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**ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS AND SYSTEMIC
INFLUENCES ON UNITED STATES MILITARY
PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE,
1980-1995**

by

JONATHAN TAGGART PERKINS, B.A. (Hons.)

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

Traditional analyses of conventional military doctrine focus on the relative influences of organizational process and systemic factors as stimuli for doctrinal change within national militaries. As a sub-component of military doctrine, peace operations doctrine is presumed to be susceptible to the same influences, though possibly in altered form given the low-intensity conflict multilateral focus of such missions compared with warfighting doctrine. This thesis examines the relevance of such theoretical perspectives in developing propositions about the conditions which can stimulate the emergence of specific military doctrine for peace operations, focusing on the evolution of peace operations doctrine in the United States military during the period 1980 to 1995. The research concludes that, in the U.S. case, systemic changes in the late Cold War and early post-Cold War periods were dominant in altering national perceptions about the utility of such operations, prompting Congressional and civilian intervention into the doctrinal process.

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Chapter One

Introduction

I. Introduction

Much past and current research on traditional peacekeeping and emerging forms of peace operations — such as "second generation" or "multidimensional" peace operations, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance — has tended to focus on the conditions underlying success or failure in such missions, and their impact upon peace operations as a form of conflict management. In such instances, attempts are made to draw inferences about how past experience can be used to refine the concepts of multilateral peace operations, thereby advancing the practice still further as a supporting element of conflict management.

Less common have been examinations of the conditions under which national militaries have sought to develop specific operational doctrine for peace operations, and how this doctrine, in turn, might serve to condition their participation in future operations. The subsequent study focuses on two questions. First, given the central role of doctrine as an ordering element of military organizations, both in terms of their structure and capabilities, what factors stimulate the development of specific peace operations doctrine on a national level? Second, how does the doctrinal development process subsequently serve to influence national participation in peace operations?

Specifically, this study focuses on peace operations doctrinal development within the United States military between 1980 and 1995. Most existing theories regarding strategic or operational doctrinal development processes focus on the impact of one or both of two broad sets of factors: internal organizational process or bureaucratic influences, and systemic influences. This study first examines elements of each approach to develop some general propositions about how these factors interact in terms of peace operations doctrine, as distinct from doctrine for other military missions. In doing so, particular emphasis is given to the factors underlying the processes in the United States as a superpower, a context which generates both opportunities and constraints. The propositions are then applied against the historical U.S. experience with peace operations between 1980 and 1995.

Explicitly, the study seeks to determine which factors more fully explain the emergence of specific peace operations doctrine within the U.S. military after 1990. Examining the relative impact of organizational process and systemic influence factors across a fifteen year time span allows for an assessment of why specific peace operations doctrine did not emerge from U.S. experience with peacekeeping in the 1980s, but did do so after the end of the Cold War.

The central proposition is that, while organizational process factors continually influenced the pattern of doctrinal development during the period in terms of the

military's comprehension of and willingness to engage in such missions, it was the overarching change in systemic conditions which permitted and even encouraged the more unconstrained participation of the U.S. military in such operations, and which more profoundly stimulated the emergence of specific peace operations doctrine as a result. Central complements to these systemic changes were the development of a new appreciation for the significance of low-intensity conflicts and peace operations in relation to U.S. strategic interests, and specific civilian intervention to create the military organizational conditions capable of responding to the changing strategic environment.

The principal value of this research is to point to situational and enduring factors which have conditioned the U.S. doctrinal response to peace operations in the past, and which continue to do so. At the outset, it is to be clearly understood that both the complexity of the U.S. military doctrinal system and the generally unique status of the United States on an international systemic level will limit the application of this research to the study of peace operations doctrinal development in other countries.

The intent, however, is not to develop a fully generalizable theory of peace operations doctrinal development, applicable across a range of countries. Instead, it is to understand more fully the processes which applied to the historical development of peace operations doctrine within the U.S. military in the period leading up to and immediately after the end of the Cold War. This, in turn, serves to impart a greater degree of understanding about the processes which continue to shape the U.S. doctrinal response to

peace operations today, or in future. This is increasingly relevant as the United States continues to face a period of systemic dominance but strategic uncertainty, in which the doctrine and related foreign and national security policies developed for peace operations up to 1995 continue to influence the conduct of multilateral peace operations on a broader level — what one observer has titled the "Americanization of Peacekeeping".¹

The remainder of the current chapter serves to outline some of the general precepts of military doctrine which will be addressed in greater detail within subsequent chapters. Chapter two develops propositions derived from the organizational process, organizational ideology, and organizational learning perspectives. Chapter three develops propositions from the literature on systemic influences on doctrine. Both sets of propositions are then examined within the context of the case study in chapter four. Summary conclusions are then presented in chapter five.

II. Peace Operations and Military Doctrine

The enduring doctrinal challenge of peace operations has been that, while undoubtedly important as a tool for multilateral conflict management (if not actual

¹ See, for example, Joel J. Sokolsky, *The Americanization of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada*, Martello Papers No. 17 (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1997).

conflict resolution), such operations do not fit easily with the core combat orientations of most militaries. This has been a source of tension in peacekeeping from its inception, recognizing that the concepts which have been seen to underpin traditional interpositional peacekeeping — namely principles of non-enforcement and non-coercion, limited use of force only in self-defence, strict neutrality, and consent of the host state(s) for the operation — are, in many respects, at odds with the concepts of offensive, coercive, decisive, forceful, and partial applications of force which underpin doctrine for most military combat operations.²

As Janowitz argued in the 1960s, this contradiction led many professional military officers — perhaps more particularly in the U.S., given its broader role and capabilities — to see peacekeeping, as it was then understood, as a second-class operational role which detracted from their core military mission.³ Indeed, the originators of peacekeeping recognized similar conceptual and practical tensions from the outset, a problem aptly captured in former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's often

² Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 4-9.

³ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960), 418-425; David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal et al., *Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 6-7.

repeated observation that "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it."⁴

More recent evolutions of the peace operations paradigm have stretched the boundaries of doctrinal compatibility further, but still tend to reinforce some of the conceptual problems encountered previously. Durch, for example, notes that new operational forms such as multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement, have introduced more forceful and less consensual elements more akin to traditional military operations. However, there still are practical and conceptual factors which constrain the unlimited application of combat force. While rules of engagement may get progressively more permissive about the use of forceful measures as one moves through each type of operation, even less consensual UN peace enforcement operations generally will seek to minimize casualties, will strive to maintain some element of impartiality, and usually will cease operations when the main political objectives have been achieved.⁵

This is not generally the case for core military combat operations which, under a Clausewitzian perspective, seek to bring decisive applications of military power to bear

⁴ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 1.

⁵ William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s", in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 3-7.

on an enemy (and most often the enemy's armed forces) in order to achieve national strategic objectives. From the U.S. perspective, the core role of the military is to deter aggression but, "If deterrence fails, then our single objective is *winning the nation's wars*. When we fight, we fight to win [emphasis in original]."⁶ Though specific allowance is made for operations short of war in U.S. doctrine, the demand for a capability to fight and win decisively in higher intensity conflict situations continues to condition the core orientation of the military, thus maintaining a degree of conceptual tension when it comes to lesser intensity operational roles.

III. Defining Doctrine

Studies on the nature of conventional doctrine and the sources of doctrinal change generally focus either on organizational process or systemic-level factors, or both. This is an approach taken by Barry Posen in his seminal study on inter-war military doctrine in France, Germany, and Great Britain.⁷ In a similar manner, other representative studies focus on the systemic, ideological, sociological learning, or cultural sources of doctrinal change, either in the period just prior to the First World War, or during the same inter-war

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995, I-1).

⁷ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

period studied by Posen.⁸ Most such studies focus on trying to explain why the countries under examination chose offensive doctrines or instituted doctrinal adaptation in a given organizational or strategic context, ascribing these either to internal institutional (organizational) factors, or systemic reasons.

These perspectives are helpful in examining the sources of change in current U.S. peace operations doctrine, though they must be adapted to reflect that peace operations doctrine, as a sub-set of what the U.S. military now refers to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW) or Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine, falls into a specialized doctrinal niche. By itself, peace operations doctrine, either at the joint or Service level, does not provide an independent doctrinal perspective. Instead, it is integrally tied on a conceptual level to the larger realm of U.S. warfighting doctrine, and must be examined in this context.

Barry Posen notes that "Military doctrines are critical components of national security policy or grand strategy. A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends

⁸ See, for example Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Emily O. Goldman, "The US Military In Uncertain Times: Organizations, Ambiguity, and Strategic Adjustment, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 20, Number 2 (June 1997), 41-74.

chain, a state's theory about how it can best 'cause' security for itself."⁹ While grand strategy or broader national security policy deals with the conceptual and functional integration of the varied military, political and economic elements of state policy, military doctrine deals explicitly with the "what" and "how" of organizing military means to support the formal and informal objectives of grand strategy.¹⁰

This basic formulation is reflected in the "capstone" publication of U.S. joint doctrine. Specifically, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, states that, "In all military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote national security and protect our national interests."¹¹ Joint Pub 1 elaborates further on the purposes of doctrine more broadly:

Military doctrine presents *fundamental principles* that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists a commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with

⁹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 10 January 1995 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), v. Joint Pub 1 is considered the "capstone" document of current U.S. joint military doctrine. It constitutes the root document from which all other joint operational doctrine publications derive, and sets out the central doctrinal concepts to which all specific service doctrines should seek to conform over time.

the fundamental issue of *how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends* [emphasis in original].¹²

At its core, then, doctrine should reflect as accurately as possible two central elements: first, an understanding of the nation's strategic ends; and, second, concepts for the ways in which military means can be applied to meet these strategic ends in a range of operational environments. The first element of doctrine speaks to systemic conditions and a nation's perception of how these can or should be influenced. The second element of doctrine speaks to organizational process factors, namely how the military organizes itself to match capabilities with action. From the start, this conception of doctrine sets up an apparent hierarchy: organizational processes ostensibly should derive from and thence work to attain strategic ends, and thus are subordinate to systemic factors of change. However, this does not address that organizational processes, by their nature, can both influence the way in which strategic ends are formulated, and also affect the implementation of any policies decided upon at a higher political level.

Addressing the ends to which military means are employed in support of national security or grand strategy objectives, Posen creates a categorization of military doctrines as being either "offensive", "defensive" or "deterrent" in orientation:

Offensive doctrines aim to *disarm* an adversary — to destroy his armed forces. *Defensive* doctrines aim to *deny* an adversary the objective that he

¹² *Ibid.*, vi.

seeks. *Deterrent* doctrines aim to *punish* an aggressor — to raise his costs without reference to reducing one's own.¹³

Posen's typology, while useful as a characterization of national warfighting doctrines, is less useful when it comes to peace operations doctrine. Specifically, the normally non-coercive and consensual principles which underpin traditional operations tend to exclude purely offensive and deterrent characteristics.

Certain types of higher intensity peace operations, such as peace enforcement, potentially would not rule out disarming an adversary in the sense of destroying or debilitating specific elements of the adversary's armed forces. Indeed, the prospects for collective peace enforcement operations, as conceived under Chapter VII provisions in the UN Charter but carried out by more ad hoc coalitions under restricted UN mandate, were given new emphasis in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*.¹⁴ However, Chapter VII operations have remained the exception, and the only recent case in which an explicitly offensive action of this sort was contemplated (but ultimately not used) was the UN-sanctioned multinational mission in Haiti during 1994-1995, but then only if the Haitian military regime offered resistance to UN operations.¹⁵ The more common model of interpositional peacekeeping — even as elaborated under multidimensional "second

¹³ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 14.

¹⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 25-26.

¹⁵ Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s", 6-7.

generation" operations such as Somalia — generally strives to deny the conflicting parties the object which they seek: namely victory by military means alone. Moreover, extrapolating from the historical record, most interpositional operations likely will continue to occur in the aftermath of a negotiated settlement or in response to a severe humanitarian crisis, in which no "offensive" military action will be undertaken as Posen defines it.¹⁶

Likewise, though peacekeeping and peace operations may attempt to have a significant subsidiary deterrent character with respect to the continuation or initiation of a given conflict, there are few instances where "punishment" in a military deterrent sense has been or would be employed by the international community.¹⁷ Again, such roles have been the exception. For most UN or non-UN multinational deployments, the central purpose of the peace operation has continued to be post-settlement support in the form of a military presence, which primarily is intended to prevent the recurrence of violence or assist in the restoration of peace under general conditions of consent (though possibly not under conditions entirely free from some violence). Again, this is more defensive in character.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹⁷ Durch, however, calls the preventive UN deployment between Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a "deterrent deployment" and typifies it as a latent form of peace enforcement. If consent for the presence comes from only one party, he sees such operations as having more of a deterrent or tripwire character. See *Ibid.*, 7. This deterrent character is also set out by Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*, 18.

In Posen's model, the offensive, defensive or deterrent character of a military doctrine primarily impacts how these doctrines will be perceived by adversaries within an essentially anarchic, competitive international system. However, this is not an issue in terms of multilateral peace operations, as such missions are generated by the broad international community itself, and normally will function only in situations in which the states concerned (or legitimate actors within the state) provide some level of consent and authority for the operation to take place.¹⁸ If there is no element of consent whatsoever, the mission cannot properly be construed as a peace operation.

A second standard by which Posen assesses the character of national military doctrine is the degree of political-military integration which it demonstrates. Ideally, political objectives and the supporting military doctrine should be harmonized within a state's grand strategy — disintegration of the two threatens to undermine core national security objectives and create insecurity within the state.¹⁹ Conversely, close integration of political objectives and military doctrine is perceived as positive. It is this aspect of doctrine which is most amenable to measurement under either the organizational process or balance of power models, and on which this study will focus. Specifically, real or

¹⁸ The level, and even source, of consent prevailing in multidimensional peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement operations varies considerably. However, as Durch notes, most of these operational forms do seek some aspect of consent. If not from formal state authorities, this at least will derive from non-state actors, such as segments of the general population itself. See Durch, "Keeping the Peace", 3-7.

¹⁹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 24-25.

perceived disintegration between doctrine and strategic objectives serves as the primary catalyst for doctrinal adjustment.

A third criterion for assessing military doctrine is innovation. Posen, for example, argues that neither innovation nor its opposite, stagnation (or stability), should be given an *a priori* normative valuation. Instead, innovation must be judged partly in terms of its general effect upon political-military integration, and partly in terms of its consistency with the general military and technological environments.²⁰ As Posen notes, "On balance, given the large number of possible changes in a state's environment and technological changes in military hardware, absence of innovation should always attract the strategist's attention. Close inspection may show that no innovation is required, but this should never be assumed."²¹ Posen stresses that innovation can be a key determinant of political-military integration, particularly since it is a manipulable variable within the state's general control. While the external political and military environment may shift rapidly, and it is easier to identify new opponents and threats than it is to amend plans for dealing with such contingencies, the ability of military doctrine to adapt to changing circumstances and innovate appropriate responses remains key.²² Consequently, reviewing the presence or absence of innovation remains part of a healthy feedback loop

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, 30-31.

in the doctrinal review process.

IV. Summary

Doctrine is an integral element of military organizations, embodying core principles by which the military organizes itself. As such, doctrine has two core characteristics. First, it is an internally constructed set of organizational beliefs about the core roles and functions of the military (whether as a corporate whole, or an individual Service), and how these roles should be implemented in practice based on past experience.

Second, following from the first point, doctrine is intended to coordinate the disparate elements of military power into a coherent whole, which can then be utilized in support of national strategic objectives. This creates an internal tension, however, when extant doctrine confronts new roles which do not fit with existing organizational concepts, or there is a fundamental change in the systemic environment which invalidates or calls into question existing doctrinal precepts.

How doctrinal change occurs from a theoretical perspective is outlined in the next two chapters, beginning with organizational process concepts in chapter two.

Chapter Two

Organizational Sources of Doctrinal Change

I. Introduction

This chapter explores theoretical concepts for doctrinal change derived from the organizational process, organizational ideology, and organizational learning literature. Posen's core model relating to organizational process factors is used as a point of departure for the examination of subsequent models.

Apart from approaches developed within political science and public administration (which themselves reflect a substantial degree of interdisciplinary insight), there is a growing body of specialized empirical and theoretical literature from sociology and psychology which provides valuable insights into how and why organizations develop and institutionalize routines and norms in their daily operations — in other words, develop their organizational "doctrine" — and the way in which such processes subsequently influence the organization's outputs. That these studies often examine the characteristics of large businesses does not negate their utility when applied to military organizations. In fact, some of the propositions fit even more closely within a highly centralized and generally closed society like the military.

II. Organizational Process Factors and Doctrine

Drawing on a synthesis of the organizational process and bureaucratic politics paradigms developed by Graham Allison, as well as a distillation of some of the organizational theory literature from sociology, Posen develops a range of theoretical propositions regarding the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics factors on doctrinal change.

First, in terms of the offense-defense-deterrence continuum, Posen contends that most militaries will express a fairly homogeneous preference for offensive doctrines.

Summarized, his propositions for this behaviour are as follows:

1. Offensive doctrines more easily lend themselves to the creation of standard operational scenarios, which reduce operational uncertainty;
2. Offensive doctrines allow the military to deny an adversary his "standard scenario";
3. Offensive doctrines do not require the military to calculate comparative national will, as would be required by deterrence doctrines;
4. Offensive doctrines increase the organizational size and wealth of the military; and,
5. Offensive doctrines enhance organizational independence from civilian authority.¹

¹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 58. A sixth proposition relating to the impact of technology and geography on doctrine is included in this section of Posen's propositions, but is not relevant to this analysis.

These initial propositions are instructive for the fact that they outline what are often considered to be the core organizational interests of the military in most doctrinal development processes. From an organizational process perspective, any subsequent doctrinal development — peace operations included — must either be reconciled with these organizational interests on some level, or explicitly seek to overcome them.

Posen's hypotheses on prospects for integration-disintegration under organizational process theory are further illustrative of the pitfalls inherent to the doctrinal development process. For example, Posen hypothesizes that, because they seek a high degree of operational flexibility to reduce uncertainty in combat, military organizations will seek independence from civilian authority. Consequently, "...military doctrines tend to be poorly integrated with the political aspects of grand strategy."² Moreover, Posen hypothesizes that, due to functional specialization, civilians and the military tend to know little about the other's affairs, and disintegration of military-political objectives thus tends to result. In addition, continuing technical specialization within the military only increases the prospects for such military-political disintegration.³ These general propositions are in accord with the broader academic literature on civil-military relations, which likewise points to the general disjuncture between the military as

² Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 58.

³ *Ibid.*

a profession and unique social institution and the broader social fabric within most Western states.

Surveying the main viewpoints in the field, Sarkesian et al. contend that the core literature on civil-military relations points to the characterization that, while the military profession operates within the general structure of society, it is a fairly conservative institution with specialized notions on its role as a support to the state (it is the ultimate guarantor of state security, for which military professionals are willing to give up their lives), that its internally-perceived purpose is seen as success in combat, and that, at least to a degree, the officer corps operates apart from the broader government structure.⁴ These self-perceptions accordingly exert an influence on how the military tends to react to external influences. Sarkesian et al. point out that the U.S. military as a professional institution has two further characteristics: first, that it primarily is oriented toward external threats to state interests (contrasting with the broader internal security role assumed by the military in some Western states); and, second, that the military is generally seen as subordinate to civilian control and does not play an active political role as an institution.⁵ These observations reinforce the point that the military holds certain organizational viewpoints about its role, and will apply these core institutional beliefs about its purpose when dealing with new types of doctrine.

