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**The Impact of War and War Preparation on State Formation
in the Third World: Four Case Studies from the Middle East**

by

Thierry Gongora, M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

July 20, 1995

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**THE IMPACT OF WAR AND WAR PREPARATION ON STATE FORMATION
IN THE THIRD WORLD: FOUR CASE STUDIES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST**

submitted by

Thierry Gongora, B. Sc., M. Sc.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

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Carleton University
September 8, 1995

Abstract

The research is about the impact of war making on Third World states, in the light of the historical pattern of state formation through war making in Europe. The methodology was a comparative case-study analysis of four national cases: Egypt (1948-73), Syria (1948-89), and Iran and Iraq (1980-88). The four national cases were taken from the Middle East because this region shared many common features with old Europe. If the European pattern of state formation through war making is not valid in the Middle East it is unlikely to be valid in other regions of the Third World. On the whole it was found that the European pattern was not validated in the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq War, the most intensive war surveyed, had a very negative impact on state power in Iran, and the available evidence points to a similar outcome in Iraq. Similarly, the power of the Egyptian state declined after 1967 when Egypt entered a period of intensive war preparation. The Syrian state was the least negatively affected by war making, thanks to its access to important external resources during the 1970s. However, during the 1980s, the Syrian state had difficulty carrying out its program of armament. As in Egypt earlier, the Syrian state had to consider an economic liberalization. The main cause of the non-occurrence of the European pattern is the form of warfare prevailing in the Middle East. High-intensity conventional warfare puts a premium on modern weaponry in large quantities, hard currency, and skilled military manpower. These resources are not readily available domestically, or likely to be generated rapidly; thus the state has no incentive to grow in power in order to extract them. It relies on foreign powers for modern weaponry and on externally-derived revenues for hard currency. Nevertheless, the financial challenge of war making forced the four states to shift resources from domestic state making to defense and to liberalize their economy.

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Introduction

We are as ignorant about war as the physicist is of the true nature of matter (Braudel 1973, 836).

War making, that is war and war preparation, has been a major cause of the emergence and development of the modern state in the Western world. The present thesis attempts to assess the impact of war making on the formation of four contemporary Third World states, namely Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. By studying these four Middle Eastern countries I wanted to answer some simple questions: Did war making in those countries influence state power positively or negatively? Did war making change state-society relations and the regime in power? If the pattern found in the four cases diverged from the European pattern of state making through war making what reasons could be put forward to explain the differences?

The impact of war making on state formation in the Third World is a subject that has not attracted all the attention it deserves. Many reasons can explain why that subject has been understudied. One reason has to do with the division of labor and specialization within the social sciences. The study of the impact of war making in the European past has been a field of research for historians (who know the subject as war and society studies) and historical sociologists, like Charles Tilly, familiar with European history. Few Third World specialists are aware of that literature and think about applying its hypotheses to the Third World. As for the analysts who study military and security affairs in the Third World, they focus on current issues rather than on long-term phenomena that have little relevance for policymaking.

However, there is a more fundamental reason for the lack of interest in the present subject: the social sciences, until recently, had difficulty viewing war as a source of social change. Sociology and economics in France and Great Britain during the 19th century developed under the influence of liberalism and positivism. For the social scientists of the

era, like Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Herbert Spencer, war was a residue of the pre-industrial age doomed to disappear with the development of international commerce and of the industrial society.¹ War was seen as dysfunctional to commerce and industrialization and thus it could not be integrated as a source of development in the evolutionary and functionalist theories of 19th century sociologists.

However, in Germany, a nation unified through a series of war in the 19th century, there were many historians and sociologists who argued that war and military organization were forces that could shape the development of a nation or society. Some among those scholars went as far as to praise war. For them war was a regenerative force that could cure a nation of the debilitating influence of materialism and individualism. Other German scholars, like Otto Hintze and Max Weber, had more moderate and scientific arguments on the subject, but the notion remained that an analyst positing war as a source of change or development was necessarily speaking in praise of war as some German nationalists and European fascists had done in the past.

The lack of interest for the study of war as a source of domestic change endured for most of the present century. The study of war became the preserve of international relations with a special emphasis on the study of the causes and prevention of war: while comparativists kept developing theories of change that were teleological, society-centered, and focused on domestic sources of change (Janos 1986, 65-8). In that context the study of war as a source of domestic change tallied with neither research agenda. The situation evolved in the 1970s when theories of change started to change in many respects. First, the international system and the interface between international and domestic politics became variables that could explain domestic development (Almond 1989; Janos 1986,

¹ The place of the factor war in sociology has been reviewed by David Dunn and Anthony Giddens (Dunn 1974; Giddens 1987, 22-7). The position of liberal economists on free trade and war was well summarized by Geoffrey Blainey and Kenneth Waltz (Blainey 1988; 18-24; Waltz 1959, 98-9). Samples of opinions from the German nationalist school on the positive role of war in the development of nations can be found in the analysis of Raymond Aron, K. J. Holsti and David Dunn (Aron 1984, 576; Dunn 1974, 226-7; Holsti 1991, 161).

68-95; Migdal 1983, 323-7). Second, the state and politics made a comeback in the literature on development. Politics and the state mattered to explain change; everything could not be accounted for in relation to economic, cultural, or societal explanations (Nordlinger 1987, 353-61; Skocpol 1985). Finally, development was reconceptualized. The notion of an inexorable evolutive process was replaced by a process of change characterized by periods of crisis and redefinition with the possibility of failure and decline (Krasner 1984, 240-3; Migdal 1983, 322-3). Theoretically, in this new context, war could be integrated as a variable explaining domestic change since it concerned politics and the state, represented an international variable and the international/domestic interface and was probably the best example of a crisis that could induce open-ended change.

Whether in reference to the European past or to the contemporary Third World the argument linking war making with the development of the state should not be construed as implying that war making was the only cause of the development of the state, or that all states developed successfully in response to the challenge of war making. Obviously this was not the case since many European states in the past disappeared as a result of war or declined because of their inability to become, or to remain, viable military powers. Similarly, the importance of war making in shaping state development has declined dramatically in the Western world since 1945; the management of the economy, of public services, and of welfare programs has created more important challenges for the capacities of advanced industrialized states than the preparation of war.

The purpose of the present thesis is not to compare war making to other potential causes of the formation of the state, or to find what proportion of states in a given population have developed in response to the challenge of war making. It rather aims at exploring the relation between war making and state formation in the Third World in the light of the European pattern of successful state making through war making.

The four Third World cases chosen for study come from the Middle East; yet this is not an area-study thesis. As it will be argued later, the Middle East was chosen as a crucial case study to confront the reality of the contemporary Third World with the pattern found in European history. The Middle East was chosen on the basis of criteria of comparative analysis, as well as because of the wealth of information available in English and French about that region. Other potential cases like India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea offered less research material and were less comparable structurally to Europe. The present research, therefore, relies on the exploitation and interpretation of already known events, facts, data, and opinions to provide an overall view that no analyst, to my knowledge, has presented yet.

However, an important limitation remains, the present study argues that the pattern found in the four cases is characteristic of the Third World and thus can be generalized to other Third World cases where similar conditions prevail; yet it does not provide a test of that assertion. The limitation of the present thesis in regard to the generalization of its results is offset in my opinion by what I think is an original line of research and by the value of the case studies as sources of evidence to generate further hypotheses and research. Ultimately, however, it rests with the reader to judge whether my decision was wise.

1. Literature Review

The present literature review is organized in three concentric circles, each one narrower than the preceding one and dealing more directly with the questions that will attract our attention in the following chapters. The first circle is made up of the studies on the impact of the military on sociopolitical change in the Third World. These studies are divided into two opposing perspectives, which nevertheless share a common research agenda: one argues that the military institution can help the transition of Third World countries toward development, while the other perspective argues, on the contrary, that the military in the Third World only contribute to the reproduction of neo-colonial relations and to the promotion of an inadequate model of development. These two perspectives represent the conventional views on the impact of the military factor on patterns of change in the Third World. They are included here so that the reader can grasp more easily the originality of the thesis' problématique by setting it against the background of the more traditional literature.

The second concentric circle in the review tackles the literature at the origin of my problématique. This literature is diverse since it is the product of the works of historians, sociologists and political scientists who have tried to explain the development of the modern state in Europe and the contribution that war and war preparation made to this process. However, a lot of attention is given in that review to the works of the historical sociologist Charles Tilly because he was a major source of inspiration for the present thesis. The last concentric circle in the literature review deals with the reoccurrence or non-occurrence of the European model of state making through war making in the contemporary Third World. This last issue is ultimately the main theme of the present research.

Two Conventional Views on the Military and (Under)Development

The Military as a Modernizing Force in the Third World

One of the earliest statement on the modernizing role of the military in Third World countries was made by G. J. Pauker (Pauker 1959). His argument was closer to policy advocacy than scholarly analysis but is still fascinating because of its advocacy of military rule as a lesser evil than communism, and as an insight into the kind of logic that led the United States to support military regimes during the Cold War. Pauker perceived the Southeast Asian societies at the time as being in a crucial transitional phase of development during which the growing expectations of the population risked to outrun economic development and lead to political instability. For Pauker there was therefore an urgent need to develop an efficient government and administration in order to undertake economic development and decrease the risks of political instability. He predicted that with the political elites and organizations then in power this was unlikely to happen and that Southeast Asia would fall under communist rule within ten years; unless the West found a local social force with the organizational ability to tackle the twin challenges of communism and development. For him that force was represented by the local officer corps, which: "include[d] some of the new countries' best human material, men with above-average qualities of leadership, patriotism, and commitment to moral values" (Pauker 1959, 339). Their organizational skills made them resistant to communist influence, their social origins and their links with the nation's struggle for independence made them nationalist and progressive (Pauker 1959, 339-40). Pauker attempted to overcome the reluctance to accept his advocacy of military rule by arguing that it would be a lesser evil than political instability leading to communist rule; that it would not necessarily prevent the future development of democracy in those countries and that the military in Southeast Asia were more progressive than those which had ruled in the past in Latin America or Europe.

Another early statement on the positive impact of the military on development came from a study on the Turkish army (Lerner and Robinson 1960). This study by Lerner and Robinson was seminal because it was the first attempt at analyzing through an actual case the modernizing potential of the military in a developing country. Their study established many propositions that were subsequently taken up by others such as the proposition that through military service traditional people (i.e., rural conscripts) would become individuals with modern outlook and a national consciousness, trained in technical skills relevant for development in the economy and society; or the proposition that military spending could have developmental effects on a Third World economy through military-related public works or the regional development associated with the creation of military installations in remote areas.

The case study chosen was also seminal in the sense that Turkey was a paradigmatic example of a modernizing officer corps. Mustapha Kemal Atatürk and to a lesser extent his fellow reformist officers represented an actual instance of the ideal type of the reformist military leadership that stepped in to assume power in a period (after the First World War) when the current political actors and institutions failed to perform adequately. These military men, turned into civilian statesmen, carried out important reforms and represented the type of military leadership that Pauker was looking for in the context of Southeast Asia. Lerner and Robinson, however, insisted on a crucial point: “by contrast with many other modernizing societies, the military sector in Turkey had been contained because the civilian sector had been relatively successful and the military had nothing better to offer”(Lerner and Robinson 1960, 22).

In light of this historical background Lerner and Robinson focused on the post-1948 period. According to them by that time the Turkish army was no longer the modernizing force and the reservoir of competent leaders it had been in the earlier years of the republic. However in 1948 the United States started a major military aid program to modernize the

Turkish armed forces, which Lerner and Robinson assessed positively since it turned the army into “a major agency of social change” with many modernizing effects on individuals and society (Lerner and Robinson 1960, 32). In May 1960 a military coup took place in Turkey, a development that Lerner and Robinson did not relate to the massive American aid program. For them, the main lesson of the 1960 coup was that: “when the civilian leadership fails to maintain the tempo and balance of social change, when dynamic growth is crippled by partisan nepotism, a frustrated military is likely to take over control” (Lerner and Robinson 1960, 44). In short their analysis of the cause of the coup was very similar to Pauker’s diagnosis about Southeast Asia. Turkey in the 1950s went through a period of rapid change during which the rising expectations of the population outran the governmental capacity of declining civilian elites prompting the alternative elite in the military to establish a caretaker government.

If Pauker, Lerner and Robinson provided early unsystematic arguments for the modernizing role of the military as an institution and as a ruling group, the essays of Lucian Pye and Edward Shils provided the key theoretical arguments for that perspective (Pye 1962; Shils 1962). Pye was probably the most optimistic of the two. He argued that armies were easier to build in transitional societies than any other form of modern institution and he emphasized the extent to which the military, in such a modern organizational context, became experts in management and technology rather than a conservative martial group. According to Pye the commitment of the military to development was even stronger than in similar civilian organizations, such as the civil service (Pye 1962, 78-80). First, because the external orientation of the military made them more sensitive to developmental gaps between their country and others. Second, because their function involved them more in future contingency planning and readiness than in day-to-day local policy making, which would make them less likely to compromise their modernity for the sake of adaptation to local conditions. In short, the military were

likely to be both modern and uncompromising in their commitment to the modernization of their country.

Pye associated a series of modernizing effects on society to the role of armies as agents of change. He saw, for instance, army training as a process of acculturation and modernization of the attitudes of individuals that was superior to the impact of urbanization. Military training, in his opinion, was more thorough in its effects and was carried out in an environment that was psychologically more secure for the traditionally-minded recruit than life in the city (Pye 1962, 80-2). Moreover, the technical skills and modern attitudes acquired during military service could be transferred to the tasks of economic development. Military life also gave a degree of political awareness and national consciousness to recruits. Pye's list of the modernizing effects of the military on society largely overlapped the list established by Lerner and Robinson in the case of Turkey. On the specific contribution of military rule to development, he came to an opinion that was less optimistic than Pauker. He argued that military rule could provide an element of stability and a strengthening of administrative functions, but that political stability for the whole society could only be achieved by stable representative institutions and practices (Pye 1962, 88-9).

Edward Shils' opinion was more sociological and qualified. For instance, while he acknowledged the modern character of armies as organizations he pointed to the sympathy of the military as a social group for traditions and certain traditional values such as order, solidarity and hierarchy (Shils 1962, 31).¹ Similarly, he viewed equivocally the impact of military life on the individual. The beneficial effects mentioned by Lerner, Robinson, and Pye were, in his view, counterbalanced by the imposition of an oppressive organizational

¹ Lucian Pye also mentioned the paradoxical nature of armies, that is, their organizational modernity and their commitment to some traditional values (Pye 1962, 75-6). But he argued that in the developing countries the modernizing features were dominant because the organizational model pursued was borrowed from the industrialized countries.

discipline that suppressed individuality just like the order of traditions it displaced (Shils 1962, 36).

Like Pauker, Shils emphasized the unique social origins and composition of the armies of the new states. Their officer corps attracted the brightest and most ambitious elements from the lower middle classes, often from small towns or the countryside. This created a lack of identity between established political and economic elites and the officer corps, especially with middle-rank and junior officers. The officers were likely to be more progressive, nationalist and puritanical than the upper class or urban and cosmopolitan elites. Like Lerner and Robinson, Shils emphasized that the ascendancy of the military was a response to the instability generated by the transitional phase of development and by the weaknesses of civilian institutions and elites. However, he was pessimistic about developmental prospects under military rule. He argued that the military could do little because they had no development program or definite notion of the kind of regime they would like to create or transfer power to (Shils 1962, 55-9).

The works reviewed so far represent the core arguments about the impact of the military on change in the heyday of development theory. They do not necessarily represent however all the writings on the military in the Third World produced in the 1960s. William Gutteridge and J. M. Lee, for instance, had a more descriptive and institutional perspective that emphasized the colonial legacy (Gutteridge 1965; Lee 1969). As for Morris Janowitz, a well-known military sociologist, he was convinced that the characteristics of the military organization and profession would lead to poor governmental rule (Janowitz [1964] 1977, 77, 116). The fact that these authors, especially Gutteridge and Lee, shirked drawing generalizations about the nature of the military and their contribution to development probably explained why their works did not become challenged like those of Lerner and Robinson, Pauker, Pye and Shils.

The challengers aimed at rebutting some of the main propositions on the military found in development theory. One of the first proposition to be challenged was the progressive character of Third World officer corps and their commitment to development and reforms once in power. Samuel Huntington argued that an officer corps from middle class background was a progressive force when power was held by upper class oligarchies or traditional monarchies, but once the middle class (helped by the military) had displaced the previous elites and that the lower classes attempted to enter the political arena, then the military became a conservative force that aimed at preserving the status quo favorable to the middle class (Huntington 1968, 219-22). Eric Nordlinger came to conclusions similar to Huntington's hypothesis in a cross-national analysis on the impact of military involvement in politics on economic development. He found that:

when military officers occupy the highest seats of government, or when they have a good measure of control over the civilian incumbents, the officer-politicians are commonly unconcerned with the realization of economic change and reform, and where there are civilian organizations and strata pressing for such changes the officers purposefully oppose them. This statement must, however, be immediately modified by adding that within a particular social and political context (when there is hardly a middle class to speak of, and when workers and peasants have not been politically mobilized), soldiers in mufti sometimes allow or even encourage economic modernization (Nordlinger 1970, 1134).

Nordlinger's explanation for this trend went almost contrariwise to what development theorists had said earlier. He argued that the institutional interest of the military was inimical to development, except in the narrow sense of industrialization, and that military values led to an obsession with a notion of political stability that precluded partisan politics and the articulation and promotion of demands by the population (Nordlinger 1970, 1134-8). A subsequent comparative analysis of the governmental performance of civilian and military regimes by the same author came to the conclusion that the record of military regimes was inferior to the one of civilian governments (Nordlinger 1977, 196-200).

Ali Mazrui went a step further in challenging the modernity of the military in the context of cases from East and Central Africa (Mazrui 1976). Mazrui built on the

distinction that both Shils and Pye made between the military as a modern organization and the military as a social group dedicated to certain traditional values to argue that in Africa the military had contributed in some cases -- which he saw as foreshadowing a growing trend -- to a partial retraditionalization of African politics. For him the factors that negated the modernizing role of African armies included: "the rural and parochial origins of most of the recruits into the armed forces, the minimal acculturation of the soldiers as compared with the better-educated civilian populations, the ethnic patterns of military recruitment with their potentialities of retribalization, and the partial revival of the warrior tradition" (Mazrui 1976, 269-70). Cynthia Enloe emphasized similarly the ethnic factor in the recruitment of Third World armies in a way that cast doubt on generalizations about the military as a national institution -- maybe in the scope of its operations, not necessarily in its make-up -- or as the promoter of national consciousness in segmented societies (Enloe 1980).

Nicole Ball took a different angle on the debate on the developmental role of the military by focusing on the effects of security spending on development (Ball 1988). She challenged both the earlier studies, which found a positive relationship between military spending and development, and the specific arguments of development theory on the relevance of the skills acquired by military men when reintegrated into the civilian economy. On this precise point she found that the military provided a limited capability for manpower training, well below the claims of the advocates of that capability (Ball 1988, 304, 330-1). At a more general level her study made an inventory of sixteen potential effects of security expenditures on economic development.¹

¹ Nicole Ball found five potential positive effects: "• improvement of the government's tax-collection effort, • expansion of aggregate demand, creation of dual-purpose infrastructure, • substitution of security assistance for domestic financing, increasing the resources available to the civil sector, • stimulation of certain industrial sectors, and • limited manpower training" (Ball 1988, 389). On the other hand, she identified eleven potential negative effects of security expenditures: "• curtailment of some kinds of public investment, • reduction of expenditures in the social sector (for instance, education and health), • contribution to trade imbalances, • reduction of foreign exchange available to the civil sector, • increase in indebtedness, • aggravation of inflationary tendencies, • exacerbation of biases against rural development, •

Third World Militarism and Underdevelopment

The perceived deficiencies of development theory, both as a set of explanations and a series of predictions about change in the Third World, led to the emergence of alternative theoretical perspectives like dependency theory and world-system theory. These new perspectives, in turn, came forward with their own propositions about the impact of the military in the Third World. The need for new theoretical propositions was felt urgently because trends in the Third World seemed at the time to invalidate many predictions made by developmentalists a decade earlier. For instance, military regimes were prevailing in Africa whereas most analysts had ruled Africa as the least likely region for military governments (Shils 1962, 53-4; Gutteridge 1965, 107-8; Janowitz [1964] 1977, 88-9). Military rule, far from disappearing from Latin America, took a more bureaucratic and repressive form in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The odds suddenly seemed to be for permanent military rule. The new perspective was best expressed by peace researchers and analysts of militarism. Their works can be contrasted with the advocates of development theory on at least three points: the level of analysis appropriate to the study of the military in developing countries, the nature of Third World officer corps, and the effects of the military on development.

Advocates of this second perspective on the impact of the military on change in the Third World all agree that the focus of analysis should be at the level of the international system, or more narrowly, on politico-military relations between advanced industrialized countries and developing countries. They thus reject the narrow domestic focus of development theory. For them, military-related trends in the Third World such as soaring arms build-ups, endemic conflicts and widespread military rule are products of a larger international structure: a world military order (Albrecht and Kaldor 1979; Thee 1980;

transfer of inappropriate technology, • use of economic aid to support the security sector, • withdrawal of technically skilled manpower from the civil sector, and • distortion of the R & D effort" (Ball 1988, 389).

Øberg 1980). The dynamics of this international military order is driven by the superpower rivalry and the requirements of the military industries of the industrialized countries. The superpowers provide military assistance and encourage their proxies in their conflicts; while the military industries promote transfers of sophisticated weaponry and a development strategy of dependent industrialization for the Third World. Military intervention in politics is seen, in that perspective, as being a product of either military assistance and training, or of the necessity to repress the social forces opposed to dependent industrialization. The key features of Third World officer corps in that context are not their modernity and progressive character, but the transnational nature of their socialization and class interest, and their commitment to develop in their society an economic structure that could support a modern army of the type found in the advanced industrialized states.

Robert Price was among the first to emphasize the transnational identity of Third World military officers and its impact on domestic politics (Price 1971). Price explained the military coup in Ghana in 1966 by arguing that the military training of the top Ghanaian military officers in Britain had the effect of transferring their identification from national reference groups to external reference groups: the British army and Britain. These officers were thus far less nationalist and puritanical than development theory would predict because they identified Ghana's national interest with policies that retained close relations with Britain and the West and they advocated for the Ghanaian armed forces equipment and standard of living similar to the ones enjoyed by the British army. The external identification of the Ghanaian top officers set them inevitably on a collision course with the nationalist and non-aligned regime of Kwame Nkrumah. After the coup, the economic policies of the military regime were clearly more hospitable to foreign economic interests than under Nkrumah's rule.

Price did not claim universal validity for the pattern he found in Ghana, but his line of argument was widely repeated by other authors. For instance, Miles Wolpin maintained that the American military training program for Third World armies was designed to turn Third World officers into agents of American and foreign capitalist influence in their country; a goal he claimed the program achieved with a moderate level of success (Wolpin 1972). Robin Luckham suggested similarly that military training and professionalism led to a transnationalization of the class structure of the industrialized countries to the periphery (Luckham 1979). Third World officer corps developed class interests that were more congruent with those of First World military and ruling classes than they were with those of local lower classes.

Another point raised by Price and found in the peace research/militarism literature is the notion that Third World military are committed to the development of armed forces based on the model of those of the advanced industrialized states (Albrecht and Kaldor 1979; Kaldor 1980; Galtung 1985; Wendt and Barnett 1993). Peace researchers drew the conclusion from this commitment that the military would develop a corporate interest in favor of a policy of heavy industrialization in order to support the type of armed forces they identified with. These analysts considered heavy industrialization an inadequate development strategy to fulfill the real needs of the Third World. The pattern of economic development promoted by the military was seen to increase the technological and financial dependence of Third World countries as well as inequalities between social classes and between urban and rural areas (Lock and Wulf 1979; Luckham 1979; Ball 1988). Moreover, this type of development by worsening social and economic problems increased the likelihood of popular mobilization and of a deepening of the authoritarian and repressive nature of the government (Luckham 1979; Senghaas 1980).

Mirror Images of a Common Research Agenda

In spite of its diverging analysis and assessment of the role of the military in the Third World this literature shares with development theory many features. Both literatures conceive the military in the Third World as an institution shaped in the image of its counterpart in the advanced industrialized countries. Furthermore, they both claim that Third World military attempt to move their societies toward the economic and social patterns of industrialized countries; although they disagree on the desirability of that process and its likely outcomes. To the extent that they discuss state institutions both literatures focus exclusively on civil-military relations and the causes of military rule. They are silent about the impact of military conflicts on patterns of change. Both literatures also tend to generalize about the Third World from theoretical arguments full of assumptions rather than from a systematic analysis of Third World cases.

The peace research/militarism literature is however distinct from development theory in an important way: its advocacy of an international or transnational perspective in the study of the impact of the military factor on change. This is an element that will appear again later in the review of Charles Tilly's works and in the framework for analysis of the present study. However, I will not pursue the same line of argument than in the peace research/militarism literature in exploring the impact of international variables on domestic development. In my opinion this literature is unsatisfactory in many respects. The emphasis on holistic concepts and the influence of neo-Marxism often led in that literature to instances of functionalist explanations and of unfalsifiable propositions about the structure, constituent elements and relations in the world military order. To a large extent the world military order was conceptualized through theoretical transfers from the literature on the world capitalist economy. In the process the specificity of the state system and of politico-military issues was lost in favor of a mode of explanation by analogies with world capitalism. My position, on the contrary, starts on the premises that the world system is made up of two distinct (yet interacting) sub-systems: the state system and the

world economy; and that the dynamics of the former cannot be reduced or subordinated to the dynamics of the latter. Military issues primarily relate to the logic of the state system. A consequence of the relative anarchy prevailing in the state system has been the possibility of war and the necessity for states to mobilize resources in order to prepare or wage war. As we will see in the following section it is even argued that warfare played a significant role in the emergence of the modern state in Europe.¹ Therefore, instead of focusing on the military as an institution the present research will focus on the state activity the military are developed for, that is war making. In this way we hope to cast a new light on the impact of the military factor on patterns of change in the Third World.

An Alternative Perspective: War Making and State Making in European History

The literature on the impact of war and war preparation on European states is of vast proportions since it is the product of scholars with various backgrounds, from military or economic historians to political scientists and sociologists. This diversity makes for a plethora of specific studies and a lack of integrated theories. It is only recently that some sociologists have attempted to integrate war making in their general theory of social change (Giddens 1987; Mann 1986). In such a context the works of Charles Tilly stand out because he was the first to provide a simplified model of the relationship between war making and state making. He thus produced a framework in which debates and hypotheses could be articulated and historical data made more meaningful. He was also the first to raise the question of the reoccurrence of the European pattern of state making

¹ A caveat is needed at this point lest the reader assumes that the following section is about explaining the emergence of the modern state or state system in Europe. It is not. The following section explores a narrower subject: the impact of war and war preparation on the emergence of the modern state as an organization and on the configuration of its political institutions (regime). The emergence of the modern state and state system is a phenomenon of such scope and duration that it can only be accounted for by a macro-analysis that would include cultural, religious and economic variables besides the politico-military factors stressed here. In other words, war making as practiced in post-feudal Europe was only one process, notwithstanding its importance, among many that converged and interacted in a unique manner in Europe to give rise to the modern state and state system. For broader accounts, see Badie and Birnbaum (1983, 65-92), Chirot (1986, 12-49), Mann (1986, 416-517).

through war making in the contemporary Third World. Tilly's writings are therefore fundamental to the present thesis.

Other works on the relationship between war making and the emergence of the modern state will be referred to, in order to bring in nuances in Tilly's argument. These specific points will become fully relevant in the following chapter. For the moment one is reminded that the present review does not cover everything that has been said on the relationship between war and social change, it rather focuses on Tilly's model and a series of associated themes that are not strictly taken from Tilly's works: (1) the effect of war making on state-building, that is, the growth of the state as an organization and of its power; (2) the effect of war making on regime formation, i.e., the configuration of state institutions, the relations between state elites and social classes or groups; and that (3) the intensity of war making, (4) the conditions of warfare in a specific period or area and (5) the political economy of the state are all intervening variables in the relationship between war making and state formation (i.e., state-building and regime formation).

Tilly's Model of State Making through War Making

Tilly tackled for the first time the issue of war making and state making in the 1970s at a time when development theory was taking "a cure in history", to borrow Gabriel Almond's phrase, in an attempt to rectify the theoretical models developed earlier when Parsonian sociology and systems theory held sway over the field (Almond 1973). It was in that context that Tilly, a historian and sociologist, was made the editor of a Social Research Council volume in the series on Studies in Political Development entitled *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. In the introduction to the book Tilly wrote:

Success in war will receive a good deal of attention later in this book. I call attention to it now for more than the trivial reason that most of the political units which disappeared perished in war. The building of an effective military machine imposed a heavy burden on the population involved: taxes,

conscription, requisitions, and more. The very act of building it --when it worked-- produced arrangements which could deliver resources to the government for other purposes.... It produced the means of enforcing the government's will over stiff resistance: the army. It tended, indeed, to promote territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of the instruments of government and monopolization of the means of coercion, all the fundamental state-making processes. War made the state, and the state made war (Tilly 1975, 42).

In this early version of Tilly's model a sort of primacy was given in the causal sequence to the formation and growth of standing armies, which in turn promoted the growth of the state as argued below:

The formation of standing armies provided the largest single incentive to extraction and the largest single means of state coercion over the long run of European state-making. Recurrently we find a chain of causation running from (1) change or expansion in land armies to (2) new efforts to extract resources from the subject population to (3) the development of new bureaucracies and administrative innovations to (4) resistance from the subject population to (5) renewed coercion to (6) durable increases in the bulk or extractiveness of the state (Tilly 1975, 73).

However, war making was still only one variable among many other conditions that, for Tilly, explained the successful cases of state making in Europe. These other conditions of success were: the availability of extractible resources, a relatively protected position in time and space, a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs, the homogeneity (and homogenization) of the subject population, and strong coalitions of the central power with major segments of the landed elite (Tilly 1975, 40). It was only in subsequent versions of Tilly's model that war making took a more salient role in an attempt to develop a specific theory on the contribution of war and war preparation to state making. In the process his theory became organized around four key state activities: war making, extraction, protection and state making.¹ The four were however linked in a sequence reminiscent of the earlier model:

¹ Charles Tilly defined the four activities of agents of the state as: "1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force 2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities -- war making, state making, and protection" (Tilly 1985a, 181).

In an idealized sequence, a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in a substantial territory, but that war making led to increased extraction of the means of war -- men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the money to buy them -- from the population within that territory. The building up of war-making capacity likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord's local rivals; thus, it led to state making. As a by-product, it created organization in the form of tax-collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus it again led to state making. To a lesser extent, war making likewise led to state making through the expansion of military organization itself, as a standing army, war industries, supporting industries, and (rather later) schools grew up within the state apparatus. All of these structures checked potential rivals and opponents. In the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the state apparatus, the managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes. The members of those classes loaned resources, provided technical services, or helped ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, all in return for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies. As a result of these multiple strategic choices, a distinctive state apparatus grew up within each major section of Europe (Tilly 1985a, 183).

Tilly's causal model also can be summarized in the following form:

Figure 1.1: Tilly's War Making and State Making Model

Source: Tilly (1985a, 183).

Tilly's diagram allows one to grasp his argument at a glance, but also to notice some of its weaknesses. The most systematic critique of this model was made by Karen Rasler and William Thompson in a constructive spirit designed to improve on Tilly's argument (Rasler and Thompson 1989, 6-24). For these two analysts there were five aspects of

Tilly's model that were problematic. First, the unidirectional dimension of causal flows in Tilly's model gave the impression that war making influenced everything but, in turn, was not influenced -- except for the unstated influences represented by the upper-left arrow. As they pointed out if war making caused an increase in resource extraction for the conduct of war, then war making, in turn, would be affected since military activities could be conducted on a greater scale or for longer periods of time; as it actually was in various periods of European history since the 16th century. Second, Tilly's model gave to the variable war making an exogenous status. War was left unconceptualized in Tilly's argument, while his analysis dwelt upon its impact on domestic politics. In the opinion of Rasler and Thompson this strengthened the traditional -- and in their view questionable -- analytical divide between international and domestic politics. This in turn led to a third criticism, the absence of a conceptualization of war left out the issue of the variable impact of different types of war on state making.

Their fourth point of criticism was that protection as a state activity should be subordinated to a broader one: domestic coalition-making. They felt that Tilly's conceptualization of state activities needed to be broadened to include coalition making but also changes in state activities over time. In that respect, they thought the state activities defined by Tilly were too narrow; corresponding well to early European state making, but not necessarily for the 19th and 20th centuries. They also pointed out that though Tilly emphasized the fact that popular resistance to state activities made a difference in the subsequent development paths of those activities, popular resistance as such was not included in his model. Lastly, they argued that Tilly left unconceptualized the broader geopolitical-economic environment where war making and state making took place. In other words, the state system and the capitalist world economy were not integrated as variables that influenced war making and state making.

Rasler and Thompson's criticisms are relevant, although on most points they stem more from the too parsimonious character of Tilly's model than from implicit assumptions on his part. It is true that his model seems to refer more to patterns typical of the 16th or 17th centuries than of the 19th or 20th centuries. It is also true that Tilly never paid much attention to the conditions of war making or its intensity as intervening variables to explain different outcomes in state making. I intend in the present research to take these points into account as well as to develop more fully my conceptualization of the state system and political economy with respect to Third World states.

In *Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1990*, Tilly presents the final version of his theory on war making and state making (Tilly 1990). Since his argument spans a millennium of European history it is more useful to focus on the main elements of his analysis than to give a full summary.

Figure 1.2: Tilly's Model of War Making and State Making (final version)
 Source: Tilly (1990, 97).

His latest causal model is slightly more complex because it includes now three new state activities: adjudication, production and distribution.¹ With the inclusion of these additional categories Tilly's model becomes more relevant for the recent past and wider in its application. Tilly also acknowledges now the reciprocal nature of the relationship between war making and state making; although the other causal links remain unidirectional in his model. It is difficult to understand, for instance, why in this new version state making causes extraction, whereas in the previous version of the model extraction was a cause leading to state making. It is obvious that if war making and state making are linked by a feedback loop it might be also the case of extraction and state making and probably of other state activities in the model. Many other issues raised by Rasler and Thompson, notably the exogenous character and non-conceptualization of the war making variable, and the absence of the international environment also do not find answers in this latest model.

In reality this new model is not central to Tilly's current argument. Tilly, in this latest book, is less concerned with the assessment of the impact of war making on state making than with the following question: Why is Europe currently formed almost exclusively of national states while a thousand years ago many other forms of states (city-states, confederation of cities, empires) existed and were flourishing?² In answering this question Tilly found out that war making was the selection mechanism that ultimately favored the growth and diffusion of the national state at the expense of other forms of state.

Tilly found that under the stimulus of war making European states followed three historical paths to state making based on different combinations of capital and coercion

¹ Adjudication refers to "authoritative settlement of dispute among members of the subject population". Production is the "control of the creation and transformation of goods and services by members of the subject population". Distribution refers to "intervention in the allocation of goods among members of the subject population" (Tilly 1990, 96-7).

² National states in Tilly's writing have nothing to do with nation-states, they are defined as: "relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory" (Tilly 1985a, 170); see also his similar definition of the state (Tilly 1975, 70).

(Tilly 1990, 30-1, 133-60). With this new perspective Tilly was able to integrate the political economy as an intervening variable in the process of state making through war making. In the state making path featuring a heavy reliance on coercion (called coercion-intensive) the political economy of the country was characterized by few cities and a predominance of agriculture over commerce (e.g., Russia, Brandenburg, Poland). In such a political economy the process of resource extraction stimulated by war led to a greater use of coercion and the development of a larger state structure to extract a given amount of resources than in a more commercialized economy. Conversely, states endowed with an economy characterized by a predominance of commerce, industry and large cities followed a capital-intensive path to state making (e.g., Dutch Republic, Venice). Because funds were easier to raise in that type of economy the state structure created in the process of extraction was weaker than in the coercion-heavy path to state making. The third path to state making is an intermediary one called the capitalized-coercion path. Tilly found that this path was more efficient for war making and became associated with the national state. Tilly put Britain, France, Prussia and Spain in this capitalized-coercion category, in spite of their differences, because they all had a political economy characterized by both a large agricultural base and some significant cities oriented toward commerce; and that all four in the process of state making converged toward a national state form.

Although one can argue with Tilly about the specifics of the relationship between war and state making, the existence of that relationship is supported by historical evidence and the opinions of other analysts. This relationship was present from the origins of the modern state in the Renaissance. War was an omnipresent phenomenon in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries (Hale 1985, 21; Levy 1983, 139-41).¹ More significantly, however, it was accompanied by a "military revolution", a set of military developments

¹ About the 16th and 17th centuries Jack Levy estimated that: "[o]f all the centuries, these two were the most warlike in terms of the proportion of years of war under way (95 percent), the frequency of war (nearly one every three years), and the average yearly duration, extent, and magnitude of war" (Levy 1983, 140). Jack Levy's study covered the period 1495-1975.

that had the effect of increasing the cost of war (Parker 1988, 1-2; Porter 1994, 65-7). The creation of a powerful and mobile siege artillery, the introduction of new (and expensive) fortifications to counter it and the deployment of large tactical formations of professional infantrymen all converged toward a dramatic increase in the cost of armies and war operations. Armies became larger and more permanent, war operations took considerable scope in time and space, weaponry became more destructive. These changes in the art of war in early modern Europe combined with the omnipresence of war in the continent gave the original impetus to the process of state making highlighted in Tilly's writings.¹

The Impact of War Making on State Making.

The importance of war making to the initial growth of the European state can be gauged by the fact that military spending was by far the largest item in the budget of governments until the second half of the 19th century when other forms of public expenditure started to increase at a faster rate (Anderson 1988, 142-3; Hale 1985, 233-4; Parker 1988, 61-4; Tilly 1990, 120-4).² Military expenditure had to be financed, ultimately by raising taxes or finding new revenues. In early modern Europe debates over war finances thus provided a recurrent theme of confrontation between the central authority and the various groups that had claims to the administration of the state; and taxation was the most common cause of rebellions (Ardant 1975, 167, 194; Downing 1992; Mann 1986a, 433).

¹ "The vastly increased expense of casting cannon, manufacturing guns and projectiles, and supplying the larger manpower that was required to make effective use of the new technology, put a premium on the resources only a centralized government could marshal. The provincial aristocrat was incapable of competing and thus of preserving his independent influence. Moreover, the military revolution had spiraling effects. It demanded additional funds, hence higher taxes, hence more bureaucrats to collect and administer the income, hence more salaries, and so on" (Rabb 1975, 60-1). This quote from Theodore Rabb shows that the connection between war preparation and state-building was already acknowledged by historians when Tilly wrote his initial essay on the subject in 1975.

² The Russian state under Peter the Great and the Prussian state under Frederick the Great spent roughly 80 per cent of their revenue on military spending; the French state in peacetime, as in 1680 and 1786, devoted more than half of its budget to military spending (Porter 1994, 116-7). Even Britain, which thanks to its insular position did not have to maintain a large army, allocated on average 52 per cent of state expenditures to the military during the period 1695-1820 (Mann 1986a, 485).

A distinctive feature of the state as an organization is its monopolization of the means of violence over a given territory. It is clear that war making contributed to that process of monopolization in Europe. The importance of artillery and siege warfare in early modern Europe favored the central authorities because they were more likely to be able to afford a large stock of artillery guns and the costs of modern fortifications (Van Creveld 1989, 109; McNeill 1982, 90; Parker 1988, 67). The development of professional infantry forces in the 17th century similarly favored central government and absolutism (Anderson 1988, 24-8; McNeill 1982, 138-9). Starting in the late 17th century a similar process took place on the sea, warships became differentiated from the previous dual-purpose armed merchantmen. The creation and maintenance of battle fleets created a new and important source of military expenditure that only a central government could afford (Anderson 1988, 95-9, 141-2; Duffy 1980). Finally, in both England and France the encroachment of the central government on the local powers was accompanied by measures of disarmament (Anderson 1988, 29-32; Parker 1988, 41-3; Tilly 1985a, 173-4).

War and war preparation also led over the centuries to a more interventionist role for the state in the economy and society. War making provided a motive for the expansion of the administrative powers of the state in many more ways than through simply the development of taxation systems. State interventionism became present in the production of artillery and firearms from the early days of that industry, in an attempt to favor domestic arms manufacturing and to insure production standards (Hale 1985, 220-1). In the absolutist regimes of Prussia and Russia during the 18th century, the preoccupation with war preparation led to a militarization of administration and of society (Anderson 1988, 116-8; Downing 1992, 95-106). The keen interest of the Prussian *Polizeistaat* (Police State¹) for the monitoring and promotion of its subjects' welfare was motivated

¹ In the Prussian and French absolutist states of the 18th century the term *police* referred to the general administration of society by the government rather than to the narrower function associated with the term since the 19th century.

ultimately by considerations of state security and expansion (Downing 1992, 101; Poggi 1990, 50). However, the degree of mobilization of resources for war making achieved in 18th century Prussia was surpassed during the French *levée en masse* in 1793-4; when government-supervised mobilization of resources and industry reached a level that was not equalled until the total wars of the 20th century (Best 1982, 83-97).

Military developments caused by the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century reinforced the trend toward state involvement in the economy. With the advent of the industrial era war preparation involved long-term planning in peacetime (Pearton 1982). Large stocks of weapons and supplies, railway systems, port facilities, and modern battle fleets had to be planned and built years before the possible outbreak of hostilities. Weapon manufacturing and strategic industrial sectors, like metallurgy, functioned in cooperation with the state. This situation led to the first military-industrial complexes in history, with their lobbies in favor of armament programs, the harnessing of science for military purposes and the development of close relations between industrialists, military officers and political elites (Bond 1984, 44-5; McNeill 1982, 269-78, 285-8).

The First and Second World Wars had the effect of promoting considerably state involvement in economic and social affairs. Developed on an ad hoc basis under the stress of resource mobilization during the First World War, state control over the economy created a repertoire of measures and institutions that could be revived in the future (Bond 1984, 107-25; Pearton 1982, 159-64). The precedent of the First World War paved the way for their return during the economic crisis of the 1930s and the war mobilization of 1939-45. Ultimately, the emergence and institutionalization of the interventionist state and of welfare programs cannot be fully understood without reference to the momentous impact of the World Wars (Giddens 1987, 236-44; Poggi 1990, 109-12; Porter 1994, 149-93, 269-80).

The Influence of War Making on Regime Formation.

War making can have also an impact on the regime that characterizes a state. This line of argument is not new. Otto Hintze, at the turn of the century, argued that the transition from a republican to an imperial constitution in ancient Rome and the passage from medieval constitutionalism to absolutism were caused by changes in military organizations (Hintze [1902] 1975). More recently, Brian Downing also argued that the military revolution in early modern Europe had significant consequences for the constitutions of European states (Downing 1988, 1992). Downing dealt with a classical theme in political sociology: the origins of democracy and authoritarianism. He showed that Barrington Moore's account on that subject, which emphasized the divergent paths of transformation of agrarian societies in explaining the origins of these forms of government, was incomplete and needed to be supplemented by an explanation that emphasized the divergent paths that medieval constitutionalism took in various countries under the impact of the military revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries. His argument was straightforward and persuasive:

First, late medieval Europe had many political characteristics that distinguished it from other major world civilizations. These characteristics, the most important of which were representative assemblies, constituted a basis for liberal democracy, which provided Europe with a predisposition toward democratic political institutions, a predisposition that can never be repeated in the modern developing world. Second, military modernization, the "military revolution" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, led to the strengthening of monarchal [sic] power in countries relying on *domestic* resources to finance modern armies. In these countries, the princes did away with medieval constitutionalism and built expansive autocracies, demolishing the fortuitous disposition. Third, in countries that avoided the military revolution, or found alternate methods of financing war than domestic resource mobilization, military mobilization did not destroy constitutional government, and a liberal political outcome, though not assured, as in the first set of cases, was at least more likely (Downing 1992, 3).

In short, the climate of constant warfare in early modern Europe and the rising costs of warfare caused by the military revolution put a great strain on the "proto-democratic" medieval institutions. In order to face up to the challenge of interstate wars the crowns of

Europe had to finance modern war machines by wringing the resources out of their estates; and a likely outcome of that confrontation was the emergence of what Downing called military-bureaucratic absolutism, as in France and Prussia.

However, according to Downing, some key factors could dispense a state involved in warfare from turning to an authoritarian solution to the problem of resource mobilization (Downing 1992, 78-9). First, a state could mobilize the resources of foreign lands, instead of its own, by waging war abroad as Sweden did in the 17th century. Second, a state could keep domestic extraction at an acceptable level by relying on alliances to obtain troops or subsidies; a strategy followed by England, the Netherlands and Sweden in their confrontation with France and the Hapsburg Empire.¹ Third, a country endowed with sources of revenue from colonies or trade could bear a higher level of resource mobilization before the latter led to a constitutional crisis. The Netherlands and Britain are two classical cases of commercially-oriented states that fought larger and militarily stronger states, respectively Spain in the 17th century and France in the 18th century, by exhausting the financial resources of their opponent.² Last, some countries were endowed with natural barriers, which acted as strong defenses against invasion (like Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden) and reduced the necessity or cost of war preparation. Downing's analysis was an inspiration to my research because it provided a demonstration of how changing conditions of warfare, foreign resources and the type of political economy could influence the relationship between war making and state making.

¹ It is true that absolutist powers like Prussia and Russia also benefited from foreign subsidies. In my opinion, therefore, it was not foreign assistance per se that precluded absolutism, but rather foreign assistance in time of crisis when a higher level of domestic mobilization could have led to a more authoritarian government, had it not been for the timely contribution of foreign subsidies or the intervention of a foreign army.

² This factor offered a barrier to absolutism only if the trade and industry at the basis of this wealth were privately owned (Downing 1992, 79). In Castile, the political center of the Spanish Empire, that wealth was owned by the crown. Thus shipments of American bullion served to guarantee the crown's loans on European financial markets rather than to provide the Castilian parliament with any influence on the monarchy.

The relationship between war making and institutional change was maintained in the 19th and 20th centuries. For instance, one study found that during the period 1816-1975, involvement in international wars increased the likelihood of violent domestic change of regime (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller 1992). The fall of a regime is obviously the most radical effect that war can have on regime formation. But war making also can cause the reform of regimes. The French Revolution showed the difference that the commitment of a whole nation to war could make, and this commitment was difficult to obtain without an appeal to the notions of nationalism and citizenship. Both Prussia (in 1807) and Russia (in 1861) had to abolish the archaic system of serfdom and to reform their state institutions following their defeat by more advanced European states (Best 1982, 156, 229-30). The defeat of the professional French army by the German army during the Franco-Prussian war set a world trend toward the German military system with its universal military service, efficient reserves and general staff.

Many analysts have found also a connection between the diffusion of universal military obligation and the extension of citizenship rights (notably, the franchise) to the lower classes (Feld 1977, 146; Giddens 1987, 233-4; Janowitz 1975, 74-82). Other politically marginalized groups such as black Americans and women saw their citizenship status and life conditions affected by the two World Wars (Marwick 1974, 76-9, 174-8; Rasler and Thompson 1989, 186-204). War created for these groups an opportunity to make gains if they were organized and the government willing to act. These gains were not all insured in a post-war context, as the return of women to traditional occupations after 1918 and 1945 showed, in spite of their contribution to industrial labor during the World Wars.

The Intensity of War Making as an Intervening Variable.

The fact that some of the most extensive evidence of the impact of war on state making has been documented in regard to the World Wars reflects obviously the proximity in time

and greater availability of data on these major wars, but also the fact that war-induced changes are easier to find in intense war efforts. The British army during the Victorian era took part in dozens of small wars and military campaigns throughout the world without much of an impact on Britain's political institutions or society. But only six years of total war from 1939 to 1945 brought fundamental changes to the British state and society and the place of Britain in the world. Similarly, Rasler and Thompson found that the debate on the displacement effect of war on state expenditures could be resolved once one acknowledged that this displacement was likely only for major wars (Rasler and Thompson 1985).¹ It is therefore essential to recognize that only important war or war preparation efforts are likely to produce a clear causal link between war making and state making.

The Impact of Conditions of Warfare on War Making and State Making.

Changing conditions of warfare have often been at the origins of periods when war making had a significant impact on state making, as in the case of the military revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries. Many social scientists, like for instance Charles Tilly, find it difficult to accept such arguments and tend to downplay them (Tilly 1985a, 177-8). I assume that many of them think an argument that posits change in warfare as a cause of change in other social realms smacks of technological determinism; since the state of military technology is often a central parameter of conditions of warfare. It need not be so if one acknowledges that technology is itself determined by social contexts and that some fundamental technological military breakthroughs are of an organizational (and therefore social) nature; for instance, the introduction of military drills and volley fire to maximize the effectiveness of early firearms (McNeill 1982, 126-30; Parker 1988, 18-23). Besides,

¹The displacement effect of war on state expenditures refers to a ratchet effect induced by war, when state expenditures increase significantly during wartime and do not return to the pre-war level after the hostilities.

what matters is not the state of military technology, but its implications in terms of resources and war effort (Downing 1992, 14).

For the analysts of the military revolution, if there had been no decline of the feudal way of warfare with the advent of professional infantry forces, artillery and new types of fortifications there would have been less pressure on medieval political institutions and less of an incentive to build a centralized government. Similarly, it was only in response to contacts with modern armies and their form of warfare that countries on the periphery of the European state system, like Russia or Turkey, and later the various nations of Asia, began to reform their military and state institutions by borrowing from the West (Parker 1988, 115-45; Ralston 1990). With the benefit of hindsight the high failure rate among non-Western military modernizers showed how much Western military technology and institutions were closely linked to Western political and social institutions.

One could even argue that the revolution in politico-military affairs caused by the introduction of nuclear weapons weakened the potential link between war making and state making for advanced industrialized countries. War scenarios in Europe during the Cold War envisaged either a short conventional war or a short period of conventional battles followed by a nuclear escalation. In such scenarios war would have contributed little to state making because the war would have been too short and too destructive to allow the process of resource mobilization to take place. Thus, the link between war making and state making has certainly become more tenuous since 1945 in the Western world; except, perhaps, for those who have argued that the Cold War has led to a drift of the liberal state toward a national security state dominated by a military-industrial complex (Edmonds 1988, 161-71).

The Political Economy as an Intervening Variable.

A recurrent theme in recent works on war making and state making is the impact that different types of political economy have on those activities (Downing 1992; Rasler and Thompson 1989; Tilly 1990). For instance, constitutionalism was preserved and the powers of the state restricted, in spite of war making, in England and the Netherlands because their commercial economy could generate significant revenue for war making and was controlled by private interests. The English and Dutch governments had neither the administrative capacity to run overnight commerce and industry, nor the foolish intent to kill the bourgeois goose that laid the golden eggs. On the other hand, states built on a more agrarian base like France or Prussia had to build larger and more coercive state apparatuses in order to extract resources from their less developed economy. In the process both states took an interest in managing and promoting their economy.

Castile (the political center of Spain), for its part, found itself in a peculiar situation. It shared with France and Prussia an economy dominated by the agrarian sector; however, wool, the main production of the rural economy, was exported rather than transformed by local industry (like in England). With wool exports and its empire in America the Castilian state had two externally-derived sources of revenue that dispensed it from reforming its domestic economy. But because of its direct access to important revenues the Castilian state was also in a strong position domestically, it could consider issues of war and peace unconcerned with the opinion of its population (Downing 1992, 79). However, the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society was achieved by a dangerous level of dependence on bullion shipments from America and taxes on wool production for export. When both sources of revenue started to decline Spain's numerous military commitments soon overburdened the financial capacity of the state. As Rasler and Thompson noticed, one reason for Spain's decline was: "that its politico-military position had rested on a weak and vulnerable economic base that depended on the export of a single cash crop and the exploitation of American minerals. It proved extremely difficult to sustain a leading global

power position with what we now refer to as a classically dependent economy" (Rasler and Thompson 1989, 54). These examples briefly show that the political economy of a state matters. The presence of externally-derived revenue, the direct access of the state to a significant portion of national wealth, the level of economic development and the type of economic activities are all factors that can influence the relationship between war making and state making.

It is also important to consider the way European states financed their wars for the purpose of comparing it with the financing of war making in the Third World. Early modern states, like France and Spain in the 16th century, financed their wars through extensive borrowings to the point of mortgaging to creditors future tax revenues up to five years ahead (Parker 1974, 561, 563). Moreover, the main financiers of these states were foreign bankers and entrepreneurs.¹ The outcome of this mode of war financing was repeated bankruptcies, high interest rates on loans, and a spiralling debt that consumed the major portion of annual revenues. A better system of war finance emerged later in the Netherlands (after 1572) and in Britain (after 1693). Modern war financing, as it developed in these two countries, was characterized by three elements: an efficient taxation on a broad tax base, a fiscal policy favorable to the development of commerce and industry, and the nationalization of the war debt.² With this system of finance Britain and the Netherlands were able to financially exhaust larger states like Spain and France

¹ For instance, the French expedition to Naples in 1494 was financed by Italian bankers based in Lyons, while Spain's war finance were supported in large part in 1551-55 by bankers in Antwerp (Rice 1970, 100-1). After the bankruptcy of 1575 Spanish authorities tried to transfer their debts from Genoese and German bankers to Castilian creditors; but this attempt to 'nationalize' the debt had failed by 1581 in the face of the rising cost of war and the limited resources of Castilian financiers (Thompson 1976, 71).

² Taxation in the United Provinces and Britain was efficient because there were few exemptions from taxes, fewer intermediaries were involved in tax collection, and taxation was approved by representative assemblies. The 'pro-business' attitude of government in both countries stemmed from the fact that bourgeois controlled the government in the Netherlands while they had a strong influence in London. In France and Spain the war debt was the king's debt, and his credit was based on his capacity to find revenues to reimburse it. In Britain and the United Provinces the war debt was public and national, it was assumed in the name of the country by its government and assembly, and its major share was owned to nationals. This characterization of war finance is based on my interpretation of various sources (Anderson 1988, 154; Kennedy 1987, 51-4, 68-9, 78-81; Parker 1974, 572-4, 577-80; Parker 1988, 63-4; Porter 1994, 119-20).

because they could borrow more money at lower interest rates. The financing of total wars during the 20th century was the ultimate development of this earlier system. The state financed its war expenditures through borrowings from the central bank, the floating of loans on financial markets, and the purchase of war bonds by the public. The war debts resulting from domestic and foreign borrowings were so large that they insured that taxation would remain high for years after the end of hostilities (Hardach 1981, 170; Porter 1994, 163). For instance, one source claimed that borrowings financed 80 per cent of the cost of World War II in the United States and that this war debt was still part of the total debt structure of the United States in 1993 (Porter 1994, 283).

There are very few cases in European history of states that managed to finance major wars out of foreign financial resources. Paul Kennedy referred to the Swedish army in the early 17th century as a “parasitic war machine” because it financed its war operations in Germany with contributions levied on allies and enemies, in addition to some subsidies from France; but he acknowledged that otherwise Sweden was still heavily burdened with its navy, home defense, and other military commitments (Kennedy 1987, 65). Foreign resources covered only a small portion of Sweden’s overall military expenditures (Porter 1994, 89). Prussia also had a similar ‘parasitic’ war machine in the 18th century. Prussia was able to bear the heavy financial cost of the Seven Years War (1756-63) thanks to British subsidies (from 1758 to 1762) and the exploitation of Saxony; the latter contributed more revenue to the Prussian state than all the provinces of Prussia (Anderson 1988, 181). However, the degree of contribution of foreign countries or territories to the war finance of Sweden and Prussia remained un-characteristic of Western war financing. Hitler’s Germany tried the same method during World War II without the same level of success. Despite the heavy occupation costs imposed on occupied territories by the Nazi authorities these revenues were equivalent to only about 40 per cent of taxation revenue; in

1944 occupied territories contributed to about 20 per cent of the total revenues of Germany (Milward 1979, 138; Weinberg 1994, 1125).

War Making and State Making in the Third World

If we agree to the argument that war and war preparations have been important factors in the emergence and development of the state in the Western world we can raise a question that relates directly to the present research: Has the European pattern of state making through war making reoccurred in the Third World, where most wars since 1945 have taken place?¹

Tilly on War Making and State Making in the Third World.

Tilly thinks it has not because: "[t]he connections of the new states to the rest of the world have changed too much" (Tilly 1975, 81). For Tilly, the process of state making over the centuries has increasingly been determined by external factors and processes. Whereas state making in early modern Europe was largely an endogenous process, a contest between the central government and the local powers, conducted with domestic resources; the process of state making in the new states has been externalized: territories and sovereignty have been determined by European powers, models for the state institutions borrowed from those same powers and reinforced by international organizations, and the military means required to guarantee the state's sovereignty have been externally-derived through arms transfers and military assistance (Tilly 1975, 75-6; Tilly 1990, 181-2). Tilly acknowledged that this externalization of the process was not specific to the Third World. Many European states in the 19th and 20th century saw their territory, sovereignty or institutions determined by external factors, for instance the Baltic

¹ In spite of different criteria to define war or armed conflict, studies that compile occurrences of conflict in the post-45 period all show that an overwhelming majority of those events have taken place in the Third World (Kende 1971; Kende 1978; Singer and Small 1982; Sivard 1983, 21).

states, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Poland. In my opinion, therefore, it is preferable to conceive the differences in state making experiences between European and Third World states as representing various mixes of external and internal factors rather than as a dichotomy between a European "endogenous" pattern and a Third World "exogenous" pattern; a tendency found in Tilly when he draws the differences between Europe and the rest of the world. I agree with him, however, that there has been a trend toward a growing influence of external factors on state making because the state system and the world economy are more institutionalized and global in scope today than they were in previous centuries.

On the specific contribution of war making to state making, Tilly argues that:

The consolidation of the state system also constricted the opportunities for the building of new states by war. That shift lies behind a paradox which many observers of contemporary state-making have noticed: armies of new states which are unlikely ever to fight an international war adopt the latest armaments, absorb the largest part of the public revenues, employ their might in putting down dissidents and guerrillas, play the parts of arbiters, king-makers and, on occasion, kings, yet fail repeatedly in their efforts to transform the social structure.... The conventional explanations of militarism in contemporary countries run to the ease with which military models (as opposed to models of industrial production or of family structure) can be imported by new states, the advantage of any army in a power vacuum, and its special significance as the most "modern" institution in a poor country, a major arena for education and communications, a likely instrument for collective tasks running from canal-building to traffic control. Our authors do not deny these effects. Instead, they call attention to their placement within a distinctive twentieth-century international structure: tremendous inequalities of military and economic power, deliberate exportation of military models and assistance by a handful of great powers, likely involvement of several of the same great powers in any war anywhere, consequent irrelevance of the small state's military establishment to its pursuit of international objectives by means of war. As a result of this international situation, military forces become favored links with (and instruments of) the great powers, and become much freer than their predecessors to intervene in domestic politics. The building of substantial armed forces, on the other hand, becomes much less likely to produce the gradual subordination of the subject population, the transformation of the fiseal structure, the freeing and absorption of resources that it did in the European seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its state-making impact appears to have diminished and changed (Tilly 1975, 75-6).

In brief, Tilly maintains that the link between war making and state making does not exist in the Third World. First, because war making is unlikely to determine the existence, or

territorial size, of a Third World state; the state system is more important in this respect. Second, because war preparation or defense in Third World countries relies mainly on foreign resources; thus, the building of armies does not trigger the process of domestic resource extraction at the origin of strong national states. Furthermore, the reliance on external resources to build armies in the Third World makes the military autonomous from, and dominating over, civilian elites and the population. In short, the causal links between the likelihood of war, the requirements of war preparation and the development of the state are severed and replaced by a process of dependent militarization similar to the one outlined by analysts of militarism.

I find Tilly's argument unsatisfying on at least three grounds. First, he does not provide much evidence to sustain his generalizations on the new states. He presumptuously dismisses the contribution of war making to state making based on the theoretical impact of some international-level variables (institutionalization of state boundaries, military assistance, great power intervention), but does not show that Third World states involved in war making have not been affected by that activity. He claims that reliance on external resources to build an army is a cause of military involvement in politics, but his evidence hardly settles a question hotly debated in the United States since the 1960s -- the impact of military assistance on the likelihood of military rule (Lefever 1979; Muller and Zimmermann 1987; Powell 1965; Wolf 1965; Wolpin 1972).¹

The prevalence of military rule in the Third World is certainly a reason for considering it a characteristic typical of regime formation in the periphery worth explaining. The fact that military rule in the Third World has taken place in varied cultural, institutional and historical contexts is also a reason for thinking that some variables at the international level might have contributed to that outcome. However, the two propositions, when added up,

¹ Tilly found that countries that were important arms importers, or that were heavily dependent on one military supplier, were more under military rule than those with multiple military suppliers or less important arms imports (Tilly 1985b, 85-7).

do not provide a reason for dismissing a priori the existence of a link between war making and state making in the Third World.

A second reason for being critical of Tilly's argument is the validity of the causal relation he established between reliance on foreign resources to build an army and the likelihood of military rule. Tilly originally argued, in 1975, that reliance on military assistance and the declining relevance of armed forces for the preservation or the expansion of the state -- this latter development caused by the institutionalization of state boundaries and great power interventions -- made the military more likely to intervene in domestic politics. But writing on the same subject ten years later Tilly made a different argument. He argued that civilian supremacy over the military in the Western world was the outcome of two processes: first, the cycle of war making and state making made the armies dependent on, and subordinate to, large civilian bureaucracies; second, in the contest between the central government and the population over the issue of resource extraction for war making institutional arrangements emerged limiting the powers of the state and of its armed forces. In the Third World, in contrast, military institutions were inherited or acquired from outside without the development of mutual restraints between armies and civilian governments and between the state and its population (Tilly 1985a, 1985b).

Tilly's argument implies that war making was in European history an activity conducted with domestic resources and it asserts that reliance on foreign resources is characteristic of the Third World and a major cause of military rule. Yet, foreign resources played important roles in the war making of many European states in the past. Furthermore, Brian Downing found that reliance on foreign resources was an important factor in explaining the absence of an authoritarian outcome to the activity of war making in some states of early modern Europe. While Tilly sees constitutionalism as an outcome of the contest between the central government and the population over resources for

military purposes, Downing sees the same contest as sounding the knell of constitutionalism.¹

The relationship between reliance on external resources and domestic resource extraction is also more complex than implied by Tilly. Arms transfers do not dispense from domestic resource extraction since financial resources must be found to pay for them at least in part. On the other hand, to the extent that a state can finance its defense effort through the exportation of a commodity over which it has direct control, it can evade the process of domestic resource extraction and the concomitant confrontation with the population. In such a scenario the military could assume power and manage the state sector of the national economy to its own benefit; a project that would be less feasible if the wealth of the nation were based on a private and diversified economy. It is only in his more recent work that Tilly hints at this type of political economic explanation in conjunction with the previous argument on military assistance and arms transfers (Tilly 1990, 201, 207-8, 218).

Finally, it is to be regretted that Tilly has dismissed so easily the possibility of a link between war making and state making in the Third World in favor of the subject of civil-military relations. In so doing he moved away from his original problématique in order to adopt the conventional research agenda of political development theorists and analysts of militarism. There is a form of *non sequitur* in Tilly's writings on war making and state making when he compares the European past with the contemporary Third World. His

¹ The disagreement between the two scholars might be explained in two ways. Downing's argument refers to early modern Europe (16th and 17th centuries), it is possible that Tilly's argument refers to a later period (18th and 19th centuries). Unfortunately Tilly does not provide concrete historical examples for his assertion that constitutionalism was an outcome of government-population conflicts over resource extraction for war-making. A second possible reason for their disagreement could be generalizations from divergent national cases. Downing is quite systematic on this point with a comparison of six national cases. Tilly, on the other hand, maybe refers implicitly to more idiosyncratic cases. As a specialist of French and British history, he might have in mind the victories of the British parliament over the Crown on the issue of the control of military appropriations, or the summoning of the French *États généraux* in 1789 in response to the poor state of French finances (caused by French involvement in the American War of Independence), a meeting that ultimately led to the French Revolution and an attempt to create a constitutional monarchy in France.

account of the European past depicts a largely endogenous process of state making in which the likelihood of interstate war led to the expansion of armies which, in turn, set off the extraction of domestic resources, the growth of the state apparatus and the development of constitutions defining the rights and duties of citizens and of governments. Then, his depiction of the Third World deals with a totally different set of relations and variables, emphasizing the impact of the state system, the importance of military assistance and great power influence and the issue of military rule. What we intend to show in this thesis is that if Tilly had kept to his original problématique he would have found evidence of a relation between war making and state making in the Third World; though not necessarily with outcomes and patterns similar to those found in the European past.

Quantitative Studies on War Making and State Making in the Third World.

Studies that explore the relationship between war making and state making in the contemporary Third World are scarce.¹ One of the first study to deal with the subject in a systematic matter was A. F. Mullins' *Born Arming* (Mullins 1987). Mullins attempted to test empirically on a sample of states the argument made by Tilly and others in favor of the positive contribution of war preparation to the development of the state. Mullins wanted to know if this pattern found in European history was still applicable to the contemporary Third World. His conclusions were that the European model did not hold in the contemporary Third World: development and growth in military capability did not correlate with each other, military capability did not vary with the security environment,

¹ After having written the first and second chapters of the present thesis, and while researching the first case-study on Egypt, I found a recent and important study on the impact of war making on state making in Egypt and Israel: Michael Barnett's *Confronting the Costs of War* (Barnett 1992). Barnett's study covers fewer cases and a shorter time period than the present study but adopts a similar methodology (comparative case studies) and comes to similar conclusions; i.e., the negative impact of war making on state power as war preparation becomes more intense.

the states that had the best development performances were those that proportionately devoted fewer resources to military capability (Mullins 1987, 104-9).

The reasons according to Mullins for the non-occurrence of the European pattern in the Third World were similar to the factors mentioned by Tilly (Mullins 1987, 11-2). For Mullins the current international system has been relatively benign, most Third World states have inherited their territories and did not carve out them through war; their subsequent territorial integrity has been determined more by the self-restraint of other states than by an active defense against encroachments. The presence of patrons in the international system has provided an alternative to the acquisition of military capability through development. Because of these factors there is no longer a necessary relationship between military power and national development. Like Tilly, Mullins also dwells upon the causes of military rule in the Third World and finds in the colonial legacy a root of this phenomenon; although he admits that new states with revolutionary armies did not fare better in respect to civilian supremacy than those with post-colonial military establishments (Mullins 1987, 17-38).

The main weakness of Mullins' study lies in its research design. Mullins chose to operationalize the original hypothesis relating war preparations to the growth of the state into various statistical analyses between an index of military capability and GNP. It is difficult to grasp how a measure of development so broad as GNP and an index of military capability can translate the specific arguments presented by Tilly and others. The passage from the theoretical variables found in Tilly's writings to the indicators chosen by Mullins constitutes an important analytical leap. In Mullins' analysis, development, the dependent variable, is never clearly defined. It sometimes refers narrowly to the growth in size and complexity of the state apparatus and, at other times, to the broader notion of economic development, or to national development (economic and political dimensions of development). Mullins maybe assumes that all dimensions of development are positively

correlated or compatible as it was presumed earlier by development theory. But this is a highly questionable assumption as Samuel Huntington and others have shown (Huntington 1971, 1987; Lane and Ersson, 1989).

Mullins' sample of forty-six Third World countries is also peculiar in concentrating heavily on Black Africa (thirty cases) or small states like Cyprus, Fiji, Jamaica, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago; thus excluding almost all the larger states with important armed forces. For the whole Middle East, only Algeria, Kuwait, Somalia and South Yemen are included. In Asia, notable absentees include China, India, Indonesia, the Koreas, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. As for Latin America, it is represented by such small powers as Guyana, Jamaica and Surinam. Mullins justifies his choice of including only countries that had their independence after 1956 in order to eliminate: "any confounding effects of the immediate post-World War II demobilization period and holds the data-collection and manipulation work to a manageable level" (Mullins 1987, 14). The result is a biased sample.

How significant are the results of a study on military power and development (whatever the latter term means), that excludes the largest Third World states and those that have accounted for the largest part of military spending and military conflicts in the Third World? The European model of state making through war making was found in studying the experiences of the most powerful and successful states of Europe, not out of the statistical average of the dozens of small kingdoms, principalities and city-states of old Europe. In Mullins' study methodological necessity takes precedence over the *problématique*; producing answers that have the appearance of scientificity but that do not answer the questions originally asked.

Mullins' study is also contradicted by another quantitative study on state-building in the Third World, which finds that involvement in interstate wars has been one of the two main causes of the growth of the state in the Third World since 1960 -- the other being the

degree of exposure of a country to the world commodity market (Lee 1988). In his conclusions, Su-Hoon Lee joins Tilly in arguing that state-building in the contemporary world is determined by external factors: “[t]he main conclusion of this study is that state-building during the 1960 to 1980 period has taken place primarily due to transnational linkages of Third World states to the modern world-system” (Lee 1988, 159). For Lee, these transnational linkages, however, are interstate wars and exposure to the world commodity market.

