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Abstract

Western governments have increasingly adopted comprehensive approaches to overseas missions, involving civilian, political and military elements. In Afghanistan, comprehensive policies introduced by national governments created new imperatives for unity of effort between government departments/agencies and armed forces. Using the lens of the historical institutional theory of gradual change, this research examines the American, British and Canadian militaries’ adaptation to unity of effort requirements identified by governments for missions in Afghanistan in the period 2001 to 2011. Each case examines how the armed forces’ existing institutional rules, forged from past experiences and operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the domestic context of national missions, led to specific changes in formal doctrine, in-country command arrangements, and Civil-Military Cooperation capabilities. The study identifies institutional and political factors that influence militaries’ role in the delivery of the comprehensive approach. It finds that armed forces’ contribution to the approach depends on: the level of discretion afforded institutional leaders to interpret rules guiding interagency efforts; and the ability of national governments to create a formal civilian entity to coordinate and deploy qualified personnel to work alongside armed forces overseas. Understanding these factors is key to further developing military capacities to work with civilian entities in future overseas missions.
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Chapter 1:
Military Adaptation and Civil-Military Unity of Effort:
A Historical Institutional Analysis of the
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International organizations and national governments have increasingly adopted comprehensive approaches to crises, drawing on civilian, political and military elements. In Afghanistan, the American, British and Canadian governments introduced comprehensive policies to secure and stabilize the country that involved imperatives to build unity of effort across government departments and agencies, and armed forces. Unity of effort may be defined as the “coherent approach to common objectives” between civilian and military components of an operation, which is realized through liaison, coordination and cooperation among the myriad actors and agencies involved in overseas missions.¹ The existing literature indicates variation in how countries defined and operationalized comprehensive approaches, and in the conduct of nation-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Differences in both instances were linked among other factors to the way armed forces’ approached complex operations.² However, it remains unclear as to what these approaches involved and how militaries adapted aspects of their organizations to unity of effort requirements identified by their respective governments. Although armed forces are critical partners in foreign missions

² Complex operations include a range of expeditionary operations such as peace support, counterinsurgency, stability operations and humanitarian assistance. Across the spectrum of complex operations, the success of these activities depends on the application of a comprehensive approach and coordination of civilian and military efforts. See Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “NATO and Complex Operations: Introduction,” in *Complex Operations: NATO at War and On the Margins of War*, ed. Christopher M. Schnaubelt (Rome, Italy: National Defense College, 2010), 11-12.
and the way they support civil-military cooperation can impact national efforts, little is known about how militaries responded to unity of effort imperatives in overseas missions. This led to the research question guiding this study: *How did the American, British and Canadian armed forces adapt their approaches to unity of effort requirements in Afghanistan?*

In Afghanistan, state governments were the primary drivers of military change on matters related to the comprehensive approach and cross-government cooperation. Governments established new imperatives for unity of effort across national entities and exerted pressures on armed forces to reform their approach to complex operations. Holding the mission and the driver of change (governments) constant, it is possible to examine how other factors influenced militaries’ rules relating to other government entities and the prosecution of joint civil-military initiatives. This study uses a newly formulated framework for understanding military change to consider the impact of armed forces’ institutional characteristics and the formal authorities and influence of military leaders on reforms to specific dimensions of the organizations. The hypothesis tested through case study analyses is as follows: *The adaptation of American, British and Canadian militaries to unity of effort requirements was influenced primarily by the existing rules and practices for complex operations and, to a lesser extent, the ability of dominant institutional actors to preserve these rules and practices when under pressure to reform their approaches. Process tracing is used to evaluate the impact of institutional characteristics and military authority and influence on adaptation of formal doctrine, in-country arrangements and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities during Afghanistan missions from 2001 to 2010.*
Although the ISAF mission in Afghanistan has recently concluded, the contemporary security environment makes it ever more likely that armed forces will be required to work with civilian agencies in non-permissive environments for years to come. With this in mind, the findings of this study contribute to discussions about armed forces’ existing supports for civil-military unity of effort, the ways institutions can further develop their capacities for interagency operations, and how governments can best support the delivery of comprehensive approaches in the future.

**Importance**

Western governments’ concerns about weak and failing states since the end of the Cold War have created new imperatives for armed forces requiring adaptation of their existing approaches to complex operations. As key partners in international responses to conflict and crises, the ways armed forces adapt to these requirements can have a significant impact on the trajectory and the achievement of the foreign policy goals in overseas missions. The following section provides an overview of the international security context and the evolution of comprehensive approaches adopted by western governments in fragile societies. It begins with a consideration of the contemporary security context and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan in 2001 through the lens of the new wars model developed by political scientist Mary Kaldor. The violence against populations typical in new wars evoked the development of international Responsibility to Protect doctrine and a new Responsibility to Build norm that underpinned the reconstruction and development missions, such as those undertaken in Afghanistan after 2001. The reconstruction of post-conflict societies required comprehensive approaches
and greater harmonization of civilian, political and military elements involved in the mission. Civilian entities and armed forces involved in Afghanistan were expected to work together to eliminate the global threat of terrorism, prevent the recurrence of conflict and create long-term stability in an especially fragile state. It is in the context of these security concerns and prevailing international norms that an analysis of military adaptation to civil-military unity of effort requirements emerges as a relevant line of enquiry.

The post-Cold War security environment is characterized by what Mary Kaldor terms ‘new wars.’ According to Kaldor, wars in the globalized era challenge traditional conceptions of war and require a new framework for analysis and policy. In this regard, she argued that new wars differ from old wars in terms of the political goals of actors, the sources funding contemporary conflicts, and the methods employed by aggressors. Unlike the state-on-state wars of the past, new wars occur within ill-defined boundaries, over longer periods of time, and involve both state and non-state actors. New wars are waged based on political identity goals, that is, on tribal, ethnic or religious grounds, rather than to advance geopolitical interests. State-on-state wars of the past were financed primarily through taxation, while contemporary conflicts are more likely to be funded by private and criminal sources. Finally, new wars are defined by the methods actors employ to achieve their goals. Whereas state-on-state wars of the past were fought using primarily military force, modern forces rely on political means to extend their influence.

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and consolidate power. More often than not, this involves the control of civilian populations through displacement and violence.\textsuperscript{4}

In the wake of the September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, American-led forces found themselves embroiled in an archetypical ‘new war.’\textsuperscript{5} First, the conflict in Afghanistan involved various state and non-state actors including coalition and government forces, private contractors, tribal militias, and insurgents. The war on terrorism extends beyond state borders to include the regional Taliban insurgent and global Al-Qaeda networks. Second, the conflict centered on Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces driven primarily by ideological agendas, but it also involved criminals and individuals who harboured grievances against foreign interveners and pro-government forces in the country. Third, insurgent and terrorist groups in the area were funded primarily by donors in neighbouring Pakistan, from poppy production, and through the proceeds of other illegal activities. Finally, insurgent groups extended their influence over the region through intimidation and violence against local populations. In Afghanistan, the safety of civilians and the creation of a state able to protect the population from the threat of terrorists became a key element of international mission mandates.

Within months of the war on terrorism, members of the international community began to present their mandates in Afghanistan in terms of protection of these populations and the creation of a state able to protect citizens from the threat of insurgent groups. Soon counter-terrorism missions were being conducted in parallel to stabilization


operations intended to address the root causes of conflict and to initiate reconstruction across the country. The initial ISAF mandate approved by the United Nations (UN) in 2002 was to secure the area in and around Afghanistan’s capital city of Kabul, and to support reconstruction in the country. In August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of ISAF and began expansion of coalition forces across the whole of Afghanistan. By this time, the mission mandate involved development and governance initiatives, as stated by NATO:

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.6

The new mission mandate reflected the precepts of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (RTP) doctrine first outlined in a report prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in December 2001, which emphasized the responsibility of the international community to protect local populations at risk, to rebuild societies after military interventions to protect populations, and to address the root causes of conflict in fragile societies.7


7 The Responsibility to Protect doctrine identifies three key responsibilities for the international community. First, the responsibility to prevent involves addressing “the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises” that put “populations at risk.” Second, the responsibility to react involves “response to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures,” including the use of coercive measures and, in some extreme situations, military intervention. And finally, the responsibility to provide applies especially after a military intervention. It involves “full assistance” of interveners “with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation”, and addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.” See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: IDRC, 2001.
Tragedies suffered in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s awakened the international community to the inability or, in some cases, the unwillingness of some states to provide for the basic needs of citizens and to protect them from violence. Proponents of intervention maintained that when states are unable or unwilling to protect their people, the duty falls to the international community. Adopted in 2005 by the UN during its World Summit, the RTP doctrine allows for the pursuit of preventative and reactive actions, including military force, to protect vulnerable people. RTP maintains that while the protection of population lies foremost with the state, state sovereignty cannot be invoked to prevent intervention by the international community in situations where the state is not carrying out this responsibility. In its prioritization of human rights, RTP aligned with the values of liberal internationalist stances of some western governments that emphasize individual liberties and equality.

Critics of RTP charge that the doctrine and humanitarian interventions carried out in accordance with the norm fail to respect the principle of state sovereignty. For some scholars and challengers, especially those in developing and non-western states, RTP provides western states with an instrument they can use to exert control and advance their interests, giving rise to what they term “liberal interventionism.” As an example, they point to the evolving mandate of states involved in Afghanistan where, they contend, an

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9 Ibid.
intervention that originally focused on counterterrorism evolved into a development mission, which reflected the value systems and national security priorities of western interveners, rather than the long-term interests of local populations. In this regard, critics of RTP point to evidence that interventions intended to secure and protect may actually exacerbate conditions in these societies.

The RTP doctrine introduced the responsibility to rebuild in post-conflict situations, which was intended to help mitigate the destabilizing effects of military interventions and prevent the recurrence of conflict. According to the doctrine, those involved in military interventions intended to prevent and to react to violence against populations are also expected “to follow through and rebuild” after military action is taken. Even though military air and ground operations in Afghanistan in the months after September 2001 were not initiated on humanitarian grounds, the international community’s involvement in post-conflict reconstruction reflected adherence to the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ norm. It was believed that these efforts in Afghanistan would create space for leaders at the local and sub-national leaders to pursue “social, economic and political evolution,” and help eliminate threats to the larger international community. This was evident in the multi-pronged approach outlined by some western governments involved in Afghanistan. For example, former Canadian Defence Minister

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15 ICISS, The Responsibility To Protect, 39.
18 Kaldor, “A Decade of the ‘War on Terror’.”
Bill Graham explained in 2005 that the country’s involvement in Afghanistan was two fold: “We must address [failed states like Afghanistan] not only because of the geopolitical instability they generate as breeding grounds for terrorism and international crime…, but also because the suffering and denial of human rights challenges basic Canadian values.” In a similar vein, in the wake of the September 11th attacks on the United States, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that, in addition to defeating international terrorism, the UK was committed to providing humanitarian assistance and assisting the Afghan citizens to create “a better, more peaceful future, free from repression and dictatorship.” Finally, the United States, under the leadership of President Obama, developed a civil-military campaign plan for Afghanistan that combined military operations against terrorist forces with efforts intended to protect the population, strengthen host government capacity and legitimacy, and marginalize insurgent forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, the evolution of mission mandates from involvement in discrete American-led anti-terrorism mission into more expansive and longer-term commitments to rebuild country evolved in accordance with emerging international norms. Unsurprisingly, these ambitious security and stabilization agendas created new imperatives for governments, civilian entities and armed forces alike.

The conditions in Afghanistan demonstrated that military power alone could not address the myriad problems plaguing fragile societies. In such cases, a multifaceted approach is needed to address the root causes of instability, as researchers Hans Binnidejik and Stuart Johnson found in their study of success in post-conflict operations:

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“No military solution is possible absent a political and economic solution, and the persistent conditions of insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic development.”21 As international organizations and governments became attuned to the mutually reinforcing nature of the diplomatic, development and security elements, they worked to better harmonize civilian and military efforts in overseas missions.22

In this vein, in 2006 NATO introduced the “comprehensive approach” as a framework for coordinating the elements of national power, activities of organizations and the efforts of local authorities in international crises.23 The Comprehensive Approach (CA) and the CA Action Plan, adopted in 2008, were intended to guide collective responses by actors involved in these missions, including those that were underway in Afghanistan. The intent of the CA is to “foster ‘cooperation and coordination between international organizations, individual states, agencies and NGOs, the private sector and the host government,” but with the expectation that CA is carried out “in a way that does not compromise any organization’s independence.”24 The American, British and Canadian governments endorsed NATO’s CA and adopted CA policies in Afghanistan that created new imperatives for unity of effort among government entities and armed forces participating in the missions. Using a historical institutional lens, this research considers how armed forces’ existing rules for complex operations and the political

context of the national missions shaped institutional approaches to interagency coherence and cooperation required for the CA in Afghanistan.

NATO’s ISAF mission has recently concluded, but weak and fragile states are likely to remain important considerations in the national security and defence policies of western governments. The political nature of modern wars increase the chances that armed forces will be called on to participate in complex operations and to work with other government and civilian entities in overseas contexts. Armed forces are necessary partners in modern interventions and their support for civil-military unity of effort is critical to mission success. In this vein, understanding the ways militaries approach unity of effort provides an indication of their support for interagency operations and their ability to deliver comprehensive responses in the future.

Gaps in the Literature

The literature on recent missions in Afghanistan and Iraq helps establish the context for a detailed study of western armed forces and their approach to the ‘unity of effort’ requirements in overseas contexts. The relevant literature can be grouped into four categories. The first category includes studies documenting the emergence of the comprehensive approach at the international level, and the various interpretations of the concept by national governments and their armed forces. Second, there exist numerous works citing the challenges encountered by entities involved in cross-government initiatives and their impact on civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq. In many cases, these studies highlight important cultural and organizational differences between civilian departments and agencies, and the armed forces that frustrate attempts to
harmonize efforts. A third category of the literature relevant to a study of unity of effort and the comprehensive approach is the existing research on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Often considered the comprehensive approach in practice, these joint civil-military teams have been the focus of many comparative and country-specific studies. Finally, a study of military adaptation requires a review of the existing theoretical approaches to understanding and studying military change, and a consideration of how a historical institutional analysis can contribute to existing knowledge of the subject. This section is to provide an overview of the existing research and highlight gaps in the literature. It also points out the ways a historical institutional analysis of military adaptation to unity of effort requirements can address these gaps and contribute to understandings of the armed forces and their evolving role in the contemporary security context.

The first theme in the literature is the development of the comprehensive approach by international organizations and its incarnations at the national levels, sometimes in the form of a “whole of government approach” to international crises. The integrated thinking that underpins the CA can be traced back to the multinational peace operations of the 1990s and the crisis management processes adopted by organizations, like the United Nations, that drew on a range of civilian and military instruments. Since 2001, international experiences in places like Afghanistan have sparked the formal articulation of this approach and the development of comprehensive frameworks to guide action.25 Although there is no single, shared definition of CA, it is generally understood

that as an approach it is “aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions.”

At the international level, CA may include all actors and entities involved in a foreign intervention, such as government and non-government organizations, armed forces and private military corporations, humanitarian and development agencies, and economic institutions. However, many national governments, including those examined in this study, have adopted CA in reference to the harmonization of national military and governmental efforts to achieve specific foreign policy goals abroad.

Similar to CA, there does not exist a single definition for the related concept of the “whole of government approach” adopted by some governments. However, a common distinguishing feature of this approach across the board is the “emphasis on objectives shared across organizational boundaries, as opposed to working solely within a ministry [department or agency].”

According to a report from the Comprehensive Approach Seminar held in Helsinki in June 2008, the purpose of whole of government approaches are “two-fold”. The first rationale is to “avoid duplication of efforts, interfering with plans of their departments, and the consequent waste of energy and resources.” Further, information sharing across actors and entities can improve situational awareness and the “capacity for ‘strategic’ planning and intelligent decision making.” A second reason for adopting a whole-of-government approach is because

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Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management by Kristiina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti (Helsinki, Finland: Ministry of Defence, 2008), 50.
26 Rintakoski and Autti, eds., Comprehensive Approach, 11.
27 Rintakoski and Autti, eds., Comprehensive Approach, 12.
28 The Comprehensive Approach Seminar held in Helsinki on June 17, 2008 was organized by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Ministry of the Interior, and the Finnish Defence Forces.
29 Rintakoski and Autti, eds., Comprehensive Approach, 11.
civilian and military efforts are highly interdependent; entities are ultimately dependent on each other to achieve their objectives. In these respects, the concept and rationale of WGA are similar to those of CA, so much so that the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Due to these commonalities between the terms, the following research uses comprehensive approach and whole of government approach interchangeably to refer to the approaches adopted by governments under study that endorse civil-military unity of effort.

Participants at the international Comprehensive Approach Seminar indicated that national interpretations and the operationalization of CA vary by country. They found that each country interpreted the concept in ways that were “compatible with their national processes and needs” and based on their own traditions. National approaches were also found, in many cases, to reflect the ways armed forces have come to think about overseas interventions. In Afghanistan, cross-country differences in CA stemmed, in part, from variation in national mandates and the emphasis placed on the security objectives of the mission. Whereas some countries assigned priority to military operations and emphasized the threats from narcotics, insurgents and terrorism, other countries referred to the mission in terms of “stabilization” or “reconstruction.” These explanations are consistent with the findings of other CA studies.

In his comparison of NATO member states, political scientist Peter Viggo Jakobsen attributed different interpretations of CA to the emphasis placed on the counterinsurgency and stabilization goals of recent missions. He found that the United

30 Ibid.
31 Rintakoski and Autti, eds., Comprehensive Approach, 18.
States’ view of CA was closely tied to counterinsurgency goals of the armed forces, as well as their engagement in high-intensity combat and counter terrorism activities.\textsuperscript{33} In the American view, stabilization was viewed as an activity that occurs in the post-conflict phase of an operation, rather than something pursued concurrent to security and combat operations.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, civil-military stabilization efforts, including reconstruction and development, were often initiated after combat has ceased. Therefore, in places where conflict was ongoing, stabilization activities that required CA were often secondary considerations.

In contrast to the American approach, Jakobsen’s study found that other NATO member states, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, were more likely to endorse a coordinated approach in Afghanistan that involved combat and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, when required, but also civilian-focused reconstruction and development efforts.\textsuperscript{35} In this regard, nations like Britain placed a high priority on the delivery of a comprehensive approach as key to stabilization operations and the creation of conditions for long-term peace in societies, like Afghanistan, affected by ongoing

\textsuperscript{33} United States Under Secretary of Defense, “A Comprehensive Approach to Modern Insurgency: Afghanistan and Beyond,” Keynote Address, NATO Conference on A Comprehensive Approach for Afghanistan, Freising, Germany (March 27 2007) quoted by Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place.”\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{35} Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place,” 82
conflict.\textsuperscript{36} Overall, the existing literature highlights international variability in CA and WGA as it relates to differences in the emphasis placed on the security and stabilization aspects of interventions. However, there is less evidence on how these approaches are influenced by the political context of overseas missions. The following analysis bridges this gap in the literature by considering the role of civilian leaders and military actors in the development of strategies and plans for Afghanistan, and the influence of armed forces on civil-military unity of effort on the ground.

A second theme prevalent in the literature is the experience of government entities and armed forces involved in cross-government initiatives, and the various obstacles to unity of effort they encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unity of effort requires “constant coordination, flexibility and assessment” throughout the phases of an operation.\textsuperscript{37} Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to achieve in practice. Numerous studies have documented the cultural, generational and organizational differences between civilian agencies that frustrate civil-military cooperation. For instance, in their study of multinational and interagency operations, Kristin Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho found that military and civilian actors’ failure to learn and understand each other stems from their different organizational identities, their separate views of security and risk in the operational environment, and their disparate working procedures and practices.\textsuperscript{38}

According to Christopher Jennings, civil-military cooperation may also be hampered by factors such as “competing institutional mandates,” resource or legal constraints, and

\textsuperscript{36} Zyck, Barakat and Deely, “The Evolution of Stabilization,” 18-19.
\textsuperscript{37} NATO, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations AJP – 3.4 (A)}, (2010), 2-1.
differences in “culture, mind-set, [or] strategic outlook.” With respect to cross-government cooperation, major obstacles to unity of effort stem from the inability of governments to recruit, train and deploy sufficient numbers of civilian experts to work alongside the armed forces, and to maintain a cadre of qualified people to deploy on long-term and sometimes dangerous assignments. Overall, there is no shortage of literature documenting the challenges to unity of effort, civil-military cooperation and interagency coordination. However, little attention has been paid to how institutions act to address, circumvent or overcome these obstacles. In this regard, the following study considers how three armed forces adapted their existing rules and practices over time to unity of effort imperatives set out in national plans and policy.

Related to the broader topic of civil-military cooperation, many scholars and practitioners have taken particular interest in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) established by foreign countries in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs were first deployed to Afghanistan by the United States in 2002. These interagency and, sometimes, multinational civil-military teams were designed to work with local populations to provide security, assess humanitarian needs and establish stability through the implementation of small-scale development and reconstruction projects. Over time, other nations adopted the concept and fashioned the teams in ways to meet their foreign policy objectives. A number of studies have focused on differences in the mandates and

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40 Military members were soon joined by representatives from US government departments and agencies creating joint civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Other NATO members and allies operating in Afghanistan adopted the concept and by 2009 sixteen nations were leading PRTs in Afghanistan. See Institute for the Study of War, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRTS,” accessed October 20, 2014, https://www.understandingwar.org/provincial-reconstruction-teams-prts.
structure of national PRTs at different points in time in Afghanistan or Iraq. Some researchers developed metrics to gauge and compare the efficiency of these teams.\textsuperscript{41} Also, analysts have carried out country-specific studies that detail the experience of national teams deployed to a particular geographic area, including the Canadian PRT in Kandahar Province or the British PRT in Helmand Province in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{42} In their account of PRT experiences, these cases considered how the changes in the operating environment impacted the teams and their activities.\textsuperscript{43} PRT studies tend to consider the teams at a particular point in time and are less concerned with the changes in their mandates, composition and aims over time. In the same vein as these largely tactical-level studies, the following analysis explores civil-military dynamics and cross-national differences. However, it attempts to locate sources of this variability by looking almost exclusively at the ways armed forces adapted their formal doctrine, in-country command


arrangements, and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities, including the deployment of this capability as part of PRTs, to support civil-military unity of effort at the strategic and operational levels of the Afghanistan mission.

**Alternative Accounts of Military Change**

Finally, an analysis of armed forces’ adaptation requires consideration of dominant theoretical approaches to military change. In their attempts to identify the forces driving military change, scholars have drawn on realist international theories, organizational and bureaucratic frameworks, cultural and learning theories and more recently, new institutionalism. This final section provides a brief overview of dominant approaches and key works on the subject, and considers how a historical institutional inspired study of change may contribute to existing understandings of military adaptation.

In the first approach, realist and neo-realists views of military change stem from their idea that states, defined as a unitary group of rational actors, react to international forces and events in ways that ensure their sovereignty and advance their national interests. In this view, state institutions, including the armed forces, were established by states to maintain a competitive edge on the international stage, and once created institutions adopt new practices and forms of organization necessary to realize these aims. For realists, exogenous factors, especially international forces and state interests at the level of global politics, were the primary sources of institutional change. Emphasis on global factors meant that the influence of domestic politics and the particular characteristics unique to national armed forces were sometimes underestimated. In his

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seminal work *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Barry Posen applied a realist framework, but also drew on organizational theory that considered the internal processes of the armed forces to understand militaries’ decisions to adopt certain kinds of doctrine.⁴⁵ He found that, indeed, political leaders’ perceptions about the balance of power within the international system, and their concerns of “defeat”, led them to intervene and, eventually, to compel changes in military doctrine to meet the political goals, including for deterrence, defensive or alliance purposes.⁴⁶ At the same time, he also discovered that militaries tended to adopt defensive doctrine because these approaches entailed greater independence from civilian authorities.⁴⁷ Posen concluded that the militaries he studied tended to “cling” to existing doctrine and that civilian intervention was required to induce change within the institution. While Posen found that a neo-realism was a “slightly more powerful tool” than organizational theories in explaining the sources of doctrine, his study did provide some insight into the internal workings of the armed forces as a separate institution.

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⁴⁵ Posen looked at the organizational and political reasons why armed forces in France, Britain and German between the World Wars adopted different types of doctrine ranging from offensive, defensive or deterrent in nature, and which was either integrated with or independent from civilian goals. (Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (New York: Cornell University press, 1984)). Balance of power theory, based on realist contentions, may refer to the concept that in an anarchic international system states will tend to join with other states against expansionist powers that may dominate within the system. States work together to protect their individual sovereignty or survival against threats (Iain McLean (ed), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.


⁴⁷ Offensive doctrine that aimed at achieving a particular effect or action against another military is more likely to involve civilian leaders and officials were more likely to become involved in military planning and operations. (Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 194). Gunnar Åselius provided succinct definitions of military doctrines based on Posen’s work: “an offensive doctrine aims at disarming an enemy and destroying his military forces. A defensive doctrine aims at denying the enemy the object he seeks, while a deterrent doctrine aims at punishing the aggressor – raising the costs of attacking – without regard for one’s own losses.” (Gunnar Åselius, *Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921-1940* (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 14.)
A second way of understanding change is through the application of the bureaucratic politics model.\(^{48}\) An offshoot of organizational theory, this approach has also been applied to studies of foreign policy development and the role of actors, including military leaders, in shaping political outcomes. Bureaucratic theorists contend that policy outcomes are the product of conflict among small groups of government personnel. These tenets were applied in Graham Allison’s study of the American decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crises and he found that bureaucrats, including military leaders, were less likely to pursue strategies based on national interests, as realists contended, and more likely to endorse policies that benefited both themselves and their organization.\(^{49}\) In his work, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974), Halperin examined the origins of American foreign policy decisions as a result of compromise among contending parties and rivals across government, rather than the outcome of rational deliberation.\(^{50}\) In this model, individual interests, as well as organizational biases, inform leaders’ views and preferences. Focused on explaining a specific foreign policy decision, the bureaucratic politics model is less concerned with how a decision taken at one point in time can impact the future or how government organizations’ responses to international crises change over time.

Culturalist accounts of military change consider the sources of individual and entity biases that influence outcomes, and point to the role of ideational factors, such as


\(^{49}\) Allison found that other factors, including the interpersonal relationships and personality of actors, as well as the access of actors to critical information, also impact bureaucratic politics and political outcomes. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971).

norms and values.\textsuperscript{51} In her work \textit{Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars}, political scientist Elizabeth Kier explained that culture, defined as shared assumptions that shape practices, influenced national decisions to adopt offensive or defensive doctrine in the interwar period.\textsuperscript{52} She found that national political-military subcultures and a military’s organizational culture shaped the institution’s response to policy requirements and constraints.\textsuperscript{53} According to Kier, cultural beliefs held by military leaders and members were derived from past experiences, as well as through training programs. Variation in these beliefs contributed to cross-national differences in military behaviour, doctrine and interpretations of the types of tasks required in a given situation.\textsuperscript{54} While cultural theories provide an account for organizational stability over time, these frameworks are less clear about what propels institutional change.

Building on organizational and cultural theories, John Nagl argued that the organizational culture of the armed forces have a significant impact on how the organization operates and responds to shifts in the external environment. Specifically, he considered how “effectively militaries learn from past and new experiences” and how

\textsuperscript{51} Culture was defined by James Q. Wilson as “those patterned and enduring differences among systems of coordination action that lead those systems to respond in different ways to the same stimuli.” See James Q. Wilson, \textit{Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It}, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 91.
\textsuperscript{53} Kier defined military organizational culture as “the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and forms of practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed and communicated to the members” of the armed forces. Political-military subcultures were defined as the civilian leaders’ perceptions of the armed forces, influenced government decision making. See Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 19, No.4 (Spring 1995), 60.
they adapt their organizations under new circumstances.\textsuperscript{55} He compared the British military’s experience with counterinsurgency in Malaya during the 1950s with the American military campaign in Vietnam in the 1960s. Nagl found that the British Army exhibited the characteristics of a “learning institution” and these tendencies contributed to its ability to adapt to evolving requirements throughout the campaign. He contrasted this experience with the American military, which demonstrated a tendency to “adhere to standard operating procedures and ignore new information” that may have challenged existing practices. He concluded that organizational culture is essential to an institution’s ability to learn and adapt, and to meet unforeseen challenges.\textsuperscript{56} In his application of a cultural-organizational learning theory, Nagl provided some insight into differences in the American and British approaches to complex missions. Taking into account these findings, the following study considers how the armed forces’ existing rules, based on historical experiences and the contemporary political context informed armed forces’ adaptation to unity of effort requirements in a more recent complex mission.

In a similar vein to Nagl’s work, Deborah Avant’s study, \textit{Political Institutions and Military Change Lessons from Peripheral Wars}, drew on tenets of organizational and cultural theories. Her study examined how government structures and military culture influenced the doctrines adopted by British armed forces during the Boer War and the American military in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{57} She found that the parliamentary system of government in Britain allowed for the centralization of decision making and military oversight at the

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
strategic level, but granted military leaders considerable autonomy in how they addressed operational-level problems. The alignment of civilian and military aims for overseas missions was kept in check through the strong interpersonal ties between civilian leaders and military commanders, and a military promotion system that rewarded responsiveness to political objectives. According to Avant, these structures, together with a military’s past experience in low-intensity conflicts, created within the armed forces an organizational culture that favoured responsiveness and adaptation to evolving policy goals. In comparison to the British case, the American government, with responsibility for oversight of the armed forces shared between the President and Congress, was less able to provide uniform direction during peripheral wars. Under these circumstances, there were also fewer incentives for the armed forces to align its practices with civilian goals. Instead, the military leadership often aligned with the political entity most supportive of its existing practices, which tended to emphasize conventional approaches to warfare. Taken together, these factors contributed to the military’s reluctance to adapt to the government’s political goals in Vietnam. Avant’s study of the role of government structures and military culture provides a context for analyses of the domestic political factors that influence military adaptation to national policy goals in modern wars.

More recently, the neo-institutionalist research agenda as applied to the security actors and entities appears to hold promise for understanding the link between institutions and actors’ behaviour, and the evolution of government entities, including the armed forces. In a work relevant to the proposed study of military change, Amy Zegart worked

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within the neo-institutional framework to apply a rational-choice inspired theory of the origins and evolution of American national security agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. She challenged the realist contention that these agencies, created by state actors, were optimally designed to serve the national interests and continued to evolve in response to international events. Zegart found that these entities were, in fact, poorly designed. Rather than products of rational deliberation, these institutions were born from conflicts and compromises among self-interested individuals seeking to advance their own agendas. In this view, the “institutional birth marks,” or the original compromises that informed organizational designs, continued to impact the effectiveness of these security agencies long after the organizations were created. Rational-choice strands of neo-institutionalism, which emphasize the role of the individuals and their deliberations, provide interesting insights into the origins of security institutions and their reproduction. Historical institutionalism offers a complementary approach that considers how institutions, once they are established, pattern behaviour and the ways gradual changes can lead to significant transformations in institutional orientation or purpose.

In sum, a review of the existing research and approaches to military change suggests that a historical institutional analysis of military adaptation may not only bridge gaps in the literature, but also offer a new way of understanding the more subtle ways armed forces change over time to retain their significance and guarantee their survival in

59 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 17.
60 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 16-17.
61 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 225.
a rapidly changing global security environment. The current research shows that national approaches to comprehensive and whole of government approaches vary due to several factors. The literature suggests that the emphasis placed on the security, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian aspects of a mission may influence how CA and WOG are operationalized during an intervention. However, knowledge of the actual impact of these interpretations on CA and WGA, and the implications for key partners, including the armed forces, in overseas missions may benefit from more systematic analysis. In particular, this study considers how the political context interacted with armed forces’ existing approaches to complex operations to impact unity of effort in Afghanistan.

The second category of relevant research focused on civil-military initiatives and various obstacles to cooperation and coordination encountered by participants in cross-government activities. This literature may be supplemented by case studies that consider how the armed forces, a critical element in overseas operations, adapted to overcome, eliminate or circumvent these challenges in practice. As well, scholars and practitioners have taken a particular interest in PRTs to understand how CA and WGA are operationalized on the ground. PRT studies have compared the mandates, structures and, even, effectiveness of nation-led teams at different points in time. The proposed research picks up on the comparative nature of these studies, but extends the analysis of cross-national analysis to consider the ways armed forces evolved their formal doctrine, reformed in-country command arrangements and developed their CIMIC capabilities to the requirements of complex operations in Afghanistan. Finally, a review of studies on military change discussed the various ways of understanding this phenomenon, including the realist and organizational theories, the bureaucratic politics model, cultural and
organizational learning frameworks, integrated approaches, and neo-institutional explanations. Common among these approaches was their explanations of stability and reproduction of the armed forces, rather than the factors or events influencing institutional change.

As key players in complex operations, the ways armed forces adapt in response to emerging requirements may have major impacts on the achievement of military objectives, as well as on the larger political goals of overseas missions. A historical institutional analysis seeks to explain how armed forces’ existing rules for the complex operations and the national political context influence the incremental changes within the armed forces over time. In particular, the application of a theory of gradual change will consider the institutional and contextual factors propelling doctrine developments, evolutions of in-country command arrangements and approaches to civil-military cooperation in response to unity of effort imperatives in Afghanistan.

Case Study Selection and the Scope of the Study

This historical institutional analysis of military adaptation considers the American, British and Canadian experiences in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011. This case study selection is consistent with the “most similar case” research design for comparative analyses. The most similar case design involves the selection of cases based on similarities on all but one independent variable, and difference in their dependent variable(s).63 The American, British and Canadian cases are similar on a number of key variables. First, each of the countries under study is a western, liberal-democracy with

membership to NATO. Second, each of the militaries being examined participated in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force at some point or continuously over the decade (from December 2001 to December 2011) under study. Third, the governments of these countries all introduced a comprehensive policy or civil-military plan for Afghanistan that set similar, though not identical, goals and imperatives for the armed forces and other government entities in complex security and stability operations. To control for variability in mission mandates, Operation Enduring Freedom, the American-led counterterrorism operations, is not the focus of this study. However, this is difficult to parcel out given that, at least for some time, US military commanders in Afghanistan commanded American troops involved in both the American-led counterterrorism mission Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF operations. Nonetheless, the selection of these similar cases permits the control of alternative explanations of difference in military adaptation and a focus on the impact of institutional characteristics on change.

The selection of these countries for analyses also permits a test of existing explanations of differences particularly studies that identify political systems as a primary factor influencing military responsiveness to civilian imperatives. Existing studies, such as those carried out by Deborah Avant and Robert Egnell, emphasized the impact of the political system on armed forces in peripheral wars and complex operations. In their view, the Westminster parliamentary system of government creates condition for greater military responsiveness and improved civil-military coordination. However, more recent

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studies on CA suggest that although Canada, like Britain, is a Westminster system of Parliamentary Government, the armed forces approach to complex missions and unity of effort are not identical to the approach taken by the British military. An analysis of the American, British and Canadian experiences permits a comparison of the American military, which exists in a state with presidential systems, with the British and Canadian armed forces from countries with parliamentary systems. It also allows for closer examination of the differences between the British and Canadian armed forces, and the possible source(s) of this variation. Guided by the precepts of historical institutionalism and a framework inspired by the theory of gradual change, this study considers how institutional characteristics and the power afforded military agents during the Afghanistan mission affected variation in militaries’ adaptation to unity of effort requirements.

The following study takes a long-view of military adaptation, especially in comparison to existing studies of recent missions that tend to focus on national experiences at a particular point in time. The time period under study begins in 2001 at the start of the war in Afghanistan and extends to ten years of the mission. The analysis includes operations up to the end of 2011 because the Canadian combat mission in Afghanistan ended in the summer of 2011. This allows for comparative examination of government policy, shifts in the political landscape, evolution of mission plans, and changes in dependent variables in the three countries over the same time period.

Finally, it is necessary to explain what is not examined in this study. First, this study focuses on complex operations in Afghanistan, including, but not limited to, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. British and American experiences during the Iraq War are included in this study only in so far as they contribute to understandings
of existing institutional rules or impacted the political context of national missions in Afghanistan. Second, this study focuses on regular forces and does not address the activities carried out by special operations forces in Afghanistan. There is little public or published information available on special operations forces and their activities, which makes it difficult to examine their activities in depth. Third, national missions were conducted under the ISAF umbrella and within a larger multinational context. This study is less concerned with the multinational command elements, and more focused on national experiences, that is, the interaction between national armed forces and their counterparts from government entities. Lastly, each of the countries under study deployed troops to Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) under the command of ISAF to train and mentor Afghan security forces. These teams were not under the command of regional commanders overseeing country-led efforts and, therefore, are not explored in this study.

An overview of the existing literature and approaches to understanding military change reveals a gap in knowledge about how armed forces approach to comprehensive approaches and its operationalization in the prosecution complex operations in Afghanistan. The selection of the American, British and Canadian militaries’ as case studies for analyses provides an opportunity to focus on institutional characteristics, namely existing institutional rules and practices, as a primary explanatory variable impacting armed forces’ support for and participation in civil-military efforts in overseas missions. Finally, these factors and the dearth of available research on military adaptation to civil-military unity of effort leads to the following research question:
Research Question

How did the American, British and Canadian armed forces adapt their approaches to the unity of effort requirements in Afghanistan?

Historical Institutionalism and the Theory of Gradual Change

The theoretical framework of historical institutionalism provides an alternate approach to the study of military change and the ways these institutions adapt over time. It can provide insight into the institutional rules structuring actors’ behaviour and choices, and mediate adaptation within armed forces. More specifically, it focuses on how institutions structure actors’ behaviour, and in turn, influence outcomes. Institutions are defined in this context as the historically constructed formal rules and organization, informal rules and norms that pattern behaviour and establish expectations. Historical institutionalists contend historically constructed rules and practices create opportunities and pose constraints on behaviour that impact political outcomes. As products of history, institutions are the outcomes of both deliberate and unintended strategies, conflict and decisions among actors. Actors are not simply institutional “rule followers,” but they are considered to be “actors who use rules to

66 Thelen and Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism,” 2.
69 Thelen and Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism,” 10.
maximize their interests. The framework assumes that dominant actors will seek to preserve rules because they have a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo.

Scholars tend to apply historical institutionalism to examine how similar institutions across time or space, including national and sub-national units, and contribute to different outcomes. Historical institutionalists seek to identify the origins and trace the development of institutions to explain these variations. In doing so, historical institutionalists evoke the concept of “path dependence” to explain institutional development and reproduction over time. The idea is that once an institution is locked into a particular path, positive feedback and increasing returns tend to reinforce the current developmental path and discourage actors from seeking alternative courses of action. Over time it becomes increasingly costly, especially for actors with vested interest in the current path, to alter the institution’s development path. From this perspective, while it is possible for an institution to embark on a new path, departures from existing trajectories occur when an exogenous event creates a small window of opportunity for change. In cases where an institution has undergone significant and abrupt change this approach may render especially useful insights. However, the punctuated equilibrium model may be less helpful in explaining more subtle changes in

70 Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism,” 126.
74 Commonly referred to as the punctuated equilibrium model of change, early historical institutionalist work maintained that institutional change occurred when exogenous shocks, such as war or global financial crises, disrupt domestic processes. In other words, these events disrupted “cycle of institutional reproduction,” and compelling institutional change. (Lecours, “New Institutionalism,”12).
institutions.\textsuperscript{75} Long-standing institutions, like the armed forces, may withstand many historic breakpoints and maintain their core attributes, but they also undergo less obvious, incremental changes that maintain their relevance and ensure their survival over time.

Historical institutional theory defines institutions as the “formal organization and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct.”\textsuperscript{76} Rules are institutional properties that pattern action and guide the behaviour of institutional actors, as political scientists Elinor Ostrom and Xavier Basurto explained: “[rules are] shared understandings by actors...concerning what actions (or outcomes) are \textit{required}, \textit{prohibited}, or \textit{permitted}.”\textsuperscript{77} Because institutions and the rules that define them are the product of historical compromise among contending actors or groups, they remain open to continual (re)interpretation and “vulnerable to shift.”\textsuperscript{78} Thelen and Steinmo argue that institutional change is most likely to occur when “problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways.”\textsuperscript{79} Incremental shifts in the rules guiding behaviour can cumulate over time in the fundamental transformation of an institution, its orientation and its purpose in society.

Grounded in historical institutionalism, the theory of gradual institutional change developed by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen postulate that institutional rules are a

\textsuperscript{75} Thelen, ‘How Institutionalism Evolves,” 211.
\textsuperscript{76} Thelen and Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism,” 2.
\textsuperscript{79} Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 11, 14. However, the degree to which rules are open to contending interpretations and variability in their enforcement is unique to each institution. According to Thelen and Mahoney, variability in rules and their interpretation may be due to several factors, such as the complexity of rules or the resources regulated by these rules. However, the theoretical framework is concerned with the extent of discretion afforded actors rather than with the source of this variation. See Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 11.
key source of institutional change. The theory of gradual institutional change is concerned with the level of discretion afforded institutional actors in their interpretation and enforcement of these rules. On the one hand, when rules are ambiguous, actors experience a high level of discretion and flexibility in their interpretation and enforcement. In these cases, the rules allow for either narrow or broad interpretations, and either the vigorous or lax enforcement of rules. On the other hand, actors are afforded low levels of discretion when the rules are highly prescriptive and clear about what actions are permitted or prohibited. These types of rules limit variation in actors’ interpretation and the ways rules can be enacted in practice.  

The theory of gradual institutional change also takes into account the context in which actors operate and institutions exist. According to Mahoney and Thelen, the context affords institutional actors either strong or weak “veto possibilities” whereby they can exercise their authorities or informal influence to preserve existing rules. The strength of the veto possibilities experienced by institutional actors may be assessed based on their formal authorities, as well as their access to the resources and methods needed to block significant changes and maintain existing rules.

As part of their framework, Thelen and Mahoney identify the types of change agents that are likely to emerge under particular institutional and contextual conditions, and identify the strategies that these agents are likely to use to influence reform. They contend a range of agents may work in concert with other challengers, as well as institutional supporters and actors from other entities, to initiate change. Taken together,
the institutional and contextual sources, and the dominant change-agent contribute to specific types of institutional change.

A Framework for Explaining Military Change

The armed forces’ and their adaptation to unity of effort requirements present unique challenges for Mahoney and Thelen’s framework for explaining change in political and social institutions. The following section addresses the concept of change agents in the context of military organizations. It also discusses the drivers propelling changes to national armed forces, and the relationship between drivers of change and the military agents involved in mediating external pressures for reform and overseeing changes to the institution. Finally, this section identifies the Framework for Explaining Military Change guiding the historical institutional analysis of the American, British and Canadian armed forces and the adaptation of these militaries to unity of effort requirements during the Afghanistan mission.

Change agents as defined by Mahoney and Thelen may exist external to the targeted institution or they emerge from within the institution and seek coalitions with institutional challengers outside the organization. Within the armed forces, actors exist within a chain of command characterized by clear hierarchies and strict discipline of its members. Change agents are less likely to emerge from within the ranks of the military and they are more likely to occupy high—level positions in the organization. Only the highest-ranking members have the authority and opportunity to initiate reforms. Even in these instances, however, the most senior members are subject to directives from their superiors and from civilian leaders. Given the unique structure of military organizations,
the change agents as defined by Mahoney and Thelen are difficult to identify. Instead, this study focuses on helpful military agents with formal authorities and influence over armed forces’ responses to unity of effort requirements. These military agents are considered in terms of their ability to preserve existing rules when the institution is under pressure to reform.\footnote{The ability of military agents to preserve existing rules when they are under pressure to reform the institution is also referred to as veto possibilities. The veto possibilities experienced by military agents are the intervening variable in this study, see p. 45.}

In the British and Canadian cases, it is easy to delineate the drivers of change and military agents. In these contexts, Prime Ministers and senior elected officials responsible for defence are identified as drivers of change. The Chiefs of the Defense Staff and senior military officers are the military agents that carry out reforms. In the American case, however, it is more difficult to differentiate between these two groups because the President may be both the driver of change and a military agent. The president is an elected civilian leader and empowered to develop new policies and introduce requirements impacting the armed forces. At the same time, the president is also the Commander-in-Chief (CIC), the head of the American military’s chain of command. In this capacity, the CIC, like other senior military officers, may mediate, implement and enforce reforms in accordance with civilian requirements. Taking into account drivers of change and this approach to military agents it is possible to depict an adapted theory of gradual change that can be applied to a study of military adaption to unity of effort imperatives in Afghanistan over a ten-year period, see Figure 1: A Framework for Explaining Military Change.
The Framework for Explaining Military Change, adapted from Thelen and Mahoney’s Framework for Explaining Modes of Institutional Change, depicts the process of military change. An exogenous event or change agent introduces imperatives for change. The institutional characteristics of the institution and the veto possibilities afforded institutional actors result in specific types of changes within the organization. Consistent with Thelen and Mahoney’s theory of gradual change, there are four possible outcomes:
### Table 1: Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institutional Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the Political Context</th>
<th>Characteristic of the Targeted Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Level of Discretion in Interpretation/Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Veto Possibilities</td>
<td>Layering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Veto Possibilities</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of this study the Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institutional Change can be adapted for an analysis of military change in the following way:

### Table 2: Contextual and Institutional Sources of Military Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veto Possibilities Experienced by Military Agents</th>
<th>Characteristic of the Military Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Veto Possibilities</td>
<td>Low Level of Discretion in Interpretation/Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layering</td>
<td>Drift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Veto Possibilities</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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83 Table adapted from Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 19.
The four modes of gradual change may be considered in turn. Layering occurs when new institutional rules are introduced alongside existing institutional rules. Layering is likely to occur when dominant institutional actors, experiencing strong veto possibilities, are able to preserve existing rules and the traditional impact of the institution despite changes in the institution itself or shifts in the external environment. However, while the dominant institutional actors are able to preserve the existing institution, they cannot prevent the introduction of new rules, requirements or institutions. In light of these new elements, dominant institutional actors amend or revise existing rules, or add new rules to existing ones. According to Mahoney and Thelen, layering may result in significant change if these revisions impact the function or the continued development of the institution. Likewise, while each of these revisions may be incremental or minor in nature, they may accumulate to effect more substantial change over time.

Drift happens when the formal, but ambiguous, rules of an institution remain in place but the impact of the institution changes due to shifts in the external environment. It most likely to occur when dominant actors with an interest in maintaining the existing rules experience strong veto possibilities. Institutional actors maintain access to the resources needed to maintain existing rules and arrangements. Unable to control external factors, however, institutional actors are unable to preserve the institution’s traditional role in a changing environment. The gap that emerges between the formal institutional rules and their implementation permits a wide range of interpretations among actors and

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84 In this study of military change, dominant institutional actors are the military agents with the authorities and influence required to mediate pressures to reform and implement reforms.

creates opportunity for diverse outcomes. Institutional change is the result of how rules are interpreted (in narrow or broad terms) and the approach to enforcement (ranging from vigorous to lax enforcement) by institutional actors.86

Conversion occurs when existing institutional rules are strategically redeployed in ways that direct the institution towards new goals. Conversion is likely to occur under two conditions. First, this type of gradual change often happens when changes in the institution itself or shifts in the external environment limit the access of dominant actors to the resources needed to preserve the traditional impact of the institution. Contending actors, or “institutional innovators” have greater access to the resources to initiate change. Second, conversion usually occurs when the existing institutional rules allow for a high level of discretion in their interpretation and application. Change agents are able to act on the ambiguities of existing rules. With improved access to resources, actors are able to exploit the ambiguities of existing rules in ways to solve emerging problems, and redirect the institution’s form and functions.

Displacement occurs when existing rules are replaced by new institutional rules. Displacement is likely to occur when actors are granted minimal, if any, discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of existing rules and defenders of the status quo experience limited, if any, access to the resources needed to maintain existing arrangements. In some cases, institutional change through displacement may occur after a major exogenous event, such as a revolution. A critical event may result in an abrupt and radical shift of an institution, or its complete dissolution. In other cases, displacement may happen more gradually. New institutions emerge and compete directly with an

existing institution. Dominant institutional actors are unable to prevent the growing support among actors within and external to the institution for the new entity: “traditional arrangements are discredited or pushed to the side in favor of new institutions.”\textsuperscript{87} Over time, new rules and practices are introduced that may replace existing ones.\textsuperscript{88}

To summarize, Table 2: Four Types of Gradual Institutional Change includes the definition, the primary mechanism for change, and the key points for four types of gradual institutional change identified by Mahoney and Thelen.

\begin{footnote}

\textsuperscript{88} Streek and Thelen, “Introduction: Institutional Change,” 22. In addition to the four types of gradual change set out by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Streek and Thelen (2005) identified a fifth mode of gradual change termed “exhaustion,” which leads to institutional breakdown. It is not part of Thelen and Mahoney’s theory and therefore, it is not included in the theoretical framework applied in this study.
\end{footnote}
### Table 3: Four Types of Gradual Institutional Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Layering</th>
<th>Drift</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td>New elements (institutions or rules) are attached to existing elements and gradually change the status or structure of the existing institution.</td>
<td>Neglect of institutional maintenance in spite of external changes. This leads to “slippage in institutional practice on the ground.”</td>
<td>Redeployment of old institutional rules in new ways that redirect the institution towards new goals or purposes.</td>
<td>Rise of a new or subordinate institution that competes and may eventually replace the existing institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanism of change</strong></td>
<td>Addition of new elements</td>
<td>Neglect (deliberate or unintended)</td>
<td>Reinterpretation and redirection</td>
<td>Defection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key points</strong></td>
<td>Change through the addition of new rules and practices on the fringe of the existing institution. This grafting may slowly alter the core elements of the institution as new elements draw support or resources away from old elements.</td>
<td>Change in institutional outcomes due to failure to adapt to evolving/shifting circumstances. Institutional rules and practices remain in tact, but changing external conditions alter their impact.</td>
<td>Gaps between rules and enactment exist due to: 1. Unforeseen limits or unintended consequences of institutional design; 2. Intended ambiguity of rules; 3. Reinterpretation of rules by non-dominant actors; 4. Changes in contextual conditions and the emergence of coalitions that create space for redeployment.</td>
<td>Institutional incoherence under changing external conditions create space for behaviour among actors that deviates or challenges the existing rules and practices. Actors pursue practices and behaviours associated with new and emerging entities within the existing institutional setting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Framework for Explaining Military Change and the Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institutional Change inform the overarching and null hypotheses guiding this study:

**Overarching Hypothesis**

The adaptation of the American, British and Canadian armed forces to unity of effort requirements was influenced by the existing rules and practices for complex operations and the ability of dominant institutional actors to preserve these rules and practices when under pressure to reform their approaches.

**Null Hypothesis**

The adaptation of the American, British and Canadian armed forces to unity of effort requirements was not influenced by armed forces’ existing rules and practices for complex missions or the ability of dominant institutional actors to preserve these rules and practices when under pressure to reform their approaches.

**Independent Variable: Institutional Characteristics of Western Armed Forces**

According to the Framework for Explaining Military Change, a study of armed forces’ adaptation to unity of effort requirements in Afghanistan requires an examination of each military’s existing rules for complex operations. The evolution of armed forces’ approach to unity of effort involves the formal guidance set out in doctrinal publications, as well as the ways militaries structure themselves and relate to civilian entities in theatre
and how they use their capabilities to support interagency initiatives.

