INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

NOTE TO USERS

Page(s) not included in the original manuscript and are unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript was microfilmed as received.

69

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]

**The political economy of communication media in Zimbabwe:
promise and performance**

[1980-1999].

By

Lazarus D. K. Dokora

B.Ed., B.A.Hons., Dip.PHE.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Mass Communications

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

April 23, 2001

©2001, L.D.K. Dokora

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-60981-2

Canada

The undersigned recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis

**The political economy of communication media in Zimbabwe:
promise and performance
[1980-1999]**

Submitted by
Lazarus D.K. Dokora
B.Ed., B.A.Hons., Dip.PHE.
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Masters of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Chair
School of Journalism and Communication

Abstract

The political economy of communication media in Zimbabwe has undergone transformation in the last nineteen years while interacting with variables of colony, conflictual heritages, and policy innovations that have exerted pressures on the polity.

The study isolated the competing visions in the national development paradigm and traced their origin to the processual and progressive emergence of social formations and the heritage of colony and liberation war. Issues of race, legal framework, and externally imposed structural adjustments have influenced the lexicon of the elite and further disconnected the urban and rural spaces. Additionally, the study underscored the significance of the liberation war heritage in *pungwe* – as constant and consistent dialogue across socio-economic formations, and the borders of rural and urban, poor and rich. Plurality, as a democratic pursuit, was thus located in the embedding of organic participation by the excluded social formations.

Dedication

To my wonderful daughters: Moira, Adia, Tteva and Michota for their comprehension
and *cariño*

And my wife, Sabina, for the joyous assurance of family in a state of *pungwe*.

And above all

To the memory of those combatants who fell in the line of combat:

They loved the country more.

Table of Contents

Title Page	
Acceptance Form	ii
Abstract	iii
Dedication	iv
Table of Contents	v
Contents	vi
List of Maps	vii
List of Appendices	viii

CONTENTS

Chapter One	1
Communication and development	
Chapter Two	39
Review of related literature	
Chapter Three	69
The promise: Growth with equity	
Chapter Four	126
Performance: Towards a critical pragmatics of social space	
Chapter Five	173
Summary, recommendations, conclusion	
References	192
Appendices	202

List of maps

Frontispiece

Map 1: Zimbabwe Provinces and provincial capitals.

[*Source:* Adapted from Stoneman & Cliffe 1989, p.xxi]

Map 2: Appendix Three

Zimbabwe Climatic Conditions

[*Source:* M. O. Collins, 1983, p.5]

APPENDICES

1.0 Appendix One

1.1 Interview Schedule [Level 1]

1.2 Interview Schedule [Level 2]

1.3 Interview Data

2.0 Appendix Two

2.1 Consent Form

2.2 *Neria* Film Questionnaire

3.0 Appendix Three

3.1 Map 2: Zimbabwe Climatic Conditions

Map 1 Zimbabwe: provincial boundaries and major towns

CHAPTER ONE

Communication and development

Introduction

The present study of the political economy of communication for development focuses on one African country: Zimbabwe. While broadly working within a Marxist framework, the study draws on the discourse of postcoloniality in its focus on the evolution of structures and practices in Zimbabwe's colonial history. At the same time, the focus on power [political, economic and in the social space] permits the partial incorporation of Foucauldian discourse on control and power. Further, in presenting evidence that demonstrates that the traditional media and new media are in a state of flux in Zimbabwe and largely confined in urban formations, the study points to blind spots as players in the field search for alternative visions. It is in this context then, in the search for alternative structuring in the communication media that the Gramscian organic vision is presented.

Zimbabwe as country and its communication media systems cannot be understood without reference to an understanding of its colonial history. The present chapter highlights the factors and historical antecedents that have impinged on the communication media landscape. The centrality of communications to development cannot be doubted – hence perspectives of various players, non-governmental organisations, voluntary associations, governments, and others in development highlight the role of communication media of one type or another as crucial either to the visibility of their performance or to facilitating development work.

Historical background

This section deals with historical circumstances that trace the common cleavages in the social formations of the country. The interests and gold dreams of Cecil John Rhodes, the politics of the South African peninsula and the ambitions of a reluctant imperial power come to shape and influence the context of development in Zimbabwe.

Common images in the colonisation phase are echoed in the 'Rhodesian' phase of the country's history. A brief overview of the pervasive tapestry provides a reading of the country's chequered legacy. The colonisation of Zimbabwe is in some ways similar to the approaches used in South Africa. Until 1923, land to the 'north' was seen in strategic terms as well: to block the northward movement of the Boers in Transvaal. The other interests that were halted by Rhodes' scheming include those of the Portuguese from their enclave of the so-called Portuguese East Africa [Mozambique] and the earlier interests of the Germans.¹

War, theft and trickery were used to secure land and minerals from the Southern African savannah lands. The European settlers had effectively occupied South African through wars and conquest. The movement to the North created an ethnic dynamic among the Europeans themselves. There was inter-European ethnic tension between the Hollanders [Dutch and Boers] and the group of British extraction. When the latter gained ascendancy in the Cape, the Boers trekked North and became the frontier people in Transvaal and

Orange Free State. The British settlers in the midst of the Boers farmers were termed *uitlanders*. Demands for voting and civic freedoms for this class were later to be at the centre of the Boer War in 1899-1902.

Within Mashonaland² itself, a rich history and tradition thrived for centuries. Beverly Whyte suggests that construction began at the complex site as early as 1100 AD. There are racist³ and colonial⁴ theories at work as well, suggesting the impossibility of these structures being the product of African people for no reason except that they could not be the authors of such a creation. It is clear, however, that by mid fourteenth century⁵, there was a thriving Kingdom of the VaRozvi in the central-southern part of Zimbabwe. The specific headquarters of the Kingdom of the VaRozvi was located at *Dzimbahwe* or Great Zimbabwe, near today's Masvingo city. This central imperial authority was identified as the Munhumutapa dynasty. The empire of Munhumutapa was engaged in trade both within the areas subsumed by today's international border for Zimbabwe and portions of what is today Mozambican territory of the Ndaus and others near the Indian Ocean.⁶

¹ Dr Holib obtained a so-called 'concession' from Lobengula earlier than Rudd and friends. Rhodes and his key friends knew about this and hence the draft terms of the Rudd Concession and even the letter from the Queen to King Lobengula refers to not giving away everything to the men who come first.

² The name relates to land that was settled by the 'Shona' people. The term 'Shona' or 'Tshona' has its own controversies that are not the subject here. The land of the Shona was bounded by two rivers: Limpopo in the south and Zambezi in the north. Further Mozambique lay to the east of this land while Botswana [then called Bechuanaland] lay to the south west. The Matabeleland settlement was located around the present Plumtree-Bulawayo axis in south west present Zimbabwe. In sum, **Map 1**[frontispiece], shows provincial divisions in Zimbabwe today. Eight of the provinces would largely conform to the Mashonaland nomenclature of colonial times. The same country was also called *Zambesia* until some friend of Cecil Rhodes, possibly Francis Dormer, at Argus Group in South Africa suggested *Rhodesia* instead.

³ W Mallows, *The mystery of the Great Zimbabwe: A new solution*, 1984, p.75-76.

⁴ Peter Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 1973, p.111, refers to the 'corrections' caused to the Monuments Guides by a colonial minister.

⁵ Beverley Whyte in Gordon Graham [Ed.], *Beneath a Zimbabwean sun*, 2000, p.75

⁶ VaRozvi refers to a part of the people of Zimbabwe in the Province of Masvingo. The Great Zimbabwe

There is archaeological evidence collected at the Great Zimbabwe suggesting contact with East Africa, the Arab and Mediterranean worlds and even the Asian subcontinent.

Trinkets, beads, and 'celadon sherds' have been identified and reported on in the excavations. These findings have helped in the reconstruction of possible patterns of movement in trade and mode of life at the imperial city:

Great Zimbabwe is the only site in the interior to yield substantial numbers of celadon sherds and so must have occupied a pre-eminent position in the trade with the coast.⁷

Pottery and iron artefacts have testified to a diversified trade and inter-linkages with other parts elsewhere in Africa and beyond. The 'stone house' complex itself has presented the clearest evidence of opulence and stability. It is inconceivable that a kingdom on the run from its enemies could have undertaken such construction. In places the Great Enclosure is of some fifteen feet wide and is believed to have been the inner chamber of the King's wife or wives. There are elaborate chevron patterns and exquisite geometric and architectural designs that testify to the existence of aesthetic sensibility of a very refined standard. There was also a marked presence of animal life with their kraals locked into seamless form with the main layout of the Great Zimbabwe.

By mid eighteenth century, the empire of Munhumutapa was in decline and other smaller principalities had found their sense of independence. The contact with adventurers from Portugal, Germany and Britain in the South African Cape Colony was preceded by one

thrived under the kingship of VaRozvi. The Ndau are people spread between Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the East of Zimbabwe. They are more numerous in Mozambique.

critical factor in the historical tapestry of Zimbabwe: the arrival of the Ndebele, under Mzilikazi in the south-western part of the country in what was then Go-bulawayo [translating broadly: 'where the killing takes place']. Mzilikazi soon died [1867] and his successor Lobengula, took over among this small group of disgruntled South African exiles. They were exiling themselves from the expansive and integrative wrath of the Zulu King, Shaka.

The late Mzilikazi and successor, Lobengula, did not have authority over Munhumutapa descendants or the principalities that had been under that empire. The Ndebele were known to the VaShona, particularly, for their raids into the periphery of VaShona communities for the purpose of rustling cattle [for food], plundering granaries for grain and abducting select women. But when the adventurers and fortune seekers like Messrs Rudd, Maguire and Thompson arrived at Lobengula's kraal, they first credited him with images of greater power than he really had. This was deliberate. They wanted him to give away 'Zambesia' land and mineral rights that he did not control, let alone have dominion over. The terms of the agreement were crude but salutary – King Lobengula would receive the following benefits, among others:

... one hundred pounds sterling British currency, on the first day of every lunar month ... one thousand Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles, together with one hundred thousand rounds of suitable ball cartridge, five hundred of the said rifles and fifty thousand of the said cartridges to be ordered from England forthwith⁸

⁷ Peter Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, 1973, p.110

⁸ *First Segment of the The Rudd Concession*, dated October 30, 1888, National Archives, Harare.

Obviously the burden of this benefit is miniaturization of the region – if it had been implemented, even minimally. The Ndebele had come into this part of the region about fifty years prior to this fraudulent scheme. The entry point for the new comers was to suggest to ‘war-like’ people that they could get guns and gain greater firepower over their supposed enemies. In that way, their friends would become the new arrivals. Neither issue materialized. Halfway through the document Lobengula is made to claim that ‘I, Lobengula, King of Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and other adjoining territories, in the exercise of my sovereign powers ...’, the macabre, tragi-comedy had taken form. Lobengula had no such power over the land of the VaShona nor could he claim routine authority over ‘adjoining territories’ whatsoever.

The framing of these instruments was a construction by the adventurers who were looking for pretexts to enter and violate the territorial integrity of the indigenous people of this part of Africa. Towards the end of the document, King Lobengula undertakes ‘to grant no concessions of land or mining rights from and after this date without their consent and concurrence’. Titular authority now rested with the adventurers and fortune seekers. Thus in a single document, the African King had both affirmed a historic lie and simultaneously lost its glory. Lobengula is made to conclude the document as one indebted to the adventurers. Of course, the adventurers were aware of this throughout. Rhodes had especially selected the group for its ability to bring success without regard as to means.

It is not surprising therefore that when Lobengula was afterwards de-briefed fully of this fraudulent concession, [there were several others who loitered at the Ndebele Royal Court] he not only dissociated himself but also sent two *Indunas*, King's Counsellors, to London to see the Queen.⁹ Edward Maund was companion and guide of these counsellors on their way to see the Queen. He was an interested party who had lost out on the deal for the supposed riches in minerals in the Shona region. By this action, he sought to pressurize Rhodes to either pay him off or draft him into some position in the forthcoming Company formation.¹⁰

Both at the Cape Colony and in London, the news was purposely let loose that there was to be flotation of shares for a Company that was to reap the mineral wealth of the mythical King Solomon's Mines. With Kimberly diamond mines having created living proof in Rhodes, a millionaire since 1869, the media boasted of similar riches being a little further North. This had an enormous impact on the public and private psyche even though the likes of political schemers such as Rhodes were aware of this. Theodore Bull, editor and later owner of the *Central African Examiner* observed that the 'exaggerated belief in the mineral wealth'¹¹ of Mashonaland was a kind of self-propelling myth.¹²

⁹ Hugh Hole, *The Jameson raid*, p.8 '... two Matabele headmen ... despatched by Lobengula on a secret mission to Queen Victoria.' The counsellors were Babyana and Mshete.

¹⁰ The rebuttal by Lobengula was published in the February edition of *Bechuanaland News*, 1889. Carefully couched, the article ended by suggesting that investigations were underway. It was common cause, and Maund was aware of this, that Johannes Grobler [July 1887] and the missionary Moffat [December 1887] had both been entertained at Lobengula's court.

¹¹ T. Bull, *Rhodesian perspective*, 1967, p.12

¹² H. Rider Haggard, *King Solomon's mines* [1885], 1942

In this context, the dispatch of the *Indunas* was a mere ploy in the rivalries over the possession of the land and minerals in Zimbabwe among the fortune seekers. From this perspective, London and the fortune seekers were at one. Lord Gifford's letter to the Colonial Office dated April 30, 1889 makes no reference to the local dispute over the Rudd Concession. Instead, Lord Gifford outlined the fourfold vision of the colonial British project in Southern Africa. The first part of the vision was 'to extend northwards the railway and telegraph systems in the direction of Zambezi' and the second, 'to encourage emigration and colonisation.' The meaning that Rhodes later attached to 'extend northwards' meant effectively occupy Africa from the Cape to Cairo.

Thereafter followed trade and commerce and the desire for a 'powerful organization' that could take charge of the competing interests including, apparently, 'securing to the Native Chiefs and their subjects the rights reserved to them under the several concessions.' An indication of the practical nature of the native 'rights' from the settler perspective had been given with respect to Lobengula's promised arms under the Rudd Concession.

When the colony later acceded to responsible government in 1923, the imperial government reserved titular legal control of constitutional matters affecting African people. Parallel efforts to lure settlers to the territory of Zambesia were of course made by such persons as Edward Maund himself. He concentrated on generating enthusiasm in what were lower middle class and working class circles that faced hardships in England's industrial capitalism. He lectured on trade prospects, the promises of riches and prospects

of ownership of vast tracts of land in the virgin land of *Zambesia* where they would find 'fresh breathing room and remunerative work.'¹³

Edward Maund theorized that settlers would find plentiful gold and 'the production of which from the soil of a country is the quickest means of developing that country. Free trade or protection does not affect gold, as it does other products gained by human industry from the earth.'¹⁴ The Royal Charter for the British South Africa Company was granted a few months later on October 15, 1889, acceding to Lord Gifford's vision and to 'Rhodes' collection of filibusterers.'¹⁵

The treatment of the *Indunas* in London typified the colonial attitude: first, the transformation of the native appearance through European dress; then they were feted by the Aborigines Protection Society, and, finally they were brought before the Queen to be impressed by the opulence of the Queen. There were gold bars on display for that purpose. The communicative significance of the purpose of their trip was lost in the midst of peripheral issues of orchestrated persuasion. Indeed, the trip was totally without effect as a few months later, in September 1890:

...settlers fanned out from Harare to find the large farms which each had been promised and for which Rhodes was required to pay no one, they happily took lands to which there could not for the time being, be title; ...did not belong to the Company or Rhodes. Even Lobengula would have been pressed to convey title.¹⁶

¹³ Hansard, 31 August 2000, p.797 cited in a contribution by Deputy Minister of Education, Hon Aeneas Chigwedere, MP. In an interview later, he detailed the Gomala incident described later in this study, p.33.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 797

¹⁵ Robert Rotberg, The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power, 1988, p. 293

¹⁶ Robert Rotberg, The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power, 1988, p. 300

Rhodes' plan was to forestall the Boers before they crossed the Limpopo in their northward movement. The icon of this venture to the North was Dr Leander Jameson. Rhodes personally selected him. Jameson had a criminal penchant. Hugh Hole, in characterizing the relationship between Lobengula and Jameson, puts it this way:

[Jameson] employed the same methods with the savage [King Lobengula] as he had so often utilized with his patients at Kimberly, and with the same result.¹⁷

Lobengula was in fact regularly injected with morphine as part of the strategy to cultivate a dependency syndrome on the 'good' doctor. Dr Jameson was thus behaving true to his character too and the special mission to which he was assigned by Rhodes. Where 'native' or 'savages' were concerned, moral scruples apparently did not apply. The categorisation of indigenous populations was entirely in the hands of the colonialists. They subjected every encounter to the narrow criteria and single-mindedness of the capture of space and establishment of colony.

Rhodes had amassed wealth in South Africa through mining interests and concerns. He also sat in the legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony in South Africa from 1883. He was strategically located in South Africa and could thus scheme and engineer events to the 'north' as part of his empire-construction for the British imperial project.

Rhodes sought not only further riches, but also political power in South Africa itself and influence in his own British homeland. He had a matching ambition to achieve both.

¹⁷ Hugh Hole, The Jameson raid, 1930, p.12

Modern State, context of development:

The First Chimurenga, 1896-97

In the preceding section, it was noted that Cecil John Rhodes sent a number of adventurers, hunters and fortune seekers to ‘annex land, not natives’ North of the Limpopo River in the name of the British South Africa Company.

Cecil Rhodes wrote to a London newspaper in 1891, re-confirming the basis of the invasion of VaShona territory:

I feel I shall have a good deal of worry in developing Mashonaland. I quite appreciate the enormous difficulties of opening up a new country but still, if Providence will furnish a few paying gold reefs I think it would be all right. Please understand it is no personal avarice which desires this, but as you know, gold hastens the development of a country more than anything. ...It will be one of the great producing gold centres of the world and it will be the indirect means of civilizing Central Africa.¹⁸

The ‘avarice’ he denies is the sole basis that triggered the colonisation process.

The notion of ‘civilizing Central Africa’ was far fetched. The composition of the Pioneer Column itself and its deliberate and calculated instant cruelty on indigenous peoples was anything but generous philanthropy.

The common myths in the vocabulary of the colonialists was to see the indigenous peoples in primal terms as ‘savages’¹⁹, and hence unrefined and needing intervention to save them from each other’s throats or eventual extinction. James Bent, a London archaeologist hired by Rhodes to study the Great Zimbabwe, wrote in his journal in 1892 in praise of the ‘strange, weird country to look upon,

¹⁸ Julie Frederikse, None but ourselves, 1982, p.9 [as quoted therein]

¹⁹ Ibid., p.8

and after the flat monotony of Bechuanaland a perfect paradise'.²⁰ This landscape view was contrasted with the human geography whose profile 'looked like monkeys',²¹ more so:

As one watched them eat, one could imagine that it was not so many generations since they emerged from a state of cannibalism.²²

The framing logic of the terminology put in play racial categories that remained a force in settler colonial literature of almost ninety years through to independence in 1980. Rhodes made the case for white conquest and control of indigenous peoples plainer in the Cape Colony Parliament:

The natives are bound gradually to come under the control of the Europeans. I feel that it is the duty of this colony when, as it were, her more fiery sons go out and take land, to follow in their footsteps with civilised government.²³

In a telling argument on the comparative weighting of ideas and their place in the debate on modernity, Aijaz Ahmad observes:

...it is the superior power of the material productions of advanced capitalism which sets the terms of comparison, in war and in peace.²⁴

Indeed, the likes of Dr Jameson made no secret of their desire to start inter-ethnic conflicts between the Ndebele and the Shona and then justify intervention to neutralize perceived enemies. They, as a settler group, were better armed and were bounded by no common humanity with local indigenous people. Hunter-cum-

²⁰ James Brent, The ruined cities of Mashonaland, 1892, p.33

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.34

²² James Brent, The ruined cities of Mashonaland, 1892, p.34

²³ Robert Rutberg, The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power, 1988, p.158

journalist, Selous accepted two thousand pounds from Rhodes to stop writing to his London newspaper on anything that might draw negative attention to the region. London was of course where money and shares changed hands. It was also where the British South Africa Company had secured capitalization of just over a million pounds at one-pound sterling per share. But at Rhodes' instruction, shares were held off the market for two years to facilitate inland penetration of Mashonaland and Matabeleland by the Pioneer Column.

By 1893, it had become obvious that there was no gold of any substance in Mashonaland. It became necessary for the British South Africa Company, in a typical cavalier manner, to create opportunities in Matabeleland to continue the search for gold as well as to engage in the seizure of land for ranching, tobacco and other crop farming.

The Ndebele stood in the way. An incident over alleged stolen telegraph wire in May 1893²⁵ led to the full-scale onslaught against the Ndebele. This was the start of the Ndebele campaign²⁶ which ended with the complete destruction of Go-bulawayo. The destruction of Go-bulawayo was associated with a mistaken belief that there was gold there. There is need to return to this incident later on but it is necessary to note Roberts' observation:

²⁴ Aijaz Ahmad, *In theory: Nations, classes, literatures*, 1989, p.25

²⁵ Brian Roberts, *Cecil Rhodes: flawed colossus*, 1987, p.166

It would be ridiculous to weep over the passing of the bloodthirsty Ndebele regime; on the other hand, there is little to be said for those responsible for its passing.²⁷

Meanwhile, in Mashonaland, a groundswell of opposition to the occupation had continued to simmer since the formal occupation of 1890. Open combat broke out with the *murenga* guerrilla fighters in 1896. The *murenga* fighters were subdued by end of 1897. Following this military defeat and a sham trial at Salisbury, the principal military and spiritual leaders of the *Chimurenga* war, *Sekuru* [Grandfather] Kaguvi and *Mbuya* [Grandmother] Nehanda were beheaded at Salisbury by the Company authorities.

The Royal Charter gave wide powers to the Company. It could literally exercise it in anyway it chose and there would be no recourse to redress in the Cape or among the London club of the so-called Aborigines Protection Society, the London Missionary Society or the imperial government itself. In fact, Rhodes' cryptic instruction to Jameson in the northward push was 'annex land, not natives.' If natives were on the land, then they were an inconvenience that could be dealt with as best by the motley group of settlers and adventurers. Summary executions were not uncommon and they continued to mark and mar relations

²⁶ Brian Roberts, *Cecil Rhodes: flawed colossus*, 1987, p.224: Trooper Peter Halket: 'Well, when I heard that the Company was going to have a row with the Matabele, I thought I'd volunteer. They said there was lots of loot to be got, and land to be given out, and that sort of thing...'

²⁷ Brian Roberts, *Cecil Rhodes: Flawed colossus*, 1987, p.188

between settler forces and indigenous people well into independence and beyond.²⁸

First Chimurenga War 1896-97

During the initial occupation years, the concern was for the establishment of an artery of roads and rail to enable the exploitation of the minerals in the country. The British South Company owned the railway line and the Hwange colliery. In order to ensure cheap labour, especially since the indigenous people felt distant from the settler administration, the colonial administrators applied what was described as a 'head tax' to married males. This did not initially get the response that was satisfactory to the labour requirement of the continuing rail construction and mining concerns, so the principle was extended to all males over age fourteen.

Eventually, there were taxes on dogs, cats and cattle and above all, there was also *chibharo* or 'compulsion'²⁹ labour. Through *chibharo*, the construction of railway lines quickened and so did the deaths on construction sites. To date, there is almost three thousand kilometres of railroad. Then on the farms and mines, shelters and compounds [dwelling structures for mine workers] were developed. This created spiral effects on health, amenities, spousal rights, and led the settler administration to begin the process of regulating African movements through a uniform pass system.

²⁸ Robert Rutberg, The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power, 1988, p.150

²⁹ J Forbes, Britain in Tropical Africa: Economic relationships and impact [1880-1960], 1984, p.55

Further, forced labour paid survival rates since payment of anything at all was not part of the compulsory labour terms. Additionally, labour was sourced from further afield: Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique regions. Forced labour brought Africans more sharply into focus with their condition of Africanness in their own country. This created, on the one hand, a firm basis for solidarity among Africans and on the other hand, continuing discomfort and irritations for the settler colonialists. Zimbabwe, at the time of the European conflict of 1914-18, was largely comprised of small business centres dotted along the railway and telegraph line and in mining encampments. In this sense, Salisbury was the capital and main hive of white commerce and industry, followed in importance by the lowveld town of Fort Victoria. These two centres became the nexus about which communications flowed to and from South Africa and hence Europe. The Meikles Hotel was established about 1915 for the elite class of entrepreneurs in the country's capital.

Both the First World War, 1914-18 and Second World War, 1939-45 came to the colony by way of settler genealogy. The British Empire sought support and collaboration from its overseas citizens in the field of war against its German and European enemies. A few thousands of indigenous people were drafted as gun-loaders, cooks and combat soldiers in far-flung places in North Africa and Burma. The contradictions re-surfaced upon the return of the survivors: the white soldiers received land and were privileged in housing and the education of their children. At best the African participants received large overcoats as thank you from the colonial administration but on behalf of the Crown.

Agrarian Economy

There is need to stress two basic lines of difference in the attitudes prevalent in early colonial Zimbabwe. The first of these was the basic agrarian outlook of the VaShona people. They depended on the land for sustenance. Prior to the 1890 occupation by the European settlers, the VaShona people had vast expanses of agricultural land. Through the communication embedded in the proverbs³⁰, it is possible to discern the age-old sensibility and empathy for anyone desirous of land. The VaShona did not 'own' land in the way in which European capitalism had parcelled out British soil in the enclosure movement and handed out title deeds to the rich. Instead, the chief holds the land in trust for the community.

African farmers combined both land tillage and cattle keeping. There were some *hurudzas* [those with grain surplus at the end of a season] among the communities who became the focal points for sustenance in drought or pestilence years. Additionally the chief's produce from the common field at the chief's kraal, cushioned the poor, the sick and those too elderly to till their own fields. These community-based forms of social welfare systems came under stress as they went unrecognized by colonial settlers and the chieftainship was seen as one more tool in colonial administration.

³⁰ 'Ukama igasva hunozadziswa nekudya', with a close rendition as: *relationships are like containers, only fulfilled by what you carry or eat together*. This presupposes the presence of adequate food for one's family and sufficient for the relations and those who visit. The mutuality and sense of community provokes comprehension for anyone who might be without land. Denial of land, consequently, is the worst form of punishment to VaShona community.

The second point of difference has to do with miscommunication on what constitutes tolerance and idiocy. The attitudes of the generality of the African people in Zimbabwe were often characterized as servile and taciturn. The oversight on the part of the colonial administration was to mistake the fact that they were dealing with a population that was managing a situation of power relations and not one of the indigenous people's choosing. The tradition established by the colonial settlers of meting out instant justice created the instinctive survival attitude: keep your counsel within your inner circle. Mungoshi's novel, Waiting for the rain, [1975] captures the spirit of the 1890s and early 1960s. The Old Man is a character who establishes the continuity between the *murenga* fighters of his time and the stirrings of the Second Chimurenga:

...we were defeated but ours was a clean fight. They misunderstood our hospitality for stupidity.³¹

Underlying all this, were the instruments of conquests: new land laws. The land Apportionment Act of 1930 ensured the best land was set aside for the colonial settler community to the tune of over 60% of arable land in Natural Rainfall Regions I, II and III. The rest of the dry-land was designated 'Reserves'. Further in 1969, there was the Land Husbandry Act that further strengthened the minority settler grip on the land. Indigenous farmers wanting to purchase land could not choose what land to buy: this was designated although in much reduced size. The standard farm size in native purchase areas was about two hundred acres. The minimal farm size for white settlers was not less than seven hundred and fifty hectares.

African people were physically herded into the reserve zones with compulsory destocking of their animal herds. In tandem with this process, teachings on birth control, and especially the use of *Depo-Provera* were introduced. This carried side effects of overweight, high blood pressure, cessation of menstruation and heart illnesses. Yet there was deliberate policy on its use. An additional taxation burden was imposed to force men into urban and farm employment. The land dispossession, increased taxation levels and birth control measures met with resistance. Meanwhile settler agriculture and urbanization grew and fed into Europe's capitalist system. Dodgshon, in dealing with the theme of societal development in time and space finds cognates in European economic and social growth in late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the geographical spaces of the periphery. The marginal zones of industrial capitalism provided the 'windfall of colonial resources, both human and physical' since Europe's 'own labour and production systems would not have permitted such a dramatic scale of growth.'³²

The Second Chimurenga War, 1966-80

In the period between 1918 and 1966, momentous developments took place. A white settler referendum was conducted in 1923 to find out if the colony should join the Union of South Africa [established since 1910] or become a self-governing colony. The settlers chose the latter option: the opinion of the African majority in the contiguous community did not matter. Further, the Federation of Central Africa [1953-63] of the States of Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe [then Southern Rhodesia] was conceived and brought

³¹ Charles Mungoshi, Waiting for the rain, 1975, p.115

³² Robert Dodgshon, Society in time and space, 1998, p.194

about to provide white settler protection in a larger framework. There was no serious consultation of African opinion in the shaping and tooling of the federation instruments. The articles of federation merely provided token and indirect representation of African people through three settlers who were to represent African interests in the federal assembly along with six African representatives selected through what was termed 'African Boards.' The federal assembly had thirty-five members in all, with the largest block of eleven settlers from Zimbabwe representing the white community.³³

The mass media powerhouse was in fact in Zimbabwe: the central European federal radio broadcasts were broadcast from Harare while African service was located in Lusaka, Zambia. In Zambia settlers constructed studios only in 1941. The wartime radio transmitters were the work of Copperbelt companies in that territory. A commission set-up to review the restructuring of organs for the federal state reported early in 1953 that:

We feel that there is much to be said for a federal public relations department within the department of Internal Affairs and Justice. It would cover government publicity, information services, press relations, tourism, films and broadcasting.³⁴

They also underscored the department's responsibility for control of newspaper and magazine publications for African audiences. The Harare model of broadcasting and mass media control placed considerable responsibility on the head of the postal services. The Postmaster General was in fact given direct access to the responsible minister. The post

³³ HMSO, *Report on Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Act, statutory instruments and command papers* [monograph], 1953, p.13

³⁴ HMSO, *Report on Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Act, statutory instruments and command papers* [monograph], 1953, article 172

office collected wireless license fees and provided land line facilities for 'broadcast services.' The Central Film Laboratory became a federal institution in 1953. This film laboratory was set up in Harare in 1948 with funding from the imperial British government. During the whole federation period [1953-63], it became a key centre for production of federal films on education for African audiences, tourist films and European documentary films. Both 35 and 16 millimetre films were made with the former for European audience consumption while the latter were used in police training and for African audiences. The Laboratory remained operational and active well into independence but has since run into budgetary constraints and closed its doors in the mid 1990s. Broadcasting became a federal responsibility in 1958. In the same year, broadcasting studios were completed for Zimbabwe where the federal broadcasts were centralised.

With the break up of the federation in 1963, the Rhodesia Front party administration sought to consolidate the benefits of federation. Additionally, Smith, the new leader of the party, was preparing the settler community for his declaration of independence. He took over the broadcasting services and established the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation as successor entity to the federal authority. There was much acrimony in the debates over whether the State should succeed the Federal ownership pattern or broadcasting should be a private company domain. The argument was that there was no evidence that the company running television programming would not be infiltrated by 'communists'. In 1964, Mr Thomas, debating the issue in the colonial chamber emphasised that the company might, in the Premier's opinion 'fall into the hands of

communists or communist sympathisers' and wondered if a vote on a matter such as the supposition of a probable infiltration was called for.³⁵

The solution for the settler administration was to combine the Rhodesia Television Company services and radio services unit into a single 'Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation/TV' entity under statutory State control. The colonial State managed the corporation through an appointed board of directors. It is worth noting that the supposed fear of radicalism in the communication media was used by the State to keep the facility away from private business. Recent debates [year 2000] in the National Assembly in Zimbabwe suggest that this facility is once again the subject of calls to return it to the private sector domain. Presumably the 'communists or communist sympathisers' are in power: you deal with them only by starving them the communication media.

The growth of urban African populations had increased considerably especially after the Second World War. White immigration increased significantly, and was actively promoted in an effort to counter the population growth of the African people. With inducements of farmland, settlement loans and cheap labour, the white population inflows into the country rose and there was a consequent rise in urban African labour as well: as house servants, British South Africa Company police force, gardeners and baby-minders ['nannies']. These workers were largely guided under the Masters and Servants Act

³⁵ Government Printers, *Parliamentary debates*, 2. 1964, pp.827-30

[1897, 1901]. These were precious instruments that provided the rubric of labour treatment in settler industries and in the domestic space.

It was not until 1960 that African workers were acknowledged in law as workers³⁶. Following this, the activism of the likes of Benjamin Burombo and his *African Voice* movement [a workers movement] organized successful strikes. The settler administration then justified its passage of the Law and Order [Maintenance] Act, 1960, in a bid to control African unrest. It was under this Act that a whole series of banning orders occurred and nationalists, workers and peasants alike were put under 'house arrest' or became restrictees with reporting appointments at local police stations countrywide. Many were sent into detention centres such as the lion-infested place called Gonakudzingwa. The name is a euphemism meaning - *the only way you can get out of here alive is by being sent away* – in other words a place where you could not imagine escaping and reaching a safe haven alive.

The Act created a new offence: anything likely to bring 'contempt or disesteem' of the security apparatus was deemed illegal. A small collection of short stories by Charles Mungoshi, Coming of the dry season, [1973], described a common occurrence in urban setting: an accident. There was no eyewitness but a crowd builds up and a young man in a straw hat begins to play the role of Everyman and he and others suggest they volunteer to give evidence against this wanton destruction of black people by white drivers. The

³⁶ T. Bull, Rhodesian perspective, p.109

message was double edged: the chance of a black driver killing a pedestrian was virtually negligible: the African population did not generally own vehicles of this nature. The other message was in fact that the police, by taking in volunteer witnesses, were corrupting the eyewitness procedure. If there was someone that should have travelled in their police car, it should have been the white driver. The crowd believes the white driver will be let loose anyway but that the volunteer youths were brave people and more like them were needed. The collection was banned because it would bring 'disesteem' to the system's agents.

It is clearly in this period that the broader confluence of African nationalism took concrete form. The late Zimbabwean 'houseboy'-cum-politician Maurice Nyagumbo typifies the political and social cleavages of this period. In his treatise, With the people, [1980], the long-time political prisoner offers a testament of the substantive thinking then. Maurice Nyagumbo was in Khami Prison [1959] and a review tribunal presented an opportunity for African nationalists to turn against their colleagues or simply change their attitude and praise the system and so leave prison life. But not the resolute Nyagumbo and his prison mates [except one]. Nyagumbo stated that *chibharo* was alive and well in his district of Makoni. The white Native Commissioner of Makoni District was telegraphed to appear before the review tribunal. Nyagumbo was forewarned that he would earn six additional months for making false allegations:

I was asked if I had anything to ask the native Commissioner and I told the tribunal I had several questions. The first one was: 'How long have you been in the district?'

His reply was: 'Six months now, but I have already gone through all the records, and I am quite satisfied that there has never been such a thing as forced labour in the district.' My second question was: 'Who built Nyamangura bridge at Makoni clinic?'