Lee treats the dependent variable state-building in a sophisticated way. He clearly defines it as: “the expansion of capacities of the state relative to the society” (Lee 1988, 3). He rightly points out that growth in state power can be uneven, varying with specific state capacities. Thus, he measures state-building with three different indicators representing three different state capacities: central state revenue as a percentage of GNP (state extractive capacity), total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (state coercive capacity) and mass education enrollments as a proportion of population (state incorporative capacity). His samples of cases vary from sixty-six to sixty countries, depending of the state capacity measured, and seem more representative of the whole gamut of conditions found in the Third World than Mullins’ sample.

Lee found that of all the independent variables he considered in his analysis only involvement in interstate war and the degree of exposure to the world commodity market had a significant influence on the growth of the extractive and coercive capacities of Third World states; though not on their incorporative capacity. On the specific impact of war-making on state-building he said:

...war making as measured by interstate war is found to be a significant causal factor in terms of state-building in Third World countries during the past two decades. This indicates that Tilly’s paradigm which was derived from the historical experiences of state formation a few centuries ago in Europe is borne out. In spite of much distinct world-systemic contexts and in spite of different positions in its [sic] occupied by the emerging core in Tilly’s case and the twentieth century periphery (and semiperiphery) in the case of this

analysis, it is striking to detect the robustness and central location of interstate war in state-building (Lee 1988, 93).

Lee argues, however, that while core states go to war to improve their position in the world system, Third World states get involved in wars as a consequence of rivalries, or wars, between core countries (Lee 1988, 107-8). This opinion is representative of the world system approach to wars in the Third World (Kick and Kiefer 1987). Lee is in agreement with Tilly when he underlines as a characteristic of Third World states the externality of their armed forces, created and developed by links to core countries rather than by domestic resource extraction (Lee 1988, 107-8). Tilly, Mullins and Lee therefore all agree that military rule in the Third World stems from the transnational links forged during the colonial era, or afterward through military assistance and arms transfers.

Conclusions

Through this literature review I have set the stage for the next chapter that deals with the research design and the framework for analysis of the case studies. At this point it might be useful to summarize the main points that this review has brought out in regard to war making and state making in the Third World, and to indicate how my framework will follow, or depart from, what Lee, Mullins and Tilly have written on the subject.

- All three authors argue that the processes of war making and state making in the Third World are more externalized, i.e., determined by international factors, than they were in the European past. While I find this argument sensible, I am not totally convinced by the reasons put forward to explain this phenomenon, or even the key features of this externality. I intend to emphasize the conditions of modern war making and the peculiar position of the state in relation to the national and world economies in the Third World.
- Lee, Mullins and Tilly leave out the variation in war making experiences, notably the degree of intensity of war making and the conditions of warfare, as intervening variables affecting the relationship between war making and state making. I have shown that this was a well-grounded line of argument in regard to the European past. I intend to follow it in my Third World case studies.
- The same three scholars got sidetracked in their analysis by the research agenda of political development theory and studies of militarism with their focus on the military and the issue of military rule. Tilly went so far as dropping totally the connection between war making and state making in favor of this more conventional problématique. All three

analysts consider that military rule is the feature that characterizes the Third World experience in regard to the impact of armies on state making. I think that explaining military rule in the Third World is a very complex issue that requires a full treatment of its own, just like the impact of war making on state making; to attempt to deal with both issues in a single study is to do a disservice to both problématiques.

- While Tilly and Mullins claim that the European model of state making through war making did not reoccur in the Third World, Lee claims that it did. My study certainly intends to give further evidence for either side.

- With the recent exception of Michael Barnett's study on Egypt, the only systematic studies that we have on the relationship between war making and state making in the Third World are quantitative analyses of large samples. Their purpose was to link war preparation (Mullins) or involvement in interstate war (Lee) with state-building through statistical correlation, while leaving the actual causal path between the two variables in an analytical black box. I intend to approach the same issue through a different research design based on a series of in-depth comparative case studies in order to offer a different analytical perspective on the relationship between war making and state making. A perspective that I think is closer to the original works already done on the European model.

2. Framework for Analysis

This chapter serves as link between the literature review and the case studies. The literature review showed that a relationship between war making and state making has been present in the history of the Western world since at least the early 16th century. War making has contributed to the growth of the state and to the transformation of regimes even it is not the only cause of those changes. The review also demonstrated that the few studies on the relationship between war making and state making in the contemporary Third World are contradictory in their findings. Lee (1988) claims that a positive relationship between the two phenomena exists, that war in the Third World has contributed to the growth of state power; while Tilly, and Mullins (1987) argue that the two processes are no longer connected. All three agree, however, that war making is more determined by external variables in the Third World, and that this externalization is an important cause of military involvement in politics.

In order to provide further evidence of the reoccurrence or non-occurrence of the link between war making and state making this study relies on a comparative case study methodology. This appears to me as a valid research design for two reasons. First, it is closer to the kind of evidence and explanation provided by the literature on the European past. Comparisons between the two historical experiences should therefore be more intelligible.¹

Second, some important questions on the relationship between war making and state making are not well suited to the quantitative research method. Quantitative studies can be

¹ I assume here that contradictory interpretations are more common when different research designs are applied to study similar phenomena. Both Mullins (1987) and Lee (1988) built their quantitative research design from propositions derived from the qualitative and historical approaches of Tilly and others. The comparability of their results with the European historical experience would have been greater had their study been the replication of quantitative research designs already applied to Western cases. But there are few quantitative studies on the Western historical experience of state making through war making (Jagers 1992; Rasler and Thompson 1985).

good for testing the existence of a relationship between war making and state making, but they leave the actual causal path between the two variables in an analytical black box. Similar causes and outcomes can hide different causal paths. For instance, both Taiwan and South Korea are considered strong Third World states and there are good reasons to think that specific wars and war preparation efforts are part of the explanation of their strength. Yet their historical trajectories in regard to war making and state making show patterns that are not similar to the experience of the early core European states; although they might be compared with the experience of states in Eastern Europe.¹ A historical case study, on the other hand, can provide both an assessment of the impact of war making on state making and a picture of the historical trajectory, of the causal path linking the two phenomena.

Quantitative studies also are limited in their capacity to assess fully the phenomenon of state making. They measure state growth or state power (as power resources), but rarely changes of regime or variations in state-society relations. Furthermore, their indicators of state power are often limited and available in continuous data series only from the 1960s on. Case studies, conversely, can tap a wider set of measures of state power and can give a more discriminate picture that includes besides state-building, issues of regime formation and state-society relations.

Comparative historical analysis is obviously no panacea, case studies also have their limitations. It is the purpose of this chapter to present and discuss the methodological and theoretical choices made in the development of a framework for the analysis of the case studies. The first section deals with issues in comparative analysis: how comparisons across time and space can be made, why the Middle East provides the four national case

¹ South Korea and Taiwan are not included among the cases in spite of the fact that their histories make them interesting comparative cases. Both countries have known Japanese colonialism which was characterized by strong direct administration rather than indirect rule. Both states emerged as independent entities following the Second World War (defeat of Japan) and the subsequent East Asian conflicts (Chinese civil War and Korean War). Both have sustained important war preparation efforts. Finally, both states have been economically and militarily assisted by the United States.

studies, and how can we generalize from the cases to the Third World in general? The second section provides the theoretical assumptions about Third World states that underpin the analysis of the cases. That section aims at giving a sense of the specificity of states and state making in the periphery of the world system; a specificity that makes more likely patterns of war making and state making divergent from the old European model. The third section tackles the issue of the conceptualization of state power. Different conceptualizations can give contradictory assessments of specific cases. It is therefore important to be as explicit as possible about one's choice. The last section presents additional clarifications in regard to war making.

The Parameters of Comparative Analysis

How to Compare States in Different World-Historical Contexts

A comparison like the one conducted here between phenomena that took place in different places, cultural contexts and times raises questions about the possibility and conditions of comparative history. One can identify three positions in social sciences with respect to that issue. From a historicist perspective one could claim that such comparisons are impossible or irrelevant because social phenomena can only be understood within their spatiotemporal contexts.¹ A comparison between two phenomena widely separated in time and space is likely to compare objects that are only marginally comparable and to provide incomplete explanations of those objects. At the other extreme, a strict positivist would argue that a quality of scientific statements is that they are universal in application, not bound by spatiotemporal conditions (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 5-8, 17-8, 24-6). From

¹ The term historicism (or historism) has been attached to various, and sometimes contradictory, meanings in social sciences. I am using the term, here, to refer to the philosophy of history and social sciences developed in reaction to positivism, notably in 19th century Germany. It can be characterized by two assertions: (1) each historical era or phenomenon can only be understood in its own terms; (2) the study of historical or social phenomena requires a mode of explanation that emphasizes an understanding of the actors involved (relativity of values), not a mode of explanation borrowed from the natural sciences and based on the search for universal laws (Jary and Jary 1991, 278; Ritter 1986, 183-6).

that standpoint, for instance, a theory of imperialism that would explain that phenomenon from ancient times to the contemporary era would be inherently superior to theories of imperialism limited to 19th century European colonialism, to the imperialism of ancient empires, or to the contemporary superpowers.

For the present research a third position has been adopted, it reflects the actual practice of many historical sociologists who have tried to balance the need to take into account spatiotemporal specificity with the requirement of developing generalizations and explanations that are applicable to a class of phenomena or objects. As such this position is less neat than the two previous ones, notably because it often reflects ad hoc methodological rules developed by scholars through their actual work rather than recommendations deduced from an explicit epistemological discourse about the nature of science, social science and explanation.

There are, more specifically, three rules of importance in my opinion. The first one is borrowed directly from Charles Tilly (Tilly 1975, 16-7). He argues that the analysis of historical material should focus on the search for generalizations about recurrent relationships rather than recurrent events or sequences. This is particularly relevant for the present research because as Tilly points out the European experience is unlikely to repeat itself in terms of events or sequences but it is possible that some of the relationships found in the European past hold in other spatiotemporal contexts (Tilly 1975, 17). In other words, the relationship between war making and state making might be present in both the European past and the contemporary Third World while not following the same sequence or causing exactly comparable events.

The reason why comparable relationships between comparable units or phenomena are likely to produce divergent sequences or events across time and space is found in large part in the second rule of comparative historical sociology. This rule emphasizes that in comparing national cases widely separated in time and space different international

contexts are likely to provide a key explanation of divergences between historical experiences (Eberhard 1968; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1975). Differences in international contexts can refer to changes in the structure of the world economy, or in the structure of the state system, or in world time (i.e., the diffusion of ideas and institutions) (Skocpol 1979, 23). This line of argumentation is common in studies on late industrializers in the Western world (Gerschenkron 1966; Veblen 1964). Although these countries (e.g., Germany, Russia) were seen as undergoing a process comparable to the one that took place earlier in Great Britain or France, their experience of industrialization was shaped by ideas, institutions, and technologies already in existence, and by an established market for industrial goods already dominated by the production of early industrializers. An outcome of this different international context has been that the state usually played a more active role in the industrialization of late developers than it had for early developers.

The third rule is that the analysis should be conducted in an open-ended and prospective manner (Bendix 1976, 247).¹ The emphasis should be on the careful selection of comparable phenomena and of similar questions for inquiry, leaving open the possibility of multiple historical trajectories; rather than on the development of a general descriptive model that could subsume all the cases. In inferring causality, the analyst should look at the various paths leading away from a particular historical condition and the conditions shaping the specific path taken rather than work backward from a particular historical condition to its causes (Tilly 1975, 14-5; Grosser 1984, 64). The latter approach too easily gives way to post facto explanations and a sense of historical determinism that distort the undetermined character of history.

¹"By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical particularity as far as I can, while still comparing different countries. Rather than aim at broader generalizations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at least similar questions of divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers" (Bendix 1976, 247). Weber and scholars inspired by him, like Bendix, often attempt to strike a delicate balance between generalizations and an awareness of historical and cultural particularities.

Comparative history can be put also to different uses by social scientists, it is therefore important to identify these different uses in order to understand the goals of any specific comparative historical study. Skocpol and Somers see three different uses of comparative history: (1) as a parallel demonstration of theory, (2) as contrast of contexts, and (3) as macro-causal analysis (Skocpol and Somers 1980). In the first use, comparative history serves to show that an explicit model or theory can be fruitfully applied across a variety of cases. This is the goal pursued in the present research when the specific patterns of war making and state making found in the Middle East are explained by reference to a general model about Third World states and their political economies as well as by reference to the conditions of warfare in the Middle East.

When comparative history is used for the purpose of contrasting one context with another, on the other hand, the main goal of the analyst is to bring out the unique features of particular cases and to show how a general process or phenomenon is affected by the context of particular cases. This is, at a broad level, the purpose of the present comparison between Third World states and the past experience of European states. Whereas the first use of comparative history aims at showing how much the cases fit the theory or model, this second use of comparative history shows how much the cases cannot be subsumed under a universal model. The two uses are not contradictory as long as they are kept, as it is the case here, at different levels of comparison: comparative history as a parallel demonstration of theory is conducted across Middle East cases, whereas comparative history as a study in contrast of contexts is conducted between the Middle East (Third World) and the European past.

The third use of comparative history is for the purpose of macro-causal analysis. In this perspective, the analyst uses evidence from comparative case studies to find which alternative explanation accounts better for the common or diverging outcomes found in the cases. This use is not central to the present study. Had I decided to apply it, it would have

meant identifying contending theories about state making in the Third World and testing which one would have accounted better for a series of cases that would have contrasted cases of successful and unsuccessful state making. However, because this use of comparative history corresponds largely to the logic of the comparative method it is possible to find it at specific points in the present study when the cases are contrasted between them on specific dimensions.

The Logic behind the Selection of Cases

There are no ideal criteria for the selection of cases in comparative analysis because different logics and purposes require different configurations of cases, from one case to many, from similar cases to contrasting ones, from cases to develop theory to cases to invalidate theory. Even what constitutes a case is relative. For instance, when comparing the European past to the contemporary Third World, the present study is a single case study because it focuses on a single region of that vast area called the Third World. If cases are delineated by the main unit of analysis, then we have four national cases (Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria). However, if we consider a case to refer to any single measure of a phenomenon (Eckstein 1975, 85), here war making, then we have many cases because some national cases (Egypt and Syria) include more than one instance of war or war preparation.

It is appropriate to start with the rationale for the highest level of comparison; that is, why the Middle East was chosen as a case study for the testing of the existence of a positive relationship between war making and state making in the Third World. The logic behind this choice is what Harry Eckstein calls a crucial-case study: "a well-constructed experiment, conducted to simulate as closely as possible the specified conditions under which a law must hold, and compare its result with that predicted by the law" (Eckstein

1975, 116). To find a crucial case is arguably a difficult task and likely to be a matter of degree than of pure nature in the realm of social phenomena, as Eckstein points out:

The essential abstract characteristic of a crucial case can be deduced from its function as a test of theory. It is a case that *must closely fit* a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory's validity, or, conversely, *must not fit* equally well any rule contrary to that proposed. The same point can be put thus: in a crucial case it must be extremely difficult, or clearly petulant, to dismiss any finding contrary to theory as simply "deviant"... and equally difficult to hold that any finding confirming theory might just as well express quite different regularities. One says difficult and petulant because claims of deviance and the operation of other regularities can always be made. The question is therefore not whether they are made but how farfetched or perverse the reasons for them (if any) are (*italics in original*) (Eckstein 1975, 118).

Crucial cases can be of the "most-likely" or "least-likely" type (Eckstein 1975, 118-9), the least-likely case serves to confirm a theory; however if one believes that the real test of a scientific theory is an attempt at invalidating it, then it is preferable to select a most-likely case. A most-likely case is a case that reproduces as far as possible the conditions associated by a theory with a certain outcome.

In the present study, the Middle East is seen as the region in the Third World that shares the greatest number of similar conditions with the old European state system in which the evidence of a positive relationship between war making and state making was established. Therefore if the relationship between the two phenomena does not hold in the Middle East it is even less likely to hold in other regions of the Third World such as East Asia, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America where conditions diverge even more from the ones that were present in Europe.

What are those structural similarities between Old Europe and the contemporary Middle East? First, both regions represent cases of a civilization divided into feuding sovereignties. The fall of the Roman empire left Europe without a single source of temporal or religious authority, the Latin heritage quickly merged with local cultures creating a variety over a substratum of uniformity. Similarly, the Middle East corresponds largely to the lands that were once ruled by the Ottoman empire and previously by other

Muslim empires. The dismantlement of the Ottoman empire after the First World War left the region divided into various states, but within a common Muslim and Arabic heritage, which has often blended with pre-Islamic or non-Arabic local cultures as in Iran, North Africa, or Turkey.

The second similarity between Europe and the Middle East is the existence of an integrated regional state system without a single dominant power. European statesmen and bureaucracies were before all concerned by the actions of other Europeans. Global international issues were perceived in relation to their impact on European politics and the maintenance of a balance of power. The pursuit of a balance-of-power policy as a state's objective was feasible because power imbalances between the main European states were never so large as to make likely the creation of a hegemony or formal empire. Scholars of the Middle East regional system similarly argue that the foreign policies of the region's states have a strong regional focus and that the regional system shows a greater degree of interaction among units than in other regions of the Third World (Korany and Dessouki 1984, 26-7; Noble 1984, 46-7). The contemporary Middle East has also been the scene of many bids for regional hegemony by regional powers that were thwarted by balancing alliances involving other regional powers or external powers (Brown 1984; Kerr 1971; Walt 1987). The presence of regional powers also helps to find significant war making efforts that would be beyond the means of small states limited in population or resources.¹

A third parallel between the two regions is the existence of a strong state making tradition. Arguably, Europeans have worked for a longer time within a nation-state tradition than Middle Easterners who have been more acquainted in the past with empire-

¹The presence of a fairly large population of small or micro states could be taken as a feature of both the old European state system and the contemporary Third World. However, as I pointed out in regard to Mullins' study, the European model of war making and state making was derived from the experiences of the main powers rather than from the far more numerous small state entities that disappeared in the process. Small states and micro-states in the contemporary world occupy a special niche, their survival being determined more by the norms of international society and the self-restraint of powerful neighbors than by domestic resources.

states and rule by foreign nationals. Even in the European context, however, the relationship between war making and nation-building is a phenomenon that emerged only at the end of the 18th century, to reach dramatic proportions in the 19th and 20th centuries. The important point is that both regions are familiar with the paraphernalia of the state: bureaucracies, taxes, standing armies, etc.; even though they might have arranged those institutions differently and have had different conceptions of sovereignty (and territoriality), of relations with minorities, or of the relation between religion and politics.

The last important similarity between both regions is the prevalence of interstate conflicts in the war making experiences of both Europe and the Middle East.¹ Although this is not a hypothesis often discussed in the literature it seems plausible that civil wars or insurrections might lead to different patterns of state making than conflicts between states. It is reasonable, therefore, to examine cases of interstate wars from the Third World rather than cases of domestic conflicts; even though the latter account for a majority of conflict in the Third World.

As for the final choice of cases within the Middle East, the selection was straightforward once one had excluded the smaller states of the region, those which had seen little or no interstate military conflict, and Israel.² Both Egypt and Syria were obvious cases because they had been involved in repeated wars and military build-ups with Israel. Iran and Iraq in their eight years long confrontation were also very relevant

¹ The recent literature on Third World security emphasizes that the main threats to state security in the Third World are domestic and not external threats emanating from other states (Ayoob 1991; Job 1992). In that sense the conflicts surveyed in the case studies are not typical of the Third World security problématique.

² Israel was excluded mainly because its level of economic development, patterns of politics and origins (as a settler state) do not make it part of the Third World. However, Israel could be a useful contrasting case in a subsequent study because it shares with the cases selected the facts that it is a case of state formation by a new state in the contemporary world system and that its state and war making activities were shaped in part by external resources and developments. Reference to Israel will be made in the context of the case studies on Egypt and Syria to the extent that it is required to explain developments in those states.

because they represented two states involved in total war.¹ This allowed for a contrast between wars of different intensity, since as it has been pointed out the intensity of the war making activity is likely to affect the strength of the relationship between war making and state making. The Iran-Iraq War also offered a conflict with a lower level of superpower involvement. Iran was largely isolated diplomatically and could rely on very little foreign military assistance. The Iranian state having just emerged from a revolution when it became involved in a war with Iraq also was an appropriate contrast with the three other states, which were characterized by more patrimonial regimes.

The wars covered through the case studies also vary in their level of technological sophistication. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War was largely an infantry war fought with a motley collection of World War II equipment. The Iranian ground operations in the Iran-Iraq War were similarly characterized by a heavy reliance on infantry and few sophisticated weapons. By contrast the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the Iraqi war effort during the Iran-Iraq War were characterized by a heavy reliance on advanced weaponry obtained from a few external sources. A last contrast is between war making efforts sustained by variable levels of externally-derived resources. Iran and Iraq were rentier states that could sustain financially significant war efforts; while Egypt and Syria had a more uneven access over time to externally-derived revenues. This last dimension of comparison relates to what has been said in the previous chapter about the impact of the political economy on war making and will be further developed later in this chapter.

From the Middle East to the Third World: Potential and Limits to Generalization

¹ A total war can be defined as follows: "By total war I mean a military conflict which a national society can only enter and sustain with some hope of success if it commits, and exposes to the risks of wear, waste and destruction characteristic of war, a very high proportion of all its material and human resources" (Poggi 1990, 112). Of course, it is a state and not a national society that commits and exposes the latter to total war.

In my opinion the four national cases selected for analysis represent a good balance of contrasts with a unity provided by the common background of interstate conflicts in the Middle East. However the selection of the Middle East as a case study representing the Third World raises an issue inherent to all case studies: to what extent is the case representative of the general category it stands for? This issue is even more acute for the present study because it can be argued that the Third World is such a diverse group of countries that the phrase has lost any reference to reality. It is therefore important to find whether or not there is a Third World to generalize about before addressing the question of the conditions and limits to generalization from the case study.

Those who claim that the Third World does not exist any more as a valid analytical category can point out two main facts. The term Third World had originally a political meaning, it was a synonym for what became the Non-Aligned Movement, a group of states that refused to be involved in the Cold War logic of alliance formation (Wolf-Phillips 1979, 105; Worsley 1979, 102). The term also took a political economic connotation when it became associated with a call for a New International Economic Order in the early 1970s (Lyon 1984, 234-5). However, the Third World in this sense of a coherent diplomatic force on the world scene has dramatically decreased in meaning since the early 1980s.

But the phrase Third World quickly shifted from its original political connotation to a more analytical meaning (Wolf-Phillips, 106; Worsley 1979, 103). For scholars interested in development studies the Third World became synonymous with the category of countries that were less developed and affluent than the liberal industrialized and the industrialized nations of the Soviet bloc. On this dimension, again, the Third World of the 1950s and early 1960s has fragmented into a variety of developmental experiences ranging from the new category of the Fourth World (low income countries) to the newly industrialized countries (NICs) -- which enjoy levels of economic development

comparable to many countries in Southern and Eastern Europe -- and to the special category of major capital surplus oil exporting countries, some of which top the ranking of countries in terms of GNP per capita. Strategies of economic development have followed a similar diversification, the old strategy of industrialization by import-substitution has been replaced or complemented by agro- or mineral-export-led growth, manufactured-export-led growth and agricultural-development-led growth in a single region like the Middle East (Richards and Waterbury 1990, 20-34).

As an advocate of the continued relevance of the term Third World I do not deny the validity of those arguments but do emphasize other important dimensions. First, one can point out the still important developmental gap between North and South overall. Second, although we are said to live in an increasingly interdependent world it remains that Third World countries are more vulnerable economically in their relations with the advanced industrialized countries than the latter are vulnerable in their economic relations with the Third World. This structural condition of dependence (in the sense of an asymmetric interdependence relationship) in the realm of the economy also exists in the social and political realms, not necessarily in the sense of Third World *compradore* elites in the pay of dominant classes in the core countries; but in the sense of the reliance of the Third World on institutional forms borrowed from the developed world. We live in a single global system in which criteria of statehood and modernity developed in the Western world are diffused and legitimated globally as universal values (Boli-Bennett 1979, 1980; Meyer 1980). In that context, countries in the periphery of the system are characterized by the fact that they are recipients, borrowers or even adapters of institutional forms that come from the core countries.

In short, while it is true that the Third World is an increasingly diversified group of countries its overall relationship with the Western world, which makes up the core of the global system, remains asymmetric. The issue is not so much one of culture than of timing

and conditions of incorporation in the world system. The term Third World is in that context a useful, if not totally accurate, phrase to refer to the countries that are currently on the periphery of the world system; as long as the term periphery is not understood in narrow economic terms.

As for the problem of generalization from a case study (the Middle East) to a general category (the Third World) there is no simple solution short of conducting a subsequent study on a more representative sampling of the varied conditions found in the Third World.¹ But the problem can be minimized as it is here by the development of a general model about the nature and dynamics of Third World states. That model is derived from the literature on the Third World rather than from studies on Middle East politics and it is used to explain the case studies. If a model derived from the general conditions of state making in the Third World can account for the patterns found in the Middle East there is less reason to believe, conversely, that the patterns of state making and war making found in the Middle East reflect some regional idiosyncrasies and cannot be generalized *to some extent* to the rest of the Third World.

I emphasize the phrase *to some extent* because the potential for generalization is likely to vary according to the similarities that the new cases would share with the Middle East cases. For instance, a pattern found in the Middle East should be more likely to be confirmed in the Indo-Pakistani conflict than in the cases of the internal wars in Angola and Mozambique. Because the Indo-Pakistani case involves, as in the Middle East, conventional interstate wars between states with established bureaucratic and military traditions and a context of superpower rivalry. Even if Angola and Mozambique in their

¹ There is an inherent tension in my research design between the crucial-case nature of the Middle East in regard to the European past and the desire to generalize about the Third World. The first purpose implies the selection of the region of the Third World that shares the greatest number of similarities with the old European state system; while those structural similarities are precisely obstacles that limit the extent to which the Middle East pattern will be generalizable to other regions of the Third World. Such trade-offs are probably part of any configuration of cases, at best they can be made explicit and one can try to cope with them as I intend to do here.

internal wars were less likely to fit the Middle East pattern in all respects, that pattern could provide a framework to develop contrasting hypotheses based precisely on the known dissimilarities between the two regions (Middle East and Southern Africa). Thus, even if it were not generally applicable as an accurate description, the present study could offer propositions or hypotheses of general application around which qualifications and revisions could be worked out to better account for varying contexts.

A Theoretical Perspective on Third World States

Comparative analysis, even a single case study, cannot be conducted without concepts and some theoretical notions or models of reality. The choice is between leaving these premises at an implicit level or stating them as explicitly as possible. The following section aims at presenting the conceptualization of Third World states that led me to expect a pattern of relationship between war making and state making in the Third World different from the one found among the older core states of Europe and to characterize this difference as a greater externality of both processes in the Third World. This section does not claim to represent the best or only way of theorizing about Third World states, as such it is not a literature review presenting the merits and pitfalls of various approaches. It is more simply a presentation of the conceptual tools and theoretical propositions used in the case studies.

State and Regime

A state is:

an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way (Migdal 1988, 19).

This Weberian definition is broad enough to be applicable to past and present states, whether they are in the core or periphery of the world system; as long as one understands that stateness, itself, is a variable property (Nettl 1968). Over time and across space states have varied in the claims to specific jurisdictions they have made under the broad notion of sovereignty, and in the extent to which they were able to implement their binding rules over specific populations and territories. A large part of the theoretical debate on the nature of Third World states is precisely about delineating the differences between First World and Third World states in that regard.

For the purpose of the present discussion the key feature of Third World states that should be underlined is their autonomy from the society over which they claim to rule. The theme of state autonomy (from society) is recurrent in the literature on Third World states. Marxist accounts, for instance, often insist on how much more autonomous from indigenous dominant classes the state is in the periphery than it is in the core capitalist countries (Alavi 1972; Saul 1979). Other scholars emphasize the extent to which states in the Third World have been shaped by external forces and criteria of statehood leading to a development of the state, in both the colonial and post-colonial periods, largely autonomous from society (Gellar 1973; Smith 1983, 18-35; Thomas and Meyer 1980). The autonomy of the Third World state is usually seen as the result of the colonial legacy reinforced in the post-colonial era by the peculiar place of those states in the world economy and state system.

The autonomy of the state in the Third World can be understood also in terms of the relative insulation of the policy-making process in those countries when compared to the pluralist or democratic corporatist models found in Western liberal states. In the Third World, society-based influence on policies usually takes place at the implementation stage rather than at the policy formulation stage (Grindle 1980, 15-6). Third World governments tend to make policies unilaterally; social groups then try to evade or alter

them, sometimes with a significant degree of success. This autonomy in policy-making coupled with inadequate policy implementation is maybe at the heart of the paradox of state power in the Third World: states can unilaterally declare important reforms even in the face of likely societal resistance but with little certainty that their reforms will yield the intended results. When one looks at the first part of the equation Third World states appear strong when one looks at the second part, however, they appear weak. Through the rest of this discussion the autonomy of the Third World state from its own society will be emphasized in the context of its political economy and the process of state formation. In my opinion, it is this feature of the state that is the most recurrent across the Third World and it has important implications for the study of war making. Third World states are more autonomous from their society than First World states because they are able to rely to a greater extent on externally-derived resources. If state making is more externalized in the Third World, war making as a state activity also might be more externalized; that is, conducted autonomously from society as far as possible, thanks to externally-derived resources.

Too often in neo-institutionalist or state-centric analysis the state becomes an all-encompassing notion at the expense of the concept of regime, which I consider an essential complement of any analysis that takes the state as a central focus. Regime refers narrowly to the type of government found in a state, more broadly it refers to the type of state-society interface found in a country. To the extent that the return to the state in political science is a return to a focus on the study of state-society relations it is therefore an important concept that requires a minimum of discussion. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of definitions of what a regime is, when compared to the plethora of definitions of the state. For the present thesis the definition offered by Richards and Waterbury seems to encapsulate well my conceptualization: “ regime refers not only to a type of government but also to ideology, rules of the game, and the structuring of the polity in a given nation”

(Richards and Waterbury 1990, 300). This definition developed in relation to the Middle East is very appropriate for the study of regimes in the Third World because it does not limit itself to a narrow legalistic or constitutional definition of regime. If in Western liberal democracies the legal-constitutional framework gives an accurate (if incomplete) picture of the regime in place, it is clearly not the case in most Third World countries, or for that matter the communist regimes formerly found in Europe; thus, the emergence of analytical categories of regimes: bureaucratic-authoritarian, corporatist, patrimonial, totalitarian, etc., depending on the features that analysts consider to be crucial.

In an attempt to find the lowest common denominator of Third World regimes -- the counterpart to the autonomy of the state from society -- it is appropriate to emphasize their low degree of institutionalization and the corresponding importance of personal rule and patrimonialism. Samuel Huntington was probably the first to argue systematically that the real challenge of "political development" in the Third World was the absence of an institutionalized political realm and the necessity of developing one so that socioeconomic change would not lead to political decay and a praetorian system.

In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly: no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts (Huntington 1968, 196).

Countries characterized by a low level of institutionalization of the political sphere typically produce authoritarian forms of government with strong personal rule.¹ Jackson and Rosberg perceptively described the character and dynamics of personal rule in sub-Saharan Africa and their insights are largely transferable to the Middle East, and other regions of the Third World (Jackson & Rosberg 1982).² In a personal rule system rulers

¹ "Personal rule is a system of relations linking rulers not with the "public" or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the "system" " (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 19).

² In recent years a trend toward a greater institutionalization of the political sphere has taken place in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, and Taiwan. This process is currently far more uncertain in Africa and the Middle East where rulers appear to resist the ultimate consequence of an

and other political leaders take precedence over the formal rules of the political game. Institutionalized rules to the extent that they are present, for instance in the constitution, are instruments of rule that can be revised by the ruler rather than a set of constraints on his rule. The formal institutional structure hides a second structure of rules, which are the real rules of the game according to the actors involved in the game of politics. These rules include clientelism, rivalries between strongmen in the regime, balancing acts by the supreme ruler between the various strongmen and their constituencies; in brief, a whole set of practices that Migdal calls "the politics of survival" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Migdal 1988, 206-37).

In that sense the dynamics of personal rule is very similar to Weber's characterization of patrimonial rule (Bendix 1977, 334-80; Weber 1968, 1006-110). Patrimonial regimes according to Weber are characterized by a continuous struggle between the patrimonial ruler and his retainers and officials. The patrimonial ruler is particularly vulnerable to two developments: (1) an overreliance on his military forces to insure his rule which would make him vulnerable to a palace coup by his own troops; and (2) a decentralization of rule or administration that could lead subordinate officials to develop power bases from which they could challenge the ruler. Weber developed his study of patrimonial rule in reference to pre-modern political systems, but many of his insights on patrimonialism are enlightening to understand the dynamics of many contemporary regimes. However, very few contemporary regimes are strictly speaking patrimonial, in the sense of conceiving the state as the extension of the ruler's household (as in the Arab kingdoms or the Brunei sultanate). It is therefore more appropriate to refer to neo-patrimonialism in those many instances when a ruler with no traditional claim to rule maintains a dominant (and often

lasting) position at the head of a regime through patrimonial means and strategies.¹ Neo-patrimonial regimes besides suffering from the tensions inherent to patrimonial rule are further handicapped by the fact that the ruler cannot rely automatically on traditional legitimacy and sources of support to sustain his rule.

The emphasis laid on the distinction between state and regime and on personal rule has direct relevance for the subject of state making and war making. Rulers are above all preoccupied with staying in power. They promote the development of their regime and state because they think this will contribute to the maintenance of their rule, the promotion of their interests and the realization of their program. State making is probably more the unintended consequence of the activities of self-interested rulers than the outcome of the actions of enlightened and voluntaristic state leaders. Furthermore, most rulers in the contemporary Third World have built and sustained their power and regime from the state, using state resources to gain support in society, rather than to have attempted to capture the state from a strong base of power in society.²

From this characterization of regimes in the Third World I deduce that the first choice of Third World state makers involved in war making is to pursue this activity with state or foreign resources in order to minimize the reliance on society-based resources. Third World state makers would rather be dependent on externally-derived resources, even if it

institutionalized system of competition for office, i.e., losing their office through the ballot. Meanwhile, oppositions contest the rules or results of elections. Thus, if a process of institutionalization is currently noticeable in many developing countries it remains that for the period and cases covered in the present study, low degree of institutionalization and personal rule were the rules rather than the exceptions.

¹ Examples of such neo-patrimonial leaders are numerous in the post-independence history of the Third World, to mention but a few: Boumedienne in Algeria, Bourguiba in Tunisia, Senghor in Senegal, Mobutu in Zaire, Asad in Syria, Zia in Pakistan, Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines. Even formally communist regimes with large party structures, as in North Korea and Cuba, show features of personal appropriation of the regime by the supreme leader and his relatives.

² At best some Third World leaders have been willing to favor the growth of a dominant, or single, party to act as a second pillar of their rule, as a potential counterbalance to the state bureaucracy, and ideally as a link to the regime's constituency in society. This was the pattern in Bourguiba's Tunisia with the Neo-Destour and in Nyerere's Tanzania with the TANU/CCM (Moore 1965; Okumu with Holmquist 1984). These cases, even if they often involved a close symbiosis between the party and the state bureaucracy, could be contrasted with the more general trend in Africa and the Middle East wherein the patrimonial ruler left the party weak or declining in favor of state bureaucracies (civilian and military).

meant to become more vulnerable to foreign pressures, than be similarly dependent on, and vulnerable to, their society. However, sometimes war making becomes so intense that state or foreign resources are insufficient to sustain it. In such a case the state leadership faces a difficult choice. One option it might consider is to settle the conflict at the origin of the war making effort. Another option is to attempt a mass mobilization of domestic resources for the purpose of war making. But my characterization of Third World regimes leads me to think that this is unlikely since it would increase the dependence of the state and regime on society at the expense of their autonomy. A third option, finally, would be to rearrange the state activities so that state resources (in particular financial ones) could be released from some sectors of activity and be reallocated to war making. In other words, the state leadership would compromise some of its domestic state making in order to sustain its military power. This choice is possible because ultimately the survival of the regime matters more to the state makers than their domestic state making project.¹

The Political Economy of Third World States

Earlier in this chapter I argued that the term Third World was still relevant to refer to the set of asymmetric relationships between two regions of the world system, the core and the periphery. In the economic realm this asymmetric relationship refers to the state of economic dependence in which most Third World countries find themselves. It is a situation of highly asymmetric interdependence in which the Third World is more dependent on, and vulnerable to, the economic links it has with the advanced industrialized countries than the latter are in regard to their links with Third World economies.² Many advanced industrialized countries, taken individually, are also

¹ This assertion assumes that the focus of "national security" in the Third World is not the nation but the state and ultimately the regime embedded in the state (Ayoob 1991, 259).

² This characterization of North-South economic relations and the concept of dependence, defined as a highly asymmetric form of interdependence, represent a liberal economic perspective on these issues and should not be confused with the different conceptualization found in dependency (*dependencia*) theory (Caporaso 1978; Duvall 1978; Keohane and Nye 1989).

dependent on foreign trade for sustained economic development and are therefore potentially vulnerable. But in contrast, most Third World countries are further handicapped because: (1) they export goods that are often affected by short-term price fluctuations or long-term price decline; (2) their exports are concentrated, they rely mainly on one or a few export commodities exported to a few countries; (3) they are not able to take full advantage of the international regimes of trade liberalization (in a specific region or world-wide); and (4) their economic and industrial policies are less adaptable to changes in the international economy. Most Third World countries suffer from some, or all, of those disadvantages; which increase the vulnerability of their externally-oriented economies.

However, we need a more focused discussion about the links between Third World states, their externally-oriented economies and the activities of state making and war making. The first pertinent point in that respect is that the importance of exports in generating national income combined with their concentration make likely state control over the export sector. If this happens the state can then finance itself from the activities of the export sector rather than from a broader base of resource extraction in society and economy. When carried to the extreme limits, as in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, this situation can lead to a rentier state, a state that has an autonomous source of wealth based on externally-derived revenue outside of any society-based constraints (Mahdavy 1970).¹ Obviously, few Third World states are in a position to enjoy a rentier status, but it is interesting to notice that rents and rent-seeking strategies have spread to

¹ Mahdavy defines rentier states: "as those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or government of a given country" (Mahdavy 1970, 428). Another scholar, G. Luciani refers to rentier states as allocation states: "those states whose revenue derives predominantly (more than 40 per cent) from oil or other foreign sources, and whose expenditure is a substantial share of GDP" (Luciani 1987, 70). Oil export is not the only source of rents in the Middle East, transit fees for oil pipelines (as in Syria), transit fees for the Suez Canal in Egypt, and economic subsidies to the front-line states in struggle with Israel are other sources of externally-derived rents present in the case studies. My own perspective in the present section is to conceive the rentier state as the extreme point of a continuum of (non-) reliance on externally-derived revenue for the financing of the state.

other Middle East countries that are not endowed with oil wealth, for instance Jordan and Syria (Beblawi 1987, 59-62). Foreign subsidies given because of the strategic location or the foreign policy orientation of a country can be in those cases an equivalent of oil rents. Somalia and South Yemen, for a time, were both able to obtain significant foreign resources for their state making activities based on their strategic location during the Cold War. A rentier state logic has also been found outside of the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Nigeria (Rubin 1992; Baumann 1992). The extension of a rentier state logic to states that do not have a rentier economy proves that Third World states, whenever possible, prefer to develop their economic base outside of societal constraints (even if this means an increased dependence on foreign actors or markets) than to have to confront their society directly for the extraction of resources.

This tendency can be noticed also in the taxation policies of Third World states: A key difference between strong and weak (or developed and developing) states is the proportion of a society's resource pool a government can extract. Developing countries generally collect a smaller proportion of taxes in relation to their GNPs than do developed industrial states. Many developing countries collect an average of between 13% and 14% of their GNPs in tax revenues of all kinds. Developed industrialized countries collect an average of 30% of their GNP in taxes (Snider 1987, 325).

Furthermore, when contrasted with the taxation structures found in the advanced industrialized states, Third World taxation policies show a greater reliance on domestic taxes on goods and services and on taxes on international trade and economic transactions; and a lesser reliance on taxes on income and profits and on social security contributions (Goode 1984, 88-91; Prest 1985, 21-2).¹ The conventional explanation offered by

¹ Oil-rich countries are excluded from those comparisons, otherwise the differences in tax structure would be even greater, these countries relying almost exclusively on oil rents and taxation of foreign corporations and residents. An analyst gave the following percentages derived from IMF data from the late 1970s: taxes on income and profits contributed on average to 24.2% of central government revenue (CGR) in developing countries while in developed countries they amounted to 41.5% of CGR, the respective percentages for social security contributions were 16.3% and 32.2%, for domestic taxes on goods and services they were 31.6% and 15.8%, finally for taxes on international trade and transactions the difference was the greatest with an average for developing countries of 17.5% while the same type of taxes only contributed to 1.8% of the CGR of developed countries (Prest 1985, 21).

economists to account for these divergent patterns of taxation mentions the level of development as a cause. Indirect taxes are easier to collect than taxes on income and profits, thus more appropriate to the less developed administrative capacities of Third World states. Indirect taxation is also more likely to reach the people in countries where the majority of the population are involved in a rural economy not yet fully penetrated by capitalism. As developing countries progress economically their tax structures become more like those of Western industrialized countries, just like the similar evolution of tax systems witnessed by European countries in the past (Goode 1984, 88-91). However, from the present perspective it is relevant to take note of the affinity between a tax structure that relies heavily on indirect taxation and Third World states characterized as reluctant to become dependent on, and responsive to, their societies. Indirect taxation often makes the link between the resources extracted and the government more remote, less obvious to citizens. Indirect taxation by affecting specific goods, services or economic sectors rather than levels of income or profit is more politically useful for state leaders who can use it to promote or hurt the economic interests of various groups (peasantry, commercial and industrial classes, etc.) depending on their attitude toward the regime.¹

Externally-derived revenue and indirect taxation make obvious parallel between the political economy of Third World states and what Rasler and Thompson said about the political economy of Spain in its era of imperial expansion(cf., pp. 33-4 of the present thesis). In fact, for Thomas Callaghy, the economic parallels between the new African states and the old European states are so numerous that he refers to the former as neo-mercantilist states (Callaghy 1979, 1988). Callaghy, and Weber before him, have also

¹ On the side of expenditure the political equivalent of indirect taxation is the use of price subsidies to maintain the standard of living of the urban population, often at the expense of the rural population; the support of urban groups being a more important concern of authorities than rural discontent. Again, from an administrative perspective it can be argued that price subsidies are easier to administer than programs of income supplement. But liberal economists and international financial organizations have argued that they are wasteful and distorting of the market.

underlined the convergence between that form of capitalism and patrimonialism (Callaghy 1987; Weber 1968, 1092-9). Mercantilism, or economic nationalism as it is called now, is dominated by the notion: "that economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state" (Gilpin 1987, 31). The terms mercantilism, or economic nationalism, is therefore more appropriate than socialism to qualify the pattern of state-led development found in the Third World.¹

I expect that important fluctuations in the ability of the state to finance its activities from its own resources or from foreign resources will have an impact on its state making and war making. For example, if the revenue of a state decreases dramatically while it is involved in a significant war making effort the state leadership is likely to be confronted with difficult choices. As already mentioned, it might have to consider a settlement of the conflict, a mass mobilization of society, or a reorientation of state activities in order to reallocate more resources to war making.² Third World state makers are likely to conduct war making with state resources because of their reluctance to become dependent on society. This implies that the financial burden of war making is borne largely by the state and is likely to constrain its (financial) capacity to undertake other activities. One could even envisage that the financial pressure on non-military-related expenditures induced by war making would be such that it would undermine the dominance of the state over the national economy, its role as the mainspring of economic development.

The importance of externally-derived revenue for war making in the Third World will figure prominently in the case study on the Iran-Iraq War. This war was significant from this viewpoint because it opposed two states with large oil revenue. The war opened with

¹ The economic parallels between the old and the new patrimonialism are not limited to the dominant role assumed by the state in trade and the regulating of economic activities. Weber had the following comment on patrimonialism that could be applied to many reformist Third World regimes in the past: "patriarchal patrimonialism must legitimate itself as guardian of the subjects' welfare in its own and in their eyes. The "welfare state" is the legend of patrimonialism.... Patriarchalism can therefore be the carrier of a specific welfare policy, and indeed develops it whenever it has sufficient reason to assure itself of the good will of the masses"(Weber 1968, 1107).

an Iraqi campaign to seize the oil-rich region of Iran and the subsequent strategic phases of the war involved diplomatic and military attempts by both states to limit the other's oil export in the hope of constraining its ability to finance a continued war effort. Egypt and Syria also witnessed important fluctuations in their externally-derived revenue during their confrontation with Israel. The connections between external revenue, state revenue and war making are not specific to the four cases, similar relationships could be found probably in other cases such as the phosphate export and Saudi subsidies for Morocco's protracted war in the Western Sahara, or Angolan exports (oil, diamond, iron and coffee) and the ability of the MPLA regime to finance its war against the UNITA rebels.

Externality in Third World State Making and War Making Processes

At various points in the thesis I have referred to the opinion that state making is more externalized in the Third World than it used to be in the European state system. Tilly mentioned the expansion of the world system to explain this situation. Late developers are by definition developing in a world system already shaped by capitalism and the state system, the range of institutions and development strategies they can adopt is constrained by the choice older states made before them. This concept of externality, however, requires further discussion if it is not to remain a vague notion.

Externality can have two different meanings in regard to state formation. First, it can refer to a process in which state formation is the outcome of decisions and developments beyond the control of indigenous state makers. State formation under colonial rule, for instance, is external in that first sense, because it is conducted by state makers acting on behalf of a foreign state. Similarly, the peace settlements that follow major wars often lead to the creation of new states. These states may be ruled by local state elites, and nationalist movements may have campaigned for independent statehood before and during the war. But ultimately the phase of state making involving the granting of full independence

and the international recognition of the new sovereignty was determined more by the outcomes of the war and of the negotiations between the major powers than by the efforts of indigenous state makers. Thus, the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires and the peace settlements that followed the First World War made possible an independent Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.¹ Much of sub-Saharan Africa, similarly, obtained formal independence from Britain and France in a context where no or very little indigenous state making had been conducted before independence was granted.

Externality in regard to state making, however, can have a second meaning. It may refer to the degree to which externally-derived resources contribute to independent state making. In that second sense indigenous elites are the state makers but they rely to a significant degree on externally-derived resources. For example, Spain's state making and bid for European hegemony in the 16th century was financed by shipments of American bullion and taxes on the export of wool. It also relied on European financiers and mercenaries. Contemporary state makers in the oil-rich countries of the Gulf rely on oil rents, foreign weaponry, and foreign labor and expertise to build and sustain their rule.

The general argument we have found in the literature previously reviewed is that state making in the Third World has been more externalized than it had been in the historical experience of the core European states (Tilly 1975; Lee 1988; Mullins 1987). With the present distinction between the two meanings of externality, one can be more specific and mention the following features of that externality.

•Externality as externally-shaped state making: (1) most Third World state boundaries have been delineated by foreign powers (Prescott 1987); (2) their formal independence for a majority was influenced by international or foreign developments (Bull 1984, 224-7;

¹ In the same vein, politics among the major European powers in the period 1938-40 brought the disappearance of the Baltic states and Czechoslovakia without the recourse to war.

Diehl and Goertz 1991; Jackson 1990, 82-5)¹; (3) many new states inherited their economic and political institutions from the colonial regime, they are post-colonial states; (4) institution-building in the post-independence era was significantly shaped by a world standard of statehood and specific models borrowed from the liberal or communist countries; (5) a new sovereignty regime sustained by the society of states protects to a large extent weak states against secession from ethnic minorities or from invasion and eradication by more powerful neighbors (Jackson 1990).

•Externality as the important contribution of externally-derived resources to independent state making: (1) military assistance and arms transfers, they are particularly available in periods of major power rivalries as during the Cold War; (2) foreign military intervention by a patron, the availability of this resource, however, is determined in large part by factors beyond the scope of control of Third World state makers²; (3) post-1945 international finance has offered various sources of short-term financing to Third World states through loans by governments, international finance organizations or commercial banks (Gilpin 1987, 310-4, 316-7); (4) multilateral or bilateral foreign aid is a new resource available to Third World states, it is a corollary of an international sovereignty regime that allows some barely viable units in the state system to exist in spite of poor developmental performance and weak state institutions (Jackson 1990, 112-8); (5) foreign civilian expertise, I put under this heading the foreign administrative expertise upon which

¹ I do not intend to downplay the impact of nationalist movements or guerrillas but to point out the following facts. First, the movement toward decolonization was helped by the decline of the legitimacy of colonial rule in the international society and in Western societies, which started with the end of the First World War. Second, the impact that the two World Wars had on the decline of the colonial powers and the myth of the racial supremacy of the West. And third, the emergence after 1945 of two superpowers both opposed to colonialism. Of course, there was a wide variety of experiences among Third World states in regard to the attainment of independence. The process was fairly externalized and peaceful in the case of the British and French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, while it involved a good measure of war making and state making in the case of Algeria, Vietnam and Indonesia. However, even in the last two cases the Second World War had an important impact by causing a breakdown of colonial administration during which the Vietnamese and Indonesian nationalists were able to increase their hold over the country.

² The control that a client state has over the intervention of a great power patron is usually limited to putting itself in a situation dramatic enough to require the patron to intervene in order to preserve the regional status quo and its credibility as a patron (McConnell 1979; Karsh 1985). It is more a resource to prevent total losses than to make gains.

a Third World state can rely to make up for the deficiencies of its human resources, it can consist of hired foreign technicians and experts (as in the Middle East oil-exporting states), of administrators lent by the former metropole (many African states in their early statehood), or of financial and development experts sent as part of a foreign aid program (contemporary African states). Even if it is probably incomplete this listing translates well the extent to which state making in the contemporary world has taken place within an institutionalized international society.

But it has been argued that war making also is externalized in the Third World and that therefore it does not contribute any more to state making. This argument has been presented in the preceding chapter and it can be summarized in the following way: (1) the consolidation of the state system and international norms of state behavior have dramatically reduced the possibility for states of acquiring territory, or of disappearing as independent entities, as a result of war; (2) Third World states can rely on their great power patron to dissuade opponents or to bail them out in time of crisis; (3) Third World armies are created and developed through links with great powers rather than by relying on domestic resources. From these points, scholars like Tilly and Mullins conclude that war making is no longer the great incentive (conquer or be conquered) to state making; and that Third World armies are dependent on the core countries and autonomous from their state and society, which explains why civilians fail to control them. As I pointed out before this line of argument rapidly gives up the relationship between war making and state making for the issue of military rule in the Third World.

The conception of externality in war making that I intend to put to the test of the case studies is different. I view this externality in terms of a reliance of Third World state makers on externally-derived resources in preparing and waging war. My explanation for this externality in the extraction of resources for war making is twofold. First, I have argued in the present chapter that Third World states (and regimes) are reluctant to become

dependent on their society. Therefore, I expect that Third World state makers would prefer to rely on externally-derived resources than to undertake a mobilization of societal resources, which would risk increasing their dependence on society.¹ However it is possible that another explanation may give part of the answer also. This second explanation emphasizes the impact of the conditions of warfare on war making and therefore indirectly on state making. This explanation is closely linked with the argument in the literature review that stressed this type of relationship in the European military past. In brief, to the extent that wars in the Middle East have been among those in the Third World conducted with the most sophisticated weapons available it might be argued that the way wars were conducted in the region made the domestic resources of a typical Third World country (for instance, large male population of military age) less relevant to the preparation and waging of war than the resources that could be externally-derived (notably modern weaponry). This is not a technological determinist argument since the introduction of modern weaponry and military doctrines in the region was determined by the political willingness of the great powers to transfer the weapons and knowledge; and by the fact that the Cold War created large stocks of, or production lines for, those weapons.

Moreover, the conditions of warfare are not reducible to the level of sophistication of military technology, they also include the geography and political nature of wars. The American technological edge in Vietnam was checked in large part by the density of vegetation and population favorable to guerrilla warfare. The political nature of the war in Vietnam, a struggle for the allegiance of the local population between the South Vietnamese government backed by the United States and the communist insurgents supported by North Vietnam, favored revolutionary warfare -- a mixture of guerrilla and terrorist tactics, and of political mobilization of the local population. This form of warfare

¹I present the choice of relying on external resources for war making as a preference of Third World state makers who want to maintain or increase their autonomy vis-a-vis society. However, Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt explain the choice of a strategy of dependent militarization by stressing "systemic dominance structures" in the world system (Barnett and Wendt 1992; Wendt and Barnett 1993).

made largely irrelevant conventional battles for which most of the American forces were prepared. The conditions of warfare in the Middle East are almost a mirror image of that situation. Most of the Middle East wars surveyed here were fought over territories with low population density and arid climates, which favored conventional battles and superior military technology. This trend was reinforced in many instances by the political nature of the conflict that required a conventional battle for a military resolution of the conflict. Short of making peace with Israel on Israel's terms, Egypt and Syria after 1967 could only hope to recover respectively the Sinai and the Golan through a conventional military offensive. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq War, when the calls for an Islamic revolution in Iraq proved unsuccessful the Iranian authorities had no other option than to defeat the Iraqi army on the battlefield in order to reach its objective of toppling the Baathist regime in Iraq. In short, military technology, geography and the political nature of the conflict all converged in the Middle East toward a conventional mode of warfare waged with modern military formations and sophisticated weaponry.

Issues in the Assessment of State Power

The study of the relationship between war making and state making should not do without at least a short discussion of the meaning of the concept of power when applied to states since the main concern of the present study is an assessment of the impact of war and war preparation on the power of the state. Power analysis in political science tends to focus either on power resources and capabilities or on specific power relationships and their outcomes (Baldwin 1979). The two conceptions of power analysis sometimes give contradictory assessments as in what David Baldwin called the "paradox of unrealized power": a situation in which a powerful actor (in terms of power resources) fails to convert its advantage into a favorable outcome in the context of a specific power relation with another actor (Baldwin 1979, 163). Some recent studies on the quantitative

assessment of state power attempt to eliminate this deficiency of power analysis based on power resources by adding a measure of political capacity (based on the tax effort and tax structure of a state) to the conventional measure of state power (Organski and Kugler 1978; Snider 1988). This solution was not applicable to the present research because the economic statistics needed to calculate the political capacity index are difficult to obtain as one gets back in time or deals with secretive governments. Furthermore, such a power analysis would not address the other issues in my agenda of research on state power and state-society relations.

Instead I chose to use an intermediate approach by combining quantitative indicators of state power, when they were available, with an assessment of state-society relations in the economic realm. I used a wide range of indicators of state power, which reflected the availability of data across periods, but also as a precaution against an overreliance on any single indicator. The indicator of state power I used the most (when data were available to measure it) was government revenue as a percentage of national income. This is a conventional measure of domestic state power, which consists in assessing the capacity of the state to appropriate national economic resources and production. I also used as a measure of state power the importance of the public sector or of public employment (excluding the armed forces), a good measure of the organizational growth of a state apparatus. Civilian governmental expenditures as a percentage of national income as well as the share of the state in capital formation were also good indicators of the power of the state in the economy.

As many of my indicators of state power imply, I choose to focus on economic power in my assessment of domestic state power and state-society relations. Control over economic resources, with control over ideas and control over the means of violence, is one of the three sources of social power (Poggi 1990, 4-5). Marxism even considers that economic power is more determinant than the two other forms of social power in shaping

historical development. By focusing on the balance of economic power between the state and private capital it should be possible to get an accurate assessment of the balance of state-society relations and of state power. Consequently, the case studies concentrate to a large extent on the impact that war making had on the economic power of the state.

Another, and complementary, way of assessing state power (in terms of state-society relations) is to conceive it as three potentially cumulative propositions. According to this line of argument a state is strong: (1) if it can determine its own preferences; (2) if it can translate its preferences into authoritative actions; and (3) if it can carry out successfully its policies. The first proposition is a weak statement about state power since it simply asserts that the state is an autonomous actor with its own interests rather than a pawn controlled by domestic or foreign groups. However, it remains a significant proposition in the literature on the state because it is the core argument of the few Marxist advocates of state strength and of neo-institutionalists in their opposition to the society-centered accounts of the state found in Marxism and pluralist theory (Alavi 1972; Block 1987; Krasner 1978; Skocpol 1985; Stepan 1978). No matter how strong a state might be in terms of power resources it will not be considered a strong state if it is not autonomous. This first proposition on state autonomy is therefore a prerequisite for any further argumentation in favor of state strength. However, advocates of state strength like to argue further, as in the second proposition above, that a strong state is a state that can impose its preferences even against the opposition of powerful actors. A third and final stage of state strength implies that a strong state is not only able to develop its own preferences and to translate them into policies, even in the face of opposition; but also that the outcome of policy implementation will correspond to the original objectives and preferences of the state. It is on the basis of that third proposition that some analysts consider Third World states as weak because their extensive reform programs often failed to reach their goals (Migdal 1988; Hyden 1980).

In my opinion a conception of state strength that includes this third cumulative meaning of state power is analytically biased in favor of a weak state thesis.¹ In this thesis state power in terms of state-society relations will be understood only in the first two cumulative meanings of the term, which are synonymous with state autonomy. A similar conceptualization of state power can be found in Michael Mann's theory of state (Mann 1986b). For Mann, there are two meanings to state power:

The first sense concerns what we might term the *despotic power* of the state elite, the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.... But there is a second sense in which people talk of 'the power of the state', especially in today's capitalist democracies. We might term this *infrastructural power*, the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm (*italics in the original*) (Mann 1986b, 113).

This distinction between despotic and infrastructural powers is relevant to the present research. For instance, Mann says that Weber's patrimonial state corresponds to a mix of high despotic power and low infrastructural power; and this is exactly how Third World states are often characterized. Furthermore, Mann argues that there has been a historical trend toward the growth of infrastructural power, but within each historical era wide variations in the despotic power of the state (Mann 1986b, 116). By transposing the same distinction in the interpretation of Tilly's theory, one finds that Tilly has both an argument on the impact of war making on the infrastructural power of the state -- war making leads to stronger states in that first sense -- and an argument on the despotic power of the state -- through war making the arbitrary power of the state has become limited by the need to

¹ It is a recurrent feature of administrative action, if not of action in general, that its outcomes are often suboptimal or divergent from those expected by the decision-makers. This gap between goals and outcomes is also likely to grow with the complexity and scope of a decision, or when too ambitious goals are set. If state weakness could be found in the failure or mixed results of extensive reforms, then the Soviet Union was probably one of the weakest state on Earth, because socialism there never worked like Soviet leaders from Lenin on had envisioned. Similarly, Western liberal states have been qualified as "overloaded" or "ungovernable" since the mid-1970s because their social and economic commitments are said to overrun their capacities (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975; King 1975). There are indeed few, if any, states that seem to be strong when it comes to the successful long-term implementation of extensive socioeconomic programs.

constitutionalize resource extraction. In brief, it is possible that war making has divergent effects on state power depending on which dimension of state power is considered.

The Case Studies: Further Clarifications

I devoted in the literature review a short section to how the intensity of war making could affect the strength of the relationship between war making and state making, a factor not taken into account by Tilly, Mullins or Lee. So I intend to study the impact of that variable in my cases. The Iran-Iraq War represents in that respect a more intense military conflict than the various rounds of the Arab-Israeli conflict taken individually or together.¹ However, another perspective could argue that what matters is the perceptions of state makers rather than an objective criterion of war intensity. In that perspective, a specific war can have an effect out of proportion to its actual intensity if it is part of the formative experience of a state maker. It might be argued that the short Syrian participation in the 1967 War had an amplifying effect of that sort because it profoundly affected the man (Hafiz al-Asad) who would assume power over the Syrian state a few years later.

The greater part of the case studies is made up of a description of the war making activities of the states surveyed. Among other things, that description aims at providing an assessment of the balance between domestic and externally-derived resources in the preparation and waging of war. In theory many factors, from the industrial infrastructure to national resolve, can be conceived as resources that bear upon the military preparedness and performance of a state. For the sake of simplicity my focus will be on three themes borrowed from Samuel Huntington: the financing of the defense effort, the mobilization of military manpower, and the procurement of weapons and other military supplies

¹ The Iran-Iraq War was more intense in regard to: (1) its duration in terms of continuous military operations, (2) battle deaths or war casualties and (3) casualties in proportion to pre-war populations.

(Huntington 1961, 1).¹ These three themes are fundamental enough to be enduring concerns of states whenever they consider war making.

The distinction between domestic and externally-derived resources should be also evident. Arms manufacturing is domestic arms procurement, whereas arms transfers are an externally-derived way of procuring weapons.² Similarly, the recruitment of military manpower from the local population is a domestic form of extraction of resources, by opposition to the contribution of foreign military personnel. The distinction between domestic and externally-derived financial resources is more complex because some externally-derived financial resources are tapped locally. For instance, I consider that oil income, or the revenue derived from the transit fees of pipelines or the Suez Canal are externally-derived revenues even though the oil is extracted domestically and a pipeline or the Suez Canal crosses a state's territory. The distinction is that these revenues are extracted from foreign-based actors (firms or other states) and that their value is determined by actors or forces (such as the world markets) beyond the reach of unilateral action by a state.³ International financial assistance, foreign loans or grants are more conventional forms of externally-derived financial resources. Finally, arms transfers can have a component of externally-derived financing when they include a measure of subsidization in their payments. Domestic financial resources are extracted through

¹ Michael N. Barnett also used this distinction, borrowed from S. P. Huntington; although less systematically, in my opinion, than I did here (Barnett 1992, 6).

² One could argue that domestic arms manufacturing often involves externally-derived resources as when license production is undertaken with foreign technologies and know-how. But what matters is that even domestic production of foreign-designed weapons involves a significant effort by the state and local firms at harnessing domestic resources; an effort not present in the transfers of already made weapon systems.

³ Externally-derived revenues are generally extracted from foreign governments or firms; although the domestic operations of a foreign firm are also within the scope of domestic financial extraction through taxation or nationalization. However, while taxation or more drastic legal measures of appropriation of wealth are within a state's jurisdiction, the determination of the level of financial extraction of an externally-derived source of income is beyond the jurisdiction of a state. It is set by agreements between states, by cartels of producers or by the market mechanism (i.e., the cost of an alternative to oil, to the Suez Canal or to a specific pipeline).

taxation and the other policy instruments a state can use to transfer wealth from society to its own coffers.

Sometimes in the case studies (as well as in the present chapter) a distinction is made between state resources and societal or society-based resources. State resources are those that are already under the control of the state under existing laws such as taxes, the public sector or the externally-derived revenues accruing directly to the state. Societal resources are the resources under the control of domestically-based groups or actors. To the extent that the state has autonomous elites and considerable resources it can conduct war making in relative isolation from society.

Summary

In this chapter I presented the parameters of the comparative case study methodology that will be applied in the following chapters. I argued that a comparison between the European past and the contemporary Third World would be feasible if properly conducted; that is, if the analyst focused on recurrent relationships without necessarily expecting recurrent events or sequences and were aware that differences in international contexts were likely to provide an explanation of the divergences in historical trajectories. I then motivated my focus on the Middle East by the logic of the crucial case study. According to that argument, since the Middle East is the region of the Third World that shares the most similarities with the old European state system it is therefore a crucial case to invalidate the proposition that the positive relationship between war making and state making holds in the contemporary Third World. If the relationship does not hold in the Middle East it is even less likely to hold in other regions of the Third World, which share even fewer common structural features with the old European state system.

The set of theoretical propositions about Third World states and regimes put forward in the present study lead me to expect that the European pattern of state making through war

making will not reoccur in the case studies. Third World states and regimes demonstrate a high degree of autonomy from society and a reluctance to become dependent on societal actors and resources. State formation in the Third World, both in the past and present, has been externalized; that is, determined by external developments or conducted with externally-derived resources. The same patterns of externality and state autonomy apply to Third World political economies.

Since state making is largely externalized in the Third World I expect war making to be so also. I argue that this externality in the conduct of war making can be either explained by the nature of Third World states and regimes (i.e., their reluctance to become dependent on society) or by the conditions of warfare prevailing in the Middle East, which favor externally-derived resources (notably advanced weaponry) at the expense of domestic resources. I expect that the first preference of Third World state makers in regard to war making will be to conduct it from state or foreign resources in order to minimize their dependence on society. However, intense war making cannot always be conducted with available state or foreign resources. If that is the case the state leadership will have to consider either: (1) a political settlement of the conflict at the origin of the war making effort; or (2) a mass mobilization of domestic resources (an unlikely development); or (3) a reallocation of state resources in favor of war making and at the expense of the domestic activities of the state. It is therefore possible, in theory, that the burden of war making affects negatively state power by forcing the state authorities to transfer resources from domestic state making to war making.

3. War Making and State Making in Egypt (1948-73)

This case study starts with the involvement of Egypt in the Palestine war of 1948-9, but it is important to take a longer historical perspective in introducing the case. By looking at the war making and state making activities of Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, one can get a background case to assess and compare the same processes under the leadership of more recent Egyptian state makers. The Egypt of Muhammad Ali can offer interesting contrasts and parallels with contemporary Middle East states to which I will come back later.

Muhammad Ali came to Egypt in 1801 as second-in-command of a contingent of Albanian irregulars who were part of the Anglo-Ottoman expeditionary force to liberate Egypt from French occupation. In 1805, after much scheming and opportune alliances, he managed to be proclaimed governor of Egypt by the notables of Cairo and to have that decision approved by the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul. Thus, Muhammad Ali became the head of a province of the Ottoman Empire, a dismissible vassal of the Sultan. From this important, but unstable, position Muhammad Ali attempted to build a patrimonial state, to turn Egypt into a personal hereditary domain from which he could extract resources to get further territory and wealth. While undertaking this venture in the following decades he came into conflict with the Ottomans, and ultimately saw his drive for expansion checked by Britain and Russia. But in the process Egypt underwent much state making and war making. If one sets aside the minor campaigns Muhammad Ali led against his rivals, the Mamluk beys of Egypt, five military expeditions representing significant military efforts were undertaken during his reign: (1) an expedition against the Wahabbis in the Arabian peninsula for the Sultan (1811-9); (2) a campaign to conquer Sudan (1820); (3) an expedition against the Greek revolt (the Morean campaign, 1824);

(4) a campaign to conquer Syria (1831-3); (5) a second campaign in Syria against an Anglo-Ottoman expedition (1839-40).

Muhammad Ali's state making activities aimed at building a strong centralized state in Egypt. As a foreigner who had come to power with the help of foreign mercenaries and the conditional support of notables, he had an incentive to develop a strong state apparatus lest he should become a puppet in the hands of either group.

The confrontation with Egypt's urban and rural notables was inevitable since they controlled trade and tax farming, the two main resources capable of financing a state and an army. Without a military force of their own and reluctant to mobilize the lower classes, the notables were easy preys for Muhammad Ali. They were divided, coopted, or marginalized by him. His administration assumed control of the land, reformed taxation, created state monopolies on all the major profitable commodities and export items such as grain, rice and cotton. The revenues from trade and taxes were reinvested in state industries (operated by conscript labor) and the financing of state activities. The Mamluk state, the previous Muslim administration of Egypt, which had a budget (in pounds sterling) in 1798 with revenue of £ 158,724 and expenditure of £ 135,887 had been replaced by a government under Muhammad Ali that collected in 1833 £ 2,421,670 and spent £ 1,927,072 (Marsot 1984,192).

The confrontation with the mercenary troops came as a result of the unruly behavior of those (irregularly) paid troops and their refusal to adopt modern (European) methods of training and warfare. Muhammad Ali was in search of a reliable and pliable military force that he could not get from other parts of the Ottoman empire because of an embargo by the Sublime Porte on the shipment of slave soldiers to Egypt. In 1820 the conquest of Sudan was undertaken to obtain from that country slaves who would be turned into European-trained soldiers. However the Sudanese slaves never became acclimated to Egypt and died at an alarming rate. Muhammad Ali was forced as a last resort to introduce (in 1823) the

conscription of Egyptian peasants in order to fill the ranks of his army. This army, which had between 30,000 and 40,000 men in its ranks in the late 1810s, had reached by 1840-1 the strength of about 130,000 regular troops (Roubicek 1977, 7, 11-2; Yapp 1975, 356). M. E. Yapp, using a figure of 277,000 men in Muhammad Ali's army (including irregular troops) and navy in 1840 and a generous estimate of Egypt's population for that period (5 million), came to an astonishing ratio of military mobilization of about 6 per cent of the population (Yapp 1975, 356). Even if one limits the estimate to the 130,000 regular army troops, this makes a ratio of 2.6 per cent of the population under arms. Such a level of mobilization was not found even in the conscription armies of late 19th century Europe, and represented a force probably larger than the Ottoman regular army.¹ This was a feat in a country where the profession of arms had been limited for centuries to a caste of warriors. However, some analysts think that such a level of military mobilization could not have been sustained over time and would have checked Muhammad Ali's expansionist designs; had they not been thwarted by European intervention (Yapp 1975, 356; Ralston 1990, 90).