Rule interpretation and enforcement in the context of military institutions is tied to the way armed forces are organized. In a study of military adaptation, the interpretation and enforcement of rules is inextricably tied to the formal command structure of armed forces in which instructions are passed from one person to another.\(^9\) This formal hierarchical structure involves the “top-down allocation of authority and responsibility” to commanders by civilian decision makers to direct subordinate members.\(^9\) In their role as commanders, military leaders operating at different levels of the command structure exercise varying degrees of authority over the development and enforcement of institutional rules, including the procedures, processes and structures in place to accomplish a mission.

The first step of in each case study involves the identification of existing rules for complex operations and the level of discretion they afford actors in their interpretation and enactment. The analysis of doctrine focuses on the availability of formal guidelines for complex operations, the level of discretion afforded commanders in their support of comprehensive approaches, and the emphasis placed on military objectives vis-à-vis the larger political goals of contemporary missions. Existing institutional rules for in-country command arrangements can be identified based on guidelines in formal doctrine or based on approaches to command structures in recent operations. Based on these sources, it is possible to assess the discretion afforded military commanders in how they organize on the ground and work with civilian personnel in the area of operation. Finally, with respect


to CIMIC capabilities, the rules governing its use and application can be identified in formal doctrine, but more often in commanders’ approach to CIMIC in recent operations.

**Intervening Variable: Veto Possibilities Experienced by Military Agents**

The theory of gradual change offers only a broad definition of “veto possibilities,” stating that they can be derived from “especially powerful veto players” or “numerous institutional veto points.” However, for the concept of veto possibilities to have an explanatory function, further definition of its components and its application to a study of military adaptation is required. A first step to operationalizing ‘veto possibilities’ as an intervening variable is to define veto players in the context of military change. Veto players can be defined as individual actors or a group of actors whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. Veto players and their powers are designated within an institution, authorized in law or created by the political system. In the context of overseas mission, at least two categories of veto players are involved: first, civilian officials involved in matters of national defence and security; and, second, institutional actors within the military with authorities related to armed forces and their operations. In the British and Canadian cases, this distinction is relatively clear. Civilian leaders refer to the British Prime Minister and the Canadian Prime Minister. In their executive roles, these political actors have, among other powers, the ability to set foreign policy and the strategy for national missions. Given that these leaders may delegate, or assign decision-making authorities, to cabinet ministers, the UK Secretary of State for Defence and the Canadian Minister of Defence have a prominent role in setting defence policy intended to

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guide military leaders in their management of the armed forces. Of particular significance to this study are military agents with veto powers relating to the operations of national armed forces, namely, the British Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and the CDS of the Canadian Forces. In their capacities as the leader of armed forces, the CDS’s may exercise their authority in orders and directives concerning the military and the conduct of complex operations.

In the American case, it is more difficult to differentiate lead civilian and military actors because the President of the United States, the leader of the country, also holds the office of the Commander in Chief of the American forces. In both his political and military roles, the President can delegate his decision making authorities to civilian officials, such as the Secretary of Defense, or subordinate military leaders, such as the Commanders of Combatant Commands responsible for the performance of the military on missions assigned by the President or by the Secretary of Defense (that is, with approval of the President). Overall, an assessment of institutional actors veto possibilities involves examination of actors able to influence the preservation or change of the military’s existing rules for complex operations during the Afghanistan mission.

In this analysis, military veto players are referred to as military agents and the strength of military agents is determined based whether or not they exercised their formal powers as they relate to identifying military objectives and managing the armed forces. Military agents demonstrate strong veto powers when they are able to translate policy into military objectives and guide the forces in the achievement of these aims.

Conversely, actors can be said to be ‘weak veto players’ when they fail to exercise these authorities.

According to theory of gradual change, veto possibilities may also be derived from numerous veto points. Veto points, as defined by political scientist Ellen Immergut, are the opportunities that arise along a chain of decisions whereby actors (veto players or not) make decisions that affect or change institutional outcomes.\footnote{Immergut, Ellen M. “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care.” \textit{Journal of Public Policy} 10, no.4 (1990), 396. In a study of health care, Immergut explained that a chain of decision making may include numerous points whereby actors or groups of actors can influence outcomes. This influence is referred to as veto potential.} Mahoney and Thelen contend that the ability of institutional actors to maintain existing rules, including at points of decision, depends on their access to “institutional or extr ainstitutional means,” which they take to include the capability to change and enact rules on the ground, and to influence the behaviour of other entities.\footnote{Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 18-19.} It is impossible to take inventory of all the decision points that emerged over the course of national operations in Afghanistan. However, it is possible to consider the veto potential of actors.\footnote{Merike Gronwald, \textit{Reforming Old Age Security Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Change in France, Germany and Sweden}. PhD Dissertation (Mannheim, Germany: University of Mannheim, December 28, 2012), accessed January 28, 2015, https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/36584/1/Dissertation__Gronwald_MADOC.pdf.} Institutional veto potential refers to the influence of actors, who although their consent is not formally required to set or change rules, can have a significant impact on outcomes.

In the case of armed forces and CA in overseas missions, sub-commanders’ support for other lines of effort and interagency activities is not formally required, but is nonetheless critical to unity of effort. The veto potential of military leaders can be assessed based on: 1) whether or not superiors granted sub-commanders limited or
significant flexibility to influence national missions, including the military campaign; and
2) whether or not sub-commanders had access to the resources needed to achieve military
objectives and national policy goals. This involves a comparison of the human resources,
funding and expeditionary capabilities available to armed forces and to other government
entities during the mission. By defining veto potential in these terms, it is possible to
capture the informal influence of the armed forces on unity of effort outcomes. Sub-
commanders realize strong veto potential when they have the flexibility and resources
needed to direct national efforts. Weak veto potential exists when sub-commanders are
not afforded the flexibility or resources needed to influence national missions. It is
important to note that key civilian and military veto players may impact the veto potential
of sub-commanders on the ground. Civilian and military leaders make decisions that can
affect the flexibility sub-commanders are afforded to direct operations in theatre, and the
resources available to armed forces and civilian entities carrying out overseas missions.

In situations where institutional actors experience strong veto possibilities, due to
strong veto powers and/or strong veto potential, they are better able to preserve existing
rules and institution adaptation is likely to occur through either the process of drift or the
process of layering.97 The process of drift takes place when institutional actors are able to
respond to external pressures, including calls for reform, by doing nothing. While the
existing rules and practices remain intact, their meaning and impact may change in
response to changes in the external environment rather than deliberate actions taken by
institutional actors. Layering occurs when institutional leaders respond to external
pressures by adding new rules alongside or on top of existing rules. The addition of new

rules can introduce new requirements or conditions for rule implementation, which may also change the existing status or structure the institution. Therefore, in this model, when under pressure to improve unity of effort in overseas missions, military actors who experience strong veto possibilities are able to maintain existing rules for complex operations, and to adapt existing rules to new requirements through either drift or layering.

It is also possible that institutional actors may experience weak veto possibilities, due to weak veto powers or diminished veto potential, in which they are unable to preserve the status quo. In these cases, veto possibilities may be compromised when actors empowered to direct the military fail to do so, do not provide the oversight needed to ensure compliance to existing rules, or are unsuccessful at securing the resources needed to implement rules on the ground. According to the theory of gradual change, when actors’ experience weak veto possibilities, the institution is more vulnerable to more dramatic forms of adaptation. In these cases, institutional change is more likely to occur through the processes of conversion or displacement.\footnote{Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 21.} Conversion is expected to occur when dominant actors respond to pressures to change by reorienting the institution’s existing rules and practices towards new goals or, possibly, new purposes all-together. Institutional change through displacement will involve the gradual removal of existing rules or the entire institution. Although displacement is possible, institutional change through this process is less common in well-established state institutions like the military.
Each case study involves the identification of key civilian leaders and institutional actors, but focuses on military leaders’ authorities and influence in the conduct of national missions. The veto potential of military commanders in Afghanistan are assessed based on their access to resources and the opportunities they are afforded to influence unity of effort on the ground. Taken together, it is possible to determine the strength of the veto possibilities realized by institutional actors and their ability to maintain existing rules when they were under pressure to reform their existing approaches to complex operations.

**Dependent Variables**

According to the Framework for Explaining Military Change, the case studies involve analysis of how militaries’ existing institutional rules and the ability of institutional actors to preserve these rules influenced changes in their approaches to unity of effort. Three aspects of armed forces’ approaches are examined: military doctrine, command arrangements, and CIMIC capability. These dependent variables are described in the following section.

1. **Dependent Variable: Joint Doctrine and Army Doctrine**

Military doctrine may be defined as “the fundamental set of principles that guide military forces as they pursue national security objectives.”

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articulated as policies, procedures, or as formal or informal rules that guide the conduct of military members, activities and tasks, and missions. In democratic societies, the terms under which doctrine is applied is determined by civilian leaders. Civilian leaders determine the goals of a given mission and what the military may or may not do to achieve these goals.100

Modern military doctrine is not usually highly prescriptive and it is often careful to grant military commanders the flexibility needed to respond in a timely and effective way to emerging or unanticipated requirements.101 At the same time, formal doctrine establishes an “institutional basis” upon which militaries prepare and conduct specific missions.102 According to counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, doctrine acts as an “institutional rudder” that attempts to “inculcate habits of mind and action that change organizational culture and behaviour,” and direct the organization towards particular ends.103 In this regard, a military may develop doctrine for some operations and not others, which indicates the priority of certain operations over other types of mission. Because it is often revised to reflect lessons learned during missions, doctrine may also be considered a record of institutional experience and change.104 And as a point of

101 Sloan, “Military Doctrine,” 244.
reference for the strategic decision-making and the conduct of military affairs, doctrine may also guide the forces in their interaction with the “wider environment.”

The following study examines how existing formal and informal rules for complex operations, together with the political context of the Afghanistan missions, led to gradual changes in the ways militaries captured these operations, and unity of effort principles, in the doctrine intended to guide future missions.

2. Dependent Variable: Command Arrangements and In-Country Unity of Effort

As the nature of missions have changed, so too have approaches to operational command. In cases of conventional state-on-state warfare, military leaders focused on basic components of “command and control,” which involves the management of personnel and resources to achieve defence and security objectives. “Command” refers to the arrangements by which decisions are made (or commanded); “control” refers to the monitoring or revision of these decisions in their implementation. Command and control systems, and command arrangements establish the processes through which strategic objectives are translated and realized at the operational and tactical levels. There are differences between command and control, and command arrangements. Command and control systems refer to the traditional, hierarchical system established by the armed forces for state-on-state war, whereas command arrangements are characterized by multiple linkages between the armed forces and civilian entities and are

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107 The references for the remainder of the paragraph are Albert and Hayes, Understanding Command, 17, 13, 42.
less hierarchical in nature. In military operations, unity of effort, that is, the cooperation and coordination of all actors involved in an intervention, is critical to achieving military objectives, but also overall policy goals of foreign missions.\textsuperscript{108}

Militaries are expected to engage expertise and personnel from outside the institution and to expand their traditional command and control systems to include other decision-makers and non-combat considerations. These “command arrangements” among military and non-military entities may be determined at the highest levels of decision-making, and they may be implemented across all levels of a mission.\textsuperscript{109} This study considers how militaries adapted in-country structures to accommodate civilian entities and personnel, and the implications of their approach for CA in Afghanistan.


Force structure refers to how a military allocates and organizes its personnel and resources. In situations of conventional warfare, military forces organize for the primary, if not sole, purpose of applying force. In the age of new wars, however, the imperatives have changed. The security and development challenges of contemporary conflicts require multi-dimensional responses. As such, militaries are brought into closer proximity with civilian organizations and are increasingly engaged in non-combat activities. Some operations and forces are now organized with greater consideration for the reconstruction and humanitarian goals of the overall mission, as well as to the development and deployment of non-combat capabilities that can be brought to bear in complex

operations.\textsuperscript{110} National militaries vary considerably both in how they organize for civil-military cooperation and the types of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities they carry out. From a military perspective, CIMIC has historically been defined as activities that involve cooperation with humanitarian and other civilian bodies to establish credibility with local civilian populations in a target state, and to gather information critical to the military campaign.\textsuperscript{111} The relationships between militaries and civilians in operational environments, however, are complicated by a number of factors including the number and diversity of civilian organizations and armed forces, as well as differences in their mandates, capabilities and areas of expertise. This study examines militaries’ existing rules for CIMIC and the ability of dominant actors to preserve existing practices in light of emerging requirements during the Afghanistan mission. In summary, each country case study involves an analysis of the institutional and contextual factors that affected specific, gradual changes in military doctrine, in-country command arrangements and the application of CIMIC in Afghanistan.

**Research Approach**

Process tracing is applied to the case studies to examine how existing institutional rules and the veto possibilities afforded military agents impacted the ways armed forces adapted to unity of effort requirements in Afghanistan. As a research method, process tracing is well suited to this analysis because it allows for the examination of multiple


variables on outcomes within single cases. This is achieved through the careful reconstruction of timelines and the sequential processes within a single historical case based on a variety of primary and secondary sources. Within the theoretical construct of historical institutionalism, the primary sources used to reconstruct historical timelines include government policy, speech transcripts, news media, civil-military plans, and original military documents (joint doctrine and field manual publications, service specific journals, campaign plans, operations orders and lessons learned reports, to name a few).

Organization of the Research Study

The case studies of the American, British and Canadian armed forces and their adaptation during the mission in Afghanistan follow a similar format. First, the historical institutional analyses involves the identification of the key drivers of change, including developments in the political and operational contexts of the missions and the emergence of key agents seeking reform to the armed forces. This is followed by an examination of each militaries’ existing institutional rules. In each case study, institutional rules are traced back to Cold War experiences in complex operations, such as counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations, and more recent experiences in peace operations in Bosnia as part of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR). Based on each military’s approach to complex and interagency operations in Bosnia, it is possible to identify the nature and scope of institutional rules at the onset of operations in

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113 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 13.
Afghanistan, especially NATO ISAF. The third step of the studies involves analysis of military leaders’ veto possibilities. This involves an examination of the ways leaders exercised their formal authorities and the veto potential of sub-commanders in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011. The final section of each case study traces how institutional characteristics and the military agents’ veto possibilities led to changes in formal doctrine, in-country command arrangements, and CIMIC capabilities. Each case study ends with a conclusion on the research hypothesis.

The final chapter reviews the main findings of the case studies and the implications of the research. In closing, it explains how the study bridges gaps in the existing literature and identifies areas for further research.
Chapter 2:
The American Military, Unity of Effort and the Afghanistan Mission

The application of the Framework for Explaining Military Change to the American military and its adaptation to unity of effort requirements is prefaced with a brief discussion of the drivers of change and the circumstances under which civilian actors’ created new imperatives for interagency cooperation in Afghanistan. The analysis of the American military and its response to new unity of effort imperatives requires the identification the military’s rules for complex operations during the Cold War and in Bosnia in the 1990s, which provided the basis for action in Afghanistan. In particular, this involves an assessment of the degree of discretion afforded institutional actors in their interpretation and implementation of rules captured formal doctrine and underpinning in-country command structures and the use of CIMIC capabilities. This is followed by an assessment of the strength of military agents’ veto possibilities leading up to the introduction of a new American counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan in 2009. The powers of key military agents and the veto potential of commanders in the area of operation are considered in turn. It is based on these factors that it is possible to trace the specific forms of adaptation undertaken by the armed forces to doctrine for complex operations, in-country command arrangements, and civil-military operations capabilities (CIMIC). The last part of the case study states whether or not the case study supports the overarching hypothesis guiding this research.
The Driver of Change: President Obama and A New Strategy for the American Mission in Afghanistan

The primary driver of change to American armed forces’ approach in Afghanistan was President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan. Throughout early 2009 civilian officials in the United States were beginning to raise concerns about the lack of civil-military coordination and its impact on the mission in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Senator John McCain commented that, after the departure of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and General David Barno, the civil-military structures, which had realized significant gains in the country, were “disassembled and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement.” According to a senior US military commander who deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, that the synchronization of civilian and military elements was the most significant obstacle to the American mission: “[The most serious problem in Afghanistan is] not the Taliban…not governance…not security…It’s the utter failure in the unity of effort department.”

During the election campaign, Barack Obama had promised a scaling back of American involvement in what he described as the “misguided effort in Iraq” and to redirect resources to Afghanistan to “address the growing threat from a resurgent al-Qaeda” in that country. This aligned with public opinion. While the percentage of Americans agreeing that the US made the right decision to use military force in Afghanistan stayed between sixty and seventy percent since 2001, there was steep decline

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in Americans support for the war in Iraq with a considerable drop in support for the mission and growing sentiments that the use of military force in Iraq was the “wrong decision” through 2008. Upon his election to the White House, President Obama initiated a shift in the country’s strategy in Afghanistan. In 2009, the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan was released, which set out new imperatives for civil-military unity of effort in the prosecution of the mission and the achievement of its ‘transformative effects’ in Afghanistan.

To understand how the armed forces adapted to the unity of effort imperatives embodied in the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan it is necessary to identify the military’s existing rules for complex operations and the veto possibilities afforded institutional actors upon the Plan’s release. It is then possible to identify how institutional characteristics and dominant military agents impacted changes on the American forces’ doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC from 2009 until 2011.

Existing Institutional Rules for Complex Operations

American Forces in Vietnam: The CORDS Experience

The American military’s experience during the Vietnam War is valuable to an analysis of institutional rules because it provides insight into the US military’s historical

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approach to joint pacification efforts and to integrated civil-military structures during a complex mission. Furthermore, the US military in Vietnam is worth considering because it had a lasting impact on the forces’ approach to complex operations and their rules for interagency initiatives, including the ways American military commanders conducted complex operations during NATO IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia.  

The American military first deployed to Vietnam in 1962 to stall the insurgency against the Government in South Vietnam and provide the host government a chance to contain the Communist threat. In the early phases of the mission, American civil-military cooperation in Vietnam was tenuous, at best. The armed forces employed a conventional approach to combat insurgents, while the other American agencies operating in the country pursued their separate agendas and established their own offices in the country. A joint council of civilian representatives and military members was created, but its effectiveness was undermined by members’ ability to appeal council decisions to their respective headquarters in Washington. For the most part, General William Childs Westmoreland, the United States Army commander of American military operations in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, took a hands-off approach to civil-military activities. He viewed pacification efforts as the civilians’ domain and dedicated few

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5 Complex operations include a range of expeditionary operations such as peace support, counterinsurgency, stability operations and humanitarian assistance that require a comprehensive approach. Across the spectrum of complex operations, the success of these activities depends on the application of a comprehensive approach and coordination of civilian and military efforts (Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “NATO and Complex Operations: Introduction,” in Complex Operations: NATO at War and On the Margins of War ed. Christopher M. Schnaubelt (Rome, Italy: National Defense College, 2010), 11-12.


7 Other USG entities operating on the ground in Vietnam, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Agriculture, and the United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID).
military resources, including a small number of security forces, to support civilians operating at the local levels. Overall, prior to 1967, civilian entities and armed forces functioned largely independent from each other and few steps were taken to better harmonize these efforts.

By 1967 political leaders were under pressure to develop a new strategy for Vietnam. Mounting human and financial costs of the War sparked concern in Washington and civilian leaders called for a shift in the emphasis in Vietnam from combat to non-kinetic programs. In response, President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint of Chiefs of Staff Army General Earle Wheeler created a joint civil-military pacification program, the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program, or CORDS. CORDS was a coordinating body for civilian pacification activities to be jointly carried by civilian personnel and military forces. The President assigned the responsibility for pacification support to General Westmoreland, who developed a plan to integrate CORDS into the armed forces’ command. Under this scheme, Robert Komer, the leader of CORDS, was given a position at the military headquarters, Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV), equivalent to a deputy commander, with direct access to General Westmoreland.

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9 One example was the Mission Councils established in 1964. Led by the American Ambassador, the council met on a regular basis. The Councils improvement information sharing among US entities in Vietnam, but did not result in harmonization of the American civilian and military entities in the country.

10 CORDs is sometimes referred to as a precursor to the modern-day Provincial Reconstruction Teams. See Michael Mc Nerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or A Muddle?” *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (2005), 44.

Kommer was also granted authority over civilian and military members of CORDS and he had direct access to General Westmoreland. The merging of the civilian and military command led to the integration of the political, economic and security elements of the American counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam.

The CORDS experience involved some elements of a comprehensive approach to complex operations. First, although the armed forces remained focused on defeating the insurgency through traditional means, the creation of CORDS required the forces to support and provide resources for joint, non-kinetic operations. Dedicated civil affairs units involving approximately sixty officers and one hundred enlisted troops were deployed to CORDS. Among their primary mission objectives, the units were to eliminate the insurgency, “diminish the [Viet-Cong’s] ability to recruit,” and “recruit indigenous trips to fight” insurgent forces.\textsuperscript{12} They also assisted with refugee assistance programs and the construction of infrastructure, schools and factories.\textsuperscript{13} Second, the experience demonstrated the value of civil affairs and civil-military cooperation in counterinsurgency situations.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, the expertise of reserve members, logistical capabilities of the armed forces and the provision of resources were critical to CORDS success in Vietnam. Finally, CORDS, often cited as an example of an integrated civil-military structure, actually involved the adaptation of the traditional command structures

\textsuperscript{12} Kathleen Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth, \textit{The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces} (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 6.
\textsuperscript{13} Nuzum, \textit{Shades of Cords}, viv, 104. For a history of American civil affairs force from the US-Mexican War to the war in Iraq see Hicks and Wormuth, \textit{The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces}, 1-19.
\textsuperscript{14} The American military’s Civil Affairs Branch first deployed to the Dominican Republic in 1965 with a mission to “[distribute] food, [restore] power, and [clear] trash” from the streets of the state capital Santo Domingo. See Hicks and Wormuth, \textit{The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces}, 5.
to accommodate civilian officials and personnel. Under the CORDS arrangement, General Westmoreland remained the lead American in Vietnam, while the head civilian Robert Komer, as deputy commander, operated within the parameters of the military chain of command. This meant that, although personnel involved in security, intelligence, development and governance efforts reported to Komer, they ultimately answered to General Westmoreland. Major Ross Coffey found that the subordination of civilian entities to the chain of command actually enhanced the influence of civilian personnel and improved their access to the resources needed to lead and carry out pacification activities, as Komer explained,

Paradoxically, this [partnership] resulted in even greater U.S. civilian influence over pacification than had ever existed before; it also powerfully [reinforced] pacification’s claim on U.S. and GVN military resources, which constituted the bulk of the inputs during 1967-1971.

Overall, the CORDS experience illustrated the importance of interagency cooperation between armed forces and other US government departments and agencies, including the benefits of accurate assessments of each organization’s contribution to American efforts.

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16 This was a novel approach, as Henry Nuzum, an analyst with at the Strategic Studies Institute in Washington, noted, “Komar was the first official of ambassadorial rank to serve under a military superior and have command of military personnel.” See Nuzum, Shades of Cords, 51.
17 Jan K. Gleiman, “Ditching Career Centric COIN: Exhuming Robert Komar with the Drawdown in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (2011), 10. Counterinsurgency expert David Galula explained that “giving the soldier authority over the civilian would … contradict one of the major characteristics of this type of war.” He goes on to explain that this practice would “reverse the relative importance of military versus political action and move the counterinsurgent’s warfare closer to a conventional one.” It would signal to insurgents that the defeat of the host government and its inability to “cope with the insurgency through normal government structures…” See David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 63.
“early coordination” and “constant communication” to the mission.\textsuperscript{19} Nonetheless, CORDS proved a temporary approach to complex operations and it was not institutionalized as part of the American military’s approach in irregular wars.

Despite the often cited success of CORDS, the lessons learned and best practices developed during the program were not formally captured in doctrine, incorporated into the military’s approach to in-country command arrangements, or reflected in greater attention to the armed forces’ civil affairs and civil-military operations capability in the years or, even, decades following the Vietnam War. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case. First, the lack of reference to the CORDS experience may be attributed in part to the armed forces’ focus on conventional capabilities during the Cold War, as well as their reluctance to commit personnel and resources to long-term post-conflict activities.\textsuperscript{20} A second possible reason CORDS was not incorporated into existing rules was because such interagency initiatives are difficult to create and sustain, even in the short-term. Henry Nuzum, an international studies expert, noted that the level of interagency integration realized with CORDS required the President’s direct involvement and the administration’s deliberate and long-term efforts to overcome departmental and organizational stovepipes. Without the sustained attention of senior civil leaders, military and civilian actors alike are likely continue to pursue independent strategies on the ground. Finally, lessons learned from CORDS were not reflected in institutional rules because the political and military failures in Vietnam tended to overshadow the programs successes. In the years and decades after the War, these failures reinforced dominant actors’ confidence in traditional warfare methods and hardened their resolve against

\textsuperscript{19} Hicks and Wormuth, \textit{The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces}, 13.

\textsuperscript{20} Nuzum, \textit{Shades of CORDS}, ix, 75, 76.
participation in ‘nation-building’ programs. Therefore, although the American military and their civilian counterparts from across USG achieved unity of effort needed to achieve pacification aims during the Vietnam War, the lessons learned and the best practices of CORDS were not translated into rules and practices to guide complex operations or support to civilian entities in subsequent missions.

It was in the long shadow cast by the Vietnam experience and after the decades-long Cold War that the armed forces confronted the unique and complex challenges of peace operations. The next section reviews the American military’s rule for complex operations during the missions in Bosnia including the formal rules captured in doctrine, the organization of in-country command arrangements and the approach taken to civil-military cooperation in the area of operations. Rules developed over the course of the 1990s provided guideposts for armed forces carrying out complex operations in Afghanistan.

Rules for Complex Operations and Unity of Effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina

By the mid-1990s, the American military’s formal rules for complex operations were provided in the US Army Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations, Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and the Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations. Notably, civilian elements and interagency relations were not addressed in these publications, but covered in a separate document titled Joint Publication Doctrine 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (JP 3-08). A cursory

21 Nuzum, Shades of CORDS ix; Thijs Broacades Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 276.
examination of these publications reveals the high level of discretion afforded commanders and members in the interpretation of rules governing military activities during multinational mission and the participation of armed forces in interagency operations as they were carried out in Bosnia, only a few years before the onset of the Afghanistan war in 2001.

In December 1994 the US army developed its first field Manual dedicated to peace operations, US Army Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations* (FM 100-23).22 The writers consulted international doctrine, especially the British publications on peacekeeping, and drew on lessons learned from ongoing operations.23 In the American view, peace operations included traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as “protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.”24 The doctrine conceded that civil-military cooperation was “critical to achieving strategic end states of peace operations” and it stressed that, regardless of the arrangement, clear civilian and military responsibilities must be defined for planning and execution of each phase of the operation. At the same time, however, the doctrine did not specify the nature and extent of the US Army’s involvement in these operations.25 Combatant commanders were instructed to integrate operations with civilian efforts at the local level when the leaders

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23 The doctrine also referenced lessons learned by the American forces during *Operation Provide Comfort* in Iraq and *Operation Restore Hope* in Somalia. (United States Department of the Army, *Peace Operations* (Field Manual No.100-23) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), V.)
24 United States Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, IV.
deemed it appropriate. Under these circumstances, commanders were granted significant discretion in setting the terms of civil-military linkages in the conduct of a wide range of peace operations.

Nearly six months after the release of the Army’s peace operations doctrine, the American military issued its first set of formal rules for military operations other than war, Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) were defined as the “use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war....focus[ed] on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises.” The broad category of MOOTW included combating terrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance and support to counterinsurgency, among others. In all its manifestations, the purpose of MOOTW was to “prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities.” According to the doctrine, armed forces must be aware they “may not be the primary player” in MOOTW and political considerations must “permeate all levels” of the military’s operations. With respect to MOOTW outside the US, the doctrine explained, the Department of State and the Ambassador was expected to coordinate US

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37 The doctrine was expected to provide the “basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations.” It provided a guide for the “exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders.” See United States, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, I-1.
39 Other MOOTW included arms control, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight, noncombatant evacuation operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, and strikes and raids (United States Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, III-1). Reference for remainder of paragraph, United States Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, III-1, IV-8.
40 United States Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, I-1.
activities, including those carried out by DOD. Commanders were expected to support interagency operations and the CMOC was identified as one mechanism to maintain coordination and consensus building among military, government entities and other organizations. The doctrine recognized that in some operations, like humanitarian assistance, other departments are likely to take the lead, but in other types of operations, such as peace enforcement, DOD will be the supported entity. Although the doctrine underscored the importance of political factors and interagency coordination, it provided few rules for commanders on how to create and foster unity of effort to achieve political goals of the various types of MOOTW.

Building on JP 3-07, the United States’ Army Field Manual (FM 3-0) Operations issued June 2001, re-categorized MOOTW as stability operations. According to this text, stability operations were conducted to:

Promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peace-time developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.

The doctrine explained that, as part of full spectrum operations, stability operations may be conducted alongside offensive, defensive and support operations. It was expected the army might carry out these operations “before hostilities, in crises, during hostilities and after hostilities.” In creating stability operations as an umbrella category for MOOTW,

31 The ten categories of stability operations overlapped with many of the types of MOOTW included in the 1995 doctrine, such as combating terrorism, support to counterdrug operations, humanitarian and civil assistance, support to insurgencies, and peace operations.
32 Support operations were defined as operations that “employ Army forces to assist civil authorities foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or responded to crises and relieve suffering” (United States Department of the Army, Operations Field Manual FM 3-0, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 1-15, quoted in Hippler, Countersurgency, 32).
the doctrine did not differentiate among different kinds operations or provide separate guidance for the achievement of the distinct aims of these operations, which ranged from countering terrorist threats to providing assistance to civil authorities. Instead, it maintained that the conduct of stability operations was “identical to [the conduct of] offensive and defensive, and support operations.” In this regard, the “nine principles of war,” described as the “enduring bedrock of Army doctrine,” were to provide the guidance for MOOTW.34 As the campaign evolves, the “tasks and objectives that directly support military operations, but are the responsibility of other agencies are identified” by commanders and planners, and then submitted to the Joint Staff and interagency working groups. It is within these “[f]ormal and task-specific interagency working groups” that policy is coordinated and tasks are assigned to various government entities. In sum, the military’s rules for MOOTW were not all that different than the rules for the conduct of war. The same rules applied during conventional were expected to inform the army’s conduct of other operations. As well, in both cases it was expected that across the range of army operations, interagency task forces would be formed and employed. It was unclear how the army was to pursue unity of effort when interagency task forces were not established or when they did not have the authority to assign tasks. In sum, the military’s rules for complex operations were informed largely by conventional warfare and did not define a role for the army in interagency operations in the absence of cross-government supports.

34 These principles were: Objective (operations to be directed towards clearly defined objective), offensive, mass (concentrate effect of combat power at the decisive place and time), economy of force (allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts), maneuver (place enemy in a disadvantageous position through flexible application of combat power), unity f command (unit of effort under one responsible commander), security (never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage), surprise, and simplicity (prepare clear, uncomplicated plans). See United States Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 4-13 - 4-15.
Instead, civil-military aspects of overseas missions were covered in separate Joint doctrine titled, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (JP 3-08). Published in two volumes, the doctrine stated a “common threat throughout all major operations,” including MOOTW, was the “broad range of agencies…that interact with the Armed Forces.” Unity of effort was identified as a principle of military and interagency operations. It was stated that unity of effort can be achieved “through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation” that are needed to “overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations.” The first step was to identify agencies with the capabilities needed to achieve common objectives. It also provided general information on government entities and international organizations. Although the doctrine identified ways to organize for successful interagency operations, it also acknowledged that many organizational planning and operations tools were not “formalized in staffing or authorization.” As well, mechanisms in place for unity of effort vary by service and by operations. As a result, the structures and tools presented in the doctrine “represent recommendations only.” In the absence of formal mechanisms for interagency operations, military commanders retained significant discretion in how they interpreted the role of armed forces in these capacities and in the conduct of civil-military initiatives in overseas missions.

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38 Ibid.
Therefore, American military doctrine leading up to 2001 provided limited guidance for the range of MOOTW, namely counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, the military was expected to carry out in Afghanistan. The armed forces maintained that, while political dimensions were important for complex operations, MOOTW were to be conducted in accordance with the nine principles of conventional warfare. With respect to civil-military unity of effort during, unity of effort was identified as a key dimension in stability and interagency operations. However, these concepts were addressed in separate publications and they were not incorporated into operational doctrine. Similar to the state of stabilization and counterinsurgency guidance, there was a dearth of formal rules and institutionalized tools in place to support unity of effort in complex operations, such as those carried out by armed forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan. Overall, the broad approach to MOOTW and the treatment of interagency aspects of operations granted commanders significant flexibility in their interpretation of principles and practices for the conduct of complex operations, including interagency activities.

The American military’s approach to civil-military unity of effort during complex operations throughout the 1990s, including NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia, provide insight into the existing rules for command arrangements at the onset of ISAF. A brief review of the approach taken in Bosnia offers insight into the in-country structures established by the American military and the degree of discretion they afforded military commanders over interagency aspects of a mission.

In Bosnia, few formal ties existed between the American military and USG
entities. National militaries participating in IFOR, and later, in SFOR operated within multinational divisions (MNDs). The United States led Multinational Division (North) (MND(N)) and one of its only formal links to other government entities in the area was through USAID’s Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (CIRP). The MND(N) coordinated CIRP-funded Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) with local leaders, which were then implemented by local citizens or American contractors.\(^{39}\) Beyond this minimal contact with USAID, USG entities and the armed forces operated largely independent of each other in Bosnia. Throughout the missions, the military maintained its existing command structures and operated within established hierarchies.

Participants at an After Action Conference at the Army Peacekeeping Institute in May 1996 identified factors that undermined unity of effort during IFOR. First, the Report from the Conference noted the civilian and military elements did not conduct joint planning for the mission and the failure to integrate at the strategic level impeded interagency cooperation across all levels of the American mission in Bosnia.\(^{40}\) Second, the Report indicated that the army preferred to maintain its combat readiness in what it considered to be an uncertain security situation rather than to dedicate resources to non-combat activities, including reconstruction and development. In this regard, the report underscored the army’s reluctance to commit to civil-military activities that require longer-term support and, possibly, extend beyond the definitive end-date for the mission declared by the National Security Council. Although the Report recommended the US Army identify methods to involve civilian experts and advisors during the planning phase


of these operations, it did not provide suggestions for how the armed forces may adapt to improve its participation or support to USG entities.

In addition to the mission-specific findings from the IFOR After Action Conference, the military’s command structure was identified as a significant challenge for interagency coordination in contemporary wars and international crises. At the operational level, the commander-in-chiefs of the geographically focused combatant commands occupied a position unparalleled by civilian government agencies. The combatant commander, typically a regional theatre commander, was authorized to manage crisis that spilled over state borders, and due to the size of the military presence and the amount of resources available, commanders were often relied on to “provide leadership on behalf of the Nation even while operating in a supporting role to civilian agencies.”

To the contrary, Ambassadors resided within the country to which the armed forces were deployed, and their authority and responsibility was confined to a single state. Ambassadors often do not have the resources or staff needed coordinate operations at the regional level. The government typically had a limited civilian presence in areas of operations. Although the Department of State employed regional assistant secretaries, these officials often did not deploy on expeditionary operations nor did they have responsibility for events in theatre. Given these realities, the armed forces remained the preeminent USG entity in the conduct of American foreign missions, especially in operations that extend beyond state borders or at a regional level.

A RAND study of interagency coordination in MOOTW during the 1990s, which

42Ibid.
highlighted obstacles to successful civil-military unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels, reiterated the impact of resource constraints on civilian entities’ ability to deploy alongside the armed forces. Unlike the military, USG departments and agencies were subject to strict staffing and budget requirements which made it difficult to muster and deploy on expeditionary operations on short notice. Once in the field, most government entities did not have established doctrine or standard procedures to conduct longer-term expeditionary missions and, as a result, their responses to crises were often ad hoc and highly variable.

In sum, the American military’s rules for in-country command arrangements demonstrated during IFOR and SFOR reflected a traditional approach to command. The American military’s experience during NATO IFOR and SFOR in the 1990s reveal it did not have rules to guide or support formal, in-country command arrangements. Instead, these linkages depended in part on its organizational preferences of the military commander and the leader’s view of the security situation on the ground. The combatant command structure and the resources provided for military operations, in comparison to civilian-led development and reconstruction programs, bolstered the influence of commanders in the conduct of international operations. Under these conditions, the armed forces maintained a traditional approach to command in the area of operations and commanders exercised significant discretion over the nature and scope of the forces’ linkages with other USG entities.

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43 For example, during an operation other than war, the State Department was unable to carry out assigned tasks including the provision of assistance to village leaders, conduct negotiations with various factions, and oversee the organization of security forces in the country due to the limited number of department staff operating in the field. See Jennifer Taw, Marcy Agnon and Lois M. Davis, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 11.
The next section examines the American military’s guidelines for civil-military operations (CMOs) during missions in Bosnia. It reviews the formal rules, the force structure of American civil affairs units and their place within the larger command, and finally, the types of activities undertaken by these forces during IFOR and SFOR. Prior to American involvement in IFOR operations, the formal rules for American CIMIC were informed by existing civil affairs doctrine, namely the 1993 Army Field Manual 41-10 *Civil Affairs Operations*.\(^4\) This doctrine set out a broad set of three types of tasks for military CIMIC teams during military operations. It differentiated among civil affairs tasks conducted in support of the commander’s relationship with civil authorities (civil affairs), tasks conducted in direct support of the military commander that may or may not provide benefit to the host nation (civil military operations), and tasks in direct support to the host nation that may or may not benefit the military commander (support to civil administration). In later doctrine, civil affairs were extended to “include activities and functions normally the responsibility of a local government.” The revision to the definition of civil affairs implicated the armed forces in non-military aspect of overseas missions, and in the delivery of non-military effects in the area of operations.\(^5\) However, the American army’s rules for CIMIC remained sufficiently broad such that military commanders continued to exercise significant discretion in their interpretation and implementation of doctrine. Military commanders decided when and how this capability

\(^4\) In the American context, civil-military operations (CMO) are referred to as CIMIC by NATO, Canadian and British forces. See United States Army Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 3-1.

was utilized on the ground. The ambiguity of existing CIMIC rules led to a range of outcomes.46

In Bosnia, US tactical CIMIC units were drawn from the nearly five thousand Army Reserve personnel with expertise in all areas of government, and, during IFOR, these teams grew to nearly 450 personnel each.47 Within MND(N), the teams were initially subject to strict force protection rules that hampered their ability to effectively liaise with non-governmental organizations and engage with local citizens throughout Bosnia. According to civil-military relations analyst Thijs Zaalberg, the constraints imposed on these units reflected military leaders’ “basic lack of understanding” of the role and value of CIMIC and civil affairs, and the reluctance of both military and political leaders to engage in nation-building efforts after Vietnam.48 As noted in a DOD Report on the IFOR mission, these requirements limited the mobility and effectiveness of the units: “When CIMIC personnel were able to muster the needed four vehicles to leave the base, they arrived at an NGO site with a heavier military presence than some NGOs desired.”49 Although doctrine identified the CIMIC Centre as the primary interface for liaising with NGOs, the ability of civil affairs personnel to link up with NGOs was hampered by its location within the gates of its military base, which was twenty minutes

46 In the early months of IFOR, NATO’s SHAPE developed plans for CIMIC in Bosnia and IFOR headquarters tasked civilian support responsibilities to a separate CIMIC Task Force. National CIMIC teams were deployed from this Task Force throughout Bosnia, and field commanders below the supreme commander had minimal “control over civil affairs teams in their area of operations.” However, in March 1996, the “IFOR land component commander General Walker gave his divisional commanders more leeway to determine the extent and methods of their involvement in civil tasks.” See Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 278. After this time, national commanders had greater discretion over the nature and scope of CIMIC within their MNDs.
47 Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 275, 277. In 1993 civil affairs units were placed under the recently established US Special Operations Command.
48 Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 278, 276.
from downtown Tuzla where many NGO headquartered. Coordination was also frustrated by the restricted access of non-IFOR personnel, including NGOs to the base and the lack of reliable communications. Without email or a fax, CIMIC teams and NGOs were forced to rely on intermediaries or the single available phone line for their communications.50

Finally, commanders insisted civil affairs personnel wear personal protective gear, including helmets, flak jackets, and combat equipment, “even when working in permissive environments” so that they could be distinguished from general purpose soldiers.51 As was noted during the Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review conference, “the combination of protective gear and large convoys had the adverse effect of creating the impression among Bosnians that U.S. forces were “more afraid of the locals and less capable of protecting the public.”52

Commanders eventually relaxed force protection measures for CIMIC units in Bosnia, but units continued to operate on the edge of established command structures, as Zaalberg explained: “[CIMIC existed on the] periphery of military operations, away from the commander and regular military units.”53 Under these conditions, highly specialized reserve CIMIC members had greater latitude in their terms of their outreach programs and, eventually, these members became heavily involved in support of civil administration activities. For instance, CIMIC units worked with former hostile factions

50 Ibid.
53 Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, 279.
on property laws, assisted the World Bank and formed working groups on matters of public health and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{54}

The neglect of CIMIC was noted in the conference report from the Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review held by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute in May 1996. The doctrine that informed the army’s earliest operations in Bosnia did not provide guidance to commanders on how to address the complexity of the crisis or how to work with the myriad of actors involved in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{55} The report stated that the military’s doctrine was “not effectively integrated into routine training and operations” and a recommendation contained in the report suggested that Army and Joint civil-military doctrine be revised. It also suggested that the analytical framework be expanded to consider the role of civilians when developing mission objectives.\textsuperscript{56}. Despite these recommendations, the American military’s rules for Civil Affairs were still based on the terms set out in the formal doctrine published in 1993 and its experience in recent operations, such as IFOR and SFOR. By 2001, doctrinal gaps continued to exist and commanders retained significant discretion over CIMIC units and ultimately, their effectiveness in theatre.

In sum, the American military’s institutional rules granted military commanders significant discretion in the conduct of military operations other than war, minimal flexibility in their approach to in-country command arrangements, and considerable latitude in their use of CIMIC in overseas missions. Through the 1990s, American military doctrine lumped a wide range of complex and distinct operations under the

\textsuperscript{54} Zaalberg, \textit{Soldiers and Civil Power}, 280.


\textsuperscript{56} United States Peacekeeping Institute, \textit{Bosnia-Herzegovina}. 
umbrella of stability operations. Broad stroke principles and guidance intended to guide the conduct in overseas missions granted commanders significant flexibility in their approach, including their support for unity of effort and their participation in interagency operations. Secondly, the American military's in-country command arrangements in Bosnia conformed to the military's traditional approach to command. Established for conventional warfare, this structure was mostly hierarchical in nature and afforded military commanders less discretion in terms of accommodating non-traditional military elements, such as civil affairs units, and civilian counterparts from non-military organizations. Finally, civil-military operations, pursued outside established structures, often proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Ambiguous CIMIC rules provided military commanders considerable flexibility in their treatment of civil affairs units, and decisions taken by individual military leaders had a major impact on the mobility of these units, the effectiveness of CA personnel, and the nature of their operations. In accordance with the theoretical framework, the first step of a historical analysis of gradual change to the American military’s adaptation to unity of effort requirements during ISAF was to identify institutional rules and the level of discretion afforded actors in the interpretation and implementation of these rules. With this task complete, it is possible to move on to an examination of the political context of the American mission in Afghanistan and the veto possibilities realized by dominant actors.
The American Mission in Afghanistan

The Framework for Explaining Military Change states that the veto possibilities realized by institutional actors is an intervening variable influencing the adaptation of existing rules and practices over time. According to the theory, the political context affords dominant institutional actors varying abilities to preserve existing rules and practices when under pressure by outside forces to change its approach or ways of operating. Depending on the context, dominant institutional actors experience either strong veto possibilities or weak veto possibilities. The theory also contends that the stronger the veto possibilities experienced by dominant actors the more likely it is they can prevent institutional reforms and ensure that existing institutional rules and practices remain in tact. Adaptation in these cases will involve few, if any, changes to the institution’s core rules and practices. The strength of veto possibilities is determined by the authority of dominant institutional actors to set and change rules that govern the behaviour of the institution’s members. Second, these possibilities are realized when dominant actors are afforded opportunities to implement the rules on the ground, which is, in part, a function of their access to the funding and resources needed to preserve what they view as essential rules and practices. The following section proceeds with the identification of military agents, and their formal authorities. It assesses the flexibility afforded military commanders to direct activities on the ground and their access to the resources needed to lead in-country efforts prior to the introduction of a change in 2009. With the strength of veto possibilities of institutional actors identified, it is possible to consider how the political context, together with existing rules, led to specific changes to
doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capability over a ten-year period.

*Civilian and Military Authorities*

An analysis of the political context of the American mission may benefit from a clear articulation of the authorities of civilian and military leaders in the direction of the armed forces and overseas operations. The American Constitution establishes the authorities assigned to the President, as Commander in Chief, (CIC) and Congress over the armed forces. The President, under Article II, Section 2 of the American Constitution, is the commander in chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of several states, when these entities are called into service. Congress is vested with the most significant power over the military, namely the appropriation of funds to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the armed forces. Congress was also granted power over statutes and investigations, and the authority to recruit and support armies. Because the specific powers of the CIC are not defined in the Constitution, all powers not explicitly assigned to Congress or to the states by the Constitution fall to the president. In comparison to Congress, presidential influence over the military, and in foreign policy more generally, is strengthened because of the position of the president at the top of the executive branch’s hierarchical structure. In this position, the president has access to information, expertise and analysis from senior officials for decision-making. As the leader of the country, the president is also able to act quickly and discreetly in responding to time-sensitive security and defence
matters without requiring the consent of other government entities.57

Under Title 10 of the United States Code, the secretary of defense is the “principal assistant” to the president in matters of DOD and the nation’s defense. In this position, the secretary exercises “authority, direction and control over the Department of Defense.”58 In the chain of command, the Secretary of Defense is only subject to orders from the president and exercises command and control over the armed forces with regards to its operations and administration. Secretary of Defense’s immediate staff is the Joint Staff, which also supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Chairman of the JCS is the top military advisor to the president, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS may pass on communications from the President or the Secretary of Defense, but the Chair does not “exercise military command over any combatant forces.”59

The President and the Secretary of Defense exercise their authorities related to the armed forces through two branches of command and control. The first stems from the president to the secretary and then to the combatant commanders. Under this arrangement, the President and the Secretary of Defense may issue commands directly to combatant commands without consultation with the JCS. It is through this chain that the operational direction is given to the combatant commanders. The second branch of

59 The CJCS are established in Title 10 of the United States Code and DoDD 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components (September 25, 1987). The CJCS consults and seeks advice of other JCS members and combatant commanders, as she or he sees fit. It also supports coordination and communication between the Department and the military, and other government agencies.
command and control runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments. The secretaries then issue directives to commanders of military service forces. Within each department, the secretaries have the authority to direct and control operations, and they exercise administrative control over the services assigned to a combatant commander.

The American armed forces are organized into combatant commanders led by commanders responsible for specific functional areas of support or for geographic region. US Central Command, one of ten combatant commands, was the American command responsible for United States’ military forces in Afghanistan. Assigned by the president, the combatant commander is “responsible to President and Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary with approval of the President.” The combatant commander is charged with “the authority, direction and control of the combatant command with respect tot the commands and forces assigned to that command.” Among his or her functions, the combatant commander can grant direction to subordinate commanders and forces over aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics, and prescribe a chain of command within the regional or functional command. He or she may employ forces within the regional or functional command, assign command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinate and approve aspects of administration, support and discipline required to carry out missions. The combatant commander establishes the command authorities to be exercised by subordinate commanders and may delegate operational and

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60 Reference for this paragraph: 10 U.S. Code § 164 - Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties
tactical control to these subordinate commanders. In this position, the combatant commander exercises the broadest authority within the strategic chain of command, as well as in the area of operations, and this authority cannot be delegated or transferred to subordinates.

*Military Agents’ Veto Possibilities, 2001 to 2008*

The political context of the American mission in Afghanistan involved fluctuations in the civilian leadership’s direction of efforts and a steady strengthening of the informal influence of the armed forces over the conduct of complex operations and interagency efforts. The following section proceeds by reviewing the American Government’s response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the authorities provided to the president by Congress. The two dimensions of military agents’ veto possibilities are assessed. First, the formal authority vested in the President as CIC, and by extension the Secretary of Defense, was exercised through the identification of military objectives and their oversight of the armed forces. A second dimension of military veto possibilities relevant to a study of interagency unity of effort is the informal influence exercised by military commanders on the ground. Sub-commanders’ influence was bolstered by the high degree of flexibility they were granted by their superiors to make decisions impacting the mission and by their access to the

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61 “Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by establishing authority, directives, and law.” See United States Department of Defense, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Publication 1) (2013), xx.
resources and expeditionary capabilities needed to lead American efforts in Afghanistan. Strong veto possibilities provided military agents the ability to preserve and enforce existing rules for complex operations when they were under pressure to change their approach in 2009.

The ability of the president, and his delegate the Secretary of Defense, to determine the strategy and the goals of military action in Afghanistan can be traced back to the weeks following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 11, 2001. Within days of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the American government was preparing for a deployment of troops to Afghanistan. Congress passed the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force in Afghanistan (AUMF), which allowed the president to use necessary military force to prevent similar attacks on the US. Civilian leaders’ veto powers were strengthened under the AUMF, which was signed into law by President Bush on September 18, 2001.

With these authorities, President George Bush deployed American troops to combat terrorism and the Taliban military in Afghanistan. The larger military effort, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), commenced on October 7, 2001 with the aim of destroying the terrorist organization and its infrastructure in Afghanistan, and to provide assistance to humanitarian organizations. From October 2001 to March 2002 the American military engaged in conventional fighting with insurgents. By November the

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64 Harvard Law review. 2078. These actions were authorized for the purpose of “prevent[ing] any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” The only limitation on the use of force is that the president must report to Congress “every six months” on the “status” of hostilities.
Taliban were driven out of Kabul and temporarily displaced from Kandahar in the following month. While the military was able to expel Al Qaeda, OEF continued against Taliban insurgents in other areas of Afghanistan and in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and members of his inner circle. Additional US troops were deployed to eliminate any remaining members of the Taliban, destroy terrorist supply lines, and block the passage of Taliban members to Pakistan.

The Bush Administration provided funding in support of other initiatives in Afghanistan, but the objectives of the military mission were to counter terrorist threats and train security forces. In the months following the attack on the US, the UN passed Security Resolution 1386 that authorized the creation of the UK-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the interim governing body for the country, the Afghan Transitional Authority, secure the area in and around Kabul and support reconstruction of Afghanistan. The US’s initial contribution to ISAF consisted of the provision of air transportation, logistical support and assistance, and an evacuation plan for ISAF troops.\(^65\) It also committed funding for reconstruction and humanitarian aid, but the majority of these efforts would be expended on the training of security forces in Afghanistan, including assistance for development of military infrastructure.\(^66\) However, American forces were directed by the Bush Administration to focus their efforts on training Afghan security forces and on destroying remnants of the terrorist networks throughout the country.

With respect to formal veto powers, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as the CIC’s delegate, granted CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks and later, Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, the commander of CJTF-180 in Afghanistan, the authorities and flexibility needed to achieve the USG’s objectives. General Franks endorsed Secretary Rumsfeld’s narrow objectives in Afghanistan and the Secretary trusted senior commanders in Afghanistan to achieve the identified mission aims and to maintain a ‘small footprint’ on the ground. While Secretary Rumsfeld’s reliance on like-minded military leaders worked during General Frank’s tenure, it was less effective after General Frank’s retirement and with the promotion of General John Abizaid as commander of CENTCOM in the summer of 2003. In the absence of direct civilian oversight, General Abizaid and General David Barno, promoted commander of American forces in Afghanistan in November 2003, interpreted the mission in broader terms and led wider-ranging operations in Afghanistan. It was not until the summer of 2004 that Secretary Rumsfeld would reassert his authority over the Afghanistan mission through stricter oversight of military commanders. Even then, military commanders continued to demonstrate their veto potential and exercised considerable influence on unity of effort on the ground.

