INDIAN RESERVE POLICY IN UPPER CANADA, 1830-1845.

ROBERT J. SURTEES.

M.A. Thesis (History 599).

Carleton University.

November 26, 1966.

Abstract

About 1830 the Indian Department in Upper Canada ceased to be solely an instrument by which the British Government secured Indian services in war. It was to promote a new policy, that of raising the Indians from a nomadic life to a society of settled farmers and tradesmen. Department officials were to co-operate with missionary groups already in the field, and together they would induce the Indians to embrace Christianity and to adopt an agricultural life on lands reserved for them by the Crown.

The new policy was too sanguine. The Department itself was too decentralised for effective leadership, and the white men involved actually hindered progress because of disagreement and hostility amongst themselves. And, as revealed at Coldwater and the Manitoulin Island, the Indians themselves failed to react as the white policy makers anticipated. By 1845, it was clear that the grand scheme had failed.


BLANK


BLANK

Table of Contents

List of Maps and Figures

Chapter I

Introduction

Much has been written about the early dealings between the Europeans and the Indians of North America. H.A. Innis' The Fur Trade in Canada,[1] Eccles' Frontenac[2] and Peckham's Pontiac[3] all describe the ways in which the North American Indians helped, encouraged, fought and disrupted the white man's progress in the conquest of Canada's wilderness. Other historians have described the relations between white and red in the times of troubles from 1776 to 1815. Professor S.F. Wise, for example, has related the "Indian Policy of John Graves Simcoe"[4] while Professor Stanley has given us a good picture of Indian activity in the War of 1812.[5] Interest in our original Canadians seems to stop at that point in time. "Tiger" Dunlop and John Galt, had only occasional dealings with the Indians as they planned their settlements in Southwestern Ontario[6] and G.M. Craig mentions them only in passing in

---

1 H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1959).

2 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac: The Courtier Governor (Toronto, 1965).

3 Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Princeton, New Jersey, 1947).

4 S.F. Wise, "The Indian Diplomacy of John Graves Simcoe," Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1953, pp. 36-44.

5 George F.G. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812," Morris Laslaw, The Defended Border (Toronto, 1964), pp. 174-188.

6 W.H. Graham, The Tiger of Canada West (Toronto, 1962).

his Formative Years.[7] Yet even a cursory study of the correspondence which passed between the Colonial Office in Great Britain and the Governors of Upper Canada will reveal great numbers of questions and requests for information about the Indians.

From published sources, therefore, we learn only that the Indians of Upper Canada played a prominent role in the defence of Canada in 1812-14 and that sometime later, when and how exactly is a mystery, they found themselves relegated to reserves in various areas of the province - on the Severn River, on the Bruce Peninsula, on the Grand River, on Lake St. Clair, and, of course, on Manitoulin Island.

In 1763 the British conquered Canada from the French. One of the implications of their conquest was the problem of dealing with Indian tribes that inhabited the newly won territories. Far from being a homogenous political unit, these people were divided into several distinct tribes or nations, and each tribe was, in turn, sub-divided into small and semi-autonomous bands which dotted the British North American landscape from the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes.

In 1763, however, the British were not strangers to the Indians. As early as 1755 the British had considered it expedient to appoint a military officer whose duty it would be to deal solely with the Indians. From the outset, the duties of these men were simple, though rather vague. They

---

7 Gerald M. Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years 1784-1841 (Toronto, 1963).

were to gain the support and friendship of the Indians in wartime, and to secure their co-operation in periods of peace.

The agents were to some degree successful, for many bands did support the British standard during the American War of Independence. As a result, the first major job of the infant department was to see to the proper treatment of these Indians when hostilities ended. This task was two-fold. First, those Indians who so wished were granted lands in that part of North America that remained British. Two large groups of Mohawks - one under the leadership of Joseph Brant, the other led by John Deseronto - were duly settled on the Grand River and the Bay of Quinte.[8] In addition, the issuing of presents[9] was continued to those Indians who had supported the British standard from 1775-1783 but who wished to remain in their own lands.

Aside from a reduction in territory to be served, however, the department remained very much as before. Indian agents continued to live among the Indians to win their friendship through the use of presents and vocal encouragement, a policy which served to enlist many tribes on the British side in the War of 1812.[10] Indian favour remained desirable for some time

---

8 Charles Johnston, The Valley of the Six Nations (Toronto, 1964).

9 See below, pp. 22-25.

10 Some doubt might be cast whether it was really the Indian agents, or even the annual presents that secured this support. Professor Stanley, for example, intimates that it was more the thought of revenge that urged the Six Nations into the battles of 1812. George F.G. Stanley "Indians in the War of 1812", p. 175.

afterwards. Eventually, however, white attitudes towards the Indian changed. His status as a desirable ally changed to that of an underprivileged savage who should be salvaged from the evils of barbarism and turned into a civilized human being. Missionaries, working alone, alongside, or sometimes even against the department officials, began this type of work rather early.

Jesuit priests had, of course, worked among the Hurons and Iroquois for many years in an attempt to bring the Indian to God. The Sulpician fathers had also preached to the Indians during the French regime.[11] Among the first English speaking societies to attempt to bring salvation to the Amerinds was the New England Society[12] and Mission of the Bretherens' Church. This latter was established in 1734, and in 1792 moved their mission and their Indians to the River Thames in Upper Canada where they built the village of Fairfield.[13]

Other groups, including the Methodists[14] and the Church of England, began to perform this work and finally, in 1830,

---

11 S.R. Mealing (ed.), The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (Toronto, 1962), p.

12 Public Archives of Canada, Manuscript Division, Record Group 10, Indian Affairs, vol. 718, J.B. Macaulay, Report to Sir George Arthur, 1839, p. 40. (Hereafter this manuscript will be referred to as P.A.C., R.G.10.).

13 Elma and L.R. Gray, Wilderness Christians: The Moravian Mission to the Delaware Indians (Toronto, 1956). Public Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 11, Q Series, "Canada, Original Correspondence, Transcripts," vol. 400 pt.2, Latrobe to Glenelg, September 29, 1837. (Hereafter this manuscript will be referred to as P.A.C., Q Series.).

14 Goldwin French, Parsons and Politics (Toronto, 1962).

the British Government also joined the crusade. This study concerns itself with the brief decade and a half after the official policy of Great Britain decreed that the North American Indians should, through the reserve system, become civilized Christians. The object here, then, is to explain the transition of the Indian from a "noble savage" to a social burden.

It is immediately obvious that two classes of Indians received presents from the British Government. 7,150 were more or less civilized, denominated Resident Indians, established in villages in different parts of the Province. Indian bands simply refused to remain at all constant. Members would leave and return; they would appear two or three times for presents[15]; or they might forget to claim their presents or to report new births. For these reasons, therefore, it was most difficult for the agents to compile accurate figures and it is therefore equally difficult to determine now the exact number and disposition of the Indians in Upper Canada. The figures in the following table are approximate, therefore, but they do provide some idea of the size of the Indian population. In addition, there were the three to four thousand visiting Indians who still followed the "wandering and precarious pursuits of savage life".[16]

---

15 The annual distribution of presents provided the only time that agents could gather all the members of a band together and therefore most census accounts were taken on these occasions.

16 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol. 718, J.B. Macaulay, Report, p. 5.

These tribes frequented

> The North shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, the borders of Lake Michigan and the more remote regions extending to the Territories of the United States, and Hudson's Bay Company.[17]

The Resident Indians, however, are the ones with whom this study deals. The principal tribes were The Six Nations, The Ottawas, The Chippewas, and The Mississagas, and these groups had attained varying levels of civilization by 1830.

Before proceeding, however, I wish to point out that two types of Indian reserves were begun in Upper Canada. Those which will be discussed were areas set aside for the specific purpose of attempting to bring the Indian to accept a civilised and settled way of life. It was for this purpose and for this purpose alone that they were brought into existence. Other lands were set aside for the Indians prior to 1830. These, however, were granted as a reward to the Six Nations Indians for their services during the American War of Independence and are situated on the Grand River and the Bay of Quinte. At that time there was no thought given towards changing the Indian way of life. These were simply lands granted to them where they could take asylum after the defeat of the British in the American colonies after 1783.

---

17 Ibid. pp. 5, 6. The presents for visiting Indians were distributed at various places. St. Joseph's Island, Drummond Island, Amherstburg and Penetanguishene were among the locations chosen. In 1837 the spot for this distribution was moved to Manitoulin Island. The resident Indians received their presents at several spots convenient to their settlements. These, too, varied but the more popular spots were Port Sarnia, Amherstburg, Colbourne-on-the-Thames, Brantford, River Credit, Rice Lake, Tyendinaga, Penetanguishene.

For this reason, therefore, no attempt has been made to incorporate them into this study, although efforts similar to those here described did take place on the Grand River under the supervision of department agents like John Brant and Joseph Clench. For a discussion of these reserves, the reader should consult Professor Charles Johnston's The Valley of the Six Nations.

This study will include a brief resume of events and policies up to the time when this policy changed radically. The year 1830, therefore, is taken as a starting point for it is from this point onwards that the white man began thinking of the Indian as a human being whose life should be made more comfortable, whose soul should be saved and whose values and morals should be raised to the level of his white neighbours. While it is true that various groups had worked towards this goal before 1830, successfully in some instances, it was at this time that the official stand changed.

The choice of 1845 as the date to end this study seems logical also. The first real change in departmental structure took place at this time. In 1842 a commission of three, Rawson, Davidson and Hepburn, was appointed to investigate and report on progress in the Indian Affairs Department. One of their recommendations was that the office of Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs be abolished for the sake of economy. That recommendation was reinforced by the fact that the incumbent, S.P. Jarvis, was suspected of misusing Indian funds. Jarvis was never able to prove his

AGGREGATE INDIANS OF UPPER CANADA IN 1839[18]

	BAND	NO. (approx.)
1.	Michipicoton--Lake Superior	57
2.	Sault St. Mary--Lake Huron	99
3.	Chippewas--St. Joseph's Island	90
4.	Manitoulin Island--188 Ottawas--80	268
5.	Pottawatomies-Saugeen--Lake Huron Chippewas--Lake Huron	370
6.	Below Manitoulin and Penetang ..... Lake Nipissing	202 59
7.	Chippewas, La Cloch and Mississonging .. Upper St. Clair ..... St. Clair Rapids	225 312 401
8.	Chenail Ecarte ..... River Aux Sable	194 217
9.	Hurons, Chippewas--Amherstburg Shawnees, Munsees	214
10.	Delawares, Chippewas and Munsees--Thames	762
11.	Upper Moravian Delawares	300
12.	Six Nations--Grand River	2,210
13.	Mississaguas--Credit River	240
14.	Yellow Heads--Coldwater and Narrows	426
15.	Rice Lake, Mud Lake, and Alnwick	508
16.	Mohawks--Bay of Quinte	336
		7,150
17.	Visiting Indians--3,000-4,000	
	Approx. Total	11,150

18 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol. 718, J.B. Macaulay, Report, pp. 131-2.

innocence of the charge, and although it was never proven against him he was dismissed and the position abolished.[19] It was also about this time - the mid 1840's - that most official parties generally conceded that the policy of civilization had proved a failure.[20] And one of the major reasons for this failure was the simple fact that Indians had become less important to both the Provincial and the Imperial authorities.

Within these same limits this study is restricted to Upper Canada. The French had treated quite differently with the Indian. They claimed New France by right of conquest and discovery and never recognized any Indian titles but set apart reserves for the Indians as a matter of grace and this, with a few exceptions, applies to all the Indian reserves in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. On the other hand, the British had always recognized the Indians' title to land, which consisted of hunting and fishing rights over the districts occupied by them, and the Crown reserved to itself the

---

19 "Return re correspondence with S.P. Jarvis etc...," Journals, Legislative Assembly, Canada, 1847, Appendix V.V.

20 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, vol. 61.
"Report of the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," Journals, Legislative Assembly, Canada, 1847 Appendix T.

exclusive right to treat with the Indians for its surrender. After the conquest of Canada the British assumed the French title to lands and the Indians were confirmed, by the Proclamation of 1763, in the possession of the reserves which they then occupied.

Within Upper Canada, Coldwater and the Manitoulin Island have been chosen as areas of special consideration. Here again the reasons are obvious. This study involves the work of one particular Indian agent in some detail. Captain T.G. Anderson devoted his entire life to the Indian Department, beginning as a young man,[21] and he helped to begin the experiments at both Coldwater and the Great Manitoulin. The latter, to a large extent, owed its very beginning to Captain Anderson. By following the work of Anderson, therefore, a thread of continuity can be seen throughout this study.

The first full scale experiments along the new lines began at Coldwater and at St. Clair under the superintendence of Anderson and William Jones. Since the former received more publicity and attention from both Provincial and Imperial officials, its choice seems obvious. On the basis of Anderson's report and his reported successes at Coldwater, the Secretary of State for the colonies, Lord Glenelg, on the advice of successive Governors of Upper Canada, Sir John Colbourne, and Sir Francis Bond Head, decided to augment

---

21 Mrs. S. Rowe, "The Anderson Record from 1699 to 1896," Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Records, VI, (1905), pp. 128-131.

an apartheid policy of progress through separate development. The region chosen for this to develop was, of course, the Manitoulin Island. The Great Manitoulin was the rock which would make or destroy the project of civilizing the Indians. History has revealed the scheme to be a failure, so the Manitoulin Island reserves play a most integral part in this study.

This study will consist of three inquiries. Firstly, I will examine the raison d'etre of the Indian Affairs branch of the public service. Once this has been determined, I will describe the machinery which was intended to perform the duties required. Finally, I will describe how two experiments, based on the principles expressed in Chapter I and using the machinery described in Chapter II, failed to produce the end intended by Government officials.

Chapter II

The Philosophy and Theory of the Indian Department 1830-1845

Indian policy in the early nineteenth century can be divided into two definite and distinct phases. One was a carry-over from a previous philosophy - perhaps expediency would be a better term - which held that the Indian, being familiar with the land and climate, should be used by the white man to help the newcomers familiarize themselves with their new home. The final stages of this idea were seen in the European wars of 1776-83 and 1812-14 when both sides put forth their best efforts to gain Indian support.[1]

Treatment of the Indian in this early period, therefore, was based on rather selfish motives on the part of the whites. Indians, from the time of the white man's arrival, were considered a menace; and later, as settlement and civilization progressed they were seen as a social nuisance. They retarded growth by their very presence and more than once they were involved in ugly affairs between the races. This had been expressed as early as 1795 by a traveller in the Canadas.

> I here first saw some of the Indians. In one, unaccustomed to them, their appearance excites a sensation of horror, but this quickly dissipates. In Europe we have many prejudices on this subject. I had been taught to believe that they were men of extraordinary strength. The fact is directly the reverse. A muscular European would manage three of them. It is an erroneous philosophy which inculcates that men are strong in proportion to the hardships

---

1 George F.G. Stanley, "Indians in the War of 1812", Morris Zaslow (ed.), The Defended Border (Toronto, 1964), pp. 174-188.

> they undergo. Hunger, cold and watching will waste any human frame, and they have made such on that of the savage. The man whose support depends on the success of the chase, will often have occasion to practice abstinence, and when successful, it may be questioned, whether the surfeit, which the craving of nature occasions, will not equally tend to impair his constitution. The strength of the savage is rather passive, than active. He can bear much rather than exert himself vigourously. This race of men are gradually wasting away. Circumscribed in their hunting grounds, the means of support fail them. Above all, the intemperate use of strong liquors contributes to enervate and destroy them. The savage returning from an expedition, benumbed with cold, and enfeebled with fatigue, would barter the world, (were it his), for a gallon of rum, nor give over drinking this fascinating liquor till his senses were overborne by the force of intoxication. It is needless to point out how unerringly fatal such a course of life must prove to those who pursue it....[2]

The answer to this dilemma was actually very simple - remove the Indian. This, in turn, meant that Indian lands, in some way, had to pass from red to white hands.

In British North America the Crown protected the Indians in their lands. And it was only by treaty between the Indian nations and the Crown that these lands could be alienated from their original inhabitants. As we will observe, this was done. Representatives of the Crown met with the Indian tribes and made open agreements by which land was ceded to the Imperial Government, usually in return for some small annuity.[3]

Other white groups especially the military, held a different view of the Indians.

> During the wars which Great Britain waged with France, and subsequently with the United States, on this Continent, both parties used their utmost

---

2 G.M. Craig (ed.), Early Travellers in the Canadas (Toronto, 1955), pp. 5-6.

3 See below pp. 38-9.

> endeavours to attach the Indians to their cause, and to incite them to join their standard.... The warlike character of their people, the temptation which the presents and encouragement of the "Red Coat"[4] offered, and the opportunity which the occasion presented for prosecuting their revenge against their adverse tribes, led a great part of the race into the field.[5]

This second view was the more important. To entice the natives to the proper side, the British offered annual presents and rewards for services rendered in wartime.[6] Exactly when and how the system of presents began is unknown,[7] but the

---

4 British Generals.

5 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", Journals, Legislative Assembly, Canada (J.L.A.C.) 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians."

6 "Return re War Losses awarded to individuals or persons in Upper Canada etc....," J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix G.G.G. This return contains a list of all Indian claims which still remained in 1845 for such services.

7 In an address to the Governor of Lower Canada in 1837 the Seven Nations Indians claimed the system of presents had been started by the French. They also made it quite clear that they considered these presents not as benefices given to them, but rather as payment for services rendered. Their statement ran thusly:

> "Father, these presents (since we are taught to call them by that name) are not in fact presents. They are a sacred debt contracted by the Government under the promise made by the Kings of France to our forefathers, to indemnify them for the lands they had given up, confirmed by the Kings of England since the cession of the country, and, to this time punctually paid and acquitted."

See "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians."

purpose is obvious. The system of distribution - performed by military officers with as much pomp and splendour as circumstances would permit - and the nature of the presents themselves - guns, ball and shot, axes - both served to conciliate and pacify the red men in peace time, and to insure their support, as well as supply their wants as warriors, in times of war.

To accomplish this double purpose a loose administrative department had developed. In 1755, General Braddock appointed Sir William Johnson to the post of Indian Superintendent with the rank of Major General. Johnson[8] reported to the Commander of the Forces, his direct superior, and beneath him supervised several officers stationed at various posts as Indian superintendents or agents. Duties of all agents consisted mainly in seeing that the presents were duly delivered, that the Indian disposition towards the British Government remained good, and that disputes between Indians and white settlers were satisfactorily resolved. As time passed and the Indian developed into more of a nuisance than a menace, the agents were expected to protect the Indians against white encroachments and see that the laws made for their protection were enforced.

Responsibility for Indian Affairs passed from military to civil control in 1799 when Royal Instructions decreed that the Lieutenant Governors of Upper Canada take on the "conduct

---

8 Col. Guy Johnson succeeded Sir William Johnson in 1774 and he, in turn, was replaced by Sir John Johnson when Sir Guy was suspended due to charges brought against him. Sir John held the post of Superintendent General and Inspector General until 1828.

and Management of Our concerns with the ... Indians ..."[9]

because

> "... we judge it to be conducive to the better Regulation of Our Concerns with the Indian Nations within Our Province, of Upper Canada, that the same should be conducted by the Person exercising the Government of Our said Province ..."[10]

A General Order of May 13, 1816 returned jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the Commander of the Forces, a situation which continued until the General Order of 1830 which again placed the Indians in the hands of the civil authorities[11]. During all this time, however, the nature of the Department remained unchanged. Indian agents were expected simply to keep Indians and white settlers on amicable terms and to maintain and nurture the Indians' friendship with the British Crown.

A new policy began about 1830 when it was decided that the Indians had been Indians long enough. Their services were no longer as valuable for war, and at the same time a wave of general philanthropic humanism was washing over the entire British governmental hierarchy. Therefore the "noble savage", almost overnight, became a poor unfortunate, uncivilized barbarian who should be granted all the amenities of white civilization. They should be educated, baptised and exposed to the joys of honest, hard labour. In short they should be civilized. This major change can be seen, for

---

9 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol. 768A. G.M. Matheson, "Historic Sketches on Indian Affairs", p. 67.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 72.

example, in the way Lt.Governor, Sir John Colbourne, spoke of Indian presents in 1832.

> The policy which it was considered prudent to countenance for the purpose of gaining their good opinion and respect is notorious, as well as the system of bringing flattery and fair promises which was pursued on all occasions when their active co-operation in support of British interests was necessary.[12]

Colbourne wrote this at a time when the threat of hostilities with the United States had receded and the entire purpose of cultivating the Indians as "prospective allies on the battlefield"[13] was being questioned. It seemed that there were simply no more wars for them to fight.[14] As a result there were many who felt that the presents should be abolished. Colbourne himself dismissed this idea "however embarrassing... it may be found to incur an expense annually for presents" because "the custom has now existed for a great many years" thus recognising "in fact if not in theory the claim of the Indians to the presents", a claim which could not "be discontinued without a loss of character on the part of the British Nation".[15] Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, later fully concurred in this opinion;[16] but because of the

---

12 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.374 pt.4. Colbourne to Goderich, Nov. 30, 1832.

13 Charles Johnston, The Valley of the Six Nations (Toronto, 1964), p. lxxxix.

14 Ibid., pp.285-287 (G17, G18).

15 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.374 pt.4. Colbourne to Goderich, Nov. 30, 1832.

16 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.395A. Glenelg to Head, Jan.14, 1836.

diminishing importance of Indian friendship, the awarding of presents was relegated to a secondary place.[17]

In fact the very existence of the Indian Department was being called into question.[18] Fortunately for the officials of the department, if not for the Indians themselves, the general tenor of aboriginal treatment was in the process of change, and now greater attention was to be paid to the role of the officials "as executors of humane and progressive plan for the civilization of the aborigines".[19] An example of the great interest taken by the British Government is volume 5 of the Imperial Blue Books which contains some 841 printed pages of reports on the aborigines in the British Empire during the years 1834 to 1836. Notwithstanding this new attitude, the British treasury, which constantly kept before it the practical dollars and cents side of all Imperial projects, called for a report in 1829,

> as to the reduction which could be effected either in the amount of Presents, or in the number of persons, employed in that branch of the public service in order that every practicable retrenchment might be adopted without compromising our faith with the Indians or materially impairing the efficiency of the Department.[20]

---

17 Johnston, The Valley of the Six Nations, p.lxxxix, and pp.291-294 (C 21).

18 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.395A. Glenelg to Head, Jan.14, 1836.

19 A.G. Price, White Settlers and Native Peoples (Melbourne, 1950).

20 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. "Copy of Treasury Minute #14412", Nov.3, 1829. As we shall see this reduction was an ever present threat hanging over the heads of the Indian agents. In fact only the Rebellions of 1837 and the threat of American aggression recalled a reduction that had already been sanctioned (see chapter II), a consideration that may well have prevented new blood from seeking employment with the Indian Department. See also P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. Dawson to Routh, Nov.14, 1829.

Sir George Murray, who had been provisional Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada in 1815, was among the first to express the new attitude taken towards the Aboriginal Tribes of North America. In 1830, as secretary of state for war and the colonies, he wrote to Sir James Kempt, the Administrator of the government of Canada.

> I consider this the proper opportunity for bringing under your notice some of the opinions I have formed with respect to the policy which has hitherto been pursued towards the native tribes living in the British Territories in North America, as well as to point out those alterations which I consider to be proper to adopt for the future.
>
> It appears to me that the course which had hitherto been taken in dealing with these people, has had reference to the advantages which might be derived from their friendship in times of war, rather than to any settled purpose of gradually reclaiming them from a state of barbarism and of introducing amongst them the industrious and peaceful habits of civilized life.[21]

Murray then suggested why this had thus far been the case, and laid responsibility with both parties.

> Under the peculiar circumstances of the time, it may have been originally difficult to pursue a more enlightened course of policy; the system may, perhaps, have been persisted in by the Home and Colonial Governments rather as a matter of routine than upon any well considered grounds of preference; whilst, on the part of the Indians themselves, there is no doubt that its accordance with their natural propensities and with their long established habits, rendered it more acceptable to them than any other. Nor is it likely that if, on the one hand, there existed a disposition in the aboriginal inhabitants to cling to their original habits and mode of life, there was a proneness also in the new inhabitants of America to regard the natives as an irreclaimable race, and as inconvenient neighbours, whom it was desirable to remove.[22]

---

21 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. Murray to Kempt, Jan.25, 1830.

22 Ibid.

Murray hoped that this attitude would change and his "settled policy" as we shall see, included, in true 19th Century English tradition, the necessity of settling the Amerinds on the land, making them into productive farmers, and, in the process, acquainting them with European ideals and the Christian way of life. Industry, education and Christianity, therefore, became the watchwords of the Indian's progress towards civilization and eventual integration.

In keeping with the new policy, the Indian Department itself received a new face. Murray took the responsibility from the commander of the forces and vested it in the Governors of the separate provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. This change, however, proved to be of little consequence.[23]

The origins of this new and philanthropic attitude are two-fold. The British Parliament and the Colonial Office had, for some years, been beseiged with complaints and criticisms about the treatment of native peoples generally in the Empire. Wilberforce and the Clapham Sect[24] had spearheaded the movement for the abolition of slavery, a long battle which they eventually won, and then had turned their reforming minds to yet other areas. The Aborigines Protection Association led the movement for better treatment of native peoples; and generally, a new liberalism was sweeping the British government. This does not explain fully, however,

---

23 See Chapter II.

24 E.M. Howse, Saints in Politics (Toronto, 1952).

why the Indian Department in Canada should change. Why then, did the North American Indian stop being a warlike barbarian, and become, instead, a "noble savage" who should be saved?

The original impetus of trying to civilize the Indians in the Canadian wilderness came not from the philanthropic wanderings of an official mind but rather from local enterprise by individual groups which had already worked among the Indians and which had apparently met with some success. Writing to Colbourne on the topic, Kempt alludes to the progress made by the Methodist missionaries among the Bay of Quinte Mohawks, and regrets that reports have alleged that these missionaries had attempted to "inculcate Republican principles in the Indians"[25]. Major General Darling, who held the post of Superintendent General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs from 1828 to 1830, admitted that these missionaries had performed good work by introducing the Indians to Christianity[26], which most people agreed would have to be the basis of civilization[27] but he felt it was worth consideration

> whether Preachers, and Teachers, from a Neighbouring Nation whose great object is to obtain the friendship of the Indians, should not be discountenanced by every justifiable means. It is undoubted they have done some good by influencing the Indians to embrace Christianity, and have inculcated the first principles of civilization, particularly in the Tribes now under

---

25 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Kempt to Colbourne, Feb.23, 1829.

26 Ibid.

27 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, June 22, 1830.

