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MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE WESTERN STATE OF NIGERIA

by

Leo O. Dare, M.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

September 29, 1972

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of
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Thesis Supervisor

Chairman, Department of
Political Science

Carleton University

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ABSTRACT

The internal structures of military organizations give them a potential advantage over weak civilian institutions for governing transitional societies. However, the Western State officers whose values and role perceptions emphasize the non-legitimacy of military leadership have not taken advantage of the assets of the military for providing strong political leadership.

They have left policy making in the hands of civil servants, hand-picked civilian commissioners and the traditional chiefs and elders. They contented themselves with vetoing the policy suggestions of the civilians.

Under military leadership, old Yoruba intra-tribal rivalry surfaced. The officers became subject to primordial pressures; political, local and personal considerations entered into the policies of the military rulers with regards to local government and

educational reform, the reorganization of the tax system and the fight against bribery and corruption. Political inexperience and a feeling of insecurity on the part of the officers made them hesitant about employing the powers of the military to enforce the policy decisions of the government. Similarly, fear that the former politicians might use civilian-based organizations to subvert the military regime made the officers shrink from creating parties, legislative assemblies and other institutions of mass participation in politics. Consequently, mass political inexperience remains thus undermining the prospects of post-military democracy in Nigeria.

Early military withdrawal means that the political institutions will not be firmly established before the return of the civilians. This situation will perpetuate the conditions which made military intervention possible in the first instance; the prospects of further military intervention become good.

It is therefore argued that post-military political stability will be assured if the military leaders overcome their inhibitions and become directly involved in policy formulation. They should also set up the institutions, nurture them and not hand over power to civilians until the institutions become firmly established.

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CHAPTER ONE

General Introduction

As Great Britain prepared to leave Africa in the late fifties and early sixties, some of the key questions asked by observers of the African political scene were:¹ Will the African armies stay aloof from politics? Will the new states created by the departing colonial authorities survive and grow into full-fledged democracies? What are the prospects for the survival of the parliamentary institutions being transplanted into Africa?

By the end of January 1972 the armed forces of twenty-four newly independent African states had either mutinied against the civilian regimes or taken control of the government of their states.² No government had been changed through elections. Thus, the coup became the most frequently employed weapon for changing regimes in

1 The most eloquent expression of this concern was by Ayo Ogunshye, who, while commenting on the coup in the Sudan, asked: Will it Happen here? See Daily Service, January 1, 1959. Text reprinted in N. J. Miners, The Nigerian Military 1956-1966 (London: Methuen & Co., 1971), p.247.

2 Figure calculated from data printed in Edward Lottwak, Coup d'Etat; a Practical Handbook (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 190-191; also from Claude Welch (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 270-300. In some cases as in Dahomey, coups have occurred more than once but only the first case of intervention is considered. In other words, we only consider whether or not the coup has occurred and not the number of times it has taken place in any particular country. There are 41 countries.

in Africa. The attention of political analysts shifted from the parliamentary institutions and elections to the barracks from which the new rulers came to replace the civilian inheritors of political independence.

The soldiers have thus abandoned the isolation of the barracks and the ethics of their training which stressed neutrality in political conflicts, respect for civilian supremacy and obedience to elected representatives. In view of the fact that military participation in politics has become common, occurring in politics that were said to be 'mature' as well as in new or 'immature'¹ polities, intellectuals became interested in the ability of the soldiers to lead their countries in the struggle towards political and economic modernization or development.² This interest spilled over into an examination of the assets and liabilities of the military for the performance of political functions.

There is general agreement that the features of the military which make it possible for it to take over the reins of government may be unrelated to the requirements for governing large societies. Consequently, the military's ability to execute a coup may be

1 S.E.Finer, The Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p.139.

2 For detailed treatment of the change in orientation, see Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," Comparative Politics, I, 3 (April, 1969), 382-384.

unrelated to its ability to govern the society and resolve some of the problems confronted by government.

The post-independence failures of many governments in the new states, their political and economic stagnation, the suppression of basic rights and increased use of coercion in the governmental process appear as disappointments to the military officers and intellectuals who would prefer to see their states move faster towards modernization. This disenchantment with the civilian politicians led people to hope that the military could do better.¹

The defects of the civilian administrations included the absence of consensus on the rules of political transaction, inexperience with governing and lack of authority to enforce governmental decisions on the people.² The military organizations were by comparison with the civilians more disciplined and capable of concerted action. Some observers felt that these qualities of the military organization would be assets if the military stepped onto the political scene.³ This view fed the hope that the military

1 D.Lerner & R. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: the Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," World Politics, XIII, (1960-61), 19-44; L.Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," European Journal of Sociology, II, no. 1 (1961), 82-93; and P.J.Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics: Patterns for New Nations? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961).

2 The authoritarian pattern of colonial rule is often cited as the reason for the inexperience of the new states with democratic process. See for example, S. Andreski, The African Predicament (London: Michael Joseph, 1968), p.111.

3 These will be treated fully in chapter two.

of the new states might be the most effective agency for promoting political development in transitional societies.

In this thesis, we shall examine how a particular military group has carried out the functions of governing. We shall see whether the officers of the Western State of Nigeria have been able to convert the organizational superiority of the military institution into political advantage. We shall also see to what extent the military leaders have been able to combat the political problems which existed when they took office. Finally, we shall examine whether military rule in the Western State can be said to lead to political development, stagnation or decay.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

DEVELOPMENT

This brings us to a point where we must define in what context we shall use the term political development

in this thesis. In political science literature, the efforts to define development can be traced back for centuries.¹ Debates about political development gained renewed vigour in the 1960's but no universally accepted definition has yet emerged.² Consequently, development is interpreted to mean different things to different people as Lucian Pye's efforts to assemble the different interpretations of the term indicate.³

However, there is implicit agreement among the various theorists that a politically developed nation has more complex and specialized national political institutions than a less politically developed nation.⁴ Aristide Zolberg equated the developmental

-
- 1 The theme of development appeared in the works of Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law; its connection with early history of society and its relation to modern ideas (London: J. Murray, 1964); Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Translated and edited by C. Loomis), (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Max Weber On Charisma and Institution Building (ed. S. Eisenstadt), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947).
 - 2 The major works include G. Almond and J. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton University Press 1960); Gabriel Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics, a developmental approach (Boston: Little Brown Co. Ltd., 1966); D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1965); --- Some conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968); F. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); E. Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962).
 - 3 Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1966), pp. 5-12.
 - 4 Philips Cutright, "National Political Development, Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, XXVIII (April, 1963), pp. 253-264, especially page 255.

process with building "instruments and institutions"¹ and a very comprehensive analysis of the dimensions and problems of transition and development can be found in the works of Samuel Huntington.²

Huntington first acknowledges that political development is never complete and that no political system ever resolves all the problems confronting it.³ From this intellectual position he attempted to define development by postulating an antithesis to it. Development is seen as a spectrum: at one end of the spectrum is development and at the other is decay. Decay occurs when a high rate of social mobilization is not accompanied by institutionalization. Decay, says Huntington, is associated with the politics of transitional societies where institutions are either weak or where political institutions have not been created at all.⁴

Institutionalization is the process by which organizations acquire value and stability, and the level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability,

-
- 1 A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order; the Party States of West Africa (N.Y., Rand MacNally, 1966), p.93.
 - 2 S.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968); "Political Development and Political Decay," in Claude Welch (ed.), Political Modernization (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967), pp.207-245.
 - 3 S. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," p.231.
 4. Institutions are defined as stable, valued, recurrent patterns of behavior. Ibid., p.215.

complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures.¹

A political system will be developed to the extent that its institutions acquire legitimacy of their own irrespective of the role-incumbents. In this way, a developed political system will be able to survive leadership changes within and across generations without disintegrating. An institution can be said to be firmly established when both its structures and procedures are accepted by its citizens because 'it is the way things are done' and not only because it will produce some immediate benefits. The strength of an institution can be measured, according to Huntington, by looking at the scope of support and the level of institutionalization.²

The weakness of the Nigerian political institutions rendered them vulnerable to military takeover. If the military is able to create viable institutions, it would contribute to political development. If on the other hand the military fails to do this, the political system will remain underdeveloped and may disintegrate if and when the military hands over power to civilians as they promise to do in 1976. The soldiers charged the politicians they displaced with mismanagement,

1 Ibid., Detailed treatment of these terms can be found in S. Huntington.

2 Ibid.

corruption and incompetence and further claimed that the political parties and legislative assemblies run by the politicians had become divisive of national consensus. They therefore abolished the parties and assemblies with the promise of creating new and viable ones. The Federal Military Government announced a nine-point programme that would lead back 'to civilian rule, peace and stability'. The programme read:

- (1) The reorganization of the Armed Forces;
- (2) The implementation of the National Development Plan and the repair of the damage and neglect of the War;
- (3) The eradication of corruption in our national life;
- (4) The settlement of the question of the creation of more states;
- (5) The preparation and adoption of a new constitution;
- (6) The introduction of a new Revenue Allocation Formula;
- (7) Conducting a national population census;
- (8) The organization of genuine political parties;
- (9) The organization of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states and in the centre.¹

In subsequent broadcasts the military leaders repeated their desire to establish a Western-type democracy.

1 General Gowon, "Blue Print for Post War Nigeria," Text of Broadcast to the Nation, October 1, 1970, p.3.

In the Western Region, the military government also specified the major areas of concern. There was some overlap with the goals of the Federal Government: these included the reform of the Local Government system, the re-organization of the personal income tax system, the reform of the educational system, the allocation of resources within the region, and above all, the eradication of corruption from national life. The target date for the completion of these objectives is 1976.

The choice of popular democracy has thus been made by the military leaders of Nigeria. The efforts in this thesis will be centred on an evaluation of the performance of the soldiers in the task of creating strong, viable and autonomous institutions in relation to these declared goals.

Perhaps we should remind ourselves of the fundamental principles of democracy. Democracy never exists in a pure or ideal form. It is only meaningful to speak of degrees of democracy as some of its features are found to a greater or lesser extent in different regimes but this is no reason for not attempting to classify regimes. A regime that lacks many features of democracy, could be reclassified.¹

Democracy is government by the people in that "it is the system of government in which the people, the members of the community,

1 For detailed explanation of this method of classification, see Harry Eckstein, The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Dimensions (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), p.30.

participate or may participate directly or indirectly in the making of decisions which affect them."¹ The major features of democratic government generally mentioned in the literature are popular sovereignty,² political equality,³ popular consultation,⁴ majority rule,⁵ periodical free elections carried out on the basis of liberty⁶ and individual and minority rights.⁷ As Giovanni Sartori has stated, "Modern democracy hinges on majority rule (those who obtain the most votes obtain the mandate, and those who have the most seats in parliament rule), on elective mechanisms and on representative transmission of power."⁸ In short, democracy does not exist only because the institutional frameworks have been established. Attitudes supportive of those institutions and the

-
- 1 See Carl Cohen, Democracy (Athens: University of Georgia, 1971), p.7.
 - 2 C.Cnuddle and D. Neubauer, Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), p.41.
 - 3 Ibid., p.49.
 - 4 Ibid., p.50.
 - 5 Ibid., p.57.
 - 6 H.B.Mayo, Introduction to Democratic Theory (Oxford University Press, 1960), Chapter 4.
 - 7 The rights of minorities can best be guaranteed through devolution of powers on local councils and administrative Divisions. Where however the minority groups are sufficiently large, their interests could be protected through the creation of separate states.
 - 8 Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1962), p.24.

freedom of the citizens to participate in the governmental process must also exist. While the institutions can be created within a short time as was done before the colonies obtained political independence, the growth of the supportive attitudes require a long period of political education and experience with the operation of the institutions. These attitudes are the spirit of tolerance for the opinion of others,¹ willingness to compromise,² respect for law³ and acceptance of the verdict of the democratic process even when these decisions are not in one's favour.⁴

The persistent absence of any or a combination of these will make the operation of democracy difficult if not impossible.

1 John P. Plamenatz, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy," American Political Science Review, L, '1 (1956), 101-137, esp. p.127.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943), pp. 295-296. These may appear to be Western concepts of democracy applicable in homogeneous societies. Some African leaders including President J. Nyerere of Tanzania, the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and the former President of Mali, Modibo Keita have attempted to re-define democracy so as to "make it relevant to African conditions", Pre-coup Nigerian leaders viewed themselves as the upholders of democracy in Black Africa. Foreign correspondents represented Nigeria as Africa's leading democracy. The Nigerian leaders did not attempt to change the parliamentary system they inherited even when the institutions proved unworkable. They borrowed and regarded the form of Western democracy as sacrosanct. The soldiers who staged the coup did so, in their words, because the politicians had destroyed democracy. Their stated goal was to restore democracy along Western lines.

These attitudes must be sufficiently widespread to be accepted as norms of desirable conduct, so that deviations from these norms are subject to questioning and usually social disapproval.

This thesis will argue that the time table of the Nigerian military and their planned departure from politics in 1976 is so short that the institutions will not have been established before the civilian politicians are brought back, and due to lack of experience on the part of the leaders and the public, political deadlock and mismanagement are likely to occur again. The military will find itself pressed to intervene to sweep off the institutions and start again. This seems to be the pattern established elsewhere in Latin America and in Ghana where the military leaders vacate the political scene before political institutions become firmly established.¹

¹ The leaders of the Coup of February 24, 1966 did not think that the military should stay in power for very long. To quote Major General Ocran, "The idea of involvement in political matters by the military should be uprooted as soon as possible. You are either a soldier or a politician. If the soldier wishes to go into politics, he must be made to retire..." A Myth is Broken (Accra: Longmans, 1968), p.97; a similar statement was made by Colonel Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, 24th February, 1966 (London: Frank Cass, 1966), esp. pp. 93-105.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO WESTERN NIGERIA.

Nigeria is divisible into linguistic and cultural sections. Though many languages are spoken in Nigeria, the three largest linguistic groups are the Hausa-speaking people of Northern Nigeria, the Ibo-speaking people of southeastern Nigeria, and the Yoruba-speaking people of southwestern Nigeria.

THE YORUBA

The term Yoruba is commonly applied to a large group of people who refer to themselves as Oyo, Egba, Ijebu, Ekiti, Osun and so on. Despite the cultural differences between the various Yoruba groups, their languages have their roots in Oyo language, and this forms the major link between the groups.

The various Yoruba groups have traditionally been ruled by chiefs, kings and monarchs. The royal lineages of the Yoruba towns trace their descent to Oduduwa, the deified cultural hero, whom Yoruba mythology claims to have been the ancestor of the various branches of Yoruba-speaking people.¹

¹For detailed discussion of the probable origin of the Yorubas, see Daryll Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria (London: International African Institute, 1962), pp. 1-5; S. Johnson, The History of the Yorubas (Lagos: C.M.S. Bookshops, 1960).

There is no evidence to suggest that a single political authority has ever effectively controlled all the ethnic groups in Yorubaland, although for a period prior to the nineteenth century, most of the chiefdoms apart from those in Ekiti, Ijebu and Ife acknowledged the ritual and political suzerainty of the Alafin (king) of Oyo.¹

Although people from other parts of Nigeria refer to the Western Region as a unit, within Yorubaland, historical intra-tribal hatred and bitterness have existed. However, whenever there were threats to Yorubas from Ibos and Hausas, the different Yoruba groups patched up their disagreements in order to combat the external enemy.² When no external enemy existed, the Yorubas have engaged in intra-tribal factionalism.

THE START OF MODERN POLITICS IN YORUBALAND

The first step towards organizing the Yorubas was taken in London in 1945 when under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo, the Yoruba students formed a cultural society dedicated to the unity and social

¹ Daryll Forde, Op. cit., p. 19

² The formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa discussed below was in response to the Ibo Federal Union which was formed in 1941 to promote the advancement of Ibos.

progress of the Yoruba people. This organization was named the society of the descendants of Oduduwa (Egbe Omo Oduduwa).¹

In 1951, on the eve of a new constitution for Nigeria which introduced a ministerial system of government, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa was reorganized into a political party called the Action Group (A.G.)² The party emerged from the regional elections of 1951 with a majority in the Western Regional House of Assembly. Its members were appointed to ministerial office; Awolowo himself became the regional minister of Local Government and Leader of Government Business in that House.³ The A.G. remained in power in the Western Region for the rest of the colonial period and appeared to be stable and dynamic.

Leadership conflict and intra-party rivalry began in 1957. The central issues were the personality and policy disagreements between Awolowo and his Deputy, Chief Samuel Akintola.

Both Awolowo and Akintola were ambitious politicians.³ While Awolowo was Premier of the Western Region, Akintola was the Leader of the Opposition in the Federal House of Representatives.

¹ See Richard Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo," in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.), Politics in Africa, 7 Cases (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966) p. 124

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

As long as the two men sat in different legislatures, their ambitions could be accommodated within a single party. The Federal Elections of 1959 brought their dispute to a head. Before the elections, Awolowo decided to run for a seat in the House of Representatives thus vacating the premiership of the Western Region. At the same time, he did not wish to leave the premiership to Akintola.¹ However, through constitutional manipulation, Akintola was able to secure the office.²

The trial of strength between Awolowo and Akintola continued, culminating in the unsuccessful attempt by Awolowo to remove Akintola from the premiership.³ On May 21, 1962, Alhaji D.S. Adegbenro, a strong Egba supporter of Awolowo was appointed premier to succeed Akintola but the latter refused to resign. The Governor then dismissed him.

The A.G. crisis reached a boiling point on

¹ Ibid., p.31

² A clause in the constitution of the A.G. states "if the Deputy leader of the party was a member of any legislature and the leader of the party was not a member, then the Deputy Leader would automatically become the A.G. leader in that legislature. Since Awolowo was vacating the Western House of Assembly, Akintola sought a seat in that House by persuading an MHA from Osun to resign so that he, Akintola could run. On winning the seat, Akintola automatically became the Premier of the Western Region. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

³ Ibid., pp. 60-64; 68-76

May 25, 1962 when fighting erupted in the Western House of Assembly. The Federal Government, in a move apparently calculated to destroy the A.G. declared a state of emergency in Western Nigeria. Dr. M.A. Majekodunmi, a political enemy of the A.G. was appointed Administrator of the Region. The Governor, Premier and ministers and other officials were removed from office and "commissioners" were appointed to discharge ministerial duties. John P. Mackintosh has described what followed:

As soon as he assumed power, the Administrator restricted all leading and many secondary politicians to places outside Ibadan, in some cases to extremely remote villages. By the end of two months virtually all the Akintola group and N.C.N.C. men were freed, but the officeholders and many principal organizers of the Action Group remained restricted...

When the state of emergency was lifted in January 1963, instead of calling a general election, Akintola was reinstated as premier by the Federal Government. He then moved to form a government under another political label - the United People's Party(U.P.P.), consisting mainly of his faction of the Action Group and a rebellious wing of the

¹ John P. Mackintosh, "Politics in Nigeria: the Action Group Crisis of 1962", Political Studies XI, 2 (June, 1963), 145-146.

N.C.N.C.¹ which left the national organization to join Akintola. This group from the N.C.N.C. was led by Fani Kayode who was made the Deputy Premier of the Western Region.²

Akintola did not find it easy to secure a parliamentary majority and the House of Assembly was not called for three months by which time, Akintola had won over a sufficient number of Awolowo's supporters either by coercion or bribery.³ Of the 82 assemblymen who had been members of the A.G. in May 1962, only 38 remained loyal to Adegbenro.⁴ The loyal members were mainly from Ijebu, Egba, Ekiti and Ondo. Chief Akintola succeeded in luring Oyo and Oshun men from the A.G. Ibadan and Ijeshas were traditionally N.C.N.C. and their faction of the party had followed the leadership of Fani Kayode. Thus, two factions formed in the Western Region: the U.P.P. later renamed the Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), and what was left of the A.G. These two groups competed for political power until the regional elections of October 1965.

¹ Due to the rivalry between the Yorubas and the Ibos, the N.C.N.C. was believed to be a party catering to the interests of Ibos. The Yoruba members of the party decided not to belong to the national organization while retaining the party label.

² Richard Sklar, Op. Cit., p. 161

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

From 1963 to the elections of 1965, all government machinery was directed against those who refused to accept membership of the N.N.D.P. The Local Government Police and the Customary courts were used to arrest and imprison vocal opponents of the N.N.D.P.¹ Through this action, the ruling party lost the goodwill of the public.

The elections were widely believed to have been rigged by the N.N.D.P.² In any case, the supporters of the A.G. refused to recognize the government formed as a result of the election. Instead, they took the laws into their own hands, attacking and destroying the properties of N.N.D.P. supporters. Violence spread to all parts of the Region and it was in the midst of this that the soldiers staged a coup in January 1966.

The stage was thus set for the problems of the military regime in the Western Region. The unpopularity of the N.N.D.P. (an Oyo/Osun based party) had made military intervention popular with the masses. It was only natural that the military leaders should try to rule with a group different from the discredited politicians from the N.N.D.P.

¹ Olushola Fadahunsi, Nigeria, the Last Days of the First Republic (Ibadan: A-O-F Press, 1970)

² Ibid., pp. 29-49

In view of the fact that the new set of rulers were from non-Oyo areas, mainly Ekiti which had supported the A.G., they were accused by the Oyo/Osun group as being partisan in favour of the A.G.¹ In this way, pre-coup political rivalry among the Yoruba groups was to dominate the politics of military rule. This will be brought out more fully in chapters four and five.

The available literature on the role of the military in political development is filled with generalizations, hypotheses and assertions about the ability of the armies to lead modernization effort without much empirical evidence. Chapter two of this thesis examines and reviews the existing body of literature.

Chapter three examines the origins of the Nigerian army, emphasizing that the colonial military policies did not inculcate a high level of military professionalism. Furthermore, after Nigeria became independent, the cohesion of the military was undermined by political considerations such as the introduction of the quota system into the

¹ See petitions for the creation of separate states in the West submitted by Oyo and Osun leaders in S.K. Panter-Brick (ed.), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule (London: Athlone Press, 1970) pp. 267-271

recruitment and promotion of officers. In addition, the political roles of the military under the civilian administration will be surveyed to see how far these induced the soldiers to intervene. The chapter concludes by examining the coup and the selection of the military governors for the existing regions of the Republic. The emphasis in this chapter is on showing that the Nigerian army, due to its background, is ill-equipped to lead society.

Chapter four begins the examination of the performance of the military regime in the Western State. It looks into how the military has attempted to communicate with the public, how the existing channels of communication were used and which new ones were opened by the military regime. It also notes how pre-coup politics have dominated the period of military rule.

In chapter five, the policies and performance of the regime are examined and criticized. The areas selected are those in which the military leaders have indicated their intention of changing the existing patterns. In other words, their performance is measured against their promises.

Chapter six surveys the present orientations toward the military regime of the Western State. The attitudes of the general public, the bureaucrats

and of non-governmental elites such as the former politicians and academics are examined through survey techniques discussed fully at the beginning of the chapter, we shall see that the initial orientation to the regime was positive and enthusiastic. The purpose of the survey is to examine the orientations of these groups after five years of military rule, to see whether or not the military has been able to retain the support with which it entered politics.

Chapter seven concludes the thesis attempting in the light of both theory and the facts available, to determine whether the military regime's performance to date can be said to make for political development, stagnation or decay. It will relate the military performance to institutionalization and the creation of conditions and attitudes necessary for democracy. The success of the regime will be measured in relation to these.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MILITARY IN DEVELOPMENTAL LITERATURE

In this chapter, we shall examine the changing importance of the military in developmental literature and the conflicting images of the military as agents for socio-political transformation. We shall also see how the literature on African politics has incorporated the role of the military. Similarly, we shall examine the conditions that prompt or hinder military intervention, and the role of external forces in the execution of coups. We shall then conclude the chapter by examining whether the army can in fact do better than civilians in leading the modernization process.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Civil-military relations and efforts by civilians to control the military institutions are as old as the Greek and Roman civilizations but the modern form of civil-military relations is unique. Samuel Huntington affirms that while it is possible to speak of the issues of civilian control, militarism and the military mind as existing prior to 1800, the fundamental transformation in the first part of the nineteenth century makes it relatively profitless to go back before that time in search of light on modern problems,¹ and he emphasizes that "the problem in the modern

1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 19-20.

state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician."¹

The military has in the West been traditionally viewed as an instrument in the service of whichever civilian group is in power. Armies were created to support the integrity of the state against foreign attack and the establishment of such a defence unit was considered an attribute of national political sovereignty. Professional military leaders were put under the control of civilian heads and top administrative positions in the defence Ministries were held by civilians who coordinated military programmes and were responsible to their civilian superiors.² Similarly, general policies about the military with regard to war, appropriations and mobilization were formulated by the elected representatives of the people while the military leaders busied themselves with the execution of policies already decided. Professional soldiers were kept in secluded garrisons and rarely interacted with the mass of citizens.

The military was therefore only indirectly influential in decision-making even when fundamental issues such as defence and foreign policy were involved. However, the extent to which the military forces in different states have been subordinate to civilian authorities has varied from time to time and place to place.

1 Ibid.

2 C. Coates and R. Pellegrin, Military Sociology (The Social Science Press, University of Maryland, 1965), pp. 39-40.

At different times, military leaders have given advice to their civilian masters when such was requested of them.

Active participation in politics by the armed forces was considered unnatural. The active participation by the Latin American forces in the political processes of their respective countries was interpreted as a sign that Latin American societies were backward and that when these societies became economically developed, militarism would end.¹ In other words, military participation in politics was seen as a feature of underdeveloped societies.

A break was made with this thinking about the time of the Second World War. The war drew many civilian governments into closer relationships with generals and admirals as well as diplomats for advice. More and more, governments depended on the military and soldiers began to realize their crucial potentiality for the making or breaking of civilian rulers.

While in 1963 it was still easy to enumerate the states where civilian regimes have succumbed to a military takeover,² by 1972, the great number of states in which the military must be

1 See Jose Nun "A Latin American Phenomenon: Middle-Class Military Coup," reprinted in J. Petras and M. Zeitlin (eds.), Latin America, Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn., Fawcett Premier Book, 1968), p.154.

2 H. Daalder, The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries (Hage: Mouton & Co., 1962), p.9; see also, S. Finer, op.cit., pp. 110-114.

taken into consideration is staggering.¹ It is therefore an intellectual exercise to speak of the separation of civil and military institutions and of the autonomy of institutions in transitional societies. Social scientists have given credence to military participation through the development of a rapidly expanding subfield: the study of civil-military relations. Amos Perlmutter summed up the change in orientation when he noted:

What was considered unnatural and deviant phenomenon before 1945 has now become widespread: the active and increasing role of the army in politics. A government dominated by an army was considered 'unnatural' not because it was a new phenomenon - it had been recognized by political philosophers from Machiavelli to Mosca - but because some social scientists refused to accept military rule as being as natural as civilian rule.²

Similarly, Kenneth Grundy illustrated the gradual increase in the phenomenon of military intervention in African politics.³

Another factor contributing to the attempt by social scientists to live with, rather than fight against military involvement in politics, is the behavioral persuasion. One significant dimension of behavioralism is the examination and quantification of what exists (the political phenomenon) rather than evaluating the

1 E. Littwak, Coup d'etat, a practical handbook (Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press, 1968), p.199; see also K. Grundy, Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa (East African Publishing House, for the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University College, Kampala Uganda, 1968), p.2.

2 Amos Perlmutter, op.cit., pp. 383-404.

3 See Figure I below.

FIGURE 1.

Source: K. Grundy, op.cit., p.2.

desirability of what has been observed. The emphasis being on quantification and prediction of occurrences, it becomes unnecessary to pass moral judgment upon the nature of regimes. Instead, the behavioralists would be inclined to ask "What social, economic, and political conditions precipitate military political action, and under what conditions do the attempted takeovers succeed or fail?"¹

A second corollary of the behavioral movement was the quest for 'scientific objectivity' in reporting observed events, the search for generalizations, hypotheses and "theories" on social relations in general, and of the military in the political process of transitional societies. This school of thought produced numerous useful generalizations to which we shall turn later.

Finally, the most recent writings have attempted to identify the contributions of the military to the development and modernization of their societies by asking:

What are the prospects, what are the chances of success and failure of military leadership in achieving the development and modernization of the societies in which they have taken over the reigns-of power? Or alternatively, how much better can the military do in achieving modernization?²

The outcrop of hypotheses and 'theories' have neither answered many questions about civil-military relations nor explained

1 Edward Hittwak is an example of this kind of neutral consideration, as he disavows any moral predispositions.Loc.cit.

2 H. Daalder, op.cit., Claude Welch, "Revolutionary Tendencies in African Armies," Black Academy Review, II, no.3 (Fall, 1971), 5-21.

the peculiarities of some successful or unsuccessful military regimes. The need for case studies has therefore never been greater than now. Circumstances are as varied as the number of countries involved and generalizations tend to be superficial and unsupported with empirical facts. In other respects, there are contradictions in the hypotheses.¹ On the one hand, the colonial legacy is said to create political armies in the image of the colonial power and such armies are less likely to interfere in politics.² On the other hand, it is asserted that "soldiers are more likely to revolt or stage a coup in their own self interest, because the legacy of colonial rule is a low level of national consciousness in the army."³

THE IMAGES OF THE MILITARY IN THE LITERATURE

From the body of literature, two main views towards the military have evolved, namely, the positive and negative views.

The Positive Image

According to Robert Brice, the positive image sees the military as an:

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- 1 Robin Luckham compiled a comprehensive list of the hypotheses in vogue. See "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," Government and Opposition, XI, no. 1 (Winter, 1971), pp. 5-11.
 - 2 William Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 2-3.
 - 3 Ali Mazrui & Donald Rothchild, "The Soldier and the State in East Africa, some theoretical conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964," Chapter One of Mazrui, Violence & Thoughts (London: Longmans, 1969).

Ideologically and structurally cohesive organization, capable of high levels of internal discipline and serving as a repository of technological and managerial skill, whose members share a professional belief-system combining the elements of secular rationality, puritanical asceticism, patriotic nationalism, dedication to public services and an orientation toward the goal of modernization.¹

Similarly, it claims that in some of the new countries, the army becomes a device for developing a sense of national identity - a social psychological element of national unity - which is specially crucial for a nation which is struggling to incorporate diverse ethnic and tribal groups.² In addition, it is reiterated that the military in the new nations have a higher degree of national consciousness than most other elites including the politicians.³ Furthermore, it views an attribute of the military profession as a strong puritanical outlook and the emphasis on anti-corruption and anti decadence which places a strong emphasis on a modest style of life, and that "military leaders are sometimes conspicuous in their non-indulgence in alcohol and tobacco."⁴

1 The idea of images is borrowed from Grundy, op.cit., see also Robert Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case," World Politics, XXIII (April, 1971), p.400.

2 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 63-64. Also, L. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in C. Welch, ed. Political Modernization (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967); D. Lerner Robinson "Swords and Ploughshares: the Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," World Politics, XII (October, 1960), 19-44.

3 Ibid. 4 Morris Janowitz, loc. cit.

Having painted such an impressive picture of the military, its entry into politics is conceived as something good for the body polity as the puritanical, decisive, efficient and self-sacrificing elements - the soldiers - displace the incompetent, corrupt, and rapacious civilian politicians.¹

In support of this view, Lt. Colonel Malcolm Bounds stated:

In almost all underdeveloped countries ... the elite of the country are the military. In the military are found those capabilities necessary to nurture national development: leadership, technical skills, administrative experience, mobility, and willingness to spend years away from home.²

Similarly, the United States' Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asserted:

Military men are symbols of power authority and sovereignty and a focus of national pride. The ablest of these young officers have gone abroad for education and are now assuming top positions of leadership in almost all of the military groups in the hemisphere. And while their loyalties are with the armed forces, their emotional ties are often with the people. Increasingly, their concern and dedication is to the eradication of poverty and the improvement of the lot of the oppressed, both in rural and urban areas.³

1 K.Grundy, op.cit., p.5.

2 Lt. Colonel Malcolm S. Bounds, "Military Civic Action," Air University Review, XX (May-June, 1969), 68-75.

3 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Hearing, Rockefeller Report on Latin America, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 20th Nov. 1969, p.86.

In short, the positive image views the military as the most effective public institution for promoting modernization.

The defect of this stand is its sweeping generalization and oversimplification of a very complex issue. It seems to have extended to all members of a categorical group characteristics which only some of its members may possess. In other words, while some politicians may be incompetent and corrupt, others may be quite competent and upright. Similarly, while some soldiers are puritanical and efficient, some are licentious and incompetent. The attachment of attributes to all members of a certain group plays down the importance of personal characteristics.

Against each of these positive attributes can be found negative ones.

The Negative Image

Those less sympathetic with the army view it as a rigid and conservative institution lacking both initiative and imagination. As Liewen argued in relation to the armies in the Latin American countries;

When the Latin American political spectrum is considered as a unit, there is little question that the armed forces are a conservative anti-revolutionary institution standing in the way of the achievement of evolutionary social revolution by democratic means.¹

1 E. Liewen, Generals Vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1964), p.130.

In a similar vein Jose Nun views the military as an instrument of middle-class rule.¹ The armed forces are periodically called to help and/or will come to the rescue of those middle class sectors with whom it tends to become increasingly identified.² The armies are seen to be obstacles to social and political change because of their origins in the rural rentier classes and their conservative political philosophy.³

The negative image perceives of military intervention in politics as a regressive step.

From these conflicting perceptions, one conclusion can be made: that one's orientation to the military and its role in politics is dependent upon one's ideological predisposition, experiences with the military, one's orientation to the civilian administration deposed by the soldiers and finally, direct observation of the performance of the military administration. If military men are effective in the self-appointed task of doctoring the polity, they will generate positive feelings in the citizens and legitimize the regime. Very often, the soldiers are not able administrators. The political failure of the military turns initial hope into disillusionment.

1 J. Nun, op.cit., p.181.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

THE MILITARY AND AFRICAN POLITICS

When in 1957 the wave of political independence began sweeping over the African continent, it was thought hardly likely that these countries, without military traditions from their colonial past, with a military well drilled in the Western tradition of civilian supremacy and with "democratic" institutions would go the way of Latin America, the Middle East and parts of Asia.

In 1961, Pierre Den Berghe, a noted commentator on Africa remarked "probably, more than any other continent, at anytime in world history, Africa is led by pen-wielding intellectuals rather than by the modern equivalent of sabre-rattling men on horseback."¹ Army mutinies as in Zaire (Congo K) had apparently been dismissed as isolated problems of adjustment and as exceptional. African armed forces were not considered as meaningful political forces and their potential for political adventurism was underplayed. Writers on African politics devoted their efforts to examining which civilian type of rule was needed such as "Charismatic leadership", "institutional and political transfer" of power, "mass parties" Africa was regarded as the continent of the 'political kingdom' where one talked about 'the primacy of politics' and not the continent

¹ Pierre Den Berghe, "The Role of the Army in Contemporary Africa", African Report, X, 3 (March 1965), 12-18.

of the army caudillo and frequent coups.¹

The military received little consideration perhaps because African countries had all gained their independence without sustained violence and without aid from their servicemen.²

When military coups swept Francophone Africa after 1963, the partial explanation was that those states were generally poorly endowed economically, had weak political institutions and had poor preparation for political independence, and were "French".

The East African Army Mutinies of 1964 were suppressed. Then came January 1966 and a coup in English-speaking Nigeria which prompted reasoning that perhaps only the authoritarian one-party system could thwart military intervention.³ This hypothesis

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- 1 Claude Welch: "The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention," in C. Welch (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa, p.3.
 - 2 Dr. G. O. Olusanya noted that "one of the factors that prevented the ex-servicemen from contributing effectively to Nigerian politics was the multiplicity of ex-servicemen organizations, highly localized, isolated, and working at cross-purposes each claiming to represent the interest of all ex-soldiers The consequence," he noted, "was that instead of full attention being paid to the struggle against colonial rule, the nationalists spent most of their time attacking one another." And he concluded: "There was little opening or direction for the men and Nigerian politicians were too busy with their mutual recriminations, too abstruse and uncertain as to means and ends, to consider to what use these excellent materials (ex-soldiers) could be put in the national cause." The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics, Journal of Modern African Studies VI, 2, (1968), 221-232.
 - 3 Kwame Nkrumah intimated this in his comments to the press about the Coup in Nigeria and the fate of the Federal Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

was immediately falsified by the Ghanaian coup of February 24th, 1966. All these have forced analysts to rethink their assumptions and be more careful about generalizations.

Here, Samuel Huntington pioneers cautious thinking.

He comments:

Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity and coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out of joint, not just the military.¹

Similarly, Grundy notes:

It would be fallacious to view the military and politics separately. Particularly in developing countries, the military and politics are part and parcel of contemporary politics and cannot be divorced from it in theory, reality or analysis.²

Military participation being viewed as an integral part of transitional politics, efforts have been made to understand the relationship of armies to governments - why they intervene or choose not to do so.

1 S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p.194.

2 K. Grundy, "Conflicting Images", op.cit., p.1.

Efforts to understand African coups have resulted in several plausible explanations which have combined to enrich the literature. Some explanations classify causes of military intervention into social, political, economic and military factors influencing the predisposition of the armed forces to take political action,¹ while others merely list factors which help to promote military intervention without attempting classification.² For our purpose, we shall reclassify all these factors under three related headings; namely, weak political institutions, the capacity of the military to seize power, and, the political perspectives of the military.

Let us consider these factors in greater detail.

WEAK POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF
THESE POLITICAL SYSTEMS TO INSTABILITY AND TAKEOVER

In their discussion on civil-military relations in Tropical Africa, Coleman and Brice wrote of the Force Publique in Congo K. (Zaire):

.... In the absence of other power structures even this armed mob was willing to follow untrained leadership and was able to extract a surprising degree of control over both leaders and events. This demonstrated the determinative

1 M. Janowitz is representative of this school.

2 See C. Welch, The Soldier and the State in Africa, pp. 17-18; also S. Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 14-27.

influence which a small military force could exercise in a situation in which counter-acting institutions or power groups are absent.¹

The same could be said for the rest of Africa. The strength of the military for political intervention does not depend only on its intrinsic characteristics. The military in Africa are among the weakest in the world but they operate in political systems of many weak characteristics.² As a result the relative strength of the military increases.

