as a whole, they merge, they dissolve in the concept of universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are constantly changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa (Engels, 1878: 27).

This point is very important for my attempt to explain the current increase in part-time work, and the (re)casualization of labour, since it means that there can be no monocausal explanation. The increase in part-time work must be studied as part of larger social transformations. Even when Engels mentions the search for "the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events" in the passage from his 1892 introduction cited above, he goes on to refer to four complex historic processes that must be considered in an historical materialist analysis -- the longue duree of economic development; changes in modes of production and exchange; changes in class structure; and class struggles.

So, for my study, I must understand changes in the material basis of production, including technological developments; changes in the capitalist mode of production, including changes to the labour process, the labour market, the international division of labour, and the way these three intersect; changes in social relations of production, which are linked to economic changes and changes in the mode of production, and affect changes to the overall class structure; and the way that all of these processes are molded by class struggles, in a dialectical fashion. Important to Marx and Engels' theory of social change is the dialectical

interplay between material "forces of production" and social "relations of production", giving rise to the thesis that social change is primarily the product of class struggles. But these struggles are very complex, as they are interwoven with other forms of social struggle, and are generally cloaked with an ideological gloss (cf. Colletti, 1972). Essential points that I draw from historical materialism for my study are (1) that historical transformations are animated by class struggles, and (2) that major social changes must be understood as "structural" changes, not the products of individual choices, as liberalism would allow.³⁴ Historical materialist analysis forces us to consider the manifold causes of phenomena, and so calls for spacio-temporal holism (cf. Marx, 1858; Engels, 1878). This necessitates a world-systems perspective on the history of capitalist development.

As noted in Chapter I, I take from the work of Marx and Engels the thesis that unmitigated capital accumulation produces social polarization. Related to this thesis are two important concepts: that of the increasing organic composition of capital (IOCC); and that of the reserve army of labour.³⁵ In Capital, Volume I, Marx discusses the development of capitalism from "artisanal" production, through "manufacture", to "machinofacture". Prior to the development of capitalist production *per se*, and before the Industrial Revolution, commodities were produced mainly by independent artisans and sold by merchants. With the factory system, many independent producers were brought together under one roof -- the

³⁴See The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (1988) on the debate over "agency and structure".

³⁵A rough translation for the IOCC would be "technological change", with machines replacing human labour-power. See Glossary for definitions.

factory -- to produce on a larger scale, and under the direction of the factory owner and his foremen. As noted in Chapter III, with the Industrial Revolution the work of direct producers was increasingly harnessed to the rhythm of the machine. This allowed for both greater productivity and greater discipline of labour.

Marx and Engels' argument that social development and social change are animated primarily by class struggles holds for changes in the labour process. The IOCC is not a pre-determined outcome of some treadmill of technology. Technology itself, not just the application of technology, embodies social relations (Sayer, 1983). Thus Marx discusses the social relations of production, and posits a theory of technological development based on inter- and intra-class struggles between capital and labour, and on competition among capitalists.³⁶ We find three circumstances which can push capital to mechanize: (1) when there is a shortage of labour, making it expensive; (2) when labour is too powerful, thereby increasing costs and gaining too much control at the point of production; and (3) when individual capitals are pushed by competition from other capitals.

But the IOCC does have a "downside" for capital, whether it is immediately perceived or not. If surplus-value is produced by labour (variable capital), but the IOCC increases the ratio of machines (constant capital) to human labour, then there will be a decrease in the rate of accumulation of capital per given unit of production. The solution can be to increase the production of surplus value by

³⁶For an early statement on the relationship between these struggles and the IOCC, see Marx's (1847) Wage-Labour and Capital.

speeding up the production process. So the IOCC is shaped to both "control" the workers and their work, and increase the "intensity" of that work to offset decrease in surplus value due to increase in constant capital. But increasing mechanization can lead to a vicious circle of an ever-increasing ratio of constant to variable capital, and an increasing alienation of workers which causes workplace problems that can disrupt production and productivity growth. These problems figure prominently in post-World War II discussions of transformation of the labour process.

Related to Marx's discussion of the IOCC is his treatment of the reserve army of labour.³⁷ Marx begins his discussion of the reserve army in Capital, Volume I, by noting how the IOCC gives rise to a steady substitution of constant capital (machines) for variable capital (human labour). Marx (1867: 630) states that

it is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant population, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus-population.

There are, according to Marx, three forms of this relative surplus population, or reserve army of labour: the floating, latent, and stagnant forms. The floating form is made up of workers displaced by the introduction of new technologies to manufacturing industries, and of other workers moving between jobs. The latent form is produced as capitalist technology and production methods are applied to

³⁷My discussion of Marx's treatment of the reserve army of labour draws on the excellent summary by Connelly (1978). See also Sweezy (1942) and Braverman (1974).

agriculture and other primary industries, and includes the "stored" labour of those not fully proletarianized, such as "peasants" and "housewives" (Mies et al., 1988).

Also interesting for my purposes is what Marx calls the stagnant form of reserve labour, whose employment is "extremely irregular" or marginal. Marx (1867: 643) notes: "It is characterized by maximum of working-time, and minimum of wages". Stagnant reserve labour

furnishes to capital an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labour-power. Its conditions of life sink below the average normal level of the working-class; this makes it at once the broad basis of special branches of capitalist exploitation (Marx, 1867: 643).

The stagnant form blends with the social group Marx called the "lowest sediment" of the surplus population -- paupers. Marx (1867: 644) argued:

Pauperism is the hospital of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army [P]auperism forms a condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of wealth [B]ut capital knows how to throw [this weight], for the most part, from its own shoulders on to those of the working-class and the lower middle class.

I find Marx's discussion of the reserve army most useful for my conceptualization of the (re)casualization of labour. Marx argued that the reserve army was necessary for capital to both maintain profits through low wages, and instill discipline into the active labour force through the threat of unemployment. Cloward and Piven (1993: 26) offer an analysis of "the new class war" in the United States, in which they note "the connection between [the neo-liberal] reordering of the American class structure and the attack on welfare and, related-

ly, other income programs".³⁸ They tell us that, to see this connection, "it is useful to remember an old Marxist idea, that the unemployed constitute a 'reserve army of labor' used by capitalists to weaken and divide the proletariat" (Cloward and Piven, 1993: 26). Cloward and Piven argue that, in the early decades of the post-World War II era, labour's bargaining power disrupted "the traditional relationship between unemployment and wage levels, between the supply of labor and the power of labor. In another idiom, the reserve army of labor was no longer performing its historic function" (Cloward and Piven, 1993: 28). So, with labour costs and militancy running too high, capital began to resuscitate the reserve army. We see this happening through the NIDL, and through the (re)casualization of labour, and expansion of the informal economy -- the latter two processes including capital's resuscitation of the latent and stagnant forms of reserve labour and pauperism. I discuss in the following section, and in Chapters V and VI, how this allows capital to shift more of the costs of reproduction of labour-power back onto the working-class, while also producing "peripheral" labour forces which can more cheaply produce inputs for production of core corporations.

I pose an historical materialist world-systems analysis as offering a more complete explanation for the recent increase in part-time and other forms of casual labour than most common explanations. In their recent study of part-time work in Britain, Beechey and Perkins (1987) critique a number of these explana-

³⁸We see this happening in Canada as well, with the government assault on income support programs, including unemployment insurance benefits.

tions. They begin: "It is often assumed that the expansion of part-time employment in the 1970s can be explained in terms of the growth of the service sector of the economy" (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 33). But Beechey and Perkins argue that this explanation is a tautological one, because the measure of growth of the service sector is based on an increase in numbers of workers in that sector, while the prevalence of part-time work gives a rather different measure if based on total hours worked. In many service industries "the number of people employed has often increased while the number of employee hours has actually decreased" (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 34). Beechey and Perkins note that "often the increase in part-time work is explained as if it were the result of the 'vast expansion' of the service sector rather than being the reason why the expansion seems to be so vast" (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 34). They then offer an evaluation of other reasons for the growth of part-time work.

In their discussion, Beechey and Perkins do not mention a common business response that part-time work is offered because women demand it.³⁹ The first reason discussed by Beechey and Perkins is shortage of labour, which was important in the 1950s and 1960s, but was not a significant reason for growth of part-time work in the last two decades. More pertinent reasons are employers need for flexible labour, and substitution of part-time for full-time jobs as part of the present restructuring. Beechey and Perkins point out that much part-time

³⁹I encountered this argument most recently in doing research on part-time employment in Saskatchewan (Broad, 1993c), and encountered as well trade unionists' disdain for what they see as business' phoney excuse for replacing full-timers with part-timers.

work is vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations. There are daily peaks in some services where more labour is required, and there are downswings in the economy when business lays off full-timers and shifts to use of part-timers as more flexible (i.e., disposable) labour. This latter use of part-timers blends into a longer term substitution of part-timers for full-timers as part of economic restructuring, and Beechey and Perkins find increasing instances of part-timers used both as flexible labour and for substitution purposes in the 1970s and 1980s.

Beechey and Perkins (1987: 6-8) criticize the sociological "job model", the "women's two roles" perspective, and labour market and labour process studies that emphasize "segmented labour markets" and "deskilling" of labour (see Chapter VI). They are not satisfied with any of these as general explanations of increasing part-time work, and offer their own gender-specific explanation. In their own research, Beechey and Perkins found the importance of flexibility for explaining the growth of part-time work, "but we concluded that this did not provide a sufficient explanation of why so many jobs (especially in the service sector) were organized on a part-time basis" (1987: 37). They argue that gender enters the picture when we attempt to explain the growth of part-time employment. It is "women's jobs" in particular that are part time. Flexibility in men's work, they argue, takes different forms -- such as overtime and short-time working.

We find this to be the case in the Canadian labour market as well, but there is also a growth in part-time work for males, especially young males (see

Sections 6.2 and 7.1).⁴⁰ I would argue that there is space here for a synthesis of gender-based and restructuring arguments, as Beechey and Perkins' (1987: 37) own discussion suggests. They state that flexibility in women's jobs takes a certain form. This is true, but we should note that the larger process is restructuring for flexible production (see Section 6.1). Gender by itself does not tell us why capital exploits labour -- female or male. Capital does not exploit women because they are women, but for their labour-power. The labour force is segregated by sex, race, ethnicity and nation, and capital will, where profitable, take labour as it finds it (Marx, 1867).

Beechey and Perkins see the reserve army of labour thesis to be limited as an explanation for part-time or women's low-status work, because it does not explain the gender specificity of this work (see also Duffy and Pupo, 1992). Perhaps their conclusions are affected by the fact that part-time employment is overwhelmingly female in Britain, while being less so in some other industrialized countries (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 40-4; ILO, 1989; Warne et al., 1992).⁴¹ But I would argue that the specificities of gender, race, et cetera can and must be incorporated into an historical materialist explanation of the current economic restructuring, and expansion of various forms of casual labour in the formal

⁴⁰According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development "the proportion of men employed part-time is quite low, but since 1979 has increased virtually everywhere" (OECD, 1987: 30).

⁴¹Beechey and Perkins' (1987: 43) figures show that, in 1981, the female share of part-time employment was 94 percent in Britain and Germany, but averaged closer to 80 percent throughout the OECD countries, and ran as low as 63 percent in Greece.

economy as part of capital's attempts to resuscitate the reserve army of labour. My investigation leads me to conclude that capital is not interested solely in female labour, but in any source of cheap, docile labour (cf. Broad and Cavanagh, 1988). This is the lesson of the NIDL, and to some extent exonerates labour market and labour process studies critiqued by Beechey and Perkins, although not completely.

Feminist scholars are right to say that there is a male bias to much of the literature on work, including that of marxists. But the contention of some that the problem is inherent to all the frameworks heretofore utilized must be challenged. I would question specifically the attack on historical materialism for having some irremediable male bias. I have yet to see this conclusively demonstrated (cf. Amin, 1980: 38ff). It can be demonstrated that the work of many practitioners has had a male bias (Bennholdt-Thomsen, 1984). But this does not amount to an immanent critique of the method of analysis they were trying to apply. The main pitfall has been failure to engage in holistic analysis, hence giving rise to any number of forms of reductionism. This is probably due more to the culture and politics of the practitioner and her/his positivistic notions of science than to some inherent flaw in the historical materialist method itself (cf. Sayer, 1983).

Given the required holism, a complete historical materialist analysis must deal with the articulation of class exploitation and gender, race and other forms of

oppression.⁴² Feminists are right to argue that the restructuring of labour markets is a gendered process. But along with discussing why this is so, we must note that there is more to restructuring than feminization of labour. Safa (1981) and others (e.g., Standing, 1989) have argued that feminization is intimately tied to capital's search for cheap labour, and that these two factors are tied to the NIDL. I noted in Chapter I that, for historical-cultural reasons, women have provided capital with a supply of cheap labour.⁴³ This is Safa's argument, but her discussion shows that capital is concerned not just with cost, but also with control of labour forces and labour processes. The class struggles entailed in labour's trade union and political organizing gave Western working classes more power with respect to both the cost of their labour-power and control over their work lives.⁴⁴ This, of course, cut into capital's ability to extract maximum surplus value, and thus profits (see below). But the organized working class was primarily male. So, what better way to undermine trade union power and cut labour costs than to resort to a female labour force, which had, in fact, been ostracized from the male house of labour, as feminists have shown.

I argue that this is primarily a class struggle, and secondarily a gender struggle, because the essence of capitalist production is capital's exploitation of

⁴²Hill (1992: 12) argues: "Marxism must incorporate feminist insights before we begin to understand the role of the other fifty per cent of the population in the English Revolution", or elsewhere, we might add.

⁴³Actually, as marxist feminists argue, women have provided this cheap labour in two senses, through their market-oriented production work, and through domestic reproduction of the labour-power of their families.

⁴⁴See Abendroth, 1972; Arrighi, 1990; Palmer, 1992; and Russell, 1990.

labour for the purpose of making profits. This is a theoretical argument, and critics will say that in reality class exploitation is always coloured by forms of oppression. This is true. But it is important to note that oppression comes in various forms -- gender oppression, racial oppression, national oppression, et cetera. Exploitation is what is essential to capitalism, though to make exploitation palatable, or to obscure it, the system requires divide and rule of the exploited working class by capital and the state. It should come as no surprise, then, that the most exploited labour is female and dark-skinned, Third World labour (Mies et al., 1988).

So, to say that economic restructuring is a gendered process is not enough. Historical materialist analysis must deal with gender oppression, but it must also deal with the articulation of exploitation and other forms of oppression, which requires that it be a world-systems analysis (cf. Shanin, 1983).⁴⁵ There is a recent growth of a literature which makes creative use of the world-systems concept of the NIDL to account for the (re)casualization of labour throughout the world-economy (see Mitter, 1986). The problem with many of these analyses, and another difficulty in utilizing historical materialism, is that they are not sufficiently historical (Chase-Dunn, 1984).

⁴⁵I recognize, as noted above, that not all conceptions of the world-system are historical materialist. As well, tendencies toward one-sided determinism should be mentioned. Some critics of world-systems analysis assert that "internal" (national) causes are determinant of social processes (Lipietz, 1987), while practitioners such as Frank and Wallerstein often seem to end up with "external" (world-economy) causes as determinant. The "external-internal dialectic" which Frank (1978; 1979) himself notes tends to be overruled.

The studies and approach of Braudel (1977; 1979) seem particularly germane to helping sort out the problems raised above.⁴⁶ Braudel criticizes many social scientists, and even historians, for engaging in ahistorical analysis. For Braudel, social history must be studied as a dialectic of the long term and the short term -- of the longue duree, with its "slow but perceptible rhythms"; and "structural and conjunctural history", with more rapid fluctuations and more frequent changes (Braudel, 1972: 20-1). One cannot be "expert" on a particular era without knowing the roots of that era. How can I understand the role played by contemporary casual labour in the capital accumulation process without studying the antecedents? Beechey and Perkins (1987: 21), for example, note that "a lot of work, especially casual and seasonal work, homework and work in service occupations, has always been done on a less than full-time basis".

Braudel's focus of study is "material civilization and capitalism, 15th to 18th Centuries". From his study, he discerns that capitalist society is structured into three overlapping tiers, or floors: (1) at the bottom -- everyday life, or material civilization; (2) above that -- the market economy; and (3) at the top -- capitalism. Rather than tiers, or floors of a building, I find it helpful to think of Braudel's (1977; 1979) three spheres of economic life as portrayed in the Venn diagram in Figure 2.1. The three spheres intersect to varying degrees historically. They tend to move together as the capitalist world-economy develops, but none ever loses its identity because tensions arise from conflicting interests -- interests in

⁴⁶See Aguirre Rojas (1992) on the relationship between historical materialism and Braudel's historical methodology.

FIGURE 2.1. Material Civilization and Capitalism.

SOURCE: Adapted from Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century (3 Volumes). London: Fontana, 1981-84.

subsistence/reproduction, competition/exchange, and monopoly accumulation/super-exploitation which emanate from everyday life, the market economy and capitalism, respectively.⁴⁷ Everyday life may include production for consumption, production for the market, and production for capital. As anthropologists have shown, not all market economies are capitalist (see, e.g., Hodges, 1988). As sites for exchanging goods and services, markets generally produce competition, but not necessarily unequal exchange. For Braudel, "capitalism" is a superlative (cf. Meldolesi, 1984). He notes the ambiguity of the term, and concludes that

capitalism is the perfect term for designating economic activities that are carried on at the summit, or that are striving for that summit. As a result, large-scale capitalism rests upon the underlying double layer composed of material life and the coherent market economy; it represents the high-profit zone. Thus, I have made a superlative of it. I may be criticized for this, but I am not the only one to have held that opinion [cf. Lenin, 1916] (Braudel, 1977: 112-3).

This is a definition based on history, not theory, and leads Braudel to other contentious conclusions: (1) successful capital has always benefited from "legal or actual monopoly and the possibility of price manipulation" (1982: 374); and (2) the great merchants "normally benefited from the acquiescence of state and society, and were thus able regularly, quite naturally and without any qualms, to bend the rules of the market economy" (1982: 401). These merchants "were friends of the prince and helpers and exploiters of the state" (1977: 57).

⁴⁷These tensions give rise to class, gender, national, regional, et cetera contradictions which give the world-system its dynamic.

So, the history of capitalism has always been one of monopolies and state "intervention" (cf. Corrigan et al., 1980). What we should conclude from this is that, in expanding and deepening, capitalism has expanded economic monopoly and the state economy. And it has prospered in opposition to and on the backs of the lower levels of the informal market and everyday life. Over the last century, these lower levels of informal economy have been overtaken by commodification and proletarianization, thus eating into the high-profit zone and undoing capitalism itself. In light of this long term, the present phase of the world-system appears to be characterized by capital's attempts to recapture or recreate the "informal economy", and thus high profits. "Rationalization combined with relocation, which constitute the response to the new structural conditions for the valorization of capital, are now bringing about a falling trend in employment in the industrial countries through the world-wide reorganization of production" (Frobel, 1982: 543). But this is a falling trend in full-time formal employment, which had become a hindrance to capitalist super-profits.

Braudel's dialectic of the long term and short term helps us, then, to understand the source of the (re)casualization of labour. His reading of the importance of "everyday life" as the backbone of the market economy and capitalism points to the necessity for analysis of the household economy and "women's work". This, and Braudel's global vision, have prompted a number of useful analyses of "households and the world-economy" by his students.⁴⁸

⁴⁸In addition to Smith et al. (1984), see the various articles in *Review*, and the special issue: Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 1985). See as well Nash and Fernandez (1983), Part II.

Braudel's view of the capitalist world-system generally accords with that of other world-systems theorists. It is a system of core and peripheral nation states, and core and peripheral workers -- as both segmented labour market theorists and some business people would put it.⁴⁹

2.3 Casual Labour and the Longue Duree

I make the point in Chapter I that we must re-evaluate standard conceptions of the process of proletarianization. The prevalent notion is that proletarianization is an all-encompassing process that comes to transform the social formation, thereby displacing all other forms of production relations. Both feminists and world-systems theorists have shown this to be untrue. Many forms of work other than the pure capital/wage-labour relation have not only persisted, but been used -- even constructed and reconstructed -- by capital in the accumulation process. While wage-labour may have become the formal logic for produc-

⁴⁹The popular use of the terms "core workers" and "peripheral workers" in the business literature on part-time and casual work is interesting from a world-systems perspective. The terms refer to one group of workers which is full-time and skilled, and another which is part-time, casual and semi- or unskilled (Duffy and Weeks, 1981; Weeks, 1980). The latter group is sometimes referred to as "marginal" - another important concept in development literature. In business literature and segmented labour market theory the terms refer to the position of workers *vis-a-vis* the firm (Edwards, 1979). What obviously attracts the attention of students of the restructuring of the IDL to segmented labour market theory is the notion that, under advanced capitalism, there is a fundamental distinction between more-skilled, higher-waged "core" workers, and less-skilled, low-waged "peripheral" workers who constitute the "secondary market casual labour" (Southall, 1988: 21). But these authors extend the typology of Edwards et al. beyond the individual firm to argue that the IDL itself is characterized by the distinction between core and peripheral workers and that, with the globalization of capitalist production, the whole world is crosscut by a latticework of core and peripheral workers (cf. Mitter, 1986). An outcome of the NIDL is to shrink the core and expand the periphery throughout the centre - thus the "peripheralization of the centre".

tion relations by the end of the last century in the developed West, many areas of production (and reproduction) were not fully proletarianized.

Wallerstein (1983) suggests that all secular tendencies of historical capitalism, notably proletarianization and commodification, eventually reach their asymptotes but, due to certain countertendencies, do not come to full fruition.⁵⁰ I wish to argue that, in the case of proletarianization, the tendency had reached its limits by the 1960s in the West. Since reaching its limits, it appears to be receding at the centre of the world capitalist system. If we wish to date this shift the year 1970 is appropriate, since it corresponds to both the rise of the NIDL and to the global economic crisis, which came with a vengeance in the recession of 1973. While the proletarianization process is still advancing in certain areas of global production, it is not outrageous to suggest that (re)casualization is coming to dominate the logic of the labour market overall, just as proletarianization did for a time, despite the fact that many -- especially women and peasants -- were not brought directly into proletarian wage-labour.

The transition from feudalism to capitalism did not result in full-fledged capitalist social relations as defined in theory by Marx (1867) and others. The mercantilist age in Europe, for example, was a long period of gestation which produced, only in the late 18th Century, any number of bourgeois and proletariat. But even with the Industrial Revolution, there remained national, regional and gender bounds on proletarian labour proper (see Chapter III). If we define

⁵⁰Note that proletarianization is being discussed here as a tendency, or process, not an accomplished fact.

"proletarian labour" as that which is wholly dependent on the capital/wage-labour relation for remuneration/ reproduction, we can agree with Wallerstein (1983: 27): "If we now look at global empirical reality throughout the time-space of historical capitalism, we suddenly discover that the location of wage-workers in semi-proletarian households has been the statistical norm".⁵¹ For the production and reproduction of labour-power has always been based on a mix of wage-labour with non-valorized domestic, peasant and artisan labour (von Werlhof, 1984).

Histories of the development of capitalism in Europe and throughout the world-system are replete with accounts of how capital has variously been forced or chosen to make use of non-proletarian labour, both for production of commodities and for the production and reproduction of labour-power (cf. R. Cohen, 1987; Corrigan, 1977). So, in its spread throughout the globe, capital has had to accommodate to some extent pre-existing social formations. This itself has made proletarianization a contradictory process. But it has also been a contradictory process because capital has not always been the foremost supporter of proletarianization.

While the commodification (proletarianization) of labour-power may provide capital with a readily-accessible labour force, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982: 68) tell us that "the proportion of the costs of reproduction borne by the

⁵¹Vilas (1986) argues that just because some members of the proletariat, in industry and agriculture, are chronically underemployed, this is not sufficient ground for classifying them as semi-proletarian. Vilas' point is well taken but, because the term "semi-proletarian" has attained a place in the literature, I will not quickly discard it. (Similarly, I prefer "transnational capital" to "multinational capital", and "periphery" to "Third World", but will often use the latter terms, respectively, because most readers can identify with them.)

'employer' or 'market purchaser' per unit of labor-power utilized is significantly greater in the case of life-time than of part-life-time proletarian households".⁵² Consequently, from the point of accessibility of labour, proletarianization may be positive for capital. But for reasons of cost, complete proletarianization would be negative. According to Frobel (1982: 534): "For capital, what is important is that the reproduction of labor-power is subsidized externally ..., which consequently allows the super-exploitation of labor-power". And Arrighi et al. (1983: 288) note:

Capitalist production ... is seen as a process that tends to reduce the value of labor-power (its real costs of production) and simultaneously to undermine the bargaining power of its possessors, so that the advantages of the reduction of labor's costs of reproduction tend to accrue entirely to capital.

Given this reading of history, Wallerstein (1983: 36) concludes: "One of the major forces behind proletarianization has been the world's work-forces themselves". In short, full proletarianization would put the onus on capital to reproduce its labour force. Thus, given optimum economic conditions, it benefits labour in its struggle for better living and working conditions to advance proletarianization -- recognizing, of course, that labour's strength is also dependent on cultural, ideological and political factors.

⁵²The hypothetical life-time proletarian household would be one where a member or members of the household spend a majority of their working lives engaged in proletarian labour, and the remuneration from this labour provides for acquisition of most goods required for household reproduction. A part-life-time proletarian household would be one where a significant proportion, perhaps the majority, of resources needed for household reproduction are acquired through other than proletarian labour. These concepts do not, of course, speak to the fact that household reproduction requires further preparation of goods, whether acquired through proletarian or non-proletarian labour. This household, or domestic labour is generally the domain of women.

Wallerstein is obviously correct, in reading the historical record, to say that fully proletarian labour has not been the norm -- especially in global terms. Proletarian labour has always been awash in a sea of non-proletarian labour.⁵³ In saying this, I am not replacing one overgeneralization with another -- i.e., totally dismissing the importance of the proletarianization process. My point is to say that proletarian labour has never been the sole, exclusive form of labour at any time in the history of capitalism and, for the reasons discussed above, cannot be. The normal state of affairs is a mix of proletarian with non-proletarian labour -- indeed, some would say an articulation of capitalism with other modes of production.⁵⁴ What is important to note is that modes of production exist in their purity only in theory. We can argue that proletarian labour is central to production relations in theoretical capitalism, but this theoretical model is watered down, so to speak, in historical capitalism, where we do find an articulation of various forms of production.⁵⁵ It is, perhaps, by overlooking this fact that many authors have come to assume a near exclusivity of proletarian labour under capitalism.

⁵³After having made this statement, I ran across the following observation on the Nigerian working classes by Peter Waterman: "We can conceive of Nigerian wage-earners as surrounded by an urban sea of petty-producers and unemployed, this being surrounded by a rural ocean of peasants" (cited in Munck, 1988).

⁵⁴This argument has been an important part of criticism of dependency and world-systems theories in the sociology of development (see Broad, 1981).

⁵⁵I prefer to use the term: forms of production here, rather than modes, which comes from an abstract concept. That concept, mode of production, as developed by Marx and Engels, is a useful heuristic tool for marking the main tendencies of an era (e.g., capitalism), but abstractions do not articulate in the concrete.

I argue, then, that the history of proletarianization has been more uneven and limited than has generally been assumed. As a result of theoretical assumptions and class struggles "full proletarianization" became the formal logic of labour markets in the West in the middle of this century. But, as workers organized into trade unions and political parties to obtain better pay and working conditions, and provision of welfare services, capital's power and profits were eroded. Capital thus needed to return the costs of reproduction of labour-power to the working class itself. This helps to explain the current global crisis of capital accumulation, and the present restructuring process. Central to the latter are corporate and state attempts at union-busting, and (re)casualization of work.

As noted in Chapter I, part of my reasoning on the limits to proletarianization is based on the fact that, while we were supposedly witnessing the full proletarianization of labour following the Industrial Revolution, half the population was being removed from the formal wage-labour force. How, then, is it possible to argue that the working class has been fully proletarianized when most women were either excluded, or limited to intermittent forms of wage-labour? And now that women are (re)entering formal wage-labour, many are employed on a casual basis -- part time or short term. I argue that women are being only semi-proletarianized but, with the growth of the service economy and women's centrality to it, they are the vision of the future, given the logic of (re)casualization that seems to be pervading the labour market overall (see Chapters VI and VII). As suggested in Section 2.2, the forces which bring those women who have been

relegated to the home back to the formal labour market, are propitious for capital's need to restructure the relations between production and reproduction of labour power.

The global context for this restructuring is the new international division of labour. The NIDL itself is based on technological transformations which permit the "internationalization of the production process" (Vuskovic, 1980: 7). The labour-process can now more easily be "segmented" (Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1979; Gordon et al., 1982). And advances in transportation and communications make geographic distances less problematic for large capital. Control of production and research and development can remain centralized, while production itself is increasingly dispersed throughout the globe (Frobel, 1982; Vuskovic, 1980).

The NIDL, and the technological advances entailed (increasing organic composition of capital), was prompted by working-class struggles. As workers in the West gained strength throughout this century, labour costs rose and capital's control of production was challenged. As the size of the proletariat increased and the reserve army of labour shrank, the conditions for capital's extraction of maximum levels of surplus-value from labour were eroded. This problem was compounded by the stagnation tendency in what Lenin (1916) has called the imperialist stage of capitalism (cf. Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Magdoff and Sweezy, 1987).

Corporations seek to increase levels of capital accumulation by reversing the above-noted trends, while labour seeks to better its conditions of life and

work. To escape the gains of labour, capital resorted to the "runaway shop". In the 1960s, transnational corporations began to close down their manufacturing operations in the developed capitalist countries and move to non-unionized, cheap-labour havens in the periphery of the capitalist world-system. This resulted in a "deindustrialization" of centre states and regions (See Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Caloren, 1978; Laxer, 1973; Starks, 1978; and Chapter V below).

Safa (1981) used the example of U.S. textiles to show how the runaway shop appeared as a distinct stage in capital's quest for cheap, docile female labour in that industry.⁵⁶ The first stage of industrialization in textiles saw the use of the American-born labour force, depending heavily on recruitment from rural areas. As this source dried up and became too expensive, by the middle of the nineteenth century, a second stage saw immigration providing the new source of cheap labour. But as we move into this century social reform, unionization of textile workers, Americanization of immigrant women, and increasing domesticization made possible by labour struggles which gave male "breadwinners" a better wage, all combined to dry up the supply of and increase the cost of textile workers once again. So the third stage of the runaway shop appeared, as capital ran off to the Third World to take advantage of a new source of cheap, docile, non-European female labour.

Safa's (1981) account ends with the third stage. But others have noted a fourth stage. Mitter (1986) contends that there has recently been a "return of the

⁵⁶Others have used the example of the electronics industry to show the same process (Mitter, 1986; Nash and Fernandez, 1983).

runaway shop". With high levels of unemployment, unions weakened, and wage scales lowered in some old industrial areas, transnational capital sees conditions more propitious for accumulation in the centre (see, e.g., Howe, 1986; Nash, 1984). Some world-systems theorists now refer to a "peripheralization of the centre" (e.g., Sassen, 1982; Ross and Trachte, 1983; Dixon et al., 1982; Broad, 1988). Indeed, a decade and a half ago Barnett and Mueller (1974) wrote of the "Latinamericanization of the United States". The NIDL has had the combined effect of expanding capital's global reserve army of labour (cf. Amin, 1976), and seeding moves toward state authoritarianism (cf. Panitch and Swartz, 1988) and super-exploitation of labour in the centre.⁵⁷

In this context, some trade unionists have argued that capital's promotion of part-time work is a form of union-busting. This is because most casual work is non-union, low-wage work. For flexible accumulation, (re)casualization is a central ingredient of capital's attack on labour's strength. For the ultimate goal is to restructure the labour market as a whole, weakening full-time proletarian labour so that capital can bargain from a position of strength, and thereby increase profits (cf. MacEwan, 1989).

Thus, more of the onus for production and reproduction of labour-power is being returned to proletarian families (cf. Corrigan, 1977). Our gaze is recast on the household economy, where we see the articulation of various forms of

⁵⁷"Superexploitation is the appropriation by capital of so many of the fruits of the workers' labour that the workers cannot maintain themselves or reproduce their labour power. In each major crisis of accumulation, capital has resorted to increased exploitation and superexploitation somewhere in the world" (Frank, 1981a: 157).

proletarian and non-proletarian labour, and of the formal and expanding informal economies.⁵⁸ This vantage point should prompt us to reconsider the myth of the full-time proletarian per se -- the historical trend toward proletarianization accepted (see Chapters III and IV).

To summarize, in terms of the longue duree, it seems appropriate to refer to a (re)casualization of labour markets at the centre of the capitalist world-system. While capital might make new uses of them, part-time labour, contract labour and self-employment are not really new. These forms of labour can be found throughout the history of capitalism (Stedman Jones, 1984; Wallerstein, 1974; 1979), and have constituted a good portion of women's paid work, even in the centre (cf. Mackenzie, 1986). What is "new" is that "now this all is also threatening the proletariat to their great horror" (Werlhof, 1984: 138). But, as continuing evidence of contradiction, on a global scale:

We thus get proletarianization without the creation of a classical proletariat, de-industrialization and de-proletarianization, peasantization and re-peasantization, etc. The processes of capitalist internationalization create and recreate intra- and inter-state differentiation, insecurity, and competition (Waterman, 1988: 293).

There is much speculation as to whether these changes are (a) simply part of the cyclical rhythms and secular trends of capitalism which will give rise to a new phase of capital accumulation on a world scale, or (b) part of a more fundamental transition -- like the mercantilist one out of feudalism -- to statism,

⁵⁸Robinson (1985) provides a theoretical account of the growing importance of the informal economy (cf. Portes and Sassen, 1987).

socialism ...?⁵⁹ Living the present as history we cannot say for sure. Only by situating our short term in the long term can we hope to make any sense of it which might help us to avoid repeating mistakes of the past.

⁵⁹See Amin et al., 1982; 1990; Arrighi et al., 1989; Tabb, 1990; Wright, 1983.

CHAPTER III

PROLETARIANIZATION VERSUS CASUALIZATION OF LABOUR IN BRITISH HISTORY

The cheapening of labour-power, by sheer abuse of the labour of women and children, by sheer robbery of every normal condition requisite for working and living, and by the sheer brutality of over-work and night-work, meets at last with natural obstacles that cannot be overstepped. So also, when based on these methods, do the cheapening of commodities and capitalist exploitation in general. So soon as this point is at last reached - and it takes many years - the hour has struck for the introduction of machinery, and for the thenceforth rapid conversion of the scattered domestic industries and also of manufactures into factory industries.

- Karl Marx

The preceding quote from Marx's (1867) Capital presents the common view of industrialization and proletarianization held by many marxian and bourgeois writers. In this chapter I draw on evidence from feminist historians and world-systems theorists to argue that capitalist industrialization has been rather more complex than it is commonly portrayed. And, far from being the "natural" process suggested in the above citation, which belies the positivist historical context of Marx's writing, proletarianization has been a more uneven process than it is often held to be. (We should note, though, that the great bulk of Marx and Engels' work shows a more nuanced sense of proletarianization than does their theoretical conceptualization.)

My purpose in this chapter is to provide an historical overview of the process of proletarianization. In the previous chapter I discussed the logic of proletarianization, here I focus on the extent and, most important for my purposes, limits to proletarianization. First for Britain, and then for Canada (in Chapter IV), I examine the standard case for proletarianization, presenting statistical interpretations of the growth of proletarian labour as a proportion of the labour force, and proletarian families as a proportion of total population. This discussion of proletarianization will entail discussions of the historical forces which have supported proletarianization, such as agricultural enclosure and industrialization.

Having presented the case for proletarianization, I will then qualify and critique the notion of a mechanically unfolding process of proletarianization through reference to evidence of continuing casual forms of labour. An historical materialist interpretation reveals that over the longue duree there has been an increase in proletarian labour throughout the capitalist world-system, but with quite dramatic regional and sectoral variations, showing a much more malleable use of the world's labour forces by capital than a strict view of proletarianization as the norm allows. Braudel's understanding of the historical intersection of "capitalism", the "market economy", and "everyday life" (see Chapter II), when applied to the capitalist industrialization of Britain and Canada, reveals that a great deal of economic activity which feeds into the capital accumulation process has not fit the strict definition of a "capitalist labour market". We see this

particularly when we consider women's work, the so-called informal economy, and the persistence of various forms of casual labour.

Where we find labour markets dominated by the logic of proletarianization, as in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution and the middle of the 20th Century, this appears as the culmination of working-class struggles which secured some regularity in the conditions of work and life for a core group of workers. Hence Wallerstein's (1983) thesis that it is the push of workers struggles, and not the pull of capital, which is the stronger force underlying proletarianization (see Chapter II). Indeed, when this regularity is attained through increased working-class power, capital has: (1) engaged in global expansion, as with the "new imperialism" at the end of the last century or through the more recent runaway shop; and (2) promoted (re)casualization of labour to overcome what business economists euphemistically call "rigidities" in the labour market. There is thus always a co-existence of proletarian and casual labour under capitalism, as we find in the histories of Britain and Canada. On a world scale, even after the rise of "industrial capitalism" (post-1770), capital has made extensive (and intensive) use of non-proletarian labour.

Most significant, as feminists point out, general accounts have often elided a whole group of labourers -- women. Focus on "the typical male worker" has omitted large areas of non-proletarianized production that have contributed to the accumulation of capital. This focus has also ignored the integral role of household work, most often done by women, in reproducing and sustaining labour-

power. Capital has historically benefitted from a range of services and use values produced by household labour without which the male proletarian could not survive. (Much of this reproductive work is now discussed as part of the so-called informal economy.) And, of course, a great number of those who entered the ranks of the proletariat during the Industrial Revolution were women and children, who were subject to the most degrading and super-exploitative conditions of work (Marx, 1867).

In Section 3.1, I briefly map out the standard history of proletarianization in Britain, widely accepted as the classic case, in its quantitative dimensions. Then, in Section 3.2, I subject this standard view of the proletarianization process to criticism and qualification based on a reading of capitalism's history which recognizes capital's continuing reliance on a mix of proletarian and casual forms of labour. (I present a similar discussion of the Canadian case in Chapter IV.) In so doing, I examine arguments and evidence that challenge some of the long-held biases regarding the extent and content of proletarianization, with respect to women's work, reproduction of labour-power, and intersection of formal and informal economies.

3.1 Quantitative Dimensions

Given a combination of unavailability and incommensurability of data over time, historical measurement of increases in full-time wage-labour forces is a

daunting task.⁶⁰ I began a survey of literature which might be used for a composite of these growth trends, finding snatches of the picture here, and snatches there, and confronted the foreboding thought that my entire project might become a piecing together of this jigsaw puzzle. This potential problem could in itself, I thought, support my thesis on the limits to proletarianization. However, I discovered that Tilly (1984) has recently undertaken the task of providing us with a statistical account, through summary of the relevant literature for Europe as a whole, along with a useful discussion of the conceptual and methodological problems encountered in confronting the data.

I have chosen the period running from the 16th Century to the 19th Century, both because this is the generally accepted period for the development of capitalism, and because my sources date the expansion of the proletariat from the early 16th Century, and provide data to illustrate this expansion. It is argued that those studies of proletarianization that focus only on the period of the Industrial Revolution, are looking at an already accomplished fact. Levine (1984: 120), for example, notes:

Hill's recognition of the early modern background of proletarianization and the protests against it made by those becoming proletarianized is salutary. It provides a solid counterweight to the incorrect inference that could be

⁶⁰In his study of the statistical expansion of proletarian families, Levine (1984: 119) states: "It should be pointed out that for the purposes of the present argument, exactness and accuracy are not my utmost concern, since what I am trying to establish are changing orders of magnitude. Given the lack of anything approaching certainty, we might do well to bear in mind R.H. Tawney's injunction about the relative nature of statistics in this prestatistical age: For most sides of economic life statistical evidence is so scanty, before the day of the Political Arithmetician; that there is a temptation, when it exists, to make too much of it." I would suggest that many students of proletarianization have done exactly that (see below).

drawn from the work of scholars whose emphasis is on the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: that this process was both new to and a peculiar characteristic of their period.⁶¹

(Of course, my own survey of the longue duree will be necessarily general -- to establish the trend of proletarianization. But, unlike many of my sources, I wish to establish that the process of proletarianization was only partial, even through the Industrial Revolution.)

First, there is the problem of defining what is meant by proletarianization. Tilly (1984: 13-4) settles on the criteria of "(1) separation of workers from control of means of production (expropriation, for short), and (2) increasing dependence of workers on the sale of their labor power (wage work, for short)." Where we see these two related trends, we see the process of proletarianization.