From 2003 until 2005, the sub-commanders in Afghanistan were afforded flexibility to make decisions affecting the military campaign and unity of effort on the ground. Beginning in 2002, President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld shifted their attention

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68 Auerswald and Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 88. By March 2003, the From November 2001 to December 2002 the number of American troops in Afghanistan grew from 1,300 soldiers to 9,700. By the time the US declared war in Iraq in March 2003 and 90,000 troops on this mission, there were 9,300 soldiers in Afghanistan.
away from the Afghanistan mission to the invasion in Iraq.\textsuperscript{69} In March 2003, the US initiated its invasion and 90,000 troops were deployed to Iraq. In comparison to the Afghanistan mission, the Iraq was an enormous endeavour and it consumed the time and energy of civilian leaders in Washington. And until the reassertion of Secretary Rumsfeld’s veto powers in mid-2004, senior military leaders in Afghanistan operated under what some termed “salutary neglect.”\textsuperscript{70}

General Abizaid took over from General Franks as the commander of CENTCOM in July 2003. Charged with the power to direct and control the command and the forces assigned to it, General Abaizaid took a different approach to Afghanistan than his predecessor. This was evident when before the deployment General David Barno, the commander of the newly created Combined Forces Command -Afghanistan, General Abizaid told General Barno that his task was to focus on “big POL and little MIL” and to focus on “political matters at the theatre strategic level.”\textsuperscript{71} Before this time, the American military’s focus was primarily concerned with training security forces and counterterrorism, as General Barno explained, “’Nation-building’ was explicitly not part of the formula.”\textsuperscript{72}

Upon taking up post as the American commander in Afghanistan, General Barno

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reviewed the military’s current approach and found that the American-led military coalition “was not well postured to counter the rising threat from the insurgency.” The review revealed that the forty-kilometer distance between the American Embassy and the military headquarters was hampering interagency unity of effort. He also found that the redirection of resources to Iraq limited military capability in Afghanistan, and the enemy-focused approach taken at the tactical level “risked alienating the Afghan people.” In response, General Barno took command of the political-military affairs in the country and formally shifted the approach in Afghanistan to counterinsurgency. This new “Five Pillars” campaign introduced new rules for the armed forces and expanded the realm of operations beyond the training and counterterrorism mandate to include assistance to the Afghan population. As the nature and scope of military activities changed, command structures were reorganized to allow for civil-military integration between the armed forces, and USG and Afghan Government entities.

It is important to note that beginning in June 2004 Secretary Rumsfeld reasserted his authority to oversee the forces through the introduction of new reporting requirements. Under this scheme, General Barno was expected to “participate in weekly video teleconferences” with Secretary Rumsfeld and to provide detailed updates on counterterrorism and training objectives. Even as American forces were now required to

73 Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’,” 32.
74 Ibid.
75 Wright et al., A Different Kind of War, 237.
76 Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, “Unified Effort Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly 56, no.1 (2010), 44. The five pillars of Barno’s counterinsurgency strategy were: defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary, enable Afghan security structure, sustain area ownership, enable reconstruction and good governance, and engage regional States. See Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’,” 35.
77 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 92.
78 Ibid.
report to both General Barno and the Under-Secretary of Defence, General Barno maintained command of the US military in Afghanistan and continued to exercise informal influence over interagency unity of effort in the area of operation.  

Notwithstanding greater civilian oversight, General Barno’s counterinsurgency strategy remained in tact and it was achieving some of its intended effects and armed forces were working with their civilian counterparts to realize these ends. Established warlords were being pushed out of power and many reconstruction projects were underway. Although civilian leaders were vested with the formal authority to redirect the armed forces, military commanders retained flexibility in their interpretation of the mission and the degree of involvement of the armed forces outside the military sphere. In an essay identifying key lessons to be learned from his time in Afghanistan, General Barno highlighted the nature of sub-commanders’ veto potential and the impact of their decisions on unity of effort in the area of operations:

Do military commanders simply ‘stay in their lane,’ work on the military and security lines of operations, and define their mission statement narrowly to deliver the ‘military requirement’? Or do commanders extend their horizons, seek maximum flexibility in their mission statements, leverage their military capacity (nearly always the biggest resource available), and drive their organization toward a broader set of whole-of-government policy goals to enable the overarching policy objectives to be met?

General Barno applied the latter approach. He experienced considerable informal influence on the terms and direction of military efforts in Afghanistan, and on the

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79 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 92-93; Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 102. The weekly video conferences with General Barno were initiated by Secretary Rumsfeld in the summer of 2004. These were similar to teleconferences he was holding with General George Casey, the senior coalition commander in Iraq from June 2004 to February 2007. See Graham, By His Own Rules, 501.
political and military aspects of the mission. However, his actions did not have a lasting impact on long-term civil-military unity of effort or on the overarching American strategy. The civilian leadership was skeptical of a strategy with aims beyond the Administration’s goals and that may have required the military’s protracted involvement in the country. Likewise, General Barno’s successors interpreted the mission statement in more narrow terms and opted to “stay in their lane.”

In this vein, General Barno’s successors were afforded a similar degree of flexibility in their leadership of the military campaign and the American mission, more generally. The decisions taken by General Barno’s successors had an equally significant, though opposite, impact on the unity of effort between civilian entities and the military. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry took over from General Barno in May 2005. In exercising his command authorities General Eikenberry initiated a contraction in army operations and a role for the armed forces in Afghanistan. He oversaw the withdrawal of the armed forces from activities unrelated to their defined mission and the replacement of the counterinsurgency plan with “kill/capture” operations, which aligned with the goals defined by the civilian leadership at the time.81 With these goals in mind, General Eikenberry and later, General Dan McNeill, who replaced General Eikenberry in February 2007, continued with a mostly conventional campaign and for the duration of their postings the military operated largely independent from other USG elements in Afghanistan. As with the case of General David Barno, the ability of commanders to reverse strategy and reestablish a conventional approach at all levels of the mission speaks to their ability to enforce institutional rules and underscores the strength of their

81 Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unity of Effort,” 44.
veto possibilities in Afghanistan.

Armed forces’ veto potential was further strengthened under President Bush’s new strategy for Afghanistan introduced in early 2007. President Bush extended the military’s involvement into realms of activity beyond counterterrorism and training. Members of the armed forces were expected to work with civilian personnel to deliver reconstruction assistance, carry out poppy eradication efforts and support anti-corruption measures. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who replaced Donald Rumsfeld in December 2006, argued for a more comprehensive approach in both Afghanistan and Iraq, making reference to the “overall government effort” of the CORDS program during the Vietnam War. This was a marked shift from a narrow focus on counterterrorism and training objectives for armed forces operating in Afghanistan, and envisioned a broader role for the military in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates exercised his veto powers in his eventual replacement of General David McKiernan as top commander in Afghanistan due to slow progress on the new counterinsurgency goals. Likewise, the Obama Administration supported the promotion of General David Petraeus as commander of CENTCOM and General Stanley McChyrstal, the commander of ISAF, supported the broader agenda in Afghanistan. Ultimately, it was General McChyrstal and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, retired General, Karl Eikenberry who were charged with the development of the civil-military plan for Afghanistan, which would establish new imperatives for unity of effort across the levels of the mission.

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82 Robert Gates was the Secretary of Defense from 2006 until he retired in July 2011.
83 Ibid. Three months before President Bush announced a renewed Afghanistan strategy the American Army released new doctrine for counterinsurgency in December 2006. Although the new strategy envisioned a broader role for the military in overseas missions, it did not identify the Afghanistan mission as a counterinsurgency nor did President Bush mention “counterinsurgency” in his February 2007 announcement.
Military agents’ influence on civil-military unity of effort in Afghanistan was strengthened by several additional factors. First among these factors, President Bush’s new mandate for the armed forces captured in the DOD Directive on *Irregular Warfare* (DODD 3000.07) grew the military’s sphere of operations beyond combat and counterterrorism. Released in early December 2008, the Directive also reflected Secretary Gates’ view that the armed forces should be able to carry to carry out both combat and security operations, and stability tasks. As he explained it, the armed forces ought to be prepared to do the range of tasks required in complex operations: “To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it -- to attain a political objective -- the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.” Through this Directive, armed forces were permitted to extend their realm of activity to include a number of tasks otherwise carried out by civilians. In doing so, it opened an opportunity for the military to conduct development and reconstruction to achieve counterinsurgency aims.

A second factor that contributed to military veto potential on the ground was the lack of coordination across USG departments and agencies in Afghanistan. Three years earlier the Bush Administration introduced National Security President Directive -44 *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, which created the Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State. The S/CRS was mandated to coordinate USG efforts in overseas missions and oversee the development a cadre of civilian personnel for overseas mission.

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84 *Irregular warfare referred to unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency; and stability operations, which “involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.” Irregular warfare also included enhanced conduct of stability operations, now considered a core U.S. military mission.*
However, without sufficient resources or authorities, the S/CRS was unable to achieve its mandate and civilian capacity for planning and deployment on expeditionary operations remained largely underdeveloped, especially in comparison to that of the armed forces. Despite USG efforts, the civilian mission in Afghanistan was uncoordinated and far less robust than operations carried out by the armed forces.

Third, the military’s ability to influence and direct the national mission in accordance with its institutional rules for complex operations was strengthened by actors’ access to resources. In his statement to Congress in January 2009, Secretary Gates highlighted the persistent imbalance between the civilian and military responses to international crises, and argued that USG departments needed more funding and more personnel to build this capacity.\(^8^5\) In terms of personnel, the number of USG civilians paled in comparison to the number of troops in Afghanistan. Although the cadre of government civilians in Afghanistan had grown from 350 in 2008 to 626 people in 2009, the civilian contingent represented a fraction of the American forces in the area.\(^8^6\) During the same period, the number of American troops in Afghanistan more than doubled from 30,000 to over 60,000 soldiers.\(^8^7\) The small numbers of USG personnel on the ground were sometimes unable to deploy to areas across the country due to security concerns. As a result, USG entities were often unable to keep pace with their military counterparts.

Finally, military commanders’ influence on American efforts in Afghanistan was bolstered by their access to discretionary funding and their ability to use this funding to


\(^{8^7}\) Ibid.
achieve military or interagency objectives. With respect to funding, in 2008 of the $6.19 billion dollars provided for the American mission in Afghanistan almost $3 billion was appropriated for security and a little over $2 billion was provided for governance and development operations. By 2009, the funding for security operations increased to over $5.5 billion while the money available for governance and development initiatives remained below $3 billion. In Afghanistan over sixty percent of American funds for reconstruction in the country were allocated through DOD, with eighteen percent of allocations to USAID, 4.6 percent to DPS and nearly seventeen percent to other departments and agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury and Department of Justice.

The primary funding source for the armed forces’ stability and development projects in Afghanistan was the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). A congressionally appropriated fund, CERP was intended for development and stabilization projects and to provide military commanders with the funds needed to deliver urgent relief and reconstruction. Since its inception in 2003, CERP spending came to account for $200 million of American appropriations to Afghanistan in 2007 and reached upwards of $500 million in 2008 and close to $600 million in 2009. From 2004, CERP funding was distributed across sectors of reconstruction and development, with sixty-one percent dedicated to transportation and storage projects, nine percent to education and seven percent to reconstruction; the remaining funds were distributed to agriculture basic

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health, food aid, communications, energy generation, government and civil society, social infrastructure and water supply and sanitation.\textsuperscript{91} Between 2004 and 2009, USG spent nearly $8,000 million on foreign assistance in Afghanistan. Of the total spent, approximately $6,000 million was channeled through DOD, including its CERP and other military assistance programs, while about $1,500 million was distributed by USAID.\textsuperscript{92} In implementing their projects, USG civilians were often subject to burdensome bureaucratic requirements, which hampered their ability to respond to local needs in a timely and effective way. In comparison, military commanders had significantly more flexibility in their use of funds, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained:

It is, as I said publicly in my testimony, ironic that our very best young military leaders - captains and majors and lieutenant colonels - are given unfettered resources through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program to spend as they see fit to build a school, to open a health clinic, to pave a road, and our diplomats and our development experts have to go through miles of paperwork to spend ten cents.\textsuperscript{93}

According to Karl Eikenberry, the former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and a retired American, General, the commander’s discretionary spending through CERP was used to fund large scale and macroeconomic initiatives to achieve what were referred to as “COIN effects.”\textsuperscript{94} Ambassador Eikenberry reported that the American military adhered to

\textsuperscript{91} Johnson, et al., \textit{The Commanders Emergency Response}, 11.
\textsuperscript{92} The remainder was distributed to the DoS, Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human Services, Trade and Development Agency and Department of Treasury. See Johnson, et al., \textit{The Commanders Emergency Response}, 10.
\textsuperscript{94} Eikenberry noted in a 2013 article that CERP was used for projects such as the creation of a large-scale diesel generator power state in Kandahar province, which he considered to be unsustainable in the long run. He argued that the military “arrogated to itself the responsibility for deciding” the development and
COIN doctrine and focused on defeating the insurgency in ways that gave “short shrift” to host nation politics and led to multimillion dollar programs that span an “array of socioeconomic conditions.” Overall, the military’s access to resources permitted involvement of the armed forces in activities outside the security realm and bolstered their influence on the ground in Afghanistan.

Overall, USG entities inability to mobilize and deploy qualified personnel, limited funding and bureaucratic requirements created a vacuum in Afghanistan that was often filled by the armed forces. Secretary Clinton explained the gradual strengthening of armed forces veto potential in overseas missions: “Much of the migration of the authority and the resources to the Defense Department came about because they were able to move, and move aggressively and agilely, to fulfill a purpose or a need.” By 2009, civilian leaders and military commanders experienced strong veto possibilities, in terms of both formal veto powers and the veto potential of armed forces in the area of operations. The Defense Department and the armed forces were increasingly able to direct operations and military involvement in complex operations in accordance with existing rules and practices.

In conclusion, Secretaries of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, as the Presidents’ delegates, were afforded decision-making authorities and exercised oversight of military operations. The strength of their veto powers was evident in their

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Ibid.

identification of mission objectives and their oversight of the armed forces during the Afghanistan mission. However, just as civilian leaders realized strong veto powers, military leaders at CENTCOM and in Afghanistan demonstrated strong veto potential. These became most evident during a period of “salyatory neglect” when commanders demonstrated their ability to influence outcomes in the area of operation. Just as General Barno’s endorsement of greater interagency cooperation supported unity of effort, the actions undertaken by Generals Eikenberry and McNeill to focus on military objectives adversely affected interagency efforts. Therefore, in the year leading up to the release of President Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan and new requirements for interagency cooperation in 2009, the civilian leadership of the armed forces had exercised strong veto powers in their oversight and direction of the mission.

A Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan and its Aftermath, 2009 to 2011

The most significant challenge to the military-led approach and the institutional rules informing their operations in Afghanistan was President Obama’s new counterinsurgency strategy for the country. The following section identifies political leaders’ mounting concerns about the mission and the state of American public opinion in 2009, which revealed greater approval for the Afghanistan mission than the war in Iraq. It considers the way President Obama and his administration worked with military leaders to develop a new approach in Afghanistan and the details of the US’s joint civil-military plan for the country. This section ends by reviewing the commitments made by the Obama Administration to support the strategy and the impact of these outcomes on the military’s veto possibilities in theatre.
In the first months of President Obama’s presidency, the White House ordered a review of the Afghanistan policy that revealed the need for an adequately resourced integrated civil-military counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan. In spring 2009 General Petraeus concluded his assessment of the CENTCOM Region, as directed by Secretary Gates in late 2008, and outlined his findings in his posture statement before the Senate Armed Forces Committee in April 2009. General Petraeus called for a new strategy for American operations in the area, including the implementation of “comprehensive approaches and [the] strengthening [of] unity of effort” in mission. General Petraeus explained that “a comprehensive, whole of government approach that fully integrates our military and non-military efforts and those of [America’s] allies and partners” was critical to addressing the challenges and threats in the region. To realize this end, combatant command level needed to work with international and interagency partners to develop joint plans and coordinate operations. With respect to Afghanistan, Petraeus maintained that “the inputs” were not aligned with the mission and he highlighted the need for, among other things, changes in leadership and greater resources.

On the heels of the White House’s review and General Petraeus’ CENTCOM report, Secretary Gates, who remained the head of the Defense Department for two years

99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
under President Obama, tasked General Stanley McChrystal, the new ISAF commander, with an assessment of progress and feasibility of the mission in Afghanistan. In his final report submitted to Secretary Gates in August, General McChrystal indicated that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating and that in the absence of decisive effort to overcome the insurgents. The Assessment emphasized the need for further adjustment of the American strategy in Afghanistan. Echoing General Petraeus, General McChrystal concluded “…the key to take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate.” General McChrystal’s assessment became the basis for the government’s new strategy for Afghanistan that emphasized civil-military unity of effort in the achievement of counterinsurgency effects across the country.

In August 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan, and Karl Eikenberry, the Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Kabul, released the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. The plan set out eleven ‘transformative effects’ for civil-military efforts in specific areas. It represented a significant step in civil-military cooperation to secure the population using the “clear, hold, build” COIN method. At the same time, it did not identify how the civilian sphere and the armed forces were expected to prioritize and harmonize their efforts to achieve these

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102 McChrystal, My Share, 316.
104 McChrystal, My Share, 330.
transformation effects.\textsuperscript{106} On this point, the Plan left this task to military commanders and civilian leaders across the levels of the mission and on the ground in Afghanistan.

Within the Department of Defense, new imperatives were captured in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 \textit{Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)}, issued September 16, 2009.\textsuperscript{107} The new directive stated that DOD and the military were expected to lead stability operations until it was possible to transfer these tasks to civilian departments and agencies. Among these activities, DOD and the armed forces were to become engaged in establishing civil security and control, restoring essential services, repairing and protecting critical infrastructure and delivering humanitarian assistance. DOD was also expected to continue to provide support in the “development, implementation, and operations of civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort” in the conduct of reconstruction, governance and development tasks. DODI 3000.05 was significant because it formally announced new imperatives for the military and for adaptation of the institution for the conduct of stability operations alongside civilian entities.

In late 2009, President Obama announced a new approach based on the \textit{Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan}.\textsuperscript{108} It was expected that the counterinsurgency strategy, and surges of civilian personnel and armed forces to Afghanistan, would help the United States achieve its mission goals in Afghanistan. However, a brief review of the year and a half following this announcement reveals that

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{106} Dale, \textit{War in Afghanistan}, 34.
\textsuperscript{107} A revised version of DODD 3000.05 issued four years earlier.
\end{footnotesize}
several factors impeded the delivery of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy and, instead, reinforced the armed forces’ position as lead-entity of the mission in Afghanistan.

Unity of effort during the American mission suffered in the absence of adequate guidance for cross-government efforts and interagency operations. The October 2010 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s audit also found that in the absence of agreed upon guidance or a model for civil-military integration some American teams struggled to establish and then sustain unity of effort in their operations. In some areas, civilians and military forces implemented formal, integrated civilian military collaboration structures, such as in RC-East where Task Force Rakkasans established a “Board of Directors” to discuss, prioritize and coordinate initiatives. This was not the approach taken in other areas. The Audit found that the degree of civil-military integration achieved in the field, according to both civilian and military officials in Afghanistan, was due to “personal tenacity rather than institutional planning”. Some civilian officials reported that, in certain field areas, civilians who were embedded with the military were quickly “tasked and absorbed into the military operations with little time to devote to development activities or to program oversight.” There was also a shortage of guidance available for civilian personnel deployed to field by government agencies on how to relate with their military counterparts in the PRT and how to interpret the tasks assigned to them by military forces.

110 Ibid.
Another major challenge to the implementation of the *Civil-Military Campaign Plan* stemmed from the failure of the ‘civilian surge’ to materialize. By fall 2010, USG agencies had deployed only sixty-seven percent of the civilian personnel required for the civilian surge. As of September 2010, 429 civilians were deployed to Afghanistan with 227 of these individuals in the field. Civilian entities struggled to train their staff and recruit experienced personnel to deploy to Afghanistan.\(^{111}\) By 2011, the armed forces continued to outnumber the USG representatives in Afghanistan and to be the recipient of the bulk of appropriated funding for Afghanistan. From March 2011 to December 2011, the number of USG civilians grew from 1176 to 3446.\(^{112}\) As well, the number of DOD civilians in Afghanistan supporting the combat mission and the Department’s capacity building efforts was approximately 2,929 in December 2011, up from 2,145 at the beginning of the year.\(^{113}\) From January 2011 to December 2011 the number of American troops fell slightly from 97,000 to 91,000 soldiers.

In some cases, the mobility of civilian representatives deployed to Afghanistan was limited due to the “lack of adequate security, limited military assets, and low priority for missions at certain coalition-led locations...”\(^ {114}\) In some cases when USG representatives were unable to deploy into the field, military reservists and contractors often took over tasks typically carried out by civilians. Where the security situation was especially precarious, military assets were utilized for security related operations rather

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than for support to civilians in their reconstruction and development tasks.\textsuperscript{115} Even when an adequate number of trained civilians were deployed to joint teams, a comprehensive approach and unity of effort were not guaranteed. Based on communications with civilian and practitioners in Afghanistan, security expert Catherine Dale found that, in some cases, an increase in the number of civilian teams led to “a sharp division of labor” between the civilian and military members. As the security situation improved, this contributed to “gaps in understanding and approach” between civilian and military members, and some armed forces’ shifted their efforts away from support for civilians’ activities.\textsuperscript{116}

There was also a continued imbalance in the funding available for civilian and military operations in Afghanistan. In 2011, of the $16.44 billion appropriated by Congress for Afghanistan, approximately $11.5 billion was for security activities, $3 billion was allocated for governance and development, about $1.5 billion was for oversight and operations, and almost $2 billion was for counter-narcotics initiatives, leaving the remainder for humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{117} Under these circumstances, the limited civilian capacity of the USG required the armed forces take the lead of non-military aspects of the mission. The extensive mandate for the armed forces set out in Departmental Directives and reviews, and its significant presence in Afghanistan secured its position as the preeminent USG entity in Afghanistan.

Therefore, even after the introduction of the 2009 Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan and efforts to boost the number of civilian personnel in Afghanistan, the

\textsuperscript{115} Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, U.S. Civilian Uplift, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{116} Dale, War in Afghanistan, 33.
\textsuperscript{117} Cordesman, The U.S. Cost of the Afghan War, 12.
armed forces continued to have significant influence on the nature and extent of interagency unity of effort realized on the ground. The Plan itself was oriented towards the achievement of the military’s counterinsurgency objectives, rather than the development, reconstruction and governance goals of civilian entities. The armed forces’ ability to interpret and implement rules to achieve these aims was bolstered by the sheer number of its members in the country and their expeditionary capabilities. As well, military commanders’ access to large sums of discretionary funding translated into significant influence over in-theatre activities. Taking into account the veto potential and informal influence of the armed forces and the institution’s existing rules and practices for complex operations, it is possible to identify how the institution adapted to the unity of effort requirements set out in the Civilian-Military Integrated Campaign Plan to Support Afghanistan. The following section traces the evolution of formal doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capabilities from 2001 to 2011.

American Armed Forces and Gradual Adaptation

Adaptation of Doctrine through Drift and Layering

This section of the case study provides an analysis of the changes undertaken by the American military to its formal doctrine. In particular, it will look at formal rules developed for complex operations, especially counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, which involve both military and civilian elements. The main points for analysis of joint and army doctrine include the emphasis on security, the roles assigned to the armed forces vis-à-vis other government entities and the provision of unity of effort guidelines. Taking into account the existing rules for complex operations, as of 2001, and
the strength of military veto possibilities, the examination proceeds by looking at doctrine before and, then, after the emergence of the new strategy for Afghanistan in 2009.

In the first phase of the mission, prior to 2009, the high level of discretion afforded military commanders by existing rules and the armed forces strong veto possibilities resulted in doctrine that reflected the transition to stability operations in Afghanistan and, later, the military’s security objectives for ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first doctrine issued after 2001 was the Army’s Field Manual *FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations* in February 2003. Issued only three months before Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the end of combat operations and the shift to stabilization operations in Afghanistan, the army doctrine stated that stability operations and support operations were “predominate” MOOTWs. In this vein, the “characteristics that make [the US Army] a premier warfighting organization” were understood to also “serve it well in conducting” stability and support operations.118 These included its ability to organize itself and carry out a wide range of functions, command “the respect of belligerents by the threat of force…” and, if necessary, use force “to compel compliance.”119 The doctrine is less clear in its definition of stability operations, which are explained as operations that “promote and protect US national interests…through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crises.” Stability goals are accomplished “through engagement and response.”120 Stability operations included nearly all MOOTW

120 Support operations were defined as operations that “employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, s they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.” In support operations, the
introduced in the army’s 1993 doctrine, which were divided into four types of operations: peace operations, foreign internal defense (including combat operations), humanitarian and civic assistance, arms control, show of force, support to counterdrug operations, support to insurgencies (including unconventional warfare and conventional combat actions) and, lastly, combating terrorism (including antiterrorism and counterterrorism actions). Among the main considerations in stability operations was interagency, joint and multinational cooperation. With respect to other government entities, the doctrine noted that in stability and support operations “the military objective usually supports another agency” and the course of action taken by the commander “may use military personnel and materiel to support a civilian agency that has overall responsibility.” Accordingly, the agency with overall responsibility “establishes priorities and determines how to use military resources.” During operations where the army is not the lead agency, “operational and tactical headquarters” were expected to “plan their operations to complement those of government or private agencies.” With respect to unity of effort, the doctrine deemed it “fundamental to success” of stability and support operations. The text stated the army could facilitate it through the provision of “liaison elements, planning support, advisors and technical experts” with other agencies and by establishing early contact and maintaining constant contact” with other key organizations.

Overall, the doctrine provided broad-stroke guidance for a wide range of operations, which are conducted to achieve very distinct goals. The role of armed forces...
in the delivery of humanitarian assistance is quite different than its function in a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operation. Likewise, the nature of interagency cooperation and the level of interagency coordination required may also vary by type of operation.

It was only after 2003 that armed forces slowly began to disaggregate the stability operations concept and issued new doctrine specifically for counterinsurgency operations. The Army’s Field Manual *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24), authored by General David Petraeus, a former commander in Iraq, General James F. Amos (US Marine Corps) and a team of civilian and military experts, provided the American military with a guide for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.123 Released in December 2006, the publication of the document also coincided with a change in civilian leadership and the arrival of Secretary Gates, who supported a new strategy in Afghanistan that involved less combat and more population-centric operations. Insurgency was defined as “an organized, protracted politico military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”124 According to its authors, the successful conduct of these operations required a shift in the American army’s thinking and practices, and a constant readjustment of the military’s approach. These operations require a mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations, and “all elements of national power”.

The second chapter was titled “Unity-of-effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities.” According to the doctrine, military efforts of COIN are “only effective when

124 Reference for this paragraph: United States Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 1–2, 1-22.
integrated into a comprehensive strategy” that draws on other instruments of national power because “a successful COIN operation meets the contested population’s needs to the extent needed to win popular support while protecting the population from the insurgents.” Unity of effort is introduced as an imperative that must be established at every level or echelon of a COIN operation: “Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.” In this regard, the doctrine endorsed a command structure with a single counterinsurgency leader to oversee all government entities. The American country team was identified as the “primary interagency coordinating structure for COIN.” It was to be led by the American chief of mission, typically the Ambassador, and included senior representatives of departments and agencies. The armed forces are not a part of the team, as explained in the doctrine: “The Foreign Service Act assigns the chief of mission to a foreign country responsibility for the coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country, except for service members and employees under the command of a U.S area military commander.”125

With or without a single ‘supremo’ to coordinate entities, military commanders were expected to work with a range of actors throughout the chain of command. In addition to fighting insurgents, armed forces were also expected to know the roles and capabilities of other partners, involve other entities in planning, support civilian efforts and “[a]s necessary, conduct or participate in political, social, informational, and economic programs.” In this respect, COIN often involved tasks classified as stability operations. Overall, the doctrine represented a departure from earlier publications that

adopted an “either-or” approach to combat and other operations, and endorsed a more inclusive approach to nonlethal actions in military campaigns.

The interagency dimensions of overseas operations were the focus of Joint Publication 3.08 Interagency Coordination released in March 2006. The publication purported to be the “doctrinal basis for interagency cooperation and for US military involvement in multi-national operations.”\(^{126}\) It emphasized the importance of a political-military plan for establishing operational goals and interagency responsibilities. It stated that the political-military plan, to be developed by the NSC, was to provide a starting point for joint civil-military and military planning. However, in the absence of such a plan, it was unclear how the armed forces should proceed, as was the case in Afghanistan. As well, it did not acknowledge the S/CRS, the entity established in 2004, to oversee and coordinate civilian efforts. Furthermore, it was unclear how this doctrine squared with the military’s existing operation-level and tactical –level doctrines, including how civilians were to participate in plans for ongoing operations. Overall, this publication did not necessarily reflect the military’s experience in past or, even, recent operations, and it raises questions about its applicability for ongoing missions at the time.

In October 2008, the army released revised doctrine for stability operations, titled Army Field Manual (3-0) Stability Operations. The new text outlined the military’s role in tasks other than combat to achieve broader political goals. In accordance with the DOD’s instruction on Irregular Warfare issued in December 2008, the doctrine identified a wide range of essential stability tasks to be carried out by land forces, including activities related to establishing civil security, restoring essential services, supporting

economic and infrastructure development and conducting information engagement activities. Commanders were encouraged to develop lines of effort to guide stability operations. In its support of the DOS Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Army doctrine provided an overarching framework that aligned to the S/CRS’s stability sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and well-being, governance and participation, economic stabilization, and infrastructure. In each sector, the army identified its own essential tasks to further efforts in these areas, specifically establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, and supporting government, economic and infrastructure development. The doctrine reflected the American experience in Iraq and encouraged armed forces to “[seize] the initiative to improve the civil situation while preventing the situation from deteriorating further.”127 However, the doctrine was less clear on how the division of responsibilities among civilian entities and armed forces, stating, as well, that “tasks and responsibilities cannot be neatly divided between civilian and soldiers, for their operations overlap too much with each other.”128 In failing to provide more specific guidance, this doctrine created space for commanders to define the nature and extent of their participation across the range of stability operational and activities listed in the doctrine.

In sum, by 2009, military doctrine addressed stability, counterinsurgency and interagency operations in three separate texts and the linkages across the concepts were far from obvious. Existing military doctrine did not provide clear guidance for the conduct of a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan. While armed

128 Ibid, 30.
forces doctrine for counterinsurgency emphasized unity of effort as necessary to meeting the needs of local populations and gain legitimacy within the societies plagued by insurgent violence, existing doctrine offered limited practical guidance for bridging these aims with the actions needed to achieve synergy with civilian entities. In light of the new strategy, several efforts were made to develop doctrine that addressed these gaps.

First, in response to the call for improved interagency processes in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the military issued Joint Publication 3, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, which provided the forces with an overview of the national security system.129 This doctrine described the strategic-level national security decision-making system stemming from the National Security Council and many forms of American government presence in foreign countries that had been established under the diplomatic umbrella of its embassies. The doctrine noted that interagency and interorganizational coordination in practice required clearly defined relationships for improved harmony among participants and described different forms of civil-military coordination, including collaboration and liaison efforts. During a domestic operation, civilian entities and the armed forces were coordinated through the national incident command system. However, the doctrine did not describe an equivalent system for foreign operations. Instead, the doctrine cited interim operational and tactical level mechanisms, such as the CMOC and PRTs, as conduits for civil-military coordination. The nature and organization of operational and theatre level structures remained highly dependent on the nature of operations in a given area. Identified arrangements were

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presented in doctrine as considerations rather than as established or necessary structures for interorganizational or interagency coordination. Similar to previous doctrine, the Joint Publication *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, provided overarching principles to guide civilians and the armed forces seeking to improve operational and tactical level civil-military coordination during stability operations, but it did not identify processes or established mechanisms to ensure unity of effort in the planning and conduct of joint operations.

As well, the military issued joint doctrine *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations* (October 2009), based on the 2008 army manual. In addition to the country team, other civil-military integration mechanisms included joint interagency coordination groups and task forces, civil-military coordination boards and task forces, PRTs and executive steering groups. However, it maintained that command of the military existed outside these mechanisms and military commanders retained authority over armed forces personnel.

This section examined the evolution of military doctrine during the mission in Afghanistan and the gradual addition of new rules for counterinsurgency and stability operations based on experiences in recent wars. The political context of the mission afforded dominant actors strong veto possibilities and maximum flexibility in their response to calls for a shift in strategy and improved civil-military unity of effort. In the absence of doctrinal rules, members responded to changes in the external environment as they saw fit, and resulting in the drift of the American military into counterinsurgency and stabilization operations was documented in separate texts. The umbrella concept of stability operations presented in pre-2001 doctrine was unpacked, and the military issued
new guidance for these operations that existed in parallel. Stability operations were presented as a distinct type of military operation, but they were also considered a primary task, alongside offensive and defensive activities, during a counterinsurgency. Unity of effort was identified as a key element of counterinsurgency operations. Overall, the military adapted doctrine to imperatives for unity of effort in complex operations through the process of layering new rules alongside each other. The result is that the rules for complex operations, which involve counterinsurgency, stability and interagency efforts, are presented in three separate and discrete texts.

*Adaptation of In-Country Command Arrangements through Layering*

The limited expeditionary capacity of USG entities and the critical role of military operations to secure the population bolstered the armed forces’ role as the lead US entity in Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, the armed forces adapted its command structure to accommodate new requirements for civil-military cooperation set out in national and departmental directives through the process of layering. The *United States Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* allowed for the preservation of the military’s traditional command structure in the country. The Plan introduced a number of intermediary groups at all levels of the mission, which brought civilian and military actors together in frequent meetings for discussion and consultation. Civil-military unity of effort did not require the reorganization of the military’s hierarchical structures or the co-location of civilian and military leaders. In Afghanistan, US civil-military integration was limited to groups and teams involved in field activities. The following analysis proceeds by considering, first, the pre-2009 command structure
and dynamics between civilian and military entities and, second, the post-2009 changes to in-country command arrangements.

During the early years in Afghanistan, the American command organization was in a state of flux. At the country-level in Afghanistan, the combatant commander and the Ambassador worked side by side in Kabul to support interagency coordination in the country. Once the American embassy was re-established in Kabul in late 2002, military cooperation with other civilian departments and agencies on the ground in Afghanistan became possible. At the time, however, the United States did not have a civil-military planning process, or authorities in theatre to manage resources, to coordinate personnel from across government departments/agencies and the armed forces or to reconcile competing operational objectives of civilian entities and the military working in Afghanistan.130 During the first two years of the mission, the military was headquartered in Badram and civilian entities were based in the Embassy in Kabul.

The first formal linkages between the American military and other USG entities occurred during the General Barno’s time as commander of American forces in Afghanistan. In October 2003, the American military established Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) alongside the United States’ Embassy in Kabul. Major General David Barno sought to establish staff and command structures that emphasized the political-military aspects of the American mission, and over time military operations were increasingly integrated with American diplomatic and aid activities. The CFC-A grew in influence to lead the “higher level aspects of political-military coordination, as

well as overall direction of military activity in the [joint operating area]." Eventually, the Commander of CFC-A was collocated within the Embassy and established a presence within the core group at the Embassy, which also included the Ambassador, and diplomatic, aid and intelligence officials. A handful of military planners were also posted to the embassy with civilians to establish an Embassy Interagency Planning Group that worked on a coordinated strategy for Afghanistan. While General Barno supported civil-military cooperation, he argued that the civilian and military chains of command at the national level ought to remain separate, as he explained:

…[T]he way we had it is as close to integration as we would want to get. . . . We’re never going to find a model where the military is subordinate in an act of conflict to the Ambassador; we always need to keep the [military] command channel up the military side.¹³³

Legally, the chief of mission is authorized to provide oversight of every USG representative in the country, except the armed forces under command of the area military commander.¹³⁴ The law, however, does not preclude civilian and military leaders from formalizing integrated interagency arrangements through the creation of civilian or military-led organizations similar to MACV-CORDs. Likewise, it does not prevent the creation of joint interagency staffs, the co-location of civilian representatives and the armed forces on joint terms, or the formation of interagency task forces.

Before changes to the organizational structures in Afghanistan in August 2009, few steps were taken by USG civilian officials and military leadership to develop a joint

approach. Without a structured solution for in-country civil-military integration, in-country arrangements were highly dependent on individual personalities. In these cases, several factors, such as “[p]roximity, informal coordination mechanisms, and senior leader attitudes” determined the effectiveness and overall success of interagency initiatives. In the absence of a civil-military command structure formalized by executive order or legislation, the informal arrangements, as they existed in Afghanistan in 2007, were unreliable in the long run.

In May 2009 President Obama’s Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the replacement of General McKiernan with Lieutenant General Stanley McChyrstal, who it was believed would bring “fresh thinking” and “fresh eyes” to the American mission in Afghanistan. According to General David Petraeus, the then commander of US Central Command, this new approach required greater unity of effort across all USG entities, including the military, in Afghanistan:

Addressing the challenges and threats in the AOR requires a comprehensive, whole of government approach that fully integrates our military and non-military efforts and those of our allies and partners. This approach puts a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. At the combatant command level, this means working with our interagency and international partners to develop joint action or campaign plans that establish appropriate missions and objectives for our subordinate elements…To effectively carry out these plans, the military elements must be coordinated carefully with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador.

US Ambassador to Afghanistan, retired General Karl Eikenberry, and General Stanley McChyrstal, the commander of NATO ISAF and US Forces Afghanistan, brought

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together S/CRS planners, staff from other civilian agencies, and US military personnel to work on a coordinated plan. The result was the *United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* that set out the organizational and management framework for the implementation of the Plan. It called for civil-military integration to “bring all civilian and military elements conducting operations or carrying out activities in “the same district or province coordinate and develop plans, assessments and coordination mechanisms that synchronize the full spectrum of USG organizations, military forces, and international partner efforts as well as non-government organizations, UN, and the whole range of Afghan partners operating in the area.”

Although the *Campaign Plan* endorsed the concept of civil-military integration of USG entities and the armed forces, its recommendation for command arrangements did not involve combining civilian personnel and military members into a single command structure as occurred under General Westmoreland in Vietnam. Rather, it endorsed adaptation of the military’s command structures in Afghanistan through the process of layering civil-working groups alongside existing arrangements. Working groups were created at every level of the mission to link parallel military and civilian structures. Where integration did occur, especially at the regional level and below, civilians were most often deployed to join or work alongside existing military units. The *Campaign Plan* led to the creation of civil-military teams at the national, regional, sub-regional, provincial and district levels to develop and implement integrated plans for civil-military activities. At the national level, the Chief of Mission (the Ambassador) and the commanding general of ISAF and US Forces in Afghanistan worked with their staffs
within the Principal’s group to set priorities, consult with the Government of Afghanistan, work with other nation partners and allocate resources across USG elements (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 2: US Civil-Military Command Arrangements in Afghanistan (2009)

USG personnel at the US Embassy and military staff were brought together to comprise the deputys-level entity, the Executive Working Group, to develop policy and make decisions related to the Campaign Plan with input from other national-level working groups, regional civil-military cells and other staff. Among its permanent members the Executive Working Group (EWG) included senior representatives from the American Embassy, ISAF and US forces, as well as other representatives from other international organizations depending on the nature of the issues discussed in the EWG meetings. Principals from key organizations that participated in EWG in Afghanistan met once a month about US civil-military plans and operations. The EWG was supported by the new Integrated Civilian Military Action Group (ICMAG) and it was responsible for staffing civilian and military entities throughout the chain of civilian and military commands. Members of the ICMAG supported the alignment of stakeholders’ strategies and developed national, regional and provincial plans for American efforts. By 2011 EWG membership grew to include leaders of the various sections of the Embassy and ISAF, and the Senior Civilian Representatives from the Regional Commands.

At the operational level and in the field across Afghanistan, the Plan created Civilian Lead Positions, later renamed Senior Civilian Representatives, at each of the Regional Command (East) and the Regional Command (South), and at each sub-regional US –led brigade taskforce and within each province in Afghanistan. The civilian leads

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140 Comprised of representatives from the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and Regional Command (East), the ICMAG eventually included US ISAF military officers and USAID planners.

141 Dale, War in Afghanistan, 33.
were to coordinate activities of civilians operation under the Chief of Mission authority to implement policy, and act as civilian counterpart to the military commander at each level to support unity of effort.\textsuperscript{142} USG also deployed additional civilian personnel throughout Afghanistan including to Kabul, the regional commands, new civilian regional hubs, to the Brigade task forces, PRTs, and to select battalions and in various districts.

Regional Integrated Teams of senior civilian representatives and military commanders were introduced at the regional level. These teams were created to support subordinate civilian and military operations, and maintained, implemented and assessed progress in the achievement of the \textit{Civilian-Military Campaign Plan} in the region. Each Regional Command also had a Civilian-Military Fusion cell comprised of representatives from civilian, military and international organizations to develop a common picture of a given geographic area. The Cell was a hub for sharing, collaborating and synchronizing activities. At the sub-regional, provincial and district levels civil-military teams with the same structure as the regional integrated teams were established to oversee the implementation of the Civil-Military plan at each level. The sub-regional teams included USG Senior civilian and representatives from other government agencies, and the commanders of the brigade combat teams and special operations forces’ components to synchronize efforts. These teams allocated resources and, as required, raised concerns to the regional level integrated team.

Similarly, the Provincial integrated teams included the commanders of the PRTs, the battalion and SOF elements, leaders of local forces, and the provincial USG civilian lead. These teams were responsible for implementation of initiatives with Afghan

Government partners, for the development of a civil-military plan, and for raising issues to the sub-regional or regional levels as required, and supporting district support teams. District Support Teams (DSTs) were established in twenty critical districts throughout Eastern and Southern Afghanistan. The teams included members of military maneuver units and three or four civilian experts, deployed by S/CRS, responsible for integrating activities at the district level.\textsuperscript{143} USG civilian elements and US military forces in the district, the ANSF mentor and partner team focused on developing a civil-mil plan for district support, assessing progress and allocating resources, and as required, raising issues to the provincial-level teams.

While changes in the architecture for decision-making under the \textit{Civilian-Military Campaign Plan} “represented a significant step toward closer civil-military integration”, these changes did not include the creation of more formal channels to support the planning and delivery of effective responses in theatre. Civilian and military practitioners in the field reported that the establishment of interagency working groups and frequent meetings of these teams did not always improve the delivery of timely and effective responses. Some participants reported that “[d]iscussing issues” was “more common that [sic] resolving them.”\textsuperscript{144} Finally, the field level teams reported the need for further clarity and agreement on the respective roles and responsibilities of members. By 2010, field teams were ad hoc in nature and the level of integration by the teams depended on the personalities of individual members.\textsuperscript{145}

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\footnote[144]{Ibid.}
\footnote[145]{Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, \textit{U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan is Progressing But Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as Implementation Continues}}
Therefore, using the “Civ-Mil Integration” instructions of the Civilian-Military Campaign Plan as a guide, the American armed forces adapted its in-country command structures to accommodate civilian entities through the process of layering. While it was possible to develop formal and integrated structures, the plan met the requirement for improved civil-military unity of effort through the creation of ad hoc groups intended to link parallel civilian and military chains of command. This approach allowed for the preservation of the military’s existing rules that favored traditional command and control channels, and placed a premium on independence from its civilian counterparts.

Adaptation of Civil Affairs Capability through Drift

The existing institutional rules for American civil-military operations at the outset of the Afghanistan mission were based on the military’s experience in peace operations throughout the 1990s. Keeping in mind the lack of updated guidance for CMO in 2001 and the strength of military veto possibilities, the following section traces the evolution of formal guidance, the roles of civil affairs units in recent missions, and the force structure civil affairs units over the ten-year period. Overall, this analysis reveals the evolution of the capability through drift.

Months before the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the American military published Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations to guide the planning and conduct of civil-military operations by joint forces and other civilian entities. In the weeks following the attack on the United States, the military brought together representatives from the UN, State Department, USAID and other NGOs joined military personnel at

(Washington, DC: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October, 26, 2010), 16.
CENTCOM, in accordance with the doctrine. In an effort to enhance civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan, the army established a Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) within CENTCOM that included both civilian representatives from non-military entities and military personnel. This group identified three roles for CENTCOM’s CMO unit during the combat operations in Afghanistan that extended the role of members into the civilian realm: the “direct provision of humanitarian assistance”; the “transportation of relief supplies on behalf of aid providers” and “coordination.” The CJCMOTF and the civil-military advisory relied on the CMOC to facilitate CMO on the ground.

The expanding role for civil affairs units was captured in new joint forces doctrine, *Joint Publication 3-75 Civil Military Operations*, issued in 2008. The doctrine explained that civil affairs activities and CMO have three elements: to enhance the relationship between civil authorities and the military forces, require coordination with other civilian entities, and involve the application of special skills and capabilities that are typically carried out by civil governments. The doctrine also identified unity of effort and the coordination of military units with multiple civilian organizations as “[o]ne of the most difficult problems for [joint forces] in CMO.” Whereas past publications defined civil affairs in terms of their support to military command, this text acknowledged the

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147 Reference for the rest of this paragraph: McNerney, “CIMIC on the Edge,” 183, 185. This group provided direct assistance by coordinating the delivery humanitarian daily rations and other supplies from US aircraft, and assisted USAID and the UN using the military’s aircraft to transport supplies along the borders of Afghanistan. CMO planners worked with civilian actors and CENTCOM to minimize the interference of combat activities on the delivery of humanitarian aid.


149 Hicks and Wormuth, 29.
wider role of civil-military operations and the units that perform them: “Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination between U.S…and [other government agencies…” Relationships with these organizations were identified as key “to winning and securing the peace.”

With respect to civil military operations in Afghanistan, CENTCOM deployed the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force to Kabul to conduct Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in December 2001. CENTCOM also created Civil Affairs Ministerial Teams to support Afghan government officials, and established Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs), the precursor to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Comprised of six to eight civil affairs soldiers, the CHLCs were a part of the combat team and based in towns throughout the country where they contracted local workers to carry out assistance projects. A year later, the CHLCs were replaced with PRTs with the aim of extending the reach of the teams into the areas of reconstruction and development. In this way, the American PRT concept was based on the activities of specialized civil affairs teams.

From the beginning of the Afghanistan mission, civil affairs units were a critical part of American PRTs. Based on the terms for PRTs approved by the US Deputies Committee in June 2003, DOD was responsible for improving security in the theatre of operation, the provision of all logistical support and the provision of protection for all members of the PRT. The military components usually included a commanding officer (normally a civil affairs officer) and his staff, a military police unit (three soldiers),

150 McNerney, CIMIC on the Edge, 185.
151 DOS was responsible for the political oversight, coordination and reporting of the PRT, while USAID was to lead reconstruction efforts.
psychological and explosive ordinance units, intelligence team, medics, force protection unit, administration and support personnel, and two Army Civil Affairs Teams (four soldiers on each team). The first civil affairs team was responsible for assessing reconstruction needs and contracting local firms to build infrastructure, while the second team operated from the PRT’s Civil Military Operations center and coordinated with the UN and other NGOs to provide humanitarian aid and development assistance. Over several months, the PRTs operations coalesced around three general objectives: “enhancing security, strengthening the reach of the Afghan central government, and facilitating reconstruction.” Aside from the identification of basic roles and responsibilities, neither USG nor DOD developed a single, shared definition for PRTs and there was “wide degree of heterogeneity” among American PRTs that were established in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq. The Combined Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) and the PRT military commanders retained a high degree of discretion in how the PRT would be implemented in a given area, and the approach taken by individual commanders influenced the degree of unity of effort realized by the team.

153 In addition to civil affairs units within the PRTs, the US Army also deployed Active Component civil affairs forces that support the regional special operations Commander.
154 McNerney, CIMIC on the Edge, 186.
156 When commanders worked closely with civilian and military members, “the PRT developed a common vision and sense of aligned purpose.” If a military was less inclined to cooperate with the team members, “project implementation tended to be ad hoc and driven by response to higher headquarters versus local dynamics.” See United States Department of State, et al., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 10. This was evident in the spring of 2005 when the Combined Joint Task Force-76 required the consolidation of its operating bases in the province of Paktika and the PRT was given 24 hours notice to relocate to the forward operating base. In this case, the military did not consult or notify the Embassy or USAID and the PRT was moved to the manoeuvre element. See ibid.
With respect to force structure, civil affairs forces underwent reorganization when Donald Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{157} Although the Army, Navy and Marine Corps each have civil affairs units, the majority of the force resided within the Army under the Special Operations Command.\textsuperscript{158} Beginning in 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld initiated the movement of Civil Affairs forces from under the Special Operations Command to the Army reserves. In a March 2005 memo concerning civil affairs, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote that the “[civil affairs] skill sets are, at this stage, probably more of a distraction than a benefit to the increasing Special Operations roles and missions.” He argued that, by placing civil affairs capability within the general army, they may better align with the general purpose of the force.\textsuperscript{159} However, the army leadership explained that the shift was not required and that the movement of the units might not lead to integration of civil affairs within the forces. They warned that such a shift was “ill-advised” given the importance of civil affairs to ongoing counterterrorism operations and that the restructuring would further diminish the civil affairs command, which was already suffering from insufficient troops and lack of training and equipment.\textsuperscript{160} Despite these concerns, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker approved the movement of reserve units to the Army Reserve, but kept active CA specialists under the Special Operations Command.

Within months of this restructuring, major divisions began to emerge among active and reserve components of the units. Reserve units struggled to attain the funds they

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\item \textsuperscript{157} The Army, Marine Corps and Navy each have civil affairs units. However, the focus of this section is the civil affairs force within the Army. See Civil Affairs Association, Civil Affairs Issue Papers (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association, 2007), 1-1.
\item \textsuperscript{158} In the early 1970, the American civil affairs capability was moved to the Army reserves due to the elimination of the draft and “shift to an all-volunteer force.” See Hicks and Wormuth, \textit{The Future}, 33.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Hicks and Wormuth, \textit{The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces}, 36.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
needed to carry out their training and operations. The size and capability of the force shrank, while demands for civil affairs support increased, as General Blackledge, the commander of the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (subordinate to the US Army’s Special Operations Command) noted, “It was too small a force to begin with. We are scrambling right now to meet additional requirements for Afghanistan…Our mission load is actually going up.”161 Indeed, as PRTs continued to expand and the American strategy in Afghanistan evolved to include the armed forces in non-security tasks, the demand for civil affairs personnel continued to increase.