The weakness of the political institutions are reflected in a number of conflicts which the political systems are incapable of handling. These include the inability of the centre to control and effectively rule the countryside. This weakness precipitates military intervention given the fact that the army by its command-obedience structure detests the existence of pockets of anarchy.

In the words of Perlmutter:

Several African military coups have occurred when the periphery has struck back against the centre, while the centre, subject to the onslaught of modernization, is itself torn asunder ...³

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- 1 J. Coleman and B. Brice Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.399.
 - 2 See Aristide Zolberg, "Military Intervention in the New States of Tropical Africa," in H. Bienen (ed.), The Military Intervenes (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p.73.
 - 3 A. Perlmutter, op.cit., p.388.

This explanation is particularly relevant to the political atmosphere of the Western Region following the Regional Elections of October 1965. The disputes which followed the elections were massive. The authority of the Regional Government was directly challenged by the political thugs and supporters of the Action Group Party. The challenge and resistance to the Government were concentrated in the countryside and some policemen refused to go into the rural areas to maintain law and order.¹ In this way, the periphery appeared to be in open rebellion against the Government.

Closely related to this is the inability of the urban sector to regulate activities in the rural areas even under normal conditions. As Zolberg states very eloquently, many African states demonstrate the heterogeneity of political societies living side by side with the national political sector unable to bridge the cleavages among the disparate elements. African political systems also have the peculiar characteristic that the modern, urban political sector only deals with a segment of the total activity of the state because it does not possess the capacity to carry the whole load of authority. For this reason, the political

1 The centre in this case consists of the urban areas where the offices of the government are situated. The police and the law-enforcement agencies operate in these areas. The rural areas are the periphery where there is minimal contact with the government and its functionaries. In these areas, the traditional authorities maintain law and order and usually, it is in the areas that the opponents of the urban administration concentrate to regroup.

authority is shared with other structures such as traditional authorities where these are officially recognized as in Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. Hence, according to Zolberg:

A common feature of all African political systems is the continued existence of a 'residual sector' of relatively traditional political activity together with the more prominent relatively modern sector with which analysts are usually concerned.¹

The residual or rural sectors of these new states have generally been the sources of disorder and challenge to the authority of the government.² The existence of rural disturbance precipitates military intervention. The soldiers rationalize their actions as necessary in order to prevent the breakdown of law and order.

Related to the centre-periphery conflict is the low level of institutionalization and the absence of sustained support for the existing political structures. Huntington identifies the strength of political organizations with the scope of support and the level of institutionalization.³ The level of institutionalization, that is, the degree to which political organizations

1 A. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in Tropical Africa," A.P.S.R. LXII (1), (March, 1968), 43-56.

2 This is possible because opponents of the regime can easily hide their operations and plans from the authority by staying away from the urban areas. They can also more easily embarrass the government by creating the impression that life was insecure in the countryside.

3 S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 12-24.

develop their traditions and norms, and the extent to which these institutions act autonomously¹ is low in all transitional societies. In addition, the authority of the new institutions are not felt in the rural areas. The level of institutionalization is low because the institutions have only recently been created, and the lack of authority results from the general weakness of transitional societies. Furthermore, the new institutions are unable to satisfy the demands made on the system. This weakness together with the absence of legitimacy reduces the system's resistance to military intervention, and soldiers like to move when they perceive resistance to their action to be low.²

Weak Political Parties

While strong and institutionalized parties can accommodate pluralistic groups and factions without too much difficulty, newly formed and uninstitutionalized ones cannot be so accommodating. Few underdeveloped or transitional societies have strong parties of the pluralist type.³ Others do not have what can be called parties at all. In addition, the existing parties in some of these

1 Ibid.

2 This consideration accounts for the fact that many coups were executed when the presidents were away on foreign trips. In other cases, the soldiers moved after there were some challenge to the authority of the ruling groups such as trade union strikes, and other cases when it was realized that the regime could not count on mass support to counter the coup.

3 Amos Perlmutter, op.cit., p.389.

societies tend to be heavily weighted in the direction of certain factions and ethnic groups and in plural and federal societies, this can be destabilizing, making the entry of the military more attractive to the soldiers.

The strains of the developmental and nation-building process, the struggle for power and supremacy all undermined the precarious consensus achieved during the independence struggle. As the legitimacy of the ruling elite becomes challenged, the leaders resort to coercion. The security forces are given greater prominence as they are employed to put down strikes, riots, demonstrations, rebellions and all other signs that may suggest dissatisfaction with the regime. The increase in coercion highlights the weakness of the civilian regime. This phenomenon has been aptly termed "power deflation."¹ The use of force increases the market value of the military as opposed to the other groups and social organizations. A danger is however created because there is no assurance that the power of the military would not be used against the government itself.

Many regimes have attempted to assure themselves of the loyalty of the armed forces in a number of ways. Initial recruitment is carefully screened to select those who will be loyal to the regime; officers are promoted as a result of political consideration; and in extreme cases, total ideological mobilization of the armed forces is embarked upon. Others have diluted the

1 Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in Tropical Africa," pp. 70-88.

military's near monopoly of the techniques and tools of violence by developing para-military forces (as the Youth Brigades of Mali under Modibo Keita 1965-67, or President Nkrumah's Own Guard Regiment), to share in the security function of the state.¹

The success of these attempts at controlling the military so that coups are averted depend on too many variables for it to be reliable. In favourable circumstances, it might produce unity between the military and the civilian elites and so bring about political stability as the military stands ready to defend the government. (We here assume corporate unity of the armed forces). In unfavourable situations, attempts to politicize the army may precipitate a coup rather than keep the soldiers out of politics, as was the case in Ghana.²

The Capacity of the Military to Seize Power

Military forces have one crucial advantage over other competing groups in their societies - control over the instruments of violence. The size of the military does not explain the military's capacity to execute a coup. In fact, the military units in Africa though very small even in comparison with those of

1 General Ankrah of Ghana explained that one of the major causes of resentment against Nkrumah was the creation of the President's Own Guard Regiment which the soldiers regarded as a private competing army. See "The Future of the Military in Ghana," Africa Forum, II, (Summer, 1966), 5-16.

2 Ibid.

other underdeveloped countries, have been very active in the political process of their respective countries.¹ The internal organization of the military, its internal cohesion and discipline become relevant as they give the military predominance over the civilian organizations.

The military's hierarchical organization and command structure and its discipline are far superior to what obtains among civilians. These qualities allow the military to take effective action when it wants to. The lack of these skills render the civilian organizations incapable of defending themselves when threatened. Whereas civilians are liable to hesitate and seek compromise solutions, the military feels it is capable of taking decisive action in view of its organizational cohesion.

The cohesiveness of the military does not pre-determine its political activities. While armies with internal cohesion have refrained from intervening in politics, others with similar qualities have deposed their governments.² The link between the ability to intervene and actual intervention is provided by the political perspective of the army to which we now turn.

1 For the relative sizes of the African Armies, see Richard Booth, "The Armed Forces of African States, 1970," Adelphi Papers, No. 67 (May, 1970).

2 The internal cohesion of the Egyptian military led to its success in 1952; the same can be said for the Sudanese army in 1958 and the Ghanaian military in 1966. Lack of internal cohesion frustrated the Ethiopian Coup in 1960, that of Turkey in 1962, and precipitated the civil war which engaged the energies of the Nigerian military from 1967 to 1970. See also Lovell and Kim, "The Military and Political Change in Asia," Pacific Affairs, XL, (Spring and Summer, 1967), 116.

The Political Perspectives of the Military

The decision to act must be made by the military. Such a decision and its timing are dependent upon the military's perspective. In other words, the army's response to the conditions within the state and its image of politics and the politicians account for the occurrence of a coup. As Lovel and Kim have stated, "salient among these perspectives are the images which the soldiers develop of their own appropriate role and status within society and their perception of civilian elites and of the political system as a whole."¹

Judging from the statements made by military leaders in various countries after successful coups, it can be said that as the political situation deteriorates in each country, the military holds the politicians in lower esteem. This attitude towards politicians is to some extent born out of the nature of officer training. Military men tend to measure the performance of civilian governments against abstract standards often based on their self-estimation of their own performance of the limited and defined task of security. They expect a similar level of proficiency from politicians whose functions remain broad and undefined and whose success or failure are not objectively measurable.

In addition, the military officers somehow tend to compare their state with the metropole and expect the same level of political maturity from their own politicians as obtains in the metropole.

1 Ibid., p.116.

In newly independent countries, this unrealistic expectation leads to frustration which in turn feeds the urge to displace the politicians.

The heritage of the military also influence their political behaviour. Where the military helped in the attainment of political independence such as in some Latin American states, Egypt and Israel, the armies feel they are the guarantors of sovereignty and the constitution, reserving for themselves the right to intervene to "save the nation" when that is deemed fit. As J.J.Johnson says of the Latin American military, "Not only did they declare for the general will of the people but now, they tend to define the content of that will."¹ In this way, the military claims to be the champion of patriotism and nationalism.

However, participating in the attainment of national independence only makes the military act more quickly and with a greater feeling of justification. In the countries of Tropical Africa where the military played no role in the struggle for independence and in fact supported the colonial regime against the nationalists, the post-colonial armies have also established themselves as guarantors of the constitution and have displaced the elected governments on flimsy grounds.

The social origins of the military also influence their political behaviour. In the Middle East, the military elites

1 J. J. Johnson, op.cit., p.119.

were drawn mainly from the lower middle class and became the instruments of middle-class domination, committed to nationalism and social change and having no identification with the traditional elites.¹ The Latin American officers also drawn from the middle-classes have held power as champions of the interests of that class.²

In Africa where only two main classes exist (the rich and the poor with a malformed middle class), most military officers have their origins in the poor class. Many of the African officers come from rural areas and are regarded as having rural origins as against the politicians who are regarded as urban.³ This rural origin of the military reinforce the puritanical image of the officers when they are compared with the "corrupt and indulgent urban politicians." Social origin notwithstanding, the African military men have seized power, in their own words, "because the politicians have failed", and not as champions of the interests of the poor class. It is however fair to say that the African officers conceptualize politics as providing influence, power and wealth.

1. M. Halpern "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Class," in J. J. Johnson, loc.cit.

2 Jose Nun, opacit., p.181.

3 Despite this pretension, many of the politicians come from rural areas. To be urban is to be modern, and to be modern is viewed as good; therefore, many politicians adopt some urban areas as their home town thus giving the impression that the politicians were mainly urban.

Intervention in politics provides the officers with the quickest avenue for entry into elite status in their respective societies, and wherever this has been the motivation for intervention, the political programmes of the officers tend to favour the conservative aristocracy of wealth (this will be discussed later).

Military involvement in politics does not necessarily take the form of a coup. Claude Welch recognized three types of military action in Africa and related these forms of intervention to different historical periods:

The first type, relative passivity and abstention from political interference, was usually confined to the immediate post-independence period. The armies remained under substantial expatriate influence, which precluded (or certainly made more difficult) any meddling in politics. This was the period of the "non-political army", in which a commander such as General Alexander could proclaim "in the armed forces we were practically free from this taint" (of politics). The second type of involvement saw the resentment against European officers and African political leaders explode in mutinies. These outbursts were not intended - at least directly - to unseat the government in control. They were aimed rather at forcing the government to adopt certain policies, notably higher pay, pension privileges, or immediate Africanization of the officer corps. Coup d'etat, the third type brought full scale military involvement in politics. The occupants of presidential palaces were removed, possibly executed; into their offices moved the initiators of the intervention intent on "restoring" the country to "normal patterns".¹

1 Claude Welch, Soldier and State in Africa, pp. 5-6.

Similarly, Finer enumerates four major characteristic levels to which military intervention is pushed.¹ These are:

The choice of techniques depends on the goals of the soldiers. While influence is generally exercised through indirect pressures on political decision-makers behind the scenes, displacement and supplantment are examples of direct action and are overt. The line between influence and blackmail is a very thin one but in all political systems influence and blackmail are employed to some extent. Suffice it to say that even though displacement and supplantment are the most dramatic and alone make the newspaper headlines, all the modes of intervention have been employed at one time or the other by the African armed forces.

1 S. Finer, Man on Horseback, pp. 140, 168.

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

One unresolved issue in coups is the role of Great Powers and external intervention. Those who support a coup do not wish to be tagged with the negative image of being "stooges of external Powers" or "neo-colonialist agents." They therefore relate the causes of the coup to the "deteriorating domestic situation" that must not be allowed to worsen.

On the other hand, people whose sentiments remain with the deposed set of rulers for ideological or other reasons often say the coups are engineered by the Great Powers in their own interests. This line of argument was rampant in "radical" circles after the overthrow of Nkrumah. Although many African Governments felt relieved after the Ghana Coup, in others the first response was that "the neo-colonialists had worked through the Ghanaian Army for their return to Africa and to remove Africa's most dynamic anti-neocolonialist."¹

The impression is therefore created that if the policies of a regime conflicts with those of Great Powers, the Powers would attempt to remove such a regime. Put differently, if your policies favour the Great Powers, the Powers would work to keep you in office. French intervention on behalf of President Leon M'Ba

1 K. Grundy, "Conflicting Images," p.27.

of Gabon is illustrative of this phenomenon.¹

In short, except in glaring situations of direct action as in Gabon, the extent of Great Power involvement will remain difficult to determine.

In review, the complexity of events belie a simple correlation between the conditions in the state and the fact of military intervention. Many countries, each with distinct heritage, economic and socio-political problems have fallen to military rule. To assume that 'popular discontent' or 'economic stagnation' or 'neo-colonialist interference' brought about a coup d'etat does not do justice to the unique combination of circumstances present in each state. Therefore, it is necessary to examine a combination of factors in order to explain why a particular military organization intervenes. We may find that a particular coup is either 'reactive' to the incompetence of the civilian administrators or 'designed' as a result of the ambitions and political perspectives of the military men concerned.

1 Hours after President M'ba was deposed by the armed Forces the French Government airlifted French soldiers from neighbouring Chad and Congo (Brazzaville), suppressed the rebellion and reimposed M'Ba on the Gabonese people all within 36 hours. French explanation was that "a few men carrying machine guns should not be permitted to seize a presidential palace at any time," but in effect, that was exactly what the French did.

CONCLUSION

What prospects do the Military officers have for accomplishing the goals they set for themselves?

We have so far concluded that military competence is best measured by the army's ability to fight wars and defend the state when attacked by foreigners.¹ This means that the functions of the professional soldier is to execute the security policies of the state, the decisions as to what those policies are being made by the recognized political authorities, usually civilians. The army is therefore a tool at the disposal of the policy-makers.

This assumption removes the military from policy-making and confines its participation to indirect influence which the army, like other groups in the society, can legitimately exert upon the civilian decision-makers. It is necessary to make this analytical distinction between military and political functions. The idealized professional soldier obeys the legal orders of the civilians without questioning them or substituting his own views.

When real people are considered, it would be more fruitful to speak and think in terms of degrees of attachment to military ethics. Needless to say, all top military leaders inevitably operate in the intermingled world of strategy and policy.²

1 Internal security is a major function of African Armies. From time to time the armies are employed in civil operations and they reassert the authority of the central governments in riotous districts.

2 S. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p.73.

The important point is that military training and professionalism regardless of what level, tend to generate certain mental attitudes and predispositions which combine to form the military personality. Writers on the military mind generally agree that the military personality is "disciplined, rigid, logical, scientific,"¹ and that it is "not flexible, tolerant, intuitive, emotional."²

While these attributes make soldiers efficient in their expert and limited functions of maintaining state security, the same attributes become liabilities when military men assume political roles. This is so for two reasons: the political functions to be performed are not as limited and defined as military functions, and secondly, the attributes required for political leadership are different from those of the military. As Huntington summarized:

Politics deals with the goals of state policy. Competence in this field consists in having a broad awareness of the elements and interests entering into a decision. Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines the professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values.³

And he emphasized:

The criteria of military efficiency are limited concrete and relatively objective, the criteria of political wisdom are indefinite, ambiguous and highly subjective.⁴

1 Ibid., p.59.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

In short, military men are not trained to govern large organizations like states. The coup and the forceful seizure of political power is a misuse of trust placed in the soldiers by the civilian politicians. This being so, the execution of a coup generally becomes an embarrassment to its perpetrators. They must therefore make their action seem legitimate through justification or rationalization. Phrases such as 'a new era', 'national rebirth', 'national reconstruction', 'rededication, liberation and redemption' are appropriated by the new ruling clique. According to Grundy, the themes of the coup "conjure up Biblical visions of Christ chasing the money-changers from the Temple."¹

The masses for their part, wait in anticipation for the promised 'return of sanity' to administration. The new leaders make lofty promises of a new political era and appeal to the governed for patience, co-operation and commitment. In the final analysis, the soldiers will be judged by what they do rather than by the promises they make; however, the performance will be measured against the promises. In this way, most military regimes create problems for themselves by making too many promises which cannot be met. They promise utopia and manage to convince the masses that miracles did not occur in the past because of the corruption of the deposed administration.

1 K. Grundy, op.cit., p.23.

Furthermore, in view of the circumstances surrounding the coups such as political deadlock and immobilism, people tend to be too enthusiastic about the goods which the soldiers can deliver. Thus, the expectations of the masses are higher than what the political system can supply. The actual performance of the new leaders are therefore evaluated against unreal, high expectations and not against the capabilities of the political system.

These limitations have not deterred military men. Many soldiers have made their debut into politics making lofty promises to correct whatever ills their societies might have been suffering from.

Since the end of Second World War and the emergence of new (underdeveloped and "immature") polities onto the world scene, the frequency of political deadlock and failures has increased. Consequently, the "reform minded" men in uniform have been tempted to enter into politics to "clean the mess." In the light of the frequency of coups, apparently few officers have been able to resist the temptation.

Initially, some observers diagnosed the problems of society and concluded that what was required was more discipline. They therefore expressed high hopes concerning the wholesome role of officers corps in a new and inexperienced political system. It was argued that the officer corps of some countries in the new nations were:

The product of an unusual process of natural selection and included some of the new countries' best human material, men with above-average qualities of leadership and patriotism as well as a commitment to moral values ... such men, acting as a group, having the advantage of organization, discipline and dedication were fit to give their country the guidance, direction and inspiration necessary for constructive development as well as to exercise the control necessary in an immature democratic society facing the danger of Communist subversion.¹

Empirical evidence revealed that the armies in transitional societies were not essentially different from the civilian political elite and that armies were not immune to the problems that plagued politicians and administrators.² "Soldiers," claimed Pye, "proved to be no supermen for they were no more able than the Burmese politicians to rise above their cultural and historical heritage."³

The internal problems of the military apart, other insurmountable problems crop up. The most important of these is the difference between the soldiers and the general public, and the inability of the soldiers to mobilize and relate to the masses. The army's esprit de corps is due largely to its separation from the rest of the unregimented society, "its training in a unique style of life, its special uniform and its monopoly of weapons."

1 G. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in J. Johnson, op.cit., p.221.

2 Ebid., p.222; see also L. Pye, "The Army in Burmese Politics," in J.J.Johnson, op.cit., p.233; S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p.231; D.J.Murray, "Nigeria After Biafra," Current History, LVIII, (343), (March, 1970), 135-141.

3 L.Pye, "Armies in Burmese Politics," op.cit., p.233.

These military virtues "would remain virtues only if society as a whole were converted into a garrison state."¹ Army leaders who have become seasoned in the art of commanding usually have problems in organizing their newer, larger, and more amorphous constituents.²

Even though military intervention can provide some transitional order, prevent general breakdown and restore general discipline to public life, soon military leaders become discredited not just by their folly in promising much more than they can deliver, but more, by their incompetence in dealing with economic problems, their political insensitivity or heavyhandedness which cause civilians to rebel.

The masses who had been accustomed to being pampered by politicians generally find the military "too hard," indifferent, or too flexible. To be successful as politicians, military men must modify their military attitudes thus "civilianizing" the military, or, regiment the society for mobilization purposes.

1 M. Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," In J. Johnson, op.cit., pp. 301-302.

2 The example of Ataturk in transforming Turkey is often cited as negating this general rule. Halpern argues convincingly that Turkish history suggests that there are few underdeveloped countries as fortunate as Turkey at the advent of Ataturk - underpopulated, culturally homogeneous, a majority of its peasants owning their own land and largely isolated from urban politics and the urban population prepared for reform by a century of discussion and united by victory over foreign foes. Ibid., p.309.

In either case both the military and civilian lifestyles suffer.

Thus, the military's confidence in its ability to avoid vitiating compromise lasts so long as it remains in the barracks. Once in politics, soldiers become "politicians" with all the handicaps of politics without too many advantages.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY

This chapter will trace the evolution of the Nigerian Army from the Colonial period to the coup of 1966. We shall pay attention to the effects of political considerations on the development of military professionalism. In the post-Independence period, we shall illustrate the effects of the colonial policies on military unity and also the impact of the cleavages within the Nigerian society on the Army.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY

The first official military unit in Nigeria was raised in 1863 by Lieutenant R.N.Glover, the Governor of Lagos. Glover who had been on a tour of Hausaland encountered some Hausa slaves and ordered them freed from their masters.¹ Following this, he gave the freed slaves protection and armed them, and they in turn gave him protection on his way back to Lagos. On his representation, the Imperial Government gave him approval to constitute the 'Glover Hausas' into a force for the defence of Lagos, and with the forty men, the Lagos Constabulary as the army was called, came into being.

1 A. Haywood and F. Clarke, The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force (Aldershot: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1964), p.5.

The number was gradually increased, first to one hundred in June of the same year, and later to six-hundred in October. In 1865,¹ the force was renamed the Hausa Constabulary to show that all its members except the European officers were Hausa.²

These Hausa soldiers were capable of acting without sentiments as they were on alien grounds. For this reason, they were very reliable soldiers always prepared to carry out the orders of the British Officers. This pattern of recruiting aliens was to be repeated in other parts of Nigeria. However, the fact that the first soldiers to be quartered among the Yorubas were aliens deeply influenced the negative image Western Nigerians have of soldiers in general.

The traders of the Niger Delta also raised a miniscule force of forty men known officially as the Oil Rivers Irregulars but nicknamed the 'Forty Thieves' in 1885.³ This unit was raised mainly to assist the trading ships sailing inland and to impose suitable punishment on the villages where traders had been attacked.⁴ This force was subsequently enlarged and renamed the Niger Coast Constabulary.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 K. O. Dike noted that the attacks on the Company's factories at Akassa, Patani and Brass in 1881 were rewarded with punishment only after 1885. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta; 1830 - 1855, an Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956), p.212.

When in 1898 the West African Frontier Force was formed, the Niger Coast Constabulary with its sixteen European officers and 548 African ranks formed its 3rd Battalion.

The formation of the Northern Regiment came last due to the fact that the British traders and officers made contact with the North only after they gained a strong footing in the South. When the Royal Charter was granted to the National African Company in 1885 enabling it to monopolize the trade of the areas under its jurisdiction, the company also accepted responsibility for the administration of its trading zone, and for policing the area in order to make it safe for British exploitation. For purposes of its own security, the company financed the Royal Niger Company's Constabulary and this force performed essentially police functions for the company. When the Company's Charter was revoked in 1900, and the British Government assumed direct administration of the colonies, the Company's Constabulary was converted into the nucleus of the 1 and 2 Special Service Corps Battalions, West African Frontier Force (W.A.F.F.) and subsequently renamed 1st and 2nd Battalions, Northern Nigerian Regiment.

When Lugard effected the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, the military units of the three administrative divisions were merged and became the Nigerian Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force. From this, the present day Nigerian army has evolved.

THE ARMY AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION:

Africa had been colonized on the basis of an alleged superiority of European civilization and it was said that the Africans were to be helped to grow out of savagery.¹ This was the moral rationalization for colonialism. If this myth broke down, the whole structure of colonialism would follow. It was therefore in the interest of the occupying power to preserve itself by guiding the aura of invincibility which had been created around the white man. This consideration affected the structure and composition of the colonial forces: the officers were all European while the rank was entirely African. For example, in 1899, the Lagos Hausa Force had twenty-one European officers and eight hundred and thirty four African soldiers, the Niger Coast Protectorate Force consisted of 16 Europeans and 548 Africans while the Royal Niger Constabulary had 13 Europeans and 996 natives.²

Before Britain took over the administration of the territories from the trading companies in 1900, the Nigerians in the army were mercenaries plain and simple. After 1900 when

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- 1 This theme ran through many writings by ~~the~~ Lugard; for details see F. Lugard, A Tropical Dependency, (London: Frank Cass 1964), p.440; Dual Mandate, pp.5 and 613; see also Lugard's Letter to Joseph Chamberlain on the type of discipline for the 'natives', reprinted in C. Newbury, British Policy Towards West Africa (Oxford University Press, 1971), p.415.
 - 2 Figures abstracted from Report of Inter-Departmental Committee of the Colonial Office, June 1899, as reprinted in C. Newbury, op.cit., p.414.

Nigeria officially became a colony, the role of the soldiers did not change; Imperial interests were substituted for that of the companies.

William Gutteridge noted that:

Imperial considerations inevitably took precedence over barely recognized local needs which could not be expected to override the ulterior political motives and human prejudices of the British Officers who recruited colonial armies. Their concern was the security of the Empire and their preference was for the volunteer mercenary native soldier especially if he was a Moslem and illiterate.¹

Efforts were made to assure the reliability of the soldiers. What this meant in practice was that in the selection process, preference was accorded to illiterates and Northerners who were reputed to possess a warlike culture.² In the long run, this policy had some advantages. Firstly, in view of the peace generated by ignorance, the 'good soldiers' from illiterate societies were not knowledgeable enough to question and challenge white rule or the proclaimed superiority of white leadership. To the illiterates, there was nothing curious about the fact that the officers came from the Imperial army while the majority of the ranks were African. The colonial officers for their part rationalized the practice by saying that recruitment was pressed among tribes with "warlike traditions" and the "useful attributes of cheerfulness and loyalty".³

1 W.Gutteridge, "A Commonwealth Political Culture," The Round Table, the Commonwealth Quarterly, No. 239 (July, 1970), 330.

2 N. J. Miners, The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966 (London: Methuen, 1971), p.24.

3 See Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun (London: Allen Lane, 1971), p.77.

However, it was quite reasonable for the colonial officers to recruit from the illiterate and 'loyal' sections of the country, given the fact that armies needed to be reliable instruments against domestic uprising. In addition, the aspirations and demands of the illiterate recruits were more manageable than those of the educated 'gentlemen' from the Southern Provinces. By keeping the educated southerners out of the army, it was possible to postpone the day when arms would be turned against the occupying masters. Furthermore, since officers require a certain minimum level of education, and given the fact that most of the Nigerians in the army were illiterate, an answer which was already provided against anyone who would ask that Nigerians be promoted to the officer class was that the Nigerian soldiers, all illiterate, could not be entrusted with such important and responsible posts.

There was consequently an upper limit on the positions to which Nigerians could be advanced, and the higher ranks of the army were reserved for British officers on their way through Nigeria to other posts in the colonial administration.

A change in policy came during the Second World War when the army was enlarged. During the war, large numbers of mechanics and tradesmen were required and there were not enough Europeans available to fill these posts. Accordingly, the officers in charge of West Africa ordered that every job that could be done by an African must be done by one.¹

1 N. J. Miners, op.cit., p.24.

This policy led to the enlistment of many Southerners into the army since these positions required some education and the majority of the educated men were in the South. Thus, the necessities of war forced a change of policy which could not be reversed after the war; however, most of the recruits into the infantry still came from the North.¹

The first Nigerian commissioned officer - Bassey - received his commission in 1946.² More Nigerians were commissioned after that time but by 1956, only twenty-four of the two-hundred and fifty officers serving in the Nigerian Army were Nigerians.³ By 1960, the situation had slightly improved and sixty-three commissioned Nigerian officers were listed as follows:

TABLE I

RANK AND DATE OF COMMISSION OF NIGERIAN OFFICERS TO 1960

RANK	Year Commissioned	Number
Major	1949	3
	1950	1
	1953	1
	Total Majors	5
Captain	1953	2
	1954	5
	1955	3
	1956	6
	1957	3
	1958	5
	1959	1
	Total Captains	25
Subaltern	1956	1
	1957	2
	1958	2
	1959	14
	1960	9
	Total Subalterns	28
Chaplains		3
Total Number of Nigerian Officers		63

Source: Federal Nigeria, III, No. 8 (August, 1960), p.1.

² Ibid.

³ See R.Luckham, The Nigerian Military 1960-67 (Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.343.

⁴ N. J. Miners, op.cit., p.18.

THE IMAGE OF THE COLONIAL ARMY

Throughout the colonial period, few Nigerians had any regular contact with the army and with soldiers as individuals. Sporadic contacts occurred when the army went to remote places to "show the flag" or when punitive expeditions were mounted against villages that had challenged the authorities of the occupying power. Between 1900 and 1914, there were forty-three punitive expeditions within Nigeria, and a few outside. The view that the army was essentially the weapon for internal domination was kept alive.

The image of the army had never been enviable among Nigerians. In view of their experience with soldiers and stories circulating about soldiers, many Nigerians thought that the army was a collection of unruly illiterates who had chosen that profession because more reputable occupations would not have them; furthermore, soldiers were thought to be uniformed vagabonds.

Part of this negative image resulted from the employment of soldiers for minor police functions and for quelling civic skirmishes. Folklore in Yorubaland had it that a soldier was expected to apply for promotion for each person he killed in "Active Duty". Medals of bravery which were awarded to fighting forces were misconceived as honour for the soldiers ability to murder.¹

¹ From the interview with a retired Nigerian ex-serviceman.
January 3, 1972.

The misbehavior of the soldiers did more to compound the negative image. Reports of rape and vagabondage followed the military expeditions and some soldiers openly claimed these to be inherent prerogatives of their profession.¹

In remote areas where military barracks were found, anti-military sentiments were prevalent. Announcements of military visitations resulted in the closure of business concerns particularly liquor stores and restaurants which were invariably looted by the soldiers.

These all combined to compound the impression that good people had nothing to do with the army and that only those predisposed to hooliganism become military men. Consequently, few people knew or cared to know military men very intimately. As Miners observed, "most of the Nigerian public regarded the army as a thing apart, an alien institution to be ignored or despised."²

Many Northerners vividly remember the prominent part played by the W.A.F.F. regiments in the "pacification" expeditions into Bida, Kotangora, Bornu, Zaria and many other parts of Northern Nigeria. In the eyes of Northerners, the soldiers had helped foreigners to "stone their homes"; this being one of the most unpardonable crimes. Thus Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto recalled:

1 Ibid.

2 N. J. Miners, op.cit., p.32.

Within sight of the school we could see the square foot and the sentries behind the parapets ... We did not like the soldiers; they were our own people and had conquered us for strangers and had defeated our people on the plain just before us. This feeling was very common all over the North.¹

And he continued:

When the British came to the North, they started by recruiting their army of soldiers by getting slaves who ran away from their masters, labourers from the markets and so on, and had them enlisted in the force. They had a bad start then.²

The recruitment policy operated in such a way that recruits came mainly from the remote tribal groups in the North such as Adamawa, Benue, the Tiv, the Idoma, the Igbira and Bornu,³ but not from "the Holy North". The impression circulated in the North that while the army might be good enough for the Hausa, it was beneath the dignity of the Fulanis.⁴

As in the North, many Eastern Nigerians first encountered the soldiers during the days of "Gunboat diplomacy." The army had not enticed the most brilliant elements of the society. Those who joined did so as a last resort. The type of people recruited along with the behavior of the soldiers combined to make

1 My Life: Autobiography of Sir Ahmadu Bello of Sokoto, (Cambridge University Press, 1962), p.23.

2 Ibid., p.36. 3 Ruth First, op.cit., p.77.

4 W. Gutteridge, "Military Forces in Colonial Africa," in Gann and Duigan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, p.302.

soldiers the object of popular hate. As Sir Louis Ojukwu recalled:

During the war, we collected some military stores in a cluster of buildings in Clifford Street, which is now an eyesore ... I agree that during the war years we like to accommodate them, but nobody likes to live with soldiers. We like them, they are our brothers; but at the same time we would like them to be far from us.¹

Through most of the colonial period, Western Nigeria viewed the army as an alien institution. This was due in part to the fact that the Nigerian Battalions of the R.W.A.F.F. were recruited mainly from Hausa speakers, and partly to the fact that the soldiers were seen only in time of trouble such as the Egba uprisings of 1918 and at other times when local situations warranted the reassertion of authority.

The Yorubas refused to don the White man's uniform. Epithets suggesting inferiority were hurled at soldiers. Perhaps, the fact that soldiers were paid less than other governmental functionaries helped to reinforce the negative image.

This plight of soldiers was vividly illustrated by Mr. Eneh (an M.P. from Calabar and a retired Ex-Serviceman) who said in exasperation:

People are jeered at when they want to join the Army, the reason being that soldiers are treated

1 H. R. Debates, 17 March 1956, Col. 1174. Sir Louis Ojukwu was the father of the future Biafran leader - Odumegwu Ojukwu. Odumegwu Ojukwu at that time was employed as a District Officer in the Administrative Service.

no better than labourers ... There is a psychology in this country that when someone is badly paid, that man is inferior.¹

N. J. Miners noted that "in towns, particularly among the Yoruba in Lagos, soldiers were more frequently a butt for ribald wit than an object of national admiration."² At the time of the Queen's visit in 1956, another expatriate Military Officer had written a letter to the West African Pilot stating:

I have visited many countries in my life, but in none have I seen soldiers being treated with such discourtesy as I have in Nigeria, especially here in Lagos ... What I see in Lagos is abuse, insult, derision, amounting to causing some minor degree of dissatisfaction among the rank and fileScarcely a year passes without some irresponsible citizen inventing some abusive epithet or another for the soldiers.³

These negative views and the aversion of Nigerians to soldiers was caused in part by the way the British treated the Nigerians in their service. There was differential treatment between British soldiers and their Nigerian counterparts suggesting that the Nigerians were seventh-rate.

For instance, "An African R.S.M. received less than £20 a month, travelled second-class on the railway and was responsible for his wife's transportation while a British Army sergeant whose wife was with him in Nigeria was paid more than £20 a week,

1 N. J. Miners, op.cit., p.30.

2 West African Pilot, 8 February 1956, reprinted in N. Miners, op.cit., pp. 30-31

3 Ibid.

travelled first-class and had leave passages for his wife and children.¹ As in the other sections of the public service, white officers were paid substantial expatriate allowance of between £ 180 and £ 300 a year,² above their Nigerian counterparts. Thus the impression circulated that the Nigerians earned little more than "starvation wages" and that they were performing slave labour.

Ruth First illustrates the fact of discrimination against Nigerians in the army stating:

From the formation of the WAFF until the outbreak of the Second World War, Nigerian soldiers had not been allowed footwear on parade or ordinary duties, only on long marches. African feet were supposedly hardened enough not to need shoes. Their uniform was deliberately made baggy: for free movement the army decreed; but "to make us look native," as a Nigerian soldier who rose to the rank of brigadier remarked. The knee-length shorts (known as a long short) were not provided with pockets, and whether this was official thinking or not, Nigerians suspected it was suspected the average "native" soldier was supposed to be a thief, and the provision of pockets would encourage stealing A Nigerian soldier whatever rank had to stand to attention even to a British sergeant, and he had to salute white civilians. Then there was the glaring discrimination in pay scales³

The special privileges granted to British Non-Commissioned officers but denied their Nigerian counterpart was cause for adverse comment and criticism by the military. British and

1 N. J. Miners, op.cit., p.21.

2 Ibid.

3 Op.cit., p.80.

Nigerian officers attended different messes, and special schools were maintained exclusively for children of white service men.

This caught the attention of Eneh who commented:

You have African Warrant officers and British Warrant officers. These people are not messing in the same place. They do not live together, they do not eat together. They are so separated that they are treated as people who are not working together, and in actual fact, the payment which is given to these men is so different.¹

The adverse comment was directed against Nigerians who were being treated as servants regardless of their ranks..

Having said this, it is necessary to emphasize that the Nigerian military men were not being treated much worse than their compatriots in other branches of the public service. In fact, it is necessary to digress a bit to examine the British attitude to other educated Nigerians employed in the Civil Service.

Though scattered exceptions were to be found here and there, the European attitude to Nigerians was generally one of condescension and contempt: Charles Roden Buxton after visiting Africa remarked that:

Few white people have a good word to say for the educated Africans Their failings and absurdities are one of the stock subjects of conversation among the European people in West Africa.²

1 H. R. Debates, March 3, 1958, col.704.

2 C. R. Buxton, "Some African Friends," The Spectator, (December 28, 1934), p.986.

Alan Burns also noted that:

.... But there are undoubtedly still a few who have yet to learn that a black man may be a gentleman and a white man otherwise If we accept the principle that we are in Nigeria merely as trustees for the people, and that it is our business to train them as rapidly as possible for self-government, there can be no excuse for treating them in such a way that resentment and hatred is engendered.¹

Eventually a few Nigerians became well educated - at least as well as the Europeans. They could not morally be denied the jobs to which their qualifications entitled them. Yet, the colonial administrators refused to accommodate the Nigerians in the administrative, judicial and technical branches of the public service and the military. Where they were admitted, their pay, compared with the British, was ridiculously low as to cause discontent. The new rationalization was that regardless of formal education, the Nigerians did not possess the moral character required for responsible positions. Said Tremeane:

It will certainly be several generations before the West African native, however carefully trained he may be, will have gained that force of character which the Englishman now inherits as a sort of birthright and which will fit him to be placed in an independent position of authority, whether in the service of the church or the state.²

Even after the Nigerians had demonstrated superior moral force and character higher than "what the Englishman now inherits

1 A. Burns, op.cit., p. 307.

2 A. J. N. Tremeane, Niger and the West Sudan (London, 1900), p.75.

as a sort of birthright," other less racist arguments were made:

It is the cardinal principle of British Colonial policy that the interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will ... of a small minority of educated and Europeanized natives who have nothing in common with them and whose interests are often opposed to theirs.¹

It was claimed that the educated minority lacked cultural identity with the masses. This was true to some extent. Few of the educated and 'detribalized' Nigerians could speak in their vernacular. Some even tried to Europeanize the African language and looked ridiculous in the process. But whatever the shortcomings of the educated Nigerian, he was still closer to his people than foreigners in official positions to which Nigerians were being refused admission.

