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THE FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE:
AN AMERICAN WEAPON OF THE COLD WAR

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Political Science,
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

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Larry D. Collins

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An American Weapon of the Cold War"

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ABSTRACT

The work is an attempt to develop a theoretical explanation of Cold War international conflict. The framework is developed from a detailed study of the organization and control of the Free Europe Committee (FEC) including the operations of its two principal sub-divisions -- Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom.

From 1949 to 1971, the FEC was an instrument of the Central Intelligence Agency, and a major foreign policy instrument in the period of this study, 1949 to 1959.

The activities of the FEC provide the empirical base for a theoretical explanation of the method of attack and defense in the Cold War. The theory rests on two basic assumptions: (1) that the Cold War period was accompanied by rapid advancement in technology, which rendered an open, conventional military contest between the two super-powers unacceptable; and (2) that the Cold War was defined, fundamentally, as an ideological contest between mutually exclusive ways of life.

Extensive use is made for purposes of terminology and perspective of the respective concepts, of informal penetration, developed by Andrew Scott, and of sociological propaganda as it has been developed by Jacques Ellul.

In brief, the thesis is as follows: the FEC represented a highly developed example of a "Cold War" weapon. It

contained the capability, within one organizational structure, for offensive and defensive operations. Through RFE it conducted what Scott has identified elsewhere as informal penetration; attempting to weaken the Soviet Union by stimulating and directing popular resistance to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Through the Crusade for Freedom, it attempted to render similar subversive attempts against the United States ineffective. Through the Crusade, the government mounted national campaigns to promote loyalty and obedience by the populace, in favor of its anti-Communist foreign policies specifically, and to America's overall Cold War commitments in general.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States is presently emerging from the Cold War. Although opinions differ over exactly when the Cold War began, there is basic agreement as to where.¹ The original divisive factor in the post war alliance was the issue of Eastern Europe. Hostility to Soviet hegemony in the area became, after World War II, a central element in American foreign policy. It was a particularly frustrating issue for Americans because the Soviet Union enjoyed de-facto control of her Western neighbors, and could not be forcefully dislodged without the precipitation of a general war. This fact notwithstanding, the United States remained implacably hostile to the new status quo, and beginning in 1952 openly committed herself to the policy of peaceful liberation of Eastern Europe.

This apparent commitment without capability has been subjected to heavy criticism by scholars representing various schools of thought regarding American foreign policy.² Regardless of which perspective one adheres to, however, there are certain factors affecting the post-war super-power contest which must be accommodated in any analysis. First the relationship was defined as a contest between two all encompassing, mutually exclusive ways of life, or ideologies. In the United States, it was viewed as a contest, without quarter, between good and evil. At stake was the survival of the American way of life (if not to say Western civilization).

since America was the acknowledged leader of the "Free World"). Second, it occurred at a time of rapid technological development. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the area of arms development. Both sides, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had the capacity to destroy each other utterly.

Together, these two factors explain one of the unique features of the Cold War; its name. It was indeed a war, but a "cold" one, because the hostility was not expressed in the conventional form by military means. To use Professor Paul Seabury's words, it was a "state of relations between states or social systems characterized by a constant policy of reciprocated hostility, in which nevertheless armed force is not employed."³ The technology of warfare had "advanced" to the point where conventional conflict was fraught with the unacceptable risk of self-destruction.⁴ The conflict was nevertheless expressed, but primarily as a competition between the superpowers for the loyalty of the masses. In the U.S. the conflict was expressed as the "battle for mens' minds". Technology while it rendered "hot" war unacceptable, however, made ideological "cold" war possible on unprecedented scale. The opposing sides, indeed all sovereign nations, were vulnerable to having the loyalty of their citizens, their culture, heritage, values, etc., eroded by appeals from the outside - in this case, to enemy attack. The Cold War is, in addition to all else, an era characterized by ideological conflict and technological change.

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Thus the Cold War required a different set of instruments and goals against which victory and success would be determined. The methods developed are commonly grouped under the single heading of 'psychological warfare'.⁵ The essence of psychological warfare is not the physical destruction of the enemy, but his demoralization. One seeks to erode the efficacy and worth of the enemy's way of life, and the values which support it, in the minds of the populace.

All states were subject to this kind of attack, and as necessary as it was to employ them, it was equally necessary to defend against similar attempts by the other side by preserving, strengthening and unifying citizen loyalty at home.

The method of attack and defense in the Cold War is the central thesis of this work. We have placed the Free Europe Committee in the center of this operational definition by analyzing its major operating divisions, Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom, in terms of two analytical frameworks: Andrew Scott's concept of Informal Penetration and Jacques Ellul's concept of Sociological Propaganda. We hold that the FEC was an ideal weapon of the Cold War whose domestic and international operations illustrate the unique character of international conflict in the last half of the twentieth Century.

Our thesis is that the FEC represented the epitome of "Cold War" weapons development. It contained the capability,

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within one organizational structure, for offensive and defensive operations. Through RFE it conducted what Scott has identified as informal penetration: actively and aggressively attempting to weaken and remove Russian control of Eastern Europe by stimulating and directing disloyal activities among the people of the area. Through the CFF it had the capability to defend the U.S. against similar attack from abroad by mobilizing the American populace. Under the cover of fund-raising efforts, the U.S. government mounted national campaigns to promote loyalty and obedience by the citizenry to its anti-communist foreign policies, specifically, and to America's overall international posture in general.

The National Committee for a Free Europe (the original corporate name of the FEC) was a government created and controlled instrument. Its creation and continuing control by the government was kept secret for 22 years. The FEC operated behind the cover of a private, non-profit corporation ostensibly subsisting on public contributions without official ties with the government. Radio Free Europe was a highly developed psychological warfare instrument aimed exclusively at Eastern Europe, which relative to its audience, qualified it as the largest anti-Communist propaganda operation of the U.S. The Crusade for Freedom was the domestic arm of the FEC existing ostensibly to solicit public contributions for the FEC. The growth and importance of the FEC continued for 10 years, 1949-1959.

a period co-terminous with the hey-day of the Cold War.

The FEC has been largely ignored by scholars interested in the international politics of the period, and even by those who concentrate on propaganda. There has been no attempt to integrate the FEC as a covert government operation, or at all, into a general explanation of this period of conflict. The literature dealing with international broadcasting in the U.S. does not deal at any length with FEC. For example, Whitaker's Propaganda and International Relations which claims to be the "Handbook for winning the next war" does not mention the FEC or RFE. Similarly, Dougherty's exhaustive A Psychological Warfare Casebook devotes but five pages to one RFE balloon operation drawn second-hand from an article from The Reporter magazine. Qualter's Propaganda and Psychological Warfare limits FEC to one paragraph. There are three works which deal with RFE specifically. One, Radio Free Europe by John Holt was published in 1958 and is invaluable for information concerning the specific operations of RFE against Eastern Europe. Another, Voices Through the Iron Curtain was written by Allan Michie, a former Deputy European Director of RFE in Munich. His book is similar in content and form to Holt's but must be read in view of his bias. Both these works, however, were written before the CIA connection was known, and most importantly, they concentrate exclusively on RFE. Neither considered the broader role of the FEC or CFF nor showed concern with relating the totality of the operation to

the Cold War period. The third work is an unpublished report by Donald Shanor, a former member of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University. Shanor is overtly partisan in favor of RFE, and his work is an attempt to prove that RFE had turned, in its stripes, as it were, from a Cold War tiger to a detente lamb. Like the others, he too concentrates solely on RFE, specifically on its change in broadcasting policy, and ignored the idea of government control or the relation of the operation to the international environment.

Students of propaganda per se concern themselves with the characteristics of the message, the requirements for effectiveness, and the establishing of a definition. Both Qualter, mentioned previously, and Ellul (Propaganda), two leading students of the "black art", ignore RFE. Leonard Doob and Harold Laswell, of course, wrote before the FEC existed.

This paucity of interest in the FEC probably has several explanations. It may be due in part to the widespread acceptance of the private cover as valid, at a time when scholars were more interested in official, open propaganda instruments. It may also be due to the historiography of the Cold War which has viewed the rhetoric of liberation as a hopeless expression of moral principle disguised as policy, having little relation to political realities; and the FEC as an undertaking of "kooks" who insisted on building their castles in the sky. RFE, the only part of the FEC to arouse even marginal interest had the reputation of a right-wing

extremist operation, not to be taken seriously, and not relevant to the weighty issues of international politics. During the height of the Hungarian Revolution controversy, for example, ~~as~~ was the East European emigre, working for ~~REB~~ in Munich, who bore the brunt of the criticism as being "out of touch" with changing conditions behind the Iron Curtain, or worse, reactionaries seeking to re-establish the pre-war regimes. This tended to confirm the image of ~~REB~~ as irrelevant, silly, and occasionally embarrassing, but little more. This study, then, attempts to fill the gap by giving the conditions of the ~~REB~~'s development and operations, and explaining its significance in terms of the unique character of the Cold War.

The study begins with a brief analysis of the period of the war-time alliance up to the Republican Administration. We concentrate on the breakdown of the alliance and the beginning of the Cold War over the issue of Eastern Europe. Chapter II concentrates on the development of an American response to the Soviets in international broadcasting by examining the official policies and ideological themes, or premises, used to justify it. Chapter III examines the successive reorganizations of the international broadcasting organization within the Government, and the inception and organization of the ~~REB~~. The focus is on the role the government played in providing the initial impetus for the ~~REB~~ and the mechanics of its subsequent support and control. Attention is paid to the flow of top government and corporate

leaders between the committee and the government, particularly during the Eisenhower Administration.

Chapter IV is an analysis of Radio Free Europe as an instrument of psychological warfare. The purpose is to arrive at a theoretical understanding of the significance of RFE in the context of the ideological conflict. This is accomplished by viewing the organization, policy and programming of RFE in terms of the concept of informal penetration, or more specifically, informal attack. Scott's conceptualization of informal penetration provides a framework in which the function and importance of RFE as an instrument of Cold War conflict can be explored. We focus on the many public statements concerning the purposes and policy of RFE, the content and strategy behind its programming and balloon campaigns and the official American position revealed in the formal communications between the Eastern European governments and Washington, resulting from RFE operations.

Chapter V is an analysis of the Crusade for Freedom as an instrument of domestic propaganda. We will explain this internal operation in terms of the necessity for lessening the vulnerability in nations to informal penetrative efforts from competing social systems. It was the defensive element required in Cold War conflict. One pursues the struggle primarily by gaining access to the processes or population of the competitor and defends against similar attempts by mobilizing one's own populace in support of the

nation and its policies. Examination of the CFF is critical since it operated only in the U.S., was controlled by the state and constituted a major part of an instrument of Cold War conflict.

As the point of analysis for the CFF we have relied on the concept of sociological propaganda as it has been developed by Jacques Ellul. According to Ellul, sociological propaganda is a phenomenon of developed technological societies. Indeed it is a necessary element arising from the necessity of coherent control in the face of increasing social complexity. Moreover, traditional political and social ethics, particularly those underpinning democracies Ellul notes, have been subjected to unprecedented attacks from both right and left in the Twentieth Century. Thus the state must undertake to organize and mobilize the population and set the standards of social behavior.

Sociological propaganda is not designed to change attitudes or create new beliefs but to reinforce existing propensities, to focus them on the ends of the state and make the individual adjust himself to desired forms of behavior. In addition to written and verbal exhortation, sociological propaganda involves citizen participation. Such activities, all pre-planned and managed, according to Ellul, develop a sense of belonging and commitment in the citizen; he develops his sense of belonging, of having an attachment to his society, through taking active part in "great events". The CFF, with its well structured national

organization, yearly campaigns and numerous rallies, where people could send messages to the "captive people", sign oaths of allegiance to democracy and contribute money, qualify it as a form of sociological propaganda. We analyze the nature of the appeals made by the CFF, and the operation of its yearly campaigns. It was the government's attempt, covertly, to elicit popular support of its hostility toward the Soviet Union.

Chapter VI, the conclusion, draws the analysis of the FEC as an instrument of informal penetration and sociological propaganda together into a final statement on the significance of this remarkable organization in the attempt to comprehend the Cold War in terms of its essential differences from previous periods of international tension.

A variety of approaches were open in conducting this study. The intention from the outset, however, was to present the FEC in its broadest aspect in relation to the period. Thus the most direct means appeared to be a descriptive qualitative analysis of the operation. There is, as a result, extensive quotation of the stated intent, speeches, broadcast programs, national campaigns and other activities of the FEC. We did not wish to narrow the focus of the study to the point where a quantitative content technique would have been manageable because this would have meant losing the broader view. The approach adopted was the most appropriate for the scope and thesis of the work and, we think, enhances its future value as an interpretive statement on a hitherto largely ignored aspect of the Cold War.

FOOTNOTES

¹For an overview of the number of opinions by scholars on the point in time when the Cold War began, see Paul Seabury's The Rise and Decline of the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 6-10. Professor Seabury discusses ten books written since the 1950s to demonstrate the degree of disagreement.

²For an excellent recent comparative analysis of the two leading contemporary schools, the realist and revisionist, and a critique of the revisionist perspective, see Robert Tucker's The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971), specifically pp. 21-55 for the comparative treatment.

³Seabury, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴We are using the word "conventional" to denote normal, traditional, open warfare, not to imply the use of non-nuclear arms.

⁵See Qualter, Terrence Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (New York: Random House, 1962), p. XII.

CHAPTER I

The Place of Eastern Europe in the Cold War:

A Brief Recounting

The original issue dividing the wartime allies and precipitating the Cold War was the post-war political development of the countries of Eastern Europe. The conflict came to be explicitly recognized between 1944 and 1952.

This chapter attempts to present a brief background description of this period during which full scale cold war conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was developing.

The central issue of Eastern Europe is interesting because of the dramatic rise in American concern for the region. Prior to the second world war the United States had not displayed great concern for developments in this area with the exception of the brief Bela Kun regime in Hungary between 1918-1919.¹ However, during and after the war, the political fate of the area grew to become a central theme in American foreign policy.

The attempt here is to explain briefly why this occurred and to provide a perspective from which the subsequent functioning and importance of the Free Europe Committee can be elaborated.

This brief analysis, therefore, will concentrate on the issue of Eastern Europe as the area which affected the

relationship between the United States and Russia. Also the chapter will discuss the domestic factor of public opinion (particularly the views of Americans of East European ethnic origin) as it was perceived by the principle American decision makers.

American interest in Eastern Europe was practically nil until after the civil war. "Until well after the civil war contacts between American and the peoples of East Central Europe were mostly indirect in nature, hardly more than incidental to the constant migration and the great commerce in trade and ideas which was rapidly building up an Atlantic community."¹ After 1882 however, the situation changed rapidly when the balance of immigration into the U.S. shifted to Eastern Europe.² From then until the 1920s, when legislation restricted the flow, millions entered the U.S. from Eastern Europe. The 1930 census showed the size of the migration:

1,269,000	Poles
492,000	Czechoslovakians
371,000	Austro-Germans
274,000	Hungarians
211,000	Yugoslavs
146,000	Rumanians

If one includes second generation Americans, the total prior to World War II equalled approximately seven million.³ By 1920 immigrants from Eastern Europe equalled 11.2% of the white population.⁴ By 1940, twenty-two million people listed a

language other than English as their mother tongue and thirty five million were of foreign birth, foreign parentage or mixed parentage.⁵ By 1944 the East Europeans in America equaled one third of the population, and some thirty-five languages were spoken other than English.

Rather naturally, upon entering the strange new environment of America, these people tended to forget the hardships of life at home and remembered the more comforting aspects of culture and family ties. Loyalties to the homeland were maintained by an elaborate infrastructure of organizations and communications media. In 1944 there were one thousand ethnic newspapers with a readership of over seven million. These were supplemented by about three hundred foreign language radio programs broadcasting in some twenty-seven languages. Over three million were members of ethnic fraternal organizations. According to Almond, these organizations have been primarily oriented toward American policies affecting their homelands. They accept the general American consensus of East-West struggle and "constitute the audience for the more overt form of ethnic influence over foreign policy."⁸

The importance of this large bloc of Americans was perceived by Roosevelt and later by Truman as an important factor to be considered in formulating negotiation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union on the question of Eastern Europe. The electoral clout of these ethnic groups will be dealt with in more detail below, but for now, one may say that the size of

this group, their Catholicism (allying them with many non-ethnic Americans), their concern for the fate of their homelands, and the fact that they voted overwhelmingly Democratic accounts for their perceived importance.

Eastern Europe has traditionally been an area coveted by other powers. It must be kept in mind that the unique aspect of the history of Eastern Europe is the existence of independent states, not foreign domination. World War I ushered in that unique period. The Turks were driven out between 1912 and 1913. Russia was forced out in the treaty of Brest Litovsk. By 1918 Russia had suffered a revolution and was beginning a period of civil war. The defeat of the Germans and Austrians, not to mention Wilson's demand for self determination, resulted in the creation of the countries of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Austria was split from Hungary with parts of the former empire going to Poland and Rumania.

Thus for twenty years Eastern Europe was permitted relative peace in which the abnormal became accepted as normal. The situation of these new nations was still precarious. Stability and development would perhaps have been achieved if the areas had been protected from their traditional enemies - Germany and Russia. This could have been achieved either by continued intervention by the United States or through a local federation giving the countries the capability to protect themselves. Neither occurred. The U.S. attitude was negative. In 1919 it refused to join the

League of Nations or join the British in underwriting French security. Indeed, the U.S. refused to maintain the status quo in Western Europe, an area of much more vital concern. France was forced to strive for stability in this area with little assistance. Backed by the war and fearful of a resurgent Germany, she alone formed alliances with the states of Eastern Europe.

Thus the area was highly vulnerable. There was little to prevent Germany or Russia (or both) from returning once each had recovered. The demise of the East European states began with Munich and when the two powers signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, the independence of no East European country was secure. The Polish alliance with France and Britain merely brought them into the war; it clearly did not preserve Poland's independence.

The West was afforded a second opportunity to influence the area when Germany attacked Russia and America joined the allies in 1941. British and American influence would appear to be crucial in so far as the victor of a Russo-German war could not be expected to deal kindly with the aspirations of the East European countries. Yet the United States did not specifically attempt to block the growth of Soviet power in Eastern Europe.

American policy makers had two primary war aims, the realization of neither of which would save Eastern Europe. The first was military. General Marshal believed in the

principal goal of destroying the enemy's ability to resist as quickly as possible. Navy Secretary Forrestal reflects this aim in his diaries: "We regarded the war, basically speaking, as a ball game which we had to finish as quickly as possible, but in doing so, there was comparatively little thought as to relationships between nations which would exist after Germany and Japan were destroyed."¹⁰

The second goal, though political, was not directly related to the East European area. Roosevelt particularly wished to preserve the good relations between the allies after the war. He envisioned a period of great power co-operation and peace. Furthermore Washington viewed Russia's participation in the war as crucial to both theaters, and was unwilling to antagonize the Soviets and threaten such co-operation. As early as the Quebec Conference, Harry Hopkins used a "very high level" estimate prepared by the U.S. military command which warned of the importance of the Soviet Union to the Alliance. Entitled "Russia's Position", it read:¹¹

Russia's post war position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. ... The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia. Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.

Sherwood points out: "This estimate was obviously of great

importance as indicating the policy which guided the making of decisions at Teheran and much later, at Yalta."¹² These considerations, particularly the latter, became cornerstones of U.S. wartime diplomacy. To convince Stalin that the U.S. could be trusted and desired only friendship, Roosevelt was wont to rely on his own winning personality, which had served him so well in domestic politics. In a 1945 letter to Churchill, the President wrote a wild boast:

I know you will not mind my being a little bit boastful when I tell you that I think I can handle Stalin personally better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all of your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so.¹³

After Teheran, though taxed by the Russian leader's tenacity, Roosevelt remained convinced that he was "settable".¹⁴ Writing in Life Magazine after the war, William C. Bullitt reported Roosevelt's strategy for dealing with Stalin and what he hoped to gain by it. Bullitt was told by Roosevelt: "I have just a hunch that Stalin doesn't want anything but security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work for a world of democracy and peace."¹⁵

The American aims of winning a quick military victory and maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union remained firm throughout the war. Prime Minister Churchill's efforts to persuade the Americans of the utility of a Balkan campaign repeatedly failed to arouse support for the plan in

Washington and he was finally overruled at Teheran. The potentiality of a Russian dominated Europe was not unknown, but for these reasons and, as we shall see, domestic political considerations, the Americans simply subordinated the question of whose armies would liberate what area.

The existence of a large minority of Americans of East European descent and their concern for the fate of their homelands was perceived by Roosevelt and other U.S. decision makers as an important factor in American-Soviet relations. Russian security anxieties and suspicion of her Western allies plus American ethnic concern for Eastern Europe resulted in a major dilemma for U.S. policy makers. Throughout the war the Americans opposed making any territorial settlements with the Russians and resisted British efforts to do so.¹⁰

Roosevelt regarded Russian expansion as inevitable but he could not openly settle the issues, he felt, without alienating a major portion of his popular support at home and perhaps risk his more important future goals. He desired a postponement of these questions until after hostilities had ended and in the mean-time to refer to statements of principle such as the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of a Liberated Europe.

The problem of balancing allies and domestic politics is well illustrated in the case of Poland. Of all the East Europeans the worst fate befell the Poles. They were victimized by both Germany and the Soviet Union and were later to

have to accept their ancient Eastern adversary as an ally. Of all the East European issues, the question of Poland took more time, was the subject of more vague compromises and the root of more hostility than any other East European nation. The case of Poland therefore deserves our attention. To accede to the Polish Exile Government's interests was to risk alienating the Soviet Union, ~~not~~ for Roosevelt to give in to the Russian interests was to risk Polish and perhaps general Catholic support at home. Roosevelt feared Polish-American public opinion.

In 1941 the Ambassador of the Polish Government in Exile to the United States was Jan Ciechanowski. His record of his meeting with Roosevelt shows that the President recognized Polish aspirations in terms of domestic opinion. Roosevelt told the Ambassador: ¹⁷

As representative of Poland you have advantages in America which less fortunate Ambassadors of other countries do not have. The millions of Americans of Polish descent are the natural and most responsive group of Poland's American allies in this country. Do not neglect them now. I want you to do your utmost for your country here. I want you to re-establish your contacts with these American Poles, to address them frequently. You should enlist the sympathy of all Americans who can assist you in developing the traditionally friendly feeling for Poland in America. Do not neglect anything.

Ciechanowski was encouraged to believe in American backing further by Sumner Welles who told him "that at the appropriate moment the President would certainly agree to use his influence on behalf of Poland, and the appropriate

time for such a step would be when Moscow applied to the American Government for Lend-Lease aid."¹⁸ Welles urged the Poles to maintain good relations with the Soviets because it would aid "in countering anti-Soviet feeling among isolationist and Catholic elements in America...." Welles referred to these anti-Soviet attitudes as "immature" and thought it would take "time and effort" to counteract them.¹⁹

American antipathy to British willingness to grant Soviet territorial claims in 1941-1942 stemmed from American fears of domestic reaction to such a deal. Anthony Eden recorded American hesitancy toward settling Russian demands for her 1941 frontiers: "In America there is still a widely held feeling of distrust and dislike of Russia which the pact with Hitler and Russia's attack on Finland greatly augmented."²⁰ Consequently the Americans could not make any agreements with the Russians or British which could have the appearance of giving away territory that was once part of Europe. Roosevelt indicated his concern to the British Ambassador Lord Halifax on March 9th that, "While everyone recognized Russia's need for security, it was too dangerous to put anything on paper now."²¹ In what appeared as a shocking lack of caution to Eden, Roosevelt proceeded to tell the same thing to Litvinov.

In a further effort to forestall an English-Russian agreement, Roosevelt sent his close advisor, Harry Hopkins, and General Marshall in April to Britain to propose a second front in France. According to Robert Sherwood the purpose of the offer was to "take the heat off Russia's diplomatic demands upon England."²² However, Molotov was sent to

Britain to sign the agreement before the second front idea could be discussed further. This forced Roosevelt to the extreme, threatening to publicly disassociate the U.S. from the treaty. The British caved in and asked that territorial questions be eliminated from the treaty. Molotov agreed in what has been subsequently interpreted as a sign of Soviet willingness to compromise, but what was more probably a realization that in the face of Anglo-American unity, the cause was lost. The Anglo-Russian treaty was signed on May 26th, 1942. Ciechanowski reported the relief of Hull at the outcome and also the large amount of praise Polish-American organizations gave to the Administration for its success.²³

The American hesitancy about the Polish, and Balkan, questions was clearly due in part to a fear of the reaction ethnic Americans might express at the polls. As Herbert Fels, former State Department advisor and participant at Yalta, put it:²⁴

The American government was not tied to Poland by as strong bonds of common cause and experience [as were the British]. But other strands moved it to uphold the independence of Poland and the Polish Government in Exile. Most Poles were orthodox Catholics and the Catholic clergy in the United States cherished the connection and the flock. Also millions of Americans of Polish origin were excitedly intent on the restoration of Polish independence and had deep personal or transmitted memories of Russian oppression of their former home.

In August 1943, at the Quebec Conference, Churchill and the President discussed the difficulty of developing a

working relationship with Russia because of domestic public opinion. Roosevelt felt that "Pro-Soviet sentiment in America was superficial and would have to be force-fed."²⁵ Ambassador Ciechanowski reported that Roosevelt was not as convinced of Russia as he pretended publicly. The President "was well aware and apprehensive of the implications of Soviet expansion and said that he kept his fingers crossed."²⁶ Thus, feeling compelled to sell Russia to a hesitant American public, Roosevelt felt hemmed in by his own propaganda. In response to Ciechanowski's expressions of concern, Hopkins put the matter bluntly in the summer of 1943. Hopkins admitted that the President had "felt compelled by circumstances since 1941 to sell Russia to a somewhat reluctant American people. To get them to 'buy' Russia as an ally at the fancy price imposed by a then-uncertain war situation, he had to boost her by means of superlatives current in American commercial advertisements. Under the circumstances he could not well afford, at the time, to weaken deliberately the purposely inspired pro-Soviet trend of public opinion. And he would probably run for re-election within a year."²⁷ Roosevelt urged the Polish Government in Exile to tone down their expressions lest they stir up anti-Soviet protests among the six million Polish-Americans.²⁸ George F. Kennan relates, from another perspective, the fate of anti-Soviet critics: "People who tried to point to unpleasant facts in the record of Soviet diplomacy or to voice doubt about the political intentions of the Soviet leaders, were apt to find themselves brusquely put in their places - sometimes even charged with disrupting Allied unity

and sabotaging the War effort." 29

On the opening of the Teheran Conference, the British efforts to reach a final settlement on Poland were again opposed by the Americans. In his memoirs Anthony Eden related that, "A difficulty is that Americans are terrified of the subject which Harry [Hopkins] called 'political dynamite' for their elections." 30 Eden singled out Roosevelt's attitude specifically. 31

President Roosevelt was reserved to the point of being unhelpful[sic]. He mentioned his political difficulties to us, but it was not until long afterwards that I learned he had also explained them to Stalin. He told the Marshal that for electoral reasons he could not take part in any discussion on Poland for another year, nor be publicly associated with any arrangement.

Robert Sherwood supports Eden's assessment of Roosevelt's attitude. In a private talk with Stalin and Molotov, the President tried to overcome what he saw as appalling ignorance on the part of the Russians about the realities

American politics. "Roosevelt felt it necessary to point out that there were six or seven million Americans of Polish origin and others of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian origin. They had the same rights, the same votes as anyone else and whose opinions must be respected." 32

When the military strategy was finalized at Teheran, there was no hope of Western forces reaching Eastern Europe first. Churchill vainly tried to win approval for a Balkan campaign. Washington, never warm to the idea, saw the plan shelved in favor of a second front in France. The final

agreement required a withdrawal of troops from Italy for the invasion.³³ Thus the Russians were given a free hand in Eastern Europe. Churchill and Roosevelt reached a compromise with Stalin over Poland by proposing that Russian territorial acquisitions in Poland be compensated by giving Poland parts of Germany up to the Oder River; in effect moving Poland several hundred miles to the west. This compromise, as Kennan had noted, made Poland dependent upon Russian protection from German irredentism.³⁴

In short, American policy makers succeeded only in delaying the Polish issue in hopes of keeping the question from damaging their domestic political base. When the issue came up again at Yalta, the U.S. avoided the territorial question and focused on the political questions of freedom and the nature of the Polish government. However by this time the Soviet Union held unilateral control by virtue of occupation. Roosevelt's chances then lay in maintaining Soviet cooperation and subsequent participation in the United Nations where the U.S., a dominant member, could air these differences before world opinion. Meanwhile, the President was obliged to rely on vague statements of principle which all partners could use for their own ends. Unfortunately Roosevelt died, and his vision and accommodating methods were not at all shared by his successor, Harry Truman, and the men he collected around him.

Of no minor importance in the matter was the delay in opening a second front to relieve pressure on the Russians.

The delay of the front until 1944 not only made the West late-comers to the continent but created, in Kennan's words, "a pervasive feeling of inadequacy and guilt", at being obliged to sit idle while Russia faced the German onslaught.³⁵ The result was that the "natural distaste" with which U.S. leaders regarded Russian territorial demands was gradually eroded.³⁶ In the final analysis, however, Kennan's assessment of Roosevelt's attitude is parallel to those of Eden and Sherwood.³⁷

But one does not get - at least I do not - the impression that Roosevelt had any substantive objections - any real political objections - to seeing these areas go to Russia, or indeed that he cared much about the issue for its own sake. One gets the impression that it seemed to him of little importance whether these areas were Polish or Russian. His anxiety was rather that he had a large body of voting constituents in the country of Polish or Baltic origin and a further number who sympathized with the Poles, and he simply did not want the issue to become a factor in domestic politics which could make trouble for his wartime leadership of the country.

By 1945 Russia was no longer in danger of defeat herself and could approach the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences from positions of great strength. Russian drives into Eastern Europe were the only major allied victories in Europe. In the Asian theater, Washington considered Russian participation crucial.³⁸ A last humiliation the West was forced to endure occurred on the eve of Yalta, December 16th, 1944, when German forces attacked in the Ardennes, routed the Americans and British and threatened a reconquest of Belgium. Churchill had to request the Russian offensive be launched ahead of

schedule to relieve the Western front, a favor for which Roosevelt and Churchill sent expressions of gratitude.³⁹

By Malta, the Russians were within one hundred miles of Berlin and victorious while the British and Americans appeared to be barely coping. On Eden at least the events had what he later described as a demoralizing effect, convincing him that the power position was now in Stalin's favor.⁴⁰

In realistic terms, this meant the United States simply could neither stop Russian actions nor promote anything the Soviets chose to oppose in Eastern Europe. It is not clear, however, that the U.S. even considered Eastern Europe's fate to be high on its list of priorities: Russian participation in the United Nations and in the war with Japan were more pressing, not to mention the necessity to agree upon the treatment of the defeated German state. The main issue involving Eastern Europe was Poland and the composition of its government. Yet here again the Soviets held the advantages. Time and circumstances were with them; they needed no agreement. On July 26th, 1944, Kennan, at Hariman's request, gave his views on Poland, writing "They will not be inclined to go far out of their way either for the Poles or for us."⁴¹ In January, Kennan stated that the border agreement made at Teheran "makes unrealistic the idea of a free and independent Poland."⁴²

Britain's commitment to Poland was motivated by the fact that the issue of Polish independence brought the English into the war - her honor was at stake.⁴³ Russia viewed Poland

as a highway of destruction, travelled twice in a generation by the Germans against Mother Russia, her security was at stake.⁴⁴ The United States viewed Poland in terms of domestic politics - the credibility of her President was at stake. On February 6th, Churchill recounted⁴⁵

The President opened discussion by saying that, coming from America, he had a rather distant view on the Polish question. There were five or six million Poles in the United States, mostly of the second generation, and most of them were generally in favor of the Curzon line. ... As he said at Teheran it would make it easier on him if the Soviet Government would make some concession. ... General opinion in the United States was against recognizing the Lublin Government because it represented only a small section of Poland and the Polish nation.

On February 9th, Roosevelt reiterated his problem by saying it was "very important for him in the U.S. that there be some gesture made for the six million Poles there [at Yalta]..."⁴⁶ The final agreement called for a reorganization of the Lublin regime to include London representatives and a pledge to hold free elections by secret ballot. Final determination of the border question was again postponed to await the peace conference. Having left the border issue unsettled the Americans placed great emphasis on the government and elections. Churchill quotes Roosevelt as saying, "The elections must be above criticism, like Caesar's wife. I want some kind of assurance to give the world and I don't want anyone to be able to question their purity. It is a matter of good politics rather than principle."⁴⁷

Aside from Poland, the other East European countries received relatively little attention. They were covered by the Declaration of a Liberated Europe in which, in the key section, the allies agreed:⁴⁸

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis Satellite State in Europe where in their judgement conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace, (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples, (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people, and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general wellbeing for all mankind.

In reality, the West was without influence in the area. Although British and American representatives were put on the Allied Control Commissions, the Soviet Union was given defacto control. The only restriction being that unilateral actions could not be taken in the name of the Commission.⁴⁹ The declaration served the purpose of delaying inter-allied disputes from arising before Germany was finally defeated. It amounted to an ambiguous collection of principles which could be interpreted by all parties according to their respective choices. By requiring only that the Allies consult when circumstances required, the principle of unanimity was established, allowing any one of the three powers to veto

any action not deemed in their respective interest. This was in line with the operative procedure set during the war; they could consult when they perceived a problem and act when they derived a policy. The future of Eastern Europe however, was by no means settled or even changed fundamentally from what it already was. The real situation of Russian military control was masked.

Ironically, the cause of its ultimate failure was also the reason for its success, i.e. ambiguity. Yalta may be viewed not as an attempt at agreement, but an attempt to bury basic disagreements. Common interests were found in vague talk. To those who shared the Rooseveltian vision, Yalta was a triumph. Harry Hopkins entered in his diary: "We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years."⁵⁰ Churchill was less elated, viewing it merely as the best obtainable under the circumstances.⁵¹ The more conservative members of the President's retinue, however, saw the Yalta declaration as ambiguous and dangerous. Forrestal quotes Admiral Leahy as saying he thought the agreements were susceptible to two interpretations.⁵² Roosevelt's attitude is rather more difficult to determine, but Herbert Feis' summation indicates that his long held feeling of the inevitability of Russian control of the area remained unshaken by Yalta. "He [Roosevelt] recognized that Russia had the power to grasp whatever parts of Central and Eastern Europe it wanted. But he planned to try to get it

to abstain from doing so, by making the resultant world reaction clear."⁵³ It soon became apparent that the Soviets intended to do precisely as they pleased in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt in a telegram of concern to Stalin on March 29th, 1945, attempted again to win Stalin over by the method Feis suggests. He said the decisions at Yalta had been accepted with enthusiasm by the people of the world and now, "Precisely because of the hopes and expectations that these decisions raised their fulfillment is now being followed with the greatest attention. We have no right to let them be disappointed."⁵⁴

Nevertheless, when the Allies found themselves in control of large portions of German territory assigned to Russian Armies, Truman insisted on honoring Roosevelt's wartime agreements and withdrew the troops despite Churchill's urging that their position be used as a bargaining tool with the Russians.⁵⁵ Truman effected the removal before Potsdam thus closing the last opportunity to participate in the fate of Eastern Europe.

President Truman's leadership was a sharp contrast to that of his predecessor. According to Herbert Feis, Truman⁵⁶

...entered office April 12, 1945, ungroomed and untutored. Little attention had been paid to the Vice President. In casual mention Roosevelt had tended to disparage him. He had not been asked to take part in conferences about foreign affairs or brought in touch with foreign statesmen or military leaders."

Nor did the new President share Roosevelt's penchant and talent for accommodation and compromise. Because he entered office so poorly prepared, he was at first dependent upon his advisors. His natural hard liner proclivity meant that he soon came to be more agreeable to the advice of those in Roosevelt's administration who had urged a strategy of assistance to the Soviet Union: such men as Acheson, Leahy and Stettineus. Truman attempted to carry out the policy of Roosevelt from an entirely different perspective. He interpreted the Yalta Declaration rigidly and took the view that it was a solid contract. He shifted from a flexible diplomacy of compromise to one of confrontation.

Upon taking office, Truman received a special briefing report from Secretary of State Stettineus on the state of U.S.-Soviet Relations and its effect on public opinion.⁵⁷

Since the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Government has taken a firm and uncompromising position on nearly every major question that has arisen in our relations. ... The present situation in Poland is highly unsatisfactory. ... because of its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union and other United Nations and upon public opinion in this country, the question of the future status of Poland and its Government remains one of our most complex and urgent problems both in the international and domestic field.

Ambassador Harriman returned, quickly, from Moscow with the ominous view that the United States was faced with a "barbarian invasion of Europe."⁵⁸ As Truman recounted in his memoirs, Harriman believed that a workable relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union "would require a

reconstruction of our policy, and the abandonment of any illusion that the Soviet Government was likely soon to act in accordance with the principle to which the rest of the world held in international affairs." 59 Harriman added the comment that American generosity and cooperative spirit were viewed by the Kremlin as softness.

On April 22nd, less than a fortnight after taking office, Truman precipitated a confrontation with the Soviets over Poland. In his meeting with Molotov at Blair House, Truman raised the question of Malta and put it, as he said later, in terms of American public opinion. 60

I wanted to bring up at this point that the most difficult question relating to the Crimea decision was the Polish matter. The proper solution was of great importance because of the effect on American public opinion.

On the 23rd the President met with his advisers prior to the second meeting with Molotov. Harriman reported that the Russian's good spirits had evaporated overnight and the evening meeting which included Eden was deadlocked. Stettinius added that it had been made plain to Molotov how seriously the U.S. regarded this matter and how public confidence would be shaken by failure to carry out the Crimea decision." 61 The President's reaction was sharp, according to Forrestal who was in attendance and who had urged a tough approach. 62

The President said that he felt our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street and that he could not continue it was now or never. He intended to go on with plans for San Francisco and if the Russians didn't wish to join us they could go to hell.

that followed between Molotov and the President has been well recorded by most historians of American Foreign Policy. Truman bluntly told the shocked Russian, "I ain't out your business." 3 He looked at through the new American, who had ended the possibility of Soviet participation in the United Nations, a risk Truman was willing to take that would have preferred to avoid. To smooth the disturbance, Truman decided Marshall take credit for the idea to dispatch the willing Mr. Hopkins to Moscow for a personal talk with Stalin. 4 A Roosevelt's former adviser, Hopkins was a well-known advocate of Russian-American friendship.

Hopkins' mission to Moscow in May, 1947, included a rehearsal of Frank's account to Stalin of the relationship between the Foreign question and public opinion, and the seriousness with which perceived shifts in public attitude were taken by Washington. 5 It is less important to this study whether these perceptions were accurate than it is to realize that decisions were taken on the basis of those perceptions. The topic was so important that Hopkins gave it number one priority on his private agenda of topics to discuss with the Marshal. 6 Hopkins proceeded to tell Stalin, 65

Two months ago there had been overwhelming sympathy among the American people for the Soviet Union and complete support for President Roosevelt's policies which the Marshal knew so well. . . . The American people at that time hoped and confidently believed that the two countries could work together in peace as well as war. . . . He said he did not intend to discuss the small minority fearists and the

"McFormicks"] but to discuss the general state of American opinion and particularly the present attitude of millions of Americans who had supported President Roosevelt's policy in regard to the Soviet Union. ... He said he wished to assure the Marshal, with all the earnestness at his command that this body of American public opinion who had been the constant support of the Roosevelt policies were seriously disturbed about the relationship with Russia. In fact in the last six weeks deterioration of public opinion had been so serious as to affect adversely the relations between our two countries. ... He said that for the moment he was not going into the reasons why this had occurred or the merits of the case, but merely wished to emphasize that it was a fact. ... Mr. Hopkins said that it was not simple or easy to put a finger on the precise reasons for this deterioration, but he must emphasize that without the support of public opinion and particularly the supporters of President Roosevelt it would be very difficult for President Truman to carry forward President Roosevelt's policy. He said in a country like ours, public opinion is affected by specific incidents and in this case the deterioration of public opinion in regard to our relations with the Soviet Union had been centered in our inability to carry out the Yalta agreement on Poland.

President Truman compromised the Polish issue through the Hopkins mission and recognized the Polish Government, but he did not relent on his attempts to weaken Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.

Potsdam might well be viewed as the last attempt to resolve the political differences arising from what had been a purely military alliance. President Truman, in putting forth his requirements for fulfillment of the Yalta agreements, in effect accused the Russians of violating them. He demanded (1) the reorganization of the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, (2) to include all democratic elements and (3) that free elections be held.⁶⁶ And, like Roosevelt

at Yalta, the new President went to the summit keenly aware of its domestic importance. At the fifth plenary session, discussing Poland, Truman "pointed out that the United States" is very much interested in the Polish elections. There are six million Poles in the United States. A free election in Poland reported by a free press would make it much easier to deal with these Polish people."

Volotov responded to Truman by calling for the reorganization of the governments of the former Axis states and to cite the Italian and Greek cases as models for Rumania and Bulgaria. The Russians simply analogized their actions in Eastern Europe with that of the West elsewhere. Truman was furious at the tactic and threatened at one point to go home. All that was settled concerning Poland was the Eastern boundary. No date for elections was established and in any event only "anti-Nazi" parties were to be permitted to contest them. The control commissions for Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania were reorganized and Italy was admitted to the U.N.⁶⁸ The important result of Potsdam was the creation of the Council of Ministers whose job it would be to draft the peace treaties with the former enemy states. The drafting, however, was to be done only between former enemies. Thus, the big three would collide again in drafting documents for the Balkans, while France and the big three would settle with Italy and Britain and Russia with Finland. This arrangement eliminated the pro-western governments of France and China from influence in Eastern Europe.

The Americans actually had little with which to move the Russians at Potsdam beyond Stalin's desire to have the puppet regimes recognized. That lever, however, was not available to Truman due to his public stands on the Yalta Declaration and his perception of the probable domestic consequences. His reaction to the conference was in line with his initial attitudes. He was now convinced that "the Russians were planning world conquest." 69

It may be, as others have attempted to establish, that the "real" American motives for wishing to participate in Eastern European affairs were economic, but that does not alter the fact that the public positions concerned the political character of those states and were couched in terms of freedom vs. tyranny. 70 Washington was unwilling to take any action in which it would appear to be legitimizing the Soviet presence, or the results of that presence, in Eastern Europe and thereby be vulnerable to the accusation that it had abandoned the wartime principles upon which participation in the war had been justified. The Soviet presence was therefore as much a threat to U.S. ideals as to its security.

The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers took place in London, September, 1945. Molotov pressed for a simple reaffirmation of the armistice terms signed with the Balkan states. Secretary of State Byrnes refused on the ground that these regimes were constituted in violation of Yalta. The meeting ended in utter deadlock and made the

East-West split public. On October 27th, 1945, in Central Park, President Truman delivered a speech in which he set the public tone of the U.S.-Soviet conflict in highly moralistic terms of honor and principle. 71

The foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice. In carrying out these principles we shall firmly adhere to what we believe to be right; and we shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil.

We went on to list point by point the "fundamentals of American foreign policy". As these related to Eastern Europe, Truman presented the U.S. stand as essentially altruistic. 72

- 1) We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation.
- 2) We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.
- 3) We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.
- 4) We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.
- 5) We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression and freedom of religion throughout the peace loving areas of the world.

Despite Truman's tough posture, the Council of Foreign Ministers was still supposed to meet every three months. Secretary Byrnes suggested a special meeting in Moscow in an attempt to get around the impasse. This was a fateful trip. He travelled to Moscow without Republican representatives which made him vulnerable to partisan attack later. Moreover,

he proceeded to accept the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania in a direct contradiction of Truman's public stand. In return for this and a proposed Joint Allied Control Commission for Japan, Stalin promised a liberalization of the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments and prompt elections. Another meeting of the Council was set for May, 1946. In his memoirs, Truman is careful to separate himself from this compromise by claiming the agreements were publicly released without his having seen them and without his approval.⁷³ The President marked his break with Byrnes from that time. In a reprimand, delivered personally, Truman reiterated the principles of the October speech. Terming Russian actions in Bulgaria, Rumania, Iran and Poland an "outrage", Truman resolved to be tougher still.⁷⁴

Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand - how many divisions do you have. I do not think we should play compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements; we should let our position be known on Iran in no uncertain terms and we should continue to insist on the internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube water-way and the Black Sea Straights and we should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific. ... I'm tired of babying the Soviets.

In January, George F. Kennan sent a long dispatch outlining the strategy and rationale for the hardline policy toward the Soviet Union. Navy Secretary Forrestal viewed the report very warmly because it coincided with his own views.⁷⁵ Kennan was recalled for consultation in Washington. Two and a half months later, former Prime Minister Churchill delivered his now famous "Iron Curtain" speech at

Fulton, Missouri, to which Stalin replied by comparing him to Hitler.

The motivation for the get tough policy did not spring entirely from Truman's personality. It was undoubtedly influenced by an expression of public sentiment in the form of a Republican Congress in 1946. They began to demand that Truman deliver on Roosevelt's promises. In 1946 Truman's popularity had reached its lowest level up to that time. The Republicans swept the House of Representatives for the first time since 1930, winning it by a fifty-eight seat margin.

The Republican attack on Democratic foreign policy had been building up for some time and it centered on Russian control of Eastern Europe. The Republican National Committee rhetorically called on the President to do as much for Poland as he was doing for Iran.⁷⁶ In December, House and Senate Republicans issued a joint policy statement attacking Truman over Eastern Europe.⁷⁷

We believe in fulfilling to the greatest possible degree our war pledges to small nations that they shall have the right to choose the form of government under which they shall live and that sovereign rights of self government shall be restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We deplore any desertion of these principles.

Secretary Byrnes complained in a Cabinet luncheon that Dulles and Vandenberg should no longer be regarded as bipartisan because, "Vandenberg found his position unsatisfactory and was looking for a way out, mainly on the ground that he was being accused by his Senate colleagues at home as having turned an appeaser."⁷⁸ Vandenberg later delivered two

separate attacks on Truman's foreign policy.⁷⁹

The situation calls for patience and good will, it does not call for vacillation. ... There is a line beyond which compromise cannot go, even if we crossed that line under the pressures of the exigencies of war.

In February, 1946, Vandenberg made a direct attack on Byrnes' leadership, saying that to live in harmony with the Soviet Union, the U.S. must: "abandon the miserable fiction, often encouraged by our fellow travellers, that we somehow jeopardize the peace if our candor is as firm as Russia's always is, and if we assume a moral leadership which we have too frequently allowed to lapse."⁸⁰ The following evening Byrnes delivered a speech in which he attempted to re-establish the weakening bipartisanship by echoing Vandenberg's hardline: "We cannot stand aloof if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the [United Nations] Charter. America is a great power and we must act as a great power."⁸¹ Byrnes' attempt to soothe the Republicans, and perhaps his President, was successful. He invited Senators Connolly and Vandenberg to accompany him to the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in April.

The attacks by the Republicans were probably motivated by a variety of things, but Professor Bradford Westerfield thinks the G.O.P. was attempting to capitalize on the growing frustration and unrest "among groups of East European and Catholic background who would normally vote Democratic."⁸² Professor Normal Graebner agrees, writing that

the Republican "posture of toughness toward Russia permitted Republican leadership to identify itself with the normally Democratic urban groups of East European and Catholic background. Herein lay the chief significance of the Soviet issue in American politics."

The sensitivity which the leaders of American foreign policy displayed toward the feelings of Eastern European ethnic and Catholic groups has been a constant theme throughout this period. Their role, and the general state of American opinion therefore deserves some individual attention.

There exist in the United States large groups of citizens who share the loyalties, aspirations and hatreds of ethnic groups which are influenced by American foreign policy. This fact is well documented throughout the literature of American politics. The fact that decision makers responsible for making American foreign policy are, in V.C. Key's words, "profoundly conditioned by the necessities of maintaining political support at home" is also well established. It remains for us to describe the function of this relationship as it existed between the Truman administration, or more accurately the Democratic party, and the American ethnic groups of Eastern European origin.

There is little doubt that the principle decision makers of the Truman administration were aware of this relationship. They were explicitly advised of the impact of ethnic attitudes on U.S.-Soviet relations prior to Potsdam. C.K. Houston,

State Department Division Head for Southern European Affairs, very plainly stated the reason for the centrality of the issue of Eastern Europe to American political leaders. In a memorandum just prior to Potsdam, Houston stated, ⁸⁴

During this period [of Russian control of Eastern Europe] relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will remain tense in spite of all efforts of the United States Government. This for the simple reason that in the population of the United States there are many millions of Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Lithuanians, Latvians, Finns who ... cannot see with complete indifference what is going on with their brothers, cousins, parents, or other relatives in their home country. They will even without wanting it, move public opinion in the United States and make it sensitive toward the policy of Soviet Russia in their national States. There will be no way to prevent this.

During and after the war the pressure of these groups was acutely felt in Washington. The State Department was in fact obliged to maintain close contact with them. This may have been for purposes of control, but the point is they were perceived as important. ⁸⁵ Americans of East Europe origin or descent were highly active in attempting to influence foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. The various groups formed an over-all organization called the Federation of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent. Headquartered in Washington D.C., it co-operated closely with another organization called Peasant-International, established by refugee political leaders from Eastern Europe. According to Gabriel Almond, "they advocate a liberal immigration program for displaced persons and a strong anti-Communist policy in the East European area." ⁸⁶ The co-ordinating

committee of the Polish-American Association was particularly militant on the Eastern European issue, calling for withdrawal of recognition from all Soviet dominated countries and re-recognition of the governments-in-exile.⁸⁷ Almond concluded that "Soviet Orbit Ethnic Stock" groups often interfere with a balanced appraisal of American interests.⁸⁸

The organized lobbying activity of these groups however, is not their most important source of power. What actually counts is their tendency to shift voting preferences.

V.O. Key thinks this factor is far more important in accounting for their influence: "Such groups do some lobbying, but the volatility of their electoral preferences assures a respectful consideration of their sentiments by politicians even without a reminder from the lobby."⁸⁹ Thus the crucial weight of the Ethnic Americans falls on the President in the form of domestic support for his party expressed in reaction to his foreign policies. Louis Gerson notes that political parties regularly seek ethnic support at the polls and this results in subjecting the President to their pressure. In foreign policy especially, he thought their influence was growing.⁹⁰ The opinions of two noted students of American politics supported these observations. Thomas Bailey put the relationship between ethnic opinion and foreign policy perhaps too colorfully.⁹¹

America is a land of pressure groups, and among the more powerful and militant organizations are those formed by hyphenates to promote some foreign cause. In many instances the hyphenated American minorities are better organized to achieve their

special purposes than are native American majorities. It is not unusual for the Washington government, under such compulsion, to make decisions that are more conducive to the interests of foreigners than of Americans.

Finally, V.C. Key expressed the unique nature of this phenomenon and its operation: ⁹²

The existence in the U.S. of large blocs of immigrants and their immediate descendants with ties of sentiment and loyalty to their homelands has provided bases for a type of voting behavior perhaps peculiar among the great democracies. A line of foreign policy favorable to the old country may attract the zealous support of those psychologically attached to their fellow countrymen abroad. The same policy may drive from a party other groups whose ancestry runs to nations not favored by the Administration's foreign policy.

In addition to their numbers, ethnic Americans are also concentrated overwhelmingly in cities and enjoy an intricate and well-established social and institutional life that preserves their attitudes and voting patterns over time. ⁹³ It was in the cities, of course, that the Roosevelt Democratic majority was centered. Samuel Lubell has shown that Roosevelt could have won the 1936 election without the urban ethnic vote - though he had it by a wide margin. But by 1940 his city-based ethnic support was crucial to his victory, supplying him with 212 electoral votes. ⁹⁴ These immigrants, by the forties, had emerged as a new majority concentrated in northern cities and providing a base for the long-running Democratic "Roosevelt coalition". Consequently the Democrats have shown themselves to be increasingly more "alive" as Lubell put it, to the needs and aspirations of the "new immigrants". ⁹⁵ The fact that ethnic people shift their vote

rapidly when their interests are abandoned is illustrated by the 1940 election. Roosevelt's heaviest losses were among rural German and Italian wards where there was great resentment against his pro-British stand. However, he was more than compensated for these losses by support from urban Poles, Jews and Czechs who had reason to support his anti-Nazi position. Polish wards in Buffalo, for example, went nine to one with individual precincts recording landslide as high as twenty to one for the President - his heaviest support anywhere in the country.⁹⁶ The same effect rebounded against the Democrats in 1944, but this will be dealt with later. Although Roosevelt managed largely to avoid the East European issue in 1944, studies show that he lost some ethnic support in the cities, particularly among Poles and Yugoslavs. The reason given was fear that Roosevelt might not protect their homelands from the Soviet Union.⁹⁷

The impact of the East European Americans was multiplied by the fact that they were also overwhelmingly Catholic and so enjoyed the support of many of their non-ethnic Catholic neighbors. They enjoyed a mutual affiliation with the twenty-five million Catholics in the U.S. in 1940.⁹⁸ That Roosevelt was sensitive to this block goes without question. Sherwood states that Roosevelt was always careful whenever religious questions were at stake.⁹⁹ The East European ethnics profited by their Catholicism under the New Deal. In what Lubell calls the "Roosevelt revolution on

American Catholicism. The traditional Irish-Catholic political hierarchy was to a large extent replaced by Italians and Poles.¹⁰⁰ As for the Church, the New Deal angered in two elements viewed with hostility. The first was a growth in the Trade Union Movement which tended to weaken the Church's authority and offer an alternative political basis. The Church organized the Association of Catholic Trade Unions (A.C.T.U.) to counter what it feared was socialism among its flock. Second, the Soviet Union's rise from unrecognized enemy to wartime ally was never wholly accepted by the Church. The fact that the friendship proved to be short-lived was a "powerful spiritual asset" according to Lubell. "The Church hierarchy has clearly interpreted the present world crisis as a challenge to reaffirm the all pervasive character of the moral doctrines of the Church and to establish Catholicism as the irreconcilable 'we or they' alternative to 'atheistic communism.'"¹⁰¹ This basic hostility was exploited by ethnic groups during the war, particularly the Polish government in exile and the Polish-American organizations. The Polish news agency served seven radio stations, twenty periodicals and 124 daily newspapers. There was also a Polish-Catholic press agency which published special material for American Catholics.¹⁰² Catholic support for the Democrats was always militant, particularly among lower income groups, but it had also been uneven. Roosevelt enjoyed overwhelming Catholic voter support, yet Truman suffered heavily in the 1946 Congressional elections because of Catholic desertion. Lubell states

this was partly due to the issue of supposed Communist influence within the Party. Truman's recovery in 1945 may

be partially explained by his having assumed a public hard-line stand against Russia and by having eliminated Wallace and his "isolationist" followers from the Democratic Party. 103

After Malta and Potsdam, the hostility of the United States to realize the hopes for cooperation with Russia grew with the seeming permanence of Soviet control in Eastern Europe intensified the hostility of the Catholics and ethnic groups. Charles Rozanek, President of the Polish-American Congress, denounced Malta as a "docile submission to Russia's demands for all the lands seized during the partition of Poland as a German collaborator". 104

The following day, the National Council of Americans of Polish descent sent telegrams protesting Malta to each U.S. Senator urging them to oppose "the fifth partition of Poland". 105

A few weeks later, in March, the Co-ordinating Committee of the American-Polish Association called for an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into the "intolerable conditions in Poland", that is the Russian liquidation of democratic Polish leaders. 106

The same group also sent President Truman a message urging him to resist the "puppet" Polish regime and bar it from the United Nations. 107

On May 20th, Polish-American organizations along with six other Eastern European ethnic organizations rallied in New York to hear speeches supporting independence in Eastern Europe. Both Democrat and Republican politicians spoke, but

the keynote speaker was, significantly, the Republican Robert Taft. Taft attacked the boundary decision and advocated economic and moral pressure be applied to the Soviet Union: "Certainly we cannot and should not go to war with Russia, but we can take our stand firmly on the principles of international justice and unless we do the San Francisco Conference is a futile gesture."¹⁰⁸

The Pope did not remain aloof from the East European issue either. The continued intervention of Rome in Eastern Europe is understandable and probably functioned in tightening the bond between East European Americans and other Catholics. On June 3rd, Pius XII stated to the College of Cardinals that small nations which have, "sustained their share of suffering in order to overthrow a system of brutal violence are entitled to refuse to accept a new political or cultural system which is decisively rejected by the great majority of their people."¹⁰⁹

As we have noted, 1945 produced increasing frustrations for the West as the full implications of Russian permanence in Eastern Europe began to be realized. Secretary Byrnes' attempt at resuming negotiations in Moscow in December 1945, though successful in that respect, was received as appeasement in the U.S. and constituted an acute embarrassment to Truman who, weeks before, had taken a public stand of principled toughness. The Polish-American Congress headquarters in Washington reacted quickly to the Moscow meeting by calling on Truman to employ economic sanctions against the Soviets to

prevent her from "destroying the world". 110

Precisely how much influence the Eastern European ethnic and Catholic militancy had on the Truman Administration is difficult to estimate, but the President was aware of its presence, bringing the matter up through Hopkins to Stalin, and later at Potsdam. He, along with his advisors, realized that: 1) to continue the policy of compromise and negotiation established by Roosevelt would be met with criticism and create political problems for the Democrats, and 2) a set tough policy would be welcomed by most (with the exception of the Wallace-ites) and win Republican support while taking the wind out of their political sails. A less than firm policy was not indicated. It is safe to conclude, we think, that the hostility expressed by these well organized Catholic and ethnic groups was a motivation to Truman, and Roosevelt before him, in denying the Russian control of Eastern Europe as a political fact.

Lawrence Fuchs found that the Republicans in the 1952 election had succeeded in winning a large proportion of the Irish and Southern European Catholic vote by placing blame for the post-war successes of Communism on the Democrats. He stated that: 111

The Polish lathe operator who knew his economic interests when he saw them in 1948 did not find the Taft-Hartley issue so compelling when he had a chance to punish the perpetrators of Yalta in 1952. The Irish Catholic milkman who thought well of Harry Truman in 1948 could not forgive him four years later for his stubbornness in sticking with Secretary of State Acheson. ... Irish Catholic and Polish Catholic voters switched more sharply from their Democratic affiliation than any other group.