Rose replied: 'I understand that the bridge was built by the chief's people who volunteered as it was going to help them in getting to the clinic.'
 My third question was: 'Who built the rest-camp now being used by the Native Commissioner and the police at Rugoyi showgrounds?'
 The reply was: 'Volunteers who were sent by the kraal heads'.
 ... For this truth, I spent four years in detention and restriction camps.³⁷

Clearly this exposé raises the question: where does truth reside? The Native Commissioner believes in his 'records' as source and confirmation. But he draws a blank there as inscriptions from his 'I understand...' seem to fill in the void. The meta-text has no resonance in the textuality of life in the villages. Without being directly confrontational, Nyagumbo succeeds in highlighting the fact of continuance of forced labour [*chibharo*] in his district, and by implication, in the country generally. In a racially segregated system, the native commissioner title may not necessarily have been given to the best person by reason of learning and experience. Other criteria prevail.

Literate Zimbabweans were avid readers of the South African *Drum* magazine, *Central African Examiner*, and *Moto* magazines. Those who could not read shared in the collective consumption of the story of the day. They kept themselves informed on current affairs, with many like the exemplar above, having travelled to South Africa and seen the pass laws of apartheid in action. They returned home to stress the need to continue the unfinished Chimurenga of the turn of the century. The message was simple: the country belonged to the African people who were 'servants' in their own land.

³⁷ Maurice Nyagumbo, *With the people*, 1980, pp.127-8

The point of rupture between the two contiguous societies was the urban class formation. The workers took the lead in the initial stone-throwing clashes between the settler colonial administration and the disenfranchised. While wages were of interest, these were tied to the broader goal of 'one man one vote' and the return of the land to the 'child of the soil'. There was a significant leadership drawn from the intellectual class: teachers, doctors and lawyers. This class very quickly coined the leitmotifs of the anti-colonial struggle: *son of the soil*, *we are our own liberators* [rallying call at the ZANU 1964 Gweru Congress], *sell-outs*, *the unfinished war* and others.

The manifest realisation was that the British could not be expected to fight for the African majority in Zimbabwe. After all, the argument went, their predecessors were implicated in the initial granting of the British South Africa Company Charter itself. The politics of the British Labour Party government's laissez-faire attitude towards Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 did more to solidify African opinion and radicalise it.

While the British Premier Harold Wilson did not approve of the UDI adventure, he ruled out the use of force to bring the rebel colony into line. He euphemistically extolled the virtues of a policy of avoidance of a 'bloody civil war'³⁸ – a reference to the inability of the British army to shoot at settlers in Zimbabwe. By the same token, other lives threatened by the settler forces were expendable. Then followed a series of talks but a

³⁸ Robert Good, UDI: The international politics of the Rhodesian rebellion, 1973, p.56

baseline had been established and well publicised in the media. The imagery from the Rivonia Trial of 1961 of Nelson Mandela, leader then of the African National Congress was seen as totally relevant in the Zimbabwean situation. Mandela drew attention to the status of the African struggle:

...as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when government met our demands with force.³⁹

And just before the trial itself, Mandela affirmed:

Our problem isn't whether to fight, but how to continue the fight.⁴⁰

These political epithets struck a deep chord in Zimbabwean politics in township and residential locations of the urban areas. Ghana's Nkrumah had in his independence speech in 1957, linked Ghanaian sovereignty to the liberation of the rest of Africa. With UDI declared, Ghana advocated the transformation of the independence struggle into military terms.

But the settler community had arrived at UDI by voting the Rhodesian Front party into power in 1962. An internal revolt took place in 1964 and Ian Smith took over the party leadership government on the promise of dealing with Africans with a firm hand in order to maintain Christian values and standards in responsible hands. Ian Smith, the leader of the RF cultivated a special vocabulary and style for captivating his white audiences on the farms and mines and often in meetings billed as *closed door*.

³⁹ Dr Miguel Pisani, 'Nelson Mandela: Spokesman of all oppressed people', in *Tricontinental*, Number 120, vol 6, 1988 p.6

The grammar and overtones of racial superiority were confirmations of Smith's effort to reconnect with the white settler colonial forefathers. His November 1965 infamous illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence was meant to echo the 1776 American declaration of independence. Even apartheid South Africa balked at formal recognition of the country that was re-named 'Rhodesia'. For the African people, it was clear, the unfinished war, the Second Chimurenga War had been declared.

Hopes of getting the American government involved faded as it became obvious that their involvement in the Vietnam war had destroyed America's 'short-lived invincibility and innocence in world affairs'.⁴¹

The USA appeared in Zimbabwean affairs in 1973/4 through what Kissinger termed 'détente' with the Soviet Union. In Southern Africa it meant the dilution of the tension among the various players in Zimbabwe and media coverage of the process was intense. Talk about talks became the watch-word and in military-political terms, détente was perceived by African nationalists as a response to the effectiveness of the military option by the armed wing of ZAPU and more particularly by ZANU in its northeast sector of the country. In a rare progress review at Chimoio in 1977, President of ZANU, Robert Mugabe singled out the assassination of lawyer and chairman of DARE,⁴² Herbert

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.6

⁴¹ Robert Stevenson, Communication, development and the Third World: Global politics of information, 1988, p.3

⁴² Shona term for War Council during the liberation war.

Chitepo as both method and sequel of the détente exercise. He went on to link détente to subterfuge at the military front:

The deliberate halting of reinforcements to the battlefield as a means of exposing our fighters to the enemy⁴³

Inside the country, the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975 was revisited in 1978 by the Rhodesian Front parliament to bring about amendments that effectively excused all security agents of the settler administration of any wrong-doing. Martial law was decreed and indemnity retroactively established by the settler parliament [with approbation from Chief Chirau], virtually licensing the wanton killing of villagers and animals and the destruction of property in all non-urban areas of the country covered by both martial law and curfew regulations.

The search and promotion of middle ground African political positions was intensified. It appeared détente desired some sort of accommodation with some Africans considered sufficiently porous. The rise into media prominence of the United Methodist Bishop Muzorewa owed his image to this period. But both the creators of the bishopric image and the general African population were clearly aware what the creators knew: the likes of then singer-cum-advertising executive Clem Tholet:

There was great hope among whites that with the Bishop, we had a guy who was rational, who understood the white problem, who understood the Russian threat, so that we could stand together. He would be ...one boss-man-chief...But he didn't sell.⁴⁴

⁴³ ZANU Information booklet, Mugabe lays the line at historic Chimoio central committee meeting 1977, p.10

⁴⁴ Julie Frederikse, None but ourselves, 1982, p.283

Guerrilla war was both brutal and arduous. The one side of white self-enclosed society controlled the state machinery while the nationalist urban-based leadership was a mixture of workers, trade unionists, teachers and intellectuals. Their cause, once expressed in land terms, was long understood in the rural communities. The mode of that reconnection was the *pungwe*⁴⁵ during the active phase of the guerrilla war.

The curfew regulations controlled daytime movement, the all-night sessions were in fact the securest forms of engaging the masses on the goals of the war, and the strategies of the settler administration. The villagers then had ample opportunity to dialogue with a process that was still a work-in-progress. Music, didactic instruction, riddles and proverbs enriched the *pungwe*. The place of the gun in time and space emphasised the appropriateness of considerations of security concerns of the masses before its use. Guerrillas could thus melt away in a strategic retreat if engagement of the settler forces might expose the community to danger.

The particular content of *pungwe* in different areas was highly informed by local situations and their inter-linkage with the national panorama. In virtually all rural areas, health, education facilities, dip tanks, agricultural support mechanisms were in a deplorable state. They had never been the full frontal content of settler administration anyway. The Native Affairs departments of the settler colonial administration saw

⁴⁵ All-night meetings in the operational war zones: skits, song and dance were fused with guerrilla teachings on political, cultural and socio-economic objectives of the war.

themselves as paying token recognition to an African community in contiguous existence to the substantive white community.

Additionally, the *pungwe* was also a structure for demonstrating power within the military operational zones. Pitted against the nationalist cause were white farmers, miners, some naïve professionals and retail merchants and South African fortune hunters whose cultural symbols were dominant in media such as radio, newspapers and television programming. The mass media could only promise the settler community a better life through increased militarization: call-up duties for all eighteen year olds, a territorial force made up of the mature, retired white settlers, and increased lengths of active military service for all grades of servicemen. Simultaneously, the mass media, especially print [the *Rhodesia Herald*, the *African Times*] splashed images of death of supposed guerrillas, collaborators, and villagers caught in crossfire, et cetera for the consumption of the rural communities and the urban African communities in general.

Frederikse's findings on the demonization of the liberation fighter leadership were that this was most intense towards the end of the liberation war in the late 1978 and early 1979. Robert Mugabe in particular was perceived as the arch-enemy of Christianity and Western civilization. He was not only a terror leader but apparently a godless Marxist who had been given guns by Chinese communists. He in turn was clear on what scientific socialism implied for Zimbabwe and had articulated this clarity in a statement of 1977:

We, who have accepted socialist theory as the basis of practice in our own countries, have a duty to read and understand what the fathers of that theory actually say. We also have to examine the theory in the light of our

history and the environment of our country. Only in this way can we evolve from the pure ideology of socialism a workable practical ideology for Zimbabwe.⁴⁶

In other words the specific ideology for Zimbabwe was something in the future, something yet to be born but through the industry of its scholars [who have a ‘duty to read’] – particularly those that were being forged in the liberation war [in ‘our history ...environment of our country’].

Structuring processes: Violence and regulation of social space

The preceding sections have underlined Zimbabwe’s chequered colonial chapter. The initial contact between the Europeans and the indigenous African people was clearly based on the motive force of capitalist logic in the home countries: the search for mineral riches, and especially gold, was a fundamental one.

The development of railway lines was a function of the need to reach gold-mining concerns and claims. The basic lines of the railway penetration have remained remarkably the same since the turn of the last century. The electrification of the railway short run from the capital Harare to Dabuka in Midlands was created in the post independence years [1983] as part of the modernisation of rail traffic. The telegraph wire reached Zimbabwe in 1890 while telephone reached the country in 1898. **Chapter Three** will deal with the current status of this service.

The telegraph traced the rail route through Matabeleland region, that is, Bulawayo area [see *Map 1: frontispiece*] en route to Harare. Early in 1893, as indicated in the preceding section, it had become clear to settlers that there were no large-scale gold deposits in Mashonaland areas. They then set out to expand into Matabeleland. The specific

⁴⁶ ZANU booklet, Mugabe lays the line at historic Chimoio central committee meeting 1977, p.14

circumstances that precipitated the conflict in Matabeleland were two interlocked developments. Telegraph wire of some five hundred yards was cut and carted away.

The settler British South Africa Company police traced the wire 'theft' into chief Gomala's area – then a Victoria region of Mashonaland. The settler police demanded return of the wire and compensation in cattle. Chief Gomala paid the cattle compensation but could not return the wire. On hearing these developments, Lobengula accused the Company police and settler administration of theft of his cattle: arguing that the cattle compensation paid involved his subjects' animals under chief Gomala. Whether Lobengula put military pressure on Gomala and the latter went back to the settler police to seek refugee and protection or Lobengula challenged the settler force to a fight, the issue is neither here nor there. What is clear is that settlers had found an excuse to start the quarrel with the Ndebele that they had wanted.

The invasion and destruction of Lobengula's headquarters started in July 1893 and lasted several months. The dispersal of Ndebele survivors [1894] led to scattered settlements elsewhere in the Shangaan, Kezi and other areas. What the war had not particularly accomplished, disease and drought proceeded to do: the decimation of the small stock of livestock, further loss of life and demoralisation of the community. Jeater [1993], while researching the foundations of a moral discourse in colonial Zimbabwe between the years 1894-1930, makes the following critical observation on the developments in Matabeleland during this period:

... the power of the king had been crushed and the power of the 'big men' had been undermined by the combined effect of rinderpest, military defeat, cattle seizures, and land expropriation.⁴⁷

The Ndebele appeared to have linked the military defeat to their lack of atonement with the spiritual realm. This introduced a sense of spiritual crisis that, elsewhere, has

⁴⁷ Diana Jeater, Marriage, perversion and power: The construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia, 1993, p.53

fascinated historians such as Terence Ranger and others. There was a definite sense in which the 1893 conflict marked a turning point in race relations as well in the colonial formation. The settlers had learnt that they could play one group against another and pick up the loot in the process. The settlers were in fact mercenary in outlook and behaviour: they believed there was gold at Lobengula's kraal and they ransacked it. There was none.⁴⁸

The settlers began a reconstruction of the Ndebele image as a fiery people whose natural allies were in fact the settler soldiery and community. The Ndebele appear in settler literature as servile but loyal in the presence of authority. The matter of telegraph wire – there was some wire [500 yards] that was cut or should one say – appropriated for more practical uses in the locales through which it passed. The telegraph wire was reshaped and designed into fashion trinkets, bangles, and setting decorative designs on the symbol of authority: the *gano* [loosely translated as *mock battle-axe*]. These items had high communicative value in indigenous communities as marriage tokens, adornments of the body and signifiers in exchanges between authority figures. While there were blacksmiths among the indigenous communities who smelted iron and worked other crafts, the telegraph wire seemed to have provided additional impetus for creativity.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Both Terence Ranger and A. Chigwedere go to great lengths and depth on matters raised here. T. Ranger, Voices from the rocks: Nature, culture and history in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe, 1999. The communicative significance of the Ndebele defeat echoes in settler play on ethnic groups in the country as discussed by Anthony Chennels in his contribution in N. Bhebhe & T. Ranger, [Eds.], Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war, 1996. **Chapter Four** of the present study takes up aspects of that reading.

⁴⁹ *Gwelo Times* was the mouthpiece of elite settler opinion in the Midlands area. Jeater notes that ideas on the possibilities of importing Chinese labour through British Aden were considered in its pages between 1899-1903. There was also the notion of allowing the indigenous people to lapse into history: '*If they did not work at all we would have them out of the way, and have a white race in the country, which would be*

The evolution of both telegraph, rail and road network in Zimbabwe was delineated in the very throes of the inception of colonial history in Zimbabwe. The basic logic was the functionality of these modes of communications, passing through populated territory in the service of settler communities in South Africa, Zimbabwe and subsequently Mozambique.

White agriculture in Zimbabwe serviced the mining settlements and any surplus was then exported to the British market. Indigenous agriculture provided mining settlements as well. This led to colonial dilemmas on whether every indigenous male should leave his plot to work for settler agriculture and mining. Europeans in Zimbabwe remained isolated from the indigenous population – in part by choice, and in part through settler-generated myths about themselves and indigenous Zimbabweans. It is instructive to note that the settler administration under Premier Huggins proposed and carried out the second major land reorganisation in the territory. Prefacing the enactment of the legislation in 1941, the premier intoned the civilizational mission of the settler and his choice of a trusted small core of a select race:

Those who regard this as a permanent solution of some of our difficulties, in other words, the ultimate aim, will be making up their minds on evidence which is obviously incomplete, because as yet we have no idea what the ultimate effect of northern European settlement and influence and modern knowledge ...is going to be on the African people. ...the ultimate aim is to raise the African from his lethargy and make him in mind and vigour a counterpart of the European...the Bill ...is merely a step on the road and required for a period of time which as yet cannot be estimated.⁵⁰

far better for it than a black one'. Native Commissioner Stuart as cited in Jeater, Marriage, perversion, and power: The construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia, 1993, pp.49-50

⁵⁰ HMSO, The Federation of Nyasaland and Rhodesia :Act, instruments and command papers, 1953, p.78-79

The collocational patterns of the text indicate that this was not yet the ‘permanent solution’ or ‘ultimate aim’ since knowledge on the ‘ultimate effect’ of the Zambian settlement was as yet to be determined. The premier was sure though that the possible relations were that of the man [white] of ‘energy, modern knowledge and science’ needed to protect himself ‘in the African environment and preserve all the characteristics of mind and body which he has acquired.’

Thus the divisions of land were not only for the good of the man of science, they were predestined for the benefit of the African as well. However, the tenure and duration of the system was of millennial proportions: ‘for a period of time which as yet cannot be estimated’. With this sort of rationalisation, the country was further re-mapped into a two-tier Native Reserve system [one communal and the other purchase area], the undetermined and unassigned areas and the European areas. By splitting a reduced Native Reserve further into purchase and communal, the Act further enhanced the perpetual migratory motion of Africans: creating a generalised ennui of placelessness among indigenous people. Their experience of modernity could only be described as profoundly unsettling.

Twenty years into independence, the land division map is remarkably consistent with that colonial legislation in spite of further cosmetic changes in 1961, 1969 and the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. Some of the provisions of the latter will be revisited in **Chapter Three**. But Bull, journalist and editor [1960s] of the *Central African Examiner*

cited a land report, the Quinton Report summary as pointing out conclusive evidence that land segregation did not achieve any useful purpose:

The Quinton Report produced factual evidence to illustrate that by 1960 the compulsory movement of Africans off 'European' land, which in many cases their fathers and forefathers had occupied before them, had cost Southern Rhodesia the staggering sum of some £30 million. No increased production or healthy development resulted from this huge expenditure of scarce capital; on the contrary ... resentment.... Misery... without compensation...led to mass non-co-operation and reduced production.⁵¹

In fact, as instrument of domination land re-mapping or shaping and re-modelling of space is part of the constant change mechanisms of capitalism. When there are overlays of race, and myths, that are part of the capitalist self-justification impulse, the experience of modernity is extremely contorted.

Conclusion

Stress has been put on the existence of two societies that developed contiguously side by side with their only points of visible interconnection at the mine, the farm, the domestic workplace, and the business retailing space and in the dominance one group over the polity. Even those interconnections were heavily constrained by racist and colonial regulations. However, the same points of interconnection – the urban workspace and crowded residential locations, and land dispossessions, these also acted as rupture zones. The rupture zone was not between tradition and modernity, but between race and the tradition-modernity continuum.

⁵¹ T. Bull, Rhodesian perspective, 1967, p.35

The preceding sections have provided some background on Zimbabwe. It is useful to consider next, the literature of communication and development in order to appreciate the impact of differentials presented in this present chapter. The communication media and the imperatives of national development in the country continue to excite both possibilities of inclusion and limits of participation.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of related literature

Introduction

The present chapter reviews the literature of the field of communications and development. There has been considerable theorising about Third World nation-formations and national development and communications since the early 1960s.

The result of national development was seen as various sorts of approximations to modernity: improved quality of life under relatively modern conditions. The term modern is taken to mean ready access to socio-economic conveniences such as clinics, transport, nutrition, housing and, above all, a readiness to challenge traditional conceptions of morality, habit and thought.

But while communications media were seen as crucial to effecting national development and ushering the new nations into modernity, the information and communication technologies themselves began to take on a high profile in the debate. Questions now arise as to what the high points of a networked society are. What role would female participants take in the networked society? Additionally, questions revolve on the ideas and traits of the new sociality. Further, the concept of the global is interrogated in its wider context: its link to power relations and practice.

The chapter ends on the implications of the Third World search for modernity and participation in globalisation.

Theoretical issues: Communication and development

Along with other African countries on the continent, Zimbabwe has made some difficult decisions on the technologies considered appropriate for communications. These have included the kind of policies that opened spaces for the provision of general education. Additionally, policies that set the tempo for socio-economic development were created with completion target dates given: education for all by year 2000, or health for all by 2000, one dam per district programme, and others. These were crucial developments at the inception in 1980. But the country's independence was achieved at the closure of one more cycle of debate over the place of communications in fostering national development.

The thesis of the first generation scholars of mass media scholars was simple enough: communications and social development are mutually interdependent. In their combined impact, they influence and shape the transition of traditional communities into modernity. This was the tale of Daniel Lerner's village of Balgat¹ in the Turkey of the 1950s. The provision of a road, electric power, faster modes of transport and clean water seemed to be the panacea for underdevelopment. The mass media scholar, Wilbur Schramm, influenced the 1960s and early 1970s decades with his UNESCO-sponsored research on mass media's role in the modernisation process of underdeveloped countries.²

Schramm followed the broad outline of the Lerner study, but charted new territory in his argument. He saw the role of the state in Third World formations as a given in the thrust

¹ Daniel Lerner, The passing of traditional society, 1958

² Wilbur Schramm, Mass media and national development, 1964

towards improved sanitation, increased levels of general education and provision of extension services in agriculture and nutrition. The preliminary results from the Third World, squalor and urban poverty, especially from countries that had achieved Lerner's take-off point of '10% urbanisation' and 15% literacy levels with accompanying circulation levels of mass media did not seem to offer a comforting vision of the movement towards modernity.³

A number of development projects were carried out in Asia, particularly India, and in parts of Africa, and the Phillipines. These projects were in part informed by the insights of the early research of the Lerner-Schramm school. The principal focus of these projects was the assumption that there was a human deficit in skills. If that were corrected, citizens would propel the further development of the economy and social services.

The multiplier instrument was radio technology. Initially, agricultural extension service classes were broadcast over radio to remote villages in India. Later, between 1974 and 1976, the lessons carried both image and audio and were beamed via satellite television to about two thousand villages. According to Stevenson, results were mixed: some villagers left the villages and more importantly, others gained a greater awareness of services that could be available. The shortages of those services created frustrations in their wake. According to the model, participatory structures ought to anticipate the frustrations. Such frustrations would shape and influence the direction of change.

³ Robert Stevenson, Communication, development and the Third World, 1988, p.19

Herbert Schiller critiqued the Lerner-Schramm development model on two principal grounds. First, Schiller underlined the perpetual dependency that the model cultivated since it focused primarily on individuals as change agents. Indeed, once a project team leaves, the projects generally fizzled out. Second, Schiller pointed out the larger power framework in which the relations of the development dynamic unfolded. Third World nations found themselves dependent on the West and especially the United States, and Europe, for the very means for reaching their own people in the dispersed communities of the Third World: transmitters, receivers and sometimes even personnel to operate the systems.

This hegemony of the West over the new nations could be avoided by ‘de-coupling’ the Third World from the capitalist system. This perspective informed a great deal of the UNESCO-led debates of the late 1970s – which coalesced in its declaration on the mass media in 1978.⁴

Samir Amin has contributed to this debate within the radical alternative perspective. Amin [1997] in ‘Reflections on the international system’⁵ identifies the modern Western capitalist state as a product of its own historical struggles spanning five centuries. So while the industrialisation of early European states was peculiarly national in its formative stages, in outlook, the capitalist force transcended boundaries of distance and space – thus encompassing ‘the Americas’⁶.

⁴ Robert Stevenson, Communication, development and the Third World, 1988, p.7

⁵ Samir Amin. [1997]. In Peter Golding and Phil Harris, [Eds.], Beyond cultural imperialism: Globalisation, communication and the new international order. ‘Reflections on the international system,’ pp.10-24

⁶ Ibid., p.10

The more significant contours of the socio-economic regime that emerged were to do with the establishment and strengthening of the market mechanisms of capitalism: premised on 'the world law of value based on world commodity markets.' For Amin therefore, the expansion of European or American influence, in territorial terms or spatial relations, is in pursuit of the marketplace principle. The West sees post-colonial states in Africa, Latin America and Asia as no more than new zones for cultivating markets.⁷

But the starting point for the Lerner-Schramm mass communication model for national development was the individual. If the individual is motivated enough, he will break with his traditional values and hence be available as a potential consumer. But Carlos Lopez draws attention to the legacy of colonial history in Africa:

What was provoked by the colonial period was an institutional void and not the foundations for the integration of Africa in the "modern" world.⁸

This observation necessitates the re-examination of the human deficit model in favour of a more holistic evaluation of the field. The 'institutional void' needed as much attention as the skills. The next question that needed to be addressed was the kind of conditions that would facilitate the development of structures and conditions for national development. The Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps and other foreign aid projects, introduced the lexicon of democracy, protection of the environment, and competitiveness as traits that were needed in the new nation-states. But, alternatives that spoke of equity in the information and communication sphere, balanced news flows, etc., that were

⁷ Ibid., p.19

⁸ Carlos Lopez, Enough is enough: For an affirmative diagnosis of the African crisis, 1994, p.8

proposed by the Third World within the UNESCO framework of the 1970s, were treated by the USA and Britain as sufficient reason to withdraw from that organisation.

For Amin, the indispensable step was 'socializing of economic control' as against the mere "rollback vision". In other words, disengagement from capitalist stranglehold with simultaneous indigenised empowerment became the serious alternative of a different mould of development. The search was for an alternative narrative of modernity for the periphery countries. Characterising this alternative as the 'polycentrist vision'⁹, Amin opens an avenue for the market principle, popular informal economies and planning to blend in the production of a 'socialist alternative.'¹⁰

In sum, there are competing visions for what the communication media should be doing in new nations of the South. The colonial heritage [or more appropriately, miscarriage] constituted a differential between the North and South. As argued by Carlos Lopez, the colonial powers had not set out to create functional institutions of the mass media, elaborate routine administrative governance structures, or indeed establish training facilities for education, health, and agriculture or standard sanitation services in the colonies. In this scenario, the communications media could not be the 'watchdog' of the national development scene but participant players in the process.¹¹

⁹ Samir Amin in Peter Golding and Phil Harris, [Eds.], Beyond cultural imperialism: Globalisation, communication and the new international order, 'Reflections on the international system,' 1997, p.23

¹⁰ Ibid., p.24

¹¹ Robert Stevenson, Communication, development and Third World, 1988, p.14

The previous chapter has presented white settler race prejudice as a factor in the public and private life of indigenous people in colonial Zimbabwe. Similar hurdles inherited by most Third World countries could not be wished away. Marquard suggests a more complex play of forces in the coloniser/colonised dichotomy:

We do know that a colonial relationship is one of psychological dependence of subject on ruler, and when it is severed there are unpredictable results for both – unpredictable and disturbing.¹²

Marquard underplays the dependency of the ‘ruler’ on ‘subject’. It is a complex relationship that returns again and again in the literature of neo-colonial formations and the creation of dependent and consumption-oriented elites. Frantz Fanon has been even more robust in his existentialist thesis on the abjection of colonial trauma. He sees this abjection as passing through phases of self-ridicule and self-rejection by the colonised, followed by nostalgic memory of the past and finally the embodiment of the values of self-assertion that encompass combative violence. Fanon’s thesis of hope, The wretched of the earth [1968], is founded on the experience of the Algerian people’s struggle for independence.

But the more ‘unpredictable’ nature of the reaction of the West to the Third World efforts at harnessing information and communication technologies [ICTs] for development was motivated by self-interest. Such self-interest is located in the logic of capitalism itself: the need for markets for products that constitute communication media themselves and their accompanying contents.

¹² Leo Marquard, A Federation of Southern Africa, 1971, p.20

It was by means of the communication media that the signs of the products, values, etc could be advertised. The UNESCO debates had underlined the need for control of communication media in developing countries: control in the service of nation-construction with related efforts to minimise the runaway spare part budgets and service contracts. The nascent indigenous capitalist class formations in most of the then emerging Third World nations were generally structurally weak at independence: largely in the retail businesses, tuck-shops, and small grocery outlets.

It is instructive to pose the question here: Should the instruments of broadcasting, both radio and television, and traditional mass media be entrusted to this class of the petty bourgeois in the name of private enterprise *pax Americana*? In practical terms the small business owners and other petty bourgeois generally form an alliance with the dominant group in the social formation. The task of the political and cultural independence leadership in these nations envisaged a period of consolidation, nation building and the expansion of communications services to allow a sense of inclusiveness to permeate the citizenry.

Stevenson objects to what he terms 'protocol news' in Third World newswires. He claims that it is mere '...endless clips of airport arrival and departure ceremonies,' and 'the dreary photos of world leaders....'¹³ The Western media certainly remain focused on Western leaders whether through CNN News flows or BBC broadcasts right down to details of a presidential handshake, a smile here an autograph there.

It appears that Stevenson objects to image flows from the developing world, not the principle underpinning the protocol news.

Yet disparate entities in Third World societies attempt to inhere in the process of nation-construction through identification with these very flows and imagery. The more inclusive the flows become the more citizens are implicated in ideas of a developing nation in the context of its times. Thus it can be said that the way the communication process itself is structured will affect the outcomes within a given country. Robert Hornik underlines the benefit of a communication system that has mutuality as one of its pillars when he stresses that 'communication reinforces the links between participants'¹⁴.

The late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere [1967] of Tanzania underlined the differences between rich and poor with respect to the application of information and communication technologies in national development. He stressed that while others [USA, and the then Soviet Union] were going to the moon, the supreme achievement of the poor nations would be to strive to reach the village. Nyerere spent over a decade in quarrels with the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank [WB] over policies relating to everything from the Tanzanian model of self-help education, establishment of SHIHATA the national news agency, use of Swahili in higher education, to the number of clinic outposts in the countryside.¹⁵

¹³ Robert Stevenson, Communication, development and Third World, 1988, p.13

¹⁴ Robert Hornik, Development communication, 1988, p.11

¹⁵ Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa or socialism, 1967

Principled leadership even in the midst of poverty [Tanzania was and is still one of the poorest countries in Africa] was a virtue that characterised few of the emerging leaders in the Third World. Frank Ugboajah acknowledges Nyerere's contribution and observed:

The pronouncements of the African elite notwithstanding, it is only in Tanzania, among all black states, that a language policy backed by an active language programme now exists.¹⁶

Information and communication technologies [ICTs] are defined in relative terms. What constitutes the new technologies in Zambia and Brazil may be a piece of technology that has already been several years in service in the country of origin. Such countries of origin belong to the European and North America continents. To that extent then, radio and the telephone could be regarded as 'new' technologies in Third World countries: their reach in places is below minimal in some countries, and barely adequate in others. There is also a large interplay with local policy, cultural and contextual factors in countries such as India, Algeria, Brazil, Zimbabwe and others.

The Zimbabwe Information Service, for example, operates a Branch of Rural Information Services. The unit was originally set up by the settler colonial administration as a propaganda tool against the liberation war in the Second Chimurenga [1966-80]. The post-independence function for this unit has been to carry 'development information, education, communication and entertainment' to rural communities. In the early 1980s the unit reached an audience of some five million people. The diverse subjects covered, with the use of video technology now, range from 'health, AIDS scourge, agriculture, environment, co-operatives, population issues, major national events and on-going

¹⁶ Frank Ugboajah, Mass communication culture and society in West Africa, 1985, p.89-90

campaigns'. Clearly, the task is a central government responsibility. It is inconceivable that profit-motivation would galvanise sufficient private capital to reach a mass of people on themes such as dipping cattle, AIDS, and population matters. In one country after another, the initial experience has been the transformation of the instruments of disadvantage and propaganda, into instruments of education.¹⁷

Zambia provided a basis for unity through its 'One Zambia one nation' slogan of the independence movement led by Dr Kenneth Kaunda. The use of the different languages on radio programming once independence had been won helped listeners identify with their own national entity. Zambia, in fact had risked partition prior to joining the Central African Federation in 1953. The settler administration in colonial Zimbabwe wanted at one stage, to federate only with white settler occupied portions of Zambia along the railway line, that is, Eastern Zambia, in their quest to create a 'Greater Rhodesia':

In 1927 the Hilton Young Commission was appointed by the United Kingdom government to enquire into the closer union of the dependencies of Eastern and Central Africa. From the imperial point of view it was seen that certain advantages might flow from the strengthening of Southern Rhodesia's position ...because public representatives of the Southern Rhodesia colony made clear that the large body of public opinion ...now ...favoured the administrative union of Central Northern Rhodesia, that is the European-settled railway zone...¹⁸

The post-independence status of white Zambians presented them with the unusual choice between race and citizenship. Those whites settled in the 'railway zone' could either pursue the citizenship route and stay in Zambia or follow white settler power and so emigrate southward to colonial Zimbabwe. Similarly, in Tanzania extensive radio programming was used to promote the national

¹⁷ Edward Mamutse, *The public service bulletin*, June 2000, vol. 3 number 1, p.18

language, Swahili, in the decade 1975 to 1985. It was promoted for use in homes, education, government and development work.

Further reading of the current trends in the political economy of communication raises fundamental issues that relate to the conception of the marketplace and Third World participation or exclusion from it. Third World development, seen through such theoretical constructs as the modernisation paradigm, is merely aimed at gauging the level of informatisation [or more appropriately, information-saturation levels] of these countries by indexing consumption of Western films, music, cars, and imports of new technologies. But this may yield misleading information. After all, this is an approach born in the heady days of imperial struggles between East and West, over the dominance of space in the Third World area. Other considerations were more fundamental:

Western, particularly U.S., attempts to incorporate communication into an explanatory paradigm congenial to mainstream intellectual and political interests.¹⁹

The subordination of other countries' aspirations to the logic of USA 'mainstream and intellectual and political interests' means, in effect, the desires and hopes of other nations have little meaning in their own right. In the present light, Mattelart refers to the notion of the Third World splintering into a 'Fourth and Fifth World'²⁰ with respect to relative developmental differences between States. The splintering, it could be argued, is also within national boundaries: the rural interior of the countries of the Third World

¹⁸ K. Kirkwood, The proposed federation of the Central African territories, 1951, p.4

¹⁹ Mosco in Sussman and Lent J. [Eds.], Global Productions: Labor in the making of the 'information society', 1998, p.21

²⁰ A. Mattelart and S. Siegelau [Eds.], Communication and class struggle: Capitalism, imperialism, Vol 1, 1979, p.420

generally constitutes the Fourth World or *the critical transition*²¹, that which marks a rupture between the city and the zone of basic developmental struggles.

If the transformation into modern societies has meaning in Africa, it is questionable whether the villagers should migrate to the city, or not. Villagers should be able to assume their role as authentic shapers and designers of their social, intellectual and economic spaces in their locality. They can then contribute freely to the change they desire in their communities. Trainor, for a start, has argued that there is need to re-visit the very notion of freedom itself:

The danger lurking in modernity from its inception was that the “free individual” which it celebrated would only be “free from” rather than being free from as a prelude or intellectual prerequisite to being authentically “free to”.²²

The purpose of freedom saturates the concept of freedom itself with dialogical content. It is not simply ‘freedom from’ traditional culture as that culture has frequently been demonised, but freedom to create something that enlarges the substance of life. The new technologies of communication, especially in the light of the convergence of telecommunications and computing, have created extremely attentive Third World city elites. They are vicariously attentive to the flu in New York, the cough in London and the dance in Paris as these are translated into so many bits per second as image, text, and sound.²³

²¹ Virilio in Ana Conley, [Ed.], Rethinking technologies 1993, p.7

²² Brian Trainor, The origin and end of modernity, 1998, p.9

²³ Paulo Freire, The pedagogy of the oppressed, 1973

Cubitt cites Godzich who claims that ‘mediated images and electronic messages, backlit by the aura of advancing technology, have overcome local resistances far more efficiently.’²⁴ The implication here is that there are other methods that have been used: naked military interventions, coups and aid packages. When Boafo says that ‘0,6% of all television receivers in the world’ and ‘3.4% of the total number of radio receiving sets’ are found in Black Africa, the necessary qualification is that these obtain in large measure, in the cities. The radio though has certainly spread to rural areas in some significant measure.²⁵

The present thrust of the neo-liberal strategy as orchestrated by the International Monetary Fund-World Bank regime tightens its relation with the cities of the Third World as nodal or entry points. These lending institutions champion the cause of deregulation regimes to reduce tariffs and duties and open borders to all forms of trade. In effect, the remaining sites of public discourse in television and radio broadcasting, agricultural parastatals and State involvement in strategic sectors such as national railway networks, and even science and education are under pressure to shift to market forces.