In short, the uneducated were lauded while ridicule was poured on the educated elements. Lugard hypothesized:

The European African differs not merely in mental outlook from other groups, but also in physique. Doctors and dentists tell us that he has become less fertile, more susceptible to lung trouble and to other diseases, and to defective dentition.²

Western education was, to this extent, bad for the moral and physical health of the African. This was the absurd reasoning of the colonial administrators whose sole desire was to preserve white domination as long as possible.

1 F. Lugard quoted by J. Coleman, Nigeria, Background to Nationalism (California: University of California, 1965), p.156.

2 F. Lugard, Dual Mandate, pp. 79-80.

A similar form of discrimination like that described above prevailed within the army, but the soldiers felt more deprived because they were denied the tax-free car allowance which their contemporaries in the civil service were paid. The professional requirements of unquestioned obedience to the command and decisions of one's superior officers - who were all British - gave the impression that everything was well in the organization. Far from it. The morale of the Nigerians was very low. One factor which helped prevent revolt against the British commanders included the realization that the officers could mobilize the support of units in other territories in the Empire to crush any revolt. In addition, a revolt could only bring recriminations and even if one superior officer had to be transferred another could be brought from the Imperial service so that nothing would be gained. Thirdly, any soldier could be fired at any time without reasons given. The suspects could be expelled without consequence.

EXTENT OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE COLONIAL ARMY

We learn to do by doing. We develop professional ethics if we are exposed to the norms of the profession over an extended period. This is the path to excellence in most human endeavours.

We have seen that Nigerians were given qualified admission into the colonial army. The discrimination against Nigerians reduced the morale of the soldiers and further dispelled any chances they might have had of internalizing military ethics. We further

observed that until shortly before political independence, few Nigerians were appointed to positions of responsibility. This parallels the situation in other establishments in a colonial situation. It resembles the legislatures and bureaucracies where effective decision-making powers were vested in the foreigners.

All these gave the colonial institutions outward forms. Among Nigerians, the level of professionalism was low. The strict military notion of hierarchy and discipline was shallow; followed more because of fear of reprisals than because they were considered right and necessary, or internalized.

As could be predicted, the colonial notions of hierarchy and discipline did not survive colonial withdrawal. The aura or legitimacy and authority which surrounded the orders of colonial officers were absent when such orders were given by Nigerians to fellow Nigerians. European notions of military professionalism survived only wherever the army retained expatriate officers in key positions,¹ and the retention of the expatriate General was to become a vital factor in the timing of coups and military insurrections.

Given the fact that the majority of the infantry were native troops - mercenaries - who could be unreliable, steps were taken by the colonial administration to maximize the reliability of soldiers. One such step was to station them far from their homes among traditional enemies or among people with whom they

¹ J. M. Lee, op.cit., p.98; R. Luckham, The Nigerian Military, Chapter X.

shared little in common.¹ Similarly, military officers were made to supervise ~~infantries~~ of different ethnic origin from theirs. This was combined with frequent transfers and relocations. The official explanation for this exercise was that the frequent transfers would give an officer a broad outlook on the problems confronting the units in different parts of the colony. The Nigerian belief was that an officer that has stayed in a place long enough to develop ties with the locality becomes, from the British point of view, a security risk. Therefore, the evolution of a leadership cult among the Nigerians was to be prevented by frequent postings.

Finally, efforts were invested into fostering rivalry between the ethnic groups, and by recruiting from groups feared by the population because of their bellicosity. In short, the colonial soldiers were considered good to the extent that they could be counted upon to suppress the endemic revolts and uprisings that the colonized people mounted from time to time. The army was simply an instrument of oppression and foreign domination.

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMY

After political independence was won in 1960, it was expected that the command of the Armed Forces would be indigenized. The political importance of the army was never underrated by the

2 Van Den Berghe in Welch (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa, pp. 258-9.

Nigerian politicians: the only exception being Awolowo who argued in favour of a small largely ceremonial army on the grounds that Nigeria's neighbours were friendly and that Nigeria had no territorial claims against her neighbours, in addition to the fact that Nigeria could not afford a large army.¹

In line with the expectations of political independence, the Nigerian leaders negotiated a phased departure of British officers and the vacancies left behind were filled by the promotion of Nigerians. The departure of the British introduced new dimensions into the role and importance of the military. Local political matters replaced the former Imperial considerations of the colonial period. The military men now have ties with the ruling civilian leaders in addition to their own views as to the direction in which the development of the country should be geared. Furthermore, the social and political problems such as regionalism which tended to dominate civilian politics affected the military through the military policies formulated by those civilians.² Although imperceptible to the general public, the power struggle among the civilians had its reverberations in the armed forces and more and more, the military men began to identify with their region

1 Obafemi Awolowo, The Autobiography of Obafemi Awolowo (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p.307.

2 More will be said about this under the selection of the First Nigerian Major General.

not only on the basis of language and religion but also of politics. Thus all major cleavages in the Nigerian society became mutually reinforcing.

The Nigerian officers were taught that the military has no business in politics. The most senior officers¹ internalized this doctrine. Brigadier Ogundipe showed his commitment to the non-interventionist doctrine when he declared: "Anyway, I must

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- 1 The majority of the officers Lt. Colonel and higher in 1966 are now either dead or have resigned from the army. The roll-call of 21 most senior officers in 1966 reads:

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Fate</u>
1	Ironsi	Major General	Killed in Coup July, 1966
2	Maimalari	Brigadier	" " " Jan. 1966
3	Ademulegun	"	" " " " "
4	Ogundipe	"	Became Diplomat in July 1966, resigned from Army in 1971 and died shortly after.
5	Kur Mohamed	Colonel	Killed in Jan. Coup
6	Shodeinde	"	" " " " "
7	Adebayo*	"	Commander of Mil. Academy
8	Largema	Lt.Colonel	Killed in Jan 1966 Coup
9	Pam	" "	" " " " "
10	Uneghe	" "	" " " " "
11	Fajuyi	" "	" " July " "
12	Banjo	" "	Joined Biafra, Executed in September 1967
13	Njoku	" "	Joined Biafra
14	Imo	" "	" "
15	Ojukwu	" "	Now in exile
16	Effiong	" "	Dismissed by Tribunal 1971
17	Nwanwo	" "	In detention in Nigeria
18	Bassey	" "	Diplomat
19	Kurubo	" "	"
20	Gowon **	" "	Head of State
21	Ejoor **	" "	Chief of Staff

* Of all those of Colonel or higher rank in 1966, only Adebayo is alive.

** Of all Lt. Colonel and higher, only Gowon, Ejoor and Adebayo are still in regular military service.

explain to you that it is not in the nature of officers with my upbringing to want to interfere in politics. We are taught to be good soldiers not politicians."¹

Even though the soldiers might have been prepared to stay in their professional roles and away from politics, the vicissitudes of post-independence politics made the politicians draw the army into politics to prop their regimes. The army was called from time to time to perform police functions during civilian uprisings. In this role, the Nigerian army took part in the Cameroons operations in 1959-60, and in the Pacification of the Tiv Division in 1964. On the international scene, it saw active duty in the United Nations' Operations in the Congo from 1961-64, and in Tanzania in 1964.

It is not necessary to describe the details of these operations² but it should be noted that in each case the army was called to meet emergencies which the civilian politicians could not resolve and in every case, the army met the challenge and succeeded in restoring peace. Though these expeditions might have added nothing to the military training of the men involved, they left a

1 Brigadier Ogundipe's Interview with Raph Uwechue reported in Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War (London: International Publishers, 1969), p.66.

2 A comprehensive narration of the history of the military expeditions in the Cameroons and the Tiv Division can be found in N. J. Miners, op.cit., pp. 71-92.

lasting impression on the soldiers: that the civilian politicians were dependent on them and without the support of the armed forces, the civilian politicians would fall. As S.G.Ikoku, a prominent Nigerian politician remarked:

In the First Republic, the Army merely tagged along as the mailed fist to the political pundits. It was only natural for the Army hierarchy to conclude that real power was in fact vested in it. And when they decided to step into the political arena on their own, no longer as agents of political groupings they were merely consummating a trend which the civilian politicians themselves had set in motion.¹

As long as the command of the armed forces rested with the expatriates, the government could count on the loyalty of the hierarchy. But if the commander were to be a Nigerian, he would have sentiments and definite views about the direction in which politics ought to move, and he could use the weapons to forcefully change the government. In addition, the ever-present fear of tribalism and the fear that the General might topple the government and impose a new one headed by someone from his tribe crept into official thinking. Above all these, the North-South conflict surfaced over Nigerianization. As in civilian life, southerners in the army were generally qualified in larger numbers than Northerners and therefore formed a large proportion of the officers even though Northerners were a majority in the ranks. Some Northern politicians suggested a quota system for the recruitment and promotion of officers. In support of a quota system, Abdullahi Magajin Musawa, a Northern

1 S. G. Nkoku, "The Military Rule, part II," Afriscopes, II, No.2 (February, 1972), p.31.

Member of Parliament stated:

I am appealing to the Hon. Prime Minister, that we in Nigeria should be united in diversity. I think it would be a good idea if we equalized our army officers ... so that the officers in (from) the Eastern Region, the Northern Region, and the Western Region are equalized.¹

On the other hand Southerners argued in favour of an undiluted merit system the operation of which would have entrenched a southern majority in the higher echelons of the army. Fortunately for National integration, the suggestion of a quota system was accepted - 50 per cent of new appointments going to the North and 25 per cent each for the Western and Eastern Regions.

The quota arrangement was not restricted to initial entry into the Force. The imbalance created by the colonial practices (where officers were mainly Southerners and the Northerners composed the ranks), the North argued, must be corrected. Redressing the balance in this way meant favouring the North. Southern officers eligible for promotion would have to stand by while Northern officers with shorter service are promoted. Such a practice would have promoted communal dissension and inflamed regionalism among soldiers. It was to the credit of the Prime Minister that the demand for a quota system in promoting officers was rejected.

The Western Region did not fill the quota assigned to it due mainly to the fact that the Yoruba did not join the army in

1 H. R. Debates, 14 April, 1960, Col.1252.

large numbers. The Eastern Region filled its vacancies without major problems. Within the North, an informal provincial quota system was put into operation. Through this, efforts were made to attain ethnic balance among the soldiers from the North. The areas which had been over-represented in the past were given reduced quotas. However aspiring recruits from such areas became adept at breaking the system: they took on Hausa names and gave their origins as some centre in the far North such as the Fulani Heartlands where people were also reluctant to join the armed forces.¹

SELECTING THE AFRICAN HEAD OF THE ARMY

The last foreigner to command the Nigerian army (Major General Welby-Everard) left in February 1965, and a Nigerian was appointed the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. While the vacancy provided Nigerians with an opportunity for promotion and advancement, it rendered the regime vulnerable to the whims of revolutionaries from within its borders as it could no longer count on external help to suppress internal uprisings. Therefore, the political perspectives of the would-be Nigerian General became an important consideration.

The loyalty of the British Major General to the government was not doubted and he could have remained in the post for life if loyalty alone were the only consideration. But the wave of

1 See Ruth First, op.cit., p.161. She noted that in some areas the bribe to be paid the recruiting officer ranged between £10 and £20.

nationalism caught up with foreigners and there were demands from several quarters for complete indigénisation.

The military was indirectly dragged into politics during the process of selecting the First Nigerian Commander. The question was not "Who is the most qualified Nigerian for the post?" but "Who is the most reliable Nigerian?"¹ Each major politician seemed for various reasons, to have sponsored someone for the position. The list was shortened to three, namely Brigadiers Maimalari (from the North), Ademulegun (from the West) and Ironsi (from the Eastern Region.)²

In an uncommon display of moral and political strength the Prime Minister resisted pressure to appoint a Northerner as Commander in Chief and Ironsi was appointed in February 1965 even against the wishes of the Sardauna of Sokoto who promoted the candidacy of Brigadier Maimalari.³

This appointment completed the evolution of the Nigerian army. The reorganized colonial army was now called upon to transform itself into an effective tool for national development. The low morale of the ranks was to be replaced with burning nationalism and patriotism. Those who had been previously denied

1 Due to the importance of the Commander, politicians in the N.P.C. attempted to win the post for a Northern Nigerian Officer. Even though Ironsi was the most senior officer, Northerners expressed fears about the political danger of selecting a Southerner for the post. See N. J. Miners, pp. 148-149.

2. Ibid., p.148.

3 Ibid.

amenities but who had just been exposed to luxuries were called upon to display the "non-indulgent" tendencies of the professional military! How could they?

THE COUP IN NIGERIA

The desire to replace the civilian politicians rose as the prestige of the politicians declined. The recurrent political deadlock, the failure of the attempts at conducting the national census in 1962 and again in 1963, the violence which accompanied the Federal Elections of 1964-65 and the Western Regional Elections of 1965,¹ and the breakdown of law and order in certain parts of the Federation all demonstrated the weakness of the political institutions and made military intervention more likely.

The political parties in Nigeria were all weak and they showed contradictions.² The three major political parties, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG) were each too closely associated with particular ethnic groups to act as a catalyst for the integration of the ethnic groups. However, despite this weakness, the politicians were able to compromise at necessary times and patch up their differences.

1 For details, see Michael Vickers, The Nigerian Federal Elections 1964-65, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1966.

2 Richard Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," Journal of Modern African Political Studies, III, no. 2 (1965), 201-213.

The mental disposition of the military became the major factor in its intervention. Following the December 1964 General Elections, the President of Nigeria, Dr. Azikiwe summoned the heads of the Police, Army and Navy and announced that in view of the present crisis, he proposed to take control and asked for their support.¹ The senior officers refused to support him. They refused to recognize the President's authority to command them and instead took orders from the Prime Minister.² The coup which deposed the civilian government was organized by more junior officers, none of whom was higher than the rank of Major: Majors Nzeogwu, Ifeajuna, Okafor Chukuka, Anuforo Ademoyega and Captain Oji.³ Rumours of the majors' coup spread but the senior officers played down the importance of the plot.⁴ They reasoned that a coup could not occur in Nigeria because of the Federal structure, the distance separating the various regional capitals, and the fact that it would be difficult to coordinate a coup in the various centres of political power. As it turned out, these problems were surmounted.

The Nigerian Coup was complex. It mixed some elements of reactive 'intervention',⁵ came as a result of 'Power inflation',⁶

1 N. J. Miners, op.cit., p.143.

2 Ibid. 3 See Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military, pp. 17-18.

4 Ibid., p.18.

5 The term is used here as was used by M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development, p.16.

6 See Aristide Zolberg, "The Structures of Political Conflict", loc.cit.

and the wave of lawlessness which the civilian administrators had been unable to curtail, and combined the 'manifest destiny of the military' and national interests with what appeared to be sectional interests.¹

The majority of the Majors who planned the coup were Ibos. The Federal Prime Minister and other politicians murdered were non-Ibos. All but one of the military officers killed were also non-Ibos. (see page 36 of this chapter). This apparent one-sided murder of politicians and officers created suspicion in the minds of non-Ibos. Major Nzeogwu's explanation that he and his men started the coup with good intentions and that some 'developed cold feet at the execution of their assignments' did not remove that suspicion. Thus while the coup leaders talked about the 'miscarriage of plans', the North particularly deliberated about the intention of the young Ibo officers.

One other significant effect of the miscarriage of plans was that the officers who planned the coup did not inherit political power. Instead, the senior officers who probably gave no thoughts

1 There have been series of debates as to whether the coup was organized mainly by Ibo officers to promote Ibo political interests. There is evidence in support of the assertion that while the plan was carried out by officers from different parts of the Federation, the execution of the play was betrayed. Those officers assigned to eliminate the Ibo politicians failed to carry out their assignments. As a result, while the politicians from other parts of the Federation were assassinated, the Ibo leaders went unhurt. To further complicate the matter, the military officer who inherited political office following the coup was himself an Ibo.

to military intervention or post-coup political policies inherited the fruits of power. Thus the military government started without definite programmes. In addition, those who were 'placéd' in power did not believe that it was the duty of the military to govern. In the next two chapters we shall examine the performance of the military regime of the Western State to see how far it has been able to correct the ills with which it charged the civilian politicians whom the soldiers replaced. In effect, we shall observe how the non-interventionist military culture influences the political behaviour of soldiers after they take over political power.

CONCLUSION

The Colonial Army was created to serve Imperial interests. Initially, preference was accorded illiterates and Northerners. The official policy limited the upper ranks to which Nigerians could be promoted. The recruitment of illiterates and obvious discrimination against Nigerians in the Army influenced the thinking in Southern Nigeria that the military was an institution for those who could not succeed in other careers; and consequently, the prestige of the military was low.

Until 1946 Nigerians were not recruited to the officer ranks and after this period, only in small numbers. The situation gradually improved in the early fifties. In view of the low prestige of the military in Nigeria, the officers identified with European norms and values. This kind of reference-group

identification of the officers has been termed "anticipatory socialization" by Robert Merton.¹

Despite this disadvantage, the Nigerian Military was able to effect a coup in January 1966. However, political inexperience and the adoption of reference-group norms, which preach that the military has no place in politics, inhibit the officers from performing the political functions they themselves took on. Their performance is examined in the next two chapters.

1 Anticipatory socialization is defined as identification with and concomitant adoption of the values of a group to which the recruit aspires but does not belong. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1963), p.265; see also Robert Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New State," p.407.

CHAPTER FOUR

MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN POLITICAL ROLE

As soon as soldiers take on political functions, they have to make decisions which affect the lives of the citizens of their countries. Soon, they acquire a record of successes and failures. What becomes relevant is their record as politicians, administrators and organizers. They might have been excellent soldiers, yet if they fail in politics, the public would forget about the previous military records and evaluate them on the basis of their political record. In other words, the record of achievement from military roles is not transferrable to the political scene; neither can political records be converted to military advantage. Therefore, when soldiers intrude into politics, it should be with the understanding that they are on a course on which they have limited experience and for which they might be ill-prepared.

In the last chapter, we observed that the popular image of soldiers in Nigerian societies was poor. Yet the poorer image of civilian politicians had overshadowed that of the soldiers so that there was public support for the military take over.

ASSETS OF THE MILITARY

As had been stated elsewhere the knowledge most Nigerians had of the military before the coup was that it was a collection

of ruffians who were generally feared and despised. Yet, the army had rid the masses of the oppressive civilian regime. In addition, the soldiers promised to end corruption, tribalism and violent politics which had plagued the country since independence.

The hatred for the civilian politicians was so total that the defects of the soldiers who displaced them were overlooked. In this way, the public was prepared to give any order which appeared different from that of the deposed civilians a good chance to succeed. During the first three months all the soldiers had to say was that they would do things differently. Such a proclamation was sufficient to evoke a spirit of sacrifice from the people.

Thus, the primary boost to the morale of the soldiers came from the general public. The excitement was reminiscent of the emotional uplift enjoyed during independence celebrations in October 1960. It was a mandate for the soldiers.¹

With such a mandate to "change things" in whatever direction they wished, the soldiers could act and count on willing obedience on the part of the general public. In effect, the soldiers were strategically placed to effect a quiet revolution.

One of the popular complaints from many quarters after the departure of the colonial rulers was that freedom had given way

1 See comments in support of the Military takeovers in chapter six, pp.199-202 of this thesis.

to lawlessness.¹ The political thuggery from 1962 to the Coup helped to perpetuate this negative image so that many influentials looked to the day when some order would be put back into all aspects of life.

The decisiveness, discipline and order manifested within the army enticed them to the hearts of the "law and order" men. The military gave further hope of restoring discipline to Nigerian life by prescribing a number of offences to be severely dealt with. For the first time, the exercise of authority was seen and this commanded respect for the "brave young officers."

Finally, the top military officers who inherited the fruits of the coup in which the same officers had been slated to die had long been associated with the civilian leaders. They had shared the civilians' quest for a general improvement in their condition of life and even though many of them were deployed against the agitators for independence, their sentiments remained with the nationalists.²

For this reason, many of them have become aware of some of the problems of governing the Western Region. In addition soldiers had been called from time to time to perform civil and police functions. Under normal conditions the experience gained

1 This was the theme of the discussion one of the prominent chiefs had with the author.

2 G. O. Olusanya, "The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics," The Journal of Modern African Studies, VI (2) (1968), 221-232.

in these operations opened the eyes of the soldiers to the complexities of politics and such knowledge would be expected to aid them in their self chosen function of governing.

By comparison, the military was more highly respected than the police who had been so closely associated with the civilian politicians that they shared most of the blame for the malpractices of the civilian regime. Similarly, the police were seen to be corrupt while the potentialities of the soldiers for corruption had yet to be demonstrated.

THE LIABILITIES

The "miscarriage"¹ of the January 15 coup left political power in the hands of senior officers. It is open to doubt if those senior officers had anticipated a coup and consequently, they had given no thought to the form of their administration. As a result of this, military officers inherited political power before they had thought about the ends such political authority would be employed to serve. In his first press conference Ironsi displayed lack of fore-thought.

Asked whether in the meantime he would appoint a cabinet, he looked up at the ceiling for a minute and then passed without a word to the next question. Clearly, it had never occurred to him.²

1 As illustrated in chapter three.

2 Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), p.200.

Ironsi reiterated that he wanted an end to regionalism, tribal loyalties and activities which promote tribal consciousness and sectional interests, yet, his first significant political act reflected a deep commitment to tribalism. Four governors were selected for the regions of the federation, and they were tribally screened. Lt. Colonel Ojukwu (an Ibo) was made military Governor of the Eastern Region; Lt. Colonel Fajuyi (a Yoruba) for the West; Lt. ^{Colonel} David Ejoor (an Urhobo) for the Mid-Western State, and Major Hassan Katsina (a Fulani) for the Northern Region.

To the young officers who had planned the coup, it looked as if they had achieved nothing given the fact that tribalism and regionalism had been reinstated. Since success is best judged on the basis of goals attempted, Ironsi who pronounced an end to regionalism appeared to have made a bad start.

Another liability was the traditional negative orientation to the armed forces. The soldiers' image had not improved. They were still regarded with contempt; as a collection of those who had failed in other highly reputed endeavours. Professor Aluko represented this negative image when he wrote:

Look round Africa and you see that most of those that were rejected from the corridors of secondary schools, colleges, universities and other educational institutions are today at the helm of political affairs.¹

1. S. Aluko, "How Best to Reform Our Society," Daily Sketch, Wednesday, January 12, 1972, p.5.

Yet, education remained one of the most highly prized commodities in Nigerian society as it was supposed to open new vistas to the lucky few who went through the selective school system. Those who could not succeed in the highly competitive school system were regarded as inferior. Therefore, the soldiers most of whom joined the army because they had been rejected at the corridors of educational institutions were considered inferior beings. This feeling towards the military reduces the tolerance of the masses to the failure of the military leaders. In this way, the masses readily manifest anomic behaviour when the leaders make mistakes.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE WESTERN STATE MILITARY REGIME

The art of effective governing requires that some communication be established between the government and the governed. By definition, a system of communication links the various groups, interests and sections of the society. The frequency of communication provides an insight into intra-societal relationships; the lack of communication reflects social isolation, distance and

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- 1 Robin Luckham noted that the military itself was aware of of this feeling towards it and that the effect had been a sort of anti-intellectualism and emphasis on collective honour on the part of the military: that is, a retreat from the cultural standards by which it is evaluated so lowly. See The Nigerian Military, Chapter Four, especially p.119.

estrangement.¹ In government, efforts to unite a disparate group of people and mobilize them for political action and developmental purposes (without employing coercion) must be premised on a high level of information interchange and communication. Similarly, the consolidation of the legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the establishment of effective lines of communication through which the people are informed about the achievements and goals of their government; and which gives the people a sense of meaningful participation in the formulation of policies.

According to Ake:

Communication facilities are an important instrument of government power. The existence of channels of communication between the political class and the governed enhances the government's ability to influence the behaviour of its citizens....There is also a need for channels for transmitting ideas and information from the people to the political class. In the first place, this helps to give the governed some sense of having some control over events and to neutralize their tendency to feel helpless and alienated. But just as important is the fact that this upward flow of ideas and information helps the political class to understand the governed. By understanding the fears, the beliefs, the interests and life expectations of the governed, the political class is better equipped for determining what incentives to offer, what superstitions to exploit, and what pressures to apply, to mobilize support for its policies.²

1 For a theoretical examination of this theme, see Karl Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," and "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," both articles in P. Jacob and J. Toscano (eds.) The Integration of Political Communities (New York: Lippincott Company, 1964), pp. 46-119; also K. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1963), especially pp. 77-78.

2 Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 108-109.

David Apter made a similar point by stating that, "the more information the less the need for coercion."¹

Military regimes need to understand the needs, feelings and aspirations of their citizens and military regimes like other forms of government will benefit from the establishment of communication channels particularly at the initial period of their reign. As M. J. Dent pointed out:

Where military regimes have succeeded for any length of time in establishing stable and acceptable governments, it is because they have found means either by themselves or in co-operation with others to fulfill these (communications) functions.²

Similarly, John D. Chick explains:

Effective channels(of communication) identify large numbers of people with a single process of formulating, expressing and exchanging ideas. This creates an area of shared experience and helps to build bridges across vertical divisions of tribe and horizontal divisions of incipient class which may represent disabling discontinuities within the body politic.³

The Nigerian Military leaders faced the difficulty of establishing channels of communication with the people in January 1966. The military was inexperienced in the art of communicating

1 David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p.409.

2 M. J. Dent "The Military and the Politicians," in S.K. Panter-Brick (ed.), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), pp. 78-93.

3 John D. Chick "The Nigerian Press and National Integration," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, IX, no. 2 (July, 1971), 1199.

with civilians and the civilians in turn were afraid of the military.¹ However, the affairs of the first six months of military rule were dominated by the centralist policies of Ironsi, the Military Head of State. After Ironsi established himself in power and appointed Regional Governors, "at the centre and in each Region, a small council was formed consisting of the Governor, the military commander in the region and one or two civil servants to give general direction."² The Permanent Secretaries in each Ministry were left in charge of the operations of their Ministries.

At the centre, Ironsi surrounded himself with a select group of Ibo advisors.³ A National Orientation Committee empowered to make surprise checks on civil servants in order to prevent absenteeism and inefficiency was created.⁴

The Regional Governors were empowered to issue edicts while the Federal military leaders issued decrees which could override the edicts.⁵ The emphasis of the Federal Military leaders was on centralizing power and increasing the authority of the

1 The fact that soldiers are distinguished by special uniforms which set them apart from the rest of the society creates some uneasiness among the civilians when they interact with soldiers. This uneasiness disrupts the communication flow. Some soldiers interviewed by the author reported that their relations advised that they should appear in ~~Mufti~~ whenever they came home for visits as military uniforms make them (the relations) tense.

2 For details of the Civil Servants, see N. J. Miners, The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966, pp. 187-188.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p.188.

5 Ibid.

Federal Government vis-a-vis the Regions. This effort culminated in Decree 34 of May 1966 which relegated the Regional governments to provinces and abolished the Federal constitutional structure.¹ In this way, most of the actions of the Ironsi regime constituted means of controlling the people.

The Fajuyi regime in the Western State did not do better than the Ironsi's at the centre. It too dissolved the elected local government councils and appointed civil servants to oversee the functions previously performed by the councils. Partisan political activities were declared illegal. The Governor also failed to seek the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the jailed leader of the Action Group and former Leader of Opposition in the Federal House of Representatives.² Both Ironsi and Fajuyi were killed in the Coup of July 29, 1966, and Gowon emerged at the centre while Adebayo was appointed the military governor of the Western State.

1 Decree 34 abolished the regions and unified the civil services of the Federation. General Ironsi's methods rather than his motive for promulgating the Decree were subject to adverse criticism as he acted before the commission set up to examine the future constitution for Nigeria had time to report. The true reasons for the Decree may never be known as the participants are now dead. However, the impression that the military regime might attempt to establish Southern and perhaps Ibo domination circulated and this precipitated the counter coup of July 1966. For further discussions of Decree 34 and its aftermath, see *Ibid.*, Chapter XI, pp. 194-226.

2 From January till May 1966, delegations were sent from the Western Region to Ironsi pleading for the release of Awolowo, but Ironsi refused to listen apparently because Awolowo "would not beg for release nor accept any particular terms of release, for he regarded his release not as a favour but ... as an act of liberation demanded by the people of Nigeria. See D.J.Dent, *op.cit.*, p.83.

Gowon's early actions helped Governor Adebayo tremendously. Awolowo, a one-time leader of the Western Region whose imprisonment in 1963 contributed to the stalemate in the Region which in turn led to the military coup of January 1966, was released from prison on August 2nd 1966, thus removing the major cause of dissent among his followers in the country. That done, it became possible to pacify the Yorubas.

Governor Adebayo probably meant to acknowledge the failure of the Fajuyi administration with regards to the continued detention of Awolowo after January 1966 when he stated:

As many of you have noted, the announcement of my appointment coincided with another event which is of momentous importance to all Nigerians. Here, I refer to the release from prison of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and other Nigerian Leaders The release of Chief Awolowo has for some time been the burning desire of most of our people in Nigeria I trust we have learnt the necessary lesson from the regrettable events of the last few days¹

Soon after his release, Awolowo toured the Region. He helped to appease his supporters and many communities had the opportunity to express their grievances which were passed on to the Governor. In this way, he was performing a vital communication function, linking the rulers and the ruled.

The new Governor wasted no time in opening many channels of communication. He invited three separate groups from the

¹ Governor Adebayo's maiden speech to the people of Western Nigeria, Thursday, 4th August, 1966.

public - the University Professors and Lecturers,¹ prominent citizens known as the 'Leaders of Thought',² and the Obas and Chiefs.³ In the Governor's own words, the leaders "had been drawn from various provinces, divisions and areas in the Western Region of Nigeria and Lagos as prominent citizens and leaders ... capable of reflecting the views, yearnings and aspirations of our people from all parts of Western Nigeria."⁴

This action reflected the realization on the part of the Governor that he must speak with the people, listen to them and at least give the impression that his policies incorporated their desires. To perform this duty, Governor Adebayo sought the help of experienced politicians by drawing some of them into the military government as Civil Commissioners.⁵ He went to lengths to justify his action given the fact that the military had earlier vowed to 'keep the politicians out.' He advanced four reasons for his decision to select the civil commissioners, stating:

-
- 1 The meeting with this group was held on Tuesday, August 9, 1966.
 - 2 Meeting took place on August 11, 1966.
 - 3 The Governor met with this group on August 10, 1966.
 - 4 Governor Adebayo's address to the Leaders of Thought Meeting held in Ibadan, 11th of August, 1966. Lagos was mentioned so as to affirm Yoruba solidarity as Lagos was not a part of the Western Region.
 - 5 Governor Adebayo, "Civil Commissioners Join Military Government," Address at the Swearing-In Ceremony, Ibadan, Friday, June 30th, 1967 (Ibadan: Government Printer, 1967).

- 1) It marks for us in the Western State a stage at which the military Government deems it fit to invite men who have had considerable experience in public affairs and who are capable of contributing a lot to the welfare of our people to assist in running the Military Government. It is a deliberate faith in the people of this state and in their leaders from among whom the Civil Commissioners have been chosen.
- 2) There is ample justification for this deliberate act of faith. It is justified because it gives us twelve men, rich in experience and mature in judgement, who are willing to serve at the very centre of governmental activity for the benefit of the teeming millions in this state.
- 3) It is justified also because it provides an opportunity for the military Government to come into closer contact with some of those who can interpret the wishes of the ordinary people among whom they wield influence.
- 4) It is again justified because, in a practical manner it gives point to the statement so often repeated by me and my colleagues that we would like to hand over the reins of government to civilians as quickly as possible and return to barracks.¹

This selection of civil commissioners seem to confirm Samuel Finer's hypothesis that "soldiers can only rule through civilian cabinets or else pretend to be something other than they are."²

In the remainder of this Chapter, we shall examine how the military regime used the communications channels, which new ones were created and how effective they were.

1 Ibid.

2 S. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p.14.

THE PRESS

In his book, Coup D'Etat, Littwak stressed that coup leaders need to control the means of communication in the early moments of their activity. Among the vital links mentioned are radio and television installations, the external links such as the telephone services and most important the weapons of coercion. All these were available to the Western Nigerian military rulers. However, certain socio-economic factors made it mandatory for the regime to cultivate other ways of reaching the people.

Radio and television addresses were employed, broadcasts were made in English and Yoruba. The shortage of receivers made this device unproductive of desired effects. Little advance warning of impending broadcasts was given so that people who did not own sets could listen from somewhere, or for those who own sets to tune in. As a result, the coverage was scanty.

Perhaps press releases and articles in the daily newspapers can aid the government. Literacy in English or the vernacular languages is low. Poverty is another factor. The fraction of the population who can read newspapers is further reduced by the number who can afford to buy the papers in circulation.

The Regional breakdown of average Daily Circulation of newspapers as of March 1964 was:

TABLE 2
CIRCULATION OF NEWSPAPERS IN NIGERIA, 1964

	Lagos	West	Mid- West	East	North	Total
Daily Times	33,240	22,170	10,100	17,330	11,120	95,650
Daily Express	21,200	18,530	1,680	4,480	2,080	48,570
West African Pilot	6,700	4,840	1,000	5,610	3,840	23,200
Nigerian Tribune	2,250	2,750	-	-	-	5,000
Nigerian Morning Post	11,800	9,990	2,380	8,220	2,380	35,390
Nigerian Outlook	1,620	150	420	15,660	150	18,000
Nigerian Citizen	300	200	-	85	7,520	8,100
Daily Sketch	-	2,000	-	-	-	-

Source: Marcia Grant - "The Nigerian Press," J. of Commonwealth Political Studies, IX, no.2 (July 1971), pp. 95-114.

Newspaper sales are a poor guide to its circulation. A United Nations report in 1966 put the average readership of every copy of newspaper bought in Nigeria at six. Since all daily newspapers sold in Western Nigeria had a circulation of 60,540, the circulation or total readership of newspapers will be about 363,240. This indicates that considerably less than 3 per cent of the inhabitants of the Western Region read newspapers. This is well

below the ten copies per hundred regarded as desirable minimum by UNESCO.¹

Even under ideal conditions, the effectiveness of newspapers is reduced as information tends to be asymmetrical. The statements of political leaders and important personalities can be recorded with ease, but it is difficult to reflect the changing climate of opinion and moods of the public. In other words, journalists do not find it easy to print the views of the man on the street. Information therefore trickles down from the leaders without a corresponding upward movement of information (reflecting the tax-payers' feelings and desires) to the leaders. To the extent that this happens, newspapers will be reduced to no more than public relations organs for the authority.

The Western State Government had closed one door when it rejected the recommendation of the Ayoola Report that it should appoint a public complaints commission.² In rejecting the recommendation, the Government argued that "local advisory committees will provide an appropriate forum for the ventilation

1 Unesco considers that a country is insufficiently supplied with information media if it has less than 10 copies of a daily newspaper, five radio receivers and two cinema seats for every 100 people. Unesco, World Communications, Press Radio, Television, Film, (Paris, 1966), p.102.

2 The Governments response to the Ayoola recommendations was published in a White Paper titled: The Ayoola Tax-Agitation Probe: Commission's Recommendations and Government Decisions (Government Printer, Ibadan, 1969), especially pp. 9-10.

of public grievances at the local level where they can be fully discussed with a view to finding appropriate remedies."¹

The Government seemed also to have ignored the argument that the local advisory councils it talked about were suspected by the common man of being too close to the Government and therefore the people did not feel free to complain to them.²

In the absence of elected representatives to articulate the wishes of the people, the newspaper editors found themselves in a position to act as safety valves for the expression of dissent against government policies. For example, the Daily Express of September 25, 1969 called upon those who had genuine grievances against the Government of the Western state to pass them to the paper for transmission to the appropriate quarters. Similarly, the Daily Times of September 27, 1969 charged the Federal Government by stating:

It is significant that the Federal Government has failed to indicate by which means it hopes to ascertain the grievances of the people. Precisely what forum exists at the moment through which aggrieved citizens could bare their chests without fear of victimization? In the absence of representative assemblies, it is necessary that some means should be devised by which citizens would be enabled to offer frank criticism of government which has come to the rescue of the Western State Government in the efforts to tighten security will persuade the Western State Government to reconsider its views about the need to appoint a complaints commission.³

1 Ibid. 2 Ayoola Report, pp. 96-97.

3 Daily Times, September 27 1969, p.3.

The newspapers had thus taken a stand on the side of the people vis-a-vis the government. However, the Government moved to restrict the freedom of the press by enacting Decree 53 which made it an offence "for any person to publish in a newspaper, on television or radio, or by any other means of mass-communication, any matter which by reason of dramatisation or other defects in the manner of its presentation is likely to cause public alarm or industrial unrest."

This Decree was all-encompassing. The Government used the wide powers with the consequence that "almost every editor of any important newspaper including those owned by the Governments has seen the inside of a police cell or army orderly room."¹ It is fair therefore to conclude that apart from the economic difficulties which restrict the circulation of newspapers, the work of pressmen has been made more difficult by the military government's over-sensitivity. The press has consequently been unable to provide the vital communication link uniting the government and the governed.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICE

The Western State Ministry of Home Affairs and Information attempted to rectify some structural deficiencies in its

1 See Alhaji Babatunde Jose "Why Nigerian Newspapers Can't Publish and Be Damned," Daily Times, December 2, 1971, p.7; See also Daily Express, October 7, 1969, p.4.

organization during 1969. The administration of information formerly centralized in Ibadan was reviewed. Five new zonal centres were created at Ado Ekiti, Abeokuta, Akure, Oshogbo and Ibadan. The headquarters unit in Ibadan, besides its co-ordinating activities, was responsible for the only Film-lending Library.