> consideration, which shews itself in the desire they have recently expressed to be collected in a village and have lands allowed them for cultivation. I also submit whether this disposition of the Indians should not be encouraged by the British Government, as the most certain means of getting their affection and securing their loyalty and attachment, which will naturally incline to that Power, from whence they are sensible their chief good is derived.[28]

He admitted that there would be some expense involved but felt that this would decline as the Indians progressed. Certainly it would be money well spent for "if the British Government does not step in between the Indians and the Methodist missionaries it may be repented too late".[29]

Major General Darling also mentioned that an experiment of Sir Peregrine Maitland, a former Lt.Governor of Upper Canada (1818-1828), had been attended with great success on the Credit River. A Tribe of Mississagas, a band of 180 persons formerly "notorious for drunkenness and debauchery" had settled in a "Village consisting of twenty Log Huts", a school house for boys and girls and 42 acres of cultivated land.[30] This success led him to the conclusion

> that a sum of money, in lieu of a portion of the presents now given, might be annually laid out for the Indians to advantage in the purchase of a few pairs of Working Oxen, Ploughs, Harrow Teeth, Hoes, Hammers, Saws and other Agricultural Implements, and Common Tools of the use of which they would gradually become sensible as they advance in Civilization .[31]

---

28 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol. 5. Kempt to Colbourne, Feb.23, 1829.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid. Darling seemed most concerned with the retention of Indian support in times of war. He mentions it several times in his report (which is enclosed in Kempt to Colbourne, Feb.23, 1829) and it appears he was more concerned with this than with the intrinsic merit of raising the Indian standard of living.

At this point a large number of administrative and legal difficulties, some of what grew out of the Indian temperament and some from the nature of the plan itself, began to present themselves. And, of course, every party with even a partial interest in the Indians had the answers.

How could the Indians adopt a white man's psyche unless he adopted the white man's faith? Therefore they would have to become Christians. But what brand of Christianity should they adopt? Since the project would be sponsored by the British Government it seemed logical that the Church of England should predominate. Work among the Indians, however, had already been done by the Moravian fathers on the Thames[32] by the Methodists on the River Credit and Penetanguishene and by the Roman Catholics among the Six Nations and Hurons. Could money granted by the British Government be used to subsidise any but the Established Church?

Also, could the Indians be induced to leave their wandering habits and settle in communities for the purpose of farming when they knew nothing about agriculture? Could they be induced to lay down the rifle and the knife to take up the axe and the plough? Who would guide them, and for how long? Surely they would also have to learn and abide by the English language and English law and give up their old tribal customs; the men of the time could think of no other way.

---

32 Elma and L.R. Gray, Wilderness Christians: The Moravian Mission to the Deleware Indians (Toronto, 1956).

Once again, who would instruct them? Another tricky question concerned land and citizenship. Indian lands were held for them in trust by the Crown. Should individual Indians or individual bands be given title deed to their lands? It was, after all, the British way! If this were done, what would protect them from unscrupulous whites who might take advantage of the Indian character and weakness for liquor to dupe them out of their land deeds for a bottle of "demon rum"?

Such were the problems which presented themselves. As already stated, all groups felt they had the solutions. Judging from the results, they all over-estimated themselves. And constantly hovering over all schemes for Indian progress was the British Treasury which wanted proof that no money was being wasted.

Further research into the nature of Indian Affairs was done by Sir James Kempt and Lord Dalhousie, the governor in chief of Canada. The former, on the request of Sir George Murray made the following suggestions to improve the condition of the Indians:

1. To collect the Indians in considerable numbers, and to settle them in villages with a due portion of land for their cultivation and support.

2. To make such provision for their religious improvement, education and instruction in husbandry, as circumstances may from time to time require.

3. To afford them such assistance in building their houses, rations, and in procuring such seed and agricultural implements as may be necessary, commuting where practicable, a portion of their presents for the latter.

> 4. To provide active and zealous missionaries at the Bay of Quinte Guillimbury, and to send Wesleyan missionaries from England to counteract the antipathy toward the established Church, and other objectionable principle, which the Methodist Missionaries from the United States are supposed to instill into the minds of the Indian converts.[33]

These proposals, in which Murray fully concurred, were approved (with the exception of the last which was not mentioned) by the Lords of the Treasury and the Secretary of State.[34]

Once sanction had been received from the Imperial Government, local authorities wasted no time in putting their new ideas into operation. Col. James Givins, a member in long and good standing among the Indian department elite[35] was immediately appointed to the post of Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Under his command were also appointed several Indian agents.[36] Special attention was to be given to two projects: one at Coldwater under Captain T.G. Anderson and the other at Lake St. Clair under William Jones. The general scheme which was to be followed can be surmised from the supposed duties of the Chief Superintendent and his underlings.

Givins' responsibility concerned all the Indian tribes in the province, but particularly those collected together in permanent settlements. He was to visit them, counsel them, and encourage them, by every possible means, to become

---

33 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol. 5. Kempt to Colbourne, Feb.18, 1829.

34 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians".

35 See Chapter II.

36 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.456. General Order, April 13, 1830.

civilized, to adopt the white man's ways and to become good Christians. At the same time he was to see to their need in this connection by insuring that they were provided with suitable houses, cattle and farming implements. His duties also required that he provide missionaries, teachers, mission houses, books and schools that the task of civilization be accomplished. Finally, he would superintend their lands and protect these against white intruders.[37] The duties of the several Superintendents were to be

> ...the same as those of the Chief Superintendent with the exception that their sphere of action is confined altogether to the Tribes over which they have been respectively appointed to superintend, and that their correspondence on Indian matters is carried on through the head of the Department...[38]

The general purpose of the entire programme, therefore, was to turn the Indian into a white man. Before this final end could be realized, however, the Indians had to be convinced that they should give up their former way of life; they must "discontinue their usual occupation of hunting"[39] and fishing for sustenance and turn to the cultivation of the soil, in good yeoman fashion, to provide for themselves and their families. The first step, therefore, in the process of civilization was to get the Indian to settle on lands set aside for him by the Crown. From this the rest of the plan could be put into operation.

---

37 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.114. Jarvis to Rawson, Dec.7, 1842.

38 Ibid.

39 P.A.C., Q.Series, vol.374. Colbourne to Goderich, Feb.30, 1832.

Missionaries, whose duties it would be "to watch over the morals of their respective flocks"[40] could be settled among the villages "to inculcate the principles of the revealed religion."[41] Other instructors, notably schoolmasters, tradesmen, and farmers would be likewise scattered amongst the tribes to propagate the virtues of the white man's ways. Nobody, it seems, anticipated that the "noble savage" would be anything but co-operative - and grateful - once they had experienced the great virtues of civilization.

Lieutenant Governor Colbourne issued instructions on the implementation of the programme at Coldwater where the three tribes of Lake Simcoe, near Matchadash (Chippewas) and the Potoganasees from Drummond Island were "placed under the charge of a superintendent of the Indian Department, and urged to clear a tract of land between Lakes Huron and Simcoe".[42] In 1830, he declared that he had directed

> houses to be built for them on detached lots, and they are now clearing ground sufficient to establish farms at each station for their immediate support, from which they will be supplied while they are bringing into cultivation their individual lots marked out for their residence. Agricultural implements have been procured for them, and schoolmasters appointed to educate their children....

---

40 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.114. Jarvis to Rawson, Dec.7, 1842.

41 Ibid.

42 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Aboriginal Tribes (North America, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, and British Guiana). Parliamentary Paper No.617, 1834, p.128. Colbourne to Murray, Extract of Despatch, Oct.14, 1830.

> The Western Indians, and those from the northern shore of Lake Huron, who repair annually to this quarter to receive their presents, will, I hope, be prevailed on to abandon, gradually, their present mode of life, and to follow the example of the Indians at these stations, when they see the advantages resulting from civilization.[43]

While the announced objects of Indian policy changed sharply, the Indian Department itself did not.[44] Also, while relations with the Indians had concentrated on winning their support, a number of instruments aimed at securing that support had developed. These emanated ultimately from Indian land surrenders and annual presents, and since it would have been most difficult, if not impossible to cancel the annuities, presents and rewards which had resulted from past policy, it was decided to use these as the means to implement the "new deal" for the Indians. Thus, the annuities have an important place in policy and merit some discussion.

Of primary importance to all proceedings between white and red in North America was the method of securing Indian lands. In this regard the British Government treated directly with the Indians and retained for itself the sole right of purchasing Indian lands. The "Canadian Indian Magna Charta",[45] the Proclamation of 1763, placed under British protection the "several natives or Tribes of Indians" and declared that these

---

43 Ibid.

44 See Chapter II.

45 Price, White Settlers and Native Peoples, p.68.

> should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such part of our dominions and territories, as not having been ceded to us...[46]

The Proclamation went on to forbid any British subjects from purchasing land from the Indians and ordered any who had "either willfully or inadvertantly" settled on unceded lands to "remove themselves". Should the Indian tribes prove willing to sell any of their lands

> the same shall be purchased only for us, in our name at some public meeting or assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that purpose, by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our colonies respectively, within which they shall be;...[47]

This was an admirable principle to propound. Unfortunately the hardy pioneer who first entered the wilderness in advance of all civilization was not overly scrupulous in respecting reserved land. Contact with the Indians, their lands, presents and annuities, often provided irresistable temptations to the needy settlers. Further laws and restrictions had to be placed on encroachment of Indian reserved lands[48] (e.g. 2nd

---

46 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians." This report includes large extracts from the Proclamation. About one-third of the document was devoted to arrangements to be made for the Indians, a fact which reveals their importance to the British at the time. See D.C. Scott, "Indian Affairs 1763-1841," Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (ed.) Canada and Its Provinces, vol.iv (Toronto, 1913), pp. 703-5.

47 Ibid., p. 703.

48 2nd Victoria, Chapter 15, 1839. "An Act for the protection of the Lands of the Crown in this Province, from Trespass and Injury."

Victoria 1839), but these often proved almost useless[49] since the weight of public opinion rested with the white settler who earned his living by hard labour while it appeared that the Indian refused to do anything except hunt, fish and collect his presents. Acts of outright aggression, therefore, were often excused as the white man's rights, for they were making full use of the land. This argument was often couched in more philosophical language.

> There is another celebrated question to which the discovery of the new world had principally given rise. It is asked whether a nation may lawfully take possession of some part of a vast country in which there are none but erratic nations, whose scanty population is incapable of occupying the whole? We have already observed in establishing the obligation to cultivate the earth, that these nations cannot exclusively appropriate to themselves more land than they have occasion for, or more than they are able to settle and cultivate. Their unsettled habitation in those immense regions, cannot be accounted a true and legal possession, and the people of Europe, too closely pent up at home, finding land of which the savage had no particular need, and of which they made no actual constant use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it and to settle it with Colonies. The Earth, as we have already observed, belongs to mankind in general, and was designed to furnish them with subsistance. If each nation had from the beginning resolved to appropriate to itself a vast country, that the people might live only by hunting, fishing and wild fruits, our globe would not be sufficient

---

49 See the following: P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. "Petition of the Mississagas against Violence of the Whites"; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Boulton to Mudge, Oct.31, 1839; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. Hagerman to Unknown, Feb.21, 1831. This that the law forbids persons from dealing with the Indians and taking goods from them; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.64. C.W. Warren to Unknown, Jan.31, 1837.

> to maintain a tenth part of its present inhabitants. We do not, therefore, deviate from the views of nature, in confining the Indians within narrower limits.[50]

With this type of reasoning, white settlers, especially during the migrations of the early 1800's, slowly and inexorably moved in on Indian lands, to settle, to trade and to steal. And with equal certitude the Indians found themselves being pushed further into the woods, sometimes very willingly and sometimes because they were presented with a fait accompli. Whites simply moved out beyond the previous bounds of white settlements and forced the Indians to retreat still further. Whatever the reason for encroachment, the ultimate responsibility lay with the British Government and its representatives in Upper Canada. These representatives, in turn usually obliged everyone by arranging for the Indians in question to give their lands to the Crown in return for some recompense. The terms of these treaties varied.

In July of 1822, for example, the Chippewas on the Thames River gave up 580,000 acres to the Crown in return for 2 pounds ten shillings' worth of merchandise at Montreal prices annually to each man, woman, and child living in the tract during their lives and to their posterity forever, provided the number of inhabitants not exceed 240, being the number of persons then composing the tribe.[51]

---

50 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians."

51 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.397. "List of Indian Land Surrenders 1820-1837". enclosed in Head to Glenelg, July 18, 1837.

The Mississaga Indians of the Bay of Quinte gave up 700 acres to the Crown in December of 1835 "in order that they may be sold for the benefit of the said Indians and for no other use, trust, interest or purpose whatsoever".[52]

Perhaps the best bargain made on behalf of the Crown was that concluded in 1836 by Lt.Governor Sir Francis Bond Head in which the Ottawas and Chippewas of Georgian Bay who gave up their claims to Manitoulin Island and "made the property (under Her Majesty's control) of all Indians whom Her Majesty should allow to reside on the said Island."[53]

In most cases, therefore, the Indians received some type of remuneration for their lands, either annuities as in the case of the Chippewas on the Thames, or payments from the proceeds of land sales as was the case of the Mississagas of the Bay of Quinte. The annuities demand some elaboration. These were, for decades, paid in goods or money as stated in the contract, at certain appointed places and times.

This system was found objectionable, for in many cases the Indians themselves did not profit. Rather white settlers often used the Indian weakness for liquor and gawdy articles to wean from them the goods or money and "rendered the scene of the payment of the annuities, one of riot and debauchery,

---

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

as long as anything was left wherewith spirits could be procured.[54]"

The annuities or payments for land did at least appear to be somewhat of an agreement between Her Majesty and the Indians. Her Majesty, however, felt that the most important part of white-Indian relations was the currying of Indian favour and friendship at all times, but especially during periods of unrest and war. For obvious reasons, therefore, this duty was vested with the military and Indian officials who were, in many respects, officers of the Army. And the principal duties of these officials were confined "to the conveying of the presents to the Indians, and attending at the different stations where they assembled to receive them".[55]

Once the basic premise, that the Indians should become more like white people, had been established, the machinery went into operation. Model experiments began at Coldwater among the Chippewas under the surveillance of Captain T.G. Anderson and at St. Clair under William Jones. These experiments apparently showed enough progress - although one is haunted by the suspicion that agents in these parts exaggerated the progress in their favour - to warrant a grand apartheid type solution to all Indian problems by settling the tribes from all over the province on the Great Manitoulin Island in Georgian Bay on Lake Huron.

---

54 "Report of Committee No.4 on Indian Department," in "Report on the Public Departments," Journals, Legislative Assembly, Upper Canada, 1839-40, vol.II. This report is also printed as Appendix No.1 of "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," J.L.A.C. 1847, Appendix T.

55 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.374 Pt.4. Colbourne to Goderich, Nov.30, 1832.

One further problem warrants discussion. No unity existed among those who were expected to carry the plan to fruition. There were extreme pessimists like Sir Francis Bond Head; there were extreme optimists such as D'Este of the Aborigines Protection Association; then there were the Indian agents themselves who tried desperately to see that the job got done - indeed these men attacked the matter with considerable vigour - but who found themselves obstructed by a shortage of money, a lack of assistance, and in some cases, a very real threat of unemployment.

Thus the "great experiment" was begun. It was, however, almost certain to fail. As will be seen in Chapter II, the organization of the Indian department was singularly unsuited to fulfill the great purpose for which it was created. Indeed, all interested parties agreed that the Indians should be raised to a level comparable in civilization to that of the white man, but at this point it seems all agreement ended. Everyone had a new and different way to help the savage. Had they all acted in unison it is still highly doubtful that they would succeed. As it developed, however, conflicts arose between government and church people, between the Indians and the Indian Department and between the department and the governor.

All questions and problems received close scrutiny; and all ideas, opinions and attitudes gained expression during the brief period that Bond Head served as Governor of Upper Canada. This can be attributed to two causes. First, Head's views on

the subject were rather extreme and therefore invited discussion and criticism from all quarters. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the aborigines in the Empire were receiving a good deal of attention at this point. In Canada, however, the Rebellions of 1837-8, while gaining some publicity for the Indians, for the most part distracted from the problem. The province itself began to grow also, and with this growth the Indian problem found itself relegated to a very secondary place. The full extent of this can be seen in the fact that the state of Indian tribes in British North America was not even mentioned in the Act of Union in 1841. Finally, the Report of a Special Investigating Committee declared in 1858, that Indian policy, on the whole had failed miserably.

Sir Francis Bond Head spent much time and thought on the Indian problem in Upper Canada. Few people, however, agreed with his conclusions. Head felt that the Indian was, in fact, doomed.[56] His conclusions can be stated simply, and in his own words.

1. The Attempt to make Farmers of the Red Men has been, generally speaking, a complete failure.

2. Congregating them for the purpose of civilization has implanted many more Vices than it has eradicated; and consequently

3. The greatest Kindness we can perform towards these Intelligent, simple minded people, is to remove and fortify them as much as possible from all Communication from the Whites.[57]

---

56 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.391. Head to Glenelg, Nov.30, 1836. According to Head, the Indians were "melting like Snow before the Sun".

57 Ibid.

Working from these premises, Head then began looking for a spot where the Indian race could live out its "twilight years" engaged in the time honoured occupations of hunting and fishing - a spot which would be well protected against further encroachments by the whites. He chose the Great Manitoulin Island and proposed that all the Indians of Upper Canada be removed to that place. Once again, in his own words, Head explained:

> Still it might appear that the transfer etc., was not to their interest because it was so good for our interest. The Manitoulin is good for the support of the Indians but not for the support of the White man. Yet it should be kept in mind that no matter how important and valuable the rich soil is for the White man, (and we got it in the exchange) this same land is useless to the Indians for they do not and cannot use it properly. It is against his nature to cultivate the soil. He had neither the Right nor the Power to sell it. Thus as soon as the game is exhausted or frightened off, the land, however rich, is useless to him, and in this state, much of the Indian property in Upper Canada at present exists.
>
> For instance, I found sixteen or eighteen families of Moravian Indians living on a vast tract of rich land, yet from absence of game almost destitute of everything; several of the men drunk; nearly all their children half-castes; the high road through their Territory almost impassable; the White Population execrating their indolence, and entreating to be relieved from the stagnation of a block of rich land, which separated them from their markets as completely as if it had been a desert.
>
> So the best thing we can do for them is separate them from the Whites. The Lieutenant Governor can protect them from open violence but not against the combination of petty vices, and it is impossible to teach the Indians to beware of the White Man.
>
> Therefore, I am of the opinion that His Majesty's government should continue to advise the few remaining Indians to retire to the Manitoulin Island or to the other Islands in Lake Huron.[58]

---

58 Ibid.

To further his plan, Head concluded agreements with Indian bands at Amherstburgh, and Moraviantown on the Thames, and on the Great Manitoulin. Referring to the first two, he observed

> that I have thus obtained for His Majesty's Government, from the Indians, an immense portion of the most valuable land, which will undoubtedly produce at no remote period, more than sufficient to defray the whole expense of the Indians and the Indian Department in this Province.[59]

One of Head's successors, Lord Sydenham, held substantially the same pessimistic view.

> The attempt to combine a system of pupilage with the settlement of these peoples in civilized parts of the country, leads only to embarrassment to the Government, expense to the Crown, a waste of resources of the Province, and injury to the Indians themselves. Thus circumscribed, the Indian loses all the good qualities of his wild state, and acquires nothing but the bias of civilization. He does not become a good settler, he does not become an agriculturalist or a mechanic. He does become a drunkard and a debaucher and his females and family follow the same course. He occupies valuable land, unprofitably to himself and injurious to the country. He gives infinite trouble to the Government and adds nothing either to the wealth, the industry, or the defence of the Province.[60]

Others disagreed with this unhappy view. Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, informed Head that his arrangements with the Indians received full sanction, but he would not agree that the Indian was doomed. Instead, he decreed that no effort be spared to save the remaining Indians from that fate.[61]

---

59 Ibid.

60 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians," Sydenham to Lord J. Russell, July 22, 1841.

61 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.391. Glenelg to Head, Oct.5, 1836.

Glenelg was unable to make any concrete suggestions himself and instead called for more information on the subject. The answers to his questions[62] form the basis for the information contained in the Introduction. In the meantime he blamed circumstances for the failures thus far, and assumed that the problems could be solved by removing the Indians some distance from the Whites.[63]

Other groups, however, felt themselves much more capable of suggesting solutions. These included the Executive Council of Lower Canada, the Aborigines Protection Association, missionary groups - especially the Wesleyan Methodists - and the officials of the Indian Department. Unfortunately, even these interested groups could not reach a consensus. All, it is true, disagreed with Bond Head. The Indian was no less than a "noble savage" and, as Macaulay reported:

> They cannot admit that in the order of Providence any race of men are doomed to an exclusion from that social improvement which the lights of knowledge and religion have uniformly bestowed, and in the intellectual condition of the Indians, apart from accidental influences they perceive nothing to prevent their

---

62 He asked for the numbers and locations of resident tribes, the numbers and locations of hunting grounds, the extent of these grounds, the names of the agents, missionaries and teachers who worked among the Indians, and opinions on whether or not the Parliamentary Grant or Territorial Revenues covered all costs. P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.718. J.B. Macauley, Report to Sir George Arthur, 1839, pp. 42-44.

63 Ibid., p. 41.

> reaching the level of the European race. At the same time, however, they perceive that powerful external agencies have operated to keep them below their fellow men, and they attribute their tardy progress to culpable neglect, and a viscious system. Notwithstanding all impediments, they consider that encouraging instances are not wanting of successful attempts to reclaim the North American Indians even in Lower Canada, and believe that Proselytes may early be multiplied. They dismiss as equally against reason and experience the apprehension that attempts to inculcate agricultural and settled habits must fail, but of the difficulties attending the details they acknowledge themselves duly sensible. In considering whether it is better to collect the Indians into distinct Cantons, or to disperse them among the whites, they remark that owing to the large tracts of waste lands and the revenues accruing to them in the shape of annuities, in Upper Canada, the adoption of the exclusive system advocated by Sir Francis Bond Head is less difficult in that province, but as to which mode is entitled to preference they conceive the one less likely to wean them from old habits of indolence and dissipation, while the other would expose them to the frauds and impositions to which they have so often been the victims. Upon the whole, they give a preference to compact communities not very far remote from the old settlers - allowing to individuals as much as possible their own choice, and distributing agricultural implements but no other presents.[64]

Somewhat more precise was the attitude of the Aborigines Protection Association towards the Indians. While they agreed with Head that "the Indians of North America had suffered immense and severe cruelties from the Whites",[65] they regretted "the removal of the Indians from the Territory which they have long occupied"[66] and felt that this treaty would

---

64 Ibid. pp.52-56.

65 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.401 pt.1. "Memorial from Aborigines Protection Association", enclosed in Glenelg to Arthur, Aug.22, 1838.

66 Ibid.

"obviously tend to hinder the progress of civilization". The first step in civilization was to stop the Indians from wandering; this task would be more difficult since it would be "much harder to convince them to cultivate the barren soil of the Manitoulin."[67] The Treaty, moreover, was unjust, for the Indians had surrendered "three million acres of the richest land in Upper Canada for 23,000 barren and unproductive islands remote from civilization...."[68] To this argument, other missionaries, of whom the Reverend Peter Jones was the most voluble, added that this removal discouraged agriculture since the Indians would see no sense in improving land if this same land was some day to be taken from them.[69] As one missionary reported it: "They say, and not without some Provocation, if we clear fields, build houses, and make orchards, the White Man will soon want them, and he must have them. God help them."[70]

The Wesleyan missionaries agreed with the Memorial of the Aborigines Protection Association in regretting Bond Head's treaty of 1836-37 with the Indians. They, too, felt that the Indians had been robbed and that Head's solution was no solution at all. Their suggestions included the following:

---

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.400 Pt.2, Alder to Glenelg, Dec.14,1837.

70 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.400 Pt.2. "Extract of a letter from a Wesleyan Missionary who was present when Head made his Treaty with the Indians for the Manitoulin" enclosed in Stayner to Head, Nov.3, 1837.

a) The Indians' lands should be secured by title deeds.
b) The rights of subjects should be conferred on Christian Indians.
c) Encouragement should be given in agriculture.
d) Central schools should be established.
e) Liquor should be completely beyond their reach.
f) Indian agents should co-operate with the missionary.
g) The wandering and uneducated Indians should be placed under the control of a protector, appointed by the government.[71]

Nearly everyone, with the possible exception of Head, agreed with the last six items. Debate, therefore, centred around the question of land possession. Where should the Indians be placed? In what capacity should they hold land? How should they be protected?

While this controversy was going on, Indian agents were dutifully carrying out their jobs as best they could, with limited financing and vague instructions. This does not preclude their having opinions also, however, and as it developed, it was the suggestions they offered that finally, almost of necessity, were followed.

S.P. Jarvis, Chief Superintendent, from 1837-45, viewed all requests and arguments in favour of title deeds with considerable suspicion. He first of all denied that any uneasiness existed among the Indians concerning deeds for their land. He went on to say:

> The project of obtaining alienable titles to the Indian Reserves, if it did not originate with the Methodist Missionaries, has for some years been pressed by them with a steady perseverence not

---

71 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.400 Pt.2, Alder to Glenelg, Dec.14, 1837.

> easily accounted for; that the Indians do not comprehend the alleged advantage to them of such a step, but have been rendered suspicious from having it constantly asserted that they may at any time be expelled at the caprice of the Government.[72]

The obvious reason for retaining control in Government hands, he affirmed, was that the land would soon change hands - in the same manner that annuities and presents had found their way into white possession - and the Indians would thus be deprived of their only means of support.[73] The Government had always acted in good faith, he claimed, and had tried to promote the welfare of its charges. More important, however, were the new problems that would arise should the system be changed.

The Commissioner of Crown Lands office was not an office of record for patents.[74] Further, how could the lands be divested from the Crown and invested in the Indians and their posterity in free and common socage without subjecting them to the liabilities which attached to the lands of white people? The Indian therefore would become liable for assessments, debts and other burdens.[75] Jarvis was quite right in balking at the transfer of land titles. The Indian

---

72 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.718. Macaulay, Report, pp.124-125.

73 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.502. Jarvis to Macaulay, Sept.20, 1838.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

would have to learn to live under English law before he became subject to it. It seems to me, that the Indian officials, in this case, were much more sanguine than the other parties who professed to be working for the good of the Indian.

One man who spent his entire life in the Indian Affairs Department, Captain T.G. Anderson, had a great effect on the policy which should be followed regarding the placement of Indians. In 1830, Anderson began supervision of a model Indian settlement based on the policy outlined by Murray.[76] His report of 1835 described the success of this mission and recommended, for various reasons that the experiment be tried again, this time on the more remote Manitoulin Island. Among his reasons for advocating the move was the uneasiness expressed by the Indians of losing their lands to the Whites. Unlike D'Este and others, however, Anderson declared that the best way to remove this feeling of anxiety was not to grant solid deeds to the Indians. Instead,

> With the knowledge of all these facts constantly before me, and impressed with the Conviction that it was necessary to take some immediate steps for the Civilization of the Indians, as well as to prevent the Total Extinction of their Race, I was induced to suggest a plan for their complete settlement on the Manitoulin Island...."[77]

In another report, Anderson also stated:

---

76 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.45. Givins to Anderson, March 5, 1830.