A 2009 DOD report to Congress acknowledged that civil affairs capabilities are applied across “a broad spectrum of operations.” In addition to their critical role in irregular warfare, the capability is “complementary” to “whole-of-government stability and reconstruction operations.”162 According to former Secretary of Defense Gates, the linguistic skills and cultural awareness of members that civil affairs personnel bring to the table are necessary to establish “liaisons to reduce friction between [US] military forces and the civilian population.” However, civil affairs units in the Army Reserves carrying out operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were heavily taxed and an increase in the force was required to ensure its ability to fulfill its role. While Secretary Gates committed to an increase in the number of civil affairs soldiers by 2013, it was unclear how DOD

162 United States Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Civil Affairs (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 29, 2009), 11. Upwards of ninety-four percent of the civil affairs force is located in the Army, and around ninety percent of the 7,500 civil affairs personnel are in the Army Reserve. See United States Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Civil Affairs, 7.
planned to enhance the capabilities contribution to WOG and CA operations.\textsuperscript{163}

In a recent assessment of the capability, Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth noted other institutional factors limiting the effectiveness of American civil affairs forces in complex operations. First, there remains a disconnection between maneuver forces and civil affairs units. According to Hicks and Wormuth, “[c]ivil affairs is regarded as a stepchild mission” comprised of “subpar personnel.”\textsuperscript{164} These types of institutional biases can prevent the treatment of the forces “as integral to [DOD’s] success across the range of military operations.” A second factor undermining the utility of civil affairs is “the lack of sufficient authorities, multiyear resources, and training to execute activities.” In theatre, the annual resource allocations for civil affairs require civil affairs personnel plan and execute projects within a year time frame, which provides insufficient time to consult with civilian populations, other civil affairs teams and other government agencies. As well, recent operations reveal the complex web of authorities involved in civil affairs resources and activities. Hicks and Wormuth found that, in addition to the CERP, these activities are tied to the requirements of other military funding mechanisms, Overseas Disaster funding, and humanitarian and civilian aid programs.

While the political imperative for improved interagency cooperation set out in the \textit{US Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan} was reflected in the military’s CMO doctrine, the current state of civil affairs reveals a gap between these rules and the capacity of these forces. All American military commanders have the responsibility and


\textsuperscript{164} The reference for this paragraph is Kathleen Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth. \textit{The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs}, 28-29, 31.
authorities to oversee civil-military operations and forces within their area of operation. A dearth of realistic guidance granted them significant discretion in their application of the capability, resulting in variation in how civil affairs units were employed in overseas mission. Despite the potential contributions of CA at all levels of a mission, Hicks and Wormuth found commanders were not optimizing the benefits of CA for complex operations, as they explained: “commanders and civilian leaders do not…employ civil affairs forces as effectively as they should.” Despite increases in funding for language and cultural training, and a commitment to grow the force, the American CA capacity remained a largely underdeveloped capability and a secondary consideration for some civilian and military leaders. By 2011 there remained a gap between the formal rules for CMO and in political statements emphasizing civil-military cooperation, and the ability of the units to meet demands in ongoing operations.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter applied the historical institutional theory of gradual change to the American military’s response to unity of requirements during the Afghan mission identified by the civilian leadership and articulated in the Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan. An examination of the institutional rules and practices for civil-military coordination in a Cold War counterinsurgency campaign and during NATO operations in Bosnia in the 1990s revealed the lack of formal doctrine for counterinsurgency, stability and peace operations, and the underdevelopment of rules to

165 Hicks and Wormuth, The Future, 29.
166 Hicks and Wormuth, The Future, 30.
guide interagency efforts in overseas interventions. It also uncovered the American military’s preference for traditional command structures and an adherence to military command hierarchies in theatre. Existing institutional rules and practices for CIMIC reflected the widely held view that pacification or nation-building activities were outside the realm of appropriate military activities. As a result, military commanders tended to treat civil-military cooperation as a secondary condition to the security goals of the mission.

The second section of this chapter traced developments in the political context as they related to the mission in Afghanistan and the ability of military leaders to preserve existing rules when under pressure to change their institutional approach. An analysis of the veto possibilities realized by the civilian and military leaders revealed that, as civilian oversight oscillated over the course of the mission, sub-commanders demonstrated significant flexibility in their ability to direct the military campaign. In their access to resources and expeditionary capabilities, sub-commanders’ decisions had consequences for the unity of effort achieved in-country. Under these conditions, military actors were afforded opportunities to adapt to new requirements in ways that preserved existing institutional rules. In other words, institutional actors realized strong veto possibilities such that when external pressures to reform emerged they were able to respond to imperatives, while also maintaining the institutional status quo.

The external pressure to reform the military’s approach in Afghanistan in 2009 led to several policy and mission reviews, the release of a civil-military comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign plan and renewed commitments by the Obama Administration to correct the civil-military imbalance in Afghanistan. The strength of the
armed forces’ veto possibilities and the discretion afforded by existing rules led to specific, gradual changes to military doctrine, in-country command arrangements and American CIMIC capabilities.

Five years into the mission, the armed forces published new doctrine that reflected the military’s largely unguided foray, or drift, into counterinsurgency and stability operations in Afghanistan. Doctrinal authors fleshed out the umbrella concept of stability operations that previously covered the entire range of military operations other than. Through the process of layering, the military published separate counterinsurgency, stability and interagency operations. While the latter doctrine identified civil-military unity of effort dimensions of overseas missions, these points were not referenced or integrated into other publications. The linkages among publication and concepts were tenuous, at best, and did not provide coherent guidance for military commanders engaged in complex operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Existing rules for command arrangements reflected the military’s experience during operations in the 1990s and the institution’s reliance on traditional command and control approaches. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and throughout the 1990s, the American military preferred the separation of the civilian structure and the military’s command during overseas missions. Written by a serving general and a retired general appointed as the Ambassador to Afghanistan, the Integrated Civilian-Military Plan for Support to Afghanistan involved some tactical level integration, but was based on a long-standing adherence to a traditional command structure. This involved the maintenance of a military command independent of civilian entities in the theatre of operations. Overall, the military adapted to the unity of effort requirements through the layering of additional
entities intended to link the parallel civilian and military structures.

Finally, the institutional rules for CIMIC at the outset of the Afghan mission were based on limited doctrinal guidance and the military’s experience during post-Cold War missions, such as those undertaken in Bosnia. This approach to CIMIC granted commanders significant discretion in their application of this capability, which often led to the marginalization of CIMIC considerations. Strong veto possibilities granted military commanders flexibility in their approach to CIMIC and in the conduct of a key CIMIC instrument, the PRTs. In the absence of formal guidance and the structural changes made to the capability in 2007, CIMIC adapted through the process of drift, whereby the civil affairs personnel struggled to respond to demands for the capability in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In conclusion, this case study applied the Framework for Explaining Military Change detailed in Chapter 1 to test the hypothesis that institutional rules and, to lesser extent, the political context of the mission influenced the institutional response to new unity of effort imperatives. The findings are consistent with the expectation that military agents afforded strong veto possibilities will preserve existing rules and adapt to changes through the processes of drift or layering. Where existing rules did not exist, actors introduced new doctrine and entities that did not require changes to their established practices. Overall, the findings of this analysis reveal that the institutional rules, preferences and practices in place before the 2001 were a primary influence on the actions undertaken by military leaders in response to new imperatives for civil-military unity of effort during the Afghanistan mission from 2001 to 2011.
Chapter 3:

British Armed Forces, Unity of Effort and the Afghanistan Mission

In accordance with the Framework for Explaining Military Change, this case study identifies Prime Minister of Gordon Brown and the new strategies for the Afghanistan mission introduced in 2008 as the primary driver of institutional adaptation to unity of effort requirements. The first section of the case study acknowledges the role of Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) in initiating reforms in 2008 before moving on to an analysis of the ways the British Armed Forces (BAF) adapted to requirements for greater unity of effort between civilian entities and the armed forces. This case study involves an examination of the BAF’s institutional rules for complex missions and interagency operations prior to deployment to Afghanistan in 2001.¹ To grasp the nature of these rules, it is helpful to consider its experiences during Cold War counterinsurgencies and post-Cold War peace operations.² This is followed by an assessment of the veto possibilities experienced by British military agents during the Afghanistan mission, especially during the Helmand mission from 2006 until 2011. Veto possibilities are assessed based on military agents’ ability to exercise their authorities in ways that established objectives and directed the armed forces to achieve these aims. The strength of sub-commanders’ veto potential was evaluated in terms of the flexibility they were granted by their superiors to make decisions concerning the military campaign and their access to resources needed to lead national efforts. The institutional rules and veto

¹ From the British perspective, complex operations include “elements of COIN and Peace Support (with frequent combat, not least in Afghanistan and Iraq).” See UK Ministry of Defence. Operations (Swindon, UK: Ministry of Defence, Shrivenham, 2010), E-8.
² Iraq and Afghanistan may be considered complex security environments. See Ben Connable, Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations: A New Paradigm (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 1.
possibilities in place in 2008 influenced the military’s response to Prime Minister Brown’s National Security Strategy and its call for greater unity of effort in ongoing and future stabilization missions. The military’s adaptation to these requirements can be traced in terms of doctrine, civil-military command arrangements and CIMIC capabilities. The chapter closes with an evaluation of the research hypothesis guiding this case study.

**The Driver of Change: Prime Minister Gordon Brown and A Comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan**

The driver of changes in the armed forces’ approach in Afghanistan emerged in 2008 in the form of Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan. The cross-government theme of Prime Minister Brown’s National Security Strategy (NSS) reflected HMG’s endorsement of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan to which Britain was a signatory in April 2008. The Action Plan developed for the international community to bring together civilian and military efforts in response to contemporary security challenges. Prime Minister Brown funded the revitalization of civilian capacity for overseas missions, which created imperatives for the armed forces that had, until that time, taken a largely ad hoc and combat-focused approach in Helmand. The following sections identify the institutional rules and the veto possibilities experienced by military agents in the conduct of the Afghanistan mission. Taking into account the institutional characteristics and the influence of military agents, it is possible to identify adaptation of the forces’ doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capabilities from 2001 to 2011.
Existing Institutional Rules for Complex Operations and Unity of Effort

British Forces in Malaya: The Institutional Legacy for Counterinsurgency

The BAF’s experience with counterinsurgency and civil-military cooperation in foreign interventions is frequently linked back to its operations in Malaya during the 1950s. While there are continued debates about the transferability of the lessons learned in earlier missions to more recent missions, there is little doubt that these missions are a defining “institutional birthmark” that continues to characterize the British military and its historic approach to complex operations.3 A recap of the British experience in Malaya in the 1950s and Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s assists with the identification of the institutional rules and practices honed during the Cold War years. Of particular relevance to this study is the military’s approach to the political aspects of these missions and civil-military cooperation during counterinsurgency campaigns.

By 1950, political leaders and civilian officials were learning that the emergency in Malaya was more complex than they originally thought and that military’s attempts to defeat the Communist threat were failing. Counterinsurgency measures to-date proved ineffective and in the eyes of political leaders, the mission was progressing too slowly. Earlier attempts to bring greater coordination to bear on the campaign floundered in the absence of a strategic plan and clear objectives for operations in Malaya. After a trip to the country in late 1951, Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttleton, concluded that the British

3 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 52. Karl Hack noted that the lessons learned during Malaya were applied in Vietnam, but the failure of Vietnam led some onlookers to question the transferability of the counterinsurgency approach of the British in Malaya to other missions. Hack concluded that, while there may be limits to their applicability, the Malaya lessons still offer guidelines for operations in complex environments, such as Afghanistan. See Karl Hack, “Extracting Counterinsurgency Lessons: The Malayan Emergency and Afghanistan,” RUSI Analysis, November 28, 2009, last modified 2009, accessed October 20, 2014, www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B14E068758F1/#.VEhfcSiRcTM,
“could not win the war without the help of the population...[and they] would not get the help of the population without at least beginning to win the war.” Having realized that the civilian and military dimensions of the conflict were inextricably linked, the British government decided to appoint a single British representative that would oversee the responsibilities of both the civilian High Commission in Malaya and the director of operations. General Gerald Templer, the first to act in this position, was expected to “fulfill the normal functions of the High Commissioner but...[also] assume complete operational command over all the armed forces assigned to the operations in the Federation.” As such, General Templer was granted civilian authorities, in addition to his command over the military, to defeat the insurgency.

Upon taking up the post, General Templer stated ‘any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated.” In 1952, General Templer’s strategy was based on the committee approach first endorsed by General Briggs. He provided much needed centralized direction to the direction and created hubs across the country where government, police and military member met and coordinated their activities. He also reassigned roles and responsibilities to

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5 Ibid.
7 In an attempt to bring strategic direction to the campaign, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, the appointed Director of Operations in Malaya in 1950, proposed the establishment of a civil-military Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Council. The council of civilian, police and military leaders was expected to coordinate the “collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence on insurgent locations, activities, and plans.” However, General Briggs, as Director of Operations, was unable to compel cooperation of civilian entities, police and the armed forces. See Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 71.
organizations and military entities, with the aim of creating conditions for the
independent governance of Malaya. By 1960, civil-military coordination was among
the three classic counterinsurgency principles derived from the Malaya mission. The next
section will consider the application of this last rule during the British military’s
involvement in Northern Ireland beginning in 1969.

*British Forces in Northern Ireland: Interagency Experience*

The British military applied institutional rules for counterinsurgency operations
developed in Malaya during their decades long mission in Northern Ireland. Similar to
the situation in Malaya, the British armed forces in Northern Ireland were given power to
oversee the operations conducted in both the military and civilian realms. However,
civil-military cooperation, a principle of British counterinsurgency strategy, proved more
difficult to implement in Northern Ireland as the British military attempted to harmonize
its activities with the civilian police force and other British government entities.

Initially, the armed forces were tasked with peace support and conflict prevention, but as

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9 Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup*, 100.
10 According to Thomas R. Mockaitis, the British army developed three principles for counterinsurgency
operations: minimum force, tactical flexibility and civil-military co-ordination. See Nagl, *Learning to Eat
Soup*, 42-3.
11 The British military’s operation in Northern Ireland, *Operation Banner*, began in August 1969 and
continued until July 2007.
12 Dr. Rod Thornton found that the British army was “given power, but power within a civil context” in
several counterinsurgency operations, including operations in Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and
“in the Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities operation in Northern Ireland.” Rod Thornton, “Historical
Origins of the British Army’s Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorist Techniques,” Unpublished paper
presented at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces Conference, Bucharest,
13 Thijs Brocades Zaalberg explained that after the Second World War the British military “discarded their
specialized capacity to perform civil and military government activities,” leaving it without a dedicated
*Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability*, eds. Sebastiaan J.H. Rietjens and
the only British department in the area, their mandate was eventually extended to include support for social initiatives.\textsuperscript{14}

In 1969, the British military was deployed to Northern Ireland on a mission to quell rioting and violence following political protests. Gaining momentum from widespread social unrest, the Official and Provisional Irish Republic Army (OIRA and PIRA), designated terrorist groups fighting for the independence of Ireland from the United Kingdom, continued to grow in size and strength.\textsuperscript{15} As the British military worked to contain violent nationalist forces, the new government in Britain worked with other political parties towards a bipartisan approach. In the absence of a clear political goal and strategic direction for the intervention in Northern Ireland, the largely understaffed military force resorted to heavy combat and force to stabilize the situation. However, their activities, including house searches, mass arrests and aggressive interrogation measures, only served to further alienate locals creating new recruits for the IRA. In 1970, a change of government in Britain brought the Conservatives to power and commitments of a troop surge in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{16} Upon the IRA’s acceptance of their failure to force a British withdrawal in 1970, the organization shifted to a political campaign, which it conducted in parallel to its military operations.\textsuperscript{17} Likewise, the British army and its allies commenced operations intended to improve intelligence


\textsuperscript{15} There were several terrorist groups active in the country during this time, but RAND explains that the “PIRA’s capabilities posted the most potent threat.” See Brian Jackson, “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a ‘Long War’,” \textit{Military Review} (January-February 2007), 75.

\textsuperscript{16} Thornton, “Getting it Wrong,” 86.

\textsuperscript{17} Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland,” \textit{The Journal of Strategic Studies} 32, no.3 (2009), 454.
gathering and to reassure the local population.\(^{18}\) Committees were established across the levels of the mission to coordinate activities between the UK army and the police force, Royal Ulster Constabulary.\(^{19}\)

Unity of effort was hampered by the absence of strategic guidance for the mission. Beyond the UK Government’s White Papers, HMG lacked “strategic vision” and a long-term plan for Northern Ireland.\(^{20}\) The strategic-level the Northern Ireland Joint Security Committee, comprised of the British General Officer Commanding with other government departments in Northern Ireland and established to achieve cross-government coordination, often addressed concerns of a tactical nature.\(^{21}\) Without a single authority to oversee the campaign and a plan for Northern Ireland, personnel struggled to coordinate and align various efforts.

It was not until 1980 that HMG and the British military established structures intended to address gaps in interagency coordination.\(^{22}\) In response to calls from senior officers to elect a ‘supremo’, like the position occupied by General Templar during the Malaya mission, to coordinate the mission, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher appointed a Chief Security Coordinator Sir Maurice Oldfeld. The Chief Security Coordinator was in


\(^{21}\) UK Ministry of Defence, *Operation Banner*, 4-2.

\(^{22}\) The analysis of Operation Banner noted that the “insurgent form of the IRA was defeated. However, it adapted and evolved into a terrorist organization” after this time. See UK Ministry of Defence, *Operation Banner*, 8-3.
place from 1972 to 1982. Nonetheless, as the British military’s review of its operations in Northern Ireland noted challenges to cross-agency cooperation continued:

Ministers and civil servants were sometimes reluctant to engage in the comprehensive, fully coordinated cross-government activity, which the Army would recognize as a campaign plan. That is a good reason for the need to take very firm action to ensure that they are engaged in, and convinced of the need to abide by, the process. This will not be easy.

To facilitate the process the HMG took unilateral steps to harmonize efforts in Northern Ireland. Senior military officers in imperial policing situations often took on a coordinating role, while junior commanders, often constrained by resources, were forced “to adapt organization and tactics to meet operational requirements.” The army turned to a range of civilian expertise to build its understanding of local politics and to devise techniques to gain legitimacy for its efforts across Northern Ireland. In sum, the British mission in Northern Ireland involved the armed forces as the lead British entity working with civilian entities and police to counter the IRA threat. The armed forces filled the void created by a lack of strategic direction and scaled their operations in accordance with the resources made available for the mission.

Therefore, in both the Malaya and Northern Ireland missions, the army was deployed with insufficient resources and troops, and the armed forces operated with minimal intelligence. Due to lack of training (in Malaya) or limited resources (in Northern Ireland), the British Army neglected operations aimed at influencing and

23 Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’?” 469.
24 UK Ministry of Defence, Operation Banner, 8-3.
25 Charters, “Intelligence and Psychological Warfare,” 195.
27 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 41-2.
gaining the consent of the local populations. Some commentators asserted that British army’s Cold War counterinsurgency operations improved once the British army relearned the principles of COIN. It is worth noting that the early failures in these missions were reversed with changes in the political context of the missions. In both Malaya and Northern Ireland, a resurgence of political will for the mission, evident in the support for a more comprehensive political-military approach and the deployment of additional troops, bolstered the armed forces’ ability to pursue interagency initiatives, secure the consent of the local population and defeat the insurgencies.

In the last years of the Cold War, the British military’s rules for complex operations were based on its experience in counterinsurgency mission. Though it did not apply the principles for effective counterinsurgencies in all cases, the armed forces did demonstrate an ability and willingness to adapt to evolving mission goals and operational requirements. The BAF emerged from missions, such as those undertaken in Malaya and Northern Ireland, with an appreciation for the civilian and political aspects of insurgencies and the effort required to “overcome the lack of synergy” that often hamper interagency initiatives. Although the lessons learned and best practices honed during these missions remained largely un-documented, they continued to provide a basis for military action in the post-Cold War era.

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30 UK Ministry of Defence, Operation Banner, 8-4.
31 UK Ministry of Defence, Operation Banner, 4-4.
Rules for Complex Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In the 1990s, the British armed forces deployed on numerous peacekeeping operations, among these several missions in Bosnia. After its deployment as part of the UN Protection Force, the UK joined the NATO IFOR and SFOR missions. The following section delineates the British military’s rules and practices for complex operations honed during NATO missions in Bosnia. It also identifies the level of discretion afforded military actors by formal doctrine, in-country command approaches and CIMIC practices.

In the decade after the Cold War, the British military attempted to codify rules and provide guidelines for complex peace operations, as distinct from the military’s Cold war operations. Cooperation among civilian and military entities, at the local, national, regional and international levels, was eventually identified as one of the many characteristics common to both contemporary peace and counterinsurgency operations. Doctrinal rules for the UK mission during NATO’s IFOR (1995) and SFOR (beginning in 1996) in Bosnia were first codified in the Army Field Manual, Volume 5, Wider Peacekeeping released in November 1995. This publication was the first attempt by doctrinal authors to develop a guide for post-cold War peacekeeping. Although Wider Peacekeeping was a first step towards a doctrine fit for new wars, political scientist Marcus Mäder noted that British doctrine for Bosnia and post-Cold War interventions, more generally, focused exclusively on the concept of traditional peacekeeping. In doing so, doctrinal authors did not link these concepts to the British military’s extensive experience with counterinsurgency and low-intensity operations. According to Mäder, this was in part due to institutional views that counterinsurgency and UN peacekeeping

were fundamentally different.33 Whereas COIN was carried out by a single country within another state, involved the application of military force and proceeded without consent of insurgents, traditional peacekeeping was often international in character, limited the application of force to self-defence, and required the consent of warring factions.34 As well, there was the view that, whereas COIN was aimed at influencing the security environment, traditional peacekeeping was more focused on maintenance of peace, or the status quo.35

The exclusion of COIN concepts from early peace operations doctrine in the early 1990s was attributed to the historic reluctance of the army to develop and rely on formal doctrine. With respect to their long history with small wars and insurgencies, the army has communicated experience and lessons learned orally and within their respective regiments. According to Mäder, this provided commanders a degree of flexibility in their decisions and the conduct of operations that would be constrained by written guidance.36 Finally, Mäder attributes the lack of COIN doctrine to the traditional civil-military relationship in Britain, whereby civilian leaders determined the policy goals and strategic framework for missions but granted commanders significant discretion in the conduct of their operations.37 Doctrine developed in this way proved ill suited to the types of operations and the conditions of modern peace operations.

In 1998, the British military published Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 3-50, Peace Support Operations to address the gap that emerged between the traditional

34 Ibid.
36 Mäder, In Pursuit of Excellence, 137.
37 Ibid.
peacekeeping approach endorsed in *WPK* and the military’s experience during IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia.\(^{38}\) Each of the services had been involved in some way in Bosnia and Somalia, and there was widespread support across the force for joint doctrine for complex peace missions. Increasingly doctrinal authors, experts and practitioners focused on the emergence of peace enforcement as a type of operation and on the possible contribution of COIN concepts to doctrine for post-Cold war peacekeeping.\(^{39}\) In the end, the doctrinal rules encapsulated in JWP 3-50 were based on lessons learned in peace enforcement in Bosnia and the military’s experience in Cold War counterinsurgencies. The concept of peace support operations was introduced as an umbrella term that included all peace-related operations, and differed from past COIN based on the strategic environment and the complexity of emergencies.\(^{40}\) The doctrine stated that in most situations of societal breakdown, the state has lost its “monopoly of power” and non-state actors direct aggression at populations and society’s infrastructure.\(^{41}\) The military was expected to carry out activities necessary to improve security and establish conditions necessary to allow civilian agencies to address underlying causes of the crisis or conflict.\(^{42}\)

Complex emergencies required a multifaceted response of local, regional, international, humanitarian, diplomatic, civilian and military actors. The doctrine provided a framework for improved civil-military cooperation that emphasized the attunement of military action to political aims, and formally recommended the

appointment of a single in-theatre civilian leader, or supremo, to oversee civil-military coordination and the development of a single civil-military plan for contemporary missions.\textsuperscript{43} This joint plan was expected to identify mechanisms for coordination, such as a civil-military operations centre (CMOC), and orient efforts to the achievement of mission aims.\textsuperscript{44}

In 2001, the British Army released an updated version of its counterinsurgency doctrine first published in the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{45} The new Field Manual \textit{Counter-Insurgency Operations} emphasized the importance of communications and public opinion, as well as intelligence and civil-military integration and cooperation for COIN operations, common among the UK military’s counterinsurgency publications since the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{46} It highlighted the civil-military presence during counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, and the familiarity of the British soldier with the civil dimension of problems during deployments to Northern Ireland and on more recent UN international peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{47} With respect to UK civil-military relations, the doctrine referred to the consultative relationship between the military commander and the senior British political representative, most likely the Ambassador or High Commissioner in theatre, when

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{43} UK Ministry of Defence, Peace Support Operations, 2.9.
\textsuperscript{44} Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons of Peace;” 69.
\textsuperscript{45} Counter-insurgency defined as ‘[a] generic term to describe the operations which forces may have to undertake when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government. These operations will have to counter threats posed by civil disturbances, terrorism and organized insurgency, irrespective of whether they are nationalist, communist or racially inspired, or directed from within or outside the state concerned.’ See UK Ministry of Defence, \textit{Counter-Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines). Army Field Manual Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 (Army Code 71749)}, prepared under the Direction of the Director General Development and Doctrine on Behalf of the Chief of the General Staff, (London, England: Upavon. DGD&D, 2001).
\textsuperscript{46} David Miller and Rizwaan Sabir, “Counter-terrorism as counterinsurgency in the UK ‘war on terror’” in \textit{Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror} edited by Scott Poynting and David Whyte (Routledge, New York: 2012); 24; Thomas Mockaitis, \textit{British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era}, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995), 135, 136.
\textsuperscript{47} UK Ministry of Defence, \textit{Counter-Insurgency Operations}, S.1, 3.
\end{flushright}
working with an allied host government in the area of operations. The control and coordination section stated that the “complexity and potential for friction within any large organization” makes unity of effort “a prerequisite for success” and identified the ideal situation as one where the government grants “one person overall responsibility for the direction of the government campaign allowing differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impartial Director.”\(^{48}\) The doctrine maintained that the unity of effort was seen as best achieved with a joint command and control structure.\(^{49}\) Within a single command system, the lead chairman is a military commander, while civil representatives, police and subordinate military commanders act as advisers who maintain “liaison links” with others.

Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, the military’s formal rules for peace operations had evolved to recognize common characteristics among these operations and the counterinsurgencies waged by the British armed forces during the Cold War. Both the peace operations and counterinsurgency doctrine identified civil-military cooperation as key to mission success, and recommended the appointment of a single person to direct and the development of joint civil-military plan to guide operations. Previous experiences prepared the armed forces to not only serve as the lead director and coordinator in these situations, but also to adapt to strategic goals and operational situations as they evolve over the course of a mission. In these respects, the formal doctrinal rules introduced in the 1990s identified the political conditions and civilian capabilities required for success, but also provided military commanders and members the discretion needed to conduct operations when these conditions were not met. Therefore, upon deployment to

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
Afghanistan, British doctrine and formal practices granted the armed forces considerable flexibility in their interpretation and implementation of complex operations, including the pursuit of interagency and civil-military coordination they deemed necessary to achieve mission goals.

British civil-military arrangements during its participation in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia were largely defined by the terms of the Dayton Accords, also known as the General Framework Agreement on Peace (GFAP). Within the British led MND (South-West) (MND(SW)), the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA), the predecessor to DFID, and the military established an informal, but close working relationship. By 1996, a civilian representative with expertise in reconstruction was posted to the military’s headquarters at MND(SW). Working together, the ODA and the armed forces developed civil-military objectives to guide their activities. Among these aims, the British ODA/IFOR team sought to carry out high impact, low cost projects with a focus on restoring essential services throughout the MND.50 As the program was rolled out, the criteria for project selection evolved from a focus on restoring basic utilities to rebuilding public facilities. The third phase entailed the funding of military-supervised projects that employed local contractors and employees. These projects were intended to strengthen “inter-entity and intra-federation cooperation” and reinforce reconciliation within the civilian population.51 This approach addressed local needs and supported the local economy, but also reduced the pressure on the military to carry out medium to longer-

term projects.

Eventually, DFID deployed civilian representatives to work alongside the military, and civil-military teams were created to manage these projects. However, the impact of these activities was primarily felt at the tactical level and they were not carried out as part of an overarching SFOR civil-military or civil affairs plan. British officers were eventually integrated into the Office of the High Representative, but the army’s engagement with other government departments and agencies continued on an informal basis and a national plan to guide the unity of effort in Bosnia was never developed. In the absence of a joint civil-military plan and a single director to oversee operations, British armed forces members in Bosnia established informal relationships with civilian entities to gain awareness of the impact of development and security activities on security goals, as well as to support civilian-led initiatives across the area of operations. Therefore, upon deployment to Afghanistan in 2001, the armed forces’ had developed a flexible, but ad hoc approach to in-country command arrangements that contributed to the achievement of both civilian and military objectives in a complex security environment.

Finally, the British military’s rules for CIMIC and the capability itself developed in response to the “operational experience in the Balkans.” The newly formed Civil Affairs Group was to be established using “existing resources” and comprised of “Territorial Army Reservists acting as functional specialists, but it actually involved “ten

54 Joint CIMIC Group, “Contemporary Civil-Military and Co-Operation in the Field,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in Conflict Zones*, eds. Michael J. Williams and Kate Clouston (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2008), 54
regular high-readiness staff” and “a larger pool of Territorial Army CIMIC generalists.”

The armed forces’ past experience in low-intensity and counterinsurgencies had demonstrated the utility of civil affairs units, but the British maintained an informal approach and it did not develop separate doctrine to guide these activities. Military commanders exercised a high level of discretion over how the forces supported civilian aspects of PSOs. In March 1996 these discretionary powers were bolstered by the NATO ARRC command directive that explicitly gave military leaders the ability to decide on the extent and nature of the forces involvement in civilian tasks. In the absence of formal rules for Civil-Military Coordination or Civil-Military Operations, contact and coordination between the armed forces and HMG entities during the operations in Bosnia proceeded on an informal basis. Many military commanders were flexible and maintained broad terms for the role of Civil Affairs Units in support of civilian entities.

In 1996 during IFOR, a civilian ODA representative with expertise in reconstruction was posted to the MND (SW) to work with the armed forces to solve basic civilian problems. The ODA/IFOR team sought to carry out high impact, low cost projects with a focus on restoring essential services throughout the MND. As the program was rolled out the criteria for project selection evolved from a focus on the provision of basic services to larger reconstruction tasks.

Eventually, DFID provided funding for military-supervised projects with a two-fold purpose: to strengthen “inter-entity and intra-federation cooperation” and reinforce

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55 Joint CIMIC Group, “Contemporary Civil-Military 54-55.
reconciliation within the civilian population. By employing local contractors and people, the military-supervised British program met local needs and supported the local economy. DFID and CA had also developed a joint process that reduced the pressure on the military to carry out medium and longer-term projects in the area. The Civil Affairs (G5) officers identified and submitted proposals for funding to the MND(SW). A Civil Affairs/ODA team then conducted a sight inspection and approved the project in as short a time period as five days. Military units managed and supervised these initiatives, and tracked all development projects within the division. The critical role of the CA teams was evident in the restoration of the Kluje hospital in MND(SW). In addition to its supervisory functions, G5 staff worked with ODA, which funded the rebuild of the hospital, Pharmacists without Borders that supplied medicines, and Médecins sans Frontières that provided equipment. The close civil-military relationship established during IFOR continued throughout the SFOR mission, and the informal rules and processes for CIMIC established in the early years of the mission continued to inform civil-military efforts in Bosnia. Eventually the ODA deployed civilian representatives to work alongside the military, and civil-military teams were created to manage these projects.

Back in the UK, the British military created a Civil Affairs Group (CAG) in 1997 to support civil-military efforts abroad. It was comprised of ten regular officers and fifty reserve officers, and the group supported overseas operations, including those underway in Bosnia. The CAG worked with host countries and international entities, and “provided

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60 Ibid.
a civil/military interface allowing the military to assess the impact of civilian activity on military plans.” Military officers and senior non-commissioned officers posted to CAG “provided advice and direction to Commanders throughout British and Multinational Formations and Headquarters,” such as MND(SW) in Bosnia.\(^\text{63}\) The creation of the CAG was significant because it reflected an acknowledgement by the military that the relationships between the civilian sector and the armed forces were critical to the military’s ability to achieve national objectives. It attuned military leaders to the importance of the civil-military relationship to achieving objectives in complex operations. For the rest of the SFOR mission, however, the CAG remained a small, reserve-based entity that liaised with other government entities and that focused on the provision of project management expertise to its civilian counterparts. As a separate unit, CAG and its civil-military activities existed on the periphery of mainstream military operations in Bosnia. Military commanders left CIMIC matters to the group and did not pursue formal strategic partnerships with civilian entities in theatre.\(^\text{64}\)

Therefore, during the mission in Bosnia, CIMIC teams became directly involved in the management of reconstruction and development initiatives of other government departments. These teams also pursued informal arrangements with civilian entities and took on activities otherwise carried out by non-military actors. Although aspects of CIMIC's expanding role were formalized with the creation of the CAG in 1997, the British forces did not develop doctrine for this group or a guide for commanders concerning the use of CIMIC in overseas missions. By the end of the 1990s, the British


\(^{64}\) Teuten and Korski, ”Achieving Unity of Effort,” 71.
military’s rules granted leaders significant discretion in setting the terms and conditions for CIMIC in future operations.

In summary, by 2001 the British military’s institutional rules for peace and counterinsurgency operations, including the nature and degree of civil-military unity of effort required for success, granted the leaders and members of the armed forces a high level of discretion. Based on their past and more recent experiences, military actors demonstrated an inclination towards flexibility in their approach in these situations and in their relationships with government and non-governmental civilian entities. With the military’s existing rules for complex operations now identified, it is possible to consider the political context of the Afghanistan mission and the impact of developments on the ability of institutional leaders to preserve these rules and practices.

The British Mission in Afghanistan

The Framework for Explaining Military Change, based on the theory of gradual change, postulates that institutional actors are afforded either strong or weak veto possibilities. Strong veto possibilities allow actors to preserve existing rules and practices when they are under pressure to reform the institution, whereas actors who experience weak veto possibilities are unable to maintain the status quo and change is more likely. Veto possibilities are determined by the power of institutional actors to change and set rules, and by their ability to enforce these rules on the ground. The next section begins by identifying the authorities of key civilian and military leaders. It then examines civilian leaders’ role in defining the UK’s Afghanistan mission and how military agents exercised their veto powers beginning in 2001. It also considers the veto potential of military agents
and their influence on the civilian and military aspects of the campaign. Before moving on to an analysis of military agents, it is helpful to first outline the formal authorities of elected leaders, civilian officials and military officers in matters of defense and overseas operations.

_Civilian and Military Authorities_

Although British governments formally serve by and through the Monarch, many of the powers granted under royal prerogative are now bestowed upon the executive, or the prime minister and the cabinet. Because the power to declare war and to agree to treaties is a royal prerogative, the executive is not required to consult or gain the approval of Parliament in declaring war or using the military. Parliament does not have the power to participate in decision-making in security and defense matters, and the only recourse available to Parliament is the withdrawal of its confidence in the government. Historically, if a vote on deployment of the military was held and the government was defeated, the government would not be required, under the constitution, to alter its policy. While the vote would create pressure for HMG to take into account Parliament’s view, the vote would not change HMG’s prerogatives. Examples of parliamentary votes for the deployment of forces include the deployment of American troops to Iraq in 2003, the 2011 vote to deploy troops to Libya after the commitment of forces to the mission, the August 2013 vote to take military action against Syria, and the 2014 vote to join air

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strikes against Islamic State forces in Iraq.\textsuperscript{66} While these votes may reflect the emergence of a new convention whereby the Government seeks approval from the House of Commons before taking military action, the Government retains its right to undertake action during an emergency without consulting Parliament.\textsuperscript{67} In these cases, the government may approve the mission on the grounds it was a response to an “emergency request”, such as in support of the United Nations. As there is no definition of what constitutes an emergency, the Government has the final say on the deployment of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{68}

Within the parliamentary system of governance, ministers are collectively responsible as members of cabinet and individually responsible for their respective departments. The Cabinet serves the prime minister and HMG, and in times of crises, it oversees the national response and application of national diplomatic, economic, and military instruments in response to overseas crises.\textsuperscript{69} The secretary of state for defense, a minister and cabinet member, is responsible for the development of and execution of defence policy, subject to the approval of Cabinet.\textsuperscript{70} The Secretary of State for Defence provides strategic direction to the Ministry of Defence, formally established in 1947. The Secretary’s deputies include the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Minister of State for the International Defence and Security, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence


\textsuperscript{67} Mills, \textit{Parliamentary Approval}, 10.


Equipment and Support, and the Under-Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister for Veterans. The Permanent Under Secretary of State, the most senior civilian in MOD, is responsible for policy, administration and finance in the Ministry and responsible to Parliament for expenditures voted to the Ministry for Defence and to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The MOD Headquarters is located at the Whitehall government complex in London, and it is the headquarters for the civilian department and the BAF.71

On the military side, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is the top military commander of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, also referred to as the British Armed Forces (BAF) or the British military. The BAF includes the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, British Army, and Royal Air Force. The CGS is also the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defence and the government and is supported by the Central Staff organization and a Vice Chief of General Staff in carrying out these responsibilities. The CGS commands and coordinates the three armed services (the Naval Services, British Army and Royal Air Force) through three single service commanders.72 The chief of the general staff of the army, chief of the naval staff and First Sea Lord, and the chief of the air staff exercise command over their respective services through separate service commands. Defence matters are managed by a number of committees including the

71 Rao, Prepare Or Perish, 412; The Secretary of State for Defence is held to account by Parliament through several channels: parliamentary question period, parliamentary debates, correspondence between Members of Parliament and Ministers, and finally, parliamentary committees. Secretaries of State, including the Secretary of State for Defence, are required to present an annual report, Annual Report and Accounts, to Parliament on both financial and non-financial aspects of departmental performance. Parliamentary committees examine the administration, policies and expenditures of government departments, while Public Accounts Committees review the department’s expenditure of its Parliamentary-approved budget to ensure the department adheres to economy, effectiveness and efficiency in its use of public funds. See UK Ministry of Defence, How Defence Works: Defence Framework, (London, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2010), 5.
Defence Council, Defence Boards, Single Service Boards, Defence Board and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The CDS attends Cabinet meetings or meetings of its sub-committees when invited and seeks advice from service chiefs of staff of the service branches through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC). CSC membership extends to civilian officials in the MOD and other senior military leaders. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the senior advisor on defence policy, and an official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to support coordination between the defence and foreign affairs ministries, attend CSC meetings. MOD officials and the CDS operate out of the Ministry’s headquarters in London.

Reporting to the CDS, the chief of joint operations (CJO) commands the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood, which was established in April 1996 as the command headquarters for joint and combined military operations, such as operations in Afghanistan. The role of the PJHQ involves the anticipation and identification of crises through monitoring events and developments that affect national interests. The PJHQ brings together “on a permanent basis, tri-service intelligence, planning, operational and logistics staff.” In this capacity, the PJHQ receives political direction from the MOD and provides the Government with military advice, develops contingency plans and exercises operational command of forces committed and deployed to operations. During operations MOD headquarters in London and PJHQ, located outside London, provide command to the armed forces. The CJO is the commander of

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74 Egnell, Complex Peace Operations, 110.
75 Heyman, The British Army, 20.
76 Egnell, Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations, 111.
PJHQ tasked with planning and executing “UK-led joint, potentially joint and multinational operations, and for exercising operational command of UK Forces assigned to multinational operations led by others.” The CJO’s deputy commander is the chief of staff (operations). A senior military officer or senior civil servant is responsible for each division and responsible for a specific capability. As such, the PJHQ involves both civilian personnel and military members in the direction, deployment, support and recovery of UK joint forces. Within MOD, civil servants and military members work side by side, and at PJHQ civilians are given the lead on particular capabilities.

This section identified the civilian and military actors, and the organization of key entities involved in the deployment of armed forces on overseas missions. With these dynamics in mind, it is possible to consider the evolving political context of the British mission in Afghanistan and the veto possibilities experienced by armed forces from 2001 to 2011.

*Military Agents’ Veto Possibilities, 2001 to 2007*

The following analysis considers the veto possibilities afforded military agents, including how they exercised their formal powers and their informal influence on national efforts, from the start of the mission in 2001 until the introduction of a new comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan in 2008. The strength of military agents’ veto powers are assessed in terms of their translation of policy goals into military objectives and their direction of armed forces towards achieving these aims. It then examines the sub-commanders and armed forces veto potential on the ground based on their ability to

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direct the military campaign and influence other government entities involved in the UK mission. The section concludes on the strength of the veto possibilities realized by institutional actors prior to the emergence of new strategy for Afghanistan and imperatives for unity of effort in 2008.

From the beginning of the mission, civilian leaders provided inconsistent messaging about the mission, which made it difficult for senior officers to translate policy goals into military objectives. The first formal statement on Britain’s involvement in an American-led response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, was issued by Prime Minister Tony Blair three weeks after the incident. In a Ministerial Statement to Parliament, the Prime Minister announced the deployment of UK forces to fight alongside the American troops against targets in Afghanistan.78 The objectives of the mission were to “pursue those responsible for the attacks, to eradicate Bin Laden’s network of terrorists, and to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring him.”79 By late 2001, the goals of the UK mission included the elimination of the terrorist threat to Britain’s national interest, but also to support the United Nations and to ensure “the international community comes together to meet the humanitarian challenge” in the country.80 And it

78 In the weeks of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, there was extensive debate in the House of Commons but a vote was not held on the deployment of British forces to Afghanistan in 2001 or on any subsequent deployments of the military to Afghanistan. Although a Parliamentary vote was not held on the deployment, the decision was made in consultation with the leaders of the political parties and had the support of the majority of the British people (Mills, Parliamentary Approval, 4). A poll found that sixty-nine percent of Britons expressing support for American and British military action against Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks. See Ipsos Mori, “Support for the War in Afghanistan: Trends 2001,” IPSOS MORI, November 29, 2001, accessed October 22, 2014, https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2399.Support-for-War-in-Afghanistan-Trends-2001.aspx?view=wide).
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/07/afghanistan.terrorism11
80 Jack Holland, “Blair’s War on Terror: Selling Intervention to Middle England,” University of Surry, June 2011; Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Borgesen, “Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of
was in this spirit Britain spearheaded the negotiations among key Afghan leaders during the December 2001 Bonn Conference and helped create the NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In support of the new force, the UK deployed British forces to provide the first ISAF headquarters and a brigade headquarters, and to lead the first multinational ISAF mission. At this time, the UK assumed the lead of international counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan as well.81 And, as ISAF expanded its presence across Afghanistan, the UK eventually assumed responsibility for PRTs in the northern provinces of Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymana.82

By late 2002, leading up to the American-led Iraq war, the political narrative around Afghanistan shifted from an emphasis on Britain’s leadership role to its support of the American-led War on Terrorism. In an April 2002 speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library in Texas, Prime Minister Blair emphasized the similarities between terrorist threats and Saddam Hussein, who allegedly was in possession of weapons of mass destruction:

We must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threaten us. The fight against international terrorism is right. We should pursue it vigorously. Not just in Afghanistan but elsewhere…getting at the…bankrollers of the trade in terror and WMD…83

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81 For a review of counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan since 2001 see Vanda Felbab-Brown.
82 The UK military commitment to Afghanistan before the Stage 3 expansion involved 1,000 people. It included staff with the PRT in northern Afghanistan at Mazar-Esharif and a PRT in Maymaneh, in which the leadership was eventually transferred to Sweden (in March 2006) and Norway (in September 2006), respectively. The initial British commitment also included a forward support base and quick reaction force in the north of Afghanistan, an infantry company (the Kabul Patrol Company in Kabul) and staff officers at HQ ISAF, staff officers on a training team with the Afghan National Army, and a detachment of aircraft to support ISAF and OEF air operations and reconnaissance. See UK House of Commons Defence Committee, The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, Fifth Report of Session 2005-06, Report, together with formal minutes oral and written evidence, (London, UK: The Stationery Office Limited, April 6, 2006), 9
He went on to declare Britain’s support for America’s engagement to overcome these threats in the following way:

[America can affect the world for good or affect it for bad. Stand aside or engage, it never fails to affect. You know I want it engaged. But if that’s what I and many others want, it comes at a price for us too. It means we don’t shirk our responsibility. It means that when America is fighting for those values, then, however tough, we fight with her…no wishing away the hard not the easy choices on terrorism and WMD…]

As the invasion of Iraq took centre stage, little attention was paid to ongoing efforts in Afghanistan. This lack of concern about the Afghanistan mission is most evident in the virtual absence of polling information on the issue from early 2002 until the beginning of the Helmand campaign in 2006.\[^{85}\] Briefly, in the wake of the coordinated bombings on London transit systems on July 7, 2005, Prime Minister Blair linked the actions to “wars on terrorism” in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it was not until December when HMG announced the deployment of armed forces to Helmand province that Afghanistan resurfaced as a point of public concern and political debate.

In the lead up to the deployment of forces to Helmand in January 2006, Secretary of State for Defence Dr. John Reid outlined the largely non-kinetic nature of the mission, which diverged from the Prime Minister’s focus on the war on terrorism. Secretary Reid explained that Britain’s objectives were “to ensure that we provide Afghanistan with a seamless package of democratic, political, development and military assistance in Helmand. All of that is necessary to ensure that international terrorism never has a base in

\[^{84}\] Ibid.
\[^{85}\] Charles Miller notes that between 2001 and 2006 “Afghanistan fell off the political radar in the UK and was eclipsed by the (at time) far more controversial Iraq war.” Charles A. Miller, Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2010, 52.
Afghanistan.” In March, as troops were arriving in the province, Secretary Reid emphasized the non-combative aims of the mission: “if we came for three years here to accomplish our mission and had not fired one shot at the end of it, we would very happy indeed.” Within a month, however, on a trip to visit soldiers in Afghanistan, Secretary Reid’s description of the armed forces combat role in Helmand: “Although our mission to Afghanistan is primarily reconstruction, it is a complex and dangerous mission because terrorists will want to destroy the economy and the legitimately trade and the government that we are helping to build up…Of course, our mission is not counterterrorism but one of the tasks that we may have to accomplish in order to achieve our strategic mission will be to defend our own troops…If this didn’t involve the necessity to use force we wouldn’t send soldiers.”

In sum, over a four-year period the reasons for the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan seemed to multiply, and the aims of UK efforts were difficult to discern. As author Christopher Elliott noted, British objectives in Afghanistan were to “defeat of Al-Qaeda,” deny terrorists’ sanctuary in the country, provide security for local populations, prevent terrorist attacks on Britain, foster democracy and bring governance to the country, defend human rights, and counter narcotics production. As the policy goals for

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86 Civilian officials maintained that Britain could simultaneously extend the reach of the GOA across the province, grow the provincial economy, and establish a level of security that would eventually permit the withdrawal of international security support from the province. John Ware, “UK’s original Helmand deployment plan examined,” BBC News, 22 June 2011, accessed November 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13855804, 11.
89 Ibid.
Afghanistan, and in particular, the Helmand mission, continued to evolve, military commanders struggled to translate goals into military objectives and to ensure the development of a viable plan for achieving these aims.

In the year before the deployment, HMG tasked the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, the PCRU, with developing a cross-government plan. In the process of developing the plan, the Unit and the armed forces deployed separate reconnaissance teams to the province. The PCRU recommended to the Cabinet Office that further analysis be conducted before the plan was finalized, and informed government officials at Whitehall that their vision of extending the Afghan government’s authority throughout Helmand province in three years was not achievable. Senior officials, however, were eager to move forward with efforts in Afghanistan and directed the PCRU to push forward with the plan. In the end, the PCRU issued a broad stroke plan for action, which civilian representatives and the armed forces knew did not adequately account for real and potential dangers in Helmand. As Mark Etherington remarked: “It was clear from the outset in my view that there had been a radical underestimation of the challenge.” HMG approved the UK Joint Plan for Helmand in December 2005 with objectives that would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the three years planned for the UK mission.

Although the planning for the Helmand mission was carried out external to the

90 The PCRU was established by HMG to develop strategy for post-conflict stabilisation activities. It was intended to bring together military and civilian for planning, to support the UK’s initiatives undertaken with other international organizations, and to implement and manage the British contribution to stability efforts in the first three to six months after the cessation of conflict. The PCRU was housed and staffed by DFID, but was funded through joint, tri-department Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs). See Miriam A. Krieger, “Approaches to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The UK Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and US Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)” (Master’s Thesis, King’s College London, 2006), 13.
91 Quote from Minna Jarvenpaa, the governance adviser to the mission and a member of planning team cited in John Ware, “UK’s Original Helmand Deployment.”
92 Elliott, British High Command, 277.
MOD, there were indications the Secretary of State for Defence Sir Dr. John Reid examined the final Plan, including the military’s plan upon arrival in Helmand.93 Initially, Secretary Reid had established three criteria that needed to be met before he was willing to sign off on the UK Joint Plan for Helmand: first, the military configuration was to be “financed in full by the Treasury”; second, NATO would provide troops around the British in Helmand; and, finally, DFID would provide additional incomes for farmers to make up for the money lost due to poppy eradication and the money the US continue to provide funds to the province.94 After some probing of the military plans for Helmand the Secretary signed off on the Plan without the guarantee that the third condition had been met. Likewise, on condition number two, there were assumptions that NATO would find the reserve forces to support the UK military in Helmand and that the existing troop levels were sufficient for the mission at hand, which was based on an incomplete picture of the Taliban threat in the province. In this regard, the Secretary and the senior officials at MOD had approved a plan that was not properly resourced and based on an incomplete understanding of the security situation in Helmand. Civilian and military personnel have remarked on the optimism of senior leaders, as Major General Andrew MacKay explained, “It resulted, I believe, in the upper echelons of government (political, civil and

93 The initial objective was to swiftly secure the area around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion to allow for development and reconstruction to begin, and then to move outwards from these areas as conditions permitted (UK House of Commons Defence Committee, The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, Fifth Report of Session 2005-06, Report, together with formal minutes oral and written evidence (London, UK: The Stationery Office Limited, April 6, 2006), 18 – 19). MOD also committed to leading the ISAF mission by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, and the deployment of additional 900 troops to the HQ ARRC or in support of the headquarters. See UK House of Commons Defence Committee, The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, 10.
94 Elliott, British High Command.148.
military) going into Helmand with their eyes shut and their fingers crossed."\textsuperscript{95} The government and senior officials at MOD were preoccupied with the day-to-day tasks of supporting a mission, rather than the conduct of strategic analysis, the serious study of mission goals and assumptions, and the development of a comprehensive approach that would harmonize the military and civilian efforts in the province.\textsuperscript{96} Ultimately, the policy issues that should have been dealt with by MOD were downloaded to the civilian and military personnel at PJHQ and key decisions with strategic-level implications were deferred to ground commanders in Helmand.\textsuperscript{97}

Military agents vested with the authority to direct the armed forces provided limited guidance for members deployed to Helmand. In translating HMG’s broad vision for Afghanistan into military terms, the CDS’s directive and the Joint Commander’s Directive for Helmand emphasized the forces’ role in achieving a range of non-kinetic effects identified by civilian officials.\textsuperscript{98} The initial guidance for the Helmand mission drafted by military leaders made few references to the use of force in Helmand. Likewise, the CJO at PJHQ had the ability to set the terms of the military mission, but the PJHQ

\textsuperscript{95} Haynes, Deborah, Anthony Loyd, Sam Kiley, and Tom Coghlan. “They Went into Helmand with Eyes Shut and Fingers Crossed,” \textit{The Times}, June 9, 2010, accessed November 12, 2013, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article2547216.ece. Brigadier Butler confirmed that government officials had proceeded without a full appreciation of the situation in Helmand, as he explained to the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2011: “I think there was some wishful thinking by some Government Departments that we were going to be welcomed with open arms, because we were coming in on a reconstruction and development operation.” See UK House of Commons Defence Committee, \textit{Operations in Afghanistan}, Ev 105.