These structural changes notwithstanding, the information centres suffer from a deficiency of materials, experienced personnel, and people with initiative. The deficiency of materials makes them dependent on Ibadan for all the papers they distribute; the lack of initiative reduces the centres to government propaganda outlets. Senior officers in the centres are seasoned civil servants who believe that they only do as they are instructed from above and never from below. They have to this extent, been unable to comprehend the fact that information centres have a second function - to present the view of the masses to the ruling authorities.¹

The traditional practice whereby affected parties communities and interests petition directly to the Ministry and the Military Governor for redress of grievances has continued. The drawback with this mode of communication is that many people view it as their last resort, coming only after other techniques have failed. Consequently it is erratic. Being so, it is not

1 The author visited two of the new outlets and most of the materials distributed had been sent from Ministry of Information, Ibadan.

an effective way to know the changing mood of the people.

In addition the application of lobbying techniques became more difficult as the number of protests increased. Said one "Leader of Thought", "The civil servants in Ibadan played on the soldiers' anti-social tendencies by turning the peoples' delegations back on the pretext that the soldiers did not wish to see them." The writer was also made to understand that the success of delegations to the ministry correlated directly with the number and level of officials, particularly military officers from the locality from which the delegation is sent. As one community leader lamented, "we have been coming here for the past year but we have not been answered simply because we do not have any important military officer to promote our case with the top leaders."¹

Needless to say the heavy dependence on personal contact leads to undue favouritism and administrative corruption. In addition, many illiterates do not realize that they can protest directly to the Ministry. At best, lobbying presents the government with a partial view of demands: the demands of the politically active sector of the population.

SOLE ADMINISTRATORS

As was hinted earlier in this chapter, one of the first acts of the military rulers was to proscribe all elected assemblies

1 Interview with Community Leader, Akoko Delegation to the Ministry of Health, January, 1972.

including the Local Government Councils. In place of the banned local councils, Divisional Officers, locally called 'Sole Administrators' were appointed. These officers who were regular civil servants were posted to the various Divisions to supervise the works of the councils. It was the official belief that if civil servants were appointed 'sole administrators' and posted to areas other than their hometowns, political favouritism and corruption of which the councillors had been accused would be eliminated. The government did not consider the fact that efficient government could be different from self-government or good government. The revelations of the Ayoola Report were to bring out the sad facts.¹

Since the Sole Administrators could not handle all the activities satisfactorily without help, many of them availed themselves of the services of local personalities in the form of "Advisory Councils". Without a definite guide to direct them other than their own absolute discretion, the body of men selected reflected the Administrator's political leanings. Some of the men were already discredited politicians and others were unknown to the general public. With these defects, the Sole Administrators who were strangers to the areas under them could not correctly inform the government the views of their constituents.²

In spite of this, the Military Governor employed Sole Commissioners for special ad hoc duties. They were instructed, as

1 The comments in the Ayoola Report pp. 91-92 are reproduced below.

2 Ibid.

circumstances warrant, to investigate problems brooding within their areas such as chieftancy disputes in Ogbomosho and Owo. Their reports (which were never published) were regarded as the thermometer of the climate of opinions. The general uprisings of 1968-1969 which the Sole Administrators did not detect until they actually happened convinced the Government the Administrators were insulated from the discontent in the State. In fact, a part of the dissent surrounded the offices of Sole Administrators.

Ayoola commented extensively upon this undesirable state of affairs as follows:

- 1) A Sole Administrator who sometimes has to look over and supervise the work of more than one council area which together make up his Division is physically unable to cope with the duties efficiently. This situation enabled the Local Government Council officials to become "tin gods" to be worshipped and idolized particularly in rural and remote areas. It also gave great opportunity for the perpetration of fraud on Council finances display of high handedness and other forms of oppressive conduct on the part of Council officials.
- 2) The people in each area are denied the opportunity of an effective say in the running of their affairs at Local Government Level, an opportunity which would have been open to them if they had some of their men, local men, acting at least in an advisory capacity to the Sole Administrator
- 3) The Sole Administrators appreciating that they could not by themselves discharge their functions without local aid have sometimes used their own initiatives to surround themselves with a body of advisers whom they sometimes refer to as 'Local Leaders' (in Ibadan" and 'Local Leaders of Thought' (in some other places).

It is not clear to the Commission how these bodies of Advisers were selected Their identities are sometimes unknown to the local populace, and it would appear that they held their offices, if one can rightly describe them as offices, at the pleasure of the particular Sole Administrator who selected or made use of them

- 4) Another reason which was given was that the Sole Administrators do not really understand local feelings and prejudices. They are not usually natives of the areas to which they are posted, and they do not stay long enough in an area to learn much about the people¹

In short, the Sole Administrator system did not please the populace and failed to inform the government of the desires of the localities. The government had no option but to end it; the Ayoola Report provided an easy way out.

The major issue which dominated the attention of the new military Governor (Adebayo) was Yoruba unity. In his inaugural address, he declared:

I consider it most important that the people of the Western Region should forget the recriminations and differences of the past and form a united front in order, they say, as a people, might succeed in bringing about the political, economic, and social progress of the Western Group of Provinces I therefore call upon all our people: Our Obas, Chiefs, elders, intellectuals and other leaders of thought, farmers - and indeed every Western Nigerian citizen - to let us bury the hatchet and enlist with me in this OPERATION UNITY²

¹ Ayoola Report, pp. 91-92.

² Text of Address Delivered by the Governor to the People of Western Nigeria on Thursday, August 4, 1966, pp. 1-2.

This unity was sought for two purposes, firstly, to end the political conflicts of the past years which had sent some of the Yoruba leaders to jail¹ and secondly, to present a united Yoruba front at the constitutional negotiations, the plan for which were in progress.²

To implement this desire, two political institutions were created, namely, the Council of Elders and the Organization of the Leaders of Thought. It was reasoned that the Leaders of Thought were prominent local leaders capable of reflecting the views of their various constituencies, and at their meetings, policy recommendations were to be made for the Governor. Members of all former political parties being invited, the organization was expected to lay the foundation of unity between the leaderless Nigerian New Democratic Party and the revitalized Action Group. What in effect the organization did was to reactivate the political activities of the former elected representatives. The former politicians constituted the most experienced members and formed a numerical majority of the Leaders of Thought and Council of Elders. At the first meeting, Awolowo was elected the Leader of the Yorubas to lead the Western Regional Delegation to the

1 This refers to the break-up of the Action Group, the declaration of the State of Emergency in the West in 1962 and the subsequent trial and imprisonment of the prominent leaders of the Action Group in 1963.

2 Under Ironsi, attempts were made at unifying the administration of the former regions. Decrees 33 and 34 abolished all political parties and formally unified the regional and Federal civil services. The fears of Southern domination over the Northerners

Constitutional Conference in Lagos. In addition, many former politicians were labelled 'Community Leaders' and spokesmen for their communities and this new function made it necessary for them to reside in their constituencies where they could be consulted by their people.

The Yoruba leaders succeeded in presenting a united front against other ethnic groups within the Federation. The utility of the Regional delegations was overtaken by events as the Eastern Region unilaterally seceded from Nigeria and named itself the Republic of Biafra. In response to Eastern Region's secession, Nigeria was subdivided into twelve states by decree rather than negotiation.

Within the Western State, the old political conflicts surfaced once again and the leaders from Oshun, Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti agitated for separate states.¹ In view of this development, the Military Governor became hesitant about calling these leaders to conference and even warned them against engaging in political activities or 'political guerilla warfare' as Governor Adebayo wittingly put it.²

precipitated the Northern coup of July 29, 1966. The immediate demands of the Northern officers was that the North should be taken out of the Federation. Gowon later rejected this but instead attempted to negotiate acceptable terms of Federation with the rest of the country. For details see N. J. Miners, The Nigerian Army 1956-1966, pp. 194-226.

1 See Appendix F of Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, S. K. Panter-Brick, (ed.), for details and reproductions of the letters sent by the leaders of these areas to the Head of State asking for the creation of separate states in their respective areas, pp. 267-276.

2 A. Adebayo, West Problems and Solutions, p.50.

The Council of Elders and Chiefs

The military leaders of the Western State also attempted to legitimize their rule by inviting the Chiefs, Obas and other traditional elites to participate in the military administration. Firstly, a group of prominent Chiefs known as the Council of Chiefs and Elders was selected.¹ This Council was assigned responsibility for organizing the larger Conference of Obas and Chiefs to which lesser traditional leaders were all invited. Before anything else, the Governor assured the Chiefs about the Military Administration's position vis-a-vis the Obas, stating:

I have left you and all your fellow Obas and Chiefs in no doubt as to our intention of maintaining the institution of Chieftaincy in all its traditional glory I have repeated again and again that the Military Government has no intention of deposing an Oba for flimsy or unproved reasons²

This done, the Government devolved two major functions on the Chiefs, namely, the settlement of land disputes within their respective areas, and the promotion of Yoruba solidarity by ending political factionalism. The Chiefs performed their

1 The membership of the Council included the Oni of Ife as Chairman, the Alafin of Oyo as Deputy Chairman, the Alake of Abeokuta, the Awujale of Ijebuland, the Owa-Obokun of Ijesha-land, the Osamawe of Ondo, the Olubadan of Ibadan, the Oragun of Ila, the Akarigbo of Ijebu-Remo, the Ewi of Ado-Editi, the Deji of Akure, the Olowo of Owo, the Timi of Ede and the Ataoja of Oshogbo.

2 Text of Address to the Conference of Chiefs, 28 September, 1966.

first function without too much trouble,¹ and many land disputes were settled outside the Courts.

However the subject of Yoruba unity became intractable as old political rivalry and partisan politics gained momentum.² Many chiefs were closely identified with the former political parties so that their effectiveness as arbiters in the conflicts became considerably reduced. In addition, many chiefs had no comprehension of the complexities of modern government and could therefore not be relied upon as sources of policy. Instead of making suggestions to the Governor, the chiefs felt they were the natural mouth pieces of their towns and were responsible for presenting demands from their towns. The back room consultations which took place during the conferences were useful to the extent that they gave the chiefs the opportunity to plead for amenities and to complain to the Governor how much their areas had been neglected. As soon as this pattern of demand was established, the Governor became hesitant about calling the conferences, and by 1972, the conference of Chiefs had been allowed to die a quiet death.

1 A senior civil servant in the Ministry of Local Government told the writer that since the first conference of chief in September 1966, only the Owo versus Emure land case had been brought to the Ministry for settlement. He also noted that court settlement of land disputes have become rare as the chiefs have been able to settle these, and remarked that the settlement of land cases was one of the traditional functions of Yoruba Chiefs.

2 This has been treated and the demands for separate states was one manifestation of partisan rivalry.

Personal Relations

From the foregoing, one gets the impression that the institutional channels of communication were not effective so that the Governor might receive inadequate feedback from the masses. However, from time to time, the writer was reminded about the personal relations of the Governor. He had friends among the masses and with a keen interest in parties and celebrations, the Governor was able to mix informally with members of the public and to hear their opinions even after institutional devices for this function failed. The Governor's friends among the chiefs,¹ the civil service² and the academic communities³ briefed him about the state of affairs adding to what could be gathered by the plain-clothed security police.

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- 1 The writer's attention was drawn to the fact that two of the leading chiefs were personal friends of the Governor and that it was an open secret among the chiefs that this inner group influenced the Governor more than the Conference of Chiefs. However, the utility of having close friends among the chiefs cannot be overestimated. The famed Olowo case was handled through such intermediaries and thus saved the Governor the embarrassment of direct involvement in a local issue. Names of such chiefs included the Elekole of Ikole and the Oni of Ife.
 - 2 The two most frequently mentioned names were Samuel Asabia and J. Akintola.
 - 3 Victor Olunloyo probably gained the admiration of the Governor due to his (Olunloyo's) administrative ability. Though considered an intellectual, he has spent most of his working life serving the Government on contracts. Under the Military regime, he moved from the Education portfolio to Local Government when massive reforms of the Local Government system was anticipated.

Much of the communication that take place under any political system goes on between groups and organized interests. The articulation of interest and demands are conveyed through group representatives.¹ All democratically elected governments seek the support of organized groups by recognizing group leaders and fundamental decisions are made only after thorough discussion with such leaders.

In all societies, groups and organizations compete for power and influence. In transitional societies, the military can forcefully seize power and dominate the political process and other societal groups because they control preponderant tools of coercion and are generally the best organized in the society. After assuming political power, the military views other groups and institutions with mass independent base of support as constituting threats to its own existence. Efforts are made to control those groups either by sponsoring favourable leaders and changing their orientation or by proscribing the group altogether. We shall now examine how the Western State military regime responded to an organized group - the Farmers' Organizations.²

1 A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Evanston, Ill.: Principia Press, 1949).

2 This aspect throws a lot of light on the behavior of military men in that civil servants played less role in the process. It also reveals how the military behaves in the face of perceived threat to its authority.

THE FARMERS

In the past, when the farmers had revolted, their demands were moderate - an improvement in producer prices for cocoa and better marketing facilities. To this extent the administration could placate the farmers. Under the military regime, the relations with the farmers went from bad to worse, ending in the most widespread uprising the Yorubas had known.

From the time of the initial coup, leaders of farmers' organizations sent petitions to the new military authorities asking for ^{an} improvement in their lot. In the initial process of establishing its authority, the military leaders did not have time to attend to the farmers' general demands.¹

However, shortly after civilians were brought in as administrators,² the Commissioner at the Ministry of Agriculture, Mr. Bola Ige,³ began to meet the various farmers' groups for consultation. He had intimated to the leaders that his administration would organize the farmers and give them a more effective say in policy-decisions affecting farmers. Some chapters of the farmers' organization had given approval to the formation of a new union.⁴

1 This was the explanation given by the Farmers' Leader interviewed 15th February 1972.

2 As of June 30th 1967.

3 Mr. Bola Ige is a seasoned politician and former publicity secretary of the Action Group Party

4 Daily Sketch, 21st December 1967.

Perhaps the military authorities felt that such a renewed Farmers' Union was too potent a force in the hand of a politician, as, whoever controls the rural areas from where most of the farmers come would be in a position to threaten the Military regime. Ige was subsequently removed from the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his pet organization - the Western State Farmers' Union - to a less influential and more remote desk in the Military Governor's office.¹

The process of forming the W.S.F.U. continued and by mid-November 1967, the organization had been launched. Membership in the W.S.F.U. was obtained through one's existing local organization. In other words, a local union decides whether or not to join and the decision becomes that of its entire membership.

The breakdown in communication resulting from the transfer of Bola Ige from the Farmers' Union did not end the farmers' efforts at getting a hearing. They explored many of the constitutional avenues left open, such as petitions to their local chiefs, to the District Headchief (the Olubadan), to some sympathetic political leaders and finally to the State Military Governor. It is fair to say these did not produce the effects the farmers desired.

They persisted. For example, on October 21st, 1968, the Farmers of Ibadan South had sent a petition to the Military

1 Daily Times, 17th January 1970, p.12.

Governor stating their plight thus:

... for the current year, it is quite evident that there is absolutely no sale of cocoa which serve (sic) as the main source from where we the farmers get our yearly income and that we are living at the mercy of the Almighty God. We beg to say that we are at present experiencing a good deal of hardship in regards to our individual mode of living at the farm; our old ones as well as the young ones are crying in hungers (sic) day in and day out while many of us go about without food, at times for days. We all know that it is our bounding (sic) duties to pay our individual tax assessment as this is the backbone of our government, but this current tax assessment is considered to be too much for the individual to meet as each person will pay £6 ... as against the former £3.¹

Such peaceful petitions won no response from the Governor and the decision-makers. According to leaders of the farmers, the petitions were not acknowledged.² Instead of reasoning with the agitators, government officials went on W.N.B.S. radio, the Press and out in loud speaker vans to say; " ... the war on defaulters and evaders will be launched. If you have not paid your 1968-69 tax, you are enjoined to pay today without fail and avoid the unpleasantness of public prosecution"³ The Government-owned Daily Sketch commented "As from tomorrow those

1 Petition from Farmers of Ibadan South District Council Area, to H.E. the Military Governor, Western State, 21st October 1968. The £6 consisted of the £1:10s. Development Fund Contribution; the Compulsory Savings of £0:10s odd, combined with the £3:17s 6d demanded by the Ibadan District Councils as flat-rate. In addition, there were other local rates.

2 Ibid.

3 Daily Sketch, 30th June, 1969, p.3.

who have not paid their tax will be blacklisted as human parasites and saboteurs and treated as such."¹

The farmers rightly felt that they had been left out of all consideration by the government. They therefore embarked on direct political action aimed at freeing themselves from their oppressors.

Following the breakdown in communication between the farmers and the Government, the farmers went on to prepare for the arrival of the tax officials. On September 16th, following tax raids and arrests of tax defaulters, the Agodi Federal Prison was openly attacked by the farmers in broad daylight and inmates freed.² The action showed an unbridgeable gulf between the ruling class and the poor peasants. In addition the farmers made demands which, for example, called for reconsideration of the role of local government in the rural areas.

Many political leaders attempted to capitalize on the farmers' discontent. Some lawyers and former politicians adopted "broker" roles, attempting to act as intermediaries between the farmers and the government. For example, Mojeed Agbaje, an Ibadan lawyer and politician, openly identified with the farmers and made

1 Daily Sketch, 30th June, 1969, p.1.

2 This assault is a very brave act in view of the fact that the Ibadan Garrisons Organization of the Nigerian Army and the Governor's House which were supposed to be heavily policed, were just yards away from the prison.

his legal knowledge available to them. Busari Obisesan acted as legal advisor to Iwo District farmers, and Chief Abiodun was widely reported to have advised Oyo farmers on what actions to take to fight the government.¹

Soon, Awolowo, the Federal Commissioner for Finance, joined in the controversy on the side of the farmers. On October 5th, 1969, Awolowo travelled to Akanran to meet with the leaders of the farmers. He claimed to have contacted the Agbekoya leaders through Ibadan contacts.² Awolowo's recommendations to the Governor endorsed the majority of the farmers' demands which had been turned down time and time again. However, Awolowo also released his recommendations to the press and it was published in full.³ In this way, he portrayed himself as the champion of the cause of poor peasants against the oppressive government.

He went further than the farmers and recommended that local elections should be held within twelve months under conditions that would ensure that only permanent residents in the rural areas could contest.⁴

Perhaps due to these contacts between farmers and former politicians, Governor Adebayo got the impression that the farmers' protest was a conspiracy engineered by "a few influential and

1 See Sunday Star, December 10, 1967, p.6. Nigerian Tribune, January 28th, 1969, pp.1, 4.

2 Daily Times, October 14, 1969, p.7.

3 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

4 Ibid.

ambitious people in this state who are still revelling in the thought of their political pasts." He continued:

I regret to say that from the nature of the evidence so far gathered, the attack on policemen on July 1st (in the Ibadan area) was carefully planned, premeditated and unprovoked. Raids on tax defaulters had not even commenced.¹

If anything, the farmers succeeded in getting the Governor worried! This was to result in a series of positive decisions.

The first of such measures was the announced reduction of the flat rate to £2 and motor-park market fees were abolished;² the official farmers' union, the Western State Farmers Union was recognized as the mouthpiece and agency representing the "genuine interests of the farmers",³ and the tax raids were suspended.

1 "The Truth About the Tax Riots: Governor Adebayo Speaks", (Ibadan: Government Printer, 1969), pp. 1, 5. This writer is of the opinion that the prior warning given by the government which was eventually followed up with action precipitated the confrontation. The politicians mentioned above merely filled a political vacuum created by the Governor's lack of political sensitivity. It is important to note that the Ayoola Report did not support the Governor's assertion. The most pressing grievance Ayoola noted, were those surrounding the increased flat rates. He deduced other causes for the agitation. These he termed "inferred" causes. The most important of these were the general feeling of neglect in rural areas with regard to the distribution of amenities, and also a feeling in some areas in Oyo Province (Ibadan, Oyo, Oshun, Ife, Ilesha) that those areas were being neglected by those in power in the State. Ayoola Report, p.103.

2 Daily Sketch, October 15th, 1969, pp. 1, 8.

3 Ibid., Details of tax reform are taken up later in this chapter

It became obvious to the government that only through dialogue and communication with the various groups could it obtain their confidence. In the process of communication, the government drew on the experience of past politicians and used them as brokers. Whatever might be the gains or failures of the farmer riots, it succeeded in showing the military authorities that the gun and the forces of law and order were not sufficient to establish political stability. It also forced the military rulers to admit the fact that the art of governing a state - a complex organization - are remarkably different from those needed for administering a highly disciplined rigid organization as the military.¹ In addition, it made the government realize that the high level of popular support and legitimacy with which it seemed to have acceded to office might have evaporated.

The Governor bent over backwards and had to invite the leaders of the farmers to seek their cooperation. This worked.² Tafa Adeoye, the leader of the Agbekoya accepted the ₦ 2 flat rate and promised to cooperate. This promise was carried out when on November 24, Adeoye helped the officials to collect taxes and was the first to pay.

1 After delivering an address to the meeting of the Leaders of Thought called on Monday 23rd December 1968, Governor Adebayo confessed to a group of friends surrounding him that he was amazed how difficult the Western State is to govern. He was credited with saying that he might have lost a number of his friends from among the people so that he had 'become a loneranger' and that the best thing for him to do was to cut down on non-official social activities.

2 Daily Sketch, November 22, 1969, p.8.

Furthermore, six leaders of farmers organizations were regularly invited to hold meetings with the Governor in the Executive Council Chamber. In the districts, the Governor's "delegates" - civil servants, Civil Commissioners and Senior Police Officers - had regular meetings with the farmers.¹

The confrontation with the farmers also impressed on the government that civilians are naturally litigious and generally demand active participation in the formation of decisions that affect them. Morris Janowitz attempting to draw a distinction between management and political leadership wrote:

Political leaders are men who specialize in verbal skills and in mass appeals. In contrast to military officers, they are men who socialize early into the techniques and process of negotiations and bargaining. In particular the military profession operates in an organizational environment that has limited contact with outside clients²

M. J. Dent³ and D. J. Muffett⁴ found the military leaders of Nigeria inexperienced in the technique of negotiation and bargaining

1 These leaders were Tafa Adeoye (Ibadan South East) Lafiku (Ibadan South), Oladijo Adisa (South West), Sanusi Obadara (West), Raji Osho (North) and Amini Isobo (East). I am indebted to Dr. Christopher Beer of the Department of Political Science, the University of Ibadan for this information. He has just completed his Doctoral Dissertation on The Farmer and the State in Western Nigeria: The Role of Farmers' Organizations and Cooperatives.

2 M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development, pp. 42-43.

3 M. J. Dent, loc.cit.

4 D. J. Muffett, loc. cit.

during the first six months of military rule. Due to this, the military leaders of the Western State were constrained to invite civilians whom they acknowledge possess these skills.¹ With time, the soldiers became ^{skilled} at negotiations and more responsive to the demands of organized interests and groups.²

The initial failure of the military to listen to the governed and enter into dialogue with them on the pretext that the military governs by decree and not debate precipitated the riots which occurred in many parts of the Western State.³

The aftermath of the riots was that the government became more attentive to the demands of the groups and learnt the art of bargaining thus acquiring some of the characteristics for which they once condemned the civilian politicians.

Now let us examine how the Military Government has responded to demands for the re-organization of the Local Government and the Personal Income Tax systems.

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- 1 A. Adebayo "Civil Commissioners Join Military Government".
 - 2 This theme will be fully illustrated under the local Government Reform and also in the reform of the educational system
 - 3 This is not intended to rule out the fact that economic hardships imposed by the Civil War contributed to the riots. The argument is that while the military government of the Western State increased taxes and cut down on the producer price of cocoa - the cash crop upon which many farmers depend - it did not meet with their leaders nor did it acknowledge the petition of the farmers. It is significant that those groups whose leaders were consulted - Civil Service and Teachers - paid the 5 per cent war tax without protest. This writer asserts that if the leaders of the farmers had been taken into confidence before the taxes were imposed, they would have persuaded their

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM

It is most significant that the reform of local councils should come during military administration when civilians have been incapable of doing much. The major reasons for the ability of the military to act were explained during interviews with senior members of the Ministry of Local Government who had been active in the reorganization proposals of the military government. Many of the civil servants said that when the military first assumed power, there was a general feeling among civil servants that there was no mandate upon which to base radical policies. Due to this feeling, the bureaucrats proceeded with extreme caution.

However, this feeling changed after the Ayoola Commission had visited several localities. During the inquiry, the masses spoke for themselves: Many tax payers complained that their local government councils had enough revenue to pay the salaries of its staff and nothing left to spend on social amenities. Some demanded that local councils be abolished altogether while others requested that the State Government should give higher subsidies to the local councils and others supported the merging of councils into larger and more viable economic units.

The violence which preceded the setting up of the Commission and the intermittent riots of 1969 in which many local council officials were attacked or murdered indicated to the

followers to support the government in spite of the economic hardships. Perhaps as Dent observed, the military leaders then believed in the "impropriety of listening too closely to the uneducated or the ignorant mass." Op.cit., p.80.

Government that the demands of the people could be ignored much longer only at great risks. Of the three suggestions, the Government opted for the "merger plan" as that was the least expensive and most manageable. The government subsequently instructed civil servants "to find out how best to merge the existing Local Government Councils."¹

Contrary to the popular conception of military regimes governing by decree, the Western State Administration established communication with communities over its plans. "Familiarization" meetings were held and local "leaders of thought" were consulted about merging their areas with others. These meetings, to a considerable extent, shaped the recommendations of the White Paper. Where on the other hand it became necessary to overrule the demands of some communities for separate existence, the Ministry tendered lengthy explanations for its decision. In short, 114 Councils were reduced to 51 and the final proposal which is not yet considered further reduces this number to 42.

The latest suggestion for the reform of the Local Government system came from the Ayoola Report. It made four recommendations about local government reform:

- (1) The Government should undertake as a matter of urgency a review of existing Local Government Council structure with a view to finding out which Councils are viable, and which are not, and thereafter Government should decide on measures

1 Text of Governor's Address, "Commission's Recommendations and Government Decisions", p.6.

for ensuring that only councils viable and capable of fulfilling their statutory obligations remain.

(2) Government should make provisions for the setting up of an Advisory Council consisting of local men of repute in each Division to assist the Sole Administrator in Local Government Administration.

(3) The Ministry of Local Government and Chieftancy Affairs should exercise more effective supervision (over) on the finances of Local Government Councils, possibly by creating an Inspectorate Section specially vested with that assignment and making regular checks on Local Government Accounts.

(4) Government should consider the possibility of appointing a Public Complaints Commissioner on the same basis as the Parliamentary Commission in Britain (otherwise called ombudsman) whose duties would include the spotlighting of Public grievances¹

In an unusually responsive fashion, the Governor on April 21, 1969, went on a joint network of the Western Nigerian Television, the Western Nigerian Broadcasting Service and the Nigerian Broadcasting corporation to announce the Government's response to the Ayoola Recommendations stating:

Consequently, Government has set up a four-man committee comprising state commissioners and senior Government officials to undertake a review of the existing Local Government Council structure throughout the State, bearing in mind the foregoing views of the Commission and to report back to Government within three months.²

1 The Ayoola Report, p.113.

2 Text of Governor's Address, "Commission's Recommendations and Government Decisions," p.6.

The Merger Commission could not report within three months because it took a broad interpretation of its terms of reference and delved into a massive overhaul of the Local Government Structure. When it finally reported in April 1971, it produced a White Paper titled: **Proposals for the Reorganization of Local Government Councils in the Western State of Nigeria.**

The main recommendations of the White Paper fall under four subheadings, namely,

- I The restructuring of the Local Government system so as to create larger and economically viable councils based, where possible, upon ethnic homogeneity.
- II The establishment of Area Committees for units comprising the enlarged councils with guarantees for the protection of local interests.
- III The introduction of what resembles the Council Manager system.
- IV A clearer specification of the functions and qualifications of Councillors and traditional office holders, chiefs and Obas who participate in local administration and politics.

The White Paper stressed the need to reconcile two often contradictory functions of local councils - the need for small councils, big enough to "satisfy the aspirations to provide the individual citizen with the maximum sense of identity with accessibility to, and participation in his government," This contrasts with the requirements of administrative efficiency

which emphasizes the need for large local councils which can afford the quantity, quality and variety of expected services and the men and machinery to provide them. In other words, while the White Paper wanted to preserve the idea of small local councils which the citizens can effectively relate to and identify with, it did not lose sight of the necessity to make the councils large and economically viable.

To achieve the reconciliation of these two objectives the Commission was guided by three main considerations:

- (a) traditional boundaries - Extent of Administrative Area and choice of headquarters, fiscal resources per head as determined by population, wealth and the will to raise contributions for promotion of social services.
- (b) Social and economic community (often this will focus around major towns and will be manifested in common interests and problems.
- (c) Localized and ethnic groupings.¹

Finally, while every effort was made by the commission to obtain the views of communities about merger proposals, it anticipated some opposition to the White Paper and stipulated that "all the proposals were amenable to modifications, and that reasoned comments were invited from the general public, local influentials, the leaders of thought and chiefs and Obas."²

1 White Paper, p.6. See pp. 4-18 for details of proposal.

2 Many community leaders thought that the public was once more being flattered by their rulers in being asked to submit their views. As a result, many people who had complaints about the White Paper did not send in their views till after the

As a result of public comments and recommendations, the proposals in the White Paper were amended by the Ministry of Local Government. The Final recommendations are reproduced as Appendix II below.

EVALUATION OF REFORM EFFORT

Too often, the zeal for reform tends to obscure the problems created by the suggestions. So is the case with the present re-organization of the Western State Local Government. Many of the reform proposals have been advanced as if they would work regardless of the personnel operating them. They focus mainly on structural arrangements while remaining silent on the attitudinal problems associated with the earlier councils. It only needs to be repeated that the best arrangements would not succeed if the attitudes of its operators at the State, Council and community levels are incompatible. Many of the defects of the previous local government system derived from the weakness of the local councils vis-a-vis the Regional Government which made the councils mere pawns in the hands of Regional politicians. Reform should be addressed to stating the relationship of the two levels of government, preferably setting limits to the powers of the

Ministry of Local Government and Chieftancy Affairs had started drafting the final recommendations. Some members of the public rushed to the ministry when they heard that comments were actually being taken into consideration. From interview with Deputy Permanent Secretary of Local Government Ministry, February 1972.

senior partner.¹

This appears as a restriction on the authority of the State Government and would be resisted by those at the helm of power at the State level. The restriction is a sacrifice that must be made in the interest of political institutionalization. Local government must be seen to have rights to exist unaffected by the whims and political predilections of the State Government.

The Council-Manager plan also presents problems of its own. In places where it has been tried,² the dilemma takes the form of possible confrontation between a strong council-manager and a weak council or vice versa. A strong manager will reduce the initiative of the deliberative assembly and in the event of confrontation between these two potential power-centres, responsibility may become blurred and difficult to establish. In view of the political insecurity in transitional societies like the Western State of Nigeria, this blurred jurisdiction may create anxiety and become the source of tension and deadlock.

In addition, the White Paper did not examine the method(s) through which these Chief Executives are to be selected.

1 This is one of the strong recommendations made by Awolowo with regard to the reform of the Local Government system. See Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.66.

2 See C. E. Ridley, The Role of the City Manager in Policy Formulation (Chicago: The International City Manager Association, 1958); L. D. White, The City Manager (N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1968); D. Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1969).

Experience suggests that they can either be nominated by the Council itself, in this way he becomes a servant of the council or may be nominated by the State Government, in which way the chances of confrontation are heightened.¹

Thirdly, the guiding principle of the reorganization was said to be 'viability' through merger. The present author fails to be convinced that this has in fact been given careful consideration. The plan is premised on faulty assumptions; it was assumed that the merger of unviable council areas will produce large and viable ones capable of promoting good administration and producing social amenities.

It is submitted that the merger of many non-viable local councils will very likely result in no improvement in the condition of the enlarged council. Since the enlarged council will have a wider geographical area under its jurisdiction, a larger population for which to cater without a visible rise in the per capita revenue of the council, merger plans will only increase the absolute revenue of the council with a corresponding increase in its expenses. Unless the State Government is prepared to make generous financial grants to the new councils, the

1 From discussions with officials, it was clear that they had given no thought to how the chief executive would be selected. Some however pointed to the need to maintain a fairly uniform standard, and suggested that perhaps the State Government might nominate them as it does in the case of the Secretaries to the School Boards.

reorganization might only produce further deadlock as one Area Committee fights with the others for a share of the 'Council's Cake'.

Conclusion

Even though the military government's efforts at reorganizing the local government system in the Western State are praiseworthy, it may be repeated that the best structures would fail unless they are supported by complementary attitudes on the part of the people who operate the structures. Democracy we hinted in the introductory chapter cannot be created by fiat. The military authorities of the Western State have so far given ~~attention neither~~ to how attitudes supportive of democratic local government structures can be created nor to the means through which the masses can be afforded the opportunity to participate in the new local government system. It is suggested here that the military government should allow local councils to elect their councillors now so as to set the stage for national participation in 1976. The present practice in which political participation is banned contradicts the goals of the military which is to return Nigeria to stable civilian politics.

Another area of massive reform to which the military addressed themselves was the Income Tax system.

THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM

Like the moribund Local Government system of the state, the Personal Income Tax system nearly broke down in 1967, leading to widespread riots and agitation. From this ferment, several proposals have been advanced to salvage the system.¹ The Ayoola Commission summed up the defects of the old tax system as centring around the level of taxation, the system of assessment and the system of collection.² In addition, the masses complained about the nature of many of the taxes that were imposed long ago for particular services which several localities enjoyed, but the taxes were retained after those services had been suspended so that the people knew that they were paying for goods which the government was not delivering. The Ayoola Commission therefore reasoned that the government should re-examine the rates and only those clearly desired by a particular community should be retained there.³

Similarly, the old tax burden was particularly heavy on the low income group - those earning less than £600 per annum, and became comparatively less heavy as the income rises above that amount.

1 These include the Ayoola Commission Report. See Appendix 'J', pp. 165-181 of that Report; the unpublished Ayo Ogunsheye's Commission on the Reform of the Tax System; and Commissioner (Dr.) C.S.Ola's Newspaper articles.

2 Ayoola Report, pp. 95-99.

3 Ibid.

Since one of the qualities of a good tax system is to redistribute the burden of government spending and to aid the less fortunate members of the society, a progressive tax system which would shift the burden and make those who earn more carry a heavier burden was in order.

Another major defect of the Western State tax system was that the assessment list did not catch the majority of the eligible tax payers. For example, there were only 813,000 tax payers on the tax roll out of a possible three million (for the year 1968/69).¹ Furthermore, many businessmen, professionals, petty traders and property-owners from whom large returns were due under-declared their incomes or completely escaped being assessed for tax.² As a result, the tax burden fell on a few honest but predominantly poor payers. This situation suggests that the reform of the system must be geared to catching these perpetual evaders. Under this section, an effort will be made to examine the former system of tax collection and the reform which the military regime has brought into existence and to see how far these reforms have corrected some of the defects of the previous system.

System of Assessment:

The Income Tax and Development Contribution Law lays down that "All persons who are in regular employment and earn salaries and wages as well as self-employed persons whose income exceed

1 Ibid., p.180.

2 Ibid.

£ 300 per annum are assessed by the officials of the Regional Tax Board." However, "self-employed persons whose annual income is £ 300 and below are assessed by the Area Assessment Committees and Local Government Councils in the different areas."

There has never been any problem in collecting the taxes of salaried tax payers whose income exceeded £300 per annum. The tax due was deducted in monthly instalments from their salaries under the Pay As You Earn scheme. It can therefore be said that by and large, all persons in regular employment have been adequately taxed. Unfortunately, this can not be said of a large proportion of self-employed persons like traders, doctors, surveyors, contractors and so on. This class has been generally difficult to assess properly either because the members fail to keep adequate records of their income or due to the fact they under-declare their income for tax purposes. This situation had given rise to many irregularities which all governments had contended with in the past.

Before the coup of January 1966, there had been much political interference with the work of the various area assessment committees. The general practice was for the majority of the members of the area committee to be drawn from the active supporters of the political party in power. Once so recruited, the committee members used taxation as a political weapon to victimize and oppress persons who did not share their political views.¹

¹ See "The Inevitability of Taxation," by Governor Adebayo, West Problems and Solutions, pp. 81-84.

The effect of this was that assessment became arbitrary. Perhaps it could be said that the system (if it can be so called) was arbitrary. The rates paid differed from person to person and also from area to area, all basically dependent upon the whims of the assessment committee. For instance, while a self-employed rate payer in one district might be assessed on a taxable income of about £1,000, a similar payer within the same district but in collusion with the assessment officers may be required to pay the flat rate. This arbitrariness of the assessment procedure was one of the factors that precipitated the riots of 1968.¹

The first corrective measure taken by the Military Governor was to dissolve all the assessment committees which had been made up largely of politicians, and to appoint new committees composed entirely of civil servants. This minor administrative tinkering did not remove all the grievances of the tax payers as there were other sources of inequity in the tax structure, but the administration has continued to find solutions and we shall now turn to the efforts so far made.

Occupational Listing and Minimum Taxable Income

The most progressive measure so far taken is the preparation of occupational listings for the various job categories in the

1 The causes enumerated as responsible for the riots included arbitrary assessment, corrupt practices by council officials, and lack of adequate contact between the government and the common people. The Nigerian Observer, January 24th 1969, p.1.

state and the determination of the minimum taxable income for each group. The system works thus: through surveys, questionnaires and careful observation, the average income for the occupations of self-employed people was determined.¹ Then a list of the exemptions which people in these occupational categories could legitimately claim was compiled. This amount was deducted from the estimated income for the occupation to obtain the minimum taxable income.

Some flexibility is provided through sub-categories within each occupation: a doctor with five years practise is assessed on a higher income than another just beginning his practice. The whole exercise was intended as a guide to the assessment officers. Any individual could be assessed a higher amount than the minimum specified for the occupation. However, the onus is on the tax payer to prove why he should be assessed less than the floor rate for his occupation.

Such procedure has two effects. Firstly, it limits the discretionary powers of the assessment officers and secondly, it tends to encourage those in private practice to work harder as they will like to earn at least the minimum for which they will be assessed, and a lot more if possible.

