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DEPENDENCY, CLASS RELATIONS AND POLITICS.

IN ROUYN-NORANDA, QUÉBEC

by

Daniel Glenday

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is the study of class relations within a dependent capitalist environment. Upon defining the conceptual and geographical basis for this study, an explanatory framework is advanced which borrows from C.B. Macpherson and the work of numerous theorists of the dependency school. A detailed historical analysis of the external structures of domination, the corporation and the trade union and the internal dynamics for social change, the dominated class of the petite bourgeoisie and the working class, is offered. In the process of our analysis, an alternate interpretation for the rise of Social Credit in Quebec during the 1960's is suggested.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is customary to thank those individuals who have contributed to making study, research and the writing of these studies possible. This I now do. First, and foremost, I wish to thank the citizens of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec whose social and political life I, as an outsider, have attempted to interpret. In this regard, a special acknowledgement is due Benoit-Beaudry Gourd who assisted me at a stage in my research when I needed it most. Dennis Forcese, John Myles and Frank Vallee have all contributed to clarifying the presentation. In this regard, a further mention should be given to Frank Vallee who, at a conference in April, 1975 entitled "Language and Community" which I helped to organize, encouraged me to pursue my doctorate at Carleton University. His support throughout this time is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I must make mention of the cohort of graduate students in the Department of Sociology. In the two years we shared adjoining offices, the fermentation of the ideas which are here presented in a more distilled fashion were nurtured. I have fond memories of those intellectually exciting times.

In the process of doing original research, the financing of field trips and other technical services has usually been borne by outside agencies. Except for a small grant from the Department of Sociology, the University of Toronto, which I gratefully acknowledge, all expenses have been underwritten by the author. At this point, I would like to thank Jill DeBon for her patience and understanding during the time it has taken to type this manuscript.

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of class relations within a dependent capitalist environment. Its primary concern is with the historically-rooted social dynamics of the dominated classes, the petite bourgeoisie and the working class, located, as they are in this particular case, in a natural resource enclave. At the same time that this is a study of class relations within dependent capitalism, it also becomes an investigation into the major structural factors which can account for the sudden emergence in 1962 and persistence over the next two decades of a form of French-Canadian petit-bourgeois nationalism known as the Ralliement des Crditistes whose equivalent in Western Canada is the Social Credit Party.

I arrived at this research problem via a rather circuitous route. In April, 1974, I was asked to conduct interviews with the teachers and administrative staffs of the Protestant and Catholic School Commissions in Rouyn, Noranda, Qubec. I was to concentrate my questions on the teachers' and administrators' reactions to Bill 22, the then Qubec government's language bill. During the short stay in Rouyn-Noranda, Qubec, I became acquainted with the importance which the company, Noranda Mines, had had on the lives of the people who worked and lived there. The public knowledge of the exhaustion of the Horne Mine, the large copper and gold mine located in Noranda, Qubec, appeared to have had an important impact on the community. Since the Horne Mine was Rouyn-Noranda's only major asset, its exhaustion meant that the community would lose its only major industry with little hope of attracting new businesses. The problem of growth, or, "la

crise de croissance", as the residents called it, brought on by dependence on one employer, was a deeply felt experience which was only then beginning to be alleviated by provincial government expenditures devoted to the expansion of educational facilities servicing the surrounding region. A new "polyvalent" (regional high school), a CECÉP (a secondary educational institution which includes a technical stream and a two year, preparatory university stream) and a branch of the Université du Québec were built in Rouyn-Noranda during the 1970's. The influx of people was beginning to breathe a new life into the community.

Intense discussions at this time with a cross-section of the local population revealed their politics to be a mixture of French-Canadian nationalism, populism and socialism. The community had attracted numerous left-wing fringe groups but the majority of the people were committed to the Ralliement des Créditistes, a brand of French-Canadian right-wing nationalism. Even though I had only spent a week in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec, I became fascinated with the social and political life there.

These two experiences, the dependence on one employer or its "company town" character and the majority of the citizen's support of a unique brand of right-wing, French-Canadian nationalism informed my search for an adequate explanatory framework to situate these two observations. The question I kept repeating to myself was, were these two experiences connected in any way? Could the community's dependence on Noranda Mines help explain the political phenomenon I had observed? Since these two experiences were the basis upon which I directed and limited my search of the literature, this study, like any other, has its range of coverage and omits everything else. Therefore, it should be stated at the outset that

this is not a traditional community study. Its concerns do not include a systematic breakdown of community institutions, voluntary associations and inter-personal behaviour patterns. What was of concern to this researcher was the possible interplay between dependence on one employer in an isolated region of Québec and the recent persistence of electoral support for the Ralliement des Créditistes.

Rouyn-Noranda's dependence on natural resource extraction for employment opportunities led me to theories of underdevelopment. Since World War II, a flourishing literature concerned with the subject of development and underdevelopment has described, interpreted and suggested policy for less developed countries and regions to follow. These studies can be roughly divided into two schools of thought - the theory of modernization and the dependency model. The former approach has analyzed contemporary less developed countries or regions in terms of either dual economies or as traditional societies. On the basis of such an analysis, the policy suggestions have taken the form of either import substitution or cultural (including technology) diffusion. The failure of these policy solutions to significantly contribute to the economic and social development of the less developed countries or regions led social scientists to adopt what has come to be known as the "dependencia" or dependency approach.¹

¹ There exists an ever increasing literature which views Canada as a dependent capitalist society. See, for example, Ian Lumsden (ed.), Close the 49th Parallel, Toronto: University of Toronto Press:1970; Gary Teeple, (ed.), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press:1972; Daniel Glenday et al., Modernization and the Canadian State, Toronto: Macmillan:1978. Moreover, as early as 1971, Arthur K. Davis argued for analysing Canadian society and history in terms of a metropolis-hinterland model. His approach was primarily didactic but he insisted on sensitizing his readers not solely to the international dimension but that the "metropolis continuously dominates and exploits hinterland whether in regional, national, class or ethnic terms" (1971:12). A recent special issue of the Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology (17:3) was devoted to an analysis of "dependency, underdevelopment and regionalism" in Canada.

T. Dos Santos has offered a careful and succinct definition of dependence.

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-starting, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development. (Dos Santos:1970:231)

His definition suggests that a dependent economy is one which is intimately linked to a larger and more powerful one in such a manner that the latter superimposes onto the former the form and direction development and expansion have and will take. Moreover, expansion in the dependent economy is determined by expansion in the dominant economy.

The dependent capitalist model has been characterized as the historical/structural/institutional approach (Girvan:1973:9-24). The core of the problem for this approach has been to identify the "institutional framework" and the "structural relations" which can only be properly understood by tracing their historical development (Furtado:1965:159). In other words, a dependent capitalist economy can only be studied by identifying the history and the institutions which created constraints within which social, political and economic life take place. The implications of such an approach rest on long-term solutions that could be based on the reorganization of the structure of domestic production around such

alternatives as worker self-management and alterations in foreign economic relations such as closer ties to "Communist" bloc countries (Frank:1969b).

When analyzing dominant social groups and classes, the dependent capitalist approach has tended to be overly descriptive. The history and social characteristics of social classes within this model tend to accentuate the causes for accommodation with foreign interests instead of accounting for changes in the internal structures of dependent capitalism which could lead either to independent political action or to alliances between various strata within the dependent nation or region. On the other hand, these issues will form the central concern for this particular case study.

Of particular importance has been the Marxist criticism of "dependencia" which center on its lack of class analysis and class struggle (Laclau:1971; Luton:1976). Ernesto Laclau, by focusing his attention on André Gunder Frank's contribution to the dependent capitalist approach has argued that this gap is due to the latter's theoretical emphasis on "the sphere of commodity exchange and not in the sphere of production" (1971:20). Commodity exchange, according to Laclau, directs the social scientist to research exploitative relationships in a general and non-specific sense, whereas concentrating on the specific mode of production directs the researcher immediately into uncovering the class relations and class struggle of a particular historical moment (1971:24).

The lack of a class analysis is a significant Marxist criticism of dependency theory. This Marxist criticism asserts that the characteristics

of a dependent capitalist economy can be accurately described yet the problem of change cannot be addressed since the analysis is restricted to the level of "commodity exchange". In other words, according to some Marxists, the dependent capitalist approach cannot explain both continuity and change within a social formation and the historical evolution of class relations within a dependent capitalist economy. Whether such an indictment automatically excludes the dependent capitalist approach from incorporating class analysis or from contributing to our understanding of internal structural change has yet to be convincingly demonstrated to this author. In this light we tend to agree with Aidan Foster-Carter who points out that "the former (the dependent capitalist approach) (is) open-minded, viewing the world inductively and bringing in Marxian elements by way of explanation; (whereas) the latter (the Marxist critics of dependency) ... (clings) dogmatically to a Marxist Weltanschauung and (deduces) scholastically from this what the world 'must be like' (1974:84). It was with this thought in mind that I sought to develop an explanatory framework to account for internal structural changes in this northwestern region of Quebec by combining "Marxian elements" within the dependent capitalist approach.

Having said that, it still appears that precious little research has been done which looks at the varied collective responses of the dominated classes in the less developed country or region to their structural and/or organizational subordination by such external agents as multinational corporations and international trade unions. Research that has been done has concentrated on the social and economic problems attendant upon the transition from pre-capitalist social formations to capitalist social relations rather than the social and political struggles of social

classes such as the working class, ~~and~~ the petite bourgeoisie within dependent capitalist structures. (Arrighi and Saul, 1973; Brett, 1973; Bernstein, 1976). This study hopes to open up such discussion and debate.

The particular characteristics of dependent capitalism in the region dominated by Rouyn-Noranda, Québec raises the question of the nature of the social class forces that have historically evolved at the community level. One of the significant characteristics of dependent capitalism is the relative simplicity of the class structure. Unlike metropolitan capitalist economies whose social density makes for a complex class structure, the nature of dependent capitalism, characterized as it is by an almost exclusive concern with natural resource extraction, does not require the existence of a wide variety of public, private and leisure occupations but only those necessary for the continued survival of the natural resource enclave. This particular context, one might be tempted to say an almost experimental one, provides the researcher with a relatively unobstructed view to investigate the historical development of the class relations of the dominated classes, the petite bourgeoisie and working class.

Within a dependent capitalist environment, the form and content of class struggles between the working class and the dominant capitalist class constitutes the structural framework in which both the petite bourgeoisie and the working class confront each other on the historical stage. As dominated classes, the social context within which each works out the social relations between themselves and with the national and international political economy is structured by the struggles between the two principal classes under capitalism, namely, the capitalist class and the working class. Therefore, this study is concerned with the historical development of the social relations of the dominated classes but situated within a particular social formation,

sources or personal observations and interviews. Having been born and raised in rural Québec helped, in part, to offset my predicament, but personal biography did not eliminate all of my reservations.

The second difficulty also stems from differences in cultural upbringing but in addition are included the "constraints" which come, in part, from formal academic training. These "constraints" are difficult to concretize yet refer, in large measure, to cultural and social class differences in "attitudes" between the researcher and informants in the host community towards social life, politics and even on the social relevancy of the university. Much of the "solution" to this problem of cross-cultural analysis remains a personal one and can only be successfully tackled, to a lesser or greater extent, by the training and personality of the researcher. I did not believe that either my own personal biography or my training should remain the sole basis for evaluation and interpreting data. Therefore, I felt it necessary to consult key informants on important chapters that I had written.

Having introduced the nature of the problem and the methodological difficulties, the remainder of this study will be divided in the following manner. The explanatory framework for our analysis of dependency and class relations will be developed in the next two chapters. Chapter I will offer a critical evaluation of two important Canadian interpretations of Social Credit as a political phenomenon. This is done to establish a skeletal framework for the development of an appropriate research strategy for this study. Chapter II will build on the foundation which emerges from the first chapter. We will begin by exploring the "dependencia" literature for insights to inform our research problem and which could contribute to fleshing out the skeletal framework derived from the investigation in Chapter I. Having

In Duverger's sense, the research for this study followed "two kinds of methods (i.e. techniques): (1) the analysis of documents such as written documents, films, photographs, etc. which throw light on social phenomena; and (2) the direct observation of social reality by inquiries, interviews, questionnaires, etc." (1964: 73). The techniques within each classification carry with them certain important limitations. For example, most written material results in a nominal view of the event or situation. Important exceptions include personal letters between informants or on-the-spot reporting of events such as strikes where clearly the more subjective impressions are left. On the other hand, interviews and field observations exhibit the tendency to capture a personal view of an event or social situation while obscuring the structural contexts within which social actions take place. This study has attempted to combine both types of techniques with a view to overcoming the difficulties imposed by each on the kind and quality of information gathered. Furthermore, key informants in the community and Noranda Mines were requested to read and comment on selected chapters with the view of correcting any errors of fact that might have been incorporated in the text, in addition to receiving their impressions on the interpretation of the chapter they had to read.

The inclusion of the final step of the research, that is, the assistance of key informants, reflected what I felt to be a significant enough problem in this kind of a study, namely, its cross-cultural nature. As a Protestant Québécois whose mother tongue is English, I believe that at least two issues should be raised. First, a researcher's lack of a general knowledge of the culture he is investigating does not/cannot provide him with the kind of assistance necessary in making meaningful projections from either documentary

sources or personal observations and interviews. Having been born and raised in rural Québec helped, in part, to offset my predicament, but personal biography did not eliminate all of my reservations.

The second difficulty also stems from differences in cultural upbringing but in addition are included the "constraints" which come, in part, from formal academic training. These "constraints" are difficult to concretize yet refer, in large measure, to cultural and social class differences in "attitudes" between the researcher and informants in the host community towards social life, politics and even on the social relevancy of the university. Much of the "solution" to this problem of cross-cultural analysis remains a personal one and can only be successfully tackled, to a lesser or greater extent, by the training and personality of the researcher. I did not believe that either my own personal biography or my training should remain the sole basis for evaluation and interpreting data. Therefore, I felt it necessary to consult key informants on important chapters that I had written.

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separated from the "dependencia" literature those structural characteristics that add to our research problem, we will build further onto the framework by specifying the manner by which the significant "actors", Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America, fit into our analysis. Once all the significant factors have been laid out, they will be integrated into an explanatory framework at the conclusion of the chapter.

The interpretation to be offered will situate the external structures of domination primarily with the corporation, namely Noranda Mines and secondarily with the union, the United Steelworkers of America. For over three decades, the domination of Noranda Mines was a fact of life in this natural resource enclave even though several challenges from the working class occurred.

The growth of the company into a multinational corporation and the known depletion of the Horne Mine in Noranda, Québec, both occurring at approximately the same historical moment, modified the structural conditions which had earlier resulted in the corporation's domination of the community. Such altered circumstances generate for the dominated classes, the petite bourgeoisie and the working class, the opportunity to successfully challenge the prior hegemony of Noranda Mines.

The incorporation of the United Steelworkers of America in the community at approximately the same time Noranda Mines is weakening its hold in this natural resource enclave creates the structural condition for a class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class in which the latter will become structurally subordinate to the former. Moreover, the class alliance will be ideologically forged by the inclusion of working class elements within the petit bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble in addition to the positive role French Canadian nationalism

plays in obscuring differences in class interests. All these factors coalesce at approximately the same time and around Réal Caouette and the Ralliement des Créditistes and result in this party's success in the community which lasts for close to two decades.

The following four chapters will divide the explanatory framework into its community, institutional and social class components. Chapter IV will not only provide the geographical and community setting for this study but will also examine the nature of the social class forces at work in the community. Chapters V and VI will investigate the historical development and particular characteristics of the two major institutions in this study, Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America. These chapters will detail the institutional obstacles which would set limits on the nature of class relations in the community. Chapter VI will uncover the historical development of class struggles in the community and show how these conflicts helped define the contours of dependent capitalism in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. Chapter VII will reintegrate the findings of the four previous chapters and offer an explanation for the Ralliement des Créditistes' electoral strength in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec in terms of the explanatory framework advanced in Chapters I and II. The final section will offer the conclusions derived from this case study.

CHAPTER I

PROLEGOMENON

In this chapter we will provide a critical survey of the relevant Canadian literature that will shed some light on our particular research problem. This seems only natural since not only the geographical context but the specific petit bourgeois political manifestation of class relations (that is, the Social Credit Party) together constitute uniquely Canadian components of our research problem.

The two prominent interpretations of the political phenomenon known as Social Credit are studies by C.B. Macpherson and Maurice Pinard. In this chapter, we will concentrate our energies on a critical evaluation of these works in the belief that either one or both might assist in our efforts to investigate class relations within a concrete social setting (that is, dependent capitalism). It will remain for the following chapter to build on the framework that will be forthcoming below.

1. The Politics of Dependent Capitalism: Social Credit in Alberta

I turn now to C.B. Macpherson's powerful examination into the class-based support for the Alberta Social Credit Party, entitled Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (1953). His book represents an important but, unfortunately, until very recently forgotten study dealing with the relationship between underdevelopment, social class, and political behaviour. It is an especially significant study for my purpose because Macpherson locates the support for the Social Credit Party first, in the subordination of the local economy to external dominance from Central Canada and second, in the numerial predominance of a middle strata of small

propertied farmers of independent commodity producers who represent one segment of the petite bourgeoisie. The other elements making up the petite bourgeoisie which are not explicitly dealt with by Macpherson are small-scale production and small-scale ownership of which more will be said in the next chapter.

The early history of Alberta represented the integration of a hitherto frontier region within Central Canadian capitalism. Alberta, like Saskatchewan, served as an agricultural hinterland supplying a cash crop, namely wheat, which was sold on the world market. The transportation of the cash crop to ocean ports and the necessary farm equipment and other supplies which would be needed by the recently settled agriculturalists were to be provided by Central Canadian capitalists. And, the whole system was under the political control of the federal state (Macpherson, 1953; Fowke, 1947). The subordination of the Alberta economy to Central Canada and the specificity of its role, namely, as a dependent agricultural hinterland created the appropriate conditions internal to Alberta that would circumscribe the nature and character of the province's class structure. In other words, according to C.B. Macpherson, Alberta's primary function as an agricultural hinterland to Central Canada led to the predominance of independent commodity producers in the province's class structure.

In analyzing the class composition of Alberta, Macpherson underscores the petit bourgeois character of the provincial economy by stating that the total farming population made up 48 percent of the gainfully occupied, whereas the non-agricultural working class comprised only 41 percent (1953: 15-16). But what proportion of the total farming population did the independent commodity producer represent? The statistics he marshalls suggest that 8%

percent of the Albertan farms relied on a permanent labour force (1953: 17). Therefore, it would appear that the Albertan economy was "primarily a farming economy" in which over 90 percent of the total farming population were independent commodity producers.

The significance of the first structural factor has been missed by many of the commentators' of Macpherson's analysis. Most, and this includes Pinard, have found fault with what they assert is Macpherson's general presumption of a homogeneous class structure for Albertan society of the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's, as if that was the sole basis for his analysis of Social Credit. Lipset, for example, states that "the assumption that class is the sole 'real' basis for partisan cleavage is a vulgar Marxist hypothesis that has been refuted time and again by history" (1954: 177). Yet, in offering his own alternative explanation for the rise of the CCF in Saskatchewan he presents the existence of a one-product economy and a single class social structure as requisite. We read that "in understanding why the CCF came to power in Saskatchewan emphasis was put on the special conditions of the wheatbelt social structure and the Saskatchewan polity that encouraged farmers to form and support a radical third party. Included in these conditions were the tensions fostered in a prairie economy by unstable wheat prices and frequent droughts, and the one-class social structure in which wheat farmers in roughly similar social and economic conditions formed and staffed a large variety of non-governmental institutions." (1968: xii Emphasis mine).

How can one analysis, Macpherson's, be faulted when the "alternative", in an even more crudely stated fashion, duplicates it? At least Macpherson spoke of the numerical superiority of the independent commodity producer or

the "relatively homogeneous social composition of Alberta" but never "the one-class social structure" of a provincial political economy. Or, could it have been the case that only Saskatchewan and not Alberta could be so characterized? Where is the logic or indeed the usefulness in such a criticism?

The point in mentioning such facile attacks is not to mount a defense of Macpherson's study. It stands as a classic in its own right. But, we merely seek to build on the general outline of his two major propositions by acknowledging, that, taken together the analysis of the class structure within a dependent capitalist social formation becomes a function of specifying the external structure of domination and their changing characteristics over time along with examining the internal class relations and the circumstances when structural subordination of the dominated classes is challenged by them.

a. The Social Position of the Independent Commodity Producers

Theoretically, Macpherson situates the independent commodity producer within the classical notion of the petite bourgeoisie (1953: 227), defined negatively as "those whose living comes neither from employing labour nor from the disposal of their labour" (1953: 225). Put in more positive terminology, Macpherson notes that the independent commodity producer holds a double relation to the market. He is "independent in being at once free of direction of (his) own labour and free of direct dependence on an economy other than directed and of which (he is) a subordinate part" (1953: 224). What Macpherson means by the "freedom" of the independent commodity producer is that the sense of "freedom" which he believes he possesses is objectively an illusion. In other words, the subjective impression of independence which motivates the independent commodity producers' political behaviour turns out to be, upon closer examination, false consciousness.

To understand Macpherson's theoretical point, we must make an analytical distinction between independence from or dependence on a capitalist for the sale of labour-power and independence from or dependence on the market for the sale of products and for the purchase of the means of production. The petit bourgeois paradox of independence/dependence pivots on an axis which points out that while nominally independent of the capitalist and the market, the petit bourgeois is, in fact, so situated in the class structure that his interests are subordinated to the general interests of the dominant social class because it alone employs large quantities of labour-power. From here, Macpherson concludes that "It is apparent that in this respect the farmers fit the classic pattern of the petit bourgeois class" (1953: 224; emphasis mine).

Macpherson goes on to analyse their role as a dependent and increasingly vestigial social class within capitalism. To reiterate, their dependence rested not in their dependence on an employer, not did their lifestyle depend on the ability to employ others. While they did not "stand immediately in either of these relations of dependence (they) were producing in an economy which, on the whole, and increasingly, operates by means of these relations" (1953: 221). The independent commodity producer, then is in a disadvantageous position within the market system where he sells his produce, buys his equipment and borrows capital due to his inability to compete on equal terms with the entrepreneur in industry, commerce and finance. Why is this so?

It is customary, indeed, to attribute the prairie farmer's insecure and fluctuating position to the fact that he must sell his products in a world market and buy and borrow in a restricted eastern Canadian market. The terms of trade are generally tilted against him. In an economy where manipulation of the terms of

trade in favour of the large entrepreneur is a normal source of capital increment as it has always been in Canada...it is natural to emphasize the weakness of the farmer in this respect... The farmer himself generally does so. Yet this is to overlook the still more fundamental source of the subordination (or dependence), already mentioned, namely his inability to dispose of substantial quantities of labour while operating in an economy in which economic power is based on that ability. (1953: 222; emphasis mine).

It is this twofold character of the petite bourgeoisie which must be underscored. As a social class, it is distinguished by the ownership of income producing property, but does not employ a steady labour force that must be constantly supervised. In many ways, the ideal petit bourgeois is a person who operates a family-owned business, be it a small farm or a corner grocery store. This represents one side of the petite bourgeoisie, the one that gives to members of this class a feeling of independent action.

The other side speaks to the dependent and subordinate features such as their dependence on major financial institutions for credit, large scale transportation companies who charge freight rates over which they have no control, transnational corporations for fuel and manufactured goods and subordination within the central state apparatus. Their priorities as a class for assistance from vagaries in the market or protection from the "unfair" practices of the dominant economic institutions come second to those who wield effective economic power in society. In other words, their location in the economy represents a power position, to be sure, but one of limited strength and subject to constraints imposed either by the dominant class, the state or even the working class when it acts through powerful and politically conscious trade unions.

Macpherson argued that the petit bourgeois notion of independence comes as a result of his identification with the entrepreneurial class. He

does not see or does not want to see "how wide the gulf is between him and them". Rather, his independence is defined "in comparison with the employee...who gives up the direction of his labour" while the farmer or the shopkeeper retains the direction of his own labour by "his own decisions as to how to use his land and capital, his skill and energy" (1953: 222-23). But, is this feeling of independence based on any objective criteria of his position and role within the class structure of society?

Macpherson bluntly says no. As a matter of fact, members of the petite bourgeoisie continually deceive themselves about their so-called independence.

Macpherson carefully offers an explanation for this self-identification.

They (petite bourgeoisie) conceive society in their own image, not realizing or not admitting that the day of that society is past. Their condition has characteristically generated the notion that classes are not significant entities, because their class is not an entity; that the only reality is the individual, and not historically determined relations between individuals, because each of them is, more apparently than individuals of other classes, related with others almost solely through their commodities and theirs, which appears to be free relation between individuals in the market. That the essence of man is in his independence of others becomes a belief so strongly felt that it leads them to believe that they can be independent. (1953: 226 Emphasis mine)

b. The Political Ideology of the Petite Bourgeoisie

If there is no objective basis for their own self-identification as independent individuals within society, what would be the political ideology of the petite bourgeoisie, if and when such a social class were capable of performing a leadership role in society? A leadership role, in this instance, would be defined by the exercise of political power through the democratic process of electing a majority of members from one political party to a legislative body, be it at the provincial or federal levels of parliament.

Macpherson argued that due to their precarious middle stratum rôle, the petite bourgeoisie oscillates between radicalism (identification with the working class) or conservatism (identification with the property system of capitalism).

From this illusive consciousness, and from their perennial insecurity, arises the oscillation between conservatism and radicalism which is characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie. They cannot entirely identify themselves, or make permanent common cause, with either of the other two classes. Yet, they are repeatedly driven by insecurity to find a solid base somewhere. So they veer between attachment to one class and to the other. Hence the history of petit bourgeois political thought and action has been a history of oscillation and confusion. (1953: 226-27)

Macpherson's analysis suggests that the direction of petit bourgeois political ideology within society rests on the relative strengths of the two major contending classes of society. In a society such as Canada dominated by capitalist social relations and a provincially divided, politically passive working class, the nature of petit bourgeois ideology would appear to lie in their identification with the property system of capitalism. In the particular case of Alberta, the numerical superiority of the independent commodity producer coupled with a politically passive working class¹ created the appropriate circumstances for the rise and persistence of a brand of conservative petit bourgeois politics in Alberta known as Social Credit.

¹ Macpherson at an early stage in his study makes an observation. He states that "the absence of any serious opposition of class interests within the province meant that alternate parties were not needed either to express or to moderate a perennial conflict of interests. There was apparently, therefore, no positive basis for an alternate party system" (1962: 21).

This may be the point to cast some doubts on recent aspersions of Macpherson's study. Larry Pratt and John Richards argue that the "central flaw in Macpherson's study on Alberta society and politics...

Furthermore, the specific elements of the political ideology of the Alberta Social Credit Party Macpherson interprets as the protest "of a quasi-colonial society (or, an underdeveloped region within Canada) of independent community producers (or, a segment of the petite bourgeoisie), in rebellion against eastern imperialism, but not against the property system". It was this last point which brought out the "conservatism inherent in petit bourgeois radicalism" (1953: 220). While Social Credit did provide to Albertans a political ideology and platform that was against certain features of capitalism, it did not outrightly reject capitalism, but, on the contrary, endorsed one of the pillars of this social system, namely, private property.²

1 cont.

is its consistent tendency toward single class analysis". They insist that Alberta has been characterized throughout its history by class and sector conflicts as "recurring not occasional, themes in the various stages of the province's development" (1978: 12). If such were the case, where are the concrete manifestations of these numerous oppositions from below? Where was a politically conscious, militant working class when either the United Farmers of Alberta or Social Credit were dominant political forces in the province? Would not the existence of such a movement have forced the independent commodity producers to take a more left wing political course of action? These questions will remain unanswered since Macpherson's observation above concerning "the absence of any serious opposition of class interests" is more representative of the early history of Alberta than the revisionist history of a Larry Pratt and John Richards.

2

Peter Sinclair has recently lent more support for Macpherson's analysis by placing both the CCF and Social Credit within a framework that stresses "how the populist elements in each were consistent with the petit bourgeois character of the most numerous class in each province". (1975: 1)

His depiction of populism is more general than Macpherson's specific study of Social Credit and yet the four characteristics Sinclair isolates are worthy of mention here if for no other reason than to show the similarities with Macpherson's understanding of Social Credit. First, populism exalts the worthiness of the people over an oligarchy. Next,

c. Summary

C.B. Macpherson's study became the first Marxist interpretation of Social Credit in Alberta. Upon examining the external structures of domination which conditioned the internal class structure of the province, he proceeded to provide a model which would be capable of explaining, in social class terms, the political ideology of the Social Credit Party. He convincingly showed the ideology of Social Credit to be congruent with the class interests of the petite bourgeoisie. He accomplished this task by pointing out the social characteristics and the ambivalent political life of the petite bourgeoisie. Its political ambivalence, Macpherson argued, was the result of its inability to employ significant numbers of workers in a society increasingly characterized by the fundamental relationship of the buying and selling of labour power. To phrase it differently, the political experience of the petite bourgeoisie falls "outside" of the polarized interests between capital and labour.

The significant feature to draw out from Macpherson's analysis of the petite bourgeoisie for this study is its inability to pursue an independent class interest, that is, autonomous from the collective interests of either the capitalist or the working class. This particular argument will be empirically substantiated in a later chapter of this study.

2 cont.

comes the rejection of "intermediate" associations between the people and the leaders of the movement. Third, populist protest is directed against an elite which resides outside the local community. This latter characteristic is especially significant for our purposes since such an antipathy could only occur within a dependent capitalist environment. Foreign capitalists cannot be located in a metropolis, only in the hinterland. Lastly, Sinclair includes the reformist character of populism. In other words, populism seeks to reform capitalist structures, not destroy them with a social revolution (1975: 95-96). These first two elements are especially critical in analysing Social Credit.

Equally important for this study, he situates the petite bourgeoisie within an economic environment that was characterized by uneven economic development between the Western Canadian agricultural periphery with the Central Canadian industrial core. This asymmetrical relationship created the conditions in which a dependent region, Alberta, was placed in a subordinate role vis-à-vis Central Canada from which there emerged a reaction to Eastern domination that became expressed politically in the Social Credit Party.

So long as the economic relationships persisted which maintained Alberta as an agricultural hinterland and subordinate province to Central Canada and as a result maintained the numerical superiority and strength of the independent commodity producer, the Social Credit Party would remain the dominant political force in Alberta. With Democracy in Alberta, Professor Macpherson has provided the outline of a theory for explaining the rise and persistence of Social Credit in Alberta.

2. "One Party Dominance and the Rise of Third Parties"

The only other important study for our purposes is Maurice Pinard's argument for the rise of the Social Credit Party in Quebec during the 1962 federal election.³ His analysis, on one level, is an attempt to criticize mass society theory. This theory argues that the rise of social movements can be explained by the weakness of integrative institutions in modern societies which leave the individual atomized. It is reasoned that atomized individuals are more easily swayed to accept demagoguery from their political leaders. He points out that the underlying assumption

³ Other studies on Social Credit in Canada have focused on different issues such as the history of this political movement where Part II in Michael B. Stein's, The Dynamics of Right Wing Protest: A Political Analysis of Social Credit in Quebec, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 1973) and John A. Irving's, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1959) offer a detailed accounting of Social Credit's development in these two provinces. Michael B. Stein's study also provides an attitudinal profile of the Ralliement des Crditistes leadership at the time of his research. Martin Robin's "The Social Basis of Party Politics in British Columbia" in H.C. Thorburn (ed.) Party Politics in Canada, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Prentice Hall: 1967), pp. 201-211 covers the characteristics of the provincial party in British Columbia. Vincent Lemieux's study entitled "Les dimensions sociologiques du Vote Crditiste au Quebec" in Recherches Sociographiques Vol. 6, no. 2, 1965, pp. 191-195 singles out four sociological variables to help the researcher account for Social Credit voting patterns in the province of Quebec. He labels them (1) socio-economic, (2) partisanship, (3) political, and (4) personal. The first of these categories represents age, occupation, income and residence. The second is concerned with the transmission of electoral traditions. The third deals with the political party system, its organization and platform. The final "dimension" singles out the leaders, the candidates, the organizers and its party workers. Lemieux agrees that the outcome in any electoral district will "vary with the expenses, the intensity and the direction of each" of these four sociological variables (1965: 195). He admits he has not provided a fully developed theory but suggests that if he was going to put weight on any one of the four variables mentioned above he would have to stress the second over all the others. While Lemieux's four variables were suggestive for future theoretical work, he has not provided us with such a model.

of mass society theory is that integrative institutions provide a restraining influence on individual behaviour. He suggests that this claim "implies a one-sided view of the role of intermediate groupings" (1969: 102). He argues that there is evidence pointing in the opposite direction, that is, "primary and secondary groupings...will act as mobilizing rather than restraining agents" (1969: 103). His alternative relies heavily on the work done on the rise of social movements by Neil Smelser (1963).

Smelser's model is comprised of six "determinants" in the analysis of collective behaviour. These are: (1) structural strain, or "the impairments in social conditions which lead to social unrest"; (3) a generalized belief "which identifies the sources of strain and proposes certain responses; (4) precipitating factors; (5) mobilization of the participants for action and (6) social control "which arch's over the other determinants and constitutes the counter-determinant aspect of any episode of collective behaviour" (Pinard, 1971: 15; Smelser, 1963: 12-21). While attempting to be an exhaustive set of factors accounting for an "episode of collective behaviour", these "determinants" are descriptive and ahistorical categories with no necessary order of significance, although "structural conduciveness" and "structural strain" are singled out by Pinard for special treatment.

a. Structural Conduciveness

Pinard's application and adaptation of Smelser's model is known as "one party dominance and the rise of third parties" (1967: 358-73). He begins by noting that federal elections in Quebec are characterized by the dominance of one political party, namely, the Liberal party. He

proceeds by assuming that "the dominant liberals were strong more or less equally in all (electoral) districts, that is, there were no (electoral) districts characterized by Conservative one party dominance" (1971: 25). He then goes on to suggest that the election of Social Credit candidates in Quebec will be more likely to occur in those electoral districts where the Conservative Party is the weakest and less likely where the Conservative Party is the strongest.

To account for the fact that the rise of Social Credit in the 1962 federal election in Quebec was preceded by the election of 50 Progressive Conservatives in the 1958 general election, an unprecedented percentage (50/75 or 67%), he argues:

To be sure, this constitutes a deviation from our model if you consider the province as a whole...therefore, to take the Conservatives' overall resurgence into account, our argument could be made slightly more complex. It seems that in some instances, the passage from one-party dominance to a third party is a two-step process. After a long period of dominance by a strong party, a dissatisfied electorate turns in part to the traditional opposition party. But if this party is soon considered to have failed, as the Conservatives were in 1962, then the electorate is not ready to return so rapidly to the dominant party it just repelled; they shift instead to a third party. In short, in some circumstances, the one-party dominance model becomes a two-step process based, so to speak, on a double frustration: first, a half-hearted move to the weak opposition party in some quarters; second, a shift to an altogether new party, particularly where the first move was weak (1971: 26).

This "determinant" which for Pinard is the existence of "one-party dominance", or the lack of a Progressive Conservative alternative to the Liberals, he reasons is consonant with Smelser's notion of "structural conduciveness".

In this instance...the element of conduciveness in the political system, and more specifically in the characteristics of the federal party system in Quebec. At the federal level, the province of Quebec has long been an area of one-party dominance by the Liberals (1971: 21-22).

A major problem with Pinard's notion of "one-party dominance" centers on his neglecting to pose the important question of why the Progressive Conservatives were weaker in some districts and not in others. Moreover, "one-party dominance" may statistically describe the nature of the Quebec political landscape, but it certainly does not account for how it came to be that way. Furthermore, Pinard's "determinant" cannot address the question of what are the conditions which would undermine the existence of Liberal Party dominance in some of the electoral districts of the province? Neither does he address the question of what are the social class forces that might account for the persistence of this political phenomenon in some communities of Quebec?

To clarify my criticism, recourse will be made to the model Pinard offers to account for "one-party dominance". The sequence of factors he marshals starts with "structural cleavages" which include "economic, ethnic and other variables" and/or "structural attachments" and/or "flagrant corruption aided by a single member plurality electoral system" (1971: 67). These conditions lead to "alienation from one of the major parties" which in turn leads to the "emergence of a one-party dominance system". His model, one could argue, does provide an "answer" to the question of how the Quebec political landscape came to be characterized by "one-party dominance". But, the "answer" begins with indicators which are highly formal in nature. Their level of abstraction is such that it leaves each one, except for "flagrant corruption aided by a single member plurality system", devoid of any content. To take one example, in order to "fill" an indicator such as "structural cleavages", recourse would have to be made to a detailed investigation of the historical

conditions which created the particular economic and/or ethnic cleavages in question. In such a case, the usefulness, heuristic or otherwise, of indicators such as "structural cleavages" may simply rest in their empirical-definitional connection instead of the empirical-causal connection Pinard's model of "one party dominance" sought to accomplish.⁴ Put differently, the "how" in my criticism of these indicators remains since we are still left with the task of uncovering the specific, historically-determined conditions and their inter-relationships which then created "one-party dominance".

b. Structural Strains

Realizing himself that "structural conduciveness" or "one-party dominance" was not a "sufficient condition" to explain the rise of Social Credit, Pinard then argues that "strains must also be present (since) without them, one-party dominance can only lead to long tenures by the dominant party" (1971: 91). By "strains", Pinard singled out economic recessions or "reversals".

We feel that a crucial factor for this sudden and meteoric rise of the Social Credit Party in Quebec lies in the worsened economic conditions of large segments of the population. It is our contention that the most general factor of large-scale political movements is to be found in the changes, and particularly reversals, occurring in the economic conditions of social groups. We do not claim that poverty per se is a source of radicalization; on the contrary, it has often been observed to be a condition of stability. But when the economic conditions of large social groups in the population worsen, the likelihood and chances of a political movement are at their best (1971: 100).

⁴ For a power criticism of the methodological underpinnings of this and similar approaches to social problems in the discipline see David and Judith Willer, Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a Pseudoscience, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall: 1973).

As with "structural conduciveness", the category of "strains" is left as a descriptive factor. Pinard makes recourse to "processes of rapid industrialization and urbanization (which) tend to create large pockets in the economy that cannot keep pace with the developments" as the antecedent causes of "strains". Yet, he provides no insights to explain what the factors were which precipitated rapid industrialization and urbanization in Quebec. In order for Pinard's second category to become an explanatory factor, one must examine how, by whom, and to whose benefit the "processes of rapid industrialization and urbanization" historically developed. It would appear that the empirical-definitional limits of "strains" must be abandoned and the task of pursuing socio-historical relationships embedded in a model or an explanatory framework still lays ahead. Yet, Pinard still has more to say about the sudden rise of Social Credit in Quebec during the 1962 general federal election.

c. The Mobilization of the Discontented

Once the proper conditions have been met, that is, "structural conduciveness" or "one-party dominance" and "structural strains" or "worsened economic conditions of large segments of the population", then Pinard tackles the problem of the "mobilization of the discontented". He correctly addresses the question of what factors intervened to account for the electoral support of Social Credit in the 1962 federal general election in Quebec. He isolates four such factors. The first he refers to as the "historical dimension". Pinard has in mind here the familiarity of Social Credit doctrines in rural Quebec that were introduced in the 1940's by the Union of Electors. The early familiarity of these political ideas among Quebec's rural electorate established at an early stage a basis which would later be drawn upon.

Réal Caouette's fifteen minute, bi-monthly television broadcasts served to disseminate the Social Credit's political platform and the personal charisma of the party's leader to a wider audience. Pinard places more weight on this factor than on the previous one.

Pinard then introduces the party's "enthusiastic activists" as his third factor. These cadres were relentless in their efforts to bring new converts and, as a result, a degree of financial stability to the Ralliement des Créditistes. Yet, he acknowledges that there was nothing new in this since the methods were those followed by the old Union of Electors.

His final factor is somewhat unusual. He argues that the low social status of the party's candidates in rural Quebec was "prejudicial" to the party's electoral successes. In other words, the mobilization of the electorate in a rural constituency was hindered by the low social status of the candidate.

The first and third factors are apparently of minor significance to Pinard since he does not again refer to them in the conclusion to this chapter. Only numbers two and four are singled out. But, it is never quite certain how each of these two remaining factors contributed to Social Credit's electoral gains in each of the rural ridings where the party was successful. There is no specific weight given to either factor. Is one more important than the other? We must assume that each is of equal strength since Pinard does not tell us otherwise. Since each factor could conceivably cancel each other out in any single riding, what other factors could be brought to bear to explain the electoral success of the party? Could it be that the "historical dimension" and the "enthusiastic party activists" become the necessary and sufficient conditions for the party's electoral success in rural Quebec? If such can be the case for any single riding, where does that leave Pinard's model of one-party dominance since

the mobilization of any given electorate can be reduced to factors specific to the third party itself, namely, the Ralliement des Crditistes?

d. Why a Right Wing Party?

Finally, Pinard places only minor importance on the content of the ideology of "the third party". His explanation for the direction of political protest in Quebec resides in indicators other than the content of Social Credit ideology. Pinard's explanation for the electoral success of Social Credit, a right-wing party and not the New Democratic Party (NDP), a social democratic party are reduced to three factors. The leadership of Social Credit had come from the rural regions of Quebec. This was not the case for the NDP. Therefore, there existed an organic link between the party and rural Quebec.

Second, the organizational strategy of the party after 1958 focused on mobilizing "the discontented" in rural Quebec. The NDP had no such strategy. Finally, the New Democratic Party was urban-based (that is, centered in Montreal) whose "leadership was still a faithful representation of the English-speaking tradition of the party in the province" (1971: 99). Therefore, the NDP was hardly a political party that would be willing or even capable of appealing to a rural-based, French-Canadian electorate.

Pinard then proceeds to "explain" the impotence of "leftist forces" in Quebec's electoral politics by recourse to the "monolithic conservative ideology of the French-Canadian elites", rooted, as they were, in "religious and educational institutions and closely tied with the constant preoccupation with nationalist concerns" (1971: 99, emphasis

in the original).⁵ In other words, the absence of a left-wing, political tradition which could have been articulated by some French-Canadian elites accounted for the "lack of ideological pluralism" within Quebec society generally. As a result, the hegemony of ideological conservatism "prevented the emergence of a leftist leadership that could constitute more than a marginal and sporadic force in Quebec politics" (1971: 99).

5 Pinard's assessment for the absence of "leftist politics" in Quebec assumes only the internationalist and not the more complex debate about the role of nationalism within socialism. Since, for our purposes, it is unnecessary to delve into a lengthy analysis of these ideological debates on the left about the "correctness" of socialist nationalisms versus international socialism, we will restrict our comments to pointing out that their political significance lies in the objective basis of their content. The former has been associated with anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and oppressed national minorities in the developed countries whereas the latter has been almost exclusively associated with some organizations of the working class in Western developed capitalist nations. These "truths" are unimportant. Their importance lies in their objective existence as ideological debates. To side with either one or to ignore one for the other is to betray a political confidence or to express ignorance. For Pinard, the latter is more clearly the case.

His juxtaposing "nationalist concern" with right-wing politics betrays the political liberalism of the author. Pinard, like Pierre Elliott Trudeau, would situate nationalism with the more retrogressive or reactionary interests in society since it stresses collective interests and not individual interests. The anti-colonial nationalisms of the post-World War II era, many of which were socialist in ideology remain anomalies for the political liberal like Pinard and even for some international socialists.

As pointed out above, nationalism and socialism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the continued existence of socialist nationalisms in the Third World attests to the power which socialist principles hold when they combine with an anti-colonial nationalism. Therefore, nationalism need not be an exclusively reactionary ideology. It has taken a progressive direction when struggling against a colonial or dependent capitalist social formation. As a result, nationalism may become an important component in the ideological mobilization of the discontented. The theoretical importance of nationalism will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.

While structural factors are accentuated and the content of the political ideology is downplayed in Pinard's theoretical schema, when he analyses the social class support for the party he gives credence to the role of ideology and its potential for mobilizing the working class. For instance, he points out in a footnote that "as we have seen, the party is against big government, against economic concentration and against labour unions, though this last point is not stressed too much, given The party's support" (1971: 114). It remains a mystery to this author why Pinard did not give more importance than he did to the content of the ideology in his theory.

Pinard does not stop here but then adds that if the French-Canadian working class had been "presented with leftist alternatives of some strength (they) could have responded favourably" (1971: 99). In the final analysis, then, Pinard appears to be asserting a crudely-expressed false consciousness on the part of the French-Canadian working class to account for its support of a right-wing, political party in the 1962 federal general election.

e. Pinard vs. Macpherson

Pinard then proceeds to criticize a different model of Social Credit: C.B. Macpherson's analysis of that Party in Alberta, a study which was explored in some detail above. He begins by outlining Macpherson's argument for the rise of Social Credit in Alberta which Pinard states is the "outcome of two necessary conditions -- the quasi-colonial status of (sic) these provinces and their homogeneity in class composition, that is, the predominance of small independent producers" (1971: 69, emphasis mine). Pinard then singles out the latter for special consideration. He places

the brunt of Macpherson's analysis of the Social Credit party in Albertá on what he calls the "class homogeneity" of the province. Pinard follows his synopsis of Macpherson's model by then assuming that class homogeneity means a uniform class structure, and not what Macpherson meant by it, namely a numerical superiority but not necessarily a numerical majority. Pinard himself knew, as evidenced from the quotation above, that Macpherson's notion of class homogeneity did not deny the existence of other social classes, nor the possibility that the numerically dominant social class need not have more than 50% but could indeed have less than half of the total population. Pinard is therefore caught arguing non-sequiturs such as "this homogeneity is at least not reflected in political action (because) the winning parties retain close to fifty percent of the votes". Or, "Macpherson's condition (of class homogeneity) obviously does not account for the rise of political movements in Ontario and Quebec which cannot possibly be described as class-homogeneous provinces" (1971: 69). To be sure, the class composition of Ontario and Quebec do not contain a "predominance" of small independent producers but on the other hand are characterized by a "predominance" of the working class. As a result, Pinard's criticism at this level of analysis is fraught with problems. Furthermore, I have shown above that Macpherson's model did not rest solely on class homogeneity but also on the underdevelopment of Alberta or its "quasi-colonial status".

Next, Pinard argues that his model differs from Macpherson's "at the individual level". Macpherson implicitly suggests, according to Pinard, that "the population has for a long time been strongly dissatisfied with the party system as such and has thus consciously rejected it,

switching to a new non-partisan political movement". Pinard is willing to speculate on this reasoning by simply saying "I doubt very much that such a conscious analysis is ever carried out by the mass of the electorate, let alone accepted" (1971: 70). Pinard's elitist notion of politics, that "the masses" are too unsophisticated to make intelligent political choices, is a tenuous proposition to make without producing a shred of supporting evidence. Du choc des opinions, Jaillit la vérité.⁶

f. Summary

Pinard's model attempts to account for the sudden rise of Social Credit in the 1962 federal general election in Quebec. It borrows heavily from Smelser's "theory of collective behaviour". As we have shown above, Pinard derives his notion of "one party dominance" from Smelser's "structural conduciveness". Pinard then links "structural strains" with "one party dominance" to arrive at the necessary structural conditions for the "rise of a third party". The intervening variables are classified according to "the mobilization of the discontented" and the direction of political protest, whether it will be to the right or to the left. Finally, this very formalistic model is contrasted with Macpherson's more socio-historical approach. Pinard's criticisms here are meant to undermine

⁶ In this vein, Blais, Gilbert and Lemieux criticize Pinard's model by arguing that from the very beginning of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec there is every indication to suggest an ever widening citizens involvement in the political process. In their words, the political culture of Quebec was more "participant" than either the Canadian (excluding Quebec of course) or American political culture. Participation, in their frame of reference includes a "conscious analysis at the individual level" of the political process and political choices. See Andre Blais, Marcel Gilbert, Vincent Lemieux, "The Emergence of New Forces in Quebec's Electoral Politics", in W.E. Mann (ed.), Canada: A Sociological Profile, 2nd ed., (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Co.: 1971).

Macpherson's interpretation by asserting the latter's inability to generalize from the specific Albertan experience.

g. Criticisms and Conclusions

As was revealed above, Pinard's two most important "determinants" exhibit empirical-definitional connections. They may have general applicability since the concepts Pinard employs attempt to possess logical certainty. This is evidenced by his numerous references to studies of third parties in other countries which he then attempts to incorporate by revealing certain similarities with his own approach. But, in his eagerness to establish a model of political change which is generally applicable, he has, of necessity dulled the edges of his major indicators. In other words, since Pinard's model is constructed at a level of generalization which seeks to explain the rise of all third parties, it helps to explain little that is specific to any regional, provincial or national context. This has been a common criticism of most structural functional attempts at theoretical generalization and need not be further explored here (Moore, Jr., 1962; Mills, 1961; Gouldner, 1971).