The logic has historical antecedents. There are markers such as the slave trade, the Berlin Conference in 1884 for the division and sharing out of the global space among imperial powers, and the wars of liberation in the post-1945 period through to the late sixties and early seventies, are evidence of this trend. The 1990s have presented capitalism in a crisis for markets. The development of science and especially converging new media

²⁴ Sean Cubitt, *Digital aesthetics*, 1998, p.2

²⁵ Boafo in Sussman & Lent, J. [Eds.], *Transnational communications: Wiring the Third World*, 1991, p.106

technologies of communication have led to a shrinking global space. While the movement of people and goods has increased, Virilio has pointed out a sort of sedentary, schizophrenic and high-tech capitalism that, he claims, fosters:

... the beginning of a type of general arrival in which everything arrives so quickly that departure becomes unnecessary²⁶.

This sort of speed in transmission, via internet, satellite and fibre optics has propelled the emergence of e-commerce and the reshaping of value units in cyberspace. Donna Haraway, using the cyborg as ubiquitous metaphor, has argued that capitalism's supreme achievement has been the blurring of distinctions between the boundary animal-human and machine. While primitive machines could be haunted, she argues, machines have become 'disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert'.²⁷

The reconfigured science landscape has also meant the re-evaluation of patent laws, largely creating not just an information rich- North and information-poor South, but an 'on' and 'off' the grid appellation. Boyle [1996] has described the phenomenon of refinements to the laws governing intellectual property rights and related work as dedicated to the creation of new spaces for markets. Lash and Urry [1994] extend this analogy further to the new markets that circulate 'economies of signs and space'. Scott Lash has warned of the danger inherent in this socially detached system of circuits. It is a danger of self-destructive force as well as the pressure from without the system by the excluded. Even the injudicious access to the products of the information society should be understood in the context of the following pressures:

²⁶ Virilio in Ana Conley, [Ed.], Rethinking technologies, 1993, p.8

²⁷ Donna Haraway, Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature, 1991, p.152

The network society has exploded limits, between human and non-human, between nation-states, between the cultural and material. But it, under the motive force of global corporations in the new sectors, has created a new border: between those included and those denied access to the mode of information; a new stratification between those inside and outside “the loop” of the information and communication structures. Sources of destabilisation to the network society will come from both outside and inside the loop.²⁸

It is in this context, however, that neo-liberal interest in the Third World should be understood. Lash and Urry make the assumption that prior to the arrival of new media technologies the social space was apparently characterised by inclusivity. They see the new media as opening a ‘new border.’ This is a myth. Whether it is the chiefly drum sounding an imminent battle, or the sleek tax collector weaving his way through social formations to pick up the king’s taxes, there has always been the divide between the included and those excluded.

Not everyone could beat the chief’s drum and send messages of danger into the community nor could everyone become a tax collector. What the new media technologies have done, and, indeed even the traditional media such as newspapers and radio, is to accentuate differences in social formations. The prototypical entry point for new media flows in Third World countries is the city. In taste, consumption patterns and lifestyle, some of the cities echo their first World metropolises. Sometimes not just the technologies are imported but also even the architecture of workspaces, methodologies and languages:

²⁸ Scott Lash, Another modernity: A different rationality, 1999, p.58

The question that stares us in the face ...is how to involve and engage our people if the languages in which they function comfortably are not equipped to handle complex discourse.²⁹

The difference between serious reason and excuse in the matter of indigenous languages can be very thin. Indeed, it is remarkable that in Africa, it is only Tanzania that made serious efforts at language policy planning. In Asia, Malaysia has made commendable difference in its approach to Malay language use and teaching. Zimbabwe still has some very long way to go: Shona and Ndebele were literally underdeveloped by the use of English to teach indigenous languages since the 1930s. But twenty years after independence, there is still a dichotomy between daring and starting a combative and informed language policy in Zimbabwe.

Thus the nodal entry point for new media is also a site, in short, for trading in commodified values: the television, video recorders, movies and other mass cultural products of music, games and even fashion styles. But the urban sprawl is not a site free from conflict and struggles either.

With the implosion of 'time-space co-ordinates of natural space'³⁰ pirated communication media are not unusual in Third World cities. The World Trade Organisation tries to restrict and control pirated copies through multilateral arrangements. Nevertheless, music, film or look-a-like jeans make their way through to those parts of the world because the World Trade Organisation cannot close all fissures. The keyword *pirated* or *appropriated* merchandise becomes coterminous with the tenuous digital divide between the information-rich and information-poor.

²⁹ Mugabe cited by D. Maruziva, in *The Herald*, 6th April, 1998. 'Use three main languages nationally'.

The elements of national development

Everett Rogers gave the basic features of the linkage between national development and mass communications at the East-West Hawaii Conference [1974] when he made a tentative break with the Lerner-Schramm school of thought. He suggested the four-point criteria for the movement of communities into modernity. The first of these was his stress on the equity issue as a core value in socio-economic planning. Local communities may need a road to send their crops to a market. The central planners believe the road is an expensive investment in the short term. Planners may reason that the road will be intensively used only for a couple of months a year. But the long-term benefits outweigh these short-term minuses.

Secondly, Rogers categorically called for 'popular participation in self-development planning.'³¹ Appropriate authority needed to be decentralised to the level of the community and communication media project implementers. The experience of effort, failure and success would propel community members to continually seek a re-definition of themselves and their new vision. Thirdly, Rogers underlined degrees of independence as necessary and the use of inputs from the local environment and context of the projects. Finally, he outlined the centrepiece of his scheme: the 'integration of traditional and modern systems and values, such as the use of acupuncture and antibiotics in Chinese medicine.'³² The Lerner-Schramm school was locked in the battle to break the traditional society. This Rogers model acknowledged the relevance of the inherent values of any

³⁰ Scott Lash and J. Urry, Economies of signs and space, 1994, p.55

³¹ Robert Stevenson, Communication, development and the Third World, 1988, p.32

³² *Ibid.*, p.32

given community. It was an advance. It was challenged though on its underlying assumptions: that the new modernity that emerged from these interventions would propel those communities or nations to insert themselves into the capitalist system of relations.

But the evolution of the information and communication technology industry has created new hierarchies and new logics in the structuring of the workspace. There is ample proof that the use of home office space in the United States and the development by American firms of 'back offices' offshore in areas like the Caribbean, create entirely different work scenarios. Through the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, work for these firms can be monitored while the managers are in Washington or other metropolises.³³

The relative isolation of the working environments makes trade union activism in the traditional sense look very anachronistic. The champions of this kind of future, Daniel Bell and colleagues, have become increasingly vocal. The role of communications as edifying human effort and creating platforms for modernity loses meaning. Rothkopf is almost lyrical, sensing the opportunity is now and the stage is set for the creation of American palettes everywhere:

... Americans should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and improve itself, and the best model for the future.³⁴

There are anxieties in this exhilarated scenario of the future. The reconfiguration of the world of human community into the world of informatics creates literally

³³ Skinner in Sussman & Lent [Eds.], Global Productions: Labour in the making of the information of the 'information society,' 1998, p.58

the superifice of equality: standard control mechanisms and information processing etc but in 'polymorphous ways' and 'with large consequences for women.'³⁵

Donna Haraway has pointed out the centrality of the cyborg as the icon of scientific and technical progress, the embodiment of modernity. She also believes the world of work becomes more complex as science and technology reduce everything to a system of controls, leading, not to a Rothkopfian future, but a different sort: the sublimation of materiality leading to the 'translation of the world into a problem of coding.'³⁶ The cyborg, says Haraway, 'makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic.' The cyborg [C³I] – control-command-communication-intelligence 'gives us our politics.' Such politics, one might add, are of dominance and opening up new spaces for colonization and mastery. Could this be considered a comforting conclusion to the search for national development and modernity through information and communication technologies?³⁷

Social relations in a network society

The debate over the nature and current socio-economic status of society has continued to provide fertile ground for splintering among various contending paradigms. In this section, only two will be identified. The first of these paradigms argues that society has changed to such an extent that we have now entered a new age, an information age. The

³⁴ As cited by Schiller in his Digital Capitalism, 1999, p.81

³⁵ Donna Haraway, Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature, 1991, p.163

³⁶ Ibid., p.164

³⁷ Ibid., p.150

second looks to the features of society that mark and brand twentieth century modernity as either merely late capitalism or qualified post-modernity. Both paradigms have implications for the notion of the global and globalisation.

What does the social mean in the new dispensation of the networked society? It is useful to interrogate the implied sociality of modernity and what it means for everyday notions of the global world and to some extent, the Third World.

Schumpeter coined the term 'creative destruction' [Webster, 1995] to identify the overly deterministic tendencies of technology in society. When a wide expanse of historical change is countenanced, it assumes, as it did for Harold Innis, and McLuhan, an aura about it that is almost quasi-religious. This led to the tendency to conflate all analytical categories in pursuit of the single harmonising theme of the civilising impetus of technology and subsequent change that is wrought in social formations. Indeed, for McLuhan, not only were the oral societies structured differently but also that they behaved differently from a technical-scientific society. Mattelart refers appropriately to 'McLuhan's hotchpotch'³⁸ in this sense.

It is noteworthy to explore determinism somewhat further: where does the frontier that initiates change reside? For Meyrowitz, the medium [technology] is a given too but he introduces tools for thinking more concretely in terms of process such as what creates or marks differences in impact between the oral, context-bound utterance and the light-weight modes of paper communication. For the technological determinists the solution,

as we have noted, is given by the insertion of the technological mechanism at a social point in a given society to mark it out as its handle and key turning point in development.³⁹

Other social theorists like Manuel Castells argued for solutions that could best engineer socio-economic development, and more importantly, set forth criteria for determining diffusion levels of the technological in any given society. This contrasted with the arch-technological determinists such as McLuhan whose conception of technology became reconfigured as extensions of the central nervous system of the prototype Western person. The argument was that oral communities were limited in scope and reflective capacity. Thus traditional society was akin to a closed shop but the printed word would transform it into a contemplative one. Carey has dubbed the society that emerges as constituted by 'private, individual points of view' – in other words, a society that has lost its sense of community and yet is made up of free individuals.⁴⁰

The electronic media are treated as liberating in their impact. The content value and human agency in the interaction of technologies with users are immaterial dimensions in this frame of thought. Grosswiler emphasises the consequences of these media. He focuses on the determinist paradigmatic insistence that these media are democratic: 'film and electronic media foster participation'⁴¹. This paradigm is consonant with the socio-economic focus of the Lerner-Schramm school already characterised at the outset of this

³⁸ A. Mattelart and S. Siegleaub [Eds.], Communication and class struggle: Liberation, socialism, 1983 p.52

³⁹ J. Meyrowitz, in R. Crowley and W. Mitchell, [Eds.], Communication theory today, pp.60-70

⁴⁰ Carey, J in *Antioch review*, 27, 1967, p.19

⁴¹ Grosswiler, The method is the medium: Rethinking McLuhan through critical theory, 1998, p.120

chapter. There are assumptions here about the pattern of ownership of pieces of equipment such television, computer, or modes of access. Ana Conley, meditating on the significance of the new technologies for the world in general finds some strange thinking ‘that appears to equate technology with truth’⁴² – hence the celebration of the advance of information technologies.

Lyon captures the essence of the second paradigm: increase in convergence, and he proceeds to isolate these two cardinal elements as follows:

The significance of cyberspace arises from the convergence and interactivity of media⁴³.

The computer, telephony, and the tele-visual image with accompanying space acoustics played out through sound and colour create the dialectics of Giddens’ [1995] ‘time-distanciation’. Time ceases to be a factor in the sense in which it presents itself as logical spatialization. Tele-presence eliminates the need to travel and constitutes non-difference between real time and virtual reality.

From the foregoing, while it could be construed that the technological determinist argument announces the arrival of the information age, there is a compelling set of counter arguments from the critical and Marxist theories. Webster [1995] best characterizes the counter argument to the determinist paradigm. In his telling response, Webster agrees that there is broad consensus that ‘change is deep-seated’⁴⁴. He illustrates that this minimal consensus is no guarantee that we could conclude that the information

⁴² Ana Conley, [Ed.], Rethinking Technologies, 1993, p.xi

⁴³ Lyon, in Loader [Ed.], The governance of cyberspace, 1997, p.28

⁴⁴ F. Webster, The Information society, 1995, p.136

age has arrived. There are several issues here. Cross-border trade, control of overseas operations, conducting e-commerce on the internet have become formidable business fronts. Even Third World countries, such as Thailand, have started strategizing to capture some of the internet e-commerce trade. This is largely in website construction, instruction on companies that do business online, etc.

The objectives in this phase of development are not different from the fundamental capitalist objective of making profit, if not in the usual marketplace then maybe in the different location of cyberspace. The fundamental contours remain the same while the sites may change or vary.

Further it would be misplaced to equate the neo-liberal project of de-regulation with the absence of a market regulatory framework. The State, far from being obsolete, is very much alive. The use of technologies that potentially do not respect borders means that the need for improved regulatory instruments was even higher 'to ensure the unity of the process [of accumulation]'⁴⁵. Finance and values, attitudes and corporate cultures flow with trading routes: Mulgan summarised this phenomenon and antecedents in the following terms:

Where early market economies grew out of the temporal and spatial regularities of city life, today's are built on the logical or 'virtual' regularities of electronic communication, a new geography of nodes and hubs, processing and control centres⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.137, as quoted therein

⁴⁶ G Mulgan, Communication and control, 1991, p.3

But even if it is conceded that modernity typifies Western society, Lash and Urry [1994] hasten to build sociological constructs that underline continuities between the past and the present and points of dissonance with appearances of normalcy in the emerging modernity. The increasing significance of informatization reifies and aestheticizes concepts of value, consumption and production cycles. This creates a frontier zone: of attitudes towards modernity and the contested visions of late modernity. Two parallel tracks run alongside each other here.

The one, a Cartesian cognitivist tendency that engages the self in modernity in a perpetual reflexivity leads to evaluation and adjustment in its location within the social, media, and economic structure. The modern citizen, to use Hall's formulation, is involved in the process of 'encoding-decoding'⁴⁷ media images. But even this process is limited in its range of possible audience action with an open text such as a technology, or a television programme.

Hall's term could be read, Wilson and Sparks⁴⁸ argue, in any of three possible ways. First, reading as engagement in legitimate extraction of meaning, *a priori*, of a 'preferred' reading. This kind of reading is an attempt to guess at what the creators of the product intended the audience to get as the textual meaning. The second possible reading is a 'negotiated' reading: the audience brings into the foreground their own experiences as they make an interpretive reading of the text. Their study was based on youth cultural

⁴⁷ van Zoonen, in Gurevitch & Curran [eds], *Mass media and society*, 1991 p.45

⁴⁸ B. Wilson and R. Sparks [1996]. 'It's gotta to be the shoes: Youth, race, and sneaker commercials.' p.402. In *Sociology of sport journal*, 13, pp. 398-427

interpretations of 'sneaker commercials'. They find no confirmatory evidence of the first two readings theorised by Hall.

Finally, there is also the possibility of 'oppositional' reading. This has much the same orientation that Gitlin [1991] has described as the deliberate exercise of human agency. The textual meanings cease to have a dependent relationship to the text. The audience constructs its own independent textual meaning. This radical proposition is harmonised in the middle range theory as theorists look to avoid the extremes of complete dependency or complete rupture between meaning and textual import. Silverstone and Mansell [1996] typify this position in their search for a middle range theory of the fate of technologies in society. They have underscored that 'social action' is both 'the constitution and communication of meaning'⁴⁹.

The second track runs along the aesthetic continuum of 'self-interpretation' of Lash and Urry [1994] and is firmly grounded in the images of representation of experience. Experience itself has become at this level, remote and primitive. The conjunction of the symbolic representation of experience and new value attachments derived from the cognitivist reflexivity creates conditions for its aesthetic re-interpretation [reflexivity]. Particularities and circumstances gain pattern through structuration at the two levels of reflexivity. Another of Giddens' formulation that is evoked by Silverstone and Mansell may be helpful here: structure and agency.

⁴⁹ Silverstone & Mansell, Communication by design: The politics of information & communication technologies, 1996, p.71

Giddens addresses the concept of duality of structure and agency. For Giddens, the structure frames [that is, it is the technological in this instance] and simultaneously allows for agency or flux [process of domestication]. The consequent flow of shifting and flowing into newer forms amounts to the radical transformation of the technological product into a commodified product that is ready for consumption. This process creates a new status for the technological product: it assumes a new structure as a socially modified technology.

Giddens' fundamental tenet emphasises that no organizational existence is possible without structure and agency. The dialectic of structure and agency is that of 'facilitation and constraint' and therefore constituting a constant flux. The informing precepts derive from the related concept of reflexivity: the process of exercising reflection on the nature of actions and the conditions under which they are pursued.

Although there are massive 'flows' of 'signs in space'⁵⁰, there is consistency and continuity in the derivation of stable cognates of meaning. This is critical and marks one line of the continuity thesis. It means too that the transition into modernity is achieved without rupture but through change in the valence of meanings attached to symbols. In this sense the imperial roads of Rome, the electric cable lines of the British Empire of the nineteenth century were transmission belts of values, authority, power and the structuring processes of empire.

⁵⁰ Lash & Urry, Economies of signs and space, 1994

In this final segment, some sense of prototypical relationships is contemplated. Lyon [1997] and Calhoun [1995] describe relationships in society as falling into four kinds of patterns. These archetypal forms of relationships would be central in any consideration of advancing modernity, cyborg science and cyberspace. The first of these is the primary relationship that takes place in a physical and contextual space. This is a primordial type but its resonance in modernity is limited. It is residual in character. It can, in effect be replaced by indirect forms of relationships.

The indirect forms of relationship include office memos, circulars, e-mail to voice mail and others. The secondary stream of relationships can further be split into what Calhoun calls 'tertiary relations'. These relations show no 'co-presence'⁵¹. Interlocutors project a measure of independence from each other but there is still some mutuality in identity recognition and intention. The typical exemplars could be drawn from banks and bureaucratic institutions. In this web of communication, the very fact of awareness of the communication exchange favours responsible self-restrained use of information generated.

The last but not least of the archetypes is the quarternary relationship. These are fostered through higher-level development of information and communication technologies. The main domain here is that of surveillance: one party will be maintained ignorant of the transactions taking place. Registration and personal details given to e-mail web companies, health insurance and warranty data and any or all cyberspace solicitation of details could potentially lead to this blind participation in surveillance. Some of this, it is

argued, is necessary and legitimate: there are security concerns of nation-states or for that matter, purposes of studying patterns in health insurance claims and so on.

Conclusion

In the light of the foregoing discussion, the belief in the capacity of communications to engender change and catapult societies into modernity was significant. Lerner-Schramm were pioneers along this track. Everett Rogers added momentum to the debate by drawing attention to the human dimension of the purposes of development and the need for 'control' to reside in the participants. In doing this, he joined others, particularly from Third World countries who were arguing for an alternative vision. Samir Amin provides the basic features of an alternative vision – a vision that encompasses possibilities of modernity anchored in alternative vision[s].

As traditional mass media products proliferated, there was an increasing role played by new information and communication technologies. The chapter has explored some of the theorising on the new technologies and what sociality they proposed. The optimistic scenario of relationships suggested by Lyon and Calhoun has been summarised. The four relationships: direct, indirect, secondary [tertiary] and quaternary [surveillance] construct a possible typology of relations in the modern networked society.

The second position has been to look at critical social theory and the stance taken by some of its adherents towards information communication technologies. While not despairing, the critique has emphasised the social rootedness of the experience of and

⁵¹ Lyon in Loader [Ed.], The governance of cyberspace, 1997 p.26

with information communication technologies. Donna Haraway provided the feminist-radical perspective and captures the challenge of the new technologies as the 'translating...into coding' of all that has significant materiality. The stress and accent has provided a basis for concluding that the global, just as imperial postal systems before it, is not really universal. The global presents an old power challenge. As concept, globalisation is thus best captured in the Mosco and Reddick phrase as something that 'refers to the worldwide restructuring of industries and firms.'⁵² The weight of this structuring and its impact in the Third World will be explored in the discussion in chapter four.

The next chapter, **Chapter Three**, presents the evidence for the kind of movement towards modernity that Zimbabwe has fostered since independence in 1980. If the alternatives are splintered: from theorising traditional media, technology itself and the sort of modernity being fostered, the choices for Zimbabwe are equally complex and formidable.

⁵² Baillie and Winseck, [Eds.], Democratising communication?: Comparative perspectives on information and power, 1997, p.23

NOTE TO USERS

Page(s) not included in the original manuscript and are unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript was microfilmed as received.

69

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]

CHAPTER THREE

The promise: Growth with equity

Instruments and data presentation

Introduction

This chapter presents summary evidence from three sources: policies with underlying communications import, excerpts of interviews, descriptions of a feature film and discussion of a video documentary on media history in Zimbabwe. The first part of the evidence sets the tone of the debate on Zimbabwe's transition into the present regulatory framework. Matters on the national agenda that subsume communication media and national development will be presented. Interview excerpts follow the outline of the legal and regulatory framework. The pointers in interview data will be discussed in the next chapter. The rest of the verbatim data, however, are located in *Appendix One*, sub-item 1.3. The second set of evidence is derived from film questionnaire returns on the first Zimbabwe feature film called *Neria* [1992]. The adjunct evidence presented last is a description and discussion of the video-documentary on the history of Zimbabwean media called *Dancing out of tune* [1999], produced by Ms Edwina Spicer.

In each case, a description of the evidence is provided with the substantive issues highlighted. Further interrogation of some of the evidence in the light of the literature will follow in the next chapter.

Legal and regulatory structures

In **Chapter One**, background detail on communications in Zimbabwe included an account of the evolution of entities and structures of radio and television broadcasting. The Central Africa Federation period [1953-63] saw the harmonisation of structures among the three territories: Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Communication media structures were reorganised. The head office of the African service of radio broadcasting was placed in Lusaka, Zambia, while European radio broadcast services remained in Harare. As noted in **Chapter One**, the Federation became involved in 1958.

In film development, the pattern was largely similar: Zambia dealt with production and screening of films for African consumption while Harare was the centre of 35 millimetre films for European consumption. The 16-millimetre film was used for native affairs films and police training films. Further, the Central Film Laboratory was located in Harare. This facility provided film-editing services from sound to image. The film laboratory had been set up with British imperial overseas aid in 1948. This constellation of services in Harare gave the settler community a dominant influence in defining colonial discourse within the federation and beyond it.

Later the distinct capacities for control of mass media such as newspapers and magazines fell on the department of the Postmaster General, who had direct access to the minister responsible. At the commencement of federation in 1953, a task force commission chaired by Sir Douglas, recommended the creation of a government department dealing with justice, public relations, internal affairs and tourism. This unit was charged with

policy formulation while a separate arm, the Postmaster General's Office dealt with wireless radio and television programming by the commercial Rhodesia Television Company. It was largely news broadcasts or imperial re-diffusion services. What is crucial to note is the linkage between justice, internal affairs and public relations. The internal affairs department had a division dealing with structures and policies for native administration.

When the Rhodesia Front Party won the December 1962 election [the following year was the last year of the Central African Federation], they set out to control both radio and television services. Thus after seizing effective control of the RF Party machinery and government, Ian Smith turned his attention to the mass media especially in 1963 and 1964. Evidence has been discussed in **Chapter One** outlining some of the reasons that were provided for the State take-over of the broadcasting function on the demise of the federation services. It was a heated debate in the chamber: with members wondering what 'communists' or 'sympathisers' could possibly infiltrate a small television company, Rhodesia Television Company that had provided the programming content during federation was now to lose that business to the State. But liberals at this period of Zimbabwe's colonial history were cast as leftwing 'kaffir boetie,' that is, those who love the black.

It must be noted too that Smith had taken office as a result of a power struggle within the settler Rhodesia Front party. The issues that split the leadership related to arguments about the pace at which the colony was going along its route to settler 'independence.'

The strength of Smith's candidature for premiership was premised on the thesis that he would get the British to grant independence to the colony. If the British did not grant such independence, Smith was prepared to proceed to unilaterally declare independence without their assent. That also meant instituting a greater profile of control mechanisms on the indigenous people: the mass media were one such mechanism.

The result of these manoeuvres was the passage of the Broadcasting Act of 1965. The Act provided for the consolidation of a State corporation and television news services. Both radio and television services, including programming, were thus brought together under State control. Under the statutory instrument that set up the corporation, state monopoly in broadcasting is acknowledged. At the head of the organisation, a management board was provided for. The board interacted with the government at two levels: its own appointment, from a cross section of the settler community, was a matter for a government minister. Secondly, the board, in consultation with the responsible ministry, appointed a director. It is the director-general who dealt with the daily management routines of the corporation as its chief executive officer. The director also prepared budgets for the running of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation [RBC/TV Services].

There was a clear intent, expressed through the structuring of the system, on silencing what was perceived as possible rupture or stress points in a society of radical political and social configurations. Missionaries, liberals and nationalists alike found their capacity to articulate a different agenda severely curtailed. Radio and television had become settler State monopoly institutions. With legal instruments for the control of African and liberal agitation such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act, Censorship and Entertainment

Act, Emergency Powers Act, the Smith regime went on a massive censorship trail. The State censorship campaign was lifted in 1969 by which time the settler community had either acquiesced or critics had been deported altogether. Architect of the censorship laws and their implementation, Van der Byl, then minister of information, reminisced:

I tried to get as much control of the media as was possible. I believed that the media should be brought under control because its largely inhabited by people of the left...behind the liberal comes the communist.¹

In the print media, the *Parade* [1953], *Central African Examiner* [1957] and the South African *Drum* magazine were popular among African people. The *Central African Examiner* was in fact a product of the settler mining industry and often clashed in its views with orthodox policy of settler administration especially after the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. Their labour constituency in the mines was largely African and they tended to see themselves as liberal. The lexicon of colonial rule regarded them as too leftwing and possibly ‘communist sympathisers.’ Their paper experienced banning and the phenomenon of ‘white space’. White space was a form of protest by mass media publications. When the settler government proscribed articles through its censors, the papers printed the blank spaces. The *Examiner* stopped publication in 1968 as the economic losses mounted with increasing *white space*.

Meanwhile Rhodes’ friend, Francis Dormer conceived a small circulation newspaper, the *Herald* then called *Mashona land and Zambesian Times*, as a private business, in 1891 [a Mr Fairbridge actually ran the paper from Fort Salisbury, present day Harare]. Dormer remained a loyal friend of Rhodes. The paper, true to that friendship, advocated ideas that

¹ J. Frederikse, None but ourselves: Masses vs media in the making of Zimbabwe, 1982, p.25

were supportive of greater affinity and even union with South Africa [1921 – 1924]. The paper carried the views of the interests of mining and exercised political expediency with regard to the local settler administration. After all, the British South Africa Company was the instrument Rhodes used to effect occupation of Zimbabwe. Over the years, the Argus Press Group [Argus Group was involved in mining in South Africa and Rhodes had shares in the Group] extended its ownership of properties in Zimbabwe by acquiring extensive land. These acquisitions along with those of new settlers that were being encouraged to come into the virgin country, fed into the resentment that led to the eventual outbreak of the First Chimurenga War of 1896 to 1897.

Argus Press Group reached deeper into the mass media in the country: the *Chronicle* [1894], a sister paper to the *Rhodesia Herald* served the Matabeleland region, and the weekly *Sunday Mail* was largely a Harare and Midlands paper. Argus set up the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company as publishing company for its stable of papers. In the central region of the country, the Midlands, settlers had their own tiny but influential *Gwelo Times*, owned by mining and farming interests there since the 1898s. There was a short-lived *African Daily* [1962-64] published by the British Thomson Newspaper Group. The paper was in fact a kingmaker of sorts. Mararike makes the following observation:

We need to stress here that the *Daily News* decided to support Joshua Nkomo and his People's Caretaker Council [PCC] which had replaced ZAPU. The newly formed ZANU, led by the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, was regarded by the *Daily News* as an extreme and violent organisation.²

² Mararike in R. Zhuwarara, K. Gecau and M. Drag [Eds.], Media, democratisation and identity, 1993, p.55

This was the state of play when Smith unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965.

There was often tension between the Argus Group stable of newspapers and the focus of the regime on key policy initiatives, including the matter of the illegal independence itself, status of African people, African majority rule and indigenous land rights. Censors physically moved into newspaper offices to perform the physical exercises of skimming and ordering suppression of particular articles, names, pictures et cetera. Frederikse, researching on the relation between masses and the media in the making of Zimbabwe, provides an insight into the impact of censorship in her exchange with Robertson, then editor of the *Chronicle*:

We got censorship by officials who came into the office with their blue pencils and started ordering us to remove this and to remove that. ...there were no half-measures about it. One of them had something to do with newspapers sometime in his experience but the other two never had anything to do with newspapers at all. One of the censors was a former superintendent of prisons.³

The question of a 'former superintendent of prisons' engaging in newspaper censorship suggests that the matter was simply treated as a police action, and the State as embodiment of violence reaching out for the colonisation of the minds of readers through selective image, text and sound. Yet the same administration passed the Copyright Act two years later, in 1967. An enlightened founding thesis of the Act was that there was then sufficient cultural output locally, a nascent university college in Harare and extensive exchange in the field of education and science with South Africa that justified the protection of copyright owners. Thirty-three years later, in 2000, Zimbabwean

³ J. Frederikse, None but ourselves: Masses vs media in the making of Zimbabwe, 1982, p.25

Minister Chinamasa justified the passage of successor legislation: the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act. First he thought the ‘proper balance between the interests of creators and public interest’ was critical.

Chinamasa distinguished between industrial property [designs, inventions, trademarks geographical nomenclatures] and copyright. Copyright referred to literary, musical, artistic, photographic and audio-visual cultural material. He then drew attention to the fact that the new legislation sought ‘to continue efforts already made in modernising existing laws to make them correspond to present socio-economic and technological needs and policies.’⁴

The Act performs two fundamental tasks. First of all, it acknowledges the settler legislation and updates the old Act in matters of detail: incorporating notions of databases and computer programmes as some of the new ways in which artistic work flows. Secondly, and this is crucial for Zimbabwe, the Act incorporates oramedia into the ambit of legally enforceable copyright protection under the law. Oramedia is communal property. Therefore the Act permits copyright in oramedia to subsist in the office of the State President.

Further comment on the new legal status of oramedia is judicious here. In rural communities, the claim on those rights requires a massive education campaign among cultural performers and local district authorities. The kind of campaign envisaged has implications for State budget provisions for the campaign and for support to rural

associations and cultural ensembles in districts. Urban cultural associations and artists of various sorts are better placed economically to enforce their rights under the new copyright legislation. Additionally, they are advantaged in that the courts and lawyers are within easy reach in the cities and towns. Thus there is a chasm between the intent of the law, on the one hand, and the resonance of this intention in the life of the beneficiaries. Social class formations influence the pace and degree of closeness to benefits. The rural social formations occupy the extreme end of the spectrum of beneficiaries after the articulate urban-based social formations and the urban poor.

The panopticon

The preceding segment has outlined the communication media environment during the period leading to the inception of the first Zimbabwe independence government in 1980. It is necessary at this stage to turn to the structural configurations of the country's transition into independent status. But first, there is need to introduce a Foucauldian concept of the panopticon. The panopticon as concept will be useful in comprehending the structure of the Lancaster House constitution for Zimbabwe. Indeed the constitution has been used as entry point by a number of players, both inside and outside, to comment or take positions on matters that would be considered internal in other states.

The panopticon can best be described as basically the design of a prison ensemble for the purpose of ensuring that no inmate of a prison facility had any prospects for escape from it. Maximum security is enhanced by the centrality of a tower light. From the vantage point in the middle of a circular prison construction, the

⁴ Government Printers, *Parliamentary debates*, vol. 27, 10, August 31 2000, columns 713-718

tower light is trained on the inmates so that the prisoners remain in a state of permanent visibility. Every movement, however idle, is in the public eye as it were: from perfunctory routines such as toiletry, rest postures and gazing back at the light. In other words, to ensure that no prisoner escapes from such a facility, vigilance and security become equated with permanent visibility.

The role of communication media is akin to the position and impact of the central tower light, bringing into full visibility both State action and individual conduct. It is not the intention here to develop the full Foucauldian discourse on the nature of the underside of the law nor his 'mapping of history.'⁵ But it is noted that there is a whole discursive field in which the isolation of the panopticon as an element may seem injurious to a whole Foucauldian armoury on epistemic difference, representation and the layering effect of history. In so far as the concept of panopticism focuses on action, this is the kernel of the image that is sought here:

...although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate on the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law.⁶

The constitution of a country is the supreme law of that country. The point at which Zimbabwe entered transitional arrangements to full independence was through the modality of a negotiated constitution in London in 1979. Zimbabwe went through to the independence general elections in February 1980. This followed the conclusion of the

⁵ A. Ahmad, *In theory: Nations, classes and literatures*, 1989, p. 166

⁶ Foucault as cited in C. Wolfe, *Critical environments: Postmodern theory and the pragmatics of the 'outside'*, 1998, p.90-91

Lancaster House Constitutional talks in London at the end of 1979. The first independence government formally assumed office on 18 April of that year. The Lancaster House constitution provided for a premier as head of government and a titular president. There was also the centrepiece of the new government: the national assembly [parliament] made up of elected and reserved white seats.

There were eighty seats on the common roll voters' register. They were only open to African people in a competitive first-past-the-post system. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front [ZANU PF] won fifty-seven seats. This figure, fifty-seven seats, was clearly sufficient for ZANU PF to form the next government without reference to any of the competitors. The other political parties such as United African National Council [UANC] picked up three seats, and the war of liberation partner of ZANU PF, the Zimbabwe African People's Union – Patriotic Front [ZAPU PF], picked up twenty seats. The white community competed for twenty reserved white seats. The balance, twenty seats, were filled by way of appointment, for example, Chiefs, and representatives for minority interests such as women.

The white community, on the other hand, the Rhodesian Front party out-performed itself: collecting all the twenty seats. The performance by the RF party underlined continuance of a white insular posture. In practice, the persistence of a dual society triumphed. The black and white communities that had lived contiguously next to each other but without organic interactivity since the 1890s were visible in the election results. Thus a new era of governance began with old problems. The reconciliation speech by Mugabe as Prime

Minister-elect, on March 4 1980 seemed a surprise turn of events in the face of the evidence. As a result, the surprise was probably the reason it was the most quoted news item of the country's first year of independence both at home and abroad.

The speech urged Zimbabweans to turn to the reconstruction of their country and substitute swords for ploughshares. It resonated well with a country smarting under the heat of war. It was carried on the single channel national television and on radio broadcasts. On March 5, the airwaves and print media were flooded with this remarkable statement. Seven years later it was still considered the 'bold and generous policy of reconciliation'⁷ but by the twentieth year of independence, it was a policy under scrutiny: 'even reconciliation,' one interview respondent, PE.3, affirms, 'worked within reason.' Once that 'reason' had expired, then it was open season.