Tilly (1984: 17) notes the relation between the historical development of capitalism and proletarianization, and then proceeds to ask where we should look for proletarianization. He discusses the relative merits and demerits of three paths to proletarianization: (1) social mobility, including the much-discussed "enclosure movement", (2) natural increase, the result of births and deaths, and (3) net migration. Of course, Tilly notes, each of these, and their various combinations, offers multiple possibilities. (Some of these will be discussed below.) More specifically, to study proletarianization: "We look for times and places in which capitalists are consolidating their power over production and in which the alternatives open to the local population are diminishing" (Tilly, 1984: 23).

⁶¹The reference here is to Hill, 1964.

To begin his count, Tilly cites Saville's (1969: 251-2) general sketch of the timing and loci of European proletarianization:

- (1) the development of commercial farming during medieval times and the existence, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, of a class of capitalist farmers;
- (2) the slow disappearance of the peasantry as a substantial element in rural society over the three centuries from 1500 to 1800...;
- (3) the presence in the countryside, from the sixteenth century onwards...of a class of landless labourers; their swelling numbers in the eighteenth century, in part the result of the further decline of the peasant class, in part the product of natural population growth;
- (4) the growth of the large farm...;
- (5) the growing concentration of land in the ownership of the landlord class from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards...;
- (6) accompanying the social changes in the agrarian structure went the technical transformation of farming methods.

From his survey of other sources, Tilly then presents a table of estimates of the percentage of the British agricultural population consisting of labourers, from circa 1600 to 1951 (see Table 3.1). This series of data sets reflects two general trends: (1) an increase in the agricultural proletariat from 1600 to the mid-1850s, then (2) a decline from the mid-1850s to the mid-1950s. These are the results that we might expect to find. As agriculture is increasingly capitalized, land is concentrated into the hands of large landowners, and the mass of producers more and more are reduced to (not necessarily full-time) wage-labour. Then, with the Industrial Revolution, as the manufacturing industries grow; populations become more urbanized; and agriculture is increasingly capitalized (constant capital replaces variable capital), there is a sort of petit-bourgeoisification of agriculture.

But the data are problematic. "A glance at the table identifies two major difficulties: First, the numbers oscillate implausibly from one period to the next;

TABLE 3.1. Estimates of the Percentage of the British Agricultural Population Consisting of Labourers.

DATE	PERCENTAGE	REFERENCE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION	AUTHOR OF ESTIMATE	CITATION
C.1600	25-33	Entire rural population, England and Wales	Alan Everitt	Everitt, 1967: 398
1688	66	English families	Gregory King	Mathias, 1957: 45
1760	59	Families, England and Wales	Joseph Massie	Mathias, 1957: 45
1803	62	Families, England and Wales	Patrick Colquhoun	Colquhoun, 1806: 23
1812	49	Males in agriculture, Great Britain and Ireland	Patrick Colquhoun	Colquhoun, 1815: 124-125
1831	76	Males 20 and over in agriculture, Great Britain	1831 Census	Abstract: xiii
1841	76	All persons classified	1841 Census	Sprackman, 1847: 143
1851	80	All persons classified	1851 Census	Census, 1851: 148
1851	79	Total in agriculture	1851 Census	Bellerby, 1958: 3
1911	64	Total in agriculture	1911 Census	Bellerby, 1958: 3
1931	59	Total in agriculture	1931 Census	Bellerby, 1958: 3
1951	54	Total in agriculture	1951 Census	Bellerby, 1958: 3

SOURCE:

Charles Tilly, "Demographic Origins of the European Proletariat", in David Levine (ed.), Proletarianization and Family History. New York: Academic Press, 1984: 28.

second, the categories and base populations fluctuate almost as wildly" (Tilly, 1984:27). Tilly suggests explanations for some of the oscillations,⁶² and then offers a "few tentative, meagre conclusions":

1. During most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a large share--most likely a majority--of Britain's agricultural labor force consisted of landless laborers.
2. Since the population of England and Wales may well have risen from 4 to 5 million people during the seventeenth century and from 5 to 9 million during the eighteenth, even a relatively constant proportion of proletarians implies a substantial increase in their absolute number.
3. During the early nineteenth century, both the absolute number and the proportion of agricultural laborers grew considerably.
4. After the middle of the nineteenth century, laborers left British agriculture so rapidly that the total agricultural labor force contracted, and the share of farmers rose significantly (Tilly, 1984: 28-9).

Thus, argues Tilly, for the century after 1851 we witness a deproletarianization of British agriculture, while the industrial labour force is proletarianizing rapidly.

Levine (1984: 88) offers estimates for the expansion of the British proletariat overall, in agriculture and industry, for the whole period from the early 1500s to 1851:

Let us begin by considering the magnitude of these changes. In 1524-1525 a subsidy was levied on Henry VIII's subjects to pay for one of his foreign wars. This graduated wealth tax suggests that about one-quarter of the adult male population was not assessed on property at all, but rather on their wages. Because it is unlikely that all or even the majority of those adult males assessed on wages were lifelong proletarians, we would be

⁶²One reason that Massie's figures record an apparent drop in the proletarian share of agricultural population between 1688 and 1760 is simply that in 1688 King saw no need to distinguish rural industrial workers from the rest of the laborers, whereas in 1760 Massie enumerated 100,000 families who were 'Manufacturers of Wood, Iron, etc.,' likewise in the country.

"Again, Massie mentions no 'vagrants' in 1760.... Gregory King, on the other hand, listed 30,000 vagrants for 1688, and Patrick Colquhoun counted a full 234,000 of them in 1803. Many 'vagrants' were indubitably unemployed agricultural labourers on the road. Should they, too, be included in the agricultural proletariat?" (Tilly, 1984: 27-8).

making a generous allowance if we proposed that there were something like 600,000 proletarians and their dependents in a total population that might have numbered 2.4 million. If we shift our attention forward some 11 or 12 generations, to the middle of the nineteenth century, we find that four out of five members of the labor force were either "employees" or domestic servants. This crude estimation suggests that from a population of 18 million at the time of the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851, there were likely to have been about 14 million proletarians and their dependents. Between the end of the medieval period in the 1520s and the heyday of its capitalist successor, the English population rose over seven times. During these same 11 or 12 generations, the proletariat grew much faster--it rose more than 23-fold.

So for 1851, Tilly and Levine register almost 80 percent of the labour forces in both agriculture and industry to be proletarianized. And Tilly suggests that Europe as a whole was not far behind, with about 70 percent proletarianized in 1843 (see Table 3.2). This is important to keep in mind if we are not to slip into viewing a British exceptionalism, which sees continental Europe as still largely "proto-industrial", and Britain fully proletarianized. For I wish to explore in this thesis the interconnections of a capitalist world-economy where, let us recall, the Dutch took the lead (Beaud, 1983; Wallerstein, 1974).⁶³

It was, of course, Britain that took the great leap forward and, as Marx (1867) demonstrated, showed most clearly the basic social relations that distinguished the new social formation from the old. But these new social relations were a long time in coming. Beaud (1983: 30) notes that at the end of the English revolutions of the 17th Century "the rural world remained predominant" (see Table 3.3). We could be generous and combine the categories of "artisans",

⁶³As well, though trying to preserve the particularity of each case, we have to look for the general along with the particular in the Canadian case (see below).

TABLE 3.2. Estimates of the European Proletarian Population in 1550, 1750, and 1843
(in thousands).

Year and Category	Total Population	Proletarian Population	Nonproletarians	Percentage Proletarian
1550				
Rural	61,175	15,661	45,514	25.6
Urban	<u>10,325</u>	<u>1,600</u>	<u>8,725</u>	15.5
	71,500	17,261	54,239	24.3
1750				
Rural	113,100	68,539	44,561	60.6
Urban	<u>18,150</u>	<u>8,131</u>	<u>10,019</u>	44.8
	131,250	76,670	54,580	58.4
1843				
Rural	145,453	115,844	30,609	79.1
Urban	<u>63,194</u>	<u>32,671</u>	<u>30,523</u>	51.7
	209,647	148,515	61,132	70.8

SOURCE: Charles Tilly, "Demographic Origins of the European Proletariat", in David Levine (ed.), Proletarianization and Family History. New York: Academic Press, 1984: 28.

TABLE 3.3. Social Classes and Income in England and Wales, 1688.

Class	Number of Families	Heads per Family	Family Annual Income (in pounds)
Lords	186	37	2,590
Baronets	800	16	880
Knights	600	13	650
Squires	3,000	10	450
Traders (maritime)	2,000	8	400
Gentry	12,000	8	280
State officials	5,000	8	240
Traders (land)	8,000	6	200
Jurists and lawyers	10,000	7	140
State clerks	5,000	6	120
Rich farmers	40,000	7	84
Navy officers	5,000	4	80
Army officers	4,000	4	60
High clergy	2,000	6	60
Professionals	16,000	5	60
Middle level peasant's	140,000	5	50
Low clergy	8,000	5	45
Merchants and shopkeepers	40,000	4.5	45
Farmers	150,000	5	44
Artisans	60,000	4	40
Sailors	50,000	3	20
Labourers	364,000	3.5	15
Soldiers	35,000	2	14
Poor and landless peasants	400,000	3.25	6.10s
Vagabonds	30,000 persons		2

SOURCES: Peter Mathias, *The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914*. London: Oxford, 1969:24; Michael Beaud, *A History of Capitalism, 1500-1980*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983:30.

"labourers", "poor and landless peasants", and "vagabonds" from Table 3.3, and argue that the populations of England and Wales was roughly 60 per cent proletarianized at the end of the 17th Century (cf. Table 3.1). But these categories include a diversity of production (and non-production) situations and conditions that hardly fit the classic definition of proletarian (see below). It is obvious, though, once we get into the 18th Century, that proletarianization as a process is well underway. What has been more keenly debated is the question of the main impetus to proletarianization. Was it the enclosure movement, as Marx's writings seem to suggest? Or was population growth a la Malthus the main contributing factor?⁶⁴

Lazonick (1974) offers a qualified defence of Marx, and a critique of bourgeois economic historians who focus on population growth. Lazonick sees both ideological and methodological misinterpretation of Marx, and criticizes those like Chambers (1953) who present economic analyses and restrict themselves to the period of the "Industrial Revolution". Lazonick notes that "Marxist economists, on the other hand, analyze the period of the 'industrial revolution' not as the starting point of the process of 'industrialization', but as a particular, and historically explicable, outcome of a centuries-long transition from feudalism to capitalism" (Lazonick, 1974: 2). He continues:

The 'industrial revolution-industrialization' approach seriously distorts economic history by creating the illusion that economic development consists primarily of the triumph of the advanced manufacturing or 'indus-

⁶⁴I take it, following my sources, that net migration, mentioned by Tilly (see above), was not a primary factor in the British case.

trial' sector over the backward agricultural or 'traditional' sector. This illusion is shattered by the Marxist approach which locates the key to the rise of capitalism in the transformation of the production relations in the agricultural sector itself (Lazonick, 1974: 3).

This is why Marx focused on the enclosure movement -- because he saw more than a history of only cumulative economic-technical advance, as described by simplistic bourgeois work (e.g., Durkheim, 1893). Marx saw not just technological advance and a more complex division of labour, but a fundamental restructuring of relations of production (class structure) towards a new social formation -- capitalism.

For Marx, then, it was not sufficient to consider the rapid increase in the size of the proletariat once the Industrial Revolution had already begun, whatever the reasons for this population growth might have been (see below). It was necessary to derive the underlying causes for the emergence of this class as a predominant class in the rising social order. Therefore, Marx (1867) devoted considerable attention to the transformation of the relations of production and the so-called primitive accumulation of capital leading up to the Industrial Revolution (cf. Saville, 1969). In short, population growth may be important to consider when studying the expansion of the proletariat. But it does not give us the origin of the class. Hence the need to study enclosure as parcel to the transformation of social relations of production.

But Lazonick also notes that Marx did not singularly focus on the enclosure movement, despite the criticism of his detractors. Marx was interested in the various ways that producing classes may have been thrown into the "free" wage-

labour market, and enclosure was one of the most obvious routes. Lazonick agrees with critics of Marx that there was probably a good deal of "enclosure by consent" but, especially as we approach the period of Industrial Revolution, there is an increase in state acts of enclosure, or "forced enclosure" (though, to qualify these distinctions, there may have been social, economic and political conditions forcing enclosures by "consent"). The drama of these "forced enclosures" obviously caught Marx's eye.

Lazonick (1974: 4) argues, following Marx, "it is the fate of the peasantry, which even in the 15th Century was highly differentiated within its own ranks [see Figure 3.1] which is the historical key to the rise of capitalist production". Crucial here is "the separation of the mass of producers from the means of production", and "the development of the forces of production in agriculture" (Lazonick, 1974: 5).

The results of enclosure in England, which took place throughout the transition process, were, according to Marx, not only the creation of purely private property in agriculture, but also the creation of a landless labour force, an expanded food supply to feed this labour force, a home market for agricultural and manufacturing products, and the concentration of landed wealth (Lazonick, 1974: 5).

This whole discussion of the origins and growth of the proletariat has been especially important to marxist explanations of the emergence of the new social formation of capitalism. Over a period of roughly four centuries we see the dispossession of the peasantry, and the emergence of capital and wage-labour as the predominant classes (Figure 3.1). And just as there were various routes into the bourgeoisie -- out of the yeomanry and small farmers, or conversion of large

**FIGURE 3.1. Social Classes in Agrarian England from the 13th Century to the 19th Century
and the Major Mobility Patterns within the Agricultural Sector.**

CENTURY

SOURCE: Modified from William Lazonick, "Karl Marx and Enclosures in England", *Review of Radical Political Economy*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 1974): 12.

landlords and merchants (Bergier, 1973; Wallerstein, 1979) -- so there were long and circuitous routes into wage-labour. But that there was this fundamental transformation from a predominantly landlord-serf structure of feudalism prior to 1500 to a predominantly bourgeois-proletarian relation by 1900 is beyond doubt. What must be kept in mind though, is that the fundamental social relations that typify the two social formations are not exclusive, nor do they always obtain in pure form, especially on the peripheries.

3.2 Qualifications

I would now like to offer a critique of the statistical picture of a steady unfolding of the proletariat presented by many -- especially Marxists. It seems to me that, with the continuance of various combinations of subsistence production, home industry, et cetera; unemployment and underemployment; and women's work in reproduction that is generally not considered in formal accounting -- and all of this lasting right into the 20th Century -- we must question the assumptions leading to the sort of statistical estimates discussed in the previous section. As capitalism has expanded on a world scale, we have seen both increase of unemployment and informal economy in the centre, and the articulation of proletarian and other forms of labour on the periphery, with the household economy as the obvious locus of this articulation.

For Britain, some of the demographic studies mentioned above (e.g., Levine, 1984), and moreso the work of feminist historians, have returned the

household economy to centre stage. The study of women's work in production and reproduction, and the household economy as the site for much of that work -- ignored in studies of male wage-labour -- has now acquired a place of prominence in research into proletarianization. And this research, much of it spawned by the feminist movement beginning in the last century, has put paid to a lot of old male myths about the proletariat, and about capitalism (cf. Braudel, 1977; 1979). The rather too easy transposition of Marx's (1867) abstract concept "mode of production" onto concrete reality seems now to be on the way out (cf. Palmer, 1984). And the way that capital has been able historically to make use of non-proletarian forms of labour for both accumulation of capital and reproduction of bourgeois-proletarian relations per se have become important areas of research.

In his now-classic The Making of the English Working Class, E.P.

Thompson (1968: 211) notes: "Still, in 1830, the adult male cotton-spinner was no more typical of that elusive figure, the 'average working man', than is the coventry motor-worker of the 1960s". By 1830 we are well into the first phase of the Industrial Revolution. But artisan labour and non-factory production abound, much of it relying on female labour. In fact, through the first phase of the Industrial Revolution, home and workshop production of textiles continued side-by-side with a growing factory production.

According to Hobsbawm (1964: 55), "the obvious way of industrial expansion in the eighteenth century was not to construct factories, but to extend the so-called domestic system". And Thompson (1968: 259) tells us that, even

in 1830, the characteristic industrial worker worked not in a mill or factory but (as an artisan or 'mechanic') in a small workshop or in his own home, or (as a labourer) in more-or-less casual employment in the streets, on building sites, on the docks.

Thompson goes on to tell us that in textiles "outwork" -- now we hear much about "contracting out" -- still predominated. Osterud (1986: 45) describes the situation in the Leicester hosiery industry, which she refers to as having been organized on a "capitalist basis":⁶⁵

Production was organized on the putting-out system. Merchants owned the raw materials and sold the finished product, while workers were paid by the piece for the goods they produced. They used relatively sophisticated hand-operated machines, called knitting frames, but did not own them; frames were rented, and the charge was deducted from the workers' earnings. As in other putting-out industries, the household was the basic work unit, and all family members participated in income-producing labour. Jobs were allocated on the basis of age and sex. In a typical family, the husband and father would work the knitting frame while children wound bobbins and the wife and mother seamed the stockings; in large families, older daughters might help with the seaming while the wife or an older son might work a second frame.

We still see the age and gender division of labour, and the work process that characterized cottage industry before it came to be dominated as outwork for merchant capitalists. Tilly and Scott (1987: 47) offer the example of the broadloom weavers:

Wives of skilled craftsmen who worked at home usually assisted their husbands, sharing the same room, if not the same bench or table. The wife sometimes prepared or finished materials on which the husband worked. These wives spun for their weaver husbands, polished metal for cutlers, sewed buttonholes for tailors, and waxed shoes for shoemakers. Sometimes a wife's work was identical to her husband's, as this romanticized portrait of two broadloom weavers makes clear:

⁶⁵This is true if Osterud is thinking in terms of "historical capitalism" (Wallerstein, 1983), or "actually existing capitalism" (Amin, 1989). See Chapter I above.

‘Or if the broader mantle be the task
 He chooses some companion to his toil
 from side to side, with amicable aim
 Each to the other darts the nimble bolt’.

If not as early in general as Osterud's example of the hosiers, Thompson (1968: 299) argues that between 1780 and 1830 many who previously controlled their own household economies -- based on a number of productive activities, including part-time weaving -- were "debased" to the level of what he calls "proletarian outworkers".

In the West Country by the end of the eighteenth century the weavers were already outworkers, employed by the great gentlemen clothier who 'buys the wool, pays for the spinning, weaving, Milling, Dying, Shearing, Dressing, etc.', and who might employ as many as 1,000 workers in these processes. A Yorkshire witness in 1806 contrasted the two systems. In the West Country, 'there is no such thing as what we in Yorkshire call the domestic system; what I mean by the domestic system is the little clothiers living in villages, or in detached places, with all their comforts, carrying on business with their own capital.... I understand that in the west of England it is quite the reverse of that, the manufacturer there is the same as our common workman in a factory in Yorkshire, except living in a detached house; in the west the wool is delivered out to them to weave, in Yorkshire it is the man's own property' (Thompson, 1968: 299-300).

By the end of the 18th Century, the new technology was being applied to the old industries, including textiles. Spinning was revolutionized with James Hargreaves' invention of the spinning-jenny in 1766, which enabled one hand labourer to spin many threads at a time. The invention of Richard Arkwright's water-frame in 1769 and Samuel Crompton's mule in 1779 replaced hand labour altogether, and required power to drive them -- first water-power, then steam. In weaving, the invention of John Kay's flying shuttle in 1733 (though not in general use until after 1760) doubled the width of cloth that one person could weave, and

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

the invention of Edmund Cartwright's power loom in 1784 eventually enabled weaving to catch up with spinning. Given the size of the textile industry, these changes set up chain reactions in other sectors, and soon affected the whole economy (Williams, 1980: 266).

"The accelerated growth of the British economy in the last decades of the 18th century generated employment opportunities in both the old and new sectors - for instance, in handloom weaving and in cotton spinning factories, in road construction as well as in canal building" (Richards, 1974: 344). But Richards (1974: 344) argues that the expansion of handloom weaving was only temporary -- lasting until about 1830 (cf. Thompson, 1968). By then the increasing use of the new technology and growth of factory production was making the hand producers less competitive. It was, though, not the introduction of new methods of production per se which made hand labour less competitive, but the super-exploitation of female and child labour.

Richards (1974: 344) states that, "in the most spectacular growth sector, cotton, there was a disproportionate expansion in jobs which were to become almost specific to women". He notes that the early mill owners had trouble recruiting male workers and habituating them to the time-discipline of factory production (cf. Thompson, 1967). "The consequence was that the lowest elements in the economy were drawn upon - the 'transient, marginal and deviant' - but particular resort was made to women and children". Referring to the case of Scotland, Richards (1974) explains how the new lines of work in the factories

required less muscular strength, but did require docility easily supplied by women. More important, as machinery reduced the need for manual effort, it became more convenient and cheaper to use the labour of women and children. "These developments in the cotton industry mark the dramatic, prefatory phase in the long slow migration of many functions and trades from the homes of the workers to the factories, from the countryside to the towns" (Richards, 1974: 355).

Overall, Richards argues that the hand trades gradually succumbed to factory production. "For women in particular the loss of employment in the traditional lines was probably greater than the creation of new opportunities: in hypothetical terms, the level of technological/structural unemployment, for women, rose". Richards argues, "therefore, that 'the rise of the factory girl' was an exceptional and atypical development in the industrializing economy" (1974: 346). He continues to say that the new cotton industry rapidly generated tens of thousands of jobs for women, but was regionally concentrated in its impact, and other industries created few employment opportunities. Even within textiles, if the gains are compared to losses of work for women in all branches, the net result may have been a reduced female participation. There was clearly a shrinkage of opportunities in many of the metal trades and in agriculture after 1815. And the leading sectors of the economy, such as iron and steel, railways, chemicals, and building, offered few employment benefits for women. Richards (1974: 346) says this all "gave rise to the mid-Victorian problem of the underemployed female".

Now the crux of the problem here is partly definitional. Are these women "underemployed" proletarians, or are they only "semi-proletarianized"? Vilas (1984) argues the former in the case of what might be called "ex-peasants" (Petras, 1978) in Nicaragua. But if these people are engaged in non-proletarian forms of production activities, as well as wage-work, and if we are careful to consider the work in reproduction that women, especially, continue to be engaged in even during their Victorian period of underemployment, then perhaps it is better to say that they are only semi-proletarianized.

Richards (1974) analysis is too limited¹. He does not consider women's reproductive activities and the relation of these activities to production activities formally defined -- the link between production and reproduction. Pahl (1984) is careful to make a distinction between "work" and "employment" (formal wage-work). He thus distinguishes different forms of productive activity, but can still pay attention to the link between production and reproduction -- between formal and informal work.

Richards' focus on the specific area of employment -- abstracting from Pahl's more general category of work -- leads to the impression that many women in the mid-to-late 1800s were not engaged in productive activities. He suggests a U-shaped curve depicting women engaged in production prior to the Industrial Revolution, dropping out of production work as we get into the Industrial Revolution, and returning to production in the mid-1900s. He argues that the areas

open to women workers (e.g., in textiles) were not sufficient to replace old areas lost. But this is in the formal wage economy.

We know that all the women made "redundant" by new methods of production were not sitting idle. Indeed, anyone who does any amount of "housework" and child care (areas of reproduction) knows they are not under-worked! Richards' point, and his U-shaped curve, are accurate as far as they go, but they do not go far enough. Recent work in women's history and in the sociology of development shows that formal wage-work cannot be seen as separate from other forms of work, and production and reproduction cannot be separated.

We know from the flowering of studies that do not focus solely on proletarian wage-work, that whole families continued to mix ways of "getting by" right through the Industrial Revolution. Stedman Jones' (1984) study of the casual labour market in Victorian London shows this well. This was a market of both men and women. Stedman Jones (1984: 83) argues that the "skilled and often semi-skilled wage rates of men in London were generally higher than elsewhere. Because of this, wives of skilled men normally did not work". But he continues: "Only semi-genteel occupations like small shopkeeping were considered to be fitting occupations for the wives of skilled men". Despite the slippage in terminology here -- work versus occupation -- it appears that even skilled workers' wives did work. For the less skilled: "The casual earnings of the men ... virtually necessitated the supplementary earnings of the women" (Stedman Jones, 1984: 85).

Stedman Jones (1984: 66) notes that there was an increase in casual labour and a decrease in the full-time manufacturing labour force between 1861 and 1891 -- during a cyclical upturn and a subsequent downturn in the economy. But even after the late 19th Century "great depression" (1873-1895), in seasonal and casual occupations there was a constant necessity for supplementary female labour.

An investigation into the condition of dockers in the Tidal Basin district of West Ham in 1909 revealed that almost without exception there was another person occupied in each family. This situation was not new. Mayhew mentioned street selling, charring, laundering, and needle work as the general occupations of labourers' wives.... In districts where there was a concentration of male casual labour, there sprang up parallel forms of female casual employment (Stedman Jones, 1984: 84-5).

Broadly speaking, there were two types of female casual employ -- factory work for the unmarried daughters of the male casual labourer, and homework for his wife.

According to Wolf (1982: 358), "the term working classes first emerged around 1815". He goes on to note the use of women and children in textile mills in the "first phase of the Industrial Revolution", and then adds:

In the English mill towns around 1850 [working-class nuclear families] coped with the problems of survival by sending women and children to work, or by aggregating ('huddling') into larger domestic groups. In the textile center of Oldham, one third of the mothers of children eleven years and under went to work, as did a quarter of the children themselves.... At the same time, people in the mill towns strove to maintain ties with kinsmen in the countryside, often with an eye toward maximizing mutual advantages (1982: 359).

In discussing the woollen industry in Devonshire in the late 1800s, Gittins (1986: 252) contends that cottage industry prevailed until the middle of the 19th Century,

when rapid mechanization resulted in a growing consolidation of capital and a proletarianization of the workforce. The process of proletarianization, however, was not gender-neutral. It was quite markedly a process of feminization of the workforce as well. As women's labour was both cheap and plentiful and, in this area particularly, generally lacking in opportunities, it resulted in extremely high profit margins for the local capitalists [as it does today].

But, as Gittins' own discussion shows, this was not necessarily a full-time female proletariat. The majority of "women's work" -- including industrial homework and domestic labour in reproduction -- was not proletarian. But this work fed the accumulation of capital nonetheless. In fact, it has been forcefully argued that women's work was an important source for the primary accumulation of capital (Middleton, 1983). In further discussing women's work in Britain in the latter 1800s, Gittins (1986: 253) notes: "Some women worked in the formal economy until they married, then withdrew and worked full-time in the informal economy as wives and mothers, often entering the formal economy for a period, or part-time, when economic circumstances within the family-household necessitated it".

The studies I have cited in this section reveal the limits to proletarianization. The renewed interest in the study of women's work makes this plain, but even the provisos and asides in less sensitive studies of proletarianization are suggestive. Most explicit are recent studies which consciously aim to give us a view of the totality of women's experience in formal and informal work, in the labour market and the home. The collections edited by John (1986) and Lewis (1986) are good examples covering the British case for the 19th and early 20th

Centuries. The studies contained therein cover a range of topics from women's participation in various trades; links between relations of production and reproduction (biological and socio-economic); strategies for survival of the family economy; to women's trade union and political organizing.

These studies support two of my main contentions: (1) women have consistently been active in (formal and informal) economic activities -- without which working-class families could not have survived; and (2) many of these activities were not what we could classify as proletarian labour. Nevertheless, they are activities that contributed both directly to the accumulation of capital, and to the reproduction of proletarian labour per se. In her "Introduction", John (1986: 3) explains why women's work has often been missed by economic historians:

Many of the generalized categories used to define and describe employment - full-time/part-time, rural/urban, heavy/light, indoor/outdoor, adult/child - are inadequate, inappropriate and sometimes misleading when applied to women's experiences. Women frequently slipped in and out of such polarities, much of their work being casual and seasonal (such as hay-making, hop picking, market gardening or a temporary resort to prostitution). For married women in particular it might not even be perceived as employment since it did not necessarily involve going out to work.

The varied activities through which women have helped their families to scrounge for livings have continued right into the 20th Century. Roberts' (1986) study of "women's strategies" from 1890-1940 reveals that, throughout the period, many working-class women struggled to find the means to feed, clothe, and house their families. Their husbands' wages alone were not sufficient to do this, and so

they had to find ways to both supplement their incomes and to spend them as economically as possible.

These various methods of balancing families' budgets may be termed 'strategies' and they included: married women working part- or full-time; relying on children's wages; exerting the most rigid control over their household budgets; using the products of their families' allotments; and borrowing both goods and cash (Roberts, 1986: 223).

Roberts goes on to note that, for the working-class woman, the public and private spheres of life are interrelated. Working-class women have been engaged in both productive and reproductive tasks, so the lines drawn between the so-called public and private spheres of life blur. And the wages of both husbands and wives who work in the public sphere are intended for the family and the home.

3.3 Conclusions

I have marshalled evidence in this chapter to show that there has been historical tension -- contradiction -- between forces promoting use of proletarian labour, and those favouring use of casual labour. New sectors have, especially with industrialization, been proletarianized. But, after initial resistance to proletarianization, workers' struggles, prompted and abetted by the process of proletarianization (socialization) of labour itself, begin to hamper capital's ability to accumulate capital and control labour processes -- there is a tendency to disinvest and look for new areas of accumulation; regain control over production through increasing the organic composition of capital and/or (re)casualizing work; or some combination of these.

The empirical evidence shows that the process of proletarianization has been patchy and uneven. It has taken various twists and turns around economic crises, secular transformations, and political upheavals. We saw at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution that there was no great rush on the part of capital to abandon cottage industry and small-scale manufacturing production. Marglin (1974) argues, against technological determinist accounts of industrialization, that what drove capital toward increasing division of labour through large-scale manufacture was less the need to increase productivity than the need to control labour.

Once proletarianization is underway, another element of class struggle comes to the fore, with the labouring classes who first resisted proletarianization now fighting to better their conditions on the proletarian terrain. This leads Wallerstein (1983) to argue that the workers themselves have given prime impetus to proletarianization. The struggles for better working conditions; for a ten hour day in Britain (Marx, 1867; Thompson, 1968) and a nine hour day in Canada (Kealey and Palmer, 1982); for better pay -- indeed, for a "family wage"; and for trade union rights, have all contributed to proletarianization. But there were limits to the process.

It is generally argued that as we move into the 20th Century women slip out of the productive economy and into the home, as the "family wage economy" with its male "breadwinner" transforms women into "homemakers" and consumers (cf. Pahl, 1984; Richards, 1974). Now the truth to this is that males were obvious in

the formal economy in skilled, blue-collar trades, which came to be defined as proletarian labour. But women were entering into areas of the expanding service economy, which seems only to have been "discovered" in post-World War II writings in the sociology of work. And they were being forced to develop new strategies to confront the "universal market" and its intrusions into the family economy. The new "housework" for women was no less onerous, as it "expanded to fill the time available" and, as some studies have shown, "new technology created more work, not less" (Pahl, 1984: 75).

Pahl (1984) shows that the notion of classical proletarian labour has not been the rule, but rather "by-employment", "getting-by", and "informal economy" to which increasing numbers of proletarians are being forced to return (cf. Mies et al., 1988). However, the return is often very difficult because the structures and resources which supported those activities have disappeared (cf. Smith, 1987). Nevertheless, many men and women, especially in "have not" regions, have been forced to resort to casual labour. And, as noted above, women's accelerated entry into the post-World War II formal labour market has been an entry into part-time, temporary and other forms of casual labour, while many of their male partners have been made "redundant" by the current (post-1973) global crisis.

The history of capitalism presented in this chapter has been given to support my argument that full-time proletarian labour has not been the rule historically. The slow but perceptible rhythms of the longue duree of the modern era, centred around growth of production for the capitalist market, have brought

more and more labourers into contact with that market, but not always in the form of proletarian labour. There has been substantial growth of wage-labour forces at periods of more rapid change, those periods characterized by Braudel as structural and conjunctural history, such as periods of agricultural enclosure, or the Industrial Revolution. But for business as usual, even during these periods of great flux, capital has relied on a mix of production forms, with casual labour being quite normal.

We are now living in another conjuncture of great historical flux, a period of global crisis and uncertainty, with great changes which seem to challenge the old ways and the old forms of production. But these changes are also forcing us to challenge some old myths, myths about what is normal under capitalism, myths about what actually existing capitalist production really is. The changes seem so dramatic and rapid for those of us living them that most analysts are not even sure how to label them, or the period they are precipitating. So it is common to find the old labels used with the preface "post" -- post-industrialism, post-Fordism, post-imperialism, even post-capitalism, sometimes by authors who call themselves post-Marxists. In the following chapter I present a parallel discussion of Canadian history.

CHAPTER IV

PROLETARIANIZATION VERSUS CASUALIZATION OF LABOUR IN CANADIAN HISTORY

Commercial capitalism has been ... a system that asked remarkably few questions about the method of production of the goods in which it dealt. It could readily integrate slave societies, feudal societies and incipient capitalist societies into its structure. It is not apparent that the European settlers of Canada were prohibited in any absolute sense from arranging production upon a basis of slavery, or upon a basis of small-scale capitalism: European settlers elsewhere had chosen such courses.... The basis of choice of method in Canada's case (and in the other cases) lay in the nature of the supply of, and demand for, labour.

- H. Clare Pentland

We have seen with the classic British case that the development of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution did bring an increased use of proletarian labour. But we have also seen that historical capitalism does not quite fit the mold of pure capitalism as theorized by Marx and others. There was no mechanical unfolding of the process of proletarianization, which rather proceeded by fits and starts, and was always found in combination with other forms of labour, given the particular conjunctural needs of capital, or survival needs of the working classes. In this chapter I present an examination of the Canadian case to show that here too we find an example of historical capitalism characterized by a mix of proletarian and non-proletarian labour.

Canada's history of proletarianization differs from that of Britain in certain respects because of Canada's different insertion into the capitalist world-economy. Despite the global parameters of its growth, the development of capitalism in Britain was relatively more indigenous than that of Canada. Capitalism immigrated to Canada, as did much of the population who came to stock the proletariat.

There is, of course, a sort of dialectic of external and internal factors affecting the particular character of the formation of capitalist social relations in Canada. The mercantile capitalist interest in Canada as a colonial producer of staple products (cf. Naylor, 1972; 1975; Ryerson, 1963; 1968); the geography of the country; the character of the most important staple products themselves (cf. Innis, 1940; 1954); the political history of conquest of Canada's indigenous peoples; the history of conflict between the conquering powers -- French and British; the pattern of settlement and status of Canada as a "settler colony"; the background and character of the settlers who stocked the working class in the 19th and 20th Centuries; the effect of a "revolutionary" United States on a "loyalist" Canada; and the impact of having a larger, expansionist economy to the south, are among the factors that have been advanced as determinants of the character of Canada's patterns of proletarianization and industrialization. In world time Canada might, for lack of a better term, be characterized as a "late starter" on the road to industrialization (Laxer, 1985). And granted, the existence of more developed states in the capitalist world-economy has been demonstrated by countless

dependency writers to have an impact on the manoeuvrability of lesser powers. But manoeuvre they have, in some cases ascending beyond previous leading centre states -- the United Kingdom over the Dutch United Provinces, the United States over the United Kingdom, and now, perhaps, a reunited Germany in the West, and Japan in the East, over the United States.

Capitalism in Canada began with the cod fisheries, which contributed to the original accumulation of capital in Europe and to the food stock for a growing European population. Settlement and a more complete incorporation of Canada into the European world-economy came with the fur trade. This "trade" also had the greatest impact on Canada's indigenous population, which was incorporated into the circuit of mercantile capital through exchange of the staple product (fur) for European commodities, provision of (mainly female) service work around the trading posts, and eventually provision of (primarily Metis) wage-labour in transportation and other aspects of the trade (cf. Bourgeault, 1983; 1988).

European settlement began with work around the staple trades -- services, shipping, et cetera -- and in agriculture. In French Canada agriculture took the form of the quasi-feudal seigniorial system, and in English Canada small settler farms. Some wage-labour existed in both agriculture and the artisan trades prior to 1800, but the development of a proletarian labour market did not get underway in Canada until the mid-1800s, with the use of wage-labour in canal and railroad building, and the spread of manufacturing and industrialization which occurred after 1850 (Pentland, 1959; 1960; Ryerson, 1963; 1968). As with the previous

chapter, in the following section I present the standard case for proletarianization in Canada. Then, in Section 4.2, I subject that case to criticism and qualification based on a more nuanced reading of Canadian history, which reveals that proletarianization has been more limited than is often thought.

4.1 Quantitative Dimensions

There are examples of forms of wage-labour in construction and manufacturing in Canada prior to the 1800s. Carpenters, for example, were hired in shipbuilding in the 17th Century in Atlantic Canada and Quebec. And in the 1730s we find the famous case of the St. Maurice Forges near Three Rivers, Quebec. Iron working went on for about 150 years at the Forges, employing between 400 and 500 persons, with a peak of 800 in the 1770s (Pentland, 1960; Ryerson, 1963). But these operations were not typical of production in general at the time, nor did they take the character of an impersonal capitalistic labour market. Labour relations in areas like shipbuilding, the fur trade, and at the Forges continued to be imbued with paternalism (Pentland, 1960; Russell, 1990).

The development of a capitalistic labour market, as Pentland (1959) calls it, really got underway with the building of the canal systems in Central Canada from the 1820s through the 1840s.

The massive canal construction program undertaken by the government of the Canadas during the 1840s created a demand for as many as 10,000 unskilled labourers at one time in Upper Canada alone. The work was labour-intensive, relying on the manpower of gangs of labourers (Bleasdale, 1982: 102).

This labour force was stocked mainly through immigration, of predominantly Irish unskilled labourers driven from their homeland by the Potato Famines. They left one onerous life (or death) for another. Work on the canals was hard and dangerous, wages were not good, nor were living conditions, and many died through accident or illness (including malaria). As a consequence, labour relations were rough and characterized by many disturbances (Bleasdale, 1982; Pentland, 1960; Ryerson, 1968).

The second great infrastructure program in Canada, in the second half of the 1800s, was the building of the railways. Much of the labour for railway construction also came through immigration, some of this -- Chinese "coolie" labour in the west -- being indentured labour (Faustino-Santos, 1988; Palmer, 1992). But the railway construction spawned outgrowths of proletarianization in, for example, mining and steelmaking. In the case of the Maritimes, "coal production, centred in Pictou and Cape Breton, doubled between 1880 and 1890, with 2,100,000 tons of coal mined" (Palmer, 1983: 97).

We see, then, that immigration was a primary factor for both population growth and proletarianization in Canada, unlike Britain where alienation of people from the land and internal population increase were the prime determinants of the growth of the proletariat. But the Canadian case shows, once again, that (especially merchant) capital is not fussy that its labour force be wage-labour.

According to Palmer (1983: 12):

The early nineteenth-century social formation was ... based on commercial capital structures that were undoubtedly hegemonic and a social structure

unquestioningly agricultural. At the same time, however, a manufacturing sector was coming into being and the process of [proletarian] class formation was underway.

Census data presented by Palmer show a large portion of the urban population to be engaged in industrial work by 1851, with substantial employment in commercial, domestic, and professional work, some of which would have been wage-labour (see Table 4.1). Of course, we find regional differences, with over a third of the population of Upper Canada, and more than two-fifths of the population of Nova Scotia directly engaged in industrial production, as opposed to agriculture. But agricultural production was the basis for much urban growth and increase in manufacturing production of agricultural implements and a range of consumer goods (McCallum, 1980). Ryerson (1968: 173-4) gives us the following example:

With the growth of towns, whose vital centre was the market-place, there came new industries. And these in turn, together with the introduction of machinery and steam-power, changed the pattern of manufactures. The experience of growing diversification was illustrated in the case of the village of Dundas, rival of near-by Hamilton as a centre of industrial activity. In 1837, with a population of less than 800, Dundas had an axemaker's shop, a foundry, a hat-maker, two carriage-works, three cabinet-makers, three breweries and four distilleries, four flour and grist mills, four cooperages, five saw and planing mills, and a stone quarry. Ten years later, with a population of about 2,000 there were: another distillery, two more each of foundries, sawmills and cooperages, six more cabinet or furniture "factories"; and in addition, these newly-started enterprises: an agricultural implements factory, a last factory, shoe factory, roller factory, lime kiln, pottery, brickyard, pump works, woollen mill, whip factory, two tanneries and two soap and candle shops.