\textsuperscript{96} According to retired Major Christopher Elliott, Sir John Reid and his successors had the responsibility to challenge the assumptions of plans for Helmand and to consider the worse case scenarios of overseas operations. See Elliott, \textit{British High Command}, 172.


\textsuperscript{98} UK House of Commons Defence Committee, \textit{The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, Fifth Report of Session 2005-06, Report, together with formal minutes oral and written evidence} (London, UK: The Stationery Office Limited, April 6, 2006), 18 – 19; MOD also committed to leading the ISAF mission by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, and the deployment of additional 900 troops to the HQ ARRC or in support of the headquarters (UK House of Commons Defence Committee, \textit{The UK Deployment to Afghanistan}, 10).
issued only broad guidance. Under these conditions, the British task force commander in theatre was “given considerable leeway to shape his own campaign.” 99 As described by the Retired Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup, the CDS in 2006, the operational commander exercised decision-making authority in theatre:

Ed Butler [the Brigade Commander] would have made the proposal or would have said, as you will recognise, ‘This is what I am intending to do.’ But he would not have said, ‘I want your decision on this, London’ or ‘PJHQ.’ He would have said, ‘This is what I intend to do.’ PJHQ or London then had the chance to say, ‘Hang on. That doesn’t accord with what we understand you are out there to do.’ 100

In his assessment of the national chain of command and the responsibilities of key actors involved in the Helmand decision, Christopher Elliott noted that this delegation of decision-making authority to ground commanders reflected a “distortion” of the concept of mission command and the failure of leadership on the part of civilian and military officials at Whitehall. 101 Ultimately, the delegation of authority of British military and civilian leaders granted sub-commanders significant latitude in defining and enforcing the rules for complex operations in Helmand, including their participation and support of cross-government unity of effort.

A lack of leadership on the part of political and military officials and their push

99 Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (August 2010), 584. Elliott explained that the idea of moving forces into the Helmand Valley to support the local Governor, and the risk that forces would be met by violent insurgent attacks, was briefed to the Chiefs of Staff. However, the decision to respond to the Governor’s request was deferred to Brigadier Ed Butler, “the subject had been fully discussed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee beforehand, Brigadier Butler was largely left alone to make the key decision of the UK’s Helmand deployment – whether to respond to Governor Daoud’s request, or stick to the original plan…” See Elliott, British High Command, 149.

100 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan, Ev. 137.

101 Elliott, British High Command, 170. Mission command involves the communication of orders and intended effect to subordinates whom then decide how best to accomplish their mission (UK, Operations doctrine). Elliott defines it as “where commanders are told what to achieve and are then left alone to decided (sic) how to achieve it.” See Elliott, British High Command, 143.
for a plan based on incomplete information had significant implications for the armed forces, the military campaign and the unity of effort realized in Helmand. For the armed forces, the military’s security strategies as set out in the UK Joint Plan for Helmand, were quickly derailed by the resurgence of the Taliban,\textsuperscript{102} as one British officer explained:

\begin{quote}
 [T]he Task Force was initially directed to conduct peace support operations to set security conditions required to foster economic development and improved governance. However, the Task Force quickly found itself conducting near continuous combat operations in the war-fighting phase of a complex counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{103}
\end{quote}

Civilian representatives and the armed forces failed to anticipate challenges from Afghan elites on how to proceed with state building and development, and changes in local and district politics through 2006 further fueled tensions and a resurgence of Taliban resistance. By early summer 2006, the British military established four additional bases in response to requests from Helmand’s new governor Mohammed Daoud who argued that insurgents and drug traders in the north were threatening his authority. The additional bases reflected a change in direction of the military mission away from securing the area and supporting reconstruction toward combat with consequences for how the military approached the operation in Helmand, as explained by General Sir Robert Fry, a proponent of hearts and minds operations in Afghanistan: “We went there with one mission, one idea, one force structure – which was all about going smaller and getting larger. We then take a complete jump out of that and take on something else and that completely dislocates the analysis that had been done about force levels, intelligence and

\begin{footnotes}
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Although the *UK Joint Plan for Helmand* identified shared goals for the mission, it did not set out processes for reconciling the different, sometimes conflicting, priorities of civilian entities and the armed forces. For example, during the initial stage of the Helmand campaign, DFID was especially concerned about maintaining control over resources committed to reconstruction and development. While the armed forces urged DFID to channel resources to Helmand, DFID maintained that local governance in Helmand could only be improved by strengthening the capacity of the central government. While DFID later found that direct investment at the provincial level was required to support the central government’s reach in Helmand, difference in perspectives held by the government department and the military contributed to interdepartmental tensions. Similarly, in the early phase of the mission in Helmand the FCO was intent on pursuing a counternarcotics agenda, a key UK commitment in Afghanistan. The armed forces were intent on avoiding participation in counternarcotics activities because they viewed these efforts as counterproductive to the military’s ongoing counterinsurgency operations, as Brigadier Butler noted,

> [The military] took a tactical view that we couldn’t get involved in those [counter-narcotics operations] because we could see that that was the quickest way of upsetting the ordinary Afghan farmer. We didn’t want to turn the farmer into an insurgent, so counter-narcotics was another contradictory objective.\(^\text{106}\)

While the *UK Joint Plan for Helmand* brought together plans from separate entities into a single document, it did not articulate a clear vision for the mission. Without this, it was

\(^{104}\) Ware, “UK’s Original Helmand Deployment.”


\(^{106}\) UK House of Commons Defence Committee, *Operations in Afghanistan*, Ev. 103.
difficult for civilian entities and the armed forces to prioritize their activities and objectives in Helmand. It was during the counter-insurgency phase that a whole-of-government approach was most needed, but the Prime Minister and the senior leadership at the time did not demonstrate the “will or the authority to make sure” it was carried out.¹⁰⁷ The House of Commons Defence Committee concluded that insufficient analysis on the part of leaders and the failure of military officers to identify the risks of the deployment to their civilian masters contributed to the UK’s inadequate response to the situation that unfolded in Helmand:

Given the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider that the implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought through… Notwithstanding our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the [UK] Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets’ nest, especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory…[S]enior military advisers should nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict.¹⁰⁸

Therefore, although the civilian leadership had the authority to define clear political goals, to develop a strategy for the Afghanistan mission, and probe assumptions of the military, they demonstrated weak veto powers in this regard. Instead, the political narrative continued to evolve and the mission goals continued to multiply. The insistence on a plan based on faulty assumptions and insufficient intelligence, in lieu of a coherent long-term strategy, led to a combat-focused campaign that fueled the insurgency and created interagency tensions.

The following section assesses sub-commanders’ veto potential in terms of their

¹⁰⁷Elliot, British High Command, 219.
¹⁰⁸UK House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan, 5-6.
access to the resources and capabilities needed to carry out complex operations. As well, it considers the influence of the armed forces on other government entities on the ground and their approach to interagency initiatives before the introduction of a new strategy for Afghanistan in 2008.

Even before the deployment of forces to Helmand, military personnel who had previously deployed to Afghanistan were aware of the precarious security situation in the province. The armed forces had a much clearer understanding of the situation in Helmand that what was put forth in the *UK Joint Plan for Helmand*, as Brigadier Butler explained the armed forces’ state of situational awareness at the time: “...we recognized, as the operators, that this was going to be a very different environment we were getting into. Actually, the intelligence that was coming back from the prelim ops headquarters in January, February and March, and from the American accounts ...before April 2006, [that] Helmand Province was already in some form of crisis.”

Within months, it was clear to the armed forces and civilian personnel that the conditions were not accounted for and that the implementation of the *UK Joint Plan for Helmand* would be nearly impossible.

With respect to troop levels, ongoing operations in Iraq had significant consequences for the Helmand mission. The initial deployment to Helmand was based on assumptions about the conditions of the province, as well the redirection of troops and resources from Iraq to Afghanistan. It was expected that, as troop levels in southern Iraq were reduced from 8,000 to 1,000 by the fall of 2006, more soldiers would be provided for ongoing operations in Helmand. However, an eruption of hostilities in Iraq required

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sustained efforts and significant resources, and planners were forced to move forward with designs for Helmand based on fewer than expected troops.\textsuperscript{110} In early 2006, nearly 3,000 personnel deployed to Helmand in early 2006, only 600 were fighting soldiers with the rest serving in a logistic or support capacity.\textsuperscript{111}

Armed forces’ veto potential was constrained by an unexpected shift in the military’s focus to support for local leaders beyond the lozenge and operations to counter Taliban attacks. Not long after deployment to the area, the UK commander was under pressure from the local governor to secure government offices across the province, the military’s plans captured in *UK Joint Plan for Helmand* were quickly derailed.\textsuperscript{112} In response, Brigadier Butler decided to deploy small detachments of UK troops to government offices in key locations at “platoon houses.”\textsuperscript{113} These houses became key targets for attacks by the Taliban and British soldiers relied heavily on artillery, close air support and attack helicopters. Brigadier Butler’s decision to establish the platoon houses shifted the UK strategy from reconstruction and development to combat-intensive counterinsurgency, in which the UK had “barely enough troops to do the tasks required.”\textsuperscript{114} Back in London there was no plan for an adequate reserve of troops to relieve or support the Helmand mission, and further, no plan for the simultaneous conduct of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{115} The forces scrambled as they

\textsuperscript{110} Haynes, et al., “They Went into Helmand.”
\textsuperscript{111} Elliott, *British High Command*, 142.
\textsuperscript{112} Elliott, *British High Command*, 143.
\textsuperscript{113} The Platoon House concept can be defined as “the defence by the Armed Forces of small isolated and fortified bases.” See UK House of Commons Defence Committee, *Operations in Afghanistan*, 29.
\textsuperscript{114} UK House of Commons Defence Committee, *Operations in Afghanistan*, 25. There were also concerns about the availability of helicopters, vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles, among other enablers, needed during the early phase of the campaign.
\textsuperscript{115} Elliott, *British High Command*, 149. CDS General Walker explained that there existed an assumption that NATO would provide redirect their assets and create a reserve to support the UK in Helmand. Prior to
were faced with “continuous combat in the war-fighting phase of a complex
counterinsurgency.”¹¹⁶

A further complicating factor of the military’s approach in Helmand was that,
because they were so thinly spread across the province and vulnerable to attack, the
forces were unable to establish positive relationships with the local population.¹¹⁷ Their
reliance on defensive air attacks was unpopular with the locals and prevented the UK
from gathering intelligence critical to reconstruction and development efforts.¹¹⁸ Without
an adequate number of troops and the resources needed to overcome the insurgency, the
UK armed forces in Helmand adapted to emerging operational requirements largely on
the hoof, as Brigadier Andrew Mackay, the commander of British forces in Helmand in
2007, explained “[armed forces] were making it up as we go along.”¹¹⁹

Finally, the armed forces experienced few opportunities to influence the cross
government campaign due to its preoccupation with the security situation in Helmand. Even at sub-optimal levels, the troops outnumbered the UK civilian representatives
deployed to the British Mission in Afghanistan, including representatives from across

the Helmand deployment, the Secretary of State of Defence Dr. John Reid asked military leaders about the
feasibility of the Afghanistan mission if the drawdown in Iraq was slower than expected and he was given
assurances that this was built-in to the planning assumptions for Afghanistan. See Elliott, British High


¹¹⁷ According to Dr. Anthony King, a sociologist at Exeter University in England, the combat operations in
Helmand did not align with the British military’s rules for counterinsurgency, but were a reflection of the
emphasis on warfare in officer training and education programs throughout the 1990s. Anthony King,
‘Why we’re getting it wrong in Afghanistan’, Prospect, September 4, 2009, last modified September 4,
afghanistan.

¹¹⁸ Robert Egnell noted that this reflected trends in military training and education programs in the 1990s
that tended to emphasize “conventional warfare.” Egnell, Lessons Learned, 306.

¹¹⁹ Chris Irvine, “Major-General Andrew Mackay: profile,” The Telegraph, September 25, 2009, last
modified September 25, 2009, accessed October 21, 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6198444/Major-General-Andrew-Mackay-
profile.html
government. By November 2007, the Helmand Executive Group, the core of the Helmand PRT, experienced restricted mobility throughout the province, and many officials previously deployed to the province were withdrawn to Kabul. In total, there were 143 civil servants stationed in Kabul, including forty-three personnel from DFID and a ten person political team from FCO. Through 2006 and 2007, many British reconstruction and development efforts were stalled and the military’s Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) provided the only operating mechanism to support broader goals. Even these efforts were jeopardized by the inability of the military to provide sufficient security to deter the threat of Taliban attacks, which, in turn, reduced the local population’s willingness to participate in reconstruction and development processes.

In summary, the military leaders charged with critical responsibilities were less than effective in identifying military objectives and bringing forward concerns about resources and capabilities to civilian officials. With respect to armed forces’ veto potential, sub-commanders were granted decision-making powers, but were unable to achieve their aims due to limited resources and exercised minimal, if any, influence on the UK’s mission. Therefore, by 2008, civilian and military actors, and sub-commanders, realized weak veto possibilities, which created space for extensive reforms to the military’s existing approach to Afghanistan.


The following section considers domestic political developments leading to the formulation of HMG’s strategy for Afghanistan emerged and highlights the main elements of the strategy. It also considers the implications for Afghanistan mission from 2008 to 2011, including improvements in the security situation, the development of joint plan for Helmand and changes to the balance between civilian and military commitments on the ground.

The political impetus for a renewed approach began in 2006 upon the deployment of British forces to Afghanistan. As reports of the Taliban’s resurgence in Helmand surfaced in Britain through 2006 and early 2007, public support for the war in Afghanistan began to wane. At the time the British public’s support for the war fell below thirty percent, but eventually held steady between thirty-seven and forty percent for the next four years. The consistent drop in support in 2006 persisted even as the number of casualties in Afghanistan leveled off and remained relatively low in comparison to other coalition forces.124 In his study of public opinion and the Afghanistan war, Charles Miller found this decline in public support aligned with doubts about the success of the mission.125 Indeed in November 2006, Prime Minister Blair admitted that “western leaders had underestimated how long it would take to win the war on terror” and that the “terrorist enemy” would require “a generation” to dismantle. Prime Minister Blair explained that the “the roots of the Taliban and al-Qa’eda are deeper and where they got

124 Miller, Endgame for the West, 55.
125 Miller, Endgame for the West, 62
footholds in a country like Afghanistan it is going to take time to banish that for good. 

In lock step with American policy, Prime Minister Blair announced his recommitment to Afghanistan soon after President Bush renewed his commitment to the mission. In February 2007, soon after the NATO-led review of its mission and President Bush’s announcement of additional resources for Afghanistan, Prime Minister Blair announced plans for reduction in troops in Iraq and Defence Secretary Des Browne reported the government’s intention to bolster the number of British troops to Helmand. Although HMG took steps to improve troops’ personal protective equipment and enhance personal safety of the forces, there were continued shortfalls in capability and insufficient numbers of soldiers on the ground to ensure a more immediate effect in Helmand. The armed forces in Helmand struggled to contain the insurgency and there was mounting pressure in Britain for a renewed, properly resourced approach to the mission. The resignation of Prime Minister Blair created an opportunity for fresh thinking on the conduct of complex missions, especially those underway in Afghanistan in Iraq.

In December 2007, Prime Minister Brown restated the aim of the Afghanistan mission was “to rebuild the failed state, to prevent the return of the Taliban and to root out al-Qaeda” and to support the Afghan government. New funding was provided for

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development, stabilization, and the training of Afghan security forces, and HMG initiated efforts to bring greater coherence to the civilian and military aspects of the mission.  

HMG’s endorsement of a comprehensive approach to complex missions was backed by a number of noteworthy initiatives. First, Prime Minister Brown restructured the Defence and Overseas Policy Cabinet Committee to create the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) in 2008. Among its membership, the ministers, civilian officials, police chiefs, the leaders of intelligence agencies, and the CDS met to discuss and oversee national security issues.

Second, in March 2008, HMG released the *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*, which Prime Minister Brown hailed as “the first time the Government has published a single, overarching strategy bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies and forces involved in protecting our national security. It is a significant step, and the latest in a series of reforms bringing greater focus and integration to our approach.”

Finally, in a further endorsement of the comprehensive approach, the NSS announced HMG’s creation of the Stabilisation Unit, jointly owned and operated by DFID, MOD and FCO, and the establishment of a £269 million Stabilisation Aid Fund.

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The HMG committed to “increasing the number of civilian staff” in the country. With respect to the armed forces, the NSS also announced its plan to “[strengthen] the capacity within the armed forces to work alongside civilians for certain specific, short-term reconstruction and development tasks in hostile environments, and to provide a stabilization presence in the immediate aftermath of a military operation while sufficient security is put in place to enable civilians to deploy.” This included consideration of how the reserve forces might contribute during the post-conflict phase of overseas operations.

HMG’s strategy for Afghanistan created pressure for the armed forces to reform its existing approach in Helmand, which was squarely focused on defeating the insurgency. It called for integration across the civilian and military elements in Afghanistan and for the military’s to simultaneously secure areas from insurgents, and provide a “stabilisation presence” until civilians are able to deploy. Taken together, these initiatives were expected to provide a basis for “an integrated and inter-agency approach” in places like Afghanistan.

On the ground, the unity of effort imperative set out in the NSS was operationalized in a new plan for Afghanistan jointly developed by the Stabilisation Unit and members of the military brigade recently deployed to Helmand. Approved by HMG in spring 2008, the new Helmand Road Map was described as a “single overarching plan” created to “guide work of all international partners” in the province. It was aimed at supporting a political dialogue between British civilians and armed forces, as well as among British actors, the local authorities and the population. The plan involved the placement of civilians and military personnel at all level and at all stages of planning.  

It also identified provincial authorities to which local Afghans could express grievances and propose areas for development. Based on lessons learned in Afghanistan to date, it was expected the Road Map objectives would be continually revised as individuals gained a more sophisticated understandings of the situation in Helmand.

With the slowdown in fighting, conditions conducive to the implementation of the Helmand Road Map began to emerge across the province.\textsuperscript{134} Foreign stabilization and development efforts commenced, and as the security situation improved more civilian representatives were deployed to the region, including twenty-eight personnel working as members of the PRT.\textsuperscript{135} With the help of American troops, British forces continued their kinetic activities, but also enhanced supports for stability operations and created two-person Non-Kinetic Effects teams at the company level.\textsuperscript{136} The armed forces provided civilian entities with protection, and through the deployment of CIMIC units, provided intelligence and reported on progress of projects to their civilian counterparts.\textsuperscript{137} British forces were not as engaged in unilateral stability operations and focused on creating space for civilian entities to operate, as Edward Burke explained that this reflected the preference of military commanders to “leave the politics to the civilians.” According to Burke, this created an opportunity for “civilian agencies to improve performance in Afghanistan and reassert political primacy at every level of operations. It has also enabled

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[135] Ibid.
\item[136] By October 2008, the number of British troops in Afghanistan doubled, reaching over 8,500 soldiers in the area. In addition to some enhancements for each soldier, the armed forces received improved training prior to deployment and additional armoured patrol and support vehicles. See “New Armoured Vehicles for Troops,” Express, October 29, 2008, accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/68508/New-armoured-vehicles-for-troops; Farrell and Gordon, “COIN Machine,” 677.
\item[137] Edward Burke, “Leaving the Civilians Behind: The ‘Soldier-Diplomat’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, “ PRISM 1, no.2 (2009), 31.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the emergence of a unique model of civil-military cooperation in Helmand Province.”

In early 2010, the British armed forces joined American troops and the Afghan National Army in Operation Moshtarak, the largest military offensive launched by NATO in the country. After four months, there remained remnants of Taliban throughout the province, but the thousands-strong force of troops was able to defeat several Taliban strongholds in central Helmand. The British armed forces were able to shift their emphasis from combat to counterinsurgency in accordance with Helmand Road Map, which superseded the Helmand Plan. The new plan took into account the American troop surge in the area and the arrival of additional State Department and USAID personnel in Helmand, and provided a blueprint for British efforts in Helmand for the next year.

In early July 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron announced the reduction of force levels in Afghanistan. The number of soldiers in Afghanistan was reduced from 9,500 to 9,000, beginning a gradual withdrawal of the majority of British troops with the majority of troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The announcement aligned

138 Ibid.
140 The Helmand Plan established annual objectives for the PRT and included District Stabilisation Plans to be established at the sub-provincial level (Stabilisation Unit, “Stabilisation Case Study: Infrastructure in Helmand, Afghanistan (Experiences from Helmand 2008-2010),” accessed October 20, 2014 http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/520/Stabilisation%20Case%20Study%20-%20Infrastructure%20in%20Helmand,%20Afghanistan.pdf). In May 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that 400 British troops would return to Britain from Afghanistan.
141 Polling information from around this time indicated that thirty-five percent of respondents supported the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan “as soon as possible, without conditions,” while nearly the same percentage of respondents (thirty-four percent) supported the withdrawal “as soon as the government in Afghanistan can protect its territory and prevent it from being used as a base for terrorism. See Rachael Gribble, Simon Wessley, Susan Klein, David A. Alexander, Christopher Dandeker and Nicola T. Fear, “British Public Opinion after a Decade of War: Attitudes to Iraq and Afghanistan,” Politics 40 (2014): 16, 18.
with President Obama’s commitment to withdraw 10,000 American troops from the area by the end of 2011, and the complete removal of remaining combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. In his statement to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Cameron explained that the troop withdrawals reflected the inroads made in Afghanistan and a transition of mission focus from combat to the training and mentoring Afghan security forces.  

In conclusion, the key civilian actors empowered to lead the UK mission demonstrated weak veto powers. This was evident in their failure to clearly identify the goals of the Afghanistan mission and to provide a realistic, adequately resourced strategic plan to guide ongoing efforts in the country. Many of the decisions that might have been made by senior officials or at MOD were passed on to the military headquarters or deferred to sub-commanders in Afghanistan. Although military commanders were granted flexibility in their interpretation of institutional rules and practices in their area of operations, insufficient resources and unexpected security situation limited their ability to implement these plans. As the armed forces’ directed its energies on achieving military objectives, sub-commanders took few, if any, steps to influence the actions or outcomes of their civilian counterparts in Helmand. Indeed, their reliance on combat-focused operations alienated the local populations and undercut the civil-military coordination needed for successful counterinsurgency efforts. By the time pressures for a new approach in Afghanistan emerged in 2008, the armed forces’ veto possibilities, defined as their ability to preserve existing rules and practices, were significantly diminished. It was

only with the surge of American troops to the area that the UK military was able to
dedicate itself to a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, including support for
civilian-led stabilization activities in the province. The following section will consider
how the armed forces’ weak veto possibilities interacted with their existing rules to
produce incremental, but significant changes in military doctrine, in-country command
arrangements and CIMIC capabilities during the Helmand mission.

B r i t i s h  A r m e d  F o r c e s  a n d  G r a d u a l  A d a p t a t i o n

A d a p t a t i o n  o f  D o c t r i n e  t h r o u g h  C o n v e r s i o n

The diminished veto possibilities experienced by the armed forces during the
Afghan mission and the discretion afforded actors in the interpretation and
implementation of existing rules permitted the creation of doctrine that reoriented the
British military towards the political goals of the recent mission in Afghanistan. The
following section traces the development of doctrinal concepts for complex operations,
especially the ways the armed forces were expected to work with other government
entities to achieve unity of effort. Over the course of the British missions in Afghanistan
and Iraq, the institutional rules for complex operations identified in the Wider
Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency doctrine that existed in 2001 provided a basis for
new joint doctrine, titled Joint Doctrine Publication 3–40 Security and Stabilisation: The

The first major doctrinal publication after 2001 was an updated version of Joint
Warfare Publication 3-50, Wider Peacekeeping. The revised doctrine, Military

Contribution to Peace Support Operations, introduced a new concept of PSOs that
reflected the conditions and operational challenges encountered in Afghanistan. A PSO were defined in more general terms as “[a]n operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace.” These operations included conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations, as well as counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations. Instead of classifying peace operations based on impartiality and measures of consent, the doctrine proposed a new view of PSOs based on the intended strategic effect or outcome of a given operation. In this view, the strategic intent of PSO was “to restore peace and security by resolving conflicts by means of prevention, conciliation, deterrence, containment or stabilisation.” Stabilization was a new term for the period following a ceasefire or peace agreement when the armed forces worked with other ‘instruments of national power’, including diplomatic and economic instruments, to reduce tension and extend campaign authority. It required the armed forces work alongside other HMG entities to realize intended effects and outcomes.

In the absence of a government-led comprehensive framework to guide interagency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Chiefs of Staff took the first step towards formalizing this approach with the release of Joint Discussion Note 4/05 The

145 Campaign authority is defined in JWP 3-50 as four interdependent factors: 2. “the perceived legitimacy of the international mandate that establishes a PSO; [2] the perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints, explicit or implicit in the mandate, placed on those executing the PSO; [3] the degree to which factions, the local population and other actors subjugate themselves to the authority of those executing the PSO...[4] and the degree to which the activities of those executing the PSO meet the expectations of the factions, local population and others.” UK Ministry of Defence, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, 2-14.
Comprehensive Approach (JDN 4/05) in January 2006. Comprehensive approach (CA) was defined as “commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation.”\(^{146}\) The guiding principles included proactive engagement across Whitehall supported by ad hoc cross-government working groups, shared understanding among government entities including the armed forces, outcome based thinking, and collaborative working practices across government.\(^{147}\) The note asserted that recent operations, such as operations in Afghanistan, proved the need for greater strategic level coherence to ensure the achievement of the desired effect and outcome. In all, the military doctrinal note identified eleven specific advantages of adopting a CA for the armed forces that would contribute “more effective and efficient deployment of finite national capabilities, including heavily tasked military assets.”\(^{148}\)

Although the PCRU, established in 2004, was mandated to facilitate cross government planning and assessment, the PCRU had yet to develop a shared concept or processes to support CA. The release of JDN 4/05 was the first formal publication on CA among government entities. According to Dr. Theo Farrell, Professor of War in the Modern World at King’s College in London, the development of the discussion note, rather than a more authoritative doctrine note, signaled the military’s desire to engage with its civilian counterparts in discussions about the CA. However, because the doctrinal note was the only formal promulgation of CA at the time, other government entities were

reluctant to adopt what they believed was a military concept. Without a single CA cross-
government policy, the Discussion Note remained the only available guidance for CA
and interagency cooperation for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.149

In 2008 the HMG announced additional resources for operations in Afghanistan
and for the delivery of the UK’s comprehensive approach, as identified in the
government’s first National Security Strategy. It did so through the revitalization of the
PCRU, which was renamed the Stabilisation Unit. The Unit was established as the hub
for interagency activity and civil-military cooperation for complex crises and post-
conflict operations. The Stabilisation Unit provided a formal arena and established
mechanisms by which civilian entities and the military could engage in joint planning.
With improved security conditions in Afghanistan, the military, as one member of a
larger, “integrated, resilient team,” concentrated on its support to civilian entities in
Helmand. This revised role of the military vis-à-vis non-military entities became the
“heart” of the armed forces’ new doctrine for support to security and stabilization
operations.150

In this vein, the British Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and
Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (JDP 3-40), released in 2008, aligned with
government’s comprehensive approach referenced in the National Security Strategy. In
overseas operations, this involved the military in the provision of security and as
conditions permitted, support to HMG entities. Written for a wide audience, including
“theatre and formation levels of command such as in Afghanistan, and their interlocutors

149 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, The Comprehensive Approach, Ev. 11.
150 Stuart Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine,” International Affairs,
87, No.2 (2001), 321.
in Whitehall and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ),” the doctrine attempted to clarify the military’s contribution to joint stability operations. Stabilization was defined in JPD-3-40 as a process that involved a range of activities, including combat, in support of stabilization, development and political settlement. In support of the wider goal of stabilization, the military was one among other entities involved in achieving the desired end state and the tasks undertaken by the armed forces in to achieve this goal included the demilitarization of society, the reform of the defense ministry, the development of national armed forces, and support to development activities.

In JWP 3-40, doctrinal authors set out new rules for stabilization operations based on existing rules for COIN and PSOs. The authors argued that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of classic COIN and PSO rules for “tackling contemporary challenges to stability.” With respect to PSOs, the doctrine stated that operations aimed at restoring and maintaining peace in Afghanistan and Iraq were stability operations. Unlike the impartial conduct of PSOs, stability operations are explicitly political interventions. The doctrine stated that PSOs, in their traditional sense, could be conducted, along with humanitarian, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities in a single stability mission. It remained unclear how the armed forces were to differentiate PSOs and peace activities conducting during stability operations, and what this distinction meant for the military engaged in these missions.

With respect to COIN, JDP 3-50 stated that were limits to the utility of classic COIN rules for contemporary conflicts. First, the British military’s COIN rules were

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based on its experience in the colonial context and in states with established “effective state security, governance and political structures. More recent operations, such as in the Balkans, Iraq an Afghanistan, however, were conducted in failed or failing states that required significant attention to development or reconstruction of essential structures, systems and infrastructure. In comparison to classic COIN, contemporary stabilization operations were characterized by the presence of numerous military and non-military actors in the area of operations and by the “multitude of irregular actors” threatening security and stability in the contemporary theatre of operations.

Nonetheless, principles from classic COIN theory were merged with concepts from the American approach to COIN to create “Operational Framework for Stabilisation Activity.” This framework was centered on a “shape-secure-hold-develop” construct for stability operations that tied military operations to governance, development and reconstruction.\(^\text{152}\) The operational framework was based on the idea that the military would take on a primary role during the first two phases and then the armed forces’ focus would shift a supported entity to a supporting element. While the construct was subject to change and the transition from ‘engage’ and ‘secure’ to ‘hold’ and ‘develop’ was not expected to be sequential in all cases, the concept was unique because it provided a systematic way to think about CA during counterinsurgencies.\(^\text{153}\)

The application of CA was not limited to the COIN-based “shape-secure-hold-develop” process in complex missions. Professor Theo Farrell explained that both COIN

\(^\text{152}\) Shape referred to the process of developing an understanding of mission challenges and planning. The “secure” phase incorporated concern for the population, as well as terrain and the enemy, while the hold phase was redefined as a time for transition from “military-led security to civilian-led development” and “develop” was intended as a cue for civilian support and the application of development capacity, primarily by civilians. See UK Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation, 199-208.

and CA involved civil-military cooperation, but CA was much more comprehensive in its application. CA was not specific to a type of operation but must be tailored to specific challenges encountered during a mission, as Professor Farrell observed: “I think [CA] is actually about developing the conceptual and institutional capabilities, capacities, so that we can then apply it to each operation as it comes along.” Nonetheless, the stability operations doctrine did not squarely address the implications of CA for existing PSO and COIN rules, among others. In failing to set out how CA fits with these existing rules, the doctrine granted readers a high level of discretion in their interpretation of how a comprehensive approach is to be developed and implemented in complex missions. Military leaders retained considerable flexibility in setting the terms of the armed forces ‘supported’ and ‘supporting’ roles during stability operations.

JDP 3-40 reflected the British military’s attempt to capture the complexities of contemporary missions as encountered during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Drawing on existing doctrinal rules, the doctrine converted these rules towards the purposes of stability operations. It set out a framework for the military’s contribution to stabilization operations that addressed emerging CA requirements and established a systematic way to deliver a coordinated, interagency response to complex crises. In the process of converting existing rules towards the goals of stabilization, there remain gaps in the guidance for the armed forces and HMG entities engaged in these operations. Most significant among these, the doctrine did not resolve existing ambiguities around PSOs and stability operations, or identify the terms of the armed forces engagement with HMG entities throughout the “shape-secure-hold-develop’ process. As a result, the JWP 3-40

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granted the armed forces a high level of discretion in its interpretation and implementation of the “Operational Framework for Stabilisation Activity.”

The British Army’s *Field Manual Volume 1, Part 10 Countering Insurgency* reiterated the comprehensive approach in JWP 3-50. It stated that CA, in countering an insurgency, was “the sum of the parts of a cross-government policy delivering a political solution.”

Unity of effort across all entities including international organizations, NGOs and host nation governments was identified as one of several key principles of counterinsurgency based on the British army’s considerable history in these types of campaigns. The relationship between counterinsurgency and stabilization depicts counterinsurgency operations as nested within the major sectors of a stabilization campaign, that is, the “Governance, Security and Development” dimensions. The “size of the COIN bubble” varied with the “scale of the insurgency” and depends on how the campaign evolves over time. The shape it takes “depend[s] on the capacity of other government departments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations” and in turn, is tied to “the contribution that security forces can make to developmental and governance activities.”

In light of the military’s experience in Afghanistan, the BAF developed a separate doctrine on the military’s evolving role in PSOs, specifically its peacekeeping activities. Joint Doctrine Note 5/11 *Peacekeeping: An Evolving Role for Military Forces* (JDN 5/11) elaborated on the distinction between specific types of PSOs and stability

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157 Ibid
operations set out in JPD 3-40. Traditionally, peacekeeping missions were predicated on a peace agreement or ceasefire of violence, and the armed forces, as peacekeepers, impartially carry out mandates with the consent of the main warring factions in support of a long-term peace settlement. However, in contemporary peace operations, such as in Afghanistan, the level of consent and compliance among warring factions may be limited or vary over time, and the threat of disruption may be high. The doctrine also differentiated between peacekeeping and stabilization operations. Unlike peacekeeping operations, military involvement in stabilization operations proceeded where the consent was provided by the host nation government, but not by other warring parties. This reflected the situation in Afghanistan where intervening actors and armed forces had the consent of the GoA, but not of the Taliban, which actively undermined the GoA and its foreign supporters. In its explanation of peacekeeping and stability operations, JDN 5/11 reflected the British military’s continued efforts to clarify concepts and provide useful guidelines for armed forces involved in peace, stability and counterinsurgency efforts.

In sum, the British armed forces’ doctrinal rules at the outset of the Afghan mission provided military commanders and members significant discretion in the implementation of concepts and practices designed to guide operations. The military’s

160 The MOD defined stabilisation as “the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and infrastructure; promote political processes and government structures; and prepare for sustainable social and economic development.” See UK Ministry of Defence, *Peacekeeping*, 1-1.
161 The Joint Doctrine Note also differentiated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. According to JDN 5/11, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the warring parties; peace enforcement may precede peacekeeping; in the event a peace process collapses, peace enforcement may replace peacekeeping. See UK Ministry of Defence, *Peacekeeping*, 1-4 – 1-6.
weak veto possibilities during the Helmand mission were tied to the ambiguous, but numerous goals of the mission, insufficient resources and troops to clear and hold areas affected by insurgent forces, and poor civil-military coordination. With HMG’s renewed commitment to the mission and a surge of American troops, the British strategy for Afghanistan involved a comprehensive approach, counterinsurgency operations, and an emphasis on long-term stabilization in the country. In parallel, British doctrine developed in ways that reflected the convergence of peace support and counterinsurgency concepts, and the role of these operations in stabilization missions. The civil-military coordination principle of classic counterinsurgency provided a basis for the comprehensive approach and the crux of British stabilization doctrine. Through this evolution, the armed forces’ institutional rules were transformed in ways that reoriented the military towards the broader and longer-term goal of stabilization in conflict and post-conflict phases of new wars.

Adaptation of In-Country Command Arrangements through Conversion

Prior to 2001, the British military’s rules for in-country civil-military relations were based on experiences during Cold War counterinsurgencies and more recent informal dealings with HMG entities in peace operations in the 1990s. In past counterinsurgency missions, military commanders served as the directors and overseers of joint, civilian and military initiatives in theatre of operations. Either by official appointment or in a de facto position, a military leader exercised authority and influence in a civilian context. In more recent contexts, military commanders exercised discretion in their support for civilian entities and members established informal, ad hoc
relationships with other government departments involved in overseas peace initiatives. These informal practices became a guide for action in complex environments and provided the basis for the armed forces’ approach to in-country unity of effort and civil-military organization in Afghanistan.

For the first years of the British mission in Afghanistan the military was the only UK entity able to deploy outside Kabul. The armed forces led military and non-military aspects of the mission, and their contact with other HMG entities was limited to civil-military PRT activities. Before the UK mission in Helmand, civil-military cooperation among British government entities and the armed forces occurred primarily within the context of the PRT. It was within this team that relationships were forged among political, development and military actors from the UK, as well as with members of other militaries and other non-government organizations. The joint command team for the UK PRTs in northern Afghanistan included the PRT Commander from MOD, a development adviser from DFID and a political Adviser from Foreign Office, each responsible for leadership of certain activities within the PRT. Funding for small-scale projects by the PRT was allocated to this group, rather than to a single individual.162 At the embassy level, the British Ambassador to Afghanistan in Kabul led the inter-ministerial Afghan Steering Group in London and the Kabul Steering Group, established in 2005, which included representatives from the BAF and the PCRU.163 Key government departments and military members also deployed representatives to Kandahar.

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162 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, EV 52.
When the UK took over responsibility for Helmand province as part of NATO's ISAF mission, the *UK Plan for Helmand* developed in 2006 identified departmental leads to oversee separate strands of activity. The Deputy Commander of Task Force Helmand was the lead for security, two senior FCO representatives were responsible for Governance and Rule of law activities, respectively and the senior DFID representative oversaw Development initiatives. Together these departmental leaders represented the Helmand Executive Group collocated to facilitate decision-making, disburse of funds for QIPs and perform regular reviews of progress on the *UK Joint Helmand Plan*.\(^{164}\) While the HEG was moved to Kabul after a targeted suicide attack, the group eventually returned to Lashkar Gah, where it was collocated with the UK Task Force Headquarters. From this location, UK civilian and military representatives in the Helmand Executive Group and from the PRT held weekly teleconferences with senior officials in London.\(^{165}\)

Although a basic civil-military architecture was in place during the early phase of the Helmand mission, there were significant challenges to the successful implementation of a comprehensive approach in the province. Chief among these obstacles was the difficulty experienced by civilian departments to find qualified personnel willing to deploy to Helmand, especially given the precarious security conditions in the province. This was further complicated by the fact that DFID, FCO and MOD had separate terms and conditions for staff deploying overseas that led to delays in civilian arrivals.\(^{166}\) As well, each department established separate thresholds for the degree of security needed in an area to deploy staff. As Brigadier Butler explained to the House of Commons Defence

\(^{164}\) UK House of Commons International Development Committee, *Reconstructing Afghanistan*, EV 56.
\(^{166}\) UK House of Commons Defence Committee, *The Comprehensive Approach*, 35.
Committee in 2010, the differences across the departments contributed to civil-military tensions in theatre:

Most risk averse was DFID and that was institutional, legal, personal and cultural, then you had the FCO, then members of the security services and then the military, and trying to get a common consensus of what was secure and sufficient security to go out and do the business, in this case, reconstruction and development, was extremely frustrating on all sides.\footnote{Ibid.}

These tensions were exacerbated by the terms of the \textit{UK Joint Plan for Helmand}. In addition to its incomplete appreciation for the situation in Helmand, the plan did not clearly identify the objectives for civil-military action or set out a process for the plan’s implementation. Civil-military unity of effort was also hindered government entities competing, and often conflicting, priorities, their separate approaches to planning and operating in dangerous environments. The British military, a highly integrated and influential force in Afghanistan in comparison to their civilian counterparts, pursued a course of action separate from civilian entities’ activities, and struggled to apply its limited manpower and resources to fight an active insurgency across the province.

By 2008, HMG initiated a number of changes that altered the strategic political-military context of the British mission in Afghanistan. HMG’s \textit{National Security Strategy} endorsed a comprehensive approach to international emergencies, including the mission in Helmand. HMG shifted its attention from the Iraq to focus on improving the British efforts in Afghanistan and it committed additional resources for the civilian and military elements of the mission. On the civilian side, the Stabilisation Unit was with the responsibility of recruiting, training and deploying qualified personnel on overseas postings to targeted countries, including Afghanistan. HMG identified the Stabilisation
Unit in the planning and delivery of British programs overseas, including civil-military efforts in Helmand. On the military side, the HMG deployed more troops and additional resources to fight Taliban insurgents and drug lords. This bigger and better equipped force was able to reach out to the indigenous army and conduct more influence activities, and eventually the security situation in the province improved.

At the same time, the reinvigorated Stabilisation Unit and the British military worked together to develop a *Helmand Road Map*. More civilian personnel were deployed alongside the armed forces to implement this renewed blueprint for British efforts in the province. Taken together, these developments reduced both the requirement and the ability of the military to conduct operations apart from other government entities.

HMG’s emphasis on the adoption of a comprehensive approach to overseas missions and the revitalized role of the Stabilisation Unit in Afghanistan reflected shifts in the political-military context of the mission. These developments had significant implications for the civil-military command arrangements at all levels in Afghanistan.168 At the national and embassy levels, the reach of British civilian leadership in Afghanistan was strengthened when the British Ambassador to Afghanistan in Kabul was appointed the leader of a cross government committee, later named the Afghanistan Delivery Group (ADG), which included representative from MOD, DFID and FCO. The ADG was the “primary governance body in-country” established to oversee, coordinate, and assess the overall British effort in Afghanistan. Departmental representative reported on their activities to respective departmental official through the Afghanistan Strategy Group, the

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Cabinet office chaired committee in London. Resources for ADG approved activities were provided through tri-departmental funds, as well as through FCO program budgets and DFID’s country plan for Afghanistan. Decisions on specific projects were also made through these in-country coordination processes.

In late 2008, provincial level in-country unity of effort was formally adopted when the Helmand Executive Group, the civilian leadership of the mission, was combined with the task force headquarters and the PRT to create the UK Civil-Military Mission Helmand (CMMH) in Lashkar Gah in June 2008. The Commander Task Force Helmand and the UK Senior Representative in Helmand, a senior FCO diplomat, co-led the CMMH. 169 While the Commander took direction from Chief of Joint Operations at PJHQ and Commander ISAF, the Senior Representative reported to the HM Ambassador in Kabul. But when mounting a military operation, the Commander consulted with the Senior Representative. 170 The CMMH was an integrated structure that coordinated efforts of the MOD, DFID, FCO and international partners in the implementation of the new joint Helmand Road Map. Together, the civilians and military members of CMMH carried out a work process defined by eight steps of action that ensured the development and implementation of “civilian led priority of desired effects.” 171 With nearly fifty experts from across government departments, the civilian component of CMMH reported on progress in Helmand and civil-military teams provided regular joint civil-military

169 UK House of Commons Defence Committee on Defence, The Comprehensive Approach, 50.
reports to Whitehall via the Ambassador in Kabul.\textsuperscript{172}

Tasks previously carried out separately by civilian representatives and the military in Afghanistan were conducted jointly, such as intelligence, political analysis, planning, media and communications, and stabilization.\textsuperscript{173} Senior officials reported that, while physical collocation was limited due to available accommodations in Helmand, they claimed that the CMMH “structure itself provide[d] a framework in which the military and the growing number of civilian staff [could] integrate their work more effectively.”\textsuperscript{174} They contended that the CMMH was a unique mechanism for joint teams, and critical to the implementation of the *Helmand Roadmap*.

In accordance with the HMG’s 2008 NSS, the Stabilisation Unit trained and deployed a growing number of British government personnel and civilian experts to Afghanistan. In 2009, HMG reported that the number of civilians in the UK-led joint civil-military PRT in Helmand had doubled in a year.\textsuperscript{175} Within a year, civilian departments and agencies had improved their ability to recruit, train and deploy qualified personnel to overseas operations. Dr. Nemat ‘Minouche’ Shafik, the Permanent Secretary at DFID, reported on improvements of civilian entities recruitment and deployment of personnel to Afghanistan:

> I think that there is actually quite a good story to tell in terms of the lesson learning and the adaptation that has occurred in terms of the number of people and types of people we have been able to deploy. If you look at the early days there was serious difficulty, for example, in recruiting civilians to go to Helmand. At

\textsuperscript{172} Edward Burke, *Leaving the Civilians Behind: The ‘Soldier-Diplomat’ in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Madrid, Spain: FRIDE, September 2009), 11.

\textsuperscript{173} UK House of Commons Defence Committee, “Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development,” in *The Comprehensive Approach*, EV 89.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.

the moment the vacancy rate in Helmand is well below 10 per cent and we are able to fill every post, and that reflects the fact that we have tapped into lots of different kinds of people and we have trained our own people and we have systems in place that can support them when they are there so that they can be effective, and I think that is a very good sign of us being able to respond and adapt.176

Likewise, Sir Peter Ricketts, Permanent Secretary, FCO, reported that since the early phase of the mission the department had improved its capacity and the ability of its personnel to operate in “difficult and dangerous circumstances,” as he explained in his testimony to the House of Commons Defence Committee: “We have built up to having one of our largest concentrations of diplomats anywhere in the world actually in Kabul; and very substantial operations in Lashkar Gah…We have learnt how to operate right alongside the military and we have had to learn about duty of care to our staff so that our staff can be out there right behind the front line and working very closely with DFID in doing that.”177 By 2010, eighty of the 165 members of the CMMH were civilians, twice the number of civilians that were in Helmand in 2009. The majority of these members were working at the CMMH located in Lashkar-Gar.

The joint civil-military structure at the CMMH was replicated across Helmand. At the district level, the Helmand PRT created ten-person joint civil-military Stabilisation Teams in which civilian expertise and military capabilities were applied to achieve shared objectives. On the civilian side, members included stabilization advisors, civilian specialist, and a political advisor, and each team had up to ten civilian personnel. On the military side, the team included a Military Stabilisation Support Team (MSST), a Danish CIMIC Support Team or, since 2009, a US Civil Affairs Team. The military elements

176 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, The Comprehensive Approach, 35.
focused on coordinating civil-military activities at the regimental, battle group and HQ levels. Stabilisation Teams were collocated with nearby Battle Group District headquarters at outposts in five districts around Helmand, four of which were Forward Operating Bases. Working together, civilian district stabilization advisors and political officers consulted with the British Battle Group commander and set “the overall direction for priorities in supporting the district governor.”

The Obama Administration’s plans for Afghanistan increased the number of American troops and civilian advisers, and provided additional resources for development in the country. Beginning in June 2009, thousands of Marines led by an American Marine Corps General were sent to reinforce the British Task Force Helmand. The British and American militaries, in cooperation with Afghan armed forces, conducted complementary counterinsurgency operations throughout the province. American, along with Danish and Estonian, civilian and military equivalents were eventually integrated into CMMH, including into district level civil-military teams.

Strengthened by HMG’s commitment to mission and improvements in the security situation through 2008, civilian officials and the armed forces turned their attention to developing a comprehensive plan for the province, culminating in the Helmand Road Map in early 2008. For the military the shift in campaign strategy from the ink spot strategy towards greater focus on securing “Afghan Development Zones” also required a greater participation of the military in non-combat activities and the inclusion of civilian advisers in these efforts. These changes in the context of the mission

179 Teuten and Korski, ”Achieving Unity of Effort,” 81.
created new imperatives for cooperation and diminished the veto possibilities available to the armed forces in Helmand. The armed forces’ rules for accommodating civilian representatives in the chain of command were shaped by flexible, informal approaches to civil-military unity of effort developed during peace operations in the 1990s. In the absence of an institutionalized approach, military commanders adopted broad concepts of acceptable in-country arrangements. To meet the requirements of the *Helmand Road Map*, the armed forces converged its in-country architecture by integrating with civilian representatives at the national, provincial and district levels in Helmand. With a civilian at the helm, CMMH represents a new model for in-country command arrangements. The appointment of a civilian supervisor establishes civilian control over all elements of national power towards the achievement of the increasingly political goals of new wars.\(^{181}\) At the same time, it also represents the implementation of the British military’s long-standing call for a civilian supremo and the evolution of its institutional approach to command in complex security environments.

*Adaptation of Civil-Military Capability through Conversion*

The British military’s approach to CIMIC in 2001 was based on the experience of CIMIC Teams during the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia. In Bosnia, military leaders maintained a broad approach to civil-military relations and CA Units became directly involved in the management of DFID-funded reconstruction and development projects. The evolution of CIMIC from a peripheral activity of the armed forces to an

\(^{181}\) Burke, *Leaving the Civilian Behind*, 39.
institutionalized capability by 2011 is demonstrated in changes undertaken to formal
guidance and the structure of CIMIC over a ten-year period.

Beginning in 2003, the UK military issued formal rules for CIMIC that reflected
its experience in ongoing operations. The 2003 Interim publication, JWP 3-90 Civil-
Military Cooperation, addressed the civil-military dimension in the pursuit of the
country’s security priorities in which military action alone is insufficient and in which the
military must work with diplomatic, economic and development entities to contain
conflict.182 A revised definition of CIMIC addressed the role of civil-military cooperation
in achieving political aims; as described in doctrine, CIMIC was “[t]he process whereby
the relationships between military and civilian sectors is addressed with the aim of
enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or
International Objectives.”183 The most significance aspect of this doctrine was its
redefinition of CIMIC as a process integral to the achievement of political aims rather
merely an activity to support the commander or to facilitate military operations, as the
text noted,184

CIMIC is applicable throughout the full spectrum of tension, and in all phases of
conflict it assists in shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of
both military and civil actors. The process of harmonizing civil and military
planning should begin at the highest political levels, and commanders should
consider the CIMIC dimension of the operation from the outset of the planning
process; it should be integrated into the campaign plan, and it should remain
coherent throughout the operational and tactical levels.185

182 UK Ministry of Defence, Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) (Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-
183 UK Ministry of Defence, Civil-Military Co-operation, Glossary-1. The doctrine acknowledged that in
peace support operations the successful implementation of CIMIC had the potential to alter the operational
environment in ways that enhanced the contribution of military operations to meet overarching objectives
184 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations, 106; Thornton, “The Role of Peace Support
Operations,” 42.
In this regard, CIMIC considerations and the CIMIC process were to be integrated into the existing chain of command.\textsuperscript{186} This broad interpretation of CIMIC created conceptual space for charting new relationships between the armed forces and civilian entities seeking to achieve the long-term, political goals of overseas missions.

To achieve these ends, the doctrine outlined specific requirements for implementing CIMIC. The military commander was responsible for achieving the harmonization of civilian and military efforts across the entire spectrum of tensions, and specific direction was given for achieving this aim. CIMIC staff of trained specialists was to be fully integrated into the military command headquarters and to provide an “interface for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange at all levels between military forces, civilian organizations, agencies and in-theatre civil influences.” It was the rules set out in this doctrine that provided the basis for military participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

In addition to the rules for UK CIMIC captured in JWP 3-90 \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation}, military CIMIC teams involved in PRTS followed the operational guidance from the CAG, which was replaced by the Joint CIMIC Group in 2004. By recruiting from other services, the JCAG doubled the number of regular members available to “support all deployable formations with specialists CIMIC staff, including provision of internal and external training to Defence.”\textsuperscript{187} The mandate of the new group expanded on the enabling functions of CAG and took on “a more pro-active and central position

\textsuperscript{186} Zaalberg, “Historical Origins of Military Cooperation,” 18.
\textsuperscript{187} Reference for this paragraph: UK House of Commons Defence Committee, “Memorandum from Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development,” in \textit{The Comprehensive Approach}, Ev. 162.
within [overseas] mission.” Its operations were based on the idea that CIMIC was key to the collection of information and intelligence in theatre, and to the armed forces’ conduct of activities on behalf of other government departments in non-permissive environments.