1 Commissioner C.S.Ola did this before he was appointed to the post.

Standardized Exemptions

A corollary of the minimum taxable income list for the occupations is the standardization of relief for payers within the same occupation. Under the old system, the assessment officers decided whether or not to grant exemptions for expenses such as school fees, health care, insurance, and at the same time decided the amount to be granted in particular cases. Needless to repeat that it was arbitrary. It also meant that while some rich people could send their children to private schools, pay handsome school fees and receive full exemption, the poor, who could not send their children to such schools, received no exemptions for the education of their children. In effect, the total exemption granted to the rich people "became so much that some of them paid a little more than the flat rate."¹ As a result, the poor people appeared to be subsidizing the high living of the rich few.

Under the new arrangement, a standard exemption rate is fixed for all classes in the society so that those who send their children to the most expensive schools cannot claim relief for all the amount they spend.² This move, claims the Commissioner,

1 Interview with Commissioner Ola.

2 Regardless of how much is actually spent, all parents can claim uniform relief. They can collect up to £15 for every child in the primary school; £25 for every child in the secondary modern school; £30 for the secondary school; £50 for H.S.C. arts; £65 for H.S.C. Science; £165 for University Arts, £165 for University Science, £210 per child for overseas training. Figures collected from the Commissioner.

"is aimed at discouraging elitism" and the practice whereby the poor subsidized the high style of living of the wealthy.

Commercial Vehicle Registration Lists:

Like many self-employed tax payers, owners of property did not keep up-to-date records of their earnings and profits. Many of the vehicle owners who dominate the communication industry of the Western State have only paid the flat rate due to the difficulty of establishing their income. This problem is being solved under the military regime. All vehicle licensing offices now have orders to send the list of all commercial vehicles registered in their areas together with the names and addresses of the owners to the Income Tax office of the Ministry of Finance. These lists were forwarded to the assessment officers in the respective areas and the minimum estimated taxable income was to be collected from the owners of the vehicles. As in the case of self-employed traders, the onus is on the vehicle owner to explain why he should be billed less than the official minimum rate.

We come to the collection machinery. No tax system can succeed independently of the collection machinery. In the past, defaulters had been taken to court and ordered to pay but many had been unable to pay due to poverty. In other words, the government won the case but had been unable to collect the taxes. The military government has therefore decided to back its claims by applying to the courts for authority to seize and auction the property of defaulters who refuse to pay after a specified time limit.

Though this threat is yet to be applied, it provides the government with a strong weapon against persistent defaulters.

In addition to all these, efforts are being made by the tax branch of the Ministry of Finance to train its secretaries and assessment officers in basic accounting procedure so that they are more able to detect defaulters.

Commentary

The execution of these reform measures reveal the anxiety of the military regime. The 1968 tax-riots were organized confrontation with the military leaders. Since military men are generally power conscious, their initial reaction was to suppress those riots before looking into their causes. As the Governor then said:

The first duty of any government is to maintain law and order, and this I intend to do in all parts of the State whatever the cost. We simply cannot afford to fold our arms and watch the situation grow from bad to worse. I am accordingly determined that respect for law and order shall be given the utmost priority and any person who persists in flouting the law of the land by encouraging or participating in civil commotion of any kind will be severely dealt with, no matter his status.¹

The large scale refusal to pay taxes constitutes one of the major internal challenges which any regime whether military or civilian can face. The Western State tax riots was therefore

1 Text of Broadcast, "Reasoning with Agitators," in West Problems and Solutions, p.65.

a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the military rulers. Rather than yielding to the demands of the rioters, the government decided to act decisively. In the words of the Commissioner, "the former policies had alienated the rate-payers, and the only thing which could restore confidence in the government was firm action." The riot was first suppressed before the policy decisions meant to please the poor were brought into effect. Tax rates were reduced by edict and new arrangements designed to collect more from the self-employed citizens were proposed. This too came in by way of an edict. The Commissioner attests to this by saying that "the only reason we were able to bring this about was because we were running a military administration, and we were never going to seek election on the basis of our ability to please certain groups in the society." It might also be added that those in authority had nothing to lose as the military personnel paid the correct amount of taxes under the Pay As You Earn system.

An elected government would be hesitant about alienating important sectors of the population such as the many self-employed tax payers but since the military had no fear about elections it could carry out its policies without much fear of future retribution by the affected parties. The major strength of the military with regard to coercion might form the basis of its weakness. There was a visible lack of consultation with both field officials and the general public which has caused some ill-feelings on both sides.

The experience of the tax assessment officers in the field reveal that no two persons even within the same occupation receive the same income. Consequently, the discretion of the field staff is still the best guide. "To group and tax people as categories," remarked a field officer, "was like grouping the proverbial apples and oranges, because they are both fruits."

The available communication lines between the decision-makers on the one hand and the executive and the general public on the other, have been poorly used. While copies of the occupational classification and the Minimum Taxable Income have been sent to the officers in the field, no efforts was made to inform the general public who were expected to pay the rates about the existence of those documents with the result that there were recurrent frictions between the officers and the rate payers. This lack of communication is accentuated by the failure of the decision-makers to take the junior officers into their confidence. For example, ten months after the report of the Ayo Ogunsheye Commission into the reform of the tax system was submitted to the Government, it remains unpublished and the field officers have not been allowed to see it. There is therefore a genuine fear that the Government might once more accept recommendations which practical experience suggest are unworkable.

As for the general public, the shortage of assessment offices and the distance separating the citizens and those offices

creates a communication gap. For example, Ibadan with a population of half-a-million has only one assessment office with the result that the officers do not have much knowledge about the income and conditions of the people they assess. In some other areas of the state, the assessment offices are several miles away from the tax payers in certain localities. The practice to which many assessment officers resorted was to make arbitrary assessment with the hope that the citizens would complain. The practice, the Ayoola Commission argued was wrong.

It is expecting too much to think that a farmer, uneducated and unsophisticated would be ready and willing to travel from his hamlet in Ondo Province to Akure where the Chairman of that area's Assessment Committee has his seat....¹

And to say that no harm is done in view of the fact that the citizen can always appeal the decision of the Committee Ayoola argued, "is similar to saying that no harm is done by an assault, since there are hospitals and doctors to take care of the possible wounds of the assault."² The reforms already undertaken might reduce the inequity in the distribution of the tax burden but unless the number of assessment offices and officials are increased, there will continue to be arbitrary assessment and avoidable injustice.

¹ Ayoola Report, p.97.

² Ibid., pp. 96-97.

CONCLUSION

It can be observed from the foregoing that the military has a potential advantage for providing strong political leadership. However, political inexperience and general insecurity of the officers in charge of the affairs of the Western State militate against utilizing these potentialities of the military. Popular consultation and a demonstration of governmental authority are both necessary for governing democracies. The Western State military government seems to shift from one to the other rather than combining consultation with a show of determination to enforce governmental policies. In this way, it neutralizes its advantage and its performance does not show any marked difference from that of the previous civilian group.

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN POLITICAL ROLE

In this chapter we shall continue to examine the efforts of the Military Government at reorienting the economic policies of the State, at restructuring the educational system and at combating corruption. We shall demonstrate that the intrusion of political and personal considerations reduced the effectiveness of the policies. Consequently, the military could do little different from their civilian predecessors.

ECONOMIC PROGRAMMES

In the eyes of many Nigerians industries and social amenities constitute the totality of development. It is also true that the private sector is small, engaged mainly in retail trade and transportation so that the public sector is depended upon for the provision of industries which in turn offer employment opportunities for the citizens. Given the fact that the resources of the public sector are also limited, it has become necessary for the government to be very selective in the siting of industries. Consequently respective governments have used the location of industries and social amenities as patronage to reward the localities which support the government. For this

reason, the even development of the state has been hampered. The military, among other things promised to spread industries evenly throughout the State.

Before the military regime and the subsequent creation of the twelve-state administrative structure, most of the Western Region's industrial establishments were concentrated in the Colony Province of Mushin and Ikeja. The Report on the Industrial Location Policy¹ found that in 1963, the Colony Province was responsible for

49 of the Western Region's 175 large industrial units. It embraces the Region's only boat-building yard, its only cycle manufacturing unit, its only glass factory, its only commercial dairy, its only confectionery business, its only beer factory, its only coconut coir industry, its two footwear factories, its only leather products industry, one of its two grain mills, one of its miscellaneous goods units, three of its six textile establishments, two out of five clothing units, two of its four rubber factories, three out of four paint works, and nine out of eleven miscellaneous metal products units²

The Report cited above also noted that "so far, the location of industrial growth in Western Nigeria had not been planned on a regional basis."³ It stated further that "the concept and techniques of systems analysis had not been applied to problems of development at the regional level."⁴

1 Leslie Green and Vincent Milone, Western State: Industrial Location Policy, a report. Town Planning Division, Ministry of Lands and Housing, Ibadan, September 1969, (Mimeo) no. page.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

Commenting on the existing state of affairs, Professor Aboyade concluded that there had been an "absence of a definite public policy on industrial location for the economy. Location policy had not only been marginal in overall importance, but incoherently formulated and haphazardly applied."¹ In the absence of clear policies, what constituted such policies had to be inferred more from the practices of government rather than from official statements and documents.

Aboyade observed that most industries had been located within or contiguous to already established industrial concentrations where they had helped to reinforce an already strong private incentive to locate especially by making the acquisition of land easy and cheap.² The result of this he concluded had been a continuing concentration of industries in the main zones, "a sprawling set of empty industrial estates in the rest of the country, a growing economic frustration by a politically disenchanted population, and the intensification of an unemployment distribution pattern that was fast becoming a source of national embarrassment."³

Both the Aboyade and the Milone studies came to similar conclusions: (1) that the past lack of articulate public policy on the location of industries was undesirable; (2) that there was

1 O. Aboyade, "Industrial Location and Development Policy; the Nigerian Case," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Research, X, no.3 (Nov., 1968), 293.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p.300.

need to reconsider industrial location within the context of state development, and, (3) that it was desirable that future industrial location policy should take physical and social needs as well as the narrower considerations into account before industries are located in any place.

Before these policy recommendations were acted upon, there was a fundamental change which witnessed the creation of twelve states in the Nigerian Federation. As a result of this change, the Colony Province was excised from the Western Region and incorporated into the Lagos State. This meant that the industrial hub of the Western Region was no longer a part of the Western State.

Some adverse repercussions of this constitutional change upon the reduced Western State can be illustrated by reference to the Revised issue of Physical Planning in Western Nigeria, 1967.¹ For example, it had been estimated that the per-capita income for the Western Region's tax payers by province for the year 1964-65 had been:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Per Capita Income</u>
Abeokuta	£ 60.4
Ibadan	£ 97.7
Ijebu	£ 74.7
Colony	£ 101.0
Ondo	£ 65.5
Oyo	£ 59.5
Western Region	£ 75.9
New Western State	£ 73.2

¹ Physical Planning in Western Nigeria, 1967 (New Issue)

This table shows the Colony to have the highest assessed income per capita for the year. With the Colony excised from the Western State, the aggregate income for the State was reduced from £75.9 to £73.2 per capita. Thus, unless the Western State Government were to reduce its expenditure, either tax collection would have to be tightened to reduce the high rate of evasion, or the tax rate would have to be increased. In either case, the burden of taxation would rise.

The past concentration of industries in Ikeja has proved disadvantageous to the Western State. If past errors are not to be repeated, a 'dispersal of industries' policy must be followed. There are contradictions which must therefore be resolved; these are the demands for profitability by foreign and private enterprises who derive advantages of scale from locating close to the bulk of industrial establishments, the diversification policy to be followed by the politicians who claim to be interested in maximizing economic welfare, and the high expectations of the many communities that the industries be located in their areas.

When the Military Government came to power, it did not lack policy suggestions. The Revised Report on Planning, 1967 which was specifically designed with the needs of the Western State in mind recommended that "efforts should be made to stimulate the expansion of not more than three towns falling within the population range of between 50,000 and 250,000" in order to ensure that other industrial hubs develop. (no page). It went further

to recommend that "the key to their choice would be an assessment of deficiencies in the existing pattern of development from zone to zone within the region. (no page). Such assessment would therefore take into consideration the needs for central places which would serve as service centres for the hinterland; places which are well provided with networks of communication.

Since the military coup of 1966, one would normally have expected rationalized planning policies if the assertion that in societies undergoing early modernization, the capacities of the Military for rational planning is superior to that of their civilian counterparts¹ were true. Military isolation prior to its intervention in politics is seen as leaving the army free from political pressures and constituency interests so that the military policies are unencumbered by allies.²

It is sufficient to reiterate with *Finer* that armies might intervene in politics for selfish and corporate interests. Such leaders would employ political power for the satisfaction of private and corporate interests. In addition, the behaviour of soldiers is dependent on their perception of political power. In the Western State of Nigeria, many soldiers view political power as essentially opening vistas for the satisfaction of personal economic interests. Due to this, many of the soldiers have been

1 See L. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization in J. J. Johnson, (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 73-80.

2 Ibid.

interested in personal acquisition rather than rationalized economic policies.

It was not until the radio broadcast on December 9, 1968 that the Western States Government guidelines on the location of industries were revealed. The delay perhaps resulted from a lack of policies and the fact that the soldiers spent the first two years of military rule consolidating their power. The guidelines read:

The development of small-scale industries is a high priority in my government's efforts. It is intended during this financial year to concentrate attention on expansion of existing small scale and cottage industries and to encourage the establishment of new ones in different parts of the State.¹

Again in 1969, the Governor restated:

As I have said on several occasions in the past, it is the policy of my Government to disperse amenities evenly throughout the State and to bring employment opportunities to the door of every town and village in this State. In doing so, we hope to stem the drift of job-seekers to the capital and other places and to correct the imbalance of opportunities which has been mainly responsible for the relative backwardness of some areas in the State.²

These were utopian goals. The resources for a balanced development of the State are not available. Within a period of

1 Adebayo, West Problems and Solutions, p.131; see also Western State Development Plan, 1970-74, p.38.

2 Even though the official pronouncements are supposed to be the guidelines, the planning officers in the Ministry of Trade and Industry claim that they did not receive formal notification concerning those guidelines, and as a result, they merely concerned themselves with the usual feasibility studies.

four years, 1966-1971, only four government-owned industries were established.¹ The scarcity of resources forces political considerations into decisions about the location of industries.

It is common knowledge within the Ministry of Trade and Industry that under the last civilian administration, feasibility studies had been conducted with respect to the location of the Textile Industry, and that Ogbomosho (the hometown of the then Premier) had been chosen as the rightful place for the industry. On assuming power, the Military Governor had commissioned another feasibility study which reversed the report of the previous study and selected Ado-Ekiti (the new Governor's constituency). The speed and dispatch with which the project was launched after the second feasibility report caused some concern among officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The motives of the Governor were open to speculation. While the Governor explained that the new regime was prepared to avoid delays as the civilians had done, the impression remained that he had moved very quickly because the interests of his constituency were involved.

Under the Military, former inter-ethnic rivalries once more came to the forefront of politics. Under the civilian administrations, Ondo Province had been neglected with regard to

1 These are the Nigerian Cocoa Products Ltd., Ikeja; the Nigerian Shoe and Rubber Products Company Ltd., Ogbomosho; Epe Plywood Factory, and the Western Textile Industries Company Ltd. at Ado-Ekiti.

the location of government industries. The Province could not boast of a single such industry by the time of the military coup.

The new 'dispersal policy' to which the Military Government had committed itself was bound to favour that Province more than any other. However, the crucial dimension was that the Military Governor himself came from Ondo Province and any policy designed to correct existing imbalance, regardless of how well-intentioned would be misconstrued in other parts of the State as efforts by the Governor to favour his own.

This concern was openly expressed by an author from Oyo Province who wrote:

Our present leaders in the West are still colonising us as the British did before Nigerian Independence. They give their divisions the best amenities, scholarships, and loans Ethnic imbalance and oppression still reign in the West. The idea that the Ijebus had played their turn so we that are now there must play the same role played by the former is what is wrong in the West. The Ekitis and the Ondos who are predominantly now in government are the remote causes of this crisis....¹

As if to embarrass the Governor, some of his friends became too indiscreet in their enthusiasm, further reminding the general public that the Governor came from Ekiti and that that part of the State was receiving favours as a result of that fact.²

1 Daily Express, October 7, 1969, p.4.

2 See Akinyede, "The Emergence of Two Military Rulers in the Western State is the Finest Thing that has ever Happened to the Ekitis," Daily Times, October 22, 1969, p.9.

In view of the communal cleavages in the state, it became difficult to persuade the citizens and groups that social justice required that the 'national cake' had to be equitably distributed. In fact, the conception of equity varied. Appealing to State sentiments or 'Yoruba solidarity' which could have been a very effective instrument to get the population to accept sacrifices when the Yorubas were vying with Ibos, Hausas or other ethnic groups proved useless since there were no external enemies. The driving force among 'the leaders of thought' and the communities were based on primordial sentiments which overshadowed 'Yoruba solidarity'.

Politics and economics have thus become interlocked and the Military rulers are unable to deviate in any significant way from the practices of their civilian predecessors. Whatever other considerations might be involved, planning decisions are political. Political leaders, civilian or military cannot place themselves 'above politics'. It is granted that many industries have not been set up since the military came to power and therefore no pattern of behaviour is clear, but it appears as if the military leaders are hesitant about resolving conflicting demands of the various communities for social amenities. Perhaps this reluctance stems from a deep-seated conviction among military leaders that they do not possess the mandate to rule. This feeling might be the underlying reason behind the endless series of feasibility studies which are invariably abandoned.

SELF-HELP SCHEME

The Government moved in 1968 to get the communities involved in the developmental effort. It initiated the Self-Help Scheme, nicknamed 'the Adebayo Scheme' due to the fact that Governor Adebayo was unusually enthusiastic about it.

The objectives of the Scheme which were in perfect agreement with the Government's effort to distribute industries throughout the state were:¹

- 1) Development in the field of social services like the building of town halls, dispensaries, maternity centres, markets, post offices, libraries, parks and so on.
- 2) The development of small scale industries in every locality in the State.
- 3) The development among the people the spirit of co-operation in business and other areas of economic activities.

The public response to the scheme was generally enthusiastic; in fact, the response surpassed all expectations. The original suggestion was that each administrative Division would start a project. Now, every town, village or hamlet has a project going. The official slogan reads 'self-help is best help; help yourself'; the response of long neglected sections is 'self help is the only help; don't wait for the government'.

1 Economic Development Through Self-Help. Text of Governor Adebayo's Address at the Launching ceremony of the Scheme. Western State of Nigeria, Government Printer, Ibadan, July 17, 1968.

Several explanations can be advanced for the success of the scheme which was hastily conceived and poorly co-ordinated. First, within the general guidelines set by the government, each community has a free hand in deciding what project to invest its money and energy into.

Secondly, people derive some satisfaction from projects completed through communal effort. The corporate feeling of achievement is increased when communities, through their own effort, complete projects for which they had waited in vain for governmental action. In fact, some communities in Akoko say that they started their scheme mainly to spite the State Government which had promised over the years without following up with action. These efforts might therefore be viewed as constructive rebellion; the intense commitment to the projects being an indicator of the degree of disillusionment with the State Government.

Thirdly, one of the causes of frustration with local government in the past was the high rate of embezzlement of public funds. In the case of the Self-Help programmes, the publicity surrounding the amounts raised reduces the chances of such misappropriations. There is keen competition among communities to see which one raises the most money and the amounts so raised are regularly announced over the State-owned radio network, (W.N.B.S.). Given the fact that the active participants in the scheme generally come from the locality, the temptation to betray trust is reduced. In the past, officials had embezzled public funds and had escaped to their villages. In any event, it was Government money so that

there was little social retribution for the offence. With the self-help scheme, the money had been raised through collective local effort. Embezzlement would definitely be visited by hostile local reaction long before the law has time to run its course. This is sufficient deterrence.

The scheme further avails individuals of the opportunity to gain local fame by donating generously to the schemes in their various localities. The names of benefactors are publicized. It is within this group that a substantial number of army officers are to be found. Most communities now make it a practice to invite military officers from their areas, not minding where such officers might be stationed, to fund-raising gatherings. The officers seem to have responded well to the appeals. As a Colonel told the author, "it adds more to one's social standing among fellow officers to be well known in one's town or village." Another senior army officer sees the self-help scheme as "a unique opportunity for civilians and military leaders from a particular place to work together without anyone becoming suspicious of their motives."

In short, the self-help scheme has helped to bridge some of the communication gaps between various groups in the society and have brought the civilian and military elites closer together.

The scheme is not without its defects. The idea of encouraging each community to select its own project without central co-ordination is hardly the best way to execute a

development programme. The government needs to do more co-ordination and the communities need more direction even after they have selected their projects. Here, the graduates of the Diploma Programme in Community Development of the University of Ibadan who return to the classrooms as lay and frustrated teachers could be put to very productive use.

While the original intention of the scheme was to appeal to people to make voluntary contributions, public pressure has removed the voluntary elements and communities are known to have made outright levies on their residents. This increases the already heavy burden of taxation. The heavy tax burden may not be as bad as it looks in that 153 out of 271 respondents interviewed in the state answered that they were prepared to pay more taxes in order to obtain certain social amenities. Of the 118 who gave a negative answer, 40 qualified their position by saying that their taxes had hitherto gone to line the pockets of corrupt governments and officials, but if they can be convinced that the taxes would be well spent, they were prepared to pay more. Perhaps, the self-help scheme offers the assurance. It also suggests that the masses of the Western State are ready for mobilization if only the leaders can be imaginative in suggesting worthy causes and presenting the image of clean administration.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM

As mentioned in chapter three most of those who joined the Nigerian army had been "rejected at the corridors of universities and other institutions of higher learning." It appears ironic that the Western State should look up to the administration of such people for the reform of the educational system, as the military would have been expected to ignore or shy away from the subject of education altogether. If, on the other hand, the budget of the Western State is examined, it will be seen that education has consistently taken from 30 to 40 per cent of the expenditure,¹ so that no government, civil or military, can ignore such a heavy consumer. Primary Education takes 44.9 per cent of educational spending.

THE OLD STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION

Nigeria, like other colonial territories in Africa, inherited an educational system which was divided into different streams lacking both coordination or integration^{which} reflected the colonial history. In the colonial era, educational institutions were run and managed by missionaries, the colonial government taking no direct part in the education of colonized peoples. The indirect role of the colonial government in education consisted of signing treaties. Through treaties, concessions were sought

1 See Western State Development Plan 1970-74, p.86; see also the Report of the Taiwo Commission into the Review of the Primary Education System in the Western State of Nigeria, Ministry of Education, Ibadan, March 15, 1968, p.32.

from local leaders to grant the missionaries land on which to build schools, and the natives were encouraged to contribute communal labour toward the erection of the school buildings.

The private denominations were responsible for the administration of the schools subject mainly to the limitation of their funds, personnel, and other resources. Nominal school fees were charged but only a few parents were able or willing to pay these and the enrolment in the schools were generally low. School buildings followed the establishment of missions and it was only in communities with large numbers of converts that schools were to be found, and even though there was no general planning to the location of schools, no area could be said to be oversupplied with them. Demand remained higher than supply.

As from 1952, the Government of the Western Region took over the financing of schools but left the administration in the hands of missionaries, religious denominations and private proprietors as before. It satisfied itself with periodic inspection through local councils and fairly uniform but low standards were maintained.

As part of the preparatory fanfare for self-government, the Action Group Government launched the free primary education for the Western Region in 1954; the government became a direct participant in school administration. There were three directors of schools, namely the religious denominations, private proprietors and government-run local council schools.

The free primary education scheme was conceived as a part of a comprehensive design for promoting political economic and social change, and envisaged universal education for all children of school-going age within five years.¹ To facilitate the achievement of this goal, the length of the primary school course was reduced from eight years to six, automatic promotion being introduced, and school fees were abolished.

The phenomenal increase in enrolment of pupils had been unexpected. Compared to an annual enrolment of 170,000 anticipated in the White Paper of 1952, actual enrolment in 1955 was 547,760 rising to a peak of 744,836 in 1961. In 1966, the figure stood at 740,997.² The swollen enrolment created numerous strains which the system was unable to handle effectively, thus causing a fall in standards and bringing the education system very close to near collapse.

The government's effort to take over the existing structure of education without reorganizing it led to wastage. As the Taiwo Commission noted:

The striking advance in numbers in primary schools has however been bought at the price of a high wastage rate and falling standards. Since 1959 for example wastage in every primary school generation has been running at not less than 52.5 per cent, which represents a cost of 1.6 million over and above the budgeted expenditure.

1 Proposals for Education Policy for the Western Region, Ministry of Education, (Ibadan, the Government Printer, Ibadan, 1952).

2. Taiwo Commission Report, p.1.

Furthermore, since 1961, the percentage of passes in the Primary Six leaving Certificate Examinations has been on the downgrade, from 71.2 in 1961 to 44.1 in 1964 and 50.2 in 1965 What emerges from the above figures is that of every hundred pupils who enter Primary one, barely twenty-five finish Primary Six successfully.¹

Even though the success of an educational system should not be measured solely on the basis of examination results, the output of the Western Nigerian primary school system was a poor return on the investment of the tax-payers money, noting that at the period under consideration, 70% of the expenditure on education went into primary education.²

The reasons for the fall in standards are easy to enumerate -- the quality of the teaching staff, inadequate supervision and lack of co-ordination between the voluntary agencies on the one hand, and the government on the other. These will be examined in turn.

TEACHING STAFF

Until 1952 when the Ministry of Education became committed to universal primary education, the emphasis was on a gradual expansion of numbers and the raising of teachers' quality from a mere "pupil" grade to the Grade III Certificate level. The job was far from accomplished when the new intakes of universal primary education flooded the schools and many more "pupil" teachers had to be employed.

1 Taiwo Commission Report, p.2.

2 Ibid., p.8.

By 1964 before the products of hastily trained teachers' colleges had time to change the pattern of teacher qualifications in the schools, 4,534 teachers were trained out of a teacher population of 14,231.¹ In other words less than a third of the teachers were duly qualified. By 1966, the position had greatly improved but the gain was not due entirely to a positive growth, but more to a decrease in the teacher population almost all of whom were untrained,² so that 83 per cent of the teachers had been trained.³

The low quality of teachers apart, the administration of the schools greatly reduced the efficiency of the staff. As most schools, except the Local Authority schools were run by voluntary agencies, the location and transfer of teachers were made within arbitrary religious parishes, diocese and prefectures. In this way, it was a common phenomenon to find schools run by one denomination over-staffed while the schools of other denominations in the same town or city remain understaffed without any effort being made to adjust the imbalance.

Similarly, teachers who have been dismissed from the service of one denomination either due to inefficiency or professional misconduct found employment under another denomination, at times, in the same town, so that there was no effective way

1 Figures from "A Program for Accelerated Upgrading of School Teachers in the Western State," Ministry of Education, Ibadan, 1968, p.1.

2 Ibid., p.3.

3 Taiwo Commission Report, p.8.

to rid the schools of undesirable ones.

"Adequate preparation in academic and professional matters is not all that makes good teachers." Morale also counts. The low morale of the teachers contributed to the poor performance in their classes. The lack of equipment, textbooks and teaching aids, responsibility for providing which falls partly on the local authorities and partly on the parents, contributed to the low morale of the teachers. In addition, the fact that teachers were not protected against dismissal by unscrupulous school proprietors and voluntary agencies also reduced interest in the teaching profession. Teaching, therefore became a stopgap for transients on their way to other professions. Many able people stayed away from teaching.

Finally, the rigid promotion system within the teaching profession, did not reward excellence. As the Taiwo Commission remarked:

Compared to the civil service and commercial enterprises, we are satisfied that it is more difficult for the person of ability or one who carries special responsibility to move more quickly up the ladder in the teaching profession, so rigid is the system of progression by annual increments.¹

Thus, the low quality and morale of the teaching staff helped to bring down the standards of the schools.

1 Taiwo Commission Report, p.16.

LACK OF COORDINATION

The failure to coordinate the educational system occurs at two levels -- failure to coordinate the efforts of similar schools and the lack of any integration of the different levels of education in line with the needs of the society. Each programme appeared to be independent of the other and each looked more like terminal programmes.

The lack of coordination between parallel schools has just been discussed. The need to coordinate the primary, secondary modern schools, secondary schools, technical colleges, teacher training colleges and University programmes was ignored. This contributed to wastage.

For example, almost 90 per cent of the children who enter school end their education in the primary schools.¹ The secondary Modern Schools took in a large proportion of primary school graduates. However, interest in Secondary Modern Schools died shortly after 1961 as most of the Secondary Modern School graduates failed to find employment. As a result, enrolment in the modern schools fell by almost half between 1961 and 1966,² and many parents remained unable to pay the rising costs of tuition fees in the Secondary Grammar Schools. The result of this was unemployment and frustration.

Furthermore, while the academic year of the primary and secondary school system ran from January to December, that of the

1 Ibid., p.5.

2 Ibid.

universities ran from September to July.¹ This had a disruptive effect on the school system and on the economy. Secondary school leavers generally sought employment in teaching and government departments immediately after graduation. For many of them, the work is intended to keep them busy till they entered university the following September. Consequently many schools and government departments lose large numbers of their staff every September with the resultant disruption of service.

The Primary School system had reached a critical stage by 1966 and the Military Government set up a commission to review it. The report of the commission was presented on March 15, 1968 and made numerous radical proposals some of which the Government adopted.²

The Education (Amendment) Edict of July 1, 1968 set the stage for the reorganization of the school system as had been suggested in paragraph 85 of the Taiwo Commission Report.

State and Local School Boards were set up. The state School Board with its seat at Ibadan was "to manage Secondary Schools and training colleges which are not government or private institutions," and each of the ten Local School board was "to control primary schools which are not private institutions."³

1 The plan is now announced and as from July 1973, the school year of all educational institutions would run from September to July.

2 Abstracts of the recommendations are included as Appendix IX (pp.304-306).

3 Education Amendment Edict.

The School Boards shall "have power to appoint ... and to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over all the schools under them."¹

In effect, this edict relieved the religious denominations of their responsibilities for the operation of the schools and vested these in the newly created school boards. The membership of the Local School Board consisted of a Chairman, three other members (increased to four as of December 31, 1969), and a secretary appointed by the Ministry of Education. The School Board became directly responsible to the Ministry of Education through the Chairman and the Secretary who send regular reports.

The effect of the Decree on the teachers was dramatic. All teachers became state teachers and were elevated to the status of civil servants. Recruitment, location, transfer or firing of teachers became related to state-wide policies and the shortage of teachers in one area could be easily adjusted by moving teachers from other school-board areas — something that was impossible under the old system. This minor change together with salary increases proposed by Asabia and Adebo Commissions considerably improved the morale of teachers.

Other related advantages accrued to the teachers. In the past, their salaries had been paid to school proprietors, many of whom were not noted for honesty. As a result the payment of

1 Ibid.

teachers' salaries was irregular. Today the salaries are paid directly to the bank where the Secretaries of the School Boards can draw upon it at the end of every month. Commenting on the changed pattern of teachers' service, a Headmaster in Egbado has this to say:

The former denominational differences have gone and all teachers now share a common brotherhood in service, and we now have more confidence in our work. Above all, our salaries are promptly paid.

The disadvantages of the present arrangements have begun to surface. One is the anonymity that resulted from greater centralization and the expansion of areas under the domain of School Boards. In the past, the proprietors and school managers were responsible for a small number of schools and had first hand knowledge of the locations of the schools and the problems of teachers in those areas. Today, the secretaries of the School Boards upon whose shoulders rest the responsibility for transfer and location of teachers are posted from Ibadan and many of them lack knowledge of the problems the teachers under them may encounter.¹

1 This charge was confirmed in three of the School Board offices visited by the Author. In Ilaro for instance, the Secretary could not locate villages to which he had posted teachers on the Egbado District Map. He had sent some new recruits from Okitipupa Division to villages without roads or transportation facilities. Those teachers returned to ask for transfer to "somewhere where transportation facilities are available." The secretary, in agreeing, explained that if he had known the peculiar problems of the villages he would only have sent teachers from Egbado District to such places.

Another defect of centralization is that the five-member School Board are expected to manage the affairs of up to two thousand teachers. The major corollary of this is impersonalism. The second is that members of the School Board are "overworked" during the early months of the school year when they have to recruit new teachers and locate old ones in addition to the routine administrative duties. The pressures of these busy months contribute to administrative irregularities.¹

1 For example, in Ibadan, the Local School Board advertised for applicants. They required 200 teachers, but 3,000 applicants showed up all with the required qualifications. With the high unemployment rate among school-leavers, those in the job market rarely hesitate to bribe the recruiting officials in order to secure a place. Many members of the School Board interviewed admit that they have been approached for such favours but had turned it down. On the other hand, many of the job-seekers talked about the "going rate of £5" to secure a place, and £5 to effect a transfer from a bush to the city. The truth lies somewhere between these two positions but the author thinks the story of the job-seekers is more plausible. The list of new recruits examined by the author indicated that while some Secondary Modern School Leavers (mainly girls) were employed, some boys with Higher School Certificates were dropped. No reason was given. The Author is aware of a case where the Secretary and Members of the School Board prepared short lists of "sponsored" applicants whose employment was automatic. After this, the remaining vacancies were filled by the appointment of some lucky few. In this case, not all the qualified applicants were interviewed. Top officials have indicated their awareness of such situations. For example, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Education remarked that he was concerned about what he called "a rather disturbing development in the operation of the school boards, in which appointment and promotions made by the Board (Ibadan)? had not been done on the principle of seniority and merit." Nigerian Observer, November 24, 1970, p.9.

The employment of Secondary Grammar and Modern school leavers as teachers in primary school results from the shortage of trained teachers. It is true that this shortage will not be rectified for at least five years to come, so that it is common knowledge that this group of teachers would be needed till qualified teachers are available to take their places. However, the practice under the School Boards is that the "unqualified teachers" are recruited only for one year. At the end of the year, their appointments are said to be terminated unless they receive a letter to the contrary. They are therefore instructed to reapply for appointment to the same School Board for reappointment.

While this may be an easy way to rid the teaching profession of undesirable teachers, the demerits override the merits of the device. Firstly, the workload of the school boards are particularly heavy at the beginning of the school year. Consequently some notices of reappointment are not sent till about February, after four weeks of regular classes have passed, thus disrupting the education of the pupils. Secondly, in view of the risks of unemployment many of the teachers so concerned feel they must guarantee relocation by "paying the annual tribute" to members of the school board. The urge to bribe is thus generated. Needless to say this uncertain situation reduces the morale of teachers and consequently, their effectiveness.

A better approach to this problem might be to serve notices to only those whose appointments are to be terminated

due to proven inefficiency or professional misconduct. Headmasters of the schools could meet with the School Board to determine those to be released and such teachers given the opportunity to appeal the decision.

SECONDARY SCHOOLS

The Military Government's policy with respect to secondary schools has been described as "expanding and consolidating the existing secondary schools."¹ While the 1962-68 policy of the Government was to provide secondary education for 10 per cent of the successful primary school leavers, the 1970-1974 Development Plan anticipates providing secondary education for 30 per cent.² To this end existing secondary schools are being encouraged to expand small ones to merge with others and few new schools are allowed to open.³

The development in Secondary education in the State has been less dramatic than that of the primary schools (in spite of the fact that the State School Board was empowered to handle staff matters and the administration of Grant-aided schools.) Schools were initially built and run by voluntary agencies and private proprietors. Given the shortage of

1 See Western State 1969, Ministry of Home Affairs and Information, Ibadan, p.18.

2 Western State Development Plan, 1970-74, p.46.

3 Western State 1969 (Ibadan: Ministry of Information, 1970), p.18.

resources, the government decided to leave the day to day operations of such schools in private hands while the Ministry of Education sets the broad policies and the Inspectorate Division of the Ministry oversees that the policy specifications are complied with.

While in theory the State School Board recruits teachers, in practice the principals of the respective schools advertise vacancies and submit names of prospective applicants to the School Board which may either conduct interviews or merely rubber-stamp the choice of the headmaster. With mixed success, the Military Government has attempted to regulate the tuition fees which schools could demand. The former commissioner decreed that "fees to be charged by schools must be approved by the State's Commissioner for Education and increases could not be made without prior approval."¹

Many proprietors have ignored the regulations by imposing some hidden taxes as adjuncts to textbook costs or for supply of school uniforms. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to fundamental reform is not the refusal of proprietors to cooperate with the Government. The major cause lies in the Government's indecisiveness. The Military Government has been half-hearted in handling the school question and its communication with private proprietors have been both poor and ineffective. When the Ministry of Education embarked on the reorganization of the Secondary Schools the private

1 See Morning Post, 7 June, 1969, p.16. Accounts of schools were demanded and examined to guarantee compliance with Government guidelines.

proprietors were all invited "to discuss the takeover bid." Understandably, there were wild protests against the Government's objectives but many of the proprietors got the clear impression that the decision to relieve them of their schools was already made, and that there was little they could do to stop it.

Later, it was discovered that the resources and personnel to effect complete takeover did not exist. Until now, the Government has failed to educate the proprietors of its short-term plans. Proprietors continue to think in terms of impending takeover. Rather than cooperate with the "expansionist" policies of the Government, they effect a "consolidation" of their profits. Little building expansion is undertaken in many such schools as proprietors are convinced that the complete takeover is merely a question of time.¹

The experience with the Farmers' protests seems to have alerted the military government to the functional utility of communication. To maintain a steady flow of information, it has attempted to encourage and sustain functional interest groups to complement the information trickling into the Ministry from other sources. First the Ministry of Education helped to build

¹ My attention was drawn to this fact by one of the former Members of Parliament and a School Proprietor that I interviewed. See also comments by Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, Daily Times, June 30, 1971, p.5.

the School Proprietors Association which was represented on the Advisory Board of Education.¹ Also the Military Government set up a ten-man Council to be known as the Western State Teachers Council to serve the State for three years and was vested with responsibility to "advise the States' Ministry of Education on Measures necessary to preserve high standards of professional conduct among teachers."² In addition it has been more responsive to the demands of organized interests.³

CORRUPTION

The pattern of public life in the days of the civilians was described as 'corrupt.'⁴ For our purposes, we shall not delve into definitional problems of corruption. Suffice it to say that an official is corrupt if he accepts money or its equivalent in kind for doing something he is under duty to do, or if he deviates from official duties and guidelines because of private (personal, close family, private clique, tribal) pecuniary or

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- 1 This was first mentioned by the officials of the Ministry of Education and subsequently crosschecked with some members of the Proprietors Association.
 - 2 Daily Express, July 27, 1970, p. 7.
 - 3 For example, on September 25, 1969, the Association of Ansar-Ud-Deen schools in Ekiti Division sent a petition to the Military Governor stating that "of 40 members of the State's School Board not a member of the Ansar-Ud-Deen had been included. Even though the Governor claimed that he had not been guided by religious considerations, the School Board Edict was amended; its membership was increased by one and Mr. Y.O. Bashorun, Principal of Lagos Secondary School and Education Secretary of the Ansar-Ud-Deen Mission of Nigeria was appointed a Member of the Board with the effect from January 1, 1970. Daily Sketch, January 8, 1970, p. 1.
 - 4 Several commentators have repeated this theme. See S. Andreski, The African Predicament, a study in the pathology of modernization.

status gains.¹

It is common knowledge that after a few years in office, many of the old politicians had amassed fortunes several times the sum of their legitimate income. It is an open secret that people employed their positions for private advantages. This took the form of bribes and kickbacks or of embezzlement: politicians received 10 per cent kick back on government contracts; tax collectors drastically reduced taxes after receiving bribes; doctors in charge of government dispensaries stole the drugs and later sold these to their outpatients or used them in their private clinics; wholesale agents requested bribes before retailers were supplied with merchandise; in some offices, one had to bribe the secretaries and receptionists to be allowed to see the senior officers.