Ryerson then presents data from the 1851 Census to show that, though uneven, the industrialization of Lower and Upper Canada were proceeding. The data, although they could be more specific, also suggest that the growth of the

TABLE 4.1. Occupational Census, Canada, 1851.

Population		Agricultural	Commercial	Domestic	Industrial	Professional	Not Classified
952,004	Upper Canada	86,637	9,297	18,013	44,950	6,798	80,773
890,261	Lower Canada	78,437	8,831	17,095	26,273	4,780	67,739
193,800	New Brunswick	18,601	1,292	--	8,276	456	11,113
276,854	Nova Scotia	31,604	7,728	--	22,819	556	--
14,112	Hamilton	82	517	608	1,645	228	782
30,775	Toronto	183	1,447	1,815	3,270	454	1,584
7,035	London	62	206	137	884	71	400
11,697	Kingston	47	606	785	1,292	186	706
7,760	Bytown	47	271	479	747	72	624
57,715	Montreal	40	2,458	1,622	4,659	451	1,333
42,052	Quebec City	86	1,571	1,323	3,604	458	1,387
38,475	Saint John (City & Country)	764	720	--	3,166	87	3,713
39,914	Halifax (City & Country)	2,099	1,117	--	4,191	132	--
25,587	Pictou County	3,463	418	--	1,387	41	--

SOURCE: Census of Canada, 1871, Vol. 4. Reprinted from Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983: 13.

proletariat was well underway. Both Ryerson (1968) and Pentland (1960) date Canada's "industrial revolution" from the 1850s. And Pentland, as well, provides data for Lower and Upper Canada in the late 1800s depicting the growth of just those areas where we would expect to find the modern proletariat. In industrial production, for example, we find an increase in employment from 26,300 in Lower Canada in 1851 to 93,200 in 1891, and from 45,000 in Upper Canada in 1851 to 158,800 in 1891, to 20 and 21 per cent of the formal labour force in each province, respectively (Pentland, 1960: 132-3).

But there is also a significant increase in the numbers occupied in agriculture.⁶⁶ This might suggest an argument against an industrial revolution. But many development theorists argue that an "agricultural revolution", as in Britain, precedes or accompanies industrial revolution (Amin, 1976). And we must remember that, with the spread of the railways, land was being concentrated and agriculture was being capitalized, especially with the growth of the wheat staple in the second half of the 1800s. So while there was still settlement in agriculture, many of those "occupied" in agriculture were landless labourers alienated from their lands or unable to acquire land as land speculation became the name of the game (Pentland, 1959; Teeple, 1972). There was, then, the growth of an agricultural proletariat. "The bankruptcy of small farms and the shrinkage of land

⁶⁶Moreover, if we were to argue that the industrial blue-collar workers in Pentland's figures constitute the classical proletariat, then only one in five workers was proletarian, a qualification which will be further developed below.

available for settlement forced [other] individuals with agricultural interests and work habits to search for jobs in industry" (Rinehart, 1987: 40-1).

Rinehart (1987: 34) argues: "Although the date is an arbitrary one, 1870 can be considered as the year when large scale production first began to dominate productive activity in Canada". By the middle of the 19th Century, the foundation for industrial capitalism had been laid by the construction of railways and canals. This transportation network stimulated the growth of cities and linked rural villages, integrating them into a national market.

By 1850 there were over 3,000 manufactories in Upper Canada, and in the next two decades the number of skilled tradesmen - carpenters, bricklayers, coopers, iron-founders, and tailors - grew rapidly throughout the country.... At the same time a new trend was emerging: steam-powered shops increased two-fold, and mechanization was introduced into the iron, wool, and wood industries (Rinehart, 1987: 32-3).

Rinehart cites Pentland (1959: 469):

Before the end of the fifties, Hamilton, besides its locomotives and railroad cars and foundry products, was turning out readymade clothing, tobacco products, and sewing machines. The expansion was geared to investment in labour-saving machinery, involving growth of the cities at the expense of village handicraft.

Then Rinehart (1987: 33) adds: "Between 1851 and 1871, the number of machinists in Hamilton increased by 800 percent. During this same period the percentage of the city's labour force working in firms employing ten or more persons rose from 24% to 83%." He goes on to say that, while in 1870 there were about 38,000 manufacturing units in Canada, by 1890 the figure had grown to 70,000 (Rinehart, 1987: 35).

Rinehart draws on Palmer (1979) for much of his data on Hamilton -- the "Birmingham of Canada" (Palmer, 1979: 9). Palmer shows the great pace of industrialization and proletarianization in Hamilton, and Kealey (1980) offers a parallel study of Toronto in the later 1800s. Together, they present aggregate data on the late 1800s industrial revolution in Ontario (Kealey and Palmer, 1982; see also Langdon, 1972).

Between 1870 and 1890 the industrial sector tasted the fruits, both bitter and sweet, of this great transformation; establishments capitalized at \$50,000 and over increased by about 50 percent; employment in manufacturing rose by 76 percent and output in constant dollar terms by 138 percent; railway mileage increased from 3,000 in 1873 to over 16,000 in 1896; manufacturing's place, in terms of value-added, rose from 19 percent of the Gross National Product in 1870 to 23.5 percent in 1890; the rate of real manufacturing output climbed from 4.4 percent in the decade 1870-80 to 4.8 percent in 1880-90 (although it slipped to 3.2 percent in the 1890s). Thus, the 1880s were an extremely significant moment in the historical rate of growth, surpassed only by the boom years 1900-10 and 1926-9. Indeed, it is the growth of manufacturing facilities in many industries during the cresting fortunes of the National Policy (1880-4) that is most striking. Between 1880 and 1890, for instance, the value of cotton cloth output rose by 125 percent, but even this dramatic increase understated the gains of the decade's first five years: the number of mills, spindles, looms, and capital investment in cotton cloth tripled in that short period (Kealey and Palmer, 1982: 29).

Kealey and Palmer (1982: 30) present data for the period from 1871 to 1911 to show the magnitude of the "industrial revolution" in Ontario. They note that "capital invested more than doubled in each decade between 1870 and 1890, while the number of hands employed increased 90 percent over the twenty-year period" (Kealey and Palmer, 1982: 29-30). By 1911 there were two and one-half times more hands employed than in 1871, and capital invested had increased almost 16 times. The latter figure hints at a trend occurring throughout the

capitalist world at the turn of the century -- a great concentration of capital combined with a further capitalization of industry. There was an increase in capital as a percentage of value-added and a decrease in wages as a percentage of value-added in manufacturing over this forty-year period (Kealey and Palmer, 1982: 31). This reflects the generalized increasing organic composition of capital going on at the time (constant capital replacing variable capital). And with the concentration of capital there was a shift toward single firms employing larger numbers of workers. This trend was accelerated with the growth of mass production in the 20th Century. "In 1890, Canada boasted around 70,000 manufacturing enterprises; by 1920, the number had shrunk to around 22,000. However, this was not a case of declining production, but the very opposite. It was an era of 'concentration of production'" (Krahn and Lowe, 1988: 18).

In the 20th Century Canada witnessed the consolidation of manufacturing and secondary sector production, a steady decline in employment in the primary sector, and a steady growth of the tertiary sector, with increasing employment in state and private services. Census data on these developments show a great shift away from primary sector employment to tertiary and secondary sector employment. In 1901, 45 percent of the Canadian labour force was employed in primary production. In 1941 almost one-third of the labour force was still engaged in primary production, but this dropped to only seven percent by 1981. "It was in the 1951 census that the proportion of workers employed in manufacturing and construction finally exceeded that in primary industries" (Chen and Regan, 1985:

26). And employment in tertiary industries grew from 28 percent in 1901 to over 66 percent in 1981.

It is often assumed that these sectoral changes imply that by the 1980s the majority of Canadian workers had been proletarianized. Krahm and Lowe (1988: 46), for example, note: "In 1946, 'paid workers' represented 67 percent of all those employed. By 1981, this had risen to 90 percent." But we must note that "paid workers" is an amorphous category, which says nothing to the likely existence of much "unpaid" work.

4.2 Qualifications

There are a number of problems with the general picture of Canadian proletarianization painted above. Though not unique in this, Canada has had, among other things, a regionally fragmented and gender and racially segmented working class. These are problems with which labour historians continue to grapple -- witness a recent debate between Drache (1984) and Palmer (1986).

The above data themselves reveal that there has been an uneven development of industry and wage-labour in Canada -- with obvious city to city and city to country differences. And there have also been great regional differences in capitalist development in Canada. Those studying the history of Atlantic Canada, for example, have noted how patterns of industrialization in Canada have skewed the dubious benefits of that process towards Central Canada (Acheson et al., 1985; Brym and Sacouman, 1979; Ryerson, 1968). While nascent industrial capital was

given an initial boost by Confederation in 1867, as the post-1879 National Policy period unfolded, federal policies and preferences combined with the seemingly inexorable concentration of capital to focus all the dynamism of industrialization on urban Central Canada at the expense of the Maritime provinces. These provinces became suppliers of certain primary products and migrant labour, and markets for Central Canadian cum U.S. manufactured goods. The Maritimes were, of course, joined in this status by Newfoundland after it entered Confederation in 1949.

In Western Canada, a somewhat similar situation is found. Prairie economic growth since the last century has been based primarily on agriculture -- especially the wheat staple. And British Columbia has had a predominantly mining and timber economy. Veltmeyer (1979: 22) provides data on the impact of these patterns of growth on the labour force structure of Canada from 1881 to 1971 (see Table 4.2). What is most obvious from these data is the continuing larger proportion of the labour force engaged in primary production in Atlantic and Western Canada than in Central Canada. In the latter region, we find a proportionately greater percentage of the labour force engaged in manufacturing production. In the Atlantic and Western regions, the percentages of labour forces working in manufacturing production fluctuate somewhat over the years. But overall, they are less than the national average, and in decline over the period. Figures for other sectors are less conclusive, though we know that some of the

**TABLE 4.2. Industrial Structure of the Canadian Labour Force, 1881-1971
(percentages).**

	Atlantic	Ontario	Quebec	Prairies	B.C.	Canada
Primary						
1881	56.8	49.4	49.5	65.2*	44.4	51.3
1921	43.4	28.2	30.9	55.2	29.4	36.6
1951	27.1	13.1	17.2	37.3	13.7	19.8
1971	8.4	5.4	5.2	19.5	7.3	8.3
Manufacturing						
1881	18.2	26.8	25.1	16.4	27.8	24.3
1921	17.4	26.4	26.9	7.1	19.3	20.8
1951	20.1	29.8	29.4	13.6	24.0	25.1
1971	15.0	27.4	26.2	10.1	17.8	22.2
Construction						
1881	4.2	4.8	4.4	5.1	5.5	4.5
1921	5.4	6.7	6.5	3.2	8.0	5.8
1951	5.9	6.4	6.8	4.8	6.8	6.2
1971	7.5	5.8	5.3	6.2	7.0	6.0
Transportation						
1881	4.9	2.2	2.6	1.4	5.5	2.9
1921	7.7	8.1	7.1	7.2	11.2	7.8
1951	10.9	9.4	9.3	8.8	11.9	9.5
1971	10.4	7.5	8.7	9.7	10.5	8.8
Trade						
1881	5.6	5.1	5.3	4.1	5.5	5.3
1921	8.2	10.7	9.9	8.3	11.2	9.4
1951	9.3	10.7	9.3	10.1	11.9	10.1
1971	19.8	16.4	15.9	17.2	19.2	16.9
Services						
1881	9.1	11.5	13.0	7.6	11.1	11.6
1921	16.9	19.9	17.9	19.3	20.8	19.2
1951	26.1	30.6	27.9	10.1	11.9	28.2
1971	38.8	37.4	37.8	37.2	38.1	37.6

SOURCES: Calculated from Census of Canada, 1880-81, Vol. II, Table XIV; Census of Canada, 1921, Vol. 4, Table 2; Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. 4, Table 4; Labour Force Survey, Statistics Canada Catalogue 71-001. Reproduced from Henry Veltmeyer, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada", in R.J. Brym and R.J. Sacouman (eds.), Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada. Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979: 22.

Note: Statistics for 1881 and 1921 are based on the age group of 10 and over. Statistics for 1921 and 1951 are for the age group 14 and over. For 1971, statistics are based on the age group 15 and over.

*Only Manitoba for this year.

high percentages for transportation employment in the Atlantic and Western regions can be attributed to shipping of primary products.

The characteristics of primary production, especially in farming, fishing and lumbering, have been conducive in many cases to a persistence of petit commodity production -- i.e., these areas have been slower to see proletarianization. Even with increase in constant capital inputs into agriculture, for example, the result has often been more expulsion of rural population than direct proletarianization. And much primary production work is seasonal, so we might say that the labour force has only been semi-proletarianized in many cases -- where we find various mixes of wage-labour, self-employment, semi-subsistence, drawing unemployment insurance benefits, et cetera (Sacouman, 1980). In transportation there is a fair amount of self-employment -- in trucking, for example.⁶⁷ In other shipping trades, such as longshoring, "development of a permanent, full-time work force ('decasualization')"⁶⁸ was often slow, until the "technological revolution in longshoring in the late 1960s" (Foster, 1986: 281). The regional underdevelopment of especially Atlantic Canada has left a lower percentage of wage earners than the national average. As well, women's formal labour force participation in that region has been consistently lower, and overall unemployment rates higher than the national averages (Veltmeyer, 1979).

⁶⁷We should note, though, that many of these "self-employed" are dependent contractors who sometimes get referred to as "disguised wage-labour".

⁶⁸Parenthesis in original.

But all of these features of Canada's labour force distribution are only the "internal" aspects of the country's mode of insertion into the world-economy. Countless students of Canada's economic history have tried to grapple with the problem of Canadian "dependency" from the earliest days of colonialism and mercantilism. Explanations for the phenomenon vary (see below), but the outcome is a situation where Canada is one of the least industrialized countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The combined foreign control of the Canadian economy and large share of primary production, relative to OECD "leaders", has left a legacy of regional unemployment and underemployment, akin to primary producers of the Third World. Given this condition, despite the way that the proletarian logic may impact on labour relations throughout the economy, just as widespread unionization will influence labour relations and wage rates in non-union settings, we must be careful not to apply this proletarian logic to the whole of the Canadian labour force.

Especially difficult to sustain would be the argument that Canadian labour has been fully proletarianized when at least half of the population has been only differentially affected by that process. Until recently, the majority of Canada's female population has been (sometimes actively) excluded from the "formal" labour force. Canadian feminist historians, like their British counterparts, contend that most writing of Canadian labour history, and Canadian history in general, has left great hollow spots with respect to the roles of women (Pierson and Prentice,

1982). The feminist historians, along with others committed to a more thorough reading of Canadian history, have endeavoured to recapture women's work in both production and reproduction -- in formal and informal economies.

The authors of a recent industrial sociology text attempt to accommodate the 'new thinking':

The absence of a wage labour market and the necessity of contributing to the household economy meant that few women were employed outside the home prior to the rise of industrial capitalism. Even in late nineteenth-century Canada, only a fraction of women were engaged in paid employment. In 1891, for example, 11.4 percent of women over age 10 were employed, accounting for 12.6 percent of the entire labour force. The growing importance of factories on the industrial landscape around the turn of the century contributed to a redefinition of women's economic role. Employers in some light industries, such as textiles, recruited women as cheap unskilled or semiskilled labourers who, according to prevailing stereotypes, would be less likely to unionize and more tolerant of boring tasks.

Focusing on paid employment, however, ignores the work performed by the vast majority of women during this era. The unpaid domestic labour of women - to raise the future generation of factory workers and to feed, clothe, and care for the present generation of workers so that they could keep the wheels of industry turning - were all essential functions within capitalism. Out of these competing pressures on women emerged a gender division of labour that still persists today (Krahn and Lowe, 1988: 124).

This is a good general account, but there is still some tension in the semantics that belies something deeper. Note the assertion in the first sentence that in the "absence of a wage labour market ... few women were employed outside the home prior to the rise of industrial capitalism". There are a number of problems with this formulation. It reads back into history a more recent separation of work and home, and of what we now call formal and informal economies, that probably did not exist in most cases. Certainly families who

engaged in subsistence, or even petit commodity production, had no strict separation of home and work. The above account neglects the roles that women might have played in "proto-industries" prior to Canada's late-19th Century "industrial revolution". It does not specify what proportion of the female population "few" might refer to. For all we know, many more than "few" women might have been "employed" ("working"?) outside the home, in unpaid agricultural production, in "cottage industries", in urban domestic work, et cetera. But, to be fair to the authors, it is not simply a matter of terminology and old thinking. For prior to the mid-1800s there is no good data base for knowing what women as a group were up to, and much data up until recently has been collected according to a male purview of the official economy. What feminist historians have been able to do is reconstruct women's history through case studies of work in various areas of wage and non-wage labour.

Cohen (1988) has provided an excellent study of women's work in 19th-Century Ontario. In considering non-manufacturing work, she notes that "the entirely self-sufficient farm was a myth" (Cohen, 1988: 7). She asserts: "If we begin with the most characteristic form of labour, rather than with markets, our analysis of growth might be different" (Cohen, 1988: 7). Cohen's focus on the "family economy" reveals a combination of subsistence production, which provided the most basic needs of the household, and market-oriented production, which provided income. Women's labour supported capital accumulation through both their market-oriented production, and through reproductive efforts which sus-

tained the family in its basic consumption needs, and freed male labour to engage in production for exchange on the market, in independent commodity production or as waged-labour (Cohen, 1988: 8).

Cohen (1988: 22-3) contends that

the paradigm of the effect of capitalist development and industrialization, based on the English experience, does not fit the pattern of development in Ontario, where the historical circumstances of development were very different from those in England. In England the transition to industrial capitalism occurred in an economy where internal markets had long been developed.⁶⁹

Cohen says that, in pre-industrial Ontario, the underdeveloped nature of the economy, along with the limited supply of labour and the orientation of market activity toward export, produced a sharper division of labour in the household economy between production for the market and production for household consumption. Under early industrialization, female labour was centred on production for the household, while male labour was focused on production for the market.

In this respect one cannot point to a withdrawal of females from market production as the economy was transformed to industrial capitalism. Rather, economic growth brought women's production efforts increasingly into the market's sphere, both through production for the market within the household and through waged labour.... Specifically, the pattern of women's market-oriented activity did not assume the U-shape of the English experience. It may be more appropriately characterized as a pattern of slow and steady increase in participation, but one which affected women in different sectors in different ways (Cohen, 1988: 24).

⁶⁹It should be noted that Cohen's discussion involves certain assumptions about "the English experience" that I have called into question in the previous chapter.

Women in Ontario combined subsistence and market-oriented production in rural settings, and also combined productive and reproductive activities and factory work in the age of industrialization. In the pre-industrial setting, while men often did much of the work in areas such as wheat farming and lumbering, women did such essential work as making clothing, gardening, dairying, and marketing -- thus combining labour that both reproduced the family economy, and produced goods for sale on the market.

As urbanization and industrialization proceeded in the second half of the 19th Century, women increasingly engaged in paid labour. But the mixed-economy of the family continued. Cohen (1988: 130) notes that "about one family in ten kept cows and pigs in Toronto in 1871, [though] these animals were virtually eliminated from the city by the turn of the century. But other forms of food production were carried on. Particularly important was keeping poultry and growing fruits and vegetables". To earn income, some urban women took in boarders, washing, or home sewing. Others, especially women without children, took up domestic service outside their homes.

With increased urbanization, women were also engaged in industrial homework, especially in the clothing industry. An 1868 article from The Globe, explained how female labour was organized in Toronto.

In the large majority of occupations enumerated, the women may be divided into two classes - those who work at establishments and those who work at their homes. Some of the larger retail dry goods houses employ women in all the branches of female industry connected with the trade, such as saleswomen, mantle and bonnet makers, milliners and dressmakers, shirt, cap, coat and trouser makers, on their premises. Others, again, and

the wholesale stores equally with those selling at retail, give out the work, and then frequently the industrious efforts of a whole family are employed to fill the orders of the employers. Often, in such instances, the child of eight or nine summers is made a source of material help in the construction of the coarser descriptions of men's garments that are now prepared for the ready made clothing market. In the same way the female head of the house, a group of daughters, and, perhaps the male members of the family, if no better occupation is available, turn in to assist the father in adding to their means of support. The work thus done, ostensibly by the head of the house, but as frequently, by all the members jointly, runs up in the busy season to bills of \$30 and \$35 a week, of which the female members earn no small share (cited in Cohen, 1988: 131-2).

The extent of this homework is given by the numbers of dressmakers and milliners listed in the 1871 Census. The total figure given is 3,867, while the numbers employed in dressmaking and millinery establishments is listed at 2,023. This indicates that at least 45 percent of those working in this branch of the clothing industry did not work in firms included in the industrial statistics produced for the Census (Cohen, 1988: 132).

In addition to homework and the sweated trades, women were employed in the factory setting. As in the Industrial Revolution in Britain, Cohen (1988: 135) notes: "In the manufacturing sector women in Ontario were concentrated in low-wage, labour-intensive industries; they were most heavily represented in the industries providing wearing apparel". Using Census data, Cohen (1988: 167-8) shows a substantial number of women to be employed as wage-labour in a few industries, such as clothing and food preparation, from 1871 through 1911, and an increasing percentage of women entering the official labour force from the end of the century to 1921. Others have shown that this steady increase in female wage-labour typified the Canadian labour market as a whole throughout the 20th

Century (see Johnson, 1972). But much of women's formal employment was not full-time, whole-life proletarian labour, and their accelerated (re)entry into wage-labour after World War II was into part-time work (see below).

Cohen's study can be put together with a number of more specific studies to give us a composite picture of women's work in industrial and pre-industrial Canada: Bradbury's (1979; 1984) study of women workers in Montreal, and Roberts' (1976) study of Toronto working women; Trofimenkoff's (1982) study of Canada's "industrial women" in the 1880s; Johnson and Johnson's (1982) history of industrial home sewing in Canada; Steedman's (1986) study of women in the Canadian clothing industry; Lowe's (1986) study of the "feminization" of office work; Parr's (1990) history of "the gender of breadwinners" in two Ontario industrial towns; and a series of debates on the relationship between domestic labour and wage work (Fox, 1980; Hamilton and Barrett, 1986). There is, in fact, growth of a sufficient body of literature to begin to fill a number of anthologies (e.g., Acton, 1974; Bradbury, 1992; Prentice and Trofimenkoff, 1977; 1985; Strong-Boag and Fellman, 1986).

These various studies reveal a mosaic which forbids any facile classification of women's work that assumes to restrict women to one certain sphere -- the home, or reproductive work. Since the later stages of the industrial revolutions in both Britain and Canada many women have been relegated, and continue to be relegated, to some of the worst job ghettos (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984; Connelly and MacDonald, 1990), but this has not always been the case. Prior to

the onslaught of industrial capitalism the gender division of labour was rather more egalitarian, though some might argue that life was "nasty, brutish and short" for most women and men. But women exercised relatively more independence than did the classic "housewife" of the 20th Century.

I will not here enter the debate on historical degrees of subordination of female labour. Rather, I will again make the point that women have always been engaged in various forms of productive and reproductive work, and have found ways to assert their independence and raise their voices (Gorham, 1975; Trofimenkoff, 1982). And I wish to emphasize that the image of the woman as housewife is a myth for many women who have continued to labour at productive work, and an historical aberration for the "middle-class" few who could "stay at home", but have recently been forced to (re)enter the formal labour market by "hard times", or "boredom".

But this historical aberration of the "housewife" is the reverse side of another historical aberration -- the full-time, whole-life male proletarian. Just as many housewives have now taken up part-time work, so many of the classical proletarians have become unemployed and underemployed -- they are now part of a casual labour market. For many Canadians, this is nothing new.

4.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, as in Chapter III, I first presented the standard case for proletarianization, and then criticized and qualified the notion of a straightfor-

ward unfolding of industrialization and proletarianization. This is not to deny that these two processes have occurred, but to argue that they have been more limited and nuanced than is often assumed. The Canadian labour market has been too fragmented through regional and gender-based non-proletarian labour for one to argue the case for full proletarianization.

We find much of the population of peripheral regions of Canada "getting-by" with various mixes of waged and non-waged work, as Pahl (1984) notes for the British case. As well, we find women's economic activities to be much too varied and complex for us to make a straightforward argument for either pure proletarianization or domesticization of women. Women came increasingly to be counted as part of the formal labour market through the 20th Century. But, as Cohen and others note, women always contributed to the family economy, which was integrated into the accumulation process as actually existing capitalism unfolded.

I do not intend the preceding discussion to imply that there was little proletarianization of labour in Canada. Proletarianization was a significant factor in Canadian history, but the process was rather more limited than is too often assumed. And, as in other industrialized countries, theory and politics tended to give a proletarian logic to the formal labour market (see Chapter I). But, again as in other industrialized countries, the proletarian standard is now being confronted by global restructuring and the (re)casualization of labour. In the following chapter, I examine the recent transformations of the world-economy, showing their effects on the Canadian labour market, and discussing the prospects

for (re)casualization of labour. Then, in Chapters VI and VII, I discuss the ramifications of (re)casualization at the national level.

CHAPTER V

RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

Capital accumulation and capitalist development have always occurred unevenly - spatially, sectorally and temporally - producing differential degrees of industrialization and varying modes and levels of integration into the global capitalist economy. Today, however, there is widespread recognition that a fundamental transformation is taking place in the conditions of accumulation and the expansion of capital on a world-historical scale. Emphasis on such factors as the major shift towards internationalization of production, the greater concentration and centralization of capital under the sway of trans-national corporations (TNCs), and the enhanced mobility of capital facilitated by modern communications technology, implies something of a transition away from the classical international division of labour (whereby underdeveloped areas were incorporated into the global capitalist order principally as suppliers of minerals and agricultural commodities) towards a restructured world economy wherein the third world is increasingly providing sites for industries which manufacture goods for sale on the world market.

- Roger Southall

In Chapters III and IV, I reviewed the historical background to the problem of casual labour markets and proletarianization of labour in Britain and Canada. In this chapter, I offer a discussion of the contemporary international political economy, as global context for my analysis of the (re)casualization of labour in Canada, asking: What are the current global transformations which prompt (re)casualization of labour?

In the previous two chapters I evaluated the argument that, since the emergence of a capitalist world-economy around 1500, capitalism has been marked by a steady increase in the proportion of workers engaged in proletarian labour. I presented evidence to argue that notions of a mechanical unfolding of proletarianization are overdrawn. Both on a world scale, and within the centre of the capitalist world-system, we have seen a mix of proletarian and other forms of labour. And rather than a mechanical unfolding, we witness proletarianization in certain places at certain times, and deproletarianization in other places at other times. All the while there has remained a large proportion of casual labour throughout the world-economy, often at the interstices of what has come to be called the informal economy, but never really separate from formal, capitalist production. Having said all this, I note that there has been an historical increase in the percentage of labour forces engaged in proletarian labour, especially at the centre of the world-economy.

My purpose in this chapter is to examine how the structural and conjunctural transformations that we witness today fit capitalism's longue duree. Two processes in particular must be considered for an evaluation of the impact of global transformations on trends in the Canadian labour market. First, there has been a further "globalization" of production and emergence of what some call a "new international division of labour" (NIDL). Second, as a consequence of globalization, but also underlying it in dialectical fashion, we have witnessed rapid technological changes -- an increasing organic composition of capital -- with

dramatic effects on labour processes and relations of production, and significant consequences for labour markets overall.

As argued in Chapter II, the recent phase of globalization has had the effect of expanding capital's reserve army of labour, by finding new reserves in the periphery and by recreating them in the centre. This has entailed resuscitation of the informal economy and renewed use of casual labour. Some would say that capital has expanded the use of what Engels called its "external" (peripheral) proletariat. But capital has also found new uses for its "internal" proletariat. Along with renewal of the reserve army of labour in the centre, capital has undertaken a shift away from the so-called Fordist regime of accumulation to a more "flexible" regime of accumulation, in an attempt to overcome "rigidities" in labour markets (see Chapter VI).⁷⁰ These rigidities, I argued in Chapters I and II, were the product of increasing labour strength, in terms of control and costs at the point of production and in overall labour markets, as a result of trade union and political party organizing. The current restructuring has entailed attempts by capital to increase productivity by recapturing full control of production and reducing labour and other production costs. Capital has also attempted to recapture the state by pushing neo-liberal policies of free-market capitalism, though some recent events suggest a shift away from neo-liberalism (see Chapter VIII).

⁷⁰Flexible production is often referred to as "new", but in terms of the *longue durée* we must question how really new it is.

In this chapter, I show how processes entailed in globalization correspond to repolarization and (re)casualization of labour. I examine the NIDL and Canada's place in it, considering both the globalization of production processes and their impact on Canada. I also consider the role played by the neo-liberal state, particularly the push for free trade. In the next chapter, I focus on national shifts corresponding to the (re)casualization of labour, including the shift to flexible production, sectoral shifts in the Canadian economy, and the increase in women's formal employment in Canada.

5.1 A New International Division of Labour?

Since the late 1970s there has been an outpouring of literature on a "new international division of labour" (NIDL). The debate now runs from acceptance, to qualified acceptance, to total rejection of the notion. This debate is important because it covers the (broadly speaking) social as well as technological aspects of global restructuring. My interest in discussing the NIDL is to show how, as a product of class struggles, the NIDL has evolved as part of capital's drive to weaken organized labour and overcome the current accumulation crisis by restructuring labour markets and labour processes. In this sense, the NIDL is the global face of flexible accumulation, an important element of which is (re)casualization of labour.

The most complete statement on the NIDL is that of Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1980), though we should also note the pioneering work of Barnett and

Muller (1974) on "the Latin Americanization of the United States" and "the obsolescence of American labour". Frobel et al. give us an outline of the evolution of the "classical" international division of labour (IDL), and go on to discuss the emergence of the NIDL.

The classical IDL, coming out of the 16th Century expansion of the European world-economy, was typified by peripheral production and export of primary products, often using non-proletarian forms of labour. There were three phases, or stages of the classical IDL, generally called "mercantilist", lasting from the 16th to 18th Centuries; "competitive" or "industrial capitalist", in the 18th and 19th Centuries; and "monopoly capitalist", in the first half of the 20th Century. The competitive and monopoly stages saw the spread of wage-labour, with the Industrial Revolution and expansion of First World production of industrial manufactures (Frobel et al., 1980: 10-1).

Based primarily on their studies of German textile and garment industries, Frobel et al. posit a further internationalization of capital centred on a new "world market factory" (or "global factory"). The NIDL is the product of technological developments in three areas which allow increasing capital mobility. First is the breaking up of production processes into "segments", differing in terms of capital intensity and skill levels of workers. Second is more efficient transportation, including containerization and air freight, which permits greater geographical dispersion of production segments without prohibitive cost increases. Third are advances in communication, information and control techniques which allow for

centralized direction and administration of highly dispersed industrial complexes (Vuskovic, 1980: 10).

Frobel et al's. (1980: 22) study showed world market factories with production vertically integrated into the global operations of individual companies. This production involved non-complex operation where, for each product or product group, the production process was largely confined to part operations, in manufacturing or assembly. So the global factory was initially seen as one where lower-level, more labour-intensive manufacturing processes have been shipped off to Third World "free production zones", where capital could avail itself of ready supplies of low-waged, low-skilled labour. Meanwhile, higher-level production, using the most advanced technology, and research and development work were retained in the centre, near the corporations' head offices. So there remains a centre-periphery axis to the world-economy. But more recently the question of international skill differences has become less consequential. Indeed, Mercedes-Benz is building its first automobile production plant outside of Germany in Mexico, because there it finds low-waged, high-skilled labour (Canadian Dimension, January 1993: 40).

The first free production zone was established in Shanon, Ireland in 1958. Commenting on the early period of post-World War II restructuring Frobel et al. (1980: 14) note:

The first shifts of US industry were to Western Europe and to countries 'south of the border'; West European companies transferred production to other regions in Europe, such as Eire, Greece, Portugal and the south of Italy; Japanese industry moved into South Korea and Taiwan. At the same

time, industrial firms recruited labour from countries with high rates of unemployment and drew it in to the traditional sites of industrial production. Hence the appearance of *Gastarbeiter* in Western Europe, and Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrant workers in the USA.

The main post-war target for transnational investment was obviously the European arena, as the United States launched its period of global hegemony (the "American Century") through "reconstruction" of the war-torn European economies. This was done under the mantle of the United Nations' major financial institutions, sanctioned through the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 (Magdoff, 1969; Wood, 1986). But soon the U.S. imperium and U.S. investors renewed their interest in the Third World. In the post-war boom the TNCs needed new sources of raw materials, but they also began to seize hold of opportunities to invest in Third World manufacturing enterprises that had been set up by national bourgeoisies in the inter-war period of global crisis (Frank, 1969; Amin, 1977a). The initial focus was on potential national and regional markets. But the poverty of the Third World masses limited these markets to mainly upper-middle and high-income groups. And because the TNCs were keen to take advantage of the reserve army of low-wage workers in the periphery, they were forced to turn to investment in export-oriented manufacturing production for the higher-waged mass market in the centre (Frank, 1980; 1981a). So by 1975 "seventy-nine free production zones were in operation in twenty-five underdeveloped countries; eleven of these countries were in Asia, five in Africa and nine in Latin America" (Frobel et al. 1980: 22).

The other side of the NIDL coin was a "deindustrialization" of centre states (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). Transnational capital was flocking to Third World sites to escape First World workers' hard-won wages, benefits, and better working conditions, as well as environmental restrictions and other sorts of unwanted state interventions. This was the phenomenon of the "runaway shop". The general impact of this deindustrialization is still subject to debate. The overall picture is muddled because much of the process coincided with both technological changes that made some workers "redundant", and the post-1973 global economic crisis that has left remaining plant capacity running at only 60-70 percent. Halevi (1992: 47) reiterates Michal Kalecki's argument that "the system of monopoly capital is subject to declining profits like the competitive Marxian one, but unlike Marx's it is also held back by persistent unused capacity." So, with the current global crisis, rates and total amounts of unemployment have risen precipitously.

In the industrial OECD countries as a whole, unemployment roughly doubled from each recession to the next - from 5 million in 1967, to 8 million in 1970, to 15 million in 1975, and 33 million in 1982. In the Third World, unemployment exploded with the 1979-80 world recession and the 1982 debt crisis; and it has continued to grow ever since. Real wages and salaries started to decline in the United States in the 1973-75 recession and later in Europe, and they have never reached their previous levels (Frank, 1987: 278).

Official unemployment rates dropped with the mid-1980s economic recovery, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is predicting OECD unemployment of 32 million by the end of 1993 (The Globe and Mail, 23/09/93). The European

Community (EC) alone now faces official unemployment of 20 million, and is locked in debate over how to tackle the problem.⁷¹

Deindustrialization and high unemployment have devastated some older industrial areas, such as the northeast of the United States, which has come to be called the "rustbelt". Not all communities were devastated, and some areas of the southern United States (the "sunbelt") and Europe experienced industrialization and economic growth. But the important element of increasing capital mobility has lead writers such as Ross and Trachte (1990) to argue that workers in all areas of the globe are now subject to the qualitatively new social relations of a fourth and new stage, or "submode" of capitalism -- "global capitalism", with its NIDL. Ross and Trachte compare competitive, monopoly and global phases of capitalism with respect to changes in capital-to-capital, capital-to-labour, and capital-to-state relations.⁷²

In the competitive era, capital-to-capital relations were typified by competition between capitals. In terms of capital-to-labour and capital-to-state relations, capital generally held sway. With the coming of monopoly capitalism, increasing concentration and centralization of capitals brought increasing monopolization of production and markets, and a decline of competition at the commanding heights

⁷¹This debate has social democrats, like the French leaders, advocating more state intervention, and neo-liberals such as British Prime Minister Major, defending extreme free-market policies ("Jobless Plans Divide EC Leaders", *The Age and Mail*, Tuesday, June 22, 1993).

⁷²It should be noted that, while Ross and Trachte's (1990) discussion of global restructuring is very useful, they defend their theory of global capitalism by unnecessarily and unconvincingly knocking down straw monopoly capitalism and world-systems theories (cf. Sonntag, 1992).

of world capitalism (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). But the spread of mass production also increased the capacity of workers to organize to demand better wages and working conditions. This increase in labour's power at the point of production also empowered communities to make demands of and set conditions on a relatively immobile capital. And the power of monopoly sector workers and communities to contest the power of capital increased the relative autonomy of the state (Ross and Trachte, 1990: Chapter 3). As we enter the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, the improved conditions for monopoly sector workers and communities, which had a spread effect in other sectors of the economy, brought about a tendency for the rate of profit to decline in the industrialized countries (Drache, 1991; Ross and Trachte, 1990). This fall in the rate of profit, along with labour's increased militancy, accelerated the increasing organic composition of capital and, with technological advances that resulted, the NIDL and the runaway shop. Monopoly capital sought to escape the costs and militancy of organized labour.

While a more globally mobile capital has not brought deindustrialization to all communities, Ross and Trachte (1990) argue that trade unions in the centre have been put on the defensive, often simply by capital's threat to run away. Frobel et al. (1980: 13) thus note: "Workers in the already industrialized countries are now placed on a worldwide labour market and forced to compete for their jobs with their fellow workers in the developing countries". They confront

"the development of a worldwide reservoir of potential labour power" (Frobel et al., 1980: 34).

The world of global capitalism is one where labour has lost power to capital and, in most instances, is forced to make concessions to capital. Sivanandan (1990) contends that capital has emancipated itself from labour (see below). States at all levels have experienced what Ross and Trachte (1990) call "the relative decline of relative autonomy", and are caught in what we might call "beggar thyself" strategies to attract investors (cf. Slaughter, 1993).⁷³ With the further transnationalization of production, individual capitals are subject to a heightened global competition for markets, thus spurring even more the drive to cut costs by all means.

The argument of Ross and Trachte and Frobel et al. concerning the NIDL and increased capital mobility is one based on class struggle. It is labour struggles for better working and living conditions that empowered workers and states to confront capital and exact concessions. Under the conditions of monopoly capitalism labour could bargain from a position of relative strength. To regain the upper hand capital both developed and used technology to escape from militant labour associations, with an eye to cutting costs and increasing profits. Peet (1983) makes a strong argument for the class struggle explanation for

⁷³For example, the U.S. state of Georgia recently ran a quarter-page advertisement in The Globe and Mail (08/03/93) inviting more Canadian companies to come set up operations in Georgia. The advertisement boasts that investors will find a high ratio of productivity to labour cost, low taxes, friendly environmental regulations, and worker training "at no cost". And the Canadian province of New Brunswick recently placed a similar advertisement in The Globe and Mail (27/09/93).

increased capital mobility by examining the conditions in U.S. states from which capital is fleeing, to conditions in those U.S. states and Third World countries where production is being transferred. The evidence shows that states experiencing capital flight are those where labour costs are higher, trade unions are more militant, and local states have been active in setting social conditions for investors. Those states and countries receiving increased investment have lower wages, lower rates of unionization, and more state provision of services to capital, but less legislation in terms of taxes, profit remittances, environmental regulations and legislation supporting labour rights and benefits. I will return to these changes and their impact on Canada following an outline of Canada's place in the world-economy.

5.2 Canada in the World-Economy

In a set of essays specifically addressed to the impact of the NIDL on Canada (Cameron and Houle, 1985), one of the editors writes:

This volume addresses a new set of issues that arise from the breakdown of the [Keynesian] liberal order abroad and the search for a new policy consensus at home. If in the late 1960s the first item on the agenda of Canadian political economists was the American domination of Canada (the national question) by the mid 1970s it was the role and nature of the Canadian state that attracted attention. This collection proposes that in the 1980s the relevant questions concern the re-structuring of the Canadian economy and the reorientation of state policy that are occurring in response to the new international division of labour (Cameron, 1985: 4).

I will argue below that the relevant questions of the 1980s are still most relevant to the 1990s.

Determination of Canada's place in the world-economy has been a much-debated issue. I noted above that, while originally populated by communal "Indian" peoples, Canada first began to play a major role in the world-economy in the 16th Century. It was then that fleets of Portuguese, Spanish, French and British ships came to fish the Grand Banks off Canada's east coast (Ryerson, 1960). Though permanent settlements were not established until the early 17th Century by the French, then the British, the stage was set for Canada's colonization and incorporation into the European world-economy. Like many other European colonial areas, such as the Caribbean (Phillips, 1987), Canada became a producer of "staples" for the imperial centre. This history has been documented in the important works of Harold Innis (see Chapter IV), who traces the development of Canada's economy through a succession of staple goods -- fish, fur, lumber, minerals, et cetera -- which were exploited to service the accumulation and industrialization process in the dominant metropole.