Moreover, the facts, gathered by Pinard derive from poll-type social surveys that concentrate on individual characteristics such as age, sex, education and income. The oft stated weakness of such investigations centers on their failure to take into account properties of social structure in which individuals find themselves such as those of work organizations and local communities. It is the "invisibles" of social structure which are lost in the employment of these techniques. Even though this study is not a community study in the traditional sense, locale remains of obvious importance at both the theoretical and empirical levels.

An important problem yet to be addressed centers on providing an explanation for working class support of an objectively reactionary political party. The observation during my original visit to Rouyn-Noranda, Québec of a widely-based community support for many of the ideas expressed by Réal Caouette and the Ralliement des Créditistes has not been satisfactorily accounted for. How can we explain the working class vote for a political party which seeks the displacement of monopoly capitalism with an historically earlier form of capitalism. What explanation can be offered that does not revert to suppositions about the unsophisticated, non-participatory character of "the masses" or the assertion of a crudely formulated "false consciousness"? Part of the solution rests with uncovering ideological elements within the political philosophy of the Social Credit Party that could appeal to the working class. The remaining task would be to provide an explanatory framework that could account for the sudden and persistent shift in electoral strength from the Liberal Party to the Ralliement des Créditistes in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. A model is sought which can account for continuity and change within a dependent capitalist social formation and which incorporates the political philosophy of Social Credit as a significant factor in the mobilization of the working class.

Pinard's account of "the mobilization of the discontented" in rural Quebec has already been shown to be wanting. The peculiar mix of variables Pinard isolates could lead to explanations for the electorate's mobilization that fall outside Pinard's model and which are specific to the political party itself. We are again left with the importance of the political ideology of Social Credit.

For Pinard, ideology becomes important only in the negative sense. With no other political options, the French-Canadian working class voted for Social Credit. Had there been a left-wing alternative, the French-Canadian working class would have inherently turned to it. But, what about the political philosophy of Social Credit itself? Were there not ideological elements within it which the working class could identify and therefore act upon? It is at the level of political ideology that the mobilization of the electorate should be analysed. Indeed, not only mobilization, but also the political direction of the electorate can be gauged. It is at this point that Macpherson's contribution can inform our research problem.

Macpherson's interpretation, though, rests on the numerical superiority of the petite bourgeoisie over other classes in society. As we have witnessed above, almost everyone has accused Macpherson of simplifying the social class structure and dynamics of Albertan society in the 1930's and 1940's by his insistence on its "relatively homogeneous social composition". There is nothing new in this criticism. My quarrel, though, is not with these empirical objections but with Macpherson's theoretical insistence that one of the two conditions necessary for the emergence and persistence of Social Credit in Alberta was the numerical superiority of a petit bourgeois class, the independent commodity producer. Having convincingly shown that the content of the political ideology of Social Credit was petit bourgeois in nature, the numerical superiority of this class in the provincial economy logically followed. Yet, the political hegemony of the independent commodity producer may have been due to the particular expression of the internal class relations of the

dominated class (that is, a fragmented and politically immature working class and a numerically large petite bourgeoisie). This criticism of Macpherson's study would require a re-examination of the class-based electoral support for the Albertan Social Credit Party. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, in the absence of numerical superiority the researcher is left with the task of incorporating elements within Macpherson's framework (that is, the nature of dependent capitalism conditions class formation in the hinterland) which would be capable of accounting for the particular form and content class relations took in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec and by so doing attempt an explanation for the manner by which the petite bourgeoisie could achieve political leadership through the political mobilization of the working class.

CHAPTER II

DEPENDENCY AND CLASS RELATIONS: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK

This chapter is divided into particular sections, the sequence of which is determined by selecting from the literature on dependency those indicators which would inform our analysis of class relations within a particular social setting. As we pointed out in the previous chapter, the skeletal framework begins with C.B. Macpherson's outline of dependent capitalism and an interpretation for a type of petit bourgeois politics. At the end of the last chapter, we stated the importance of ideology for our explanatory framework. Yet, before we can begin to incorporate the role played by ideology in the political mobilization of the working class by the petit bourgeoisie in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec, we must first specify how the structural circumstances historically emerged to permit the dominated classes to politically challenge their subordination within dependent capitalism.

Stated differently, the external constraints imposed by institutional actors arranged hierarchically in order of importance and historically to capture the dynamics of structural change constitute the necessary first step in the construction of the explanatory framework for this study. In other words, the ground rules, or, more appropriately, "the "givens" of the contemporary situation we are examining" must be provided first. (Hamilton: 1967:278). Only then can we proceed to situate the internal characteristics and dynamics of the dominated classes within these "givens". That is, our present task becomes the development of an explanatory

framework which will establish the basis for investigating the externally imposed limits on and possibilities for internally generated collective action.

Therefore, the remaining task can be divided into two broad strategies. First, since the setting for this study is a small region and not a complete province within Canada, a more detailed inquiry into the structural constraints on political and social life should be examined. This means that the institutions which created and fashioned the mold within which class relations developed become important. But, a catalogue of significant institutional "actors" would not get us very far. So, we must attempt to situate the major "actors" in a hierarchy of importance. Furthermore, the dimension of historicity is included in order to capture the particular dynamics of externally imposed change on this single industry community.

The principal institutional actors will be Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America. We will argue that the company created the conditions for the social production of dependent capitalism in this northwestern section of Québec. The nature of corporate leadership, the significance of the Horne Mine to both the community and the company and the historical development of Noranda Mines from a small, locally-based company to a multinational corporation are all intertwined in establishing the most important "given" for this study.

At a later point in the history of the community and the company, the United Steelworkers of America enters the picture and after a series of struggles with Noranda Mines is successful in establishing a local in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. While of lesser importance than the company, the political

nature of this trade union (that is, its economism) will contribute to the creation of appropriate structural conditions at a moment in time when a political vacuum in the community emerges.* This part of our task will not be an easy one since we are treading on relatively virgin territory (see my comment on page 6). We will attempt to follow a systematic, yet as judicious a procedure as possible.

Having established the institutional framework for analysing the externally imposed constraints on the capacity natural resource extracting social formations possess to produce their own conditions of existence, we would proceed next to the business of articulating the manner in which class relations would evolve in such a setting. The task here is twofold. First, the specificity of the class struggle within this particular single industry community will be examined. It is here where the institutional expression of capital, the historical evolution of the corporation, again bears most heavily on the analysis. While it can be argued that capital has an inherent interest in the preservation of the private appropriation of labour power, not all capitalists pursue this collective interest in the same manner. Some pursue it more aggressively than others. Some are more compromising. Still others are shortsighted and fall into the ranks of labour.* Therefore, the unique make-up of the capitalists who control Noranda Mines, namely James Murdoch and Alf Powis will determine the form of the class struggle; whether the combatants are uncompromising or flexible or whether the expression of the class struggle is violent (that is, strikes) or legally sanctioned (that is, collective bargaining).

Next, the specific basis by which a class alliance is forged between the dominated classes and its political and ideological expression is offered.

Once an interpretation is provided for the subordination of the dominated classes in dependent capitalism that covers two-thirds of the community's history, we will elaborate on how these social classes could come to articulate, in a single political voice, against their structural subordination. In other words, we will argue that threatened with the imminent exhaustion of the natural resource on which the community owed its social existence coupled with little prospect of future possibilities for economic growth, a class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class is forged and becomes politically articulated through the Ralliement des Créditists. We will argue that in this particular case it is at the level of ideology where the degree of mobilization and the political direction of the working class should concentrate.

We will posit that political leadership fell onto the petite bourgeoisie because the organizational expression of the working class, the United Steelworkers of America defaulted on the opportunity to offer a radical critique and strategy for economic growth in the region. The United Steelworkers of America was not capable of exercising such a mandate due to its unique history as a bulwark of anti-communism and its participation as an arm of United States foreign policy. Radical critiques and strategies do not come from defenders of the status quo. Therefore, the basis for a class alliance between the working class and the petite bourgeoisie is comprised of both structural and ideological components.

Recapitulating, this chapter will offer an explanatory framework for interpreting the mode of domination in a prototype of a dependent capitalist social formation. The dominant class represented by the corporation on one side and the dominated classes represented by the petite bourgeoisie and working

class on the other make up the social whole. The struggles between the corporation and the organized expression of the working class constitute the dynamics of internally generated social change. The successes or failures of either combatant condition the level at which the class struggle will proceed in the future.

Due to the nature of the petite bourgeoisie, that is, its inability to command large numbers of workers in a society increasingly so characterized, it cannot act as an independent social class distinct from the collective interests of capitalists or workers. We will see that in its attempts to pursue an independent course of action during periods of class struggle, it was unable to do so. Moreover, when it becomes necessary for the petite bourgeoisie to take a leadership role in the political life of this community, the political and ideological expression of the petite bourgeoisie contains elements that represent both capitalist and working class interests.

1. Agriculture, Class and Politics: The Legacy of C.B. Macpherson

Returning to Macpherson's study as the starting point for explaining the rise and the persistence of Social Credit in Rouyn-Noranda, it will be noted that he began with the dependent relationship of the Albertan agricultural hinterland with the Central Canadian industrial core. He demonstrated that the particular underdeveloped character of the Albertan economy was the single

most important factor in explaining the class composition and eventually the nature of the political ideology that influenced the thinking of the majority of Albertans. In other words, the agricultural production of wheat for an international market created technical preconditions which set limits on the complexity of the class composition of the provincial social structure. Therefore, the fact that Alberta had been relegated to an agricultural hinterland of Central Canada became a necessary condition in explaining the numerical strength of the independent commodity producer in the Albertan economy.

The principal economic relationship between Central Canada and the underdeveloped economy of Alberta focused on the importance of one staple export. In order to facilitate the exploitation of this staple the necessary infrastructure had to be built, that is, a transcontinental railroad which would be used for shipping the staple out and the movement of settlers, farm machinery and manufactured goods into the province. Dependence on Central Canadian banks for credit, manufacturing industries for farm implements, construction materials and consumer goods and the Canadian Pacific Railway for transportation arteries resulted in the creation of an economically subordinate region exhibiting a relatively simple class structure; that is, the underdevelopment of the Albertan economy created few opportunities for the establishment of secondary manufacturing and therefore "forced" significant numbers of Albertans to be gainfully occupied in primary production as independent commodity producers. Furthermore, as a result of the underdevelopment of the Albertan economy and its subordinate role within the framework of Central Canadian domination, there emerged and grew protests from independent commodity producers against their exploitation by metropolitan capitalists. Due to

their numerical strength and the lack of constraints on their political development imposed by either Central Canadian capitalists or an organized and politically conscious working class, the independent commodity producers were free to pursue what they felt were their collective political goals, in this case electoral support for the Social Credit Party.

For Macpherson, then, the underdeveloped character of the Albertan economy defined by the production for export of one major agricultural commodity, the relatively simple provincial class structure, the numerical superiority of the independent commodity producer and a particular brand of conservative petit bourgeois political ideology were all factors that intertwined to explain the electoral successes of the Social Credit Party during the Depression and immediate post-war period in Alberta. Furthermore, Macpherson stressed the importance of the underdeveloped character of the Albertan economy in explaining the other significant factors mentioned above. Put differently, the economic ties which bound Alberta to Central Canada constrained the development of class forces such as those linked to secondary manufacturing that would have undermined the numerical strength of the independent commodity producer and, by implication, the ability of the Social Credit Party to acquire political power in that province.

Unlike Alberta, Rouyn-Noranda has historically depended on the exploitation of a mineral resource, namely copper and gold and not an agricultural commodity. Therefore, the context within which the community is integrated as a functional part of the metropolis will be mediated by economic institutions which play a necessary role in the exploitation of copper and gold; namely, Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America. The fact that the working class will play a more significant role in the

class structure here than it did in Macpherson's study will necessarily change the analysis. As such, consideration must be given to how large scale economic enterprises fit into the dependency model. It is with this thought in mind, namely, the importance of structural dependence on class formation, that recourse will be made to recent dependency approaches of economic development to uncover certain theoretical elements which can later be re-integrated in order to construct an interpretive framework appropriate for analysing class relations within dependent capitalism and explaining Social Credit electoral strength in Rouyn-Noranda during the 1960s and 1970s.

2. The Natural Resource Enclave

a. The Multinational Corporation

I intend to begin to construct such an interpretive framework by referring to Stephan Hymer's two laws of economic development because he locates patterns of uneven development in the organizational structure of the multinational corporation (1972: 113-40). The first law he calls the "Law of Uneven Development" or the "tendency of the system to produce poverty as well as wealth, underdevelopment as well as development" (1972: 113). The second he calls the "Law of Increasing Firm Size".

By the "Law of Uneven Development", Hymer means that the concentration of capital both within and across nation-states has always been uneven. Hymer's basic tenet posits that multinational corporations, as the contemporary institutional expression of capitalist development, "would tend to produce a hierarchical division of labour between geographical regions corresponding to the vertical division of labour within the firm". In other words, this uneven arrangement has been defined by a vertical international division of

labour where the hinterland or the peripheral area contributes "captive production" of raw materials to an integrated economic organization which is itself an institutional expression of capitalist market forces. The corporation then manufactures and markets the finished product outside the territory and control of the peripheral region or community. As a result, this uneven structural relationship has led to the creation of a dynamic resource exporting enclave(s) which is (are) integrated as a functional part of the metropolitan economy and not the host nation (Frank, 1967; 1969; Rhodes, 1970; Oxaal et al, 1975). Since the weight of the problem of underdevelopment falls on an analysis of the capitalist firm, I turn presently to Hymer's "Law of Increasing Firm Size".

Hymer singles out five stages in the growth of the "representative business firm" in order to highlight the second law. He begins with the workshop, moves to the factory, then to the national corporation; next comes the multi-divisional corporation and finally the multinational corporation. Not all business enterprises need go through each and every stage. Hymer's stages represent metaphors which capture the historical movement of capitalist enterprise. This movement was also caught by Lenin when he noted that "the enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises represent one of the most characteristic features of capitalism" (Lenin, 1967: 685). Or, analysing modern capitalism from a different theoretical perspective, Berle and Means came to a similar conclusion when they wrote "within (the corporate system) there exists a centripetal attraction which draws wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size, at the same time throwing control into the hands of fewer and fewer men" (Berle and Means, 1934: 18).

Hymer goes on to argue that each stage is marked by a "more complex administrative structure to coordinate its activities and a larger brain to plan for its survival and growth" (1972: 114). In other words, the basic requirement for a qualitative change in the organizational structure of the capitalist firm was growth. Alfred Chandler summarized this characteristic of organizational change in capitalist business firms when he stated that

Until the volume or technological complexity of an enterprise's economic activities had so grown as to demand an increasing division of labour within the firm, little time needed to be spent on administrative work. Then the resulting specialization required one or more of the firm's executives to concentrate on coordinating, appraising and planning these specialized activities.... Expansion of volume led to the creation of an administrative office to handle one function in one local area. Growth through geographical dispersion brought the need for a departmental structure and headquarters to administer several local field units. The decision to expand into new types of functions called for the building of a central office and a multidepartmental structure, while the developing of new lines of products or continued growth on a national or international scale brought the formation of the multidivisional structure with a general office to administer the different divisions.. the move into new functions will be referred to as a strategy of vertical integration and that of the development of new products as a strategy of diversification. (Chandler, 1962: 13, 14; Emphasis in the original).

The process of growth which includes the expansion of productive facilities, labour force and supervisory personnel are often financed internally. In other words, a certain percentage of the profits generated by the business enterprise is used to finance new ventures or modernize existing facilities. But if the company requires significant sums of capital it must seek outside funds, usually from banks or other financial institutions. Both Kari Levitt (1970) and Stephan Hymer (1972) have argued that the contemporary world economy, characterized as it is by multinational corporations with their demands for huge sums of capital, has brought about the "re-integration of metropolitan entrepreneurship with metropolitan capital", or, more simply put, the integration

of multinational corporations with major banking institutions (Levitt, 1970: 31).

In our analysis of Noranda Mines, attention will be paid to the internally generated sources of capital for expansion and growth. We will also determine at what point in the company's history quantitative growth led to qualitative changes in the training of senior personnel and organizational structure. In other words, management "styles" are closely related to the size of the company. A small firm will be usually characterized by a paternalistic "style" in which direct, face-to-face contact with all subordinates is cultivated or aimed for as a goal. The larger company or multinational corporation cannot run in such a manner. A more bureaucratic, specialized management "style" is required of its senior executives. These two "styles" will be captured in the character of James Murdoch who ruled over the company and Noranda, Quebec for over a quarter of a century. The second "style" is represented by Alf Powis. His approach is more casual and he sees no personal need or desire to control the community which bears the company's name. James Murdoch's management "style" can be explained because the company was small and depended heavily on the Horne Mine for continued growth. On the other hand, Alf Powis controls a multinational corporation with world wide assets. The company is no longer dependent on one large mine and therefore he can "afford" to have a more aloof manner towards Noranda, Quebec than his predecessor. The "relaxation" of organizational control over the community typified by Alf Powis' management "style" will translate into the potential for more autonomy for the dominated classes in this natural resource hinterland. The significance of this organizational development will be drawn out later on in this chapter.

CHART I

STAGES IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH
OF A NATURAL RESOURCE COMPANY

LEGEND

- B ... Banks
- D ... Department (managing & coordinating field units)
- F ... Field Units
- H ... Headquarters
- M ... Manufacturing

SOURCE: Adapted from A. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure

This diagram shows the changing organizational structure of a natural resource company. In Phase A the company is totally dependent on its one important asset. Phase B denotes the organizational structure that evolved once corporate executives seek to vertically integrate and thereby control the manufacturing stage(s) of the total operation. Phase C, our final stage, depicts the corporation's diversification into other fields. One reason diversification is done is to minimize the adverse impact of downturns in demand for the single commodity the company depends on. Another, the case of Noranda Mines, was the likelihood of being taken over. It also shows the relative independence, compared to Phase A, of the corporation on any one field unit. Where in Phase A the mine played such a critical role in the continued survival of the corporation, by the final phase, this dependence had been significantly lessened. Because the focus of this inquiry is a mining community and region in Quebec, it is at the bottom level, the field unit, and its changing relationship with head office, where the analysis of large scale economic organizations will be concentrated.

Each level in the corporate pyramid is smoothly coordinated with all the others. Coordination means control and control is little more than saying that power must be centralized. Christopher Tugendhat in his important work on the structure and functioning of multinational corporation states:

The most striking characteristic of the modern multinational company is its central direction. However large it may be, and however many subsidiaries it may have scattered across the globe, all its operations are coordinated from the center...the subsidiaries are not run as separate enterprises each of which has to stand on its own feet. They must all work within a framework established by an overall group plan drawn up at headquarters, and their activities are tightly integrated with each other.... Central direction of this sort only became possible in the last two decades (1950's and 1960's). It depends for its effectiveness on rapid and reliable air travel, an efficient telephone, telegraph and telex system, and computers capable of handling a mass of information (1973: 31).

Certain important features of the multinational company therefore emerge. Power is concentrated in the metropolis or the geographic center of the organization. The subsidiary located in the hinterland is often "tightly integrated" within the internal corporate structure of the enterprise and as a result, is subordinate to the organizational goals dictated from the metropolis. Moreover, the effectiveness with which decisions arrived at in the center will be carried out at all levels of the hierarchy has been facilitated by recent developments in communications.

The coordination of functions, the financial requirements of the firm and the long-term strategies of the enterprise as a whole are all facets of power relations within the internal structure of the organization. The integration of each part into the whole edifice represents another subordinate link ultimately connected to a handful of powerful executives at head office located in a metropolis. Fundamental power is wielded by owners and managers of capital who exercise that power over other institutions, such as trade unions, and social classes, such as the petite bourgeoisie, in the hinterland in order to appropriate surplus and accumulate capital in the metropolis.

In order for the firm to be capable of sustained growth, the corporation cannot be dependent on any one natural resource subsidiary. Senior executives must seek to maximize the availability of raw materials no matter where they may be located in order to increase the growth potential of the enterprise and, by so doing minimize their availability to competitors. By spreading out the available sources of raw materials, senior executives have increased their flexibility while, at the same time, augmenting their power by threatening to shift their operations elsewhere if any social groups or classes in the hinterland seek to push for the further processing of the raw materials or demand a larger share of the surplus generated from the exploitation of the natural resource.

Certain natural resources such as nickel and oil pose a different problem for the men who control these corporations. Relative scarcity of these natural resources viz à viz copper, on a world scale, means that the field units represent very important links in the corporate chain of command. These field units are "tightly integrated" into the organizational structure of the corporation as a whole. But, dependence on scarce supply usually means that senior management seeks to intensify their exploration efforts for other sources of supply in the hope of minimizing their dependence on existing and diminishing mines or oil fields.

Up to now I have argued that the relationships of domination and subordination, and domination and underdevelopment are institutionalized within the corporate framework of multinational corporations. They can be found in the relations integrating regions within a nation or between nations where the principal mediating institution is the multinational corporation. The internationalization of capital which has taken the contemporary form of the multinational corporation has therefore been marked by a geographical bias, that is, surplus is concentrated in a metropolitan centre at the expense of where it is generated, in the underdeveloped hinterland. This unequal relationship is most pronounced as we have seen at the lowest level of the corporate hierarchy, the field unit, which for the purpose of this study is represented by the copper and gold mine in Noranda, Quebec. Because the raw material is of vital importance to the corporation's total operations, it is essential that natural resource subsidiaries be brought under the total control of the head office.

In Chandler's important study of the strategies and structures of large scale economic organizations in the United States, he concluded that the

histories of the copper companies "has been one of increasing centralized administrative control" (1962: 329). Thus, it would appear that the large copper companies were not immune to the development characterizing the growth of other economic institutions. This proposition of increasing firm size will be empirically tested in our study of Noranda Mines.

b. The Limited Internal Market.

As we saw with the nature of cash crop agricultural production in Alberta, the nature of natural resource extraction conditions the level of economic development in the hinterland. The underdeveloped character of the hinterland creates a limited internal market. Or, put differently, the more economically developed a region is, the more diversified its economy is and therefore the larger the internal market becomes.

Once a natural resource subsidiary is integrated within the hierarchical structure of the multinational corporation, its function is to contribute to the profitability and growth of the enterprise as a whole. It does not and is not meant to contribute to the economic development of the region where it is located. In other words, the decisions concerning the processing and manufacturing of products related to the particular natural resource will be determined at head office in the metropolis. As a result, the expansion of the internal market in the hinterland will be severely restricted and the creation of job opportunities in areas other than natural resource exploitation will be negligible (see also Rex Lucas: 1971). Therefore, the integration of the natural resource subsidiary into the corporate pyramid of the multinational corporation will impose limits on the future economic development of the hinterland region and, by implication, constrain the emergence of class forces other than those which reflect the bias of

natural resource extraction. This last point is of some importance and will be returned to later but suffice it to say here that the class structure in the underdeveloped hinterland will conform to the nature of the natural resource exploited in the region. For example, in C.B. Macpherson's study mentioned earlier the nature of an agricultural export economy created a relatively simple class structure in which the independent commodity producer comprised the largest single category of "gainfully employed". And, the class structure in underdeveloped hinterlands characterized by non-renewable natural resource enclaves, will be determined by the historical development of the externally imposed structure of the multinational corporation. Yet, while the relations between classes in the natural resource enclave would be profoundly influenced by the power which the corporation exercises over the lives of everyone working and living there, the working class and petite bourgeoisie are "internal, integral elements" of this particular social setting and would naturally seek the advancement of their own interests either collectively through some form of alliance or as individual social classes (re: as was the case in Alberta with the independent community producer).

It should be apparent from the preceding analysis that the role played by large scale capitalist economic organizations such as multinational corporations represent the most important "institutional framework", to borrow Girvan's typology, from which to account for the origins and nature of underdevelopment. The multinational corporation not only integrates a variety of economic functions within its overall corporate structure but also subordinates a critical component, namely, the natural resource subsidiary, to the goals of sustained growth and capital accumulation

for the enterprise as a whole.

A significant consequence arising from this dominant/subordinate relationship is the creation of a relatively small internal market in the natural resource enclave. Possibilities for economic development in the hinterland are restricted because the surplus generated there becomes institutionally funnelled to the metropolis where it is distributed according to criteria arrived at by the firm's senior executives.

c. The state and the trade union in the hinterland¹

In most cases, the role of the state in the periphery has been one of facilitating the exploitation of the natural resource through measures such as building the infrastructure of roads and railways, ensuring an adequate supply of energy and, even, enticing these corporate giants by providing subsidies or tax concessions. (Frank, 1972; Moran, 1974; Quijano, 1971; Baran, 1957). These actions by the state make it a willing but subordinate partner to the corporation. The state has entered into such arrangements with multinational companies for a variety of reasons, such as alleviating regional unemployment and/or enlarging the tax-based revenues accruing to the state treasury (Moran, 1974).

The context of the relationship between the state and the corporation will determine the nature of the relations between the state and the working class in the natural resource enclave. If the state and the corporation enjoy what appear to be a mutually beneficial arrangement, then, in all likelihood, the state will do all in its power to maintain this bond by restricting the collective expression of the working class. This usually refers to measures

¹ The next three pages borrow some of the ideas contained in Norman Girvan's recent contribution to the "dependencia" model entitled Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation, (New York: Modern Reader, 1976), Chapter I, "Corporate Imperialism in Mineral-Export Economies", pp. 11-51.

aimed at repressing trade unions either through legal means or by using the state's policing functions against workers when the need arises, such as during strikes. On the other hand, if relations are strained between the two parties, then the possibility arises that the state may be more supportive towards trade unions and their demands.

These two extremes follow an historical continuum beginning with a hostile relationship between the state and trade unions, but progressing, over time, towards a more sympathetic view of their role in society. The early history of the natural resource enclave will invariably be characterized by a close working relationship between the company and the state. This relationship endures for some time due to the powerful position of the corporation and the service rendered to the state by the corporation; for example, providing employment and/or tax revenues. Consequently, the state will inhibit the organizing of workers and openly challenge the goals of trade unions operating in the periphery. As time passes and the corporation has increased its share of assets and raw material production in the periphery, the balance of power will begin to shift towards the state. The state can begin to challenge the corporation's power over what happens to the surplus generated in the periphery and how it is distributed with some degree of success because of the firm's increased stake in the peripheral economy (see for example, Moran, 1974). Of course, this possibility is contingent on the corporation increasing its capital investment. If it does not, the likelihood of the state being able to successfully challenge the corporation's power or even wanting to exercise more authority in decisions affecting the local economy, will probably be lessened.

But having acknowledged this proviso, it can be safely argued that the state's relations with trade unions located in the enclave economy will in all likelihood continue to improve since trade unions are a significant countervailing power to the corporation.

The state's bargaining maneuverability with the corporation during the later phases of the historical continuum spoken of earlier would be enhanced if it were to create a more sympathetic environment for trade unions to operate within. Trade unions have occasionally challenged the legitimacy of capitalist institutions but they have more often struggled through institutionalized means such as collective bargaining to acquire a larger share for its members of the income generated by the corporation. These interests over what represents the appropriate share of the economic surplus for each of the three economic actors, the state, the trade union and the corporation, and the conflicts they engender may eventually become translated into the short-term, shared goals of the trade union and the state in the periphery vis-à-vis the corporation (Davies, 1966). Of course, the likelihood of this trend developing does not deny that the vested interests of each contestant, namely, the state and the trade unions may, in the long run, be contradictory or form the basis of conflicting strategies for development (Quijano, 1971)..

While the role of the state contributes to understanding either the broadly defined limits imposed on trade unions or their potential maneuverability in the periphery, there remain at least two other factors which undermine the power of trade unions vis-à-vis the corporation. First, their bargaining power will tend to be weakened by the existence of a readily available large labour pool. For example, in Chapter VI, the early struggles for a trade union in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec were thwarted because the Great Depression of

the 1930's had provided management with a very large workforce desperately looking for jobs. Second, the corporation, for whatever reasons, may concede large wage increments during negotiations with the trade union resulting in what later may be a higher capital/labour ratio or an absolute decline in the workers employed. A higher wage bill may make it economically feasible to replace a proportion of the workforce with machines. A reduction in the union's membership brought on by technology can mean a decrease in its overall power vis-à-vis the corporation (Beynon and Nichols, 1977; Braverman, 1974: 150).

Recapitulating, the important features of the dependency matrix include (1) a dynamic resource exporting enclave which is integrated as a functional part of the metropolitan economy by a transnational corporation, (2) the increasingly important role played by the trade union in the hinterland, albeit of less significance to the role played by the multinational corporation.

Having said this, the "institutional framework" of the dependency approach outlined earlier by Norman Girvan has led me to include in the interpretive framework for this case study (1) the structure and strategies of the transnational corporation, (2) the structure and objectives of the trade union as they have evolved historically. In other words, the dependency model has emphasized the significant institutional factors that account for the unequal structural arrangements between the core and peripheral areas, their importance in constraining economic development in the natural resource enclave, which, in turn, has imposed limits on the emergence of class forces other than those related to the exploitation of the particular raw material.

3. Class Relations in Natural Resource Enclaves

a. Class Formation

Up to now, I have argued that it is the historical development of the corporation and its relationship with the natural resource enclave that is of critical significance since without the company there would be no community. And second, the integrated nature of the company conditions the level of economic development within the enclave economy and, as a result, constrains the emergence of class forces independent of natural resource extraction. Therefore, class formation in a concrete, historically given community and region begins with the creation of the means of production, in this instance characterized by the exploration and eventual exploitation of the Horne copper and gold mine in Noranda, Quebec.

The corporation is the most important institution for this study because within capitalism the private firm's ability to mobilize capital and people makes it the more powerful entity. According to Stephen Hymer and others, capitalist economic development which is mediated by the multi-national corporation has always been uneven. The geographic form which it takes can be expressed by the fact that some regions benefit at the expense of others. The former is known as the metropolis (or core) while the latter is the hinterland (or periphery). Both capital and natural resources are drained out of the hinterland and are utilized in the metropolis for expanding job opportunities and further exploitation of resources in the hinterland.

The integrated structure of the corporation would condition the limited opportunities for economic development in the natural resource enclave. The processing of the raw material is under the absolute control of head office. The various stages of fabrication take place in different geographic locations and follow the economic logic of the particular corporation. The weakest link in this chain of command and production is the natural resource enclave. In

other words, the potential existence of minerals throughout the world makes this stage the least important one for the continued survival and growth of the corporation. So long as the firm expands its natural resource base to include many mines, it achieves a degree of independence from any one of them. On the other hand, if we are dealing with a scarce natural resource then the field unit may play a very significant role. By necessity, head office may believe it to be imperative that its field units be tightly integrated into the corporate structure. In which case, the likelihood of organizationally relaxing corporate control in the hinterland would be highly unlikely.

It was argued above that because the natural resource enclave is integrated into the corporate structure of the private firm, its function is to contribute to the profitability and growth of the enterprise as a whole and not to the economic development of the region where it is located. Since the technical preconditions of natural resource extraction inhibit the creation of secondary manufacturing and the fact that capital is drained out of the enclave, the avenues of economic opportunity there are confined to those industries directly related to the exploitation of the natural resource and to providing services to the community (for example, retail businesses, entertainment, legal services and transportation). Furthermore, since it is with a natural resource company and not with a manufacturing industry that this study is concerned, the specific characteristics of that natural resource are important. Whether it is an agricultural product or a raw material derived from the exploitation of a nonrenewable resource will condition the social class composition within the enclave. The former case can give rise to the predominance of independent commodity producers, as was evidenced in C.B. Macpherson's Study of Social Credit in Alberta. On the other hand, we will

argue below that the latter would result in the creation of an industrial skilled and unskilled working class and a petite bourgeoisie located in the sphere of circulation. In other words, the economic integration of the resource hinterland into the corporate structure of the enterprise conditions the development of a locally-based petite bourgeoisie predominate in the sphere of circulation. Therefore, in addition to determining the structure of the working class, the corporation also conditions the nature and the level of development of the petite bourgeoisie in the natural resource enclave. Moreover, since the structural relationship between the metropolis and the natural resource hinterland is uneven, the subordination of the local economy to the metropolitan one engenders in the former an antagonism towards the latter's dominating position and role. In other words, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie as the two dominated classes in the natural resource enclave would tend to repudiate their subordination, although these protests might take muted forms at different historical moments instead of a clearly articulated expression of defiance at all times.

When the multinational corporation is capable of maintaining economic growth within a dependent capitalist setting, its political dominance is a reflection of its ability to sustain economic opportunities there and the extent of challenges from the dominated classes are thereby lessened. As will be demonstrated later, for over three decades the exploration and exploitation of other minerals in northwestern Quebec occasioned by the Horne discovery of a large copper-gold deposit in Noranda, Quebec sustained a "frontier environment" which encouraged petit bourgeois entrepreneurship in the sphere of circulation and relative security of employment for the working class. In addition, it will be shown that during this period when the Horne

Mine was seen by senior management as an important asset to the future growth of the company, the Board of Directors possessed the conviction and the strength to obstruct the development of what was felt to be "undesirable elements". This referred specifically to hampering the incorporation of trade unionism in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. Therefore, the unique character of senior management at Noranda Mines profoundly influenced the course the class struggle would take throughout the history of this community. So long as James Murdoch was Chairman of the Board of Directors, Rouyn-Noranda would be the site for some of Québec's most bitter strikes. A change at the executive level which would see the retirement of James Murdoch in 1956 and the eventual election of Alf Powis would correspond with a change in management styles towards trade unions. The new approach became more bureaucratic and more tolerant towards trade unions than during the earlier period. This shift in management style is roughly coincident with the incursions made by the United Steelworkers of America into Rouyn-Noranda, Québec.

What remains is to analyse, in more depth, class relations within the context of this study. We shall begin with an examination of trade unions under capitalism and move on to specify the nature of the trade union which will have an important political influence on the working class at a later point in the history of Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. We proceed next to identifying both the social basis and the political ideology of the petite bourgeoisie. We return to the importance of ideology for this study by specifying those elements within Social Credit that are included among the conditions for a class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class. We conclude by integrating these steps into an explanatory framework.

b. Working Class Relations: Trade Unions under Capitalism

Capital may be the more powerful of the two fundamental social classes under capitalism, but as the second major contender, an examination into the nature of the working class should provide us with some insights into the possible political directions the working class may move towards given certain internal structural conditions. We begin by asking the question: Is the working class revolutionary? Some, such as revolutionary syndicalists would answer unequivocally in the affirmative. The inherent spontaneity of the working class, so the syndicalist would have us believe, is pictured as being at the heart of its revolutionary zeal. And, as such, the syndicalist project for a socialist future begins with the "General Strike" of all the workers in order to bring capitalism crashing to its knees. But such a vision can hardly be seriously maintained today. In the words of French Marxist Henri Lefebvre "the working class is not revolutionary in itself, by itself, for itself; there is no revolutionary essence of the working class" (1976: 95). An attempt must be made to come to grips theoretically with the nature of the working class and the role which trade unions play under capitalism and more specifically in our particular case, dependent capitalism.

The worker enters into the process of production by selling his labour power to an owner of capital. The worker's role, then, is not to direct production but to put himself at the disposal of an employer for a specified period of time. He receives a wage as the price of his labour power which he, in turn, uses to purchase commodities to sustain himself and his family's means of existence so that he may continue in this relationship. On the other hand, the employer appropriates the product of the worker's labour power which he sells at a profit. Therefore, the fact that the worker

is "free" to sell his labour power to an employer and the contradiction between the private appropriation of the product by the employer and the social organization of production, are the fundamental elements defining the worker's position in the mining industry and, more generally, in capitalist societies.

It is from this antagonistic relationship that combinations of workers are based and worker's organizations established whose goals often include instrumental demands and a degree of control over the work process. Marxists have advanced the notion of "trade union consciousness" or "economism" to account for the instrumentalism of trade unions under capitalism. Marx, Lenin, Gramsci and Trotsky all spoke to this issue and Perry Anderson has been able to aptly and succinctly distil their arguments when he says

As institutions, trade unions do not challenge the existence of society based on a division of classes, they merely express it. Thus trade unions can never be viable vehicles of advance towards socialism in themselves; by their nature they are tied to capitalism. They can bargain within the society, but not transform it. (Anderson, 1977: 334)

Such a harsh indictment of trade unions as expressions of the working class' short term interests belies the potential for radical social change stemming from working class institutions themselves. Yet, Anderson and most Marxists would maintain that class conflict still exists within contemporary capitalist society, but they would argue that "where there is no political articulation of this conflict, it will be the most elemental form -- economic struggle -- that will subsist" (Anderson, 1977: 342). Or, in a different vein, it has been argued that "to the extent that the working class allows itself to be held within the ideology of the enterprise, it tends to rebuild the relations of production and to reproduce them" (Lefebvre, 1976: 99). As a result, to

the degree which trade unions limit themselves to working within capitalism, their general organizational goals will increasingly reflect the day-to-day struggles in the capitalist firm.

The importance of socialism as an ideological counterweight to "economism" becomes all the more problematic when it is realized that socialism as a political ideology of the working class must be learned. Important factors which influence the degree of socialist education are the nature of trade union leadership and the role of a working class political party. (It is a well known historical fact that Lenin countered the "economism" inherent in trade unionism by positing the significant role to be played by the revolutionary vanguard party.) Maurice Zeitlin, in his analysis of the working class in the Cuban revolution, spoke to the important conjuncture of historical, ideological and leadership factors.

Not only the content of socialist ideology but also the talent of the movement's leaders, their tactical skills, their knowledge, their daring and courage, both physical and intellectual, their oratorical gifts and organizational abilities, their personal persuasiveness and integrity - all these qualities of a movement's leadership enter into and may have a determining effect on the political course the workers will take. The whole gamut of qualities that competing political organizations and movements present to the workers...will condition their success. (Zeitlin, 1970: 6)

Taken together, the principal theoretical point to reiterate is that socialist ideology and practice is learned and does not come spontaneously to the working class. The structure of working class organizations, of which the trade union is the most important, the role played by a revolutionary political party, if any exists, and the nature of trade union leadership, are among the critical factors which intervene and contribute to directing the political role the working class will play; whether it will be restricted to the economic front, pursue a social democratic path or whether it will engage in

a radical criticism and seek to transform society in a socialist manner.

Can anything more be said about the political role of trade unions under capitalism? The analysis presented above was restricted to trade unions operating within the national boundaries of core capitalist countries. But, what can be said of international unions?

c. "Trade Union Foreign Policy"

An almost forgotten area of research in the dependency approach has been the role of trade unions based in metropolitan countries but whose activities extend to the peripheral nations of the world. The only important work in this vein has been Jeffrey Harrod's Trade Union Foreign Policy: A Study of British and American Trade Union Activities in Jamaica, (New York, 1972). The British Trade Union Council (TUC) and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) are the two labour bodies Harrod focused on: The bauxite industry workers were the sole attraction that lured them to Jamaica. The desire, organizational capabilities and self-interest of the USWA resulted in their eventual success in representing these Jamaican mine workers.

What can be said about trade union foreign policy? Harrod has argued that:

It was not, however, until after World War II that direct involvement of trade unions from one society in a foreign society became prevalent. No doubt arising from cooperation with state diplomacy, in 1945, the American Congress of

Industrial Organization (CIO) and the American Federation of Labour (AFL) began extensive independent activities and by 1950, the AF or L was spending approximately \$500,000 annually on international affairs and maintaining bureaux with full-time staff in Brussels and Latin America. An author writing in 1948 described this as "a new kind of diplomacy, a kind of free enterprise diplomacy". (1972: 36)

If trade union foreign policy was a "new kind of free enterprise diplomacy", in what respects did trade unions contribute to the maintenance of the free enterprise system? Harrod is again instructive. In analysing the role of the United Steelworkers of America in the Jamaican bauxite industry, he concludes by arguing:

Workers in North America were, barring bauxite stockpile releases, dependent upon the two thousand Jamaican workers in the bauxite mining and alumina processing facilities...it was for these... workers that the USWA was involved in Jamaica and the general objective was to ensure the uninterrupted supply of bauxite and alumina to the plants of the USA, thus preventing work disruption among members and at the same time fulfilling a national strategic policy. (1972: 350-351)

The point I seek to draw from Harrod's important study is a simple one. Trade unions from metropolitan nations who organize workers in the natural resource enclave economies may play a contributory role in stabilizing the vertically integrated structures of multinational corporations. Since the same union (that is, the United Steelworkers of America) is one principal institutional actor in both Harrod's and my own study, and because the timing of the USWA's organizational drive at Noranda, Quebec roughly coincides with their efforts in Jamaica; taken together, makes the importance of analysing the structure and objectives of the United Steelworkers of America in Canada and Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec all the more important. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect that the general objectives of "economism" and "free enterprise diplomacy" advanced by the United Steelworkers of

America had dramatically changed when they were organizing mine and smelter worker in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Therefore, its role in that natural resource enclave, in addition to advancing the instrumental demands of the rank and file, would include maintaining the unequal structural relations between core and periphery. Maintaining the unequal structural relations between the core and periphery would mean, at the very least, ignoring the choice of politically advancing economic development in the enclave. Passive acceptance of the "way things are" would confine the leadership of the union to "bread and butter" issues. Of course, organizationally this would include containing the emergence and development of socialist ideology. So that, in addition to the "economism" or "trade union consciousness" characterizing trade unions generally under capitalism, the particular case of the United Steelworkers of America in Rouyn-Noranda would include a strategy and structure consonant with maintaining dependent capitalist relations.

This is of obvious importance in terms of the present analysis since the role of the trade union within the natural resource enclave would be the political containment, institutionally expressed, of the Rouyn-Noranda working class. Allow me to be perfectly clear on this point. What this refers to is the proposition that the United Steelworkers of America would not independently and politically struggle against the unequal arrangement between core and periphery because it plays, to borrow again from Norman Girvan, an "institutional part" in these "structural relations". It would confine its demands to increments in the wage and benefit package negotiated with management for the rank and file mine and smelter workers. Therefore, the desire and degree to which the United Steelworkers of America would

mobilize the community's working class would be determined not only by its strength vis-à-vis management and rival trade unions but also by the extent to which these mine and smelter workers could further its general objectives of "economism" and "free enterprise diplomacy".

There is nothing in the nature of the United Steelworkers of America in and of itself that would make it more successful in organizing the working class in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec than any other trade union. As we will show in Chapter VI, the eventual "success" of the United Steelworkers of America came as a result of the positive action by the provincial government. Noranda Mines, through its Chairman of the Board, James Murdoch continued to be intransigent towards legally recognizing any trade union in the corporation, or admitting the potential benefits for management of the collective bargaining process.

What the installation of the United Steelworkers of America in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec would mean is that it would be institutionally incapable of mobilizing the community's working class because (1) of its organizational propensity to limit the internal development of radical political alternatives in addition to (2) its contributory role in containing the antagonism between core and periphery by, for example, ignoring political and economic alternatives to dependent capitalism (for example, failing to demand worker control over the industry).

This does not mean that there would not be some individuals in the United Steelworkers of America who would struggle to alter its present political orientation. Yet, the significance of these developments points to the potential for change within the organization. Unfortunately, they do not touch on existing structural constraints imposed by the organization

itself on local politics.

The fact that CCF and later NDP candidates were fielded at the federal level in this riding depicts the commitment of some to pursue a social democratic alternative. Yet, the evidence of minimal support for these candidates in this community also hints at the degree of commitment the organization has afforded to the pursuit of political alternatives. This point is further enhanced when it will be shown in Chapter VI that when a trade union, in this case, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, an alleged "Communist" union, became involved in organizing the mine and smelter workers, it was the first and only time a CCF candidate (the union organizer) was elected to the provincial legislature.

d. The Class and Ideological Determination of the Petite Bourgeoisie within Dependent Capitalism

Returning for the moment to the studies by C.B. Macpherson and Maurice Pinard elaborated upon above, the political ideology of Social Credit was consistent with the class interests of the petite bourgeoisie. For instance Pinard points out that the support for Social Credit given by the small businessmen "was as much the result of congruence between their ideology and that of the party as the effect of deteriorating economic conditions" (1971: 113). Moreover, for Macpherson, Social Credit represented a particular brand of petit bourgeois ideology. He spoke of Social Credit as not only a class-based political worldview but as the protest of a "quasi-colonial society....in rebellion against eastern imperialism" (1953: 220). In other words, Social Credit represented the outcome of specific political struggles waged by a distinctive community of interests. The relative homogeneity of this community of interests (that is, its petit bourgeois make-up) constituted not only the

movement's power but also would become the cause for its eventual demise.

On the other hand, the community of interests in Rouyn Noranda, Québec, was made up of two social classes, the petite bourgeoisie and the working class.

We have examined, in some detail, the dominant role played by capital in determining the structural constraints at the local level. We have also concluded that an organizational analysis of the trade union is necessary in order to gauge the degree of socialist political activity it is actively engaged in. We have also pointed to the significance of political ideology for our explanatory framework. In other words, we have provided the structural constraints imposed by external institutions on class relations in the community and have suggested where we should look next when it comes to the manner by which the dominated classes can collectively respond to their subordination. It remains for us to analyse in more depth the nature of the petite bourgeoisie within dependent capitalism.

Nicos Poulantzas (1978) has addressed himself to the problem of defining the petite bourgeoisie and suggesting the possible political roles in which the petite bourgeoisie can engage. He begins by defining the petite bourgeoisie as "neither belong (ing) to the bourgeoisie nor to the working class" (1978: 206). Realizing that a negative definition is insufficient, he maintains that "although the exclusion of these groupings from certain places (bourgeoisie, proletariat) does not suffice to locate their specific situation, this exclusion still indicates, even at the level of economic relations, the outlines of their places, which are reaffirmed by the political and ideological relations" (1978: 206; Emphasis mine).

More concretely, the twin pillars of the petite bourgeoisie for Poulantzas are small-scale production and small-scale ownership. The former

"consists of forms of artisan production, or small family businesses, where the same agent is both owner and possessor of his means of production, as well as the direct producer" and as such "draws profit from the sale of its goods and through the overall redistribution of surplus-value, but does not directly extort surplus value". The latter refers to "retail trade in the circulation sphere, where the owner of the trading stock, helped by his family, provides the labour, and again only occasionally employs wage-labour". The class determination of the petite bourgeoisie so defined "lies in the fact that the direct producer is in each case himself the owner of the means of labour, that is, in the combination of ownership with the absence of direct exploitation of wage labour" (1978: 285). It should be obvious that Poulantzas' definition of the petite bourgeoisie approaches that of C.B. Macpherson, discussed earlier.

Within dependent capitalism, as outlined above, the petite bourgeoisie will predominate in "the sphere of circulation" or "small-scale ownership" and not in the area of "small-scale production". It was argued above that the nature of dependent capitalism restricted the opportunities for economic development within the natural resource enclave, thereby minimizing the likelihood that capital would find a home in "small-scale production". (In a similar vein, see Geoffrey Kay's analysis of merchant's capital and underdevelopment; 1975: 96-124). Consequently, the class determination of the petite bourgeoisie within the prototype of dependent capitalism will be restricted to the "sphere of circulation". This distinction will become more important when the particular political ideology of Social Credit is examined.

Poulantzas goes on to argue that reference must be made to the

"political and ideological relations" because the petite bourgeoisie "is not at the centre of the dominant relations of production, that is, the direct extraction of surplus-value; it undergoes a polarization that produces very complex distortions and adaptations of the political and ideological relations in which it is placed" (1978: 207). That is, it may not be the objective location of the petite bourgeoisie which is the important characteristic of this class for the researcher, but, under what circumstances the petite bourgeoisie becomes an "actor" in society. It is only when the petite bourgeoisie is "thrust" onto the historical stage that its significance as a class becomes recognized. That is, it is the point when the myriad intermediary relations the petite bourgeoisie had previously been engaged in become congealed into a political and ideological force.

In this case, the petite bourgeoisie in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec takes on an historically meaningful role only in times of crisis such as during strikes and at that conjuncture of structural factors when it politically articulates against the subordination of both itself and the working class. Its role in the former will be its attempt but inability to work out an independent class strategy in the face of the struggle between capital and labour. Its role in the latter case centers on its capability to mobilize the working class through the specific politico-ideological appeals of the Ralliement des Créditistes.