From July 2003 to 2005, the British PRT was the primary civil-military instrument employed by the UK aimed at extending the reach of the Afghan government to the provinces and supporting development and reconstruction. The initial British PRT model was based on a concept of joint leadership whereby MOD, FCO, DFID and armed forces’ worked side by side, which was possible due to the largely permissive environment in Northern Afghanistan that experienced minimal infighting among locals or other threats. The civilian and military elements focused on creating consensus among local stakeholders, and facilitating and enabling reconstruction projects through networking, institution building and intelligence gathering and counternarcotics efforts. To facilitate these efforts, the PRT’s military Mobile Observation Teams of six to eight personnel conducted patrols in the areas, carried out information campaigns and acted as mediator to cease hostilities between fighting factions.

The deployment of British troops to Helmand in 2006 coincided with the MOD’s announcement of a fully operational Joint CIMIC Group (JCG) and the release of revised CIMIC doctrine in April 2006. The JCG and the CIMIC doctrine provided the foundations for the military’s approach to civilian entities and cooperation within the Helmand PRT, which the UK assumed control for in May 2006. The British military’s new CIMIC doctrine, JDP 3-90 Civil-Military Co-operation, released in April 2006, was

188 Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 28.
189 Ibid.
190 Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 56.
191 Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 28.
intended to provide operational level guidance for British commanders and his or her staff “responsible for the coherence of CIMIC in the Joint Operations Area.” CIMIC was defined as the “co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and Non-Governmental Organizations and agencies”. CIMIC was described as a “function of operations conducted to allow the Commander to interact effectively, on a day-to-day basis, with the civil environment in…Joint Operations.” The doctrine required military commanders to adopt “a more comprehensive and long-term view of the strategic environment” and support the harmonization of “all contributions, enabling better identification and achievement of desired outcomes.” It was expected that the armed forces engage with their civilian counterparts at every level and through every phase of an operation, and incorporate CIMIC staff and processes into the military chain of command to support the implementation of more comprehensive approaches to operations.

At the strategic level, the armed forces were expected to work with other government entities were to develop plans to meet HMG policy goals for a given mission. At the operational level, CIMIC was an activity and a function, and was expected to support interaction between military commanders and civilian entities, and facilitate the achievement of sub-objectives to be pursued at the tactical level of the

mission.\textsuperscript{194} As a hub of joint civil-military planning and activities, the British military doctrine described the PRT as the “logical extension of the aims of CIMIC.”\textsuperscript{195} At the same time, the publication did not elaborate on the relationship between CIMIC and the PRT. For instance, it did not explain how the CIMIC staff and processes were expected to support or be integrated in the PRT, nor did it address how members were to prioritize the military-focused CIMIC activities, conducted in support of the military commander, and its role in civilian-led PRT initiatives.

In Afghanistan, the JCG sent CIMIC staff teams (CSTs) comprised of four CIMIC personnel, including functional specialists, CIMIC advisors and CIMIC practitioners to deployed formations in Helmand.\textsuperscript{196} At the operational level, staff officers to headquarters and civil-military structures, namely, PRTs. Familiar with the limits and motivations of civilian entities, the CIMIC staff’s main task was to liaise with other organizations, participate in intergovernmental and interagency working groups, participate in operational planning at the military headquarters, report on progress, and provide information to commanders and other CIMIC personnel.\textsuperscript{197} This involved working with stabilization and development personnel to develop proposals to be submitted to the PRT, or similar entity, for funding. When the security situation

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\textsuperscript{194} The doctrine defined CIMIC in the following terms: “CIMIC is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and Non-Governmental Organisations and agencies.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{195} UK Ministry of Defence, Civil-Military Cooperation (Joint Doctrine Publication 3-90), 4-6.

\textsuperscript{196} CIMIC teams were defined as “A team of (usually) 4 CIMIC personnel from the Joint CIMIC Group supporting the command by conducting field assessments of civil environment, establishing or managing CIMIC centres and planning and supervising designated tasks (such as Quick Impact Projects) in support of the civil environment.” UK Ministry of Defence, Civil-Military Cooperation, Glossary -1.

\textsuperscript{197} Interdepartmental and interagency working groups were led by civilian and military experts, and consisted of members of local government, representatives from international organizations and NGOs, and other interested partners. To facilitate the comprehensive approach CIMIC personnel ensured that civilian programs and planning were “also integrated with the military planning cycle.” See UK Joint CIMIC Group, “Contemporary Civil-Military,” 56.
prevented the deployment of civilian representatives, these personnel would provide an “outreach” function and work with the PRT. Their aim was to “[ensure] all military activity, and especially pre-planned kinetic targeting, [was] undertaken with an understanding of both the impact of the immediate operation and longer-term ramifications for the civil environment.” As well, the staff worked to “mitigate negative effects and capitalize on opportunities” to foster consent and influence the population. At the tactical levels, CSTs were attached to a battalion or company, and the teams participated in the planning and assessment processes and to provide a liaison functions. Their objectives were to develop relationships and create mutual understanding among leaders and the population, support the military and civilian population, and “to set the conditions for subsequent stabilization and development activity.”  

Therefore, by 2006, when the UK assumed the leadership of the Helmand PRT based in Lashkar Gah, the military’s existing rules for CIMIC afforded members a high degree of discretion in how they employed CIMIC capabilities, especially in support of PRTs. The Helmand PRT was collocated with the headquarters of the UK Task Force Helmand, which supported joint civil-military decision-making. However, by this time, government entities had only deployed a small number of civilians to Helmand, and the security situation in the province limited their ability to deploy beyond Lashkar Gah. The onslaught of violent confrontations with drug lords and insurgents made it

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198 UK Joint CIMIC Group, “Contemporary Civil-Military,” 56.
199 Farrell, Improving in War, 574.
200 In 2006, a small number of civilians from the Stabilisation Unit, FCO and DFID were deployed to the PRT. By 2007 this number grew to twenty-five. See Robert Egnell, “Lessons Learned in Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency?” International Affairs 87, no.2 (2011), 308.
“extremely difficult” for civilians to “move out from the base to meet with local people,” and adversely impacted the growth of the Helmand PRT’s civilian capacity.201

Given the poor security situation in Helmand in 2006, the UK government entities and the armed forces decided that QIPs would be conducted to simultaneously improve the security situation in the province, and supporting the delivery of basic, but much needed public services to the local population. Military personnel at the Task Force Headquarters and the CIMIC group attached to the PRT came together to create a separate branch that worked with the Helmand Executive Group to develop a list of priority QIPs that aligned with the goals of local GoA officials. Restrictions on civilian members meant that the PRT relied primarily on CIMIC teams to identify opportunities for QIPs. CIMIC patrols, in turn, called on its few local contacts in Lashakar Gar and Gereshk willing to work with the PRT to implement the projects. 202

In 2008 the shift in HMG attention from Iraq to Afghanistan had a positive impact on the Helmand mission. HMG’s commitment of additional resources and soldiers bolstered the effectiveness of the military’s counterinsurgency efforts and the situation in Helmand steadily improved. With improved security conditions, restrictions on civilian movements outside Lashkar gar were relaxed. The PRT was able to deploy stabilization advisers and newly created military stabilization support teams to forward operating bases throughout Helmand, extending the “reach and capability” of the PRT’s civil effect

202 Sherwood, “Reconstruction and Development,” 93. Dr. Stuart Gordon noted that while the PRT’s QIPs realized some success in winning the consent of the local population, in 2006 and early 2007. However, the PRT did not have the mechanisms to assess the impact of the QIPs or monitor risks inherent to specific projects. He also noted that the lack of capacity in the PRT to assess and monitor these projects had an adverse effect on the local population’s regard for the UK mission in Helmand. See Stuart Gordon, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province,” in Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations, eds. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, April 2011), 43. .
across the province. Over the next year the number of civilians deployed to the PRT by the Stabilisation Unit grew to eighty, up from twenty-five in 2007. That spring HMG approved the *Helmand Road Map* developed by the PCRU and military planners in the province. The Road Map was built on the brigade’s operational plans but also took into account the lessons learned by the PRT over the past two years. Taking into account the failures of the UK Helmand QIP program, the *British Helmand Road Map* paid special attention to how to engage local leaders and provincial authorities in constructive debate about community needs and development priorities.

Since 2008, the Stabilisation Unit steadily increased its capacity to deploy qualified civilian personnel on overseas missions and eventually, in December 2009, announced the creation of the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG). The CSG was comprised of 1,000 civilian personnel available for potential deployment to “post-conflict missions overseas,” which permitted the Stabilisation Unit to deploy up to 200 personnel at any one time, if required. At the Stabilisation Unit grew its capacity to deploy qualified civilians, government departments realized an improved presence, and therefore, influence over the direction of the mission in Helmand.

The same year the Stabilisation Unit was founded, the military formally institutionalized the role of the military in ongoing stability operations, especially the extensive application of CIMIC as part of the PRT, with the creation of the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG). In light of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MSSG’s were tasked with the preparation and delivery “civil

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effect/CIMIC planning teams and functional specialists, capable of providing stabilisation support to all deployed formation HQs and Battle Groups (BGs).” The MSSG expanded CIMIC training previously provided by JCG’s to ensure military staff were prepared to plan, co-ordinate and deliver military capabilities to achieve civilian effects. It also provided pre-deployment CIMIC and stabilisation training for the entire British Task Force in Afghanistan. In effect, the establishment of MSSG reflected the evolution of CIMIC from its function as “enabler for security and military operations”, to increasingly critical capability for the UK’s overseas missions. Fully operational in November 2009, the MSSG and its civilian counterpart, the Stabilisation Unit, commenced joint training: members of the CSG participated in military training exercises and courses, and MSSG personnel attended courses organized by the Unit.

In Helmand, the MSSG and civilians from Stabilisation Unit developed an integrated approach to stabilization in districts across the province. Specifically, MSSG trained Military Stabilisation Support Teams were dispatched alongside civilian district stabilization advisers and political officers deployed by the Stabilisation Unit. The civilian members, in consultation with the battle group commander, set the overall direction and priorities for a given district. The MSSG teams, comprised of five or six

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207 “Civil effects is a term associated with “the work of the MOD within the Comprehensive Approach”. They may be defined as the “activities carried out with and for the civilian population and civil society that are in line with the Commanders’ objectives for the mission.” These activities may include QIPs, “‘hearts and minds’ activities for consent winning, reconstruction of infrastructure and capacity building of government ministries including security sector reform” See Tearfund, “Appendix J: Tearfund comments on National Audit Office research to support the house of Defence Committee inquiry into the Comprehensive Approach,” included in the *Defence Committee Inquiry into the Comprehensive Approach, Perspectives of Non-Governmental Organisations on the Comprehensive Approach, A Paper prepared by the National Audit Office for the Defence Committee* (Victoria, London: National Audit Office, 2009), 64.
military officers, supported the implementation of these priorities by, for instance, managing contracts for projects to be delivered by NGOs or local contractors. In Helmand, the Task Force Battle group established the security needed for the civilians and MSSTs to carry out these activities, while the Embassy and PRT provided necessary support, such as working with GoA officials, for local projects. By December 2009 the MSSG had deployed forty personnel to the British military operation, Operation Herrick, in Afghanistan to carry out stabilization planning functions focused on CIMIC. This group was composed primarily of regular forces. In addition to six reservists, the MSSG deployed six members from the Royal Navy, twenty-eight member of from the British Army, and six members from the Royal Air Force. An additional forty personnel were deployed on the same operation as functional specialists in the areas of counter narcotics, civil engineering and police mentoring.

The creation of MSSG was not accompanied by updated CIMIC rules that reflected the extensive application of this capability by the armed forces in stability operations, specifically the use of military capabilities to achieve civil effects. Rather, the rules set out in the April 2006 doctrine set out two general roles for CIMIC: first, CIMIC was a task conducted to support the Commander in interaction with the civil environment; and, second, CIMIC staff and processes could be integrated at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the military chain of command to support a comprehensive approach to operations. Given these ambiguous rules for CIMIC, military commanders exercised a high degree of discretion with respect to the nature and extent of

CIMIC in stability operations. During the early years of the UK mission in Helmand, CIMIC teams were the eyes and ears of the PRT, as well as the key contact for local contractors involved in implementation of the PRT’s QIPS throughout the province. In 2008, new imperatives for a comprehensive approach and the enhanced capacity of the Stabilisation Unit sparked the military’s formalization of its contribution to CA and the UK’s stability operations. This wide interpretation of CIMIC by the armed forces was institutionalized in the MSSG, a permanent military entity dedicated to training members to become planners, advisors, managers and coordinators in support of civilian efforts to stabilize countries emerging from conflict or crisis. In effect, the ambiguous rules for CIMIC were redeployed in ways that converted the military capability to the comprehensive approach and the political goals of British stability operations.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The British armed forces adapted its doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capability over the course of the mission in Afghanistan through the process of conversion. The findings of this analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional rules was a primary factor affecting institutional adaptation of the British armed forces in Afghanistan. The informal institutional rules developed during Cold War counterinsurgencies and peace support operations in the 1990s afforded actors a high level of discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of rules. Due to their diminished veto possibilities, the armed forces relied on conventional warfare tactics to combat an increasingly powerful insurgency and exerted little influence on the delivery of CA in Helmand. The case study demonstrated that the political context can impact the armed
forces’ ability to preserve existing rules and mediates the changes undertaken by the institution when it is under pressure to reform. Although the armed forces were able to interpret their mission and objectives in accordance with institutional views and experiences, their ability to implement these plans on the ground was hampered by lack of resources and insufficient troops.

Once HMG recommitted to the mission and an American troop surge was initiated, the military was better able to contain the insurgency and work side-by-side with their civilian counterparts across the province. Upon the announcement of Prime Minister Brown’s new strategy for Afghanistan and the creation of the Stabilisation Unit, a civilian led interagency unit, the armed forces were no longer the de facto lead on civilian initiatives and HMG entities were able to participate as equal, effective partners in joint initiatives. The balance of civilian and military commitments in Afghanistan aligned with the forces’ historic approach to complex operations. The military took steps to formalize rules in doctrine, create an integrated civil-military command structure, and develop their CIMIC capacity to better support modern-day operations. Ultimately, the institutional and political factors resulted in the adaptation of the armed forces to unity of effort requirements through the process of conversion.
Chapter 4:

Canadian Forces, Unity of Effort and the Afghanistan Mission

The following case study applies the Framework for Explaining Military Change to the Canadian Forces (CF) and to an analysis of the military’s adaptation to requirements for a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan.¹ This is initiated with the identification of the driver of change, which in this case was the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (also known as the Manley Panel) appointed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in late 2007. The Panel’s report recommended a rebalancing of the civilian and military commitments in Afghanistan, and greater cooperation across government entities and the armed forces. The case study proceeds with an examination of the CF’s existing rules for complex operations at the onset of the war in 2001 and an examination of the veto possibilities afforded the armed forces during the mission and upon the release of the Manley Panel’s recommendations in 2008. The strength of military agents’ veto powers is assessed based on their exercise of their formal authorities, as well as in terms of sub-commanders’ influence on the national mission, including the military campaign and civilian initiatives. The last section examines how institutional rules and the strength of military agents’ veto possibilities contributed to specific changes to doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capabilities from 2001 to 2011. Based on these findings, the case study closes with a conclusion on the research hypothesis guiding the analysis.

¹ In 2013 the Harper Government began to refer to the Canadian Forces as the Canadian Armed Forces. The terms are interchangeable and this study uses “Canadian Forces,” the official name of the entity during the Afghanistan mission.
The Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan’s report and its recommendations for a rebalancing of Canada’s civilian and military commitment initiated changes to the CF’s existing approach to the Afghanistan mission. The Panel called for greater coordination of Canadian government entities and the armed forces, and the creation of mechanisms to support interagency initiatives and unity of effort in Afghanistan. In accordance with the Panel’s recommendations, the Government of Canada (GoC) created a cabinet committee to support cross-government coordination and a full-time Afghanistan Task Force within the Privy Council Office. It also identified key priorities for the mission and implemented reporting requirements whereby the GoC would update Parliament and the Canadian public on progress on these priority projects. Most significant for the armed forces was appointment of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), a civilian representative deployed to Afghanistan to oversee government representatives in Afghanistan, and to establish greater synergy between civilians and the military in theatre. Improved cooperation across civilian departments and agencies, and the CF led to the creation of a joint plan for the Canadian mission in Kandahar in late 2008. Having identified the primary external driver of change, it is possible to move on to consider the military’s existing rules for complex operations and the veto possibilities experienced by military agents in Afghanistan. The case study then moves on to an examination of the impact of the CF’s institutional characteristics and the veto possibilities of military agents on how the armed forces’ adapted aspects of its organization to unity of effort requirements from 2001 to 2011.
Existing Rules for Complex Operations

Canadian Forces and Cold War Peacekeeping

The CF’s institutional rules for complex operations after 2001 were informed by their previous experience in multinational peacekeeping missions and low-intensity conflicts through the Cold War years, and the complex operations it conducted throughout the 1990s. Among its key peacekeeping deployments during the Cold War, Canada dispatched detachments to India and Pakistan, parts of the Middle East, the Congo and Cyprus. In the 1950s, the Canadian forces joined international peacekeeping forces (the United Nations Emergency Force) in the Arab Israeli War. In 1960, the Canadian forces deployed to the Congo on a mission most akin to peace operations they would undertake after 1989. As part of the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, the forces delivered humanitarian aid, provided signalers to the mission, and evacuated refugees and Canadian nationals from the area.

With the exception of Canada’s experience in Cyprus and a number of incidents in the Congo, the Canadian army’s experience in low-intensity operations was limited to peacekeeping and support to peacekeeping forces as part of a large multinational force.

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2 Between 1950 and 1953, Canada forces, with troops from sixteen other UN member nations, deployed to Korea in response to the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea. Over 26,000 Canadians served in combat and in peacekeeping operations after the cessation of conflict. For an official account of the Canadian Forces in Korea see C.P. Stacey, Canada’s Army in Korea: The United Nations Operations, 1950-53, and their Aftermath (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956), last accessed April 11, 2015, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/docs/korea1956_e.pdf.

3 David A. Charters and James LeBlanc, “Peace-Keeping and Internal Security: the Canadian Army in Low-Intensity Operations,” in Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, eds. David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell (London, ON: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989), 149. In an operation most similar to recent experiences in Afghanistan, a small Canadian contingent in Cyprus participated in peace restoration operations that included the seizure of the airport in Nicos by UN troops to prevent its takeover by belligerent forces. Ibid.

4 Charters and LeBlanc, “Peace-Keeping and Internal Security,” 161, 155. The UN missions in the Congo, involved the propping up of the Congolese government by UN forces. The Congolese was under attack from Communist inspired sources. In Cyprus from 1964 to 1974, UN Forces, including its Canadian contingent, was involved in “fire brigading from ethnic hotspot to ethnic hotspot” in an attempt to prevent
Participation in these missions created with the CF an ability to defuse confrontations, prevent the escalation of conflict, and work with host nation governments and populations to restore peace. As well, the CF’s participation in international missions honed across the force an aptitude for multinational military interventions and an ability to overcome the logistical and structural challenges inherent to such missions.

Throughout the Cold War, the Canadian Government did not develop national mission strategies, but instead deployed troops under NATO and UN mandates. Once deployed the military conducted its operations virtually independent of the Canadian government, civilian officials and other departments and agencies. By the end of the Cold War, the CF’s informal rules for overseas missions were based on their participation in multinational peace operations, their experience working directly with host countries and populations, and limited consultation and cooperation with other government entities. As the next section demonstrates, these experiences were reflected in the rules and practices applied by the CF in post-Cold War operations.

Rules for Complex Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Just as the CF’s Cold War missions provided a basis for action after 1989, the approach taken to complex operations through the 1990s informed the rules and practices applied in Afghanistan in 2001. Given that institutional rules are a product of history and experience, this section reviews the state of CF doctrine, in-country command options and CIMIC capability during the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization

Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canadian Forces first deployed to the former Yugoslavia in April 1992 as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to protect non-combatants and monitor areas throughout the region. In December 1995, the General Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Peace Accord, was signed by warring factions and NATO created an Implementation Force (IFOR) to oversee and ensure its implementation. The CF contribution to the year-long mission involved, among other tasks, the maintenance of cease-fires and the provision of security to entities working to achieve the civilian aspects of the Accord.

Over 1,000 CF personnel were deployed as part of Canada’s commitment, which included the provision of Canadian-led Multinational Brigade Headquarters, reconnaissance and an infantry company, and the Canadian command and support elements. As the year-long IFOR mission reached its conclusion, NATO established a multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) to provide security for international agencies and local authorities to which Canada deployed upwards of 1,200 troops. The next section traces the development of doctrine, in-country command practices and CIMIC guidelines to identify the state of the CF’s rules for complex operations in 2001. In accordance with the theory of gradual change, the rules in place by the end of 1990s provided a basis for action in Afghanistan. A closer analysis will determine the degree of discretion they afforded military commanders and members in their interpretation and enforcement of existing rules.

Historically, the CF took an informal approach to doctrine, but tragic events in Somalia involving Canadian Soldiers in the early 1990s prompted the formal articulation of their rules and practices for overseas operations.\footnote{In 1994, the Canadian government created a commission to investigate reports of the death of a Somali teenager at the hands of Canadian soldiers deployed to Somalia in early 1993. The Commission’s inquiry revealed a dearth of doctrine, guidelines or standards for armed forces deployed on peace operations. See Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Executive Summary. Ottawa, ON: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997.} Based on Cold War experiences, the doctrine developed in the mid-1990s was focused on UN peacekeeping and emphasized a traditional approach to command. Within this structure, the CF CIMIC units operated on the periphery of command and pursued linkages with other government agencies on an ad hoc basis.

With respect to formal rules, CF publications maintained a distinction between traditional peacekeeping and other peace operations, which required the CF to take on “roles and objectives” broader than those applied in traditional peacekeeping.\footnote{Canada National Defence, Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations (1995), Para 2101.1.; Canada National Defence, Operations Land and Tactical Air, Volume 3 Peacekeeping (1995).} While the latter category was left largely undefined, the texts also differentiated between peace support operations and low-intensity operations.\footnote{Low intensity conflict (LIC) conflict was defined as “a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives” confined within a geographic area. See Canada Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations (1995), 104.} For the most part, the doctrine released in the early 1990s detailed the conduct of peace missions under UN mandates, and provided little guidance for all other operations. As a result, there was a considerable gap between the formal rules presented in military doctrine and the challenges faced by the CF when it deployed to Bosnia to join IFOR.
The limits of CF and Canadian Army peace operations doctrine for the post-Cold
War environment was evident in feedback from soldiers carrying out peace enforcement
and stabilization operations in Bosnia. In June 1996, the after action report of the first
rotation of the Canadian contingent of IFOR called for a strategic level policy and
appropriate doctrine for operations other than traditional peacekeeping; specifically, the
report identified the need for doctrine to guide peace-enforcement operations.9 Nearly a
year later, in May 1997, Canadian military units deployed with SFOR once again called
attention to the lack of formal doctrine for modern PSOs and the need for the
development of relevant guidance.10 In Bosnia, military commanders exercised
considerable discretion in how it pursued the non-military objectives set out in the
Dayton Accords.11 Upon deployment to Afghanistan, the CF’s existing doctrine did not
clearly articulate an institutional approach and actors were afforded a high degree of
discretion in the conduct of peace support and low-intensity operations.

The CF’s rules for in-country civil-military arrangements in Afghanistan were
based on their experience in peace operations during the 1990s. National militaries
participating in IFOR, and later, in SFOR operated within multinational divisions
(MNDs) across Bosnia that included designated sectors. During IFOR, Canadian troops
operated out of Multi-National Division (Southwest) (MND(SW)), the British-led

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9 Canadian Contingent Implementation Force Rotation One After-Action Report, June 1996, on
10Canada Army Lessons Learned Centre, Common Observations and Issues OP Palladium Rotations Zero
to Four, (Kingston, ON: Army Lessons Learned Centre, May 1997), 5.
11 The GFAP provided the overarching structure for civil-military arrangements during IFOR by setting
out the three primary vehicles for achieving the objectives of the mission: the military elements, a High
representative to coordinate civilian activities and a Donors Conference comprised of senior officials
involved in reconstruction and crisis management.
Headquarters in Banja Luka.\textsuperscript{12} While the Canadian Embassy in Sarajevo provided civilian oversight and the Deputy Ambassador approved and occasionally inspected the projects, neither CIDA nor any other government entities were represented at the divisional or brigade headquarters.\textsuperscript{13} Outside contact with the Ambassador in Sarajevo, the CF had limited contact with Canadian civilian personnel from other government departments. During the first months of IFOR, national armies undertook several infrastructure projects to improve the movement of troops and to establish supply lines for the military forces with positive consequences for the local population, and by October 1996 the members of the Canadian Brigade sector carried out three CIDA funded projects.\textsuperscript{14} Under these circumstances, the CF did not establish formal rules for in-country civil-military arrangements, but relied on the informal practice of leaving civil-military and cross-government matters to its CIMIC units. These units often operated outside the military’s command and on an ad hoc basis. Upon its deployment to Afghanistan, then, the CF’s existing practices for in-country civil-military coordination were not supported by formal structures or interagency bodies, but based on infrequent and, mostly, ad hoc contact with other government entities involved in the mission.

\textsuperscript{12}The mission of the Canadian Multinational Brigade (CMB) was set out in two formal orders. The first, covering the first three months of the mission, involved establishing military security in the area. Among its priorities, the CMB was focused on “force protection; firm, positive control; effective communication and liaison; and, the establishment of a credible, visible and robust presence” within its sector. At the six-month mark, given that the priorities for the first phase for the mission were achieved, the military was to shift their focus and resources to support and facilitate non-military aspects of the GFAP. \textit{Canadian Contingent Implementation Force Rotation One After-Action Report, June 1996}, on Information Warehouse CD-ROM, Version 8 (Kingston, ON: Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1998).


\textsuperscript{14}The only formal tie between GOC civilian entities and the CAF were those established through funding arrangements for reconstruction and development projects. These were managed by Canadian CIMIC units.
Likewise, the military had few formal rules to guide CIMIC in Bosnia. During the first months of IFOR, national armies undertook several infrastructure projects to improve the movement of troops and to establish supply lines for the military forces with positive consequences for the local population. By October 1996, the members of the Canadian Brigade sector’s CIMIC unit was involved in the delivery of three CIDA funded projects and activities that did not serve military purposes, but were for the strict benefit of civilians. In late 1995 IFOR operations were wound down and efforts were taken up by NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), and the CF’s CIMIC units officially shifted the focus of their efforts to stabilizing the areas of operation.

During SFOR, the CIMIC units developed a process by which they assessed potential projects within their area of operation and liaised with locals to determine civilian requirements. The military commander then reviewed the project proposals to determine which projects aligned with the mission’s stabilization objectives. CIMIC members hired an NGO or local contractor and supervised the implementation of the project. However, this process was not formalized and CIMIC arrangements remained highly fluid. The amount of time and energy dedicated to projects, the level of

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15 In the early months of IFOR, NATO’s SHAPE developed plans for CIMIC in Bosnia and IFOR headquarters tasked civilian support responsibilities to a separate CIMIC Task Force. National CIMIC teams were deployed from this Task Force throughout Bosnia, and field commanders below the supreme commander had minimal “control over civil affairs teams in their area of operations.” However, in March 1996, the “IFOR land component commander General Walker gave his divisional commanders more leeway to determine the extent and methods of their involvement in civil tasks.” See This Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 278. After this time national commanders established the nature and scope of CIMIC within their MNDs.
16 Siegel, “Associating Development,” 100.
17 The CF’s contribution to SFOR was smaller than that under IFOR. It involved 650 troops, but was reduced to eighty-five members in 2004. ReliefWeb, “Canadian Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” (September 26, 2005), accessed November 21, 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/canadian-operations-bosnia-herzegovina
consultation with the local population and leaders, the extent of soldiers participation in coordinating with civilian actors and the actual implementation of the project varied by rotation.\textsuperscript{19} The need for greater consistency over time was reflected in soldiers’ concerns that Canadian doctrine and CIMIC training was too geared towards warfare, and their recommendation for the “production of CIMIC doctrine and a plan for training CF personnel in CIMIC activities.”\textsuperscript{20} Two years after the start of SFOR, the Canadian military issued formal CIMIC rules.

In 1999 the CF institutionalized some of its CIMIC functions with the publication of a tactical level guide, \textit{CIMIC in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War}.\textsuperscript{21} The doctrine defined CIMIC in the following way,

\begin{quote}
In peace, emergencies, crisis or war, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and national authorities, civil, military and paramilitary as well as civil populations in an area where Canadian Forces elements are or plan to be deployed, employed and supported. Such measures would also include cooperation and coordination of activities between commanders and non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and civil authorities.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

According to the doctrine, the military’s involvement in post-conflict nation-building activities required “clear and guidelines from the Canadian Government and DND as to the areas of CIMIC commanders are authorized to get involved in and which correspond

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\textsuperscript{20} Canada Army Lessons Learned Centre, \textit{Analysis Report – OP Assurance} (Kingston, ON: Army Lessons Learned Centre, June 1997), 25-6.
\textsuperscript{21} This doctrine provided separate definitions for Civil-Military Cooperation and CIMIC Activity. Civil-Military Cooperation were the measures taken to support the coordination between military commanders and civilian entities; CIMIC was a military activity “intended to support the achievement of a military mission by pursuing an objective which is the responsibility of a military authority, [international organization] or NGO or civilian activity intended to support the achievement of a civilian aim by assisting in the pursuit of a military objective.” See Canada National Defence, \textit{Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War} (B-GG-005-004/AF-023) (1999), Annex A, 1A-5 - 1A-6.
\end{flushright}
to national interests.” Further, it instructed that after the government has taken the political decision to engage in an international operation, the lead time should be used by the task force commander to “plan, organize and consult with internal and external organizations” including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), CIDA, RCMP and UN organizations. The doctrine acknowledged that “[t]he CF had no formalized CIMIC structure at the strategic, operational or tactical levels beyond a limited organizational capability…organic to Joint Headquarters (JHQ) in Kingston.” It also stated that these ad hoc arrangements were “no longer suitable to meet the demanding challenges of civilian emergencies in either domestic or international operations” and that the CF intended to move “away from strict reliance on ad hoc arrangements.” Its purpose was to formalize CIMIC activities, force structure and purposes by the CF and to “move away from strict reliance on ad hoc arrangements.” In this regard the CIMIC was identified as a key consideration of operational planning. In 2000, the Chief of the Land Staff announced that the CF’s “very limited CIMIC capability” was reassigned to the army reserves where members were understood to have “a better inherent ability to deal with civilian agencies.”

Upon closer examination, there were clear limits to the applicability of this doctrine for CIMIC in practice. First, the doctrine assumed that the Government of Canada and DND would identify national interests and provide guidelines for CIMIC activities that aligned with these interests. It did not provide principles to help

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commanders determine the scope or contribution of CIMIC activities to the achievement of political objectives of a mission in the event that these instructions were not issued by civilian officials. Second, while the doctrine offered the first doctrinal reference to other government departments (OGDs), the formal rules only acknowledged the involvement of these civilian entities in the consultation phase of Canadian military involvement in UN Operations. It did not expand on how the army was to work with OGDs or civilian actors beyond the initial consultation stage of an operation or in the conduct of NATO operations. Finally, whereas the doctrine provided clear examples of the possible interrelationships among provincial/territorial and other government of Canada entities, and the armed forces in domestic operations, it did not provide a similar description of cross-government civil-military linkages in international operations. Overall, the CF’s doctrine did not reflect experience in recent peace missions, nor did it provide guidance to help members balance the military and civilian priorities in more complex situations.

The assignment of the capability as an army reserve function limited its exposure across CF elements and regular forces received minimal, if any, CIMIC training.\(^{28}\) As a result, there remained serious gaps between CIMIC rules and the environment in which they were to be applied, and between CIMIC units and the regular forces within which they were expected to operate. Ambiguous rules meant that CF commanders retained significant discretion over CIMIC was a consideration in operational planning and how CIMIC was incorporated within the traditional command structure.

\(^{28}\) In an Action Directive issued August 3, 2000, the Chief of Land Staff announced that the CF’s “very limited CIMIC capability” was reassigned to the army reserves where members were understood to have “a better inherent ability to deal with civilian agencies.” See Canada National Defence, *Action Directive 007/00 Army Reserve New Capability Initiatives Civil-Military Cooperation* (2000), 1, 2.
In sum, the Canadian military’s rules for complex operations at the outset of the 2001 Afghanistan war were based on their peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s. Formal doctrine for operations and CIMIC granted commanders and members discretion in the interpretation of rules, while reliance on the traditional command structures were less amenable to integration with civilian entities and cooperation with OGDs occurred on an ad hoc basis. The next section will consider the veto possibilities afforded by the political context of the mission from 2001 to 2011 and identify institutional leaders’ ability to preserve flexible rules for the conduct of operations other than war, traditional in-country structures, and an informal approach to CIMIC in foreign theatres.

The Canadian Mission in Afghanistan

The theory of gradual change posits that the larger political context impacts the ability of actors to preserve existing rules when they are under pressure to reform the institution. This section begins with an overview of the formal authorities of Canada’s elected officials and CF leaders as they relate to matters of national defence and the armed forces. It is followed by an assessment of military agents’ veto possibilities during Canada’s mission in Afghanistan from 2001 until the release of the Manley Panel’s report in 2008. The strength of veto possibilities military agents are assessed based on their strength as veto players and their veto potential. The veto powers of military agents are determined by their ability to exercise their formal authority to translate political goals into military objectives, and to direct the armed forces in the achievement of these aims. Sub-commanders veto potential during the Afghanistan mission was determined by the flexibility they were grated by their superiors and by their access to the access to
resources and capabilities needed to carry out operations, especially vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts on the ground. This section concludes on the strength of military agents’ veto possibilities in 2008 when the GOC introduced new imperatives for unity of effort in Afghanistan.

Civilian and Military Authorities

To assess the strength of the veto possibilities afforded to the Canadian Forces by the domestic political context of the Afghanistan mission, it is necessary to consider the authorities of civilian leaders and military agents within the institution. As the head of the Government of Canada, the prime minister is granted the authority to exercise the powers of the Crown including the power to decide if and when to deploy the armed forces, and to issue national strategic policy for Canada’s international missions.29 Although the prime minister often issues directives to the Department of National Defence and the CF through the minister of national defence, he or she may also circumvent the minister and set the policy for the department.30 The minister of national defence is expected to direct the department in ways that follow government policy, and he or she is individually responsible and accountable for Canada’s defence to Parliament. In this capacity, the

29 When the governing party holds the majority of the seats in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister must only secure the support of his or her political party to pass legislation. However, in a minority government in which the governing party holds less than half of the seats, the Prime Minister must secure the support of party backbenchers as well as members of the opposition needed to form a majority to pass legislation. See Michael S. Whittington, “The Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Executive Powers in Canada,” in Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, eds. Michael S. Whittington and Glen and Williams (Scarborough, ON: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2000), 44-45.
minister is responsible for directing and managing the armed forces and may authorize the creation of formations and commands within the military.\footnote{Deputy Ministers are responsible for defence administration, procurement, finance and policy for oversight of military training planning and operations. See Lagassé, \textit{Ministerial Responsibility}, 34).}

Beyond its approval of the federal budget and estimates, Parliament has a limited role in defence policy and matters. The 1922 National Defence Act (NDA) set out when the Act ought to be reviewed by the House of Commons and explained how other federal legislation and statutes affect the Act. While the Act directs the government to pass on certain information on defence and the military to Parliament, this is not a legal requirement. Further, the government is not required to consult the House of Commons on its decisions to deploy the armed forces. Parliament does not have any power to declare war or direct the Canadian military and it cannot introduce legislation related to expenditures, as this remains the sole right of the government. Therefore, Parliament and Parliamentary Committees in Canada have mostly an indirect role in defence and security decisions, including those concerning the military.\footnote{Lagassé, \textit{Ministerial Responsibility}, 5, 6, 11}

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the highest-ranking officer of the Canadian Forces, is the primary advisor to the Government regarding defence and the armed forces. As well, the CDS is expected to inform the government how policies may affect the armed forces and Canada’s defence options and capabilities.\footnote{Canada Department of National Defence, \textit{Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence} (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1999), 4, 7, 13. Although the prime minister may consult the CDS, he or she is not obliged act in accordance with the CDS’s advice. See Douglas Bland, “Hillier and the New Generation of Generals: The CDS, the Policy and the Troops,” \textit{Policy Options} (2008), 55.} The CDS is also responsible for the execution of the government’s defence policy and for the planning, preparation and conduct of Canadian Forces operations and remains accountable to the
Prime Minister and the Defence Minister in this regard. The CDS exercises specific authorities and responsibilities for the administration and control of the Canadian military, which are set out in the NDA. The NDA, which grants ministers the authority to set a range of regulations for the armed forces, also requires the CDS to follow the directives of the ministers in the control and administration of the Canadian Forces. In accordance with the military’s chain of command, the NDA states that all orders for action to carry out decisions made by the prime minister or the minister of defence be “issued by or through the Chief of Defence Staff.”

The government may delegate some of its decision making to the CDS and senior military leadership, as was the case with the Liberal Government under Paul Martin and Stephen Harper’s Conservative Government during the Afghanistan mission. Within the military, the NDA and other laws governing armed conflict grant commanders authority “to make decisions, transmit intentions to his subordinate commanders, and impose his will on subordinates.” This occurs through the chain of command, the system by which command of the armed forces is exercised by commanders, or leaders of the institution. It links superior and subordinate commanders, and officers with non-commissioned members of the armed forces. The CDS may delegate some authorities

34 In this role, the CDS must also consult and coordinate with the civilian defence department, and the deputy minister in the control and administration of the armed forces. See Canada Department of National Defence, Organization and Accountability, 4-6.
35 The Prime Minister exercises the power to appoint the CDS and remove individuals from this position.
36 Section 12 (1) of the NDA also states it is within Cabinet’s authorities to determine how the Canadian Forces are organized and structured.
39 Canada Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces 101 for Civilian (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence), 24.
40 The chain of command may be defined as “the structure by which command is exercised through a series of superior and subordinate commanders. It is a military instrument that joins a superior officer to other
to subordinate commanders and in turn, these commanders delegate certain authorities to select subordinates. Subordinates in the chain of command are accountable to their superiors.

Prior to 2005 the military command structure ran from the Prime Minister to the Minister of National Defence to the CDS at National Defence Headquarter. The CDS oversaw five CF commands including the Maritime Command (The Canadian Navy), Land Force Command (The Canadian Army), Air Command (The Air Force) and Joint Task Force 2 (Counter Terrorist Unit), as well as deployed contingents. Environmental chiefs of staff were assigned formations and exercised direct responsibility for force generation and operational activities, as well as responsibility for specific operations. In 2005, under the leadership of CDS General Hillier, the CF command structure was reorganized to mirror the structure of the American military. Four new commands were established, including the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, which was responsible for the use of forces on expeditionary operations such as the mission in Afghanistan. These command structures remained in place under Hillier’s successor, General Walter Natynczyk, and for the duration of the combat mission in Afghanistan.

This section outlined the authorities of key civilian and military actors, including the prime minister, Defence Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff. It also reviewed the role of parliament in decisions related to the deployment of armed forces and outlined

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41 The other commands were Canada Command (CANCOM) (to oversee Canadian Forces involved in domestic missions), Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) (for support functions).
42 General Walter Natynczyk became CDS in July 2008. In 2012, the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Canada Command and the Canadian Operational Support Command were merged to create the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). CJOC includes support, expeditionary and continental components (five geographically based joint task forces).
the Canadian military command structure before and after 2005. It is with these authorities and structures in mind that the analysis turns to the political context of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and the ways military leaders exercised their veto powers, and the veto potential of armed forces on the ground. In particular, it traces the gradual strengthening of military leaders’ veto powers at the strategic level and their informal influence on civil-military unity of effort in theatre from 2001 to 2011.

Military Agents’ Veto Possibilities, 2001 to 2007

The next step in this analysis of the Canadian Forces’ adaptation involves the identification of key actors’ veto possibilities, or their ability to preserve existing rules when they were under pressure to reform. With the formal authorities of civilian and military leaders identified, it is possible to examine military agent’s veto possibilities. This is assessed based on whether or not military leaders translated political goals into clear military objectives and provided direction to the armed forces in the achievement of these aims. Military agents’ possibilities are also apparent in sub-commanders’ influence on the national mission on the ground. This veto potential is assessed in terms of the flexibility granted to sub-commanders by their superiors and sub-commanders access to the resources and expeditionary capabilities needed to carry out operations in non-permissive environments, especially in comparison to their civilian counterparts from other government departments and agencies. The section concludes on the strength of armed forces’ veto possibilities in 2008 when the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan and the Kandahar Action Plan (KAP) introduced new imperatives for unity of effort in Afghanistan.
In the first few years of the mission the armed forces had minimal influence on strategic-level decisions, most significantly on the government’s decision to deploy troops to ISAF in 2002. On the day of the terrorist attacks on the United States, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that Canada was ready to assist the United States in any way necessary. The Canadian military mobilized for a six-month mission in Afghanistan, and by late 2001 Canadian special operations forces, along with other supports for intelligence and ground operations, were in theatre.43 In December 2001, Canada participated in the Bonn Conference that set the terms for a transitional government in Afghanistan and supported the UN Resolutions to establish the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

In late 2002, as the United States was turning its attention to a potential war with Iraq, it was looking to its allies to step up their contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan. In their discussions with then Defence Minister John McCallum, the Canadian military leadership clearly expressed their concerns about such a mission. In their view, the ambiguous rules of engagement and the lack of clear objectives, and reluctance of other countries to replace the CF after its mission, would make it difficult to withdraw from the area protracted involvement in Afghanistan.44 However, seeking to avoid involvement in the impending Iraq war, the GOC decided to commit troops to ISAF. In February 2003,

43 This included the dispatch of Canadian Special forces and a Canadian naval fleet in late 2001, and the deployment of up to 850 troops on the six month tour to Kandahar in February 2002.
Defence Minister McCallum announced the deployment and by August, soldiers were arriving in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital city.\textsuperscript{45}

While the military leadership was unable to convince the government against deployment of forces under ISAF, military commanders at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa retained significant control over the armed forces once they were in Afghanistan. The NATO plan for ISAF was “written broadly enough to allow nations to opt in or out of rules of engagement or missions in which the nations did not want or could no legally allow their troops to participate.”\textsuperscript{46} In the Canadian case, a narrow interpretation of the mandate by military leaders was reflected in highly restrictive rules for engagement that hampered the contribution of theatre-level commanders and the forces to ISAF operations.\textsuperscript{47} For the duration of the Kabul mission, civilian leaders delegated decisions concerning the military to then CDS Ray Henault and senior commanders at NDHQ in Ottawa.

From the start, beginning in 2002 with the first Kandahar mission, the highest-ranking officers in Ottawa exercised strict oversight of the armed forces in theatre.

According to Professor Stephen M. Saideman, Canadian units in Afghanistan operated under “tight constraints and were ‘micromanaged’ from Ottawa.”\textsuperscript{48} In his study of civil-military dynamics and Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, Saideman found that Canadian

\textsuperscript{45} Canadian Major General Andrew Leslie became deputy commander of ISAF’s first rotation.

\textsuperscript{46} Steve Beckman, From Assumption to Expansion: Planning and Executing NATO’s First Year in Afghanistan at the Strategic Level, (Master’s Thesis, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2005), 11.

\textsuperscript{47} Stephen M. Saideman, “Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience?” The Afghanistan Papers 10 (2012), 6. Dr. Saideman links military leaders’ aversion to risk in Afghanistan, and during the Bosnia mission in the 1990s, to their experiences during the Somalia Affair. The inquiry into the death of a Somali youth by Canadian soldiers in 1993, followed by a decade of budget cuts by the Liberal government, casted a long shadow on the public’s view of the armed forces and created a fear of failure among institutional leaders. See Saideman, “Afghanistan as a Test,” 7.

\textsuperscript{48} Saideman, “Afghanistan as a Test,” 7.
commanders were required to reach back to Ottawa before engagement in ISAF
operations where there existed a chance of casualties.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} In this regard, the early years of
the mission of Afghanistan were characterized by military leaders limited influence at the
strategic level and significant control over military operations. Although military leaders’
set narrow terms for force engagement, the point is that civilian leaders afforded
institutional actors the ability to set and change institutional rules, namely the nature and
extent of force involvement in complex operations. The appointment of General Rick
Hillier to the position of CDS led to the strengthening of the military’s effect at the policy
level and the delegation of decision-making powers from Ottawa to task force
commanders on the ground.

The appointment of General Hillier to the position of CDS by Prime Minister Paul
Martin led to an unprecedented role for the military leader in policy development. Upon
his return from a post as ISAF commander in August 2004, General Rick Hillier was
tasked by then Defence Minister Bill Graham to lead the development of the defence
government in the 2004 federal election. General Rick Hillier was the NATO ISAF commander from
February to August 2004.} The end
product aligned with the IPS’s emphasis on a 3D or whole-of-government (WOG)
approach to international missions, including operations underway in Afghanistan. These
frameworks, first described in the government’s \textit{National Security Policy} in 2004, called
for the application of an “increasingly integrated approach to defence, diplomacy and
development (the ‘3Ds’) that brings together civilian and military resources in “a focused and coherent fashion.”

Within the constraints of existing policy, General Hillier envisioned an extensive role for the armed forces in the post-9/11 world. Based on the concept of the “three block war” introduced by American General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s, General Hillier explained that the forces would be expected to conduct combat, stabilization and humanitarian activities within a single geographic area. To fulfill these roles, Hillier argued for a transformation of the CF, including new equipment, an increase in the size of the force, and the restructuring of existing command structures. Overall, General Hillier’s vision for the CF involved its ability to conduct these operations simultaneously, and less attention was paid to how the military ought to support the delivery of 3D or WOG in complex environments.

Prime Minister Martin promoted General Hillier to the position of CDS in February 2005. The Prime Minister appreciated General Hillier’s operational experience and his straightforward leadership style, and viewed the military leader as a “change agent” who would provide the strategic vision to reinvigorate the institution and its image after a decade of budget cuts and its very public failure in Somalia. For the duration of its tenure, the Martin government continued to seek General Hillier’s advice when making decisions on Canada’s participation in overseas mission, most notably the

53 Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 155. Hillier also succeeded in securing funds in the GOC’s 2005 budget to implement these changes.
54 Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 158-9.
decision in late 2005 to deploy Canadian Forces to Kandahar.\textsuperscript{55} Political scientists Philippe Lagassé and Joel Sokolsky noted that civilian officials within the Department of National Defence encouraged the engagement of General Hillier and senior officers in the policy process. \textsuperscript{56} More attuned to the input of military leaders than the preceding government, the Martin Government was willing to consider CDS General Hillier’s case for continued involvement in Afghanistan. Within the first few months of his appointment, General Hillier presented the political leadership with a plan for Afghanistan, which involved a new, more robust role for the military. In addition to the deployment of Canada’s Special Forces to Kandahar, General Hillier’s plan called for a PRT in Kandahar by late summer 2005, the deployment of up to 1000 troops and Canada’s leadership of the Multinational Headquarters in Kandahar over a nine month period, in which it would transition from OEF to NATO.\textsuperscript{57} According to General Hillier, this mission would garner greater support for the CF among civilian leaders and Canadians, but also signal to the United States and other NATO allies Canada’s commitment to international efforts in the country.\textsuperscript{58} The plan was approved by Prime Minister Martin in early spring 2005 and, in May, Defence Minister Graham announced Canada’s intention to lead ISAF operations in Kandahar.

\textsuperscript{55} According to Lagassé and Sokolsky, the Defence Minister and senior civilian staff at DND were not especially concerned about granting the CDS a role in the policy development because the Cabinet could always exercise its veto powers if they felt a policy was not realistic or aligned to the Government’s positions. See P. Lagassé, and J. Sokolsky, "A Larger 'Footprint' in Ottawa: General Hillier and Canada's Shifting Civil-Military Relationship", \textit{Canadian Foreign Policy} 15, no.2 (2009), 23-24.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Chief of Defence Staff, \textit{TFA – CDS OP O For the Mission in Afghanistan} (December 5, 2005): 2 – 3, (3350-165/A37) A0289529, acquired via Access to Information request.
\textsuperscript{58} Gross Stein and Lang discuss how CAF involvement in Kandahar was presented by Hillier to civilian officials as a way to repair relations with the US, which had suffered a set back after Canada refused to join its Ballistic Missile Defence Program. (Stein and Lang, \textit{The Unexpected War}, 181-196).
General Hillier proceeded with plans for the transition of Canadian Forces from Kabul to Kandahar and set in motion efforts to realize his vision of the CF detailed in the 2005 IPS. The involvement of the armed forces in a range of activities and across all levels of the mission was outlined in the CDS Operations Order issued in December 2005. The order explained that the CF would assume “key roles at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to maximize the Canadian impact in Afghanistan” and “assist the whole-of-government efforts at capacity building regional governance structures.” 59 Among other initiatives, this involved the establishment and operation of the governance-building focused Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A) and the deployment of forces to the Kandahar PRT. 60 Although government policy emphasized the need to better harmonize the roles of government entities and the military to achieve Canada’s national objectives, the CDS’s Operations Order did not specify how the CF would support OGDs or WOG. Instead, the directions created space for the armed forces to take on key roles across the security, development and capacity-building pillars. In-country commanders realized considerable discretion in the nature and extent of military involvement in non-military activities.

The CF leaders ability to set the rules and direction of the mission was evident in the CF’s May 2006 Campaign Plan-Afghanistan, which outlined the elements of the 3D strategy in Afghanistan. 61 The CF did not adopt a whole-of-government approach that addressed the interdependencies of the security, reconstruction and development efforts,

59 Chief of Defence Staff, TFA – CDS OP O For the Mission in Afghanistan, 12.
but rather provided separate schematics for each of the three pillars of development, diplomacy and security efforts. For each pillar, the CF plan set out decisive points and identified specific initiatives tied to “Defence, Diplomacy and Development End States” and the country’s five year information strategy, “Canada’s Five Year Information Strategy – Afghanistan.” The CDS approved the plan’s “Measures of Effectiveness” for activities in each of the three areas and noted that these metrics would “facilitate decision-making by operational and tactical level decision-makers in theatre, trigger Departmental or Governmental leverage when and where required to maintain progress, or to signal the culmination of CF operations.” While other government entities were tasked with aspects of the mission, the CF established the management framework for the entire Canadian mission. As the lead developer of these plans, the CF defined the benchmarks, the decision-making processes, and the key turning points for action for civilian entities. In doing so, they set a course for development and reconstruction in the country.

In sum, civilian leaders downloaded many decisions to the military, while the CDS exercised formal authorities through translating policy into military objectives and reorganizing the forces for modern warfare. General Hillier’s influence extended to the policy realm, where he was widely consulted by civilian officials. He developed Canada’s plan for Kandahar and carved out a broad role for the armed forces in

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Afghanistan. For the duration of the Canadian mission, as Auerswald and Saideman explained, “nearly all the decisions and dynamics” were intra-military in nature.\textsuperscript{63}

As well, theatre-level commanders’ veto potential was bolstered by General Hillier’s reforms to the Canadian command structure. When General Hillier was promoted to CDS he created a new command structure for CF that included a separate command for expeditionary operations, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). Similar to the American CENTCOM, the command was led by generals with the authority needed to direct overseas missions. Under this new scheme, greater authority was also delegated to commanders in theatre, which provided them with the authority and flexibility to respond to challenges as they emerged.\textsuperscript{64} In-theatre leaders were afforded the ability to establish, interpret and enforce institutional rules for complex operations as they saw fit.\textsuperscript{65} Task force commanders retained this flexibility for the duration of the mission.