Whereas in 1940, 49% of the Catholic vote went to the Democrats and only 25% to the Republicans, in 1952 it was evenly divided at 42% and 41% respectively.¹¹²

Immediately after the death of Roosevelt and the imminent defeat of the Axis, President Truman had expressed confidence in the possibility of continued co-operation with the Soviet Union. When Western and Eastern Allied fronts met in Germany, the President released a message in which he declared: "Nations which can plan and fight together shoulder to shoulder in the face of such obstacles of distance and of language and of communications as we have overcome can live together and can work together in the common labor of the organization of the world for peace."¹¹³ In an effort to maintain an atmosphere conducive to good relations, even after his blow up with Molotov, Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow who tried to explain quite frankly the bind the President felt himself to be in. He also, through Ambassador Davies, urged Churchill to consent to a private meeting between himself and Stalin in a further attempt to establish some mutual understanding.¹¹⁴ One of the last statements the President was to make favoring allied unity was associated with the surrender of Japan. He veritably bubbled over with enthusiasm stating that America wanted "peace and happiness" for all nations "and that perhaps now the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount could be put into effect."¹¹⁵

In a matter of weeks, however, Truman adopted a more petulant and openly aggressive stand vis-à-vis the Russians. As early as the conclusion of the Potsdam conference, the President became convinced that the Russians were not really concerned with peace and that "force is the only thing they understand".¹¹⁶ From that point on, as his address in New York and rebuke of Byrnes' efforts demonstrate, Truman proceeded to stand on principle and abandon efforts at compromise. During 1946 and 1947, especially in the wake of the 1946 elections, Truman became tougher still. The 1946 Republican dominated Congress shared little of Roosevelt's enthusiasm for conciliation and compromise toward the Soviet Union. Moreover, their criticisms threatened to eat into the Democrat's solid base of support among Catholic and East European Americans. Truman, like Roosevelt, could not afford to ignore the voting power of millions of East European Americans, not to mention the twenty-five million Catholics, who needed no prodding to express their consistent opposition to Russian domination in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt had avoided the consequences in the election of 1944 (in a way Truman could not in 1946) by standing on principle and postponing territorial settlements. Truman stood on principle, to be sure, but time had run out for him.

Looking back on the period, then, one can see that the early optimism of the post-war alliance was replaced by concern and apprehension. The root of the perceived threat

to American ideals and security was publicly couched in terms of the Soviet Union exclusively. This obviously is not unreasonable. One can identify several specific events which contributed to the re-emergence of American hostility toward Russia. Although such events have been noted and analyzed in many works, it remains that disagreement at Yalta, over Poland and Eastern Europe, was the first (and the most long-standing) cause of manifestation of American-Russian tensions.

America's stand on principle was motivated to a significant extent by an unwillingness to run afoul of the urban-ethnic-Catholic vote which had become such an important element in the Democratic coalition. Truman ended up in the uncomfortable position of convincing the American people that he was tough and steadfast, not an appeaser, while at the same time promising to carry out action based upon the principles which had at first justified American participation in the war and were quickly becoming tests of the worthiness of her very existence.

The abrupt change in the attitudes of the nation's leaders, particularly that of its president, from conciliation to hostility, from "trust to terror" as Herbert Feis entitled his book on the period, had a telling effect on public opinion. Truman's pronouncements reinforced the public's belief in American ability to control events. The Administration equated compromise with appeasement and vowed to

check Soviet aggression and subversion. A prepared and firm United States, guided by its principles, could put an end to the tyranny and chaos which, as Truman said in March, 1947, was being forced on unwilling people by alien minorities. Professor Athan Theoharis has studied Truman's style very carefully and has concluded that,¹¹⁷

President Truman's manner of defining the objectives of American policy radically altered the rhetoric of American politics, that Truman's statements and decisions structured the national security debate, affecting the understanding of the American public and thus their expectations and fears. It is true that public attitudes, already anti-communist, were altered by the events around which controversy sharpened - Soviet foreign policy and subversion. But the emotional anti-Communism of the post-war years was sharpened by Truman's depiction of Soviet motives and U.S. policy options, his portrayal of U.S. actions as wholly altruistic and his preference for military power over accommodation.

Other historians of different intellectual persuasions than Professor Theoharis have reached the same conclusion. Professor Norman Graebner, historian of American diplomacy, wrote concerning Eastern Europe: "[e]t within the new rhetoric lay eventual tragedy, for it convinced too many Americans that there was some special power in words and created the illusion that the choices before the nation in its negotiations with the Soviet Union were much broader than the presence of Red armies in all regions of dispute suggested."¹¹⁸ Herbert Feis reached a similar conclusion when commenting on the style of the letter of reproof Truman read to Secretary Byrnes: "Peremptorily, it may be said, that were the objectives set down by Truman as 'shoulds'

to be the gauge of the success or failure of his Administration, it ... would have to be judged in many respects a failure". 119

Truman, it seems, by adopting the Cold War rhetoric, had created the conditions for his later trouble, not only for his party electorally in 1952, but earlier in the form of charges of communist subversion in the U.S. government. There was no ~~cause~~ available when Eastern Europe remained under the Soviet yoke and when China "fell" to the Communists that would satisfy the frustrations, or soothe fears, of the American public. The result was the first Republican President since 1932 and an intensification of the Cold War.

An analysis of public opinion data between 1945 and 1952 indicates that the general public adopted a Cold War frame of reference in relation to three general attitudes:

- 1). Popular opinion toward the prospects for cooperation with Soviet Union and Soviet intentions, generally, deteriorated rapidly.
- 2). Popular attitudes toward the Truman Administration at first were understandably ambiguous, but later tended to support his policies they regarded as firm ones while criticizing him for being too soft on the Russians.
- 3). Popular American tolerance for the rights of domestic Communists declined rapidly.

Two general indicators used repeatedly over a four year period show the overall decline in American trust in the Soviet Union. When asked whether they thought there was a possibility of war with the Soviet Union within the next

twenty-five years, Americans thinking there would be war increased rapidly between 1945 and 1948.¹²⁰

Percentage seeing United States in War within 25 years:-

March, 1945		38%
March, 1946		69%
April, 1947		73%
February, 1948		76%

The same trend is evident when asked whether they believed "Russia is out to rule the world",¹²¹

June, 1946		58%
October, 1947		76%
March, 1948		77%
May, 1949		66%
January, 1950		70%

Other questions which were put to the public concerning Soviet intentions confirm this trend. As the differences between the two super-powers became more acknowledged by Truman and the men around him, the public readily changed their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In 1945, when asked if they agreed that the Soviet Union was a peace-loving nation concerned only with self-defense, the Americans were evenly split: 38.6%-yes, 37.8%-no, 8.4%-no opinion.¹²² The same question put in 1947 revealed a decided shift in opinion had occurred: 12%-yes, 66%-no, 22%-no opinion.¹²³ Asked again in 1945 if U.S.-Soviet cooperation would continue after the war, Americans, by a heavy majority, responded that it would:-

March, 1945:

55%	... yes
31%	... no
14%	... no opinion

September, 1945:-

54% .. yes

30% .. no

16% .. no opinion¹²⁴

Again a decided negative shift is revealed in 1946:-

32% .. yes

52% .. no

16% .. no opinion¹²⁵

Whereas prior to Roosevelt's death, Americans wholeheartedly approved of "the way Roosevelt ran the war", once their faith in the goodwill of the Soviet Union began to fade there was also widespread belief that Truman was not effectively dealing with the situation.¹²⁶ Early in Truman's administration the public revealed itself as undecided in their judgement of his policies with regard to the U.S.S.R. Responding to invitations to assess Truman's Soviet policies between 1946 and 1948, American dissatisfaction is unmistakable: in 1946, 60% felt the U.S. was "too soft" with Russia and only 3% felt it to be "too tough".¹²⁷ In October 1947 and March 1948, polls revealed a sharp increase in the public's suspicion of the Soviet Union. In October, 62% felt Truman was "too soft" toward Russia. By March 1948, 73% of the American public felt that way. Only 3% and 6% respectively thought he was too firm. At the same time, however, they were willing to credit Truman's good intentions. Only 17% felt the President was "giving in" to the Russians, while

53% thought Truman was against giving in, with 4% having no opinion.¹²⁸

By early 1948, well after Truman had become openly hostile to the Soviet Union, the public's attitude still showed a desire for a firmer policy toward Russia. Questioned about U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, 10% felt the Administration should be more willing to compromise, 26% thought current policy was about right, while 53% supported a firmer policy, with 11% undecided.¹²⁹ In September 1948, the public was willing even to place blame on Roosevelt. When asked if it should have been clear to Roosevelt back in 1945 that it was not a good gamble to hope Russia would act in good faith, 52% thought Roosevelt should have known, 37% did not, and 11% had no opinion.¹³⁰

The revelation that the Russians possessed the Atom Bomb deepened American fears. A December poll revealed that 45% felt Soviet possession of the bomb made war more likely, 28% said "less likely", and 17% said "no difference", and 10% had no opinion. Fully 70% felt at the same time that Russia was attempting to become the "ruling power in the world", 18% felt it sought only "protection", while 12% expressed no opinion.¹³¹ When asked in March, 1950, who was winning the Cold War, 42% expressed ignorance of the term, 23% thought the Soviets were winning, 16% the U.S., 5% thought neither was winning, and 14% didn't know. By 1951, 12% felt neither side was winning, but 30% thought the Soviet Union was winning it, and only 9% thought the U.S. was

*prevailing.¹³²

At the same time that Truman's hostility toward the Russians was contributing to the public's fears of the Soviet Union, his belated responses to criticisms (particularly from the McCarthy wing of the Republican Party) of his conduct of relations with Russia was contributing to a steady decline in public tolerance for domestic political radicals. Not only did his actions, in the area of domestic security, contradict his words, his underestimation of public fears of internal subversion led to responses which encouraged more fear and suspicion. Theoharides found that Truman's creation of the federal employee loyalty program was largely responsible for this shift because the program failed to distinguish between radical dissent and disloyalty, or even to make its objectives explicit.¹³³

Whereas in July, 1946, 39% of the public thought Communists should not be permitted to speak on radio, by 1948 57% favored denying them this right.¹³⁴ Larger percentages favored prohibiting Communists from holding government jobs and prohibiting the Party altogether. In April, 1947, after Truman introduced the loyalty program, while 14% had no opinion, 67% of those polled felt Communists should be excluded from the federal civil service, only 19% favored giving Communists the same rights as others.¹³⁵ In February, 1948, 45% felt the Communist Party of the U.S. posed a threat to national security; 40% considered it no threat, with 5% expressing no opinion. By August of that year, 63%

of those polled favored the Nixon-Randt Bill requiring registration of Communist party members and their front organizations. 176 On a related issue, but still relevant to this analysis, 73% felt college and university teachers should not be permitted to belong to the Communist Party, and 70% agreed with the decision of the University of California to impose a loyalty oath on its academic staff. 37

In February, 1946, George Kennan dispatched a cable to Washington. Kennan's analysis of Soviet behavior and his arguments for the proper American response came later to be published in Foreign Affairs, the leading foreign policy journal in the U.S. This statement became accepted as the primary rationalization of Truman's foreign policy. Kennan provided a framework for Washington's understanding of Soviet behavior which would form the basis of American policy for at least two decades. The Republican attack on containment was aimed at the specific policies of the Democrats, and not the assumptions of Soviet behavior upon which these policies were based.

Kennan's strategy accepted the prevailing assumptions of the Truman Administration concerning the irrational, inevitably expansionist character of the U.S.S.R. and of the extreme unlikelihood of reaching mutually acceptable compromises. Soviet decision makers, Kennan wrote, were "neurotic" in their desire for security and in their belief in the inevitability of conflict between the two systems. The Soviet idea of security lay in the destruction of the

adversary, not in compromise or agreements. Although ideologically incoherent and reserved in style, his message was not a significant departure from the "iron fist" approach favored by Truman. Moreover, it was a positive statement with an offensive thrust. True, Russian control of Eastern Europe would have to be accepted, but only until the West's response produced sufficient pressure that the Soviet system altered its character. This basic change would result from a contradiction between the Soviets' need for expansion and its inability to expand.¹³⁸

The United States, as it is in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

It is necessary to consider the offense message of the containment position: checking Soviet expansion would simultaneously protect the West from penetration, particularly informal penetration in the form of subversion and domestic chaos. Thus a primary element in containment was the stabilization of the Western world so that its economic and political infrastructures could resist Soviet encroachment. "Patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies" would require a long-term U.S. effort to rebuild and re-arm Western Europe and institute order, abundance, and generally to demonstrate the suitability and progressive character of capitalism.¹³⁹ Kennan's program offered flexibility in meeting the threat through the

alternatives of military, economic and/or political policies. Kennan did not eliminate an ideological-propaganda response to America. The U.S., he wrote, could influence the actions and internal development within Russia and the entire Communist bloc. The success of containment involves: 140

... a question of the degree to which the United States... and the... would... the impression of... knows what it wants, which is... successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy.

Upon these assumptions, then, were founded such policies as the Marshall Plan, the N.E.P., and the National Committee for a Free Europe (for which, not surprisingly in light of the above, the Secretary of State chose Kennan to build the initial organizational structure). Containment was quite acceptable in so far as it promised not only to prevent further penetration of Communism, but also to alter favorably the nature of the conflict. It therefore implied self-determination for Eastern Europe without necessitating an overt intervention or "threats or blustering"; that is, without direct confrontation and possible war.

The theory of containment was not judged over the years primarily on the bases of its actual accomplishments, which were considerable. The standards, as Felt has pointed out,

were not the "real" achievements but the "shoulds" put in terms of principles, and the gap between them did not seem to narrow -- at least not tangibly enough to prevent the Republicans from seeking public support by condemning containment as immoral. Although under containment Truman put together policies which resulted in an utterly devastated continent, the costs were high. Containment required the maintaining of a huge peace-time military apparatus, engagement in an arms race and it fostered a general psychological climate of fear and mutual suspicion amid a constant state of war preparedness. Finally containment did not "mellow" or "break up" anything.

It was these factors upon which the Republicans mounted their attack. They criticized the Democrats' foreign policy as expensive and imprincipled; furthermore, it abandoned millions to slavery. Writing in Life magazine in 1952, John Foster Dulles, Republican foreign policy critic, perceptively pinpointed the weaknesses of containment: "If you think back over the past six years, you will see that our policies have largely involved emergency action to try to contain Soviet Communism by checking it here or blocking it there."¹ He also charged the Democrats with being overly militaristic, of endangering civilian control. In short, he wrote that our policies were, "Too militaristic, too costly, too erratic and too inconclusive".² The U.S. had consigned to slavery all the peoples the Communists had come to dominate and was not trying "to win the war with

Communism, but presumably to live with it forever.¹⁴³ The proper course, according to the future Secretary of State, was "liberation" -- and that would occur only when the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur". Dulles mentioned Radio Free Europe as an example of the type of organization which might contribute to that end.¹⁴⁴ When writing the foreign policy plank in the 1952 Republican Platform, Dulles charged the Democrats of "ignominious barter with our ...", offering "no hope of victory".¹⁴⁵ In a passage that is remarkable for its mixing of altruism and self-interest, Dulles brought the conflict of principle and morality with the Soviet Union to its logical conclusion. If elected, he promised the Republicans would make:¹⁴⁶

... clear on the highest authority of the President and Congress, that the United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence of those captive peoples. We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark places. That program will give the voice of America a real function. It will mark an end to the negative, futile and immoral policy of containment which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and Godless terrorism which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon of our destruction.

In summary, this analysis indicates the relative unimportance of Eastern Europe in the priorities of American foreign policy until it emerged as the initial and central source of tension and hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the relatively brief period

between 1944 and 1950, the attitude of the United States changed from one of victorious elation and optimism to one of open hostility. The object of that hostility and cause for the change of attitude was the perceived threat of Communism to America's principles upon which it had fought the war and defiled the fruits of victory. The origin of the threat was clearly Moscow whose danger was revealed by her actions in eastern Europe. Practically all of America's policy initiatives were structured and justified by that threat, giving American policy a basic cast for years to come.

The impetus for the hostility was the so-called betrayal by the Soviet Union of the Yalta Declaration of a Liberated Europe and agreements on Poland. In retrospect however, the U.S. at least partially created the betrayal by placing rigid interpretations on these vague agreements which seem unjustified in terms of their actual content, and then demanding that this view be accepted by the Russians. The Soviet Union had made known its concern and interests in Eastern Europe rather early in the war-time consultations. They had made explicit the high degree of importance which they placed on a secure, friendly, Western frontier.

It was not that the Americans were betrayed as much as U.S. leaders allowed the country to be deluded about the context in which the agreements were made, the actuality of Soviet designs for the area and Russia's capabilities for attaining them. Roosevelt clearly felt no deep concern over Eastern Europe, apart from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

no country in the area evoked his sympathy. He regarded Russian influence there as largely inevitable and was willing to bury the matter in principle and compromise. Neither Roosevelt nor Truman could politically afford indifference, however, to the potential votes of millions of Americans of East European descent. Nor could they ignore the Catholic vote which included the East European ethnics and which received the Soviet Union with special deference. The desires and suspicions of these people were frequently referred to by both Presidents. They constituted an important part of Democratic voting strength.

This analysis is intended in no way to suggest that Soviet actions were more "just" than those of the United States, or even that they were more understandable. It does intend to convey to the reader that it was not what the Russians did, but how their actions were perceived by American decision makers and presented to the American people that largely accounts for the unique ideological character of the Cold War and the methods used in its prosecution. A link was clearly perceived between the necessities of domestic and foreign policy which became mutually supportive, and tended to freeze issues of the Cold War.

The Soviet Union's permanent presence in Eastern Europe gave the United States three choices of action. To seek physically to unseat the Russians would have precipitated the third world war and would have been self-defeating. To

accept the status quo would have meant abandoning principles which justified American participation in the war and whose fulfillment a large and vocal segment of the population demanded. These principles were presented to the public as the pay-off for the sacrifice; high expectations had been raised. The third alternative, the one adopted, was to keep the issues open - to refuse to admit the permanence of the situation and carry on the conflict on a primarily ideological plane.

The resort to ideological conflict then, was surely a retreat to principle (or "moralism"), but not a retreat from reality. On the contrary, it was a frank realization of where the relatively safe possibilities for continuing the conflict lay. The Cold War was not a retreat from the "real" arena of power politics; direct use of military force was too risky - the aim was to live for the principles, not die for them. Neither was the Cold War an abandonment of diplomacy because the techniques of diplomacy are not suited to conflicts of principle. Diplomacy is most useful where mutual interests exist; such mutuality was not perceived after World War II, aside from the desire to avoid war.

The battle of principle, of "ways of life", was not an illusion masquerading as policy (despite some writers' claims), but was a vigorous policy, sincerely and determinedly pursued, whose stakes were the "minds of men", or in more mundane terms, universal acceptance of the respective ideologies. Both sides quickly undertook to demarcate the

boundary between them with military and economic programs which would demonstrate the "vitality" of each system and establish the hegemony of each super-power.

Like all wars, however, if victory is not won, the leadership is replaced. In the Cold War the fruits of the conflict lie in waging it, actual results were not always tangible ones. The Republicans were more perceptive about this than the Democrats. Realizing the Cold War could not be ended without either destruction or self-denial, their only alternative was to escalate it. This they proceeded to do.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Kertess, Stephen, (Ed.) The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame., 1950), p. 21.
- ² Miller, Watson. "Administering Our Immigration Laws", The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 262, March, 1949, p. 189. (Hereafter cited as Annals.)
- ³ Kertesz, op. cit., p. 24.
- ⁴ Kiser, Clyde. "Cultural Pluralism", The Annals, March, 1949, p. 126.
- ⁵ Chyz, Yaroslav & Lewis, Reed. "Agencies organized by Nationality Groups in the United States", The Annals, March 1949, p. 149; Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy. (New York: Praeger Inc., 1960), p. 184.
- ⁶ Kalijarvi, Thorsten. "Central-East European Minorities in the U.S.", The Annals, March, 1944, p. 153-154. Another student of Eastern European immigration Stefan Wl6szczewski found that the actual number of Polish Americans in the U.S. equaled 7-10 million in 1945, while the 1940 census counted only three million. His findings were based on what he called the Polish "sociological group" who were Americans of Polish parentage. The census figures included only those born in Poland which he called the Polish statistical group. Wl6szczewski found that the bulk of all Polish Americans were concentrated in nine states, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, Wisconsin and Connecticut. See Wl6szczewski, Stefan, "The Polish Sociological Group in America", The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. IV (August, 1945), pp. 150-151.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Almond, op. cit., p. 184. A more recent work by Paul Seabury sustains Almond's view: "The 'Captive Nations' constituencies of recently arrived East Europeans came to represent, during the height of the Cold War, the hard core of United States liberationism, which opposed the containment policy of the Truman Administration and supported 'rollback' efforts to force a showdown with Stalin and establish free governments in Eastern Europe." See

Seabury, Paul. The United States in World Affairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 90.

⁹Almond, ibid., p. 183-184.

¹⁰Millie, Walter, (Ed.) The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 53.

¹¹Sherwood, Robert. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 748. (Emphasis not added).

¹²Ibid., p. 749.

¹³Churchill, Winston. The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1950), p. 201.

¹⁴Sherwood, op. cit., p. 799.

¹⁵Bullitt, William C. "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace" Life Magazine XXV, (August 30, 1948), p. 94.

¹⁶This is a well known fact of American policy. See Kalko, Gabriel. The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 161-164. For Roosevelt's personal confirmation of this policy see, among many examples, Churchill, Winston Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1953), p. 219.

¹⁷Ciechanowski, Jan. Defeat in Victory (Garden City: Doubleday, 1947), p. 4.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 32.

²⁰Eden, Anthony. The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), p. 371.

²¹Ibid., p. 376.

²²Sherwood, op. cit., p. 526.

²³Ciechanowski, op. cit., p. 108, 106.

- 24 Feis, Herbert. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 23.
- 25 Ciechanowski, op. cit., p. 201.
- 26 Ibid., p. 208.
- 27 Ibid., p. 208. For other examples of the Ambassador's concern and particularly his comments on the O.W.I., see pp. 115-116, 129-131.
- 28 Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw. The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 25-26, 37-38.
- 29 Kennan, George F. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little-Brown, 1960), p. 359. Mikolajczyk cites similar experiences, op. cit., p. 25.
- 30 Eden, op. cit., p. 495.
- 31 Ibid., p. 496.
- 32 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 796.
- 33 Sherwood, ibid., p. 780.
- 34 Kennan, op. cit., p. 361.
- 35 Ibid., p. 358.
- 36 Ibid., p. 357.
- 37 Ibid., p. 357.
- 38 Kelko, op. cit., pp. 194-204. Also Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 748-749, the military feared defeat of Japan without Russian aid would be "abortive". Also see Kennan, op. cit., p. 378.
- 39 Churchill, op. cit., p. 279. Kelko, op. cit., p. 351.
- 40 Eden, op. cit., p. 604.
- 41 Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925-1950. (Boston: Little-Brown, 1967), p. 206.

- ⁴²Ibid., p. 214.
- ⁴³Churchill, op. cit., p. 368.
- ⁴⁴Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1955), pp. 499-500. Also Churchill, ibid., p. 369.
- ⁴⁵Churchill, op. cit., p. 367. Also Foreign Relations Papers (Yalta), op. cit., p. 667.
- ⁴⁶Foreign Relations Papers (Yalta), op. cit., p. 846.
- ⁴⁷Churchill, op. cit., p. 384.
- ⁴⁸Foreign Relations Papers (Yalta), op. cit., p. 977-978.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., p. 889-890.
- ⁵⁰Sherwood, op. cit., p. 870.
- ⁵¹Churchill, op. cit., p. 402.
- ⁵²Millis, op. cit., p. 51.
- ⁵³Feis, Herbert. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 174-175.
- ⁵⁴The entire telegram is reprinted in Churchill, op. cit., Appendix "A", p. 473.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 603-605.
- ⁵⁶Feis, From Trust to Terror, op. cit., p. 15.
- ⁵⁷Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Year of Decisions Vol. I, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), p. 15.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 71.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., p. 71.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 76.

61 Ibid., p. 77.

62 Millis, op. cit., p. 50. In his memoirs Truman edited the last line to read "... if the Russians did not want to join us that would be too bad." Truman, op. cit., p. 77. Truman was referring to the San Francisco Conference on International Organization which began on April 25, 1945.

63 Ibid., p. 82.

64 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 886.

65 Ibid., pp. 888-890.

66 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) (1945, 2 Vols. 1960), Vol. I, pp. 201-202. Also see Truman, op. cit., p. 345-6.

67 Foreign Relations Papers (Potsdam), Vol. II, p. 206.

68 Ibid., II, pp. 1491-1494.

69 Truman, op. cit., pp. 411-412.

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and Studies (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1970), p. 217.

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- 144 Ibid., p. 154.
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CHAPTER II

Official U.S. Policy in International Broadcasting

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the official policy of the United States in international broadcasting as they related to the U.S.-Soviet conflict in Europe. First we will examine the ideological premises in the broadcast policy. In the following chapter we will examine the implementation of those policies in terms of organization and programs of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Much of the data cited below will be elaborated upon later in the work. They are cited here to indicate the purposes of American international broadcasting, though their usefulness may be considerably reduced.

Throughout the period of this study, the United States maintained two international broadcasting operations. The first was the official government system, openly controlled and acknowledged as the voice of the United States. The agency responsible for this overt operation was the United States Information Agency, created in 1953, which operated the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS). The VOA was the main system. Worldwide in scope, its mission was the dissemination of official U.S. policy abroad. The RIAS broadcast exclusively into East Germany. The second government controlled international broadcasting operation was covert. The fact of U.S. sponsorship

and control was kept secret from its inception in 1949 until 1951. The organization established by the government to carry out the cover operation was the National Committee for a Free Europe (N.C.F.E.) which operated Radio Free Europe (R.F.E.) and broadcast exclusively to the countries of eastern Europe except Albania.¹ To conceal the fact of government control, the N.C.F.E. assumed the cover of a private citizen-based, non-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New York.²

Both operations were designed to counter the communist threat, but the VOA was concerned primarily with the image of the United States and with the accurate and acceptable presentation of its official policies.³

The long-term interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective the VOA must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will govern VOA broadcasts. 1) VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA will be accurate, objective and comprehensive. 2) VOA will represent America, not a single segment of America. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions. 3) As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.

Martin Willenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in 1971: "The VOA is essentially committed to providing information about the United States, its people and the policies of the United States Government." The VOA operated as a foreign service of the U.S. government

in a manner similar to the RFE service.

RFE on the other hand, had a different mission. It was specifically an anti-communist operation, highly aggressive and militant in tone, whose purpose it was to intervene actively in the internal affairs of selected countries and attempt to subvert their governments. Because it was aimed exclusively at Eastern Europe and was, in fact, created in response to Soviet control of the area, it could be viewed as one of America's chief weapons in the cold war. According to the State Policy Handbook, written in 1951, the purpose of the program was to "sustain the morale of the captive peoples and stimulate them in a spirit of non-cooperation."⁵ RFE's principle publication News Behind the Iron Curtain carried an editorial note in each issue called "About this Publication" which left little doubt about the purpose of the RFE's combative intent. "The Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist system, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system."⁶ As initially organized, RFE acted as home-radio-in-exile to the countries of Eastern Europe and reflected the liberation position of the Eisenhower Administration.

The two broadcast operations were designed for different audiences as well as different purposes. The amount of attention devoted by VOA to Eastern Europe was trivial compared to that of RFE. There was a clear division of

labor between the two. Washington reserved Eastern Europe for the special messages of RFE, while the rest of the world received the official government service via VOA. The following table supplied by the State Department shows VOA service to Eastern Europe to be about one-eighth of that of RFE.⁸

DAILY BROADCAST HOURS			
	VOA	RFE	RADIO LIBERTY
EAST EUROPEAN LANGUAGES	504	504	
IN SOVIET LANGUAGES	135		

Testifying on another occasion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Willenbrand explained why the U.S. government-sponsored Radio could not duplicate the function of RFE.⁹

It is true that international radio services which function as agencies of various governments - the VOA, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio-Transmission, et diffusion Francaise, and others - fill a part of this information void. However out of well-founded diplomatic considerations such official government radios must take care to avoid the charge of interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, testified that while the VOA's mission was to discuss the United States, RFE was "focused rather on what is going on within those countries to which they [including Radio Liberty] are directed and between those countries to which they are directed."¹⁰

Examination of the official statements of the government and RFE indicate that there were three primary ideological themes upon which the U.S. broadcast effort was justified. These were:

- 1) The theme of the national interest: expressed as protection of American political security or the preservation of the American way of life.
- 2) The theme of the right of freedom of information by all peoples.
- 3) The theme of truth expressed, usually, in terms of its utility.

As expressed in documents or by officials these assumptions were never clearly separated. They overlapped and were employed in mutually supportive ways. Therefore our choice of statements to illustrate these themes will reflect that lack of neatness of separation. The justification was basically that freedom of information is a universal right. By promoting that right, the U.S. will aid the dissemination of the truth about America and the free world. If the truth be known, the lies and deceit of the communists will be exposed and the appeal of their propaganda will be blunted. The world would then be further along the road to international harmony and the American way of life would be preserved, if not adopted by others. This argument was used to justify both VOA and RFE. Statements in support of RFE, however, were couched in significantly more aggressive and militant terms explicitly emphasizing the anti-communist

intent. In its own official publication, RFE gave its purpose as "direct action aimed at the liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries"¹¹ Moreover, RFE was justified primarily through the concept of national security. To be sure, it sought to bring the truth to the so-called captive peoples, but its primary function was supposed to be the dissolution of Russian control. In his 1954 report to the Board of Directors, the President of the Free Europe Committee, Joseph Grew, stated that RFE was supposed to "engage in a struggle against Soviet Russian colonialism behind the Iron Curtain and Communist influence on this side of the curtain."¹²

The Concept of Self-Preservation

The concept of self-preservation was the basic assumption behind the U.S. international broadcasting effort. At the beginning of the cold war it was perceived that national security, a concept dependent upon encouragement of the free flow of information between nations and specifically an accurate presentation of the American Republic. The prerequisites for national security were broadened to include something more than military power. William Bryton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Director of the Interim International Information Service, the predecessor to the USIA, delivered a speech in which he demanded that Americans recognize the different nature of the cold war. He had left his federal office and had become a

U.S. Senator from Connecticut 13

We Americans have been told a hundred times in the five years since the end of the shooting war - I suppose it has been said a hundred times on the floor of this Chamber - that the contest now raging all over the world is in its essence a struggle for the minds and loyalties of men. We have been reminded again and again that, in this struggle, bullets, bombs and shell flame do not change men's minds or win their loyalty. Yet at the end of five years we are still preoccupied with physical force as though this were the answer to our present problems with the Russians. ... Is it not time - past time - for us to create a Marshal Plan of ideas?

The cold war was increasingly being perceived as a struggle between opposing political philosophies. America's security, her way of life, was therefore dependent upon **an active U.S. effort** to expose the threat which communism held for mankind. Six months after Senator Benton's speech, his former employer, President Truman, delivered a similar address at the convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in which he drew the connection between the nature of the conflict and American security. 14

The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda can be overcome by truth - plain, simple, unvarnished truth - presented by newspapers, radio and other sources that the people trust. ... Communist propaganda is so false, so crude, so blatant that we wonder how men can be swayed by it. We forget that most of the people to whom it is directed do not have free access to accurate information. ... In recent years, there has been tremendous progress all over the world in education and the exchange of ideas. This progress has stirred men everywhere to new desires and new lives, they want to be masters of

their own affairs. We have helped and encouraged the people. But the communists have seized upon their desires and ambitions and are seeking to exploit them for their own selfish purposes. . . . The communists understand this situation very well. They are trying to move in and take advantage of these aspirations. . . . From every standpoint our free way of life is vastly superior to the system of oppression which the communists seek to impose upon mankind. In many parts of the world, however, where men must choose between freedom and communism, the true story is going untold. We cannot run the risk that nations may be lost to the cause of freedom because their people do not know the facts. . . . We must use every means at our command, private as well as governmental, to set the truth to other peoples.

The VOA was, of course, engaged in this struggle for men's minds but their involvement was limited to news and documentaries about the U.S. -- oriented to countering popular misconceptions as well as communist propaganda. It was also aimed at all countries both friendly and unfriendly.

Edward Barrett, first director of the USIA, outlined four steps the agency was following in its programs to "take the psychological offensive in the cold war." All were related to American security: 1) creation of a climate of confidence in the Free World's desire for peace; 2) the presentation of an accurate picture of the U.S. making plain the country's moral and physical strength and its desire for peace; 3) setting back further Soviet encroachments by "frustrating their psychological preparations for war"; 4) help roll back Soviet influence.¹⁵ A more direct testimonial on the function of the VOA was given by Kent Cooper, an official in the VOA organization. "Our purpose in broadcasting to the Soviet Union and its satellites", he said, "is to give their peoples the chance

to listen to the truth".¹⁶ Thus the VOA operated to protect U.S. security by relying on a sort of "upseer hand" theory which held that, given adequate and accurate information about America's peaceful aims and hopes, the peoples of other countries would take the rational choice for truth.

Radio Free Europe was far more direct in its approach to broadcasting. Unlike the VOA it was oriented toward the dissolution of specific agreements. Its programs were justified by their direct enhancement of American security. Harassment of Soviet control in eastern Europe was one method as outlined in 1951 by then director C.D. Jackson: "If we can keep the Russians busy with the people they have already conquered by holding out a genuine hope of freedom, we can, perhaps, prevent the march across Western Europe".¹⁷

Vice President Barkley speaking eight months later at the Waldorf Astoria in support of the RFE fund-raising campaign claimed the radio "could prevent a hot war by winning the cold one." ¹⁸ In 1954 this line was still used. Representative

Thomas Lane read into the Congressional Record a policy statement issued by Joseph Grew, Chairman of the Board of FEC. Mr. Grew said, "The busier we can keep the Bolsheviks in their own backyard, the less chance of their starting trouble elsewhere."¹⁹ Walter Bedell Smith, former Army

General, Director of the E.I.A., and ambassador to Moscow stated that "the greatest deterrent to Soviet aggression is the unsettlement in neighboring satellites. Thus the activities of RFE are extremely effective."²⁰

President Eisenhower endorsed RF via closed-circuit television to a group of corporate executives who were being urged to make contributions. His remarks are perhaps the most explicit of any in justifying RF in terms of its protection of the country. 21

I strongly believe that RF and the Crusade for Freedom are vital to success in the battle for our minds. For, as we found during the war that the most potent force is spiritual: that the appeal to men's minds produces a dedication which surmounts every trial and test until victory is won. While we maintain our vigilance at home and abroad, we must intensify our will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. These countries are in the Soviet back-yard and only so long as their people are convinced that the outside world is not forsaking them - only that long is the danger that will deter them to Soviet aggression. Therefore the mission of RF merits greater attention and effort. It serves our national security and the cause of peace.

The theme of national security was consistent throughout the history of RF. — At the radio pursued the goal of liberating the Eastern Europeans from the repression of their puppet dictators. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity with which that goal was sought. Later, beginning after the Hungarian Revolution, the radio did tone down its inflammatory format and assume the more moderate role of a news radio. But the assumption of its utility in the service to American security remained constant. Martin Willenbrand repeated the security theme. His comments reflect a less militant mood, in so far as the fear of an actual invasion is no longer present; rather, the argument is rephrased in terms of the more contemporary issue of a re-ordering of priorities. 22

It would like to review briefly with the committee the importance of these two radio stations and to the people to whom they broadcast and their value to other people, in their own view, who share the view that an informed public is a safeguard of peace. . . . In radio broadcasts the interests of all these people can be served. The force. For them as well as us, large sums of money could be allocated to radio broadcasts, which could be allocated to other purposes, but which could be for the purposes of other policies. It is a reasonable assumption that an informed public can better alter its own policies for the interest of its own welfare than an uninformed public. . . . If these people can improve their own welfare it will be possible to reorder our own priorities to the benefit of the American public.

In essence, the Cold War is a struggle for the application of international broadcasting. The United States must encourage and develop the production of truthful information between people. This will have three results: 1) provision of a clear, consistent picture of the U.S. and its policy, 2) counter propaganda, 3) stimulate people to choose freedom over tyranny, a promote a will for freedom in those countries under communist yoke. Insofar as these results are attainable, the prospect of having to renege on the promise of force is diminished. If communist propaganda is effective, they will win the cold war, the battle for peace, and a "hot" war then becomes the only recourse. The United States therefore, as a matter of self-defense, must undertake the task of international broadcasting. It must seek to enhance the world's opinion of America and its policies, to specifically carry the battle for peace.

Concept of Freedom of Information

Freedom of information has deep historical roots in the American political tradition, dating back to the confederation period, and later incorporated into the Constitution as one of the conditions for ratification by the states. In terms of international broadcasting, the U.S. projected this basic right to include all the world's peoples. In a conflict of philosophies of government, this basic element in American political tradition would naturally be brought forth. The argument is that the individual, regardless of his nationality, has a basic right of free access to information. Free flowing information between peoples will break down artificial barriers and suspicions between countries and promote peace through better understanding in a more open world. Where freedom of information is greatest the government is subject to the will of the people. Where it is restricted or banned, as implied in the statements above, governments can assume the proportions of a dictatorship and use the people for their own purposes.

The basic right to freedom of information as it related to broadcasting was made by President Roosevelt in 1943. In a letter to the Director of the Federal Communications Commission, he emphasized the importance of this right. "If the principle of freedom to listen is to help in providing the basis for a better understanding between peoples of the world, it seems to me important that we lay the proper foundation for an effective system of international broadcasting for future years."²³ President Truman narrowed the issue by recognizing

the furnishing of information exacted by the 1954 Act, the above cited above, the President, signed Order "Exemption of the Government from the disclosure of information" OR 100-10 to consist the disclosure of information. 24

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corruption and brutality of the local regimes. Endorsements were not limited to public displays of confidence by political leaders. During the RFE balloon campaigns against Eastern Europe, the State Department specifically defended RFE in diplomatic notes to the target countries, primarily on the basis that such campaigns were merely a response made necessary by the target governments' erection of barriers to open communication.²⁹

The Concept of Truth

The logic of the concept of truth as it related to America's effort in international broadcasting is that if mankind is to benefit from a free flow of information, it must be accurate and trusted by everyone. The VOA and RFE both were committed to accuracy, though RFE included heavy emphasis on commentary. The VOA concern for truth was related to the accuracy with which it communicated official policy.

The concern for truth is deeply rooted in American broadcasting history. The Government first entered the field in 1939 in response to what were perceived as Nazi lies and propaganda.³⁰ In 1942, with American entrance into the war, the government took over international broadcasting, ending a period where it merely bought time blocks from private broadcasters. After lengthy negotiations, the government accomplished the takeover by buying all the time on all the transmitters twenty-four hours a day.³¹ On February 24th, 1942,

the VOA officially came on the air in German, "Daily at this time we shall seek to speak to you about America and the war - the news may be good or bad - we shall tell you the truth."³²

The concern for accuracy was expressed after the war when problems of how to deal with the defeated, suspicious German people became an immediate reality. Writing in Foreign Affairs, John B. Whitton discussed what U.S. policy should be. "The first rule to govern broadcasts to the German people during the period of occupation will be to tell the truth. That is the only way to gain the confidence of a people suspicious of everything heard from transmitters known to be under foreign direction."³³

Truth was central, but as the cold war became progressively more intense the problem arose as to what exactly constituted truth. The threat of communist domination evidenced by Soviet control of Eastern Europe made questions of strategy important. The product of both government operations was controlled so nothing contrary to the image desired could get on the air (barring some degree of mutiny which was claimed to have occurred in RFE during the Hungarian Revolution). It was necessary to tell the truth but also to get the message across, that is, to ensure as far as possible that the broadcasts were interpreted in the way they were intended. Edward R. Murrow, a distinguished journalist, and former director of the USIA reflected this change from telling simply the "unvarnished" truth;³⁴

In the broad sweep, it is the purpose of the USIA to portray this country as it really is. The truth must be our guide but dreams must be our goal. We must try to reflect the fact that this country is not allergic to change.

His successor Edward Loomis concurred a bit more candidly. "Our job is to try to make U.S. policy understandable everywhere ... and palatable where possible. ... This requires us to judge who and what is responsible and 'significant' and to determine what is a 'fair' balance."³⁵ This was particularly the case in broadcasts to communist controlled countries. The first efforts to penetrate the Soviet Union had the purpose of presenting a "humanized" image of the U.S. in order to counter Soviet descriptions of America.³⁶ According to Robert Shayon, even news reports were "truthful but selected with the purpose of countering Soviet distortion. At the same time its aim was to bolster the will of all Europeans to resist communist pressure and convince listeners that the U.S. is doing all that is possible to preserve peace."³⁷ The VOA accomplished this task by emphasizing "news and analysis" programs to Iron Curtain countries. General VOA programming allotted eleven per cent of air time for popular music to non-communist targets, but only one per cent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.³⁸

One could view the very creation of RFE as recognition by the government that the traditional brand of official broadcasting was not sufficient to meet the danger facing the U.S. RFE concentrated on news of local events which were likely to be suppressed. There was little other than

commentaries and news, generally designed to emphasize the disparities between the regimes' promises and actual conditions, and to portray life in the West as infinitely more comfortable and happy.³⁹

Thus behind the concept of truth was both strategy and ideology. RFE was well aware that its credibility was always at stake, and errors about local events or political leaders wrongly condemned could endanger the entire effort. The concept of truth was thus tied to political aims. RFE had the overall task of opposing the "big lie" of communism where it was in actual control. To do that it had to provide truthful information.

The American program in international broadcasting was carried out on two levels. Both were based upon certain ideological concepts deeply rooted in the political culture. The overt operation was passive in nature and universal in scope. It sought primarily to operationalize the concepts of freedom of information and truth by representing the United States accurately to the world. The covert operation was more specifically oriented to the concept of national security. It sought to carry the ideological struggle to the enemy camp and operationalize these concepts in the form of actual opposition to communist control in Eastern Europe. The ultimate aim was the preservation of American security through the destruction of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ A second covert operation was Radio Liberty (RL). It was much smaller in size and scope and is not the subject of this work. The National Committee for a Free Europe was renamed in 1963 to the Free Europe Committee. The initials of the second name (FEC) will be used throughout this work for convenience.
- ² Certificate of Incorporation Filed May 11, 1949, and amended November 11, 1963. (Files of the Foreign Relations Committee - U.S. Senate).
- ³ The Voice of America Doubles its Power (Washington: United States Information Agency, 1963), pp. 9-10.
- ⁴ Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, May 24, 1971 (Washington, GPO, 1971), p. 35. Hereafter cited as Hearings.
- ⁵ Radio Free Europe Policy Handbook, 1950-51 Quoted in Holt, Robert, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 22.
- ⁶ News From Behind the Iron Curtain, p. 1.
- ⁷ Price, James R. Radio Free Europe: A Survey and Analysis (Washington: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1972), pp. 20-22.
- ⁸ "U.S. Government Radio Facilities in Europe", Hearings, p. 131. The State Department said that the VOA broadcasts to Eastern Europe were "only a fraction" of that of RFE. Radio Liberty was a counterpart to RFE, but was directed exclusively toward the U.S.S.R.
- ⁹ Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, July 30, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 19. Hereafter cited as RFE Report.
- ¹⁰ Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, June 6 & 7, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 62. Hereafter cited as Funding Hearings.
- ¹¹ News From Behind the Iron Curtain, January 1956, Back cover.

- 12 Quoted in Holt, Radio Free Europe, op. cit., p. 18.
- 13 "The Struggle for the Minds and Loyalties of Mankind - Proposing a Marshal Plan of Ideas", a speech delivered by Senator William Benton. Reprinted in the Congressional Record (March 22, 1950), pp. 3863-65.
- 14 "Fight False Propaganda with Truth". Speech delivered by President Harry S. Truman, April 19, 1950. Reprinted in the New York Times, April 20, 1950, p. 33. Also reprinted in Whittaker, Urban G. (ed.) Propaganda and International Relations (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1962), pp. 163-170.
- 15 Barrett, Edward W. Truth is Our Weapon (New York: Funk & Wagnals, 1953), pp. 78-79.
- 16 Cooper, Kent. The Right to Know (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudaby, 1956), p. 269.
- 17 Time Magazine, January 29, 1951, p. 19.
- 18 New York Times, September 12, 1951, p. 9.
- 19 Congressional Record Appendix, April, 1954, p. A2873.
- 20 NYT, October 22, 1953, p. 17.
- 21 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 2069. See also Department of State Bulletin (Washington, GPO, 1956), p. 295.
- 22 RFE Report, op. cit., pp. 19 & 20.
- 23 Fitzpatrick, Dick. "Telling the World About America", Public Opinion Quarterly, I. (Winter 1946-47), p. 584.
- 24 "Fight False Propaganda with Truth", NYT, op. cit., and Whittaker, op. cit.
- 25 DSB, June 12, 1950, pp. 952.
- 26 Radio Free Europe Fact Sheet (New York: Radio Free Europe Fund Inc., 1963), p. 1.

- 27 Feinstein, Donald. "Free Voices in the Battle for Men's Minds". Journalism Quarterly XXXI, (Spring 1954,) p. 193.
- 28 The Radio Free Europe Story (New York: Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc., 1962), p. 3.
- 29 The specific nature of the government's defense of RFE in diplomatic correspondence will be discussed below.
- 30 Rollo, Charles, & Strausz, Hupé R. "United States International Broadcasting". Harpers Magazine, August 1941, p. 301.
- 31 "U.S. Takes Over Short Waves to Win Air Propaganda War", Newsweek, October 19, 1942, p. 30.
- 32 Voice of America Doubles its Power. op.cit.
- 33 Whitten, John B. "Radio After the War", Foreign Affairs XXII, (January, 1944), p. 310.
- 34 "USIA's Marrow: Is Truth the Best Weapon", Newsweek, September 18, 1961, p. 26.
- 35 USIA News Release #16, February 21, 1962, p. 2.
- 36 "Voice of America", New Republic, March 3, 1947, p. 10.
- 37 Shayan, Robert L. "Europe and the VOA", Saturday Review, February 3, 1951, p. 44.
- 38 Fitzpatrick, op.cit., p. 6.
- 39 See the NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9; September 20, 1955, p. 30. A complete analysis of RFE programming will be given below.

for government action, that the Free Europe Committee was established. Its Radio Free Europe Division went on the air in 1950, broadcasting specifically to Eastern Europe, through emigre broadcasters. The programming was designed to disrupt Soviet control of the area by creating popular opposition. Between 1950 and 1951, the period when the government adopted an aggressive propaganda policy, the budget of the FEC tripled from approximately three to nine million dollars.⁸ In 1950 RFE employed one 7.5 kilowatt transmitter, but by 1952 it operated eight with a total power output of 760 kilowatts.⁹

Psychological warfare was given a higher priority in August, 1951, when Truman took steps to ensure overall strategic coordination among the various parts of government conducting propaganda operations. He created the Psychological Strategy Board whose duty it would be to coordinate "foreign information and psychological strategy in situations where joint actions by more than one agency of the government is required in this field."¹⁰ The Board was actually an interdepartmental committee, consisting of the Departments of State and Defense, and the Mutual Security Agency. It reported directly to the National Security Council.

Although the President was relatively free to reorganize as he wished, he was less able to secure increased funding for his new policies. His major policy address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, cited in the previous

government departments assumed their separate tasks in an uncoordinated fashion.

This demobilization was simply part of the general reduced military strength which public opinion had come to expect. Truman, as he indicated throughout his memoirs, felt powerless to resist publicly the demand for a return to normalcy, even though he opposed it, claiming to have recognized early the true Russian goals. The FEC was the first major effort mounted by the government to oppose Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. Formed in 1949, its government control was hidden behind the facade of a private non-profit corporation.

The U.S. development of international broadcasting and psychological warfare operations was refined during World War II. It was employed specifically as an adjunct of the military effort to assist the army in ensuring defeat of the enemy in the most efficient way.¹ Its value as a weapon in the war was admitted, but its potential, and indeed the nature of the coming conflict with the Soviet Union, was not widely recognized until the creation of FEC in 1949 and the Psychological Strategy Board in 1950. President Truman liquidated the OWI in August, 1945. It survived in a limited way as the Interim International Information Service attached to the Department of State under the administrative control of William Benton, Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Mr. Benton was later to become a Senator from Connecticut and a leader in the drive to win government

recognition of the importance of international propaganda.²

The OSS was also broken up by Executive Order in September 1945.³ In Europe the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF was dissolved, authority for propaganda being placed in the Information Control Division under the Command of the High Commissioner in Germany. The PWD was the largest and most experienced of its kind in all theaters of the war. The purpose of its successor was primarily that of winning the cooperation and loyalty of the German and Austrian populations. Many of the leading figures in these intelligence and propaganda operations resumed their careers after the war, first in the FEC.

In 1948 Congress passed the Information and Educational Exchange Act (Smith-Mundt). This law funded a number of programs, including international broadcasting, designed to give a "full and fair" picture of the U.S. and counter Soviet vilification. The program was not an effort to use the experience gained in World War II, but resembled more an official advertising campaign. This was the state of the official post-war effort in propaganda at that time.

By 1950 President Truman had openly adopted a strong anti-Soviet foreign policy. Along with his other well known responses to the Communist presence, he moved to reorganize and revive the nation's propaganda warfare apparatus. It was essentially the lessons of the wartime period which Truman seized upon when he created the

Psychological Strategy Board in 1951.⁴ The accepted definition of Psychological Warfare at that time was one given by Professor Paul Linebarger in his noted study Psychological Warfare published in 1948. Psychological Warfare is: "The use of propaganda against an enemy together with such other operational measures of a military, economic or political nature as may be required to supplement propaganda."⁵ Propaganda he defines as the: "planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral, or friendly group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose".⁶

A decided shift in tone and emphasis occurred at this time in the government's broadcast policy to reflect the more open hostility between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Professor William Daugherty reflected on this change in attitude:⁷

In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the emphasis of the program shifted sharply from a 'full and fair picture' of this country to one with more definite objectives. Programs were designed specifically to deter further aggression, to help maintain the stability and cohesion of the countries of the non-communist world and to inspire in them confidence in their mutual capacity to meet any eventualities. With this change came the development of a system of priorities among countries in programming and a highly specialized approach to each country or area and to the various social and economic groups within them. In short, an attempt was made to adjust the content and the techniques of the program to needs growing out of the widened schism in the world.

It was during this period, when the above definition of psychological warfare and propaganda provided the framework

for government action, that the Free Europe Committee was established. Its Radio Free Europe Division went on the air in 1950, broadcasting specifically to Eastern Europe, through emigre broadcasters. The programming was designed to disrupt Soviet control of the area by creating popular opposition. Between 1950 and 1951, the period when the government adopted an aggressive propaganda policy, the budget of the FEC tripled from approximately three to nine million dollars.⁸ In 1950 RFE employed one 7.5 kilowatt transmitter, but by 1952 it operated eight with a total power output of 760 kilowatts.⁹

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Although the President was relatively free to reorganize as he wished, he was less able to secure increased funding for his new policies. His major policy address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, cited in the previous

chapter, in which he called for a "campaign of Truth" against Communism did not convince a doubtful Congress, which refused his request for a special supplementary appropriation to increase the government's overt propaganda program.¹¹ Congressional harassment of official government broadcast operations has been a perennial feature of their existence. Objections usually spring from those who see no tangible results from the effort or from those who fear the programs will not adhere to their particular version of a strict pro-American line. Herein lies one of the advantages of a covert propaganda operation.

The membership of the Psychological Strategy Board was upgraded in 1951 to include the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA. The old membership, which consisted of their representatives, became known as the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The split was aimed at separating strategy from actual policy coordination.¹² These two bodies remained unchanged until the Republicans took office in 1953.

During the election campaign of 1952, the Republicans made the quality of America's moral response to the Communist threat a chief issue. The fact of the Cold War was openly admitted by them to be a struggle as important to the U.S. as any hot war. They attacked the policy of containment inaugurated by the Truman Administration, pledged to liberate the captive peoples of Eastern Europe and roll back the Communist menace generally. John Foster Dulles threw down the

gauntlet over American policy toward the Soviet Union. He charged the Democrats with abandoning the struggle, which he perceived to be one between irreconcilable principles, and adopting a conservative, defensive attitude.¹³ Mr. Dulles had a clear idea of the nature of the challenge facing the U.S. In an address delivered at Colgate University in July, 1950, he stated that the Soviet plan for world conquest could be learned by reading Stalin's Problems of Leninism:¹⁴

The plan is to conquer the weaker countries one by one by methods of propaganda, penetration, subversive war, and as a last resort open war. ... [America is] ever bound by faith and by sacrifice to the cause of righteousness. I am confident that our response will be worthy of our heritage and that we shall not be afraid to live sacrificially and even dangerously in a righteous cause.

Dulles demanded the U.S. take the offensive and declare openly American intent to roll back communism. The correct posture was the offensive and the correct weapons were ideas. Writing in Life in May, 1952, he declared:¹⁵

We should use ideas as weapons and these ideas should conform to moral principles. ... There is a moral law or natural law, not made by man, which determines right, and wrong, and in the long run, only those that conform to that law will escape disaster. This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers and for that violation they can and should be made to pay.

During the campaign there were frequent Republican calls for liberation of the captive peoples and a roll-back of Communism. In New York, Eisenhower said the U.S. must take the offensive and he called for "a rolling back of the tide of Communist aggressions".¹⁶ Senator Irving Ives, up for re-election in New York, favored liberation by deed as well as word "by giving every possible aid to underground movements

within the Iron Curtain."¹⁷ Senators McCarthy and Taft on separate occasions called for propaganda, infiltration and covert support for rebels in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ William J. Donovan, wartime Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and at this time a member of the FEC noted in a speech that Korea and such "wars of containment are expensive" and advocated guerilla forays behind the Iron Curtain as a "cheaper way to harass Stalin".¹⁹ On October 8, 1952, Eisenhower made a major campaign speech in which he clearly identified ideological conflict as a major feature of the Cold War: "We must adapt our foreign Policy to a Cold War strategy that is unified and coherent. ... In spirit and resolve we should see in this Cold War a chance to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save peace."²⁰ He elaborated on the strategy by stating that its scope went beyond a purely broadcasting effort.²¹

Many people think Psychological Warfare means just the use of propaganda like the controversial Voice of America. Certainly the use of propaganda, the written and spoken word, of every means known to transmit ideas, is an essential part of winning other people over to your side. But propaganda is not the most important part of this struggle. There are many peaceful tools that must be used through every medium of communication, mutual economic assistance, trade and barter, friendly contacts through travel and correspondence and sports...."

In November Eisenhower issued a press release (along with Stevenson) supporting the activities of RFE and urging the public to contribute to the fund-raising campaign of the Crusade for Freedom. Eisenhower was a founding member of the

Free Europe Committee.

The role that the FEC was supposed to play in the new offensive was detailed only once (so far as this author could determine) during the campaign. Speaking in Buffalo, Dulles delivered a speech in which he assured his audience that Eisenhower was determined to follow a policy of liberation toward the Eastern European satellites. The program, he said, would be wide in scope and include fomenting acts of resistance. Once those movements gathered momentum they would be supplied "with air drops and communications from private organizations like the Committee for a Free Europe."²² This in fact is what the Committee did in 1953 and 1954 in its "balloon campaigns".

The importance Eisenhower gave to propaganda and to psychological warfare operations is exemplified by his creation of a select Committee on International Information Activities.²³ He chose William Harding Jackson, former Deputy Director of the CIA between 1950-1951, to chair the committee and named as his personal representative Charles D. Jackson, former civilian Deputy Director of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF, who resigned as Director of Radio Free Europe to join the administration. The purpose of the committee was both to conduct a complete review of all U.S. psychological warfare operations and to make recommendations on their overall reorganization into an effective psychological warfare effort of the government.²⁴

The committee's report was released July 8th, 1953.

Its primary recommendation was the liquidation of the old psychological Strategy Board and a re-examination of the goals of propaganda.²⁵

The primary and overriding purpose of the information program should be to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations that their own aspirations for freedom, progress and peace are supported and advanced by the objectives and policies of the U.S. ... These goals and desires which we hold in common, must be explained in ways that will cause others to join with us in achieving them.

The committee recommended the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board which would direct all aspects of the nation's broadcasting policies.²⁶ The President created the Board and named C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant for Psychological Warfare Matters, as his representative.²⁷

Another major change brought about by Eisenhower was to group all the government's overt propaganda operations together under one agency. On June 1st, 1953, he issued Executive Order #871953 creating the United States Information Agency (USIA).²⁸ The USIA assumed tasks formerly performed by the Mutual Security Agency, the International Information Agency of the Department of State, and the Technical Cooperation Administration. Although the USIA was an independent agency, overall responsibility for content and policy was given to the Secretary of State. The order stated: "The United States Information Agency will be the normal outlet for this program [broadcasts], but the Secretary of State may use other channels for dissemination of this program abroad when in his judgement the use of such channels is required."²⁹

The history of the USIA is well known and needs no further elaboration here beyond noting that it suffered a rather stormy public career. It was attacked repeatedly by congressional critics. Senator McCarthy's celebrated hearings in 1953 are credited for so demoralizing the agency that forty percent of its personnel, including those with the most creative writing talent, left.³⁰ The USIA also suffered from a poor quality of leadership. Its Directors were little more than political appointees. None could be described as professional propagandists or communications experts. Turnover was frequent, with four Directors sitting between 1953 and 1959, compared to no turnover in the Chairmanship of the FEC during that time. In 1957, for example, the Agency suffered a fifty percent cut in its budget, and its Director Arthur Larson was subsequently forced to resign because he referred to the Democratic "Fair Deal" as an "alien philosophy imported from abroad."³¹

In the aggregate, creation of the USIA functioned to bring all the overt government information operations under one bureaucratic roof, thereby clearly separating them from those agencies conducting covert operations -- such as Radio Free Europe, which remained under the joint direction of the State Department and CIA, and which received covert funding as a bona-fide private organization.