Although war making provided the original impetus for the growth of state power in Muhammad Ali's Egypt, the heavy burden of war making also caused the first retreat in state power. In 1829, for instance, an advisory council (*majlis al-shura*) of about 150 officials and village headmen was created to advise the government on how to administer the country. According to Marsot, the council had been created at a time when the Egyptian state was recovering from the rout suffered in Greece in 1824 -- when it had lost its fleet and a part of its army -- and was preparing a campaign in Syria. As Marsot put it: "with the impending campaign the government needed men for the army as well as funds, and so sought to achieve its aims peacefully and with the cooperation of the rural elite,

¹ M. E. Yapp gave a ratio of mobilization of around 1 per cent for European armies in the period 1870-1914; with France reaching 2 per cent in 1913 in an effort to compensate its demographic imbalance with Germany (1975, 353). He also referred to an exceptional and short-lived military mobilization reaching 6 per cent of the population in Prussia in 1813 (Yapp 1975, 335).

which it thus brought into the majlis" (Marsot 1984, 108). Muhammad Ali was putting a consultative veneer over his personal rule. However, the constant search for more revenue, for his army and military campaigns, led him to make a more fateful decision: he chose to grant lands to members of his family and of the state elite in return for steady future tax payments. In so doing he created conditions for the emergence of an Egyptian class of great landowners, who came to dominate the Egyptian state and society; until a century later a new group of state makers came to displace them in 1952.

With the defeat of his army in Syria in 1841, Muhammad Ali shelved his project of expansion in return for the recognition of his family's right to rule Egypt and the Sudan for the Ottomans. As for Muhammad Ali's state, its military power was dramatically curtailed to 18,000 men, a force sufficient to maintain order in Egypt and Sudan, but not to acquire new territories. The economic power of the state was also negatively affected by the abolition of the state monopolies and the lowering of tariffs that were parts of the settlement imposed by the Ottomans and Britain.

Muhammad Ali died in 1849. His descendants were not talented statemakers, and they worked under less auspicious domestic and international conditions than he had. Under the Khedive Ismail, a grandson of Muhammad Ali, a modernization of Egypt (including of the military) was attempted. But Ismail's state-building project crumbled under foreign debts, European interferences, and a military revolt that led to a British occupation in 1882. Egypt's quasi-colonial status became an official protectorate in 1914 when Britain found itself at war with the formal sovereign of Egypt, the Ottoman empire. In February 1922 Britain granted Egypt's independence unilaterally after some nationalist agitation.¹

¹ Egypt's independence, however, was qualified as the following account shows in regard to military affairs. In other spheres of activities, also, Egypt only won its full sovereignty gradually. For instance, the large foreign communities living in Egypt could not be directly taxed by the Egyptian state until the abolition of the Capitulations in 1937. These same communities were also subject to a separate judiciary system until 1949. Egypt became a member of the League of Nations only after the abolition of the Capitulations.

War Making and Resource Extraction

This section aims at presenting how the Egyptian state from 1948 to 1973 obtained the military manpower, weapons and financing needed to prepare and wage war. The intent is to arrive at an assessment of the Egyptian war making effort, and notably how much of that activity relied on externally-derived resources. Because this section is fairly detailed and chronologically ordered it can help the reader unfamiliar with the case to get a basic grasp of its history before we consider the impact of war making on state power and regime formation.

War Making under the Old Regime

Issues of defense, of war and peace, were decided by the British authorities during the colonial period. What was left of the Egyptian army after 1882 was turned into a paramilitary force for internal security, controlled by British officers seconded to Egypt. The unilateral granting of independence in 1922 did not change anything to British control of the Egyptian army and to British military presence. The latter was called for to ensure the security of imperial lines of communication (i.e., the Suez Canal). However, things started to change with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which put the control of the Egyptian army totally in Egyptian hands; although British forces would stay in Egypt to defend the Canal Zone until the parties agreed that the Egyptian armed forces could assume that mission. This gave an impetus for the Egyptians to expand and modernize their armed forces as quickly as possible -- already an Egyptian Royal Air Force had been created in 1935. The task was daunting since a British military mission in 1937 found that the Egyptian armed forces lacked training and even the most basic support weapons required for modern military operations (Stephens 1971, 42). In 1938 an ambitious five-year military development plan was approved by the Egyptian government. Unfortunately for Egypt the military equipment had to be bought from Britain, the dominant partner in

the alliance; and Britain hardly had aircraft, ships or tanks to spare in its own effort to rearm for a possible confrontation with Germany or Italy. The military modernization program, therefore, did not achieve much before World War II in regard to equipment. Yet, the increased demand for military officers created by the program led to the relaxation of admission criteria to the Egyptian military academy. The academy, which had been until 1936 a preserve of the upper class, was opened to all candidates with a secondary education. From the first classes of that reformed military academy emerged the officers who would lead the 1952 coup and would dominate Egyptian politics thereafter.

The coming of the World War to Africa in 1940 did not change the poor state of military preparation of Egypt. The British worried about the lukewarm support, if not pro-Axis sympathy, they found in the Egyptian royal house, government and army (Hurewitz 1969, 63). Therefore, they preferred to use their limited war production output to equip more politically reliable and militarily efficient troops from the Commonwealth or Allied nations. Egypt finally declared war on Germany and Japan in February 1945 in order to join the post-war United Nations.

When Egypt went to war in 1948 it had no military advantage to speak of over the nascent state of Israel. Even the demographic advantage of Egypt -- 19 million people versus a Jewish population in Palestine of about 680,000 -- did not translate into a numerical advantage in the field. The Egyptian army had a strength of 30,000 to 55,000 men in 1948, of which only a force of about 3,000 men was sent initially in Palestine in May 1948.¹ Whether one takes the 30,000 or 55,000 figure as the total army strength of

¹ All military figures concerning the 1948-9 Arab-Israeli War are surrounded by imprecision. Dupuy gives a paper strength of 55,000 men for the Egyptian army in 1948, and refers to an initial force of 5,000 men sent to Palestine, including probably 2,000 Muslim volunteers from Egypt and North Africa; although at another point he refers to an initial force of 7,000 men (Dupuy 1978, 16-7, 55). Hurewitz puts the Egyptian army at a maximum strength of 30,000 men in 1948 (Hurewitz 1969, 139). From a breakdown of the 1948 Egyptian expeditionary corps given by an historian, a figure of 3,000 troops appears a fair estimate of the initial force, a figure also given by another source (Goldschmidt 1988, 82; Roubicek 1977, 33-4). Sources disagree to a greater degree on the total number of Egyptian troops that saw combat during the war. Stephens refers to a peak strength of 40,000 men; while Dupuy gives a strength of 18,000 men in Palestine in October 1948 on the eve of the first Israeli offensive against the Egyptian army (Dupuy

Egypt in 1948, it hardly was a mobilization effort of consequence for a nation of 19 million (a ratio of mobilization amounting to 0.16 or 0.26 per cent of the population). As a measure of extreme comparison Israel in the final weeks of the 1948-9 war was able to put 13 per cent of its population under arms (Dupuy 1978, 121). Egypt's limited military manpower was not even the result of a choice in favor of a small voluntary force -- like Jordan's British-trained Arab Legion -- since the Egyptian army was theoretically a conscript force. However, the small size of the army and a five-year-long military service meant that the annual intake of conscripts was very limited and that conscription was borne by those unable to afford the exemption fees. The Egyptian soldiers of 1948 were probably better treated than in Muhammad Ali's time but they still, overwhelmingly, came from a poor peasant background, where service in the army was a calamity rather than a civic duty or a profession (Stephens 1971, 42).

It is difficult to speak of Egyptian military preparation in reference to the first war with Israel. The Egyptian government and nationalist public opinion had been more concerned until 1947 with the British presence in Egypt and the future of Sudan than with the Zionist presence in Palestine. Egypt became involved in the war on the insistence of King Faruq who felt he had to intervene in order to maintain Egypt's leadership in the Arab League. He also wanted to intervene in order to check the possible gains of King Abdullah of Jordan, who, many felt, was ready to agree to a partition with the Jews in exchange for a share of Palestine. A decision not to intervene in Palestine also would have been unwise from a domestic perspective. The main opposition to the Egyptian regime, the Muslim Brotherhood, was already involved in the civil war in Palestine that had followed the UN decision in November 1947 to partition the country between the Jews and the Arabs. A decision of non-intervention, after the Jews had gotten the upper hand in the civil war and

1978, 91; Stephens 1971, 77). The figure given by Stephens seems wildly generous given the overall strength of the Egyptian army and the size of the units reported in accounts of military operations. As for military casualties, there is no precise figure for Egypt, Dupuy gives a figure of 15,000 killed and 25,000 wounded for total Arab losses during the Palestine War (Dupuy 1978, 124).

had declared the foundation of a Jewish state, would have been open to criticism for its lack of commitment to Muslim solidarity or Arab nationalism.

Thus, Egypt went to war in 1948 without war preparation or even a perception that the Egyptian state was threatened by the Jewish population in Palestine. The planning and initial deployment of the Egyptian expeditionary force was totally lacking in professionalism.¹ When the first truce of the war came the Israelis took advantage of it to obtain arms through contacts made ahead in Europe and America -- in spite of a UN embargo on arms supplies to the warring parties. Meanwhile Egypt only managed to buy some stocks of obsolete and defective weapons. In October and late December 1948 Israeli offensives drove the Egyptians back of most of Palestine and brought Israeli troops into the Sinai. The Israeli thrust into Egyptian territory prompted the UN Security Council to order a ceasefire. Israel turned a deaf ear to the call and kept aiming at a total defeat of the Egyptian army in order to compel Egypt to sue for peace. At that point, in late December 1948, Britain became directly involved in the war because of its treaty with Egypt. Under British and American pressures, Israel agreed to withdraw, especially after a clash between British and Israeli fighters over the Sinai on January 7 increased the risks of a military confrontation with Britain. An armistice between Egypt and Israel was concluded in February 1949.

After the 1948-9 War Egypt's defense policy and the security aspects of its foreign policy reverted to a large extent to their pre-war concerns: how to modernize the armed forces and to get the evacuation of British forces from the Canal Zone. In regard to

¹ The poor planning of the Palestine campaign could be seen in the following details: maps of Palestine had to be obtained from the Buick dealer in Cairo, trucks had to be rented in Palestine to move troops, officers were given money to buy food for their troops (Goldschmidt 1988, 82; Stephens 1971, 78). Another analyst made the following assessment of Egypt's preparation for the 1948-9 War: "Militarily, the Egyptian Army was ill-trained and ill-equipped. It had had no experience of modern warfare. Its supply, transport, and servicing arrangements were hopelessly inadequate to the needs of a serious campaign. In spite of political pronouncements about Palestine, no active preparations were made until the last moment for a military invasion of Palestine. It seemed that the official view was either that something would turn up to prevent war or that, in the event of war, Zionist resistance would be negligible" (Marlowe 1965, 328).

military modernization the king insisted on hiring veteran German officers to conduct training and planning tasks in spite of the reservations of the army leadership (Vatikiotis 1991, 373-4). The government also announced in July 1949 a three-year rearmament program (valued at US\$ 300 million) to build a defense industry, to strengthen the air force, and to create an armored division (Jabber 1981, 131). However, the procurement of weapons and weapon production licences for that ambitious program remained hampered by external developments. In 1950, Britain, France, and the United States made a commitment, known as the Tripartite Declaration, to guarantee the armistice lines of the 1948-9 War against violations and control arms transfers to the Near East so as to maintain a balance between Israel and the Arab states (Jabber 1981, 64). Furthermore, Britain kept using the procurement of modern weapons as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Egypt about the future of their bilateral security relation. Since 1946, Egypt had attempted to get modern weapons from Britain but this issue was linked to the revision of the 1936 Treaty and to the future of Anglo-Egyptian defense cooperation. The treaty negotiations failed in 1946, but were resumed in 1950. Egypt was even put on Britain's privileged list for arms deliveries and got its first modern design weapons: a few Centurion tanks and about seventy Meteor and Vampire jet fighters. However, in September 1950 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations stalled again and the British ambassador informed the Egyptian government that further sales of modern military equipment to Egypt would come after NATO and Commonwealth orders (Hurewitz 1969, 137; Jabber 1981, 98-9). In short, Egypt would not obtain modern arms from Britain unless it negotiated a new security arrangement.

In early October 1951, after nineteen months of unsuccessful talks, Egypt unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1899 Sudan Condominium Agreement with Britain. A state of latent war between Egypt and Britain followed when the British authorities decided to stay, by force if necessary, until they had an agreement to replace

the abrogated treaty. British forces in Egypt (numbering 80,000 men) easily took control of key points in the Canal Zone, thus isolating the Egyptian military units deployed in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Egyptian guerrilla groups soon formed to harass the British troops. Once more, the Muslim Brotherhood played an important part in organizing these irregular military forces and operations; although the government and the police also had a hand in those operations. Since the Egyptian government was unable or unwilling to stop those guerrilla activities, the British decided to extend their military control beyond the Canal Zone area. In January 1952 the situation worsened dramatically. The Egyptian government besieged with criticisms and demonstrations against its inactivity in the face of a British occupation ordered a police station in Ismailia to resist a British search operation. A British force made an assault on the station causing many casualties to the Egyptian police. A day of rioting, sacking and burning aimed at symbols of foreign presence ensued in Cairo on January 26, 1952, leaving parts of the city devastated and the regime shaky. A few months later, in July 1952, a group of young military officers, calling themselves the Free Officers, made a coup d'état. In a short time they would do away with the old parties and the monarchy.

War Making in the Period of Power Consolidation of the New Regime (1952-6)

It is often said that the economic policy of the military regime in its early years was a continuation of the policies of the old regime with the notable exception of the land reform. This characterization applies as well to the defense policy of the early years of the Free Officers' regime; it was characterized by continuity with the notable exception of the arms agreement concluded in 1955 with the Soviet Union (through the intermediary of Czechoslovakia). The strongest element of continuity in the defense and foreign policies of the two regimes was that Britain, not Israel, was the first priority. Getting Britain to relinquish its last hold on Egypt (the Suez Canal Zone) and managing the military and

political consequences of the campaign against British presence were far more important than the smoldering tension along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice lines. After all, failure to get British evacuation without concession had proved to be the nemesis of the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood was ready to take advantage of that same issue against the junta.

Negotiations with Britain proved surprisingly successful considering the previous record of failures and the nationalist ideology of the new regime. With the monarchy gone, the issue of Sudan became less salient and an agreement with Britain was reached on that subject in February 1953. Negotiations about the British presence in the Canal Zone took more time, but came to fruition with an agreement coming into effect in October 1954.¹ With the conclusion of this agreement Britain resumed its arms deliveries to Egypt and the United States soon came forward with a US\$ 40 million aid package (Stephens 1971, 135).

British military presence in the Canal Zone had overshadowed for years the tension along the 1949 armistice lines. With the British withdrawal, the Egyptian-Israeli border and the Gaza Strip gained in importance. No peace treaty had put an end to war between the two states and Egypt interpreted this situation as allowing it to take economic sanctions or blockade measures against Israel. Moreover, Palestinian guerrillas based in Egyptian-controlled areas regularly infiltrated into Israel bringing in return Israeli military retaliation. Thus, from February 1949 to February 1955 tension fluctuated along the armistice lines as a result of those military activities and the mood of governments in Tel Aviv and Cairo (Oren 1989).

From the Egyptian standpoint, however, things changed fundamentally when on February 28, 1955, Israeli paratroopers launched a raid on Gaza killing thirty-seven

¹ The agreement provided for: (1) the evacuation of British forces within a period of 20 months; (2) the maintenance of British military facilities in the Canal Zone by British civilian contractors for seven years; (3) the return of British forces in the event of an attack by an outside power on Egypt, or on a member of the Arab Collective Security Pact, or on Turkey (Marlowe 1965, 408).

Egyptians and wounding twenty-eight others. This raid was a significant escalation in the border conflict because of the number of casualties and the fact that the Israeli troops had attacked an Egyptian military facility (Oren 1989, 357). Many analysts argued that this event was decisive in prompting Nasser to look for more weapons from any source (Jabber 1981, 147-8; Safran 1969, 49; Stephens 1971, 156-7).¹ Furthermore, the Gaza raid did not stand as an isolated event in the perceptions of Egyptian leaders. It came a few days after the announcement of a military alliance between Iraq and Turkey, a development unfavorable to Egypt's regional role; in the context of evidence and rumors about an emerging Franco-Israeli entente that would provide Israel with large quantities of modern weapons; and within a year of the Lavon affair -- a failed attempt by Israeli agents to conduct terrorist acts against American and British property in Egypt. Raymond Baker well summarized the effect of the raid when he said:

The raid dramatized the military weakness of the Egyptians, particularly galling for a regime that relied essentially on the military for its support. From the very genesis of their movement the Free Officers had pledged themselves to the creation of a strong national army. Their inability to respond in kind to the Israeli raid revealed to all the world -- notably Egyptian military itself -- that this pledge had not yet been kept (Baker 1978, 37).

Nasser had already found that he could not get weapons from Britain or the United States without agreeing to closer security cooperation with those countries (Burns 1985, 8-18; Jabber 1981, 133-49). When, in April 1955, he went to the Bandung Conference he put out a feeler to see if Egypt could get Soviet weapons from China. In June, direct contacts were made with the Soviets and an arms transfer agreement was officially announced by Nasser in September 1955.

¹ A Free Officer gave the following description of Egypt's military preparedness at the time of the Gaza raid: "we were desperately weak. Our armed forces were short of everything. At the time of the Gaza raid, Egypt had six serviceable planes; about thirty others were grounded for lack of spare parts; Britain had stopped deliveries. We estimated that our tank ammunition would last for a one-hour battle. Nearly sixty per cent of our tanks were in need of major repairs. Our artillery was in the same deplorable state. We were even short of small arms. We had tried to buy arms from Britain and America -- but in vain" (Scale 1965, 235).

The arms agreement was a milestone for Soviet foreign policy, which effectively gained access to the Middle East through it. For the Western powers it meant the instant obsolescence of their policy to control military developments in the Middle East through a monopoly over arms transfers. Finally, for Nasser it represented his first important success on the road to the unparalleled status of Pan-Arab leader and a proof of what could be done by playing the major powers against each other.

From our perspective, the agreement with the Soviet Union was also significant because it started a pattern that would become dominant in following years. First, a significant improvement in the war making capacity of Egypt had been achieved by a bold foreign policy initiative of the ruler rather than by a longer and more arduous process of mobilization of domestic resources. Second, the highly favorable terms of the arms agreement amounted to a subsidization of Egypt's war preparation by the Soviet Union. Finally, it set a trend in Egyptian war preparation: an emphasis on equipment modernization at the expense of the improvement in other dimensions of war making, notably military manpower. Let us review these three points.

A conservative estimate of the weapons delivered to Egypt by the Soviet Union before the outbreak of the 1956 War mentioned at least one hundred tanks, eighty MiG-15 jet fighters, thirty IL-28 jet bombers and a large number of self-propelled guns, artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers as well as a few naval craft. These transfers represented a fifty per cent increase in the tank inventory and a hundred per cent increase in the jet inventory of the Egyptian armed forces in a period of little more than a year (Glassman 1975, 11). This dramatic improvement occurred after almost twenty years of a quest for an unrestricted source of military equipment and supplies, and had been achieved only by a few months of diplomatic activity.

The Egyptian state increased its defense outlay significantly (by 75 per cent in 1955 over the previous year) as a result of the Gaza raid and the Soviet arms agreement; but a

closer examination shows a less impressive performance. Michael Barnett argued that the increased defense effort was financed with borrowings from domestic and international sources rather than by a significant increase in domestic taxation (Barnett 1992, 87-8). At the time the regime was committed to the promotion of economic development through incentives to domestic and foreign businesses. Thus, for the period 1952-5 the tax burden on business was lowered and government income from business taxes decreased. Further taxation of the population also was a sensitive subject for a regime with a populist ideology; but a limited direct tax earmarked for defense was introduced in 1956. In that context the terms of the Soviet arms agreement made a real bargain. The arms and supplies included in the agreement were half-priced, credit was offered at a low interest rate for more than ten years and the Soviets agreed to be paid in Egyptian agricultural exports, so that Egypt could save its foreign currency reserves (Barnett 1992, 88-9; Glassman 1975, 10).

Increased extraction of manpower from society for military purpose was clearly not on the agenda of the new regime. The Egyptian armed forces had grown as a result of the 1948-9 War, but during the period 1952-5 their size remained around 80,000 men (Hurewitz 1969, 139). Nadav Safran claimed that after the 1952 revolution the conscription was applied more seriously (Safran 1969, 208). Barnett also referred to slight changes in the conscription policy after 1952 and to the fact that two thirds of eligible men were exempted from service because of health and educational deficiencies (Barnett 1992, 92). The limited nature of Egypt's military manpower mobilization becomes more significant when set against the performance of other countries in the region. Table 3.1 shows that Egypt had in proportion to its population an available military manpower comparable to Lebanon -- a country with limited military capabilities and commitments -- and inferior to Iraq, Jordan or Syria, not to mention Israel. It appears that at the time the Egyptian authorities did not pay attention to the improvement of the qualitative and

quantitative aspects of military manpower. The consequences of this neglect emerged during the period 1960-7, when the shortage of officers became important and the poor quality of manpower was identified as one of the causes of the defeat in the 1967 War. In short, preparing war for the Egyptian state first and foremost meant to get weapons comparable or superior in number and quality to what Israel had; and this, it thought it had done with the 1955 arms connection with the Soviet Union.

Table 3.1 Military Manpower in the Middle East in 1955

Country	Population (millions)	Military Manpower (thousands)	Military Manpower (per 1,000 of population)
Egypt	22.9	80	4
Iraq	6.0	40	7
Israel ^a	1.8	250	134
Jordan	1.4	23	6
Lebanon	1.4	6.2	4
Syria	3.9	25	6

^a including reserves.

Source: Hurewitz (1969, 448).

War preparation gave way to actual war in 1956. The causes of the 1956 Egyptian-Israeli War and Suez Crisis are beyond the scope of the present subject. Suffice it to say that after the arms agreement he had concluded with the Soviet Union Nasser gained in diplomatic stature. In October 1955, Syria and Egypt formed a military alliance. The agreement was an empty shell and was designed more as a diplomatic front against the Baghdad Pact than as a military alliance against Israel (Scale 1965, 253-4). It hardly represented an accretion of military resources for Egypt; so, Nasser asked the Syrians to stay out of the war in 1956.

The independence shown by Nasser, when he broke the Western arms monopoly in the Middle East, led the United States to woo him with an offer to help to finance the major development project of the regime, the Aswan High Dam. However, the international financial scheme developed to finance the High Dam crumbled in July 1956 when the US government withdrew its offer because it felt that Egypt's foreign policy remained defiant.

Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal so that its revenue could finance Egypt's development. The British and French governments, which saw in Nasser a new Hitler, used this action as a pretext for teaching him a lesson. Israel soon joined in the project.

The diplomatic crisis surrounding the nationalization of the Suez Canal was spread over a few months, Egypt, thus, had time to carry out some military preparation.¹ Unfortunately, much of the planning was based on two wrong assumptions made by the Egyptian leadership (Bandmann 1990, 79-84; Hewedy 1991, 168-9; Shemesh 1990, 151-2; Stephens 1971, 224-5). First, the leadership wrongly assumed that Egypt would face only an Anglo-French expeditionary force. Nasser thought that Britain would not cooperate with Israel in an aggression against Egypt because such an alliance would damage the remaining influence of Britain in the Arab world. So, about half of the Egyptian forces deployed in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip were withdrawn for the defense of the Canal Zone. Second, Nasser assumed that the risk of an Anglo-French intervention would decrease with time, as the crisis dragged on. On these two points subsequent events proved him wrong.

The unexpected Israeli offensive struck on October 29, 1956. The Egyptians decided to send back in the Sinai some of their recently Soviet-equipped units when they found that the Israeli attack was more than a limited raid. The following day the Anglo-French ultimatum that would provide a pretext for an intervention to seize the Canal Zone was issued. It required Egypt and Israel to withdraw their troops to ten miles from the Canal. At the time no Israeli unit was that close to the Canal and therefore the ultimatum was clearly aimed at Egypt. On October 31, Egypt, having failed to comply with the ultimatum, was subjected to air bombardment; which mostly affected the air force and its bases. This

¹ Plans to defend the Sinai had changed as a result of the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt. Before 1955, Egyptian military planners had assumed that an Israeli offensive would be limited to the Gaza Strip and the northern Sinai. After the British withdrawal the Egyptians had to plan for an in-depth defense of the whole Sinai. They relied for that on a study made in 1951 by one of the German officers hired by the monarchy. But by 1956 no preparation on the terrain had yet been made for the implementation of the new defense plan (Bandmann 1990, 77-8).

led Nasser to order a withdrawal of Egyptian units from the Sinai to face the impending Anglo-French intervention. The withdrawal, executed poorly, turned into a rout in which many casualties were sustained. In its short confrontation with Israel in 1956, Egypt lost an estimated 1,000 killed, 4,000 wounded and 6,000 captured or missing men (Dupuy 1978, 212). The high proportion in captured and missing men was probably a consequence of the hurried retreat through the Sinai.

The Anglo-French forces landed in Port Said and Port Fuad on November 5. Nasser had planned to fight the foreign intervention with popular resistance for which he had distributed thousands of rifles (Stephens 1971, 231). The Anglo-French forces, thus, were mostly met by lightly armed reserve and National Guard units. The fighting stopped in the early hours of November 7, shortly after the UN ceasefire had come into effect. An estimate of Egyptian losses against the Anglo-French intervention is more difficult to reach, but it seems that losses in the range of 1,000 to 1,700 are probably close to reality (Dupuy 1978, 212; Stephens 1971, 236).

Nasser had counted on popular resistance to slow down the Anglo-French intervention and on pressures from the international community to get the Anglo-French forces out of Egypt. On that last point he was right. Soviet and American diplomatic pressures contributed to a quick end to the Anglo-French expedition. International speculation on the British currency, encouraged by the sale of sterling by the American Federal Reserve, forced Britain to deplete its gold and foreign currency reserves and to stop its intervention in Egypt (Ovendale 1992, 182). Further American diplomatic pressure was necessary in early 1957 before Israel agreed to the UN call to withdraw from Egyptian territory (Little 1993, 564).¹ Nasser emerged from the crisis with an enhanced stature in Egypt and in the Arab world. But this political success could not hide the fact that once more the territorial

¹ With its withdrawal, however, Israel got the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran (blockaded by Egypt before the Suez War) and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai. Egypt tried to wipe out these Israeli gains during the crisis preceding the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

integrity of Egypt had been preserved by foreign powers (in this instance American diplomacy) rather than by the war making capability of the Egyptian state.

War Making in the Heyday of Nasser's State Making (1957-67)

During the decade following the 1956 War, as we will see later in greater detail, the Egyptian state witnessed a dramatic increase in its power. For a short period of time (1958-61), the Egyptian state even managed to extend its administrative rule over Syria in what was called the United Arab Republic.¹ Although the Egyptian state demonstrated signs of overload in the mid-1960s, one can safely say that the decade spanning from the 1956 War to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War saw the climax of Nasser's state making activities.

In a later section I will argue that war making played a part in that expansion of state power in Egypt, but only in regard to the short-term consequences of the Suez War, i.e., the nationalization of French and British assets in Egypt. The expansion of state power that took place between 1960 and 1967 was caused by other factors than war making. However, this does not mean that war making was absent during that period. On the contrary, the Egyptian armed forces were significantly expanded, and their equipment modernized during those years. From October 1962 the Egyptian army also became involved in a civil war in Yemen. The deployment abroad of a significant part of the Egyptian army and its involvement in an arduous counter-insurgency campaign for five years contributed to the financial difficulties of the Egyptian state and to the state of unpreparedness of the Egyptian army in the Sinai in June 1967.

Egypt's armed forces more than doubled in size in the decade 1956-67. They went from a total of around 80,000 men on the eve of the 1956 War to a total of 100,000 in 1960 and 180,000 men in 1966 (Hurewitz 1969, 136). This growth in military manpower

¹ If state making were assessed simply in terms of territories and population controlled by a state, then the union with Syria was certainly Nasser's greatest state making achievement. Ironically, this union came into being on the initiative of Syrian military men and politicians, while Nasser had reservations about a hurried union between the two countries.

retrospectively showed how little of the manpower pool had until then been tapped by Egyptian governments. Defense expenditure also rose significantly over the period. According to one source, it passed from US\$ 257.6 million in 1956-7 to US\$ 575.2 million in 1965-6; in proportion to GNP the transition was from 8 per cent to 12.2 per cent for the same period (Safran 1969, 148).

In addition to the increased defense outlays and the manpower expansion the program of military modernization initiated before 1956 was stepped up through a series of arms transfer agreements concluded with the Soviet Union at two-year intervals through the period. Sometime in the early 1960s groups of Soviet military advisers came to assist the Egyptians and Egyptian military units were restructured according to Soviet doctrine. The 1963 arms agreement brought significant quantities of contemporary Soviet equipment such as T-54/55 tanks and MiG-21 interceptors, as well as jet bombers and transport planes (Glassman 1975, 24-6). These acquisitions corresponded to the objectives of the military modernization program adopted after 1956, which emphasized the development of airpower for defensive and offensive purposes as well as the creation of additional armored units (Karawan 1984, 156; Safran 1969, 213).

The emphasis on modern weaponry also was vividly illustrated by Egypt's arms production. Instead of concentrating on the production of simple supplies and weapons, Egypt decided to give priority to the development of a supersonic fighter and a range of surface-to-surface missiles. This program started in earnest in 1958 when a team of European experts under the direction of German scientists were hired to develop these weapons systems. The program proved extremely costly and gave little result; but Nasser was committed to it. By 1965 the German scientists had been forced to leave the program as a result of the pressure of the United States and of West Germany, and of a few letter bombs sent by Israeli intelligence. Retrospectively, it seems that the Egyptian arms industry during that period was doomed to failure, the production of sophisticated

weapons was beyond its technical expertise and the production of less sophisticated equipment or supplies was not competitive with Soviet transfers sold under very generous conditions (Selim 1984, 131-4; Väyrynen and Ohison 1986, 107-8, 117).

It might be useful at this point to get a comparative perspective on Egypt's defense effort during that period. Table 3.2 makes such a comparison with the states that were previously compared with Egypt for the year 1955 (cf., Table 3.1) and Turkey, a country with a demographic profile similar to Egypt. In regard to the front-line states and Israel, the Egyptian performance had improved over the decade 1955-65, but remained unexceptional in view of Egypt's regional power status. The Egyptian ratio of military mobilization went from 4 soldiers per thousand of population in 1955 to 6 soldiers per thousand of population in 1965. At a regional level this was the second lowest ratio of military mobilization; only Lebanon mobilized fewer men in proportion of its population. In contrast, the size of the Turkish army and Turkey's ratio of military mobilization showed what could be attained from a demographic base similar to Egypt. On the other hand, Egypt's defense effort in terms of expenditure was more commendable. It equalled the effort produced by Israel (as a proportion of GNP) and was superior to Turkey's. This performance was even more significant because both Israel and Turkey had more dynamic economies and larger GNPs to support their financial effort. The remarkable point, therefore, in the data of Table 3.2 is the gap between the size of the Egyptian armed forces and the size of the Egyptian defense budget. With a military budget larger than those of Israel and Turkey, Egypt managed to field an army less than half the size of those of these countries. It is difficult to know what caused this difference in performance between Egypt and Turkey or Israel -- maybe the intervention in Yemen; but the (comparatively) poor level of military mobilization achieved by Egypt remained a feature of Egypt's war preparation effort during the period 1957-67.

The source of the lower rate of military mobilization in Egypt appeared to be a shortage of skilled and educated manpower to fill the posts of officers and technicians (Gawrych 1987, 537-8; Karawan 1984, 148; Vatikiotis 1978, 162-3). Without these cadres and support personnel the expansion and modernization of the Egyptian armed forces were hindered. Ever since its opening to candidates of all social backgrounds in 1936 the military academy had been unable to form a sufficient number of officers for the army. After the 1952 Revolution the situation only worsened as politically unreliable officers were cashiered, while loyal ones were posted throughout the civil administration, the diplomatic corps and the public sector. In the 1960s training sessions in the Soviet Union and the creation of new organizations in the armed forces for command, planning, and educational purposes took away further officers from field units. The Egyptian army thus started to experience a shortage of officers during the Yemeni Civil War, for which it compensated by conscripting for a time more university graduates and by giving incentives for officers to serve in Yemen (Barnett 1992, 101; Vatikiotis 1978, 162).

Table 3.2 Comparison of Defense Efforts in the Middle East in 1965

Country	Population (millions)	Military Manpower (thousands/per 1,000 of population)	Defense Expenditure(US\$) (millions/as a % of GNP)
Egypt	29.6	180 / 6	461.84 / 9.1
Israel ^a	2.6	375 / 144	315.93 / 9.3
Jordan	2.0	45 / 22.5	58.80 / 12.0
Lebanon	2.4	13 / 5	29.35 / 3.3
Syria	5.6	60 / 11	95.47 / 8.8
Turkey	31.4	480 / 15	440.19 / 5.0

^a including reserves.

Source: Hurewitz (1969, 106-7).

But these ad hoc measures did not change the basic weakness of Egyptian conscription policy: the fact that it did not provide an adequate intake of recruits with a university or technical school level of education. A great achievement of the 1952 Revolution had been the development of Egypt's educational system. Students, and in particular university

students, were politically an important group. Their militancy was a potential source of concern for the authorities, while their political support and their skills were essential to the regime and its development program. In 1961 a law was passed guaranteeing employment in the bureaucracy or the public sector to all university graduates. Perhaps, given the size of the Egyptian bureaucracy and public sector and the commitment of the regime to socialism, this was not a far-fetched promise at the time. At any rate, these prospects of employment looked more promising than a tour of duty in Yemen. Also, the Egyptian government was unlikely to change that situation since an increased conscription of students would risk raising discontent and would divert a skilled manpower from developmental tasks at home (Barnett 1992, 102). It was only after 1967, under much dire circumstances, that the Egyptian state turned to the systematic conscription of the most educated classes of society.

It seems that during the decade 1957-67 the Egyptian government wanted, so to speak, to have its cake and eat it; that is, to make a significant war preparation effort without compromising its commitment to improve the lot of all Egyptians. The reluctance to acknowledge that a significant defense effort would affect the social and economic development of Egypt could be seen in the conscription policy. A growth in military manpower was carried out, but without an adequate supply of skilled manpower, because to do otherwise would risk compromising state-led development. The result was a military compromise: a large army with an insufficient number of cadres. The tendency of the Egyptian state to eschew the hard choice between an adequate extraction of resources for war making and the requirements of its development program also can be found in the strategies adopted by the Egyptian state to finance its war making activities. Again, a pattern emerged in which the state, reluctant to make the society bear the full cost of the defense effort, tried to defer the payment through credit, to decrease the cost to society

through externally-derived resources, or to hide its true extent with an intricate system of indirect taxation.

Analysts agree about the importance of foreign economic aid to Egypt during the period under study; although their estimates of those financial transfers vary. Raymond Baker claimed that Egypt got US\$ 3.43 billion of credit between 1957 and 1965 (Baker 1978, 45). Another analyst gave an estimate of US\$ 2.9 billion for 1955-65, with US\$ 1.65 billion in economic aid from Western countries and US\$ 1.25 billion in Eastern bloc's economic aid to Egypt (Hurewitz 1969, 442). Obviously this economic aid was not designed to finance Egypt's defense effort, but it allowed Egypt to postpone for a time the choice between war preparation and development. The link between foreign economic aid and defense spending could be quite remote and yet present, as for Egyptian food imports subsidized by the American government that allowed Egypt to sell more of its agricultural production to the Soviet Union in return for weapons (Waterbury 1983, 400). American food aid to Egypt was reduced in stages and finally ended during the period 1964-66 for various reasons including the fact that the Johnson Administration felt it derived little influence from that aid in spite of its importance.¹

At first sight arms transfers might appear as the costliest component of the increased defense effort. On further analysis, however, this impression seems wrong. At the time, arms transfers were clearly an instrument of political influence for the Soviet Union rather than a source of foreign currency earnings; therefore, Moscow granted very generous conditions of sale to Egypt. For instance, in 1962, the USSR raised its discount rate on arms transfers to Egypt from a level of 33 per cent to 40 per cent, and made Egypt's military debt repayable after twenty years at low interest rates and in local currency (Barnett 1992, 99). In September 1965 Nasser returned from a trip to Moscow with a

¹ "Between 1958 and 1965, Egypt was the world's largest per capita consumer of U.S. food aid" (Burns 1985, 1). American food aid was a crucial factor in helping Egypt feed its growing urban population and improve its balance of payments (Waterbury 1983, 399-402). Over the period 1952-66 US food aid to Egypt amounted to US\$ 1.06 billion (Burns 1985, 215).

substantial reduction of the military debt as a contribution of the Soviet Union to the Egyptian war effort in Yemen (Barnett 1992, 100). Furthermore, the Soviet Union always consented to barter agreements. The prices of Egyptian exports to the Soviet Union were set in bilateral trade agreements, in which Egyptian goods were often overpriced by as much as 20 to 40 per cent of world market prices (Waterbury 1983, 398). These trade agreements thus amounted to a further reduction of the cost of Soviet weapons for Egypt.

The financing and subsidization of arms imports also involved indirectly the Egyptian peasantry. Following the 1952 Revolution and the socialist reforms of the early 1960s the Egyptian state had a dominant position over the agricultural sector without resorting to the collectivization of lands and the regimentation of peasants in collective farms. Instead, private property was maintained (with ceilings on the size of individual or family landholdings), but a network of agricultural cooperatives controlled by the state was created to supervise production. Through the cooperatives the state had a monopoly over the inputs of production and the purchase of the main crops. The state used this control to tax indirectly the peasantry by selling to the peasants the inputs needed for production above market prices and buying their production below market prices; then the production was sold by the state on foreign markets, sometimes over the market prices as in bilateral trade with the Soviet Union (Mabro 1974, 76-7; O'Brien 1966, 190-1). In short, the Egyptian state won from start to finish by acquiring modern weapons through agricultural exports.

The use of the agricultural cooperatives as an indirect means of extracting resources from the rural population was typical of taxation in Egypt. Indirect methods always prevailed over direct ones. Although revenue from income taxes rose sharply from 1963, the actual ratio of income taxes to indirect taxes remained constant around 1:3 for much of the 1960s (Abdel-Fadil 1980, 72). After the nationalizations of 1961 the public sector was so large that it became the main source of income, profit and business taxes (Waterbury

1983, 225). Thus, direct taxes were mostly borne by the economic sector that the state directly controlled rather than by the private sector. The first source of indirect taxation was customs and production duties; however, by 1966 the second largest source of indirect taxation was made up of differences between factory and wholesale prices on a wide range of goods. At the time the rate of indirect taxation on a mass-consumption item like footwear amounted to about 22 per cent of the retail price (Abdel-Fadil 1980, 80-1).

In 1964 the Egyptian state started to experience serious financial difficulties, which deepened in the two following years. A growing trade deficit and a large foreign debt led to a balance of payments crisis. The crisis was the result of a convergence of factors among which the cost of the Egyptian intervention in Yemen played a part. The Egyptian involvement in the Yemeni Civil War had constantly increased since October 1962. The 20,000-strong expeditionary force in 1963 grew to 40,000 men in 1964 and 70,000 men in 1965-6 at the height of the intervention (McDermott 1988, 156). The actual financial cost of the intervention for Egypt is not known precisely, but it was certainly significant.¹ More importantly, from a military standpoint, it tied up a large proportion of Egypt's regular army at a time when Arab-Israeli tension was rising again.

The tension rose first in 1964 when the Arab states riparian to the Jordan river opposed an Israeli plan to divert part of the waters of that river for development purposes. From that crisis emerged the Unified Arab Command, an Arab League body designed to coordinate the defense policies of the front-line states (including Iraq) and to improve their defenses against Israel (Wood 1965, 3). In November 1966 Egypt signed a treaty of mutual defense with Syria. In both instances it appears that these measures were seen by Egypt more as instruments to gain control over the defense and foreign policies of other Arab states than as measures of war preparation against Israel.

¹ P. J. Vatikiotis gave an extremely high figure for the total cost of the war in Yemen for Egypt: £E 4 billion over five years (Vatikiotis 1978, 162). Other estimates are much lower. J. C. Hurewitz referred to a annual cost in the range of £E 25 - 75 million (Hurewitz 1969, 140). While Michael Barnett gave a range of £E 40 - 60 million a year (Barnett, 1992, 99).

However, Israel did not draw such moderate conclusions. By making an alliance with the Syrians Nasser got himself embroiled in the Israeli-Syrian conflict along the 1949 armistice lines. In April 1967 a particularly sharp incident increased the prospect of a limited Israeli-Syrian war, which, in turn, compelled Nasser to show Egypt's commitment to the defense of Syria. By ordering a general mobilization, by requesting the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip and by closing the Straits of Tiran, Nasser meant to convey the seriousness of his commitment to Syria, while he expected a diplomatic mediation of the crisis, notably by the United States at any moment. The Israeli government, on the other hand, felt that enough warlike signals had been sent by the Egyptians to warrant a pre-emptive strike on June 5, 1967.

Although Egypt had declared general mobilization on May 14 and had had about three weeks to prepare itself for a possible war with Israel, the performance of its armed forces during the war was very poor. The air force was wiped out on the ground in the morning of June 5 by the surprise attack of Israeli aircraft. The air raids destroyed close to 300 Egyptian aircraft and killed about 100 pilots out of a force of 350 qualified pilots (Dupuy 1978, 246). The ground forces in the Sinai hardly fared better in the ensuing three days of battle. With about 50,000 regular troops in Yemen in June 1967, the Sinai front was left to face the Israeli offensive with 100,000 men, about a third of them being hastily called-up reservists (Dupuy 1978, 236; McDermott 1988, 160). The events in Sinai became a re-enactment of 1956, fierce defense by some Egyptian units gave way to a poorly planned general retreat, which soon turned into a rout. This time, however, the Israeli army advanced on the Canal with the intention of staying there as long as Egypt would not sue for peace. On June 8 the UN Security Council ordered a ceasefire, which came into effect in the early hours of June 9, 1967. According to Nasser, Egypt had lost in that short war about 80 per cent of its military equipment and about 10,000 soldiers and 1,500 officers, plus 5,500 prisoners (Dupuy 1978, 279; Safran 1969, 349).

The Israeli army executed a textbook case of blitzkrieg campaign during the 1967 War, but one must say that it had been helped by the weaknesses of the Egyptian army. By 1967 the Egyptian military establishment had become highly politicized as a result of its close connection with the regime. This situation worsened in the early 1960s when a rivalry emerged between Nasser and Field Marshal Amer, a Free Officer and close friend of Nasser, who had been placed at the head of the army to ensure its loyalty to the regime. In spite of its title of field marshal, Amer had little professional military expertise, he was above all a political appointee that Nasser often used as a personal envoy to deal with difficult political situations as during the union with Syria, or in 1966 when the regime launched an "anti-feudalist" campaign in rural Egypt. However, Nasser became concerned about Amer's power and clientele network in the army, and thus he attempted to reassert his control by reducing Amer's functions and by bringing back more professional officers in key posts (Gawrych 1987, 542; Stephens 1971, 358-61). The covert rivalry between the two men was not clearly settled by June 1967 when Amer used some of its remaining influence to tamper with the defense planning of the Sinai front and the war operations. Thus, for a crucial period the Egyptian army had almost a double chain of command that added much confusion to its operations. Trevor Dupuy, in his analysis, emphasized that the Egyptians had a sensible plan for the defense of the Sinai, but this plan had not been carried out before 1967 because of lack of funds; and then in 1967 Amer ousted from the general staff most of the officers who had devised the defense plan (Dupuy 1978, 241). George Gawrych, in a more detailed analysis, came to the following assessment:

Although everything seemed to favour a long, drawn-out war in the Sinai, the Egyptian army had in fact suffered a great deal of self-inflicted confusion in the critical three weeks prior to the outbreak of war, confusion that largely negated any progress achieved by the military since the 1956 war. Changes in commanders, the unexpected creation of a major command, the discarding of the defensive plan for the Sinai, and concomitant troop redeployments, all wrought havoc in the Egyptian military, weakening an army that otherwise possessed numerical superiority over its foe (Gawrych 1991, 280).

The 1967 War brought Egypt back to reality. Until June 1967 most Egyptians might have assumed that it was natural for their state to promote economic and social development while modernizing and expanding its army and fighting Yemeni rebels. But events in 1967 and thereafter proved that the Egyptian state had overreached itself during the previous years and that society would now have to bear an increased proportion of the defense burden.

The Egyptian State and Society Mobilizing for War (1968-73)

The crushing defeat of the Arab armies in less than a week at the hands of the Israeli army was a terrible blow to Nasser, an indictment of the way his regime's state making activities had been structured over the previous decade. The Egyptian army had lost 80 per cent of its war material in less than a week. The Egyptian government had lost three of its main sources of revenue: the Sinai oilfields, the Suez Canal tolls, and tourism as a result of the war. These sources of hard currencies used to accrue to the Egyptian state to help it pay for its imports and to redress its balance of payments. Finally, the Egyptian state had been severed of its territory east of the Suez Canal, with little prospect of recovering it quickly through international pressures on Israel as it did in 1948-9 and in 1956. In light of the extent of the defeat Nasser took the initiative in resigning shortly after the war. But he was instantly brought back to power by massive public demonstrations against his resignation, which appeared to have been largely spontaneous. Nasser got the mandate to rectify past errors and to recover what Egypt had lost in the 1967 War. For the first time, after three Arab-Israeli wars, the Egyptian state took war making seriously and made it its first priority over economic development and the extension of its influence in the Arab world.

The 1967 War and its consequences also brought war home to large parts of Egyptian society, a development that would restrain the ability of the state to conduct its defense

policy in isolation of public opinion as it had done in the past. Many groups in urban Egyptian society, especially workers and students grew restive, demonstrating at various moments against the lack of domestic reforms and of military action against Israel.

After June 1967 Egyptians experienced more directly the costs of war and war preparation. A state of intermittent military clashes along the Canal started in August 1967 and it soon spread to civilian targets along the Canal and into the Egyptian hinterland as the Israelis adopted a policy of retaliation aiming at economic targets (Whetten 1974, 60-1). Accordingly, the Egyptian authorities decided to evacuate a large proportion of the population from the cities along the Canal. Suez, for instance, went from a population of 250,000 before June 1967 to a population of 60,000 and then of only 35,000 between the fall of 1967 and the fall of 1968 (Rubinstein 1977, 67). Estimates of the flow of refugees caused by that limited state of war ran as high as 700,000; creating a supplementary burden on other large cities like Cairo (Goldschmidt 1988, 129; Stephens 1971, 510). Then, from March 1969 to August 1970, Egypt and Israel embarked on a more sustained confrontation known as the War of Attrition. This limited conflict entailed the same cross-Canal harassment that had characterized the previous period, except that by January 1970 Israel made the decision to escalate the conflict by launching a campaign of strategic bombing against Egypt in order to force it to stop its harassment of Israeli positions east of the Canal. The human life cost of this confrontation for Egypt is unknown, but it is clear that it was not limited to military personnel. On at least one widely reported instance, in February 1970, a factory was hit causing close to 200 casualties among the workers (Glassman 1975, 76). Israel's uncontested air superiority, until the Soviet Union intervened in March-April 1970, brought for the first time to the bulk of the Egyptian population the impression of living in the front line.

Another way in which the Egyptian society felt the cost of war making more acutely than before was in regard to increased military manpower extraction. After June 1967 a

permanent state of mobilization was declared, which meant that all men called up would be retained as long as all Egyptian territories had not been liberated. But, by 1972, such prolonged mobilization started to strain the stability of Sadat's regime. The extraction of financial resources from society also was stepped up by the government; although the taxation system kept its heavy reliance on indirect taxes (Abdel-Fadil 1980, 72). The increased taxation had the effect of cutting the purchasing power of urban families by 5 to 9 per cent (Kanovsky 1968a, 139). In brief, the Egyptian society during that period had to bear a greater share of the human and economic costs of war making than previously. Consequently, instances of political protest against the regime and its policies occurred more frequently after June 1967 as we will see later.

A good indicator of the increased war making effort of the Egyptian state after 1967 is the growth of its defense expenditure in absolute terms and in proportion of government expenditures. For the period 1968-73 the data in Table 3.3 shows that the Egyptian state spent on average 40 per cent of its current expenditures on war preparation; and this proportion is a very conservative estimate of actual defense outlays.¹

Table 3.3 Egyptian Defense Expenditures, 1967-73

Year	Defense Expenditure (millions of £E) ^a	Defense Expenditure as % of Total Current Government Expenditures
1967	167	25.2
1968	182	32.7
1969	178	34.0
1970	297	52.6
1971	238	38.7
1972	267	38.8
1973	281	40.0

^a Much higher estimates of Egyptian defense expenditure are available. For instance, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated Egypt's defense expenditure in 1967 at US \$ 645 million (12.7 per cent of GNP), and in 1973 at US \$ 4,071 million (31 per cent of GNP); that is an increase of 531 per cent

¹ The figures reported in Table 3.3, from which the proportion of 40 per cent was calculated, certainly underestimate the actual defense expenditures of Egypt in the period 1967-73. For instance, they do not include the sums from the Emergency Fund created after June 1967. In 1967 the fund added £E 60 million to Egypt's defense outlay; in 1973 the figure was £E 399 million, much higher than the officially reported defense expenditure (Barnett 1992, 311).

in defense expenditure over 1967-73, compared to an increase of only 68.3 per cent in the figures reported in Table 3.3 (Dessouki and Labban 1981, 69-70).

Source: World Bank (1976, 311).

The most significant war preparation effort made by the Egyptian state after 1967, in the light of past performance, concerned military manpower. The point has repeatedly been made in this chapter: Egypt had a lower mobilization rate than Israel and most other front-line Arab states since the start of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently, Egypt's large demographic preponderance in the region did not translate into an effective military manpower advantage against Israel. This situation changed after June 1967. The Egyptian armed forces were dramatically expanded and their manpower was used more effectively with the setting up of a modern reserve system and the drafting of more men with post-secondary education.

The Egyptian armed forces (including reserves) went from a total of 211,000 men in 1967 to a 832,000-strong force in 1973 (Howard and Hunter 1967, 50; IISS 1973, 31). Most of the expansion took place in the ground forces, which increased from 180,000 to 760,000 men (including half a million men in the reserves by 1973) during the same period. Part of the expansion in military personnel was achieved by lowering the educational and health standards for conscripts (Shazly 1980, 38-9). But such a solution would not solve the shortage of officers and educated manpower in the Egyptian armed forces; hence the necessity of drafting a larger number of students from technical schools and universities and of giving to many of them a shortened officer formation (Shazly 1980, 38). As a result by 1973 there were 110,000 university and technical school graduates under arms (McDermott 1988, 169).

However the economic costs and the political consequences (increased protest among students) of such a large standing army finally brought about a fundamental reform of Egypt's military reserve system in 1972. Egypt's reserve system was archaic, with the shortage of officers, it was one of the main reasons for Egypt's inability to deploy more

military units in the field in past wars against Israel. The then reserve system could not mobilize the reservists and turn them into effective field units within the short time frame of an Arab-Israeli war (based on the short campaigns of 1956 and 1967). In 1972-3 the reserve system was reformed by adapting the Swedish reserve system model to Egyptian conditions. The new reserve system could field reserve units within seventy-two hours and, thus, could contribute even to a short war. The calling up of reserves was intensively tested in 1973 and this contributed to deceiving the Israelis, who got used to regular Egyptian mobilization exercises in the period preceding the October War (Shazly 1980, 52-5).

Another sign of the serious commitment of the regime to war making after June 1967 was the reorientation of the Egyptian officer corps. The Egyptian officer corps had been the mainstay of Nasser's regime since its inception. Military officers were the ultimate clientele or supporters of the regime and one of its two main sources (the other being civilian technocrats) of personnel to staff key positions in the state bureaucracy and the public sector. By 1967 high-ranking officers devoted more time to administrative tasks and political jockeying than to military planning and training. The debilitating effect of that situation on military professionalism was a lesson learned by Nasser in 1967 (Gawrych 1987, 546). He reasserted his control over the armed forces at the expense of Field Marshal Amer's clique, streamlined the command structure, reduced the number of full generals, and did away with the rank of field marshal. Sadat after 1970 followed the same policy. As a new leader and successor to the charismatic Nasser, Sadat had to fear the emergence of a rival from among the high officers, like Amer had been to Nasser. As a result of these reforms the Egyptian high command showed a greater degree of professionalism in the planning and execution of the Suez Canal crossing in October 1973 (Gawrych 1987).

The period of war making that followed 1967 was characterized by an increased extraction of domestic resources, but also by an increased reliance on foreign actors and resources to prepare and wage war. The Soviet Union, notably, became crucial to Nasser's war making strategy after 1967. At first the Soviet Union acted only as an arms supplier, but in the spring of 1970 Soviet military personnel also took part in the effort to stem Israel's strategic bombing offensive, by operating surface-to-air missile batteries and flying air missions over Egypt. In the ensuing years Sadat dramatically reduced Egypt's reliance on the Soviet Union for war making but the Soviet contribution was crucial to the last years of Nasser's rule.

Moscow showed alacrity in making up for the material losses sustained by the Egyptian armed forces in June 1967. By early July 1967 130 combat aircraft had been delivered, by October of the same year 80 per cent of material losses had been replaced (Glassman 1975, 66; Whetten 1974, 59). The cost of that massive resupply operation to Egypt is not known, but in July 1968 Nasser claimed that Egypt had paid nothing for it (Rubinstein 1977, 29). Subsequent arms deals were made under the same type of concessionary conditions that had prevailed since 1956, i.e., discount on prices and long-term, low-interest loans repayable in Egyptian currency (Barnett 1992, 115). The dramatic increase in Soviet arms shipments to Egypt can be gauged by the fact that between 1963 and 1966 the weapons transferred to Egypt had a total value of US\$ 424 million whereas for the period 1967-73 the total value of weapons transferred amounted to US\$ 2.231 billion (Barnett 1992, 115). However, with the deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations under Sadat the Soviets became more business-minded in their arms supply relationship with the Egyptians and started to ask for cash payment in hard currency. They knew that the Arab oil-rich states would come forward with the funds.

Moscow's heightened commitment to the survival of Nasser's regime after the 1967 defeat was not limited to weapons shipments, it also included a large contingent of military advisers, as Alvin Rubinstein pointed out:

The military relationship between the USSR and Egypt altered dramatically after the June War. From approximately 500 Soviet military advisers before the war, the number jumped to several thousand [sic]; from a purely advisory role relating primarily to the technical operation of weapons, Soviet advisers moved into all phases of training, planning, and air defense; and from advising mostly at the divisional level, Soviet personnel were assigned to all levels of the Egyptian armed forces. The magnitude of the Soviet commitment was unprecedented, surpassing in both quantity and quality the aid given to North Vietnam and exceeding the rate at which aid had hitherto been given to allied or friendly countries (Rubinstein 1977, 30).

This increased Soviet military presence in Egypt was not the result of a more assertive and expansionist Soviet leadership willing to extract concessions from a client in dire straits. It was rather Nasser who looked for a closer relation with the Soviets by asking for a large contingent of advisers, by granting the Soviet navy support facilities in Egypt, and by putting out feelers about a Soviet-Egyptian mutual defense agreement (Glassman 1975, 66-7; Rubinstein 1977, 46, 149).

The climax of Soviet involvement in Egypt's war making activities took place in 1970 when Nasser's strategy for the War of Attrition backfired. As devised and initiated by the Egyptians in the spring of 1969 the War of Attrition was based on the following strategy: "to take advantage of Egypt's massive superiority in manpower and artillery and Israel's comparative disadvantage in static warfare and well-known sensitivity to casualties in order to exhaust her militarily, economically, and psychologically, and thus pave the way to an Egyptian crossing to dislodge Israel from the Canal" (Shlaim and Tanter 1978, 484).¹ At first the strategy appeared to work, Israeli casualties along the Canal increased

¹ In March 1969, M. Heikal, a prominent Egyptian journalist and unofficial spokesman for Nasser, reviewed the various alternatives to liberate the occupied territories. He found a massive frontal assault, a disarming aerial strike and a blitzkrieg thrust to be alternatives beyond the means of the Arabs. He therefore argued that the only alternative was a protracted struggle through which the Arabs would inflict unbearable casualties on Israel and force it to keep force levels close to full mobilization with adverse effects on its economy (Glassman 1975, 69-71).

dramatically as a result of Egyptian commando raids and artillery barrages (Whetten 1974, 82-3). However, in spite of Egypt's intention to keep the conflict limited to low intensity ground operations across the Canal, Israel escalated the conflict in July 1969 by committing its air force. By the end of the fall of 1969 the Israeli air force had gained complete air supremacy over the Canal area, to the extent that the Israeli army had been able to land a small armored force on the western bank of Suez where it roamed with impunity for a day before embarking back for Israel. Then, in January 1970, the Israeli air force started to conduct bombing raids deep into Egypt. By this further escalation of the conflict the Israeli government hoped it could force a ceasefire on the Egyptians or even bring down Nasser. This policy of escalation was made possible by the recent delivery to Israel of American F-4 Phantom aircraft, sophisticated long-range fighter-bombers against which the Egyptian air defense had no answer (Shlaim and Tanter 1978, 489-92). With an air defense system in a shambles and the economic infrastructure of the country vulnerable to bombing, Nasser had to request Moscow to take charge of the reconstruction and upgrading of Egypt's air defense. By the end of 1970 Moscow had sent more than 200 pilots and between 12,000 and 15,000 men for the network of surface-to-air missiles (Glassman 1975, 75). The Israeli government ended the strategic bombing of Egypt in mid April 1970, after Israeli aircraft started to meet Soviet-manned interceptors over Egypt. In the summer of 1970 Nasser agreed to an American-mediated ceasefire. He had failed to exert unbearable military pressure on Israel, but he had gotten at least a modicum of American involvement in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is important to understand the nature of the Soviet contribution to the Egyptian war making effort after June 1967 in order to reach valid conclusions about the balance of external and domestic resources in Egypt's war making. Had the resources provided by the Soviet Union during that period been of a nature that could have been extracted from Egyptian society, the argument could be made that the reliance on Soviet resources was a

way for the Egyptian state of avoiding a confrontation with its own society over the extraction of resources. However this was not the situation that prevailed in regard to Soviet military assistance. The resources provided by the USSR were of a nature that could not have been extracted from, or produced in, Egypt given the level of economic development of the country.

The Soviets provided large quantities of modern military equipment at short notice, something that could only be undertaken by a superpower with a large arsenal and military industry. In this respect even industrial and military powers like France or Britain would have failed to resupply Egypt on the scale the Soviet Union did. Essentially, only the Soviet Union and the United States had the arsenal stock and production lines to satisfy Egypt's and Israel's military demand after 1967, and so they became the main arms suppliers and patrons of the two regional powers. The Soviet Union also sent to Egypt a large group of military advisers, i.e., a specialized military manpower in charge of transferring to the Egyptians the know-how needed to operate effectively modern weapons. Finally, when the Egyptians proved incapable of stemming the Israeli air offensive the Soviet Union assumed the air defense of Egypt on a temporary basis. No amount of increased taxation, manpower mobilization or local weapon production by the Egyptian state could have provided these resources and an answer to the growing technological sophistication of military conflicts in the Middle East. Reliance on the Soviet Union in those circumstances was not a sign of state weakness, but the only way of trying to close the military gap between Egypt and Israel.

The other major source of external resources for Egypt's war making after 1967 was the Arab world, or more precisely those Arab states wealthy enough to give Egypt subsidies as contributions to the Arab war effort against Israel. Since most of the oil-rich states were also conservative monarchies this meant that Nasser had to shelve its confrontational Pan-Arab policy in favor of a conciliatory one, which played down

differences between Arab regimes in the name of Pan-Arab cooperation against Israel. Nasser, thus, watered down his statements and agreed to withdraw his troops from Yemen. In return for Nasser's moderation, Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia pledged to support Egypt financially in order to make up for some of the foreign currency revenues that Egypt had lost as a result of the war. The original pledge was of about US\$ 266 million a year (Kanovsky 1968a, 139-40).¹ But Arab subsidies to Egypt fluctuated in the following years, for instance they reached a high value of US\$ 320 million in 1969-70, but declined to US\$ 283 million in 1970-1 (Barnett and Levy 1991, 384). Some analysts argued that one reason that led Sadat to expel Soviet military advisers from Egypt in 1972 was a desire to curry favor with anticommunist Arab monarchies like Saudi Arabia. This argument holds a kernel of truth to the extent that Arab subsidies to Egypt soared in 1973 with US\$ 300 to US\$ 500 million allocated for weapons purchases and US\$ 400 to US\$ 500 million to support Egypt's balance of payments (Barnett and Levy 1991, 390; Rubinstein 1977, 196). The 1973 War brought even more Arab financial assistance to Egypt, both during and after the hostilities. The actual amount of financial assistance to Egypt forwarded by Arab states is difficult to assess given the various financial channels used and the difference between the sums allocated and those actually disbursed. As a rough estimate the total for the period 1973-6 should be between US\$ 2.86 and US\$ 4.2 billion (Barnett 1992, 138, 165, 322).

The role of Arab subsidies in Egypt's balance of external and domestic resources for war making is complex. Theoretically it might be argued that more financial resources could have been extracted from society; although it seemed that the tax burden had reached its politically-acceptable limit by 1967-8. In practice, however, the problem was not to get more tax revenue but more foreign currency revenue, which was urgently needed to

¹ Considering the following losses of foreign currencies as a result of the 1967 War: US\$ 280 million for the closure of the Suez Canal, US\$ 56 million for the Sinai oilfields, and an estimated US\$ 84 million for tourism, the Arab pledge of US\$ 266 million at the Khartoum Conference in 1967 was far from solving Egypt's financial problems (Kanovsky 1968a, 139-40).

redress Egypt's balance of payments. The urgent need for a specific financial resource, foreign currency, dramatically reduced the range of domestic options open to the Egyptian state. In the wake of the war, after years of financial difficulties and with an inefficient public sector, the Egyptian state could not expect to earn hard currencies through a dramatic surge of its exports. Therefore, the government chose to liberalize partially foreign trade by relaxing controls on foreign exchange and imports and by allowing a return of private ventures in import-export business (Barnett 1992, 113; Cooper 1982, 44-5; Mabro 1974, 131-2). Obviously this limited appeal to private business did not answer Egypt's foreign currency need, but it proved a harbinger of the regime's will to reconcile to private capitalism and to envisage a limited economic liberalization.

Reliance on foreign financial assistance was thus a necessity given the limited potential of short-term domestic strategies to earn foreign currencies. But it must be added that the reliance on foreign financial assistance was facilitated by two other factors. First, although I refer to Arab financial assistance to Egypt as a "foreign" or "external" source of revenue, because in analytical terms it was outside of the scope of the Egyptian state's sovereignty, it might be argued that for Arab statesmen the distinction was not as clear-cut. Even if each Arab state is mindful of its own sovereignty there also is the supranational notion of an Arab community that brings up the question of sharing the resources of the Arab world when addressing an issue that concerns the whole Arab nation. The Palestine/Israel issue is certainly such a consensual, supranational issue for the Arab world if there ever has been one. Nasser and Sadat thus felt they had a right to tap the oil-rich states for funds to face Israel's challenge and, conversely, the oil-rich states felt it was their duty to contribute to the war effort of Arab states that faced Israel. The ups and downs in the financial aid relation between Egypt and the Arab oil-rich states were not caused by the issue of Egypt's right to Arab subsidies, but by the issue of the size of those subsidies (Egypt often finding

them not generous enough).¹ The demise of that relationship came when Sadat departed from the Arab consensus to pursue a separate peace settlement with Israel. Therefore, it might be argued that Egypt's reliance on Arab financial assistance was not perceived by the actors involved in that relationship as an external, or foreign-based, resource extraction strategy; although it remains so from the analytical perspective of the present thesis.

A second facilitating factor that explains why Egypt relied on Arab financial assistance after 1967 is that reliance on external resources for state making was part of the policy repertoire of both Nasser and Sadat (Baker 1978, 44-8). The contemporary history of Egypt has been marked by bold foreign policy decisions that brought important benefits in terms of resources for the Egyptian state like the decisions to nationalize the Suez Canal and British and French assets in Egypt, to accept Soviet military and economic assistance, to expel Soviet military advisers, to wage war in October 1973 or to make a peace offer to Israel. In a sense the strong personal-rule character of the regimes of Nasser and Sadat, and their correspondingly weak institutional bases in society meant that a strategy of external resource mobilization appealed more to the leadership than a strategy of domestic resource mobilization. Foreign policy decisions could be made and implemented by the ruler and a limited set of individuals and organizations, with short-term results of often dramatic proportions. On the other hand, domestic reform or mobilization involved a broader set of Egyptian actors in the decision-making and implementation processes, took more time, and often led to mixed results.

¹ The first tension in the Egyptian-Arab financial aid relationship seemed to appear at the Rabat Arab Summit in late 1969. The Egyptians had come to the conference with a bleak assessment of Egypt's defense posture in order to obtain an increase in financial assistance, but their demand was ignored by most of the other states (Dawisha 1976, 56-7; Rubinstein 1977, 102). In 1973, after the outbreak of the war with Israel Sadat sent a personal emissary to tour the oil-rich states of the Gulf. The envoy: "was under instruction from President Sadat not to ask for any specific sums of money: Other Arabs had to be made to face their obligations" (Ajami 1981, 99). The sentiment that the Arab oil-rich states had not done enough for Egypt, considering its prominent role in past Arab-Israeli wars, was also widespread in Egypt in 1977-8 when the windfall of Arab investment capital, on which Sadat's policy of economic liberalization was based, failed to materialize (Ansari 1986, 187-8). Sadat expected a form of Arab Marshall Plan for Egypt in the range of US\$ 10-12 billion, but by September 1977 Egypt had received no more than US\$ 4.4 billion (Waterbury 1983, 417-8).

Egypt's war making effort in 1973 was also significant for a dimension of externality that had been underused before that period, namely coalition warfare. In 1948-9 and in 1967 Arab states supposedly went to war with Israel in a coordinated effort. In reality little agreement on goals or coordination of operations between Arab states took place before or during these two wars. As for the War of 1956, Egypt had asked Syria not to participate in spite of a defense treaty between the two countries. By contrast, Egypt and Syria went to war together in 1973 in a coordinated initial assault designed to force Israel to fight on two fronts simultaneously. Contacts between the two countries for a joint offensive were probably made as early as 1971; although close cooperation between the two military high commands really occurred only during 1973 (Korany 1986, 98, 101-2; Seale 1989, 190-4). Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil-producing states also agreed to help Egypt and Syria to reach their political objectives during the war by wielding the oil weapon. The decision to implement a selective oil embargo in October 1973 against countries perceived as supporting Israel was not made in the heat of the moment. Contacts concerning that matter had been made between Sadat and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in late August 1973. Faisal agreed to use the oil embargo as a political weapon during the war on condition that the war lasted long enough for that policy to have an impact on world public opinion (Korany 1986, 100).

A final dimension of externality in the war making experience of Egypt after 1967 can be found in Sadat's strategy for the War of 1973. Sadat's plan for the war did not aim at the liberation by force of the whole Sinai, but at the creation of a defensible bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Canal in the hope that the opening of a new round of Arab-Israeli hostilities would trigger a diplomatic process favorable to Egypt's recovery of the territories lost in 1967 (Karawan 1984, 158; Sadat 1978, 244). A year before the war, at the end of October 1972, Sadat had to purge elements of the Egyptian high command, including the minister of war, who found this war strategy too risky (Gawrych 1987, 550);

Karawan 1984, 158; Shazly 1980, 122-3). Sadat's insistence on holding a bridgehead in the Sinai under any circumstances and his expectation that international developments would win somehow the war for him were validated during the 1973 War. The Egyptian army managed to cross the Canal, to entrench itself in a bridgehead and to weather the first Israeli armored counterattack successfully. Even when the Israelis created their own bridgehead on the western bank of the Canal and thus threatened the supply lines of Egyptian troops, Sadat insisted that no unit should be withdrawn from the Sinai to face the Israeli threat in the rear areas. This decision caused a confrontation with General Shazly, the chief of staff, who took the Israeli threat to Egyptian lines of communication very seriously. Ultimately, Sadat was proved right, superpowers' diplomatic pressures (including a Soviet threat of military intervention) and a UN ceasefire came before the Israeli army could obtain the surrender of the Egyptian troops in the Sinai.

The 1973 War was a longer and more intense war than the campaigns fought in 1956 and 1967, it lasted eighteen days (October 6-24, 1973) with periods of fighting on a scale reminiscent of the great land battles fought during the Second World War in Europe. One analyst estimated the cost of the war to Egypt at US\$ 3.7 billion (Barnett 1992, 135). Estimated Egyptian military losses for the war were the following: 5,000 men killed, 12,000 wounded, and about 8,000 prisoners or missing men. Material losses were impressive in proportion to human losses: Egypt notably lost 1,100 tanks, 450 armored personnel carriers, 300 artillery pieces and 223 aircraft (Dupuy 1978, 609). Some researchers took the material losses of all belligerents and translated them into rates of loss of more than one aircraft per hour and more than one tank every fifteen minutes for the length of the war (SIPRI 1974, 5).¹

The present study of Egypt's war making activities ends with the 1973 War, on the grounds that after 1973 the likelihood of another Egyptian-Israeli war decreased rapidly,

¹ In order to avoid repetition, especially for Egypt and Syria, I will discuss the impact of the conditions of warfare on war making and state making in the final chapter.

but the burden of defense did not end. Little of the military demobilization that one associates with the end of a long conflict in Western democracies took place in Egypt after 1973. On the contrary, the defense effort was kept at a high level. For instance, in 1976 defense spending as a percentage of GNP reached an all-time high level of 37 per cent (Dessouki and Labban 1981, 70). The size of the regular armed forces also kept growing: from 298,000 men in 1973 to 342,500 in 1976 and 367,000 in 1980 (IISS 1976, 32; IISS 1980, 41). In short, the Egyptian state concerned itself less with war preparation -- especially once a peace treaty with Israel was negotiated and signed in 1978-9 -- but it remained heavily militarized.