The police and the law-enforcement agents were surrounded with similar practices. Vehicle inspectors allowed non-roadworthy vehicles to operate after the owners of such vehicles paid the agreed bribes; suspects in criminal cases were 'not recognized'

(London: Michael Joseph, 1968); M. McMullen, "A Theory of Corruption," Sociological Review, IX (July, 1961), 181-201; E. Simkins and R. Wraith, Corruption in Developing Countries N.Y.: Norton and Company, 1963

- 1 This has been an attempt to modify J. Nye's definition, 'Corruption and Political Development; a Cost Benefit Analysis,' American Political Science Review, LXI, (1967), 419.

after they tipped the officers on duty. Examples of these practices can be multiplied a thousand fold. The frequency and persistence of these irregularities led Andreski to conclude that:

In Africa, it is quite impossible to get through any official business without the services of special contact men who know how and to whom to pass a bribe, part of which they keep for themselves.¹

And he went on:

Until the military Coup of January 1966, Nigeria was the most perfect example of kleptocracy;² not only because from the highest to the lowest, practically everybody was involved in the kleptocratic circulation of wealth; but also because the position in the structure of power were bought and power itself rested upon the ability to bribe.³

When the military took over and expelled the politicians, part of its justification, or rationalization was that public life in the country had degenerated to a low and shameful level. One of its objectives before returning power to the civilians would be to eradicate corruption. It therefore set itself up as a doctor to the body politic.

1 S. Andreski, The African Predicament; a study in the pathology of Modernization (London: Michael Joseph, 1968), p.93. .

2 Kleptocracy is defined as the practice of using the power of office for making private gain in breach of laws and regulations normally in force. Ibid., p.92.

3 S. Andreski, Ibid., p.108.

This commitment reflects the insensibility of the soldiers to the nature of social problems. The problem of corruption is a combination of factors, attitudes and predispositions. It is as complex as other social problems like tribalism. While the government could be swept away within hours, social problems and attitudes take longer to modify or change.

In traditional Yoruba polity, no distinction was made between the public and private interests of the leaders. Both were interdependent. The leader was considered the embodiment of the system and his security depended upon the political health of the body politic. If and when the citizens grew dissatisfied with the state of affairs, it was blamed on the leader and if the hardship continued over a long time, the frustration might be expressed in the removal of the leader. In this way, there were controls and constraints and these set limits on the behaviour of the leaders.

Colonialism introduced new dimensions into Yoruba politics: literacy became an important aspect of government and given the fact that the masses were illiterates, they were separated from their foreign dominated government. The Nigerians who were first selected for the colonial administration served as secretaries, interpreters and cooks to the District Officers. While the salaries paid these functionaries were marginal, the social prestige attached to their positions was incalculable - they

were the major links with the Officer, not to mention the awe with which their new skills, the ability to speak the White man's language was regarded.

People intending to see the District Officers sought the friendship of these strategically placed Nigerians who could be formidable obstacles if they so desired. Many prospective litigants found it necessary to tip them in order to avoid being obstructed. The colonial officers for their part tended to encourage the obstruction in view of the fact that it reduced their workload. Thus, beginning with the secretaries and interpreters, the impression was created that the official was doing members of the public big favours by performing the functions for which he was employed. In other words, the sense of duty and public service were not inculcated into the first servants of the colonial administration.

Similarly, before independence, Nigerians placed in important positions did not hesitate to divert government money into their personal coffers, and there was no public resentment against those guilty of this practice: after all, was it not 'government money which is nobody's money' which he has taken? Anyone who could do this and get away with it was considered wise and lucky. The general desire of most of the prospective job hunters was to be posted to positions where they could manage large funds, a part of which they could appropriate.

Political independence did not alter these social attitudes. The offering and taking of bribes continued. The public

came to regard bribes and inducement gifts as a necessary part of all major transactions, that those soliciting help now offer bribes as a matter of course even before the officials make formal demands.

For an official to turn down a bribe offer was interpreted to mean that he would not help with the matter under discussion; at which point the bribe-giver approaches another officer. Somewhere along the line, it is accepted and that officer takes credit for the outcome of the request regardless of his part in it.

The preceding was intended to illustrate the fact that 'a climate of corruption'¹ prevailed in the Western State. Bribery is thought to be everyone's equipment for his daily struggle. Since people behave the way those around them behave or seem to behave, in the existing climate of corruption, there is reinforcement and interaction between the willingness of the public to pay bribes and the willingness of the officials to take them. As a roadworker commented, "everyone, except members of the Jehovah's Witness give bribes."

The critical shortage of basic needs in the society feeds corruption. It is worthless blaming the politicians, the civil servants and members of the general public when the system asks for perversion. The shortage of schools make it profitable for

1 Term borrowed from M. McMullen, op.cit., p.187.

Headmasters to make illegal demands before children are registered for supposedly free primary education.¹ Lacking alternatives, the illiterate parents find it prudent to condone the irregularity. When as in Ibadan there is only one vehicle licensing office and there are over 1000 daily applicants wishing to license their vehicles, there are bound to be long delays. The honest applicant may have to wait for several days or weeks while the bribe-giver obtains his papers within hours and goes about his business, making profits while the honest man loses several business days.

The social and economic conditions have also contributed to the prevalence of corruption. As McMullen noted:

Politicians in West Africa do not come from an established patrician class. Most of them are 'new men' and have therefore had little opportunity to develop standards different from the rest of society, such as can develop in a particular class or group, and are not personally wealthy (at least at the beginning of their career).²

Perhaps this could be broadened to include all the elite groups in Africa and not just the politicians. In addition to being upstarts, many of the elites have grown up in societies where competition for survival is keen and only those with better...

1 In May 1969, the Commissioner for Education, Victor Olunloyo had to cancel the registration list of the Primary Schools in Ibadan because there were irregularities on the part of the headmasters. The Nigerian Tribune did not express surprise but only commented that "this episode only illustrates that corruption is a permanent feature of the Nigerian Society."

2 Op.cit., p.195.

than average abilities reach the top. Having gone through such stiff competition, many of the leaders seem to get the impression that they have proved themselves and that they were due their reward. In other words, they seem to feel that the society owes them a living. Many therefore take their salaries for granted and expect their clients to induce them to perform the duties for which they had already been paid.

It might also be added that it is difficult for a man who has risen from poverty to eminence within a relatively short period as many Nigerian elites have done, to remain confident and secure that the present affluence will last.¹ The inclination to hoard in secret accounts in foreign banks might be explained by this fear. While the going seems good, the income from the official positions must be maximized; the only restraint being the size of the market and the demand situation.

The expenditure behaviour of public figures particularly elements in the military does not suggest thrift among the leaders.² The expenditure behaviour is related to the peasant backgrounds of the leaders and their desire to prove to the world that they had become members of the oligarchy. The tendency towards ostentatious and conspicuous consumption; the desire for big cars and flowing robes and all the other trappings of the civilian oligarchy can be explained as a part of the bid to be accepted into the oligarchy.

1 Ibid., p.196. 2 See Exhibit 'J' of Ayoola Report, p.178.

Prior to 1966, soldiers lived in virtual isolation from the general public and their propensities were unknown. With the coup, the top leadership of the army moved into positions vacated by the displaced politicians. There was general optimism that the soldiers would put an end to corruption as they promised. However, as was explained in Chapter Three, Nigerian Military officers were among the deprived elements of the society, and throughout the colonial era, they longed for the days when they would live in luxury. With the rest of the population, soldiers had 'been in the rain'. The coup presented them with the opportunity to live in luxury and affluence and their behaviour was similar to that of the politicians. They built palaces for themselves,¹ acquired the most expensive cars and other luxury items, spent lavishly at night-clubs and parties and many are reputed to have impressive accounts in foreign banks. The junior officers and 'privates' posted to traffic duties behave no better than armed bandits as they force tolls from all commercial vehicles and military police officers take up the complaints of only the people who offer them the right inducements.

¹ The author was informed by very reliable sources that the current practice among the soldiers is to apply to either the W.N.D.C. or the W.N.H.C. for loans of any amount before they embark on impressive projects. The loan served as a camouflage for previous embezzlement, and was usually a small percentage of the amount spent on the project. In one case a senior officer got a loan for £2,000, and then proceeded to build three houses, one in Lagos, another in Akure and a third one in Ekiti.

We need to keep in mind the fact that most of the soldiers had joined the army in order to earn a living, rather than because of commitment to some imaginary military professional ethics. They therefore share the materialistic inclinations of their civilian counterparts.

Present day Nigerian society does not seem to discourage incumbents from abusing their positions. People of doubtful character who are known¹ to have misappropriated public funds can display such wealth in the midst of public cheers and admiration. This is one of the symptoms of a society in transition where old taboos and traditions have broken down but new ones have not yet taken root. In the past, the virtue of honesty was cherished and if someone was convicted of a crime, he remained unpopular and isolated in the community. Today, noted a commentator, "all the dignitaries in town would be at the reception called to welcome a convicted rogue who has just completed his sentence." Since the existing attitudes tolerate a high level of corruption, the eradication of corrupt practices must aim at changing the existing social values. This will not be easy in view of the critical shortages of certain basic needs

1 D.J.Murray noted the case of a senior official whose assets were in danger of being confiscated for alleged irregularities who was assured by his town that if the assets were confiscated as planned, the town would make good the loss. "The Western Nigerian Civil Service Through Political Crises and Military Coups," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, VII, no.3, (November, 1970), 236.

which make it easy for those in positions of trust to exploit their positions. The shortage of licensing offices makes it profitable for the police officer to demand bribes before the clients are answered; the demands for schools make it possible for the headmasters to collect bribes before children are registered; the demand for exit visas and passports provides the officers in charge with the opportunities to ask for heavy bribes before these are issued, the import restrictions and domestic scarcity provides salesmen with the golden chance to seek bribes before the names of applicants are placed on the waiting list, or placed on top of the list depending on how generous is the offer. In Nigeria, everyone believes that all other people give bribes and this conviction propels the syndrome. Military intervention into politics has not been able to cure this ill.

This in effect supports Claude Welch's assertion that:

If military regimes set themselves up as doctors of the body politic, they risk being infested by the ills from which the previous civilian government suffered, or, should the patient fail to improve, the physician may be discharged. There is thus a dual danger. The military may fall prey to corruption, unwarranted use of force, electoral or ethnic manipulation, or the denial of political rights - all weaknesses that helped justify (or rationalize) the toppling of the civilian government.¹

¹ Claude Welch, "The Roots of Military Intervention," in Soldier and State in Africa, p.51.

The military officials are aware of the prevalence of corruption in public life. Several enquiries have been set up to probe the illegal acquisition of wealth by certain public officials,¹ but the revelations have done little to lower the social status of the officials concerned. In fact many members of the public think that the officials so probed are unfortunate victims and scapegoats of circumstances.

The leaders also promise an anti-corruption decree, but the public shrugs it off saying that the proclamations are no more than window-dressing as the leaders themselves are the bedrocks of corrupt practices. In other words, there is a credibility gap between the military leaders and the masses; in addition, the sincerity of the leaders is questioned due to observed discrepancy between actual performance and declared intentions.

Perhaps it is not too late to retrieve the reputation of the military leaders. They can make a good start by demonstrating their intentions and sincerity by declaring their assets. This modest example will go a long way towards

1 These include the Somolu Assets Tribunal, the Piper Commission into Election Irregularities in the Western Region: the Investigation into the Assets of Council Employees. Even though the reports of the last two have been presented to the military government for over a year, nothing has been done and no public statements have been issued about the revelations. This leaves the impression that the Somolu Tribunal was politically motivated - designed by supporters of the old A.G. to persecute the N.N.D.P. officials.

restoring the principle of accountability to public life. Decrees and police action unsupported by public opinion and practice would most likely lead to more corruption and blackmail.

CONCLUSION

The initiative for reform in each of these branches of governmental activity seems to have come from the civil servants and commissioners rather than from the soldiers.¹ The input of the soldiers into policy-making has consequently been minimal. This is due partly to the fact that the ruling officers of the Western State attempt to isolate themselves from 'politics', as a result of their non-interventionist orientation. As a consequence of this orientation, few soldiers were appointed to political and administrative posts. Civil servants and Commissioners were left in charge of policies for their respective Ministries while the Executive Council, to which all Permanent Secretaries and Commissioners belong, co-ordinated the activities of the different Ministries.

1 A senior civil servant in the Ministry of Education commented that the Government of the State is Military only in name, and that civil servants have shouldered all responsibility for governing the Ministry since 1966. He further illustrated that each time the Military officers participated in the affairs of the Ministry, they only created confusion. In support of this claim, he referred to the Polytechnic crisis in which the new Governor (Rotimi) dismissed the staff appointed by Governor Adebayo. In this particular case, civil servants were recruited as interim administrators of the institute.

The Military governs indirectly by remote control or veto rather than directly by suggesting policies. Government policies are therefore what the civil servants and Commissioners think can be passed without offending the sensibilities of the military. Consequently, policies have generally been conservative, tending to preserve what exists and excluding radical changes.

In view of their poor educational background the officers may be incapable of comprehending the intricacies of modern government or of suggesting policies. But, military government may still be effective if the officers lend moral support to the policy recommendations of the bureaucrats. Empirical evidence indicates that the military has not given the necessary support to the civil servants. The delay in implementing the Local Government reform and of the takeover of private schools support this assertion.

Much of the negative comments by civil servants on the military regime centre around the lack of dispatch on the part of the soldiers in responding to recommendations and commission reports.¹ Similarly, the negative orientations of members of

1 The reports of the Piper Commission into Election irregularities and the Ayo Ogunshye Commission on Tax Reform were submitted to the Governor in 1970 and 1971 respectively. The reports have not been revealed and no action has been taken.

the general public vis-a-vis the military regime originate from perceived indecision and the vulnerability of the ruling officers to political and para-political pressures. Some people compared the military with the deposed politicians and found no difference.

As a disillusioned teacher in Ile Ife said:

The politicians were discredited for doing nothing, and for their corruption. The soldiers promised to rectify these. After five years of military government, one notices that the only difference between the soldiers and the politicians is the uniform. To whom do we now turn?

The same teacher stated:

It does not matter whether we have military or civilian leaders. What I like to see is a government like that of the Mid-West State that will not hesitate to act. The leaders must lead and not follow. We know and expect some mistakes will be made. These can be corrected later.

In different words, a similar point was made by a civil servant in the Ministry of Trade. He noted:

Instead of acting on the reports prepared on the reorganization of the State Corporations, the new Governor decided to set up another commission of inquiry and reappointed some members of the previous commission.

Examples can be multiplied. The fact remains that the Western State Military rulers are slow and indecisive or perhaps, afraid to make decisions.

The officers could employ the former politicians in policy-making roles. However, fear that the politicians might subvert the military and general insecurity of the soldiers make this option unacceptable to them.¹ In short, the military government of the Western State has not utilized all the opportunities opened to it for transforming the political life of the State.

1 The removal of Bola Ige from the M.A.N.R. and the Farmers' Union; the seizure of assets of former political parties and the frequent warnings that those engaging in political activities will be severely dealt with are some of the manifestations of this insecurity.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE MILITARY REGIME

In this chapter, an effort will be made to determine the present orientations of the citizens towards the military regime of the Western State of Nigeria. Three groups were selected for examination; these were the general public, the bureaucrats and the former political elites. We chose the general public because its views and orientations determine the level of support enjoyed by the regime; the bureaucrats in view of their roles as advisers to the military government and executioners of governmental policies; and the former political elites due to their influence with the general public - an influence which may be employed to rally the masses in support of the government or to challenge the government.¹ The interaction of these three groups and the extent to which they cooperate or fail to do so will determine the stability of the military regime.

RESEARCH METHOD

Interviews were conducted with samples of the three groups. The interviews with the bureaucrats were confined to the top level - Senior Assistant Secretary or higher. Efforts were made to interview all Permanent Secretaries and their Deputies in each

1 Only the former politicians and chiefs were included in this survey due mainly to the fact that they could be easily identified, and this saved us the trouble of deciding who is an elite and who is not. saved

of the eleven Ministries. However, four Permanent Secretaries and eight Deputy Permanent Secretaries and six Senior Assistant Secretaries (out of about twelve for each group) were actually interviewed. These were the people available for the interviews. The length of the interviews varied from about twenty minutes in some cases to an hour in others. Though no formal questionnaire was prepared, each interview included the following questions:

- 1 How has military rule affected your role as a civil servant?
- 2 Has the appointment of the Civil Commissioners affected this role (reference to answer in question one)?
- 3 Since a military regime is said to govern by decrees and edicts, how do you make sure that your policy recommendations are in line with the wishes of the populace?
- 4 Looking at life generally, how do you evaluate the impact of military rule on the Western State?
- 5 From your observation, what has the military regime made worse?

There were secondary questions in many cases and the responses were written in the presence of the respondents. Similarly, informal interviews were held with some members of the non-governmental elite, mainly the former politicians. Since the whereabouts of many former politicians is unknown, efforts were made to contact only those known to be resident in the cities and towns from which the samples for the general public were selected. Eighteen were successfully contacted. The author found this group to be most approachable and except in one case, their responses

were uninhibited, subject of course to the demand for anonymity.

The following questions were included in the interviews:

1. What was your reaction to the Coup of 1966?
 - 2 In your view, what do you regard as the good effects of the military rule in this state?
 - 3 What are the bad effects of Military rule?
 - 4 How will you compare the present military regime with the deposed civilian administration with reference to (economic allocation policies, corruption, law and order etc.?)
 - 5 If civilians were to be brought back today, what aspects of military rule do you think should be preserved?
 - 6 Do you think the soldiers will vacate the political scene as they promise in the year 1976?
- If not, why not?

Although not planned, it was possible to interview four Chiefs. Two of these were members of the Council of Chiefs,¹ another was frequently mentioned as a close friend of Governor Adebayo and the last was an ordinary member of the Conference of Chiefs who prided himself in having attended all the meetings called since the

1 The Council of Chiefs consisted of twelve chiefs selected to organize the programmes of the Conference of Chiefs to which all chiefs were by right invited.

military came to power. The comments made with reference to the Chiefs are based on these interviews. A formal questionnaire was administered to a sample of the population,¹ designed to test their current knowledge and feelings toward the military regime and its performance. It was assumed that the orientations will determine the level of support enjoyed by the military and by inference, its stability.

Method of Sample Selection

Nine major towns and cities in the state, each one representing a major ethnic group had been selected; that is,

<u>Town or City</u>	<u>Ethnic Group</u>
Ibadan	Ibadan
Abeokuta	Egba
Oyo	Oyo
Ijebu-Ode	Ijebu
Ilesha	Ijesha
Ondo	Ondo
Ikare	Akoko
Ogbomosho	Oshun
Ado Ekiti	Ekiti

From each town a sample of about thirty was selected.

1 Copy of the questionnaire attached as Appendix VIII. All the interviews were conducted during January to March 1972. The special problems encountered are also discussed in appendix VII.

In each of these towns, an effort was made to find out the major sections into which the town is divided. For example, Ibadan has major subsections such as Mokola, Bodija, Agodi, Bere, Onireke and so on. The aim being to give all sections of the town equal representation on the sample, if a town has five major sections, six cases were selected from each of these. Names of streets were compiled for each subsection separately, and the number of cases assigned to that section selected. Assuming Ibadan has ten subsections, each section was assigned three cases of our sample. Therefore, the names of streets in Mokola were written on pieces of paper which were thoroughly mixed before three were finally selected by lot. The process was repeated for each of the other sections, after which the house numbers from the streets selected were taken from the table of random numbers. Two substitutes were also selected for each case so that alternatives were readily available in case of a failure to find the first choice, refusal to answer or a poor response or a combination of these. In all cases, the interviewer first asked to speak to the head of the household - male or female. Where these were not available, the available adult was interviewed.

THEORETICAL RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

All political systems to some extent depend on their citizens for support.¹ Support provides a vital link between the

1 D. Easton defined the political system in several ways: as a set of interactions through which valued things are authoritatively allocated for a society ... as a means for resolving differences

rulers and the ruled and this interrelationship is termed by the general systems theorists as 'input'.¹ Inputs take the form of demands and support² but for our purposes, we are mainly interested in the support for political systems as it directly affects the feelings of the citizens towards the regime. The effect of support on the political system has been well summarized by Easton who writes:

First without support for some of the authorities, at least, demands could not be processed into outputs Second, without support, it would be impossible to assure some kind of stability in the rules and structures through the use of which demands are converted into outputs ... and third, support is vital in order to maintain minimal cohesion within a membership.³

The system might obtain support through a wholesale acceptance of its policies, or the support might be based on factors of emotional commitment which may be unrelated to the present policies of the government. The citizens may support the system because they are aware of the power and 'legitimate physical compulsion' available to the regime and that they may be punished for failing to obey.

or as a set of interactions through which demands are processed into outputs. From another perspective, it is seen as a means through which the resources and energies of society are mobilized and oriented for the pursuit of goals. A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p.153.

- 1 D.Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems." World Politics, IX, (April, 1957), 383-408; also G.Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics, a developmental approach (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 25-26.
- 2 G.Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics, loc.cit.
- 3 D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p.157.

Though most regimes can prop their authority with force, there is an inverse relation between coercion and legitimacy.¹ Force can only be used as a temporary expedience. In the long run, a system based on force alone will destroy itself. As has been argued by Easton, "No system could endure, at least for very long without the presence of some moderate belief in its legitimacy."² This includes military regimes as well.

While all regimes attempt to meet the demands of their citizens, it is clear that no regime can satisfy all the demands made on it as resources are always limited. Therefore the leaders must select certain demands from the innumerable requests that are made. Through the selection process, efforts are devoted to balancing the interests of groups so that no politically relevant sector of the society becomes completely alienated from the system. In this way, it becomes morally obligatory for a citizen to support the regime even when he does not like particular policies, the support deriving from the "conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime." Thus, on a day-to-day basis, support for the system may persist even in the face of repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the

1 This has been argued elsewhere in Chapter One.

2 D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p.278.

authorities or their failure to act.¹ Stated differently, if regimes are to avoid daily disorder, there must be stabilized belief in the legitimacy of those in authority so that each group, party or individual does not rise up against the authorities each time the decisions go contrary to their expectations. However, no individual will support the regime indefinitely unless it occasionally satisfies some of his wants.

While the willing or tacit acceptance of the policies of a regime are good indicators of legitimacy, violence, demonstrations and protests or at worst, political withdrawal and alienation are signs of a lack of legitimacy. While active and willing participation in the political process are indicators of affective orientation to the regime,² lack of support such as mass refusal to pay taxes show that the regime can no longer rely on the citizens to support its programmes without the use of coercion. In short, the level of support depends on the attitudes of the citizen toward the government.

The formation of political attitudes are closely related to the socialization process by which the norms and behaviour patterns acceptable to the ongoing political system are transmitted

1 Ibid.

2 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 17-27.

from one generation of citizens to another.¹ The existing culture, traditions, discipline, myths, and reverence for the political system are inculcated in the youth through the formal and informal learning processes, and these shape the attitudes of the recipients.

Early socialization alone does not explain the totality of the citizens' orientation. Adult experiences with the political system; its outputs and contact with role incumbents all combine to shape the feelings of citizens toward their political system. Similarly, the knowledge - cognition - of the political process and its goals, expectations and the satisfaction of some of these, the individual's sense of political competence and his self-perception within the political system become significant variables in the formation of political attitudes. If generally the attitudes thus formed are favourable, actions supportive of the political system can be expected to follow or vice versa. This is represented as follows:

1 This theme runs through the existing literature on socialization. See Bender, "Political Socialization and Political Change," Western Political Quarterly, XX, (1967), pp. 390-407; D. Easton and J. Dennis, Children in the Political System (Toronto: McGeaw Hill, 1969); Easton, "The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization," Canadian Journal of Pol. Science 1, no.2 (June, 1968), pp. 125-146; H. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority," International Social Science Journal, XV, (1963), 542-559; Langston, Political Socialization (Oxford University Press, 1969); R. Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (Appleton-Century, New York, 1945).

Figure 2

Political Socialization Chart

There is no direct correlation between attitudes and action. Between them, there are moderators or what scientists call 'resistors' or filters. The nature of these resistors vary from person to person and place to place, but it may take the form of fear, religious values, ideological predilections, social pressure, the past performance of the regime, the charisma of the role incumbents, the political culture or a combination of these. In other words, some unfavourable attitudes towards a regime will not immediately be translated into hostile action against the regime due to the interplay of these resistors while at the same time, a good act on the part of the government will not immediately lead to public jubilation if the regime has a record of mismanagement. Efforts will be made to examine the orientation to the Military Government of the Western State of Nigeria within this framework. The concentration of the questionnaire on cognition and evaluation by the public is deliberate in view of the fact that these determine the attitudes held towards the regime.

INITIAL ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE MILITARY REGIME

When the Nigerian armed forces replaced the 'corrupt' politicians, there was a feeling of relief among the general public as well as members of the opposition parties who had been persecuted by the ruling parties. These jubilant sectors of the population pronounced the action by the soldiers 'an act of God'.¹

1 Nigeria's Military Government, First 100 Days, January 15 - April 24, 1966. Daily Times of Nigeria (April, 1966), p.5.

Statements in support of the new regime came from many sources - from the Acting Secretary of the N.C.N.C., Chief Kola Balogun; from the Action Group signed by the Acting Leader, Alhaji Adegbenro; from the Joint Action Committee of the Trade Unions; the Nigerian Workers' Council and the United Labour Congress; the Nigerian Youth Congress and the National Union of Nigerian Students.¹ From the Northern Region, the Sultan of Sokoto termed the Coup "the will of Allah", and took the significant step of visiting Lagos for a cordial meeting with General Ironsi.² In a release signed by Alhaji Hasim Adaji, one of the N.P.C. Ministers, the Party said:

The Party regards the transfer of authority as the only solution to the many problems facing this country. The party gives its unqualified support to the military regime and to the Major General in particular We call on all the peoples of Nigeria irrespective of tribal origin or political persuasion to rally round the new military government so as to make easy its great and noble task.³

Chinua Achebe, a Nigerian journalist referred to the general enthusiasm of the masses by writing:

Overnight, everyone began to shake their heads at the excesses of the last regime. Newspapers, the radio, the hitherto silent intellectuals and civil servants - everybody said what a terrible lot; and it became public opinion the next morning.⁴

1 Ibid. 2 Africa Digest, XIII, no.6 (June, 1966), p.139.

3 West Africa (January 22, 1966), p.83.

4 Chinua Achebe, A Man of the People (Ibadan: Heinemann, African Writers Series, 1966), p.166.

In a similar vein, Dr. Azikiwe, the former President of the Republic hailed the military action by demolishing the records of the deposed civilians:

Relatives appointed relatives to high position of state, corruption took the shape of bribery, favouritism and party patronage, while nepotism reigned supreme in official and unofficial circles. The tragedy of the old regime was that power was exercised selfishly in the interest of an oligarchy and a practising clique of political fortune-hunters.¹

And he made the call to the soldiers to restore discipline into the national life:

As a country we lack discipline in our private and public life. This is therefore an opportunity for the army to impregnate our society with the hard but necessary lesson of discipline.²

The military heroes, before now unknown but despised became popular not so much for what they promised to do - that promise was yet to be made - but for what they fought against: the group that had abused political power.

Even though the people of Western Nigeria had little confidence in the ability of soldiers, their hatred for the deposed 'clique of political fortune-hunters' appeared to be so deep that they (the people) were prepared momentarily to reconcile themselves with the soldiers in order to fight the greater foe.

1 See West Africa (April, 23, 1966), p.469; see also "Popular Army Rule," Africa Digest, XIII, no.6 (June, 1966), p.139; Nigerian Military Government, p.31.

2 Ibid., see also, "Azikiwe on New Regime," West Africa (April, 23, 1966), p.469.

The ease with which the men in arms swept away the politicians - and reflection of the lack of support these and the political institutions enjoyed - was construed by favourable newspaper commentators as the strength of the armed forces and the ability of the men in uniform to effect social and political transformation.¹ While some members of the politically aware strata of the society appealed to the military to correct the ills of the society, others merely placed the blames for the social and political decay of the First Republic at the doorsteps of the politicians. Since this group was no more, it was assumed that a transformation would come about without delay. People expected miracles overnight. There was therefore the danger of overenthusiasm. Ojukwu, the military Governor of the Eastern Region was the first to capture this mood when he commented:

Everybody is for us and so many expect us to create miracles overnight. Mothers are confident that the military regime would degree free primary education for their children and teachers expect a pay raise. City workers want low-cost housing, villagers want electricity, running water and so on. The talk everywhere seems to be of New Nigeria, but² few seem to realize what it will take to create it.

The support which is needed to succeed had turned into wants which the regime lacked the resources to satisfy. Like the deposed

1 The New York Times carried this theme for about a month. The Majors were said to be dynamic; Ironsi was painted as a 'no-nonsense man' and so on. For more details, see 'Ironsi Starts Well', Africa Digest, February 1966, p. 118; 'Ironsi Starts Well', Economist 218, February 12, 1966.

2 New York Times, February 18, 1966, p. 5:1.

civilian group, the military regime had to contend with rising expectations. If it failed to meet these, optimism would quickly turn into disillusionment. In this section therefore, we shall attempt to determine the present orientation to the military regime bearing in mind the fact that the feelings to the regime are related to the performance of its political functions. The present orientation to the regime will indicate the extent to which the military has been able to retain and/or build upon the initial support with which it came into power. In other words, the present orientation to the regime will show the public evaluation of the military's success with governing the Western State.

THE ORINENTATIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS TO THE MILITARY REGIME

The executive functions of governments devolve on the civil service and the effectiveness of governments is to a great extent determined by the efficiency, competence and morale of the civil service. The higher echelons of the civil service are generally intricately involved in the formation of policies. This was the case under civilians and more so under the military as the military officers were new to the art of governing and had to rely on the permanent staff and bureaucrats. Any attempt to study the performance of the military government must therefore take into consideration the relationship of the civil service and the political masters.

The civil servants were among the first groups to support the military leaders. Without their support, the military's bid for power probably would have collapsed.¹ The civil servants welcomed the military regime for professional and administrative reasons. The civilian regime was correctly blamed for delay, indecision and irrational planning. These blames rubbed off on the civil servants who had to execute the plans. The pervasive effect of political considerations in all aspects of life including the recruitment, transfer and promotion of civil servants had reduced the morale of the service as civil servants were incapable of usefully employing their technical know-how and were frequently overruled by the politicians.

Thus, civil servants saw their names and prestige being discredited as a result of the failure of the civilian politicians; yet there was little they could do to rectify the situation. When the soldiers came, they not only promised to end politics but said that they would leave administration to the professional administrators.

In Lagos, General Ironsi decreed that "All holders of appointments in the Civil Service of the Federation and of the Regions shall continue to hold their appointments and to carry out their duties in the normal way."² Similarly in Kaduna,

1 See D.J.Murray, "The Western Nigerian Civil Service Through Political Crises and Military Coups," J.of Commonwealth Political Studies, viii no.3 (Nov. 1970), 229-240. See also Face to Face with Adebayo, Questions 10-13.

2 Text of Ironsi's maiden speech, see Olushola Fadahunsi, Nigeria, the last days of the First Republic (A.-O.-F Press, Ibadan, 1970), p.70.

Major Nzeogwu, the Leader of the January 1966 Coup, told a Press Conference that he had appointed a government of civil servants for Northern Nigeria to stamp out nepotism, tribalism and regionalism.¹ Despite threats on the lives of certain prominent civil servants, no bureaucrat was killed or purged as a result of the coup. The Service's political neutrality was therefore recognized and it had to reciprocate by working with the new set of leaders. In the Western Region, the civil servants were advised to continue to run the government. When minor changes were announced in February 1966, they were intended to reorganize the service. This took the form of reshuffles and three officials who had under the civilian administration combined professional responsibilities with those of Permanent Secretaries were relieved of their posts as Permanent Secretaries.² In short, the administrators operated without too much interference from the soldiers. In addition, the fact that the military men were inexperienced in their new role gave the civil servants a larger margin of freedom in making major decisions for presentation to the nominal heads for ratification.

1 Military Government in Nigeria, First 100 Days, p.5.

2 These were Dr. S.O. Franklin, Controller of Medical Services, T.B. Aribisala, Controller of Agricultural Services, and Chief Somade, Chief Inspector of Education. There were some complaints about the manner in which Mr. P. Odumosu was promoted to Secretary to the Military Governor and Acting Head of the Civil Service as he was the least qualified among the three likely candidates for that position.

The Western Region came close to being a technocracy. As one Deputy Permanent Secretary recalled:

During most of 1966 and 67, civil servants made all decisions rapidly. There was no question about the rationality of those decisions and the Executive Council agreed to all the civil servants presented to them; no lobbying, no politics and all personal considerations were put aside Even the general public had confidence in the civil servants.

It can therefore be said that the civil servants were happy with their role under the new administration. They became more closely drawn into the policy-making process as a result of perceived limitations in the ability of the soldiers. This was put thus by a witty civil servant:

The civilian politicians can be compared to wise but toothless bulldogs who can only bark but not bite. The soldiers on the other hand, are like brainless giants but can be counted upon to bulldoze programmes which they are incapable of comprehending.

Another civil servant commented that the soldiers almost got carried away with the enthusiasm to reform and reshape the society overnight. "Some of them were attempting the impossible and we found it necessary to apply the brakes."

The weakness of the soldiers and their political inexperience showed in their deference to the former politicians.¹ Even as the public was being told that the military would keep the politicians out, regular consultation went on between the military elites and those same politicians. As a Permanent Secretary known to

¹ There are two possible explanations for this, the insecurity of the soldiers in political office or the previous politicization of the army.

the author summed it, "They worshipped Awolowo like a folk hero and had no answers to his questions. They spent a good deal of time wondering what to do with the popular politicians." Given the educational and administrative limitations suffered by the soldiers, they depended heavily on the bureaucrats.

Thus, the civil servants respected the former civilian politicians for having the brains and mandate even though they were incapable of acting; the military men on the other hand are seen to lack both brains and mandate but at the same time are respected for their ability to stand firmly behind the decisions that have been made in their name. This placed the civil servants in a preferred position to influence the course of events in the state by acting as the brains behind the 'giants'.

All this changed after civil Commissioners were appointed to serve in the Military Government in July 1967. For a year and six months, the senior civil servants had been able to take their policies directly to the Executive Council for ratification. Though the Commissioners were originally intended to act as links between the government and the masses,¹ they became links between the Military Council and the civil servants. In this way, Commissioners represented a hurdle between the service and the military elite. Furthermore, the functions of the Commissioners were vaguely defined so that there was confusion about their powers vis-a-vis the public service.

1 See text of Governor Adebayo's speech "Civil Commissioners in Army Government," op.cit., See Chapter IV of this Thesis.

While the Commissioners had been selected primarily because of their administrative competence, efforts were also made in the selection process to balance interests - ethnic groups, former political parties and the administrative divisions in the state.¹ This consideration, a necessary one, unintentionally associated the Commissioners with partisan bargaining and many civil servants see them as the new breed of Ministers. A Deputy Permanent Secretary commented:

Since the appointment of the Commissioners, all former political intrigues, delaying tactics, personal interests and local considerations have crept back into the decisions of the Ministry.

He supported his assertion by pointing to the fact that since then, decisions about Chieftaincy affairs have become progressively more difficult to reach "as different Commissioners support different candidates."² Civil servants also feel that the new slate of Commissioners appointed by the new Governor in 1971 is a reflection of the formation of new political alignments in the State.

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- 1 When the new Governor announced his slate of Commissioners in September 1971, it is significant that the Farmers' Union sent a delegation to the Governor that they have not been represented in the slate of Commissioners and asked the Governor to appoint someone with whom the farmers could relate, as was done by the outgoing Military Governor.
 - 2 This theme was illustrated with the Ex-Olowo case. Chief Olowe a former supporter of the N.N.D.P. had been dismissed after his people rose and sent him into exile. His dismissal was blamed on the supporters of the Action Group who were prominent in the slate of Commissioners appointed by Governor Adebayo. When Governor Rotimi replaced all the Commissioners with his own appointees, the case was reopened and the supporters of the ex-Olowo petitioned the new commissioners for his reinstatement.

Their entry they claim, "led to the reopening of cases already concluded in the past even when the people knew that justice had been done." Thus, the presence of the Commissioners is seen to "bring eternal and para-political influences to bear on decisions made by the government departments."