⁴ Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1995), 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

On the other hand, Posen notes that, despite the preceding hypotheses favouring disintegration, civilian intervention into military affairs often will be the catalyst for integration. Specifically, he points out that it is normally only civilian leaders who possess the power and authority to reconcile military means with political ends, and it is often only civilians who have a vested interest in doing so.⁶

Finally, Posen hypothesizes that military organizations will rarely sponsor innovation themselves, both due to an institutional tendency to maintain the status quo and due to the fact that innovation can create new sources of unwanted operational uncertainty. It is here that Posen develops the important proposition that both battlefield failure and civilian intervention can cause military doctrinal innovation.⁷ Though seemingly self-evident, this proposition assumes a central role in organizational process concepts on doctrinal development.

III. Additional Perspectives on Organizational Process Theory

Now well into their third decade, the "Organizational Process (Type II)" and "Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics (Type III)" paradigms put forward by Graham

⁶ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 58.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 59. Posen includes additional hypotheses about the impact of technology on innovation, but these are not directly relevant to this study and thus are not included.

Allison in his 1971 *Essence of Decision* continue to influence the study of the organizational or bureaucratic sources of defence and foreign policy, including the more specific aspect of military doctrinal development. Though admittedly incomplete as explanatory tools for state behaviour in the international system, and too often misapplied in theoretical studies that do not adequately differentiate them, the paradigms have contributed substantially to organizational theory broadly defined.⁸ Indeed, there are few intensive studies of the organizational aspects of military doctrinal or strategic development which do not pay attention to the basic paradigms and the questions that Allison's models pose, even if ultimately deciding that the concepts demand further refinement.

Posen, for example, uses Allison's paradigms as the basis for generating several propositions, most with somewhat greater emphasis on Model II. In this study, the majority of attention is devoted to Model II factors as well. As Welch points out in his retrospective and prospective critique, Model II "explains deviations from ideal rationality at the moment of decision by highlighting the ways in which organizational routines constrain the *formation of options*, and it explains deviations from perfect

⁸ For a retrospective assessment of Allison's contributions, as well as a critique of the central features of either paradigm, this research has drawn on David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Security*, Volume 17, Number 2 (Fall 1992), 112-146. As Welch points out (p. 118), much of the subsequent research on Allison's paradigms has focused on Model III bureaucratic politics. In contrast, the present study draws more substantially on the Model II organizational process paradigm.

instrumentality after decisions are made by revealing how routines affect implementation [emphasis in original]."⁹ Propositions derived from the organizational process paradigm are most readily tested in terms of their contribution to and impact upon doctrine.

This is particularly relevant given that doctrine, representing the formalized standard operating procedures and routines of the organization, is both a reflection of the organization's perceptions of its environment (either domestic or international), and the way in which the military organization as an institutional "actor" believes it can influence that environment through doctrinal and operational outputs. While bureaucratic politics factors (Allison's Model III) undoubtedly play a part in determining such outcomes, the testing of propositions derived from the Model III paradigm is far more difficult. In the case of the current study, the reality is that there currently is inadequate empirical evidence available in the public realm to fully test the paradigm.

Regardless, there is general recognition that the two paradigms have merit in terms of assessing why military doctrine is developed in the manner in which it is. As Posen notes:

Military doctrines are in the day-to-day custody of military organizations. Such organizations have a large part of the responsibility both for the construction of military doctrine and for its execution.... Intuitively, one would be surprised if such organizations did not exert a powerful and

⁹ Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," 117.

distinctive influence on military doctrine, and through it on grand strategy as a whole."¹⁰

Posen's propositions also draw on Waltz's concepts of "second image" theorizing, as well as a range of perspectives from the literature on civil-military relations, organization theory, state building, and state structure.¹¹ These varied perspectives are distilled down to the three causal forces to which organizational theorists often make reference: purpose, people, and environment.

Posen's conception of "purpose" resonates closely with what others have described as organizational essence or organizational culture. For example, Posen notes that, "Organizations come into existence for the pursuit of a specific purpose. Purpose demands coordination, planning, and supervision. It requires the systematic introduction of rationality criteria, of cause and effect, cost and benefit. The pursuit of purpose encourages behaviour and structure aimed at reducing uncertainty."¹² Similarly, addressing the impact of organizational essence on defense policymaking, Halperin *et al.* write that,

Organizations have considerable freedom in defining their missions and the capabilities they need to pursue these missions. The organization's essence is the view held by the dominant group in the organization of what the missions and capabilities should be. Related to this are convictions

¹⁰ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 42.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹² *Ibid.*, 43.

about what kinds of people with what expertise, experience, and knowledge should be members of the organization.¹³

Both of these conceptions broadly correspond with the more detailed propositions of Allison's Model II organizational process paradigm.¹⁴

In terms of military organizations — whether perceived of as individual Services, or as a Joint entity — and their doctrine, it is clear that the way in which the organization is structured, and how it perceives its own role and capabilities, will assert an important influence upon how the organization attempts to shape its own doctrine, and what degree of external intervention it will tolerate. Similarly, this internally shared view of organizational essence or purpose can stimulate a given military Service (itself a semi-autonomous sub-organization of the larger whole) to take an active interest in any joint or inter-Service doctrine which impacts the individual Service's core roles and missions, and hence also its organizational essence.

Posen's conception of people as a causal factor can be viewed as a distillation of several related theoretical propositions in Allison's "Model III" governmental or

¹³ Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, "Organizational Interests" in John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, eds., *American Defense Policy*, 4th Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 207.

¹⁴ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 78-96. The variations inherent to Allison's model are much simplified in Posen's work, but the general concepts come through.

bureaucratic politics paradigm, but likewise draws upon broader organizational theory to fill in some of the conceptual gaps. Specifically, Posen states that, "Organizations must pursue their purposes with people. People are a great source of uncertainty.... Power, authority, prestige, deference, good fellowship, and so on all condition the behaviour of people in organizations."¹⁵

Jeffries, in synthesizing Allison's work with that of other organizational theorists, categorizes the people dimension as "Bureaucratic Politics (Model IIIB)," which he takes care to differentiate from "Organizational Politics (Model IIIA)".¹⁶ The former relates to the role of the individual, as distinguished from the latter's conception of the organization itself as a unitary "actor" in the broader decision-making process. As Jeffries notes,

"...the decisionmaking process is not just a 'unitary actor' process, nor just a result of organizational *processes* and organizational *politics*, but also a process of *individuals* in politics reacting to their own perceptions of national, organizational, and *personal* goals [emphasis in original]."¹⁷

This conception applies equally to personnel within the military Services and the broader defence establishment, who at the same time reflect both personal and institutional traits.

¹⁵ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 43.

¹⁶ Chris L. Jeffries, "Defense Decisionmaking in the Organizational-Bureaucratic Context" in Endicott and Stafford, eds., *American Defense Policy*, 4th Edition, pp. 233-237.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

The last of Posen's three main causal factors is "environment," namely the general domestic political context within which the organization must exist. As Posen elaborates:

In the most basic sense, the environment spawns the organization: it produces the purpose that calls the organization into being. From the environment, contributions of people and materiel must be obtained....The environment is, however, a source of great uncertainty. Will the organization's output satisfy those in the environment on whom the organization depends? Will essential contributions turn up at the time and place required for the organization to accomplish its purpose?¹⁸

As the subsequent examination of other organizational theory concepts demonstrates, the link between the military and its domestic and international environments can be a crucial one in terms of shaping perceptions and defining organizational action. Responsive (though not always accurate) feedback from the environment, which either reinforces or contradicts perceptions of reality, appears particularly relevant in helping to shape doctrine.

Similarly, examining naval perspectives on current military doctrine development, Tritten identifies several influences on military doctrine development, which he categorizes as either "topical" or "enduring". Among those that he considers topical are: "...current policy, available resources, current strategy, current campaign concepts, current doctrine, current threats, and fielded and emerging technology that influence

¹⁸ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 43.

doctrine."¹⁹ Among the enduring influences on doctrine Tritten counts "...lessons learned from history, the strategic culture of the nation and the individual Service, geography and demographics, and the type of government."²⁰

Of interest here is that most of Tritten's enduring influences on doctrine correspond closely with the purpose-people-environment organizational theory typology which prevails in Posen's work. Conversely, Tritten's topical influences are, for the most part, more closely identifiable with external or systemic influences. This further reaffirms the concept that organizational factors can have a long-term influence (not to equate this with determinism) on the doctrinal process.

Ultimately, Posen argues that organizational theory has somewhat less utility in explaining the sources of military doctrine than balance of power factors, stating that, "The analysis does not show that organizational factors are unimportant, but rather that they are more often than not overridden by constraints and incentives that lie at the level of the international political system."²¹ However, to the extent that Posen's conceptions draw heavily on the organizational process paradigm developed by Allison, they also

¹⁹James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives for Military Doctrine Development". Electronic publication from Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine Home Page at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> [Adobe Acrobat Format], 11.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 39.

reflect the same ambiguities about the determinism of "pure" organizational interests, namely the assumption that organizations will, in the absence of contrary external intervention, continue to pursue their own interests, even to the potential detriment of the state or society at large. Though not refuting the central idea that organizational interests are important, the subsequent perspectives point to instances in which such interests can be moderated or overridden, at least over time, by external influences from the domestic social or political environments, or by broader systemic challenges.

IV. Complementary Approaches: Organizational Ideology and Organizational Learning

a. Organizational Ideology

Seeking an explanation for the adoption of ultimately disastrous offensive military strategies and supporting doctrine by France, Germany, and Russia prior to World War I, Snyder develops a concept of "organizational ideology" which synthesizes competing factors of rationality, motivational (institutional interest-based) bias, and the requirement for cognitive simplification of doctrine.²² The approach recognizes that rational strategic calculation, and the doctrine that flows from it, is prone to being skewed by deeply-rooted organizational interests and corresponding motivational biases, as well

²² Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 30.

as the cognitive limitations of large organizations. Together, these factors demand the simplification of complex strategic calculations into easily understood and disseminated doctrine. The character of a given doctrine or strategy reflects aspects of all three elements, with the actual outcome of the doctrine/strategy formulation process in a specific case being the result of the relative balance between them. An equal balance between the three factors is possible, but more common seems to be the dominance of one over the other two.²³

As Snyder argues, rational calculus of a state's strategic policy would look at traditional, objective aspects of strategy, such as national aims, technology and geography, and the military balance. Clearly, these are factors which stand prominently in a realist balance of power calculus. However, he points out that such rational calculus is rarely present in its pure form. Instead, imperfect strategic choice — and hence doctrine, as the implementing arm of strategy — usually is "rationalized" through the two forms of bias mentioned: motivational factors and cognitive simplification.

Like Posen, Snyder identifies institutional interests as a source of motivational bias. For the most part, these are factors already identified within the organizational process paradigm: parochial biases, problems of budget sharing, issues of prestige and

²³ *Ibid.*, 30-32.

self-image by the military, and the timeless quest by military organizations for autonomy from civil control in core operational matters.²⁴

Snyder's discussion of the cognitive simplification bias goes even further toward explaining the contribution of doctrine to the character of a given strategy, as well as illustrating the feedback loop that reinforces or even tends to pattern doctrinal development. The point of departure is that strategic calculation in any age is an inherently complex and uncertain process, requiring understanding or manipulation of many competing national and systemic-level variables. One method of dealing with this complexity, particularly in terms of implementing strategic choice through concrete operational planning, is breaking down and simplifying the problem by passing it through doctrinal filters. As Snyder notes:

It is primarily military doctrine, a set of beliefs about the nature of war and the keys to success on the battlefield, that performs this function [of simplification] for the military planner. These beliefs provide a framework for organizing information and criteria for evaluating its importance. They also provide a curriculum for the training of new soldiers, a guide for the design of organizational structures, and a criterion for the establishment of standard operating procedures. Thus, doctrine helps to provide a simple, coherent, standardized structure for strategic thought and for military institutions.²⁵

Snyder primarily looks at cognitive simplification and the process by which it is achieved as an *output* of doctrine. However, this also can be an important *source* of

²⁴ Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*, 24-25.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

doctrine. Indeed, Snyder notes that experience, training, and methods of processing information all contribute to the nature of doctrine; similarly, such factors can reinforce institutional tendencies for doctrine to stress characteristics such as "continuity, ease of recall, and a restricted scope of attention to information."²⁶

From his own study, Snyder derives several enduring institutional and cognitive processes which can influence the sources and character of doctrine. The first of these he terms "focus of attention," which revolves around the perceptual bias of the military profession in terms of how they view state security and the international environment. In sum, Snyder argues that, given their constant preoccupation with state security, the military tend to be "oversocialized" by prevailing state views of international systemic anarchy, a perceptual bias which can ultimately reinforce an institutional focus on offensive doctrines.²⁷

In terms of the current study, there is an obvious parallel with how the U.S. military as an institution perceived the international environment both during and after the Cold War, and what this suggested perceptual bias meant for the development of peace operations doctrine. This is particularly relevant in the transitional post-Cold War period, where there has been (and continues to be) considerable uncertainty about how

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

fundamental systemic changes have altered the international setting, and the role of military power and warfare within it.

A second factor which Snyder addresses is the explicit process of formulating doctrine. In particular, he argues that "doctrinal beliefs are inordinately influenced by a few formative experiences. Past wars and early training, in particular, establish patterns of thought and organization that are highly resistant to change."²⁸ This is relevant for U.S. peace operations doctrine development, particularly since the direct empirical base of U.S. experience is relatively small and has involved some painful (thus presumably formative) experiences. Moreover, the U.S. system of doctrinal development and operational training places a heavy emphasis on simulation and exercise. As these processes explicitly serve to share operational experience and attempt to "learn" from it, the weight of such experiential factors in formulating peace operations doctrine could be significant.

A third factor is the inherent institutional tendency to dogmatize doctrine. Snyder first argues that all doctrines exhibit some dogmatic characteristics in that "they are simple, narrow, deductive, and resistant to change," then goes on to propose that this process will be more likely when "authority is highly centralized and when environmental

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

disruptions, like wars or domestic political changes, are absent."²⁹ This corresponds closely with Posen's viewpoint examined earlier, which stressed that organizational process factors will make organizations resistant to change in the absence of external intervention, or an immediate and significant challenge to existing doctrinal perspectives. Indeed, even the process of disseminating doctrine through military education, manuals, command structures, and plans ostensibly contributes to further simplification of doctrine, as it must be fairly easily understood in order to usefully reach a range of audiences.³⁰ Given the large doctrinal development and publication system which prevails in the U.S. military, either in intra-Service or Joint terms, this likewise becomes a relevant factor in assessing the organizational sources and impact of peace operations doctrine.

On the whole, Snyder's conceptions support many of the central tenets of the standard organizational process paradigm. Indeed, they serve to give more precise specification to various aspects of the concept. This also is the case with the organizational learning model.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

b. Organizational Learning

Goldman draws heavily on sociology-based organizational literature to develop an organizational learning concept to explain U.S. strategic adjustment in times of uncertainty.³¹ In particular, Goldman attempts to explain instances of significant military innovation in peacetime, which the organizational process paradigm would view as unlikely in the absence of civilian intervention or significant external threats. From the evidence, she concludes that:

...military organizations can innovate in response to a dynamic peacetime environment, provided that they have the right sorts of pressures and resources to reduce the level of ambiguity that confronts them in peacetime. Three factors are key to reducing ambiguity: domestic political inducements; international vulnerability; and credible knowledge that supports the proposed innovation.³²

In Goldman's model, the presence or absence of domestic political inducements and incentives for change affect the *desirability* of adjustment. This includes inducements and incentives for change (or, conversely, constraining pressures against it) from domestic political actors such as Congress, or even from counterpart military

³¹ Emily O. Goldman, "The US Military in Uncertain Times: Organizations, Ambiguity, and Strategic Adjustment," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 20, Number 2 (June 1997), 41-42. A good synthesis of the sociological literature is provided by Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 14 (1988), 319-40.

³² Goldman, "US Military in Uncertain Times," 42.

Services which require support for their own roles.³³ This view accepts Posen's basic argument that direct (usually corrective) civilian intervention might be necessary to stimulate change, but goes a step further by recognizing that organizations respond to carrots in addition to sticks.

Likewise, the presence or absence of recognized strategic vulnerabilities in the international environment similarly affects the perceived *urgency* for adjustment. The degree of urgency in peacetime will reflect the perceived level of vulnerability for specific interests, and is not necessarily dependent on the overall systemic level of threat. As Goldman notes, "Even during periods of low external threat, geostrategic vulnerabilities created by geography, international agreements, and technological developments influence strategic adjustment."³⁴

This concept can be extended to doctrinal adjustment as well. As Goldman puts it, urgency reduces planning ambiguity both by helping to identify vulnerabilities which need to be addressed, and by prompting actors to focus on prioritizing solutions. For large, global powers like the United States, diffuse international responsibilities and a variety of possible sources of vulnerability make it difficult to focus on or develop specific solutions for any one problem until a degree of urgency brings it to the

³³ *Ibid.*, 42-43, 45.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

forefront.³⁵ Here there is an immediate parallel with the international environment after the Cold War, and U.S. attempts to define a role in peace operations.

In addition, the level of credible knowledge from which to judge the practicality of a proposed adjustment impacts institutional perceptions about its *possibility*. This aspect is crucially related to the current base of available experience, or peacetime opportunities to expand the level of experience.³⁶ Here there is an obvious link to the U.S.'s limited direct experience with peace operations prior to the post-Cold War resurgence of UN and other multilateral peace operations.

For Goldman, these desirability-urgency-possibility variables better serve to explain why, how, and under what circumstances the military as an organization will choose to innovate significantly versus adapt incrementally. Goldman uses the factors to explain why, in innovating, the military might consciously choose to ignore what otherwise would seem to be in its parochial institutional interests as understood through the organizational process paradigm examined earlier.

While ostensibly focusing on strategic adjustment writ large, Goldman's model is likewise informative for the study of lower level doctrinal adjustment. Indeed, some of

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

Goldman's cases more closely assess the strategic impact of changes in operational doctrine — such as the interwar failure of mechanization in the U.S. Army or, in contrast, the successful development of amphibious warfare by the Marine Corps — than they do true strategic adjustment. Goldman notes that:

Adjustment is operationalized as alterations in the combat tasks -- or "roles and missions" -- of service organizations. Roles and missions define how the military services provide security and reflect the organizations' estimates of present and future threats and challenges. By identifying the tasks the services will train for and prepare to execute, roles and missions reflect service priorities about how to fight.³⁷

As discussed previously, the strategic roles and missions of the military are, at least ideally, closely reflected in doctrine, though perhaps in simplified form. Accordingly, an adjustment of general strategy should impact doctrine, and vice versa.