War Making and State Power

There had been a trend toward the growth of the Egyptian state as an organization during this century; even before an elite committed to rapid development seized power in 1952. The state budget over the period 1919-51 (32 years) increased almost sevenfold (Tignor 1984, 282-3). However, what concerns us is the contribution that war or war preparation made to the growth of the state and of its domestic power. In the European model a rapid growth in the cost of war making triggered the process of state growth. In Egypt this process did not occur until the Palestine War of 1948-9. Before the beginning of the military modernization program in 1938-9 military expenditure, on average, had amounted to 5 per cent of government expenditures. With the modernization program military expenditure reached 13 per cent of government expenditures in 1938-42; but declined afterward. Table 3.4 shows that defense expenditure remained at a moderate level after 1945, but increased significantly as a result of the war in Palestine. With 21 per cent of its budget allocated to defense in 1948-50, the Egyptian state was faced with the financial challenge of war making for the first time.

The Egyptian state made its first important deficit as a result of the 1948-9 War (Vatikiotis 1991, 368). Two measures were taken to meet the deficit created by the increase in defense expenditure. One consisted in domestic borrowing: in 1948 the government issued two £E 15 million loans to cover the cost of the war, of that total £E 22 million were reserved for financial institutions and £E 8 million left to the public (Issawi 1954, 237-8). The second measure, taken after the war, was to increase direct taxation. In spite of the resistance of the dominant economic groups the state managed to double its revenue over the period 1946-51, from £E 112.8 million of collected revenue in 1946-7 to £E 238.8 million in 1951-2 (Tignor 1984, 238-9).

Table 3.4 Total Budgets and Defense Expenditures, 1946-51

Fiscal Year	Total Budget Estimates (millions £E)	Defense Expenditure as a % of Budget
1946-47	102.2	7.7
1947-48	94.5	9.9
1948-49	157.7	21.3
1949-50	163.8	21.6
1950-51	190.2	16.2

Source: Tignor (1984, 283).

The aftermath of the 1948-9 War thus led to a demonstration of state autonomy and strength on the issue of taxation, but the Egyptian state remained far from being an unbound Leviathan. It had won the taxation issue in part because the resistance of the wealthy classes was weakened by the division between those who had wealth in land and agriculture and those who had it in industry, commerce or profession (Tignor 1984, 235-6). In regard to more fundamental issues, however, the Egyptian government shrank from making important and needed reforms. For instance, although government revenues were raised dramatically between 1947 and 1951, the taxation structure remained archaic with a heavy reliance on customs duties and other indirect taxes. Even with the new direct tax scheme that came into effect in 1950 the tax structure in Egypt relied heavily on indirect taxes, which affected mostly the middle and lower classes (Barawy 1951, 408). Budget

estimates for 1951-2 forecast that customs duties, alone, would provide close to half of the state revenue (£E 107 million out of £E 231 million) (Barawy 1951, 408). The government also failed to address the issue of land reform (Tignor 1984, 232-5). It was not that the government or the political parties were unaware of those problems, but they could not muster the will to act on issues that would have challenged the core interests of their key supporters, in particular the landed class.

The new regime that came to power by a coup d'état in 1952 spent its early years consolidating its position. Internally, the power struggle between General Naguib, the official head of the junta, and Nasser, the actual leader among the Free Officers, was resolved in favor of the latter. Domestically, the regime moved to eliminate political rivals like the traditional parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, and leftist or labor organizations. So, the expansion of state power until the end of 1956 took place mostly in the despotic dimension of that power, i.e., the growing decisional autonomy of the new state elite and its resort to authoritarian measures against autonomous political activities.

The infrastructural power of the state hardly changed in the early phase of the regime. Most analysts agreed that there was a continuity in economic policy between the two regimes with the exception of the land reform decreed shortly after the Free Officers came to power (O'Brien 1966, 68-84; Vatikiotis 1978, 204-5; Waterbury 1983, 58, 60). The land reform, however, aimed at dismantling the economic power base of large landowners, who had been the mainstay of the previous regime, not at bringing a social revolution from above in the Egyptian countryside (Mabro 1974, 56; O'Brien 1966, 78; Vatikiotis 1978, 204-5).

Limited state involvement in economic affairs gave way after 1956 to the emergence of a large public sector and a growing bureaucracy, which by the mid-1960s had achieved complete dominance over the economy. As one analyst put it: "Few developing countries other than those that are professedly Marxist ever cut so deeply into their private sectors as

Egypt" (Waterbury 1983, 76). The growth of the state as an organization and of economic state power after 1956 can be illustrated with a few indicators. The Egyptian government was made up of 15 ministries in 1952, and of 18 ministries in 1956-7; this number, however, had grown to 24 in 1962 and to 29 ministries by 1965 (Ayubi 1980, 241). Public employment in the same period grew from 350,000 people in 1951-2 to 454,000 in 1956-7, and went up to 770,000 in 1962-3 to reach 1,035,000 employees in 1965-6 (Ayubi 1980, 243). With the development of state planning after 1956, and the implementation of an ambitious five-year plan in 1960, the Egyptian state assumed a dominant role in economic development. Whereas in 1952-3 gross capital formation in Egypt was carried out at 72 per cent by the private sector; the proportion had been inverted by 1959-60, with the state assuming 74 per cent of gross capital formation (O'Brien 1966, 100). A fair estimate of the size of the public sector in Egypt in the mid-1960s, after close to a decade of state expansion, put it at around 40 per cent of GDP, in contrast to 1952 when the private sector contributed to 85 per cent of GDP (O'Brien 1966, 155-6). By the mid-1960s the Egyptian state had reached the practical limits of its economic expansion.¹

The fact that this development of state power occurred after the War of 1956 raises the question of the impact of that war on the subsequent growth of the state and of state power. The important dimension of the 1956 War in that respect is not the confrontation with Israel, but the Anglo-French intervention. In response to this intervention the Egyptian government used military law to sequester all British and French property and assets in Egypt. Since British and French concerns were the two main components of foreign capital in Egypt, this meant an important and sudden acquisition of economic resources to the Egyptian state. The sequestrations included notably 9 banks, 64 insurance companies and shares in various companies amounting to over £E 50 million (Owen 1991,

¹ By that assertion I mean that the numerous commercial and industrial enterprises still in private hands were of such a small size (often less than ten employees) that they could hardly be put under state control (Mabro 1974, 130-1).

367). These acquisitions were in addition to the asset and future source of revenue represented by the Suez Canal, which remained in Egypt's possession as a result of the failure of the Anglo-French intervention. In January 1957 the Egyptian government created the Economic Organization to manage the sequestered companies (the financial institutions were transferred to the Egyptian private sector), and to lay down a public investment policy. In the same month a National Planning Council was established, followed in April 1957 by a five-year industrial plan. In June and July 1957 an Egyptian central bank was created and a new banking and credit law had the effect of strengthening the authority of the state over the banking system through the new central bank. These developments were followed in 1958 by a Soviet loan and economic assistance program for the Egyptian public sector and for the building of the Aswan High Dam (Owen 1991, 367-8).

Measures toward greater state intervention in the economy were so closely linked to the Suez crisis that the dominant opinion in the literature is that the 1956 War (in its Anglo-French dimension) was a turning point in Nasser's state making. Patrick O'Brien spoke of: "a marked reorientation in Egyptian economic policy" after the war (O'Brien 1966, 215). While John Waterbury said: "The Suez War was thus a major watershed. The state found itself the owner of considerable assets and from then on until 1967 there was no turning back in the systematic expansion of the public sector" (Waterbury 1983, 69). Michael Barnett even said with a certain hyperbole: "The Suez War punctuated the equilibrium, reversed the hierarchy between the capital and the state that had characterized the pre-1956 period, and institutionalized a new set of state-society relations" (Barnett 1992, 216).

However, this consensus on the importance of the Suez crisis should be qualified. Roger Owen, for instance, pointed out the difficulty of reaching a definitive conclusion on the subject, while Robert Mabro clearly downplayed the impact of the Suez crisis by

arguing that many post-1956 developments were already in an incipient phase before 1956 (Mabro 1974; Owen 1991, 368-9). These skeptical analysts had a point. It was true that the new regime had shown an interest in state planning and public industrial investment before the events of 1956. It was also true that the second wave of economic nationalization in 1961-2, which struck domestic capital, had its own logic and was not simply the last ripple of the original 1956 shock wave. The measures taken in 1961-2 were in response to the perceived lack of cooperation of the private sector in the implementation of the first five-year plan, and to the secession of Syria from the UAR (Mabro 1974, 129-30; O'Brien 1966, 130; Waterbury 1983, 76-7).

But, conversely, it would be wrong to assume that the development of a state-dominated economy in Egypt was inevitable once the new regime seized power in 1952. Most accounts of the economic policy of the Free Officers mention that the new regime had no coherent economic ideology beyond a vague commitment to economic nationalism. Even after 1956 the regime remained divided between advocates of increased interventionism and those favoring a pause and a rationalization of the public sector; until the former group, backed by Nasser, won the argument in the early 1960s (Waterbury 1983, 69). Furthermore, the contexts surrounding the two waves of nationalization, and Nasser's decision making style, pointed to the high degree of pragmatism and of opportunism that governed the decisions that led to the creation of a state-controlled economy in Egypt. It was not the result of a deep commitment of the regime to socialism.

Therefore, the Suez War was an important cause of the expansion of state power because it created for the Egyptian state an opportunity to get a clear advantage over foreign and domestic capital. However, once this advantage was won other factors, notably the predisposition of the regime, played a more important part in shaping the emergence of what could be called a state capitalist or neo-mercantilist economy in Egypt in the period 1960-7. Had it not been for the Suez War, in its specific dimension of a

confrontation of Egypt with Britain and France, Nasser's regime would have faced an uphill battle against not only domestic capitalists, but also a large foreign capitalist community entrenched in Egypt's economy. It is doubtful that the regime would have achieved what it did, and at the pace it did, had it been confronted with a coalition of domestic and foreign capital.

The next crucial moment for Nasser's state making came in the wake of the June 1967 War. The extent of the Arab defeat had shaken the regime to its foundations. The Israeli presence along the Suez Canal entailed an indefinite period of war preparation to recover the Sinai. The importance of the political and financial consequences of the war meant that somehow the Egyptian state would be affected. Quantitative indicators show that for the period 1967-73 the Egyptian state, as an organization, grew at a slower pace and that its power over the Egyptian society declined to a noticeable degree. An analysis of state power based on more qualitative criteria confirms the limited decline of state power after 1967.

Bureaucratic growth in Egypt slowed down after 1967. The government had 28 ministries in 1970, compared to 29 ministries in 1965-6 (Ayubi 1980, 241). Public employment also had a slower growth rate than before, the 1,035,000 public employees found in Egypt in 1965-6 were 1,200,000 in 1969-70 (Ayubi 1980, 243). Table 3.5 shows the limited decline in state power that occurred in Egypt after 1967. Figures about government revenue in proportion to national income demonstrate that the state extracted a diminishing share of national wealth during 1967-73: the state's current revenue represented only 18.6 per cent of GDP in 1973, compared to 23.7 per cent in 1967. The degree of decline in the extractive capacity of the state was modest, but it remained significant from an analytical standpoint since what was expected was a significant increase in the extractive capacity of the state in order to meet the financial need of war making. The decreasing importance of civilian government expenditures (as a proportion

of GDP) between 1967 and 1973 -- a drop from 30.4 per cent to 23.4 per cent of GDP -- was another sign that the domestic economic power of the state was affected negatively by increased war preparation. In order to finance its defense expenditure the Egyptian state did not raise its revenue, but shifted resources from the civilian sector to the military. Current civilian expenditures were the most severely affected by this measure: they represented 19.7 per cent of GDP in 1967, but only 11.6 per cent of GDP in 1973, after having dropped as low as 8.8 per cent of GDP in 1970. On the other hand, capital expenditures increased after 1967, both in absolute and relative terms. Capital expenditures stood at 38.2 per cent of total government expenditures in 1973, compared to 29 per cent in 1967.¹ The politico-military situation after June 1967 compelled the Egyptian state to trade off domestic power for military power. The intense period of war preparation and protracted conflict with Israel spanning from 1967 to 1973 did not lead to an increase in state power, but to a limited decline in the power of the state to extract revenue and to spend on civilian programs.

Table 3.5 Central Government Revenue and Expenditures, 1967-73
(millions of £E, constant 1965)

Year	Gross Domestic Product	Current Revenue (as a % of GDP)	Civilian Expenditures (as a % of GDP)	Current Civilian Expenditures (as a % of GDP)	Capital Expenditures (as a % of Total Exp.)
1965	2,340.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1966	2,353.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1967	2,323.1	549.7 (23.7)	707.1 (30.4)	457.6 (19.7)	249.5 (29.0)
1968	2,359.8	436.8 (18.5)	578.6 (24.5)	337.6 (14.3)	241.0 (32.5)
1969	2,523.5	474.6 (18.8)	585.0 (23.2)	307.2 (12.2)	277.8 (37.4)
1970	2,682.8	542.1 (20.2)	543.9 (20.3)	235.1 (8.8)	308.8 (38.4)
1971	2,794.1	537.1 (19.2)	633.6 (22.7)	325.0 (11.6)	308.6 (36.8)
1972	2,846.3	555.8 (19.5)	701.1 (24.6)	353.5 (12.4)	347.6 (37.6)
1973	2,925.0	543.3 (18.6)	685.4 (23.4)	337.9 (11.6)	347.5 (38.2)

Source: Based on data from World Bank (1976, 90-1, 311).

¹ It is likely that these capital expenditures included many items of a military nature.

If state power is looked at in terms of specific balances in state-society relations, the post-1967 era, up to the death of Nasser in 1970, also witnessed timid steps toward economic liberalization. Controls over foreign exchange and import were relaxed and new opportunities were opened for private sector exports (Barnett 1992, 217-8; Cooper 1982, 44-5). Mark Cooper considered that these measures, favoring the urban middle classes and the business sector, prefigured Sadat's own liberalization policy after 1973 (Cooper 1979). In the countryside, the regime shelved after 1967 the campaign against "feudalism" it had started in 1966. Sequestrations of land were stopped and in many instances the seized properties were returned to their owners, even if this meant dispossessing the small peasants who had benefited from the distribution of sequestrated property. This sudden moderation of the regime was perceived, again, by some as a concession to the rural middle class, dominant in the countryside (Ansari 1986).

These timid concessions toward dominant social groups in urban and rural society and the limited, but significant, reductions in state extraction and civilian expenditures constitute the essential elements of the retreat of the Egyptian state after 1967. However, can that decline in state power be attributed entirely to the impact of the 1967 War? The dominant opinion in the literature acknowledges the 1967 War as an important cause of the developments mentioned previously (Ansari 1986; Barnett 1992; Cooper 1982; Waterbury 1983). However, one must concede that the state-dominated economy erected by Nasser after 1956 was showing signs of exhaustion by 1965-6. The 1967 War, therefore, did not kill a flourishing socialist experiment, but dealt a final blow to a socialist economy already in crisis (Cooper 1982, 39-40; Waterbury 1983, 10, 99-100). Essentially the 1967 War eliminated one option: an intensification of socialism as a way out of the 1965-6 crisis, and it left open only the option of a more balanced mixed economy, of an economic liberalization. It was the option of a mixed economy that Nasser timidly considered after 1967, and that Sadat more forcefully pursued after 1973.

The 1973 War was the next significant moment when state power was affected by war making. After 1973 Egypt embarked on an economic liberalization known as *al-infitah* (the opening). The link between this liberalization policy and the 1973 War was underlined symbolically by the fact that the document in which Sadat expounded the new economic orientation of the country was called the October Working Paper in commemoration of the October War; although the document was made public in March 1974. An assessment of the impact that war making, in the period 1971-3, had on state power after 1973 is made difficult by the contradictory evidence available. Some indicators point toward an increase in state power, but others qualify this growth by pointing at other dimensions of state power and autonomy where a decline occurred as a result of years of war preparation.

One of the sign of the continued growth of the state after 1973 was the importance of the public sector. Public employment went from 1,471,200 people in 1973, to 1,701,000 in 1975, and to 2,065,300 in 1978. The bureaucracy accounted for 17.7 per cent of total employment in 1973, 18.84 percent in 1975, and 21.86 per cent in 1978 (Rivlin 1985, 21). The share of the public sector in GDP, which stood at 53 per cent in 1971-2, had reached 57 per cent in 1979 (Rivlin 1985, 14). Table 3.6 shows that the greatest increase in state power after 1973 occurred in regard to financial extraction and civilian government expenditures. These two variables had suffered a serious drop during the period 1967-73, but soared after 1973, although with fluctuation over the years. In 1973 the current revenue of the Egyptian state represented only 18.6 per cent of GDP, whereas for the period 1975-9 it represented, on average, 36 per cent of GDP. Similarly, civilian government expenditures amounted to only 23.4 per cent of GDP in 1973 in comparison to an average of 45 per cent during 1975-9. During the period 1975-9 the Egyptian state spent on civilian programs, only, more than its revenue, as if the government were trying to compensate for the hardships suffered before 1974, and to show the population the dividends of its new foreign policy.

Besides the imbalance between revenue and expenditure, other indicators showed the fragility of state power growth in Egypt after 1973. For instance, some analysts pointed out that the increase in tax revenue after 1973 came almost entirely from taxes on foreign trade, and not from an increase in direct taxation (Ikram 1980, 318-9; Rivlin 1985, 108, 111). Thus, the increase in government revenue was not so much an indicator of increased state power than of a return of foreign economic activity in Egypt. Similarly, while Table 3.6 showed an important increase in civilian government expenditures, it also showed a decreasing proportion of total government expenditures allocated to capital expenditure. In other words, the growth of civilian government expenditures after 1973 hid the declining role of the state as the mainspring of development.

Table 3.6 Central Government Revenue and Expenditures, 1974-78 (millions of £E, constant 1975)

Year	Gross Domestic Product	Current Revenue (as a % of GDP)	Civilian Expenditures (as a % of GDP)	Capital Expenditures (as a % of Total Expenditures)
1973	4,471.9	830.7 (18.6)	1,047.9 (23.4)	531.2 (38.2)
1974	4,783.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1975	5,218.0	1,985.3 (38.1)	2,603.2 (49.9)	495.9 (17.0)
1976	5,979.5	1,955.9 (32.7)	3,054.7 (51.1)	988.1 (29.5)
1977	6,739.9	2,617.4 (38.8)	2,882.3 (42.8)	567.0 (18.0)
1978	7,134.0	2,706.4 (37.9)	2,776.1 (38.9)	482.7 (16.0)
1979	7,562.5	2,585.1 (34.2)	3,082.9 (40.8)	639.2 (19.2)

Sources: Based on data from World Bank (1976, 90-1, 311; 1983, 52-3, 283).

This last point agrees with Michael Barnett's assessment of state power in Egypt. Barnett argues that after 1973 an erosion of state power and autonomy took place in Egypt. The first evidence of that process was the growing dependence of the Egyptian state on foreign assistance to finance itself: whereas in 1966 borrowing funded 22 per cent of the budget, this proportion had reached 40 per cent by 1973 and 53 per cent by 1975, decreasing to 41 per cent in 1978 (Barnett 1992, 221). The second proof of the declining power of the state was the diminishing role of the state in economic development:

Although before 1967 the Egyptian economy was evidencing serious economic difficulties, the state was still chiefly responsible for economic growth and capital investment. The state's centrality for capital investment began to change during the interwar period, particularly once the government relieved the public sector of much of its investment capital, concentrated more on providing both welfare and warfare, and gave greater breathing space to the private sector as a way of relieving the shortage of capital funds. This changing state role was solidified after the 1973 war when the budget was increasingly consumed with defense, public works, welfare, and debt redemption (Barnett 1992, 223).¹

After 1973 the Egyptian state played second fiddle to private domestic and foreign capital in joint ventures, or made investment in less profitable activities. Furthermore, the *infitah* policy led to a decentralization of decision making in the public sector, each enterprise gained autonomy at the expense of the overall coherence of the public sector and the ability of the state to control it (Barnett 1992, 223-4).

For Michael Barnett war making was the source of the decline of state power in Egypt:

In general, war preparation was central in promoting four factors instrumental in eroding state power. War preparation led to: a decrease in the amount of capital available to the public sector; a deepening of the fiscal crisis of the state as a result of a heavy defense burden that began with the Yemen; a government that became more consumed with welfare, warfare, and debt redemption and less with continuing its past role as the dominant source of investment capital; and the undermining of those actors associated with Arab socialism and the promotion of those who championed capitalist and market rationality (Barnett 1992, 224).

John Waterbury's assessment was not as extensive as Barnett's but agreed with the latter in asserting that the post-1973 liberalization came on the initiative of the state and was linked to the 1973 War. However, while Barnett stressed the exhaustion of the state through war preparation, Waterbury emphasized the place of the 1973 War in Sadat's overall state making strategy. He argued that Sadat considered a new Arab-Israeli war a necessity in order to break the political and economic deadlock in which Egypt was

¹ The evidence presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 contradicts Barnett's assertion since it shows that after 1967 current civilian expenditures were negatively affected by war preparation, while capital expenditure started to decline only after the 1973 War. However, Barnett supports his assertion by referring to the growing importance of defense spending in total investment (Barnett 1992, 223). Despite this disagreement I agree with Barnett's main thrust of argumentation.

trapped since 1967. Sadat felt the future economic development of Egypt lay in the infusion of Western technology and Western and Arab capital, but that this would not happen as long as the stalemate with Israel endured and that Egypt remained committed to a socialist economy (Waterbury 1983, 127, 159). Thus, war and economic liberalization were closely linked in Sadat's thinking in the early 1970s.

Furthermore, the prestige Sadat won as a result of the war allowed him to be more explicit about his plan to liberalize the economy, and to urge its quick implementation (Rivlin 1985, 52). There is no gainsaying that Sadat was already initiating the *infitah* as early as 1971, when various measures were taken to attract foreign capital in Egypt, followed by additional ones in 1973 before the war (Rivlin 1985, 45-7). However, like Nasser and the nationalizations and economic reforms of 1956-7, it is doubtful that Sadat could have proceeded as far and as quickly as he did, had it not been for the consequences of the 1973 War. Egypt's commendable military performance during the war strengthened Sadat's power domestically, giving him more decisional autonomy. This increased autonomy, in turn, allowed him to adopt a foreign policy of rapprochement with the United States and of peaceful settlement of the conflict with Israel. American economic assistance, Western financial aid, and Arab capital were essential to finance Sadat's liberal experiment, but they would not have come to Egypt had it not been for the 1973 War.

War Making and Regime Formation

War making in Egypt between 1948 and 1973 did not affect only the power of the state, but also the configuration of its institutions, the make-up of the political elite, and the relations between the government and society. Broadly speaking the periods that were significant in regard to the impact of war making on regime formation were the same that were significant for state power. The Palestine War of 1948-9 was a formative experience for many officers involved in the 1952 military coup subsequently. The 1967 War and the

period of intense war preparation following it witnessed a decline in the despotic power of the state, which paralleled its timid economic liberalization. After 1973 the political liberalization was extended to a limited, but real, degree of pluralism. The 1956 War is an exception because it can be said that the impact of the war was less significant politically for the regime than it was economically for the state.

Egypt in the late 1940s and early 1950s had many of the symptoms of a country ripe for a progressive military coup. The country was undergoing socioeconomic change with its attendant dislocation of traditional social and economic patterns; the monarchy and the established political parties were incapable of dealing with the challenge of development and had lost much of their nationalist legitimacy in past compromises with the British; finally, the officer corps was increasingly recruited from men of the lower middle class who shared few interests or ideologies with the elite in power. These circumstances and the fact that political conspiracies had been rampant in the army since the early 1940s meant that the chances of a coup d'état were high in Egypt. The Free Officers who seized power in 1952 were only one of the military groups that were conspiring against the regime at the time; their success being explainable by the qualities of their organization and leadership and the fact that the other groups had lost momentum as a result of the regime's repression and surveillance (Dekmejian 1971, 20-2).

The military coup occurred three years after the 1948-9 War. To what extent did this war contribute to the fall of the old regime? The Free Officers' group was formed shortly after the war, but Robert Stephens thought that the Palestine war was not the real cause of the 1952 revolution, it merely hastened the revolutionary process (Stephens 1971, 85). Other analysts, however, pointed out that the Palestine War was important because it focused military dissatisfaction on the regime (Dekmejian 1971, 20; Vatikiotis 1978, 104). The military blamed the Palace and its appointed government for the poor planning of the Palestine campaign and the procurement of defective military materials. The war, thus,

created a bone of contention between the military and the regime about an issue close to the corporate interest of the military. A similar feud between the military and the civilians on the responsibility for the defeat in Palestine had led to a military coup in Syria in March 1949. The fact that the blame for the 1948-9 defeat was squarely put on the king and the civilian politicians by many in the military made it possible for officers with diverse political leanings to band together to topple the regime (Vatikiotis 1978, 104). Had it not been for the association of the regime with military incompetence the conspirators would have had to focus the objectives of their plot on a program of reforms; and this could have divided the Free Officers given the wide ideological spectrum found among them. The Palestine War, therefore, gave to those officers already dissatisfied with the regime a cause for which active or tacit support for a coup could be built up in the military.

The impact of the 1956 War on Nasser's regime was limited in comparison to what it brought in terms of increase in economic state power. By 1956 Nasser had already removed General Naguib, the original head of the junta; and the regime had eliminated or driven underground the civilian opposition. A new constitution, establishing a strong presidential regime, had been approved in early 1956. In comparison the Suez War only increased the charismatic legitimacy of Nasser, which he derived from his resistance to the Anglo-French expedition. But Nasser's charisma at home and abroad had been building up for at least a year before the Suez War. His determined opposition to the Baghdad Pact, his conspicuous presence at the Bandung Conference, his decision to break the Western arms monopoly in the Middle East by buying arms from the USSR, and finally the nationalization of the Suez Canal had already earned him the title of First Arab Nationalist well before the failed Anglo-French expedition made him the new Saladin.

The impact of war making on regime formation in the decade 1957-67 was negligible. In fact, it is probably more relevant for that period to discuss the reverse relationship: the impact that regime formation had on the capacity of the state to prepare and wage war.

Nasser's regime up to June 1967 could be characterized in various ways, by its personal rule system, its blend of authoritarianism and populism, or its corporatist organization of societal interests; but one characteristic with a direct impact on war making was its heavy reliance on military officers and ex-officers to control the bureaucracy and the various institutions of the regime. This situation led to a decrease in military professionalism that directly affected the Egyptian military performance in June 1967.

An analyst aptly summed up the role of the military in Nasser's state making strategy, and its consequence, when he said: "Nasser did not perceive the role of the military in society strictly as a military institution, but as a bureaucratic system that could administer sanctions, and as an old boys' network that could dispense patronage. He denied it the chance of developing a corporate military professional ethos" (Vatikiotis 1978, 160). In fact Nasser, playing down his own importance, once said (in 1959): "The army is my parliament. The army has [not] carried out the Revolution simply to make me a ruler and to leave me and go. I have to satisfy the army that the demands for which the Revolution was carried out are being realized" (Dawisha 1976, 115). The officer corps was perhaps Nasser's ultimate parliament or constituency, but it also was one of his essential instruments of rule. By assigning officers or ex-officers to crucial posts in the state apparatus Nasser made the large bureaucracy a compliant organization to maintain his rule and to impose his revolution from above on the Egyptian society.

In overall terms the military presence in the state apparatus after 1952 was not overwhelming. An analyst found that from September 1952 to October 1968 about 33.6 per cent of Egypt's state leadership had a military background (Dekmejian 1971, 171).¹ The proportion of military men, however, was often higher in crucial posts. The president and the vice-presidents were always former military men. The proportion of military men in cabinet was on average 44.4 percent for the period from October 1953 to May 1967; the

¹ The state leadership (or power elite in Dekmejian's terms) includes the president, vice-presidents and the cabinet (Dekmejian 1971, 168).

cabinet of September 1966 had 55.3 per cent of ministers with military background, while the one appointed just after the June 1967 War had a military representation of 65.5 per cent (Dekmejian 1971, 203). Military presence in the bureaucracy was more difficult to measure, data for 1961 tended to show that military bureaucrats were concentrated in a few key ministries or agencies like the Presidency of the Republic (20 per cent of personnel), the Ministries of Interior (83.76 per cent) and Foreign Affairs (9.31 per cent); paradoxically military bureaucrats accounted for only 0.20 per cent of the personnel surveyed in the Ministry of War (Dekmejian 1971, 220). The military presence was overwhelming at the head of the governorates of Egypt: out of 26 governors 22 were officers or former officers. Military bureaucrats were also found in the agencies in charge of the public sector (16.21 per cent of personnel) and in banks (10 per cent) (Dekmejian 1971, 222).

When mobilization and war came in the spring of 1967 many officers in the administration were hastily recalled to command operational units (Waterbury 1983, 337). There was a consensus after 1967 that widespread military involvement in administration had caused a decline in military professionalism. Also one could argue that Nasser's heavy reliance on the military hindered the social transformation sought by the regime as well as its institutionalization (Baker 1978, 48-9).

The complete defeat of the Egyptian army in the 1967 War shook Nasser's regime to its foundation. It unleashed a wave of popular protest and it exacerbated discord within the regime. Both developments were probably smoldering before 1967 as a result of the economic crisis, but the defeat in June by weakening the regime gave rise to trends that had been repressed in previous years. Within the regime the dispute involved those who favored a deepening of the revolution, notably the single party called the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and its leader Ali Sabri, against those who favored a limited liberalization to rectify the excesses of the regime, these moderates were found in some media (the well-

known journalist Muhammad Heikal), the National Assembly (and its president Anwar Sadat), the army and the technocracy (Cooper 1982, 41-2). For a time it appeared that Nasser would arbitrate between the two factions, but in early 1968 he was forced to move toward the moderates. This decision was in response to the unprecedented popular demonstrations against the regime and its policies.

The masses had spontaneously taken to the streets in June 1967 to return Nasser to power after his resignation. In February 1968 they came back to force him to make reforms. Ostensibly the cause of the popular protest that engulfed Egypt's larger cities in February 1968 was the lenient sentences passed on the air force officers put on trial after the 1967 War. The protest started at an aircraft factory in Helwan, but university students soon joined workers in protesting about the sentences and the repressive nature of the regime. In clashes with security forces two civilians were killed and six hundred protesters were arrested (Waterbury 1983, 329). On February 25, during a National Assembly session, speakers called for the dismantling of the "repressive state apparatus" (Ansari 1986, 144). In late March judges came forward with a demand for a professional and independent judiciary (Ansari 1986, 144).

At first, Nasser seemed uncompromising when he addressed the workers in Helwan, but in March he took two important measures that indicated he intended to answer to some extent the demands of protesters. First, he formed a new cabinet. The March 1968 cabinet was significant because for the first time in many years military presence in the cabinet decreased, and half of the new civilian ministers were university professors known for their reformist and pro-student positions (Dekmejian 1971, 259). Then Nasser issued a document, known as the 30 March Declaration, in which he outlined the economic and political orientations the regime would follow in subsequent years. This document, approved by referendum, was ambiguous because it reiterated the commitment to socialism and the irreversible character of the Revolution while it guaranteed liberal

economic and political rights. The declaration was interpreted as an attempt by the regime to win the support of its core socioeconomic constituency, the middle classes, without appearing to go back on the gains made by the lower classes in the previous populist era (Cooper 1982, 55).

Nasser also acknowledged that the single party, the ASU, suffered from a lack of democracy and he recommended that it should be rebuilt on the basis of elections at all levels instead of the previous method of appointment from the top down. The other main political reform promised in the 30 March Declaration was a new constitution, which would guarantee a series of individual rights, the sanctity of the judiciary, and the review of the constitutionality of laws by courts. Also, the constitution would set limits to the tenure of individuals at the highest executive levels. With the 30 March Declaration the regime promised the population to get rid of the police state built before 1967 and to replace it by a more constitutional and legal order.

The political liberalization that took place in Egypt between the 30 March Declaration of 1968 and the death of Nasser in September 1970 was limited. Analysts disagreed on the extent to which the new elections to the ASU in 1968 were unrigged (Dekmejian 1971, 270-81; Cooper 1982, 56; Waterbury 1983, 331). In 1969 Nasser brought back the judiciary under tight governmental control (Ansari 1986, 149-50). On the other hand, the National Assembly of 1969 saw the election of 23 independent deputies out of 350 seats, which used to go all to the single party (Dekmejian 1971, 283).

Political liberalization proceeded further under Sadat. In part this renewed and more significant liberalization resulted from Sadat's political designs. But it also stemmed from the weariness induced by the years of war preparation Egyptian society had undergone. In 1972 the process was triggered, as in 1968, by mass protests about an issue relating to the conflict with Israel. Sadat had repeatedly proclaimed throughout 1971 that it was the "year of decision" in regard to the conflict with Israel, when by the end of the year he came

forward with a lame excuse to justify the lack of action student disturbances broke out (in January 1972). Students of all political leanings protested against the no-war, no-peace situation on nationalist grounds and because it mortgaged their future with unlimited military service (Hinnebusch 1985, 51). As in 1968 the protest became a denunciation of the lack of democracy in Egypt. Professional associations (of engineers, lawyers, and journalists) joined the students in calling for greater freedom (Cooper 1982, 83; Hinnebusch 1985, 51). Even the parliament (renamed the People's Assembly in 1971), which had been a stronghold of Sadat's partisans in 1971, started to assert its independence vis-a-vis the government. In late 1972 it went as far as to criticize the government for its laxity in preparing war against Israel (Cooper 1982, 85; Dawisha 1976, 193). Even in the army the lack of initiative by Egypt was causing problems of discipline (Cooper 1982, 84; Shazly 1980, 116-7, 128-9). Sadat argued to his National Security Council that Egypt had to go to war in 1973, otherwise its economy would collapse sometime in 1974 (Sadat 1978, 245). However he also went to war because prolonged war preparation without war was straining the stability of its regime.

The perception that the 1973 War had been a victory for Egypt boosted Sadat's stature as a statesman and his legitimacy. Overnight he became the "Hero of the Crossing" (of the Suez Canal). I have mentioned how this new legitimacy allowed him to proceed faster and more decisively with his economic reform. Changes in the realm of politics after the October 1973 War were also significant. The demilitarization of the cabinet went to unprecedented levels: in the September 1974 cabinet only 17.1 per cent of ministers had a military background, while this proportion dropped to 9.1 per cent in the February 1977 cabinet (Cooper 1982, 145). The reform of Egypt's party system was also renewed. Already in 1972 Sadat had asked the new leader of the ASU to accommodate those in the party who were asking for greater democratization (Hinnebusch 1985, 158). But this policy was quickly shelved. However, in the new context created by the 1973 War Sadat

opened the debate about the reform of the single-party system in 1974. Members of the elite, Sadat included, were ambivalent, or divided on the degree of pluralism to be introduced in Egypt. Sadat wanted some democratization to differentiate his rule from Nasser's, to satisfy the participatory demands expressed by liberals and urban sectors of the population between 1968 and 1973, and to please the Americans (Hinnebusch 1985, 158-9). However he feared the divisive impact of a multi-party system on national unity. So, at first, a compromise was worked whereby three "platforms" (representing the left, center and right wings) in the ASU were allowed to compete in open elections. The success of the center platform (pro-governmental) in the 1976 elections led to a transformation of the platforms into full-fledged political parties. Mark Cooper summarized in the following way the partial transition toward liberal democracy Egypt had accomplished between 1967 and 1977:

From one party defined as the sole political organization, it moved to several platforms within the party and then to a smaller number of parties. From a very tightly controlled press, it moved toward greater freedom in the press, but it stopped far short of permitting complete freedom to publish. From certification of candidates for political office by the Arab Socialist Union it moved to an almost complete freedom of candidacy. From rather rigidly controlled elections it moved to rather free and competitive elections (Cooper 1982, 128).

Conclusion

At this point it would be premature to generalize from a single national case study about the impact of war making on state making. Nevertheless, the Egyptian case presents some interesting findings. The European model of state making through war making predicts that the power of a state will increase in response to the challenge of war, but out of four Arab-Israeli wars only two (the Palestine War of 1948-9 and the Suez War of 1956) led to an increase in state power in Egypt; and of these two wars only one (the Palestine War of 1948-9) was really consonant with the European pattern. For the Arab-Israeli Wars of

1967 and 1973 the evidence points to a relative decline in state power as a result of years of war preparation rather than to an increase in state power.

The Palestine War of 1948-9 was the only case that tallied with the European pattern described by Tilly and other historians. The Palestine War caused an increase in defense expenditure that led the Egyptian government to increase taxes in the face of opposition by dominant groups. It resulted in a show of state autonomy and a durable increase in the extractive capacity of the Egyptian state. The Suez War of 1956 led to an even greater increase in economic state power in Egypt. As a result of the failed Anglo-French intervention the Egyptian state assumed possession of considerable assets, which allowed it to dominate its economy. However, this accretion of state power had nothing to do with the European pattern, in which state power growth resulted from the need to extract more resources for war making. The 1956 War showed instead an idiosyncratic pattern, in which a conflict created an opportunity for a Third World state to expropriate the largest elements of foreign capital on its territory. The increase in state power was thus made possible by the nature of the conflict, not by the challenge of war to the mobilization capacity of the Egyptian state.

In the light of the European pattern it is surprising to find that the period during which the Egyptian state prepared war in earnest (1967-73) did not lead to a significant increase in domestic state power, but, on the contrary, to a limited decline in state power and autonomy. After 1967 financial extraction and current civilian expenditures declined, while the government took timid measures of economic liberalization. The situation after 1973 showed an improvement in the financial extractive capacity of the state, with the return of foreign economic activities; but with the continued economic liberalization the state lost its function of mainspring of economic development. The period between the June 1967 War and the October War of 1973 also showed that when a real domestic effort for war making had to be made the Egyptian state became more vulnerable and responsive to demands

originating from society. There is a clear parallel between this pattern and Tilly's argument about how increased extraction for war making led to societal resistance and constitutionalism in Europe.

It might be argued that what took place after 1967 and 1973 was not an absolute decline in state power but a trade-off between two forms of state power. The Egyptian state gave up some power over its economy but gained military power for its confrontation with Israel. Domestic economic power was traded off for external military power. Whether this choice was wise is beyond the scope of this research. But it seems that assessments of decline in state power after 1967 and 1973 (including mine) are based on two premises: domestic power is more important than external power, and economic power is more important than military power for a state. It seems that these premises were not shared by Nasser and Sadat between 1968 and 1973 when Israel's military challenge was so present.

A comparison of Nasser's and Muhammad Ali's state making and war making is also instructive. Both men built strong, centralized states in Egypt with significant state interventionism in the economy. Both men also were involved in wars that ultimately strained the resources of their states forcing them to open their economy to foreign capital (although this later development really occurred under Sadat). In both cases also it has been said that the withdrawal of the state favored the state bourgeoisie, which benefited from the enrichment opportunities created by the economic liberalization.

The differences between the two historical experiences are, however, also significant. The level of resource extraction achieved by Muhammad Ali's state was spectacular. With a less developed administration and without the resort to nationalism Muhammad Ali's state had a regular army representing 2.6 per cent of Egypt's population. One had to wait until 1973 to see a somewhat similar performance in the mobilization of men when the Egyptian armed forces (including the reserves) represented 2.3 per cent of the population (the regular armed forces still making up only 0.8 per cent of the population). Muhammad

Ali's war preparation also involved much domestic weapon production, whereas in contemporary Egypt this production was marginal until 1973. In this respect, it might be argued that the difference between the two cases lay in the differences between war making before and after the application of the Industrial Revolution to military affairs. Domestic weapon production on a large scale was simply not a realistic option to meet Egypt's defense need in its conflict with Israel. In that sense the growing sophistication of the military confrontation between Egypt and Israel after 1956 meant that foreign weapons and military expertise would play a growing role in Egypt's war preparation.

Table 3.7 summarizes the various findings of the Egyptian case in regard to the impact of war making on state making. Among the points not yet reviewed I think some deserve attention. First, war making was not the only source of changes in state power and regime formation in Egypt after 1948. A significant increase in state power and a radicalization of the regime took place during the first half of the 1960s (actually up to the June War of 1967); and in my opinion war making did not cause these developments. As I said earlier, it would be excessive to present the nationalizations of the 1960s as an inevitable outcome of the 1956 Suez War. As for the war in Yemen, it is difficult to assess its impact on Egypt. The available evidence does not allow to discriminate between what is explainable by the war in Yemen and what resulted from the economic crisis in Egypt; in which the intervention in Yemen, itself, played a part by raising defense spending. In short the real impact of the intervention in Yemen on Egyptian state making in the period 1962-7 remains unclear.

Table 3.7 Summary of Impact of War Making on State Making in Egypt, 1948-73

	War Making & State Power	War Making & Regime Formation	War Making & Resource Extraction
1948-9 War	Demonstration of state autonomy and increased financial extraction.	The war helped to rally elements of the officer corps against the regime.	Limited domestic extraction (men and taxes). Military modernization stalled by Western powers.
1952-6 (before Suez War)	No impact of war making on state power.	Outcome of previous period: the 1952 Revolution.	No serious effort at war preparation. In 1955 modern weapons were obtained under subsidizing conditions from the USSR.
1956 War (the Anglo-French intervention)	Significant increase in state power as a result of nationalization of foreign capital.	Increase in Nasser's charisma.	
1957-67 (before June War)	The increase in state power in the period 1960-7 <u>was not</u> due to war making.	The radicalization of the regime in the period 1960-7 <u>was not</u> due to war making.	Increase in war preparation. Continued subsidization of defense effort by USSR. Inadequate manpower mobilization.
1967 War	See below for consequences after June 1967.	Decrease in the internal cohesion of the regime. Crisis of legitimacy. See below.	
1968-73	Limited decline in state power as a result of war preparation.	Divisions within the regime between radicals and moderates. Protests by various groups led to promises of reforms. Decline of military influence. Weariness induced by years of war preparation threatened regime stability in 1972.	Significant war preparation effort. Increased domestic mobilization (manpower). Increased reliance on the USSR and Arab countries for selective resources. First serious attempt at coalition warfare (with Syria).
1973 War and after	Limited decline in state power in following years as Sadat used the outcome of the war to promote an economic liberalization.	Increased legitimacy for Sadat. Partial political liberalization in following years.	Military preparedness kept at a high level (notably manpower and defense spending) after 1973.

4. War Making and State Making in Syria (1948-89)

At first sight it seemed that contemporary Syria offered few opportunities for state makers bent on creating a regional military power from its resources. Syria had a population and an economy smaller than those of Egypt and Iraq (or Saudi Arabia), the main contenders for hegemony in the Arab world. Furthermore, Syria had a highly segmented society, a fact that boded ill for the capacity of a central government to legitimize its rule and mobilize the population. Small, but geographically concentrated, Muslim heterodox communities, like the Alawis and the Druzes, lived in Syria and had always challenged the encroachments of central government on their autonomy. The Sunni Arab majority was divided by rivalries between members of the oligarchy and between urban centers (notably Damascus and Aleppo). Syria's political system up to the 1970s, therefore, was characterized by instability. Syria had the Middle East record for the number of military coups, appeared to have civilian cabinets at a rate comparable to Italy's post-war Republic, and witnessed numerous protests or revolts. Some observers even considered that Syrians were not really committed to the existence of their country because of their eagerness for mergers between Syria and Iraq or Egypt. Syrians seemed to have local, communal, or Arab identities but hardly an allegiance to the post-colonial Syrian state. In short, Syria was not a fertile soil for ambitious state makers, unless they relished the thought of taking up a great challenge.

Syria found such state makers among the ranks of the Baath party, which seized power in 1963. Despite its handicaps the Syrian state was transformed over the years from a weak power penetrated by foreign influences and pressed from all sides into a regional power with a veto on the resolution of the Lebanese and Arab-Israeli conflicts. The Syria that could not withstand an Israeli onslaught alone gave way to the Syria that committed itself to reaching strategic parity with Israel.

In a sense this chapter charts the emergence of Syria as a regional power over a period of forty-one years. But above all it is an account of the war making activities of the various regimes that have ruled Syria since its independence. Through this account I hope to show the impact that the conflict with Israel had on the Syrian state. Syria was pulled apart by many centrifugal forces, but Israel was probably the most important force bringing together Syrians. In this respect the conflict with Israel was far more important for state making (and nation-building) in Syria than it ever was in Egypt.

War Making and Resource Extraction

War Making in Pre-Baathist Syria (1948-62)

In the previous chapter we saw that Egypt went to war in 1948 with little war preparation; in spite of the existence, since the late 1930s, of a modernization program for its armed forces. The situation was not better in Syria. The country had gotten its sovereignty gradually during the Second World War as a result of a pledge by the Free French in 1941 to grant Syria and Lebanon their independence, and of Allied pressures to make the French honor their promise. Before the end of the war Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union had recognized Syria as an independent state. In January 1945, the Syrian authorities declared war on the Axis powers in order to join the United Nations and announced the creation of a national army. The formation of the latter led to a final showdown between the Syrian authorities and France, which insisted on the negotiation of a bilateral treaty that would give it a privileged status in Syria before transferring the colonial troops to Syrian sovereignty and withdrawing French troops from Syria. A crisis followed during which French troops bombarded Damascus before a British ultimatum brought a ceasefire. In April 1946 French forces withdrew from Syria and the Syrian state achieved sovereignty.

The Syrian army was formed out of the *Troupes Spéciales du Levant*, the colonial forces raised by the French in Syria and Lebanon during the Mandate period between the two World Wars. About 5,000 of these troops were in Syria in 1945 and became the nucleus of the Syrian army (Torrey 1964, 44). Like many other colonial troops raised by imperial powers the *Troupes Spéciales du Levant*, and its heir the Syrian army, were largely made up of men from minorities and therefore were not a reflection of the actual demographic make-up of society. The over-recruitment of minorities continued in the Syrian army after 1945 because few members of the urban Sunni elites took up a military career. Conversely, a military career was often the only path of social advancement for young men from the countryside, often from heterodox Muslim sects, who had some education (Hurewitz 1969, 153; Petran 1972, 89; Seale 1989, 38-9). This pattern applied to the officer corps and to the other ranks. Military service was introduced in Syria after the Palestine War, but conscripts from urban areas left in greater numbers after their two-year term of service than conscripts from rural areas (Seale 1989, 39). Furthermore, most middle-class youths could afford the exemption fee for the military service (Devlin 1983, 63). The trend toward a recruitment from rural, minority groups did not affect the war making capacity of the Syrian state but it meant that civilian-military relations could deteriorate rapidly because of the different backgrounds of civilian and military elites -- as we saw in Egypt when the military academy was opened to lower-middle class candidates.

The involvement of Syria in the Palestine War followed a two-step pattern similar to Egypt's. At first the involvement was limited to the support of the Arab Liberation Army based in Damascus -- a volunteer militia led by Syrian and Iraqi officers who had resigned their commission to join this paramilitary unit. The purpose of the ALA was to take part in the civil war in Palestine that all felt was inevitable when in late November 1947 the United Nations decided to partition the country. With a strength of 7,700 men the ALA started to operate in Palestine on January 10, 1948 (Dupuy 1978, 13, 22). The second

stage of involvement, the commitment of the Syrian army to the fighting in Palestine, came after the Jews had proclaimed the state of Israel in May 1948. The Syrian army was at the time 8,000 to 10,000-strong (Dupuy 1978, 17; Maoz [Zeev] 1986, 72). It managed to send to Northern Palestine a combined-arms force of about 1,800 men equipped with a motley collection of obsolete tanks, guns, and armored cars that the French and British had left in Syria during the Second World War (Laffin 1982, 16; Petran 1972, 95; Seale 1989, 34). Estimates of military losses for the Palestine War are difficult to find, one source gives a figure of 400 dead for Syria, which seems a high casualty rate if less than two thousand soldiers were engaged; unless this estimate also includes casualties from the ranks of the ALA (Picard 1980, 146). Analysts do not agree on Syria's military performance during the Palestine War. One account of the war gives the impression that the Syrians fought poorly (Dupuy 1978, 47-50). Other analysts, however, think that Syria did well because at the end of the war it was in control of a few strategic strips of land that had been assigned to the Jews in the UN partition plan (Laffin 1982, 16; Petran 1972, 95; Yaniv 1986, 160).

However, the overwhelming majority of Syrians at the time felt that their army and government did badly during the Palestine War. The operation in Palestine, which had been presented as a walkover, turned out to be a gruelling campaign during which the Syrian army was stopped and then driven back. For most Syrians the only valid explanation for this unexpected defeat was an incompetent Arab leadership. Syrians were dissatisfied with their politico-military leadership early in the Palestine campaign, after the Syrian expeditionary force ground to a halt in the face of Jewish resistance. On May 24, after merely ten days of campaigning, the defense minister resigned and the chief of staff was retired (Seale 1965, 33). Thereafter things got worse as scandals about shoddy supplies to the army and embezzlements of funds earmarked for the struggle in Palestine fed the flames of popular discontent. In late November 1948 demonstrations and riots

broke out for the first anniversary of the UN partition resolution: the Syrian government resigned and martial law was declared.

The situation did not improve in early 1949, the government and civilian politicians castigated the military for the reverse in Palestine while relying on the military to maintain public order. Colonel Zaim, the chief of staff, felt that he and the military were threatened by the statements and intentions of politicians, so he carried out a coup d'état on March 30, 1949. This military coup was the first one in Syria's recent history and unfortunately not the last one. Two other coups occurred in 1949, one in August brought to power Colonel Hinnawi, and another in December replaced him by Colonel Shishakli. Shishakli ruled behind the scenes until November 1951, when he assumed power directly by displacing the civilian government with a second coup. For a time it appeared that Shishakli would reform the Syrian state, would become a Syrian Atatürk or a precursor of Nasser. But civilian elites and the military were far more factious in Syria than in Egypt, and Shishakli was forced to flee the country in February 1954 as a result of a military revolt. Parliamentary government was re-established because the army was divided into too many factions to form a junta. Rivalries within the officer corps were indeed so intense that in early 1958 a group of officers requested Nasser to mediate and asked him for a union between Syria and Egypt (Seale 1965, 319-21). Since both Nasser and Syrian politicians were committed to Pan-Arabism they had to consider the proposition of the Syrian military seriously. In early February 1958 the United Arab Republic was proclaimed, and Syria became its northern province.

This summary of Syrian domestic politics during the period 1949-58 was required to show the degree of governmental instability at the time, a context that was not favorable to long-term military planning. As one analyst pointed out:

Although Syria's defense effort as expressed in military expenditure has been as strenuous as that of most countries in the area, its general strategy has been the least coherent and consistent. The reason for this is most probably the notorious political instability that has plagued the country since 1949 and has

engulfed the armed forces themselves, thus preventing the successive defense chiefs from developing a continuous systematic policy suited to the realities of Syria's position (Safran 1969, 227).

The lack of coherence in Syria's strategy, however, should not be exaggerated, nor should it be explained only by political instability. After all, we saw that Nasser's regime, which enjoyed a greater degree of stability and cohesion than any regime in Syria, also had problem in modernizing the Egyptian armed forces and in identifying a clear mission for them. In that respect Syria was not an exception. For instance, as in Egypt, military modernization in Syria was initially handicapped by the Tripartite Declaration and its limitation on arms transfers to the Near East. When the Soviet arms connection was established unfamiliar equipments flowed in, which the Egyptian and Syrian armies took years to absorb. Like Egypt, Syria did not focus its war preparation only on Israel. Sometimes (as in 1956-8) it appeared to Syrians that Israel was only an element in a larger imperialist offensive against Syria and Arab nationalism involving also Turkey, Iraq and the United States.

Despite these circumstances it would be wrong to contend that war preparation during the period had no coherence, showed no pattern, was not based on some broad principles. In this respect the National Charter of March 1956, a document agreed upon by the main political parties and groups to guide coalition cabinets, was important. It included the following points concerning defense and foreign affairs: Syria should oppose peace with Israel, as well as foreign (i.e., non-Arab) military alliances and promote positive neutralism in East-West relations (i.e., to lean toward the side sympathetic to the Arab cause); the Syrian government should promote civil defense, the strengthening of the army and a joint armament policy with Egypt, as well as the further development of the military alliance with Egypt in order to include political and socioeconomic affairs and subsidies to the Jordanian army; and finally the government ought to impose an additional income tax earmarked for the defense effort (Torrey 1964, 303-4).

Let us review now the various aspects of Syria's defense effort between the end of the Palestine War and the formation of the UAR in 1958. Table 4.1 shows Syria's defense outlays from independence to the year of the union with Egypt. Military expenditure increased significantly after 1949 with the introduction of the military service and the consequent expansion of military manpower. The next significant increase in Syria's defense effort occurred after 1954. To a large extent the increase corresponded with the Suez crisis, followed by the diplomatic tensions of 1957 between Syria and the United States, Turkey and Iraq. The increase in defense spending in the period 1955-58 also was due to the upgrading of Syria's arsenal now that it had access to modern weapons from the Eastern bloc. During the period 1950-58 defense was the most important item in current government expenditures, accounting for forty to fifty per cent of outlays.

The financing of the state and of its defense effort after 1949 was done by various means. An important source was taxation, which significantly increased in the early 1950s, even if it remained heavily dependent on indirect taxes. Colonel Zaim, Syria's first military strongman, started in 1949 a program to strengthen the Syrian army. In order to finance this program, evaluated at US \$28 million, Zaim's government imposed a direct tax earmarked for the defense program and reallocated resources from other ministries to the defense budget (Torrey 1964, 129). The increased defense effort initiated in 1955 was financed by increases (from 10 to 20 per cent) in taxes, but also by raised oil transit fees (a rent derived from the oil pipelines crossing Syria), and by a Saudi loan (Petran 1972, 114).¹ The Saudi loan and the oil transit fees indicated the start of a reliance on external sources of revenue to finance the defense effort.

¹ A possible additional source of financing might have come from Egypt. In May 1956 Egypt claimed to have contributed US \$ 1.4 million to Syria's armed forces (Torrey 1964, 301).

Table 4.1 Syria's Defense Expenditures, 1945-58²

Year	Defense Expenditure (millions of £S)	Defense Expenditure as a % of Current Central Government Expenditures
1945	31.5 ^a (16.4) ^b	31.8 (16.5)
1946	42.1 (27.8)	37.4 (24.7)
1947	36.3 (20.8)	29.5 (16.9)
1948	62.8 (44.8)	46.1 (32.9)
1949	65.3 (49.3)	46.3 (34.9)
1950 ^c	84.8 (69.0)	50.9 (41.4)
1951 ^c	84.8 (69.0)	50.9 (41.4)
1952 ^c	84.8 (69.0)	50.9 (41.4)
1953	93.3	47.4
1954	89.9	43.0
1955	104.8	40.2 ^d
1956	166.3	48.5 ^d
1957	166.0	40.0 ^d
1958	276.8	n.a.

^a For 1945-52 IBRD's figures adjusted to reflect Safran's definition of defense expenditure.

^b Defense expenditure as reported by IBRD.

^c Average out of total defense expenditure for fiscal years 1950-51 and 1951-52.

^d These percentages are calculated from budget figures in Hurewitz's study.

Sources: IBRD (1955, 255, 289) for the years 1945-52; Safran (1969, 170) for defense expenditure in the years 1953-58; Hurewitz (1969, 159) for figures on central government expenditures in 1955-57. See the Table's footnote for further details.

The extraction of financial resources for war making often involved taxes specifically assigned to the defense budget, as if the authorities wanted to lower popular resistance to taxes by associating them with a popular cause. This practice came to a climax in November 1955 when a fund-raising week for the defense effort was proclaimed. Ministers and deputies pledged a month's salary to the defense fund and urged other

² The following sources provide data on early Syrian defense expenditures: Hurewitz (1969, 159) for the period 1953-65; IBRD (1955, 255, 289) for the period 1945-54; Safran (1969, 170) for the years 1952-65 and SIPRI (1972, 86-9) for the years 1950-70. I relied on IBRD and Safran because both clearly identified their primary sources (official Syrian statistics) and described what was included under the term defense expenditure. The team from the IBRD only reported as defense expenditure the expenditure put under the defense budget, these figures are reported between brackets in Table 4.1. However the team also found that for the period 1949-52 an additional amount £S 89 million had been devoted to defense without being included in the ordinary budget (IBRD 1955, 259). Nadav Safran, on the other hand, included spending on the gendarmerie and police forces in defense expenditure (Safran 1969, 425). For the sake of consistency I have adjusted IBRD figures so that they reflect Safran's definition. Once adjusted IBRD figures were similar to those reported by Safran for the years 1952-54, for which the two sources overlapped. These two sources were therefore merged into a single series of figures.

officials to contribute. By February 1956 this fund-raising drive had collected over US \$4 million from government officials and the population (Torrey 1964, 298).

The strengthening of the Syrian army also required more military manpower. The first significant step in this respect was taken after the partition of Palestine in late 1947. In response to the UN decision, and the outrage it caused in Syria, the parliament voted increased military spending and for a compulsory military service law (Torrey 1964, 104). In March 1949, however, while the armistice with Israel was not concluded yet, the Syrian government proposed, in order to save money: "to reduce officers' allowances, to demobilize several thousand officers and men, and to end inductions [for the military service]" (Torrey 1964, 115). Needless to say that these intentions gave grounds for Colonel Zaim's coup in April 1949.

Zaim and the subsequent military strongmen of Syria were committed to the modernization and expansion of the Syrian armed forces. Compulsory military service (with the possibility of paying for exemption) was introduced in 1950 with a two-year term of service (Seale 1989, 39). Table 4.2 shows the growth of Syrian armed forces in absolute terms and in proportion of population. Between 1948 and 1958 Syria's rate of military mobilization increased by at least a factor of three in spite of rapid population growth. Increases in Syria's military manpower followed on Arab-Israeli wars, even if Syria did not participate in the Suez War of 1956, this trend also applied to later periods (Maoz [Zeev] 1986, 74).

A component of Syria's military manpower in the 1950s not included in Table 4.2 was the militia. Official statements gave importance to this paramilitary force and it remained a feature of Syrian politics under Baathist rule during the 1960s. The militia was established in 1956, during the Suez Crisis, with the purpose of countering an expected imperialist invasion. The militia was apparently 100,000-strong, and at least 3,000 militiamen armed with Czech submachine guns paraded in Damascus on December 6, 1956 (Torrey 1964,

342). The militia was used again during a diplomatic crisis with the United States and Turkey in 1957 (Petran 1972, 116, 123). At the time many Western observers saw the people's militia as a political force paving the way for a communist takeover in Syria (Scale 1965, 287). Although a militia was also formed in Egypt during the Suez Crisis, it was largely a stopgap measure; whereas in Syria the militia became an option for state makers in search of additional military forces.

Table 4.2 Syria's Military Manpower, 1945-58³

Year	Population (millions)	Force Level (thousands)	Force Level per 1,000 of Population
1945	n.a.	5	n.a.
1948	3.0	8	2.6
1950	3.2	10 - 15	3.1 - 4.7
1955	3.9	25	6.4
1958	4.4	40 - 45	9.1 - 10.2

Sources: For the population: Hurewitz (1969, 159), Maoz [Zeev] (1986, 71), United Nations (1951, 28); for the force levels: Devlin (1983, 64), Hurewitz (1969, 159), Safran (1969, 230, 254), Torrey (1964, 44).

Money and men are two of the three essential resources needed to prepare or wage wars, the third is weaponry. Arms procurement by Syria was hindered by the same constraint experienced by Egypt; namely, the reluctance of Western powers to transfer large quantities of modern weaponry to Arab states outside of the framework of a Western military alliance, an alliance that neither Egypt nor Syria were willing to consider. The situation, however, was more complicated for Syria because France, its most likely Western arms supplier, had little to offer. France's arms industry had been devastated by the French defeat in 1940 and the four-year German occupation. French arms exports after 1945 were therefore hindered by a limited productive capacity, few modern designs, and the priority of supply to the French army (Jabber 1981, 104; Kolodziej 1987, 43-50). Eventually France's arms industry started to produce modern weapons based on French

³ As in the case of Table 4.1 a caveat is required about the figures reported in Table 4.2. Estimates of military manpower often vary across sources (for instance the years 1950 and 1958), probably because of different definitions. The sources often did not specify what they included in, or excluded from, their estimate of military manpower. Nevertheless, it is still possible to conclude that an important growth in military manpower occurred between 1948 and 1958.

designs, but then the political context had changed. France was at war with Arab nationalists in Algeria and therefore an arms supply relationship developed between France and Israel rather than with an Arab state. The paucity of French arms supplies can be gauged by the fact that one of the most significant transfers to Syria was made up of less than two dozens of obsolete German tanks captured during the Second World War (Jabber 1981, 82).

Under these circumstances Syria came to the same solution as Egypt: an arms connection with the Eastern bloc. Thus, in 1954 (before Nasser's 'Czech arms deal') the Syrian military concluded an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia (Scale 1965, 233). The arms agreement concerned a batch of German tanks of the same model obtained from France previously, and thus it was not considered a breakthrough diplomatically or militarily for Syria or the Eastern bloc. But in 1955 Syria contacted with the Soviet Union for the supply of modern equipment in quantity. Patrick Scale summarized the reasons that brought Syria to contact Soviet authorities in the spring or summer of 1955:

She was impelled in this direction by Israel's large-scale raids on Arab territory, by Turkish threats, by the reluctance of Britain and the United States to supply arms outside the framework of a defense pact, and by the disinclination of France -- Syria's traditional supplier -- to arm the Arabs after the start of the Algerian war (Scale 1965, 234).

The conditions of the arms agreement with the Soviet Union are not known, but they were probably similar to the ones offered to Egypt at the time, namely long-term credit and the possibility of bartering agricultural products for weapons. Syria's trade started to shift from its traditional Western markets and toward the Eastern bloc in 1956-57 (Torrey 1964, 356-7). Maybe this shift in commerce reflected exports in payment for arms transfers rather than Syria's estrangement from Western Europe. The value of the weapons transferred up to December 1956 was estimated at US \$56 million (Ramet 1990, 17-8). In 1957 a second arms agreement, evaluated at US \$110 million, was concluded. Soviet arms transfers to Syria in 1955-58 seemed identical to the types of weapons transferred to

Egypt: a composite armored force of tanks and assault guns of World War Two design (about two hundred T-34/85 and SU-100) with more recent jet fighters (around eighty MiG-15 and 17) and a few motor torpedo boats (Safran 1969, 230; SIPRI 1975, 63-5).⁴ It is doubtful that the Syrian armed forces had absorbed much of that equipment before the union with Egypt brought further confusion.

The merger of Syria with Egypt in 1958 was in a sense a predictable outcome of the Syrian state makers' search for an alliance partner that would be reliable and acceptable to Syrians. For instance, Colonel Zaim, Syria's first military dictator, attempted a rapprochement with Turkey and Iraq, and he was considered pro-French (Seale 1965, 62; Torrey 1964, 134-5). From a domestic standpoint these prospective alliance partners were handicaps for Zaim because Syrians had a grudge against Turkey since the French had given a part of Syrian territory to that country, and they were divided on the desirability of an alliance with a Western power or with the Iraqi monarchy. Although Zaim was not toppled for his choice of alliance partners, Colonel Hinnawi, who succeeded him in August 1949, was overthrown in December apparently because of his pro-Iraqi policy (Petran 1972, 98-9; Seale 1965, 84-5). During the 1950s Syria thus became the willing prize in a contest of influence between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iraq on the other hand. The contest of influence between the various Arab powers, however, became more complicated with the return of the Israeli threat and when Western powers started to promote a project of regional alliance that would include Turkey and be aimed at the Soviet Union rather than Israel.

The first serious military clashes with Israel along the demilitarized zone between the two countries occurred in early 1951 as a result of an Israeli plan to drain an area for settlement (Seale 1965, 106; Yaniv 1986, 161). Subsequent clashes led Syria, in May

⁴ At least two sources report the delivery of T-54 tanks (a post-45 tank design) in the period 1955-58 (Seale 1965, 233; SIPRI 1975, 65). This is doubtful since the T-54 was the most recent Soviet tank design, and that Egypt did not receive such modern tanks until the early 1960s.

1951, to appeal to Egypt and Iraq for aid, and to invoke the collective security pact of the Arab League. Apparently, only Iraq answered the call by sending a few anti-aircraft artillery batteries (Scale 1965, 107-8).

Meanwhile, Britain and the United States started to probe various countries in the Middle East about a project of regional defense organization designed to contain the Soviet Union. Ultimately this project came into being in late February 1955 when Turkey and Iraq (Britain joined a few weeks later) formed the Baghdad Pact. Syria could not evade the political pressures from the Baghdad Pact members and their opponents. Already during the September 1954 election in Syria the dominant issue had been whether to join an alliance sponsored by Western powers or not; and a government had fallen over the same issue in early February 1955 when the proclamation of the Baghdad Pact appeared inevitable (Scale 1965, 164, 217).

In March 1955 Syria decided to join an alternative coalition formed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which led to a military alliance between Syria and Egypt in late October 1955. Apparently, a reason for joining the Egyptian-Saudi coalition had been the Israeli raid on Gaza -- which also had an important impact on Egyptian decision makers as we saw in the previous chapter (Torrey 1964, 276, 316). The defense treaty with Egypt was detailed and included the setting-up of joint institutions for defense cooperation.⁵ Unfortunately most of the military provisions of the treaty were not implemented because Nasser was concerned about Syria's factious politics (Seale 1965, 253-4). Nevertheless the defense treaty had positive and negative consequences for Syria. In November 1955 Saudi Arabia came forward with a US \$10 million loan, which was used to finance the defense effort; while Israel greeted the formation of the military pact with a raid on Syrian positions,

⁵ The institutional structure created by the treaty included: a Supreme Defense Council where the foreign and defense ministers of both countries issued directives to the Joint Command, the organization in charge of commanding the armed forces of both countries in time of war; a War Council made up of the chiefs of staff of both countries played an advisory role to the Supreme Defense Council. The defense treaty stated that an attack against one party was an attack on both. The treaty was valid for five years with automatic renewal (Torrey 1964, 299).

which caused fifty deaths in order to prove the hollowness of the defense treaty with Egypt (Seale 1965, 254; Smith 1988, 168-9; Yaniv 1986, 162).

The year 1956 witnessed a short-lived period of military cooperation between Syria and Jordan. In April 1956 a joint communiqué announced that the two countries had agreed to coordinate their defense against Israel and to avoid foreign alliances; apparently during the Suez War Syria sent a division to Jordan to bolster the latter's defense against a possible Israeli attack (Torrey 1964, 300-1; Petran 1972, 116). Otherwise the participation of Syria in the Suez War was very limited: it broke diplomatic relations with France and Britain, and some military men and workers took it on themselves to sabotage the pipeline of the Iraqi Petroleum Co. -- an action that cost the Syrian state about US \$750,000 per day in lost revenue (Petran 1972, 116; Torrey 1964, 323-4, 335).

Nineteen fifty-seven proved to be another eventful year for Syria. With the Eisenhower Doctrine and growing instability in Jordan and Lebanon in the background, Syria got embroiled in diplomatic crises with the United States and Turkey. The Syrian authorities accused the United States of fomenting conspiracies to overthrow the Syrian government. But a more serious crisis broke out when Turkey conducted troop movements along the border with Syria in April and August 1957. A diplomatic crisis followed when Syria called up a partial mobilization and filed a complaint to the UN, while Egypt sent troops to Syria and the Soviet Union warned Turkey against invading Syria (Kushner 1986, 85-6; Petran 1972, 123; Torrey 1964, 363-7). The involvement of the USSR in the crisis on behalf of Syria was significant because it brought the first instance of Soviet naval diplomacy in support of an Arab state, when two warships made a visit to the Syrian port of Latakia in September 1957 (Dragnich 1975, 243). The diplomatic behavior of the Soviet Union during the Turko-Syrian crisis was a clear sign of its commitment to Syria's security, which reinforced earlier signs such as the arms agreements and the declaration of support by Moscow when Syria had refused to join the Baghdad Pact.

This survey shows that by 1958 Syria had reached a level of external insecurity that was matched by its degree of governmental instability. The union with Egypt thus seemed a relief to the Syrian military and civilian elites. Unfortunately, the respite was short-lived. Syrian politicians found that they were marginalized in the institutions of the UAR. Syria, the northern province of the republic, was simply absorbed into the administrative and political structures that Nasser had already established in Egypt. The Baath party, which favored the union and had taken a part in the last governments of the Syrian republic, was forced to disband and went underground, while politicians more amenable to Nasser's wishes assumed power in Syria. Even the economic elites felt that they were threatened by the socialist tone of Nasser's policies and his economic measures favoring Egypt at the expense of Syria.

The consequences of the union for the Syrian military were also dramatic. Some 4,800 Syrian officers and NCOs were ousted or transferred, most of Syria's military academics were transferred to Egypt, and around 2,300 Egyptian officers were posted in Syria (Petran 1972, 146; Scale 1989, 59). Needless to say that Syrian officers resented their subordination to Egyptian officers -- as well as the reduction of their pay to Egyptian standards (Kerr 1971, 21). Defense spending was increased during the UAR period from £S 276.8 million in 1958 to £S 299.9 million in 1961 (Safran 1969, 170). This increased financial effort might have contributed not just to Syria's defense. One source claimed that during the union some Soviet arms transfers intended for Syria reached Egypt instead, possibly because of a cooling off in Soviet-Egyptian relations and the difficulty of the Syrian forces to absorb the new weaponry (Safran 1969, 231).