Canada's role as a staples producer is much celebrated because, unlike most so-called Third World countries, we have achieved a modicum of industrial development, relatively high standards of living for many, and a liberal-democratic politics. But unlike most centre states, Canada is very much a dependent country. Panitch (1985: 1) notes:

Canada is a country that resists ready classification within conventional taxonomies. Its status as what might be aptly called a 'rich dependency' puts it at the interstices between the advanced industrial countries and the dependent capitalisms of the 'third world'. In terms of per capita income, patterns of consumption, social structure, and levels of education, as well as form of political regime, Canada clearly resembles the former countries.

In terms of the extent of foreign ownership and control over the economy and of Canada's international trade pattern (export of resources and import of manufactured goods), Canada looks more like belonging in the company of Venezuela or Nigeria.

While most Canadian scholars would agree with Panitch, there is no agreed terminology to describe Canada's place in the world-economy, perhaps because there is no single conception of the world-economy. The country has variously been called a "rich, industrialized, underdeveloped economy" (Levitt, 1970), a "branch plant quasi-imperialism" (Naylor, 1972), a "rich dependency" (Panitch, 1981), or a "secondary advanced capitalist formation" (Livingstone, 1985). And there is continuing debate as to whether Canada is, in world-systems lexicon, a centre or a semi-periphery.

In a recent article, Glenday (1989) considers Canada's "ambiguous position in the world-economy" as "rich but semiperipheral". Arrighi and Drangel (1986: 55,62), however, classify Canada as a centre country on the basis of "core-like industrial activities" and "the distribution of rewards in the world-economy and the approximate position of states in relation to that distribution".

An alternative position, which I adopt (Broad, 1988), is to view Canada as a "region within the centre" (Williams, 1989), as part of a "continental corporate economy" (Clement, 1977). A number of authors have traced Canada's role as a "junior partner" in the imperial enterprises of first Britain, then the United States (e.g., Naylor, 1972; Clement, 1977). But with the shift from primarily British portfolio investment to mainly American direct investment, and the setting up of a "branch-plant economy" dominated by U.S. TNCs over this century, it has been

argued that Canada has been increasingly "sucked into" the U.S. political economy. One author argues, in fact, that the recently-signed Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), simply puts the finishing touches on the continental political economy (Teeple, 1986).

That the post-World War II Canadian economy has been dominated by U.S. capital is undeniable. And, though foreign control declined somewhat in the period between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, the neo-liberal government of Brian Mulroney reversed this trend through programs such as the conversion of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) into Investment Canada, with a mandate not to control, but to attract foreign investment. Williams (1989: 4) notes: "Forty-four percent of the exports of Canada's fifty leading exporters come from foreign-owned enterprises. This compares to less than 5 percent for France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, and the United States".

There has been continuing debate as to the origins and persistence of the dependence and foreign domination of the Canadian economy.⁷⁴ The focus runs from fingering the impact of colonialism and neocolonialism pure and simple; the character of the Canadian ruling class (too much dominated by mercantile interests?); the character of the wage-labour force in a dependent, predominantly resource-based economy; through to the nature of an economy based on branch-plant industrialization. The most common explanations are that Canada never fashioned a strong, indigenous industrial fraction of the bourgeoisie, that the

⁷⁴Panitch (1981) and Clement (1988) offer surveys and critiques of these debates.

dependent character of Canada's manufacturing industry has made it uncompetitive on the world market, or simply that Canada was a "late follower" in industrialization (Laxer, 1991).

Williams (1986) articulates the argument that Canadian industry has not been competitive because it is "not for export". Though U.S. branch plants in Canada may earlier have served as platforms for U.S. export to the British Empire, with the post-World War II establishment of U.S. global hegemony and rise of TNCs to dominate the global economy, the Canadian export platform was no longer so important to U.S. capital -- especially as more and more British colonies became politically independent. U.S. TNCs exported from their own headquarters, or from the periphery as the NIDL proceeded, and did their research and development (R & D) at the heart of the centre as well. The Canadian state did too little in the way of promoting R & D and indigenous entrepreneurship. So, as a manufacturing exporter, Canada's performance fares lowest on the scale of major industrial states -- being challenged, in fact, by some less-industrialized countries (Williams, 1986: 8). For the Science Council of Canada, lack of R & D combined with technological dependence is "the weakest link" in the Canadian economy (Britton and Gilmour, 1978).

With the globalization of capitalist manufacturing production, deindustrialization began to hit Canada in the late-1960s. Left and left-liberal academics and politicians began to warn us about the spectre of this deindustrialization process (e.g, Laxer, 1973), asking: "Is the Canadian economy

closing down?" (Caloren, 1978). And by the mid-1970s it appeared that this was indeed the case as, in 1975, Canada became a net exporter of capital, mainly to the U.S. (Carroll, 1985; Dickey 1985; Ethier, 1985). But this should not surprise us if we accept that Canada is simply part of a continental political economy which is characterized by uneven development. The country, pace Williams (1989), does not have its own "autocentric" (self-centred) economy. Canada is not underdeveloped in the Third World sense. But neither did it develop on its own as an independent centre, so we might refer to Canada as a subdeveloped, subcentre.

Resnick (1989) suggests that Canada has moved from the "semiperiphery to perimeter of the core". He discusses a "maturing of Canadian capitalism" that runs concurrent to "an internationalization of capitalism" (Resnick, 1988: 278) and "a new conjuncture in the world-economy" (Resnick, 1988: 279), noting that "it is more and more a world-economy to which individual countries and their capitalist classes find themselves obliged to adapt" (Resnick, 1988: 281). Adaptation for Canada has come most forcefully in the form of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which is now being expanded into a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to incorporate first Mexico, and eventually all of Latin America.

5.3 Free Trade and Structural Adjustment in Canada

Capital's argument for so-called free trade is that, in the increasingly competitive world of global capitalism, the knocking down of all impediments to capital mobility will ensure the most competitive corporations free access to the best and cheapest factors of production, and to markets. And with the more global production processes of the NIDL, and the heightened competition between U.S., Japanese, European and other TNCs for the world market, this argument for freer trade is true. But the reality is that while the world-economy is becoming more integrated economically, in political-economic terms it appears to be breaking up into three blocs: the United States with its American peripheries; Japan with its Asian peripheries; and Western Europe with its East European, Middle Eastern, and African peripheries (Magdoff, 1992; Sweezy, 1989). Nevertheless, there is freer trade emerging, especially within these blocs (Marchak, 1991). And it is obvious that, while this freer trade may be good for those capitals which can compete, it is not so good for labour and communities which have been restructured.⁷⁵ We see this clearly for Canada in the post-1988 era of the FTA.

It has been argued "that the Mulroney government wanted the FTA as a way to implement, through the back door, its agenda for corporate restructuring and for reducing the role of the public sector in Canadian society" (Campbell,

⁷⁵Adjustment to restructuring for labour and communities in centre states is akin to IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment for peripheral states. Referring to the latter, Amin (1990) argues that the states of the South are forced to adjust to the North's restructuring.

1990: 2). The FTA, then, is not simply about freer trade, but "is one element, albeit the centrepiece, of a Conservative policy agenda which includes deregulation, privatization, government cutbacks etc." (Campbell, 1990: 3). Much has been written about the neo-conservative/neo-liberal projects of the Thatcher and Reagan regimes in Britain and the United States in the 1980s. The neo-liberal agenda was less clearly articulated and developed at the federal level in Canada during the first part of the 1980s. Some provincial governments, especially in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, served as good examples of the neo-liberal trend (Havemann, 1986; Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990). But during the first Mulroney term (1984-88) neo-liberal policies and programs were only haltingly implemented (Broad, 1988). However, since the second Mulroney triumph at the polls in 1988, neo-liberal policies have been pushed at the federal level with a vengeance.

Researchers with the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) have tracked the implementation of the neo-liberal agenda since the 1988 federal election. Campbell (1990), for example, has noted how, under the mantle of the FTA, there has been a dramatic Canada-U.S. "social harmonization" and "corporate restructuring". Harmonization involves "what the Europeans call the social dimension of market" (Campbell, 1990: 5). With the FTA there has been a push to harmonize Canada-U.S. social standards to fit the free trade "level playing field". This means that Canada's social standards are being harmonized down to the U.S. level. Consequently, we see an

erosion of Canadian social and regional development insurance benefits; of federally-subsidized communications services (e.g., Via Rail and CBC); of social service programs; and a more regressive tax structure, as with, for example, the notorious goods and services tax (GST) which has replaced the old manufacturers sales tax (MST). These measures all contribute to social repolarization.

The CLC, the CCPA and the Action Canada Network (ACN) have been producing data on how the neo-liberal policy of reducing the role of the state has jeopardized the general welfare and living standards of Canadians, in terms of health, education and social welfare services, as well as undermining Canada's political-economic independence. The programs being subjected to state restructuring are, according to the neo-liberal logic of the FTA, unfair subsidies to Canadian business, and must therefore be removed.⁷⁶

The second thrust of neo-liberalism is corporate restructuring. Campbell (1990: 7) notes: "Continental corporate restructuring didn't begin with the FTA but it is accelerating dramatically now that the corporate agenda has been entrenched" (cf. Teeple, 1986). Campbell (1990: 8) continues:

The process encompasses many actions: takeovers, mergers, downsizing, rationalization, production shifts, buy backs, bankruptcies, adjustment, closures, layoffs and wage cuts. It also involves public sector adjustments such as privatization, deregulation, contracting out, and other measures which enhance the corporate climate.

⁷⁶But the irony is that, while neo-liberals on both sides of the border push ahead with their deconstruction/ restructuring of state programs, progressive U.S. trade unionists, social welfare activists and politicians have been examining Canadian welfare state policies and programs for ideas on expanding the U.S. welfare state, which is the least-developed in the industrialized world.

He then proceeds to list examples of these actions and to discuss their impact on Canadian society.

Most dramatic for Canadian workers and their families has been the shutting down of Canadian branch plants of U.S. corporations and a general "rationalization" of production, leading to a massive loss of jobs and pressure on Canadian workers to make wage and benefit concessions. Downsizing and rationalization of production through technological and labour-process changes have led to jobs lost and forgone. Even more obvious has been job loss through plant shutdowns. Campbell (1991: 19) notes that job loss in the most important Canadian manufacturing industries from the period since the recession of 1981 to the signing of the FTA in 1988 amounted to 0.9 percent. But job loss from June 1989 to November 1990 amounted to a drop of 6.9 percent. As of the latter date, the CLC registered a direct free trade-driven job loss of 226,000. But, it is argued, this is a conservative estimate because it does not include indirect job losses -- especially in services.

"In the five years prior to the FTA's implementation, the economy created an average of 325,000 new jobs a year" (Campbell, 1992: 5). However, "in the first two-and-a-half years of the FTA there was a net destruction of 90,000 jobs" (Campbell, 1992: 5). From June 1989 to March 1991 there was a net loss of 435,000 jobs. "Over 150,000 of these jobs disappeared before the onset of the so-called recession which began in the Fall of 1990" (Campbell, 1992: 6). In the period from June 1989 to March 1991, while total manufacturing employment in

the United States fell by 4.6 percent, Canadian manufacturing employment fell by 21.7 percent (Campbell, 1992: 7).

Along with their tally of FTA-induced job losses, CLC and CCPA researchers have tracked the destinations of the runaway shops. Most runaways have transferred operations to the southern United States or the Mexican maquiladora zone along the Mexico-U.S. border (CLC, 1990; Campbell, 1991). The attraction of these "sunbelt" zones as sites for production transfers was noted in Section 5.1. Wages are lower than in the older industrial zones of the northern United States and Canada. Labour forces are less unionized in the sunbelt, and many states of the U.S. south, for example, have so called "right to work" laws which make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for workers to organize into trade unions. In Mexico, where they do exist, most unions are dominated by the authoritarian Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).⁷⁷ In both the southern United States and Mexico, corporations find more lax occupational health and safety regulations and environmental regulations; looser controls on profit transfers; lower taxes; et cetera. And in many cases investors are provided with free electrical power and free buildings in which to set up operations. These are the conditions to which Canadian workers find themselves being harmonized.

So, as in the U.S. rustbelt zone (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Ross and Trachte, 1990), workers and communities in Canada are being put in a position where they must make concessions to an increasingly mobile capital, or face the

⁷⁷On the character of the PRI as a "bureaucratic-authoritarian" (BA) state, see the work of Guillermo O'Donnell in Collier (1979), and Klaren and Bossert (1986).

prospect of more runaway shops and community decay. The impact on communities and workers in the U.S. rustbelt has been dramatic, as graphically displayed in the feature film on General Motors and Flint, Michigan -- "Roger and Me". Union density in the United States, for example, has dropped from 32 percent in 1951 to 17 percent in 1989 (Moody 1990: 216; Russell, 1991: 41). The drop in percentage of unionized workers has not been so great in Canada. Here we find an increase from 28 percent in 1951 to 40 percent in 1983, then a drop to 36 percent in 1989 (Albo, 1990: 481; Russell, 1991: 41). But this decline will probably continue, given the current restructuring which is well summarized by the ominous-sounding title of a recent Globe and Mail article (18/10/90): "Massive closings turn industrial heartland into Rust Belt North". The sub-title of the article reads: "Unlike U.S. companies that closed in the 1970s, Canadian firms may never reopen". Enter the NAFTA -- incorporating Mexico.

The Canadian magazine Our Times (October, 1991) recently featured a cover photograph of a demonstration of southern Ontario workers against free trade. One marcher carried a placard with a map of North America on it. Mexico was labelled "job zone", the United States "banking zone", and Canada "unemployment zone". The map graphically illustrates a process that is likely to accelerate as NAFTA turns the whole of Mexico into a maquiladora zone. Mexico has a population of 85 million people, three times the population of Canada. Mexico City alone has a population roughly equal to that of Canada as a whole. "Together, open unemployment and underemployment now affect 50% of

the [Mexican] work force" (CLC, 1991: 41). So, many people must try to scratch a living from day-to-day in the informal economy. In development literature these people are referred to as "marginalized" (from the formal economy). But Cockcroft (1983) argues that because the work of those in the so-called informal economy is connected to production for the formal economy (cf. Portes and Sassen, 1987; Broad, 1991), the better term to describe the officially unemployed and underemployed is "immizerized".⁷⁸ This immizerized population has historically provided a reserve of legal and illegal migrant labour for U.S. farms and sweatshops (Cockcroft, 1990; Sassen, 1988).

More recently this reserve army of labour has begun to flock to the maquiladora zone, as U.S. capital itself migrates south. Employment in the maquiladora zone was approaching half a million workers in 1989 and rising fast. The maquilas grew at a rate of 3.5 percent per year in the 1970s, but by 7.2 percent per year in the 1980s (Barkin, 1991). Industries producing a range of products, from food and clothing to electronic equipment, have set up in the zone, paying wages that range from (U.S.) \$0.60 to \$1.20 per hour. These low wages and other cost benefits which accrue to corporations make the attraction of the zone for runaway investors obvious. And the prospect of exposing all of Mexico's reserve army to U.S. and Canadian capital appears to have only some medium-sized companies, such as Canadian automobile parts manufacturers, feeling uneasy

⁷⁸For a good summary of the situation of the Mexican poor and their prospects under NAFTA, see the special issue of *Report on the Americas*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (May 1991) on "The New Gospel: North American Free Trade".

about NAFTA (The Globe and Mail, 12/10/91). But even some of these companies, such as Magna International, have already begun to move off to Mexico.⁷⁹

In January of 1991 the CLC (1991) compiled a selected list of 63 corporations which have set up production facilities in the Mexican maquiladora under the FTA, leading to a direct loss of 16,474 jobs. The list includes various types of manufacturing industries, including autos and auto parts. The same CLC document includes a 36-page list of where companies had shut down Canadian operations between November 1988 and November 1990, with many running away to the southern United States or Mexico. Although it would appear hardly necessary, the authors of the CLC document also present reasons why Canada should not enter into a NAFTA. The reasoning includes a critique of the neo-liberal, and often hypocritical, justifications for NAFTA given by Canadian state, business and academic pundits.⁸⁰ The reasons why capital wants NAFTA amount essentially to the reasons why labour should not (Moody and McGinn, 1992). Noting that NAFTA is an important part of the U.S. restructuring initiative to compete against Europe and the Far East, the authors of the CLC report state:

⁷⁹For its part, the pro-free trade business press has made a big deal out of General Motors' decision to move a plant from Mexico to Lansing, Michigan. The Globe and Mail (22/06/93) reported that a union official "would not comment on whether the union offered concessions to GM". But, especially given the United Auto Workers' track record on concessions, we can surmise that silence means assent.

⁸⁰An interesting twist is given in a CCPA publication which offers a legal-based argument against the FTA and NAFTA as an unfair wage subsidy (Stanford, 1991).

Specifically, the corporations want to include Mexico, especially the border region (the Maquiladora) in a Continental trade deal primarily because of its extremely low wages (\$0.60 per hour) and because of the absence of environmental, tax, and other regulatory obstacles. What makes it so important is that it is literally on the door step of the American market. No need to build a communications/transportation infrastructure. One has only to cross a bridge. A two and a half day truck drive will get you to the Canadian border (CLC, 1991: 40).

For North American, and some European and Japanese capitals, this presents the best of all possible worlds. But the effect on Canadian labour and communities is the same as that discussed for the U.S. case by Ross and Trachte (1990).

The Mexican maquiladora has become an important tool for corporations, a giant pool of [cheap] labour, through which to extract concessions at the bargaining table, to undermine Canadian labour and social standards and to weaken regulatory regimes such as those which protect the environment.

Free Trade will enhance and entrench their power to pursue their lowest-common denominator drive for competitiveness, ignoring any demands to operate within social and ethical rules (CLC, 1991: 41).

5.4 Conclusions

Let me return to the theory of the NIDL to explain how the trends described above relate to the (re)casualization of labour. Fernandez (1989) offers an evaluation of theories of the NIDL which touches upon factors most pertinent to my inquiry.

This process was viewed as the beginning of a new stage in capitalist development characterized by five features: (a) the unprecedented mobility of capital investments throughout the world; (b) the utilization of advanced technology to further the fragmentation of production and the deskilling of labor; (c) the centralization, in advanced industrial countries, of decision-making processes affecting production, combined with the dispersal of manufacturing to third world locations; (d) the resulting extension of

proletarianization in less developed areas; and (e) the increasing reliance on women as providers of labor in direct production (Fernandez, 1989: 149-50).

Fernandez tells us that the scenario for the centre is not one of simple "deindustrialization" as many NIDL theorists argued, but a process of industrial restructuring which is much more complex. She cites Sassen's (1982; 1988) studies of New York City, where there is growth of both professional employment in TNC research and development and high technology production, and growth of sweated labour in low-level production and service work (cf. Ross and Trachte, 1990). Much of this service work involves provisioning the life-styles of higher-paid professionals -- through domestic service, restaurants and various forms of entertainment (including, as in the NICs, prostitution).

Fernandez recognizes a key feature of manufacturing and service work in both centre and periphery which contradicts the simple notion of an "extension of proletarianization". Her studies of the U.S. show that

both garment and electronics production are characterized by the presence of new working arrangements, particularly a strong shift toward subcontracting and, in varying degrees, a reliance upon industrial homework to supplement production in factories. The growing importance of both subcontracting and informal working arrangements is a vivid indicator of industrial restructuring in the United States that parallels the process of economic internationalization (Fernandez, 1989: 148-9).

Here we see what seems a replication of the situation during the industrial restructuring of the early 1800s in Britain. There also we found "a reliance upon

industrial homework to supplement production in the factories" (cf. Thompson [1968] on textiles production).⁸¹

As for the Third World, Fernandez (1989: 150) says "export-oriented industrialization continues to flourish side-by-side with bloated service sectors and the so-called informal economy" (cf. Portes et al., 1989). In fact, "export-oriented industrialization in the third world has incorporated a relatively small percentage of the labour force" (Fernandez, 1989: 150).

Fernandez' discussion suggests that we should question the notion of a straightforward connection between the internationalization of capital and proletarianization of labour. For the evidence on restructuring in both centre and periphery suggests that we are as likely to see increased use of casual labour as full-time proletarian labour. It is this conclusion which has led some world-systems theorists to argue that, for many workers, present trends are bringing a "peripheralization of the centre". Rather than industrialization simply spreading to the Third World, and with it proletarianization of labour, the "new mobility of capital" can correspond to a mobility of production relations and socio-political conditions which result in such things as the "Latin Americanization of the United States" (Barnet and Muller, 1974).

In short, mobility of capital carries with it mobility of social and working conditions, which will give rise to corresponding political struggles. As long as TNCs are allowed free reign, they will "return" to those centre areas where unions

⁸¹My discussion of these aspects of the contemporary restructuring process and their relation to (re)casualization of labour in Canada are further developed in Chapter VII.

have been broken, wages lowered, and state incentives to capital made plentiful (Howe, 1986). And not only will the "providers of labour" be women, but work itself will be "feminized" (Fernandez, 1985; von Werlhof, 1984).

The notion of a general and global "feminization" of labour, female and male, is most clearly articulated in the various writings of Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen and Claudia von Werlhof (see, e.g., Mies et al., 1988). Von Werlhof (1984), for example, has argued that the vision of the future for labour in general is not more proletarianization, but "housewifization" of labour.⁸² Based on studies of working conditions and social relations for Third World workers and peasants, and for women working worldwide, von Werlhof and her colleagues see a transition away from secure, high-wage proletarian labour to more casual, low-wage, non-wage, and informal labour. This, it is argued, is the logic created by an increasingly mobile capital in search of cheaper and less militant labour forces.

Mies (1988: 10) succinctly summarizes the trend in terms of what she and her colleagues call a "housewifization" of production. She argues that capital, both international and national, in trying to solve its accumulation crisis, is propagating the "hitherto hidden" production relations of the housewife not just for reproduction of labour-power, but for production of commodities. Through rationalization and automation capital is rendering the "'free' proletarian superfluous" (cf. Sivanandan, 1990).

⁸²The concept of "housewifization", as developed by Mies et al., should not be confused with the concept of "domesticization" of women, as discussed in previous chapters.

The proletariat disappears, because he is: a) too expensive, b) not 'productive' enough. He is increasingly being replaced by housewifized labour, that is, labour that bears the characteristics of housework, namely, labour not protected by trade unions or labour laws, that is available at any time, for any price, that is not recognized as 'labour' but as an 'activity', as in the 'income generating activities', meaning isolated and unorganized and so on (Mies, 1988: 10).

This is being done under the slogan of "flexibilization of labour". The "housewifization" of labour is particularly propagated with regard to the new computer technology and "the old/new strategy of homeworking. Women will constitute the bulk of this new labour force outside the 'formal sector'. But men, also, will increasingly find themselves in such housewifized labour relations" (Mies, 1988: 10). Mies argues that the motives for this strategy of capital are not just economic. The process is "also a political strategy to break the power of the organized (male) proletariat. The trade unions, which never included housework in the definition of work, are not in a position to counter this strategy of capital" (Mies, 1988: 10).

So the structures and social relations often assumed to characterize Third World countries are being reintroduced into previously proletarianized areas of production in First World countries. "Flexibilization of labour" means making labour more docile by increasing competition between workers in primary and secondary labour markets, between different sectors, and between communities. There is increasingly a "level playing field" for labour that is global. It is a playing field on which First World workers, by and large, must play by the Third World rules, and see their living and working conditions peripheralized. It is a playing

field on which wages and working conditions for many women increase relative to men's largely because men's status is on the decline (see, e.g., The Globe and Mail, 28/01/92). The "new" logic for capital-labour relations in this game is affected through increasing "flexibility" in both labour processes and labour markets. In the following chapter I present a discussion of how this push for flexible labour is played out on the national front through industrial restructuring. The three main elements of this restructuring are the shift away from so-called Fordist mass-production, the growth of the service economy, and the feminization of labour.

CHAPTER VI

RESTRUCTURING THE WORLD OF WORK: FLEXIBLE PRODUCTION, THE SERVICE ECONOMY, AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Now sociologists are beginning to warn that technology should be applied only when the environment - human, social and natural - is considered as the context in which it must work. Experts such as Canadian Heather Menzies say society has labelled technological change as a technical and economic question rather than a political and social one. The growth of computer automation and its application to a widening spectrum of life brought mixed blessings. The silicon chip entered most workplaces, from robots building automobiles to computers replacing telephone operators, largely at the expense of workers (emphasis added).

- The Globe and Mail

In the previous chapter I discussed global trends which are contributing to social repolarization and a (re)casualization of labour, with specific reference to the thesis of a new international division of labour (NIDL), and the neo-liberal politics of freer trade. In this chapter I shift my focus more to the national level to consider elements of industrial restructuring which are contributing to repolarization and (re)casualization.⁸³

⁸³I make the separation of global and national levels simply to delineate processes, and to facilitate my presentation of those processes to the reader. Some might argue that the trends discussed in this chapter are not really national trends, because they can be found in other countries. Nevertheless, they tend to operate mainly at the national level, to the extent that it can be separated from the global one,

There are three central facets to industrial restructuring which are affecting the Canadian labour market: (1) the shift from Fordism to flexible production; (2) the growth and restructuring of the service economy; and (3) the (re)entry of women into the formal labour market -- the so-called reproletarianization of women. The first facet relates primarily to restructuring of the labour process, as new technologies are applied to reorganization at the point of production. Facets (2) and (3) relate more directly to labour-market restructuring, though labour process and labour market are intertwined. New technologies and forms of work organization that are part of the flexible production package, first applied to manufacturing production, are now being applied to service work. And growth of the service economy is itself resulting in new types of employment and new labour processes. The feminization of labour, as well, involves both a changing gender distribution in the labour market, but what some analysts see as a feminization of work itself (Fernandez, 1985; Mies et al., 1988). I discuss the three trends in turn, noting where they interrelate, and how they contribute to social repolarization and (re)casualization of labour.

6.1 From Fordism to Flexible Production

There has been much discussion in the sociology of work in recent years of a shift from "Fordist" accumulation to "flexible" accumulation of capital (e.g.,

and take on particular national colorations according to specific national histories and modes of insertion into the world-economy. For a discussion of the complexities in doing world-systems analysis of shifting back and forth between global and national levels see So (1990).

Harvey, 1989). Fordism is a system of accumulation, attributed to Henry Ford's practices (Gramsci, 1936), which combines mass production with mass consumption. Assembly-line mass production involves the worker as a cog in the machine, such as we see with the machine-tender in Charlie Chaplin's film Modern Times, whose job was repetitive, boring and required little skill. Most of the work itself was quite alienating, as Chaplin's film showed, and as countless studies of worker satisfaction have shown (Krahn and Lowe, 1988; Rinehart, 1987). But the Fordist way of producing was part of an overall regime, or social structure of accumulation, which was acceptable to the workers because it included an element of mass consumption allowing for job satisfaction based on extrinsic rewards, of wages, benefits and social status, as opposed to intrinsic rewards gained from satisfying work. As long as these extrinsic rewards could be obtained, there existed a sort of social compromise between labour and capital.

However, through collective bargaining trade unions were able to gain sufficient say in how workplace changes could be affected, and earn sufficient wage increases to create what business analysts call rigidities in the labour market. So, as production stagnated, profits declined, and businesses had to confront the new global competitiveness, more employers began to shift toward so-called flexible production processes in the formal economy. In Europe and North America this is sometimes called the "Japanization" of industry, because many of the methods of production and the new labour relations are based on the Japanese model (Morris, 1991).

Among marxian authors who have conceptualized Fordism are Aglietta (1979) and Lipietz (1987), who represent one strain of the so-called French Regulation School of radical economics (see Cataife, 1989). The main operating concepts of the school are "regime of accumulation" and "mode of regulation". For Lipietz (1987: 14-5) the term regime of accumulation describes the long-term stabilization of allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation.

This implies a certain correspondence between the transformation of conditions of production and the transformation of conditions of reproduction of wage-labour, between certain of the modalities in which capitalism is articulated with other modes of production within a **national economic and social formation**, and between the social and economic formation under consideration and its 'outside world'.

According to Lipietz, the regime of accumulation must be materialized in the shape of norms, habits, laws and regulating networks. This involves a set of internalized rules and social procedures which incorporate social elements into individual behaviour, and is referred to as the mode of regulation. The resulting dominant regime of accumulation in the OECD countries during the post-World War II period is referred to as Fordism. This regime encapsulates a proletarian logic for the formal labour market.

Some U.S. authors have articulated a similar construct of "social structures of accumulation". For Gordon et al. (1982: 9) the social structure of accumulation is "the specific institutional environment within which the capitalist accumulation process is organized". This environment includes concrete historical structures which affect the way firms buy inputs in one set of markets, produce goods and

services, and sell the resulting outputs in other markets. Included as well are "the monetary and credit system, the pattern of state involvement in the economy, the character of class conflict, and so forth" (Gordon et al., 1982: 9). Gordon et al. apply their concept to an analysis of U.S. working-class history "by examining the interaction among (1) long swings in economic activity, (2) social structures of accumulation, and (3) the organization of work and the structure of labor markets" (Gordon et al., 1982: 8). They discern three periods in the historical transformation of U.S. labour: (1) an initial proletarianization of labour, from the 1820s to the 1890s; (2) an homogenization of labour, from the 1870s to World War II; and (3) a segmentation of labour, from the 1920s to the present. These periods overlap because they each entail stages of exploration, consolidation and decay.

Gordon et al. suggest that we are now at the conjuncture of decay of segmented labour structures as they appeared in their consolidation stage, and exploration of a possible new social structure of accumulation. They caution that this does not mean the end of segmented labour markets.⁸⁴ But new arrangements are emerging which may encapsulate labour segments in different ways. I will discuss this further below with respect to flexible production.

Heron and Storey (1986) suggest the applicability of Gordon et al's. concept of social structures of accumulation to Canada, and offer a periodization

⁸⁴They also caution that their three main segments of independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets (discussed below) have not captured all forms of labour, nor did homogenization or proletarianization.

of transformations of Canadian labour which parallels that of Gordon et al. for the United States: (1) independent commodity production prior to 1850; (2) the rise of industrial capitalism, from 1850 to 1890; (3) the consolidation of monopoly capitalism, from 1890 to 1940; and (4) the challenge of industrial democracy, from 1940 to the present. While they note particularities of the Canadian case, we see in Heron and Storey's account the same proletarianization, homogenization and segmentation tendencies described by Gordon et al. for the United States. We also see in case studies in Heron and Storey's collection signs of the current shift to flexible production. In Chapters III and IV, I discussed the history of proletarianization for the British and Canadian cases. Here I will discuss the homogenization and segmentation of labour, and how they relate to the current shift towards flexible production.

Braverman's analysis of mass production in his Labor and Monopoly Capital is perhaps the most influential study of homogenization, and of changes in the labour process since Marx's Capital. In fact, Braverman quite consciously saw his work as an updating of Marx, and has generated a renewed interest in study of the labour process.⁸⁵ Braverman focuses on the control aspects of the increasing organic composition of capital by considering the work of Charles Babbage on the disciplinary function of machinery and, especially, the "scientific management"

⁸⁵The significance of Braverman's work is signalled by the fact that most studies of the labour process are either extensions of or responses to his ideas. Braverman et al. (1976) and Zimbalist (1979) offer examples.

approach of Frederick Taylor ("Taylorism"). Braverman evaluates Taylor's three principles of scientific management.

- 1) [The] first principle we may call the dissociation of the labor process from the skills of the workers....
- 2) [The second] should be called the principle of the separation of conception from execution....
- 3) [And] the third is the use of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of execution (1974: 113-9).

When conception and execution of tasks are separated, work is degraded and deskilled, and the worker becomes more of an appendage of the machine. This, of course, is the extension of the increasing organic composition of capital. And not just control of labour and the labour process is at stake. After all, capitalist social relations are relations of exploitation. Singer (1990: 44) notes how Taylor "reveals that the revolutionary secret of scientific management is 'that both sides take their eyes off the division of the surplus'", and adds; "No wonder that he [Taylor] also says that 'soldiering will cease because the object of soldiering will no longer exist' and thus exits the class struggle".

The result of application of Taylor's principles to 20th Century mass production has been, according to Braverman, increasing alienation and deskilling in work, along with fragmentation and segmentation of production processes. Deskilling and segmentation of work, we have noted, is important for students of the NIDL. Of particular interest has been the development of a literature on segmented, or dual labour market theory. Edwards (1979) and Gordon et al.

(1982), for example, offer an evaluation and extension of Braverman's discussion of control of the labour process, and homogenization of labour.

According to Gordon et al. (1982: 128ff) the homogenization process has three principal dimensions. The first is an interdependent mechanization and task-compression in the labour process. Technical innovations supported labour management through machine control in production, thus reducing employers' reliance on craft workers. Gordon et al. (1982: 131) note, for example, "that the automobile assembly line, like earlier efforts toward mechanization, arose at least partly as a result of corporate efforts to gain greater control over production". They add how Ford himself acknowledged that labour unrest helped spark the sequence of innovations that led to mass production. The goal was to reduce skilled workers' control over production, and eliminate social contact among semi-skilled operatives. The result, highlighted by Braverman, was the further alienation and deskilling in the labour process -- the reduction of increasing numbers of jobs to a common, semi-skilled denominator (Gordon et al., 1982: 132-3).

The second principal dimension of homogenization was that the continuing trend toward mechanization also produced continuing increases in plant size, which reinforced the spreading impersonality of wage-labour. The third principal dimension was more use of foremen and superintendents to achieve greater control over the production process. "As skills were reduced and craft workers were replaced in many industries, foremen substituted their own authority for the

coordinative and managerial activities that craft workers had formerly provided" (Gordon et al., 1982: 135). We see mixed with the three principal dimensions of homogenization Taylor's three principles of scientific management noted by Braverman: (1) the dissociation of the labour process from the skills of the workers; (2) the separation of conception from execution; and (3) monopoly control over each step of the labour process. Taylorism, or scientific management, thus provides the production principles of Fordism.

But as we move into the post-World War II period of economic growth, product lines and production processes become more complex, and the service sector and attendant professions rapidly expand their share of the labour market. Taylorist principles of control and homogenization of labour then blend into the segmentation of labour markets as an overriding tendency. Edwards (1979) discusses three distinct labour market segments and the types of control which correspond to them.

The characteristics of the three labour markets are depicted in Figure 6.1. The first is the secondary labour market, where most jobs are nominally low-skilled, low-paid and non-union. They are found in both manufacturing and services industries, and are held mainly by ethnic and racial minorities and women. Most secondary labour market work is labour intensive, and is subject to the simple control of foremen and forewomen. The second, subordinate primary labour market can be roughly equated with blue-collar work. It is generally unionized and higher-waged than most secondary labour market work, with the

Figure 6.1. The Correspondence Between Systems of Control and Labor Market Segments for Sample Jobs.

<div>System of Control</div> <div>Market Segment (jobs)</div>	Simple Control	Technical Control	Bureaucratic Control
Secondary	I. <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Small manufacturing jobs•Service jobs•Retail sales•Temporary and typing-pool office work	Southern textile jobs	Part-time academic jobs
Subordinate Primary	Unionized garment workers	II. <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Jobs in auto and steel plants•Assembly-line production work•Machine-paced clerical work	Personal secretary jobs
Independent Primary	Jobs in small consulting firms	Technicians' jobs monitoring chemical production	III. <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Jobs at IBM, Polaroid•Craft work•Nonproduction staff jobs

SOURCE: Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain. New York: Basic Books, 1979: 179.

best jobs being held by white males. The work is labour intensive, using assembly-line technology. It is therefore subject to technical control, being the stereotype of Fordist/Taylorist production. This is the work we think of as classical proletarian labour.

Work in the third, independent primary labour market is more knowledge intensive than labour intensive. This work is where execution resides in the Taylorist schema. It involves creation and design of products and production processes, and requires high levels of formal education. The jobs are not necessarily unionized, but have good pay and benefits, and are generally held by white males. These workers enjoy a fair degree of independence in their work, but are subject to the bureaucratic control of senior decision-makers and policy-makers who are ultimately in charge of production and investment. Edwards (1979: 178) contends:

Labor markets are segmented because they express a historical segmentation of the labor process; specifically, a distinct system of control inside the firm underlies each of the three market segments. The secondary labor market is the expression of workplaces organized according to simple control. The subordinate primary market contains those workplaces (workers and jobs) under the 'mixed' system of technical control and unions. And the independent primary market reflects bureaucratically controlled labor processes. Thus, the fundamental basis for division into three segments is to be found in the workplace, not in the labor market.

As we will see, with flexible production, we find a blending of subordinate and independent primary work through so-called teamwork and de-layering programs.

In Chapter V, I noted that the new international division of labour has given global capital a new "flexibility" in terms of production sites and world

sources of labour. But flexibility has also been sought in the production process itself, leading from Fordism to new forms of "flexible production", and a new regime that Harvey (1989), among others, calls "flexible accumulation". Implementation of this new regime of accumulation initially entailed, on a world scale, the extension of Taylorism to the periphery and the search for "new" methods of production in the centre, to both increase labour productivity and rehabilitate labour to the discipline of capital (Ross and Trachte, 1990). But the new methods of production are, in many ways, the reverse of Taylorism. Flexible production is replacing Fordism as the norm for the formal labour market.

We find three forms of flexibility applied to production. First, there is "financial flexibility", which involves cost-cutting by reducing the size of work forces, mainly in the old declining manufacturing industries. Second, there is "functional flexibility", which means "making more efficient use of permanent full-time employees through quality control, working smarter, continuous production" (Drache, 1991: 258). The third form is "numerical flexibility", which entails "closer tailoring the size of the workforce to a firm's use of part-time, contractual, and temporary personnel" (Drache, 1991: 258). These processes conform to the (re)casualization of labour which, as noted, fits Marx's (1867) discussion of capital's need for a reserve army of labour (see Chapter II).

The resulting labour market structure is depicted in Figure 6.2. At the core we find the most (formally) highly-skilled workers, especially those involved in research and design, who are noted for their functional flexibility. The first

FIGURE 6.2. Labour Market Structures under Conditions of Flexible Accumulation.

SOURCE: David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989: 151.

peripheral tier incorporates full-time workers, who are numerically flexible due to higher turnover than the core group. The second peripheral group provides even greater numerical flexibility, because it is made up of part-timers and other casual workers. "All evidence points to a very significant growth in this category of employees in the last few years" (Harvey, 1989: 150-1). On the outer tier, not directly employed by core firms, we find the temporary help agencies, sub-contractors, self-employed, and increased outsourcing to the geographical periphery -- the Third World.

Table 6.1 depicts the contrast between Fordist and flexible production methods. Flexible production methods borrow much from the Japanese approach of "just-in-time" (JIT) production (see, e.g., Linge, 1991). JIT is oriented to specialty markets and therefore requires an ability to adapt and change products more rapidly than the mass production of homogeneous goods under Fordism allows. Rather than an orientation to "economies of scale", JIT is oriented to small batch production for "economies of scope". For the new approach to be financially feasible, inventories of stocks must be kept to a bare minimum, and the production process itself must be very flexible. No costly down-time for retooling of production processes is allowed. The implications for workers on and off the shop floor are significant.

Taylorism entailed an increasing separation of conception from execution of tasks, so that an increasing mass of workers were required only for their physical labour. But for flexible production to work, the workers must be

TABLE 6.1. Contrast between Fordism and Flexible Accumulation.

Fordist production (based on economics of scale)	Just-in-time production (based on economics of scope)
A. THE PRODUCTION PROCESS	
mass production of homogeneous goods	small batch production
uniformity and standardization	flexible and small batch production of a variety of product types
large buffer stocks and inventory	no stocks
testing quality ex-post (rejects and errors detected late)	quality control part of process (immediate detection of errors)
rejects are concealed in buffer stocks	immediate reject of defective parts
loss of production time because of long set-up times, defective parts, inventory bottlenecks, etc.	reduction of lost time, diminishing 'the porosity of the working day'
resource driven	demand driven
vertical and (in some cases) horizontal integration	(quasi-) vertical integration sub-contracting
cost reductions through wage control	learning-by-doing integrated in long-term planning
B. LABOUR	
single task performance by worker	multiple tasks
payment per rate (based on job design criteria)	personal payment (detailed bonus system)
high degree of job specialization	elimination of job demarcation
no or only little on the job training	long on the job training
vertical labour organization	more horizontal labour organization
no learning experience	on the job learning
emphasis on diminishing worker's responsibility (disciplining of labour force)	emphasis on worker's co-responsibility
no job security	high employment security for core workers (life-time employment). No job security and poor labour conditions for temporary workers.