Different sections of the population expected and worked to achieve consolidation of their power, largely through economic, social and cultural policy initiatives or through international linkages that led to favourable outcomes. It is necessary though to preface a discussion of the evolution of new challenges for Zimbabwe with a re-assessment of the British-American-South African axis in Southern Africa when it was clear the majority population in Zimbabwe were on the brink of taking political power.

In 1977, the UK and US foreign secretaries mentioned in their draft proposals for a settlement that there was need for what was called: the Zimbabwe Development Fund. The Fund would cater to a broad sweep of social strata:

...various sectors and programmes such as rural development, education, health, social and economic infrastructure, resettlement and training schemes for Africans, including those affected by the present conflict.⁸

This Fund, maintained in the Lancaster constitutional talks two years later, was to receive inflows of development aid in cash and kind through bilateral protocols but the World Bank would set-up a mechanism for its management and disbursement. The independence government was expected to participate in the arrangements on the management of the Fund. The guerrilla army was obliquely referred to as 'those affected by the present conflict'. In fact the Fund was an inducement for the guerrilla leaders, Mugabe and Nkomo, to sign the Lancaster House Agreement. Stoneman and Cliffe reviewing the economic situation of Zimbabwe in 1989 refer back to the Fund as follows:

In the event virtually no aid was forthcoming save for the relatively small British grant [£50 million] that was their redemption of the promise made at Lancaster House of a massive grant for land transfer; a 'development fund' had been the price the PF had been able to extract for agreeing to this formula, but it did not materialise.⁹

The government of Zimbabwe faced a second critical aspect in the initial arrangements for an independent and sovereign state: the new constitution entrenched clauses on the judiciary [Chapter VII, Section 79 subsections A and B]] and the bill of rights [Chapter III with sixteen sections in all]. The membership of the bench became overnight the sacred cows of a new system that was born with independence. The bill of rights laid stress on recourse to the judiciary for enforcement of individual rights over land, freedoms of assembly, association and expression. The vast rural areas that had been under martial law were beyond the reach of the law: actions of security forces had

⁷ *Zimbabwe News*, 18 No.3, March 1987 p.1

⁸ David Owen, *Rhodesia: Proposals for a settlement*, September 1977, p.7

⁹ C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, economics and society*, 1989, p.33. The mnemonic 'PF'

retroactively been condoned by the Indemnity Act since 1978. The new supreme law excluded the rural areas from its field of vision: there was no accession to a settlement in relation to the only source of livelihood: land.

Further, as one Harare lawyer, Biti, acknowledges:

... up until 1985 the greater majority of the judges had been appointed before Independence in 1980. This situation never pleased Government...¹⁰

To say that government was not 'pleased' is probably an understatement: it was a theme that could not be explained to the ordinary mass of people whose children and other relations had been sent to prison and worse by the same judiciary for taking part in the armed struggle. But seen together in the light of the economic bait promised in the eventual agreement, it was clear the joint powers of Britain and USA were emphatic that the new state took its place in the Western capitalist economic system on their own terms.

Hence the effect of the provisions in the constitution was to frame the spatial co-ordinates of the new government. It was clear that the individual rights were enshrined without taking into account the reasons that led to war in the first instance. Peace appeared to be an immediate benefit in the struggle for land. How that land could come in the future was outside British and American interests in the focus of the conference. There was also some kind of *fejafēja* in the arrangements with the assumption that someone other than

stands for *Patriotic Front*, a reference to ZANU PF and ZAPU PF.

¹⁰ T Biti in T. Biti, B. Elliot, G. Feltoe, et al [Eds.], *Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin*, 1, July 1999, p.99

Mugabe was the winning candidate in the elections that followed the agreement.¹¹ Even at his return to Zimbabwe on 27 January 1980, one Commonwealth observer, Chan, noted:

Rumours had flown ...that assassins were in the crowd awaiting Mugabe. All through the previous night, busloads of singing supporters had cruised through central Salisbury [Harare]. All through the previous few days, the press had built up Mugabe's return from Mozambique as the return of the devil's spawn. Now, he was finally coming, and there could be no peace in the election campaign.¹²

Davidow, characterising the December 1979 period in Harare, refers to an air of jingoist pride:

Radio Rhodesia pumped out the party line, trumpeting the death of terrorists, and the vaguely pre-World War II British air of dog shows, afternoon teas, and rugby prevailed.¹³

The air of surrealism in the election period itself led to the overwhelming confidence that of the African political formations, anyone else but Mugabe would win the election. Indeed Lord Soames, the colonial governor newly installed in Harare to oversee the process, wanted to ban Mugabe from participating in the elections for alleged violations of the cease-fire. Assassins tried physical elimination of Mugabe in a bomb blast in Masvingo, a populous province in the South of the country. Someone else apparently was expected to win: Muzorewa and Nkomo were expected to form coalitions with settlers, the worst scenario was a Nkomo-Mugabe coalition, not an outright win by Mugabe. The local and international system [World Bank, International Monetary Fund, USA and Britain] would work the mechanisms in place to ensure an empty victory if the preferred options did not emerge. Such an outcome might be consonant with the standstill

¹¹ *Shona* term for street game of tricks in which the newcomers always lose. But newcomers play anyway for the sheer thrill of it.

¹² S. Chan, The Commonwealth observer group: Election 1980, 1985, p.25

mechanisms in the constitution that were brokered at Lancaster. Thus settler land rights were confirmed in the new constitution. The colonial judiciary was also confirmed in its exercise of power in the new arrangements. Individual rights, which are the centrepiece of capitalist organisation, loomed large in the new dispensation.

Apparently, the peasants eking out an existence out of some dry patches of rural land, they too had rights under the supreme law: the right to their patches. The new State of Zimbabwe was an attempt to create a modern Western democracy of a sort: complete with provisions for protecting existing property rights, individual rights, entrenching judiciary 'independence' and assigning non-value attributes to the dreams of the rural people without land. Yet what was specified in the constitution was as critical as were the exclusions. The new government in fact would be judged on the observance of the provisions: not on the degree to which it approximated the dreams of those 'outside' the new law's spirit and letter, the ambitions and passions of the excluded peasants.

Further, the new State, it turns out in the constitution, was the old settler State: complete with colonial statutes, structures of governance, civil service personnel, and the renamed State broadcaster: Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation/TV. The invitation to some kind of State 'dancing,' with the international system, to borrow Spicer's term [discussed below], was conditioned by the legal and state apparatus described above. It is clear too that any national development projects that stayed close to the dreams of the excluded millions would sooner rather than later, come into conflict with an emerging convergence of interests between settler interests and new social formations based largely in the cities

¹³ J. Davidow, A peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979, 1984

and towns.¹⁴ The oft quoted Mugabe victory speech may, after all, not have been voluntary but merely a pragmatic reading of the forces ranged against the new government in the field of play: economic, political, social and even military. Its surrealism was even more striking: urging citizens to transform ‘swords’ into ‘ploughshares’ and inviting all citizens to a new sense of oneness. Mugabe the orator and steely intellect secured the moral high ground. He became an instant success with the world of international media for ‘what came to be termed “reconciliation policy”, which was a policy of continued concessions to whites and limited structural change and not just a set of attitudes.’¹⁵

At the outset, it appeared that at the level of leadership there was some appreciation between what Szajkowski calls ‘contradictions ...between goals and actuality in the pursuit of a common destiny’- more so when that ‘destiny’ is not singular but comprised of multi-layered visions. The State set about instituting measures in agricultural extension to re-invigorate production stalled by years of war, lack of adequate farmland, and deliberate lack of attention by the colonial settler administration. Retired agriculture workers and former guerrillas with skills in any branch of agriculture were called to join forces. College students of agriculture in their second year were urged to reinforce the teams that set out to rural areas with inputs: fertilisers, seed, and chemicals for distribution at community meetings.¹⁶

¹⁴ Edwina Spicer, *Dancing out of tune*, 1999 [video documentary] discussed later in this chapter.

¹⁵ C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, economics and society*, 1989, p.37

¹⁶ B Szajkowski in *Editor's preface*, C. Stoneman, & L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, economics and society*, 1989, p.vi

Radio broadcasts were instituted at the end of 1980 and the master farmer-training programme was expanded. In areas such as Rushinga, in the north east of the country, this rapid modernisation effort produced involuntary resistance in some places. The spirit mediums simply blocked the use of fertilisers on ‘their soil’: the recipients sold off their free supplies or hid these in the hills. It took somewhat longer to discover why the crop output in that area was still low while inputs were indeed distributed. The mobilisation strategies of wartime once again took form to overcome an apparent contradiction committed in the name of modernisation. Communal farmers contributed 8% of maize output in 1980 rising to 40% in 1984. Cotton production was virtually a white commercial preserve, but by the 1997/8 season, communal farmers were producing 77% of the crop. There were village community workers [VCW], village health workers [VHW] in almost every village. Restocking of cattle herds and renovations of cattle dipping facilities within radius of rural communities improved rural animal health.¹⁷

But there were limits to what could be done in the context of land congestion in the newly renamed communal lands [rural areas]. A settler calculation of January 1979 admitted that rural areas ‘were holding 2.5 million people in excess of their carrying capacity’¹⁸ while other studies at the local university in Harare indicated that up to ‘60 percent of European farming land is not being fully utilised’.¹⁹

¹⁷ Cattle-dipping refers to a practice of fighting ticks on cattle by passing the animals through water with anti-tick chemicals.

¹⁸ Roger Riddell in Morris-Jones & Dennis Austin, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, 1979, 3

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.5

In 1974, in a school book for African education on population control, Mills had sought to justify the vastness of land allocated to settlers, because, he wrote, they needed ‘five hectares of land for one animal as is needed in some parts of Rhodesia.’²⁰ The reference to ‘some parts of Rhodesia’ is to the central plateau of the country – which is climatically *cold to cool*. The rest of the country falls into *warm*, *hot* and *very hot* communal regions of the country shown in *Appendix Three*. The broad climatic divisions generally correspond to human settlement patterns as instituted by successive land apportionment Acts culminating in the Land Husbandry Act of 1969 that remained in force into the post independence period. The cool areas also constitute the fertile agricultural land, Regions I and II, and sections of Region III that constitute continuing contested occupancy by about four thousand five hundred farmers. Communal areas [hot and very hot] and small-scale purchase farmers take up the balance of the land [warm].

The other question of equity arose in general education. All schools were declared non-racial entities and children were to be welcome in every school. The structural impediments such as uniforms, age and school fees were de-emphasised in the primary school: making them peripheral to the business of education. By 1982, there were over 2 million children in primary school. It was not unusual at this time to find fifteen-year olds in grade one. The secondary stream opened up as well: making it possible to attain eleven years of schooling for the young people. It was clear also that teacher output needed further enhanced innovation at both primary and secondary levels.²¹

²⁰ G. M. Mills, *Thinking about the future*, 1974, p.19

²¹ In 1985, Zimbabwe and Cuba entered into a scientific and technical co-operation arrangement. Cuba offered to train two thousand science teachers for secondary education. The first group left for Havana in 1986 and the last to return from Havana arrived back in Zimbabwe in the 1997/8 academic year.

Fey Chung, one of the pioneers of education programming in the refugee camps in Mozambique, was appointed to oversee the setting up of the rapid teacher education programme for the primary sector. Chung was one of six hundred or so education workers who had been in Mozambique under ZANU PF's education department. Her new minister in independent Zimbabwe was her old superior in the war, Dr Mutumbuka. The new minister made a difficult transition himself in relation to the civil service and management levels of the school system:

Should he try to work with this old guard or should he replace it by bringing in all six hundred members of his Education Department from Mozambique?²²

Chung had hoped to revamp the education system in Zimbabwe. At the same time it was clear the Constitutional Agreement had not been anticipated – not so soon anyway. Further, in circumstances where the civil service regarded themselves as the 'insiders' and new comers as 'outsiders', there was no prospect for major overhauls. However, Chung was able to launch the Zimbabwe Integrated Teacher Education Course [ZINTEC] in the 1981/2 period. ZINTEC had a basic sandwich structure: sixteen initial weeks of theory followed by three and a quarter years of practical teaching. The last sixteen weeks in the fourth year were both of theoretical and professional tooling for entry into the profession.

Seminars and cluster meetings between tutors and their students in the field marked the long teaching practice. But this structure effectively brought the teacher shortage under some semblance of control. The trainees and their tutors were innovative. They also left in their schools traditions of involvement. There were follow up sessions into the

student's class teaching: by not only his tutors but also the local school and district education authorities. The ZINTEC teacher was required to engage in research within his community. Some of the themes touched on the cause of diarrhoea in the school catchment area, the pattern of school achievement and parents' involvement in the children's education, et cetera. The student also relied on his modules from his parent college. Some of these modules embodied an idealism that flew in the face of Marxist theory in whose name some of the modules were written. The following is an example of what was offered then as explanation for the 'term socio-economic growth':

The social aspect involves providing basic socio-cultural development services such as education and health facilities; eliminating all forms of inequality, social classes, stratification, and, freeing man from misery.²³

'Eliminating' what is clearly a scourge: 'inequality' in the same breadth as the 'social classes' and 'stratification' can give reason for alarm. Increased provision of social services means people will be able to live longer, attain modern services conveniently. But agencies involved in service provision, schools, clinics, literacy programmes and others inaugurate processes that have a structuring impact on social formations, not an eliminatory one.

Almost as soon as the innovative Zimbabwe Integrated Teacher Education Course [ZINTEC, 1981] started, it became a battleground between bureaucrats who wanted ZINTEC to continue and encompass other forms of training [to *Zintecise* systems] and those who felt ZINTEC was disruptive of established routines. In spite of these debates, by the 1990s the quantitative impact was considerable. To date this programme continues

²² N. Bhebhe and T. Ranger, [Eds.], Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war, 1996, p.23

in two colleges: Gwanda ZINTEC and Morgan College. The structural modifications suggest that the latter group of policy makers won the argument: ZINTEC has become largely *conventionalised*.²⁴

The government of Zimbabwe conducted mass mobilisation for literacy in the early 1980s. The exercise was housed in one department, that of Community Development and Women's Affairs. The ministry had responsibility for crèche and nutrition programmes for children under five years of age. The impact of the two programmes, while noticeable in the figures relating to social services expenditures and improved national literacy rate, lacked formative research support. If the literacy campaigns are interlocked with other domains of socio-economic development, a huge social movement towards autonomous and self-reliant development is unlocked. The experience in Cuba of their massive one-year [1961] literacy campaign taught history, rudiments of agrarian work, political economy, preventive medicine and media literacy.

The vast potential for post-literacy and continuing work with a far more global impact in the literacy sphere was not fully exploited. Brazil's example, led by Freire, and expounded by him as thinker and activist behind the programme, captures the vitality of a live process. Freire's approach was to elevate literacy to a fighting cudgel:

... every reading of the word is preceded by a reading of the world.
Starting from the reading of the world that the learner brings to literacy programmes [a social and class determined], the reading of the word sends

²³ ZINTEC National Centre, *Sociology of education module: School and society*, 302, 1983, p.38

²⁴ Instead of 16 weeks of intensive theory followed by three and half years of practice, ZINTEC has modified to one year in college and two years out on practical teaching. The fourth year is also a college-based theory and examination year. The community project today is simply a research project.

the reader back to the previous reading of the world, which is, in fact, a re-reading.²⁵

Literacy as conceptualised here, is no less than a technical tool for use in the interrogation and exploration of personal, social and more global spaces. Gramsci proposes content that is consonant with many conditions of Third World countries. The call by Antonio Gramsci is that folklore should be placed on the education curricula as part of a process of 'systematic work' that empowers the masses and provides rigorous training for organic intellectuals. He compares the awakening of the popular social classes, in the wake of the project he was proposing, to that of the Reformation in the Protestant countries. Gramsci argues that if proper research is conducted then folklore teaching becomes a tool for organic change:

Folklore must not be thought of as an oddity, something strange or picturesque, but as something very serious and to be taken seriously. ... the birth of a new culture in the popular classes... the gap between modern culture and popular culture or folklore will disappear.²⁶

The substantive issues in society are anchored around the potential of communication: and folklore is embedded in African orature. Work in literacy with oramedia as adjunct would be undoubted contributions to the enlargement of public participation in a democratic dispensation that seeks to free all citizens from the constraints of illiteracy.²⁷

²⁵ Freire, Pedagogy of the city, 1993 p.58

²⁶ A. Mattelart & S. Siegelau, Communication and class struggle. Liberation, Socialism, Vol. 2, 1983. p.75

²⁷ Orature was coined from 'oral literature.' N.wa Thiongo, Decolonizing the mind, 1986. Oramedia is a term meaning information and communication channels for oral traditions in the bulk of what the study has referred to as the rural zones and poor urban social formations. Rituals in the film *Neria* exemplify oramedia.

The education, health and extension sectors had an annual growth in the 1980-88 period of 7.5% of the gross domestic product. The table extract below summarises comparative data with other sectors [constant MZWD, Million Zimbabwe Dollar].

Sector	GDP 1980	GDP 1988	Average Annual Growth 1980-88
Agriculture	451	580	3.2
Mining	285	291	0.3
Manufacturing	802	993	2.7
Distribution	451	442	-
Public administration	291	397	4.0
Education, Health & Services	413	739	7.5
Other	531	608	1.7
Total GDP	3224	4050	2.9
Population [thous.]	7360	8880	2.4
GDP per capita	438	456	0.5

Table 3.1: *Economic indicators*²⁸

Even as part of the cluster sector of education, health, extension and social services, the particular contribution of education to the expenditure tended to draw attention to the immediate pressures of provision rather than long-term sustainability. The feeding schemes under the department of Community Development and Women's Affairs [described below] constituted indirect expenditure on education. In real terms government expenditure in education was far more than the statistical quantification attempt to approximate.

The literacy campaign was launched in 1980/81 from within the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs. The ZINTEC teachers became key units in the expansion of the literate community and the setting up of crèche centres especially in

²⁸ Obert Maravanyika, et al report, *Education in Zimbabwe: Dilemmas of quantity and quality*, 1990, p.18

communal areas in the districts. The literacy project relied exclusively on voluntarism and appeals to cultural and ideological values. It made sense then to open thousands of adult literacy classes under trees adjunct to feeding points for malnourished children. The mothers who brought children to nutrition points also learnt to read and write. Subsequent expansion in education, especially after 1985, led to the establishment of greater variety of courses in technical and vocational training. More institutions with small enrolments opened right through to university level.

The railway coach system was restructured. Instead of coaches designated ‘fourth class’ for Africans, they became ‘economy’ class for those with a small budget. Rail travel continues to be one of the cheapest modes of transport for goods and passengers. Rail travel certainly provides heavy passenger inflows into and out of the Bulawayo-Harare route. In related communication fields such as telecommunications, the 1980s were years of expansion of services but the 1990s were characterised by struggles for system maintenance. The table below summarises these data in tabular form.

Data type	National level	Capital Harare	Rest of population
Post offices	226	10	216
Fixed network lines	300 000	130 000	270 000
Mobile [State commercial unit]	80 000	50 000 est.	30 000 est.
Mobile private	90 000	60 000 est.	30 000 est.
Population	12 000 000 est.	1 200 000	10 800 000

Table 3.2: *Post office, fixed network telecom lines and mobile phone distribution estimates, 2000*

The analogue and digital exchanges are now on fifty percent each of the exchange technologies in place. It is the fifty-percent digital component that carries the greater

volume of telecommunications traffic. By early 2000, Zimbabwe had almost three hundred thousand telephone lines installed countrywide. This figure includes Harare's share of one hundred and thirty thousand fixed network lines. Nationally, two hundred and seventy thousand lines serve some eleven million people.²⁹ Post office service points are included in the table above. Service counters would in fact be a better distributive index against population concentrations. But the broad sweep suggests postal services are still a scarce service in the out of town zones. Two hundred post offices and postal agencies serve rural areas. The postal agencies have severe limitations on monetary withdrawals, thus hampering the circulation of financial flows in the rural zones.³⁰

The projected figure for mobile phone services for 2000 for the State Posts and Telecommunications Corporation's own NetOne Company, was estimated at eighty thousand subscribers. There are two other players in the mobile phone sector, Econet and Telecel, estimated to have between them some ninety thousand subscribers.³¹ The concentration of telecommunications is found in urban centres. Harare is the major hub of connectivity and telecommunication traffic. Gweru has the international gateway system. Between these two centres, the weighting of telecommunications is largely determined. The other centres are largely peripheral to this dyad. This raises issues of rural-urban

²⁹ Ministers of Education and Communication Conference, Harare International Conference Centre, 21 March 1999. Interventions by Chen Chimutengwende, then in charge of the Ministry of Information and PTC and Dr Ignatius Chombo, then in charge of Higher Education and Technology. Teledensity for Zimbabwe would be based on the fixed lines estimated at 300 000 lines, plus estimated mobile phone users who are not also connected to the fixed network. Additional information on estimates of mobile phone users was extracted from the sector October-November reports, Zimbabwe National Y2K Taskforce, Higher Education & Technology, Harare, 1999.

³⁰ POSB, *Annual report presented to parliament: Year ended December 1998*, 2000, pp.2-3

³¹ T Strive Masiyiwa Holdings [Pvt] Ltd appealed to the government to let him set up as a private phone mobile business. There was resistance by the state monopoly: Posts and Telecommunications. Masiyiwa then dragged government through to the courts [1996] to plead, under the Lancaster House constitution, his injured individual rights. He won.

equity in connectivity and communications across all kinds of sectors, social and economic. Stoneman states that in 1985, there were two hundred-fifty thousand telecommunication fixed network lines: the difference with the 2000 figure suggests an additional net line supply of one hundred and fifteen thousand in fifteen years. Those early years to 1985 covered the period of expansion in social services before the Structural Adjustment regime was implanted in 1989/90.³²

Arguments in the present section can be summarised in the following manner. The constitutionalism introduced at the end of the liberation war created a new phase in the struggle for equity in Zimbabwe. The old State remained intact while new players were introduced. Social services were expanded but there were limits to which this expansion could resolve the basic contradictions obtaining in the supply of land as economic resource and entry into commercial farming and industrial sectors by African people. The new players who came on board began to enjoy some of the fruits and benefit hitherto restricted to a minority – particularly in the monopoly of mass media consumption, white collar jobs in the civil service, and access to telecommunication services. The reality of high interconnectivity in urban spaces occurs in the same country where there is plenty of poverty and large populations still off the grid especially in the rural zone. The next section attempts to focus on the realities of communications in Zimbabwe as understood by the key national policy shapers and departmental executives in the government of Zimbabwe.

³² C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, economics and society, p.151

The research programme for the present study involved interviews with senior policy executives and vision shapers in government. The research evidence covers a broad sweep of the communication media field: their status and challenges. The guiding questions of the study also sought to find and open new spaces for a fuller appreciation of processes in the communications media field. There are suggestions in the interview material for new directions or a resuscitation of practices abandoned over the years since independence. Above all, there are insights into the state of communications in government, reconciliation as policy, notions of the evolution of social classes in the country, and the primacy of communications media in national development. There is further reflection on this point in **Chapter Four**. Meanwhile there is need to turn to the summary interview data below. The rest of the interview data is found in *Appendix One* subitem 1.3.

Description of instruments and procedures

Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe, with four national policy designers [this study will call these vision shapers, **VS.1, 2,...ⁿ**] and three policy executive operators [hereafter called policy executives, **PE.1, 2, ...ⁿ**]. Each respondent was required to indicate consent to the interview by signing a consent form. Then each of the respondent's office staff worked with the researcher and set up appointments convenient to respondents. The times were strictly monitored to disallow interruptions. In that exercise, the office staff of the various respondents helped in ensuring the same control and result. All responses have been pooled and grouped under each broad item in

the Interview Schedule. It was felt this was the convenient and cohesive way in which a sense of structure and feel of the field could emerge.

The interview schedule for the vision shapers contained some nine [9] items and for the policy executive operators carried ten [10] items. The interview schedule placed communications in the national development context. The respondents were asked to identify what they saw as the goals of their departmental mission, components of continuity or rupture with the past, and current status of communications in Zimbabwe.

The item on rupture or continuity with history sought to capture the sense of rupture with the pre-independence era or rupture with recent history since independence in 1980. The next set of items asked the vision shapers in particular what hallmarks of national development they could point to.

The Interview Schedule is found at the end as *Appendix One*, subitems 1 & 2. The following extracts from the interviews constitute the key ideas in the body of interview data.

Select verbatim quotations³³

Interviewer: What would you say are the goals of your communication policy?

VS.1: [...]...to ensure that we reach the remotest possible places. We disseminate information ...distribute educational programmes.

³³ The bracket at the start of an utterance signifies substantial omissions. The dots indicate some omissions but not as substantial as the initial bracket.

[] The goals are to ensure that we also move with the happenings in the world today ...modern communication methods which are internet services, e-mail, even the establishment of education by distance learning.

[] Seventy five percent of Zimbabwe has got access to our own radio communication. The telecommunication system has reached more than fifty percent of the country. Right now the introduction of mobile communication is in progress. Most of the urban areas are covered by mobile communications but the rural areas are not yet developed to that extent...

PE.1: The goals...largely to do with rural areas and giving media opportunity to grassroots. ...seeking to monitor and highlight development activities at grass-root level so that rural communities and their aspirations, their ambitions, their problems are articulated in the media as much as social and other groupings in urban areas.

PE.3: Well, we did not always have a communication policy ... in the past we relied on newspapers and other mass media and electronic media.

[] We want people to know how to deal with us, how to access us and what services to expect from us. We now have a web-page ...

Interviewer: Is there a distinction between the way communications function in communal Zimbabwe and urban communities?

VS.1: Certainly. The use of the fax, e-mail, internet, and even the use of the telephone and mobile system is found in the city. TV services and even radio itself ...accessibility is mainly in urban areas but in the rural areas there is need for great improvement.

PE.1: [] We've deployed media personnel at district stations ... in some of the remotest parts of the country: Binga to Beitbridge and across to Chipinge and others. ...our staff is

to do features, reports and capture local response to multifaceted developments in the rural areas and the participation of people in the programmes.

PE.2: Yes, there is a distinction. I think the media are aware that in the communal area they may actually have to lead the people...make people aware...not usual though to be invited to cover what's happening in the rural areas. The urban people want the media to cover them. The rural people want to get on with their lives... almost like the media are an inconvenience.

PE.3: I wouldn't say there is a distinction between rural and urban, it's more of class. We have newspapers like the *Herald*, *Sunday Mail* and then we've the *Kwayedza* and others. These others carry stories about the witches, healers and so on They're catering for this other population. It's not very informative. ... we're catering for two different classes.

[] Children spend all afternoons watching cartoons but they're not watching cartoons about us. So when they grow up they fail to relate to being an African... through these little cartoons: they're swamped into foreign cultures, foreign behaviours.

[] So the child who develops, watching these things is not an African... .

Interviewer: What was the communicative significance of the liberation war?

VS1: [] in the liberation struggle communication was based on person-to-person contact. When the liberation guerrillas moved into an area, they used a number of communication systems to get the message across. They used our history. History was communicated through song. They politicised people by addressing them directly.

[] There was also the use of the radio... that was being run from Maputo.

[] What we have lost ...leaders moving to explain, communicating with people by staying with them, talking to them and explaining government policy. We've kind of built a gap between the leadership and the people.

[] We only visit them ... this is where we have lacked in communicating even the problems of the government, the hardships of the economy. They only hear them from the radio, they can read them partly from newspapers ...

PE.1:[] ... most of our leadership was going back to their provinces. They were addressing huge crowds, defining the policies of the new government, the ambitions of the new government and introducing the government to the population.

[] With time, there was less and less of that until hardly anything remained.

[]...the voices that were heard so much would have not have suddenly gone unheard...

[] the local leaderships, and during the liberation they included *mujibhas*³⁴ [guerrilla couriers] all the way to the chief. Nobody across the age-group would have remained unheard.

PE.2: You know, educationally, during the war people were not reading newspapers as such. The radio was the source of what's happening ... and I think because ...[they] trusted the Maputo radio, this has continued into independence. This is a good tool for education. It's trusted.

[] If you communicate anything by radio, the rural areas will get to know about it. For instance, that radio programme on deaths is very widely listened to.

³⁴ The term, *mujibha*, refers to male youths who were guerrilla couriers during the liberation war: news, logistical material, security reports etc. and the female counterpart were termed *chimbwindo*.

PE.3: Let me put it this way. Before independence, people were talked to...the whole liberation struggle was about winning the hearts and minds of people. It wasn't like Smith dictating to people.

[] *Pungwe* was about dialogue. It was about education, educating people about their lives, independence, development and people became partners. They participated.

[] I think people learnt that when you have a government, it doesn't dictate to you. It works with you: it consults you. You are partners together. I think this is the greatest achievement of the liberation war: to put people at the centre as human beings who had rights, opinions, and ideas. And guerrillas impressed this lesson on our people.

Interviewer: What was the vision at independence? How well has practice approximated that vision?

VS.1: [vision]...where every person had access to information. So the first thing they did was to ensure that people were educated. ...they started the educational thing...once you are educated, literate, you can now read and write then you can have access to information. Secondly, communication entails advancement of knowledge through whatever programmes will be coming up...

VS.2: When you are literate, you can appreciate and understand ...programmes on television or radio... the whole country can understand and can communicate in the process and share ideas. Then we have a knowledgeable community and society.

PE.1: ...reasonably well, but fell short of our own vision. Think of the government news agency. They generate a huge amount of copy without themselves being responsible for that copy's publication.

[]... but ultimately it's the editors of those media who determine how much or whether any of it will be published.

[] What we have is *reporting on* the communities.... You are unlikely to find a copy of CNG³⁵ newspaper at a local business centre or at a local secondary school or primary school. It's in the orientation.

[] ...the minister was incidental to the aspirations ... seeks to fulfil but the agency of the programme is with the people. ...seek to inspire this community ...see their own power and opportunity for empowerment.

PE.2: ... a lot depends on the ministers... some see the need for communication, others don't. [] Even when there was nothing wrong, that dialogue was needed... to continue, with women academics, vice chancellors... over a luncheon, or we just pick up the phone and say 'hello, what's happening at your institution?' I think this has come about only in the last six or seven years: it has not always been there. ... those communication lines are being opened.

PE.3: We learnt slowly about the power of communications, and especially that it must not be left to other people. Government as a whole has been generally reactive... the negative publicity the country has received, it has received this because there's a void. The print media and foreign media has played havoc on us because we've not ourselves told the story of what we're doing and why we're doing the things we do.

Interviewer: Status of communications in government administration?

³⁵ Community Newspapers Group publishes the community newspapers in the regions of Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

VS.1: []...There is only the use of the telephone. ...a number of government departments are not even computerised, it takes a long time for documents to move from one person to another.

PE.1: Telex services ...there is this desk here at the province. They raise the district stations and say 'what's your diary like and when can we expect your feature or stories for the day or week?' ...video technology is almost instantaneous.

[] Educational opportunity through participatory approaches is possible here. Our own staff can film and within days or weeks take back the film and cause discussion, debate, and interaction between the communities and the extension officer or our own staff.

Interviewer: Any efficacious modes of communication?

VS.1: The radio is very instrumental in affecting people's daily lives...cheapest mode of distribution of information. You do not need infrastructural development of a serious nature...it can go far and wide. The programmes put on radio can be in many languages that can easily be understood by people.

VS.2: The newspapers are not very accessible. The computer requires a lot of money to put up the infra-structure and then education. But the radio is for everybody.

VS.3: The need to deploy everything that is available is not always appreciated. The internet is available in some ministries and of course much more in the private sector. There is need to increase the appropriate use of the common telephone...

PE.1: []...the media are alerted especially the ZBC who consume our copy for their radio newscasts. ...then we have two live radio broadcasts each week when reporters speak from their district stations.³⁶

³⁶ ZBC: Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation

PE.2: ...we meet every two weeks ourselves. Because we are a small unit, we meet to discuss or pass necessary information to each other. This is not a matter of policy. It's just practice.

PE.3: Globalisation is here. People want to know what's happening in the world and here as well. We now have public relations officers. We didn't have this before, there're two of them, but that's how important communications have become.

[] Our communication is not just through the media, we do ...workshops ...provincial visits, we write letters to the press, as ministry or representing other points of view ...it's a way of bringing information to bear...

[] Leadership should take the time, and not wait to be asked. We educated a lot of people since the 1980s, now we must provide the information.

Interviewer: Is there general concern with communications by Zimbabweans?

VS.1: Certainly. They are very very concerned. Our people, because of the present economic hardships, they want to know what is happening.

[] ...a growing communication industry. There are many newspapers around now, radio stations, the deregulation of the communication sector, mobile and telephone services. People are interested.

VS.2: There's no doubt about this at all. Communications have become, in the last few years, everybody's business. The way our people watch the eight o'clock news across this country ...

PE.1: ... government would pronounce ... media and information policy and put that out very clearly in order for media players to know the environment.... The media itself

seeking to regulate its performance and its personnel through maybe some media council...

PE.2: I think the bush network has finally graduated now. You see many people buy one or other of the newspapers but usually both. For me, the fact of buying the two papers seems to be the need for objectivity. Even old newspapers will be read in the rural areas.

PE.3: Our belief is that Zimbabwe has achieved a great deal since independence. We've not received credit for the great deal we've done in education, health, human rights. But we've left it to others who have an axe to grind with us....

[] Let me say this, I believe in regulating the airwaves. I believe we can get better service by including more players. ... You see, now you can have a cell-phone but not the line or the line but no cell-phone.

[]...high blood pressures among senior executives might be due to some of these factors....you pay ... but can't communicate. If we bring other players, we improve this efficiency and don't forget we also create jobs.³⁷

The preceding section has covered the bulk of key issues that arose in interviews. It is clear from the foregoing that among senior policy executives there is evidence of concern over critical matters in communications media in Zimbabwe. There is concern on the question of status of communications in the country, the generation, propagation and profiling of sound, text and image flows in the media. Programming for the two-channel television, four radio stations and community and daily newspapers has met with mixed reception. The next chapter will discuss the implications.

For now, there is the filmic instalment to deal with, as PE.3 puts it: ‘we’ve not ourselves told the story of what we’re doing and why we’re doing the things we do.’ One way of telling ‘the things’ a country is doing is by way of production of music, art, video and above all, film. The medium of film provides sound, image and vicarious participation in the life and arguments that inform the film. The primary question may then revert to the status of a specific film in relation to its relevance in any nation-state as part of the national meta-narrative on development, training, and entertainment, gender sensitisation or some such intention. Responding to a question on what constitutes Canadian film, scriptwriter Blum responded ‘It’s a sensibility and a point of view.’³⁸

Yet a significant increase in film production in Canada occurred only after Telefilm Canada began offering tax shelters [1974-79] from government for those who invested in feature film productions. There have been problems of course in trying to determine what exactly constitutes a ‘Canadian’ film: in content, budget levels, extras and the Blum factor of ‘sensibility and point of view’. Zimbabwe’s experience in feature film production is virtually non-existent. *Neria* is the first Zimbabwean feature film produced in 1992. Efforts at other productions have failed to achieve the stature of this first feature for Zimbabwe. The period 1995-1996 saw efforts by Sinclair [*Flame*, 1996] and Dangarembizi [*Everyone’s child*, 1995].