In review, there seems to be a greater degree of job satisfaction among the civil servants under the military administration than had been the case when the civilians ruled. This does not mean that the bureaucrats see a general improvement in all aspects of public life. The topic of corruption came up frequently in the interviews.¹ The responses of the civil servants ranged from outright condemnation of all military men as corrupt: "The military are corrupt from top to bottom," to a more cynical view about military leadership which states: "the military have opened our eyes to corruption. The civilians were corrupt but discreet about it. The military have succeeded in telling the people that hard work does not pay." Similarly, a top official rationalized the practices of the civilians by saying that "they distributed a large part of the public funds to their thugs and constitutents. This time, the soldiers are themselves the armed thugs." In addition, another civil servant lamented the death of public conscience by saying, "the young officers on fairly low wages now build palaces for themselves and ride in a Mercedes.

1 Question: When the Military took over, the soldiers promised to eradicate corruption. In your view, how well have they done?

They are the wealthiest in the society. Everybody knows that the money does not come from their salaries." Finally, a disillusioned administrator found it necessary to sympathize with the convicted and executed armed robbers, many of whom were recruits into the army, by saying:

They all went into the army to earn a living. Fortune has brought the top officers to the seat of government and they have diverted public funds to private use. What do you expect the junior recruits to do? Starve on the low wages? Since the senior officers who are supposed to show examples have taken advantage of their positions, isn't it natural that their followers would take advantage of the guns which they know how to handle very well?

Civil servants say that corruption is prevalent in contracts negotiated with the Government. Disenchanted politicians cry out against alleged corruption by the military.¹ -Fears of the public are reinforced by revelations that far "more than double the appropriated amount (for the armed forces) was spent in only nine months of the 1970-74 Development Period."² In addition, the image of the military seems to slip with the unguarded utterances such as the one attributed to Governor Audu Bako saying that he agreed most of the leaders of Nigeria are corrupt but that he did

1 See O. Awolowo, "Military are not In Office by Revolution," Daily Times, November 3, 1971, pp. 1 and 2.

2 Mr. Ebong, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction noted that the appropriated fund for Defense was ₦ 38.8 m. per annum, but a total of ₦ 92.4 m. was spent in the first nine months of the Plan. Daily Times, July 20, 1971, p.7.

not believe that "a probe of public officers is a means of ridding the nation of bribery and corruption." He went on: "most people in the country are involved in bribery and corruption ... and for the fight against the two vices to succeed, everybody should be probed. But this would be an impossible exercise."¹

By implication, Bako was imploring the people to give up on the fight against bribery and corruption. As was the case with the former civilians, the military leaders will be blamed for not eradicating corruption and 'the physician may eventually be dismissed if the patient fails to improve.'

There is evidence of growing impatience with military rule. As Colin Legum wrote:

The most immediate signs of danger are the schisms building up within the Army itself. One group among the younger officers is impatient because the leaders are not purifying either the army or the country of corrupt practices Corruption is by no means confined to the new military caste: it is widespread and endemic throughout the country.²

ORIENTATIONS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Before 1966, few Western Nigerians knew members of the military or even the top leadership of the army. However, the anonymity of the soldiers disappeared as soon as the military

1 Audu Bako, Daily Times, March 22, 1972.

2 Africa Digest, XIX, no.2 (April, 1972), p.36.

took over the political functions from the civilian politicians. More and more military officers are interacting with members of the general public and playing new roles in local affairs. We attempted to find out how many people could correctly identify the Military Governor of the State and also how much the military leaders have come to be regarded as local influentials. The results follow:

TABLE 3
NAMING OF THE MILITARY
GOVERNOR

Correct Answer Gov. ROTIMI	Wrong Answer Former (Governor) ADEBAYO	Wrong Answer AKINTOLA (Civilian Premier)	Others	No Response
183(67.4%)	43(15.9%)	4(1.5%)	41(15.2%)	1(0.4%)

N = 272

Question: Could you name the Governor of this State?

Similarly, the respondents were asked to identify local influentials. The purpose of the two related questions was to find out whether as a result of military rule, the soldiers will feature prominently among the names of community leaders. However, the response pattern was as follows:

TABLE 4

IDENTIFICATION OF INFLUENTIALS

Chiefs and Elders	Politicians	Rich People and Academics	Government Officials	Army	Others	No Response
206(76%)	22(8.1%)	30(11.1%)	12(4.4%)	1(.4%)	0(0%)	1(.4%)

N = 272

Question: If I want to start some community project in this area and I come to you for advice on whom to contact about getting the people interested in the project, which of the following people should I contact? (1) Chiefs and Elders (2) Politicians (3) Rich People and Academics (4) Government Officials (5) Army Officers (6) Others (specify).

The response supports the earlier claim made in Chapter four that the Chiefs and Elders had been returned to their traditional positions of honour and dignity due to the efforts of the military to employ them as links between the State Government and the communities.

The pattern of response to the second question revealed the continued prominence of the former politicians in local and community affairs. Though the politicians lost power, their roles did not change much, many remaining the representatives of their communities but under a new title - the Leaders of Thought. The Self-help programmes provided them with a forum where they could openly mingle with the people and through this, some of them were able to retrieve their reputation as good citizens as opposed to the ill repute they gained in the days of partisan politics

Insert Table 5 here

This response shows that the prestige of the military men has not risen among the general population. The respondents were asked to name the most profitable profession in the State, and even though the military was regarded as the second most profitable profession, very few of our respondents were prepared to join the military profession even if given the opportunity.

Insert Table 6 here

TABLE 5

IDENTIFICATION OF LOCAL INFLUENTIALS

Chiefs and Elders	Politicians	Rich People and Academics	Government Officials	Army Officers	Others	No Response
87(32.2%)	136(50.4%)	22(8.1)	0(0%)	13(4.8%)	12(4.4%)	1(.4%)

N = 272

Question: Could you name any other important personality from this area?

(This was then classified according to the occupational groupings used for the earlier question).

TABLE 6

IDENTIFICATION OF THE MOST PROFITABLE PROFESSION

Business	Military	Farming	Medicine	Teaching	Government Work	Industry	Other	Don't Know	No Response
119(41.1%)	51(18.9%)	41(15.2%)	29(10.7%)	13(4.8%)	12(4.4%)	4(1.5%)	1(.4%)	1(.4%)	1(.4%)

N = 272

Question: What is the most profitable profession in the State today?

For the Structures responses refer to the occupational groupings
in question 8.

While 71.5% of our respondents indicate that they would be prepared to enter the most profitable profession that they themselves have selected, 38 out of the 51 people (=75%) who chose the military as the most profitable profession say that they were not prepared to join the military profession. This indicates a persistence of strong negative feelings towards the military profession. The comments of some of our respondents ranged from "I have little regard for military life," or "I don't know if I will find it rewarding and self-satisfying," to "I am afraid of combat". Whatever the excuse, and in spite of the fact that the military profession is seen to bring money and unlimited opportunities for advancement, it is still considered a poor career choice in the Western State of Nigeria.

The distribution of amenities has always been a subject of concern to the people of the Western State due to the fact that it is believed that whoever controls the administration diverted all major amenities to his area of origin at the expense of the other communities. All of our respondents were aware of the amenities (development or progress) which they would like to have for their localities. Social amenities such as hospitals, schools, electricity and pipe-borne water were the most frequently mentioned. Some wanted industries to be located in their towns with little consideration for the profitability of these in the particular localities. The popular attitude was to compare one town with the others saying: "Ogbomosho has a shoe factor, Ilesha should have

one too." Perhaps this stems from the conception that the location of industries are politically motivated and that the government can always be counted upon to supply subsidies to industries that cannot stand on their own.

The view that those in government use their powers and influence to advance the cause of their constituencies and localities was expressed again and again. For example, a University graduate from Ado-Ekiti proudly commented that "Ado now has the textile industry because we have our boys at the helm of power making the right decisions." A teacher in Ogbomosho-Oshun mentioned the fact that "this town has not been forgotten by the State Government since the death of Akintola because we have at least one important military officer who is respected by the military authorities." (The author believes the important officer is Colonel B. Adekunle who was honoured by the town in 1969 and made a honorary chief).

To a considerable extent, this pattern of behaviour by the soldiers is reminiscent of that of the civilian politicians struggling to acquire amenities for their constituencies. Because of this, many people presently complain that the military government of the state is as partisan as that of the former civilians. When asked whether the government was doing enough for (this locality) the response for the whole State, as expected was solidly negative.

TABLE 7

GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR LOCALITY

Yes	No	Not these days	No Response
81(30.1%)	174(64.7%)	14(5.2%)	3

N = 272

Question: Is the Government doing enough for (this locality?)

These responses become more significant when they were broken down into localities (see Table 8 on next page). The highest negative vote (91.2%) was recorded in Oyo. This shows that the earlier allegation that the military Government had ignored Oyo and that Oyo Province should seek salvation in a separate state was not an idea confined to the representatives of the province.¹ The figures from Oshun were equally revealing. Of our respondents, 35.5 per cent claim that the change in government which transferred power from representatives of Oyo to people from Ekiti caused Ogbomosho to lose. The location of the shoe factory in Ogbomosho does not seem to be regarded as enough compensation.

1 For earlier manifestations of Oyo and Oshun disenchantment, see "Petition for the Creation of Yoruba Central State by Decree Submitted by the Representatives of Oshun to General Gowon, June 28, 1967, as reprinted in Panther-Brick (ed.), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), pp. 269-271.

TABLE 8

PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN (BY LOCATION)

	IBADAN	ABEOKUTA	OYO	IJEBU-ODE	ILESHA	ONDO	IKARE	OGBOMOSHO	ADO-EKITI
1. Yes	6 (22.2%)	9 (30.0%)	3 (8.8%)	12 (48.0%)	11 (37.9%)	4 (13.3%)	8 (26.7%)	8 (25.8%)	20 (60.6%)
2. No	21 (77.8%)	21 (70.0%)	31 (91.2%)	12 (52.0%)	18 (62.1%)	26 (86.7%)	21 (70.0%)	12 (38.7%)	11 (33.3%)
3. Not these days	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11 (35.5%)	2 (6.1%)

N = 269

Question: Is the Government doing enough for this area? (named)

TABLE 9

PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR LOCATION
(BY ETHNICITY)

	IBADAN	EGBA	OYO	IJEBU	IJESHA	ONDO	AKOKO	OSHUN	EKITI
1. Yes	3(15.0%)	9(32.1%)	4(11.1%)	11(37.9%)	11(39.3%)	4(13.3%)	10(29.4%)	10(31.3%)	19(59.4%)
2. No	17(85.0%)	19(67.9%)	31(86.1%)	18(62.1%)	17(60.7%)	26(86.7%)	22(64.7%)	13(40.6%)	11(34.4%)
3. Not these days	0	0	1(2.8%)	0	0	0	2(5.9%)	9(28.1%)	2(6.2%)

N = 269

Question: Is the Government doing enough for this area?(named)

TABLE 10
ROTATION OF GOVERNORSHIP (BY EDUCATION)

	No Educa- tion	Some Primary	Completed Primary	Some Secon- dary and Secondary Modern	Completed Secondary	H.S.C. and University
1. Yes	38(39.6%)	27(75.0%)	34(58.6%)	26(56.5%)	21(80.8%)	7(77.8%)
2. No	58(60.4%)	9(25.0%)	24(41.4%)	20(43.5%)	5(19.2%)	2(22.2%)

N = 271

Question: Should the Governorship of this State be rotated among the various ethnic groups such as the Ekiti, the Egba and so on?

In short, the acquisition of certain amenities were linked to extra-procedural pressures exerted by certain individuals, Military officers and civil servants on behalf of their respective areas of origin. Very few associated the redistribution of amenities with objective military policies. Thus, there is a wide margin between what the regime says it is doing and what the public believes it to be doing. This popular view about government behaviour influences the response to the next question which asks: Should the Governorship of the State be rotated among the different ethnic groups such as the Ekiti, the Egba, and so on? (Both Governors Fajuyi and Adebayo were from Ekiti, The present Governor is Egba).

For the State as a whole, the response was solidly in favour of rotation, 173 (64.1%) saying yes, and 97 (35.9%) saying no. There was no marked differences between the different localities on this. In addition, cross-tabulating the responses by education revealed no major differences between the most educated and the least educated sections of the population. It would have been natural to expect that the most educated would be less parochial and tribalistic and would be less in favour of a rotation system based on ethnicity. If anything, the evidence revealed the opposite: the most educated were a little more in favour of the rotation, tending to confirm Edward Shils' assertion that

In spite of all pronouncements the intellectuals are not uprooted and detribalized as they themselves sometimes assert with such melancholy. They have remained attached to their traditional

patterns of social life, their tribes, ethnic and caste communities and almost seek expression in the public policies in domestic political alignments.¹

Nothing illustrates the feelings of the population towards the military and military administration more than the set of questions they were asked in order to determine their evaluation of the military:

TABLE 11
COMPARISON OF MILITARY & POLICE

	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know
Our Soldiers have generally been honest people	61(22.5%)	189(69.7%)	21(7.7%)
Our Policemen have generally been honest people	26(9.6%)	236(87.1%)	9(3.3%)
Our Soldiers are more honest than our policemen	146(53.9%)	74(27.3%)	51(18.8%)
Those who violate the laws are generally always detected and punished	151(55.7%)	105(38.7%)	15(5.5%)

Question: From your experience of the past few years, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¹ Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," World Politics XII, (1960), 344-345.

These responses are revealing. A predominant majority of the population feel that the soldiers have not been honest. This pattern remains unchanged when cross-tabulated with age, sex, ethnicity and education. Similarly, the respondents overwhelmingly disagreed with the statement that the Policemen have been honest people. Many of them pointed to the arrest and conviction of two Police Inspectors - Amusa Abidogun and Patrick Njovens¹ as bubbles in the sea of police dishonesty. Furthermore, the respondents expressed the view that most of the crimes committed in the State were aided and abetted by some police officers.

It is also significant that the majority of the respondents agree that the soldiers are more honest than the police. However, when these were cross-tabulated with education, the most educated group disagreed that the soldiers were more honest than the policemen:

Insert Table 12 here

In the same way, the most educated were the most unimpressed with the government's efforts about detecting and punishing those who violate the law as Table 13 indicates

Insert Table 13 here

1 Daily Times, December 28, 1971, p.1.

TABLE 12

PERCEPTION OF SOLDIER AND POLICE HONESTY(BY EDUCATION)

	No Education	Some Primary	Completed Primary	Secondary Modern	Completed Secondary	H.S.C. and University
Agree (146)	43(44.8%)	19(52.8%)	41(70.7%)	31(67.4%)	10(38.5%)	2(22.2%)
Dis-agree (74)	31(32.3%)	9(25.0%)	8(13.8%)	9(19.6%)	10(38.5%)	7(77.8%)
Don't Know (51)	22(22.9%)	8(22.2%)	9(15.5%)	6(13.0%)	6(23.1%)	0(0%)
	96 = 100%	36 = 100%	58 = 100%	46 = 100%	26 = 100%	9 = 100%

N = 271

Question: Are our Soldiers more honest than our Policemen?

TABLE 13

PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE (BY EDUCATION)

	No Education	Some Primary	Completed Primary	Secondary Modern	Completed Secondary	H.S.C. and University
1. Agree (151)	58(60.4%)	23(63.9%)	30(51.7%)	25(54.3%)	13(50.0%)	2(22.2%)
2. Dis- agree (105)	33(34.4%)	12(33.3%)	25(43.1%)	16(34.8%)	12(46.2%)	7(77.8%)
3. Don't know (15)	5(5.2%)	1(2.8%)	3(5.2%)	5(10.9%)	1(3.8%)	0(0%)
	96 = 100%	36 = 100%	58 = 100%	46 = 100%	26 = 100%	9 = 100%

N = 272

Question: Are Law Breakers always detected and punished?

Few of our respondents view themselves in activist roles. They were asked: What opportunities do you have for telling the leaders what you think they might do for this area? The aim was to see which means the people identify as being available to them. Their responses revealed a high level of estrangement. A storekeeper in Ilesha remarked: "I don't have any opportunities. Even if I had, I would not bother myself because I believe that the leaders only listen to important people." A former local party organizing secretary in Ikare commented "the ears of the present set of leaders are too high that they are incapable of hearing the people." In brief, the answers show poor communication between the leaders and the ruled:

Insert Table 14 here

This pattern cuts across education, age, ethnicity. It is worth noting that government officials are not regarded as a means of communication. Perhaps if the government sets up the office of Ombudsman in every administrative Division, this flaw could be corrected and the masses would get a better feeling of participation in the decision-making process. As will be argued in greater detail later, it is necessary for the people to participate at local levels and to receive political education through practice before full-scale civilian rule is restored.

TABLE 14
UTILIZATION OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

None at all	At the local gatherings	Through personal contact	I write letters to newspapers	I write letters to Government Ministry	Through radio	Through Government officials	Whenever Governor tours our area	At the market place
189 (67.7%)	30 (11.1%)	27 (9.9%)	18 (6.6%)	4 (1.5%)	2 (.7%)	1 (.4%)	0	0

N = 272

Question: What opportunities do you have for telling the leaders what you think they might do for this area?

Closely related to political activism is the ability or perception of one's ability to change the decision of the local council when the decisions go contrary to one's interests. Given the fact that bribery and favouritism were said to be rife in public life, it was anticipated that most of the respondents would offer bribes as means of changing the decisions of their local councils. However, the empirical data did not support this assumption. Instead the answers were as follows:

TABLE 15

AVENUES OF COMPLAINT

Visit Council to complain	Visit Civil Servant at his home	Look for Big Shot	Withdraw	Bribe the Official
128(47.2%)	23(8.5%)	29(10.7%)	73(26.9%)	18(6.6%)

N = 271

Question: If you do not like the decision that has been made by your Council, how will you go about trying to make the Council change its decision?

The choice of visiting the Council to complain was not without qualifications. Many of the respondents admitted that offering some bribe was probably the most effective way to assure some hearing and that other people were doing that. Almost all

admitted also that bribery was bad and that he/she would offer bribes as a last resort. Perhaps this was a clear indication of the difference between what the people would like to be caught doing and what they actually do. Nobody confesses to offering bribes; yet everyone thinks everyone else does it. In addition, 68.8% of the respondents answer that military rule has had no effect on the ability to employ these avenues of complaint. In other words, military rule has not affected these social behaviour and attitudes.

THE ORIENTATIONS OF THE ELITES

The aspects mentioned as significantly good effects of military rule are as varied as the respondents. Each of the groups in the survey seems to have particularistic purposes for lauding certain aspects of military rule. The former politicians, Chiefs and local councillors were in agreement that the ban placed on partisan political activities led to temporary peace and reduced the level of political tension under which the State lived from 1962 to 1966. The Chiefs in particular had nothing but praise for the soldiers. As we hinted before, under civilian administration, the Chiefs had been forced to play partisan politics and many of them had become disoriented with regard to their roles. The uncertainty which surrounded their positions was removed with the end of partisan politics. Similarly, the military administration has returned the Chiefs to their traditional dignity; they are consulted before major decisions are made and they have

assurance that they would not be removed from office without cause.

Former councillors and politicians have cause to rejoice. Admittedly they lost their privileges and social status to the army but the general feeling among those interviewed was that the "Coup was a saving grace to the nation as everything was crumbling." Fear, partisan antagonism and political thuggery which made life insecure evaporated when the soldiers occupied the political battlefield.¹ The same group applauded the initial effort of the Western State Military Governor (Adebayo) to forge unity among the leaders of the various political parties. The 'Operation Unity' call and the frequent meetings of the 'Leaders of Thought' were said to have been useful forums where the former political foes sat and reasoned together.²

The former politicians were elated about 'the return of sanity' to the judicial system. Under the civilians, the Courts had been politicized and it became a partner in the war of

1 The assertion by Huntington that military intervention has the capacity for generating transitory order seem to have been substantiated. Political Order in Changing Societies, p.217.

2 One former N.N.D.P. politician summed up the feelings when he said: "It was not until I sat side by side with the members of the Action Group on the same side facing the Military Governor did it dawn on me that we the civilians had lost all power." The Military removed the cake, so if we continued to fight, it would have been over nothing.: In other words, the objects of the former political fights had been removed by the military, and the politicians found that they had no reasons to continue fighting. This brought peace to Yorubaland.

harrassment waged by the government party aimed at demoralizing its political opponents. With partisan politics banned, an end was put to the practice and confidence was restored in the Courts. A former Action Group politician stated, "If you disagreed with the government, you spent a greater part of your time going to court to answer concocted charges; but now, everybody is free to go about his legitimate business without fear of persecution." An N.N.D.P. politician claimed that in the last days of the First Republic, "If one agreed with the government, the Opposition thugs would make life difficult, whereas if one agreed with the opposition, one can be sure he would be going to jail."

Generally, those who were opposed to the regime were more vocal than those who felt that the effects of military rule has been good. Among the frequently discussed adverse effects of the regime's policies were corruption, highway robbery, partisanship in the allocation of amenities, non-payment of cocoa prices and above all, the unprecedented high rate of inflation. Professor Aluko spoke for this group when he declared:

The man who appeals against tribalism may be the most tribalistic person around, just as most of our leading men who daily decry corruption are some of the most fraudulent Nigerians.¹

Whatever the true fact, the belief that the soldiers are dishonest and corrupt is widespread throughout the Western State of Nigeria.²

1 Daily Sketch, January 12, 1972, p.5.

2 See Table//; see also Africa Digest XIX, no. 2 (April, 1972), p.36.

As in most of the underdeveloped countries, unemployment and inflation were named as the most pressing national problems. Though the military regime is censured for creating unemployment, it must be explained that the most serious and potentially explosive form of unemployment is that of the secondary school leavers and not of the illiterate population. In other words, the unemployment is the product of the previous policies of the civilian era which produced more school leavers than the economy of the State can accommodate. Similarly, many of the school leavers reject certain available positions either because the jobs are located in the rural areas or because it is not 'White Collar' and as a result, below their expectations.

Also with regard to inflation, the civil war had led to serious shortages of many commodities. When the war ended, the soldiers were added to the number of consumers and this had the effect of further pushing up the prices. The masses clamoured for a price control commission. The Government responded by setting up a Rent and Price Control Board to regulate the retail prices of essential commodities but the Board operated for a short time and died a slow painless death.¹

1 The task before the Board was a very difficult one. In Nigeria, except for a few supermarkets, the retail prices of goods are rarely fixed or displayed. The onus has always been on the buyer to bargain for the lowest price he thinks the seller would sell while the seller tries to get the best deal possible. This is coupled with the fact that most of the population are illiterate and even if the official prices were higher than the one shown without the illiterate buyer knowing. Thirdly, the government did not give any official prices for

The simple explanation given by the members of the general public was that the government had only given a half-hearted support to price control due to the fact that most of the senior military officers engage in retail trade, either in their own names or in the names of their relations; that many soldiers have become landlords in whose interests it is to keep the rents up; and that too many of the soldiers are contractors who are interested in phasing out rivals, the price mechanism being an effective way to do this.

CONCLUSION

Let us pull together the implications of all that we have so far recorded. Our data show that the people of the Western State of Nigeria are highly politically informed even though they do not see themselves in active roles or as participants in the system.¹ The enthusiasm with which the military regime was

the commodities declared to be essential so that the Price Control Board had nothing to go by, other than their common sense.

All these amounted to the fact that there was no definite way in which the Board could determine how much a particular trader charged on any item as the prices changed from one buyer to the other, and the continuing shortages forced the buyers to pay higher prices or even to agree with the trader that he would not disclose the price he has paid. Thus, the lack of co-operation from the members of the public - both buyers and sellers - made it impossible for the Board to operate. See West Africa (March, 19, 1971), p.1; Africa Digest, XVIII, no.6 (December, 1971), p.116. The urban cost of living continues to rise. Federal statistics show that the figures for Ibadan, Lagos and Kaduna were up between 14 and 20 per cent in 1971 over the previous year. See Africa Confidential, XII no.12 (May, 1972), p.5.

- 1 D. Gibbons found the same orientation among the Chinese farmers of Singapore and termed this kind of orientation a Spectator Political Culture. His parameters for the spectator culture

welcomed in 1966 seems to have subsided and there appears to be growing disenchantment and disillusionment with the performance of the military government. It is common for governments to lose some support after some time. However, it could be said that the military leaders of the Western State have demonstrated little initiative, ability to govern or charisma, yet, the masses have not taken to the streets to ask for the end to the military administration. Several reasons can be advanced for the relative passivity of the masses. First, the ban on political gatherings and activities has not been lifted. This ban tends to atomize the citizens and denies the possibility of disenchantment gaining corporate strength. For the military, this is good. Secondly, the weakness of the former political parties and organizations and their sectional rather than national bases of support have made it easy for the military regime to proscribe them as tribal associations which are divisive of national unity.¹

include knowledge of the national leaders and the ability to name some national problems. The spectator falls between the subject and the participant, having a cognitive orientation toward the political system as a general object, toward the output objects and toward the input objects but not towards the self as a participant. "The Spectator Political Culture; a refinement of the Almond and Verba Model," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, IX (March, 1971), 19-35, especially p.32.

- 1 While this might be true, the author has reasons to believe that the military authorities would not look too kindly on any organization even if it were national in scope; an organization that might compete with the military for power. On November 3, 1971, Awolowo spoke to the Press and answered that he had not vacated public life, fears circulated in military circles that he might try to broaden the Action Group and make it a more national organization capable of dislodging the military from

Many of the former civilian politicians were not committed to public life. For instance, shortly after the coup, many top politicians declared that they were hanging up their political gloves for good and that they were returning to their private professions. Even where there were political functions to perform and interests to articulate, most of the former politicians have not taken advantage of their previous positions to lead the masses.

In addition, previous antagonism between different civilian groups and elites have persisted so that no civilian counter-force to the military has formed. Similarly, the memory of the violence and lawlessness which accompanied civilian politics during the First Republic make the public reluctant to demand the return of those politicians. Such fears of the events of the past lead the masses involuntarily to support the military regime.

Fourthly, the economy of the Western State remains stable even though successors charge their predecessors with economic mismanagement. The taxes paid by the citizens have been stabilized so that the citizens carry no extra burden as a result of military rule. In addition, the many gestures of the Military Governor such as the Self-Help Scheme and financial aid to small-scale industries locating in rural areas, have provided employment for the formerly jobless school leavers; the enlarged

their entrenched positions. To counter any such eventuality, the Federal Military Government in February 1972 confiscated the assets of all former political parties including the Action Group, the N.C.N.C. and the N.P.C. See Daily Times, February 5, 1972. See also Daily Times November 3, 1971, pp. 1 and 2.

military offers employment to many school leavers from the rural countryside and the indigent student grants make it possible for many destitute students of Western State origin to complete their education.¹ In short, while some people are becoming disenchanted with the military, others have vested interests in keeping the military in power. Alternatively, the military government has prevented the crystallization of the opposition by not lifting the ban on political organizations.

Finally, the junior officers, many of whom expressed dissatisfaction with the political programmes of their leaders have formed no alliance with the civilians to unseat the leaders due to corporate self interest;² many of them believe that military rule enhances their own positions in the society, and to bring the civilians back would mean a reduction of military influence and consequently, a lowering of their personal prestige.

1 During the first year of the scheme, 2,250 students were aided and the cost to the tax-payer was £225,000. Figures published by the Western State Government, Daily Times, October 28, 1971, p.3.

2 Opinions suggesting dissatisfaction were expressed during the author's informal discussions with junior officers of the Mokola barracks in Ibadan. Similar discontent was expressed in Akure and Owo. One of the senior officers at Owo who accompanied the author during some of the discussions said that the grievances of the junior officers were genuine but that there would be no solution for some time to come. See Also Africa Digest, XIX, no.2 (April 1972), 36-37.

Thus, it appears as if the negative and positive feelings toward the Western State Military regime are at an equilibrium due mainly to the interaction of the moderators - fear of being shot by the soldiers, absence of organized effort due to the feebleness of the civilian elites, and the sincere belief by the masses that the state of life under the soldiers is better than the violence that visited the dying days of the First Republic. Unless the civilians eventually organize, the solution to the disenchantment with the military may be the replacement of particular military governors rather than the restoration of civilian rule. For ^{the present} the disenchanted and alienated tend to withdraw.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we shall discuss the implications of the performance of the Military Government for post-military political stability in the Western State of Nigeria.

In chapter two we noted that the military organization is more cohesive than many civilian organizations such as political parties and interest groups. The lines of command and obedience are also clearer in the military. Consequently, the military is potentially capable of acting decisively. We intimated that in many underdeveloped societies, political institutions are weak, that the elites in these societies lack unity, parties have no clear programmes and there is no consensus on the rules of political transaction. We concluded that the organizational superiority of the military can fill the authority void which civilian disunity creates.

The military must itself share the view that soldiers can lead their societies in the process of modernization. It must be prepared to exploit its known assets and convert these into political advantage. We noted however, that soldiers who share a non-interventionist military culture do not utilize the

military advantage. The culture requires soldiers to stay out of politics. If and when intervention is deemed necessary, the orientation makes the officers shrink from getting their hands dirty in political conflict by abstaining from playing forceful leadership roles. It also teaches that governments led by soldiers are inherently bad.

The colonial recruitment policies discriminated against Nigerians with high education. The impression circulated that the army contained illiterates and those who could not succeed in other highly reputed professions. The officers attempted to improve their own self image by identifying with their foreign peers and British military traditions.

The anxieties of post-independence politics drew the civilian leaders into closer alliance with the army, and the senior military officers supported the ruling civilians. However, junior officers who had little regard for the politicians successfully staged a coup. The miscarriage of the coup left political power in the hands of the senior leaders. This had three effects: the military leaders had no policies; they felt insecure in government due to their training which emphasized the impropriety of military government,¹ and they set dates for handing over power to civilians.

1 This orientation affected the performance of the military government. The insecurity led to frequent changes in policy which in turn reduced the respect the masses initially had for the soldiers.

After the soldiers assumed power, they made some decrees, promised to keep the politicians out and to restore rationality to governmental decisions. Such a reassurance was necessary at a time when the people were fed up with the high level of violence and indecision which had accompanied civilian politics. It also made military government acceptable to all segments of the society.

The military mentality of the leaders influenced their political behavior. They started ruling through decrees rather than consultation. They failed to seek the views of their subjects and this precipitated riots in which some leaders lost their lives. Next, an attempt was made to organize the leaders of various groups in the society under the umbrella of Leaders of Thought. When the conference of leaders developed into demand channels, the military rulers felt threatened and decided not to call any more such meetings. They reverted to the earlier position of non-communication. Once more there were riots. The government this time decided to listen to opinions from all quarters.

These changes in policy can best be explained as resulting from the general insecurity of the officers in political roles. Both lack of communication and what looks like unending consultation are bad as they only serve to reduce the confidence of the masses in the ability of the leaders to make decisions. An acceptable

median point which will make it possible for the people to have their say while not denying the leaders the opportunity to make the final decisions must be established. In the case of Local Government Reform, a time limit to consultation is needed. The officers could fix a limit of six months, after which the final policy statements are revealed. This procedure has two main advantages to recommend it: the people will be able to influence decisions while the leaders will be able to make quick and informed decisions.

Some level of mass participation is a necessary foundation for promised democratic institutions. There is also a need for local institutions to promote and facilitate participation and consultation. Both local government and political organizations remain banned in the State. Radio coverage of local events is scanty and the ordinary citizen who is illiterate cannot write to government departments and newspapers. In short, the local foundation for democracy has not been laid yet, the government expects democratic practices as soon as it hands power to civilians. It is recommended that local government councils should be launched without delay. The military government can therefore supervise the operation of the councils to ensure that there is conformity to the norms and conventions of the local government system. This is the only way the masses will become politically educated in the operation of the system. Local participation is not antithetical to military rule.

The government's decision not to appoint the Public Complaints Commission needs to be reconsidered. Such intermediaries will improve the responsiveness and image of the military administration with the public. It will also avail the government opportunities to speak to the people affected by the policies and more, keep open one channel of communication.

Corruption persists. One is tempted to say that the officers have no interest in combating it. The fact is that corruption is a multi-dimensional problem which feeds on public attitudes and socio-economic conditions. When the soldiers took office, there was popular belief that they would halt the process of corruption. This hope has not been realized. Instead, the officers do, as their civilian predecessors, become involved in ostentatious living and use public office for personal advancement.

The half-hearted efforts made to combat corruption did too little too late. The assets of some public officials were investigated but the haphazardness of the operation and the people investigating and being investigated gave the impression that the efforts were little more than political persecution of the opponents of the ruling coalition. It therefore had no deterrent effect.

Critical shortages of many basic needs makes it necessary for those in need to exert some pressure in order to obtain what they desire. The fact that some prominent military officers

benefit from the high prices of commodities makes the administration hesitant about establishing price control regulations. There is a need to create some commission to look into the rising prices. In addition, the distinction between private and public interest must be made. Soldiers interested in private business should be made to resign from the army, at least for the duration of army rule. Similarly, public officials should be asked to declare their assets when they take or leave office. At present, the masses perceive the leaders as employing their office for personal enrichment and as long as this attitude prevails, there will be little public cooperation in the fight to end corruption.

The Military Government has however, been weakest in the realm of creating viable political institutions. The weak institutions of the post-independence period made military intervention possible. It is simple logic that if the soldiers wish to establish viable democracy, they must set up strong civilian institutions which will be able to manage future conflict. As Claude Welch asserts, "The prospects of the military for success depends upon their developing political institutions with a capacity for effective change."¹ Similarly, Samuel Huntington notes that "neither military

1. Claude Welch, Soldier and State in Africa, p. 38.

juntas nor charismatic personalities nor free elections can be a long-term substitute for political organizations."¹ Empirical evidence from the Mexican, Egyptian and Turkish military governments support these statements.²

From the Mexican and other examples it can be seen that the process of creating political institutions takes a long time, some patience and deliberate planning. All successful military regimes have found the means for establishing

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- 1 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," p. 245.
 - 2 Mexico under Diaz 1876-1910 suffered from political and social disorder. Military intervention which occurred in 1910 did not by itself end political violence and the first three military governors met violent deaths. The military junta moved to establish a political party in 1929. The demands of various interest groups and organizations for representation were accommodated within the ruling party and this ended the resort to violence. After 1940, the party was reconstituted to emphasize civilian sectors and reduce the predominance of the military and by 1957 the military had imperceptibly withdrawn from the political arena. The party dominates Mexican political life and has succeeded in moving Mexico from the traditional bureaucratic system of 1910 to the partially mobilized democratic system of 1972. For details, see G. Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics: a developmental approach (Boston: Little Brown Series in Comparative Politics, 1966), p. 271; C. Anderson and C. Cockcroft, "Control and Cooptation in Mexican Politics," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, VII (1969), pp. 11-29; F. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 35-38; L. Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System," A.P.S.R., LI (1957), pp. 995-1008; R. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (N.Y.: Illini Books, 1964), pp. 50-150.

political institutions. It must also be emphasized that the officers who have succeeded ignored adverse foreign criticism and became directly involved in administration and policy formulation. They accepted their roles as political and made no distinction between military politicians and civilian politicians.

However, officers who share a non-interventionist orientation generally feel they have violated their peer-group and professional norms by intervention,¹ and they conclude that the right thing for them to do is to hand power to civilians at the earliest opportunity and return to the barracks.² In line with this feeling, they view their stay in politics as temporary pending the arrival of civilians. They set dates for their departure. Consequently, they do not get too deeply involved in administration and confine their activities to supervising the work of the civil servants and some handpicked

1 See R. Price, "Military Officers and Political Leadership: the Ghanaian Case," Comparative Politics, III, 3, (April, 1971), p.269.

2 Ibid., See also A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, p. 37.

administrators who are left free to frame and execute policies, as in Ghana under the First Military Government, 1966-1969.¹

The hesitation to 'play politics' results from the self image of the senior officers in which they consider themselves professional soldiers and not politicians: that is, their non-interventionist orientation. Soldiers with the orientation regard the establishment of political instruments as the legitimate function of politicians and not of soldiers. Therefore if these institutions are to be set up during military rule, the action must be delayed till shortly before the arrival of the civilians.

1 The First Ghanaian military rule lasted three and a half years. Robert Price observed that the military relied upon civilians to perform all political functions; that no officers were appointed to government departments, state enterprises, statutory boards or the civil service. There was also a moratorium on the discussion of political and national issues. Aspiring politicians returned to their areas in order to build support on the basis of regional, ethnic personal and other particularistic criteria. New political institutions were set up on the eve of the soldiers' departure from politics. The institutions were still weak when the officers left, and this weakness rendered them vulnerable to another military coup. After eighteen months of civilian rule, another clique of the military found it necessary and easy to overthrow it. According to Colonel Acheampong, the leader of the coup, "the leaders of the 1966 coup did not get down to work as seriously as they should have done... they did not move to change our way of life." See West Africa, 19th May, 1972, p. 609; D. Austin, "Return to Ghana," African Affairs, LXIX (January, 1970), pp. 67-71; and R. Price, Loc. Cit..

The fact that the military withdraws before the institutions become firmly established restores the country to the conditions that precipitated the initial coup and makes the prospects of further military intervention more likely.

The Western State officers wish to create a viable democracy. This is their declared objective. Three years to the time set for their departure, the officers have done little toward creating civilian-based political structures. One reason is the fact that the officers underestimate the difficulties of establishing democratic polities. Another is the inexperience and ignorance of the officers about politics.. A third is the insecurity of these officers in political roles. This insecurity is reflected in their fear and distrust of civilian politicians. During the first two years of military rule, the officers devoted some energy to "keeping the politicians out." The officers feel that if civilian-based organizations are created, it will be necessary to bring in the politicians. These politicians, we observed in Chapter six, are still influential with the masses. Armed with civilian organizations, the politicians will be in position to subvert the military regime. The soldiers do not want this, so, they have refrained from setting up civilian institutions. Their action however perpetuates the conditions which had invited the initial military intervention. This is the dilemma: to

create the institutions is to risk being thrown out, not to create them is to risk perpetual instability.

In view of the fact that political institutions take a long time to take root , it is recommended that the military rulers of the Western State should take steps to set up political parties, elected assemblies and channels of mass participation and supervise their operation. After the institutions acquire some strength, the military should gradually and imperceptibly withdraw and leave more power in the hands of civilians. Such a process will give civilians experience in managing the institutions and the presence of the military will augment the authority of the institutions. In short, the military should set up the institutions and stay as long as necessary to nurture them and not completely quit the political scene until the institutions acquire strength and legitimacy.