SOURCE: David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989: 177-8.

involved in the constant changes that small-batch production requires. There is a tendency to reunite conception and execution in the labour process, so that workers can be exploited for their ingenuity. The emphasis is on learning-by-doing, and on-the-job learning (see Table 6.1). As opposed to the steady deskilling and segmentation of tasks performed by single workers under Fordism/-Taylorism, flexible production requires that workers perform multiple tasks, leading to an elimination of job demarcations. And there must be a more horizontal organization of labour, with emphasis on worker co-responsibility. The latter has been pushed through a process called "teamwork", or "production teams", replacing the individuated workers of Taylorism.

Many critics argue that, in practice, what we find is a hybrid of Taylorist methods and flexible production (Drache and Glasbeek, 1992; Parker, 1985; Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Rosenfeld et al., 1993; USWA, 1992; Wells, 1986; 1987). The contention is, given that capitalism is a mode of production based on capital's exploitation of labour, that workers' "flexibility" and incorporation into production decisions can only be allowed to go so far. So, if Taylorism entailed a division of labour where management told workers what to do and how to do it, with the new approach management still tells workers what to do, but incorporates the workers into the process of figuring out how to do it. It is the workers who must be "flexible".

Enter the "team concept", which combines the new technologies of computers and robotics with teams of workers to produce smaller batch runs of whole

commodities. Team members are to engage in multiple tasks and problem solving. However, many of the tasks still require little skill, and the pressures put on workers to produce leads some critics to call the team approach "management-by-stress" (Parker and Slaughter, 1988). The conclusion is that the new labour processes may be more stimulating, but are no less alienating than the old (Menzies, 1989; Drache and Glasbeek, 1992).

To sell flexible production to workers, it has been dressed up in "quality of working life" (QWL) clothes, borrowing a chapter from the old human relations school of management.⁸⁶ Company brochures, videos, and television advertisements present a brave new work world of harmony and consensus between capital and labour, managers and workers, where everyone is one big happy family and work has become one long stimulus. The notion is based on the Japanese model of corporate paternalism. But critics argue that the model is an illusion, for all members of the family are not equal. Many are left outside the family and now, with increasing stagnation in Japan, lifetime employment for corporate family members there is disappearing as well (Labor Notes, May 1993).

It is those left outside the family who are my prime concern here. They have been quite visible in Japanese flexible accumulation, which is based on the "tier system" of production (Hill, 1989).⁸⁷ Segmentation theorists such as Ed-

⁸⁶See Krahn and Lowe (1988) for a good summary comparison of the scientific management and human relations schools.

⁸⁷We might note here that Japan has retirement at age 55, marginalizing even core workers at that point to jobs in subsidiaries on the outer tiers, or leaving them without work (and its attendant benefits).

wards (1979) noted how, under monopoly capitalism, labour markets are segmented between large and small firms, and primary and secondary jobs (see Figure 6.1). Under Fordism/Taylorism the core workers in frame II of Figure 6.1 (the classical proletarians) were seen to be the norm. But under flexible production there is a relative decline in these workers in the middle of the labour market, with subordinate primary jobs, and an increase at the two extremes depicted in frames I and III, in secondary and independent primary jobs.

As we will see in the case of Canada (Section 6.2), there is a polarization of labour markets based on a growth of the new "knowledge" jobs, such as the jobs at IBM and Polaroid and craft work used as examples by Edwards, and an increase in non-union, lower-waged, less-secure jobs in small manufacturing firms, service jobs, retail jobs, temporary and typing-pool office work, et cetera. Increasingly though, as with the Japanese tier system, large firms at the core and small firms on the periphery are integrated into a single production process through contracting-out. Specialty inputs for, say, a small batch of cars for a particular market, are contracted out to smaller firms by the large core companies. This allows both flexibility of production and externalization of costs for core firms, which need not keep large stocks of specialty parts or large staffs of multi-skilled workers.

The workers in the smaller firms may not be less skilled than workers in core firms. In fact, they may need to be more skilled for design and manufacture of specialty parts. But, as with secondary labour market workers discussed by

Edwards et al., work in the small firms is less secure, lower waged, and generally non-unionized. So large capital has easier access to low-cost, skilled, and often casual labour. And in both the periphery and core states of the world-economy we now find a growing "informal economy", providing both goods and services to the "formal economy" (Broad, 1991; and Chapter VII).

Canada accompanied the rest of the Western world in seeing Taylorism/-Fordism applied to more areas of work over the course of this century (Heron and Storey, 1986; Rinehart, 1987). Automobile production, beginning with Ford, of course, is the stereotypical case, and will serve as a good example for my discussion here. The Canadian auto industry has been tightly interwoven with the U.S. auto industry throughout this century -- officially with the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact of 1963 -- and the same methods of production have prevailed. Holmes (1987: 100) notes that "the combination of the increasing specialization of the technical division of labour, the progressive generalization of Fordist techniques of production, and the continued expansion of mass consumption led to steady economic growth and rising levels of productivity in the period from 1945 to the late 1960s". But, according to Holmes, by the late 1960s and early 1970s the Canadian auto industry experienced two problems central to the crisis of Fordism, a slowdown in productivity growth and intensification of international competition. Earlier, the Canadian industry experienced a crisis of further development due to lack of correspondence between production and consumption, given the limited Canadian market. This crisis was resolved through the Auto Pact, which assured

reinvestment in Canada by the big U.S. auto companies by mandating Canadian content -- for every car sold in Canada, one had to be produced here. But the generalized crisis of Fordism has affected Canadian production along with world production, and brought to Canadian auto production the drive for flexible accumulation.

The "big-three" U.S. auto makers, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors (GM), have experienced economic problems since the 1970s, due largely to foreign competition (especially from Japan) and overproduction (Marchak, 1991). They have thus been pushed to restructure both for global competitiveness and to try to recapture their North American market shares. This has involved global outsourcing, increasing national contracting-out, joint ventures with Japanese and European companies, and attempts to restructure the labour processes of core workers along the lines of flexible accumulation. This has been a halting process, largely because the Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) has put up more resistance to implementation of so-called QWL and teamwork processes than the U.S. United Auto Workers (UAW). The more extensive deindustrialization of the old auto sector in the United States, along with more willingness of the UAW to make concessions, has put more pressure on U.S. than Canadian auto workers. And, very important, the Canadian auto industry has been protected by the Auto Pact, until the signing of the FTA. But, as noted in the previous chapter, with the FTA, both protection of Canadian producers (especially small and medium parts producers) and the bargaining power of the CAW is eroded. This means, of

course, that the ability to resist concessions to management on wages and working conditions is seriously undermined.

I noted in Chapter V that one important effect of the FTA was plant shutdowns. Given that a large segment of Canadian manufacturing is in the auto industry, it comes as no surprise to find that a high percentage of shops running away to the southern United States or Mexico produce automobiles or parts (CLC, 1990; 1991). And the industry was recently hit by another round of closures. On December 18, 1991, the president of GM in Detroit, Michigan announced that the company will shut down 21 plants across North America by 1995, laying off 74,000 workers. A number of media commentators suggested that the vagueness of the announcement -- not stating which plants would get the axe -- seemed calculated to instill fear into the workforce. The message was: 'Be prepared to make concessions or lose your jobs'. This became clear in late February 1992. A title in the business section of The Globe and Mail (26/02/92) read "GM signals need for concessions", with the sub-title reading "This week's cutbacks have left no doubt that the survival of the two General Motors plants in Oshawa [Ontario] depends on the flexibility of the workers".

The importance to GM of this demand for worker flexibility was underscored by the outcome of GM restructuring on two plants in the United States. "When the manager of General Motors Corp's Arlington [Texas] plant got word last fall that a big restructuring was afoot, he called union leaders in for a brainstorming session" (The Globe and Mail, 26/02/92). The union, UAW Local

276, had already demonstrated itself to be most flexible. "In 1986, the UAW local adopted a team concept in which workers learn each other's jobs. And in December, the local's members voted to accept the more flexible work hours the company asked" (The Globe and Mail, 26/02/92). In a race with a less flexible workforce in North Tarrytown, New York, the Arlington plant won out, with Tarrytown production to be transferred to Texas where, we should note, wage levels are generally lower, and GM has been offered tax breaks (The Globe and Mail, 26/02/92).

So Canadian auto workers are being told that only those plants willing to accept more flexible working rules will survive. When GM chairman Robert Stempel announced several plant closings on Monday, February 24, 1992 he stated: "Innovative labour agreements and work arrangements are going to be part of our decision making". He added: "We've got to utilize our fixed facilities more fully" (The Globe and Mail, 26/02/92) -- an obvious reference to pushing flexibility on the core group of workers. "At the same time, GM Canada was told that its two car plants in Oshawa were among five producing mid-size, front-wheel-drive vehicles that would be reduced in number to - at most - four". So workers in these five plants have been pitted against each other, as with the two U.S. plants mentioned above. "Workers at [the two] plants in Oshawa, Ont., will be pressured to make concessions - a word the company won't use and a condition the union [CAW] says it won't accept - to save many of their 15,000 blue-collar jobs" (The Globe and Mail, 26/02/92). But given the continental

whipsawing that comes with the FTA and NAFTA, it may be harder for Canadian workers to resist.

This push for more worker flexibility is, again, not new to the current recession, as might be suggested. Nor is it a product of the FTA. Both are part of a global restructuring process which has been occurring for at least two decades, in all sectors of the labour market. In the periphery it has brought a concomitant proletarianization of labour and explosion of the informal economy. In the centre it has brought a peripheralization of labour, through combined neo-liberal state and corporate attacks on labour and the welfare state (Broad, 1988). While the capitalist market is freed through deregulation and contracting-out, labour is coerced by this freer market (including less protection from rising unemployment), and by more authoritarian state legislation against workers (Albo, 1990; Panitch and Swartz, 1988).

It is in this context that one must understand the (re)casualization of labour. The global effects of restructuring, including both a more flexible international division of labour for capital, and more flexible work patterns, combine in producing a more bifurcated labour market than that under Fordism. With the regime of flexible accumulation, we find high job security for a few core workers, but no employment security and poor labour conditions for the increasing ranks of casual labour. In Section 6.2 I examine the concomitant growth of a few "good jobs", but more "bad jobs" in Canada. Then in Section 6.3 I turn to a discussion

of the role that feminization of labour in Canada plays in this polarization of the labour market.

6.2 The Service Economy, Industrial Restructuring, and Labour Market Polarization in Canada

In Chapter V and Section 6.1, I focused mainly on the effects of global and national restructuring on manufacturing production. In this section I will deal more with industrial restructuring in terms of the post-World War II increase in services employment, and discuss the character of service work. It should be noted at the outset that in discussing the service economy we are not simply referring to the service sector, as opposed to the goods sector, but the fact that in so-called post-industrial society service employment now leads the economy, the way manufacturing did 35 or 40 years ago. Critics of the post-industrial society thesis are right to argue that manufacturing still matters (Cohen and Zysman, 1987; ECC, 1991). But whereas services once served manufacturing, the shift to a service economy is almost like the tail wagging the dog.

A number of researchers have produced studies of the wage and skill nature of jobs being produced by the service economy (ECC, 1990a; 1991; Krahn, 1992; Myles 1988; Myles et al., 1988a; 1988b; 1990; Picot, 1986; Picot et al., 1990). These discussions focus on problems of the "declining middle" and "deskilling" of work. Following a brief overview of increases in service employment in recent decades, I discuss three things which are relevant to the (re)casualization and repolarization of labour -- the relationship between productivity growth and so-

called jobless economic growth, wage polarization in the service sector, and skill polarization in service work.

In 1901 the majority of the Canadian labour force, 45 percent, was in primary production. Only 27 percent was to be found in secondary production, with 28 percent then in the tertiary, or service sector (Chen and Regan, 1985: 27). By 1992 only six percent of the Canadian labour force was employed in primary production, secondary sector employment declined slightly in relative terms to 22 percent, with 72 percent, almost three-quarters of Canadian workers employed in services.⁸⁸

Moreover, while goods production has been strongly effected by cyclical swings in the economy, service employment has grown steadily, with slight dips during the 1981-82 and 1990-92 recessions.⁸⁹ Pold (1990: 1) notes:

By industry, employment in the goods sector in June 1990 was down to the levels of late 1987. Manufacturing has been the big loser in this group, employment having declined for over a year. In contrast, employment growth continues in the service-producing group with virtually all recent increases coming in the community, business and personal service industry.

So, close to three quarters of the Canadian labour force is now employed in service work. The big shift since the beginning of this century has been the decline of "blue-collar" jobs, and the growth of "white-collar" jobs and what some refer to as "pink-collar" work in female job ghettos (see Section 6.3). Less than one quarter of the Canadian labour force is now found in blue-collar work, while

⁸⁸Statistics Canada, Labour Force Annual Averages 1992. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 71-220.

⁸⁹See *ibid.*

half can be found in white-collar work (Krahn and Lowe, 1988). The two categories do not directly correspond to goods and service production, respectively, but the changes in each category can be attributed to the growth of the service economy.

Using Census data, Chen and Regan (1985) present a study of changes in occupational divisions from 1901 to 1981. Service occupations show a marked growth over the whole period. This includes white-collar occupations and those blue-collar occupations, such as transportation, which are tied to provision of services. Silver (1989) presents data on occupational growth by industry for the last two decades showing that, while "managerial and administrative", "professional", "clerical", "sales", and "service" occupations have increased their proportions, primary and manufacturing occupations have declined in proportions. He notes that "for all industries combined, the growth in the proportions of the labour force in all the 'white collar' occupations and the decline in the 'blue collar' occupations" (Silver, 1989: 23). And, as noted above, we see that both absolute employment and employment growth are concentrated in the service industries.

In reviewing the changing industrial mix of employment in post-World War II Canada, Picot (1986: 10) says

it can be noted that the more rapidly rising demand for services by the population (and the associated increase in output) was probably not the major cause of the faster increase in service sector employment in the 1950s and 1960s. And this was certainly not the only cause in the 1970s. More rapidly increasing productivity in the goods-producing rather than the commercial services sector plays a large role in this restructuring of the

labour force. This was particularly true during the period of high productivity increase before the early 1970s.

Picot (1986: 80) goes on to offer two observations about the relationship between industrial restructuring and labour productivity in Canada:

- The possibility of rising productivity in the goods-producing sector, as firms have learned to produce more with fewer workers because of their experience during the [1981-82] recession.
- The possibility of high productivity gains in producer services, which are involved in the analysis, processing and dissemination of information, and hence, can potentially make productivity gains through the micro-processor and other technological innovations.

In his evaluation of the growth of services in the Canadian economy, Cross (1988: 33) notes that employment in goods industries never recovered to its pre-recession (1980) level, while employment in services continued to expand. "The restraint in hiring in goods industries, particularly in mining and manufacturing, reflects the increased emphasis on raising output-per-employee." Cross (1988: 37) remarks:

Researchers have speculated⁹⁰ that goods-producing firms are specializing more, and are contracting out services which used to be provided within the firm (also called vertical disintegration). The heightened importance attached to raising productivity and reducing costs after the 1981-82 recession could provide a motive for this increased specialization (cf. Cote, 1990: 13).

I noted in Chapter II that Marx and marxists see a direct relation between the increasing organic composition of capital and what has come to be called technological unemployment. In his study Picot discusses the relationship between

⁹⁰Scanning the business pages of The Globe and Mail we see that there is more than mere speculation to this observation.

technological change and changes in employment. He notes that, "all other things being equal, jobs will tend to be reshuffled toward industries with slower productivity growth, as has occurred in many parts of the service sector" (1986: 57), where most jobs are labour-intensive. But Picot then cautions: "This is not necessarily true, as rapidly rising productivity may lead to lower costs, and hence rising demand, which could partially or completely obviate any employment loss" (Picot, 1986: 57). He shows that labour productivity increased in Canada throughout the post-World War II period, with the exception of commercial services during the 1981-82 recession. Picot then goes on to consider the importance of the relationship between final demand and technological change/productivity growth to employment. He refers to an Economic Council of Canada study which "noted that if output had remained unchanged after World War II, the number of jobs would have been halved. But since total output has more than doubled, employment too has risen" (Picot, 1986: 59).

Picot (1986: 78) points out "that the service sector's increasing share of employment during the fifties and sixties was due largely to differences in productivity growth in the goods-producing and service sector. The former demonstrated much more rapid gains in measured productivity". On the growth of commercial services in the 1970s, Picot (1986: 78) says: "Two-fifths of the gain in commercial services employment over goods-producing employment resulted from changes in the output of goods and services, and three-fifths from differences in the rate of growth of productivity and technology". In manufacturing, mining and oil,

agriculture, and distributive services total employment was reduced by technological change. In construction, producer services, and consumer services productivity either had little effect or tended to increase employment relative to other sectors -- technology was "labour-using", rather than "labour-saving". As for productivity gains in services, Cross suggests that services output is hard to measure, and productivity gains may be greater than is usually assumed (cf. Magdoff, 1982). Cross notes that, since 1973, the gap between output per unit of labour time in goods and services has narrowed. And he adds a point that is important for my thesis: "The higher the share of services in employment than in output by industry is largely due to the heavy concentration of part-time employment in services, particularly in the trade and financial industries" (1988: 31; see also Chapter II above, and Beechey and Perkins, 1987).⁹¹ According to Picot (1986: 79): "Economists argue that an increase in productivity makes it possible for real wages and profits to rise, stimulating demand and creating jobs through greater consumption or investment". But marxists know that this all depends on class struggle.

What should be stressed here is the fallacy of the current fixation on low productivity as the main cause of economic crisis and resulting need for industrial restructuring. Given the extent of so-called technological redundancies in both goods and services employment over the last couple of decades, arguing that workers are not productive enough is absurd. The low-productivity argument is simply a pretext for trying to buy workers into their own increased exploitation

⁹¹A number of studies have shown that employers find increased productivity with use of part-time workers (see, e.g., Labour Canada, 1983).

(Magdoff, 1982; Menzies, 1989; Waldie, 1988). It is, in fact, technology-induced increases in labour productivity in goods and services production that have caused researchers to argue that labour has been "uncoupled" from economic growth (Valaskakis, 1990), or that capital has emancipated itself from labour (Sivanandan, 1990; see below).

Turning to the question of wage polarization in the service economy, we find general agreement that there is a "declining middle" of income earners, which is associated with the decline of higher-waged, full-time jobs, and expansion of lower-waged casual employment. Using data from 1981 and 1986 supplements to the Labour Force Survey, Myles et al. (1988b: 9) note that, in the first half of the 1980s, the growth in jobs was concentrated at two points on the wage spectrum -- at the very bottom, where the number of full-time equivalent jobs grew by 34 percent, and in the upper middle, where employment grew by almost 21 percent. Myles et al. go on to say that "the increased concentration at the bottom and upper middle levels of the wage distribution is evident when full-time jobs only are examined, and hence the growth of part-time jobs does not account for much of this change" (Myles et al., 1988b: 11). In other words, increasing part-time work is, as I have been arguing, but one aspect of a growing super-exploitation of labour in the centre.

According to Myles et al. (1988b: 11):

Many theorists suggest the major motor of change is the industrial restructuring of employment. It is argued that whereas traditional blue-collar jobs in manufacturing were concentrated in the middle of the wage distribution, those in services are concentrated at the top and the bottom. Judging from

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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the wage distributions over eight industry sectors, this portrayal of the distribution of wages by industry is not far off the mark. Industries based on natural resources and construction provide quite high paying jobs; in other manufacturing industries, jobs are clustered in the middle. The services industries are more mixed in their wage profiles: public administration, health, education and the distributive services provide a disproportionate number of high paying jobs, but consumer service jobs tend to be found in the lower end of the wage distribution.

The proportion of full-time, full-year jobs created in goods production continues to decline, while the proportion in services increased, up to the 1990-92 recession.⁹² The greatest increases were in the higher-paying health, education and welfare jobs, and in the lowest-paying consumer services jobs (Myles et al., 1988b: 11). What we see is a concentration in growth of jobs at the lower and higher ends of the wage spectrum, and a decrease in the middle -- thus the "declining middle". But even here the numbers are deceptive. "The rapid job growth in the managerial/administrative category was not confined to high paying jobs, [but] was distributed over a very wide range of the wage distribution, from below-average paying to the highest paying jobs" (Myles et al., 1988a: 53).

Perhaps Myles et al.'s most important discovery is that occupational restructuring of employment explained little of the change in the wage distribution. Rather, the declining middle is the result of wage changes occurring within occupational groups. And the wage gap corresponds to an age gap in the occupational structure. "There was a remarkable downward shift in the relative wages of

⁹²After two consecutive quarters of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP), Statistics Canada declared the recession over in January of 1993. But with continuing high levels of unemployment -- so-called jobless economic growth -- others might question the extent of recovery, especially as we continue to experience a Kondratieff long-wave downturn, or what the Monthly Review School sees as long-term stagnation under monopoly capitalism.

young workers and an increase in the relative wages of middle-aged and older workers" (Myles et al., 1988b: 14). And "the wage distribution of jobs held by men and women was quite different -- the male shift was mainly towards the top of the wage distribution and the female shift towards the bottom" (Myles et al., 1988b: 14). Myles et al. note that this gender distribution of wages is related to changes in the wage distribution by age, given that female workers also tend to be younger than male workers. Data from the 1991 Census show that women have made wage gains relative to men, only because men's wages have fallen (The Globe and Mail, 15/01/93).

Myles et al. (1986b: 18) go on to postulate:

The redistribution of jobs probably occurs largely through the relative decline in entry-level jobs in some industries and occupations and a relative abundance of entry-level jobs in others. Also, redistribution resulting from lay-offs and rehiring is likely to be concentrated among the young, among whom rates of permanent lay-off are higher (see also Picot and Wannell, 1987).

It would seem that the future does not bode well for Canada's youth, especially when we learn that "hourly wage distributions by educational level show that the downward shift in wages of younger workers was observed for all educational levels" (Myles et al., 1988b: 19). Wannell (1992: 2) notes: "Net new job creation [in the 1980s] occurred at the bottom and to a lesser extent at the top of the wage scale.... Since young people occupied many of the newly created, low-wage jobs, their average wages plunged in relation to the wages of older workers". Myles et al. (1988b: 21) cite evidence "that similar shifts in the earnings distribution were

occurring during the 1970s", and proceed to consider "supply side" and "demand side" explanations for the declining middle.

The "supply side" explanation saw the decline in youth wages in the 1970s to be a result of "generational crowding" in the "baby boom" cohorts. But Myles et al. note that between 1981 and 1986 the percentage of young Canadians in both the overall population and the labour force declined. They suggest the possibility "that a combination of 'generational crowding' and recession provide the occasion or impetus for a reorganization of the labour market which may prove to be relatively permanent" (Myles et al., 1988b: 26). This explanation leads to the "demand-side" perspective, which is most amenable to my structural explanation. Kuttner (1983), for one, includes industrial restructuring, privatization, declining real wages, the impact of international competition, and a weakened labour movement among the variables affecting wage trends. To these we can add the institution of two-tier wage structures in some industries and increased contracting-out to achieve lower labour costs. Myles et al. (1988b: 25-6) say their research

shows that there has been significant decline in the percentage of unionized jobs held by young workers that was quite independent of the shift to industries with low levels of unionization.⁹³ Shifts such as a lower percentage of unionized jobs and possibly more job creation in smaller firms are indicators of significant change in the organization of the youth labour market within industries. This supports the notion that significant changes are occurring within industries and influencing wage levels.

⁹³Myles et al. (1988b: 30) add a note here: "The percentage of unionized jobs held by young workers fell from 27% in 1981 to 18% in 1986. In resource-based industries, the percentage of unionized jobs held by young workers fell from 52% to 30%, in other manufacturing from 35% to 28%, in construction from 26% to 15%, and in the social services from 49% to 40%."

Krahn's (1992) study Quality of Work in the Service Sector, based on data from Statistics Canada's 1989 General Social Survey (GSS), corroborates this picture. The GSS data show that extrinsic rewards of pay and benefits, promotion opportunities, and job security are limited for all lower-tier service workers, and especially for those in so-called non-standard employment. But Krahn also points out that the extrinsic rewards are more limited for manufacturing workers than is often thought. He says that "the image of well-paid blue-collar workers in the automobile industry may not be an accurate picture of the typical manufacturing sector employee. Many are also employed in smaller establishments where pay rates may not be as high" (1992: 75-6).

Turning from wage polarization to the question of job skills, we find that the evidence is less straightforward. We cannot simply argue that jobs are being deskilled, as an over-simplistic reading of Braverman (1974) might suggest. There are some high-skilled jobs being created, as in computer programming and design work. But overall, Standing (1989) notes two trends in the industrialized countries. First, given that it is often "male" craft jobs that have decreased in number, the use of craft skills has declined. Second, we find a trend toward skill polarization, with technically skilled high-status specialist workers on one end, and a larger mass of technically semi-skilled production and subsidiary workers on the other end. These findings are spelled out for Canada through Menzies' (1989) examination of a number of case studies.

Menzies presents data on a number of occupational areas in both services and goods production. In services, Menzies discusses the impact of recent application of information technology on redefining office work, health care, and customer service in the retail trades. In goods production, she analyses the application of computers and robotics to the automobile, electronics and garment industries. In summarizing her findings, Menzies (1989: 200-12) notes ten recent trends: (1) **job loss**, mainly due to automation; (2) **mobility of work**, from skilled workers into computers, on to professionals, then back through computers to skilled clerical staff; (3) **jobless economic growth**, with new technology increasing output per worker; (4) **jobless employment growth**, with individual workers expected to do more tasks and increase their output per hour; (5) **deskilling/reskilling**, with some jobs being downgraded and others upgraded, but the latter generally requiring technical and procedural skills, not conceptual skills; (6) **polarization**, of the workforce and society at large; (7) **prevalence of part-time work**, exacerbating the polarization trend; (8) **training and qualifications**, which are unevenly divided and making their own contribution to polarization; (9) **alienation and the 'new work model'**, with computer monitoring and the reorganization of work contributing to the polarization of work by closing workers inside a "systems-defined ghetto"; (10) **loss of control**, where we find control continuing to seep out of workers' hands and into the hands of management.

Not all agree that there is a declining middle of skills. In one article Myles (1988) contends that, in terms of skills, there is an "expanding middle", though

elsewhere he focuses more on a polarization into high- and low-skilled work (Myles and Fawcett, 1990). Part of the problem has to do with differences between industries. If we consider all industries, we get the impression of a greater expansion of skills than if we consider only certain growth occupations.

Myles begins with the debate over Bell's (1973) view that the "post-industrial society" would, on the whole, raise skill levels, versus Braverman's (1974) picture of an overall deskilling of the labour force. According to Myles (1988: 346), we find in the service sector, on one hand,

the highly skilled social services (the 'welfare state' industries) and business services (the 'information economy') and, on the other, the unskilled services associated with wholesale and retail trade and consumer services (where the fast food industry is located). Bell is betting expansion will occur in the former set of industries; Braverman and the deindustrialization theorists anticipate expansion in the latter (Myles, 1988: 346).

Myles' evidence points to a bifurcated skill distribution in the service sector, which recommends a segmented labour market approach, rather than the opposing views of Bell's "knowledge society" or Braverman's "mass occupations" (Myles, 1988: 338, 352).

Myles and Fawcett (1990: 1-2) argue that, in general, the shift to employment in services appears to have led to an upgrading of skill requirements for the economy as a whole primarily because job growth in the high-skill service sector has been greater than in low-skill personal services and retail trade. They consider skill changes in terms of "job complexity" and "autonomy and control", the latter being, they say, the main focus of Braverman. With respect to job complexity, Myles and Fawcett (1990: 3) state that the service economy is charac-

terized by skill polarization, with the information sector and the public sector having high skill requirements, and the retail and personal services having low skill requirements.

Distinguishing two types of autonomy, Myles and Fawcett (1990: 4) tell us: "Sectoral differences in task autonomy (control over working hours and pace of work) are non-existent". However, "[s]ectoral differences in conceptual autonomy (the requirement to conceptualize or design important aspects of a product or service) differ slightly in degree and pattern from sectoral differences in job complexity". In the information sector and public services we find a high proportion of jobs with conceptual autonomy as well as job complexity. But in the goods sector and in distributive, retail, and personal services we find lower requirements for conceptual autonomy.⁹⁴

That, as noted above, the latter areas are the major growth areas should tend to support Braverman's overall projections. And Myles and Fawcett, as well as Krahn (1992), do find a mismatch between educational attainments and formal requirements, with many workers being overqualified for their jobs. Myles and Fawcett (1990: 4) note that, the combination of low skill requirements and a youthful but well-educated labour force results in a large number of overqualified employees in retail sales (for females) and personal services (for males and females).

⁹⁴These findings support the segmented labour market theory discussed in Section 6.1.

Unlike the situation with respect to wage distribution discussed above, age differences in skill requirements within industrial sectors are modest. But there are clear gender differences.

The way in which men and women can acquire job skills differs dramatically. Women are virtually excluded from high-skill jobs in which job-relevant skills are provided through on-the-job training. Instead, they are limited to jobs where skills are acquired outside of the workplace -- i.e., in the formal educational system (Myles and Fawcett, 1990: 4).

Krahn's analysis of data from the 1989 General Social Survey shows that just over half (54%) of Canadian workers feel that they have a fair degree of job autonomy, but less than half (46%) think that their jobs require high levels of skill, and almost two-thirds (62%) find their jobs to be repetitious or somewhat repetitious. The GSS data support Myles and Fawcett's findings that "women and young workers were less likely to report intrinsic job rewards" (Krahn, 1992: 107).

Now, we should note that both Bell and Braverman are discussing much longer time frames than Myles and Fawcett. Bell is projecting into an unknown "post-industrial" future. And Braverman is focusing on a long history of degradation of work since the Industrial Revolution. In the long run, I think Braverman makes the best case (see Section 7.3). The most recent decade of the 1980s suggests both the declining middle and a growing mass of semi-skilled, if not outright deskilled workers, as a combination of scientific management and computer deskilling have been applied to more and more areas of the service economy (Menzies, 1989). Davis and Stack (1993: 4) argue that, with flexible production, "a neo-Taylorism emerges, where, instead of dictates coming down

from above as they did in the past, workers in teams on the shop floor study ways to tailor themselves more tightly to the task". We might only add that, with delayering and so on (see below), this is happening in both goods and services work.

We should remember as well that the major growth areas of the service economy are, as Krahn and Lowe (1988) note, most amenable to part-time work. How are these positions affected by intrinsic job rewards? Krahn (1992: 107) summarizes:

Workers in non-standard jobs reported less job autonomy, more repetitious work and lower skill requirements than did those in standard jobs. Workers in the lower-tier services, especially those in non-standard jobs, typically reported lower skill requirements and a greater mismatch between their education and their job. They were also more likely to say they were overqualified for their job, and were less likely to agree that their pay was good.

If there continues to be a large reserve of overqualified workers, then further casualization of the labour market could occur, as the growth of temporary help agencies for business services suggests (see Section 7.2).

In its study of employment trends in Canada's service economy, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, the Economic Council of Canada notes a creation of both good and bad jobs, but moreso a polarization and deskilling of many jobs (ECC, 1990a). Fred Pomeroy, of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, tells us that we can project 20 percent good jobs and 80 percent bad jobs as a result of the new technology.⁹⁵ Overall, the Economic Council's findings suggest a continuing polarization of Canadian labour. The authors of the Coun-

⁹⁵"Shift Change", National Film Board of Canada, 1986.

cil's study tell us that their "analysis suggests ... segmentation of the labour market into 'good-job' and 'bad-job' sectors", providing two distinct "growth poles" (1990a: 18, 17). To counter this trend the Council presents a policy wish-list for a better deal for the casualties of industrial restructuring by advocating "adaptation to market forces as the best approach to meet the challenges of an increasingly competitive global economy" (ECC, 1990a: 19). However, labour market segmentation theorists tell us that labour market polarization is the product of capitalist market forces themselves (Edwards, 1989; Gordon et al., 1972). Despite the best wishes of Council members and theorists of post-industrial society, unless capitalist exploitation of labour is tackled head on, many workers will continue to experience alienating, unrewarding, and insecure employment. And it is women who are over-represented in the worst of this employment.

6.3 Reproletarianization of Women and the Repolarization of Labour in Canada

In Chapters III and IV, I discussed the historical processes of domesticization by which many women in the now-industrialized countries were relegated from the formal economy to the informal sphere of the home.⁹⁶ This began towards the end of the Industrial Revolution. But during the First and Second World Wars women were recruited back into the formal economy while men were

⁹⁶I also qualified this to say that women, though many were relegated to the informal economy, remained economically active.

enlisted into the armed services. After each of these wars there was a drive to redomesticize women, with varying degrees of success.

However, by the 1960s women were (re)entering the formal labour force in record numbers. In this section I will discuss the impact of this (re)entry on the formal labour market, with particular emphasis on women as the prime source of casual labour in the expanding service economy. I follow the argument that women's continuing role as the primary family care-givers is a structural constraint to their educational and labour force advancement. These family responsibilities, combined with the systemic discrimination of sexism, make women a reserve pool of casual labour (cf. Connelly, 1978). Consequently, the recent proletarianization of women is only a semi-proletarianization, but it is essential to the repolarization of labour.

The (re)entry of increasing numbers of women into the formal wage-labour market was related to the arrival of "the age of high mass consumption", as Rostow (1970) calls it. Braverman (1974), among others, discusses the ways in which the "universal market" came to replace much household production of goods and services (cf. Nett, 1988; Smith, 1987). While households previously engaged in subsistence activities, provisioning of these needs was increasingly shifted to the commodity market. Many household production activities become both more time-consuming and more expensive than alternatives provided by the market. And, as new "big-ticket" items such as home appliances and automobiles were added to the market, women, who had done most of the household produc-

tion, were driven into the wage-labour market. A second wage became necessary for families to acquire both the basics and those commodities tied to the higher standard of living (Nett, 1988; Smith, 1987).

There are, of course, many personal and political reasons why women enter the formal labour market, but the most important reason many women give is economic necessity (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1983). Mandell (1989: 20) tells us: "Money motivates most women to work and guarantees their continued employment. It also creates tremendous tension within marriages". In the early 1980s, a study of employed women in Toronto found that "68 percent of the full-timers and 49 percent of part-timers mentioned financial need as a motivating factor" (Mandell, 1989: 20). In general, Mandell notes: "Family income is inversely proportional to married women's rate of participation in the labour force" (Mandell, 1989: 20). She concludes: "In short, women work for the same reasons men have always worked - because they need the money to survive" (Mandell, 1989: 20). The National Council of Welfare notes that twice as many families in Canada would live in poverty without wives' wages.⁹⁷

In Chapter IV, I noted a steady increase in female workers as a percentage of the Canadian labour force in the first half of this century -- from 13 percent in 1901 to 22 percent in 1951. This trend was accelerated during the post-World War II boom years, with women making up 43 percent of the formal labour force by 1986. According to Canadian Census data, in 1951 only 24 percent of women

⁹⁷National Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited. Ottawa, Spring 1990.

participated in the formal labour force, but by 1991 58 percent were in the labour force. As a percentage of all workers this represented an increase from 22 percent to 45 percent (cf. Armstrong & Armstrong, 1984; Connelly & MacDonald, 1990). But according to a study done for the Canadian Labour Congress by Andrew Jackson, women's share of the workforce is beginning to shrink for the first time since 1966. Jackson notes that women's official unemployment rate is lower than that for men, but their real unemployment rate (including various forms of underemployment) is higher. And he points out that women's labour force participation rate reached a high of 58.4 percent in 1990, but dropped to 57.6 percent in 1992 (The Globe and Mail, 04/06/93; see also Ghalam, 1993). Whether this is a result of the 1990-92 recession or the beginning of a longer-term trend remains to be seen.

In terms of age, only women in the older age groupings have not made significant inroads into the formal labour market.⁹⁸ In 1992, three-quarters of women in the prime working ages, from 20 to 54 years, participated in the labour force. Over half of women aged 15 to 19 were in the labour force, while only one-third of women aged 55 to 64, and fewer than one in twenty women over 65 were in the formal labour force. This compared to a participation rate of close to two-thirds for men in the 55 and over age grouping. Labour market analysts note that, until recently, the labour force has continued to grow largely because of the increasing participation rates for women (Pold, 1990; Shea, 1990). Most notable :

⁹⁸The following data is derived from Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey, Catalogues 71-201; 71-220; 71-534E; 89-503E; and 98-125.

has been the increasing participation rate for married women with young children. Married women's participation rate increased from 42 percent in 1975 to 72 percent in 1992. Married men's participation rate, by contrast, decreased from 85 percent to less than 80 percent over the same period.

When we consider labour force participation in relation to presence of children in the family we see that the greatest increase in participation rate is for married women with pre-school age children (0-5 years). These women's participation rate increased by almost one-third from 1976 to 1992. Married women with children aged 6-15 years increased their participation rate by one-quarter over the same period. Married mothers living with their spouses increased their participation rate more than twice that of single mothers, by over 20 percent versus less than 10 percent. In 1976, 53 percent of female single parents participated in the labour force, compared to 42 percent of wives with children. By 1991 the order was reversed, with 63 percent of single mothers and 72 percent of married mothers participating in the labour force (Devereaux and Lindsay, 1993: 10-1).

These figures suggest a number of conclusions related to women's labour force participation. They support the argument that it is both financially necessary and easier for married, as opposed to single women with very young children to enter the labour market, even if only part time. The former group has partners to ease the double day and/or provide a combined income that allows expenditure on child care. It is no surprise that discussions of the "feminization of

poverty" focus especially on single women with young children. But the figures showing significant increases for all women with older children (6-15 years) suggest an age divide, with younger women more interested and/or more prepared for entry into the labour market. It should come as no shock that demand for child care has become so urgent, or that it is primarily family responsibilities that prevent women from working full time.

The above data show that two-thirds of the adult female population has now been incorporated into the formal labour force, leading many to argue that women are being proletarianized. However, borrowing a chapter from literature on the Third World peasantry, I have argued above that many women in the developed countries have been only semi-proletarianized, for women are disproportionately represented in the casual labour market. And they still confront an inordinate share of non-wage activities related to household reproduction. Coates (1988: 11) tells us that women are more than twice as likely as men to be working part time, with one in four women working part time compared to one in 13 men. "Women make up the largest proportion of part-time workers (71 percent) and have accounted for about three-quarters of the growth in part-time employment over the past thirty years" (Coates, 1988: 11).

Many women are forced to "choose" part-time work because they are saddled with the lion's share of family responsibilities -- both housework and child care (see Pupo, 1989, and Section 7.2 below). The former is often handled

through what feminists call the "double day" -- with women mixing paid work and housework.

In 1986, there were 896,990 women in the labour force with at least one child under 6 years. The number of children involved is 1,173,780 and of this number 445,530 were under age 2. A 1984 study estimated that there were only 172,000 child-care spaces in Canada. As more women with pre-school children enter the labour force, concern over the availability of quality child-care facilities has increased (Connelly and MacDonald, 1990: 18).

Because the majority of women work out of economic necessity (Connelly and MacDonald, 1990: 18), many must make do with something less than "quality" childcare, and/or work around ad hoc childcare arrangements made with family, friends, and neighbours (often using the informal economy, and creating yet more low-waged, casual work for other women).

Within the formal labour market women face discrimination through relegation to "job ghettos". The segmented labour market theories discussed in Section 6.1 explain how women and subordinate ethnic and racial groups experience the segregation of secondary labour market work through a sort of informal apartheid. White males find it easier to enter the better jobs of the primary labour market, while women and "minorities" are slotted into the secondary labour market.

"Women's work" is found primarily in low-waged, non-union service occupations. Krahn and Lowe (1988) note that, although women have made some gains, they are still over-represented in certain jobs. Comparing Census data for

1901 and 1981, Krahn and Lowe found a persistence of clearly defined women's occupations. They ask:

Has sex segregation in the labour market changed over the course of this century? [I]n 1901, 71 percent of all employed women were concentrated in five occupations. Of this small group of socially acceptable "women's jobs", domestic servants were the most numerous, accounting for close to 36 percent of all employed women. Next in importance were seamstresses and school teachers, each employing roughly 13 percent of the female labour force. These three occupations fit our description of a job ghetto, given that between 78 and 100 percent of all workers in them were female (Krahn and Lowe, 1988: 132).

Krahn and Lowe go on to note that, at the turn of the century, clerical work was still a predominantly male occupation, being both expanded and "feminized" with the growth of the service sector. And since the Canadian economy was still primarily agricultural in 1901, it is not surprising that women formed a part of the paid agricultural work force. Of course, we know from studies like those by Marjorie Cohen (1988), discussed in Chapter IV, that women played a more significant role in agriculture than the figures for female wage-labour in that sector suggest. By 1981, "the three leading female occupations were all in the clerical area. Waitressing and nursing, both long-standing female economic roles, had become even more important sources of employment" (Krahn and Lowe, 1988: 133).