The union between Egypt and Syria came to an abrupt end on September 28, 1961, when a military coup supported by Syria's economic elites took Syria out of the UAR. Initially, Nasser considered a military intervention to prevent the secession, and did send

airborne troops in Syria; but he changed his mind when he found that the putschists had the control of the country.

For about eighteen months Syria reverted to its traditional pattern of politics, with coalition governments on stage and military factions behind the scenes ready to intervene at the moment they thought the civilians had strayed.⁶ The security of the state also reverted to a deplorable condition with subversion by pro-Nasserist or unionist groups and increasing tension with Israel (Bar-Siman-Tov 1983, 79-116). This short and troubled period ended when the success of a Baathist coup in Iraq led Baathist officers in Syria, in alliance with a few other military factions, to carry out a coup in Syria on March 8, 1963.

War Making under the Baathist Revolution (1963-70)

The seizure of power by the Baath party in 1963 did not put an end to domestic political instability. The Baath party had not come to power by relying on its organizational strength -- the party had reportedly fewer than five hundred members at the time of the coup -- but through the actions of Baathist officers acting in concert with other military factions. The hold of the civilian leadership over the military wing of the party was as tenuous as the overall hold of the Baathists on power, constrained as they were initially by the necessity to share power with other putschists and by the lack of a strong popular base of support. Moreover, the Baath party became divided by a generational gap. The older urban leadership of the party, which believed in a mild form of socialism, was challenged by a younger generation of militants from rural and minority backgrounds who were committed to a radical reform of Syrian society. On February 23, 1966, the old party

⁶ When the putschists transferred power to a civilian government in the fall of 1961 they created a National Security Council in which they had a majority of seats. This institution had the mandate of formulating the broad lines of state policies and therefore was a way of institutionalizing military supervision of civilian governments (Rabinovich 1972, 29). One example is enough to show the interference of the National Security Council: in early December 1962 the Council found that a teachers' strike was: "a serious blow to the national interest and security of the state" (Bar-Siman-Tov 1983, 104).

leadership was expelled from the country by a coup and the more radical leadership, often called the neo-Baath, took control of Syria.

The commitment of the neo-Baath to a social revolution in Syria and the Arab world had the effects of isolating the regime diplomatically (except with the communist countries) and of increasing societal resistance to Baathist rule in Syria. From that period a significant opposition by some Sunni groups in urban society emerged, denouncing the regime as atheistic and dominated by members of heterodox minorities such as the Alawis. As if domestic opposition and diplomatic isolation in the Arab world were not enough the neo-Baath became involved in an escalating border conflict with Israel. Increased tension with Israel was maybe an effective means of dissipating domestic opposition and diplomatic isolation, but it backfired in the spring of 1967 when it led to a war with Israel for which Syria was unprepared.

The war started on June 5 but the Syrian front remained relatively quiet until June 9 when Israel launched its offensive. The Israeli army conquered the Golan Heights in the face of a retreating Syrian army before Tel-Aviv agreed to a UN ceasefire in response to international pressure. Syrian military casualties during this very short war were estimated at 600 killed, 700 wounded and 570 captured or missing (Dupuy 1978, 326). The Syrian air force lost during the war from fifty to seventy aircraft, or at least half of its pre-war strength (Glassman 1975, 45; Hurewitz 1969, 484; Pajak 1976, 97). The war and the Israeli occupation also caused a flow of refugees from the Golan estimated between 100,000 and 130,000 (Kanovsky 1968b, 283; Petran 1972, 199; Picard 1980, 167; Seale 1989, 141).

The economic consequences of the war were less dramatic for Syria than they were for Jordan, which had lost the most productive part of its territory, or for Egypt (Kanovsky 1968b, 278; Petran 1972, 201). Syria's economic losses, according to one analyst, included the loss of oil transit fees, a decline in tourism (which was anyway marginal) and

increased defense expenditure (Kanovsky 1968b, 282). However, the losses were no less significant for the Syrian state because its elites were already under siege domestically (Petran 1972, 201). The poor performance of the Syrian army, the rumors that the regime had been more concerned during the war by the security of its rule in the capital than by the fighting at the front, and the loss of a whole province of Syria to Israel were an indictment of Baathist rule in Syria. The neo-Baath, itself, could not avoid an internal debate on the causes of the defeat and the future course of action. The debate developed between a radical faction, which wanted to pursue the revolutionary path adopted before June 1967, and a more moderate faction, which argued for giving priority to war preparation against Israel over the promotion of the social revolution. Eventually the moderate faction led by Hafiz al-Asad, the minister of defense, prevailed in November 1970. This second successful military coup under Baathist rule became known as the Corrective Movement.

Table 4.3 Syria's Defense Expenditures, 1962-70⁷

Year	Defense Expenditure (millions of £S)	Defense Expenditure as a % of Current Central Government Expenditures
1962	279	n.a.
1963	297	n.a.
1964	346	n.a.
1965	365	n.a.
1966	316	n.a.
1967	366	46.6 (27.7) ^a
1968	587	56.6 (36.6)
1969	600	51.0 (35.6)
1970	670	52.0 (33.0)

^a The percentages between brackets represent the share of defense expenditure in central government expenditures (CGE), i.e., current and capital expenditures of the state. These percentages are provided to ease the transition between Tables 4.1 and 4.3, which report the share of defense expenditure in current CGE only, while Tables 4.4 and 4.8 report the share of defense expenditure in total CGE (current plus capital expenditures). However, comparisons across Tables based on these percentages only are not justified in my opinion because the sources are too diverse.

⁷ This series of figures on defense expenditure is not strictly comparable to Table 4.1 since the latter was based on Nadav Safran's definition of military expenditure. Moreover, for the period 1950-70 SIPRI (the source used for Table 4.3) tended to report lower Syrian defense expenditure than other sources. Table 4.3, therefore, presents a conservative estimate of what was actually spent on defense by the Syrian state during the period 1962-70.

Sources: SIPRI (1972, 88-9) for defense expenditures, World Bank (1976, 376) for the financial statistics from which the percentages spent on defense for the years 1967-70 were calculated.

Despite dissension among the state elites, societal resistance, and isolation from traditional alliance partners war preparation was kept at a high level during the period 1963-70, in particular after 1967. Table 4.3 shows that over a period of merely eight years Syria's defense expenditure grew by 240 per cent. Except for the years 1964-5, for which the increase can be explained by the resumption of Soviet arms deliveries, most of the growth took place after the 1967 War. Despite the debate within the regime after 1967 about the setting of priorities (war preparation versus social revolution), it is clear from these figures that the military faction led by Asad and his civilian supporters had enough influence to make war preparation a priority of the Syrian state.

Syria's armed forces stood at about 60,000 men in 1965 with an additional 40,000 men in the reserves (Safran 1969, 231; Wood 1965, 17-8). Out of a population of five million and a half, the standing armed forces represented a ratio of military mobilization of eleven soldiers per thousand of population, slightly more than had been achieved in the late 1950s (cf., Table 4.2). By 1970 the Syrian armed forces stood at 86,750 men, which meant a ratio of mobilization of fourteen soldiers per thousand of population (Institute for Strategic Studies 1970, 44). Contrary to Egypt where there was ample evidence of inadequate intake of qualified manpower in the armed forces before 1967, and of resistance to prolonged military service after 1967, little is known about the existence of similar problems in Syria. Only one source reported the government's attempt to bring back home technically qualified young men who had left Syria to avoid conscription by offering them immunity from punishment and alternative public service (Petran 1972, 252). Apparently the long term of service and the possibility of being retained indefinitely led many men to try to evade military service.

Despite the official neo-Baathist discourse, which extolled people's war as the only valid strategy to liberate Palestine, it was during the second half of the 1960s that the Syrian armed forces became a conventional force of some importance equipped with modern weapons. The support of the Soviet Union was crucial for this program of military modernization. Initially the Soviet Union reacted coldly to the Baathist takeover. In late 1963 Soviet arms deliveries were suspended for a year because of the uncertainties surrounding the Baathist regime and its persecution of Syrian communists. But when deliveries resumed they brought modern weapons such as T-54/55 tanks and MiG-21 fighters (Safran 1969, 231). Syria's losses in military equipment during the 1967 War severely affected the air force since like its Egyptian counterpart it had been devastated by the initial Israeli air strike. However, within a year of that defeat Soviet arms deliveries had more than made up for the Syrian losses and Syria ended up with a larger air force equipped with a larger proportion of modern aircraft (Pajak 1976, 97). Some sources claim that in 1968-69 Syria made overtures to France and China in an attempt to diversify its arms supply; but only light weapons for Palestinian guerrillas were obtained from China (Pajak 1976, 97; Ramet 1990, 54). This feeble attempt to diversify sources of arms, which might have been an attempt to get a better deal from the Soviets, did not alter Syria's military dependence on the Soviet Union. By 1970 Syria was: "nearly totally dependent on the Soviet Union for the sustenance of its military machine" (Pajak 1976, 98).

The role played by the Soviet Union in the 1967 War was controversial. Moscow did not want a war between the Arabs and Israel, but passed on to the Egyptian authorities information (which proved to be erroneous) about an Israeli military build-up on the Syrian border that led Nasser to set in motion the chain of events in the Sinai that provided Israel with a pretext for going to war. During the war the Soviet Union deployed a large number of naval units in the Mediterranean and put its airborne divisions on alert. On the

diplomatic front, on June 7, Moscow threatened to break diplomatic relations with Israel and to consider "other necessary measures" if Israel did not agree to a UN ceasefire; but this message failed to impress the Israeli government (Neff 1984, 237). When Israel decided to take the offensive on the Syrian front (June 9), after the Arab states had agreed to the UN ceasefire, Moscow broke its diplomatic relations with Israel and informed Washington that it was considering a unilateral intervention (June 10). The ceasefire between Israel and Syria came into effect in the late afternoon of June 10, after the Israeli forces had achieved their objectives and before the Soviet threat of intervention was made public; both Israel and the United States being concerned of the diplomatic advantage Moscow would win if the ceasefire was implemented after the announcement of the intention of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in the conflict (Brecher 1980, 283-5). In short the Soviet Union had contributed to the escalation that led to a war that neither it nor its regional clients wanted, and its diplomacy during the war had failed to prevent serious territorial and military losses to Egypt and Syria.

Despite the reliability of the Soviet Union as an arms supplier and as a diplomatic source of support to moderate Israeli war aims, Syria's weakness as a military power required alliances with Arab states. Syria needed the external resources that an alliance could provide in order to put up a credible defense against Israel or to undertake the liberation of Palestine. However, the Baath was unwilling to accept the ideological compromises that alliances with conservative Arab regimes or rival reformists like Nasser would entail. At first when the Baath seized power in Syria in 1963 an alliance was formed readily with the Baathists ruling in Baghdad. This alliance led in the fall of 1963 to an agreement about an economic and military union between the two Baathist-ruled countries; and Syrian troops were sent in Iraq to fight a Kurdish insurrection (Kerr 1971, 92; Petran 1972, 170, 174). This alliance, however, was short-lived because the Baath was overthrown in Iraq in November 1963.

Nineteen sixty-four proved to be a year of relative diplomatic isolation for Syria when the members of the Arab League sided with Nasser in recommending a prudent course of action in the dispute with Israel about the Jordan waters (Kerr 1971, 100). Some in the Baath party would have liked a more confrontational policy.⁸ Syria, however, was included in the United Arab Command, an organization set up to coordinate the defense effort of the Arab states sharing a border with Israel. Through this organization member states of the Arab League would help the front-line states to finance their defense; but there was no evidence that Syria received subsidies from that source (Hurewitz 1969, 481-2; Wood 1965, 3).

The isolation and vulnerability of Syria were demonstrated in the spring of 1964 when it proved incapable of protecting from Israeli raids the diversion works it was conducting on tributaries of the Jordan. The Syrian authorities appealed to Egypt for military assistance. But Nasser answered the call for assistance with conditions to the dispatch of Egyptian air units that were unacceptable to Syria, and he argued that Syria ought to deal with such minor incidents on its own (Bar-Siman-Tov 1983, 138-9; Rabinovich 1972, 168-9). Nevertheless, relations improved between Syria and Egypt in the following years, to the extent that on November 7, 1966, a Treaty of Mutual Defense was signed by the two countries; the Egyptians intending to moderate Syrian behavior vis-à-vis Israel through this instrument (Kerr 1971, 122; Seale 1989, 126). However the treaty did not instil prudence into the Syrians. On the contrary, tension with Israel was kept at a high level through a war of words, Palestinian guerrilla infiltrations, and border incidents, which ultimately led to war in the spring of 1967 when Egypt felt obliged to step in the Syrian-Israeli dispute.

⁸ The radical wing of the Baath accused the Syrian delegation to the Arab Summit conference of January 1964 of having deviated from the party's line, which called for an immediate war on Israel to prevent it from completing its water carrier project (Bar-Siman-Tov 1983, 133-4; Rabinovich 1972, 102-3). A similar internal debate between a pro-war faction and a moderate faction took place in 1965 after the Arab Summit conference in Casablanca (Bar-Siman-Tov 1983, 134-5).

Initially the Arab defeat in June 1967 did not alter the Baath's lack of predisposition to form alliances with other regimes. Syria refused to join the emerging consensus at the Khartoum Arab Summit in August 1967 and thus was not eligible to subsidies from oil-rich states, while Egypt and Jordan were (Petran 1972, 201; Seale 1989, 144). This attitude, however, became harder to maintain in subsequent years as the debate within the neo-Baath progressed. Asad's faction advocated military cooperation between all front-line states. As Asad put it before a Baath party congress in March 1969:

I have repeatedly stressed the importance of Arab military coordination -- notably among the Arab states that border with Israel -- regardless of the differences and the contradictions in their political positions, as long as it would serve the armed struggle.... the defensive capability of the Syrian front is closely tied with the capability of other Arab fronts ... and the same mistake prior to 5 June [1967] could be repeated and Israel would be able to strike in each of the Arab fronts separately one after the other (Maoz 1988, 38).

As early as July 1968 Asad's faction argued for a rapprochement with the new Baathist regime in Baghdad, but Jadid's faction opposed the move because the Baathists in power in Iraq were affiliated to those who had been expelled from Syria in February 1966 as rightist elements (Roberts 1987, 92). Nevertheless, in 1969 Asad managed to have the upper hand in the internal struggle and took the initiative of promoting the idea of an Eastern Front against Israel where Syria, Iraq and Jordan would participate in cooperation with Egypt's own effort. Some Iraqi troops moved into Syria and Jordan, and some Syrian units were sent to Jordan as a result of that initiative, which apparently ended in the summer of 1970 (Maoz 1988, 112; Petran 1972, 244). The tension in Jordan between the monarchy and the Palestinian organizations led to a civil war in September 1970 during which Syria intervened in favor of the Palestinians by sending an armored force.⁹ The

⁹ Accounts of Syrian decision making during the crisis diverge. Many conventional accounts argue that the intervention was decided by Jadid's faction and that Asad withheld air support to the ground units sent in Jordan because he was opposed to the intervention and did not want to provoke an Israeli counter-intervention (Hinnebusch 1984, 305; Maoz 1988, 39). However, other analysts argue that Asad approved of the intervention in order to prevent a massacre of Palestinians (Petran 1972, 247-8; Seale 1989, 157-9). This interpretation seems to be supported by the fact that Asad had a firm control of the armed forces by 1970 and it is difficult to imagine how armored units could have intervened in Jordan from Syria without his approval.

fighting between Palestinian, Syrian and Jordanian troops, while Iraqi troops in Jordan stood idle, boded ill for the future of military cooperation between the three countries.

We will see in more detail in a later section the impact of war making on regime formation in Baathist Syria, but conversely war preparation was affected by the policies and development of the Baathist regime from 1963 to 1970. Like their Egyptian colleagues, Syrian officers had become excessively politicized by 1967; this caused a drop in military professionalism and combat performance. In Syria the decline in military professionalism came as a result of repeated purges of the officer corps as different parties and factions attempted to control the institution that since 1949 had been the kingmaker in Syria. Within less than two months of its seizure of power in 1963 the Baath military faction was purging the Nasserist and independent military factions that had supported it during the March coup; then during the summer of 1963 it created a crash course at the Homs military academy to train hundreds of Baathists as officers (Seale 1989, 79, 82-4). The neo-Baath coup in February 1966, and a subsequent coup attempt in September by Druze officers, led to further purges. More than four hundred officers were purged in 1966 alone. As Patrick Seale pointed out, it appeared that Syria: "stumbled into war in 1967 without an officer corps or at any rate with a greatly depleted one" (Seale 1989, 113).

If such inopportune purges of the Syrian officer corps were vaguely reminiscent of Stalin's military purges before the Second World War, Syria's commitment to a strategy of revolutionary war to confront Israel was a pale imitation of the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Algerian revolutions. From 1966 Syrian decision makers developed an official strategic doctrine against Israel outside of the parameters of conventional military operations. The adoption by the neo-Baath of an unconventional strategy was a natural outcome of its make-up and ideology. After the February 1966 coup a new chief of staff was appointed and this officer was a former military attaché to the Syrian embassy in

China where he had studied Maoist strategy; moreover, three other prominent members of the regime had done volunteer medical service during the Algerian War of Liberation, these men had in mind the recent successes of revolutionary warfare and its potential relevance for Palestine (Olson 1982, 111). The notion of a people's war against Israel carried out by the Arab masses suited well the neo-Baath's objective of a social revolution in the Arab world and its self-perception of having the right leadership and ideology to lead such a campaign.

However, the adoption of a people's war doctrine also had a military or strategic rationale. Both Palestinian analysts and Syrian Baathists had come to the conclusion, before 1967, that a conventional war strategy against Israel was becoming irrelevant because Israel kept its conventional defense effort at a high level and would soon get nuclear weapons that could deter a conventional Arab offensive (Jabber 1973, 159, 167). In that context conventional war preparation by Arab states appeared to be a futile undertaking and people's war the only strategy that could circumvent Israel's conventional military superiority and its presumed nuclear deterrent. For many Arab radicals the ease with which the Israeli army defeated three Arab armies in a few days in June 1967 seemed to confirm the validity of the previous analysis.

However, in spite of the apparent validity of the argument in favor of revolutionary warfare and the commitment of the regime to the doctrine, little was done to implement it. As one analyst put it: "the regime was unable or unwilling to take the (potentially revolutionary) measures required to wage a popular liberation war, the new policy became one of revolutionary and bellicose verbalism" (Petran 1972, 195). A consequence of the neo-Baath's commitment to revolutionary war was increased support by the Syrian authorities to emerging Palestinian organizations that advocated similar views, like *al-Fatah* led by Yasser Arafat. Another practical application of the revolutionary war principle was the formation of a people's army in Syria, an organization that grouped together the

various militias the regime had created to repress domestic opposition and that it used as a symbolic deterrent in its escalating conflict with Israel before June 1967 (Bar-Siman-Tov 1983, 149; Petran 1972, 197). After the 1967 War, in the context of the rivalry between the factions of Asad and Salah Jadid, the latter's faction attempted to build its own military base of support out of a Baathist-controlled Palestinian guerrilla organization (*al-Saiqa*) in the expectation of a potential violent showdown with Asad's faction (Jabber 1973, 194; Kaminsky and Kruk 1987, 51; Seale 1989, 156-7).

In short, during the period 1963-70 war preparation was stepped up in Syria. Despite the appearance of single-party rule, Syria's regime remained unstable to a degree that affected the war making capacity of the Syrian state notably its ability to develop a rational war strategy, to make alliances with other Arab states, and to develop professionalism in its armed forces. These deficiencies led in June 1967 to the loss of a Syrian province to Israel. The ensuing debate between two factions of the regime over the causes of the defeat and the future course of action open to the Baath led to a consolidation of power in favor of a faction advocating that the priority of the regime should be the liberation of the territories lost in 1967 rather than further radical domestic reforms and an uncompromising foreign policy toward other Arab regimes. This faction led by Hafiz al-Asad, Syria's defense minister since 1966, seized power unequivocally in November 1970, and launched what Asad called the Corrective Movement to rectify the past errors of the Baath.

War Making under Asad's Corrective Movement (1971-80)

The 1970s represent a crucial decade for state making and war making in Syria because of the significant changes that occurred during those years. The expulsion of the radical wing of the neo-Baath from the higher realms of politics in 1969-70 meant that for the first time in Syria's contemporary history power was consolidated in the hands of a homogeneous ruling group led by an uncontested leader, Hafiz al-Asad, who was elected

president in 1971. The regime stability and policy coherence that Asad and his associates brought to Syria allowed, for the first time, the Syrian state to develop a significant military capacity, which turned Syria into a regional power. Syria's military manpower more than doubled between 1971 and 1980, while in the same period its military expenditure increased more than twelve times.

The strategies for war making and for the procurement of the financial resources needed for war making also changed significantly during the 1970s. Initially Asad's regime, like all previous Syrian regimes, planned its war making activities on the assumption that Syria would confront Israel only in conjunction with other Arab states: thus the close cooperation between Syria and Egypt in the preparation and opening round of the 1973 War. By 1980, however, in response to the defection of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli military confrontation and the impossibility of developing an alternative alliance with Iraq, Jordan, and the PLO, Syrian decision makers were convinced of the necessity for Syria, alone, to reach strategic parity with Israel.

The second important change in regard to war making during the period under study concerns the increasing reliance of the Syrian state on externally-derived resources to finance its defense effort. By breaking the diplomatic isolation from which the Baath regimes had suffered since 1963, Asad's regime was able to tap the wealth of the Arab oil-producing states for its own state making and war making activities. In conjunction with Syria's own oil revenue and a lenient Soviet treatment of Syria's military debt, the reliance on Arab resources allowed the Syrian state to pass on only a portion of the costs of war preparation to the Syrian population. External resources and statesmanship by a cohesive group of state makers were crucial to the transformation of Syria in the 1970s from a second-order power to a regional power of consequence.

Table 4.4 shows how much the official Syrian military budget expanded during the 1970s. While £S 676 million were reported as military expenditure in 1971, the military

budget had reached £S 8.8 billion in 1980. This was an increase of more than twelve times in current defense expenditure for the period 1971-80. However, if one takes into account the high level of inflation in Syria in the 1970s the real growth of defense expenditure in the period was probably in the order of a five-time increase; which is still significant for a period of only ten years.¹⁰ Furthermore, the military expenditures officially reported were certainly an understatement of the sums actually spent by Syria on defense. The estimated values, on an annual basis, of Syria's arms imports were as large as the official military budgets; therefore, one can deduce that since 1973 the official military budget probably covered the operating costs while arms imports were financed outside of the official budget (ACDA 1984, 46, 52; Kanovsky 1986, 296).

Table 4.4 Syria's Defense Expenditures, 1971-80

Year	Defense Expenditure (millions of £S)	Defense Expenditure as a % of Central Government Expenditures
1971	676	29.1
1972	793	29.7
1973	1,485	44.5
1974	1,682	30.2
1975	3,280	33.9
1976	3,614	32.1
1977	3,908	30.1
1978	4,750	35.6
1979	6,190	40.5
1980	8,804	35.4

Source: Kanovsky (1986, 324-5).

Despite the dramatic increase in the sums officially allocated to defense in Syrian budgets, the proportion of military expenditure in central government expenditures remained stable (except in 1973 and 1978-79) because the Syrian state also increased significantly its development expenditure (i.e., capital investment) during the decade.

¹⁰ The ACDA reported a five-time increase in Syrian military expenditure over the period 1971-80 when reported in constant 1979 US dollar: from US \$ 402 million in 1971 to US \$ 1,999 million in 1980 (ACDA 1983, 68).

From 1971 to 1980 the sums allocated to development in Syrian budgets were superior to those allocated to defense, except in 1973 and 1979 (Kanovsky 1986, 324-5).

Table 4.5 Foreign Aid to Syria, 1971-80 (millions of US \$)

Year	Estimate 1 ^a	Estimate 2 ^b
1971	n.a.	21
1972	n.a.	45
1973	283	364
1974	580	416
1975	546	654
1976	456	402
1977	558	1,143
1978	347	783
1979	1,300	1,627
1980	n.a.	1,520

^a Estimate 1= OPEC Arab countries aid disbursements.

^b Estimate 2= Total grants received.

Sources: Estimate 1 (Carr 1980, 457); Estimate 2 (Kanovsky 1986, 332-3).

The significant increases in the defense and development expenditures of the Syrian state during the 1970s were made possible by a significant increase in foreign aid, mostly from oil-rich Arab states. Table 4.5 gives two estimates of those financial transfers to Syria. There is a wide difference between the amounts reported by the two sources but the direction of change is similar in both series of figures. An increase in foreign aid occurred after 1973 with a slump in 1976, when Syria's Arab sponsors were displeased with its intervention in Lebanon, and another in 1978 when several Arab oil-exporting states in the Gulf had budgetary deficits. Foreign aid significantly increased after 1978, following the decision of the Baghdad Arab Summit conference to increase Arab subsidies to Syria in response to the Camp David Accords. The importance of foreign aid to Syria in the 1970s has been assessed by various analysts. Eliyahu Kanovsky found that officially reported grants accounted for only 4 per cent of the Syrian state's budgetary revenues during the period 1968-72, while in the period 1973-76 they accounted for 31 per cent of those revenues (or 10 per cent of GDP); for the period 1977-81 one third of budgetary revenues came from foreign grants (Kanovsky 1986, 294-5). Another analyst found that 60 per cent

of Syria's budgetary resources in the period 1976-79 came from Western and Arab loans or subsidies (Picard 1980, 182). Syria relied heavily on foreign aid to finance its development in the 1970s (Chatelus 1980, 227, 245, 253).

The extent to which state making and war making in Syria in the 1970s were subsidized by foreign financial resources would be underestimated if only foreign economic aid was reported. The latter allowed the Syrian government to spend on defense without compromising economic development; thus, it was an indirect subsidization of Syria's defense effort. During the 1970s Syria also received large sums from Arab oil-exporting states to pay for Soviet arms imports or the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon. The direct subsidization of Syria's defense effort is obviously a sensitive issue and therefore the evidence on financial military assistance is only partial. For instance, Libya was reported to have paid in hard currency a Soviet arms shipment to Syria in 1978 and to have paid about US \$ 1 billion in 1979-80 to cover a part of Syria's military debt to the Soviet Union (Boris 1988, 166; Ramet 1990, 114). When Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war in June 1976, the initial response of Arab states was one of displeasure. However, in the fall of 1976 a limited inter-Arab conference in Riyadh created an Arab Deterrence Force for the Lebanese crisis financed by Arab states of the Gulf, and made up of the Syrian contingent in Lebanon and a few Saudi and Sudanese troops (Dawisha 1980, 163; Picard 1980, 181). Apparently Arab subsidies to the ADF were kept up to 1981, even if the Syrian army was the only participant in the force after 1978 (Picard 1980, 181; Ramet 1990, 146).¹¹ The Soviet Union also did its share to lighten the financial burden of war preparation. For instance, there were reports of a twelve-year moratorium made in 1974 on the repayment of Syria's military debt to the Soviet Union (Karsh 1988, 17; Ramet 1990, 110). Also, in October 1979, Moscow was reported to

¹¹ It is possible that this subsidization of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon was included in the economic foreign aid previously reviewed since in all likelihood it took the form of subsidies to the Syrian budget.

have written off a quarter of Syria's military debt (estimated at the time at US \$ 2 billion) (Karsh 1988, 49; Kehat 1980, 827; Ramet 1990, 141).

The Syrian state's reliance on foreign subsidies to finance its activities also had its domestic counterpart. During the 1970s a growing proportion of revenues of the Syrian state became externally-derived. Table 4.6 shows that a growing proportion of the domestic revenues of the Syrian state in the period 1970-76 came from transfers from public sector enterprises. Public sector transfers were the first source of revenue during the 1970s producing more revenue after 1973 than direct and indirect taxes combined (Boris 1988, 121; Chatelus 1980, 268). These transfers were essentially made up after 1973 by the benefits of oil exports.

Table 4.6 Public Sector Transfers as a Percentage of Total Domestic Revenues, 1970-76

Year	Public Sector Transfers	Year	Public Sector Transfers
1970	32.5%	1974	52.5%
1971	33.1%	1975	57.5%
1972	31.7%	1976	54.2%
1973	36.6%		

Source: calculated from Syrian official statistics as reported in Chatelus (1980, 268).

Oil had been struck in Syria in 1959 and the oil industry, nationalized in 1964, started to export in 1968 (Hopwood 1988, 108-9). Oil made up only 4.6 per cent of the value of Syrian exports in 1968, but with the dramatic increase in world oil prices after the 1973 War oil exports became Syria's main export item in 1974 (55 per cent of commodity exports) reaching 78.8 percent of the value of commodity exports in 1980 (Kanovsky 1986, 334-5).

The growth of oil exports more than made up for the decline of another externally-derived revenue during the 1970s, namely oil transit fees. Oil transit fees from the pipeline coming from Iraq and heading for Lebanese ports had accounted on average for a quarter of revenues in the early 1970s according to one estimate (Boris 1988, 121). Unfortunately, the poor state of Syrian-Iraqi relations affected the renegotiation of the

transit fees agreement in 1976, and a new agreement was only reached in 1979. In the interim Syria reportedly lost US \$ 240 million a year in transit fees and discounts on Iraqi oil imports (Carr 1980, 458).

A final and more marginal source of externally-derived revenue for the Syrian state in the 1970s was made up of remittances from Syrians working abroad (mainly in the Arab states of the Gulf). The Syrian state had only a partial control over these capital flows, essentially the portion that went through the banking system, but even this partial control contributed to Syria's balance of payments. Officially-recorded workers' remittances were valued at only US \$ 8 million in 1971 but stood at US \$ 901 million in 1979 (Kanovsky 1986, 332-3). In sum, during the period 1971-80 state making and war making in Syria were heavily financed by foreign subsidies and by the oil revenue of the public sector.

Another aspect of war preparation and the concomitant extraction of resources for that purpose in the 1970s, was the expansion of Syria's armed forces. Table 4.7 shows that Syria's armed forces in 1971 stood at 110,000 men while in 1980 they were a quarter of a million men-strong. As with previous increases in Syria's military manpower this growth occurred for the most part in a very short period of time after an Arab-Israeli war. Syria's armed forces doubled their manpower between 1973 and 1975.

Table 4.7 Syria's Military Manpower, 1971-80

Year	Population (millions)	Force Level (thousands)	Force Level per 1,000 of Population
1971	6.5	110	16.9
1972	6.7	115	17.2
1973	6.9	115	16.7
1974	7.1	130	18.3
1975	7.4	230	31.1
1976	7.6	230	30.3
1977	7.9	225	28.5
1978	8.2	225	27.4
1979	8.4	250	29.8
1980	8.7	250	28.7

Source: Kanovsky (1986, 330-1, 338-9).

There is little evidence of change in conscription policy during the 1970s in Syria. Since the seizure of power by the Baath in 1963 conscription had been enforced and the exemption fee ended; only university students received a temporary exemption for the duration of their studies (Sinai 1988, 260). In 1978 a military service exemption fee of several thousand dollars was introduced for Syrians living abroad (Devlin 1983, 63; Kanovsky 1986, 313; Kehat 1979, 724). Despite a conscription policy that seemed effective to draft males of military age from various socioeconomic backgrounds, Syria suffered from a lack of trained and technical manpower for its armed forces.¹² During the 1973 War large numbers of Soviet and Cuban technicians were involved in Syrian logistic services: repairing equipment, ferrying the tanks and assembling the aircraft delivered during the war by the Soviet air- and sea-lifts (Karsh 1988, 13; Ramet 1990, 97). In addition many Soviet military advisers assisted the Syrian army (down to the battalion level), while surface-to-air missile batteries operated by Soviet personnel protected the air- and sea-lifts from Israeli attacks (Jabber and Kolkowicz 1981, 449-50; Ramet 1990, 98). Also, there were reports of Cuban and North Korean pilots flying combat aircraft in Syria during and after the 1973 War (Pajak 1976, 100-1; Ramet 1990, 97). Roger Pajak described the situation of the Syrian armed forces after the 1973 War, when the Soviet resupply effort had made up for the equipment losses but not for the losses of trained personnel:

The critical Syrian weakness remained trained and experienced manpower. Half of Syria's tanks were reportedly manned by inexperienced crews, while many aircraft remained grounded due to shortage of fully qualified pilots, only about sixty of whom were reported to have survived the war. Until Syrian pilots could be trained, some of the newly arrived MIG-23s were reportedly being flown by Cuban or North Korean pilots (Pajak 1976, 100).

Arab armies also contributed to the defense of the Syrian front in 1973. The Iraqis made the largest contribution by sending approximately 12,000 ground troops and

¹² The shortage of skilled manpower actually affected the whole Syrian economy in the 1970s. There was an exodus of skilled workers and professionals from the Syrian public sector to the private sector and from Syria to the Arab states of the Gulf.

hundreds of tanks and aircraft; followed by the Jordanians who sent a 4,000-strong armored force; smaller contingents of Moroccan, Saudi and Kuwaiti troops were also present in Syria during the war (Dupuy 1978, 537; Seale 1989, 215). Except for the period of the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel, Syria relied to a greater extent than Egypt on foreign technical assistance and foreign troops to bolster its defense and compensate for its shortages of technical or trained personnel.

As mentioned earlier, Syria remained committed during most of the 1970s to a war making strategy that envisaged war against Israel only in conjunction with one or more Arab states. Egypt was the obvious candidate for such an alliance since the Egyptians were as committed as the Syrians to the recovery of the territories lost in 1967. The 1973 War and its diplomatic aftermath, however, showed to the Syrians both the potential and limits of coalition warfare. Initial contacts between Asad and Sadat about the possibility of a coordinated war against Israel were made in early 1971, although actual detailed planning did not start until the spring of 1973 (Seale 1989, 190-2). Initially the two allies achieved a high degree of success in the war since their joint offensive took the Israelis by surprise, confronting them with a much dreaded two-front war on October 6, 1973. But the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal did not lead to an all-out offensive in the Sinai, as the Syrians expected. On the contrary, the Egyptians took the time to consolidate their bridgeheads while the Syrian offensive on the Golan had to face the bulk of Israel's military power, notably of its air force. As the Israeli counter-offensive gained momentum on the Golan, the Syrians asked the Egyptians to proceed with their offensive so as to force Israel to shift forces from the Golan to the Sinai. However the Egyptian offensive from the Sinai bridgeheads took place only on October 14, when the Syrian forces had already been pushed beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines and were losing additional territory. In short, the initial coordinated offensive had given way to a sequential offensive, which

allowed Israel to deal with Syria first before concentrating on Egypt in the remaining phase of the war.

The responsibility of Egypt, or more precisely of specific Egyptian decision makers like Sadat, for the failure of the Arab two-front war strategy is debatable. But if one relies on the account of Patrick Seale, a sympathetic biographer of Asad, it appears that the Syrians were disappointed by Egyptian behavior and felt deceived. Sadat had not told the Syrians that he envisaged only a limited war to break the diplomatic deadlock with Israel and the United States, rather than an actual military reconquest of the Sinai: Syrian planners had been shown Egyptian plans for the liberation of the whole Sinai peninsula, while the Egyptian planners only thought the creation of bridgeheads across the Canal was feasible (Seale 1989, 194-7). The impression that Sadat had been deceitful must have been strengthened from a Syrian standpoint by subsequent events. Egyptian officials started negotiating with their Israeli counterparts right after the October War, reaching a first disengagement agreement that separated Egyptian and Israeli forces in January 1974. This agreement was followed by a second disengagement agreement in 1975, which reduced the likelihood that Egypt could renew on short notice hostilities with Israel. In November 1977 Sadat took the initiative of visiting Jerusalem and of offering peace to Israel. This visit led to the Camp David Accords of September 1978 and the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. In the meantime, all that Syria had achieved on its way toward a settlement of its conflict with Israel was a disengagement agreement with Israel in May 1974, after months of military clashes, and the return to Syria of the town of Quneitra -- a town that prior to the 1967 War had been a regional capital of 37,000 inhabitants, but that the Israelis razed to the ground in 1974 before withdrawing.

The progressive and ultimate withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli military confrontation increased the sense of insecurity of Syrian decision makers. With Egypt out of the military equation, Israel might more easily consider a new round of hostilities with

Syria. Furthermore, the precedent of a bilateral settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict created by Egypt could lead countries like Jordan or Lebanon to follow suit at the expense of the interests of Syria and of the Palestinians. Accordingly, Syria attempted after 1973 to build an alternative alliance system with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO in order to compensate for the loss of Egypt as an alliance partner and to prevent further defections from the Arab camp.

The Iraqi connection was the most promising, but also the most difficult to develop given the record of poor relations between the two Baathist regimes. Iraq was the second Arab military power after Egypt, and the 1973 War had shown that the Iraqis had the logistics to send a significant force to the Syrian front.¹³ However, the antagonism between the two Baathist regimes was such that it was only when Egypt appeared irrevocably engaged in a settlement with Israel that both parties overcame their reciprocal loathing in order to discuss cooperation. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 was enough to drive the Syrians into a rapprochement with Iraq. However the Syrian overtures met only Iraqi intransigence (Kehat 1979, 736-7). With the conclusion of the Camp David Accords in 1978 it was the turn of Iraq to take the initiative of a rapprochement with Syria. In October 1978, a Charter for Joint National Action was signed by the two countries (Kehat 1980, 814). The alliance included a joint military command, and apparently during the winter of 1978-79 discussions about the logistics of an Iraqi intervention as well as exercises for such an operation were conducted -- Iraq claimed it could move up to five divisions within a week (Baram 1986, 133-4; Kemp and Vlahos 1980, 84). The alliance was a mixed blessing for Syria, it brought an increase in military capability, it opened economic opportunities and ended a source of support for domestic opposition; on the other hand, the Syrian Baathist regime could be challenged over time by its larger Iraqi

¹³ Iraq was not involved in the planning of the 1973 War, or even informed of the project like Saudi Arabia. It was apparently on October 7, 1973, at Damascus' request that Baghdad agreed to send troops to Syria. The transfer started on October 8, and the first ground units arrived in Syria on October 12 being sent in combat almost at once (Baram 1986, 130).

counterpart (Kehat 1980, 814-5). Neither the ominous consequences nor the positive prospects of the Iraqi alliance were realized in 1979. A strain on the alliance appeared when Damascus asked to limit it to bilateral cooperation and Iraqi troops' deployment in wartime, while Iraq argued for a federal union and Iraqi troops' deployment at once (Kehat 1980, 816). The alliance was dissolved when the Iraqis claimed to have uncovered a Syrian-sponsored plot against the new Baathist leadership of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Improved relations with Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO obviously did not have the same military potential as an alliance with Iraq, but they could be easier to manage since that Syria was a greater power than the three other actors. Syria's policy toward these three actors has often been interpreted as an attempt to recreate a Greater Syria in the Near East. But one need not put such an expansionist design behind Syria's policy to understand the military logic behind improved relations with Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO. The defenses of the Golan and of its approaches were so impressive after two Arab-Israeli wars that an outflanking strike through Lebanon or northern Jordan appeared a much more viable offensive option against Syria (and conversely against Israel) than a frontal assault from the Golan area. Many motives led to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, but one of them was to prevent the Lebanese civil war from becoming a pretext for an Israeli intervention that would open a new front between Israel and Syria -- for Asad, the security of Syria was linked to the security of Lebanon (Dawisha 1980, 38). A rapprochement with Jordan in 1975 was similarly motivated from the Syrian standpoint by the need to secure Jordanian military cooperation in the event of a new Arab-Israeli war (Karsh 1988, 22). During 1975 both countries moved closer, reaching a broad cooperation agreement that worked well during two years (Maoz 1988, 117). However, the alliance became a dead letter after 1977 when Jordan refused to join the Tripoli Bloc (Algeria, Libya, the PLO, South Yemen and Syria) set up after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem (Maoz 1988, 118; Nevo 1986, 145). By 1980, Jordan was harboring members of the Syrian Islamist opposition

and moving close to Iraq. As a result both states came close to war when in late 1980 Syria moved military units to its border with Jordan.

By 1979-80 it was clear that Syria had failed in its attempt to develop an Eastern Front Command, an alternative alliance of Arab states that could compensate for the defection of Egypt. This situation led Syrian decision makers to promote more openly the doctrine of strategic parity, i.e., the notion that Syria should match Israel on its own. According to Moshe Maoz's account, Asad's strategy to redress the balance with Israel went through three stages after the 1973 War: initially Asad remained committed to a Pan-Arab strategy of cooperation in which the Cairo-Damascus axis would play a crucial role; however, with the conclusion of a second military disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975, Asad switched to a strategy of balance with Israel based on an Arab alliance led by Syria; finally, the failure of that strategy in regard to Jordan and Iraq led to a strategy of balance with Israel that Syria should reach on its own (Maoz 1988, 107, 177-8). Until 1980 official Syrian declarations had emphasized Pan-Arab cooperation in reaching a balance with Israel, however in June 1980 the Syrian foreign minister explicitly stated for the first time the need for a military balance between Syria, alone, and Israel; this assertion was frequently made thereafter (Dishon and Maddy-Weitzman 1981, 206).

Syria's growing sense of vulnerability as Egypt progressively withdrew from the Arab-Israeli military confrontation, the inadequacy of alternative Arab alliances and the decision to adopt a policy of strategic parity with Israel were all elements that increased the value of a close relationship with the Soviet Union from a Syrian standpoint. After 1978 Syria's diplomacy actively sought a close and formal alliance with the Soviet Union that would match up to the close relationship between Israel and the United States. This quest led in October 1980 to the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Moscow and Damascus. This document was a significant development considering that in 1972 and 1975 Syria had refused Soviet offers for such a treaty; even if Egypt and Iraq already had

such treaties with the Soviet Union (Karsh 1988, 47-8; Pajak 1976, 98). The 1980 treaty, however, was a compromise between the two parties and both gave a different interpretation of the document:

Whereas the Syrians depicted the treaty as embodying a far-reaching Soviet undertaking to redress the strategic imbalance caused by Egypt's desertion of the Arab camp, by ensuring that 'any aggression to which Syria will be exposed will not be faced by Syria separately', the Soviets sought to downplay the extent of their commitment by highlighting the international, rather than bilateral, ramifications of the treaty (Karsh 1988, 54).

The Soviets were particularly eager to dissipate any impression that the treaty included secret military clauses, or that it was aimed against a third party (Karsh 1988, 54-5). Moscow was willing, as it did during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, to use its diplomacy and armed forces to influence Israel and Washington; but it was not ready to commit itself beforehand and under all circumstances to the defense of Syria.

Moscow's real contribution to Syria's defense, therefore, lay more in its commitment to supply modern weapons to Syria. The Soviet record in that respect was commendable during the 1970s. Soviet arms shipments to Syria before the 1973 War were significant, especially after Egypt had expelled its Soviet advisers (Pajak 1976, 98-9). Syria's important losses in tanks and aircraft during the 1973 War were more than made up for by the Soviets during and after the war since the equipment lost was replaced by more recent models (Glassman 1975, 131; Ramet 1990, 100-1). For the period 1971-74 estimates of Soviet military aid to Syria put it at 31 or 27 per cent of total Soviet military aid to the Third World (Ramet 1990, 101). There were some reports that Moscow withheld arms deliveries to Syria in early 1974 in order to compel it to reach a disengagement agreement with Israel (Karsh 1988, 15-6; Ramet 1990, 100). Moscow also suspended arms transfers for a time in 1976-77 to express its displeasure with the Syrian intervention in Lebanon (Karsh 1988, 36, 39; Ramet 1990, 112-4). Nevertheless, for the period 1974-78, Syria was the third largest importer of Soviet weapons in the Middle East after Iraq and Libya, and by 1978 had the largest contingent of Eastern bloc military advisers in the Third World

(Ramet 1990, 125). By 1980 Soviet military assistance had become the cornerstone of Syria's program to reach strategic parity with Israel.

The two main military commitments undertaken by the Syrian armed forces during the 1970s were the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the intervention in the Lebanese civil war from 1976. One estimate of Syria's losses during the 1973 War (seventeen days of operations) put the military casualties at 3,100 killed, 6,000 wounded and 500 prisoners or missing; equipment losses included notably 1,200 tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers, 250 artillery pieces and 118 aircraft (Dupuy 1978, 537, 609). The 1973 War also involved important costs to Syria's economic infrastructure. In retaliation for Syrian surface-to-surface missile strikes in Israel, the Israeli air force started on October 9, 1973, a strategic bombing offensive against Syria's vulnerable energy and port facilities (Dupuy 1978, 465; Glassman 1975, 131-2). Oil refineries, fuel tank farms, oil terminals, electric power plants and (un)loading facilities at Syrian ports were hit. Estimates of the economic costs of the 1973 War for Syria ranged from US \$1 billion to US \$ 3.5 billion (Firro 1986, 44; Seale 1989, 211).

The costs and the consequences of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and thereafter are more difficult to assess. Estimates of the cost of maintaining the Syrian contingent in Lebanon ranged from US \$ 1 million to US \$ 3 million per day (Kehat 1979, 731; Maoz 1988, 154; Picard 1980, 181). It is likely that this operating cost when added to the initial movement of refugees from Lebanon to Syria caused an unwelcome economic burden to the Syrian economy (Kanovsky 1986, 283-4; Maoz 1988, 154). However, it is difficult to believe that this burden did not decrease over time as Arab subsidies came to support the Syrian intervention while the latter brought a degree of public order in Lebanon that was conducive to a return of economic activities. Analysts agreed that the intervention in Lebanon had a negative impact on the readiness of the Syrian army to confront Israel. The Golan front was depleted of troops in favor of Lebanon where a

significant proportion of Syria's regular army was used in activities that did not prepare it for a war with Israel (Kehat 1979, 731; Maoz 1988, 138; Seale 1989, 312). Additionally, Syrian troops deployed in Lebanon were more vulnerable to problems of discipline (Kaminsky and Kruk 1987, 194; Kehat 1979, 731). In a sense, Syria's intervention in Lebanon was comparable to Egypt's intervention in Yemen during the 1960s. Both interventions involved a significant proportion of the regular army in a secondary theater of operations at the expense of military readiness against Israel; and the impact of those prolonged military interventions on state making remained unclear.

War preparation under Asad's Corrective Movement was stepped up and it allowed Syria to reach the status of a regional power for the first time since its independence. However, this achievement had been largely reached through the exploitation of various resources over which the Syrian state had little control. Arab subsidies and military commitments were subject to the vagaries of inter-Arab politics. Syria's oil income was dependent on international economic conditions. Only the relationship with the Soviet Union appeared as an element upon which Syria could rely over the long term. The 1980s, however, would show that even Soviet support could not be taken for granted.

War Making and the Doctrine of Strategic Parity (1981-89)

In the 1980s, in particular after the war in Lebanon in 1982, Syria attempted to reach strategic parity with Israel by increasing its defense effort. Unfortunately for the Syrian state the set of conditions that allowed it to conduct war preparation in the 1970s largely through external resources fell apart during the 1980s. Arab subsidies to Syria decreased as the Arab states of the Gulf became more concerned by the Iran-Iraq war than by the Syrian confrontation with Israel. Syria developed in the 1980s an alliance with Iran but the latter did not provide enough financial aid to compensate entirely for the drop in Arab financial assistance. Syria's own oil revenue also decreased during the 1980s as world oil

prices went down. Even the alliance with the Soviet Union started to show some strain after 1985 as Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power and gave a new orientation to Soviet Middle East policy. By the end of the 1980s it became clear that Moscow would not support Syria in its attempt to reach strategic parity with Israel. These external constraints compelled the Syrian state to scale down its war preparation effort and to redefine strategic parity from a concept with a heavy military content to a concept emphasizing the emulation of Israel in all fields of development.

Table 4.8 summarizes Syria's defense effort for the period 1981-89 in terms of defense outlay and military manpower. As in previous periods in Syria's war making, defense expenditure and military manpower increased as a result of an Arab-Israeli war, in this instance the limited war in Lebanon in 1982. Between 1982 and 1985 military expenditure increased by 43 per cent and the armed forces (in proportion of the population) by 20 per cent. However, from 1986 on signs appeared indicating that Syria could not sustain such a level of war preparation. For instance, although close to half of central government expenditures were allocated to the military in 1986 the military expenditure in real terms decreased in comparison to the previous year. This trend continued during the late 1980s. By 1989, although 69.8 per cent of central government expenditures were allocated to defense, military expenditure was in real terms 46 per cent lower than the 1985 level.

Table 4.8 Syria's War Preparation Effort, 1981-89

Year	Military Expenditure (constant 1989 US \$, millions) ^a	Military Expenditure as a % of Central Government Expenditures	Force Level per 1,000 of Population
1981	2634	37.7	30.1
1982	2891	34.5	32.3
1983	4061	41.0	41.5
1984	4059	41.7	40.2
1985	4129	42.0	38.8
1986	3230	48.0	37.2
1987	1937	40.4	35.9
1988	1875	42.8	34.5
1989	2234	69.8	33.3

^a Military expenditure figures probably omit most arms acquisitions and are estimates for the years 1983-88.

Source: ACDA (1991, 83).

The ACDA data presented in Table 4.8 do not fully reflect the extent of Syria's military effort in the 1980s, notably the changes in the armed forces' structure that took place after 1982. Table 4.9 shows how Syria after 1982 put the emphasis on the growth of its regular forces and the acquisition of modern equipment. Regular armed forces almost doubled between 1982 and 1989, reflecting Syria's emphasis on military readiness, but also raising the cost of military manpower since regular troops are more expensive than the call-up of reservists. The growth in regular military manpower allowed the Syrian army to create one additional armored division and mechanized division, to add one armored brigade to each armored and mechanized division, and to form a division of special forces. Around 1984-85 an additional level of military command, a structure of two army corps, was created to control the larger ground forces (Kent 1986, 15). At least one analyst asserts that the corps structure was also introduced as an additional layer of bureaucratic insulation between the army and the regime's factions after Asad's poor health condition led to a succession crisis in late 1983- early 1984 during which army and regime security troops came to blows (Mason 1988, 211).

Table 4.9 The Growth and Modernization of Syria's Regular Forces, 1982-89

	1982	1989
Regular Forces	222,500 men	404,000 men
Number of Divisions	4 armored, 2 mechanized	5 armored, 3 mechanized, 1 special forces
Main Battle Tanks	3,990 (1,790 recent models)	4,050 (1,950 recent models)
Combat Aircraft	449 (106 recent models)	499 (199 recent models)

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (1982, 62; 1989, 114-5).

Although the expansion of the arsenal after 1982 was less spectacular than the increase in the size of the regular armed forces -- and it probably reflected Syria's difficulty to acquire and absorb new equipment rather than a willful decision to emphasize manpower

over modern weaponry -- it was still significant. The number of main battle tanks increased by only 60 units between 1982 and 1989, while the increase in combat aircraft strength in the same period was of 50 units. However, the number of modern tanks and combat aircraft in the same period increased respectively by 160 and 93 units; reflecting the effort of the Syrian armed forces to upgrade their arsenal.¹⁴ Syria after 1982 also got other modern weapon systems notably a new surface-to-air missile network, more surface-to-surface missiles and various C³I and electronic warfare systems.

By 1989 Syria had achieved numerical superiority over Israel in the areas of regular armed forces and total armed forces, artillery, surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-surface missiles; Syria had numerical parity with Israel in tanks, but was inferior to Israel in the number of reserve troops, armored and mechanized divisions and high-quality combat aircraft (Khalidi and Agha 1991, 193). Although Syria had by 1989 achieved numerical parity or superiority with Israel in many areas, other aspects of military readiness cast doubts on whether Syria had closed the qualitative military gap with Israel. The Syrian armed forces had difficulties servicing the weapons in their arsenal and absorbing new acquisitions. Up to thirty per cent of the tank force was in storage or used in static defense (Khalidi and Agha 1991, 195). Two analysts estimated that: “[n]early 1,000 of its tanks do not have properly trained crews, and it has substantially less than one trained pilot per combat aircraft” (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 290-1). Political considerations continued to affect negatively professionalism in the officer corps; and the rapid expansion of the armed forces after 1982 led to a decline in training standards (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 279, 289-90; Khalidi and Agha 1991, 195). Israel’s qualitative edge over Syria was particularly threatening in the realm of airpower. The Israeli air force has repeatedly achieved air superiority over Syria in 1967, 1973 and 1982. After 1982, Israeli military planners reportedly planned a strategic bombing campaign

¹⁴ Modern tanks in Syria’s arsenal are defined here as T-62 and T-72 models and modern combat aircraft as MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29.

designed to handicap Syria's post-war economy in the case of a new Syrian-Israeli war (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 235-6, 246). A future war with Israel might imply greater damage to Syria's economic infrastructure than those witnessed in 1973. In that respect, the level of destruction achieved by the Coalition's bombing of Iraq's economic infrastructure in 1991 must have given food for thought to Syrian planners considering the consequences of a war to liberate the Golan. The conventional military build-up in Israel and Syria in the 1980s might have increased the potential costs of a war between the two states to an unacceptable level, even without considering the impact of nuclear or chemical weapons.

The Syrian government's decision to increase war preparation after 1982 could not come at a worse time economically speaking. The Syrian economy was beset with high inflation and shortages of basic commodities and hydroelectric power. Syria's main exports and sources of revenue for the state also became unstable as the prices of oil collapsed and agricultural crops felt the vagaries of the climate. As a result in part of these economic difficulties war preparation started to slacken after 1985: defense expenditure decreased and 20,000 men were withdrawn from the regular forces (Khalidi and Agha 1991, 210). The dominant opinion among analysts at the time, however, was that the economic crisis had compelled the Syrian authorities to put the emphasis on economic development, but had not led them to give up the goal of strategic parity with Israel (Khalidi and Agha 1991, 210). As one analyst pointed out in regard to Syria's financial predicament, although the Syrian government had financed its budget deficits in the 1980s through domestic borrowing and foreign aid: "the country's internal and external public debt remained moderate and did not impose an oppressive annual repayment burden" (Boris 1988, 120).

Syria's own economic difficulties were compounded by the drop in concessionary financial aid from Arab states. Data on Arab economic assistance to Syria in the 1980s are

fragmentary but the general trend was that the sums transferred fell well below the US \$ 1.8 billion annual aid pledged by Arab states of the Gulf at the Baghdad summit. For instance, in 1983, a year after the Syrian-Israeli confrontation in Lebanon from which Syria could expect increased Arab financial aid, it received between US \$ 1 and 1.3 billion in Baghdad summit's money (Boris 1988, 165; Cooley 1984, 13; Olmert 1985, 820). However, in 'quieter' years the amounts received were much lower, one analyst reported the following sums: US \$ 800 million in 1986, US \$ 600 million in 1987 and US \$ 500 million in 1988 (Olmert 1990, 733). As during the 1970s, there were some unconfirmed reports after the 1982 War about grants given by Libya and Saudi Arabia to pay for Soviet arms transfers to Syria (Boris 1988, 166; Firro 1986, 62).

The decrease in Arab financial assistance to Syria in the 1980s was in part compensated by the alliance Syria struck with Iran in 1982. In April 1982 Syria agreed to close the Iraqi pipeline on its territory in return for an annual oil deal with Iran in which the latter's oil shipments to Syria would be in part free and the balance sold at a discount (Kanovsky 1986, 288). The level of subsidization included in the oil grants and price discounts of the Syrian-Iranian annual oil agreements is not precisely known; but it was significant. By 1986 Syria reportedly had an oil debt to Iran in the range of US \$ 1.5 to 2 billion (Cooley 1986, 4). In response, Iran stopped its oil shipments since Syria could not pay even the discount price offered by Iran. But the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement led the Iranian authorities to renew the deal in 1986-7; although Syria had not yet paid for the oil shipments of the past five years (Jansen 1987, 7; Olmert 1988, 616-7).

In spite of the declining revenues from oil, agricultural exports, and Arab grants the Syrian state did not restructure its domestic taxation system in order to extract more financial resources from Syrian society. In 1985, the transfer of surpluses from public sector enterprises remained the first source of revenue, accounting for 31 per cent of total budgetary revenues. All tax revenues combined made up only 24 per cent of total

budgetary revenues with a breakdown of 10 per cent (each) for respectively business taxes and indirect taxes, and a mere 1.3 per cent coming from personal income taxes (Boris 1988, 120-1; Calleo 1988, 287). Syrian officials intended to raise further revenues by increasing the productivity (and thus, profits) of public sector enterprises and by raising the prices of commodities and services rather than by increasing taxes (Boris 1988, 121).

The drop in Arab subsidies and the relative isolation of Syria in the Arab world, as a result of its alliance with Iran, confirmed the importance of the relationship with the Soviet Union if Syria intended to maintain its policy of strategic parity. Through the 1980s the Soviet Union remained committed to the preservation of Syria's security, while refusing to become too closely involved in the Syrian-Israeli confrontation. Moscow turned down at least on two occasions (in 1981 and after the 1982 war in Lebanon) a Syrian request for upgrading the Soviet-Syrian treaty to the level of a formal defense treaty between the two countries (Karsh 1988, 62, 71). Nevertheless, Moscow reacted with its traditional determination to recoup a client's losses when the military confrontation in Lebanon in June 1982 turned to the disadvantage of Syria. Aircraft and surface-to-air missiles were airlifted to Syria, and after the war Moscow agreed to resupply and upgrade Syria's arsenal as well as to deploy Soviet-manned missiles in Syria to deter further Israeli aggression (Karsh 1988, 67-8, 71-2). Between June 1982 and April 1983, alone, the Soviet Union sent to Syria: 800 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 160 combat aircraft and many self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (Ramet 1990, 149).

Obviously all these weapons did not come free. Estimates of Syria's debt to the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc in the 1980s ranged from US \$ 12 to 15 billion (Boris 1988, 167; Firro 1986, 63; Ramet 1990, 205). Like in the past, Moscow seemed understanding about Syria's debt. One source claimed that Asad got from the Soviets an interest rate on the Syrian debt of only two per cent and a deferment of payments until 1993 (Kanovsky

1986, 303). Other reports mentioned an undetermined rescheduling of Syria's debt reached during Asad's visit to Moscow in April 1987 (Karsh 1988, 91-2; Ramet 1990, 209). Finally, in 1989 Moscow agreed to be paid in Syrian pounds in view of Syria's shortage of hard currency; with its account in Syrian currency, Moscow could buy and export any Syrian commodity except oil and phosphates, which remained state monopolies because of their capacity to generate hard currency (Sadowski 1992, 8).

All these aspects of Soviet policy toward Syria had been present in the previous period (1971-80). However, with the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 Soviet interests in the Middle East started to diverge from those of Syria. Gorbachev's Middle East policy aimed at improving the relations between the Soviet Union and all the countries in the region including Israel, Egypt, and the conservative Arab monarchies of the Gulf so that the Soviet Union could assume a role in regional diplomacy and conflict mediation (Golan 1987). Moscow's intention of improving relations with all states in the region meant for Syria a decline of its importance in Soviet Middle East policy and therefore of its leverage on that policy.

Furthermore, Gorbachev and the reformists associated with him put forward a new political thinking on security issues. This new thinking emphasized the declining relevance of war as a rational political means and criteria of "reasonable sufficiency" and non-provocative defense in the development of a defense policy (Meyer 1988, 133). Although designed in regard to East-West security issues, there is evidence to support the argument that Gorbachev's new thinking on security issues also provided the analytical framework for dealing with Middle East security issues. Apparently as early as in June 1985 Gorbachev made it clear to Asad that Moscow was reluctant to support Syria's quest for strategic parity with Israel (Karsh 1988, 88-9). In April 1987, during his visit to Moscow, Asad learned from Gorbachev that Moscow intended to renew diplomatic relations with

Israel in the near future, but also that: “the reliance on military force has completely lost its credibility as a way of solving Middle East conflict” (Golan 1987, 41, 51).

In the spring of 1988 Soviet military officials visiting Syria conveyed the message that the Soviet Union was willing to assist in modernizing Syria’s armed forces, but not to assist Syria in reaching strategic parity in offensive weapons with Israel, or in acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 277). In late 1989 the Soviet ambassador to Syria assessed the state of Soviet-Syrian relations for the Syrian media in the following way: the Soviet Union did not intend to loosen its ties with Syria; there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the two countries on how to deal with regional issues, but conflicts in the region must be resolved peacefully; the Soviet Union would keep its commitment to Syria’s security and would be guided in that respect by its assessment of Syria’s “reasonable sufficiency”, which he defined as: “the capability to withstand an Israeli strike and then to inflict unacceptable losses on it in a counterattack” (Gera 1991, 644). It is clear from open or private Soviet statements to Syrians that from 1985 Moscow was willing to assist Syria’s defense effort only to the extent that it reinforced Syrian deterrence against a potential Israeli attack, but not to the point where it could allow Syria to consider an offensive against Israel.

Economic difficulties, declining Arab subsidies, and Soviet reluctance to support the development of Syria’s offensive capabilities compelled the Syrian authorities in the mid-1980s to redefine the doctrine of strategic parity. What was originally a program to reach military parity with Israel was transformed into a project to emulate Israel in all spheres of development. The precise moment when this redefinition occurred is difficult to pinpoint since Syrian officials and commentators insisted in retrospect that strategic parity had always meant parity in all aspects of development rather than just military parity. One analyst found that Asad gave a broader meaning to strategic parity in several statements in

1985 (Mason 1988, 212). In a speech to the General Union of Peasants on March 8, 1986, Asad said the following about strategic parity (also translated as strategic balance):

When we raised the slogan of strategic balance a few years ago we understood that this did not just mean the balance of gun to gun or tank to tank. But that it meant balance in the political, demographic, social, educational, economic and military aspects of life. The neglect of any of these factors will leave a gap in the substance of this balance. This will not be achieved easily or in a few days but will take proper time and proper efforts (Jansen 1986, 8).

Then, from 1987, statements on strategic parity also mentioned that the attainment of parity was a Pan-Arab obligation that should concern all Arab states and not only Syria (Olmert 1989, 641). In 1988 official statements on strategic parity emphasized the long-term and historic dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need to prevent short-term capitulation since time is on the Arab side (Olmert 1990, 734). In short, by the end of the 1980s the concept of strategic parity had been redefined in such a broad sense that it had lost any precise meaning.

Overall for the period 1981-89 Syria engaged in little direct hostilities with Israel. There were many periods of tension, notably in 1981, 1983 and 1986, when statements and military activities by both sides hinted at a coming final showdown. But the Israeli and Syrian armies fought each other during the period only in Lebanon in 1982. The Syrian-Israeli War of 1982 was a limited conflict in time and space as well as in the proportion of total troops committed, but the intensity of modern conventional warfare still implied heavy losses especially of military equipment. The conflict was limited to Lebanese territory, although the Syrian border and Damascus were very near some of the battlegrounds, and most of the fighting between the two armies occurred intermittently a few days or weeks at the time in June and July 1982. Estimates of Syrian strength in Lebanon on the eve of the Israeli invasion ranged from 22,000 to 28,000 men (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 118; Olmert 1984, 858). But by the end of July there were probably 60,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 146). With a regular army strength of 170,000 men in 1982 this meant that roughly a third of Syria's standing

ground forces were committed to Lebanon in 1982. Estimates of Syrian casualties put them at over 4,000 men (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 150, 153; Seale 1989, 394). One estimate of Syrian equipment losses for the key initial battles in the Bekaa valley (June 8-11, 1982) put them at: 400 tanks, 90 aircraft and 120 surface-to-air missile launchers (Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 150). These equipment losses were equalled to 20 per cent of Syria's combat aircraft strength and to 22 per cent of Syria's modern tank inventory. Considering that this depletion of Syria's arsenal had been suffered in only a few days of combat one can better judge the level of Syrian 'overarmament' that a full-scale war against Israel would require to compensate for such high attrition rates.

The case study ends in 1989 because no crucial breakthrough in the resolution of the conflict between Israel and Syria has yet taken place. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the early 1990s were insignificant from the perspective of the present *problématique*. But data and analyses are still too recent or partial to be interpreted unequivocally.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War in 1991 were unpredictable events that changed many parameters in Syria's position in the Middle East. By making a contribution to the Coalition forces -- one armored division and one regiment of special forces -- Syria improved significantly its relations with the conservative Arab states and with the Western powers. After the war Syria received US \$ 700 million in credit from European and Japanese sources, while more than US \$ 2 billion in financial assistance was pledged by Arab states of the Gulf (Sadowski 1992, 6). In addition, the Gulf War dealt a tremendous blow to the rival Iraqi Baathist regime, which after the Iran-Iraq war had challenged Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. In brief, the Gulf War had brought more positive than negative spin-offs to Syria.¹⁵

¹⁵ Among the negative consequences of the Gulf War from a Syrian standpoint one could mention the large presence of Western troops in the Middle East, unprecedented since the Second World War when most of the countries of the region were under some form of colonial rule. A second negative aspect of the war was the relative ineffectiveness of Iraqi surface-to-surface missile attacks on Israel, since these weapons are

Another unforeseen development that changed fundamentally Syria's situation was the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. In a short span of time Syria lost the support of a power that was understanding about Syria's domestic and foreign orientations as well as about its predicament. In a post-Cold War world, Syria could no longer take the subsidized supply of advanced weaponry by a superpower for granted. In the short term, Syria could get Soviet-style weapons from alternative suppliers; as apparently it did from Czechoslovakia and North Korea. But these smaller arms suppliers were unlikely to subsidize Syria's defense effort like the USSR did, and they might be more easily influenced by outside powers, like the United States, to limit their supply of weapons to Syria.

These unforeseen developments reinforced the trends that had already led to a slackening of war preparation since 1986. Economic recovery and development remained in the early 1990s the short-term priority of the Syrian government. One analyst claimed that Syrian civilian technocrats lobbied successfully the Syrian government for a limited economic liberalization, economic investment, and debt servicing (Sadowski 1992, 7-8). The decision of Syria to join the Madrid Conference in October 1991 and the subsequent multi-track negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinians were also signs that Syria was now nearer to a settlement of its conflict with Israel than it ever was. Many obstacles remain, however, notably whether Asad's regime can accept normal relations between Syria and Israel or will not agree only to a state of legal non-belligerency; and whether Israel will give back the Golan Heights in its entirety. War making has been so central to the emergence of Asad's regime and has been so important in its state making activities that it is sometimes difficult to imagine how this regime could

also the only strategic strike capability Syria has against Israel. Finally, the scope of the destruction wrought by the Coalition's air forces on Iraq pointed up the consequences in case of war of Syria's inability to counter Israel's air supremacy.

shift to a new task and ideological program without some internal tension and a change in the upper levels of the regime.

War Making and State Power

The Syrian state at independence was a weak state in comparison to the Egyptian state surveyed in the previous case study. Its bureaucracy was small and had little tradition. The state, through the parliamentary regime, was dominated by rival factions of politicians whose leaders were members of an oligarchy with its own power base in society, and who saw the state apparatus only as resources to be distributed through the spoils system. The strong regional and communal identities were further apparent structural obstacles to the growth of state power in Syria in contrast to the more homogeneous and geopolitically centralized Egypt. Yet, in spite of these inauspicious conditions, the Syrian state managed to develop after 1946 and to reach by the mid-1960s a degree of dominance over the economy and society similar to the one achieved in Nasser's Egypt. War making, however, played only a limited role in the growth of state power in Syria in comparison to events like the union with Egypt in 1958-61 and the Baath Revolution of 1963.

The impact of the Palestine War on state power in Syria was mixed. Total expenditures increased by 27 per cent over the period 1947-51. However this growth hid the fact that during this period when defense expenditure more than tripled the other expenditures of the central government shrank by 14 per cent (IBRD 1955, 255). The Palestine War had only a moderate effect on the state capability to extract further revenue. The receipts of the central government stood at £S 116 million in 1947, £S 136 million in 1949 and £S 139 million annually in 1950-51; a growth of 20 per cent (IBRD 1955, 255). This was not enough considering the financial needs of the government -- rising defense expenditure and recurrent budget deficits since 1947 -- and the fact that Syria was in an economic boom that could have afforded the government more revenue. In comparison we saw that

the Egyptian state managed to double its revenue over the period 1946-51. In conclusion, the Palestine War caused a modest increase in the revenue of the state, but had a negative impact on its civilian expenditures.

The most significant impact of the Palestine War on the Syrian state was the involvement of the military in politics in the wake of the defeat in Palestine. Military involvement in politics led to a greater autonomy for the state and to an increase in its despotic power. From 1949 civilian politicians had to share power with military strongmen who generally had a different social background and policy agenda than the civilian establishment. Military rule, however, was so unstable in Syria that no military dictator ruled long enough to implement a 'revolution from above' that could have led to a permanent growth in the infrastructural power of the state like the Kemalist revolution in Turkey or the Nasserist revolution in Egypt.