Three key assumptions underlie the organizational learning model, each of which elaborates a different form of constraint on adjustment. These are outlined by Goldman as follows:

First, the basic motivating goal of an organization is to achieve an optimal result in the outside world. Second, to achieve this goal, organizations will re-evaluate beliefs about causation that define their tasks, and redefine tasks, skills, and procedures accordingly. Third, organizations redefine tasks based on observations and interpretations of experience. This is the context in which organizations "learn."³⁸

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

This describes an optimal doctrine development process, but it is clear that there are several constraints on accurate organizational learning. These constraints are addressed more fully in the sociology literature. Levitt and March, for example, build their interpretation of organizational learning from classical behavioural studies of organizations, observations which suggest that: 1) organizational behaviour is based on routines; 2) that organizational actions are history dependent; and, 3) that organizations are target oriented.³⁹ This leads the authors to contend that:

Within such a framework, organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour. The generic term "routines" includes forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which they operate. It also includes the beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that buttress, elaborate, and contradict the formal routines. Routines are independent of the individual actors who execute them and are capable of surviving considerable turnover in individual actors.⁴⁰

Commenting further on constraints to this idealized process, Levitt and March note:

The experiential lessons of history are captured by routines in a way that makes the lessons, but not the history, accessible to organizations and organizational members who have not themselves experienced the history. Routines are transmitted through socialization, education, imitation, professionalization, personnel movement, mergers and acquisitions. They are recorded in a collective memory that is often coherent but is sometimes jumbled, that often endures but is sometimes lost. They change as a result of experience within a community of other learning organizations. These

³⁹ Levitt and March, "Organizational Learning," 320.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

changes depend on interpretations of history, particularly on the evaluation of outcomes in terms of targets.⁴¹

With little or no amendment, this is the essence of the doctrinal development process in any specific historical or national context. There is obvious complementarity with viewpoints found in Posen and Snyder, as well as Allison's organizational process paradigm. To name only a few, these include the emphasis on the way in which organizational standard operating procedures (SOPs), programs and routines both are developed internally and how they subsequently influence outputs; the emphasis on organizational goals (roughly equivalent to "targets" in this instance, such as stressing organizational health as a primary objective); and the way in which organizational learning and change respond to various stimuli from the environment.⁴² Overall, these concepts about organizational learning likewise expand upon the organizational process paradigm and further inform some of its aspects.

The organizational learning literature contains several propositions about the consequences of group cognitive processes which have application to doctrinal development. For example, the literature proposes that organizational learning derived from direct experience is based both on trial and error experimentation, and on mechanisms for organizational search which draw from a pool of routines in order to

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² See, for example, Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 82-88.

identify, and ultimately adopt, those which perform best. However, the literature warns of the dangers posed by so-called "competency traps," in which successful historical applications of inferior procedures tend to encourage the organization to accumulate further experience with the same procedures, versus continuing to search for or building experience with potentially superior ones.⁴³

Similarly, the literature postulates that an organization's interpretation of experience is often based on a limited empirical base within a complex, evolving ecology, and that causal links are subsequently hard to identify with accuracy. Paralleling Snyder's comments on the need for cognitive simplification, Levitt and March note that one method which organizations develop to deal with complexity is "stories, paradigms and frames" which help them in their interpretation of experience, but which also exert an influence on the quality of that learning.⁴⁴ The literature likewise suggests that an organization's learning may be more influenced by the perceptual frameworks it applies than by direct history, and that such perceptual frameworks may encourage the organization to conserve beliefs in the face of disconfirming evidence.⁴⁵ This is markedly

⁴³ Levitt and March, "Organizational Learning," 321-22.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 323-24.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* The issue of the learning "ecology" is an interesting one when applied to military organizations and doctrine. Much simplified, the basic concept of "ecologies of learning" is that, since there is similar adapting behaviour by other organizations within the same environment, outcomes based on a certain set of routines may differ over time, or different routines may produce the same outcomes in separate periods.

(continued...)

similar to the inferences that Snyder makes about the role of doctrinal frameworks in patterning or reinforcing certain forms of inappropriate historical perceptions by the organization.

An additional informing perspective from the organizational learning literature regards how organizations interpret ambiguous successes or, conversely, how they perceive and learn from their experiences of failure. For example, the literature suggests that, though unequivocal outcomes of success are rare, individual decision-makers will often tend to reinterpret existing outcomes in a way that makes success seem more apparent.⁴⁶ Moreover, the organization may be prone to so-called "superstitious learning":

Superstitious learning often involves situations in which subjective evaluations of success are insensitive to the actions taken. During very good times, or when post-outcome euphoria reinterprets outcomes positively, or when targets are low, only exceptionally inappropriate routines will lead an organization to experience failure.⁴⁷

This is an aspect of the literature which applies well within the current study, as it questions what truly constitutes "failure" from an organization's perspective. This serves

⁴⁵(...continued)

The evolving learning ecology likewise tends to complicate systematic learning and comprehension by a given organization. This perspective seemingly would tend to qualify the "lessons" derived from experience at a given point in time. See *Ibid.*, 331-32.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 325.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 325-26.

to qualify the proposition examined earlier that severe experiences of failure will prompt either the organization to adjust internally, or will stimulate corrective action from civilian authorities. Indeed, there may be instances of failure where the wrong conclusions about experiential lessons are drawn, or correct lessons ignored.

V. Propositions For The Case Study

The preceding review of organizational process theory suggests several propositions about how these factors might apply to peace operations doctrine development:

1. Organizational process theories suggest that the military will resist the development of explicit peace operations doctrine on the grounds that it does not serve core organizational interests (such as prestige and budget), nor does it fit with their traditional organizational roles and core orientations, namely higher level military operations (combat).
2. Even when faced with an operational requirement to conduct peace operations, the military will be slow to respond to the new role, and it will take external intervention by civilian actors or a major instance of failure to challenge existing doctrine and stimulate organizational change.

3. Even if doctrinal change does occur, it is possible that the adjustment will have been an incorrect response to the prevailing circumstances, exhibiting characteristics of cognitive simplification or a continuing degree of disintegration between military doctrine and political (strategic) goals.

Within the context of chapter four, these propositions are applied to see how the U.S. military tended to view peace operations in relation to its core roles and missions. For example, were peace operations perceived as adding to or detracting from core organizational essence, such as by building organizational prestige or adding to capabilities? Did relative instances of success or failure generate a greater degree of doctrinal adaptation? Finally, did either general experience or the outcome of a specific mission result in external civilian intervention to stimulate adjustment in applicable doctrine? If so, what was the outcome on doctrine, either immediately or in the longer term?

Chapter Three

Systemic Sources of Doctrinal Change

I. Introduction

This chapter examines concepts related to systemic sources of doctrinal change. Posen's balance of power concepts are used as a point of departure, and analysis is then expanded to draw on comparative realist and liberal institutionalist perspectives about potential systemic sources of doctrinal change. This leads to additional propositions on systemic sources of doctrinal change that are tested in chapter four.

In contrast to organizational process theory, Posen argues that balance of theory predicts heterogeneity along the offensive-defensive-deterrent factors discussed in the preceding chapter. To him, doctrinal change will depend upon the state's view of the international environment and its preferred strategy for dealing with the vagaries of an anarchic international system.¹ Several of Posen's balance of power propositions challenge one to interpret more broadly the offensive or defensive character of peace operations, particularly as they are interpreted by major powers like the United States.

¹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 78.

For example, Posen hypothesizes that "States that face several adversaries may prefer offensive doctrines. (Again, offensive doctrines are the vehicle for preventive war.)"² On an *a priori* level, one might argue that this is exactly the circumstance in which the United States viewed itself at various points during the Cold War and after, including during the build-up phase of peace operations doctrine. However, none of the U.S.'s potential "adversaries" in the peace operations context during this period had the capability to harm the United States — either militarily, politically, or economically — in any appreciable way, at least as such threats are commonly understood in balance of power theory. As a result, it is difficult to interpret the development of U.S. peace operations doctrine as offensive in the manner in which Posen views the subject.

Instead, Posen's hypotheses regarding the defensive orientation of military doctrines again tend to ring truer in the case of peace operations. Specifically, Posen hypothesizes that defensive doctrines will be favoured by states which favour coalition formation, and its consequent division of risks, costs and benefits. This is further balanced by a related proposition which advances the idea that states seeking coalitions must please their coalition partners.³ These two propositions are particularly relevant in the context of multilateral peace operations through the United Nations, or through other non-UN multinational arrangements. As will be examined subsequently, the application

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

of balance of power considerations to peace operations doctrine potentially also introduces an element of institutionalist theory.

With respect to the integration-disintegration and innovation-stagnation dimensions examined in the previous chapter, Posen advances several relevant propositions based on balance of power considerations. First, he advances that situations with an increased perception of threat to state security will stimulate civilian intervention, and hence possibly promote integration and innovation. Similarly, he notes that military leaders generally will be more amenable to innovation when the perceived threat level is higher.⁴ Second, he notes that recent military setbacks can stimulate innovation and integration. Finally, Posen notes that anticipated high costs of conflict can also stimulate civilian intervention.⁵

Balance of power theory offers much as an explanation for the doctrinal orientations chosen by Britain, France and Germany during the inter-war period studied by Posen. Ultimately, he contends that these balance of power factors had a more profound influence on doctrinal development in each country than did the organizational process factors examined in the previous chapter. While not unimportant, institutional or organizational factors were less deterministic than broader balance of power

⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵ *Ibid.*

considerations in the highly anarchic (in realist terms) international environment of the inter-war period.⁶ In his subsequent analysis, Posen tends to argue from a core balance of power approach which draws principally on traditional realist theory.

However, given the multilateral focus of this study's analysis of U.S. peace operations doctrine, traditional realist perspectives need to be balanced by examining comparative aspects of institutionalist or regime theory. Most applicable in this respect are institutionalist theories dealing with collective security. Certainly, both realist and institutionalist theories attempt to explain systemic influences on state behaviour, but institutionalist theory gives more weight to the impact of multilateral institutions, and various forms of principle-based systemic cooperation. Consequently, given the multilateral and institutional focus characteristic of peacekeeping, it is useful to examine how an institutionalist or regime-based approach might differ from a realist balance of power perspective in explaining doctrinal evolution.

This study contends that systemic influences are clearly more relevant when assessing changes in U.S. peace operations doctrine. Since World War II, the U.S. military-political approach to peace operations has lain in the troubled nexus between two domestic conceptions of the U.S.'s role in the world. On one hand is the U.S.'s emergent post-World War II role as a powerful, self-interested sovereign state actor willing and

⁶ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 59.

able unilaterally to pursue its core security interests, and with a strategic rationale for doing so. On the other hand has been the U.S.'s real or potential role as the cornerstone of multilateral collective security institutions like the UN which, at least theoretically, might serve to constrain the independent exercise of U.S. power.

The questions to be posed in the chapter are several. First, what are the systemic factors which, from the realist perspective, might stimulate changes in peace operations doctrine? In turn, is this consistent with realist expectations that, given a prevailing set of systemic conditions, a state such as the U.S. generally would act in a self-interested, gains maximizing manner? Alternatively, how does the explicit institutional context of most peace operations — either through the U.N. or another limited multilateral grouping — affect the possible U.S. response to peace operations doctrine development?

From the outset, there are some interesting comparisons to be drawn with the period studied by Posen. During the inter-war period of 1919-1939, Britain, France and Germany formed the European core of a broader multipolar security environment which, from a systemic perspective, was highly anarchic.⁷ The sole multilateral collective security institution created in the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations, was quite quickly and effectively neutered by the loss of U.S. participation, and subsequently collapsed under the pressure of self-interested actions by its member states.

⁷ By this, realists mean only that the system lacks a sovereign entity able to enforce sanctions upon state actors, not that the system is inherently turbulent or chaotic.

In the Cold War period during which this study begins, the existing security environment was one of intensified bipolarity between the United States and Russia, a factor which served to neutralize most of the explicit collective security provisions of the U.N. Charter. This state of bipolarity had existed almost since the creation of the U.N., but had been intensified in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the increasing assertiveness of the U.S. and Soviet Union in conflicts then occurring in several regions around the globe.

However, instead of leading to the U.N.'s institutional collapse, the enduring systemic condition of bipolarity ultimately stimulated the development of peacekeeping and other interim forms of conflict management as a response to the realities of superpower rivalry.⁸ These initially *ad hoc* conflict management mechanisms subsequently have taken on a life of their own and, arguably, have served to create a new set of norms and principles influencing state action in the conflict management sphere. Despite the collapse of bipolar competition, the conflict management mechanisms established under the U.N. framework have survived into the post-Cold War period with most of their core norms and principles intact. While several of these norms and principles have been bolstered, clarified or otherwise adapted to new security realities, their core rationale remains substantially unaltered. It is also within this evolutionary institutional context that systemic influences on doctrine must be examined.

⁸ For a short survey of the evolution of peacekeeping, see Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 21-31.

II. Systemic Sources of Doctrinal Change: Posen's model

Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that Posen's propositions on balance of power theory in relation to doctrinal change predicted a greater degree of heterogeneity in general military doctrine due to the fact that individual state interests and capabilities differ markedly across the system. As such, there is no opportunity for militaries to pursue their core organizational preferences and adopt a homogeneous preference for offensive doctrines that bolster their organizational prestige and autonomy. In contrast, Posen contends that, when threats to a state appear within the international system and focus attention on the possibility of conflict, balance of power considerations generally (but not always) tend to override the institutionally-generated preferences of the military as civilians step in to take charge of doctrine.⁹ In making this point, Posen argues along traditional balance of power lines, which has several salient features.

First, as with virtually all systemic perspectives (including neo-institutionalist theory) Posen works from the basic premise that the international environment in which states exist is one of anarchy, meaning that there is no central sovereign authority to impose rules or moderate disputes. As such, the potential for violence between states is an omnipresent feature of the system, and states are required to muster power in the form

⁹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 59.

of military capability, as well as demonstrate the will to protect themselves from violence by other states.

The twin concepts of capability and will become measures of power in the system. and states will attempt to increase their power within a variety of self-imposed or structural limits, each state having the intention of maintaining its sovereignty or, as Mearsheimer frames it, seeking to guarantee its survival and striving for maximum relative power gains in comparison to other states in the system.¹⁰ Specific reasons for increasing state power may vary, but within the condition of anarchy prevailing in the broader system and the consequent self-help burden imposed on individual states, even ostensibly defensive changes in power by one state may elicit balancing behaviour by other states.

This is all part and parcel of the balance of power systemic approach, and is an indication of the enduring "security dilemma" that faces most states in the international system.¹¹ The security dilemma concept is central in Posen's contextual analysis of interwar doctrinal change, and similarly has relevance within the present analysis. As Job explains the traditional systemic perspective on the security dilemma, "Operating in

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 61. Also John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3 (Winter 1994/95), 11. Though there are variations in realist theory, Posen's basic summarization is a useful overview, and differs little from that put forward by Mearsheimer in the article cited.

¹¹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 60-61.

conditions of anarchy, states, by seeking to advance their *individual* national securities (through policies of arming, deterrence, and alliance), create and sustain an international environment of decreased relative security for themselves and for the collective of states. The security dilemma, therefore, hinges on the external threat conditions that states experience and on the results of their efforts, as unitary state actors, to meet these threats. [emphasis in original]"¹²

Posen notes that balancing occurs in two basic forms: coalition formation and internal mobilization. Coalition or alliance formation can take a variety of forms, but the more common is balancing with another state or group of states against a perceived threat. Posen makes the case, however, that coalition formation as a mode of balancing behaviour has less utility in a bipolar environment than a multipolar one, as the relatively greater power of the bipolar states means that there are few others — even in a coalition — able to challenge them and, conversely, there is little that these coalition states really can add to the power of the larger state.¹³

Internal mobilization as the second way to increase state power takes the form of looking internally into one's own state (and also society) for an increase in capability. This could mean increased extraction of state resources (i.e., mobilization of economic,

¹² Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World", in Brian Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma* ([citation], 1992), 17.

¹³ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 61-63.

human, or materiel resources) for military purposes, quantitative or qualitative improvements to existing military capabilities, or building new weapons systems in a typical arms race fashion. Similarly, a state can demonstrate greater will by moving forces or changing their alert posture, or even engaging in small conflicts or overt shows of force as a way to deter larger conflicts, or to effect changes in the behaviour of another state without engaging in active hostilities.¹⁴

Several factors will affect the degree to which balancing behaviour of either kind takes place, but the most important of these is the intensity with which a state attempts to improve its power position. This will directly stimulate balancing behaviour on the part of immediate neighbours, or perhaps even on a larger systemic scale if the state pursuing more power is construed system-wide as a rising hegemon. Also important, but possibly less deterministic, are factors such as the distribution of power in the system, geographical constraints, and military technology.¹⁵

In addition, Posen contends that a secondary influence on the nature of the systemic balancing behaviour will be the number of great powers in the system. According to the balance of power model, multipolarity both makes it more difficult to measure changes in relative capabilities between states, and also more difficult to muster

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

individual or coalition capabilities in reaction.¹⁶ For example, the concept predicts that, under systemic conditions of multipolarity, the preference of individual states will be to let others deal with the problem of an emerging threat, thereby conserving their own power. In contrast, this is not normally seen as an option under bipolarity, as there are no other states (or even groups of states) able to muster sufficient power to balance changes in the capabilities of either of the two principal states in the system, so the bipolar states are obliged to react when there is a change in the capabilities or will of the other.¹⁷

However, the measurement of changes in power — and, more particularly, relative versus absolute change — in a multipolar system is complicated by the range of options for differing patterns of coalition. In addition, balancing reactions to changes in the systemic distribution of power are complicated by the fact that states can, in seeking a "free ride," bicker over who is to shoulder the burden of dealing with the threat to the status quo, thereby possibly also delaying a response until it is too late. Distribution of risks, costs, and the spoils of victory all are points of contention which make coalition formation more difficult, and which will tend to make any potential outcome sub-optimal.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Finally, Posen makes a general argument that the issue of relative capabilities is important, as this can influence whether individual states will seek to balance using coalition formation (generally seen as the tendency of weaker states) or through independent internal mobilization (an option more easily exercised by stronger states, given their greater relative capabilities).¹⁹ Geography and technology are also factors which Posen sees as possibly influencing the intensity of balancing behaviour, but these will not be addressed in this analysis.

Applying Posen's model creates an expectation that national doctrinal approaches to peace operations will depend largely on the state's broader interests, and its perceived role in the world. In addition, the state's position within the system will also influence its willingness — or its relative ability — to engage in certain forms of balancing response to threats, such as coalitions.

To Posen, the balance of power approach will also predict the conditions under which national political leaders will intervene to ensure integration of doctrine with broader security strategy, or to encourage doctrinal innovation. Specifically, he predicts that any increase in the level of threat (again, either real or perceived) will stimulate such intervention, as will recent military disasters, the anticipated high costs of a conflict, or the state's degree of geo-political isolation. Posen argues that such situations will tend to

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

overcome organizational inertia in military circles, and make military leaders more receptive to change.²⁰

III. Other realist and institutionalist perspectives

Posen's balance of power conception of systemic influences on doctrine potentially goes some way toward explaining why state actors such as the United States might, from an inherently self-interested perspective, choose to engage in the mechanism of peacekeeping as a response to a specific threat.

Still, these perspectives do not, in any significant way, account for the moderating role possibly played by international institutions operating in the realm of collective security. Particularly in terms of multilateral, institutionally-based mechanisms such as peacekeeping, institutionalist or regime theorists have much to say in reaction to realist predictions of state behaviour, and from this it is possible to infer some propositions for how doctrinal development could likewise be influenced by institutions or regimes.