In review, the Western State military leaders have not created the institutions for the education of the masses in democracy. The efforts at reforming the society have so far been spearheaded by civil servants and not the military. This is due to the fact that the soldiers regard military political leadership as something inherently bad and are prepared to rule indirectly by censoring the actions of the civilian administrators and commissioners. As a result, their decisions have been uncoordinated tending to confirm Robert Price's assertion that:

The political leadership provided by the professionally motivated officers is more likely to be characterized by indecisive, contradictory and ad hoc decision-making than is the leadership provided by officers who are motivated by some broader societal interests.¹

In short, the military appears to be following the practice of the colonial era which Andreski described as follows:²

A committee of lawyers would be set up who would draft a constitution containing all the democratic provisions they could think of. Then the rebellious African politicians were told that they could have independence and power if they signed a promise to follow it... The weakness of these farewell exhortations on democracy was that until shortly before their departure the colonial rulers had never tried to exemplify the practice of democracy, and were perfectly content with ruling in a strictly authoritarian manner.

The Western State military leaders seem to have chosen the same alternative as was chosen by the British during the colonial period: to abrogate all political activity and to reconstruct an alliance with the chiefs on the local level - in other words, to rebuild the administrative - traditional system with soldiers assuming the role of the British colonial officers.³

1. R. Price, "Military Officers and Political Leadership," p. 364.

2. S. Andreski, The African Predicament, p. 111.

3. Edward Feit, op. Cit., p. 188.

Nigeria may be different from Ghana, but the similarities between the military government of Ghana (1966-1969) and the present military regime in the Western State of Nigeria are many. The Ghanaian experiment failed. The Western State military by not getting down the business as it should have done may also fail. Or as Edward Feit summarized:¹ "Men make their mistakes in order to repeat them" and "Men knock down their political structures in order to replace them with ones essentially similar." Military rule has changed nothing in the Western State of Nigeria.

1 Ibid., p. 192.

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APPENDICES I - IX

APPENDIX I

ANNEXURE IV SUGGESTED RE-ORGANISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS INTO LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIONS

Serial No.	Administrative Division	Councils to be merged	Population per Council	Population of proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of present Council	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of proposed L.G.A.
1. AKOKO						
		Ikare District Council		[1]	£	£ [1]
		Akoko West Provisional Authority	61,696	—	27,505	—
		Akoko North (less Onuwo Provisional Authority)	29,013	—	12,560	—
		Akoko Central Provisional Authority	22,103	—	1,780	—
		Akoko North-East Provisional Authority	20,121	—	13,820	—
			20,596	153,529	11,530	67,495
2. AKURE						
		Akoko South Provisional Authority	38,184	[2]	13,345	[2]
		Akoko East Provisional Authority	30,345	—	9,565	—
		Oka District Council	62,761	131,290	21,555	44,465
		Akure District Council	129,415	[3]	182,040	[3]
		Ifedore District Council	70,727	[4]	19,682	[4]
		Idanre District Council	78,169	[5]	36,805	[5]
3. EGBA						
		Egba Divisional Council	—	[6]	—	[6]
		Abokuta Urban District Council	187,292	—	169,475	—
		Egba Ikereku District Council	24,011	211,303	5,980	175,455
		Imala District Council	18,735	[7]	11,350	[7]
		Egba Ohafeini District Council	45,083	[8]	31,855	[8]

Serial No.	Administrative Division	Councils to be merged	Population per Council	Population of proposed L.G.A.	1970-71 Estimated Revenue of present Councils	1970-71 Total Estimated Revenue of proposed L.G.A.
				[9]	[9]	[9]
		Egba Owode District Council	.	91,566	44,685	57,825
		Oba Provisional Authority	.	}	13,140	
		Egba Ifo District Council	.	[10] 95,552	92,165	[10] 92,165
		Egba Odeda District Council	.	[11] 115,708	57,695	[11] 57,695
		Ota District Council	.	[12] 51,618	40,475	[12] 40,475
		Ilaro District Council	.	[13] 44,993	39,420	[13] —
		Egbado-Ketu District Council	.	129,885	68,645	103,065
		Egbado-Iponrin District Council	.	[14] 54,232	28,970	[14] —
		Ipokia District Council	.	54,702	22,905	—
		Ado-Igbessa District Council	.	61,509	34,520	86,395
		Ado District Council	.	[15] 262,337	76,280	[15] 76,280
		Ghonyin District Council	.	[16] 88,946	24,320	[16] 24,320
		Ikole District Council	.	[17] 102,519	25,905	[17] —
		Omuo Provisional Authority	.	22,812	8,760	—
		Ekiti Northern District Council	.	90,827	16,865	51,530
		Ekiti Southern District Council	.	[18] 344,120	71,237	[18] 71,237

8. EKITI WEST	• • •	Ekiti Western District Council	• • •	171,347	[19]	—	30,660	[19]
		Ijero District Council	• • •	165,798	—	—	36,760	—
		Ogun District Council	• • •	98,513	—	—	20,625	—
		Ido-Osi District Council	• • •	93,705	529,363	—	18,380	106,425
9. IBADAN CITY AREA	• • •	Ibadan City Council	• • •	627,379	[20]	627,379	1,056,990	[20]
10. IBADAN (LESS CITY)	• • •	Ibadan North District Council	• • •	120,407	[21]	—	124,055	[21]
		Ibadan West District Council	• • •	65,584	185,991	—	37,350	161,405
		Ibadan South-West District Council	• • •	30,844	[22]	—	49,270	[22]
		Ibadan South-East District Council	• • •	46,867	—	—	74,130	—
		Ibadan South District Council	• • •	31,438	109,149	—	27,860	151,260
		Ibadan East District Council	• • •	219,158	[23]	219,158	71,240	[23]
11. IBARAPA	• • •	Ibarapa West District Council	• • •	116,948	[24]	—	53,625	[24]
		Ibarapa East Provisional Authority	• • •	—	116,948	—	30,285	83,910
12. IFE	• • •	Ife Divisional Council	• • •	—	[25]	—	£ 263,670	[25]
		Ife District Council	• • •	303,174	—	—	73,790	—
		Ifedero Local Council	• • •	29,177	—	—	9,465	—
		Ipetumodu Local Council	• • •	24,080	—	—	8,870	—
		Edunabon/Moro Local Council	• • •	20,337	376,768	—	7,860	363,655
13. IJEBU	• • •	Ijebu Divisional Council	• • •	—	[26]	—	—	[26]
		Ijebu-Ode District Council	• • •	113,796	—	—	150,770	—
		Ijebu East Central District Council	• • •	20,858	—	—	5,305	—
		Ijebu Imushin Provisional Authority	• • •	14,785	—	—	6,620	—
		Ijebu Southern District Council	• • •	37,424	—	—	14,275	—
		Ijebu Western District Council	• • •	18,610	225,429	—	15,965	205,295
		Ijugun/Alaro District Council	• • •	19,956	—	—	12,360	—

Serial No.	Administrative Division	Councils to be merged	Population per Council	Population of proposed L.G.A.	1970-71 Estimated Revenue of present Council	1970-71 Total Estimated Revenue of proposed L.G.A.
			[27]	[27]	[27]	[27]
		Ijebu-Igbo District Council	73,983		51,800	
		Ijebu Northern District Council	7,558		6,535	
		Ijebu North-Western District Council	33,420	114,961	21,745	80,080
			[28]			[28]
		Oshunmaiyegeun District Council	22,853		12,440	
		Ijebu-Waterside District Council	57,082	79,935	38,465	50,905
14.	IJEBU-REMO		[29]	[29]	[29]	[29]
		Ijebu-Remo Divisional Council			76,915	
		Offin Shagamu Local Council	48,916		13,565	
		Makun Shagamu Local Council	19,260		3,232	
		Ode-Ikeno Local Council	4,554		380	
		Iperu Local Council	16,869		895	
		Ilara Local Council	713			
		Irolu Local Council	2,717		192	
		Ode-Remo Local Council	8,317		688	
		Ilishan Local Council	6,092		700	
		Ishara Local Council	20,470		790	
		Ogere Local Council	5,661		880	
		Ikenne Local Council	9,917		1,255	
		Orile-Oko Local Council	4,839			
		Akaka Local Council	1,843		220	
		Ipala Local Council	5,157	155,325	265	99,977
15.	IJESHA NORTH		[30]	[30]	[30]	[30]
		Ijesha Northern District Council	177,429	177,429	60,070	60,070
16.	IJESHA SOUTH		[31]	[31]	[31]	[31]
		Ijesha Urban District Council	165,822	165,822	59,290	59,290
		Ijesha Southern District Council	138,470	138,470	49,170	49,170

17.	OKITIPUPA	Okitipupa Divisional Council							[33]		[33]
		Ikale-Idapometa District Council								21,535	
		Ikale Idapomarun								21,965	
		Ikale-Orisumeta District Council							164,107	11,930	56,640
									[34]		[34]
		Ilafe District Council								22,390	
		Ese-Odo District Council							111,602	34,250	56,640
18.	ONDO	Ondo Divisional Council							[35]		[35]
		Ondo Central District Council							148,733	120,345	120,345
									[36]		[36]
		Ondo Western District Council								26,820	
		Ondo Southern District Council							44,694	25,016	52,836
									[37]		[37]
		Ile-Oluji, Oke-Igbo District Council							64,636	35,040	35,040
19.	OSUN CENTRAL	Oshogbo District Council							[38]		[38]
									251,674	83,165	83,165
		Irepodun District Council							[39]		[39]
									156,321	22,215	22,215
		Ede District Council							[40]		[40]
									182,594	48,960	48,960
20.	OSUN NORTH-WEST	Oghomosho District Council							[41]		[41]
									343,279	101,349	101,349
		Ejigbo District Council							[42]		[42]
									112,295	28,710	28,710
21.	OSUN NORTH-EAST	Ifelodun District Council							[43]		[43]
		Iree/Eripa Provincial Authority								26,770	
		Ila District Council								5,360	
		Ikirun District Council							413,341	36,490	
		Odo-Otin District Council								31,149	129,140

Serial No.	Administrative Division	Councils to be merged	Population per Council	Population of proposed L.G.A.	1970-71 Estimated Revenue of present Councils	1970-71 Total Estimated Revenue of proposed L.G.A.
22.	OSUN SOUTH	Iwo District Council	336,821	[44] 336,821	102,730	[44] 102,730
		Egbedore District Council	71,783	[45] —	47,945	[45] —
		Aiyedade District Council	162,883	—	62,955	—
		Orile-Owu District Council	34,031	268,697	16,810	127,710
23.	OWO	Owo District Council	140,035	[46] —	74,095	[46] —
		Ekamarun District Council	26,752	—	14,410	—
		Irekari District Council	23,060	189,847	12,395	100,900
24.	OYO NORTH	Shaki District Council	139,601	[47] 139,601	42,085	[47] 42,085
		Irepo District Council	158,986	[48] 158,986	27,035	[48] 27,035
		Okcho-Iganna District Council	113,904	[49] 113,904	42,545	[49] 42,545
25.	OYO SOUTH	Oyo Southern District Council Afijio Provisional Authority	308,310	[50] 308,310	128,925 24,815	[50] 153,740
		Iseyin District Council	164,522	[51] 164,522	54,435	[51] 54,435

APPENDIX II

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REGARDING MERGING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
Akoko Serial No. 1 730.08 sq.mi.	Ikare District Council	61,696	(1)	27,505	—
	Akoko West P.A.	29,013	—	12,566	—
	Akoko North less Omuo P.A.	22,103	—	1,780	—
	Akoko Central P.A.	20,121	—	13,820	—
	Akoko North-East P.A.	20,596	—	11,830	—
	Akoko South P.A.	38,184	—	13,345	—
	Akoko East P.A.	30,345	222,058	9,565	90,405
Akure Serial No. 2 1,027.22 sq.mi.	Oka District Council	62,761	62,761	21,555	21,555
	Akure District Council	129,415	—	182,040	—
	Ifedore District Co.	70,727	200,142	19,682	201,722
Egba Serial No. 3 2,058.75 sq.mi.	Idanre District Co.	78,169	78,169	36,805	36,805
	Egba Divisional Council	—	—	—	—
	Abeokuta Urban District Co.	187,292	—	169,475	—
	Egba Ikereku District Co.	24,011	—	5,980	—
	Egba Obafemi District Co.	45,083	—	31,855	—

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
	Egba Owode District Co.	91,566	—	44,685	—
	Oba Provisional Authority	95,552	—	13,140	—
	Egba Ifo D.C.	115,708	—	92,165	—
	Egba Odeda District Co.			57,695	—
			559,182		414,995
	Imala District Council	18,735	18,735	11,350	11,350
	Otta District Council	51,618	51,618	40,475	40,475
Egbado Serial No.4 2,067.83 sq.mi.	Ilaro District Council	44,993	—	39,420	—
	Egbado-Ketu District Co.	129,885		68,645	
			174,878		108,065
	Egbado-Ifonyn District Co.	54,232		28,970	
	Ipokia District Co.	54,702		22,905	
	Ado-Igbessa District Co.	61,509		34,520	
			170,443		86,395

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
Ekiti Central Serial No. 5 500.87 sq.mi.	Ado District Council	262,337	262,337	76,280	76,280
	Gbonyin District Co.	88,946	88,946	24,320	24,320
Ekiti North Serial No. 6	Ikole District Council Omuo Provisional Auth. Ekiti Northern District Co.	102,519		25,905	
		22,812		8,760	
		90,827		16,865	
			216,158		51,530
Ekiti South Serial No. 7 329.31 sq.mi.	Ekiti Southern District Co.	344,120	344,120	71,237	71,237
Ekiti West Serial No. 8 545.80 sq.mi.	Ekiti Western District Co. Ijero Western District Co. Otun District Council Ido-Osi District Co.	171,347		30,660	
		165,798		36,760	
		98,513		20,625	
		93,705		18,380	
			529,363		106,425

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
Ibadan City Area Serial No. 9 105.45 sq.mi.	Ibadan City Council	627,379	627,379	1,056,990	1,056,990
Ibadan Division (less city) Serial No. 10 1,096.31 sq.mi.	Ibadan North District Co.	120,407	—	125,055	
	Ibadan West District Co.	65,584	—	37,350	
	Ibadan South West D. Co.	30,844	—	49,270	
	Ibadan South East D. Co.	46,867	—	74,130	
	Ibadan South District Co.	31,438	—	27,860	
			295,140		312,665
	Ibadan East District Co.	219,158	219,158	71,240	71,240
Ibarapa Serial No. 11 1,190.80 sq.mi.	Ibarapa West District Co.			53,625	83,910
	Ibarapa East Provisional Authority	116,948	116,948	30,285	
Ife Serial No. 12 696.35 sq.mi.	Ife Divisional Council	—	—	263,670	—
	Ife District Council	303,174	—	73,790	—
	Ifetodo Local Council	29,177	—	9,465	—
	Ipetumodu Local Council	24,080	—	8,870	—
	Edunabon/Moro Local Council	20,337	—	7,860	—

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (IN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (IN).
			373,768		363,655
Ijebu Serial No. 13 1,826.57 sq.mi.	Ijebu Divisional Council	—	—	—	—
	Ijebu-Ode District Co.	113,796	—	150,770	—
	Ijebu-East Central D.Co.	20,858	—	5,305	—
	Ijebu-Imushin Provisional Authority	14,785	—	6,620	—
	Ijebu Southern District Co.	37,424	—	14,275	—
	Ijebu Western District Co.	18,610	—	15,965	—
	Ilungun/Alaro District Co.	19,956	—	12,360	—
	Oshunmaiyegun Provisional A.	22,853	—	12,440	—
	Ijebu-Water-side District Council	57,082	—	38,465	—
			338,784		277,945
	Ijebu-Igbo District Co.	73,983	—	51,800	—
	Ijebu Northern District Co.	7,558	—	6,535	—
			81,541		58,335

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
Ijebu-Remo Serial No. 14 381.69 sq.mi.	Ijebu-Remo Divisional Co. Offin (Shagamu Local Council)	—	—	76,915	—
	Makun (Shagamu Local Council)	48,916	—	13,563	—
	Ode-Lemo Local Council	19,260	—	3,232	—
	Iperu Local Council	4,554	—	380	—
	Ilara Local Council	15,869	—	895	—
	Irolu Local Council	713	—	—	—
	Ode-Remo Local Council	2,717	—	192	—
	Ilisan Local Council	8,317	—	668	—
	Ishara Local Council	6,092	—	700	—
	Ogere Local Council	20,470	—	790	—
	Ikenne Local Council	5,661	—	880	—
	Orile-Oko Local Council	9,917	—	1,255	—
	Akaka Local Council	4,839	—	—	—
	Ipapa Local Council	1,843	—	220	—
		5,157	—	265	—
			155,325		99,977
Ijesha North Serial No. 15	Ijesha Northern District Co.	177,429	177,429	60,070	60,070

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
Ijesha South Serial No. 16 462.53 sq.mi.	Ijesha Urban District Co. Ijesha Southern District Co.	165,822 138,470		59,290 49,170	108,460
Okittipupa Serial No. 17 1,614.68 sq.mi.	Okittipupa Divisional Co. Ikale-Idapometa District Co. Ikale Idapometa District Co. Ikale-Orisumeta District Co.	— 24,495 65,227 74,385	— — —	— 21,535 21,965 11,930	— — —
			164,107		56,640
	Ilafe District Council Ese-Odo District Council	55,615 55,987	—	22,390 34,250	56,640
			111,602		
Ondo Serial No. 18 1,691.90 sq.mi.	Ondo Divisional Council Ondo Central District Co. Ondo Western District Co.	— 148,733 17,878	— — —	— 120,345 26,820	— — —

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
	Ondo Southern District Co.	26,816		26,016	
			193,427		173,181
	Ile-Oluji/Oke-Igbo District Council	64,636	64,036	35,040	34,040
Oshun Central Serial No. 19 462.14 sq.mi.	Oshogbo District Council	251,674	—	83,165	—
	Irepodun District Co.	156,321	407,995	22,215	105,380
	Ede District Council	182,594	182,594	48,960	48,960
Oshun North-West Serial No. 20 701.48 sq.mi.	Ogbomosho District Co.	343,279	343,279	101,349	101,349
	Ejigbo District Council	112,295	112,295	28,710	28,710
Oshun North-East Serial No. 21 446.98 sq.mi.	Ifelodun District Co.	113,123		26,770	
	Iree/Eripa Provisional Authority	20,973		5,360	
	Ila District Council	138,476	—	29,280	

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Present Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
Oshun South Serial No. 22 757.21 sq.mi.	Tkirun District Council Odo-Otin District Co.	101,601 177,644		36,490 31,140	129,140
	Iwo District Council	336,821		102,730	102,730
	Aiyedade District Co. Orile-Owu District Co.	162,883 34,031	— 196,914	62,955 16,810	— 79,765
	Egbedore District Co.	71,783	71,783	47,945	47,945
Owo Serial No. 23 1,033.44 sq.mi.	Owo District Co. Ekamarun District Co. Irekari District Co.	140,035 26,752 23,060	— — 189,847	74,095 14,410 12,395	— — 100,900
	Shaki District Council	139,601	139,601	42,085	42,085
	Irepo District Council	158,986	158,986	27,035	27,035

Administrative Division and Area in Sq.Mi.	Councils to be Merged	Population per Council	Population of Proposed L.G.A.	1970/71 Estimated Revenue of Prosent Council (LN).	1970/71 Total Estimated Revenue of Proposed L.G.A. (LN).
	Okeho-Iganna District Co.	113,904	113,904	42,545	42,545
Oyo South Serial No. 25 3,249.44 sq.mi.	Oyo Southern District Co. Afijio Provisional Auth.	308,310	308,310	128,925 24,815	153,740
	Iseyin District Council	164,522	164,522	54,435	54,435

APPENDIX III

NUMBER OF PROPOSED AREA COMMITTEES IN EACH DIVISION

1.	Akoko	15
2.	Akure	11
3.	Egba	38
4.	Egbado	27
5.	Ekiti Central	12
6.	Ekiti north	11
7.	Ekiti South	6
8.	Ekiti West	23
9.	Ibadan City	6
10.	Ibadan (less City)	26
11.	Ibarapa	5
12.	Ife	8
13.	Ijebu	17
14.	Ijebu Remo	11
15.	Ijesha North	9
16.	Ijesha South	13
17.	Okitipupa	14
18.	Ondo	10
19.	Oshun Central	11
20.	Oshun North West	9
21.	Oshun North East	17
22.	Oshun South	15
23.	Owo	8
24.	Oyo North	10
25.	Oyo South	16
Total		348

APPENDIX IV

FINANCIAL PICTURE OF NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS BASED ON
ESTIMATED REVENUE OF COMPONENT COUNCILS AS AT 1970-71 IN
ORDER OF MAGNITUDE

COUNCIL	POPULATION	1970/71 ESTIMATED REVENUE (IN)
1. Ibadan City	627,379	1,056,990
2. Egba Local C.	559,182	414,995
3. Ifo	376,768	363,655
4. Ibadan	295,140	312,665
5. Ijebu	338,784	277,945
6. Akure	200,142	201,722
7. Ondo	193,427	173,181
8. Oyo	308,310	153,740
9. Oshun North East	551,817	129,140
10. Ijesha	304,292	108,460
11. Egbado Northern	174,878	108,065
12. Ekiti Western	529,363	106,425
13. Oshogbo	407,995	105,380
14. Iwo	336,821	102,730
15. Ogbomosho	343,279	101,349
16. Owo Divisional	189,847	100,900
17. Ijebu-Remo	155,325	99,977
18. Akoko	222,058	90,405
19. Egbado South	170,443	86,395

20.	Ibarapa	116,948	83,910
21.	Aiyedade	196,914	79,765
22.	Ado	262,337	76,280
23.	Ibadan East	219,158	71,240
24.	Ekiti Southern	344,120	71,237
25.	Ijesha Northern	177,429	60,070
26.	Ijebu Igbo	81,541	58,335
27.	Ikale	164,107	56,640
28.	Ilaje-Ese-Odo	111,602	56,640
29.	Iseyin	164,522	54,435
30.	Ekiti Northern	216,158	51,530
31.	Ede	182,594	48,960
32.	Egbedore	71,783	47,945
33.	Okeho/Iganna	113,904	42,545
34.	Shaki	139,601	42,085
35.	Otta	51,618	40,475
36.	Idanre	78,169	36,805
37.	Ile Oluji/Oke Igbo	64,636	35,040
38.	Ejigbo	112,295	28,710
39.	Irepo	158,986	27,035
40.	Gbonyin	88,946	24,320
41.	Oka	62,761	21,555
42.	Imala	18,735	11,350

APPENDIX V

POPULATION AND AREA OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THE WESTERN STATE OF NIGERIA

DIVISION	AREA (Sq. mls.)	POPULATION
1. Oyo North	4,513.49	412,491
2. Oyo South	3,249.44	472,832
3. Egbado	2,067.83	345,321
4. Egba	2,058.75	629,565
5. Ijebu	1,826.57	419,355
6. Ondo	1,691.90	258,063
7. Okitipupa	1,614.68	275,709
8. Ibarapa	1,190.80	116,948
9. Ibadan Div. (less city)	1,096.31	514,298
10. Owo	1,033.49	189,847
11. Akure	1,027.22	278,311
12. Oshun South	757.21	608,518
13. Akoko	730.08	284,819
14. Oshun North West	701.48	455,574
15. Ekiti North	679.39	216,158
16. Ife	596.35	376,768
17. Ekiti West	545.80	529,363
18. Ekiti Central	500.87	351,283
19. Ijesha South	462.53	304,292
20. Oshun Central	462.14	590,589
21. Oshun North East	446.98	600,000

22.	Ijesha North	382.24	177,429
23.	Ijebu Remo	381.69	155,325
24.	Ekiti South	329.31	244,120
25.	Ibadan City Area	105.45	627,379

APPENDIX VI.

WESTERN STATE DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

DIVISIONS	HEADQUARTERS
1. Akoko	Ikare
2. Akure	Akure
3. Egba	Abeokuta
4. Egbado	Ilaro
5. Ekiti Central	Ado Ekiti
6. Ekiti North	Ikole
7. Ekiti South	Ikerre
8. Ekiti West	Ijero
9. Ibadan City Area	Ibadan
10. Ibadan Div. (less City Area)	Ibadan
11. Ibarapa	Eruwa
12. Ife	Ile Ife
13. Ijebu	Ijebu Ode
14. Ijebu-Remo	Shagamu
15. Ijesha North	Ijebu-Jesha (temporarily)
16. Ijesha South	Ilesha
17. Okitipupa	Okitipupa
18. Ondo	Ondo
19. Oshun Central	Oshogbo
20. Oshun North East	Ikirun
21. Oshun North West	Ogbomosho

22.	Oshun South	Iwo
23.	Owo	Owo
24.	Oyo North	Shaki
25.	Oyo South	Oyo

APPENDIX VII

Special Problems With Survey Interviewing In Western Nigeria:

Survey interviewing in a society like the Western State of Nigeria where this mode of study is relatively new to the masses may present problems which can only be circumvented through a relaxation of the 'scientific rigour' of the research design. Without such relaxation, either the research will not be possible at all, or the content of the study will be sacrificed to technical niceties.

The first problem arose with the selection of the samples and the units to be used. As there are no lists of residents for any city, we could not select individuals as the sample unit. The decision was therefore made to select house numbers and to interview any adult found in the unit. The trial run of the questionnaire in Ibadan showed that even where the houses on a street may be numbered, many houses were without numbers. Similarly, some numbers were omitted without explanation. For example, number 6 Adegoke Road was selected but when the street was located, there were numbers 1-5, and the next numbers to be found were 9 upwards. The solution to this initial problem was the selection of substitutes at the time the sample is selected so that in case of a failure to find the first unit, substitute units, also randomly selected were readily available.

It was usual for the interviewer to be met at the door by a child. The best thing to do was to ask for the landlord (Bale) or landlady

(Iyale). If these are both absent, other adults in the house would normally come forward. It was most profitable not to insist on interviewing any particular person as the people tend to become suspicious that the names of such people might have been registered and that their answers would be submitted to those in authority.

If after a mistake was discovered and a set of responses was declared unusable it was decided to conduct another interview as a replacement for the useless one, it was best not to return to the original house or person for this was counterproductive. People tended to interpret the return of the interviewer as a signal that someone was in fact after them and most of the answers become 'don't know'. The easiest way out of this was to go to one of the substitutes previously selected.

In many of the towns, there are no street maps or guides. The major source of information for that was to go to any of the Primary Schools in the area (about primary class IV) where local geography is studied. The teachers were most helpful with this. From the locally made maps one can gather the names of the streets for sample selection.

Administrative Problems:

Many illiterate parents prefer to have their literate sons or daughters by their side while the interview lasted. Perhaps they do this as a security measure. There might be problems if the child attempts to tell the father what he thinks is the right answer. The best thing is to obtain the child's pledge of non-co-operation with his father and explain to him that there are no right answers as such. In many cases, the short talk with the child made the parents more relaxed.

With the literates, many of them wanted to read the whole set of questions before answering them. Knowing that this will take an exceedingly long time, the questionnaire was left with them with the understanding that it would be collected in about three hours. This procedure saved time and the answers were less inhibited.

A special problem developed with the literates. When the identifying number was placed on top of the questionnaire before it was distributed to them, they became very reluctant about completing it. The simple solution was to avoid the identification numbers until the questionnaire was already completed, or if they were numbered, it was wise to take some blank questionnaires along. If these fail, allow the respondent to select which questionnaire he wants from the pile. In this way he is sure that there will be no way to identify him at a later time.

When translating the possible answers, 'don't know' presents an easy way out, and many respondents will thank you for including it as one of the options. 'Don't Know' as one of the answers was therefore left out until the respondent himself selects it.

Similarly, the order of the responses were read differently each time. The trial run showed that some of the respondents tended only to remember the last two or three answers and when they were read differently, the respondents tended to think about their answers rather than merely repeating the last and familiar answer.

Finally, the value of patience cannot be overstated. Some questions may have to be repeated four or five times if not more often before people made up their minds that they understood the question. So also, it is necessary to carry an identification card, preferably, one

with the photo on it. You will also have to convince the respondents that you are not a government agent and that your work has nothing to do with tax assessment. If you can do this, the responses will flow freely.

APPENDIX VIII

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN THE WESTERN STATE OF NIGERIA:

A QUESTIONNAIRE

Location: _____

No. _____

Sex:

1. Male
2. Female

Marital Status:

1. Single
2. Married
3. Widowed
4. Divorced
5. Separated

To which Group do you belong?

1. Ibadan
2. Egba
3. Oyo
4. Ijebu
5. Ijesha
6. Ondo
7. Akoko
8. Oshun
9. Ekiti
10. Other (specify)

What is your Age Range?

0. Under 20
1. 20-30
2. 30-40
3. 40-50
4. 50-60
5. 60 and over.

What is your occupational Grouping?

1. Government work
2. Industry
3. Farming
4. Teaching
5. Personal Business
6. Military or Police
7. Student
8. Others (specify)

What is your Estimated Income? in Pounds (N).

1. Under 100
2. 100-200
3. 200-300
4. 300-500
5. 500-750
6. 750-1,000
7. 1,000 and above.

What educational level did you attain? _____

In public affairs, some people have more influence than the others.
Would you regard yourself as having:

1. Considerable influence?
2. Some Influence?
3. No Influence at all?

If Yes, are you consulted before decisions of local importance are made?

1. Often
2. From time to time
3. Not at all

If you do not like the decision that has been made by your local council,
how would you go about trying to make the council change its decision?

1. Visit the Council office to complain
2. Visit the Civil servant responsible at his home
3. Look for a big shot to pull your case
4. Withdraw because there is nothing that you can do
5. Bribe the official

Since the change in Government to military rule, have you been able to
use these avenues of complaint?

1. More?
2. The same?
3. Less?

Has there been any change in your condition of life since the Military
took over government?

1. Yes
2. No.

How would you like to classify those changes?

1. Have been generally good?
2. Have been insignificant?
3. Have not been good?
4. Don't know

If you say they have been good, which aspects strike you as the most significant?

If you do not think they have been good, why?

In your view, what big national problems have persisted?
.....

How can these be eliminated?

From your experience of the past few years, would you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Agree Disagree, D. Know

Our soldiers have generally
been honest people

Our policemen have generally
been honest people

Our soldiers are most honest
than our policemen

Those who violate the laws
are generally always
detected and punished

There is little chance for
advancement today in
Government unless one
knows someone important
to pull for him.

There is little chance for
advancement today in
industry unless one
knows someone important
to pull for him.

Success today depends more
on luck than on real
ability

Success today depends more on
the people you know than on
real ability

Education is still the only
source of advancement.

Could you name the Governor of this State? _____

How about naming any other important personalities from this area?

If I want to start some community project in this area and I come to you for advice on whom I should contact about getting the people interested in the project, which of the following people should I contact?

1. Chiefs and elders
2. Politicians
3. Rich People and Academics
4. Teachers, Government Officials such as Dispensers, e.t.c.
5. Army Officers
6. Others (specify).

From which sources do you receive most of your information about politics?

1. Radio and Rediffusion
2. Newspapers
3. From Gatherings
4. Government Officials come round to inform us
5. Whenever the Governor tours the State
6. I overhear people discussing politics
7. I write letters to Government Departments
8. From the market place

How often do you catch up on the news?

1. Everyday
2. About once a week
3. From time to time
4. Never

What opportunities do you have for telling the leaders what you think they might do for this area? _____

How often if ever do you apply these means? _____

Could you name two amenities (developments) that have come to this area since about five years ago? _____

Why were they brought here? _____

Why weren't they brought here before? _____

Could the locality have got them without a change in government to a Military regime? _____

Is the Government doing enough for this area? _____

What would you like the Government to add to the amenities in this area? _____

Are you prepared to pay more in taxes so that your locality will get these amenities?

Should the Governorship of the state be rotated among the different ethnic groups such as the Ekiti, the Egba, the Oyo, etcetera?

Why?

What is the most profitable profession in the State today? (One)

Given the opportunity, would you learn that profession?

1. Yes
2. No

If not, why not?

Is the Government doing enough to curb corruption and associated practices?

TAIWO COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction (Pages 1-4)

1. The advantages of free primary education include the phenomenal increase in primary school population and the higher proportion of girls now in school, which augurs well for nation building.
2. Some of the problems are wastage, which has been considerable both in the number of those who do not complete the course and those who fail to achieve a certificate, and an increase of unemployed persons, a large number of whom are school leavers.
3. The success of a scheme like the free primary education depends on other complementary development such as a fast-growing economy able to generate higher incomes and employment opportunities, an efficient tax system, substantial support from local communities, parental interest in the education of their children and research into Nigerian education.

The Present System (Pages 5-10)

4. Public education in the State is in three stages of which primary education is the first. One implication of this provision is that children pass from the first to the second stage.
5. Primary education should equip the school leavers to continue their education formally or, if they have to enter the labour force, informally.
6. The aims of primary education as stated in the primary school syllabus are amplified and reformulated so as to keep in view the background and the needs of the Yoruba child.
7. The dual function of the primary school is general and polytechnical education.
8. The financial responsibility for primary education should be shared by the State Government, the Local Education Authorities, the parents and the proprietors.
9. The fall in standards is due to inadequate financial provision and consequent lack of essential teaching equipment and facilities, poor staffing and low morale among teachers, lack of textbooks and materials for the children and inadequate supervision, guidance and control.
10. Wastage due to drop-outs and failures should be further investigated and the causes removed.
11. The unit cost of education depends on teachers' qualifications, teacher/pupil ratio and the size of teaching units. Efforts should be made to keep the schools to a size—with an economic number of pupils per school and number of pupils per teacher.

Curriculum (Pages 11-14)

12. We recommend the setting up of a series of syllabus committees to review the existing syllabuses, which should be tried out by practising teachers before general adoption. (Suggestions are made in the Report on the different areas of the school curriculum).

School and Public Library Systems (Page 15)

13. We recommend as a matter of urgency the setting up of a library service for primary schools and of a State Library Service.
14. We recommend the appointment of a Director of the Library Service. Technical Assistance sources should be explored in connection with the Library Service.

Teacher Education and Conditions of Service (Pages 16-17)

15. In order to raise the morale of teachers, the salaries and conditions of services of teachers should be no less favourable than those applicable in the Civil Service.

16. Teachers of ability and teachers who carry special responsibilities should be given accelerated promotion.

17. Promotion should be based on merit and experience.

18. Teachers in rural areas should receive salary differentials. Teachers who are listless and whose contributions, for various reasons, are inconsequential should be weeded out.

19. There should be in-service training programme aimed at depth and professional competence.

20. Entry requirement into teacher training colleges should be stepped up to the West African School Certificate or the General Certificate of Education at Ordinary level. New entrants should be selected on the basis of academic merit and aptitude.

21. A comprehensive review of teacher training should be undertaken with a view to providing deeper content and modern techniques.

22. The State and its leaders should demonstrate their esteem of teachers by 'honours' awards.

Parents (Page 18)

23. Parents should take a keener interest in the education of their children by encouraging the children and co-operating with the teachers.

24. The formation of Parents/Teachers Associations should be encouraged.

Organisation and Administration (Pages 19-22)

25. The recommended length of the primary school course is six years.

26. It is recommended that as far as possible every primary school leaver should spend two more years in an appropriate post-primary institution.

27. Promotion in schools should be on merit but teachers should give special assistance to the weaker children and use all the techniques that would ensure promotion to the next class.

28. The number of the children in a class should be reduced to thirty-five.

29. On admission to the primary school, a child should not be below six years of age.

30. The trend to send children to nursery schools before they are six years should be encouraged. The conditions of opening such schools should be realistic and advice from the Ministry should be easily available.

31. Birth registration should be made compulsory. This would aid research and accurate planning for the provision of primary education.

32. Headmasterships should be regarded as special positions and should go to the more experienced and better qualified teachers, namely, Grade I teachers and higher.

33. The objective should be to have one or two holders of the Nigeria Certificate in Education in the large schools. (It is anticipated that courses in primary education will be included as alternatives in the courses for the Nigeria Certificate in Education).

34. For effectiveness, small schools should be merged into large units.

35. The Ministry, the school and the parents have responsibility in ensuring good discipline in the schools.

36. Compulsory education in the State is considered premature.
37. Provision should be made for a senior post at the Headquarters of the Ministry, whose sole responsibility will be primary education.
38. The field inspectorate responsible for primary education should include officers highly qualified, academically and professionally.
39. The Inspectorate should concentrate on the essential duties of inspection, guidance and advice and should be relieved of strictly administrative duties.
40. Recruitment into the Inspectorate should take into account the educational qualifications, professional competence and general and special experience in certain subjects or fields or special localities.
41. The desirability of inviting into the Inspectorate teachers of proved ability and experience should be considered. Officers in the Inspectorate should pay particular attention to their attitude, which should be directed at effective assistance to the teacher.
42. The number of schools allotted to each officer of the Inspectorate should be realistic, not exceeding fifty-two generally and fewer in the case of the less accessible schools.
43. Inspection reports should be made available to the schools soon after the visits.
44. Frequent transfer of inspectors and inspecting assistants should be discouraged.

School Buildings (Page 22)

45. The standard of school buildings should be improved. It is recommended that the Ministry should have on its Staff building inspectors competent to examine and advise on building plans and specifications.

Financing Primary Education (Pages 23-24)

46. The local contribution has been too little. The local Authorities should be assisted to overcome the difficulty of making their full contribution.
47. The parents must equip their children with the necessary textbooks and material.
48. Voluntary Agencies should resume their contribution to the provision of primary schools.
49. Schools should be merged into economic and efficient units.
50. The proposals by the Ministry for bulk purchase of textbooks and materials should be explored and executed.
51. Admission of pupils into the primary school should be made conditional on the possession of the necessary textbooks and materials by the children.

Provincial or Divisional School Boards (Pages 25-26)

52. School Boards should be created to perform the duties hitherto laid on the local education committees and the duties specified in this Report.
53. The actual number of the School Boards should be related to the organisation of the administrative units of the State. A probable arrangement is suggested in the Report.
54. The composition of a School Board reflects the interested bodies in primary education in a locality.
55. The Secretary of the School Board should have qualifications and experience not below those of a Senior Education Officer.