The best example of the potential and limits of military-led reforms in Syria in the 1950s was represented by the rule of Colonel Adid Shishakli. An officer of Kurdish origin, Shishakli seized power in December 1949. The civilian governments he supported or led put forward various reforms that had the effect of increasing state power and of promoting economic and political nationalisms. Taxation under his rule was substantially increased and an international team of experts found that Syria's tax extraction ratio of 16 per cent of national income in 1953 was comparable to those of several of the larger Latin American states and far superior to India's ratio of 7 per cent (IBRD 1955, 270-1). Shishakli's government was nationalist and interventionist in regard to the economy: it nationalized all foreign-owned utilities, required foreign agencies and firms to be represented by Syrians, ended the customs union with Lebanon and initiated a few significant development projects (Petran 1972, 100). Shishakli, in an attempt to promote national unity, also moved against the various communities and their special status in education and parliamentary representation (Maoz [Moshe] 1986, 21; Petran 1972, 103;

Seale 1965, 121). Finally, it was under Shishakli's rule that the Syrian state achieved an uncontested control of traditionally dissident rural areas like the Druze Mountain (Maoz [Moshe] 1986, 22).

But Shishakli was removed from power in February 1954 by a military rebellion. During his rule the power of the state had increased but the power structure in Syrian society had not been challenged. The society remained dominated by an urban-based class of big landowners with branches in commerce and industry. A reform-minded military dictator was helpless against such economic interests without the support of a mass movement or a large autonomous bureaucracy. Shishakli had no mass organization to mobilize the lower classes and a small bureaucracy (24, 000 people in 1952) with little tradition of state intervention.

With the union with Egypt in 1958 the situation changed, a significant growth in state power occurred in a short span of time, and the dominant socioeconomic order was challenged by the state. Public expenditures almost doubled in Syria between 1958 and 1961, in part as a result of the growth of the bureaucracy (Petran 1972, 144). Nasser once disparagingly said that the Syrian government's machinery would scarcely be adequate for an Egyptian grocery shop. This hyperbole conveyed well the difference in bureaucratic power between the two states at the time of the union. The union with Egypt confronted the dominant classes in Syria with a bureaucratic opponent in an altogether different category than the pre-Union Syrian administration. The first clash occurred in the months following the merger when the Egyptians brought their agrarian reform to Syria. The agrarian reform was a direct challenge to the landed upper class since it put ceilings on landholding, it expropriated for redistribution to landless peasants the lands in excess of the ceilings, and it regulated the working conditions and tenancy of sharecroppers and agricultural laborers (Aziz-al Ahsan 1984, 303-4). Then, in July 1961, Nasser introduced the Socialist Decrees in Egypt and Syria, which were a direct challenge to the Syrian

commercial and industrial classes. The decrees nationalized all banks and insurance companies as well as to various degrees 28 firms in Syria, including the three largest ones. The decrees compelled all firms, private or public, to transfer 25 per cent of their annual profits to their employees and to include representatives of workers and staff on their board of directors (the salaries of directors being set by the state). The decrees also introduced a progressive income tax and strict controls of foreign exchange and imports (Keilany 1973, 65-6). Most of Nasser's socialist decrees were never fully implemented since in September 1961 a military coup, probably supported by the groups alienated by the July decrees, led to the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic. The reforms of the UAR period, however, were only partially dismantled and rearranged after the break-up because support for their broad orientation existed in the population and among some factions of the secessionist regime.

The following period of rapid growth in state power occurred after the Baath party seized power through a military coup in March 1963. As during the UAR period the first dominant group to be affected by the reforms was the landed class. In 1963 the new government introduced ceilings on landholding lower than those fixed in 1958, and it started to redistribute land to poor and landless peasants. By the end of 1964 more land had been expropriated (994,058 hectares) and redistributed (232,050 hectares) than during the whole UAR period (670,212 and 148,440 hectares respectively) (Keilany 1973, 63-4). After having broken the power of the landed class the Baath moved against the industrial and commercial classes. The banks were nationalized again in 1963, then in 1964 the government made a few other nationalizations: insurance companies, nine commerce firms and a quarter of ownership in fifteen other companies (Aziz-al Ahsan 1984, 306). But in January 1965, under the influence of the radical wing of the Baath, the government declared a sweeping wave of nationalizations whereby the state took control of 106 firms employing about 12,000 workers (Petran 1972, 179). As an analyst pointed

out: “by the middle of June 1965 the state had complete control over banking and insurance, energy, most of the import trade, at least three-quarters of the export trade, about one-third of road transport, and most of industry, excluding small workshops” (Aziz-al Ahsan 1984, 306). The Baathist agrarian reform and the nationalizations had been politically motivated, designed to break the power base of groups seen as opposing the regime and to acquire assets to cater for the classes wooed by the Baath: peasants, workers and lower middle classes (Metral 1980, 298; Perthes 1992b, 208). War preparation played no role in the expansion of state power in Syria during the union with Egypt or the Baath revolution and its subsequent reforms. Yet these periods were the most significant ones for the expansion of state power in Syria.

The consequences of the 1967 War for the state making activities of the neo-Baath, which had taken power in 1966, were limited. The war and subsequent war preparation did not cause a stalling of state socialism as they did in Egypt. This is understandable since Syria had suffered much less economic dislocation as a result of the 1967 War than Egypt or Jordan (Kanovsky 1968a; 1968b). Current civilian expenditures kept growing after the war, from £S 420 million in 1967 to £S 558 million in 1969, although they slightly decreased to £S 523 million in 1970 -- an increase of 25 per cent (22 per cent if adjusted for inflation) over the period 1967-70. Capital expenditure, a good indicator of state involvement in economic development, also increased after 1967, from £S 535 million to £S 740 million in 1970 -- a growth of 38 per cent (36 per cent if adjusted for inflation) (World Bank 1976, 376). In comparison, current civilian expenditures in Egypt in the period 1967-70 dropped by 85 per cent, while capital expenditure increased by 30 per cent (World Bank 1976, 311). Even the financial extractive capacity of the state, a common indicator of state power, increased, though only moderately between 1967 and 1970. In 1970 central government revenues represented 22.5 per cent of Syria's GDP in comparison to 19.3 per cent of GDP in 1967 (World Bank 1976, 222-3, 376).

The real impact of the 1967 War on Syrian state making was delayed until after 1970 and took place through the process of regime formation. We will see in greater detail in the next section how the 1967 defeat led to a debate on the causes of the Arab *débâcle* and the future course of action. Suffice it to say that this debate led to a conflict between two factions in the neo-Baath. A conflict that was not resolved until the end of 1970, when the faction led by Hafiz al-Asad, the defense minister, displaced the opposing faction in order to carry out a program geared to war preparation rather than to further socialist transformation at home.

As part of its war preparation Asad's regime tried to gain a wider legitimacy and constituency than the previous regime through a series of limited political and economic reforms that had a liberal overtone. The economic measures of liberalization were reinforced in 1974 giving rise to a Syrian version of Egypt's *infitah*. We found in the Egyptian case that the *infitah* had not stopped the growth of the Egyptian state as an organization, and had had a marginal impact on its financial extractive capacity. But we also saw that some analysts argued, on the basis of the decreasing role of the state in economic development and its growing dependence on foreign and domestic capital, that a significant decline in state autonomy and power had occurred. In the Syrian case the evidence shows that the *infitah* was less pronounced and had less impact on state power. As in Egypt domestic and foreign capital became more active in Syria after 1973, often in conjunction with the public sector. However it would take a particularly class-centered analysis to consider that these limited inroads by domestic or foreign capitalists amounted to a dismantling of the state-dominated economy or to a proof of creeping bourgeois influence in the Syrian state and regime.

The economic liberalization measures introduced by Asad's regime from 1971 included notably: (1) an amnesty for economic crimes committed before 1971, which aimed at bringing back the capital that had been illegally transferred abroad since 1963; (2) a

relaxation of import regulations and of foreign exchange controls; (3) the establishment of industrial free zones where private firms could freely import, process and export commodities; (4) tax exemptions and cheap credit to encourage private investment in manufacturing and tourism; (5) subcontracting and joint ventures between the Syrian public sector and foreign firms (Boris 1988, 116; Chatelus 1980, 249). These measures had only a limited success in attracting private investment and channelling it into productive sectors like manufacturing (Aziz-al Ahsan 1984, 309; Perthes 1992b, 210). Changes in the rural economy were even more limited under Asad's early rule. After 1967 the neo-Baath had pursued an ambiguous policy by tacitly allowing the consolidation of private landholdings into units larger than those permitted by laws, while promoting the creation of state farms. Under Asad's rule the state farms declined to the benefit of the cooperative and private sectors. In 1972, 82 per cent of the total cropped area was cultivated by private farms, 16 per cent by cooperatives and the remainder by state farms; by 1982 the private sector accounted for 2/3 of the cropped area and the cooperative sector for the remaining third (Kanovsky 1986, 286). The dominance of the state over the rural economy, however, remained pronounced, in spite of the abandonment of state farming, because the state kept supervising cooperatives and private farms (Metral 1980, 305).

The Syrian *infatih* was thus more limited than the Egyptian one. An analyst summarized the differences between the two economic liberalizations in the following way:

In comparison to Syria, the Egyptian opening has been more liberal. Initially Sadat wanted to reintegrate the Egyptian economy in the free-market world economy, whereas Assad wanted a rather controlled economy with considerable opportunities for private business and manufacturing.... Egypt gave explicit guarantees to protect new investments whereas Syria lacks such firm guarantees. Foreign investments in Syria were mostly in equity participations; joint ventures which were bilateral and cooperative in nature whereas in Egypt they were rather direct investments and in wholly foreign-owned projects. The Egyptian labor code, taxation laws, and currency exchange regulations were modified more thoroughly than those in Syria to encourage private investment, particularly, foreign investments (Aziz-al Ahsan 1984, 316).

An opinion also shared by another analyst: “[c]ompared to Egypt, the Syrian version of *infitah* was far more state-capitalist: the state continued to control strategic areas such as foreign trade, it played the leading role in industry, and state expenditure programs directed the course of development” (Perthes 1992b, 209). Others found that Syria’s economic liberalization was more a rationalization of the state-dominated economy than a retreat of state interventionism in the economy (Boris 1988, 116-7; Carr 1980, 465).

The reasons put forward to explain the limited character of Syria’s economic liberalization after 1973 usually emphasized domestic factors. Fred Lawson, for instance, argued that the economic liberalization was limited by the rise of an active Islamist opposition in Syria in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which led the Baathist regime to fall back on its staunchest supporters: the public sector and labor movement (Lawson 1990, 27, 39-40). Similarly, Lawson pointed out that the new capitalist class that benefited from the liberalization did so by providing services to the public sector and the state bourgeoisie, and thus had an interest in the maintenance of a large public sector (Lawson 1990, 36-7). Syed Aziz-al Ahsan, for his part, emphasized the parameters of Asad’s economic liberalization: he intended that reform as a way of correcting the excesses of the previous regime, of getting the support of the Sunni urban commercial class, and of increasing the supply of food and basic consumer goods; but he could not liberalize beyond a certain point for fear of alienating large groups in the Baath party and the public sector that were essential to the regime (Aziz-al Ahsan 1984, 317).

The presence in Syria of a mass party committed to socialism was certainly an important factor in the limited character of the Syrian *infitah* compared to the situation in Egypt, where the socialist party created by Nasser had never been a strong autonomous force and had been weakened by the rise to power of Sadat. However, the comparison with Egypt also brings out another contrast between the two cases that can explain the more limited nature of the liberalization in Syria. The Syrian state had less suffered from

the 1967 War and the subsequent years of war preparation that led to the 1973 War than the Egyptian state, and therefore it was not compelled to adopt economic liberalization. In short, the Syrian state had a less compelling incentive to embark on economic liberalization and once this policy had been adopted had also many good reasons to pursue it to a lesser extent than in Egypt under Sadat.

Table 4.10 shows through a series of indicators that no decline in state power occurred in Syria after 1973: at worst state power remained stable between 1972 and 1980. The share of current civilian expenditures in total current expenditures in the period 1972-80 remained relatively stable; showing that the war preparation conducted after 1973 did not distract the state from its civilian functions. A trend also confirmed by the slight increase in the share of government services in GDP for the period 1971-80. The public sector's share of gross domestic investment (GDI) and the importance of capital expenditures in the total expenditures of the central government show that through the 1970s economic development in Syria was led by the state, and that this function was a significant activity of the state. The financial extractive capacity of the Syrian state, as measured by current central government revenue as a proportion of GDP, remained stable over 1972-80 after having increased significantly in the years 1975-77 -- because of the fast growth of GDP in those years rather than as a result of an increase in the rate of taxation. Moreover, we saw previously that the revenue of the Syrian state in the 1970s largely came from public enterprises and their oil exports rather than from an increased extraction of financial resources from society. Finally, as in Egypt, economic liberalization did not put an end to the growth of the state as an organization. Public employment (excluding the armed forces and security forces) rose from 194,000 in 1973 to 368,000 in 1980 (Kanovsky 1986, 338-9). Even with Syria's rapid population growth, the proportion of the total population employed in the public sector and bureaucracy rose from 2.8 per cent in 1973 to 4.2 per cent in 1980.

Table 4.10 Some Indicators of State Power in Syria, 1971-80

Year	Current Civilian Expenditures as a % of Total Current Expenditures	Share (%) of Government Services in GDP	Share (%) of Public Sector in GDI	Capital Expenditure as a % of Total Expenditures	Current Central Government Revenue as a % of GDP
1971	n.a.	12.2	65	n.a.	n.a.
1972	62.8	11.1	56	35.1	25.3
1973	55.5	17.2	59	32.9	28.0
1974	64.0	17.1	73	42.6	27.0
1975	66.1	15.7	72	46.8	42.2
1976	69.8	14.5	73	49.9	36.6
1977	70.7	15.3	60	50.3	38.2
1978	64.3	14.9	62	45.1	22.6
1979	59.4	17.9	72	39.7	23.6
1980	64.2	16.2	64	37.1	26.8

Sources: International Monetary Fund (1984, 764-5) for current civilian and total current expenditures and central government revenues; World Bank (1993, 584) for GDP at market prices in current Syrian pounds; Kanovsky (1986, 316-9) for shares of public sector in gross domestic investment (GDI) and of government services in GDP (market prices).

In short, economic liberalization in Syria after 1973 was not the result of the 'exhaustion' of the state after years of war preparation, as one could argue in the case of Egypt. Although the initial motives that led Asad and his regime to promote a limited economic liberalization before 1973 included the concern to buy peace at home so that the state could more easily conduct war preparation against Israel. But this logic concerns more regime formation than state-building, or state power growth, since there is no evidence that the power of the Syrian state declined over the period 1971-80. At worst, one could argue that the stagnation in the indicators shown in Table 4.10 -- that is the fact that after an increase in the mid-1970s most indicators had returned in 1980 to levels similar to those of 1971-72 -- indicated that the growth of state power in Syrian had reached its limits.

The fact that sustained war preparation in the 1970s did not negatively affect state power in Syria, that is, the ability of the state to lead economic development and to provide services and benefits to the population, can be explained by the reliance of the Syrian state

on the externally-derived revenues and subsidies described previously. With access to these financial resources the Syrian state was spared the painful choice between state-led development and war preparation. Thus, the relationship between a high level of war preparation and the necessity to liberalize the economy did not hold.

We saw in the previous section that Syria's war preparation effort increased significantly after the war in Lebanon in 1982, but that this effort could not be sustained after 1985 because of the poor state of the Syrian economy and the decline of foreign support and subsidies. The burden of defense in a period of shrinking financial resources led the Baath regime to initiate a second campaign of economic liberalization in 1985. The Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath party in January 1985 was the forum chosen to discuss and make public the direction that the regime and the state would take in the following years. The problem posed to the party delegates was: "to find some way to revive economic growth, although tampering with the level of military spending was off-limits" (Sadowski 1985, 5). The limited finances of the Syrian state and its commitment to large annual outlays on defense meant that further economic growth would have to come from the private sector. A debate followed about the proper balance between the public and private sectors to achieve further development (Sadowski 1985, 6). Some favored a firm commitment to socialism, a reassertion of governmental controls over the economy, as well as more centralized planning of the public sector. This line of argument, however, was defeated during the congress by delegates who argued that a reassertion of governmental controls would deprive the regime of support among the commercial bourgeoisie and the rural middle class. Economists, for their part, pointed out that to sustain the defense budgets envisaged by the government would require more austerity budgets like the ones adopted since the early 1980s, and, therefore, a reliance on the private sector to compensate for the decline in public investment. In the end the party congress came up with resolutions and a final communiqué that reasserted the regime's

commitment to strategic parity as well as economic development, and which called for measures to encourage private investment and the forces of the market (Boris 1988, 160; Sadowski 1985, 6).

The government quickly followed up the party's recommendations. Muhammad Imadi, who had been the architect of Syria's first *infitah*, was reappointed minister of the economy and foreign trade and the government took a series of measures to promote private sector exports and foreign currency earnings. One analyst made the following assessment of the cumulative effect of the search for foreign currency earnings through the liberalization of foreign currency and foreign trade controls:

[T]he state's capacity to regulate the economy declines. Because foreign trade plays a key role in Syria's economy, its liberalization affects to some extent the state's capacity to conduct effective monetary policies and to set political guidelines for the development of production and consumption, such as, for example, securing an acceptable supply for mass consumption or supporting specific industries. The public sector not only loses its economic leadership, but in certain fields becomes dependent on private entrepreneurial decisions, and public-sector productive units -- industries and work force -- are partly rented to the private sector. Thus, a certain amount of state control over private imports and exports is virtually replaced by some private control over public facilities (Perthes 1992b, 222).

A second significant reform introduced by this second wave of economic liberalization was a law allowing the establishment of mixed agricultural joint-stock companies. In 1987, only, four such companies were set up between the public sector and domestic or foreign Arab capital (Olmert 1989, 640). As with other mixed companies in Syria, the participation of the state to a quarter of the company's shares allowed these firms to be exempted from many Syrian laws regulating private business such as the labor laws, and foreign trade and currency regulations. The development of large agribusiness firms in Syria could be seen as a retreat of the state, which until then had acted to prevent the concentration of landholdings in the private sector (Perthes 1992b, 221). The development of mixed companies in which the state agreed to not apply its laws in return for a share of the benefits of private economic ventures led Volker Perthes to say that what took place in

Syria should be called a privatization not a liberalization (Perthes 1992b, 220, 222). The public and private sectors cooperated more closely than ever, sometimes in joint ventures, the state relinquishing a part of its regulating capacity and giving access to the resources of the public sector in exchange for a share of the benefits of private business. In the process the state lost some of its regulating power over the economy; but the advantages gained by the private sector remained unstable since the government could decide to re-enforce the regulations or nationalize the mixed companies.

Yet, there is no denying that the private sector played a greater role in the Syrian economy in the late 1980s than it had ever done under Baathist rule. By the end of the decade the private sector's share of gross domestic investment stood at almost 50 per cent, a proportion higher than in 1963 when the Baath seized power (Perthes 1992b, 211). In the late 1980s the private sector's shares of gross output and of foreign trade stood at levels equal or superior to those of the early 1970s (Perthes 1992b, 211). But as one analyst underlined: "this change was the result of the public sector's deteriorating performance, and only secondarily of overall real growth in the private economy" (Perthes 1992b, 211).

This argument seems to be supported by the data presented in Table 4.11; especially if they are compared to those reported in Table 4.10. Table 4.11 shows that the share of capital expenditure in central government expenditures decreased from 29.9 per cent to 26.5 per cent over the period 1986-90. This is not a dramatic drop. However, when it is compared with the rates of capital expenditure in the 1970s the decrease becomes more significant. For the period 1972-80 the Syrian state earmarked on average 42.2 percent of its expenditures for capital investment, and this in spite of a significant defense effort. In contrast, in the late 1980s the Syrian state because of its significant defense effort could only allocate, on average, 29.6 per cent of its expenditures to capital investment. In the 1970s, and particularly in the period 1974-78, the Syrian state had been able to conduct

war preparation and economic development simultaneously thanks to externally-derived revenues and the subsidization of its activities by other states. In the 1980s, with the decline of external resources, the Syrian state was compelled to jeopardize its developmental role in order to maintain the level (also reduced as we saw) of defense spending required by the doctrine of strategic parity.

Table 4.11 Indicators of the Developmental and Civilian Functions of the Syrian State, 1986-90

Year	Capital Expenditure as a % of Total Expenditures	Current Civilian Expenditures as a % of Total Current Expenditures
1986	29.9	40.3
1987	35.0	37.8
1988	30.3	50.1
1989	26.4	57.4
1990	26.5	57.1

Source: International Monetary Fund (1992, 516).

A similar trend can be noticed in the share of civilian expenditures (i.e., the expenditures on administration and the provision of services to the population) in total current expenditures. On average, the Syrian state allocated 48.5 per cent of its current expenditures to that function in 1986-90 compared to an average of 64.1 per cent for the period 1972-80. However current civilian expenditures were less affected than development (capital) expenditure in the late 1980s. Their proportion of total current expenditures actually rose in the years 1988-90. This increase reflected the slow growth, or relative decline, of military expenditure -- the other element of current expenditures -- but also the fact that the government could not withdraw as easily the provision of services, or reduce the size of the bureaucracy and public sector, as it could cut on capital expenditure. While a reduction in the latter could be compensated by an increase in private sector investment, cuts in the former could lead to social and political unrest.

It is important to note the differences between the two Syrian *infitah* periods. The first one was initiated from a position of state strength and was mainly the outcome of regime

formation. It was the ultimate consequence of the struggle between two factions within the neo-Baath and it was motivated by Asad's desire to broaden the base of support of the Baathist regime. The second *infītah* was initiated from a position of state weakness, in the sense of limited financial resources, resulting from years of war preparation in a period of declining external revenues. Although one could argue that the *embourgeoisement* of the Baath regime also played a role in the fact that a liberal economic solution was adopted so easily. Volker Perthes also made a distinction between the two liberalization periods that corresponds in part to the present argument:

This new *infītah* was qualitatively different from that of the 1970s. At that time public resources seemed almost unlimited and the state, by means of its expenditures, led economic development, opening or expanding existing fields for profitable private-sector activities. In the 1980s, however, with diminishing public resources and austerity budgets, the government tried to mobilize private capital and skim off some of its profits, thus hoping to uphold the state's sphere of action and to save both the public sector and the public administration from bankruptcy. The private sector's role thereby increased (Perthes 1992b, 211).

War Making and Regime Formation

The Syrian government was the first Arab government to fall as a result of the repercussions of the Arab defeat in Palestine in 1948. The Syrian government was toppled by a military coup in March 1949 only a few months after the end of the hostilities, while King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951 and the Egyptian monarchy fell in 1952. The links between the 1948 Palestine War and the military coup of 1949 were obvious. The defeat was perceived by the officer corps as a professional and national disgrace for which traditional politicians were responsible (Hinnebusch 1990, 83). The defeat also caused a dramatic decline in the popular legitimacy of the civilian government (Picard 1980, 146-7). Both conditions made a military coup very likely. In fact, the links between the defeat in Palestine and the first military coup were so obvious that some analysts felt the need to find a deeper meaning or cause to the military coup. Thus, Tabitha

Petran argued that the 1949 coups were the expressions of: “profound frustrations and social tensions which had been sharpened by the Palestine war and its exposure of the bankruptcy of the existing order” (Petran 1972, 97). While Patrick Seale argued that, although the Palestine War increased the military’s disaffection and revealed the extent of civilian governmental incompetence, it was radical political forces and Arab nationalism that drove the military to rebellion (Seale 1965, 45).

The second period in Syrian contemporary history when war making had a significant impact on regime formation was after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. However, one can argue, as it was done in the Egyptian case study, that for the early 1960s the relationship between war making and regime formation was also present, but in a reverse relationship: the war making capacity of the Syrian state being affected by the dynamics of the Baathist regime. As in Egypt before 1967, the officer corps in Syria suffered from a decline in professionalism that directly affected the Syrian military performance during the War of 1967. As mentioned before, the Syrian officer corps was repeatedly purged in the years preceding the war. The promotion of officers in the Syrian armed forces after 1963 became determined by one’s communal identity and political allegiance and this had a clearly negative impact on the performance of the army (Picard 1980, 159). As in Egypt, military officers also assumed a variety of key political functions. From a list of cabinet members for the period from March 1963 to March 1966 (nine different cabinets) one finds that on average 14.7 per cent of minister posts were filled by military officers (Rabinovich 1972, 219-25). The highest level of military participation was in the cabinet of October 1964 with military men forming close to a quarter of the cabinet. The posts assumed by officers were all crucial to the regime and included prime minister and the ministries of Defense, the Interior, Planning, and Agrarian Reform. The participation of military officers in the Baath party direction in Syria (i.e., the Baath Regional Command)

was even higher. On average 36.7 per cent of members of the Regional Command were military men between 1963 and 1966 (Rabinovich 1972, 226-7).

The 1967 defeat had a significant impact on the neo-Baath. Until June 1967 the military and civilian wings of the neo-Baath had shared the same attitudes and opinions, but the defeat drove the military faction led by General Hafiz al-Asad to adopt new and distinctive opinions (Petran 1972, 239-40). One obvious bone of contention between Asad's faction and the radical civilian faction led by Salah Jadid (himself a former officer) was the responsibility for the defeat. Asad held the political leadership responsible for the purges that had sapped the strength of the army, while the civilian faction blamed the defeat on the conventional character of Arab military strategy (Petran 1972, 240). Both groups also disagreed on the future course of action for the regime. The agenda of Asad's faction included the following points notably: (1) the absolute priority to the rebuilding of the Syrian armed forces; (2) the end of party interference in military affairs; (3) army's control over the party's paramilitary units and over the activities of Palestinian guerrillas in Syria; (4) cooperation with other Arab states, irrespective of their regime, in order to liberate the occupied territories through a conventional military campaign; (5) conciliatory overtures to the other progressive forces at home and the urban bourgeoisie. Jadid's faction, on the other hand, kept the pre-1967 neo-Baath agenda: (1) priority to economic development and socialist transformation to pave the way for the liberation of Palestine; (2) a commitment to a people's war strategy led by Palestinian guerrillas to liberate Palestine; (3) refusal to cooperate with other Arab regimes; (4) no overtures to progressive forces at home (Kaminsky and Kruk 1987, 47-8; Petran 1972, 240-1). The agenda propounded by Asad was defeated in party congresses in September and October 1968 (Seale 1989, 149). But Asad's firm control over the military meant that he could not be displaced, and that his opinions had to be taken into account by Jadid's faction. Asad assumed power gradually

in the following years through two limited coups in February 1969 and November 1970.

He then purged the party of Jadid's supporters and had his program approved.

Asad's regime remained committed to Baathism but was less doctrinaire than the neo-Baath. As one analyst put it:

Syrian Ba'thist rule as Asad developed it was a hybrid animal: from Jadid he inherited Soviet-style *étatisme* and a commitment to promote unfavoured classes. But anxious to throw off the unpopularity the radicals had earned, he dropped class warfare and set about broadening the base of his support by wooing the disaffected social classes with economic and political liberalization (Seale 1989, 169).

Asad's image as a state leader was also different from the collective direction associated with the neo-Baath:

From the moment he seized power, Asad sought to project an image of his regime as constitutional and democratic, and of himself as a national and popular leader deriving his authority from his people. He insistently and systematically avoided giving the impression of relying on military support or of endorsing a single-party system (Maoz 1988, 48-9).

In fact, Asad's political reforms could be interpreted as an attempt to eliminate collective leadership and to limit somewhat the influence of the Baath party in favor of an Egyptian-style strong presidential regime.

Asad was elected President of the Republic in March 1971 through a plebiscite. In September 1971 the Syrian electorate was consulted through a referendum about a project of federation with Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. In March 1972 elections for the regional councils took place, with independent candidates making important gains. In March 1973 there was a referendum to approve a new constitution. Finally, in May 1973, a parliamentary election was held in which four left-wing parties ran on a common electoral list with the Baath and against independent candidates (Picard 1978, 132-4). Obviously none of these popular consultations and elections could have been lost by the Baath given its control of the state institutions, the press and the popular organizations. Yet, this frequent resort to the ballot was in contrast to the strict single-party rule enforced by the neo-Baath before Asad assumed power. It reinforced the impression that Asad drew his

legitimacy from popular sovereignty (through the plebiscite of the presidential candidate selected by the Baath) and had direct access to the people (through referenda).

Contrary to the neo-Baath, Asad also tried to introduce some pluralism in the Syrian political system by making limited overtures to left-wing parties and to independent candidates representing more conservative forces. In March 1972 the National Progressive Front was formed by the Baath and other small left-wing parties representing communists, Nasserists and Arab socialists. By agreeing to form the NPF with the Baath these parties got some seats in parliament (through the single NPF electoral list) and in the cabinet, and the possibility of expressing their opinions in the regime-controlled press. In return, they had to acknowledge the leadership of the Baath in the coalition and to refrain from propaganda in universities and the armed forces (Picard 1980, 172). The overtures to the Right made by Asad's regime were even more limited since they did not involve the possibility of participating in the government or the formation of right-wing parties, but only the running of independent candidates in local and national elections against those of the NPF list. In short, Asad's political reforms were significant in comparison with the practices of the neo-Baath, but they fell far short of a political liberalization and the emergence of a pluralist political system.¹⁶

Asad's cosmetic political liberalization gave way to more authoritarian measures and a return to the political style of the neo-Baath in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to the terrorist activities of the Islamist opposition. It is difficult to say whether these significant political developments were tied to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. For some analysts, like Robert Olson, the crisis of legitimacy of Asad's regime and the growth of an Islamist opposition were directly linked to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon (Olson

¹⁶ Another aspect of Asad's political reforms was his effort to correct the under-representation of Sunnis in the political elite in order to correct the sectarian image associated with the neo-Baath (Drysdale 1981, 13). However, Asad's personal rule system still implied a heavy reliance on members of his community (Alawi) and region (province of Latakia), notably in the security and intelligence networks (Maoz 1988, 51, 56).

1982, 121-2, 126-7, 136). On the other hand, one could easily point out that Baath's rule in Syria had always been challenged by a Sunni opposition that used religious themes to denounce the regime's socialist and secular policies (Roberts 1987, 115). The initial Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, which appeared to favor the Christian forces in the civil war, was in that sense only an additional charge laid against the Baath by the Islamist opposition. Besides, it seemed that the initial acts of terrorism after the intervention originated from Palestinian and Iraqi sources not from the Syrian Islamist opposition; although from late 1977 terrorism seemed to originate from Syrian-based organizations (Kaminsky and Kruk 1987, 89-90; Rabinovich 1978, 609-10).

Isolated acts of terrorism against Alawis and figures associated with the regime turned into unrest in some urban areas in the early 1980s; with a culmination in the uprising in Hama, one of the largest city in Syria, in February 1982. The Hama uprising was put down with the full range of military means causing thousands of civilian casualties -- estimates ranged from 5,000 to 30,000 dead (Olmert 1984, 852; Roberts 1987, 121, 128). Such a level of brutality was symptomatic of the siege mentality under which Asad's regime operated in those years. Terrorist acts and the apprehension of urban uprisings by the Sunni majority led the regime to adopt a set of totalitarian measures and to raise (as before 1967) militias from labor and peasant organizations affiliated to the Baath (Kaminsky and Kruk 1987, 104, 115-6; Kehat 1981, 766-70; Mayer 1982, 792-4; Seurat 1989, 61). Criticisms of the repressive measures were made by some professional groups (notably the lawyers) and by the left-wing parties in the NPF; but they were silenced by the regime (Kehat 1981, 761-2; Le Gac 1991, 133, 140; Seurat 1989, 76-7). The Islamist challenge to Baathist rule decreased significantly after the repression of the Hama uprising. Actually, the most serious threat to Baathist rule after 1982 came from conflict within the regime. When Asad became seriously ill in late 1983- early 1984 some strongmen in the regime (including the President's brother, Rifat al-Asad) deployed their 'private armies' in

the streets of Damascus in an attempt to jockey for the best position in the event of Asad's death.

The second campaign of economic liberalization initiated in 1985 was accompanied by some political measures designed, like those of the early 1970s, to give to the Baathist regime a more democratic veneer. For instance, the parliamentary election of May 1990 led to the formation of a larger parliament (the People's Council) in which a higher percentage of seats were reserved for independent deputies. Whereas in the old People's Council 160 seats out of 195 had been reserved for the NPF led by the Baath, the new People's Council allocated a smaller majority of seats (168 out of 250) to the same coalition (Perthes 1992a, 15). Independent candidates had to be approved by the authorities and in general those elected were: "respected urban upper middle class elements, mostly lawyers, physicians and university teachers; traditional (including religious) leaders; and merchants and other members of Syria's new commercial bourgeoisie" (Perthes 1992a, 17). Syria's parliamentary reform remained extremely limited. Although a greater degree of pluralism in interest representation was allowed, the reform fell short from a limited political liberalization like the one initiated by Sadat after 1973. In fact, the corporatist form of representation favored by the Baath regime in its reform was more in tune with the local tradition of consultative assemblies designed to advise autocratic Muslim rulers than an incarnation of the sovereign parliament as conceived in liberal political thought (Perthes 1992a, 18).

In conclusion, the impact of war making on regime formation in Syria took two forms depending on whether one looks at the impact of war or of war preparation. In two instances (1948 and 1967) the outcome of an Arab-Israeli war led to a change of regime when the civilian political elites were blamed for the defeat and displaced by military men. In the case of periods of war preparation, both in the early 1970s and late 1980s Asad's regime adopted a set of limited reforms designed to gain a wider legitimacy for Baathist

rule at a time when the regime was giving priority to the defense effort. These reforms designed in part 'to quiet the home front' were more limited than those adopted by Sadat in Egypt and they hardly qualified as economic or political liberalization.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the most significant impact of war preparation on regime formation has been little noticed because it is in a way so obvious: the growth of the armed forces and of security units. The consequence of the tremendous growth of the armed forces and of various 'praetorian guards' under Asad's rule is that the regime is likely to survive any popular uprising as long as the security units and armed forces remain loyal to the Baath or the supreme ruler. In addition, the growth of the armed forces and the number of security units means that any single military plot to overthrow the regime is less likely to succeed than under the old republican regime, or in the early years of Baath's rule, when the control of a few battalions or a single brigade was enough to displace a government. In that narrow sense war preparation has significantly increased regime's stability in Syria.

Conclusion

Syria has tremendously gained in domestic and external state power as well as in regime stability over the period covered by this study (1948-89). Syria in the early 1950s was a country characterized by governmental instability, an economy dominated by the private sector and a weak power status in the regional state system. The contrast with the late 1980s is striking: Syria had been ruled for almost twenty years by the same regime and group of state makers, had an economy dominated by the public sector, and was a regional power. To what extent has war making contributed to this accretion and consolidation of state power?

The impact of war making on these developments is most evident in regard to external state power, i.e., the transformation of Syria from a weak to a significant power in the

Middle East. Syria's regional status is based on its military power, and the acquisition of that power resulted from the war preparation conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. But the topic of the present thesis is the development of domestic state power -- state power oriented toward society rather than other states -- and in that respect the answer is less clear-cut as Table 4.12 shows.

In regard to state power the evidence put forward in this case study shows that the most significant increases in state power were not due to war or war preparation, but to the union with Egypt (1958-61) and the Baath Revolution of the early 1960s. War making, however, was at the origin of the much smaller increase in state power witnessed in the early 1950s when the military became involved in politics, raised taxation, and introduced conscription. Considering the trend toward the growth of the state in the modern world system war making did not give much additional impetus for a faster growth of state power in Syria after 1948.

Table 4.12 Summary of Impact of War Making on State Making in Syria, 1948-89

Periods	State Power	Regime Formation	War making & Resource Extraction
Palestine War, 1948	Military involvement in politics after 1948 led to an increase in the state's despotic power and its autonomy. In the following period some accretion of state power resulted from military rule.	The defeat in Palestine led to the first military coup in March 1949.	Some measures were adopted to raise more taxes and soldiers, but they were carried out in the following period.
1949-62	The most significant increase in state power in the period <u>is not</u> due to war making but to the union with Egypt (1958-61).	No clear evidence that war making had an impact on regime formation in this period.	Increase in domestic extraction (men and taxes). Limited reliance on external revenues and subsidies. Military modernization stalled by Western powers until Soviet arms deal in 1955-56.

1963-66	The increase in state power in the period is <u>not</u> due to war making but to the Baath revolution.	Changes in the Baath regime <u>are not</u> due to war making.	Incremental increase in war preparation. Beginning of military modernization. Failure to develop viable alliances to make up for military weakness.
1967-70	Contrary to Egypt, the 1967 defeat and the subsequent years of war preparation did not affect negatively state power in Syria.	The 1967 defeat led to a split within the regime; the faction favoring military preparation as a priority won in 1970.	Increase in war preparation. Significant support by the USSR in rebuilding the armed forces. Attempt at alliance with Iraq.
1971-80	Contrary to Egypt, war making had no negative impact on state power because of high levels of external revenues and subsidies.	Asad's 'liberal' reform was designed in part to buy peace on the home front while priority was given to war preparation.	Significant increase in war preparation (defense outlays, size of armed forces, modernization). First attempt at coalition warfare in 1973. High degree of subsidization of defense effort. Some reliance on foreign military manpower.
1981-89	Limited decline in state power after 1985. The state was forced to decrease its civilian and developmental functions as a result of the financial burden of war preparation in a period of declining foreign support and subsidies.	Baath overtures to private capitalism after 1985 directly related to financial crisis of the state caused by war preparation.	Significant increase in war preparation after 1982, but decrease after 1985. Significant decline in foreign support (USSR) and subsidies (Gulf states).

On the other hand, the impact of war making on state power in Syria has not been particularly negative either; in contrast to the pattern we found in Egypt after 1967 and 1973. The hypothesis that war or war preparation could exhaust the resources of a state and compel it to liberalize its economy is supported only in the last period of the case study. While state power in Egypt was negatively affected by the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars and the period of war preparation between these two wars, it was not so in Syria. Two factors were put forward in the case study to explain this divergence between the Egyptian and Syrian cases. First, the economic consequences of the 1967 defeat were much more severe in Egypt than in Syria and were worsened by the War of Attrition.

Second, Syria in the 1970s benefited from subsidies and externally-derived revenues that allowed it to evade the difficult choice between war preparation and state-led development. Syria, however, was confronted by this dilemma in the 1980s when renewed war preparation in a period of shrinking external subsidies and revenues compelled the state to reduce its civilian and development functions and initiate a limited economic liberalization.

The impact of war making on regime formation in Syria illustrated the conventional historical pattern of a change of regime after a military defeat. This development occurred after only a few months in the case of the 1948 Palestine War, but it was delayed until 1970 in the case of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The impact of the latter on regime formation in Baathist Syria was decisive. The radical course of Syrian politics was checked by the 1967 War and altered by the subsequent struggle within the Baath triggered by the defeat (Hinnebusch 1990, 136). As Raymond Hinnebusch said:

Asad's rise marked the victory of the military over the radical intelligentsia. There followed a corresponding reorientation of the state from an instrument of class revolution to a machinery of elite power "above" classes and in the service of *raison d'état* -- state consolidation and war mobilization (Hinnebusch 1990, 144).

The choice Asad's regime made to put the quest for military power before further state power accretion at home is similar to the choice of priority made by Sadat. In both cases, state makers chose to give priority to externally-oriented military power, which could be used in interactions with other states, over internally-oriented economic power. Obviously, a political scientist may point out that an increase in domestic state power can ultimately translate into an increase in externally-oriented power. But it seems that state makers rarely have such long-term views on that matter and are more concerned by the possibility of wars in the short and medium terms, the necessity to develop armed forces to meet these contingencies, and the need to find short-term solutions to the financial burden of war preparation.

5. War Making and State Making in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)

For almost eight years the Iranian and Iraqi states committed themselves and their societies to a war that ranks among the longest and bloodiest of this century. The Iran-Iraq War represents a unique example of total war between Third World states. Its intensity would have been enough to qualify it as a case study. Admittedly, if war making has an impact on state making, this impact should be easier to retrace in wars of higher intensity.

The relevance of the Iran-Iraq War as a case study is not limited to the intensity of the war effort made by both countries. The war also pitted against each other two rentier states: two states that had derived for years more than half of their revenues from the export of a commodity (oil) produced by an industry they controlled. The Iraqi state and the Iranian state (before the 1978-9 Revolution) were states that had shown a high degree of autonomy from society, and that had a commanding position in their national economies. To a greater extent than Egypt and Syria, the Iranian and Iraqi states had the financial means to prepare and wage war without relying on their societies or on foreign subsidies. In both countries increased oil revenues during the 1970s had been used in part to finance an expansion of the armed forces and the purchase of large quantities of sophisticated weaponry from East and West. This military spending effort was so intense in Iran that the defense burden (i.e., military expenditure in proportion of GNP or of central government expenditures) was lower while the Islamic Republic was at war with Iraq than it was in the later years of the Shah's regime (ACDA 1987, 79).

The Iran-Iraq War also involved the two superpowers to a lesser extent than might have been expected, considering the strategic importance both powers gave to the region. Initially the superpowers were reluctant or unable to give their full support to either side. Washington had become estranged from Tehran by the Islamic Revolution, while its relations with Baghdad were limited by mutual suspicion. Moscow, on the other hand,

tried during the initial phase of the war to strike a neutral position in the conflict, and to this end it went as far as suspending its arms transfers to Iraq. As the war dragged on and as Iran became perceived (from mid-1982) as the party opposed to a ceasefire and bent on upsetting the regional status quo the superpowers increasingly gave their support to Iraq. The Soviet Union resumed its arms shipments while the United States made available commercial agricultural credit and military intelligence on Iranian forces to Iraq. There is no doubt that the American naval intervention in the Gulf during the last year of the war and the American-led international arms embargo against Iran played a part in the decision of the Iranian leaders to agree to a ceasefire in July 1988. Nevertheless, superpower involvement in the Iran-Iraq War was less pervasive than in the Arab-Israeli wars since 1967. Iran fought on its own while Iraq relied on a constellation of supporters that were not willing, or able, to undertake unlimited commitments to the Iraqi cause.

If the relevance of the Iran-Iraq War was obvious in regard to the problématique of the present thesis, the dearth of data, and the uncertainty surrounding those available, made the Iran-Iraq War a less than optimal choice of case study. The involvement of Iran and Iraq in a total war meant that a host of data assumed a strategic value because they could show the weaknesses of both parties, notably their capacity to sustain the conflict over time. Information on casualties, numbers of men mobilized, defense expenditure, foreign financial assistance, oil exports and revenue, inflation, and the state budgets was often of uncertain quality, simply not available, or only available through the estimates of foreign sources. This problem was compounded in the case of Iraq by the government's refusal since the late 1970s to release complete information on the economy or the state budgets, and for Iran by the reorganization of state institutions in the wake of the Islamic Revolution.

In spite of these difficulties I think that there is enough evidence to support the assertions that will be made in this chapter. This case study on Iran and Iraq does not

stand alone, it is part of a cumulative build-up of evidence that includes the Egyptian and Syrian cases. The Iranian and Iraqi cases have been merged into a single chapter to make the comparisons between the two countries easier and to avoid the repetition of background material common to both cases. Since this chapter deals with a shorter time period than the preceding ones it is divided into sections that correspond to the themes present in all the case studies rather than into chronological periods. Thus, the section on resource extraction is subdivided into sections covering the strategies used by both states to finance the war, to mobilize men for their armies, and to procure weapons. The subsequent sections deal with the impact of war making on state power and on regime formation. Before we proceed any further, however, a brief overview of the war will provide some background for the reader unfamiliar with the conflict.

The Iran-Iraq War: A Brief Overview

Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. There followed a war that lasted until 1988, when on July 18, Iran agreed unconditionally to UN Security Council Resolution 598; the fighting on the ground lasted until a ceasefire on August 20 -- almost a month short of the eight anniversary of the war. The Iran-Iraq War lasted 95 months, longer than the First or Second World Wars. Among interstate wars in this century, only the Vietnam War (1965-75) lasted longer (122.7 months) and possibly the Sino-Japanese War (97.4 months) -- if one merged the war between China and Japan from 1937 with the Second World War (Small and Singer 1982, 90-3).

The Iran-Iraq War was also among the most murderous wars of the present century; even if the range of estimates of the human cost of the war is wide. For instance, Iran, the only belligerent to have released official figures on its casualties, reported the death of 123,220 combatants, 60,711 missing in action, and 11,000 civilian deaths (Hiro 1990, 250). But estimates of Iranian war casualties by various American governmental agencies

range from 300,000 to 730,000 killed (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 3; Gera 1990, 219). Estimates of Iraqi casualties by the same sources range from 120,000 to 340,000 killed. Based on these estimates, the Iran-Iraq War would have caused between 420,000 and 1,070,000 deaths and this would rank it as the sixth or fifth most severe interstate war in this century, well before the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, which combined caused 47,231 battle deaths (Small and Singer 1982, 87-95). The economic cost of the war was also considerable. One detailed estimate put the total cost of the war at US \$ 1,079 billion, pointing out that on average between 1980 and 1988 the cost of the war consumed annually 60 per cent of Iran's GNP and 112 per cent of Iraq's (Mofid 1990, 135).

The number of casualties and the share of GNP expended on the war underline the total nature of the conflict between the two states. This aspect of the war was also illustrated by the strategies and goals of the belligerents. The Iran-Iraq War witnessed economic warfare, indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations, as well as the use of chemical weapons on a large scale. The stake in the conflict also was total because the Iranian leadership, in particular Ayatollah Khomeini, made it clear that its settlement could only come after the fall of the Baathist regime in Baghdad.

Given the intensity of the Iran-Iraq War, there is some irony in learning that the Iraqi leadership had considered only a short and limited war when deciding to invade Iran in September 1980 (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 54; Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 79). The decision had been made after a year of rising tension between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Baathist regime in Baghdad. If one sets aside arguments about the 'historical enmity' between Persians and Arabs, or between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam, the invasion seemed to be motivated in the eyes of Iraqi decision makers by both fear and the lure of gain. The Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein feared that Arab Shias in Iraq (a majority of the population) would rebel and rally to the Islamic Republic of their Iranian

coreligionists. By striking at Iran, the Iraqi leadership felt that it could at least sever the external connections of the Shia opposition in Iraq and at best deal a mortal blow to the Islamic regime in Tehran. To this defensive motive was added the potential gains that Iraq could derive from striking at Iran while its armed forces were in disarray in the wake of a revolution. By striking at a weak Iran, Baghdad could expect to recover its sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab, the river delineating the southern part of the border between Iran and Iraq, and to gain the status of undisputed regional power in the Gulf, a claim to regional hegemony made by Iran during the 1970s.¹

Iraqi leaders had envisaged only a limited war, assuming that the Islamic Republic would either quickly sue for peace or be toppled by a pro-monarchist military coup. A limited war was also all that the Iraqi army could wage. In the first weeks of the war it even failed to reach its objectives in the face of a disorganized Iranian defense. But the Islamic Republic neither fell nor gave away to Iraqi demands. While the Iranian authorities called the conflict "the imposed war", many in the Islamic regime considered that it was an opportunity to mobilize and rally the population in a period of economic and political difficulties. The war with Iraq became a safety valve for the popular forces unleashed by the revolution, and an issue in the struggle between the various revolutionary factions.

From the fall of 1980 to the summer of 1982 the Iran-Iraq War remained at a moderate level of intensity. In Iraq the financial reserves accumulated before the war and the subsidies from the Arab oil states of the Gulf allowed the regime to maintain a pretense of normalcy: consumption and development expenditures remained high in spite of the increased level of defense expenditure. As some analysts pointed out, Iraq pursued in this period a 'guns and butter' policy designed to cushion the Iraqi society against the impact

¹ Before 1975 Iraq had complete sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. However, in 1975 Iraq agreed in a treaty to a series of concessions to Iran, notably setting the international border in the middle of the navigable channel in the river rather than along the Iranian bank, in return for an end to Iranian support to Kurdish insurgents in Iraq. Iraq might have had also a maximalist goal in its invasion of Iran: the annexation of the oil-rich region inside Iran populated with Arabs.

of the war. Similarly, the Islamic Republic was able to maintain its war effort at a level acceptable to its society. Defense outlays were lower (in real terms) than under the Shah, there was no shortage of volunteers for the war, and the remains of the Shah's arsenal, as well as some Soviet weapons sent by third parties like Syria and Libya, were enough for the ground forces to go over to the offensive. Iranian oil exports and oil revenues were not what they used to be under the Shah, but this was due to the disorganization of the oil industry in the wake of the revolution rather than to Iraqi actions. Iraq did not yet have the military capability to impede Iranian oil exports through the Gulf.

From the summer of 1982 the situation started to change. The Iranians had forced the Iraqis out of most Iranian territory and were now taking the offensive inside Iraq, brushing aside offers of mediation and of ceasefire in an effort to bring the fall of the Baathist regime. Iran started to mount military operations that would become characteristic of the Iranian offensives in the southern part of the front until 1988: frontal mass attacks on prepared Iraqi defenses leading to limited gains and appalling losses. Iran seemed to rely on revolutionary and religious fervors as well as on its demographic advantage (a population roughly three times larger than Iraq's) to overwhelm Iraqi defenses.

The Iraqi leadership, short of committing political suicide by accepting Iranian terms for a settlement of the war, had no other option than to match the Iranian war machine and develop strategies to compel the Iranians to cease fire. In taking up the Iranian military challenge the Baathist regime achieved spectacular results. As we will see, in spite of its demographic disadvantage and the lower level of popular legitimacy of its regime, Baghdad managed to put more men under arms than Tehran. This mobilization effort coupled with almost unrestricted access to foreign weaponry allowed the Iraqis to set up impressive defenses against the Iranian human-wave attacks.

From 1982, despite foreign financial assistance, the Iraqi war effort could no longer be sustained without affecting the economy and society and their relations with the state.

Levels of military mobilization and of casualties meant that almost every Iraqi family was affected by the war. The authorities could no more conduct the war as if it were only Saddam's *Qadasiya*.² Furthermore, by late 1982, Iran's politico-military campaign against Iraq's oil exports had jeopardized the Iraqi government's plan to maintain consumption and development at their pre-war levels. Decreasing oil revenues compelled the Iraqi authorities to make austerity budgets, including cuts in development expenditure and civilian imports. In short, after 1982 the Iraqi state could no longer wage war in isolation from its society; and the war, itself, started to undermine the capacity of the regime to legitimize its rule through development and welfare expenditures as it had done during the 1970s.

In order to compel the Iranians to agree to a ceasefire and to modify their terms for a settlement of the conflict, the Iraqis had only the option of escalating the conflict, since a decisive victory in battle over the Iranian forces was beyond the capabilities of the Iraqi forces at the time. This process of escalation took the form of missile strikes and air raids on Iranian cities, and of air strikes on shipping and Iranian oil export facilities in the Gulf. From mid-1982 to early 1986 land warfare between Iran and Iraq settled into a process of attrition.

However, the land war entered into a new phase in early 1986 with an Iranian offensive (called *al-Fajr 8*) in February and March. During this offensive the Iranian forces managed to break through the Iraqi defenses and captured a large part of the Fao peninsula: which they held in spite of vigorous Iraqi counterattacks. With the benefit of hindsight, the capture of Fao in early 1986 can be considered the swan song of the Iranian war effort. The success achieved at Fao at a high cost (up to 30,000 dead for Iran) led the Iranian leadership to believe that an extra mobilization effort and a series of offensives

² In 637 AD Arab Muslims defeated the army of the Persian Empire at the battle of Qadasiya. In 1980 the Baathist regime used this historical precedent to present the invasion of Iran as a second Qadasiya, pitting pious Arabs against heretic Iranians. This second Qadasiya was explicitly linked to Saddam Hussein's leadership; thus the war became known as "Saddam's Qadasiya" (Hiro 1990, 44-5, 53).

could break the Iraqi defenses within a year. This strategy culminated in the offensives *Karbala 5* to 9, from January to April 1987, which failed to break through the Iraqi front but bled white the Iranian forces mobilized for what had been presented as the final effort. After these offensives the Iranian authorities had increasing difficulties with the recruitment of men. In fact the low intake of recruits produced by the annual mobilization campaign in the fall of 1987 compelled the Iranian leadership to postpone further grand offensives and to rely instead on a series of limited offensives in the mountainous Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq.

The Iranian success at Fao in 1986 and the subsequent large Iranian offensives in early 1987 had almost the opposite effect on the Iraqi war effort. The politico-military leadership grasped that Iraq had to regain the initiative or else one day the Iraqi defenses would break under the repeated ramming of Iranian attacks. Apparently, in March 1987, Iraq's political and military leaders agreed to expand the elite Republican Guard, to prepare forces for a counteroffensive, and to step up strikes on shipping in the Gulf in order to bring about an international intervention to end the conflict (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 259-60).

Iraq's new strategy bore fruit in 1987-88 largely because Iran played into the hands of its opponent. Iran's inability to mount large offensives after the spring of 1987 left a breathing space for the Iraqi forces to regroup and prepare themselves for the counteroffensive. Also, Iran shifted its attention from the land war to the Gulf where its actions provoked the international interventions that Iraq sought. On July 20, 1987, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 598, which notably called upon the belligerents to cease fire and start negotiating a settlement of the conflict through UN mediation. Contrary to previous calls for a ceasefire, Resolution 598 included the possibility of further measures to enforce compliance. Iraq agreed to the resolution, but Iran neither agreed to nor rejected it. The United States was the main sponsor of the Security

Council's resolution and had had for years a policy (called Operation Staunch) of denying military supplies to Iran. Even if Washington could not get a UN-sanctioned arms embargo against Iran for its failure to agree to Resolution 598, it did manage to further restrain Iran's arms acquisition through diplomatic pressure on potential suppliers (McNaugher 1989, 185-6). Finally the American naval presence in the Gulf in 1987-88 brought Washington and Tehran on the brink of an open conflict.

The war entered into its last phase in early 1988 when developments led the Iranian leadership to reconsider the value to the regime of prosecuting the war further. The first event that led to this reassessment was an intense series of Iraqi missile strikes on Iranian cities and in particular Tehran. This series of strikes from late February to late April 1988 might have been just another round in the War of the Cities between the two states. Instead this time it led to a breakdown of civilian morale as more than a million Iranians fled the capital. Further evidence of eroding Iranian morale was found in the relative ease with which the Iraqis reconquered the Fao peninsula, in merely two days in April, and then the Shalamche salient in May. Iran was losing in days and weeks what it had spent years to conquer. A cause of the erosion of Iranian morale widely mentioned was the publicity given to the use of chemical weapons against civilian Iraqi Kurds on March 16, 1988. Chemical weapons had been used against Iranian soldiers since at least 1983. But in 1988 it seemed that the Iranian soldiers (and the civilians) could not bear stoically anymore the thought of a chemical attack.

Iraqi strikes on civilian targets and military defeats on land were concomitant with increasing clashes between American and Iranian military units in the Gulf. In April 1988, while Iraq was reconquering Fao, Iranian naval units were engaged in a day-long confrontation with the US Navy. The Iranian Navy lost in the process some of its last operational fighting ships. On July 3, 1988, in the midst of another naval confrontation between American and Iranian units, a US Navy cruiser shot down an Iranian civilian

airliner causing the death of 290 people. By then a majority in the Iranian leadership had already come to the conclusion that the war had to be ended, but this last event was apparently used by the pro-ceasefire faction to overcome the resistance of Ayatollah Khomeini to the idea of ending the war. The fundamental argument of the pro-ceasefire faction was that the war had outlived its usefulness for the Revolution and was now putting in jeopardy its future. On July 18, 1988, Iran agreed to the terms of Resolution 598.

War Making and Resource Extraction

This section deals with the strategies states used to finance their war, to man their armies and to procure weapons. However, in order to understand well the differences between Iran and Iraq in regard to these aspects, one needs to study their strategies of resource extraction with some prior knowledge of the war effort both countries made between 1980 and 1988. As the following pages show, Iraq emerged from the war debt-ridden, with an extremely large army in proportion of its population, and a huge arsenal. These were the results of an eight years long war effort that had been more intense in Iraq than in Iran.

Table 5.1 shows the extent to which Iraq's war effort was superior to Iran's. According to the data presented here, Iraq's annual defense expenditure was on average twice larger than Iran's, Iraq's annual arms imports were on average more than three times larger than those of Iran, and Iraq's rate of military mobilization was on average five times greater than Iran's. This last proportion is particularly striking because the portrayal by the media of land warfare during the war -- depicting Iranian human waves assaulting well-armed Iraqi positions -- gave the impression that Iran had a manpower-intensive military strategy while Iraq relied on a capital-intensive strategy based on its better access to foreign weaponry. In theory it was true that Iraq's comparative advantage lay in its access

to weaponry and its effective use on the battlefield, while Iran's comparative advantage lay in its demographic size and the revolutionary or religious fervor of its masses. In practice, however, Iraq's demographic disadvantage against Iran meant that the Iraqi state had to mobilize a greater proportion of its population. In fact, Iraq managed during the war to have more men in its regular armed forces than Iran had in its regular and revolutionary armed forces. Iranian leaders based their military strategy on their well-known advantages, revolutionary fervor and demography, but they failed to exploit their full potential. As a result, in both its capital and manpower aspects the Iraqi war mobilization was more intense than the Iranian one.

Table 5.1 Comparison of Iran's and Iraq's War Efforts, 1980-88

Year	Defense Expenditure (US \$ millions at 1988 prices & exchange rates) ¹		Defense Expenditure as a % of GNP ²		Arms Imports (US \$ millions at 1988 prices) ³		Armed Forces per 1,000 of Population ⁴	
	Iran	Iraq	Iran	Iraq	Iran	Iraq	Iran	Iraq
1980	16,108	12,306	5.2	9.9	594	3,395	7.8	32.6
1981	12,321	14,007	4.0	19.9	1,194	5,421	6.4	28.6
1982	10,230	21,952	3.1	32.3	1,940	8,611	5.7	28.5
1983	8,523	28,596	2.4	43.9	963	8,174	5.5	29.5
1984	8,082	31,590	2.3	46.0	2,702	10,360	7.4	51.7
1985	9,705	23,506	2.9	34.9	1,886	5,137	7.3	49.9
1986	9,339	16,531	2.9	29.1	2,451	6,074	7.1	48.8
1987	7,679	17,073	2.5	25.8	1,519	5,681	7.0	53.0
1988	7,353	12,868	2.3	19.6	2,000	4,600	12.6	56.9

¹ The defense expenditure figures for both countries were taken from SIPRI (1990, 1992) -- the only source to provide complete series for 1980-88 in constant prices. However, SIPRI does not encourage close comparison between countries (SIPRI 1990, 201-2). Figures reported by the ACDA (for 1978-85 in constant 1988 prices) were much higher because they included the estimated value of arms imports (ACDA 1990, 51). Contrary to SIPRI's, ACDA's figures showed Iran outspending Iraq in military expenditure in 1985 and Iraq outspending Iran in 1980. Otherwise, both sources showed Iraq spending more than Iran in constant 1988 US dollars; however the spending gap was greater in the SIPRI's series than it was in ACDA's. A possible explanation is that SIPRI used the official Iranian budget figures for defense expenditure while ACDA used its own estimates of military-related expenditures in Iran. At least one source claims that the Iranian authorities greatly understated the defense expenditure for domestic political reasons (MacPherson 1989, 150-1).

² These series of figures were calculated from SIPRI's figures on defense expenditure and the GNP figures (in constant 1988 US \$) of ACDA. SIPRI had its own series of figures on defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP, but only for 1979-85. SIPRI's estimates were very close to those shown here for Iran, but were much lower for Iraq. My average for Iraq in the period 1980-85 was that defense expenditure represented 31.2 % of GNP compared to SIPRI's average for the same period of 19.8 % of GDP.

³ Estimates of annual arms imports are from ACDA (1990, 93).

⁴ Numbers of men under arms per thousand of population are from ACDA (1990, 51).

Sources: ACDA (1990, 51, 93), SIPRI (1990, 1992, 201-2).

The reasons why Iran made a less intense war effort than Iraq, in spite of the fact that it was the party that had defined the conflict as total, remain unclear. This is an understudied question, generally analysts become concerned with Iran's commitment to the war only in their coverage of the last year, or months, of the conflict in order to explain the sudden decision of the Iranian leadership to agree to a ceasefire. An analyst could argue, with a touch of cynicism, that the Islamic Republic was less committed to the war than the declarations of its leader implied. The war effort was kept at a level where it would keep the Revolution running, but without exhausting it. When this level of effort could no longer be maintained, in 1988, the war was ended, because to increase the war effort to match the one made by Iraq would have hurt the interests and the future of the Revolution. There is a kernel of truth in that argument. In the sense that the war was ended in 1988 because the Iranian leadership felt that its continuation would decrease popular support for the regime and divert from its domestic goals too many scarce resources (Hiro 1990, 243-5, 259). This assessment by the Iranian leadership of the costs and benefits of the war was new. Earlier in the war, notably in 1982 when Iran had the chance to agree to a ceasefire after having expelled the invader from most of its territory, the dominant opinion within the Iranian leadership had been that the war had to be prosecuted further and had positive effects on the Iranian Revolution (Hiro 1990, 86; Menashri 1990, 228-30). However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that between 1982 and 1988 Iranian leaders engaged in a mock war, i.e., that they did not plan the war effort to win but only to keep it at a level where it would have a positive effect at home.

Another explanation for the lower level of the war effort in Iran could lie in the fact that the war mobilization system was less efficient in Iran than in Iraq. Iran's war making

relied to a large extent on a decentralized system of resource mobilization made up of a network of local revolutionary and religious institutions. Iran also maintained two armed forces: the regular military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (also known in short as *Pasdaran* or *Sepah*) each with land, sea and air services, different ministries, and logistic systems. This structure was not efficient and difficult to reform because a reform would hurt too many interests in the regime. However, an important quality of the Iranian system of resource mobilization for war, despite its inefficiency, was that it involved considerable volunteer and popular participation. Each year, large numbers of men volunteered for the *Basij* militia in order to participate for a few weeks or months to the war at the front, while the population made contributions to the war effort through mosques, foundations, and other non-governmental organizations. The fact that resource mobilization was conducted with less state coercion and bureaucratic supervision, and more popular support in Iran than in Iraq was a sign of the legitimacy and strength of the Islamic regime in Iran. But, ultimately when in 1987 and 1988 popular support for the war dried up, nothing was left for the regime but to agree to an end to the fighting.

Financing the War Effort

The financing of the war was a major challenge for both belligerents. For instance, an estimate often quoted put the monthly cost of the war for Iraq at US \$ 1 billion.³ Initially both states had access to considerable financial resources that did not depend from society to finance the war, namely revenue from oil and, in addition for Iraq, large foreign currency reserves. Nonetheless, the cost of the war, the campaign each waged against the oil exports of the other, and the declining world prices for oil meant that oil revenue could not pay the military bill of the war and sustain the developmental and consumption needs

³ It is possible that this estimate of US \$ 1 billion a month originated from the Lloyds Bank Group in 1983, see Whittleton (1986, 66). Another source estimated the cost at US \$ 25 million per day, i.e., US \$ 750 million a month for Iraq. (Mason 1990, 123).

of these countries. Both states, therefore, had to increase domestic financial extraction to some extent and streamline the state expenditures and the public sector in order to raise more revenue and save on non-war-related expenditures. In addition, Iraq had access to subsidies from the Arab oil states of the Gulf right from the outbreak of the war, and it increasingly used foreign borrowing and military credit after 1982. In that sense, Iraq relied to a much greater extent than Iran on externally-derived revenues. Iraq's foreign debt after eight years of war was so large that many analysts saw it as a motive for the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Table 5.2 gives an estimate of Iran's and Iraq's oil exports and revenues during most of the war. Estimates vary across sources but the trends are generally the same: from 1980 to 1983 Iraq was losing the 'oil war' as its oil exports were impeded by the military and diplomatic actions of Iran. However, Iraqi oil exports recovered after 1983 as Iraq developed new export routes. Meanwhile, Iran's oil export through the Gulf started to be hindered by Iraqi strikes on oil terminals and tankers. Iran's oil exports after 1983 decreased or stagnated. Thus, in the last two years of the war Iraq was probably exporting more oil than Iran.

Table 5.2 Oil Exports and Revenues of Iran and Iraq, 1980-87

Year	Oil Exports (thousands of barrels per day)		Oil Revenue (millions of US \$)	
	Iran	Iraq	Iran	Iraq
1980	952	2,459	13,300	26,136
1981	809	746	12,053	10,388
1982	1,718	861	19,200	10,100
1983	1,816	787	19,225	9,650
1984	1,579	917	12,300	11,242
1985	1,607	1,155	13,100	10,285
1986	1,464	1,465	6,600 (estimated)	6,465
1987	n.a.	1,700 (estimated)	9,500 (estimated)	11,158 (estimated)

Source: Kanovsky (1989, 234-5, 244-5).

Both states were affected by the decline in oil prices during the 1980s. This decline was particularly sharp in late 1985 - early 1986 when Saudi Arabia triggered a price war to

reconquer its share of the market (and maybe also to hurt Iran's war effort). The result was that oil exports after 1985 brought in much lower revenues to Iran and Iraq. This drop in oil prices was particularly dramatic for Iran since its oil exports were also declining during the same period; while Iraq could at least compensate for the drop in oil prices by increasing its exports.

At the start of the war Iraq was exporting oil through pipelines across Syria and Turkey and by oil terminals in the Gulf. Within the first weeks of the war the outlet through the Gulf was closed by the Iranian armed forces. Then, in early April 1982, Syria agreed to close the Iraqi pipeline across its territory in return for Iranian oil subsidies. The closure of the trans-Syrian pipeline meant for Iraq an annual loss of revenue of at least US \$ 5 billion (Bengio 1985, 588; Chubin and Tripp 1988, 179-80). In a period of about two years Iraq had seen its oil exports cut down by Iranian actions to roughly a third of their initial level. Iraq was able to recover from this situation by developing other export routes for its oil. The capacity of the pipeline through Turkey was expanded, another one was developed to export oil through Saudi Arabia, and tank trucks were used as a stopgap measure to export oil and oil products through Jordan and Turkey (Kanovsky 1989, 238; Whittleton, Muhsin and Hazelton 1989, 243).

Iran's oil exports at the start of the war were more hindered by the disorganization of its oil industry than by Iraqi actions. As the Iranian oil industry recovered from the turmoil caused by the revolution, oil exports increased; although they never reached their pre-1979 level. Analysts agreed that in 1982 and 1983 Iran had enough oil revenue to allow the state to pay for its civilian and military imports, to build its foreign currency reserves, and to maintain expenditures on development and socioeconomic services (Hiro 1985, 209, 215; Hooglund 1984, 36). Some analysts even spoke of a 'guns and butter' policy in Iran in 1982-83 because the Iranian leaders agreed both to prosecute the war, by invading Iraq, and to stimulate the economy through development expenditures (Chubin and Tripp 1988,

126; Clawson 1988, 382). It was in 1983 that the Iranian government introduced the first five-year development plan of the new regime.

This somewhat favorable situation rapidly deteriorated after 1983 as a result of declining oil prices and the increasing effectiveness of Iraqi strikes on Iran's oil export facilities in the Gulf. Iraq had declared its intention of blockading Iranian oil terminals in the northern Gulf since August 1982. But its air force did not have the capability to implement this blockade until early 1984. From that point onward Iran's main oil terminal at Kharg Island in the northern Gulf became increasingly vulnerable to Iraqi air strikes, and Iran had to develop another terminal at Sirri Island much closer to the Straits of Hormuz. The Iraqis, however, were able to strike at this terminal at various times in the late summer and the fall of 1986. Nevertheless, some analysts thought that Iranian oil exports were more affected by the world oil glut than by Iraqi strikes on shipping and terminals (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 212). But one thing seems clear, oil revenue after 1984 could no longer cover both the cost of the war and the civilian expenditures envisaged by the social reformists in the regime. Therefore the implementation of the development plan was delayed, non-oil civilian imports were cut, short-term foreign borrowing was resumed, and foreign currency reserves decreased again (Clawson 1988, 375, 383; Hiro 1990, 175-6; MacPherson 1989, 148, 150, 154).

Initially Iraq benefited from two financial assets in comparison with Iran: large foreign currency reserves and subsidies from the Arab oil states of the Gulf. Iraq's foreign currency reserves stood at US \$ 35-37 billion in 1980 before the outbreak of the war, while its foreign debt was of only US \$ 2.5 billion (Kanovsky 1989, 238; Muhsin 1986, 238; Whittleton 1986, 70). In comparison, Iran's foreign currency reserves at the time were around US \$ 10 billion (1980) with a foreign debt of US \$ 15 billion (1979) (Kanovsky 1989, 244; Percebois 1990, 67). Financial assistance to Iraq by Gulf states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has been estimated between US \$ 30 and 40 billion for

the whole of the war (Parisot 1990, 37). But one source put it at as high as US \$ 50 to 60 billion by the end of 1987 (Kanovsky 1989, 237). Most analysts argued that during the first two years of the war Iraq received cash loans from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the tune of US \$ 1 billion a month, though after 1982 direct cash payments were reduced or stopped in favor of oil exports from the Neutral Zone on behalf of Iraq (Mofid 1990, 134; Whittleton, Muhsin and Hazelton 1989, 243-4). Oil revenues from the Neutral Zone declined over time as the price of oil fell; but they still constituted substantial amounts of money. One source reported the following revenues: US \$ 4 billion in 1981 and in 1982, US \$ 3.2 billion in 1983 and in 1984, US \$ 2.9 billion in 1985, US \$ 1.3 billion in 1986, and an estimated US \$ 1.8 billion in 1987 (Kanovsky 1989, 235). Iraq was supposed to repay these oil (export) subsidies with equivalent volumes of oil after the war. However, foreign analysts, and the Iraqi leadership itself, believed that Iraq would not repay its debts to Arab states of Gulf. The Iraqis considered that they had fought the Iranians on behalf of the whole Arab nation and therefore the financial transfers received from Arab states of the Gulf were war contributions not loans (Bengio 1992, 518).