Since the end of the Cold War, the debate between realism and institutionalism has only sharpened. Generally, institutionalist theory has taken the offensive following the Cold War, claiming that many of the current systemic changes further expose

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 74-77, 79.

enduring flaws in the realist outlook. At the same time, advocates of realist theory continue to maintain its primacy — possibly even its resurgence — regardless of more idealistic hopes for the new security environment.²¹ Either side ultimately claims to subordinate the other's theory, even if grudgingly recognizing the relevance of certain aspects of it.

As outlined, realist theory predicts that doctrinal change, such as the adoption of a specific doctrinal sub-element dealing with multilateral peacekeeping, will be the result of self-interested calculations by states based on their individual perceptions of systemic conditions. Even where systemic conditions stimulate the creation of coalitions — and, by extension, doctrine which might stress a coalition or collective focus (like multilateral peace operations) — realism predicts that such coalitions are likely to be temporary. Moreover, realism contends that such coalitions ultimately are based on self-interested power calculations versus an intrinsic state recognition of the value of multilateral institutions, or a desire to be bound by their normative rules and principles.²²

²¹ See, for example, the varying perspectives put forward by proponents of either perspective in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). A particularly spirited defence of realism which has elicited much reaction from proponents of institutionalist perspectives is found in John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3 (Winter 1994), 5-49. Reactions to the Mearsheimer article from a number of institutionalist perspectives appear in *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995), 39-81.

²² Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." 13.

For Mearsheimer, realism recognizes that states may occasionally choose to act through institutions, but that this is out of self-interest. Moreover, "The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it."²³ Accordingly, a change in doctrine which seemingly runs counter to balance of power considerations may, in fact, be a very self-interested change on the part of the state, and thus fully in line with realist expectations of strategic calculation.

For the purposes of this study, the most applicable elements of broader institutionalist theory are those dealing with collective security and regimes. Other forms of institutionalist theory, such as core liberal and neo-liberal institutionalism, also have some relevance, but it is recognized even by their proponents that these theories have limitations when it comes to explaining the prospects for cooperation in the realm of security, or the conditions under which this can occur.²⁴ As such, the subsequent section focuses on the core concepts underpinning collective security theories, as well as the applicability of regime theory as a source of doctrinal influence.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ A central concern of liberal institutionalist theory is dealing with the problems of cheating under cooperation, as well as overcoming state concerns about relative versus absolute gains. As Mearsheimer notes in his critique of the theory, liberal institutionalists like Charles Lipson have recognized that, because the consequences of cheating in security affairs are more severe, cooperation in this realm is more difficult to achieve than in economic matters. The result is that the theory, as it now stands, has limited applicability to security matters. See Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions"; 16, 19-23.

Recent iterations of collective security theory usually recognize the relevance of several realist assumptions about state behaviour and the characteristics of the international system. However, from this common base the two perspectives differ on the degree of cooperation that is possible within the international system, and the way in which balance of power logic will operate. For example, collective security theorists share the general realist assumption of anarchy in the international system and recognize the need for systemic balancing against threats and aggressors. However, the same theorists then argue that better balancing responses are achieved under situations of cooperation within international institutions, and that this provides a richer view of how states interact in the security field than does realism's central focus on power.²⁵ As argued by Charles and Clifford Kupchan, "The case for collective security rests on the claim that regulated, institutionalized balancing predicated on the notion of all against one provides more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his own."²⁶

Critics of collective security, like Mearsheimer, argue that the concept is inherently idealistic, and ultimately unrealistic, because it demands that states act counter to many of their standard notions of self-interest. This includes renouncing the use of

²⁵ Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995), 52. This article is one of the rebuttals to Mearsheimer's broad critique of international institutions in "False Promise of International Institutions".

²⁶ *Ibid.*

force to alter the status quo; foregoing narrow self-interests in favour of broader international community interests when dealing with aggressors; and trusting that other states also will act in accord with international norms.²⁷ From the realist perspective, none of these patterns of interaction are easily — nor necessarily ever — achievable.

As Mearsheimer argues, the very existence of collective security institutions recognizes that some states will be aggressors, thereby negating the notion that all states ever will renounce force.²⁸ Likewise, adherence to broader community security interests is complicated by the fact that narrow calculations of self-interest by states within a self-help system exert a powerful influence on them to refrain from acting collectively in the absence of threats to their vital interests. Finally, given the realist conception that states fear one another, realism's proponents contend that collective security's notion of trust is flawed, and that fundamental questions (at least within the realm of security) about the possibilities of cheating and relative gains notions remain unanswered.²⁹

Collective security theorists counter that such conceptions misunderstand collective security's causal logic. Specifically, they argue that collective security theory

²⁷ Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," 28-30. This summary greatly simplifies the collective security argument, but does point to some of the enduring features of the concept, at least in its more idealistic forms.

²⁸ Of course, the reverse of this argument is that, if all states fully renounced force, there would be no need for collective security in the first place.

²⁹ Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," 28-30.

explicitly recognizes that balancing behaviour will occur in an anarchic system, but that collective security institutions provide a better (not to mention more principled) method for coordinating and regulating balancing-type behaviours than do individually-motivated instances of balancing taken in aggregate. At its worst (in other words, in its least coordinated and unregulated mode), they argue that collective security will provide a similar level of balancing response as would a self-help system, and that even a modicum of adherence to the collective security principle would constitute value added.³⁰

Unfortunately, collective security theorists are not fully able to predict the conditions under which states will cooperate, and how trust will develop within the system to overcome the central concerns faced by states under an anarchic, self-help system. This seemingly is one of the more valid criticisms made by realism, and goes to the heart of the realist versus institutionalist debate over the relative limits to, and

³⁰ Kupchan and Kupchan, "Promise of Collective Security," 54-55. The principal realist critique of this is that, by fostering a sense of trust that ultimately might be broken, the collective security system could leave states unprepared to undertake the requisite degree of individual balancing behaviour. The Kupchans respond (pp. 55-57) that any possible failure of the system will be progressive, allowing states to develop individual compensatory capabilities. Further, those states who would be most damaged by cheating will, as realists predict, be aware of the possibility of defection, and will maintain some capabilities to deal with the situation should it occur. Force levels and capabilities within individual states in a collective security system also will be based on their individual threat environment, not based solely on collective capabilities. Finally, with respect to the prospect of free riding, the Kupchans maintain that collective security systems are no less or more prone to the problem than would the case with individual balancing behaviour under anarchy.

prospects for, true cooperation when it comes to highly central issues such as state security.

Specifically, collective security theorists like the Kupchans admit that the compatibility of states within the collective security system is important to its effective functioning, and that this compatibility largely is a function of underlying state interests and intentions. Following the central logic of institutionalism, they go on to argue that interactions between states within a collective security system help to build compatibility and reinforce cooperation, and make the point that this a stability-enhancing feature of collective security.³¹

Nonetheless, they still fail to refute fully some of the enduring realist arguments about the importance of relative versus absolute gains (particularly when it comes to security issues). In response, however, institutional theorists contend that prolonged interactions within collective security institutions ultimately could allow states to focus more on absolute gains than relative ones.³² Finally, they also adopt elements of a critical

³¹ Kupchan and Kupchan, "Promise of Collective Security," 57-58.

³² *Ibid.* It is not intended here to examine the relative merits of the realist and institutionalist arguments over absolute versus relative gains. Comparative perspectives on this aspect can be seen in Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," both in Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, pp. 85-140.

theory perspective in arguing that collective security institutions can perhaps, over time, affect ideational variables and thus help states redefine their national interests in a new way which promotes greater stability and enhances collective security.

Clearly, there remain a number of differences between the realist and institutionalist schools of thought which impact how one can portray the effects of systemic conditions and interactions upon doctrine, and peace operations doctrine more specifically. However, given the level of post-Cold War debate about the utility of peace operations, or various operational forms within the paradigm, it is useful to outline some aspects of regime theory as a demonstration of the potential influence of systemic collective security factors on national doctrinal development. This section draws upon Legault et al.'s examination of regime theory in relation to the United Nations and its various collective security sub-regimes, with emphasis on those dealing with traditional and "next generation" peacekeeping, and with peace enforcement.

These are the collective security mechanisms most closely related to peace operations doctrinal development in the U.S., and encompass the realm of operations studied in chapter four. To be clear from the outset, the intent here is not to argue that regime theory necessarily provides the better explanation, nor that a regime for peacekeeping has, or ever will, emerge. However, regime theory provides a useful way to examine how basic collective security considerations at the broader systemic level might, through the variables involved in the creation and maintenance of regimes, come

to exert an influence on national doctrinal development. This is most relevant in terms of examining whether the post-Cold War emphasis on and euphoria about the prospects for peace operations had some impact on the United States in terms of doctrinal change.

As Legault argues, regime theory forms an increasingly useful heuristic device in examining collective security. Specifically, he states that:

Regime theory makes it possible to explain the organization and dynamics of the collective system for managing and settling disputes because it assumes that states behave rationally and have mutual interests which induce them to co-ordinate their policies. To some extent, the theory of regimes subsumes individual paradigms, particularly political realism and the sociological paradigm, by including elements of both approaches.³³

Collective security is itself defined in a broad manner, attempting to overcome the overly restrictive and sometimes idealistic definitions used in the past:

...collective security could be defined as the set of norms, rules and methods that states agree to adopt to ensure peace and international security. Their actions, sanctioned by international organizations, aim to manage conflict either through diplomatic means or through collective action to limit or stop threats to the peace or acts of aggression.³⁴

Regime theory incorporates realism's basic emphasis on power and national interest in respect to a regime's formation and the influence these factors have on the regime's evolution. However, it also makes the argument that the international system is

³³ Albert Legault et al., "The United Nations at fifty: regime theory and collective security," *International Journal*, Volume L, Number 1 (Winter 1994-95), 77.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 76.

not entirely anarchical, in that, "the behaviour of the main actors in the system (that is, states) is determined by certain interests, values and norms governed by certain rules, whether formal or informal."³⁵ The theory also incorporates elements of the sociological paradigm, in that the pre-existence of collective goals are a condition for regime formation. In the case of collective security, "In short, each country's security depends on the security of the entire system: individual interests tend to merge into a general collective interest, and dispute settlement seems to be most effective when a co-operative approach is taken."³⁶

Agreeing with Stein³⁷ that regime theory is useful for examining the informal conflict management arrangements which often function in the absence of more formalized mechanisms, Legault makes the argument that regime theory also helps to shed light on systemic evolution. He notes that, "Just as international security may be

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 78. This statement implies that there is some element of informal "governance" within the anarchical international environment, or what Legault might term metaregulation. James Rosenau makes the case that regimes should be differentiated from broader conceptions of systemic governance as he defines it. Though both look at the convergence of actors' expectations around formal or informal conceptions of norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures, regimes are more closely defined as being focused around a specific issue area. See James N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics" in James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel, *Governance Without Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and defection: security 'régimes' and the management of international conflict," *International Journal*, Volume XL, Number 4 (Autumn 1985), 599-627.

called into question when the system becomes unbalanced, collective security regimes evolve in response to changes within the system: the emergence of new values, new security rules, and new methods for applying collective decisions."³⁸

Several factors are critical to the creation of a regime. Stein argues that there are three requisites: "convergent expectations among its members, interdependence among participants and across policy issues, and procedures for multilateral decision-making to effect collective choice."³⁹ This is similar to Krasner's commonly accepted definition of the factors which are central to regime creation: "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area."⁴⁰

Legault quite clearly differentiates between those factors which are intended to establish and condition the central imperatives of a regime, and the actual rules and procedures by which it functions and is subsequently monitored. The former he terms "metaregulation," which constitutes a set of higher-level ordering factors which include the dimensions of a regime (its main structural components, or sub-regimes), its principles (the main objectives it seeks to attain), and its norms (general legal provisions

³⁸ Legault et al., "Regime Theory and Collective Security," 79.

³⁹ Stein, "Detection and defection," 603.

⁴⁰ Stephen Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables," *International Organization*, Volume 36 (Spring 1982), 185, cited in Stein, "Detection and defection," 603.

which define codes of conduct, either formally or informally).⁴¹ Falling into a second category of "regulation" factors are the regime's specific rules (the formal or informal criteria through which the regime's principles and norms are given effect), its implementation procedures (national, regional or possibly even global procedures by which rules and norms are implemented), and its mechanisms for monitoring regime congruence (methods by which the regime ensures continuing congruence with its central norms).⁴²

In the case of the broad collective security regime, Legault argues that three specific sub-regimes or dimensions can be discerned. These are peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, each of which corresponds largely with established UN definitions.⁴³ Likewise, the principles (the main objectives) for the three current dimensions of collective security tend to be drawn from the United Nations Charter. In general, the principles respectively correspond to the Charter's chapter on peaceful resolution of disputes, the so-called "Chapter VI and a Half" objectives which are seen to underpin traditional peacekeeping, and the formal Chapter VII provisions for collective security enforcement. However, there possibly also are new emerging sub-regimes,

⁴¹ Legault et al., "Regime Theory and Collective Security," 82-29.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 90-101.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 84-86. In this work, Legault et al. do not devote significant attention to the fourth operational type which emerged from *An Agenda For Peace*, namely post-conflict peacebuilding.

dealing with issues of "next generation" peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, both of which do not fit neatly into one of the existing definitions.⁴⁴

The norms for each sub-regime largely are drawn from specific articles of the UN Charter or past practice (such as peacekeeping, whose norms evolved out of experience), as well as some informal consensus which has built up around emerging formulations like next generation peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention.⁴⁵ Admittedly, there remains some question about the applicability of certain articles in the context of different security situations, but regime theory seemingly is able to accommodate these differences as part of its normal cycle of adaptation. If there is, at the very least, informal consensus on the interpretation of a specific article, then the regime may accommodate itself to that interpretation, versus the formal article. This was one of the adaptive regime mechanisms which allowed for the emergence of peacekeeping as a UN-centred form of conflict management, even though there were no formal provisions for it in the Charter.⁴⁶

Hitherto, we have included all three nominal dimensions of collective security. At this point, when it comes to regulation of the sub-regimes, the focus will turn to peacekeeping and emergent forms of peace operations, such as next generation

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 84-87.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 87-89.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. The reason for doing so is that the regulating elements of a regime -- its rules, implementation procedures, and its regime congruence monitoring mechanisms -- are the aspects which are likely to be most closely reflected in national military doctrine. As such, it may be inferred that, just as higher-level regime dimensions, principles and norms provide metaregulation for and thus influence change in the regime's regulation factors, so too might they influence change in national military doctrine related to peace operations.

The extent to which national doctrine reflects regime regulations allows for at least partial measurement of the influence of higher-level regime factors (and hence systemic considerations) at the national level. As Legault notes:

Rules are the means incorporated into the fundamental arrangements which makes the norms and principles of the regime operational. The rules must comply with established norms and principles and may either be legal and formal (such as resolutions of the Security Council or the United Nations General Assembly) or informal (established behaviours that have been elevated to the status of rules through repeated use).⁴⁷

As these regime regulations are created largely at the systemic level based on shared objectives, their presence within national-level doctrine will serve as an indication of the influence of systemic-level factors on doctrinal change. This is particularly the case if these regime regulations tend to contradict the principles for military doctrine which otherwise might result from organizational process factors alone.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

Implementation procedures are those functional arrangements by which the operational aspects of regimes are achieved, such as for funding and troop contributor selection. They can be seen to operate at the national, regional (as part of the response of regional security institutions), and possibly even the global level.⁴⁸ Again, this provides for comparison with national doctrinal responses, in terms of how a nation such as the U.S. chooses to implement aspects of the regime within the context of doctrine.

IV. Summary and Propositions

The preceding sections have outlined the possibilities for systemic influences on doctrine, both in relation to realist balance of power factors and collective security. As both realists and institutionalists focusing on collective security argue that anarchy exists and states exhibit balancing behaviour in response to conditions of instability, we are not seeking here to prove or disprove the central validity of either theory.

Moreover, the case for systemic influences on doctrine, as outlined by Posen, does not rest on one of the theories being right to the exclusion of the other. Instead, it simply seeks to find evidence that one of the two concepts applies, and that this provides more of

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 94-100.

an explanation for doctrinal change under a given set of circumstances than do the organizational theory factors examined in chapter two.

Drawing on the foregoing discussion, the following propositions can be advanced for consideration within the case study:

1. Doctrinal change will occur principally in response to systemic conditions, which generate specific sets of state interests and corresponding broad conceptions of how these interests are best achieved in the international system at various points in time.
2. The emergence of specific peace operations doctrine will require systemic conditions in which peace operations roles are seen as contributing to the achievement of state interests in the international system. Until then, organizational process factors will tend to dominate.
3. Certain historical periods may favour more institutionally-based responses to systemic challenges, which can be indicated by the convergence of actors around an emerging regime such as peace operations.

In applying the propositions within chapter four, the following questions will be addressed. First, was there a consistent level of U.S. national interest in direct participation in peace operations across various periods of systemic circumstances, or is the development of specific peace operations doctrine linked to a certain set of systemic circumstances? Second, was the level of civilian intervention into peace operations doctrinal development similar across various systemic periods, or did certain periods prompt more intervention than others? Third, was civilian intervention triggered by any significant disjuncture between existing military peace operations doctrine and national strategic objectives? Fourth, was the content or character of U.S. peace operations doctrine influenced by external systemic factors, such as multilateral peace operations practice through the United Nations? Finally, did international practice introduce doctrinal elements which conflicted with existing U.S. doctrinal precepts? If so, which prevailed?

Chapter Four

Evolution of US Peace Operations Doctrine, 1980-1995

I. Introduction

This chapter examines the specific evolution of U.S. peace operations doctrine during the period 1980-1995, applying the theoretical approaches which were developed in the preceding chapters. The intent is to examine elements of the theories in context, testing the degree to which organizational process or systemic factors variously influenced doctrinal development for peace operations, and which of the two has had the more dominant effect.

As noted in chapter one, direct U.S. participation in UN-based or other multilateral peace operations prior to the end of the Cold War was extremely limited. From the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in 1946 to the post-Cold War phase of UN peace operations that began in 1989, the United States participated directly in only four UN-centred peace operations. All were limited in scope and scale, restricted to logistical support and occurring during what Wiseman has called the "Nascent Period" of UN peacekeeping¹: the United Nations

¹ Henry Wiseman, "The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis" in United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Dordrecht: (continued...))

Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). International participation in the four operations never exceeded 572 military personnel at any one time², with U.S. contributions ranging from a low of 21 personnel in UNCI to a peak participation of 327 within UNTSO.³ None involved the deployment of U.S. combat troops.

Apart from its involvement in the Dominican Crisis of 1965 -- in which roughly 28,000 U.S. troops were deployed at peak strength, either unilaterally or as part of the Inter-American Peace Force -- the United States did not contribute ground forces to UN or other peace operations between 1956 and 1980.⁴ It was only in 1981, following the

¹(...continued)
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 266.

² *Ibid.*, 272.

³ David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support – Experience and Prospects* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 535.

⁴ The Dominican Republic operation clearly derived from U.S. hemispheric interests, and its peacekeeping characteristics largely were invoked as a post-facto justification for U.S. intervention. As such, neither it nor similarly-motivated operations in Grenada (1983) or Panama (1989) will be considered. The Dominican operation was conducted under general mandate from the Organization of American States (OAS), with a degree of UN oversight under the auspices of the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic from May 1965 to October 1966 (two military observers). The context of the Dominican operation is well covered in Wainhouse,
(continued...)

conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreements that created the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai, that the U.S. committed itself to its first deployment of combat troops to a peacekeeping operation based on a nominally UN model.