The Agency appears to have enjoyed only minimal support from government leaders. Mr. Dulles criticized the Agency before Congress because "there is no clear purpose that

underlies the Information Program, and the result is that a great deal of miscellaneous information is sent out.³²

Indeed Professor Burtin Sapin found that the motivation for the USIA was due in part to a desire to disengage the Department of State from activities which were a continual source of public embarrassment.³³ Whereas the operations

Control Board included the President's personal advisor on psychological warfare matters and reported directly to the National Security Council, the USIA was left adrift, albeit linked to the State Department. Not until 1955 did the USIA Director become a member of the OCB and granted observer status at meetings of the NSC.³⁴ Professor Edward Bernays, a noted specialist in communications, sums up the position of the USIA quite adequately:³⁵

The agency's activities are mainly holding operations, a don't-rock-the-boat policy, instead of an imaginative, professional, contemporary social science operation, fulfilling the promise of its important mission. The agency goes through the motions of spending its appropriations, happy if no Congressman raises a public ruckus by questioning its actions.

Despite the fact that the Republicans created it, and despite all the public, scholarly and journalistic attention given its activities and effectiveness, the USIA was not, in this author's opinion, a primary instrument of American foreign policy. The main organization through which the Republican policy of liberation was operationalized was the FEC and its propaganda division -- Radio Free Europe. The FEC and RFE grew, expanded operations, and maintained the utmost anti-Communist militancy. The USIA simply did not.

The popular criticisms which accuse the Eisenhower administration of talking liberation while practising containment, of replacing rhetoric for politics, do not take into account the fact that the FEC was a CIA operation and that it flourished under his presidency.

By carrying out its psychological warfare programs behind the front of a private corporation, the government enjoyed a great deal of latitude for action both in the U.S. and in Eastern Europe. The FEC was free from the ordinary democratic controls, such as Congressional investigations and budget restrictions, which so frequently hampered overt efforts. Also RFE was beamed exclusively at Eastern Europe where the policy of liberation was primarily meant to apply. It also allowed the government to intervene in the political processes of target states while denying official responsibility. Such covert intervention became policy in 1951 when the Truman Administration permitted CIA funds to be given to private organizations with international ties such as labor unions and student organizations.³⁶ Although the FEC was two years old in 1951 and a creature of the government in idea and reality, it was designed to appear in every respect as a private voluntary organization.

Analysis of Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom must give some attention to the inception of its corporate parent the National Committee for a Free Europe (FEC). RFE was the committee's psychological warfare operation and the

CFF was the yearly public fund-raising campaign ostensibly supporting the FEC and RFE.

The initial impetus for the FEC came in 1949 from the State Department. The Soviet Union's moves to establish complete control over Eastern Europe through a program of complete Stalinization of the area and its resultant isolation from the West, plus the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, were taken as examples of the threat facing the West. There were also many East European exiles in the United States who, having fled the Nazis or the Russians, were making frequent visits to the State Department.³⁷ The exiles were a potential source of embarrassment to the government. First, they enjoyed extensive contacts with East European ethnic organizations in the U.S. Secondly, despite American hostility to the Communist regimes, the government could not overtly receive and assist the exiles without creating incidents with their home governments which the U.S. had recognized. Thus any act of relief would lead to sticky diplomatic problems. However, in addition to the welfare problem presented by the exiles' presence, there was a foreign policy motive behind the creation of the FEC. The Soviet Union was well practiced in the art of promoting its objectives through "private" front organizations. The exiles' presence in the United States presented the government with an opportunity to mount a similar operation against the Russians in Eastern Europe. According to the Katzenbach Committee, which revealed the fact that the FEC was CIA

beneficiary:³⁸

After World War II the United States witnessed a surge of activity carried out by the so-called private groups but which were actually sponsored by the Soviet Union. The U.S. reacted by covertly funding U.S. organizations formed to meet the challenge but not able to be self-supporting from the public. This assistance was given pursuant to National Security Council policies beginning October, 1951 and with subsequent concurrence of future administrations.

Covert funding of private groups would promote an American ideological response to Communism which would appear spontaneous and public-supported rather than official. Covert funding was also necessary to avoid having to justify each instance of support. Thomas Braden, a CIA official during this period, has noted that the Administration wished to outflank the watchful eye of Senator McCarthy and other right-wing members of Congress who would condemn government aid to any but the most extremely conservative groups when those groups considered most effective propaganda channels were thought to be liberal, and left-wing anti-Communist organizations, particularly in Europe.³⁹

There is no indication that the Katzenbach Committee was aware of the fact that the FEC was not in fact a private voluntary organization. It merely listed the FEC and RFE as receiving covert funds. The fact of CIA control was not made public until Senator Clifford Case introduced legislation in 1971 to cut RFE off from CIA funds.⁴⁰ He acted on the basis of the Katzenbach Committee's recommendation that all covert funds to private organizations should be halted. The State Department responded in a statement saying that RFE was "not

an educational or private voluntary organization" and therefore did not fall under the restrictions of the Katzenbach Committee.⁴¹ The Case bill prompted President Nixon to respond with an alternative bill to fund RFE and Radio Liberty through amendment of the Smith-Mundt act.⁴² During the hearings which followed, the State Department released the report of yet another committee, headed by then Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It had been established by President Johnson to recommend methods for overt funding of the organizations exposed by the Katzenbach effort. The Rusk Committee recommended that RFE and Radio Liberty continue to be financed by the CIA because "(a) they did not represent a clear-cut case of legitimate private voluntary organizations, and (b) because they had been considered of such great importance to U.S. policy for so long."⁴³

George F. Kennan was assigned the task, by the State Department, of laying the groundwork for the FEC. Mr. Kennan spoke to a number of individuals in and out of government. In February, 1949, he consulted finally with Joseph Grew, Ambassador to Japan at the start of World War II and former Under and Acting Secretary of State in the Truman Administration. Kennan expressed the Department's view that an appropriate response to Soviet policy and the exile problem should be outside official government.⁴⁴ Grew agreed to cooperate, and Secretary of State Acheson then formally requested that Grew form a private corporation, ostensibly to "deal with certain aspects of the refugee problem."⁴⁵ Grew,

in turn, enlisted the aid of his former foreign service colleague, Dewitt C. Poole, and together they recruited other members of the FEC. The Committee was formally incorporated in New York and as stated its purposes were:⁴⁶

To help nonfascist and non-Communist exiles and refugees to maintain themselves in useful occupations during their absence from their homelands and to come to know the people of the United States and other free nations and to understand their spirit and aims; to assist these exiles and refugees in maintaining contact with their fellow citizens in other countries by radio and other means and in keeping alive among them the ideals of individual and national freedom; to make available facilities whereby these exiles and refugees can contribute to the cause and maintenance of freedom under law.

On June 2nd, 1949, Grew held a press conference and announced the formation of the FEC. In speaking of the necessity for suitable employment of the "democratic exiles who have come to us from Eastern Europe", he alluded to what would become Radio Free Europe: "Our second purpose will be to put the voices of the exiled leaders on the air, addressed to their own peoples back in Europe, in their own languages in the familiar tones. We shall help them also if we can, to get their messages back by printed word."⁴⁷ The FEC was ostensibly governed by a nineteen man Board of Directors from which an executive committee was drawn. The FEC was headquartered in New York City, and established radio operations in Germany, Portugal and Spain.

The original members of the committee, according to Robert Holt, were: Joseph Grew, Chairman of the Board; Dewitt C. Poole, Frank Altschul, Hamilton Fish Armstrong,

A.A. Berle, Francis Biddle, Robert Woods Bliss, James B. Carey, Hugh O. Drum, Allen W. Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark Ethridge, William Green, Charles R. Hook, Arthur Bliss Lane, Henry R. Luce, Arthur W. Page, Charles M. Spofford, Charles P. Taft, Dewitt Wallace, Mathew Woll and James A. Farley.

Between 1949 and 1953 the membership changed and the committee expanded. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Dewitt C. Poole, Hugh Drum, William Green, Arthur Bliss Lane and Mathew Woll left the committee. Beginning in 1951 many new members were added: Clarence Adcock, Raymond Pace Alexander, Laird Bell, Robert Bradford, Harry Eullis, H.W. Chase, Lucis D. Clay, William L. Clayton, Clark Clifford, Cecil B. De Mille, Frank Denton, Frederick Dolbaer, William J. Donovan, Julius Fleischmann, Henry Ford II, Virginia Gildersleve, Palmer Hoyt, Charles D. Jackson, Paul Keston, J.V. McKee, Web Maddox, H.B. Miller, Irving L. Olds, Frederick Osborn, Spencer Rheonix, Whitney Sheppardson, John Silby, Spyrous Skuras, H. Gregory Thomas, Abbot Washburn, W.W. Waymack, Walter Wheeler, Charles E. Wilson, Mrs Quincy Wright (wife of then High Commissioner in Germany) and Darryl P. Zanuk.⁴⁸

In recruiting members for the committee, the government clearly attempted to accomplish more than a mere assemblage of grey eminences for letter-head purposes. It certainly did create a coalition of corporate and government elite. But it also relied heavily on men with military and governmental backgrounds whose experience was relevant to the functions of the committee. Five members were former high

ranking officials in government operations directly related to intelligence gathering, psychological warfare and propaganda. The most prominent, William J. Donovan, former Director of the Office of Strategic Services, Palmer Hoyt, former Domestic Director of the Office of War Information and Charles D. Jackson, Deputy Civilian Director of the Psychological Warfare Division - SHAEF. Nine members were former Generals in World War II; eight had served with the Military Government in Germany, including the Commander, General Clay. Thirty-four others had served in civilian government roles during the war and in the Truman administration afterwards. This group included six former Under Secretaries of State and five former Ambassadors. In addition to men with these service backgrounds, four members were public relations executives, ten were either top executives or experts in the mass media, and three, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Arthur Bliss Lane and Mark F. Ethridge, could be considered experts in Eastern European politics and Soviet policy in the area. Moreover, a number of foundations important for their bringing together government, military and corporate leaders for post-war planning were represented. Nine committee members, for example, belonged to the Council on Foreign Relations, three to the National Planning Association, four to the Twentieth Century Fund, seven to the Committee for Economic Development, and two to the Foreign Policy Association.⁴⁹

Aside from these general categories, a number of

individuals warrant specific attention, because of roles they played in the past, or were to play in the Republican Administration. Mark Ethridge, apart from the value of his background as a journalist, headed the U.S. Investigatory Commission to Eastern Europe for President Truman. His task was to report on the degree of democracy in the regimes and the extent to which the Soviet Union was fulfilling its part of the Yalta agreements. His decisively negative report was an admitted significant factor in Truman's decision to adopt a firmer policy with the Soviets.⁵⁰ Arthur Bliss Lane was U.S. Ambassador to the Polish government-in-Exile in London, and after the war, to the Communist Polish government. He was bitterly critical of Yalta and during his tenure as Ambassador emphasized the puppet character of the regime and the widespread use of terror. His numerous dispatches were influential in shaping Washington's policies toward Eastern Europe.⁵¹ Dwight Eisenhower was former Commander-in-Chief - SHAEF, and later President of the United States. Allen Dulles brought his considerable experience in the OSS first to the FEC, then to the CIA as its Director under Eisenhower. Of those men who joined the FEC after its initial organization, John C. Hughes subsequently became Eisenhower's Ambassador to NATO and Abbot Washburn resigned his FEC membership in 1952 to direct the National Headquarters of Citizens for Eisenhower. He later was named to the President's special committee on International Information Activities. Washburn then served briefly as C.D. Jackson's deputy before becoming Deputy

Director of the USIA.⁵² Probably the most important link between the FEC and government was Charles D. Jackson. Jackson was Director of Radio Free Europe during its initial development and executive Vice Chairman of the FEC. He left his position to become Eisenhower's Special Advisor for Psychological Warfare Matters. He resumed his membership on the FEC in 1957, after leaving the Administration. Finally, Charles E. Wilson, Chairman of General Electric, resigned his membership in 1953 and became Secretary of Defense.

What this career analysis indicates is that there was a significant personal interchange between the FEC and the Federal government. Men who at one time were involved in policy making during the war and in the Truman Administration later did the same in the FEC. Others were later to join the Republican Administration in decision making positions in Defense, Intelligence and Psychological Warfare areas. Members with backgrounds in the military and mass media were undoubtedly important to FEC subdivisions, the Crusade for Freedom and Radio Free Europe. The Crusade relied heavily on free exposure in the media, while Radio Free Europe conducted intelligence and balloon operations in addition to broadcast propaganda. The FEC itself supported exile organizations in the U.S. plus operating a large publishing division.

Most members had gained their respective experiences in wartime or during the initial stages of the Cold War. In this light the committee's militant anti-Communist stance

(including the posture of almost a war footing by Radio Free Europe) is not surprising. The long-accepted view that Radio Free Europe's hard core propaganda was due to its emigre broadcasters is not accurate. That notion rests on the assumptions that the FEC was a non-governmental institution and that broadcast decisions, as per RFE publicity, were made by the emigres. Now that we know that neither situation was the case in fact, the importance of the original guiding lights of the FEC, with their war-oriented backgrounds, cannot be underestimated.

Policy control of the FEC was the joint responsibility of the CIA and the Department of State. This included content control and control of operating policy for Radio Free Europe.⁵³ Only the top executives of the Committee were made privy to the CIA sponsorship. Although it is not certain whether all members of the committee were officially informed, those who sat on the board and the executive committee seemingly knew of the connection. Those so informed were required to sign a statement of secrecy. The text was given to the New York Times by a source described as being "long familiar with the operation",⁵⁴

The undersigned has been informed that Radio Free Europe is a project of the CIA and that the CIA provides funds for operations of this organization. The undersigned has now been officially informed. If he divulges this information to a third party, he becomes liable for a fine and punishment not to exceed 10,000 dollars and ten years in prison.

At FEC headquarters in New York, government control was exercised through regular meetings between the Board and CIA.

Normally the liaison at this level concerned budgetary matters and the overall character of FEC programs.⁵⁵

Discussions did not take the form of specific operating instructions.⁵⁶ Day to day affairs were handled by the FEC/RFE bureaucratic structure, within the parameters established by the CIA.⁵⁷ Specific content control of broadcasts was maintained by the inter-agency committee and RFE headquarters in Munich.⁵⁸ According to the Library of Congress research report, which studied the relationship only between October 1970 and April 1971, the link maintained between the CIA and FEC was "the kind of relationship which one might expect to exist between a government agency and one of its subordinate extensions".⁵⁹ Liaisons with the Department of State and the Office of the Budget and Management were maintained by the New York office -- apart from that with the CIA. These connections were for purposes of information gathering and finance, not policy control.⁶⁰

Specific links between the committee and the government were obviously necessary for program maintenance, but it is clear that the nature of the FEC, its purpose, was insured by definition through its membership. These were men who had made or executed earlier policies which led subsequent decision makers to decide that an organization like FEC was necessary. Thus the real control was rooted in a consensus about the nature of the threat and the appropriate response. The membership included those who had witnessed the demise of the grand alliance, the absorption of Eastern Europe by

Russia, and who had set the tone of American hostility to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Committee included those who would subsequently join an administration pledged to "liberate" Eastern Europe.

The Free Europe Committee was funded from the secret budget of the CIA. The initial expenditure was 69,000 dollars in 1949, allowing Grew to establish the Committee. From that point on the Committee received millions annually, cumulatively totalling \$117,169,349.65 by 1959.

TABLE 3-1
Schedule of U.S. Contributions to
Free Europe Committee⁶¹

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
1949	\$ 69,000.00
1950	3,108,968.73
1951	8,681,715.50
1952	16,164,867.25
1953	14,871,703.51
1954	12,230,764.38
1955	11,728,850.01
1956	12,299,669.29
1957	14,430,322.30
1958	10,103,301.32
1959	13,480,187.36

The figures show that the FEC grew as the Cold War became increasingly intense. Between 1949 and 1950 its budget

increased by over 45 times its original allotment. In 1951 it tripled and by 1952 it had doubled again.

Radio Free Europe consumed most of the CIA funds given to the FEC and may be regarded as the major operation undertaken by the Committee. There were however, two other divisions not directly connected with the radio activity which the FEC operated. These were the Free Europe Press and the Exile Relations Division. Both were abruptly ended by the government in 1971 when the CIA connection was made public. This may have been prompted by the fact that both of these non-radio activities constituted covert domestic operations and thus put the CIA in violation of the National Security Act.

The Free Europe Press was the Committee's publishing division. It printed a variety of materials on Eastern European politics and the Soviet presence there in book, magazine and pamphlet form. These publications were extensively distributed in the U.S. upon request, without fee, except for postage.⁶² Others were intended for both foreign as well as domestic audiences. There were three continuing publications in this category, Na Antenie in Polish, Magyar Hirlap in Hungarian, and Osteuropaische Rundschau in German. Na Antenie contained reprints of Polish language broadcasts by RFE. Its circulation was 2,800 in 1971 of which 800 were freely distributed. It was designed to supplement RFE and was mailed to Poles living in the West, to be re-mailed to relatives and friends in Poland.⁶³ Thus

RFE as the source was disguised. Magyar Hirlap is similar in nature intended for the Hungarian audience in the West and in Hungary. In 1957 its circulation was 8,000.⁶⁴ After the Hungarian Revolution, in 1956, the Free Europe Press printed 38,000 refugee handbooks which were distributed by the Department of State to refugees fleeing into Austria.⁶⁵ The book contained basic information about life in the West and the U.S. The German publication was designed as a public relations effort in West Germany, in support of the RFE presence there. Its circulation in 1971 was 12,000.⁶⁶

The U.S. publications were aimed primarily at libraries, research institutions and academics. The principle publication was News from Behind the Iron Curtain, later renamed East Europe after the government muted the Committee and RFE's Cold War image. Mailed free upon request, it contained articles on Eastern European affairs, RFE research reports and even articles by scholars on occasion. Beginning in 1958, German, Italian and French editions were published. The reason, according to the President's Report of 1958, was to combat Communism among "uncommitted peoples".⁶⁷ In 1957 the American edition had a circulation in the U.S. of 6,500 and was reported to be increasing at the rate of approximately 1,500 subscribers a year.⁶⁸ In addition to its magazine, the Free Europe Press also published large printings of Research and Analysis reports. These contained data gathered from RFE monitoring of East European radios, press summaries and political events.⁶⁹ Several were published each month

with a circulation of around 900 in 1971.⁷⁰ Between its inception and 1959 the Free Europe Press published "Special Reports" which it distributed to newspapers, television stations and wireservices. Often these were printed under the letterhead of the Crusade for Freedom.⁷¹ These also concerned a variety of topics, like the Research and Analysis reports but with two important differences. First, where the Research Reports were produced in a scholarly format, the Special Reports were journalistic and extremely anti-Communist in tone. Second, many of the Special Reports concerned events occurring in the U.S. as well as material on Eastern Europe. They were sent out as factual news releases, but were very polemic in their style.⁷² Some typical examples of these reports are: "Comments on the Forthcoming Congress of the All-Union Communist Party" (sent to wire-services); "The Position of Youth in the Captive Countries: an Examination of Communist Techniques in the Indoctrination of Youth" (#14); and "Western Labor Fights Communism" (#23). This was a collection of statements from U.S. labor leaders George Meany, James B. Carey (FEC), David Dubinsky, and Michael Ross. The latter report referred to these men as "labor diplomats".⁷³ Another (#28), dated for release May 8th, 1952, was an interview with an Hungarian woman who had just fled to the West. Special Report #30 was a news release reporting on the "Freedom Dinner" given by the Tolstoy Foundation in New York in honor of twenty-two Russians who had defected. Number 36 was a re-write of a New York Times item

retitled "Reds forget Lend Lease". Number 39 entitled "The Case Against Slave Labor", featured testimony of Mathew Woll, an FEC member before the International Confederation of the Free Trade Unions.

In 1957 the FEC took measures to counter the widespread criticism directed toward RFE for broadcasts it made during the Hungarian Revolution. The Free Europe Press produced a special publication, resembling Life Magazine, entitled The Revolt in Hungary. It was a chronicle of the uprising with samplings of broadcasts monitored by RFE of rebel shortwave broadcasts. It was silent, however, on the nature of RFE broadcasts. Besides a huge English edition, 10,000 and 50,000 were printed in French and Italian respectively.⁷⁴ The FEP also reprinted the UN General Assembly investigation of the revolt, Report on Hungary. 14,410 copies were printed in English, French, Spanish and Russian respectively.⁷⁵ Ten thousand copies were sent, as the President's Report put it, "to Free World newspaper and magazine editors".⁷⁶ Not satisfied with condemning the Russian intervention, the Committee assembled "kits" on "The quisling regime of Janos Kadar" and sent them free of charge to all United Nations Delegates and to the UN Press Corps. The USIA placed 415 kits in its overseas libraries.⁷⁷

The Free Europe Press also published a booklet series under the title Studies in Communism. These consisted of essays on various anti-Communist themes written by the emigres. In 1956-57 for example, nine were issued: Ideology and

Revolution, Youth in Revolt, Forty Years of Communist Power, Responsibility and History, Poland Between Octobers, People in the Polish October, Force vs Food, Religion Under Communism, Flashes in the Night. Each subscriber to the RFE Magazine, including the USIA, received copies.⁷⁸ The importance of what was in effect a CIA publishing firm should not be gauged by the small numbers of its editions. Though nothing, except possibly the piece on the Hungarian Revolution, ever became a best seller, the audience was select. It consisted of professionals, mostly academics, and research institutions. Moreover, the entire repertoire was concentrated on the single theme of Eastern Europe and functioned to direct attention on the area by those likely to produce more of such work.

The second non-radio function of the FEC was as important for its domestic function as the Free Europe Press. The original purpose of the FEC was declared in part to aid the "refugees to maintain themselves in useful occupations during their absences from their homelands".⁷⁹ By implication their absence was to be temporary; they were to be "maintained" during their absence rather than integrated into a new homeland. This was accomplished partly by employing the exiles in writing and broadcast roles. Another means, however, was by direct support of individuals and organizing and funding exile organizations. At the outset, responsibility for this rested with the Exile Relations Program.⁸⁰ It was later renamed the Exile Political Organization Division.⁸¹

There were four sub-divisions publicly linked to the FEC: the Western European Operations Division; the Free Europe Organization and Publications Division; the Free World Operations Division; and the Citizen Services Division.⁸²

There were four other sub-divisions whose names implied no connection with the FEC: the Committee for National Councils; Committee for Intellectual Co-operation; Committee for American Contact; and Support of the Free Europe University in Exile.⁸³ Sixteen separate symbolic organizations were supported. The government paid salaries, expenses and equipment costs.⁸⁴ Two important programs were the Mid-European Studies Center and the Free Europe University in Exile. The Studies Center employed exiles to undertake research on historical, cultural, political subjects in their respective countries. The Free Europe University in Exile was a part of the University of Strausborg. The Strausborg Chancellor, Levering Tyson, was a founding member of the FEC. The purpose of the University was to permit exiles to complete education interrupted by the necessity to flee their homelands and to allow others to attain a University degree.⁸⁵

These non-radio activities of the FEC ended abruptly by Presidential order when the CIA link was exposed.⁸⁶ The sole activity of the FEC today is Radio Free Europe.

In summary, through the FEC front, the CIA was able to disseminate a variety of materials hostile to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and make it appear as though it were a free and independent undertaking of concerned citizens. The exile

relations program gave the government a means of controlling the East European exiles and orienting their efforts into areas supportive of American foreign policy. What is particularly important is the orientation with scholarly activity both by the Free Europe Press and the exile program. The intellectual community of academics and media professionals comprises an important element of the opinion elite of the population in foreign policy issue areas. The mass appeals to the general public conducted by the Crusade for Freedom will be shown to be quite different in style and tone.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Qualter, Terrence. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 125.
- ²His speech is cited in Chapter II. Daugherty, William E. A Psychological Warfare Case Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 136. This casebook was prepared for the Operations Research Office for training purposes in PW operations. See also Qualter, op. cit., p. 161.
- ³Qualter, ibid., p. 161.
- ⁴Perusse, Roland. "Psychological Warfare Re-examined" in Daugherty, op. cit., p. 26.
- ⁵Quoted by Perusse ibid., p. 26. Linebarger's book was published first by Combat Forces Press in 1948 and in second edition by Duell, Sloan & Pearce in 1954.
- ⁶Ibid.
- ⁷Daugherty, op.cit., pp. 136-137.
- ⁸U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1972), pp. 101 & 103. Hereafter cited as GAO Report.
- ⁹GAO Report pp. 96 & 97. Also see the NYT March 19, 1951, p. 3.
- ¹⁰Quoted by Daugherty, op. cit., p. 38.
- ¹¹Patch, B.W. "Non Military Weapons in the Cold War Offensive" in Summers, R.E. (ed.), America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare (New York: Wilson Co., 1951), p. 32.
- ¹²Sapin, Burtin. The Making of United States Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 206-7.
- ¹³Republican Party Platform (Foreign Policy Plank), written by Dulles and reprinted in McCoy, Donald & O'Connor, Raymond G. (eds.) Readings in Twentieth Century History (New York: MacMillan Co., 1963), p. 550.
- ¹⁴U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1950, pp. 88-91. Hereafter cited as DSB.

¹⁵Life Magazine, May 19, 1952, pp. 154-156.

¹⁶NYT, September 18, 1952, p. 24.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸For McCarthy's statement see NYT September 19, 1952, p. 14.
For Senator Taft's, see NYT, October 26, 1952, p. 67.

¹⁹NYT, October 12, 1952, p. 3.

²⁰NYT, October 9, 1952, p. 24.

²¹Ibid.

²²NYT, August 28, 1952, p. 12.

²³DSB, February 9, 1953, p. 217.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵DSB, July 27, 1953, p. 124. Also see NYT, July 9, 1953, p. 8.

²⁶DSB, ibid.

²⁷DSB, September 28, 1953, p. 421.

²⁸DSB, June 15, 1953, p. 854.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Kraft, Joseph. "USIA: Uncle Sam's Interpreter Abroad" in Show, vol. III, June 1963, p. 47.

³¹Ibid. Also see Bremel, Arthur "The Split Personality of the USIA" Harpers Magazine vol. 231 (September 1965), pp. 116-124. For contemporary accounts see "Secret Blacklist: the Untold Story of the USIA", The Nation, vol. 179, (October 30, 1954), pp. 376-378. "USIA getting Kicked Around", America, vol. 94, (November 26, 1955), p. 226, and Davie, E. "Profile and the Censors", Saturday Review, vol. 38, (March 5, 1955), p. 11.

³²Kraft, op. cit.

- 33 Sapin, Burtin. The Making of United States Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 207.
- 34 Daugherty, op. cit., p. 139.
- 35 Bernays, Edward, & Hershey, Burnet (eds.), The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Policies and Programs (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 8-9.
- 36 "Report of the Committee to Review Relationships" (Katzenbach Committee) in Compilation of Presidential Documents vol. 3, (Washington, 1968), p. 556. Full report not cited here, but for reference.
- 37 Radio Free Europe - A Survey and Analysis (Washington: Library of Congress, 1972), p. 7. Hereafter cited as Library of Congress Report.
- 38 Katzenbach Committee, op. cit., p. 556.
- 39 Braden, Thomas "I'm Glad the CIA is Immoral", Saturday Evening Post, May 20, 1967, p. 14. Also see "House of Glass", Newsweek, March 6, 1967, pp. 28-32. For a general discussion of CIA support of liberal/intellectual organizations, see: Domhoff, William G. The Higher Circles (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 251-275. For an interesting account of the CIA connection to the left liberal National Student Association and its links with Labor Unions, see: "A Short History Account of International Students and the Cold War with particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, etc.", Ramparts Magazine, March 1967; and "Three Tales of the CIA", Ramparts, April 1967.
- 40 Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations - U.S. Senate, May 24, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 5. Hereafter cited as RFE Hearing.
- 41 "Don't Ask", New Republic, February 6, 1971, pp. 13-14.
- 42 RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 1.
- 43 "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: History", submitted by the Department of State. Printed in RFE Hearing, ibid., p. 72.
- 44 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 7.

⁴⁵Quoted in Hold, Robert. Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 10.

⁴⁶Certificate of Incorporation National Committee for a Free Europe. Filed May 11, 1949, and amended November 1, 1963. This document is in the Foreign Relations Committee Files.

⁴⁷NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.

⁴⁸Holt, Robert, op. cit., p. 233. For a career history of each member of the FEC, see Appendix I.

The membership of the Committee is printed on the back cover of issues of News From Behind the Iron Curtain, the official RFE magazine. See Appendix I for a complete list of FEC members and their career backgrounds.

⁴⁹A great deal of scholarly attention has recently been paid to the influence of these policy-study foundations on domestic foreign policy by so-called "revisionist" historians and social scientists. The following is not a complete list, but is adequate for background purposes. Domhoff, G. William Who Rules America (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1967). This book investigates the links of these organizations to the American governing class. His Higher Circles does the same, but concentrates specifically on foreign policy (Chapters V and VI). For the groups' asserted planning role, see "Business Planners and America's Post War Expansion" by David Easkins in Horovitz, David, Corporations and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), and Marver Bernstein's "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform" in his edited volume Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Random House, 1968).

⁵⁰Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Year of Decisions, Vol. I, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), p. 551. Also Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 99.

⁵¹Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 402.

⁵²NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.

⁵³Congressional Record, March 6, 1972, p. 53314.

⁵⁴ Binder, David. "Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role", New York Times, March 15, 1971. Reprinted in RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 67.

⁵⁵ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ RFE Hearing, pp. 7, 11, 38, 71.

⁵⁹ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 37.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁶¹ GAO Report, op. cit., p. 101. For a complete breakdown of government monies provided to the FEC, see Appendix II.

⁶² GAO Report, p. 88. See also Binder, op. cit.

⁶³ GAO Report, ibid., pp. 34 & 88.

⁶⁴ President's Report, 1957 (Free Europe Committee), p. 18.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ GAO Report, op. cit., p. 88

⁶⁷ President's Report, 1958 (Free Europe Committee), p. 3.

⁶⁸ President's Report, 1957, op. cit., p. 16. The German edition of News From Behind the Iron Curtain was entitled Dem Eisernen Vorhang. Titles for the other editions were not given.

⁶⁹ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 53.

⁷⁰ GAO Report, op. cit., p. 89.

⁷¹ Special Reports, Bound volume, 1952. These were collected and bound by the Library of Congress for 1952 only. The volume contained no page numbers; so the edition number given on each release has been used.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid. All examples are from this source. No other examples from other years could be located.

74 President's Report, 1957, op. cit., p. 17. The French edition was titled Le Revolte En Hongrie; the Italian, La Revolizione Ungherese.

75 Ibid. The U.N. report is titled Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York: 11th Session of the General Assembly, 1957).

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Certificate of Incorporation, op. cit., p. 1.

80 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 10.

81 GAO Report, op. cit., p. 10.

82 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., p. 30.

85 Ibid., p. 17.

86 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 10, and GAO Report op. cit., p. 30. The government is now paying annuities to individuals formerly supported through these programs.

CHAPTER IVRADIO FREE EUROPE

In this chapter we shall discuss the radio operation of the Free Europe Committee; Radio Free Europe. RFE was a highly developed instrument of psychological warfare created by the government and operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was aimed exclusively at the countries of Eastern Europe, which made it in relation to its audience, the largest anti-Communist instrument in the world. Government control was concealed behind the facade of a private corporation subsisting on public donations. We will demonstrate that RFE became the principle instrument of the Eisenhower Administration to operationalize its policy of liberation in Eastern Europe.

To place RFE in the context of our theoretical perspective of the Cold War, it will be examined as an instrument of informal penetration. The concept of informal penetration as it has been developed by Professor Andrew Scott provides an operational framework for understanding the function of RFE. Professor Scott defines informal penetration as a policy, "by which the agents or instruments of one country gain access to the population (or parts of it) or processes of another country."¹ The "informal" character of such policies comes by virtue of the fact that they operate on the populations or processes of the target(s) rather than on the government.

Whether the target country's government approves or disapproves, is aware or unaware of the penetration is largely irrelevant.² Scott thus uses the terms "formal" and "informal" in potentially confusing ways. Formal relations have usually international contacts recognized by the governments conducting them. But not to Scott.³

Formal relations, government to government relations, have been increasingly supplemented by informal relations, in which the agents or instruments of one country are able to reach inside the border of another, with or without the knowledge and approval of the government of the second country.

Thus, informal penetration can be any instrument of foreign policy designed to have an impact on the political process or population of the target country. This is thought by Scott to be the distinguishing characteristic of international relations since World War I. Prior to the first world war, international politics had been characterized by relations between governments. There was little concern for the nature of the system the governments maintained. The emphasis was primarily on applying external influences. However, history is not without examples of informal penetration, usually referred to as Trojan Horse or fifth column tactics. Such precedents are not analogous to the present scene because of their limited scope and duration. They were associated with war situations and did not constitute the dominant style of relations between states.

Scott provides five general explanations for the change. First, public opinion has become a factor for governments of all types to consider in decision making. The degree a target

government can be influenced by the attitudes or behavior of its masses is the degree to which the population will become a potential target. Second, the development of ideological competition also explains the importance of informal penetration. The Cold War period was fundamentally presented as a conflict between opposing ways of life. Conducting conflict with techniques of informal penetration requires, according to Scott, an ideological base.⁴ Third, as never before, nation states are vulnerable to having the loyalty of their citizens subverted through the introduction of differing ideologies from outside. The principle change in the international system is that the primary units of the system, nation states, are no longer self-contained decisional units.⁵ Fourth, technology is an obvious element in the use of informal penetrative techniques. RFE is an archetypal example of the application of technology to international politics. Technology also removed other forms of conflict from the option lists of decision makers. The advent of nuclear weapons raised the possibilities of mutual destruction and has made governments unwilling to pursue courses which might lead to open warfare between states possessing them. Of course, informal penetration existed before nuclear weapons and so was not caused by their existence. But the existence of such weapons helps to explain the rapid development and popularity of the technique. RFE was the sole instrument by which the U.S. attempted to dislodge the Soviets from Eastern Europe. The last factor is the rise of

new nations, whose desire for assistance usually outweighs their concern for strict total control over their internal processes. This is tangentially applicable to the present study.

We can view the Eastern European countries as they emerged from World War II as new states. They had governments whose policies and ideology were radically different from the traditional forms. Many of the most cherished cultural traditions, private property, religious values, civil liberties, etc., were altered swiftly and forcibly. A wide elite-mass gap commonly associated with "developing" nations was clearly evident. It was precisely that gap which the United States attempted to exploit through RFE.

Professor Scott points out that informal penetration can be used either for purposes of supporting a target or attacking it. The Cold War gets its name because it was a period of informal attack. The bulk of Scott's analysis of informal penetration is devoted to the question of informal attack.⁶ He assigns a relatively secondary importance to informal support because attack techniques were developed earlier, assigned greater importance and were in dominant use during the Cold War. He also believes the potential for growth and elaboration of informal attack is, at least for the time being, greater.⁷ Scott defines informal attack as a:⁸

means of attacking a nation state through the dissolution of loyalty that binds citizen and nation. It places new demands on the loyalty of the individual, and it means that the leaders

of a nation can no longer assume that the citizen will automatically give his primary loyalty to that nation.

Scott provides five categories of informal penetration distinguished by source: 1) governmental - access by the agents of a government; 2) quasi-governmental - access by those not government agents, but who have a special relationship with it; 3) nongovernmental - access by tourists, missionaries, etc.; 4) access by an international organization; 5) access by a nation through the medium of an International Organisation.⁹ Because the motivation, support and direction of RFE were governmental, it will be treated as a government instrument of informal penetration.

The significance of a covert government instrument of informal penetration is not easy to determine. Scott considers the difference merely a matter of tactical necessity. His writing displays no systematic analysis of the distinction, probably because he assumes that "it does not involve significant changes in the structure and functioning of the nation state system".¹⁰ Clearly however, there are important differences. The first, easily recognized in Scott's work, is that informal attack techniques are always covert. And it is attack techniques which Scott emphasizes when discussing what he considers to be the major change in the international system, to wit: the attempted creation of mass disloyalty.¹¹

At least two factors had a bearing on the decision to operate the FEC and its divisions, RFE and the Crusade for Freedom (CFF) covertly. One was the nature of the formal

relations between the U.S. and the countries of Eastern Europe. The civilian facade of RFE permitted the government to execute its liberation policy without having to accept official responsibility for the nature and consequences of specific operations. RFE broadcasts and particularly the balloon campaigns constituted open breaches of international law and custom governing the behavior of states enjoying formal peaceful relations. The second factor involved the domestic operation of the FEC, the Crusade for Freedom. Professor Scott concentrates solely on penetration and ignores techniques which function to counter other nations' penetrative efforts. As nations became more "porous" as he puts it, and increasingly threatened with losing control over the behavior of their populations, methods were developed to defend against informal attack. The obvious example is Eastern Europe which operated a network of radio jamming facilities to block RFE broadcasts. Indeed they attempted to cut themselves off as much as possible from all "Western" influences. The CFF performed a similar function for the United States. It was an instrument of domestic propaganda directed by the state which mobilized public opinion against Communist ideology and its chief exponent, the Soviet Union.

As stated in the introduction, if the Cold War is primarily a period of intense ideological conflict pursued with techniques of informal penetration, then the operation of the FEC is central to our understanding of the period. The FEC represents the ideal form of Cold War weaponry. Through

RFE the government waged informal attack directly against the enemy, while through the CFF it simultaneously protected its own internal processes from penetration by the enemy. It was an ingeniously simple and efficient weapon (insofar as it combined both attack and defense in one instrument) of the Cold War. The Cold War consisted primarily of the use of and defense against informal penetration, principally informal attack. This chapter discusses one instrument of attack, perhaps the most important, Radio Free Europe.

Origins

The Free Europe Committee established a radio committee in 1949, less than a month after its announced formation. Robert Lang, a former member of the OSS, had been retained to direct the work of a 136 man staff whose task it was to lay the foundations for RFE.¹² Lang initially travelled to Europe and the Middle East with the aim of purchasing air time for the FEC on short wave stations already operating. He was turned down by everyone he contacted and returned to recommend the FEC establish its own facility.¹³ Specialists were hired to train the exiles in broadcasting.¹⁴ Training took place in New York and the first programmes were recorded at the WMCA studios.¹⁵ The scripts were then flown to Germany via the State Department for broadcasting.¹⁶ The FEC had a thirty man staff in Germany at the RFE transmitter. At this time the operation was small. The exiles' knowledge and expertise on Eastern Europe were the source of the scripts

of which about 100 were produced per week.¹⁷ The Committee had difficulty acquiring frequencies over which to broadcast. This was partially due to Soviet interference which had thrown European radio into utter confusion. The State Department, however, finally intervened directly to obtain three channels for the Committee. These were two short-wave in the six megacycle band and one medium wave frequency on 179 kilocycles.¹⁸ RFE hit the air waves on July 4, 1950, over a 7.5 kilowatt transmitter located in Lampertheim, West Germany.¹⁹ Air time was limited to 1½ hours daily to each country in Eastern Europe except Yugoslavia.²⁰ On July 4, 1950, the New York Times reported the location was being kept secret. On July 9th, it said the transmitter was "in the vicinity of Munich". On July 17th, Newsweek reported the transmitter to be thirty miles south of Frankfurt.²¹

In April, 1951, the FEC set up transmitters in Portugal. The purpose was to provide RFE with the capability of overcoming the Soviet jamming.²² The license was held by a Portuguese corporation, S.A. de Radio-Retransmissao, S.L.R.L., or "RARET". Sixty percent of the board was required to be Portuguese and hold a majority of the stock. RFE was granted 40% of the seats and made responsible for all the financing.²³ Chairman of Raret was General Peixoto Auha, former Military Governor of Lisbon. Between 1951 and 1952 RFE was permitted to import one million dollars worth of equipment duty free.²⁴ Eight transmitters were built, with an output, cumulatively, of 400 kilowatts.²⁵ RFE constructed the site at Gloria for

an initial cost of 490,000 dollars -- and 57,000 dollars in property purchases from the Portuguese Government.²⁶ Operations began in 1951. By 1954 four more transmitters were added and in 1958-59 an additional two were built, bringing the total to 14 transmitters producing a total of 835 kilowatts of power.²⁷

<u>Year</u> <u>Operational</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Transmitters</u>	<u>Power of Each</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Kilowatts</u>
1951-52	8	50	400
1954	4	100	400
1958	1	10	10
1959	1	25	25
<u>Total</u>	14	<u>Total</u>	835

Also in 1951, the entire RFE programming operation was moved to Germany in an effort to decrease the time and distance between preparation and broadcast. It gave RFE a greater ability to gather intelligence directly from Eastern Europe and greater speed in reacting to events there. RFE was registered as a non-profit foreign corporation. Licenses were granted by the German Federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications which enabled RFE to sign long-term leases for transmitting and monitoring stations and for maintaining a general Headquarters.²⁸ RFE leased 117 acres in a Munich district known as Englische Garten for \$8,700 per year. At a cost of \$1.1 million it constructed its general headquarters which included studios, offices and

housing for personnel.²⁹ Additional transmitter facilities were constructed at Biblis and Holzkirchen at an initial cost of \$124,000 and \$114,000 respectively.³⁰

<u>BIBLIS</u>			
<u>Year Operational</u>	<u>Number of Transmitters</u>	<u>Power of Each</u>	<u>Total Kilowatts</u>
1951	1	20	20
1952	3	50	150
1953	5	10	50
<hr/>			
Total	9	80	220
<hr/>			
<u>HOLTZKIRCHEN</u>			
1951	1	150	150
1952	4	10	40
<hr/>			
Total	5	160	190

These facilities made up the producing end of RFE. Using them were five "desks" in the Munich headquarters. Each desk operated as a separate radio station with separate program schedules and call names. These were called the Free Voice of Czechoslovakia, the Free Voice of Poland and so on for the five countries targeted by RFE.

The physical growth rate of RFE is an indication of the speed with which the government committed itself to a policy of informal penetration in Eastern Europe. In 1950 RFE operated one 7.5 kilowatt transmitter. In 1951, it

operated 11 from three permanent sites broadcasting 68 hours a day.³¹ In 1952, 18 were in service producing 218 hours of programs a day.³² By the mid '50s, RFE had reached its peak with 29 transmitters, producing 18-20 hours of programs a day to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and 9-10 hours a day to Bulgaria and Rumania.³³ In 1956 the Munich headquarters employed 1,200 people including 220 Americans and 550 exiles.³⁴ They produced programs out of a facility which, by 1952, had 22 separate studios and occupied 70,000 sq.ft. of floor space.³⁵

Organizationally the Munich headquarters contained departments which supported the broadcast desks by collecting data from Eastern Europe and converting this information into program material. These were the news department or Central News Room, RFE Bureaus and the Research and Analysis Department. Each will be briefly described because their operation made RFE not only the government's largest propaganda effort, but also an immense intelligence-gathering system. RFE collected data of every conceivable type on the countries of Eastern Europe.

The Central News Room monitored eleven Communist wire services: Tass, Hsinhua (China), CETEKA (Czechoslovakia), PAP (Poland), MTI (Hungary), Agerpres (Rumania), ETA (Bulgaria), TANJUG (Yugoslavia), ADN (East Germany), ATA (Albania) and VNA (North Vietnam).³⁶ The Research and Analysis Department also monitored and taped broadcasts from 50 East European radio stations. Over 300 hours were stored daily.³⁷ RFE operated two large monitoring facilities. The

largest was located at Schleissheim. Its receivers took up 235 acres which were originally leased from the Military Government in Germany. It was built at an initial cost of 660,000 dollars.³⁸ The smaller was at Moosburg. It became operational in 1952 for a mere 5,900 dollars.³⁹

Detailed monitoring of local radio output was carried on by RFE news bureaus. The establishment of bureaus began in 1953. RFE had applied to open one in every country along the Western border of Eastern Europe. They applied for one in Tel Aviv but were turned down by the Israeli Government.⁴⁰ By 1955, RFE was operating 15 bureaus around the perimeter of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from Stockholm to Istanbul.⁴¹ Five were eventually closed leaving bureaus in Athens, Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome, Stockholm and Vienna.⁴² The aggregate output of the bureaus to Munich was about 1,115,000 words per day.⁴³

The most detailed intelligence was gathered by the Research and Analysis Department. It collected and stored material of a cultural, economic, political, historical and biographical nature. Some of this material was used as background material for the broadcast desks, but it was not supplied to them in raw form. The Department operated under the Office of the Director of RFE. All material was received by the staff of that office, then material was released to the individual desks.⁴⁴ The department collected every newspaper, professional journal and periodical published in Eastern Europe. This included the smallest provincial

newspapers plus tapes of provincial and municipal radios not heard outside Eastern Europe.⁴⁵ In 1957, according to Harpers, its library held 25,000 volumes and a biographical section containing personal data on 1,250,000 people.⁴⁶ RFE according to a source quoted by the New York Times as "very close to the operation" reported that RFE regularly hired accredited correspondents to enter Eastern Europe; "They were paid by RFE to bring back specific information." The department also maintained regular contact with anti-Communist residents in Eastern Europe for the same purposes.⁴⁷ In short, this department was the backbone of RFE's intelligence gathering operation. The Library of Congress study described its importance thus:⁴⁸

Both the files of the information analysis center and the supporting library operation are unique in their quantity, scope and comprehensiveness in Eastern European lore, and it would be impossible to put a realistic price on their value to the scholars, governments, journalists and others who regularly subscribe to the RFE research output.

Policy

The top executive positions in RFE were held by Americans. The highest position obtainable for Exiles was that of Desk Chief, which carried the responsibility of administering the national programming.⁴⁹ The chief American administrator was the Director of RFE. All of the men who have held that position had had extensive government service experience in propaganda and intelligence areas.

Robert Lange was a former member of the OSS. C.D. Jackson's

background has already been documented. The third Director was Richard J. Condon who assumed the post in 1951 after Mr. Jackson resigned. Condon had served in the Office of War Information as an advisor on radio broadcasting. After the war he joined the International Information Agency in the Department of State.⁵⁰ The IIA made up the major element in the future USIA. He resigned in 1955 to become Director of Radio Liberty, the government's other covert propaganda operation. Mr. Condon was replaced by a State Department colleague, J. Convery Egan. Mr. Egan was also an early member of the IIA who later served in the USIS in Germany in the office of Quincy Wright, the High Commissioner of Germany (whose wife was a member of the Board of the FEC). Egan later became the West European Public Affairs Officer attached to the Staff of the American Ambassador to NATO. While with the High Commissioner's Office, Egan was the American censor of the German Daily Die Neue Zeitung and director of American propaganda operations in Berlin (which included RIAS).⁵¹

Publicly, the FEC claimed: "All programs are prepared by the East European exiles for broadcast to their countrymen behind the Iron Curtain."⁵² That statement was technically correct, but distorted by implication the question of policy control. The CIA operated both direct and indirect control over the operation of RFE.

Direct control was exercised by instructions issued by a State Department-CIA inter-agency committee. The

procedure involved reviewing the daily "guidances" covering broadcast policy issued in Munich.⁵³ These were the standard control mechanisms: Daily Guidance Summaries and Notes, Daily Reports (summary highlights of activities of the Eastern European regimes), Recommended Lists (lists of news stories from Communist and Western sources with ratings as to their usefulness) and Principal Program Listings (subjects to be emphasized by each broadcast desk).⁵⁴ Government instructions were relayed back to Munich and varied from "mandatory" to "optional" depending on the importance and sensitivity of the topic.⁵⁵ Normally the instructions concerned the content of editorial opinion and political commentaries.⁵⁶ There were also annual guidances prepared for each country to which RFE broadcasted.⁵⁷

Another form of direct government control came from the presence of CIA employees who operated as part of the American staff of RFE in Munich. Their function was to insure policy guidances were followed and to be available for detailed on-the-spot control if unexpected events should occur.⁵⁸ The specific mechanisms and types of guidances given by the CIA in Munich were not made public, but were stated to be generally consistent with that given to the USIA.⁵⁹ Thus the broadcasts of RFE were insured to be consistent with the tenets of U.S. foreign policy toward the respective targets. All CIA employees in Munich were either transferred to the RFE payroll or removed entirely in 1972.⁶⁰

Indirect control was achieved by virtue of the way the RFE bureaucracy was organized. All divisions which handled raw information were kept separate from the broadcast desks. The Research and Analysis division, probably the most important unit at Munich, was attached directly to the Director's Office. All data was first screened and then written up for the desks to use in program development. The purpose was to insulate the desks from independent sources of information.⁶¹ Similarly, the Central News Room rewrote and edited its data into a "daily news-and-features file" which was then teletyped to the broadcast desks.⁶²

All front line units with responsibility for policy control were organizationally attached directly to the Office of the Director. They were independent from the exiles. Before the reorganization in 1956, Americans occupied three vital points in the structure, a) the office of Director, b) the position of Political Advisor who reviewed scripts before they were aired, and c) the position of Deputy Desk Director, ostensibly acting as an advisor to the Desk Chief.⁶³ CIA intervention could have come at any of these points.

The reorganizations after 1956 abolished the office of Political Advisor. The last Political Advisor was William E. Griffith, who was in charge of broadcasting during the Hungarian Revolution. He left after the uprising and went to the State Department.⁶⁴ The one-man office was replaced by a staff called the Broadcast Analysis Unit. It monitors all broadcasts and issues on performance and adherence to policy

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for each desk.⁶⁵

Another unit added after the Revolution was the Audience Public Opinion Research Department (APOR). Its role was to keep abreast of RFEs impact and audience tastes in Eastern Europe. RFE did not begin such study of its audiences until after 1956, when East European regimes began to liberalize their restrictions on western travel.⁶⁶ RFE was not able to gather what it considered reliable data on its impact until the 1960s.⁶⁷

Purposes - Goals

The official U.S. policy of liberation has been documented many times. In testimony before the Senate in January, 1953, John Foster Dulles closely linked the liberation policy with propaganda. It was entirely logical that he do so, since his original call for a changed American response included "using ideas as weapons." "Those who do not believe that [liberation] can be accomplished by moral pressures, by the weight of propaganda, just do not know what they are talking about."⁶⁸ In 1955, the policy was stated as follows by President Eisenhower in response to a protest by the Soviet Union: "The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is, and until success is achieved, will continue to be the major goal of U.S. foreign policy."⁶⁹ Again in 1955, in his opening address at the Geneva Summit Conference he repeated the U.S. commitment to liberation: "The Americans feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many

with a long and proud history of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements."⁷⁰ At the Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1956, the President put the matter again: "The satellite nations are still ruled by Soviet Puppets. We must be tireless in our efforts to remedy these injustices and to resolve the disputes that divide the world."⁷¹

Radio Free Europe's mission, so to speak, was the disruption of the political processes of the East European countries with a view toward ultimately removing Communist influence in the area. Publicly this was expressed as working toward the liberation of Eastern Europe. Such was its public position from the beginning. When the government changed the emphasis of American policy from containment to liberation, RFE began developing a coherent rational program to subvert the East European regimes through the manipulation of discontent among the populations. It was under the Republican Administration that RFE developed and implemented a preconceived strategy.

In 1950, the FEC chairman, Joseph Grew, stated that the "Practical down to earth, hard hitting job" of RFE was "to prepare the way toward the restoration in Eastern Europe of social, political and religious liberties."⁷² At the same time, Robert Lang, RFE Director also emphasized the liberation goal: "All we emphasize is getting their country back. After

they get their countries back, it is up to their own people to decide what to do."⁷³

News From Behind the Iron Curtain, the Committee's major domestic organ described RFE in 1953 as an operation which permitted the "Free World" to take "direct action aimed at the liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain Countries".⁷⁴ The President's Report of 1954 stated the same theme but alluded to activities in the West as well: "Radio Free Europe is a political warfare operation engaged in the struggle against Soviet Russian colonialism behind the Iron Curtain and Communist influence on this side of the Curtain."⁷⁵

In 1956, a "policy letter" released to newspapers by RFE, and quoted in the New York Times defined RFE as follows: "Radio Free Europe is a propaganda station not a debating society. Our purpose is to help the Captive Peoples of Eastern Europe in their struggle to regain their freedom and rejoin the world community of free nations."⁷⁶ The Library of Congress study summed up RFE's operations this way: "RFE engaged in continuous psychological warfare against the East European Regimes and with the aim of keeping alive in the people the hope of eventual 'liberation' from the Communist governments."⁷⁷ The last two statements indicated the change in RFE strategy that was adopted permanently under the Republican Administration. RFE's "hard hitting" job was supplemented with the hint of a method, i.e. the "helping" of the captive peoples and the "keeping alive" in

those peoples the future prospect of liberation. The essential change was the decision to create and direct subversive activities within the targets as well as a frontal attack on the fact of Russian dominance. The current President, Mr. Durkee, put it this way:⁷⁸

When RFE began its service in the early 1950s, it saw its mission mainly in countering regime propaganda. Programs were heavily polemical and addressed to an audience assumed to be uncritically receptive to anti-Communism. RFE was a reflection of the intense Cold War atmosphere of the time.

There were certain premises upon which the government operated RFE, but which should not be confused with the basic goal of liberation. These operating principles were later to be emphasized when the nature of East-West relations changed and the Cold War subsided. Professor Scott points out how instruments of informal penetration may have secondary goals which are brought forward when the primary aims cannot be achieved.⁷⁹ Three of these were outlined in Chapter Two as the Concept of Truth, the Concept of Freedom of Information, and the Concept of Self-Preservation (expressed as the maintenance of the American way of life). RFE certainly set out to break the monopoly enjoyed by the regime media. Any attempt to compete with that monopoly from the outside would constitute a threat. The ideological alternative offered by RFE included also the concepts of truth and freedom of information considered necessary if the captive peoples were to struggle for self-determination. RFE prided itself on breaking news of events occurring in and out of Eastern Europe before the regime media reported them. This served to

establish RFE's credibility and show, by example, the intrinsic superiority of freedom and Western life. These concepts however, were not unique to RFE. They served to justify all of America's international broadcasting operations.

There were two additional operating principles which only RFE and Radio Liberty maintained and which were the elements that distinguished it as an instrument of informal penetration from the more conventional information operation of the VOA. These were a) RFE was designed to operate as a "home service" radio, and b) RFE was designed to appear as a private non-governmental broadcasting operation.

That RFE was designed to operate as a home service radio means simply that its propaganda would be produced in the symbols, language and cultural context of the people who were the target. Hence RFE was self-contained, with its own immense intelligence gathering and monitoring support system which backed the five "Free Voices", each operated by exiled natives of the target country. In short, RFE attempted to operate as though it were a native indigenous radio. It was quick to point to this quality as an indication of its uniqueness. It was a part of the original concept as attested by its creator Robert Lang. Speaking in 1950, he stated: "Exiles will evolve their own scripts, incorporating their own ideas and own sense of humor. Above all, RFE will be idiomatic."⁸⁰ The "home service" operating principle distinguished RFE from other governmental operations. It

was designed to reach specific audiences, those of Eastern Europe, in a way the VOA could not.⁸¹

The Voice of America's job with regard to the peoples of Eastern Europe is the same as its job world-wide - to speak for the American people and government. ... Radio Free Europe in contrast is the voice of Europeans speaking to Europeans, countrymen speaking to countrymen. ... In doing these two jobs RFE and VOA complement each other rather than compete and together perform a function which neither could do alone.

The effectiveness of RFE would thus be due to the fact that it could speak for the free world in a way not possible for any other outside source. Its message would be carried by "countrymen speaking to countrymen", not as foreigners speaking to other foreigners. To determine the relationship between the "home service" format and informal penetration we must turn to Professor Scott. He considers a home service quality critical to the definition of an instrument of informal penetrative operation.⁸²

If an ideology is to penetrate a country, it must be adapted to the psychological needs of its potential adherents and perform certain functions with at least a minimum of effectiveness. It must offer a variety of reasons for joining the movement, and these reasons must correspond to the needs of the target population. ... Before an individual can be brought within the fold, he has to be freed at least partially from his attachments to other institutions and doctrines. To further this the ideology must be designed to increase the sense of individual alienation and it should explain to potential followers why they have a right to be discontented with the society of which they are a part. It may also seek to undermine loyalties to a particular governmental class or institution such as the Army. In addition ... the new ideology must also offer an alternative set of values, evocative symbols and doctrines.

The organization of RFE as a home service functioned to adapt its message to its audiences. The "alternative reasons" offered varied greatly and will be covered specifically when programming is discussed. Generally, however, RFE's Policy Handbook written in 1951 listed four themes through which RFE would "sustain the morale of the captive peoples and stimulate them in a spirit of non-cooperation":²³

- a) by reminding the listeners constantly that they are governed by agents of a foreign power whose purpose is not to further the national interest but to carry out the imperialistic aims of the rulers of Soviet Russia;
- b) by displaying the moral and spiritual emptiness of Communism as an ideology and the material incapacity of Communism as an economic system to provide an acceptable standard of living for the working class;
- c) by inculcating hope of eventual liberation through a convincing display of the superiority of skill, resources, and military strength of the West, and through reiteration of the promise that the West intends that the listeners shall be free;
- d) by sowing dissention in each regime through exposing the ineptitude of its officials and sowing fear among the officials by denouncing confirmed acts of oppression and cruelty and threatening retribution.

The second operating principle unique to RFE was that of independence. Appearing as an autonomous, non-governmental system served a dual function. Autonomy is first a function of the home service principle. RFE could hardly present itself as an authentic indigenous radio while openly acknowledging itself as an instrument of the American government. A democratic home service radio in exile had also to be outwardly a free press; otherwise it would not be an alternative. The advantages accruing from its image

of a free press was recognized by both the government and RFE. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stated to the Committee on Foreign Relations.⁸⁴

The theme, Mr. Chairman, of these radios [RFE and Radio Liberty] from the beginning, the theme, I think we will have to continue to maintain, is that they are an independent, responsible and free press, and they carry out that function in regard to the target countries to which they are directed.

The definitive government position was provided by the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting established by President Nixon on August 9, 1972. Its job was to recommend financing procedures. In a document whose purpose it was to rationalize the exposed government control, there was nevertheless recognition of the importance of its image of independence.⁸⁵

The particular attractiveness of the stations [RFE and Radio Liberty] is the fact that they are not considered official spokesmen for government. Rather they are thought of as independent and more credible media.