77 P.A.C., Q Series, vol 389-1-2. Anderson to Colbourne, Sept.24, 1835, enclosed in Colbourne to Glenelg, Jan.22, 1836.

> If concentrated and civilized, the Indian Nations would be useful and loyal subjects during Peace, and in the event of war might become an important support to the Government. Our Indian allies emigrating from the United States and seeking our protection as well as the British Indian whose means of subsistence are exhausted, have claims on our humanity, which would be most easily satisfied by forming one extensive establishment for the purpose of leading them to the exercise of the arts of civilized life. The Manatoulin Island on the North Side of Lake Huron, in extent is about one hundred miles by thirty, appears to be the most suitable for the purpose....[78]

As we know, Anderson's advice was duly accepted. When all was said and done, therefore, after all views had been stated and all reasons had been heard from all interested parties and from all self-appointed experts, the British Government and its representatives in Canada chose to heed the advice of its own men, the local experts, the "men on the spot", the men who worked most directly with the Indian bands.

As a result, no titles were granted to Indian bands; and the Indian bands were to attain a civilized status through a policy of racial segregation. Such a decision, however, did not prevent the other groups from continuing their efforts. Missionaries from many groups still worked among the Indians in the various parts of the province. A unified policy, therefore, still did not exist. Interest in the problem also began to wane and by 1845 it was obvious that the policy of civilizing the Indians had failed.

---

78 Ibid.

The recommendations made by the Commissioners who reported in 1845 leaves one with the impression that no one heard of Murray's policy back in 1830. The very fact that these suggestions are simply repeated indicates a singular lack of success.

1. That as long as the Indian Tribes continue to require the special protection and guidance of the Government, they should remain under the immediate control of the Representative of the Crown within the Province, and not under that of the Provincial authorities....

2. That measures should be adopted to introduce and confirm Christianity among all the Indians within the Province, and to establish them in settlements.

3. That the efforts of the Government should be directed to educating the young, and to weaning those advanced in life from their feelings and habits of dependence.

4. That, for this purpose, schools should be established, and Missionaries and teachers be supported at each settlement, and that their efficiency should be carefully watched over.

5. That in addition to Common Schools, as many manual labour or industrial schools, should be established, as the funds applicable to such a purpose will admit....

6. That the co-operation of the various religious societies whose exertions have already proved very beneficial among the Indians, should be invited in carrying out the measures of the Government, particularly among tribes which do not belong to the Church of England. The Secretary of State, Sir George Murray, has expressly discouraged the limitation of the channels through which the blessings of civilization should flow among the Indians. The Government of the United States has experienced much advantage from this assistance in the establishment of the Missouri Conference School.

7. Steps should be taken to establish schools among the Indians of Lower Canada, and to avert that opposition on the part of the Missionaries, which has hitherto prevented their successful operation in that part of the Province.

8. Every practicable measure be adopted to familiarize the adult Indians with the management of property, with the outlay of money, and with the exercise of such offices among themselves as they are qualified to fulfill, such as Rangers, Pathmasters, and other offices, for ordinary Township purposes. Several proposals to this effect will presently be submitted, in connection with their lands and annuities.

9. That the Indians be employed, as far as possible, in the erection of buildings, and in the performance of other services for their own benefit, and that, with the same view, the employment of dissipated or ill-conducted contractors or workmen among them be not permitted. It has been a matter of complaint, that contractors have introduced drunken workmen, and exhibited a pernicious example among them.[79]

Failure, it seems to me, resulted for very basic reasons. As I have already stated, the new suggestions reveal that the old ones had also failed. Apparently Christianity had not spread generally among the Indians; they had not been weaned from the old way of life; schools, missionaries and tradesmen had not taught them to leave their hunting and cultivate the earth.

Policy had been stated only in vague generalities. As a result the agents could not follow any definite instructions and had constantly to write for information. Furthermore, the instruments by which this new scheme was to be carried out were old. More important, however, the Indian Department itself, while gaining a new raison d'etre, did not in fact gain a new structure. The Commission appointed in 1842 to investigate the Indian Department reported it thusly.

---

79 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1847, Appendix T, Section III, "Present made of conducting Indian Affairs, with recommendations for its amendment" part I.

> They found that within a few years, a change had taken place in the views of the Government with respect to Indians, that in consequence, a number of recommendations had been offered by the Governors of the two Provinces, and a number of instructions issued by the Secretary of State, which, owing to the disturbed state of political affairs, had been neglected or only partially carried out; and the former Constitution of the Department, which was adapted to a different system, had remained unchanged.[80]

The Report of 1858 on Indian Affairs emphasized the fact that "interests of greater magnitude have sprung up and the Indian has been lost sight of and has sunk to a state of comparative neglect."[81] They citedas an example the fact that at the time of the Act of Union in 1841, Indians had receded to the inner recesses of men's mind to such an extent that the Indian Department was not placed on the Civil List.[82] By this time, the Imperial Government had begun to look upon the Indian Service as an "expiring one",[83] an attitude which the Commission opposed strongly. The Commissioners received a special report on the state of the Manitoulin Island from the Roman Catholic missionaries at that place. These missionaries endorsed an act passed in 1857, the substance of which, I feel, is quite illustrative of the position held by the Indians in 1858. The priests stated,

---

80 Ibid., part VI.

81 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part III.

82 Ibid..

83 Ibid.

> They found that within a few years, a change had taken place in the views of the Government with respect to Indians, that in consequence, a number of recommendations had been offered by the Governors of the two Provinces, and a number of instructions issued by the Secretary of State, which, owing to the disturbed state of political affairs, had been neglected or only partially carried out; and the former Constitution of the Department, which was adapted to a different system, had remained unchanged.[80]

The Report of 1858 on Indian Affairs emphasized the fact that "interests of greater magnitude have sprung up and the Indian has been lost sight of and has sunk to a state of comparative neglect."[81] They citedas an example the fact that at the time of the Act of Union in 1841, Indians had receded to the inner recesses of men's mind to such an extent that the Indian Department was not placed on the Civil List.[82] By this time, the Imperial Government had begun to look upon the Indian Service as an "expiring one",[83] an attitude which the Commission opposed strongly. The Commissioners received a special report on the state of the Manitoulin Island from the Roman Catholic missionaries at that place. These missionaries endorsed an act passed in 1857, the substance of which, I feel, is quite illustrative of the position held by the Indians in 1858. The priests stated,

---

80 Ibid., part VI.

81 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part III.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

The aim of the government as far as we can understand it from the Bill mentioned and from what was told us by Mr. Commissioner Washington is as follows:

Until now the remains of the Ancient Indian Tribes or Bands had occupied large tracts of reserves on the North Shore of Lake Huron, lying between Penetanguishene and the Bruce Mines. This territory, in the hands of the Indians, has until now remained uncultivated and useless.... The interest of civilization therefore absolutely required that this obstacle be removed without, however, in any way trespassing on the rights of justice or humanity. This has been for some years past the aim of the Canadian Government in offering to purchase from the different bands or tribes their reserves, and then making over to them the Manitoulin Island, recommending them to inhabit and cultivate it, guaranteeing to them, with certain privileges, its entire possession, to the complete exclusion of all strangers. A large number of Indians obeyed the paternal wishes of the Government and settled on the Island. It is our intention, in a subsequent article, to show clearly and distinctly their present condition. A number of these bands refused to profit by the advantages offered to them and preferred their erratic existence in the woods to a more civilized life. The Government tolerated this; but the onward and irresistable advance of civilization will not admit of matters remaining in their present state, with reference to these nomadic bands. Their reserves will have to disappear to make room for the wants of civilization. It is evident and just that the interest of individuals must make way for the public good. The intention of the Government is to purchase the reserves and apply the proceeds for the benefit of the Indians; whence arises the important question, what is to be done with these Indians? The dictates of justice and humanity do not admit of the supposition that it is intended, in the inferior and degraded state in which they are, to abandon them to ruin and utter extinction. This, therefore, must be the aim of the Government to send all these remains of Indian bands or tribes to Manitoulin Island, to bring them up by degrees to that state of civilization which at a later time will admit of their mixing with the white man, to gradually thus absorb the Indian in the Canadian element, and cause to disappear the now existing anomaly between

> the state of Indians and that of the other Canadian subjects of Her Majesty.[84]

This extract, from the report of two priests, is indicative of a general change in attitude towards the Indians. The same hopes and aspirations and the same declaration of the rights of Indians is voiced, but the spirit and enthusiasm for the cause has gone. Nevertheless, the Special Commissioners recommended that changes be made in the structure of the Indian Department. The three men, however, did not try to deny the failure of the Indian policy.

> It is this absence of action which amongst other things has been so prejudicial to the Indians of the various schemes which have been broached, few have ever been tried, and even when tried, but little inquiry seems to have been made whether the failure of an experiment arose from any inherent defect in the plan or from accidental external causes which marred its full development.
>
> We are therefore, after all these years and in spite of the industry and ability displayed in collecting information and drawing up reports, still groping in the dark. The time for experiments is fast passing away, if it is not already expired; therefore the aid given by the Imperial Government is threatened to be soon withdrawn, and measures must be taken without delay for defraying from other sources all the expenses connected with the land and superintendence of the Indians.[85]

What, then, was this Department which had failed to change its structure and failed to civilize the Indians?

---

84 T. Hannipeaux and F. Ferard, "Report upon the Present State of the Great Manitoulin Island and upon that of the Nomadic Bands or Tribes on the Northern Shore of Lake Huron", August, 1857. Enclosed as an Appendix to "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21.

85 "Report of the Special Commissioners...." Part III.

Chapter III

The Organization and Personnel of the Indian Department

As we have seen, Government policy towards the Indians changed in 1830. No longer was it sufficient to curry Indian favour and secure their loyalty to the British cause; in addition, officials of the Department were expected to shoulder the "White Man's Burden" and carry civilization and Christianity to His Majesty's "Red Children" of the forest. It is the purpose of this chapter to show that while some administrative change did occur in the Department of Indian Affairs in 1830 and again in 1845, these changes took place only at the top level, and the actual machinery of the department, in fact, changed very little. Personnel remained substantially the same, even as late as 1845, and the finances continued to be an unhealthy paradox of central responsibility and decentralised control. That is, the officials of the department held immediate responsibility for their charges since, as the "men on the spot", they possessed the most exact knowledge; but they lacked the official power necessary, in many cases, for immediate action. As Chief Superintendent S.P. Jarvis declared to the Committee to Investigate Indian Affairs in 1839-40, he "should have discretionary power to act in all ordinary matters, and should be made responsible for these acts instead of having to trouble the Lieutenant Governor, on the most trivial

occasions for his signature".[1] He added:

> If a party of Indians from a distance, (and it is not an unfrequent occurrence) were to visit Toronto tomorrow, and arrive in a starving condition, the Chief Superintendent could not order for their relief a few rations, without first procuring a requisition signed by the Governor General, who might chance to be ill or absent from the place, or occupied in matters which rendered it inconvenient to him to be seen, and this too, notwithstanding a year's supply of provisions for the Department, on approved requisition actually in store.[2]

Too many Government officials and too many branches of the public service had a share in Indian management, with the result that during the entire period of Imperial control the Indian Department lacked a centre of focus. The Imperial Government looked upon the aborigines as its personal responsibility and continued to hold sway over their welfare until 1860. In the Mother Country, therefore, three agencies took a long distance view of Indian affairs in Canada. The Secretary of State for the Colonies authorised the final adoption of all policy changes and supervised the appointments of personnel. Thus it was that the Lieutenant Governor,

---

1 "Report of Committee No.4 on the Indian Department," in "Report on the Public Departments," Journals, Legislative Assembly, Upper Canada, 1839-40, vol.II. Hereafter, in this chapter, this source will be referred to as Report, 1839-40.

2 Ibid.

Sir Francis Bond Head, had to seek the Colonial Secretary's sanction for a successor to James Givins, the Chief Superintendent, in 1837. Also in 1837, notice came from the Colonial Office of the dismissal of three superintendents though Head had recommended these reductions beforehand. The Lords of the Treasury maintained a watchful eye over Indian expenditure through the Parliamentary Grant for that service, and the army Commissariat managed the purchasing of Indian presents in England and their transport to Canada.

In Canada itself the Commander of the Forces had charge of the Indians from 1816 to 1830 at which time they became the responsibility of the Lieutenant Governor of each province. Immediately below these officials came the top ranking Department official, be he the Deputy Superintendent General (1794-1828), the Chief Superintendent and Inspector General of Indian Affairs (1828-1830), the Chief Superintendent (1830-1845) or the Chief Superintendent ex officio (1845-1860). In addition to these high ranking officials within the department itself, the Canadian branches of the Commissariat, and the Crown Lands Commissioner also had an interest in the Indians. All these masters had to be served. Since this absence of a central focus remained constant throughout the entire period of Imperial rule, its importance cannot be over-estimated. As the Committee Report of 1840 stated,

> Had, indeed, an effective protecting power over the Indians' property been, many years since, given to a properly organised Department...your Committee would not now have to lament the injudicious disposal of much valuable property, and the disappearance of unaccounted funds....
>
> With regard to the Indian Office itself, nothing can be less proportioned to the extensive and varied duties which it ought to perform. The Chief Superintendent is himself the only Officer in it. There is not even a permanently appointed Clerk....This total inadequacy of the office to the growing interests of the various Indian communities, has been probably one cause of the business which properly belongs to it, being conducted by other departments.[3]

A longer view would indicate, as Professor Hodgetts points out, that "because so many departments had undertaken various responsibilities for the Indians, they had crowded out the Indian Department."[4]

Because the early dealings of the Government with the Indians were concerned almost exclusively with the cultivation of their support in times of war, the constitution of the Indian Department took on a military character whether it came under the control of the Commander of the Forces or that of the Governor General. Officials of the Department reported at various times to different superiors[5] but in essence their

---

3 Ibid.

4 J.E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service (Toronto, 155), p. 215.

5 See above, p.59.

duties changed very little in the long period from 1782 to 1830. Only towards 1829 when Sir John Colbourne took careful interest in the department did their duties increase, and it was not until 1828[6] that they were obliged officially to engage themselves in more than a superficial way with the actual welfare of the Indians; and not until 1830 was the administration altered to accommodate the change in policy after 1828.

It is true that before 1830 the superintendents, missionaries and interpreters did try to settle local disputes among the different Tribes of resident Indians;[7] it is also true that they often acted as a mediary between the Indians and the higher officials in the Government,[8] and they were expected to protect the Indians against encroaching Whites.[9] But aside from these occasional "extra-curricular activities", local agents played a predominently military role.

---

6 General Order, April 13, 1828. See C.B. Sissons, "George Ryerson to Sir Peregrine Maitland, June 9, 1826", Ontario History, XLIV (1952), pp. 24-5.

7 As outlined in Chapter I, there were two groups of Indians that came under the attention of the Department in Upper Canada. But since the visiting Indians from the United States and the wandering Indians in the different parts of British North America came before the Government only once a year for their presents, they provided little opportunity for concrete work by the officials. The major attention of the Department, therefore, focused on the resident Indians.

8 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. General Order, May 25, 1822.

9 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. "Petition of the Mississaga Indians re the violence of White men", Jan. 27, 1829.

> The Superintendents had military rank, were entitled to wear a uniform, and received the same rates of pay and allowances, during the war, as the Officers of corresponding rank in the regular army, which, up to the year 1832, were paid from the Military Chest, provided for out of Army Extraordinaries. Their duties were confined, "principally, to the conveying of the Presents to the Indians and attending at the different stations where they assembled to receive them", with as much military pomp and display as the occasion would permit.[10]

To perform these functions a small establishment gradually developed. As already stated, the wandering and visiting Indians drew attention only once a year, at the distribution of presents. For this purpose they congregated at two or three locations - Drummond Island, and (when that island was ceded to the United States in 1828) St. Joseph's Island, Amherstburg and, later, Penetanguishene. After 1835 the Great Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron became another location for the annual rendezvous. Presents were, of course, also distributed among the settled Indians, usually at some spot close to their settlement, such as the Bay of Quinte, the Grand River, the River Credit or even York.

---

10 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C., 1847, Appendix T, Section III, "Present Mode of Conducting Indian Affairs, with recommendations for amendment," Part V. Hereafter, in this chapter, this source will be referred to as Report, 1847. In many cases postings in the Indian Department were granted for military service, as was the case with Colonel James Givins, Captain T.G. Anderson, and Captain James Winniett.

Meanwhile, the missionaries were at work, and through their influence more and more of the Tribes took up permanent residence, notably the Chippewas at Coldwater and the Narrows of Lake Simcoe, and the Mississaguas near Amherstburg. As the number of settled Tribes increased the Indian Department placed resident superintendents among them to see to their needs. Thus, in 1829, on the eve of the re-organization of the Department and the official beginning of a benevolent reserve policy, the department consisted of the establishment listed in Table I.

Table I

Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, in the Year 1829[11]

Rank	Name	Station	Pay & Lodging		
Superintendent	James Givins	York	413	0	0
Clerk	Joseph B. Clench	"	191	6	8
Interpreter	B. Fairchild	Amherstburg	102	3	4
Superintendent	George Ironsides	"	231	0	0
Missionary	Rev. Fenelet	"	50	0	0
Surgeon	Robert Richardson	"	374	14	2
Clerk	Geo.Ironsides Jr.	"	102	3	4
Interpreter	Joseph St.Germain	"	102	3	4
Blacksmith	Alexis T. Le Mai	"	94	3	4
Superintendent	Wm. McKay	Penetanguishene	247	0	0
Clerk & Interpreter	T.G. Anderson	"	191	6	8
Interpreter	Wm. Solomon	"	102	3	4
Interpreter	John Bell	"	102	3	4
Surgeon	David Mitchell	"	237	16	8
Blacksmith	James Farling	"	94	3	4
Schoolmaster	A.de Kaghruteas-cre	Tuscarora Village	20	0	0
Superintendent	John Brant	Grand River	231	0	0

11 Report, 1847, Appendix No.78, "Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, in the year 1829".

The next year, Indian affairs for the two provinces were separated and control passed from the Commander of the Forces to the respective Lieutenant Governor of Upper and Lower Canada. At the same time, the office of Chief Superintendent was created for Upper Canada. This man was to direct Indian policy under the guidance of the Lieutenant Governor and delegate responsibility to the local agents.

The new policy of 1830, which called for the civilization and settlement of the Indians in villages, with the view to their eventual assimilation, had been anticipated for some time,[12] and with this end in view an Indian post was established in 1829 at Coldwater to service the three Tribes around Lake Simcoe under Chiefs Yellow Head, John Aisence, and Snake.[13] This new establishment had a staff of six,[14]

---

12 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. Sir George Murray to Lt. Governor Sir James Kempt, Dec.3, 1828. See also P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116, Murray to Kempt, Jan.25, 1830.

13 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians". Hereafter, in this chapter, this source will be referred to as Report, 1844-5. See also, P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Anderson to Z. Mudge, Dec.7, 1829.

14 See Table on p. 63.

a new dream, and high hopes. The reports of its clerk, T.G. Anderson, to the Chief Superintendent's Office, indicate a steady rate of progress by the Indians. Yellow Head and John Aisence appear more than willing to co-operate, and it is from this station that the first requests appear for a change in the nature of the annuities (and sometimes the presents) from the usual trinkets and guns to oxen, harness or other useful items for agriculture.[15] A study of the correspondence between Coldwater and York from 1830 to 1835 seems to indicate that Anderson, who was promoted to Superintendent in 1830, was not being overly boastful (though perhaps overly optimistic) in his Report to Sir John Colbourne on the state of the Indians around Lake Simcoe when he stated that

> Every Indian throughout the settlement is possessed of the means with moderate Industry, of providing himself with an ample supply of food and clothing, and he has acquired sufficient knowledge of the Arts of civilized life to avail himself of these Advantages; the minds of the younger Branches are opened by Education, and Religion has fixed itself upon the Attention of all.

---

15 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.612 contains several such requests. However, as we shall see in Chapter IV these requests were motivated by a desire to make life easier for themselves rather than a wish to adopt agricultural pursuits.

He went on.

> Hitherto the Measures of Government have been applied to the Civilization of the Indians within the settled Territory. Of late Years the Distribution of Presents at Penetanguishene[16] has brought to the Vicinity of Coldwater many of the more distant Tribes, and their Visits to the Settlement have been frequent; they have witnessed the Advantages of their Civilised Friends, and Applications to have the same Assistance extended to them have been frequent.[17]

The apparent success of the Coldwater establishment led to initiation of an even larger experiment intended to provide a final solution to the Indian Affairs question. This was the elaborately planned and very expensive establishment on the Great Manitoulin Island, begun in 1836. The hopes held out for the success of the Manitoulin venture, plus the progress made at Coldwater, and, indeed, the general enthusiasm portrayed by interested groups like the Aborigines Protection Association, all combined to cause a general expansion of the Indian Department which, by 1845, included the following additions:

---

16 The practice of issuing presents to some of the visiting Indians at Penetanguishene began in 1830. The decision to do so was announced in 1829 at the distribution on Drummond Island.

17 Report, 1844-5, Section II, "Past and Present Condition of the Indians".

1 Superintendent at Colbourne on the Thames
2 Assistant Superintendents at St. Clair and Walpole Island
1 Interpreter at Port Sarnia
3 Missionaries at Manitoulin, Carrodoc and Walpole Island
2 Schoolmasters at Manitoulin.[18]

The elaborate plans for Manitoulin also called for an establishment of Artificiers which included a Master Carpenter, a Blacksmith, a mason, a cooper, a coalburner, a shoemaker and five labourers.[19] However, in addition to the closing of the Coldwater station in 1837, the department was reduced by a missionary, an interpreter, a surgeon, a clerk and a Blacksmith at Amherstburg, a schoolmaster at Grand River and an Interpreter at Fort George. Total cost had, in the process, increased from 2,886 l. to 3,567 l.,[20] in fifteen years. The results of these changes and transfers can be seen by the establishment of 1845 which is shown in Table II.

Officially, total responsibility for the Indians lay with the Governor or Lieutenant Governor "who were technically

---

18 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of Conducting Indian Affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part V.

19 Ibid. The total cost was 500 l.

20 Ibid.

Table II

Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, in the Year 1845[21]

Name	Rank	Station	Total Salary & Allowances
S.P. Jarvis	Chief Super	Kingston	374 11 4
George Vardon	Clerk	"	250 0 0
J.B. Clench	Super	Colbourne	231 5 4
George Ironsides	"	Amherstburg	241 5 4
James Winniett	"	Brantford	241 5 4
T.G. Anderson	"	Manitoulin	210 5 4
William Jones	Asst.Super	River St.Clair	136 9 4
William Keating	Acting Asst. Super	Walpole Island	153 9 4
William Solomon	Interpreter	Penetang	106 10 11
Jacob Martin	"	Grand River	45 0 0
Jean B.Assekenack	"	Manitoulin	25 0 0
Henry Chase	"	Port Sarnia	80 12 2
Paul Darling	Surgeon	Manitoulin	150 0 0
John Burkett	Schoolmaster	"	75 0 0
Charles Lamorandiere	"	"	50 0 0
Rev. F. O'Meara	Missionary	"	200 0 0
Rev. James Flood	"	Carradoc	83 6 8
Rev. Carry	"	Walpole Island	83 6 8
Rev. S. Givins	"	Tyendenaga	30 0 0

supposed to provide detailed supervision over the Indians",[22] but who found that they usually lacked the experience and the time necessary to perform the task properly.[23] Hence, Department officials found themselves left pretty well to

---

21 Ibid.

22 Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 215.

23 Report, 1844-5, Section I, "History of the Relations between the Government and the Indians", Sydenham to Lord J. Russell, July 22, 1841.

their own initiative. This point can scarcely be over-emphasised, since it meant that the very success or failure of the entire Indian policy rested on the ability of the individual agents residing among the different Tribes.

> ....the duties of the officers in times of peace.... are various and important; much discretion is required for their faithful and satisfactory discharge, and from the remote, and in some measure, uncontrolled situations in which these officers are sometimes placed, it becomes necessary to rely almost implicitly upon their integrity and judgement.[24]

For this very reason, some consideration of the type of men who administered Indian policy at the local level in Upper Canada seems advisable. A study of Tables I and II suggests several generalizations.

The establishment was rather small and very few men actually attended to the affairs of the Indians in Upper Canada. They also formed a rather compact little group, often corresponding amongst themselves, or visiting one another's station;[25] and the case of George Ironsides Jr. provides at

---

24 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Aboriginal Tribes (North America, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, and British Guiana), Parliamentary Paper No.617, 1834. Viscount Goderich to Sir John Colbourne, April 3, 1832.

25 Winniett and Clench, for example, seem to have kept up a regular correspondence; Ironsides Jr. was a frequent visitor to Amherstburg after his transfer to the Manitoulin Island (P.A.C.,R.G.10,vol.117 provides several instances of these visits); and Anderson was a visitor at various stages at Coldwater, Manitoulin and St.Joseph's Island. The annual distribution of presents also provided a means of direct communication among the different stations. Clench, for example, accompanied Claus, the Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to the Grand River in 1823 and 1824; and Anderson was present for the issue at Drummond Island and St.Joseph's in 1828 and 1829.

least one example of nepotism.

Beginning with the head of the permanent establishment, it seems obvious that Colonel James Givins, the first man to occupy the new position of Chief Superintendent[26] in the new scheme of things after 1830, was particularly unsuited to administer a progressive policy. His job entailed the general guardianship of the entire Indian population in Upper Canada. More specifically, he was expected to "receive all communications for the information of the Lieutenant Governor from the officers employed in his department and occasionally visit every station".[27] This provides perhaps the most striking example of the very slight change which actually took place in the departmental re-organization in 1830. Immediately prior to his new appointment Givins had been the senior officer in the old establishment. Already stationed at York he simply stepped into the new office as Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs. It is also an unfortunate example of how the old department was simply incapable of fulfilling its new duties.

By 1830 Givins had already spent 34 years in the service of the department, and despite Colbourne's describing him

---

26 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. General Order, April 13, 1830.

27 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Colbourne to Wm. Hay, (Private) May 3, 1829.

as "an old man, but active and esteemed by the Indian",[28] and though he was always spoken of in the highest regard - usually in connection with his past services[29] - he was in fact physically incapable of visiting the resident Indians as his duties required. He himself realised this and attempted to retire in 1830;[30] by 1832 Colbourne also admitted his mistake and declared that the heavy correspondence received by the Chief Superintendent was too great to be handled by one man and recommended that Givins be given an assistant because

> The correspondence of the Indian Department has so much increased since the system for the civilization of the different Tribes in Upper Canada has been adopted, and the accounts of the several Establishments are so complicated that I find the Chief Superintendent cannot carry on the business of the Department without the aid of a clerk.[31]

Finally Sir Francis Head stated bluntly in 1836 that while the past services of Givins were both lengthy and good, the man was no longer competent to perform them,[32] and recommended

---

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Givins to Colbourne, Feb.8, 1830.

31 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.374 Pt.4. Colbourne to Goderich, Dec.1, 1832. The clerk was never appointed on a permanent basis until after the transfer of control to the Civil Secretary in 1845.