Significantly, this included placing U.S. troops under the operational control of a foreign military commander, though political control of the operation remained within a non-UN multilateral body explicitly headed by an American.

Apart from its abortive involvement in Beirut during 1982-1984, the U.S. did not again commit combat troops to a peace operation until 1991. This new era began with the provision of forces for security and humanitarian aid assistance to Kurdish refugees in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War as a follow-on to US-led coalition ground combat operations. From the Kurdish deployment onward, U.S. involvement in peace operations rose dramatically in comparison with previous periods. More significantly, all of these subsequent operations were conducted directly under or with close reference to UN mandates. Of central interest to this paper, the post-Cold War expansion of effort was accompanied by a sustained initiative to develop specific peace operations doctrine.

Applying the theoretical models examined in the preceding chapters, the case study seeks to assess why doctrinal development occurred in the post-Cold War period, but did not similarly occur as a result of the operations undertaken in the early 1980s. In

⁴(...continued)

International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 459-516.

doing so, the study examines the interplay between systemic and organizational process factors within each of the sub-phases between 1980 and 1995.

The principal UN and other operations in which U.S. forces were employed during the period are outlined in Appendix One. In each of the missions listed, U.S. ground combat troops in excess of company strength were deployed in support of either traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian assistance/intervention, or peace enforcement tasks. The listing of missions thus excludes operations where only non-combat or support forces (such as unarmed observers, engineers, or logistical support elements, including air- and sea-lift) were deployed.

Though reference will be made to other cases where applicable, three of the listed operations have been selected for more intensive examination: the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai mission (1981-ongoing), the Multinational Force (MNF) operation in Beirut (1982-1984), and the UNITAF/UNOSOM II mission in Somalia (1992-1994). On a military operational level, all three were conducted, at least initially, under non-UN multinational auspices. Both the MFO Sinai and the MNF in Beirut were conducted in their entirety outside explicit UN mandates and thus can be contrasted with the later UNITAF/UNOSOM II operations (both of which had explicit UN sanction, though the former was conducted under a U.S.-led coalition).

Most significantly from the military perspective, the three operations were conducted with mixes of Army and Marine forces, allowing contrasts of influences on Service and Joint doctrine over the various periods and missions. Each of the missions was also conducted within the zones of responsibility of the same two unified military commands: the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). This reduces the possibility for regionally- or geographically-induced variations in command structure which might have influenced doctrinal outcomes. Finally, each mission involved the commitment of U.S. ground forces at or in excess of 1,000 personnel on a multi-year basis. This is significant, as it requires the rotation of troops and, as a consequence, demands ongoing military planning, training, and budgeting for these roles.

II. The Period 1980-1985: First Steps

That the U.S.-led multinational operations in the Sinai and Lebanon during this first phase did not result in doctrinal adjustment for peace operations was due to the fact that neither the overall systemic environment, nor the operations undertaken during the period, provided the necessary levels of stimulus to encourage such change. Specifically, the fact that prevailing systemic conditions continued to marginalize the importance of the peace operations role in comparison to broader U.S. security and foreign policy interests meant that existing deficiencies in the military's comprehension of peace

operations could be allowed to continue. Even in the face of outright failure in Lebanon, the conclusion was not that the doctrinal concepts applied to the operation necessarily had been wrong, but that U.S. involvement in such missions was not generally in the national interest. Far from stimulating concentrated discussion about how national military doctrine for peace operations could be improved (or even if it really should be), the response to the failure — both on the part of the military and civilian leaders — simply was to retreat from such commitments in future. At the same time, success in the Sinai did not contribute to an enhanced U.S. doctrine for peace operations, as the mission being undertaken similarly continued to be marginalized in comparison to other core military tasks, and there was not an evident connection made between such operations and their contribution to enhanced national security.

Forced to confront a vast range of problems and conflicting policy imperatives in the Middle East, the interests of the United States in the region during the early 1980s were distilled to four main factors: safeguarding the free flow of Middle East oil, containing or reducing Soviet influence in the area, promoting regional stability, and preserving close contacts with friendly states in the region.⁵ These, in turn, served as the strategic imperatives to which peace operations in the region had to conform on some level.

⁵ Barry Rubin, "The Reagan Administration and the Middle East" in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, editors, *Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), 369-369.

Ongoing U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry helped to condition the interests of the Reagan administration in the Middle East, as it had for previous administrations. An explicit strategic premise of the Reagan administration was "that the Soviet Union posed the greatest clear and present danger to the region," contributing to the administration's attempts to conclude an anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" in the area, and likewise serving as a focus for U.S. military and foreign policy.⁶ One explicit strategy, carried over from the Carter administration's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, was to place increased emphasis on rapid conventional force projection capabilities in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East region, either to act as an explicit deterrent to Soviet action, or be able to react to any aggression or regional instability which occurred.⁷ These general conceptions served to pattern the U.S. response to the conflict situations then prevailing in the Sinai and Lebanon.

Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai arose directly out of U.S. efforts to support the recent Camp David Accords and the general Egyptian-Israeli peace process. The new accords offered progress on the prolonged diplomatic and military stalemate which had continued to exist in the Sinai peninsula

⁶ *Ibid.*, 374-378.

⁷ Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment" in Oye, Lieber and Rothchild, *Eagle Defiant*, 85-87. Also James K. Oliver and James A. Nathan, "The Reagan Defense Program: Concepts, Continuity, and Change" in Stephen J. Cimbala, editor, *The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), 12-14.

after the 1973 war, and even a partial resolution would contribute to increased stability in the region. This clearly corresponded with broad U.S. strategic interests, and served to catalyze U.S. efforts in acting as a broker to, and ultimately a guarantor for, a negotiated settlement.⁸ This finally was achieved in March 1979.

Central to the verification and monitoring provisions in Annex I of the Treaty, the "Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements," was Article VI, which specified that the parties would ask the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the Israeli military withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and assist with the implementation and monitoring of the accords.⁹ Missions to be performed by the planned international force were diverse. They included the establishment of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along the boundaries between the two states; twice-monthly verification inspections on the progress of implementation; additional verification inspections at 48 hours notice by either party; and ensuring freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba, per Article V of the main treaty.¹⁰

⁸ John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An assessment of peacekeeping operations at the Arab-Israeli interface* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 167.

⁹ Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, reproduced in Mala Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 125-137.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Virtually from the outset, however, it was apparent that the Soviet Union would veto any attempt by the U.S. to seek an extension of the mandate for the existing Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) to cover implementation of the new agreements.¹¹ Anticipating this possibility, President Jimmy Carter issued identical letters to the Israeli and Egyptian governments on 26 March 1979, in tandem with the signing of the Treaty on the same date. The letters specifically pledged that, "If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force."¹² Subsequent failure to reach consensus on a UN force (due both to Soviet and Arab opposition) thus committed the U.S. to organizing the force and shouldering a substantial share of its financing, contributing troops to it, and inventing a non-UN multinational structure to oversee its operations.¹³

Consequently, representatives from the U.S., Israel and Egypt met in July 1981 to conclude a separate protocol for the establishment of the Multinational Force and Observers. This was signed on 3 August 1981, and former U.S. diplomat Leamon Hunt

¹¹ Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, 168-169; Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1984), 7-8.

¹² Letters from President Jimmy Carter to President Saddat and Prime Minister Begin, dated 26 March 1979, reproduced in Tabory, *Multinational Force and Observers*, 159.

¹³ Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts*, 8-10.

was named the first Director-General, a position which the parties had concluded should be held by an American national. Norwegian Lieutenant General Frederik V. Bull-Hansen, a NATO-trained officer who had earlier served as Commander, Allied Forces North Norway, was appointed as the MFO's first military commander, responsible for a total force strength of some 2,600 troops and civilian observers.¹⁴

Establishment of the MFO thus flowed from a fairly orderly set of U.S. interests in the region generally, and the Egyptian-Israeli conflict in particular. Still, the institutional and organizational structure of the mission was (and remains) somewhat unique in terms of historical peace operations practice.¹⁵ The primary mission of MFO forces is to monitor compliance with treaty provisions in each of zones of separation established under the agreement, and in the adjacent Straits of Tiran. This includes physical and technical monitoring through patrols, checkpoints and sensor systems; ground inspections by unarmed observers; and satellite and aerial reconnaissance. Many of these provisions had been in place during the preceding Sinai Field Mission, and were carried over into the new agreements to provide for an effective verification and confidence-building system between the two parties, which is one of the MFO's most

¹⁴ Multinational Force and Observers, Office of Public Affairs, *The Multinational Force and Observers* (Rome: Multinational Force and Observers, December 1987), 9-11.

¹⁵ Differences between the MFO structure and prevailing UN practice are addressed at length in the studies by Mackinlay and Pelcovits cited earlier, as well as in the study by Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trink, *Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, November 1984), so will not be addressed here.

enduring legacies.¹⁶ The relative success of the MFO mission has also been attributed to the clarity of its mandate, which derives from a peace treaty versus an interim ceasefire or truce.¹⁷

All of these factors served to minimize Congressional or U.S. public hostility to the mission. However, there were inevitable questions from Congress about how the operation would serve U.S. interests in the region, and whether the commitment would expose U.S. troops to the possibility of terrorist attack, or leave them trapped should hostilities resume between Israel and Egypt. Moreover, there was the enduring question of the President's constitutional authority to deploy troops in this manner. However, specific U.S. troop contributions would be on the order of 1,000 personnel, which complied with the limits set upon the President in the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. Furthermore, State Department officials cited compliance with the reporting requirements under Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution of 1974,

¹⁶ Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel in Tabory, *Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 125-141. An excellent discussion of the role and nature of verification and confidence-building measures used in the Sinai is provided by Brian S. Mandell, *The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management* (Ottawa: Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, 1987), 17-18.

¹⁷ See, for example, Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon*, Chapters 6 and 7; also Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, Chapter 6. Operations such as Cyprus, where the interpositional UN force is assigned to monitor the de facto truce line, suffer from the fact that these interim boundaries have not been reconciled under a longer-term peace process. In contrast to the earlier UNEF I and UNEF II operations in the same area, the MFO has had the benefit of monitoring compliance along agreed borders.

acknowledging that, if there were signs of imminent hostilities in the region which could involve the U.S. forces, sub-sections 3 and 4(a) of the Resolution would apply.¹⁸

In answering Congressional concerns about possible attacks on the force, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Nicholas Veliotis testified:

You can't rule out an incident here and there, but I think it important to understand that the peacekeeping force reinforces the security of the two countries in a very important, if intangible, political and psychological manner. In our view, just because there is so much instability elsewhere, and because there is so much still to be done in the peace process, it argues strongly for quick approval of the peacekeeping force. This will insure the strengthening of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, which is a tangible and very important step toward a wider peace in the area.¹⁹

In the end, Congress retained the ability to review its approval for the mission annually during budget appropriations, and most other objections were easily disposed of during hearings on the force.

In contrast to the MFO, where U.S. participation had been planned within the clear mandate and general level of consensus provided by the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli agreements, the Multinational Force mission in Beirut suffered at the very outset from the

¹⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and Europe and the Middle East, *Creation of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, hearings and mark-up, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 1981, H.R. 349, 22.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

complexity of the ongoing conflict situation that then prevailed in Lebanon. From the U.S. perspective, the MNF was intended to help address the relative weakness of the Lebanese government as a regional ally by providing a supportive interpositional presence between it and the rival confessional groups and militias who continued to battle throughout various parts of the country. Moreover, there was an explicitly-stated U.S. interest in helping the government rid the country of the foreign forces which controlled large parts of Lebanese territory. This included the Syrian-backed Arab Deterrent Force (which was seen as a Soviet influence) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose use of South Lebanon as a base of operations for attacks on northern Israel had been the catalyst for the Israeli invasion of the country in June 1982.²⁰

The MNF operation undertaken by the U.S. and its partners fell into two major phases, each of which served under a substantially different mandate. The first phase, MNF I, involved the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian forces from Beirut between 25 August and 10 September 1982 in the midst of the Israeli invasion of the country. The mission was accomplished quite readily and without enduring controversy, so it will not be covered in detail.

²⁰ Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, 69-71. The full complexity of the Lebanese situation is beyond the scope of this study, but good overviews are available in several volumes. See, for example, the collection of papers presented in Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, editors, *The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991). Mackinlay's study also offers a good overview and comparison of the MNF operation with other UN operations in the region.

The second, more complex phase, MNF II, began with the reinsertion of U.S. Marine forces on 29 September after the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel and the massacres of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and ended 26 February 1984 with the re-deployment of U.S. Marines to their amphibious ships offshore. In the interval, over 241 U.S. Marines lost their lives to car bombings, along with several score killed among other MNF contributors.²¹

The policy motivations for the second MNF mission were complex and, for the most part, not clearly related to any viable longer term plan for the resolution of the Lebanese internal conflict or foreign interventionism. The initial mandate and authority for the second force derived from an exchange of letters between the Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon and Ambassador Robert Dillon on 25 September 1982, but subsequently was extended more broadly in May 1983 to assist the Lebanese government with implementation of the withdrawal of Israeli troops.²² On 29 September, a force of 1,200 U.S. Marines deployed ashore along with roughly 400 troops each from Italy and France. Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, but stressing his own authority to act, President Reagan communicated with Congress to outline the MNF task:

²¹ An excellent chronology of the U.S. deployment can be found in Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), 149-153.

²² Letter from Deputy Prime Minister Fouad Boutros to U.S. Ambassador Robert Dillon, dated 25 September 1982, reproduced in Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts*, 139-140; "Agreement on Withdrawal of Troops from Lebanon, Done at Kiryat Shemona and Khaldeh, May 17, 1983," *Ibid.*, 142-153.

Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces. In carrying out this mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense and will be equipped accordingly.²³

Reagan did not announce a possible withdrawal date, but stressed that the deployment would only be for a "limited period," and that there was "no intention or expectation that U.S. Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities".²⁴

Crucial to the eventual outcome of the Marine mission was the stated role of "presence," which no one on the ground appeared to fully comprehend. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston, leading the battalion landing team of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), typified the early confusion of the Marines about the new orientation of the MNF, saying that it was seen as "a very broad, very unspecific mission of a presence to allow the Lebanese army to accomplish their mission. And quite frankly, we weren't really sure exactly what their mission was."²⁵ This uncertainty was echoed within the higher command chain, including among the staff of the amphibious squadron offshore, whose Navy commander retained operational control over the Marine forces on the

²³ President Ronald Reagan, message to Congress, 29 September 1982, reproduced in Appendix B of Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts*, 141-142.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Johnston, USMC, Interview by Ron Spector, 13 January 1983, transcript; Marine Corps Oral History Program, Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC; 46.

ground as part of a complex chain of command designed more to facilitate logistical support than expedite higher command guidance.²⁶ Despite the initial vagueness, the Marines gradually elaborated the concept in practice by trying to ensure that they remained visible to the local population, the Israelis, and any PLO left in the camps. This included active patrolling in their assigned zone and manning checkpoints in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces and other MNF contingents, but also included signalling a longer-term presence by building bunker facilities and fortifying some of their key positions around the Beirut airport. The underlying intent was that the Lebanese Armed Forces would do most of the work to re-establish the government's presence and authority, but in actuality much of this role fell to the Marines.²⁷

Operationally as well as doctrinally, the key problem for the Marines operating in Lebanon was the disjuncture between the forces deployed and the missions they were gradually required to undertake as the Lebanese political situation continued to deteriorate. Through the remainder of 1982 and into the summer of 1983, there was uncertain progress on the diplomatic front as the U.S. and other powers attempted to broker a deal for the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon, and to establish the basic conditions under which progress could be made to resolve the fighting

²⁶ Brigadier General Jim R. Joy, USMC, Interview by Benis M. Frank, 26 May 1984, transcript; Marine Corps Oral History Program, Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC; 18-23.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 47-49.

between Lebanese confessional groups. What stability the Israeli occupation forces had provided in terms of helping the MNF to control some of the rival Lebanese militias was removed in August of 1983 as the Israeli army withdrew from the hotly contested Shouf mountains and fighting between the Druze and Falangists groups escalated, catching the MNF in the middle.²⁸

To Pelcovits, this period of the MNF operation amply demonstrated what he terms "cognitive dissonance" between short and long term U.S. objectives for participation in the MNF. Specifically, this was the schism between the MNF's ostensible role as a short-term interpositional stability force (i.e., its loosely defined peacekeeping presence), and the longer term U.S. objective of having the MNF assist with the eventual restoration of Lebanese territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence in the face of numerous intra- and extra-state pressures. Pelcovits argues that the two positions were inherently contradictory, and makes the case that this cognitive dissonance gradually became more pronounced on the operational level as the general security situation continued to deteriorate markedly in September 1983 with the mountain battles around Souq-el-Gharb.²⁹

²⁸ This overview of the evolving security situation is drawn from Geoffrey Kemp, "The American Peacekeeping Role in Lebanon" in McDermott and Skjelsbaek, *The Multinational Force in Beirut*, 131-142.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 138-139. Nathan A. Pelcovits, "What Went Wrong" in McDermott and Skjelsbaek, *Multinational Force in Beirut*, 42-44.

It was at this point in the operation that U.S. military liaison officers serving with the hard-pressed Lebanese Armed Forces asked for naval gunfire support to bolster the crumbling Lebanese army positions, permission for which was finally received from the Reagan administration on 19 September after repeated requests. This significantly modified the standing rules of engagement, which hitherto had largely been those set out for peacetime contingencies by U.S. European Command.³⁰ The impact was to signal that the U.S. had taken sides in the conflict, and with this the U.S. MNF contingents began to take more direct hostile fire as their ostensible neutrality disappeared.

Though the U.S. MNF forces ashore were now calling for naval bombardment in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and suffering direct attacks on their positions, senior U.S. military officials continued to describe the mission as "peacekeeping". However, there was significant confusion about what this meant, as evidenced by statements to Congress by Admiral James D. Watkins, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in hearings on 28 September 1983. Addressing increased Congressional

³⁰ In the wake of the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks, the Department of Defence Commission (known subsequently as the Long Commission) inquiry into the incident undertook a comprehensive review of the rules of engagement in place at various points in the mission, demonstrating the degree of conflicting higher command guidance that the Marine forces received, and the cumbersome nature of the inter-Service command chain which was present in the mission. See U.S. Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, *Report of the Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

concerns about the U.S. role in Lebanese hostilities and potential conflicts in the rules of engagement as a result, Watkins' written statement advanced that:

The mission of the U.S. contingent has not been one of combat, and as I mentioned, has not changed since the marines were first deployed to Lebanon. I do not foresee any changes in the mission in the future....The rules of engagement are fully consistent with the multi-national forces' peacekeeping mission. These rules are the normal, peacetime operating rules of engagement. Military force may only be used when required in self defense and to protect us [sic] personnel and the U.S. diplomatic mission against hostile threat or action.³¹

Later in his oral testimony, Watkins responded to a question on the apparent shift in the authority and rules of engagement for the U.S. peacekeeping role by replying:

First...we are not in a peacekeeping role. It is very important that we not link our mission to peacekeeping because peacekeeping is in the mind of the beholder. Peacekeeping could well be a combat operation. This is not a combat operation. We have been there to provide an interposition force, since the time we went in, between the legitimate Lebanese internal security forces and the departing Israelis and Syrian forces....