There has been some movement of women into "male" professions over the last couple of decades (The Globe and Mail, 14/04/93). But there is gender segregation within professions, and women continue to be concentrated into "female" white-collar occupations, having made no great inroads into the old blue-

collar male jobs that still exist, despite restructuring and recessions. In fact, women's employment has generally declined in blue-collar work, while there has been some increase in male employment in blue-collar service and recreation, and craft and production work (Armstrong, 1984; Cusson, 1990; Shea, 1990; Krahn and Lowe, 1988).

Analyzing recent Census data, Connelly and MacDonald (1990: 7) discover:

- The concentration of women in trade and community, business and personal service industries increased from 55.7% in 1971 to 61.6% in 1986.
- The concentration of women in clerical, sales and service occupations increased from 55.0% in 1971 to 58.1% in 1986.
- Both in 1971 and 1986, the three occupations in which the most women were employed were secretaries, bookkeepers and salespersons.

By 1991, 71 percent of women versus only 30 percent of men were still concentrated into five occupational groupings (teaching, nursing, clerical, sales, and service), giving us a clear picture of gender segregation both between and within occupations (Ghalam, 1993: 5). Certain older occupations are still perceived as "women's work". And many newer occupations in the service sector have developed as women's work. Cross (1988: 23) notes that "over 80 percent of women are employed in services", and they are concentrated in certain lower-status occupational groups (Cohen, 1987). Women make up 80 percent of the clerical and related occupations, but only 34 percent of managerial, administrative and related occupations, and as few as 17 percent of natural science, mathematics and engineering workers. At the close of the 1980s, according to Shea (1990: 22), "31 percent of all working women were in clerical positions. By contrast, just 6

percent of employed men were in such jobs". In fact, a slightly higher percentage of women were in clerical work at the close of the 1980s than earlier in the decade.

An important question is whether certain jobs are characterized as women's work because of the nature of the work, or due to the position of these jobs in the overall economy. Some work in the service sector, in health care for example, seems simply to extend women's tasks from the home into the formal economy. But other work which is now characterized as women's work, clerical work for example, was once male work (Lowe, 1987). This work has been "feminized", it appears, largely for structural reasons. Service sector jobs in general are lower paid than jobs in goods production.

Keeping costs down in the service sector requires low-wage labour. Women, for cultural reasons, have provided the greatest source of this labour -- a source which is most attractive to capital because of its low rates of unionization and pay. In their comparison of Census data for the 1970 to 1985 period, Connelly and MacDonald (1990: 24) discovered "that women who work full year, full time continue to earn on average significantly less than men in the same occupations". These women's average earnings in 1985 were just 66 percent of those of their male counterparts, only a slight increase over 1970, when women's average employment income was only 60 percent of men's. By 1991, female full-time, full-year workers still earned only 70 percent of what their male counterparts earned (Ghalam, 1993: 40). Overall, Connelly and MacDonald (1990: 26) conclude:

It seems clear from looking at occupational growth and incomes that occupations with the largest increases in the number of women are in categories where the employment income is low. For example, in the service occupational category, in which the earnings ratio was 56% in 1985, men earned \$24,151 compared with women's earnings of \$13,418 that year.

Even "when age and education are controlled for female full-year, full-time workers still earn considerably less than men" (Connelly and MacDonald, 1990: 26). Ghalam (1993: 5) observes that the gap has recently closed somewhat for women with higher formal educations. But women with a university degree still earned only 72 percent as much as university-educated men in 1991.

Using data from the 1986 Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) appended to the LFS to analyze the minimum wage distribution in the labour force, Akyeampong (1989e: 10) tells us:

Women are also over-represented among low-wage earners. In 1986, they accounted for 45% of all paid employees, but comprised 60% of those earning the minimum wage or less. Women were almost twice as likely as men to be working for \$4.00 or less an hour, the incidence rates being 11% for women and 6% for men. Close to a quarter of a million adult women worked for the minimum wage or less sometime in 1986.

Comparing data from the 1990 LMAS we find the same picture of women's over-representation in low-waged, part-time service work.⁹⁹

A number of arguments have historically been offered to explain why women should earn less than men. First there is the "traditional" argument that men are "breadwinners" who must be paid a "family wage". But it was noted above that most women have entered the wage-labour force because men's "family

⁹⁹See Broad (1993c) for an analysis of the Saskatchewan labour force based on 1990 LMAS data.

wage" was no longer supporting the family, if it ever did. It has also been argued that women's family responsibilities give them less time at work, so they acquire less "human capital" and are therefore less productive. "Evidence shows that there was indeed a negative relationship between marital status and earnings" (Connelly and MacDonald, 1990: 27). But we certainly cannot take this to say that women are less productive than men.

The notion of "human capital" is often used to argue that "women's work" has less value than "men's work" -- i.e., because the skills needed for many women's jobs are learned informally, rather than through formal education or on-the-job training, then the lower market value of women's work warrants lower pay. But this idea has been heavily criticized by feminists who argue that concepts such as "skill" are too narrowly defined, so that even when women do sell their labour-power in formal service work, for example, they are defined as unskilled (Gaskell, 1986). The current struggles for "equal pay for work of equal value" constitute attempts to rectify this situation. However, as noted above, even in areas where they have equal formal education, women earn less than men on average. So I would argue that the best explanation for lower female earnings is that women are subject to discriminatory labour market mechanisms and practices.

The expansion of service sector employment is intimately tied to the feminization of labour which, as noted above, is an essential ingredient in the drive to lower labour costs throughout the world-economy (Mies et al., 1988;

Standing, 1989). History shows that there is always a lag between the formation of new economic areas and occupations and the unionization of labour in those areas. As certain branches of the economy open or expand, employers who enter these branches attempt to keep all costs to a minimum, including labour costs. But feminization has been used as a way to maintain low labour costs throughout the service sector, and through the globalization of manufacturing production as well (see Chapter V).

The main difference we find in Canadian women's service employment is that between private and public services. There has been both better pay and more security in public services which, not incidentally, have a much higher union density than private services. However, with the more recent neo-liberal assault on service-sector workers, both rates of pay and employment security have come under attack. And the (re)casualization of labour has come to play a central role in this attack. I was shocked to discover that only 47 percent of members of the Saskatchewan Government Employees Union (SGEU), most of whom are women, have permanent, full-time employment status. Unfortunately, this is not out of line with the national picture.

6.4 Conclusions

I have discussed in this chapter the three most important moments of national industrial restructuring which contribute to the (re)casualization of labour in Canada. First is the shift from Fordism to flexible production. This shift is

having a dramatic effect on manufacturing production, with mass-production assembly lines being replaced by lean production teams. Concurrently, management is being restructured through "de-layering" and application of the principle of "total quality management" (TQM) to production, so that production teams themselves take on many former roles of management. This, of course, affects both manufacturing and service work and, in combination with use of new technologies (increasing organic composition of capital), these changes are leading to what is euphemistically referred to as "downsizing" of work forces. Hence we see rising levels of unemployment and underemployment, resulting in growth of a reserve army of casual labour (see next chapter). (Re)casualization is also promoted through the trend to contracting-out, with large firms trying to lower overhead costs and construct "just-in-time" production networks more adaptable to market ups and downs than the old mass production approach. The result, for those working on the outer tier of these networks, is less-secure, more casual work than core workers have.

The second trend which has had an impact on (re)casualization of labour is the shift from predominantly goods-producing to predominantly service employment in the so-called new economy. This trend is closely related to the third trend, which is the (re)entry of masses of women into the formal labour market in the post-World War II era. These two trends combined opened up new areas of the economy to be staffed by a "new proletariat". The relative decline in manufacturing employment has resulted in the decline of the old male full-time working

class as the norm, and posed a new logic on the labour market overall. This new logic is that of non-union, low-waged, female part-time or temporary workers. Hence we have the feminization of labour, with not just increasing numbers of women formally employed, but a dialectic of formalization for some and informalization for others, such as industrial homeworkers (see Chapter VII), with a resulting semi-proletarianization of labour, and a feminization of work itself (Fernandez, 1985; Mies et al., 1988). In the following chapter, I examine the contours of this "new" labour market in Canada.

CHAPTER VII

(RE)CASUALIZATION OF LABOUR IN CANADA:

TOWARDS THE HOLLOW SOCIETY

The problem is starkly simple: an astonishingly large and increasing number of human beings are not needed or wanted to make the goods or to provide the services that the paying customers of the world can afford. Since most people in the world depend on having a job just to eat, the unemployed, the underemployed, and the 'subemployed' - a term used to describe those who work part time but need to work full time, or who earn wages that are too low to support a minimum standard of living - have neither the money nor the state of mind to keep the global mass consumption system humming. Their ranks are growing so fast that the worldwide job crisis threatens not only global economic growth but the capitalist system itself.

- Richard J. Barnet

In Chapter V, I discussed international trends which provide the global context for (re)casualization of labour. Then, in Chapter VI, I presented an analysis of trends at the level of the nation-state which lay the national basis for (re)casualization. These national trends are the corporate shift from Fordist to so-called flexible production, the great expansion of certain types of service sector employment in recent decades, and the post-World War II increase in women's formal labour force participation.

As stated in Chapter I, this thesis is not a study of part-time or casual labour per se, but an attempt to provide an historical, global explanation for the

(re)casualization of labour. In Chapters III and IV, I provided a comparative history of the proletarianization of labour in Britain and Canada. This comparison was presented to show the degree to which Canada fit the established pattern of proletarianization of labour. However, I also noted that proletarianization has been a contradictory process in all cases. In both the Canadian and classic British cases proletarianization was re-evaluated to show the limits to the process. But it was also noted that proletarianization of labour was extensive enough to enable labour to organize in demand of better wages and working conditions (cf. Arrighi, 1990).

In other words, proletarianization has been a limited process which, nonetheless, through socialization of labour (Marx, 1867), led to a strengthening of the working class, and weakened the absolute power of capital over the labour market and the labour process -- thus the formal labour market took on a proletarian logic. More recently there has been (re)casualization of labour as capital attempts to resubordinate labour. In this chapter, I present a profile of the casual labour market in Canada to show how its characteristics fit the project of capital, which is labelled "the corporate agenda" by the Canadian labour movement, and includes an anti-union thrust as part of capital's attempts to reassert absolute control over the labour process and the labour market. I have argued that the (re)casualization of labour is one ingredient in this process which, in general, has led to social and labour market repolarization, and expansion of the reserve army of labour.

In Section 7.1, I present data on part-time and casual labour in Britain and other industrialized countries to provide a comparative context for the Canadian case. Section 7.2 provides my profile of the casual labour market in Canada. Then, in Section 7.3, I conclude with a discussion of how (re)casualization is leading to a further degradation of labour. In Chapter VIII, I discuss possible solutions to the problems resulting from the (re)casualization of labour.

7.1 Britain Revisited: An International Comparison of (Re)casualization of Labour

In Chapters I and II, I noted that increases in part-time and other forms of casual labour are not peculiar to Canada -- there is what is being called a casualization of labour throughout the industrialized countries. In this section I provide a brief discussion of the expansion of part-time work in countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and an overview of the British, U.S. and Swedish cases to provide a comparative context for my discussion of the (re)casualization of the Canadian labour market in the Section 7.2. The Swedish case shows that the expansion of part-time work need not entail increasing exploitation of labour. In Chapter VIII, I discuss how a Swedish-style social-policy orientation might be adapted to better the conditions of Canadian casuals.

Table 7.1 presents data on the growth rates of full-time and part-time employment in Canada and six other OECD countries for the ten-year period

Table 7.1. Percentage Growth Rates of Full-time (FT) and Part-time (PT) Employment in Selected Western Countries, 1973-83.

Country	% Growth FT	% Growth PT*
Canada	18.4	52.3
France	0.2	100.1
West Germany	-4.0	65.4
Japan	6.2	26.6
Sweden	-2.0	37.2
United Kingdom	-6.7	21.9
United States	14.8	19.7

SOURCE: Chris de Neubourg, "Part-time Work: An International Quantitative Comparison", International Labour Review, Vol. 124, No. 5, September-October 1985: 561.

*There are various definitions of part-time work. The Canadian Government's Commission of Enquiry into Part-time Work lists nine classifications of part-time work, including: regular or permanent part-time employees; casual or contingent part-time employees; temporary part-time employees; job sharing; work sharing; short-time employees; seasonal employees, or part-year workers; contract employees; and phased retirement (Labour Canada, 1983: 37). The Commission then offers a definition which encompasses all of these: "A part-time worker is one who works less than the normally scheduled weekly or monthly hours of work established for persons doing similar work" (Labour Canada, 1983: 42). This definition is too broad and amorphous. The focus of this dissertation is permanent, temporary and casual part-week work and will use Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey (LFS) definition of part-time work as that which is usually less than 30 hours per week. It follows, then, that full-time work is defined as 30 hours or more per week.

Different countries offer different definitions. Most developed Western states classify as part-time work that which is usually less than 35 hours per week (de Neubourg, 1985). Statistics Canada used the 35 hour mark until 1975, but lowered the limit to 30 in that year because so much full-time work was dropping below 40 hours per week. This change of definition can cause difficulties for some historical and cross-national comparative analyses, but this is not a particular concern of this dissertation.

from 1973 to 1983. We see that the growth rates for part-time employment greatly outpaced those for full-time employment in all cases but the United States. In fact, in three cases, West Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, full-time growth rates were negative, and in France there was virtually no growth of full-time employment. Table 7.2 shows that in the ensuing five-year period (1983-88) the percentages of part-timers employed in these countries remained relatively stable, with slight increases in France, Japan and the United Kingdom, and a slight decrease in the United States. Throughout the OECD part-time employment has again increased with the 1990-92 recession. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), roughly 60 million people now work part time in the industrialized countries. "One out of every seven workers in the industrialized nations holds a part-time job, most of them women and many without the benefits or protection given to full-time employees" (The Globe and Mail, 06/09/93).

I referred in Chapter I to research on the casualization of labour in Britain. British authors discuss various modes of casual employ being used by capital to lower production costs and reassert capital's control over the labour market and the labour process (Mitter, 1986; Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987). Mitter (1986) discusses a concomitant casualization and rise of what she calls a "new proletariat", in both new and old areas of the formal economy. The new proletariat is primarily female, and it is largely casual. Many women in the British service sector work part-time, as they do in Canada. More than one in five

Table 7.2. Percentage of Part-time Employment in Selected Western Countries, 1983 and 1988.

Country	1983	1988
Canada	15.4	15.4
France	9.7	12.0
West Germany	13.7	13.6*
Japan	10.5	12.0
Sweden	24.6	24.4
United Kingdom	21.1	24.7
United States	18.4	17.3

*1985

SOURCE: International Labour Office, Conditions of Work Digest, Volume 8, Number 1, 1989.

workers in Britain are part-timers, over ninety percent of whom are women.

Along with part-time work, there has been a significant increase in short-term and temporary contract work throughout the British economy. And there has been an increase in homeworking, or domestic putting-out work, in labour-intensive clothing and toy manufacture, but also in more capital-intensive work (cf. Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987). Social scientists have noted a resurgence of homework throughout the West, in both new and old industries (Allen & Wolkowitz, 1987; Fernandez, 1989; Johnson & Johnson, 1982; Mitter, 1986; Sassen, 1982; 1988). In areas like textiles, homework is like a glimpse back into the early Industrial Revolution discussed in Chapter III. And in areas like electronics, it is hardly the glamorous post-industrial "electronic cottage" that people like Toffler (1980) describe.

As does Menzies (1989) in the case of Canada (see Section 6.2), Mitter sees a connection between technological change and the casualization of labour. Contrary to the notion that automation will improve workers' lives (see Section 7.3), Mitter (1986: 22) states: "Till now, the impact of NT [new technologies] has been more pronounced in the casualization of work than in bringing automation". And she says that "women are getting more jobs because, with the advent of NT, most jobs are becoming ill-paid, insecure or part time" (Mitter, 1986: 22). Looking at Britain, Mitter sees "the Third World in the midst of the First", with expansion of flexible and casual work, and the emergence of an acutely polarized labour market (Mitter, 1986: 139). She traces these trends through examination

of the clothing and garment industries in the British Isles, and links them to the degradation of work and the new international division of labour.

Though with less focus on the world-economy than Mitter, two sets of British authors have recently produced studies of the increases in part-time work and industrial homeworking in Britain (Beechey and Perkins, 1987; Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987). As in the case of Canada, Beechey and Perkins (1987) find a steady increase in part-time work in post-World War II Britain. They note that the majority of part-timers are women, an even higher percentage than in Canada, 94 percent versus 70 percent. They also note a shift in the use of part-time labour between the 1940s and 1950s, and the 1960s and later. In the earlier decades women part-timers were more apt to be found in manufacturing employ than later. Women were incorporated into the labour force during the war and immediate post-war boom years to make up for a shortage of male workers, and accommodation had to be made for women's family responsibilities through part-time employment. Some employers were initially resistant to this, but as they witnessed the benefits of flexibility, lower costs and increased productivity from the new proletariat of female part-timers, their resistance waned (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 22).

Beechey and Perkins (1987) note that the expanded use of part-time labour became more marked in the 1960s, with increases in part-timers in manufacturing, and even moreso in services -- both public and private. In the state sector, women were recruited as part-time labour in the 1960s to help deal with a labour

shortage. This had the effect of expanding part-time work in professional occupations such as nursing and teaching. But, for the most part, part-time work remained highly segregated between and within professions: "It appears that the association of the least desirable forms of work with part-time working, which was promoted by the Ministry of Labour during the war, continued throughout the post-war years" (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 25).

In the 1970s part-time work continued to increase in the British service sector, along with women's labour force participation. But the 1970s and 1980s also brought economic crisis to Britain, with previous labour shortages in some areas giving way to high unemployment, "and moves on the part of many employers to restructure their labour processes" (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 30). With these moves, part-time work became one of a number of modes of casual employ used by capital to achieve a more flexible labour force.

Allen and Wolkowitz (1987) focus specifically on the revival of industrial homeworking, in old and new industries, as another instance of casualization of labour. They cite Marx's (1867: 595) analysis of "so-called" domestic workers in the clothing industry as "an external department of the manufacturers, warehouses and even of the workshops of smaller masters". Marx notes the super-exploitation and vulnerability of workers in these positions, and Allen and Wolkowitz note the same conditions for modern homeworkers. They follow others in showing how homework is integral to capitalist production, and to the current phase of capitalist restructuring.

As to numbers of industrial homeworkers, an exact estimate is probably impossible. Much homework flows into the informal economy, and there is a great mix of actual homeworking and outworking -- where workers are employed in small manufacturing shops doing the same kind of work that others are doing at home (Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987: 34ff). Estimates are further complicated by the practices, in most official surveys, of including homeworkers with the self-employed. Like Canada, Britain has had a steady increase in the number of self-employed, according to British Census data. There is now close to one in ten Britons in the labour force who are self-employed. More telling, there is evidence of an increase in number of suppliers of homework in Britain in recent years (Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987: 37), though again the exact extent is probably hidden by the informal economy (cf. Mitter, 1986).

As noted in the previous chapter, employers' use of casual labour is part of the shift to flexible production, allowing in particular for numerical and financial flexibility. Allen and Wolkowitz (1987: 167) see the move towards "flexibility" as a way of "cutting costs or passing them on to other firms, state bodies, or, as in homeworking, workers themselves". They point out that in the majority of cases

temporary work or short-term contracts are made available by employers according to their own requirements, and part-time hours are fixed according to production schedules and consumer demand. If they fit in with the workers' other responsibilities or with their preferences, this is coincidental (Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987: 166).

This observation certainly corresponds to my findings in a recent study of part-time employment in Saskatchewan (Broad, 1993c).

Allen and Wolkowitz relate their findings on homeworking to increases in other forms of casual labour, fragmentation of the labour process, privatisation and deregulation, expansion of the so-called informal economy, and the rise of a neo-familialism, with more First World households returning to the income-pooling units that have been the historical norm. They conclude "that casualized employment does not constitute a solution to economic recession, but is in fact one of its symptoms" (1987: 181).

Turning to the United States, we find a situation similar to Britain and Canada. There has been an increased use of part-time and other forms of casual labour in the formal economy in recent years. As in the other two cases, the proportion of part-timers in the U.S. labour force has been steadily rising over time, with over one in five U.S. workers now employed part time (McKie, 1992). Kolko (1988: 312-3) observes:

In addition to sectoral shifts in employment, work itself is being restructured. Part-time, homework, temporary, and other forms of "cost-free" labor are replacing traditional employment in both service and production. Such forms account for the expansion of employment in the United States.

Kolko attributes these trends to capital's restructuring for "global competitiveness and flexibility. She notes that the number of part-timers in the United States grew by 58 percent over the 1980s, with involuntary part-timers doubling to one in five part-timers. Kolko (1988: 313) argues that the "expansion of part-time work obviously depends on a large reserve army of unemployed" (though I have argued that the semi-proletarianization of women into part-time work might be seen as expansion of the reserve army itself). She also states that

"over the 1980s the number of jobs defined as temporary grew at 20 percent a year in the United States. Temporary workers are most prevalent in office work and are a major restraint on labor's organizing efforts" (Kolko, 1988: 314). Kolko goes on to note an increased use of "the old technique of homework and sweatshops, made possible by an increase in the number of illegal immigrants" (cf. Petras, 1992; Sassen, 1991). But homeworking is increasingly used in service industries as well. Here is a portrait of the life of a woman who does home data processing for an insurance company:

When I get the claims at night, I try to put in an hour while the kids are watching TV. Then I get up at 4:30 am to work before the kids get up.... I work between 5:50 and 7:30 am.... During the day, I turn on the TV and tell my preschooler to watch. When she takes a nap, I can work (Daniels, 1986: 18).

Harrison and Bluestone (1988: 45) point out that the ranks of U.S. "contingent labor -- leased and temporary workers, involuntary part-timers, employees of subcontractors, and home workers -- grew from 8 million in 1980 to 18 million by 1985". They argue that this increase is tied to global restructuring and the hollowing of U.S. industry, and conclude that "the corporate benefits of substituting temporary, leased, and part-time workers for regular, full-time employees are not restricted to bad economic times" (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988: 45).

These trends are part of a program for "zapping labour", as publicly enunciated by President Nixon's assistant secretary of labour, Arnold Weber, in the early 1970s (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988: 51). Harrison and Bluestone show how contingent labour is useful to capital for cost cutting, union avoidance, and

union busting. They argue that this is all part of a corporate agenda and state neo-liberalism which, since the early 1970s, have brought about a "great U-turn" from the Fordist social compromise between labour and capital in the mid-20th Century (cf. Arrighi, 1990).

Data from the OECD show that, while there has been a general expansion of part-time work, it has been uneven across OECD countries. For example, "since 1979 part-time relative to total employment has increased everywhere except in Italy and Sweden" (OECD, 1987: 30). In the case of Italy, the proportion of part-timers is affected by the fact that the country is less industrialized than its northern OECD neighbours, has a large informal economy (Portes et al., 1989),¹⁰⁰ and a relatively low proportion of females in the formal economy. Only slightly more than 40 percent of women are in formal employ in Italy, while twice that percentage are formally employed in Sweden (Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 42).

Sweden makes an interesting counterpoint to those cases where part-time work has emerged as a form of super-exploited labour. The proportion of part-timers in the Swedish labour market is very high, with more than one in four workers employed part time. Most of these (85%) are women, more than in Canada, though less than in Britain (see above). Sweden is more industrialized than Italy, but what makes the situation of part-time employees stand out in the

¹⁰⁰While Canada has an informal economy estimated to be 15 percent of total economic activity, Italy's is estimated at 30 percent (The Globe and Mail, 22/05/93).

Swedish case is the history of social-democratic social policy, which has benefitted part-timers.

Sundstrom (1987: 15) notes a steady increase in Swedish women's formal employment since 1970, along with a somewhat smaller increase in part-time employment. In 1970, 38 percent of Swedish women worked part time, rising to 47 percent by 1982, and dropping slightly thereafter. Both women's part-time and total part-time employment are high compared to Canada, probably for two reasons. First, legislation in Sweden has permitted women with young children to work part-time without loss of seniority. This has prevented part-time work in Sweden from becoming synonymous with degraded labour. Second, a Swedish worker who works a least 17 hours per week, half the hours of a full-timer, "gets the same social benefits as a full-time worker but *pro rata*. Those working fewer hours lose some benefits, but all employees regardless of weekly hours are entitled to sick pay, old age pension, vacation etc." (Sundstrom, 1987: 15). Such legislation has benefitted Swedish part-timers and, arguably, the productivity of the Swedish economy. But with recent centre-right and social-democratic governments further opening Sweden to globalization and backtracking on social policy, the future for Swedish workers looks less rosy (Hermele, 1993). How does the Canadian case compare?

7.2 Part-time Work and the Casual Labour Market in Canada

In this section, I begin with a profile of part-time labour in Canada, based on the recent plethora of statistical and descriptive studies of part-time workers and their conditions of work.¹⁰¹ My intent is not to replicate these studies, but to utilize their findings in support of my argument that the growth of part-time labour is a product of economic restructuring. Consequently, following my presentation on part-time labour, I will present other data relating the increase in part-time labour in Canada to increases in other forms of casual labour.

Statistics Canada first began to measure part-time employment through the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in 1953. At that time part-time work was employment of "less than 35 hours per week", and 197,000 people, or less than four percent of the Canadian labour force was found to be working part time (see Table 7.3). At present, despite the fact that the measure for part time was lowered to "less than 30 hours per week" in 1975, LFS data show that 2,058,000 people, or almost 17 percent of Canadian workers are part-timers. And use of the old (35 hour) measure would put those working part time over 20 percent of the labour force (see Graph 7.1).

The official LFS count of 17 percent part-time workers in the Canadian labour force is based on reference point figures. Statistics Canada also releases annual average figures, which have shown over 20 percent of the labour force to

¹⁰¹The sources consulted include Coates (1988), Duffy et al. (1989), Duffy and Pupo (1992), Labour Canada (1983; 1990), Statistics Canada (1990a), Warne et al. (1992), Weeks (1980), and White (1983).

TABLE 7.3. Part-time and Full-time Employment in Canada, 1953-1992.

Year	Part-Time Employment			Full-Time Employment		
	Actual ('000)	As a % of Total Employment	Average Annual Percentage Change	Actual ('000)	As a % of Total Employment	Average Annual Percentage Change
1953	197	3.8	—	5,039	96.2	—
1954	208	4.0	5.6	5,035	96.0	-0.1
1955	230	4.3	10.6	5,136	95.7	2.0
1956	243	4.4	5.7	5,342	95.6	4.0
1957	288	5.0	18.5	5,441	95.0	1.9
1958	349	6.1	21.2	5,356	93.9	-1.6
1959	367	6.3	5.2	5,502	93.7	2.7
1960	366	6.2	-0.3	5,565	93.8	1.1
1961	441	7.3	20.5	5,578	92.7	0.2
1962	497	8.0	12.7	5,728	92.0	2.7
1963	532	8.3	7.0	5,843	91.7	2.0
1964	597	9.0	12.2	6,013	91.0	2.9
1965	657	9.6	10.0	6,205	90.4	3.2
1966	647	9.1	-1.5	6,474	90.9	4.3
1967	706	9.6	9.1	6,618	90.4	2.2
1968	785	10.5	11.2	6,675	89.5	0.9
1969	854	11.1	8.8	6,839	88.9	2.5
1970	922	11.9	8.0	6,856	88.1	0.2
1971	960	12.1	4.1	6,996	87.9	2.0
1972	988	12.1	2.9	7,204	87.9	3.0
1973	1,031	12.0	4.4	7,567	88.0	5.0
1974	1,106	12.4	7.3	7,845	87.6	3.7
1975*	1,175	12.9	6.2	7,919	87.1	0.9
1975	988	10.6	—	8,296	89.4	—
1976	1,047	11.0	6.0	8,431	89.0	1.6
1977	1,128	11.7	7.7	8,524	88.3	1.1
1978	1,206	12.1	6.9	8,780	87.9	3.0
1979	1,301	12.5	7.9	9,094	87.5	3.6
1980	1,392	13.0	7.0	9,316	87.0	2.4
1981	1,486	13.5	6.8	9,515	86.5	2.1
1982	1,528	14.4	2.8	9,090	85.6	-4.4
1983	1,639	15.4	7.3	9,036	84.6	-0.5
1984	1,668	15.3	1.8	9,263	84.7	2.5
1985	1,737	15.5	4.1	9,484	84.5	2.4
1986	1,789	15.5	3.0	9,742	84.5	2.7
1987	1,804	15.2	0.8	10,057	84.8	3.2
1988	1,882	15.4	4.3	10,363	84.6	3.0
1989	1,888	15.1	0.3	10,597	84.9	2.3
1990	1,932	15.4	2.3	10,640	84.6	0.4
1991	2,023	16.4	4.5	10,317	83.6	-3.0
1992	2,058	16.8	1.7	10,182	83.2	-1.3

SOURCES: Statistics Canada, Historical Labour Force Statistics 1991 (Catalogue 71-201); and Mary Lou Coates, Part-time Employment: Labour Market Flexibility and Equity Issues. Kingston: Queen's University, Industrial Relations Centre, 1988.

- * The Labour Force Survey was revised in 1975. The first figure is based on the old Labour Force Survey; part-time employment between 1953 and 1975 consisted of persons who usually worked less than 35 hours per week. The second figure is based on the revised Survey and since 1975 part-time employment consists of persons who usually work less than 30 hours per week.

GRAPH 7.1. Percentage of Part-time Workers in the Canadian Labour Force, 1953-1992.

SOURCE: Table 7.3.

be part time, using the 30-hour mark (Gower, 1988: 17). According to Connelly and MacDonald (1990: 27): "Census data show that the percentage of the employed labour force who worked mainly part time increased from 17.9% in 1970 to 21.4% in 1985." And those part-timers who are "self-employed" are categorized as self-employed by the LFS, not as part-time. Moreover, the number of part-timers, and all casuals, would increase yet more if we included members of the informal labour force. Suffice to say that at least one in five members of the Canadian labour force is now working part-time.

The important thing to note from Table 7.3 is the steady growth in part-time work over the post-war period. The figures show that the rate of increase has been subject to cyclical swings, but the whole period has witnessed a steady growth of part-time work overall (see Graph 7.1). As well, Pold (1990: 6) notes: "The increase in part-time employment may moreover be somewhat understated because of the large growth of multiple job holders (from 212,000 in 1975 to 626,000 in June of [1990])".

Significant for my thesis, then, is the continued growth of part-time work over two decades of economic boom and two decades of economic crisis -- i.e., the increase in part-time work is more than a cyclical phenomenon. But, looking at Table 7.3, we do see an important trend related to economic cycles. With the recession of 1981-82 there was a decrease in full-time employment and an increase in part-time employment. From 1984 to 1989 there was an increase in full-time employment, but gains in part-time employment continued. With the

most recent (1990-92) recession, full-time employment declined, but part-time employment increased again. This is an increase that we should expect to remain, as the labour market overall is subject to more casualization (see below), and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) continues to erode the basis for full-time manufacturing employment as Canadian workers are restructured to fit the global economy (Campbell, 1992).¹⁰²

As noted above, the rate of growth of part-time work has been greater than that for full-time work. That the increase in part-time work coincides with increasing formal labour force participation by women explains this in part. But, as argued in Chapters V and VI, structural shifts related to the articulation of technological change, the rise of the service economy and the new international division of labour must also be entertained (see below). But first let us examine the profile of part-time workers in Canada.

Data from recent studies suggest that most male part-timers are young and single (though the number of older male part-timers is increasing slightly).¹⁰³ Females are more apt to be older and married. The majority of males generally work part time while completing their education, others because they cannot find full-time work ("involuntary" part time). Young females, like young males, may

¹⁰²Tracing back through Statistics Canada's monthly releases on labour market participation as reported in The Globe and Mail, we find ups and downs in creation and loss of full-time work, but growth of part-time work is steady. When drops in the unemployment rate are reported, the next line is usually that most of the jobs created are part time.

¹⁰³The following data is taken from the sources listed in Note 101 above, and Statistics Canada Catalogues 71-201 and 71-220.

also work part time while taking an education. And a significant portion are forced into involuntary part-time labour.¹⁰⁴

As noted in Chapter VI, women are over-represented among the ranks of part-time workers. Both male and female part-time workers have increased in numbers in recent years, but females slightly more than males. In 1975, 20 percent of women worked part time while only five percent of men did so. Now 25 percent of women work part time, but still less than eight percent of men. Women have been the majority of part-time workers throughout the post-World War II period, and continue to make up over two thirds of part-time workers.

Considering part-time workers by age, we find that male part-timers tend to fall in the youngest and oldest age categories, perhaps using part-time work to help finance an education or ease into retirement.¹⁰⁵ Women are more evenly spread across age groupings. While less than one in twenty males in the prime working ages of 25 to 64 work part time, more than one in five females in the same age range are part-timers. In terms of marital status, single males and females are both likely to work part time. Until recently this has been primarily a factor of age, with most young single part-timers being students who do not want

¹⁰⁴We should take the distinction between "involuntary" and "voluntary" part-time work to be problematic in many senses. If we had a different social order, which encouraged and allowed women to escape the more burdensome aspects of family responsibilities to take up educations and careers that were rewarding and useful, knowing that their children were well taken care of, would not more current "voluntary" part-time work have to be defined as "involuntary"?

¹⁰⁵Some males over 40 years of age who have been laid off as a result of industrial restructuring may be taking part-time work due to lack of full-time work, but there does not appear to be a great increase in part-time work for this group. More tend to drift between temporary full-time work and unemployment.

full-time work. However, the effects of high unemployment and labour market polarization on youth now makes part-time employment less of a "choice" for youth (see Section 6.2).

The most striking differences in the correlation of part-time employment and marital status are those by gender. While more than one in five single males work part time, only one in forty married males do so -- perhaps because the latter are still expected to bring in the "family wage". On the other hand, three out of 10 single females work part time, as do one in four married females.

As noted in Section 6.3, we might surmise that fewer married than single females work part time due to family responsibilities, though perhaps even fewer would work at all if not for economic necessity, or more would work full time if quality affordable child care and good full-time jobs were available (see below). Divorced, separated and widowed women are less likely to work part time than married or single women, for a variety of probable reasons. Single mothers with young children are less able, financially and time-wise, to be able to work at all (see above). Single mothers with older children are more able to work full time (and must, since over 70 percent of their ex-husbands default on support payments in Canada).¹⁰⁶ And widowed women are usually older and not able to work due to age.

The relationship between work and women's family responsibilities is made clearer when we examine the correlation between family status and age of

¹⁰⁶See, for an account of this problem, the National Film Board video, "For Richer, For Poorer", 1986.

youngest child(ren). "Women with pre-school age children are more likely to work part time, especially those mothers living with a spouse" (Statistics Canada, 1990a: 75). I noted in Section 6.3 that single mothers with young children are less likely to participate in the labour force than those with older children, but those single mothers with young children who do work are most apt to do so part time.

Labour Force Survey data show reasons given by respondents for working part time. These data reveal that the majority of both males and females listed as "married" or "other" (divorced, separated or widowed) who work part time, state that they "do not want full-time work". The second most frequent answer given by all four of these groups is "can only find part-time work". But the difference in spread between frequency of response for married women was three times as great as for married men and "other" men and women. Over half of married women state that they "do not want full-time work", as opposed to less than one quarter who "can only find part-time work". Less than half of respondents from the other three groups just mentioned "do not want full-time work", while just over one-third say they "can only find part-time work".

The third most frequent reason for working part time given by married women is "personal or family responsibilities". This answer is given by almost one in five married women, slightly more than one in twenty "other" women, only one in one hundred single women, and three in one hundred married men. That married women stand out as the group most likely to state they "do not want full-time work", and the group most likely to give "personal or family responsibilities"

as their reasons for working part time, leads me to surmise that it is actually family responsibilities that keep them from working full time. The reasons for working part time used in the LFS would have to be further disaggregated to show this. But other studies, especially those based on interviews and other interpretive data, suggest that it is family responsibilities that lead more women than men to work part time (Labour Canada, 1983; Pupo, 1989; White, 1983). On the other hand, some might "not want full-time work" because the jobs they experience are so alienating.

The most frequent reason for working part time given by both single males and single females is "going to school", given by two-thirds of each group. The second most frequent response given by both groups is "can only find part-time work", given by one-quarter of single females and one-fifth of single males. As suggested above, most of these people are probably young, and confronting the job ghettos for youth discussed in Section 6.2.

Considering part-time employment by industry, we see that part-time work is most frequent in the service industries as a group, especially in the retail trade and food and accommodation services. This is the case for both males and females. There are also high percentages of women part-timers in agriculture and construction. But the numbers are deceptive, since few women in total are employed in either industry. As would be expected, the occupations with the greatest proportion of part-timers are also in the service sector, especially clerical, sales and service work. "Clerical, sales and service occupations in which women

tend to be concentrated also absorb a large share of male part-time employment, although relatively fewer men work part time" (Statistics Canada, 1990a: 75; see also Connelly and MacDonald, 1990).

This concentration of both male and female part-timers in service sector industries and occupations implies that there is something in the nature of this work -- generally seen as "women's work" -- that makes it a favourite for hiring part-timers. In other words, it is not so much family responsibilities or women's "demand" for part-time work that begets it, but the nature of the work in this sector. Of course, cultural values that cast certain of these jobs as women's work make them more amenable to casualization. But, as noted in the previous chapter, clerical work was not always seen as "women's work". According to Lowe (1987) it was actively "feminized", a structural process which is proceeding in other areas -- therefore the feminization of not just the labour force, but of work per se (Fernandez, 1985; von Werlhof, 1984). Of course, for cultural reasons, it is easiest to induce women to do feminized work, though with long-term economic restructuring and massive unemployment, male standards are changing.

But whether it has to do with supply-side or demand-side factors, women are still more likely to work part time than men. High percentages of women employed in transport, equipment operating, and materials handling work part time, though few women work in these areas. Women part-timers are also prevalent in professions, where growing numbers of women are employed. "Part-time employment absorbed almost 19% of total women employed within the

managerial, administrative and professional occupational category but less than 5% of employed men" (Statistics Canada, 1990a: 75). We can observe in the Canadian case then, as in others (see Section 7.1), that part-time employment is the form of flexible employment most often utilizing female labour, whereas male labour is more often used in short-term or overtime flexible working arrangements.

The service sector in general is where we find a concentration of female workers, part-time workers, and non-union, low-waged jobs. It was noted above that over 80 percent of formally employed females work in the service sector. And while 25 percent of all employed women work part time, over 30 percent of women in the service sector work part time. Many studies of part-time work tell us that employers in the service sector like to hire part-timers to fit "flexible" schedules (e.g., Weeks, 1980). In the retail trades, for example, it is cheaper to hire part-timers to work the busier "peak hours" and weekends, than to have full-timers who are accorded certain benefits and holidays not legislated for part-timers (Coates, 1988; White, 1983). And workers brought together full time are more able and apt to unionize (cf. Marx and Engels on socialization of labour).

Coates (1988) and White (1983) have shown that part-timers fare low on scales of worker rights and benefits (cf. Labour Canada, 1983). "The average hourly wage rate for part-time workers in 1984 was \$7.33, and \$10.93 for full-time workers" (Coates, 1988: 27). Akyeampong (1989e: 13), in his study of those who

work for minimum wage based on the 1986 Labour Market Activity Survey, reports:

Part-time employment (less than 30 hours a week) features very prominently in low-paying jobs. Approximately 46% of jobs paying minimum wage or less in 1986 were part-time, compared with 22% for all paid positions. Young workers occupied about three-quarters of the low-paying part-time jobs. Approximately one-quarter of the low-paid part-time jobs entailed only a few (up to ten) hours of work a week: not surprisingly, most of these jobs were occupied by students.

Data from the most recent (1990) LMAS show little change to this picture (Broad, 1993c). It is also instructive to note the discrepancy in earnings between full-time, full-year workers and all other (non-standard) workers. In 1991, men working full-time, full-year had average earnings of \$38,567, while women full-time, full-year workers earned \$26,842. However, male non-standard workers earned only \$12,539, and female non-standards earned \$8,890 (Ghalam, 1993: 40).