32 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.390-1-2-3. Head to Glenelg, May 5, 1836.

that the Colonel be allowed to retire at full salary, his position to be assumed by Mr. Hepburn. Hepburn had actually been running the Indian Office for two years because of Givins' inadequacy, and Head was most anxious that this "active and intelligent person" be retained by the Indian Department.[33]

Perhaps it is not surprising that Hepburn left the Department to take a position with the Court of Chancery. Aside from salary discrepancies, there was also the problem of security of tenure,[34] for it was at this time that the British Government was considering the advisability of merging the Indian Department with the Commissariat. Another possible reason for Hepburn's decision was the almost complete chaos and staff shortage that he found in the Indian Affairs office. The office itself was most inadequate for the duties which it was expected to perform. The Chief Superintendent was the only officer there,[35] although one of the

---

33 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.389-1-2. Head to Glenelg, Feb.16, 1836.

34 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.395A. Glenelg to Head, July 4, 1836. It was agreed that Givins be retired at full pay, but Glenelg procrastinated on the matter of appointing Hepburn. Finally, S.P. Jarvis took the post on a temporary basis. He held position on that basis until 1845.

35 Report, 1839-40.

secretaries of the Government Office or one of the Officers of the Commissariat occasionally rendered some assistance.

> Mr. Hepburn states that in the year 1835, when he accepted the appointment of Clerk in the Indian Department, and entered upon its duties, he found everything connected with it in a most unsatisfactory state. That Colonel Givins, the then Chief Superintendent, an old and infirm officer had been for a long period without any other assistance than the occasional services of Mr. Gifford, a Clerk in the Government Office, who conducted the routine and other business of the Department, with as much promptitude and efficiency as could possibly be expected from the contingent nature of his connection with it. That, as might be expected, therefore, he found extensive and long-standing arrears of business - so much as so to render hopeless the attempt to bring up such arrears, consistently with the due despatch of current business. That the Correspondence of the Department, until within these few years, most irregularly kept; and the account books of the annuities, and other funds belonging to the several Indian tribes, were without system of arrangement. To rectify this was absolutely necessary, and it was done accordingly; but so rapidly did the duties of the Department increase, both in amount and importance, during the two years when Mr. Hepburn was in its service, that he found his whole unassisted exertions necessary to keep down the urgent demands of present business, and neither leisure nor opportunity afforded him to mature or devise any general plan of improvement in the conduct of official duties....[36]

Mr. S.P. Jarvis, therefore, undertook no easy task when he accepted the post of Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1836. It would appear, however, that he entered on the task with considerable vigour.

---

36 Ibid.

secretaries of the Government Office or one of the Officers of the Commissariat occasionally rendered some assistance.

> Mr. Hepburn states that in the year 1835, when he accepted the appointment of Clerk in the Indian Department, and entered upon its duties, he found everything connected with it in a most unsatisfactory state. That Colonel Givins, the then Chief Superintendent, an old and infirm officer had been for a long period without any other assistance than the occasional services of Mr. Gifford, a Clerk in the Government Office, who conducted the routine and other business of the Department, with as much promptitude and efficiency as could possibly be expected from the contingent nature of his connection with it. That, as might be expected, therefore, he found extensive and long-standing arrears of business - so much as so to render hopeless the attempt to bring up such arrears, consistently with the due despatch of current business. That the Correspondence of the Department, until within these few years, most irregularly kept; and the account books of the annuities, and other funds belonging to the several Indian tribes, were without system of arrangement. To rectify this was absolutely necessary, and it was done accordingly; but so rapidly did the duties of the Department increase, both in amount and importance, during the two years when Mr. Hepburn was in its service, that he found his whole unassisted exertions necessary to keep down the urgent demands of present business, and neither leisure nor opportunity afforded him to mature or devise any general plan of improvement in the conduct of official duties....[36]

Mr. S.P. Jarvis, therefore, undertook no easy task when he accepted the post of Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1836. It would appear, however, that he entered on the task with considerable vigour.

---

36 Ibid.

> ....Since I have been in the Department, I have endeavoured to visit each of the aforesaid Tribes once a year, and those residing within one hundred miles of Toronto I have been in the habit of visiting repeatedly in the course of the year. The Indians have repeatedly expressed the greatest satisfaction at a custom which once prevailed but which has been discontinued for many years, being renewed once again; and they consider it proof of the interest which the Government are again beginning to take in their welfare and prosperity. My visits to the Indians of the River St.Clair, Lake Simcoe, and Rice Lake in particular, have, I think been productive of much good. It has been my endeavour to stimulate them to exertion - to encourage to persevere in Agricultural pursuits, and to expend their annuities in what is essentially of benefit to them, and to convince them of the perniscious effects of indulging to excess in the use of ardent spirits, by contrasting the situation of those members of the community who have given themselves up to such indulgence, to those who are sober and industrious, and who attend to the wants and comforts of their families.

He too, however, found that in spite of his energy it was most difficult to do the job the way he would have wished.

> I frequently receive from the Indians, invitations to visit them for the purpose of settling disputes between Chiefs or particular individuals of the Community, which they do not appear able to manage among themselves, or perhaps to remove some obnoxious person, who has taken possession of a part of their lands, or is committing trespass on the same; - and were it in my power to absent myself from the office, without occasioning additional embarrassment to it, I would most unquestionably comply with such requests, but the present inefficient state of the office, in the want of adequate assistance to conduct its affairs, and the consequent accumulation of business, rendering it impossible for me to be absent for a day, without subjecting both the public and myself to inconvenience - for if I leave Toronto the Indian office is closed until my return, and a suspension of all business is in consequence.[37]

---

37 Ibid.

Partly for the reasons given by Jarvis in the above passage, partly because of the complicated financial arrangements of the department which we will investigate shortly, and partly also because of frustrations resulting from demands of the British Treasury[38] to reduce expenses countered by simultaneous requests from the local agents for more money, Jarvis was unable to manage the Department efficiently. The Commission which was appointed in 1842 to investigate the Indian Department reported in 1845, and in the process of its investigations had discovered certain irregularities in the financial management of the Chief Superintendent. While Jarvis's name was eventually cleared, he was dismissed from his post in 1844 and in 1845 the Civil Secretary became the head of the Indian Department in addition to his other duties. This additional change in the administrative machinery at the top had virtually no concrete effect on the operations of the department. Even after 1845 it remained a bureaucratic department with full responsibility for the Indians but with no control over its finances.

At the apex, therefore, it would appear that the Indian Department was rather unfortunate in its choice of Superintendents. Immediately below the Chief Superintendent were

---

38 See, for example, P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Colbourne to Wm. Hay, May 3, 1839.

the several resident superintendents who, as we have seen,[39] were expected to fulfill the same duties as their Chief, but with reference to their particular bands only. Because of the haphazard control exerted from the centre, however, the local agents were left very much to their own initiative, and it was therefore inevitable that certain abuses take place. Sometimes the agent might become too closely involved with the disputes of the Indians, as was the case with John Brant on the Grand River.

> Captain Brant, Superintendent of the Six Nations, died a month ago of the cholera and I have appointed Major Winniett (late of the 68th Regiment) to succeed him. The Indians of the Six Nations have long been divided into parties, one of which was in the interest of the Brants, and another supported by the Chiefs opposed to them. These divisions have retarded their progress and I am of the opinion that it is not advisable to appoint anyone who is connected with the Indians as Superintendent in the department.[40]

George Ironsides involved himself in a similar dispute when the Mississaguas at Amherstburg divided into two hostile camps, one supporting the superintendent, the other petitioning the Lieutenant Governor against him. Even T.G. Anderson had to face certain charges levied against him by the Indians at Coldwater.[41] This sort of mismanagement leads one to believe

---

39 See Chapter I.

40 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.374 Pt.4. Colbourne to Goderich, Nov.30, 1832.

41 See below, Chapter IV.

that the Indian agents were, in many respects, men of second rate ability. The nature of their position lends strength to this presumption.

These men had to live under rather harsh physical conditions, often far away from the areas of settled white population and amongst a people for whom they felt only a paternal instinct and usually no great respect. As the Commissioners of 1842 admitted, the Indian officials' salary failed to reward them for the duties they were expected to perform,[42] and even these were often tardy in their arrival due to department regulations[43] which the slightest clerical error could delay even longer.[44] The added incentive of "isolation pay", as provided today, could therefore not be used to attract the more competent men.[45]

---

42 Report, 1839-40.

43 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. Wm. Thorton (Military Secretary) to Lt. Governor Gore, July 10, 1810.

44 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. Anderson to Z. Mudge, Dec. 7, 1829.

45 The salaries never were increased. In fact they were diminished. Yet the duties were greater after 1830 than before. These reductions resulted from the abolition of the rations which the superintendents were allowed according to army regulations. When the Department lost its military make-up, these rations were stopped. Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part V. Also Ibid., Appendix No.48.

Also, one gets the impression of a very closely knit, self perpetuating group which held a virtual monopoly of the posts in the department. Thus it is that we find George Ironsides Jr. at Amherstburg first as an assistant and then a full superintendent; he turns up later as the superintendent at the Manitoulin Island. Thomas Gummersol Anderson represents the most transient, and the most successful of the agents. He first appears as a clerk at St.Joseph's Island, a posting granted for services with the Indians during the War of 1812; then he becomes a combination clerk and interpreter and then superintendent at Coldwater; later we find him as the superintendent at Manitoulin Island; and still later he becomes, after the dismissal of Jarvis, the head of the department, stationed at York.[46]

Anderson, in fact, is the most colourful of all the agents, and, it would appear, also the most competent,[47] a quality which was apparently noted by his superiors. In 1838, Joseph Clench complained to the Lieutenant Governor

---

46 Mrs. S. Rowe, "The Anderson Record from 1699 to 1896," Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Records, VI (1905), pp. 128-31.

47 The sheer volume, clarity, and promptness of his correspondence at both Coldwater and Manitowaning seems to mark him out as a cut above the others.

that he had more years of service than Anderson and yet Anderson's name had appeared before his in a list of appointments in the Gazette, a complaint which would indicate a seniority system of advancement. Yet it was Anderson who became the eventual head of the Department, and it was also Anderson who was retained when the decision came to reduce the establishment in 1837, while Clench, Winniett and Ironsides Jr. were all served their notices of dismissal.[48] As it turned out, however, these reductions were never effected, for the disturbances of 1837-8 led to the belief that the Indians would again be needed as allies, and the establishment was therefore maintained - in fact, enlarged. It is perhaps also indicative of the regard held for Anderson's ability that it was on the strength of his report that the site of the Manitoulin was chosen for the first large scale reserve experiment,[49] even though Captain Winniett had suggested it several years earlier in 1829.[50]

---

48 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.114. Glenelg to Arthur, Feb. 21, 1839.

49 Report, 1844-5, Section II, "Past and Present Condition of the Indians".

50 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.374 Pt.4. Winniett to Unknown, March 29, 1829.

Thus, although the official head of the department was changed, and the lines of communication were somewhat altered, the personalities with whom rested the onus of assimilation remained substantially the same. Throughout the period, this task remained in the hands of the same men doing the same job at - in many cases - the same places. These officials were expected to spearhead the civilization of the Indian Tribes. One would therefore naturally expect that they would also carry the power necessary, and shoulder most of the burdens of the Indian problems. Such, however, was not the case. Three of the principal matters concerning the management of Indian affairs were the distribution of Indian presents, the protection and management of Indian lands, and the payment of annuities. While the Indian officials were in some way involved in all three, the main tasks for each was actually delegated to several branches of the public service.

At first glance, the financial arrangements for the Indian department appear almost elementary. Indian affairs remained an Imperial responsibility, and expenses were therefore met by the Parliament of Great Britain. A closer look, however, reveals that a labyrinthian system had developed, an evolution resulting from the military origins of the Indian Department. The Department itself was passing through an uneven metamorphosis, for while a progressive

philosophy now pervaded Indian policy, the practical economics of the department lagged behind. The men who devolved the new policy were philanthropists, not economists or accountants; and while they extolled the virtues of reclaiming the savage, they failed to give expression to the less inspiring, though equally important, question of every day finance. Such a mundane topic, it would appear, was to be left to the more practical minds of the permanent civil servants. Unfortunately for the Indians who were intended to be the chief beneficiaries of this "new deal", permanent officials were either too concerned with simply reducing expenses, or else lacked the initiative or the influence to secure new monetary arrangements.

Meanwhile the practical minds of the Lords of the Treasury were most willing to accommodate the higher motives as long as it did not cost too much. More specifically, they limited Indian spending to 20,000 l. per annum (in addition to the cost of rations, fuel and candles to the different Officers of the establishment)[51] and consistently admonished successive Governors to remain within the budget. Thus, at a time when it was decided to launch an all out campaign to civilize the Indians, the monetary means to secure that end were severely circumscribed.[52]

---

51 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.116. Minute No. 14412, Nov.3, 1829.

52 The 20,000 pounds was to provide for the Establishment and costs of administration in Lower Canada as well.

There can be little doubt that the annual distribution of presents to the Indians provided the major expense of the Department. The Indians looked upon the presents as an inalienable right, and, in spite of suggestions to revoke them as early as the 1820's,[53] the custom continued until 1858. The nature of the presents, however, changed gradually as the efforts to civilise the Tribes gradually increased, the original trinkets and ammunition being exchanged when possible, for harness and oxen, in an attempt to wean the Indian from the worship of Nimrod and begin him doing homage to the soil.

While the nature of the presents might have changed, their source of supply did not. The Imperial Parliament provided them, through the annual Parliamentary Grant for Indian affairs. They were shipped from England where they were manufactured expressly for this service, because, strangely enough, it involved considerably less expense than purchasing the same items in Canada,[54] in spite of a 10% charge for freight.[55] Such long distances required advance

---

53 Charles Johnston, The Valley of the Six Nations (Toronto, 1964), p. 218 (G18).

54 There were some exceptions to this rule. In 1831, for example, it was decided to buy tobacco in Canada because of lower prices.

55 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.485. Departmental Order, Oct.28, 1830. Accountants also added a 20% charge for costs of inland transportation to the various stations; but most of this would have applied even had the goods been purchased in Canada.

planning and in 1830, the Lords of the Treasury ordered that one year's supply of presents should be kept in store in Canada "to guard against the Contingency of late arrival, or loss, of the Ship, in which, the usual Annual Supply, may be embarked."[56] A most complicated procedure for obtaining these presents developed.

Local superintendents transmitted estimates of the needs for their stations for eighteen months to two years in advance[57] to the Chief Superintendent.[58] These estimates were then transferred to the Lieutenant Governor who, in turn, passed them on to the Commissariat Department in England.[59] The supplies were then duly purchased and transferred across the Atlantic to the local depots of the Commissariat in Canada. Here the presents remained until the time for the annual distribution, at which time

---

56 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.5. G. Couper to Colbourne, May 6, 1830.

57 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.485. "Estimate of Presents for the supply of Indians in Upper Canada for the year 1830". Also, P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.485. Anderson to Givins, May 24, 1830.

58 Ibid.

59 Before 1830, these estimates went first to the Commander of the Forces from the Lieutenant Governor, and after 1841 they proceeded via the Governor-General.

> the heads of the Department[60] submit to the Governor General[61], Requisitions containing the number of Indians in each settlement and the quantities of goods wanted for their supply, which, when approved, is forwarded to the Commissariat, who thereupon forward the supply to the Station at which the issue is to take place, and for the first time debit the Indian Department with the cost.[62]

The accounts charged against the Indian Department by the Commissariat were then transferred to the Imperial Treasury which in turn transmitted them to the Audit Office, one of its subordinate branches at the time,[63] for payment. Thus, aside from the requisitioning which was based on the annual returns of Indian enrolment, and the actual distribution of the presents, Indian Officials simply played the role of the middleman in conveying the presents from the Commissariat to the Indians. It might also be added that a member of the Commissariat also attended the issue of

---

60 There were two separate departments after 1830, one for each of the two provinces.

61 Or the Lieutenant Governor, depending on the date.

62 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part V.

63 Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 214.

presents, and that in some cases, like that of the Six Nations Indians on the Grand River, the presents were simply handed in bulk to the Chiefs who performed the individual distribution among the members of their Tribes. It is small wonder, therefore, that Imperial authorities seriously contemplated abolishing the Indian Department per se and investigated the possibilities of merging it with the Commissariat.[64]

Such a transfer would have had the advantage of reducing the personnel and therefore also the monies expended on salaries, pensions and rations - expenses which were also charged against the Imperial Grant. Partly because of the renewed importance of the Indians to the Imperial interest during the rebellions of 1837-8, but more because of the concern about what harm would befall the Indians, the transfer never took place. As Sir Francis Bond Head indicated, the Government of the Indians required

> moral considerations and elastic Adaptations which are totally incompatible with the straight Railroad Habits of a Public Accountant....And it is quite evident to me, that if the Two Parties were brought into Contact, either the Accountant must abandon his Principles or the poor Indian must be made the Victim to the Four Rules of Arithmetic.
>
> The migration of these simple People from Equity to Law would be productive of the most serious Evils to them as well as to the Government.

---

64 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.396 Pt.4. Head to Glenelg, April 4, 1837.

> The Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, styled by the Indians "their Father", has, under the Direction of the Colonial Minister, hitherto treated them as his Children, but if any new regulations whatever were to be created to deprive him of Parentally governing these People according to their simple habits, and according to transient circumstances, they would be losers by the Arrangement; while on the other hand the breed of half-castes, who are every Day becoming more crafty and cunning, at the instigation of the Whites, would give a great deal of Trouble to the Government if they had anything to claim under strict Treasury Regulations; in short, I feel confident that the more the Indians are left to the Mercy of the Colonial Minister the better it would be for them; and I think highly politic that we should retain the advantage as well as the Disadvantage of possessing no written documents, or no fixed rule of governing the Indians beyond the will and pleasure of the Great Father, the King.[65]

Salaries of the Department officials - superintendent, interpreters and the occasional clerk and missionary, - also came from the annual sum voted by the British Parliament. The pay lists, however, did not have to travel the same circuitous route as the present returns. Instead they were paid through Governor General's warrants issued against the Commissariat. A similar arrangement was made for contingencies, which were also charged against the grant.

Since the Imperial Government insisted on retaining sovereignty over Indian affairs, the problem of Indian Lands fell into the Imperial lap as well. The Proclamation of 1763, protected Indian Lands from the encroachment of the Whites, excepting where the Tribes ceded them totally to

---

65 Ibid.

to the Crown. By 1841, the British had "relieved a large part of Upper Canada from Indian title, and had compensated the Indians by creating reservations and by granting... annuities".[66] The annuities were simply annual payments, in money or goods,[67] in perpetuity by the Crown to the Indians for the cession of their lands.

For a long time these payments were distributed in the same manner and form as the annual presents, and, like the presents, were charged against the Parliamentary Grant. But a double change took place in the annuities. First, once it became apparent that many Indians were using these "extra presents" to buy liquor, and once the process of civilization had begun, the annuities were often issued in the form of agricultural implements or else used to expedite the costs of building permanent dwellings for the Indians who took up a permanent residence. The settlements at Coldwater and St. Clair were built largely by this means. This meant, of course, that the Indians had to be given a voice in the use of these funds, and while the commutation from presents to useful articles seems to have been at first adopted with

---

66 A.G. Price, White Settlers and Native Peoples (Melbourne, 1949), p.68.

67 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.397. Head to Glenelg, July 18, 1837.

some reluctance,[68] gradually it became

> a settled arrangement between the several Tribes and the Chief Superintendent that no money is to be advanced in respect to these annuities except upon a requisition signed by the principal Chief or Chiefs stating the purpose for which it is required.[69] The Chief Superintendent, being satisfied that the money is necessary, prepares a warrant for the signature of the Lieutenant Governor, addressed to the Senior Commissariat Officer at the Post nearest to the place from which the requisition was sent.[70]

Secondly, in 1834, Lord Gosford ordered that henceforth these annuities be charged against the Territorial Revenue, and not the Parliamentary Grant, on the grounds that since a certain revenue was derived from the sale of these ceded lands, the revenue so gained should bear the cost of these surrenders.[71]

In some cases the terms of surrender stated that the lands were surrendered to "His Majesty in order that they may be sold for the benefit of the said Indians and for no other use...whatsoever".[72] In a fewer number of cases, all, or

---

68 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian Affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part V.

69 In 1844 this procedure was made official. The Resident Missionary or Schoolmaster and Interpreter were also expected to sign the requisition to certify that the Indians fully understood its nature. P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.612. Circular, Sept., 1844.

70 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part IV.

71 Ibid.

72 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.397. Head to Glenelg, July 18, 1837.

part, of the proceeds of these sales were to be used for the "general use of the Indian Tribes in Upper Canada".[73] And while the superintendence of these lands was a most important aspect of Indian affairs, it fell completely beyond the ken of the Indian Department. Instead the Crown was the agent in trust for these lands, and the management of their sales was conducted by the Commissioner of Crown Lands.

Once the land came under Crown control it was surveyed and inspected by the Surveyer General[74] and opened for sale in the same manner as other Crown Lands except that

> as in the case of the Clergy Reserve Lands, of which sale is also conducted by the Commissioners of Crown Lands, the Government, conceiving itself bound, as a trustee, to obtain the highest amount for the land without reference to general public interests, has authorized a system of receiving payment in annual instalments, instead of requiring the immediate payment of the whole sum.[75]

Before 1841 the sales were made through the Commissioner of Crown Lands office by auction under the authority of the Lieutenant Governor. This system was abandoned for various reasons, among them being the lowering of the prices through the collusion of the buyers.[76]

---

73 Ibid. See below, p.90.

74 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part IV.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

The money so collected by the Commissioner of Crown Lands was then used either to redeem warrants of the Governor General presented for Indian service, or else transferred the cash to the Chief Superintendent. This transfer, of course, took place only after the costs of management had been deducted, for the lands were expected to "live on their own". Unfortunately, the costs of management often exceeded the receipts.

According to a system worked out by Lord Sydenham in 1841 the management of all lands through the Crown Lands Department were lumped together and a percentage of the total costs charged against the different groups. Thus, the Crown Lands paid for 50% of the management costs, the Clergy Reserves 40% and the Indian Lands 10%. The Commissioners of 1842 disliked the system for two reasons.

Firstly, the Indians should not have been charged more than five per cent of the total cost.[77] Furthermore,

> ...the charge is unequal and most oppressive in its operation. It has no relation to the service actually performed during the current year, nor to the monies received. Hence, in any single year, the charge for which the whole of the Indian sales are liable, may fall on one or more Tribes, whose lands happen to be then productive, while in the next year, although the lands of the other Tribes may be equally productive, the former derive no exception on account of their payment in the previous year, but have to pay again in the same proportion as the others. Again it may

---

77 Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p.218.

> not unfrequently happen that the charge may exceed the whole receipts as was the case in the half year ended December 1842, when the amount collected for the Six Nations was 1451. 17s. 10d. currency, as their proportion of the disbursement for the half year carried forward until there should be funds, was 2211. 2s. 1d. [78]

In addition to these charges which covered only the costs of the central agency of the Crown Lands Commission, there was also the additional costs of inspection and surveying which were paid to the Survey-General's Office and also the commission of 5% on all collections which had to be paid to the agents of the Crown Lands Department. It was not for several years that the sales of Indian lands through the Crown Lands Office showed an overall profit among the various Tribes for whom the lands had been sold.[79]

Indian Affairs in Upper Canada, therefore, suffered from the absence of a focal centre, and from all appearances it would appear that the machinery was singularly ill-equipped to perform the task assigned to it. The Chief Superintendent in 1839, S.P. Jarvis, claimed that the problem could be solved by consolidating all aspects of Indian Affairs into one office.

---

78 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian affairs, with recommendations for amendment", Part III.

79 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part III.

"There appears," he said

> really a desire on the part of the other departments to participate in the onerous duties of the Indian Office. A Clerk in the Receiver-General's Office is made the Accountant of the Six Nations Indians. The Surveyor General surveys the Blocks of Indian Lands designed to be sold; the Commissioner of Crown Lands has the selling of them, ...The Surveyor General's Office has, I believe, a percentage or charge in some shape or other for surveying - the Commissioner of Crown Lands for selling - for receiving instalments - for keeping accounts - in fact for doing what should be the most important part of the duty of the Chief Superintendent, and yet hitherto that officer has not been allowed even a Clerk in assisting him in the daily necessary duties of the Department, although sums of money have been taken and expended from the Indian funds in percentages, and in rewarding the services of other departments - quite sufficient, and I believe more than sufficient, to have placed and maintained the Indian Office on a most respectable and efficient footing.[80]

Jarvis did have a good case, for such centralization would undoubtedly have allowed for a more complete and exact record of accounts, and perhaps it would also have allowed more efficiency in the management of the local affairs of the various Tribes. On the other hand, it must be remembered that after the responsibility passed from Imperial to Colonial control in 1860, Indian Affairs did become a separate branch of the civil service; and by no means can the policy pursued since that time be called more successful than that followed in the years before.

---

80 Report, 1839-40.

More immediate to our concern, however, is another consideration. A clientele department as advocated by S.P. Jarvis would unquestionably have increased administrative costs, for the Indian Department would then have had to employ experts in timber sales, accountants for the Indian annuities, land management specialists etc., whereas under the diffused system these tasks were performed as peripheral duties by members of the Commissariat, the Crown Lands Department, or the Surveyor General. The Commissioners appointed to investigate Indian Affairs in 1842 made a special note of this factor.[81] With this point in mind, it must also be remembered that the Lords of the Treasury had confined Indian expenditures to 20,000l. per annum, a sum which was overspent in 1841 and 1842 in spite of the strictest admonishments to economy from the Colonial Secretary. Expansion of the department, therefore, was virtually impossible.

This discussion, however, is entirely problematic. What concerns us must be the actual results of the decentralized system of management. And this, it seems to me, can best be stated in the words of Chief Superintendent Jarvis when he was defending himself against charges of superceding his

---

81 Report, 1847, Section III, "Present Mode of conducting Indian affairs, with recommendations for amendment," Part IV.

powers and of laxity in the administration of Indian affairs.

> I have already stated to you verbally and in writing, that it was not in my power to give the Commissioners the detailed statement they require. I have never had an accountant in the office, and the money transactions of the Department have, in a great measure, passed through the Commissariat, the Receiver General and the Crown Lands Office.
>
> On more than one occasion I have represented to the Government the difficulties under which I laboured for the want of a proper accountant; and the inconvenience which was occasioned by having three other Departments participating in the duties which should be conducted exclusively by the Indian Department; but up to the present period, all my efforts to have the office placed on a different and more efficient footing have proved unsuccessful.[82]

Unfortunately for Jarvis his explanations and excuses did not suffice to explain the "irregularities" which the Commissioners discovered in the Indian Affairs' accounts. A balance of 9002 l. was declared against him; Jarvis was dismissed from his post;[83] and the Governor's secretary assumed the position of Chief Superintendent ex officio in addition to his other duties.

The central office was ill-equipped to handle either the correspondence or the responsibilities of the department. The Indian agents acted too much on their own initiative and acted without the control over them that a properly organised central office would have been able to

---

82 "Return re correspondence with S.P. Jarvis etc....", J.L.A.C., 1847, Appendix V.V. Jarvis to R.W. Rawson, July 13, 1843.