So our mission has not changed. It is presence; it is to be visible, along with our allies...to demonstrate our support for the Government of Lebanon and as role models to the fledgling Lebanese Armed Forces, so they can come alive and get their internal security capability back on its feet.³²

Clearly, this demonstrated the degree of misunderstanding evident among the military about the central nature of peacekeeping in the Lebanese context, and that the mission being undertaken differed markedly from traditional concepts of peacekeeping.

³¹ Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearings on The Use of U.S. Military Personnel in Lebanon and Consideration of Report from September 24-25 Committee Delegation to Lebanon*, 98th Congress, 1st session, 28 September 1983, 50.

³² *Ibid.*, 71.

At this point, Congressional leaders clearly were concerned that the mission was ill-defined, and worried about the degree to which U.S. forces were becoming mired in the internal Lebanese conflict. This prompted a joint resolution on 12 October which stated that, as far as Congress was concerned, U.S. forces were indeed engaged in hostilities and that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution had become effective as of 29 August 1983. The resolution provided authorization for the mission to continue an additional eighteen months, but listed a set of criteria for its eventual termination and instituted a requirement for the President to submit more regular reports on the deployment.³³

The culminating event in this escalating spiral was the 23 October 1983 car bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at Beirut airport, killing 241 Marines. This was immediately followed by Congressional inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the U.S. deaths, and growing public discontent with the overall mission. With no strong support by the U.S. military for an apparently untenable mission that appeared more like Vietnam every day, eventual withdrawal of the U.S. and other MNF troops seemed fairly self-evident, and this indeed occurred in mid-February 1984.³⁴

³³ Public Law 98-119, 12 October 1983, reproduced in Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts*, 154-157.

³⁴ Kemp, "American Peacekeeping Role in Lebanon," 139-141; Pelcovits, "What Went Wrong?," 42-46.

In retrospect, the U.S. military in Lebanon found itself heavily involved in perhaps one of the most complex forms of peace operation imaginable: a multi-party, multi-issue conflict that simultaneously was both intra- and extra-state in orientation. Little historical or practical guidance was available for how to conduct a successful peace operation in such an environment, and the UN had itself tried and failed to achieve much progress in the country with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

As Nelson demonstrates in his comparison between the MFO and MNF operations in relation to established UN peacekeeping practice, the MNF operating environment in 1983 was far and away more complex than most of the UN operations which had come before it, both as a result of U.S. policy actions, as well as the actions of other involved states. The MNF experience differed from almost all preceding UN operations, and there likewise was little comparable or relevant experience being gained in the newly formed MFO operation, which operated almost in an ideal manner.³⁵

From the organizational process perspective, neither Army nor Marine Corps doctrine in the 1980-1985 period contained anything substantive about the types of operations either service encountered in the Sinai or Lebanon. The 1982 version of the capstone publication of U.S. Army doctrine, FM100-5 *Operations*, had only just recently

³⁵ Richard W. Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model" in McDermott and Sjkelsbaek, *Multinational Force and Observers*, 20-32.

introduced a short section on contingency operations short of general war. These were operations of limited scope and duration which could be undertaken within a Cold War context, but the general approach continued to stress the organizational and perceived strategic imperative of the period: namely containment of Soviet or communist forces globally.³⁶

Clearly dominating the Army doctrinal agenda of the period was consideration of how to fight a high intensity conventional conflict in Western Europe against numerically superior Soviet conventional forces. In 1982 there had been an undoubted doctrinal revolution with the release of a new edition of FM100-5 *Operations* that, for the first time, stressed the operational level of war and concepts for manoeuvre warfare.³⁷ The resultant AirLand Battle concept was significantly more in line with Army organizational interests, in that it continued or expanded emphasis on the growth and modernization of heavy conventional forces, which had been neglected in the post-Vietnam War period.³⁸ Against this, there was little incentive or large-scale Army interest in revising doctrinal orientations or service priorities to focus on apparently marginal operations like the Sinai.

³⁶ Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," *Military Review*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 1995), 35-35.

³⁷ William S. Lind, "Special Supplement: Military Reform in the Army and Marine Corps" in Joseph Kruziel, editor, *American Defense Annual, 1987-1988* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 227.

³⁸ Oliver and Nathan, "The Reagan Defense Program," 9-14.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Army paid little attention at the time to specific training for peace operations. Indeed, though the requirement for an infantry battalion to participate in the MFO had been anticipated for some time, the unit selected for the first rotation — the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry, of the 82nd Airborne Division — had no specific pre-deployment training related to the peacekeeping mission apart from a regular desert training deployment at Fort Bliss, Texas in January 1981, and this had simply been a continuation of the unit's normal training cycle for global contingency operations.³⁹ Moreover, the Army's decision to use elite, aggressively-oriented units like the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on a rotational basis for the mission contrasted with social science concepts about what types of units were best suited to the peacekeeping role.⁴⁰

The Army, however, maintained that light infantry forces like the airborne most closely fit the MFO operational requirement for patrolling in small units across rugged desert terrain. Moreover, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Edward C. Meyer, felt that the best-trained soldiers would also make good peacekeepers.⁴¹ In pre-deployment surveys

³⁹ David R. Segal and Mary Wechsler Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 68.

⁴⁰ Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 57.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* Also, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and Europe and the Middle East, *Creation of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, hearings and mark-up, 99th (continued...)

of the troops involved in the first MFO rotation, a majority had initially thought that additional peacekeeping training would be required, but this number had declined significantly by the time the rotation ended.⁴² Subsequent experience seemed to support this perspective, at least in terms of low-threat interpositional operations. Research also concluded that there was a significant degree of acceptance of the peacekeeping role by the units deploying, and few of the troops thought that the use of force would be necessary. Notably, these findings contrasted sharply with sociological research on military attitudes toward such roles in the 1960s and 1980s — both among Army (airborne and regular infantry) and Marine forces — which had suggested that professional soldiers saw such missions as being less compatible with their core military roles.⁴³

Ultimately, the consensual operating environment in the Sinai did not create significant doctrinal problems for the Army troops, which contrasted markedly with the experience of the Marines in Beirut. Still, despite their traumatic exposure to ill-defined peacekeeping, the Marines did not seek to develop any new doctrinal concepts for the

⁴¹(...continued)

Congress, 1st Session, 1981, H.R. 349, 21-22. Meyers' attitude was consistent with that of the military leadership in other countries, including Canada, during the same period.

⁴² Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 70-91.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 69-71. The research examined military attitudes to "social control" roles like suppression of riots, prevention of domestic violence, or restoration of law and order in disaster areas. These are missions similar in orientation to the traditional constabulary peacekeeping role of the UN.

employment of their amphibious troops within peace operations. One possible explanation for this is entirely organizational, in that the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1983-1987, General P.X. Kelley, created an environment within the Marine Corps that was hostile to doctrinal innovation of any sort, including concepts of amphibious manoeuvre warfare that had been developing since 1981, and which would form the basis for the Corps' doctrine in the next decade.⁴⁴

The military response generally was to petition the civilian leadership to announce publicly more stringent criteria regarding the employment of U.S. forces within conflict situations abroad.⁴⁵ In 1984, following in the wake of the Beirut bombing and the extensive findings of the Long Commission Report, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger released a list of six criteria, establishing that force should only be used in specific circumstances:

1. In support of vital U.S. interests
2. With the full and wholehearted intent of "winning"
3. With clearly defined political and military objectives
4. When circumstances change, reassessments must determine if force is still required
5. With "reasonable assurance" of public and Congressional support

⁴⁴ Lind, "Military Reform in the Army and the Marine Corps," 229.

⁴⁵ David H. Petraeus, "Military Influence And the Post-Vietnam Use of Force," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer 1989), 497. Petraeus contends that the military overall were more cautious about recommending forceful options than were contemporary civilian leaders.

6. Only as a last resort, when all other means have failed⁴⁶

The list closely reflected the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military leadership, but immediately pointed to a rift with the State Department, whose leadership saw the criteria as a criticism of U.S. foreign policy, and an undue restriction on options to employ force in pursuit of foreign policy.⁴⁷ This, then, largely was the end result of U.S. experience with early peace operations.

III. 1986-1990: Hiatus and Reorganization

The period 1986-1990 was one of hiatus for U.S. participation in peace operations, and likewise for UN peacekeeping. Still dealing with many of the protracted operations begun in the 1960s and 1970s, the UN did not launch any new peacekeeping operations between 1978 and 1989, when the UN Transition Advisory Group (UNTAG) was established to support the linked peace accords reached in Angola and Namibia.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Cited in F.G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 47.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ There were, however, four observer missions established during this period: the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) in May 1988, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) in August 1988, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) in January 1989, and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in December 1989. All followed in the wake of interim political settlements to several outstanding conflicts
(continued...)

Still, the period did not lack significant developments that would affect the longer-term course of U.S. peace operations doctrine.

The key systemic change during the period was increasing U.S. strategic interest in the many intra-state conflicts that were then occurring in the Third World, most specifically in regions of traditional or emerging strategic significance for the U.S., such as Latin America and Africa. As with U.S. policy interests in the Middle East, the preoccupation of the Reagan administration — and subsequently the Bush presidency — was countering what was seen as growing Soviet influence in these areas. The concept of the Soviet threat was articulated in two general ways: first, as a possibility for regional instability prejudicial to U.S. interests as a result of Soviet-sponsored revolution; and, secondly, as the potential for disruption to Third World sources of supply for strategically important resources as a result of Soviet or proxy influence in key resource-bearing countries, or in areas adjacent to strategically important transportation routes.⁴⁹

⁴⁸(...continued)
during the 1980s. This continued to demonstrate the usefulness of smaller scale observation and verification missions in the wake of conflicts, even at a time when international interest in larger-scale peacekeeping had waned somewhat. See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, Second Edition (United Nations, 1990), Appendix II.

⁴⁹ Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment" in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild, editors, *Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), 93-98.

Part of the Reagan administration response was to attempt to challenge Soviet expansion head-on, moving away from a traditional, defensively-oriented containment strategy to a more flexible and ostensibly offensive system which stressed an ability to deny Soviet gains in the Third World. A major focus of the new defence program was upgrades to U.S. conventional force capabilities, including power projection forces which could meet a continuum of contingencies globally, ranging from a medium-intensity ground conflict in the Persian Gulf to low-intensity counter-insurgency operations in places like El Salvador.⁵⁰

A necessary complement to the program was renewed focus on low-intensity conflict doctrine, though the task was not always embraced enthusiastically by the military. Despite this, the 1st Special Operations Command was established in 1982, grouping together a range of disparate Army Special Forces, Ranger, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units, and attempting some inter-Service coordination with Navy special forces (the SEALs). Subsequently, in 1984 the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) and a Special Operations Policy

⁵⁰ Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, "Reagan Administration Defence Policy: Departure from Containment" in Kenneth A. Oye et al., editors, *Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 92-95.

Advisory Group within the Department of Defense, as well as pushed for modest budgetary increases for unconventional warfare capabilities.⁵¹

However, seeing continuing deficiencies in U.S. special operations and low intensity capabilities, as well in lines of command responsibility, Senator William Cohen and Representative Dan Daniel led Congressional efforts for institutionalization of the special operations mission through the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict and Special Operations, and a separate unified command for special operations.⁵² This was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who contended that the Congressional proposals created a new service for special operations forces (which traditionally were viewed with some scepticism by other elements of the military), and also confused the two quite distinct concepts of low intensity warfare and special operations.⁵³ Adding to JCS concerns about the proposed unified command were the protracted and inevitable bureaucratic struggles over readjustment to the responsibilities of the existing unified and specified commands. True to their expectations, there was a significant level of inter-Service and inter-unified command

⁵¹ Sam C. Sarkesian, "Special Operation Forces in the 1980s" in Cimballa, ed., *The Reagan Defense Program*, 103.

⁵² Ronald H. Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 97-98.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

rivalry before the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established in April 1987.⁵⁴

Sarkesian observes that JCS concerns about the confusion of low-intensity and special operations roles were warranted, as uncertainty about the two concepts was general throughout the military. Specifically, he notes that special operations are "basically conventional ones in a special setting and are intended to be of short duration, specifically focused, and usually of high intensity. Their missions include spearhead, hit-and-run, counter-terror, raids, and hostage rescue."⁵⁵ This contrasts with low-intensity conflict operations — such as insurgency and counter-insurgency, revolution and counter-revolution, and security or nation assistance — which have a protracted duration, and a significantly more diffused political-military focus.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 98-100. As established, USSOCOM has control of all active and reserve special operations forces from each of the armed Services, including responsibility for training, readiness exercises, deployment planning, validating requirements and establishing priorities, and commanding special forces in selected missions. Along with fairly exclusive powers over promotion of special forces personnel and subsequent authority to procure specialized hardware, this gives USSOCOM a wide latitude in its operations not enjoyed by other unified commands. USSOCOM provides special forces detachments to the theatre-level Special Operations Commands of each of the other regional unified commands. See John M. Collins, "Where Are Special Operations Forces?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, Number 2 (Autumn 1993), 7-16.

⁵⁵ Sarkesian, "Special Force Operations", 107.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Evidencing the general confusion, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) hosted a multi-Service and multi-agency Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project in 1986, whose final report noted that, "As a nation, we do not understand low-intensity conflict; we respond without unity or effort, we execute our activities poorly; and we lack the ability to sustain operations."⁵⁷ The asymmetrical, unconventional, protracted, and largely alien nature of these operations also pointed toward a growing disjuncture between conventional warfighting and low-intensity conflict doctrine. Neo-Clausewitzian concepts of higher intensity war dominated the AirLand Battle doctrine found in the latest 1986 version of FM100-5 *Operations*, stressing principles such as concentration of overwhelming military power upon enemy "centres of gravity" (i.e., points of vulnerability). For AirLand Battle doctrine, this meant concentration upon enemy forces using overwhelming firepower and concentrated action in the air, on the ground, and across the enemy's full depth.

Civilian and military analysts alike have noted that these ideas had limited direct application within the low-intensity conflict paradigm, within which the continuum of conflict and associated victory conditions could be conceived of in an entirely different

⁵⁷ Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project (JLICP) Executive Summary, *Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report* (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1986), 2, cited in Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, US Army (ret.), "OOTW: A Concept in Flux", *Military Review*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 1996), 4.

manner from the putative Clausewitzian model.⁵⁸ Under the circumstances, some have called for (and continue to do so) a complete re-thinking of the military's understanding of conflict conditions (i.e., when "war" exists in different, primarily non-Western societies), and the resulting conditions for establishing victory. This would be much more oriented toward the political dimension of low-intensity operations other than war, and would more closely reflect the concepts advanced by Sun Tsu than Clausewitz.⁵⁹

The other development of the period which fundamentally influenced the future of peace operations doctrine was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Significantly, the initiative was given major impetus by criticism from within the military itself. In early 1982, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, began speaking publicly about what he perceived as a flawed system of military leadership which was dominated by parochial concerns on the part of the individual Services and their Chiefs of Staff, who historically placed Service concerns ahead of effective joint execution of military operations.⁶⁰ Jones' criticisms prompted a concentrated Congressional review in the early 1980s of U.S. military organization, which highlighted a range of long-standing organizational impediments to effective

⁵⁸ Sarkesian, "Special Operation Forces," 108-110; Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," 37-38.

⁵⁹ Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," 36-37; Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," 6-8.

⁶⁰ David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Number 13 (Autumn 1996), 23-28.

civilian control of the military. The findings stimulated Congress to explore a host of radical structural reforms, culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.⁶¹

Most significant from a doctrinal development perspective were three areas of reform. First, the legislation clarified the previously uncertain relationship between the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the existing unified commands and the Secretary of Defense. Henceforth, the CINCs would be responsible directly to the Secretary and the President, bypassing the corporate Chiefs of Staff and its inherent bias toward parochialism on the part of individual Services. Command of U.S. troops in combat would thus be by the CINCs of the unified commands, with the Services acting principally as providers of forces.⁶² Second, the legislation clarified the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and President, and establishing a level of independence and authority relative to the Services which the position had not previously enjoyed.⁶³ Finally, the legislation dictated that the President prepare an annual report on national security strategy, and that the Secretary and Under-Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS would have greater responsibility for preparing and implementing strategic plans which corresponded

⁶¹ James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Number 13 (Autumn 1996), 10-11.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶³ *Ibid.*; John P. White, "Defense Organization Today," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Volume 13 (Autumn 1996), 19-20.

more closely with available manpower and fiscal resources.⁶⁴ Taken together, the reforms constituted a significant recasting of the existing command system.

The organizational process effect on the doctrinal development process was two-fold. First, the Chairman's new role and freedoms gave him authority to stimulate and oversee the coordination of authoritative joint doctrine across the military Services. Though imperfect, this allowed for attempts to distil organizational learning military-wide. Secondly, from a low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine perspective, the Goldwater-Nichols Act stimulated the creation of a board on LIC within the National Security Council, and also tasked the military departments to initiate plans for operations short of war. These were direct stimuli for renewed efforts on the drafting of low-intensity conflict doctrine in the late 1980s.⁶⁵

Peace operations finally received formal doctrinal recognition at the end of the period with the December 1990 publication of FM100-20/AFP 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, a joint Army and Air Force effort. Though still clearly reflecting a strategic perspective derived from Cold War concepts, chapter four of the new manual set out a number of operational principles for U.S. doctrine in peacekeeping

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁵ Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," 4.

operations. Eight principles were listed as the fundamental basis for peacekeeping doctrine:

1. ***Consent*** by the disputing parties and mission participants;
2. ***Neutrality*** on the part of troop contributors;
3. ***Balance*** in the geographic, political, and functional composition of a peacekeeping force;
4. ***Single-Manager Control*** of the operation, such as by the UN Secretary General;
5. ***Concurrent Action*** between military elements of the force and other actions to promote peace;
6. ***Unqualified Sponsor Support*** by contributing countries and organizations;
7. ***Freedom of Movement*** for the force; and,
8. ***Self-Defense*** as an inherent right of the force, and the need for clear, unambiguous rules of engagement.⁶⁶

The publication subsequently outlined typical structures and roles based closely on extant UN practice of the period, but also raised the issue of peacekeeping within potentially hostile environments and, in a subsequent chapter on peacetime contingency operations, broached the subject of more forceful impositions of peace under the rubric of peacemaking.⁶⁷ Both conceptions were fundamental to U.S. doctrine in the period that followed.

In summary, the period 1986-1990 was first characterized by a degree of continuity in strategic policy. Although the level of Cold War rivalry with the Soviet

⁶⁶ Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 5 December 1990), 4-1 to 4-2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-10, 5-7.

Union began to decline significantly toward the end of the phase, it still served to condition broad U.S. security interests. Concern about Soviet intentions in the Third World had stimulated Congressional intervention in formalizing low-intensity conflict doctrine, and Congress had also intervened fundamentally to reform the structure of command relationships within the military. In turn, this served to free up the Chairman of the JCS to begin more comprehensive joint doctrinal development on a range of subjects, one of which was peace operations doctrine.