Generous Arab subsidies, large foreign currency reserves, and the prospect of considerable oil revenues were all factors that led the Iraqi decision makers to believe, early in the war, that they had the financial means to prosecute the war without jeopardizing development at home. As Taha Yassin Ramadan, a prominent member of the Baathist regime, said in October 1980: "We have the means to sustain a war for more than a year without the population being affected by it; for two years and even more by imposing some restrictions that our people are ready to accept" (Balta 1987, 155). Ramadan's prediction proved surprisingly accurate. From the fall of 1980 to the fall of 1982 the Iraqi government followed a 'guns and butter' policy, stepping up its civilian expenditures as if there were no war. In early 1981 Iraq started a new five-year development plan with some US \$ 130 billion of estimated expenditures (Crusoe 1986,

34). In 1981, only, US \$ 20 billion worth of new contracts were awarded as the 1981 budget showed a 29 per cent increase over the previous year in development expenditure (Crusoe 1986, 34; Hiro 1990, 57). In 1981 the Iraqi state was probably spending more on development than on the war effort with development expenditure at US \$ 22.5 billion and an estimated annual cost of the war at US \$ 12 billion (Hiro 1990, 58). Government spending, which stood at almost US \$ 21 billion in 1980, reached US \$ 30.5 billion in 1981, then dropped slightly to US \$ 29.5 billion in 1982 (Kanovsky 1989, 233-6).

Some analysts said that the development drive in Iraq slackened in early 1982, probably after the closure of the trans-Syrian pipeline. development expenditure in 1982 was estimated at US \$ 10 billion (Bengio 1985, 589; Crusoe 1986, 34; Hiro 1990, 58). However, the real austerity measures came in late 1982 and early 1983 when the government cut development expenditure significantly, as well as civilian imports, and the benefits and salaries of government employees (Hiro 1990, 109; Marr 1985, 301). With shrinking oil revenue and now depleted foreign currency reserves the authorities had to adopt a new economic policy in order to pursue the war (Axelgard 1986, 9; Kanovsky 1989, 237; Marr 1985, 297). This policy involved some elements of continuity already covered, notably the attempt to increase oil exports through alternative routes and the securing of subsidies based on oil exports from the Neutral Zone made on behalf of Iraq. But it also involved new elements, namely the emphasis on foreign borrowing and the rescheduling of existing foreign debts, the rationalization of the public sector, and the introduction of incentives for private business. Finally, the population was called to contribute more significantly to the financial aspect of the war effort.

Baathist Iraq had been cautious about foreign borrowing until the outbreak of the war. As mentioned, Iraq's foreign debt stood at only US \$ 2.5 billion in 1980. This situation changed after 1982 as Iraq increasingly made use of foreign credit while rescheduling its repayments (notably in 1983 and 1986). According to the estimates of the *Economist*

Intelligence Unit the total foreign debt of Iraq, i.e., including the debts owed to Arab states of the Gulf as well as the debts contracted for arms purchases, progressed in the following way: US \$ 10.3 billion in 1981, US \$ 19.9 billion in 1982, US \$ 26.4 billion in 1983, US \$ 55 billion in 1984, US \$ 65 billion in 1985, US \$ 75 billion in 1986 and US \$ 80 billion in 1987 (Kanovsky 1989, 235). As mentioned, few expected Iraq to repay its debts to Arab states of the Gulf. But Iraq's military debt to Western countries (mainly France) was estimated at US \$ 8-10 billion for the war, while the military debt to its main arms supplier, the Soviet Union, ranged between US \$ 10 and 20 billion (Parisot 1990, 37). In short, after eight years of war Iraq's military and civilian debts to Eastern bloc and Western creditors ranged between US \$ 37 and 50 billion (Parisot 1990, 37). In addition Iraq owed smaller sums to other nations like Egypt (US \$ 2 billion), Jordan (US \$ 650 million), or Turkey (US \$ 2.7 billion) (Bengio 1990, 530-2).

The measures taken by the Iraqi authorities to streamline the state and its public sector and to give incentives to private business will be reviewed in the section on the impact of war making on state power. The measures taken to increase domestic financial extraction, however, can be reviewed here. In that respect, the most spectacular measure, although probably not the most significant financially, was the donation campaign conducted by the regime in the summer of 1983. Iraqis were invited to make contributions to the war effort in cash, jewels, gold, or volunteer overtime work (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork 1984, 28). In order to insure a modicum of 'popular enthusiasm' for the donation campaign soldiers or militiamen went from door to door to check receipts of donation, and those receipts became necessary for the processing of many official documents (Muhsin 1986, 238). The government claimed that the war donation campaign yielded US \$ 600 million (Bengio 1985, 589). Obviously this was not an efficient and permanent way of financing the war; although it might have fulfilled some propaganda purpose at the time.

More efficient measures of financial extraction adopted by the authorities included deductions and cuts in wages and social benefits (Cobbett 1986, 133; Muhsin 1986, 239). Obviously, these measures were mostly applicable in the public sector of the economy where the government could easily control the revenue and benefits of employees. Another source assessed taxation in Iraq during the war in the following way:

For the first time since it came to power, the government has been forced to raise revenues from the people. It seems to have approached this in the most gingerly fashion. Tax collection procedures have reportedly been tightened up, but at the same time many tax rates have been reduced (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork 1984, 28).

This source argued that the tax yield increased in Iraq during the war as a result of stricter tax collection combined with lower tax rates to make the taxation more acceptable. However, given the absence of detailed economic statistics on Iraq, it is impossible to assess the extent to which the Iraqi state increased its taxation as a result of the war.

Iran's financial strategy for the war shared with Iraq's a heavy reliance on oil revenue. But as mentioned this source of income became increasingly unreliable for Iran as the war progressed. In contrast to the Iraqi government, Iranian authorities tried to avoid as much as possible foreign borrowing as a means of financing the war and their domestic activities. The Islamic Republic paid most of Iran's outstanding long-term debts in 1981. Afterward, Iran made some use of short-term credits, for instance US \$ 3 billion of credit were used in 1981 and repaid in 1982 (Clawson 1988, 375). In 1985-86 as oil revenues dropped Iran again made use of short-term borrowing.⁴ The use of international credit was anathema to the new regime, and the war did not significantly lessen the reluctance of the

⁴ The size of Iran's foreign debt at the end of the war was uncertain. One source said that Iran had up to US \$ 5 billion in short-term foreign debt in the last years of the war (Sigler 1990, 148). Another source reported that Iran, by 1987, owed US \$ 5.6 billion in trade credits but had sufficient foreign reserves to cover this debt (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 129). But, another source put Iran's foreign debt in early 1988 at only US \$ 0.5 billion with foreign reserves estimated at US \$ 5.8 billion (Hiro 1990, 250). Finally, another estimate put Iran's long-term foreign debt in early 1987 at as low as US \$ 5 million (MacPherson 1989, 152). As for the Iranian authorities, they claimed that the Islamic Republic never used foreign borrowing (Farazmand 1990, 168).

authorities to borrow abroad; although there was a debate after the war about the wisdom of using foreign credit to rebuild the economy.

Since foreign borrowing was largely rejected by the Iranian authorities, three other options remained available: raising more tax revenue, cutting expenditures, and deficit spending. To increase the tax yield was an option favored by the reformists since this would contribute to two socioeconomic objectives of the Revolution: to decrease the dependence on oil revenue and to redistribute wealth in favor of the poorer classes. However, the tax legislation was fiercely opposed by conservative elements in the regime, which took a very restrictive view of Islamic precepts on taxation.

The debate on taxation started in 1984-85 when the government attempted to raise taxation to make up for the decline in oil revenue. According to the minister of economy, the government aimed at raising about 80 to 90 per cent of its revenue from taxes within a period of five to ten years (Menashri 1988: 337). But when the new taxation law was presented to the parliament in 1985 it provoked considerable opposition. The government and leading figures of the regime argued that the dependence on oil revenue had to be decreased and that Islam allowed taxation in time of emergency like war. On the other hand, the opponents of the new taxation scheme stuck to a restrictive interpretation of Islam that allowed taxes only for the religious establishment, and argued that extraordinary taxation to meet emergency situations had to specify the duration, purpose, and amount of taxation in order to be in conformity with Islam (Menashri 1990, 358). As with many other debates between reformists and conservatives within the regime, the debate on taxation reached no clear and satisfactory conclusion. One analyst claimed that the Iranian government managed to impose higher taxes, but not by much, and that the religious arguments against taxation were additional grounds for tax evasion (Clawson 1988, 378-9).

Data presented in Table 5.3 confirm that little was achieved in regard to taxation in Iran under the stimulus of war. In constant 1985 prices, the Iranian state collected in tax revenue in 1988 nearly the same amount than it did in 1980, a year after the revolution when a large degree of administrative anarchy prevailed in the country. In terms of total financial extraction, the Iranian state's total revenue in the period 1980-83 amounted to 21 to 24 per cent of GDP compared with only 11 to 14 per cent in the period 1986-89. The only apparent achievement of taxation policy under the Islamic Republic was the greater share of total revenue derived from taxes: this share stood at 32 per cent in 1980 and went as high as 67 per cent in 1986, to decline again during the last years of the war and after. However, much of that achievement was due to the drop in oil revenue not to a dramatic increase in tax revenue.

Table 5.3 Main Revenues of the Iranian Central Government, [1977] 1980-92 (in billions of rials, constant 1985)

Year	Tax Revenue (as a % of total revenue)	Oil Revenue (as a % of total revenue)	Total Revenue (as a % of GDP)
1977	1,580.9 (23.7)	4,846.1 (72.5)	6,682.4 (36.9)
1980	776.1 (31.8)	1,516.9 (62.2)	2,440.3 (21.6)
1981	1,042.5 (37.2)	1,542.2 (55.0)	2,806.5 (23.0)
1982	1,032.3 (30.6)	2,111.9 (62.6)	3,372.9 (24.2)
1983	1,141.1 (34.8)	1,951.1 (59.4)	3,282.7 (21.3)
1984	1,245.9 (39.8)	1,439.4 (46.0)	3,132.9 (19.7)
1985	1,352.1 (45.6)	1,188.7 (40.1)	2,963.7 (17.9)
1986	1,135.6 (67.3)	348.8 (20.7)	1,688.0 (11.1)
1987	979.1 (55.3)	540.0 (30.5)	1,769.7 (11.8)
1988	778.7 (56.1)	372.5 (26.9)	1,387.1 (11.2)
1989	885.1 (50.2)	354.7 (20.1)	1,761.7 (13.8)
1990	1,034.7 (40.1)	435.7 (16.9)	2,578.7 (18.1)
1991	1,302.4 (48.8)	329.7 (12.4)	2,665.8 (16.8)
1992	1,294.6 (41.9)	1,281.2 (41.5)	3,088.3 (18.3)

Sources: The data are from the IMF's *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* for the years 1988, 1990 and 1993. The 1993 Yearbook warns that data after 1987 do not form a consistent series with those of earlier years. I doubt that the discontinuity is significant. The current prices were adjusted in constant 1985 prices by the means of the GDP deflator provided in the yearbooks.

The declining share of oil and the increasing share of taxes in total revenue might give the impression that the Iranian state shifted its revenue from an externally-derived source (oil rent) to internally-derived sources based in society. This proposition must be

considerably qualified. One source said that taxation was mainly borne by government employees -- they accounted for 76 per cent of collected individual income tax in 1984 (MacPherson 1989, 153). Another source reported that 10 per cent of tax revenue came from a tax on the central bank (Clawson 1988, 378). The share of non-tax revenue (minus oil revenue) also increased after 1983 and most of these revenues came from sources controlled by the state. In short, the Iranian state shifted its sources of revenue from external to domestic sources under the impact of the war, but this shift was to a large extent to domestic sources controlled by the state rather than by groups based in society.

Another source of domestic financial extraction existed in Iran during the war, although it is difficult to describe its structure as well as its evolution. As a result of the Islamic Revolution Iran got a double set of political institutions, some directly connected to the state and its bureaucracy, others forming a diffuse network of religious and revolutionary organizations that vowed allegiance to the regime but were not integrated in the bureaucracy and the government. As the Revolution became institutionalized over the years some of these 'regime institutions' like the *Pasdaran* and the Reconstruction Crusade became integrated in the state with their own ministries. But there remained a whole range of locally-based institutions, like mosques and Islamic societies, and nationally-based foundations that undertook various 'para-administrative' functions such as the collection of donations for the war, the recruitment of volunteers for the *Basij* militia, and the administration of welfare services and subsidies for the poorer classes and the victims of the war.

This vast para-administrative network was essential for the war effort but it also escaped monitoring by the state bureaucracy and possibly even by the top leadership of the regime. It was consequently impossible for me to find data on the financial contribution of this network to the war effort. It is clear from the sources consulted that resource

mobilization for war in Iran was largely decentralized.⁵ Each region, each town or city of some importance contributed directly to its manpower quota for the war. In addition, they were asked to contribute to the maintenance of troops at the front. This system allowed the regime in Iran to mobilize its society for war without relying as much on the bureaucratic power of the state as it was the case in Iraq.

However this decentralized system of war mobilization was also less efficient than a centralized, bureaucratic system. Misappropriation of local war funds was possible, and the whole system produced an uneven distribution of men and material resources across units at the front (Schahgaldian 1987, 54). The fact that the system was less than perfect can be guessed from the effort of Iranian leaders to create a centrally-managed war mobilization system as early as 1984, but without success (Schahgaldian 1987, 54-5). An illustration of the difficulties with a conversion to a centralized system occurred in the fall of 1987 when the government declared a "financial *jihad*" to raise financial contributions for the war effort: whereas until then donations had been collected locally by religious authorities (Menashri 1989, 404, 420). This war donation campaign met with the reluctance of the population (Menashri 1990, 390). It is possible that the difficulties the Iranian authorities met in mobilizing men and funds in the fall of 1987 were forerunners of the war weariness that would engulf Iran in 1988. But it is also possible that by attempting to manage centrally the war mobilization effort in the last phase of the war the authorities alienated the local representatives of the regime who had played such an essential role in

⁵ The decentralization actually affected the whole institutional structure of Iran; although few analysts specifically treated of the subject except, A. Farazmand (Farazmand 1987, 1989, 1990). The latter analyst mentioned the "remarkable role" various mass organizations played in Iran's war effort (Farazmand 1990, 161). Officially, the regime created in December 1981 the Office for Coordination of the Revolutionary Organs (Menashri 1990, 161). But it is doubtful that this central organization had much control over the network of organizations and groups. Local mosques, for instance, assisted the government in administration and in recruitment for the war (Menashri 1990, 8). At least four different foundations dealt with war victims and veterans (Kechichian and Sadri 1989, 283). A variety of organizations, ranging from mosques to foundations and ministries, were involved in collecting public donations for the war effort (Schahgaldian 1987, 54). Groups of towns and villages were asked to sponsor units at the front with food and clothing (Hiro 1990, 176). Until the creation of their ministry in late 1982, the Revolutionary Guards had financed and armed themselves through local and individual efforts (Katzman 1993, 101).

war mobilization in previous years. Such a deduction is not far-fetched considering that the Iranian president felt the need, when declaring the financial *jihad* in November 1987, to deny that this campaign aimed at strengthening the central government at the expense of non-governmental organizations (Menashri 1989, 420). The need for such an official denial implied that some people thought differently. In brief, a network of non-governmental institutions helped the Iranian state to mobilize the resources of society for war, but the exact extent of that contribution and its evolution over time remain unclear from the accounts currently available.

Another way of meeting the financial needs of the Iranian state during the war years was to finance the recurrent annual deficits through the creation of additional money. This strategy was used notably in fiscal years 1981-82 and 1986-87, when the government deficits as a percentage of GDP reached respectively 11 and 10 per cent -- while it usually stood at about 7 or 8 per cent of GDP (Clawson 1988, 375-7). Analysts agreed that the financing of deficits through the expansion of money supply by the central bank was an important cause of high inflation in Iran (Clawson 1988, 375-6; Karimi 1986, 36).

Another option for a government confronted with declining revenue and recurrent deficits is to cut down on its expenditures. The Iranian government followed this policy earnestly. Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased from 46 per cent in 1977-78 -- i.e., under the Shah and just before the revolution -- to 23 per cent of GDP in 1986-87 (Clawson 1988, 376). Analysts found it remarkable that a regime with a populist ideology and at war (two incentives for spending more, not less) could reduce its expenditures to such an extent (Clawson 1988, 377-8; Karimi 1986, 35). Development expenditure was particularly affected by the cuts (Clawson 1988, 378; Karimi 1986, 34). The choice of targeting the development budget for the cuts was made easier because the regime also wanted to distance itself from the development and consumption patterns found under the Shah (Karimi 1986, 34). This significant drop in government

expenditures during the war will be dealt with again later since it is an important indicator of the impact of the war on state power.

In short, both states started the war with access to an externally-derived source of revenue: oil income. However, this source of revenue controlled by the state was negatively affected by the war and the drop in world oil prices. Oil revenue could not sustain both the war expenditure and the civilian expenditure of the state. The responses of the Iranian and Iraqi states to that situation had points of convergence, but also of divergence. Both states found that they had to cut down on their civilian expenditures, particularly the development budget, after a period when they had followed a 'guns and butter' policy. Both states also increased their financial extraction from the population: although the authorities seemed reluctant to declare tax increases and favored war donation campaigns and other forms of contribution (payroll deductions, cuts in benefits, free overtime, etc.). Generally direct and indirect taxation was borne more by the public sector than by the private economic sector in both countries.

A significant contrast between Iran and Iraq in the financing of the war was the greater reliance of the Iraqi authorities on foreign financial assistance in the form of subsidies from Arab oil states of the Gulf and civilian or military credit from foreign suppliers and contractors. In contrast Iran used foreign borrowing only on a short-term basis -- as a stopgap measure in periods of sharp drop in oil revenue -- and had to give subsidies to its major regional ally, Syria. Another contrast between the two countries was the fact that in Iraq war mobilization was centrally-managed and relied ultimately on coercion by the state, while in Iran it was decentralized and relied to a greater degree on popular participation.

Mobilizing the Men

As mentioned earlier, one of the striking features of war mobilization during the Iran-Iraq War was the extent to which Iraq managed to mobilize more men than Iran even if the

latter had a three to one demographic advantage, a higher level of domestic legitimacy, and revolutionary or religious fervor on its side. Table 5.4 shows that in terms of active armed forces -- those forces readily available for military operations -- Iraq maintained through the war a numerical superiority over Iran. Iran would achieve parity or a slight superiority for short periods if one added to the figures reported in Table 5.4 about 100,000 militiamen from the *Basij*. But Iraq also had a militia force (the People's Army), which reportedly had reached 650,000 members by 1984. From the mid-1980s Iraq probably had the highest rate of military mobilization in the world. Only Israel had a rate approaching that of Iraq. But Israel's mobilization potential was based on the call-up of reserves for short periods during crises or wars, while Iraq's rate of mobilization was maintained over months and years. In the last two years of the war, when both sides tried to achieve a decisive victory, Iraq's armed forces grew by 155,000 men while Iran's armed forces decreased in size by about 100,000 men.

Table 5.4 Active Armed Forces in Iran and Iraq, 1980-88

Year	Population (millions)		Armed Forces (thousands) ¹		Armed Forces per 1,000 of Population ²	
	Iran	Iraq	Iran	Iraq	Iran	Iraq
1980	38.3	13.1	not known	242	not known	18.5
1982	39.1	13.6	235	342	6.0	25.1
1984	42.5	14.9	555	643	13.1	43.2
1986	45.2	15.4	705	845	15.6	54.9
1988	52.8	16.3	605	1,000	11.5	61.4

¹ The term armed forces includes for Iran both the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); for Iraq it means the regular armed forces (including the Republican Guard). The size of Iran's armed forces in 1980 is not known precisely. As a result of the turmoil caused by the revolution and its aftermath it is believed that the armed forces had been reduced by as much as 60 per cent of their personnel (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 33; Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 66-7). This reduction would have left between 170,000 and 238,000 men in the armed forces (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 64). In addition, the IRGC was estimated at around 25,000 men in mid-1980 (Schahgaldian 1987, 69).

² These series of figures are different from those reported in Table 5.1 under the same variable. ACDA's figures (used in Table 5.1) had usually higher population estimates than the IISS's data base, while the ACDA's reporting on the size of armed forces seemed to use an inconsistent definition of the term over time. Nevertheless, both series show a large gap between Iran and Iraq in terms of manpower mobilization.

Source: IISS, The Military Balance (various years).

The outstanding rate of mobilization achieved by Iraq during the war was not a feat that could be done through ordinary means. In order to achieve it the Iraqi authorities had to resort to successive extensions of conscription, to draconian measures against draft dodgers and deserters, to an expansion of reserve forces, and to the employment of women and foreign workers in the administration and economy. The use of foreign troops remained marginal through the war in proportion to the number of Iraqis mobilized.⁶ However, small groups of foreign pilots and military advisers might have made up for shortages of skilled manpower and expertise in the Iraqi armed forces.⁷

As a result of the outbreak of the war compulsory military service in Iraq was extended indefinitely beyond the peacetime two-year period of service. Given the shortages of trained manpower, many technicians began to serve for as long as five years (Kechichian 1990, 220-1). Initially the authorities urged men to volunteer for the war, but quickly they had to use decrees to extend the categories of Iraqis liable for military service (Bengio 1984, 594). By mid-1982 men discharged from the army after their military service became again eligible for drafting, as well as college graduates, and those who had paid a monetary compensation to be dispensed from military service (Bengio 1984, 594; Hiro 1990, 89). Conscription was also extended to new age groups. In 1984, the draft age was lowered to seventeen (Marr 1985, 300; Muhsin 1986, 239). As the war progressed older classes of age were also called up for service in the reserves, so that by 1987 men up to 50 years of age could be conscripted (Bengio 1986, 474-5; Bengio 1989, 436; Hiro 1990,

⁶ In spite of Iraq's attempt to portray the Iran-Iraq War as a conflict between Arabs and Persians (Iranians), there were relatively few Arab volunteers for the war. In early 1982 King Hussein of Jordan announced the creation of a volunteer force for service in Iraq, it numbered between 3,000 and 5,000 men by the time it left for Iraq in March and April (Susser 1984, 689). In late 1982, Sudan opened 15 recruitment centers for volunteers to fight in Iraq. Six groups of 500 volunteers each were sent to Iraq. In addition the Sudanese authorities sent a contingent of 1,000 men from the armed forces in January 1983 (Shaked and Ronen 1985, 784). The majority of foreign Arabs who fought on the side of Iraq during the war were foreign workers conscripted or gang-pressed into service, see main text below.

⁷ The Iraqi Air Force was often short of qualified pilots. In 1982, Iraq recruited 40 to 60 Egyptian pilots (Hiro 1990, 277). As a result of important combat losses in early 1987, Iraq again had to recruit foreign pilots. Iraq had experienced pilots for only about a quarter of its combat aircraft (Bengio 1989, 435; Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 280; Hiro 1990, 184).

109). In 1987 the need for additional troops was so pressing that half of Baghdad's police force was sent to the front, with apparently negative effects on security in the capital (Bengio 1989, 436; Whittleton, Muhsin and Hazelton 1989, 245).

Only two groups seemed to be less subjected to conscription than others, these were the Kurds and students. Iraqi Kurdistan had been in more or less open rebellion against the central government during most of the 1960s and 1970s, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War created an opportunity to assert again Kurdish autonomy. The conscription of, and the prevention of desertions among, Kurds were therefore difficult tasks. In 1983, Hussein admitted that up to 48,000 Kurds had deserted the armed forces (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 267). It was probably in response to high desertion rates that Kurds were exempted from military service from late 1982 to mid-1983 (Helms 1984, 190). Although Kurds represented between 15 to 20 per cent of Iraq's population, their contribution to military manpower was probably limited mainly to the cooperation of pro-governmental militias in Kurdish areas.

Students were another group that the regime had some difficulty in mobilizing. Before the war the granting of deferments from military service to pursue post-secondary education had been common practice, so students tried to resist conscription on the basis of the pre-war regulations (Bengio 1986, 475). During the war some students even deliberately failed their exams in order to remain in college as long as possible (Muhsin 1986, 240). The authorities, however, closed this loophole in 1984 when they decided to draft all students who had failed their final examinations for three years of military service instead of two (Bengio 1986, 475). In 1984 some student unrest occurred as a result of two developments. First, the government decided to mobilize all students into the People's Army (the regime's militia); second, fewer high school graduates were admitted to universities, thus increasing in all likelihood the number of conscripted students (Bengio 1986, 477). Both developments indicated the growing regimented control of the student

population. However, the authorities backtracked on the issue of the compulsory enrolment of students in the People's Army; and the following year they only required students to work in factories and public offices during the summer holidays (Bengio 1987, 465).

Students and governmental authorities clashed again in June 1986 when the authorities announced that 100,000 students and 15,000 university teachers would be conscripted and trained for possible service at the front (Bengio 1988, 372; Whittleton, Muhsin and Hazelton 1989, 244). Officials presented the decision as a necessary measure to inculcate students with patriotism and discipline, and to prepare them for their future military life after the completion of their studies. President Hussein also added that this measure was important to fight demoralization among young soldiers, envious of the preferential treatment given to students, and to prevent aimless students from being exposed to negative influences during the summer holidays (Bengio 1988, 372). As in 1984, protests ensued from the announcement of the conscription measure and the possibility of sending students to the front. Again, the authorities partially backtracked. In October 1986 Hussein declared that after discussion the Iraqi politico-military leadership had reached the conclusion that the army was strong enough to defeat the Iranians without having to send students to the front (Bengio 1988, 373).

Other Iraqis also dreaded military service, but their resistance was expressed through draft-dodging and desertion. Some analysts estimated at over 100,000 the number of Iraqi deserters, many of them turned bandits or guerrillas after regrouping (Muhsin 1986, 240-1). By 1982 desertion was such a problem that the authorities had to introduce the death penalty for it, as well as for other forms of absence from military units (Bengio 1984, 594; Hiro 1990, 89). In February 1983 a decree prohibited the employment of deserters; and the authorities called upon their families to induce them to rejoin their units (Bengio 1985, 571). Special units were also created to execute deserters or retreating soldiers right behind

the front (Bengio 1988, 373-4; Muhsin 1986, 240). The very definition of desertion was widened to include obeying an order likely to remove oneself from duties at the front (Bengio 1989, 436). With such a definition, a soldier retreating under the order of a superior could be considered a deserter. In June 1987 students were made liable to military discipline. From then on students evading military training risked immediate conscription and the full application of the military penal code (Whittleton, Muhsin and Hazelton 1989, 244-5).

The authorities also tried to deter desertion and draft dodging by stigmatizing the men who committed it. For instance, the Revolutionary Command Council (the effective executive of the government) decreed that a wife could divorce her husband if he had deserted or evaded the draft. The divorce would only be revocable if the husband joined back the army, and it would become irrevocable if he deserted a second time (Bengio 1988, 373-4). Propaganda and official art also played upon the theme of parents willing to kill their son who had deserted (Bengio 1988, 374). In February 1986 an edition of the Baath party newspaper showed a picture of Hussein decorating a man who had shot his own son for having refused to go to war (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 267). The authorities clearly tried to send the message that draft dodging or desertion would only lead to death or a life as a social outcast.

At the start of the war the Iraqis had the option, like the Iranians, to develop a dual armed forces system or to consolidate their manpower by putting most resources in one of the two forces: the regular armed forces or the People's Army. During the first two years of the war it seemed that the People's Army would play an important part in the war. But as the war progressed further the military function of this organization declined; although its formal membership kept growing. The People's Army had been established in 1970 as a security force for the Baath party and as a military reserve. In 1975 its ranks were opened to non-Baathists and in 1976 to women, so that by 1980-81 it had reached a

membership of 250,000 (Helms 1984, 99-100). The commander-in-chief of the People's Army claimed in February 1982 that his force had by then 400,000 militarily-trained men and that 55,000 of them were deployed in rotation at the front (Bengio 1984, 594). Their military performance there, however, was less than impressive. People's Army units broke down and surrendered more easily than regular army units (Abbas 1986, 220-1).

The role of the People's Army in military operations declined rapidly after 1982 to the benefit of the regular forces and a new elite force, the Republican Guard, closely associated with the regime (more specifically with President Hussein himself). The Republican Guard distinguished itself during the operations to contain the Iranian offensive at Fao in 1986, and the regime decided to expand it from a force of 7 brigades to one of 28 brigades with a total of 100,000 men (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 354-5). These elite troops led the first Iraqi offensive in April 1988. Meanwhile, it seemed that the People's Army was appreciated more for its propaganda value than its military relevance. The rapid growth of the organization, up to 650,000 people, the short politico-military training it gave to its members, and the statements of its commander-in-chief to the effect that his organization aimed at becoming an economical alternative midway between a militia and a regular army, implied that it was a symbolic reply to Iran's own brand of popular mobilization (namely the *Basij* militia). Recruitment for the People's Army was unpopular and the cost of its training program was seen as an economic burden (Bengio 1986, 476; Bengio 1990, 517; Hiro 1990, 139). So it is not surprising that it was first on the list for post-war demobilization (Bengio 1990, 516-7). Little is known about the Iraqi military reserve system, but it is clear that the rapid growth in Iraqi military manpower in the second half of the 1980s came from a better use of that military manpower pool. At least one source reported that in the mid-1980s reserve units started receiving intensive training and were sent to the front to relieve active units temporarily or to make up for shortages of men (Kechichian 1990, 221).

So many Iraqi males took part in the war effort that this situation seriously affected the civilian economy. Even before the war Iraq had had to import foreign labor to meet the demands of its booming economy (Marr 1985, 281). The demand for foreign labor, however, became more acute with the war even if the remittances of foreign workers to their families abroad were an important financial drain. As a result of war mobilization the work force in factories and offices had been reduced by as much as 40 to 45 per cent by 1982 (Marr 1985, 301). The number of foreign workers in Iraq during the war ranged between three-quarters and two million people (Whittleton 1986, 60; Kanovsky 1989, 236; Hiro 1990, 4). By 1982, Egyptians, the largest group of foreign workers, made up 63.3 per cent of the work force in agriculture and construction (Bengio 1986, 478). Women were also asked to replace men who had left their jobs for the war. By 1985, women made up 25 per cent of the work force, however, their participation was up to 51 per cent in administration and 31 per cent in the public sector, compared to only 17.9 per cent in the private sector. By then women accounted for 60 per cent of the educational staff and 55 per cent of students at Baghdad University (Bengio 1987, 467). Foreign workers and women were essential to run the economy and administration, but they also made a limited contribution to military manpower. As many as 20,000 Egyptians working in Iraq were gang-pressed, or conscripted with the approval of Egyptian authorities (Bengio 1986, 475; Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 119; Muhsin 1986, 235). Some women also got military training in the People's Army while others served in the air force and in the air defense units (Bengio 1988, 371-2; Kechichian 1990, 221).

Manpower mobilization for war in Iran was almost a point-by-point contrast with the situation in Iraq. Iran's military manpower was shared between three different military organizations: the regular armed forces, the IRGC and the *Basij*; whereas Iraq put the emphasis on its regular armed forces. Iran also relied more than Iraq on volunteers. However, as the war progressed, even volunteer organizations like the *Basij* and the

IRGC started to use conscription to fill their ranks. Resistance to mobilization was also a problem in Iran, but the authorities took less draconian measures than in Iraq to fight it. Although Iran ran short of military manpower to carry out its strategy of final offensives in 1986-87, it never suffered from a general shortage of manpower. While Iraq had to import foreign labor, Iran experienced high unemployment rates.⁸ In brief, while Iraq used almost the full potential of its manpower, Iran spoiled much of its demographic advantage through a sub-optimal use of its manpower resources.

An obvious source of inefficiency and waste was the maintenance of three significant military organizations: the regular armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the *Basij* militia. This institutional setup stemmed from the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Revolution had left Iran with much reduced regular armed forces as a result of desertions and purges. The regime was uncertain about the loyalty of the armed forces, and many argued for their replacement by a revolutionary army. But the new government decided to keep the armed forces, notably to quell insurrections by ethnic minorities, which had taken advantage of revolutionary disorder to assert their autonomy. The formation of the IRGC by a decree of Khomeini in May 1979 was an attempt to discipline and integrate the various Islamic guerrilla and militia groups that had contributed to the Revolution. The function of the IRGC was to protect the Revolution from its internal and external enemies. In Iran, this role meant that the Revolutionary Guards were designed to counter putschist elements in the regular army as well as the leftist paramilitary organizations, which had taken part in the Revolution but that the Islamists were now trying to push aside or suppress. Finally, during the period of tension that followed the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the formation of a people's army, which became in 1980 the *Basij* militia.

⁸ For instance, unemployment in Iran in 1986 was officially estimated to affect about 4 million people, that is 29 per cent of the labor force (Kanovsky 1989, 243-6; Menashri 1989, 402).

In theory it could be argued that the three organizations were not competing for the same manpower. The regular armed forces were made up of professionals and conscripts, the IRGC was a volunteer organization open to men dedicated to the Revolution, and the *Basij* was also a volunteer organization, but open to youths under draft age and to men over 35 to 40 years of age. In reality, both the regular army and the IRGC were in competition for the same manpower pool, young adult males. The regular army, however, was handicapped by the fact that the IRGC was in charge of carrying out the draft as well as of supervising and training the *Basij*. The fact that conscription for the army was implemented by a rival organization and the intention of the authorities of keeping the regular armed forces smaller than they were under the Shah might explain why the regular army never fully exploited its conscription potential. Each year during the war 422,000 young men reached conscription age in Iran -- compared to 161,000 in Iraq (Hiro 1985, 237). Yet the army (ground forces) grew at a slow rate during the war. It stood at around 150,000 men during 1981-83, then reached a level of 250,000 men in 1984-85, and of 305,000 men in 1986-88. The *Military Balance* reported only 100,000 conscripts in the army in the years 1981-85 and perhaps 200-250,000 in 1986-88. The demographic potential of Iran was therefore not fully tapped by conscription for the regular army.

The situation was worsened by the poor state of military reserves. The *Military Balance* reported about 350-400,000 men in the army reserves during the war. Yet the most detailed account available of the Iranian reserve system revealed a system lacking in credibility, in which reservists were never recalled and lacked commitment to their duty. In addition, the analyst mentioned economic costs and the lack of influence of the regular army as factors working against the development of an effective reserve system (Schahgaldian 1987, 56-7). It was only during the last months of the war that the Iranian authorities finally grasped that in order to pursue the war with success they would have to rely more on conscription and reserves (like the Iraqis) than on short-term volunteer

service (like the *Basij* militia). In 1988 the military service was extended from 24 to 28 months. In June, Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani was appointed acting commander in chief by Khomeini and put in charge of the reorganization of the Iranian war effort. One of his task was to provide more combat-ready manpower by relying on conscription and reserves and a longer military service (Gera 1990, 213).

Initially the revolutionary government had shortened the period of military service from 24 to 12 months; but already by late 1979 the period of service had been prolonged to 18 months (Schahgaldian 1987, 18, 42). The war brought the military service to its pre-1979 length of 24 months. At least one source claimed that until the end of 1983 students could easily obtain deferments, but from then on conscription was applied more thoroughly (Hooglund 1984, 36). Another source also argued that conscription was applied more equally under the Islamic Republic than under the Shah's regime, when conscripts were selected by drawing lots (Hourcade 1990, 71).

During the last two years of the war the Iranian authorities tried to mobilize more men by repeatedly appealing for volunteers, but also by modifying the conscription law. The new law required that all conscripts spent at least a year at the front -- this implied that before it was possible to get safe assignments in rear areas -- it also set a limit of five years to exemptions from service, and it allowed the recalling of veterans (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 232; Kechichian and Sadri 1989, 261). Finally, in view of the insufficient intake of volunteers during the mobilization campaign of the fall of 1987, the authorities had to extend the military service to 28 months in 1988 (Gera 1990, 224; Hiro 1990, 199). The extension of the conscription and the (planned) increased reliance on reserves were a belated acknowledgement that voluntary service was insufficient to mobilize men for a war on the scale of the Iran-Iraq War. In fact the limits of voluntary service had been amply demonstrated in 1987-88.

After the success at Fao in early 1986 the Iranian authorities (including Khomeini) had declared that the current (Persian) year (i.e., from March 21, 1986 to March 20, 1987) would be decisive for the war (Hiro 1990, 170-1). The Fao offensive had shown that victory was possible and declining oil revenue made it a necessity that it came soon (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 76). The commitment of the leaders to a renewed mobilization effort was confirmed by their statements and the measures they took. In March 1986 Khomeini declared that all Iranian males had to decide how to contribute to the war effort. The IRGC followed this declaration by issuing status determination forms, on which every man had to specify his status in regard to the war effort. From these forms the IRGC selected men for military training. The whole exercise maintained the pretense of voluntary service, but in practice the system worked almost like conscription (Zabih 1988, 218-9). Conscription was actually used to fill the ranks of the IRGC and the *Basij*, organizations that until then had been relying only on volunteers (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 76-7; Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 232; Katzman 1993, 63). The mobilization campaign was carried out by 90 provincial councils, which had to fill manpower quotas and were supervised by a newly-formed Council for War Support (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 76; Hiro 1990, 171). The quota of *Basij* militiamen that each district could send to the front was doubled (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 232). Additional manpower was sought, largely symbolically, in the recruitment and training of women by the *Basij* militia (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 245; Kechichian and Sadri 1989, 260). The government also took measures to give military training to its employees and to prepare some of them for service at the front (20 per cent of 1.6 million employees) (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 75-6; Hiro 1990, 170-1).

In May 1986 a statement by the commander-in-chief of the IRGC amounted to an acknowledgement that Iran had not done enough in terms of war mobilization until then. He said:

The reason that Iraq has not yet collapsed is that we have fought the enemy with only 2 per cent of our manpower. Is our country's population a mere 150,000? We can easily mobilise eight million people in our country. In this decisive year for war all our people should be ready for general mobilisation. We must increase this 2 per cent of our manpower who have already gone to the fronts to 30 per cent, 40 per cent; and even 50 per cent (Zabih 1988, 219).

In his statement Muhsin Rezai, the leader of the IRGC, added that Iran had only to throw into battle four times more lightly-armed infantry than the Iraqis to win the war (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 77; Hiro 1990, 171).

At least one analyst drew the conclusion that the mobilization campaign during 1986 met with difficulties, because clerics and politicians repeatedly called for mobilization and a statement from the gendarmerie warned those considering draft evasion that they would be submitted to an extension of service if caught (Menashri 1988, 342). This assessment was confirmed by the fact that in the midst of the bloody *Karbala-5* offensive in January 1987 the IRGC had to make another public appeal for men. Apparently the mobilization campaign in 1986 had produced an intake of 200,000 men compared to the half a million sought by the authorities (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 250-1). In 1987 the mobilization campaign again produced fewer recruits than planned and this led to the decision to prolong military service (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 359; Hiro 1990, 199). The situation did not improve during 1988 when calls for volunteers brought few recruits, except in late July 1988 when an Iraqi offensive threatened to penetrate deep into Iran (Hiro 1990, 204-5, 244-6).

During the last year of the war draft dodging became a serious problem as youths fled the country in increasing numbers to evade military service following its extension and more systematic implementation (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 130). Some sources in the US government estimated that about a quarter of Iranian refugees in Turkey were draft dodgers, that is more than a quarter of a million people (Zabih 1988, 202). The penalties against draft-dodging in Iran seemed less severe than in Iraq. They consisted of measures

such as fines, jail sentences, extension of military service, and restrictions on various rights for up to ten years (Kechichian and Sadri 1989, 261).

Both states also tried to minimize the impact of military casualties on their societies. Both Iran and Iraq had extensive programs of compensation and assistance for the families of men who died at war. The programs usually included lump sums and pensions, outright gifts of land or housing, privileged access to rationed goods or services like university education.⁹ However, both states differed on the public display of mourning. In Iran, Shia Islam favored the celebration of martyrs (Hiro 1990, 106). In Iraq, in contrast, public signs of mourning were prohibited, the official reporting of casualty figures after battles was ended, and the authorities used cold storage facilities to stock the war dead so that the return of their remains could be spread over time (Bengio 1985, 566; Bengio 1988, 373; Whittleton, Muhsin and Hazelton 1989, 247). The only public ceremonies honoring war dead in Iraq were those for the victims of Iranian missile strikes on Baghdad (Bengio 1988, 374).

Equipping the Armies

As the data in Table 5.1 pointed out, the monetary value of Iraqi arms imports during the war was at least three times larger than the value of Iranian arms imports. But the gap between Iran and Iraq in terms of weapons and military supplies was in fact larger because Iraq's direct access to some major arms suppliers, like the Soviet Union and France, meant that per dollar spent Iraq got more arms, of better quality, and sold under more

⁹ In Iran the compensations for the death of a regular army soldier were: a lump sum (equivalent to) US \$ 24,000, full salary as pension, a US \$ 60 monthly deposit in a bank account for children until they reached 18, and assistance in finding a dwelling (Hiro 1985, 239; Kechichian and Sadri 1989, 284). The Martyr Foundation also had an assistance program to help relatives of a dead combatant (probably the *Basij* militiamen). It included preferential treatment in regard to food rationing, housing, and the pilgrimage to Mecca, as well as a small pension and child allowance (Hiro 1990, 54; Zabih 1988, 184). In Iraq the compensations included a lump sum large enough to buy a car, a house, or a piece of land for the parents, and monthly pensions for the brothers and sisters as well as for the widow and children (Kechichian 1990, 246). However, the sources claimed, or implied, that the Iraqi compensation package was reduced by financial difficulties as the war dragged on (Kechichian 1990, 246; Muhsin 1986, 237).

favorable financial terms than Iran did (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 190). The latter had to rely either on copies of Soviet weapons supplied by China and North Korea, or on an intricate network of middlemen to get weapons and military supplies from Western suppliers. In contrast to Arab-Israeli wars since 1956 both belligerents chose, or had, to diversify their sources of arms supply. In addition, both Iraq and Iran made an effort during (and after) the war to develop a local arms industry.

Table 5.5 Major Arms Suppliers to Iran and Iraq, 1979-88 (millions of US \$)

	IRAN		IRAQ	
	1979-1983	1984-1988	1979-1983	1984-1988
USA	1,200 *	10		
USSR	975	5	7,200	15,400
China	230	2,500	1,500	2,800
France	20	100	3,800	3,100
UK	140	100	280	30
W. Germany	5	10	140	675
Italy	150	200	410	370
Poland	5	20	400	750
Romania	40		850	
Czechoslovakia		70	40	675
Bulgaria		800		650
Others	2,600	6,705	3,000	5,200
Total	5,365	10,520	17,620	29,650

* Almost all US deliveries took place in 1979.

Sources: ACDA (1985, 134; 1990, 117).

Table 5.5 gives an estimate of the value of arms transfers to Iran and Iraq made by various suppliers. It shows that three major suppliers provided the bulk of arms to Iraq, namely the Soviet Union (48 per cent of arms sales for 1979-88), France (15 per cent) and China (9 per cent). The picture for Iran is less clear. Various minor arms suppliers provided the bulk of arms transfers (59 per cent) to Iran through the war. These transfers included the shipments of Soviet weapons by third parties, like Syria and Libya, and the sales of weapons by minor suppliers, like North Korea and Yugoslavia. The large values given to American and Soviet arms transfers in the first period (1979-83) represented transfers made before the deterioration of US-Iranian relations in 1979, and covert arms

supplies to Iran from the Soviet Union. The latter point is not confirmed by other sources. Apparently the Soviet Union offered to sell arms to Iran in 1980 after the Iraqi invasion, but Tehran declined the offer (King 1987, 48). Supplies of Soviet weapons to Iran during the early part of the war came from the arsenal of Syria and Libya, which might have acted with the approval of the USSR (Cordesman 1987, 14; Litwak 1989, 204). Similarly, sales of Soviet-designed weapons by North Korea and East European countries seemed to follow the vicissitudes of Soviet-Iranian relations (Cordesman 1987, 20, 25).

Iraq also had its share of difficulties with the Soviet Union, its main arms supplier, early in the war. In the fall of 1980 Moscow suspended its arms transfers to Iraq in order to express its dissatisfaction with the Iraqi invasion of Iran. But apparently Moscow did not deny the Iraqis access to Soviet weapons from East European suppliers (Litwak 1989, 204). It is not clear when Soviet arms transfers to Iraq were resumed. It is certain that large transfers resumed in mid-1982, when Iraq became the party threatened by an invasion, but it is possible that smaller transfers took place as early as in the spring of 1981 (King 1987, 68). After 1982 the Soviet Union became a reliable source of arms for Iraq. Only the Soviet Union could transfer on short notice vast quantities of weapons and military supplies to counter the great Iranian offensives of 1986 and 1987 (Baram 1989a, 89; Bengio 1989, 448; Hiro 1990, 227). France, on the other hand, was Iraq's main source of advanced attack aircraft for much of the war. Without these aircraft and their guided bombs or missiles Iraq could not have successfully implemented its strategic campaign against Iranian oil exports in the Gulf.

There is a dearth of information on the financing of arms transfers by both parties. For Iraq it is known that three sources were used to pay for arms: payments in cash or oil by Arab states of the Gulf on behalf of Iraq, Iraqi payments in cash or oil, and long-term military credit provided by the suppliers (Kanovsky 1989, 239). However, the share of total arms imports assumed by each of the three means is unknown. It is known that

France accepted oil in exchange for arms (Balta 1987, 215; Kechichian 1990, 230; Mason 1990, 126). In addition, France was a source of military (and civilian) credit for Iraq. The terms of payment for Soviet arms transfers to Iraq are largely unknown. One source claimed that when the USSR agreed to resume arms transfers to Iraq it asked to be paid in hard currency (Hiro 1990, 74-5). But another source reported that the Soviets offered a low-interest loan to Iraq to finance the sale of advanced fighter aircraft in 1987 (Kechichian 1990, 230). It is likely that the Soviet Union subsidized the arming of Iraq less generously than that of Egypt (in the past) and of Syria. Iraq's oil wealth, the subsidies from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the fact that the Iran-Iraq War did not contribute to the objectives of Soviet foreign policy in the region were all factors militating against a too lenient treatment of Iraq by Moscow.

Even less is known about the financing of arms transfers by Iran. Iran did not receive foreign subsidies, payments to arms suppliers had to be made in hard currency or by bartering oil for arms. Except for Syria and Libya (and Israel and the United States in their covert transfers), most arms suppliers seemed to be motivated more by economic gains than political objectives in transferring arms to Iran. It is therefore unlikely that they offered Iran favorable terms. For instance, China -- Iran's largest single source of arms -- made slow deliveries and did not hesitate to delay transfers until payment had been received (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 233).

Both countries made significant efforts to develop their arms industries during the war, probably in response to the arms embargoes both sides had experienced, but also as a symbol of independence from the major powers. This situation contrasts with Syria, where local arms production was never considered seriously, and with Egypt, where local weapon development and production largely failed under Nasser and was revived as Egypt withdrew from the Arab-Israeli conflict. To a greater extent than Syria and Egypt, Iran and Iraq tried to shift from foreign arms imports to local arms production.

Obviously, Iran had a great incentive to develop an arms industry given the virtual arms embargo of the Western powers. As with other sectors of Iran's war effort arms production was undertaken by many organizations, thus causing inefficient redundancies (Schahgaldian 1987, 58-61). First, there were military plants inherited from the pre-revolutionary period. They were run by the Defense Industries Organization (established in 1981) and under the control of the civilian bureaucracy and the regular military. Second, there were factories involved in military production under the supervision of the Reconstruction Crusade -- a revolutionary organization involved in rural development and turned into a fully-fledged ministry later. Finally, in 1983-84 the IRGC ministry started to develop its own arms industry. Military production was rationalized into a single coordinated effort only after the war. According to a source the combined military production of these organizations kept busy half of the factories of the Ministry of Heavy Industry as well as 12,000 subcontracting workshops; and 115 out of 200 colleges and universities took part in military research and development (Hiro 1990, 195). By 1992 Iran's arms industry included 240 state-owned factories employing 45,000 people (Cordesman 1993, 401).

Foreign analysts paid attention to Iraq's military industry only after the war as a result of the public display of its products by the Iraqi authorities, of the importance of the arms industry in the Iraqi post-war economic program, and of Iraq's program to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. But Iraq's effort to develop a major arms industry, beyond the few factories it already had, started in 1984. By 1990, the Iraqi defense industry was reportedly employing 100,000 people and was second only to Egypt's in the Arab world (Sayigh 1992, 103-4). The defense industry in Iraq has been centralized under a single authority, the Ministry of Industry and Military Industry since 1987 (Sayigh 1992, 106).

Officials of both countries made boastful statements about the achievements of their arms industries. In reality, while the local production of basic items like small arms, artillery, rockets, and munitions was a success, the claims to the local development and production of major weapons systems like tanks, submarines, or advanced military planes had more to do with propaganda than with a realistic assessment of the capabilities of local military industries. In both Iran and Iraq the development of a local arms industry was made possible thanks to extensive foreign assistance (Cordesman 1993, 401; Sayigh 1992, 121-4). In addition, local arms production was no panacea against embargoes. For instance, during the war, Iran had to use covert procurement channels to obtain munitions, or supplies for the local production of munitions, from Western sources (Cordesman 1987, 20, 23). Although both states embarked on significant arms production programs during the war there is little evidence to sustain the notion that local arms production has decreased the dependence on foreign weaponry and technologies.

Iraq's privileged access to major arms suppliers during the war (in comparison to Iran) translated into a growing gap between the arsenals of the belligerents. Table 5.6 shows the evolution of the balance between Iran and Iraq in regard to some key weapons systems used in modern warfare. Iraq managed to increase its relative material advantage between 1981 and 1983 as a result of arms deliveries that partially made up for the important losses of equipment it had sustained. Meanwhile, Iran's arsenal was also under attrition, but with an insufficient access to spare parts and new weapons. In the period 1983-85 Iran managed to reduce the gap with Iraq in terms of tanks and other armored fighting vehicles by acquiring Soviet and Chinese equipments from various sources, but it was unable to get combat aircraft. By 1987 the Iraqi air force had an eight-to-one material advantage over its Iranian counterpart; while Iraq had again widened the gap in terms of tanks and other armored fighting vehicles. During the last year of the war Iraq had the manpower and arsenal to go over to the offensive again.

Table 5.6 Balance in Some Weapon Categories between Iran and Iraq, 1981-87

Year	Main Battle Tanks Iraq/Iran (ratio)	Other Armored Fighting Vehicles Iraq/Iran (ratio)	Combat Aircraft Iraq/Iran (ratio)
1981	2,600 / 1,410 (1.8:1)	2,100 / 860 (2.4:1)	335 / 100 (3.4:1)
1983	2,360 / 940 (2.5:1)	3,100 / 680 (4.6:1)	330 / 70 (4.7:1)
1985	3,600 / 1,900 (1.9:1)	3,250 / 1,110 (2.9:1)	500 / 80 (6.3:1)
1987	6,210 / 1,260 (4.9:1)	4,100 / 1,110 (3.7:1)	500 / 60 (8.3:1)

Note: Figures reported in this Table are estimates given the difficulty in assessing the size of arsenals during a war. The figures for Iranian combat aircraft represent the estimated number of serviceable aircraft. Light tanks have been computed with other armored fighting vehicles.

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance, editions 1981-82, 1983-84, 1985-86 and 1987-88.

Infantry attacks with little air and armor support were the rule, and almost a military doctrine, in Iran during the war. The Iranians made a virtue of the necessity of coping with inadequate arms supplies. A tendency reinforced by some revolutionary elements who wanted to develop a new form of warfare, an Islamic people's war (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 42-3). Nevertheless, there were signs that shortages of modern weaponry hindered Iranian offensives at various points during the war. The first Iranian offensive into Iraq in the summer of 1982, at a time when the Iranians had the momentum, had to be stopped because of important losses of equipment (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 151-2; Hiro 1990, 88). Even a year later, in 1983, some analysts estimated that Iran's ground forces had only about a third of the major equipments of a force of its size (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 168-9). From the Iranian standpoint an important motive for doing the arms-for-hostages deal with the United States in 1985 was the necessity to get more weaponry for the upcoming offensives (Zabih 1988, 252). The anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles covertly delivered by the United States and Israel, however, appeared to have had only a limited impact during subsequent Iranian offensives (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 212; Cordesman 1987, 26; Zabih 1988, 198-9, 207). Although a shortage of arms was not at the root of Iran's military collapse in 1988; Iran had to consider a ceasefire after the military defeats of 1988 had led to the loss of over 40 per cent of major army equipments

and of most Soviet and Chinese weapons in its arsenal (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 360-1; Cordesman 1993, 400).

War Making and State Power

The assessment of the impact of almost eight years of war on state power in Iran and Iraq is particularly difficult. A first difficulty, in the case of Iraq, is the absence of statistics on public finances and the importance of the public sector in the economy. One can identify the changes in the economic power of the Iraqi state, but it is impossible to measure them precisely. Such a quantitative assessment can be done in part for Iran, where public finance statistics were available even during the war. But there remains a dearth of official statistics concerning the size of the bureaucracy and public sector in Iran. A second difficulty in assessing the effects of the war on state power in Iran and Iraq is the fact that a change in regime occurred in both countries a year before the war. The Islamic Republic was established in Iran in March 1979, while Saddam Hussein became the undisputed leader of the Baath regime in Iraq in July 1979. Consequently, some analysts could argue that the changes in state power witnessed during the 1980s in both countries were due to the nature of the new regimes and not to the impact of the war. The following analysis tries to deal with both difficulties. It will show that no increase in state power occurred in Iran and Iraq as a result of the war. In fact, the available evidence shows that war caused a decrease in state power in both countries.

In contemporary Iraq significant increases in state power have essentially resulted from two developments: changes of regime and the growth in state oil revenue. The first significant development occurred in 1952 with an agreement on profit-sharing between the Iraqi state and foreign oil companies. As a result of that agreement the share of oil revenue in total government revenues jumped from 10 per cent to over 60 per cent between 1952 and the end of the decade (Whittleton 1986, 56). With this newly-found wealth the

government of the Iraqi monarchy undertook important development projects, which were of benefit to the landed class involved in agriculture (Hazelton 1986, 18). In July 1958 the monarchy was toppled by a military coup. The new regime proved its power and autonomy by introducing an agrarian reform in 1958 as well as a Ministry of Planning in 1959. The land reform was only a partial success, it broke the power of the great landowners but failed to solve the problems of the peasantry and of agricultural production (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 225-7). By 1961 oil revenue made up 45 per cent of all government revenues (Marr 1985, 173). However, the Iraqi state began to assume a dominant role over the economy only in 1964. In that year a military regime, which had recently seized power from the Baath party, decided to enter into an alliance with Nasser's Egypt. In Iraq this alliance translated into a set of nationalization decrees modelled on those existing in Egypt. As a result of these nationalizations the Iraqi state came to control the banks and insurance companies, many large industrial firms, and a significant share of foreign trade (Marr 1985, 193-4; Zaher 1986, 38).

The Baath party came back to power in July 1968 through a military coup and it was determined not to lose power this time. The Baath regime introduced in 1970 a new agrarian reform law, more severe for landowners: the law was also more fully implemented as the regime became committed to the setting up of state farms and agricultural cooperatives (Marr 1985, 240-1; Whittleton 1986, 59). In 1972 (with some measures taken later in 1973) the Iraqi government nationalized the oil industry. The presence of a regime committed to social reforms and state-led development combined with the nationalization of oil and the dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973-74 to produce a period of rapid economic and state power growth. Oil revenue increased from US \$ 1 billion in 1972 to US \$ 21 billion in 1979, while Iraq's real GDP increased in the same period by an annual average of 15 or 16 per cent (Kanovsky 1989, 231). After 1973-74 oil revenue became larger than the total expenditures of the Iraqi state, despite the fact that

government expenditures grew at a rate more than three times that of GDP (Khafaji 1986, 74). The share of oil revenue in total government revenues increased from 52 per cent in 1971 to 87 per cent in 1976 (Stork 1982, 37). By then, indisputably, the Iraqi state had become a rentier state. Oil revenue allowed the Baath regime to carry out its reforms and to build up a large public sector. The share of the public sector in domestic production stood at 31 per cent in 1968 -- the year the Baath seized power for the second time -- nine years later (in 1977) it stood at 80 per cent (Marr 1985, 242). Between 1969 and 1978 the number of industrial firms in the public sector grew by 79.3 per cent and their work force by 144 per cent; in the private sector the equivalent proportions were of 24.7 per cent and of 5.4 per cent (Whittleton 1986, 68). Public employment (excluding the armed forces) increased from 224,253 people in 1968 to 835,000 in 1980; that is, from 26 public employees by 1,000 of population in 1968 to 63 public employees by 1,000 of population in 1980 (Khalil 1989, 41).

Oil revenue made state-led development possible in Iraq in the 1970s (Stork 1982, 39-40; Whittleton 1986, 64-5; Zaher 1986, 51). With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and Iran's politico-military campaign against Iraq's oil exports, oil revenue fell precipitously. As we saw this drop compelled the Iraqi government to cut its lavish development expenditures and to introduce an austerity program after 1982. Among the measures adopted after 1982 to solve the economic difficulties created by the war was a set of measures of economic liberalization designed to increase the contribution of the private sector to the production of goods and services. From 1987 these measures were supplemented by a wave of privatizations in the public sector and regressive measures against public employees. Privatizations and economic liberalization were pursued after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

Many of the first official measures to promote the private sector were introduced in 1983, following on from the final report of the Baath Ninth Regional Congress -- held in

late June 1982, the final report of the Congress was made public only in January 1983. The report contained a severe criticism of the public sector and urged the promotion of the private sector (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 112; Crusoe 1986, 45-6; Hiro 1990, 93). A particularly significant piece of legislation was Public Law no.35 that allowed Iraqi or foreign Arab entrepreneurs to rent land (without restrictions on the size of holdings) from the state for five to twenty years for agricultural production (Marr 1985, 302; Springborg 1986, 37). By 1984 more than a thousand leases had been granted to private agribusiness enterprises (Mason 1990, 158-9). Another significant measure was the promotion of private hospitals. For lack of sufficient financial resources and staff the public medical system could not deal with the numbers of casualties produced by the war; thus, in 1984, the government allowed doctors from the public sector to set up private hospitals and gave them tax exemptions and loans as incentives (Bengio 1986, 476; Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork 1984, 30). Various measures were also taken in regard to the private industrial sector. The latter was exempted from duties and taxes on the importation of machinery, and was given tax exemptions for capital investment and research and development (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 266; Mason 1990, 148).

Until 1987 the economic liberalization in Iraq had been a cautious *Infitah*, as in Baathist Syria, it consisted in giving new incentives and opportunities to the private sector without taking away from the public sector. The only exception to that generalization was in the agricultural sector, where the regime had systematically dismantled state farms and cooperatives since the early 1980s (Springborg 1986, 36). However, in early 1987 President Hussein announced a more radical program of economic reforms, which he referred to as a "shake-up" and an "administrative revolution" (Bengio 1989, 425). This second wave of reforms directly affected the bureaucracy and the public sector. The administrative structure of the state was streamlined by the abolition of bureaucracies, levels of government, and official positions (Bengio 1989, 431-2). More than 600

departments and organizations were abolished as a result of the administrative reform initiated in 1987 (Crusoe 1989, 76). Thousands of white-collar workers in the public sector were laid off -- mostly foreign nationals -- while thousands of others were given the choice between resigning or being reassigned as factory workers (Bengio 1989, 433; Mason 1990, 128). This unprecedented move against public employees was made possible by a decree abolishing Iraq's labor law. As a result of these changes, employees in the public sector could be laid off or reassigned by their managers and were denied the right to form a union. The reform was a direct blow to the Baath party, which until then had had an influence in the bureaucracy through its union (Bengio 1989, 433-4).

The streamlining of the bureaucracy and of public employment was accompanied by a wave of privatizations of public enterprises in industries and services. Although some sources referred to privatizations in those sectors as early as 1984 or 1985 (Crusoe 1986, 47; Lawson 1990, 32). This practice became so widespread after 1986 that it suggested a firm commitment of the regime to this new policy. There are no precise figures on the number of privatizations, but they appear extensive. In the industrial sector the government apparently aimed at privatizing light industry while retaining control of heavy industry like petrochemicals, metallurgy, and automotive manufacturing (Crusoe 1989, 76). The government also privatized many assets in the service sector like supermarkets, gas stations, transport companies, and the tourist industry (Bengio 1989, 431; Bengio 1990, 517-8). The Iraqi authorities pursued their policy of granting incentives to the private sector; although it seemed that after 1987 the emphasis was on deregulation rather than on the introduction of additional subsidies or tax exemptions (Bengio 1989, 431; Lawson 1990, 32-4; Mason 1990, 130).

On the basis of the evidence presented here, even if it lacks in precision, it is clear that the power of the Iraqi state over its economy did not increase as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. In fact, the evidence shows that the economic power of the state declined; although it

probably retained its preponderance by the mere control of the oil industry. This finding disproves the notion that war is a stimulus to state power growth in the Third World. Furthermore I would like to argue that war led to the adoption of these measures that had the effect of circumscribing the economic power of the state. This argument might appear evident after the account given here. We saw that economic state power steeply increased during the 1970s in Iraq and that the Iraqi authorities tried to preserve this growth during the first two years of the war through a 'guns and butter' policy. But after 1982 financial constraints caused by the war compelled the Iraqi government to cut its lavish development expenditure. Austerity budgets became the rule and incentives were given to the private sector so that it could compensate the waning performance of the public sector. Problems in the public sector, notably in agriculture, were not new; but the war, by limiting the financial resources of the state, did not allow the government to bear the cost of inefficiencies in the public sector anymore. By 1987 the Iraqi regime had to adopt more radical measures than incentives for private entrepreneurs, it had to streamline its own bureaucracy and public sector. The streamlining was not politically innocuous, significant interest groups affiliated with the regime were hard hit by the measures.

Although some analysts made a circumstantial connection between the initiation of the two stages (1983 and 1987) of economic liberalization and military crises at the front; none of them made out a good case for the impact of the war on the Iraqi economic liberalization (Bengio 1989, 423, 425; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 266). At best, analysts acknowledged that the war created financial difficulties for the state that were favorable to an economic liberalization, or that the war created a situation that Hussein exploited to carry out its own economic design (Bengio 1984, 583; Bengio 1989, 425; Chubin and Tripp 1988, 111-2; Kanovsky 1989, 239; Tripp 1989, 65). In short, the war only hastened trends toward economic liberalization that were already present in Iraq before the war (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 265-6). An analyst even argued that the war had

nothing to do with the economic liberalization; the latter was the natural outcome of state capitalist development in Iraq (Khafaji 1986, 73).

Arguments that downplay the impact of the war on the process of economic liberalization in Iraq are essentially based on two related propositions. The first one is that the Baath regime has never been socialist, even in the 1970s; thus, the economic liberalization is the continuation of a policy of state capitalism, whereby the Iraqi state looks after the development of a local capitalist class, rather than a new policy initiated in response to the economic difficulties created by the war (Khafaji 1986). The second proposition is that Hussein, since his takeover in 1979, has been committed to a policy of economic reform designed to promote the emergence of a clientele of supportive private entrepreneurs dependent on his rule (Springborg 1986). Both propositions are similar in arguing that economic conditions favoring the private sector existed before the war and that these conditions stemmed from decisions of the state (and its ruler) and not from the influence of capitalists on the government: they differ in the fact that the first argument is influenced by Marxist analysis, while the second is not.

That a group of capitalists emerged and prospered in Iraq during the 1970s is undeniable. The development expenditures of the Iraqi state after 1973 were so important that they gave rise to a contracting industry led by entrepreneurs who had connections with regime. During that period the development of private enterprises in Iraq was an outgrowth of the very growth of economic state power. The private sector developed in symbiosis with the public sector. However, with the outbreak of the war and the financial difficulties experienced by the Iraqi state after 1982 the relationship between the development of the private sector and the economic role of the state started to change. The development of private enterprises was no longer a byproduct of state-led development but instead a strategy of the authorities to deal with the crisis of public finance. From 1987 the relationship between the private and public sectors became almost a reverse image of the

situation of the 1970s; the growth of the private sector was now the result of the dismantling of the public sector and the abolition of state regulations. The mainspring of capitalist development was no longer development expenditures by the state but instead privatization of public enterprises and partial deregulation. Except for the dismantling of state farms and cooperatives (initiated in part as early as 1979-80) there was no inkling before the war of this reversal in the relation between the public and private sectors. By downplaying the impact of the war most analysts obscured the important change in the relationship between the state and the private sector that resulted from eight years of intense warfare, in favor of a superficial continuity -- namely, the fact that both before and during the war the policies of the Iraqi state favored the development of capitalism in Iraq.

The relationship between war making and state power in Iran broadly followed the same pattern than in Iraq. Before the Iran-Iraq War the growth of state power in Iran resulted from the increasing oil revenue of the state and the economic designs of the Shah. The Iranian Revolution brought an additional increase in economic state power when the assets and enterprises of the ruling class were nationalized by the new authorities. As in Iraq, the war after a few years severely limited the capacity of the Iranian state to carry out a policy of state-led development as reformists in the regime advocated. Instead, the Iranian state decreased in importance; although the regime retained a significant degree of control over the economy through state regulations and the assets of its large conglomerate, the Foundation for the Disinherited.

The oil industry in Iran was nationalized in 1951 by the nationalist government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. After the overthrow of Mossadegh (in 1953), the Iranian government and a consortium of foreign oil companies came to an agreement, whereby the profits of oil would be shared equally between the two parties while the consortium would remain effectively in control of the formally nationalized oil industry (Abrahamian 1982, 419; Halliday 1979, 141). The oil revenue of the Iranian state increased rapidly as a result

of this agreement: from US \$ 34 million in 1954-55 to US \$ 181 million in 1956-57 and US \$ 437 million in 1962-63 (Abrahamian 1982, 420). In the 1950s and 1960s oil revenue and American credit were important resources for the development of the Iranian state and of its armed forces. However, even more externally-derived resources became available in the 1970s with a new agreement with the oil consortium and the rise in oil prices. As a result of the dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973-74 the Iranian state's oil revenue, for about the same level of production, went from US \$ 4.4 billion in 1973 to US \$ 11.65 billion in 1974 (Hiro 1985, 60). Between 1972 and 1977 Iranian oil production increased only from 5.1 MBD to 5.7 MBD, but in the same period the oil revenue accruing to the state jumped from about US \$ 4 billion to US \$ 24.3 billion (Kanovsky 1989, 240). Oil revenue was already contributing to more than fifty per cent of total government revenues in the early 1970s, but after 1973-74 it contributed to 84.3 per cent (1974-75) and 76.7 per cent (1975-76) of total government revenues (Moghtader 1980, 244).

The inflow of oil revenue allowed the Iranian government to revise upward the objectives of the Fifth Development Plan: investment expenditures were almost doubled from US \$ 35.5 billion to US \$ 69 billion (Moghtader 1980, 253). By 1977 the Iranian state had a dominant position in its economy. The public sector was contributing to 56.2 per cent of gross domestic investment: an understatement of the real contribution of the state to capital formation since this estimate did not include the contribution of the state, through grants and low-interest loans, to the private sector's share of gross domestic investment (Katouzian 1981, 262, 266). In 1977 the revenues of the Iranian state represented 36.9 per cent of GDP, while its expenditures represented 41.3 per cent of the value of GDP (cf., Tables 5.3 and 5.7). The state bureaucracy had grown to 304,000 civil servants by 1977, and the public sector was the first source of employment for the salaried middle class (Abrahamian 1982, 434, 438). The state also had 89 state farms and was

supervising 8,500 agricultural cooperatives with 1,700,000 members (Abrahamian 1982, 439). In addition, through the Pahlavi Foundation, the monarchical regime had shares in 207 private companies (Abrahamian 1982, 438).

From the spring of 1977 growing political protest in Iran led to a revolutionary situation that, by early February 1979, had forced the Shah to flee Iran and had brought to power a fragile coalition of revolutionary groups. Except for the initial period of the revolutionary regime, when the breakdown of public order, the proliferation of authorities and armed groups, and the purges of the civil and military bureaucracies undermined the state as an organization monopolizing force, rule making, and rule enforcement, the Islamic Revolution resulted in an increase in state power. Essentially, the Iranian state got further economic power through the expropriation and nationalization of the assets of the pre-revolutionary ruling class. In June 1979 the revolutionary government of Prime Minister Bazargan assumed control of the banks and insurance companies (Bakhash 1984, 178-9; Hiro 1985, 115). Then, in July, the nationalizations affected heavy industrial firms, firms owned by entrepreneurs linked to the old regime, and firms in economic difficulties as a result of the revolution (Bakhash 1984, 179-80). By 1982 the Iranian state controlled 500 to 600 industrial firms with over 150,000 workers. In addition, the Foundation for the Disinherited, which had taken over the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation among other things, controlled 200 to 300 industrial firms, some 100 construction firms, 150 to 200 commercial firms, and 91 agricultural enterprises (Bakhash 1984, 184). The Foundation was the second largest employer, after the state, in the country (Farazmand 1990, 161). Public employment increased in Iran as a result of the Revolution because more people became employees of the state through the nationalizations than were purged from the bureaucracy for their association with the former regime (Farazmand 1989, 93).