83 Ibid. F. Ferguson to J.M. Higginson, Nov.15, 1844.

provide. Major Indian problems sought solutions from too many sources. Ultimate sanction for all major decisions had to be transmitted across the Atlantic from the Colonial Secretary, the Army Commissariat, or the Lords of the Treasury, while in Canada the various accounts had to pass through the Lieutenant Governor, the Crown Lands office, the Surveyor General, the Commissariat officials, the Chief Superintendent, and sometimes even the local missionaries. In short, "there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians".

Machinery of the Indian Department



Chapter IV

Coldwater and the Narrows Reserve

Once the general aim had been postulated, debated and finally adopted, the next logical step was to put the whole plan into operation. The Chippewa Tribes of Lakes Huron and Simcoe, numbering about 500,[1] and led by three chiefs - John Aisence, YellowHead and Snake - had, in 1815 surrendered land around Penetanguishene to the government and remained scattered in "the rear of what was then termed "The Home District."[2] General Darling reported in 1828 that "these Indians expressed a strong desire to accept Christianity and adopt the habits of civilized life"[3]. These bands, therefore, were among the first chosen to benefit from the new attitude of the Indian department.[4]

Accordingly, Lt. Governor Sir John Colbourne collected them, under the guidance of Captain T.G. Anderson as superintendent, on the "Coldwater and Narrows Reserve", a tract of land on the northwest shore of Lake Simcoe. William Hawkins, the

---

1 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.59. Anderson to Colbourne, Sept.24, 1835.

2 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol. 788. Copy of Memorandum on Indian Affairs, File 27006-1, vol.1, 1925.

3 Ibid.

4 Similar experiments were begun at this same time at the St. Clair River and at Colbourne on the Thames. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Aboriginal Tribes (North America, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, and British Guiana). Parliamentary Paper No.617, 1834. Colbourne to Murray, Oct. 14, 1830.

Deputy Surveyor, described the reserve in 1833.

> This reserve is situate about 90 Miles North of York; is bounded at the North West end by the Township of Tay; and from which it stretches in a South Easterly direction for about 14 Miles until coming to Lake Simcoe; its greatest breadth is 1½ miles.[5]

Hawkins also described the general features of the reserve:

> The general feature of the reserve is level, though there are many steep hills in it.... It is well watered, having the Coldwater and North Rivers passing through it, with many tributary streams which flow to them....
>
> The general quality of Soil is a light covering of black loam; but is variable as to its quality and depth....[6]

It was on this site, then, that the great experiment would begin.

The three tribes were to be disposed in settlements at the Narrows, at Coldwater and along the road which would be built to link these two locations.[7] At each end of the reserve the Indians would clear land for a "general farm" which would provide rations for them while they then cleared land of their own for cultivation - with each individual family being granted a sixteen acre lot. While the natives were thus engaged white

---

5 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.53. William Hawkins, "Report and Description of the Indian Reserve between Lakes Simcoe and Coldwater," p.1. The reserve covered an area of about 9,800 acres.

6 Ibid. pp. 3-5.

7 The original plan had been to build farms at the Narrows and Matchedash and to link the two with a road. The latter was replaced by Coldwater because this location was more in a direct line between Penetanguishene and the Narrows.

labourers would assume the task of building log houses[8] for the permanent settlement of the Indians at the three locations already mentioned. In this way it was anticipated that the Indians would soon recognize the inherent benefits to be derived from industry on the land and would soon be able to support themselves from the proceeds of their farming. Experienced and capable white farmers and mechanics would also be employed at the Establishment (to be situated at Coldwater) to guide, instruct and set examples for the Indians in these tasks.[9] It was anticipated that permanent homes and a stationary food supply, would convince the Indians of the superiority of a settled life over a nomadic existence which depended upon the rather risky income from hunting and fishing. In short, the Indian Department was to provide the initial capital expenditure for establishing the Indians as profitable farmers.

In addition the reserve was strategically placed between the white communities of Orillia and Penetanguishene and from surveyor Hawkins' report it is evident that the road from the Narrows to Coldwater provided the easiest transport from Lake Simcoe to Penetanguishene. It was proposed, therefore, that the Indians build a road over the fourteen mile route and

---

8 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Aboriginal Tribes. Colbourne to Murray, Oct. 14, 1830.

9 Ibid. and P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.46. Givins to Anderson, Mar.5, 1830. Also P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Mar. 30, 1830.


Gloucester Bay
Matchedash or Severn
7th Fall
Matchedash Bay
Matchedash
North River
Small Rapids
50 wide
2d Do
Mouth
Upper Fall
Creek
The South River may be made navigable for Boats as high as H
H
R
A
S
B
R
Road
Chief Yellowhead's Island
The Narrows
Long Point N
N
W
E
S
Creek
Kempenfelt Bay
Lake Simcoe
R.R.
S – Go

enter the transport business[10] which would, hopefully, also provide them with an income, and thus relieve the department of some expense. In any case, both the farming and the transport line would force them to take up permanent residence and wean them away from their wandering habits. It was further expected that

> The Western Indians, and those from the northern shore of Lake Huron who repair annually to this quarter to receive their presents, will.... be prevailed on to abandon, gradually, their present mode of life, and to follow the example of the Indians at these stations, when they see the advantages resulting from civilization.[11]

While these activities were taking place, schoolmasters would instruct the Indian children in the "three R's", hygiene and the virtues of civilized life in schoolhouses to be built at the Narrows and at Coldwater;[12] missionaries would, at the same time, tend to their spiritual welfare and acquaint all natives with the joys of organized Christianity.

No doubt all concerned with the project - Colbourne, Givins, Anderson, Jones etc. - left the drawing board with feelings of definite satisfaction. They had covered all angles; the Indians would become farmers and Christians once they recognized the benefits to be derived; they would soon take charge of their own affairs and the Crown would have

---

10 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Nov.6, 1830.

11 Ibid.

12 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.59. Anderson to Colbourne, Sept.24, 1835.

several hundred more solid citizens in its North American colonies. As it turned out, these Chippewa Tribes of Lake Simcoe did take charge of their own affairs on March 31, 1837,[13] but with some disastrous results. By 1838, they had left their farms and were disposed on Beausoleil Island,[14] Rama and Snake Island.[15] The seven year programme simply had not prepared them sufficiently for the new way of life - and the old problem, the advance of white civilization.

The Coldwater establishment suffered, as did the entire Indian Department, from a chronic shortage of funds. The organization and machinery of the department moved too slowly; Anderson was overworked; rival religious groups served in too many cases to confuse the Indians; the Establishment personnel was often incompetent and sometimes even retarded progress; and of course the white man, who surrounded the reserve, hindered Indian progress by encroachment on reserved land and by distributing whiskey amongst the Indians. Perhaps the greatest reason for the failure of the project was the Indian himself; Indian temperament, it seems, simply could not allow the rapid transition demanded by the department and often all progress stopped at the Establishment because the Indians reverted to their old habits. Anderson himself complained

---

13 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.501. Givins to Anderson, Oct.26, 1836.

14 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.788. Copy of Memorandum on Indian Affairs, File 27006-1, vol.1, 1925.

15 Part of this band migrated to Manitoulin Island upon the suggestion of the Indian Department. P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.612. Anderson to Campbell, Dec.13, 1847.

that they required constant supervision; and perhaps if the department had continued to control things at Coldwater for a longer period the scheme might have succeeded. But the department abandoned it in 1837 to try a new experiment at the Manitoulin Island. None of the above reasons acted independently, and as we look at Coldwater in the years from 1830 to 1837 we will see how each project suffered from one or all of them.

Before any progress could be made the Establishment had to be put on its feet. Anderson divided the Indians into work platoons for service at Coldwater, the Narrows and the road[16] between the two; work began in the early spring of 1830.

By June of 1831 enough land had been cleared at Coldwater, and the Narrows to allow 37½ acres to be planted with Indian corn, oats, pease, spring wheat, potatoes and turnips, enough claimed Anderson,[17] to see the Indians through the winter. This meant, of course, that rations, which had been provided for those Indians who had been clearing land, could be reduced. This was most fortunate since the funds available to the Establishment were very limited[18] and a money shortage had

---

16 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Aug.24, 1830.

17 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.48. Anderson to Givins, May 1, 1830.

18 The department was operating on such a strict budget that Anderson was told to have a house built for himself, but he was to lead the contractor to believe that he (Anderson) was to build it at his own expense, since the house could probably be then obtained at a more reasonable rate. P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, May 25, 1830.

already prevented the purchase, in August 1830, of oxen, horses and other items essential to farming.[19]

In the meantime, Anderson had also divided the road into three sections, each to be completed by one of the three tribes on the reserve.[20] By June 1830, the Potaganasees had finished underbrushing their section; Aisence and Yellow Head had finished only one half of their's. Before the winter, a tolerable road had been completed, and in January Anderson presented the topic of a transport system to the Indians.[21] This would seem to be considerable progress; but we must consider other facts as well. Anderson had been predicting the opening of the road since early July.[22] He also reported that many Indians resented the work and wished to return to hunting[23] and that a camp meeting had held up work for 8-10 days. From these reports it seems that the Indians did not take to this type of labour with enthusiasm. A glance at Anderson's account book showing the payment due to Indians during the Fall of 1830 reveals this to be true. Payment was called for a total of 197 days labour, performed by 45 different men, some of whom worked as many as 12 days, others as few as one.[24] In fact, Colbourne was so discouraged by the Indians' attitude that he directed Givins to tell Anderson that

---

19 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Aug.24, 1830.
20 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, May 1, 1830.
21 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Jan.24, 1831.
22 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.46. Anderson to Givins, July 1, 1830.
23 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.46. Anderson to Givins, May 31, 1830.
24 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Jan.6, 1831.

> If you still find them as impractical to deal with as they have proved themselves, that it may be better to locate only such Indians as appear inclined to take possession of the Houses built and to cultivate the ground allotted to them and to break up the Establishment.[25]

Anderson did not write an unencouraging letter to York for three months!

But when he reported in February, the news must have been disheartening to Colbourne. After listening to Anderson's proposal about engaging in the transport business along the new road and considering the expense and work involved,[26] the Indians turned down the suggestion, a Colbourne original!

> They decline laying out so large a portion of their annual payments for that object, alleging that very little would remain to supply themselves with stock and furniture for their new mode of life, but that in two or three years they will have settled on their farms and have a stock of working cattle.... and the road will have undergone a thorough repair and they will enter upon the business with confidence; but in the meantime they wish the Contractor for Transport to make use of their road and pay them something annually for it.[27]

Equally discouraging was the Indian attitude towards their farms. They were simply too indolent to please Anderson who complained that unless they were supervised constantly "they do not work one half their time";[28] and they were supposed

---

25 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Nov.23, 1830.

26 Anderson told them that they must put the road in good repair in the Spring of that year and that any goods which were provided for them were to be paid for out of the money received from the transport income. He also explained that if they lost or broke any of the goods, they would have to pay for them. P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47, Anderson to Givins, Jan.24, 1831.

27 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Feb.27, 1831.

28 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, April 11, 1831.



N T E
O R I L L A
O R O
or
settled
Y T S B U R Y
Cold water Road 14 miles
Indian Village
Bristol Channel or Cooteeching Lake
MARA
narrows
Shingle bay
8 mile point
Road
Capt Davis
LAKE
SIMCOE
Big bay point


NTE
A
ORO
or
settled
YTSBURY
ORILLA
MARA
LAKE
SIMCOE
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Cold water Road 16 miles
Indian Village
Bristol Channel
or
Cocteeching Lake
Shingle bay
narrows
9mile point
Road
Big bay point
Mr Hewson

to be working for themselves, a task for which the department paid them and provided rations as well. Anderson, on the Lieutenant Governor's sanction, began a system of piece work rather than daily payments.[29] Three weeks later he could report that Aisence and several of his tribe had begun clearing small patches for potatoes and that Yellow Head's tribe had "in two weeks chopped 15 acres for a farm near the Narrows."[30]

Perhaps an additional cause of the Indian disinclination to clear land for themselves was the fact that their land was to be located near the houses which were being built for them along the road, and these houses were raised at a very slow rate. Anderson began building these in 1830; his duties as superintendent kept him too busy to supervise this job properly and so the job was contracted out; and here the problems began. The first contractor, Lewis, neglected his job badly and buildings he had completed had to be repaired [31] by Mr. Berman who took over his contract in 1831.[32] Berman also failed to meet the contract requirements;[33] Anderson again tried to have the job done by contracting out small portions of it,

---

29 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Foote to Anderson, April 20, 1831.

30 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, May 12, 1831.

31 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.48. Anderson to Givins, July 30, 1831.

32 Ibid.

33 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.49. Anderson to Givins, Sept.26, 1831.

but his other duties were again too much to allow this and finally a third contract was issued to a Mr. McDonald in October 1832.[34] McDonald apparently completed the houses that were needed. Indians moved into the houses as these were made ready. But only fourteen were occupied by December of 1831, despite the desire to have them all finished by that Fall.

On the whole, either the houses were not completed, or else the Indians declined to occupy them permanently, although certainly most of the 500 Indians on the reserve did have a semi-permanent residence. There was enough Indian settlement by 1835 for Anderson to claim that the general result had been

> that each Indian with a family has now a little farm under cultivation, in which he raises not only Potatoes and Indian Corn, but also Wheat, Oats, Pease and etc. His wigwam is exchanged for the loghouse. Hunting has in many cases been altogether abandoned and in none appears, as formerly, to be resorted to as the only means of subsistence--habitual intoxication is unknown, the Sabbath is carefully observed--their religious duties strictly adhered to--and reading and writing with a moderate knowledge of arithmetic is almost universal among the young people...[35]

This picture might be questioned by noting that the Indians still embarked on lengthy hunting trips,[36] and still moved about en masse on occasion. There could be some doubt cast on the value they placed on these loghouses, too, if we consider Aisence's statements about them. He wanted them

---

34 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.52. McDonald to Givins, Oct.4, 1832.

35 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.59. Anderson to Colbourne, Sept.24, 1835.

36 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.63. Anderson to Givins, Oct.31, 1836.

built in a line like the village at York "that we may see the people passing to and fro".[37] Also we might question the value of a farm to them, or the inherent value of their new way of life. They undoubtedly did appreciate the produce which resulted, but this was not inducement enough to work harder or to apply their presents and annuities to agricultural purposes. In some instances they did ask for horses or oxen to help with their labours but these animals were not properly treated[38] and the casualty rate among Indian farm animals was appalling. As late as the summer of 1834 Yellow Head declined to have his annuities applied to agricultural purposes, and at the same time Anderson complains of their lethargy towards farming, certainly something that an industrious person like the Captain could not understand.

> I would beg leave to observe that these Indians will not duly appreciate the advantages to be had from laying out their funds as the whites do and unless they are in some measure forced like children to comply with what is known to be for their good in this respect their money will not be of any real benefit to them or their children for years to come.
>
> Notwithstanding their pleading poverty, it is remarkable that they are generally better dressed than the middling class of white settlers and when at their work, they are far better dressed than the poor white settler in his Sunday clothes, in fact there is no set of profits, labourers or farmers who have so good an opportunity of bettering their condition if they would only be industrious and exert themselves.

---

37 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.46. Anderson to Givins, July 19, 1830.

38 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Feb.21, 1831.

> I often represent to them the thriving situation of the poor white man around them who have nothing to depend upon but their industry and by which they bring up large families. But no argument of this kind appears to affect them, they will still idle their time in fishing etc.[39]

It would appear, then, that the Indian himself was not yet ready to adopt a settled mode of life. To compound this very basic difficulty there were other factors which retarded progress. First among these is the fact that the instrument charged with their conversion was badly equipped with money and personnel to do the job. As we have seen the entire department was accorded only 11,500l.[40], and the Coldwater establishment cut into this deeply. Anderson received constant admonitions to economise and on several occasions definite cuts were ordered. The establishment was ordered reduced in 1832;[41] payment to Indians repairing the road was abolished in 1831;[42] work had to stop on the schoolhouse in Spring of 1831;[43] and a carpenter instructor could not be hired in April of 1831.[44] Anderson's budget for

---

39 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.56. Anderson to Givins, Aug.4, 1834.

40 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Feb.14, 1831.

41 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.500. Givins to Anderson, Nov.15, 1832.

42 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, May 10, 1831.

43 Ibid.

44 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Foote to Anderson, April 29, 1831.

farming expenses was limited to 250 l. in 1831 and in 1833 the entire allotment to the Establishment was 2,500 l.[45] In all these instances - (and there were many more) - some important project was halted or slowed down.

Perhaps it was for these financial reasons, perhaps because of the isolation of the reserve, perhaps because of the nature of the Indians, that competent people could not be found to assist Anderson. The turnover among the help was great; no two pay lists (issued monthly) contain all the same names. And the organization of the department (See Chapter II) occasionally resulted in the loss of good help. One man, a carpenter by the name of Morgan, whom Anderson liked, waited over two months for permission for Anderson to hire him, before he finally left to gain work elsewhere,[46] and a good man was lost to the Establishment. Anderson also found himself the victim of the system. He complained in 1831 that

> Under existing circumstances, the Superintendent's time is fully occupied in keeping accounts and other writings, totally neglecting his more peculiar duty of instructing etc. and encouraging the Indians to work and attend to their Farms; and while this continues to be the case they will advance but slowly towards a state of civilization, for their habits are such, that unless the person appointed to instruct them be constantly with them and willing to set the example in all their work they will not labour with constancy.[47]

---

45 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.500. Givins to Wickens (Commissariat at Penetanguishene), June 26, 1833.

46 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, April 14, 1831. It required from ten days to two weeks for mail to get from York to Coldwater.

47 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.48. Anderson to Givins, July 22, 1831.

Furthermore Anderson was an Indian agent, not an accountant, and he found himself confused by the Commissariat's "peculiar form of document" which were invariably returned for renewal with the result that he lived in fear of the accounts ending in a state of utter confusion.[48] He made repeated requests for an accountant, even offering to use his son at his own expense but this request was never granted.

Another disturbing consideration of the reserve was the proximity and encroachment of the white settlers. The most dangerous factor was that the white man sold liquor to the Indian. Yellow Head and Aisence complained of this several times. One source was the work force employed by the two contractors. Men engaged in transport also carried spirits with them. In all cases, the result was disastrous for the Indian, who would give up anything while intoxicated. The constant efforts of all those engaged in trying to promote Indian interests to stop liquor from reaching the reserves is testimony to the evil effects of liquor on the Indian. The reserve, however, was surrounded by white settlements and little could be done to prevent it. The only way that men could be prosecuted was for selling liquor without a licence.[49] It was therefore with great concern that Anderson

---

48 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.48. Anderson to Givins, June 13, 1832.

49 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Jan.25, 1832.

reported the construction of two buildings - a store and a house of entertainment - on lots close to the reserve.

> Grog shops are fitting up on many of the adjacent Lots, owned by private individuals and they will at all times, find means of distributing it.[50]

The Indians were aware that the white man was more skilled in the crafts than they were. The department had hoped that white men could be used to train the Indians, and in some cases this did happen. But the Indians often simply hired white men to do their work and used the annuities to pay them. This was one of the major reasons why Anderson could not convince the Chippewas to lay out their money on agriculture and do the work themselves. That way they had to spend their money and work too. It was much easier to hire white men and by June of 1831 they owed 10351. 8s. 2½d., a sum which far exceeded what they expected.[51] The Indians simply could not manage their money. And when they were in debt, Aisence and Yellow Head continued to ask for advances on their land payments so they could liquidate their debts. Otherwise, they argued, they would have to hunt and fish to get the money and would not be able to farm as the Lieutenant Governor wished them to do![52] Onee again, the closeness of the white man hindered their progress.

---

50 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.51. Anderson to Givins, July 7, 1832.

51 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.48. Anderson to Givins, June 27, 1831.

52 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Mar.19, 1831.

This was not the only time that Aisence and Yellow Head provided headaches for Captain Anderson. Early in the life of the Coldwater Establishment these two Indians journeyed to York where they had levied several charges against their superintendent. These charges accused Anderson of stealing goods and supplies and, while distributing the presents, of giving liberally to those who brought presents for him while retaining "a portion from those who brought nothing".[53] Yellow Head, apparently, "expressed sorrow at having made the charges"[54] shortly afterwards, but Aisence refused to repent for over two weeks,[55] and, according to Anderson, even after acknowledging "that he has in two instances made false reports of me to the Governor" he "still says bad things about me in the country where he lives."[56] These charges angered Anderson to the extent that on January 20, 1831, he wrote to Givins.

> ...After having served His Majesty for upwards of seventeen years in various capacities and often in highly responsible situations, that my honesty and integrity should now be called in question by a worthless savage, influenced probably by a more worthless council is mortifying in the extreme.[57]

---

53 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, Jan.12, 1831.

54 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Jan.20, 1831.

55 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Feb.2, 1831.

56 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Feb.21, 1831.

57 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Jan.20, 1831.

The behaviour of Aisence and others would continue to plague Anderson. Later, as we shall see, Aisence was joined by Tawgawinine and the two of them caused confusion among the Indians, in this case over religion. This had some very bad effects on the schools and the attendance at them by the Indian children.

School buildings for boarding students were completed early in the year 1832 at both the Narrows and Coldwater.[58] For the year and a half prior to this, a Mr. Robertson had conducted classes in an Indian house at Coldwater with sufficient success[59] to allow Anderson to write encouragingly about the prospects of the new schools. All the Indian boys and girls from 6 to 15 were to be admitted as boarders where they would be provided with clothes and lodging. Half breeds could enter for a fee of 7l. 10s. per year and those over 15 could attend as day scholars.[60] The children were to be given a basic academic education and instructed "in the various mechanical branches".[61]

---

58 For the Narrows see P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.49. Anderson to Gilbert Miller, Methodist missionary, Nov.21, 1831. For Coldwater see P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Givins to Anderson, Feb. 18, 1832.

59 By this time two teachers had already been dismissed; one for incompetence and one for excessive drinking.

60 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Anderson to Givins, Feb.3, 1832.

61 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.55. Anderson to Givins, May 29, 1834.

Regulation number 9 dictated that "Every exertion must be used to encourage a desire to be cleanly, their hair must be cut short and much praise bestowed on those who are most tidy",[62] a regulation that indicates how the school was expected to aid in the civilizing of the Indians.

To accomplish this purpose Anderson expressed a need for dedicated teachers "devoted to the cause".[63] Such an animal was a rarity throughout Upper Canada in the 1830's, and many a schoolhouse remained closed due to a lack of teachers to open the doors.[64] An Indian station, isolated as Coldwater was, would have an even greater difficulty in attracting capable instructors[65] than the regular common schools. Even so, according to Anderson's reports to Colonel Givins it appears that at least two men - a Mr. Rowe[66] and a Mr. Burkett[67] - had considerable success at the Establishment.

---

62 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Anderson to Givins, Feb.3, 1832.

63 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, Feb.4, 1831. Also P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.56. Anderson to Givins, Sept.8, 1834.

64 Report of the Royal Commission on Education in Ontario (Toronto, 1950), p.22.

65 In some ways, however, the Indian Department did have some advantages over the usual pioneer school situation. The teacher could be sure of gaining a monetary salary and he was also given living quarters; these were two amenities which were not always available in the common schools of the 1830's.

66 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Anderson to Givins, March 6, 1832.

67 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.500. Givins to Anderson, Dec.22, 1834.

The Indians themselves compounded the difficulties. Late in 1834 Anderson reported that "the Indians and their children appear much pleased with his (Mr. Burkett) mode of teaching",[68] but in early 1836 his report stated "that in consequence of the Indians' dissatisfaction with Mr. Burkett there has not been any school at this place for some time...."[69] The Indians, at this point, requested that a Mr. Andrew Robertson take Burkett's place, which change Anderson duly requested saying that "Mr. Robertson is quite competent to the duties"[70] and added that perhaps "this would satisfy this simple and fickle people...."[71] On several occasions also, enrolment in the school dropped drastically because the Indians embarked on a hunting or fishing expedition and insisted on taking the children with them.[72] One time when this happened the reason given was that the children were not supervised properly at the school and the adults feared that the bigger boys would injure the smaller ones.[73]

---

68 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.56. Anderson to Givins, Nov.16, 1834.

69 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.61. Anderson to Givins, April 1, 1836.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 For example, see P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.63. Anderson to Givins, Oct.31, 1836.

73 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.53. Anderson to Givins, June 27, 1833.

The Indians themselves compounded the difficulties. Late in 1834 Anderson reported that "the Indians and their children appear much pleased with his (Mr. Burkett) mode of teaching",[68] but in early 1836 his report stated "that in consequence of the Indians' dissatisfaction with Mr. Burkett there has not been any school at this place for some time...."[69] The Indians, at this point, requested that a Mr. Andrew Robertson take Burkett's place, which change Anderson duly requested saying that "Mr. Robertson is quite competent to the duties"[70] and added that perhaps "this would satisfy this simple and fickle people...."[71] On several occasions also, enrolment in the school dropped drastically because the Indians embarked on a hunting or fishing expedition and insisted on taking the children with them.[72] One time when this happened the reason given was that the children were not supervised properly at the school and the adults feared that the bigger boys would injure the smaller ones.[73]

---

68 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.56. Anderson to Givins, Nov.16, 1834.

69 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.61. Anderson to Givins, April 1, 1836.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 For example, see P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.63. Anderson to Givins, Oct.31, 1836.

73 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.53. Anderson to Givins, June 27, 1833.

Religious and academic instruction to the Indians and their children can not be separated since the ministers and teachers at Coldwater and the Narrows concerned themselves with both aspects of education. This was a natural consequence since in the 1830's these two fields were felt to be so mutually dependent. A harbinger of the problems which would arise because of this idea came early in the history of the establishment. In May of 1830 we find Givins writing to Anderson to say that Colbourne, having heard that the Methodist Societies

> formed for the purpose of converting the Indian tribes in the Province Complain of the interference of the Indian Department; His Excellency has directed me to request that you will be particularly cautious, that the Methodist Instructors and Missionaries are never interrupted in forming their schools as communicating Religious instructions to the Tribes under your charge; but you will acquaint them that their assistance will be always received with satisfaction.[74]

For a short period, co-operation between the missionaries and the department did exist. In 1830 and 1831, the Methodists operated through the department channels to make requests for land,[75] for stores,[76] and for the use of the schoolhouse at the Narrows for their teachers.[77] In all cases their requests

---

74 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, May 31, 1830.

75 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.47. Anderson to Givins, April 7, 1831.

76 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, July 5, 1830. With this despatch Givins sent 100 copies of the Bible for Mr. Archbald, the Methodist missionary, to use as he saw fit. This letter also orders Anderson to give "Mr. Archbald every assistance you can".

77 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.49. Mr. Gilbert Miller to Anderson, Oct.24, 1831.

were granted, to the extent that the schoolhouse at the Narrows was built attached to the Methodist meeting house,[78] and it seemed that the two groups would be able to unite their efforts towards the civilizing of the Indians committed to their care. It should have been easy, it seems, since surely the important factor was the progress of the Indians to embrace Christianity, in some form, and, with this spiritual guidance, become better citizens.