It is the nature of these "political and ideological relations" and their specific articulation that informs Poulantzas' theoretical concern for the role played by the petite bourgeoisie in capitalist society and not the empirical investigation into whether so-and-so is or is not an objective

member of the petite bourgeoisie. Taking this insight into account, it is with the "political and ideological relations" of the petite bourgeoisie that this research problem is concerned with and not a detailed investigation of who is or is not a member of the Rouyn-Noranda petite bourgeoisie. That is, one facet of our research problem is to provide an explanation for the persistence of a specific kind of petite bourgeois "political and ideological" phenomenon in northwestern Quebec. Therefore, we must address the theoretical and empirical problem of the phenomenon in question, namely Social Credit as a petit bourgeois political ideology and the nature of the class support for it within a particular social setting. Put differently, an analysis of the objective membership of the local petite bourgeoisie is not of major concern for this research problem.

Poulantzas addresses the problem of the "political and ideological relations" of the petite bourgeoisie by arguing that because it does not possess an autonomous class position in the long run, he must refer to the ideology of the petite bourgeoisie as a "sub-ensemble" since the "only ideological ensembles that have a specific coherence and are relatively systematic are those of the dominant bourgeois ideology and of the ideology connected to the working class" (1978: 287). He then proceeds by suggesting that "elements" of bourgeois ideology and working class ideology are injected into the ideological "sub-ensemble" of the petite bourgeoisie. But, Poulantzas is quick to point out that the "presence of working class ideology in the petty-bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble always tends to be dominated both by specifically petty bourgeois ideological elements and by the bourgeois ideology that is also constitutively present in the petty bourgeois sub-ensemble" (1978: 289, Emphasis mine).

The point I seek to draw from Poulantzas' analysis of the "petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble" is that there are elements within it with which the working class can identify and which may be used, given the correct circumstances, by the petite bourgeoisie to mobilize the working class for its own particular class objectives. Because there are working class ideological elements within the "petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble", it is not, as a political ideology "foreign" to the working class, even though working class ideology tends to be a subordinate part of the total "sub-ensemble".

What constituted, concretely the ideological sub-ensemble of the petite bourgeoisie? Of primary importance is its dualism, that is, its anti-capitalist stand but articulated in a "status quo" fashion. What Poulantzas means by this is that the petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble

is against 'the rich', but the traditional petty bourgeoisie are often afraid of a revolutionary transformation of society, since this grouping fiercely holds onto its (small) property and is afraid of being proletarianized. It makes sharp demands against the monopolies, since it is gradually itself being ruined and eliminated by monopoly capitalism, but these often aim at restoring 'equal opportunity' and 'fair competition', which is how the fantasies of the petty bourgeoisie picture the past stage of competitive capitalism. What this petty bourgeoisie often seeks is change without the system changing. It aspires to share in the 'distribution' of political power...and exhibits characteristic resistance towards the radical transformation of this power....

Afraid of proletarianization below, attracted towards the bourgeoisie above, these petty-bourgeois agents also aspire to become bourgeois by way of 'individual' upward transfer (becoming small businessmen) for the 'best' and 'most capable'. This aspect also often takes elitist forms, those calling for a renewal of elites, and a replacement of the bourgeoisie which is 'not fulfilling its role' by the petty bourgeoisie, by way of a 'democratization' of capitalist society.

An ideological aspect of power fetishism: its economic isolation (petty-bourgeois individualism) and its distinction from both the bourgeoisie and the working class give rise to the belief in a neutral state above classes; this petty bourgeoisie expects

the state, duly 'democratized', to bring it rain and sunshine from above....

In this case the traditional petty bourgeoisie also identifies itself with the state, whose neutrality coincides with its own, and conceives itself as a neutral class between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and thus as the pillar of a state that would be 'its' state. (1978: 295-96)

From the description provided by Poulantzas, the political ideology which best reflects the interests of the petite bourgeoisie located in the sphere of circulation would be a theory of underconsumption. Underconsumption is defined as the lack of purchasing power by the mass of wage and salary workers (see Bleaney, 1976: 204-06). According to Bleaney, the core of Social Credit philosophy is built upon such a theory and is known as the "A plus B theorem". First articulated in the 1920's by Major C.H. Douglas, a British mechanical engineer, it stated that "all payments made to individuals (wages, salaries and dividends) (A) and all payments made to other organizations (raw materials, bank charges and other external costs) (B) go into prices, the rate of flow of prices cannot be less than A plus B". Since "the rate of flow of purchasing power to individuals is represented by A" only, then it is impossible for A to purchase A and B. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the state to create money to distribute as "dividends" to consumers to cover B.

In more general terms, the ideological sub-ensemble of the petit bourgeoisie can be distilled into the notion of 'the people' versus 'the power bloc' political struggle. And, since the working class does not constitute 'the power bloc' or any fraction of it but, is part of 'the people', the working class will tend to respond to this particular ideological discourse. But, and this is of crucial importance, the working

class will so respond (1) in the absence of a clearly articulated socialist ideology expressed by a political party and (2) when working class ideology (i.e. socialism) has been neutralized in the overall political discourse or when both conditions have been met (Pinard's insistence on the monolithic and conservative character of French Canadian political ideology could represent an instance of the first condition referred to above). By neutralized, I mean limiting working class ideology to the 'economism' and sectional interests of trade unionism described earlier.

Moreover, the rights of private property are powerfully sanctioned in our society. To put forward a serious challenge to the rights of private property would require a determined effort on the part of the organized working class. In the absence of such a challenge, the *petite bourgeoisie* takes on a leadership role in this struggle by default.

e. The Role of French Canadian Nationalism in the Petit Bourgeois

Ideological Sub-Ensemble

In the review of the literature on 'dependencia' theory little mention was made of the ideological role nationalism could play in the mobilization of the dominated classes in the natural resource enclave. It is generally accepted that the twin issues of language and religion have played significant historical roles in Quebec and Canadian politics. Both are the two more important characteristics which define and separate French-Canadians from other ethnic groups in the province of Quebec. In addition to cultural dissimilarities is the existence of an ethnic division of labour. Everett Hughes was the first sociologist to analyse the work world in Quebec in ethnic terms. He analysed the impact of industry on rural Quebec society in this manner:

The labour is largely native; the management is alien to the native culture. No great wonder that they (French Canadians) attribute the trials of the new life not only to the industrial system but to the fact that it was introduced and is controlled by aliens. (1938: 349)

Externally imposed, foreign control of industry resulting in a separation of economic function coterminous with ethnic differences characterized Quebec's industrial structure then and now. John Porter (1965), Richard Ossenberg (1971) and Hubert Guindon (1964, 1967, 1978) are among the many social scientists who have analysed and explained social and political phenomena in Quebec with reference to the ethnic division of labour. They have argued that capitalist industrialization in Quebec fueled the flames of an already existing Catholic nationalism and secularized it in the period which led up to the Quiet Revolution. In addition, the unequal meeting of "the two solitudes" in the realm of work fostered resentment and bitterness towards what was felt to be an unjust economic arrangement. Some commentators such as Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1968) have argued that one of the political expressions of Quebecois nationalism (the 'Independentist' movement" was a retrogressive political product of capitalist industrialization in the province. He nonetheless saw this development (that is, French-Canadian nationalism) as a powerful force in the mobilization of French-Canadians in Quebec.

The point of bringing up the role of French Canadian nationalism as a significant element within this particular petit bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble is a simple one. Macpherson made no mention of nationalism in his analysis since Alberta did not constitute a nation: a recent frontier, yes; a nation, clearly not. On the other hand, Pinard underscored the

positive role of nationalism in mobilizing support for Social Credit candidates. In contrast to Pinard, Michael Stein whose history of Social Credit in Québec will be relied upon in Chapter VII, places a great deal of weight on the nationalism of Réal Caouette in molding the political ideology of the party. The evidence Stein provides and the significant role exercised by French Canadian nationalism throughout most of its recent political history would tend to lend credence to the positive role of nationalism in contributing to the mobilization of the dominated classes in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. Moreover, the point we are making is to suggest that appeals to French Canadian nationalism would be one way of forging a class alliance between the dominated classes in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec by smoothing over differences in social class interests between the petit bourgeoisie and the working class. Therefore, in addition to a petit bourgeois "ideological sub-ensemble", the existence of French-Canadian nationalism in the natural resource enclave would tend to facilitate the political mobilization of the dominated classes.

4. The Explanatory Framework

Bringing together the pieces of our puzzle into an interpretative system will be our present task. We laid out the procedures for developing the explanatory framework at the outset of this chapter. We pointed out that specifying the external structures of domination was the necessary first step in our plan. Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America became the two major institutions which would impose structural limits on class relations within this natural resource enclave. Other factors such as the provincial government and the supply of labour in this region of Québec would have to be considered but remained of secondary importance to the two institutions referred to above.

Having established the contours within which class relations would evolve, we proceeded by positing the possibilities for internally generated collective action. In this regard, we suggested the particular history of class struggles (that is, strikes) in this natural resource enclave depicted the domination of capital over the dominated classes. The continuity of capital's domination over the dominated classes within dependent capitalism was the result of the company's determination in exercising control over its assets in the community, in this case, the most important asset was the Horne mine.

As we argued above, the less important the mine became for the continued profitable growth of the corporation, the probability increased for relaxing the degree of domination in the natural resource enclave. That is the degree of importance of the mine to the company is inversely related to the growth of Noranda Mines into a multinational corporation. In addition to the institutional pattern of increasing size of the company leading to greater "degrees of freedom" for the dominated classes to manoeuvre, the exhaustion of the natural resource would distance the company even more from the community and afford a further structural opportunity for the dominated classes to act.

Yet, we have also pointed out that the political direction collective action would take by the dominated classes would be greatly influenced by the organizational proclivities of the trade union. The less aggressively socialist in orientation the trade union was, the greater the probability that the political direction would take on a petit bourgeois outlook. Therefore, a conjuncture of structural factors would coalesce at approximately the same moment in time creating the opportunity for the petite bourgeoisie to take on a leadership role in the natural resource enclave.

Before the petite bourgeoisie could exercise this leadership role, certain structural and ideological conditions for a class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class would have to be met. At the structural level, the condition would be the organizational containment of the working class into an instrumentalist orientation. At the ideological level, this condition became the incorporation of working class elements into the Ralliement des Crditistes in addition to the positive role French Canadian nationalism could play in obscuring competing class interests between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class. When brought together, they formed the proper mix for the petit bourgeoisie to take on a leadership role in the natural resource enclave. Their hegemony would persist so long as the structural and ideological conditions remained and no other external factors introduced which could alter the conjuncture of factors outlined above.

Therefore, the remaining chapters of this case study will follow the sequence of steps just presented. After describing the history and location of the community, the following two chapters will provide an indepth analysis of the two institutional actors. More attention will be paid to Noranda Mines than to the United Steelworkers of America because of its significance to the life of the natural resource enclave.

Having established the contours of this study, we will move on to describing the specific history of class struggles in Rouyn-Noranda, Qubec. We will show how Noranda Mines maintained domination over the dominated classes for over three decades. We will also point out the petit bourgeois dilemma referred to by C. B. Macpherson and N. Poulantzas as its inability to pursue

an independent class strategy when caught in the middle of the class struggle. We will conclude by showing how and when the United Steelworkers of America became installed in this natural resource enclave.

The next chapter will bring together the conjuncture of structural factors which would allow the petite bourgeoisie to take command in this natural resource enclave. We then proceed to describe the history of Social Credit in this region of Québec with an eye to uncovering these ideological elements which could appeal to the working class. We conclude by empirically substantiating working class support for the Ralliement des Créditistes in the 1962 general federal election.

CHAPTER III

THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND COMMUNITY SETTING

This chapter will address the more important factors that set the stage for the social evolution of Rouyn-Noranda and the outlying region as a natural resource enclave within the larger national economy. First, the geographical isolation of Abitibi-Temiscamingue from the rest of the province contributed to it's being called an "internal colony" of Quebec by Raoul Blanchard, one of the country's foremost geographers. The historical pattern that led to the exploitation of natural resources in northwestern Quebec contributed to its economic integration with northeastern and southern Ontario which further enhanced this region's separateness from Quebec's provincial economy. The branch lines of the Temiscamingue and Northern Ontario Railway into Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec were especially important. Manufactured goods and food from Ontario were brought into Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec by rail while the natural resources of copper and gold were moved out of the region. The physical and structural relationships which defined northwestern Quebec from the 1920's until today also characterizes the prototype of a natural resource enclave outlined in the previous chapter.

The theoretical argument which emerged from an analysis of the natural resource enclave pointed out that the technical preconditions for the exploitation of the natural resource(s) plus the export of capital condition the class composition there. More specifically, in the previous chapter, it was advanced that the uneven structural relationships binding the metropolis with the hinterland gave rise to commercial dominance in the

area of intermediate capitalist enterprises in the hinterland. In social class terms commercial dominance translates into the petite bourgeoisie located in the sphere of circulation. Furthermore, commercial dominance in the natural resource enclave suggests the lack there of a manufacturing base. Therefore, this chapter will provide evidence in support of both the dominance of commercial capitalist enterprises and the lack of manufacturing industries in this natural resource enclave, thereby supporting the contention that in addition to the working class, the class composition includes the petite bourgeoisie located in the sphere of circulation. The importance of the latter and the virtual absence of small-scale production centres on highlighting the fragile base on which natural resource enclaves are built. In the absence of the mine, the enclave ceases to function as a functioning unit. In other words, the lack of small scale production cannot, by definition, compensate for structural dependence on natural resource extraction. Moreover, a political theory of underconsumption is consistent with the existence of a commercial capitalist class. Both are opposite sides of the same coin. This important characteristic will be examined in more detail in Chapter VII.

We will also address the problem of the ethnic component in the mobilization of the community's petite bourgeoisie and working class. Evidence will be brought to bear in Chapter VII that will reveal the religious and nationalist appeals of the Ralliement des Creditistes. As a result, the social class dimension in its political ideology (that is, the Ralliement des Creditistes' theory of underconsumption) coupled with its ethnic nationalist appeals would provide a powerful combination in the mass mobilization of the dominated classes in this natural resource enclave.

Therefore, we will include in this chapter an examination of the historical evolution of the Quebecois or French-speaking character of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec.

One of the two important structural factors which would have to be met before the petite bourgeoisie could politically dominate in the natural resource enclave would be the expansion of the company, Noranda Mines, into a large enough enterprise in which it would no longer be dependent on the one large mine in Noranda, Quebec. At the community level, a significant indication of such a development would be the progressive disengagement of the company from directly influencing local municipal politics. Alternately, so long as the Horne Mine was important for the growth of Noranda Mines, senior management would be impelled, in a paternalistic fashion, to directly control community affairs. Once the company had grown large enough and possessed alternate sources of raw materials to operate as a relatively independent concern, there remained little reason for the company to continue its direct presence at the local level. Therefore, this chapter will also examine the historical development of municipal politics in Rouyn and Noranda and provide evidence to support the progressive disengagement of Noranda Mines from the local political scene.

As important as this development is in setting the stage for the eventual emergence of the petite bourgeoisie as the leading political force in this community, an additional factor of not insignificant proportions was "la crise de croissance" brought on by the knowledge that the copper-gold reserves of the Horne Mine were depleting and would be exhausted by the early 1970's. The limited reserves of the mine not only hastened Noranda Mines' disengagement from the community but also became a serious problem for the reproduction of the petite bourgeoisie in this

natural resource enclave. Without the mine, the fear of being thrown into the ranks of labour provided an even more powerful reason for the petite bourgeoisie to espouse a political theory of underconsumption. But this dimension of the problem will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter VII.

The Physical Setting

The Quebec provincial counties of Abitibi and Temiscamingue are the outer boundaries of the regional setting where Rouyn-Noranda is located. They represent the larger territorial unit to which this analysis will be concerned and are collectively known as "The Quebec Northwest" ("Le Nord-Ouest du Quebec" - See Figure 1)..

The physical characteristics of "The Quebec Northwest" begins with southern penetration of the Canadian Shield which occupies more than 50,000 square miles in Quebec and is often referred to as the Laurentian Upland. Along the southern edge of the Shield, there is a break known as the Laurentian Escarpment separating the St. Lawrence Lowlands from the Canadian Shield. Numerous rivers pour down the sharp cliffs which provide a natural source of hydro electric power for the mining industry located above this rim.

Abitibi and Temiscamingue are also the location of the Clay Belts, a unique outcropping of arable land in an otherwise rocky terrain. Figure II divides the Quebec northwest into three zones. First, a southern strip occupying the eastern and northeastern sections of Lake Temiscamingue which never obtained direct road access to southern Quebec. Secondly, a scattered zone of farmland spread between Rouyn-Noranda and Val d'Or is next. Today, many of the farms are small, rural landholdings for the

2

THE QUÉBEC NORTHWEST

THE CLAY BELTS

middle class employed in either of the two main centres. Finally, (3) a northern zone located completely in Abitibi county which has evolved as an important agricultural area. Amos, for many years, served as the principal supply and distribution point for the surrounding hinterland and, in addition, was the provincial government's administrative centre for all "The Quebec Northwest".

Each of these three zones can be divided historically and functionally. The first is the older, agricultural belt located in central Temiscamingue county. The second is a more recent, mining periphery situated at the northern tip of Temiscamingue in what has become known as the Cadillac Fault ("la Faille de Cadillac"). The third is an agricultural zone in Abitibi which was colonized during the Depression years.

Today, mining is more important than agriculture. While the greatest number of operating mines in the Canadian Shield are located in a central core straddling both sides of the Ontario-Quebec border, the vast potential of the Shield has yet to be developed. The exploitation of mineral deposits along the Cadillac Fault is but the outer rim of the vast potential located in the interior of the Canadian Shield.

The boldness and impressiveness of this vast expanse of land can be appreciated while travelling northward from Montreal along Highway 59, a distance of approximately 390 miles. In order to make this trip, one must pass through La Verendrye Park. There are no other Quebec land routes to either Val d'Or or Rouyn-Noranda from Montreal. Only dense forests, many lakes and hills and occasionally wildlife can be seen along the Park's roadside which stretches over 100 miles from Mont Laurier to Val d'Or. This virgin territory acts as a physical barrier separating the Quebec

northwest mining communities from the southern metropolitan centre of Montreal. Capturing the isolation of Abitibi and Temiscamingue, Raoul Blanchard described this region as an "internal colony" of the province:

les deux comtés apparaissent ainsi comme une région à part du reste de la Province, une sorte de domaine colonial qui s'est développé sans être directement greffé sur les organismes préalablement établis en fonction de la vallée du St. Laurent.... un isolement rigoureux derrière un écran de solitude reste étanche; une vigoureuse poussée humaine qui se développe d'elle-même, par une sorte de génération spontanée, et qui continue d'élargir à travers la sauvagerie une "frontière", type d'occupation devenue si rare aujourd'hui en Amérique du Nord (Emphasis mine.)

These two counties appear as a region apart from the rest of the province, a sort of "Internal colony" that has developed independently from the economic activity based in the St. Lawrence River Valley....a harsh and watertight isolation; suddenly developing by a sort of spontaneous generation that continues to expand across a "wilderness", a pattern of frontier development that is rare today in North America. (Emphasis mine.)

The, at times, beautiful metaphorical language of Raoul Blanchard points out the geographical factors that contribute to making "The Quebec Northwest" an "internal colony"¹ of the province. Yet, more important than the topography of the region is the unique historical pattern of its economic development.

The Lumber Industry

The earliest economic penetration began as early as 1872 with lumber companies operating in the northern part of Temiscamingue along Lakes Quinze, Victoria and Dasserat. These ventures were little more than frontier outposts where freshly cut logs were floated downstream to Lake Temiscamingue and

¹ Internal colony is here meant as a metaphor to describe its geographic isolation from the rest of the province and not the theoretical model of the same name. Internal colony, as used by Michael Hechter in his Internal Colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1977) refers to the periphery in the core-periphery model and shares some similar characteristics to our notion of natural resource enclave economies.

then redirected down the Outaouais River to Pembroke and Ottawa. Here the logs were processed into lumber and furniture. 1880 can be taken as the year which marked the beginning of the "take-off" period in the exploitation of the region's forests. By 1888, lumber camps and sawmills had penetrated as far north as Lakes Latour and Lumsden. Twelve years later, in 1900, the lumber companies operating in the region employed upward of 5,000 men. The lumber industry provided seasonal employment to the growing number of French Canadian agricultural settlers into "The Quebec Northwest".

Agricultural Colonization

Efforts at agricultural settlement in Temiscamingue met with limited success until the coming of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1896. In the period immediately following, settlement mushroomed. The estimated population increase for Temiscamingue County alone between the years 1895 and 1905 rose from 222 to 3,080. But, the first quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the stabilization of rural settlements. Population, for example, rose to 8,500 in 1911 and increased only slightly to 10,500 by 1921. In 1923, the Canadian Pacific Railway extended its rail line to Angliers with a branch line to Ville Marie. And, to this day, there remains no other direct rail link connecting this region with Montreal. (See Figure II.) The initial penetration of lumber and agriculture into the region resulted in small settlements and limited economic opportunities. The terrain except for the Clay Belt was not appropriate for agriculture. Even so, the Roman Catholic Church and the Quebec government promoted agricultural colonization schemes during the Depression. But, it would remain with the exploitation of the natural resource potential of the region where its economic future would rest.

The Colonization Plans

The Gordon Plan

The coming of the Great Depression ushered in a period when the

Quebec government and the Roman Catholic Church, acting in concert, devised schemes aimed at promoting rural colonization. The first colonization project was called the Gordon Plan (1932-34). 3,440 out of the 5,955 persons who settled under the government scheme did so in the northwest regions of the province -- 2,664 persons in Temiscamingue and 2,776 persons in Abitibi. And yet, the Gordon Plan was not considered to be a success. There were still thousands of unemployed in the cities who posed a potential danger to the safety and security of "civil society" in Quebec. It was felt that the Gordon Plan was not comprehensive enough. The meagre subsidy of \$600, given by the Quebec government to the prospective candidate as the total support necessary for two years in this wilderness country was considered to be insufficient to attract significant numbers to the scheme.

The Vautrin Plan

An alternate arrangement, known as the Vautrin Plan (1934-36) was adopted. The provincial parliament voted a credit of \$10 million and offered to prospective candidates; (1) free transportation, (2) a subsidy which was to be used in constructing a home, (3) interim camps which would act as a transitional base until the candidate was properly settled and (4) a scales subsidy which would act as a personal salary. Even though close to 45,000 persons were relocated throughout the province, neither plan could be considered a success since few remained permanently on the land.

Up until the Second World War, the regional economy would be characterized by marginal farming, the exploitation of its forests and the growing importance of the mining industry. It would not be long before the latter would dominate the economic life of "The Quebec Northwest". An.

indication of the growth in the region's importance to the Quebec economy is borne out by the statistics on its contribution to the total value of mining production. In 1927, the year in which production from the Noranda Horne Mine began, the counties of Abitibi and Temiscamingue accounted for only \$76,674 from a provincial total of \$29,124,110, or roughly 3 percent. Fifteen years later (1942), these two counties accounted for approximately 60 percent of the total value of mining production in Quebec, estimated at \$104,404,146 (Gourd, 1977:56-67).

The Pattern of Natural Resource Development

Of paramount importance to the exploitation of mineral deposits in the Quebec Northwest was the earlier discovery of large nickel and copper reserves in the Sudbury Basin in 1883. This discovery came as a result of clearing and blasting a route for Canada's first transcontinental railroad, the Canadian Pacific Railway. The discovery of copper was the reason for the early enthusiasm. It was not until metallurgical research had found a profitable means to extract nickel from the ore that Sudbury became the nucleus of mining activity in the Ontario northeast. Sudbury became a magnet, attracting the interests of prospectors, settlers and the Ontario government.

In 1902, a bill was introduced to "build a railway from North Bay into the Temiscamingue district which, it hoped, would give access to the vast arable lands of the Clay Belt discovered only two years earlier, extend the operations of the lumbering industry and expose... "deposits of ores and minerals which are likely upon development to add greatly to the wealth of the Province" (Nelles, 1974: 120). In 1903, silver and cobalt were discovered in the process of building the newly created Temiscamingue

and Northern Ontario Railway. The town of Cobalt came into existence in 1905. Silver attracted thousands to this part of the Shield. A pattern began to emerge. The exploitation of natural resources, sparked by the Sudbury findings led to a gradual movement of the Canadian mining industry further east towards the northwestern boundary of the province of Quebec.

This rail line, the Temiscamingue and Northern Ontario Railway, had opened up the Ontario northeast to colonization and exploitation of forest lands and mineral deposits. Smaller towns began to spring up. They acted either as supply centres for the mines, for example, Haileybury, or the small agricultural areas in the Clay Belt, such as New Liskeard. New Liskeard became the base of operations for Ed Horne and the Lake Tremoy Syndicate who would be instrumental in the development of the Quebec northwest (see Chapter IV).

Prospectors fanned out north and eastwards from Cobalt and discovered in 1909-10 rich gold deposits in what was to become known as the Timmins-Porcupine Gold Fields. Two large gold deposits led to the creation in 1910 of McIntyre Gold Mines Limited and Hollinger Gold Mines Limited. A second, highgrade gold deposit was located in what was to become Kirkland Lake in 1911-12. As in Sudbury's case, the Shield's rivers provided hydro-electric power for these mining centres. The first power for the Kirkland Lake Mines came in 1914 from a small generating plant at Charlton. In 1917, both Cobalt and Kirkland Lake were linked by transmission lines (Innis, 1936: 321-89).

By the end of World War I, this region was tied together by roads and rail lines. Hydro-electric power was supplied from rivers cutting through the Canadian Shield. Transmission and communication lines contributed

to making this region an economic unit linked to southern Ontario (Moore, 1941). It was not until after World War I that prospectors from Kirkland Lake and Timmins moved eastward into Quebec - the border was only twenty-five and eighty miles away respectively. The eastward move was occasioned by Ed Horne's important copper-gold discovery in Rouyn Township in 1920.

The Quebec Northwest

Once the copper-gold ores had been discovered and a mining company established, the building of railways and power lines quickly followed. In 1926, a C.N.R. branch line from Taschereau reached Rouyn while an eastern extension of the Temiscamingue and Northern Ontario Railway reached the town in 1927. A fourth mining nucleus had been established, located in Quebec but functioned as part of the northeastern Ontario mining region (see Chapter IV).

But only two towns, Sudbury and Rouyn-Noranda, were to have processing capacities in the form of smelters. Since processing is necessary in the production of gold and other base metals, a distinct economic advantage was given to Inco in Sudbury and Noranda Mines over other operating mining companies in the area. The many small mines and the vast costs involved limited the possibility that smelters could be built by other companies who, therefore, found themselves dependent on either one of the two smelters in the region. These two companies with their large mineral deposits and their smelting capacity meant that both Sudbury and Rouyn-Noranda were to emerge as the two most important centres in this mining belt.

From Noranda, new mines were established further east near Malartic and Val d'Or. Rail links were built in the 1930's to integrate these

communities into this internal, regional, natural resource economy. The 1920-40 period witnessed the expansion of mining activity as more mines were opened up in the Sudbury, Timmins and Val d'Or triangle (Innis, 1936: Chapter 9).

The post-World War II era gave birth to renewed interest in the old core area of northeastern Ontario and further expansion in a north-easterly direction from Val d'Or. In addition to the exploitation of silver and gold near Timmins; gold, nickel and molybdenum near Noranda; copper and gold Mines at Chibougamau, Quebec came into production in this period.

Such has been the history of mining activity in the Ontario northeast and the Quebec northwest. Spreading out from Sudbury as the first and still important nodal point, prospectors ventured out to strike it rich and reached as far east as Chibougamau. J.F. Gregory has categorized these developments into five distinct stages:

- 1) 1848-1902: the opening and establishment of Sudbury
- 2) 1903-1921, the opening of Cobalt, Porcupine-Timmins and Kirkland Land
- 3) 1922-1932: the opening of Rouyn-Noranda
- 4) 1933-1950: the opening of Val d'Or and Malartic
- 5) 1950- : the opening of Chibougamau

These developments have been traced on Figure III. Each can be considered a stage in the development of the mining industry in this new frontier. The importance of this, besides providing a classificatory scheme, is to add historical substance to the already existing geographical characteristics of Abitibi-Temiscamingue - a region, it should be added, that may not be politically integrated but is economically linked to the

THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF MINING

Ontario northeastern natural resource extracting economy.

The nature of the region's geography described by Raoul Blanchard as an "internal colony" of Quebec and the history of the mining industry moving as it did from northeastern Ontario into northwestern Quebec contributed to the isolation of this region from Quebec's economy. The history of dependent capitalism in this corner of Quebec created specific conditions that have aggravated the alienation of the natural resource enclave from the larger provincial economy. Its physical and economic isolation within Quebec would constitute an added dimension to the existing economic subordination as a natural resource hinterland to southern metropolitan centres. ~~When these structural and geographical characteristics~~ of the region were brought into bold relief once the relations of production were threatened during the 1960's, the dominated classes were aroused and the local citizenry could feel justified in claiming that both the Quebec and Federal governments had neglected the economic needs of the region.

Having sketched the unique topographical characteristics of the region which have made it an "internal colony" within Quebec, attention will now turn to our next major concern, namely, the commercial capitalist nature of this natural resource enclave. But, before we embark on this aspect of the region, a few words are necessary concerning the nature of the twin communities of Rouyn-Noranda.

The Natural Resource Enclave

The counties of Abitibi-Temiscamingue have been and continue to be defined by a regional specialization of production in natural resources; principally, non-ferrous metals and lumber. Over the past several decades, Rouyn-Noranda has emerged as the area's core city.

During the 1920's and 1930's, Amos, an agricultural service community, had been the region's capital due to the provincial colonization programs that lured many thousands to the Little Clay Belt. But, mining very quickly eclipsed farming as the source of attraction for settlement into the region. As a result, the demise of Amos as regional centre was soon followed by the rise of Rouyn-Noranda. Benoit-Gourd suggests the year 1937 as the turning point when mining increasingly displaced agriculture in the region's economy. 1937 was chosen because of the activity generated at the mining camps of Val d'Or, Malartic and Cadillac in that year.² Furthermore, the fact that the Horne Mine had been the first and proved to be the second largest copper and third largest gold mine in Canada in addition to being the largest selenium mine in the world accounts for the shift in the region's core city to Rouyn-Noranda (Moore, 1941).

Noranda: A Planned Community

Early in 1927, the Montreal firm of De Martigny and Bruneau were awarded the contract for planning the Noranda townsite (Roberts, 1956: 108). The stated policy of Noranda Mines was aimed at minimizing the negative effects of being a "company town". The manner by which this goal was to be accomplished was to "incorporate an independent town which would be open to all comers as well as to their own employees". The town was to be "laid out on Company land" where "the Company would layout certain subdivisions, grade streets, lay sewers and water supply, and when these

² Benoit-Beaudry Gourd, "Aperçu critique des principaux ouvrages pouvant servir à l'histoire du développement minier de l'Abitibi-Témiscamingue (1910-1950)", Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique Française, Vol. 30, No. 1, juin 1976, p. 104.

preliminaries were completed they would auction the building lots" (Rowe, 1934: 206).³ Noranda Mines also became a credit agent. Loans were made to prospective home owners if they did not have sufficient capital of their own. In this manner, Noranda hoped to attract a stable and permanent labour force and, at the same time, build up its equity in the community by the selling of real estate properties to its employees.

Rouyn: The Commercial Town

Rouyn grew up as a commercial town serving the needs of the mining population in Noranda and the expanding eastern frontier which included such producing mines as Powell-Rouyn, Quemont Mining, Waite-Amulet and New Senator Rouyn. In contrast to Noranda, Rouyn was not a planned community. The rate and extent of growth was not rigidly determined but ebbed and flowed with the vagaries of the local economy so that Rouyn followed the pattern of many single industry communities in Canada. As so often happened, "squatters" or "parasite communities" would spring up on the outskirts of resource towns. One important problem in these fringe settlements was sanitation. The lack of any regulations meant health standards were very often neglected. Over a period of years, the resource town would be forced to incorporate the "parasite community". Such was the case for Rouyn. Rouyn South was a community of "squatters" which, during the 1950's, was annexed to Rouyn and provided with public utilities.

³ The severe problem of bush fires in newly opened up mining communities is a well known phenomenon. Noranda sought to minimize this danger by clearing the bush area for one mile around the town. The company also forbade the building of nothing but fire-proof buildings on the main business thoroughfares of the town so that "any serious fire in any one of the quadrants is segregated and the hazard to the rest of the town is reduced to negligible proportions. (Rowe, 1934: 206).

⁴ For a full description of these communities, see William C. Wonders, "Parasite Communities in Newfoundland", Community Planning Review, Vol. III, No. 1, 1953, pp. 27-29.

A sense of the difference in function and lifestyle between Rouyn and Noranda was expressed by Raoul Blanchard in the following passage:

Rouyn est la ville du commerce....Noranda, qui la prolonge vers l'Ouest, est un quartier de résidence, asservir a un rigoureux plan d'Urbanism, donc plus desservie; elle se compare a un Westmount dont Rouyn serait le Montreal (1949: 123).

The commercial character of Rouyn was contrasted with the planned, residential community of Noranda. The latter was very different. Noranda was the centre of economic activity. If things were going well in the copper market, Rouyn benefited from the increased purchasing power of workers, managers and technical staff. In bad times, everyone suffered. Moreover, Noranda was the place of residence for the English-speaking managers and technicians. Noranda exhibited a class and ethnic character where English-speaking, non-residents became associated with better-paying and less dangerous jobs. They also happened to live in the better houses of Noranda.

These demographic characteristics of the community are important because they depict a pattern of residential segregation which has its counterpart in the ethnic subordination of French Canadians within the company. When both class and ethnic subordination co-exist within a concrete social setting, the stage is set for a potentially explosive confrontation. That is, nationalist and class antagonisms can feed on one another. Each nourishes the other. Both collective expressions tend to grow the more homogeneous the working class becomes and when the natural resource enclave is seen to be subordinate to the interests of the metropolis.

But such a situation did not always exist. The demography of the community and the company was initially ethnically plural. The importance of sequence, in this particular case, the tendency toward ethnic homogenization of the working class and the petite bourgeoisie roughly coincides with

the appearance and subsequent growth of Social Credit. The history of these demographic characteristics will be sketched below.

POPULATION TRENDS

The First Recruits

Next, we will examine the historical development of the ethnic component in the region's population. The first recruits into the Noranda Mines' labour force were "British" Ontarians and Eastern Europeans. (Blanchard, 1956: 120-21). The latter were recruited from the disbanded road gangs who had been initially contracted for railway construction. Many from Eastern Europe had been influenced by communism to that when management arbitrarily reduced wages during the Depression, communist trade union organizers could find a sympathetic ear amongst this segment of the working class. Very few French Canadians were employed at this time by the company (see Chapter IV).

During the first years of operation, Rouyn-Noranda could count thirty-three different nationalities among its population. This mixture posed many problems of communication. One fascinating account centres on the early experience of a local bank manager.

This man had been enlisted by the Bank of Commerce as a teller and, in 1926, was sent to Rouyn, Quebec because of his knowledge in foreign exchange. When asked why the bank wanted to hire someone with this type of training, he responded by saying:

...Most of the miners here were from Central Europe....they were all strangers. And mind you most of them didn't talk a word of French or English. It was pretty hard to do business with them, but with those maps that we had on the walls, we used to bring the customer in and we'd ask him, where do you live? Oh, this little town (in Poland, for example). 'That's my town. I live there.' So we used to send the money from the Post Office for his wife see, because they came here alone; they left their families in

Europe and they used to send money to Europe every month, and some time after, their wives and families would come here.⁵
(Emphasis mine)

These remarks suggest the existence of chain migrations from Eastern Europe. These men would play an important role in the early history of class conflict in Rouyn-Noranda (see Chapter VI). As a collectivity, they had to contend with the hardships of working in a mine and living in a frontier community without a family or indeed without familiar human contact and expectations. Furthermore, they found themselves acting as a buffer between the English-speaking managers and technicians and the French-speaking shopkeepers, professionals and miners.

Labour Mobility

A further characteristic of the Rouyn-Noranda population is the geographical mobility of a significant proportion of the labour force. One of the factors explaining this phenomenon focuses on the economic prospects engendered by the opening of the Quebec northwest to the exploitation of natural resources. The numerous mining companies vied with one another for labour, thereby creating pockets of potentiality rewarding opportunities for workers. The problem of labour turnover would be the most serious during periods of prosperity. Knowledge of higher wages spread quickly and workers were prone to move to more promising jobs.

But, an important development during the early stages of mining activity in and around Rouyn-Noranda came as a consequence of the Great Depression. The gloomy national employment statistics were in contrast to the more optimistic picture along the mining corridor. The high prices for

gold and some other natural resources made Rouyn-Noranda a magnet for unemployed workers. Labour from the south was more than welcome in the region because mine management knew they were operating in a buyers' market. Competition among workers for jobs lowered wages and placed employers in an extremely advantageous position due to the large surplus of workers in the regional labour market.

The coming of the Second World War altered this picture. The many English-speaking Canadians from Abitibi-Temiscamingue who went to Europe provided an impetus for increasing the number of French Canadians to work in the mines. Most of these new entrants were siphoned off from the colonization plans of the Great Depression (1932-36; see above for details). But, even so, mine production was under-utilized. At the height of the War (1944), the number of men employed in the mines dropped from a 1942 figure of 10,000 to 7,900. The immediate post-war period was little better. By January 1, 1948, the number of miners decreased still further to 7,540. At Noranda Mines, the 1947 figure was only 1141 out of a potential labour force of 1800 (Blanchard, 1949: 120). The War had altered the labour picture by transforming the regional economy into a sellers' market. This predicament for capital was borne out by the fact that Rouyn, at this time could count on an annual turnover rate of approximately 30 percent.

The year 1948 marked the return to a more favourable structuring of the labour market in management's favour. This was the period when many "displaced persons" were being funnelled into the region to work in the mines. The introduction of foreign ethnics into the regional labour force meant that the scales were once again tilting in favour of management. The pattern of labour recruitment up until approximately 1960 was conditioned

by economic circumstances, to be sure, but within the vagaries of the labour market could be discerned another pattern, a movement towards a predominantly French Canadian work force.

Ethnic Homogenization

In addition to the vagaries of the regional labour market brought about by the Depression and the War, further ethnic characteristics of the company and community population can be discerned. Although Rouyn has always had a substantial French-speaking population, a trend towards ethnic homogenization is observable within the population of Rouyn-Noranda as a whole. Tables I and II depict this tendency toward ethnic homogenization. It is Noranda which has been and continues to be the residential preference for the English and immigrant groups, even though that position would appear today to be a substantially diminished one. In all, in terms of both absolute numbers and proportion of the total population, the British and immigrant groups are vanishing from the scene, even in Noranda.

Ethnic Division of Labour

While a decidedly French-speaking character is coming to prevail in Rouyn-Noranda, an institutionalized ethnic division of labour has existed historically in the world of work at Noranda Mines. In summarizing the findings for Noranda Mines, Waite Amulet, Beattie, Normetal and the other mining companies operating in the Quebec northwest, Raoul Blanchard remarked that:

On constate ainsi une tendance à une unification de la main-d'oeuvre; des paysans peu fortunés prennent l'habitude de s'embaucher l'hiver aux mines, tandis que des fils de cultivateurs y travaillent à l'année. Se les cadres, presque partout, restent anglais, le personnel ouvrier se francise, et c'est tant mieux, car il s'agit là d'une main d'oeuvre qui a fait ses preuves (1949: 121).

TABLE I

Net Changes in Ethnic Population of Rouyn and
Noranda, 1941-1971

	BRITISH		FRENCH		OTHERS	
	1941	1961	1971	1941	1961	1971
ROUYN	920	732	785	6681	16823	16310
		(-188)	(+53)		(+10142)	(-513)
					1207	715
					(-46)	(-446)
NORANDA	2065	2564	1750	1579	6907	7810
		(+499)	(-814)		(+5328)	(+903)
				935	2006	1180
					(+1071)	(-826)

From: Census of Canada, 1941, 1961, 1971,
Vol. 1, Population

TABLE II

Percentage of the Population of Rouyn and Noranda
that are French, English and "Other", 1941-1971

	BRITISH			FRENCH			OTHER		
	1941	1961	1971	1941	1961	1971	1941	1961	1971
ROUYN	10	4	4	76	90	92	14	6	4
NORANDA	45	22	16	34	60	75	21	18	11

From: Census of Canada, 1941, 1961, 1971,
Vol. 1, Population

One witnesses a tendency towards a unification of the workforce, farmers who unfortunately must sell their labour-power to the mines in the winter, while the sons of farmers work year round. If the management (cadres), almost all of whom are English, the workers are becoming more French and (sic), it is for the best, because it is a labour force that has proved itself (Translation).

Both agriculture and forestry became potential sources of French-Canadian labour to work in the mines. Many French Canadians were attracted to wage employment in the expanding mining fields of "The Quebec Northwest". After 1935, following "The Foreigners' Strike" ("la greve des 'fros") at Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, Noranda Mines together with other mining companies began to earnestly recruit French Canadians as miners. (See Chapter VI for the historical details on why Noranda Mines decided to make a shift in its recruitment policy).

The penetration of the mining industry into "The Quebec Northwest" resulted in the creation of an ethnic division of labour in which the French Canadians eventually made up the bulk of the working class whereas the managerial and technical staffs were manned by English-speaking Canadians. The subordination of the French Canadians in the industrial hierarchy of the region was preceded by a period of roughly twenty-five years characterized by an ethnically mixed working class. As will be argued in the subsequent chapters, so long as management discriminated against the hiring of French Canadians, the ethnic character of this mining community would be culturally diverse, and, as will be seen, politically conscious with Socialist leanings. (see Chapter VI) Once such a recruitment policy was reversed, the French Canadian component would increase and, over time, would numerically overwhelm the other ethnic groups. The point I will seek to draw from the numerical predominance of French Canadians in the working

class centres on the creation of a linguistic, religious and culturally cohesive population which would be sensitive to nationalist appeals rooted in the long history of their subordination to English-speaking Canada.

In addition to these demographic differences were the contrasting characteristics of local municipal politics which we will presently turn to.

Municipal Politics I - Noranda, Quebec

Noranda Mines had established, at the very beginning, a direct influence over municipal politics in Noranda, Quebec. Noranda's first mayor, James Y. Murdock, was also the then Chairman of the Board of Directors of Noranda Mines. His tenure of office lasted three years, from 1926 to 1929.

He was followed by Ernest Hibbert who was the General Manager of the company's Noranda, Quebec operations. He remained the head of municipal government until 1931. James A. Carter followed Ernest Hibbert. He held this position for eighteen years, or until 1949. James Carter was the chief accountant for Noranda Mines. For the first twenty-three years of Noranda's existence these men, in addition to being mayor of the community, were also important corporate personnel. They wore the clothes of both the local politician and the prominent businessman.

The next man to take up the mayoralty of Noranda was Frédéric Hébert. Mr. Hébert had been Secretary of the City of Noranda since 1927. His association with Noranda Mines, while not direct, was very much influenced by the interests of the company. His long association with municipal government covered the years it was governed by men who were directly associated with Noranda Mines. Mr. Hébert also experienced a long tenure, seventeen years, from 1950 to 1967. He was succeeded by Achille Juneau in 1967.

TABLE III

The Mayors and Counsellors of Noranda, Québec

1926-1949

	1926-29	1929-31	1931-49
MAYOR	J.Y. Murdoch (Chairman, Board of Directors, Noranda Mines)	Ernest Hibbert (General Manager, Noranda Operations)	J.A. Carter (Chartered Account- ant, Noranda Mines)
	Ernest Hibbert (General Manager, Noranda Operations) Raymond Allen Joseph Copeman J.C. Burgess (Montréal accountant)	J.R. Bradfield (Vice-President, Noranda Mines) J.A. Carter A.J.B. Saumier R. MacDonald	J.R. Bradfield (Vice-President, Noranda Mines) T.J. McManus P. Saucier R. MacDonald

Unlike most municipal governments which rely on regular and periodic elections to contest the political records of its incumbents, Noranda, Quebec did not experience this side of democratic political life. Up until the time of his writing the history of Noranda (1955), Leslie Roberts commented that "at no time in the town's history had there been a contested election" (1956: 109). The interests of Noranda, Quebec were one and the same with the interests of Noranda Mines until such time when the company would no longer require a visible presence in the community.

Municipal Politics II - Rouyn, Quebec

Before proper elections could be called in this community, a provisional council made up of three English-speaking and three French-speaking members governed the town. This body functioned until April 1, 1927 when Rouyn was incorporated as a town with a population of 2,332.

The first mayor, Joachim Fortin, was a provincial government engineer who was responsible for building the highway from Micmac to Rouyn. As one informant suggested, "he lived in Rouyn so we thought it would be nice to have a mayor that was an engineer - we needed a man like that". He resigned the following year on completion of the highway and was quickly replaced by Edouard Charlebois, a local horsetrader. He had come to Rouyn from Western Canada in the hopes of making money by buying and selling horses, a necessity in an era when cars and tractors were luxury items. Success has been laconically recorded by a contemporary - "he made a lot of money and he became mayor".⁶ The third mayor was Leslie Reilley whose tenure during the first years of the Depression was short lived (1932-34). His contribution to the growth of Rouyn was contained in his building the first hardware store.

⁶ Both quotations come from an interview conducted on June 19, 1978.

In 1934, Romuald Gagne was elected mayor and remained in office until 1938. The growth in the town's population and the extensive exploration and mining activity in the eastern region of Temiscamingue made Rouyn a natural entrepot. The man taking advantage of this opportunity was Romuald Gagne who became Rouyn's first wholesaler of food and other necessities.

Over the remainder of the history of Rouyn's mayoralty, the merchant-character of the office underwent a degree of transformation. Over the next twelve years, the office of mayor appeared to undergo a transition. An accountant, J.A. Tardiff, was elected mayor in 1938 but Romuald Gagne regained office in 1940. He remained mayor of the community during the war years but in 1946, Paul Cuddihy, a lawyer, was elected mayor and held this position until 1950. He later became a provincial court judge. Real Caouette's brother, Maurice Caouette was elected mayor in 1950. He kept the position the longest, from 1950 until 1961. Maurice Caouette was followed by Alex Leclerc who held the seat until 1969. Finally, Jean-Charles Coutu was elected mayor but lost to Marcel Gaudreault in 1974. The pattern of municipal politics in Rouyn is certainly more checkered than that of Noranda. In addition, the evidence points to the decidedly petit bourgeois character of the local political leaders.

Up until the early 1960's, municipal politics in Rouyn, Quebec were more democratic than Noranda's. The company did not appear to directly intervene in Rouyn's local contests whereas Noranda Mine's direct involvement in Noranda was felt up until the election of Frédéric Hébert in 1950. Yet, Mr. Hébert's long standing tenure in Noranda's municipal affairs, beginning as it did in 1927, did not signal a radical break with established tradition. What his election does appear to signify is the relaxing of the company's

stranglehold on Noranda's political affairs. This development suggests that Noranda Mines no longer deemed it necessary to maintain a direct presence in local political affairs. The groundwork was being laid for the rise to the political stage of the local petite bourgeoisie.

The Lack of a Manufacturing Base

Yet, before we proceed to investigate the conjuncture of specific circumstances that would blend to help create the "opportunity" for such a development, an analysis of the internal characteristics of natural resource enclaves is in order to establish the importance of sequence for our analysis. In other words, history can illuminate a perplexing issue or event, especially when it reveals that continuity has been broken due to factors that are both internally generated and externally reinforced. What would otherwise appear at one particular moment as an aberration, when viewed longitudinally becomes transformed into a process which can then be interpreted.

The problem of the continued reproduction of class relations in a natural resource enclave becomes contingent on its nature as a social formation within capitalism. To establish the dependence solely on natural resource extraction means that exhaustion of the natural resource jeopardizes the continued existence of class relations. In order to verify such a structurally dependent characteristic, it must be substantiated that manufacturing plays an insignificant role in the natural resource enclave. Otherwise, the loss of employment brought on by exhaustion absorbed by the manufacturing side of the economy. On the other hand, if no such avenue exists, then the vulnerability of the economy and the magnitude of a crisis of this kind for the reproduction of class relations would be clearly

established.

The historical record of secondary industry in the community and region is not encouraging. The processing which did and continues to occur is concerned with meeting local needs in selected economic areas. It has always employed only a very small fraction of the total labour force.

In a report entitled L'Orientation du Développement et de l'Action de Développement prepared in 1971 by the joint executive of the regional economic and social committees of the Quebec northwest explained the lack of economic diversification within the regional economy in the following manner:

Les industries liées aux ressources sont trop souvent localisées en dehors de la région. La transformation des métaux et minéraux extraits du Nord-Ouest se fait en dehors du Nord-Ouest (le zinc à Valleyfield et le cuivre à Montréal Est). Le bois du Nord-Ouest alimente plusieurs pulperies situées à l'extérieur de la région (1971: 12).