The second function served by the image of a private radio relates not to its credibility but to its penetrative capability. By operating RFE as a non-governmental instrument, the government freed itself from the diplomatic restraints which restrict the scope and militancy of official operations. This factor was consistently cited as a principle strength of RFE. As a covert operation, it could actively promote subversion behind the Iron Curtain without bringing official censure on the U.S. government. A

private propaganda network could employ tactics that would be wholly improper for an official government station. In 1950, Robert Lang noted the advantage of RFE was that "it need not stand on ceremony necessarily common to formal, government operated radio stations. (Radio Free Europe is not adverse to being impudent if it will make the Russians wince."⁸⁶ Frank Altschul, member of the FEC (and Lang's immediate superior), said: "Unhampered by diplomatic restrictions we can slant our programs in a more definitely anti-Soviet way than the Voice of America."⁸⁷ Another FEC member and soon to be Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson reiterated Altschul's point two years later: "Because Radio Free Europe is an organization of private individuals free from outside controls, it can carry on the fight against Communism with hard hitting effectiveness which no other kind of agency could attempt."⁸⁸

The importance of the ability to intervene directly without involving the government was not denied even most recently after the CIA connection was exposed. Speaking for the government, Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand said that RFE and Radio Liberty could report and comment directly on events within Eastern Europe: "However, out of well founded diplomatic considerations such official government radios must take care to avoid the charge of interference in the internal affairs of other Nations."⁸⁹

Thus two elements were made a part of the RFE operation which served to distinguish it from the government's official

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propaganda networks. These elements, the "home service" orientation and its status as a private system gave RFE an increased capability to develop a high degree of credibility with its target audiences and to reach them in ways outside the limits of conventional means. An analysis of the network's programming and balloon campaigns will provide specific examples of how this instrument of informal attack operated.

Programming

The programming was produced, under general guidances, by each of the five "desks" of RFE. Each desk tailored the material according to the requirements of the culture, history and specific events in its target country. There was, however, a general character to all the broadcasts which this analysis will emphasize. RFE has never opened its broadcast tapes to public review. It turned over massive records only once to outside sources. This was to the West German Government and the Council of Europe for their investigations of RFE's role in the Hungarian Revolution. Although the State Department has complete sets of all RFE programs, it has released nothing earlier than 1971. However, several of the regular programs have been published individually either in FEC news releases, or by journalists and scholars. Many examples have been obtained from RFE's own publication News From Behind the Iron Curtain and from investigative reports in the New York Times, Time and the New Republic. The FEC

supplied the Committee on Foreign Relations with documents which gave some indication of the general themes and changes in programming. Finally there have been a few books which have touched upon RFE programs. Two which provide some detail of program types are Allan Michie's Voices Through the Iron Curtain, and Robert Holt's Radio Free Europe. Mr. Michie was Deputy European Director of the RFE until 1957 and Professor Holt is a well-known political scientist. Two additional works -- James A. Michener's Bridge at Andau and Leslie Bain's The Reluctant Satellites -- contain samples of RFE broadcasting, but are limited to the Hungarian Revolution. The following examples are taken from normal programming periods.

Up until 1956, RFE programming emphasized blatant hardhitting attacks on the regimes of Eastern Europe. The effort attempted to orient the programming around the strategic objective of guiding internal opposition, but the overall militancy remained. The motto of RFE was "propaganda through information, educations and entertainment".⁹⁰ After the Hungarian Revolution, RFE began to shift to less polemical content and more flexible programming schedules. The President's Report of 1957 stated: "Gone was the adequacy of any single overall approach to the broadcasting requirements of all satellite targets; instead each target required a more special handling".⁹¹ The former schedule which divided the audiences into subtargets with programs specially made for workers, youth, farmers, etc., was modified

into a "panorama format, devoted to lively discussions of various aspects of life in attractive variety without the heavy political accents".⁹² Up until that change was established however, according to Mr. Michie: "Every program including music had a political meaning or point to make, a propaganda reason for being on the air."⁹³ That point is confirmed by an RFE staff member in Munich who described for the New York Times the network's general programming approach:⁹⁴

Straight political commentary, amusing satire in the political vein, descriptions of a given country's culture being preserved abroad against the day of national liberation, good comedy with political overtones and specific educational material for parents so they can counteract at home Communist techniques which their youngsters receive in school.

The emphasis was primarily on discrediting the regimes in the eyes of the public, and later promoting popular resistance. Donald Feinstein, a journalist who conducted an early analysis of RFE programs, concluded that broadcasts were heavily editorialized accounts of regimes' deficiencies.⁹⁵

If Poland's people go meat-less because a million pounds of Polish meat is shipped to Russia; if Hungary's women are forced to volunteer for factory work because thousands of Hungarian workers are shipped to Russian Slave labor camps - then Radio Free Europe brings the people behind the Iron Curtain the facts and the meaning of such actions.

By 1953, RFE was established as an instrument of informal attack. It had shown that the ideological struggle could be carried to the enemy. It was uniquely suited to meet the specific requirements for reaching each of its targets. It had the intelligence gathering support necessary

to establish its credibility on a wide variety of events. What it lacked however, was a strategy, a plan of attack.

The question of developing an action program for RFE began after the Republican Administration came to office in 1953. Although RFE was originally a creation of the Democratic Administration, it pursued no policy other than simply discrediting the Communist regimes. President Eisenhower came to power with an affirmed policy of liberating Eastern Europe and it was under his Administration that RFE sought out effective strategies to achieve that goal. In the pursuit of a plan of attack, the central problem of Cold Warfare was confronted in a specific context. The Republican policy was "peaceful liberation" and the problem was how to pursue a policy of removing Communist control from Eastern Europe without precipitating an open confrontation with the Soviet Union. Allan Michie indicates that this dilemma was clearly recognized.⁹⁶

On the one hand it was RFE's first objective to keep up hope among the East European populations, to assure them that the day would come when they would again be free peoples. On the other hand what hope for liberation - apart from invasion, which in turn would lead to war - could RFE hold out to the Captive Peoples?

The eventual strategy was formulated chiefly by two men at RFE described by Michie as "the top policy advisors" in the FEC. They were Louis Galantiere, Chief Policy Advisor for the New York Headquarters and William E. Griffith, Political Advisor in Munich.⁹⁷ If in the early period RFE could be viewed as a battering ram, the new strategy refined it into a

chisel. The strategy was to use RFE to create and direct internal opposition within the regimes, to encourage the target populations to work for their own liberation, as it were, by opposing regime policies. RFE would operate as an outside headquarters for the internal opposition -- by providing information, suggesting courses of action, and by sowing dissension in the ranks of officialdom. The East Berlin riots and the uprising in Pilsen indicated relatively wide-spread opposition, though unorganized and leaderless, which could be tapped by RFE. An internal policy guidance described the potential this way:⁹⁸

We are now able to say, in entire good faith, supported by irrefutable evidence, that ways exist by which they [East Europeans] can contribute to their own liberation. Our long campaign in support of their courageous resistance against Russification, indoctrination, collectivization on the farm, pauperization in the town, in the sole interest of Soviet imperialism is now justified by events. From this moment we shall intensify and add to every previous line that sought to persuade our listeners not to hope for liberation, but to act to be free.

RFE broadcast the change of strategy into Eastern Europe in a very optimistic tone and one which clearly alluded to the change from the Democratic to the Republican administration in Washington. Using words quite similar to those employed against the Democrats' containment policy RFE heralded the new will to liberation:⁹⁹

It is no longer a defensive will to contain and to check the aggression of Communist totalitarianism. Instead, it is a conscious effort toward mobilization of positive strength, an effort undertaken with the clear intention of building a lasting peace on the principle of the complete independence of all nations and the true freedom of all people. That is

why, when we think today of the liberation of Poland and other peoples oppressed by the Soviets, we do not have to worry any longer about 'ifs' and 'whethers'. The problem may be narrowed down to the single question: 'when'.

Michie indicated the new role of RFE was expected to be significant. RFE would provide leadership and direction for the new internal resistance; almost paternalistically he stated:¹⁰⁰

For RFE audiences, this marked their entry into a new phase of the struggle for liberation. It involved their re-education - by RFE - to make them realize that liberation would not come to them from the outside, that it must be achieved from inside. RFE's role would be to encourage this quiet resistance.

A typical example of the attempt at such re-education is contained in the following RFE broadcast to Czechoslovakia. It emphasized that the people must become aware of their own strength and to bear in mind certain essential facts about the Communist system in order to protect themselves from delusions about the regime's concern for their welfare.¹⁰¹

Recently we have spoken to you with new confidence. We told you about the changed situation, about the confusion of the Communist governments; we have stressed the fact that things are starting to move behind the Iron Curtain, and that the time has come when the dictatorial governments can be forced to make concessions, that it is worthwhile to work with [sic] this aim, and that it is necessary that the people be aware of their power. ... There are three things which these people who have begun to participate again in history must be aware of. In the first place the people must know that they can rely only on themselves and their anonymous leaders, and that they can have no real friends among those who are Cabinet or Parliament members, or who write in the press, or who publish books, or who have been assigned by the government to be functionaries of Trade Unions. All of that is a bureaucracy without a mind. ... Secondly, the peoples movement

behind the Iron Curtain must recognize that the Communist government will again attempt to deceive, that they will promise more than they intend to give. ... The third point is that Communist policy is, and always will be, muddled. Lines are set forth and abandoned; men are raised up and torn down, the people are flattened and fired on ... whoever gives his soul to Communist policy is in the position of someone who has tied his property to the tail of a mad dog. ... The Communist governments are estranged from the people to such an extent that the struggle will continue regardless of who is directing Soviet policy. It is a disagreeable fact for dictators that every rule is dependent upon the labor of the people. This is a basic power of which the people cannot be deprived.

At the outset, RFE's programs consisted primarily of U.S. pop music. This was broadcasted in order to drum up a listening audience. After a few weeks, the broadcasts switched to the propaganda schedule.¹⁰² The call sign for all the desks was four peals from the FEC's 10 ton freedom bell cast for the Crusade For Freedom campaigns.¹⁰³ The programs were divided into blocks, each oriented to a specific section of the target population. Up until 1956 (as mentioned above) this format was not changed.

Although at its peak RFE was on the air about 19 hours a day, only about half of that time represented original programs. Program blocks were repeated throughout the day on various wave lengths. Listeners who were unable to maintain regular listening habits could tune in at irregular periods and not risk missing too much.¹⁰⁴ This also functioned to provide listeners with uniform information necessary if particular attitudes were to be maintained and particular activities encouraged. At the end of each broadcast

day RFE aimed all transmitters at each country in turn and "saturated" it on every available wavelength with a comprehensive review of the day's themes.¹⁰⁵ This literally flooded the air waves and rendered jamming very difficult. The content of the 557 hours of programming a week were typically divided up as follows:¹⁰⁶

News	...	...	...	...	...	...	16.1%
Political Commentary	...	...	...	...	...	...	34.7%
Music & Entertainment	.	...	...	...	...	...	21.6%
Cultural & Special	...	...	...	...	...	...	18.8%
Religious	...	...	...	...	...	...	2.2%
Miscellaneous	...	...	...	...	...	...	6.6%

The program examples which follow fall into four thematic categories regardless of their specific subject or the group to which they were targeted. These were: 1) that East Europeans had no control over their own destiny; no voice in politics; 2) that the regimes were puppets of Moscow and unfailingly followed Moscow directives; 3) that the regimes did not consider the interests of the people when making decisions, indeed, the people were actively exploited by their own governments; and 4) that the West was superior to the Communist world politically and technologically.

The material aspect was not underplayed. Free life in the West usually meant the ability to acquire things, such as T.V. sets, high wages, good medical care, etc. Paul Tigrid, a desk chief in 1955, described the materialistic emphasis put on liberty. RFE, he said, tried "to bring them [East

Europeans] a sampling of what man enjoys in a democratic society; what he reads, sees on T.V., in the movies, where he travels on his paid vacations. In short, it attempts to show what it means to live as a free individual."¹⁰⁷

In the following examples we have relied primarily on the RFE publication News From Behind the Iron Curtain and the works of Michie and Holt. Professor Holt provided specific examples of actual broadcasts while Mr. Michie's work emphasized general descriptions. The complimentary effect was quite helpful in providing an overall picture.

Political programs occupied the largest single block of air time, though as we shall see, all programs were "political". The overtly political broadcasts were called commentaries and covered a wide variety of topics. They editorialized on events both within the Communist bloc and in the West with the main purpose of countering Communist distortions.¹⁰⁸ (Before 1956 topics for commentaries were chosen by the desk chiefs and reviewed by the Political Advisor. Guidances covering general themes or targets were sent (at first) from New York. The desk chief's role was to develop specific programs for his audience which would achieve the intent outlined in the guidance. Holt provided a typical example of the process. In August 1955 the Polish Desk received a guidance or "target paper" from New York. It directed the Polish Desk to focus a series of commentaries on the "Progressive Catholics", a regime-backed organization designed to make the Church more cooperative. The Polish

Desk produced the following propaganda line the programs would take:¹⁰⁹

The 'progressive Catholics' acts as a non-Communist group which has ostensibly set as its main goal the defense of the Church and of the Catholic religion in Poland. The chief task of our campaign will be to demonstrate the falsehood of that thesis, and prove to the broad masses of our listeners that the 'Progressive Catholics' are but a tool of Soviet policy and that they work for the destruction and not the defense of the Faith of the Church.

The following are descriptions of general political commentaries which were addressed to the population as a whole. Other programs, discussed below, were aimed at specific groups such as workers, farmers, etc.

"Parents Take Care of Your Children": According to Michie, RFE produced a series of programs which "advises parents to use holiday months, when their children are more often at home, to lead their youngsters to democratic ways and [the series] gives specific advice to parents for combating the effects of Communist indoctrination of the children".¹¹⁰

"The Other Side of the Coin": These programs consisted of reading the regime press or of simply picking up on a current issue or policy and then presenting "the other side of the coin", i.e. the West's interpretation of the event, or the true picture of the situation. Two typical examples, broadcast to Poland in 1953 and 1956 respectively, follow.¹¹¹

A constantly expanding system of spying on, and denouncing of citizens by various police networks is one of the most typical of Soviet institutions. In addition to the ordinary plainclothes detective, and a tremendous apparatus of internal espionage and counter-espionage; in addition, then, to the

Seksot [undercover State employee], an open official position of informer - the area correspondent - has been established by the State. In the general process of transplanting to the enslaved countries the system of control by terror prepared in the Soviet Union, all the refinements of civilization developed by the leading country of concentration camps were also transplanted.

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The revival of the faked Sejm is part of the present Communist effort to build up the appearance of democracy in Poland. ... Whatever Cyrankiewicz argues, what happens in Poland has nothing to do with democracy and he is not a democratic leader. He is no more and no less than an obedient executor of Moscow's policy. He took his orders from Stalin; now he takes his orders from Kruschew. Never does he go beyond what is sanctioned by Moscow. He confesses to have followed wrong policies, but nevertheless he stays in office. Can such things happen in any democratic system? Is not this the best proof that the Polish nation is enslaved?

"Home Commentary": These broadcasts were very similar in purpose to those titled "The other side of the coin". The following examples were concerned with the changes in Soviet leadership, comparing it with American electoral change in Administrations and its effects on the local regime. The first example is from a broadcast called "The Meaning of Beria" beamed to Czechoslovakia in 1953;¹¹²

Last autumn we witnessed the Presidential elections here in America. Every American received a slip on which he checked off the name of his candidate, and after all the votes had been counted and it was determined that Eisenhower got the majority, no appeal against it was possible. The authority of the people had spoken [sic]. Truman left the White House and Eisenhower took up residence there. Such was the American Presidential election. Beria's execution will be the Russian Presidential election. In Russia the decisive authority of the people is missing; there is nothing to bow before, nothing is definitely resolved so long as one candidate does not annihilate the other physically. ... Real elections in Czechoslovakia took place last December

when eleven Communist leaders were roused from sleep one morning and hauled to the gallows. That was when the trend of Czechoslovak policy was decided - not when you put a wholly insignificant list into an equally insignificant box. ... The election commission is - the hangman.

The following concerned the changes in the Eastern European countries wrought by the 20th Party Congress. It was beamed to Hungary in April, 1956.¹¹³

Following the 20th Party Congress the process of liquidating the Stalinist past has started in the peoples' democracies. In certain countries this has led to some benefits for the people, but not in Hungary. There has been neither an increase in wages nor a reduction in prices, nor has there been any let up in applying the methods of the Stalinist class struggle. ... Public opinion is completely neglected in Hungary. The Yugoslav-Hungarian financial negotiations now under way are a case in point. The public was not informed on the subjects to be discussed at Belgrade. ... An agreement must sooner or later be reached - yet no matter what the details of such an agreement, it will be far less advantageous than if the Hungarian nation had been represented by a capable government which considered the true interests of the Hungarian people.

Another general commentary ("Reflector") to Hungary concentrated on the same theme.¹¹⁴

In his speech Ljos Acs emphasized that criticism reflecting disadvantageously upon the party is not permissible. Thus should anyone make a statement disadvantageous to the present regime he will again be put on the blacklist and will be referred to as having had 'disagreeable affairs'. All this proves that, basically nothing has changed in Hungary.

RFE was quick to react to Soviet attempts to increase peaceful contact with the West. The broadcasts concerned the Soviet call for peaceful coexistence and its attempts to promote socialist Communist cooperation. RFE held that protestations and peaceful overtures were, in reality, an

attempt to secure recognition for their control of Eastern Europe. Below are broadcasts to Poland: ¹¹⁵

The true opinion of the British Labor Party concerning Communist-Socialist cooperation is best expressed by the article just published in the Labor Party organ. This paper of which Gaitskill was one of the staff members - points out that there can be no cooperation between the Communists and the Democratic Socialists. There could be a similarity in the principles only until the Communists triumphed in Russia. Since then it has been proven that 1) the Communists do not ensure the workers' rights, nor do they safeguard their interests; the workers are not given any role in directing their own fate, and 2) there is no hope of making the Communists see reason, for they still refuse to deviate from their basic tenets. The Communists believe that whatever means they use to achieve their ends, history will always justify their actions.

The organ of the French Socialist Party Le Populaire, in a series of articles, explained why Western Socialists will not cooperate with Communists. ... Le Populaire states that the Socialists could start negotiations with Communists only after the latter first filled a number of conditions. Among these conditions one of the most significant is the restoration of freedom to East European countries.

Below are two broadcasts, to Czechoslovakia and Poland, which illustrate RFE's attitude toward peaceful coexistence. The first was to Czechoslovakia, entitled "The possibilities of Coexistence". The second was beamed to Poland: ¹¹⁶

Just now the Communists spread a new slogan, co-existence. This time the Communists deigned to apprise an anxious world that, in their opinion, Communism and Capitalism are perfectly capable of living next to each other; in other words each should keep what he already has and let the others be. ... The coexistence proposed by the Communists means nothing beyond a continuation of the permanent war by different means. Another name for this coexistence is - anesthesia. So far the Communists do not abandon their attempts to lull the vigilance of a free world. ... The Iron Curtain is a hot-house in which untruth is comfort, it is a hotbed of intrigue and a factory producing hatred. When, therefore, the Communists speak of coexistence, the

free nations must first look at what is going on behind the Iron Curtain, and also observe whether or not it is being demolished. If indeed it stands as firmly as ever, then all talk of coexistence is futile.

On the international scene the object of new Soviet tactics is a) to secure acceptance by the West of the principle of coexistence, which is tantamount to approval of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, and b) to pave the way for the establishment of popular fronts. The idea of popular fronts however was firmly rejected by the Socialist International. The meeting between Krushchev and the British Socialists ended in an atmosphere of tension. In his speech Eisenhower stressed that Eastern Europe remained under the Soviet dominion, and in this way he put an end to Soviet Russia's hope that her conquests might be recognized by the West.

The issue of an East Europe Federation was a popular topic of RPE. It took the view that a federation of the nations of East-Central Europe was the only guarantee of security from foreign domination and decried the fact that through the narrow nationalist attitudes of political leaders federation had continually been sidetracked. RPE held that there were four historically distinct Eastern Europes. The first was that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the second that of the interwar period, the third that of the German occupation and the last, Soviet East Europe. RPE argued that, after the fall of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, federation must be a primary objective. Below are broadcasts to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively on this issue.

To Hungary: "The Common Front of the Oppressed":

The Soviets are making immense efforts to maintain the Communist prison that comprises the fourth East Central Europe. But he who is aware of history's logic knows that sooner or later the final collapse

will occur, for in the course of recent history no tyranny has been able to maintain itself over a long period. What will happen when the Soviet prison, the fourth East-Central Europe also collapses. History will then provide an opportunity of creating an East-Central Europe that will give the little nations in this area their last chance to build a future on lasting foundations. Along this road our people will no longer travel alone as in the past, but their endeavors will be backed by great numbers of people in East-Central Europe, who in the dark hours of Soviet tyranny, were spiritually fused into one. In the hours of trial they have formed the common front of the oppressed. Assuredly, these peoples will want to maintain this solidarity - this federation of spirit - in the future. And from the ruins of the present in countries known as "the captive nations" will come a new community of peoples, the fifth and federated East-Central Europe, which will eventually become, in turn, a part of a larger federation of all free European lands.

To Czechoslovakia: "The Final Goal of All Policy": Communist regimes - like Fascist and Nazi regimes - suffer from a double fear; they fear their own people and therefore democracy; and they fear world public opinion and therefore supranational authority. Each component leads to the abolition of totalitarian regimes. Should truly free elections, free from fraud, free from brute force, free from intimidation take place; should our democracy be guaranteed internationally against outward attack and against inward conspiracy, the Communist overlordship of Czechoslovakia would dissolve like the snow in spring sun.

"The Price of Disunity":

Once we are liberated [Czechoslovakia] we must know what to do with our liberty. We must strive to arrange matters so that past events cannot recur. Had there been a European federation, the Communist putsch would not have happened. That is why the Communists rave so savagely against the concept of the federation. Had there been a federation Hitler would not have seized us fifteen years ago. ... Deep in the 20th Century, the small nations in Central Europe have every reason to re-examine their situation and to deliberate whether they can find security at all short of a resolution to seek strength in some form of union. That is why we speak of the federation so frequently - and why the Communists rave against it so frequently. ... We are never so sure that we are aspiring to the right goal as when we see

Communist wrath provoked by the concept of federation or when we see their disappointment at having failed to destroy some alliance.

To Poland: "One House":

Have there been any fundamental changes in this unanimous attitude of the Poles toward federation? None. During the numerous held with the new refugees from Poland, not one voice was raised against federation policy. At the same time however ... many are assailed by doubts as to whether the federal idea is feasible. We, the exiles, are fully aware that the source of these doubts lies in the bitter conclusions drawn from past disillusionments. All the more are we convinced that it is our duty to inform our countrymen of how this problem is being considered in the free world and particularly in the United States. The following statement made by an American statesman, illustrates the prevailing view. When he was asked whether he was for the idea of a European federation, he answered: 'This is not a question of sympathy, of antipathy, of whether one likes the idea or not. Neither the European nations nor the Americans have any choice in this matter. The alternatives are simple: federation or imperialist chaos.'

The state of the Fine Arts in Eastern Europe were the subject of RFE commentaries. Generally RFE emphasized the intellectual poverty and dogmatic character of regime sanctioned material. The following are two broadcasts to Czechoslovakia which are illustrative of RFE's position:¹¹⁸

"Battle of the Books":

With Christmas approaching we have been studying the list of new books being published in Czechoslovakia this season. ... In 1953 there does not exist in Czechoslovakia one single spiritual dish which is not seasoned with poison. In 1953 Czech booklists, aside from a few native and foreign classics debased by Marxist introductions, contain nothing but trash, never compiled in such quantity by all the backyard publishers of trash in the course of many decades. ... They [the regime authors] are not the interpreters of your joy and sorrows; they are simply the jesters of Zapotocky's court. They are desecrating our language and hurting our youth; they are forgers and traitors to our nation's best traditions. They have been promoted to the ranks of the new nobility only by the

grace of the aliens of Moscow. Protect yourselves - disdain their work. It is up to you to boycott and pillory them. Do not hesitate - this revolt is not in vain. The honor and foundations of Czech and Slovak culture are at stake.

"Out of the Desert":

From the time the Communists seized power, the National Theater has resembled a museum. The program is no homage to the Classics; nowhere else do the Communists pay homage to anything classical. No, it is a mantel around nudity. If a regime seizes the rule and proclaims that zestful literary and artistic life will flourish under its care, and if it subsequently offers novelties and fifty or three hundred and twenty years, then this dance of the skeletons indicates but one thing: no zestful life flourishes; contemporary spiritual life has been slain.

A broadcast by the Voice of Free Romania focused on the subject of humour. Specifically, it pointed out that even laughter is controlled by the Kremlin. The program was entitled "The Forced Laugh",¹¹⁹

On April 8 of this year [1953] there was a discussion by Soviet writers in Moscow in the problems of satirical comedy. On April 17, Contemporanul [organ of the Romanian Communist Party] featured an editorial on the same subject. As you can see, whatever is shouted in Moscow must echo in Bucharest.

Moscow had felt the urge to lay down the "line" on laughter. After so many changes in her "line", in the course of which doctors were criminals one day and innocent victims the next, while victims became executioners and the executioners became the victims, Moscow must have felt in the mood for laughing. The go-ahead signal was given by Malenkov himself, who made the most famous admission in the history of self-criticism in modern Russia: "We would be mistaken to believe that our Soviet reality does not offer material for satire." Although Malenkov's remark sounds like an invitation to laughter, it clearly indicates that there is but one kind of laughter in a Communist regime. Man laughs - as it was so well put by the French writer, Andre Malraux - "with a knife between his teeth." ...

For such is the situation: Romania is the country where man cannot laugh any more. The people, those who are oppressed, those who are humiliated by persecution.

cannot laugh any more. The minority - the leaders, the servants, the agents of the occupiers - can barely grin.

In addition to general commentaries a number of broadcasts were designed for particular audiences. The following examples were programs directed at the military, youth, workers and farmers.

Programs addressed to the military were usually titled "To the Army", or they took the form of spot announcements inserted into the regular schedule. Excerpts from this type of programming were not frequently found. RFE described the purpose of its messages to the Polish Army, for example, as informing the soldiers that all the high-ranking officers were Russians. Polish officers were not permitted, according to RFE, to rise above the junior grades. Therefore in a time of crisis the people, not the Russians, could depend on the Army.¹²⁰ On one occasion RFE played back a speech delivered in Poland by Konstanty Rokossowski, a Soviet Army Marshal who was then Polish Minister of National Defense. Rokossowski apparently made a slip of the tongue in his national address which RFE used to drive home the point of Russian control,¹²¹

Rokossowski: "The resolution of the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Control Committee of the PZPR [Polish Communist Party] which are of such importance to your country also have a tremendous significance for the growth of our army."

RFE: "You are honest, Rokossowski. Thanks for the cue. It's your army and our country, alas, too true. ... The country is ours, Polish; the army is yours, Soviet, and that is the only reason the Party has any existence at all."

Similar broadcasts were made to the Czechoslovakian Army.

RFE oriented the programs to the officer ranks and reminded

them that their first loyalty was to the people, not the Communists. Much was made of the fact that the East German Volkpolizei had refused to fire on their countrymen during the 1953 riots in East Berlin. The program ended by asking the Czech soldiers, "If that day should come for you, would you do less than the East German Vopos did?"¹²²

Spot announcements to the military were a regular feature on all the RFE desks. RFE provided one example:¹²³

Soldiers, policemen, state militia, attention!
We are addressing you soldiers, policemen, state militia. Stop persecution of the people! Do not obstruct manifestations of the peoples' will! You will have to answer for everything tomorrow! Soldiers, policemen, state militia, heed our broadcasts!

Programs aimed at the youth of Eastern Europe emphasized parental loyalty, avoidance of Communist youth groups and preparation for times of crises when the regime might possibly be overthrown. According to Michie, RFE encouraged the youth to "learn what they could from their parents and at the same time learn a profession, to learn from the Communists how to handle fire arms, motor trucks, or lead a squad of soldiers, because their country might some day need those skills."¹²⁴ The following two programs were broadcasted to the Polish youth:¹²⁵

The fall in the party's prestige after the demolition of the Stalin myth, has also seriously affected the ZMP [Polish youth organization]. The ZMP is getting sicker and sicker. First and foremost, there is the constant hostility of young people to the organization through which the regime tries to regiment them.

Several days ago we received two very interesting letters from Poland. ... One letter was written by a young girl, the other by a woman of the older generation. The first, signed by a girl named Jodzia begins with the words, "I listen carefully to your youth programs, and it is as if I were together with you at work or at a camp sitting around a camp fire. ... At the Pioneer camps in Poland there is ideological training to try to uproot our national culture. The Communists know that our nation will exist as long as that culture is alive in Polish hearts. ... Most of us will not let ourselves be duped, but we will march forth steadfastly as our forefathers did. ..." However we find an entirely opposed view on youth in the second letter, signed with the pen name "citizen", "Your information on Polish youth is not really accurate. ... The young people of today are not like those of 1918, the little Lions and Eaglets of our generation. Today they are brought up on Komsomol examples. For them, national traditions, religion and family are unnecessary burdens that hinder life. They are spellbound by the present only. Alas it is too late to save them now." No Madam! We do not believe for a moment the picture you present. ... The youth of today is no less patriotic, no less ready for sacrifice than your generation, the generation that fought for independence during the first World War. ... Our only hope lies in solidarity and friendship between the older and the younger generation.

A program to the young people of Czechoslovakia found that the Czech youths' love of sports had a political connotation, 126

Anyone going to the sports field cares little whether or not his presence there is going to fill the plan of Communist evolution; everybody simply takes refuge in sports because physical exercise offers at least some freedom, sorely lacking in shop, office or school. The Communists have deprived youth of a horizon. They have deprived them of the opportunity to study freely, to travel, to practice enterprise, to see things for themselves and to speak of them without fear. Recently a young refugee miner from Ostrava said he had left the country after he had become convinced that no amount of honest work would bring him success of any kind. These accumulated conditions induce the young people to devote themselves more to sports. It is the same as it was during the war. Then too the theater and cinemas offered a fare seasoned with propaganda and the press was censored. Sports, however, thrived comparatively well. In clipping

the wings of the young people but leaving open the gates to the tracks and gymnasiums, the Communists were hardly concerned with the welfare of the nation.

A broadcast by the Voice of Free Hungary in February, 1954, focused on the regime admissions of failure in its youth policy brought out in the self-criticism occasioned by de-Stalinization. The program was broadcast under the title "Home Commentary":¹²⁷

In this home commentary we shall discuss the reasons for the change in Communist policy toward the youth of the country. What ~~fate is~~ in store for the Hungarian youth in the 'People's Democracy'? Why has the Hungarian Communist Youth Organization failed to achieve its goals? Can the coming elections within the Youth Organization be considered democratic?

The great wave of self-criticism which has swept the 'People's Democracies' in recent months indicates a striking failure of Communist policy in all fields. It has become apparent, and is admitted even by the Party, that for years the Communists have guided the Hungarian people by the wrong methods, in the wrong direction, toward complete chaos. This applies to our youth too. The younger generation were to be the shock troops of the planned economy, the system which now admittedly ignored the fundamental interests of the people. They were trained, encouraged, prodded and even coerced into serving this one purpose. And now, after the frantic efforts of so many years, the Communists are forced to admit that all was in vain; that their efforts were wasted on the united and firm resistance of the young people.

RFE experienced difficulty in establishing an acceptable propaganda line suitable to labor audiences. Regular programming to workers on the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia was stopped in 1957. RFE ascribed the problem to the fact that few of the early exiles came from the working class; "The bulk of the first wave was bourgeois and liberal democratic

elements representing a wide spectrum reaching from the extreme right to the extreme Social Democrats, to moderates of the left."¹²⁸ The Czech Desk's problem was indicative of other desks' frustration. The programs were generally rated as being of "poor quality, without control or a framework."¹²⁹ The programs generally centered on the themes that the Western labor forces supported their enslaved brethren and on comparisons between work standards and labor conditions between the East and West. After the worker riots in East Berlin and Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, RFE put labor leader and FEC member, James B. Carey, on the air to express the solidarity of American labor with their European counterparts.¹³⁰

Carey: But we will do more than pay tribute and we will do more than proclaim their [the rioting workers] courage. We will renew our efforts on their behalf and on behalf of workers everywhere behind the Iron Curtain. We will work through our own government; we will work through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; we will work through our trade union representatives and offices in Europe and Asia to aid the struggle of anti-Communism against the slave masters of the Kremlin. ... As strongly, as profoundly - as devotedly - as sincerely as we can, we of the American labor movement are today clasping hands with German and Czechoslovak workers, the men and women who fought East Berlin's and Pilsen's battles for democracy.

In October, RFE was still speaking about the worker revolts and their impact on the Russians.¹³¹

Three months ago, a rather curious situation existed. Some people in the West believed that those behind the Iron Curtain had perhaps given in to Soviet occupation, that perhaps they had already died politically, that perhaps they no longer thought of liberation. But, in June, the presumably lost Czechoslovak people openly demonstrated against the government; the people of

East Germany, who were presumably resigned to their Communist fate, took the open road of glorious rebellion: and the entire Polish territory, criss-crossed by Russian trains, has changed into a region dangerous for Russian travellers. Then something possibly even more important, even more historic happened: the East German Communists sent Russian soldiers against the rebels. It turned out in several cases that the rifles of the Russian soldiers, instead of being aimed without flinching, quivered like magnetic needles.

These developments had a profound impact. This time, the people behind the Iron Curtain themselves determined the direction of politics: the topic of liberation shall not disappear from the agenda. Did they say you were weak? Did they say you could do nothing? Look how weak you are: you have given direction to world events.

When Poznan workers rioted in 1956, RFE quoted labor leader Jacob Potofsky, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, who promised the Polish workers that "they did not fight alone".¹³² David MacDonald, President of the United Steel Workers was quoted describing Poznan as a "valiant action which electrified the hearts of freedom loving Americans."¹³³ Other efforts were oriented to describing the benefits of the European federation which awaited the East Europeans once they were free from Communist control.¹³⁴ In June, 1953, an RFE guidance stated, "naturally in this union must be included the nations of the Soviet Bloc once they are free from the present tyrannical rule."¹³⁵ The following is a broadcast to Polish workers delivered in 1956 called "No Curtain Shall Divide Us",¹³⁶

Pay increases are so widely recognized as essential to good labor relations throughout the world, and worker resistance to the regime in Poland has become so stern, that the Communists in Poland have decided to make a gesture which would show that they too have a concern for labor's wellbeing. But as usual their gesture amounts to no more than a niggardly dole.

Another program to Czechoslovakian workers was called "Mechanics of Monotony" and sought to characterize the life of the Czech worker as one of unending, miserable routine. At every high point in the worker's life, birth, marriage and death, etc., the party was always on hand with a propaganda handout. RFE held that it was considered a stroke of luck if the worker fell ill; at least then he could be alone.¹³⁷

The Communists issue statistics on production and on collection of scrap. But one of these days statistics will be published on what they have done with human life, how much boredom and monotony they have wrought. For swifter than they increased production did they impoverish life. And to deprive man of joy is the same crime as to deprive him of bread. A man behind the Iron Curtain wakes up in the morning, steps out in the street - and already gray monotony trails behind him like a mangy dog. Taken together, these things are as strong an incentive to revolt as are loss of freedom and the government's cruelty. Poverty of life is no less harrowing than material poverty, and one of these days the people will oust the Communist government partly just because they are making life unbearably dull. Never fear, Communism will be vanquished. It has human nature to oppose it.

A Hungarian labor commentary of 1953 hit the same theme. RFE said the regime's concept of the "ideal man" (the title of the commentary) was "a nonthinking robot. Moscow and her Hungarian accomplices are conspiring against the law of God and man. In their undertakings however they cannot count on the help of men who yearn for fraternal love and justice."¹³⁸

The same theme was pursued in a broadcast to Polish workers. Entitled "Holiday Rejects" it proposed an analysis of the fact that so few workers had utilized government-run holiday resort spots.¹³⁹

When a worker does find time to go away on a vacation, what pleasures are in store for him! [sic]. He finds that the vacation centers look like barracks. Strangers are crowded into one room. A man on holiday has to defend himself against "educationalists" - political overseers whose task is to drag the holiday makers to various propaganda functions. ... This is what Communist holidays are like. In principle, holidays for the masses are a good and useful thing. But the curse of some secret intention hovers over every Communist action. That is why the vacation program, which every normal man enjoys, assumes in Communist Poland, the aspects of a manhunt.

Other labor programs concentrated on more common forms of political and economic exploitation of the worker at the hands of the state. Three such broadcasts to Hungary in 1953 and 1956 centered on regime "concessions" to labor, and worker control by Moscow: ¹⁴⁰

The government wants to satisfy the workers by apparent concessions. During this period only whole-sale reforms can help. ... It appears that the government will stop at promises. ... The desire for change is alive in the heart of every worker. He himself will put leaders in place of the present leaders. The increasing resistance will put men at the top who are real leaders of the workers; men who will, at the first possible chance, rightly represent their interests. In these historical times they must assume the responsibility.

In 1956 RFE attacked the regime's decision to permit worker criticism "in the party spirit": ¹⁴¹

Such criticism 'in the party spirit' means only criticism that is allowed by the party. No criticism may be voiced, for instance, against Rakosi or the Party resolutions, nor may any of the social measures be criticized. This kind of 'concession' is only a subterfuge to make the workers feel that their opinions and feelings are being taken into consideration in forming policy. But it is just a sham concession that means nothing.

Another labor broadcast in 1956 exposed the regime's scheme of worker involvement in formulating Hungary's five year plan

as a fraud:¹⁴²

They [Rakosi & Hejedus] are trying to mobilize the workers and give them the impression that they are preparing the new plan. We remind the workers that their present mobilization is meant to result in still further exploitation. The plan cannot be decided upon in the factories for the main questions will have been answered long before the workers are consulted. The regime knows the workers would not produce a plan in which the Moscow dictated requirements for heavy industry are met.

Programs addressed to the East European farmer were designed to expose the Communist exploitation of agriculture and methods by which peasants could resist the regime.¹⁴³

Alas, according to Allan Michie, programs were oriented toward comparing the levels of achievement between East European and Western agriculture methods.¹⁴⁴ The examples below, broadcast in 1953 and 1954, were beamed to Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland.¹⁴⁵

While in Bucharest, the Rumanian Minions of Moscow hold Congresses and plan all kinds of statutes to strike at the Rumanian peasant, in the Free World the fruits of freedom serve the people directly.

"The Sovrom Squeeze" was also a program to Romania, which dealt with the exploitation of Romanian agriculture by the Soviet Union through the formation of joint stock companies which were mechanisms by which Russia siphoned off Romanian farm and economic production generally. RFE compared the companies with the emerging European Economic Community.¹⁴⁶

All Romanian land has in effect become an estate of the Soviets. But these 800,000 acres [land expropriated from Romanian citizens of German ancestry] are not only 'in effect' theirs like the rest of the country; they are, in fact, the actual property of the Soviets. Can you imagine France or England becoming after the war, owners of extensive

tracts of land within the borders of Italy or Germany? What has the Free World done in the face of this type of Soviet exploitation, this new feudalism, this economic squeeze? With the voluntary consent of the participating nations, it has created a new sovereignty which will function freely. To the communality of Steel and Coal, France, Western Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg have accorded supra-national powers; thus this authority has become the first agent of tomorrow's European Federation. ... You can imagine how much free Romania will benefit from being able to export agricultural products and place them on a free market of the entire European continent.

To the Bulgarian farmer, RFE offered tactical advice and promised reform: ¹⁴⁷

"Spot Announcement": Observe these rules during this year's harvest: send grain from the threshing machine - directly to the people. Hidden wheat makes provisions for the civilian resistance Army. What you don't deliver to the state will be the peoples. Every bushel of grain will strengthen our ranks.

"Deeds and Titles": Peasants of the Collective farms: the story of Todor Tzenov, who committed suicide as a result of the poverty brought on him by the Communists is not unique. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian farmers were robbed of their rich lands in the same way. Their property was absorbed into the village Kolkhozes, and the former owners and their families were plunged into misery, privation and despair. ... They will be dissolved immediately after liberation.

Two programs to Hungary and Poland respectively concentrated on the unpopularity and low productivity of collective farms: ¹⁴⁸

"Collective Farms": Out of 134 families, only eight voted to continue the collective farm. Never Mind! The Aszlo Council President declared to the correspondent of the village radio: "Only eight of us remained yet we were victorious in the end." We would like to ask the President how it was possible for eight members to be victorious over 126? Our way of thinking, our ethics, must be old fashioned; or let us put it this way, they are the ethics of democracy. ... Until we get an answer we must believe that eight people can overrule 126 only in a state in which there

are no rights, no justice, no law.

"Your Neighbor's Farm": Communist propaganda claims that agriculture in Poland lags behind industry and that the free peasant must be blamed for this. ... The fact is that independent peasants, though surely handicapped by lack of help from the State and industry, and enjoying none of the aid given to inefficient Kolkhosi, still fed the nation with their produce.

Specific attacks on each regime were a major part of RPE's efforts to undermine the governments themselves. The intention was to demoralize supporters of the regime and its functionaries by creating a sort of "we-are-everywhere" paranoia in the ranks. This was regularly done with a program called "Calling the Communists", which denounced as traitors those regime members who informed on others, spied, or were suspected of brutality. Programs were normally ten minutes long and one was produced a week and repeated. RPE describes the format this way: "Addressed mainly to Communist Party members, this program has the specific objective of sowing and fostering doubts and uneasiness among them, while its broad goal is to encourage or maintain centrifugal tendencies, inside the Communist orbit."¹⁴⁹ Usually the name of the culprit to be denounced would arrive by mail at RPE headquarters in Munich or via the recollections of defectors who were invariably interviewed by the RPE. The program ended with an admonition to reform or else: "Unless you change your ways at once you will never escape trial and punishment when liberation comes."¹⁵⁰ The RPE bibliographical file, discussed earlier, held a

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special "black book" section of over 75,000 names of persons so exposed. Data was drawn and used when necessary and, of course, augmented.¹⁵¹ To Bulgaria the program was titled "We accuse" and threatened severe retribution if good behavior was not shown.¹⁵² One such exposure was aimed at a Dr. Timon, Physician at the wire works in Bohumin, Czechoslovakia, who was reportedly refusing sick leave to keep the absentee rate down; "This is a warning Timon. We are keeping a check on your brutality. A day of reckoning will come."¹⁵³ The following program to Bulgaria gives clearly the intent of this type of broadcasting:¹⁵⁴

"We accuse": As our listeners already know in this series of talks we regularly expose the criminal activities, outrages and treacheries against the Bulgarian people committed by those Bulgarians who have placed themselves in the service of the Soviet occupiers. Obviously these hierlings have sold themselves for certain material benefits which they could not achieve by honest work. ... Today, for instance, we will take up the case of Ivan Mirchev, a former insurance agent and now a secret agent of the State Security Service in Russe. Dear listeners, try to remember his name well, because one day you will need it. We repeat: He is Ivan Mirchev, former insurance agent and presently a secret agent of the State Security Service in Russe. Here in brief is the career of this traitor to the Bulgarian people. ... In order to conceal his real activities, his Communist bosses appointed him inspector of tobacco cultivation in the Russe area. ... In conversations with them, he joined them in their complaints about the Communist regime in order to gain their confidence. Through this technique, Mirchev succeeded in misleading a great number of gullible peasants. Since Mirchev did not denounce them right away, the peasants believed that confiding in him was safe. ... The Communist State Security Service, acting on denunciations and evidence handed in by Ivan Mirchev, struck in 1950, Peasants from the Silistra villages of Popina, Alfatar, Isheriovo, Srebarna and Aydemir, as well as the Tutrakan villages of Malak, Preslavetz, Dunavtzi, Sokol, and many other villages in the

Kurbunar and Dobrotch regions, were deported en masse to forced labor camps of the Tutrakan region. As a result of one man's shameless betrayals, hundreds of peasant families suffered from the terror campaign launched by the State Security Service in Russe. ... Take heed, Ivan Mirchev, the Bulgarian Judas from Russe; we, the free Bulgarians, are addressing you! Remember that your name appears on the black list in capital letters!

Next, Kyril Stanchev's turn. He is chief of the Cadre Department of the Borough Committee of the Ferdinand [County] Communist Party. Dear listeners, try to remember his name, because some day you will need it, too. We repeat: He is Kyril Stanchev, chief of the Cadre Department of the Borough Committee of the Ferdinand Communist Party. Here in brief is the career of this traitor to the Bulgarian people.

There were attacks aimed at the entire leadership as well as individual offenders. In a program entitled "Due Process", RFE read an indictment of the Bulgarian Communist hierarchy accusing them of treason. Prepared by the Union of Bulgarian Jurists in Exile, the document was mailed personally to 2,570 high ranking Communist officials (all members of the Council of Ministers, Presidium and National Assembly). In publicizing the document RFE said:¹⁵⁵

The day of the restoration of Bulgarian independence is approaching. The accused who have usurped the rule, and all their accomplices and voluntary collaborators will be brought to court to face the Bulgarian people and account for all their criminal acts.

Another example relating to Czechoslovakia:¹⁵⁶

Hello Bratislava! Radio Free Europe calls the citizens of Bratislava! In the office of the resettlement bureau and the National Reconstruction Fund is employed one Comrade Absolonova. We warn you against her as emphatically as possible. She is a dangerous agent for the Communist Police. Her task is to recruit for the State Security Police new agents and informers from among young people. Absolonova is about 170cm. tall and blonde. She concentrates her attention on young men whom she seduces and then blackmails into collaborating with the police. We warn you against

this fanatical Stalinist informer.

The following was aimed at Poland in 1954.¹⁵⁷

We are calling Joseph Goda at Tatabanya. Listen carefully, Goda. We know how you abuse and exploit your miners, and the inhuman conditions under which you force them to live. Your name is in our black book. Unless you change your habits at once you will never escape trial and punishment when liberation comes. This is your last chance, Goda.

The Voice of Free Hungary ended one exposure with this plaintive statement: "I also said lately that I should like to find some excuse for you Boris Laszlo, but in vain I turn back the pages of your life; not one single deed do I find in your favor."¹⁵⁸ A later example attacked the top leadership, "Rakosi and Company" of Hungary:¹⁵⁹

What is criticism in accordance with the Party line? Why are the practical meanings of these expressions not clarified? ... If Rakosi and Company were to take party democracy seriously they would have to call a party Congress and there freely debate the new Moscow dictated line.

In 1954, Colonel Jozef Swialto, former Deputy Chief of Department Ten of the Ministry of Public Security (secret police) in Poland defected to the West. He was featured on the Voice of Free Poland in 101 broadcasts in which he exposed, in detail, inter-departmental rivalries, purges, corruption, assassinations and the organization of the secret police apparatus.¹⁶⁰ His material was used in an additional 146 broadcasts, in which Swialto did not personally speak, between September 28 and December 31, 1954. RFE claimed credit for the major shakeup in the security police which occurred shortly thereafter.¹⁶¹

"Non-political" programming included a vast number of cultural to recreational topics. Most of these were not translated into English.¹⁶² Fortunately RFE did publish examples in the mass media in the U.S. and made comments which can provide us with an understanding of their general content. Overall they can clearly be seen to have a political intent. They emphasize a "how-the-West-does-it" format. The following program titles and descriptions were provided to the Committee on Foreign Relations:¹⁶³

Everybody's Hobby: concentrates on hobbies and pastimes in the West.

Economics: Lists economic problems in the target country and illustrates how these would be dealt with in the West.

Film Magazine: News and human interest stories from the world of film and on leading Western film figures.

Free Men In A Free Society: Presents a picture of everyday America. The land of free enterprise in which labor enjoys a high standard of living and has a big voice in government. Also shows current social, economic and educational trends in America.

Kaleidoscope: Reports on life in West European capitals and Washington.

Military Power: The object of this program is to debunk Soviet claims to technological and military superiority over the Western Allies.

Literary Corner and Bookshelves: Reviews of current Western publications indicating the wide range of thought and expression by Western authors.

On Stage: New York plays and others in Europe indicating the vigor and trends of theatrical life in Western countries.

Music: [Folk songs, classical, pop and dance].

The President's Report of 1957 went into detail on programming also, due to the initiation of a new format after the Hungarian Revolution. Though the format was new in abandoning the rigid schedule of programs for particular sections of the population, militancy and a political emphasis

remained. * In the aggregate, there has been little change since 1957 when the two schedules are compared: 164

In carrying out its hard hitting function of opposition to Soviet domination and Communist rule in Eastern Europe, they [Free Europe Committee] must remain a flexible instrument unhampered by rigorous operational concepts. Gone was the adequacy of any single overall approach to the broadcasting requirements of all satellite targets. Instead each target required more special handling.

The Committee's objective [in 1957] was to assist in preserving the anti-Communist gains where they had been achieved, and to capitalize on the advantages that resulted from Communism's damaged reputation throughout the world.

RFE Themes for 1957:

- 1 defection of Communists to the West after Hungary.
 - a. Polish writers turn in their Party pins
 - b. Milovan Djilas' The New Class
 - c. Imre Nagy's testaments.
- 2 spotlighting retrenchments of civil liberties by Gomulka after he gained power.
- 3 spotlighting Soviet war mongering in the Middle East. Communist tactics and movements offered a new challenge: to analyze the dangers frankly, yet maintain the morale of East Europeans who might begin to fear, however much they might discount Moscow propaganda that the free world was in retreat.
 - a) Soviet war scheme opposed by the Eisenhower doctrine and that with this doctrine trouble makers were not going to prevail.
 - b) containment of Egyptian and Syrian adventurism.
- 4 Little Rock Arkansas: Gave the Communists plenty of propaganda, but RFE pointed out that the spectacular events were actually a small part of the total picture, which was one of racial peace and progress carried out by the democratic process. Then, carrying the offensive to the enemy it asked by what right did he criticize.
- 5 disarmament: Soviets block every scheme and avenue to reductions. The West would not play this game; its strength would be maintained regardless of Communist machinations.
- 6 Removal of Marshall Zhukov: what happened to Russia's leading soldier proved once again the instability of Communism as a system.
- 7 space satellites: showed contrast between all out effort on this front and the cynical indifference to their peoples' standard of living and human rights.

8 40th Anniversary of Russian Revolution: several scripts outlining how the Revolution had failed and exposing Communist claims for the Revolution as hollow promises and lies.

Music was an important propaganda tool for RFE which concentrated on songs, composers, and types (rock and jazz) banned by the regimes. Patriotic and folk songs and composers whose works were not permitted by the regime were emphasized, such as Bartok in Hungary. Western pop music, particularly jazz, was used for the same reason.¹⁶⁵ Children's programs also received attention. According to Michie, these were "programs devoted to games, fairy tales, plays and songs for small children: not political, but designed to help develop moral values among the young listeners and sustain their national traditions."¹⁶⁶ Comedy and satire were featured and were heavily political in their message. One was called "A Conversation between two Portraits" broadcasted to Poland. "The two portraits, Rokassovsky and Bierut, chatted easily. Gradually the conversation became tense as each expressed fears of being replaced by a more "collective" picture of the Russian countryside or a slave labor camp."¹⁶⁷ Religious programs (called "The Fighting Church") usually featured exiled religious leaders from all faiths who conducted services to their homelands. "Such programs", related Michie, "try to help parents instill religious values in their children and maintain their own faith and worship in an atheistic state."¹⁶⁸ On occasion, however, RFE attacked

the Church behind the Iron Curtain whenever it showed signs of cooperating with the regimes. The Voice of Free Poland, for instance, criticized Catholic Priests for accepting state honors while other Priests and Bishops were being held in prison.¹⁶⁹

"Decoration of the Patriot Priests": The satisfied expressions of the 'patriot Priests' flouting their medals will deceive no one. They are alone on this road of betrayal. Their desertion of matters of faith is especially clear at the moment that they accept decorations from those who keep Bishops and Priests in prison, who conduct a sustained and cunning war both with the organization of the Catholic Church and against its ideals of brotherhood and love. The regime's struggle with the Church still continues and assumes ever new forms.

Each desk attempted to maintain the traditional holidays and historical ceremonies which the regimes had decided were to be forgotten. RFE maintained a "special events" section, which covered ceremonies, activities of famous exiles, and escape attempts. In June 1956, the Voice of Free Hungary attended the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the victory of Nanorfehervor over the Turks. The site of the battle was in Austria and had formerly been an occasion for a pilgrimage, to the site, by Hungarians. The regime prohibited the pilgrimage and ignored the anniversary. RFE covered the event with broadcasts into Hungary. In March, the Czech desk covered the appearance of Rafael Kubelik conducting the Vienna Philharmonic at the Sportsplatz in Berlin, site of many of Hitler's rallies.¹⁷⁰ In June 1955, every desk broadcasted live the "March of the Captive Nations" in which exiles in their native costumes marched through the streets

of New York and held a rally where speeches for each captive nation were given. The keynote speaker was Bishop Guthbert O'Gara, recently expelled from the Peoples Republic of China. The Bishop described the new Soviet moves toward peaceful coexistence as an "impossible dream" and assured his audience, and Eastern Europe, that "the Captive Nations look westward for help to break their chains."¹⁷¹ Other special programs featured government leaders' and prominent politicians' expressions of solidarity with the cause of liberation. Both President Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Dulles used RFE to send Christmas greetings to Eastern Europe in 1955.¹⁷²

Eisenhower: We share your faith that right in the end will prevail to bring you once more among the free nations of the world.

Stevenson: No nation is truly at peace until all nations in our world dwell together in brotherhood. We in America will continue to work for the time when peace is joined together with justice and both are wed to freedom for all peoples of the earth.

Dulles: We look to the future with hope and resolution, confident that freedom and justice shall at last prevail.

One program was unique because it provided physical as well as psychological comfort. The program was called "Radio Doctor" and was a feature of all the desks. The program was broken into three parts. The first broadcasted public health and hygiene information to the public. It answered listeners' letters -- describing their symptoms and even prescribing and shipping drugs to given addresses.

The second part was a medical journal of the air in which technical data, research findings, etc. by Western

doctors, was broadcasted for East European doctors who could not get research data from other Western sources. RFE recognized that the regimes probably intercepted some of the drugs. However there were frequent letters acknowledging that drugs did reach some patients. RFE stated that overall the scheme "has far greater value to the masses of people who look to the West for salvation. On balance the Free World is gaining a clear victory."¹⁷³

The third part of the program was devoted to the exposure of the regimes' poor progress in the field of medicine. When the Bulgarian Minister of Health Kolaroff claimed the infant mortality rate was declining rapidly, the Voice of Free Bulgaria pointed out his figures were six times higher than those of Sweden.¹⁷⁴ In Czechoslovakia, the government urged citizens to collect and preserve certain common herbs because they had therapeutic uses. The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia interpreted this as an admission of backwardness;¹⁷⁵ "At a time of great triumphs in Free World medicine, your country is returning to the therapeutic ways of the witches. If the Communist regime cannot cure even the simplest diseases, how can it expect to accomplish the grandiose schemes it promises?"¹⁷⁶

RFE had always maintained publicly that it did not urge East Europeans to defect to the West. According to an official at Munich quoted by the New York Times, RFE attempted to "prevent such futile action."¹⁷⁷ In fact, however, RFE was deeply involved in the process of encouraging

defections. RFE employees were reported to have participated in setting up escape networks. Underground railroads, so to speak, were a part of the desks' activities.¹⁷⁸ Defectors were a valuable source of information. In this period of operations they were a major source because travel between East and West Europe was at a virtual standstill. RFE's "Special Events" section had as a routine assignment the interviewing of all defectors. These flowed into Munich at the average rate of 1,200 per week.¹⁷⁹ During the early period of its operation the Voice of Free Hungary transmitted coded messages from escapees to their friends and relatives.¹⁸⁰

The urging of military personnel and Communist officials to defect was overt. In October, 1953, RFE urged Czech Air Force pilots to fly their trainers to Graz Austria.¹⁸¹

"Calling the Czech Airforce"

It is an oversimplification to tell you that today you are at a crossroad which offers you two possibilities. The first leads to your doom: you may be able to continue flying for a while, but eventually people will come to ask you the unpleasant question - Why? ... The second possibility means that even when Communism is only a memory, you will still fly. That is the road taken by the Czech airmen who came to Graz in Austria in an old Arado training plane. ... What is at stake is the salvation of the Czech Air Force for the future. Set course 225 from Pilsen and fly 15 minutes. Remember that from time to time: course 225 and good flight.

The same was done over the Voice of Free Poland. It honored two Polish pilots who flew their Migs to Denmark, crediting them with "saving the reputation of the Polish Air Force."¹⁸²

Another program ended with an admonition to Polish airmen to "Restore the sovereign insignia [of the Polish Air Force]

to its original significance."¹⁸³ One Polish pilot claimed, over RFE, that his decision to defect came after hearing over RFE how easily it had been done by a colleague.¹⁸⁴

In 1953, RFE began Operation "Golden Bridge". Pamphlets were mailed to Czech Party members and government officials in the Czech and Slovak languages urging them to "earn forgiveness" for themselves by sabotaging regime policies or by defecting at the first opportunity. "Golden Bridge" was, according to Michie, "designed to undermine the reader's confidence in the superiority of Communism and to encourage him, before it was too late to cross the 'Golden Bridge'". "The warning was the reminder that Communist officials who owed their loyalty to the Kremlin had an uncertain future, especially since they could not know which faction would win the power struggle then going on in the Kremlin, and that they could expect punishment at the hands of their own people when eventually they became free."¹⁸⁵

Names were compiled from RFE's well stocked biographical file and the letters were mailed from all over Europe so as to disguise their source. In May 1954, the New York Times reported that a Bulgarian "Golden Bridge" campaign had begun, aimed at jurists and police officials. The sources claimed the new program was justified on the basis of the success of the Czech operation.¹⁸⁶

Though no broadcasts could be found which specially urged citizens to defect, RFE functionally encouraged them by its studious reporting of defections and by making it a

practice to put defectors on the air. This was particularly the case when the defection had been executed in a spectacular way. Information valuable to defectors was also broadcast, such as the fact that portions of the Czech border with Germany were electrified. Each defector was interviewed for information on his country. Minute details were considered important for RFE's credibility: food prices, working conditions, clothing quality, bus line schedules and every aspect of a person's daily life was recorded.¹⁸⁷

A 13-year old Polish boy was allowed on the air simply because he was so young. He admitted making the defection attempt because he had heard of so many others who had done it.¹⁸⁸ Dr. Macek Korowicz made several broadcasts after he quit the Polish delegation to the U.N. in September, 1953.¹⁸⁹ In September, 1951, Jaroslav Konvalinka, drove his passenger train at full throttle through the border crossing into West Germany. Thirty-one passengers elected to stay when they learned where they were. RFE's special events unit got all 31 to speak over the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia.¹⁹⁰

Hear what it [7:00 p.m. News] has to say about the Czechs who escaped by train today! We're going to listen too. But tune us back at 7:30 then we'll tell you what really happened.