It soon became apparent, however, that this situation could not last, and this general spirit of co-operation degenerated into an uneasy truce. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Establishment was considered to be a Church of England advocate, a notion that Anderson did nothing to dispell; the appearance of Roman Catholics augmented the religious bickering; and the Chippewas were caught in the middle.

The first open breach appeared in December of 1831 at a meeting attended by Anderson, Mr. Rowe (the schoolmaster at Coldwater), the two Methodist missionaries, and some Indians. Some rather bitter accusations were made, according to Anderson's report.

> Mr. Currie (the Methodist Missionary at Coldwater) then made a speech of some length, the purpose of which was to insist that we were intruders, that we had commenced our Establishment on ground that they had pre-occupied,

---

78 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, July 12, 1830.

> that we were forcing from their school children whom they, the Methodists, had Christianised, that this Establishment was raised at the expense of the Indians, that the Church of England never has done any good to the Heathen and finally that he would protest against our arrangement...."[79]

From this, and other correspondence, it becomes evident that the Methodists and the Establishment simply did not co-operate in matters of religion. All the blame should not be laid with the Methodists, however, for Anderson refers haughtily to the Methodists on more than one occasion and himself advocates the placing of an Anglican missionary at Coldwater. He once suggested that a Presbyterian clergyman who visited the reserve, be so employed. There appears to have been no Roman Catholic missionary stationed on the reserve, although one priest, Rev. Bennet, visited the reserve from Penetanguishene to baptize, preach, hear confessions, and say mass.[80] As a result no official open hostility occurred between the Catholics and the others, but the deep antipathy which Anderson held for the Church of Rome[81] could not but create some difficulty in his dealings with the Catholic Indians.

---

79 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.49. Anderson to Givins, Dec.12, 1831. See also Mr. Rowe's views on the meeting in P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.49. Rowe to Anderson, Dec.12, 1831.

80 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.52. Anderson to Givins, Nov.5,1832.

81 See below, p.159.

This religious controversy affected both the white men charged with the task of carrying Christianity to the Indians, and the Indians themselves. In the case of the former, it meant that these men lost sight of their primary objective, and this, of course, hurt their cause; in the case of the latter, the result was more serious because the Indians could not separate Church and state in any way. They could not distinguish between the spiritual life and material wealth as represented by the missionaries and the Establishment, but seemed to feel that both had to be entirely right or entirely wrong. Thus if the Churchmen gave faulty advice about farming etc., it meant that their theology was also faulty. Hence, this division had, as we shall see, a most detrimental effect on their conduct, their labour, their attitude towards whites and Indians of other denominations, and towards their schools. In short, the varying creeds confused them, and the unfriendly relations between Methodist, agent and priest and the advice given by each served only to augment this confusion.

In July of 1831, some Indians reported to Anderson that the Methodist preachers had been criticizing him, and saying that the Establishment was of no value to them. The Indians also stated, wrote Anderson,

> that they (the preachers) not only censured me, but those who were doing the most good for them; that the preachers asked the Indians what they were to do with those carts, horses, oxen etc. sent to them; I will

> tell you, said one, take them down to the lake and throw them into it, they are good for nothing and all the government does for you is good for nothing.[82]

Needless to say, Anderson replied to these charges to both the Indians (to whom he took some pains to explain the value of their oxen, etc.) and to the Chief Superintendent. And when Egerton Ryerson suggested that the "advice given (by the missionaries) was both prudent and loudly called for"[83] Anderson again replied that Ryerson had been misinformed, that the Methodists had exaggerated their success at Coldwater, that they had constantly given bad advice to the Indians, that they had not taught them to read or write, and that they were jealous of his success.[84] The matter eventually cleared itself up, but not until the school had been closed

---

82 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.48. Anderson to Jarvis, July 1, 1831.

83 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Ryerson to McMahon, Acting Secretary to the Lt.Governor, Jan.12, 1832.

84 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Anderson to Givins, Feb.8, 1832. Also P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Anderson to Givins, April 18, 1832. In this letter Anderson states that Rowe <u>did</u> teach the Indians to read; and that these same children had been taught, before Rowe's arrival, by the Methodists, and they were unable to pass simple reading tests conducted by Rowe.

for some time,[85] and not without bitterness among the whites and confusion among the Indians.[86]

In October of 1832, Bishop Alexander McDonald, Roman Catholic Bishop at York, wrote to Tawgawinine, an Indian at Coldwater.

> Your letter of the 1st inst. was delivered to me by your countrymen from Coldwater, and they told me that you kept your promise to me faithfully which gave me great pleasure and satisfaction, and as long as you continue to follow the instructions which I gave you or which any priest that I will send you may give you, you may rest assured that I will not allow any other layman to take your place. You have been informed by me and any other priest that taught you Religion that there is but one God and one good and true religion and that good and true religion is the Catholic religion and that no other Religion can be good but the Catholic Religion. If any man tell you that every Religion be good you must not believe him, and you will tell the Indian not to believe him. This is what I told you

---

85 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.50. Ryerson to McMahon, Jan.12, 1832.

86 It is quite possible that the Methodists had been simply preaching a sermon and admonishing the Indians about the evils of "building up treasures on earth". The wording might have been something like this. "The goods which the government has provided are of no use unless you prepare yourself for the next world. You might just as well throw those wagons etc. in the lake if you do not tend to your spiritual life as well." An argument like this could easily have been misunderstood by the Indians; and with relations strained as they were between Anderson and the Methodists it is entirely possible that he did not inquire of the missionaries about it, but simply accused them of giving bad advice to the Indians.

> when I saw you last and I am very glad you kept it in your heart and hope you will always keep it in your heart. I send out a priest along with the Indians to hear the confessions of the Indians of Coldwater and to say mass for them. They will take him to Penetanguishene where he will remain for some short time to serve both the Indians and other Catholics there, but the people of Penetanguishene and of Coldwater will endeavour to make some sort of collection to defray the expenses of the priest. I hope you will be as kind to him as you can and get the Indians to accompany him to Penetanguishene and afterwards on his return to Coldwater.[87]

This letter gains in importance when we learn that John Aisence converted from Methodism to Catholicism[88] so that now a large Catholic population lived on the reserve.[89] The result again was confusion among the Indians. The Catholic Indians interrupted morning prayers at the school;[90] one woman accused the teacher of being more attentive to the Methodists than to the Catholic children;[91] and when Anderson

---

87 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.52. Bishop A. MacDonald to Mr. Tawgawinine, Oct.14, 1832, enclosed in Anderson to Givins, Nov.4, 1832.

88 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.51. Anderson to Givins, Sept.24, 1832.

89 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.53. Hawkins, "Report and Description of the Indian Reserve between Lake Simcoe and Coldwater", p.4. There were about 100 Catholics and 434 Methodists in 1833.

90 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.52. Anderson to Givins, Nov.5, 1837.

91 Ibid.

admonished her for this, the Catholic girls left the school.[92]

More serious instances of this controversy took place. It contributed to a tribal feud, for when Aisence became a Catholic many of his tribe (Methodists) "declared they would not obey his Orders, said they would emigrate to some other part of the country and take their children from the school."[93] Later Chief Yellow Head refused to allow a Catholic Teacher "under any circumstances" thus depriving the Narrows' school of a teacher which it badly needed. It caused a cessation of industry on the part of some of Aisence's band. In May of 1834, Anderson reported.

> With regard to the Catholic Indians there appears something lurking in the minds of John Aisence and Tawgawinine, which I cannot make out; they are now idling between this and Penetanguishene while all the others of the two tribes who laugh at their folly are more earnestly engaged in farming than ever before. I do however believe that the correspondence kept up between these people and Bishop McDonald is productive of much evil. Tawgawinine, I understand, employed Henry Soloman, who is well known to be a vile character to make long and grieving representations

---

92 Apparently the girls had been instructed by Tawgawinine and Aisence. It is perhaps important to note that when the Catholic girls started to leave, the other girls (Methodists) did not understand the reason and began to leave also. Anderson stopped the Methodist girls in time, but it is another example of the confusion caused by religious troubles.

93 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.56. Anderson to Givins, Sept.24, 1834. Anderson convinced them to stay.

> perfectly regarding whether they be true or false, while his Lordship takes all as a matter of course and by this means his letters probably being misinterpreted or misunderstood, a kind of feverish intercourse appears to be kept up which at all events cannot forward the civilization of the poor nation.[94]

The entire affair caused Anderson considerable consternation. He expressed his concern and a possible solution to Givins in May, 1834. After remarking on the importance of the school in the process of civilization, he stated that

> before any good of consequences can be done either at this school or the one at the Narrows, a change must be made in the mode of conducting them; for so long as the same family as it were have teaching from sects, at variance with each other in their creed, the Indians will remain in doubt with whom to choose and thus the children will be kept in ignorance, and be trained in uncontrollable idleness.
>
> It is a subject which causes me much uneasiness but to find a remedy is not an easy matter. If a proper missionary and teacher belonging to the church could be got and if the Methodists (who could find ample room for their missionaries elsewhere) would cordially withdraw their influences, I believe the schools would soon be made to prosper; if this however can not be done I feel it my duty (from a desire for the improvement of the Indians) to say that it would be better to give up their education and religious instruction to a certain extent to the Methodist.[95]

---

94 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.55. Anderson to Givins, May 29, 1834.

95 Ibid.

Moreover, probably in reference to Aisence and his band, he added.

> I believe also the better plan is to leave the disaffected to themselves, to render to those who show a disposition to improve their situation every convenient assistance and let those who insist upon remaining in ignorance and idleness be made sensible of their folly at leisure.[96]

In the end a sort of compromise was reached. The schools were to be operated on a non-denominational basis as far as possible for all the children. And since there were no mission houses or churches, the schoolhouses could be used by each denomination on Sundays at times specified by Anderson, each group receiving equal time.[97] This solution, however, proved little more than an uneasy truce, for until the death of the Establishment in March of 1837, the two denominations continued to bicker, to ask for more time in the schoolhouses, and to complain about the Establishment and its activities. The Methodists were most vocal in their complaints about the Department,[98] but both the Roman Catholics and the Methodists interfered with each other's Sunday services.[99]

---

96 Ibid.

97 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.61. Anderson to Givins, April 1, 1836; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.501. Givins to Anderson, April 11, 1836.

98 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.63. Anderson to Givins, Oct.31, 1836.

99 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.61. Anderson to Givins, April 1, 1836.

Considering the state of confusion on the Coldwater and Narrows reserve, it is perhaps surprising that the Department decided to let the Indians begin to manage their own affairs. The decision seems even more surprising if we also consider the statements of Mr. Robertson, the schoolmaster at the Narrows. He was charged with the responsibility of taking care of matters while Anderson was absent on the Manitoulin Island where he was preparing for a new Establishment at Manitowaning. Robertson painted a most discouraging picture of what would result should the Chippewas be left to their own resources. He pointed out that in the year 1835 they had taken over control of the Grist Mill and the Saw Mill.[100] With Anderson at the helm, these two businesses had shown a profit[101] which served to finance the schools and care for the aged, thus enabling the Establishment to remain free of debt. Once the Indians took charge, however, the Establishment

---

100 These two had been completed by 1833 at a considerable expense - about 1500 l. for the Grist Mill.

101 The white people surrounding the reserve had made use of these two mills. In fact these were the only mills in the vicinity and as a result were excellent investments. They were built at the joint expense of the Department and the Indian annuities.

lost money, the schools suffered, and the old people of the reserve went unprovided. Moreover the general progress on the farms etc. was also retarded because the Indians had used the money from the mills to live instead of providing for themselves by their agricultural endeavours.[103] Robertson predicted that this same trend would, of course, continue, and that bothersome and irresponsible chiefs (he mentions John Aisence as a specific example several times) would prevent any progress on the reserve.

But by the time of Robertson's warning, the decision had already been made, for other developments were taking place. A new establishment would be built on the Manitoulin Island with Anderson again taking charge. The origins and details of this scheme will be presented in the next chapter. Here it is sufficient to mention that Indian officials hoped to remove all the tribes of Lakes Huron and Simcoe and Georgian Bay to the Manitoulin Island where they could progress as farmers on their own volition, uninterrupted by the white man's influence. It was with this end in mind that Bond Head in 1836 concluded agreements with the various tribes to surrender the Island of Lake Huron, and with the Chippewas

---

103 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.63. Robertson to Anderson, Oct. 19, 1836.

of Lake Simcoe to give up most of their reserve.

Other considerations also entered the picture. The Indians complained that their affairs had not been conducted with the greatest economy; they claimed to be able to handle them more efficiently and requested that they themselves assume control.[104] In addition to this request, the Indians submitted two plans to Anderson, one prepared by John Aisence and the other by Yellow Head, showing the manner in which they would manage the financial matters of the reserve. Yellow Head's brief in particular seemed to reveal a clear understanding of the possible dangers involved, as well as a logical and detailed financial statement. These were forwarded to Givins by Anderson[105] and served to convince the department that it was taking the right actions.

Moreover, in 1836 the Chippewa Chiefs presented Bond Head with a set of regulations which they had prepared for the projected government of their reserve should they be granted control. These regulations seemed to indicate that the Indians were fully aware of their own shortcomings and weaknesses. The Chippewas were, in fact, according to these

---

104 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.62. "Petition of the Indian chiefs to the Lt.Covernor of Upper Canada," Aug. 19, 1836.

105 P.A.C., R.G. 10, vol.61. Anderson to Givins, April 3, 1836.

rules of behaviour, proposing a social code along the same lines that the white men - both the department officials and missionaries - had been advocating since the policy of civilization began in 1830. Perhaps the Indian was becoming more like the white man! These regulations declared, for example, that no Indian was to change his residence without the permission of the Chiefs, that drinking of spirits was to be supressed and punished, that single Indian women who had children be punished by a loss of annuities and presents for a period of time, etc.[106]

For these reasons, therefore the Coldwater Establishment ceased to exist on March 31, 1837. On that day Anderson gave them a list of all their possessions - real and moveable. And before long these goods began to find their way into the hands of the white men. The Indians had already given up most of their lands in 1836, and two years later Jarvis expressed the opinion that since the public highway between Coldwater and the Narrows of Lake Simcoe thus ceased to pass through Indian settlements it would "very soon become the residences of Industrious farmers".[107] Jarvis was proved correct. White men had in fact already begun to request permission to obtain plots of this land.

---

106 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.60. "An Address of the Simcoe Indians to Sir F.B. Head, Jan.28, 1836, enclosed in Anderson to Givins, Feb.3, 1836.

107 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.502. Jarvis to Macaulay, June 19, 1838.

At the time of the 1836 surrender when the Indians gave up about 8,200 acres[108] of their reserve in return for receiving annually the interest of one third part of the proceeds of the sale of the Tract,[109] they were informed by Head

> that it was optional with them either to remove to the Great Manitoulin Island, where an Indian settlement on an extensive scale was contemplated, or to occupy any other unsurveyed lands to the North but yet in the vicinity of their present Habitations.[110]

---

108 There are conflicting reports on the amount of land surrendered in 1836. "Surrenders of Lands in Upper Canada 1820-1837", enclosed in P.A.C. Q Series, vol. 397, Head to Glenelg, July 18, 1837 states 8,200 acres. The Report of the Special Commissioners states that they gave up 9,800 acres. The Memorandum on Indian Affairs, File 27006-1, vol.1, 1925, states that the reserve had originally contained 9,800 acres; it seems logical, therefore, that the surrender was, in fact, 9,800 acres - unless the memorandum of 1925 used the Report of 1858 as its source of evidence.

109 The remaining two thirds was to be divided in half, one part to be applied for the general use of Indian Tribes in Upper Canada, the other to be used for any purpose the Lt.Governor stated, "except for the benefit of the said Indians". ("Surrender of Lands in Upper Canada 1820-1837" etc.) As of 1858, however, the Lakes Huron and Simcoe bands had enjoyed the full benefit of the surrender. Since this was the case, the Special Commissioners suggested that it "would be unwise to disturb the present arrangement." Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part II.

110 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.502. Jarvis to Macaulay, June 19, 1838.

As events turned out, some of the Indians did move to Manitowaning, but most of the Chippewas refused to move too far from Lake Simcoe. Instead they chose to remain close by. Yellow Head and his band moved to the East side of Lake Simcoe in the township of Rama, while Aisence's group selected land at the mouth of the Severn River. It cost Yellow Head 12s. 6d. per acre for his new land.[111]

The special Commissioners of 1858 investigated the subsequent activities of these bands; their report was most discouraging. They found that these Indians had split into several groups in the Lake Simcoe area - at Rama, Snake Island, Beausoleil Island, the Christian Islands, and Colpay's Bay - and that little, if any progress had been made by any of them since 1838. In some cases the results had been disastrous. Speaking of the Rama band, for example, the report read:

> This Band was located on its present Reserve in 1838. It affords one of the most striking and lamentable instances of the deterioration which has taken place in the condition of the Indians by reductions in the number of officers appointed to superintend and direct them in the road to civilization.[112]

---

111 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.119. In Council, Aug.2, 1838.

112 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part II.

Apparently the department had erred in deciding to give the Indians responsibility of their own affairs. And obviously the work done by Anderson at Coldwater had not inculcated the Indians with the white habits of industry as the scheme had originally intended. Anderson, in the meantime, had begun a new project, this time on the Great Manitoulin Island; and it is to this project that we now turn.

Chapter V

The Manitoulin Experiment

October 30, 1838 was a miserable day on Georgian Bay. In the midst of a heavy snow storm, after a rough passage of 21 days from Coldwater,[1] the Wanderer entered Manitowaning Bay on the southeast corner of Manitoulin Island. She carried provisions and supplies for her 31 passengers who arrived to bring civilization to the Indians on the Island. For two years, arrangements and building had been carried on by the leader of the expedition,[2] Captain T.G. Anderson, in preparation for this party's arrival, and everyone on board the Wanderer was "delighted at the prospects of being soon relieved from their miserable condition and comfortably lodged in warm houses".[3] But these hopes were soon dashed away. No sooner had the schooner come in sight of the proposed establishment than the weary travellers observed fire on the shore. Upon landing they discovered that fire damage included the mission house, which had been slated for

---

1 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Dec.20, 1830. See also Miss M. Anderson (daughter of Captain T.G. Anderson), "Birth of the Establishment", Frederick William Major (ed.), Manitoulin: The Tale of the Ottawas (Gore Bay, Ontario, 1934), p.17.

2 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.501. Givins to Anderson, Mar.31, 1836.

3 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Givins, Dec.20, 1838.

the accommodation of almost half the party, its goods and chattels, most of the missionary's provisions, all the medicines, and other important articles including all the seed wheat.[4] It was an omen of the things to come.

Indian and government officials had shown interest in the Manitoulin Island for a number of years. As early as 1832, Lt. Governor Colbourne had learned that two Chippewa families had taken up residence and had begun cultivating the land there. At that time he recommended that these people be encouraged to remove themselves to Coldwater since no provision had been made for a permanent post on the Island.[5] By 1836, however, Colbourne had become convinced that the best place to settle the Canadian Indians was the Manitoulin Island.

Accordingly he made plans for the settlement at that place[6] and despatched Anderson[7] to make the necessary arrangement, and at the same time requested that this "projected establishment of the Indians of the Northern Shores of Lake Huron on the Great Manitoulin Island which has already been partly carried into effect"[8] be approved. Colbourne also

---

4 Ibid.

5 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.499. Givins to Anderson, June 4, 1832.

6 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.389-1-2. Colbourne to Glenelg, Jan.22, 1836.

7 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.501. Givins to Anderson, Mar.21, 1836.

8 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.389-1-2. Colbourne to Glenelg, Jan.22, 1836. Glenelg chose to wait till Head had reported about the island before making his decision; he decided, of course, to proceed with the Establishment. P.A.C., Q.Series, vol.395A. Glenelg to Head, Oct.5, 1836.


MANITOUANING BAY
HEYWOOD ID
OLD IN.
SHEGUANDAH
GUANDAH
TURTLE L.
CON. A
IGINACK
SUCKER LAKE
IND. RES.
SUCKER L.
CON. I.
CON. II
BUZWAH School
MANITOUA
MANITOUANING 4 miles
$630 Expended last fall
to WIKWEMIKONG
WIKWEMIKONG VILLAGE
WIKWEMIKONG BAY
SMITH BAY
Farming settlement
3 Miles
Bridge to be erected
Settled
Proposed expenditure
CREEK
Farming
settlement
KABONI SETTLEMENT
Bridge
$200. to be expended
Settled
Road
Waste land
Rough Road
WIKWEMIKONGSING
CAPE SMITH
PORTION OF ISLAND NOT CEDED
SOUTH BAY VILLAGE
SOUTH BAY
to MANITOUANING
Jos. Peltier farm
TH BAY
JOCKO BAY
Rough Rocky Land
Timber-Cedar & Small
quantity of Pine
OWEN CHANNEL
TAMARACK HARBOR

1531

directed that the Indian presents which had hitherto been issued at Amherstburg be distributed in the future on the Great Manitoulin.[9] Once again, the idea was to expose the visiting Indians to the results of what could be done by farming and industry, and, as had been the case at Penetanguishene, it was hoped thereby to induce these visitors to settle down to a farming life. To effect this distribution, Colbourne's successor, Sir Francis Bond Head, journeyed to the island in 1836. As we have seen, Head anticipated no future for the Indians in Upper Canada. They were doomed, he claimed, and therefore there was no sense in building a costly establishment to watch them die on the Great Manitoulin.

The Manitoulin, however, did have its function according to Head, but not as a centre of progress - rather as an old age home for the Indians. With this end in mind he concluded his famous treaty with the Ottawas and Chippewas of Georgian Bay by which the Indians surrendered all the Islands in Georgian Bay to the Crown on the simple condition that these lands be used for the general good of all the Indians of Upper Canada. This action, and Head's personal attitude towards the Indians, created great furore amongst all interested parties.[10] As a result, the project for the Manitoulin proposed

---

9 P.A.C., Q Series, vol.389-1-2. Colbourne to Glenelg, Jan.22, 1836.

10 See above, Chapter II, pp. 42-8.

by Colbourne and the treaty made by Head were fused. Thus, on the Great Manitoulin, the Canadian version of apartheid would begin. This was

> a practical experiment to test the advantages to be derived by isolating the Indians from improper white behaviour and at the same time giving them the advantageous and secular instruction and supervision.[11]

It was for the purpose of this instruction and supervision that the party on the Wanderer had travelled across Georgian Bay to Manitowaning. Their purpose had been explained to the Indians by Colonel S.P. Jarvis in August of 1838 during the annual distribution of presents to the visiting Indians. He told them that an establishment was planned for the Manitoulin Island to encourage civilization. This establishment would include the Superintendent, Mr. Anderson, "an old and tried friend", and a "Minister of the Church of England" to teach them the Christian way of life. To provide leadership and protection in secular matters, a"medical gentleman", a schoolmaster, a carpenter, a blacksmith and a few labourers would also form part of the settlement.[12] This party of leaders almost starved during the first winter on the island!

---

11 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part III.

12 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.69. "Jarvis' Report on the Manitoulin", Aug.25, 1838.

The overall plan had the same aims as that at Coldwater, and once again, it seemed quite adequate on paper. But, once again, it proved a failure. The reasons for this are many. Basically, the chief weakness of the scheme was the expectation of rapid results. And fast results rested on three very important assumptions. First, the Upper Canadian Indians would have to move themselves to the Island. Secondly, these same Indians would have to listen to and co-operate with their white leaders and instructors. And, finally, the leadership provided by the whites would have to be excellent to provide inspiration and invite imitation by the Indians. In the end, the Indian temperament and makeup, the white personnel and local social and geographic conditions all combined to thwart this grand "final solution" on the Manitoulin.

For the first time, it would appear that an Indian Department project was not hindered by a great shortage of funds. Captain Anderson received what amounted to a blank cheque for acquitting the necessities for the Manitowaning Establishment.[13] The failure of the Manitoulin experiment

---

13 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.119, Pt.I. "Copy of a Minute in Council approved by His Excellency, the Lieutenant Governor on a memorandum from the venerable the Archdeacon of York respecting the proposed mission on the Manitoulin Island", Sept.20, 1838. It is true that Anderson was instructed that the first year's expenses on the island should not exceed 1,000 l. But when we consider that the total expenses of the Department was fixed at 20,000 l. (including the presents and the cost of their transport) the sum granted to Anderson is most munificent.

The overall plan had the same aims as that at Coldwater, and once again, it seemed quite adequate on paper. But, once again, it proved a failure. The reasons for this are many. Basically, the chief weakness of the scheme was the expectation of rapid results. And fast results rested on three very important assumptions. First, the Upper Canadian Indians would have to move themselves to the Island. Secondly, these same Indians would have to listen to and co-operate with their white leaders and instructors. And, finally, the leadership provided by the whites would have to be excellent to provide inspiration and invite imitation by the Indians. In the end, the Indian temperament and makeup, the white personnel and local social and geographic conditions all combined to thwart this grand "final solution" on the Manitoulin.

For the first time, it would appear that an Indian Department project was not hindered by a great shortage of funds. Captain Anderson received what amounted to a blank cheque for acquitting the necessities for the Manitowaning Establishment.[13] The failure of the Manitoulin experiment

---

13 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.119, Pt.I. "Copy of a Minute in Council approved by His Excellency, the Lieutenant Governor on a memorandum from the venerable the Archdeacon of York respecting the proposed mission on the Manitoulin Island", Sept.20, 1838. It is true that Anderson was instructed that the first year's expenses on the island should not exceed 1,000l. But when we consider that the total expenses of the Department was fixed at 20,000l. (including the presents and the cost of their transport) the sum granted to Anderson is most munificent.

cannot, therefore, be blamed on a shortage of capital. Nor did Anderson have opposition from important chiefs on the Island. There was no Yellow Head or Aisence to restrict his actions. The main reason for failure was that the Indians simply did not move, en masse, to the Manitoulin Island. The end result, therefore, was a rather elaborate settlement at Manitowaning, but no Indians for it to serve. By 1857, for example, the schoolmaster had under his charge only those children whose parents formed the establishment. On the whole the Indians were ignoring him. The question which must be answered, therefore, is why did the Indians refuse to move to the Island, and why did those who did take up residence there ignore the government establishment.

One reason is obvious. A man would never give up a situation to move to one that was worse! And while Manitowaning Bay has a most picturesque and scenic setting, the fact remains that the Island, as a whole, was both barren and distant. The Commission to investigate Indian Affairs in 1858 still clung to the idea that the Island offered all that the Indian could wish, and more,[14] but these claims have a very shallow ring. Any visitor to the Island today would have to agree with the

---

14 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part III.

Roman Catholic missionaries, Fathers Hennipeaux and Ferard, who stated in 1857 that

> ...it will be readily seen that the arable land on the Island, vast as it may appear at first sight, is but little, when we take into consideration the mountains, the rocky land, the inland lakes, and the extensive bays, absorbing one third of its superficies....[15]

The testimony of the travellers on the Wanderer in 1838 should serve as proof that the Island was certainly remote! The government of Upper Canada also admitted this fact in a minute in council of September 26, 1839 which stated the necessity of "laying in supplies for the winter when the means of communication are cut off".[16] For this reason also, Anderson had difficulties in hiring white men to work on the Island to prepare the settlement for the Indians.[17]

The Commissioners who reported in 1858 gave another cause - the love of the Indian for his own region.