The armed forces’ ability to influence the Canadian mission on the ground was further strengthened in early 2006 with a resurgence of violence in Kandahar that required the involvement of armed forces as the “eyes and ears” of their civilian counterparts. Within months of Canadian troops deploying to Kandahar, an unanticipated

\textsuperscript{63}Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 135.
\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65}Gavin Buchan pointed out that the demands of the mission also contributed to improved flexibility for operational commanders. He explained this in the following way: “…despite intense scrutiny from Ottawa, the robust staffing of the operational headquarters deployed and the sheer volume of daily decision making required do appear to have restored significant substance to the concept of mission command.” Mission command, according to Buchan, can be understood as the provision of subordinates with “maximum freedom consistent with commander intent” (Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005). See Gavin Buchan, “Civil-Military Coordination: Canada’s Experience in Kandahar,” in Security Operations in the 21st Century eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 2011), 99.
resurgence of Taliban in Kandahar sparked concern back in Canada. In early January 2006 a car bomb hit a Canadian military convoy killing Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry and injuring three Canadian soldiers.\textsuperscript{66} As the number of Canadian casualties continued to climb through the spring, the leaders of the opposition parties became more vocal about the need for a national discussion on Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{67} Prime Minister Harper finally conceded to requests for a debate and in April a non-binding motion was passed to extend the mission until February 2009.\textsuperscript{68} Although twenty-seven of its members voted in favour of the extension, the Liberal Party remained concerned about the direction of Canada’s mission and the engagement of Canada in combat operations. According to the Liberals, the current “piecemeal approach” to Afghanistan was “doomed for failure” and called for greater emphasis on the development and diplomatic elements of the GOC’s 3D framework.\textsuperscript{69}

Indeed, the violence in Kandahar was preventing the delivery of a 3D response in Afghanistan and armed forces were required to step-up their involvement in the development and governance pillars of the mission. Government agencies began to

withdraw the small number of civilian representatives working in Afghanistan. CIDA announced its suspension of aid projects in Afghanistan, citing the region as “too dangerous,” and civilian personnel from across GOC entities that would otherwise deploy into the province withdrew from the area or were confined to military bases.\textsuperscript{70} The removal of civilian personnel created a vacuum in Afghanistan that the armed forces was required to fill.

In the fall of 2006, DND announced enhancements to strengthen the CF’s reconstruction and development efforts, not entirely linked to its security and military objectives.\textsuperscript{71} Additional troops were sent to secure the area around Kandahar to permit reconstruction efforts to proceed. Canada also developed and deployed Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams comprised of civilian and military personnel to mentor and train Afghan security and police forces. New assets were assigned to the PRT to enhance its security capability and to permit greater mobility of the team throughout the province. Colonel Steve Bowes, the Commander of the Kandahar PRT in 2006, explained that the military acted as “the eyes and ears for [DFAIT] and CIDA in the far reaches of Kandahar Province” and participated in council meetings with village elders. The CF then reported back to CIDA and Foreign Affairs representatives on its discussion from village elders to better inform reconstruction and development efforts in the area.\textsuperscript{72} Therefore, in addition to their security tasks, the CF members of the PRT also acted on

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72}Lee Windsor, David Charters and Brent Wilson,\textit{ Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada’s Afghan Mission}, (Mississauga, ON: John Wiley and Sons Canada, Ltd., 2008), 39, 45.
behalf of civilian entities, gathering information and reporting on the concerns and basic needs in communities across Kandahar. Under these circumstances, the armed forces were afforded frequent opportunities to enforce their interpretation of the mission mandate and carry out operations that aligned with their interpretation of the mandate.

Even when civilian departments and agencies began to redeploy personnel through 2007, the CF retained its ability to align mission efforts to their existing approach in Afghanistan. Several factors contributed to these veto possibilities. First, although civilian personnel returned to Afghanistan, the number of civilian representatives never reached numbers comparable to the number of military members in the country. By 2007, there were approximately 2,500 CF members and only forty-seven GOC civilians working in Afghanistan at either the Canadian embassy in Kabul, the Kandahar Airfield or with the PRT in Kandahar.73 Further, some civilian representatives sent to Afghanistan, such as CIDA personnel in Kandahar, were subject to strict security regulations established by their parent entities that restricted their mobility in the province and their ability to make “regular contact with the people they are expected to help” was limited.74 In these cases, CIDA and DFAIT placed priority on investments at the national level in Afghanistan and provided only some support for PRT activities because they did not have the personnel to extend their reach at the sub-national level.75

Remarking on the limitations of civilian capacity in late 2007, civilian officials Elissa Golberg and Michael Haduk explained the situation in the following way:

73 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa, ON: Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, 2008), 28.
74 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Independent Panel, 26.
The handful of Foreign Affairs political officers, Canadian civilian police, and CIDA development officers had a difficult time prioritizing activities and keeping up with and feeding into the military who vastly outnumbered them, and who often treated their civilian counterparts as guests and not partners. Consequently the military often assumed a lead role on policy or program matters because they had the resources to reinforce their vision.\footnote{Goldberg and Kaduck, “Where is Headquarters?” 130.}

A second factor contributing to the armed forces’ influence, and their ability to enforce existing rules and practices, stemmed from their well-developed processes and a long history of participation in international operations. In this regard, civilian entities struggled to prioritize their activities and keep pace with their military counterparts. Many departments did not have plans for Afghanistan and their capacity for expeditionary operations paled in comparison to that of DND and the CF.\footnote{Michael H. Thomson, et al., \textit{Interagency Trust in Whole of Government Approach to Canadian Forces Operations: Subject Matter Expert Discussions}, (Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Centre, 2011): 16.} The varying planning capacities of DFAIT and the CF was elucidated by a civilian subject matter expert (SME) interviewed for a Defence Research and Development Canada sponsored study on interagency trust:

\begin{quote}
Our departments didn’t take it [strategic long-term planning about the mission in Afghanistan] seriously, and they didn’t apply the resources in the serious manner like DND [Department of National Defence] had…If you were to ever ask, you know ‘Does the Department of Foreign Affairs have a 5 year plan for Afghanistan?’, you’d be laughed out of the building. It doesn’t exist. It’s not the way that we operate…\footnote{Thomson, et al., \textit{Interagency}, 13.}
\end{quote}

In comparison to their civilian counterparts, military leaders and members had the resources and capabilities to lead the mission. As a result of their strengths vis-à-vis civilian personnel, they were afforded strong veto potential in the conduct of complex operations requiring both civilian and military elements.
The informal influence of the armed forces on Canadian efforts in Afghanistan was most apparent in late December when their campaign plan shifted from the conduct of 3D activities to a supporting role. With the arrival of more civilian personnel in theatre, the CF began a gradual retreat from the non-security pillars of the mission, which was outlined in the December 2007 CEFCOM’s Campaign Plan. The Plan redefined the CF’s role in the WOG mission in ways that emphasized its responsibility for security and its supporting role for WOG partners. However, in the absence of a formal WOG strategy and civilian capacity, the focus of the CF on security objectives had an adverse impact on civilian activities and the ability of Canadian entities to “achieve lasting effects” on the ground. In one instance civilian staff and senior military leaders convened to discuss Canadian efforts in a village the CF had cleared of insurgents. It was agreed that the CF would stay on in the village and provide the security needed for civilians to proceed with stabilization efforts. Shortly after embarking on this plan, the CF determined it would leave the village, which was believed to be free of insurgents, in order to redirect its efforts to another area of the province. The CF argued that public opinion polls indicated Afghans’ desire for basic services and argued that reconstruction and development efforts were required in the village, and that a military presence was not required. At the same time, the civilians pointed to evidence that international partners and Afghan officials would not work in certain areas, including the village, without a security force for fear of insurgents attacks. Therefore, the enhanced, yet still insufficient, numbers of civilians in theatre and the CF’s focus on security did not necessarily result in

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80 Reference for the paragraph: Golberg and Kaduck, “Where is Headquarters?” 129.
the delivery of CA. By the end of the year, civil-military relationships in Ottawa and Afghanistan were strained and, on certain files, the civilian and military relationship was described by senior DFAIT officials as “downright hostile.”

In summary, the CF had experienced a gradual strengthening in their veto possibilities since 2005. This can be traced back to CDS General Hillier and his enhanced veto powers vis-à-vis his role in policy making and as the architect of Canada’s first whole-of-government plan in Afghanistan. In theatre, sub-commanders’ authorities were enhanced under General Hillier’s new command structure and they realized more frequent opportunities to influence 3D outcomes as the de facto leaders of the Canadian mission. The armed forces were afforded greater informal influence in Kandahar with the resurgence of violence in 2006. With public approval of the mission on the decline, casualties on the rise and Liberal call for a shift in emphasis from combat to development and reconstruction in Kandahar, the government approved the deployment of additional troops and support for non-security aspects of the mission. As government entities withdrew personnel and shut down some of their programs, the military received additional resources for support to reconstruction and development initiatives. Due to the operational environment and their extensive experience in expeditionary operations, armed forces found themselves carrying out tasks otherwise conducted by civilians, such as the identification of community priorities. Even after the return of civilian personnel to the area through 2007 and armed forces’ retreat from non-security pillars, the CF retained significant influence over the mission. As the forces acted in accordance with its

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institutional rules for complex operations, their decisions continued to impact the effectiveness of civilian activities and the level of unity of effort achieved on the ground.

The Manley Panel’s Report and the Kandahar Action Plan, 2008-2011

The major challenge to the military’s approach in Kandahar emerged in early 2008 with the release of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan’s report and its recommendations for a rebalancing of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. The following section provides an overview of the political context and the developments that led to the creation of the Panel. It also highlights the Panel’s main findings and recommendations, particularly those with that called for reform to the armed forces’ existing approach to complex operations in Afghanistan. In conclusion, it considers the impact of the government’s response to the report, the development of a joint civil-military plan for Kandahar, and the American troop surge in Afghanistan on military veto possibilities through 2009 to 2011.

By 2007 the Harper government was under pressure to address public and political concerns about the mission. At least three factors were at play during this time. First, there was a decline in public approval for the mission. In one year, from 2006 to 2007, the percentage of Canadians who strongly supported the decision to send Canadian troops to Afghanistan fell from forty-three to thirty-seven percent.82 Second, there was growing concern about the number of casualties, as well as the rate at which Canadian

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82 From 2001 to 2007 Canadian approval of the Afghanistan mission fell from over seventy percent to less than thirty percent of those polled (see Saideman, “Afghanistan as a Test,” 14). Between 2007 and 2009 there was an increase in public approval with upwards of 40 percent of respondents expressing approval for the mission. By 2010, this figure was on the decline. See Kim Richard Nossal, “Making Sense of Afghanistan: The Domestic Politics of International Stabilization Missions in Australia and Canada,” Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand (Ardal NSW: University of New England, 2010), 4.
soldiers were being killed. In an eighteen month period, Canadian soldiers in Kandahar were dying at three times as quickly as British forces in the province of Helmand and at nearly four times the rate of American troops deployed across eastern and southern parts of the country.83 A third factor was emerging allegations that Canadian soldiers were transferring Afghan detainees to foreign governments, under which they suffered torture. Overall, there were indications that, if the government did not respond in some way to concerns about the mission, there was a good chance Afghanistan would become a pivotal issue in 2008 federal election.84

The Harper Government’s efforts to de-politicize the Afghan file before the 2008 federal election led to the creation of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. In October 2007, Prime Minister Harper announced that the independent five person panel led by a former Liberal Cabinet Minister, John Manley, would consider Canada’s options in Afghanistan and make recommendations on the future direction of the mission after February 2009. The Panel, also referred to as the Manley Panel was expected to report its findings prior to a scheduled parliamentary vote on the extension of the mission in early 2008. As a bipartisan entity, the panel offered a way for the minority government to involve members of other parties and to arrive at a consensus on the way forward. However, in the selection of a former Liberal minister to head the panel, the government effectively quelled criticisms of the Liberal opposition and made it more

84 Claire Turenne Sjolander, “A Funny Thing Happened on the Road to Kandahar: The Competing Faces of Canadian Internationalism,” Canadian Foreign Policy 15, no.2 (2009), 90.
likely the Liberals would accept the recommendations of the panel. When the GOC held a vote on Afghanistan on March 13, 2008 the House of Commons approved the extension of the mission until 2011 by a vote of 197 to seventy-seven. The Liberals supported the extension, provided the Manley recommendations were implemented.

The Manley Report found that the existence of separate departmental entities to oversee specific agendas in Afghanistan was not adequate and that improvement in the coordination of cross-government efforts required leadership by the Prime Minister, supported by a cabinet committee and a full-time task force. By aligning national and departmental priorities and operations, the panel argued, there would be marked improvement in Canada’s effectiveness in Afghanistan. It was expected that this would extend to in-country initiatives, including to the PRT, which, the Panel reported, suffered from fragmentation and lack of coordination.

The GOC accepted the Manley Panel’s recommendations to enhance cross-government cooperation at the strategic level. DFAIT’s Task Force for Afghanistan was renamed and placed within the Privy Council to manage cross-government coherence. Directly responsible to the Prime Minister, the new Afghanistan Task Force was responsible for the development of strategic policy, and the monitoring and coordination of the government’s operations in Afghanistan. However, the ability of the Task Force

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85 Sjolander, “A Funny Thing Happened on the Road to Kandahar,” 91-92
86 Ibid.
87 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa, ON: Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, 2008), 34.
88 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Independent Panel, 30.
89 In 2005 the GOC established the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Team was described as the government’s “centre of expertise for stabilization and reconstruction in fragile and conflict affected areas throughout the world.” Its status as an agency of a larger department, rather than an independent entity, limits the ability of its officials to compel cross-government cooperation. Further, representatives from across government may participate in
to compel cross-government cooperation was limited because, although it included representatives from other departments, the majority of its staff and its leader were DFAIT personnel. Further, the leader of the Task Force, a Deputy Minister, did not have formal authority to direct other government entities or to take independent decisions. He was unable to deploy a member of the Task Force without first obtaining the approval of the member’s departmental minister. While the Manley Panel envisioned that such a body would improve intergovernmental cooperation, CIDA and DFAIT continued to manage their Afghanistan files out of their separate departmental units. These departmental Task Forces existed under the respective ADMs and worked with DND, as well as the CF’s Strategic Joint Staff and CEFCOM. The civilian representatives of these departments and agencies and the CF continued to hold interdepartmental meetings independent of the Task Force. Ultimately, it was the linkages established among these departments during these meetings that led to the development of the joint civil-military the Kandahar Action Plan in December 2008.

The KAP, the joint civil-military plan for Kandahar, was based on the priorities and signature projects identified by the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan. It was

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START initiatives, but the Task Force relies solely on its parent department for its funding and resources. Other entities are not involved in the overall management of the unit. This research did not uncover references to START’s participation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2001.


91 Buchan, “Breaking Down the Silos,” 78; In addition to the Task Force, the GOC established the Special Committee on the Mission in Afghanistan, a group of Members of Parliament, which monitored progress on the Government’s priorities for Afghanistan, produced quarterly reports to Parliament on the Government’s engagement in the country, and provided additional information on the mission to Canadians.

92 The CCOA was created “to consider diplomatic, defence, development and security issues related to Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.” By bringing together the political leaders of the government entities engaged in Afghanistan, the CCOA provided an opportunity outside regular cabinet meetings to focus on issues related to the overseas operations. See Canada Treasury Board Secretariat, “Department of Foreign
based on the GOC’s priorities for Afghanistan that Elissa Golberg, the newly appointed Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) responsible for the civilian presence, and Brigadier-General D.W. Thomson, the Commander of Joint Task Force-Afghanistan and leader of the military operations, produced the Kandahar Action Plan (KAP) in 2008 based on the GOC’s six priorities for Afghanistan. The Plan addressed civilian and military efforts in its Annexes that included plans for efforts in the areas such as Governance, Reconstruction and Development, and military activities including Civil-Military Cooperation, Detainee Handling and Relief in Place. To support the focus of resources and the implementation of the KAP, civilian and military personnel were collocated at the Kandahar Airfield, at Forward Operating Bases and at the KPRT Headquarters at Kandahar City.

In the years after the release of the Manley Panel’s report, the GOC approved the KAP, a plan intended to establish a better balance between the civilian and military commitments in Afghanistan. From early 2009 onwards, there were some improvements in civilian officials’ and representatives’ engagement in the mission. As one civilian official described, it “[the Manley Report] essentially provided [civilians] with the

93 The RoCK was Canada’s senior representative to Afghanistan working under the Canadian Ambassador. The GOC’s six priorities in Afghanistan included four priorities specific to Kandahar: enable Afghan National Security Forces, promote law and order, strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver services and promote economic growth, provide humanitarian assistance, enhance border security. GOC’s priorities for Afghanistan at the national level were to advance Afghanistan’s capacity for governance and to facilitate political reconciliation in the country.

94 Golberg and Kaduck, “Where is Headquarters,” 133. Canadian Forces’ doctrine defined counterinsurgency as follows, “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.” Accordingly, “[o]nly a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy of the insurgents will obtain an enduring solution.” See Canada Land Force, “Counter-insurgency Operations,” (Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence, 2008), 1-3.
platform to get the resources, to get the people into the field, to work better." 95

Described as a GOC-led comprehensive approach, the KAP was developed to “to reinforce the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and its people to establish … districts [that] are more secure and better governed; where Afghan institutions are better able to deliver basic services; and better maintain security, law and order…” 96 Overall, the aim was to improve conditions within the context of the insurgency: “the tactical and operational plans were increasingly tied to governance and development objectives, with civilian and military counterparts designing these plans together and synchronizing their activities to enable tangible counterinsurgency results.” 97 The emphasis of the KAP was on the achievement of counterinsurgency objectives, rather than long-term stabilization and development in the province.

The priority on counterinsurgency effects was reflected in the distribution of resources across the government, development and security elements of the mission. With respect to funding, it is estimated that between 2001-2002 and 2007-2008 the Canadian government spent at least $5.85 billion on military operations while $0.97 billion was spent on foreign aid in Afghanistan. 98 By 2011, the Parliamentary Budget Office estimated that the cost of the mission in Afghanistan for all departments and agencies, and for the armed forces from 2001 to 2011 was between $13.92 billion and $18.14 billion. At the strength of 2500 troops from 2008-2009 to 2010-2011, it was

95 Thomson, et al., Interagency Trust, 13.
97 Golberg and Kaduck, “Where is Headquarters?” 133.
98 The calculations for military operations are based on estimated incremental costs. Incremental costs are “costs that would not have been incurred except for the operation. Alternatively put, these would be the total savings to the GC had Canada not been involved in the Afghanistan mission.” See Mathilakath Ramnarayan, Ashutosh Rajekar, and Sahir Khan, Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, (Ottawa, ON: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2008), 7.
expected that the cost for military operations was at least $5.06 billion, in comparison to the $0.68 billion that was expected to be provided in the form of foreign aid.\footnote{Ramnarayan, Rajekar, and Khan, \textit{Fiscal Impact}, 8. Based on NATO data, the number of Canadian troops in Afghanistan as part of ISAF increased from 2500 in 2008 to 2922 in 2011. The estimates provided in the Parliamentary Budgetary Report are based on the maintenance of troop levels at 2500 from 2008-2009 to 2010-2011. Therefore, it is likely that the incremental cost for military operations was more than estimated in the Report. NATO, ISAF Placemats Archives, http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html.} The majority of funds for the mission were provided to PRT activities, which remained under the control of the military. Dr. Nipa Banerjee, the head of Canada’s aid program in Kabul from 2003-2006, noted that due to its placement under military command the PRT’s initiatives were “driven by short term political and military objectives of the troop-contributing countries.”\footnote{Nipa Banerjee, “Notes for Presentation by Nipa Banerjee,” \textit{Group of 78 Annual Policy Conference 2012, “Military Intervention: Lessons from Afghanistan”} (Ottawa, ON: University of Ottawa, September 29, 2012), 3.} By late 2008, the number of civilian staff in Kandahar increased from twenty-four to seventy-one: upwards of sixteen of these individuals worked at Kandahar Airfield while the remainder were based with the PRT in Kandahar City.\footnote{Buchan, “Civil-Military Coordination,” 104.} Although personnel were collocated to pursue joint planning and intelligence, there were only a limited number of civilian personnel available to advise and work with the CF units that oversaw operational planning.\footnote{Canada Joint Task Force Afghanistan, \textit{Report on Kandahar Whole of Government Lessons Learned Workshop} (June 2, 2011):3, A-2013-0054 acquired through Access to Information request, 8.}

The coordination achieved by CF and GOC entities in Kandahar through 2009 was disrupted by the arrival of American troops and changes to the CF’s area of operations in 2010. As a result of the influx of American soldiers, the Canadian Task Force’s area of responsibility was reduced from the entire Kandahar Province to the districts of Daman, Dand and Panjwa’i. While the KPRT’s activities were based on
GOC’s six priorities and three signature projects for the whole of Afghanistan, the Task Force’s efforts were now very much focused on these districts. The KPRT and TFK remained mutually supportive, but these changes disrupted the civil-military synchronization achieved to date and “efforts were no longer aligned, and occasional friction arose.”103

In conclusion, a decline in public approval of the mission, mounting Canadian casualties, and the Afghan detainee issue prompted the government to address concerns about the mission and its creation of the Manley Panel. The Panel’s report introduced new imperatives for unity of effort across the civilian and military elements of the mission. Greater cooperation across entities and the military supported the development of the KAP. However, a closer examination of the Plan reveals that the orientation of the KAP was more towards the security or counterinsurgency aims of the mission, rather than long-term stabilization and development in Afghanistan. In comparison to other government entities involved in Afghanistan, the armed forces had the personnel and resources to operate across the pillars of the mission, extensive experience in expeditionary operations and the capabilities to operate in dangerous environments. Under these circumstances, the CF continued to organize and direct Canadian efforts based on the military’s established rules and practices for complex operations. In a context that afforded them strong veto possibilities, military actors’ interpretation and enforcement of institutional rules influenced specific and gradual changes in their approach to complex operations during the Afghanistan mission. With the strength of veto possibilities and the level of discretion afforded actors by exiting rules in mind, the

next section traces evolution of formal doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capabilities.

**Canadian Forces and Gradual Adaptation**

*Adaptation of Doctrine through Drift and Layering*

The formal institutional rules for complex operations were articulated in the CF’s *Peace Operations Doctrine* in 2002 and provided the basic guidance for the CF’s initial efforts as part of ISAF in Afghanistan. By 2002, the rules that would inform CF operations other than war in Afghanistan were codified in the Joint Doctrine Manual, *Peace Support Operations*.104 Developed in response to the *Report of the Somalia Inquiry*, the doctrine acknowledged that previous approaches to peace missions were “ill suited to assist in the resolution of post-1988 complex emergencies” and captured the security and stabilization goals that would come to define the CF’s mission in Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the 2002 doctrine offered a broad definition of PSOs that extended beyond traditional peacekeeping and enforcement, with the military objectives “to “[c]reate the secure environment that permits political negotiations to proceed and humanitarian assistance to be delivered.” PSOs included conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, traditional peacekeeping, and a new category, complex peacekeeping operations. More akin to the international operations conducted by the CF in the post-Cold War years, CPKO included operations in the provision of general

104 Reference for this paragraph: Canada National Defence, *Peace Support Operations (Joint Doctrine Manual)* (B-GJ-005-307/FP 030) (2002), 2-1, 5-8, 2-4, 3-7. This doctrine was written for use by commanders at the strategic and operational levels, joint staff at National Defence Headquarters, and task forces conducting PSOs.
security assistance for humanitarian assistance to support for transitional civil administration. The initial focus of a CPKO operation was to stabilize a situation through the provision of “sufficient security to permit the delivery of emergencies humanitarian aid” followed by activities to protect “international agencies and NGOs attempt to construct a capable state.” Besides differences in definition, the doctrine only listed tasks for specific types of peace operations without reference to military operations other than war such as stabilization operations during ongoing conflict or counterinsurgency. Further, it did not explicitly address situations in which the CF might be expected to engage in combat and non-combat tasks simultaneously, or how these tasks ought to be balanced with combat tasks in a CPKO.

Four years into the Afghanistan mission, the CF released a new joint doctrine, *Canadian Forces Operations* (2005), which identified CF operations according to the level of conflict involved ranging from peace to war. Along this continuum, operations other than war were conducted in peaceful situations as well as under conditions of conflict including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The doctrine maintained a clear separation between its chapters and sections on the application of combat power and those related to peace operations, which included TPKO and CPKO. Stabilization of the security situation in failed states and areas of intrastate conflict was described as the military objective of Complex Peacekeeping Operations (CPKO). In CPKOs, the military objective was to stabilize the security situation in a failed state and not the defeat or destruction of an enemy. The doctrine did not provide a definition for operations other than war that would speak to the CF’s recent and ongoing operations such as the CF’s

participation in counterinsurgency operations under the OEF or its deployment on
Operation Athena with ISAF to secure and stabilize the area in and around Kabul. It
did not address how the CF could balance non-combat tasks with combat operations in
the conduct of the 3BW, as described in the GOC’s 2005 Defence Policy Statement or in
a single area of operations, as it would experience in Kandahar in 2006.

In 2007, the Chief of Review Services (CRS) conducted an evaluation of the
maintenance and currency of CF Doctrine that identified significant deficiencies in the
formal guidance available to the armed forces. CF members reported that existing
institutional rules were inadequate for guiding military activities and that doctrine needed
to be revised to better reflect the challenges faced by soldiers in contemporary
operations. While these rules permitted considerable flexibility in the interpretation
and enforcement of standards in complex situations, internal reviews reported that
“changes in the global security environment…and Canada’s commitment to assuming an
increased leadership role in international expeditionary operations” have led to “new or
renewed CF operational roles,” such as in counterinsurgency operations and as part of
PRTs, and rules were required to guide members’ behaviour in these capacities.

The release of the Manley Panel’s final report in January 2008, which called for a
better balance between the civil and military commitment in Afghanistan and improved
civil-military cooperation coincided with the release of Canadian Land Operations

106 Interestingly, the doctrine did not make any references to Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom,
OEF or ISAF.
107 In 2006 the government issued “Government of Canada Guidelines on Humanitarian Action and Civil-
Military Coordination.” The document identified the key players in interagency operations, but was geared
towards the armed forces. Guiding principles were intended to “inform any Government of Canada
decisions regarding possible roles for military forces in supporting carrying or carrying out humanitarian
assistance tasks.” It did not provide guidance on the conduct of joint civil-military operations.
108 Canada Chief of Review Services, Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine
(Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, March 2007), 22-23.
doctrine. This publication reflected a broader view of contemporary operations that included references to counterinsurgency and the comprehensive approach. Stability operations were defined as “a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order.” Along with offensive and defensive activities, stability operations may be undertaken simultaneously or sequentially during an assigned mission. According to this view, stability operations are not a type of campaign, but a tactical level activity carried out to support PSOs or COIN operations. In the prosecution of PSO or COIN, stability tasks are aimed at addressing the root causes of crises and may include security and control, support to demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, support of security sector reform, support to civilian infrastructure and governance, and assistance to other agencies.

With respect to civil-military aspects of Land Force’s operations, the doctrine referred to the Joint, Interagency, Multi-national, and Public (JIMP) framework, first introduced in the CF’s Leadership in the Canadian Forces publication in 2005. The 2008 Land Operations doctrine stated that members must plan to conduct operations within a

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109 A peace support campaign was defined in this doctrine as one that “impartiality makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace.” COIN is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.” Counterinsurgency campaigns are characterized by: “an insurgent based adversary, the political nature of the crisis, a need to address multiple facets of the environment and root causes of the crisis through a comprehensive approach with the military in an overall supporting role, and a degree of combat that is less than that experienced in a major combat campaign.” (Canada National Defence, Canadian Land Operations (B-GL-300-001/FP-001), (2008), 3-10.
110 Reference Canada National Defence, Canadian Land Operations (B-GL-300-001/FP-001), (2008), 3-18. According to the doctrine, “stability operations” are not a type of campaign, even though this was the case in the past; campaigns are either peace support or counterinsurgency, and stability operations are among the tactical level activities carried out in support of the campaign.
112 Reference for the paragraph: Canada National Defence, Canadian Land Operations (B-GL-300-001/FP-001), (2008), 2-14, 2-16.
comprehensive approach in consideration of and coordination with joint, interagency, multinational, and public (JIMP) elements to realize shared objectives. The doctrine emphasized interagency coordination and cooperation to reinforce unity of effort and purpose, but warned that in unstable environments “the military must be prepared to assume many of the responsibilities that would best be undertaken by OGDs or elements” until the security conditions improve. According to the doctrine, the combination of JIMP agencies constitute a comprehensive approach whereby there is the integrated employment of civilian agencies and the armed forces to address sources of conflict. However, CA was also defined as a way to assess the effects of the CF’s operations on the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) realms of a campaign. The PMESII framework was applied in Afghanistan to bring greater coherence to interagency reporting. A civilian subject matter expert who deployed to Afghanistan explained the application of the approach in the following terms:

One of the interesting things we did actually is [sic] early days, DND would do it’s [sic] reporting, Foreign Affairs would do it’s reporting, and CIDA would do it’s [sic] reporting and we sort of said…If were supposed to be 3D, to do a single report…so we created a mini board that contained [the] Chief of Staff and the political advisor and [the] development advisor where we all contributed a piece. And it was still probably 85% military…and we all went through it and said ‘Well I don’t understand any of this. This we have to change. And I don’t understand this bit.’ And we were all reading each other’s things to the point where, you know, we were submitting what became a very meaty…weekly report. It’s called the PMESIR – the Political Military Economic Social and Intelligence Report…it was a single report that was our sort of first attempt at really, you know, showing that we’re…a team on the ground…teamwork on the ground worked really, really well.113

Through the adoption of the CF’s PMESII framework, the military initiated civil-military dialogue in theatre and improved the coherence of civilian reporting in Afghanistan.

The CF’s Land Force’s December 2008 Counter-Insurgency Doctrine was significant because it addressed the linkages among counterinsurgency, peace and stability operations. In the COIN doctrine, military operations were described as a “series of predominant campaign themes” that may include major combat, counter insurgency, peace support and peacetime military engagements. These themes were located along the spectrum of conflict, but their position was not fixed. As in Afghanistan, the doctrine noted that different campaign themes could occur within a single campaign theatre such that “one region of a nation may require peace support, while another is enduring an insurgency.” Similar to other doctrine, the publication asserted that the campaign themes involve full-spectrum operations and the simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive and stability tactical activities. The military and the other agencies must develop unity of purpose, based on common objectives, to facilitate a comprehensive approach as difference entities carry out separate but interdependent tasks to develop effective solutions to root causes of an insurgency. However, this doctrine did not make any references to the JIMP concept or the PMESII tool recommended for situational assessments in previous publications. From 2008 to 2011, the COIN doctrine provided the basic guidance for ongoing operations in Afghanistan, which aligned with the KAP’s

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115 CAF doctrine provides definitions for PSO and COIN that highlight the differences of between these engagements. According to the doctrine peace support campaigns “impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or peace building.” COIN is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.” Counterinsurgency campaigns are characterized by: “an insurgent based adversary, the political nature of the crisis, a need to address multiple facets of the environment and root causes of the crisis through a comprehensive approach with the military in an overall supporting role, and a degree of combat that is less than that experienced in a major combat campaign.” Canada National Defence, Counter-Insurgency Operations (B-GL-323-004/FP-003) (2008)
emphasis on achieving counterinsurgency results and the nesting of stability activities within a larger COIN campaign.

In 2011, as part of Canadian Military Doctrine, the CF’s new strategic level doctrine, stability operations were redefined as a specific type of operation or mission “carried out by armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order.” Stability activities were presented as a part of “WOG strategy” and “a greater comprehensive approach strategy” that ensures “all elements of national and coalition power” are working within a unified theme. Stability activities are especially emphasized during COIN operations. In this publication, whole of government referred to the GOC’s “integrated approach to crisis situations that incorporates instruments of national power: diplomacy (e.g. DFAIT), military (DND/CF), and economic (e.g. CIDA).” In order to realize maximum benefits from WOG, the doctrine asserted that structures and processes ‘may need to be adapted…” However, it was unclear how the armed forces were to reform existing rules, structures and process to support WOG approaches to international conflicts and crises.

In summary, the rules for complex mission in 2001 were underdeveloped, which created space for the CF leadership to interpret the CF’s role in Afghanistan in either narrow or broad terms. Whereas senior military officers directing the mission from 2001 to 2004 took the former approach, General Hillier interpreted the CF’s role and responsibilities in complex missions in much broader terms. The existing rules for

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116 Reference for this paragraph: Canada National Defence, Canadian Military Doctrine, CFJP 01 (B-GJ-005-000/FP-001). The doctrine defined CA as “A collaborative process that includes all actors that may affect the conduct of operations within a joint operating area. These actors may include: military (joint and multi-national forces), Canadian government department and agencies (whole of government), foreign governments and international organizations (e.g. NATO and UN), and publicly funded organizations (e.g. NGOs).”
CPKO, which purported to include other MOOTW besides peacekeeping, and CIMIC granted the leadership the ability to define the CF’s role and responsibilities as reaching across all levels and pillars of the mission. Over the course of its participation in Afghanistan, CF adapted its doctrine through the process of layering new rules for counterinsurgency alongside its existing rules for peacekeeping and combat operations. In the process, stability operations were redefined as a type of activity conducted across all campaign themes, and the doctrine was not developed to guide the CF in its support to civilian entities or in the achievement of stabilization goals in overseas missions. As a result, the CF’s contribution to WOG and CA approaches in the future remains open to interpretation by leading institutional actors.

Adaptation of In-Country Command Arrangements through Layering

The CF’s institutional rules for command structures in foreign missions at the beginning of the ISAF mission emphasized traditional command and control elements, and provided minimal guidance on how the armed forces ought to work with civilian entities in theatre. Throughout the 1990s, military operations proceeded according to traditional principles of command and control, but commanders relegated tasks not directly related to military objectives outside these structures. As was the case in Bosnia, CF participation in activities otherwise the domain of civilian entities included direct involvement in development and reconstruction. In late 2008, after the release of the Manley Report, civilian personnel and the armed forces developed the joint Kandahar Action Plan, which promoted collocation and joint planning of operations. Persistent imbalances in the civilian and military commitments secured the armed forces’ position
as lead entity in Afghanistan. In-country command arrangements evolved through the process of layering civilian personnel within existing traditional command structures.

In the early phases of the mission in Afghanistan, the CF command structure was complicated by the fact that Canada worked with the Coalition Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) under US-Central-Command (US CENTCOM), as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and within the NATO-led ISAF command. The coordination between Canadian government departments and agencies and the armed forces was limited and pursued on an ad hoc basis. This is demonstrated in a review the SAT-A. The release of the Manley Panel in early 2008 and new imperatives for unity of effort led to changes on the civilian side and the gradual integration of civilian and military elements at the Kandahar Airfield. The military’s response to these new requirements involved the adaptation of traditional command arrangements through the process of layering.

The case of the SAT-A in Kabul provides insight into the nature of in-country dynamics between the CF and other Canadian government entities from 2003 until 2008. The SAT-A was a CF initiative that operated independently from other military commands and Canadian civilian officials in Afghanistan. The SAT-A was an in-country governance initiative led by the CF, which involved only minimal participation of GOC civilian entities. In 2003, ISAF commander General Hillier provided the Karzai Government with CF military officers to help develop a long-term approach to stability.

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117 From 2001 until the summer of 2003, the CAF participated in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In August 2003, the CAF redeployed to Kabul as part of the ISAF mission to maintain security in the city and surrounding area. Two years later, the CAF assumed leadership of Task Force Afghanistan (TFA), including Task-Force Kabul, the theatre support element and the PRT in Kandahar. In February 2006, a CAF officer took on the role of commander TFA and the Canadian National Command Element (NCE) and the National Support Element (NSE) was moved from Kabul to Kandahar.
and development. It was based on the success of this partnership that Hillier responded to President Karzai’s request for continued support with the deployment of a group of CF officers, along with a handful of Canadian civilian personnel from other government departments, to assist the Afghan Finance Ministry to work on plans for international aid and investment in the country. SAT-A members were “embedded” within government ministries, taking up posts as chiefs of staff within the Government and introducing military planning approaches as a way to manage civilian problems. The SAT-A’s activities were, as described by Colonel Donald Dixon, the chief of SAT-A team in 2007, focused on the development public administration capacities within the GoA: “one of the things we’re trying to show them is how to delegate responsibilities, always consistent with their goals and objectives”. Over the course of three one-year deployments, the civil-military team, which expanded to nineteen members, was instrumental in the drafting of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy approved in February 2006 that would provide the basis for international efforts in Afghanistan.

Increasingly, civilian officials voiced concerns about the Team and its expansion into the political foray of governance in Afghanistan. While it was responsive to the Canadian Ambassador (Head of Mission) and the Afghan Government, SAT-A was an

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118 St-Louis, “A Comprehensive Approach to Stability,” 60. The Team was comprised of twelve military officers and two civil servants from DND, one representative from CIDA, and eventually, two public servants from DFAIT.
120 Ronald J. Fitzgerald, “The Canadian Strategic Advisory Team to Afghanistan: A Possible Model for Multinational Whole of Government Approach to Defeating an Insurgency.” Unpublished Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012), 5. Four separate military groups were assigned to SAT-A from 2005 until it was disbanded in 2008
autonomous entity, as Major James McKay explained: “...SAT-A is independent of the embassy, though the SAT House backs onto the property and our offices are nearby.”

Although CF members consulted DFAIT and CIDA, civilian officials were not directly involved in the team and some civilian officials argued that the military’s involvement in governance was not appropriate. DFAIT officials became increasingly concerned that the military, namely General Hillier, had “strayed outside his portfolio.”

Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, argued that the advisory role assumed by the CF should be reassigned to Canada’s diplomats. Another concern was that the SAT-A, a military initiative, was taking direction from the Afghan government rather than the Canadian embassy, and this raised questions about who was setting the terms of Canada’s mission. In this regard, the reliance on the Canadian military in this way raised doubts about Canada’s willingness, and ability, to provide civilian expertise and resources to facilitate capacity building in weak states. While the real reasons for the demise of SAT-A are unknown, these concerns and bureaucratic infighting certainly contributed to its disbandment in 2008 and its replacement with the CIDA-led Canadian Governance Support Office (CGSO). The decision reflected some
government officials desire to civilianize the program, but it also aligned with the Manley Panel’s calls to balance the civilian and military commitments to the mission. In sum, the SAT-A was a military-led and staffed initiative that existed outside established command structures. Besides the few civilian representatives working on the team, the team’s ties with other GOC departments were limited and occurred on an informal basis. Overall, the command context in which SAT-A was established and operated is consistent with the institutional practices applied during the peace operations in Bosnia. A more significant challenge to this practice occurred in Kandahar as civilian personnel redeployed to the province in 2007 and later, after the Manley Panel report’s recommendations for improved coordination.

The separate chains of command maintained by individual civilian entities and the traditional command system established by armed forces in Kandahar was a persistent challenge to in-country unity of effort throughout the mission. Since the beginning of the Kandahar mission in mid-2005, civilian entities and the armed forces reported along separate chains of command and the coordination of efforts occurred primarily at the tactical, or ground, level within the KPRT. On the military side, Canadian forces reported to Joint Task Force-Afghanistan at the Kandahar Airfield, which in turn reported to CEFCOM headquarters in Ottawa. On the civilian side, personnel reported to and received most of their direction from Ottawa, rather than Canadian officials in Kabul. This was due in part to the location of Canadian officials in Kabul and the deployment of

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Embassy-202213Aug08.pdf). In the end, CGSO was staffed with consultants from CANADADEM, the non-profit recruiting agency and with support from DFAIT. See Anthony Fenton and Jon Elmer, “Building an Expeditionary Force For Democracy Promotion,” in Empire’s Ally: Canada and theWar in Afghanistan, eds. Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 325-6.  
the majority of civilian personnel to other parts of the country. Although Canada had an Ambassador and a Head of Aid to oversee development projects, these officials were in Kabul and unable to provide consistent oversight and direction to civilian personnel deployed with JTF-Afgh at Kandahar Airfield or the representatives working with the PRT in Kandahar City. For the first three years of the mission, civilian entities and the armed forces within separate chains of command and coordination was pursued on an informal basis.

In February 2008, after the release of the Manley Report, the GOC appointed a Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), the senior civilian representative of Canada in the province and equal in rank to the Commander of JTF-Afgh. Among the RoCK’s primary objectives was to improve the coordination of civilian elements and support integrated planning. Senior GOC officials in Afghanistan were co-located with the CF commander at Task Force Afghanistan Headquarters. However, the unity of effort realized between civilian leaders and commanders was highly dependent on the approach taken by individual commanders, as one CF commander explained:

…[T]he first thing I did was I kicked my Deputy [Commander] out of his office which was next door to mine and moved her [Senior Civilian] in there. So visually it looks right, it was the Commander and you have the Senior Civilian and they’re in the same executive suite so that, you know, people immediately recognize that they’re co-equals…

The degree of civil-military integration achieved across the command system was also dependent on the decisions of military leaders. CF commanders retained the authority to

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128 Buchan explained that although there was a Canadian Ambassador in Kabul, DFAIT personnel often received direction and reached back to headquarters in Ottawa. Similarly, CIDA established a Head of Aid in Kabul, but looked to Ottawa for direction. Buchan, “Civil-Military Coordination,” 100.
129 Buchan, “Civil-Military Coordination,” 103.
130 Thomson, et al., Interagency Trust, 37.
determine whether or not to embed civilian personnel within military cells and units, and
to alter the physical location of civilian officials within the headquarters. Civilian
personnel were placed within various cells at TFA HQ. Again, CF commanders
determined where ‘integration’ was needed, taking into account the implications of
civilian involvement in particular cells for military operations and the mission, more
generally. The same commander explained the approach to placing civilians in military
units:

…[W]e looked across the headquarters for areas where we needed to be
integrated…the guys that do the campaign plan, so the people that are looking out
six months a year, two years, that needed to have a civilian component because
military planners don’t have that level of expertise. So I think it was three or four
civilians from both CIDA and DFAIT that were added to that team or stuck into
the campaign planning cell. The second piece was Intelligence…we needed
people to analyze the tribal structures to figure out, you know, who the informal
power brokers are in the province, so you, you know which belly button to push
to make something happen…it’s certainly augmented or made even more
effective if you throw some civilians into the mix. So we put two civilians into
what was then called the White SA [Situational Awareness] Cell…the third area is
public affairs…if you’re trying to get your message out…you need to do more
than just the military sorties…and then…visitors. You’re absolutely inundated
in these places by visitors and many of them are Ministers from these other
Ministries. So constantly, and they’re constantly handled by military people…so
we put civilians into the Visit Cell.131

In the intelligence realm, there seemed to be a greater degree of integration. At Camp
Julien in Kabul, army signalers, the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSEC) worked side-by-side at
an All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC). Civilian personnel and CF members worked
together to collect intelligence from electronic and human sources.132 The unity of effort
achieved at the Centre vastly improved the situational awareness of Canadians and ISAF,

131 Ibid.
132 Gordon Ohlke, “Army News—The All Source Intelligence Centre,” Canadian Army Journal
(Fall 2007).
and was credited with saving lives.\textsuperscript{133} In terms of information sharing, the collocation of civilian personnel and military members was highly beneficial to ongoing efforts in the country.

The unity of effort among collocated personnel was frustrated by the maintenance of separate reporting chains by civilian entities. To varying degrees, the civilian entities maintained centralized chains of authority with direct ties to Ottawa. Some decisions needed to be submitted for approval from higher levels of government in Ottawa and limited the ability of civilian representatives to respond quickly and progress interagency initiatives. The centralization of civilian decision-making was described by one CF member in the following way:

They try to direct it, try to pull the levers, from 10,000 kilometers away in Ottawa...and for the record that never happened to me militarily...but that wasn’t the case for [Senior Civilian] and all of [the] policemen [RCMP] and [the] development folks [CIDA] and the diplomats [DFAIT], etc....constantly getting calls from Deputy Ministers in that office that was next to mine and being, you know, being questioned or told what to do or having...ideas shot down, having to constantly justify what it was [Senior Civilian] was doing. None of which I suffered through.

There was also the issue that various departments and agencies granted their representatives in theatre various levels of discretion to make in-theatre decisions. Often, the command hierarchy and structure provided military members with more authority and discretion over their particular units than granted by civilian departments to their deployed personnel. Finally, unlike in Afghanistan where civilian and military personnel were collocated, bureaucrats and CF members assigned to mission-related files in Ottawa continued to work within their respective home departments or headquarters. As a result, in-country coordination was sometimes obstructed by the lack of unity of effort and

\textsuperscript{133}Bercuson and Granatstein, Lessons Learned, 5.
communication among entities operating in Canada.\textsuperscript{134}

In sum, the strong veto possibilities experienced by the armed forces in Afghanistan and the military’s continued reliance on traditional command structures led to the gradual adaptation to unity of effort requirements through the process of layering. The CF enforced a traditional approach to command and organization during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Existing rules provided minimal guidance on how to establish formal linkages and harmonize civil-military structures across the levels of a mission. From 2003 to 2005, DND and the CF were the primary GOC entities operating in Afghanistan. When General Rick Hillier created the CF-led SAT-A, which extended the CF’s influence over non-security pillars of the mission, the existing command structure was not adapted in any way to accommodate the Team. Instead SAT-A was established outside existing military commands. From 2005 through 2007, the CF continued to operate within the established structures, while civilian entities in Ottawa maintained separate reporting chains. In 2008, the Manley Report recommended an increase in civilian commitments to Afghanistan and greater civil-military coordination in the delivery of a comprehensive approach. Under pressure to reform existing arrangements to new unity of effort requirements, traditional military command structures were not replaced or merged with civilian organizations to create new civil-military entities. Instead, commanders upheld a military approach to organization by embedding civilians within existing units. Under these arrangements, the CF retained significant control over the ability of civilians to influence and participate in CF-led activities.

\textsuperscript{134} Thomson, et al., Interagency Trust, 24-5.
Adaptation of Civil-Military Capability through Drift

The CF’s existing rules for CIMIC upon deployment to Afghanistan granted military commanders significant discretion over the nature and scope of CF members’ involvement in activities. The identified dearth of formal guidance for CIMIC afforded both leaders and members involved in these operations considerable latitude in how they related to civilian entities and populations. During the mission in Afghanistan, CF CIMIC teams were centered in the KPRT, which was based at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City in 2005. Keeping in mind the strong veto possibilities afforded the armed forces during the mission, this section traces the evolution of CIMIC, as part of the KPRT, and its shift in focus after the release of the Manley Report. This section proceeds with a brief review of institutional rules for CIMIC in 2003 and then moves on to consider the evolving role of CIMIC in Afghanistan from 2003 until March 2006, when CF released updated CIMIC guidance. This is followed by an analysis of the military’s adaptation of the capability after the release of the Manley Report in 2008. In particular, it demonstrates how military actors’ increasingly narrow view of CIMIC resulted in its redefinition as a type of information operation. Overall, this analysis reveals that Canadian CIMIC was adapted through the process of drift, and that current institutional rules continue to afford military commanders maximum discretion in their interpretation of its purpose, utility and application in overseas operations.

The CF’s 1999 doctrine stated that CIMIC was intended to assist military operations and to further Canadian national objectives, and that clear guidelines were

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needed to determine the areas for CIMIC activity.\textsuperscript{136} However, a year after the
publication of this doctrine, CIMIC was officially designated a reserve capability and
these formal guidelines were not developed. Similarly, the GOC did not develop
guidance for the KPRT that would assist CIMIC teams to develop terms and guidance for
their involvement in reconstruction and other stability activity. Although KPRT was
touted as a major Canadian commitment in Afghanistan, the only official documents
concerning the team included a Memorandum of Cabinet, setting out Canada’s rationale
for establishing the PRT, and an unsigned PRT Framework Agreement developed by
DND, DFAIT and CIDA.\textsuperscript{137} For their part, military leaders did not establish formal
directives for the KPRT either and Roto 0 KPRT received only verbal direction from the
CDS to focus on support to local elections.\textsuperscript{138} Therefore, it was with very few formal
rules that CIMIC teams operated in Kabul from 2003 to 2005 and in Kandahar from 2006
to 2011.

As part of Canada’s first deployment to Kabul in 2003, CIMIC teams were
expected to support the Battle Group Commander, facilitate support to the task force, and
provide support to the civilian environment and to other ‘all of government’ entities in
the area.\textsuperscript{139} In 2005 CIMIC were redeployed to Afghanistan as part of the Canadian-led
KPRT, which included 235 civilian and military personnel. The team was composed of
support elements, military function enablers, other government departments and agencies

\textsuperscript{136}Before assuming control of the KPRT, DCDS assigned a six-member CIMIC team to support the Battle
Group Commander during Operation Athena, Afghanistan. The team was expected to facilitate civilian
support to the task force, and provide support to the civilian environment and to other ‘all of government’
entities in the area Graham M. Longhurst, “Civil-Military Cooperation- The Inukshuk.” \textit{The Bulletin} 10,
no.1 (2004), 60-1.

\textsuperscript{137}Canada Chief of Review Services, \textit{Evaluation of CAF/DND Participation in the Kandahar PRT} (Ottawa,
ON: Department of National Defence, December 2007), 15.

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid.

from Canada, Britain and the United States, and the Patrol Company.\textsuperscript{140} As one of the four military function enablers, CIMIC was often expected to provide support to deployed units and facilitate military operations, but teams often found themselves working with local populations and in frequent contact with civilian entities.\textsuperscript{141}

Similar to activities carried out by Canadian CIMIC cells in Bosnia, the CIMIC team attached to the KPRT in 2005 helped identify development and reconstruction needs across the province. The military commander and the CIMIC detachment attended local council meetings, or \textit{shuras}, with CIDA-supported Community District Councils and district-level Development Assemblies to identify local needs. The CIMIC team collected information and cleared requests for quick-impact projects with national ministers, and then, through Canadian Diplomat Glyn Berry, worked with the governor of Kandahar to coordinate efforts. The CIMIC team also contracted out some projects, such as repairs to local infrastructure.\textsuperscript{142} As well, the KPRT CIMIC cell acted as the “eyes and ears” for coalition forces, and CIDA and DFAIT.\textsuperscript{143} However, unlike previous missions in Bosnia where CF CIMIC personnel worked fairly independent of GOC entities, CIMIC personnel in Kandahar were required to work more closely with Canadian, British and American civilian entities. Rather than taking the lead on projects and setting up contracts with local outfits, the KPRT had to work with the civilian organizations leading key

\textsuperscript{140}Maloney, \textit{Confronting the Chaos}, 142. While the majority of the members were from the CAF, there were also representatives from CIDA, United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID), Britain’s Department For International Development (DFID), the RCMP and DFAIT. Each of these organizations deployed between one and three people to the Team. These civilian personnel focused on deliverables in the field including the allocation of aid and reconstruction money, supporting capacity building of the bureaucracy and government, and police training in Kandahar city and other districts across the province.

\textsuperscript{141}Maloney, \textit{Confronting the Chaos}.

\textsuperscript{142}Windsor, Charters and Wilson, \textit{Kandahar Tour}, 41.