IV. 1990-1995: A New Era in U.S. Peace Operations Doctrine

The U.S. military faced a radically altered strategic environment with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. With unexpected suddenness, most of the strategic constraints imposed by the systemic competition of the preceding period disappeared and, on the systemic level, the United States now stood largely alone as a military superpower. On a broad systemic level, the U.S. appeared to have a wide range of possible alternatives for defining a new grand strategy, which Posen has characterized as falling under five main options: neo-isolationism or disengagement based on traditional realist calculations of power and interest, selective engagement to maintain conditions of peace other great powers within a new multipolar system, collective or cooperative security through multilateral institutions, containment of new (primarily regional) challengers, or seeking to maintain conditions of hegemonic primacy (or

unipolarity).⁶⁸ Each of the options entails a different degree of specific emphasis on the key grand strategy variables of military, political, and economic power; and, further, on the relative weight given to realist or institutionalist interpretations of how to achieve state interests in an anarchic international system.

Under prevailing conditions of strategic uncertainty in the international system, a central problem confronting U.S. foreign and defence policy — and impacting the evolution of peace operations doctrine as a dependent variable of both — was (and still is) how to frame concepts of national interest. One enduring conception of U.S. national interests, as embodied in the curriculum of the U.S. Army War College, involves their division into four main categories — physical security, economic prosperity, promotion of values, and world order — each of which is then assessed in terms of whether it is vital, important, or peripheral in its intensity.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing U.S. Grand Strategies" in Robert J. Lieber, editor, *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1997), 101-124.

⁶⁹ David Jablonsky, "The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military Power," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (Spring 1996), 7. Jablonsky notes that the categories are derived from the work of Donald Neuchterlein, while the intensity variable comes from Robert D. Blackwill. An updated version of Neuchterlin's categories sets out eight "value factors": proximity of danger, nature of the threat, economic stake, sentimental attachment, type of government aided, effect on the balance of power, national prestige at stake, and support of key allies. Donald E. Neuchterlin, *America Recommitted: United States National Interest in a Restructured World* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993), 28, cited in Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What, and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Lieber, *Eagle Adrift*, 68, n. 28.

As Jentleson points out, conceptualizing and giving relative weight to each of these factors is an imprecise task. Problems in doing so must ultimately be divided into structural and behavioural causes (the former is a general cognitive inability to frame and prioritize a list of generalizable interests, while the latter is specific failure of an administration to attempt to do so).⁷⁰ Early in the post-Cold War period, Bartlett and Holman contend that the Bush administration recognized that the previous grand strategy of containment was obsolete, and subsequently framed an imprecise but ambitious policy of "peacetime engagement," an opportunity- versus threat-driven mix of ideals about global leadership and world order tinged with some realism-based assessment of continuing U.S. defence interests.⁷¹

The specific consequence for contemporary U.S. military and foreign policy was a strategy which stressed a moderate degree of global involvement acting through collective security institutions or ad hoc alliances, and the maintenance of a medium level of balanced conventional forces with high technological superiority that would be able to intervene in key regions of U.S. interest.⁷² Indeed, this was consistent with U.S. action in the period, in that the Bush administration chose to engage the United Nations much

⁷⁰ Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How," 50-52.

⁷¹ Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Grand Strategy and the Structure of U.S. Military Forces," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 42-44.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 48-49. Bartlett and Holman contrast this with the two other extremes of disengagement and pure balance of power, which have different predictions for U.S. force structure.

more actively, and was active, muscular and decisive in its application of force to coalition actions such as during the Second Gulf War in 1991, or similar UN sanctioned but multilateral coalition-based humanitarian assistance and peace operations in Somalia in late 1992.

From an operational and doctrinal perspective, U.S. forces in the early post-Cold War period benefitted greatly from the conceptual work and practical military reforms which had come with peace operations and low-intensity conflict experience during the previous two periods examined. A salient example is the U.S. force which undertook the task of providing humanitarian relief and security for Kurdish refugees on the northern Iraq border, beginning in mid-April 1991. Under the general humanitarian assistance mandate which applied to multinational Coalition forces in the Persian Gulf under UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) *Provide Comfort* brought together combat and support forces from the United States, Britain, Italy, France, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany (in a non-combat role), Belgium and Canada.⁷³ The resolution did not specifically mention the use of Coalition forces in this manner, but was loosely interpreted by participants in this manner to justify their actions. The core U.S. contribution included Army Special

⁷³ United Nations, Security Council, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991*, reproduced in Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War* (London: Paladin/HarperCollins, 1992), 548-9; Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 240-243. Bolger, Chapter 6, provides a good overview of the operation from the U.S. perspective.

Forces, airborne, aviation, engineer, military police and logistics units; a Marine Expeditionary Unit and supporting units; and various Air Force elements organized into a composite wing.⁷⁴ Carried out in rough terrain and under conditions where some Iraqi units in the operating zone could offer a level of threat, the mission was complex and fluid, crossing geographic lines of responsibility between the U.S. European and Central Commands.

Functional responsibility for the mission fell to U.S. European Command, whose CINC issued a simple operational concept consistent with the UN mandate and U.S. policy: "Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF) Provide Comfort [on deployment] conducts multinational humanitarian operations [in Turkey and Iraq] to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations can assume overall supervision."⁷⁵ Though recognizing that the mission differed substantially from traditional peacekeeping, U.S. forces utilized some of the unit-level operating and training concepts which had been developed from the ongoing Sinai experience, adapting them as necessary to accommodate the multinational, multi-Service, and multi-agency nature of the force.⁷⁶ Coordination with a host of non-governmental and private relief organizations posed some significant hurdles at the outset, but these

⁷⁴ Bolger, *Savage Peace*, 240-3.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.

⁷⁶ Lieutenant Colonel John P. Abizaid, US Army, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," *Military Review*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (March 1993), 11-19.

gradually were accommodated through the adoption of informal military-civilian liaison centres in the operating zone.⁷⁷ The operation was fairly quickly and successfully able to conclude its core tasks and hand over to the civilian sector, though there was a continuing military presence as an outgrowth of the stationing of U.S. forces in the region in follow-up to post-war verification measures.

The second, more substantive, operation launched by the Bush administration at the very end of its mandate was the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia. This, too, had its initial focus in humanitarian concerns, which had increasingly preoccupied both the Administration and Congress since mid-summer 1992. Hearings by the Sub-Committee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in June and September clearly highlighted Congressional concern over the evolving Somali civil conflict and humanitarian crisis, and demonstrated approval for the Administration's commencement of an airlift operation on 17 August to assist with the delivery of relief supplies to aid groups working in the country.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 1996); 43, 61-63. Seiple's broader analysis of the operation, 21-63, offers an excellent overview of the complexity of the relationship between the military, NGOs, and UN agencies in the area.

⁷⁸ Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *A Review of U.S. Policy and Current Events in Kenya, Malawi and Somalia: Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 23 June 1992; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Crisis and Chaos in Somalia: Hearing Before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee of Foreign Affairs*, 102d (continued...)

However, prior to this step, there had been a coordinated inter-agency review by the Administration regarding possible forms and levels of U.S. support to UN peace and humanitarian operations. The National Security Council went so far as to outstrip past UN practice and propose a brigade-sized U.S. peace force based in the continental U.S. which would remain on standby for UN contingencies — thus serving as a UN rapid reaction force — but this was flatly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who also opposed any placement of U.S. troops under direct UN command.⁷⁹ The JCS, and particularly Chairman Colin Powell, stressed traditional U.S. military attitudes toward peace operations by suggesting that the U.S. might commit more effort to providing capabilities in short supply, such as airlift and command, control, communications and intelligence, but that ground forces were better supplied by others.⁸⁰

All of these debates had followed from President Bush's 21 September speech to the UN General Assembly, in which he had urged continuing reform of UN peacekeeping practices and pledged a wide range of US commitments to support peacekeeping in terms of logistics, training, airlift, communications, bases, and even U.S. financing reforms. Bush already had stimulated a UN review of peacekeeping operations by Secretary

⁷⁸(...continued)
Cong., 2d sess., 16 September 1992.

⁷⁹ Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping" in Dorch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 38-9.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

General Boutros-Ghali during a meeting of the Security Council in January 1992, and Boutros-Ghali had responded with his thought-provoking report, *An Agenda for Peace*, by mid-1992.⁸¹ Culminating the process, Bush issued his seminal National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 74 in January 1993 which endorsed most of the UN proposals, pledged commitment of U.S. support elements to the UN, but fell short of offering U.S. combat troops on either an ongoing or stand-by (Article 43-type) basis.⁸² Congressional tolerance for a new U.S. presence in and support for UN peace operations similarly was in evidence by October 1992, with various proposals floating around for how better to finance UN operations within the U.S. budget. Some Senate members also suggested that the existing 1,000-man constraint in the United Nations Participation Act of 1947 might be overcome through Congressional authorization for a 2,000-man volunteer force of military personnel.⁸³ Congress likewise remained seized of the Somalia situation, and continued to support general U.S. policy in the area for provision of relief supplies, though chafed at the continuing security situation that hampered adequate food distribution.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 37-8; See also Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*.

⁸² Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No," 39.

⁸³ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.N. Peacekeeping in Africa: The Western Sahara and Somalia, Hearing before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1 October 1992, 1-2.

The intervening U.S. policy process demonstrated a new willingness to participate directly in UN operations, and also a growing consensus about the core elements of UN peace operations. In certain respects, this supports the perspective advanced by Legault about the creation of regime conditions based on convergent actor interests in and expectations for the conduct of UN collective security tasks like peacekeeping and, to a degree, limited Chapter VII enforcement-type operations. However, the scope of the Chapter VII-mandated operations in this time frame largely would remain limited to encompass expanded multi-dimensional peace operations, and did not necessarily form an unqualified endorsement by the U.S. or anyone else for the Charter's original concept of Chapter VII operations.

The Somalia operation highlighted a number of ambiguities in terms of how strictly the U.S. military would apply the general precepts of UN peace operations then extant, or whether it would seek to advance or modify some of the new operational roles which were then emerging, including new concepts of humanitarian assistance, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Somalia, to a great degree, was something of a blank sheet, in that it represented the first large-scale humanitarian operation of its type conducted under a specific Chapter VII mandate. This left the UN and its members with a great deal of latitude in defining the parameters of the mission they would undertake in the country.

The full context of the Somalia operation has been well covered in the literature, so the focus here will be on the interplay between operational experience in the mission and guiding or emerging U.S. doctrine on peace operations.

U.S. peace operations doctrine during the first half of the 1991-1995 period was crucially influenced by the Bush initiatives in 1992, and subsequently by the Unified Task Force operation launched into Somalia in December 1992. The general context of the mission has been covered in great detail in numerous other sources, so it will not be replicated here. For doctrinal development, the key aspect of the operation was the degree to which existing peace operations doctrine supported the mission in its initial phases, and the way in which U.S. doctrine subsequently evolved to account for the experience. Primary focus here will be on Army doctrine, as it was the one which received the most attention at the time, and formed the core of subsequent joint doctrine for ground-based peace operations.

U.S. Army forces deployed to Somalia with the concepts of the 1990 FM100-20 *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* as their primary guide. However, analysts have pointed out that the publication had not then (nor still in 1996) received much widespread attention, and the concepts it contained had not then fully been accepted by the Army.⁸⁴ In addition, starting in 1990, the Army had begun to draft Operations Other

⁸⁴ Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," 4.

Than War (OOTW) concepts into its central FM100-5 *Operations* doctrinal manual, and a preliminary draft from December 1992 was available to U.S. forces deploying to Somalia. This was being distributed in January 1993 as part of doctrinally-relevant briefing materials prepared by the Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), part of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Their Special Edition 93-1 publication, *Somalia: Operations Other Than War*, set out six central concepts for OOTW and peace operations found in the draft FM100-5:

1. ***Objective:*** Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
2. ***Unity of Effort:*** Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
3. ***Legitimacy:*** Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
4. ***Patience:*** Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
5. ***Restraint:*** Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
6. ***Security:*** New permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.⁸⁵

Certainly, these principles reflected key elements of the UN approach to peace operations during the period, though tinged somewhat with object U.S. experience with places like Lebanon in terms of the stress on security, restraint, and legitimacy.

⁸⁵ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Special Edition No. 93-1, *Somalia: Operations Other Than War* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Command, January 1993) Chapter II.

Many of these concepts were fairly consistently applied within the initial UNITAF operation. The mission set by Bush in December 1992 under the Chapter VII mandate from the UN was clear and attainable in its core goals, and the plan of operations subsequently developed for UNITAF by U.S. Central Command both was consistent with U.S. policy direction and demonstrated an understanding of the situation extant in Somalia at the time.⁸⁶ Unity of effort was provided through clear U.S. command of the UNITAF coalition, while legitimacy flowed from the authorizing UN resolution, as well as the neutral operational conduct of U.S. forces on the ground, which engendered a substantial degree of early cooperation from the Somali parties. Though there was a clear U.S. interest — both politically and militarily — to conclude the operation as quickly as possible, the concept of patience was applied in setting out the main operational phases. Restraint was also clearly exercised by U.S. troops, who refrained from widening the scope of the UNITAF mission to include potentially conflictual tasks like disarming the Somali clans. U.S. forces likewise took substantial steps to ensure that the dictum of security was adhered to in the early operation.

The UNITAF operation clearly benefitted from the operational experience of many of the troops deployed. The 10th Mountain Division had only recently participated

⁸⁶ Joseph P. Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Number 2 (Autumn 1993), 56-63; Major General Waldo D. Freeman, US Army, Captain Robert B. Lambert, US Navy, and Lieutenant Colonel Jason D. Mims, US Army, "Operation Restore Hope: A US CENTCOM Perspective," *Military Review*, Vol. 73, No. 9 (September 1993), 61-72.

in the disaster relief operations in Florida after Hurricane Andrew, and thus had developed a high degree of competence in working with local aid groups in the delivery of relief supplies. They also drew on the experience of U.S. officers who had participated in the relief operation with the Kurds in Northern Iraq.⁸⁷ From the Marine perspective, a good deal of institutional experience and corporate memory was present in the UNITAF operation in the form of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF). The U.S. Central Command, anticipating the possibility of a mission of this type at some point in its future, had developed Joint operational plans for humanitarian assistance and had exercised 1 MEF extensively to deal with such contingencies, including cooperation with international relief organizations and host-nation agencies.⁸⁸ Application of institutional memory was furthered by the fact that 1 MEF was led by Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, who had commanded one of the Marine battalion landing teams during the 1982-1984 Beirut MNF mission.⁸⁹

Experience with the UNITAF operation fed back to the Army through a variety of institutional bodies which attempted to collect, analyse, and disseminate relevant lessons. Both the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Center for Military History had teams

⁸⁷ Major General S.L. Arnold, US Army, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review*, Vol. 73, No. 12 (December 1993), 26-35.

⁸⁸ Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, "Operation Restore Hope: A U.S. CENTCOM Perspective", 62.

⁸⁹ Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," 58.

of officers active in the field to survey U.S. troops, though the benefit of the process was moderated by the uneven collection and analysis of the information.⁹⁰ Experience in Somalia was too recent to have much impact on the new FM100-5 *Operations*, released in June 1993. The only change evident in its core principles for peace operations and OOTW was re-labelling the principle of "Patience" to "Perseverance," and some critics of OOTW doctrinal concepts argued that FM100-5 still did little overall to help clarify either OOTW or peace operations in comparison to the earlier FM100-20.⁹¹

The experience of U.S. forces under UNITAF differed markedly with the subsequent UN operation. The UNOSOM II mission entailed a significantly revised UN mandate under Security Council Resolution 814, which established the objective of trying to disarm the Somali clans. As Durch and others have pointed out, this was a fatally flawed concept given the available UN forces and the command and control relationships which applied, but the ill-explained and confused rationale for the revised force and the continuing U.S. military presence was accepted at the height of Clinton Administration

⁹⁰ Informal interview by author with staff of Center for Military History (CMH), 24 January 1997. CMH historians were critical of the CALL survey teams, and questioned the longer term validity of some of their "lessons".

⁹¹ Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," 3; Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), Chapter 13.

euphoria about "assertive multilateralism" — a policy which still entailed enthusiastic support for UN operations.⁹²

The new operation placed U.S. logistical support troops under the operational control of the UN force commander, but maintained the important distinction that the troops remained under strict U.S. national command.⁹³ However, even though the U.S. support forces were nominally under the operational control of the UN commander, much of their actual control remained closely in the hands of Major General Thomas Montgomery, U.S. Army, who had been appointed deputy commander of UNOSOM II, and who simultaneously served as Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia under the authority of U.S. CENTCOM. As part of the latter command, Montgomery also controlled U.S. intelligence personnel, and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force, which remained strictly outside of UN control throughout the operation. He did not, however, exercise command over the Army Ranger forces sent in August 1993 to assist in the capture of Mohamed Farah Aideed, a flaw which complicated liaison and response between the two elements

⁹² William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Intervention in Somalia" in Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 326-327.

⁹³ In U.S. military doctrine and related public law, "command" of U.S. forces can only be exercised by the President as Commander in Chief, or by a designated Commander in Chief of a unified command. Command is never relinquished to foreign nationals. In contrast, "operational control" allows U.S. troops to function under foreign leadership for designated tasks, within parameters set by U.S. law and the specific situation.

of the U.S. force, as well as with the broader UN force.⁹⁴ Clearly, these arrangements fundamentally conflicted with the general principle of unity of command, but were responsive to higher-level pressures to retain clear and separate control over the command of U.S. combat troops.

The vague doctrinal guidance available to U.S. forces in Somalia, as well as the unfocused and disintegrated doctrine which emerged from the experience, typified the difficulty the military faced in trying to adjust its operational doctrine quickly enough to keep pace with evolving Administration and Congressional policy pressures, which either supported or constrained enhanced U.S. involvement in peace operations. Throughout the period, the Clinton Administration was working feverishly to draft a new and comprehensive U.S. policy on the conduct of UN and other multilateral peace operations, and was seeking to more clearly define the role of U.S. military forces in these missions. Enhanced support to UN peace operations was a cornerstone of the Administration's policy of assertive multilateralism, and the new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Democracy helped to signal that peace operations were increasingly being seen as a core activity for the military.⁹⁵ This enthusiasm, however, was balanced by a continuing degree of reluctance on the part of the military to jump wholesale into the new role to the detriment of its core combat roles.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 338-339.

⁹⁵ Daalder, "U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping", 40-41.

Military opposition was particularly pronounced at a time of severe budgetary pressures which, under the existing Bottom-Up Review force reductions, were going to result in reductions in the numbers of Army divisions and Marine forces, both of which tended to shoulder the burden of peace operations.⁹⁶ To a number of former senior military personnel, as well as many in Congress, most of the peace operations of the period were perceived as being of relatively marginal importance to core U.S. interests, and were a significant drain on the Army's ability to maintain adequate forces and funding for higher-threat contingencies like the nearly-simultaneous two Major Regional Conflict scenario envisioned under the Bottom-Up Review defence guidance released in September 1993.⁹⁷ Congress was also again clearly reactive to the deaths of U.S. service personnel as attacks on the UNOSOM II forces began to mount in the summer and Autumn. Both the Senate and House passed resolutions during September 1993 which increasingly constrained Administration policies in Somalia, and called for clearer objectives to be put forward for the U.S. military presence. This was both part of a general Congressional campaign to define appropriate exit strategies, as well as attempts

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

⁹⁷ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services*, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 14 July 1993; Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *The Impact of Peacekeeping on Army Personnel Requirements: Hearing before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 27 October 1993.

to assert Congressional authority under the War Powers Resolution and other applicable legislation.⁹⁸

Daalder argues that tensions over missions like Somalia, mixed with the perceived failure of the Administration's policy of assertive multilateralism and continuing Congressional and military opposition to the general peace operations role, eventually led to significant redrafting of the Clinton Administration's emerging policies on multilateral peace operations, as represented by Presidential Review Directive-13 and the subsequent Presidential Decision Directive-25. Early hopes to enhance the role of peace operations in U.S. foreign and defense policy eventually were constrained by new domestic pressures to more clearly relate such missions to priority domestic interests, and also by continued military opposition. As it emerged in May 1994, the final version of Presidential Decision Directive-25, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, still recognized the general importance of multilateral peace operations for U.S. policy, but presented a number of criteria which signalled that the U.S. was not enthusiastic about all the operational types that the UN now envisioned, nor did it perceive that U.S. forces would become involved in every new operation that came along.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Daalder, "U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping", 49-50.