> The attachment of the Indians to the parts of the Country where they have been born and brought up is extreme, and it cannot therefore be wondered at that they have in many cases refused to exchange their present Reserves for lands in the north and west, fertile perhaps, but much more inhospitable in climate and productions than the rich tracts now occupied by them in the Western Peninsula of Canada....[18]

---

15 T. Hannipeaux and F.Ferard, "Report upon the Present State of the Great Manitoulin Island and upon that of the Nomadic Bands or Tribes on the Northern Shore of Lake Huron," Aug., 1857. Enclosed as an Appendix to "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21.

16 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.119, Pt.I. Minute in Council, Sept.26, 1839.

17 P.A.C., R.G.10,vol.125. Anderson to Jarvis, July 4, 1838. Also, P.A.C., R.G.10,vol.71. Anderson to Jarvis, Sept.8,1838.

18 "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21.

We have already seen that the Chippewas of Lake Simcoe refused to leave their own area and even bought land in nearby townships so that they could remain close by their old reserve.

In 1840, one chief, Shingwakonce, who had been courted for two years by agents to remove himself and his tribe to Manitoulin Island, and who had visited the island in 1840,[19] remained determined to stay on his lands near Sault St.Marie. His reasons sum up both the idea that the island was barren and remote, and the love of the Indian for his own territory.

> I cannot think of leaving this place. We are too poor. We have a great attachment to this place. We cannot afford the move but we are trying to improve this place. So allow us to continue to be happy here. It is not a good idea to settle too many Indians on that barren rock, and I am getting too old and I don't want to go and live like a gull sitting on a rock because that is what living on the Manitoulin would be like.[20]

The Indian agents complained of yet another reason why the Indians refused to move to the Manitoulin Island: American Indian agents were accused of dissuading the Indians from settling on British territory.[21] No doubt the Americans did

---

19 Ibid.

20 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.76. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.6, 1841.

21 See the following: P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. George Alley to Jarvis, Jan.4, 1839; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.76. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.6, 1839; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.505. Jarvis to Anderson, Mar.26, 1841.

try to stir up trouble among the Indians. This was, after all, a time when Canada and the United States seemed to be on the brink of war and the Indians had played prominent roles in these conflicts in the past. Exactly how successful these American agents were is difficult to assess, although they probably did have some effect. As one Canadian agent stated,

> ...they say to them "You see the British have given up to us in succession, Mackinaw and Drummond Island and we will make them give up St. Joseph's and Manitoulin before long". This produced a great effect with the Indians who, not knowing the reason why these two important posts were surrendered to the Yankees, naturally believe them, when they tell them they forced the British to yield them...[22]

Government publicity and propaganda and the constant urgings of Indian agents did serve, however, to convince some Indians to travel to the Manitoulin Island. These were mostly Chippewas and Ottawas from the Bruce Peninsula and the northern shore of Georgian Bay, though some did move from Penetanguishene[23] and others came from the United States.[24] These Indians who did make the move, therefore, were the ones that the Establishment at Manitowaning had to civilize. Here, substantially the same problems and difficulties that had contributed to the overall failure at the Coldwater and Narrows Reserve again

---

22 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Alley to Jarvis, Jan. 4, 1839.

23 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Nov.24, 1837.

24 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.71. "Reply by Anderson to questions posed by S.B. Harrison", Aug. 19, 1839.

appeared at Manitowaning. There were, for example, certain disciplinary problems arising amongst the employees of the Establishment.

Shortly after the permanent settlement began at Manitowaning village, Anderson found it necessary to remind employees of their responsibility and chastized them for bad conduct when he issued "Directions for Persons Employed at the Establishment".

> Everyone employed here is acquainted with the humane object of the Government in forming this Establishment, thus to civilize and Christianize the destitute Indians.
>
> For the furtherance of this object, it is necessary that the morals of every individual be marked with examples of the best, and most strict attention, not only in Action, but in words also.
>
> The Superintendent Sincerely regrets that the men should have forced upon him, the unpleasant task of reproving them, for a violation of their Christian duty in breaking the 4th Commandment of God yesterday, and in absenting themselves from their employer without leave. All are aware that their time on the Sabbath Day is as much at the disposal of the Superintendent as any other day of the week, and however pleasant it may be to him to force an observance of their duty as Christians, he must insist (if for no other reason, as an example to the Indians) upon their constant attendance at Public Worship on the Lord's Day.[25]

Anderson's duties as superintendent were most complete.[26] These duties were not simplified by a group of obstreperous employees.

---

25 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.69. "Directions for Persons Employed at the Establishment," by T.G. Anderson, Dec.17, 1838.

26 See above, Chapter II, pp. 32-3.

The Manitoulin Indians were expected to earn their living by farming. In addition to overseeing the work at Manitowaning, therefore, Anderson was expected to divide the land among the Indians, distribute sections to new arrivals, and see that the Indians progressed towards civilization. His was the task, therefore, of guiding the actions of the other white leaders and of providing for the erection of Indian houses and the clearing of land for farms. The obstacles he encountered were almost overwhelming, but Anderson did manage to perform his tasks with a considerable degree of success - but only with great exertion.

His efforts were taxed from the very beginning when he discovered that, through carelessness on the part of the white labourers,[27] fire had reduced almost two years' work to ashes. As a result of this disaster which occurred even as the Wanderer approached Manitowaning, Mr. and Mrs. Anderson were forced to share their quarters with three other families - a total of 25 persons in a house intended for six.[28] A double disaster soon struck these crowded quarters. The day after

---

27 See above, p.133.

28 Miss M. Anderson, "Birth of the Establishment", p.17. These people included the Andersons and 4 children, 2 young friends and a servant, the Brough's (the missionary) and their 4 children, the Bayly's (the schoolmaster) and 3 children, and Dr. Darling, his wife, an infant son, and a nurse.

the party's arrival the Bayly's eight month old baby died,[29] and six weeks later Dr. Darling's infant son also died.[30] In both instances the ground was too cold and prevented the mourners from digging the graves for several days. To create even greater despair amongst this harrassed group, the schooner which was supposed to return to carry their winter supplies from Penetanguishene was unable to land because of ice.[31] A food shortage, a shortage of medical supplies, and the cramped quarters all combined to make it a most depressing winter for the unfortunate party. In fact, had it not been for the assistance they received from the Indians that they had come to help the hardships could have proven fatal for more of them.

Nonetheless Anderson managed to complete some of the buildings that had been begun the summer before; Dr. Darling treated several Indians who had travelled to Manitowaning, and he even crossed the seven mile portage to the Indian village of Wiquemicong across the bay; Mr. and Mrs. Brough

---

29 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Dec.20, 1838.

30 Miss M. Anderson, "Birth of the Establishment", p. 18.

31 Ibid. Also, P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Givins, Dec. 20, 1838.

held Bible classes and Sunday services throughout the winter and baptised a number of Indians. All this had to be done in the Superintendent's house.[32]

The arrival of Spring in 1839 gave Anderson more scope; he began building immediately. Two complete sets of houses were required - those for the white members of the Establishment, and those for the Indians who attached themselves to it. Prior to this, a building splurge had taken place at Manitowaning once the decision had been made to move from Coldwater, and by the time of the Wanderer's arrival in October of 1838, white labourers had completed a house for the superintendent, a mission house, a schoolhouse, and a shanty for the labourers. Fire, of course, later destroyed the mission house. By July of 1839, Anderson could report that houses for himself, the doctor, the missionary, the schoolmaster and two for the men had been covered.[33] It was several months before these same buildings were fully completed, however, since the proper building materials had to be shipped in from Penetanguishene.

---

32 Eight years later the superintendent's house also burned down, all records being destroyed with it. P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.572. Ironsides to Higginson, Feb.5, 1846.

33 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, July 10, 1839.

At this same time Anderson had already begun building houses for two families of Indians who had joined the Church.[34] Several other Indian houses were completed that summer; land was also cleared for cultivation. This building and clearing programme continued for three years as the number of settlers on the island rose to 732.[35] Included in the building plans were a saw mill, and shops for the carpenter and blacksmith as well as the Indian house.[36] Due to the heavy expenses and rigours of supervision,[37] Anderson had 25 Indian houses built by contract in 1842, at a cost of about 20l. each.[38] Also built that year by contract were a large store, a cooper's shop and a barn.[39]

In addition to the construction Anderson overseered the clearing of land for cultivation. In this task the Indians provided much of the labour, some 800 Indians being occupied to some extent in this task and in the actual cultivating by 1844. This figure must be explained, however. While the

---

34 Ibid.

35 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C., 1847, Appendix T. Appendix No.82, "A Sketch of the Progress of the Establishment at Manitoulin".

36 Ibid.

37 The recruiting and supervision of labourers occupied a large part of Anderson's attention. He had to travel to Penetanguishene to recruit; and at Manitowaning he had to keep careful watch over his help to see that their conduct was acceptable in front of the Indians.

38 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.76. Anderson to Jarvis, April 25, 1841.

39 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C., 1847, Appendix T. Appendix No.82, "A Sketch of the Progress of the Establishment at Manitoulin".

number of Indians remained about the same, they were not always the same Indians.

In 1839, Anderson had planned to survey lots and assign 50 acres to each Indian family as it joined the settlement.[40] This proved too time consuming, however, and, when added to his other duties, Anderson found it impossible to carry out. As a result he allowed the Indians to settle and clear land wherever they chose. Because of the nature of the Island, - i.e. close to the abundance of game and fish and the relative barreness of the soil - a family was unlikely to remain constant.[41] Should another family seek to settle on the Island, they would usually choose a site which had already been cleared or partially cleared and then abandoned.[42] Also, the success of these farming attempts was limited. This was particularly true of the Chippewas who settled around Manitowaning. The Indians of Wiquemicong, a village situated across the bay from Manitowaning, were considerably more successful. Anderson explained the difference thusly.

---

40 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section II, "Past and Present Condition of the Indians".

41 Ibid.

42 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.129. Anderson to Jarvis, June 10, 1843. Needless to say, Anderson was often called in to settle disputes which arose when the first family returned to take up residence again. It is to Anderson's credit that he was always able to achieve a settlement.

> The Ottawas who have emigrated from the United States and settled on this Island, have, all their lives been Indian farmers; they seek no other means of subsistence but that obtained from the soil and the fish they take in the immediate vicinity of their village and in the Autumn each family has a sufficiency to last them through the winter, consequently it is not necessary for them to leave their homes in search of food; neither do they, as the Chippewas, trust to the precarious mode of spearing fish through the ice during the winter season. The Chippewas who never, until lately, cultivated the soil have no fixed place of residence, they necessarily change their camp often, even in the depth of winter in search of new fishing places and, though many of them within a few days journey of this and admit of the benefits arising from growing corn, potatoes, etc. Still it has required much persuasion to make a commencement which they are doing on various parts of this Island and on the main land. It has been advisable not to press them too hard, or to insist on their adopting a new mode of life until prepared for it by degrees and experience has taught them the advantage of the change....[43]

This condition continued to exist. There were some Indians who fared rather well by farming, and there were also some who took instructions and became rather proficient at various trades - blacksmiths, carpenters and masons.[44] But, on the whole, the Manitoulin Indians at Manitowaning did not progress towards civilization as the department officials had hoped and expected.

---

43 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.71. "Anderson replies to questions posed by Harrison", Aug. 19, 1839.

44 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada" J.L.A.C., 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section II, "Past and Present Condition of the Indians."

Much more discouraging than the shoddy progress made in agriculture were the results of the school attendance by the Indian children, and the laxity and slowness with which the Indians embraced Christianity. The school attendance was particularly disappointing since it was the younger generation that most officials hoped to influence the most. Successive reports from the Manitowaning station, however, all indicated poor attendance at the school.[45] Anderson tried to explain some of the reasons for this and suggested a remedy.

> Very little has been done, as yet, but having the proper facilities, i.e. a school house and place for their board, much could be done. We cannot expect the Indians to leave their children at the school unless such provision is made.
>
> We need good teachers, i.e. those who want to do a lot of good for these poor people.[46]

Furthermore, the Indians again refused to remain stationary. O'Meara complained of the "difficulty which the necessary absence of the Indian children with their parents during the winter presents to the prospects of their receiving permanent benefits from the privilege of a resident Schoolmaster."[47]

---

45 Ibid. Also, see the following: "Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Part III; P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.71. "Anderson replies to questions posed by Harrison", Aug.19, 1839.

46 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.71. "Anderson replies to questions posed by Harrison", Aug.19, 1839.

47 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.127. O'Meara to Jarvis, Aug.4, 1830.

The children could not attend school if their families were constantly moving. Good teachers were also difficult to find, for the same reasons that it was difficult to get them for the Coldwater Establishment. In the case of the Manitoulin, of course, the situation was even more remote and therefore it was even more difficult to obtain teachers. Mr. Baylys left after a year or two.[48] He was succeeded by Mr. Burkett, who had been a schoolmaster at Coldwater.[49] In both cases there is some doubt as to their ability to teach the Indian children, but in any case, until the Indians would settle in one place and realize the value of education, there was little these men could do.

Perhaps the greatest failure, however, came in the religious field. So little progress was made that Anderson complained in 1842 that Rev. O'Meara "during almost four years residence amongst the Indians had but one adult convert."[50] In this field, a major problem would appear to be the type of person sent to minister to the Indians. The first missionary, Rev. Brough, was not accustomed to the hard life involved and he complained a great deal about it. Moreover, he was often

---

48 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Feb.6, 1832.

49 Ibid.

50 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Aug.13, 1842.

sick, his child died that first winter, his wife was often ill also; for these and other personal reasons he was absent from duty much of the time.[51] He did, it seems, strive desperately to perform his job on the Island and Christianize the Indians, but the Chippewas made very little progress towards the acceptance of the Christian ideals. He was replaced, in 1841, by Rev. O'Meara who did perform the very useful task of translating the Bible into the Chippewa language - a task for which he received a permanent pension[52] - but on the whole it seems that O'Meara attacked his job with something far less than great vigour. Even Anderson, who tended to be most charitable towards all those involved in the task of civilizing the Indians, complained of O'Meara's laxity and continual absence from duty.[53]

---

51 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, May 23, 1840. These "other personal reasons" were not given. Anderson simply wrote that "Mr. Brough's duties are quite sufficient at this place to give him employment every hour in the day, but it was necessary for him to go to the Western District to make arrangements for his family".

52 It is interesting to note that Anderson actually did a great deal of the work involved in this translation. The collusion between Anderson and O'Meara on this project took place before the conflict concerning their views about the Establishment.

53 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Aug.13, 1842.

The records would seem to indicate that both Brough and O'Meara were unsuited to perform the tasks assigned to them. This appears in the fact that Brough simply could not acclimatize himself to the situation and local conditions on the island, and at the same time cope with his personal problems. O'Meara did not really exert his full efforts towards his work, and the results of his proselytizing bear this out. Moreover, O'Meara did not co-operate or get along with Anderson. One handicap which all three men - O'Meara, Brough and Anderson—faced in common, however, probably gives us the greatest reason why the Manitowaning settlement failed so badly. They had stiff competition. This came from the Wiquemicong settlement led by Rev. Proulx, a Roman Catholic priest whose abilities and dedication outstripped those of his missionary colleagues across the bay, and whose ambitions caused Anderson more than some consternation.

The main result of the existence of the Wiquemicong settlement, of course, was a division in Indian policy on the Island. At Manitowaning the settlement was Protestant and government operated; at Wiquemicong it was Roman Catholic and privately operated; the Indians at Wiquemicong were Ottawas, at Manitowaning they were Chippewas; Wiquemicong proved quite successful, Manitowaning failed badly.

From the very beginning, Anderson found it necessary to divide the Island into Protestant and Roman Catholic

sectors.[54] Anyone who visited the Island and reported on the progress of the Manitoulin experiment treated the Island as a unit. It made for a much better report, and even Anderson, the man on the spot, sent encouraging reports to his superiors in which he included the progress made by the Ottawas at Wiquemicong. These reports,[55] however, give a false impression about Manitoulin affairs, however, and cover up the division which existed on the Island.

It is most difficult to assess exactly what effect the rivalry between Proulx and the Establishment had on the Indians. There can, of course, be no doubt about the results of the two villages; Wiquemicong was quite successful, while Manitowaning failed badly. This same situation exists to this day and the Wiquemicong Indians still exert great influence on the Manitowaning white merchants.[56] Proulx's efforts also hindered the hopes of the Anglican missionaries from winning

---

54 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section II, "Past and Present Condition of the Indians".

55 Such reports were written from time to time by Jarvis, Strachan, Anderson and the Commissioners appointed in 1842.

56 In 1962, for example, when the whites on the Island were planning the celebration for the centennial of the purchase of the Island from the Indians in 1862, the Wiquemicong Indians were quite opposed to the celebration. In their view the date was not one for celebration. Accordingly, they threatened the Manitowaning merchants with a boycott should they join in the celebrating. The merchants complied, and the town of Manitowaning did not participate in the general celebration on the Island.

the Ottawas to their faith. This hurt the prestige of the Government establishment. And as was the case at Coldwater, the religious disputes amongst the white people did serve to confuse the Indians, many of whom did not know what group to believe. In addition the internal disputes between Anderson and O'Meara could not benefit the Establishment; and the fact that Anderson was apparently convinced that Proulx was constantly plotting the destruction of the Manitowaning efforts precluded co-operation between Roman Catholic and Anglican.

The animosity between the two villages began immediately upon the decision to begin the Manitowaning Establishment.[57] It was soon clear that, as at Coldwater, some religious rivalry would be present, since Anderson's first move was to divide the Island into two sectors - for Protestants and Catholics. Anderson explained this to a group of Ottawas who had asked that a house be built for their priest at Manitowaning.

---

57 It is difficult to state exactly when the Roman Catholics began their mission at Wiquemicong. In 1839, however, Jarvis did state that "it is at least eight years older than the one under Anderson." (P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.71. Jarvis to Harrison, Oct.5, 1839). This would mean 1828 or 1830, depending on when Jarvis considered Anderson to have begun his work: in 1836, under Colbourne's orders, or 1838 when the white party finally took up residence. To confuse matters further, the Report of the Commissioners appointed in 1842 states that the priest (Proulx) had joined the village in 1838. This seems unlikely, however, since the Indians had made considerable progress by that time.

> ....You will remember that from the time I was first sent here by Your Father His Excellency Sir John Colbourne, it was well understood that each Religious denomination should be settled in different parts of the Island and this, you recollect was to prevent unpleasant occurrences amongst them. You have your village, Church, and farms at Wiquemicong. We have ours here, and should the Methodists or any other denomination come to settle on the Island a separate place will be alloted for them also.[58]

Here again, therefore, the Indian Department was trying to make use of forces already established to further its aims of Indian conversion. And, as had been the case at Coldwater, the incumbents - in this case, the Roman Catholics - considered the Establishment to be invading an area where they claimed to have a monopoly of conversion. Jarvis, who visited the Island in 1838, reported that he had been informed by Indians about a council held by the Roman Catholic priest, Father Proulx.

> Then a council was held. All chiefs were invited to it. It was presided over by the Roman Catholic Priest, Proulx, Bishop Goulin and another priest. After the Council some of the Chiefs told me that the subject discussed was the propriety of allowing a Protestant Mission on the Island. Also a school house unless the teacher was a Roman Catholic. Or houses for the Indians unless they professed the Roman Catholic faith. And that the Chiefs should lodge a protest to the settling of Protestants on the Island said the Priests.[59]

---

58 P.A.C., R.G., vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, May 10, 1839.

59 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.69. "Jarvis' Report on the Manitoulin", Aug.25, 1838.

Such complaints as well as requests, by the priest, for privileges on the Protestant side of Manitowaning Bay continued throughout Anderson's administration. In May of 1839 they requested permission to build a house for their missionary at Manitowaning[60] and earlier in the same year it was suggested to Anderson that his party leave the Island.

> We understand...you intend to build houses for some of the Indians, at this place. We do not approve of this because, when the English erect Houses for the Indians they do not long continue to reside in them. Witness Coldwater, the houses you built there are all vacant! We understand that you intend to clear and cultivate 1000 acres of Land here, this will not do, more whites will be coming every year - We asked Jarvis the summer before last, to send us a School Teacher of our Own Religion, he has not done this but sent one of another Religion. We do not want him here. There is plenty of land on the main shore over which we have no control, if the English wish to make a village for other Indians they may go there and build....[61]

These requests and complaints, which were not always properly worded, as well as other actions made by the Indians led Anderson to the very definite conclusion that the Priest at Wiquomicong was trying to destroy or at least injure,[62] his establishment. In speaking about the request for a

---

60 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, May 10, 1839.

61 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Mar.24, 1839.

62 Ibid. and P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Dec.24, 1838.

missionary house at Manitowaning he wrote.

> This appears to be a following up of their plan to injure this Establishment in the eyes of the surrounding heathen Indians, and by obtaining a breach in the contemplated measure for the purpose of keeping peace and quietness amongst the various denominations, they would manifest their importance by showing to the heathen the willingness of the Government to accede to their views, and by this means make them believe that their becoming Protestants and being taught to read the Holy Scriptures is a matter of minor importance while it is in fact of the first consequence.[63]

It is difficult to indicate that Proulx wanted to destroy the Establishment. This does not seem likely since his Indians did receive many advantages from its existence, although he did undoubtedly feel that the Department was usurping his authority. It is more likely that the Indians misunderstood their white leaders and, in turn, the white leaders misunderstood each other. Feelings between the two groups along religious lines were both tense and emotional. The Catholics were most concerned about the beginning of a Protestant establishment. Furthermore, the Catholics were not the only ones guilty of encroachment. Both Brough and O'Meara made trips across the Bay to the Catholic settlement, and of course they tried to induce the Wiquemicong Indians to move to Manitowanig. In this latter instance they had some success, apparently, for in May of 1839 Anderson reported

---

63 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, May 10, 1839.

that "several young Wiquemicong Indians have been coming here for instructions and they say that tho' it is against the instructions of their Priest they will learn to read."[64]

Proulx also crossed the Bay to hold services; Anderson objected to this and stated, "I believe tho' I cannot prove that here they try to discourage the Indians from Joining the Church of England."[65] It was perhaps especially annoying to Anderson that the services were held at the home of Asseckenack, his interpreter.[66] In this way, therefore, Anderson and his party regretted the existence of the Catholic village. Brough's task of converting the Indians, said Anderson, would be very difficult because "I fear Mr. Proulx...has so completely filled even the Heathen minds with Superstition that it will take sometime to convince them of his errors."[67] Jarvis did entertain the thought that perhaps a Catholic teacher could be appointed to the Wiquemicong village but great care would be required.

---

64 Ibid.

65 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.8, 1842.

66 Ibid.

67 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.124. Anderson to Jarvis, Mar.25, 1839.

> "the introduction among the Indian youth of a bigot or a person of doubtful loyalty might be attended with most injurious consequences, and I therefore think that for the present it would be better to make no communication to Mr. Proulx.[68]

In his reply Anderson concurred and stated that he would keep watch for a competent Roman Catholic teacher, but he expressed doubts that a person of that religion could be competent. Jarvis also explained to the Indians that they should become Protestants.

> Among other advantages she (The Queen) had directed that a Minister of the Church of England should reside here for the express purpose of imparting to those who may embrace Christianity a true Knowledge of the Scriptures and the manifold Blessings which are derived from them. And here it may not be improper for us to mention that the Protestant Faith is the religion of Your Great Mother the Queen....[69]

This speech of Jarvis met with considerable official disapproval. Civil Secretary Macaulay wrote to the Chief Superintendent in November, 1838.

> His Excellency considers it unfortunate that you used language so unmeasured...for in point of fact the Queen acknowledges two national Churches within the limits of the Empire - and considering the manner in which the Roman Catholic Church has been recognised in the Imperial Statutes it seems rather unnecessary to have averred to the Religions which are but tolerated.
>
> His Excellency recommends that you modify in some degree the Report so far as it relates to the Address.[70]

---

68 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.505. Jarvis to Anderson, Mar.26, 1841.

69 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.69. "Jarvis' Report on the Manitoulin", Aug.25, 1838.

70 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.69. Macaulay to Jarvis, Nov.27, 1838.

The situation seemed to grow better as a few years passed. It would appear that the men themselves admired each other personally and that their accusations and ill feelings were predicated by religious differences rather than anything else. In early 1844 the Wiquemicong Indians again came to Anderson, this time to request that "a house be built at their village for their priest the same as the one for the Minister at Manitowaning."[71] The next day they also asked that Proulx receive a salary from the government.[72] Regarding the first request, Jarvis' comments indicate a changed attitude.

> It was unnecessary for Captain Anderson to wait for instructions to erect a house for the Priest at Wiquemicong. The Artificiers employed at the Establishment were engaged for the benefit of the resident Indians generally and it was never intended to confine their services to one body of Indians. The Indians at Wiquemicong are as much entitled to have a house erected for their Priest as the Protestant Indians to have one for their Clergymen. The supply of building materials annually sent to the Island is to be used for the general benefit of the resident Indians.[73]

---

71 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.129. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.9, 1844.

72 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.129. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.10, 1844.

73 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.129. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.9, 1844. This quotation is taken from the comments written on this letter by Jarvis.

Anderson remarked that Proulx was not paid by the Government but on Proulx's behalf stated that "a more zealous man of that faith cannot be found.[74] Jarvis added:

> I can add my testimony to Proulx's usefulness among the Roman Catholic Indians and of his zeal...and I think it should be but justice to grant him some allowance however small, but as the Parliamentary Grant is the only fund out of which an allowance can be made, it rests altogether with His Excellency whether he will sanction it or not.[75]

It should not be assumed, however, that the troubles had been settled between the two villages. Anderson and Proulx had simply come to terms. This was probably due to the fact that by 1844 Manitowaning still had very few Indians who remained resident while Wiquemicong had proven rather stable and progressive. However, George Ironsides, Anderson's successor, complained in 1846 about encroachment by the Wiquemicong Indians. To obtain timber for a church the Priest had suggested that it be obtained "from the Manitowaning side of Hudson Sound".[76]

> The suggestion has caused some great consternation among the Indians here because such action would be a direct encroachment on their rights because the part of this island referred to by the priest was, from the first, set apart by Captain Anderson with the sanction of the Government for the use of the Indians here and they consider this an inviolable right.[77]

---

74 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.129. Anderson to Jarvis, Jan.10, 1844.

75 Ibid. from Jarvis' comments written on this despatch.

76 P.A.C., R.G.10, vol.572. Ironsides to Higginson, Feb.3, 1846.

77 Ibid.

Even today, the rivalry continues. The present Anglican minister at Manitowaning, Fr. Locke, was the first of all the missionaries at that post to carry Holy Communion across the bay to the Catholic village of Wiquemicong.[78] Again, I say that it is difficult to assess how much, if any, this rivalry among white leaders (and to a lesser extent, among the Indians) hurt the Manitowaning Establishment. Surely, however, it can be assumed that as at Coldwater such animosity served to confuse the Indians and retard their progress towards Christianity, and towards civilization.