In 1945, Abitibi employed 305 persons in industries other than mining and lumber in such economic areas as butter, cheese, bread, printing and bookbinding, textiles and leatherworks (Blanchard, 1949: 124-25). Table IV details the number of manufacturing establishments for both Rouyn and Noranda in 1959. Apart from those linked to the lumber and mining industries, the remaining businesses include only food, textiles and printing. And, the textile industry with but two employees is of little importance to meeting the local demand for textiles. Clothing, shoes and other fabrics must be imported from outside the region. Food processing and printing are the sole activities which contribute to supplying local needs.

By 1974, the number of employed workers in processing industries had shown an increase to 11.8 percent from the 1959 figure of 6.5 percent

TABLE IV

The Number of Manufacturing Establishments and Employees
in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, 1959

	Food and Drink		Textiles		Lumber		Printing and Binding		Iron and Steel Products		Non-ferrous Metals Products		Non-metallic Mineral Products		Chemicals (Explosives)		TOTAL		TOTAL ACTIVELY EMPLOYED
	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	EST.	EM.	
ROUYN	11	136	1	2	8	66	5	44	7	18	1	3	4	57	1	1	38	327 (8.3%)	3926
NORANDA	1	13	-	-	2	10	-	-	6	203	-	-	-	-	1	7	10	233 (5.2%)	4446
TOTAL																	48	560	8372
Percentage of manufacturing to total actively employed																		6.5%	

Compiled from: Inventaire économique et industriel,
Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce,
Province de Québec, 1959.

LEGEND

EST. = the number of establishments

EM. = the number of employees

(1977: 11.1). While this represents an overall gain, most of these businesses are tied to the lumber and metal mining sector of the regional economy and therefore do not significantly contribute to meeting local consumer demand and therefore the diversification of the regional economy.

The Commercial Sector

The exploitation of the copper-gold ore bodies of the Horne Mine created the twin communities of Rouyn-Noranda. The demand for labour which this engendered also meant that "des commerçants ont accompagné les ouvriers et leurs familles" (Blanchard, 1949: 121). By the end of the Second World War, Rouyn became a large distribution center selling groceries, fresh fruit and vegetables, meat, automobiles and construction materials (Blanchard, 1949: 124). Most of these products were imported due to regional specialization in mining and lumber. A relatively high standard of living made for the creation of a small but lucrative market. The region exported what it had in abundance, namely natural resources, and imported what it lacked; most of its food and manufactured goods.

Les importations sont considérables, soit à cause des besoins spéciaux des centres miniers, soit parce que l'agriculture est très spécialisée, et aussi parce que cette région jeune et dynamique exige un standard élevé d'existence. Toute la farine destinée à l'alimentation humaine vient de l'Ouest canadien, et avec elle d'autres produits de meunerie. Les pommes de terre que consomment les centres urbains sont achetées en Nouveau Brunswick; on tire les pois de l'Ontario. Puis on achète à l'extérieur une partie des légumes, les fruits, les conserves, la bière. Ajoutons les envois d'épicerie, puis les quincaillerie, l'ameublement, les appareils ménagers, les postes de radio. Enfin tout l'équipement industriel vient du dehors, et aussi le ciment. Le Nord-Ouest est un marché plein d'intérêt pour les fournisseurs de l'extérieur (Blanchard, 1949: 126-27; Emphasis Mine).

Internal dependence on external sources for food and manufactured goods characterized the region's structural links with Ontario and the

national economy. Furthermore, the external sources for food and manufactured goods were concentrated in Toronto and southern Ontario and not in Montreal and southern Quebec. The factors explaining this structural relationship were rooted, as we saw earlier, in the historical development of mining activity in the Canadian Shield

The extension of natural resource exploitation followed a west-to-east loop from Sudbury, Ontario to Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec and moving in the post-World War II era as far east as Chibougamou. The structural links binding northwestern Quebec with northeastern Ontario had been established by the development of natural resource exploitation. And, these links tied them both to Toronto and southern Ontario. In addition, Toronto, Ontario and not Montreal, Quebec had always been the corporate headquarters for companies such as Inco, Hollinger Gold Mines and Noranda Mines. Furthermore, the communications axis connecting the Quebec northwest with Toronto had developed earlier and penetrated more completely than the Montreal to Abitibi-Temiscamingue axis. For example, the distance by rail or road to Toronto from Rouyn-Noranda was shorter than to Montreal and shorter distances meant cheaper transportation costs.

Jusqu'à une date récente le réseau de communications favorisait l'entrée des marchandises ontariennes; la distance de Rouyn à Toronto par voie ferrée met cette ville à 40 miles plus près que Québec, et 76 milles plus près que Montréal (Blanchard, 1949: 127).

In 1948, for example, two stores in Rouyn were being supplied from Montreal while twenty-five depended on Toronto and other Ontario cities for their merchandise.

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Financial Times, October 1, 1948

The evidence has shown that Abitibi-Temiscamingue had an appreciably large commercial market that was supplied primarily from Toronto. Yet, as early as July, 1945, a report commissioned by the Montreal Chamber of Commerce⁸ sought to exploit this market for Montreal-based wholesalers and manufacturers. The report stated that in 1941, Abitibi-Temiscamingue could count 1237 retail stores grossing over \$21 million but supplied primarily from outside the province of Quebec. It pointed to the fact that the demand for wheat, other grains and meat was supplied from Winnipeg. Canned fruits and vegetables came from Toronto while Montreal supplied some construction materials, explosives and liquor. But the more important source of merchandise trade came from Ontario. The report went so far as to infer that Abitibi-Temiscamingue was "Ontario's Fiefdom".⁹ The report concluded by encouraging Montreal businessmen to "conquer" a larger share of the Abitibi-Temiscamingue market from their Toronto counterparts.

L'industriel de Montréal qui désire vendre au Abitibi et au Temiscamingue y rencontrera ses concurrents de Toronto; le marchand de gros de la métropole devra rivaliser également avec ses confrères du nord-ouest québécois. La conquête du marché abitibien, comme d'ailleurs la conquête de tout marché quel qu'il soit, n'est pas chose facile. Mais c'est une conquête que nos hommes d'affaires peuvent et doivent faire parce qu'elle en vaut la peine (1947: 12).

⁸ R. Perron, "L'Abitibi et Montréal", Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce au district de Montréal, Vol. 47, no. 6, July 1945, pp. 7-12.

⁹ "Evidement le marché du Temiscamingue et d'une partie de l'Abitibi a été pendant longtemps presque un fief de l'Ontario", *Ibid.*, p. 7.

In a later study compiled by the Mines and Natural Resource¹⁰ Section of the Montreal Board of Trade and Chamber of Commerce, the importance of Rouyn-Noranda as the marketing capital for the region was stressed once more.

As the largest marketing center in Northwestern Québec, Rouyn and Noranda do an annual retail business which is estimated at about twenty million dollars. There are 241 retail stores (Noranda 65, Rouyn 176) and 14 wholesalers (Noranda 9, Rouyn 5). Industrially the towns depend on mining, and as a result there are only four small manufacturing establishments, three being located in Noranda and one in Rouyn (1953: n.p.).

These studies point to the overwhelming importance enjoyed by retail businesses in Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. From the very beginning, this sector of the natural resource economy became the most important area for entrepreneurial opportunities. As the above quote makes abundantly clear the manufacturing sector of the local economy was insignificant in comparison to the retail sector. The latter afforded enormous opportunities for suppliers located in the southern developed regions of Ontario and, of lesser significance, Québec. An annual retail business of \$20 million for Rouyn-Noranda in 1953 spoke for the importance attached by the Montréal Chamber of Commerce.

A report¹¹ tabled by the Province of Québec in 1959 was the closest date to the 1962 general federal election that could be found that gave a detailed breakdown of economic activity in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. The reason

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A General and Statistical Survey of the Counties of Abitibi East, West, Rouyn-Noranda and Temiscamingue in Northwestern Quebec, (Montréal: n.p.:1953).

11 Inventaire économique et industriel, (Québec: Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce: 1959).

that we sought out data on the commercial sector for this time period was to show a relative decline in this group which would provide corroborative evidence for the growing economic crisis effecting the stability of the petite bourgeoisie in the community. In addition, a detailed breakdown of the commercial sector would highlight the make-up of the petite bourgeoisie in Rouyn-Noranda. Table V divides the commercial sector into six classifications: Food and Related Products, General Merchandise, Automobiles and Accessories, Clothing and Shoes, Hardware and Lumber and a category entitled "other". In all, there are 227 establishments in Rouyn-Noranda, a decline of 14 (6%) from the 1953 number of 241. The retail businesses in Rouyn and Noranda are concentrated in food and related products and clothing and shoe stores. These are followed by hardware and lumber and automobile and accessories. General merchandise rounds out the list. Most of these establishments are small businesses. The total number (both sexes) of individuals employed in retail for Rouyn-Noranda were 619 or 2.7 individuals per establishment. A review of Table V and the above ratio of individuals per establishment suggest that there is no hard evidence of a trend towards concentration in the retail business sector of the economy to account for the decline in the total number of establishments. Therefore, the decline can probably be attributed to a shrinkage in the local market.

Little has changed during the ensuing two decades to alter the basic structural pattern described above. In a study commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Rouyn-Noranda, (1926-1976) the authors note that

commerce (still) plays an important part in Rouyn-Noranda. In 1972, 44 wholesalers and 821 retailers grossed total sales of almost \$95 million.

(n.d., n.p.)

One of the differences which the authors note that is different from the 1953 study referred to earlier was the location of the wholesale and

Table V

Breakdown by Commercial Sector
for Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec (1959)

I. Rouyn

a. Food and Related Products

Corner Grocery Stores	37
Bread and pastry	1
Milk Stores	4
Fresh fruit and vegetables	2
Epicerie	3
Specialty Meats	1
Other	<u>1</u>
Total	49

b. General Merchandise

Department Stores	3
Bazaars	<u>2</u>
Total	5

c. Automobiles and accessories

Tires and accessories	8
Gas stations	4
Car dealers	<u>2</u>
Total	14

d. Clothing and Shoes

Shoe Stores	6
Men's stores	3
Women and Children's stores	6
Haberdasheries	<u>32</u>
Total	47

f. Not Classified - Others 40

Overall total, 175 commercial establishments

II. Noranda

a. Food and Related Products

Milk stores	2
Fresh fruit and vegetables	2
Epicerie	7
Specialty Meats	<u>8</u>
Total	19

b. General Merchandise

Department stores	1
Bazaars	<u>1</u>
Total	2

c. Automobiles and accessories

Gas Stations	2
Total	<u>2</u>

d. Clothing and Shoes

Shoe Stores	3
Men's clothing	1
Women and Children's clothing	2
Haberdasheries	<u>8</u>
Total	14

e. Hardware and Lumber

Hardware	4
Lumber	<u>2</u>
Furniture	<u>1</u>
Total	7

f. Not Classified - Others . 8

Overall Total 52 commercial establishments

Compiled from: Province de Québec, Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce,
Commissariat Industrial, Inventaire économique et industriel, 1959.

manufacturing industries. By 1972, the balance had shifted in favour of Rouyn. The number of wholesalers had increased to 44 with 12 in Noranda and 32 in Rouyn, the latter representing 77 percent of the total value of wholesale merchandise sales. The number of manufacturing industries had increased to thirty, seventeen now located in Rouyn and thirteen in Noranda. While these statistics reveal an increased vigor for the community, the explanation for the rise of Rouyn and the decline of Noranda centers primarily on the exhaustion of the Horne Mine and the designation of Rouyn as the regional administrative and educational center by the provincial government in 1966.

The characteristic differences between Rouyn and Noranda can be seen as historically rooted and are primarily the result of a planned/non-planned distinction between them. Yet, the differences are of secondary importance when both communities are analysed in terms of their economic function in the region. All of the more striking characteristics such as the dominance of commercial capitalist enterprises and the lack of a manufacturing base define Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec as a natural resource enclave.

The fact that the commercial sector grew so rapidly meant that numerous economic opportunities in this particular economic sector of the region had been created. The continued growth of the petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation until the mid 1950's was due to the intensified exploitation of natural resources in the adjacent Val d'Or and Malartic regions of the Quebec northwest (see Figure III). That is, the demand for intermediaries in the sphere of circulation to provide goods and service to the working class, the natural resource companies and their local management and technical staff would be sustained. Therefore, the reproduction of class relations in the natural enclave could be assured.

In other words, even though this was a subordinate region to southern metropolises, the growth of economic opportunities for petit bourgeois entrepreneurship in the sphere of circulation would act as a "safety valve" for the existing structural subordination and limited range of economic opportunities occasioned by the technical preconditions for natural resource extraction which had resulted in the creation of a limited internal market. So that, when growth stopped or even reversed (that is, negative growth) the structural subordination and dependence on natural resource extraction can only then be singled out as explanatory factors for unemployment and a limited range of economic opportunities. In other words, sustained economic growth camouflages the structural weaknesses on which natural resource enclaves are based.

"La crise de croissance"

In addition to the apparent disengagement by the 1950's of the company from local political affairs as revealed earlier was the experience of a crisis brought on by the knowledge of the eventual exhaustion of the copper and gold reserves of the Horne Mine. This development is important because it quickened the process by which both the company and the local petite bourgeoisie would be thrown onto the historical stage. The exhaustion of the mine would quicken Noranda Mine's disengagement from Noranda, Quebec while "la crise de croissance" would place the petite bourgeoisie in a position to seize the opportunity to try and politically resolve this crisis in its own interests before it, as a class, would be thrown into the ranks of labour.

The fragile base upon which the Abitibi-Temiscamingue and Rouyn-Noranda economy rested was dramatically highlighted at the latest by the late 1950's. After several decades of rapid growth, the Quebec northwest had suddenly become a

"problem area". It was lumped together with the Gaspé and Lac St. Jean regions as being marginal to the Quebec economy.

The situation became acute when regional unemployment surpassed the provincial average. This period also saw the first indications of an out-migration and a slight decline in the overall population. Employment in agriculture and mining was declining. The agricultural labour force declined from approximately 11,000 in 1950 to less than 1,800 in 1971, a drop of almost 84 percent. In the eleven year period from 1961 to 1972, employment in mining declined by a little over 40 percent (See Table V). Public services in health, education and welfare were painfully deficient. And, finally, the region's overall uncertain future bred an atmosphere of insecurity within the population, especially in Rouyn-Noranda when it became known that the Horne Mine would soon become exhausted.

TABLE VI

Employment in Mining in the Quebec Northwest

YEAR	1961	1966	1970	1961-72
Number of mine workers	6,800	6,300	5,100	-2,200
% difference				-41

In a devastating critique,¹² the joint committees of Le Conseil

¹²

L'Orientation du Développement et de l'Action de Développement, May, 1971, p. 12.

Economique Régional du Nord-Ouest Québécois (CERNOQ) and Le Conseil de Développement Social du Nord-Ouest Québécois (COSNOQ) argued that the "origins of the problem" could be found in the neo-colonial status of the Québec northwest. In almost classical metropolis-hinterland imagery, the report singled out the fact that much more capital and taxes had been removed from the region than were reinvested so that the draining of resources from the Québec northwest had left it in a state of under-development.

Les gens d'ici répètent sans cesse que les grandes entreprises, et les Gouvernements viennent chercher, dans la région, des profits et des taxes, mais qu'ils ne réinvestissent sur place qu'une partie infime de ces argent. Les résidents de la région ont conscience d'avoir été, depuis toujours, des créateurs de richesses; ils ont extrait du sous-sol des montagnes de minerai, ils ont coupé des centaines de millions d'arbres, ils ont défriché etensemencé 500,000 acres de terre....la production du secteur minier, depuis 40 ans, s'élève à plus de trois milliards et demi de dollars. Depuis cent ans, la valeur de la production forestière s'élève probablement aussi à plusieurs milliards. De ces montants, la part des profits réalisés par les entreprises s'élève certainement aussi à plusieurs centaines de millions de dollars, dont une mince partie seulement a été réinvestie dans des secteurs productifs de l'économie de la région....Par ailleurs, l'Etat lui-même adopte cette attitude colonialiste; il se conduit comme une métropole vis-à-vis sa colonie, retirant de la région taxes, impôts et redevances et ne réinvestissant sur place qu'au compte-goutte. (1971: 4-5)

The report from which the above quote came was prepared by a local group of prominent citizens who had formed CERNDQ and CDSNOQ in response to "la crise de croissance". The more important of the two organizations was Le Conseil Economique Régional du Nord-Ouest Québécois (CERNOQ). It became the center of activity throughout the 1960's and early 1970's in the region where the collective interests of the dominated classes coalesced. The domination of the petite bourgeoisie in this important organization is evidenced by the degree of labour input into CERNOQ.

The organization was divided into an executive committee of eight members and an administrative council of thirty-seven members. Beneath this structure, there were ten consultative committees who advised the executive on matters under their respective jurisdictions. The ten consultative committees were (1) an agriculture committee of seventeen members, (2) a municipal affairs committee of ten members, (3) a social welfare committee of seventeen members, (4) an education committee of fifteen members, (5) a forestry committee of fifteen members (6) an industrial committee of thirteen members, (7) a mining committee of fourteen members, (8) a marginal parishes committee of eight members, (9) a transportation and communications committee of eleven members and finally, (10) a tourism committee of eighteen.

In neither the formal hierarchy of CERNOQ nor in the consultative committee structure was organized labour's position decisive. For the most part, labour enjoyed a consultative role. Only one labour representative held a position at the executive level while six men out of the thirty-seven man administrative council were from organized labour. There were no union representatives in the agriculture, municipal affairs and marginal parishes committees. One labour representative out of seventeen could be found in the social welfare committee. Two labour representatives were included in the education, forestry, transportation and communications and tourism committee. There were three representatives from labour on both the mines and industry committees. At no time did labour numerically possess the strength to exercise a decisive voice over the petite bourgeoisie. Its strength ranged from a high of 23 percent, on the forestry committee to no representation on three of the ten consultative committees. The numerical subordination of labour at all levels of the organizational structure of Le Conseil Economique Regional du Nord-Ouest Quebecois is suggestive of a class alliance between the working class

and the petite bourgeoisie during the period known as "la crise de croissance". But, a class alliance in which the petite bourgeoisie exercised a dominant influence.

The "crisis" experienced by Rouyn-Noranda during the 1960's, of which more will be said in a later chapter, brought into bold relief the limited and fragile economic base on which both the community and the region as a whole depended. In addition to, (1) the geographical isolation of Abitibi-Temiscamingue from southern Quebec, (2) the "expatriation" from the regional economy of "millions of dollars of profit" by large mining companies (See also Chapter IV for Noranda Mines; role), (3) the integration of "The Quebec Northwest" into the northwestern mining sector of the Ontario economy, (4) the Quebec and Federal governments' "colonial attitude" towards the regional economy, all of which contributed to feelings of powerlessness, there was added, (5) "la crise de croissance" in which the working class would become structurally subordinate to the petite bourgeoisie. This was organizationally represented in CERNOQ, would be ideologically expressed in the Ralliement des Creditistes and culminate with the election of Real Caoclette in 1962.

So long as Noranda Mines had maintained a strong presence in the political life of these communities, the overt expression of grievances translated into political action was contained. But, the decline in mining "la crise de croissance". As we will develop in the remaining chapters, the circumstances which would lead to the creation of a "crisis". In the community and regional economy provided the structural opportunity for the emergence of political protest in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec from the early 1960's and into the 1970's.

Conclusion

The social evolution of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec and the outlying region gave evidence to its characterization as a natural resource enclave. The single most important factor contributing to such a description was the export of natural resources and the importing of manufactured goods and food.

Evidence was provided to support the contention that this natural resource enclave was characterized by (1) the predominance of commercial capitalism, (2) the lack of a manufacturing base and (3) a limited, but in this case, relatively affluent internal market. These structural factors, limited the development of social class forces to the petite bourgeoisie located in the sphere of circulation and a working class of mine and smelter workers.

The petite bourgeoisie purchase the needed commodities from centres that lie outside the political boundaries of the province of Quebec and are concentrated in Toronto and the farming and manufacturing region of southern Ontario. The explanation for the existence of these "external" sources for goods lay, as was examined above, in the particular historical development and geographical structure of dependent capitalism in northwestern Quebec.

Noranda was the economic and political centre of the region for close to half a century. The fact that it was the physical location of the Horne Mine made it the economic center of the region. Noranda Mines' interest in this community is evidenced by the fact that the company financed the costs towards making Noranda, Quebec a planned community. In addition, the visible presence of senior management in municipal politics until well into the 1950's attests to the importance the company attached to its participation in local affairs. Yet, by the 1950's, the company had begun to relax its hold on Noranda, Quebec as indicated by the election of Frédéric Hébert. Rouyn, on the other hand, served as the commercial and service centre for the twin towns and could be considered a sub-regional centre, next in importance to Noranda, Quebec.

So long as Noranda Mines had maintained a strong presence in the political life of these communities, any real or perceived grievances that might be translated into political action found little opportunity to be expressed. But, the disengagement of Noranda Mines from local political affairs and the knowledge that the Horne Mine would soon become exhausted of its copper-gold reserves ignited a "crise de croissance". The creation of a "crisis" in the community and regional economy became the opportunity for a class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and working class which would lead to the rise and persistence of a form of political protest in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec that would combine ideological elements derived from a petit bourgeois political doctrine of underconsumption with the emotional appeals of French-Canadian nationalism. As will be shown, the specific political form that the protest took would be determined by (1) the "external structural relationships" between this natural resource enclave and its metropolis mediated by two major economic institutions, namely, Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America and (2) also the "internal, integral elements of a hinterland society", that is, the historical development of the petite bourgeoisie and working class in this particular part of Quebec. Moreover, an important consideration in the social evolution of Rouyn-Noranda was the tendency towards ethnic homogenization. The increasing Quebecois or French-speaking character of the population would contribute to the political mobilization of the petite bourgeoisie and the working class through the nationalist appeals contained within the ideology of the Ralliement des Creditistes. Such nationalist appeals could only be effective in helping to forge a class alliance within a population which is predominantly French-speaking Quebecois. The importance of the political platform and ideology of the Social Credit Party in Quebec will be left for a detailed examination in a later chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE CORPORATION IN DEPENDENT CAPITALISM

The previous chapter provided evidence for the description of Rouyn-Noranda and the outlying region as a natural resource enclave. It was revealed that the community and region was characterized by the exploitation of natural resources whose technical preconditions led to the development of a limited internal market, the importing of manufactured and other goods and the creation of an internal class structure composed of a working class of miners and smelter workers and a petite bourgeoisie predominant in the sphere of circulation. We also showed a structural change in the pattern of class domination in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Where for over thirty years the corporation dominated the internal developments in the community; by the late 1950's it was being replaced by the petite bourgeoisie. At both the local political (that is, the mayors of Rouyn and Noranda) and organizational levels (that is, CERNOQ), the petite bourgeoisie exhibited a dominant influence.

This chapter will establish the contours of the major institutional pattern within which these local developments took place. We will show that from the 1920's until the latter part of the 1950's Noranda Mines was dependent on the second largest copper mine in Canada located in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec for its continued survival and growth. This relationship between the company and the subordination of local interests to corporate interests lasted from the founding of the

community until the Quiet Revolution.

Due to a series of factors, to be developed below the 1960's witnessed the emergence of Noranda Mines as a typical multinational corporation¹ characterized by its integrated nature, the international dimension of its operations and its institutional linkages with financial institutions. Evidence will be provided to illustrate what Stephen Hymer referred to as "The Law of Increasing Firm Size". This is important because without growth the company would have remained dependent on the Horne Mine and would not necessarily have disengaged itself from local community affairs when it did. An important factor in conditioning the nature of corporate growth is the availability of the natural resources. In other words, is it a scarce or an abundant factor of production? The availability of copper on a world-wide basis gives to management in this industry a greater flexibility than would otherwise be the case with a scarce resource such as nickel. The nature of copper then would mean that once the company had grown large enough management could be more flexible in its control at the local firm

¹ We assume that the goal of any organization is to survive and grow. For an economic organization functioning within capitalism the goals of survival and growth are determined by profit. In other words, the privately-owned and controlled economic organization is dependent on capital accumulation for its continued growth and development.

level since the company's growth becomes dependent on many sources and not just one.²

In the process of examining the historical development of Noranda Mines, some attention will be given to the organizational structure of the company. We intend to show that Noranda Mines fits the structure of

² Theodore Moran (1974), in his study of the relations between the two major copper companies of the world, Anaconda and Kennecott, with successive Chilean governments has also provided a detailed account and analysis of the international copper industry. The growth of the electrical and telephone business and the corresponding technological advances in the extraction and processing of low grade copper ore in the post World War I period created opportunities for the expansion of the industry on an international level (see also Alfred D. Chandler, 1959: 20). The demands of the electrical, telephone and the automobile industry in the United States and Canada were rapidly growing so that by the 1920's, the exploration for and the exploitation of copper mines had begun to take on an international dimension when "new ore bodies in Canada and Africa were added to those in the United States" (Moran, 1974: 32).

Finally, there are two factors which Moran describes that are related to the copper smelting, refining and fabricating companies that either (1) integrate "backwards to own copper mines", or (2) "finance the growth of new small copper mines and be paid back in output" (Moran, 1974: 34). These strategies of integration are better known as horizontal and vertical integration.

Horizontal integration occurs between firms producing similar products, for example, the merging of two copper mines. Vertical integration, on the other hand, operates within a firm whose strategy is aimed at capturing the various levels of production for a particular product, for example, the combining of copper smelting and copper refining processes. Therefore, for my purposes, the concept of integration refers to certain basic features of corporate enterprises. A corporation is said to be integrated if it controls the series of stages in a specific line of production which begins with natural resource extraction and moves up to the manufacturing or fabricating stages. The process of integration also includes the expansion of the size of the market in which the corporation has an interest. In other words, the strategies used by management to achieve these goals have been defined as vertical and horizontal integration. The former refers to the control of the stages of production while the latter is reserved for describing the expansion of the corporation's interests within the particular industry.

corporate growth theoretically analysed earlier in Chapter II. In other words, the quantitative growth of the company eventually led to a qualitative change in its organizational structure. The move was away from a tightly-knit group of mining executives to a more diversified management team. This development is important because it reflects a change in overall corporate strategy. For example, certain modifications in corporate structure will have a bearing on the company's relationship with trade unions. We will see that labour relations today are institutionalized, whereas under the old management team led by James Murdock the relationship was one of confrontation (See Chapter VI for more details).

The major concerns now of senior management center on diversifying its corporate interests and consolidating its position in the marketplace. The older management team was concerned with diversification but the long-standing dependence on the Horne Mine also led them to be concerned with local affairs in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Evidence was provided in the last chapter to illustrate senior management's concern with municipal politics, and in a forthcoming chapter evidence will be provided to show senior management's confrontation tactics with organized labour.

The timing of this organizational change is important for this case study as well. It will be shown that the change in organizational structure and personnel towards a multinational corporate form began with the retirement of James Murdock as Chairman of the Board of Directors in 1956 and rapidly proceeded along these lines during the first half of the 1960's. James Murdock represented, indeed made the older style of management, characterized by the notion that ownership, whether it represented land, physical assets or labour was the exclusive right of management. Senior

management could do with them as they please. Hence James Murdock was concerned with local municipal affairs and as we shall see later he fought the demands made by trade unionists. But as the company grew changes in management personnel would result in their taking a position of accommodation with trade unions. The larger the corporate structure, the more flexibility it began to wield in its overall corporate strategy viz à viz the Horne Mine and Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. In other words, as the company grew and a degree of organizational flexibility had been achieved through the availability of alternate sources of copper in other regions of Quebec, Canada and elsewhere in the world, the corporate hold on Rouyn-Noranda would become correspondingly relaxed. The larger Noranda Mines grew as a natural resource enterprise, the less dependent it became on the Horne Mine, thereby diminishing the corporate desirability to maintain a symbiotic relationship with the community.

Furthermore, the nature of the industry, namely the exploitation of a non-renewable resource, places management and the community in a unique position. Dependence on a mine means that the life of the community is determinate. As Rex Lucas has remarked, "by nature the community of single industry seldom expands, it is vulnerable to changes in international markets, changes in technology, and in most instances it has a limited life expectancy, if for no other reason than that the sole reason for the town's existence may disappear" (1971: 98).

During the latter part of the life cycle of a single industry community, Lucas has noted that for a variety of reasons the company will disengage itself from local affairs. The change in status from paternalism

to a strictly business-oriented company varies but always includes the transfer of ownership of "houses, non-industrial facilities, and major community responsibility to the citizens of the community" (1971: 72).

In the previous chapter, evidence was presented which showed the company's initial strong presence in the community and the progressive disengagement of the company from local political affairs. The forthcoming analysis of Noranda Mines will situate the emphasis of this local development in terms of the growth dynamics of the organization itself. This investigation will add a further dimension to the already established growth cycle of single industry communities analysed by Rex Lucas.

Therefore, it is the historically determined organizational independence of the corporation from the Horne Mine, which itself would remain an integrated but dependent and subordinate part of the corporate structure of Noranda Mines, that establishes the principle theme of this chapter. In other words, the change in status for Noranda Mines from a locally-based company to a multinational firm lessened its domination over the community since the Horne Mine no longer represented the only important asset for the corporation. This development, as we will later see, helped to remove some of the fetters containing the emergence of an indigenous political movement.

I. The Heritage

a. The American Invasion

"Since the company's incorporation, the Horne Mine has been the Key Stone of the Noranda enterprise".³

³ Unless otherwise indicated the early economic history of Noranda Mines is taken from William A. Bulk, "Noranda Mines Limited: A Study in Business and Economic History", unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1958.

The man responsible for the discovery of the copper-gold deposits in the township of Rouyn was a Nova Scotian named Edmund Horne.⁴ For many years he had travelled as a prospector for gold across Canada and California and in 1911 was living in the northeastern Ontario mining community of New Liskeard. That year he travelled a little over thirty miles into the Province of Quebec panning for gold on the shores of Tremoy Lake, now called Lake Osisko. At that time he reasoned

"it didn't seem sensible to believe that all the good geology would quit at the Ontario border, just because somebody had drawn an imaginary line there". (Buik: 1958: 18)

By the middle of March, 1923, there began a mini-gold rush into the Rouyn-district - "Nobody dreamed of copper...the search was all for gold". (Buik: 1958: 14) With the gold fever well on its way by 1922, Ed Horne was more than anxious for someone to take an option on his claim. The fear of someone "jumping" his claim prompted Ed Horne to search out prospective financiers.

b. The Thomson-Chadbourne Syndicate

By midsummer, of 1923 Horne decided to give a free hand to Peter Graham, a Haileybury mining man. Graham talked to a representative of the Thomson-Chadbourne to come to New Liskeard and take an option on the Horne claims. Chadbourne arrived in late July and by late August a deal with the Lake Tremoy Syndicate had been completed. The Thomson-Chadbourne Syndicate agreed to option 90% of the Horne property for \$320,000. The remaining 10% would take the form of "shares in any operating company the Thomson-Chadbourne Syndicate might subsequently incorporate to finance its activities on the

⁴ Leslie Roberts, Noranda, (Toronto: Clark, Irwin: 1956), p. 9.

Horne property". (Buik: 1958: 11)

In February, 1921, the Thomson-Chadbourne Syndicate had been formed with an original capitalization of \$100,000. The members were well established New York financial and mining men such as:

Harry S. Haskell, Vice-President, E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co.

Hugh C. Wallace, United States Ambassador to France

William E. Corey, former President of United States Steel

Percy A. Rockefeller, Chase Manhattan Bank

S.C. Thomson and H.W. Chadbourne were made the directing partners of this venture whose collective aim was to develop a large mine in Canada. "We didn't want any borderline mines, any low grade ore bodies and high scale bush costs. We were out for a big mine. All or nothing". (Roberts: 1956: 38)

The Canadian partner who was to become responsible for directing the operations of the company once a mine was discovered was James Y. Murdock. A company, under the name of Noranda Mines⁵ was incorporated under Ontario Charter on May 1, 1922 with James Y. Murdock as president. The original capitalization of Noranda Mines consisted of 5,000 shares of \$100 per value, all of which were issued to the Thomson-Chadbourne Syndicate.⁶

Once drilling on the Horne property began, the potential value of the ore body grew dramatically. In March 31, 1924, estimates were pegged at \$7,600.00. A little over a year and a half later, on Dec. 31, 1925, the estimated value of the ore was placed at \$21,686,294. The prospects of a large mine were sympathetically echoed by both Managing Directors, Thomson and Chadbourne when they said "during this period the Horne has grown from

⁵ Noranda Mines is an amalgam of Northern Canada.

⁶ Leslie Roberts, op. cit., p. 52; Financial Post Corporation Service, Noranda Mines, July 17, 1957.

a promising prospect to a developed mine, needing only railway transportation to bring it into profitable operation". (Buik: 1958: 18).

c. The State and Economic Development in Quebec: The Transportation Problem

In order for the mine to be brought into profitable operation, the necessary transportation links with southern industrial and port facilities would have to be built.

Noranda's first efforts at negotiating for a railroad into Rouyn, Quebec began on October 24, 1924 with the Canadian National Railway. The original company plan called for the erection of a smelter to treat the mined ore. Both the mine and the smelter would employ approximately 500 men and thereby support a community of between 1500 to 2000 people. The railroad would be supplying "powder, lubricants, hardware and so on for the mine and mill, and supplies for a town of from 1500 to 2000 persons. Outgoing freight would include 80 tons of blister copper daily plus the normal haul from such a community". (Buik: 1958: 21)

The Canadian National Railway employed its engineers and economists to study the feasibility of 'The Noranda Plan'. The final Report they submitted was not altogether favourable to Noranda's original scheme.

Apart from the Canadian National Railway, the only other railway which might consider building a connection to Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec was the Ontario-owned Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad (TNO) through its subsidiary, the Nipissing Central Railway. Noranda's backers began to negotiate with the Ontario government who appeared to be favourable to such a suggestion. This move had the immediate result of heightening Quebec's interest in the project.

⁷ The Canadian Pacific Railway had already made it known that it was not at all interested in such a venture.

For some time, the Quebec government had been encouraging the development of the lumber industry and colonization schemes in northwestern Quebec. Quebec was anxious to economically tie this uninhabited, hinterland region with the rest of the province.

Figure IV boldly pictures the vast hinterland of northwestern Quebec at the beginning of the second quarter of the 20th century. In comparison, northeastern Ontario is criss-crossed with rail lines. In addition, the Ontario region was comprised of established mining towns such as Timmins incorporated as a town in 1912, Sudbury incorporated in 1892 and New Liskeard which had been incorporated as a town in 1903. It was a populated region that was well integrated by rail to southern industrial and port facilities.

Ontario's involvement at the negotiating table with Noranda could be seen as an important political issue for Quebec over who in the future would exercise political sovereignty in this region. The discovery of a rich mineral deposit in this Quebec hinterland would prompt the Quebec provincial government to actively pursue the steps necessary in providing transportation links with the southern parts of the province. If the Ontario government through the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad (TNO) was successful in establishing a rail link between this region and the rest of Ontario before Quebec, the danger of political integration with Ontario could be that much closer to realization. Quebec had to make its presence felt in this region if it hoped to politically administer and economically benefit from future royalties and corporate taxes.

The leading spokesman for the Quebec government in what was to transpire was the Honourable J.E. Perrault. This man's vision of good

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government was succinctly captured when he said:

"The duty of the government is apparent. In a country such as Canada the government which does not lend every possible assistance to those who seek to open the way to natural resources does not deserve the name government. We decided from the beginning that as we're dealing with responsible people who were spending their own money, the least we could do would be to provide them with, or assist them to obtain, every facility for opening up the country as development progressed with roads, then railways and all the other essentials of modern industry it lies within a government's power to five". (Roberts: 1956: 21)

According to Perrault, the provincial government assumed the role of facilitating the exploitation of natural resources by entrepreneurs. This was done by generously and freely providing financial assistance for the building of the necessary infrastructure. Obviously, this ideology also had the political goal of more closely tying the northwestern hinterland region to core economic and political decision-making centres in Quebec.

We turn now to the specific measures taken by the Quebec government in assisting Noranda Mines to profitably exploit the Horne-copper-gold mine in the Township of Rouyn, Quebec. It will be shown that at this early stage, the provincial government assisted the company in the economic integration of this frontier region as a natural resource enclave into a southern metropolitan economy. Economic integration could only take place once a transportation-link was established between Rouyn-Noranda and Montreal. Only then could natural resources be shipped out and manufactured and other goods transported into the region.

When Perrault first met Chadbourne in Rouyn, Quebec, he recounted "Your first need, obviously, is roads. I'll see that you get them". (Roberts: 1956: 66). But roads were expensive to build over the rough

terrain and besides the cheapest way for the ore mined in the Rouyn township to be transported south was still rail. Figure V presents the picture that as late as 1936, road construction from Montreal to Rouyn-Noranda was still very much in the planning stages.

While roads were a desirable form of transportation to tie this northwestern hinterland to southern Quebec and the first choice of the provincial minister, the company needed a rail connection to tap southern markets and port facilities. Consequently, the Quebec government focused its efforts on providing sufficient incentives to the CNR for the building of a branchline into Rouyn-Noranda from O'Brien, Quebec which is located on the main transcontinental artery. In this way, both the economic needs of the company (cheap freight) and the political goal of the Quebec government (incorporation of its northwestern territory) could be mutually satisfied. In order to circumvent Ontario's intrusion into this hinterland region of Quebec, a provincial government proposal was made to assist the CNR to the amount of \$250,000 in five yearly installments of \$50,000 beginning February 1, 1927. The only stipulation imposed by the Quebec government proposal stated the line into Rouyn had to be completed before the date of the first installment.

On April 3, 1925, the Rouyn Mines Railway Company was authorized to construct a line "from a point near O'Brien, south to a point in the Township of Rouyn, with power to construct branch lines". One year later in March, 1926, the name was changed to the National Transcontinental Branch Lines Railway Company.

THE QUÉBEC NORTHWEST: THE ROADS

In order to ensure the CNR's success, the Quebec government proceeded to take out an injunction against the Nipissing Central Railway preventing it from crossing the Quebec provincial boundary. Since the charter of the Nipissing Central Railway authorized it to construct railway lines anywhere in Canada, Quebec's court action was meant to delay construction in order to permit the CNR to build its line in advance of the Nipissing Central. CNR tracks reached the outskirts of Rouyn on October 25, 1926, almost four months in advance of the Quebec government's deadline.

The political struggles centering on the question of sovereignty in the Quebec northwest between the Ontario and Quebec governments had been skillfully used by Noranda Mines. It resulted in ensuring the more profitable exploitation of the Horne copper property by defraying infrastructure costs onto the Quebec government and the transportation companies.

d. The 'Manufacturing Condition'

Now that the Quebec government had actively intervened in assisting Noranda in the exploitation of the Horne copper-gold mine by facilitating the construction of rail links, concern began to be raised in certain government circles about whether ore mined in the province should also be processed there. The Quebec Legislature's action in regard to the exploitation of copper in Rouyn by foreign interests resulted in the setting up of duties on profits and in addition stipulated that

In the event of the ore, minerals or mineral-bearing substance coming from any mines in the Province of Quebec being removed outside of the Province, to be there treated, or of their being treated in the Province

of Quebec in any smelter, mill or refinery, the place and situation whereof has not been chosen determined or approved as aforesaid, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may exact from the owner, manager, holder, lessee, occupant or operator of such mine thrice the amount of the duties therein above established."⁸

This legislative action taken by the Quebec government had unforeseen results in that it would contribute to placing control of the company in Canadian hands. The American interest in developing a significant mine in Northern Canada was predicated on the feasibility of exporting an untreated natural resource to U.S. industrial markets. The alternatives now facing the foreign management of Noranda Mines were either to pay prohibitive taxes on a rising scale or ensure the smelting and refining of the ore in Quebec. Neither alternative appeared in the least way attractive to them. In addition, it was common knowledge that the United States possessed abundant and untapped copper reserves. Unlike nickel, for example, which is a non-ferrous metal of limited known reserves, copper is a relatively common non-ferrous metal. Neither was copper, at this time, of immediate strategic importance to the United States economy or military. Therefore, it did not possess an overwhelming attractiveness for the American owners. Put differently, the initiatives of the provincial government would have met with stronger resistance from the American backers had the metal been a scarce natural resource such as nickel or of military significance. But

⁸ Quebec Mining Act R.S. 1925, C.80, S.12. H.V. Nelles has documented similar moves by the Ontario government at the turn of the century. Successive Ontario governments' enacted "manufacturing conditions" for the lumber and mining industries operating in that province. H.V. Nelles, "Empire Ontario: The Problems of Resource Development" in Donald Swainson (ed.), Oliver Mowat's Ontario, (Toronto: 1972) pp. 189-219; H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1890-1940 (Toronto: Macmillan: 1975)

because copper was not such a metal, they could turn a deaf ear to the Horne property and look elsewhere for a large, attractive mining venture.

Therefore, the intransigence of the Quebec government and the availability of copper in other parts of North America led the American stockholders to divest their interests in Noranda Mines. Due to the unusually high price for copper that year, some members were to make up to 2000% profit on their initial investment.

The capital which was necessary for Noranda to build a smelter at the site of the Horne mine would come from Noah Timmins. The possibility of finding other copper mines in the vicinity of the Horne property plus the prospects of acquiring monopoly control of the copper smelting and later refining business in Quebec, all under the protection of the provincial state, prompted Timmins, as head of Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines to provide \$3,000,000 to Noranda Mines in January, 1927. This capital was to be used in the construction of a smelter at Noranda, Quebec. As a result, Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines was to have at least one representative on the Board of Directors of Noranda Mines.⁹ On December 17, 1927, only fourteen months after the railway had reached the town, the 500 ton unit of the Noranda smelter was brought into production.

The advantage which Noah Timmins saw in this situation was that Noranda Mines could be in a monopoly position for custom smelting and refining in the province and possibly in Canada as a whole. Since there were no other major mining companies in Quebec, "the possibility of a rival in the near future was remote". (Buik: 1958: 28)

⁹ Financial Post Corporation Service, Noranda Mines, April 30, 1956. No further outside capital investment in Noranda Mines was made until 1952. All capital investment came from retained earnings.

e. Corporate Strategies of Growth: Vertical and Horizontal Integration

In 1929, the Canadian Copper Refiners was incorporated. The company was established to refine the products of Noranda and the Hudson's Bay Mining and Smelting Corporation under a management contract with Phelps Dodge Refining. In May 1930, a partnership was formed between Noranda and the British Metals Corporation giving Noranda access to British expertise and markets. The construction of its Montreal East copper refinery with an annual capacity of 65,000 tons was begun in that year. It was brought into operation early in February, 1931.

In 1930, Noranda acquired a substantial interest in Canada Wire and Cable Company which had factories in Toronto and Hamilton, Ontario. A plant was built beside its Montreal East refinery to make wire and other commercial copper products. The acquisition of Canada Wire and Cable Company meant that Noranda had found an outlet for most of its copper products. All these acquisitions were part of Noranda's corporate strategies of integration into the fabrication stages of production. From the Horne Mine came the copper ore that was smelted in Noranda, Quebec, refined at the Montreal, Quebec works, made into copper wire and cables in Montreal East, Toronto and Hamilton and then marketed in Canada, the United States and Great Britain. In summarizing Noranda's basic corporate strategies, the special magazine supplement of The Northern Miner, commemorating Noranda's 50th Anniversary pointed out that

From the beginning, Noranda followed a policy of vertical integration to the maximum extent economically justified, and of horizontal expansion whenever its abilities and capital would contribute logically to the success of a new venture. This was Noranda's original policy, and remains its policy today. (1972: 7)

But, as was shown above, the success of Noranda's corporate strategies of integration could not have been achieved alone. Political factors helped shape the social milieu which afforded to Noranda Mines the opportunity to establish itself in the Quebec northwest and eventually throughout the world.

f. The Horne Mine

The success of Noranda's strategies of horizontal and vertical integration rested on the profitability of the Horne Mine. By 1932, the copper-gold reserves of the Horne Mine were to prove to be, "next to Inco, the largest copper mine in Canada. Buik estimated that at December 31, 1956 copper and gold prices, the reserves at the Horne Mine were valued in excess of \$206,435,000. On an initial equity investment of \$11,300,000 in Noranda Mines, we could conclude that Noranda Mines was indeed profitable. As proof of the above, William Buik's study showed that Noranda Mines made net profits in every single year of operation. His study terminated in 1957. An analysis of Noranda Mines' Annual Reports since that date reveal that this trend has continued until at least 1976. Very few mining companies can boast of a hefty profit record in every single year over a fifty year period.

Yet, the importance of the Horne Mine did not rest solely on its ability to provide substantial profits in every single year of its operation. It required Noranda's management to seek to diversify and expand its base of operations through vertical and horizontal integration if the company hoped to survive. Such strategies would lessen the company's dependence on one huge mine so that once the reserves were depleted, as inevitably happens to all mining properties, the company itself would not

die but continue a reasonably steady pattern of growth. The acquisitions and investments made by Noranda Mines from 1927 until well into the 1950's were done through retained earnings. In addition, once Noranda's program of vertical integration into the refining stages of production had reached a satisfactory level "mine production increased dramatically so that throughout most of this period (1928-39) it was almost exclusively Horne Mine ore that was processed by the expanding processing and fabricating facilities". (Buik: 1958: 37) That is, the Horne Mine proved to be the "foundation" on which "the structure of the Noranda enterprise was raised". (Buik: 1958: 56) Noranda's dependence on the Horne Mine continued for decades and lasted until the early 1960's when production was replaced by such massive copper reserves as those of the Gaspé Copper Mines in Murdochville, Quebec.

The vulnerability of an enterprise which dependence on one large mine brings in the natural resource industry caused Noranda's management to expand horizontally into other copper mines in order to reduce this dependence and vertical integration for economic and political reasons. First, vertical integration was an attempt to ensure the continuation of dividends to its shareholders. Secondly, it provided a "captive outlet" for production coming from the mine. As Canadian demand for refined copper increased, the discovery and exploitation of new mines was meant to provide the smelter with expanding sources of input and by so doing not only keep pace with the growth of the Canadian market but also increase the earnings base for the Company.

Therefore, in addition to the market forces within which Noranda Mines was operating the growth of the company during at least the first twenty-five years of its existence was assisted by a political, and one could say, protective shell - the Quebec provincial government. It would only be

after the retirement of James Y. Murdoch and the copper boom of the early 1960's that the way would be paved for the company to finally burst out of its shell and establish itself as a multinational corporation.

g. The Copper Market

Even though Noranda had an ally in the provincial government, its growth and maturity depended heavily on the metal markets. The volatility of the copper market placed the company in a precarious position. But, the Horne ore body, fortunate enough for Noranda, contained significant quantities of gold. The significance of finding gold with copper was such that when the copper market was weak, the profits from gold more than offset the meagre returns from copper. W. A. Buik succinctly summarized the cumulative advantageous effects of the Horne copper-gold ore body for the Noranda enterprise as a whole in the face of the vicissitudes of the world metal markets.

"There is no question but that certain advantageous circumstances contributed to Noranda's growth.... The price of gold was satisfactory when the Horne Mine came into production and the increase in 1934 proved to be a windfall that supported and expanded Noranda's earnings and dividends in the face of a weak copper market. Despite the low price of copper in the early 1930's, Noranda was the beneficiary of high (copper) prices while it was financing for production and in the first years of operation. In the years 1946 to 1956 the average price of copper was the highest of the century and consumption reached record levels.... Although Noranda through its custom business and fabricating facilities has tried to insulate itself somewhat from violent short term weakness in metal prices, it has in the final analysis remained basically dependent on world metal markets. The generally highly favourable tone of these markets during its lifetime has contributed greatly to the Company's success." (Buik: 1958: 191)

II. Noranda's Management

The personnel make-up and outlook of Noranda's management can be separated into roughly two historical stages. The earlier period is characterized by a management team whose business knowledge rested almost

exclusively in the copper mining field. The second stage is marked by a younger management team trained in finance and commerce and whose outlook is worldwide and whose business interests, while linked to the natural resource industry, are much more varied.

a. The Early Period: The American Interlude

Initially, the Board of Directors was made up of seven Americans and two Canadians. With the resignation of four Americans in 1926, four Canadians, all from Toronto, Ontario were recruited. From that date on, Canadians were to make up the majority on the Board of Directors. Also in 1926, all administrative work was brought under the supervision and charge of the president and the Board of Directors.