7:30, Engineer Konvalinka:
The Communists are lying when they tell you that every passenger went back. Thirty-two of us have chosen freedom. If you don't believe I am here, go to my house. Here is the address -----
Go to these other addresses ----- You will not find one of us at home. We are all here in the West - and the climate is wonderful!

On March 25, 1953, a Czech airline pilot flew his plane to Frankfurt. RFE broadcast interviews with all who elected to remain. The same occurred over the Voice of Free Hungary in 1956 when 20 people hijacked an airliner and flew it to Germany. In July, 1953 Voclaw Uhlik drove his homemade tank across the Czech border. RFE purchased the tank and sent it on tour in the U.S. as part of the Crusade For Freedom campaign.¹⁹¹ In 1955 RFE featured the Masin brothers, Citod and Josef, who had escaped after a 28 day running battle over the East German countryside in which they reported having killed four East German police. They claimed they made the attempt after hearing a tribute to their father, General Masin over RFE.¹⁹²

It was also the practice of RFE to allow refugees to broadcast personal messages back to their friends and relatives. The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia, for example, aired such messages seven days a week, four times a day. The messages below are samplings of a typical days programming. Though these were claimed to be the words of the refugees, each contains a grain of propaganda about the free world or RFE. The program was entitled "Messages Home".¹⁹³

This is password Little Garden - dear mother, I was worried about you; I had not heard from you for so long. Now I have had news on the situation of all of you at home. We know that these are the worst times you have ever lived through, but you must believe that one day we will see you again.

This is password Hephaistos - calling my friends from the Moravsky Krumlov area. The border crossing was hard and exhausting, but it was a success. Now I am well, and I see true freedom. You may trust that true

freedom will return to our country. I have registered for Canadian immigration. Tell my parents that I regret I did not say goodbye to them. Give my regards to all, especially my parents. Listen again in two months.

Other than the defection of Colonel Swialto, the most important person to defect to the West was Seweryn Bialer, another Polish citizen. Bialer was a high ranking member of the Polish Communist Party. He was a member of the Communist underground during World War II and later a political advisor to Trybuna Ludu and teacher in Party schools. His importance was not due strictly to the amount of "intelligence" information he brought with him, which was plentiful, but because he was the first high-ranking defector who had grown up entirely under the influence of Communism. His defection then symbolized a major RFE theme, that Communism was a violation of human nature and could not hold those who saw the truth and yearned for freedom. The Voice of Free Poland, according to Michie, featured him on the air for weeks.¹⁹⁴

The Balloon Campaigns

The original idea for a balloon campaign against Eastern Europe was put forth by Dr. Robert Milikan, now the President of the California Institute of Technology. Dr. Milikan was involved in similar projects against the Germans in World War II, and had strongly urged their employment in the Cold War. In 1950, together with Dr. Milikan, the FEC began studying the technique as a means of supplementing its radio operation. The Committee contracted the General Mills Corp. to research

and develop a system capable of penetrating Eastern Europe with written messages. General Mills had held similar contracts with the government during World War II, and its Chairman, Harry Bullis, was a member of the FEC. The Committee also retained the Dewy Almy Chemical Company of Boston to test rubber balloons as potential carriers.¹⁹⁵

Eventually two designs capable of meeting the FEC requirements were developed. One was a rubber balloon, hydrogen filled, and designed to rise to an altitude of 30,000 to 40,000 feet (where the prevailing winds are from West to East) whereupon it would burst and discharge its cargo. The second type was made of plastic and was square in shape. It was supposed to leak hydrogen at a prescribed rate and settle to the ground, bursting on impact.¹⁹⁶ A third design was developed later employing a timed release container using the sublimation rate of dry ice as a trigger.

In all there were five balloon campaigns conducted against the countries in Eastern Europe. Operation "Winds of Freedom" beginning in August, 1951, and Operation "Prospero" in October, 1953 were both conducted against Czechoslovakia. These were short duration, experimental campaigns. The lessons learned from these barrages were incorporated into two extended campaigns which began in 1954. Operation "Veto" launched on April 29th was again directed against Czechoslovakia and Operation "Focus" was begun against Hungary on October 1st. The fifth balloon assault was called Operation "Spotlight" and began against Poland on February 12, 1955.

"Spotlight" will not be dealt with because, unlike "Veto" and "Focus", it was not an extended barrage, but one intended only to publicize as fully as possible the revelations of Colonel Swialto.¹⁹⁷ We shall compare these operations to demonstrate the gradual refinement in the strategy of penetration of RFE. The years 1954-1955 marked the height of the balloon campaigns. Over 90 million leaflets were dropped during that period on Czechoslovakia alone.¹⁹⁸

Czechoslovakia was chosen as the first target partly because it was close and partly because RFE thought the Czechs, with their long history of democratic institutions and the memories of Masaryk and Benes, would be the most receptive.¹⁹⁹ The launching site was the Bavarian town of Tirschenseuth, ten miles from the Czech border. The cost of the operations has never been made public, but it must have been substantial. RFE built a launching site which included barracks, mess halls, research centers and meteorological stations.²⁰⁰ A full-time staff of meteorologists was retained to predict wind speed, precise direction, and probable target areas. Leaflets were chosen in accordance to the target of the balloons so that each city would receive messages that were addressed specifically to that populace. The whole affair was automated. Machines inflated the balloons, tested each for lifting power and added the cargo and released them at a rate of six per minute.²⁰¹ By November, 1954, the FEC had purchased all the publicly available hydrogen in West Germany and had begun buying supplies in France and Italy.²⁰²

By April, 1956, 400,000 balloons had dropped 250 million leaflets on Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.²⁰³ The campaign was indeed a massive one.

The barrages were hailed by RFE as an overt display of sympathy by the West for the satellite peoples' will to freedom. A song was composed to commemorate the occasion, "The Iron Curtain Does not Reach the Sky". It was broadcast when a launch was about to begin.²⁰⁴ "Ultimately" said an official statement, "the balloon campaign means that the West will not recognize as final any measures which stop short of restoration of liberty to the oppressed peoples of central and Eastern Europe."²⁰⁵

The first barrage, "Winds of Freedom" was begun against Czechoslovakia. It lasted four days. According to RFE, "The operation was explained politically as an overt expression of the West of the Czechoslovak peoples' will for freedom as expressed in their recent demonstrations against the Communist regime. The balloons were intended to prove the ineffectuality of the Iron Curtain, to show that the West could and would always find a means by which to communicate to the enslaved peoples."²⁰⁵ Harald Stassen, Mutual Security Administrator and also Chairman of the 1951 Crusade for Freedom, was on hand along with C.D. Jackson and Drew Pearson, an outspoken supporter of RFE. Together they symbolically released the first balloons. Printed on the side of each balloon was the word "Svoboda" (Freedom) and inside were leaflets proclaiming the new device.²⁰⁷

A new wind is blowing. New hope is stirring. Friends of freedom in other lands have found a new way to reach you. They know that you also want freedom. Millions of men and women have joined together and are sending you this message of friendship over the winds of freedom. There is no dungeon deep enough to hide truth, no wall high enough to keep out the message of freedom. Tyranny cannot control the wind, cannot enslave your hearts. Freedom will rise again.

The leaflets formed no overall message, apart from the introductory statement of friendship. The other leaflet was a picture story of the Konvalinka train escape. The engineer contributed a personal message: "There were no terrorists, no secret foreign plot. The only terrorists are the Communists; the only foreigners are those from Russia."²⁰⁸ On the back of both missiles were the times and wavelengths of RFE broadcasts to Czechoslovakia. The recipients were urged to keep the schedule and pass it on to family and friends.

The campaign was a short test-run. It lasted only four launch days. Generally, the results were considered disappointing. The regime ignored the balloons and escapees reported they had had little impact.²⁰⁹ The barrages seemed to have no practical advantage. Nothing was put in print which could not as easily have been broadcast over the air. They reflected the battering ram approach which characterized early RFE programming strategy. Harald Stassen, without intending to, described this essential aimlessness. When asked to explain what the barrage had accomplished he could only say: "We tore a big hole in the Iron Curtain."²¹⁰ The

militancy of the propaganda and the technical means of attack were available, but not until 1953 was a strategy developed.

When RFE was reoriented to pursue a course of stimulating and directing internal opposition, or in Scott's terms, to create mass disloyalty, the balloon barrages were made an integral part of this strategy. The function of the balloons was to supplement the radio propaganda. Their message was intended to be integrated with the current tactical objective pursued by RFE and provide a physical presence to the broadcasts. Papers, manifestos, stickers or whatever, reflecting the current line, could be kept or passed on. As we will see below, they were to provide the instructions for specific acts of resistance as well. RFE reviewed the significance of the new tactic this way:²¹¹

Through the operation of their own press and radio [balloons and RFE] the captive people received not only uncensored news but proof of their continuing connection with the West and a sense of their own unity and power against the Communist oppressor. ... This combined printed and spoken word operation was the first attempt by the West to communicate methodically and intensively with the captive peoples.

The first test of the coordinated effort came in 1953, and was called operation "Prospero". In June, 1953, the Czech government carried out a sweeping currency reform which wiped out almost everyone's savings -- and touched off a series of riots. At the same time, the Workers of East Berlin were rioting seriously enough to require the state's use of Soviet tanks. Operation "Prospero" was mounted as a

coordinated attempt of RFE with the balloons to use the opposition to the currency reform in Czechoslovakia as a base for a permanent anti-regime movement. In addition, RFE tried to instruct the workers as to what sort of demands to make. One message urged the workers to view their actions as an indication that Russian oppression was crumbling.²¹²

Hear the message which comes to you today from the Free World. The Soviet Union is growing weaker. The peoples of the Captive Countries are growing stronger. Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and join the struggle against the oppressor. Everywhere in the Free World your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows. The Free World is with you. All power to the people.

Another was designed to resemble the new Czech one crown note issued by the government.²¹³

Men call this the Hunger Crown, gift of the Soviet Union. It is a symbol of regime desperation, of five years of failure. It is a challenge to fight, to meet weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

Other articles were: a pamphlet giving details of the East Berlin riots, assuring the Czechs they were not alone in their opposition, "With unity and courage organize your strength: Down with the Collectives: Insist on Workers' rights."²¹⁴

There was a sheet with news of the fall of Beria and finally a small metal medallion in the shape of the FEC freedom bell inscribed: "All Czechs and Slovaks for freedom - all the Free World for the Czechs and the Slovaks."²¹⁵ On the final night of the barrage, balloons were launched with lighted lanterns attached for effect, and RFE broadcast that the

balloons were an "overt expression by the West of the Czech peoples' will to freedom as expressed in their recent demonstrations against the regime."²¹⁶

Sustained balloon campaigns were begun in 1954 against Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In the Czech barrage, called Operation "Veto", RFE hoped to coordinate the public dissatisfaction into opposition against the Party candidates in the up-coming local, regional and national elections. It was designed as a multi-phased attack providing advice and encouragement to specific segments of the population as well as blanket appeals. It would attempt to promote a program of specific, obtainable demands for those (whom RFE considered the vast majority) who opposed the regime. Popular unrest resulting from the currency reform and the Pilsen riots was evident. The elections were seen as the regime's attempt to shore up its ranks with new functionaries brought in through the elections. RFE sought to mold the unrest into an active opposition against the government -- what it called a "peoples opposition movement."²¹⁷ Balloons were the principal element with this operation signalling that they were no longer in the test stage. RFE described their intended function this way:²¹⁸

The mission of Veto and Focus is to give support and coherence to the opposition of the captive peoples to their Communist rulers. The rising pressure of discontent behind the Iron Curtain had been charted from the workers riots in June, 1953, the assertions of escapees, the admission of the Communist regime in its own press, and above all, by the changes and retreats in post-Stalinist Communist policy. The Free Europe Press [balloons] and

Radio Free Europe combined radio-leaflet operations seek to crystallize the forces of opposition and to provide the people with the means and the will to exact concessions which will improve their own life, while at the same time undermine the power of the regimes.

RFE composed 10 demands, which, through monitoring and interviews, it had decided represented what in general were the major grievances of the masses. These formed the nucleus of what RFE named the "Czechoslovak Peoples' Opposition Movement." The demands were carried on leaflets and in a newsletter titled Svoboda Europa (Free Europe). Additional information, along with the appropriate demands, were dropped addressed to particular groups in the target when RFE considered their grievances could be furthered most effectively: to voters during the elections, to workers during the trade union elections, and to farmers at harvest time. To the Czech voter RFE urged a show of no interest, destruction of ballots or using the law to slow down and frustrate the regime. To workers, it advised that only sympathetic and anti-regime colleagues be elected to shop committees, and to the farmer RFE used the slogan "The land belongs to those who till it" urging them to withhold quota deliveries or abandon the collectives. RFE also urged that citizens do individually whatever they personally thought would be effective and could get away with.²¹⁹ Such minor acts, it was hoped, would have a cumulative effect. The people would become conditioned to expressing themselves, to opposing the regime and would develop a self-confidence which in the long

run would make control increasingly more difficult. Below are two broadcasts by RFE explaining the opposition movement and what it was supposed to achieve.²²⁰

"A New Political Front":

It must be clear to careful observers that the real roots of political life in Czechoslovakia today are not in the Party Congress; the Congress only reflects the events around it. This fact is not changed by the visit of the Secretary of the Soviet Party, who came to flatter and encourage the local Gauleiters of World Communism - abandoned by their own cadres - and to issue orders and give courage for the struggle against their own people. ... Where do the roots of political life lie today? In the factories, fields, stores and offices, where the Party helplessly endures the workers' refusal of 'Socialist' slavery and the farmers' rejection of the kolkhoz yoke. This causes trouble and embarrassment to Communist cadres as well as management, and is reflected in the Congress.

The careful observer will see that this is only one part of what is brewing among the people. ...

The Communists only wish that the People's Opposition would forget its final aim: the overthrow of the tyrannical regime. But this hope is in vain. The Opposition has presented its action program now for good reasons. ...

Today they are all linked by the supreme social law: the fight against those who have imposed this state of material distress and spiritual and political slavery on the people. The essence of political life now lies in the People's Opposition, by the default of the regime itself. ...

The regime ties the people hand and foot. They must free themselves from this straitjacket through the program of the Ten Demands. They must extend their activities. They must take all their interests into their own hands before entering the final stage of the battle. This is the role of the Opposition's action program in the total fight against the regime. This action program had to be issued so that the final defeat of the regime could be prepared.

"What is the 'Peoples Opposition'?"

A new message in the form of letters is now going into the hands of members of the Czechoslovak People's Opposition. It is a message in which we in the free world again only formulate the thoughts born in our homeland; we print them in our printing-houses and speak them over our radio. And we then send them back

home from where they came. For, just as it was necessary for every member of the People's Opposition to know and adopt this program, so it is necessary that he understands clearly its meaning. ... The letter to members of the Czechoslovak People's Opposition, above all, answers the question of what the Czechoslovak People's Opposition is. It is both you at home and we abroad. But we are not merely your voice, we are your envoys: your leaders are at home among you. How do you recognize them? You know best yourselves: a leader of the people is the peasant who, in the village, manages best to organize a silent yet effective resistance to collectivization and extortion of crop deliveries. He is the trade-unionist who, whenever worker's rights are at stake, manages with the aid of his companions, to put pressure on the board of directors at factories. He is the National Committee member who does not permit district officials to step on his toes. He is the teacher who, with the aid of parents, protects children against Communist indoctrination and against Communist labor recruitment. He is the functionary who helps undermine the regime from within. He is the SNB [police] man who knows he should protect the people, not the regime.

Upon examining the 10 demands put forth by RFE, it is clear that implementation would have required a practical dissolution of the regime. They were: 1) Trade Unions for the trade unionists; 2) More pay, less propaganda; 3) Freedom to quit jobs; 4) No State regimentation of free time; 5) No more [farmer] serfdom; 6) No agriculture quotas or smaller ones; 7) Autonomy for local National Committees; 8) Goods for the people, not for the Soviets; 9) Back to servicing the customer; 10) Housing for families, not for the state.²²¹

The balloons carried small bumper type stickers bearing the numeral "10". Recipients were urged to put them on government buildings or on the homes and cars of government officials. 20 million mock ballots were dropped containing

the 10 demands and reading,²²²

This ballot of the Czechoslovak People's Opposition does not belong in the government ballot boxes. It belongs in the hands of the citizens who will use it - each according to his own possibilities - as a demonstration of the peoples' solidarity and as a first part of a step by step program against the regime. Securing these ten demands will constitute a historic milestone on the road toward a free Czechoslovakia in a free united Europe.

There were also leaflets called the Masaryk letter as well as Svoboda Europa. The Masaryk letter resembled an ordinary air mail envelope bearing the Masaryk stamp, a regular issue in Czechoslovakia. The cancellation read "Truth Prevails". Printed where the return address would normally be found was the inscription, "In Unity Strength", and the address was to "All the people of the Opposition". The main message admonished the people,²²³

To be aware of and to spread the consciousness of the peoples' solidarity. To choose according to your own possibilities the areas in which you can oppose with the greatest success. To select the demand which you can best propagate, to assist your fellow citizens, to rely on them, to trust that there is truth, strength and victory in the people.

Svoboda Europa usually ran to eight pages containing sections elaborating on the Peoples' Opposition, explaining the importance of the ten demands and how they could be used against the regime. The paper was described by RFE thusly,²²⁴

This is the backbone publication of Operation Veto. The six issues ... contain articles outlining and commenting on the ten demands and the peoples' opposition program, and provide statistical and analytical material to pin down regime lies and promises, and to contrast life behind the Iron Curtain with life in the Free World.

In its broadcasts RFE emphasized that the paper was not a state organ, but an uncensored free press of the masses.²²⁵

Dear Listeners, some of you have now read the magazine of the Peoples' Opposition brought to you by the freedom balloons. ... Let us simply consider the fact that there has been no freedom of the press in Czechoslovakia for six years. Like any other dictatorship, the Communist regime fears any expression of freedom and most important, freedom of the printed word. ... But the regime cannot prevent Czechs and Slovaks from reading a periodical which has not been marked with the censor's stamp. The Free Europe magazine is a weapon which has been sharpened without regime supervision: it is the peoples' weapon against the dictatorship.

At the outset of Veto, RFE thus concentrated on explaining the "why" of the opposition. Five questions were anticipated and answered in the leaflets: 1) What is the Peoples' Opposition Movement; 2) What are its goals; 3) What are the ten demands; 4) Why is it begun at this time; 5) What can the ordinary citizen do?²²⁶ After the operation was well underway RFE switched to the question of "how" the people could achieve the ten demands. Three million leaflets were dropped addressed to peasants. It was titled "The Harvest of Self Defense". It related to demand number five; "No more serfdom", and to number six; "No quotas or smaller ones". "To whom does the harvest belong?", the leaflet began. "It belongs to those who cultivate it." Six possible forms of resistance were suggested: 1) to independent farmers: "Delivery quotas do not have to be fulfilled"; 2) to Kolkhoze farmers: "Demand recompense in kind [food and fodder] then make deliveries to the state"; 3) National Committee members: "Protect your constituents [from higher

quotas]"; 4) to State purchasing agents: "Coöperate with the farmers or else starve with them"; 5) to the Police: "If you want to eat don't report those farmers who resist"; 6) to Government functionaries: "Now is the time to show that you recognize the treachery of the Party leadership".²²⁷ Accompanying the leaflet was a bumper sticker depicting four men, connected with different aspects of agricultural life, protecting a corn crop from a seedy Communist official. Above the picture was printed, "The Harvest of Self Defense" and the numeral "10". Concurrently, the third issue of Svoboda Europa was dropped (two million copies). The lead article discussed ways farmers could resign from Kolkhozes.²²⁸

The RPE broadcast below gave advice to voters as to which elections they should ignore and which should occupy their interest:²²⁹

"Hidden Opportunities in the Elections":
Insofar as elections to the National Assembly are concerned (for these also are scheduled), everything is plain to everybody: nothing can be done, for the regime is going to announce in any case that 99 per-cent of the votes were cast in favor of its candidates - and the threehundred puppets, whose every word and every move can be minutely controlled by the regime, will go on eating their bread, thickly buttered. So it follows: don't concern yourselves with the elections to the National Assembly. But the plant councils and the national committees - they are quite a different matter. There hundreds of thousands of functionaries will be elected and the regime cannot possibly place a policeman alongside every single one. While the National Assembly resembles a brilliantly lit playground, the nation committees resemble a thicket. ... Here the regime is about to create a gigantic body which it can control only with difficulty. If the people have objectives other than those of the regime, the national committees are probably the place where it is possible to try to put them through. If opposition against the regime does exist, it can find expression in the national committees.

The last issue of Svoboda Europa, ending Operation Veto, proclaimed the success of the peoples opposition.²³⁰

It has been done, and will be done again even better - on that principle operation Veto continues, bringing the captive people of the Soviet bloc not merely symbolic reassurance of Western interest in their welfare, but a concrete action program based on proven causes of dissatisfaction inside the country and geared to realistic goals: Today concessions, tomorrow Freedom!

RFE did a rough analysis of Operation Veto to determine the geographical and demographic impact. By noting regime press and radio attacks, reports of leaflet findings and interviewing refugees, it was estimated that 36,000 of the 49,000 square miles of the country had been covered by the balloons and that Veto material circulated in eighty-six localities among a population of 11.8 million out of a total audience of 13 million.²³¹

Operation Focus was the second sustained campaign attempting to combine radio broadcasts and print in an effort to organize and direct popular resistance to regime policies. The campaign began, while Veto was still underway, against Hungary on October 1, 1954. Hungary was chosen because, like Czechoslovakia, RFE considered the political situation there potentially unstable. There were indications of severe stress within the party resulting from de-Stalinization and its Hungarian co-variant, the "New Course", promulgated by Imre Nagy in July, 1953. The New Course amounted to a relaxation of regime control and more rational social and economic policies, which were opposed by the conservative

members of the Central Committee. According to RFE, "Clearly this situation presented a real opportunity for the Hungarian Opposition of the people to demand further concessions from the regime; and by winning one concession, to open the way for yet another in a war of attrition against the Nagy-Rakosi ruling clique."²³²

Twelve demands, similar to those of Veto, were formulated: 1) Real autonomy for local councils; 2) Free speech and assembly; 3) Rule of Law, not the reign of the party; 4) The land belongs to those who till it; 5) Free Trade Unions for free workers; 6) An end to industrial slavery; 7) Production for Hungary's well-being; 8) Raise living standards; 9) Services to the people in the hands of the people; 10) Homes, not barracks; 11) Equality of education and free intellectual life; 12) Freedom of worship and of conscience.²³³ The operation was given the name Nemzeti Ellenallasi Mozgalom (National Opposition Movement). The initials were "NEM" which in Hungarian spells "No".²³⁴ The NEM manifesto, dropped around the clock, read in part:²³⁵

The NEM believes that the time has come to use new and more effective legal means to win liberty for our people and to dispel the Communist darkness over our land. ... The NEM represents a solidarity based on the cooperation of the masses; it is not a conspiracy and it is not a secret underground organization. ...

The final goal of the NEM is a free and democratic society in which the rights and freedom of the individual are protected by law. ...

Invincible strength lies in the spirit of a conscious and united people. The stronger the people become, the weaker become those who would hold them in bondage ... the Hungarian Communist regime has been forced to give ground before the persistent mass resistance of the past fourteen months.

In November, Szabad Magyarorszag (Free Hungary), the counterpart to Svoboda Europa, was launched into Hungary. Its length was normally around ten pages. The November issue provided similar propaganda to that of the Veto campaign.²³⁶

Free Hungary, carried on the wings of the wind, voices the thoughts and desires of the Hungarian people who are now condemned to silence. We raise our voice at a time when the Opposition of the Hungarian people has achieved concrete results of which the whole world takes note. The Communists retreated in July 1953 - but not enough. The regime can still be forced into yielding a series of concessions; but these can be extracted from the regime only by broadening and strengthening national opposition.

Since the Communists took over, this is the first time the Hungarian people have had a free press - a newspaper written with Hungarian hearts and minds, by free Hungarians. Free Hungary is the extension of that same free press which Petofi and his followers demanded in their March 1948 Twelve Points. Free Hungary is the symbol of national unity. ...

Kossuth said of his movement: 'It arose spontaneously.' So also, the National Opposition Movement sprang from the will of the people, to weaken the Communist system, quietly, relentlessly.

The Movement is intangible - it fights with the invisible weapon, a weapon therefore all the more effective: silent opposition. Every man is a soldier in this Movement:

The worker, who, covertly and secretly, delays production of machines and weapons for the Soviet Union;

The peasant, who casts off the chains of the kolkezi;

The official, who, when the opportunity presents itself, destroys the file of the persecuted.

Free Hungary assists our people in their fight against the Communists.

Bumper stickers were also a part of the Hungarian campaign. RFE reprinted four examples which through pictures urged such acts as writing the numeral "12" on public buildings, defending the harvest from the government, laying

down arms and marching en masse off the collective farms. 237

RFE supplemented the leaflets with an almost continuous program schedule alerting the people to the movement's existence, attempting to intimidate officials with the line that NEM was a mass movement and they were on the verge of losing control, and in the aggregate attempting to create the impression that this was a spontaneous grass roots opposition movement. The goal, of course, was a free democratic Hungary. Four examples of this type of broadcast follow: 238

We bring you a special newscast. Starting last night, thousands of balloons are floating over Hungary and are carrying in leaflets the twelve demands of the National Opposition Movement, the spirit of the nation united in an invisible front. Leaflets are falling by the millions on the soil of our fatherland. ... The final aim of the NEM, according to the leaflet is a free and democratic society in which the rights of the individual are protected by law; the laws of the land are passed by the freely elected representatives of the people; and the workers and their families are assured healthy living conditions and a decent life.

Has the Hungarian nation broken down or capitulated because it cannot throw the word No into the face of foreigners? Does not the people's will revolt, no matter how strongly their mouths are gagged? Does the Hungarian peasant accept serfdom? The Hungarian worker slavery? Has the Hungarian intelligentsia consented to be prostituted? They have denied our lips the right of No, but here is another NO in its stead, written with capitals instead of small letters, the new and unanimous Hungarian Nem: the HUNGARIAN NATIONAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. The movement whose hundreds of thousands of balloons, expressing the Hungarian peoples' basic complaints and demands, are floating above the Danube and the Tisza regions. The many silenced and suppressed No's can now be heard all at once, and cannot be silenced ever again.

They believed that when they extinguished the No from our language they extinguished our soul as well. But it did not vanish - instead of the little nem it gave birth to the great, the historic NEM:

the National Opposition Movement. 'The free man creates himself' - says Wagner's Wotan. The free nation also creates it. Thus the Hungarian nation is creating itself as well. That is why now, above the thousand-year-old homeland, balloons are floating, shouting to the world the irrepressible Hungarian NO!

"Calling the Communist": In all probability, local party agent, you are feeling slightly chilled, since, in the past few days millions and millions of leaflets have suddenly been added to my [the announcer] occasional discreet admonitions. ... I remind you that I myself have warned you at least fifty times - do not be a blind tool in the hands of the usurpers of power. Now you have received this warning from the Hungarian people in writing so you cannot claim that no one has warned you. ... Have no doubts about the fact that the National Opposition Movement is truly the voice of the Hungarian masses. Be thankful that today it is setting up such mild demands which can be so easily fulfilled.

The people, the exploited and downgraded people, have created the National Opposition Movement. The mills of history grind slow but sure. We shall soon know which of these two will win the field: the "Front" [Peoples' Patriotic Front created by the regime to mobilize the populace behind the new policies] which has been named "patriotic", with Soviet bayonets at its back, or the unnamed opposition movement with the soul of the nation in its voice and in its aims.

Like Operation Veto, Operation Focus concentrated heavily on the peasants. Peasant resentment against the regime was extreme in Hungary. Within six months of the inauguration of the New Course by the Hungarian Communist Party, 51 percent of the membership of the collective farms had quit and 25 percent of the Kolkhoze land was decollectivized. RFE urged the peasants to make further demands. One NEM leaflet addressed to peasants, for example, stated:²³⁹

We demand:

The dissolution of the kolkhozes, the return of pooled land and tools to the owners!

The equal division of common kolkhoz property

the cancellation of debts to the State!

Production supports and long-term credits for the independent farmers!

The return of confiscated peasant lands, the cessation of forced commassation and forced land exchange!

The distribution of State farms among the landless peasants!

The end of discriminatory classification of peasants, the elimination of the "kulak" category!

Protection for the peasants, the legal protection of their lands!

The abolition of collectivization!

Reduction of delivery quotas until deliveries are ultimately abolished altogether!

The National Opposition Movement.

These appeals were supported by RFE broadcasts to the peasants. The example below attempted to show the peasant the progress achieved for him by NEM. By implication, the spontaneous migration away from all forms of collectivization was included by definition as part of the RFE created NEM movement.²⁴⁰

Let us pause for a moment, farmers, and see what the NEM has brought us. Let us see whether it was and will continue to be worth while to oppose the demands of the peasant-exploiting Communist government.

- 1) [Crop delivery quotas reduced and previous year's arrears remitted]
- 2) [Local Communist Party officials are trying to curry farmers' favor by] Lightening your burden under the pretext of making allowances for weather, etc.
- 3) [Communist regime budgeted more money for capital equipment in agriculture] It shamefacedly admitted it had sinned against you, that its economic policy was wrong, that from now on it would give you what you need for production. ... Was it their pleasure to do it? No, they did not enjoy doing it. They collided with the steel like wall of your mute opposition.
- 4) Do you notice that this year they do not dare use force to form Kolkhozes? Instead of violence they only plead. ... You and I, we both know why. You taught them that it is not a wise thing to oppose

the will of millions. Adding it all up we can fairly state that it was worth while. It cannot be denied that there are results. Who could doubt that from now on there will be even more! The important thing is that your every thought, your every step be directed by the conviction that you are the stronger.

Both operations continued simultaneously until 1955, when the emphasis shifted to getting listeners to accept new possibilities for liberating themselves. The use of balloons continued however until they were finally ended after the Hungarian Revolution.²⁴¹ Naturally, RFE considered the balloon operations a significant achievement. According to Michael Hoffman, a member of the RFE Director's staff in 1954, they proved that, "opposition to the Reds can be stimulated and guided by the Free World."²⁴²

Clearly these programs were a sophisticated attempt to penetrate the populations of Eastern Europe and disrupt the political processes of the respective states. There were no hysterical calls for revolution, but rather an urging to attempt the possible; to engage in acts which cumulatively would render the target governments unable to pursue desired policies.

Professor Scott talks at length of the relationship between the modern phenomenon of mass disloyalty and the technique of informal penetration.²⁴³ But the question might logically be asked: what is the relationship between mass disloyalty and the period known as the Cold War? Why that strategy at that time? Simply put - it was the method of victory. To phrase it in conventional terms, victory, the

destruction of the enemy's capacity to resist, had to be brought about from within. An external assault on Communist control would have involved too great a risk.

The balloons represented an obvious escalation in the attack on the countries of Eastern Europe and brought about a quick and decisive response from the regimes in the form of diplomatic charges against the U.S. The exchanges between the U.S. and Czechoslovakia and Hungary afford an opportunity to examine the way the government could give programatic support for RFE while continuing to deny formal responsibility. The U.S. could even take credit for the campaigns, by implication, by stating the activities of RFE were a natural result of Americans' love of freedom and concern for those denied it in Eastern Europe.

The replies by the American Government followed a pattern, a) denial of responsibility, b) assertion that the FEC and RFE were non-governmental and thus a spontaneous expression of the American people for universal principles and c) assertion that the means employed were really the fault of the target because they denied those principles.

The first protest was lodged by Czechoslovakia on June 19, 1951. It accused the U.S. of fomenting subversion with border violations and radio using falsehoods. The U.S. reply began with a lecture to the Czech government on the meaning of freedom and the degree to which the American people held to it and followed with a denial of involvement. 244

Radio Free Europe was organized and operated by a group of private citizens. It is a division of a corporate body, the National Committee for a Free Europe, which is incorporated in the State of New York. More than 16 million American citizens are supporting RFE. Thus while the American people have a direct interest in the activities of RFE, the United States Government does not.

The note continued with the obvious conclusion: the activities of a non-governmental organization could not result in the U.S. government violating any international law or agreement. The employment of Czech exiles was also protested. The U.S. responded that it was no one's business but RFE's.²⁴⁵ The next Czech protest charged RFE with "carrying out activities hostile to and directed against Czechoslovakia".²⁴⁶ They received the same reply: RFE was private and committed simply to the universal principle of freedom of information.²⁴⁷

Undaunted the Czechs protested again, but this time with a more carefully constructed case. Their note cited three points, 1) RFE was headquartered on land under the occupation administration of the United States, therefore the U.S. government was responsible for its activities; 2) the note quoted a New York Herald Tribune story dated May 21st as proof that "RFE is not technically an American operation, but it could not function without government approval"; 3) the principle of freedom of information was groundless because RFE was beamed at Czechoslovakia, a free country.²⁴⁸

The U.S. reply stated that RFE's location had no bearing on the government's responsibility to its area of occupation, a skillful avoidance of the Czech's first point. Then the

note lapsed into the familiar theme that the American government was "committed to the principle of freedom of communication." And "After reviewing the leaflets", the U.S. had concluded that that was all RFE was committed to. RFE only furthered that principle. The U.S. would take no action because RFE did not "incite espionage or crime".²⁴⁹

When Operation "Prospero" began in 1953, the Czechs had different grounds for complaint. The U.S. was accused of "flagrant interference into the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia."²⁵⁰ Below is the U.S. reply in full. Washington employed its usual tactic of turning the tables and blaming the Czech government for the use of such unusual means of communication as balloons. By raising a barrier to free communication, then, the Czech government had brought this upon themselves. The tone of the U.S. reply is interesting. Washington appeared only vaguely aware that anything was going on. Moreover it contains a condescending lecture on the principles of freedom.²⁵¹

The balloons apparently in question were released by the Crusade for Freedom, an organization established by private American citizens. The U.S. Government has ascertained that the balloons were released for the purpose of communicating with the people of Czechoslovakia.

It is a fundamental conviction of the American Government and people that free communication between people constitutes a principle upon which the very life of the international community should be founded. If any Government attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people from contact with the outside world, it is inevitable that ways will be found both by the people inside that country and by the people of other countries outside to penetrate that artificial barrier and maintain some line of contact with one another. The use by those outside of such media as

balloons, confirm that the Czechoslovak Government has created a barrier interfering with free communications. The U.S. believes that the best assurance that this means of communication will not be used is to obviate the need for it by permitting what is natural and necessary in the modern world; namely, free contact between nations and the free exchange of information and ideas.

As for the content of the messages carried to Czechoslovakia by this medium, it is understood that they contained information on current developments in Central and Eastern Europe and, in addition, various statements focusing on the idea of 'freedom'. There would be no reason for a Government to be disturbed by the principle of freedom in a message to its people, if conditions of freedom actually existed in that country. One cannot readily believe that the Czechoslovak Government would even raise this issue with the U.S. Government if the fundamental freedoms were observed in Czechoslovakia, and if the Czechoslovak Government were not now especially concerned about the attitude of the people toward the absence of those freedoms.

The U.S. Government cannot agree that the transmission of these messages to the people of Czechoslovakia from the territory of the U.S. Zone of Germany by the Crusade for Freedom Committee involved any misuse of the position of the U.S. as an occupying power. Such communication is clearly not contrary to any quadripartite agreement affecting Germany, nor does such communication violate any other international agreement to which the U.S. Government is a signatory.

With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace, the U.S., as is generally known, has endeavored in every practical way to work step by step, in accordance with the deep interest of the American people in permanent peace, and in cooperation with other countries, toward building an enduring structure of international peace and stability. The U.S. seeks to help bring about a relaxation of international tension whenever there are genuine possibilities of doing so. It is recognized, at the same time, that true international tranquility presupposes conditions which assure human rights and fundamental freedoms for the people concerned.

A year later during Operation "Veto" the Czech government charged the U.S. with violating international law, violations of Czech air space and interference in her internal affairs.²⁵² President Zapotocky supplemented the note with a personal

condemnation: 253

Czechoslovakia sends no saboteurs, no diversionists, no murderers abroad, launched no balloons and does not mix in the internal affairs of other countries as do traitorous emigres under the patronage of American imperialist circles.

The U.S. reply was predictable: 254

It is understandable the American people would seek to maintain by such means as are available to maintain contacts with the people of Czechoslovakia with whom they had formerly enjoyed free association and with whom they share many common traditions. If the Czechoslovak Government desires that this form of communication not be utilized, it is within its power to remove the need for such media by opening the barriers to free access to the people of Czechoslovakia.

The American people take a profound interest in the welfare of the people of Czechoslovakia. The leaflets borne to Czechoslovakia express the interest of the American public in seeing the welfare of the people there improve through the attainment of a series of goals. Notwithstanding, the Czechoslovak Government claims that these leaflets were subversive and inciting. It consequently appears that in the eyes of the present regime in Czechoslovakia, discussion of concrete steps to better the lot of the common man in that country is tantamount to subversion.

As has been previously suggested, the United States holds firmly to the view that there must exist unobstructed communication between peoples if nations are to live in peace and freedom with one another. When a government violates this principle by trying to insulate its people from the world of ideas without, it is only natural that efforts will be made both inside and outside that country to break through the insulation.

The United States Government is informed that the Crusade For Freedom has sent messages to the people of Czechoslovakia by the vehicle of balloons. The Crusade for Freedom, an organization of private citizens is supported by millions of Americans and expresses the aspirations of the American people for the liberation of all peoples. The messages, it has been learned, transmitted news items and concrete goals in which the Czechoslovak people would be interested. The operation was undertaken by this private organization and neither the United States nor U.S. authorities in Germany were involved. The United States government rejects the protest of the Czechoslovak government which is without foundation.

The Hungarian government entered with similar futility into the diplomatic fray with protests over Operation "Focus". The U.S. replies were the same as those sent to the Czechs. In one note however, the U.S., after making the usual denials, proceeded to defend individually each of the 12 demands in the RFE program.²⁵⁵

The leaflets do no more than urge the Hungarian people to get what they are entitled to under the Hungarian Constitution and the Treaty of Peace. ...

- a) investing authority in local councils responsible to the people
- b) guaranteeing free speech and assembly
- c) equality before the law
- d) right of the peasant to a fair share of his crops
- e) allow workers to join free trade unions
- f) insuring workers get proper rest and recreation
- g) more emphasis on consumer goods
- h) protesting nationalization of stores and services; has deprived Hungarians of liberty
- i) lack of housing and need for protection of marriage and the family
- j) free education and freedom of religion

The note ended with the statement: "The U.S. Government hopes that the day will come when balloons will no longer be necessary as a means by which the people of one country may freely communicate with people of other lands. Presumably it is within the power of the Hungarian Government to take the necessary remedial action."²⁵⁶

The balloon campaigns led to charges of injury and death in 1956. In January, the Czechs claimed a 14 year-old boy had suffered second degree burns and a concussion when a balloon exploded in his face.²⁵⁷ On January 21st, the government halted all night flights into Prague because of the alleged danger of collision with balloons.²⁵⁸ On the

22nd they issued official warnings to all foreign air carriers of the balloon danger. KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) stated they considered the balloons a flight hazard and halted service.²⁵⁹ In February 1956, Czechoslovakia announced that a Czech DC-3 air-liner had collided with an RFE and crashed. FEC headquarters in New York responded by saying the chances of such a collision were, in its words, "infinitesimal".²⁶⁰ The Czechs, in the UN General Assembly, declared the crash was due to balloons and that the U.S. was responsible. On June 19th, they demanded 770,000 dollars (5,525,374 in Crowns) as compensation and punishment of the "people whose activity caused this tragic accident."²⁶¹ The U.S. requested a delay, additional details from the Czech government and permission for U.S. investigators to inspect the site and the plane. In February, 1957, the Czechs responded by forwarding its official investigative report, but denying permission for an American on the sight investigation. The final U.S. reply rejected the entire protest for a number of reasons: 1) Czech refusal to permit U.S. inspection, the note said, meant the charge was not true; 2) Czech description of the balloon involved was not of the type used by RFE; 3) the U.S. carried out test collisions between DC-3s and RFE balloons and determined that the type of damage claimed was not possible from a balloon; 4) the Czech report admitted the plane had been flying in bad weather with a faulty altimeter; 5) survivors reported loud noises just before the crash; the U.S. surmised that the plane could have been

shot down by Czechoslovakia's own air defense system. Washington in rejecting the protest, challenged Czechoslovakia to take its case to the International Court of Justice.²⁶²

The Hungarian Revolution

A critical question to which all informal penetrative operations must address themselves is that of accessibility. Accessibility is a two-sided coin. First the operation must acquire the technical means of penetrating the target, and secondly it must determine the type of penetration to which the target is vulnerable. Professor Scott has called the former technical accessibility and the latter substantive accessibility.²⁶³ Substantive accessibility is the degree the target responds favorably to the penetration, i.e. its emotional or ideological response. It is quite possible to have the former and not the latter. For example, the Soviet Union, or any of its East European Allies could probably have mounted a similar operation as RFE against the U.S. on the AM and FM bands, and technically reached almost every American home, but it is unlikely that the message would have been met with a favorable response by the public. Cuba's lack of noticable success with its "Radio Free America" program lends support to this supposition.

The significance of the Hungarian Revolution is that it forced the government to consider the question of the substantive accessibility of RFE. Although no clear evidence can be found to support the view that the RFE was instrumentally

effective in either initiating or prolonging the uprising, subsequent changes in policy and personnel indicate that the U.S. government considered the impact of RFE had been such that it required considerably more control and a new approach.

From 1956 onward, RFE toned down its militant attacks on the regimes and calls for opposition and gradually became what it is today, a sort of specialized VOA. Up until 1956, RFE was not systematically concerned with its substantive impact. As Mr. Durkee pointed out, they merely assumed the audience was uncritically receptive to anti-Communism. After 1956, efforts were made to determine systematically the response of East Europeans to RFE. And a reliable technique was admittedly not developed until 1961. This may have been due to the lack of travellers from Eastern Europe. RFE concentrated on surveying only those who planned to return, for obvious reasons.²⁶⁴ Audience taste and opinion have since become a major policy guide.

Hungary brought to light the fact that substantive access is cumulative. After years of attacking the regime, condemning its supporters, protesting the sympathy and support of the "West" and urging, in a calculated manner, actual opposition to the government, it was not possible to avoid responsibility in times of crisis. It was not possible to take credit here and deny responsibility there selectively. The penetration, in time, becomes part of the process it seeks to change.

Despite the evidence that exiles violated RFE policy

and made broadcasts which emphasized the possibility of Western military intervention or a UN force, these instances were minor, sporadic and negligible in terms of RFE's total output.²⁶⁵ It is far more important to note that RFE broadcasts during the revolution were squarely within the established policy of encouraging and coordinating internal opposition. Mr. Michie, a participant, described RFE's role this way:²⁶⁶

As RFE saw its role in the early days of fighting it was to serve as the communications carrier, the transmission belt that carried the demands of one area to the others. It was RFE that enabled the freedom stations to be heard throughout Hungary. ... From these broadcasts RFE's Hungarian specialists were able to compare demands that were common to all areas of Hungary, thus unifying the freedom movement. ... In its broadcasts on October 29th the Voice of Free Hungary was able to stress these points as the common program of the rebellion.

Actually it was the New York headquarters of the FEC which decided what demands would be repeated during the uprising and which would not. New York cabled 8 demands to be repeated over the Voice of Free Hungary: 1) immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops; 2) total dissolution of the AVH (Security Police) immediately, and placement of the direction of any new police or security forces and the Army in the hands of a Minister not associated with any previous central Communist body; 3) full amnesty to all freedom fighters who participated in the uprising; 4) exclusion from the new temporary government of all previous persons associated in any way with the regime, government or top Party Command since Imrey Nagy's previous premiership;

5) the majority of the Cabinet of the new temporary government to be drawn from various patriot groups on a representative basis; 6) immediate calling of a constituent assembly selected by free secret popular vote to form a new charter of government and action program - this charter and program to be submitted to the people for free secret voting on acceptance or rejection within a stated period, such as six months; 7) withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact by Hungary; and 8) continuation of local workers' and other councils and patriot committees which have been formed during the crises and continuous communication between them until all the above conditions have been achieved.²⁶⁷

As these demands add up to the complete destruction of the regime and disappearance of Soviet influence, their widespread propagation by RFE equalled active support for the revolution. RFE encouraged the forceful attempt to drive the Soviet Union from its sphere of influence. This was done with the knowledge that U.S. intervention would not occur.

The severe criticism of RFE, after the revolt resulted in three official investigations of the network's scripts.²⁶⁸ The first, conducted by the West German Government was not released. Conrad Adenaur gave a contradictory verbal report to a press conference that charges of incitement against RFE "do not correspond to the facts; remarks however were made that were subject to misinterpretation. The matter has been discussed and personal charges have resulted. I believe we

can consider the matter closed for the time being."²⁶⁹

The second inquiry was conducted by the Council of Europe. It reads as though it had been written by the FEC. The director of the Council's investigation was J. Goedhort of the Netherlands. Mr. Goedhort concluded; "The American promoters of RFE have rendered a great service to their country as well as to Europe, and have shown great concern with the cause of freedom and democracy."²⁷⁰ The "misrepresentation" Adenauer had referred to, according to the Council, came from the broadcast of a London Observer report from Washington speculating that U.S. aid would probably come if the Hungarians could hold out a few more days. The report called this broadcast, "misleading but an entirely proper press review."²⁷¹ The criticisms of the report centered on the fact that it was totally an American operation.²⁷²

The third investigation was conducted by the United Nations' Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. Its conclusion spoke to the point of the overall effect of the presence of RFE:²⁷³

The Committee was told that during the uprising Radio Free Europe was very encouraging and obviously sympathetic. Listeners had the feeling that RFE promised help, although witnesses stated clearly that it gave no reason for expecting military help. Rather the general tone of these broadcasts aroused an expectation of support which some listeners hoped might take the form of a United Nations token force to help in stabilizing the situation. In a tense atmosphere such as that prevailing in Hungary during these critical weeks, optimistic and encouraging broadcasts which paid tribute to the aims of the uprising were welcomed. It would appear that certain broadcasts by

Radio Free Europe helped to create an impression that support might be forthcoming for the Hungarians. The Committee feels that in such circumstances the greatest restraint and circumspection are called for in international broadcasting.

None of the inquiries questioned the American policy of liberation nor RFE connections with the U.S. government. Primary emphasis was on the question of incitement and specific unauthorized broadcasts. Predictably, the public response of RFE was to shift responsibility to the exiles. More quietly the government abandoned the active execution of its liberation policy through RFE.

On December 7, 1956, Richard Condon, European Director of RFE, issued a statement that the exiles would be more strictly controlled in the future.²⁷⁴ Several Hungarian and Czechoslovak broadcasters were fired, each desk received a new Chief and eight American "free-lance" writers were added.²⁷⁵ The explanation was that exiles were found to have been "out of touch" with the conditions in Eastern Europe. In short the exiles took the blame for the government's liberation activities from 1951-1956.

After years of warning regime functionaries how perilous their careers and lives were in a Stalinist system, getting the ax themselves must have come as a bitter irony. The exiles were, in a word, had. At no time did they set policy or strategic priorities, but merely carried them out with their unique talents. The fast shuffle by the American management of the FEC to shift the blame to the exiles rather than let it fall on the Eisenhower Administration, or RFE,

is one of the less defensible aspects of the whole affair. In his 1957 annual report, Condon wrote that changes in RFE were made to "insure that the sensitive lines of policy would be implemented effectively, all in conformance with overall Free Europe Committee policy."²⁷⁶ Weekly policy "directives" were to be sent from New York in addition to the daily "guidance". Topics were chosen in New York and each country received new "strategy papers".²⁷⁷ The President's report gave the impression that the active pursuit of informal attack, as it had been waged in the past, was over. "Exhortations of outrage were out" said the report and were replaced by "Skilful projection of Free world values and institutions in the context of Communism's basic vulnerabilities. RFE's strategy was to exploit stress wherever those stresses appeared, using the principle that the people themselves could develop the strength necessary to force a loosening of their bonds, and that RFE's role was to sustain and nourish that strength."²⁷⁸ Such strong language, however, was for the public and the Board only. The actual directives issued to the desks - renamed the "Czechoslovakian Desk Of Radio Free Europe", the "Polish Desk of ..." etc., from the previous titles of "Free Voice" - were given in the Library of Congress Report. Almost every activity RFE previously engaged in was now prohibited.²⁷⁹

The correct tone is as important in adhering to RFE policy as correct content of broadcasts. The following restraints are therefore emphasized:

[paraphrased]

- 1) Avoidance of vindictiveness, polemics and vituperation,
- 2) avoidance of inflammatory broadcast material (including news items),
- 3) avoidance of blatant propagandistic argumentation,
- 4) avoidance of any action which could amount to incitement to revolt or other violence,
- 5) avoidance of tactical advice - recommendations of specific action in particular cases,
- 6) avoidance of patronizing, condescending positions and preaching,
- 7) avoidance of parochial points of view,
- 8) avoidance of sweeping evaluations,
- 9) avoidance of tone or content which would give RFE image of a voice of emigre opinion,
- 10) avoidance of repetition,
- 11) avoidance of broadcasting rumours, or unsubstantiated information,
- 12) avoidance of jumping to conclusions based on regime actions,
- 13) RFE should not encourage defections,
- 14) RFE must not lead audiences to believe that the West will intervene in case of uprisings and should not speculate about the possibility of an uprising,
- 15) criticism of regimes should be to the fact involved not be subtle or indirect,
- 16) avoidance of material characterized as gossip, slander or attacks on personal lives or families of government or Party figures, or on individuals as such.

Emergency Conditions

In the event of uprisings or war, RFE will not assume any attitude toward such developments or participate in them in any way except for straight and restrained news reporting.

RFE reflected the government's change from an emphasis on liberation to detente. Emrey Kelri-Santo, a Hungarian and current Chief of the Audience Opinion Division, put the change this way: 280

The difference between the old and the new is the same as the difference between how the world, including the U.S., regarded East-West relations in 1950 and 1970. When RFE began, we looked upon it as a five year job. By then, we thought, the Iron Curtain would have been rolled back and our broadcasts reflected this belief. We were wrong, and eventually we had to make an agonizing reappraisal that meant recognizing and accommodating

to the longer view. Now, I think our broadcasts no longer reflect a senseless and unbelievable appeal for the overthrow of Communism.

Noel Bernard, Chief of the Rumanian Desk, backed up this view: "Before 1956 we were an agitation station, telling people what to do, how to take advantage of certain laws. Now we are an informational station, a detached constructive critic."²⁸¹ James F. Brown, Director of the Research and Analysis Division, stated that 1956 "forced a change in staff, outlook and leadership. To listen to some of our Hungarian commentators now you would think they were Kadarites." (followers of Hungarian Party Chief Janos Kadar).²⁸²

As a principal weapon in the Cold War, the changes in RFE reflected the changes in the relationship between the two antagonists. Metaphorically it can be likened to a read-out monitor of the period. The early intensity of the conflict was reflected in the operations of the network as was its later relaxation. When asked by Senator Fullbright whether RFE had encouraged the overthrow of the Polish Government during the 1968 disorders there, Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand replied: "That was not the purpose of the broadcasting. As I say, the sophistication of the broadcasts has greatly increased over the years, and they [including Radio Liberty] have moved away from the Cold War confrontation which existed in the 1950s."²⁸³

Summary

In this chapter we have outlined the growth and activities

of Radio Free Europe. We have placed it in the context of the Cold War period as an instrument of informal penetration, specifically informal attack. RFE was a covert instrument of the United States Government employed to pursue strategies aimed at the dissolution of Soviet Communist influence in Eastern Europe. As such it reflects a method of conflict from which the Cold War period gets its name. The method of disruption was through stimulation and guidance of mass disloyalty among the East European populations. We have outlined how this was attempted; through encouragement of internal opposition to regime programs, intimidation of regime loyalists and the coordination of specific activities. It was a strategy of ideological conversion, touching upon every aspect of a man's life. From his attitudes toward his working conditions, to his hobbies, to the raising of his children, the East European was encouraged to hold beliefs and act against his government, and the values it expounded.

The covert nature of RFE represents the second element in the methodology of Cold War conflict. The U.S. government could carry out direct attacks on the enemy without acknowledging official responsibility for the consequences of the operation. Covert informal attack was the only strategy which could be pursued without greatly increasing the probability of nuclear war. RFE then, is not only an ideal form of Cold War weaponry, its activities represent the ideal strategy.

FOOTNOTES

¹Scott, Andrew. The Functioning of the International Political System (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 192.

²Scott, Andrew. The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 4.

³Ibid., The emphasis is Scott's.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Scott, op. cit., p. 200.

⁶See Revolution in Statecraft ... op. cit., Chapters 2, 4, & 6.

⁷Ibid., pp. 166-167.

⁸Ibid., p. 138.

⁹Scott, Functioning ... op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁰Revolution ... op. cit., p. 17.

¹¹See Chapter IV, ibid., pp. 113-140.

¹²New York Times, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9. Hereafter cited as NYT.

¹³Lang, Robert "Fight for Freedom", Library Journal, vol. 77, (August, 1952), p. 125.

¹⁴NYT, op. cit.

¹⁵NYT, July 4, 1950, p. 7.

¹⁶"Plenty of Bite", New Yorker, Vol. 26 (July 10, 1950), p. 70.

¹⁷"Added Voice", Newsweek, vol 36 (July 17, 1950), p. 48. and "The Needle", Time, vol. 57, (January 9, 1951), p. 19. (Page numbers for the same stories are different in the Canadian edition of Time; in this case it is p. 9).

¹⁸NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.

- ¹⁹ East Europe - Challenge and Opportunity (New York: Free Europe Committee Inc.), p. 5.
- ²⁰ Price, James. Radio Free Europe - A Survey and Analysis (Washington: Library of Congress, 1972), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Library of Congress Report. Broadcasts to Albania were abandoned presumably because of the small number of radio sets in the country, p. 20. It might be noted too that the U.S. had no diplomatic relations with Albania.
- ²¹ NYT, July 4, 1950, pp. 1 & 7. July 9, 1950, II, p. 9. "Added Voice", Newsweek, op. cit., p. 48.
- ²² Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 18.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ NYT, March 17, 1951, p. 3.
- ²⁵ U.S. Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1972), p. 97. Hereafter cited as GAO Report.
- ²⁶ Ibid., p. 99. For a cost breakdown of RFE and U.S. contributions, see Appendix II.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p. 97. To put the size of Gloria in some kind of perspective, American radio stations (AM) are limited by law to a maximum output of 50 kilowatts.
- ²⁸ Martin, John. International Propaganda, its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 32-33. Also Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 18.
- ²⁹ GAO Report, op. cit., pp. 94 & 97.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p. 97.
- ³¹ President's Report, 1952 (New York: Free Europe Committee), p. 3.
- ³² Ibid., p. 4.
- ³³ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 8. Also GAO Report, op. cit., p. 8.

- ³⁴ Schmidt, M. "Visit to Radio Free Europe", Independent Woman, vol. 35, (February, 1956), p. 8.
- ³⁵ President's Report, 1952, op. cit., p. 4. The Headquarters in Munich was expanded until it included 115,000 sq. ft. by 1972. GAO Report, op. cit., p. 94.
- ³⁶ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 46.
- ³⁷ Radio Free Europe Fact Sheets (New York: Radio Free Europe Fund Inc., 1963), p. 1.
- ³⁸ GAO Report, op. cit., p. 100.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ NYT, June 3, 1953, p. 14.
- ⁴¹ Editor and Publisher, January 8, 1955, p. 56.
- ⁴² Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 17.
- ⁴³ Radio Free Europe Fact Sheet, op. cit., p. 1.
- ⁴⁴ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 52.
- ⁴⁶ Spellman, P. "What the Hungarians Say About Western Propaganda", Harpers, Vol. 214, (April 1957), p. 74.
- ⁴⁷ Binder, David. "Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role", NYT, March 15, 1971. Reprinted in full in Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 67-69.
- ⁴⁸ Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 53.
- ⁴⁹ Bolt, Robert. Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 76.
- ⁵⁰ "Voice of Hope", U.S. News & World Report vol. 41, (December 21, 1956), p. 18.

⁵¹Holt, op. cit., p. 48.

⁵²News From Behind the Iron Curtain, July 1953, p. 38.
Hereafter cited as News.

⁵³Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations - U.S.
Senate, May 24, 1971. (Washington, GPO, 1971), p. 12.
Hereafter cited as RFE Hearing.

⁵⁴Standard Policy Control Mechanisms, Tab L to "Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty: A History". Submitted by the
Department of State. All Tabs are on file in the Offices
of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The History is
reprinted in RFE Hearings, pp. 71-74.

⁵⁵RFE Hearing, p. 11.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 12. Specific examples were not provided for
years before 1971, however, the procedure was in effect
from the beginning of RFE operations. Ibid., pp 71-72.

⁵⁸Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Hearing
before the Committee on Foreign Relations - U.S. Senate,
June 6 and 7, 1972. (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 59.
Hereafter cited as RFE Funding Hearing.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 65.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 69.

⁶¹Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 50.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁶³Detailed bureaucratic operations are given by Holt, op. cit.,
pp. 60-63.

⁶⁴NYT, December 9, 1958, p. 1. Mr. Griffith is currently
an eminent Political Scientist at the Centre for Intern-
national Studies at MIT.

⁶⁵Library of Congress Report, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

- 66 RFE Programming. Annex VII, p. 2; to "East Europe and Radio Free Europe in an Era of Negation". Statement submitted by William P. Durkee, President of the Free Europe Committee to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Annexes are in the Committee's files and are listed in RFE Hearing, op. cit., pp. 148-9.
- 67 RFE Listening Trends and Audience Preferences, Annex XI p. 1., ibid.
- 68 Quoted by Robertson, Charles L., in International Politics Since World War II; A Short History. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 154.
- 69 Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1956, p. 85. Hereafter cited as DSB.
- 70 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1959), p. 455.
- 71 DSB, June 4, 1956, p. 939.
- 72 "Added Voice", Newsweek, Vol 36, (July 17, 1950), p. 48.
- 73 NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.
- 74 News, January 4, 1953, p. 8.
- 75 President's Report, 1954 (New York: PEC, 1955), p. 2.
- 76 NYT, February 12, 1956, IV, p. 7.
- 77 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 32.
- 78 RFE Programming, Annex VII, op. cit., p. 2.
- 79 Scott, Revolution, op. cit., p. 23.
- 80 NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.
- 81 Your Money's Worth in the Cold War (New York: Radio Free Europe Fund Inc., 1963), p. 9.
- 82 Scott, op. cit., pp. 130-1.