Through the public sector and the regime-sponsored Foundation for the Disinherited the new Iranian state makers had reached by 1982 a dominant position in the modern sectors of the economy. But this assessment must be qualified by the evidence presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.7. Data in Table 5.7 show that state expenditures (both current and capital) were much smaller under the Islamic Republic than under the Shah (in 1977). Similarly, Table 5.3 showed that the Iranian state extracted less revenue under the Islamic Republic than under the Shah. This contradiction between the increase in state power due to the Iranian Revolution and indicators in state power showing a decline in state power after 1980 can be explained in my opinion by taking into account the impact of the Iran-Iraq War on the new Islamic state. The war brought little additional increase in economic state power in Iran. In fact, the only sectors where such an argument might be made would be foreign trade and domestic commerce. In those sectors the necessity of saving foreign currency and of implementing the rationing system led to governmental intervention, which was opposed by the traditional commercial class of the bazaar and its supporters in the regime (Bakhash 1984, 192-3; Hiro 1985, 244; Hiro 1990, 140-1). But state involvement in foreign trade and domestic commerce was a goal of the reformists in the regime even before the war made it necessary.

Patrick Clawson is the only analyst who fully grasped the extent of the reductions in state expenditures in Iran during the early 1980s. He found that in a period of five years, from 1977-78 to 1982-83, state expenditures had decreased by as much as 18 per cent of GDP -- the data in Table 5.7 shows a decrease of 12.4 per cent over 1977-83. He also mentioned that no industrialized country had been able to reduce expenditures by as much as 5 per cent of GDP in five years, and that the cuts in expenditures in Iran were larger than those that indebted Latin American countries had borne. For Clawson, the reduction in state expenditures in Iran: "would seem to be among the most rapid and far-reaching experienced by any government since such data began to be collected systematically after

World War II" (Clawson 1988, 378). Clawson felt that such deep cuts in expenditures were a remarkable accomplishment for a populist regime involved in a war. Nevertheless, the only explanation he had was that: "[r]eduction in government spending under the Islamic Republic has reflected the strength of the 'moderates' in the Majlis [the Iranian parliament], which must vote the budget" (Clawson 1988, 379). This is a weak explanation. Clawson, himself, acknowledged that the 'radicals' (whom I call the reformists) -- i.e., those favoring more interventionism and reforms -- were dominant in the government and had a narrow majority in the Iranian parliament (Clawson 1988, 380). The real stronghold of the 'moderates' (whom I call conservatives) was the Council of Guardians, an institution in charge of reviewing the laws to insure their conformity with Islam, and that was not directly involved in the budgetary process. The argument that such drastic cuts in expenditures resulted from the actions of a faction of the regime that did not hold a majority in government or parliament is far-fetched. Accounts of the economic debates between reformists and conservatives in Iran during the war show that these debates concerned issues close to the interests of traditional clerics and the commercial class, namely taxation and the protection of the rights to private property and of free commerce (Bakhash 1984, 191-4, 202-11, 216; Hiro 1985, 216, 244-8; Menashri 1990, 224, 231-2, 327, 358). There is no evidence that conservative elements in the regime or society effectively challenged the dominant role of the state and compelled it to reduce its expenditures.

In reality there are good reasons to consider that it is the Iran-Iraq War that caused the dramatic reduction in state expenditures. Table 5.7 shows a complete series of figures on state expenditures for the period 1979-90. From these figures one can see that the reduction in state expenditures that took place during the war was greater than estimated by Clawson previously. In constant prices, the total expenditures of the state in 1989 were less than half those made ten years earlier in 1979. While state expenditures represented

39.3 per cent of GDP in 1979, the proportion was 17.7 per cent by 1989, a drop of 21.6 per cent of GDP over the period. Although both current and capital expenditures were affected by the cuts, the drop was more severe for capital expenditures; this reflected the fact that the government gave priority to defense and current civilian expenditures at the expense of investments. The only period of growth in capital expenditures was in 1982-83. This period corresponded to the initiation of the first development plan of the new regime, when the authorities in Tehran thought they could afford a 'guns and butter' policy. After that period, however, austerity had to be enforced because of declining oil revenue (cf., Table 5.3). Contrary to Iraq, Iran did not have access to foreign subsidies and was reluctant to become indebted to foreign creditors. The drops in state expenditures and GDP after 1985 were obvious signs of the deteriorating economic situation in Iran after years of war. The impact of the war provides a far more simple and convincing explanation of the declining economic power of the Iranian state during the 1980s than the alleged influence of conservative elements in Iran.

Table 5.7 Central Government Expenditures in Iran, [1977] 1979-90 (billions of rials, constant 1985)

Year	Total Expenditures (as a % of GDP)	Current Expenditures	Capital Expenditures (as a % of total expenditures)	Gross Domestic Product
1977	7,482.1 (41.3)	4,485.3	2,996.8 (40.1)	18,123.7
1979	5,157.1 (39.3)	3,927.2	1,229.9 (23.9)	13,119.8
1980	4,697.6 (41.6)	3,647.4	1,050.2 (22.4)	11,299.8
1981	4,546.7 (37.3)	3,503.9	1,042.8 (22.9)	12,188.2
1982	4,488.9 (32.2)	3,277.9	1,211.0 (27.0)	13,940.0
1983	4,437.9 (28.9)	3,151.9	1,286.0 (29.0)	15,380.8
1984	3,743.9 (23.6)	2,866.0	877.9 (23.5)	15,893.1
1985	3,583.3 (21.6)	2,846.3	737.0 (20.6)	16,555.8
1986	2,941.1 (19.4)	2,356.7	584.4 (19.9)	15,167.8
1987	2,638.4 (17.6)	2,165.7	472.7 (17.9)	14,989.7
1988	2,384.2 (19.3)	1,961.8	422.4 (17.7)	12,370.4
1989	2,265.0 (17.7)	1,873.0	391.9 (17.3)	12,781.5
1990	2,840.2 (19.9)	2,135.6	704.6 (24.8)	14,281.0

Sources: The data are from the IMF's *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* for the years 1988, 1990 and 1993. The 1993 Yearbook warns that data after 1987 do not form a consistent series with those of

earlier years. Personally I doubt that the discontinuity is significant. The current prices were adjusted to constant 1985 prices by the means of the GDP deflator provided in the yearbooks.

A policy of economic liberalization, and a more pragmatic approach to economic issues emerged after the Iran-Iraq War. The sheer size of the reconstruction effort after ten years of revolution and war was probably enough to make Iranian leaders think about the potential contribution of the private sector and of foreign capital to the task. This opinion was reinforced by the fact that war preparation remained a concern of the state. Iran had to replace the military equipments lost in 1988 and to develop its armed forces to deter new aggressions. The Iranians had learned from the war the necessity of promoting professionalism in their armed forces and of upgrading their arsenal. This program implied that defense expenditure would remain a burden on the budget for years to come at the expense of development. This situation was in the background when Rafsanjani, now president of the republic, declared that state domination of the economy had been a war measure that was no longer required (Rezun 1990, 208). Rafsanjani's government decided to privatize from 500 to 800 industrial firms; but this privatization policy was hindered by the resistance of the advocates of the public sector and by the lack of interest of investors for the firms put up for sale (Hunter 1992, 81).

In brief, this section showed that war making in the 1980s did not lead to an increase in (economic) state power in Iran and Iraq. State power in both countries, in the contemporary period, increased as a result of increased oil revenue and changes of regime. The Iran-Iraq War did not contribute to that process. In fact, I argued that in both Iran and Iraq the war had the effect of decreasing the economic power of the state because it limited both its (oil) revenue and (civilian) expenditure. In addition, the war transformed the 'symbiotic' relationship between the state and the private sector in Iraq. While in the 1970s the private sector in Iraq developed thanks to state-led development, in the late 1980s it was developing as a result of privatizations and deregulation. After the war the liberalization of the Iraqi economy was pursued; while in Iran a strategy of economic

liberalization was also chosen for the post-war reconstruction. But it is difficult at this point to draw firm conclusions on the permanence and extent of the economic liberalizations that have occurred in both countries since the end of the hostilities.

War Making and Regime Formation

The fact that the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein and the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged a little more than a year before the outbreak of the war made it difficult to assess the impact of the war on regime formation in both countries. This problem was less acute in the section on state power because different hypotheses could be confronted with evidence, and comparisons could be made between state power before and during the war. In the case of the impact of the Iran-Iraq War on regime formation one often finds assertions that can be best refuted by considering alternative courses of events or by challenging their assumptions; but both ways of arguing can lead to a sterile debate. Accordingly, the following section is more a review of the most common assertions made about the relation between war and regime formation during the Iran-Iraq War than an attempt at developing original arguments. However, this section also deals with some themes that were present in other case studies, namely war and political liberalization and military reverses and changes in leadership. Although the Iran-Iraq War does not present significant events relating to these two themes, it does confirm patterns found in previous case studies. First, the fact that intense war making often leads an authoritarian regime to adopt (in word more often than in deed) political liberalization. Second, reverses on the battlefield are critical moments that can induce political instability and reforms.

The impact of war on regime formation in Iraq was characterized more by continuity than dramatic changes. In fact, some analysts felt that the war had failed to fundamentally change Iraqi politics (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 120-2). This assessment was certainly valid concerning the position of the Baathist regime on a democratic-authoritarian spectrum.

Before the war the Baathist regime had been characterized by many totalitarian features, and this characterization was still valid in 1989, in spite of promises of post-war liberalization. Nevertheless, three changes occurred during the war: the development of Hussein's personal rule system, the growing importance of the armed forces as a key institution of the state, and a greater representation of Iraqi Shias in the political elite. While the development of patrimonial rule seemed to be a strategy adopted by Hussein before the war, the greater status given to the armed forces and the Iraqi Shias seemed to result from the circumstances of the war.

Saddam Hussein unequivocally seized power in July 1979, although he had been very influential for many years as the number two in the Baathist regime after the ageing President Bakr. From the start Hussein's rule was characterized by a reliance on relatives, people from his native region, and individuals whose careers had been tied to his own for some years. This informal power network was supplemented by institutional measures that gave precedence to the presidency (held by Hussein) over the Baath party and the collegial leadership of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Hussein's first political reform was the establishment of a parliament -- Iraq had not had one since the fall of the monarchy in 1958. Hussein intended to broaden his base of support through the election of a National Assembly (Marr 1985, 231-2). Although the National Assembly, elected for the first time in June 1980, was a weak institution compared with the Baath party or the RCC, it was an alternative institution of popular representation that the supreme ruler could use against the single party -- as Sadat had done in Egypt in the early 1970s.

The war allowed Hussein's to monopolize power further at the expense of the Baath party and the RCC, which had been powerful institutions before his takeover and the war. Thus, in the wake of the Ninth Regional Baath Party Congress in the summer of 1982, Hussein took advantage of a difficult military situation at the front and some dissatisfaction

with his leadership to purge the party of his opponents and lukewarm supporters. From then on only staunch supporters of Hussein were nominated to the Regional Command, the executive of the Baath party, but members of the Regional Command lost their statutory membership of the RCC, the executive of the government. Furthermore, the RCC was reduced in size from 17 to 9 members, all closely associated with Hussein (Hiro 1990, 65). By mid-1986 Hussein and his cousins made up 22.2 per cent of the membership of the RCC and 17.6 per cent of the Baath Regional Command (Baram 1989b, 457). The party congress of 1982 also led to a revision of the party's history to make Hussein its central figure since 1968; a personality cult developed presenting Hussein as an omniscient and infallible leader (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 89-90; Hiro 1990, 93).

The reforms introduced in 1987 and those envisaged for the post-war period meant an additional decline in influence for the RCC and the Baath party. As we saw the party had its union in the public sector dissolved in 1987 by the changes in labor laws. Then, in early 1988, a decree abolished compulsory membership of many organizations like unions, societies, and clubs through which the Baath party had maintained its influence on society (Bengio 1990, 502). In November 1988 Hussein even began to talk of introducing a multi-party system in Iraq. This design did not mean the end of the Baath, but it was certainly a setback for the party, which was used to a virtual monopoly of representation. Baathist candidates for the National Assembly in April 1989 won roughly 40 per cent of seats compared to 73 per cent in 1984 and 90 per cent in the first election of 1980 (Bengio 1991, 380). Nevertheless, the majority of deputies remained highly supportive of the regime, out of 250 seats more than 150 were taken by government officials (Bengio 1991, 380). From 1987 an increasing number of technocrats were nominated to the cabinet, while the Presidential Office became the new locus of executive power (Joffe 1990, 231-2, 234-5). All these changes meant less influence for the older generation of Baathist

politicians and for the RCC. In the latter's case the draft of a new constitution even envisaged its abolition. The draft constitution described a strong presidential system: a president with extensive powers directly elected by the people, a committee system (of the National Assembly) to supervise the activities of the cabinet, and the establishment of a second assembly, the Consultative Council (Bengio 1992, 383-4; Joffe 1990, 238). These political reforms, however, were shelved by the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Some analysts argued that Hussein's monopolization of power and political reforms stemmed from his conception of politics, the war only gave him opportunities to carry out his designs by lessening the resistance of the Baathist establishment (Bengio 1990, 500, 502; Chubin and Tripp 1988, 85-6, 91, 243). On the other hand, the increased status of the armed forces and of Shia politicians in the regime seemed to result from the circumstances of the war. Iraq has a long history of military coups, going back to 1936. Changes of regime have always come as a result of military involvement in politics, even for the two takeovers of the Baath party in 1963 and 1968. Accordingly, during the 1970s the Baath party did everything possible to penetrate and subordinate the Iraqi officer corps (Abbas 1986, 216-7). By the late 1970s power was firmly in the hands of civilian party men like Hussein rather than in the hands of military officers (Khalil 1989, 71). This system of political subordination and indoctrination of the armed forces was more difficult to maintain in wartime. The dramatic expansion of the army had the effect of diluting the presence of staunch Baathists in its ranks, while the success of military operations called for giving priority to military professionalism over ideological conformity in the assignment and promotion of military officers. The critical military situation of Iraq in the summer of 1982 led to a reassessment of civil-military relations. After a purge of the officer corps, a closer relationship emerged between Hussein and senior military officers because the Iranian invasion was threatening both the regime and the army (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 116). Hussein agreed to treat Baathist and non-Baathist officers equally (Hiro

1990, 89). A second crisis in civil-military relations followed the military defeats in 1986 at Basra and Mehran (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 118-9). As a result of this second crisis the officer corps gained more influence in the regime and decisional autonomy on the battlefield (Bengio 1989, 423; Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 356; Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 192-3). By the end of the war the military institution and military-related activities had become central to Hussein's regime. But paradoxically, the officer corps remained a minor political force because of constant purges and monitoring by Hussein's security services. If it had not been for the war Hussein would have relied less on the military because this dependence could spell his undoing. Even if it is constantly monitored and purged the officer corps remains the most likely source of successful challenge to Hussein's rule in Iraq.

Iraqi politics has traditionally been dominated by Sunni Arabs, although Shia Arabs are the largest community in Iraq with slightly over half of the population. The presence of a large Shia community and of Shia religious centers in Iraq was a cause of anxiety to the Baath regime because Shia Islam had played an important part in the Iranian Revolution. Thus from the start the Iraqi authorities saw the involvement of the Islamic Republic in all protest or terrorist activities by Iraqi Shias and began to expel thousands of them to Iran. During the two first years of the war the issue of the loyalty of the Shias to the Baath regime concerned both belligerents. The Iraqi authorities feared that Shias would refuse to fight their coreligionists, while the Iranians counted on a rebellion by the Shia population to facilitate their invasion of Iraq in 1982. The fact that the majority of Iraqi Shias remained loyal and fought against the Iranians led some analysts to consider that the war had contributed to nation-building in Iraq, to the emergence of an Iraqi nationalism shared alike by Sunni and Shia Arabs (Hiro 1990, 257). Other analysts, however, doubted the nation-building effect of the war by pointing out that the war worsened the conflict between the central government and the Kurdish minority (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 84-5).

It is difficult to assess the impact of a war on a diffuse social phenomenon like nationalism or nation-building. The only certainty is that Hussein's regime tried to further the integration of Shias into the polity during the war. For instance, Hussein brought into the leadership some Shia politicians (Balta 1987, 79; Marr 1985, 283, 303).

The two most common assertions about the impact of the Iran-Iraq War on the Islamic Revolution are that the war contributed to the consolidation of the Islamic Republic, but hindered the realization of many of the economic objectives of the Revolution. That the war helped the Iranian authorities to consolidate their regime is a widely-held opinion (Hiro 1985, 3; Hooglund 1984, 31; Menashri 1990, 262). The Islamic authorities were aware of the positive aspects of the war on the development of their regime and thus refused to agree to a ceasefire until years of war had reversed the relationship between the war and the consolidation of the regime (Hiro 1990, 4-5, 257, 259; Menashri 1990, 228-30, 389). The war rallied the population to a common cause, inhibited divisive debates on domestic issues, and led to a takeover by militant clerics at the expense of secular politicians (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 69, 73; Hiro 1990, 255, 264). The latter aspect was predominant in 1980-81, when militant clerics made use of the failure of the initial Iranian counteroffensive and the ties between President Bani-Sadr and the regular military to evict him from office (Hiro 1985, 170-1; Menashri 1990, 173-4; Zabih 1988, 16).

If the war helped to consolidate the Islamic Revolution it also prevented its leaders from reaching many of their economic objectives. One of these objectives was to decrease Iran's economic dependence. But in this respect the new regime failed. For instance Iran's import dependence increased during the war (Mofid 1990, 22). The increasing dependence on agricultural imports was particularly significant because it underlined the failure of the agricultural policies of the new regime (Mofid 1990, 29-31). By 1987 Iran was more dependent on agricultural imports than it had been in the 1970s, it was one of the largest per capita purchasers of wheat in the world (MacPherson 1989, 178, 186). A third of

foreign currency resources in 1988 were used for basic agricultural imports (Percebois 1990, 67-8). The dependence on oil was also worrying since initially the regime wanted to decrease both the importance of the oil industry in the economy and oil exports to the West. But these plans were jeopardized during the 1980s because oil exports were essential to finance the war. The dependence of the Iranian economy on oil thus increased and Iran had to keep exporting to industrialized countries in order to get hard currency to pay for its military and non-military imports (Hiro 1985, 207; Menashri 1990, 280). At home, as we saw, the financial constraints created by the war also jeopardized the first development plan of the regime. In addition, the war was an obstacle to the regime's commitment to income redistribution (Menashri 1989, 46-9). An analyst found that at least eight important economic goals of the regime had been put in jeopardy by the war (Mofid 1990, 32).¹⁰

We saw in the cases of Egypt and Syria that defeats in war often brought political instability and changes of regime. This pattern is less present in the case of the Iran-Iraq War probably because neither party suffered a clear-cut defeat, the sort of defeat that would be an indictment of the regime in power. Neither side lost a part of its territory as a result of the war and both sides had their periods of victories and of defeats during the war. Nevertheless, periods of military reverses during the war often caused regime instability. The two occasions (except for assassination attempts) when Hussein's rule seemed to be in jeopardy came after military defeats: first, in the summer of 1982 when the Iranians, having driven back the Iraqis, began to invade Iraq; and then in 1986, when the Iranians managed to capture Fao and reconquer Mehran, a town lost to a recent Iraqi counteroffensive. In both instances Hussein's response was to have his leadership

¹⁰ These were: (1) to reduce the dependence of the Iranian state on oil revenue, (2) to diversify the Iranian economy, (3) to increase the share of non-oil exports in total exports, (4) to reduce the share of trade with Western countries in total Iranian foreign trade, (5) to give priority to agricultural development, (6) to promote food self-sufficiency, (7) to reduce imports of consumer goods, and 8) to stem rural migration to urban areas.

reconfirmed by the party and to launch a reform program. In Iran the only clear instance of the same process occurred in early 1981 when the failure of the first Iranian counteroffensive, made by the regular army under the orders of President Bani-Sadr, was exploited by militant clerics to challenge Bani-Sadr's leadership and to discredit the regular military. At least one analyst claimed that the series of Iranian defeats in 1988 was similarly exploited by Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani to weaken the opposition of the IRGC to a ceasefire and to impose on it more cooperation with the regular military (Katzman 1993, 58).

Another theme present in the Egyptian and Syrian case studies was the relationship between war making and political liberalization. After the defeat of June 1967 Nasser made the promise to liberalize Egypt's political life, while Sadat made use of his moral victory in 1973 to introduce a limited pluralist system in Egypt. In Syria the few political reforms designed to increase popular participation and pluralism occurred during periods when war preparation was intense and were part of Asad's strategy to buy peace on the home front. In the case of the Iran-Iraq War the link between war making and political reforms occurred only in Iraq.

Promises of political liberalization in Iraq were essentially a post-war phenomenon. Although Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had hinted to *the New Yorker* in October 1987 that a multi-party system would be introduced in Iraq after the war (Bengio 1989, 427). It was only in November 1988, in an address to the Iraqi Bar Association, that Hussein promised to introduce a multi-party system and to free all political prisoners (Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 197). In the following months Hussein's scheme for political reform was clarified, it boiled down to three main issues: the drafting of a permanent constitution, a multi-party system, and freedom of the press. Each issue was dealt with by a specific committee, and Hussein warned against mindlessly transferring Western democracy to Iraq (Bengio 1991, 376).

The political liberalization was indeed adapted to Hussein's peculiar understanding of democracy. The multi-party system, for instance, would be open only to "positive parties": parties that were patriotic and supportive of the principles of the Baath Revolution as well as of Iraq's stance during the war (Bengio 1991, 377). Similarly, the only political prisoners who were released by the presidential pardon were those who had not collaborated with Iran (Bengio 1990, 503). These restrictions had the effect of excluding the main opposition movements in Iraq: the Kurdish nationalists and the Islamists. As for the freedom of the press, the reform was dropped after an experimental period of free speech of a few weeks (in January-February 1989) produced writings that were too critical in the opinion of the authorities (Bengio 1991, 377-8).

Some analysts saw the signs of a liberalization in Iran after the 1988 ceasefire, but this movement was apparently stopped by Khomeini with his edict against the British writer Salman Rushdie, which brought back strict ideological rectitude in Iran (Menashri 1990b, 486-9; Rezun 1990, 211-2). With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989 Iran underwent various institutional reforms and changes in the leadership. These reforms, however, were due to the necessity of adapting Iran's political regime after the death of an exceptional charismatic leader; they were not a consequence of the war. With the death of Khomeini the Iranian Revolution entered into its Thermidorean phase.

In conclusion, the Iran-Iraq War, in spite of its intensity, did not have an impact on regime formation as profound as some shorter Arab-Israeli wars. This mitigated effect resulted from the fact that the war was a relative stalemate without the type of dramatic defeat that could give rise to the condemnation of a political order. The effects of the Iran-Iraq War on both regimes often took time to emerge. Furthermore, the links between the war and changes in the Iranian and Iraqi regimes could often be questioned. For instance, I doubt that the war led Hussein to develop a patrimonial system of rule in Iraq; although I would agree with the proposition that the war created opportunities that Hussein exploited

to strengthen his rule. Arguably, the evidence to support such an argumentation is limited, it is based on the fact that Hussein had already shown a tendency to monopolize power before the war, that he made use of military crises during the war (in 1982 and 1986) to consolidate his rule at the expense of the Baath party and its socialist ideology. On the other hand, the proposition that the war derailed the economic and social reforms of the Islamic Revolution is based, in my opinion, on firmer ground. The financial constraints imposed by the war directly affected the capacity of the regime to finance reforms and compelled it to renege on some of its promises, notably in regard to oil and trade with Western countries. Of course, some analysts might claim that domestic conservative forces and imperialism would have compromised the objectives of the Islamic Revolution anyway. But this assertion does not deny the role that war actually played in that process.

Conclusion

Eight years of intense warfare failed to increase the power of the Iraqi and Iranian states significantly. In fact, the available evidence supports the proposition that state power over the economy declined as a result of the war. This drop in economic state power is the most significant finding of this joint case study. This finding can be related to the pattern in Egypt after 1967, when years of intense war preparation and a subsequent war with Israel caused a decline in state power. The cases of Iraq and Iran give further support to the thesis that the relationship between war making and state making is negative in the contemporary Third World. Economic state power had been building up over the years in Iran and Iraq, through changes of regime and increased oil revenue, when the war came and compelled the transfer of resources from domestic state making to war making. This transfer put in jeopardy state-led development in both countries.

Both Iran and Iraq were rentier states and, in addition, Iraq had access to foreign financial assistance in the form of foreign credit and subsidies by Arab states of the Gulf.

But these externally-derived revenues were not sufficient to spare both states the negative impact of war making on state power; although they prolonged the war and prevented the collapse of Iraq. The war between Iran and Iraq was so intense and lasted so long that external resources could not mitigate completely the negative impact of war making, contrary to the experience of Syria in the 1970s.

Early in the war, both the Iranian and Iraqi authorities assumed that they could pursue a 'guns and butter' policy. They thought they could evade the choice between war making and state-led development. But this hope was shattered around 1983-84, when the financial constraints created by the war led to cuts in development expenditure and to other austerity measures in both countries. Had the war been limited to one or two years, externally-derived revenues might have been sufficient to prevent a decline in economic state power. In that case we would have found that war making had contributed neither to a growth, nor to a decline, in state power.

Manpower was the main resource that both states extracted from society; but in that respect Iran and Iraq adopted different approaches. For a long time Iran relied on popular fervor and volunteers to field its armies, while Iraq relied on coercion and conventional solutions, notably the formation of efficient reserve forces. By the end of the war the Iranian authorities had to acknowledge that their military manpower system had been unsatisfactory. It seemed that domestic resource extraction in Iran was impeded by what was otherwise the strength of the regime: its reliance on a decentralized network of revolutionary and religious authorities, on competing military organizations, and on popular support and participation. This revolutionary amateurism contrasted with the ruthless administrative efficiency of the Iraqi state.

The Iran-Iraq War did not have a dramatic impact on regime formation. One of its effects for the Iraqi regime was to confirm the undisputed leadership of Saddam Hussein, a development that might have occurred even without the war. The specific impact of the

war seems more evident, however, in the cases of the improved status given to the armed forces and Iraqi Shias in the state making activities of the regime. The war had a paradoxical effect on the Iranian Revolution: on the one hand it helped to consolidate the Islamic Republic in Iran, on the other hand, it prevented it from carrying out many elements of its socioeconomic program. The war thus contributed to the institutionalization and de-radicalization of the Iranian Revolution.

6. A Study of Contrasts between Two Historical Patterns

So far this study has described the relationship between war making and state making in the context of four national case studies from the Middle East. Now is the time to summarize the main patterns found in the cases and to compare them with the European model of state making through war making. Readers who are familiar with the European model probably found that the case studies lent little support to the thesis that the European cycle of war making and state making could occur in the Middle East. This chapter shows how and why the cycle of war making and state making broke down in the cases surveyed. In the process of this demonstration I will consider the conditions of warfare as a key variable that explains the breakdown of the cycle and the non-occurrence of the old European pattern in the Middle East.

Summary of Main Findings

War Making and Infrastructural State Power

The most significant finding to emerge from the cases is the number of instances in which war making had a negative impact on the infrastructural power of the state, in particular on its ability to extract financial resources from society and to control the economy through its expenditures, regulations, and public sector. This negative relationship between war making and state power was particularly evident in the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq (1980-88). In both Iran and Iraq significant decline in state power occurred as a result of the war. For the Iranian state, where financial statistics are available, an unprecedented implosion of state power took place. The total revenue of the Iranian state amounted to only 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1988, compared with 21.6 per cent in 1980 -- a year after the revolution when much administrative chaos still prevailed in the country -- and 36.9 per cent in 1977 under the Shah. Similarly, the

total expenditures of the Iranian state in 1988 amounted to only 19.3 per cent of GDP compared with a proportion of 41.6 per cent in 1980 and 41.3 per cent in 1977. In the absence of financial statistics a quantitative assessment of the decline in infrastructural state power in Iraq is not possible, but the available evidence points to a significant decline in economic state power as the regime of Saddam Hussein took measures to liberalize the economy, to streamline the bureaucracy, and to privatize firms in the public sector. In both cases the decline in the economic power of the state was all the more outstanding because before the war both states had gained economic power steadily and had been committed to state-led development.

The intensity and duration of the Iran-Iraq War made the drop in infrastructural state power in Iran and Iraq more severe than those Egypt and Syria sustained in their conflict with Israel. Nevertheless, prolonged periods of war preparation had a negative impact on state power in Egypt and Syria. For Syria, this was the pattern during most of the 1980s when the Syrian state tried to reach strategic parity with Israel at a time when its oil income and Arab subsidies were declining. The financial burden of defense in a period of decreasing revenue was borne in part by the development budget, and this led the government to further liberalize the economy so that the private sector could compensate the reduced contribution of the state to economic development. The end result meant less economic power for the state and its public sector and more for private business.

Similarly, war making had a significant impact on the Egyptian state after June 1967. Its bureaucratic growth slowed, its extractive capacity declined slightly -- current revenue amounted to 18.6 per cent of GDP in 1973 compared with 23.7 per cent in 1967 -- and its civilian expenditures decreased -- from 30.4 per cent of GDP in 1967 to 20.3 per cent of GDP in 1970, and 23.4 per cent of GDP in 1973. The trends after the 1973 War were less clear, quantitative indicators showed that bureaucratic growth continued, that the financial extractive capacity of the state improved, and that the public sector remained important in

spite of an economic liberalization. However, more qualitative assessments of state power showed evidence of a limited decline in state power and autonomy vis-à-vis foreign and domestic capital.

Of all the dimensions of state power the one that seems the least negatively affected by war making is bureaucratic growth. In Egypt the growth of public employment was never reversed or stopped by the financial constraints of war making; at best it was slowed. For Syria and Iran there was no evidence of reductions in public employment; although some reductions might have occurred in Iran after the war when the government decided to privatize many public enterprises. Only Iraq had an official policy to lay off public employees and to downsize the bureaucracy; although the absence of detailed figures prevented a precise assessment of these cuts.

On the other hand, the dimension of state power the most often negatively affected by war making was the developmental function. Capital expenditure was generally the first budget item to be affected by the transfer of resources from the civilian to the military sector. This was the pattern in Iran and Iraq, after a short period of 'guns and butter' policy, and in Syria in the late 1980s. The only exception was Egypt after 1967, where it seemed that current civilian expenditures sustained the cuts, while capital expenditure kept growing.¹ In short, the first victim of war making in the Middle East has been state-led development. This point is often missed in the literature that tries to explain the decline of state-led development in the region and the initiation of policies of *infitah*. For instance, Alan Richards and John Waterbury, in their extensive study of Middle East political economies, mention the impact of war only briefly in regard to the Iraqi *infitah* in the 1980s (Richards and Waterbury 1990, 255-7, 259). Yet, the present study shows that the impact of war making on the political economies of the region is more widespread than

¹ It is possible that the growth in capital expenditure in Egypt after 1967 was in part military-related. Capital expenditure is a convenient budget item to hide a part of defense expenditure, like the purchase of arms and military-related construction works, as investments in capital rather than as current expenditures.

assumed by Richards and Waterbury. This lack of concern for the impact of war stems from the fact that most analysts of Middle East political economies conceive war as a discrete or unique event of secondary importance in comparison with variables that are central in theories of political economy. In order to discern the impact of war one has to conceptualize war as a process of resource mobilization for war making rather than as a transient phenomenon. War making was a central activity of the four states surveyed here and it deserves more than a footnote in the explanation of the evolution of their political economies.

Instances of positive relationship between war making and the infrastructural power of the state have been rare in the four national case studies. The prime example of a positive relationship between the two variables was Egypt and the Suez War of 1956. The Egyptian state gained considerable economic power as a result of the Suez War. Overnight it assumed control of vast economic assets previously in the hands of foreign capital. However, the Suez War does not confirm the European model of state making through war making since what brought the increase in state power was the political act of nationalization of French and British assets in Egypt not the extraction of resources for war making. The Suez War had a positive impact on state power in Egypt because of peculiar circumstances, namely a large French and British economic presence in Egypt coupled with what was probably the last openly imperialist intervention by Western powers in the Third World.

On a much smaller scale, but according to a pattern that confirms the European model, the Palestine War (1948-9) had a positive impact on the infrastructural power of the Egyptian state. The financial burden of the war led to an increase in taxation in spite of the opposition of dominant socioeconomic groups. The revenue of the state doubled over the period 1946-51. The impact of the Palestine War on the Syrian state is more contradictory. Over the period 1947-51 the revenue of the Syrian state increased by 20 per cent, but

much of this increase went to finance the defense expenditure, which more than tripled, while civilian expenditures decreased by 14 per cent over the same period. Thus, the Palestine War led to a modest increase in the extractive capacity of the Syrian state, but it restricted its non-military functions. It is worth mentioning that the instances of positive impact of war making on the infrastructural power of the state occurred at a time when superpower involvement in regional conflicts, massive arms transfers, and large oil rents were not yet features of international politics in the Middle East.

War Making and Regime Formation

The despotic dimension of state power -- i.e., the degree of autonomy of state elites from society -- has also been affected by war making. The impact of the Palestine War in that respect was unique. As a result of the Arab defeat in Palestine a new state elite largely made up of military officers, with a background different from the one of dominant socioeconomic groups, seized power in Syria and Egypt. Military rule in that context increased the autonomy of the state and the possibilities of confrontation between rulers and economic elites. However, military rule does not automatically result in revolutions from above and significant state power accretion as the divergent experiences of Shishaskli in Syria and Nasser in Egypt showed. Military rule increases state autonomy, but it still requires a large bureaucracy or a mass party to lead to permanent gains in state power and to successful reforms.

The case studies lent little support to Tilly's theory about the rise of constitutionalism through war making -- that is, the notion that the agreements state makers have to make with groups in society in order to obtain resources for war making lead to restrictions on the despotic power of the state. At best, it might be argued that the elements of such a process were in place in Egypt after June 1967 when various groups in society became politically mobilized and called for a political liberalization. Nasser agreed to the demand,

but in practice little political liberalization was achieved before his death in 1970. In 1972 the stability of Sadat's regime was shaken by the protests and criticisms of various groups which blamed the government for the absence of political reforms and of decisive results in the confrontation with Israel after years of sustained war preparation. After the commendable performance of Egypt in the 1973 War Sadat was confident enough to initiate a program of political reforms designed to introduce a greater degree of pluralism in Egypt's political life. Defeat and years of war preparation made the Egyptian state more vulnerable and responsive to demands originating from society.

Similar programs of political reform, promising the people a greater measure of democracy and constitutionalism, were also initiated in Baathist Syria and Iraq. However, in these cases the reforms were initiated by the state leadership in an attempt at preventing instability in a context of military demobilization (Iraq in 1988-90), or at buying peace at home at a time when the state leadership was preoccupied by war preparation and foreign policy (Syria under Assad). Since these reforms were initiated by the authorities rather than forced on them by popular mobilization they were less significant than in Egypt.

A pattern of war making and regime formation shared by the case studies and the European past was how military defeats or setbacks induced regime instability, which could lead to changes of regime or reforms. In both Syria and Egypt the unexpected defeat of Arab armies in Palestine in 1948 was considered an indictment of the regime in power and it contributed to the involvement of the military in politics. Similarly, the extent and rapidity of the Arab defeat in the June 1967 War led to regime instability in Egypt and Syria. The relative stalemate produced by the Iran-Iraq War was not conducive to dramatic changes of regime. Nevertheless, military setbacks had their impact on regimes, contributing to the fall of President Bani-Sadr in Iran, and to tension in the Baathist regime. In addition, Hussein's reforms of the economy and state apparatus were initiated after military setbacks.

Externality of Resources for War Making

Externality pervades the war making activities of the states surveyed. However, the degree of reliance on externally-derived resources varies according to the main resource required for war. The highest degree of reliance on domestic resources lay in the realm of manpower, as the states relied on their own manpower to prepare and wage war. The participation of foreign ground troops was usually symbolic (of pan-Arab support), except on the Syrian front in 1973 where it made a real contribution to the battle. Nevertheless, domestic manpower resources were often inadequate to provide enough personnel in technical fields like the air force, air defense, and logistic and support services. Egypt in the 1960s even had a shortage of officers. In those instances of shortage of qualified manpower the states had to rely on foreign pilots and military technicians. The most dramatic instance of such a reliance on foreign skilled manpower occurred during the War of Attrition when Soviet military personnel had to assume the air defense of Egypt against deep-penetration raids by Israeli bombers; but Syria also relied on foreign pilots and technicians in 1973 and afterward, while Iraq had to recruit foreign pilots during its war with Iran.

The highest degree of reliance on external resources was undoubtedly in the field of weaponry. Despite efforts to build local arms industries, the arsenals of the region remained dependent on arms transfers for all major weapon categories. This is not a surprising finding considering the quantities of arms transferred by industrialized countries to the Middle East. However, the consequences for war making and state making of a heavy reliance on imported advanced weaponry are not often fully grasped; a theme upon which I will dwell in a following section.

The degree of reliance on externally-derived resources in the financing of war making is more difficult to assess because financial resources are multiform and more versatile

than soldiers or weaponry. Thus, even financial assistance for civilian purposes can help a state to sustain its war making effort by contributing to its finances. Nevertheless, out of the four cases Iraq seemed the one that relied the most on externally-derived resources. Iraq, like Iran, was a rentier state, with considerable oil income and foreign currency reserves, but, in addition, it had access like Egypt and Syria to subsidies from Arab oil states. It was only in regard to concessionary military credit from the Soviet Union that Iraq seemed less favored than Egypt and Syria had been in the past. A high degree of reliance on externally-derived resources was also characteristic of Syria in the 1970s when the state enjoyed for a few years a rentier state situation where over half of its revenues were externally derived (without considering Arab subsidies). Domestic financial resources are mainly extracted through taxation, in this respect it is worth noting that the financial burden of war making did not induce major reforms of taxation with the aim of extracting more revenue from society. For instance, the significant growth in the tax revenue of the Egyptian state after the Palestine War left the basic structure of taxation unaltered, with its heavy reliance on indirect taxes. Generally, in the four countries surveyed, taxation remained dependent on indirect taxes and the burden of direct taxes was assumed by the public sector.

Foreign subsidies and the subsidization of arms transfers were important aspects of the externality of the financing of war making (except for Iran). This importance resulted from a convergence of factors: the fact that the superpowers gave importance to the region and their local clients; the presence of oil-rich states (Saudi Arabia in particular) with large disposable income; and the sense of Arab community that facilitated the transfer of resources among states. Syria, in the 1970s, was the most successful instance of a state financing its war making activities through the exploitation of foreign subsidies from other regional powers and the subsidization of arms transfers by a superpower. Iraq tried the same strategy in its war against Iran with what appeared to be a high degree of success at

the time; although retrospectively it resulted in a level of indebtedness that weighted heavy on post-war developments. Resort to foreign subsidization was also part of Nasser's and Sadat's war making and state making strategies. But the sheer size of Egypt made such a strategy less viable. A given amount of Saudi subsidies could contribute more to the financial needs of the Syrian state, or even of the Iraqi state, than of the Egyptian state. But, Egyptian state makers were innovators in using Pan-Arabism and the interest of the superpowers in the region to get resources from abroad, a strategy adopted afterward by other state makers in the Middle East.

There is nothing exceptional in the fact of borrowing to prepare or wage war. Western states in the past also had to resort to borrowing to finance their major wars. If early modern states, like France and Spain in the 16th century, often relied on foreign lenders and contractors to finance their wars, with negative consequences for their finances, modern war finances as they evolved in the Netherlands and Britain relied rather on domestic borrowing. Domestic borrowing remained dominant in the two World Wars even if the Allies had access to the financial market of the United States. Furthermore, whether the war debt belonged to domestic or foreign creditors its reimbursement was based on increased domestic taxation. The pattern found in the case studies is different. In general domestic borrowing was not an important instrument of war financing, the exceptions were Iran, which borrowed extensively from its central bank, and Egypt in 1948 which issued two war loans. One can surmise various causes for this lack of reliance on domestic borrowing, notably low levels of national savings, lack of trust in the government's creditworthiness, and better opportunities for investors abroad or at home; but the end result was that Egypt, Syria, and Iraq relied heavily on foreign financial assistance to finance their war making effort. Moreover, this financial assistance was generally from government to government taking the forms of concessionary military aid, commercial credit, and subsidies. The terms of this financial assistance were highly

political. A military or commercial debt could be rescheduled, cancelled in part, or not repaid as a result of developments in the relation between the creditor and the borrower; as the Soviet Union learned in its relations with Egypt and Syria. Even the existence of a debt was sometimes challenged as when Iraq claimed that the financial assistance from Arab states of the Gulf should be considered outright grants, not loans. The notion that foreign financial assistance would have to be repaid by increased taxation at home was absent since the reimbursement of a debt depended on political considerations or on externally-derived revenue like oil income.

The Impact of the Conditions of Warfare

In the first and second chapters the conditions of warfare that obtain in a particular region and time were considered an important set of variables that could influence the relationship between war making and state making. This demonstration was postponed until now because the conditions of warfare in this study were not country- or war-specific but affected the region of the Middle East. My argument is that the introduction of modern weaponry in the Middle East (since roughly 1955-56) in conjunction with the geography and the nature of conflicts in the region have led to the emergence of high-intensity conventional warfare. The conduct of this form of warfare, often more intense in the Middle East than what was envisaged for a confrontation between industrialized countries in Central Europe during the Cold War, lay the emphasis on two resources that are generally externally-derived in the Third World, namely modern weaponry and hard currency, at the expense of the contribution of domestic resources. This situation, in turn, weakens the relationship between war making and state making since the state no longer has the incentive to grow in power in order to extract resources from society for the purpose of preparing or waging war.

Before proceeding to a description of the contemporary conditions of warfare in the Middle East it is worth considering some historical precedents in the same region; that is, other periods when different conditions of warfare existed and influenced differently war making and state making. The best historical precedent is probably Muhammad Ali's Egypt. The war making and state making activities of Muhammad Ali in early 19th century were significant because they occurred at a time when the Industrial Revolution had not yet transformed military technology and warfare. Muhammad Ali was therefore one of the last non-Western state makers who had a chance to develop an army and a state before the military-technological edge of the Western world made such a venture almost impossible.

Because Muhammad Ali's activities took place before the Industrial Revolution spread to the field of warfare one can see in the case of Egypt at that time that the European pattern of state making through war making was possible outside Europe. Muhammad Ali's state greatly increased in power as a result of war making. An important step in that process of state making through war making was Muhammad Ali's decision to form modern military units for his army; that is, for the time, large tactical formations of infantrymen using volley fire. This development meant the replacement of the warrior caste (the Mamluks) and mercenary contingents by a larger army and conscription. Muhammad Ali had to find new revenues to finance the army and to buy artillery and ships from abroad. The financial requirement of war making thus led to the development of an administrative apparatus as he took control of taxes and established monopolies in export crops at the expense of the merchant class and the tax-farmers.

The presence of a large army, and the development of a navy, brought the establishment of local industries to supply the armed forces with uniforms and other goods; while the local production of firearms, artillery, ships, and ammunition was undertaken. All these industrial activities were undertaken in state-owned factories, arsenals, and shipyards, or with the cooperation of the state authorities, which could

provide conscript labor for factory work. The arming and equipping of a growing army was at the origin of the development of public enterprises in Egypt more than a century before Nasser's socialist experiment. When Muhammad Ali was forced to reduce its army after 1841 all these industries declined rapidly (Marsot 1984, 249; Richmond 1977, 64; Selim 1984, 124).

Egypt's capacity to build ships and to produce guns and firearms at the time -- that is, the main implements of war in its age -- contrasts with the limited capacity of contemporary Middle Eastern states to produce modern weapons systems. The success of the former and the failure of the latter lie in the passing of an age, in the difference in world-historical time. With the introduction of the techniques of the Industrial Revolution in warfare, from the second half of the 19th century, the technological and military gaps between Western and non-Western states widened to the point that no state in the Middle East was able to close them (Hurewitz 1968, 156-7).

Another example of how conditions of warfare affect war making and potentially state making concerns the First World War in the Middle East. By 1917 large armies were fighting for the control of Palestine and the communication lines of British and Commonwealth forces went back to Egypt across the Sinai desert, which represented at the time a significant barrier to the movement and supply of armies. Egypt until then had provided logistical support to the Allies with a Labor Corps and a Camel Transport Corps, both voluntary organizations. But the logistical requirements of the military campaign in Palestine in 1917-18 required much more manpower than voluntary service could provide, notably to extend a railway and a pipeline across the Sinai desert (Richmond 1977, 173). The Egyptian authorities thus required village headmen through Egypt to provide 'volunteers' for this military corvée. By the end of the war the Egyptian Labor Corps was about 88,000 strong, while the Camel Corps had at least 21,000 men (Roubicek 1977, 30). One source even claimed that by the end of the war 1.5 million Egyptians had served

in the Labor Corps (Vatikiotis 1991, 254-5). In addition, in order to support the large foreign military presence important requisitions of cereals and of pack animals were made that seriously hurt the Egyptian peasantry (Richmond 1977, 174). Of course, the ability of the Egyptian state to extract men and resources from society on a large scale during World War I was ultimately backed by British administrative and military power. But the demands of warfare before the age of widespread motor transport were directly at the origin of the need to extract resources from Egypt; resources that were no longer militarily relevant (except for food supply) during World War II when large European armies fought again at the gate of Egypt.

The transfer of modern weaponry and the presence of Israel, as a successful military power to be emulated by other states in the region, induced the diffusion of modern conventional warfare in the Middle East. Few analysts grasp the fact that in the contemporary Middle East, states that are not yet fully-industrialized have been conducting conventional warfare at a level of intensity superior to the one envisaged for war operations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Densities of troops and material in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1973 and 1982 were superior to those considered for operations in Central Europe or by the US Army (Cordesman and Wagner 1990a, 14, 350). The intensity of conventional warfare in the Middle East also translates into high levels of consumption of equipment and supplies. In 1967 the Egyptian armed forces lost almost 80 per cent of their equipment in four days of operations. In 1982 in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon during only three days of a 'limited war' with Israel, Syria lost 20 per cent of its combat aircraft strength and 22 per cent of its modern tank inventory. It appears that the Iraqi artillery during the large Iranian offensives in 1986 and 1987 fired as much ammunition per gun per week as NATO countries have per gun in their inventory (Cordesman and Wagner 1990b, 452). Moreover, the speed of replenishment of arsenals is as astonishing as the rate of consumption of equipment and supplies during war.

Repeatedly, after the 1967, 1973, and 1982 Arab-Israeli Wars, the Soviet Union replaced the equipments lost by Egypt or Syria with equivalent quantities of more modern weapons within a year. Even Iraq, in spite of steady battle losses and decreasing revenue, managed to expand its arsenal during its eight years long war with Iran.

The diffusion and dominance of modern conventional warfare in the Middle East were reinforced by other factors than the large transfers of modern weaponry by the great powers and the presence of Israel. The climate and terrains found in the Middle East also favor the side with a military-technological advantage.² In addition, after the 1967 War the war making activities of both Egypt and Syria were centered on the recovery of the territories lost during that war. Militarily speaking, the recovery of the Sinai or the Golan could only be envisaged through conventional military operations. Guerrilla and other alternative military strategies had little relevance in that context. Similarly, the Iranian war objectives during the Iran-Iraq War could only be reached through a defeat of the Iraqi army in a conventional battle.

These conditions of warfare will not necessarily endure in the future, but until now their impact on the relationship between war making and state making has been negative. Basically, the waging of modern conventional warfare in the Middle East marginalizes the value of domestic resources and increases the value of resources that are mainly externally-derived. Modern conventional warfare requires advanced weaponry and considering the limited capacity of local arms industries these weapons systems can only be acquired from foreign suppliers. Furthermore, foreign currency, another resource which is not readily generated by domestic extraction, has become a strategic resource. Foreign currencies contribute to the payment of civilian and military imports and the repayment of debts, they are therefore essential to the finances of the state. In the Middle

² According to Martin Van Creveld: "everything else being equal, the simpler the environment the greater the military benefits technological superiority can confer" (Van Creveld 1989, 228-9). The pure cases of simple environment are obviously air and sea, but within the range of ground environments the Middle East often presents battlefields far simpler than those found in other regions of the world.

East the economic sectors that generate foreign currencies are generally under the control of the state and are often negatively affected by a prolonged conflict as Egypt (after June 1967), Iran, and Iraq discovered.

An alternative form of warfare could have sustained a positive relationship between war making and state making by favoring the exploitation of domestic resources by state makers. The Arab states in their confrontation with Israel, and Iran in its conflict with Iraq, had two domestic resources in plenty: a large demographic advantage against their opponent and a strong nationalist or religious sentiment in their population making it susceptible of being mass-mobilized. These resources could have sustained a people's war, revolutionary warfare, as indeed the neo-Baath in Syria and the revolutionary elements in the Islamic Republic of Iran tried unsuccessfully. Revolutionary warfare by emphasizing the mobilization of the people and guerrilla tactics and by downplaying military technology and conventional war operations would have made war making an incentive to the penetration of society through the development of a political apparatus. But as mentioned, revolutionary warfare is militarily irrelevant to the resolution of the interstate conflicts surveyed in the case studies. Revolutionary wars in the Third World have been struggles for the control of a population, usually a peasantry, between incumbent authorities (colonial or post-colonial) and a rebel political organization. These conditions do not obtain in the cases of the Arab-Israeli wars and the Iran-Iraq War.

An additional factor working against the adoption of revolutionary warfare and for the diffusion of conventional warfare in the cases of Egypt and Syria was the nature of the regime in power. Revolutions in both countries were made by professional military officers. The promotion of revolutionary warfare would go against their professional status and their political influence since it would imply the subordination of the military to civilian cadres. Conversely, the diffusion of modern conventional warfare promotes the professional expertise of the officer corps and the growth of its ultimate power base, the

regular armed forces. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the fact that the conditions of warfare in the Middle East make revolutionary warfare irrelevant provides a better explanation of the absence of a war strategy based on domestic resources than the nature of the regimes. As the confrontation between Iran and Iraq showed, the military superiority of conventional warfare over revolutionary warfare is real in interstate conflicts.

The Missing Links: How the Relationship between War Making and State Making Dissolves in the Third World.

An argument brought up against quantitative analyses on war making and state making was that they left the causal process in an analytical black box. A statistical analysis of the occurrence of the phenomenon of state making through war making does not provide an explanation of the causal flow linking the two variables. It is important to break down the relationship between war making and state making into its components in order to find out whether or not the European pattern is present in the Third World; and if it is not, to find out the reasons for its absence. We saw, for instance, that the economic power of the Egyptian state increased as a result of the Suez War (1956). But a closer examination revealed that this accretion of state power was unrelated to the European model of state making through war making: it was the outcome of conditions peculiar to the conflict between Egypt and Britain and France.

This section aims at showing how the various processes of resource extraction that form the links between war making and state making present divergent patterns in the European model and in the four national cases from the Middle East. In the European model the state gains in power because war making creates an incentive to extract more resources (like money, men or weapons) from society. Wars that are more intense require not only a greater contribution from society in terms of the quantity of resources but also in terms of the number of economic sectors that become relevant to the war effort; as a

result there is an incentive for the involvement of the state in the whole production and distribution processes. In the Third World model identified in the case studies the state does not gain in power during a sustained effort to prepare or wage war because the resources it needs most -- modern weaponry, hard currency, and skilled military manpower -- are not available in quantity in society, or likely to be generated from domestic resources in time; while they are readily available from foreign sources. Let us examine these divergent patterns in detail.

•War making and financial extraction. In the European model the financial demand of war making created an incentive to increase taxation and to develop bureaucracies for the administration of state finances. The relationship between the growth of taxation and war making was particularly evident before the 19th century when state finances meant basically war finances because the bulk of a state's income went to the upkeep of its army and navy. In the nineteenth century (after the Napoleonic Wars) this relationship somewhat weakened because war making had to share the resources of the budget with new spheres of governmental activity, and because economic growth yielded increased revenue for the same level of taxation (Porter 1994, 155; Tilly 1990, 120-4). Furthermore, wars between the great European powers were few or short in the period. But the intensity of the World Wars recreated the link between war making and significant increases in domestic financial extraction during the 20th century (Porter 1994, 162-3, 269-70).

In the Third World this relationship does not hold well. There was only one clear case of significant increase in taxation as a result of a war, that was in Egypt after the Palestine War of 1948-9. There were also instances of introduction of taxes earmarked for defense, as in Syria in the 1950s and in Egypt; but these direct taxes were largely symbolic and did not change the structure of taxation in these countries. On the other hand, the case studies

presented instances of decreasing financial extraction as a result of war making, notably in Iran during the 1980s and to a lesser extent in Egypt after 1967.

In my opinion, the fact that the relationship between war making and financial extraction is weak or even negative in the case studies can be explained by the importance of foreign currencies in the finances of the state. Foreign currencies are required to pay for military and civilian imports, including large food imports in many Middle Eastern countries. Foreign currencies cannot be readily extracted from domestic sources, they are rather generated by exports; but the export sectors likely to generate large foreign currency earnings are usually controlled by the state in the Middle East. Thus, the state need not penetrate society further to earn more foreign currencies. On the other hand, if the sources of foreign currency earnings controlled by the state decline as a result of war, as in Egypt (after June 1967), Iran, and Iraq, then in all likelihood the state will liberalize foreign trade so that the private sector assumes a greater share of foreign currency earnings.³ Thus, war making, if it affects the capability of the state sector to generate foreign currencies, can lead to a decrease in state power over the economy.⁴

•War making and the mobilization of military manpower. Conscription, the requisition of men by the state for war making, is a form of resource extraction that intrudes deeply into society. In old Europe conscription was generally associated with states that were bureaucratic and absolutist like France, Prussia, and Russia. However, with the French Revolution and the subsequent diffusion of the ideologies of nationalism and popular sovereignty, conscription became more legitimate and universal. By 1914 universal

³ A complementary solution consists in liberalizing agriculture in the hope of increasing domestic production so as to decrease food imports or to contribute to exports. With both solutions (liberalization of foreign trade or of agriculture) foreign currency earnings or savings require less, not more, state regulation.

⁴ The promotion of private commerce affects the power of the state because the bulk of tax revenue in Third World states comes from indirect taxes on commercial and financial transactions. A government engaged in a liberalization of commerce has to lower taxation so as to promote this activity, hopeful that increased commercial activity will yield more revenue even with lower tax rates. It appeared to be the case in Egypt after 1973.

military service was widespread in Europe and present in many modernizing states in Asia and Latin America. Universal military service is never fully implemented in peacetime, the proportion of eligible men inducted is determined by the level of military readiness that the state requires, and measures of exemption or deferment are made available for various categories of men.

Table 6.1 Some Major Military Mobilization Efforts, 1786-1988

Country, Year(s).	Percentage of Total Population under arms.
Prussia, 1786	3.4
French Republic, 1794	2.7
Muhammad Ali's Egypt, 1840	2.6 (6.0)
France, 1914-18	21.5
Germany, 1914-18	16.9
Germany, 1939-45	17.9
Soviet Union, 1941-45	11.7
United States, 1945	8.7
Israel, 1973	3.6 (9.4)
Egypt, 1973	0.8 (2.3)
Syria, 1984	3.5 (5.2)
Iran, 1986	1.6
Iraq, 1988	6.1

Sources: For Prussia, the estimate is for the year of the death of King Frederick II, Prussia was at the time the country in Europe with the largest army in proportion of its population (Corvisier 1976, 126). The ratio of military mobilization of the French Republic in 1794, a year after the declaration of the *levée en masse*, was calculated from the population figure for 1801 and a French army estimated at three-quarters of a million in 1794 (Lynn 1990, 23, 26). For Muhammad Ali's Egypt, the first estimate is for the regular army and the second for all military forces (cf., p. 87 of the present thesis). The ratios for France, Germany, and the Soviet Union in the World Wars were calculated from pre-war population estimates and the total military manpower mobilized during the war (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986, 990, 1198; Mitchell 1992, 4, 7). The figure for the United States represents the peak year of military mobilization when 12.1 million people were in the armed forces (U.S. Bureau of Census 1975, 8, 1141). For Israel and Egypt in 1973, the first figure represents the standing forces and the second figure the wartime mobilization (IISS 1974, 31, 33). Similarly, for Syria in 1984 the first estimate represents the regular armed forces while the second figure includes the active reserves (IISS 1984, 70-1). The figures for Iran and Iraq represent the peak year of military mobilization for each belligerent (cf., p. 254 of the present thesis).

Data in Table 6.1 shows that the difference between the European pattern and the Third World pattern found in the Middle East is one of degree rather than of nature in regard to the performance of the state in the mobilization of military manpower. The performance of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in terms of military mobilization is comparable or superior to the best performances of European states before the 19th century, but it is inferior to the level of mobilization of modern Western states involved in a total war. Iraq was the only

case that reached a level of military mobilization close to the performance of a Western state during a total war (the United States in 1945); while Syria maintained in peacetime a level of military mobilization comparable to the exceptional level of military readiness achieved by Israel. Surprisingly enough, Egypt and Iran, two states with relatively homogeneous population and an old state formation did not mobilize as many men (in proportion) as Syria and Iraq, countries with more profound ethnic or religious cleavages and a more recent state formation.

In conventional warfare sheer superiority in numbers will not be a guarantee of success if an opponent benefits from force multipliers such as a superior technology or doctrine and a skilled manpower. In this respect, the difference between Third World and European states seems to lie in the insufficient intake of skilled manpower in Third World armies. This shortage of skilled personnel in the armed forces stems from the shortage of skilled manpower in society and the economy, and from the priority given to loyalty over competence in the recruitment and promotion of officers. However, in Egypt (until at least 1967) and Iraq, the shortage of skilled manpower in the armed forces was worsened by an insufficient conscription of young adults with a post-secondary education. Students were better able to resist conscription than other social categories.⁵ Finally, the increasing sophistication of military technology exacerbates the shortage of skilled manpower. A fighter pilot could be trained in about a year during World War II, it now takes three years or more (Cohen 1986, 154). In short, unless a state faces an opponent with a very large demographic advantage (like Iraq against Iran) there is no military requirement nowadays for the large mobilization of men that were witnessed in the past.

⁵ I conjecture the following causes for this situation: the fact that students are a potential source of organized protest in the capital, that university students are also the sons of the elites, and that the government wants to woo students who will provide the next generation of administrators, entrepreneurs, engineers, and scientists.

•War making and the arming and supplying of armies. In European history the supplying of armies with weapons, equipment, and food was probably the oldest motive for state interventionism in the economy. In early modern Europe war making was for the state an incentive to undertake the production of weapons and war supplies in state-owned facilities, to supervise this production when it was undertaken by the private sector, and to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials for military production. Even once ideologies and social forces favorable to state interventionism and welfarism appeared, the greatest increases in state interventionism in the economy and society occurred during and immediately after the two World Wars (Porter 1994, 163-9, 179-93, 269-84). It was only after 1945 that the developments of state interventionism and of the welfare state became unrelated to military production.

The pattern is clearly different in the Third World. Since major weapons systems are acquired from foreign suppliers the state finds no incentive to intervene in the economy for the purpose of supplying its armed forces with weapons. If, nevertheless, the state sets up a local military industry to increase its military self-sufficiency this industry becomes part of an already large public industrial sector as the cases of Egypt, Iran, and Iraq show. Thus, the development of a military industry will be an addition to the public industrial sector rather than a path-breaking development in the relation between the state and the economy. The only instance of state interventionism in response to war found in the cases that closely corresponded to the European pattern occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, when high inflation and shortages of foodstuffs and other commodities compelled the authorities in both countries to implement rationing and extraordinary measures to prevent profiteering and hoarding. This regulation of distribution, consumption, and prices by the state was comparable to the response of industrialized states faced with similar problems during the World Wars.

However this specific example of increased economic regulation by the state pales into insignificance beside the overall drop in economic state power that resulted from the Iran-Iraq War. The case studies showed a pattern in which war making was an incentive to decrease governmental regulation, public investment, and even the size of the public sector. This pattern, divergent from the European historical experience, results from different initial positions of the state in its relation to the economy. In the European pattern the state starts from a point where state interventionism is either unknown or limited. In contrast, in the cases where a negative relationship occurred the state was thoroughly involved in the economy initially. In the European model intense war making leads to increased financial extraction and increased regulation of the economy by the state. As mentioned, this is not the pattern in the Middle East because domestic resources are less relevant to the war effort given the conditions of warfare that prevail in the region. In fact, the financial burden of war making is mainly borne by the state and its public sector with the result that state-led development is put in jeopardy. Consequently, the state authorities are compelled to liberalize the economy so that the private sector can offset the decreasing role of the state in economic development. In addition, increased private economic activity offers the prospects of increased tax revenue and of foreign currency savings or earnings, which could mitigate the financial difficulties of the state.

In that context, foreign subsidies, financial assistance, economic rents accruing to the state, and the subsidization of arms transfers are all instruments that can delay or mitigate the negative impact of war making on economic state power. However, only Syria in the 1970s managed to get enough externally-derived revenues to cushion the negative impact of war making. In the other cases, like Egypt after 1967, Syria in the 1980s, Iran, and Iraq, foreign resources were not provided on a scale sufficient to cancel out the negative effects of significant war making efforts. Periods of heavy reliance on externally-derived resources also tend to be periods of intense war making; thus, reliance on externally-

derived resources is not an easy answer to the problem of resource mobilization for war. A Third World state that has to make a significant war making effort has the choice between total war mobilization, which means for a Third World state the adoption of some form of revolutionary warfare, or a greatly increased reliance on externally-derived resources. In the Middle East the conditions of warfare made a domestic war mobilization like revolutionary warfare irrelevant from a military standpoint; while, on the other hand, externally-derived resources were available in sufficient quantities to sustain modern conventional warfare.

In conclusion, the patterns of the European past and of the contemporary Third World, as represented by the Middle East, diverged the most in regard to the impact of war making on the extraction of financial resources and on state interventionism. This divergence prevented a reoccurrence of the European model of state making through war making. Above all the conditions of warfare prevailing in the Middle East explain the divergence of historical patterns. The neo-patrimonial nature of the regimes in the region was only an additional factor that facilitated the adoption and diffusion of the pattern. Ultimately, if another form of warfare, based on domestic resources, had been viable in the region a state would have adopted it (as Iran tried) and its military successes would have caused emulation by others; thus creating potentially a different pattern of war making and state making in the Middle East.

Conclusion

The findings of the present research lend support to Charles Tilly's proposition: the European pattern of state making through war making does not apply to the Third World. The evidence corroborating the European pattern was marginal in the case studies in spite of the fact that the cases had been drawn from the Middle East, the region in the Third World, in my opinion, where the European pattern was most likely to reoccur. In fact, the most significant pattern to emerge from the case studies was one in which intense war making led to a decrease in state power, a result contrary to the European model of state making through war making.

Charles Tilly explains the non-occurrence of the European pattern by the fact that state making has been more externalized in the Third World than it was in Europe. Tilly emphasizes that in the Third World war does not determine the existence, or territorial size, of a state and that war making is mainly conducted through foreign resources; thus the process of extraction of domestic resources, which leads to state making, is not triggered by war making. For Tilly the main consequence of this situation is a process of dependent militarization in which the military becomes dominant over society and civilian authorities while being dependent on foreign powers.

The present study does not support such an account of the non-occurrence of the relationship between war making and state making in the Third World. It is true that war making was found to be externalized to a significant extent in the case studies, especially in regard to modern weaponry and financial resources. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli wars have been the scene of diplomatic interventions by outside powers to prevent the complete defeat of local clients and to guarantee their territorial integrity. However, the war making efforts of these states were significant and remained relevant to their survival and territorial integrity. The financial burden of war was real and the mobilization of men significant in

cases of intense war or war preparation effort; and even in a region like the Middle East during the Cold War, where patron-client relations were close, the support from a superpower did not prevent significant setbacks, which affected the territorial integrity of states and the political stability of their regimes.

War making does matter in the Third World, even if a significant proportion of the resources used to conduct it are externally-derived. In fact, it matters so much that in a number of cases the relationship between war making and state making was not simply absent, as Tilly would lead us to believe, but was reversed. War making was not an incentive to increase state power, but on the contrary it was a stimulus for a decrease in state power, in particular of economic state power. This consequence of intense war making was far more significant in the case studies than the consequence alleged by Tilly: the growing involvement of the military in politics as a result of their links with foreign powers. It is paradoxical that this argument on the relationship between military assistance and militarization, which is so common in the literature on Latin America and Africa, is not supported in the case studies despite the huge size of the military assistance programs given by the Soviet Union to countries like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The cases of military involvement in politics as a consequence of war making found in the case studies resulted from the traditional pattern of political instability after a military defeat, not from the links between national armies and their main supplier of arms and training.

The findings of the present study are more difficult to compare with the quantitative studies on the same subject by Mullins and Lee. Mullins found that the European model of state making through war making was not applicable to the Third World while, on the contrary, Lee's study lent support to the validity of the European model. Although the present study agrees with Mullins' study about the inapplicability of the European model to the Third World I remain convinced that his study has serious methodological shortcomings. In the case of Lee's study the divergence of results might stem from

differences in research design.¹ On the other hand, my study brings additional evidence to Michael Barnett's study on Egypt and Israel. Barnett found that the decline in state power occurred only in regard to the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis foreign actors and local capitalists (Barnett 1992, 260). The present study confirms this pattern in the cases of Egypt and Syria, but it shows that a decline in the infrastructural power of the state is also possible as in Iran and in all likelihood in Iraq.

The present research confirms me in the opinion that a case study is the most appropriate methodology to study the relationship between war making and state making. As the case of Egypt and the Suez War showed, a positive relationship between war making and state making can occur without confirming the pattern found in the European past. A case study methodology can dissect the causal chain between war making and state making and therefore it can describe and explain the differences between the European past and the contemporary Third World. In the case of the Middle East I showed that the state did not gain in power as a result of war making because the resources it needed most were not available through domestic extraction; thus, the state had little incentive to penetrate society as in the European model. Furthermore, in periods of intense war making the financial burden of war and war preparation could be such that it jeopardized the developmental role of the state and compelled it to liberalize the economy.

The conditions of warfare prevailing in the Middle East were found to be a crucial cause of the divergent pattern identified in the case studies. The conditions of warfare were at the origins of the premium put on the acquisition of externally-derived resources like advanced weaponry and foreign currency and the correspondingly reduced relevance of domestic resources. However, since the conditions of warfare in the Third World are

¹ For instance, Lee considers the correlation between the occurrence of war and the growth in military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) to be a proof that war making increases the state's coercive capacity, one of the dimensions of state power (Lee 1988, 57, 101). However in the present study the same indicator, military expenditure, is not considered an indicator of state power but an indicator of the intensity of war making. Thus, the same indicator stands for the dependent variable in one study and for the independent variable in the other.

variable, being the results of a conjunction of political, geographical, and technological factors, one has to discuss the extent to which the results of the present study can be generalized to other regions of the Third World.

In that respect, the present study answers some questions but also raises new ones that can lead to an agenda for further research. One can consider at least three options in regard to the issue of the conditions of warfare as a crucial variable. One option involves selecting new cases that share common features with the cases surveyed here to find out if the pattern reoccurs outside of the Middle East. The conflicts between the two Koreas and between India and Pakistan seem to be the most likely cases for this research option since they concern interstate conflicts prepared and waged with conventional armies and foreign military assistance. The disadvantage of this option is that it keeps the focus of research on a form of warfare unrepresentative of the majority of Third World conflicts, which are internal wars. A second option, therefore, is to study internal wars to establish the pattern between war making and state making in this type of conflict. However internal wars present a wide range of conditions from civil wars between factions in the absence of a central authority (ex: Somalia, Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal), to more traditional insurrections opposing a government to an armed opposition (Central America), and to full-scale civil wars (Nigerian and Angolan civil wars). It is not clear that a single pattern will emerge from such various contexts. A third option, not exclusive of the second one, consists in selecting conflicts where war making is largely conducted through the harnessing of domestic resources and the mobilization of the people; in brief, instances of revolutionary warfare. Since the positive relationship between war making and state making depends on the extraction of domestic resources for the purpose of war making instances of revolutionary warfare should show that war making can contribute to state making even in the Third World.

Instances of positive relationship between war making and state making in the Third World are not inconceivable, but they are not likely to follow the European pattern. For example, a common outcome of wars of national liberation or civil wars in the Third World is that the new government and its bureaucracy assume control of the economic assets of fleeing colonialists or capitalists. This pattern was present in the Vietnamese and Algerian wars of liberation, and in the Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian revolutions. Even the case of Egypt during the Suez War of 1956 corresponds in part to this logic. In such instances the accretion of state power caused by a war or a revolution results from the political nature of the conflict not from the necessity of penetrating society to extract resources for war making as in the European past.

My hope, in concluding this study, is that it showed the importance of studying war making as one of the fundamental processes of change affecting states and societies even in the Third World. Development in the Third World is affected not only by domestic or international socioeconomic processes, such as industrialization or the international division of labor, but also by wars and the processes of resource mobilization they unleash. Each war, considered separately, might seem a contingent source of change, a cataclysm, that one cannot theorize into a general explanation of change. But if war is conceptualized as only a moment in a broader process of mobilization of resources for the purpose of preparing and waging war, then it becomes possible to theorize about its effects and to find traces of its impact in the histories of states and societies. Much of the study of war is focused on preventing it, controlling it, or learning to wage it more successfully. The present study had no such overt policy orientation at its origin and thus contains no explicit advice for politicians, policy-makers, or military men. Instead, it assumed that a better understanding of the role war making played in past and present times was a goal worth pursuing in itself.

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