TABLE VII

Noranda's Mines'

Board of Directors

The American Interlude	Post-1926 Period
James Y. Murdock - President - Canadian	James Y. Murdoch - President - Canadian
S.C. Thomson - Director - American	S.C. Thomson - Director - American
T.L. Chadbourne - Director - American	Honourable F.H. Phippen-K.C. - Director - Canadian
H.W. Chadbourne - Director - American	C.L. Ellsworth - Director - Canadian
H.S. Haskell - Director - American	W.H. Beatty - Director - Canadian
Noah Timmins - Director - Canadian	W.S. Walton - Director - Canadian
Percy A. Rockefeller - Director - American	Noah Timmins - Director - Canadian
W.D. Baldwin - Director - American	H.S. Haskell - Director - American
Irving W. Bonbright - Director - American	Irving W. Bonbright - Director - American

Post-1926 Period

Additions to Noranda's management team who played the critical role of bringing the Horne Mine into profitable production were all mining personnel and spent an important part of their corporate career at the Noranda, Quebec operations. The recruitment of these personnel indicate the importance of the Horne Mine for Noranda Mines and therefore provides another indication of the corporation's interest in the stability of this natural resource enclave.

Ernest Hibbert, a well travelled British specialist in silver and copper mining was employed as the general manager of the Noranda, Quebec operations. He held that post from 1925-31. He was directly responsible for bringing the Horne Mine into production. Between 1931-38, he was retained by the company as a consulting engineer.

H.L. Roscoe, a former associate of Ernest Hibbert was employed by Noranda Mines in 1926. He was the assistant general manager at Noranda, Quebec from 1926-31 and general manager from 1931-50. In 1940, he was elected a director of the company.

Oliver Hall became the assistant general manager of the Noranda, Quebec operations when he joined the company in 1931. He was a graduate of McGill University and came to Noranda Mines via the International Nickel Company (INCO) where he had been superintendent of mines and the general manager of Mond Nickel, a subsidiary of INCO. Oliver Hall, whose "uncanny ability to unravel the knotty problems of ore deposition" was considered by all who knew him at Noranda Mines to be chiefly responsible for the success in the acquisition and development of such mining properties as Pamour, Hallnor, Aunor, La India and Gaspé Copper Mines. He died in 1954.

A very important addition to Noranda's management was J.R. Bradfield; also a graduate in civil engineering from McGill. He was a construction superintendent of the copper smelter at the Noranda, Quebec operations from 1927-31. He was made plant manager in 1931 and continued in this position until 1938. During the war years he was made secretary of the company. From 1948-56, he was vice-president and became president of Noranda Mines in 1956 upon the retirement of James Y. Murdoch.

All these men had an intimate knowledge of the copper industry and were in large measure responsible for the early success of the Horne Mine and Noranda's performance as a new copper producing company. In less than four years, despite the problems of financing and transportation, production at the Horne Mine had been achieved, ore reserves trebled, a strong management team had been built up and a start made in the program of acquisition of outside mining interests. However, the recruitment of these men and the overall direction of the company rested primarily in the hands of James Y. Murdoch and secondarily with Noah Timmins. It was these men who worked to bring about a stable and steady growth pattern for Noranda Mines through their management recruitment program and their far-sighted policies on vertical and horizontal integration. The early dependence on the Horne Mine resulted in the subordination of the natural resource enclave to the overall corporate interests as developed by James Murdoch. Yet, the growth of the company would pave the way for creating the proper conditions for the company to structurally distance itself from dependence on the Horne property.

• Post-Second World War Growth

The post-war era brought new challenges to the Noranda enterprise. First, the Horne Mine was now acknowledged as a depleting resource. No new

reserves of ore had been found. This is of obvious importance when it comes to the company's commitment to the community of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. So long as the Horne Mine was a proven resource and the company was dependent on it for its principal source of capital formation, senior management would seek to subordinate local ~~interests~~ to those of the company. The growth of Noranda Mines coupled with the knowledge of the Horne Mine as a depleting resource would create the appropriate conditions in which senior management would necessarily lose interest in this depleting resource and the community which it supported. Yet, the mine still remained Noranda's "main source of income". (Buik: 1958: 95) Noranda possessed a profitable custom smelting and refining business and it was making investments in outside mining properties. Expansion became the logical course of action for Noranda to follow. The 1950's witnessed the company's management making investment decisions into new developments. The range of business may have been broadened, but the "basic policies of the company remained the same; they were largely restricted to familiar fields". (Buik, 1958: 184)

The fact that the investment decisions were into "familiar fields" reveals a basic cautious, or conservative business attitude of Noranda's management which it continues to exhibit to this day. In addition, it was a reflection of the nature of Noranda's management team during this first stage of Noranda Mine's development. There were all mining men. The mining business was virtually all they knew. Ironically, the business environment of the post-World War II era was making it abundantly clear that long term survival depended on expanding management's horizons into such complex areas as corporate law, finance and labour relations. Unfortunately, such was not the case for Noranda's senior management team and would slowly become a concern only after the resignation of James Y. Murdoch as President of the

Board of Directors. James Murdoch typified Noranda Mines' strong stand against the legal recognition of trade unions and the importance of the Horne Mine for the company and the community which is supported. His retirement meant a change in management and a change in the relation between the company and Rouyn-Noranda were in the offing. Up until such time, besides being only mining experts, the senior management team of Noranda Mines were also a closely-knit group of men who had worked together from the beginning of the development of the Horne Mine. While additions had been made to the lower management levels during the post World War II period, "no additions to top management were made at Noranda during the 1950's". (Buik: 1958: 178) Until his retirement in April, 1956, James Murdoch's strong hand had been felt in the company and the community of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec.

Until his resignation, James Murdoch continued to express the opinion of Noranda's Board of Directors and management on government policy and other matters affecting the mining industry. (Buik: 1958: 184)

The Latter Period: Noranda Mines Becomes a Multinational Corporation

The copper boom of the 1960's had given Noranda Mines record earnings in every single year from 1961 to 1967. Operating revenue rose from \$76,130,000 in 1961 to \$354,729,000 in 1967, an increase of over 365% in seven years. In comparison to the previous seven years, operating revenue climbed from \$24,499,000 in 1954 to \$80,122,000 in 1960, an increase of 227%.¹⁰

¹⁰ Calculated from Noranda Mines, Annual Reports, for the years 1954, 1962 and 1967.

Expansion and diversification were necessary to the continued growth of the company. The main objective now was to seek important alternative mining properties that would take the place of the Horne Mine. The 1965 Annual Report of Noranda Mines spelled out the company's policy in this regard

"A good mine dies hard"....but inevitably. An important objective has been to ensure the replacement of earnings from the Horne Mine and certain other mines. The expansion programs and the new projects in production or under construction should readily accomplish this. Your company will continue to seek out opportunities in, or related to, the field of natural resources where its know-how and financial strength can be profitably employed. Research, development and exploration have been expanded in the belief that these activities are essential to the growth of your company.¹¹

A strategy that Noranda Mines followed in its diversification efforts in the natural resource field was to buy large reserves. Senior management had successfully learned from their earlier experience with the Horne Mine.

The 1960's were a period of growth through vertical integration and horizontal expansion for Noranda Mines. The successful experience with the Horne Mine meant that an important Noranda strategy centered on the acquisition of properties with proven large reserves. The earlier years were characterized by the importance of the province of Quebec in the investment decisions of the company. However, the later years seemed to indicate that a more national outlook had been taken.¹²

¹¹ Noranda Mines, Annual Report, 1965, p. 4.

¹² For more details see, The Northern Miner, "Noranda's 50th Anniversary", July 6, 1972, pp. 38; 43 and 44.

1. Internationalized Production

We saw in a previous chapter that two of the major characteristics which Stephan Hymer describes are the internationalization of production which comes with the increased size of economic institutions and the establishment of closer institutional linkages between multinational corporations and banks.

The final period in Noranda's growth is characterized by, at least development refers to the more international dimension of Noranda's manufacturing interests. For example, in addition to Canada Wire and Cable's plants in British Columbia, the company is associated with manufacturing companies located in Mexico, Iran, Brazil, and Spain. What is more, Noranda's Annual Report for 1974 stated that "during the last five years, Noranda's manufacturing companies have invested \$175.6 million in new facilities. Of this amount, including the aluminum reduction plant, \$129.6 million has been spent in other countries". This last figure illustrates the fact that from 1970 to 1974, almost three-quarters of manufacturing investment (73.8%) was spent on facilities outside Canada. Noranda Mines has only recently provided statistics to show the extent of internationalized production by which is meant the incorporation of labour from many countries into the company's integrated transnational structure. Table VIII provides a detailed description of the three economic sectors which Noranda Mines operates in and the extent of Canadian and international labour participation within these sectors.

TABLE VIII

Internationalized Production

of Noranda Mines

1975-76

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Employment	1975		1976	
	<u>Canada</u>	<u>International</u>	<u>Canada</u>	<u>International</u>
Mining/Smelting/ Refining	16,200	5,700 (26%)	13,800	6,500 (32%)
Manufacturing	4,900	5,400 (52%)	5,000	5,900 (54%)
Forest Products	10,000	1,100 (10%)	9,900	1,000 (9%)
TOTAL	31,000	12,200 (28%)	28,700	13,400 (32%)

From: NORANDA MINES, Annual Reports, 1975, 1976.

2. Qualitative Change

In addition to this growth being quantitative, it was also qualitative. In other words, production and the efficient use of management skills were being integrated into a more complex structure where a knowledge of financial and banking transactions was becoming a prerequisite for top management personnel. In addition, the increasing complexities of dealing with organized labour and the various levels of government; municipal,

provincial and federal in such areas as collective bargaining, corporate tax structures and development programs also required knowledge of a different kind from the traditional mining entrepreneur who made up Noranda's Board of Directors in the immediate post-World War II period. By the early 1960's, it became increasingly evident that certain important additions were required to be made to Noranda's top management staff if the company was to continue to survive and grow.

3. New Foundations

The concerns of an earlier and more conservative management under the leadership of James Murdoch who had to deal only with copper and gold must be contrasted today by a team of executives under Alf Powis who have over 118 companies to supervise. The attitudes of Noranda's present management must also be cast in a different light. As The Northern Miner noted in it's special issue of 1972 commemorating Noranda's fiftieth anniversary:

"Mr Powis leads the new generation of mining executives found within the Noranda organization. They do not all have a background in mining. Noranda is no longer just a mining company... Noranda's leaders shoulder the responsibilities associated with maintaining the internationally competitive position of a multi-product organization." (1972: 9)

Much of the responsibility for the expanded horizons of Noranda Mines during the 1960's and 1970's can be accounted for by the addition of young and aggressive personnel in key management positions. Two such important additions to the company's management team were Alf Powis, and A.H. Zimmerman.

Alf Powis was born in Montreal, Québec in 1930. He attended Westmount High School and in 1951 graduated from McGill University with a Bachelor of Commerce degree. He began his business career as an investment analyst for Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. In 1955, he moved to the head office of Noranda Mines in Toronto as Internal Auditor. In 1958, he was appointed Assistant Treasurer and in 1961 became the Assistant to the then President of Noranda Mines, John R. Bradfield. He became Executive Assistant to the President two years later and in 1964 was elected to the Board of Directors. In 1968, he became President of Noranda Mines. Alf Powis was made President and Chief Executive Officer the following year. In addition to his directorships on Noranda Mines and its associated companies, he is also a director of Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Gulf Oil Canada Limited, Simpsons Limited and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.¹³ In seven short years, Alf Powis had come to control Canada's largest, domestically-owned and controlled natural resource corporation.

Adam Hartley Zimmerman, Jr. was born in 1927. He was educated at Upper Canada College. In 1950, he graduated from the University of Toronto with a Bachelor of Arts degree. From 1950 to 1958, he was retained by the firm of Clarkson, Gordon and Company of chartered accountants and in 1956 became a member of the Ontario Institute of Chartered Accountants. In 1958, he moved to Noranda Mines as an Assistant Comptroller and three years later, in 1961, he was promoted to Comptroller. In 1974, he was elected Executive Vice-President of the Company.¹⁴

¹³ Who's Who in Canada, 1975-76, p. 96.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 114.

Chart III graphically represents the organizational links between the various senior officers of the corporation. It is evident that the corporation's three functions, mining, manufacturing and forest products are divided between the two Executive Vice-Presidents, William James and Adam Zimmerman. William James has responsibility for the mining operations while Adam Zimmerman is responsible for the manufacturing and forest products end of the Noranda Group. An indication of the importance which mining has had and continues to have in the company's overall structure is found in the fact that the four men who are responsible to William James have their offices at the Toronto headquarters while the management of the manufacturing and forest products industries do not. Only six men, E.K. Cork, R.D. Riggin, William James, K.C. Hendrick, D.H. Ford and Adam H. Zimmerman report directly to Alf Powis, Chairman and President of Noranda. From the evidence which this chart describes, a legacy of past experience has been maintained at Noranda - a tightly-knit organization at the senior management level.

What is more significant is the reorientation of the Board of Directors in terms of its composition and residence. From Table IX, a pattern can be quite easily discerned. Up until 1967, from two-thirds to three-quarters of the members of the Board of Directors were weighed in favour of the various mining functions in which the company was engaged. In addition, five out of the twelve individuals were Quebec residents, six were from Toronto and one was from Vancouver.

From 1968 on, a more balanced picture of mining and banking interests emerges with six members on the Board of Directors coming from each of these areas of the economy. A shift in residence for Board members

CHART II

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

OF NORANDA MINES

A. POWIS (Chairman & President)

H.O. Hinds (Exec. Asst. to President)

R.C. Ashenhurst (Secretary) R.L. Pepall (Consulting Counsel)

Wm. James

(Ex.V.P.)

A.H. Zimmerman (Ex.V.P.)

E.K. Cork
(V.P. Treasurer)

R.D. Riffin
(V.P. Corporate
Relations)

K.C. Hendrick
(V.P. Marketing)

D.H. Ford
(V.P. Comptroller)

D.E. Schmitt
(V.P. Mines)

J.A. Hall
(V.P. Mine
Projects)

B.H. Morrison
Pres. (Canadian
Copper Refins.)

A.G. Balogh
(Director of
Metal Opera-
tions)

Manufacturing
Companies

Forest
Products
Companies

TABLE IX

Noranda Mines
Board of Directors
and Officers
(1962-1976)
Corporate Affiliations

Year	Noranda and Subsidiary Interests	Banking and Corporate Legal Concerns	Other
1962	9	2	1
1963	8	3	1
1964	8	3	1
1965	8	3	1
1966	8	3	1
1967	7	4	1
1968	6	6	
1969	6	6	
1970	6	6 (1)*	
1971	6	6 (1)*	
1972	6	5 (1)*	1**
1973	7	3 (1)*	2+
1974	7	3 (1)*	2+
1975	7	3 (1)*	2+
1976	7	3 (1)*	2+

* Of the six men, James C. Dudley, an independent New York financial consultant was elected to the Board of Directors in 1970.

** W.P. Wilder was President of Wood Gundy Securities, Ltd., Toronto and had been elected to the Board in 1966. In 1972, he became Chairman of Canadian Arctic Gas Studies, Ltd., Toronto.

+ D.E. Mitchell, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Great Plains Development Company of Canada, Calgary, Alberta was elected to the Board in 1973. In 1974, Great Plains Development Company became the Alberta Energy Company, Ltd.

TABLE X
Noranda Mines
Board of Directors
and Officers
(1962-1976)

Directors Officers Total				Directors Officers Total			
1962	12	6 (2)*	11	1970	12	17 (11)*	23
1963	12	21 (17)*	29	1971	12	16 (11)*	23
1964	12	20 (15)*	27	1972	12	16 (11)*	23
1965	12	14 (9)*	21	1973	12	16 (11)*	23
1966	12	10 (6)*	18	1974	12	18 (14)*	26
1967	12	13 (8)*	20	1975	12	17 (13)*	25
1968	12	13 (7)*	19	1976	12	16 (12)*	24
1969	12	17 (11)	23				

* denotes the number of officers who were not also directors of the company

Source: Noranda Mines, Annual Reports, 1962-1976 inclusive.

can also be seen - the number of residents from Quebec declines from four in 1968 and 1969 to three in 1970. In 1973, the number is further reduced to two. However, the number of Toronto residents increases to seven in 1968 and remains at that number until 1976. Finally, the Board of Directors of Noranda Mines acquired an international character in 1970 with the election of James C. Dudley, a U.S. financial consultant from New York City who remains a director of the company.

III. Labour Relations

The company's relations with organized labour are important in terms of the latter's capability to politically mobilize the rank and file. As was argued in Chapter II, only once a trade union has been able to acquire a permanent status in the company and therefore a stable position in the community could the workers be mobilized. Moreover, we have suggested that the direction of collective action at the local level (that is, socialism or economism) will be conditioned by the organizational structure and type of trade union leadership.

This section will be concerned with establishing a time frame for when trade unions and collective bargaining procedures became institutionalized within the organizational structure of Noranda Mines. The nature of the company, its size and type of senior management personnel tell us a great deal about the structural parameters wherein conflicts with the local working class would take place. The evidence in Chapter VI will provide a detailed account of the bitter labour struggles brought on by the intransigence of James Murdoch. The integration of trade unions into the corporate body took place during a short time period after the retirement of James Murdoch as Chairman of the Board of Directors. Moreover, the institutionalization of trade unions through a Department of Labour Relations at Noranda Mines also

meant that the trade unions took on new responsibilities whose function was to socially control the rank and file. This development proves to be of some significance since the analysis in Chapter II stressed the containment of working class interests by the trade union as a factor which could facilitate the political rise of the local petite bourgeoisie. It will be left to the following chapter to add to the argument to be presented here.

a. The Pre-Multinational Stage

An important consideration for senior management during the pre-multinational stage and one which was looming larger over the corporate horizon, especially after World War II, was Noranda's relations with organized labour. The formulation of policies to deal with labour both on an individual and union scale seems to have been left with the senior management group as a whole rather than with any individual specialist.

From the time of the first major confrontation between organized labour and Noranda's senior management, certain ground rules were clearly established which would condition the nature of future conflicts. First, James Murdoch had made it quite clear that union leadership must be in the hands of men of "high integrity" and that management must seek to balance its obligations to its employees, its share-holders and the general public. What, in the eyes of James Murdoch and Noranda's senior management made trade union leaders "responsible" and men of "high integrity"? Primarily, it was their denial of "class struggle" as an immanent characteristic of labour-management relations in capitalist societies.

It is interesting to note that Noranda's policy statements at the time (the Mine-Mill Strike) indicated the policy which seems to have governed the company's approach to labour disputes since that time. It was denied that there is any "class struggle" between the worker and employer under which the former must always get the least for the most and the latter demand the

most for the least. (Buik: 1958: 113-114)

However, Noranda's senior management position towards trade unions included more than the simple rejection of "class struggle". From an analysis of three strikes in Rouyn-Noranda (See Chapter VI), it can be argued that senior management felt that any independent trade union posed a threat to the proper functioning of the company by seeking to interfere with what they saw as the rights of management. In other words, Noranda's senior management during the period we have labelled the pre-multinational stage would have preferred what has been called "company unions" as legitimate trade unions. The leaders of all other labour organizations were not felt to be men of "high integrity" or "responsible" because they sought through legal and even "illegal" means to interfere with what management believed to be its own proper sphere of influence. Moreover, the detailed description of these labour struggles will bear witness to the importance James Murdoch and senior management at Noranda Mines attached to its direct involvement in local affairs of this natural resource enclave.

The Multinational Stage

Labour relations today at Noranda is no longer in the hands of senior management alone. The complexities of labour-management relations generally and the international character of the company which brings it in touch with many trade unions makes labour relations a specialized function within Noranda's overall management structure. The Department of Labour Relations is a separate section and comes under the supervision of R.D. Riffin, Vice-President of Corporate Relations.

In an interview with the senior officer of Labour Relations,¹⁵ it was revealed that the company's basic philosophy towards trade unions has not dramatically changed. But a process of adaptation or "learning" has characterized the evolution of the relations between these two different forms of industrial organizations.

I don't think that we have changed a hell of a lot except that Noranda and the unions have learned to live together. Basically, that is the key thing.... There are a lot of things we accept more readily now than we did before. I guess that's the learning process, living together. This is basically the collective bargaining process.

One of the more important changes and one which has been a relatively recent development is the formation of company-union committees at various organizational levels. In other words, there has occurred a closer structural integration between these two institutions when it comes to areas of shared or common interests.

I don't think that we have changed our policies. I think we have evolved our policies. We belong to various groups where trade unions are which we did not do twenty years ago.

We've got joint committees at the local level on safety and health. We've got joint job evaluation programs. We've closed mines and we had joint reclassification committees. And that's the key. I think that is the emphasis that I would like to put.

In addition to the formation of joint committees at the local level, participation and communication on an informal basis between executive officers of both the trade union and the company was seen as an important change.

¹⁵ In what is to follow, the quotations are taken from an interview conducted with André Y. Fortier, Director of Labour Relations, on May 4, 1976.

I went to Geneva to an ILO technical committee meeting. There were two Steelworker representatives there so I had lunch with them. We were civilized towards one another...and it not tuxedo unionism, I'm not making deals. You get to know one another. You go to a reception. We meet them and so on. We belong to a provincial manpower council where the Steelworkers are represented. This was a government sponsored thing but we were there and so were they. My boss belongs to associations where he met with senior people from the CLC and others and so on. We participate in joint activities more than we did before. We communicate a hell of a lot with them. We don't try and ignore them and I think this is a big thing. (Emphasis mine).

If the company has not appreciably altered its philosophy towards trade unions and there is now more cooperation between them, has it been the ideology associated with trade unions which has changed and as a result brought these two organizations closer? Referring to the principle ideas expressed by trade union leaders in the early post-World War II period, the opinion was expressed that

at that time, labour was trying to associate itself against private enterprise. I don't think they were in favour of socialism as such but I think they were against private enterprise and profit and so on. I think today they recognize the need for profit. I think they recognize it in order to provide jobs and so on. We have to generate profits. So, they accept, they agree with our way of operations and we have more of a common ground to talk about than we had before. (Emphasis mine).

Once this common level of tolerance has been reached, and this "common ground" means the restriction of the adversary relationship between the two parties to issues within the framework of capitalist social relations and not to competing views on the fundamental structure of industrial society, trade unions take on the role of social control agents in partnership with the company. Let us take the examples of wildcat strikes and work stoppages as spontaneous actions on the part of workers in a particular mine, factory or other such industrial organization.

You have to say that well we don't tolerate such things and we don't. We'll take the measures necessary to correct these things, so will the trade union. You know you see today a lot of trade unions recommending to their men that they have to go back because it is a wildcat. Okay, they acknowledge the same right as we have.... They (the trade union leaders) get the message across to the employees that they have made a deal (with management) and they have to respect and live with it.

In summary, labour relations during the multinational stage of Noranda's organizational history is characterized by a more formal relationship between it and the many trade unions it must deal with. In part, this is due to the fact that ideologically, both the trade unions which the company must deal with and the company itself share the theoretical and practical need for private enterprise to generate profits. This development means a class collaborative role for the trade union. This characteristic is consistent with the economism inherent in trade unions under capitalism which was analysed in Chapter II. The existence of structural collaborationist tendencies would imply that at the rank and file level, the trade union contains, and/or channels the workers interests, into acceptable avenues. The establishment of structural and organizational fetters within the working class of which the company (that is, Noranda Mines) is an active participant, would tend to permit the petite bourgeoisie to take a leadership role in the community given the other structural conditions laid out in Chapter II.

Summary

It is evident that over the past two decades, Noranda Mines has evolved into a multinational corporation and conforms to the pattern described by Stephan Hymer. First of all, the shift from a predominantly provincially-bound corporation to a multinational enterprise occurred during the 1960's. One indication of this shift was the decreasing

number of Quebec residents on the Board of Directors. They were replaced by Canadian and American personnel.

As Noranda Mines moved to become a multinational corporation the membership on the Board of Directors shifted towards a more equitable integration of banking and financial interests with the company's primary economic function as a natural resource industrial complex. Noranda had become a fully integrated company in such areas as copper, zinc, aluminum and forest products. Also, the company appears to be increasing the international part of its structural division of labour.

In all then, Noranda Mines as an industrial organization did not suffer from the depletion of its most important asset, the Horne Mine in Rouyn-Noranda. As a matter of fact, it emerged out of the decade of the 1960's as a multinational corporation and occupying a stronger position in the Canadian political economy than in any earlier period of its history.

The growth of Noranda Mines into a multinational firm occurred because the corporation had become Canadian-owned and controlled. The significance of this development rests with the establishment within Canada of major decision-making power. Decisions concerning such projects as the exploration for and the working of new copper mines in Quebec, Canada and throughout the world, the building of smelting and refining capacities and the creation of a major research and development centre, all in the province of Quebec, were executed because authority resided with James Murdoch and senior management of Noranda Mines.

The fact that Noranda Mines developed into a multinational corporation is significant because the company's dependence on one big mine,

namely the Horne property in Noranda, Quebec, would be reduced. While the steady growth and diversification program of Noranda Mines from the late 1920's until the copper boom of the early 1960's depended on the incredibly lucrative earnings garnered from the Horne Mine, the strategies of integration executed by senior management during this time period were meant to make the company independent from any one source of earnings. So that, while the subsidiary operations at Noranda, Quebec were economically integrated into the evolving corporate structure of the corporation, its importance to the overall operations of the firm would, over time, diminish. Moreover, when no new reserves of copper were to be found, knowledge of the mine's impending closure further distanced senior management's interest in this particular property and community.

On the other hand, had Noranda Mines remained a subsidiary of U.S. business and finance, none of the projects mentioned above would necessarily have been developed. It has already been shown that the United States backers would not risk building a smelter at Noranda, Quebec. Why would they have financed these other ventures if Noranda Mines had remained American controlled? Weren't these men looking for one large mine to exploit? It would have made more economic sense to the U.S. backers to funnel the profits from the Horne Mine back to the United States where they would make the decisions on what the priorities would be for future capital investment. There is certainly no guarantee that these decisions would have followed the historical course taken by the Canadian management of Noranda Mines. In all likelihood, the fabricating end would have been established in the United States and little or no capital expenditures would have been made in the province of Quebec due to the availability of copper worldwide.

If the corporation's history had been altered in this manner, so might our analysis have to be recast in a different mold. Given the importance placed on the role of the corporation in the theoretical framework advanced in the previous chapter, such a dramatic change could undoubtedly have witnessed a different set of locally circumscribed class relations and community politics. The early history of Noranda Mines, tied up so much with the personality of James Murdoch conditioned the local environment within which the working class and the petite bourgeoisie functioned. It became the relationship between the man; James Murdoch, the organization; Noranda Mines and the Horne Mine which combined to create a set of circumstances which would not only bear on the growth of Noranda Mines itself but because of the particular history of that growth would have serious consequences for the history of class relations in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. For instance, if the company had remained American and without James Murdoch as senior executive, the important class struggles between organized labour and Noranda Mines during the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's might not have happened.

Or, had there not been Canadian capitalists to take the risk when the Quebec government forced the hands of the U.S. financiers with its "manufacturing condition", it may have been years, even decades before attempts at exploiting the natural resources in the Quebec northwest would have been made again. Considering that the Depression quickly followed the discovery and development of the Horne property, it is not inconceivable that if there had not been Canadian capitalists such as Noah Timmins to take over from men such as Percy Rockefeller and Harry Haskell, the significant amounts of capital necessary to develop the natural resource

potential of the Quebec northwest would not have been available until the beginning of the Second World War. Certainly, such a possibility requires a degree of imagination, but it does speak to a completely different history of the company and therefore a changed "institutional framework" and an altered set of "structural relations" to analyse and explain what would conceivably have been a different set of class relations and a different kind of community politics. But, such was not the case. It was the detailed explanation of the birth and development of Noranda Mines as a Canadian-owned and controlled corporation that this chapter analysed.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMISM AND IMPERIALISM:

THE CASE OF THE UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA

The previous chapter spoke to the importance of the corporation in creating and maintaining a natural resource enclave in northwestern Quebec. We helped to uncover the structural pattern of descendent capitalism over a period of roughly fifty years. The externally imposed domination of this natural resource enclave by Noranda Mines lasted until roughly the latter part of the 1950's because of the Horne Mine's importance to the growth of the company. The rest of the time frame witnessed the rapid expansion of Noranda Mines into a multinational corporation. Moreover, the shift in its pattern of organizational growth coincided with the depletion of the Horne Mine. So the most important institutional "actor" in this case study, the conjuncture of these factors at roughly the same point in time would help to modify the structural conditions of domination in this natural resource enclave. We have already seen in Chapter III the displacement of the corporation by the petit bourgeoisie in Rouyn-Noranda from the late 1950's onward. We will now delve into the nature of the second institutional "actor" in this study, namely the United Steelworkers of America to provide evidence for the organizational containment of the working class. This would mean that at all levels of the organization, from the local to the executive head, members would be constrained to pursue objectives that were congruent with those of the organization as a whole. We are not suggesting that there would be no challenges to minor, day-to-day directives. Nor are we suggesting that there might not be questioning of some of the more important institutional goals. On the contrary, challenges to important organizational goals would point to their constraining influence on members behavior. And, evidence of

this latter point is precisely what we have discovered (See Appendix B and C). Therefore, this chapter will examine the organizational environment within which members of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) must work. Our analysis will focus on the leadership, strategies and formal structures of this working class organization. An investigation of these factors will indicate the constraints which individuals must conform to in order to survive in such an environment.

Of specific interest for our research problem is the tendency within the United Steelworkers of America to arrest the development of radical political ideologies and radical political leaders. The containment of radical politics limits the alternatives available to the working class in times of crisis. This is of obvious importance for this study since without political direction the working class will tend to follow political ideologies and political leaders who may offer alternatives but who usually represent the interests of another social class.

More concretely, this chapter will examine the almost exclusive concern of the United Steelworkers of America in both Canada and the United States with instrumental or "bread and butter" unionism. We will argue that such a strategy constrains the emergence of radical labour ideologies within the rank and file of the Steelworker's union.

In addition to the constraining influence on political behaviour posed by an emphasis on instrumentalism which the United Steelworkers of America shares with most international trade unions in North America, there remain at least two further factors that bear on an assessment of the depoliticization of the rank and file within the USWA. First, the avowed anticommunism of its leaders in both Canada and the United States led to the historic interunion rivalry between the United Steelworkers of America and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. The latter was

believed to have been led by "communists". The contours of this particular struggle were North American in scope, but the historical specifics of the conflict that pertains to this study will be left for the next chapter.

The second factor centers on the organizational barriers within the United Steelworkers of America. A case in point is evidenced by the constitution which forbids officers and rank and file workers not only membership in left-wing organizations but denies to individuals "support for" or "participation" in left-wing activities on penalty of loss of membership status within the union.

Finally, a provisional hypothesis will be advanced that will argue that the USWA participates as one international non-governmental organization in an international hierarchical structure that has been characterized as metropolis-hinterland. A great deal of concern and printed matter has dealt with the conduct of multinational corporations in this world arrangement. The role of trade unions, on the other hand, has been a neglected area of enquiry. In keeping with the explanatory framework developed in Chapters I and II, we will make a tentative statement on the role of the United Steelworkers of America in maintaining the uneven structural relationship between the natural resource enclave and the metropolitan center(s). The organizational strategy of the USWA in acting as an agent of United States foreign policy, which includes ensuring an uninterrupted flow of natural resources to the American economy, is another structural constraint on workers in the hinterland. The combination of all four factors complement each other and have structured an organizational environment in the natural resource enclave in which the promotion, emergence and sustainability of radical labour ideologies, radical political goals and radical leaders becomes highly improbable.

Unlike Noranda Mines which owed its very existence, let alone its development to the Horne Mine and to the men and women who worked for the

company in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, the United Steelworkers of America is an organization which came from "outside the community." Even though the nature of the work involved created the circumstances for organizing in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec (see Chapter VI), the trade union had to come from outside in order to provide strength through organization to structurally isolated mine and smelter workers. And, it would take the efforts of three trade unions, the Mine workers Industrial Union, International Union of Mine, Mill and a Smelter Workers, and the USWA covering a period of roughly thirty years before one of them, the United Steelworkers of America, would be capable of achieving a relatively permanent and secure position within the corporate and community social structures. Therefore, this chapter will provide an historical and organizational overview of the United Steelworkers of America in order to substantiate the argument that this particular trade union characterized by the four factors enumerated above contributed to the depoliticization of the working class in Rouyn-Noranda once it had become a stable feature in the community. Furthermore, the timing of its stabilization in the community would be congruent with the conjuncture of factors enumerated above concerning the changing pattern of structural domination by Noranda Mines on Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. When all these developments coalesce, the structural opportunity for the displacement of the corporation by the petite bourgeoisie would be created.

The Formative Years: SWOC Chartered³

The move in the direction to form an industrial union in the steel

³For an analysis of the early history of this union see David B. Stephens, "Labour Union Response to Federal Manpower Policy: A Comparative Study of the USWA and the International Union of Operating Engineers", unpublished Ph.D., University of Texas, Austin, 1975 (Business Administration), pp. 224-229; see also, History of the United Steelworkers, Pittsburgh, pamphlet No. PR-195, p. 1; David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Non-Union Era, (New York: Harper), 1960.

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industry came with the formation of the Steelworkers Organizing Committee on June 7, 1937 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in conjunction with the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. SWOC was formed as one of the ten trade unions comprising the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) within the American Federation of Labour (AF of L). The former represented the industrial unionist group, whereas the latter were the longer established craft unions. When the CIO was suspended from the AF of L in August, 1936, it remained a committee until 1938 when the name was changed to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

Under the early leadership of Philip Murray, SWOC in the United States began as a "purposeful, strong and unified body".⁴ Many of the organizers had come from Murray's past involvement as an officer with the United Mine Workers (UMW). These were experienced and dedicated trade unionists. Yet, more than experience and dedication were required. A strong organization was needed which could act as a countervailing force to the consolidation and centralization of economic power within the steel industry. In addition, this organization would have to be concentrated within the various economic sectors - from extraction to fabrication, if it was to be at all effective. In commenting on the success of this early strategy, Adams remarks that

the leaders...realized the necessity (of) creating a comparatively wide flung and yet unified body which could tolerate no slackness either in control or administration. To this end, then, the Steel workers union has already maintained this tradition and today represents a solid testimony to the accomplishment of that goal. (Adams: 1952:175:Emphasis mine)

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Robert McDonald Adams, "The Development of the United Steelworkers of America in Canada, 1936-51", unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1952; p. 48.

As such, the structural basis for an industrial union, a semi- and unskilled labour force, coupled with the necessity of having a centralized organization to confront a highly integrated Canadian and United States steel industry meant that the USWA would possess the organizational strength and experience to enter later on into the Canadian mining industry and organize its workers.

SWOC and the USWA in Canada

According to Irving Abella,⁵ the pre-World War II years saw John L. Lewis and the CIO in the United States as "half-heartedly" interested in expanding into Canada. But under "relentless pressures from north of the border", CIO activity in Canada was sanctioned, but only in name. The decision to use only Canadian organizers and the "SWOC decision to give its Canadian section autonomy were to prove the twin keystones upon which the CIO was to build its organization in Canada" (Abella, 1973: 30).

On July 1, 1938, Canada became the fourth regional district of SWOC. John L. Lewis, then head of the CIO in the United States appointed Silby Barrett to be in charge of SWOC activity in Canada. Barrett's first task was to organize the Nova Scotia workers.⁶ Charles H. Millard, past President of the UAW at the Oshawa General Motors plant was appointed as Executive Director.

⁵ Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

⁶ Barrett was so successful in organizing the workers at Dosco, that the SWOC local, Local 1064 was granted "check off" by the company. The approximately \$4000 a month from this local not only helped organize Canadian workers under the SWOC umbrella but also "made it possible for the international in Pittsburgh to meet its financial obligations. Without the life-saving dues from Sydney, the history of the Steelworkers' union in the United States might have been considerably different" (Abella, 1973:55)

Type of Leadership

Charles H. Millard figures prominently in the formative years of the United Steelworkers of America in Canada. He had played an active role in the Oshawa strike of 1937 but many saw him as "incompetent", "irresponsible" and even "a weakling who can't do anyone any harm".⁷ The fact that he had been repudiated by his own union, the UAW, attests to the ambivalence with which he was greeted in many Canadian labour circles.

Charles Millard was a staunch anti-communist. The leaders in the CIO headquarters in the United States appointed him first as Executive Director of the CIO in Canada. He later became National Director of the Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC). As part of his mandate, Millard provided "day-to-day surveillance" of 'Communist' activity in Canada. The contents of his reports to the United States on "Communist influence in the Canadian CIO soon alarmed the American leadership" (Abella, 1973: 55). After a series of manoeuvres, Communist influence in SWOC was eliminated and the union leadership under Charlie Millard was firmly entrenched.

By June 1940, Millard could boast to David Lewis that he was in complete control of SWOC. His power was such that "other members of the staff have been plainly informed that they are to take their instructions from me and that any connections with the (Communist) party will mean immediate and summary dismissal".⁸

⁷ The first two assessments of Charlie Millard's character come from Dick Steele, an ousted Communist from SWOC that Millard helped engineer. The last comes from David Croll, the Ontario Labour Minister at the time of the Oshawa strike (Abella, 1973, pp. 57-59; 11).

⁸ Charles Millard to David Lewis, June 7, 1940, quoted in Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: the CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1963), p. 57.

At a convention in Cleveland, Ohio, SWOC and the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers were disbanded and the United Steelworkers of America was established as a constitutional body on May 22, 1942. Under the American leadership of Philip Murray and David McDonald, Charles Millard was named National Director for Canada. He retained his title until 1956 when he began the task of working in the administrative offices of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. He concluded his work for the ICFTU in 1961 and retired to Toronto, Ontario.

He was replaced by William Mahoney, himself an anti-communist who had played an important role in disarming the Communist influence in the British Columbia-based International Woodworkers of America from 1948 to 1949 for the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). He retired from the position of National Director of the United Steelworkers of America in 1976.

North American Membership

In total membership, the United Steelworkers of America represents the largest industrial union and the second largest trade union organization in the country. Likewise, in the United States, the USWA is the largest industrial union and second only to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in total membership. One further indication of its strength is the remarkable growth in net worth of the organization. In 1943, the net worth of the United Steelworkers of America was \$1,744,905.19. In 1975, this figure had climbed to \$111,505,617. In 1976, the amount had risen a further 22% to \$135,807,967.13.⁹

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TABLE XI

Membership in the Top Three Unions in
Canada and the United States

Canada (1976)	United States (1972)
1. Canadian Union of Public Employees... 219,137	1. International Brotherhood of Teamsters..... 1,855,000
2. United Steelworkers of America..... 183,240	2. United Steelworkers of America..... 1,400,000
3. Public Service Alliance..... 143,728	3. United Auto Workers..... 1,394,000

From: Department of Labour

Labour Organizations in Canada 1976; U.S. Department of Labour
Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1972

Organizational Structure

The jurisdiction of the Steelworkers testifies to the range and depth of its interests. These include basic steel and allied ferrous and non-ferrous metals producing and fabricating industries. In addition to production and maintenance workers the union bargains for clerical, technical and plant protection employees in ore mining, quarrying, smelting and refining, chemicals, Great Lakes shipping, rail transport, cement, refractory brick and tile making, primary metal production, foundries, coating steel, forgings, extrusions, rolled sheets, pipes, tubes, molds, wires, nails, screws, nuts, bolts, ordnance materials, barrels, cans and other containers. This list, as long as it may be, is not exhaustive.

The structure of the United Steelworkers of America is divided into three levels - the International or Headquarters level, the District and finally, the Local. The headquarters of the union is located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The central administration composed of the International officers and the several research and advisory departments are all carried on in Pittsburgh. It is a complex organization with a vast

CHART III

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA

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CHART IV

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA IN CANADA

LOCAL UNIONS

scope of operations.

The International officers for the union are the President, the two Vice-Presidents and the Secretary-Treasurer who are selected every four years by international referendum vote. The International Executive Board is probably the most important constituted body of the organization. It is composed of the three international officers mentioned above plus the District Directors and the National Director for Canada. The Board meets at least twice a year. Its function is to enforce and interpret the Constitution. It is also instructed to carry out the policy resolutions of the International Convention. It acts with full power to direct the union's affairs between conventions.

At the second level, the District Director's first loyalty is to the International office which pays his salary. His principle role as defined by the constitution is to implement policies, maintain unity, administer his district, organize new workers and to handle important strikes and negotiations.

Finally, we come to the local level. To start a USWA local, there must be ten or more persons who are eligible for membership in the International. Eligibility is defined in economic and political terms. Economic refers to the union's jurisdiction. The politics of eligibility, on the other hand, are couched in negative frames of reference. Quoting from the Constitution of the United Steelworkers of America we read

No person shall be eligible for membership or for nomination or election or appointment to, or hold any office, or position or to serve on any committee in the International Union or a Local Union or to serve as a delegate therefrom who is a member, consistent supporter or who actively participates in the activities of the Communist Party, Klu Klux Klan or of any fascist, totalitarian or otherwise subversive organization which opposes the democratic principles to which the U.S. and

Canada and our Union are dedicated.

In addition to the above eligibility requirement for membership in the union, a similar requirement is enforced for the election of officers to the union hierarchy.

The emergence from within the USWA of radical labour ideologies such as socialism are highly unlikely. In addition to the history of opposition to socialism in the United States as a "subversive" and "anti-democratic" political philosophy there also exists institutional constraints as sanctioned by the constitution. As such, the USWA leadership would be capable of eliminating an individual or group in the trade union organization who could be so labelled. And, as was previously noted with the case of Charles Millard this particular clause confers a great deal of politically-inspired and directed leadership.

Exclusion on racist or fascist grounds may, at first glance, appear to be an appropriate stance for a trade union to take. But surely, another position a trade union constitution could take would be to educate its rank and file on such counter-productive ideological tendencies. Instead, the United Steelworkers of America has seen fit to exclude membership on such grounds. Furthermore, the constitution lumps communism, socialism and fascism together as anti-democratic philosophies and social movements. One important consequence which emerges is the organizational reluctance to render active support for radical social change. Put differently, in addition to its non-radical leadership in Canada, the union's constitution represents

¹⁰ USWA, Constitution of the International Union, adopted in Las Vegas, Nevada, September 2, 1976, Section IV, p. 5. This is the latest date in which the eligibility requirement has been in force.

the extent to which depoliticization has become institutionalized at various levels within this trade union's structure.

Furthermore, the principle objective of the union is "to advance the best interests of its members through collective bargaining with employers (and be so doing) establish through collective bargaining adequate wage standards, shorter hours of work and improvements in the conditions of employment for workers in industry".¹¹ The instrumentalism¹² of the USWA's aims for its membership is projected in its contracts with employers which provide "liberal pensions with early retirement, sickness and accident benefits, life insurance, hospitalization and surgical benefits for the worker and dependents, many holidays and long vacations with pay, training programs and strong job protection measures".¹³ In addition to these positive contributions for workers which the USWA has been able to win from employers, the organization also sees itself as advancing the interests of liberal capitalism in the Western World.

In promoting and extending instrumental demands for its membership, the union has had to develop formal institutional linkages with the corporation. The analysis in the previous chapter confirmed this tendency between the USWA and Noranda Mines. It was revealed that collective bargaining was a "learning

¹¹ USWA, Questions and Answers Concerning the USWA, n.d., PR #156, p. 2 and USWA, How the Union Serves, n.d., PR #225A.

¹² Instrumentalism is here defined as the sober calculation of material advantages.

¹³ USWA, Questions and Answers Concerning the USWA, n.d., PR #156, p. 2.

process", a process of "living together". This has meant the formation of joint committees at the local level such as safety, health and job evaluation programs. In addition to the formal linkages there emerged informal networks. A very important and added dimension to the contemporary role which the USWA and other trade unions play which we examined in the previous chapter is in the social control function they now serve.

In all then, the USWA, as one particular working class organization tends to restrict itself to working within the framework of capitalism. This will become an important factor in the analysis of the containment of working class politics in Rouyn-Noranda. Instead of playing two roles, struggling for material advantages for its membership and engaging in a radical political struggle at the provincial and federal levels, the USWA has concentrated almost exclusively on the former with only moderate commitment to the latter.

Political Orientation

As indicated in the preceding section, although the United Steelworkers of America puts collective bargaining as its primary objective, the relative autonomy of the three Canadian Districts with its National Director has resulted in the International Union being formally wedded to the New Democratic Party (NDP). Part of the explanation for this more active political involvement from its Canadian counterpart comes as a result of Charles H. Millard's post-World War II endorsement of David Lewis and the predecessor of the NDP, the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).

During the late 1940's and 1950's, the Left in Canada, which included the CCF and the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) were bitter enemies.

Each jealously sought to become the vanguard of progressive forces in Canada. The former sought legitimacy as a reform party within liberal capitalism as it was constituted in Canada whereas the latter saw itself engaged in an active political struggle against capitalism. Since the USWA and other CCL affiliated international unions were also waging a battle against the Communist Party and apparent "communist infiltrated trade unions", a common "enemy" drew these unions and the CCF closer together. In all, those individuals and social groups who were against the Communists but who believed themselves to be progressives became tied to the CCF. When the CCF was disbanded in 1961 and became the New Democratic Party, the USWA continued to contribute funds and endorse the political platforms of the new Party (Young, 1971: 80).

Foreign Policy

The United Steelworkers of America seeks "to protect and extend our democratic institutions and civil liberties; and to perpetuate and extend the cherished traditions of democracy and social and economic justice in the United States, Canada and the World Community".¹⁴ (Emphasis Mine). This clear objective leads into our next major concern which is with trade union foreign policy.

Trade union foreign policy is a relatively little explored area as a goal of organized labour in North America. From the preceding section it was learned that the outlook of the United Steelworkers of America emphasized the virtues of business unionism, it championed liberal capitalism, espoused

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USWA, How the Union Serves, n.p.

a conservative trade union programme and resisted alternative labour ideologies. The involvement of the United Steelworkers of America and other CIO unions in Canada has led to a reduction in the competition for cheap labour in Canada as international unions grew and forced higher wages from their employers. In the words of John Crispo, "the extent to which international unions bolster the bargaining power of their Canadian members varies considerably, but only in a few cases is it inconsequential". (Crispo, 1967: 303).

In an article for Nation's Business entitled "Union's Foreign Policy: Raise Overseas Wages", the author begins by stating

American unions are spearheading a drive through international labour organizations to increase their bargaining power with U.S. employers.... They are trying to build strong unions in countries which lack them, strengthen international union cooperation, and raise wage and employee benefit standards where they lag. Main objectives of the unions' foreign policy: help narrow the current wage gap...protect American labour standards and jobs by minimizing the advantages of lower foreign wages in international trade and reducing the incentive for U.S. business to invest overseas...improve the welfare of workers in the free world while at the same time helping fight communism and preserving our way of life.¹⁵

Or, in the more direct language of Rodolph Faupl, a U.S. worker delegate to the International Labour Organization in Geneva

When we help our trade union brothers overseas, we are also helping ourselves. We are insuring that exploitation of workers in other countries will not take our jobs and reduce our standards.¹⁶

¹⁵ April, 1962, p. 33.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 34.

One of the reasons for the involvement of U.S. based international trade unions in Canada and abroad is self-interest. The promotion of higher wages and fringe benefits where these unions have or desire to establish themselves outside the United States helps those workers by contributing to a higher standard of living but also protects jobs at home in the United States which might otherwise be lost to cheaper labour in those countries.

'Cold War' Foreign Policy

Another and equally important role of U.S. labour organizations centers on its unqualified ideological and organizational support to Cold War foreign policy. In a penetrating article by Sidney Lens for The Nation, the author dramatically highlights the involvement of American organized labour's intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations in Latin America, Europe and Asia. He goes so far as to say that "what the U.S. Government does not do directly because it would be a flagrant meddling with the internal affairs of other nations, and what the CIA cannot do because it is suspect, the AFL-CIO does, on their behalf".¹⁷ Among the incidents he discussed includes American organized labour's role in splitting the French and Italian labour movements in the immediate post-war period, supporting unionists in the then British Guiana in an effort to depose the government of Cheddi Jagan,¹⁸ training Brazilians who later joined the generals in the coup d'etat against the Goulait government, encouraging the emergence of conservative labour leaders in many German unions and "educating literally

¹⁷ "American Labour Abroad: Lovestone Diplomacy", The Nation, July 5, 1965, p. 11.