Both attempt a perspective that is clearly a borrowed tool: Sinclair attempts to appropriate the imagery of the liberation war and feminise it at the same time while

³⁷ Talking about ownership of cell-phone handsets but without a line or vice versa.

³⁸ Brian Johnson, The Canadian patient, B. Szuchewycz & J. Sloniowski [Eds.], in Canadian

Dangarembizi searches for individual personal destiny in the domestic private space. The parents of the two teenagers die of HIV/Aids and both youths set out to survive: one becomes a prostitute while the other maintains a precarious existence within urbanity.

Mawuru's *Neria* on the other hand, illustrates a bold attempt to deal with incommensurable space. The urban space and its promotion of industry and creation of new solidarities not based on the communal bonds, constitutes an emerging modernity. Here, in the urban space, the ease of translation of values is apparent everywhere: from the women's raw materials and labour into capital that flows through the marketplace, the jobbing by the youths and *Neria*'s monthly bills. Contrasted with this situation is the rural zone: a space that has a special reverence for tradition, community and belonging. Katsande's little grocer's shop is the only visible outpost of the village's interconnection with the city life.

There is also the technology that brings the brothers to the village at Patrick's funeral: the public bus system. Is it possible to achieve modernity without loss of community? Can *Neria* attain Majority Age rights without alienation from the family and community? Mawuru, in this feature film takes these critical issues head on. While not perfect, the film *Neria* helps define the agenda for the place of communications in Zimbabwe.

There is no film industry afoot in Zimbabwe. Although the country has played host to visiting film companies – the local scene has far too many splintered houses playing at segmented specialisation in an uncoordinated field. Perhaps future efforts will benefit

from Mawuru's success in pooling local talent into a coherent voice. The next section presents an outline of the film and summary data from questionnaire response.

The feature film *Neria* [1992]

The next descriptive evidence covers the film *Neria*. The film by Godwin Mawuru was produced in 1992 and is considered the first Zimbabwean feature film. Godwin Mawuru is a self-made producer who assisted visiting companies shoot their films in Zimbabwe, including the film *A world apart* [1987] produced by Sarah Radclyffe. She let Mawuru do the 'final shot'³⁹ of that film. The feature film *Neria* is one hour 35 minutes long.

Plot and exegesis

The story is about a young couple in a fast changing urban environment, Harare. They have two children and generally have made it in the city or at worst, they get by. They have a house and friends and the husband is employed there. The rest of their relations are in the communal area of Domboshava, outside the city environment. The tranquillity and apparent success of this family is threatened when the husband, Patrick, dies in an accident with a car while cycling home from work.

What follows his death is the emergence of battle lines between the traditional values and culture and the modern values of the urban structure. The heroine, Neria, succeeds in the legal suit against Katsande, her husband's brother, who had hoped to inherit wife, house, property and children. She marks out the boundaries of modernity in an age-old set of

³⁹ F. Ukadike, Black Africa cinema, 1994, p.125

values: gender in patriarchy, law and development, individuals and culture, and so on.

Throughout the film, Zimbabwean music is played at opportune moment.

The Canadian International Development Aid [CIDA], and the Swedish International Development Aid [SIDA] funded the film with some local contribution to the wardrobe and props.

The survey

The research sought to establish the issues that the young viewers believed were placed on the agenda by the symptomatic nature of the film. The survey on the reaction to the film was based on a structured sample. Forty young adults in Lower Sixth were selected to take part. The one half of the group was in an urban school while the other half was in a rural school. In each case the class was the only Lower Sixth in the school.

After the purpose of the research was explained and consent to participate protocols were dispensed with, the video was screened for the volunteer participants. Thereafter, they were given the Film Questionnaire. The Film Questionnaire listed twenty [20] items. It is attached as *Appendix Two* together with a proforma *Consent Form*.

Summary results

Score→ ↓ Item	A	B	C	D	E	High score	% G	Highest score item
1			1	7	32	E32	80	Film has message
20	2			14	24	E24	60	<i>Court-trial woman in search of justice [gender]</i>
5	23	7	1	2	1	A23	58	<i>No:Katsande is wrong on inheritance</i>
13		2	2	13	22	E22	55	<i>Preference for watching similar film</i>
16	1		1	22	15	D22	55	<i>Music is good [largely indigenous music]</i>
8			1	16	21	E21	53	<i>End: justice triumphs [legal instrument]</i>
12	3	21	3	9	5	B21	53	<i>No: treatment of women not good</i>
9	1	1	7	20	10	D20	50	<i>Yes: snake has spiritual value</i>
7		1	3	19	17	D19	48	<i>Yes: the modern and traditional are different</i>
19			1	19	16	D19	48	<i>Yes: magistrate's court shows justice done</i>
15	18	15	2 [+]	2 [+]+	[+]	A18	45	<i>No: fiction not fiction [fiction has purpose?]</i>
17	9	18	6	7	1	B18	45	<i>No: treatment of children is not good</i>
10	2	5	2	17	12	D17	43	<i>Yes: choice on film watching in domestic space</i>
11	3	17	7	8	5	B17	43	<i>Disagree: no romanticism of the rural</i>
14	3	4	6	8	17	E17	43	<i>Yes: kurova guva as tradition should continue</i>
18	1	5	9	17	9	D17	43	<i>Adults: don't value opinions of children</i>
2	2	9		15	13	D15	38	<i>Home as urban house</i>
3	1	10	7 [+]	6 [+]	10	B/E15	38	<i>Home as communal family</i>
4	13	12	6	4	1	A13	33	<i>No: to suggestion of exclusive space to couple</i>
6	1	1		13	25	D13	33	<i>No:Katsande was wrong over inheritance</i>

Table 3.3: Highest frequency scores with item identification

Description of score processing

Scores from the questionnaire returns were entered in blocks of ten initially. The entries were arranged in tabular form [see *Table 3.3* above].

Mnemonic coding for each core item was reflected in the extreme right hand column of the table. Care was taken to maintain a faithful rendition of the orientation of the item as originally cast in the Film Questionnaire. The majority total for each case was expressed as a percentage of the possible total of forty. Column **G** provides the percentile results.

There were some invalid entries in Items 3 and 15: two respondents made more than one entry for each of the items [shown by + symbols]. But the effect on the overall result was insignificant. The entry errors did not occur in any of the borderline cases where a plus 1 or 2 could have made a significant difference to the result. The case of parity in Item 3, for example, could have been affected.

Profile of results: First batch in the 50 to 80%

The respondents reflected a clear indication in the 50-80% agreement range on the following matters about the film:

- a. The film carried a 'message'
- b. They agreed on classifying the music as 'good'
- c. Both process and achievement of justice by the heroine is categorised as worthwhile
- d. They agreed too, that the snake in the film represents an ill-omen
- e. Given an opportunity, they would watch a similar film
- f. Katsande is considered in the wrong over his pursuit of inheritance

The second set 33 to 49%

While the choices when computed still showed majorities, they were in this category, much more dispersed through the other item scores.

- a. At the head of this second set, is the agreement that [at 48%] the modern and the traditional are different.

- b. The respondents indicated that the snake constituted an ill-omen. In this set, they support the suggestion that the traditional ceremony of bidding farewell to the dead [*kurova guva*] should be continued.
- c. Respondents think children are not treated well in the film.
- d. They reject the notion that the film romanticises rural life
- e. Forty three percent have a say in what films they watch at home
- f. The respondents are equally split between those who say Patrick's home is the urban 'house' and those who think it is located in his rural communal 'family'.

Discussion of results

A couple of caveats are important here. The first caveat is to recall that the structured sample was small, forty respondents, and generalisations could only be drawn very tentatively. The second caveat was that since the specific film had not in fact been subjected to this kind of audience feedback analysis, it was necessary to proceed cautiously. Available literature on film as part of the communications media will be brought to bear in the discussion that follows in Chapter Four. It is necessary though to identify *Neria*'s rating at the box-office, one year after its release:

... 1992 saw the start of a greater effort to show African films. The biggest box-office draw was the local production *Neria*, which beat *Terminator II* into second place.⁴⁰

It was clear from the returns of questionnaire that respondents believed in the didactic purpose of film as a medium. They rejected the notion of film as mere fiction. This has consequences for the ideas they derive from the medium of film. This too may indicate

⁴⁰ Russell Honeyman [Ed.], Africa film & tv 1998, p.144

the need to escalate the production of feature films in this genre and communications generally.

Second, the respondents draw a distinction between what is modern and what is traditional. With this in mind, respondents preferred continuation of *kurova guva*,⁴¹ - a traditional-cultural practice. They associate the appearance of the snake not with fortuitous nature, but with a meaning derived from the cultural and social milieu in which the story is embedded.

The third inference was the acknowledgement of usefulness of the judicial-legal system in the empowerment of women. They recognise the woman's legal challenge and see her victory as an achievement message for others. In this sense, both rural and urban women respondents concur as well.

The fourth aspect that could be inferred from the data was the apparent contradictory position of the respondents with respect to what their own status was in the domestic space of their parents. These were dependent young adults still in school. They do claim to have some choice in films that they viewed at home. But their view of children in the film was that the children were treated unfairly. Since film is taken seriously by this sample, ['film is not fiction'] there might be reason to suggest that the respondents have made greater social advances in their own life experience than children of the immediate post-independence decade.

⁴¹ This ceremony, in Zimbabwean culture and custom, is held a year after an adult person dies. The purpose is the distribution and dispersal of the deceased's property and assignment of titular and executive

Finally, the other result that draws our attention is the split between home-is-town-house and home-is-in-communal-family – a split implied by location of the sample as well: fifty percent rural and the other fifty percent urban. But one can also view this choice as a pseudo-dichotomy. These processes would appear to occur on a continuum along the tradition-modernity axis. Respondents uphold both the modern notion of upward mobility of women assisted by the laws of the land, but still think that a snake is some errand messenger.

The simultaneous or serial occupation of both spaces would not be an unusual circumstance in the emerging urban environs. In this sense, it is conceivable that they should prize both ‘communal’ family space as home and the urban ‘house’ as home as well. Neither space excludes the other. The tallies show the split occurred even across the urban and rural divide. This has significance for the struggle for equity and identity politics within the two spaces: urban and communal spaces. Who owns what space and who is willing to fight to defend it? Whose space and rights does one defend? [As workers, students, market women, peasants, the elderly et cetera]. The matter of the politics of place brings us to the last evidence of the present chapter: the video documentary on media history in Zimbabwe.

Description of video documentary: *Dancing out of tune* [1999]

A private company, Edwina Spicer Productions, produced a video documentary on the media in Zimbabwe in 1999. The video instalment summarises some of the conflicting politics of place within the media in Zimbabwe. Spicer’s interest is in the publicly owned

responsibility for remaining family members.

media: the Zimpapers and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, particularly television. The particular incident that used to spark the debate on the media involves two journalists who were picked up by the army after they wrote a story on what they claimed was a failed coup by Zimbabwean troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The alleged treatment of the journalists at the hands of the army is claimed to be unusual, and the voiceover says 'at a time when the free flow of information has become the norm.' This instance of the voiceover reduces to an indirect reference the debates of the New World Information Communication Order [NWICO] of the 1970s that culminated in the McBride Report of 1978. In those debates between the First and Third Worlds, one of the key planks by Third World experts was the acknowledgement of absence of neutrality of any media. The Third World therefore sought to insert its perspective and sensibility in the global media flows. So for Spicer to sing the song of 'free flow of information' is to take the debate three decades back – to the imperial assumptions of the North.

The video is framed by a collection of former editors, retired journalists, human rights activists, former State employees and others who all appear to be grieved by the State in some way. She then uses cold news files for the State voice and intervention by the then director of information, Chakaodza [1993-98]. The video highlights the difficulties that journalists meet in trying to 'balance' their stories. State bureaucrats appear non-responsive to journalistic enquiries. This is a charge that has resonance elsewhere in the oral interviews. There is admission in the interviews that the State has left others to do the telling of activities of 'our story.' This certainly puts the State on the defence. Yet closely related to this charge is the silence exercised by the very same private media on

central issues in media such as ethics and codes of behaviour by professionals in the sector.

There is also the period in Zimbabwe's history when the dismemberment of the young State looked real, the 1982-3 'dissident' period. There was generalised conflict in Matabeleland that translated into economic sabotage, destruction of communication links and generally an assertion of difference by force of arms. However, this period began and came to an inconclusive end without anyone assuming leadership of the armed difference. The role of the army comes in for questioning. How was the army controlling the 'insurgency' and could the media participate in the field of operations? These questions are raised from a naïve standpoint. The political convulsions in the country's western provinces impacted on the national psyche. The late Nkomo, co-leader of the liberation struggle in the Patriotic Front, captured the significance in a news clip file:

[Mugabe] ...is very sly...trying to smear me. Turns round and calls me a traitor, me? A man who worked for this country so much? [1983]

A few screens later, there is footage on the Unity Agreement of December 1987. This is mentioned in passing but in fact the angry Nkomo picture and the embrace between Mugabe and Nkomo some four years later requires explanation if the 'history' of the media is a useful tool to understanding. Instead there is silence. The two largest political parties came into a Unity Agreement and founded a new party called 'ZANU PF.' The same mnemonic as the main fighting party of the liberation war led by Mugabe. But this Unity Agreement paved the way for the grant of amnesty to 'dissident' forces in Matabeleland.

It does appear that other interventions on the Matabeleland saga in the video documentary seem to imply that the army is some kind of soccer team that ought to draw crowds as it plays. The army is, of course, not this sort of club. It is a repressive organ of the State. The standing armies in the USA, UK and Third World countries are of this mould: they monopolise violence. The management of the media by the USA army in the Gulf War [1991] could be construed as either efficient: the dazzle and the glare, complete with guided tours and maps of 'clean' targets, or a disastrous manipulation of the media with no single voice from Iraqi victims. One editor in the city newspaper [1983-89], the *Chronicle*, Nyarota commented on the Matabeleland situation:

We were sitting in the middle of news but you could not step out of your office ...because of the state of emergency.

The fact that the 'emergency powers' were promulgated in the colonial state formation was immaterial: the new players in State power politics inherited these same instruments as well. The voiceover comes through to claim that '... the progress that had been made towards an unfettered press was being frustrated by the leadership'. 'Leadership' here means the political and executive side of the State. First of all, as Mararike states elsewhere, there is no such thing as an 'unfettered press.' The media may be free from State ownership, but someone surely owns such media: private capital, philanthropic society [if that can be found anywhere] or some consortium of the journalists themselves.⁴² Each ownership pattern provides opportunities and limitations. It does appear that the different forms of media could at least come together and engage in the

⁴² C. Mararike in R. Zhuwarara, K. Gecau and M. Drag [Eds.], *Media, democratisation and identity*, 1997. Chapter Four, pp.51-60 'There is always a very close relationship between the media and the ruling class. The talk which we sometimes hear of an independent media should make us wonder,' p.60

sharing of experience and arrive at some tentative codes of behaviour. Bill Saidi, featured prominently in several spots in the video, is puzzled why the media should focus on ‘toilets in Magunje – is that national at all?’ He wants attention focused on the International Monetary Fund and the demands of that Fund on the country: that is, according to him, ‘national news’. The IMF demands relate to removal of subsidies for staple foodstuffs, transport and allowing the economy to run on marketplace capitalist logic with no State intervention. This raises a fundamental question: who sets the national agenda in the media and in whose interests?

The video under discussion, *Dancing out of tune* [1999] is the product of a three-person media house in Harare. The funding for the entire video project came from Soros Foundation [USA], Open Society [USA], Danish government, and the European Union. The video blurb states that the tape ‘examines the current limitations of and challenges to Zimbabwe’s media by placing them within the context of the country’s history.’ Societies that would not ordinarily interest themselves in the internal media configuration in Zimbabwe suggest themselves as willing funders to these kinds of video footage. Such funding cannot fail to carry traces of origin and the kind of desired outcomes in media disposition in Zimbabwe.

The recent developments in Zimbabwe seem to point to innovative directions. The responsible minister, Prof Moyo stated recently what the issues in a forthcoming Freedom of Information Bill are:

We have existing accreditation regulations whose implementation had been relaxed if not corrupted...people who only yesterday used to write

letters to the editors, are now masquerading as journalists to the detriment of the profession because they know nothing about the ethics of journalism.⁴³

This is a productive line to pursue and is ignored as a major issue of the media by Spicer's video intervention in the debate. The legislative intent, on the other hand, is designed to deal with structures, ownership patterns and prevention of monopolies. Chikwari, a former director at Media Institute of Southern Africa [MISA] is the lone voice on Spicer's video who draws attention to the fact that there is only criticism from those in media but nobody in the same media is offering 'alternatives'. Perhaps the Freedom of Information Bill will open some spaces in the continuing dialogue – the *pungwe* in the Zimbabwean media has only begun.⁴⁴

The opening sequences bring the 'current limitations' to the fore in the form of two journalists, Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka of the *Standard* newspaper, narrating their experience at the hands of the Zimbabwean military police. Chavhunduka was editor and Choto was the journalist at the *Standard* at the time. The newspaper started publishing in the last few years as a private business venture. A Mr Wilson owns the newspaper. January 1999 is given as a key date when, according to the footage, the Zimbabwe private media took confrontation with government 'to a head'. The newspaper published a story on January 10 1999 alleging that the military, the Zimbabwe National Army [ZNA] had foiled a military coup against the Zimbabwe government. The coup, they went on, had been uncovered in December 1998.

⁴³ *The Herald* online edition, 9th March 2001.

⁴⁴ Pungwe – Shona term for an all-night meeting during the liberation war years, 1966-79.

A couple of days later, the reporter and editor were picked up and remained under military control for some days. The tale of the footage is then split into various voices: experts in their field, like the mature Hove, writer and journalist, and others whose opinions are sought while some industrial strike of civil servants [1996] is shown in the background. In some cases, it is not clear if the views being heard bear any relationship to the supposed on-going action in the background.

Elsewhere, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe issued a statement on 25 January 1999. This was obviously not coincidental. They also made public a report on torture they had written twelve years previously. The media monitoring project in Zimbabwe was born about the same time as well: it is as yet a faceless organisation. It is necessary to make comment on these two other developments because they appear to have been stage-managed to draw attention to the media by the fact of the arrest of the journalists.

Funders [especially of the non-governmental organisation type] tend to work on a sense of crisis: both Catholic and media monitoring projects depend on donors, and so did the private company, Edwina Spicer P/L, for its production of the video under description. Different agendas coalesce here for the purpose of using the media as the panopticon of Zimbabwean polity. The dialogue that ensues from such interaction is not for Zimbabweans by Zimbabweans – there is an externality to the tone of debate and search for the engagement of external interests.

Few months later, some neo-conservative American legislators, Mr Frist, Mr Helms and Mr Feingold proposed the 'Zimbabwe democracy Act, 2000' in the American Senate. Among some of the provisions, there is the undertaking to settle 'legal and related expenses' of what is described as 'democratic opposition' litigations in the law courts in Zimbabwe. Indeed if someone else is footing the bill [USA], then everyone has a case: there is no preclusion on the basis of frivolity. One British academic at Essex University, Professor Stuart Weir could have done very well as consultant on Zimbabwe for Spicer's video documentary:

The real battle in Zimbabwe is not against white farmers. Mugabe's target is a black middle class committed to modernity and rock music.⁴⁵

This is an astounding claim. It has respectability too: it is actually published in the London *New Statesman*, April 10 2000. If the oppositional debate in Zimbabwe is about those 'committed to modernity and rock music' against those wanting something else, then the USA is more than justified to invalidate the sovereignty of an independent State with American dollars and power over the airwaves. At least it may be possible then to predict part of the content: 'rock music.' The present charge is clearly shared by Spicer: she does not define anywhere on tape as to what this 'broad spectrum of civil society' is. By implication, she makes invitation to external players to come and resolve what principally is a matter for resolution by those who identify and defend their spaces within the sovereign entity.

Further, to follow Spicer's argument, she wants the media to 'dance' the democratic 'free flow' tune. The United States of America will now make Zimbabwe a target for

‘increased use of radio broadcasting’ to Zimbabwe so that radio broadcasting ‘serves as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective and comprehensive news.’⁴⁶

Basic questions open the jingoism to what is involved here: ‘Consistently’ [with what?], –‘authoritative source’ [from whose perspective?] and, ‘accuracy’ [in whose circumstances?] and finally, who are the audiences? They are certainly not the rural zone citizens of Zimbabwe who form the eighty-percent of the population. The American State finally wants to talk to their counterparts who perform at their bidding as –government-in-waiting in the urban social formations. But to do so, they are willing to violate the integrity of a Third World and developing sovereign State.

But to return to the video documentary, key in the opening salvos is a Mr David Chimhini, then of the Zimbabwe Human Rights [ZIMRIGHTS] organisation, laying claim to ‘have a right to correct information’. This claim to a new right, ‘a right to correct information’ ought to be placed in the light of the third generation UNESCO New World Information Communication Order [NWICO] debates of the late 1978s. There is woolly thinking that somehow a claim to ‘correct’ information as a ‘right’ will of itself translate into better things. There is no substitute for interrogating any and all evidence. The star witnesses in the video remain the pair that opens the sequence: Choto and Chavhunduka and the authorial male voice-over with the impressive and neatly written placards: ‘We are alarmed,’ ‘Resign yesterday,’ and others. This certainly confirms the constellation of

⁴⁵ S. Weir in *New Statesman*, April 10 2000. ‘The long war against democracy,’ pp.2-3.

⁴⁶ 106th Congress/second session document, Section IV, subitem 3 [b], *Zimbabwe democracy Act 2000*,

social class formations involved and termed by the voiceover, ‘a broad section of civil society, which was alarmed ...’ They all spoke impeccable English too. A further indicator of differentiation that is characteristic of the ‘broad civil society’ in whose name these matters are debated.

Discussion of this tape has drawn attention to important silences embedded in its argument that the communication media are distorted by the State. The entire 63 minutes fails to get comment from academics that deal with this theme in the training of journalists. The video has been placed in the contemporary times of its production so that the interconnections with other forces can be thrown into relief. In its sweeping generalisations on the ‘broad sweep’ of civil society, it locates its own social space within this urban-based sensibility. The last aspect constitutes the interrogation of the work [video footage] and its placement within the larger socio-economic and class context. The apparent assumption that media can play the panopticism card is belied by the fact that they too, are businesses – whether in private hands or as consortia of journalists.

Conclusion

The present chapter has presented evidence that is at the centre of the study: communications media and national development in the evolution of a modern Zimbabwe. The sectors of education and extension services have played a central function in the generalisation of communications. The execution of State policy in creating social spaces to facilitate social mobility has been outlined.

The policy executives and vision shapers in Zimbabwe present a variegated views on communications in the national development and communications debate. Their views form a critical segment of the available evidence of the state of play in communications media. Then the filmic evidence of *Neria* was presented along with a video instalment on the history of the media and state performance in Zimbabwe. The presentation and discussion of the video documentary has traced the profile of the questioning of legitimacy of State action in the media, in politics, in public morality and invocation of the State of Emergency in dealing with the secessionist tendencies in Matabeleland. Criticism has also been made against the use of a cast that has something against the State as the accused without affording a single live response from the then current State players in the media sector.

The present chapter has provided substantive evidence suggesting pointers to an informed discussion of communication media and national development debate in Zimbabwe. The next chapter, **Chapter Four**, carries this burden.

CHAPTER FOUR

Performance: Towards a critical pragmatics of social space

Introduction

Zimbabwe has made difficult choices and continues to adapt its choices in tandem with or under pressure from both specialised agencies within and outside its borders. This has impacted on national development. The national effort by government has also created debate among both public and private sector participants in the communication field. The present chapter discusses these efforts as sequel to the evidence presented in **Chapter Two** and **Chapter Three**.

The preliminary segment of this chapter deals with the logics of place and shifting spaces as a partial explanatory model for the tolerance of production of urban social formations. An attempt is made in this section to situate the notion of change within the cosmology of the indigenous world in Zimbabwe. Pragmatics of social space that are implicated here point forward to tolerance levels and backwards to communication that has been lost, especially the negotiation of borders within consensual community. Next, the chapter discusses the fundamental paradigm challenges of communications media and national development using the contrasting profiles of closed [dark] and open [white] space. The last section synthesises arguments on the place of film as a development tool within the overarching thematic of the direction of modernity. Pointers to new and tentative directions are proposed in this section.

Social pragmatics

There are twin issues in the interconnection between practice of national development and the theoretical foundations. Then there are practical contingencies and insights that inform practice and in turn return the loop back to theory. It was pointed out in **Chapter One** [p.32] that Mugabe postponed debate on the exact status of Marxist theory and its possible application in independent Zimbabwe. At one stage in 1978, ZANU PF led by Mugabe explained its source of inspiration as deriving from Marxist-Leninist-Mao tse Tung-Kim-il Sung Thought. This is not the place to debate the issues involved in welding together the tendencies in the different strands of ideas implicated by this conflation of theory and tendencies. Suffice to suggest that the rigours of war produce their own dynamic: there may be contingencies in the formulations that were necessities in wartime. In **Chapter Three**, emphasis has been made on the continuity of the settler State machinery beyond 1980: that effectively foreclosed any serious national debate on ideological alternatives.

The immediate focus is on a much smaller scope: at the level of the community and the individuated participation in community action. Although Manungo has studied peasant contribution to the liberation war with respect to Chiweshe District, there is a vast amount of sources of resistance of Zimbabwean peasantry that remain unknown.¹

There are questions that relate to the notion of change, in particular, change in minute movements, conceptions of the good and social evil, and the interlocked psyche between

¹ K. Manungo, 'The role peasants played in Zimbabwe war of liberation, with special emphasis on Chiweshe District', Ohio Univ. PhD Thesis.

the living and dead. The interlocked psyche retains permanent visibility through ritual and custom. In this context, participation by spiritual mediums in the First and Second Chimurenga War [war of liberation] was part of the mobilisation of spiritual and cultural resources by the liberation movement. In the First Chimurenga, the initiative lay with the spirit mediums, Sekuru Kaguvi and Mbuya Nehanda.

What is called for is a re-appraisal of the terrain again: to establish the sources of psychological strength, social impetus and inertia, cultural and spiritual foundations that provided succour in almost a century of resistance to colonialism. The place and significance of communications in these processes cannot be in doubt - as oramedia, person-to-person communication, and in the spiritual dimension negotiating borders between the living and the dead, urban and rural or as Lash and Urry put it, 'outside and inside the loop.'²

But there are other contingencies: such as social mobility and political expediency that are implicated in fostering dialogue or its management. The Zimbabwean response, especially in the rural areas, on acceding to independent nationhood status has yet to be fully documented. Alexander's study dealing with processes of political change in rural Chimanimani district focused on an apparent growing polarity between central government and expectations of villagers. What she discovers, while not conclusive, is seminal:

The government turned from mobilising people to managing them through bureaucratic control and local alliances.³

² S. Lash and J. Urry, *Economies of signs and space*, 1994, p.58

³ J. Alexander in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger [Eds.], *Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war*, 1996, p.184.

This is akin to the way the Canadian government relates to what it calls 'First Nations' – indigenous populations in Canada. From within the so-called First Nation perspective, there is a conception of *healing* [social, psychological, behavioural all included] as process. The dominant discourse has appropriated the imagery of wellness that is clearly in contradistinction from the First Nation perception of healing as a process. The burden of the Canadian meta-narrative is thus directed towards handling the *scientificism* of the underdevelopment in the midst of a First World economy: the establishment of holding centres, halfway houses, de-toxication centres, rehabilitation places, and employment of science and technology to deal with the First Nation as problem. The media too generally paint the indigenous peoples as some kind of lost cause. Madame Clarkson, the Governor General summarised what she saw among indigenous people when she paid a visit to a local community:

This is not an isolated problem. This is not just the Labrador Peninsula. This is a problem for a lot of our aboriginal peoples, coming from isolation, coming from poverty we normally associate with the Third World.⁴

Zimbabwe is of course a Third World country. The cause of national development and nation building in Zimbabwe, expressed as a free enterprise venture, will largely re-create conditions of extreme differences and of poverty and wealth. The meta-narrative of equity in the early years of independence in social service sectors avoided the thorny issue of land. In the last chapter, [p.88], constitutionalism placed 'non-value' attribution to millions of peasant dreams for land. This locked peasants in social and economic spaces that required the same resources that facilitated survival in the war of liberation.

⁴ 'Processes of post-war political change in Zimbabwe's rural areas,' pp.175-191

⁴ Mike Blanchfield article in *The Ottawa Citizen*, January 20 2001. p.A2

But if eighty percent of the population is rural and largely peasant, one cannot with scalpel set out to redefine their condition in terms of appellations of the colonial discourse: laziness, diseased, alcoholics, ignorant farmers, et cetera.

Not only was the basis of that source of resistance essential during the war, it was even more crucial at the conclusion of the war in 1980: peasants were not privy to treatment for trauma and other disorders associated with the scars of war. They were not even aware of entitlement to lodge claims for their resources destroyed during the war: cattle, huts, chickens, and goats at the hands of the martial law soldiers. The urban-based social formations were aware of these legal provisions of an inherited State. They were close and in the print media environment. Indeed some went ahead and claimed from government various sorts of compensation under the War Victims and Compensation Act of the 1970s.

So while equity has been avowed, a construction of inequity has also survived along with its denial. In the last chapter, **Chapter Three** [p.92], one of the policy executives puts his finger on the pulse on the national information divide in the most graphic way:

We have newspapers like the *Herald*, *Sunday Mail* and then we've the *Kwayedza* and others. These others carry stories about witches, healers, and so on...It's not very informative...we're catering for two different classes.

But how is it possible that society that emerged from war only twenty years ago can outperform itself in this fashion? The basic tenets though of the theoretical approach suggested here can only be described briefly. Shona culture and language are replete with sayings, proverbs and word games that have over the centuries been a constant source of

education of the young and old alike through cajole, satire, and drama et cetera. Sayings could also be specific to linguistic groups within Zimbabwe. Under the generic term Shona, there are five language communities that are mutually comprehensible with each other: the Korekore, Karanga, Ndau, Zezuru and Manyika.

The following exemplar is illustrative of the critical pragmatics of social space. The Shona [Korekore language community is used here] use the expression: *Nyedza ndinyedzewo* or *sheta ndishetewo*. The broad semantic interpretation can be paraphrased as follows: *just shift a little so that I can shift into where you are as well*. The assumption of the structural meaning is that there is movement but it is based entirely not on an overhaul but the preservation of a stable structure. The inner motivation for change is thus embedded in the internal perception of direction of change. But the individual located in the process takes his cues from the social circle – initiating movement on consensual indicators and assumptions. Individualist missionarism – the kind of dog-eat-dog capitalism, is more a reflection of a thing fallen from communal bond: how can he come here and tell us he knows everything? The classical religious missionary in Central Africa could not figure out why his Sunday faithfuls who took *holy* communion on Sundays also participate in religious observances in the African sites of worship in the home or community.

A further parallel could be drawn with radio too. While it is praised in the interview data as a mode of communication with universal significance – it can also alienate by its insistence on the monological and unidirectional flows, with no resonance in the

consensual frame. Incorporating phone-in programmes does not necessarily open this space for participation: telecommunications are a resource in the hands of a few as data has demonstrated in the present study [**Chapter Three**, Table 3.2, p.87]. The urban areas are estimated to carry slightly more than forty four percent of the fixed lines and almost hundred percent of the mobile network lines. The two-channel television station, one State the other private, does not yet reach the entire country. The term ‘yet’ is used advisedly: it has been twenty years since independence. One of the respondents, [**Chapter Three**, p.92-3] in the interview clarifies this matter:

What we have lost is probably this idea of the leaders moving to explain, communicating with people by staying with them, talking to them, and explaining government policy. We’ve kind of built a gap between the leadership and the people.

This pattern is consistent with the structuring process under the logics of capitalist impulse. It could be asserted that Harare is highly connected, but the city carries a mere 1.2 million people in a national estimate of some 12 million citizens. In Zambia, Ferguson’s study on the Copperbelt confirms the way in which technologies might actually contribute to severe underdevelopment and insensitivity:

... cellular technology allows businesses and elites to ignore their limited and often malfunctioning national telephone systems and do their business via state-of-the-art satellite connectivity, bypassing altogether the idea of a universal copper grid providing service to all.⁵

This has special implications for government and other ‘experts’ whose task has to do with interaction with communities in the country. Even the communication difficulties of community newspapers like *Kwayedza* fall into this category: how do editors re-connect

⁵ James Ferguson, Expectations of modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1999, p.244

with oramedia and become interactive again? The contingency of war kept both guerrilla and elite leadership in communion with the masses. If change is organic, that re-connection is the minimal undertaking. In several of the interventions in the interview data, there is recognition of something lost between independence in 1980 and two decades down the road. Yet two decades in the life of a nation is infinitesimal, but not insignificant.

The challenge: Two decades of independence

The insertion of information and communication technologies [ICTs] and general improvement in communication media in the country placed national development in the limelight from the inception of the independent governance in 1980. The pattern, however, has been demonstrably skewed in favour of urban-based social class formations. The interview data show three features of the insertion and development of information and communication technologies in the country. The development of a transport network in the country through the colonial phase was clearly the desire to connect and link mining establishments with the railway and road networks. Telegraph development was an adjunct of the railway network: originally both had their principal co-ordination centres in South Africa.

When gold mining yielded poor returns, the settlers had moved on to farming. They grabbed and carved out land for themselves while systematically removing indigenous people from the cool and fertile lands of Regions I and II as illustrated in Map 2 [*Appendix Three*]. The colonial settler administration maintained the principal road

networks while farmers were supported to create by-roads into farm settlements. Beyond this, the settler administration had no further interest. The consequent colonial discourse that developed perceived spaces differently: 'open' and flexible space was identified with settlers while 'closed' space was dark space occupied by the other. The origin of this rationality can be located in the Enlightenment project.

Appadurai posits the founding thesis in the dual heritage of Western civilisation, the Enlightenment project that promised 'the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular.'⁶ There is a tension in the insistence on the 'universal' or as Harvey puts it, the 'sense of eternity in the midst of flux.' Specific places become sites for local expression, colour and salience while the overarching motion encapsulates the Enlightenment affirmation of the knowable and the *scientificism* of exponential progress. The settler State was infinitely embedded within this heritage. Its space constitutes open space in colonial discourse. But under the cloak of flexible and open space, there are overlays of irrationality based on race, religion, creed et cetera through which the open space defines the closed space.

Chennels has traced the contending thematics of settler fictional writing from the turn of the last century right through to the eve of independence in 1980. He characterises the discourse as operating on a paradigm of *open* and *closed* space. The open space represents the locus of settlers and civilizational values. The closed space represents everything that negates the open space: it is primitive space and is capable of atavistic

⁶ Appadurai, A 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy' in Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalisations, Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1996, p.43

bestiality. In *The Sunbird*, in particular, Chennels finds the colonial template for the future development of Africa defined in essentialist terms:

... history repeats itself, and the only constant feature is Africa's savagery. Whites establish their states which are characterised by technological skill, a love of beauty and the delights of leisured living, only to have them destroyed by savages unable to appreciate what they have created. If Blacks rise against South Africa and Rhodesia, then like their predecessors, they can have no other motive than to destroy.⁷

This lexicon, of the struggle between open and closed space, remains current in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Muriel Truter, self described as 'Zimbabwean-born', writing in the *Globe and Mail*, 22 April 2000, from her Toronto home:

I left Zimbabwe shortly after the country's independence to move to London, eventually to Toronto for personal reasons. My parents owned a tobacco farm in Macheke... At sunset, we barricaded ourselves into our farm compounds and listened to the crackle of the radio, which was our only connection with our neighbours.