It is often argued that non-standard workers have lower pay and fewer benefits because they are not unionized. A 1984 Statistics Canada Survey of Union Membership, appended to the LFS, revealed that 19 per cent of part-timers were unionized, but 41 per cent of full-timers were unionized. Data from Statistics Canada's Labour Market Activity Survey shows the same pattern. The breakdown by sex and industry is instructive, showing that male full-timers are more likely to be unionized than female full-timers. But these males are more concentrated in the goods-producing industries, related services (e.g., transportation), and public service professions, which tend to be more unionized than private services. Women part-timers are more apt to be unionized than male part-timers

but, of course, most part-timers are female. Krahn's (1992) analysis of the 1989 General Social Survey shows the same pattern (see also Ghalam, 1993).

However, there are great differences by sector. In the service sector, where most women are employed, one in five female part-timers is unionized, while only one in seven male part-timers is unionized. On the other hand, in the goods sector less than one in ten female part-timers is unionized, but almost one in five male part-timers is unionized. Clemenson (1989: 35) notes that "there was an increase in the unionization of year-round, part-time workers over the 1981-1986 period". But we have seen the fastest growth in recent years in short-term, involuntary part-time employment.

To summarize, it is significant to note that, with cyclic fluctuations, there has been a steady increase in part-time employment over two decades of economic growth and two decades of global crisis. To account for this, I noted in Chapter II and VI a confluence of two factors: (1) the great increase in women's formal labour force participation that creates a "demand" for part-time work; and (2) structural changes that create a demand for part-time workers, or "supply" of part-time work.

Women's need for part-time work cannot itself beget that work. There must also be a demand for part-time workers. That "involuntary" part-time employment has grown faster than voluntary part-time employment (Akyeampong, 1986; 1987b; 1989a) is an indication that structural factors are at work. One in five persons working part time do so because they cannot find full-time work, accord-

ing to the LFS (Statistics Canada, 1990b). The majority of these workers are married women of prime working age (25-44). Between 1975 and 1986, full-time employment grew by 15 percent and voluntary part-time employment increased by 41 percent, while involuntary part-time employment grew by 375 percent (Akyeampong, 1986: 144), and continues to grow. In 1992, one-third of part-timers wanted full-time work.¹⁰⁷

Krahn and Lowe (1988: 55) write:

Although the flexibility of part-time work may appeal to some labour force participants (particularly students and young parents), the fact that fringe benefits, job security, and career potential are typically limited, and that many part-time workers would prefer full-time employment, suggests that the larger beneficiaries of this major shift in the Canadian labour market are employers.

Krahn and Lowe go on to argue that the increase in part-time work is a structural phenomenon, noting that "the 'growth' occupations tend to be white-collar service sector jobs, typically held by women and amenable to part-time employment" (1988: 63).

The "restructuring" explanation for increasing part-time work is also supported by the fact that there is a growth in other forms of casual work. A recent study by the Economic Council of Canada (ECC, 1990a) notes the rapid growth of "non-standard" forms of work, in particular part-time employment; short-term work; own-account self-employment; and temporary-help agency work. "Between 1981 and 1986, these four forms of nonstandard employment accounted

¹⁰⁷Perspectives on Labour and Income, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 1993): 72.

for about half of all new jobs; they now represent nearly 30 percent of total employment" (ECC, 1990a: 12). The Economic Council adds that its "analysis indicates a long-term trend towards more nonstandard employment" (1990a: 13).

Research based on Statistics Canada's 1989 General Social Survey (GSS) also identifies the importance of the growth in non-standard employment, especially in the service sector (Krahn, 1992). In 1989 one-third of Canadian workers could be identified as non-standard. "The lower-tier service industries (retail trade and other consumer services) exhibited the highest rates of non-standard employment. Over one-third of people working in these sectors were in non-standard (part-time, part-year and/or temporary) jobs. However, the upper-tier education, health and welfare industries also had almost 30% of their employees in non-standard jobs" (Krahn, 1992: 53). Most non-standard employees identified through the GSS were young and female, and many fared low in terms of both extrinsic (pay and benefits) and intrinsic (quality of work) employment rewards.

Statistics Canada recently released a report on the growth of self-employment in Canada. The author states: "In 1986, almost one out of every seven workers in Canada was self-employed" (G. Cohen, 1988: 9). "Between 1975 and 1986, the number of self-employed workers increased more than twice as fast as the number of paid workers: 54.0% compared with 22.6%" (G. Cohen, 1988: 9). Whereas part-time work is more apt to be the domain of women, self-employment has been more the domain of men. "Since 1975, however, the number of self-

employed women has been rising three times as fast as the number of self-employed men: 117.6% compared with 39.1%" (G. Cohen, 1988: 9).

Self-employment has been common in resource production, where most workers are male. But the recent growth in self-employment is in manufacturing production, and especially in services, where we find predominantly women workers. Between 1971 and 1991, the number of self-employed workers in secondary and tertiary industries increased from seven percent to 8.4 percent of the workforce of these two sectors (Crompton, 1993: 23). "For women, the prevalence of self-employment is considerably higher among part-time than among full-time workers. For men, about equal proportions of full-time and part-time workers are self-employed" (G. Cohen, 1988: 11). Full-time self-employed tend to work longer hours than full-time paid workers -- over 50 compared to over 40 hours per week.

Average 1987 earnings of self-employed, at \$23,400, were similar to those of paid workers (\$24,300). But among the self-employed, earnings of employers were more than 80% higher than those of own-account [self-employed] workers (\$29,700 compared with \$16,000) (G. Cohen, 1988: 12).

And we see a greater increase of self-employed with paid help, than of own-account self-employed workers.

Part-time work and self-employment are the two forms of casual employment with the highest growth rates in the formal economy, but the Economic Council of Canada also singles out short-term work and temporary employment. The Council tells us that "the proportion of the employed labour force in short-term work (jobs of less than six months' duration) rose by nearly two percentage

points between 1978 and 1988" (ECC, 1990a: 12). The Council report states that "the largest numbers of short-term jobs are found in traditional services" (ECC, 1990a: 12). And these "jobs are more likely than longer-term ones to be part-time and to be situated in small firms; they are less likely to be unionized or to be covered by a pension plan" (ECC, 1990a: 12). These, again, are what the labour movement calls "McJobs" (see Section 7.3).

Temporary employment has become more noticeable partly because of the growing profile of temporary-help agencies. These are agencies which keep a roster of persons on file who can either be referred to, or contracted out to employers. With the growth of contracting-out in recent years some of these agencies have been booming -- especially in business services. The Drake agency recently published an eight-page supplement to The Globe and Mail (23/11/92), entitled "The Drake Productivity Report", which lauds the benefits of outsourcing for employers by touting Drake success stories. The Economic Council of Canada reports:

Temporary-help agency work has tripled in the 1980s and now stands at over 80,000. A 1988 survey of temporary-help workers found that 41 per cent were engaged in this type of employment because they could not find full-time jobs. Most temporary-help workers are in clerical occupations, and about 70 per cent are female. Wage levels are generally well below those for full-time workers, and fringe benefits are usually minimal (ECC, 1990a: 12).

In his study of temporary-help agencies Akyeampong (1989b) notes that their contribution has not greatly expanded the numbers of temporary workers in recent years, but mirrors the changing face of temporary work. Cyclical and

seasonal factors have always affected the ranks of the temporary labour market, but the logic of economic restructuring is now being seen. Akyeampong (1989b: 43) states: "Employers choose to use temporary help supplied by agencies for various reasons, but the overriding one appears to be cost minimization".

Workers supplied by these agencies tend to be better educated than the average work force, and are often hired by businesses which require specialized professional services or skills for only a brief period. Many "businesses are demanding qualified professionals - programmers, accountants, engineers - on a temporary basis, and the temporary help industry is diversifying to meet the demand"

(Akyeampong, 1989b: 45). Akyeampong (1989b: 47) notes: "At 19%, the proportion of temporary jobs in managerial and professional occupations was high". He also notes:

Part-time employment is more prevalent among temporary help workers. In 1986, slightly more than one in three paid jobs in this industry was part-time...; in comparison, part-time employment represented only one in five paid jobs in all industries (Akyeampong, 1989b: 46-7).

And, of course, the wages of the workers placed by the temporary-help agencies is lower than average, partly because the wage excludes the supplying agencies' mark-up. "In 1986, the average hourly wage rate paid to these workers was \$8.17 compared with an all-industry average of \$10.26" (Akyeampong, 1989b: 47).

Researchers at Statistics Canada have used LFS data to produce a number of other recent studies of non-standard work. One interesting study shows a steady increase in "moonlighting" over the past decade. "Since 1980, the number of workers with two or more jobs has risen 65%, surpassing the half million mark

in 1988. Their share of the work force has crept up over the years: 2.1% in 1976, 3.1% in 1980, 4.5% in 1988" (Webber, 1989: 21).¹⁰⁸ Webber tells us: "The term 'moonlighting' conjures up a picture of a full-time worker in a nine-to-five job holding down a second, night-time job" (Webber, 1989: 21). She adds: "This picture may have been accurate twenty years ago but today's reality is much more diverse" (Webber, 1989: 21).

Webber (1989: 22) notes that a "strong link exists between multiple jobholding and self-employment". Small business people and farmers, for example, generally combine self-employment with a wage or salary job. She comments: "It would be interesting to know how many small businesses could not survive without income from secondary jobs" (Webber, 1989: 22). But in 1988, half of all multiple jobholders held two wage and salary jobs.

"One of the most striking features of moonlighting in the 1980s is the rapid increase in the multiple jobholding rate for women" (Webber, 1989: 22). This rate increased by 62 percent between 1980 and 1985, with women constituting 44 percent of multiple jobholders by 1988. "The proportion of multiple jobholders in 1988 was highest among teenagers and declined with age, a finding which holds true for both men and women" (Webber, 1989: 23). But the rate is also high for those in their twenties who have been affected by state funding cutbacks for education, and must work to support increasingly expensive schooling at the post-secondary level. Others in their twenties must string together jobs to try to

¹⁰⁸Note that these are official statistics, which miss the way that moonlighting intersects with the informal economy.

survive, as a result of the age-differential impact of the declining middle discussed in Section 6.2.

The relationship between the new moonlighting and the growth of the service economy is obvious. Webber (1989: 24) states that

multiple job-holders tend to be more highly educated than single job-holders. They are also slightly over-represented in sales and service occupations, and under-represented in processing, fabricating and machine occupations. The former tend to be low-paying jobs, the latter are often high-paying jobs.

In accounting for the difference, Webber notes: "The incidence of part-time employment is higher in sales and service jobs than in processing jobs, hence the work schedules may be more flexible and opportunities for multiple job-holding accordingly greater" (Webber, 1989: 24). But there is another connection between multiple jobholding and part-time work.

Some multiple jobholders may hold down two part-time jobs because they are unable to find one full-time job. In 1988, 154,000 moonlighters - over a quarter of the total - worked less than 30 hours in their main job. About 77,000 of these saw their hours boosted to 30 or more (the LFS dividing line between full-time and part-time work) by virtue of the second job (Webber, 1989: 26).

Webber notes: "On the whole, multiple jobholders tend to work long hours. In 1988, nearly half of them put in 50 or more hours a week" (Webber, 1989: 27).

Relevant to my discussion in Chapters II-IV on households as income pooling units, Webber tells us that "nearly three-quarters of all moonlighters live in families with at least one other worker. In addition, fully 16% of these workers are not the only moonlighter in their family. This degree of labour market activity may help offset low wages" (Webber, 1989: 27). She goes on to report

that "moonlighters are not generally high earners. Their average annual earnings are only slightly higher than those of single jobholders: \$23,500 versus \$22,600 in 1987" (Webber, 1989: 27). But here again there is inequality by sex. "In 1987, male multiple jobholders earned slightly more than their single jobholding counterparts, but among women, multiple jobholders actually earned less than single jobholders" (Webber, 1989: 27).

Finally, Webber reports that, "among married couples, those with children do have higher rates [of multiple jobholding] - perhaps because of greater economic need" (Webber, 1989: 28). And these rates should increase with the general decline in labour income (which includes wages and salaries and supplementary labour income, such as pension plans). Pold and Wong (1990: 45) tell us that between 1977 and 1988 total labour income per employee dropped from \$30,453 to \$29,969, in constant 1988 dollars. The most recent issue of Statistics Canada's Perspectives on Labour and Income, listing the 1992 labour income per employee in 1986 dollars, shows a further decline to \$25,400.¹⁰⁹ But, of course, the cost of living for working families has increased, especially with Canada's recently implemented goods and services tax (GST). And there is a foreboding sectoral unevenness in changes in labour income. Incomes actually grew slightly in the goods-producing sector, from an average of \$33,519 per year in 1977 to \$34,141 in 1988. However, in the service sector, where most jobs are being created, the average income declined from \$29,192 in 1977 to \$28,510 in 1988, in

¹⁰⁹Perspectives on Labour and Income, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 1993): 78.

constant 1988 dollars (Pold and Wong, 1990). In the reified language of mainstream economics which appears, not surprisingly, to blame the victims, Pold and Wong (1990: 46) remark: "The large numbers of part-time and temporary workers in the service sector have doubtless exerted considerable downward pressure on both components of labour income".

Since 1979 the LFS has included an annual (March) Survey of Job Opportunities (see Akyeampong, 1987a; 1989d). The survey provides data on persons on the "margins of the labour force" -- the intersection between the formal and informal economy. This data, collected on people who are unable to work full-time due to health problems, family responsibilities, shortage of formal work, et cetera, reveals another part of the puzzle of the changing labour market. Though obviously affected by the cyclical fluctuations in the economy, the number of these "marginals" has grown over the years -- probably more than LFS figures suggest as many people have dropped off the official roster and become more active in the informal economy.

The latter point, and others raised above, suggest that the data from the LFS should be taken as problematic, both for what they miss, and the connections they fail to make. Data do not, of course, speak for themselves. Insights must be drawn from them, such as a concurrent rise of part-time work and multiple job-holding. But the LFS is not structured to draw these links. Other data sources must be called upon to see where multiple job-holders might straddle the boundary of formal and informal work (cf. Mirus & Smith, 1981; Ross & Usher, 1986).

A case in point is the increase in industrial homeworking, especially in garment and electronics assembly.

The Toronto-based Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice (ECEJ) has noted an increase in homeworking, primarily by women, in garment and clerical work.¹¹⁰ With global competition and free trade, garment manufacturing companies are increasingly farming out production work to homeworkers through sub-contractors, called "jobbers". Many of the homeworkers are immigrant women, though not all, as a study of garment homeworking in southern Quebec shows that capital will use cheap labour as it finds it.¹¹¹ The second case of homeworking discussed by the ECEJ, that of clerical work, involves what has come to be called "teleworking" -- a trend which has become significant enough to warrant a special issue of the International Labour Office's Conditions of Work Digest (ILO, 1990). This modern form of homeworking finds the worker outfitted with a home computer and modem, so that clerical work can be done at home and transferred electronically through telephone lines. The Canadian government introduced a pilot project in teleworking, praising the benefits for workers who can more easily balance work and family responsibilities.

However, the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) has raised a number of concerns about the trend towards teleworking, in terms of working conditions, job security, et cetera. Homeworking is often done on piecerate

¹¹⁰Economic Justice Report, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1992); Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1992).

¹¹¹See "The Treadmill", National Film Board of Canada, 1986.

terms, and pays less than minimum wage. "Research by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) shows that homeworkers are mainly immigrant women, paid as little as \$1.00 an hour and rarely more than \$4.50" (Yalnizyan, 1993: 5). And, of course, these workers receive no benefits, because legal fiction classifies them as self-employed. The ECEJ contends that, rather than allowing women to better balance paid work and family, homeworking leads "from the double day to the endless day".¹¹²

A study by Yalnizyan (1993) on the experience of Canadian garment workers connects the expansion of homeworking with global and industrial restructuring. Yalnizyan discusses how globalization of production and increased global competition, both accelerated by moves towards freer trade, have undermined the viability of many medium-sized Canadian garment manufacturers.¹¹³ She notes that the industry is outsourcing more production to low-wage zones, and moving to a "pyramid structure" of production in Canada and other developed countries. This pyramid structure, with a few large retailers at the top, has led to a more fragmented industry, with an increasing number of small firms, and an increase in industrial homeworking. In Ontario, for example, "43 per cent of these firms operate with one to four workers; only 23 per cent of the industry operates in establishments with more than 20 workers" (Yalnizyan, 1993: 3).

¹¹²See, for example, the case studies in "The Treadmill", National Film Board, 1986.

¹¹³The ILGWU notes that 80,000 jobs were lost in the Canadian garment industry since the Canada-U.S. FTA was enacted in 1989, and predicts more losses with NAFTA (*Canadian Dimension*, May/June 1993: 48).

Most homeworkers are concentrated in large urban areas. The ILGWU estimated that by 1991 there were 4,000 garment homeworkers in downtown Toronto. However, the Ontario Ministry of Labour had only 70 homeworkers registered, giving a good indication of the extent to which this form of disguised wage-labour operates through the informal economy. The majority of the workers are immigrant women, with over 60 per cent being Chinese or Vietnamese. Leach (1993) provides a case study of some of these workers, who are employed by a firm given the pseudonym "the Cotton Company".

Both Yalnizyan (1993) and Leach (1993) note how the garment industry is being restructured to provide a flexible labour force suited to the demands of just-in-time production. But they both also note that the imperative is to provide low-cost labour. Yalnizyan shows how in Canada, as in other countries (cf. Petras, 1992), the role of the retailer is most significant in the pyramid structure. As the final purchasers, a few giant retailers dictate the terms of production, from contractors through sub-contractors, on down to the homeworker. This leaves even sub-contractors as virtual employees of the core firm. Leach (1993: 72) cites the example of one woman who became a sub-contractor to the Cotton Company, but found she had no more security and was as much at the whim of the company as individual homeworkers. The company externalized costs of production and constructed a flexible labour force.

Leach (1993: 73) notes that "through the different organization of the labour process between the in-house sewers (semi-skilled, section work), the

company's own homeworkers (skilled, entire garment) and the subcontractors (skilled, section work), the company ensured access to a variety of production options, utilizing different levels of skills for different kinds of tasks". The beauty of this flexible production for capital is that it allows direct control of production for some work, but also the externalization of other production to cut costs. The result is lack of security for both in-house and out-workers, increased polarization of the labour force, and (re)casualization of labour.

My purpose in this section has been to show that increasing part-time work is part of a larger pattern of structural change in the labour market. Part-time work is, as the Economic Council of Canada notes, one of a number of growing forms of casual work (ECC, 1990a). And this (re)casualization of work is intimately tied to the degradation of work and the feminization of work, all of which figure prominently in current economic restructuring. Contrary to the best scenarios of theorists of a post-industrial utopia, I noted in Chapter VI that the Economic Council, hardly an institution given to criticizing the prevailing capitalist system, finds more "bad" than "good" jobs being created, both in terms of skill content and wages. The prospects, for many workers, appear to be for casual, at best semi-skilled work, and declining standards of living.

7.3 (Re)casualization of Labour: Manufacturing McJobs

I have noted above how the dominant labour market trends in recent years have been a (re)casualization and informalization of work for some, who must

scrounge to get by, and increased working hours and overtime work for others. Nevertheless, it is still common to find introductory sociology texts with chapters combining discussions of work and leisure, as if the two go hand in hand.¹¹⁴ Such treatments of work are based on the thesis of post-industrial society by Bell (1973) who, still in the throes of the post-World War II economic boom, postulated shorter working hours, higher wages, and expanded leisure time as the norm.¹¹⁵ However, given the casualization of labour for some, and lengthened working days for others, the post-industrial society thesis would seem to be somewhat incongruous with present facts.

My reading of the evidence leads me to accept Braverman's (1974) thesis of increasing alienation and exploitation of labour through degradation, deskilling (as a process, not an end state) and segmentation of work and workers. The use of new technology to further deskill and segment work, the internationalization of capitalist production, and the drive to cheapen labour through both globalization and erosion of labour's strength ("union busting"), feed into (re)casualization as a way to disorganize labour. The fact that most new jobs are being created in a service sector which can be staffed by an already disorganized female labour force is a propitious circumstance for capital. But (re)casualization of work in its various forms is not being restricted to women or the service sector (von Werlhof, 1984).

¹¹⁴See, for example, Robert Stebbins, *Sociology*. New York: Harper and Row, 1990.

¹¹⁵Bell's post-industrial society has recently been updated in the guise of Drucker's (1993) "post-capitalist society".

Researchers like Menzies (1991) and Reiter (1991) argue that capitalist restructuring, in the drive to increase productivity, is "manufacturing McJobs" -- in goods and services production. Menzies (1991: 31) notes that "many jobs are becoming part time or temporary. Even if they are full time, they're referred to as 'turnstile' jobs because people exit at the same level they entered". Menzies (1991: 31) asserts: "What's significant about the McJob is that it could become the most plentiful of the new types of jobs being created by the technology of the post-industrial information age".

The McJob is not so much a feature of a particular type of occupation or industry. It's symbolic of people's relation to the technology on the job: whether they're working with the technology or for it; whether they control it or it controls them. Increasingly, computers determine the work to be done, which means control is being transferred to the computer and those who control and programme it (Menzies, 1991: 31).

As noted in the previous chapter, the Economic Council of Canada reports a declining proportion of Canadian families with middle-level income (ECC, 1990a: 15). This trend has been so obvious as to call forth a recent series in The Globe and Mail (December 29, 1990ff) on "the shrinking middle class". Citing, among others, the ECC's project director for the study of Employment and the Service Economy, the lead article to the Globe series states:

Some attribute the decline of the middle to the growth of the service economy, with its concentration of low-wage hamburger flippers on one end and high-income computer programmers on the other. Others say it is because women, with their generally lower incomes, have joined the labour force in greater numbers.

Part-time and temporary jobs, whose numbers soared during the 1980s, and the decline of unions, which tend to even out wage levels, are also blamed for the shrinkage in the middle (The Globe and Mail, 29/12/-90).

Defenders of the capitalist system are quick to tell us that "we are not all getting poorer". And there was a great flurry of excitement in the mainstream media over Statistics Canada's report that, in 1989, the annual income of the average Canadian family including two or more people topped the \$50,000 mark. But the "average" Canadian family includes more than two people. And such a figure is representative of nothing, given the more extreme polarization of incomes. The Canadian Council on Social Development's Fact Book on Poverty tells us that there are four million poor people in Canada, 25 percent of whom are children. And with current and rising levels of unemployment in Canada, these people have little to look forward to.

I noted above that unemployment rates have climbed steadily throughout the OECD countries since the early 1970s. While it dropped back down from 12 percent in Canada after the 1981-82 recession to just over seven percent, the official unemployment rate returned to double digit figures in the most recent recession, and promises to remain high according to most forecasts, in what the mainstream media is calling "the jobless recovery". Moreover, the official rate does not catch all unemployment. The ECC (1990b: 38) notes:

In the course of a year, the total number of people affected by unemployment is much greater than the monthly rate might suggest. For example, the unemployment rate averaged 9.5 per cent in 1986, but fully 20.6 per cent of the labour force experienced at least some unemployment during that year.

And the Council, along with researchers at Statistics Canada, points out that the duration of unemployment (number of weeks unemployed per worker), increased

throughout the 1980s. As well, the official unemployment rate does not touch underemployment. Gower (1990) points out that, if we count unutilized hours rather than unutilized workers, the current unemployment rate would increase by at least two percentage points.

Included among the unutilized hours are: the number of hours that would be worked if all unemployed people had jobs; the hours lost by part-time workers who would prefer to have full-time employment ('involuntary part-time'); and the hours lost by people on short work weeks (Gower, 1990: 73-4).

Moreover, since 1981, the gap between the hours-based and official rates "has shown a gradual tendency to widen from one year to the next" (Gower, 1990: 76), another indication of the casualization of work.

Sivanandan (1990) goes so far as to say that, rather than labour emancipating itself from capital in the sense anticipated by Marx and Engels, using the new technologies of the information age capital has emancipated itself from labour. Mies et al. (1988) would say that capital has emancipated itself from proletarian labour. Advances in communications and transportation mean that capital can now roam the globe in search of cheap, docile labour. Deskilling and segmentation of work, combined with use of robotics, means that capital needs smaller numbers of workers, who are more easily replaceable. And despite all the talk of "job enlargement", "job enrichment", "quality of working life" and so on, Taylor's principles of scientific management seem to endure (Silver, 1987).

Given the degradation of labour and increasing structural unemployment, in a talk in the mid-1970s Braverman (1975) forecast a future of competition for

employment that used to be taken only as "second" jobs -- the sorts of jobs that people would tolerate when "moonlighting" for extra money. It is increasingly only in these "McJobs" that work is readily available. (Re)casualization and degradation of labour are leading to social polarization -- to a hollow labour market and a hollow society. If standards of life and work are not to further erode, the labour movement, on the decline, according to The Globe and Mail article cited above, and on the defensive, has its work cut out for it (see Chapter VIII).

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN LABOUR:

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.

- Karl Marx

For what is, in my opinion, central to the Marxian position is the capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediately observable facts and to see the tree of the future in the tiny shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combination of historical vision and the courage to be eutopian - with the vision sternly disciplined by an analysis of tendencies discernible at the present time, and with the eutopia rendered concrete by the identification of the social forces that may be expected to further its realization.¹¹⁶

- Paul Baran

In preceding chapters, I noted that some business analysts have begun referring to "the hollow company" and "the hollow economy" in recent years. In observing trends related to global restructuring and technological change, these analysts noted that companies were "outsourcing" more and more work previously done "in house", and retooling to produce more with fewer workers. Most recently, business analysts have adopted terms like "jobless economic growth" and "jobless recovery".

¹¹⁶I have taken the liberty of changing Baran's spelling of "utopia" to accord with Simon's (1985) distinction between "utopia" (no place) and "eutopia" (a good place), the latter meaning best fitting Baran's intent.

Not only are employers throughout the industrial economies producing more goods and services with fewer workers. The notion of lifetime employment, especially with one single employer, is gone (Barnet, 1993). The norm is no longer assumed to be that of the well-paid, full-time worker. In von Werlhof's (1988) words, "the proletariat is dead". The theoretical and political norm of the formal labour market has returned to that of casual labour. In my own terms, labour has been (re)casualized. And this (re)casualization is producing a "hollow society".

British sociologist T.H. Marshall (1964) analyzed the struggles of workers and social reformers which led in the 18th Century to the expansion of "civil rights", and in the 19th Century "political rights". The 20th Century, according to Marshall, was the century of struggle for "social rights", to which Macpherson (1985) added "economic rights". These struggles for provision of social services, more equitable distribution of wealth, full employment, et cetera were integrated into the programs of social-democratic and socialist political movements.

Central to the struggle for Marshall's package of "citizenship rights" were demands for more equality and more democracy (cf. Wallerstein, 1988). But, as noted in previous chapters, these demands did not fit the interests of capital, which mounted an assault on labour and the social movements through what has euphemistically come to be called economic restructuring, wed to the politics of

neo-liberalism (cf. Marchak, 1991).¹¹⁷ As increasing numbers of people are being marginalized by corporate restructuring and state cutbacks, they lose their hard won citizenship rights,¹¹⁸ and society is hollowed out. "Neo-liberalism is, by definition, the denial of human rights", stated liberation theologian Pedro Casaldaliga in greeting participants to the Latin American Encounter of Indigenous, Black and Grassroots Movement, held in the Brazilian city of Salvador de Bahia from July 11-15, 1993 (Aleman, 1993: 30). Meanwhile, the powers that be and their ideologues contend that the current restructuring is simply a technical matter.

In the current debate over economic restructuring in Canada, we find the two basic positions reflecting the opposing social class positions and class interests of capital and labour. The position of capital informs financial planner Nula Beck's (1992) Shifting Gears: Thriving in the New Economy, which follows the assumption that current trends in technological change and global restructuring are inevitable, and we must adjust and adapt to them. On the other side of the debate, in her book Fast Forward and Out of Control: How Technology is Changing Your Life, Heather Menzies (1989) notes the negative aspects of technological change and workplace restructuring, and the harmful effects on labour and society. Menzies argues that we should slow down and more thor-

¹¹⁷"Fear of the masses" was stated plainly with the corporate-sponsored Trilateral Commission's pronouncement that the expansion of democracy was leading to a "crisis of democracy" (i.e., bourgeois democracy) (Crozier et al., 1975).

¹¹⁸For example, those unfortunate enough to find themselves "without a fixed address" (homeless) cannot receive unemployment insurance benefits or social assistance.

oughly evaluate the restructuring process in terms of who benefits, who loses, and what will be the long-term social effects. It is not simply a matter of deciding how to implement technological change, but can be a matter of choosing whether to adopt certain technologies or forms of restructuring at all.¹¹⁹

We should note that these two positions derive from the old sociological debate over "industrial society" versus "capitalism" (Giddens, 1987; Walton, 1987). The idea of industrial society, coming from Durkheimian sociology, has a notion of history as the cumulative building up of socio-technical advances which results in a modern industrial society that, while not perfect, is the best of all possible worlds. This assumption is at the core of Durkheim's (1893) The Division of Labour in Society and subsequent writings in the industrial society vein. The conclusion is that we must make the best of things as we find them. Much of the literature on labour market adjustment takes this position, assuming that labour is the dependent variable which must be adjusted to restructuring.¹²⁰

The opposing view, seen clearly in Marx and Engels' writings on capitalism, is that individual historical societies are qualitatively different and transitory. Capitalism, our case in point, has a different fundamental class structure and economic imperative than previous tributary and communal societies. There are obvious advances in so-called forces and social relations of production, but these are not simply the necessary outcome of cumulative change. There are periods of

¹¹⁹This point is important in planning for environmentally-sensitive, sustainable development.

¹²⁰For a more complete discussion of this point and its policy implications, see Broad (1993b).

socio-economic crises, in Braudel's terms periods of structural and conjunctural history, which call for human choices that, in the extreme, can bring about a revolutionary rupture of the old social forces and entry into a new era. We call these periods of "revolution". But choice is also involved in the creation of interim socio-economic "reforms".

I call attention to the thoughts of those like Marx and Engels because the present malaise seems to be one of resignation to some mechanical forces of history.¹²¹ Ideas of qualitative change through human choice have been marginalized by the current neo-liberal discourse which advocates submission to Adam Smith's (1776) "invisible hand" of the capitalist market. The refrain of this discourse is "there is no alternative" to the market or, more often, "the deficit made me do it". This refrain recently caused University of Toronto political economist Mel Watkins to remark: "It's a funny old world when you can choose between 50 kinds of light beer, but can have only one kind of economy" (Work, Fall 1992: 12). The following discussion is premised on the assumption that there are alternatives. In truth, the shift from Keynesian liberalism to neo-liberalism in the 1970s was a matter of policy choice, not a matter of historical inevitability. What are the other options?

In this concluding chapter I want to discuss some possibilities for improving the situation of Canadian workers and Canadian society, for ensuring that people's personal troubles get addressed as public issues (Mills, 1959). In general, there

¹²¹There has been great debate as to whether Marx himself believed in natural laws of history, though West (1991), for example, argues convincingly that Marx did not.

are two possible roads to the left of neo-liberalism. One is the Keynesian social-democratic option for reforming capitalism,¹²² which has fallen into disarray. Some would argue, of course, that this is not because of any inherent flaw in Keynesianism, but because of the neo-liberal assault on labour and the welfare state, and neo-liberal hegemony at the level of public ideology. The second alternative is the possibility of a more radical restructuring of society, with a more inclusive form of political participation based on an antisystemic (i.e., anticapitalist) social-movement politics, and more co-operative and egalitarian economic structures. Despite historical misuses of the term (see below), I will call this second option socialism. In the next two sections, I discuss the moderate and radical left options in turn, admitting that the two positions share some common ground. I begin by presenting assessments of the current neo-liberal conjuncture from the point of view of each position, respectively, followed by discussion of their alternatives for political action to counter the (re)casualization of labour and the hollowing of society.

8.1 The Social-Democratic Alternative

In light of the breakdown of Fordist political-economic structures -- the "great U-turn" as Harrison and Bluestone (1988) put it -- some writers on the left

¹²²Wallerstein (1990) more generously views social democracy historically as an antisystemic movement, given at least rhetorical support for the values of liberty, equality and fraternity coming out of the French Revolution. But in light of the practical record (of which Wallerstein is critical as well), I am more sceptical that social democracy was ever fully antisystemic, especially since it never articulated an economic program more radical than Keynesian liberalism. I will deal with this further below.

are calling for a new social-democratic social compromise to replace the Fordist one. We see this in the work of Harrison and Bluestone (1988), Lipietz (1987) and Menzies (1989), the latter calling for a "new social contract" to reclaim "a democratic middle ground of shared values". This would be "a common ground of indivisible social goals which can yield diverse participation in a de-massified society without the perils and the injustice of polarization" (Menzies, 1989: 243). In this section, I present the outline of a Keynesian critique of the neo-liberal restructuring program, and discuss elements of a social-democratic reform package that would replace the neo-liberal program and address the "new casual labour problem".¹²³

There is no doubt that the free-market-oriented global restructuring of recent years has had a negative impact on job creation in the developed countries (see, e.g., Drache and Gertler, 1991; Frobel et al., 1980; Ross and Trachte, 1990). Former Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo has been quoted as saying: "When neo-liberal stabilization programs, justified by transitory conditions, are perpetuated, greater injustices result than those supposedly being corrected. Fatally, salaried workers' wages are restricted; capital centralizes; and the state's room for manoeuvre is reduced. The state's capacity to resolve conflicts is annulled, its possibility of governing cancelled" (cited in Cockcroft, 1989: 15). And, as noted in Chapter I, even the World Bank's chief economist, Lawrence Summers, after his institution has spent the last two decades pushing neo-liberal

¹²³Recall that in the later part of the Industrial Revolution (the late 1800s) there was much concern about a casual labour problem (Stedman Jones, 1984).

free-market policies throughout the globe, now argues: "If we're going to do better in the next decade I don't think there's any alternative to greater government action" (The Globe and Mail, 22/10/92).

But this presents what is essentially an ideological dilemma. When the world-economy entered its second long-wave depression of this century in the early 1970s, neo-liberal economists and politicians were quick to pronounce the crisis a product of Keynesian-liberal economic policies. The neo-liberal argument is that the economic crisis is a product of Keynesian-induced government intervention into the economy. The neo-liberals advocate a return to the classical liberal ideas of laissez faire -- freeing the "invisible hand" of the market from the heavy hand of the state.

But the neo-liberal argument is fraught with a number of inconsistencies (cf. Marchak, 1991). First, it should be observed that full Keynesianism never obtained in Western countries in the post-World War II era. Governments' war-time spending and development of new technologies, followed by release of pent-up consumer demand, promoted new areas of economic growth in the immediate post-war decades. In this context, the Keynesian policies begun in the mid-1930s were only partially implemented, resulting in what Joan Robinson, a student of Keynes, called "Bastard Keynesianism". To varying degrees, for example more in Sweden and less in the United States, governments utilized a few tools from the Keynesian kit, but not all of them (Magdoff and Sweezy, 1977). Consequently, it must be concluded that the post-1973 crisis is not one of Keynesian policy, but

rather another long-wave "Kondratieff" downturn that Keynesianism was originally designed to fix.

Nevertheless, the neo-liberals mounted a campaign to return to the market freedoms advocated in the late 18th Century, ignoring along the way a second important critique of their program. Neo-liberal governments came to power in Britain in 1979, the United States in 1980, and their program spread to other countries throughout the 1980s. They began to dismantle the economic and social structures of the state, to free markets, and to laud the role of the capitalist entrepreneur. But this was an attempt to return to a past that probably never was, and cannot be (Braudel, 1977). Contrary to neo-liberal dogmas, the historical tendency of competitive capitalism has not been to induce more competition but, through economic survival of the fittest, monopolization. It is the large corporations, not the small entrepreneurs, that dominate the world-economy (Marchak, 1991). Given both the needs of a complex economy and society, and the conflict and potential conflict and social inequality created by the market economy, government must play a role in economic co-ordination and promotion of the social good (Heilbroner, 1992). That role is not inherently inefficient, as neo-liberals argue, but is as efficient as we make it.

Keynesian economists argue that the "downsizing" of government is increasing social inequality and laying the basis for increasing social problems and conflict, and crippling the economy (see, e.g., Chorney and Hansen, 1992). On the economic front, it is argued that as long as neo-liberal monetarist policies are

followed, the job-creation aspect of labour adjustment to economic restructuring cannot be realized. Privatization and fighting inflation and the deficit cannot coincide with full employment. The continuing push by governments of all stripes to "balance the budget" will lead only to further stagnation (cf. Frank, 1987). Chorney and Hansen (1992) show that these same policies were disastrous for labour and economic growth when pushed in the early 1930s, and it was not until governments started priming the demand side of the economy in the later 1930s that the situation started to improve.

As for government deficits and debts, today's are not high by historical standards. Chorney and Hansen (1992) argue that deficits by themselves are not the cause of economic crisis, but more the symptoms (cf. Rosenbluth, 1993). Historical evidence shows that, if properly managed, government spending can play a role in economic renewal. This recognition induced U.S. President Bill Clinton, in his post-election economic conference, to ponder aloud the merits of redefining some of what is currently being called "deficit" as "investment".¹²⁴ This same logic underpins the recent federal New Democratic Party (NDP) economic strategy paper which calls for increased spending on human and physical infrastructure and social supports (NDP, 1993). The problem of limiting that portion of the deficit that is unproductive and unsustainable must be recognized, of course, but the neo-liberal definition of all government spending as deficit is a

¹²⁴Keynesians criticize the procedure, such as that used in Saskatchewan, of including not just current account spending, but capital expenditures and crown corporation accounts in calculating the deficit. This, it is argued, overstates the real deficit.

recipe for continuing stagnation. "Contrary to much of the current rhetoric about wasteful government expenditure, government in modern society is an important producer of wealth and economic activity" (Chorney and Hansen, 1992: 124).

The social-democratic conclusion is that, for modern capitalist societies, what is required for economic growth and the public good is a well-regulated mixed economy. The privatization approach, especially leaving all job creation to the private sector, has not worked. In fact, economists of various colours recognize that the operation of a private, profit-oriented economy has demanded some degree of unemployment to assure labour "flexibility". In mainstream economics the optimum level of unemployment gets mapped out in something called the "Phillips curve" (Bannock et al., 1987). For labour the optimum level of unemployment is, of course, zero. Historical experience shows that the only way to come close to this level is with a mixed economy (Keane and Owens, 1986).

So, if full employment as a social right is to be part of a program of labour adjustment to restructuring, government must fulfil its role in the economy. It is for this reason that we find the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) opposing neo-liberalism, advocating a mixed economy, and calling for more political imagination in solving our economic problems. The problem from the point of view of labour is that, as Valaskakis (1990) puts it, labour has been uncoupled from economic growth or, as Sivanandan (1990) puts it, capital has emancipated itself from labour. I recently spoke with an official from the federal government's Department of Western Diversification who admitted that, when projects are considered

by the Department for funding, job creation is not a consideration, only economic growth potential per se. What labour demands, of course, is more focus on the job-creating aspects of economic growth -- a "recoupling" of labour with the economy. But labour recognizes that recoupling cannot be achieved by resuscitating unproductive, labour-intensive forms of production. Labour does not wish to return to the past, but wishes to be involved in developing new forms of high value-added production that include labour as a partner, not simply as a "factor of production" seen only as a cost or tool to be replaced by new capital inputs where possible. The Canadian branch of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), for example, has articulated an alternative, drawing on the European experience of "co-determination", with labour, business and government involved in planning mutually beneficial economic restructuring (USWA, 1992).

Trade unionists' main concern regarding the growth of so-called contingent labour is that it runs counter to their struggles for full and better employment, and contributes to the current social and labour-market polarization in Canada, to the particular disadvantage of women and youth. We have heard much in the media in the last few years about a "lost generation of youth", who have only unemployment or low-waged, dead-end, casual service-sector jobs to look forward to.¹²⁵ In opposition to the contingent economy, some social-democratic labour economists argue for a "share economy" as the more humane way to increase

¹²⁵Not only is this a waste of human potential, the trend appears to be having a negative impact in terms of high youth crime rates and attraction to fascistic political movements, which prey on alienation by offering youth simplistic explanations for their problems (e.g., that non-white immigrants are taking all the good jobs).

human resource flexibility. The share economy is represented by long-term employer-employee relationships that can be adjusted based on norms, standards or various formulas. Some of the key institutions of the share economy include profit sharing, gain sharing, performance bargaining, leaner job ladders, retraining, and redeployment" (Belous, 1989: xi). Belous describes this as the "new deal model" of human resource management, as outlined in Table 8.1. With the new deal model, as opposed to the contingent model, we find emphasis placed on labour, business and government partnerships, and long-term economic planning.