\textsuperscript{143}Ibid.
initiatives. Through 2005 the KPRT CIMIC team provided a supporting role for their civilian partners. However, changes in the operational environment in early 2006 widened the range of activities carried out by CIMIC teams.

A surge of Taliban attacks and violence in southern Afghanistan in early 2006 prompted the withdrawal of civilian representatives and NGOs from the area creating new challenges for the KPRT. By September 2006, the tactical situation in Kandahar made it increasingly difficult for both military and civilian entities to carry out development and reconstruction activities. Civilian representation on the 140 person KPRT was reduced to three representatives from CIDA, one representative from Foreign Affairs and three Canadian Police Officers. CF members attached to the Team were redeployed from the KPRT to support the Canadian-led offensive against insurgents west of Kandahar, and the KPRT’s mobility was further reduced. In response to a call from Minister of Defence Gordon O’Connor for more projects and development activity, DND deployed more soldiers and additional military resources to Kandahar in September 2006. Additional personnel were sent to the KPRT to strengthen its security capacity and to provide the force protection needed for the Team to move more freely around the province. As well, the KPRT CIMIC was enhanced with the addition of a CIMIC platoon (that is, six CIMIC tactical teams of operators and drivers) to the team.

Updated CIMIC guidance, released in March 2006, identified a larger role for CIMIC

144 Maloney, Confronting the Chaos, 168.
146 Ibid; Canada Department of National Defence, “DND: Military Strengthens.”
147 The augmentation of personnel in September 2006 involved large military contingent, as well as a civilian advisor from DFAIT, four RCMP officers, one police officer and development specialists from CIDA, bringing the total membership to over three hundred.
in complex operations. The specialized joint doctrine, *CIMIC: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, issued in 2006, defined CIMIC as “a military function that supports the commander’s mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in the commander’s area of operations.”\(^{149}\) It outlined the tactics, techniques and procedures for CIMIC in land force operations. It noted that the success of contingency operations, including stability, international humanitarian assistance and combat operations, requires effective interaction and coordination between the armed forces and civilian actors. CIMIC capability, according to this publication, must be employed in operations across the spectrum of conflict and for all types of operations. It included general descriptions of CIMIC’s core functions, including liaison with civil actors, coordination of civil support to the military force, and the coordination to civil actors. The doctrine also indicated what types of civil-military cooperation tasks may be required across the phases of a mission, and provided general guidelines for the conduct of these tasks. As well, there were a range of factors that CIMIC teams must consider in carrying out operations such as the legal assistance, public administration, education and health, safety and economic development, the environment, cultural relations and transportation and property control in a given area. In its comprehensiveness, the doctrine codified the extensive reach of CIMIC in Afghanistan and granted military commanders the ability to interpret its function in the widest possible terms.

However, following the return of government representatives to Kandahar through 2007 and the release of the Manley Report, a gap opened up between these rules and the

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situation on the ground. As the GOC sought to rebalance the civilian and military commitments, CIMIC teams withdrew from many of the activities they carried out prior to 2008 and the capability was redefined as a military support function.

By the time civilian personnel were being redeployed to Kandahar in 2007, the KPRT CIMIC capability had grown and its role in the mission had evolved. The KPRT’s CIMIC platoon became increasingly involved in projecting the team’s effort within the area of operation. CIMIC personnel focused on liaising between other government agencies, district leaders and other local officials. But its role also extended to include a mentorship role, as described by the director of the Army Lessons Learned Centre, Lieutenant Colonel R.H. Matheson:

CIMIC roles have tremendously evolved under the umbrella of the PRT and TF-Afgh since the beginning of our commitment in Afghanistan. Beyond the normal liaison with civilian authorities, a new CIMIC role has emerged: mentoring local leaders.

This mentorship was carried out to improve governance, development and security in the area of operations.\(^{150}\) In Zharey and Pajwayi Districts, the CIMIC detachments frequently met and consulted directly with local groups on what was needed in their communities, once again taking up an ‘eyes and ears’ function for civilian entities. The detachment also resumed its project management functions. For instance, in most districts in Kandahar, the CIMIC team discovered that while the “basic infrastructure for education and health care already existed” in such areas as Spin Boldak, by the time Canadian ISAF and the Afghan Army re-entered the area, these systems were in various

states of disrepair and unable to meet the needs of the local population. In this role, the CIMIC personnel coordinated the various groups working in Kandahar and gained significant insight into what was needed in a community, which they would then report to civilian agencies. Further, the CIMIC detachments also provided an important check on reconstruction and development projects by ensuring that funding was going to the intended projects and that these projects were being progressed. Between March and May 2007, “97 projects were approved by the district assembly and were either under construction or finished,” including the construction of schools, as well as repairs to irrigation systems and bridges.

However, there were ongoing concerns about the capability and its role as part of the KPRT. A 2007 Chief of Review Services report on the KPRT brought to light concerns about the future of the CF’s CIMIC capability. First, it stated that just as the evaluation found there was “no coherent overarching direction” to guide the military and OGD members of the team, there was “no evident direction” on how functions such as CIMIC were to be integrated to help achieve campaign aims. Instead, the first rotation that deployed with the KPRT, including the CIMC teams received “verbal direction from the CDS on his ‘Commander’s Intent’” and the KPRT CO worked with the Commander of Joint-Task Force-Afghanistan to develop the KPRT’s task orders. Second, the CRS study found that there was a varied level of readiness across Canadian civilian and

151 Reference for the remainder of this paragraph: Windsor, Charters and Wilson, Kandahar Tour, 157, 100, 189.
153 Canada Chief of Review Services, Evaluation of CF/DND, 15.
military personnel deployed to the KPRT. Reserve CIMIC operators received their training at the Peace Support Training Centre’s Centre of Excellence that trains CF CIMIC and PsyOps specialists. However, this training was often done on an individual basis and not as part of the PRT, and the length of their contracts meant they had less time in collective KPRT training than other civilian personnel and regular CF members. Finally, the report raised questions about the ability of the CF to force-generate sufficient numbers of reserve specialists to staff CIMIC teams for the duration of the mission. According to the report, in 2007, the between sixty-five and seventy-five personnel that comprised the CF’s CIMIC capability were force-generated by the designated Land Force areas and that some of the trained CIMIC members were unable to deploy when required.

In November 2007, the Canadian Land Forces provided its first written direction for the KPRT, a doctrine note titled, Civil—Military Transition Teams/ Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The note reflected a shift in the forces’ approach to CIMIC. Although the doctrinal note referenced NATO’s definition of CIMIC, which was much broader than the CF definition of CIMIC, it tied the function of CIMIC to the military’s concept of operations rather than the coordination and cooperation between commanders and civil actors. In addition to this broader definition, the doctrine identified the capability as an integrated part of PRTs. This narrower concept of CIMIC and its purpose

155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Canada Chief of Review Services, Evaluation of CF/DND, 24
158 The doctrine note adopted the NATO definition of CIMIC “as the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organizations and agencies.” See Canada Land Force, Land Force Doctrine Note (LFDN) 4-07 Civil Military Transition Teams/Provincial Reconstruction Teams, November 2007.
reoriented the capability towards the military objectives of the mission, which may or may not have included support to WOG partners.

In the same vein as the 2007 PRT doctrinal note, the CF’s *Canadian Land Operations* doctrine released in January 2008 included a revised definition of CIMIC that reflected its intelligence gathering function during operations in Afghanistan. While the doctrine adopted a definition of CIMIC as the coordination and cooperation between military leaders and civil actors in support of the mission, CIMIC was redefined from a support function to a form of operations. Through its support of reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan, CIMIC forces were acknowledged for their ability to influence, inform, and persuade populations. The new rules emphasized CIMIC’s contribution to the situational improvement of the military, the enhancement of positive perceptions, legitimacy among local populations for the campaign, and the gaining of support from targeted audiences. CIMIC was identified as one of nine key activities in the information operations of land forces “for first order effects on the psychological plane.” Defined in these terms, CIMIC was considered an important part of the overall operational plan and CIMIC influence activities were to be developed together with other JIMP, rather than in terms of its contribution to a comprehensive response or a WOG approach in overseas missions. While the Manley Report’s recommendations, released the same month as this doctrine, called for a balanced, but more coordinate, approach in Afghanistan, the doctrine reflected a reorientation of the capability as serving a largely military purpose.

This approach to CIMIC created several gaps for its application in complex operations and its support for the delivery of CA. First, in defining CIMIC as an activity
pursued for purely military aims, this doctrine did not adequately account for the critical role of CIMIC in support of broader political goals of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, especially in the areas of reconstruction and development. Second, the doctrine maintained that CIMIC was a tactical level consideration and acknowledged that CF did not develop operational level doctrine for CIMIC. In the absence of operational doctrine, the CF would not have institutional rules to guide planning and analysis of CIMIC operations. This is inconsistent with CF practices, given that it has developed operational-level doctrine for other information operations, such as psychological operations. Third, neither the CF’s Information Operations Policy Directive or the Joint CF Information Operations Manual addressed CIMIC as an information operation or explained how CIMIC was to be integrated with other information operations during overseas missions. Without an updated doctrine for CIMIC operations, there remained many questions about the conduct of these operations in complex emergencies and its role in future peace and stability operations. It is not surprising that in the months following the release of Canada’s Land Operations, soldiers deployed to Afghanistan continued to request doctrine that reflected the PRT’s role in mentoring small communities, development and reconstruction.  

With the Government of Canada’s renewed commitment to a whole-of-government approach to Afghanistan after the release of the Manley Panel’s Report, more civilian officials and representatives were deployed to Afghanistan, reaching

\[159\] Canada Army Lessons Learned Centre, Army Lessons Learned Centre 2008 Roll-Up Report, 9.
upwards of one hundred personnel by 2009. The collocation of civilian and military personnel at the KPRT created new challenges for the alignment of civilian PRT and military CIMIC activities. There were also issues with the PRT’s ability to coordinate and synchronize its projects. It was expected that greater “inter-ministerial cooperation” and interagency pre-deployment training would go some way in improving the coordination of the PRT. Many of the problems encountered by the KPRT – including confusion over equipment entitlements, training, budgets and other administrative issues – existed because the team did “not exist as a unit” until it was stood-up in theatre. While it was recommended that the KPRT be established “as a unit with a [Unit Identifier Code] in Canada,” no steps were taken during the mission to formalize the KPRT. With respect to CIMIC within the PRT, there were concerns about how the capability was applied within the team. Reports indicated the need to better integrate CIMIC into the tactical and operational level operations of the KPRT.

By spring 2009, the unity of effort established within the KPRT was disrupted by the surge of American troops to Afghanistan, including Kandahar. With the influx of troops, the Canadian Task Force’s area of operations was focused on three districts of the province, while the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team was working to implement the GOC’s six priorities and three signature projects across Kandahar. While the KPRT

162 An army lessons learned report stated that the army needed to develop a better understanding of other government entities’ capabilities and organization and culture, and non-military PRT members needed to improve their understanding of the military’s functions. See Canada Army Lessons Learned Centre, Army Lessons Learned Centre 2008 Roll-Up Report, (Kingston, ON: Army Lessons Learned Centre, March 2009): 18. A-2012-00751, acquired through Access to Information request.
and TFK remained mutually supportive, the change in the operational environment disrupted the civil-military synchronization achieved to date and “efforts were no longer aligned, and occasional friction arose.”

By the time the combat mission in Afghanistan began to wind down, the CF had taken few steps to institutionalize CIMIC across the forces. While the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston continued to offer baseline CIMIC training for CF members, the Canadian military did not have a permanent entity focused solely on the recruitment, training and deployment of personnel with specialized skills to support civilian efforts in overseas missions. The little attention given to CIMIC within the CF led General (Retired) Andrew Leslie, Canadian defence scientist Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek to conclude that “the entire area of CIMIC, and by extension, JIMP and the comprehensive approach, remains essentially a secondary consideration in the capability development process.”

Ambiguous rules and the lack of formal guidelines permitted wide variation in how the CIMIC was conducted over the course of the mission. The broad interpretation of the capability in the context of the KPRT from 2005 through 2007 was followed by a contraction of the capability, as captured in military’s doctrine released in January 2008. In the early phases of the Kandahar mission, the small number of civilians deployed to Afghanistan and their inability to operate outside the wire permitted the CF flexibility in how it applied CIMIC in support of the KPRT. Without a formal strategy for the WOG approach, the terms for civil-military cooperation were largely undefined and military

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commanders supported the extension of CIMIC’s involvement in the development and reconstruction realms of the mission. After 2008, the GOC’s emphasis on the WOG approach and the deployment of more civilians from other government departments to the region created new imperatives for CIMIC. Rather than adapting to unity of effort imperatives in ways that integrated with and supported civilian entities, CIMIC capabilities were re-cast in narrow terms. Revised definitions of CIMIC identified it as an information operation and its utility in collecting intelligence critical for military operations. By the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan, the CF’s CIMIC rules had limited, if any, applicability to the development and delivery of joint civil-military responses in overseas missions.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The application of the historical institutional theory of gradual change demonstrated that the level of discretion afforded CF leaders and members in the interpretation and enforcement of existing rules was a primary factor affecting institutional adaptation over the course of the ISAF mission. Rules defined in doctrine or established through informal practices pattern members’ behaviour, but also reflect norms intended to guide future action. In the early phases of the mission, dominant actors supported the extensive involvement of the CF in non-military aspects of the ISAF mission. This decision was consistent with the military’s past experience in peace operations throughout the 1990s, when the military was often the only Canadian entity with the resources to carry out activities in the area of operations, including the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the implementation and management of development projects.
The findings of this case study are also consistent with the hypothesis that the larger political context mediates the types of gradual changes undertaken by an institution when it is under pressure to reform. The authority, resources and opportunities afforded members to prevent reforms contribute to actors’ veto possibilities and the amount of control they have over institutional change. Throughout the ISAF mission, the CF realized strong veto possibilities vis-à-vis civilian entities and GOC personnel involved in Afghanistan. In particular, the CF retained strong veto possibilities at the operational and tactical levels of the mission, including access to significant resources, extensive experience in expeditionary operations, and a presence in Afghanistan unmatched by the civilian sector. These factors bolstered the CF’s position as the lead Canadian entity in the country and reaffirmed its critical role in the provision of security, support and advice to other government representatives in the theatre of operations. Under these circumstances, the CF was able to incorporate civilian personnel without changes to its existing command structures.

While the gradual theory of institutional change assumes that dominant actors will seek to preserve the status quo, or existing rules, the findings also suggest that dominant actors may seek to revise institutional rules to maintain the institution’s status and/or relevance under changing political or operational conditions. When the political context afforded the CF leadership opportunity and resources (i.e. strong veto possibilities), dominant actors responded to the complex problems in Afghanistan with the (re)introduction of rules intended to bolster the CF’s status or effectiveness, rather than concepts that fostered a joint civil-military approach to the mission. The 3BW concept, which envisioned the military’s simultaneous conduct of combat, reconstruction and
development and humanitarian operations, reflected General Hillier’s vision for the CF. While the concept was not formally adopted, it was reflected in the CF’s participation in activities otherwise lead by civilians, such as government capacity building with the SAT-A. Likewise, new COIN doctrine provided the CF with guidance on battling insurgent forces. It emphasized the security aspects of these operations, while stability operations were defined as a tactical level activity conducted to support military objectives. Overall these publications identified a broad role for the CF in all aspects of overseas missions and provided few guidelines for CF support for civil-military unity of effort and the delivery of a comprehensive approach to stability missions.

Overall, the findings of the case study support the research hypothesis that institutional rules are a principal factor affecting institutional change. The research shows that the CF’s formal and informal institutional rules in place at the onset of the ISAF mission established basic standards and expectations for the institution, and the parameters for institutional adaptation when requirements for change emerged with the release of the Manley Report in 2008. The degree to which existing rules were preserved or adapted was mediated by the political context of the mission, especially the authority and influence of dominant CF leaders from 2003 to 2008 and the resources available for military operations in Afghanistan. Under these conditions, dominant military actors oversaw the adaptation of the armed forces in ways that maintained existing rules or introduced new rules they viewed as essential to the CF’s survival in an era of modern wars.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

In Afghanistan western states adopted comprehensive policies intended to secure, stabilize and prevent the return of terrorist groups to the country. These policies created new imperatives for unity of effort between armed forces and other government entities, and created pressure for changes in militaries’ approaches to the missions. Existing research indicated differences in the armed forces’ support for interagency operations and the delivery of comprehensive responses on the ground in Afghanistan. This research applied a historical institutional theory to the American, British and Canadian armed forces with the aim of identifying the sources of these variations. Analyses of these cases found that unique institutional characteristics and, to a lesser extent, the domestic political context of national missions impacted the ways militaries supported unity of effort between 2001 and 2011. The case studies identified the specific changes undertaken by armed forces to formal doctrine, in-country command arrangements and civil-military capabilities over a ten-year period. This final chapter highlights key research findings and their policy implications. It concludes by outlining areas for further research.

Findings

Recent studies of the Afghanistan mission document the differences in national comprehensive approaches and the ways government departments and agencies, and the armed forces related during overseas operations. The existing literature identifies the various obstacles to civil-military cooperation and similarities and differences across nation-led, civil-military PRTs. What is not as well understood is how key institutional
partners in complex operations adapted to unity of effort imperatives in overseas contexts. The following question was formulated to guide a research study to bridge this gap in the literature: *How did the American, British and Canadian militaries adapt their approaches to the unity of effort requirements in Afghanistan?*

The historical institutional theory of gradual change developed by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen provided the basis for a Framework for Explaining Military Change. Change is most likely when problems of rule interpretation arise and dominant institutional actors are under pressure, from either internal or external sources, to reform. In response to these pressures, institutional characteristics and contextual factors lead to specific types of gradual change. Based on this framework, the hypothesis guiding the study was as follows:

*The adaptation of the American, British and Canadian militaries to unity of effort requirements was influenced primarily by the existing rules and practices for complex operations and, to a lesser extent, the ability of dominant institutional actors to preserve these rules and practices when under pressure to reform their approaches.*

The case studies were organized based on this hypothesis, beginning with an examination of each military’s existing rules for complex operations and the level of discretion afforded military commanders in their interpretation and enforcement. Given the formal authorities granted civil and military leaders, the analyses moved on to consider the political contexts of national missions and the veto possibilities realized by institutional actors.

In this analysis, veto possibilities are derived from either strong veto players or from strong veto potential of actors or groups to impact unity of effort outcomes in theatre. Veto players can be defined as individual actors or a group of actors whose
agreement is required to alter the status quo. Veto players and their powers are designated within an institution, authorized in law or created by the political system. The veto powers of civilian and military leaders were assessed based on their provision of strategic objectives and their oversight of armed forces in the achievement of these aims. A second aspect of veto possibilities was the *veto potential* of armed forces and their ability to influence CA outcomes on the ground. Institutional veto potential was assessed based on: 1) whether or not military and civilian leaders granted sub-commanders limited or significant flexibility to determine operations on the ground; and 2) whether or not sub-commanders had access to the resources needed to carry out military activities and extend their influence to national-level efforts. This involved a comparison of the human resources, funding and expeditionary capabilities available to armed forces and to other government entities during the mission. Taken together with the existing rules, it was possible to trace the impact of these factors on gradual changes made to formal doctrine, in-country command arrangements and CIMIC capabilities consistent with the modes of change identified in *Table 2: Theory of Gradual Institutional Change: Four Types of Gradual Change.*

In the American case study, the military’s existing rules for complex operations reflected its approach to conventional warfare and, in the absence of formal guidance, commanders were granted significant discretion in their conduct of military operations other than war. During the Afghanistan mission, the military leadership realized a gradual

strengthening of its influence culminating in the appointment of two armed forces officers to lead the development of joint civil-military plan. On the ground sub-commanders were granted considerable flexibility, while their access to resources and expeditionary capabilities bolstered their influence on US government efforts in the area of operation. The analysis revealed that, although the military was responsive to unity of effort imperatives, it undertook changes that preserved its existing rules and practices. Adaptation occurred through the layering of additional doctrine alongside existing publications, and the creation of parallel, but separate, command arrangements in Afghanistan. Despite its benefit to ongoing missions, American civil affairs were left to languish. Most certainly, the veto possibilities realized by institutional actors contributed to the preservation and enforcement of existing rules. However, it is clear based on the analysis that the rules and practices in place prior to 2001 were the starting point for change and a primary influence on the types of changes undertaken by the American military between 2001 and 2011.

The analysis of the British military and its adaptation to unity of effort requirements documented the armed forces’ experience in complex operations and its familiarity with other UK government entities in overseas operations. During the Afghanistan missions, civilian and military leaders failed to identify achievable objectives, develop realistic blueprints, and provide clear direction for forces deployed to Helmand in 2006. Although sub-commanders were afforded flexibility in their decision-making, their ability to contain the insurgency in Helmand and influence on the activities of other entities in the area was diminished due to their limited access to the troops and capabilities needed to secure the province. These weak veto possibilities made the armed
forces more vulnerable to pressures for reform. Existing rules provided the basis for new, more comprehensive doctrine for military support and stabilization operations. They also informed the creation of an integrated command structure in Afghanistan and the evolution of CIMIC capabilities to include dedicated teams for stabilization missions. Indeed, these reforms were undertaken by British armed forces at a time when it experienced diminished veto possibilities. However, the findings of the case study reaffirmed that, even in these circumstances, the military’s existing rules provided the foundation for institutional evolution. This is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional characteristics are critical variables in explanations of military change.

Finally, the Canadian case study reviewed the armed forces’ history of Cold War peacekeeping and its rules for complex peace operations as they evolved in the 1990s. An analysis of the evolving context of the Afghanistan mission revealed that the military leadership realized increasingly strong veto powers with respect to Canadian policy and the development of mission plans intended to guide national efforts. Under new command structures, greater decision-making authorities were delegated to sub-commanders on the ground and the armed forces had access to resources to lead the mission. New counterinsurgency doctrine was layered alongside existing publications and civilian personnel were placed alongside military personnel within established command structures. Despite the proven value of CIMIC during the Afghanistan mission, the capability evolved more through drift than deliberate reforms and a secondary concern for the CF. The findings showed that the rules for complex operations informed the military’s approach after 2001 and the political context of the Afghanistan mission afforded the forces opportunities to adapt in ways that left existing rules largely intact.
The American and the British cases reveal that these armed forces took very different approaches to unity of effort during complex operations. These findings are consistent with existing studies of these militaries, their historical experience and their organizational biases. This research, however, adds to current understandings of the American and British armed forces because it examines the impact of different institutional rules on military adaptation to civilian imperatives. It demonstrates that the institutional characteristics and the influence of military agents led to differences in the ways these militaries responded to unity of effort requirements. During the Afghanistan mission, the American armed forces’ rules emphasized the military objectives in recent counterinsurgency operations and traditional command organizations. Existing rules provided little guidance to members on the role of armed forces’ in support of civilian and joint initiatives, and the contribution of military operations to overarching political goals. Key aspects of the organization were adapted through the processes of layering and drift. In comparison, the British armed forces abided by more open-ended rules that reflected historical cooperation with civilian entities and a role in supporting political and civilian entities in complex environments. These rules were adapted through the process of conversion and reoriented the institution towards support and conduct of stabilization missions. This research shows that the institutional characteristics of armed forces and the influence of military agents at a particular point time interact to influence specific gradual changes within armed forces. In doing so, it offers an alternative explanation for differences in the American and British armed forces, especially in the context of recent missions.

The inclusion of the Canadian case in this study permits comparison with both the
American and British forces’ experience in a recent mission. In the first case, a comparison of the Canadian and American armed forces allows for a comparison of countries with similar geo-political interests, but different political systems. It reveals that the Canadian Forces’ existing rules and its adaptation were similar to those of the American military. Like the US force, the Canadian military introduced new rules for counterinsurgency alongside its existing doctrine for peace and combat operations. As well, the Canadian Forces upheld a traditional concept of command that was not conducive to the inclusion of non-military personnel and led to largely ad hoc civil-military arrangements in Afghanistan. Similar to the American military’s approach to its Civil Affairs branches, few steps were taken by the Canadian Forces to formalize CIMIC’s extensive role in complex operations and to build the capability for future missions. The Canadian and American military both adapted doctrine and in-country command arrangements through layering and permitted gradual changes to CIMIC and Civil Affairs capabilities through drift. The findings suggest that militaries with similar rules for complex operations and similar levels of influence on national missions will adapt in similar ways.

A comparison of the Canadian and American case studies shows that while militaries adapted dimensions of their organizations through similar processes, there was variation in the nature and extent of these changes. For example, two years after the American military released its counterinsurgency doctrine, the Canadian Forces published its own counterinsurgency document. In the American case, the counterinsurgency doctrine existed alongside separate doctrine for stability operations and interorganizational coordination in joint operations. In the Canadian case, the
counterinsurgency guidance was layered alongside existing rules for peace and combat operations. Stability operations and interorganizational operations were referenced in strategic-level documents, but they were not covered in separate operational or tactical level texts. Another example of variation in layering is the American and Canadian approaches to in-country command arrangements. Whereas American in-country arrangements involved the creation of a parallel civilian structure and the ad hoc working groups linking civilian representatives and military personnel, Canadian adaptation involved the ad hoc placement of civilian representatives within existing military units. These findings indicate that, although institutions may experience gradual change through the same process, such as layering, the same change mechanisms may lead to different outcomes depending on the institution.

The inclusion of the Canadian case in a historical institutional analysis of military adaptation also provides an opportunity to compare the experiences of the Canadian and British militaries, which both come from countries with Westminster Parliamentary systems of governance. The case studies reveal that, although the Canadian and British forces evolved and function within parliamentary systems, these militaries followed different rules for complex operations and adapted dimensions of their organizations through dissimilar processes. In comparison to Canadian Forces, the British armed forces had more experience working with civilian entities. They also maintained a more flexible approach to in-country structures and took steps to formalize the expanding role of its CIMIC capabilities during complex missions. The Canadian Forces adapted aspects of its organization through the processes of layering and drift, which left existing rules and practices largely in tact. In the British case, however, gradual changes to the institution
occurred through conversion. This involved the reinterpretation and redirection of the institution’s existing rules, and the reorientation of the military towards its future role in support and stabilization missions. The Canadian and British forces demonstrated divergent approaches in their adaptation to the unity of effort imperatives identified by their respective governments. A comparison of the American, British and Canadian cases shows that the American and Canadian armed forces adapted in similar ways to unity of effort requirements, while the British military evolved along a separate track. Based on these findings, it is possible to conclude that a state’s political system may not have as big of an impact on military adaptation to unity of effort requirements as other variables. Overall, this research has found that armed forces’ institutional characteristics and the influence of military agents on national campaigns have a significant influence on the types of gradual changes undertaken within the armed forces in response to unity of effort imperatives set out by their respective governments.

Policy Implications

The research leads to three general conclusions about military adaptation and unity of effort. These findings have separate implications for the delivery of comprehensive approaches (CA) in the future. First, the research indicates that the options available to military leaders for civil-military cooperation were bound by existing institutional rules. Existing practices, based on past experiences and recent peace operations, influenced the types of reforms that were possible and acceptable to members. For example, during peace operations in Bosnia, the American military relied on traditional command structures separate from civilian entities. In Afghanistan existing
rules informed in country civil military command arrangements and resulted in
adaptation through the layering of ad hoc entities that linked parallel civilian and military
commands. In comparison, the Canadian military, which also demonstrated a preference
for traditional command organization, drew on its experience working with civilian
entities in Bosnia and allowed for the incorporation of civilians within existing
arrangements in Afghanistan. Similarly, the British military, with its long history in
combined and integrated command structures, eventually joined with civilian
counterparts from other government departments and agencies to create the Civil Military
Mission in Helmand. From the analyses it is clear that the rules and practices that pattern
action may act as both constraints, as they did in the American case, or permit more
flexible responses, as in the Canadian and British contexts. Ultimately, the doctrine and
standard operating procedures established over the course of a mission can greatly impact
the level and nature of unity of effort achieved in future operations.

The cases underscore the utility of codifying best practices in formal doctrine and
standard operating procedures to ensure unity of effort in future counterinsurgency and
stabilization missions. Armed forces are likely to have a role in humanitarian
interventions and stabilization missions where cooperation with interagency partners is
critical to success. Where the threat to civilians is too great, the armed forces may be
required to deliver humanitarian aid to desperate populations, establish stability in fragile
societies, and prevent the further entrenchment of insurgent groups. However, as Philipp
Rotmann, the associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute, noted some
militaries have been slow to adopt these new roles: “[f]or many NATO armies, the shift
from homeland defense and a conventional defense doctrine around tank battles to
expeditionary warfare, stabilization and institution-building remains far from complete after the end of the Cold War." Progress on this front may be aided by the incorporation of lessons learned and best practices from recent interagency experiences into the standard procedures and formal publications that guide complex operations.

A second significant finding is that the decisions taken by political leaders to support a formal entity to coordinate government departments and agencies, and deploy personnel on overseas missions had a significant impact on the armed forces' role in interagency operations. For example, in the American and Canadian cases the ability of military leaders to enforce their interpretation of mission intent derived in part from the lack of civilian capacity in government. In these contexts, failure of governments to create a better balance of the civilian and military commitments in Afghanistan created conditions under which the military assumed command of the political, development and security aspects of the mission. As a result, reforms to support civil military unity of effort were largely ad hoc in nature or not fully institutionalized. In comparison, the relatively weak veto possibilities afforded British military leaders contributed to reforms through the process of conversion. The development of stabilization doctrine, the establishment of the Civil Military Mission Helmand and the creation of formal Military Stabilisation Support Groups reflect the forces alignment with Britain’s strategy for building stability overseas.4

The research indicates that the development of civilian capacities to coordinate

entities and deploy civilians abroad is key to achieving more balanced approaches in overseas missions. When this capacity exists entities are better able to apply their respective expertise and to harmonize their efforts with armed forces. In the British case study, the Stabilisation Unit led civilian planning efforts and worked closely with the armed forces to coordinate and develop joint civil-military plans for the rest of the mission. Edward Burke argued that by “leaving politics to the civilians” (that is, by leaving non-security aspects of the mission to government entities) the military created conditions for civilian agencies to “improve their performance in Afghanistan...”5 In sum, cross-government infrastructure and the creation of a cadre of qualified civilians may improve the success of joint responses in complex environments.

Finally, the case studies indicate that individual military leaders can impact the nature and extent of the military’s support for civilian programs in conflict zones. While the theory of gradual change assumes that institutional leaders seek to preserve existing rules and practices when under pressure to reform, the analyses found that, when select military commanders experienced strong veto possibilities, they introduced new rules or purposes for the armed forces in support of whole-of-government operations. For example, American General David Barno worked with his civilian counterparts at the American embassy to develop a counterinsurgency plan that shifted the American strategy from a combat focused mission to a population-centred campaign. In 2010, General Stanley McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry introduced a similar strategy for Afghanistan. In the Canadian case, General Rick Hillier interpreted the forces’ role in ways that built on its traditional role in peace operations, emphasized its

5Edward Burke, Leaving the civilians behind: The 'soldier-diplomat' in Afghanistan and Iraq (Madrid, Spain: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2009), 5.
combat capabilities, and demonstrated its willingness to carry out a range of non-military tasks. Even in the event of weaker veto possibilities, as experienced by British military actors in Afghanistan, leaders adopted a counterinsurgency approach that contributed to the UK’s long-term stabilisation strategy for the country. The research reveals that military leaders accepted and, in some cases, actively pursued changes to existing rules, especially when they believed reforms would improve the military’s effectiveness or ensure its relevance.

The research findings suggest that continued adaptation of armed forces to the comprehensive approach may depend on the attitudes of military leaders towards holistic responses. In a survey of 2,460 British officers and European officers from the NATO School in Germany, Professor Theo Farrell found that eighty-six percent of those polled in both groups agreed that “[f]uture operations will be characterized by a holistic approach, involving a mix of military and non-military instruments…” The high level of acceptance among British officers reflects their recent experience in Helmand. According to Professors Farrell and Sten Rynning, British thinking evolved over the course of the mission and by mid-2007 onwards the military mission was focused on assisting civilian agencies with the governance and development lines of operation.6 Farrell and Rynning contrasted these views on the utility of a holistic approach to ongoing debate in American military circles. In the United States, the challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq have cast long shadows of doubt on the effectiveness of comprehensive responses applied in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.7 Overall, the incorporation of holistic

7 Farrell and Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Transformation Gaps,” 689.
norms into mainstream military thought depends on improving military leaders’ understanding of how comprehensive approaches can improve institutional effectiveness and reduce the costs of complex operations.

In conclusion, this research on military adaptation to unity of effort requirements in Afghanistan offers new insights into the endogenous factors driving military change, the role of governments in balancing the civilian and military commitments overseas, and the impact of leaders on institutional development. The findings indicate that the codification of rules and practices for interagency operations in Afghanistan may be a useful first step in developing military capacities going forward. The inclusion of guidelines may provide a starting point for military leaders interested in strengthening unity of effort in overseas missions. As well, the case studies reveal that the creation of a civilian entity to coordinate activities and deploy personnel to work alongside the military is key to the delivery of CA. Finally, the success of CA depends in part on actors’ appreciation of the added value of unity of effort in the conduct of complex operations.

**Areas for Further Research**

The findings of the case studies point to three areas for further research. First, the case studies showed the military’s support for unity of effort and stability operations is critical in the contemporary security environment. This study examined the institutional rules and practices that pattern action, but it did not consider how training and promotion systems might impact members’ behaviour in complex environments. In 2009, General David Barno, the commander of the American Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan from 2003-2005, noted that the existing promotion and selection system for military
leaders in the American armed forces rewards tactical success in war-fighting rather than the ability of military commanders to support big-picture, strategic goals of overseas missions. Building on existing research that identifies the skills needed in interagency environments, it may be possible to identify key competencies for military commanders and evaluate how existing systems support the development of these competencies. Findings may provide a starting point for an analysis of existing training and promotion systems, and their role in preparing members for the range of tasks they may be expected to carry out in complex environments.

Second, there remains a dearth of evidence on how whole-of-government approaches are applied in practice and the ways national resources can best be utilized to achieve specific foreign policy goals. For instance, one of ISAF’s primary tasks was to train Afghan Security forces so that security responsibilities could be handed over to the host nation. Western governments deployed a host of civilian and military personnel to assist with these programs, including local police officers, intelligence personnel, law enforcement experts, military training officers and special operations forces. Closer examination of the ways interagency actors organized to achieve program objectives may assist in identification of effective CA procedures that can be refined and applied in other cases.

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10 Svenja Post, Toward a Whole-of-Europe Approach: Organizing European Union’s Member States’ Comprehensive Crisis Management (Berlin: Springer, 2014), 399-400.
Finally, the case studies revealed that militaries often assumed leading roles in the political aspects of the Afghanistan mission, including the definition of mission goals, the development of joint plans and the coordination of entities in theatre. Civilian involvement in these endeavours was less obvious. A closer reading of counterinsurgency doctrine, however, indicates that civilian leadership of the political aspects of the conflict is critical to the success of complex campaigns, as Robert Cassidy noted in his study of British forces: “The key to the British army’s success in counterinsurgency conflicts was its integrated approach. Civilian officials remained in control of emergencies and were responsible for the broader political strategy and for propaganda. The British Army operated under civilian control...” 11 Similarly, Edward Burke argued that armed forces involved in nation-building activities must yield to civilian guidance and civilians ought to have “unequivocal authority at every stage of the design and implementation of stability operations.” 12 However, little is known about the nature and extent of civilian authority in the context of modern wars. Given the primacy of civilian control in democratic societies, the ways civilian oversight is exercised at various stages of overseas missions warrants further examination.

Adaptation is a key theme in contemporary military doctrine and responsiveness is considered essential to institutional survival in the contemporary security environment. 13 It is highly likely the armed forces will be expected to work with civilian

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12 Edward Burke, “Leaving the Civilians Behind: The ‘Soldier-diplomat’ in Afghanistan and Iraq”, Prism 1, no.2 (2009), 42.
13 See for example: Canada Ministry of Defence, Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow: A Land Operations 2021 Publication (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 23, 44, 53; UK Ministry of Defence, Operations (Swindon, UK: Ministry of Defence, Shrivenham, 2010), 5-13, 7-3, 8-
agencies to address the roots of instability and establish conditions for peace in fragile societies. Findings of studies like this provide a thorough account of three western militaries’ existing approaches to interagency operations. As well, this research identifies the institutional and political factors that determine armed forces’ participation in cross-government initiatives, and points to ways variables can be influenced to improve unity of effort. Understanding the adaptive processes unique to national armed forces is a necessary first step in developing military capacities for the delivery of comprehensive responses to overseas crises in the future.

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Appendix A: Map of Afghanistan

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/images/afghan-provinces-map.gif
Appendix B: A Timeline of Key Events in the War in Afghanistan, 2001 – 2011

September 2001

- Hijackers fly planes into the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. Thousands of people are killed. A few days later American officials confirm that Osama bin Laden is the prime suspect in the attacks and demand that Taliban in Afghanistan hand him over and expel Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan.

October 2001

- American-led Operation Enduring Freedom begins. The United States, United Kingdom and its allies launch air strikes against Al-Qaeda training camps after the Taliban refuse to meet American demands.
- American and British troops deploy to Afghanistan.
- Canada announces intentions to contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom. Begins to prepare for deployment of air, sea and land forces as part of Operation Athena.

November 2001

- Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance enters Kabul after weeks of fighting Taliban troops. Taliban retreat and flee south towards Kandahar, to Pakistan or to mountainous regions to the north.
- British Embassy in Kabul reopens.

December 2001

- Non-Taliban Afghan groups meet in Bonn, Germany and reach consensus about the formation of an interim government, the Afghan Transitional Authority.
- The International Security Assistance Force is created under a UN mandate to establish and maintain security maintain security in and around Kabul and to train Afghan National security forces.
- Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of the interim government.
- Taliban lose stronghold in Kandahar and international troops move south.

January 2002

- The first contingent of troops is deployed to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led ISAF.
- Canadian troops are deployed to Afghanistan and join the Canadian Special
Forces operating in the country since late 2001.

March 2002

• The American-led operations commence to defeat Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in the eastern part of the country. American forces are joined by UK troops.

October 2002

• Canadian troops deploy to Afghanistan to join in US-led Operation Enduring Freedom

May 2003

• United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, announces the end of ‘major combat’ in Afghanistan.

July 2003

• Canadian forces deploy to Kabul as part of ISAF.

August 2003

• NATO takes over responsibility for security in Kabul.
• Canada opens its embassy in Kabul.

December 2003

• NATO initiates Stage 1 of its expansion across Afghanistan and takes over command of the German-led Kanduz Provincial Reconstruction Team. Eight PRTs operating in 2003 remain under command of American-led Operation Enduring Freedom.

June 2004

• NATO announces plans to establish four additional PRTs in Baghlan, Feyzabad, Mazar-e Sharif, and Meymaneh.
September 2004
• American forces establish Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team.

October 2004
• Stage 1 of NATO expansion ends.

November 2004
• NATO assists with elections. Hamid Karzai elected president of Afghanistan.

February 2005
• NATO announces Stage 2 and expansion to the west in Afghanistan.

May 2005
• NATO’s Stage 2 begins and ISAF assumes command of PRTs in Heart and Farah and a Forward Support Base in Heart.

August 2005
• Canadian forces begin to transition from Kabul to Kandahar Province and take over leadership of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team.

September 2005
• NATO establishes PRTs in Chaghcharan and Badghis marking the completion of Stage 2 of its expansion.

December 2005
• Stage 3 of ISAF expansion is announced.
January 2006

- Canadian troops commence combat operations in Kandahar
- Britain announces deployment of troops to lead ISAF in Helmand in southern Afghanistan.

May 2006

- NATO’s Stage 2 begins and ISAF assumes command of PRTs in Heart and Farah and a Forward Support Base in Heart.
- The UK assumes leadership of the Helmand PRT.

July 2006

- NATO assumes command of southern Afghanistan from US-led forces and expands into six provinces including Kandahar and Helmand. NATO takes command of four PRTs in the south.

October 2006

- NATO implements final stage, Stage 4, of ISAF’s expansion across Afghanistan and assumes command of US-led coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan.

February 2008

- Canadian Parliament votes to extend the Canadian combat mission in Kandahar to 2011.

September 2008

- American President George Bush deploys an addition 4,500 troops to Afghanistan.

February 2009

- American President Barack Obama announces the deployment of 17,000 troops to Afghanistan and the withdrawal of the majority of American troops in 2014.
March 2009

- President Barack Obama announces a new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the deployment of US civilian personnel to assist with training of security forces and support development in Afghanistan.

October 2009

- British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announces deployment of 500 additional troops to Afghanistan.

December 2009

- President Barack Obama announces a troop surge of 30,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan. NATO announces deployment of extra 7,000 troops.

January 2010

- London conference brings together foreign ministers and senior representatives from over 70 countries to plan for a new phase of transition-handing over control of security operations to the Afghans.

February 2010

- NATO-led forces begin major offensive, Operation Moshtarak, against Taliban in Helmand. American, British and Afghan troops participate in the joint offensive. Province American, British

June: Prime Minister David Cameron makes his first visit to Afghanistan, meeting President Karzai in Kabul and British troops in Camp Bastion.

June 2010

- General David Petraeus takes over from General Stanley McChrystal as Commander of the multinational ISAF forces.
November 2010

- At the NATO Summit in Lisbon it is agreed that security for Afghanistan is to be transferred to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
- Canada announces it will end its combat mission in 2011 and take on a non-combat role until 2014.

May 2011

- British Prime Minister David Cameron announces that over 400 troops will return to the UK from Afghanistan in coming months.
- Canada begins deployment of troops as part of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan to train and provide development support to Afghan security forces.
- The United States announces it killed Osama bin Laden in a raid on his compound in Pakistan.

June 2011

- President Barack Obama announces the withdrawal of 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and the return of an additional 22,000 troops to the United States by the summer of 2012. Approximately 70,000 troops were expected to stay on in Afghanistan until 2014.

July 2011

- Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar province ends.

December 2011

- Attendees at the Bonn International Conference pledge to continue its support for Afghanistan for the decade following 2014.
Appendix C: Country Timeline – United States and the Afghanistan Mission, 2001-2011

September 2001

- Hijackers fly planes into the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. Thousands of people are killed.
- Congress passes a joint resolution allowing the president to use necessary and appropriate military force to prevent similar attacks on the United States.

October 2001

- American-led Operation Enduring Freedom begins. American troops deploy to Afghanistan under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) General Tommy Franks, and General Dan McNeill the commander of the American formation, Combined Joint Task Force – 180 (CJTF -180) in Afghanistan.

December 2001

- ISAF is created under a UN Mandate. The Bush Administration’s goals for the military continue to focus on counterterrorism and the training of Afghan security forces.

May 2003

- Secretary Rumsfeld announces the end of major combat in Afghanistan. General Dan McNeil hands over command for CJTF – 180 to General John Vines.

October 2003

- The Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) is established to oversee American forces in Afghanistan.

December 2005

- NSPD -44 Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization creates the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State.
December 2006

- Robert Gates replaces Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense.

February 2007

- President Bush introduces a new strategy for Afghanistan that extends military’s involvement beyond counterterrorism and training.

December 2007

- DOD releases the Department of Defense Directive on Irregular Warfare (DODD 3000.07) stating armed forces should be able to carry out combat and security operations, as well as stability tasks.

July 2008

- General David McKiernan replaces General McNeill as commander of American Forces in Afghanistan.

November 2008

- Barak Obama is elected the President of the United States.

January 2009

- President Obama takes office and initiates reviews of Afghanistan policy.
- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlights persistent imbalance between civilian and military responses to international crises.

March 2009

- President Obama announces a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

April 2009

- Retired General Karl Eikenberry becomes American Ambassador to Afghanistan.
- General Petraeus tells the Senate Armed Forces Committee that combatant command needed to work with interagency partners to develop plans and coordinate operations.

August 2009

- General McChrystal, the new ISAF commander, submits a report on Afghanistan to President Obama. General McChrystal and Ambassador (and retired General)
Karl Eikenberry develop the *United States' Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.*

September 2009

- Department of Defense releases Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction* ordering the department and military to develop its own stability operations capacity.

December 2009

- President Obama announces troop and civilian surges in Afghanistan. This is in line with this campaign promise to redirect resources from the war in Iraq to Afghanistan.

January 2010

- The Department of Defense releases the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review that highlights the challenges of continued limited civilian capacities for overseas missions.

October 2010

- Office of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction audit finds the absence of guidance for civil-military integration of American teams.
Appendix D: Country Timeline – Britain and the Afghanistan Mission, 2001-2011

October 2001

• Within weeks of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Prime Minister Tony Blair issues a Ministerial Statement announcing the deployment of UK troops to Afghanistan. British forces will join American forces to eliminate the terrorist threat and support the United Nations in meeting the humanitarian challenge in Afghanistan.
• UK forces participate in US-led airstrikes against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

November 2001

• UK troops deploy to help secure Bagram airfield outside Kabul.

December 2001

• Britain leads negotiations with key Afghan leaders and creates ISAF in accordance with the Bonn Conference. UK takes command of ISAF in Kabul.

March 2003

• Prime Minister Blair announces the deployment of British troops to Iraq.

June 2004

• ISAF takes command of four PRTs in northern Afghanistan, and UK assumes responsibility for the PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymana. The UK commitment to Afghanistan reaches 1,000 personnel, including staff with the PRTs.

Fall 2004

• HMG establishes the tri-department Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit.

March 2005

• HMG decides to deploy to Helmand Province and to staff the ISAF headquarters in Kabul.

July 2005

• Terrorist forces launch coordinated attacks on the London Transit system.

December 2005

• HMG approves the *UK Joint Plan for Helmand*. 
January 2006

• HMG announces deployment of British soldiers lead ISAF operations in Helmand.

May 2006

• NATO ISAF’s begins Stage 2 expansion into western Afghanistan. UK takes over command of the Helmand PRT and assumes control of the ISAF force for twelve months.

September 2006

• Opinion polls reveal a significant decline in public approval for the Afghanistan war with only thirty percent of Briton’s expressing support for the war, in comparison to over seventy percent expressing approval for the mission in early 2002.

October 2006

• NATO ISAF takes command from the American-led coalition forces and assumes responsibility for the country’s security.

November 2006

• Prime Minister Blair visits Kabul and announces renewed commitment to Afghanistan mission.

February 2007

• Prime Minister Blair announces plan to reduce troops in Iraq and to increase the number of British troops in Helmand.

April 2007

• More British troops deploy to Helmand.

June 2007

• Prime Minister Blair resigns. Gordon Brown becomes Prime Minister.

December 2007

• Prime Minister Brown announces new strategy for Afghanistan. HMG announces increased support for development and stabilisation, and security training efforts.
• UK armed forces with Afghan security forces engage in heavy fighting against insurgents in Helmand.
March 2008

- PM Brown announces new National Security Strategy that announces the creation of the Stabilisation to replace the PCRU, intentions to increase number of civilian staff for overseas missions, and support for an interagency approach in Afghanistan. HMG approves the Helmand Road Map in the spring 2008.

April 2008

- Britain endorses NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan.

June 2008

- Prime Minister Brown announces the deployment of an additional 230 troops to Afghanistan, increasing the size of the British force to 8,030.

June 2009

- The UK leads an offensive operation that drives Taliban from strongholds in Helmand and establishes an ISAF presence in the province.

October 2009

- Prime Minister Brown announces deployment of additional 500 troops, increasing the British force to 9,500 soldiers.

December 2009

- President Obama announces a surge of 30,000 American troops and NATO commits an additional 7,000 soldiers to Afghanistan

February 2010

- UK joints Afghan National Army and American forces in Operation Moshtarak to defeat Taliban in central Helmand.

May 2010

- Gordon Brown resigns as Prime Minister and David Cameron is elected Prime Minister.

June 2010

- American forces take command of British troops in Helmand.
July 2011

- Prime Minister Cameron announces a reduction in British force levels in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of British soldiers from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and the eventual transition from combat to a training mission.

September 2001

• Terrorists attack the United States.

October 2001

• Prime Minister Jean Chretien announces Canada’s support and participation of the American-led counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. National Defence Headquarters signals the deployment of upwards of 900 combat troops and a Naval fleet.

December 2001

• Canada participates in the Bonn Conference, which set the terms for a transitional government in Afghanistan, and supports the UN resolution to create ISAF.

February 2002

• Canada deploys combat troops for a six-month mission in Afghanistan.

April 2002

• Canada announces intentions to withdraw ground troops from Afghanistan by the end of the summer.

February 2003

• The Government of Canada announces its decision to join ISAF and intention to deploy armed forces to Kabul.

July 2003

• Canada deploys 700 CF members to Kabul as part of ISAF and 200 support personnel throughout Southwest Asia. NATO takes command of ISAF in August.

October 2003

• UN approves expansion of NATO across Afghanistan.

August 2004

• Canadian Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier hands over command of ISAF to France.
April 2005

- The Government of Canada releases its International Policy Statement setting out broad role for CAF and endorses a 3D and WOG approach to international missions, including Afghanistan.

February 2005

- Prime Minister Paul Martin promotes General Rick Hillier to the position of Chief of Defence Staff.

April 2005

- Prime Minister Martin announces Canadian forces will maintain a presence in Afghanistan after the end of the 24-month mission in Kabul in August.

May 2005

- Defence Minister Bill Graham announces the government’s plan for Afghanistan including the deployment of 700 troops to Kandahar in early 2006 and a brigade headquarters for between nine and twelve months.

August 2005

- The majority of Canadian troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. An air support group and 600 combat troops remain in the country. These troops begin transition to Kandahar province. Canada assumes command of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and deploys upwards of 350 military and civilian personnel to assist with development, governance and security in the province.

January 2006

- Stephen Harper becomes Prime Minister of Canada. He wins a minority government.
- Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry is killed in a suicide attack. He is the first Canadian civilian on the mission to die in Afghanistan. Three Canadian soldiers are also killed.
- Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) suspends aid projects in Afghanistan in light of recent violence.

September 2006

- Political opposition parties criticize the “piecemeal approach” to Afghanistan and call for greater emphasis on the development and diplomatic elements.
- Department of National Defence announces the deployment of additional troops to strengthen Canada’s reconstruction and development efforts.
February 2006

- Canadian Brigadier-General David Fraser takes command of Multi-National Brigade (Regional Command South) in Kandahar as part of ISAF.

April 2006

- A House of Commons vote is held and a motion is passed extending Canada’s mission in Afghanistan to February 2009.

August 2006

- The number of Canadian troops in Afghanistan reaches upwards of 2,000.

October 2007

- Prime Minister Stephen Harper appoints former Liberal cabinet minister John Manley to lead an independent panel in an assessment of Canada’s options in Afghanistan.

January 2008

- The Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, also known as the Manley Panel is published.

February 2008

- Elisa Golberg is appointed Representative of Canada in Kandahar.

March 2008

- A motion passes in the House of Commons to extend the Afghanistan mission until 2011.

June 2008

- The government announces six strategic priorities and three signature projects to guide Canada’s mission until 2011.

December 2008

- The Kandahar Action Plan is released.

November 2010

- The government announces Canada’s role in Afghanistan will be based on four priorities: humanitarian assistance, education and health, security and regional diplomacy.
May 2011

- Canada’s training mission in Afghanistan begins.

July 2011

- Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan ends.
Appendix F: Number of ISAF Troops in Afghanistan by Country, 2007-2011

<table>
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<th>Month</th>
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<th>Canada</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>90000</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>*556</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Canadian ISAF troops were training Afghan Security Forces.

15 Note: Numbers are based on “broad contribution” and “do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time.”