- 83 Quoted in the Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 22. Also see The Radio Free Europe Story, (NY: RFE Fund Inc., 1962), p. 3.
- 84 RFE Funding Hearing, op. cit., p. 57.
- 85 The Right to Know, Report of the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting (Washington: GPO, 1973), pp. 22 and 83. There are a number of statements by RFE and the government attesting to the advantage of being autonomous. See the statements of Durkee, RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 142, and Hillenbrand, Ibid., p. 24. Also the State Department History of RFE, ibid., p. 72. Also RFE Funding Hearing, op. cit., pp. 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 55 and 57. And lastly Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 21. Hereafter cited as RFE Report.
- 86 NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.
- 87 "Urgent Whisper: Radio Free Europe", Time, vol. 56, (July 17, 1950), p. 68.
- 88 "Telling Democracies Story: Radio Free Europe", Independent Woman, vol. 31, (November, 1952), p. 323.
- 89 RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 24. This was repeated by U. Alexis Johnson, RFE Funding Hearing, op. cit., p. 55. Also RFE Report, op. cit., p. 19.
- 90 Quoted by Holt, op. cit., p. 93.
- 91 Presidents Report, 1957, p. 1.
- 92 RFE Programming, Annex VII, op. cit., p. 4.
- 93 Michie, Allan Voices Through the Iron Curtain (New York: Dodd Mead Co., 1963), p. 52.
- 94 NYT, July 9, 1950, II, p. 9.
- 95 Feinstein, Donald. "Free Voices in the Battle for Men's Minds", Journalism Quarterly, XXXI (Spring, 1954), p. 3.
- 96 Michie, op. cit., p. 75.

- 97 Ibid., p. 76.
- 98 Quoted in Michie, op. cit., p. 132.
- 99 News, June, 1953, p. 41.
- 100 Michie, op. cit., p. 132.
- 101 News, August, 1953, pp. 49-50.
- 102 "Added Voice", Newsweek, Vol 38, (July 17, 1950), p. 48.
- 103 "The Needle", Time, Vol 57, (January 29, 1951), p. 19.
Canadian edition, p. 9.
- 104 Stowe, Leland "They Hit the Communist where it Hurts",
Readers' Digest, Vol 64 (February, 1954), p. 83.
- 105 Ibid., see Appendix III for a breakdown of RFE programming.
Tables 1 and 2 provide general percentage breakdowns of
programs by type. Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide actual
daily logs and brief descriptive notes.
- 106 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 72. Feinstein
writing in 1954 and Holt in 1958 gave similar breakdowns.
In June, 1953, News stated RFE was broadcasting 300
program hours a day into Eastern Europe (p. 37).
- 107 NYT, September 20, 1955, p. 30.
- 108 RFE Programming, Annex VII, p. 7.
- 109 Holt, op. cit., p. 90.
- 110 Michie, op. cit., p. 53.
- 111 News, March, 1953, p. 58. And Holt, op. cit., p. 88.
- 112 News, September, 1953, p. 40.
- 113 Holt, ibid., pp. 84-85.
- 114 Ibid., p. 85.

- 115 Ibid., pp. 83, 88-9, 87.
- 116 News, November, 1954, pp. 46 and 47. And Holt, ibid.
- 117 News, April, 1954, pp. 40-2.
- 118 News, December, 1953, pp. 32-33. And May 1954, p. 43.
- 119 News, August, 1953, p. 53.
- 120 News, November, 1953, p. 48.
- 121 News, June, 1954, p. 39.
- 122 Holt, op. cit., p. 48. Also noted in Michie, op. cit. p. 132.
- 123 News, September, 1953, p. 45.
- 124 Michie, op. cit., pp. 54 and 133.
- 125 Holt, op. cit., p. 89. And News, January, 1955, pp. 41-2.
- 126 News, September, 1954, p. 27.
- 127 News, February, 1954, pp. 44-45.
- 128 "Minutes of Broadcast Analysis Meeting on Czechoslovakia, March 1971", Annex R. to the Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 2. All Annexes to the Library of Congress study are on file with the Committee on Foreign Relations.
- 129 Ibid., p. 3.
- 130 News, July 1953, pp. 55-56. The story of Carey's address was carried by the New York Times with a slightly different version of the text. See NYT, June 20, 1953, p. 7.
- 131 News, October, 1953, p. 43.
- 132 NYT, July 1, 1956, p. 4.
- 133 Ibid.

- 134 Michie, op. cit., p. 53.
- 135 NYT, June, 1953, p. 43. Also see News, July, 1953, p. 52.
- 136 Holt, op. cit., p. 89.
- 137 News, June, 1953, p. 37.
- 138 News, July, 1953, p. 56.
- 139 News, September, 1954, pp. 28-9.
- 140 News, August, 1956, p. 50.
- 141 Holt, op. cit., pp. 83-4.
- 142 Ibid., p. 86.
- 143 News, August, 1953, p. 53.
- 144 Michie, op. cit., p. 52.
- 145 News, July, 1953, p. 55.
- 146 News, June, 1953, pp. 39-40.
- 147 News, September, 1953, p. 43. And March, 1954, p. 36.
- 148 Holt, op. cit., p. 86. And News, February, 1954, p. 44.
- 149 RFE Programming, Annex VII, op cit., p. 6.
- 150 "Balloon Barrage", Time, vol. 67, (March 5, 1956), p. 26.
- 151 Ibid. Also Stowe, op cit., p. 82.
- 152 News, June, 1953, p. 42.
- 153 Ratcliff, J.D. "Radio Medicine Pierces the Iron Curtain", Readers Digest, vol. 68, (March, 1956), p. 98.
- 154 News, June, 1953, pp. 41-42.

- 155 News, December, 1953, pp. 35-6.
- 156 Feinstein, op. cit.
- 157 Stowe, op. cit., p. 82.
- 158 Michie, op. cit., p. 72.
- 159 Holt, op. cit., p. 84.
- 160 News, February, 1955, pp. 30-1.
- 161 "Radio Free Europe", Television Magazine, vol. 27 (May, 1960), p. 67.
- 162 Holt, op. cit., p. 73.
- 163 RFE Programming, Annex VII, op. cit., pp. 8-13.
- 164 President's Report, 1957 (New York: Free Europe Committee, 1958), pp. 1-11.
- 165 Michie, op. cit., pp. 55-56..
- 166 Ibid.
- 167 Holt, op. cit., p. 96.
- 168 Michie, op. cit., p. 52.
- 169 News, September, 1953, p. 47.
- 170 Holt, op. cit., pp. 94-5.
- 171 NYT, June 20, 1955, p. 2.
- 172 Eisenhower, DSB, January 16, 1956, p. 84. Stevenson: NYT December 24, 1955, p. 16. Dulles: ibid.
- 173 Ratcliff, J.D. op. cit., p. 97.
- 174 Ibid., p. 98. All broadcasts were delivered by exile doctors from the respective country.

- 175 "Balloon Barrage", Time, op. cit., p. 26.
- 176 NYT, August 22, 1954, p. 14.
- 177 "Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role", David Binder, NYT, March 15, 1971. Reprinted in full in RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 68.
- 178 Michie, op. cit., p. 97.
- 179 Ibid., p. 72.
- 180 News, October, 1953, p. 48.
- 181 Ibid.
- 182 Ibid.
- 183 "Memo From Munich: Freedom Rings in Soviet Ears", U.S. News and World Report, vol. 35, (July 10, 1953), p. 36.
- 184 Michie, op. cit., pp. 133 & 142.
- 185 NYT, May 10, 1954, p. 22.
- 186 Stowe, op. cit., p. 84.
- 187 Ibid., p. 83.
- 188 Ibid., p. 85.
- 189 Michie, op. cit., pp. 73-4.
- 190 Ibid., pp 99-101. Also Stowe, op. cit., p. 84 describes the same events.
- 191 Michie, op. cit., pp. 99-101. Also Stowe, op. cit., p. 84 describes the same events.
- 192 News, January, 1954, pp. 11-12. Also see Michie, op. cit. p. 101. General Masin was a pre-Communist Czech General shot by the Nazis.
- 193 News, November, 1953, p. 49.

- 194 Michie, op. cit., pp. 168-9.
- 195 Balloon Box, Hoover Institute, mimeographed, un-numbered history of the balloon campaigns. This Box contained a sample balloon from operation "Winds of Freedom" and untranslated leaflets.
- 196 News, August, 1953, pp. 22-6.
- 197 For the official RFE report on Operation Spotlight, see News, February 1955, pp. 37-8. The campaign consisted of dropping a 40 page booklet documenting Swialto's charges into Poland.
- 198 News, August, 1955, p. 38.
- 199 Sondern, Frederick. "Balloons Across the Iron Curtain", Readers Digest, Vol. 66, (January, 1955), p. 61.
- 200 Clay, George. "Balloons for a Captive Audience", Reporter, vol. 11, (November 18, 1954), p. 28.
- 201 Sondern, op. cit., p. 61, and Clay ibid. The cost of the balloon barrages was not revealed by the GAO Report because money came from the budget of the Free Europe Press who was the legal sponsor of the project. In practice, however, the barrages were tied completely to the broadcast strategy of RFE.
- 202 Clay, op. cit.
- 203 News, April, 1956, p. 24. Also see Time, vol. 67 (March 5, 1956), p. 26, the Time figures were slightly inflated claiming half a million balloons had been launched.
- 204 News, August, 1953, p. 24.
- 205 Ibid.
- 206 Ibid.
- 207 "Winds of Freedom", Time, vol. 62, (August 27, 1951), p. 21.
- 208 "Windborne Message", Time, vol. 62 (October 8, 1951), p. 30.

- 209 Sondern, op. cit., p. 61. Also Michie, op. cit., p. 137.
- 210 Sondern, ibid.
- 211 News, April, 1956, p. 24.
- 212 News, July, 1953, p. 23.
- 213 Ibid.
- 214 Ibid., p. 22.
- 215 Ibid.
- 216 Ibid. "Prospero", like "Winds of Freedom", lasted only four days, but 12 million leaflets were dropped in that relatively brief time.
- 217 News, "Operation Veto", July, 1954, p. 34.
- 218 News, August, 1955, p. 38.
- 219 Ibid., pp. 38-9.
- 220 News, August, 1954, pp. 42-3, and 46.
- 221 News, August, 1955, p. 41.
- 222 Ibid., p. 34.
- 223 News, October, 1954, p. 16.
- 224 Ibid., p. 18.
- 225 News, August, 1954, pp. 44-5.
- 226 News, October, 1954, p. 16.
- 227 Ibid., p. 17.
- 228 Ibid.
- 229 News, May, 1954, p. 4.

- ²³⁰News, October, 1954, p. 16.
- ²³¹Ibid., p. 21.
- ²³²News, December, 1954, p. 38. Also see Michie, op. cit., p. 155.
- ²³³News, August, 1955, p. 41.
- ²³⁴Ibid., p. 38.
- ²³⁵News, December, 1954, pp. 38-9.
- ²³⁶Ibid., p. 41. Fifteen million pieces were dropped during Operation Focus.
- ²³⁷Ibid.
- ²³⁸Ibid., p. 40-46.
- ²³⁹News, August, 1955, p. 43.
- ²⁴⁰News, January, 1955, p. 39.
- ²⁴¹Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 9. Michie claims over 300 million pieces were dropped on Eastern Europe by balloons, op. cit., p. 162.
- ²⁴²NYT, August 22, 1954, p. 14.
- ²⁴³Scott Revolution op. cit., pp. 113-140. And Functioning op. cit., pp. 201-202.
- ²⁴⁴American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1950-1955 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O.), p. 2101. Hereafter cited as APP.
- ²⁴⁵Ibid., p. 2102.
- ²⁴⁶DSB, September 10, 1951, p. 421.
- ²⁴⁷Ibid., July 2, 1951, p. 13.
- ²⁴⁸DSB, op. cit., p. 419.

249 Ibid., p. 417.

250 DSB, August 15, 1953, p. 210.

251 Ibid., this reply was printed in full in News, August, 1953, p. 26.

252 DSB, June 17, 1954, p. 881.

253 NYT, May 10, 1954, p. 6.

254 DSB, op. cit. Also AFP, op. cit., pp. 2113-4.

255 AFP, op. cit., pp. 2128-2130. Also DSB, January 3, 1955, p. 14.

256 Ibid.

257 NYT, January 18, 1956, p. 4.

258 NYT, January 21, 1956, p. 4.

259 NYT, February 4, 1956, p. 1.

260 NYT, February 22, 1956, p. 9.

261 DSB, June 16, 1958, pp. 1010-1029.

262 Ibid.

263 Scott, Revolution op. cit., p. 21.

264 For an analysis of RFE's sampling techniques see "Audience Analysis and Public Opinion research - Radio Free Europe" by Szalay Lorand, Annex A to the Library of Congress Report, op. cit.

265 Michie, op. cit., p. 257. Only four scripts out of 308 total broadcasts were found to clearly violate standing policy. Only 16 were considered distortions of such policy.

266 Ibid., pp. 224-226.

267 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 28.

268 The most persistent critic of RFE's role in the revolution was Leslie Bain. His book The Reluctant Satellites (New York: Macmillan, 1960) is a general indictment of RFE. See particularly pp. 199-205. Also highly critical is James A. Michener's book The Bridge at Andau (New York: Random House, 1957). He bases his criticisms on interviews with refugees. See pp. 251-253 in particular. For examples of specific broadcasts during the Revolt, see Holt, op. cit., pp. 187-199, and Michie, op. cit., pp. 221-231. Both authors play down RFE's impact and quote sparingly from scripts. However, additional examples can be found in the New Republic, December 17, 1956, pp. 12-13 and November 26, 1957, p. 5. The NYT, December 9, 1956, p. 3., and Ross & Wise's book The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 348.

The image held by the rebels of RFE are evident from the broadcasts of their so called "freedom stations". Appeals for air drops, arms, medical supplies and information were directed at RFE, which was on the air 24 hours a day. See U.S.-Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, no publishing agency given), not paginated, reports for October 30 - November 4, 1956.

Lasky, Melvin (Ed.) The Hungarian Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 239-40; The Revolt in Hungary, (New York: Free Europe Committee, 1957), not paginated.

For the nature of domestic criticism of RFE see the New Republic, op. cit.; The Nation, December 15, 1958, p. 509; the NYT, April 23, 1957, p. 1., October 22, 1956, p. 1., October 27, 1957, p. 1, and November 25, 1956, p. 1. The Christian Science Monitor, November 12, 1956, p.1.; The Reporter, December 13, 1956, p. 15.

269 NYT, January 26, 1957, p. 3.

270 Council of Europe Official English Translation of the Council of Europe Special Committee on Radio Free Europe, 1957, p. 4.

271 Ibid., p. 6.

272 Ibid., p. 20.

273 U.N. Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York: 11th Session of the General Assembly, 1957), p. 18.

274 NYT, December 9, 1956, p. 1.

275 President's Report, 1957, p. 10.

276 Ibid., p. 8.

277 Ibid., p. 9.

278 Ibid.

279 RFE Programming, Annex VII, pp. 6-7. Also see Library of Congress Report which quotes the Annex, op. cit., pp. 34-35. Also see President's Report, 1958, pp. 7 & 8, for essentially the same restraints.

280 Goshko, John. "RFE Alters Sullied Image", Washington Post, November 22, 1970. Reprinted in full in RFE Hearing, op. cit., pp. 42-46.

281 Binder, op. cit., p. 68.

282 Ibid.

283 RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 66. The emphasis is the present author's.

CHAPTER VThe Crusade For Freedom

The Crusade for Freedom (CPF) was the public fund-raising division of the Free Europe Committee. Ostensibly it was the source of monetary support for all the Committee's programs, although only RFE received prominent publicity. Beginning in 1950, the CPF carried out public campaigns on behalf of the FEC. These were highly organized complex undertakings on a national scale. In addition to endorsements and media coverage, there were public rallies, and displays of symbols of Soviet slavery or free world determination. Elaborate procedures were established for citizens of the United States to participate -- personally and directly -- in what was presented to them as a principal weapon in the struggle against Communism. The CPF was endorsed by both President Truman and Eisenhower on the basis of its private status and effectiveness. Eisenhower in fact was an instrumental figure in CPF campaigns before becoming President, and continued his support while in office. The most open and frequent government support of the CPF occurred during the Eisenhower Administration.

Along with the exposure of the FEC as a CIA operation, subsequent investigations revealed that the CPF had also received substantial government monies. These subsidies were in addition to those paid directly in support of RFE and

served to pay the costs of the campaigns. In the light of government control and subsidy of the FEC, the function of the CFF becomes a matter of interest.

The first and most obvious conclusion is that the Crusade functioned to provide "proof" that RFE and the FEC were bona fide private organizations, supported, as they claimed, by American citizens. Its existence served to make official government denials of involvement and responsibility plausible. However, it is our position that to consider this to be the sole function is unreasonable. Clearly none of the governments of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union accepted such "proof". If the theory of plausible denial or, as it has been called, the "fig leaf" theory, is accepted as its primary function, then any number of smaller and less expensive mechanisms would have sufficed, including a simple official denial.¹ The CFF however, was a large, even massive, operation with a nation-wide structure and program. It was indeed a "Crusade".

In view of the government connection, its size, and the thematic content of its programs, we will examine the CFF as an instrument of domestic propaganda. In short, we hold that the CFF functioned as a mechanism of public mobilization directed by the state. The private facade of the CFF served two purposes. Certainly it allowed the government to side step official responsibility for some of the more questionable operations of RFE. The documentary evidence leaves that point incontestable. And it operated the same way domestically.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA was prohibited from conducting domestic operations. By mounting a domestic propaganda effort under the cover of a private corporation, the act's prohibition could be evaded.² The greatest significance of the CFF lies in its function as an instrument for domestic propaganda. We will analyze it as such by examining its origins and operation in terms of Jacques Ellul's theory of sociological propaganda.

Ellul's classic study Propaganda addressed itself to the necessity and pervasiveness of propaganda in modern societies including democracies. The phenomenon has always been difficult to define precisely because its character is relative to its technique and the technique is relative to the goal. If propaganda is defined either too broadly or too narrowly it is a useless concept. One would be left either with the view that every communication is propaganda or that only the most narrow forms of communication constitute propaganda. Ellul defines the "broad sense" of propaganda to include all of the following: 1) psychological action - modification of opinion by purely psychological means; 2) psychological warfare - used against any foreign enemy with the aim of making each target doubt the validity of his beliefs and acts; 3) brainwashing - the process of converting an enemy to an ally and applicable only on prisoners; and 4) public and human relations - processes of adapting the individual to his society in general or to a specific activity or policy; its aim is conformity.³ From these different

forms. Ellul extracts what he sees as the common elements:

1) the institutional character, 2) the use of psychological influence, 3) the organization of people, 4) the intention to produce action. These he organizes into a working definition: "Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization."⁴

In Ellul's concept, the object of propaganda is not so much to change opinions and attitudes as it is to organize existing opinions, to focus them, and lead the individual to adjust himself to desired patterns of behavior, i.e., action. Thus the propagandist mounts his effort on the basis of existing attitudes to elicit his desired form of behavior. The CFF was not built on new ideas; its message was not foreign to the audience. Five basic themes have been identified which were employed repeatedly to elicit public support, specifically for the government's policy toward Eastern Europe, and more generally for the Cold War posture of the nation. These themes were 1) anti-Communism, 2) Communism as a threat to the American way of life, 3) the duty of loyal citizens to rise to a national challenge, 4) the efficacy of private initiative (in the form of the CFF) over reliance on government, and 5) the power of truth. Ellul argues at length against the conventional wisdom that propaganda aims to alter beliefs.⁵

The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to provoke action. It is no longer to change adherence to a doctrine, but to make the individual cling irrationally to a process of action. It is no longer to lead to a choice but to loosen the reflexes. It is no longer to transform an opinion, but to arouse an active and mythical belief.

Propaganda is made, according to Ellul, because of a desire for action; it exists for the purpose of furthering a pre-determined policy of "giving irresistible power to its [the state's] decisions."⁶ For the individual citizen, "It furnishes him with a complete system for explaining the world, and provides immediate incentives to action."⁷

The element of action then is fundamental. Ellul defines it as supportive participation in the goals of the state, "The participation may be active or passive: active if propaganda has been able to mobilize the individual for action, passive if the individual does not act directly but psychologically supports the action."⁸ Psychological support, Ellul is careful to point out, is not another term for public opinion which can be held by mere spectators who take no part whatever. Rather a psychological supporter is committed while not directly participating. Ellul uses the analysis of team rooters at a football game and those who attend mass, as examples of psychological supporters. He states his case this way:⁹

Propaganda goes much further and demands an acceptance that is not that of a spectator; it demands his support as a minimum and his active participation as a maximum. Propaganda evidently plays its part where normal, spontaneous development of opinion would not have led to such action but would have translated itself into private, non-collective

attitudes. Only very rarely does opinion itself lead to action. The great feat of propaganda is to cause the progression from thought to action artificially.

The effect of action is to deepen commitment greatly. Thus controlling action is the highest stage of control. Again this effect is most eloquently stated by Ellul:¹⁰

He who acts in obedience to propaganda can never go back. He is now obliged to believe in that propaganda because of his past action. He is obliged to receive from it his justification and authority, without which his action will seem to him absurd and unjust, which would be intolerable. He is obliged to continue to advance in the direction indicated by propaganda, for action demands more action. He is what one calls committed - which is certainly what the Communist party anticipates, for example, and what the Nazis accomplished. The man who acts in accordance with the existing propaganda has taken his place in society. From then on he has enemies.

The relation between resistance to change before and after action has been shown experimentally when it was found that action on the basis of an opinion increases the opinion's resistance to change and increases the probability that the behavior will be repeated.¹¹ Thus signing the so-called "freedom scrolls" provided by the CFP, and donating 50¢ or a dollar was important beyond the fact of the revenue it produced because it represented a "commitment" or participation and greatly increased an individual's resistance to counter-communications.

Ellul makes various distinctions between different forms of propaganda, two of which are especially relevant to our analysis. First he distinguishes propaganda forms by their basic impact with respect to the promotion of unity or disintegration among members of the target. The latter he

calls propaganda of agitation and is the type most familiar to students of politics. It is a form of propaganda which has been used throughout history to promote rebellion or subversion. It is used internally by governments carrying out fundamental social and political changes and, in doing so, must crush the internal resistance of one class or segment of the population, and at the same time, mobilize the population to produce the quick action and extreme sacrifice required to achieve the state's goals. Some contemporary examples, among others cited, which Ellul considers illustrative, are the propagandas of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Lenin and China's Great Leap Forward. Propaganda of agitation is effective only for short periods, the passions of the people cannot be kept at fever pitch for a very long time. Thus it is associated with crisis situations and frequently contributes to the crisis. Because it is designed to provoke "violent reactions", to give release to the deep "passions" of the people, to use Ellul's words, against real or created internal enemies, propaganda of agitation requires no elaborate organization or technical sophistication; a speech, pamphlet or rumour is often sufficient.

Propaganda of integration, which is of direct concern here is a phenomenon of advanced, developed societies. It is long in duration, requiring a well developed organization and technique, with the aim of completely integrating the people, of unifying them, within the established belief and behavior patterns of the society. In short, its aim is total

adaptation. Ellul makes the distinction between the two propaganda forms thusly:¹²

Propaganda of integration thus aims at making the individual participate in his society in every way. It is a long term propaganda, a self-reproducing propaganda that seeks to obtain stable behavior, to adapt the individual to his everyday life, to reshape his thoughts and behavior in terms of the permanent social setting. We can see that this propaganda is more extensive and complex than propaganda of agitation. It must be permanent, for the individual can no longer be left to himself. In many cases such propaganda is confined to rationalizing an existing situation, to transforming unconscious actions of members of a society into consciously desired activity that is visible, laudible and justified.

The second distinction Ellul makes is between direct or "political" propaganda and "sociological" propaganda. They are very closely related without sharp boundaries. One becomes the other by a matter of degree. Political propaganda is a specific case of deliberately bringing about a desired behavior in support of a specific limited goal. But once that behavior is achieved, it too becomes part of the molding process leading to other forms of behavior. The individual generally interprets events in the terms of the cumulative demands of discrete policies he has been induced to support. Simply put, once an individual has acted in one area, he is predisposed to view other events in the terms of the belief behind the prior action. Thus propaganda is sociological in so far as it appeals to existing propensities resulting from established behavior patterns. The two are linked and mutually supportive. Ellul clouds the point he makes by insisting upon an analytical separation. It would

be easier and clearer to say that Ellul has noted the sociological aspect of political propaganda. The analogy of the "breeder" reactor is a good illustration. The breeder reactor produces its own fuel while in operation. Ellul has noted that propaganda of integration produces the conditions upon which future propaganda is made. The fuel of propaganda consists of the attitudes and beliefs moulded by previous propaganda.

When the phenomenon of the CFP is put in this framework, then its importance reaches far beyond a mere government attempt to create support for its policies toward Eastern Europe. By eliciting support through "participation" and rhetoric for that limited goal, general attitudes regarding the Soviet Union, America's role in world affairs and the worth of American values were developed. Through support of the CFP the individual also was told he was "rededicating" himself to sacred American values and "striking a blow" against Communism as well as helping the oppressed people in Eastern Europe. The CFP functioned to gain public acceptance for America's role in the Cold War in its broadest scope as a leading participant in a world-wide struggle against the threat of international Communism embodied in the Soviet Union's drive for world domination. Sacrifice, unity and dedication were the duties of the citizenry. By committing himself to the government's policy of liberation, the American citizen was well on the way to accepting other aspects of the Cold War scenario; huge military expenditures, an arms

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race, and shifts away from domestic priorities to the all-pervading virtue of national security.¹³

The sociological effect of propaganda has been partially identified elsewhere as "preparatory" propaganda which is the attempt to control public reaction to events by setting a context for them prior to their occurrence. Gladstone, Janis and Lumsdane have arrived at similar conclusions as a result of studying the effects of preparatory communications to following news events. In their conclusion they find:¹⁴

When a communication succeeds in altering beliefs, it influences the way in which subsequent events are perceived or interpreted. One could say that a new or modified frame of reference is created by the preparatory communication which determines the way in which subsequent relevant experiences will be assimilated.

In effect, the cognitive structure determines the way new events are received. The function of sociological propaganda then is to condition the individual to judge his relationship to society and define subsequent events either good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable. What is here called a cognitive structure Ellul calls a "way of life".¹⁵

The first element of awareness in the context of sociological propaganda is extremely simple. What starts out as a simple situation gradually turns into a definite ideology, because the way of life in which a man thinks he is so undisputably well off becomes a criterion of value for him. ... From that moment on, everything that expresses this particular way of life, that reinforces it is good; everything that tends to disturb, criticize or destroy it is bad. ... But from the instant a man uses that way of life as his criterion of good and evil he is led to make judgements: for example, anything un-American is evil. From then on, genuine propaganda limits itself to the use of this tendency and to leading man into actions of either compliance with or defense of the established order.

The propaganda element of the CFF included more than the content of its message or its rallies. It came also from its very structure in that it was designed as a "private" citizen-based movement. The CFF was the peoples' answer to the Communist challenge and was held to be a natural outgrowth of the best American values of self help, private initiative and independence from government. The leadership presented themselves simply as ordinary citizens seeking to enlist their fellows in a common cause. The CFF was non-partisan and supported by an array of personalities from liberals to conservatives, Democrats to Republicans. Its nongovernmental, non-partisan status undoubtedly aided it in drawing support from wide sections of the citizenry. The effectiveness of a nonpartisan image was demonstrated by Cartwright who reported that government films designed to stimulate voluntary public support for the war effort (in this case giving blood) attracted those who believed beforehand in giving blood or those who had already done so. Those who were neutral or opposed to the idea did not attend the showings. Subsequent studies revealed that a probable cause was the open identification of the films with the government. A wider audience would have been attracted, it was concluded, if the government had hidden its sponsorship and released the films simply as private entertainment.¹⁶

Ellul holds that propaganda is actually a necessity of all states which are technologically advanced. The possibility, as well as the need for propaganda, arises from the increasing

need for more sophisticated and coherent control of an ever more complex society. This is a characteristic of all modern societies, including democracies to which Ellul devotes much attention. Democracies, in contrast to popular belief, must make propaganda due to two fundamental conditions. First, and most telling, is the fact that the individual needs propaganda. A technological society detaches the individual from his traditional value moorings by breaking down primary groups. Mass man is left with nothing against which he can secure his identity, worth, or position relative to the system as a whole. In the past, close family ties, religious faith and ethnic groups provided the standards. In a mass society he is alone. Propaganda, according to Ellul, fills this gap by providing him with a sense of worth, achievement or identity through participation in a cause. Propaganda delivers more than verbal exhortation; it allows participation and personal involvement in great affairs of state. Of course, these are now mainly preplanned and controlled. Still they instill a sense of belonging and commitment.¹⁷ Propaganda achieves this end through simplification of complexity and makes the individual feel the urgency of some action while convincing him of the success of the act and the rewards to be derived therefrom.¹⁸ This is especially the situation in modern democracies because the citizens expect and are expected to take part in political affairs. All states must at least be aware of public opinion, but in America it is a factor of significance. Moreover, Americans not only expect

to participate, they do so with a high belief in the efficacy of their input.¹⁹ The relationship between the effects of mass society and the psychology of the individual, and the requirements for democratic stability has been a major concern of American political scientists. Their search essentially has been for mechanisms of control. Frenkel-Brunswick explicitly recognized the need for control in technologically advanced democracies. In 1951 he wrote:²⁰

Thus we come to ask what kind and degree of integration of the internal "personality agencies" we may expect from individuals who live in a period of increasing division of labor and of part-functioning in the manufacturing process, from individuals increasingly controlled by outside forces which must remain opaque and unintelligible to them, with the value of the family challenged and many traditional values in decay, with social changes too rapid to be genuinely assimilated, and with an emphasis on success and competition which compels the individual to a degree of externalization that is only too likely to interfere with internal integration. ... How can democratic values be stated so that misinterpretation both in the direction of totalitarian absolutism and in the direction of too far-reaching relativism will be avoided?

He answered his long question with a call for "new constructive solutions" which would function to "avoid putting too great a burden on the individual."²¹ The CPF was one solution, though not one Frenkel-Brunswick would necessarily have endorsed.

Another problem is simple ignorance. While Americans believe they ought to be active and do have an influence, voting and opinion studies have revealed the average citizen to be uninformed and uninterested in political matters, particularly foreign policy questions.²² In short, a modern

democracy cannot escape the public yet it cannot follow it either. In periods of crisis and rapid change, the responsibility for preserving the essential values which form the democratic structure falls on the government. The celebrated statement of E.E. Shattschneider put the problem bluntly; "The problem is not how 180 million Aristotles can run a democracy but how we can organize a community of 180 million ordinary people so that it remains sensitive to their needs."²³

The second factor Ellul finds requiring democracies to make propaganda is the need for defense in a hostile world.²⁴

Why a totalitarian regime would want to use propaganda is easily understood. Democratic regimes, if we give them the benefit of the doubt, feel some compunction and revulsion against the use of propaganda. But such democratic regimes are driven to its use because of the external challenges they have to meet. Ever since Hitler, democracy has been subjected to relentless psychological warfare. The question then, is which regime will prevail, for both types claim to be of universal validity and benefit; this obliges them to act upon each other. ... Every state must accept the burden of defending itself against propaganda aggression. As soon as one country has taken this road, all must eventually follow suit or be destroyed. ... Here we face a new problem: in today's world, much more than in the past, a nation can survive only if its values are secure, its citizens loyal and unanimous, and if they practice the civic virtues.

It is this function of propaganda which is critical to this chapter. The Cold War was a period of intense ideological conflict in which one of the main objects was the creation of mass disloyalty. As we have pointed out, this was the dominant form of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Traditional forms of conflict had become too risky, but technology provided a solution to the problem

it created by providing the means to carry out the conflict by informal attack. The goal is to destroy the adversary by draining the vitality from his society: to disintegrate it in the sociological sense of that term. It is our position that the CPF as an example of sociological propaganda of integration functioned to defend against informal attack while another division of the FEC, RPE, functioned as an offense conducting informal attack against the enemy. RPE carried the battle to the enemy while the CPF neutralized penetration retaliation. The FEC had the genius of simplicity: it combined both offense and defense in one structure.

As the state marshals its army and materiel in a conventional military crisis, so must it marshal its moral and ideological power in the unconventional crisis of the Cold War. To defend its "way of life" the state insures that certain qualities exist in the citizenry for defense does not consist of blocking the penetration, which at best is difficult and inefficient, but in rendering the population immune to the subversive call. Thus the CPF was the government's instrument to promote active support of American values, to get them to "dedicate" themselves to the system. Their belief and loyalty to America was reinforced through directed action based on those beliefs. The CPF permitted the government to defend against external threat while not altering the essential features of the democratic structure.

The question of the survival of democracy and the preservation of its basic features has been a major concern

of political scientists who have spent much time trying to explain the factors promoting the survival of democratic systems. They employ the term stability, however, in place of survival, and for what Ellul calls the "way of life" some political scientists prefer the less abused term of "civic culture". However, the common element is threat.²⁵

If a political system is to be effective - if it is to be able to initiate and carry out policies, adjust to new situations, meet internal and external challenges - there must be mechanisms whereby governmental officials are endowed with the power to make authoritative decisions. The tensions produced by the need to pursue the opposing goals of governmental power and governmental responsiveness become most apparent in times of crises. Wars for instance (hot or cold), have often shifted the balance so far in the direction of governmental power and authority as to cause concern about the preservation of democratic responsiveness. Yet if the balance is not so shifted, it is argued that democratic governments may succumb to external challenges.

The authors conclude that in a democracy: "The ordinary citizen must turn power over to elites and let them rule.

The need for elite power requires that the citizen be relatively passive, uninvolved and deferential to elites."²⁶ In the aggregate the leading students of the American system conclude that survival rests on the maintenance of a series of balances in the public. That is to say, the public must be controlled, expressing limited interest, limited commitment, limited knowledge and limited participation, so that the elites can meet the challenges which arise.²⁷

The concern of this chapter is principally with the defense of the system from external threats. It is interesting to note that two of the leading theorists on the

relationship between the public and foreign policies agree that the citizenry must be controlled in this area. James Rosenau draws a fairly dark picture to make his point.²⁸

There are inherent limitations in modern society on the capacity of the public to understand the issues and grasp the significance of the most important problems of public policy. This is particularly the case with foreign policy where the issues are especially complex and remote. The function of the public in a democratic policy-making process is to set certain policy criteria in the form of widely held values and expectations. It evaluates the results of policies from the point of view of these basic values and expectations. The policies themselves however are the products of leadership groups ('elites') who carry on the specific work of policy formation and policy advocacy.

Gabriel Almond drew the same conclusions but stated the necessities much more bluntly.²⁹

On rare occasions when it does awaken from its slumber, the mass public, being no more informed than previously, is impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, unpredictable, capable of suddenly shifting direction or of going in several contradictory directions at the same time. ... Hence it would seem that given these conditions as the alternative to indifference, the prevalence of the mass public's passive mood introduces a factor of stability into the foreign policy decision making process.

Neither Almond nor Rosenau, however, question the origins or character of those "widely held beliefs and expectations".

Indeed, they assume that those belong to the masses and constitute the check on the elites which qualifies the system as essentially democratic. Almond and Verba did study the origin and character of those beliefs which they said constituted the civic culture. Their findings were that the beliefs are maintained by the process of political socialization which gradually "exposes" new generations to the

established beliefs of the old. This is a rather automatic "gradual" process of "fusion".³⁰ If Rosenau and Almond beg the question of the nature of the "widely held beliefs", Almond and Verba beg the question of the nature of political socialization, beyond merely pointing out that it is gradual and moderate. Ellul, in effect, proceeds from where Almond and Verba left off and shows how those "widely held beliefs", the "balances" and the "civic culture" by which the masses are controlled are subject to manipulation by the state through sociological propaganda. The necessity is survival, the means is technology and the method is propaganda.

In the technological age, during an intense Cold War period especially, democracies are required to make propaganda to hold the system together from the atomizing effects of mass society and the threat of external attack. Our concern is with the latter need for defense from aggression in a new form made necessary and possible by technology. The operation of the CFF is a case of sociological propaganda which functioned to defend the country from informal attack in a period of intense international conflict whose unusual character has led it to be called "cold" war. What follows is an examination of the instrument with respect to its origins, organization, financial structure, themes and actual campaigns.

Origins and Organization

There are few Americans over thirty who have not heard

of Radio Free Europe or the Crusade for Freedom. There have been annual appeals by the CFF since 1950. Its chief ostensible function was to solicit "truth dollars" from the public to keep RFE on the air. Millions of Americans contributed to it as they did to the heart fund or Red Feather; it was a worthy cause. The CFF (since renamed the Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc.) was established as a separate structure of the FEC, much the same as RFE. The precise nature of its organizational beginnings, however, are unclear. Supposedly it was the creation of one man, General Lucius D. Clay, hero of the Berlin airlift, who claimed to have acted out of personal conviction on his own. He indicated the CFF came after the FEC was established and was his idea. His testimony supports the subsequent propaganda line that the CFF was a spontaneous private response independent, like RFE, of the government.³¹

When I left Germany, I came home with a very firm conviction that we needed, in addition to the Voice of America a different broader voice, a voice of the free people, a radio which would not speak the words of government but would speak to each country behind the Iron Curtain in its own language and from the throats of its own leaders who had fled for their lives because of their beliefs in freedom. I returned home determined to do something to develop such a voice and I found that one was already getting under way in the National Committee for a Free Europe - known as Radio Free Europe. It seemed to me that this was the proper vehicle, but what it needed was a broad base of support from the American people. Then it would truly be a voice of freedom representing the free peoples in the countries behind the Iron Curtain but sponsored and supported by the people of America. That was the origin of the Crusade for Freedom.

The organizational structure is equally hard to pin down because it included many honorary titles all of which sounded as though the individuals possessing them were the executive heads and because the structure grew over the years as the CFF expanded its operation. At first it appears that Clay and presumably a small staff formed the nucleus. They set up the campaigns by drawing on volunteer help on a national local scale. By 1952 two positions which were actually a functioning part of the permanent system, were the National Chairman (Clay) and the Executive Vice Chairman. In addition there were the posts of President and National Campaign Chairman which were honorary and changed hands from year to year. There was a permanent Board of Directors separating it, on paper, from the FEC but which was identical in membership to the FEC Board.³² Eventually Clay stepped down and his office was passed to well known businessmen. Thus the chief permanent bureaucratic position was the Executive Vice Chairman. In 1956 the Board of Directors included the following individuals: Harlow Curtice, President of General Motors; Roy Larson, President of Time, Inc.; Cecil Morgan, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of Standard Oil of New Jersey; Gwilym Price, President of Westinghouse; Frank Stanton, President of CBS; Howard C. Sheppard, Chairman of the First National Bank of New York; and Louis D. Crittenger (U.S. Army Retired), President of the FEC. All, of course, were members of the FEC.³³ The position of Chairman was held at one time

by each of the following: Lucius D. Clay; Henry Ford II; Charles Kellstadt, Chairman of Sears Roebuck Inc.; Eugene Holman, Chairman of Standard Oil of New Jersey; Crawford Greenwalt, Chairman of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Corp.; Michael Haider, successor to Holman as Chairman of Standard Oil; and James M. Roche, Chairman of General Motors. The actual coordination of the campaigns, record keeping, distribution of material and liaison with the Advertising Council were the responsibility of the Vice Chairman.³⁴ The 1950 campaign established an elaborate volunteer infrastructure which reached to the local community level. It was maintained for subsequent campaigns. It included 59 state chairmen and co-chairmen and over 1,000 local volunteers, almost all of whom were businessmen. These people did the leg work among their associates and local community. Overall coordination rested with the New York headquarters.³⁵ This pattern of organization was to remain for each campaign. In 1953 the American Heritage Foundation took over the CPF and ran the campaigns until 1955 when it separated and resumed its status as a separate FEC division.³⁶

In the early period the CPF accumulated impressive bipartisan support. Public figures of all parties and walks of life lined up to endorse the Crusade. The following is a list of those reported to have lent their support or who were actively engaged in campaigns. They have been culled from a variety of sources. Musician Dimitri Mitropoulos, commentator Roscoe Drummond, Labor leaders Phillip Murray,

William Greene and Daniel Tobin, Omar Bradely, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ira Eaker, Herbert Lehman, Allan Dulles, Vice President Alban Barkely, Frederick Osborne, W.P. Kennedy, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Rabbi William F. Rosenbalum, John J. McCloy, Acting Mayor of New York Vincent Impelliteri, Admiral William F. Halsey, David Sornoff, Harold Stassen, Governor Thomas Dewey, Adali Stevenson, Jacob Javits, national religious leaders Bishop Henry Knox Sherril, head of the Episcopal Church, Rabbi David D. Sola Pool, former President of the Synagogue Council of American, Julius Alder Ochs, Vice President and General Manager of the New York Times, New York Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Cardinal Spellman and others. Moreover the prestigious New York Times endorsed the CFF, urging citizen support six times in the period of this study, and gave it in the early period, widespread, but unfailingly favorable news coverage.

It is not easy to assess the impact of such widespread support. Any conclusion would be tentative. But it seems reasonable that non-partisan support served to remove not only the CFF, but also what it stood for, from the arena of partisan politics. The campaigns themselves emphasized the need for unity, indeed, "unshakeable unity" according to Eisenhower, in the cause of the struggle against Communism. These supporters' backgrounds indicate that kind of response occurred. In short, dissent in the issue area of America's Cold War mission was discouraged. To criticize the CFF

would implicitly mean one was against self-defense, the principles of freedom, and opposing Russian aggression.

After the Hungarian Revolution the public campaigns were drastically cut back. Though the headquarters staff and Board of Directors remained, the volunteer structure appears to have been disbanded, with the exception of the designation of state chairmen. The CFF publicly relied almost totally on corporate contributions by 1956. The trend began openly in 1953. Although there has never been a clear cut verdict on RFE's role in the Hungarian episode it served to alienate liberal support by raising suspicions that RFE was in the hands of right-wing extremists. Lavish campaigns after 1956 would not have enjoyed the united front kind of backing, and would most probably have drawn public criticism on the basis of Hungary. Ellul states that propaganda must convince the individual of the urgency of action in a particular direction: To create that sense of immediacy is next to impossible in the face of competing counter communication which flowed so freely in 1956. Events in Hungary damaged RFE by destroying its non-partisan base of support. The criticism, it should be noted however, was limited to the problems of RFE, specifically its "foreign" element, the emigres. The criticism in no way questioned any of the themes upon which the CFF based its appeal, i.e., the motives behind RFE. The CFF simply concentrated its activities where support remained most universal; on the deep friendly carpets of corporate board rooms.

Financing

The government reported that the CFF began in 1951. Therefore, details of the 1950 Crusade do not appear in government audits. This may be due to the fact that government contributions did not begin until 1951. Beginning in 1953 the CFF was reported to be seeking corporate support. President Eisenhower openly supported this effort, employing Department of Defence, CIA and White House Staffs members. After the exposure of RFE as a CIA operation in 1971, the Munich headquarters dismantled two plaques which read that RFE was made possible by "the contributions of the American people".³⁷ The demise of the huge public campaigns is reflected in the number of times the CFF was mentioned in the news:

TABLE I

Number of citings in the New York Times of the CFF per year
between 1950 and 1959

<u>Year</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Number of citings</u>
1950	Jan-Nov	54
1951	Jan-Nov	29
1952	Mar-Nov	14
1953	Feb-Oct	11
1954	Jan-Dec	23
1955	Jan-Sept	8
1956	Jan-Nov	4 (no major stories)
1957	Jan-Nov	2 (")
1958	October	1 (")
1959	November	1 (")

From 1956 onward the campaigns all but disappeared. The coverage in the press amounted to no more than a mention of a personality having accepted a voluntary role. The corporate solicitations continued however. The FEC supplied the Foreign Relations Committee with 1971 examples of the types of appeals made and said they were representative. These consisted of a letter of the President of the U.S. to the National Chairman of the CFF which he in turn used as an entree in approaching corporations. In contrast to the early days of bombast and ceremony, this was a quiet, unpublicized, discreet operation. In 1970 President Nixon issued the letter to James Roche, Chairman of General Motors:³⁸

Dear Jim,

As you talk with business men about Radio Free Europe I hope you will tell them of my own long-standing and unreserved admiration for the job it is doing. I hope you and your colleagues in the business world will continue to back Radio Free Europe. Without such support, RFE could not continue.

James Roche spoke at over thirty CFF sponsored luncheons that year attended by businessmen. His Baltimore appearance is illustrative: "Radio Free Europe is very largely paid for by businessmen and I take pleasure in helping to raise money. This is no chore for me."³⁹ In 1971 Stewart S. Cort, Chairman of Bethlehem Steel Corp., mailed on his Corporation's stationery the following appeal as campaign Chairman:⁴⁰

Dear Fellow Business, [these were presumably personally addressed]

In all the recent public discussion about RFE, there is one fact that must not be lost sight of: RFE operates as an independent privately managed broadcasting service to the people of Eastern Europe, and it is the backing of American business that makes

it possible. While the Soviet Union is trying to lull us and our friends in Europe with talk of 'detente' and security conferences, Soviet actions in Europe, Mid-East and elsewhere have seldom been more aggressive and its press has seldom been more hostile to the U.S. and its allies.

The FEC has never released its lists of corporate contributors or their individual contributions. Senator Fulbright requested, but did not subpoena, such information and received the following reply from Durkee: "As you will no doubt appreciate we have not made public the names of contributors, as is common practice of those who solicit and receive private contributions."⁴¹ Durkee did reveal that the total amount received from private contributions (both corporate and public) from financial year 1951 to July, 1971 was \$47,007,383.⁴² Moreover there were 8,279 separate Corporate donors in 1970. This figure may serve as an indication of past responses if one assumes that donors give to the same causes yearly and solicitors, like hobos, tend to return to the same doorsteps. The concentration on corporations was limited, according to the Department of State, to an emphasis on firms having particular interests in Europe, both East and West. These were manufacturing companies with extensive export business.⁴³ It was possible to piece together a partial picture of specific amounts from private sources. Business Week reported that the largest contributors, \$50,000 plus, were auto, steel and oil companies.⁴⁴ The Ford Motor company admitted giving \$250,000 from 1950 through 1955.⁴⁵ And Standard Oil of New Jersey did the same.⁴⁶

According to the General Accounting Office, the CFP received the following amounts from public campaigns:⁴⁷

1949 - no campaign	1955 - \$3,250,000
1950 - no amount reported	1956 - \$3,000,000
1951 - \$1,750,000	1957 - \$3,250,000
1952 - \$2,750,000	1958 - \$2,750,000
1953 - \$1,250,000	1959 - \$2,750,000
1954 - \$3,300,000	

The public figures released to the press at the time, however, do not jibe with figures given to the government. It

appears that the figures were padded for the public. In

1950, Clay claimed the income from the Crusade was 1,288,044

(1.3 million) million dollars.⁴⁸ The combined total for 1950

and 1951 was given to be \$3.5 million which meant in 1951

the income should have been 2.2 million.⁴⁹ But the figure

given to the government was only 1.75 million. In 1952 the

announced goal was 4 million dollars.⁵⁰ No public report

was given of the income which equalled only 2.75 million.

There was no goal claimed in 1953 and no amount reported.

From 1954 a continuing goal of 10 million was set and repeated

through 1959.⁵¹

During the same period the government admitted paying the following amounts into CFP coffers:⁵²

1949 - 0	1953 - \$793,528
1950 - 0	1954 - \$1,747,500
1951 - \$2,343,534	1955 - \$1,747,500
1952 - \$2,343,534	1956 - \$1,070,167

1957 - \$1,000,000

1959 - \$925,000

1958 - \$1,000,000

The figures indicate that the initial turn to corporate donations in 1953 resulted in increased funds. From 1954 through 1957, four years, the receipts did not fall below 3 million dollars annually. Moreover, the government contributions equalled 30% of the private income from 1954 onward. In 1951 they exceeded private income and in 1952-53 they averaged over 50%. Thus the government regularized its contributions in 1954 on a 30% matching basis. The increased attention to private corporations after 1953 (which was a relatively poor year) is understandable. They were well represented on the FEC and an integral part of the CPF structure. It was far easier and cheaper to canvas them rather than pour more resources into the public campaigns. The propaganda message could be continued at relatively little cost due to the support of the Advertising Council.

The CPF contributed 18.7% of RFE's operating costs, including the Crusade costs, which equalled about 37% of the receipts.⁵³ This cost-income ratio of 37% is about equal to the government-private ratio of 30%, thus as the table below indicates, the government paid the costs of the yearly Crusade.

The fact that the government paid the bills was not the only hidden benefit. Another was the free advertising space resulting from Crusade sponsorship by the Advertising Council. There was also a free professional creative input from

TABLE II

Comparison of U.S. Government and Private Contributions to
the CFP*

Amount in
millions

--- Government contributions to CFP
 _____ Private contributions to CFP

*Table compiled by the author from data supplied by GAO Report, pp. 102 & 103

volunteer advertising agencies. The benefit of Advertising Council sponsorship to private, non-profit organizations is the elimination of all costs of national publicity. The organization pays only the out of pocket expenses of physical production. Between 12 and 20 million dollars in costs has been saved each year since 1951 while public contributions, of course, have never approached that figure and have fallen

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to less than \$100,000 since 1969.⁵⁴ Therefore, the costs of the CFF have continually exceeded its income.

Themes

A major propaganda effort requires planning, organization, and employment of all the media instruments advanced technology provides. It must also be on-going. Its impact is achieved through the use of all forms of media and constant repetition of the message.⁵⁵ The CFF emphasized the same basic themes from 1950-1959. We have drawn them from every printed endorsement in periodicals and the New York Times. The Times has provided the widest amount of contemporary data. It reported not only the CFF activities in New York but from around the country. The reputation of the Times as the nation's leading newspaper, frequently indicating government policy, and widely accepted as an influence on government qualifies it as a significant source. We have included its editorial support of CFF in this analysis also for the same reasons. We found the themes did not vary greatly by source or time of issuance. That is, government leaders, CFF figures, local notables and even the Times employed the same basic arguments year after year.

The yearly themes adopted by the Advertising Council were drawn from the endorsements; in fact, they were adopted from the phrases of leading backers. In 1950 it took a line from Eisenhower's kick off speech, "Fight the big lie with the big truth". In 1951 it was "Help truth fight

Communism; join the Crusade for Freedom". 1952 was the last year an overall slogan was announced, it was "How you can fight Communism". The emphasis on personal action was constant throughout. We have adopted a different format for the qualitative analysis of the campaigns from that employed in chapter two. Rather than group the relevant statements under their respective thematic headings, we have cited the basic themes and presented summaries of the arguments used to develop them. The actual endorsements are related in the context of the yearly campaigns as they occurred. This has been done in an attempt to combine the advantages of a categoric examination and a chronological one. The categoric method is presented first in which the statements have been summarized under their thematic headings. The chronological method permits the campaigns to be "seen", as it were, as they were actually produced and in relation to the other techniques of rallies, sign-ins and displays. As we pointed out in Chapter two statements do not occur in pure thematic form. The endorsements were detailed and our quotes are lengthy at times, so more than one of the themes we have analytically separated, were a part of the actual endorsements. Thus we think that presenting them as they occurred, in relation to other activities of the total campaign, gives the reader a fuller picture of the CFF operations; in short, the "flavor" of the campaigns. In Chapter two we were content to show that certain assumptions were developed. In this chapter we must also deal with the fact

that there was a concerted, organized effort, a "crusade", which must also be examined. Ellul emphasizes that the impact of propaganda is greatly determined by the organized use of all available techniques. He uses the metaphor of music; "The propagandist uses a key board and composes a symphony."⁵⁶ We think the music is better understood when heard as a symphony rather than as separate instruments.

The yearly slogans adopted by the Advertising Council were supposed to be the catch phrases, but these were not different from the themes of the specific endorsements. They are alike in their emphasis on personal action and anti-Communism.

A total of five separate themes were isolated from the overall period of the campaign. These were: 1) Anti-Communism; 2) the Cold War; 3) the Crusade for Freedom; 4) the duty of citizens and 5) truth and freedom.

Anti-Communism - All statements presented gross oversimplifications of the issues between the Soviet Union and the United States. The specific issue of Eastern Europe was pictured as a result of the Soviets' aggressive lust for power and contempt for human values. Apart from that, Communism was presented as evil incarnate, a movement out to destroy every vestige of human dignity, utterly ruthless and bent on world conquest. The U.S. and Soviet Union were drawn as irreconcilable systems engaged in an inevitable and ultimate struggle with one system based on freedom and truth and the other on slavery and lies.

The Cold War - The theme of the Cold War defined the nature of the threat facing America. It was defined as the battle for men's minds, of the "big lie" against the "big truth". Thus the Cold War was explicitly presented as an ideological confrontation. It was often cited in distinction to the "hot" war in Korea to illustrate its different nature. The Communists were said to be mounting a mental and moral attack on the American way of life, to sap its spiritual strength at home and discredit its way of life abroad. The American response (in the form of CFF) was a "truth offensive" or moral crusade to meet Communist lies. Without such a response, America would eventually lose its "birth right".

Citizens' Duty - These were statements which defined the requirements of the private citizen in the Cold War struggle. There were two parts to this theme. First the nature of the Cold War challenge placed every American on the frontline. Each citizen had an individual opportunity to contribute to America's cause. The opportunity, of course, was in the form of the CFF. In addition to participating in the Cold War, each citizen was urged to "rededicate" himself to America. Both participation and rededication could occur more or less at once by contributing and signing a "freedom scroll". The second part of this theme was directed at the public as a whole who were told that nothing short of a domestic mobilization on their part was required. This challenge could not be met with a "politics as usual" attitude. The citizenry was called upon to show unity in the cause. By

implication, dissent and partisan debate was a dangerous luxury because it was divisive.

The Crusade for Freedom - Although our main concern with the CPF is as an instrument, it nevertheless became, to some degree, an end in itself. It was held that the need for a crusading spirit on the part of all Americans to meet the Communist challenge was one which could be most effectively expressed through support for the CPF organization. A very great deal was said in self-praise of the CPF itself and gradually the organization which existed to mobilize public concern was used as evidence of its own success. The existence of the CPF showed that the American people had risen to the challenge. The CPF was always presented as a private, citizen-inspired response to the ideological challenge of Communism, and therefore America's most potent weapon in the battle for men's minds. Its effectiveness sprang from its freedom from government control. It exhibited the American value of self-reliance and private initiative. Without the taint or restrictions of government, the CPF could be "hard-hitting" through RFE. Its effectiveness meant that oppressed peoples would not be lost and that the Soviets would be tied down with a hostile Eastern Europe making further aggression difficult. The concept of self-preservation, illustrated in chapter two, was specifically applied to the CPF.

Truth and Freedom - Truth and dedication to freedom were the ammunition fired by the CPF weaponry. America was held

to possess the truth and the true dedication to liberty. When the truth was offered and made known, men everywhere would choose it. This was especially the case in Eastern Europe where the people "hungered" for the truth. It was a case of the "unseen hand" theory applied to international conflict. The situation would take care of itself once Americans rallied and effectively set the record straight.

Verbal statements, according to Ellul, serve to establish a particular view and shape general orientations in the propaganda matrix. Because they are explicit and long-lasting, (in print form or through reiteration) there is a natural tendency to concentrate wholly on them in a propaganda study. This would be a mistake however because other methods -- rallies, displays, and other such physical activities -- are equally important. These, Ellul says, achieve a shock effect, and in combination with verbal exhortation precipitate immediate action. The technique was aptly demonstrated in the case of the CFP. Public rallies were frequent and often held at sites which identified the CFP with cherished American principals, vis Lincoln's birthplace and the statue of Liberty. The gatherings included displays of RFE techniques and demonstrations such as mock balloon launches. The audience was urged to "join" the crusade, to sign a freedom scroll or send a message (via balloon or RFE) to the captive people. Escapees from Eastern Europe and their means of flight were at times present.

The main symbol for all the campaigns was the "Freedom

BePl". It was commissioned sometime before the 1950 campaign and was meant to act as the symbol of the CFF and of the American response to the Communists. It was designed by Walter Dorwin Trague who took his inspiration from the Liberty Bell. Cast in Great Britain by Gillet and Johnson, Ltd., it stood eight feet high and weighed ten tons. Except for the finishing, it was a replica of the Liberty Bell.⁵⁷ The Bell was shipped back to New York, given a ticker tape parade and sent on a nation-wide tour appearing at CFF rallies. It was then shipped to West Berlin and placed, with elaborate ceremony, in the Tower of the City Hall. At the base of the bell were the words from Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "That this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom." Above the inscription were five figures passing the torch of freedom around the circumference.

The supportive action by the public which was the end of all this effort did not include merely making monetary donations, although that action was a significant form of commitment too. The unique appeal of the CFF was the solicitation to the public to endorse the principles for which the Crusade stood and the overt identification of these with the nation. This action took the form of signing a personal pledge called the "declaration of freedom". Alone the pledge appears as a motherhood statement of principles to which almost no American would deny adherence. However, placed in the context of the campaign it became "striking a blow for liberty" in the world struggle for survival, not to mention

support for the government's specific policies toward Eastern Europe. By signing this statement, one had joined in a great patriotic cause - a Crusade for freedom. The New York Times printed the text:⁵⁸

I believe in the sacredness and dignity of the individual.

I believe that all men derive the right to freedom and equality from God.

I pledge to resist aggression and tyranny wherever they appear on earth that this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom.

The names attached to the declaration constituted the freedom scrolls. Some were dropped into Eastern Europe via balloon and others were placed in the base of the Freedom Bell in Berlin. In the analysis which follows, the activities of the yearly campaigns will be discussed in terms of the campaign organisation, verbal endorsements and rallies and other public events. The intent is to show the techniques of the CFF in actual operation.