¹⁸ Pat Terrill of the USWA was one of the American unionists who were in Georgetown before, during and after the 1963 General Strike which helped to bring down Cheddi Jagan's government.

tens of thousands of unionists in anticommunism and setting them loose, with money and inspiration, against unions with left-of-centre leadership."¹⁹

(Emphasis mine).

American organized labour was able to carry out these actions because it had helped in the setting up and financing of such international labour institutions as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Caribbean Area Division of the Inter-American Regional Organization of the ICFTU.²⁰ These bodies served to act as a bulwark against the more left-leaning World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

Canada was no more immune to the ideological and organizational incursions of American-based international labour than any other nation in the "free world". At the 1947 Convention of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), a policy endorsing the Marshall Plan as "in essence, a symbol of the generosity of the people of the United States (sic) and Canada in giving so largely of their treasure" was adopted.²¹ One year later a motion supporting NATO was carried. In 1949, the CCL withdrew from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).²² At this convention, Larry Sefton, A USWA

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Sidney Lens, "American Labour Abroad: Lovestone Diplomacy", op. cit., p. 13

²⁰

See P. Reisev, L'Organisation Regionale Interamericaine des Travailleurs (ORIT) de la Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Libres (CISL) 1951-1961, (Geneva: Droz, 1962).

²¹

Canadian Congress of Labour, Proceedings, 1947, pp. 65-69.

²²

Canadian Congress of Labour, Proceedings, 1949, p. 31.

delegate and one of this union's more important leaders continued to voice support for U.S. foreign policy in Europe.

We have in the world today the greatest production machine which the world has ever known, and if we are to preserve our own well-being we must preserve the well-being of others.... It offers a constructive program for world peace and for the stimulation of world trade. The Marshall Plan is a generous plan. In re-affirming our responsibilities to others we are meeting the needs of our own people.²³

In his statement, Sefton clearly acknowledged the interdependence of the Western industrial system and the leading role played by the United States in preserving it. He understood that the preservation of the material benefits which North American trade unions have struggled for were inextricably tied to the preservation of the "well being of others" who are themselves linked to the present international arrangement. In other words, trade unions have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Continuing in this tradition, the 1950 CCL convention went on record supporting the United States' participation in the Korean War.

While CCL foreign policy was increasingly adopting resolutions sympathetic to U.S. foreign policy, trade unions in the Congress who were politically left-of-centre such as the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (IUMM & SW or Mine-Mill), United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) and the International Fur and Leather Workers Union (FLWU) were being expelled from this national organization. The first casualty was Mine-Mill in 1948; next came UE in December, 1949 and finally IFLWU in 1952. All of these actions, while justified on different grounds,

were aimed at eliminating what were believed to be "Communists" from the ranks of Canadian labour.

In addition to the depoliticization of the general USWA membership, the Union's presence in the Canadian mining industry exhibited another characteristic. The involvement of the United Steelworkers of America in Canada not only resulted in the objectives enumerated above but also in establishing a particular pattern of trade unionism in the Canadian natural resource industries.

At the outset of the USWA's involvement in the organizing of Canadian workers in the mining sector, the strong hand of United States control was felt. When Mine-Mill was ousted from the Canadian Congress of Labour in 1948, the jurisdiction of organizing mine workers in Canada fell to the United Mine Workers. But bitter disputes over who should be awarded the jurisdiction emerged. It was only resolved "after pressure was exerted from CIO officers in Washington on international presidents to order their Canadian representative to support the Steel (i.e., USWA) claim" (Abella, 1973: 109) (Emphasis mine).

It was believed by some that Mine Mills' principle objective in organizing workers in the mining sector of the Canadian economy was to disrupt the shipments of strategic ores to the United States. In a letter to Charlie Millard in 1947, Ralph Carlin warned that "the aim of the Communist Party (was) to be in a position to paralyse the production of nickel and copper" in Canada. (Abella: 1973: 94) Mine-Mill and Communist Parts were seen as synonymous by both these and many other labour leaders in Canada.

The fear expressed within the leadership ranks of the USWA against the role of "Communist" trade union organizers and leaders in the Canadian labour movement, especially those involved in the mining sector were echoed at Canadian Congress of Labour conventions. Irving Abella, in his important study dealing with the contours of the Canadian labour movement from 1935 to 1956 exhaustively documents the suspicion expressed by International trade union leaders such as Charlie Millard of the USWA against the "Communists" role in the Canadian labour movement. As a result, the role of the United Steelworkers of America in organizing workers in Canadian mining towns was an attempt to arrest alleged Mine-Mill strategy to disrupt the "production of nickel and copper". This belief would help explain the seriousness with which the USWA saw and undertook its task to dislodge Mine-Mill's position in the mining sector. Therefore, the zeal which seized the USWA's organizational drive against Mine-Mill was meant to oust "Communist" influence in the Canadian mining sector because Mine-Mill was seen as an organization which could potentially disrupt the flow of trade in natural resources to the United States.

This being the case, the USWA could be seen as contributing to the efficient control of essential natural resources for the United States political economy by helping to maintain an uninterrupted flow into that country. It is instructive to read John Crispo's indictment of the United Steelworkers of America in this regard. He charges that "while the Steelworkers had consistently defended imports of Canadian iron ore and base metals (to the United States), they have not done so with respect to imports of finished steel products (to the United States)" (Crispo, 1967: 307).

At the Seventh Constitutional Convention of the United Steelworkers of America (1954), statements made by both the then National Director, Charles Millard and District 6 Director, Larry Sefton, speak directly to this issue and are worth quoting at length. First, Charles Millard.

Canada is daily becoming of greater industrial concern for the Steelworkers in the United States. We have literally only scratched the surface of the great wealth of mineral resources to be found in the northern section of the North American continent, in Canada. Daily, almost hourly, new discoveries, new extensions, mining and smelting and steel-making, is taking place in Canada, is taking place not only through Canadian efforts, Canadian discoveries, Canadian finances and development, but is taking place because industry in the United States, leaders in industry here, are looking out for resources, supply lines, and they are operating in Canada in some cases through Canadian front organizations....

Also I would like to take this opportunity to point up that the influence of this Union must go beyond the United States and Canada. We in Canada, as here in the United States, are now getting a great deal of our bauxite for the aluminum section of our industry, from such places as Jamaica. I am very pleased you heard Brother Abel yesterday make mention of this, that our Union has been carrying on an operation in Jamaica, assisting the Jamaica bauxite workers, and I am pleased that in our midst today we have a delegate from Jamaica, a representative of this Union....

So, Mr. Chairman and delegates, I want to repeat, I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the great and continued assistance that you have given to us in Canada. I want to point out the Canadian mineral resources in other parts adjacent to this hemisphere, these supply lines are coming directly into our mills and plants here and in Canada, and are of increasing importance to all of us. It means that we have not only a job to continue to do in the United States, but we have a great organizational job to do in Canada. We have a further organizational job to do in those countries mentioned by President McDonald in his inaugural speech when he became President of this great Union, and we are going to ask your continued support and interest in these great endeavors of our Union in what may seem to you to be outposts of the Union. (Emphasis mine).

Next we hear from Larry Sefton.

We have a companion economy or a part of the same American economy. We supply great quantities of uranium for the atomic energy development. We are supplying more and more iron ore. We are supplying more base metals. We are supplying more and more newsprint. If the development of our industrial economy, to give to you people and to us the best standard of living in the world is going to have any real meaning and have improved standards and improved benefits for your people and our people and all the people of the world, it has got to be obtained from a platform of solid labour organization that speaks for the operations of the working people and the people of good will in your country and our country. Our interests are the same as your interests. (Emphasis mine).

The arguments presented for continued organizational activity by the United Steelworkers of America in Canada and even in the Caribbean are found in the contributory role the union can play in maintaining the supply line of natural resources to primarily United States-based manufacturing enterprises. The advantages which the USWA brings to workers in the natural resource industries are the higher wages and better fringe benefits that, they argue, could not have been won without them. Furthermore, industry gains by an uninterrupted supply of natural resources while the USWA membership in steel, aluminum and other manufacturing industries do not have to suffer from work stoppages caused by disruption in the flow of raw materials from the hinterland, be it Canada or Jamaica. Trade union links are forged in terms of those regions where security of supply of natural resources can be reasonably assured. The words of the Canadian Director, Charles Millard, acknowledged that this USWA organizational goal had to expand to include certain nations in the Caribbean. A confirmation that Canada would not be the only nation where the USWA would contribute to the security of supply of strategic raw materials is argued in an important study by Jeffrey Harrod

on the role of the USWA in the Jamaican bauxite industry that was referred to in Chapter II.

Conclusion

The United Steelworkers of America was an externally imposed organization. An analysis of its history and formal structure provides an accurate picture of its potential political role in the natural resource enclave. Our research problem focused on the organizational mechanisms which would constrain the development of radical politics among the rank and file. Our emphasis, therefore, was on structure and the probable consequences for local politics stemming from the specific institutional framework of this trade union as the "given" for this analysis: in this case the organization of the United Steelworkers of America. Our concern was not with the causal determinants of day-to-day life activity in a particular social setting. That is, whether certain local trade union officers became directly involved in subverting radical politics or even promoting Social Credit ideas or candidates at the expense of other radical candidates is of secondary importance to this analysis. The reason for doing an analysis of the total organization was to point out that local trade union representatives did not have to become directly involved since the organizational structure had already prevented radical political alternatives from developing at the local level. It was revealed, for example, that recruitment at both the rank and file and officer levels excluded those individuals who were members or who were sympathetic to socialism.

Therefore, the results of the examination of the United Steelworkers

of America's activities in Canada which are important for this study are the following: First, early elimination of radical elements from within the organizational structure of the union. Next, the creation of a leadership cadre which is strongly committed to a policy of instrumentalism for its membership. Third, the institutionalized manner in which the officers and the rank and file have been denied the chance to create an independent and radical criticism of Canadian capitalism so that if there emerges a groundswell of activity in a particular locality, the leadership can be counted on to restrain its members (See Appendix B & C for further details). Finally, we pointed to its collaborationist role in maintaining the unequal structural relationship between the metropolis and the natural resource enclave. All four characteristics reinforce each other and together created the conditions for the containment of rank and file militancy. John Crispo, in his important study on international unionism offers a similar conclusion:

For the most part, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that governments in Canada are prepared to live with international unionism, if not to welcome it as a healthy and positive factor. This attitude reflects not only the fact that international unions are well established and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, but also that they sometimes exercise a moderating influence over their Canadian sections. Thus, in some parts of the country, provincial governments go out of their way to favour individual international unions when they have been embroiled in rivalry with purely national bodies (Crispo, 1967: 303).

In Quebec, this point is more dramatically made by Eugene Forsey who wrote that

Quebec employers particularly who at one time smiled fondly on the purely Canadian Catholic unions, now are more inclined to pray for the day when those nice, quiet, peaceful, reasonable international unions will take over. This is, of course, an

over-simplification; but there is no doubt that American influence is, as is now generally recognized to be, a restraining rather than an inflaming influence. (Forsey, 1959: 146) (Emphasis mine).

The concrete and instrumental achievements which the USWA and other international unions have brought to Canadian workers are certainly important advantages which should not be undermined nor arbitrarily denigrated. This was certainly not my intention when mentioning such objectives of the union as collective bargaining. What is important for my purpose is the ideological and organizational tendency of the USWA to restrain internally, the emergence and development of radical labour ideologies, policies and leaders. For the USWA, as examined above, this has meant the insistence on a tightly controlled organization. Even allowing for the relative autonomy of the Canadian section, flexibility is strictly defined by the parameters of business unionism. Any attempts either from the inside or the outside to actively move the organization to consider radical labour ideologies let alone radical political goals have very little chance of survival let alone any opportunity to grow within the structure of this trade union.

CHAPTER VI

TRADE UNION MILITANCY AND CLASS CONFLICT

Up to now, we have provided the community setting and an analysis of the two institutional "actors" for this case study.

In this chapter we will bring together these factors and investigate the history of class conflict in this natural resource enclave. We will show the specific manner by which the corporation exercised its domination at the local level. Moreover, we will show the subordination of the petite bourgeoisie and its inability to pursue an independent class strategy during periods of class conflict. The only substantive challenge to the domination of capital came from the working class. But, a working class of individuals whose confrontation with capital was determined by the nature of capital itself and the trade unions' who were advancing what it felt were the collective interests of its constituency.

Specifically, this chapter will depict the contours of class conflict between the senior management of Noranda Mines and three trade union organizations which were active at the company's mine and smelter operations in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. The history of that conflict begins with the organizing efforts of the Mine Workers Industrial Union during the early years of the Great Depression. It continues with the struggles of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in the post-World War II period and concludes with the installation of the United Steelworkers of America in this single industry community in 1951 and its eventual consolidation by 1964 when the provincial state legislated voluntary and revocable "check-off".

The struggle of these three trade unions over this approximately thirty year period can be generalized into two dominant themes. First, it describes the extreme difficulties in organizing workers in this mining community. The intransigence of James Murdoch towards granting concessions on what he believed to be management's rights over the workplace resulted in three bitter struggles. These strikes pitted James Murdoch and Noranda Mines against the organizational representation of the working class, namely, three different trade unions.

Second, a radical break in the political ideology of trade unionism in Rouyn-Noranda can be readily discerned. Both the Mine Workers Industrial Union and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers were part of a radical tradition in the history of Canadian trade union ideology. On the other hand, the United Steelworkers of America, as we have already argued could be seen to represent an extension of American business unionism into Canada.

I have selected four topics which contribute to interpreting these two themes. In terms of importance they are (1) senior management's restricted view of trade unions as usurping managerial control; (2) the organizational strategy of the United Steelworkers of America after World War II; (3) the view that mining communities are isolated, relatively homogeneous enclaves which tend to promote working class social cohesion is contradicted by the company's initial policy of recruiting Eastern Europeans which resulted in an ethnically heterogeneous workforce that lasted into the decade of the 50's and (4) the consistent pattern of provincial state intervention on the side of Noranda Mines in the three strikes.

It will be recalled that this roughly thirty year period in the history of Noranda Mines corresponds to what I have labelled the company's pre-Multinational stage. This was the time senior management was led by James Y. Murdoch.

At this stage in the history of Noranda Mines, senior management jealously guarded what it felt were its rights over the workplace. The employment relationship was structured in such a way as to subordinate the worker to managerial control. Control signified management's ability to unilaterally alter working conditions and pay. Not only did management believe they had the right to set the price of labour, but also the right to exercise power over what constituted the worker's job and therefore his security of employment.

The social relations of work severely constrained the individual worker's independent actions. Managerial control denied to him the opportunity to defend or improve his conditions of work. Workers who sought change or objected to management's decisions concerning their job, had little recourse other than to collectively withdraw their labour power or to engage in individual acts of sabotage. Certainly, the full exercise of the power of the working class at the Noranda, Quebec operations could be felt only if action were to be carried out collectively, not individually. And, organization is necessary to co-ordinate and implement collective action. Therefore, the necessary pre-conditions for the entrance of trade unions in Rouyn-Noranda existed.

Senior management believed that virtually all trade unions, political ideology notwithstanding, denied to them their right to fully control their company's operations. Trade unions may have to be tolerated if all else fails, but never would Noranda Mines under James Murdoch provide

for union security in its operations at Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Union security would mean the permanent establishment of a trade union which senior management, under James Murdoch would never consent to for this community. In this particular case, union security would mean management's endorsement of some form of "check-off", that is, individual worker's payment of union dues which is collected by management from the worker's pay check and turned over to the leaders of the trade union local.

In fact, Noranda's fears were well founded. The regulation of certain aspects of management control over workers is inevitable once a trade union has secured a stable and permanent position in a community and even more so for a particular industry. Many industrial relations experts have commented on this important role of trade unions. One such writer is A. Fox.

The public's preoccupation with the union's economic role in labour markets has meant that an even more important role has been neglected and insufficiently understood. That is the role of union organization within the workplace itself in regulating managerial relations, that is, the exercise of management authority in deploying, organizing and disciplining the labour force after it has been hired. (Fox, 1966: 7). (Emphasis in the original).

Once trade unions became a part of the industrial organization, their function as advancing the interests of workers becomes narrowly channelled into collective bargaining and the agitation and militant action which may have characterized an earlier period is very often diluted. The view that trade unions have blunted the edge of workers' discontents is forcefully expressed by F.H. Harbison:

"Collective bargaining, where it operates with reasonable success, fulfills three functions: first, it provides a partial means of resolving the conflicting economic interests of management and labour; second, it greatly enhances the rights, dignity, and worth of workers as industrial citizens; and third, as a consequence of the first two functions, it provides one of the most important bulwarks for the preservation of the private enterprise system (1954: 274)

It is indeed unfortunate that senior management at Noranda Mines did not see that one of the consequences of trade union recognition and security was "the preservation of the private enterprise system". A great deal of hardship and misery in the post World War II period in Rouyn-Noranda might have been avoided. Instead, any move towards placing a trade union as a permanent working class organization in Rouyn-Noranda would be fought with stout determination by senior management. Senior management did not want to relinquish any authority over its workers to a trade union, no matter what political orientation it professed to espouse, be it pro or anti-capitalist. The issue was managerial control and therefore the extent to which each side, management and trade union, would be capable of defining and defending its, what it felt was its own, turf.

I turn next to the strategy of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Noranda Mines employed in the vicinity of 1800-2000 workers at its mining and smelter operations. The size of its workforce made this single industry community an important base from which the USWA would successfully launch an organizational drive against Mine-Mill's efforts in Canada's mining communities.

Mine-Mill was an industrial union committed to representing the interests of mining and smelter workers in post-war Canada. It possessed a group of cadres, many of whom were Marxists and Communists. The leadership within the USWA, as earlier described, was committed to fighting Communists

and their sympathizers within the Canadian trade union movement. Mine-Mill became the logical and most important target for the USWA in the immediate post-war period.

The importance of Rouyn-Noranda and the intensity of the conflict waged between the two rival trade unions and senior management of Noranda Mines became a struggle over which of the two trade unions would represent not only the workers in Rouyn-Noranda but eventually the workers in the mining communities across Canada. What is more, it was an ideological struggle between one trade union organization which espoused an avowedly anti-capitalist doctrine against another trade union which sought the advancement of the working class, almost exclusively, in terms of collective bargaining. Rouyn-Noranda became the focal point of inter-union rivalry in addition to the struggle between an admittedly harsh anti-union management with all three trade union bodies.

These struggles will not only show the domination of the corporation over the working class but also point to the subordination of the petite bourgeoisie to pursue an independent class strategy during periods of class conflict is suggestive of Macpherson's and Poulantzas' contention about the ambivalent role this class plays in the class relations under capitalism.

I intend to concentrate on three strikes which occurred during this time period in order to dramatize this interaction. A strike affects everyone in a small community. A strike, can be defined as "a temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees in order to express a grievance or enforce a demand" (Griffin, 1939: 20-22). The fact that a strike is

temporary in both the eyes of the workers and management indicates the workers' intention to return to the same job with the same employer at the conclusion of the strike. The denial of labour-power or "stoppage of work" remains the workers' sole weapon in their struggle to exercise a degree of control over their work-life. Their success in gaining any control is never certain because they represent, as earlier described, both a dependent and subordinate class within the framework of capitalist social relations. Once a strike begins, production is stopped and the workers no longer have a source of income. Employers are in a much better position due to their dominant position in capitalist society. They can live off past accumulated profits. As such, a strike cuts open the fabric of society and exposes the antagonistic relationship between the employer of labour-power and the worker. And, as we move from an analysis of one strike to another, a further dimension to the picture will be added with the rivalry between Mine-Mill and the USWA.

In addition to the importance of analysing the nature of Noranda's senior management position on labour relations, and inter-union rivalry, attention must also be directed to an investigation of the nature of the community. Single industry communities which include mining towns such as Rouyn-Noranda form isolated enclaves creating their own codes, myths, heroes and social standards (Lucas, 1971; Kerr and Siegel, 1954). Moreover, almost everyone is dependent on the same employer. The workers are engaged in the extraction and in cases such as in Rouyn-Noranda, the preliminary processing of a mineral. A great part of the work requires little skill so that craft distinctions are minimized. Therefore, mining communities

constitute a relatively homogeneous and isolated mining setting for industrial conflict. Homogeneity here refers to the relative sameness in jobs when compared to the range of occupations in a metropolitan setting.

The isolation in geographic and social terms and the homogeneity of the community's work force produces few neutrals to mediate in industrial disputes or strikes. Workers and the petit bourgeois class of retailers, small-scale businessmen and professionals are in one manner or another dependent on the community's dominant employer so that in times of crisis such as in strike periods all social classes are affected. One of the sub-themes in the strikes to be described concerns the precarious position which the petit bourgeois class finds itself in; and the limited extent to which this class is successful in pursuing an independent class strategy.

Another dimension to this investigation of class conflict in Rouyn-Noranda centers on the position and role of ethnic heterogeneity in the workforce and therefore the community. Management strategy originally had been to recruit labour from outside of Canada. The particular intersection of class and ethnicity in Rouyn-Noranda which will be described below resulted in maintaining, for the short term, senior management's control over its workforce. As its ethnic composition became more homogeneous, that is, French speaking, by the end of World War II, the linguistic and cultural basis for social cohesion amongst the workers was reinforced. The development of ethnic homogeneity within the working class would become a precondition for the building of a class alliance between the French Canadian petite bourgeoisie and the evolving French Canadian character of the working class. French Canadian nationalism could be effective only in an ethnically homogeneous population where such appeals could be seen as

transcending class interests.

The relative success in unionizing most of the workers who greeted both Mine-Mill and the United Steelworkers of America in the World War II and post-war period compared to the failure of the Mine Workers Union during the Depression years was, in part, due to an increasingly homogeneous ethnic base. Fragmentation along linguistic and/or cultural lines was not significant. An additional important factor which helps to explain the failure of the first trade union in Rouyn-Noranda was the availability of a reserve army of surplus labour during the Depression years of which management readily made use.

Finally, I come to the predictable role of the provincial police. In each of the three strikes in Rouyn-Noranda, the state had intervened to provide protection to company property by sending in the police. The state also aided employers by restricting workers actions against the employer through legal sanctions such as injunctions.

La Grève des "Fros"¹

Ethnic Composition of the Workforce Before the Strike

An important dimension to the ethnic composition of the labour force at the Noranda Mine and smelter during the early history of this single industry community was the predominance of non-French Canadians. According to one source,² as many as 60% of the workers were from Eastern

¹ "Fros" is a shortened form of "foreigners". The word "fros" was used by French Canadians in Rouyn-Noranda to express the presence of a large proportion of immigrants in the community who identified in linguistic terms with the English speaking management of Noranda Mines. Most of the events described rely on Evelyn Dumas' account of the strike in her Dans le sommeil de nos os, (Montreal, Lemeac, 1971) and Benoit-Beaudry Gourd, "Les travailleurs miniers et l'implantation du syndicalisme dans les mines de l'Abitibi-Temiscaminique, 1925-50, in De l'Abbittibbi-Temiskaming (4), (Rouyn: College du Nord-Ouest, 1977), pp. 45-111.

² Rouyn-Noranda Press, July 26, 1934. English Canadians comprised 27% while French Canadians made up a little over 12% of the workforce.

and Central Europe. This can be explained by Noranda management's belief that "foreigners" would make better workers because they did not have a "home" outside of the mine and as a result would be more susceptible to their control.

In other words, "foreigners" were physically removed from their relatives and from a familiar culture and territory. They were in a new country, on another continent and in a frontier environment. In order to establish themselves in this completely different social situation which included beginning a new life in this frontier community, management believed they had a captive labour force. As such, it was believed that they would put up with more hardships and restrictions on their work than would native Canadians.

Many of the Eastern European workers who came to work in Noranda, Quebec had been earlier influenced by socialism and communism in their home countries. One informant in the community confided that he could remember seeing pictures of Joseph Stalin in some of the miners' homes (Interview, 1978). Their familiarity with radical politics would make many of them susceptible to the communist trade union organizers for the Workers Unity League.

On the other hand, management was under the impression that Canadians, and in this case, French Canadians would not so easily succumb to a work discipline which was under strict management supervision because it was felt that French Canadians had an escape value - they could always go back to the family farm or seek seasonal employment in the lumber industry.

Working Conditions

During the first year of the Depression (1930), wages at Noranda ranged from 60 cents an hour for a miner, to 53 cents an hour for an apprentice miner and 43 cents an hour for a surface worker. One year later, wages were automatically decreased across the board by 3 cents. The work week consisted of eight hours a day, six days a week. Often over-time was required at no increment in the wage rate. An eight hour a day shift really meant nine to ten hours underground because the company refused to pay workers for the time it took them either to get down into the mine or the time it took them to get back up to the surface. Due to the fact that there was only one 'cage' which was used to transport workers up and down the shaft, the time it took until everyone was moved could vary from between thirty to ninety minutes. In addition, the company did not offer the miners suitable changing, cleaning or locker space. The working conditions were such that, according to one source, many Noranda miners were not capable of working more than five years underground because of the high levels of silica dust in the mine shafts which caused the workers to contract severe lung disease.³

The social relations of production between mine management and its workforce centered primarily on the ability of management to effectively control labour. The Depression had provided the company with available cheap labour that could be used not only to depress wages but also as an accessible labour pool which could be easily tapped in the event

³ A delegation from the Canadian Labour Defense League, a wing of the Workers Unity League which met with Quebec Premier Taschereau and the Minister of Labour, Charles-Joseph Arcand on July 10, 1934 as reported in the Montreal Gazette, July 11, 1934.

of a strike. In addition, an ethnically heterogeneous workforce was more easily controllable. The dissimilarity of language and cultural background inhibited communication between workers. Ethnic differences could also be manipulated to stereotype and thereby divide the workers even further, leaving management intact and in control. Finally, it would also be easier to scapegoat foreign militant leaders as Bolshevik.

Union Organizing Activity

January 1933 can be taken as that point when the first signs of organizing activity in the community began. The Workers Unity League (WUL), a Canadian and Communist labour federation, through one of its affiliate unions, the Mine Workers Industrial Union, had begun to take an interest in the plight of the Noranda Mine workers.

The WUL was an outgrowth of Canadian and U.S. Communist Party policy which aimed towards the establishment of "new 'revolutionary' organizations among workers, farmers and other groups in direct opposition to established trade unions and farm organizations" (Jamieson, 1975: 215).

As one labour commentator has remarked, the working-class struggles of the early 1930's were "nearly all in these industries and, in most cases, under Communist union leadership" (Jamieson, 1975: 216).

According to the WORKER⁴, the WUL newspaper, organizing activity in Rouyn-Noranda had begun in earnest early in July, 1933 and had netted about 150 members out of a total work-force of approximately 1500. For reasons related to tactical organizational errors, the union's efforts were stymied until January, 1934 when a six month plan devised by the regional leadership was put into effect.

⁴ June 23, 1934.

Organizing began in the open but the initial success of the union resulted in the firing of five union organizers by Noranda in April, 1934. As a result, the union had to do its work more discretely. But even under these hardships, the Mine Workers Industrial Union could boast of having signed up approximately one third of the employees or 500 men. It appears that the vast majority of the union members were "foreigners". Only a handful of English or French Canadian workers were union members.

On Sunday, June 10, 1934, the union held a public meeting in Rouyn where the union leaders set out the demands they were to present to management the following day. The ultimatum would be a call to strike if management refused to negotiate. On Monday, June 11, 1934, a union delegation met with H.L. Roscoe, general manager of the Noranda, Quebec operations and outlined their demands. These included:

1. improved dry houses, hot water for every worker and separate lockers.
2. an 8 hour day underground.
3. the right to join the union of one's choice, recognition of mine and smelter committees, freedom from discrimination on the job and the reinstatement of the five workers fired for union activities.
4. proper ventilation in the smelter against gas.
5. 10 percent increase in pay for everyone.
6. time and a half for overtime.

Today, these demands by the union would be considered minimal standards for mine workers. Then, over forty years ago, these demands were bordering on the revolutionary and would have to be fought for. Management took these demands as attacks on what it considered to be its rights.

The Strike Begins

The plant manager, H.L. Roscoe, after having heard the union's position was reported to have told the delegation that he "would have nothing to do with the Mine Workers Union which was only composed of a bunch of

Communists" and if they were not satisfied, he challenged them to "go ahead and strike". That evening, a union rally was called in Rouyn where the union leaders asked their members for a strike vote which was unanimously given from the reportedly 300 or so workers who attended.

The next morning, close to one thousand strikers and sympathizers set up picket lines at the gateway to the mine. Production at the mine for that day was completely halted. However, by noon, strike breakers were being recruited from the hundreds of unemployed who were "barracked" in the town. Many of these men were French Canadian.

At the same time, volunteers, many of whom were company foremen, were sworn in as "special agents" of the Noranda municipal police force. In addition, the fourteen Provincial Police of the region were being reinforced by fellow officers from other parts of Quebec where they were then transported by plane to Rouyn. The significant numbers of "special agents" and police in the community did not intimidate the workers, at least not initially.

The handful of French and English Canadians who were also members of the union only supported the strike for the first couple of days. Hence, the name of the strike which is still remembered today in the community as "la grève des 'fros'" - the foreigners strike. By Friday, April 14, the mine was operating again at a normal pace. From that time on the strike had been effectively broken even though the men stayed out for over three more weeks.

The Ethnic Composition of the Workforce After the Strike

While the union had lost the struggle which also meant its organization, the strike did set in motion an important change in the ethnic composition of the labour force. Where at one time French Canadians had

been excluded, they were now moving quite rapidly into becoming a significant part of the total number of mine and smelter workers. The numbers of French Canadians moved from 188 before the strike to 450 by July 1, 1934. English Canadians moved up from 416 to 544 or 35 percent of the workforce. Foreign born but naturalized Canadians declined from 354 before the strike to 195. H.L. Roscoe declared that foreigners who had not obtained Canadian citizenship before the strike also suffered a loss in numbers. The numerical breakdown is: Yugoslavs were 149 before the strike, 43 after; Czechoslovaks went from 39 to 17; Ukrainians, Poles and Russians from 91 to 54; Austrians from 10 to 4; Serbs from 5 to 2; Finns from 35 to 9; Swedes from 15 to 7. There was little change with respect to the relatively small number of Hungarians, Roumanians, Bulgars, Italians, Norwegians, Danes, Montenegrins, Belgians, Swiss, Germans, French and Dutch.⁵

Once the strike at Rouyn-Noranda had been effectively broken by management, the mine workers in the community and the outlying region no longer had an organization. The workers in the region were once again in a structurally weak position vis à vis the mine operators. Noranda Mines would exercise complete control over the community's workforce for close to a decade.

⁵ Rouyn-Noranda Press, Vol. 2, no. 17, July 1, 1934, p. 1. A local miner, R. Jodoin, in his personal memoirs recounts the role of management in deliberately inviting French-Canadians during the strike to take jobs in the mine. "J'ai encore dans les oreilles les cris des autorités de la mine, 'Come on Frenchies', et les 'Frenchies' allaient avec fierté et ignorance couper le cou de l'autres travailleurs comme ceux qui cherchaient à obtenir des conditions de travail raisonnables. Ces grévistes ne demandaient pas de luxe croyez-moi." R. Jodoin, En-d'ssœur (Montreal: Editions quebecoises, 1973), p. 102, quoted in Benoit-Beaudry Gourd, op. cit., p. 77. The Financial Post of August 4, 1934 noted that "the net results of the strike at Noranda Mines recently was that the percentage of foreign-born workers has been reduced from 50 to 25%".

During this period, attempts were made to organize workers at Rouyn-Noranda and the Abitibi-Temiscamingue region. The United Mine Workers of America, John L. Lewis' influential trade union body, had made incursions into Rouyn but there is no evidence to show that a local had been set up. (Gourd, 1977: 79).

Next, inspired largely by the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church the Syndicat des mineurs de l'Abitibi had a short history. It lasted roughly four years, from 1938 until 1942 and was under the leadership of Dr. W. Desrosiers. When Dr. Desrosiers decided to step down from the leadership of the union in 1942, he quickly became one of the principal organizers for Real Caouette and the l'Union des electeurs in the region. After his departure from the union, it appears to have simply disappeared from sight because when the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers began to organize in Val d'Or and Malartic in 1944, they came across no opposition from the Syndicat.

Finally, there was the Toronto Trade and Labour Council. It began organizing in Rouyn in 1941. The English speaking organizers were quickly replaced by a Quebec contingent of the Trades and Labour Council. The Miners Union, local 2834 was given jurisdiction over the entire Abitibi-Temiscamingue region. The summer and autumn of 1941 witnessed organizing activity by the union at Noranda, Waite-Amulet and Powell-Rouyn. By the end of the year close to 1000 members could be counted. (Gourd, 1977: 79-80)

The fear of the coming of Mine-Mill resulted in mine management installing a "union" of its own at Noranda. The problem of an organization which was outside management control, that is, an independent trade union local, was to be resolved with the introduction of a management-sponsored

workers committee. The committee was to be made up of 15 members representing the different sectors of the mine and the different ethnic groups that made up the workforce. There were 5 miners, 3 foundry workers, 3 mechanical and electrical maintenance workers, 2 workers from the concentrator and 2 employees from the office. The committee was ethnically divided into 6 English Canadians, 6 French Canadians and 3 immigrant workers. At this time, the ethnic breakdown of the total Noranda workforce was made up of 18% immigrants and 41% each for English and French-speaking Canadians.

Noranda gave to this committee the formal right to negotiate problems in labour relations which would surface from the day-to-day operations of the mine. The committee was restricted in its actions. It could not act until after the foreman and department heads had intervened in a dispute. Its effectiveness in the eyes of the workers as a legitimate body advancing workers interests was therefore undermined. The committee was subordinate to management.

From 1927 until 1943, the working conditions which the miners in Rouyn-Noranda had to contend with were the result of the arbitrary and patronizing actions of the employer. Noranda Mines had the highest number of deaths due to accidents in the twenty-five year period from 1925-50 than any other mining company in northwestern Quebec (see Table XI). The mining companies in northeastern Ontario and northwestern Quebec, some of which were Noranda subsidiaries, had rejected the demands for better working conditions which had been made by trade unions. What is more, many immigrants who came to work in the mines during the Depression years faced deportation if they became involved in trade union activity. In addition many of the trade unions who sought to organize workers in the resource

Table XII

Deaths due to Accidents in the Mines
of Northwestern Quebec, 1925-50

(The Top Ten)

Company	Years																								Total	
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48		49
Noranda			1		2	7	1	3	2	3	2	4	6	2	1	4	2	4	2	2	2	1	2	2	4	59
East Malartic														3	1	3	4	2	1	1	3	1	17	2		38
Beattie								3	1	1		3		3	1	1	1	1	2	1		4	2	3		27
Malartic Goldfields																1	3				5	1		2	12	
Canadian Malartic												3	1				1	1	2			1	1	2	12	
Waite-Amulet						3										1	2	2		1	1			2	12	
Siscoe						1		1		1				1			1	2	1						10	
Normetal																	2	4				1	2	1	10	
Lamaque											1			6												9
Powell-Rouyn													2				3	2								9

From: Gourd, B., Mines et Syndicats en Abitibi-Temiscamingue, 1910-1950, M.A. (History), 1978, p. 69

frontier in Canada were too small to face up to the strength of companies like Noranda Mines. The Mine Workers Union of Canada, le Syndicat des mineurs de l'Abitibi and the United Mine Workers of America attempted to organize mine workers but were never recognized by the mining companies. In the face of hostile management capable of either forcefully driving out trade unions or by co-opting some of the functions of trade unions through, for example, workers committees, these early efforts at organizing were doomed to fail. But they did serve as examples to organizers within the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and later the United Steelworkers of America of what Noranda Mines and other mining companies were willing to do to exclude trade unions from installing themselves as permanent organizations in Rouyn-Noranda and other mining communities across Canada.

The Mine Mill Strike: 1946-47

Introduction

1940 marked the founding of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). The CCL was the merger between the All Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL) and the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) locals expelled from the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). The TLC was the Canadian counterpart to the American Federation of Labour (AFL), the affiliation of skilled workers into appropriate bargaining units. The TLC had long taken a Gompers's style apolitical position. The TLC at this juncture in Canadian history was the most powerful labour organization in the country. The CCL, on the other hand, was concerned with organizing production workers and was considered to be a politically left-wing organization. The growth of the

CCL, soon to surpass the strength of the TLC, was tied to the expansion of large-scale industrial enterprise in Canada.

Among the affiliates of the CCL were the International Union of Mine-Mill and Smelter Workers (IUMM & SW) and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). The rich gold, copper, nickel and uranium mines of northern Ontario and northwestern Québec were soon to become the scene for extensive organizational activity between these two rival trade union bodies. The first to enter the scene was the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, more commonly known as simply Mine-Mill.

The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers

The Stage is Set

Mine-Mill began to organize workers in Abitibi-Temiscamingue at the beginning of 1944. Two organizers were sent - David Côté to Rouyn-Noranda and Olivier Breton to Val d'Or. By March, 1944 local 688 was installed in Rouyn-Noranda. On June 13, 1944, a vote of accreditation was undertaken under the supervision of the National Labour Relations Board. A total of 1,333 out of the 1,906 employees were eligible, of which 1,176 cast their vote. Mine-Mill obtained 1,086 votes or 91%. This was the first time in the region of Abitibi-Temiscamingue that a trade union was recognized as the legal representative of the miners (Gourd, 1977: 85-86).

Once Mine-Mill was recognized as a legitimate organization, other miners quickly joined. In the months that followed the decision at Rouyn-Noranda, miners at Beattie, Waite-Amulet, Powell-Rouyn were incorporated into local 688. Other locals quickly sprung up at Val d'Or (Local 654) and Malartic (Local 696).

The political significance of Mine-Mill's presence in Rouyn-Noranda was expressed when the chief organizer of the local, David Côté, was elected as a provincial C.C.F. member of parliament in August, 1944. This was the first and would prove to be the last time that a socialist candidate would be elected to the Quebec National Assembly from Rouyn-Noranda.⁶ For that matter, Mister Côté became the only CCF candidate to ever be elected in the province of Quebec.

During the negotiations for a first contract, management told the union representatives that "the only reason they were sitting down with the union was because the law said they had to, otherwise they couldn't see where the union was going to do anybody any good". Negotiations continued with no foreseeable resolution for several months until a Conciliation Board report was accepted by both management and labour. On February 8, 1945, the union and the company signed their first and only collective agreement.

The collective agreement recognized the union as the unique bargaining agent for the workers (Mine-Mill was unsuccessful in getting voluntary "check-off" which would have given it a more permanent status). Management maintained its exclusive control over the operations and production of the mine. Its authority over discipline, hiring, firing, classification, promotions and suspensions remained intact. In all, Mine-

⁶ Gourdeau remarks that Côté benefited from the large number of candidates that year who sought election, there were nine candidates. Côté was able to squeeze through because his constituency was the largest, the most homogeneous and block voted. B. Gourdeau, op. cit., cf p. 87.

Mill had barely entered the door at Noranda Mines. Its presence had been guaranteed by the Federal government through the National Wartime Labour Relations Board but its position in the company was precarious.

The Toronto headquarters of Mine-Mill in March, 1946 worked out a broad strategy for future negotiations in the mining sector of north-eastern Ontario and northwestern Quebec once the Federal Wartime Labour Relations Board was dismantled and handed over to the provinces. If successful, their program could affect over 40,000 workers in the two provinces. It consisted of a 29 cent an hour increase bringing the base rate to \$1.10/hour, a 40 hour week and a guarantee of 1,900 hours a year. It also called for a two week paid vacation, paid holidays and time and a half for overtime. Finally, it called for voluntary and revocable "check-off" of union dues which the company would remit to the Toronto headquarters of Mine-Mill.

Mine-Mill began negotiations with Noranda for a new contract in March 1946. Armed with this general outline, the representatives of Local 688 made the following demands to H.L. Roscoe: a 20 cent/hour increase, an eight hour day, forty hour work week, time and a half for overtime work, one week of paid holiday after one year's service and two weeks holiday after five years service, 6 paid holidays a year and finally, voluntary "check-off" of union dues. Senior management rejected all the demands. The company waited until May, 1946 to offer a 7 cent/hour increase which the union rejected.

This impasse resulted in the matter being taken up by a Conciliation Board. Its recommendations for October, 1946 provided for wage increases and voluntary "check-off" for the union.

The company refused to accept the recommendations and countered on November 10, 1946 with a wage increase of 10 cents/hour effective November 1, 1946. The union turned it down informing the company that a strike would take place within 72 hours if the company did not accept a 16 cent/hour increase retroactive to May 16, 1946.

The Strike Begins

This final offer the company refused to accept. On November 18, 1946, a strike vote was called. Of the 943 workers who were union members, 522 participated in the vote. 496 voted in favour of a strike. The strike was to begin at 7 a.m. on November 22. However, the union discovered that the company was taking in supplies and men onto company property in the hope of maintaining production. Consequently, the strike went into effect earlier than expected at 11.00 p.m. on November 21, 1946. The strike lasted for 79 days, until February 9, 1947.

The first days of the strike began with over 400 workers picketing outside the Noranda gates. Production was halted completely. After consultation with mine management, the union representative agreed to reduce the number of picketers to 30 every shift period and permitted 190 maintenance men and technicians to enter company property to assure that the machinery would not be damaged.

The Quebec provincial police positioned themselves during the first few days of the strike on company property. The police had been requested by the Mayor of Noranda, James Carter, ostensibly to protect company property. Incidentally, it should be recalled that the Mayor of Noranda also happened to be the chief accountant for the company's Noranda, Quebec

operations. The first few weeks of the strike produced little in the way of confrontations with the Quebec provincial police. While the police kept vigil over the conflict, the company was beginning a propaganda campaign in the regional newspapers and the radio against the union (Gourd, 1977).

The Principle Issue

Both the company and the union had been summoned to Ottawa to discuss the strike with officials from the Department of Labour. But all efforts expended were to no avail. Christmas, 1946 came and went with no visible signs of a negotiated settlement. The conflict expanded to other Noranda operations and independent mining companies such as Waite-Amulet, Normetal, Francoeur, Mic-Mac, Powell-Rouyn and Elder.

The key issue was not money but again "check-off". As before, "check-off" meant union security and senior management under James Y. Murdoch who had no intentions of granting any form of union security at the Noranda mine, the largest copper mine in Canada. It was believed that the implications of granting Mine-Mill "check-off" and therefore some form of union security at Noranda, Quebec would not stop there. The "infection" would spread to other mines across northern Quebec and Ontario.

One commentator on the strike argued that as early as one month into the strike, it was evident that "la retenue syndicale, plus que les salaires, est au coeur du conflit" (Gourd, 1977: 94).⁷

⁷ Many individuals who took an interest in this strike were fully aware of the significance of this demand. For example, J.B. Szilberg, Communist MPP commenting on the strike said:

The fight of the Noranda miners is one fight for all of the miners of the North. This is the opening gun of the struggle of all miners of this great rich area for their long deferred and essential wage increases and union security. (Canadian Tribune, Dec. 7, 1946)

Attempts at Mediation in the Strike

During December, 1946 and January, 1947, there were efforts made by individuals and groups within the community to resolve the conflict. The first attempt came from Réal Caouette, the newly elected federal Member of Parliament. Caouette met with H.L. Roscoe, the Vice-President and General Manager of Noranda Mines on January 2, 1947. At this meeting, he "expressed himself definitely against voluntary and revocable check-off" but would fight for the best possible financial agreement for the workers. (Rouyn-Noranda Press, January 2, 1947) A week later, he was reported to have argued that he and "the Union des Electeurs are opposed in principle to all "check-offs", be it deductions at the source for tax or other purposes, because it infringes on personal liberty. (Rouyn-Noranda Press, January 9, 1947) While Caouette's position may have appeared to him to be a compromise solution it was not far removed from the company's own offer. His attempt failed for obvious reasons.

Next, the Mayor of Rouyn, Mr. M.P. Cuddihy presented himself as a mediator. Mine-Mill leaders agreed to accept him, but H.L. Roscoe refused. (Rouyn-Noranda Press, January 9, 1947) The local petite bourgeoisie through the Chambers of Commerce for both Rouyn and Noranda proposed that a secret vote be taken by the workers on the company's last offer. Spokesmen for management while lauding the initiative of the merchants and other notables of Rouyn-Noranda, refused to consider putting "check-off" to a vote.

As the strike moved into its tenth week, the Rouyn municipal council (conseil municipal) proposed a "compromise" solution to the conflict. As Benoit Gourd notes, the contents of the "compromise" were "identique à celui du syndicat" (1977: 96).

None of the attempts at mediation could be considered to have succeeded since each "compromise solution" favoured either one side or the other. Class conflict within this dependent capitalist situation pitted the capitalist against the worker. The petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation could not take an independent path because, as we theoretically argued in chapter II, the petite bourgeoisie does not constitute an independent social class under capitalism. And, in a prototypical situation such as this, it rests with the two dominant social classes to determine the parameters of the struggle, not the petite bourgeoisie. Therefore, the petite bourgeoisie remains subordinate to the class interests and class struggles of the capitalists and the workers.

On January 20, 1947, a top mine official notified the Department of Labour that the strike would soon be over as only twenty percent of the men in the union wanted to continue with the strike. This news provoked the union to take a more determined stand. On January 22, 1947, union members manned the picket lines and refused entry to everyone. The 100-odd Quebec provincial police hurled tear gas into the picketers but due to the severe cold the gas did not rise over three feet and finally blew back into the faces of the officers themselves. These mass picketings continued for three weeks in the bitter cold.

Finally, Judge Boulanger from Ottawa was sent to Rouyn-Noranda to mediate in the conflict. The participants included James Murdoch, President

of Noranda Mines and H.L. Roscoe, General Manager of Noranda. T.F. McGuire, J.A. Rankin and O. Breton represented the interests of the workers and Mine-Mill. The negotiations began on February 4, 1946. The proposed recommendations consisted of a 13 cent increase effective November 1, 1946 and a 10 cent increase retroactive to February 1, 1947. It also called for a plan whereby the union would have a desk in the medical office for the collection of union dues two one-half days a week. The company initially refused but negotiations continued until the package was accepted by both the company and Mine-Mill on February 8, 1947. The union called it the "first successful strike in the metal mines in Eastern Canada". But the prestigious trade magazine of the mining industry, The Northern Miner deemed it a "resounding defeat for the IUMM and SW." The article made specific reference to the fact that James Y. Murdoch had had the unanimous support of his board of directors in pursuing a no 'check-off' policy. No one opposed wage increases but "they (Noranda's management and shareholders) were rigidly against any form of check-off". The last two paragraphs are worth quoting at length.

"In picking Noranda as the scene of a strike, the CIO leaders displayed considerable cunning. What they were after was the check-off for the entire mining country. If they could have forced this at Noranda they would have been in a position to demand this of the three Porcupine mines which Noranda controls, that is, Aunor, Pamour, Mallnor. That could have led to its enforcement upon the whole Porcupine camp. As Mr. Murdoch is president of Kerr-Addison, the acceptance of the check-off could have been used as a lever for similar action at Kerr-Addison, and hence throughout the entire Kirkland-Larder goldfields. With these fallen, all the other Ontario and Quebec mining areas might have been solidly entrenched through the check-off in the leading Canadian mining camps. Anyway, this ~~was~~ the thought behind CIO strategy.

It was a bold scheme and those in the confidence of the CIO were led to understand that the International would fight to the limit.

That they admitted failure in less than three months at Noranda suggests that the organization is even weaker than it appears."

The February 15, 1947 edition of the Financial Post also argued that "settlement of the 79 day Noranda strike without any provision for the key demand - the check-off - is being taken as a broad hint that the scales of management labour relations are returning to the pre-war balance after having been weighted in favour of labour for the last seven years."

While it is difficult to surmise the extent of the "success" of Mine-Mill's struggles with Noranda Mines at Rouyn-Noranda, one point can be made. The three locals, 688, 696 and 654 were dependent on the success of Mine-Mill as a trade union organization in Canada. Without "check-off", these locals did not have an independent financial base on which they could depend. Furthermore, with the dismantling of the National Wartime Labour Relations Board and the administration of accrediting trade union locals having fallen on the provincial governments, Mine-Mill had to contend with the complicity of the Duplessis government in addition to the hostility of Noranda Mines and similar mining companies operating in northwestern Quebec. On top of it all, Mine-Mill was about to be faced with a determined challenge to its jurisdictional right in organizing workers in Canada's mining communities from the United Steelworkers of America.

The context of the struggle which Mine-Mill would be faced with has been succinctly summarized by Benoit Beaudry Gourd.