But Truter reviews Africa now from an outsider perspective. She refers also to 'my former homeland'. There is no questioning of the war itself: was it at all necessary for the indigenous citizens to go to war while she and her parents were forced into retreat behind barricades? There is an implication here that the outsider holds the key to unbiased, free and clear objectivity in analysing the other's space. Truter finds her childhood images are of landmines, ambushes, friends killed, school-in-convoy and returns to the present: 'it would seem that basically nothing has changed'. The past is the present. Accompanying this article in the *Globe and Mail* is a resplendent picture of Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe with the caption - 'inciting racial conflict in a desperate attempt to

⁷ A. Chennels [1996]. In N. Bhebe & T. Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war*, p.116. *Rhodesian discourse, Rhodesian novels and the Zimbabwe liberation war*, pp.102-129

cling to power'. There is no indication as to who authored the caption but the picture, with a clenched fist symbol and youthful crowd, is sourced from Reuters.

In the London-based publication, the *Africa Review in Business and Technology* of June 1996, there is an article by Trevor Grundy, 'Talking tourism,' which opens with an authoritative statement on the subject of tourism from none other than the chairman of the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority, Dr Isidore Gwashure. He is upbeat and optimistic about tourism and believes Zimbabwe has established itself as the hub of conference activities in Southern Africa. Then there is a Mr David Chapman, chairman of the Zimbabwe Tourism Council. He too speaks about tourism's potential, particularly the creation of new jobs. But framing the article is a picture of a white man, Mr Roy Meiring, chief executive of Meikles Hotel. One is tempted to ask the question: why is he in the picture at all?

Mr Meiring is not the chair of either of the authorities in the story. The reasons may well be that the good doctor, Gwashure, did not have a picture or the reporter had no photographer – it could be any of these things or more. But it is an interesting detail that Mr Meiring should be cited in the last couple of paragraphs and his opening remarks are instructive:

Throughout its 81 year history, we have managed to retain our position ...

This tenure of open [white] space ['81 year history'] seems to be the key to the present. The past is also the present in this instance. But continuing with Truter, and the tension between closed and open spaces: one black needing salvation

from white space, probably 'white' Canada [- she writes: '..will someone out there speak in something louder than a whisper?']. Colonial Zimbabwe novelist Daniel Carney wrote a novel called *Whispering Death* [1969] where, Chennels observes, Carney celebrates white supremacy: 'the novel sets primitive emotions of love and revenge against the imposed structures of law and order'. The response is swift: open [white] space re-asserts its authority and deals blows to the degenerate closed [native] space through army and police action. Truter is asking for no less: thirty years after the fictional story. Truter sings praises to the internet: 'I hear word via the mighty Internet which, thankfully, Mr Mugabe cannot control... .' Here technology and religion are fused. This notion of technology as truth incarnate has been debated in **Chapter Two** [p.56]: confirming Conley's critique of this sort of pedestrianism in thinking about technology: 'that appears to equate technology with truth.' And Mr Meiring too assures his clients: 'When top businessmen arrive in Harare they want excellent facilities for communications. We have the 21st century at our fingertips'

Yet in a tiny inset in the same *Africa Review* issue, a couple of pages before this article, there is talk of the prospects of improved telecommunication in rural Zimbabwe via digital wireless technology. The key idea flows through the third paragraph where the sector is described as 'confronted with the stark reality of antiquated telephone exchanges and the lack of cabling infrastructure, particularly in rural areas ... the theft of telephone cables... has rendered Zimbabwe virtually without any form of electronic communication'.

Further evidence could be drawn from the latest edition of Graham's book, with text by Beverley-Whyte [2000], Beneath a Zimbabwe sun, which transforms Zimbabwe into a place of 'enchantment' where only a few minutes from its 'sophisticated cities' one sees the timeless, 'savage grandeur of Africa.' Later when a picture of Zimbabwean huts appears, she writes with spectacular ignorance that this is a product of *nhimbe* or *utshwala*. The concept of *nhimbe* is a co-operative effort in strategic tasks in a community. The system functions as an insurance against want. Those who work will obviously have food, meat and beverages that could include beer. *Utshwala*, on the other hand simply means beer. So to use these terms interchangeably is misleading.

Then when Beverley-Whyte describes an African face she is keen to take a close look at a piece such as this find in the enchanted place:

There are faces which are the landscape of Africa in themselves, hewn from rock, weathered by wind and rain.⁸

In this homogenised white space, those off the grid and in the closed space become part of the natural history museum. They are not only inferiorised, but they are as unchanging as the rock itself. There is an additional charge laid against those *off* the grid: they are also thieves of cable wire and thus enforcing the *off-gridness* of others. The National Railways of Zimbabwe echoes this sentiment in its 1999 *Annual Report*, with praise for its security agents who recovered the 'stolen copper cables.' It will be recalled that a war was started over this matter of cable wires – way back in 1893 [**Chapter One**, p.32-33]. Perhaps what is clear is

⁸ B. Whyte in Gordon Graham [Ed.], Beneath a Zimbabwe sun, 2000, p.21.

that the logics of place, space dominance, connected and disconnected polarities, and capital flows are not in the past but very much in the present – complete with the inequities of yesterday.⁹ Attention has been drawn to what Haraway has described as the icon of modernity – the cyborg phenomenon, [**Chapter Two**, p.53]. Villagers who confronted imperial power, in 1893, by cutting five hundred yards of cable wire and appropriated and transformed it into value added symbols in circulation in the communication flows in their community [bangles, earrings, trinkets etc], were engaged in an action that has continuity into the present. Such action is typical of the excluded, as Haraway points out:

The world is subdivided by boundaries differentially permeable to information. Information is just that kind of quantifiable element [unit, basis of unity] which allows universal translation, and so unhindered instrumental power...The biggest threat to that power is interruption of communication.¹⁰

The naked reality of the digital divide could not be more palpable. The *off-gridness* in that colonial encounter were coloured by race, class, gender, poverty and history. In today's efforts at modernisation in Zimbabwe, the critical negotiating tools and attributes in the marketplace of ideas, communications and financial flows are still coloured by vestiges of colony, structural impediments of a settler State apparatus attempting to absorb those formerly from closed space and poverty levels. Those *on* the digital grid have a discourse as Chennels has outlined but so too do those who are *off* the grid. Taylor has stressed this possibility in relation to the notion that everyone has some idea of what is 'good':

⁹ *National Railways Zimbabwe Annual Report*, 1999, p.21

¹⁰ D. Haraway, *Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature*, 1991, p.164

But what is involved in seeing the evaluative point of a given term? ...one needs an understanding of the kind of social interchange, the common purposes, or mutual needs, how things can go well or badly between people in society...one needs to grasp the qualitative discriminations that the people concerned make; one needs to get a sense ...of their perceptions of the good.¹¹

Taylor stresses inclusiveness both of ideas and players as definitional imperative before inaugurating *development* action. But his scheme is naïve in its belief of equality of 'social interchange' and 'common purposes.' The search for 'qualitative discriminations' however, is crucial in identifying those issues that divide, exclude or point in new directions. Spicer's video documentary [**Chapter Three**, pp.115-119] has been criticised for this reason: it has important exclusions and silences from the dialogue on the communication media in Zimbabwe. The State is represented by cold news file, the rural zone is silenced and those who feel they have a grievance against government appear to have the only valid viewpoint. One participant, Saidi argues that toilets at Magunje are not 'national news.' His submission is that the State should be a faithful IMF and World Bank client: a neo-liberalism with a distinct class bias. Also the prevalence and salience of class influence, attitude, and plain obscurantism colour a lot of the debate on the communication media in the Spicer video documentary as well as in the National Assembly of Zimbabwe:

Mr Biti: Can I ask the Hon Minister of State Information and Publicity, Professor Jonathan Moyo what the government policy is on liberalising the government airwaves in particular the liquidation of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation [ZBC] monopoly on airwaves in this country?
Minister Moyo: The government policy on liberalisation of the airwaves is that this is exactly what we did in 1980 and we are now consolidating it to ensure that this important aspect of communication remains in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe.

¹¹ Charles Taylor, Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity, 1989, HUP, p.54

Mr Biti: Section 27 of the Broadcasting Act imposes a monopoly on the ZBC and I am asking how the government is going to liberalise that or is the monopoly going to stay?

Minister Moyo: The important thing is to ensure that this aspect belongs to the people of Zimbabwe and that is exactly what is happening. We are going to continue with that.¹²

It is not impossible to foresee that if the Corporation were privatised, particular class interests, views, and attitudes would prevail in the privatised media entity just as others prevail in the State entity. There is in fact a Media Monitoring Project, born out of donor funds in January 1999, that projects its agenda as 'national'. It is keen to see the State divest from the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. As a project, they claim that:

The Constitution should create an independently-appointed independent Communications Authority, answerable to Parliament, to regulate broadcasting and telecommunications.¹³

This sort of arrangement would bypass the government of the day. The emphasis on 'independently-appointed independent' authority would appear to be a search for institutional transparency. That, it would appear, would raise media authority's panoptic credentials in society [**Chapter Three**, p.78]. The search for neutrality, however, is illusory. There is no way in which interests of people can be expressed and translated into concrete structures without participation by a government of the day. The Media Monitoring project suggests too that Canada should train personnel in broadcasting because of its long tradition in public broadcasting. They urge that a 'freedom of information act' should be enacted in Zimbabwe as a matter of 'priority.' This has been

¹² *Parliamentary Debates*, 13 September 2000. Vol. 27. 15. Column 1390-1391.

¹³ Media Monitoring Project, A question of balance, 2000, p.44

discussed as a process already underway in Zimbabwe as this study was being concluded [Chapter Three, p.120].

In addition, they take a censorial attitude. They argue that ‘paid political advertising in the media should be prohibited’ and yet they have called for a communications media Authority that has so much power: a miniature state-within-a-State. The expectation would be that that Authority would handle questions of whether there should be paid advertising or not as routine content of their work. Even their model, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunication Commission [CRTC] is in fact a government appointed commission. The commission obtains its funding from the federal government of Canada and is not an ‘independently-appointed independent’ entity. Its chief strength lies in enforcing voluntary codes of conduct by the media: the media fraternity in Zimbabwe has yet to agree to a voluntary self-policing forum. Further, the freedom of information commissioner does not report to Parliament in Canada: he reports to the Office of the Prime Minister.

But Zimbabwean legislators respond to their own constituency: they are not especially guided by arguments that suggest they copy another nation’s laws and impose those in Zimbabwe. It is akin to invoke the colonial past to the present. Mosco and Reddick, in urging rethinking of the political economy of communication argue that inclusivity should define the area of debate with ‘concepts as entry points in a social field’. They stress too that even the epistemology brought into play in the research has a dynamic relationship with different ‘entry points’:

... the epistemology is constitutive in that it recognises the limits of causal determination, including the assumption that units of social analysis interact as fully formed wholes and in a linear fashion. Rather, it approaches the social as a set of mutually constitutive processes, acting on one another – an ongoing dynamic interaction – in various stages of formation and with a direction and impact that can only be comprehended in specific research.¹⁴

In the communication media, transparency as absence of local colour or texture is not a worthwhile pursuit. The politics of place matter. It is their engagement as ‘entry points’ that should be ensured, not their exclusion. A wholesale invalidation of sovereignty by invitation, on the other hand, to satisfy the imperatives of a private agency or an anonymous group of individuals seems to be an exaggerated sense of self-importance by the Media Monitoring project [**Chapter Three**, p.121].

The media project monitors themselves are merely said to number six and the majority ‘hold a post-graduate qualification in media studies from the University of Zimbabwe’. In their acknowledgement, they are grateful to Article 19 based in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, Norway, and the Swedish International Development Agency, Sweden, for funding for the ‘project’. For a half dozen people making large claims on the Zimbabwean media scene, full disclosure of identity would have been a first step. The usual disclaimer to dissociate the ideas contained in the report from those of the funders is absent. If indeed the six monitors are genuine products of the University of Zimbabwe media school, there is a need to examine what the training is designed to achieve.

¹⁴ V. Mosco and A. Reddick [1997]. In M. Bailie and D. Winseck, Democratizing communication?: Comparative perspectives on information and power, p.18. ‘Political economy, communication, and

The present structures of media arrangement have been identified in the last chapter. The structure maintains the Corporation in State hands. An elected government appoints the Board that runs the Corporation. Any of the African business class elite would probably spend a lot more time either defending their source of wealth or venture capital for tapping into an oasis of a liberalised economy. But those with business traditions that run into *eighty-one years*, the hotel, for example or their association, could whistle their way to the bank. What would be the source of their mandate – transnational corporatism or by the fashionable nomenclature, global capital linked to local networks?

Spicer's video documentary makes a great deal of issue on the Mass Media Trust mandate. They were the successor structure set up by government at independence to assume the role of the colonial Argus printing company. The six million Zimbabwe dollars used to purchase the Argus shares [51 percent] was a grant donated by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Mass Media Trust then appoints a Zimpapers Board whose mandate is to run the *Herald* and the *Chronicle*. The two papers count a daily circulation of over one hundred and fifty thousand copies. There is the *Daily News*, a private paper run by Associated News of Zimbabwe, a consortium of private capital, including external capital. There was a by-election in January 2001. Both the *Herald* [State] and the *Daily News* [private, considered oppositional] created headlines on January 16th that read as follows:

MDC loses Bikita West

ZANU PF wins Bikita West seat

It is as if the two headlines were generated in the same newsroom: the first is in fact the *Daily News* headline. What distinguishes one from the other could be content – perhaps. But the articles in both papers begin with the celebratory tone: *Daily News* – ‘MDC seats in parliament reduced by one yesterday after Claudius Makova, the ZANU PF candidate ...won.... The *Herald* begins its leader in a similar vein – ‘ZANU PF candidate Col Claudius Makova yesterday won the Bikita West ...seat....’ Perhaps we know the extra detail that Makova is a colonel by reading the *Herald*. But that is all: where are the views of the voters? What are the challenges in the constituency? Both papers carry photos on the front page but none of the photos has anything to do with the election that is headlined. It is virtually the appearance of difference but basic structural unity. The desire for inclusivity of other socially embedded viewpoints creates a major challenge for policy and media practitioners alike. One interview respondent suggests that consumers buy two newspapers [the *Daily News* and the *Herald*] because they want ‘objectivity’. Well, it may be the appearance of difference that fascinates but substantively, the papers serve the same social class formation.

The preceding paragraphs draw attention to the need for journalist and media worker education renovation. Once provided with a thorough grounding in the content of specific disciplines, they could move into sandwich courses in media.

Disciplines could include natural sciences, social sciences, biology, communications, social geography, law and media law, medical sciences and others. This segment of the country's human resource cannot be left to donors and others to do the training for the local. The closed space identified by Chennels may remain *closed* in spite of his woefully optimistic confidence in the independence phase that that transition wiped out vestiges of the past. There are questions of gender inequity. There are divisions also between poor and rich, urban and rural and connected and disconnected.¹⁵

It was noted in the last chapter that education expanded after independence. Efforts at diversifying and re-focusing the system were infinitesimal: it was a demand for quantitatively more of the same. The point at which education reached some kind of crisis of focus was at the start of the 1990s, when the thousands of unemployed youths and their counterparts in the universities and colleges began clamouring for more loan money for their education and job opportunities in a shrinking liberalising economy. They took their clamour on to the streets as well. Both were unthinkable requests to the IMF and World Bank technical experts. In substance, it was the endgame of an inherited system that had no answers for the majority attempting to escape closed space for the open and flexible space.

To the rural population of Zimbabwe, about eighty percent of the national population, the spectre of continued disconnection has been their experience through colony and

¹⁵ A. Chennels [1996]. In N. Bhebhe & T. Ranger [Eds.], Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war, 1996,

independence years. The translation of the rural into financial units that could then circulate within the rest of the flows continues to present challenges. Haraway's vision of the repression of materiality by the interests of C³I is important here. The basic goal of the repression is to facilitate material sublimation into translatable values for 'coding,' [discussed in **Chapter Two**]. This suggests that for rural zones, their integration into national communications networks is to render them translatable, in terms of capital and information. The time span can only be of the structure of the *longue durée*.

The rural areas have been described in the preceding paragraph as being *off* the grid and additionally, associated with the theft of cable wire. At the same time rural areas cannot be ignored by the sheer quantitative preponderance: eighty percent of the population lives in these zones. The spectre of disconnection or its continuance has been their experience through colonial and independence years. The postal service into the communal areas grew as a tool of administration: linking police posts, Native Affairs Department offices and gradually as a tool accessible by indigenous people. The intensity of use grew as the urban populations of indigenous workers and migrants from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique grew, rising to 373 000 by 1950 estimates.¹⁶

Interconnection between urban and village through footpaths, telegraph money orders, telegram messages, letter and rare and irregular private bus system. Some of the earliest public bus service providers were Ruredzo, Bhiri, Kambasha, Mucheche and Matambanadzo. 'African' bus services of the fifties and sixties became social events in

p.129

¹⁶ HMSO, Report on Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Act, statutory instruments and command papers, 1953,

the communal areas. Further, since the levels of illiteracy were virtually universal, the ability to read a letter became a skill with pride of place in the scale of communal values. The Zimbabwe government programme to accelerate literacy among adult populations started with enthusiasm in 1981 largely to offset this colonial heritage.

One of the interview respondents [Vision Shaper] refers to an apparent equation between literacy and comprehending television programming:

VS.2: When you're literate, you can appreciate and understand
... programmes on television or radio....

In the categories of the new sociality, this would tend to associate literacy with entry and participation in indirect relationships fostered by the media of television and radio. This view, which places high regard on education, has historic precedents.

In October 1966, Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, travelled to Harare to negotiate with the settler administration over the constitution that the settlers were about to bring into force. The franchise had provisions that were prohibitive in their requirements; for example, it stipulated salary and educational qualifications that were clearly designed to keep indigenous people out of the polity. What little educational provision had been provided was largely due to missionary influence in pursuit of their sectarian ends as well: attempting to proselytize through mission stations. The settler administration set up one of the first African schools, Goromonzi secondary school, only in 1946. But Wilson offered to *educate the African* people to the standards that the settler community had set: and so allow Africans to enter the franchise through schooling processes. In other words, schooling bestowed a special status of the *modern* on those

who acquired this. Politically, of course, this meant an indeterminate and deceptive promise of ‘advancement’ of African people.

What is critical in the present scenario is that the principle of ‘standards’ that needed maintenance was acceded to then. The March 4 1980 reconciliation speech afforded the settler community an opportunity to maintain ‘standards’ it had been accustomed to [**Chapter Three**, The panopticon]. The independence government was faced with the option that to do otherwise, would have been construed as lowering ‘standards’. It opened more spaces for African pupils to go to school. There was even deliberate bussing of children, for a time, from the urban African townships into formerly white schools in the suburbs. As noted above, the multitudes that emerged from the school system found themselves on different sides with the system that had opened the spaces for since 1980.

Meanwhile, the white community in turn moved further away from the spaces that were colonised by African people. The outward symbols of and instruments of racial segregation became illegal in public spaces such as transport, government service, and education in particular. The white community set up, and this is legal under the present constitution, private independent institutions, such as Lomagundi College in Lomagundi [1985-86]. The college is open to everyone. Everyone who can afford to pay high fees is welcome. Further, several other Lomagundis have joined Lomagundi College: more schools for the children of the elite. The shifting into and out of social spaces suggests a kind of politics of social space: acutely processual.

In the social realm, white and black clubs and societies mushroomed. They all stressed the new discriminator: economic in nature but underpinned by a ‘structure of feeling’. The education and social service budgets that had been designed to carry the burden of a quarter of a million settlers were opened up in 1980 to include the excluded African majority. This power of inclusion was informed by political imperatives discussed in **Chapter Three**. Here, it is necessary to stress the interconnection between budgetary expansion for social services and the regular contact with rural communities. If there is content and deliverables to report on, the interaction between the leadership and followers flow. Respondent PE.1, reflecting on the dominant sensibility at the time speaks in the following form:

Shortly after independence, nearly every Friday, most of our leadership were going back home to their provinces. They were addressing huge crowds, defining the policies of the new government, the ambitions of the new government, and introducing the government to the population.

There was a kind of echo of panopticism: of transparent performance placed in the public court. Report back to electorate was thus elevated to a tool for national development. Progress was easier to measure as milestones could be recounted. This was the organic participation of ordinary publics in the-nation-in-transformation. But the rural structure of the population, because of its history, experience in the war, led to the emphasis on direct modes of interaction – person-to-person or large meetings as highlighted above, that relied on the co-presence of leader and villagers. Vision shaper, VS.1, also identifies the rural with communication forms requiring co-presence when he says that in the liberation struggle ‘communication was based on person-to-person contact’.

But the independence government sought to create conditions, in the rural areas in particular, for transition into a literate community. PE.2 observes that ‘during the war people were not reading newspapers as such. The radio was the source of what’s happening’. The oral structure of communal society became a feature that pre-disposed the rural to radio penetration. Radio also appropriated comedy, drama, news, commentary, and listener response. PE.2 praises radio and recommends it as ‘a good tool for education’. The success cited is the patronage of a programme dealing with ‘deaths’ [now death has become a major feature of the impact of HIV/AIDS]. This is a subject of utmost importance: the war made sure of this. But whether there is an adequate shared project base for education may be another matter.

Meanwhile, in attempting to literally send the country to school, into the *modern*, the education regulations, however, carried the implication that operating grants be given to institutions independent of their ability to pay other costs: this had been the basis of white privilege. The private institutions were included in the grant system and the State paid their teachers and in every way treated these institutions on a par with the rest of the institutions in the country.

For the urban social formations the process of embourgeoisement proceeded apace with increase in civil service jobs to run the multiple functions of an enlarged government delivery service system. It became possible for some to enter the spaces of privilege: in the schools, clubs, and boating outings, into formerly white suburbs. Instead of regular travels into rural homes, class cleavages strengthened in the urban social formations. One

vision shaper, VS.1, almost in frustration, wonders why leaders are no longer 'communicating with people by staying with them'. The effect of schooling was to enter into the privileged, into the zone of the mastery or dominant discourse of the indirect forms of communication. Those in the out-of-school ethic stake a claim on those in the school-ethic [on/off communication grid scenario] and certainly approximate the exponent from PE.2: 'If you don't live here, you shouldn't be interested'. The urban social formations express the sentiment differently but to the same effect as captured by policy executive, PE.3:

Children spend all afternoons watching cartoons but they're not watching cartoons about us. ... so the child who grows watching these things is not African.

The common thread marking the urban from the rural may be this state of permanent exclusion: one space from the other. The urban space is implicated in the global media but excluded from the local space or its experience. Yet the local has strength by virtue of its place location or situatedness. Urbanity constitutes a new frontier for millions of people in all countries. But Third World countries, in particular, arrive at these formations in circumstances of a largely involuntary nature. Urban space is a different sort of neighbourhood principally characterized by heightened cultural flows of all kinds. Cultural groups, burial societies, dance and music clubs and other forms of spatialization of urbanity constitute efforts by urban dwellers, in Jameson's phrase, to engage 'in successful accommodations of the old institutions to modern technology.'¹⁷

¹⁷ Jameson & Miyoshi, The cultures of globalisation, 1998, p.63

They too, as bricolage social class formations, participate, however vicariously, in the consumption regime at the heart of the capitalist impulse. The speed and scale of participation differs from one location and its place politics to another. But in the bulk of these formations, it is possible to discern dual logics of place and spatial temporality. By 1989, the country was in the midst of negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions for setting in the economic liberalization regime. The British-based *African Review of business and technology* cooed, citing Lander, the Anglo American Corporation Chairman:

...there had been dramatic improvements in business conditions since Zimbabwe launched the structural adjustment programme in 1990. Price controls have been abolished, local borrowing limits lifted, dividend remittances allowed to rise to 100 percent of after-tax profits and complex project approval procedures turned into simple formalities.¹⁸

Zimbabwe experienced food riots for the first time at the beginning of 1996. The chairman of Anglo-American and others, in the same year, praised the mechanisms of liberalization. Urban poor communities protested food prices that were out of synchronization with growth of real earning power.

In the Zimbabwean context, the sense of the new attempting to be born in the aftermath of the dislocation of the liberation war is seen in the emergence of community theatre and people's shows in both urban and rural areas. Although subject matter is variable, some of the drama derives from archetypal characters such as those condemning moral vices, encouraging healthy relations and dealing with the balancing a family budget at the end of each month.

But evidence from the interviews also points to change: PE.3 says '*Pungwe* was about dialogue. It was about education ...and people became partners.'¹⁹ But during the liberation war, practice and dialogical content had shared resonance. If dialogue has ceased today between the leadership and the communities, the logical deduction is that content is no longer shared. There is nothing more that binds two sides in shared space. But there are hopeful spots in the shifting space pragmatics that show how new content might be building up even if to answer old problems.

There is talk, for example, of how new government structures were created 'to enrich the changes to higher education' [PE.2]. Another respondent says, 'we do hold workshops,' as information and communication channels, and they also engage in 'visits.' This is important: that they leave office to see their service users on location. They also do 'letters' to the media [PE.3] taking different standpoints in their contribution to on-going debates. There is also clarity of this vision in extension work where they make video films and 'take back the film and cause discussion.' They also underline that accent is on people - 'the agency ...is with the people' [PE.1] – echoing the techniques and strategies of *cinema vérité*. Cinema vérité is a filmic method that implicates camera, filmmaker and subject in the search and shaping of truths with contributing partial vision. Media, in other words, participate in the social action they record.

The privileged settler community did not transform overnight into ordinary Zimbabweans. They stopped attending independence celebrations as they did in colonial

¹⁸ J Phelan [Ed.], *African review of business and technology*, June 1996, p.13

¹⁹ All-night meeting during the war of liberation that included skits, political orientation, security themes,

time. But through processes of appropriation of new space and blacks acceding to the accepted 'standards,' there has been a gradual rise of an enlarged privileged group in Zimbabwe's social formations. Non-attendance at public places to participate in the symbolic life of the nation is no longer restricted to particular groups with racial overtones. In other words, as race factors became less defensible in law, the persistence of social class has assumed dominance.

Herman and McChesney's book: Global media, is appropriately sub-titled: *the new missionaries of capitalism*. The first generation of nineteenth century missionaries may have carried bibles and prayer books and a calculating heart, in the mould of Livingstone in Central Africa. The new generation missionaries carry palm-PCs of varying speeds in search of points of insertion in the still disconnected portions of the globe. Two concepts from their thesis are critical to the view developed here. First, the notion that capitalism seen in institutional terms is unstoppable. The second notion is that the specific peculiarities of capitalist development in Africa are carried out within capitalist logic which when confronted by part-time capitalist practices of the citizens of the poor countries, creates strange power games. But the overarching lexicon talks about the modernisation of the global space.

The interconnections in rural zones may only have been through largely police outposts and internal native affairs district offices. During the war of liberation, the telephone was a legitimate target in an effort to deny settler administration the means of communication with the rural interior zones. PE.2's insightful observation is useful in this context:

song, and theatre.

The urban people want the media to cover them. The rural people want to get on with their lives... almost like the media is an inconvenience.

The global spread of capital flows could be accomplished through the use of resident forms of class formation and powerful elites. If that were achieved, then the translation of local ‘materiality into code’²⁰ would accelerate the insertion of Zimbabwe into the digital grid with enormous consequences for women, the poor rural zones, and unemployed and urban poor.²¹ But the comment by the policy executive above suggests that the relation between the urban and the rural may be coloured by *imperial* attitudes as well, prompting the latter to engage in resistance: they want to ‘get on with their lives.’

There are other players in the Zimbabwean marketplace for the development of entrepreneur culture and institutions, apart from the government and its skills training. These other players are non-governmental organisations [NGOs] and transnational corporations [TNCs]. The Non-Governmental Organisations [NGOs] community has a host of problems of its own and apparently has its own agenda as well. Quantitatively, the over one thousand three hundred NGOs mark Zimbabwe as one country with a high NGO-population density.

There are on average twenty organisations per administrative district or one NGO per nine thousand Zimbabweans. Yet the bulk are also concentrated in the urban formations – with occasional forays into rural areas where they generally tend to duplicate each other

²⁰ Donna Haraway, *Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature*, 1991, p.164

²¹ J.Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*, 1989, p.17 ‘The markets for foreign trade were now justly considered “institutional products”; they resulted from political efforts and military force’.

in efforts to impress the consumers of their efforts. Some have taken on the role of teaching politics in the name of 'local governance.' Fettmer Consulting P/L is an exemplar. The following is what they were teaching in the last quarter of 2000 at workshops on the theme of 'party politics':

is an apparent liberalisation of controls on the political activities of citizens. ...to exercise their civil and political rights only under the guidance of their party.²²

This may read better in the German translation: otherwise this is hopelessly irrelevant nonsense. And as pointed out in **Chapter One**, Zimbabwe became independent at a time the communication media and the national modernisation paradigm had been discredited. This is true of any location where NGOs in the various sectors might be involved. Paulo Freire, in his own forthright way, critiqued the status and significance of the NGOs in relation to Brazil in the following turn of phrase:

I will always see negatively any so-called organisation "of co-operation," which distortedly, however, intends to impose its options onto us in the name of the help it might give us.²³

As then Secretary for Education in the Municipal Government of Sao Paulo, Freire knew precisely the double articulation that NGOs carry by their very nature. They must of necessity serve the needs of their sponsors and creators and secondarily promote the interests of groups that are in consonant with their home country's vision. One resonates with the other. If the focus is on children and women's rights, domestic violence, small businesses et cetera, then local groups will be animated to complement these objectives.

²² Bohwasi, R. [Ed.], *Empowering Zimbabwe united residents association on participation*, 41, 2000, p. 9. A German NGO project: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

²³ Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the city*, 1993 p.60

Once funding runs dry, new fashions are created in endless cycles that are completely uncoordinated and frustrating to participants as well.

Pre-project training is envisaged in most of these activities: the modes of communication between group and project managers, and unique features of the organisation and reports of what it has done elsewhere. In the same instance quoted above, Paulo Freire reiterated the bias-of-origin argument:

In reality, there are no neutral organisations of co-operation. We demand very little to live well with any organisation; only that it treats us with respect.²⁴

And ‘respect’ accorded to a Third World government, let alone a rural community [off the *grid* type] is not the price the West and NGOs usually want to pay to these countries. The assumption has been that their arrival on the scene in some sector of development is what constitutes development. They in turn expect to be given respect and gratitude. They too end up occasionally managing the communities rather than mobilising them for development. A few deserve respect. Many have a high media profile – often playing the role of protectors of the voiceless. The panopticism they exercise on others should reveal an interesting underside.

As indicated above, Zimbabwe has some over one thousand three hundred NGOs registered²⁵ in the country. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the complexities associated with their activities in a country are enormous. A number of the NGOs are composed of husband and wife teams with a sprinkling of local employees among their

²⁴ Ibid.,p.60

personnel. From among the genuine, they nevertheless contribute to what sometimes constitutes the *vision* of the local communities within the nation-state. The highly sophisticated nodal points [the capital and administrative centres] of the urban metropolis give the impression of the information society that has arrived: the new technologies are noticeable by their deployment throughout private NGO office space and outside the traditional labour domains.

They are, as NGOs, part of the army of global chain capital flows – often called Track II – in relations between nations. They help break community resistance to capital penetration and induce them to take steps to be ready to join the global flows of information and capital. They occasionally are able to work with their communities through video and film. It is in this context that the Canadian government agency, Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA] and the Swedish government jointly sponsored a feature film in Zimbabwe to promote Western-legal Dutch-Roman law. The State passed a Majority Act in 1982, making it legal for a woman to enter into contract in her own right as a major in law. The sponsorship had a gendered articulation. In spite of this background though, it is the first feature film that could be described as Zimbabwean. In **Chapter Three** [pp.98-101] its uniqueness and strength have especially made the film a perfect exemplar of how film has been used to propagate myths about modernity, freedom, rights of individuals, and promote urbanity as the flexible and open space contrary to closed and rural space. The next section looks in detail at the implications of *Neria* [1992].

²⁵ S Matindike, Directory of non-governmental organisations in Zimbabwe, 1992

Cinema: *Neria* and Modernity

The film could be sympathetically treated as symptomatic comment on the socio-economic formations of post-coloniality with specifics relating to Zimbabwe. There is a duality of existence running through society and the lives of the people in the narrative. There is an understood African value system and a semi-opposed parallel urbanity with its own as it were 'structure of feeling.'²⁶ Kevin Robins, reflecting on the meaning of the city in modern cultural settings, affirms this distinctiveness:

...we may think of the city in terms of "a mode of seeing", a "structure of visibility"²⁷

Neria and husband Patrick, choose to settle in town but without breaking ties or their link with communal family members. The transition from urbanity to communal open-air rhythm is symbolically cast in the form of an actual journey out of the city to the rural home of the parents and back again. As long as there is movement across the divide of the modes of existence, the equilibrium is apparently maintained.

A crisis is produced when the time-space variables in one time dimension are called up in the other. One of these instances is the appearance of a snake in the space between Neria's house and that of her friend. The friend, Connie, immediately goes into convulsion and shouts incoherent utterances. It is not long after that that they find out Patrick has had a fatal accident. The snake-type image represents an ill omen in the scheme of things in the communal setting, and its appearance here in the urban setting has the effect of parallel communal time visiting upon the fast-paced rhythm of urbanity.

²⁶ A Ahmad, In theory: Nations, classes, literatures, 1992, p.100

²⁷ Kevin Robins, Into the Image, p.129

The result is seen in the convulsions, which Connie suffers. Yet the film's narrative argument rests on support from Connie and her friends. How could she be both a support for the urban 'structure of feeling': the women's market, the idea of the lawsuit against the uncle etc., and yet be utterly at the mercy of the competing time-experiences? A parallel, but not similar occurrence, is found in *Wend Kuuni*. The dumb speaks but he speaks only when he can no longer hold back the urge to explain the tragic death of the old man. He regains his voice only at the point that he must re-tell the tragic suicide of Bila, the prospective husband in an arranged betrothal. The intensity of betrayal and the feeling of its immediacy, rupture Kuuni's isolation as the dumb: he finds the impulse to verbalize his communication.

Neria's reluctance to take her uncle to a court of law is located on the fringes of urbanity. 'How can I fight my children's blood?' – she asks the prosecutor. And further, the memory of Patrick is something close to her thinking: 'I did not want to offend anyone even those who have departed'. Patrick is of course no longer alone in the cosmological hereafter: he has joined a constellation of 'the departed'. Not all spirits and ancestors are friendly or play the same supportive role. So the appeal is to both Christian gods and 'you in the winds' who are seen as participants in the struggle for normalcy in the domestic space. Harvey has commented extensively on the turn to cultural forces and writes on the veracity of this kind of development in times of crises:

The confidence of an era can be assessed by the width of the gap between scientific and moral reasoning. In periods of confusion and uncertainty, the turn to aesthetics [of whatever form] becomes more pronounced. Since phases of time-space compression are disruptive, we can expect the turn to aesthetics and the forces of culture as both explanations and loci of active struggle to be

particularly acute at such moments²⁸.