The CFF's initial entry on to the American scene was made to appear as a response to an appeal from Truman for private action in the world-wide struggle against Communist propaganda. The public announcement by Grew and Clay followed, by only six days, one of Truman's major addresses. Delivered before the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1950; the speech combined an alert to Communist inspired anti-American propaganda and a call for a citizen response. He called for public unity in foreign policy matters, referring to debate and partisan discussion

as twisting the facts, and private action to get the truth about America to the people of the world.⁵⁹

Foreign Policy is not a matter for partisan presentation. The facts about Europe or Asia should not be twisted to conform to one side or the other of a political dispute. Twisting the facts might change the course of an election at home, but it would certainly damage our country's interests abroad. ... Only in a democracy is there such mutual trust and confidence among citizens that a private group [Newspaper Editors and Reporters] is given such an all important role in determining what a nation as a whole shall do. There is too much nonsense about striped trousers in foreign affairs. Far more influence is exerted by the baggy pants of the managing editor. There has never been a time in our history where there was so great a need for our citizens to be informed and to understand what is happening in the world.

The second part of his message was a call for private initiative in the battle for men's minds. Americans could effectively counter Communist propaganda through their own abilities as laborer, farmer or businessman: "We must strive constantly to break down or leap over barriers to free communication whenever they might exist. We must make full use of every means of communicating information in simple, understandable form to people whose backgrounds and cultures are different from ours."⁶⁰

The announcement of the formation of the CPF came on April 26th. Joseph Grew, Chairman of the FEC, wrote Truman that the private group had organized to let Americans help East Europeans "fight for the restoration of freedom in their countries."⁶¹ Clay stated the CPF would also "put American ideals on the offensive."⁶² Truman responded separately to both men, giving presidential support to the

project, and urging the public to support it;⁶³

Your letter of April 26, advising me that the National Committee for a Free Europe is launching a nation-wide Crusade for Freedom meets with my heartiest approval. I hope that all Americans will join you in dedicating themselves to this critical struggle for men's minds.

To Clay, Chairman of the CFF, the President expressed his gratification for the quick response to his earlier appeal;⁶⁴

I hope that all Americans will join with you in dedicating themselves to this critical struggle for men's minds. I am deeply gratified by your prompt response to my appeal of April 20th, in which I emphasized the important role of private groups and organizations in this great endeavor.

The CFF thus enjoyed a rather orchestrated beginning which confirmed in detail its private status. These were the first instances of official support for the Crusade, and though they were delivered prior to the actual commencement of the campaigns, they exhibit the basic thematic framework which would follow: the emphasis on the conflict as ideological, i.e., one in which the stakes were men's minds, and the theme of citizen "dedication".

In Chicago at a luncheon for 65 state chairmen and co-chairmen for the up-coming drive, Clay set the kick-off date for Labor Day. He noted that funds collected from the drive would pay for the soon to be unveiled Freedom Bell. The original funds spent to establish the CFF amounted to \$600,000 which came from a source he declined to name.⁶⁵

The Crusade, from its outset, had the solid support of Madison Avenue. The Advertising Council agreed to provide free space in the media and the Advertising firm of Hewitt,

Ogilvy, Benson and Mather Inc. volunteered to prepare all the creative material. The scope of the campaign was impressive. For a six week endeavor, 14 separate newspaper ads were prepared plus different material for radio, television, periodicals and roadside billboards.⁶⁶ A separate P.R. firm, Roger Brown Inc., of New York and Chicago established a "Radio and Television Committee", to coordinate electronic media coverage.⁶⁷ Members of this committee, who had also volunteered to produce specific material, were Young and Rubicon, Inc., The American Association of Advertising Agencies, the advertising division of Proctor and Gamble, Inc. and the J. Walter Thompson Co.⁶⁸

The organization depended heavily on volunteer aid from the public in addition to that of professionals. The CFF was diligent in its efforts to include as many people as possible in the crusade. On August 30th, Clay announced that "enrollment centers" would be set up in every community in the country, "so that every man, woman and child in the United States will have an opportunity to sign freedom scrolls".⁶⁹ To accomplish this feat, 100,000 community volunteers were required to man the centers. In his statement, Clay stated that he had received pledges of cooperation and support from 350 national trade associations, 1,200 corporations, 200 labor unions and 1,000 public relations consultants. 50,000 scrolls, each headed with the declaration of freedom, had been shipped to the local volunteers.⁷⁰

In New York City, local police stations, fire houses and the 200 Western Union stations were used as enrollment centers. Frederick Osborne (FEC), the city's CFF chairman, claimed he would have one million signatures in the first week of the campaign.⁷¹ The Theatrical Union announced at the Theater Authority that all New York theaters would observe the week of October 17th as "entertainment week for Freedom". During the week, performances at all the city's legitimate theaters would be interrupted and the audiences would be asked to make a donation and sign a freedom scroll "to help lift the Iron Curtain everywhere".⁷² The highlight of the week would be a midnight rally at the Majestic Theater.⁷³

The scrolls from all over the country would be ferried in a "spiritual airlift" to Europe by a cooperative effort of the country's six major airlines - free of charge.⁷⁴

The CFF was aided by nationally prominent men who were not members of the FEC or CFF. They sat on the "National Crusade Council" set up by Clay as an "advisory" committee on campaign planning. It appears to have been a vehicle through which nationally prominent people could attach their names to the Crusade. There were no reports of any actual undertakings.⁷⁵ Those reported as members were leading religious, labor and political personalities, Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee, Jacob Javits, Reinhold Niebuhr, Max Ascoli, William Greene and Phillip Murray.⁷⁶

This campaign organization was to remain in the same

basic form for each yearly Crusade. At the top there was a structure of voluntary professionals, recruited by the New York headquarters, which produced, without charge, the creative input of the Campaign. Next was a system of lay volunteers beginning with state Chairmen and reaching down to the community level to those who manned the enrollment centers. Also working at this level were a number of associational groups, trade associations and labor unions, particularly, which lent themselves to the effort. In short, the CFF was able to establish an elaborate organization in a relatively short period of time. They were aided in that effort by a free flow of public endorsements from high federal and local officials which were issued in the course of the organizational build-up.

Truman's public support for the CFF acted as a green light for others to follow suit. Edward Barret, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, delivered a speech following Truman's in which he reiterated the President's plea for private action and praised the CFF specifically as, "an enormously promising example of what I have in mind".⁷⁷

On July 28th, the New York Times delivered the first of three editorials it would issue during the first campaign. Except for the third which was a bit melodramatic, all the editorials took their thematic cues from the CFF. There was little independent thought or reflection in them. They stressed the basic theme of citizen participation against Communist propaganda in the battle of ideas. The first said:⁷⁸

The Crusade for Freedom which is headed by General Clay and sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe, offers American men and women, as private citizens, the opportunity to participate in a campaign to demonstrate before all the world our true aims of freedom and friendship before all peoples. Enrollment in the Crusade will enable individual Americans both to express their faith in a world of human liberty and to support the vigorous private effort now being made to bring a message of truth and encouragement to the millions of people held under Communist rule. ... The Crusade For Freedom was conceived long before the invasion of Korea, but the evident success of Communist propaganda among the Korean people emphatically points up the need for a large scale democratic truth offensive by every possible agency, public and private in the most important battle of all, the battle of ideas.

The second editorial appeared on September 4th, the day of Eisenhower's network-wide speech officially opening the Crusade: 79

Each person who signs the freedom scrolls to be distributed throughout the country will be declaring his belief in the sacredness and dignity of the individual and in the God-given right to freedom, and will be making a pledge to resistance against aggression and tyranny. The submerged masses behind the Iron Curtain, who have been deprived of all means of expressing their belief in the principles for which the Crusade for Freedom stands may take new courage from its success. They will know that they have not been forgotten and they will be constantly reminded that while there is life there is, indeed, hope. ... Funds for Radio Free Europe are needed and those who enroll in the Crusade will have the opportunity to support their words by contributing to this important medium in the battle for the air waves.

The third and final tribute from the Times concerned the Freedom Bell's dedication in West Berlin. It was celebratory and full of optimism: 80

Radio Free Europe is helping spread the truth. We hope that the bell, whose sound rolls Eastward from Berlin today, foreshadows that time when, indeed from every mountain-side, freedom will ring without letup or hindrance.

Prior to Eisenhower's kick-off speech the state chairman and other FEC personnel were laying the groundwork. Retired Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, CPF State Chairman in California, spoke at a luncheon attended by business, civic and group volunteers. He stressed the importance of private citizens meeting the Communist "tide".⁸¹

Recent developments in Korea coupled with known facts about Communist propaganda make it imperative that this Crusade be extended to every freedom loving American without delay. The Crusade for Freedom springs from the people of America and gives everyone of use a chance to help turn back the Communist tide.

Allan Dulles, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the FEC, spoke to a similar luncheon group in New York City. His speech was quite similar to Eaker's, according to the Times, calling on Americans to "show where they stand in the world struggle against Communism."⁸²

The kick-off speech was delivered by Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University. It was delivered nationwide over all four networks. This address set the tone for all following endorsements and indeed for the subsequent campaigns. In it are woven, in classic Cold War rhetoric, each theme the Crusade relied upon. The General began by giving examples of perfidious Communist propaganda in Korea, portraying U.S. soldiers as invaders and imperialists.⁸³

To destroy human liberty and control the world Communists use every conceivable weapon, subversion, bribery, corruption, military attack. Of all of these none is more insidious than propaganda. Spurned by this threat to our very existence, I speak tonight about the Crusade For Freedom.

This crusade is a campaign sponsored by private American citizens to fight the big lie with the big truth. ... Powerful Communist radio stations incessantly tell the world that we Americans are physically soft, and morally corrupt; that we are disunited and confused; that we are selfish and cowardly; that we have nothing to offer the world but imperialism and exploitation. ... In this battle for truth you and I have a definite part to play during the Crusade. Each of us will have an opportunity to sign the freedom scroll. It bears a declaration of our faith in freedom and our belief in the dignity of the individual who derives the right of freedom from God. Each of us by signing the scroll pledges to resist aggression and tyranny wherever they appear on Earth. Its words express what is in all our hearts, your signature on it will be a blow for liberty. ...

In totalitarian countries the individual has no right that the state is bound to respect. His occupation is selected by his masters, his livelihood is fixed by decree, at a minimum which will give him the strength to work another day. ... Unless the individual accepts the governmental mastery of his life and soul, he can be convicted without trial; he can be executed without right of appeal; he can be banished to live out his life in a slave labor camp. This is what the Soviet planners contemplate for all the world, including America. We must meet this threat with courage and firmness. Unless we look with clear and understanding eyes at the world confronting us, and meet with dynamic purposes the issues contained therein, then we will lose the American birth right. The system of government established by our forefathers will disappear. The American record from Washington to the day of that disaster will be only a blank page in history. We American citizens can assure that this will never happen to us if the fervor of our devotion to freedom and country is equal to the seriousness of the threat. Amid these dangers personal participation by each in public deliberation and activity is necessary to our safety. Each must make it his responsibility to see that we remain strong, morally, intellectually and nationally. Our material strength must comprise a healthy devoted and prosperous population, high productivity, financial stability and such military power as can meet aggression on respectable terms. ...

We must have efficiency and economy in all governmental expenditures; we must concentrate all our resources to ensure victory in this bitter and probably prolonged struggle. Until it is won we must practise spartan frugality in all non-essential matters, so that we may make the greatest possible contribution to the defense of our way of life. All lesser considerations

must wait; we cannot tolerate politics as usual - any more than we can tolerate business as usual. Ladies and Gentlemen, we must get tough, tough with ourselves. ...

In the dangers and trials ahead our ultimate security lies in the dynamic purpose, the simple courage and unshakable unity of the United States and the free world, a unity that depends upon common understanding of and common veneration of freedom. But these can live only where there is access to the truth. Thus truth becomes our most formidable weapon, a weapon that each of us can help forge through the Crusade For Freedom. And let us never forget that for those who have lost freedom there is no price, or cost, or sacrifice that can even faintly reflect its value. But it is still the core of America's boundless heritage. It will remain so for as long as we plain American citizens are ever ready to guard it with vigilance and defend it with fortitude and faith.

Three days later, Clay read a letter of support from the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, John W. McCloy, to a CFF fund-raising luncheon for 500 invited guests in Minneapolis.⁸⁴

Events in the far East have only accentuated a danger that has been with us all during your [Clay's] tour in Germany. The present Crusade must be presented as such or else the forces that press the world into slavery and dictatorship will prevail. Here in Europe we welcome this Crusade. West Berlin will be subject to further pressure, and I have no doubt that the people and spirit of West Berlin will remain as steadfast as they have in the past. Free life is threatened as never before in history.

The events of the Campaign in New York City were naturally closely reported in the Times. There were other local rallies, etc., in other cities which occasionally the Times would report. We think the events in New York were not substantially different from other areas since the Crusade was planned on a national scale. Moreover, some of the events which occurred in New York were linked to the national campaign plan, like "Freedom Sunday" and the bell ringing

incident which will be discussed below. Therefore, we shall cover New York's Crusade in detail on the basis of our belief that it is indicative of the course of the Crusade in other cities and also because it illustrates the grass roots operation of the Campaign.

Acting Mayor Vincent R. Impelliteri began the Crusade in New York by proclaiming September "Crusade for Freedom Month". He called the CFF a "dynamic truth campaign designed to refute Soviet lies and proclaim the determination of the American people that freedom and peace will prevail throughout the world."⁸⁵ The next day the Freedom Bell arrived from the foundry in Britain. It was given the honor of a parade up Broadway and placed on display in front of City Hall.⁸⁶

The acting Mayor described its power: "Even the thick walls of the Kremlin will not suffice to keep it from the ears of those sinister and evil conspirators who by cunning false promises, stealth and threat of force now rule no small portion of the world and seek to extend their grip to all."⁸⁷

Senator Herbert Lehman delivered an address to New Yorkers over WCBC, New York City. His presentation demonstrates a subtle transition which would later show up in other statements. The CFF which existed to build up public awareness and for mobilizing participation soon became proof of its own success, i.e., as proof that American citizens were aroused to the danger.⁸⁸

The free world must do many things to combat the Communist threat. The Crusade For Freedom is concrete evidence that the American people recognize

the danger and know the job that must be done. Certainly we must have military force of sufficient size and strength to deter the Communists from further aggression. But arms alone are not enough. We must embark on a great moral crusade - a Marshal Plan of ideas - if we are to win the world wide struggle in which we are now engaged. That's where the Crusade For Freedom comes in.

Religious sentiment became a major part of the CFF campaign. Although it was not a separate theme, religious freedom and belief in God unquestionably served as a medium through which the Campaign sought to appeal to the public. All faiths were obvious and natural allies in any struggle against Communism. Religious leaders urged the faithful to recognize the struggle as a threat to religion also and to support the CFF. Governor Dewey made his initial entrance into the Crusade on this issue by proclaiming October 8th "Freedom Sunday" in New York State. It was done in coordination with the overall CFF campaign plan which sought to have Freedom Sunday observed nationwide. In his press statement, Dewey compared the CFF with traditional military preparedness:⁸⁹

Our country is now embarking on a mighty defense effort preparing to organize and train armies, to mobilize and make materials for war. Of equal importance at this time is the mobilizing of our strongest weapon, the idea of freedom.

Mayor Impellitteri urged New Yorkers to "pray on freedom Sunday to protect our way of life against the evil forces who would destroy it and to give hope and courage to the enslaved peoples of the world seeking to regain freedom and self-government."⁹⁰ Rabbi William F. Rosenblum of Temple of Israel Synagogue urged that "Every American and every person

who holds religion and liberty precious should get behind the Crusade For Freedom to demonstrate to the world that the two foundations upon which democratic civilization rests are not to be destroyed."⁹¹ Cardinal Spellman issued a pastoral letter urging all Catholics to support the Crusade.⁹² Many churches permitted themselves to be used as enrollment centers for freedom scroll signers on October 8th. Clay announced that he had appealed to 80,200 Ministers, Rabbis and Priests all over the country to concentrate their sermons that Sunday on the "spiritual significance of the Crusade".⁹³ Special meetings were arranged between CFF leaders and ministerial associations and Church Councils at which the importance of Church support of the Campaign was discussed.⁹⁴

On Freedom Sunday in New York City, a parade of 3,000 marchers was staged, led by Clay, Impellitteri and Governor Dewey. At a Rally in the Manhattan Center, where the parade ended, the Governor and Clay re-emphasized the familiar themes of the Communist threat and the moral response. Governor Dewey:⁹⁵

The Communist lie has now conquered 800 million people who are prostrate under the heel of 14 men in the Kremlin. One third of the people of the world are their slaves and at least 15 million serve in slave labor + in torture unto death. ... We as a nation have waked up at last. We are no longer yielding, compromising, appeasing and retreating.

Clay:

We as a free nation have joined others in stopping the physical menace of Communism. That was relatively simple. Now we have to determine to stop its moral growth and supplant it with the ideal of freedom.

Other speakers included four East European exiles, Ferenc Nagy and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former premiers of Hungary and Poland respectively, Vladko Moak, former Vice Premier of Yugoslavia, and Dimitar Matzankiew, former leader of the Peasant Party in Bulgaria. Collectively they assured the audience that the CFF would "bolster democratic forces" in their homelands, according to the Times.⁹⁶ On October 15th, about 5 weeks after the Crusade officially began, Clay announced that over 3,500,000 people had "joined the Crusade" by signing freedom scrolls: "It is especially heartening to see how Americans in all parts of the country have welcomed the Crusade For Freedom and how the Crusade has brought about a revitalization in the belief in freedom throughout our land."⁹⁷

An important part of the Campaign was physical activity in the form of rallies and displays where the vital "participation" could occur by the public. Since the aim was to achieve action in terms of belief, speeches and press statements were not the whole program. The infrastructure of the CFF existed for making contact with the citizen. We have, therefore, reserved a discussion of the rallies of the CFF for separate treatment, except, as with such activities of the Freedom Sunday parade, they are treated elsewhere to preserve continuity.

On September 13th a CFF rally at the Loop in Chicago featured Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey who followed Eisenhower's lead and emphasized the struggle's ideological

character and the resultant responsibilities of the citizenry.⁹⁸

Korea is a job for our fighting men, but there is another kind of war, a war of words and ideas in which every American citizen should play a part. This is the battle for men's minds. It is a war in which every American is a front line soldier of the CFF.

He concluded that the Crusade existed to "combat Stalin's big lie with the big truth of freedom". Frederick Osborne, New York City CFF Chairman, received the Medal of the Bill of Rights on "Bill of Rights Day" in New York. It is an annual award presented to an outstanding American by the Wall Street post of the American Legion. To a crowd which the Times estimated to be 1,500, Osborne said the American people "have been rudely awakened from our complacency by Moscow's attempts to poison men's minds by its use of brute and ruthless force in various parts of the world."⁹⁹ In California every major motion picture studio held noon rallies on September 27th for the CFF. At each, huge replicas of the Freedom Bell were constructed. Speakers at the rallies were Louis B. Mayer, Henry Warner, Cecil B. De Mille (PEC), Frank Truman and John Wayne. The rallies had similar programs, each beginning with a recorded replay of Eisenhower's initial Denver Address. Twentieth Century Fox had General Eaker, California State Chairman, as its special guest. All the rallies were sponsored by the Association of Motion Picture Producers.¹⁰⁰ There was an enrollment center opened at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opened the center.¹⁰¹

In New York, the New York Philharmonic, led by its conductor Mimitri Mitropoulos, publicly signed freedom scrolls. Frederick Osborne was on hand for the ceremony and attempted to put the U.S.-Soviet conflict in historical perspective, as though it were merely another challenge Americans were facing up to.¹⁰²

The Iron Curtain is not really iron. What is going on in Russia today is not new; it has been witnessed in other lands before this. It is simply control of the masses by small groups. Germany went through such a stage. When you add your names to these scrolls you join millions of Americans and thereby give us a weapon to get the truth to the people behind the Iron Curtain.

Upon completing its national tour, the Freedom Bell was given a send off parade from New York. The highlight of the event was the launching of 1,000 freedom balloons, colored red, white and blue, from the Empire State Building. The balloons carried small individualized freedom scrolls and an envelope addressed to General Clay. The keynote speaker for the day was Roscoe Drummond, Director of Information for the Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe. Drummond followed the established theme of the effectiveness of the CFF as a weapon. However his address varies from the mold because it is the only occasion in which the Crusade was referred to as propaganda. He declared the time had come when the "free world was able to seize the propaganda initiative behind the Iron Curtain. Moscow has begun to show itself frantically jittery about the anti-Communist restlessness throughout the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

The Communists are afraid to allow free exchange of information. I am sure that now is the time to spread the propaganda of truth and freedom. The Crusade For Freedom is one means for doing it."¹⁰³

The CFF planned a nation-wide celebration of the dedication of the Freedom Bell in Berlin. Its first peals would be broadcast over RFE to Eastern Europe and by all four networks in the U.S. Simultaneously churches were urged to ring their bells at the same moment, 12:03 pm, October 24th. The Times reported that New York Churches had agreed to go along with the request and so had the school system, ships in harbor (whistles) and carillions.¹⁰⁴

On the day of dedication, 250,000 Berliners were on hand to witness the placing of one million freedom scrolls in the bell tower base. Maxwell Taylor, current U.S. Commandant, Clay his predecessor, John J. McCloy and Dr. Ernst Reuter, Mayor of West Berlin spoke to the crowd. Clay said the bell would "strike a note of warning to oppressors, a sound of confidence and courage to those called upon to defend their freedom, and a message of hope to all those who are enslaved."¹⁰⁵ Clay used the occasion also to endorse German rearmament; "All free peoples must bear the responsibility for strengthening the West and defending freedom." He warned that the American people expected all to bear their share of the burden.¹⁰⁶ McCloy asserted the Bell would symbolize a "floodtide of freedom to the scores of slaves and oppressed peoples who are looking toward us full of hope."¹⁰⁷

At the close of the first Crusade Clay claimed that 15,507,877 people had signed freedom scrolls and contributed 1,298,044 dollars to RFE. In that statement he emphatically asserted the war of ideas would continue and meeting the Cold War challenge would prevent a conventional war.¹⁰⁸

It is my personal belief that recent world events make an intensified effort even more important. We must build up our strength in this field of idea warfare, just as we are militarily and economically, to turn back the menace of Communist aggression. If we can do these things fast enough we may be able to avoid a full scale war.

The thousands of local volunteers would remain available for the next Crusade. The 1950 Campaign had succeeded in setting up an organization while carrying out the Crusade.

The goals of the 1951 Campaign were layed out by Clay at a CFF sponsored banquet in the Commodore Hotel. Three million dollars would be sought to finance two new transmitters for RFE. Moreover, the aim was to enrol 25-30 million people in the Crusade through the signing of freedom scrolls.¹⁰⁹ Through the CFF the American people were able to "expose informers and quislings behind the Iron Curtain, undermine the authority of local Communist regimes and help those trapped behind the Iron Curtain to prepare for the day of liberation."¹¹⁰

The organizational structure remained basically the same for 1951. Changes were in the form of beefing up the current operation. Clay shared the limelight with Harald E. Stassen, President of the University of Pennsylvania and a former Governor of Minnesota, who was named National Campaign Chairman.¹¹¹ There was a greater emphasis on soliciting

support from organized labor in 1951. Whereas in 1950 almost every important CFF personality was a corporation executive, in 1951 labor received top honorary positions.

Stassen named Daniel Tobin, President of the Teamsters, James B. Carey (FEC) secretary of the CIO, and W.P. Kennedy, President of the Brotherhood of Rail Road Trainmen, as national co-chairmen in charge of the CFF drive among the ranks of labor.¹¹²

In his announcement of the appointments, Stassen reminded the leaders that they too had a stake in the struggle for freedom.

"Behind the Iron Curtain there is no freedom of labor.

Unions are merely tools of the Communist Party. Labor has a tremendous stake in the struggle against International Communism."¹¹³

In New York State a special CFF committee was established to concentrate the drive among ethnic groups. The members were Frederick Taylor (Austrians), Chi Chung Hoy (Chinese), Maria Voclavsek (Czechoslovakia), Harald Raudsepp (Estonian), Louis Poi (French), Ward Lang (German), Basil Vlastos (Greek), Kalman Molnar (Hungarian), Harry Lieinoro (Latvian), J. Balkunos (Lithuanian), Ignatius Nurkiewicz (Polish) and Andrew Valuchek, a Czech and owner of two Czech language newspapers.¹¹⁴

The starting date for the campaign was September 3rd. CBS produced the opening program the format of which symbolized the world scope of the Crusade by having each participant speaking from separate cities in Europe and America. Continuity was provided by the moderator Edward

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R. Morrow. Eisenhower spoke first from Paris emphasizing the CFF as a powerful weapon of truth against Communism.¹¹⁵

Though they are marched and countermarched in the lockstep of totalitarianism, the people behind the Iron Curtain also hunger for the truth. I trust that every American will support wholeheartedly the campaign to use truth as our most powerful weapon against Communist domination of the world.

U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Gifford, endorsed the Crusade from London. He said the "key" to the power of the Crusade "is that it represents a movement of the American people." He reminded his audience that "unity of purpose" in ideological warfare was as critical as it was in a shooting war.¹¹⁶ Stassen, from Philadelphia, emphasized similar points.¹¹⁷

The Crusade is particularly important because it is a people to people, man to man approach in which millions of free Americans reach through and over the Russian wall to make direct contact with victims of Soviet aggression.

Clay, speaking from New York, concentrated on the theme of private citizens' duty, saying that the truth would develop popular demands behind the Iron Curtain which could not be resisted by the Soviets and which would eventually lead to the collapse of their oppression. Thus,¹¹⁸

If we truly want a free world then each and every one of us must be willing to play a part in bringing it about. It is not our way to have our problems to be entirely resolved by government. It is our way as a people to join together in doing those things which we believe to be worthwhile. The Crusade For Freedom presents an opportunity for each American to take a personal part in the struggle for freedom.

On September 11, the Campaign received the blessing of

the New York Times:¹¹⁹

What the Crusade For Freedom is doing is vitally necessary. At present the Soviet Union is bombarding those within its orbit with an unceasing humdrum of propaganda vilifying the United States. At every turn our every action is slandered, criticized and distorted. The Soviet propaganda effort has reached a new intensity, and we are threatened with the loss of many friends unless we can bring the true picture back into focus.

CBS sponsored a second program on behalf of the CFF, this one featuring Omar Bradley. He urged Americans to unite behind the CFF, "to help the common man travel the road away from slavery." He emphasized that the job had really just begun: "The satellite peoples are only beginning to learn by broadcasts and freedom balloons that you and I, one hundred and fifty million of us, are doing everything we can to avoid war."¹²⁰ The organization of the public in participatory events included an increase in the use of voluntary groups in addition to the public rallies. In fact only one rally was reported by the Times. We think the lack of attention given to the rallies is due more to the fact that they were no longer the news they were in 1950 and because they occurred so frequently. Those reported after 1950 involved very important people or gimmicks in the form of displays, launchings of balloons, etc. The one rally reported was a major event held at Rockefeller Plaza and featuring Vice President Alban Barkley. After addressing the crowds, he retreated to a CFF fund raising banquet at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. This was, to say the least, a gathering of notables. Cardinal Spellman personally delivered

the invocation, and present at the head table were the Rt. Rev. Henry Knox Sherrill, Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, Rabbi David de Sola Poole of Congregation Sherith Israel and David Sarnoff, New York State Campaign Chairman. In introducing the Vice President, Sarnoff emphasized the relationship between the two modern forms of conflict; "We can win the Cold War as well as the hot one and if we win the Cold War - or at least prevent the Russians from winning it, we may not have to fight a third world war."¹²¹

Barkley's address was on the same point. He stated the cost of penetrating the Iron Curtain with the CFF was nothing compared to the cost of another full scale war. Moreover, there was no middle way. Rather, conflict was inevitable because "Democracy lives on truth while autocracy feeds on falsehood and the two are always antagonistic."¹²²

Those events which received attention in the press indicate an emphasis on support from private organizations and activities in which citizens could support the Crusade in ways other than physical attendance at gatherings. The major program in this respect was the "Greenwood Plan" which took the form of a national contest. The scheme got its name from Greenwood, South Carolina where it was conceived by the Chamber of Commerce who then presented the idea to the CFF. The contest was for the public to think up new ways for the American ideas and messages to be conveyed to the captured peoples. At the end of the contest, prizes would be awarded to the five best submissions. Each winner

would receive a free trip to Germany.¹²³ The contest judges were Mrs. Alban Barkley, Clay and Stassen.¹²⁴ This was indeed participation in its highest form. And it is quite significant that the idea came from the public, as it were, which indicates the degree the CFF had succeeded in integrating and co-opting the public to its propaganda. Sociological propaganda can doubtless reach no higher degree of efficiency than to achieve such acceptance as to be improved upon by those it seeks to influence. Certainly the elaborate infrastructure of the CFF was mostly voluntary and thus represented public co-option. But these workers were contacted by the CFF leaders, and in effect, acted as agents for the Crusade, though they were volunteers. The Greenwood Plan, on the other hand, was a spontaneous phenomenon from the target masses. Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, there was no record of any winners or of the plans they submitted.

A similar example is that of Thomas J. Watson, an Executive Vice President of IBM and Boy Scout Commissioner for the New York City area. He became the first 1951 subscriber to the Crusade, and after joining in the presence of Clay and Sarnoff, announced that his 80,000 boy scouts would canvass door to door in the city to get people to sign freedom scrolls and make donations.¹²⁵ In Los Angeles, radio station KMPC produced its own program, thirteen hours in length, on behalf of the Crusade in the city. The show was supposed to be an example of what would come over the radio if America were to fall under Communist control. There

were long periods of boring "official music" interrupted by the local "Commissar" who would set down the officially designated view on some topic, only to interrupt a short while later to order everyone to forget that line and adopt an opposite one. There were long dramatized "confessions" by people designated as "enemies of the state". At the conclusion of the broadcast, the California CFF State Chairman warned that this could happen and asked for donations to CFF.¹²⁶

In yet another example, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen distributed Crusade "kits" on the seats of 14 commuter lines serving New York. Commuters were asked to make a pledge to the Campaign on one card and compose a brief personal message to the captive peoples. The former when mailed would go to Clay, the latter, via balloon, into Eastern Europe. This operation reportedly reached 150,000 people.¹²⁷ The Allied Trades Council of the A.F. of L. put on a demonstration of RFE balloon barrages in New York in which the actual type were loaded, inflated and released over the city.¹²⁸

In a more conventional vein, General Motors and Ford announced that their dealers' showrooms would serve as enrollment centers for freedom scrolls. General Motors also donated 49 new Chevrolets to the Crusade for a motorcade which would travel the country releasing balloons at locally sponsored CFF rallies.¹²⁹ Not to be outdone, Ford responded by donating an unspecified number of trucks which would perform the same service.¹³⁰ Lastly, the Advertising Council

was a busy partner in 1951. Just after the Crusade opened, it announced that it had placed 5,400 ads in newspapers, covered 2,600 billboards and mailed 107 special program kits to television stations from which commercials on behalf of the Crusade could be produced.¹³¹

In 1952 the CFP experienced a proliferation of honorary offices and a change in its top leadership. Henry Ford II replaced Clay as National Chairman, who stepped down but not out, continuing actively to support the campaign.¹³² This change in top leadership was evidently a preparatory step in the take-over of the Crusade by the American Heritage Foundation in 1953. Ford also became the Chairman of the Foundation. Two new posts were created in 1952, that of President occupied by retired Admiral H.B. Miller (PEC) and National Treasurer, occupied by Winthrop Aldrich, Chairman of the Chase National Bank and the Chairman of the American Heritage Foundation.¹³³ Charles E. Wilson, Chairman of General Electric and soon to be Secretary of Defense became National Campaign Chairman, succeeding Harold Stassen.¹³⁴ Richard Walsh resigned his position in the Department of State to become the Executive Vice Chairman at the New York Headquarters.¹³⁵

The Advertising Council distributed a small booklet to newspapers and the media entitled Here is how you can fight Communism, the slogan it adopted for the Crusade. The booklet accompanied the 9,500 "kits" containing eleven different CFP ads.¹³⁶ Another change was the phasing out of

freedom scrolls and their replacement by "freedom grams". Freedom Gram centers replaced enrollment centers for freedom scrolls. With a Freedom Gram, a citizen was invited to write a brief personal message to the people of Eastern Europe. The CFF guaranteed that these would be dropped via balloon into Eastern Europe. Freedom Grams could also be verbal. If the citizen preferred, he could tape his message which would then be broadcast over RFE to the country specified by the subscriber. At the center in the Park Sheraton Hotel, the current Communist propaganda line in Eastern Europe was on display. The individual was invited to offer his personal refutation of the lie over RFE.¹³⁷ Special days were reserved by RFE to be devoted to messages from respected ethnic groups and religious leaders to their homelands in Eastern Europe.¹³⁸

In his opening statement as the National Campaign Chairman, Wilson emphasized the power and latitude accruing to the CFF and RFE from their private status. "Nothing that is effective in combating Communism," he said, "or in strengthening the will of the people is overlooked."¹³⁹ Clay drew upon this theme with a practical illustration of the importance of that latitude. "Only by carrying the fight for men's minds to the Soviet dominated territories can we stop the Kremlin from establishing bigger and better Iron Curtains closer to America."¹⁴⁰ On November 4th, two weeks before the Crusade was to officially commence, President Truman released a letter encouraging public support for the

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On the success of the 1952 Crusade rest the plans for the Crusade For Freedom to build more radio stations in free Europe and Asia. If this can be done and I believe that it will be done, the Free World can more effectively get the truth behind the Iron Curtain. It is essential that people everywhere know we are working for peace, freedom and prosperity for all mankind.

Truman's support of the Crusade, though genuine, never reached the pitch of Eisenhower's endorsements, which were rich with hyperbole and pithy phrases. His endorsement of the 1952 Campaign, given as President-elect, was no exception. With the beginning of the Republican occupation of the White House, the most extensive and open government support of the CFF began. To open the 1952 drive, the CFF again arranged a nationwide TV program over all four networks. In a show of unity, Adlai Stevenson appeared with Eisenhower "in the common cause of freedom" according to host Henry Ford II. 142

Stevenson concentrated on the credibility of RFE because of its private source of support and commended the public for their action. He said the U.S. must not "sit back and lose the war of ideas by default." The VOA was indispensable of course, but RFE carried greater weight because it was voluntary. "Imagine yourself on the listening end for a moment. There is no free radio behind the Iron Curtain. Bombarded constantly from all sides by official propaganda, how could you fail to be more impressed by the one voice in the chorus that was voluntary? Those who have aided the Crusade For Freedom can properly take the greatest satisfaction in its

performance."¹⁴³ In contrast to this restrained, almost analytical support, Eisenhower's concentration on the Communist menace and blatant identification of CFF with love of country represented a wholly different attitude. The Times commented that in addition to endorsing the Crusade, Eisenhower intended to use the opportunity to bury once and for all any doubt that he was an isolationist Republican.¹⁴⁴

Few movements have touched such a responsive chord as this one has. The American people proved during the following days [since 1950] that they not only detested Communism, but were willing to do something about it once they were shown the way.

Now two years later, I have the privilege of announcing the opening of the third Crusade For Freedom for the support it merits from the American people. A great deal has happened to all of us in those two years. But one thing remains unchanged, and that is the long shadow of Communism. ...

In these two years, millions of people have listened to an infinite number of Communist lies designed to make them hate us. And at the same time their children have been told in endless repetition that it is their duty to spy on their parents. They are told that the story of God and His compassion is a fable designed to enslave the minds of the people of the decadent Western Democracies. These are not pretty facts to think about. But we are doing something about them, and we can be proud of our record of accomplishment in these last two years. On that Labor day in 1950, the Crusade for Freedom outlined the course it has followed without deviation since. One aim was to keep the American people informed of what Communism was doing in the lands it has overrun. Its other primary purpose was actively to oppose Communism, to fight the big lie with the big truth. ...

In today's world freedom cannot live in any nation no matter how powerful unless it is preserved also in other significant parts of the Globe. ...

The fact we face now is the Bolshevik world is engaged in the greatest campaign in history to destroy the power of the people to think for themselves, and to fill their minds with distorted, pre-digested ideas. People believe lies only when they have no opportunity to hear the truth. ... The only way to

frustrate this evil manipulation of human minds and emotions is to supply the truth which gives the oppressed people a measuring stick to lay against each lie that is told to them. The Crusade For Freedom, through Radio Free Europe, is supplying the truth. Men and women who might otherwise have succumbed to this philosophy that it is good to be slaves, still keep alive the spark of freedom in their hearts. ...

This work serves not only the nations we seek to help - it serves the best interests of the United States. To support the Crusade For Freedom is to support our own beloved country.

Other events staged by or for the CFF were reported in the press. On March 8th, the New Jersey Philharmonic played a special benefit performance for the CFF. Included on the program were representative groups of thirty-one exile organizations who gave speeches and sang the national anthems of their homelands. Radio Free Europe carried the program into Eastern Europe.¹⁴⁵

From New York the CFF issued an appeal to the Churches and Synagogues across the country to hold special worship services on March 22nd and 23rd. RFE, it was announced, was urging the people of Eastern Europe to do likewise on the same day. The object was to "establish brotherhood and spiritual ties with the victims of Communism", and create "a unity of spirit on both sides of the Iron Curtain."¹⁴⁶ The inspiration for the pray-in came from long-standing CFF backers Bishop Henry Knox Sherrill, Cardinal Spellman and Rabbi David de Sola Pool who, according to the Times, had "expressed opinions that the spiritual forces of the United States could help strengthen the spiritual resolve of oppressed peoples and thus lead to a weakening of Communist

influence.¹⁴⁷ CFP New York Headquarters said the expected results were the encouragement of oppressed people counter-acting the anti-religious propaganda of the Communists and "the awakening among Americans to a clearer realization of the menace of Communism."¹⁴⁸

In December, just prior to assuming control over the CFP, the American Heritage Foundation sponsored seventy-one representatives of various voluntary associations, among them the Women's Club of America on "inspection" tours of RFE headquarters in Munich. Afterwards they were guests of Alfred M. Greunther, Allied Commander in West Berlin, who, "briefed them on the conditions behind the Iron Curtain."¹⁴⁹ It was expected that the visitors would return and speak on the operations of RFE.

In 1953, when Henry Ford II became Chairman of the American Heritage Foundation, he announced that it would take over the CFP, which would go out of existence as a separate entity. The annual Crusade would become the sole project of the Foundation.¹⁵⁰ President Eisenhower publicly commended the planned take-over. Speaking both as a former member of the CFP and Trustee of the Foundation he said:¹⁵¹

I believe that this work is of great importance and it seems to me that the American Heritage Foundation is uniquely qualified to carry it out. It is a public service of no less importance than the tasks that the Foundation has accepted in the past.

Previously the Foundation had conducted public get-out-the-vote campaigns during elections and other efforts designed to acquaint voters with candidates and the issues.

Charles E. Wilson, remaining as National Campaign Chairman, was the principal speaker at a CFF banquet at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Before his audience of 200 he emphasized the CFF's defensive value. He claimed the CFF, through RFE, was keeping the people of Eastern Europe hostile to the Soviet Union and thereby making her hesitant to use those countries as a spring board for an invasion of Western Europe.¹⁵² Julius Alder Qchs, Vice President and General Manager of the New York Times recommended in an address to the Fraternal Order of the Eagles that it endorse the Crusade because it was engaged in the task of educating Americans, "on the vital differences between a free society and a Communist slave society."¹⁵³

On September 23rd President Eisenhower held a formal dinner at the White House for twenty-two leading business and government executives, the purpose of which was to urge them to support the CFF. Those who attended were Frank W. Abrams, Chairman of Standard Oil of New Jersey; *Barney Balaban, President of Paramount Pictures, Inc.; *Thomas D'Arcy Brophy, President of Kenyon and Eckardt Inc; Cleo P. Craig, President of American Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Everit R. Cook (Gen. U.S.A. ret.), President of Cook and Co., Exporters; Harlow W. Curtice, President of General Motors; Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to Eisenhower; Morse G. Dial, President of Union Carbide Corp.; Benjamin Fairless, Chairman of the United States Steel Corporation; *Henry Ford II; **C.D. Jackson, Special assistant to the President for

Psychological Warfare; Fred G. Curley, President of the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad; **John L. McCaffery, President of International Harvester Corp.; John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Chase National Bank and former High Commissioner in Germany; Richard T. Mellon, President of T. Mellon and Sons (Trust Co.); *Louis T. Norris, Executive Vice President American Heritage Foundation; **Arthur W. Page, member of the Board of A.T.&T.; Bernard M. Shanky, Special Counsel to the President; **Walter B. Smith, Under Secretary of State; E.J. Thomas, President of the Goodyear Rubber Co.; **Abbot Washburn, Special Assistant to the Director of the U.S.I.A.; **Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense.¹⁵⁴

This marked the first time the White House was used to organize support for the Crusade involving the President personally. Along with open government involvement it was also the first public instance where the CFF openly courted corporate contributions. The prestige of the White House was being employed in that direction as well as toward the public. Public appeals would remain strong, however, until 1956 when corporate funding would have come to represent the only significant non-governmental source of funds.

The government was again publicly involved when it was announced by the American Heritage Foundation on October 2nd that a special Pentagon briefing would be held October 20-22

*Trustees of the American Heritage Foundation

**Associated at one time with the FEC

for a specially invited group of civic, business and labor leaders from across the country. The Pentagon refused to state the nature of the meetings beyond the fact that they were "private briefings in the Pentagon covering the state of affairs in Eastern Europe and the necessity of RFE."¹⁵⁵ Four hundred and fifty guests appeared at the first session and were given a closed briefing by Charles E. Wilson and Allen W. Dulles, Director of the CIA. The participants were not identified beyond being representatives of 175 civic, fraternal, labor, professional and service organizations and 250 corporation executives. A CFP press release said the purpose was to reach twenty-five million Americans through the organizations they belonged to and develop an awareness of the "responsibilities of free men and of the nature and methods of International Communism. The sessions have been arranged to give outstanding leaders of American life a close look at this situation and what is being done by private citizens to bring the truth to the captive peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania to sustain their will to resist Communist domination. So long as we sustain this will to resist integration into the Kremlin war machine we will keep Moscow off balance and stop World War III before it starts."¹⁵⁶ Besides Dulles, Wilson and Ford, President Eisenhower delivered a brief address also. Walter Reuther observed that it was not usual that he and Henry Ford were on the same side but they "could easily do that in the fight against Communism".¹⁵⁷

The sharp escalation of public government support after Eisenhower took office is not surprising. The main theme of the Republicans during the Campaign regarding foreign policy concerned the quality of the American response to Communist expansion. John Foster Dulles had long staked out the issue as one of the failure to realize the moral nature of the threat facing the U.S. The adoption of the liberation policy toward Eastern Europe has already been discussed along with Eisenhower's identification of the Cold War as an ideological contest and the importance he gave to a psychological warfare response. His Select Committee on International Information Activities had delivered its report in July, three months before the White House opened its doors to the CFF. We have what was frankly a bizarre situation where the government was obliged to pursue its policy of liberation covertly through a dummy private corporation employing techniques of informal attack. Then, to associate itself with its own policy, the government endorsed publicly but in keeping with its private facade, its own instrument. Thus the close association of the government and the CFF is clear. Not being able officially to implement their policy, beyond emphatically declaring it, Washington had to closely support the CFF in order to be associated with the liberation goal.

The organizational structure of the 1954 campaign was not different from the 1953 effort. Walter Beddle Smith became President of the American Heritage Foundation and William Greene became the first labor leader to assume the

post of National Chairman. The Crusade again had the support of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen who in 1953 had distributed 125,000 CFF kits to commuters in the New York City area alone. The principal effort for 1954 was in the form of a nationwide newspaper campaign. It was to run from January 1st through February 22nd. The continuing goal of ten million dollars and 25 million CFF memberships was the target.¹⁵⁸

The Leo Burnet Co. of Chicago took over from Hewit, Ogilvy and Mather as the Advertising Agency producing the creative material, and the newspaper campaign was their responsibility. They also brought back the freedom scroll as the instrument for signing up members in the Crusade. The results of the concentration were never released, but a progress report was made once in early February. The American press had pledged two million lines of free space to the CFF during January alone. This represented 6,650 ads. The goal was 15,000 ads by the end of February.¹⁵⁹ Of the many examples supplied, the Burnet creations were used almost exclusively. Most popular was the ad featuring President Eisenhower endorsing the Crusade. Ranking second was one headlined "Truth can Stop H-Bombs".¹⁶⁰ On February 23, the day after the newspaper drive ended, the New York Times editorially endorsed the Crusade.¹⁶¹

Among the Agencies which seek to sustain the hope of [East Europeans] and inform them of the true state of affairs in the world, none does a more effective job than Radio Free Europe. ... Through the Crusade For Freedom the national Committee seeks to

enlist support, moral and financial of all Americans in this vital work. The current campaign for funds to continue this activity deserves a generous response from all friends of freedom.

The major pitch of the year was made by Joseph Grew, Chairman of the FEC. In an address before the Women's Forum on National Security convention in Washington D.C., he masterfully integrated all the themes of the CFF into one for support, which undoubtedly sent shivers through the audience. His talk is such a classic of the genre that it deserves to be quoted at length: 162 .

In the first place, I am encouraged that wives and mothers are now assembled in this forum on the very subject of national security. It seems to me a matter of urgency that each of us now relate the security of our nation with the security of our daily lives and our homes. ... The Soviets are busy minding the business of 800 million people inside the Iron Curtain today - and they are dedicated to a conquest and control of the entire world by any and all means. The present 'non-hardware' phase of their campaign might be called 'conquest by corrosion'. This threat to our security presents an important opportunity for mothers, wives and daughters - for the corrosion is aimed at the very foundations of the nation - the family, the home, and education of the children - the corrosion of our values, our traditions and our institutions. If the so-called Cold War is regarded in these terms it becomes clear and urgent that American Women must now take heed of the security of our nation. For this is their sector in a new contest - the struggle for the mind, heart and loyalty of all humanity. ... Home and mother stand at the very center of the arena. ...

I want to talk to you today about one aspect of our national security that has been very much neglected in the past: East and Central Europe. ... In the first place two world wars have started in this area and in both of these wars America has been committed with resulting losses of our sons and husbands which stagger the imagination. The quest of U.S. foreign policy as it affects these countries has been in the bright spotlight of publicity notice in the last twelve months. More American families are descended from this area than from any other part of the world. The question of liberation vs containment and the decision that the United States

will not make any bargain which will recognize and perpetuate enslavement of the 90 odd millions of people in these captive countries - these are matters of our foreign policy now in the forefront of publicity attention.

The National Committee For a Free Europe, which I have the honor to serve as Chairman of the Board is engaged in the important business of piercing the Iron Curtain with the 22 transmitters of Radio Free Europe. We are also working with the exiles from the Iron Curtain countries, making plans, and preparing against the day when the curtain will disintegrate - as surely it will just as all past tyrannies have fallen. I would like to repeat one point, the founders of the national Committee for a Free Europe had returned to private life, it is the private American citizen who has contributed to its support. There is a plaque at the big station headquarters in Munich which says that this station has been made possible by the support of over twenty five million private American citizens. That is the essence of the operation, as a people to people program. Radio Free Europe supplements the Voice of America. It does not compete with it. The Voice of America is the official voice of the United States Government and does an extremely important job in about 43 languages in world wide broadcasts. Radio Free Europe speaks with the voice of exiles - the Voice of Free Poland, Free Czechoslovakia, Free Hungary, Romania and Albania, people to people. I repeat that it is supported by private citizens. This has great advantages in the tactics of day to day operation. It does a saturation job in a smaller but very vital sector.

.... In closing, I would refer to the millions of Americans who support this effort. This is done through donations to the Crusade For Freedom, which was started by General Clay with the help of President Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University. - It is presently honored to have as its Chairman Mr. Henry Ford II, who leads a distinguished group of voluntary workers from all sections of the country. This year for the first time, the Crusade For Freedom is sponsored by the American Heritage Foundation - and I commend it highly for your consideration. Mr. Ford puts it this way: 'In these times of strife between those who enjoy freedom and those who destroy it, we Americans as individuals are apt to be frustrated. However, too rarely is there a chance to do something that promises positive results.' Now through the Crusade For Freedom and Radio Free Europe each of us can take a personal part in countering Communist tyranny with the most powerful weapon at our command - truth. Here is a people to people operation in action. It provides a

daily life line of hope and truth to the millions who have lost the freedoms which we too often are prone to take for granted. Here is something constructive in the cause of national security, something which each one of us as a private citizen can do about Communism. As a matter vital to our national security it is a cause worthy of our wholehearted support. And as wives and mothers I would again remind you of the vital job to be done on the home front in defending the values and traditions which our forefathers fought and died to win for us.

Then there are the children. In the curtain countries, they are separated from their parents - educated by cold calculation in the state schools. They are taught to spy on their parents. The Boy Scouts in Poland are told Paulik Morozov is a Soviet hero. Why? Because he denounced his parents for hiding grain. They were arrested and deported. It illustrates what happens when the cause is lost on the home front. This cause will be won in America with the active participation of our wives, mothers and daughters.

The Campaign sponsored over 500 rallies in communities across the country in 1954. Each rally included in addition to a keynote speaker and freedom scrolls, a demonstration launch of balloons used by the FEC in Eastern Europe. One of the largest of such rallies was held at the home of Abraham Lincoln in Springfield, Illinois.¹⁶³ In New York, Mayor Wagner officially converted Times Square into "Freedom Island" for one day. A seventy foot high watch tower was constructed, complete with sweeping search lights, to simulate the Communist border. The mayor dedicated it.¹⁶⁴ In the evening, stage and movie stars Gig Young, Sandra Deal, Bert Lytell and Betsy Van Funstenberg provided a benefit performance and solicited funds.¹⁶⁵ At Philadelphia's Independence Hall, the CFF sponsored a rally on Lincoln's birthday at which a wounded American veteran tapped the

Liberty Bell seven times in honor of the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain.¹⁶⁶ Another example was a rally held at the Statue of Liberty at which Bulgarian exiles in native dress placed a wreath at the monument's base and thanked the American people for supporting RFE.¹⁶⁷

The biggest splash of the year was made by the tour of the home-made tank constructed and driven over the Czech border into West Germany by Voclaw Uhlik.¹⁶⁸ The tank and its builder were honored with a parade up Broadway and a special welcome by Mayor Wagner. The tank was then put on display at the World Motor Sports Show being held in Madison Square Gardens.¹⁶⁹ People were urged to sign a freedom scroll and drop a "truth dollar" into the turret. 2,500 scrolls a day were signed out of a daily attendance of 7,000. The pledge was slightly altered from the previous declaration in that there was an added clause pledging the signer to "bring truth and hope to courageous freedom hungry people behind the Iron Curtain."¹⁷⁰ More than 10,000 signed scrolls and made donations during the run of the show.¹⁷¹

There were no changes recorded in the organization of the Campaign in 1955. Only one new position was added, that of Campaign Chairman for government and military personnel. Eisenhower named Walter Williams, Under Secretary of Commerce and former head of the Committee for Economic Development (CED) to be the first man to hold the post.¹⁷² American military personnel, especially those stationed overseas, were reported to be the heaviest per capita contributors.¹⁷³

On January 24th, the New York Times supported the Crusade once again, and again emphasized the theme of the citizens' opportunity for private, extra-governmental action.¹⁷⁴

Soviet ruled Eastern Europe is one of the key areas in today's great struggle between freedom and slavery. ...

Eastern Europe is one of the seed beds which has contributed the essential elements that have gone into forming our own nation, and many of us have ancestral ties with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania. This intimate linking of many of our people makes our concern all the more pressing and all the more legitimate, quite aside from political considerations. Today this concern of our people, as distinguished from our government, with the fate of Eastern Europe is best expressed through the Crusade For Freedom which makes possible the spreading of hope for future freedom among those now under Moscow's yoke. ... All of us can help this important work by sending our contributions large or small to the Crusade For Freedom, care of your local Postmaster. It is a good cause.

On February 8th, the White House became directly involved in the Crusade again. Eisenhower delivered a special appeal on behalf of the CFF via closed circuit television to specially invited audiences in cities around the country. He was seen in Akron, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Bridgeport, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dallas, Dayton, Denver, Des Moines, Detroit, Fort Worth, Houston, Lincoln, Los Angeles, Memphis, Milwaukee, Minnesota, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, Richmond, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo and Youngstown. After the address, local CFF volunteers solicited pledges of support.¹⁷⁵ The audience was not identified by the Crusade beyond saying they were national leaders. However, in his introduction of the President, Henry Ford II

gave an indication of who they were: 176

My work with the Crusade has shown me that there is no more effective way for the average American businessman to translate into action his own conviction about freedom and the future peace of the world. I do not need to emphasize to you how great a stake we have in this business of world affairs.

According to the Times, the White House emphasized that the President had not altered his speech after learning of the fall of Malenkov and his replacement as Premier by Nikolai Bulganin. The implication was that the U.S. did not consider that this change in leadership represented opportunities for new approaches for settling the East European issue. Eisenhower emphasized the Crusade's effectiveness in furthering national security by its effectiveness in promoting subversion in the target countries: 177

I am happy to be with you tonight for I strongly believe that Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom are vital to success in the battle for men's minds. Without this victory there can be no other victories. By our efforts, backed up by America we can achieve our great goal - that of enabling us and all the peoples of the world to enjoy in peace the blessings of freedom.

While we maintain our vigilance at home and abroad we must help intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. These countries are in the Soviet backyard, and only so long as their people are reminded that the outside world has not forgotten them - only that long do they remain as potential deterrents to Soviet aggression. Therefore the mission of Radio Free Europe merits greater support than before. It serves our national security and the cause of peace.

I have long given the Crusade my strong endorsement. I did that because I am familiar with its purposes, its operations, the people who run it and perhaps most important, its hard hitting effectiveness as an independent American enterprise. I knew that our country and our friends behind the Iron Curtain can count on you for active participation and leadership

in this the most critical of all battles - the winning of men's minds.

In Milwaukee "Freedom week" began on February 12th. The CFF held a huge rally that day releasing 2,000 balloons of the type used by RFE. Each contained a freedom scroll and an envelope addressed to CFF, New York.¹⁷⁸ In another operation, 23 newspapers across the country permitted their news boys to solicit funds for the CFF. Twenty thousand boys took part and collected \$90,000.¹⁷⁹

The extensive public campaigns which characterized the CFF came to an abrupt end after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Up until then there had always been a primary emphasis on public participation. After the revolt however, the primary emphasis, indeed the exclusive emphasis, was on corporate support. The number of citations in the press, as shown above, dropped drastically from a fairly constant level in previous years. In 1956, Eugene Holman, Chairman of Standard Oil of New Jersey, took over the National Chairmanship, and William Greene became the National Campaign Chairman. As if to erase any doubt Holman emphasized the Cold War was still on. By the end of his tenure, the CFF would have become a casualty of that war. In his press statement, Holman seemed to indicate, by implication, the corporate thrust CFF was beginning to take by associating more openly than before freedom with freedom of enterprise.¹⁸⁰

Freedom to show individual enterprise is at stake. When Communism marches in, all the freedoms we take for granted disappear. The Cold War is still on in earnest. This means that the battle for men's

minds is today more critical than ever before. If the Soviets cannot achieve their ends by the use of military force they must rely increasingly on diplomatic manoeuver and propaganda - with all the lies and deceit that go with centrally controlled propaganda. We must get constantly better at countering deception and untruth with truth itself. Radio Free Europe and the Free Europe Press balloon operations are doing this in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.

Eisenhower's blessing was bestowed at a White House ceremony with William Greene in attendance. The President did not deviate from the themes he had employed for the past six years.¹⁸¹

In the continuing work of combating propaganda, Radio Free Europe, the radio arm of the Crusade For Freedom, plays a major and effective role. Day in and day out its broadcasts extend the hand of friendship and hope to the people behind the Iron Curtain assuring them that their plight has not been forgotten by the free world and fortifying their devotion to liberty. To the National Committee for a Free Europe I extend congratulations on this and other valuable activities of the organization, with my best wishes for success in enlisting, through the Crusade For Freedom, the support of the American people. I am confident they will respond generously and thus forward this vital work for the cause of freedom and peace.

During the revolution in Hungary, Holman attempted to use it to promote support. Whether the FEC would subsequently deny all responsibility for the revolt it did not do so at the time through the CFF. The Chairman said it was "vitally important at this moment when Hungarian martyrs are dying by the thousands that a voice from the free world supported by the generosity of the American people be heard behind the Iron Curtain."¹⁸² In Wilmington Delaware, the CFF erected a replica of a Communist border crossing complete with barbed wire, watch towers and search lights. Citizens were invited

to cross a "mine field" and sign freedom scrolls for RFE.¹⁸³

Eisenhower remained steadfast in his support of the FEC and the Crusade throughout his tenure as President. As the deluge of criticism began to fall on RFE, from liberal critics who had at last found the courage to speak out, Eisenhower came forth with a forceful rebuttal.¹⁸⁴

Since the Crusade For Freedom began six years ago, I have wholeheartedly endorsed its concept and its activities. More than ever before contributing to the Crusade for Freedom is an effective way for every American to reassert his belief in the individuality of human freedom, and in the rights of people wherever they may live, to have governments of their own choosing. Events of the past several months are dramatic evidence of the profound depth of the spirit of freedom which motivates the people of captive Europe. Soviet military intervention and repression in Hungary, designed to crush the spirit of freedom so bravely shown by the Hungarian people make it more vital than ever that Radio Free Europe continue to provide all the subjugated peoples with unbiased truth about events in their own lands and in the world. These people must remain assured that their courageous lasting love of freedom is not passing unnoticed.

The 1958 campaign was almost completely unreported in the press. And the CPF concentrated on quiet solicitations avoiding the former public hoopla. For example, the Crusade sent 56 community civic leaders to tour the Munich headquarters of RFE. Like the last group sponsored by the American Heritage Foundation these people also received cordial treatment from Allied Headquarters. But this group was composed of people long active in CPF campaigns, not new initiates or neutrals. After they returned they were expected to speak widely in support of the Crusade to other organized groups.¹⁸⁵ There were two public events. The CPF

released a film, "Hungary Aflame", "made on the spot", which was shown at the U.N. and ran for three weeks at Hunter College in New York. It also compiled and sent on national tour an "exposition of documentary materials" consisting of artifacts of the revolt like Pal Matator's personal flag.¹⁸⁶

In 1959 only the appointment of W.B. Smith as National Chairman received attention in the press. The President of Campbell's Soup Co. had no comment to make to the press.¹⁸⁷

In this chapter we have analysed the operations of the Crusade for Freedom as a government directed propaganda instrument for social mobilization operating in a democracy. We have attempted to understand its function in the context of the Cold War as a case of sociological propaganda, as that concept has been elaborated by Jacques Ellul. The CFF functioned to organize public support for pre-determined policies. Like RFE, the Crusade was a necessity of Cold War conflict due to two primary factors, the impact of technology and the perception of external threat. Whereas RFE reflected the method of attack in the conflict, the CFF reflected the method of defense. That is, the organization of loyalty to the state in terms of certain cultural values and attitudes, selected for emphasis by the state. We have isolated those selected values or attitudes, summarized the appeals to them and then, in detail, explored year to year operation of the instrument.