Les syndiques du Mine-Mill, a ce moment crucial dans leurs rapports avec les compagnes minières, au moment précis où leur combativité et leur unité peuvent les amener à développer les acquis de la récente grève à la Noranda, font face au surnois marandage de l'United Steelworkers of America, le

puissant syndicat de la métallurgie, qu'appuie en sous-main, puis de plus en plus ouvertement, le (Canadian Congress of Labour, la centrale) canadienne à laquelle les deux syndicats internationaux rivaux sont affiliés (1978: 113).

The Expulsion of IUMM and SW from the Canadian Congress of Labour

Although the circumstances surrounding the suspension on August 24, 1948 of Mine-Mill from the Canadian Congress of Labour are unclear, it is generally believed that this action was taken because of the union's involvement with the Communist Party. Once expelled, the Canadian sections of the United Mine Workers (UMW), the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and even the Canadian Congress of Labour itself fought over who should take over Mine-Mill's jurisdiction in the northern Canadian mining communities. Only after pressure coming from officers in Washington was exerted on the Canadian executives to endorse the United Steelworkers of America claim, was it finally adjudicated (Abella, 1973: 109).

According to George Harris, District Secretary for the United Electrical Workers of America, Charlie Millard had begun to undermine Mine-Mill's local at Noranda shortly after the strike of 1946-47. It was alleged that he sent in organizers to both Timmins, Ontario and Noranda, Quebec, "with the message that all would be well if the miners would leave the "red" Mine-Mill union...that the mine owners would not give the workers decent wages or a good union contract with union security as long as they remained in Mine-Mill. But on the other hand, if the miners joined a 'respectable' union then the 'bosses' opposition would disappear."

(Canadian Tribune, Sept. 14, 1954)

Since Mine-Mill had not been successful in obtaining 'check-off', it, therefore, fell prey to these incursions by the United Steelworkers of

America. The Rouyn-Noranda Mine Workers Union was formed and received its charter from the Canadian Congress of Labour. Mine-Mill slowly retreated out of Rouyn-Noranda and the region. On January 19, 1950, the United Steelworkers of America was awarded jurisdiction of the mining sector. It was not until 1951 that the USWA was implanted in the region. It would take another year before negotiations for collective agreements with Noranda Mines and the mining companies would begin.

The Noranda Strike: 1953-54

On August 22, 1953, a legal strike was called by the United Steelworkers of America at both Noranda, Quebec and Timmins, Ontario. Over 93% of the 1600 Noranda mine and smelter workers voted to man the picket lines.

When negotiations between the Steelworkers and Noranda broke down, the union leaders under Pat Burke called a membership meeting to decide on a strike vote. In the words of one of the strikers, the mood of the workers was to go on strike

So with the last meeting with the company they went and called a meeting at 10 o'clock, at night no earlier than that, around 8 but by 10 they had the vote, the old hall on 111 Main Street, it was packed and everybody was yelling strike, strike. So they decided that at 12 o'clock they were going to hit the bricks. So about twenty to twelve, they jumped into the cars and everything else and they took off to go to the mine to start the picket line at midnight.⁸

The strike lasted for a total of 147 days, broken down into 110 days in 1953 and 37 days in 1954. The total number of man-days lost was 235,000

⁸ Interview, June 15, 1978.

at an estimated cost of \$1,974,000 in salaries alone.⁹ The strike was terminated by the union on February 3, 1954.

¹⁰ In an exhaustive study of the strike, Jean Mehling argued that the issue of voluntary and revocable "check-off" again dominated the negotiations. Referring to documentation he had access to, Mehling argues that management saw the issue of voluntary and revocable "check-off" as the first step in a three-stage grand plan by the union which would lead next to a union shop and culminate in a closed shop. Once the union had gained "check-off" at Noranda, Quebec, it would expand to the other Noranda operations and the rest of the Canadian Mining industry.

In an early advertisement in the Quebec City daily Le Soleil, Noranda made its position irrevocable.

Pour bien comprendre ce que représente le soi-disant sécurité syndicale, il faut considérer séparément le cas des membres de l'union et celui des chefs d'union payés et du bureau-chef de l'union. La loi protège les membres des unions et assure à leurs syndicats autant de sécurité que les membres en désirent pour elles. La sécurité des chefs unionistes payés et du bureau-chef de l'union ne devrait dépendre que de l'appui libre et du bon vouloir des membres de l'union.

En demandant la soi-disant "sécurité syndicale", les chefs d'union payés cherchent en réalité à obtenir que l'on garantisse leur situation financière et leur puissance d'action sur les employés et sur l'économie nationale, au moyen de retenues obligatoires sur les salaires des travailleurs. (September 29, 1953)

⁹ The figure of \$1,974,000 was arrived at by multiplying the total number of hours lost due to the strike by the hourly rate. The figure for the total number of man-hours lost was arrived at by multiplying the workforce of 1600 men by the total number of days lost (147) by an eight hour day. The resulting figure is 1,880,000. The hourly rate of pay with the 7½% increase which the men accepted came to \$1.05. 1,880,000 x \$1.05 = \$1,974,000.

¹⁰ Analyse socio-economique d'une grève, (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales: 1963).

One of the strikers interviewed who was later to become a trustee and a sergeant-at-arms for the Steelworkers also acknowledged "check-off" as an important issue in the strike:

But the strike in 53...check-off had something to do with it and on top of that the company insisted on this 4%. It was only a small amount, 4%. So the boys went out and took a strike vote.¹¹

The Steelworkers were determined to press for some form of union security at the Noranda, Quebec operations and the company was even more determined to deny to them this demand. The two adverseries locked horns on this one issue.

The strike spread so that by early October, 1953, 4,100 miners were on strike at Noranda, Quebec, the McIntyre Porcupine Mines, Hollinger Consolidated, and three other mines in the Timmins-Porcupine area of Ontario.

The Petite Bourgeoisie

The petite bourgeoisie was again caught between the workers and the company. A neutral position became increasingly more difficult to maintain as they were being forced to take a position even though they tried to balance themselves between the two combatants. The petite bourgeoisie were obliged to give credit to the striking workers if they hoped to stay in business after the strike. Yet not all of the petite bourgeoisie in the town felt confident about accepting vouchers from the union. An interview with one of the union representatives explained the petite bourgeoisie's apprehension in the following manner:

¹¹ Interview, June 15, 1978.

"There was the odd store that refused to accept vouchers. Now you couldn't exactly blame them for that because in the early 40's in Kirkland Lake, Mine-Mill was in there and there was a strike in Kirkland Lake in the gold mine and there are still merchants in Kirkland who have never been paid for what they gave on vouchers for the Mine-Mill strike, and word gets around so you really can't blame these merchants here for some of them being leery.¹²

Most storekeepers advanced credit to the striking workers. But there was at least a two week waiting period before the vouchers could be cashed.

This prompted a degree of protest from some of the petite bourgeoisie who had to keep their own creditors at bay.¹³

One manner in which the petite bourgeoisie once again attempted to act as intermediary in the strike was by requesting the provincial Minister of Labour through the local Chamber of Commerce to intervene in the conflict. This attempt failed.

The Steelworkers did much to enhance their image as a positive force in the community. There were no important incidences of violence or destruction of company property. In the words of one of the strikers, "it was an orderly strike and there wasn't one cent's worth of damage done".¹⁴

The fact that the Steelworkers spent over \$2 million meant that workers who were union members did not completely shoulder the burden of the expenses brought on by the strike. The money which union members received found its way into the hands of the petite bourgeoisie in the

¹² Interview, June 15, 1978.

¹³ The Archives of Canada, Ottawa, RG 27 Volume number 229.

¹⁴ Interview, June 6, 1978.

community who sold food, clothing and other necessities to the men and their families. Because the petite bourgeoisie was regularly paid by the union for extending credit to the workers, a bond of trust between them and the union began to be established. It presented itself in the community as an organization whose size and wealth could be counted on to protect the worker and his family.

"Nobody suffered. If it was necessary that phone bills and medicine and that had to be paid, the union would pay. Now it cost the Steelworkers one hell of a pile of money here for that strike of 3,000 here and at the same time they had the strikes at Normetal and in Timmins, the Porcupine camp, they had 2 or 3 thousand people on strike up there so the Steelworkers had around 7000 or 8000 people on strike in northeastern Ontario and northwestern Quebec.¹⁵

The experience of trust between the petite bourgeoisie and the United Steelworkers of America during this strike would suggest that there could be circumstances when mutually self-serving interests between the dominated classes could coalesce. This historical legacy is precisely the kind of experience which would become a part of any future class alliance between the dominated classes. It represents an intangible yet important asset in the development of a class alliance.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ During causal conversation with numerous individuals in the community, I would occasionally make reference to the post-war strikes in the community. Everyone, who was old enough to have lived through the experience of the 1953-54 strike, had nothing but praise for the conduct of the union officials and the financial obligations that had all been met by the United Steelworkers of America. The union had earned a good name in the community.

The Strike Ends

But, the issue of voluntary and revocable "check-off" kept the two classes apart and would not be resolved until one of the two either withdrew the demand or gave in to it. On the twenty-first of January, 1954, lawyers for the United Steelworkers of America recommended to the union negotiators to accept Noranda's offer without the "check-off" provision. On February 13, 1954, the union took the matter to its membership. The vote was 564 to 125 in favour of accepting the company's offer. On February 17, 1954 the strike was officially over.

Both Murray Cotterhill, director of the CCL's Political Action Committee (PAC) and Vincent Sweeney, past director of the United Steelworkers of America acknowledged the importance of this strike for the future status of the union in these northern mining communities. Cotterill notes:

"The showdown found thousands of miners on the picket lines during a sub-zero winter in Timmins, Rouyn and other Quebec mining camps. Before the strike ended more than \$2,000,000, most of which came from U.S. Steelworkers, had been spent in strike welfare and legal costs. But this time the strike didn't end in a company win. It ended with increases, intact organization and a wary respect for union strength which had never existed in the offices of mine managements up until that time." (Canadian Labour, June, 1957).

Sweeney remarks:

"(This strike was) one of the longest, grimmest strikes in Canadian History. For over eight months, during the bitter winters of 53 and 54, more than 7,000 miners patrolled the pitheads at temperatures as low as 40° below zero... But only a union as big and as determined as the USW could have provided the help. For the first time in the history of the far north mining camps, a strike was settled with the union organization unsmashed and the miners returning under new agreements including wage boosts." (Sweeney, 196).

The fact that the Steelworkers could not make the inroads that they had anticipated into the Canadian non-ferrous mining industry in northern Ontario and northwestern Quebec meant a partial vacuum still existed in this important natural resource sector that could still be filled by Mine-Mill.

In a front page article in the Financial Post, under the heading, "One Step Now Shapes Mining Labour Future", the stage was set for what would be a significant development. The article begins by stating that "Canadian Mining this week stood at a labour crossroads. The direction it will take in two major areas will do much to determine its future labour outlook; both in wages and hours and in the unions which represent its employees." These two major areas were the uranium mines of northern Ontario where the United Steelworkers of America had just won a representation vote at Bicroft, the largest uranium mine in Ontario's Bancroft field and, of course, Noranda with the largest copper mine in Canada. "The battle lines between the steel union and the pinko Mine-Mill now are pretty well drawn." (Financial Post, January 26, 1957, pp. 1 and 3)

At Noranda, the Financial Post argued that "this is a key contract for the Steelworkers. Noranda is an extremely tough bargainer. If steel can get a good settlement without a strike, it gains prestige as compared with Mine-Mill, sets a pattern which dozens of smaller mines will have to follow. If, however, Steelworkers stubs its toe again on Noranda, Mine-Mill's cause among the miners is advanced...it (Noranda) is tied up with

the fight for labour power between the two unions. Steelworkers cannot afford to lose prestige in any branch of mining if it wishes to keep expanding its miner membership at the expense of Mine-Mill."

The importance of 'check-off' or a good collective agreement between Noranda and the United Steelworkers of America would surely entrench this trade union in these mining communities. The event which would have a bearing on the wage and benefit package for the workers at Noranda and which would establish the United Steelworkers of America as the only major trade union representing mine workers in Rouyn-Noranda occurred in another single industry community in the Gaspé region of Quebec.

Gaspé Copper Mines and the United Steelworkers of America

Prelude

The scene for this historic confrontation is the Gaspé peninsula. The company is the Gaspé Copper Mines Limited, a subsidiary of Noranda Mines. The company town where the events unfolded is Murdochville, named after the chairman of Noranda Mines, James Y. Murdoch.

The narrative of the strike will be restricted to the events which transpired after between the Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian Congress of Labour into the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). I will only mention here that the United Steelworkers of America had been attempting to organize the workers at Murdochville since 1952. They were thwarted each time they tried and when in 1954 the International Union of Mine Employees (IUME), an affiliate to the Trades and Labour Council, was certified by the QLRB, they were forced into a temporary background. A two year contract had been signed with Gaspé Copper Mines which was due to

terminate in July, 1956. Negotiations for a new contract had already begun sometime in January, 1956 between the union and the company.

(Chartier: 1957b: 374-75)

In April 1956, the Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress merged to form the new Canadian Labour Congress. After a meeting with Théo Gagnier, past president of local 514 of the IUME at Murdochville, the Canadian Labour Congress decided to 'allocate' the IUME local to the United Steelworkers of America. Emile Boudreau, a Steelworker organizer, argued that it might be easier to simply administer the IUME contract.¹⁷

Théo Gagnier countered that he was convinced that "the workers wanted a change, and they did not want a change in name". The fact that the IUME had only twenty members out of approximately 1000 production workers at Caspe Copper Mines was probably the more important of Theo Gagnier's arguments in convincing Emile Boudreau that the workers "wanted a change". (Labour Gazette, June, 1970)

All told, though, the United Steelworkers of America anticipated very little difficulty in organizing the majority of the workers. According to Pat Burke, by June 6, 1956 the union had managed to sign up 776 members. On June 6, 1956, local 4881 of the USWA presented a petition for certification to the Quebec Labour Relations Board (QLRB). When the board investigated the application in the first week of July, 840 cards had been

¹⁷ Interview, March 16, 1975.

signed and paid for.¹⁸

Standard procedure required the board to inform the company of the union's presentation. This the provincial labour body did on June 22, 1956. The Quebec Labour Relations Board then investigated the claim made by the Steelworkers on July 3, 1956 with the result that out of 920 workers eligible to join, 840 were "declared" members of the union. All these circumstances, up to this point, indicated that the United Steelworkers of America would soon be certified as the sole bargaining agent at Murdochville. This being the case, the United Steelworkers of America would be in a strategically important position. Obviously, its bargaining strength vis à vis Noranda Mines would have been formidable once Local 4881 became the certified bargaining agent at Murdochville. It would then be in a position to seriously disrupt Noranda's total operations since the Horne Mine and Murdochville represented almost all of Noranda's copper production at that time.

The company's first reaction to these developments was to request on July 6, 1956 from the Quebec Labour Relations Board the local's petition and all other supporting documents. This request was complied with on July 15, except for the names of the workers who had paid their dues to the union. On August 2, 1956, the company obtained from Hon. Oscar Boulanger of the Quebec Superior Court a writ of prohibition against the Quebec Labour Relations Board which ordered the Board and the local to suspend all proceedings for certification. The reasons offered were that

¹⁸

Pat Burke, "Report on Gaspé Copper", August 19, 1956

the board had acted "illegally and without jurisdiction" by refusing the company's request for the names of all the signed-up employees.

R. Chartier observes that the company's actions in this regard were an out and out challenge to "the validity of article 41a of the Quebec Labour Relations Act which states as clearly as possible that "no writ" of any kind, and namely that "of prohibition", may be issued against the Board...acting in their official capacity". (Chartier: 1957b: 9) Not until September 27, 1957, did Mr. Justice Morin deny the writ of prohibition so that certification procedures could once more begin.

The union, confronted with the delay in certification, sent a letter to the company on September 27, 1956 requesting that a committee of fourteen members be set up to discuss their common problems. Gaspé Copper refused on the grounds that nothing could be done until the matter before the court had been settled.

The Steelworkers decided to call a meeting in order to decide on what should be done next. A strike vote by secret ballot was taken. Out of 681 votes, 98% voted in favour of a strike. A strike at this time was prevented by the union. The union argued that negotiations were being carried out at Noranda, Quebec between the United Steelworkers and the parent company of Gaspé Copper Mines; Noranda Mines. The steelworker representatives stated that if negotiations were successful at Noranda, then it would be possible to reach a peaceful agreement at Murdochville. A few days after the strike vote had been taken, the company made effective wage increases from 7 to 18 cents per hour.

The Strategy of the United Steelworkers of America

We return now to a consideration of the overall Steelworker strategy for the Quebec mining industry. Roger Bédard, the United Steelworkers of America international representative writing to Margaret Lazarus on August 16, 1956 argued that "everything seems to indicate that we will be forced to take strike action before we sign a contract here".

Pat Burke, in a report dated August 19, 1956 affirms:

"this year we feel we are in probably the best position we have ever been in because of the tremendous expansion in the mining industry and the shortage of miners. Any stoppage of work this year at Noranda Mines would mean they would lose a great portion of their experienced help which could not be replaced for some time. I feel very strongly that Noranda Mines and Gaspé should be struck this year to establish our Union in the mining industry for all time to come. We are certified for approximately 10,000 miners in district 5 (i.e. Quebec) at the present time and with the expansion of the industry this could easily reach 16 to 18 thousand within the next two or three years.... This anti-Union fight is being led solely by Noranda Mines and they must be brought to understand once and for all that they must give complete recognition to the Union through some form of union security."

In an interview conducted on March 16, 1975, Emile Boudreau echoed these same concerns.

"The strategy from then on (was) to get Murdochville organized in order to be able to have both smelters in the same union and hopefully in the same contract. If you negotiate for one smelter and you know damn well that that smelter is equipped to produce much more than the smelter you are negotiating for, well then you are in a weak negotiating position. If you can negotiate for 100% of the output of a copper organization like Noranda Mines into one province and that was 100% of Noranda Mines output in copper because they did not have any output anywhere else, so if we could negotiate for both smelters then we stood a good chance of getting better contracts and this was of course our strategy."

The Steelworkers broad strategy in the struggle that was to ensue centered on forcing Noranda Mines to capitulate on the demand for union

recognition. The Steelworkers had earlier (1953-54) committed over \$2 million to gain this demand but had failed. Such a massive commitment in the form of money and personnel was not to have been expended in vain. Union recognition (that is, "check-off") was crucial to their organizational drive in the Canadian mining industry. Mine-Mill in the rest of Canada and the Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC) in Quebec stood in their way of monopoly control of this sector of the economy. All efforts to oust these trade unions from "their (that is, the United Steelworkers of America) jurisdiction" would be mounted. For example, Pat Burke, in the report cited earlier made note of the CTCC certification at Opemiska in the newly developed copper fields in the Chibougamau area. He openly acknowledged that "their contract opens in September (1956) (and) we are opening a campaign to take over this operation".

The outline of the union's strategy we have presented was a determined and pragmatic assessment of the union's goals in the Canadian mining industry and the only means (that is, using Noranda Mines as the target company) by which these goals could be achieved.

The Murdochville Strike

The trigger which ignited the strike happened on March 8, 1957. Théo Gagnier, the union's representative, received notification that he was to be laid off. The company had presented it in the form of a termination notice. In addition, a rumour was circulated to the effect that an additional 100 or 125 men might also be laid off. At a hastily called meeting for Sunday evening in the Church basement, attended by approximately 400 men, it was unanimously decided to cease work immediately and set up

picket lines.

Working Class Solidarity vs. Divide and Conquer

The reaction of the workers at Noranda was one of sympathy with the workers at Murdochville. At the local union meeting on March 22, 1957, a motion brought to the floor which stated that no contract would be signed at Noranda unless it was signed at Gaspé Copper at the same time. It was carried by a strong majority with only eleven negative votes.

The day before, on March 21, 1957, Arbitration Council recommendations were tabled and brought into the negotiations between Noranda Mines and the Steelworker local 4278 at Noranda, Quebec. On April 7, 1957, a special union meeting at Noranda, Quebec was held in the basement of the Church. Noranda's offer was discussed and a vote was held for 12:15 a.m. in order to give shift workers an opportunity to vote.

The result showed 54% voted against accepting the offer while 46% agreed to accept. The union's stipulation that only a 75% or more vote against the contract offer would be acceptable as a mandate to strike meant that there would be no sympathy strike at Noranda.

CHART V

Arbitration Council Recommendations and Noranda's Offer to the USWA

Board Report		Noranda's Offer	
Wages			
5¢	1st year	7%	1st year-minimum of 7¢
3¢	2nd year.	2%	2nd year-to the nearest cent
Hours of Work			
Favoured reduction in the work week from 44 to 40 in a "reasonably near future"		44 to 40 before August 16 (4 months after signing	

Vacation with Pay	
1 wk after 1 year	same as the Board
1 1/2 wk after 3 years	
2 wk after 5 years	
3 wk after 15 years	

The company's motives in granting a much larger wage settlement (see Chart I) than had been recommended by the Arbitration Council was meant to forestall a strike at Noranda and in the process divide the two Steelworker locals and avert co-ordinated action by the union against the company. In this, the company succeeded. On the other hand, settlement at Noranda without a strike, especially such a good settlement meant that workers at the Noranda, Quebec operations and the other mining communities in northern Ontario and Quebec would be attracted to the Steelworkers. Of course, this increased membership would come at the expense of Mine-Mill and would assuredly mean the entrenchment of the United Steelworkers of America in the Canadian mining industry - the union's avowed overall goal.

R.V. Porritt, General Manager of Noranda Mines, in his address to the Annual Meeting held on April 26, 1957, commented on the negotiations and the contract agreement:

The negotiations were protracted and difficult because of the Union's perennial demand for the "check-off" of Union dues. Agreement was finally reached only after the employees decided that they would not strike but would accept the Company's proposal which was somewhat more advantageous to the employees than the recommendations of the majority of the Arbitration Council. The agreement provides for a forty-hour work week and increased wages and other benefits, all of which are equivalent

to an increase in wage rates of 30 cents per hour.. In consequence, the cost of mining and treating ore will be increased by more than \$1.00 per ton." (p. 11)

Steel Labour, the official organ of the United Steelworkers of America had this to say about the settlement:

The Noranda settlement is expected to set the pattern for the company's other mines in the area - Quemont, Waite Amulet and Normetal. There is no indication that this company has really changed its anti-union attitude, say union men here. 'The fight is still for real union recognition.'" (Steel Labour, May 1957, p. 2).

The Struggle at Murdochville Continues

The strike at Murdochville, Quebec would continue for another six and one half months, or until October 5, 1957. It was an extremely bitter confrontation in which the union was unsuccessful in maintaining its local there. In addition, the union was sued by the company for \$2,234,000 in damages. The trial began on September 26, 1960. The final decision was rendered on January 28, 1970 by the Supreme Court of Canada in which the United Steelworkers of America was required to pay the company the sum of \$2,350,000. A bitter struggle and an unfortunate conclusion for the union! But the Rouyn-Noranda local remained intact and as a consequence of the settlement reached with the company on March 22, 1957, the United Steelworkers of America was eventually successful in eliminating Mine-Mill from the Canadian mining fields.

The Quiet Revolution in Quebec brought with it the final event in the history of class conflict in Rouyn-Noranda. With the efforts of René Levesque as Minister of Natural Resources, the Labour Code was revised on July 31, 1964 in such a manner as to guarantee to any union the voluntary and revocable "check-off" as long as it was a certified association.¹⁹

¹⁹ Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1964, Chapter 45, Section 38, July 31, 1964

Conclusion

The history of class conflict in Rouyn-Noranda begins with the position of the miner as a wage-worker in the industry. The miner enters into the process of production by selling his labour power to an owner of capital. The worker's role, then, is not to direct production but to put himself at the disposal of an employer for a specified period of time. He receives a wage as the price of his labour power which he, in turn, uses to purchase commodities to sustain his and his family's means of existence, so that he may continue in this relationship. On the other hand, the employer appropriates the product of the worker's labour power which he sells at a profit. Therefore, the fact that the worker is free to sell his labour power to an employer and the contradiction between the private appropriation of the product by the employer and the social organization of production, are the fundamental elements defining the worker's position in the mining industry and, more generally in capitalist societies.

It is from this antagonistic relationship that combinations of workers spring and workers' organizations established whose goals often include instrumental demands and a degree of control over the work process. As we have shown, it is the latter goal in the form of the "check-off" that Noranda's management under James Murdoch refused to compromise. It was to be left to the intervention of the provincial government to finally settle the issue of "check-off" in favour of the union.

The struggle of the working class in Rouyn-Noranda for some form of trade union recognition was a protracted one. Throughout the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's, the permanent existence of a trade union in the community

was always in question. The recruitment policy of senior management during the initial stages of mine and smelter production and in the immediate post-World War II era to hire foreign immigrants added an ethnic dimension to the problem of working class social cohesion. Furthermore, the Eastern Europeans who came to Rouyn-Noranda during the 1920's and early 1930's tended to inject a socialist element into the community's working class. Many had been influenced by European socialist working class movements. Their familiarity with socialism made them receptive to the organizational ideology of such trade unions as the Mine Workers Union and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.

The Second World War and the establishment of the Wartime Labour Relations Board meant that inroads into the Ontario minefields, Rouyn-Noranda and the Quebec northwest could be made by trade unions. The early success of Mine-Mill attests to this trend. But the combined efforts of the provincial government, senior management at Noranda Mines and inter-union rivalry which centered on ideological and jurisdictional disputes halted the further expansion of Mine-Mill into the Quebec northwest. On the other hand, it opened the door to the United Steelworkers of America who had managed to capture the support of the Canadian Congress of Labour against Mine-Mill. Yet, the demise of Mine-Mill was no guarantee that the USWA would automatically be successful in organizing the workers at Noranda Mines. They still had to contend with the intransigence of senior management and a complacent provincial government. Its very survival was continually put in jeopardy. Trade unions in this mining community were fragile organizations. Moreover, it was not until the state sanctioned voluntary and revocable "check-off"

that, finally, the Steelworker local achieved any degree of permanence and stability. Finally, the installation of the United Steelworkers of America in Rouyn-Noranda by 1964 also meant the containment of a militant tradition in the community's working class which had begun with the Mine Workers Industrial Union and continued with the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.

In summary, the historical experience of class conflict in Rouyn-Noranda provides another indication of the complexity of the problem of working class political radicalism. It is much too simplistic to argue working class consciousness as the subjective, almost reflex, counterpart to the objectively antagonistic social relations workers find themselves in with their employers - indeed, even when the unit of analysis is the capitalist firm and the isolated community it supports.

In their often quoted study, Kerr and Seigel argued that miners were among those workers who are the more strike prone because they "form isolated masses, almost a race apart". Their communities are such that "there are few neutrals in them to mediate the conflicts and dilute the mass". They share common grievances which leads them to a "consciousness of collective grievance" and translates into a "strong emotional attachment to their unions, and are insulated from societal norms depreciating overt industrial conflict" (Hyman, 1977: 60-61).

The historical experience of class conflict in Rouyn-Noranda does correspond to some of Kerr and Seigel's findings, such as the fact that there are no neutrals to mediate class conflict in such a single industry community. As we have already pointed out, the petite bourgeoisie

was unable to pursue an autonomous class strategy during periods of class conflict in the community. Their attempts were such that they either supported one side or the other but could not work out an independent path. During the 1953-54 strike, the United Steelworkers of America spent a great deal of money to maintain the support of its own workers and in the process won over the trust of many local retailers. The proposals for mediation put forward by representatives of the petite bourgeoisie at the end of the strike were synonymous with the trade union's demands. These developments would represent an intangible asset for the eventual class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class.

In contrast to the argument provided by Kerr and Seigel, it remained with the nature of the capitalist class (that is, the senior management of Noranda Mines) and not the nature of the community (that is, its isolated character) which was the major factor to explain strike proneness in this instance. Furthermore, the issue of class consciousness in this study had very little to do with a "strong emotional attachment" to the union, even though most workers probably did have a sincere commitment to their organization. It was ethnicity, or the existence of Eastern Europeans which not only provided the basis around which the early trade unions were formed, but also the decidedly socialist character of the early struggles. In fact, it would probably be accurate to conclude that there existed, in this particular instance, a degree of correspondence between working class radical trade unionism with non-English, non-French speaking ethnic groups. This degree of radicalism became translated into

political action as indicated by the August 1944 provincial election of David Côté, the only CCF candidate ever to be elected in the province of Quebec. His election to office does indicate the willingness and the ability of the communities' working class to identify with social democratic politics. But, the ~~incorporation~~ of the United Steelworkers of America in Rouyn-Noranda would dramatically alter the contours of this locally expressed political development.

Finally, the history of class conflict and trade union militancy in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec revealed the political and organizational domination by the company over the dependent social classes, that is, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie until the early 1960's. For example, in Chapter III evidence was provided to show the political domination exercised by Noranda Mines over municipal politics in Noranda, Quebec until the late 1950's. This chapter has provided evidence to indicate the domination of the company over the organizational activities of the communities' working class until 1964. The company successfully undermined all attempts at organizing the working class from the early efforts of the Workers Unity League in 1934 until the organizing drives of the United Steelworkers of America in the 1950's.

CHAPTER VII

DEPENDENCY AND CLASS RELATIONS:

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PETIT BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM

We begin this chapter by returning to one of the questions raised earlier namely, how can we account for the rise and persistence of the Ralliement des Crditistes in this particular region of Quebec? Recourse will be made to situating the conjuncture of important structural factors and their unique historical development in this northwestern corner of Quebec that created the conditions for the petite bourgeoisie to dominant local federal politics.

In the previous chapters, the concrete problem of analysing dependent capitalist relations in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec was addressed by the historical development of those class-based institutions which created structural constraints within the particular setting social and economic life took place. I cannot underline too forcibly the significance of this emphasis on the structural constraints placed on the social class forces in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec by such organizations as Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America. Up to now, this study was concerned with establishing and examining, in some detail, the particular environment within which the relations between the dominant and dominated classes took place. In the previous chapter, our attention was more specifically directed to investigating the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class. It was revealed that for over thirty years the petite bourgeoisie and the working class were subordinate to the domination of the corporation. So long as social relations were reproduced the petite bourgeoisie, in periods of crisis, could not offer an independent course of action simply because it did not need to. Moreover, when caught between capital and labour during

periods of class conflict, the petite bourgeoisie could do little but oscillate between the two contending social classes. It was only the working class which challenged the dominant social relations within dependent capitalism.

We will argue in this chapter that when the class position of the petite bourgeoisie is threatened and there is an absence of a radical trade union with a leadership, organization and ideology to politically organize and direct the working class, the petite bourgeoisie, defined by "its political and ideological relations", will assume a commanding position within this natural resource enclave.

Our present concern focuses on how the company and the trade union have independently aided in the containment of community politics within the narrow parameters defined by the petite bourgeoisie located in the sphere of circulation and its particular Québec political expression, the Ralliement des Crditistes. The explanation lies, as I have argued in Chapter II, in the institutional and class relations within dependent capitalism.

In Chapter III, evidence was provided to substantiate the claim that Rouyn-Noranda was a natural resource enclave. That is, the economic world within which Rouyn-Noranda and its immediately surrounding region participate in is not a closed one. Although it may give that appearance due to the physical isolation of the two counties, the fact remains that Rouyn-Noranda participates as an enclave system within the national and international economy. This community was founded on a set of structural relationships dominated by the export of natural resources, copper ingots and gold, and the importing of manufactured goods and food. This uneven structural relationship was maintained over the history of the community so that at no time did manufacturing constitute anything but an insignificant

proportion of employment. Productive wealth was, for the most part, created by the exploitation of natural resources. Economic growth and the development of an internal market for manufactured goods was conditioned by the profitability of this sector of the economy. Therefore, the lack of a manufacturing base and the relatively small internal market required the importation of consumer goods, food, clothing and other commodities so that the commercial capitalist sector of this dependent capitalist economy provided the only important opportunities for petit bourgeois entrepreneurship. Therefore, the class structure of this community located as it was, in a natural resource enclave, would be characterized by a working class of miners, a petite bourgeoisie of retailers, wholesalers and local transportation entrepreneurs and dominated by a metropolitan class of mining capitalists.

Class Relations within Dependent Capitalism

Class relations begin with the fundamental interaction between ownership and non-ownership of private property defined as land, labour or capital and the surplus generated by this interaction. Two questions which emerge concern themselves with the "form" the surplus takes and secondly the manner of disposal of the surplus.

Most of the surplus generated from the natural resource enclave comes from the mining sector which, in this particular case, is Noranda Mines. The form the surplus takes is the profits generated by the company. On the other hand, commercial profits enter as the result of an unequal exchange between one trading partner and another (that is, buyer $\leftrightarrow$ seller) where profits are actually transferred from one to the other.

The second question focuses on the manner of disposal of the surplus. A large part of the surplus which is extracted from the mining

sector is funnelled into the metropolitan economy. As we saw in Chapter IV, the growth of Noranda Mines rested on the exploitation of the copper-gold ore body of the Horne Mine and is a testament to the disposal of surplus into the metropolitan economy. It was accumulated in the metropolis to be used for further expansion of the corporate enterprise. That accumulation which does occur in the enclave economy occurs mainly in the commercial sector and is not transformed into the promotion of secondary industry. This is the single most important characteristic of a vertically integrated, export-oriented economy. In other words, what is produced is not consumed and what is consumed is not produced in the enclave economy.

Commercial profits constitute the basis upon which a petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation rests. Moreover, this particular class is subordinate to and dependent upon the exploitation of natural resources in the export-oriented enclave. This intermediate class fraction is, for all intents and purposes, a ward of the metropolitan class.

The Petite Bourgeoisie: From Subordination to Hegemony

The growth and prosperity of the petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation in Rouyn-Noranda was dependent upon Noranda Mines, that is, so long as the Horne Mine was a producing and highly profitable venture. Therefore, this class is subordinate to and dependent upon the degree to which the natural resource sector has been or can be developed. If the latter suffers from a decline brought about by either the local exhaustion of natural resources or by depressed world market prices for these raw materials, the effects are felt immediately by the commercial sector and a crisis at the local level will be the result. In other words, the petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation does not exist independently from the export sector. There does not happen to be sufficient economic diversification at the local level to "carry" this class fraction while

the natural resource sector readjusts to newer conditions brought on by either market conditions or the exhaustion of the known reserves of the natural resource. The dependence of the enclave system on extraction of raw materials means the petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation is virtually helpless if something happens to damage the nature of its structurally subordinate relationship to the dominant natural resource sector. In other words, the continuity of these relationships depends on the capability of the corporation to maintain growth within dependent capitalism. The economic and political domination of the corporation at the local level is a reflection of its ability and willingness to sustain economic opportunities such as employment for the working class and the profitableness of petit bourgeois entrepreneurship in the sphere of circulation (for example, the retail trades).

The petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation may be a weak link to the national and international economy, but, the fact that the company, Noranda Mines, is dependent on one large mine will ensure its class position within this social formation. Yet, once the company seeks a corporate strategy aimed at limiting its dependence on the Horne Mine by diversifying into other copper mines and other natural resource ventures, the more precarious the position of the petite bourgeoisie becomes. Furthermore, the depletion of the known reserves of ore would aggravate the weakness of the social position of the petite bourgeoisie within this natural resource enclave. In other words, the growth of Noranda Mines into a multinational corporation would be not only coterminous with the increasing exhaustion of the Horne Mine, but would contribute to jeopardizing the continuation of the class position of the petite bourgeoisie in the natural resource enclave.

Chapter IV revealed the significance of the one large mine, the

Horne Mine, for the profitability and growth of Noranda Mines for over a quarter of a century. So long as the company, Noranda Mines, was dependent on the Horne Mine for its continued survival and growth and so long as the Horne Mine was a producing and lucrative venture, the reproduction of the class relations in the natural resource enclave would continue.

The company's dependence on this single property for such a long period of time conditioned its relationship with the community. Noranda Mines had enjoyed a "special relationship" with the community. It was the home of its most important mine. Its dependence on the Horne Mine dictated its domination over the petite bourgeoisie and the working class for over three decades. Chapter III gave evidence for this in that Noranda, Quebec began as a planned, company town, one of the first in Canada. This "special status" for the community continued until well into the 1950's.

Chapter VI gave further proof of the subordination of this natural resource enclave to the corporate interests of Noranda Mines, stretching as it did from its inception to the late 1950's. Class struggles in this single industry community were especially severe. Senior management, under the leadership of James Murdoch, saw little need for trade union interference with the proprietary rights of management. The historical evidence showed that it took until the late 1950's before the United Steelworkers of America became a relatively stable institution in this community. This historical record attests to the success James Murdoch had in enforcing his will in Rouyn-Noranda.

The strong hand of James Murdoch and his senior management staff had left their mark. But changes were beginning to surface. Not only the mine but James Murdoch was also aging. In 1956 he retired as Chairman of the Board. Under his leadership, Noranda Mines was becoming a multinational corporation. Yet, a new brand of management was taking over which saw the

world and not Rouyn-Noranda, Québec as their oyster. At the same time, the Horne Mine had become a depleting resource. No new reserves had been found and the fragile base on which the community rested was thrown in bold relief. A "crisis" emerged and seized the community's petite bourgeoisie and working class.

We are arguing that the combination of a new, more broadly interested management team, the rapid growth of Noranda Mines and the depleting natural resource created certain important structural conditions within the community that would be conducive to the seizure of political power by the petite bourgeoisie. The company had grown to such a degree and was under a different management team which saw the Horne Mine as just another asset and a depleting one at that. No longer did the mine and the community constitute integral elements for the continued growth of Noranda Mines. The company's involvement in community affairs would never be as direct as they had once been because the company no longer needed the mine. This is further evidenced by the trend which witnessed the direct pressure of senior management on community politics gradually lessening over the roughly fifty year history of Noranda, Quebec. The first quarter century was characterized by the company's authoritative presence; the next fifteen years saw the gradual erosion of direct influence and the final ten years has been a period of even further diminished importance of corporate interests in the community.

The second factor in our argument and one which occurred at approximately the same time was that the United Steelworkers of America had become an integral part of the community's social structure. The containment of the working class which this development occasioned left the petite bourgeoisie as the sole agent to politically lead the community in the face of this "crisis" ("la crise de croissance") which was brought

on by the growth of Noranda Mines into a multinational corporation and triggered by the depletion of the mine. The permanent presence of a trade union at Noranda Mines is a relatively recent phenomenon. Organized labour in Rouyn-Noranda has led a precarious existence throughout most of this community's history. As previously examined, the trade union movement has had to wage a bitter struggle against a senior management at Noranda Mines which held an extremely restricted view on the role trade unions should play in industrial relations. The bitter battles which the three principle trade unions, the Mine Workers Industrial Union, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and the United Steelworkers of America fought against Noranda Mines resulted, by the late 1950's, in only a limited role for one trade union, the United Steelworkers of America. It took the strike at Murdochville, Quebec in 1957 to eventually install this union in Rouyn-Noranda, but, even then, it remained with the Quebec government, who in 1964 forced Noranda Mines to recognize voluntary and revocable 'check-off'. With the consolidation of the United Steelworkers of America which 'check-off' brought at Noranda Mines in 1964, three points about this trade union should be stressed.

First, the incorporation of the United Steelworkers of America was important in that a militant working class tradition was arrested. Both the Workers Industrial Union and 'Mine-Mill' were recognized for their radical leadership and politics. The 1944 provincial election of David Côté, the first and only CCF candidate to do so in Quebec is an indication of the relative strength of a militant working class in the community. At the time, David Côté was the chief organizer for the "communist" International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers which had just then established a foothold in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. As we saw in Chapter V, the United Steelworkers of America is known for stressing "bread and butter" issues. Its relative

success in bargaining for instrumental demands contributed to reinforcing, at both the rank and file and leadership levels an organizational policy which stresses almost exclusively increments in wages and fringe benefits.

Secondly, the organizational constraints imposed on members and officers against supporting or voicing radical political philosophies limits the likelihood that this union would act as an aggressive and progressive force in community politics, be it at the federal or provincial levels. As a matter of fact, evidence in Chapter IV revealed the social control function this union has played for Noranda Mines. In other words, the probability that the local of the United Steelworkers of America in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec could and would have the ability and the will to mobilize the rank and file workers and pursue an aggressive and politically radical program would not be likely to happen. The policy and organizational constraints are formidable.

Finally, there was some evidence to indicate that the United Steelworkers of America tended to play a role which was congruent with United States foreign policy. Its identification with United States foreign policy included acting in a class collaborationist manner in helping to maintain metropolis-hinterland relationships in the Western Hemisphere. As such, it would appear that Jeffrey Harrod's indictment of this union in the Jamaican bauxite industry of contributing to the unequal structural relationship between a natural resource enclave with its metropolitan partner by maintaining the steady supply of raw materials can also be said to be a part of its role in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec.

In all, the history, leadership, organization and its commitment to the United States foreign policy reinforced each other to create a political and organizational environment inhibiting the emergence of a

socialist working class in this natural resource enclave. In other words, since socialism must be learned; it does not come spontaneously to the working class as syndicalists believe, the opportunities for that development must be present. Without socialist education there can be little hope for socialism to arise at the rank and file level. And, if the United Steelworkers of America are committed to other than socialist goals, what chance does socialism have at the local level? Working class interests will be channeled into alternate, less radical avenues. Therefore, the incorporation of the United Steelworkers of America in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec became the principle organizational factor in constraining any radical political mobilization of the community's working class. Moreover, it could be argued that this union had an interest in maintaining the status quo of uneven capitalist development as it has historically evolved in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. As a result, the political mobilization of the community's working class would result from a class alliance between the petite bourgeoisie, and the working class but dominated by the former.

We saw in Chapter III that the working class through the trade union had participated in CERNOQ, a local organization representing the dominated classes in their struggle against their collective subordination to metropolitan, corporate interests. Most of the documents it produced were earmarked for the Quebec government. Yet, the working class was itself subordinate to the petite bourgeoisie in this organization. We are suggesting now that the explanation for the subordination of the working class rests with the organizational proclivities of the United Steelworkers of America. Moreover, we are proposing that this remains an important structural condition for a class alliance between the working class and the petite bourgeoisie during the 1962 federal general election. The remaining factor would be the appeals to French Canadian nationalism and working class elements in the petit bourgeois

ideological sub-ensemble. A conjuncture of these structural and ideological factors would contribute to the political success of the Ralliement des Crditistes from 1962 onwards.

Recapitulating, the structural conditions were such that the early part of the 1960's can be said to be the historical moment when the French-Canadian petite bourgeoisie was able to 'seize the chance' to spearhead a protest movement aimed at 'saving' the community, the region and, of course, their own class position from a "crise de croissance". The "ideological subensemble" of the petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation must also contain "elements" sufficient to mobilize the working class in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Furthermore, the predominantly French-Canadian working class could be mobilized by appeals to French Canadian nationalism which would tend to obscure any social class differences with the petite bourgeoisie. Finally, the power relations between the metropolis and the hinterland created the conditions for the expression of protest in the hinterland. All together, the class dimension of the political ideology (that is, under-consumption and an anti-capitalist stance), Quebecois nationalism and the inherent antagonism in the hinterland towards the metropolis would combine to give the ideology of the Ralliement des Crditistes its political saliency for the working class and the petite bourgeoisie in this community.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to substantiating this analysis. Special attention will be paid to the historical development and the specific ideological content of the Social Credit movement in Quebec from its inception in 1936 until the election of Ral Caouette and twenty-five other candidates from the province of Quebec in the 1962 federal general election. This is done to show that neither the specific ideological content of the party's philosophy nor the personal charisma of Ral Caouette were

the necessary factors which could account for the sudden rise of the Ralliement des Crditistes in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec in 1962 and its continued presence there until 1978. The structural conditions outlined above which would create the necessary social base would have to be present in order for the petite bourgeoisie to take a leadership role in the political life of this community. This chapter will conclude with an examination of the voting behaviour in working class districts of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec during the 1962 Federal election to substantiate the hypothesis that the working class did indeed vote for the Ralliement des Crditistes.

The Political Ideology of Social Credit

1. Underconsumption Theories

The political ideology of Social Credit, as first articulated by Major C.H. Douglas has been properly defined as an "underconsumption theory".¹ Bleaney defines underconsumption as (1) "the idea that a state of depression is not just a phase of the industrial cycle or the result of a temporary conjunction of circumstances but is the state towards which the economy naturally tends in the absence of offsetting factors; and (2) the idea that this is a result of a persistent tendency towards insufficiency of demand for consumption goods" (1976: 11, emphasis in the original). Bleaney sees underconsumption theories as playing two inter-related functions. First, they represent a criticism of capitalism which implies that such a socio-economic system "cannot guarantee continuous full employment and rising living

¹ Michael Bleaney, Underconsumption Theories: A Historical and Critical Analysis, New York: International Publishers, 1976.

standards and is liable sooner or later to slip down into prolonged stagnation" (1976: 9). As such, underconsumption theories, he argues, have been the "grist to the mill" of anti-capitalist movements which have tended to be supported by the rank and file within trade unions. So that, working class support for Social Credit in Rouyn-Noranda Quebec should not be an unexpected phenomenon since the anti-capitalist tenets of underconsumption theories such as Social Credit can be seized upon by the working class as their own, given the proper circumstances.

Second, and of only minor significance for this study, is Bleaney's assertion that underconsumption theories have offered criticisms of the dominant schools of economic thought. Underconsumption theories, then, provide a general criticism of capitalism by concentrating on the persistence within the system of an insufficient demand for consumption goods. They also contain within their ideological discourse elements which correspond to some of the collective interests of the working class.

2. The Political Theory of Social Credit

The major components of Social Credit theory can be summarized as follows:

By far the strongest force in the world at present is the centralized power of finance. It is all the more powerful because it is not generally recognized... It seems probably that there exists a small minority of men at the head of the international financial hierarchy to whom profit... is a secondary consideration, who are actuated chiefly by the will to power. They aim quite definitely at a financial hegemony of the world, and their ideal is the servile state. By their monopoly of credit they determine the size of national incomes, they control directly or indirectly all important organs of public information and... the policy of political governments.... Such superficially opposite political movements as Fascism and Bolshevism obtain support from international finance because they are both examples of centralized control. (quoted in M. Bleaney, op. cit., p. 205)

Underconsumption enters into the picture when it is claimed that the total national income cannot purchase the total national product. This proposition is developed by Major Douglas in his now famous A + B Theorem, the outline of which will be presented below. Let A represent all personal incomes which includes wages, salaries and dividends paid to shareholders. Then, B becomes payments made to firms for raw materials, machinery and other charges. Therefore, the price of goods cannot be less than A + B. But, since A is less than A + B, the incomes of all the employees and shareholders cannot buy all the goods which a nation can produce. Hence, it becomes necessary to create a "social credit dividend" and distribute it to consumers in order to cover B or as subsidies to producers in order to fix prices at A.

Finally, the pro-capitalist or conservative elements of Social Credit political philosophy argue that "the institutions of private property and of private management of industry and agriculture are essential to the preservation of liberty and democracy" (Pinard, 1971: 12). To summarize the basic tenets of Social Credit theory, it is a political philosophy which maintains that "modern technology had made possible an era of great plenty and leisure both of which could and should be distributed throughout the community as unearned income, and that this could be done by some comparatively simple monetary devices which would not interfere with the structure of ownership and private enterprise" (Macpherson, 1953: 94).

The above represents the core around which Social Credit political ideology rests. But, in Quebec, Social Credit theory became inundated, at a very early stage in its history with other, distinctly French-Canadian

characteristics. Michael Stein succinctly details the essence of the philosophy of Social Credit in Quebec when he points out that

Creditistes believe that traditional values such as obedience, duty and morality, which they claim pervaded the Quebec social system in earlier times, will be re-established once the corrupting influence of monopoly capitalism and the avaricious inclinations of bankers are curbed through the system of social credit. They foresee the regeneration and ultimate prosperity of the farmer, the small-town merchant, and the artisan once they have sufficient credit to rebuild their shattered finances. They believe that the church and religious institutions will be resuscitated and the confessional school system saved. They call for insulation of the small town communications system from the corroding effects of the media in the large-urban environment. (1973: 14).

Stein goes on to note the specific emphasis on French-Canadian nationalism and provincial autonomy that characterized Social Credit political philosophy in Quebec. These elements would include the "attitudes and doctrines (of) anti-conscription, antagonism to English-Canadian monopolies and economic domination, cultural, linguistic and educational autonomy for Quebec, recognition of the rights of French Canadian minorities in other provinces and permeation of social and economic life with Catholic, particularly papal framed ultramontane principles" (1973: 52).

Combining the "elements" of the political ideology of Social Credit in Quebec means the incorporation of French-Canadian nationalism with the underconsumption theory of Major Douglas. The latter corresponds to what Nicos Poulantzas has argued as a "petit bourgeois ideological subensemble".