The symptomatic nature of *Neria* as narrative could be seen in this larger context of the moral sphere coming into uncomfortable contact with the Western legal-framework which seeks to entrench the supremacy of the individual over the communal. The communal trajectory is itself an odyssey extending its reach into the very lexicon of the beneficiaries of the legal framework: widows like Neria. The fact is that while the law is comforting as resource for the resolution of intractable disputes, one has to live with one's family. The weighting of the decision to proceed to court cannot be taken lightly. The last resort action by Neria, of proceeding to a court of law is not undertaken without consternation and much anguish.

Using a naturalistic style of presentation, the film makes use of the Age of Majority Act of 1982. For the first time since colonial days and before that, a woman could now claim majority decision at age eighteen. She could enter in personal contracts, cease to be her father's charge and of course play her role in lawsuits such as this film celebrates. But legal social space granted by the Act was a sequel of the war experience of women: they had led men in battles and they had been equally brutalised as well. The first woman minister [1980], who had also been a guerrilla leader, Mrs Mujuru, played a crucial role in explaining the resonance of the law as meeting the needs of today's woman.

But the clash of the interconnectedness of life in the community and the individualistic volition of urban structure plays itself out in the humble lives of young people in the film

²⁸ David Harvey, The condition of postmodernity, 1989, p.327

as well. The level of awareness of these dichotomies is different, but there is no doubt that the young son, Shingi, revels in the open-air home of the communal grandparents. At the same time when the uncle engages him in persuasive dialogue to get him to like the idea of 'home' as the communal location and work in his petty grocer's shop, the young son is quick to ask: 'Would you pay me any money?' Labour is translated into money. Money and its use structure urbanity: the son thinks of paying bills to relieve pressure on his mother. This is an entirely urban frame of thinking: breaking down things into units that flow, or to use Haraway's term, this is the 'translation of the world into a problem of coding.'²⁹

In the communal context, successful work is also marked by symbols of success such as more animals for the family. The men, accompanied by mature women, take the formal decisions in the village. Patrick wants to buy the family bull but feels he needs the opinion of his wife. This becomes a source of irritation to Phineas [rural] who does not see why Patrick [urban] should now seek Neria's opinion [young wife]. Worse, this consultation takes place in private space. Patrick claims there is 'a new world out there' in his efforts to get villagers to see things differently, in *modern* terms. This film recycles urban space as the zone of the modern. The city, the citizen and the *modern* become one.

In *Neria*, there are two critical scenes worth commenting on in relation to the movement-image. First, there is the removal of furniture from Neria's house in the city. This happens off screen but the occurrence is echoed in the various dialogues between Connie and her friends and then with Neria. The fullness of the act is seen only when that

²⁹ Donna Haraway, Simians, cyborgs, and women, 1991, p.164

furniture is brought back and Connie's girls break into song and dance. The shots that bring this moment into full bloom start with a reluctant Neria who is then prodded into the scene and action by Connie and her friends. Surprised at her power, which is negotiated through the courts of law, Robins assessment of the city as symbol of urban strength is probably apt here: '... the city may exist as a space of potentiality.'³⁰ There is solidarity here of a different sort: designed principally to advance the individual's participation in informal trade and the protection of personal space. The communal ethic is broken: Neria can associate with Connie and others not because they are her family, but because they are first and foremost, women. This new solidarity in urban space confirms the city as open and flexible space with enormous possibilities for individual aspiration. Deleuze captures this vitality of new beginnings in Movement-image [1983].

The second instance is the trip to the communal 'home' where we are treated to parallel story telling. Patrick and his brother are in a vehicle going 'home' [rural] and their mother is narrating a 'ngano' – a teaching story. There is rhythm as the tale involves teaching the children what cruelties of Charles Mukaranga. He did not care for his wife who had given him children. She had worked hard too to create the basic conditions for a comfortable life. His wife was a loyal wife – even the elders concurred. As Patrick tells his story, they are heading towards the communal home: the very centre of communal cosmology.

In both scenes there is no real action except that Patrick is mobile in his vehicle. The sense of movement is derived instead from the *content of space*: the grandmother story

³⁰ Kevin Robins, Into the Image: Culture and politics in the field of vision, 1996, p.133

and the rhythmic participation of the children brings into the Patrick version a sense of pain and disordered orientation although each is enclosed in separate space-times. The travellers burst their closed space-times as they arrive in the homestead. They immediately join in the beat of the refrain: 'Chari Mukaranga...Chari Mukaranga'. There is clarity that we are dealing with two sensations of time: the self-reflexive mode, which is aware of its own duration [Patrick's urban time dimension] and the flow and rhythmic passage of the grandmother's time dimension [closed].

Elsewhere Ukadike has termed this montage technique – of cutting between disjunctive scenes [rural/urban], as having the combined effect 'to make a meaning greater than the total sum of its parts'³¹. This divide between time dimensions also marks the film's handling of thematics. But the flow of life in the film defies this simple and mechanistic divide. The basic outline can be sketched simply. The 'uncle' Phineas is not universally avuncular in the world of the film. To the communal world, he is the 'senior father' who is expected to stand-in for the late young brother: stand-in for the protection and upkeep of the children. Patrick's young son is quite happy in the open air and among the herds. The fact that at the final ceremony to dispose of the possessions of Patrick, Neria chooses a surrogate protector in the form of her young son is a way of negating re-marriage to the prospective lineage of Patrick's family.

However, two myopic interventions speak out of turn on the succession ceremony when the white magistrate [representing law, open and flexible space] accuses Phineas

³¹ N. F. Ukadike, *Black African Cinema*, 1985, p.123. See discussion of *The Marriage of Mariamu*: constant juxtapositions of traditional African medicine with Western medicine characterise the film's

Katsande [inflexible, closed space] of abusing the traditional mores to break the law. The extra-legal embellishments of the judgement speak volumes about the propaganda value of the tale. The exact location of the Dutch-Roman law in relation to customary law remains obscured. But as to who upholds the standards of Dutch-Roman law there is no doubt: the magistrate represents that value. The mother-in-law [to Neria] refers to Neria's victory at the court as proof that one can 'bend our customs a little' to achieve sensible results. These remarks stand out as part of the tools for propaganda work for the Roman-Dutch legal framework typical of most Third World nation-states as they struggle with heritages through post-coloniality. Neria's rejection of re-marriage is anticipated in customary law as a distinct possibility. It is not bending any custom in any way.

The film demonstrates a play on memory and the composition of the self in the light of that memory. The wedding photograph first appears in the domestic space of husband and wife: Neria and Patrick. It is brought out for admiration and the couple re-lives as it were the happiness of that memory. They are firmly located in the urban moment of their lives. But time has moved on and the couple's reaction to their own past happiness is this embodied introjective movement. The same photograph, when presented in the final ceremony of the dispersal of belongings of the late Patrick Katsande, produces a quick response from Neria. The photograph has no emotional content in the communal family space scene. Patrick in photographic image or in life belongs to a larger circle of relationships where he is Patrick 'the boy', 'the son' and 'the brother' or 'father'.

The mother is indeed given the ‘boy’s’ photograph: the point at which Neria leaves the scene to locate herself in a personal zone of their former friendship with the late husband.

Marks refers to the handling of this sort of affection-image in Deleuzian terms :

Deleuze considered any-spaces-whatever to constitute images that arouse an emotional or visceral response, that is, affection-images. ...emotion or feeling opens us to the experience of time...the body may be involved in the inauguration of time-image cinema.³²

Neria’s reaction is out of touch with the transactions in this public space. The dispersal scene is not a site for negotiation for private emotions. The sense of lack of personal space at the dispersal scene allows the community to share in the loss and the triumphant retrieval of the collective memory of Patrick, the ‘boy’ who grew up in this community. But it does appear that the narrative of the film conflates the dual time-space that it set to create by resorting to the experiential reaction of Neria. Teleologically framed, the experience can only provide partial truths as Phineas and wife reappear in her dreams as witch and wizard of classical European medieval imagination and consequent contortions of myths of African witchcraft. It could thus be argued that Neria is unable to situate herself in the communal world and seeks through the mechanism of the law and the support of her loyal urban circle of friends to maintain her place in the urban structure. This locates Neria’s salvation is in the urban city: a place where friendships form on contingencies of place. Neria’s inability to share in the communal family space is contrasted with her effusive circle of friends in the city whose dance she prepared to countenance.

³² L. Marks, *The skin of the film: Intercultural cinema, embodiment, and the senses*, 2000, p.28

The individual effort by Neria as a mother and woman amounts to very modest achievements in the overall scheme of things. Neria has lost a husband, the principal breadwinner. Her claim of individual rights in the court amounts to her only achievement. She has risked alienating her family in the communal home. Harvey has referred to apparent progress over actual movement in the contradictory conditions of human freedom:

... in particular ...the conflictual and confusing experience of space and time, neither has the power to overturn established ways of seeing or transcend the conflictual conditions of the moment³³.

Touki Bouki [Mambety, 1973] is similarly structured in its inconclusive ending. After Mr Mory has spent so much energy trying to get to Paris: through theft, trickery and gambling, at the final call by the boat, he literally re-traces his running all over again – only this time away from the very platform that would have sent him to Paris. But interestingly too, the open-air architecture of the ship recalls the very open air with communal participation that is so typical of the adventures that he has been through and to which the hyena must commit Anta alone. On the ship of course, there is no wrestling here or a make-believe serenade of a prince and princess newly returned from Paris. Rather, there is a tasteless conversation among white strangers on the ship.

There may be nothing in metropolitan Paris that is not already offered in Senegal: adventure, open and free space – even freedom to break the law. The flash point of this highly elliptical and fast-moving melodrama is the pretence scene of the returning prince and princess. To celebrate the return – the woman with the blue mouth leads in the dance

³³ David Harvey, *The condition of postmodernity*, p.322

routines and welcome songs. The duality of time is present here: time present and the imaginary.

Finally, there is need to revisit the court scene and assess the validity of its claims to settle the matter of the family inheritance and welfare of the children with a sense of finality. The latter are caught up in contradictory experience of time and therefore to imply a consonant recourse to the instruments of law is to suggest an ending that leads to closure. But is closure the motive force of this film?

In other words, the narrative presumes to end debate with the delivery of an enthusiastic judgement against traditional social space whereas the reason for the present furore is located in the larger cultural sphere where this instance is but one minuscule occurrence. That frame of things will continue to live its life, its rhythm and contours unless it can be persuaded through largely other means rather than a legal invocation of Roman-Dutch Law.

In these post-colonial formations, it is appropriate to recognise the role of what Gramsci has termed traditional intellectuals. They have cultivated a sense of taste and value derived from the segments of society that tie them to landed [middle and upper class] interests and thus continue the marginalization of the bulk of the poor social formations. It is symptomatic that the film structures the naïve role of the white magistrate as a messenger of Roman-Dutch law: setting women free by decree, and judgement.

The courts obviously require money to access them and the vast majority of the *Nerias* are in the very interiors of Third World countries. Justice by invitation or through charitable courts is clearly a misnomer: the real issues remain outside the dominant discourses on the development agenda. Perhaps to ask that from Godwin Mawuru is asking for the tools of Third Cinema of which *Neria* is not even a remote exemplar. His film is true to the standard hero-focused form, an imitation of classical Hollywood feature film, where it 'privileges the individual over the social and the collective'³⁴. It is only African cinema by accident of place otherwise the outsider perspective informs the ethos of story telling and the drama and of course the eventual triumph of particular individual values.

The appeal to modernist and legal formula 'rationalises'³⁵ and silences the very substance that should inform cinema emerging from Third World countries. The courts become one more plank and conduit that peddle templates of 'standards.' Human rights are defined in contradistinction to community, and dissonance between the living and dead is celebrated. In conclusion, it is instructive to posit the vision that Gabriel has of Third Cinema, if only to underline the heightened turnover of time-space compression through the dialectic flux in community:

Third Cinema films work with a sense of place and with fluidity of perspective. If they have any mood at all, it is that of a ritual or carnival. Their meaning, however, resides in the relation of the work to its situation. Besides the open-ended nature of the films, which accounts for the consideration of everyday life, also helps compose its aesthetic. The memorability of the work has much to do with our intellectual stimulation as well as with our sense of what is

³⁴ Teshome Gabriel in J. Pines and P. Willemsen [Eds.], Questions of Third Cinema, p.60

³⁵ J. MacCannell in W. Apollon & R. Feldstein [Eds.], Lacan, politics, aesthetics, p.68

emancipatory aesthetics³⁶.

Conclusion

The discussion in the present chapter has identified the salience of social class as successor to the post-colony social formations in Zimbabwe. Further, the specific expression of class cleavages in part are negotiated through the politics of social pragmatics of space. The presence of the discourse of colony has been noted as a contributory factor in re-shaping the media image of the Zimbabwe landscape.

In the face of poverty, the limitations of information and communication technologies have been illustrated. Their depth of penetration in the urban areas was noted but their extent of spread in the interior rural zones is virtually negligible. The NGO's impact on development has been described and their limitations sketched.

The presence of a sense of change in communication media was evident. The preferred modes revolved around the co-presence person-to-person, the indirect via radio and to some extent, mediated through print modes. The inherited models in education, health and social services and the economic liberalisation regime of 1989 have contributed to a sense of crisis. Participation in the diverse spheres of the jurisdiction has enlarged but principally within the urban social formations.

Mawuru's film demonstrates the contradictory discourse in the division between rural-urban, traditional-modern, and Third-First world jurisprudence. Mawuru introduces

³⁶ Teshome Gabriel in J. Pines and P. Willems [Eds.], Questions of Third Cinema, p.61

dichotomies of community-individual rights with the legal courts suitably performing the ritual foreclosure of debate and discussion. But that closure is part of the logic of imperial domination of capital flows of the C³I [command-control-communication-intelligence] type: even justice is not possible unless everything has been sublimated to the same 'standard,' – the translation requirements where justice serves the will to abstraction which is an imperative of modernisation.

The next chapter turns to the sequel of the present discussion: summary, recommendations and conclusion.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, recommendations, conclusion

Introduction

This final chapter sets out a summary of the study findings. The present research has identified historical, attitudinal and contingent factors that have coalesced to give salience to particular forms of communication media in Zimbabwe. These factors have been identified and debated from **Chapter One** that provided the necessary background while **Chapter Two** dealt with theoretical arguments of the field. **Chapter Three** has presented the framing legal-regulatory context with the media intervention claiming panoptic vision in relation to State action. Interview data, a feature film and a discussion of a video documentary on media have been presented in this chapter.

The preceding chapter though, **Chapter Four**, presented the context of performance. Evidence has been led in the relation between ‘growth’ and ‘equity’ from social-cultural assumptions, constitutionalism, and continuity of open and closed space paradigm and players in the field and their jostling for salience. The burden of the next segment of the present chapter, Chapter Five, provides a summary of the preceding discussion. The summary will highlight the critical strands of the study and make tentative suggestions on the critical horizons of the communication media debate in Zimbabwe.

The second section describes four recommendations covering the status of the findings and identifying entry points for action and future research. The last section concludes the

findings of the present research by placing the study in the Zimbabwean communication media and national development context.

Summary

Historical developments in Zimbabwe both prior to and after European occupation have impacted on the evolution and status of communication media. Important features along the evolutionary process have been identified particularly in Chapter One. Chapter One has identified historical markers such as the Empire of Munhumutapa and its imperial achievements in architecture and design as seen at the Great Zimbabwe.

Further, it has been noted as well that the arrival of a new imperial domination of the region that began variously in late nineteenth century was markedly British. Both German and Portuguese efforts to effect occupation in the area of *Zambesia* were futile. Britain, with a more aggressive search for territory overseas to offload the woes of its industrialism at home, particularly a poor working class, facilitated in 1889 the foundation of the instrument of colonisation: British South Africa Company. The Company became a tool by which the South African millionaire Rhodes created and funded a group of adventurers christened 'pioneer column'.

Evidence has been presented on the way in which the British South Africa Company as an occupying military force ['column'] imposed itself first as a mining and prospecting front for white settlers. On arrival in the county in 1890 though, their first action was to initiate a land-grab policy in Mashonaland while continuing their interests in mine

exploitation and prospecting. By 1893, however, it was clear to the settler group that there were no gold mines of the stature of the *rand* in South Africa's Transvaal. They turned to Matabeleland.

Rhodes had instructed the leader of the column, Dr Jameson, to 'annex land, not natives.' An opportune moment arose in the relation between the settlers, Company police, indigenous people and a missing five hundred yards of telegraph wire. The five hundred yards of imperial copper grid created the pretext for the wholesale military invalidation of the sovereignty of Lobengula's region in 1893-94. The double loss of the region included the reparation in cattle and ransacking and looting of resources by rampaging Company volunteer troops and police. Alienation of land accelerated in the region with rinderpest and drought completing disastrous pillage. The 'annex land, not natives' militarist policy had taken concrete form in both Mashonaland and Matabeleland.

Meanwhile, the telegraph wire was identified as an alternative source for trinkets, bangles, earrings and decorative designs for traditional symbols of power called *gano*. The appropriation of telegraph wire ensured that marriage tokens with copper wire became a fashionable practice, with decorative designs for women to enhance their beauty and the *gano* referred to as symbol of power and masculinity among the indigenous male population. Later in 1960s at the start of the Second Chimurenga, both Mugabe and Nkomo [leaders in the liberation movements] received a *gano* from elders. This was symbolically to mark the general beginning of the second liberation struggle: the *ganos* normally exhibit some copper wire decoration.

Spiritual leaders – Sekuru Kaguvi and Mbuya Nehanda, led the outbreak of the First Chimurenga of liberation in 1896 in Mashonaland. The critical charge against the settlers and Company police was the loss of land through the land-grab policy and deliberate encouragement of inflows of settlers into the country. They were defeated and the leaders, Kaguvi and Mbuya Nehanda were executed in 1897. Part of the players in the land-grab policy included Argus Press Group. Over the years, and through Mr Dormer's friendship with Rhodes, they supported greater immigration of white settlers into the country. They took land themselves as an Argus Group and popularised the imagery of land for the taking in Mashonaland. They published the first newspaper in the country in 1891.

The country went through the early years of occupation as 'Company' territory until 1923. In that year, Company administrators and white settlers were given an option by the imperial power, London, to either join the South African Union or opt for self-governing status. The settlers chose the latter. Indigenous populations were not even considered as a possible source of opinion. That, as the study has shown in Chapter One and Chapter Three, meant the development and consolidation of two contiguous communities in Zimbabwe. Two communities emerged: marked out by race, prejudice, tension between open and closed space, militarist and violent control, and the competing visions in the polity.

The second chapter has dealt with theoretical issues and critiqued assumptions of the early communications media and national development paradigms. The political

imperatives that informed the theoretical framework has been challenged especially by Herbert Schiller. Complementing Schiller's analysis, Amin has argued for an alternatively motivated socialist development paradigm: plural yet focused on people development needs. Participation of the alternative visions is critical to success.

The study has also drawn attention as to the goals of communications and national development. Among the 'polycentrist vision' [Amin] and the march towards the village [Nyerere] and the superpower preoccupation with the galaxy [USA] – a legitimate question arises on the purposes for implicating communications in national development. Gramsci offers a vision of socio-economic development that is firmly embedded in the popular classes. For Zimbabwe, these social classes constitute the bulk of the rural social formation and urban poor.

Modernity that is achievable, as a conscious project of emancipation from underdevelopment, cannot bypass these social formations. Four typologies of sociality in modernity have been identified as the direct [co-presence necessary, person to person], indirect [no co-presence: office memos], secondary [where no co-presence is necessary but there is an awareness of the other], and quaternary relationships [constituted by surveillance technologies].

Chapter Three has presented evidence that has highlighted the salience of communications in the national development efforts. The social services, in spite of their limitations of reach in the rural zone, have been demonstrable milestones: in education,

health and agriculture. The achievements have been constrained by history and continuing struggles among contending visions in the polity. Some of the contending visions have sought to construct a profile of the communications media as the panopticon of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe.

Further, the chapter has underlined the different communication media flows that followed the Mugabe reconciliation speech of 1980. Clearly framed by the continuance of a settler State apparatus, the speech gave hope to competing visions in the same space and same place. The land hungry looked forward to the return of their land and the end of long anchorlessness. The other contiguous community [white] occupying it celebrated the idea of 'swords' turning into 'ploughshares.'

The chapter has presented evidence on the 'national development' dynamics that have produced in the last twenty years an economically weak elite social formation based largely in the urban areas. The same period has also seen a sharpening of actual differences between the urban poor and rural people. On the one hand the elite social formation is highly connected and occupies flexible space on the global grid [the city as nodal point of interconnection]. The rural and urban poverty zones have created veritable milestones in development but within a space defined by the structure of the inherited State: for example, social services required subsidies for both rich and poor.

The lexicon of urbanity as the ultimate rendezvous place with modernity also frames their participation in development: the filmic exemplar, *Neria*, has been presented and

discussed as part of this logic. Neria does not feel at home in the rural communal setting: the pull towards the city as flexible space with freedom is greater than the village links of marriage. The law is accessible in the city. Ironically, it also suggests that the city is where the constitution and the new rights reside.

The video instalment by Spicer – *Dancing out of tune* [1999] complements the film in the sense in which the tape looks at the history of media from the human rights perspective. Such human rights are violated in the arrest of city journalists. The arguments revolve around the legitimacy of the State's exercise of both symbolic and coercive power. The media elevate themselves to the status of participants in the panopticism over the new State. There are others: the Catholics, a nameless donor-driven media monitoring project, and, of course, the United States of America. None of these has any interest beyond the city lights though: that, in a sense, is the meaning of bourgeois 'civil society' and the limits of its democracy.

This 'civil society,' as noted in the communications statistics [**Chapter Three**, p.94], enjoys virtual monopoly on access to telephones, television, video films, cinema, web connectivity, postal services, electric power and banking. Harare has 43 percent of fixed network telecommunications lines. This site also has easy access to legal services with complementary rights [called 'human' rights to distinguish them from rural areas where NGOs and 'civil society' fight for 'animal' rights such as elephants and 'forests'].

Finally, evidence from interviews with vision shapers and policy executives has been presented. Two pointers stand out clearly: there is an awareness of the differences between connectivity within the city and its translation into rural areas. The second track that emerges is the need to harmonise and maximise on certain types of communications as against others in the effort to reach villages: the radio is one such medium. There is change that is implicated in the characterisation and criticism of community newspapers that they could be different: not merely concentrate on imposing witchery and other texts that impose an external view on the rural communities.

One of the policy executives talks about the employment of video technology to engage communities in a transformative participant development model. They videotape a village and return to that village to ‘cause discussion’ and get feedback on an ongoing project in the area. The study has illustrated, with Neria, the level of confidence placed in the medium by the viewers. The type of action undertaken with video technology can allow a village to enter open and flexible space and thus propel itself – through ownership of the process, to new insights and secondary action as needed. Amin in the company of Gramsci and under the guidance of Nyerere might yet reach the village along this route.

Chapter Four has carried the main burden of synthesis. In an attempt to understand the rural zone and urban poor, and indeed the urban elite, scholarship in the informing inspirations is suggested. There are several zones of rupture, contested meanings and of appropriation and circulation. What is the meaning of social class among peasant and

other social formations? To what extent is migrancy implicated in the negotiation of space dominance between women and men? What are the communication markers of these relationships? And further, when, how and why do ruptures occur at various stress points in communication flows?

To some extent, this section of **Chapter Four** is an attempt to de-emphasise defining Africa, ultimately, Zimbabwe, through extrapolation. The same can be said about the divide between the urban and rural. It is the urban that tends to impose its imperial definition on the rural. Attention has been drawn to the National Railways of Zimbabwe [**Chapter Four**, p.138]. They still believe in economic and militarist solutions: incurring expenditures for more *Company* 'security' guards to prevent theft and recover 'stolen copper cables.'

The chapter then turns to the fate of the communication media structures. The heart of the argument is that there are those who link the communication media and national development as a dynamic intended to satisfy the urban social formations. This social formation has an embedded elite as noted previously, that shows the taints and frightening images of its sister configurations [civil society by any other name] elsewhere [calling for the invalidation of national sovereignty] in pursuit of its objectives.

The Harawayan conception of development is also taken up in the chapter. Haraway has encapsulated the phenomenon as the C³I: control-command-communication-intelligence – cyborg modernity that flattens all materiality into the service of capital flows. In the

struggle for the enlargement of space and creation of alternative sites for discourse by other voices, strategic positioning of communication media is critical if the cyborg challenge is to be contained. In that struggle, the media will stand by their owners too. They have done this for centuries in all jurisdictions. The urban poor and the rural peasants need to be embedded in the genuinely plural media configurations. However, no one has all the answers and none will have them. Inclusivity will define the content that shapes and informs the national development dynamic and ethic.

Such organic inclusivity will certainly transform the media landscape and the orientation of communications in general. It will certainly offer the country its best protection against externally imposed and imperial broadcasts: copper-wired or not. The country benefits more from its own organic plurality reporting on itself than the promised 'objective' reporting by Voice of America radio. As illustrated by reference to supposed 'oppositional' and State newspapers in the urban formations [Chapter Four, p.144-5], there are no real differences. They are merely epiphanies of apparent difference emanating from the same social formation. The two dailies constitute two sides of a single opinion.

The traditional communications media such as print media are generally available to the bulk of urban social formations. But the new information and communication technologies such as internet, satellite dishes and mobile phone service tend to be located within particular social classes. Indeed, such configurations separate even along variables

such as attitudes and conscious opinion-formation and spatial locations. The urban poor and the affluent live in two discrete worlds while sharing the same urban space.

Though in cases still somewhat amorphous in form, the emergence of class affinity has impacted on social structuration processes. Some social classes have achieved high articulacy levels while their exact structure is still malleable. Factors of race have remained part of the Zimbabwean backdrop, even though overt race discrimination has been officially outlawed since 1980.

The dual inheritances of Zimbabwe: sensibility and experiences of the second liberation war and settler administration structures and their sensibility have co-existed uneasily. Media images have mirrored the uneasiness. At the policy level, there is acknowledgement of a divided society: 'we're no longer one nation.' But this segmentation is part of the modernising project that was heightened by aggressive capitalism in 1890 and continued at independence. The notion that reconciliation was somehow a policy that would keep everybody together in an amorphous class character has not survived the enormous changes in the social, economic and cultural spheres of society.

The supreme law itself, the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979 also mirrored the racial tension in the country. The document constructed a spatial perimeter for the State and expanded social and legal space for racial minorities who were included in protectionist clauses. Some of the clauses remain in force such as protection of land rights, [Chapter

Three, Section 11c]: ‘protection from ... compulsory acquisition of property’ which end in the same subparagraph by asserting ‘...the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.’ The very fact of the settlement proposals meant that, *prima facie*, a special circumstance existed. Under situations of normality, the tenets of the section are comprehensible: everyone would start out from relative equality, not inequality between those who have [‘property’: land, as defined in Section 16 later in the constitution] and those without. That this ownership should not cause ‘prejudice’ of the ‘public interest,’ is a spurious innovation that embeds violence in the supreme law.

The constitution created blind spots on race, historical inequities of colony, and land seizures. At the same time, the new constitution embedded ‘individual rights’ that were operative, and were justiciable in the courts. The judiciary was effectively the preserve of the Gramscian traces of continuance in personnel and legal instruments.

Further, it is necessary here to extend the metaphor and clarify the conception of justiciable ideas. In the repertoire of prison mechanisms of control, the status of communications is central in the prison regime: its frequency in relation to letters, human contact, verbal exchanges, participation in activities, orders and solicitation for input into the system and others. In the Nyagumbo text cited in **Chapter One**, there is evidence that the status of communication was a key variable in the ‘punishment’ of offenders already within the ‘closed’ prison system. It meant ‘isolation’ in a cell without light for a subjectively determined period.

The radio, already a privilege in the first ‘closure’ was inconceivable in the punishment zone. In 1972 at Kwekwe Prison, Nyagumbo talks of prison-issued radios that could only capture the Rhodesia Broadcasting station [– this was sub-frequency broadcasting]:

Our own radios were removed and we were given the one which could only be tuned to RBC. We were also not allowed to receive food parcels or monies from any quarter ...¹

About the same period through to 1978, these same radios were being given ‘free’ to the rural zones by the settler administration. The same zones were under military martial law. Research on the response from both forms of prison spaces would open yet another portal to our understanding. In sum, the prison system then envisaged ‘closure’ within ‘closure.’

Thus organic plurality is of this order: justiciable. A single broadcast station is akin to the monologue of class conflict in urban formations. It is unidirectional in structure and the model is a hallmark of self-indulgent standards. So inclusivity is the source of genuinely alternative voices. The policymakers observe that there are voices that have been silenced by the continuance of mechanisms of capital and the instruments of law that validated that continuity. This is seminal.

There are other polarities that arise: What impact did the experience of colony have on the national psyche? Much is made in the media of arch-typical prison graduates such Jomo Kenyatta [Kenyatta], Robert Mugabe [Zimbabwe], Nelson Mandela [South Africa], Nadabaningi Sithole [Zimbabwe], Kenneth Kaunda [Zambia] and many others of the independence movements. Personages such as Nelson Mandela literally subsume the

nation-in-one-person motif. When he walked out of prison in 1990, Mandela invited some of his jailers to lunch. Yet contemporary Europe and Israel are still-hunting the Jewish jailers of the Third Weimer Republic of Germany, almost fifty-six years later. International media, such as CNN, European Television and radio, celebrate the hunt in the same breath as they celebrate forgiveness from African leaders. The sense of wonder is conveyed by Hassanpour and Winter as well. After scalping the Canadian scene with its high concentration of ownership in the hands of a few entities and individuals like Conrad Black, they observe wryly:

When the men who own the politicians also own the news media, where do we turn for our information?²

They do not have to look very far. They could, to begin with, turn to history, power relations between the polity and media, access to resources, profits, and the politics of place in the creation of advantage and symbolic power. The two seasoned journalists seem to be looking for what the faceless media monitoring project is looking for in Zimbabwe: ‘an independently- appointed independent’ communications authority – apart from being a mouthful, it does not belong to rational thought. There are Gramscian traces all along that route of ‘independent’ appointing another ‘independent’ to arrive at the communications ‘authority.’

But on this sobering reflection, a turn to recommendations is due. These recommendations are drawn on the basis that their pursuance will enrich experience and train cadres in the communications media field. The scholars will not arrive at these

¹ Maurice Nyagumbo, With the people: An autobiography from the Zimbabwe struggle, 1980, p.210

² A.Hassanpour and J. Winter in Canadian communications: Issues in contemporary media and culture,

studies from frivolous colourlessness or independence from life – they will bring with them their biases, insights and their desire to learn. It is these attributes that enrich a field of combat.

Recommendations

First. The study has shown the interconnected spaces between engendering a common solidarity in the pursuit of the liberation war and talking development in its aftermath. The forging of the common solidarity in the struggle for independence used principally person-to-person [direct] mobilisation methodologies. The content varied from history, song, dance skits and didacticism on the goals and strategies of the colonial forces. The first recommendation is thus located in this sphere. There is need to make greater use of oramedia in national development work. In extension work in health, agriculture, education, and in the present efforts to fight HIV/AIDS scourge, oramedia can exercise a decisive influence in the cause for genuine opinion-formation while fighting underdevelopment.

To de-link Zimbabwean society from its millennial traditions that served the country well in the liberation war would be an emasculation of a whole way of life for a people. PE.3 [Chapter Three, p.102] has stressed this point in defining the centrality of *pungwe*.³ Castells has also drawn attention to the relations of power between the pre-existing modes of communication to the newer forms. The latter are embedded in the earlier

1999, p.82

³ All-night meeting in the war, here used to mean persistent and and focused dialogue.

repertoire of communication modes: 'restructured and reorganised.'⁴ Technologies and skills do not die in this McLuhansque way: by replacement. Instead they reconfigure. Both urban social formations and the rural zones could thus participate.

Second. It would appear that there are lessons that could be learned from the experience of war and colony and media organisation elsewhere. But each space in the 'global ecumene' must make a contribution to the growth of global insights through its own research into its own conditions while allowing for interaction with others under other jurisdictions. Fanon's thesis of the way the colonial peoples wrest subjectivity from their oppressors must constitute one of several entry points to this thematic, political economy of communication being another. There is need to accelerate the development of media courses for both current practitioners and younger members of the field. Further, alongside their training, there should be a deliberate generalisation of research culture. The ZINTEC mode of training engendered such an orientation.

Communicational media research needs to become both training and simultaneously useful as research evidence for policy options in sectors such as railways, parliament, workers associations, cultural associations, and rural communities, and others. The specific profile of such a programme of professional development could be developed in tandem with the four institutions that have created initial study programmes in media courses: the University of Zimbabwe [Harare], State University in the Midlands [Gweru] and the Zimbabwe Open University [distance-learning] and Harare Polytechnic. Along with these institutions, there should be inclusion of the fledgling media houses,

⁴ Manuel Castells, The information age: Economy, society and culture, Vol.1, 1996 p.330

government departments, media workers associations and unions, cultural and indigenous language associations et cetera as part of the plural workspace.

Donor funded programmes, while useful, they should always be screened to prevent funders from leading the institutions to the production of persons who then become the champions of articles of faith of various sponsors. The present study has drawn attention to both dangers and possibilities in working with NGOs.

Media workers who are both professional and specialist in their own hardcore disciplines say, history, orature, languages, economics, natural sciences, psychology and others can be trusted to participate in the dialogue within the contending paradigms of national development. Every person matters in national efforts to confront contradictions of underdevelopment. In the evidence presented in the present study, there is manifest support for the construction of such fraternities as products of sector *pungwes*.

Third. Research into communication media, new information and communication technologies and oramedia is still in the inception phase in Zimbabwe. There is need to further the present tentative efforts into the examination of dynamics of change factors in localised spaces. Such spaces could include but not be limited to residential areas, workplace management communication locales and styles, identification of oramedia, print, radio and television media traits in relation to their function as communication channels of critical information from education, entertainment through to disasters. There

are also spaces of potential social rupture in the borders between rural and urban, young and old in different spaces and the factors of race and social class.

Fourth. The communication media structures as presented in the present study are skewed generally in favour of information-rich urban centres. This pattern is a successor to colony, race privilege, and the capitalist profit-oriented development model. The essence of the modern should not mean migration into town: but the conveniences and advances that have been achieved by humanity ought to be informed by other considerations as well. These other considerations relate to equity issues, the full development of human capital resources and considerations for spaces for women, children and the elderly.

Therefore there is need to restructure and create conditions that facilitate the development of different media located in the zones of poverty in the country: both urban and rural. Such restructuring will involve a re-look at the legal framework. There is certainly reason to provide for genuine plurality of radio broadcasting. This medium reaches the largest number of listeners currently. There is need to create subsidies even if these constitute a counter-cannon to neo-liberal regimes of the World Trade Organisation and its sister partners. Further, there is need to provide for internships for alternative media. It is these alternative media channels that will provide the bulwark of support against partisan and extra-territorial intrusions through the airwaves and digital bits such as the USA now wishes to engage in. The advanced popular sectors of the nation-state are required [even

in their disconnected condition] to preserve the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of a nation in the throes of national development.