The first casualty in time of war, someone once said,

is truth. And so it is. We cannot resist the obvious irony that, in the name of truth and freedom, the government felt obliged to lie to the people and organize their beliefs and actions.

FOOTNOTES

¹This, after all, was the mechanism employed during the U-2 affair. There was a denial and a cover story.

²The CIA undertook a number of operations hiding their involvement behind ostensibly private foundations and other sources, some of which were shown to be wholly creations of the Agency. See Chapter 3, footnote 39.

³Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965, published originally in French in 1962), p. XIII. Conformity is, of course, the aim of all these forms, that is, conformity with the aims of the propagandist. The idea that human relations is a form of propaganda is not new with Ellul, though some reviewers believe it is. In the United States, human relations has been raised to the level of therapy. Marcuse, for example, holds that conformity is the goal of modern psychoanalysis and its weakness. See Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), pp. 217-253.

⁴Ellul, ibid., p. 61.

⁵Ibid., p. 25.

⁶Ibid., p. X.

⁷Ibid., p. 11.

⁸Ibid., p. 26.

⁹Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 29.

¹¹Greenwald, Anthony. "Effects of Prior Commitment on Behavior Change After a Persuasive Communication". Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 29 (1965), p. 600.

¹²Ellul, op. cit., p. 75.

¹³For example, such domestic programs as the interstate highway system and the government student loan program were justified by the argument that they contributed to national security. The development of the extensive network of freeways was entitled the 'Interstate and Defense

Highway Act'. The major law for federal aid to university students was entitled the 'National Defense Education Act'.

- 14 Jarvis, I., Lumsdane, A. & Gladstone A. "Effects of preparatory communication on Reactions to Subsequent News Event". Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 15, (1956), p. 514.
- 15 Ellul, op. cit., pp. 67-68 & 70.
- 16 Cartwright, Dorwin. "Some Principles of Mass Persuasion: Selected Findings of Research on the Sale of United States War Bonds". Human Relations, vol. 2, (1949), p. 257.
- 17 Ellul, op. cit., pp. 90-92, 96, 141.
- 18 Ibid., p. 209.
- 19 Almond and Verba reported that 83% of Americans felt an obligation to take part in politics and 66% believed they exerted some influence on national and local government. Almond, G. & Verba, S. The Civic Culture (Boston: Little-Brown, 1965), pp. 128 and 174.
- 20 Frenkel-Brunswik, Else. "Interaction of Psychological and Sociological Factors in Political Behavior", American Political Science Review, vol. XLVI, (1951), p. 46.
- 21 Ibid., p. 65.
- 22 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes in The American Voter, abridged ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), revealed a general lack of sophistication in the process of making voting choices. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee in Voting (Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1954), showed that beside the fact of ignorance, voters distorted information which did not fit initial positions on the issues. See also Berelson, Bernard "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol 16, (Fall, 1952), p. 323, and Lazarsfeld, et al, The Peoples Choice (New York: Duell Sloan and Pearce, 1944), p. 82. For the same conclusions with respect to foreign policy matters, see Rosenau, James. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 36; and Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Inc., 1950), pp. 53, 73-76.
- 23 Shattschneider, E.E. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Reinhart, Winston, 1960), p. 138.

²⁴Ellul, op. cit., pp. 133-135.

²⁵Almond & Verba, op. cit., p. 341.

²⁶Ibid., p. 343.

²⁷See Berelson, Voting, op. cit., pp. 303-306. The same basic conclusions are reached by R.A. Dahl in his Who Governs? (New York: Harper, 1962), and by Talcott Parsons in "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System" in Burdick E. & Broadbeck, A. (Eds) American Voting Behavior (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959). Also Truman, David, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955). There are numerous others,

²⁸Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

²⁹Almond, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

³⁰Almond & Verba, op. cit., p. 368. We would like to note, with no intentions to raise old skeletons, that the civic culture is a culture for the masses. Elite norms, their culture, is not the subject of their inquiry.

³¹Quoted in Michie, Allan. Voices Through the Iron Curtain (New York: Dodd Meade Co., 1963), pp. 14-15.

³²U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1972), pp. 79 & 81. Hereafter cited as GAO Report.

³³New York Times, November 22, 1956, p. 23. Hereafter cited as NYT.

³⁴GAO Report, p. 11.

³⁵Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, May 24, 1972, p. 149. Hereafter cited as RFE Hearing.

³⁶Price, James. Radio Free Europe: A Survey and Analysis (Library of Congress, 1972), p. 11. Hereafter cited as Library of Congress Report.

³⁷Goshko, John. "RFE Alters Sullied Image", Washington Post, November 22, 1970. Reprinted in full in RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 44.

- 38 "Letter from President Nixon to Chairman of RFE Fund, February 16, 1970", Annex IV to statement submitted by William P. Durkee, President PEC, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, May 24, 1971. The Annex is in the Committee files.
- 39 "A Voice that Pierces the Iron Curtain", Nations Business (August, 1970), p. 70.
- 40 Annex III to the Durkee statement, op. cit. "Sample Print Advertisement, Advertising Council's 1971 RFE Campaign and Sample Solicitation Letter, 1971".
- 41 Letter from William P. Durkee, President Free Europe Inc. to J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 16, 1971. Reprinted in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 30, 1971, p. 11. Hereafter cited as RFE Report.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 RFE Hearing, op. cit., p. 29.
- 44 Op. cit., p. 73.
- 45 NYT, January 27, 1955, p. 25.
- 46 NYT, January 22, 1956, p. 21.
- 47 GAO Report, op. cit., p. 103. GAO figures were supplied by the PEC.
- 48 NYT, December 21, 1950, p. 17.
- 49 Ibid., June 24, 1952, p. 17, and August 4, 1952, p. 10.
- 50 Ibid., August 4, 1952, p. 10.
- 51 Ibid., January 1, 1954, p. 31. And "Radio Free Europe". America vol. 96, (February 9, 1957), p. 515.
- 52 GAO Report, op. cit., p. 102.
- 53 Library of Congress Report, op. cit., p. 12.

- ⁵⁴RFE Report, op. cit., p. 9. See Appendix II.
- ⁵⁵Ellul, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 10.
- ⁵⁷NYT, August 28, 1950, p. 14. Also September 7, p. 35, and October 8, p. 50. See also "Peals for Peace", Newsweek, vol. 36, (October 23, 1950), p. 29.
- ⁵⁸NYT, October 25, 1950, p. 19.
- ⁵⁹NYT, April 20, 1950, p. 33. And also reprinted in Whittaker, Urban G., Propaganda and International Relations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), p. 164.
- ⁶⁰Ibid.
- ⁶¹DSB, June 12, 1950, p. 962.
- ⁶²"Added Voice", Newsweek, vol. 36, (July 17, 1950), p. 48.
- ⁶³DSB, op. cit.
- ⁶⁴NYT, July 28, 1950, p. 23.
- ⁶⁵NYT, Ibid.
- ⁶⁶NYT, August 11, 1950, p. 32.
- ⁶⁷NYT, August 15, 1950, p. 31.
- ⁶⁸NYT, August 26, 1950, p. 19.
- ⁶⁹NYT, August 31, 1950, p. 23.
- ⁷⁰Ibid.
- ⁷¹NYT, October 17, 1950, p. 38.
- ⁷²NYT, October 14, 1950, p. 12.
- ⁷³Ibid.

74 NYT, October 19, 1950, p. 17.

75 NYT, October 1, 1950, p. 80.

76 Ibid. For a more complete list of those who openly associated with the Crusade, see Varney, H.L. "Big Names in the Window: The Crusade for Freedom". American Mercury, vol. 82, (March, 1956), pp. 97-102.

77 DSB, December 18, 1950, p. 968.

78 NYT, July 28, 1950, p. 20.

79 NYT, September 4, 1950, p. 16.

80 NYT, October 24, 1950, p. 28.

81 NYT, August 19, 1950, p. 6.

82 NYT, September 2, 1950, p. 16.

83 Eisenhower, Dwight D. "The Crusade For Freedom: Truth Our most Formidable Weapon", Vital Speeches, October 1, 1950, pp. 746-747. Also reprinted in the NYT, September 5, 1950, p. 14.

84 NYT, September 7, 1950, p. 35.

85 NYT, September 8, 1950, p. 19.

86 NYT, September 9, 1950, p. 32.

87 Ibid.

88 NYT, October 7, 1950, p. 9. The "Marshal Plan of Ideas" was a phrase devised first by Senator William Benton (see above). He employed it in a resolution (S. Res. 243) urging Truman to beef up America's propaganda offensive in recognition of the true nature of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter in April, Truman delivered his speech to the Editors.

89 NYT, October 5, 1950, p. 28.

90 NYT, October 6, 1950, p. 32.

- 91 NYT, October 8, 1950, p. 54.
- 92 NYT, October 9, 1950, p. 9.
- 93 NYT, October 8, 1950, p. 50.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 NYT, October 9, 1950, p. 11.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 NYT, October 15, 1950, p. 91.
- 98 NYT, September 13, 1950, p. 21.
- 99 NYT, September 26, 1950, p. 33.
- 100 NYT, September 28, 1950, p. 39.
- 101 NYT, October 6, 1950, p. 5.
- 102 NYT, October 19, 1950, p. 17.
- 103 NYT, October 11, 1950, p. 19.
- 104 NYT, October 22, 1950, p. 23.
- 105 NYT, October 25, 1950, p. 19.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 NYT, December 21, 1950, p. 17.
- 109 NYT, May 3, 1951, p. 19.
- 110 Ibid.
- 111 NYT, July 26, 1951, p. 7.

112 NYT, September 18, 1951, p. 22.

113 Ibid.

114 NYT, October 22, 1951, p. 6.

115 NYT, September 4, 1951, p. 13.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 NYT, September 9, 1951, p. 71.

119 Ibid., p. 28

120 NYT, September 16, 1951, p. 7.

121 NYT, September 12, 1951, p. 9.

122 Ibid.

123 NYT, July 15, 1951, p. 12.

124 NYT, October 14, 1951, p. 63.

125 NYT, August 27, 1951, p. 4.

126 NYT, September 29, 1951, p. 6.

127 NYT, October 23, 1951, p. 6. (

128 NYT, October 3, 1951, p. 9.

129 NYT, August 23, 1951, p. 32.

130 NYT, September 9, 1951, III, p. 8.

131 Ibid.

132 NYT, August 4, 1952, p. 10.

133 NYT, June 24, 1952, p. 17. The fact that Aldrich was also Chairman of the American Heritage Foundation was not reported here.

134 NYT, September 4, 1952, p. 11.

135 NYT, August 8, 1952, p. 7.

136 NYT, September 9, 1952, p. 41, and November 15, 1952, p. 24.

137 NYT, September 21, 1952, p. 85.

138 Ibid.

139 "Telling Democracy's Story: Radio Free Europe", Independent Woman, vol. 31, (November 1952), p. 322.

140 NYT, March 9, 1952, p. 4.

141 NYT, November 5, 1952, p. 21.

142 NYT, November 12, 1952, p. 1. Text, p. 13.

143 Ibid., p. 13.

144 NYT, March 9, 1952, p. 30.

145 Ibid.

146 NYT, March 22, 1952, p. 14.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 "Close Up of Operation Radio Free Europe", Independent Woman, vol 31, (December, 1952), p. 451.

150 NYT, February 1, 1953, p. 92.

151 NYT, May 15, 1953, p. 21.

152 NYT, February 18, 1953, p. 32.

- 153 NYT, August 15, 1953, p. 3.
- 154 NYT, September 23, 1953, p. 34.
- 155 NYT, October 2, 1953, p. 13.
- 156 NYT, October 21, 1953, p. 19.
- 157 Ibid.
- 158 NYT, January 1, 1954, p. 31.
- 159 NYT, February 3, 1954, p. 32.
- 160 Ibid.
- 161 NYT, February 23, 1954, p. 26.
- 162 Grew, Joseph. "Maginot Line Concept of Security Pallacious". Vital Speeches, March 1, 1954, pp. 300-302. In this speech Grew incorrectly states the sponsorship by the American Heritage Foundation began in 1954. In fact, of course, it began in 1953. Also the public apparently was not told that RFE ceased operations against Albania in 1951.
- 163 NYT, January 24, 1954, p. 7.
- 164 NYT, February 20, 1954, p. 17.
- 165 NYT, March 3, 1954, p. 13.
- 166 NYT, January 24, 1954, p. 7.
- 167 NYT, March 7, 1954, p. 24.
- 168 See Chapter 4, p. 72.
- 169 NYT, January 19, 1954, p. 20.
- 170 NYT, January 26, 1954, p. 20.
- 171 NYT, January 28, 1954, p. 31.

172 DSB, April, 1956, p. 636.

173 NYT, September 26, 1955, p. 23.

174 NYT, January 24, 1955, p. 22.

175 NYT, February 9, 1955, p. 1 & 6.

176 Ibid., p. 6.

177 The speech appears in DSB, February 21, 1955, p. 295.

178 NYT, February 13, p. 3. 1955.

179 NYT, April 4, 1955, p. 38.

180 DSB, March 27, 1956, p. 636.

181 Ibid.

182 NYT, November 12, 1956, p. 31.

183 NYT, February 10, 1956, p. 5.

184 NYT, January 10, 1957, p. 12.

185 NYT, October 26, 1958, p. 129.

186 President's Report, 1958 (New York: FEC, 1959), p. 18.

187 NYT, November 30, 1959, p. 12.

CONCLUSION

The period of the Cold War is distinguished from other periods of international conflict by the magnitude and importance given to ideological conflict between the two principal contending social systems, the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the methods employed to pursue that struggle. This work has been a study of the Free Europe Committee as an instrument of American foreign policy in the Cold War. We have argued that the conflict took the form of ideological war conducted offensively through techniques of informal penetration and defensively by the use of sociological propaganda designed to block or blunt the effectiveness of foreign ideologies within the domestic system. Methods of ideological conflict were developed primarily because they avoided or reduced the probability of direct military confrontation. The factors leading to this emphasis were systematic, arising from a division of the international system into a bi-polar configuration, and the technological changes brought about in military weaponry, specifically the advent of nuclear devices. Military conflict between the antagonists was rendered unacceptable because of the high risk of mutual destruction. We hold that the FEC represents an archetypal form of an offensive and defensive weapon in ideological conflict. An examination of its organization and operations provides an insight into the dynamics of the Cold War, and a perspective from which one can grasp generally the

the limits and possibilities of conflict in a period where
* traditional means were no longer readily usable.

Through Radio Free Europe, the United States waged informal attack directly against the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Through the Crusade for Freedom it simultaneously protected its own internal processes from similar outside influence and disruption. The FEC had the genius of simplicity because it permitted the U.S. to act both offensively and defensively through a single integrated unit whose operations were mutually reinforcing. The CFF was a domestic propaganda instrument which mobilized the population in support and defense of the American way of life. RFE was an international instrument of propaganda but presented domestically as the operational expression of American principles on the offensive.

The precipitating cause of the Cold War was the permanent occupation and political subjugation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. Between 1945 and 1950 the attitude of the U.S. changed dramatically from elation over the defeat of fascism and its attendant horrors to open hostility toward the Soviet Union. Communism and its chief proponent were perceived as negating the principles upon which America justified its participation in the war and defined as the fruits of victory. Very quickly the Soviet Union came to be considered a vital threat to American security and indeed to Western Civilization generally.

The roots of the conflict lie immediately in the politics

of the wartime Allied alliance. They centered around divergent interpretations of vague statements regarding the disposition of the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly on compromises regarding Poland.

The Soviet Union expressed its interest in Eastern Europe early. They made clear their desire to exercise a major influence in the area in order to obtain, once and for all, a secure Western frontier bounded by friendly nations. They were less than precise, however, on what their specific plans for the area were. During the war, the question of spheres of influence was subordinated by the Americans to other priorities, chiefly defeating Germany, securing Soviet assistance in the Asian theater, postwar cooperation in securing future peace and the needs of domestic politics.

Roosevelt, who was not overly concerned about Eastern Europe, apart from Poland and Czechoslovakia, succeeded in reaching a series of vague principled compromises regarding the area. His strategy (more like a hope) was to avoid antagonizing the Russians without simply giving in, binding them in the process to the universal ideals and institutions to which the Americans subscribed, and finally using these and world opinion to tame the Russian's fears and demands. Though one may wish to charge Roosevelt for adhering to too many convenient assumptions regarding the Soviets, it is nevertheless the case that his choices were few. As the Soviets came to control the area by virtue of occupation, the reality of the Communist influence had either to be accepted

or forcibly removed.

What for Roosevelt were statements of universal aspirations, the ideal to strive for, became for Truman and later administrations, hard promises. Truman was called upon to deliver the goods at a time when the wartime ally had become a powerful, entrenched adversary. The attempt by the U.S. to enforce its interpretation of wartime compromises, couched in principle, partially explains why disagreements with the Soviets over Eastern Europe came to be viewed as a universal conflict between "free" and "slave" civilizations.

During the course of the Cold War the U.S. would seem to have had three basic options in the face of what was taken as Soviet intransigence and expansionism. First America could attempt to directly unseat the Russians militarily. Any such attempt at forcible eviction, however, would have precipitated a general war. This option quickly came to hold the risk of mutual destruction where the costs of victory would not be significantly different from the costs of defeat. Indeed the only interest mutually shared by the super powers was a desire to avoid direct military contact. The second option would have been to acknowledge the status quo and proceed as though Russian presence in Eastern Europe was a natural outcome of the war and Russia's long fears, but represented no particular threat to the U.S. To proceed thus however, would have been interpreted domestically as an abandonment not only of the peoples of Eastern Europe to Communist tyranny, but also of the universal principles which

were the foundation of the American war effort. These principles were presented to the American public as the reward for the sacrifice. Truman, like Roosevelt, could not lightly disregard, either, those volatile groups of Americans whose cultural and ancestral ties were to Eastern Europe. These people and the large number of American Catholics were important parts in the Democratic coalition. The third alternative, the one adopted, was to keep the issue open. The U.S. refused to accept the presence of Communism in East Europe as permanent and sought to carry on the conflict primarily on the ideological level.

The ensuing period of intense hostility was thus perceived and prosecuted as a conflict between the ideologies of fundamentally different civilizations, one 'free' and founded on liberal democratic values, and one 'slave' based upon total state control and regimentation. Whole series of programs followed in which each side drew the lines between them, organized their allies and set about demonstrating the vitality, strength and worth of their respective systems. At stake was the loyalty of the world's peoples through whose future actions one of the differing world views would come to dominate, i.e. act as the general framework for world political development. The essential realities of the Cold War thus were symbolic. Victory was not seen to lie in physical possessions, like territory, but in the winning of the minds of men. The conflict thus became as universal as the principles expressed in it and meant, ultimately, the

destruction of one of the contending civilizations.

The conduct of the Cold War on the ideological plane represented a frank realization of where the relatively safe possibilities for conflict lay. Technology eliminated the traditional forms of warfare from the realm of possibility, except in extreme circumstances, but it provided opportunities for pursuing it by alternative means. It rendered all nations permeable. National populations were vulnerable to outside influence without the necessity of physical penetration. One way was the exposure of peoples to alternate information and political values from those promoted by the host government; to gain access to a nation's internal processes through its population. Various programs were developed by the U.S. to do precisely that. The method studied here was international broadcasting and the use of printed material to gain control over foreign populations. This was the fundamental form of the Cold War as it was pursued by the U.S. in Eastern Europe.

The existence of the FEC indicates that, contrary to various critics of American foreign policy, the rhetoric of liberation, the general moralism with which the U.S. addressed itself to the problem of Eastern Europe was a well planned, vigorous policy designed to subvert Communist political control in Eastern Europe. It also mobilized the American public to support the policies toward Eastern Europe, specifically, and the world wide leadership role America must assume.

In response to the challenge posed by Communism, the U.S. premised its official propaganda effort on general principles

which were a part of its political tradition. The U.S. justified international broadcasting on the assumption that there existed a universal right by all peoples to free, truthful information. America's purpose in entering the field would be to promote and extend information about what America stood for and what it was trying to achieve internationally. If the principle of freedom of information was established and the truth be known about America, then rational men would readily eschew the lies of Communist propaganda whose purpose was to destroy the good image of the U.S. In this way mutual understanding between peoples would lessen international tensions, promote understanding and harmony, thus preserving America from isolation and promote the acceptance, even adoption, of its values by others. These concepts, freedom of information, the power of truth and the preservation of the American way of life, were the general principles officially underpinning the U.S. international broadcasting effort.

The United States, in fact, developed a dual international broadcasting system. One operation, the USIA, was officially acknowledged as the voice of the American government. It was world wide in scope and existed for the purpose of disseminating officially endorsed views of the U.S. and government policies abroad. It was essentially passive. There was no attempt to interfere in other nations' internal affairs. The other operation, the RFE division of the FEC, was covert, operating behind the front of

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a citizen-based, non-profit corporation. RFE was a highly aggressive anti-Communist propaganda instrument aimed exclusively at Eastern Europe. It attempted to disrupt the domestic politics of the East European states by promoting and directing internal opposition leading eventually to the demise of the Soviet controlled Communist governments. It employed specialized broadcasts to each country, aired by exiles, oriented to the events within the targets. RFE operated as a free press and radio in exile preparing for the day when the "captive people" would be liberated. Thematically it concentrated on the overall superiority of the West and its dedication to the liberation of the people from Communism. Moreover, it emphasized that the people themselves, when properly informed and guided, could bring about their own liberation. In this last effort, RFE attempted to act as the organized center for internal opposition. RFE was the sole instrument by which the U.S. attempted to dislodge the Soviets from Eastern Europe. Because it was directed specifically at Eastern Europe, created in response to Soviet hegemony in the area, RFE constitutes one of Washington's major post-war foreign policy initiatives comparable in its significance to such measures as the Marshal Plan and NATO as a recognition of the threat Communism posed and the need for measures to block its expansion. RFE constituted the offensive capability of the FEC.

The Crusade for Freedom was a domestic propaganda instrument operated exclusively within the borders of the U.S.

to act on the American public. The CFP functioned to mobilize the public through appeals to values deeply rooted in the American political culture. The appeals were designed to orient support for general principles into public backing for pre-determined foreign policies. Five themes were isolated in this work which constituted the Crusade's propaganda appeal throughout the period. These were: 1) anti-Communism; 2) Communism's challenge to the way of life America represented; 3) the duty of loyal citizens to take action opposing the threat; 4) the efficacy of private initiative which the CFP and the operations of RFE came to represent and 5) the power of truth.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union were presented as the principal antagonists in a global clash between irreconcilable civilizations. This conflict was explicitly presented by the CFP as ideological, expressed as the battle for men's minds, or more colloquially, as the big lie against the big truth. The Communists had launched an ideological attack on the "American way of life". They were pictured as attempting to discredit the liberal democratic values upon which the worth of the American and Western systems were based. They were attempting to isolate America and the West from the rest of the world and convince people and Americans themselves that Western methods and values represented the "old" world view of quickly passing relevance.

This challenge, according to the CFP, placed every American on the front line of the struggle. It required

that Americans personally rededicate themselves to America and reaffirm the country's moral and spiritual strength. It amounted to a domestic moral re-armament. The CFF was an avenue through which such a revitalization could be expressed by concrete action, by donating money to RFE and signing oaths one was affirming a personal commitment to democracy, truth, freedom, etc. The CFF included rallies, sign-ins and other opportunities for a mass participation in the struggle against the enemy. These rallies were, of course, well managed and of themselves represented no actual public input to the policy. They did, however, serve to draw upon and translate basic beliefs into active support for the government's specific programs. Thus to support the FEC, liberation in Eastern Europe and the world battle against Communism was to support America and to participate personally in great affairs. In this effort, the CFF enjoyed wide bi-partisan support from both Democrats and Republicans, Presidents, defeated Presidential candidates, business, labor and the major religious faiths. Criticism of what in actuality was a Republican foreign policy was quite difficult as it would raise the question of one's loyalty.

Thus the CFF propaganda reduced the complex nature of the differences between the U.S. and Russia to a simplified scenario of universal conflict between friend and enemy. Support for U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe was the immediate objective. But the conflict in that area was presented as an example of the more general threat posed by the Soviet's

lust for power, contempt for human values, and monolithic drive for world domination. The public acceptance generated by the CFP went beyond the single issue of Eastern Europe. It included the whole range of demands both domestic and foreign which would be required of the leader of the free world engaged in a world wide struggle.

The Free Europe Committee's role in the Cold War could not have been assessed without a conceptual framework in which its operation could be analyzed systematically against the characteristics of the period. Scott's concept of informal penetration and Ellul's concept of sociological propaganda provide complementary explanations of one structure, the FEC and its relevance to the Cold War conflict. Both works recognize the importance of technology and its impact on political behavior.

Professor Scott focuses on the growth and development of the techniques of informal penetration, in this case informal attack, in international relations. As nations became more vulnerable to outside influences on their internal processes, methods were developed to exploit the opening. In many cases the process was voluntary, for example, by countries in need of foreign aid. In other cases it was not. Eastern European countries were undergoing rapid, enforced, structural changes which led to widespread popular unrest. It was the popular disaffection with Communist policies which the U.S. attempted to exploit with RFE to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe was substantively

accessible to the degree its populations would respond favorably to outside persuasion. RFE represented the technical capability for getting the message across. Scott's concentration is primarily on the international system. He does not explore the possible responses a nation may take when threatened by outside attempts to subvert the loyalty and civic virtues of its citizens, in short, a loss of control over its internal affairs.

To understand CFP propaganda as constituting America's defensive capability during this period we have turned to Professor Ellul's framework. He considers the force of technological change on the society, specifically on problems of internal control. Briefly put, in a period of technological change, especially when there is an external threat perceived, all societies are required to make propaganda in an attempt to hold the system together. The state must assume the responsibility, or burden, of preserving the essential norms which characterize the nation and ensure that these norms elicit supportive behavior for national goals. Such propaganda, which Ellul calls propaganda of integration, is technologically sophisticated and on-going. It bases its appeals in terms of existing attitudes, to organize them and give them meaning through supportive behavior for the state's policies. The CFP did not attempt to induce the American people to abandon or change their basic beliefs about America, but to actively support a foreign policy on the basis of them. The CFP gave the American government the

capability to achieve the kind of social control necessary for mounting Cold War programs to counter the threat of Communism without the necessity of altering the basic democratic structure of the society.

Informal penetration and sociological propaganda thus discretely analyze two sides of the same coin when brought together in a study of the FEC as an instrument in the Cold War struggle, developed by the U.S. to simultaneously subvert the enemy's way of life while strengthening and protecting its own. Clearly this brings the FEC out of the doldrums of political inquiry into central significance in any attempts to comprehend the limits and opportunities for conflict during the period known as the Cold War.

APPENDIX I

The following is a list of members of the Free Europe Committee from 1949 to 1959. Background data were obtained from Who's Who in America, Who Was Who in America, Who's Who in the East, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, Current Biography, Who's Who in American Politics and Biography Index. Additional information was obtained by cross referencing the names in various publications concerned with the period of this study. Those used were, Roosevelt and Hopkins (Sherwood), Churchill's Memoirs, The Forrestal Diaries (Kilgus), Truman's Memoirs, The Politics of War (Kolko), The Making of United States Foreign Policy (Sapin), The Higher Circles and Who Rules America (Domhoff), Eisenhower's Memoirs, Towards a New Past ... (Berstein, editor) and Corporations and the Cold War (Morowitz, editor). The membership of the FEC was listed on the inside cover of each issue of News From Behind the Iron Curtain. To control for changes in membership these lists were compared at six month intervals up to 1959. Members who joined in the later period (1956-59) were difficult to trace. Frequently they appeared in none of the major reference works, or the memoirs. The only plausible explanation is that after 1956 less prominent men were recruited. It may be that after the Hungarian affair it was difficult to recruit the "blue bloods" who had earlier lent their expertise and stature to the Committee.

Clarence P. Adcock: U.S. Military Academy; World War II Major General (North Africa); Deputy to General Clay in Berlin, 1946; Chairman of Bipartite Control Commission on Economic Operations for British and American occupation zones; Assistant to the President (Clay) Continental Can Co. while on the FEC.

Archibald S. Alexander: joined the FEC in 1958. No data available.

Raymond P. Alexander: University of Pennsylvania and Harvard; Philadelphia lawyer and judge; National Chairman of the March of Dimes while on the FEC.

Frank Altschul: Yale; Chairman of American Investors Corp.; Vice President, Secretary and President of Council on Foreign Relations; Vice Chairman of National Planning Association while on the FEC.

Hamilton Fish Armstrong: Princeton; Special Correspondent for New York Evening Post in Eastern Europe from 1919-1921; decorated, Order St. Riva, 1918, Order of White Eagle, 1919 (Serbia), Order of the Crown, 1924 (Romania), Order of the White Lion, 1937 (Czechoslovakia); Member of Advisory Board on Post War Foreign Problems, 1942-44 (Dept. of State); Special Assistant to Ambassador to Britain, 1944; Special Advisor to Secretary of State, 1945; member Presidential Advisory Commission on Political Refugees, 1945; Author of The New Balkans (1926), Where East Begins (1929), Can We be Neutral? with Allen Dulles (1936), The Calculated Risk (1947).

Tito and Goliath (1951); Member of School of Slavonic Studies (London); Editor of Foreign Affairs, while on the FEC.

Theodore C. Augustine: No data available.

Laird Bell: Harvard; Member of Military Government in Germany, 1945; Member U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, 1946; Chairman of Timber Co.; Member of the Boards of Carleton College, University of Chicago and Harvard; President of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations while on the FEC. He left the Committee in 1957.

A.A. Berle: Harvard; Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-44; Ambassador to Brazil, 1945-46; Author of Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (1954), Tides of Crises (1959); Power without Property (1959); Trustee Twentieth Century Fund while on the FEC.

Francis Biddle: Harvard; Attorney General of the U.S., 1941-45; Member of Military Tribunal in Germany, 1945-46; Trustee Twentieth Century Fund; National Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action while on the FEC.

Robert Woods Bliss: Harvard; Diplomatic Career (Ambassador to Argentina) 1903-33; Consultant to Department of State, 1942; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1944-45; President of American Foreign Service Association, 1946-47; Member of the Board Free Europe University in Exile, and Harvard; Member of Council on Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy

Association while on the FEC.

Robert F. Bradford: Harvard; Governor of Massachusetts, 1947-49; Director of Underwood Corp., Prudential Fund of Boston, Boston 5th Savings Bank, Cambridge Trust Co., W.F. Monroe Co., C.H. Sprague Co.; Chairman, Board of Overseers Harvard while on the FEC.

David K.E. Bruce: 1941-45 with Office of Strategic Services; Chief of ECA Mission to France, 1948-49; U.S. Ambassador to France, 1949-52; Under Secretary of State, 1952-53; Special U.S. observer on Interim Committee of European Defense Community, 1953; Special American Representative to European High Authority for Coal and Steel, 1953-54; Ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany, 1957-59; Member of FEC 1955-57.

Harry A. Bullis: University of Wisconsin; Chairman Mutual Security Valuation Team to Formosa, 1953; Chairman General Mills Corp.; Director Northwest Bancorporation; Vice Chairman Committee for National Trade Policy; Director Foreign Policy Association in Minneapolis while on FEC.

James B. Carey: University of Pennsylvania; Member Planning Board in Office Production Management; member Harriman Committee on Foreign Aid, 1947 (The Harriman Committee was composed largely of members of the Committee for Economic Development. It drafted the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 - The Marshall Plan.); President of Radio Machine Workers of America; Vice

President AF of L-CIO; member Labor Advisory Committee for Foreign Operations (Dept. of Labor); member Americans for Democratic Action while on the FEC.

H.W. Chase: Dartmouth; President University of Illinois, 1930-33; Chancellor of New York University, 1933-51. He left the Committee in 1955.

Lucius D. Clay: U.S. Military Academy; Commander of U.S. military forces and Military Government in Germany, 1947-49; Chairman Continental Can Co; Director Finance Policy Commission of General Motors Corp.; Director Marine Midland Trust Co., Lehman Corp., Newmont Mining Corp., while Chairman of Crusade for Freedom, and member of the FEC.

William L. Clayton: no school listed; Assistant Secretary of Commerce, 1943-44; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1944-46; Special Advisor to Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1947; Trustee Committee for Economic Development while on the FEC.

Clark Clifford: University of St. Louis; Naval Aid to President Truman; Special Counsel to Truman, 1946-50.

Winthrop M. Crane III: Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State, 1940-42; Member of the Board of Directors Crane Co., Eyron Weston Co., Otis Elevator Co., New York City Excelsior Printing Co.; Member Council on Foreign Relations; joined FEC in 1958.

Willis D. Crittenberger: No data available; joined the FEC in 1957.

Cecil B. DeMille: no school listed; President American Academy of Dramatic Art; Director Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors of America Inc. while on the FEC. He left the Committee in January, 1957 and resumed his membership in December.

Eli Whitney Debevoise: Yale; Partner in Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates, 1931- ; Chairman Alien Enemy Board NYC, 1942-45; member, National Appeal Board (Alien Enemy), 1943-45; General Counsel to U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, 1951-53; Acting Deputy High Commissioner 1952-53; Chairman Committee on Integrity and Ethical Standards in Government (NY State), 1954; Delegate Conference on Germany and Western Europe, 1955; member International Commission of Jurists, 1955; Director, Bank of New York, St. Joseph Lead Co., Westvaco Corp; Lecturer, Yale, on German Post War Development, 1953-; joined FEC in 1958.

Hugh Drum: U.S. Army General; Head, Eastern Defense Command World War II; Retired 1943 as Lieutenant General; President Empire State Building Corp., (Headquarters of FEC), 1944. Member of FEC until his death, October 3, 1951.

Frank R. Denton: University of Kansas; Brigadier General in World War II (on Staff of General Clay before Clay's transfer to Europe); Chairman Mellon National Bank; Director of Kellogg Co., Pullman Car Co., Western Alleghany Railroad Co., Shamrock Oil and Gas Co., Jones

and Laughlin Steel Co., Swindel Dressler Corp., Westinghouse Corp., National Union Fire Insurance Co., Diamond Alkali Co., Scaif Co., Trustee Pennsylvania State University; Advisor to Dept. of Commerce while on the FEC.

Frederick R. Dolbaer: no data available.

William J. Donovan: Columbia University; Major General World War II as Commander of the Office of Strategic Services; Left the FEC in 1953 to become Ambassador to Thailand. He left the Committee in 1958.

Allen Dulles: Princeton; member of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II as Director of Operations in Switzerland until 1945; Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency, 1951-53; Director of the CIA 1953-61; Member Council on Foreign Relations. He left the committee upon entering the CIA.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: U.S. Military Academy; Supreme Allied Commander World War II; President Columbia University (while on the FEC); President of the United States.

Mark F. Ethridge: University of Mississippi; Chairman U.S. Investigatory Commission to Eastern Europe, 1945; Delegate San Francisco Conference, 1947; Chairman U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, 1949; Editor Denver Post while on the FEC.

James A. Farley: Duquense; Democratic Party National Chairman, 1932-40; Postmaster General of U.S., 1933-40;

Member Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, 1953; Trustee Committee on Economic Development; Chairman Coca-Cola Export Corp. and Coca-Cola Canada Ltd., while on the FEC.

Julius Fleischmann: no data available.

Henry Ford II: Yale; Advisor to Dept. of Commerce-National Industrial Conference Board; President Ford Motor Co., 1945-60; Alternate U.S. Delegate U.N. General Assembly 1953; National Chairman Community Chests of America, 1948-49; Chairman American Heritage Foundation; Trustee Committee on Economic Development while on the FEC. He left the Committee in 1957.

Virginia C. Gildersleve: Columbia; member American Education Mission to Japan, 1946; Delegate to San Francisco Conference, 1945; Dean Barnard College while on the FEC. She left the Committee in 1957.

William Green: President of the AF of L-CIO; member National Labor Board while on the FEC.

Joseph Grew: Harvard; Ambassador to Argentina and Japan; Under Secretary of State 1944-45; Acting Secretary of State 1945 (between Stettinius and Fyrnes); Vice Chairman National Security Committee; Member Board of Review-Atomic Energy Commission; member Council on Foreign Relations.

Charles A. Hook: Ohio University; member National Industrial Conference Board, and Chairman Labor Policy Commission, 1949; member Dept. of State Economic

Mission for Industrial Problems in Europe, 1949;

Chairman Armco Steel Corp.; Director, Cleveland,

Cincinnati and Chicago Railroad Co., Equitable Life

Insurance Co., U.S. Louisville and Jefferson Bridge

Railroad Co., Westinghouse Corp., while on the FEC.

John C. Hughes: No data available; joined FEC in 1957.

Palmer Hoyt: University of Oregon; Domestic Director

Office of War Information, World War II; Publisher

Denver Post; Director Associated Press while on the

FEC.

Charles D. Jackson: Princeton; Deputy Civilian Chief of

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF in World War II;

Vice President of Time Inc.; Publisher Fortune

Magazine; Director Radio Free Europe Division of the

FEC before joining the Republican Administration. He

rejoined the Committee in 1957.

Paul Keston: University of Wisconsin; Director War Adjust-

ment Council, 1941-46; Vice Chairman Columbia Broad-

casting System, 1943-46; Chairman Science Association

Inc. He left the Committee in 1957.

Arthur Bliss Lane: American Ambassador to Polish-Government-

in-Exile, World War II; Ambassador to Poland after the

War.

Robert Lang: OSS in World War II; no further data available.

Henry R. Luce: Yale; Chairman of Time Inc. while on the

FEC.

Joseph V. McKee: Fordham; Lawyer and acting Mayor of New York

City - no other data available. He left the Committee in 1957.

Web Maddox: Harvard (Ph.D.); Chief Division of Technical Services of Dept. of State (the Technical Services Division conducted International Broadcasting and was later amalgamated into the USIA), 1946-47; Director Foreign Service Institute, 1947-49; Counsellor to Embassy of Portugal, 1949-52; Counsel General to Thailand, 1952-55, while on the FEC. He joined the Committee in 1957.

W.B. Miller: U.S. Naval Academy; Rear Admiral World War II; Director Public Relations, Dept. of the Navy, 1945-46; Vice President Trans World Airlines, 1946-47; Director of Public Relations Pan American Airways while on the FEC. He joined the Committee in 1957.

J. Clayton Miller: no data available.

Samuel E. Morison: Harvard; Historian in American and Naval History; best known for his history of naval warfare in World War II; joined FEC in 1955.

Earl Newsom: Oberlin; Senior Partner Earl Newsom Co. Inc., (Public Relations firm); Public Relations Counsel NYC 1935-66; member Executive Committee of the Academy of Political Science, and National Institute for Social Science; Author, Public Relations: a Look at the Record (1947) and Considerations in Dealing with Public Opinion (1950); joined FEC in 1958. 8

Irving S. Olds: Yale; member National Industrial Conference

Board Dept. of Commerce, 1943- ; Chairman U.S. Steel Corp., 1940-52 (while on FEC); Trustee American Heritage Foundation; member President's Committee to Finance Foreign Aid, 1953; member Council on Foreign Relations, while on the FEC.

Frederick Osborn: Princeton; member President's Advisory Committee on the Selective Service, 1940-41; Major General in World War II (in charge of Morale Branch of U.S. Army and Director Information and Educations Division), 1941-45; Deputy U.S. Representative U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1950 (while on the FEC); Director Carnegie Corp.

Arthur W. Page: Harvard; Director AT&T., Chase National Bank, Continental Can Co., Westinghouse Corp., Kennecott Copper Co., Prudential Insurance Corp., while on the FEC.

Spencer Phoenix: Harvard; Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1922-28; Staff member U.S. Military Government in Germany, 1947-48; member American Advisory Commission to Greece, 1949. He left the Committee in 1957.

Whitney Shepardson: Colgate; Special Assistant to U.S. Ambassador to Britain 1942, in Washington, 1943-46; Trustee Council on Foreign Relations, while on the FEC.

George N. Shuster: Editor of the Commonweal, 1925-29; member General Advisory Commission, Division of Cultural Relations, Department of State, 1944-45; member Alien Enemy Board #2 (NY), 1942-45; Chairman of Historical

Commission to Germany, Department of Defense, 1945;
 Advisor to American Delegation to London conference on
 International Education, 1945; delegate UNESCO Con-
 ference, Paris, 1946-1958; U.S. Representative on
 Executive Board of UNESCO 1958-64; member of University
 of Chicago Committee on Freedom of the Press, 1944-47;
 Chairman Institute for International Education, 1942-51;
 President of Pestalozzi Foundation, 1955; Director,
 Fund for the Republic and Carnegie Endowment for
 International peace, 1954-64; Author Religion Behind
the Iron Curtain (1954).

John A. Silby: University of Georgia; Chairman Trust Co.
 of Georgia; Director Coca-Cola Export Corp., Equitable
 Life Insurance Co., Continental Can Co., Creomulsion
 Co., Georgia Power Co., Nashville Chattanooga and St.
 Louis Railroad, while on the FEC.

Spyros Skouras: no school; President Twentieth Century Fox
 Corp. while on the FEC.

Charles M. Spoford: Yale; Brigadier General in World War II;
 U.S. Deputy Representative North Atlantic Council, 1950;
 Chairman North Atlantic Council of Deputies and
 European Coordinating Committee, 1950-52; Director
 Guaranty Trust Co., Mutual Life Insurance Co.; member
 of Council on Foreign Relations, while on the FEC. He
 left the Committee in 1958.

Theodore C. Streibert: Harvard; Chairman of Mutual Broad-
 casting Service Inc., 1944-51; member of the business

staff of Nelson and Lawrence Rockefeller, 1957-60;
 Director United States Information Agency, 1953-56;
 joined FEC in 1953.

Charles F. Taft: Yale; Director Wartime Economic Affairs, 1944; Director Transport and Communications policies, Dept. of State, 1945; member Committee for Economic Development; Trustee Twentieth Century Fund; General Counsel Committee for a National Trade Policy while on the FEC.

H. Gregory Thomas: no data available.

John C. Trenbagen: no data available, joined FEC in 1955.

Levering Tyson: Columbia; Director National Advisory Council on Radio in Education, 1929; Director of Study, Radio Broadcasting in Education (for Carnegie Corp.), 1930-32; member Wartime Commission of U.S. Office of Education, 1941-45; President Muhlenberg College, 1937-51; Executive Secretary Free Europe University in Exile, 1951-52; and President, 1952-53; Chancellor University of Strausborg, 1952-56.

Samuel S. Walker: no data available.

Dewitt Wallace: University of California; Editor in Chief and President of Readers Digest Inc.

W.W. Waymack: Drake University; Special Advisor to Dept. of State, 1942; Director Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1941-59; Trustee Twentieth Century Fund; member American Council for NATO, 1954; member National Committee on Overseas Information Service, 1955- , while

serving on FEC.

Abbot Washburn: Harvard; Manager Department of Public Services, General Mills Corp., 1932-52; Executive Vice Chairman Crusade for Freedom, 1950-52; See text for career after 1952.

Walter Wheeler, Jr.: Harvard; Deputy Director Contract Distribution Division, Office of Production Management, 1941; Division Chief, 1942; North East O.P.M. Regional Director, 1942-44; Chairman Pitney-Bowers Corp., Director Manhattan Refrigerator Co., Stanford Trust Co., General Time Corp., Union Terminal Cold Storage Co.; Director Committee for a National Trade Policy, National Industrial Conference Board; member Committee for Economic Development, while on the FEC.

Charles E. Wilson: Columbia; Chairman General Electric Inc.; Director of Defense Mobilization and Deputy Director War Production Board World War II; Secretary of Defense in Republican Administration.

Mrs. Quincy Wright: Wife of Quincy Wright, U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, 1949-50.

Bernard Yarrow: no data available.

Darryl F. Zanuck: Private Tutor; Vice President Twentieth Century Fox Corp. while on the FEC.

APPENDIX II

The following information is from the Report of the General Accounting Office on U.S. funds provided to the Free Europe Committee.

The FEC was financed out of CIA budgets to the amount of 306 million dollars in its twenty year history. Approximately 83% of those funds went for the operation of Radio Free Europe.¹ The RFE share cited in Chapter III was roughly equal to that provided to the Voice of America's world wide operations.² This means that RFE, relative to its specialized audience and organization, was a very costly operation indicating a real commitment by the U.S. government. RFE was also self-contained, operating its own intelligence division, monitors, news agency, library and staff facilities.

Differences in yearly amounts budgeted to RFE should not be taken as indicating changes in government interest in its operations.

For example, the slight decline in total funds between 1952 and 1957 (Table 2) corresponds to the massive and expensive balloon barrages which were not reported as RFE expenditures. Moreover, about 75% of RFE funds were spent

¹GAO Report, pp. 7, 14 & 19.

²RFE Funding, p. 56.

in Europe in foreign currencies. Thus the fluctuation in exchange rates would affect the size of the budget. It is a considerable factor, amounting to 13% less the value of U.S. funds in 1972.³

TABLE 1

The following schedule itemizes the operating expenses of Free Europe for fiscal year 1971.

Free Europe, Inc., Schedule of
Operating Expenses for Fiscal Year 1971

<u>Item of expenses</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent of total operating expenses</u>
Compensation and related employee benefits	\$15,601,777.50	69.8
Employee termination expenses	207,025.35	0.9
Program free-lance fees	492,639.12	2.2
Exile support	537,998.37	2.4
Outside professional services	416,227.52	1.9
Power purchased	568,125.39	2.5
Repairs and maintenance	447,293.97	2.0
Rent and utilities	338,802.00	1.5
Transmission lines	247,930.33	1.1
Office supplies	275,702.99	1.2
Licenses	115,350.00	.5
News service and information	174,926.62	.8
Travel	161,129.69	.7
Special projects	63,281.01	.3
Conferences	38,801.38	.2
Foreign currency conversion costs	1,295,952.35	5.8
Other expenses	772,977.05	3.5
 Total operating expenses of continuing divisions	 21,756,050.54	 97.3
Expenses of publications and special projects division -- discontinued in January 1971	610,825.87	2.7
 Total operating expenses	 \$22,366,876.41	 100.0

TABLE 2

Free Europe, Incorporated
Income and Expenses
From Inception Through June 30, 1971.

(millions of dollars)

Total Income

Total Expenses

Government

RFE

Private

Other

Source: U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1972), p. 103.

TABLE 3

Schedule of U.S. Government Contributions
to
Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc.
From April 1, 1951, to June 30, 1968

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Contribution</u>
1951-52	\$ 2,343,534
1953	793,528
1954-55	1,747,500
1956	1,070,167
1957	1,000,000
1958	1,000,000
1959	925,000
1960	900,000
1961	851,200
1962	890,600
1963	913,800
1964	928,920
1965	827,600
1966	812,000
1967	870,000
1968	600,882
	<u>\$16,474,731</u>

Note: Government contributions were obtained from records made available by Free Europe, Inc.

APPENDIX III

The following charts illustrate RFE programming.

- Tables 1 and 2 give general percentage breakdowns of types of programs. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide actual examples of program blocks and titles.

5

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TABLE 1Composition of RFE's Weekly Broadcasts

<u>Program</u>	<u>Percent</u>
News	16.1
Political significance ...	34.7
Music	21.6
Culture	18.8
Religion	2.2
Miscellaneous	<u>6.6</u>
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Source: Price, James Radio Free Europe - A Survey and Analysis (Washington: Library of Congress, 1972), p. 88.

TABLE 2

Chart of RFE Programming by Subject CategoryCzechoslovak*

Music	16.3%
Political	38.1%
Cultural	20.4%
News	17.1%
Religion	2.3%
Misc.	5.8%

Hungarian

Music	22.9%
Political	25.0%
Cultural	21.2%
News	16.0%
Religion	2.8%
Misc.	12.1%

Bulgarian

Music	20.1%
Political	45.3%
Cultural	11.4%
News	19.4%
Religion	0.9%
Misc.	2.9%

Polish

Music	24.0%
Political	33.3%
Cultural	20.2%
News	14.6%
Religion	2.4%
Misc.	5.5%

Rumanian

Music	25.3%
Political	40.2%
Cultural	14.3%
News	15.1%
Religion	1.8%
Misc.	3.3%

RFE

Music	21.6%
Political	34.7%
Cultural	18.8%
News	16.1%
Religion	2.2%
Misc.	6.6%

*Based on Total Programming: i.e., Original and Repeat.

Source: Price, James. Radio Free Europe - A Survey and Analysis (Washington: Library of Congress, 1972).

TABLE 3

Specialized Political Commentaries, Voice of Free Czechoslovakia

<u>Program</u>	<u>Minutes per Week</u>		
	<u>Munich</u>	<u>New York</u>	<u>Total</u>
Calling the Communist Party			
Current Events ...	30		30
Kaleidoscope of Paradoxes ...	10		10
History of Communism ...		10	10
Letter to a Friend ...		10	10
Farmers' Programs			
Behind the Iron Curtain	10		10
Agriculture in the West ...	10	10	20
Having a Look at Our Villages	10		10
Talk by Farmer Konopa ...	10		10
Sunday Forum ...	15		15
Farmer Klas Speaks ...	10		10
Labor Programs			
Workers in Opposition ...	10		10
Discussion after Work ...	15		15
Commentary by Kelansky ...	10		10
Commentary by Baraba ...	10		10
Labor Forum ...	15		15
Trade Union News ...	10	10	20
Women's Programs			
Commentary by Chaloupeck ...	15		15
Talk with Parents ...	7.5	7.5	15
Literary Review ...	7.5	7.5	15
Horacka and Novacka ...	15		15
News of Women's Life ...	7.5	7.5	15
Women and Politics ...	7.5	7.5	15
Youth Programs			
Do You Speak English? ...	20		20
Youth Group I ...	30		30
Youth Group II ...	30		30
Youth Group III ...	30		30
Youth Program ...	15		15
Student Program ...	15	15	30
Miscellaneous			
To the Army ...	15	10	25
Europe without the Iron Curtain	30		30
New World in the Making ...	15		15
Programs of economic commentary	30		30
Programs for civil servants	6.5	3.5	10

Source: Holt, Robert. Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 81. The original source was the "Program Schedule in effect from June, 1955-June, 1956. The Czechoslovak desk broadcasts many more political commentaries than the other desks."

TABLE 4General Political Commentaries, Voice of Free Czechoslovakia

<u>Munich Programs</u>	<u>Minutes per week</u>
Best Article	60
Iron Curtain News	15
Local Commentary	70
Messages	90
Night Commentary	40
Other Side of the Coin	90
Round-table Discussion	10
Spotlight	35
Voice of the Opposition	30
Total	440

<u>New York Programs</u>	<u>Minutes per week</u>
From Official Soviet Sources	15
How It Really Happened	15
Inside U.S.A.	15
International Commentary	70
Medical Messages	15
New York Correspondent	60
Carpatho Ruthenian Report	5
Night Commentary	10
Our First Republic	15
Peroutka Talk	15
Round-table Discussion	10
Who Is Who?	15
Total	260

Source: Holt, Robert. Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 82. Original source, Program Schedule in effect from June, 1955, to June, 1956.

TABLE 5

Program Block - Voice of Free Poland.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Description</u>
1700	News	
1710	Unscheduled block	Literary comment- current themes
1750	Melody Time	Popular Music
1800	News	
1810	Travelling Reporter	Sports and human interest stories
1820	10 min. music	Pop and Classical
1830	Art and Literature	cultural topic - by Polish intellectuals in exile
1900	News	
1910	Calling the Communist Party	News of Communist policies and actions
1920	American Hit Parade	U.S. rock music
1935	The Western Way	Sketches of a democratic society at work
1945	Everybody's Hobby	hobbies and pastimes of Western youth
2000	News	
2010	Facts and Views	Commentary on current developments inside Poland
2040	Melody Time	repeat
2100	News	
2110	Panorama	Topical; current events, biographies, conferences, shows, etc.
2150	Sports and Jazz	Sports events with Jazz fill-ins

continued ...

TABLE 5, continued

<u>Time</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Description</u>
2200	News	
2210	Press Review	Editorial Comments of leading Free World Journals
2220	10 min. music	repeat
2230	Art and Literature	repeat
2300 to 2320	Night Package	Saturation - highlights of days' events and programs

Source: Sample of Radio Free Europe Program Block (Monday)
- Poland (New York: RFE Fund Inc., 1963), p. 1.

TABLE 6

Program Schedule for Voice of Free Hungary

<u>Air. Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
5.56	Hungarian Anthem, Sign-on & Time Signal	
6.00	News	
6.10	Morning Music	Rimskij-Korsakov: Schehere- zade (in three parts)
6.20	Calendar	Commemorating Josef Pilsudsky's birthday
6.25	Morning Music	Part II
6.35	Farmer's Advisor	Talk on the future of state farms
6.40	Morning Music	Part III
6.49	Spot Announcement	
6.50	Local Commentary	Why the government cannot supply the farmers with the necessary means of production
7.00	News	
7.10	For Women	(See text)
7.15	Reflector	Satirical script on what has become of the govern- ment program and promises
7.24	Spot Announcement	
7.25	Messages	Personal messages from refugees abroad to their families in Hungary
7.40	Women's World	
7.49	Spot Announcement	
7.50	Farmers Program	Talk on human rights

continued ...

TABLE 6 - continued

<u>Air Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
8.00	News	
8.10	Interpretation	(see text)
8.19	Spot Announcement	
8.20	Preview of coming programs	
8.25	European Movement	(see text)
8.39	Spot Announcement	
8.40	To German Refugees	Account of three villages settled by ethnic Germans in Hungary
8.50	Magazine Program	Talk on the French Goncourt literary prize
9.00	News	
9.10	Home Commentary	Talk on symptoms which show that the situation in the Soviet Union is graver than recent political changes indicate
9.19	Spot Announcement	
9.20	Farmers Program	Talk on lack of protection of farmers' interests
9.30	Stolen Culture	Poems and songs illustrating the homogeneity of Central and East European culture
9.40	Personal Experiences	Medical problems of a woman
9.50	Calling Communists	Review of "I Believed", book by Douglas A. Hyde, editor of the London Daily Worker
10.00	News	
10.10	Great Artists, Little Songs	Deanna Durbin sings arias from <u>La Traviata</u>

continued ...

TABLE 6 - continued

<u>Air Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
10.20	International Commentary	Radio Free Europe's rebuttal to Communist Radio Budapest's program "Answers to Listeners' Questions"
10.30	Great Artists, Little Songs	Two songs by Robert Stolz and Strauss
10.40	World Mirror	Military-political events
10.50	Great Artists, Little Songs	Victoria de Los Angeles sings Spanish songs
11.00	News	
11.10	East European Review	Talk on the new Romanian wage decree
11.19	Spot Announcement	
11.20	Hungarian College	An exile Hungarian curator speaks on an exhibition in Paris
11.35	Program Preview	
11.40	Review of the Day	Incidental topics: Himalaya expedition, successful surgery on the Siamese twins
11.50	Midnight Patrol	Account of the disarmament debate in the U.N.
<hr/>		
12 noon	News	
12.10	Local Commentary	
12.19	Spot Announcement	
12.20	Visit to the West	On the spot report from the Latin Quarter in Paris
12.50	Report from Moscow	Review of Soviet agriculture on the basis of Pravda articles

-continued ...

TABLE 6 - continued:

<u>Air Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
1.00	News	
1.20	Sports Review	Davis Cup tournaments in Australia, Swiss ski contest, etc.
1.30	Gypsy Music	Hungarian folksongs
1.45	Discarded Village Customs	The customs of the Hansag region and an old legend
2.00	News	
2.10	Reflector	(See text)
2.19	Spot Announcement	
2.20	Workers Program	Talk on the Communist interpretation of trade union democracy and the real tasks of the trade unions
2.30	Prayers	
2.35	World Report	On the spot report from a Western department store
2.50	Calling Communists	
3.00	News	
3.10	Dance Music	
3.25	Interpretation	
3.35	Dance Music	
3.49	Spot Announcement	
3.50	World Press	Commentary on current events from the world press; Review of articles on the Bermuda Conference in the Baltimore Sun and Philadelphia Inquirer

continued ...

TABLE 6 - continued:

<u>Air Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
4.00	News	
4.10	East European Review	
4.20	Program Preview	
4.25	European Movement	
4.40	To German Refugees	
4.49	Spot Announcement	
4.50	Magazine Program	
5.00	News	
5.10	International Commentary	Talk on U.N. discussions on forced labor and prisoners of war. Soviet tactics described
5.20	Stolen Culture	
5.30	Midnight Patrol	
5.40	Personal Experiences	
5.49	Spot Announcement	
5.50	Calling Communists	
6.00	News	
6.10	Great Artists, Little Songs	Part I
6.20	Local Commentary	
6.30	Great Artists, Little Songs	Part II
6.40	World Mirror	
6.50	Great Artists, Little Songs	Part III
7.00	News	

continued ...

TABLE 6 - continued:

<u>Air Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
7.10	Home Commentary	(See text)
7.20	Hungarian College	
7.35	Program Preview	
7.40	World Press	
7.50	Farmers Program	
8.00	News	
8.10	East European Review	
8.20	Visit to the West	
8.50	Report from Moscow	
9.00	News	
9.10	Reflector	
9.20	Sports	
9.30	Gypsy Music	
9.45	Discarded Village Customs	
10.00	News	
10.10	International Commentary	
10.19	Spot Announcement	
10.20	Workers Program	
10.30	Prayers	
10.35	World Report	
10.50	Calling Communists	
11.00	News	
11.10	Dance Music & Quiz	Part I

continued ...

TABLE 6 - continued:

<u>Air Time</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Description</u>
11.25	Glossary	
11.35	Dance Music & Quiz	Part II
11.49	Spot Announcement	
11.50	Review of the Day	
12.05- 12.35 am	All (22) Radio Free Europe transmitters directed to Hungary in a "saturation" broadcast of news and selections from the day's commentaries.	

Source: News From Behind the Iron Curtain, February, 1954, pp. 43-45.

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