Social Credit is a political ideology that "is against the rich,...it makes sharp demands against the monopolies, since it is gradually itself being ruined and eliminated by monopoly capitalism...it aspires to share in the "distribution" of political power...and exhibits characteristic resistance toward the radical transformation of this power...(in short)... what this petty bourgeoisie often seeks is change without the system changing" (1978: 295).

In addition to reflecting the class interests of the petite bourgeoisie, the underconsumption theory of Social Credit, as earlier noted, includes "elements" corresponding to some of the collective interests of the working class.

The Catholic and nationalist attitudes contained within the political ideology of Social Credit in Quebec were specific, historically-determined "elements" of the total "ideological subensemble". Such typically French-Canadian nationalist sentiments as anti-conscription, the sentiment against Anglo-Canadian economic domination and the demand for "cultural, linguistic and educational autonomy" for Quebec are all significant emotional and political experiences and aspirations for the French-Canadian collectively in Quebec. If we combine this commonly shared and historically determined French-Canadian nationalism with the political protest, anti-monopoly capitalist notions of Social Credit theory, the result is a unique combination, to be sure, and one which would have a potential appeal to the French-Canadian population in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, the majority of whom are members of either the petite bourgeoisie in the sphere of circulation or the organized working class.

Social Credit in Quebec: A Brief History

1. La Ligue du Credit Social de la Province du Quebec, 1936-39

The Social Credit movement in Quebec began as a political pressure group during the latter part of the Depression. The Depression gave rise to political parties and groups which challenged the dominant social and economic ideas of Quebec society. The Action Liberale Nationale in 1935-36, the Bloc Populaire in 1942-45 and La Ligue du Credit Social in 1936-39 were the three major political challengers of the status quo. (Stein, 1973).

La Ligue du Credit Social de la province du Quebec was founded in May, 1936 by three men: Louis Even, a journalist; Armand Turpin, an

Ottawa municipal employee; and Louis Dugal, a young Montreal lawyer. It was an ideologically right-wing political protest movement. In October of the same year, the principal organ of propaganda for the movement, the Cahiers de Crdit Social was launched with the aid of Pre Georges-Hnri Lvesque, the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Laval University.

Reverend Lvesque had already established a reputation for himself as a Church critic of the new social and political movements that had sprung to life during the Depression. He had condemned the CCF as a party which did not "merit the support of Catholics" because of its promotion of the class war, its extensive programme of socialization, and "its materialistic conception of the social order" (Quinn, 1963: 56). But, in Social Credit, Lvesque saw much that was consistent with the teachings and beliefs of Roman Catholicism. Stein summarized what Pre Lvesque felt to be the similarities between the two doctrines as "their spiritualism, their pacific character, their support of private property, individual liberty and a restricted role for the state" (1973: 41 footnote).

The alliance between Social Credit and Catholicism at a very early stage in the movement's history would not only be a source of conflict over the movement's future ideological and organizational direction, but, symbolized the coalescing of a right-wing political movement (Social Credit) and the ideological conservatism of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec.

The early endorsement of the Social Credit movement by the Roman Catholic church gave to it an almost immediate legitimacy in the province. By 1938, subscribers to the Cahiers du Credit Social rose to 2,500 and in June of that same year, the Ligue du Credit Social hosted its first provincial convention in Saint Hyacinthe.

2. Union des Electeurs, 1939-58

An important new member entered the Ligue at this time. Gilberte

Côté brought with her money and a strong personality with definite ideas about what should be the nature of Social Credit in Quebec. This combination led to the bifurcation of the movement into a political arm under the direction of Louis Dugal and Armand Turpin and a nucleus which included Louis Even and Gilberte Côté around the newly formed newspaper Vers Demain, a bi-monthly tabloid of no more than ten pages. In addition, the name of the movement was changed to the Union des Electeurs in 1939 and was soon under the control of Gilberte Côté. She emphasized the need to direct the organization as an organ of mass education rather than a political party. She also influenced many within the Union des Electeurs to cultivate the similarities between Roman Catholic teachings and the philosophy of Social Credit. With time the former would supercede the latter in importance and would be a cause for a future split within the Union des Electeurs.

The movement's early legitimacy and enthusiasm led to the running during the spring 1940 federal election of Louis Even and Armand Turpin in the Lac Saint Jean and Hull ridings respectively. The former lost his deposit while Armand Turpin made a respectable showing with 7,083 votes, only 4,000 fewer than the winning candidate. The Union was not discouraged and in the 1944 provincial election it entered eleven candidates. The following year, in the federal election, the Union fielded 43 and in the 1948 provincial election a full slate of 92 candidates. In each of these contests, the Union failed to elect a single representative. It was only in the 1946 by-election that Réal Caouette was elected in the county of Pontiac.

The consequence of these discouraging results led to the conviction among the leaders of the Union, especially Gilberte Côté, that the Union should be concentrating on extra-preliminary measures such as the propaganda work of Vers Demain and the numerous study groups scattered across the province.

From 1949 until the formation of the Ralliement des Crditistes in 1958, the Union did not contest any of the provincial or federal elections.

2. The Ralliement des Crditistes, 1958-65

Begun by eleven dissidents from within the Union des Electeurs, the Ralliement des Crditistes was formally established on April 11, 1958 under the leadership of Ral Caouette. The major chism within the Union which led to the creation of the Ralliement des Crditistes centered on the former's religious orientation combined with its refusal to enter electoral politics. Ral Caouette and the others believed the Quebec brand of Social Credit should be offered to the general population during periodic elections. In the fall of 1959, the Ralliement des Crditistes launched their own journal entitled Rgards.

The Ralliement was committed to de-emphasizing the Catholic element within the movement's ideology while promoting the reforms contained in Major Douglas' Social Credit philosophy by contesting federal elections. It was believed that federal elections would be the most appropriate tactic possible since the British North America Act had placed jurisdiction over banks and the transportation companies under federal law. Monetary reform, in the context of Social Credit political philosophy, which, of course, included such items as a guaranteed annual income, family allowance and the famous "Social Credit dividend", could only be effectively implemented and administered across the country by the federal level of government.

Unlike the Union des Electeurs, its predecessor, but very much like William Aberhart's Social Credit in Alberta which had utilized the media (that is, radio) in his propaganda campaign, the Ralliement des Crditistes almost immediately decided to publicize their political philosophy which combined Social Credit with certain "elements" of French-Canadian

nationalism via the television. Réal Caouette financed what was to become twenty-six bi-monthly broadcasts of fifteen minutes over the Rouyn-Noranda television station by borrowing approximately \$20,000 from the Caisse Populaire of Rouyn. These efforts proved to be eminently successful since by the fall of 1959 similar broadcasts were begun in the Jonquière, Sherebrooke and Quebec city regions.

The chequered history of the Ralliement des Créditistes from its founding until its first contested federal election of June, 1962 need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the party's success at the polls in Quebec came as a shock to the established centers of power. One of the more important personalities in the Ralliement des Créditistes, its acknowledged leader in Quebec and the representative of the federal riding of Villeneuve from 1962 until his death in 1976, Réal Caouette deserves our attention.

Réal Caouette

1. His Political Career, 1944-76

One of the most important leaders of the party was Réal Caouette. Since he was the representative for the federal riding of Villeneuve in which Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec constitutes the major urban centre, a brief historical sketch of Réal Caouette's career in electoral politics and his political philosophy will be examined below.

Réal Caouette made numerous attempts to be elected in this region from 1944 on. He first ran in the provincial election of 1944 as a candidate for the Union des Electeurs. He failed to get elected. A year later, in the May 1945 federal election, Réal Caouette tried once more to get elected for the Union des Electeurs. A similar fate awaited him. Undaunted, he ran as

a federal candidate for the Union des Electeurs in 1949 in the riding of Villeneuve, only just then reconstituted from the older Pontiac boundaries. He made a strong showing registering 43.3 percent of the popular vote but ended up in second place. The decision by Gilberte Côté and Louis Even, the leaders of the Union des Electeurs to abandon politics for the movement's religious and educational goals delayed Réal Caouette's involvement in electoral politics until the provincial election of 1956 when he agreed to enter the race as a Liberal candidate in the Pontiac riding. Once more he had to be content with a modest and insufficient effort. Yet, these experiences did not detract him from continuing to be involved in electoral politics, for, in the following federal election (1957), he ran as an independent candidate in Villeneuve. He received just over 31 percent of the popular vote but had to be content with second place. He contested the next federal election in the same constituency (1958), but lost out to the Liberal candidate, A. Dumas. He registered third with 28.7 percent of the popular vote, behind the Progressive Conservative candidate, A. Lemieux, who accounted for 34 percent of the total number of votes cast.

Until his 'surprising' success in the 1962 federal election, where he received 67.2 percent or 21,022 out of a possible 31,275 votes cast, he contested six provincial and federal elections from 1944 up until his victory in the 1962 federal election and he was unsuccessful in every single case. With the one exception in the September, 1946 by-election in Pontiac, on which more will be said below, when Réal Caouette was elected as the federal member, his electoral support in this region of Quebec was never sufficient. As Table XIII indicates the history of electoral politics for the

TABLE XIII

Federal Elections

Pontiac, Quebec pre-1947
Villeneuve, Quebec 1947-1964
Temiscamingue, Quebec 1965-

<u>Members of the House of Commons</u>	<u>Political Affiliations</u>	<u>General Election</u>
W.R. McDonald	Liberal	1945
R. Caouette	Union des Electeurs	1946 (Sept. 16) by-election
A. Dumas	Liberal	1949
A. Dumas	Liberal	1953
A. Dumas	Liberal	1957
A. Dumas	Liberal	1958
R. Caouette	R des C*	1962
R. Caouette	R des C	1963
R. Caouette	R des C	1965
R. Caouette	R des C	1968
R. Caouette	R des C	1972
R. Caouette	R des C	1974

* R des C - Ralliement des Creditistes

Source: Canadian Parliamentary Guide, the appropriate years

region was characterized by the dominance of the Liberal Party, until the success of Réal Caouette in the 1962 federal election and his continued success in this riding throughout his career as a politician.

2. His Political Philosophy

Réal Caouette's political philosophy begins with Major Douglas' doctrines on Social Credit. He considered himself to "be a one hundred percent orthodox Douglasite" (Stein, 1973: 199). He believed capitalism to be the most efficient economic system and the one which best preserved the dignity of the individual.

It was Social Credit that made me believe that free enterprise is not responsible for what took place; the system was responsible. Free enterprise did everything it could to supply goods and services, and that is the main object of the economic system to supply goods and services. But to get those goods and services to the consumers, that is an altogether different question (Stein, 1973: 216).

To Caouette, it was the banking and the monetary system which was at fault. The solution lay in increasing the purchasing power to consumers. But increased purchasing power was not to be done by going into debt but, on the contrary, the purchasing power of consumers should be "increased by debt free payments in the form of dividends, family allowances and pensions which would not be financed by taxation but would be tied to the overall capacity for production in the society" (Stein, 1973: 217).

In addition to his indebtedness to the underconsumption theory of Social Credit, there is combined the appeal of French-Canadian nationalism. In his own words, he acknowledged that "I am a French-Canadian nationalist, I definitely am one, but not to the detriment of others" (Stein, 1973: 204). Yet, his nationalism was tempered by his conviction that it could only be

through the federal state that effective and meaningful Social Credit reform could be implemented. Therefore, he was not a Quebec separatist. But, that did not mean he accepted the political status quo.

A paper written in 1867 can no longer do the job for us in 1967. That doesn't mean that we must separate. In 1867 our fathers separated certain things, for example education, justice. There are, perhaps, other aspects to readjust, and I say that whatever happens should apply not only to Quebec but to the people of other provinces as well.... I have always had the conviction, which I may change, since only fools do not change, that there is a possible way of convincing Ottawa that the provinces should have more power, more liberty, more freedom and more control over their economy. (Stein, 1973: 205).

He may have attempted to downplay his nationalism, but, to many according to Michael Stein, "the nationalism and nationality of Caouette won many supporters (in Quebec) to his side who might otherwise have hesitated to follow him" (Stein, 1973: 203).

To summarize, Réal Caouette's political philosophy combined "elements" of French-Canadian nationalism with the underconsumption theory of Social Credit. The former appealed to the collective aspirations of an economically and culturally subordinate ethnic group. The latter concentrated on preserving capitalism while at the same time increasing the purchasing power of consumers through some form of subsidy awarded to citizens by the state.

The importance of Réal Caouette's Social Credit philosophy was its congruence with a petite bourgeoisie who materially benefit from the unequal exchange of value. Put differently, increased purchasing power for consumers would mean more money to buy goods from a petite bourgeoisie of retailers.

Since one of the concerns of this study is to explain the form and content of community politics under dependent capitalism in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, this short history of the Social Credit movement in Quebec was meant to highlight two important points. First, the existence of Social Credit in Quebec generally and the Rouyn-Noranda region specifically prior to the June 1962 federal election meant that the population of Rouyn-Noranda was familiar with the organization and the political philosophy of Social Credit.

At the ideological level, the philosophy of Social Credit in Quebec had evolved from an early combination of Roman Catholicism and Douglasite Social Credit theory during the 1930's, 40's and most of the 50's to a more secular version encompassing Social Credit doctrines with a more broadly defined French-Canadian nationalism as evidenced by Réal Caouette and the Ralliement des Créditistes.

At the organizational level, the Ralliement des Créditistes had evolved from the earlier Ligue du Credit Social and the Union des Electeurs. These two latter organizations had helped lay the necessary groundwork for the arrival of the Ralliement des Créditistes in the June 1962 federal general election by familiarizing many Quebecois with Social Credit through its propaganda work executed during the earlier period by the study groups and the bi-monthly tabloid Vers Demain. In addition, the Ralliement des Créditistes, unlike its predecessors, had utilized television for propaganda purposes. All these developments were important precipitating factors for the success of Social Credit, not only in Rouyn-Noranda but more generally in Quebec during the 1962 federal general election.

Secondly, this familiarity was insufficient to elect Réal Caouette as a Social Credit candidate from the 1944 provincial to the 1958 federal election. Neither personal charisma nor familiarity with Social Credit was enough. He required a large enough social base made up of the French Canadian petite bourgeoisie and working class. Yet, even at a very early stage, the program and philosophy of Social Credit in Quebec must have appealed to more than only the French-Canadians in Rouyn-Noranda otherwise Réal Caouette would not have been elected in the 1946 by-election. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, Réal Caouette's anti-union stance during the long and bitter 1946-47 strike probably helped to alienate many voters. In addition, the ethnic heterogeneity of the population probably could not identify with the quasi-religious nationalism of the party and as a result dampened the ideological appeal of Social Credit and the personal dynamism of Réal Caouette in the next federal election.

The "success" of Réal Caouette in the riding of Villeneuve during the 1962 federal general election and, more importantly, the persistence of Social Credit in this riding throughout the 1960's and 1970's must be sought in the class relations examined earlier which permitted Social Credit to have a broadly based appeal within the petite bourgeoisie and working class of the community.

Class Support for the Ralliement des Creditistes

An investigation of Chart VI reveals that an abrupt shift in voting trends at the federal level in Rouyn-Noranda away from the Liberal Party can be discerned from the early 1960's on. Liberal Party support peaked in the 1953 election and from that point until the 1962 federal election was on a

CHART VI
Trends in Voting Behaviour in Rouyn-Noranda during Federal Elections
1945-1974

From: Report of General Elections for the appropriate years from 1945 until 1974

- KEY
- CCF - Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
 - L - Liberal Party
 - NDP - New Democratic Party
 - PC - Progressive Conservative Party
 - SC - Social Credit Party
 - UE - Union des Electeurs

steady decline. From 1962 until the 1974 federal election, Liberal Party support in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec has remained stable at approximately 25% of the total votes cast whereas the Social Credit has a relatively constant 65%. This tendency lends support to the claim that the conditions were ripening for the creation of a political vacuum that would be filled by the local petite bourgeoisie.

From the early 1950's until the 1962 federal election community support for the incumbent was weakening. This period corresponds to the development of structural conditions examined earlier which would come together at approximately the same historical moment and create a political vacuum in the community. The growth of Noranda Mines, the known depletion of the ore reserves and the installation of the United Steelworkers of America were all structural factors that were identified above.

Moreover, it will be recalled that 1953 was the year of the bitter strike between the United Steelworkers of America and Noranda Mines in which the former had laid some important groundwork in establishing trust with the community's petite bourgeoisie. Three years later James Murdoch retired as Chairman of the Board and the way was cleared for Alf Powis to take over the reigns of power. The following year witnessed the signing of a handsome collective agreement between Noranda Mines and the United Steelworkers of America which resulted in relative stability in labour-management relations in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. All these events were working together and building up to their coalescing at approximately the same moment in time.

As these developments were ensuing towards their culmination, the groundwork for community support of Social Credit had already been established. The birth of Social Credit ideas in Rouyn-Noranda date back to the Second World War. The unique combination of an under consumption theory

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with French Canadian nationalism and the protest of a "quasi-colonial society" against its structural subordination within the larger political economy contributed to creating the ideological sub-ensemble of the petite bourgeoisie. Most of these elements would have an appeal to the community's working class but French Canadian nationalism would be capable of bridging any potential class differences that the working class might express vis à vis the petite bourgeoisie.

The petite bourgeoisie in the community coalesced around the Villeneuve Constituency Association which had an active membership of 873 in 1965 (Stein: 1967: 474). At the head of this organization was Arthur St. Jean who owned a cleaning business in Rouyn-Noranda. He was responsible for building "a well-oiled machine which reached into every sector and poll of the constituency" (Stein: 1967: 474). St. Jean was an enthusiastic Social Crediter who sacrificed a great deal for the Ralliement des Crditistes. In an interview with St. Jean Michael Stein captures this devotion when he says

"I worked hard (at my cleaning business), and yet less hard than (I did) in taking my car, paying for the gasoline, and driving down to the other end of the constituency, which took me 150 or 160 miles, to set up an organization meeting, orient the people and return home, at one or two a.m. I paid for the gas myself. In addition there was the money I wasn't making [in my shop]: I was obliged to engage someone to make it in my place. I would estimate that in 1962 that must have cost me \$1600 to \$1800" (Stein: 1967: 477).

Ral Caouette, a used car dealer and Arthur St. Jean, a cleaner together symbolize the petit bourgeois character of the party's personnel in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec.

In interviews with the chairman for the combined Chambers of Commerce for Rouyn and Noranda (Le Conseil Industriel), it was learned that local businessmen voted for Ral Caouette, not only because of his own personal style but also due to the fact that he was a leader of a political protest party they could identify with.

Real Caouette was for the people of the north...he looked after the people, he was living with them and he was helping them...even the businessman was voting for Réal Caouette because the government was doing so little and they were doing things that was displeasing the businessman, so a way of showing it to the government was to vote for Real Caouette.² (Emphasis mine)

In interviews with the son of Réal Caouette, Gilles Caouette, who won his father's seat in a 1976 by-election due to the sudden death of his father the suggestion of political protest once again emerges.. In commenting on a question which suggested that the Social Credit vote in Rouyn-Noranda was little more than a protest vote by workers and businessmen, Gilles Caouette commented:

There's a part of truth in that... It has been proven through the years that it is far more than a negative vote but obviously it's certainly a part of a protest vote in our election. What one has to consider is that these peripheric areas have been created by people of the place, not the government. They were brought there during the crisis (i.e. the Depression). They were moved into these remote areas by the government, the provincial government at that time. They never had any support from these governments after that, they just transplant people down there and say, well now we got rid of them, we don't have them on our shoulder. So these people, they fought their way through life by themselves. They still got that independent attitude. So when you come to an election, they know that they built the country, it was not the governments. They pay taxes to the government and when they request help from the government, they never got it and they are always the last ones to receive it, so obviously there is a part of frustration against the government which give votes to us, there is no doubt about it.³ (emphasis mine)

² Interview, June 16, 1978

³ Interview, December 12, 1978

Both informants made it clear that support for Social Credit rested, in part, on a regional and class-based protest vote. An unresponsive and unsympathetic state was being blamed. It was felt that this "peripheric" region had been neglected by the government. A political presence was needed so that "the people" in this hinterland could be heard and "their" interests afforded an opportunity to be acted upon.

The evidence from interviews with two key informants and the analysis provided above of the political philosophy of both Réal Caouette and the Social Credit Party in Quebec confirms our claim made in the explanatory framework derived in Chapters I and II that Social Credit political philosophy would find a home among the local petite bourgeoisie.⁴ But what of the working class?

The explanatory framework developed at the beginning of this study suggested that with (1) the disengagement of Noranda Mines from the community, (2) the containment of radical leaders and politics within the United Steelworkers of America, occurring as they both did at approximately the same historical moment, (3) the combination of the presence of French-Canadian nationalism within the predominantly French-speaking working class and (4) of "working class ideology in the petty-bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble", would result in the political mobilization of the Rouyn-Noranda working class in support of Réal Caouette and the Ralliement des Créditistes. It could only be with the combined support from the French-Canadian petite bourgeoisie and the working class that the electoral success of Réal Caouette

⁴ These results are also confirmed by the findings of Maurice Pindard, C.B. Macpherson, Michael Stein and Vincent Lemieux. Since our definition of the petite bourgeoisie was restricted to small scale ownership, we have eliminated the "notables" from our analysis. An investigation of this class fraction, while intriguing falls outside the scope of the present study.

could ever have occurred when it did and be maintained over such a long period of time. Table IV provides evidence for the degree to which the working class was mobilized and the direction to which their electoral support was given. Table IV was derived in the following manner.

The map of Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec contains the boundaries of the class and residential divisions for each community. A general description of each district has also been provided. These divisions constitute the basis for separating out the working class polling stations from the total number available.

The description of each district was obtained by comparing the income levels per enumeration area with first-hand information from an informant who was a qualified historian of the region and had lived all his life in this community. The data he provided corresponded to that contained in the enumeration area level statistics, if we assume that working class districts would exhibit lower average earnings than middle class districts. Since his information was more detailed, I used his data to determine the boundaries for class and residential segregation in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. Middle and upper-middle class districts were automatically excluded from consideration. Districts which exhibited mixed social class characteristics were also eliminated from the sample of working class districts because these districts would tend to contaminate any generalizations which could be made about the voting pattern for the community's working class. In other words, a two-class district would not reveal the dominant trends of a single social class. Therefore, referring back to Figure VI, Districts 1, 3, 6, 7, 11a and 12a make up the working class districts we will examine.

Once the parameters of the working class districts had been determined, the next step was to go to the electoral map and separate the polling stations that best corresponded to the previously determined boundaries.

TABLE XIV

Voter Turnout and the Percentage of Voters in Working
Class Districts of Rouyn-Noranda who Voted for Real
Caouette in the 1962 Federal General Election

Districts:	Voter Turnout:	Percentage Vote for Real Caouette:
Polling station	Total Vote Per Polling Station Electors on List	Vote for Real Caouette Per Polling Station Total Vote Per Polling Station
Rouyn		
1	87.0	76.3
2	78.0	70.9
3	90.0	75.0
4	92.5	66.2
5	72.6	59.2
6	82.0	72.0
7	88.7	79.9
8	82.1	61.1
9	88.0	64.5
10	82.7	52.7
11	82.8	69.8
Noranda		
12	81.3	46.7
13	81.8	53.4
14	82.4	53.0
15	83.3	49.5
16	84.2	55.8
17	88.7	62.7
18	79.8	40.4
19	89.2	41.5
20	81.2	33.6

Compiled from: The Rouyn and Noranda Polling Districts for the 1962
Federal Election; District Numbers 1-69

Figure VI

CLASS AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN ROUYN-NORANDA, QUEBEC

NORANDA

<u>District</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	A working class district created by Noranda Mines to house immigrant miners. It is still today a working class district which also houses some unemployed, retired, and many youths because the lodgings are cheap.
2	An upper middle class district. The section marked with an asterisk(*) comprises those who are managers for Noranda Mines while the remaining part (1) houses French Canadian notables such as doctors and lawyers.
3	Resembles district number 1 but is of more recent origin and a little more diversified in its social composition. Before 1960, the district was made up of mostly immigrants and French Canadian miners. Today, the district also includes the unemployed, youths and some students.
4	Mixed district of middle and working class. Districts 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute old Noranda (1926).
5	A mixed district but in the section marked with an asterisk(*) primarily working class, especially before 1960, while, in the remaining portion marked by a dot(.) there are included many middle class types.
6	Industrial district, mostly machine shops with only a small number of workers.
7	A working class district established after World War II. A small presence of middle class has developed and has implanted itself here today. Districts 5, 6 and 7 constitute Noranda townsite from 1940-60 period.
8	A recently established district of middle class professionals and commercial bourgeois.
9	Noranda-Nord - a squatters district.

ROUYN

District

Description

- 10 Commercial bourgeois district from the beginning of Rouyn. The center of night life in Rouyn-Noranda. Population fluctuates with the level of employment opportunities.
- 11 "Quarter populaire". A mixed district which has been divided into a working class and a petit commercial bourgeois section.
- 12 Same as district 11 in social composition. It too has been divided into a working class and a petit commercial bourgeois section.
- Districts 10, 11 and 12 form Old Rouyn. The working class districts are not as well defined as they are in Noranda because in Noranda development was controlled by the company.
- 13 Rouyn-Sud. This district is composed of squatters who settled here prior to 1960. Since 1960, this has become a mixed district including both workers and petit bourgeois. No notables live here.
- 14 New suburban development.

When this was done a total of twenty polling stations were counted, eleven for Rouyn and nine for Noranda. These are numbered accordingly on Table XIV so that the twenty polling stations (1-20) constitute the working class districts isolated from Figure VI. The extent to which the working class was mobilized in Rouyn-Noranda was monitored by the "voter turnout" in each district. This percentage was arrived at by dividing the total votes cast by the total number of electors on the list. In each case, the vast majority participated in the election. The median for all twenty districts was 82.6 percent while the average was 83.9 percent. The second column gives the percentage of votes cast at each working class polling station for Real Caouette. This number was arrived at by dividing the votes cast for Real Caouette by the total number of actual votes cast in each polling station. These figures also lend support to the explanatory framework in that the majority of workers in Rouyn and the plurality of workers in Noranda supported Real Caouette's candidacy.⁵

⁵ At least one or two may be in order here concerning the existing literature on class-based voting behavior in Canada. The issue of the lack of class voting in North America generally has been inspired by the persistence of working class support for social democratic and communist parties in Western Europe. This "exception" has indeed created a voluminous literature. Social scientists have not only addressed themselves to an empirical examination of this pattern but have also sought to explain the anomaly between the apparent lack of class voting in Canada and the existence of a more elaborate social welfare apparatus and state interventionist policies in the Canadian economy than in the United States.

This literature can be divided into three broad categories: the aristocratic tradition in Canadian history, the existence of third parties and the "debate" with Robert Alford. The first lies outside of the issue of the lack of class voting. It explains the more extensive social welfare programs in Canada to an ethos of "aristocratic responsibility" held by the dominant capitalist class and not to social democratic pressures. The minimal support given by the working class to the political process becomes a non-issue from this perspective (see Grant: 1965).

The more serious scholarly work in this area can be divided into those who hold the existence of third parties, especially the New Democratic Party, as evidence for class-based voting behavior in Canada (Porter: 1965; Forcese: 1975; Horwitz: 1968). On the other hand, the elaborate empirical evidence

The lower percentage vote for Réal Caouette in Noranda can probably be accounted for by the degree of ethnic variation of working class districts in Noranda. Tables IX and XVI gives an ethnic breakdown of working class districts in both communities for the 1961 census year. The working class districts lettered A to J were arrived at by collapsing the polling districts into the appropriate enumeration areas. These figures were arrived at by dividing classification by ethnic origin with the total basic population figures for each of the working class districts that corresponded to the enumeration areas for the 1961 census. As examined above in Chapter II, the combination of French-Canadian nationalism and an economic theory of underconsumption were necessary factors in the mobilization of the communities working class. The lower percentage of worker support for Réal Caouette in Noranda is probably related to the lower percentage of French-Canadians to other ethnic groups

5 cont'd
marshalled by Robert Alford and his colleagues points in the opposite direction. The contention here is that Canada exhibits a lower level of class-based voting behavior than the United States (Alford: 1963).

Criticisms of both perspectives have centered on the theoretical adequacy of Alford's manual/non-manual distinction for social class and the methodological problems attendant to selecting the appropriate quantitative measures for the aggregate data derived from elections in both countries. None, though, have disputed the low-level of class-based voting in Canada. (Myles and Forcese: 1979).

What this study has done is to show, at the local level, the manner by which the working class was mobilized. We agree with Englemann and Schwartz that the basic cleavage in society is social class. Their contention that class voting has not been mobilized in Canada maybe correct but we have suggested that at least at the local level and given the appropriate structural conditions the working class can be mobilized and will block vote for a candidate whom they perceive can represent their interests at the political level. This study, then, contributes albeit in a minor way, to our understanding of class-based electoral politics in Canada.

TABLE XV

<u>Rouyn</u>	<u>Ethnic Composition of Working Class Districts (1961)</u>		
<u>Districts</u>	<u>French-Canadian</u>	<u>British Isles</u>	<u>Other</u>
A	95.3	2.8	1.9
B	91.6	3.7	4.7
C	78.1	5.2	16.7
D	83.3	5.6	11.1
E	93.4	1.6	5.0
F	78.7	5.6	15.7

TABLE XVI

<u>Noranda</u>	<u>Ethnic Composition of Working Class Districts (1961)</u>		
<u>Districts</u>	<u>French-Canadian</u>	<u>British Isles</u>	<u>Other</u>
G	53.1	24.1	22.8
H	55.7	17.5	26.8
I	55.7	15.4	28.9
J	45.3	21.4	33.3

Compiled from: Enumeration level data for the 1961 Census Tracts;
4-54-076 - 103; 4-54-107 - 109; 4-54-113

in this particular community. French-Canadian nationalism as expressed by Réal Caouette would have very little appeal to non-French-speaking Quebecois. As a matter of some importance, the historical pattern of attitudes towards French-Canadian nationalism by other ethnic groups in Quebec has been nonsympathetic and, at times, has been seen as a threat to their own material and cultural well-being (Laczko, 1978: 280-96). Therefore, the non-French-speaking ethnic groups within the Noranda working class could very likely feel threatened by French-Canadian nationalism and, as a result, vote for any one of the other three candidates.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to establish the ideological content of Social Credit in Quebec and the social basis for its support in Rouyn-Noranda. The explanatory framework developed in Chapters I and II argued that both the social class support and the ideological content of the Social Credit party could be explained by an approach that incorporated a class relations analysis within a metropolis-hinterland or dependent capitalist framework.

This chapter was preceded by four others which empirically established the temporal sequence of class relations within a dependent capitalist context that created the conditions for the eventual political ascendancy of the local petite bourgeoisie. Having summarized those factors which created the necessary structural conditions for the political ascendancy of the petite bourgeoisie at the beginning of this chapter, the remainder sought to substantiate the claims made that this particular social class could mobilize the communities working class through its underconsumptionist, anti-monopoly capitalist and French-Canadian nationalist appeals. At the ideological level and in the absence of any significant political alternatives, the combination of these "elements" would be sufficient to capture the majority support of the communities working class.

Upon revealing that these "elements" did indeed comprise the political ideology of Social Credit in Rouyn-Noranda both before and at the time of the 1962 federal election, evidence was provided to show that the community's working class did put their electoral support behind Réal Caouette. In other words, the structural conditions leading up to the 1962 federal election analysed in the previous chapters and the particular character of petite bourgeois political ideology in Rouyn-Noranda, resulted in the mobilization of the working class in support of Réal Caouette and the Ralliement des Créditistes.

The persistence of Social Credit in this riding is further testimony to the saliency of the party's political philosophy for the communities working class and the petite bourgeoisie and the personal style of Réal Caouette. Yet, even Réal Caouette needed a social base upon which to build his political reputation. What is more, even after his untimely death in 1976, his son Gilles Caouette was elected as the Social Credit candidate for the riding of Villeneuve. It could not have been Réal Caouette's personal charisma alone but the social basis of support for the party that must account for determining, in the last instance, the persistence of Social Credit in Rouyn-Noranda.

CONCLUSION

In building the explanatory framework for this study, we started with establishing the criteria for dependent capitalism. C.B. Macpherson's study of Social Credit in Alberta proved to be invaluable in this regard. The factors which were used from his analytical framework became the foundation for our own efforts.

We began by defining dependent capitalism by the creation of a natural resource enclave linked to a metropolitan centre. Raw or semi-processed materials were exported while manufactured products were imported into the enclave. The export of capital and the technical preconditions for the exploitation of the natural resource restricted the development of the internal market and limited petit bourgeois entrepreneurship to the sphere of circulation. Therefore, the structural basis for determining the internal class relations were laid.

In other words, what we were arguing throughout this investigation was that both the external structures of domination and the internal dynamics for social change conditioned the nature of dependent capitalism in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec. The explanatory framework which we developed sought to incorporate these factors into its overall discourse. We assumed the relevance of history in our sociological analysis. And, when it came to studying dependency we started "from the idea that history is movement and that structures are the result of impositions, even though these impositions may become crystallized, they contain tensions among classes and groups which always makes them, at least potentially, dynamic"

(Cardoso, 1977: 16). What Cardoso had in mind when he spoke about "tensions among classes and groups" and "dynamic" was that proper inquiry into dependent capitalist development not only addressed itself to the imposition of external structures of domination such as the private appropriation of the means of production and the subordination of one economy to another, but, also inquired into the conditions which challenge this order of affairs. In other words, it is not only the continuity in the structural relationships of dependent capitalism which was of utmost concern, but also how, when and by whom challenges to the existing state of affairs would emerge.

In unravelling the historical narrative, many of the threads which intertwined to tell the story were unique. They would not nor could they ever be repeated again. Yet behind the particular there stood the more general, without which explanation would be impossible. And the substance of the theoretical concerns which this study addressed centered on the exploration of social class relations within a dependent capitalist formation.

Class relations in a natural resource enclave began with the institutional expression, that is, the corporation and the trade union, of the two major social classes, the capitalist class and the working class. The detailed historical analysis into the nature of these organizations and their respective environments revealed the contextual circumstances within which the evolution of the community took place.

Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter III in the analysis of "la crise de croissance", the subordination of local interests to the general

goals of the corporation created the conditions for opposition in the enclave towards the continuation of these uneven relationships between metropolis and the hinterland. This opposition was over and above the conflict between the capitalist and the worker since it was directed towards the promotion of economic development in the natural resource enclave. It was an opposition to the felt "neglect" in the natural resource enclave of their interests by the established political and economic institutions located in the metropolis:

Let us now review the findings of our analysis. Since the nature of the corporation was so important in the creation of the natural resource enclave, we examined the history of its organizational structure.

The findings in Chapters III, IV and VI upheld the twin dominant tendencies of capitalist firms: growth and uneven development. Moreover, the history of Noranda Mines confirmed the claim that so long as the natural resource, in this case the Hofne Mine, was important for the continued growth and profitability of the enterprise, then local interests would be subordinate to the interests of the corporation, as a whole.

The suppression of trade unions and the direct presence of senior management personnel in the municipal government of Noranda, Quebec were among the efforts used to control the local political economy.

The pattern which we established Noranda Mines to have followed in its relationship with this natural resource enclave was as follows: a period of some thirty years (1926-1956) was marked by the continued direct presence and intervention by the company in the

community. The next period of twenty years was the time when the company had grown into a multinational corporation and together with the known exhaustion of the Horne Mine created the appropriate conditions for the company to begin to minimize its direct involvement in local affairs. The most important structural condition for the creation of a political vacuum in the natural resource enclave had been met.

On the other hand, the establishment of a trade union in the natural resource enclave became an important structural condition in the eventual creation of a persistent and legitimate expression of political opposition in the natural resource enclave. Now keep in mind that the political nature of the trade union would influence the final direction this political opposition could take and would depend, to a large degree, on the relative strength of the trade union viz à viz the corporation and whether its leadership and avowed political ideology were committed to the socialist transformation of capitalist society.

Evidence from Chapter V confirmed the anti-communist leadership of the United Steelworkers of America. Moreover, the organizational structure ensured the creation of a cadre committed almost exclusively to economism. Furthermore, as disclosed in Chapter IV, the union served a social control function. Finally, we learned that this trade union supported United States foreign policy and contributed to maintaining natural resource supply lines to this metropolitan economy. All together, the United Steelworkers of America contributed to containing the establishment of a viable and militant socialist tradition within the working class located in this natural resource enclave.

The historical conjuncture of these structural conditions (that is, the disengagement of Noranda Mines and the depoliticization of the working class) created a political vacuum in the natural resource enclave that was filled by the petite bourgeoisie. The "elements" of a political ideology consistent with the class location of the petite bourgeoisie, examined in Chapter II, were the following: an economic theory of underconsumption, an anti-monopoly capitalist stance articulated in a status quo manner, protesting the continuation of the metropolis-hinterland relationship, and appeals to French-Canadian nationalism. The combination of all these "elements" would be sufficient to mobilize both the working class and the petite bourgeoisie.

In the absence of political alternatives, the working class would be mobilized by an ideology that criticized some of the basic economic features of capitalist society while suggesting an alternative that appeared logical and simple and at the same time would give to them more of the economic benefits than they then enjoyed. Moreover, the predominantly French-Canadian population in Rouyn-Noranda would be sympathetic to nationalist appeals. Therefore, an economic argument in concert with ethnic nationalism would mobilize the French-Canadian working class in support of Réal Caouette.

The empirical data in Chapter VII disclosed the ideological content of the Ralliement des Créditistes to be consonant with the four major petit bourgeois ideological characteristics listed above. Furthermore, the attempts by Réal Caouette from 1944 until 1962 to get elected as the Social Credit candidate at both the provincial and federal levels,

with but one exception, were for naught. These failures reinforce the theoretical and empirical arguments advanced above that Ral Caouette and the Ralliement des Crditistes required the opportunity and the social base on which to build electoral support. Once certain structural circumstances were met, then and only then could the working class be politically mobilized by a petit bourgeois "ideological sub-ensemble". An examination of electoral support for Ral Caouette in working class districts of Rouyn-Noranda revealed that the French-Canadian working class voted for his candidacy.

By way of a final statement, the explanatory framework we constructed sought to understand the processes of change and continuity by recourse to the historical development of class relations under a definite social condition; that is, dependency and in a single locale. It offered a view of how men make their own history. But, men do not make history in isolation from the social class forces that condition their social existence. It is only in the examination of the processes by which human beings come to grips with the constraints and the opportunities provided to them at different points in time that meaning is given to their struggles. Whether they win or lose in terms of the larger historical framework we can leave to the philosophers of history. The human drama as it unfolds and how it can be explained is what I believe is the crucial task for sociologists to pursue.

Appendix A

Noranda Mines

Association Memberships (1977-78)

American Bureau of Metal Statistics
American Hot Dip Galvanizers Association
Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association
Battery Council International
Cadmium Association
Canada Japan Trade Council
Canadian Agricultural Chemical Association
Canadian Association of Recycling Industries
Canadian Club
Canadian Copper & Brass Development Association
Canadian Export Association
Canadian Institute of International Affairs
Canadian Institute of Mines
Canadian Industrial Traffic League
Canadian Manufacturers' Association
Canadian Nuclear Association
Copper Club
Copper Development Association
Corrugated Steel Pipe Institute
Empire Club
Gold Institute
Industrial Marketing Research Association
International Copper Research Association
International Lead-Zinc Research Organization
International Wrought Copper Council
Lead Development Association
Lead Industries Association
Marine Club
Montreal Board of Trade
National Association of Recycling Industries
National Resource People Canada Inc.
North American Society for Corporate Planning
Personnel Association of Toronto
Potash Institute of North America
Potash/Phosphate Institute
Prospectors & Developers Association
Selenium/Tellurium Development Association
Silver Institute
Society of Die Casting Engineers
Society of Mining Engineers of the American Institute of Mining Engineers
World Bureau of Metal Statistics
Zinc Alloy Die Casting Society
Zinc Development Association
Zinc Institute
Zinc Institute - Cadmium Council

Appendix B

United Steelworkers of America

Canadian Policy Conference 1973

Resolutions 84 and 85

84. BE IT RESOLVED that this conference while decrying and repudiating efforts of ultra-nationalists to destroy the international character of the United Steelworkers of America, nevertheless also call, in view of the development of late years of a sharp conflict of interests politically and economically between Canada and the United States, for a more realistic measure of autonomy for the Canadian section of the union.
- LU. 1064
85. WHEREAS at the present time the U.S. section of the International Union is actively supporting political action towards protectionist measures namely (the Burke-Hartke Bill) which is designed to protect U.S. business and thus jobs of our brothers in the U.S.; and WHEREAS in the March 3rd edition of the AFL-CIO stated: "The deterioration continues and it may get worse with the increased need to import raw materials and fuels: "The Burke-Hartke Bill would provide government regulation and restraint on the export of American technology and capital. "It would also set up" - sliding door limitation on most imports, except those goods that are not produced here or that are in short supply." WHEREAS the AFL-CIO in numerous press releases has called for the enactment of the Foreign Trade Investment Act of 1973; and WHEREAS the AFL-CIO right along with the American multi-national corporations regard the Canadian Workers as little more than hewers of wood and haulers of water; and WHEREAS George Meany in a February press conference when asked if he would propose any measures that would exclude Canada from import quotas or detrimental measures stated: This is a matter that greatly concerns some of our unions, but at the present time we have not excluded anybody; and WHEREAS Mr. Meany nor any of the AFL-CIO has little to do and wants little to do with the International Labour Organization or the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions nor the Trades Union Congress in Britain; and WHEREAS we have repeatedly asked I.W. Abel and the AFL-CIO to exclude Canada from the Burke-Hartke Bill; and WHEREAS William Mahoney stated in his 1972 annual report that: We do not have the same labour conditions in Canada as those that exist in Japan and Taiwan. He stated: We must say, however, that building a wall of protectionism is not, in our judgement, the way to do it (referring to the prevention of unfair competition) He stated: We would like to see the AFL-CIO back in the I.C.F.T.U., play a more constructive role in I.L.O. strengthening the solidarity of workers would seem to us to be a more constructive approach to eliminating unfair competition than the building of tariff walls or the composition of quotas. WHEREAS the United Steelworkers of America are strongly represented in the AFL-CIO and in fact have had a major hand in helping draft the Burke-Hartke Bill; and

WHEREAS the U.S.W.A. are strongly represented in the AFL-CIO, and back most of the anti ILO, ICFTU, TUC, utterings of George Meany: and
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that this 1973 Canadian Steelworkers Policy Convention demand that Canada be made exempt from the Burke-Hartke Bill and any other protectionist trade bills initiated by the AFL-CIO or International; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that Canadian Steelworkers make strong representation to the International Officers that they begin to help strengthen the I.L.O and I.C.F.T.U.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this 1973 Canadian Steelworkers Policy Conference resolve that should the United Steelworkers of America not withdraw their support of the Burke-Hartke bill or any other protectionist bill not exempting Canada from trade barriers and should the Burke-Hartke bill pass with the International Unions blessings then the Canadian Steelworkers shall separate from the International Union and become a completely independent and autonomous Canadian Union, with a new constitution and henceforth be known as the United Steelworkers of Canada.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we further resolve that we endorse our National Director Bill Mahoney's statement to the effect that should the International Union not act in the best interests of all union members in Canada and the United States that the Canadian section will have to go it alone.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that separation be a last resort and that in fact Canadian Steelworkers strongly demand that the International Union reverse its inward United States protectionist stand, initiate and help a true movement of International Unionism to bring collective bargaining and the benefits of unionism to all workers of the world.

LU. 6166

Appendix C

United Steelworkers of AmericaCanadian Policy Conference 1974Resolutions 100-104

100. WHEREAS the United Steelworkers of America in Canada allege that their practice in operation is "autonomous" with the Canadian way of life; and WHEREAS the Canadian way of life embracing the laws of Canada allow that no individual will be denied the right to practice creed and belong to any political party of its choice; and WHEREAS Article 3, Section 4, of the Constitution of the United Steelworkers of America is proposing a flagrant violation of Canadian Rights; therefore BE IT RESOLVED that Canadian Steelworkers instruct the Canadian Directors to instruct the International President that this section of the Constitution is not applicable in Canada; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this action be taken upon instruction as a policy decision by Canadian workers in the best interest of their Trade Union and social environment.
101. WHEREAS the constitution of the United Steelworkers of America forbids its members from being members of the Communist party; and WHEREAS a Canadian member of the Steelworkers Union faces expulsion from the union for being a member of the Communist party, and WHEREAS the Canadian Labour Congress and the Ontario Federation of Labour have removed from their constitutions, the clause forbidding membership to members of the Communist party. BE IT RESOLVED that the constitution of the United Steelworkers of America be amended to provide that Canadian members be excluded from the reference to membership in the Communist party contained in Article III, Section 4, of the said constitution.
102. WHEREAS our Constitution is a made-in-U.S.A. Constitution and does not reflect the political, and democratic traditions of Canada, but does reflect the McCarthyite and Watergate undemocratic attacks on the working class and its organizations in the United States, AND WHEREAS it contains clauses that prohibit communists from being members, AND WHEREAS it has been applied by Local 6200 in Port Colborne to expel brother John Severinsky, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that this National Conference be opposed to this expulsion and to the use of anti-communist clauses in Canadian Locals; AND FURTHERMORE call on the Canadian Director, and District Directors of Canada to make representation to the International Executive that this clause not be used in Canada; AND FURTHERMORE that the International Executive send a letter to all Canadian Locals so instructing them.

LU. 1005

LU. 2868

LU. 8030

103. WHEREAS the present constitution of our union bars membership to members of or consistent supporters of the communist party; and WHEREAS it is no longer reasonable to identify various national communist parties as subversive wings of an international conspiracy; and WHEREAS it is outright discrimination to not allow a person to belong to an organization because of his political beliefs; and WHEREAS it is useless and futile to legislate against people's beliefs; and THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that this Policy Conference make known to the International Constitutional Convention that the Canadian section of the U.S.W.A. demands that the constitution be changed to allow communists to be eligible to join the U.S.W.A.

LU. 6166

104. WHEREAS the purpose of the trade union is to defend the economic interests of workers;
BE IT RESOLVED that the United Steelworkers of America oppose expulsions for any reason other than activity directed towards undermining the existence of the union and that a person's political beliefs is his own affair.

LU. 14382

Appendix D

NORANDA MINES LIMITED

Year	Pounds of Copper from the Horne Mine	Ounces of Gold from the Horne Mine	Ounces of Silver from the Horne Mine
1927	552,345	767	
1928	32,113,413	52,335	
1929	44,472,520	66,756	
1930	69,244,529	116,179	
1931	61,800,247	251,617	
1932	60,584,462	338,025	
1933	63,518,749	283,058	
1934	68,208,741	242,112	
1935	74,106,222	259,763	
1936	62,697,995	340,664	
1937	80,122,543	274,157	599,911
1938	75,934,608	300,544	607,447
1939	82,626,816	267,504	595,102
1940	76,720,860	251,665	753,298
1941	74,403,256	259,039	729,996
1942	67,516,855	263,901	702,305
1943	66,364,854	269,903	660,780
1944	56,580,845	196,402	508,126
1945	53,565,532	174,217	439,330
1946	27,525,548	155,197	317,997
1947	27,539,066	85,462	319,215
1948	43,731,979	142,273	437,493
1949	51,896,244	185,418	524,315
1950	51,462,222	202,543	572,080
1951	50,630,000	197,470	595,100
1952	50,760,000	200,280	610,800
1953	30,791,995	132,045	404,230
1954	43,763,970	168,067	631,520
1955	55,468,000	206,310	777,000
1956	52,616,000	199,630	779,800
1957			
Total	<u>1,657,300,000</u>	<u>6,083,303</u>	<u>9,762,385</u>

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INTERVIEWS

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- (2) André Y. Fortier, Director of Labour Relations, Noranda Mines, May 14, 1976.
- (3) Louis-Marie Fortin, Chairman, Conseil Industriel, Rouyn-Noranda, Québec, June 16, 1978.
- (4) Leon Garon, retired, local historian, June 19, 1978.
- (5) Benoit-Beaudry Gourd, resident, Rouyn-Noranda, Québec, June 18, 1978.
- (6) William Hurn, retired, United Steelworkers of America, Rouyn-Noranda, Québec, June 15, 1978.
- (7) Danielle Lee, Department of Sociology, Université d'Ottawa, May 19, 1977.
- (8) Emile Boudreau, United Steelworkers of America, Montreal, Québec, March 16, 1975.

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