Investigations in 1857 and 1858 both concurred that the experiment had largely failed. As late as 1858 some hope was held for success. For the reasons discussed above, however, with emphasis placed on the remoteness and relative barrenness of the island, such hope was futile. Indications in 1845 were that the experiment was indeed failing. Only a total of 552 (estimated) Indians were settled at the two villages (94 families at Wiquemicong, and 44 at Manitowaning), a reduction from 732 in 1840; school attendance was irregular, and never very high, the number at the Manitowaning school never exceeding 45; the total number of Indians converted to the Protestant faith was only 172, and as was noted above,

---

78 In an interview I had with Fr. Locke in 1965, he used this as an example of how the rivalry was diminishing.

Anderson was unaware of a single convert since 1841.[79] Perhaps the best indication of the scheme's potential failure was a description of Indian work habits in the Report of 1845.

> The division of the day is not systematic. They generally rise about day-light and go to rest a little after sunset. They take a hearty meal before going to work, and during the day they work, smoke, rest, perhaps sleep, eat and drink alternately, as happens to be convenient, without regard to time or place.[80]

This same report did, however, make some encouraging remarks. Apparently the Indians seemed to be improving slowly in agriculture, and, regarding civilized habits, they dressed more like white people and washed "their hands and faces daily", and often expressed "their regret that they did not sooner become civilized".[81]

But if there were doubts about the project failing in 1845, there could be no such misgivings in 1858. The Special Commissions who reported in that year painted a rather black picture of the Manitowaning settlement.

> The village of Manitowaning no longer presents the appearance which it did twelve years ago. Many of the Inhabitants have emigrated, some to join the Newash Band, others to settle themselves at Garden River, and a few have founded the village of Wiabejiwong.

---

79 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", J.L.A.C. 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E., Section II, "Past and Present Condition of the Indians".

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

> Manitowaning now contains, according to the returns of the Superintendent, not more than 22 houses, and this probably includes those occupied by the officers in charge of the settlement, as well as the schoolhouse, and may be taken as the outside limit of the number of houses now standing. There are also 2 barns, 6 stables, and 4 out houses; all the buildings are constructed of logs - many of them are deserted and ruinous - the schoolhouse is dilapidated and untenantable, and the workshops from which the mechanics are withdrawn, are destitute of tools, deserted by the Indians who formerly worked there, and in an utter state of decay. The church is in tolerable repair, but we found no Indians attending services.
>
> The School Returns show 20 children as receiving instruction, but the greatest number of days during the last quarter, on which any one child attended the school was 14, and ten of the children do not appear to have been present for a single day. The books said to have been used are the Church of England catechism, the first, second and third books of lessons of public instruction, for Upper Canada - Elementary Instruction is also given in Geography - but the returns do not lead us to believe that any children are taught the catechism.
>
> At the time of our visit, there were no Indian scholars in attendance, and we learned that the schoolmaster had, for some time past been driven, by the ruinous condition of the schoolhouse, to teach such children as are under his charge, in his own house.[82]

In general, then, two types of scheme were tried in order to civilize and Christianize the Indians according to the general policy laid down in 1830. The one attempted, through constant intercourse with the white race, to assimilate the Indians, i.e. to turn the Indian, as much as possible, into a white man. This was tried, and found wanting at Coldwater. The other advised the total seclusion of the aborigines from contamination by the white settlers in order that the natives could progress at their own rate to a level comparable to their white neighbours. This too had failed on the Great Manitoulin Island.

---

82 "Report of the Special Commissioners to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, Section III.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

This study has attempted to explain how the Indian reserves of Upper Canada began in 1830, and how these reserves failed to serve the purpose for which they were set in operation. In the process I have looked at the philosophy behind this scheme and at the same time have studied the reactions of the local bands of Indians for whom this philosophy was promulgated and put into practice. On this basis, and from the evidence presented it is possible to summarize and to draw certain conclusions.

By the third decade of the nineteenth century, Europeans in British North America had taken on an entirely new and different view of their red neighbours. While the Indians had at one time been viewed as extremely useful friends and allies in the process of survival and commerce, and as very dangerous enemies or desirable allies in times of war, they had by this time evolved as a rather decadent race more to be pitied or ignored - or exploited - than feared.

While this change in attitude had been taking place, however, several groups of missionaries had been in operation trying to change the Indian way of life. At the same time strong groups of influential men in England were also pressing for reforms in the treatment of aboriginal tribes throughout the British Empire. The influence of these men spread to Canada. Here, activities which had hitherto been conducted only through private groups became a public responsibility;

and, after preliminary hearings and expressions of opinion which stretched through 1828 and 1829, responsibility for Indian affairs in Canada passed from military to civil control. Moreover, the responsibility itself changed; henceforth the Indian department was to enter the field of converting the Indians to a Christian and civilised life, a field that had thus far been occupied almost solely by missionaries of the various denominations.

Problems arose immediately, for the men involved in this task could reach no consensus on the actual methods to be used, or in some cases, even on the principles themselves. Some like Bond Head felt that the Indian was beyond salvation, while others felt that the "noble savage" simply had to be exposed to the amenities of the white man's ways and he would, like a child, follow the example because a civilized existence was obviously better than a nomadic life. Some from this second group of men also possessed great confidence in the stability of the Indians, for they recommended that land deeds be granted to provide the native with security of tenure, to provide him with the incentive which comes from pride of ownership, to improve his situation. The Treasury department and the commissariat, always aware of practical economics, expressed the opinion that the presents and annuities be issued in money, instead of articles, and this money could be used to purchase oxen, ploughs and other agricultural implements to aid their progress towards a settled life. Such procedure meant, of course, a great reduction in time,

trouble and expense to those who had to supply the provision - i.e. the commissariat. This point of view did not display any great interest in the Indians, only in the promotion of efficiency within the department.

Somewhere in the middle of these opinions (all of which had to be considered because of the structure of the organization of the department in charge of Indian Affairs) we find the men directly involved in the operation. They too were sanguine of success, but on the whole they tempered their optimism with a certain realism. These were the agents - Givins, Jarvis, Anderson, Jones, Clench... - who knew something of Indian ways. They opposed title deeds and the commutation of presents to money on the simple grounds that the Indians would soon lose both to the whites for liquor and other useless articles. The controversy of these and other instruments of civilization was continuous; it led to charges and counter-charges[1] and served to create hostility amongst the groups who were intended to work towards a common goal.

In many ways, the only new detail in the Indian department after 1830 was the job assigned to it. Considerations of economy preserved the existing departmental machinery almost

---

1 The missionaries, notably the Methodists, continued to claim that the Indian could never be expected to improve his land while it was possible for him to lose it to the Government. Title deeds would protect against this eventuality. Agents, on the other hand, blamed the Methodists for pressing for deeds. They claimed that this was bad advice and that the Indians would not try to progress while the agitation for these deeds continued.

trouble and expense to those who had to supply the provision - i.e. the commissariat. This point of view did not display any great interest in the Indians, only in the promotion of efficiency within the department.

Somewhere in the middle of these opinions (all of which had to be considered because of the structure of the organization of the department in charge of Indian Affairs) we find the men directly involved in the operation. They too were sanguine of success, but on the whole they tempered their optimism with a certain realism. These were the agents - Givins, Jarvis, Anderson, Jones, Clench... - who knew something of Indian ways. They opposed title deeds and the commutation of presents to money on the simple grounds that the Indians would soon lose both to the whites for liquor and other useless articles. The controversy of these and other instruments of civilization was continuous; it led to charges and counter-charges[1] and served to create hostility amongst the groups who were intended to work towards a common goal.

In many ways, the only new detail in the Indian department after 1830 was the job assigned to it. Considerations of economy preserved the existing departmental machinery almost

---

1 The missionaries, notably the Methodists, continued to claim that the Indian could never be expected to improve his land while it was possible for him to lose it to the Government. Title deeds would protect against this eventuality. Agents, on the other hand, blamed the Methodists for pressing for deeds. They claimed that this was bad advice and that the Indians would not try to progress while the agitation for these deeds continued.

in toto while necessity required the continuance of presents and annuities. It was intended to convert these latter two into an advantage rather than a liability by convincing the Indians to buy useful articles with this income. This did not work out in the manner expected. Also, the division of opinion amongst interested groups and the question of economy prevented a detailed plan of concerted action. A general principle had been enunciated and accepted. What evolved from this was a vague plan whereby the agents would use the annuities, presents, parliamentary grant, and their own skills to work out a plan for conversion. Since it was too expensive in most cases to provide full facilities, the agents were expected to work in co-operation with the private groups which had already begun to work in the field. This proved highly difficult.

The groups who were already at work not only differed in opinion from the agents but also resented the encroachment of the department in an area where they considered themselves to have a monopoly. Both the Methodists at Coldwater and the Credit River and the Roman Catholics at Wiquemicong expressed this opinion. Co-oporation therefore, was uneasy at the best of times, and often broke into open hostility. At Coldwater the Methodists accused the department of not operating for the Indians, of being an advocate of the Church of England which had never done anything for the Indians, and of using Indian funds for its own purposes. At the same time the Roman Catholics at Coldwater served to confuse the Indians further by denying the truth of any religion but their own. In this

case the effects on the school, the mission, and the settled habits of the Indians were most harmful. So harmful, in fact, were these controversies that Captain Anderson finally came to the conclusion that it would be best if the Methodists moved out, or failing that, were given a clear field. On the Manitoulin Island where the Church of England established a mission there was a state of constant tension between the two villages of Manitowaning, the Protestant settlement, and Wiquemicong, the Roman Catholic community.

Furthermore the agents operated under other difficulties. Finances, of course, were a constant handicap. In addition the great amounts of correspondence limited the time they could spend supervising their charges. And as outlined in Chapter II the hardships and isolation of the job, the low pay, the ever present threat of dismissal, and the general white attitude towards the Indians all worked to limit the type of man who would accept the position. The fact that the department of government for which they worked was completely decentralised was a further handicap. They were not vested with the authority to make rapid decisions and in many cases this proved quite embarrassing. Jarvis complained of his inability to care for the Indians that visited him in York while other agents found themselves unable to act when an emergency arose. On several occasions, for example, Anderson wrote to York for permission or instructions about the issuing of presents or rations to Indians who suddenly appeared at the Coldwater establishment. Considering that the mail required a week, and sometimes two,

to travel between the two points, the efficiency of the department must have appeared very poor to the visiting Indians. The resident Indians also saw how the superintendents' hands were tied and on many occasions they went over his head by travelling to York to speak to the head office. Aisence caused no little concern when he complained about Anderson directly to the Lt. Governor.

Perhaps the greatest miscalculation made by all white groups involved in this scheme - the governor, the missionaries, the Aborigines Protection Association, the Indian agents - was that no one expected the Indian to be anything but grateful for the work that was being done on his behalf. No one doubted that this plan was the best that could be offered to the Indians and as a result could see no reason at all why it should not succeed. It occurred to no one that perhaps the Indian might prefer to maintain his identity as an Indian - or even his life as a nomad. Furthermore, it can also be doubted that these men completely understood the Indian mind. Or if they did, it is not apparent from their correspondence.

At this point it should be noted that the Indians with whom Jarvis, Anderson, Clench, O'Meara and others were dealing were adults whose attitudes had been set, and who formed a society that had survived in a very barren environment for many centuries. The Indian was only interested, generally speaking, with the present and he would worry about the future in the future. It was a natural attitude for a people living in such harsh surroundings to have, for the days of ease and

leisure must be fully enjoyed; hard times would come soon enough. They were fully cognizant of the fact that the white men had more amenities than they, and they were envious of these conveniences. They were also shrewd enough to see that the white men wanted to help them, and they were quite willing to have anything done that might make life easier for them. As a result they did express a desire to become Christians. This expression obviously pleased the white man, and they were quite anxious to please. This did not, however, mean that they were anxious to exert themselves in the same way as their white neighbours. It meant only that they were willing to make life easier for themselves.

The people who worked among the Indians mistook this attitude for laziness, stupidity and childishness. Indian agents continually looked upon their charges in a paternal way. It was his duty to encourage, teach, and instruct these children because he, as an adult, knew what was best for their welfare. These men, therefore, found it most exasperating when the bands would pack up and move to new grounds, or when they would leave their settled abodes on extended hunting and fishing trips. In all cases it proved most disconcerting, all the more so because the Indians insisted on taking their children with them. This meant that the schools - including the boarding school at Coldwater - would be vacant while the band stayed away. It also meant that the missionaries and teachers lost their control over the younger generation, who were now being trained in the old ways of the band and in whom

the white workers had hoped to inculcate new habits of behaviour. This insistence on keeping their children with them reveals yet another Indian trait - i.e. the extreme love they had for their children. This does not mean to say that the whites did not love their offspring. But it does show the difference, for the Indians enjoyed just watching their children, while the whites, in general, enjoyed seeing their children progress and develop.

These Indian characteristics can be seen easily in the way they reacted to the various efforts extended on their behalf by the Indian department. At Coldwater, all the buildings at the Establishment were put up by white labourers; the Indian houses were also built by white men; yet the Indians were the ones who were to benefit from them. Indians did clear the road which stretched from Coldwater to the Narrows. In this case, however, it was a slow process and Anderson had great troubles keeping them on the job. The Indians would not work for any length of time and could not be depended to turn up for work. After he stopped paying them by the day, however, Anderson found that their work progressed more quickly. Once the road was complete it was expected that the Indians would use their annuity money to provide them with capital to conduct a freight service between the Narrows and Penetanguishene. This they declined to do because it was too costly and would use most of their annual income. Instead they allowed the road to be used for that purpose by white men who would pay them a fee for its use. There was no sense in

doing the work if they could get others to labour and still get paid.

At every opportunity the Indians hired white men to do their work. The transport line is one example. They did the same thing with their mills, and in fact used the proceeds from the mill to live rather than grow their own crops. In 1837 they miscalculated however, and the charges against their annuity for the services of white workers exceeded the annual land payments by £211. Also at Coldwater, the Indians refused to have their presents changed to agricultural implements because these presents were required to keep them clothed in winter. The annuities and presents, therefore, served to encourage the Indians in their old habits instead of promoting civilization as the officials had hoped.

The Indians of Upper Canada had lived for the most part on very good lands, usually among the best in the province. This hurt the department's policy in two ways. First, the Indian was loathe to leave this land because it was so good and because he had a deep affection for the area where he was raised. We have seen how this affected the project on the Great Manitoulin Island. Secondly, the whites moving into the backwoods coveted this Indian land and did everything they could to obtain it. The general attitude of the white settlers towards the Indians also served to hurt the department's cause. It was one of the major reasons why the establishment at Coldwater was closed, and the proximity of whites to the reserves generally, had a detrimental effect

on the Indian bands. This white attitude was expressed by J.G. Kohl, a traveller in the Canadas in 1854.

> An old Simcoe farmer whom we had on board, and to whom I had been endeavouring to communicate some of my notions of the Indians' rights of property in the land, favoured me with his views in return. "These Indians", he said, "ought to be altogether kicked out from here. They are a lazy race, and hinder the progress of our undertakings. They are too stupid and too idle to cut down the woods themselves in the sweat of their brow, and so they make us pay them a tax like great lords, and spend the money in making merry on the island where the finest wood grows, and where it is easiest to be got at from the water. Our Government makes a great deal too much ceremony with these fellows and their rights of property, as they call them. What property can an Indian have but his bow and arrow, and his fighting tackle? This notion of Indian property in land is quite a new-fangled invention."[2]

With this attitude, it is not surprising that the white men used every means they could to get Indian land. The sale of liquor, of course, was the usual method, for while drunk the Indian would part with anything that would buy more spirits. In this way, land, presents and other possessions found their way into white hands. Even the removal to the Manitoulin did not prevent the sale of liquor to the Indians. Anderson complained on several occasions that white traders visited the Island for that purpose and that he was powerless to stop them.

To conclude, therefore, the new benevolent policy of the Government, begun in 1830, failed for many reasons but these can be basically reduced to three. The men and the machinery

---

2 G.M. Craig (ed.), Early Travellers in the Canadas (Toronto, 1955), pp. 200, 201.

expected to civilize the Indians were not properly suited for the task. After 1830, the same men continued at work at the same places amongst the same Indians. This applied to both department officials and missionaries, although the latter were changed more often than the agents. The department machinery remained substantially unchanged, and was too decentralized to allow concerted actions by the agents; and the various methods to be used to promote civilized habits - presents, annuities, buildings - often worked to retard them. Furthermore, the various groups who advocated the principle of civilization could not reach a consensus on other matters. As a result controversy arose amongst the white leaders in the field, and the Indian was caught in the middle. Finally, the Indians themselves contributed to the failure. Their reaction to the new programme was definitely not what the white officials had anticipated. Unless given specific directions and constant supervision, the native would simply incorporate the amenities offered him under the new programme into the old pattern of life, rather than use these advantages to progress towards the white man's ways.

Bibliographical Essay

The bulk of all materials gathered for this study was gleaned from documents found in the Public Archives of Canada, Manuscript Division, Record Group 10. This group entitled "Indian Affairs" consists of papers and records of the Indian Affairs department of government, begun in 1755 and deposited in the Dominion Archives at intervals since 1907. The existing organization of the papers was done in 1951. All files are not complete, however, and as a result, there are gaps in the correspondence for various reasons. Volumes 612-619, for example, are supposed to contain letters received at the Manitowaning office between 1822 and 1894, but there is almost nothing for the years 1844-1846. Presumably these were lost in the fire which destroyed the superintendent's house in 1846.

The manuscripts are divided into four sections: correspondence which concerned Indian affairs administration, 1755-1860, the period of Imperial control; correspondence concerning the administration after 1860, the period of Canadian control; Records of the various field offices (e.g. Coldwater, Manitowaning, Sarnia, etc.) for both periods; and Indian land records for both periods.

The most valuable of these for this study was the correspondence among the department officials during the period of Imperial control. All the correspondence received at the central office for the department between the years 1828 and 1847 (volumes 47-77, 124-128, 129-139,

142-145) has been consulted. Of course, special attention was given to letters sent by Anderson, Jones, Brough, O'Meara, Burkett, Robertson and all the others who were involved at the establishments at Coldwater and Manitowaning. Almost all of these men, at one time or another, wrote to the Chief Superintendent to get instructions, to register complaints or to offer suggestions. Included also in the correspondence received at the central office are letters from prominent persons in the colony who took an interest in the Indians (e.g. Egerton Ryerson and Bishop Strachan), from men in other government departments (e.g. Foote and Roote from the Commissariat), from various white men who presented memorials concerning Indian lands or for work among the Indians; and, of course, from the Indians themselves who often wrote to ask favours or make some suggestions.

The letters (both official and private) sent by the agents in the field - men like Anderson, Jones, Clench, Brant, etc. - contain the most valuable and complete material to be found in these files. Since both Givins and Jarvis kept rather complete letter books (volumes 498-509, 749) it was possible to compare both the letters sent by the agents and the replies by the Chief Superintendent, and thereby acquire a sense of the chronology of events. For the most part these records are arranged in chronological order. Some (volumes 124-128, 129-139) are further arranged in alphabetical order. This latter arrangement proved most helpful, for it allowed me to turn quickly to most of the

correspondence written by a specific person. I say "most" because the arrangement of documents is not completely accurate and there are many letters or reports which are scattered throughout the series in the wrong places. Matheson's Index for the series (volumes 766, 767) is somewhat helpful but it is by no means complete and is of little value to someone doing intensive research with these papers.

The field office records from Manitowaning (volume 612) and St. Clair (volume 456) were of some use; also useful were the Orders in Council (volumes 119, 710, 711), miscellaneous reports and documents (714, 625-627), and records of land sales (volume 669). Macauley's Report (volume 718) to Sir George Arthur on the state of Indian Affairs gives quite a complete picture of the situation as it existed in 1839.

Once again, however, I should point out that the correspondence in R.G. 10 provides the basis for this work. Without these the chapters about Coldwater and Manitoulin could not have been written. Furthermore, these records also provided a clearer picture of how the department really operated. They also provide indications of how the entire plan of civilization was carried out, and a picture of the men who were to do the work as well as the conditions under which they worked. It was all well and good to declare a principle which should be followed, as the Colonial Office did in 1830, but it was in the Upper Canadian forests where the scheme would succeed or fail; and the documents in R.G. 10 explain how and why events turned out as they did.

Mention should also be made of the P.A.C. Q Series. This is a most comprehensive collection of all official despatches and letters (with numerous enclosures) that passed between Downing Street and York. It was this series that contained much of the data concerning aims, methods and the organization of the Indian department which is recounted in Chapters I and II. These also helped me to integrate the experiments in Upper Canada with official imperial policy formed in Great Britain. Also valuable in this latter connection were several of the books listed in the Bibliography. D.M. Young's Colonial Office, A.G. Price's White Settlers and Native Peoples, and George R. Mellor's British Imperial Trusteeship were the most useful.

Fortunately, the Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain, copies of which are deposited in the Public Archives of Canada contain much information about aboriginal tribes in the Empire. These are also listed, and proved most helpful in constructing chapters I and II.

Again, the government of Canada took sufficient interest in the Indians to appoint commissions of inquiry in 1839, 1842 and 1856. These groups reported in 1841, 1845 and 1858 respectively and their reports tend to reflect the prevailing attitudes of the whites towards the Indians. These are also listed in the bibliography and are to be found in the

appendices of the Journals of the Legislative Assembly. The Report of the Commission appointed in 1842 was very helpful. These commissioners made their voluminous report in 1845. It was printed as appendices to the Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada in two sections (Appendix E.E.E. in 1844-5 and Appendix T. in 1847). These two sections are listed as two items in the bibliography. Once again, these reports were used in writing the first two chapters of this study. The report of 1858 also contained a special report on the state of the Manitoulin Island and this, of course, helped to explain many of the details and discussion in chapter IV.

Published works on the Indians of Upper Canada in the period discussed are rare. Charles Johnston's The Valley of the Six Nations and the Grays' narrative of Wilderness Christians are the only ones which deal directly in any way with the topic discussed in this study. There are a large number of articles to be found which treat directly and indirectly with the subject of Indians (principally in Ontario History) and some of these have been listed in the bibliography. For the most part, however, all these published sources could be used only on the peripheral areas of this study.

Bibliography

Books

Adam, Margaret I., Ewing, John and Munro, James. (ed.) Guide to the Principal Parliamentary Papers Relating to the Dominions, 1812-1911. London: Oliver and Boyd, 1913.

Bishop, Olga Bernice. Publications of the Government of the Province of Canada. 1841-1867. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963.

Craig, G. (ed.) Early Travellers in the Canadas. Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1955.

_____. Upper Canada: The Formative Years 1784-1841. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963.

French, G.S. Parsons in Politics. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1962.

Graham, W.H. The Tiger of Canada West. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1962.

Gray, Elma and L.R. Wilderness Christians: The Moravian Mission to the Deleware Indians. Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1956.

Hodgetts, J.E. Pioneer Public Service. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955.

Howse, Ernest Marshall. Saints in Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952.

Innis, H.A. The Fur Trade in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956.

Jackman, S. Galloping Head: The Life of Sir Francis Bond Head, 1793-1875. London: Phoenix House, 1958.

Jenness, Diamond. The Indian Background of Canadian History. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1937.

_____. Indians of Canada. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960.

Johnston, Charles. The Valley of the Six Nations. Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1964.

Major, Frederick William. (ed.) Manitoulin: The Isle of the Ottawas (Being a handbook of historical and other information on the Grand Manitoulin Island). Gore Bay, Ontario: The Recorder Press, 1934.

Mellor, George R. British Imperial Trusteeship 1783-1850. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1951.

Morrell, W.P. British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell. Oxford: Clarendon, 1930.

Peckham, Howard H. Pontiac and the Indian Uprising. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947.

Price, A.C. White Settlers and Native Peoples. Melbourne: Georgian House, 1950.

Sissons, C.B. Egerton Ryerson: His Life and Letters. vol.1. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937.

Wallace, W. Stewart. (ed.) The Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Toronto: Macmillan, 1963.

Young, D.M. The Colonial Office in the Early Nineteenth Century. London: Longman's, Green and Co.Ltd., 1961.

Periodicals

Beatty, Willard W. "The Goal of Indian Assimilation" C.J.E.P.S. XII (May, 1946), pp. 394-404.

Lewis, Rundall M. "The Manitoulin Letters of the Rev. Charles Crosbie Brough" OH XLVIII (1956), pp. 63-80.

MacInnes, T.R.L. "History of Indian Administration in Canada", C.J.E.P.S. XII (May, 1946), 387-394.

Rowe, Mrs. S. "The Anderson Record, From 1699 to 1896", O.H.S.P.R. VI (1905), pp. 109-135.

Scott, D.C. "Indian Affairs 1763-1845", In Shortt, Adam and Doughty, Canada and its Provinces, vol.IV, Toronto: T. & A. Constable, 1913, pp. 695-725.

_____. "Indian Affairs 1840-1867", ibid., vol. V, pp. 331-362.

Sissons, C.B. "George Ryerson to Sir Peregrine Maitland", O.H.S.P.R. (1952), pp. 23-29.

Stanley, George F.G. "The Indians in the War of 1812", in Zaslow, Morris (ed.) The Defended Border. Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1964.

_____. "The Indian Background of Canadian History", Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1952, pp. 14-21.

Wise, S.F. "The Indian Diplomacy of John Graves Simcoe", Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1953, pp. 36-44.

Journals, Printed Reports etc.

"Despatches on Indian Affairs", Journals, Legislative Assembly, Upper Canada, 1837-8, Appendix, pp.180f.

Great Britain, Colonial Office. Aboriginal Tribes (North America, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, and British Guiana). Parliamentary Paper No. 617, 1834.

Great Britain, Colonial Office. British North American Provinces, Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, Dated 11 June 1839, for Copies or Extracts of Correspondence since 1st April 1835 between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Governors of the British North American Provinces Respecting the Indians in those Provinces. Parliamentary Paper No. 323, 1839.

Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons. Select Committee appointed to consider what measures ought to be adopted with respect to the Native Inhabitants of Countries where British Settlements are made... Reports. Parliamentary Papers No. 538, 1836, and No. 425, 1837.

"Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", Journals, Legislative Assembly, Canada, 1844-5, Appendix E.E.E.

"Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada", Journals, Legislative Assembly, Canada, 1847, Appendix T.

"Report of Committee No.4 on Indian Department", in "Report on the Public Departments", Journals, Legislative Assembly, Upper Canada, 1839-40, vol. II.

"Return re correspondence with S.P. Jarvis etc...", Journals, Legislative Assembly, Canada, 1847, Appendix V.V.

"Report of the Special Commissioners to investigate Indian Affairs in Canada", Sessional Papers, Canada, 1858, Appendix 21, vol.6.

Manuscripts

Public Archives of Canada, Record Group 10, "Indian Affairs".

Public Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 11, Q Series, "Canada, Original Correspondence, Transcripts".