To all of this we should add the possibility of work-sharing, which has been discussed in the past as a way to deal with unemployment, but also as a basic feature of the "leisure society". In the 1960s, given the increasing application of new technology to production and vastly expanded capacity for supplying basic human needs, the expectation was that those in the developed countries would have increasing leisure time to fill, and those in the underdeveloped countries could begin to escape the daily chore of simply trying to survive. Since the 1960s, our capacity to produce has been augmented, not diminished, but social imperatives still come second to economic growth in our market economy.

According to labour and women's groups, and as discussed in previous chapters, the problem with flexible work schemes to date is that they have too often been implemented to the advantage of the employer, but to the disadvantage of the employee. It is the worker who must be flexible. However, there has been some experimentation with flexible working arrangements which are more

TABLE 8.1. The New Deal Model Versus the Contingent Model of Human Resource Management.

New Deal Model	Contingent Model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Unions play a central role in the development and operation of human resource systems. ● Government is a leading influence in human resource systems in terms of regulations and guidance. ● Contingent workers are the exception rather than the norm. ● International economic forces play only a small role in establishing human resource systems. ● Greater emphasis is on security than on risks and rewards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Unions play a small, peripheral role in the human resource system. ● Government, while still a factor, is not looked to as a major source of guidance. ● Contingent workers play a major and central role in the flexible system. ● International economic forces have a large impact in establishing and altering human resource system compensation levels and work rules. ● Risks and rewards are given more emphasis, and security is viewed as a less obtainable objective.

SOURCE: Richard S. Belous, The Contingent Economy, Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1989: 95.

"worker-friendly". Some employers permit "flex-time" arrangements, which allow their employees to better balance work and family responsibilities. There has also been some use of "job-sharing", which allows two employees working part time to share one full-time job. And, especially in Europe, there has been much discussion of "work-sharing" which, through reduced hours for full-time workers, would allow for the unemployed and underemployed to be better incorporated into the active labour force.

With respect to part-time work in particular, the potential for labour is seen in possibilities for phased retirement for older workers, or for phasing younger workers or disadvantaged groups into the labour force by allowing them to gain some workplace experience. As noted in the previous chapter, women in Sweden have benefited from their legislated right to work part-time while they have young children, without loss of seniority or benefits (Sundstrom, 1987). But this example raises the crux of the problem of part-time work -- that it is most attractive and beneficial to employees if they are guaranteed their rights and benefits, at least prorated, in terms of hours worked and seniority.

The Canadian Government's 1982 Commission of Inquiry into Part-time Work (Labour Canada, 1983) identified much part-time and short-term work as not just non-standard, but sub-standard. The Commission recommended a number of legislative reforms to improve conditions of work and benefits. But one policy analyst contends: "The recommendations of bodies like the Commission of Inquiry into Part-time Work, who have argued that governments have a

role to play as example setters for private employers, have largely fallen on deaf ears to date" (Drummond, 1992: 71). In the decade since the Commission made its recommendations, very little has been done in Canada to improve standards for part-timers.

As noted in the previous chapter, part-timers still receive lower pay and have fewer benefits than full-timers. Part-timers are often not entitled to paid holidays or vacations. Most are not eligible for paid sick leave, family leave, or bereavement and compassionate leave. They are not eligible for maternity or paternity leave, and few are covered by health, dental or long-term disability (LTD) plans. Leaves for education and training that are available to full-timers are less often available to part-timers. Some trade unionists complain that most seniority rights do not apply to part-timers, who experience fewer promotions than full-timers, and consequently fewer pay increments. Trade unionists representing bargaining units with large numbers of part-timers also complain that these workers are often worked without breaks, and so recommend legislated changes in this area (see below).

Most employers have argued that part-timers do not deserve the same coverage as full-timers for various reasons, including part-timers' supposed lack of commitment to the labour market, the notion that they only work for "pin money", or that the cost of giving the benefits is too high, especially for small businesses (CFIB, 1988). The first two reasons, part-timers lack of commitment or the supposition that they work only for pin money, have been heavily criticized by

trade unionists and feminists. It has become increasingly obvious, especially with the rapid growth of involuntary part-time work, that many part-timers do have a long-term commitment to work, and do work to help support their families. In those areas such as the retail trade where employers hire mostly part-timers, many of whom have worked for the same employer for years, it would be hard to sustain the argument that it is the workers themselves who have no long-term commitment to the labour force.

As to what reforms might be implemented to improve conditions for part-timers, labour activists see two obvious possibilities. The first is to expand collective bargaining to incorporate part-timers, many of whom remain unorganized. The second is to improve labour legislation to ensure that part-timers gain better coverage with respect to rights and benefits. The intent of legislative reforms would be to raise the minimum standards in the labour market overall (Fudge, 1991). The difficulty with the collective bargaining solution for contingent workers is that many are employed in small workplaces while, for the most part, labour legislation in Canada is more conducive to organizing larger workplaces.

The Canadian system of labour market regulation is based on the single employer, single location fragmented model. This model is feasible for organization of large units of employees. But trade unionists argue that, without national or industry-wide regulation, it is difficult to organize small groups of workers. The problem is exacerbated when the workers are part-timers who often work shifts or may not have long-term employment with one employer. Consequently,

many trade unionists would like to see legislation more conducive to organizing on a sectoral basis. Given the increasing employment of contingent workers by small business, the demand for sectoral bargaining will probably increase.

Sectoral bargaining is enjoyed by many European workers. It was considered as part of the NDP labour law reform in British Columbia, and is being demanded from the Ontario NDP government by labour, women's and community groups.

Feminists argue that a major problem with the current fragmented system is that it reinforces gender segregation. More women than men are employed as contingent workers in small workplaces. Those working in large production units which employ primarily male workers have fared well, until recently, with the fragmented system. But Fudge (1993: 36) contends: "What is needed is the development of new forms of broader-based bargaining and inclusive unionism which do not replicate and reinforce the deeply fragmented, gendered, racialized and hierarchical labour market which currently exists." According to Fudge, not just labour law reform, but reform of the heretofore male-dominated union movement is needed. She concludes that inclusive unionism is necessary not only for more women to enjoy trade union representation, but for the survival of a strong and effective union movement for both men and women confronting the spread of contingent labour.

A second area of labour legislation where trade unionists and feminists would like to see reform is in labour standards. It is commonly noted that many contingent and women workers fall outside the provisions of labour standards acts.

In a lengthy discussion of employment standards, Fudge (1991: 16) argues:

"Existing labour standards legislation have failed to protect workers from employers' attempts to exploit flexible labour." She goes on to note that

emphasis upon the length of employment with a particular employer as a means of determining entitlement to employment benefits encourages employers to use labour flexibly through a variety of means including on-call labour (business' counterpart to just-in-time inventory), temporary and part-time work, contracting out, and lay-offs, while imposing few burdens upon employers regarding the social costs of such labour (Fudge, 1991: 21).

In the second half of her paper, Fudge discusses how labour standards legislation could be applied to various sorts of leaves, hours of work, and employment income and security. Moreover, the majority of non-unionized workers would benefit from an increase in minimum standards, which would create a sort of "level playing field" for employees. Of course, many employers would object to such strengthening of legislation in the interest of workers because, as one business representative interviewed for a report on the Saskatchewan labour market stated: "As far as most business people are concerned, the only good labour legislation is no labour legislation" (Broad, 1993c).

The difficulty with the social-democratic option is that, while some business leaders might agree to certain aspects of a social-democratic program, the overall program is antithetic to the current neo-liberal corporate agenda, as the experience of the NDP government in Ontario reveals. Moreover, many on the left argue that the accumulation crisis of capitalism cannot be remedied by social-democratic reforms, nor is the capitalist ruling class as a whole open to these in any event. So the radical left advocates a more revolutionary alternative than

social democracy. This is not to argue that all of the social-democratic reform measures lack merit, or are incompatible with a more radical restructuring program. The social-democratic program simply does not go far enough -- i.e., capitalism is not now open to major reform that would benefit the working class as a whole. Apropos this point is Russian socialist Boris Kagarlitsky's (1991: 15) conclusion to a discussion of the Soviet revolution that

the left all over the world now has to pay the price of its uncritical support and adulation of the Russian revolutionary tradition.

On the other hand, there is an objective necessity to have a left different from what social democracy can offer. Social democracy is also exhausted, capitalism itself is exhausted. In a way the Russian and Eastern European experience once again shows that capitalism has nothing new or efficacious to propose. It demonstrates the extent to which capitalism has become exhausted worldwide. The need for an alternative is clearly there.¹²⁶

8.2 The Socialist Alternative

The radical left posits socialism as the alternative to capitalism. For Durkheimians, capitalism ('industrial society') is the end of the road -- the best of all possible worlds. But for socialists, if capitalism becomes the end of the road, it would be the worst of all possible worlds. In the terms of an old aphorism, the choice is between "socialism or barbarism". Given the current crises of social polarization, militarism and environmental destruction produced by global capitalism, this old saying has gained new relevance.

¹²⁶For a more complete discussion of these references to the East, see Broad (1993a) and Broad and Foster (1993).

Some socialists argue that capital is confronting an accumulation crisis which is not just cyclical in nature, but a long-term condition of economic stagnation.¹²⁷ The downturn of the early 1970s signalled the return of a stagnation trend which began with the depression of the 1930s, but was countered for a time by the Second World War, the post-war economic boom, and continued military spending as the United States consolidated its position of global hegemony. But these post-war stimuli eventually ran their course, bringing a return of the stagnation tendency of monopoly capitalism. Other socialists argue that the post-1973 crisis is another long-wave downturn -- the so-called B-Phase of a 45-60 year Kondratieff wave.¹²⁸ According to this thesis, the combination of new technologies with industrial restructuring could bring about a renewal of accumulation -- an A-Phase upturn. But even if this happens, another day of reckoning will come.

In line with the Monthly Review School of thought is Sivanandan's (1990) contention that, with the new international division of labour and technological restructuring, capital has emancipated itself from labour. Davis and Stack (1993) articulate this in terms of Marx and Engels' conception of a contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production. Marx and Engels argued that, at a certain point in the development of a social formation, the development of the productive forces (land, labour and capital) outgrow the existing relations

¹²⁷This argument is most consistently made by Harry Magdoff, Paul Sweezy and others of the so-called Monthly Review School.

¹²⁸Studies in this vein can be found in journals such as New Left Review, Review, and Review of Radical Political Economics.

of production (property relations). In other words, the existing property relations present a block to the further development of the productive forces. We see this now in two senses: (1) "With fewer jobs and lower wages as a result of the new knowledge-intensive forces of production, the circulation of commodities in exchange for wages becomes impossible";¹²⁹ and (2) "The 'cost of production' of marginalized workers exceeds their usefulness as labourers - in the logic of capitalism, they are people with no value" (Davis and Stack, 1993: 11,9).

Hence, Davis and Stack (1993: 12) argue: "Between people's needs and the immense productivity of the knowledge economy stands a system of property relations - 'private property', as a social convention, developed, not without much struggle, during the beginning of the capitalist period in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries". Many marxists have argued that the property relations of capitalism were necessary to marshall the productive forces for the great developments that ushered in the Industrial Revolution. Whether capitalism was a necessary, or simply a sufficient condition for this development is open to question. But, given the continuation of capitalist relations of production, Davis and Stack (1993: 11) contend: "The problem becomes not how to produce wealth, but how to distribute it". They go on to say: "The knowledge-intensive productive forces are straining against the chains of private property relations. The qualities of knowledge, to be fully maximized, require a system based on co-operation and

¹²⁹For example, the NIDL is based primarily on capital's drive to cut production costs by running off to Third World low-wage zones like Mexico to produce for the so-called world market. This results in more unemployment and underemployment for formerly high-waged workers in Canada and elsewhere who constituted that market. So, we should ask, what happens to the market?

sharing, because co-operation and sharing generate more information and social wealth" (Davis and Stack, 1993: 12). And co-operation and sharing are the antidote to the alienation and exploitation that are not only endemic to capitalist relations of production, but exacerbated by the present neo-liberal direction of economic restructuring (Menzies, 1989).

A point stressed by Marx and Engels is that capitalism is an historical system, with a beginning and eventual end. Capitalism is also, in human terms, an irrational system. United Nations statistics show a deterioration of living conditions for the majority of the world's people through the post-World War II heyday of American hegemony and its subsequent decline (Amin, 1984; Moreau, 1991). There is increasing immization, revealed daily in, for example, the famine-struck and war-torn African faces on our television screens. Defenders of capitalism are wont to attribute the plight of Third World peoples to natural disaster and irrational fratricide. But the real culprits are capitalist "green revolutions" and imperialism. I once overheard a comment most apropos -- "Perhaps capitalism can deliver the goods, but it doesn't deliver them to all addresses".

While it is easy to target capitalism as the problem and say what socialism is opposed to, it is more difficult to articulate a socialist alternative. We can say some general things about co-operation and sharing as a guide, and look for seeds of the alternate system in present-day social movements. But Marx and Engels, among other socialists, have argued that no blueprint is possible, because the concrete shape of the new society will be determined through the struggle for it.

The closest Marx and Engels come to an outline is in The German Ideology, where they postulate a future socialist society

where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch they wish, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisher, shepherd or critic (Marx and Engels, 1846: 53).

As well, Marx, in his Grundrisse (1858), foretold a time when production for exchange would collapse, giving way to production for social use and the "free development of individualities". This would entail "the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them" (cited in Panitch, 1987: 138-9). But Marx, of course, knew that this future could not come about without capitalism, as he put it, "breaking down", which requires a fundamental change in capitalist class and power relations (cf. Panitch, 1987). This means directly challenging capitalist social relations. What is being done in this direction?

Within capitalist societies there have been various attempts at promotion of "economic democracy" and "workplace democratization" (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1987; Krahn & Lowe, 1988). These have run the gamut from individual enterprises; to regional co-operative enterprises, such as the Mondragon co-operative network in the Basque area of Spain; to adoption of worker-manager

teams in large capitalist enterprises.¹³⁰ The first two experience all the problems of producing for a capitalist market. Success rates for individual enterprises are not great. And the Mondragon co-ops, though financially successful, have not done away with hierarchy and inequality. But, as Lenin (1923) pointed out in assessing the relevance of applying the co-op model to building socialism in the U.S.S.R., co-ops tend to take on the character of the larger social context. The experience of later-day co-op enterprises in Saskatchewan makes it clear that there can be a "co-op capitalism". Of course, we can and should construct co-operative enterprises and co-operative social relations within capitalist society, but we must include these as part of a strategy of fundamentally altering the competitive, individualist (i.e., liberal) structures and social relations of capitalism. Co-operatives must be fashioned to reflect a larger socialist vision. We can begin with some of the social-democratic reforms discussed in Section 8.1, but we must go further.

The future of work under socialism requires a reconception of work in terms of duration, content and product. With the new technology, there is no reason why anyone on the planet should spend long hours doing back-breaking, mind-bending, dangerous work. But, as Gill (1985) notes, the use and character of technology is a political issue -- shaped by a particular set of social relations. If those relations are ones of exploitation, technology will be used to increase

¹³⁰Gill (1985) and Krahn and Lowe (1988) discuss the positive results of worker participation in some enterprises in the Scandinavian countries. These countries are, to some extent, a special case due to their histories of social-democratic labour and political movements. But they are still capitalist economies where the class struggle continues, as recent shifts to the right have shown.

productivity and stability in production by cheapening labour-power and making the labour force more docile. Often where a cheap, docile labour force is available, work is still labour-intensive, not capital-intensive (e.g., in the Third World). And the working day is long. When technology is applied in the centre, Taylorism (or perhaps neo-Taylorism) is still generally the name of the game, as the Economic Council of Canada (1990a) notes. This need not be. Technology could be fashioned and used to make work less dangerous and more interesting, and to shorten the hours of work.

Part of making work more interesting involves not only creating a labour process which is fulfilling, but creating products (not commodities) that we can take pride in. So much that is made now has no use value. It is created only to be carried to a market that has been conjured up through advertising, which gives the "consumers" (the consummate subjects of capitalism) the illusion that their life is now more satisfying. But this quantitative approach to satisfaction knows no limits -- i.e., it makes satisfaction impossible (Leiss, 1976). Satisfying work and a satisfying life are not things that can be separated. Most of us have at some time (too often in our "leisure time") had the satisfaction of creating something we are proud of -- a cabinet, an essay, a painting.... But under capitalism the product becomes the means, not the valued end, which is making profit. And only the perverse entrepreneur of liberalism finds that process satisfying -- but at what cost to their fellow human beings? Under socialist social relations, there must be an intimate connection between the act of production and what is being produced.

Having passed beyond the realm of subsistence, production, consumption and satisfaction can only be measured in qualitative terms. We create things for their social value, in a co-operative setting, and take pride in doing so. And social value means that resources not be wasted on trash commodities to make profits; no one need do dangerous work or work "overtime"; necessary labour that is drudgery be shared and cut to a minimum for each individual; and if production threatens the environment, we do without!

All of this necessitates a process of consciousness-raising (Menzies, 1989), or disalienation (Amin, 1980). And this means overcoming the ideology of liberalism. But this will be a major achievement that will take some time. Magdoff and Sweezy (1990: 16) note: "The possessive individuals of classical political economy did not just appear one fine day to run the new economy. It took generations to create them". And now they must be unmade. The best hope for this is the so-called new social movements,¹³¹ advocating human rights and social justice, aboriginal rights, women's rights, peace and disarmament, a halt to environmental destruction, international solidarity, anti-bureaucracy, alternate lifestyles, et cetera. But their success depends on their ability to coalesce and integrate their concerns with those of the "old" movements for national liberation and socialism. And it depends on their ability to articulate and maintain an antisystemic program which overcomes the old movements' dilemmas of getting co-opted once state power is attained (cf. Arrighi et al., 1989; Wallerstein, 1990).

¹³¹Reviewing history back further than the 1960s, Frank and Fuentes (1990) question the extent to which these movements are so new, suggesting more of a cyclical pattern.

Finally, central to the concerns of this thesis, socialism requires a union of the labour movement with other social movements, which itself requires a restructuring of labour as a social movement, with an antisystemic agenda incorporating the concerns of all oppressed groups. Can this be done?

My immediate answer to this question is yes, it is being done. But the process of constructing a "family" of antisystemic movements, as Wallerstein (1990) calls it, is in its infancy. Let me review briefly what is being done and what the potential is for ending class-based exploitation. Perhaps a sign of the successes of the new social movements is the extent to which the powers that be have been forced to address concerns raised by the social movements. It is impossible now to act in any area of society in ignorance of so-called women's issues without immediate repercussions. The same can be said of aboriginal rights and rights of various so-called minorities, rights of disabled people, gay rights, et cetera. Canada has had for some years a federal employment equity act designed to promote equal opportunity for the designated equity groups of women, aboriginal people, visible minorities, and disabled people in the public sector. Critics, of course, will note the limits to the act's implementation in practice, and argue quite rightly that promotion of a few women, for example, to the upper ranks has not brought equal pay for work of equal value for all. The point is, however, that the social movements have forced the state to move.

Structural changes (feminization of labour) and the women's movement are also having a significant impact on the house of labour. Women now make up 40

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
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percent of union members in Canada, forcing unions in the service sector especially, and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), to act on women trade unionists' concerns. Visible minorities have made less headway in the labour movement, perhaps because of their relatively low numbers in the Canadian labour movement, though some would argue due to continuing racism amongst white trade unionists.

Some unions have tried to move from institutionalization to more of a social movement stance, by incorporating broader community interests into their programs. The Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW), for example, has run magazine advertisements on their initiatives and concern for social issues. And other unions have been campaigning for retention and improvement of welfare state services. With a raft of progressive union leaders recently elected to the CLC executive, many social movement activists hope that labour as a whole will expand further beyond bread and butter issues.

It might be argued that labour's long affiliation to the New Democratic Party has always kept the labour movement involved in the struggle over social issues. However, the relationship was generally one where labour helped deliver NDP vote, but stuck to the workplace and left "politics" to the party. And as the NDP, like other social-democratic parties, became institutionalized and lost its social movement impetus, the labour movement's purview was narrowed as well. The resulting lassitude of labour politics has been challenged by the new social movements coming out of the 1960s. This is leading to a revitalization of the

labour movement as a result of pressure from other social movements, and a sort of cross-fertilization as labour has come to incorporate younger cadre who are also active in the other social movements. There appears to be a growing reunion of labour and community, as in the early days of the modern labour movement in the 1800s.

With both the aforementioned cross-fertilization and the globalization of production, labour is also becoming more cognizant of the need for international solidarity with labouring people of other lands. Many Canadian union locals have been involved in solidarity work with Third World liberation fronts and trade unions for some years now. And the coming of the North American Free Trade Agreement has resulted in a trinational labour organizing forum, conferences and lobbying efforts in Canada, Mexico and the United States.

Some trade unions are also becoming more active on environmental issues. But the difficulty here, as with the other issues raised above, is that all these efforts are still too limited. We can see the tiny shoots of the tree of the future, but it is not yet strong enough to fully withstand the systemic forces of cooptation and repression. Whether the issue is trees versus jobs in British Columbia, "their" (foreign) manufacturing jobs versus ours in Ontario, or our fish versus theirs on the Grand Banks, we still find too little recognition that these are global problems that require global solutions, and insufficient recognition that they are systemic crises. It may seem that I have strayed far from part-time workers and the (re)casualization of labour in Canada. But the central argument of this disser-

tation is that these particular problems are products of larger global processes of capital's restructuring to overcome its accumulation crisis. Environmentalists have enjoined us to "Think Globally and Act Locally". I would argue that the global magnitude of current crises requires us to think and act globally and locally.

To tackle the roots of "the casual labour problem", the labour movement needs to make a more concerted solidarity effort on two fronts. On the national front, organized labour must do much more to unite all sectors of the working class, including all racial, ethnic and gender groups, and the employed, underemployed and unemployed. Pupo and Duffy (1992) have noted that the labour movement has too often been ambivalent or apprehensive about part-time workers, only lately recognizing the need for more effort to defend part-timers' rights. And labour has also been so focused on maintaining job security for full-time workers, that too little has been done to make common cause with unemployed workers, including laid-off workers who all of a sudden find themselves no longer welcome in the house of labour. More solidarity with these groups could help advance the struggle for a better society, rather than a rear-guard action to defend labour's remaining interests in an increasingly hollow society.

On the international front, labour must redouble efforts of international solidarity in struggle against a very mobile capital which, rhetorical expressions to the contrary, has no basic interest in workers rights, human rights of any sort, lack

of democracy, military repression, or environmentally-sustainable development.¹³² There are some good beginnings at international solidarity (see, e.g., Waterman, 1988; 1993), though much remains to be done. But the results will be well worth the effort. Not only do oppressed and super-exploited working people of the periphery need global support for their struggles. But in the process of advancing more global labour solidarity, workers in centre states like Canada could learn lessons from the popular front politics of the Third World in uniting workers, peasants, community activists, aboriginal people, women, et cetera. These fronts continue their struggles despite the heavy hand of imperialism, which itself is better countered through international solidarity.

Essential to these solidarity efforts is education and, as noted above, disalienation if people are to grasp the possibility of a socialist alternative. This seems a daunting task as the events of 1989, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the setbacks to Third World revolutions have resulted in choruses of "the triumph of capitalism" (Heilbroner, 1989) and "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1990) by capitalist ideologues. But I have noted elsewhere that these endorsements of capitalism do not accord with the reality of that crisis-ridden inhumane system, or its lack of potential for peoples of the post-Communist East, let alone the

¹³²The great rush to market "environmentally-friendly" products, for example, like previous drives to market "light" this or "natural" that, is nothing more than a cynical attempt to capitalize on people's concerns about a fundamental crisis. As the old saying goes, "anything to make a buck".

impoverished South (Broad, 1993a; Broad and Foster, 1993).¹³³ Nor do they offer accurate portrayals of socialism. So I must concur with Galeano (1990: 12):

I sometimes feel as though they have stolen even our words. The term 'socialism' is applied in the West as make-up for injustice; in Eastern Europe, it evokes purgatory or maybe hell.... In our time, the bureaucrats have stigmatized hope and besmirched the most beautiful of human adventures; but I also believe that socialism is not Stalinism.... And today more than ever it is necessary to dream. To dream, together, dreams that undream themselves and become incarnate in mortal matter.... This is my testimony. A dinosaur's confession? Perhaps. In any case, it is the affirmation of one who believes that the human condition is not doomed to selfishness and the obscene pursuit of money, and that socialism did not die, because it had not yet been -- that today is the first day of the long life before it.

¹³³A symptom of the crisis of capitalist ideology in the North is the current scrambling of politicians in countries like Canada and the United States to present more of a populist, social-movement image in their efforts to keep disgruntled citizens within the fold of the state.

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

This glossary lists key terms and concepts used in the dissertation. Terms printed in **bold** in a definition are cross-referenced.

Alienation of labour: Under capitalism labour is alienated in a number of ways: (1) through separation from the means of production; (2) through separation from the product itself as a commodity; (3) through separation of the "conception" of tasks and the "execution" of those tasks; (4) resulting in what Marx (1844) saw as a psychological alienation of humans from their "species-being". See also **degradation** and **deskilling of labour**.

Capital: According to Mandel (1975: 591), "exchange-value which seeks a further accretion of value. Capital first appears in a society of petty commodity producers in the form of owners of money (merchants or usurers) who intervene in the market with the aim of buying goods in order to resell them at a profit." As this definition suggests, capital is a social relation, embodied in the capitalist class or bourgeoisie.

Casual labour: Labour engaged primarily in some form of work other than full-time, wage-labour. For example, **part-time work**, temporary work, industrial homework, et cetera. See also **contingent labour** and **non-standard labour**.

Casualization of labour: Seen by some researchers as the process whereby labour which has been proletarianized is turned to some form of **casual labour**. This can be the result of various historical tendencies, including technological changes and capital's attempts to undermine the strength of proletarian labour. It is the argument of this dissertation that there is an historical dialectic of casualization and **proletarianization** of labour under capitalism. See also (re)casualization.

Centre: In world-systems analysis, the most-developed, dominant parts of the **world-system**. The less-developed, dominated and exploited parts are called the periphery. Amin (1977a: 107) argues that "the concepts of centre and periphery are related to the expansion of capital in general [into

a world-system]. They are definitely not synonyms of imperialist and colonial or dependent countries."

Constant capital: According to Mandel (1975: 592-3), "that part of capital which is used to purchase buildings, machinery, raw materials or energy, and whose value remains constant because it is incorporated into the value of final commodities and conserved by the activity of labour-power."

Contingent labour: Term used by some researchers to refer to labour other than full-time wage-labour. The term refers to the casual, on-call relationships that many of these workers have with employers. See also **casual labour** and **non-standard labour**.

Degradation of labour/work: A concept developed by Braverman (1974) to describe the effects of alienation, deskilling and segmentation of labour under monopoly capitalism.

Deindustrialization: Term referring to the erosion of manufacturing capacity and jobs in the older areas of the centre as a result of the **new international division of labour**. See also **runaway shop**.

Dependency theory: This is an approach to the study of development and underdevelopment which emerged in the 1950s from the work of researchers around the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and authors such as Paul Baran (1957). The theory posits the idea that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin. Through the history of capitalist expansion, colonial and imperial powers have dominated and exploited **peripheral** areas of the globe, shaping peripheral production to suit the needs of the dominant **centre**. The periphery is thus made "dependent" on the centre. See also **world-systems analysis**.

Deskilling of labour/work: Term used to describe the process under mass production through which the **increasing organic composition of capital** is tied to detailed division of labour in production and separation of conception and execution of tasks. Unlike the artisan of old, mass production workers generally find themselves doing minute tasks which require less skill and education. But the process of deskilling has been uneven over space and time. See also **alienation**, **degradation** and **segmentation of labour**.

Domesticization of women: Term used to refer to the formal relegation of many women to the so-called private sphere of the household as men became the primary wage-workers and supposed "breadwinners" for proletarian fam-

ilies. This dissertation develops the argument that this was an ideal which never completely accorded with reality.

Exploitation of labour: Process of domination and control through which one class appropriates the product and surplus of another's work. Under theoretical capitalism (Marx, 1867), the bourgeoisie exploits the proletariat by paying a wage lower than the value of the workers' labour. Under "actually existing capitalism" (Amin, 1989), the bourgeoisie also exploits other than proletarian labour through a variety of social relations that bring the fruits of the workers' labour into the circuit of capital. See also **surplus-value**.

Feminization of labour: This term has a double meaning: (1) refers to the increase in women's formal labour force participation in the post-World War II decades; (2) refers to the process through which work in the formal labour market is taking on the characteristics of domestic labour, being more casual and informal in nature. See also **housewifization of labour** and **(re)casualization of labour**.

Flexible production: Regime of capital accumulation based on a labour force which includes some "core" workers with job tenure and relatively good salaries, but significant use of casual labour. Units of production are often smaller than under mass production systems, and production is intended for the world market rather than the mass consumer market of Fordism (Harvey, 1989). See also **outworkers** and **teamwork**.

Fordism: Regime of capital accumulation based on mass production of commodities by full-time proletarian labourers who provide a mass consumption market (Gramsci, 1936; Aglietta, 1979). Fordism is wed to a "scientific management" approach to production known as Taylorism. See also **flexible production**.

Globalization of production: Refers to the process whereby manufacturing and service production which was once restricted to centre states of the world-economy is now occurring world-wide. See also **new international division of labour (NIDL)**.

Homework: Concept used to refer to industrial homework farmed out by capital, through "jobbers", to those working in their homes. These workers are nominally self-employed, but are in reality dependents of the companies. Homework has been common in textiles and electronics subassembly, and is done mainly by women whose family responsibilities make them a captive labour force. See also **outworkers**.

Housewifization of labour: Term used by Mies et al. (1988) to refer to the transformation of the formal labour market and labour processes through which more women are being formally employed; the nature of work is being given the casual and nominally unskilled characteristics of women's "housework"; and the status, power and security of the male proletariat is being eroded. See also **feminization of labour** and **(re)casualization of labour**.

Imperialism: Political, economic and military domination and exploitation of periphery states by centre states. See also **dependency theory**, **trans-national corporations** and **world-systems analysis**.

Increasing organic composition of capital (IOCC): According to Marx (1867), in the process of its development capital tends to respond to needs for increased productivity and control over labour by replacing **variable capital** (human labour-power) with **constant capital** (machines).

Industrial Revolution: The Industrial Revolution, which took place in Britain in the 1700s and 1800s entailed the application of scientific discoveries to production processes in the drive to increase production of commodities for the market. The process earned the status of "revolution" by the very dramatic impact it had on labour processes and the restructuring of society. The term is generally capitalized in reference to the British experience. But the process has, of course, been replicated in many other parts of the world.

Informal economy: The "informal economy" can be defined simply to include economic activities that escape the official circuits of capital as sanctioned by the state -- i.e., it includes a wide spectrum of both unpaid and illegal activities. This should not lead us to conclude, however, that informal activities are separate from the real circuits of capital, which incorporate such things as domestic labour in reproducing labour-power, and non-market production of goods which can enter the commodity circuit (Robinson, 1988).

Labour: The term can refer to "work" -- the combination of human labour-power with tools and resources to produce some good or service. Labour is also used as a noun to refer to a social class, and as an adjective to discuss the labour movement, labour force, labour markets, labour relations, labour power, labour process, et cetera.

Longue duree: Concept used by the French Annals School of history to refer to historical movements and processes of long duration. The concept is counterposed to that of the "conjuncture" which refers to short-term cycles

and events. Braudel (1972: 20-1) argues that social history must be studied as a dialectic of the long term and the short term -- of the longue duree, with its "slow but perceptible rhythms"; and "structural and conjunctural history", with more rapid fluctuations and frequent changes.

Multinational corporations (MNCs): See transnational corporations (TNCs).

Neo-conservative: See neo-liberal.

Neo-liberal: The term "neo-liberal" is used in this dissertation in reference to current political-economic practices based on the notion of free-market capitalism a la Adam Smith's (1776) "invisible hand" of the market. These practices are sometimes referred to as "neo-conservative", given that they have been pushed by Tory governments in Britain, Canada and the United States, but the affinity with classical liberalism makes neo-liberal the more apt term.

New international division of labour (NIDL): Technological changes and the expansion of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the post-World War II era have brought an increase in manufacturing production in the Third World for the world market. Many TNCs have closed plants in the First World and moved to the Third World for cheaper labour and laxer state regulation. The NIDL is distinguished from the "classical" international division of labour, in which the Third World periphery produced primary products while the centre states produced manufactured goods. See also runaway shop.

Non-proletarian labour: See proletariat.

Non-standard labour/work: Term often used by government agencies to refer to other than full-time wage-labour, which is considered to be standard. Examples are part-time work, temporary work, self-employment, et cetera.

Outsourcing: Strategy adopted by large corporations of contracting out work to cut costs of constant capital and variable capital. For transnational corporations work can be outsourced to other countries. See also homework, new international division of labour, outworkers and runaway shop.

Outworkers: Contract labour that does work farmed out by large corporations in their attempts to cut costs of production through cutting physical plant overhead costs and high wages and benefits of unionized "in house" workers. This is a key ingredient in the regime of flexible production. Outworkers may work out of their own homes, or for small contracting companies. See also homework and outsourcing.

Part-time work: This dissertation adopts Statistics Canada's definition of paid employment of less than 30 hours per week. Different agencies and countries have different definitions of part-time work. Many countries use a 35 hour rather than a 30 hour cut-off line. Labour Canada's (1983) Commission of Inquiry into Part-time Work defined the concept very broadly to include part-week, part-month and part-year work.

Peripheralization of the centre: As a result of global economic restructuring, people in centre states are experiencing high unemployment and deteriorating standards of life and work. This is bringing social conditions in the centre to look more like those of the periphery (Sassen, 1982; Ross and Trachte, 1983). See also *deindustrialization*, *informal economy*, *new international division of labour*, and *runaway shop*.

Periphery: See *centre*.

Proletarianization: This term has a double meaning: (1) In classical marxian theory and most other discussions of the transition to capitalism, refers to the transformation of more and more of the working population into full-time wage-labour, or proletarians who, as a class, replace peasants and other petty producers as the numerically dominant working class. This common thesis is challenged in this dissertation, and the historical reproduction of various forms of *casual labour* is emphasized. (2) In this thesis, the term also refers to the process whereby working class trade union and political party struggles gave a "proletarian logic" to the formal labour market -- the logic of unionized, full-time wage labour.

Proletariat: The social class of labourers who own no means of production, and are forced to earn their living by selling their labour-power for a wage. In the marxian schema, this class is seen to be the natural antithesis to *capital* under the capitalist mode of production. It was expected that this class would become the numerically dominant form of labour, and the main agent of antisystemic struggle. In practice, the proletariat had great successes in organizing into trade unions and political parties (though many adopted a reformist nature). It is argued in this dissertation that the theoretical status and political successes of the proletariat brought acceptance of proletarian labour as the standard form of labour, but the numerical reality under capitalism has always been one of a mix of proletarian and *casual labour*. See also *non-standard labour* and *proletarianization*.

Quality of working life (QWL): A strategy that has emerged with the move toward *flexible production*, in an attempt to reincorporate workers' conceptual skills into the production process. QWL involves the use of workers grouped into "quality circles" for the purpose of "brainstorming" to

solve problems and increase productivity. Critics argue that the strategy is often only partially implemented, and does not alter the basic hierarchical structures of capitalism (Parker, 1985; Wells, 1987). See also **alienation** and **teamwork**.

(Re)casualization of labour: Refers to the post-1960s shift away from the proletarian logic of the formal labour market (see **proletarianization**). This dissertation has argued that proletarian labour became the standard in theory, and as a result of labour's successes in organizing into trade unions and political parties. However, **globalization**, **feminization**, and the erosion of labour's strength have brought a challenge to proletarian hegemony as the labour market norm by so-called **non-standard** forms of labour. The prefix "re" is placed in parenthesis here to signal the historical-theoretical nature of the concept. See also **casualization of labour**.

Reproduction: In the marxian schema, the term refers to the reproduction of the capitalist production process overall (see Bottomore, 1983). In the literature on domestic labour, reproduction refers to the process of supplying the needs of the household unit and, under capitalism, reproducing labour-power through provision of labourers' sustenance and the biological reproduction of the next generation of labourers. As a result of the gender division of labour in society, most of this domestic labour is supplied by women. For the purposes of this thesis, reproduction refers to domestic labour.

Reserve army of labour: Marx (1867: 630) argues that "capitalistic accumulation ... constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant population, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus-population." This surplus population provides capital with a reserve army of labour which can be called upon to replace proletarian labour when it becomes too expensive or militant. See also **proletariat**.

Runaway shop: Term used to describe industries which close down operations in the centre and move to the periphery to take advantage of cheaper labour, and laxer state regulations, et cetera. See **new international division of labour (NIDL)**.

Segmentation of labour/work: Concept derived from segmented labour market theory to describe the process whereby the labour market is divided into segments of higher-paid, secure, high-status jobs filled mainly by white men and lower-paid, less-secure, low-status jobs filled mainly by women and

people of colour (Gordon et al. 1982). Segmentation is also used as a term to describe the detailed task separation of 'Taylorist' production methods.

Self-employment: In theory, someone who owns their own business, regardless of whether they hire some paid labour or work on their own (own account workers). In reality, many nominally self-employed find themselves in the position of dependent contractors to larger businesses working as **contingent labour**. See also **homework** and **outsourcing**.

Semi-proletarian labour: Bernstein (1988: 36-7) refers to two uses of the term "semi-proletarianization": "The first can be illustrated [with respect] to debt bondage, which refers to a relationship whereby someone is forced to pay off their debts by providing goods or labour service to their creditor.... [In] the second form of semi-proletarianization ... periodic wage labour is combined with other economic activity (and especially subsistence agriculture) to provide a means of livelihood and household reproduction." We can, then, refer to the existence of semi-proletarian labour where producers mix wage-labour with other economic activities -- i.e., they do not engage exclusively in full-time wage-labour.

Super-exploitation of labour: The exploitation of labour at a rate below the level at which the labourer can reproduce herself or himself, under given social conditions.

Surplus-value: According to Mandel (1975: 597-8), "the monetary form assumed by the social surplus product in a commodity-producing society. In a capitalist society, surplus-value is produced by wage-labourers and appropriated by capitalists: in other words, it is the difference between the new value produced by labour in the process of production and the cost of reproducing labour-power or the value of labour-power). In the final analysis, it represents unpaid labour appropriated by the capitalist class" from the proletariat. See also **exploitation of labour**.

Taylorism: An approach to production developed by Frederick Taylor. Taylorism, also known as "scientific management", is a method of labour control which entails the breaking up of production processes into minute tasks requiring low levels of skill. This approach formed the basis for assembly-line mass production. Taylor's intent was to put total control of production in the hands of management. The approach did increase control and productivity, but due to increasing **alienation**, also caused problems in production as a result of stress and low levels of worker satisfaction. See also **flexible production** and **Fordism**.

Teamwork: The "team concept" entails a shift away from the old Fordist methods of mass production by using computers and robotics to group workers into "production teams" for production of commodities. Rather than deskilled assembly line workers, workers are expected to be "multi-skilled" so that they can rotate jobs. Critics argue that, in practice, there is often a mixing of teamwork with the old deskilled and segmented production of Taylorism (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; USWA, 1992). See also flexible production and quality of working life.

Transnational corporations (TNCs): Giant monopoly corporations which, though based in one state, operate on a global scale. See also new international division of labour.

Variable capital: According to Mandel (1975: 599), "that part of capital which is used to purchase labour-power (to hire workers) and whose value accrues with the surplus-value extracted from this labour-power by the owners of capital."

World-economy: See world-systems analysis.

World-system: See world-systems analysis.

World-systems analysis: World-systems analysis is an outgrowth of dependency theory, and has been formalized in sociology by Wallerstein (1974; 1979). There are two strains of world-systems theorists --liberals and neo-marxists. For both, the modern "world-system" is based on an overarching capitalist "world-economy", but with politically independent nation-states ranked hierarchically according to their mode of incorporation into the world-economy. Most developed are centre, or "core" states, followed by "semi-peripheries" and "peripheries". (These categories apply as well to regional hierarchies within states.) Interstate relations are typified by domination and exploitation. For neo-marxists, these nation-state relations are based on and cross-cut by social class relations of exploitation. This dissertation follows Wallerstein's (1984) preference for hyphenating the terms "world-system" and "world-economy" to stress the unity of the system.

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