Conclusion

The present study has identified the interlocked nature of place, history, social and economic regimes of the polity and their relation to the evolution of particular forms of communication media. A small but dominant social class [whose margins are still coalescing] has developed in Zimbabwe. This dominant social class is located generally in the urban centres. It is an elite class that enjoys high levels of media consumption in the urban sprawl through information flows - television, satellite, internet, mobile and fixed phone connections along with print media.

The development of a digitally opulent social class has led some of the representatives of the same social class to demand privatisation of the State media structures – a claim that is consonant with the neo-liberal regime of the Bretton Woods institutions. Some of the seasoned journalists assimilate this focus and want to annihilate – in cyborg fashion, news about ‘toilets in Magunje - is that national at all?’ The study has underlined the enormous responsibility and consequences of media restructuring especially where competing visions have important exclusions. The study has emphasised though the place of plurality - if that plurality is organic and inclusive of the marginal zones of disadvantaged social formations. Even in their exclusion, they are still the soul of the nation.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, A. [1992]. In theory: Classes, nations, literatures. Verso. London.
- Amin, S. [1997]. Reflections on the international system. In Golding, P. & Harris, P. [Eds.]. Beyond cultural imperialism: Globalization, communication and the new international order. Sage. London.
- Anselmi, W. and Gouliamos, K. [1998]. Elusive margins: Consuming media, ethnicity and culture. Gurnica. Toronto.
- ANZ. [2001]. *Daily news*. "MDC loses Bikita West."
- Appadurai, A. [1996]. Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalizations. Minnesota UP. Minneapolis.
- Austin, D. and Morris-Jones, W. [1980]. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Frank Cass. London.
- Bailie, M. & Winseck, D. [Eds.]. [1997]. Democratizing communication? Comparative perspectives on information and power. Cresskill. NJ:Hampton.
- Barnett, T. [1997] States of the state and Third Worlds. In Golding, P. & Harris, P. [Eds.]. Beyond cultural imperialism: Globalization, communication and the new international order. Sage. London.
- Bent, J. [1971]. The ruined cities of Mashonaland 1892. Books for libraries Press. Freeport.
- Bhebhe, N. & Ranger, T. [Eds.]. [1996]. Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war. Heinemann. Oxford.
- Bhebhe, N. & Ranger, T. [Eds.]. [1995]. Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war. James Currey. London.

- Bohwasi, R. [Ed.]. [2000]. Empowering Zimbabwe united residents association on participation. 41. Friedrich-Ebert-Stifling. Harare.
- Bonde, D. [Ed.]. [1995]. *Moto*. No. 148.
- Boyd-Barrett, O. [1997]. International communication and globalization: Contradictions and directions. In Mohammadi, A. [Ed.]. International communication and globalization. Sage. London.
- Boyle, R. [1996]. Shamans, software and spleens : Law and the construction of the information society. Harvard Univ Press. Cambridge.
- Bull, T. [1967]. Rhodesian perspective. Michael Joseph. London.
- Calhoun, C. [1995]. Critical social theory. OUP. Cambridge.
- Castells, M. [1996]. The information age: Economy, society and culture [Vol1]. Blackwell. Malden.
- CCJPZ. [1999]. *A report on the practices of torture and brutality*. CCJPZ. Harare
- Chamunorwa, W. [Ed.]. [2000]. *The public service bulletin*. PSC. Harare.
- Chan, S.[1985]. The commonwealth observer group in Zimbabwe. Mambo. Gweru.
- Chifunyise, S. [Ed.]. [1983]. *Teachers' forum*. Various. College Press. Harare.
- Chennels, A. [1996]. Rhodesian discourse, Rhodesian novels and the Zimbabwean liberation war. In Bhebhe, N. & Ranger, T. [Eds.]. Society in Zimbabwe's liberation war. Heinemann. Oxford.
- CPA Doc. [1998]. *Parliament and the media: Building an effective relationship*. CPA Secretariat. London.
- Collins, M. [Ed.]. [1983]. The new junior secondary atlas for Zimbabwe. Longman. Harare.

- Conley, A [Ed.]. [1993]. Rethinking technologies. UMPress. Minnesota.
- Crowley, R. & Mitchell, W. [Eds.]. [1994]. Communication theory today. CUP. Stanford.
- Cubitt, S. [1998]. Digital aesthetics. Sage. London.
- Curran, J. & Gurevitch, M. [Eds.]. [1996]. Mass media and society. Arnold. London.
- Davidow, J. [1984]. A peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia, 1979. Westview. Boulder.
- Deleuze, G. [1983]. Movement-image. Vol. 1. UMPress. Minnesota.
- Dodgshon, R. [1998]. Society in time and space. CUP. Cambridge.
- Fanon, F. [1968]. The wretched of the earth. Grove Press. NY.
- Feenberg, A. [1995]. Alternative modernity: The technical turn in philosophy and social theory. Univ. of California Press. Berkely.
- Feltoe, G., Biti, T. et al. [1999]. *Zimbabwe Human rights bulletin*. LFZ. Harare.
- Ferguson, J. [1999]. Expectations of modernity: Myths and meanings on the Zambian Copperbelt. Univ. of California Press. Berkeley.
- Frederikse, J. [1982]. None but ourselves: Masses versus media in the making of Zimbabwe. Ravan. Johannesburg.
- Freire, P. [1993] Pedagogy of the city. Continuum. New York.
- Freire, P. [1970] Pedagogy of the oppressed. Herder. New York.
- Foucault, M. [1977]. Discipline and punish. Pantheon. New York.
- Gabriel, T. [1982]. Third cinema in Third World: The aesthetics of liberation. UMI; Research Press. Michigan.
- Garlake, P. [1973]. Great Zimbabwe. Thames and Hudson. London.

- Giddens, A. [1995]. The globalizing of modernity. In Ali Sreberney-Mohammadi et al [Eds.]. [1997]. Media in global context: A reader. Arnold. London.
- Graham, G. [Ed.]. [2000]. Beneath a Zimbabwe sun. Graham House. Harare.
- Gramsci, A. [1971]. Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Lawrence. London.
- Grosswiler, P. [1998]. The Method is the medium: Rethinking McLuhan through critical theory. Black Rose. Montreal.
- Good, R. [1973]. UDI: The international politics of the Rhodesian rebellion. Routledge. London.
- Habermas, J. [1989]. The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. [translated by Thomas Burger]. MIT Press. Cambridge.
- Haggard, H. [1993]. King solomon's mines. OUP. Oxford.
- Hannerz, U. [1996]. Transnational connections: Culture, people, places. Routledge. NY.
- Hannerz, U. [1997]. Notes on the global ecumene. In Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., Winseck, D. et. al. [Eds.]. Media in global context: A reader. Arnold. London.
- Haraway, D. [1991]. Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. Routledge. New York.
- Harvey, D. [1989]. The condition of postmodernity. Blackwell. Oxford.
- HMSO. [1951]. Report on Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Act, statutory instruments and command papers. HMSO Printers. London.
- Hole, H. [1930]. The Jameson raid. Philip Allan. London.
- Honeyman, R. [Ed.]. [1998]. Africa: Film and television. Z Promotions. Harare.

- Hornik, R. [1988]. Development communication: Information, agriculture, nutrition and the Third World. Longman. New York.
- Horton, R. [Ed.]. [1982]. *Zimbabwe journal of education*. Mambo. Gweru.
- Human Kinetics Pub. [1996]. *Sociology of Sport Journal*. Vol. 13. Hamilton.
- Jameson, F. & Miyoshi, M. [1998]. The cultures of globalisation. Duke Univ. Press. Durham.
- Jeater, D. [1993]. Marriage, perversion, and power. Clarendon. Oxford.
- Judd, D. [1977]. The Boer war. MacGibbon. London.
- Kahari, G. [1980]. The search for Zimbabwean identity. Mambo Press. Gweru.
- Kirkwood, K. [1951]. The proposed federation of the central African territories. SAIRR. Johannesburg.
- Lash, S. [1999]. Another modernity: A different rationality. Blackwell. London.
- Lash, S. & Urry, J. [1994]. Economies of signs and space. Sage. London.
- Lerner, D. [1958]. The passing of traditional society. Free Press. New York.
- Loader, D. [Ed.]. [1997]. The governance of cyberspace, Routledge. New York.
- Lopez, C. [1994]. Enough is enough: For an alternative diagnosis of the African crisis. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Uppsalla.
- Lyotard, Jean-F. [1979]. The postmodern condition : A report on knowledge. MUP. Minneapolis.
- Mallows, W. [1984]. The mystery of the Great Zimbabwe: A new solution. Norton & Co. New York.
- Manungo, K. [1991]. *The role peasants played in the Zimbabwe war of liberation, with special emphasis on Chiweshe District*. [Ph.D. thesis]. Univ. of Ohio. Ohio.

- Marquard, L. [1971]. A federation of Southern Africa. OUP. London.
- Marks, L. [2000]. The skin of the film: Intercultural cinema, embodiment, and the senses.
Duke UP. Durham.
- Maravanyika, O. et al. [1990]. [Gov. Doc.]. *Education in Zimbabwe: Dilemmas of quantity and quality*. MoEC. Harare.
- Mattelart, A. & Siegelau, S. [Eds.]. [1979]. Communication and class struggle: Capitalism, imperialism. IMMRC. Bagnolet.
- Mattelart, A & Siegelau, S. [Eds.]. [1983] Communication and class struggle : Liberation, socialism. IMMRC. Bagnolet.
- Matindike, S. [1992]. Directory of NGOs in Zimbabwe. Annual. Nango. Harare.
- McChesney, R & Herman, E. [1997] Global media: The new missionaries of corporate capitalism. Cassell. London.
- McLuhan, M. [1964] Understanding media: The extensions of man. McGraw Hill. NY.
- Mills, M. [1974]. Thinking about the future. Collins. Salisbury.
- M.M. Project. [2000]. A question of balance. Harare.
- MoEC of Zimbabwe. [1983]. School and society. National Centre. Harare.
- Mosco, V. [1996]. The political economy of communication: Rethinking and renewal.
Sage. London.
- Mulgan, G. [1991]. Communication and control. Routledge. London.
- Mungoshi, C. [1975]. Waiting for the rain. ZPH. Harare.
- [1972]. The coming of the dry season. Mambo. Gweru.
- Munro, J. [1984]. Britain in tropical Africa: Economic relationships and impact (1880 - 1960). Macmillan. London.

- National Railways. [2000]. *Annual report for 1999*. NRZ. Harare.
- Ngugi wa, T. [1986]. Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature. James Currey. London.
- Nyagumbo, M. [1980]. With the people: An autobiography from the Zimbabwe struggle. Allison and Busby. London.
- Nyerere, J. [1967]. Ujamaa or socialism? EAPH. Dar es Salaam.
- OSPAAL. [1988]. *Tricontinental magazine*. 6. 120. Nov-December. Osvaldo Sanchez. Havana.
- Owen, D. [1977]. Rhodesia: Proposal for a settlement. HMSO. London.
- Phelan, J. [Ed.]. [1996]. *Africa review of business and technology*. June.
- Poster, M. [1995]. The second media age. Polity Press. Cambridge.
- Pool, S [Ed.]. [1977]. The social impact of the telephone. MIT. Cambridge.
- Pool, S., Frey, C. et al. [1973]. Handbook of communication. Rand McNally. Chicago.
- POSB. [2000]. *Post office savings bank: Annual report*. Harare.
- Pride, J. [Ed.]. [1985]. Introduction. Cross-cultural encounters: Communication and miscommunication. River Seine. Melbourne.
- Rhodesia Gov. [1964]. *Parliamentary debates*. Vol. 1 and 2.
- Riddell, R. [1978]. Alternatives to poverty. Mambo. Gweru.
- Roberts, B. [1987]. Cecil Rhodes: The flawed colossus. Hamish Hamilton. London.
- Robins, K. [1996]. Into the image: Culture & politics in the field of vision. Routledge. New York.
- Rotberg, R. [1988]. The founder: Cecil Rhodes and the pursuit of power. OUP. Oxford.
- Schiller, D. [1999]. Digital capitalism: Networking the global market. MIT. Cambridge.

- Schramm, W. [1964]. Mass media and national development. Stanford Univ. Press. California.
- Silverstone, R. & Mansell, R. [1996]. Communication by design: The politics of information and communication technologies. OUP. Oxford.
- Silverstone, R & Hirsch, E. [1996]. Consuming technologies: media and information in domestic spaces. Routledge. London.
- Singer, B. [1980]. Social functions of the telephone. Palo Alto. California.
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. & Mohammadi, A. [1997]. Small media and revolutionary change: A new model. In Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., Winseck, D. et. al. [Ed.]. Media in global context: A reader. Arnold. London.
- Southam Group. [2001]. *Ottawa citizen*. Jan. 20. CanWest. Ottawa.
- Stein, R. [Ed.]. [1995]. *Teacher in Zimbabwe*. Various.
- Stevenson, R. [1988]. Communication, development and the Third World: Global politics of information. Longman. London.
- Stoneman, C. & Cliffe, L. [1989]. Zimbabwe: Politics, economics and society. Pinter. London.
- Sussman, G. & Lent, J. [Eds.]. [1991]. Transnational Communications :Wiring the Third World, Sage. California.
- Sussman, G. & Lent, J. [Eds.]. [1998]. Global productions: Labour in the making of the 'information society'. Hampton Press. California.
- Szuchewycz, B. and Sloniowski, J. [1999]. Canadian communication: Issues in contemporary media and culture. Prentice Hall. Scarborough.

- Taylor, C. [1989]. Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Harvard UP. Cambridge.
- Thomson P/L. [2000]. *The globe and mail*. April 22, 23, 30.
- Thompson, J. [1995]. The media and modernity: A social theory of the media. Univ. of California Press. California.
- Trainor, B. [1998]. The origin and end of modernity. World Heritage. Quebec.
- Ugboajah, F. [1985]. Mass communication, culture & society in West Africa. Zell. Munich.
- Ukadike, F. [1994]. Black African cinema. Univ. Calif. Press. California.
- UNESCO, [1999]. *Africa Recovery*, Vol 13. 1. June
- US Senate doc. [2000]. Zimbabwe democracy act 2000. Senate. Washington DC.
- Webster, F. [1995] Theories of Information Society. Routledge. London.
- Weir, S. [2000]. The long war against democracy. Gale Group. *New statesman*. April.
- Wolfe, C. [1998]. Critical environments: Postmodern theory and the pragmatics of the "outside." Univ.Minn.Press. Minneapolis.
- Yack, B. [1997]. The fetishism of modernities. Notre Dame. Indiana.
- Zhuwarara, R. et al. [1997]. Media, democratisation and identity. UZ Publ. Harare.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [1989]. *The promotion of investment: Policy regulations*. Gov.P. Harare.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [2000]. *Presidential powers (temporary measures) (land acquisition) regulations*. Gov. Printers. Harare.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [2000]. *The copyright and neighbouring act*. Gov.P. Harare.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [1999]. *Y2K National taskforce reports*. Various. Harare.
- Zimbabwe Gov.[2000]. *Zimbabwe parliamentary debates*. Vol. 27. 36.

- Zimbabwe Gov.[2000]. *Zimbabwe parliamentary debates*. Vol. 27. 11.
- Zimbabwe Gov.[2000]. *Zimbabwe parliamentary debates*. Vol. 27. 7.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [2000]. *Zimbabwe parliamentary debates*. Vol. 27. 6.
- Zimbabwe Gov.[1999]. *Zimbabwe parliamentary debates*. Vol. 25. 79.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [1999]. *National child labour survey: Country report*.
- Zimbabwe Gov. [1985]. *Zimbabwe report to UNESCO conference*. Gov. Printers. Harare.
- Zimbabwe PH. [1995]. *Teachers in Zimbabwe*. Various. Harare.
- ZANU PF. [1977]. *Mugabe defines the line*. ZANU PF Commissariat. Maputo.
- ZANU PF. [1987]. *Zimbabwe news*. Various. Jongwe. Harare.
- Zimpapers. [2001]. *Herald* January 16. "ZANU PF wins Bikita West seat."
- Zimpapers. [1999]. *Herald*, September 25. "Summit news."
- Zimpapers. [1998]. *Herald* April 6. "Use three main languages nationally."
- Filmography
- Dangarembizi, T. [1995]. *Everyone's child*. Harare. Zimbabwe.
- Mambety, D. [1973]. *Touki Bouki: The hyenas' journey*. Senegal.
- Mawuru, G. [1992]. *Neria*. Harare. Zimbabwe.
- Sinclair, I. [1996]. *Flame*. Harare. Zimbabwe.
- Spicer, E. [1999]. *Dancing out of tune*. Harare. Zimbabwe.

APPENDICES

Appendix One.

Interview Schedule [Level 1].

Interview Schedule [Level 2].

Verbatim Interview extracts.

RESEARCH INTO COMMUNICATION MEDIA

ZIMBABWE

Semi-structured Interview: Instrument One (1)

Level of Application: Ministerial/Parliament

DATE:.....INTERVIEW CODE:.....PLACE:.....TIME:.....

Micro-cassette Tape Label:.....Counter/Duration:.....Level:.....

Question Items.

Item 1.

What would you say are the goals of your communication policy?

Item 2.

To what extent is your Ministry/Department involved in programmes aimed at achieving these purposes?

Item 3.

How well has government met its goals in communication since independence in this country?

Item 4.

Is there a distinction between the way communication functions in communal Zimbabwe and that of the urban communities?

Item 5.

In your opinion, what was the communicative significance of the war of liberation? Why?

Item 6.

What vision did the government have of the new Zimbabwe at independence?

Item 7.

What would you say are the particular strengths and characteristics of communications in the modern civil service of Zimbabwe?

Item 8.

What aspects of communication policy do you see as instrumental in influencing the place of communications in the daily lives of Zimbabweans? Why?

Item 9.

Would you say Zimbabweans are generally concerned with communications? What media are open to them?

RESEARCH INTO COMMUNICATION MEDIA

ZIMBABWE

Semi-structured Interview: Instrument Two (2)

Level of Application: Directorate

DATE:.....INTERVIEW CODE:.....PLACE:.....TIME:.....

Micro-cassette Tape Label:.....Counter/Duration:.....Level:.....

Question Items.

Item 1.

What would you say are the goals of your communication policy in the Department?

Item 2.

To what extent have you promoted programmes that meet your Departmental commitment?

Item 3.

How well has government met its goals in communication in Zimbabwe since independence?

Item 4.

Is there a distinction between the way communication media work in communal Zimbabwe and that of the urban environment? How does your Department operate between the two locales?

Item 5.

What do you think was the communicative significance of the war of liberation? Why?

Item 6.

What are the particular characteristics of office routines in your Department?

Item 7.

In the past, how did you organize for communication in your Department?

Item 8.

Do you think there have been any significant shifts in office routines since independence?

Explain your response.

Item 9.

What aspects of communication media policy do you see as instrumental in influencing the place of communications in the daily lives of Zimbabweans? Why?

Item 10.

Would you say Zimbabweans are concerned with communications?

Interview data: Extracts

Verbatim quotations

Interviewer: What would you say are the goals of your communication policy?

VS.1: ...to ensure that we reach the remotest possible places. We disseminate information ...distribute educational programmes.

[] The goals are to ensure that we also move with the happenings in the world today in terms of bringing in modern communication methods which are internet services, e-mail, even the establishment of education by distance learning.

[] Seventy five percent of Zimbabwe has got access to our own radio communication. The telecommunication system has reached more than fifty percent of the country. Right now the introduction of mobile communication is in progress. Most of the urban areas are covered by mobile communications but the rural areas are not yet developed to that extent...

PE.1: The goals...largely to do with rural areas and giving media opportunity to grassroots. ...seeking to monitor and highlight development activities at grass-root level so that rural communities and their aspirations, their ambitions, their problems are articulated in the media as much as the social and other groupings in urban areas.

PE.3: Well, we did not always have a communication policy in the ministry... in the past we relied on newspapers and other mass media and electronic media.

[] For instance, we relied on public occasions such as graduation ceremonies to communicate with the general public what we're doing. And the speech at the ceremony became the medium of communicating with the general public. Or we would find

ourselves reacting to media questions on some of our institutionswe normally have enormous difficulties in dealing with students... housing, feeding, financing ...

[] We want people to know how to deal with us, how to access us and what services to expect from us. We now have a web-page with departmental functions outlined there. We want people to be informed ...we play a critical role in manpower development for this country.

Interviewer: Is there a distinction between the way communication functions in communal Zimbabwe and urban communities?

VS.1: Certainly. The use of the fax, e-mail, internet, and even the use of the telephone and mobile system is found in the city. TV services and even radio itself ...accessibility is mainly in urban areas but in the rural areas there is need for great improvement.

PE.1: [] we've deployed media personnel at district stations under Zimbabwe Information Services or ZIS. They are found in some of the remotest parts of the country: Binga to Beitbridge and across to Chipinge and others. The brief for our staff is to do features, reports and capture local response to multifaceted developments in the rural areas and the participation of people in the programmes.

[] Where we have been lucky, personnel teams of extension officers in agriculture, health and co-operatives and the media officers interact with the audience after watching a film or video to elaborate on the messages being shown or given.

PE.2: Yes, there is a distinction. I think the media are aware that in the communal area they may actually have to lead the people...make people aware...not usual though to be invited to cover what's happening in the rural areas. The urban people want the media to cover them. The rural people want to get on with their lives... almost like the media is an

inconvenience. The attitude seems to be: ‘if you don’t live here, you shouldn’t be interested’.

PE.3: I wouldn’t say there is a distinction between rural and urban, it’s more of class. We have newspapers like the *Herald*, *Sunday Mail* and then we’ve the *Kwayedza* and others. These others carry stories about the witches, healers and so at a much lower level. They’re catering for this other population. It’s not very informative. If you compare the information you get from the *Herald* on finance, business and someone relies on *Kwayedza* for their information, then they are going to be very ignorant people.

[] But then you need to be able to read English to read these other newspapers. Again if you take radio, say Radio One and Two. Radio topics are again different with Radio Two emphasising Africanism, culture and they put it at a level where they assume people are not sophisticated. Even news items are not the same: we’re catering for two different classes. Television, there’s hardly anything there for the working person. I am trying to get the class distinction thing here. You see, someone walked in here one time and said they wanted to do a degree specializing in cartoons.

[] Children spend all afternoons watching cartoons but they’re not watching cartoons about us. So when they grow up they fail to relate to being an African... through these little cartoons: they’re swamped into foreign cultures, foreign behaviours.

[] So the child who develops, watching these things is not an African... and worse they don’t go to the rural areas either. Television sometimes gets a topic for discussion. But what time do they programme it? In the morning, on *AM Zimbabwe* or Saturday morning – just when people are in town. Or again the university graduation, you find the papers

don't report it in the community papers: we must ask why? If you read in local languages you are expected not to appreciate what goes on at university?

Interviewer: Communicative significance of the war of liberation?

VS.1: During the liberation struggle communication was based on person to person contact. When the liberation guerrillas moved into an area, they used a number of communication systems to get the message across. They used our history. History was communicated through song. They politicised people by addressing them directly.

[] There was also the use of the radio... that was being run from Maputo. And that was assisting. What we have lost is probably this idea of the leaders moving to explain, communicating with people by staying with them, talking to them and explaining government policy. We've kind of built a gap between the leadership and the people.

[] We only visit them when we need the vote and this is where we have lacked in communicating even the problems of the government, the hardships of the economy. They only hear them from the radio, they can read them partly from newspapers but if we were going to talk to them like guerrillas used to do, they would understand more than they do now.

PE.1: ... there would have much to gain from a linkage between communication and liberation and communication, now, with development. A lot of it more or less spilled over into independence. Shortly after independence nearly every Friday most of our leadership was going back to their provinces. They were addressing huge crowds, defining the policies of the new government, the ambitions of the new government and introducing the government to the population.

[] With time, there was less and less of that until hardly anything remained.

In another way, if we had linked communication strategy with the liberation, it would have meant also that the voices that were heard so much would have not have suddenly gone unheard: the local leaderships, and during the liberation they included *mujibhas*¹ [guerrilla couriers] all the way to the chief. Nobody across the age-group would have remained unheard.

PE.2: You know, educationally, during the war people were not reading newspapers as such. The radio was the source of what's happening ... and I think because trusted the Maputo radio, this has continued into independence. This is a good tool for education. It's trusted.

[] If you communicate anything by radio, the rural areas will get to know about it. For instance, that radio programme on deaths is very widely listened to.

PE.3: Let me put it this way. Before independence, people were talked to...the whole liberation struggle was about winning the hearts and minds of people. It wasn't like Smith dictating to people.

[] *Pungwe* was about dialogue. It was about education, educating people about their lives, independence, development and people became partners. They participated. I think some of the problems we have now date back to that. I think people learnt that when you have a government, it doesn't dictate to you. It works with you: it consults you. You are partners together. I think this is the greatest achievement of the liberation war: to put people at the centre as human beings who had rights, opinions, and ideas. And guerrillas impressed this lesson on our people. And the war was by the people for the people.

¹ The term, *mujibha*, refers to male youths who were guerrilla couriers during the liberation war: news, logistical material, security reports etc. and the female counterpart were termed *chimbwindo*.

[] The Zimbabwe that we had just after independence had a lot of dedication. Civil servants worked dedicated to the idea that this is our country, our nation together. Even the policy of reconciliation was feeding into this stream of thought, born out of the war effort. Twenty years later, we're no longer one nation...perhaps even reconciliation worked within reason. Even the significant achievement of communication is gone.

Interviewer: Vision at independence? How well has practice approximated it?

VS.1: [vision]...where every person had access to information. So the first thing they did was to ensure that people were educated. ...they started the educational thing...once you are educated, literate, you can now read and write then you can have access to information. Secondly, if communication entails advancement of knowledge through whatever programmes will be coming up.

VS.2: When you are literate, you can appreciate and understand ...programmes on television or radio... the whole country can understand and can communicate in the process and share ideas. Then we have a knowledgeable community and society.

PE.1: ...reasonably well, but fell short of our own vision. Think of the government news agency. They generate a huge amount of copy without themselves being responsible for that copy's publication. So they feed all kinds of media, newspapers and broadcasting, but ultimately it's the editors of those media who determine how much or whether any of it will be published.

[] The government news agency has not had a vehicle of its own to take or carry ... news stories. ...localised newspapers...circulated within the communities themselves. What we have is *reporting on* the communities.... You are unlikely to find a copy of CNG²

² Community Newspapers Group publish the community newspapers in the regions Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

newspaper at a local business centre or at a local secondary school or primary school. It's in the orientation.

[] ...the minister was incidental to the aspirations ... seeks to fulfil but the agency of the programme is with the people. ...seek to inspire this community ...see their own power and opportunity for empowerment. That is where I say we have fallen short.

PE.2: ... a lot depends on the ministers... some see the need for communication, others don't. They simply leave it to directors. Even when there was nothing wrong, that dialogue was needed... to continue, with women academics, vice chancellors... over a luncheon, or we just pick up the phone and say 'hello, what's happening at your institution?' I think this has come about only in the last six or seven years: it has not always been there. ... those communication lines are being opened.

PE.3: We learnt slowly about the power of communications, and especially that it must not be left to other people. Government as a whole has been generally reactive... the negative publicity the country has received, it has received this because there's a void. The print media and foreign media has played havoc on us because we have not ourselves told the story of what we're doing and why we're doing the things we do.

Interviewer: Status of communications in government modern administration?

VS.1: []...There is only the use of the telephone. ...a number of governments departments are not even computerised, it takes a long time for documents to move from one person to another.

PE.1: Telex services ...there is this desk here at the province. They raise the district stations and and say 'what's your diary like and when can we expect your feature or stories for the day or week?' ...video technology is almost instantaneous.

[] Educational opportunity through participatory approaches is possible here. Our own staff can film and within days or weeks take back the film and cause discussion, debate and interaction between the communities and the extension officer or our own staff. ... they can also carry a success story from one community to another.

Interviewer: On efficacious modes of communication?

VS.1: The radio is very instrumental in affecting people's daily lives...cheapest mode of distribution of information. You do not need infra-structural development of a serious nature...it can go far and wide. The programmes put on radio can be in many languages that can easily be understood by people.

VS.2: The newspapers are not very accessible. The computer requires a lot of money to put up the infra-structure and then education. But the radio is for everybody.

VS.3: The need to deploy everything that is available is not always appreciated. The internet is available in some ministries and of course much more in the private sector. There is need to increase the appropriate use of the common telephone...

PE.1: []...the media are alerted especially the ZBC who consume our copy for their radio news casts. ...then we have two live radio broadcasts each week when reporters speak from their district stations.

PE.2: ...we meet every two weeks ourselves. Because we are a small unit, we meet to discuss or pass necessary information to each other. This is not a matter of policy. It's just practice. One officer can call for meeting if they think they have a task, such as a Bill, that they think requires input from everyone else....

[] We also find our way into what the ministry is doing even if others do not want to know what we do here.... We prepare papers, background material.... the need is almost

always sectoral...tertiary education included universities, technical colleges, teachers' colleges, everybody. The need was there for a unit, which became the national council for higher education, to enrich the changes in higher education.

[] Visits were made to Kenya, you see, people wanted a para-statal, not a sort of arm of government...there were even demonstrations in 1990 when the Act was promulgated.

PE.3: Globalisation is here. People want to know what's happening in the world and here as well. We now have public relations officers. We didn't have this before, there're two of them, but that's how important communications have become. They arrange work with the media, prepare press statements and generally is between us and the media...Our communication is not just through the media, we do hold workshops if say, we're changing policy. We do provincial visits, we write letters to the press, as ministry or representing other points of view ...it's a way of bringing information to bear...We participate in Trade Fair, colleges do so on an individual basis, they also have their own prospectuses... Leadership should take the time, and not wait to be asked. We educated a lot of people since the 1980s, now we must provide the information.

Interviewer: General concern with communications by Zimbabweans?

VS.1: Certainly. They are very very concerned. Our people, because of the present economic hardships they want to know what is happening.

[]...This is why the liberalisation of the communication industry. There are many newspapers around now, radio stations, the regulation of the communication sector, mobile and telephone services. People are interested. They are interested in getting communication.

VS.2: There's no doubt about this at all. Communications have become, in the last few years, everybody's business. The way our people watch the eight o'clock across this country has transformed the meaning of the national news broadcast.

PE.1: ... government would pronounce ... media and information policy and put that out very clearly in order for media players to know the environment.... The media itself seeking to regulate its performance and its personnel through maybe some media council...be the buffer between the media and government, the media and private individuals and institutions ...discipline its own members...

PE.2: I think the bush network has finally graduated now. You see many people buy one or other of the newspapers but usually both. For me, the fact of buying the two papers seems to be the need for objectivity. Even old newspapers will be read in the rural areas. The need for transparency ...media is almost now on a rampage to make people aware of what officials in any form are doing ... what they are doing, with accountability and transparency.

PE.3: Our belief is that Zimbabwe has achieved a great deal since independence. We've not received credit for the great deal we've done in education, health, human rights. But we've left it to others who have an axe to grind with us. You will not believe that up to the time of the last elections, we did not even have a web-page.

[] All our 'enemies', [*in inverted commas*] have web-pages and we have left them to write about us and our country. Even the so-called independent newspapers, they are on-line and linked to BBC and others entities.

[] Let me say this, I believe in regulating the airwaves. I believe we can get better service by including more players. The monopoly of radio, television and even the PTC [post and

telecommunications] is short-changing the public. Efficiency would improve. You see, now you can have a cell-phone but not the line or the line but no cell-phone.

[] Sometimes you have something urgent to pass on, and you have cell-phone in your pocket but you cant communicate...blood pressures among senior executives might be due some of these factors....you pay for it but can't communicate. If we bring other players, we improve this efficiency and don't forget, we also create jobs.

Appendix Two.

Consent Form.

Neria Film Questionnaire.

CONSENT FORM

Participation to the Interview Schedule/Questionnaire Response

Research Theme/Topic

The Political Economy of Communication Media

in Zimbabwe: Promise and Performance

[1980 – 1999]

Aim of the Study

The study focuses attention on the significance of communications in national efforts to develop countries such as Zimbabwe. Communications cut across many things. They are supposed to help communities develop and increase their capacity for achieving high and modern standards of life. The aim is therefore to find out the status of communications for development in Zimbabwe.

Interview schedule/Film Questionnaire

- a. The Interview Schedule lasts at most fifteen minutes. The Film Questionnaire lasts less than seven minutes. But the film lasts 1 hour 35 minutes.
- b. It is important that those of you selected to participate in the Interviews, share your experiences and views on communications and development.
- c. You may not want to answer all the questions. Please simply indicate on the copy of the Interview Schedule. On the Film Questionnaire, simply skip the item.
- d. Your identity will not be revealed in the research report, instead a code will be used.

Grant of consent to participate

I should be grateful for your indication [by signature] below as willingness to participate in this research. You can still withdraw, however, if you change your mind.

Thank you.

.....
L D K Dokora

Researcher Date

.....
Participant

Film/Interview Schedule [delete n/a]

FILM QUESTIONNAIRE [FQ]
RESEARCH INTO COMMUNICATION MEDIA
ZIMBABWE

There are twelve statements below. After watching the film, NERIA, please evaluate the items on this sheet. The score 1: means disagree strongly; 2: disagree; 3: no opinion; 4: agree; 5: agree strongly. Circle your response.

Thank you for your time and effort. The Film: NERIA, is one hour 35 minutes.

1. The film has a message for the audience.	1	2	3	4	5
2. 'Home' for Patrick and Neria is:					
a. Their house in town	1	2	3	4	5
b. Their communal family	1	2	3	4	5
c. The hill-side place	1	2	3	4	5
3. After Patrick dies in the accident, Katsande is right in his actions towards his young brother's family:					
a. Yes, he was right	1	2	3	4	5
b. No, he was wrong	1	2	3	4	5
4. Tradition and modern life are different systems.	1	2	3	4	5
5. At the end of the film, justice is seen to be done.	1	2	3	4	5
6. The snake in the film is a sign from the spirits.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I watch films of my choice at home.	1	2	3	4	5
8. The film makes it look interesting to live in rural areas.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Women are treated fairly in the course of the film.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I would like to watch another film like NERIA.	1	2	3	4	5
11. The <i>kurova guva</i> ceremony should be continued as a tradition.	1	2	3	4	5
12. The film is not to be taken seriously: it's only a film	1	2	3	4	5
13. The music in the film is good.	1	2	3	4	5
14. The treatment of children in the film is good.	1	2	3	4	5
15. The adults do not consider the opinions of children important.	1	2	3	4	5
16. The courtroom scene shows the triumph of justice.	1	2	3	4	5
17. The court-case shows the determined Neria as a woman in search of justice.	1	2	3	4	5

Thank you for your co-operation.

Appendix Three.

Map 2: Zimbabwe climatic conditions.

Map 2. Climatic conditions: Zimbabwe

Collins, M. O. [Ed.], New junior secondary atlas for Zimbabwe, 1983, p.5