⁹⁹ Daalder, "U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping", 58-60.

Ironically, the organizational inertia inherent within the doctrinal development process meant that, while U.S. Army and Joint doctrine clearly responded to the new strategic environment and changed conceptions of U.S. interests by beginning to focus on and develop specific peace operations doctrine, much of the emergent doctrine was increasingly disintegrated with political objectives when it was released. For example, in December 1994, the Army released its new FM100-23, *Peace Operations*, which more closely combined extant U.S. and UN experience in peace operations with the fundamental operational concepts set out in FM100-5.¹⁰⁰ Preceding FM100-23 by two months was a related but subordinate multi-service manual, FM100-23-1 *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, which attempted to further codify some of the experience gained in Somalia and the Iraq operation with the Kurds. Both manuals were predicated on an enhanced U.S. role in multilateral peace operations in future, even though national policy was once again retreating from closer involvement.

Indeed, the doctrine in the new manuals was distinctly disintegrated with new Congressional positions on peace operations. As a result of Somalia and ongoing territorial battles with the Administration, a newly-elected Republican Congress had, by early 1995, introduced sweeping new legislation which would greatly restrict the Administration's freedom to employ U.S. military forces within UN peace operations. The *National Security Revitalization Act* and *The Peace Powers Act* represented clear

¹⁰⁰ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 30 December 1994).

Congressional attempts by the House and Senate to ensure that, in future, U.S. forces were not placed under foreign command, that U.S. contributions to the UN in terms of funding and non-combat logistical support would only occur under constrained circumstances, and that none of these contributions would be at the expense of the maintenance of core U.S. military capabilities.¹⁰¹

The military and civilian OOTW critics also continued to maintain that there was still a lack of a unifying concept for such operations in relation to the realities of low-intensity conflict.¹⁰² This level of simplification or misunderstanding inevitably was carried over to subsequent Joint publications, as the concepts developed under Army doctrine were incorporated with little amendment into Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* and its subordinate manual, Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, both released in 1995. Both attempted to more concretely apply extant Army doctrine across to other services, with the Army taking a lead role in their drafting. Both contain a substantial degree of discussion about the context and operational practice of UN and multilateral peace operations which closely reflects the large body of experience accumulated by the UN in

¹⁰¹ See, for example: Congress, House, Committee on National Security, *H.R. 7-National Security Revitalization Act: Hearings by the Committee on National Security*, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 19, 25, and 27 January 1995; Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Peace Powers Act (S. 5) and the National Security Revitalization Act (H.R. 7): Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 March 1995.

¹⁰² Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," 4.

its operations, and attempts to reconcile this with existing U.S. doctrinal concepts. On one level, this indicates that UN experience and principles had penetrated from the systemic level into core U.S. doctrine. However, the fact that the doctrine which stresses the UN and many of its operational concepts has since been superseded by evolving Administration and Congressional policy tends to limit the scope and utility of its application within the U.S. military.

Experience in Somalia also clearly impacted on broader peace operations policy within the Clinton administration. Elements of Presidential Decision Directive-25, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, were incorporated into both FM100-23 and the later Joint Pubs 3-07 and 3-07.3, providing for a closer correlation between the new doctrine and what was then being announced as U.S. strategic policy with regard to the UN and peace operations. The key operating principles for OOTW did not subsequently change, though the conditions under which the Administration was willing to undertake such operations did. However, this spoke more clearly to changes in broad national security policy for subsequent operations, not to the operational conduct of OOTW itself, or the core validity of the doctrine which underpinned the role.

The UN mission to Haiti (UNMIH), which occurred in the midst of these various processes, was also too late to add substantively to the emerging U.S. doctrine, but it did serve to test many of the concepts already in place. From the military's perspective, Haiti

was a successful application of the core doctrinal concepts developed during the period. and incorporated many of the formal and informal lessons learned from operations in the early post-Cold War period. In one workshop after the event, six "Reasons for Success" were put forward: 1) planning had incorporated previous lessons learned; 2) previous diplomatic efforts had created a permissive environment for the operation; 3) the U.S. military system had been flexible in responding to the mission requirements; 4) there had been good military/inter-agency cooperation at the tactical level; 5) the U.S. lead in the operation had allowed the UN to develop an appropriate follow-on force and accomplish a smooth transition; and, 6) international police monitors had been able to fill some of the gaps in the mission plan with respect to maintaining local conditions of security.¹⁰³

Interestingly, while the Department of Defense had been reluctant to participate due to many of the higher-level policy discussions then ongoing, the military had anticipated the requirement for a mission and had begun early development of contingency plans based on available doctrine and experience.¹⁰⁴ This still did not signify that the military was overly enthusiastic about such missions, but it did further indicate

¹⁰³ Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - A Case Study* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), 27.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

that there was acceptance of the basic mission among the Services, and that attempts were being made to apply the new doctrine to existing mission requirements.¹⁰⁵

V. Summary

This chapter has sought to examine major elements of the U.S. military's experience with peace operations in the historical period between 1980-1995. It has demonstrated that the U.S. military faced varying degrees of systemic and organizational process influences on its doctrinal development processes during each of the three periods examined. The overall effects of these interactions will be summarized in the following chapter.

¹⁰⁵ George T. Raach, "Military Perspectives on Peace Operations" in Chayes and Raach, eds., *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, 84.

Chapter Five Conclusions

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that both systemic and organizational process factors have a substantial degree of influence on doctrine, and peace operations doctrine in the U.S. context more particularly.

As predicted by the existing theories of doctrinal development, there is evidence that, with peace operations as with other doctrine, systemic factors have the more dominant impact on the eventual character of the doctrine, particularly in terms of its comparative degree of integration or disintegration with grand strategy, or the conditions under which doctrinal innovation or change will occur.

In the first of the periods examined in the case study, U.S. grand strategy was predominantly focused on the threat posed by the Soviet Union to broader U.S. interests. The U.S. defence policy of the period was clearly a balancing response to the extant systemic factors. In the period 1981-1985, the U.S. chose, for self-interested reasons, to introduce two peace operations into the Middle East in the absence of a broader consensus for UN multilateral operations. There was no extant U.S. military doctrine for these operations, and the military as an organizational entity did not see any imperative to undertake an independent degree of doctrinal development as a result either of

comparative success in the Sinai, or demonstrable failure in Lebanon. This corresponded with the fact that the peace operations role continued to differ substantially from stated U.S. military institutional interests, and was thus marginalized. As such, expectations for organizational process inertia in the absence of systemically-stimulated change or a clear threat prevailed.

Systemic conditions between 1986-1990 showed a degree of evolution, particularly later in the period. However, Cold War systemic considerations continued to prevail in much of U.S. grand strategy. One permissive development for doctrinal change during the period was Congressional identification of the failure of U.S. military policy to deal effectively with low-intensity conflict. This resulted in specific political intervention — contrary to the military's self-perceived interests — to mandate development of this capability, and this in turn stimulated a degree of doctrinal change. Moreover, a related Congressional intervention in the same period fundamentally recast the organizational structure of the military, providing for substantially enhanced and more direct civilian control over the corporate Armed Services. Both factors served to overcome organizational process inertia and stimulate a degree of relevant doctrinal development, and provided conditions conducive to more focused doctrinal development in the subsequent period.

In the final period 1991-1995, overall systemic change created a permissive strategic environment in which previous structural constraints on U.S. participation in

peace operations (namely strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union) no longer existed. Moreover, U.S. perceptions of grand strategy now contemplated a role for limited engagement in peace operations through multilateral organizations, though a general preference continued to be expressed for operations under UN mandate but, exercised operationally under separate U.S. control. These conditions stimulated a high degree of doctrinal development in an attempt to readjust U.S. military orientations toward these new roles. The resulting doctrinal process continued to meet with some organizational resistance, but the overall level of political intervention was to stimulate continuing change.

However, there was evidence that some degree of cognitive dissonance continued throughout the period, particularly in terms of the relationship between OOTW and traditional concepts of higher intensity military operations. Moreover, doctrine clearly was unable to evolve as quickly as broader political policy, meaning that there was an evident, and possibly growing, disjuncture between the new doctrine and evolving U.S. national policy during the period.

Overall, the research has supported many of the propositions which derive from the organizational process and systemic influence literature on doctrinal development. As predicted in the chapters on organizational process and systemic influences, the latter was the dominant influence on doctrinal change. While the U.S. case is not fully generalizable to other countries, the U.S. experience does serve to demonstrate the

validity of these concepts to sub-doctrinal fields such as peace operations, which differ markedly from the core combat roles of the military.

Like other aspects of military doctrine, peace operations doctrine is fundamentally influenced by systemic factors and consequent perceptions of national interests. The conceptual contradictions between peace operations as a form of operations other than war do tend to create tensions with higher level warfighting doctrine, but these can be reconciled through civilian intervention. It is apparent that the role of peace operations will be marginalized by broader military organizational interests in the absence of specific political intervention. In the U.S. context, such intervention required that there first be a permissive systemic environment which accommodated and stimulated emphasis on roles such as peace operations, and second, that there be sustained civilian intervention to ensure that these operations are reconciled with core military roles.

These general interactions are summarized in Table One on the following page.

In the case of the United States, the research highlights the central roles played by Congress and the President in fostering doctrinal change within the military. While operational doctrinal change remains primarily responsive to systemic factors, there clearly is an influence exerted by the domestic political and economic environment, which can either be enabling or constraining depending on the fiscal and political mood of the time.

Table 1: Impact of Systemic and Organizational Process Variables on Doctrinal Outcome

Variable	Phase I: 1981-85	Phase II: 1986-90	Phase III: 1991-95
Systemic Conditions	Constraining/stable. Systemic bipolarity, primary strategic focus on Soviet threat	Constraining/evolving. Continuing systemic bipolarity for most of period but evolving in 1990, primary strategic focus on Soviet threat, but new attention on Third World and low intensity conflict	Unconstraining/evolving. Conditions of unipolarity or limited multipolarity with elimination of Soviet threat, dominant strategic focus on regional and low-intensity conflict
Organizational Process	Constraining. Military continues to view high intensity threat as dominant focus, no perceived urgency or incentive to develop specific LIC doctrine, and no corrective civilian intervention.	Constraining/evolving. Military continues to view high intensity threat as dominant focus, but Congressional intervention to force focus on LIC, and reorganization of military structure to increase responsiveness to civilian control.	Partly constraining/evolving. Military continues to place primary focus on medium/lesser regional conflict, but increased recognition of LIC/OOTW mission in relation to main focus. Congressional intervention first provides incentive, then constraint.
Doctrinal Outcome	No adaptation or focus on mission.	No large scale adaptation, but some recognition of LIC/peace operations mission.	Large-scale recognition of LIC and peace operations mission.

The U.S. system of defence and foreign policy making is perhaps somewhat unique in terms of the constitutional arrangements between these two actors in terms of their legal competencies in this field, which simultaneously entails both strict division of responsibility and degrees of overlap. In practice, this provides the military with two masters, each of which can at times speak with a conflicting voice. In the case of Congress, the preceding research has demonstrated that it intervened at several key points to force internal military organizational adjustment. This facilitated the creation of new organizational processes responsive to doctrinal change. In some instances, the short-term catalyst for these interventions lay in domestic budgetary concerns, or was the result of general Congressional-Executive wrangling.

However, even the budgetary pressures on the U.S. military during the post-Cold War period ultimately can be traced back to systemic change, in that the waning of strategic rivalry resulted in increased domestic pressures to consolidate and reduce defence spending. This forced the military and the executive to draft new strategic plans and force structures to deal with reduced funding levels within a threat-ambiguous strategic environment, a process which led to the Bottom-Up Review. Though the review's primary focus remained on possible simultaneous major regional conflicts, it demonstrated a strong subsidiary focus on new, proactive roles such as peace operations that could help to moderate threats and insecurity before they became more severe. The

net effect was to foster doctrinal change within the military which ultimately allowed it to respond more effectively in future to systemic changes.

Conversely, not all Congressional intervention has been positive. As the preceding case study outlined, the Clinton Administration faced a Congress that was becoming increasingly hostile to UN-based peace operations missions, beginning in mid-1993 and mounting through 1995. This opposition followed in the wake of the trials and tribulations of Somalia, the intense controversy generated by the often-frustrated UN-mandated intervention to restore legitimate democratic rule in Haiti, and domestic concerns over preparations for a large-scale deployment of U.S. troops as part of a NATO-led peace force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time that the U.S. military was developing specific peace operations doctrine to respond more effectively in future to these operational roles, Congress was pressuring the Executive to back away from such missions. Indeed, by mid-1995, draft legislation had clearly indicated that Congress would henceforth place some definite legal limits on the extent to which the U.S. would be able to contribute to UN peace missions in future, either militarily or financially.

Finally, a surprising finding of the research was to see the degree to which prior UN peace operations practice and principles had penetrated U.S. doctrine, given the broader misgivings of the U.S. toward UN peace operations on a political level. All of the key U.S. peace operations doctrinal publications developed during the 1990-1995 period contain large sections outlining or drawing on prior UN practice, and thus

reflecting some long-established UN operational principles. This is not to assert that the U.S. military has fully internalized these principles, nor that it agrees with all or even most of them on an organizational level (indeed, this clearly is not the case). However, it is to demonstrate the degree to which this existing UN experience has influenced the military's perception of the peace operations mission, and the degree to which the UN experience formed a useful starting point for the development of specific U.S. doctrine. Several of these manuals are now undergoing planned 5-year revision cycles, and undoubtedly will be modified to reflect more recent U.S. experience, as well as emerging political attitudes.

Appendix 1. Principal U.S. Peace Operations, 1980-1995

Operation	Operation Type	Contributing Nations	U.S. Forces Involved (peak or average strength)	Authority for Mission	Result
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Sinai <i>3 Aug 1981-present</i>	Non-UN multinational operation. Interpositional monitoring of ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in Sinai peninsula	Infantry battalions from U.S., Columbia, and Fiji; Support elements from Italy, France, Canada, Uruguay, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States	One infantry battalion drawn on rotational basis from regular or reserve units based in continental U.S.; logistics support unit and transportation elements. (average 1,000 troops)	Mission based on U.S. pledge to support the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979, with U.S. organizing force after failure of UN to achieve agreement on deployment of peacekeeping forces. Protocol for mission signed by both Egypt and Israel.	Ongoing mission, but considered successful. No major incidents between conflicting parties since mission established.
Multinational Force (MNF), Beirut <i>25 Aug 1982-29 Sep 1982 (Phase I); 29 Sep 1982-26 Feb 1984 (Phase II)</i>	Non-UN multinational operation. Evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut (Phase I); Interpositional presence and support to Lebanese Government (Phase II)	Infantry and support forces from U.S., United Kingdom, France, and Italy	Rotational deployment of a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) with attached support elements, as well as associated amphibious support units; additional deployment of U.S. 6th Fleet and other naval elements (average 1,200 ground personnel)	Multinational forces present in country at request of Lebanese Government, under letter of agreement dated 25 Sep 1982.	Phase I considered a success. Phase II resulted in attacks on MFO forces, culminating in bombing of U.S. Marine barracks with loss of 249 personnel. MFO units depart country in Feb. 1984 with civil conflict still ongoing.

Operation	Operation Type	Contributing Nations	U.S. Forces Involved (peak or average strength)	Authority for Mission	Result
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Iraq-Turkey border 16 Apr 1991 - ongoing	UN-mandated multinational operation. Humanitarian assistance for Kurdish refugees on Iraq-Turkish border	United States, United Kingdom, and other Gulf coalition nations	One Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with Special Forces personnel and various airlift and other support elements (average 1,200 troops)	Mission established by U.S. with reference to humanitarian relief mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 688.	Success. Mission was able to provide security and food assistance to Kurdish refugees in protected zones along Iraqi border.
Unified Task Force (UNITAF)/ Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia 4 Dec 1992- 4 May 1993	UN-mandated Chapter VII operation. Humanitarian assistance for Somali population as leader of the multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF)	United States with 20+ coalition countries	Elements from all U.S. armed services, with core forces provided by Marine Corps and Army brigade-sized units (peak strength of 28,000, including forces offshore)	Humanitarian relief mission announced by U.S. on 25 November, with United Nations providing formal mandate for Unified Task Force operations under UN Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December	Initial relief efforts highly successful, reducing mortality among Somali population and establishing basic security conditions. UNITAF forces handed over operations to UN forces operating under UNOSOM II mandate.

Operation	Operation Type	Contributing Nations	U.S. Forces Involved (peak or average strength)	Authority for Mission	Result
Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), Somalia 4 May 1993-31 Mar 1994	UN-mandated Chapter VII operation. Logistical and combat troop support to UN ground forces operating under new UNOSOM II mandate	Contributions from 10+ countries.	U.S. Army and Marine forces totalling some 4,000 personnel, divided into logistical elements and quick reaction force. Additional U.S. forces deployed temporarily during final evacuation of U.S. and UN forces in March 1994.	UNOSOM II mission with expanded mandate authorized by Security Council Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993.	Failure. Protracted deterioration of security situation eventually led to direct attacks on UN forces, with US combat forces becoming engaged and losing 18+ casualties. Failure of larger peace process forced eventual withdrawal of all UN forces.
Multinational Force (MNF), Haiti/United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), Haiti 3 July 1993-31 March 1995	UN-mandated Chapter VII operation. Established to assist with implementing Governor's Island Agreement, but later took on role of restoration of Haiti's constitutional government	Contribution of forces from 24 countries during operation	U.S. forces from all services, in excess of 15,000 personnel at peak of mission.	Original UNMIH mandate expanded by Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994, sanctioning multinational force to operate under Chapter VII provisions to restore conditions under which UNMIH operation could resume functioning.	Success. Combined MNF and UNMIH operation resulted in departure of Haitian military government and restoration of democratic rule. Transition from MNF back to UNMIH occurred 31 March 1995, while UNMIH operation continued to June 1996

Operation	Operation Type	Contributing Nations	U.S. Forces Involved (peak or average strength)	Authority for Mission	Result
UN Protection Force, Macedonia (UNPROFOR-M)/United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia <i>31 Mar 1995-present</i>	UN-mandated preventive deployment. Monitor and report on security situation along borders of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	Troop, observer, and support contributions by some 27 countries (1996 figures)	Reinforced infantry company under UNPROFOR-M; subsequently reinforced to battalion strength under UNPREDEP.	UNPROFOR-M established by Security Council Resolution 795, 11 December 1992. Follow-on UNPREDEP mission authorized by Security Council Resolution 947, 31 March 1995.	Success. Operation has continued to monitor Serbian border with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia without significant incident.

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